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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..18141b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #66028 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/66028) diff --git a/old/66028-0.txt b/old/66028-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 4b58644..0000000 --- a/old/66028-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30547 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the -International Military Tribunal, Vol. 12, by International Military -Tribunal - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International - Military Tribunal, Vol. 12 - Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 - -Author: International Military Tribunal - -Release Date: August 9, 2021 [eBook #66028] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -Produced by: John Routh, Cindy Beyer, and the online Distributed - Proofreaders Canada team at http://www.pgdpcanada.net. - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS -BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOL. 12 *** - - [Cover Illustration] - - - - - TRIAL - OF - THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS - - BEFORE - - THE INTERNATIONAL - MILITARY TRIBUNAL - - N U R E M B E R G - 14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946 - - - [Illustration] - - - P U B L I S H E D A T N U R E M B E R G , G E R M A N Y - 1 9 4 7 - - - - - This volume is published in accordance with the - direction of the International Military Tribunal by - the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction - of the Allied Control Authority for Germany. - - - - - VOLUME XII - - - - O F F I C I A L T E X T - - I N T H E - - ENGLISH LANGUAGE - - - - P R O C E E D I N G S - - 18 April 1946—2 May 1946 - - - - - CONTENTS - - - One Hundred and Eleventh Day, Thursday, 18 April 1946, - Morning Session 1 - Afternoon Session 33 - - One Hundred and Twelfth Day, Tuesday, 23 April 1946, - Morning Session 64 - Afternoon Session 97 - - One Hundred and Thirteenth Day, Wednesday, 24 April 1946, - Morning Session 136 - Afternoon Session 167 - - One Hundred and Fourteenth Day, Thursday, 25 April 1946, - Morning Session 196 - Afternoon Session 226 - - One Hundred and Fifteenth Day, Friday, 26 April 1946, - Morning Session 263 - Afternoon Session 292 - - One Hundred and Sixteenth Day, Monday, 29 April 1946, - Morning Session 317 - Afternoon Session 350 - - One Hundred and Seventeenth Day, Tuesday, 30 April 1946, - Morning Session 393 - Afternoon Session 429 - - One Hundred and Eighteenth Day, Wednesday, 1 May 1946, - Morning Session 460 - Afternoon Session 494 - - One Hundred and Nineteenth Day, Thursday, 2 May 1946, - Morning Session 527 - Afternoon Session 555 - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH DAY - Thursday, 18 April 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Dr. Seidl. - -DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Hans Frank): Mr. President, -Members of the Tribunal, on 9 April of this year, deviating from the -rule made by the Tribunal, I made the application that I should first be -allowed to present the documents, then call the witnesses, and then at -the end examine the defendant as a witness. I do not know whether the -Tribunal is already in possession of the document books. I have -ascertained that Volume I of the document book was translated by 8 -April, Volume II and III on 11 April, and Volume IV and V a few days -later. At any rate, I have not yet received any document books myself, -for the reason that the office concerned has not yet received permission -to bind the books. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, I thought I asked about this, not yesterday, but -the day before yesterday—yes; and you said you were perfectly ready to -go on. - -DR. SEIDL: I had been told that the books had been translated, and I -naturally assumed that these books would also be bound. Yesterday I -discovered that this is not the case. At any rate, the fault is not -mine. - -THE PRESIDENT: I was not suggesting that there was any fault on your -part. - -MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): In -the first place, we did not have much to go over with Dr. Seidl. The -agreement was reached with him the night before last about 6 o’clock or -a little afterwards. Thereafter the materials were put into the process -of preparation, and there are 500 pages. They have just not been -completed, and it is not so that the people did not receive authority to -go ahead. They have not been able to complete their work and there will -be some delay. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you can go on with your witnesses. You have -the defendant himself to call and several other witnesses. - -DR. SEIDL: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: And the documents will no doubt be ready by then. We are -rising this evening at half past four, and by the time that the Tribunal -reassembles, by Tuesday morning, no doubt all the documents will be -ready. As to your application, the Tribunal has considered the -application and sees no reason to depart from its ordinary rule that the -defendant should be called first; that is to say, if you intend to call -the defendant. - -DR. SEIDL: Oh yes, I intend to examine the defendant; but in the -interests of accelerating the proceedings, I suggested that the other -witnesses should be heard first so that the examination of the defendant -might be as short as possible. It is possible that he can then answer a -number of questions merely by saying “yes” or “no.” Another reason why I -consider this procedure to be the most expedient is because a proper -examination of the defendant is only possible if I have the document -books at hand at the same time. That necessity does not apply to the -other witnesses. I should, therefore, beg the Tribunal to give me -permission so that I can first examine the witnesses who are already in -the witnesses’ room. - -THE PRESIDENT: The documents are all, or nearly all, I imagine, in -German and can be put to the defendant in the course of his examination; -and the Tribunal think, as they have already said, that calling the -defendant first is in the interests of expedition; and they, therefore, -feel they must adhere to their rule. - -DR. SEIDL: Very well. In that case, with the permission of the Tribunal, -I call the Defendant Dr. Hans Frank to the witness stand. - -[_The Defendant Frank took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you give your full name? - -HANS FRANK (Defendant): Hans Frank. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: - -I, swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down, please. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, when and where were you born? - -FRANK: I was born on 23 May 1900 at Karlsruhe, in Baden. - -DR. SEIDL: Will you please give the Tribunal a brief outline of your -education? - -FRANK: In 1919 I finished my studies at the Gymnasium, and in 1926 I -passed the final state law examination, which completed my legal -training. - -DR. SEIDL: And what profession did you follow after that? - -FRANK: I had several legal posts. I worked as a lawyer; as a member of -the teaching staff of a technical college; and then I worked principally -as legal adviser to Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist German -Workers Party. - -DR. SEIDL: Since when have you been a member of the NSDAP? - -FRANK: I joined the German Labor Party, which was the forerunner of the -National Socialist German Workers Party, in 1919, but did not join the -newly formed National Socialist Workers Party at the time. In 1923 I -joined the Movement in Munich as a member of the SA; and eventually, so -to speak, I joined the NSDAP for the first time in 1927. - -DR. SEIDL: Were you ever a member of the SS? - -FRANK: I have never been a member of the SS. - -DR. SEIDL: That means you have never had a rank of an SS -Obergruppenführer or General of the SS? - -FRANK: I never had the rank of an SS Obergruppenführer or SS General. - -DR. SEIDL: Not even honorary? - -FRANK: No, not even honorary. - -DR. SEIDL: You were a member of the SA. What was the last position you -held in that? - -FRANK: I was Obergruppenführer in the SA at the end, and this was an -honorary position. - -DR. SEIDL: What posts did you hold in the NSDAP during the various -periods, and what functions did you exercise? - -FRANK: In 1929 I became the head of the legal department of the Supreme -Party Directorate of the NSDAP. In that capacity I was appointed -Reichsleiter of the NSDAP by Adolf Hitler in 1931. I held this position -until I was recalled in 1942. These are the principal offices I have -held in the Party. - -DR. SEIDL: Until the seizure of power you concerned yourself mainly with -legal questions within the Party, did you not? - -FRANK: I dealt with legal questions in the interest of Adolf Hitler and -the NSDAP and its members during the difficult years of struggle for the -victory of the Movement. - -DR. SEIDL: What were your basic ideas regarding the concept of a state -controlled by a legal system? - -FRANK: That idea, as far as I was concerned, was contained in Point 19 -of the Party program, which speaks of German common law to be created. -In the interest of accelerating the proceedings, I do not wish to -present my ideas in detail. My first endeavor was to save the core of -the German system of justice: the independent judiciary. - -My idea was that even in a highly developed Führer State, even under a -dictatorship, the danger to the community and to the legal rights of the -individual is at least lessened if judges who do not depend on the State -Leadership can still administer justice in the community. That means, to -my mind, that the question of a state ruled by law is to all intents and -purposes identical with the question of the existence of the independent -administration of law. Most of my struggles and discussions with Hitler, -Himmler, and Bormann during these years were more and more focused on -this particular subject. Only after the independent judiciary in the -National Socialist Reich had been definitely done away with did I give -up my work and my efforts as hopeless. - -DR. SEIDL: You were also a member of the Reichstag? - -FRANK: In 1930 I became a member of the Reichstag. - -DR. SEIDL: What posts did you hold after 1933? - -FRANK: First, I was Bavarian State Minister of Justice, and after the -ministries of justice in the various states were dissolved I became -Reich Minister without portfolio. In 1933 I became the President of the -Academy of German Law, which I had founded. I was the Reich Leader of -the National Socialist Jurists Association, which was later on given the -name of “Rechtswahrerbund.” In 1933 and 1934 I was Reich Commissioner -for Justice, and in 1939 I became Governor General of the Government -General in Kraków. - -DR. SEIDL: What were the aims of the Academy of German Law of which you -were the founder? - -FRANK: These aims are written down in the Reich Law regarding the -Academy of German Law. The main task, the central task, of that Academy -was to carry out Point 19 of the Party program to bring German Common -Law into line with our national culture. - -DR. SEIDL: Did the Academy of German Law have definite functions, or -could it act only in an advisory capacity? - -FRANK: The Academy of German Law was the meeting place of the most -prominent legal minds in Germany in the theoretical and practical -fields. Right from the beginning I attached no importance to the -question whether the members were members of the Party or not. Ninety -percent of the members of the Academy of German Law were not members of -the Party. Their task was to prepare laws, and they worked somewhat on -the lines of an advisory committee in a well-organized parliament. It -was also my idea that the advisory committees of the Academy should -replace the legal committees of the German Reichstag, which was -gradually fading into the background in the Reich. - -In the main the Academy helped to frame only laws of an economic or -social nature, since owing to the development of the totalitarian regime -it became more and more impossible to co-operate in other spheres. - -DR. SEIDL: If I understand you correctly, then the governmental -administration of law was solely in the hands of the Reich Minister of -Justice, and that was not you. - -FRANK: No, I was not Reich Minister of Justice. The Reich Minister of -Justice, Dr. Gürtner, was, however, not competent for the entire field -of legislation but merely for those laws which came within the scope of -his ministry. Legislation in the Reich, in accordance with the Enabling -Act, was in the hands of the Führer and Reich Chancellor and the Reich -Government as a body. Consequently my name appears in the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_ at the bottom of one law only, and that is the law -regarding the Reintroduction of Compulsory Military Service. However, I -am proud that my name stands at the end of that law. - -DR. SEIDL: You have stated earlier that during 1933 and 1934 you were -Bavarian Minister of Justice. - -FRANK: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: In that capacity did you have an opportunity of voicing your -opinion on the question of concentration camps, and what were the -circumstances? - -FRANK: I learned that the Dachau concentration camp was being -established in connection with a report which came to me from the Senior -Public Prosecutor’s Office in Munich on the occasion of the killing of -the Munich attorney, Dr. Strauss. This Public Prosecutor’s Office -complained to me, after I had given them orders to investigate the -killing, that the SS had refused them admission to the Dachau -concentration camp. Thereupon I had Reich Governor, General Von Epp, -call a meeting where I produced the files regarding this killing and -pointed out the illegality of such an action on the part of the SS and -stated that so far representatives from the German Public Prosecutor’s -Office had always been able to investigate any death which evoked a -suspicion that a crime had been committed and that I had not become -aware so far of any departure from this principle in the Reich. After -that I continued protesting against this method to Dr. Gürtner, the -Reich Minister of Justice and at the same time Attorney General. I -pointed out that this meant the beginning of a development which -threatened the legal system in an alarming manner. - -At Heinrich Himmler’s request Adolf Hitler intervened personally in this -matter, and he used his power to quash any legal proceedings. The -proceedings were ordered to be quashed. I handed in my resignation as -Minister of Justice, but it was not accepted. - -DR. SEIDL: When did you become Governor General of the occupied Polish -territories, and where were you when you were informed of this -appointment? - -FRANK: On 24 August 1939, as an officer in the reserve, I had to join my -regiment in Potsdam. I was busy training my company; and on 17 -September, or it may have been 16, I was making my final preparations -before going to the front when a telephone call came from the Führer’s -special train ordering me to go to the Führer at once. - -The following day I traveled to Upper Silesia where the Führer’s special -train was stationed at that time; and in a very short conversation, -which lasted less than ten minutes, he gave me the mission, as he put -it, to take over the functions of Civil Governor for the occupied Polish -territories. - -At that time the whole of the conquered Polish territories was under the -administrative supreme command of a military commander, General Von -Rundstedt. Toward the end of September I was attached to General Von -Rundstedt’s staff as Chief of Administration, and my task was to do the -administrative work in the Military Government. In a short time, -however, it was found that this method did not work; and when the Polish -territories were divided into the part which was incorporated into the -German Reich and the part which then became the Government General, I -was appointed Governor General as from 26 October. - -DR. SEIDL: You have mentioned the various positions which you held over -a number of years. I now ask you: Did you, in any of the positions you -held in the Party or the State, play any vital part in the political -events of the last 20 years? - -FRANK: In my own sphere I did everything that could possibly be expected -of a man who believes in the greatness of his people and who is filled -with fanaticism for the greatness of his country, in order to bring -about the victory of Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist movement. - -I never participated in far-reaching political decisions, since I never -belonged to the circle of the closest associates of Adolf Hitler, -neither was I consulted by Adolf Hitler on general political questions, -nor did I ever take part in conferences about such problems. Proof of -this is that throughout the period from 1933 to 1945 I was received only -six times by Adolf Hitler personally, to report to him about my sphere -of activities. - -DR. SEIDL: What share did you have in the legislation of the Reich? - -FRANK: I have already told you that, and there is no need to give a -further answer. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you, as a Reich Minister or in any other State or Party -post want this war, or did you desire a war in violation of treaties -entered into? - -FRANK: War is not a thing one wants. War is terrible. We have lived -through it; we did not want the war. We wanted a great Germany and the -restoration of the freedom and welfare, the health and happiness of our -people. It was my dream, and probably the dream of every one of us, to -bring about a revision of the Versailles Treaty by peaceful means, which -was provided for in that very treaty. But as in the world of treaties, -between nations also, it is only the one who is strong who is listened -to; Germany had to become strong first before we could negotiate. This -is how I saw the development as a whole: the strengthening of the Reich, -reinstatement of its sovereignty in all spheres, and by these means to -free ourselves of the intolerable shackles which had been imposed upon -our people. I was happy, therefore, when Adolf Hitler, in a most -wonderful rise to power, unparalleled in the history of mankind, -succeeded by the end of 1938 in achieving most of these aims; and I was -equally unhappy when in 1939, to my dismay, I realized more and more -that Adolf Hitler appeared to be departing from that course and to be -following other methods. - -THE PRESIDENT: This seems to have been covered by what the Defendant -Göring told us, by what the Defendant Ribbentrop told us. - -DR. SEIDL: The witness has already completed his statement on this -point. - -Witness, what was your share in the events of Poland after 1939? - -FRANK: I bear the responsibility; and when, on 30 April 1945, Adolf -Hitler ended his life, I resolved to reveal that responsibility of mine -to the world as clearly as possible. - -I did not destroy the 43 volumes of my diary, which report on all these -events and the share I had in them; but of my own accord I handed them -voluntarily to the officers of the American Army who arrested me. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, do you feel guilty of having committed crimes in -violation of international conventions or crimes against humanity? - -THE PRESIDENT: That is a question that the Tribunal has got to decide. - -DR. SEIDL: Then I shall drop the question. - -Witness, what do you have to say regarding the accusations which have -been brought against you in the Indictment? - -FRANK: To these accusations I can only say that I ask the Tribunal to -decide upon the degree of my guilt at the end of my case. - -I myself, speaking from the very depths of my feelings and having lived -through the 5 months of this trial, want to say that now after I have -gained a full insight into all the horrible atrocities which have been -committed, I am possessed by a deep sense of guilt. - -DR. SEIDL: What were your aims when you took over the post of Governor -General? - -FRANK: I was not informed about anything. I heard about special action -commandos of the SS here during this trial. In connection with and -immediately following my appointment, special powers were given to -Himmler, and my competence in many essential matters was taken away from -me. A number of Reich offices governed directly in matters of economy, -social policy, currency policy, food policy, and therefore, all I could -do was to lay upon myself the task of seeing to it that amid the -conflagration of this war, some sort of an order should be built up -which would enable men to live. The work I did out there, therefore, -cannot be judged in the light of the moment, but must be judged in its -entirety, and we shall have to come to that later. My aim was to -safeguard justice, without doing harm to our war effort. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, did the police, and particularly the Security Police -and SD, come under your jurisdiction in the Government General? - -FRANK: The Higher SS and Police Leaders were in principle subordinate to -the Reichsführer SS Himmler. The SS did not come under my command, and -any orders or instructions which I might have given would not have been -obeyed. Witness Bühler will cover this question in detail. - -The general arrangement was that the Higher SS and Police Leader was -formally attached to my office, but in fact, and by reason of his -activities, he was purely an agent of the Reichsführer SS Himmler. This -state of affairs, even as early as November 1939, was the cause of my -first offer to resign which I made to Adolf Hitler. It was a state of -affairs which made things extremely difficult as time went by. In spite -of all my attempts to gain control of these matters, the drift -continued. An administration without a police executive is powerless and -there were many proofs of this. The police officers, so far as -discipline, organization, pay, and orders were concerned, came -exclusively under the German Reich police system and were in no way -connected with the administration of the Government General. The -officials of the SS and Police therefore did not consider that they were -attached to the Government General in matters concerning their duty, -neither was the police area called “Police Area, Government General.” -Moreover the Higher SS and Police Leader did not call himself “SS and -Police Leader in the Government General” but “Higher SS and Police -Leader East.” However, I do not propose to go into details at this -point. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, did the concentration camps in the Government -General come under you, and did you have anything to do with their -administration? - -FRANK: Concentration camps were entirely a matter for the police and had -nothing to do with the administration. Members of the civil -administration were officially prohibited from entering the camps. - -DR. SEIDL: Have you yourself ever been in a concentration camp? - -FRANK: In 1935 I participated in a visit to the Dachau concentration -camp, which had been organized for the Gauleiters. That was the only -time that I have entered a concentration camp. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, in 1942, by a decree of the Führer, a State -Secretariat for Security in the Government General was created. The date -is 7 May 1942. What was the reason for creating that State Secretariat? - -FRANK: The establishment of this State Secretariat was one of the many -attempts to solve the problem of the police in the Government General. I -was very happy about it at the time, because I thought now we had found -the way to solve the problem. I am certain it would have worked if -Himmler and Krüger had adhered to the principle of this decree, which -was co-operation and not working against each other. But before long it -transpired that this renewed attempt, too, was merely camouflage; and -the old conditions continued. - -DR. SEIDL: On 3 June 1942, on the basis of this Führer decree, another -decree was issued regarding the transfer of official business to the -State Secretary for Security. Is that true? - -FRANK: I assume so, if you have the document. I cannot remember the -details of course. - -DR. SEIDL: In that case I shall ask the witness Bilfinger about this -point. - -FRANK: But I should like to add something to that. Wherever the SS is -discussed here, the SS and the police are considered as forming one -body. It would not be right of me if I did not correct that wrong -conception. I have known during the course of these years so many -honest, clean, and upright soldiers among the SS, and especially among -the Waffen-SS and the police, that when judging here the problem of the -SS in regard to the criminal nature of their activities, one can draw -the same clear distinction as in the case of any of the other social -groups. The SS, as such, behaved no more criminally than any other -social groups would behave when taking part in political events. The -dreadful thing was that the responsible chief, and a number of other SS -men who unfortunately had been given considerable powers, were able to -abuse the loyal attitude which is so typical of the German soldier. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, another question. In the decree concerning the -creation of the State Secretariat for Security, it is ordered that the -State Secretary—which in this case was the Higher SS and Police -Leader—before making basic decisions, had to ask you for your approval. -Was that done? - -FRANK: No, I was never called upon to give my approval and that was the -reason why before long this, my last, attempt proved to be a failure. - -DR. SEIDL: Did the Higher SS and Police Leader and the SS -Obergruppenführer Krüger, in particular, obey orders which you had given -them? - -FRANK: Please, would you repeat the question? It did not come through -too well. And please, Dr. Seidl, do not speak quite so loudly. - -DR. SEIDL: Did the Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger, who at the same -time was the State Secretary for Security, obey orders which you gave -him in your capacity as Governor General? - -FRANK: Not even a single order. On the strength of this new decree I -repeatedly gave orders. These orders were supposedly communicated to -Heinrich Himmler; and as his agreement was necessary, these orders were -never carried out. Some special cases can be confirmed by the State -Secretary Bühler when he is here as a witness. - -DR. SEIDL: Did the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police, -before he carried out security police measures in the Government -General, ever obtain your approval? - -FRANK: Not in a single case. - -DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has submitted a document, L-37, as Exhibit -Number USA-506. It is a letter from the Commander of the Security Police -and SD of the District Radom, addressed to the branch office at -Tomassov. This document contains the following: - - “On 28 June 1944 the Higher SS and Police Leader East issued the - following order: - - “The security situation in the Government General has - deteriorated so much during the recent months that the most - radical means and the most severe measures must now be employed - against these alien assassins and saboteurs. The Reichsführer SS - in agreement with the Governor General, has given order that in - every case of assassination or attempted assassination of - Germans, not only the perpetrators shall be shot when caught, - but that in addition, all their male relatives shall also be - executed, and their female relatives above the age of sixteen - put into a concentration camp.” - -FRANK: As I have said that I was never called upon by the Reichsführer -SS Himmler to give my approval to such orders, your question has already -been answered. In this case, I was not called upon either. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, were you at least informed of such orders from the -Reichsführer SS Himmler or from the Higher SS and Police Leader East -before they were carried out? - -FRANK: The reason why this was not done was always the same. I was told -that as Poles were living not only in the Government General but also in -those territories which had been incorporated into the Reich, the fight -against the Polish resistance movement had to be carried on by unified -control from a central office, and this central office was Heinrich -Himmler. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, what jurisdiction did you have in the general -administration? - -FRANK: I think it would accelerate the proceedings if the Witness Bühler -could testify to these details. If the Tribunal so desires I will of -course answer this question now. In the main I was concerned with the -setting up of the usual administrative departments, such as food, -culture, finance, science, _et cetera_. - -DR. SEIDL: Were there representatives of the Polish and Ukrainian -population in the Government General? - -FRANK: Yes. The representation of the Polish and Ukrainian population -was on a regional basis, and I united the heads of the bodies of -representatives from the various districts in the so-called subsidiary -committees. There was a Polish and an Ukrainian subsidiary committee. -Count Ronikier was the head of the Polish committee for a number of -years, and at the head of the Ukrainian committee was Professor -Kubiowicz. I made it obligatory for all my offices to contact these -subsidiary committees on all questions of a general nature, and this -they did. I myself was in constant contact with both of them. Complaints -were brought to me there and we had free discussions. My complaints and -memoranda to the Führer were mostly based on the reports from these -subsidiary committees. - -A second form in which the population participated in the administration -of the Government General was by means of the lowest administrative -units, which throughout the Government General were in the hands of the -native population. Every ten to twenty villages had as their head a -so-called _Wojt_. This Polish word _Wojt_ is the same as the German word -“Vogt”—V-o-g-t. He was, so to speak, the lowest administrative unit. - -A third form of participation by the population in the administration -was the employment of about 280,000 Poles and Ukrainians as government -officials or civil servants in the public services of the Government -General, including the postal and railway services. - -DR. SEIDL: In what numerical proportion did the German civil servants -stand to the Polish and Ukrainian civil servants? - -FRANK: The proportion varied. The number of German civil servants was -very small. There were times when, in the whole of the Government -General, the area of which is 150,000 square kilometers—that means half -the size of Italy—there were not more than 40,000 German civil -servants. That means to one German civil servant there were on the -average at least six non-German civil servants and employees. - -DR. SEIDL: Which territories did you rule as Governor General? - -FRANK: Poland, which had been jointly conquered by Germany and the -Soviet Union, was divided first of all between the Soviet Union and the -German Reich. Of the 380,000 square kilometers, which is the approximate -size of the Polish State, approximately 200,000 square kilometers went -to the Soviet Union and approximately 170,000 to 180,000 square -kilometers to the German Reich. Please do not ask me for exact figures; -that was roughly the proportion. - -That part of Poland which was taken over into Soviet Russian territory -was immediately treated as an integral part of the Soviet Union. The -border signs in the east of the Government General were the usual Reich -border signs of the Soviet Union, as from 1939. That part which came to -Germany was divided thus: 90,000 square kilometers were left to the -Government General and the remainder was incorporated into the German -Reich. - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think there is any charge against the defendant -on the ground that the civil administration was bad. The charge is that -crimes were committed, and the details of the administration between the -Government General and the department in the Reich are not really in -question. - -DR. SEIDL: The only reason, Mr. President, why I put that question was -to demonstrate the difficulties with which the administration had to -cope right from the beginning in this territory, for an area which -originally represented one economic unit was now split into three -different parts. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I am coming now to the next question. Did -you ever have hostages shot? - -FRANK: My diary contains the facts. I myself have never had hostages -shot. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you ever participate in the annihilation of Jews? - -FRANK: I say “yes”; and the reason why I say “yes” is because, having -lived through the 5 months of this trial, and particularly after having -heard the testimony of the witness Hoess, my conscience does not allow -me to throw the responsibility solely on these minor people. I myself -have never installed an extermination camp for Jews, or promoted the -existence of such camps; but if Adolf Hitler personally has laid that -dreadful responsibility on his people, then it is mine too, for we have -fought against Jewry for years; and we have indulged in the most -horrible utterances—my own diary bears witness against me. Therefore, -it is no more than my duty to answer your question in this connection -with “yes.” A thousand years will pass and still this guilt of Germany -will not have been erased. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, what was your policy for the recruiting of laborers -for the Reich when you were Governor General? - -FRANK: I beg your pardon? - -DR. SEIDL: What policy did you pursue for the recruiting of labor for -the Reich in your capacity as Governor General? - -FRANK: The policy is laid down in my decrees. No doubt they will be held -against me by the Prosecution, and I consider it will save time if I -answer that question later, with the permission of the Tribunal. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, did Hitler give you any instructions as to how you -should carry out your administration as Governor General? - -FRANK: During the first 10 minutes of the audience in his special train -Adolf Hitler instructed me to see to it that this territory, which had -been utterly devastated—all the bridges had been blown up; the railways -no longer functioned, and the population was in a complete turmoil—was -put into order somehow; and that I should see to it that this territory -should become a factor which would contribute to the improvement of the -terribly difficult economic and war situation of the German Reich. - -DR. SEIDL: Did Adolf Hitler support you in your work as Governor -General? - -FRANK: All my complaints, everything I reported to him, were -unfortunately dropped into the wastepaper basket by him. I did not send -in my resignation 14 times for nothing. It was not for nothing that I -tried to join my brave troops as an officer. In his heart he was always -opposed to lawyers, and that was one of the most serious shortcomings of -this outstandingly great man. He did not want to admit formal -responsibility, and that, unfortunately, applied to his policy too, as I -have found out now. Every lawyer to him was a disturbing element working -against his power. All I can say, therefore, is that, by supporting -Himmler’s and Bormann’s aims to the utmost, he permanently jeopardized -any attempt to find a form of government worthy of the German name. - -DR. SEIDL: Which departments of the Reich gave instructions to you -regarding the administration of the Government General? - -FRANK: In order to expedite the proceedings I should like to suggest -that the witness Bühler give the whole list. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you ever loot art treasures? - -FRANK: An accusation which is one that touches my private life, and -affects me most deeply, is that I am supposed to have enriched myself -with the art treasures of the country entrusted to me. I did not collect -pictures and I did not find time during the war to appropriate art -treasures. I took care to see that all the art treasures of the country -entrusted to me were officially registered, and had that official -register incorporated in a document which was widely distributed; and, -above all, I saw to it that those art treasures remained in the country -right to the very end. In spite of that, art treasures were removed from -the Government General. A part was taken away before my administration -was established. Experience shows that one cannot talk of responsibility -for an administration until some time after it has been functioning, -namely, when the administration has been built up from the bottom. So -that from the outbreak of the war, 1 September 1939, until this point, -which was about at the end of 1939, I am sure that art treasures were -stolen to an immeasurable extent either as war booty or under some other -pretext. During the registration of the art treasures, Adolf Hitler gave -the order that the Veit Stoss altar should be removed from St. Mary’s -Church in Kraków, and taken to the Reich. In September 1939 Mayor Liebel -came from Nuremberg to Kraków for that purpose with a group of SS men -and removed this altar. A third instance was the removal of the Dürer -etchings in Lvov by a special deputy before my administration was -established there. In 1944, shortly before the collapse, art treasures -were removed to the Reich for storage. In the Castle of Seichau, in -Silesia, there was a collection of art treasures which had been brought -there by Professor Kneisl for this purpose. One last group of art -treasures was handed over to the Americans by me personally. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, did you introduce ghettos, that is, Jewish quarters -in the Government General? - -FRANK: I issued an instruction regarding the setting up of Jewish -quarters. I do not remember the date. As to the reasons and the -necessity for that, I shall have to answer the Prosecutor’s questions. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you introduce badges to mark the Jews? - -FRANK: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself introduce forced labor in the Government -General? - -FRANK: Forced labor and compulsory labor service were introduced by me -in one of the first decrees; but it is quite clear from all the decrees -and their wording that I had in mind only a labor service within the -country for repairing the damage caused by the war, and for carrying out -work necessary for the country itself, as was of course done by the -labor service in the Reich. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you, as was stated by the Prosecution, plunder libraries -in the Government General? - -FRANK: I can answer that question plainly with “no.” The largest and -most valuable library which we found, the Jagellon University Library in -Kraków, which thank God was not destroyed, was transferred to a new -library building on my own personal orders; and the entire collection, -including the most ancient documents, was looked after with great care. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, did you as Governor General close down the -universities in the Government General? - -FRANK: The universities in the Government General were closed because of -the war when we arrived. The reopening of the universities was -prohibited by order of Adolf Hitler. I supplied the needs of the Polish -and Ukrainian population by introducing university courses of -instruction for Polish and Ukrainian students—which were actually on a -university level—in such a way that the Reich Authorities could not -criticize it. The fact that there was an urgent need for native -university-trained men, particularly doctors, technicians, lawyers, -teachers, _et cetera_, was the best guarantee that the Poles and -Ukrainians would be allowed to continue university teaching to the -extent which war conditions would allow. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, we were last speaking of the universities. Did you -yourself, as Governor General, close the secondary schools? - -FRANK: My suggestion to reopen the Gymnasiums and secondary schools was -rejected by Adolf Hitler. We helped to solve the problem by permitting -secondary school education in a large number of private schools. - -DR. SEIDL: Now, a basic question. The Prosecution accuse you of having -plundered the country ruled by you as Governor General. What do you have -to say to that? - -FRANK: Well, evidently by that accusation is meant everything that -happened in the economic sphere in that country as a result of the -arrangements between the German Reich and the Government General. First, -I would like to emphasize that the Government General had to start with -a balance sheet which revealed a frightful economic situation. The -country had approximately twelve million inhabitants. The area of the -Government General was the least fertile part of the former Poland. -Moreover, the boundary between the Soviet Union, as well as the boundary -between the German Reich, had been drawn in such a way that the most -essential elements, indispensable for economy, were left outside. The -frontiers between the Soviet Union and the German Reich were immediately -closed; and so, right from the start, we had to make something out of -nothing. - -Galicia, the most important area in the Republic of Poland from the -viewpoint of food supplies, was given to the Soviet Union. The province -of Posen belonged to the German Reich. The coal and industrial areas of -Upper Silesia were within the German Reich. The frontier with Germany -was drawn in such a way that the iron works in Czestochowa remained with -the Government General, whereas the iron-ore basins which were 10 -kilometers from Czestochowa were incorporated into the German Reich. - -The town of Lodz, the textile center of Poland, came within the German -Reich. The city of Warsaw with a population of several millions became a -frontier town because the German border came as close as 15 kilometers -to Warsaw, and the result was that the entire agricultural hinterland -was no longer at the disposal of that city. A great many facts could be -mentioned, but that would probably take us too far. The first thing we -had to do was to set things going again somehow. During the first weeks -the population of Warsaw could only be fed with the aid of German -equipment for mass feeding. The German Reich at that time sent 600,000 -tons of grain, as a loan of course, and that created a heavy debt for -me. - -I started the financial economy with 20 million zlotys which had been -advanced to me by the Reich. We started with a completely impoverished -economy due to the devastation caused by the war, and by the first of -January 1944 the savings bank accounts of the native population had -reached the amount of 11,500 million zlotys, and we had succeeded by -then in improving the feeding of the population to a certain extent. -Furthermore, at that time the factories and industrial centers had been -reconstructed, to which reconstruction the Reich authorities had made -outstanding contributions; Reich Marshal Göring and Minister Speer -especially deserve great credit for the help given in reviving the -industry of the country. More than two million fully paid workers were -employed; the harvest had increased to 1.6 million tons in a year; the -yearly budget had increased from 20 million zlotys in the year 1939 to -1,700 million zlotys. All this is only a sketch which I submit here to -describe the general development. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, in your capacity as Governor General did you -persecute churches and religion in the areas which you had under your -administration? - -FRANK: I was in constant personal contact with the Archbishop, now -Cardinal, Sapieha in Kraków. He told me of all his sufferings and -worries, and they were not few. I myself had to rescue the Bishop of -Lublin from the hands of Herr Globocznik in order to save his life. - -DR. SEIDL: You mean the SS Gruppenführer Globocznik? - -FRANK: Yes, that is the one I mean. - -But I may summarize the situation by quoting the letter which Archbishop -Sapieha sent to me in 1942, in which, to use his own words, he thanked -me for my tireless efforts to protect the life of the church. We -reconstructed seminaries for priests; and we investigated every case of -arrest of a priest, as far as that was humanly possible. The tragic -incident when two assistants of the Archbishop Sapieha were shot, which -has been mentioned here by the Prosecution, stirred my own emotions very -deeply. I cannot say any more. The churches were open; the seminaries -were educating priests; the priests were in no way prevented from -carrying out their functions. The monastery at Czestochowa was under my -personal protection. The Kraków monastery of the Camaldulians, which is -a religious order, was also under my personal protection. There were -large posters around the monastery indicating that these monasteries -were protected by me personally. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, when did you hear for the first time about the -concentration camp at Maidanek? - -FRANK: I heard the name Maidanek for the first time in 1944 from foreign -reports. But for years there had been contradictory rumors about the -camp near Lublin, or in the Lublin District, if I may express myself in -such a general way. Governor Zörner once told me, I believe already in -1941, that the SS intended to build a large concentration camp near -Lublin and had applied for large quantities of building materials, _et -cetera_. At that time I instructed State Secretary Bühler to investigate -the matter immediately, and I was told, and I also received a report in -writing from Reichsführer SS Himmler, that he had to build a large camp -required by the Waffen-SS to manufacture clothes, footwear, and -underwear in large SS-owned workshops. This camp went under the name of -“SS Works,” or something similar. - -Now, I have to say I was in a position to get information, whereas the -witnesses who have testified so far have said under oath that in the -circles around the Führer nothing was known about all these things. We -out there were more independent, and I heard quite a lot through enemy -broadcasts and enemy and neutral papers. In answer to my repeated -questions as to what happened to the Jews who were deported, I was -always told they were to be sent to the East, to be assembled, and put -to work there. But, the stench seemed to penetrate the walls, and -therefore I persisted in my investigations as to what was going on. Once -a report came to me that there was something going on near Belcec. I -went to Belcec the next day. Globocznik showed me an enormous ditch -which he was having made as a protective wall and on which many -thousands of workers, apparently Jews, were engaged. I spoke to some of -them, asked them where they came from, how long they had been there, and -he told me, that is, Globocznik, “They are working here now, and when -they are through—they come from the Reich, or somewhere from -France—they will be sent further east.” I did not make any further -inquiries in that same area. - -The rumor, however, that the Jews were being killed in the manner which -is now known to the entire world would not be silenced. When I expressed -the wish to visit the SS workshop near Lublin, in order to get some idea -of the value of the work that was being done, I was told that special -permission from Heinrich Himmler was required. - -I asked Heinrich Himmler for this special permission. He said that he -would urge me not to go to the camp. Again some time passed. On 7 -February 1944 I succeeded in being received by Adolf Hitler -personally—I might add that throughout the war he received me three -times only. In the presence of Bormann I put the question to him: “My -Führer, rumors about the extermination of the Jews will not be silenced. -They are heard everywhere. No one is allowed in anywhere. Once I paid a -surprise visit to Auschwitz in order to see the camp, but I was told -that there was an epidemic in the camp and my car was diverted before I -got there. Tell me, My Führer, is there anything in it?” The Führer -said, “You can very well imagine that there are executions going on—of -insurgents. Apart from that I do not know anything. Why don’t you speak -to Heinrich Himmler about it?” And I said, “Well, Himmler made a speech -to us in Kraków and declared in front of all the people whom I had -officially called to the meeting that these rumors about the systematic -extermination of the Jews were false; the Jews were merely being brought -to the East.” Thereupon the Führer said, “Then you must believe that.” - -When in 1944 I got the first details from the foreign press about the -things which were going on, my first question was to the SS -Obergruppenführer Koppe, who had replaced Krüger. “Now we know,” I said, -“you cannot deny that.” And he said that nothing was known to him about -these things, and that apparently it was a matter directly between -Heinrich Himmler and the camp authorities. “But,” I said, “already in -1941 I heard of such plans, and I spoke about them.” Then he said that -was my business and he could not worry about it. - -The Maidanek Camp must have been run solely by the SS, in the way I have -mentioned, and apparently, in the same manner as stated by the witness -Hoess. - -That is the only explanation that I can give. - -DR. SEIDL: Therefore you did not know of the conditions in Treblinka, -Auschwitz, and other camps? Did Treblinka belong to Maidanek, or is that -a separate camp? - -FRANK: I do not know; it seems to be a separate camp. Auschwitz was not -in the area of the Government General. I was never in Maidanek, nor in -Treblinka, nor in Auschwitz. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution has presented under Number USA-275 -the report of the SS Brigadeführer Stroop on the destruction of the -Warsaw Ghetto. Before that action was initiated, did you know anything -about it and did you ever come across this report? - -FRANK: I was surprised when the American Chief Prosecutor said in his -opening speech, while submitting a document here with pictures about the -destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto, that that report had been made to me. -But that has been clarified in the meantime. The report was never made -for me, and was never sent to me in that form. And, thank Heaven, during -the last few days it has been made clear by several witnesses and -affidavits that this destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto was carried out -upon direct orders of Himmler, and over the head of all competent -authorities of the Government General. When in our meetings anybody -spoke about this Ghetto, it was always said that there had been a revolt -in the Warsaw Ghetto which we had had to quell with artillery; reports -that were made on it never seemed to me to be authentic. - -DR. SEIDL: What measures did you take to see that the population in the -Government General was fed? - -FRANK: An abundance of measures were taken to get agriculture going -again, to import machinery, to teach farmers improved farming methods, -to build up co-operative associations, to distribute seeds in the usual -way. - -DR. SEIDL: The Witness Bühler will speak about that later. - -FRANK: Moreover the Reich helped a great deal in that respect. The Reich -sent seeds to the value of many millions of marks, agricultural experts, -breeding cattle, machines, _et cetera_. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, you have told us what you did for the welfare of the -population of the Government General. The Prosecution, however, has -charged you with a number of statements which they found in your own -diary, and which seem to contradict that. How can you explain that -contradiction? - -FRANK: One has to take the diary as a whole. You can not go through 43 -volumes and pick out single sentences and separate them from their -context. I would like to say here that I do not want to argue or quibble -about individual phrases. It was a wild and stormy period filled with -terrible passions, and when a whole country is on fire and a life and -death struggle is going on, such words may easily be used. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness... - -FRANK: Some of the words are terrible. I myself must admit that I was -shocked at many of the words which I had used. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, under Number USA-297 the Prosecution has submitted a -document which deals with a conference which you apparently had in 1939 -or 1940 with an office of the Chief of the Administration Ober-Ost. I -shall have the document handed to you and ask you to tell me whether the -report of that man, as it is contained in the document, agrees with what -you have said. It is on Page 1, at the bottom, the second paragraph. - -FRANK: That is a shortened summary of a speech, which perhaps in an -address... - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the PS number? - -DR. SEIDL: Dr. Frank, what is the number? - -FRANK: 297, I believe. - -DR. SEIDL: No, on the cover, please. - -FRANK: On the cover it says 344. I will return the document to you. -Would you kindly ask me about individual phrases. It is impossible for -me to read all of its contents. - -DR. SEIDL: The number is 297, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it is USA-297. It is EC-344, (16) and (17), is that -right? - -DR. SEIDL: Yes. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] It says here that during the first -conversation which the chief of the central department had with the -Reich Minister Dr. Frank on 3 October 1939 in Posen, the latter -explained the task which had been given him by the Führer and the -economic-political principles on which he intended to base his -administration of Poland. This could only be done by ruthless -exploitation of the country. Therefore, it would be necessary to recruit -manpower to be used in the Reich, and so on. - -I have summarized it, Mr. President. - -FRANK: I am sure that these utterances were not made in the way it is -put here. - -DR. SEIDL: But you do not want to say that you have never spoken to that -man? - -FRANK: I cannot remember it at all. - -DR. SEIDL: Then, I come to the next question. - -FRANK: Moreover, what actually happened seems to me to be more important -than what was said at the time. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that your actions as Governor General, and -undoubtedly also many excesses by the police and the SD, were due to the -guerrilla activities? - -FRANK: Guerrilla activities? It can be said that it was the resistance -movement, which started from the very first day and was supported by our -enemies, which presented the most difficult problem I had to cope with -during all these years. For this resistance movement perpetually -supplied the police and the SS with pretexts and excuses for all those -measures which, from the viewpoint of an orderly administration, were -very regrettable. In fact, the resistance movement—I will not call it -guerrilla activity, because if a people has been conquered during a war -and organizes an active resistance movement, that is something -definitely to be respected—but the methods of the resistance movement -went far beyond the limits of an heroic revolt. German women and -children were slaughtered under the most atrocious circumstances. German -officials were shot; trains were derailed; dairies were destroyed; and -all measures taken to bring about the recovery of the country were -systematically undermined. - -And it is against the background of these incidents, which occurred day -after day, incessantly, during practically the entire period of my -activity, that the events in that country must be considered. That is -all I have to say to that. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, in the year 1944 a revolt broke out in Warsaw under -the leadership of General Bor. What part did the administration of the -Government General have, and what part did you have in putting down that -revolt? - -FRANK: That revolt broke out, when the Soviet Russian Army had advanced -to within about 30 kilometers of Warsaw on the eastern bank of the -Vistula. It was a sort of combined operation; and, as it seems to me, -also a national Polish action, as the Poles at the last moment wanted to -carry out the liberation of their capital themselves and did not want to -owe it to the Soviet Russians. They probably were thinking of how, in -Paris, at the last moment the resistance movement, even before the -Allies had approached, had accomplished the liberation of the city. - -The operation was a strictly military one. As Senior Commander of the -German troops used to quell the revolt, I believe, they appointed SS -General Von dem Bach-Zelewski. The civil administration, therefore, did -not have any part in the fighting. The part played by the civil -administration began only after the capitulation of General Bor, when -the most atrocious orders for vengeance came from the Reich. - -A letter came to my desk one day in which Hitler demanded the -deportation of the entire population of Warsaw into German concentration -camps. It took a struggle of 3 weeks, from which I emerged victorious, -to avert that act of insanity and to succeed in having the fleeing -population of Warsaw, which had had no part in the revolt, distributed -throughout the Government General. - -During that revolt, unfortunately, the city of Warsaw was very seriously -damaged. All that had taken years to rebuild was burned down in a few -weeks. However, State Secretary Bühler, in order to save time, will -probably be in a better position to give us more details. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, you are also accused of having suppressed the -cultural life of the population of the Government General, especially as -regards the theater, broadcasting, films. What have you to say about -that? - -FRANK: The Government General presented the same picture as every -occupied country. We do not have to look far from this courtroom to see -what cultural life is like in an occupied country. - -We had broadcasting in the Polish language under German supervision. We -had a Polish press which was supervised by Germans, and we had a Polish -school system, that is, elementary schools and high schools, in which at -the end, 80,000 teachers taught in the service of the Government -General. As far as it was possible Polish theaters were reopened in the -large cities, and where German theaters were established we made sure -that there was also a Polish theater at the same time. After the -proclamation of the so-called total war in August 1944, the absurd -situation arose in which the German theater in Kraków was closed, -because all German theaters were closed at that time, whereas the Polish -theaters remained open. - -I myself selected composers and virtuosos from a group of the most well -known musicians of Poland I found there in 1939 and founded the -Philharmonic Orchestra of the Government General. This was in being -until the end, and played an important part in the cultural life of -Poland. I established a Chopin Museum in Kraków, and from all over -Europe I collected relics of Chopin. I believe that is sufficient on -this point. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, you deny, therefore, having taken any measures which -aimed at exterminating Polish and Ukrainian culture. - -FRANK: Culture cannot be exterminated. Any measures taken with that -intention would be sheer nonsense. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that as far as it was in your power you did -everything to avoid epidemics and to improve the health of the -population? - -FRANK: That State Secretary Bühler will be able to confirm in detail. I -can say that everything humanly possible was done. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution, under Number USSR-223, has -submitted an excerpt from the diary, which deals with the report about a -police conference of 30 May 1940, and we find here in Pages 33 to 38 the -following... - -FRANK: [_Interposing._] Unless the Court orders it, it is not necessary -to read that. - -DR. SEIDL: No, I only want to read one sentence, which refers to the -Kraków professors. Apparently, if the diary is correct, you said... - -FRANK: [_Interposing._] May I say something about the Kraków professors -right away? - -DR. SEIDL: Yes. - -FRANK: On 7 November 1939 I came to Kraków. On 5 November 1939 before my -arrival, the SS and the police, as I found out later, called the Kraków -professors to a meeting. They thereupon arrested the men, among them -dignified old professors, and took them to some concentration camp. I -believe it was Oranienburg. I found that report when I arrived and -against everything which may be found there in my diary, I want to -emphasize here under oath that I did not cease in my attempts to get -every one of the professors released whom I could reach, in March 1940. -That is all I have to say to this. - -DR. SEIDL: The same police meeting of 30 May 1940 also dealt with the -so-called “AB Action,” that is, with the Extraordinary Pacification -Action. Before I put to you the question which is concerned with it, I -would like to read to you two entries in the diary. One is dated 16 May -1940, and here, after describing that extraordinary tension then -existing, you stated the following: That, first of all, an action for -pacification would have to be started, and then you said: - - “Any arbitrary actions must be avoided; in all cases the - safeguarding of the authority of the Führer and of the Reich has - to be kept in the foreground.”—I omit several sentences and - quote the end—“The action is timed for 15 June.” - -On 12 July a conference took place with the Ministerialrat Wille, who -was the chief of the Department of Justice, and there you said in your -own words: - - “Regarding the question as to what should happen to the - political criminals who had been arrested during the AB Action, - there is to be a conference with State Secretary Bühler, - Obergruppenführer Krüger, Brigadeführer Streckenbach and - Ministerialrat Wille.” - -End of quotation. - -What actually happened during that AB Action? - -FRANK: I cannot say any more or any less than what is contained in the -diary. The situation was extremely tense. Month after month attempted -assassinations increased. The encouragement and support given by the -rest of the world to the resistance movement to undermine all our -efforts to pacify the country had succeeded to an alarming degree, and -this led to this general pacification action, not only in the Government -General, but also in other areas, and which I believe was ordered by the -Führer himself. - -My efforts were directed to limiting it as to extent and method, and in -this I was successful. Moreover I should like to point out that I also -made it clear that I intended to exercise the right of reprieve in each -individual case; for that purpose I wanted the police and SS verdicts of -death by shooting to be submitted to a reprieve committee which I had -formed in that connection. I believe that can be seen from the diary -also. - -DR. SEIDL: Probably the witness Bühler knows something about it. - -FRANK: Nevertheless, I would like to say that the method used at that -time was a tremendous mistake. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, have you at any time recognized the principle -introduced by the SD and SS of the liability of kin? - -FRANK: No, on the contrary. When I received the first reports about it, -I complained in writing to Reich Minister Lammers about that peculiar -development of the law. - -DR. SEIDL: The first SS and Police Leader East was Obergruppenführer -Krüger. When was this SS leader recalled and how did it come about? - -FRANK: The relations between him and myself became quite impossible. He -wanted a peculiar kind of SS and police regime, and that state of -affairs could be solved only in one way—either he or I had to go. I -think that at the last moment, by the intervention of Kaltenbrunner, if -I remember correctly, and of Bach-Zelewski, this remarkable fellow was -removed. - -DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution once mentioned that it was more a personal -struggle for power. But is it more correct to say that there were -differences of opinion on basic questions? - -FRANK: Of course it was a struggle for power. I wanted to establish a -power in the sense of my memoranda to the Führer, and therefore I had to -fight the power of violence, and here personal viewpoints separated -altogether. - -DR. SEIDL: The successor of SS Obergruppenführer Krüger was SS -Obergruppenführer Koppe. Was his basic attitude different? - -FRANK: Yes. I had that impression; and I am thinking of him particularly -when I say that even in the SS there were many decent men who also had a -sense of what was right. - -DR. SEIDL: Were there Polish and Ukrainian Police in the Government -General? - -FRANK: Yes, there were 25,000 men of the Polish security, criminal, and -uniformed police, and about 5,000 men of the Ukrainian police. They also -were under the German police chief. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, I now come to one of the most important questions. -In 1942, in Berlin, Vienna, Heidelberg, and Munich, you made speeches -before large audiences. What was the purpose of these speeches, and what -were the consequences for you? - -FRANK: The speeches can be read. It was the last effort that I made to -bring home to Hitler, by means of the tremendous response of the German -people, the truth that the rule of law was immortal. I stated at that -time that a Reich without law and without humanity could not last long, -and more in that vein. After I had been under police surveillance for -several days in Munich, I was relieved of all my Party offices. As this -was a matter of German domestic politics under the sovereignty of the -German Reich, I refrain from making any more statements about it here. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that after this you tendered your resignation? -And what was the answer? - -FRANK: I was, so to speak, in a permanent state of resigning, and I -received the same answer: that for reasons connected with foreign policy -I could not be released. - -DR. SEIDL: I originally intended to read to you from your diary a number -of quotations which the Prosecution has submitted; but in view of the -fact that the Prosecution may do that in the course of the -cross-examination, I forego it in order to save time. I have no more -questions to put to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel wish to -ask any questions? - -Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? - -CHIEF COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE L. N. SMIRNOV (Assistant Prosecutor for the -U.S.S.R.): Defendant, I should like to know what precisely was your -legal status and what exactly was the position you occupied in the -system of the fascist state. Please answer me: When were you promoted to -the post of Governor of occupied Poland? To whom were you directly -subordinated? - -FRANK: The date is 26 October 1939. At least on that day the directive -concerning the Governor General became effective. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You will remember that by Hitler’s order of 12 -October 1939 you were directly subordinated to Hitler, were you not? - -FRANK: I did not get the first part. What was it, please? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you remember Hitler’s order concerning your -appointment as Governor General of Poland? This order was dated 12 -October 1939. - -FRANK: That was in no way effective, because the decree came into force -on 26 October 1939, and you can find it in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_. -Before that I was Chief of Administration with the military commander -Von Rundstedt. I have explained that already. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: By this order of Hitler you were directly -subordinated to him. Do you remember? Paragraph 3, Sub-paragraph 1, of -this order. - -FRANK: The chiefs of administration in the occupied territories were all -immediately under the Führer. I may say in elucidation that Paragraph 3 -states, “The Governor General is immediately subordinate to me.” - -But Paragraph 9 of this decree states, “This decree becomes valid as -soon as I have withdrawn from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army the -task of carrying out the military administration.” And this withdrawal, -that is, the coming into force of this decree took place on 26 October. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I fully agree with you, and we have information -to that effect in the book which you evidently remember. It is Book 5. -You do remember this book of the Government General? - -FRANK: It is of course in the decree. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, when this order came into force, to whom -were you directly subordinate? - -FRANK: What shall I read here? There are several entries here. What is -your wish? To what do you wish me to answer? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It states that this order came into force on the -26 October. Well, when this order actually became valid, to whom were -you subordinated? Was there, or was there not, any further order issued -by Hitler? - -FRANK: There is only one basic decree about the Governor General. That -is this one. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Quite correct. There were no further -instructions? - -FRANK: Oh yes, there are some, for instance... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I understand that, but there was no other decree -determining the system of administration, was there? - -FRANK: May I say that you can find it best on Page A-100 in your book, -and there you have the decree of the Führer verbatim. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Quite right. - -FRANK: And it says also in Paragraph 9, “This decree shall come into -effect...” and so on, and that date was the 26th of October. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, that is quite correct. That means that -after 26 October you, as Governor General for occupied Poland, were -directly subordinate to Hitler? - -FRANK: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then perhaps you may remember when, and by whom, -you were entrusted with the execution, in occupied Poland, of the Four -Year Plan? - -FRANK: By Göring. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means that you were Göring’s -plenipotentiary for the execution of the Four Year Plan in Poland, were -you not? - -FRANK: The story of that mission is very briefly told. The activities of -several plenipotentiaries of the Four Year Plan in the Government -General were such that I was greatly concerned about it. Therefore, I -approached the Reich Marshal and asked him to appoint me trustee for the -Four Year Plan. That was later—in January... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, it was in December. - -FRANK: Yes, it was later, according to this decree. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This means that as from the beginning of -December 1939 you were Göring’s plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan? - -FRANK: Göring’s? I was the plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Now perhaps you can remember that in October -1939 the first decree regarding the organization of administration in -the Government General was promulgated? - -FRANK: Yes. That is here, is it not? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you recall Paragraph 3 of that decree. - -FRANK: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It says that “The sphere of action of the State -Secretary for Security will be determined by the Governor General in -agreement with the Reichsführer SS and”—this is the passage which -interests me—“the Chief of the German Police.” - -Does that not coincide with Paragraph 3 insofar as from the first day of -your appointment as Governor General you undertook the control of the -Police and SS, and, consequently, the responsibility for their actions? - -FRANK: No. I definitely answer that question with “no,” but I would like -to make an explanation.... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What interests me, Defendant; is how could that -be explained otherwise? - -THE PRESIDENT: Let him make his explanation. - -Defendant, you may make your explanation. - -FRANK: I want to make a very short statement. There is an old legal -principle which says that nobody can transfer more rights to anybody -else than he has himself. What I have stated here was the ideal which I -had before me and how it should have been. Everybody has to admit that -it is natural and logical that the police should be subordinate to the -Chief of Administration. The Führer, who alone could have decided, did -not make that decree. I did not have the power nor the authority to put -into effect this decree which I had so carefully formulated. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then do I understand you to say that this -Paragraph 3 was an ideal which you strove to attain, but which you were -never able to attain? - -FRANK: I beg your pardon, but I could not understand that question. A -little slower please, and may I have the translation into German a -little slower? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Shall I repeat the question? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I asked you a question; does this mean that the -statement can be interpreted as follows: Paragraph 3 of this decree was -an ideal which you persistently strove to attain, which you openly -professed, but which you were never able to attain? Would that be -correct? - -FRANK: Which I could not attain; and that can be seen by the fact that -later it was found necessary to appoint a special State Secretary for -Security in a last effort to find a way out of the difficulty. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you will recall that in April 1942, -special negotiations took place between you and Himmler. Did these -negotiations take place in April 1942? - -FRANK: Yes; certainly. I do not know on what you base your question. I -cannot tell you the date offhand, but it was always my endeavor... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: To confirm these facts, I can turn to your -diary. Perhaps you will recall that as a result of these negotiations an -understanding was reached between you and Himmler. - -FRANK: Yes, an understanding was reached. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In order to refresh your memory on the subject I -shall ask that the corresponding volume of your diary be handed to you, -so that you may have the text before you. - -FRANK: Yes, I am ready. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would refer you to Paragraph 2 of this -agreement. It states: - -THE PRESIDENT: Where can we find this? Is it under the date 21 April -1942? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes; that is quite right; 21 April 1942. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we have got it. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is Document Number USSR-223. It has been -translated into English, and I shall hand it over immediately. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we have it now; we were only trying to find the -place. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is on Page 18 of the English text. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Go on. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would ask you to recall the contents. It says: -“The Higher SS and Police Leader (the State Secretary) is directly -subordinate to the Governor General, and, if he is absent, then to his -Deputy.” - -Does this not mean that Himmler, so to speak, agreed with your ideal in -the sense that the Police should be subordinate to you? - -FRANK: Certainly. On that day I was satisfied; but a few days later the -whole thing was changed. I can only say that these efforts on my part -were continued, but unfortunately it was never possible to put them into -effect. - -You will find here in Paragraph 3, if you care to go on, that the -Reichsführer SS, according to the expected decree by the Führer, could -give orders to the State Secretary. So, you see, Himmler here had -reserved the right to give orders to Krüger direct. And then comes the -matter of the agreement... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is true, but in that case I must ask you to -refer to another part of the document... - -FRANK: May I say in this connection that this agreement was never put -into effect, but that this decree was published in the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_ in the form of a Führer decree. Unfortunately, I do -not know the date of that; but you can find the decree about the -regulation of security matters in the Government General, and that is -the only authoritative statement. Here, also, reference is made to the -“expected decree by the Führer,” and that agreement was just a draft of -what was to appear in the Führer decree. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, I was just proceeding to that subject. You -agree that this decision was practically a verbatim decree of the -Führer? - -FRANK: I cannot say that offhand. If you will be good enough to give me -the words of the Führer decree, I will be able to tell you about that. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes. - -[_Turning to the President._] Incidentally this decree appears in your -document book, Mr. President. - -FRANK: I haven’t the document. It seems to me that the most essential -parts of that agreement have been taken and put into this decree, with a -few changes. However, the book has been taken away from me and I cannot -compare it. - -THE PRESIDENT: The book will be submitted to you now. - -[_The book was submitted to the defendant._] - -FRANK: Very important changes have been made, unfortunately. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would request you to turn to Paragraph 3 of -Hitler’s decree, dated 7 May 1942. It is stated here that the State -Secretary for Security is directly subordinate to the Governor General. -And does this not confirm the fact that the police of the Government -General were, nevertheless, directly subordinate to you? That is -Paragraph 3 of the decree. - -FRANK: I would like to say that that is not so. The police were not -subordinate to me, even by reason of that decree—only the State -Secretary for Security. It does not say here that the police are -subordinate to the Governor General, only the State Secretary for -Security is subordinate to him. If you read Paragraph 4, then you come -to the difficulties again. Adolf Hitler’s decree was drawn up in my -absence, of course. I was not consulted by Hitler, otherwise 1 would -have protested, but in any case it was found impracticable. - -Paragraph 4 says that the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police -gave direct instructions to the State Secretary for Security in the -field of security and for the preservation of German nationality. If you -compare the original agreement with this, as contained in the diary, you -will find that in one of the most important fields the Führer had -changed his mind, that is, concerning the Commissioner for the -Preservation of German Nationality. This title embraces the Jewish -question and the question of colonization. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It appears to me, Defendant, that you have only -taken into consideration one aspect of this question, and that you have -given a rather one-sided interpretation of the excerpt quoted. May I -recall to your memory Paragraph 4 of this decree which, in Sub-paragraph -2, reads as follows: - -“The State Secretary”—this means Krüger—“must receive the consent of -the Governor General before carrying out the directives of the -Reichsführer SS and the German Police.” - -And now permit me to turn to Paragraph 5 of this self-same decree of -Hitler’s which states that “in cases of divergencies of opinion between -the Governor General and the Reichsführer of the SS and the German -Police, my decision is to be obtained through the Reich Minister and the -Head of the Reich Chancellery.” In this connection I would ask you, does -not this paragraph testify to the very considerable rights granted by -you to the leaders of the police and the SS in the Government General -and to your own responsibility for the activities of these -organizations? - -FRANK: The wording of the decree testifies to it, but the actual -development was quite the contrary. I believe that we will come to that -in detail. I maintain therefore that this attempt to gain some influence -over the police and the SS also failed. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then may I ask whose attempt it was? In this -case it is evidently an attempt by Hitler for he signed this decree. -Krüger was evidently more powerful than Hitler? - -FRANK: That question is not quite clear to me. You mean that Krüger went -against the decree of the Führer? Of course he did, but that has nothing -to do with power. That was considered by Himmler as a tremendous -concession made to me. I want to refer to a memorandum of the summer of -1942, I think, shortly after the decree of the Führer came into force. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have the following question to ask you: Is it -possible that you... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell us, Defendant, who was the actual leader of -the National Socialist Party in the Government General? - -FRANK: I hear nothing at all. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you... - -FRANK: I hear nothing at all. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have the following question to put to you: -After 6 May 1940 in the Government General... - -FRANK: 6 May? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, 6 May 1940, after the Nazi organization had -been completed in the Government General, who was appointed its leader? - -FRANK: I was. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thus the leadership of the administration of the -National Socialist Party and of the Police was concentrated in your -hands. Therefore you are responsible for the administration, the Police, -and the political life of the Government General. - -FRANK: Before I answer that question, I must protest when you say that I -had control of the Police. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I believe that that is the only way one could -interpret the Führer’s orders and the other documents which I have put -to you. - -FRANK: No doubt, if one disregards the actual facts and the realities of -the situation. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, then, let us pass on to another group of -questions. You heard of the existence of Maidanek only in 1944, isn’t -that so? - -FRANK: In 1944 the name Maidanek was brought to my knowledge officially -for the first time by the Press Chief Gassner. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will now ask that you be shown a document -which was presented by your defense counsel, which was compiled by you, -and which is a report addressed to Hitler, dated June 1943. I will read -into the record one excerpt, and I wish to remind you that this is dated -19 June 1943: - - “As a proof of the mistrust shown to the German leadership, I - enclose a characteristic excerpt from the report of the Chief of - the Security Police and SD in the Government General...” - -FRANK: Just a moment. The wrong passage has been shown me. I have the -passage here on Page 35 of the German text, and it is differently -worded. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Have you found the place now? - -FRANK: Yes. But you started with a different sentence. The sentence here -starts “A considerable part of the Polish intelligentsia...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Which page is it? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Page 35 of the German text, last paragraph. - -FRANK: It starts here with the words “A considerable part...” - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: All right. Then I will continue: - - “As a proof of the degree of the mistrust shown to the German - leadership I enclose”—these are your own words, this passage - comes somewhat higher up in the quotation—“a characteristic - excerpt from the report of the Chief of the Security Police and - SD in the Government General for the period from 1 to 31 May - 1943, concerning the possibilities of propaganda resulting from - Katyn.” - -FRANK: That is not here. Would you be good enough to show me the -passage? Now, what you are presenting here is not in my text. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, it is there; it comes somewhat earlier in -your text. - -FRANK: I think it has been omitted from my text. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I begin now at that part which you find lower -down at the bottom. Follow the text: - - “A large part of the Polish intelligentsia, however, as before, - will not allow itself to be influenced by the news from Katyn - and holds against the Germans alleged similar cruelties, - especially in Auschwitz.” - -I omit the next sentence and I continue: - - “Among that portion of the working classes which is not - communistically inclined, this is scarcely denied; at the same - time it is pointed out that the attitude of Germany towards the - Poles is not any better.” - -Please note the next sentence: - - “It is said that there are concentration camps at Auschwitz and - Maidanek where likewise the mass murder of Poles is carried out - systematically.” - -How can one reconcile this part of your report which mentions Auschwitz -and Maidanek, where mass murder took place, with your statement that you -heard of Maidanek only at the end of 1944. Well, your report is dated -June 1943; you mentioned there both Maidanek and Auschwitz. - -FRANK: With reference to Maidanek we were talking about the -extermination of Jews. The extermination of Jews in Maidanek became -known to me during the summer of 1944. Up to now the word “Maidanek” has -always been mentioned in connection with extermination of Jews. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, we are to understand—I refer to -the text submitted to you—that in May 1943 you heard of the mass murder -of Poles in Maidanek, and in 1944 you heard of the mass murder of Jews? - -FRANK: I beg your pardon? I heard about the extermination of the Jews at -Maidanek in 1944 from the official documents in the foreign press. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And you heard of the mass killings of the Poles -in 1943? - -FRANK: That is contained in my memorandum, and I protest: these are the -facts as I put them before the Führer. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will ask that another document be shown to -you. Do you know this document, are you acquainted with it? - -FRANK: It is a decree dated 2 October 1943. I assume that the wording -agrees with the text of the original decree. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, it is in full agreement with the original -text. In any case your defense counsel can follow the text and will be -able to verify it. I have to ask you one question. What do you think of -this law signed by you? - -FRANK: Yes, it is here. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You were President of the Reich Academy of Law. -From the standpoint of the most elementary standards of law, what do you -think of this law signed by you? - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the number of it? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is Exhibit USSR-335, Mr. President. - -FRANK: This is the general wording for a court-martial decree. It -provides that the proceedings should take place in the presence of a -judge, that a document should be drawn up, and that the proceedings -should be recorded in writing. Apart from that I had the power to give -pardons, so that every sentence had to be submitted to me. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to tell us how this court for -court-martial proceedings was composed, who the members of this court -were. Would you please pay attention to Paragraph 3, Point 1 of -Paragraph 3? - -FRANK: The Security Police, yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You were telling us of your hostile attitude to -the SD. Why then did you give the SD the right to exert oppression on -the Polish population? - -FRANK: Because that was the only way in which I could exert any -influence on the sentences. If I had not published this decree, there -would have been no possibility of control; and the Police would simply -have acted at random. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You spoke of the right of reprieve which was -entrusted to you. Would you please note Paragraph 6 of this law. I -remind you that a verdict of a summary court-martial by the SD was to be -put into effect immediately according to the text. I remind you again -that there was only one possible verdict: “death.” How could you change -it if the condemned person was to be shot or hanged immediately after -the verdict? - -FRANK: The sentence would nevertheless have to come before me. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, but a sentence had to be carried out -immediately. - -FRANK: Those were the general instructions which I had issued in -connection with the power given me to grant reprieves, and the committee -which dealt with reprieves was constantly sitting. Files were sent in... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Since you have spoken of the right to reprieve, -I will put to you another question. Do you remember the AB Action? - -FRANK: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you remember that this action signified the -execution of thousands of Polish intellectuals? - -FRANK: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then what did it signify? - -FRANK: It came within the framework of the general action of appeasement -and it was my plan to eliminate, by means of a properly regulated -procedure, arbitrary actions on the part of the Police. This was the -meaning of that action. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I do not understand very well what you mean. How -did you treat persons who were subject to the AB Action? What happened -to them? - -FRANK: This meeting really only dealt with the question of arrests. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you what happened to them later? - -FRANK: They were arrested and taken into protective custody. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And then? - -FRANK: Then they were subjected to the proceedings which had been -established. At least, that is what I intended. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was this left to the Police exclusively? - -FRANK: The Police were in charge. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In other words, the Police took over the -extermination of these people after they had been arrested, is that so? - -FRANK: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, then tell us, please, why you did not -exercise your power of reprieve while they were carrying out this -inhuman action? - -FRANK: I did make use of it. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will put before you your statement, dated 30 -May 1940. You certainly remember this meeting with the Police on 30 May -1940, when you gave final instructions to the police before carrying out -this action? - -FRANK: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You stated the following: - - “Any attempt on the part of the legal authorities to intervene - in the AB Action, undertaken with the help of the Police, should - be considered as treason to the State and to German interests.” - -Do you remember this statement? - -FRANK: I do not remember it, but you must take into account all the -circumstances which spread over several weeks. You must consider the -statement in its entirety and not seize upon one single sentence. This -concerns a development which went on for weeks and months, in the course -of which the reprieve committee was established by me for the first -time. That was my way of protesting against arbitrary actions and of -introducing legal justice in all these proceedings. That is a -development extending over many weeks, which you cannot, in my opinion, -summarize in one sentence. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am speaking of words which in my opinion can -have only one meaning for a jurist. You wrote: - - “The reprieve committee which is part of my office is not - concerned with these matters. The AB Action will be carried out - exclusively by Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger and his - organization. This is a purely internal action for quieting the - country which is necessary and lies outside the scope of a - normal legal trial.” - -That is to say you renounced your right of pardon? - -FRANK: At that particular moment; but if you follow the further -development of the AB Action during the following weeks you will see -that this never became effective. That was an intention, a bad -intention, which, thank God, I gave up in time. Perhaps my defense -counsel will be able to say a few words on the subject later. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One single question interests me. Did you -renounce your right of pardon while carrying out this operation or not? - -FRANK: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well then, how can you account for your words, -this one sentence: “The reprieve committee is not concerned with these -matters.”? - -How should we interpret these words? - -FRANK: This is not a decree; it is not the final ruling on the matter. -It is a remark which was made on the spur of the moment and was then -negotiated on for days. But one must recognize the final stage of the -development, and not merely the various motives as they came up during -the development. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, I understand that very well, Defendant. But -I would like to ask you, was this statement made during a conference -with the Police and did you instruct the Police in that matter? - -FRANK: Not during that meeting. I assume it came up in some other -connection. Here we discussed only this one action. After all, I also -had to talk to State Secretary Bühler. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, all right. While discussing the AB Action -with the Police you stated that the results of this action would not -concern the reprieve committee which was subordinated to you, is that -right? - -FRANK: That sentence is contained in the diary. It is not, however, the -final result, but rather an intermediate stage. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps I can recall to you another sentence, in -order that you may judge the results of this action. Perhaps you can -recall this part which I will put to you. You stated the following: - - “We need not bring these elements into German concentration - camps, for in that case we would only have difficulties and an - unnecessary correspondence with their families. We must simply - liquidate matters in the country, and in the simplest way.” - -What you mean is that this would simply be a question of liquidation in -the simplest form, is that not so? - -FRANK: That is a terrible word. But, thank God, it did not take place in -this way. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, but these persons were executed. What do -you mean by saying that this was not carried out? Obviously this was -carried out, for the persons were executed. - -FRANK: When they were sentenced they were killed, if the right to pardon -them was not exercised. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And they were condemned without application of -the right of pardon? - -FRANK: I do not believe so. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Unfortunately these people are no more, and -therefore obviously they were executed. - -FRANK: Which people? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Those who were arrested under the AB Action. I -will remind you of another excerpt connected with this AB Action. If you -did not agree with the Police with regard to certain police actions it -would be difficult to explain the celebrations in connection with the -departure of Brigadeführer SS Streckenbach when he left for Berlin. Does -this not mean that you were at least on friendly terms with the Police? - -FRANK: In connection with political relations many words of praise are -spoken which are not in keeping with the truth. You know that as well as -any other person. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will allow myself to remind you of only one -passage of your speech addressed to the Brigadeführer Streckenbach, one -sentence only. You said: - - “What you, Brigadeführer Streckenbach, and your people, have - done in the Government General must not be forgotten; and you - need not be ashamed of it.” - -That testifies, does it not, to quite a different attitude toward -Streckenbach and his people? - -FRANK: And it was not forgotten either. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no further questions to put to the -defendant. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does that conclude the cross-examination? - -MR. DODD: I have only one or two questions, if Your Honor pleases. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] In the course of your examination I -understood you to say that you had never gathered to yourself any of the -art treasures of the Government General. By that I do not suppose you to -mean that you did not have them collected and registered; you did have -them collected and registered, isn’t that so? - -FRANK: Art treasures in the Government General were officially collected -and registered. The book has been submitted here in Court. - -MR. DODD: Yes. And you told the Tribunal that before you got there one -Dürer collection had already been seized—before you took over your -duties. - -FRANK: May I ask you to understand that as follows: - -These were the Dürers which were removed in Lvov before the civilian -administration was set up there. Herr Mühlmann went to Lvov at the time -and took them from the library. I had never been in Lvov before that. -These pictures were then taken directly to the Führer headquarters or to -Reich Marshal Göring, I am not sure which. - -MR. DODD: They were collected for Göring, that is what I am driving at. -Is that not a fact? - -FRANK: State Secretary Mühlmann, when I asked him, told me that he came -on orders of the Reich Marshal and that he had taken them away on orders -of the Reich Marshal. - -MR. DODD: And were there not some other art objects that were collected -by the Reich Marshal, and also by the Defendant Rosenberg, at the time -you told the Tribunal you were too busy with war tasks to get involved -in that sort of thing? - -FRANK: I know of nothing of that sort in the Government General. The -Einsatzstab Rosenberg had no jurisdiction in the Government General; and -apart from the collection of the composer Elsner and a Jewish library -from Lublin I had no official obligation to demand the return of any art -treasures from Rosenberg. - -MR. DODD: But there were some art treasures in your possession when you -were captured by the American forces. - -FRANK: Yes. They were not in my possession. I was safeguarding them but -not for myself. They were also not in my immediate safekeeping; rather I -had taken them along with me from burning Silesia. They could not be -safeguarded any other way. They were art treasures which are so widely -known that they are Numbers 1 to 10 in the list in the book—no one -could have appropriated them. You cannot steal a “Mona Lisa.” - -MR. DODD: Well, I merely wanted to clear that up. I knew you had said on -interrogation there were some in your possession. I am not trying to -imply you were holding them for yourself, if you were not. However, I -think you have made that clear. - -FRANK: I should like to remark in this connection, since I attach -particular importance to the point, that these art treasures with which -we are concerned could be safeguarded only in this way. Otherwise they -would have been lost. - -MR. DODD: Very well. I have one other matter I would like to clear up -and I will not be long. - -I understood you also to say this morning that you had struggled for -some time to effect the release of the Kraków professors who were seized -and sent to Oranienburg soon after the occupation of Poland. Now, of -course, you are probably familiar with what you said about it yourself -in your diary, are you? - -FRANK: Yes, I said so this morning. Quite apart from what is said in the -diary, what I said this morning is the truth. You must never forget that -I had to speak among a circle of deadly enemies, people who reported -every word I said to the Führer and Himmler. - -MR. DODD: Well, of course, you recall that you suggested that they -should have been retained in Poland, and liquidated or imprisoned there. - -FRANK: Never—not even if you confront me with this statement. I never -did that. On the contrary, I received the professors from Kraków and -talked to them quietly. Of all that happened I regretted that most of -all. - -MR. DODD: Perhaps you do not understand me. I am talking about what you -wrote in your own diary about these professors, and I shall be glad to -read it to you and make it available to you if you care to contest it. -You are not denying that you said they should either be returned for -liquidation in Poland, or imprisoned in Poland, are you? You do not deny -that? - -FRANK: I have just told you that I did say all that merely to hoodwink -my enemies; in reality I liberated the professors. Nothing more happened -to them after that. - -MR. DODD: All right. - -Were you also talking for special purposes when you gave General Krüger, -the SS and Higher Police official, that fond farewell? - -FRANK: The same applies also in this case. Permit me to say, sir, that I -admit without reservation what can be admitted; but I have also sworn to -add nothing. No one can admit any more than I have done by handing over -these diaries. What I am asking is that you do not ask me to add -anything to that. - -MR. DODD: No, I am not asking you to add anything to it; rather, I was -trying to clear it up, because you’ve made a rather difficult situation, -perhaps, for yourself and for others. You see, if we cannot believe what -you wrote in your diary, I don’t know how you can ask us to believe what -you say here. You were writing those things yourself, and at the time -you wrote them I assume you didn’t expect that you would be confronted -with them. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does he not mean that this was a record of a speech that -he has made? - -MR. DODD: In his diary, yes. It is recorded in his diary. - -THE PRESIDENT: When he said, “I did that to hoodwink my enemies”? - -MR. DODD: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: I presume that that particular record is a record of some -speech that he made. - -MR. DODD: It is. It is entered in the diary. - -FRANK: May I say something about that. It wasn’t that I put myself in a -difficult position; rather the changing course of the war made the -situation difficult for every administrative official. - -MR. DODD: Finally, do you recall an entry in your diary in which you -stated that you had a long hour and a half talk with the Führer and that -you had... - -FRANK: When was the last conference, please? - -MR. DODD: Well, this entry is on Monday, the 17th of March 1941. It’s in -your diary. - -FRANK: That was probably one of the very few conferences; whether I was -alone with him, I don’t know. - -MR. DODD: ...in which you said you and the Führer had come to a complete -agreement and that he approved all the measures, including all the -decrees, especially also the entire organization of the country. Would -you stand by that today? - -FRANK: No, but I might say the following: The Führer’s approval was -always very spontaneously given, but one always had to wait a long while -for it to be realized. - -MR. DODD: Was that one of the times you complained to him, as you told -us this morning? - -FRANK: I constantly complained. As you know, I offered to resign on 14 -occasions. - -MR. DODD: Yes, I know; but on this occasion did you make many complaints -and did you have the approval of the Führer, or did he turn down your -complaints on this occasion of the 17th of March, 1941? - -FRANK: The Führer took a very simple way out at the time by saying, -“You’ll have to settle that with Himmler.” - -MR. DODD: Well, that isn’t really an answer. You’ve entered in your -diary that you talked it out with him and that he approved everything, -and you make no mention in your diary of any disappointment over the -filing of a complaint. Surely, this wasn’t a speech that you were -recording in your diary; it seems to be a factual entry on your -conversations with the Führer. And my question is simply, do you now -admit that that was the situation, or are you saying that it was a false -entry? - -FRANK: I beg your pardon, I didn’t say that I made false entries. I -never said that, and I’m not going to argue about words. I am merely -saying that you must judge the words according to the entire context. If -I emphasized in the presence of officials that the Führer received me -and agreed to my measures, then I did that to back up my own authority. -I couldn’t do that without the Führer’s agreement. What my thoughts -were, is not made clear from this. I should like to emphasize that I’m -not arguing about words and have not asked to do that. - -MR. DODD: Very well, I don’t care to press it any further. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, do you wish to re-examine? - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, the first question put to you by the Soviet -Prosecutor was whether you were the chief of the NSDAP in the Government -General, and you answered “yes.” Did the Party have any decisive -influence in the Government General on political and administrative -life? - -FRANK: No. The Party as an organization in that sphere was, of course, -only nominally under my jurisdiction, for all the Party officials were -appointed by Bormann without my being consulted. There is no special -Führer decree for the spheres of activity of the NSDAP in the occupied -territories, in which it says that these spheres of activity are -directly under Reichsleiter Bormann’s jurisdiction. - -DR. SEIDL: Did your activity in that sphere of the NSDAP in the -territory of the Government General have anything at all to do with any -Security Police affairs? - -FRANK: No, the Party was much too small to play any important part; it -had no state function. - -DR. SEIDL: The next question: The Soviet Prosecution showed you Document -USSR-335. It is the Decree on Drumhead Courts-Martial of 1943. It states -in Paragraph 6: “Drumhead court-martial sentences are to be carried out -at once.” Is it correct if I say that no formal legal appeal against -these sentences was possible, but that a pardon was entirely admissible? - -FRANK: Certainly; but, nevertheless, I must say that this decree is -impossible. - -DR. SEIDL: What conditions in the Government General occasioned the -issuing of this decree of 2 October 1943? I am thinking in particular of -the security situation. - -FRANK: Looking back from the more peaceful conditions of the present -time, I cannot think of any reason which might have made such a demand -possible; but if one recalls the events of war, and the universal -conflagration, it seems to have been a measure of desperation. - -DR. SEIDL: I now come back to the AB Action. Is it true that in 1939 a -court-martial decree was issued providing for considerably greater legal -guarantees than that of 1943? - -FRANK: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that people arrested in the AB Action were, on -the strength of this court-martial decree, sentenced or acquitted? - -FRANK: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it also true that all sentences of these courts were, as -you saw fit, to be passed on to the competent reprieve committee under -State Secretary Bühler? - -FRANK: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: The prosecutor of the United States has laid it to your -charge that in Neuhaus, where you were arrested after the collapse of -the German Armed Forces, various art treasures were found, not in your -house, but in the office of the Governor General. Is it true that you -sent State Secretary Dr. Bühler with a letter to Reich Minister Dr. -Lammers, and that this letter contained a list of these art treasures? - -FRANK: Yes, not only that, I at once called the attention of the head of -the Pinakothek in Munich to the fact that these pictures were there and -that they should at once be safeguarded against bombing. He also looked -at the pictures and then they were put in a bombproof cellar. I am glad -I did so, for who knows what might otherwise have happened to these -valuable objects. - -DR. SEIDL: And now one last question. The Prosecution has submitted -Document 661-PS. This document also has a USSR exhibit number, which I -don’t know at the moment. This is a document which has been made to have -a bearing on the activities of the Academy for German Law, of which you -were president. The document has the heading “Legal Formation of -Germany’s Polish Policy on Racial-Political Lines”; the legal part -serves as a tect for the Committee on the Law of Nationalities in the -Academy for German Law. I’m having this document submitted to you. -Please, will you tell me whether you’ve ever had this document in your -hands before? - -FRANK: From whom does it come? - -DR. SEIDL: That is the extraordinary part; it has the Exhibit Number -USA-300. - -FRANK: Does it state anywhere who drew it up or something of the sort? - -DR. SEIDL: The document has no author; nor does it show on whose order -it was compiled. - -FRANK: I can say merely that I’ve never seen the document; that I never -gave an order for it to be drawn up; so I can say really nothing about -it. - -DR. SEIDL: It states here that it was found in the Ministry of Justice -in Kassel. Was there a Ministry of Justice in Kassel in 1940? - -FRANK: A Ministry of Justice in Kassel? - -DR. SEIDL: Yes. - -FRANK: That has not been in existence since 1866. - -DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to his seat. - -DR. SEIDL: In that case, with the permission of the Tribunal, I shall -call witness Dr. Bilfinger. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: This document which you produced as USSR-223, which are -extracts from Defendant Frank’s diary; are you offering that in -evidence? Apparently some entries from Frank’s diary have already been -offered in evidence; others have not. Are you wishing to offer this in -evidence? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This document has already been submitted in -evidence under two numbers; the first number is 2233-PS, which was -submitted by the American Prosecution, and the second is Exhibit -USSR-223, and was already submitted by us on 15 February, 1946. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see. Have these entries which you have in this document -been submitted under USSR-223? You see, the PS number does not -necessarily mean that the documents have been offered in evidence. The -PS numbers were applied to documents before they were offered in -evidence; but the USSR-223 does imply that it has been offered in -evidence. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This document has already been presented in -evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, what the Tribunal wants to know is -whether you wish to offer this USSR-223 in evidence, because unless it -was read before it hasn’t been offered in evidence, or it hasn’t gone -into the record. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: We already read an excerpt on 15 February, and -it is, therefore, already read into the record. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I retire, Mr. President? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -[_The witness Bilfinger took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you stand up, please, and will you tell us your full -name? - -RUDOLF BILFINGER (Witness): Rudolf Bilfinger. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, since when were you active in the Reich Security -Main Office (RSHA), and in what position? - -BILFINGER: From the end of 1937 until the beginning of 1943 I was -government councillor in the RSHA, and later senior government -councillor and expert on legal questions, and legal questions in -connection with the police. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that on two occasions and at different times -you were head of the “Administration and Law” department attached to the -commander of the Security Police and SD in Kraków? - -BILFINGER: Yes. In the autumn of 1940 and in 1944 I was head of the -department “Administration and Law” attached to the commander of the -Security Police and SD in Kraków. - -DR. SEIDL: What were the tasks you had to fulfil at different times in -the Government General—in broad outline. - -BILFINGER: In 1940 I had the task of taking over from the Government -General a number of branches of the police administration and working in -that connection under the Higher SS and Police Leader. - -DR. SEIDL: What was the legal position of the Higher SS and Police -Leader, and what was his relation to the Governor General? Did the -Higher SS and Police Leader receive his instructions concerning the -Security Police and the SD from the Governor General? Or did he receive -them direct from the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the Police, that is, -Himmler? - -BILFINGER: The Higher SS and Police Leader from the very beginning -received his instructions direct from the Reichsführer SS, Himmler. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it furthermore true that the commander of the Security -Police and of the SD in the Government General also received direct -orders and instructions from Amt IV, the Gestapo, and from Amt V, the -Criminal Police in the RSHA? - -BILFINGER: Yes, the commander of the Security Police received many -orders direct from the various departments of the RSHA, particularly -from departments IV and V. - -DR. SEIDL: Did the institution of the State Secretariat for Security, -which occurred in 1942, bring about a change in the legal position of -the Governor General with reference to measures of the Security Police -and the SD? - -BILFINGER: The appointment of a State Secretary as such did not alter -the legal position of the Governor General or of the State Secretary. -New spheres of activity were merely added to the State Secretariat for -Security. - -DR. SEIDL: Do you know of a decree of Reichsführer SS and Chief of the -German Police, Himmler, in the year 1939, and what were its contents? - -BILFINGER: I knew of a decree, probably dated 1939, dealing with the -appointment of the Higher SS and Police Leader, which ruled that the -Higher SS and Police Leader would receive his instructions direct from -Himmler. - -DR. SEIDL: The institution of the State Secretariat dated from 7 May -1942 and was based on a Führer decree. The application of this decree -called forth another decree dated 3 June 1942, which dealt with the -transfer of official business to the State Secretary for Security. Do -you know the contents of that decree? - -BILFINGER: The essential contents of the decrees which you have -mentioned are known to me. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that on the basis of this decree the entire -Political Police and the Criminal Police, as had been the case before, -were again subordinated to the State Secretary for Security within the -framework of the Security Police? - -BILFINGER: These two branches from the very beginning were under the -Higher SS and Police Leader, and later on under the State Secretary for -Security. To this extent the decree did not bring about a change, but -was merely a confirmation. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it known to you that in Appendix B of that decree there -are 26 paragraphs in which all the branches of the Security Police are -transferred to the Higher SS and Police Chief as State Secretary for -Security? - -BILFINGER: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: Do you know that in this decree, in Appendix B, Jewish -matters are also mentioned specifically? - -BILFINGER: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: Do you know that in Paragraph 21 of Appendix B it is ruled: - - “The special fields of the Security Police: Representation of - the Government General at conferences and meetings, particularly - with the central offices of the Reich, which deal with the - above-mentioned special fields.”? - -BILFINGER: I know that as far as the sense is concerned, such a ruling -was contained therein. Whether Paragraph 21 or another paragraph was -worded this way I don’t remember. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it also true that on the basis of this decree the last -remains of the administrative police were removed from the -administration of the Government General and handed over to the State -Secretary for Security, who was directly under Himmler. - -BILFINGER: That was the intention and the purpose of this decree. But, -contrary to the wording of that decree, only a few branches were taken -away from the administration; concerning the remainder a fight ensued -later. The result was, however, that all branches of the police -administration were taken away. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, did the administration of the Government General -have anything to do with the establishment and administration of -concentration camps? - -BILFINGER: To the best of my knowledge, no. - -DR. SEIDL: You were with the Chief of the Security Police and SD in -Kraków. When did you yourself hear of concentration camps at Maidanek, -Treblinka, and Lublin for the first time? - -BILFINGER: May I correct you, I was attached to the Commander of -Security Police. - -DR. SEIDL: Yes, the Commander of the Security Police. - -BILFINGER: I heard of Maidanek for the first time when Lublin and -Maidanek were occupied by the Russians; and through propaganda I heard -for the first time what the name Maidanek meant, when the then Governor -General Frank ordered an investigation regarding events in Maidanek and -responsibility for these events. - -DR. SEIDL: According to your own observation, generally speaking, what -were the relations like between the Governor General and the SS -Obergruppenführer Krüger, and what were the reasons for those relations? - -BILFINGER: Relations between them were very bad from the beginning. The -reasons were partly questions of organization and of the use of the -Police, and partly essential differences of opinion. - -DR. SEIDL: What do you mean by essential differences of opinion? Do you -mean different opinions regarding the treatment of the Polish -population? - -BILFINGER: I can still recollect one example which concerned the -confirmation of police court-martial sentences by Governor General -Frank. In opposition to Krüger’s opinion, he either failed to confirm a -number of sentences or else mitigated them considerably. In this -connection I remember such differences of opinion. - -DR. SEIDL: Were these sentences which were passed in connection with the -so-called AB Action? - -BILFINGER: I know nothing of an AB Action. - -DR. SEIDL: You came to the Government General later, did you? - -BILFINGER: I came to the Government General in August 1940. - -DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions for this witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask questions? - -DR. RUDOLF MERKEL (Counsel for Gestapo): May I put a few questions to -the witness? - -Witness, the Prosecution states that the State Police was a circle of -persons formed in accordance with a common plan, and that membership in -it was voluntary. Since you had an especially high position in the RSHA, -I ask you to tell me briefly what you know about these questions? - -BILFINGER: Of the members of the Secret State Police only a small part -were volunteers. The former officials, the officials of the former -political department of the headquarters of the Commissioner of the -Police, constituted the nucleus of the membership of the Secret State -Police. The various local police head offices were created from these -former political departments of the central police headquarters, and at -the same time practically all the officials from these former political -departments were taken over. In Berlin, for example, it was Department -I-A of the central police headquarters. - -Apart from that, administrative officials were transferred from other -administrative authorities to the Secret State Police, or were detailed -to go here. As time went on people from other administrations and -offices were forced to transfer to the Secret State Police. Thus, for -instance, the entire frontier customs service was transferred to the -Secret State Police in 1944 by order of the Führer. At about the same -time the whole of the intelligence service was transferred. - -In the course of the war numerous members of the Waffen-SS who were no -longer eligible for active military service were detailed to the Secret -State Police. In addition many people who originally had had nothing to -do with police work were drafted as emergency members to the Secret -State Police. - -DR. MERKEL: If I summarize it by saying that the Secret State Police was -a Reich authority and that the German civil service law applied to its -employees, is that correct? - -BILFINGER: Yes. - -DR. MERKEL: Was it possible for the officials to resign from the Secret -State Police easily? - -BILFINGER: It was extremely difficult and, in fact, impossible to resign -from the Secret State Police. One could resign only in very special -circumstances. - -DR. MERKEL: It has been stated here with reference to the composition of -the Secret State Police personnel that there was the following -proportion: executive officers about 20 percent; administrative -officials about 20 percent; and technical personnel approximately 60 -percent. Are these figures about right? - -BILFINGER: I have no general information about the composition of the -personnel; but for certain offices about which I knew more these figures -would probably apply. - -DR. MERKEL: Under whose jurisdiction were the concentration camps in -Germany and in the occupied countries? - -BILFINGER: The concentration camps were under the jurisdiction of the -Economic Administration Main Office under SS Gruppenführer Pohl. - -DR. MERKEL: Did the Secret State Police have anything to do with the -administration of the concentration camps? - -BILFINGER: No. It maybe that at the beginning certain concentration -camps here and there were administered directly by the Secret State -Police for a short period. That was probably the case in individual -instances. But in principle even at that time, and later on without -exception, the concentration camps were administered by the Economic -Administration Main Office. - -DR. MERKEL: Do you know at all who gave orders for the liquidations -which took place in the concentration camps? - -BILFINGER: No, I know nothing about that. - -DR. MERKEL: Can you say anything about the grounds for protective -custody? On the strength of what legal rulings was protective custody -decreed after 1933? - -BILFINGER: Protective custody was based on the Decree of the Reich -President for the Protection of the People and the State, of February -1933, in which a number of the basic rights of the Weimar Constitution -were rescinded. - -DR. MERKEL: Was there later a decree by the Minister of the Interior -which dealt with protective custody, at the end of 1936 or the beginning -of 1937? - -BILFINGER: Yes, at that time the Protective Custody Law was drawn up. -The legal basis as such remained in force. At that time power to decree -protective custody was confined to the Secret State Police. Before that -a number of other offices, rightly or wrongly, had decreed protective -custody. To prevent this, protective custody was then confined to the -Secret State Police. - -DR. MERKEL: Is it correct that for some time you were in France. In what -capacity were you there? - -BILFINGER: In the late summer and autumn of 1943 I was commander of the -Security Police in France, in Toulouse. - -DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything about an order from the RSHA, or from -the commander of the Sipo for France, or from individual district -commanders, to the effect that ill-treatment or torture was to be -applied when prisoners were interrogated? - -BILFINGER: No, I do not know of such orders. - -DR. MERKEL: Then how do you explain the ill-treatment and atrocities -which actually took place in connection with interrogations, proof of -which has been given by the Prosecution? - -BILFINGER: It is possible that ill-treatment did occur; in a number of -cases this either took place in spite of its being forbidden, or else it -was committed by members of other German offices in France which did not -belong to the Security Police. - -DR. MERKEL: Did you, while you were active in France, hear of any such -ill-treatment either officially or by hearsay? - -BILFINGER: I never heard of any such ill-treatment at the hands of -members of the German police or the German Armed Forces. I heard only of -cases of ill-treatment carried out by groups consisting of Frenchmen who -were being employed by some German authority. - -DR. MERKEL: Were there so-called Gestapo prisons in France? - -BILFINGER: No, the Security Police in France did not have prisons of -their own. They handed over their prisoners to the detention camps of -the German Armed Forces. - -DR. MERKEL: One last question: The Prosecution has given proof of a -large number of crimes against humanity and war crimes which were -committed with the participation of the Security Police. Can one say -that these crimes were perfectly obvious and were known to all members -of the Secret State Police, or were these crimes known only to a small -circle of persons who had been ordered directly to carry out the -measures concerned? Do you know anything about that? - -BILFINGER: I didn’t quite understand the question from the beginning. -Were you referring to France or to the Security Police in general? - -DR. MERKEL: I was referring to the Security Police in general. - -BILFINGER: No ill-treatment or torture of any kind was permitted; and, -as far as I know, nothing of the kind did happen, still less was it -known generally or to a larger circle of persons. I knew nothing about -it. - -DR. MERKEL: I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? Is there -nothing you wish to ask arising from Dr. Merkel’s cross-examination, Dr. -Seidl? - -DR. SEIDL: I have only one more question to ask the witness. - -Witness, in Paragraph 4 of the decree of 23 June 1942 the following -ruling is made, and I quote: - - “The SS and Police Leaders in the districts are directly - subordinate to the governors of the districts, just as the State - Secretary for Security is subordinate to the Governor General.” - -Thus it does not say that the entire police organization is subordinate, -but only the police leaders. - -Now I ask you whether orders which had been issued by the commanders of -the Security Police and the SD were forwarded to the governors or were -sent directly to the district chiefs of the Security Police and the SD? - -BILFINGER: These orders were always sent directly from the commander to -the district chiefs of the Security Police and the SD. The commander -could give no instructions to the governors. - -DR. SEIDL: If I understand you correctly you mean that the Security -Police and the SD had their own official channels which had absolutely -nothing to do with the administrative construction of the Government -General. - -BILFINGER: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions for the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. - -DR. SEIDL: With the permission of the Tribunal, I call as the next -witness the former Governor of Kraków, Dr. Kurt von Burgsdorff. - -[_The witness Von Burgsdorff took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -KURT VON BURGSDORFF (Witness): Kurt von Burgsdorff. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: - -“I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing.” - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Government General was divided into five -districts at the head of each of which there was a governor; is that -correct? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: From 1 December 1943 until the occupation of your district by -Soviet troops you were governor of the district Kraków? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. To use the correct official term, I was... - -GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Mr. -President, the defense counsel has put the question of the “occupation” -of this region by Soviet troops. I energetically protest against such -terminology and consider it a hostile move. - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I have just been told that perhaps a mistake -in the translation has crept in. All I intended to say was that, in the -course of the year 1944, the area of which this witness was governor was -occupied by the Soviet troops in the course of military action. I do not -know what the Soviet prosecutor is protesting against; it is at any rate -far from my intention to make any hostile statement here. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think the point was, it was not an occupation; it was a -liberation by the Russian Army. - -DR. SEIDL: Of course; I did not want to say any more than that the -German troops were driven out of this area by the Soviet troops. - -Witness, will you please continue with your answer? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I was entrusted with exercising the duties of a -governor—that is the correct official expression. Until a few months -ago I was still an officer of the Wehrmacht, and during my entire -activity in Kraków I remained an officer of the Wehrmacht. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, according to your observations, what basically was -the attitude of the Governor General toward the Polish and Ukrainian -people? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I want to emphasize that I can answer only for the year -1944. At that time the attitude of the Governor General was that he -wished to live in peace with the people. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that already in 1942 the Governor General had -given the governors the opportunity of setting up administrative -committees, comprised of Poles and Ukrainians, attached to the district -chiefs? - -VON BURGSDORFF: There was a governmental decree to this effect. Whether -that was in 1942 or not I do not know. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself make use of the authorization contained -therein, and did you establish such administrative committees? - -VON BURGSDORFF: In the district of Kraków I had such a committee -established at once for every district chief. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, according to your observations what was the food -situation like in the Government General, and particularly in your -district? - -VON BURGSDORFF: It was not unsatisfactory; but I must add that the -reason for that was that, in addition to the rations, the Polish -population had an extensive black market. - -DR. SEIDL: According to your observations what was the attitude of the -Governor General on the question of the mobilization of labor? - -VON BURGSDORFF: He did not wish any workers sent outside the Government -General, because he was interested in retaining the necessary manpower -within the country. - -DR. SEIDL: Was the Church persecuted by the Governor General in the -Government General; and what basically was the attitude of the Governor -General to this question, according to your observations? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Again I can answer only for my district and for the year -1944. There was no persecution of the Church; on the contrary, the -relations with churches of all denominations were good in my district. -On my travels I always received the clergy, and I never heard any -complaint. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you have any personal experience with the Governor -General with regard to this question? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. In the middle of January 1944 I was appointed -District Standortführer by the Governor General, who at the same time -was the Party Leader in the Government General; that is, I was appointed -to a Party office for the district of Kraków. I pointed out to him, as I -had pointed out to the Minister of the Interior, Himmler, before, that I -was a convinced church-going Christian. The Governor General replied -that he was in no way perturbed by that and that he knew of no provision -in the Party program which prohibited it. - -DR. SEIDL: What, according to your observations, were the relations like -between the Governor General and the administration of the Government -General on the one side, and the Security Police and the SD on the other -side? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Doubtlessly underneath they were bad, because the Police -always ended by doing only what it wanted and did not concern itself -with the administration. For that reason in the country districts also -there was real friction between the administration offices and the -Police. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that when you took office, or shortly after, -the Governor General issued several instructions referring to the -Police? I quote from the diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank, the entry of -4 January 1944: - - “The Governor General then gave some instructions to Dr. Von - Burgsdorff with reference to his new activities. His task will - be to inform himself, as a matter of principle, of all decisive - factors in the district. Above all the Governor should direct - his efforts to opposing energetically any encroachments by the - Police.” - -VON BURGSDORFF: Today I no longer remember that conversation of 4 -January 1944, but it may have taken place. However, I do remember that -after I took office, at the end of November 1943, I went to see the -Governor General once more and told him that I had heard that the -relations with the Police were not good and were scarcely tolerable for -the administration. He replied that he was doing what he could in order, -as I might put it, to bring the Police to reason. It was on the basis of -this statement by the Governor General that I definitely decided to -remain in the Government General. I had, as is known, told the Reich -Minister of the Interior that I was unwilling to go there. - -DR. SEIDL: In your capacity as Governor did you have any authority to -issue commands to the Security Police and the SD in your district? - -VON BURGSDORFF: None whatsoever. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself ever see a police directive? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Never. With the Police, orders are passed down -vertically, that is, directly from the Higher SS and Police Leader to -the SS and Police Leader respectively—and that is probably the usual -way—from the chief of the Security Police to the unit commander of the -Security Police. - -DR. SEIDL: In your activity as Governor did you have anything to do with -the administration of concentration camps? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Never. - -DR. SEIDL: Do you know who administered the concentration camps? - -VON BURGSDORFF: No, not from my own experience; but I have heard that -there was some central office in Berlin under the Reichsführer SS. - -DR. SEIDL: When did you hear for the first time of the Maidanek -concentration camp? - -VON BURGSDORFF: From you, about a fortnight ago. - -DR. SEIDL: You want to tell the Tribunal under oath... - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: ...that you, although you were Governor of Kraków in the -occupied Polish territory, did not learn about that until during your -captivity? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes, I am firmly convinced that I heard about this -concentration camp from you for the first time. - -DR. SEIDL: When did you for the first time hear of the Treblinka -concentration camp? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Also from you on the same occasion. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Governor General is accused by the Prosecution -of issuing a summary court-martial decree in the year 1943. What at that -time was the security situation in the Government General? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Again I can judge only for the year 1944. As the German -troops came back from the East, it became worse and worse, so that in my -district it became increasingly difficult to carry out any kind of -administration. - -DR. SEIDL: According to your observations what was the economic -situation like in the agricultural and industrial sectors of your -district, and is the statement justified that, allowing for wartime -conditions, the administration of the Government General had done -everything to promote economy? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Economy in my district was at full force in 1944 both in -industry and in agriculture. Some industries had been transferred from -the Reich to the Government General; and, as far as agriculture was -concerned, the administration imported large quantities of fertilizers -and seeds and the like. Horse breeding was also greatly promoted in my -district. - -DR. SEIDL: The Defendant Dr. Frank is accused of not having done -everything that was necessary with regard to public health and sanitary -conditions. What can you say about this point? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I can say that in my district—again speaking of -1944—hospitals were improved and new ones installed. A great deal was -done, especially in the fighting of epidemics. Typhus, dysentery, and -typhoid were greatly reduced by inoculation. - -DR. SEIDL: The Defendant Frank is also accused of having neglected -higher education. Do you know anything about the conditions in the -Government General in regard to this? - -VON BURGSDORFF: When I came into the Government General there was no -longer any higher education at all. On the basis of other experiences I -suggested immediately that Polish universities be opened again. I -contacted the president of the main department for education, who told -me that the government was already entertaining such plans. In every one -of my monthly reports I pointed out the necessity for Polish -universities, because within a short time, or more correctly in a few -years’ time, there would be a shortage of technicians, doctors, and -veterinaries. - -DR. SEIDL: Now, one last question. There was a so-called sphere of -activity of the NSDAP in the Government General; you were the District -Standortführer in the Government General? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, what, according to your observations, were the -relations between the Governor General and the Head of the Party -Chancellery, Bormann? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I believe I can say without exaggeration that they were -extremely bad. As District Standortführer I combined this office with -that of District Governor and witnessed the last great struggle of the -Governor General against Bormann. The Governor General held the view, -and in this he was justified, that it was wrong to combine the Party -office with the government office. He was afraid there would be too much -interference not only by the Police but also by the Party, and he wanted -to prevent that. Bormann, on the other hand, wanted to establish the -predominance of the Party over the State in the Government General as -well. That led to the most serious conflict. - -DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions for the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other Defense Counsel wish to ask any other -questions? - -DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): -Witness, you were at one time Under State Secretary in the Government of -the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia? When was that? - -VON BURGSDORFF: From the end of March 1939 until the middle of March -1942. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And to whom were you directly subordinate as Under -State Secretary? The State Secretary Frank or the Reich Protector? - -VON BURGSDORFF: State Secretary Frank. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: How did you come to know about the activities of -Von Neurath as Reich Protector? - -VON BURGSDORFF: From conferences with him and personal conversations. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What kind of work did you have to do as Under -State Secretary? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I was in charge of the administration proper. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were the Police and the various SS and police -offices subordinate to you? - -VON BURGSDORFF: No. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: To whom were they subordinate? - -VON BURGSDORFF: To State Secretary Frank. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was State Secretary Frank’s attitude to Von -Neurath? - -VON BURGSDORFF: You mean officially? - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Officially, yes, of course. - -VON BURGSDORFF: Herr Von Neurath tried at first to get on with Herr -Frank; but the stronger Frank’s position became, the more impossible -that was. State Secretary Frank, later Minister Frank, had behind him -the entire power of the SS and the Police, and finally Hitler also. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: From whom did Frank get his orders directly? - -VON BURGSDORFF: As far as I know, from Himmler; however, I saw that on -one or two or three occasions he received direct orders from Hitler. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And that happened mostly without Von Neurath being -consulted? - -VON BURGSDORFF: That I cannot say, but I assume so. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was it possible for Frank to perform his political -functions independently within his sphere of activity, or did he have to -have the approval of Herr Von Neurath? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Whether he was authorized or allowed to do so, I should -not like to decide, but at any rate he did so. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were Herr Von Neurath and Herr Frank of the same -opinion concerning the policy towards the Czech people? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I did not understand your question. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath agree with the policy toward -the Czech people pursued by Frank or his superior, Himmler? - -VON BURGSDORFF: No. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Could he carry through his aims? - -VON BURGSDORFF: He could not do anything, confronted as he was by -Himmler’s and Hitler’s immense power. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Herr Von Neurath’s own policy and -attitude? - -VON BURGSDORFF: At the beginning I spoke very often about these things -to Herr Von Neurath. On the basis of the decree of 15 March he hoped and -believed he could get the Germans and Czechs in the Protectorate to live -together reasonably and peacefully. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But as Frank’s position became stronger, that -became more and more difficult? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you remember that in the middle of November -1939 serious disturbances broke out among the students in Prague? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you also remember that on the day after these -incidents Herr Von Neurath and Frank flew to Berlin? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you remember that Frank returned from Berlin -alone on the same day? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I believe I can recall that Frank returned on the same -day, but I do not know whether he returned alone. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You don’t know whether Herr Von Neurath returned -with him? - -VON BURGSDORFF: No. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything else about the incidents -connected with the students’ disturbances and what the consequences -were? - -VON BURGSDORFF: They resulted, as far as I remember, in the execution of -several students and in the closing of the universities. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know whether the universities were closed -on Himmler’s order? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about the attitude of Herr -Von Neurath towards the Catholic and Protestant Churches? - -VON BURGSDORFF: His attitude was always above reproach, and there were -no difficulties with the churches during the time that I was in the -Protectorate. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that Herr Von Neurath was in contact -with the Archbishop of Prague until the latter’s death? - -VON BURGSDORFF: No, I don’t know anything about that. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything concerning whether, during -the term of office of Herr Von Neurath, with his approval or upon his -orders, art treasures of any kind, pictures, monuments, sculptures, -libraries, or the like, belonging either to the State or to private -owners, were confiscated and removed from the country? - -VON BURGSDORFF: It is certain, absolutely certain, that he did not order -anything of the sort. Whether he consented in any way to this I do not -know, but I do not believe so. I remember one incident in the Malta -Palace, where some Reich office—I don’t remember today which it -was—removed art treasures. Herr Von Neurath immediately did everything -to make good this damage. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that the customs union which had been -ordered by Berlin from the very beginning between the Protectorate and -Germany was not established for a long time because of Herr Von -Neurath’s intervention? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. I definitely know about that. However, in the -interest of the truth, I have to add that State Secretary Frank also was -against the customs union, because, like Herr Von Neurath, he believed -that the economy of the Protectorate would be damaged by the stronger -economy of Germany. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: While Von Neurath was Reich Protector, was there -any compulsory deportation of workers? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I am convinced that that did not happen. Workers were -recruited, but in an entirely regular manner. That was the case while I -was in the Protectorate. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know whether Von Neurath made travel in or -out of the Protectorate dependent on official approval? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Whether or not Von Neurath did that, I do not know. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about the closing of the -secondary schools? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about it? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I remember that the closing of the secondary schools was -a necessary consequence of the closing of the universities. There were -too many secondary schools in the Protectorate. Not all of them were -closed by any means. On the other hand technical schools were greatly -expanded and new ones established. I cannot remember anything more exact -about it. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Von Neurath’s attitude -towards the Germanization of Czechoslovakia as intended by Himmler? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes, I remember the memorandum which Von Neurath sent to -Hitler about the whole affair. That memorandum was intended to defer -Himmler’s plans for forced Germanization. Von Neurath expressed the -view, which he had frequently mentioned to me, that in the interest of -peace in the Protectorate he did not advocate these attempts at -Germanization. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no more questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? - -MR. DODD: Tell us, please, when you first joined the National Socialist -Party? - -VON BURGSDORFF: On 1 May 1933. - -MR. DODD: And did you achieve office in any of its affiliated -organizations? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I was an honorary SA Gruppenführer. - -MR. DODD: Any other honors? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Then for a few years, just as I had been during the -democratic regime, I was legal advisor to the administration of Saxony. - -MR. DODD: Weren’t you also an Oberbannführer in the HJ, the -Hitler-Jugend? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I once became Oberbannführer on the occasion of the -Reich Youth Leader’s visit to Prague. But that was purely a gesture of -courtesy, which had no consequences. - -I should like to mention again, since you speak of Party offices, that, -as was said before, because of my post as Governor of Kraków I was -District Standortführer from the middle of January 1944 until the end, -that is the middle of January 1945. - -MR. DODD: You also received the gold badge of the Hitler Youth, did you -not? - -VON BURGSDORFF: No. - -MR. DODD: Weren’t you in some way associated with Reinhard Heydrich when -you were in Prague? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I was with Heydrich until the middle of 1942. Then, as -is generally known, because of the course pursued by Heydrich, I left -the Protectorate, and at 55 years of age I went into the army. - -MR. DODD: What position did you occupy with relation to Heydrich? - -VON BURGSDORFF: The same as under Herr Von Neurath; I was Under State -Secretary. - -MR. DODD: Let me put it to you this way: You told us that you never -heard of Maidanek, the concentration camp? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And you never heard of Auschwitz? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Of Auschwitz, yes. - -MR. DODD: Had you heard of an installation known as Lublin? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Of Lublin? Not of the concentration camp but of the city -of Lublin, of course. - -MR. DODD: Did you know of a concentration camp by the name of Lublin? - -VON BURGSDORFF: No. - -MR. DODD: You did know, I assume, of many other concentration camps by -name? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Only of German camps, yes—of Dachau and Buchenwald. - -MR. DODD: That is all. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you any questions? - -DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions for the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Who is your next witness? - -DR. SEIDL: The next witness would be the former secretary of the -Governor General, Fräulein Kraffczyk. However, if I understood the -Tribunal correctly yesterday, this session will end at 1630 hours. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now until Tuesday morning. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 23 April 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND TWELFTH DAY - Tuesday, 23 April 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl. - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I shall dispense with the hearing of the -witness Struve, Chief of the Central Department for Agriculture and Food -in the Government General. With the permission of the Tribunal I am now -calling witness Dr. Joseph Bühler. - -[_The witness Bühler took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please? - -JOSEPH BÜHLER (Witness): Joseph Bühler. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, how long have you known Defendant Dr. Hans Frank; -and what were the positions in which you worked with him? - -BÜHLER: I have known Herr Frank since 1 October 1930. I worked with him -in government spheres of service from the end of March 1933. I served -under him officially when he was Minister of Justice in Bavaria; later -when he was Reich Commissioner for Justice; and still later when he was -Minister. From the end of September 1939 Herr Frank employed me in an -official capacity in the Government General. - -DR. SEIDL: In what capacity did you serve in the Government General at -the end? - -BÜHLER: From about the second half of 1940 I was state secretary in the -government of the Government General. - -DR. SEIDL: Were you yourself a member of the Party? - -BÜHLER: I have been a Party member since 1 April 1933. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you exercise any functions in the Party or any of the -affiliated organizations of the Party, particularly in the SA or the SS? - -BÜHLER: I never held an office in the Party. I was never a member of the -SA or the SS. - -DR. SEIDL: I now come to the time during which you were state secretary -to the chief of the government in the Government General. Will you -please tell me what the relations were between the Governor General on -the one side and the Higher SS and Police Leader on the other side? - -BÜHLER: I might perhaps say in advance that my sphere of activity did -not touch upon police matters, matters relating to the Party, or -military matters in the Government General. - -The relations of the Governor General to the Higher SS and Police -Leader, Obergruppenführer Krüger, who was allocated to him by the -Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police were, from the very -beginning, made difficult by essential differences of opinion. These -differences of opinion concerned the conception of the task and the -position of the Police in general in an orderly state system, as well as -the conception in particular of the position and tasks of the Police in -the Government General. The Governor General held the view that the -Police must be the servant and the organ of the executive of the state -and that accordingly he and the state authorities should give orders to -the Police and that this assignment of tasks involved a limitation of -the sphere of activity of the Police. - -The Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger, on the other hand, held the view -that the Police in general had, of course, to fulfill tasks originating -with the executive of the state but that in fulfilling these tasks it -was not bound by the instructions of the administrative authorities, -that this was a matter of technical police questions, decisions about -which administrative authorities could not make and were not in a -position to make. - -Regarding the power to give orders to the Police, it was Krüger’s view -that because of the effectiveness and unity of police activity in all -occupied territories, such power to issue orders had to rest with the -central authority in Berlin and that he and only he could issue orders. - -As far as the duties of the Police were concerned, it was Krüger’s -opinion that the Governor General’s view regarding the limitation of -these duties as unfounded for the very reason that he, as Higher SS and -Police Leader, was simultaneously the deputy of the Reichsführer SS in -the latter’s capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of -German Nationality. - -As far as the relation of the Police to the question of Polish policy -was concerned, it was Krüger’s view that, in connection with work in -non-German territory, police considerations would have to play a -predominant role and that with police methods everything could be -achieved and everything could be prevented. This overestimation of the -Police led, for instance, to the fact that, during later arguments -between the Police and the administration regarding their respective -spheres of work, matters concerning non-German groups were listed among -the competences of the Police. - -DR. SEIDL: Do you know that as early as 1939 Reichsführer SS Himmler -issued a restricted decree, according to which the handling of all -police matters was his own concern or the concern of his Higher SS and -Police Leader? - -BÜHLER: That this was the case became clear to me from the actions taken -by the Police. I did not see a decree to this effect, but I can state -this much: The Police in the Government General acted exactly as in the -directives which I have described before. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, in 1942, by decree of the Führer, a State -Secretariat for Security was instituted. At whose instigation was this -instituted and what was the position taken by the Governor General in -that connection? - -BÜHLER: This decree was preceded by a frightful campaign of hatred -against the person of the Governor General. The institution of the State -Secretariat for Security was considered by the Police a step, an -important step, in the fight for the removal of the Governor General. -The matters specified in that decree, or at least the majority of them, -were not being transferred to the Police now for the first time, but the -actual state of affairs was—the actual course of events had already -been—in conformity to the contents of this decree before it was issued. - -DR. SEIDL: In the decree implementing this Führer decree and dated 3 -June 1942 all the police spheres of activities which were to be -transferred to the State Secretary were given in two lists; in an -Appendix A, the tasks of the Regular Police; and in an Appendix B, the -tasks of the Security Police. Were these police matters at that time -transferred completely to the State Secretary and thus to the police -sector? - -BÜHLER: The administration did not like giving up these matters; so -where the Police had not already got hold of them, they were given up -only with reluctance. - -DR. SEIDL: You are thinking first of all of the spheres of the so-called -administrative police, health police, _et cetera_, are you not? - -BÜHLER: Yes, that is to say, the police in charge of communications, -health, food, and such matters. - -DR. SEIDL: If I have understood your statements correctly, you mean that -the entire police system, Security Police as well as SD and Regular -Police, was directed by the central office, either by Himmler himself or -by the Reich Security Main Office through the Higher SS and Police -Leader? - -BÜHLER: In general according to my observations, it was possible for the -Security Police to receive orders direct from Berlin without their going -through Krüger. - -DR. SEIDL: And now another question: Is it correct that resettlements -were carried out in the Government General, by Reichsführer SS Himmler -in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German -Nationality? - -BÜHLER: Resettlements, in the opinion of the Governor General, even if -carried out decently, always caused unrest among the population. We had -no use for that in the Government General. Also, these resettlements -always caused a falling off of agricultural production. For these -reasons, the Governor General and the Government of the Government -General did not, as a matter of principle, carry out resettlements -during the war. To the extent that such resettlements were carried out, -it was done exclusively by the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation -of German Nationality. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General, because of this -arbitrary resettlement policy, repeatedly had serious arguments with -Himmler, Krüger, and SS Gruppenführer Globocznik? - -BÜHLER: That is correct. The intention of preventing such resettlements -always led to arguments and friction between the Higher SS and Police -Leader and the Governor General. - -DR. SEIDL: The Defendant Dr. Frank is accused by the Prosecution of the -seizure and confiscation of industrial and private property. What -basically was the attitude of the Governor General to such questions? - -BÜHLER: The legal provisions in this sphere of the law originated with -the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. Confiscation of private property -and possessions in the annexed Eastern territories and in the Government -General was subject to the same regulations. - -The decree of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan provided for the -creation of a trust office—the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost—with its -central administration in Berlin. The Governor General did not want to -have the affairs of the Government General administered in Berlin, and -therefore he opposed the administration of property in the Government -General being entrusted to the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost. Without -interference by the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, he established his -own rules for confiscations in the Government General and his own trust -office. That trust office was headed by an experienced higher official -from the Ministry of Economy of Saxony. - -DR. SEIDL: What happened to the factories and works which were situated -in the Government General and were formerly the property of the Polish -State? - -BÜHLER: Factories, as far as they were included in the armament program, -were taken over by the military sector, that is to say, by the Inspector -for Armaments, who was subordinate to the OKW and later to Minister -Speer. Factories outside the armament sector, which had belonged to the -former Polish State, the Governor General tried to consolidate into a -stock company and to administer them separately as property of the -Government General. The chief shareholder in this company was the -Treasury of the Government General. - -DR. SEIDL: That is to say, these factories were administered entirely -separately by the Reich Treasury? - -BÜHLER: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted an extract from Frank’s diary in -evidence under Number USA-281 (Document Number 2233(d)-PS.) This is a -discussion of Jewish problems. In this connection Frank said, among -other things: - - “My attitude towards the Jews is based on the expectation that - they will disappear; they must go away. I have started - negotiations for deporting them to the East. This question will - be discussed at a large meeting in Berlin in January, to which I - shall send State Secretary Dr. Bühler. This conference is to - take place at the Reich Security Main Office in the office of SS - Obergruppenführer Heydrich. In any case Jewish emigration on a - large scale will begin.” - -I ask you now, did the Governor General send you to Berlin for that -conference; and if so, what was the subject of the conference? - -BÜHLER: Yes, I was sent to the conference and the subject of the -conference was the Jewish problem. I might say in advance that from the -beginning Jewish questions in the Government General were considered as -coming under the jurisdiction of the Higher SS and Police Leader and -handled accordingly. The handling of Jewish matters by the state -administration was supervised and merely tolerated by the Police. - -During the years 1940 and 1941 incredible numbers of people, mostly -Jews, were brought into the Government General in spite of the -objections and protests of the Governor General and his administration. -This completely unexpected, unprepared for, and undesired bringing in of -the Jewish population from other territories put the administration of -the Government General in an extremely difficult position. - -Accommodating these masses, feeding them, and caring for their -health—combating epidemics for instance—almost, or rather, definitely -overtaxed the capacity of the territory. Particularly threatening was -the spread of typhus, not only in the ghettos but also among the Polish -population and the Germans in the Government General. It appeared as if -that epidemic would spread even to the Reich and to the Eastern Front. - -At that moment Heydrich’s invitation to the Governor General was -received. The conference was originally supposed to take place in -November 1941, but it was frequently postponed and it may have taken -place in February 1942. - -Because of the special problems of the Government General I had asked -Heydrich for a personal interview and he received me. On that occasion, -among many other things, I described in particular the catastrophic -conditions which had resulted from the arbitrary bringing of Jews into -the Government General. He replied that for this very reason he had -invited the Governor General to the conference. The Reichsführer SS, so -he said, had received an order from the Führer to round up all the Jews -of Europe and to settle them in the Northeast of Europe, in Russia. I -asked him whether this meant that the further arrival of Jews in the -Government General would cease, and whether the hundreds of thousands of -Jews who had been brought into the Government General without the -permission of the Governor General would be moved out again. Heydrich -promised me both these things. Heydrich said furthermore that the Führer -had given an order that Theresienstadt, a town in the Protectorate, -would become a reservation in which old and sick Jews, and weak Jews who -could not stand the strains of resettlement, were to be accommodated in -the future. This information left me definitely convinced that the -resettlement of the Jews, if not for the sake of the Jews, then for the -sake of the reputation and prestige of the German people, would be -carried out in a humane fashion. The removal of the Jews from the -Government General was subsequently carried out exclusively by the -Police. - -I might add that Heydrich demanded, particularly for himself, his -office, and its branches, the exclusive and uninterrupted competence and -control in this matter. - -DR. SEIDL: What concentration camps in the Government General did you -know about during your activity as State Secretary? - -BÜHLER: The publications in the press during the summer of 1944 called -my attention to the Maidanek camp for the first time. I did not know -that this camp, not far from Lublin, was a concentration camp. It had -been installed as an economic establishment of the Reichsführer SS, in -1941 I think. Governor Zörner came to visit me at that time and he told -me that he had objected to the establishment of this camp when he talked -to Globocznik, as it would endanger the power supply of the city of -Lublin; and there were objections, too, on the part of the Police with -regard to the danger of epidemics. I informed the Governor General of -this and he in turn sent for Globocznik. Globocznik stated to the -Governor General that certain workshops for the needs of the Waffen-SS -at the front had been erected on that site by him. He mentioned -workshops for dressing furs but he also mentioned a timber yard which -was located there. - -In these workshops for dressing furs, as I heard, fur articles from the -collection of furs were altered for use at the front. At any rate, -Globocznik stated that he had installed these workshops in compliance -with Himmler’s command. - -The Governor General prohibited the erection of any further -installations until all questions were settled with the police in charge -of building and blueprints had been submitted to the state offices, in -other words until all rules had been complied with, which apply to the -construction of buildings. Globocznik never submitted these blueprints. -With regard to the events inside the camp, no concrete information ever -reached the outside. It surprised the Governor General just as much as -it surprised me when the world press released the news about Maidanek. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution has submitted a document, Number -437-PS, Exhibit USA-610, which is a memorandum from the Governor General -to the Führer, dated 19 June 1943. I think you yourself drafted that -memorandum. On Page 35 a report of the commander of the Security Police -is mentioned and quoted verbatim in part. This report of the Security -Police mentions also the name of Maidanek. - -Did you at that time realize that this Maidanek was identical or -probably identical with that camp near Lublin? - -BÜHLER: No. I assumed that, like Auschwitz, it was a camp outside the -territory of the Government General, because the Governor General had -repeatedly told the Police and the Higher SS and Police Leader that he -did not wish to have concentration camps in the Government General. - -DR. SEIDL: Under whose jurisdiction was the administration of -concentration camps in the Government General? - -BÜHLER: I don’t know because I did not know of the existence of the -camps. In August, on the occasion of a visit to the reception camp at -Pruszkow, I heard about the administration of concentration camps in -general. At that time I brought instructions from Himmler to the camp -commandant, according to which transport of the inhabitants of Warsaw -who had been removed from the city to concentration camps was to cease -forthwith. - -DR. SEIDL: Was that after the uprising in Warsaw? - -BÜHLER: It was during it; it must have been on or about 18 or 19 August -1944. The camp commandant, whose name I have forgotten, told me at the -time that he did not know about that order, and that he could receive -instructions only from the Chief of Concentration Camps. - -DR. SEIDL: Do you know whether the Governor General himself ever sent a -Pole, a Ukrainian, or a Jew to a concentration camp? - -BÜHLER: Nothing like that ever happened, when I was present. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it true that a large number of Jewish workmen who were -working in the castle at Kraków were taken away by the Security Police -against the wishes of the Governor General and during his absence? - -BÜHLER: This Jewish workers’ colony is known to me because I lived in -that castle. I also know that the Governor General always took care of -the maintenance of this colony. And the chief of the Chancellery of the -Government General, Ministerial Counsellor Keit, once told me that this -group of Jewish workers had been taken away by force by the Police -during the absence of the Governor General. - -DR. SEIDL: I now come to the so-called AB Action, this extraordinary -pacification action. What were the circumstances which occasioned this -action? - -BÜHLER: It may have been about the middle of May 1940 when one morning I -was called from the government building, where I performed my official -work, to visit the Governor General in the castle. I think I remember -that Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart had also been called. There we met the -Governor General together with some officials of the Police. The -Governor General stated that, in the opinion of the Police, an extreme -act of pacification was necessary. The security situation at that time, -as far as I remember, was this: Certain remnants of the Polish armed -forces were still roaming about in deserted forest regions, causing -unrest among the population, and probably giving military training to -young Poles. At that time, that is May 1940, the Polish people had -recovered from the shock which they had suffered at the sudden defeat in -1939; and they began openly, with little caution and without experience, -to start a resistance movement everywhere. This picture I remember -clearly because of the statement given by the Police on that or some -other occasion. - -DR. SEIDL: May I interrupt you and quote from Frank’s diary, an entry of -16 May 1940. I quote: - - “The general war situation forces us to regard the security - situation in the Government General very seriously. From a - number of symptoms and actions one can draw the conclusion that - a large organized wave of resistance among the Poles is present - in the country awaiting the outbreak of greater and violent - events. Thousands of Poles are reported to have been organized - secretly and to have been armed, and are being incited to carry - out acts of violence of all sorts.” - -Then the Governor General quoted some recent examples, as, for instance, -an uprising in certain villages under the leadership of Major Huballa in -the district of Radom; the murder of families of German blood in -Józefów; the murder of the mayor of Grasienta, _et cetera_. - - “Illegal pamphlets, inciting to rebellion, are being distributed - and even posted up everywhere; and there can therefore be no - doubt that the security situation is extremely serious.” - -Did the Governor General express himself in that manner at the time? - -BÜHLER: When I took part in that meeting, the Governor General spoke -about the situation for some time, but the details I cannot recollect. - -DR. SEIDL: What happened after that? - -BÜHLER: I had only one impression. In the previous months the Governor -General had succeeded, by taking great pains, in imposing on the Police -a procedure for courts-martial which had to be observed in making -arrests and dealing with suspicious persons. Furthermore, the Police had -to concede that the Governor General could refer the sentences of a -summary court-martial to a reprieve commission and that the execution of -sentences could take place only after the sentences had been confirmed -by the Governor General. The statements of the Governor General during -this conference in the middle of May 1940 made me fear that the Police -might see in these statements the possibility for evading the -court-martial and reprieve procedure imposed on them. For that reason I -asked the Governor General for permission to speak after he had finished -his statement. The Governor General cut me short at first and stated -that he wanted to dictate something to the secretary in a hurry, which -the latter was then to dictate to a stenotypist at once and then put it -into its final version. Thereupon the Governor General dictated some -authorization, or order, or some such document; and with absolute -certainty I remember that after he had finished dictating, the secretary -and I think, quite definitely, Brigadeführer Streckenbach, the Commander -of the Regular Police, left the room. I am saying this in advance -because it explains the fact that everything that happened afterwards -has not been recorded in the minutes. The secretary was no longer -present in the room. I expressed my fears, saying that these -requirements laid down for court-martial procedure should be observed -under all circumstances. I am not claiming any particular merit in this -connection, because if I had not done it then this objection would have -been raised, I am convinced, by Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart, or the -Governor General himself would have realized the danger which his -statements might have caused in this respect. At any rate, in reply to -my objection, and without any debate, the Governor General stated at -once that arrests and shootings could take place only in accordance with -the court-martial procedure, and that sentences of the summary -courts-martial would have to be examined by the reprieve commission. - -In the ensuing period these instructions were followed. I assume that it -is certain that the reprieve commission received all sentences -pronounced by these courts-martial and dealt with them. - -DR. SEIDL: Another entry in Frank’s diary, 12 July 1940, leads one to -the conclusion that at first these leaders of the resistance movement -concerned were merely arrested. I quote a statement of the Governor -General: - - “Regarding the question what is to be done with the political - criminals caught in connection with the AB Action, a discussion - is to take place in the near future with State Secretary Dr. - Bühler, Obergruppenführer Krüger, Brigadeführer Streckenbach, - and Ministerial Counsellor Wille.” - -Who was Ministerial Counsellor Wille, and what task did he have in that -connection? - -BÜHLER: I might say in advance that there is a gap in my memory which -makes it impossible for me to say for certain when the Governor General -told Brigadeführer Streckenbach that in all cases he would have to -observe court-martial procedure and respect the reprieve commission. On -the other hand, I think I can remember for certain that at the time this -discussion took place between Krüger, Streckenbach, Wille, and me, -arrests only had taken place and no executions. Ministerial Counsellor -Wille was the head of the Department of Justice in the Government and -was the competent official for all matters concerning reprieves. The -Governor General wanted these matters dealt with by a legally trained, -experienced man. - -During the conference with Krüger, Streckenbach, and Wille it had been -ruled that the persons who had been arrested up to that time were to be -subjected to court-martial procedure and that sentences had to be dealt -with by the reprieve commission. The Police were not exactly -enthusiastic about this. I remember that Krüger told me privately after -the conference that the Governor General was a jack-in-the-box with whom -one couldn’t work, and that in the future he would go his own way. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal thinks that this has been gone -into in too great detail. - -DR. SEIDL: Yes, I am coming to the end of my questions. - -Witness, during a Police meeting in 1940 on 30 May, the Defendant Dr. -Frank mentioned among other things the following: “The difficulties we -had had with the Kraków professors were terrible. If we had handled the -matter here, it would have taken a different course.” Who arrested these -professors, and to what extent was the Governor General concerned with -this matter? - -BÜHLER: On 7 or 8 November 1939, when the Governor General arrived in -Kraków to begin his activities, all professors of the University of -Kraków were arrested by the Security Police without his knowledge and -taken away to concentration camps in the Reich. Among them were -acquaintances of the Governor General, with whom shortly before he had -had social and academic connections through the Academy for German Law. -The Governor General used his influence on Obergruppenführer Krüger -persistently and uninterruptedly until he achieved the release of the -majority of these professors from concentration camps. - -This statement of his, which contradicts this, was made, in my opinion, -for the purpose of placating the Police, for the Police did not like -releasing these professors. - -DR. SEIDL: What basically was the attitude of the Governor General -concerning mobilization of labor? - -BÜHLER: The Governor General and the Government of the Government -General were always attempting to get as many Polish workers for the -Reich as possible. It was clear to us, however, that the employment of -force in recruiting workers might bring about temporary advantages but -that recruitment of workers in that way would not promise much success -in the long run. The Governor General gave me instructions, therefore, -to conduct extensive and intensive propaganda in favor of employment in -the Reich and to oppose all use of force in the recruitment of workers. - -On the other hand the Governor General wanted to make his recruitment of -workers for the Reich successful by demanding decent treatment for -Polish workers in the Reich. He negotiated for many years with the Reich -Commissioner for the Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, and -improvements were in fact achieved. The Governor General was especially -opposed to the identifying of Jews and Poles by distinguishing marks in -the Reich. I remember a letter from Reich Commissioner Sauckel in which -he informed the Governor General that he had made every effort to insure -the same treatment for Polish workers as for other foreign workers, but -that his efforts were no longer crowned by success whenever the -influence of the Reichsführer SS opposed them. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, I now come to another point. Under Number USA-275 -the Prosecution has submitted Document 1061-PS, which is a report of -Brigadeführer Stroop on the destruction of the ghetto in Warsaw. Were -you, or the Governor General, informed beforehand about the measures -planned by the Security Police? - -BÜHLER: I certainly was not. As to the Governor General, I do not know -that he was informed about any such plans. - -DR. SEIDL: What did you learn afterwards about the events at the ghetto -in Warsaw in 1943? - -BÜHLER: I heard what practically everybody heard—that an uprising had -broken out in the ghetto which had long been prepared; that the Jews had -used the building materials given them for the purpose of air-raid -protection to set up defense works; and that during the uprising violent -resistance was encountered by the German troops. - -DR. SEIDL: I now come to the Warsaw uprising of 1944. To what extent did -the administration of the Government General participate in the quelling -of that revolt? - -BÜHLER: As our comrades in Warsaw were encircled by the -insurrectionists, we asked the Governor General to apply to the Führer -for assistance to bring about a speedy quelling of the Warsaw revolt. -Apart from that the administration assisted in the welfare of the -population in connection with the evacuation in the battle zone of the -quarters that were to be destroyed. But the administration did not -exercise any authority here. - -DR. SEIDL: On 4 November 1945 you made an affidavit. The affidavit bears -the number 2476-PS. I shall now read to you that affidavit, which is -very brief, and I shall ask you to tell me whether the contents are -correct. I quote: - - “In the course of the quelling of the Warsaw revolt in August - 1944, approximately 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw (a - Polish estimate) were taken away to German concentration camps. - As a result of a _démarche_ made by the Governor General, Dr. - Frank, to the office of Reichsführer SS Himmler, the latter - prohibited further deportations. The Governor General tried to - secure the release of the 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw - who had already been taken to concentration camps in the Reich. - The Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, Obergruppenführer - Kaltenbrunner, refused this request, made in writing as well as - orally on the occasion of a visit of mine to Berlin in September - or October 1944, on the grounds that these inhabitants of Warsaw - were being used in the secret manufacture of armaments in the - Reich and that therefore a general release was out of the - question. However, he would be willing to consider individual - applications favorably. Individual applications for release from - concentration camps were granted by Kaltenbrunner during the - subsequent months. - - “Contrary to the Polish estimate, the number of persons taken - from Warsaw to concentration camps in the Reich was estimated to - be small by Kaltenbrunner. I myself reported to my office - Kaltenbrunner’s statement regarding the number of internees, and - after a renewed investigation I found that the above-mentioned - figure of 50,000 to 60,000 was correct. These were the people - who had been taken to concentration camps in Germany.” - -I now ask you, are the contents of this affidavit, made before an -American officer, correct? - -BÜHLER: I can supplement it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Before he supplements it, is it in evidence? Has it yet -been put in evidence? - -DR. SEIDL: It has the number 2476-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: That doesn’t prove it has been put in evidence. Has it -been put in evidence? Dr. Seidl, you know quite well what “put in -evidence” means. Has it been put in evidence? Has it got a USA exhibit -number? - -DR. SEIDL: No, it has not a USA exhibit number. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then you are offering it in evidence, are you? - -DR. SEIDL: I don’t want to submit it formally in evidence; but I do want -to ask the witness about the contents of this affidavit. - -THE PRESIDENT: But it is a document, and if you are putting it to the -witness, you must put it in evidence and you must give it an exhibit -number. You cannot put documents to the witness and not put them in -evidence. - -DR. SEIDL: In that case I submit this document as Document Number -Frank-1. - -I now ask you, Witness, whether the contents of this affidavit are -correct, and, if so, whether you can supplement this affidavit. - -BÜHLER: Yes, I should like to supplement it briefly. It is possible that -I went to see Kaltenbrunner twice about that question—not only -once—and after Kaltenbrunner had refused to release these people the -second time, on the strength of my experiences with the camp commandant -in Camp Pruszkow, I had the impression that it was not in -Kaltenbrunner’s power to order such a release. He didn’t talk to me -about that. - -DR. SEIDL: But from his statements you had the impression that perhaps -he too did not have the power to release those people? - -BÜHLER: During those conferences I had brought up questions about the -Polish policy, and from these conferences I had the impression that I -might gain Kaltenbrunner’s interest in a reasonable Polish policy and -win him over as an ally in negotiations with Himmler. At any rate, -talking to me, he condemned the methods of force used by Krüger. I -gathered from these statements that Kaltenbrunner did not want to see -methods of force employed against the Poles and that he would have -helped me if he could. - -DR. SEIDL: The Soviet Prosecution has submitted a document bearing the -Exhibit Number USSR-128 (Document Number 3305-PS). It is a teleprinted -message from the intelligence office of the Higher SS and Police Leader -East addressed to the Governor General and signed by Dr. Fischer, then -Governor of Warsaw. Under Figure 2 it reads as follows: - - “Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach has been given the new task of - pacifying Warsaw, that is to say, of laying Warsaw level with - the ground during the war, except where military considerations - of its value as a fortress are involved. Before the destruction, - all raw materials, all textiles, and all furniture will be - removed from Warsaw. The main task will fall to the civil - administration. - - “I herewith inform you that this new Führer decree regarding the - razing of Warsaw is of the greatest significance for the further - new policy regarding the Poles.” - -As far as you can recollect, how did the Governor General receive and -view that telegram? And to what extent was his basic attitude altered on -the strength of that message? - -BÜHLER: This telegram referred to instructions which Obergruppenführer -Von dem Bach had received from the Reichsführer SS. The administration -in the Government General did not welcome the destruction of Warsaw. On -the contrary, I remember that, together with the Governor General, ways -which might be used to avoid the destruction of Warsaw were discussed. -Just what was really tried I cannot recollect. It may be that further -steps were not taken because of the impossibility of achieving anything. - -DR. SEIDL: I now turn to another subject. - -THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors, before I continue the -interrogation of the witness Dr. Bühler, I should like to inform you -that I forego the interrogation of the witness Helene Kraffczyk; so this -witness will be the last one. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Defendant Dr. Frank has been accused by the -Prosecution of not having done everything within his power to ensure the -feeding of the population of the Government General. What can you say -about that? - -BÜHLER: The decisive reason, the real cause, why the population in the -Government General could not be supplied as efficiently and as -satisfactorily as in Germany was the lack of co-operation on the part of -the Polish population in the measures taken by the Germans to bring -about a just and equal distribution of food quotas. This lack of -co-operation was caused by patriotic considerations, the aversion to -German domination, and the continuous, effective propaganda from the -outside. I do not believe that there was a single country in Europe -where so much was pillaged, stolen, and diverted to the black market, -where so much was destroyed and so much damage was done in order to -sabotage the food program, as in the Government General. - -To give one example: All the dairy machinery, which had been provided -with great pains, and the chain of dairies, which had been organized -with difficulty, were destroyed again and again so that a more or less -comprehensive control of milk and fat supplies could not be carried out. -I estimate that the fat sold on the free market and the black market in -the Government General was several times the quantity of that controlled -and distributed officially. - -Another decisive reason may be seen in the fact that the Government -General had been carved out of a hitherto self-contained governmental -and economic structure and that no consideration had been given -effecting a proper economic balance. - -The large centers of consumption in the Government General, that is to -say, the cities such as Warsaw, Kraków, later Lvov, and also the -industrial area in the center of Poland, had previously received their -supplies to a very large extent directly from the country through the -standing market. In these areas of the Government General there was a -lack of granaries; a lack of refrigerators; there was no systematic -chain of dairies; and storehouses of all kinds were lacking—all -necessary for the directing or controlling of a supply economy by the -state. - -The Government General had to construct all these things step by step, -and therefore the supplying of the population was proportionately -difficult. It was not intended to supply the population fully right -away; the supplies were to be improved gradually. I always saw to it -that the directives issued for combating the black market allowed -margins for the acquisition of foodstuffs and that the inhabitants of -the cities were given the opportunity of contacting the producers. In -1942 the rations were to have been increased; then an order came from -the Delegate for the Four Year Plan that rations were not to be -increased and that certain quotas of foodstuffs were to be allocated to -the Reich. Most of these foodstuffs were not taken out of the area, but -were consumed by the Armed Forces on the spot. The Governor General -fought continually against the authorities of the Four Year Plan, in -order to achieve an increase and an improvement in the food supplies for -the Polish population. That struggle was not without success. In many -cases it was possible to increase the rations considerably, especially -those of the workers in armament industries, and other privileged groups -of the working population. - -To sum up I should like to say that it was not easy for the population -of the Government General to get its daily food requirements. On the -other hand there were no famines and no hunger epidemics in the -Government General. A Polish and Ukrainian auxiliary committee, which -had delegations in all districts of the Government General, saw to the -supply of foodstuffs for those parts of the population which were in -greatest need. I used my influence to have this committee supplied with -the largest possible amount of foodstuffs, so that it should be able to -pursue its welfare work successfully, and it is known to me that that -committee took special care of the children of large cities. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, what were the measures that the Governor General -took to safeguard art treasures in the areas under his administration? - -BÜHLER: With a decree of 16 December 1939 the Reichsführer SS, in his -capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German -Nationality, had already ordered, without informing the Governor -General, that all art treasures of the Government General were to be -confiscated and transported to the Reich. The Government General was -successful in preventing this transport to a great extent. - -Then a man arrived in the Government General from the Delegate for the -Four Year Plan, State Secretary Mühlmann, who claimed to have plenary -authority from the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. I asked to see that -authorization. It was signed, not by Göring himself, but by somebody in -his circle, Gritzbach. He was entrusted with the task of safeguarding -the art treasures of the Government General in the interests of the -Reich. In order to bring this commissioner—provided as he was with -plenary authority from the Reich—into line with the Government General, -the Governor General entrusted to him, in addition, the task of -collecting together the art treasures of the Government General. He -collected these art treasures and also had catalogues printed; and I -know, from conferences which took place with the Governor General, that -the Governor always attached the greatest importance to having these art -treasures kept within the area of the Government General. - -DR. SEIDL: The prosecution, under Number USA-378, that is Document -1709-PS, submitted a report about the investigation of the entire -activity of the Special Commissioner for the Collection and Safeguarding -of Art and Cultural Treasures in the Government General. On Page 6 of -that report it reads, and I quote: - - “Reason for investigation: Order of the State Secretary of the - Government of the Government General of 30 June 1942 to - investigate the entire activity of the Special Commissioner - appointed for the collection and safeguarding of art and - cultural treasures in the Government General, according to the - decree of the Governor General of 16 December 1939.” - -I ask you now what caused you in 1942 to give this order for -investigation, and did the report lead to serious charges? - -BÜHLER: The investigation was found necessary because of the possibility -of a collision of duties, in the case of State Secretary Mühlmann, -between the order given by the Reich and the order given by the Governor -General. I had also heard that some museum pieces had not been properly -taken care of. The investigation showed that State Secretary Mühlmann -could not be blamed in any way. - -DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has submitted another document, 3042-PS, -Exhibit USA-375. It is an affidavit by Dr. Mühlmann, and I quote: - - “I was the Special Commissioner of the Governor General of - Poland, Hans Frank, for the safeguarding of art treasures in the - Government General, from October 1939 to September 1943. Göring - in his capacity as chairman of the Reich Defense Council had - commissioned me with this duty. - - “I confirm that it was the official policy of the Governor - General, Hans Frank, to take into safekeeping all important art - treasures which belonged to Polish public institutions, private - collections, and the Church. I confirm that the art treasures - mentioned were actually confiscated; and it is clear to me that - in case of a German victory they would not have remained in - Poland, but would have been used to complement German art - collections.” - -I ask you now: Is it correct that the Governor General from the very -beginning considered all art treasures which had been safeguarded the -property of the Government General? - -BÜHLER: Insofar as they were state property, yes; insofar as they were -private property, they were temporarily confiscated and safeguarded; but -the Governor General never thought of transferring them to the Reich. If -he had wanted to do that, he could have taken advantage of the war -situation itself in order to send these art treasures to Germany. But -where the witness obtained his information, as contained in the last -sentence of his affidavit, I do not know. - -DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted a document, L-37, under Exhibit -Number USA-506. It is a letter of 19 July 1944 from the commander of the -Security Police and SD of the district of Radom, to the branch office of -Tomassov. There it says, among other things, and I quote: - - “The Higher SS and Police Leader East issued the following order - on 28 June 1944:” - -I skip a few sentences and then quote: - - “The Reichsführer SS, with the approval of the Governor General, - has ordered that in all cases where assassinations of Germans or - attempts at such assassinations have occurred, or where - saboteurs have destroyed vital installations, not only the - perpetrators are to be shot but also all their kinsmen are - likewise to be executed and their female relatives above 16 - years of age are to be put into concentration camps.” - -Is it known to you whether the Governor General ever spoke about this -question with the Reichsführer SS and whether he had given any such -approval? - -BÜHLER: I know nothing about the issuing of an order of that kind. Once -during the second half of 1944, an order came through my hands relating -to the joint responsibility of kin, but I cannot say whether that -concerned the Reich or the Government General; it was a police order, I -should say. If it had had that formula, “with the approval of the -Government General,” I should have questioned the Governor General on -that point. - -DR. SEIDL: Would such an approval have been consistent with the -fundamental attitude of the Governor General to this question as you -knew it? - -BÜHLER: The fundamental attitude of the Governor General was on the -contrary opposed to all executions without trial and without legal -reasons. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that from 1940 on the Governor General -complained continually to the Führer about the measures taken by the -Police and the SD? - -BÜHLER: Yes; I myself drew up at least half a dozen memoranda of about -the length of the one submitted, addressed to the Führer direct or to -him through the Chief of the Reich Chancellery. They contained repeated -complaints with regard to executions, encroachments in connection with -the recruiting of workers, the importation of inhabitants of other -regions without the permission of the Governor General, the food -situation, and happenings in general which were contrary to the -principles of an orderly administration. - -DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted one of these memoranda under the -number USA-610. This is a memorandum to the Führer of 19 June 1943. Is -this memorandum essentially different to any previous or later -memoranda; and what, basically, was the attitude of the Führer to such -complaints and proposals? - -BÜHLER: This memorandum, which has been submitted, is somewhat different -from the previous ones. The previous memoranda contained direct -accusations with regard to these happenings and the encroachments by the -Police. When these memoranda remained unsuccessful, acting on the order -of the Governor General, I drew up the complaints contained in this -memorandum of June in the form of a political proposal. The grievances -listed there were not caused by the government of the Governor General; -rather they were complaints about interference by outside authorities. - -DR. SEIDL: In the diary we find on 26 October 1943 a long report about -the 4 years of German construction work in the Government General which -was made by you yourself. On the basis of what documents did you compile -that report? - -BÜHLER: I compiled that report on the basis of the material which the 13 -main departments of the government had given me. - -DR. SEIDL: Now a question of principle: What, basically, was the -attitude of the Governor General to the Polish and Ukrainian people, as -you know it from your 5 years’ activity, as the head of the government? - -BÜHLER: The first principle of all was that of keeping peace in this -area and of increasing the usefulness of this area as far as possible by -improving its resources, economically speaking. In order to achieve -that, decent treatment of the population was necessary; freedom and -property must not be infringed upon. Those were the principles of policy -according to which, acting on the order of the Governor General, I -always carried out my functions as state secretary of the government. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General also tried within the -framework of wartime conditions to grant the population a certain -minimum of cultural development? - -BÜHLER: That was the desire of the Governor General, but the realization -of this desire very frequently met with resistance on the part of the -Security Police, or the Propaganda Ministry of the Reich, or it was made -impossible by conditions themselves. But in principle the Governor -General did not wish to prohibit cultural activity among the Polish and -Ukrainian populations. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that he tried particularly to revive higher -education and that, evading the directives from the Reich, he instituted -so-called technical courses in colleges? - -BÜHLER: Instruction was certainly given at the technical schools by -Polish professors in Warsaw and Lvov which corresponded approximately to -a university education. As a matter of principle, the Governor General -also wanted to open secondary schools and seminaries for priests, but -that always failed because of the objections of the Security Police. As -no agreement could be reached, and acting on the order of the Governor -General, in October 1941 on my own authority I promised the opening of -secondary schools and, I believe, of seminaries for priests with a -certain advisory autonomy for the Poles. Two days after this -announcement the Führer’s opinion was transmitted to me that I had no -authority to announce such measures. - -DR. SEIDL: Dr. Frank’s diary often mentions the principle of unity of -administration and the fact that the Governor General was the deputy of -the Führer in this territory and the representative of the authority of -the Reich. Does this conception tally with the facts? What other -authorities of the Reich and the Party came into the administration of -the Government General? - -BÜHLER: The authority of the Governor General was limited from the very -beginning in many important respects. Thus, for instance, before the -establishment of the Government General, the Reichsführer SS had been -invested with full power in the matter of the preservation of German -Nationality in all occupied territories. The Delegate for the Four Year -Plan had equal authority and power to issue decrees, in the Government -General. But many other offices as well, such as those for armaments, -post, railways, building, and other departments tried, and tried -successfully, to take over parts of the administration of the Government -General or to gain some influence over it. After the Governor General -had lost his offices as Reichsleiter in 1942, there was a special rush -in this direction. I might almost say that it became a kind of sport to -diminish the prestige of the King of Poland. - -DR. SEIDL: Who appointed, dismissed, and paid the police officials in -the Government General and otherwise saw to their interests from the -point of view of the Civil Service? - -BÜHLER: That was done exclusively by Himmler’s administrative office in -Berlin. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that even officials of the administration of -the Government General were arrested by Krüger and that it was not -possible for even the Governor General to effect their release? I remind -you of the case of Scipessi. - -BÜHLER: Yes. I can confirm that from my own experience. Even from my own -circle people were arrested without my being notified. In one such case -I instructed the commander of the Security Police that the official was -to be released within a certain space of time. He was not released, and -I demanded the recall of the commander of the Security Police. The -result was that Himmler expressed his special confidence in this -commander of the Security Police and the recall was refused. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, how long was the Government General able to work at -all under normal conditions? - -BÜHLER: I might almost say, never at any time. The first year was taken -up in repairing destruction caused by the war. There were destroyed -villages, destroyed cities, destroyed means of transport; bridges had -been blown up in very large numbers. After these destroyed objects had -been repaired, as far as it was possible under war conditions, the -Government General became again the deployment area for the war against -the East, against the Russians, and then the transit area to the front -and the line of communications area. It was the great repair shop for -the front. - -DR. SEIDL: Another question: During the war Himmler presented to the -Reich Government the draft of a law concerning the treatment of -anti-social elements. What was the attitude of Dr. Frank towards this -draft? - -BÜHLER: As far as I can remember... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal thinks that the matters which the -witness is going into are really matters of common knowledge. Everyone -knows about that. I think you might take the witness over this ground a -little bit faster than you are. - -DR. SEIDL: Yes, Sir. He has given the answer already. - -Witness, during the war did the government of the Reich... - -THE PRESIDENT: But I am speaking of the future, Dr. Seidl. - -DR. SEIDL: Yes, Sir. - -[_Turning to the witness._] During the war, Himmler submitted to the -Reich Government, the draft of a law concerning the treatment of -anti-social elements. - -BÜHLER: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: What was the attitude of the Governor General to this? - -BÜHLER: The Governor General protested against this. At the conference -which I had with Heydrich in February 1942 the latter asked me as a -special request to ask the Governor General to retract his protect -against the law. The Governor General refused to do this. - -DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has presented a chart which shows Dr. Frank -as having authority over the Reich Minister of Justice, Dr. Thierack. -Did such a situation ever exist? - -BÜHLER: That must be an error; such a situation never existed. - -DR. SEIDL: What, according to your observations, were the relations -between the Governor General and the Reichsführer SS Himmler? - -BÜHLER: The Governor General and the Reichsführer SS Himmler as -individuals were so different... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, I thought we had been hearing all morning what -the relations were between the Governor General and the Reichsführer. - -DR. SEIDL: Then I will not put that question. - -Witness, the Soviet Prosecution, under Exhibit Number USSR-93, (Document -Number USSR-93), submitted an appendix to the report of the Polish -Government. The appendix is entitled “Cultural Life in Poland.” I have -shown it to you once before and would like you to tell me whether the -Governor General, or his government, ever actually issued such -directives? - -BÜHLER: I do not remember ever having signed such directives or having -seen any such directives signed by the Governor General. This document -submitted to me, seems to me to be a fake or a forgery. That can be -recognized from the contents. - -DR. SEIDL: In the diary we find a large number of entries referring to -the policies of the Governor General which seem to contradict what you -yourself said before as a witness. How can you explain these -contradictions? - -BÜHLER: These statements by the Governor General, which have also been -called to my attention during previous interrogations, do not merely -seem to contradict what I said; they very clearly do contradict what I -had to say as a witness. As I myself heard such statements frequently, I -have tried to understand how he came to make such statements; and I can -only say that Frank perhaps took part more than was necessary in the -conferences and affairs of the government officials. There was scarcely -a conference in which he did not take part. Thus it happened that he had -to speak many times during one day, and I might say that in 99 out of -100 cases he spoke on the spur of the moment, without due reflection, -and I frequently witnessed how after making such grotesque statements he -would try in the next sentences, or at the next opportunity, to retract -them and straighten them out. I also witnessed how he rescinded -authority which he had delegated on the spur of the moment. I am sure -that if I could go through the diary for every one of these statements, -I would be able to give you a dozen—dozens of other statements to the -contrary. - -DR. SEIDL: Frank’s diary includes... - -BÜHLER: I should like to say the following: When the Governor General -was working with the members of his administration, he never made such -statements; at least I cannot remember any. Those statements were always -made when the Higher SS and Police Leader was sitting next to him, so -that I had the impression that he was not free at such moments. - -DR. SEIDL: The diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank covers about 10,000 to -12,000 typewritten pages. Who kept this diary—he himself or somebody -else? - -BÜHLER: According to my observations, the diary was kept by -stenographers. At first by one stenographer, Dr. Meidinger, later by two -stenographers, Nauk and Mohr. The procedure was that these stenographers -were in the room during conferences and took notes. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that to a certain extent these stenographers -received reports from a third person as to what was said at a -conference? - -BÜHLER: I often noticed that these stenographers did not take the -trouble to record everything literally, but merely wrote summaries of -the sense. I was also sometimes asked what this or that person, or what -the Governor General, had said or thought in some particular instance. - -DR. SEIDL: Did the Governor General see these entries in the diary or -read them later? - -BÜHLER: From what I know of the Governor General I do not believe that -he read them over. - -THE PRESIDENT: How can this witness tell whether he read the notes -later? - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the witness, Dr. Bühler, was the Governor -General’s closest collaborator. - -THE PRESIDENT: If you wanted to put that sort of question, you should -have asked the Defendant Frank. - -DR. SEIDL: A further question, Witness. According to your observations -what caused the Governor General not to destroy that diary, but to hand -it over when he was arrested? - -BÜHLER: On 15 March for the last time I was... - -THE PRESIDENT: That, again is a matter which rests in the mind of Dr. -Frank, not of this witness, why he did not destroy it. - -DR. SEIDL: He has answered the question already, and I forego the answer -of the witness. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Now, one last question. In 1942, after the -speeches made by Dr. Frank, he was deprived of all his Party offices. -What effect did that have on his position as Governor General? - -BÜHLER: I have already referred to that. It weakened his authority -considerably, and the administration in the Government General became -increasingly difficult. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct, that the Governor General repeatedly, both in -writing and orally, tendered his resignation? - -BÜHLER: Yes, written applications for resignation I often worded myself; -and I know that he also asked orally many times to be permitted to -resign, but that this was never approved. - -DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions for the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to ask any -questions? - -DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): Witness, is it -correct that by far the largest number of the Polish workers who came to -Germany, came into the Reich before April 1942, that is, before Sauckel -came into office? - -BÜHLER: I cannot make any definite statement about that, but I know that -the recruitment of labor produced smaller and smaller results and that -the main quotas were probably delivered during the first years. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were the labor quotas which had been demanded from the -Governor General reduced by Sauckel in view of the fact that so many -Poles were already working in the Reich? - -BÜHLER: I know of one such case; Sauckel’s deputy, President Struve, -talked to me about it. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Is it true that Himmler for his own purposes recruited -workers from the Polish area, without Sauckel’s knowledge and without -observing the conditions which Sauckel had laid down? - -BÜHLER: I assume that that happened. Whenever I was told about roundups -of workers, I tried to clear matters up. The Police always said, “That -is the labor administration,” and the labor administration said, “That -is the Police.” But I know that once, on a visit to Warsaw, Himmler was -very annoyed at the loafers standing at the street corners; and I -consider it quite possible that these labor raids in Warsaw were carried -out arbitrarily by the Police without the participation of the labor -administration. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know Sauckel’s directives with regard to the -carrying out of labor recruitment? - -BÜHLER: I have not seen them in detail, and I don’t remember them. I -know only that Sauckel stated, on the occasion of a visit in Kraków, -that he had not ordered the use of violence. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was that a speech of Sauckel’s? - -BÜHLER: No, it was a conference. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Do you recall an address which Sauckel made in Kraków to -the various authorities? - -BÜHLER: He spoke as a Party speaker. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did he make any statements there about the treatment of -workers? - -BÜHLER: These statements were made at a conference which preceded the -visit to the Governor General. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what was the nature of his remarks? - -BÜHLER: My people had told him and his people that there had been -encroachments, and he answered that he had not ordered the use of -violence and denied that these events—the arrest of people in motion -picture houses or other places of assembly—had ever been ordered or -decreed by him. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know the structure of the labor administration in -the Government General? - -BÜHLER: The Labor Department was part of my field of authority. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have any immediate influence on the carrying -out of labor recruitment? - -BÜHLER: Not only did he have influence, but he also sent a deputy who -was not under my authority. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was it possible for that deputy to carry out the -recruitment of labor direct? - -BÜHLER: If he wanted to, yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: In what manner? Could he give any instructions, or direct -orders? - -BÜHLER: The recruiting units set up by Sauckel were not under my -authority. I tried on several occasions to get these people within my -organization, but these attempts were always countered with the argument -that these recruiting units had to be used in all the occupied -territories and that they could not be attached to one particular area. - -In other words, Sauckel’s deputy in the Government General, President -Struve, who was also in charge of the Labor Department, was on the one -hand dependent on Sauckel’s directives and did not need to pay attention -to me but was also on the other hand responsible to me to the extent -that he acted as president of the Labor Department. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What branches handled forced recruitment whenever that -became necessary? Could the recruiting units do that? - -BÜHLER: I do not know. The deputy always denied the fact of forced -recruitment. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask questions? -Does the Prosecution desire to cross-examine? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, I should like to define your official -position more accurately. As from 1940 and until the moment of the -liberation of Poland you were Frank’s chief deputy, were you not? - -BÜHLER: From the end of September until November 1939 I served the -Governor General in a leading position on his labor staff. In November -1939 I became Chief of the Department of the Governor General; that was -the central administrative office of the Governor General, in Kraków. -During the second half of the year 1940 the designation of this function -was changed to “State Secretary of the Government,” and I was State -Secretary of the Government until I left Kraków on 18 January 1945. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently you were the chief deputy of the -Defendant Hans Frank. - -BÜHLER: My field of activity was definitely limited. I had to direct the -administrative matters. Neither the Police, nor the Party, nor the -Wehrmacht, nor the various Reich offices which were directly active in -the area of the Government General, were under my authority. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: When Frank was away, who was then his deputy? - -BÜHLER: The deputy of the Governor General was Seyss-Inquart, Reich -Minister Seyss-Inquart. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And after Seyss-Inquart left? - -BÜHLER: After the departure of Seyss-Inquart there was a gap. I cannot -recall the month, but I think it was in 1941 that I was assigned as -deputy of the Governor General. But that appointment was approved only -with certain modifications. I was supposed to represent the Governor -General only when he was neither present in the area nor... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Answer me briefly. When Frank was away, did you -carry out his duties? - -BÜHLER: I answer as my conscience dictates. Whenever Frank was not -present within the area, and could not be reached outside the area, then -I was supposed to represent him. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I understand. That means that you took over when -he was away. - -BÜHLER: Yes, whenever he could not be reached outside of the area -either. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, yes. That is precisely what I am asking -about. - -I should like the witness to be shown the typed transcript of the report -on a conference of 25 January. Will you show him, first of all, the list -of those who were present. The Tribunal will find the passage that I -desire to quote... - -THE PRESIDENT: What year? You said the 25th of January. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: 1943, Mr. President. Your Honors will find it on -Page 7, Exhibit Number USSR-223, (Document Number USSR-223), Paragraph -6. - -Witness, is that your signature among the list of those present? - -BÜHLER: My signature, yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means you were present at that conference. - -BÜHLER: 1943, yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I shall quote three sentences from the typed -transcript of the report. Please hand the original to the witness. - -I quote three sentences from this document. It is Dr. Frank’s speech: - - “I should like to emphasize one thing. We must not be too - soft-hearted when we hear that 17,000 have been shot. These - persons who have been shot are also victims of the war.... Let - us now remember that all of us who are meeting together here - figure in Mr. Roosevelt’s list of war criminals. I have the - honor of being Number 1. We have thus, so to speak, become - accomplices in terms of world history”. - -Your name is second on the list of those present at the conference. Do -you not consider that Frank must have had sufficient grounds to number -you among the most active of his accomplices in crime? - -BÜHLER: About such statements of the Governor General I have already -said all that is necessary. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then you ascribe this to the Governor General’s -temperament? - -THE PRESIDENT: Witness, that is not an answer to the question. The -question was, do you consider yourself to be one of those criminals? - -BÜHLER: I do not consider myself a criminal. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: If you do not consider yourself a war criminal, -will you perhaps recollect who personally—I emphasize the word -“personally”—actively participated in one of Frank’s most cruel orders -with regard to the Polish population? I am talking about the decree of 2 -October 1942. Were you not one of the participants? - -BÜHLER: Which measures? Which decree? I should like to be shown it. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am talking about the decree signed 2 October -and published 9 October 1943, Exhibit Number USSR 335, (Document Number -USSR-335), the decree about the creation of the so-called courts-martial -conducted by the Secret Police. - -BÜHLER: The draft of this decree did not come from my office. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Does this mean that you deny participation in -rendering that cruel decree effective? - -BÜHLER: Yes, the decree comes from the Police. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The passage I should like to quote, Mr. -President, is on Page 35, of our document book, and in Paragraph 4 of -the English translation. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Did you not, together with Dr. Weh, at a -time when even Frank was undecided about signing, succeed in persuading -him to do so and bring into force a decree of a frankly terrorist nature -to legalize tyranny by the Police? - -I quote Page 142 of the minutes on the conference with State Secretary -Dr. Bühler (he evidently means you) and with Dr. Weh, concerning the -order issued by Dr. Weh for combating attacks on the German work of -reconstruction in the Government General: - - “After some brief statements by the State Secretary Dr. Bühler - and Dr. Weh, the Governor General withdraws his objections and - signs the drafted decree.” - -Was it not you? - -BÜHLER: I request the interpreter to repeat the question. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am asking you: Was it you who persuaded Frank -to sign that decree as quickly as possible? - -BÜHLER: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Does that mean that the entry is false? - -BÜHLER: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In that case, how am I to understand you, if -this is “no” and the other is “no”? - -BÜHLER: I can explain that to you exactly. The draft for this decree had -been submitted to the Governor General by SS Oberführer Bierkamp who had -recently been assigned to the Government General. The Governor -General... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please... - -THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing] He is in the middle of his answer. You must -let the man answer. What were you saying? You were saying the draft had -been made by somebody? - -BÜHLER: This draft had been submitted to the Governor General by -Bierkamp who had just recently come to the Government General. The -Governor General returned this draft and had it revised in the -legislative department. When it was presented to the Governor General, -the Governor General’s doubts were whether the legislative department -had revised it or not. I do not assume material responsibility for this -draft, and I did not have to. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You simply explained to Frank that the project -of the decree had been sufficiently worked over by the competent -technical department? - -BÜHLER: Yes, by the legislative department. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And after that the Governor General signed the -decree? - -BÜHLER: Obviously. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were you not the person who, at the meeting of -23 October 1943, when a letter from Count Ronikier, a person evidently -known to you, was discussed, referred to the practical interpretation of -this cruel decree of 2 October and stated that the application of the -decree would in the future favor the camouflaging of the murder of -hostages by giving the shootings of hostages the semblance of a legal -sentence? Were you that person? - -BÜHLER: I ask that the question be repeated. I understood only part of -it. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were you the person who, at the meeting of 23 -October 1943, stated that the application of the decree of 2 October -would, in the future, favor the camouflaging of the shooting of -hostages, since it would give them the semblance of a legal sentence? - -BÜHLER: It is not quite clear to me. May I repeat what I understood? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: If you please. - -BÜHLER: You want to ask me whether I was the one who, on the occasion of -a conference on the 23rd of October 1944... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: 1943. - -BÜHLER: 1943—who, on the occasion of a conference on 23 October 1943 -stated—stated what? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You stated that the application of the decree of -2 October would help to camouflage the shooting of hostages. - -BÜHLER: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The place which I wish to quote now, Your -Honors, is on Page 26 of the English translation of Exhibit Number -USSR-223, (Document Number 2233-PS), Paragraph 4. I shall now quote your -own words to you: - - “State Secretary Dr. Bühler considers it advisable that all - those Poles who are to be shot should first be tried by regular - court-martial proceedings. In the future one should also refrain - from referring to such Poles as hostages, for the shooting of - hostages is always a deplorable event and merely provides - foreign countries with evidence against the German leadership in - the Government General”. - -BÜHLER: I said that, and thus I objected, and wanted to object, to the -shooting of hostages and to executions without court-martial -proceedings. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: So you consider that a court consisting of -high-ranking, police officials represents justice and is not a travesty -of the very idea of justice? - -BÜHLER: To which court do you refer? I pleaded for courts-martial. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is the very court I am talking about, the -“Standgericht” or summary court-martial, composed of Gestapo officials -centralized in the Government General, according to the decree of 2 -October. - -BÜHLER: I can give you information about the reasons which may have led -to this stiffening of the summary court-martial order of 2 October, so -that you may understand how, psychologically, such a decree came about. - -MR. COUNSELLOR. SMIRNOV: I am not interested in psychology. I am -interested in knowing if a court, composed of secret police officials -and considered to be a court, is not in fact sheer mockery of the very -idea of a court of justice? - -BÜHLER: The summary courts-martial had to be appointed exactly in -accordance with the decree. I am not of the opinion that a summary -court-martial, simply because it is composed exclusively of police, -should not be considered a court. But I did not make these statements -which you have held against me now in reference to this decree of 2 -October; rather I demanded, in general, sentences by courts-martial, and -termed the shooting of hostages a regrettable fact. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You are not giving me a direct answer to my -question. Perhaps you will remember Paragraph 3 of the decree which -stipulates how these courts were to be composed. Show the witness -Paragraphs 3 and 4. I am reading Paragraph 4 into the record: - - “The summary courts-martial of the Security Police are to be - composed of one SS Führer of the office of the commander of the - Security Police and the SD, and of two members of these - organizations”. - -Would a court of this composition not testify _a priori_ to the nature -of the sentence which the court would impose? - -BÜHLER: Did you ask me? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, yes. - -BÜHLER: Whether I consider a summary court-martial a court? I think, you -are asking me about things which have nothing to do with my field of -activity. I do not know what reasons were given for composing these -courts in this fashion. I cannot therefore say anything about it. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you will look at the signature to that -decree. It is signed by Frank, and it was you who persuaded Frank to -sign that decree. - -BÜHLER: I thought that I had corrected that error before. I did not -persuade Herr Frank to sign that order. Rather, I told him that that -order had been worked out in the legislative department. As before, I -must now deny any responsibility for this order, because it did not -belong to my sphere of activity. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I shall pass on to another series of questions. -Do you recollect the following subparagraph of that decree, particularly -the report of Obergruppenführer Bierkamp at the conference of 27 October -1943 in Kraków? - -BÜHLER: I cannot remember without notes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please show him the passage which I wish to -quote. The passage I wish to quote, Your Honors, is on Page 26 of our -document, the last paragraph of the text. I quote the passage in -question: - - “Pursuant to the decree of even date, the Security Police have - detained many people who since 10 October have committed - criminal acts. They have been condemned to death and will be - shot as an expiation for their crimes. Their names will be made - known to the population by means of posters, and the population - will be told that such and such people may expect a pardon, - provided there are no further murders of Germans. For every - murdered German, 10 Poles will be executed....” - -Does it not testify to the fact that from the very first days of the -enforcing of Frank’s decree, it merely served to mask mass executions of -hostages? - -BÜHLER: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then to what does it testify if, for each slain -German, 10 Poles entirely unconnected with the crime were to be executed -in accordance with these so-called “verdicts”? - -BÜHLER: In my opinion it testifies that 10 Poles would be shot who had -committed crimes punishable by death, and who had been sentenced to -death. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: For each German killed? - -BÜHLER: It is possible that these Poles were called hostages. That is -possible. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means that the decree camouflaged the -system of taking hostages? - -BÜHLER: No, it was rather that real shootings of hostages no longer -occurred. Real shootings of hostages occur when people who are not -criminals, who are innocent, are shot because of an act committed by -someone else. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you think this will be a convenient time to break off? - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has heard with the deepest regret of the -death of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone of the Supreme Court of the -United States of America. His loss will be most deeply felt in America, -where he had proved himself to be a great public servant. But it is -fitting that this Tribunal, upon which the representatives of the United -States sit, should express its sympathy with the American people in -their great loss. - -After serving as Dean of the Law School of Columbia University he was -appointed Attorney General of the United States in 1923, and two years -later he became Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. In 1941 he -became Chief Justice and discharged the duties of that high office with -great ability and in accordance with the highest traditions. - -The Tribunal desires that I should express its sympathy in -acknowledgement of the great loss the American people have sustained. - -Mr. Justice Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor of the United States, is a -member of the Supreme Court over which the Chief Justice presided, and -perhaps he would like to add a few words. - -MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States): -May it please the Tribunal: It is not only because he was the head of -the judicial system of the United States that the news of the passing of -Chief Justice Stone brings sadness to every American heart in Nuremberg, -but because he was the personal friend of so many of us. He had a rare -capacity for personal friendship. No one was more kind to, and -thoughtful of, the younger men who from time to time came to Washington; -and they found in him a guide, philosopher, and friend. - -Now, I know that not only do I feel the loss of a personal friend but -that the American representatives on the Tribunal, Mr. Biddle and Judge -Parker, feel the same way, and many of the younger men on the staff had -intimate contact with the Chief Justice which you might not expect if -you had not known Harlan Stone. - -As Attorney General he took over the Department of Justice at one of its -most difficult periods and imparted to it the impress of his integrity, -an impress which stayed with it and was traditional in the department, -as we well know. - -As a Justice of the Court he was a forward-looking man, open-minded, -always patient to hear the arguments of both sides and to arrive at his -decision with that complete disinterestedness and detachment which is -characteristic of the just judge. He presided with great fairness and -with kindness to his associates and to those who appeared before him. - -It is the passing of a man who exemplified in public life those sturdy -qualities which we have come to associate with the New Englander. - -The consolation of his friends lies in this: He died exactly as he would -have chosen to die, in full possession of his faculties and in the -discharge of his duties. - -I express great appreciation that this Tribunal has seen fit to take -note of his passing and to allow us to record on behalf of the American -Bar our appreciation of his talents and character. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, before proceeding to a further -examination of the witness, I feel that I ought to make the following -statement: - -During the examination of the witness by counsel for the defense Dr. -Seidl, the former stated that the document, which is an official -appendix to the report of the Government of the Polish Republic, was a -forgery. This document sets out the losses suffered by the Polish -Republic in objects of cultural value. The Soviet Prosecution does not -wish to enter into any controversies on the subject, but it does request -the Tribunal to note that this is an official appendix to the report of -the Government of the Polish Republic, and that it considers the -statement of the witness as libellous. - -THE PRESIDENT: [_To the witness._] Did you say anything then? - -BÜHLER: I was going to say that it was a document that contained a list -of art treasures. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that the document, Colonel Smirnov, a document which -contains a list of art treasures? - -BÜHLER: No, I do not mean that. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, Mr. President. It is a list of losses in -cultural treasures. It is a list of libraries and of the losses suffered -by these libraries during the reign of the Germans in Poland. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is USSR-93, is it not, the document you are referring -to? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is an appendix to the Document Number -USSR-93, an official report by the Polish Government. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it deals with certain directives. That was the -evidence that was given this morning. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, Mr. President. This is a list of losses -sustained. It is an official appendix to the report of the Polish -Government. It contains no directives, but it does state the sum total -of the losses sustained by the public libraries in Poland. - -THE PRESIDENT: [_To the witness._] Is there anything you want to say -about it? - -BÜHLER: Yes. I do not think the description just given applies to the -document which I had in mind. The document which I question contains -directives regarding German cultural policy in the Government General. -It does not deal with art treasures or details of library property. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What I took that you said this morning was that the -directives which you thought were referred to in the document did not -appear to have been made, or at any rate you had not heard of them, and -you thought they might be forgeries. - -BÜHLER: I questioned the document. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the document. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I proceed to the next question? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You state that you personally, as well as the -administration of the Government General, had no close connection with -the activities of the Police. Have I understood you correctly? - -BÜHLER: May I hear that question again, please? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You declare that neither you personally nor the -administration of the Government General were in any way closely -connected with the activities of the Police. Have I understood you -correctly? - -BÜHLER: We had daily contact with the Police, but we had differences of -opinion. Moreover, the Police were not under my jurisdiction; the Chief -of Police was in no way under my orders. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In that case the Police did not come within your -competence? - -BÜHLER: No, it was not one of my duties. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How then can you explain that no one but you -carried out successful negotiations with the Police for the exploitation -of the property of Jews executed in the concentration camps? Do you -remember these negotiations? - -BÜHLER: I did not quite understand you. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you: If you had no direct relations with -the Police, how can you explain the fact that you, and none other but -you, were the person who carried out successful negotiations with the -Police for the exploitation of property belonging to Jews murdered in -the concentration camps? Do you remember these negotiations with the -Police? - -BÜHLER: I do not remember any such negotiations, and I could not have -conducted them. In any case the Administration was the department which, -by order of the Four Year Plan, had to effect the confiscation of Jewish -property. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, have I your permission to submit -a document handed to us by the American Prosecution, Document Number -2819-PS? It is a directive issued by the Administration of the Economic -Department of the Government General and addressed to the Governors of -Warsaw, Radom, Lublin, and Galicia. May I submit this document? - -I quote the following from the text of this document: - - “Subject: Transfer of Jewish movable property from the SS to the - Government. - - “I inform you herewith that, on 21 February 1944, in the - presence of various departmental directors, an agreement was - reached by State Secretary Dr. Bühler and the Higher SS and - Police Leader, Obergruppenführer Koppe, that movable Jewish - property, insofar as it is, or will be in the future, in - storehouses, will be placed at the disposal of the Government by - the SS. In execution of the agreement arrived at I have ordered - that the taking over of the goods stored in the various SS - depots shall take place in the shortest possible time. Goods - deriving from confiscation and safeguarding have likewise been - turned over to me by the commander of the Security Police and - the Security Service. Please get in touch with the local SS and - Police Leader in order to come to an understanding....” - -Here I interrupt the quotation. After this, Witness, do you still insist -that you had no relations with the Police? - -BÜHLER: I was in touch with the Police daily in my work, I do not want -to deny that for a moment; but I had no right to give orders to the -Police. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In any case the property of Jews murdered in the -concentration camps of Poland was, as a result of your negotiations, -transferred to warehouses in the Government General? - -BÜHLER: That is not correct. The property mentioned was not that which -proceeded from Jews who were killed, but simply property which came from -Jews and which was removed by the Police after having been converted -through the administration department in the regular way. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But could the Security Police or the SD be in -possession of property belonging to Jews who were not murdered? - -BÜHLER: Why not? Right from the beginning the Police had taken over -Jewish problems, and therefore also came into possession of their -property in this manner. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But did the Auschwitz depot in Chopin Street -also keep the property of Jews who had not been murdered? Of Jews who -were still alive? - -BÜHLER: The depots which have been mentioned here are not to be -interpreted as being concentration camps, but as depots where goods were -stored. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What other depots were there for storing the -movable property of Jews besides those in the concentration camps? - -BÜHLER: I do not know what things looked like in concentration camps, as -I have never entered or seen one; but that the Police took possession of -movable Jewish property is something I was certainly told about by the -director of my trustee department. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you this: In 1944 when the machines of -destruction were working at top speed at Auschwitz and Maidanek, what -depots or warehouses existed for the storage of Jewish movable property -besides those which stored the movable property of Jews executed in -concentration camps? Do you know of any other warehouses and where they -were located? - -BÜHLER: The Jews were deprived of their property on the spot. I have -never assumed that Jewish property was to be found in concentration -camps. I did not know anything at all about these camps. Where the -Police took that movable property was not clear to me, but depots must -have existed. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would draw your attention to the date—21 -February 1944. At that time were there any Jews still alive in Poland, -or were the Jewish ghettos already quite empty? - -BÜHLER: The Jewish ghettos were empty, but there were still some Jews; I -know that because they were being used in one way or another in the -armament industry. Jewish property could not have been removed from the -territory, it must have been somewhere in the Government General, very -probably near the ghettos or wherever else the evacuation of Jews took -place. And this telegram, I repeat, does not concern stores which were -in concentration camps; they were everywhere. Every place had property -stored somewhere which originated from the resettlement of the Jews. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then the Jewish ghettos were already empty. In -that case, what happened to the Jews from Poland? - -BÜHLER: When these Jewish ghettos were emptied, I assumed they were -resettled in the northeast of Europe. The chief of the RSHA had -definitely told me at the conference in February 1942 that this was the -intention. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: On the 21 February 1944 the front line ran -through the Government General. How and where could the Jews have been -transferred to the northeast? - -BÜHLER: According to the conference this was to have taken place in -1942. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The document is dated 1944, 21 February 1944. - -I pass on to the next question. Tell me, does not the fact that the -police chiefs attended all the conferences at the headquarters of the -Governor General and that the Governor General arranged for special -conferences to be held dealing exclusively with police matters indicate -that the very closest relations existed between the administration -department of the Governor General and the Gestapo? - -BÜHLER: I have already mentioned at the beginning that the view of the -Governor General was that he should have jurisdiction over the Police. -This is the reason why the Governor General repeatedly called the Police -for discussions around the conference table. But that did not prevent -the Police from going their own way and using methods of their own. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But were no conferences held by the Governor -General for dealing directly and exclusively with police problems, and -with police problems only? - -BÜHLER: Yes, from time to time. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Very well. Then will you tell me who took -Krüger’s place when he was removed from his post as Chief of Police? - -BÜHLER: As far as I can remember Krüger was removed from his post in -Kraków in November 1943 and was replaced by Obergruppenführer Koppe. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What were your personal relations with Koppe? - -BÜHLER: The relationship with the Police under Krüger had always been -hostile, and whenever the administration department had any wish that -involved police jurisdiction, such wishes had always been frustrated by -Krüger; therefore, after Krüger had left Kraków I tried to establish a -comradely relationship with the new Higher SS and Police Leader, so that -in this manner I could influence the work of the Police and the methods -employed by them. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Could you answer briefly: What exactly were your -personal relations with Koppe? Were they good or bad? - -BÜHLER: They were comradely. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to show you one document. You, Mr. -President, will find the passage on Page 38, Paragraph 2, of the English -translation. I am reading the passage into the record. It is a statement -made by Frank to Himmler at the conference with Himmler on the 12 -February 1944: - - “Immediately after the exchange of greetings, Reichsführer SS - Himmler entered into conversation with me and SS - Obergruppenführer Koppe. The Reichsführer asked me right at the - beginning how I was co-operating with the new Secretary of State - for Security, SS Obergruppenführer Koppe. I expressed my deep - satisfaction at the fact that between myself and SS - Obergruppenführer Koppe, as well as between him and State - Secretary Dr. Bühler, there existed extraordinarily good - relations of friendly co-operation.” (Document Number 2233-PS.) - -Does that statement by Frank correspond to the fact, Witness? - -BÜHLER: At that time Koppe had been in the Government General only a few -weeks. This statement confirms just what I said here at the beginning, -namely, that after Krüger had been replaced by Koppe I tried through -comradely relations with Koppe to gain influence over the police powers -in the Government General. Thus there had been no friction up to that -time. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And between Koppe and Dr. Bühler, that is, -between Koppe and yourself, there existed the most comradely -collaboration; is that correct? - -BÜHLER: I repeat, my relations with Koppe were comradely. Apart from -that, the problems with which we had to deal brought me into daily -contact with Koppe. For instance, there was this question of Jewish -property. One could not possibly have discussed such a question with -Krüger, as he held the view that all Jewish property belonged to the SS. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: When Koppe took over the post of Chief of -Police, was there any change with regard to the Polish population? Did -the police measures become less severe? Did they become less repressive -with Koppe’s arrival? - -BÜHLER: I believe they were milder. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to follow the minutes of one -particular administrative conference of the 16 December 1943, held at -Kraków. - -Please show the witness the original. - -Incidentally, is that your signature on the list of those present? On -Page 154. - -BÜHLER: Government meeting, 16 December 1943? Yes, I signed that; that -is right. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me, do you remember who Ohlenbusch was? - -BÜHLER: Ohlenbusch was the President of the Department of Propaganda. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was he in any way connected with the Police or -with the administration? - -BÜHLER: Ohlenbusch participated in the government meetings, at which the -Police were also present as a rule. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But he himself, in his own function, did he have -any connection with the Police or not? - -BÜHLER: As a state official and head of a government department he did, -of course, have connections with the Police, official connections. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But he was an official of the civilian -administration of your organization? - -BÜHLER: Yes, of course. As far as his official position was concerned, -he was subordinate to me. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am reading into the record a short extract -from Page 176. Your Honors will find it on Page 33 of our document book, -Paragraph 3, Ohlenbusch’s speech: - - “It would be well to consider whether, for reasons of - expediency, one should not, as far as possible, carry out - executions on the spot where the attempt upon the life of a - German took place. One ought, perhaps, also to consider whether - special execution sites should not be created for this purpose, - for it has been confirmed that the Polish population streamed to - the execution grounds, which were accessible to all, in order to - put the blood-soaked earth into containers and take them to the - church.” (Document Number 2233-PS.) - -Do you not consider this question a purely police question? - -BÜHLER: It does not mention buckets of blood in my translation. It says -containers. I do not think that the blood could be carried away in -buckets. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: We are talking here about containers into which -the blood-soaked soil was placed. Do you not consider that the question -of organizing secret execution grounds was purely a matter for the -Police? - -BÜHLER: I am of the same opinion. For this reason this matter was by no -means approved of. But perhaps I may add that at the same time German -pedestrians in Kraków and Warsaw were being shot in the back daily, -without any reason, and that this affair was due to the excitement -which... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am asking you about something else, Witness. -Do you not consider the fact that this question was discussed at the -initiative of Ohlenbusch as positive proof that even the petty officials -in the civilian administration interfered in police matters and were in -direct contact with the Police? - -BÜHLER: No, I would not say so. This was not suggested as a police -measure. It arose from the threat under which all Germans lived at that -stage of the occupation. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This question of secret execution grounds—did -it arise on Ohlenbusch’s initiative? I trust you are not going to deny -this. - -BÜHLER: What do you mean by this question? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did it arise on—was it provoked by the -initiative of Ohlenbusch? You are not going to deny it? - -BÜHLER: I do not know whether this was discussed at all. In my opinion -there was not... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The typewritten report of that conference is -before you, and you were present at that conference. - -BÜHLER: Yes, there are statements made by Ohlenbusch, if I am not -mistaken. Yes, it mentions “President Ohlenbusch” here. That is right. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I shall proceed to the next question. Did SS -Obergruppenführer Koppe not report on the subject at all during the -conference? I will quote a brief excerpt which Your Honors will find on -Page 34, Paragraph 2. It is on Page 180 of your document book. - - “...For the railway outrage 150 and for the two German - officials, 50 Polish terrorists were executed either on the spot - or in the immediate vicinity. It must be remembered that the - shooting of 200 people affects at least 3,000 (nearest - relatives)...” (Document Number 2288-PS.) - -Do you not consider this as evidence that with the arrival of Koppe the -same savage measures of repression were used against the people of -Poland? - -BÜHLER: Inasmuch as this mentions the shooting of 150 and 50 people this -obviously concerns the shooting of hostages, which never did have the -approval of the Governor General or my approval. If I have nevertheless -stated that in its entirety Koppe’s regime appeared milder to me, then I -must stand by that statement of mine. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Does this mean that the hostage system did not -meet either with your approval or with the approval of the Governor -General; is that correct? - -BÜHLER: It did not have my approval, and I do not think it had the -approval of the Governor General. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please look at Page 185 of the document -in your possession. I begin with the quotation: - - “The Governor General expressed his gratitude and recognition to - SS Obergruppenführer Koppe for his effective work and spoke of - his satisfaction that an expert with such high qualifications - should be at the head of the police organization in the - Government General. He promised SS Obergruppenführer Koppe the - active co-operation of all offices in the Government General and - expressed his best wishes for the success of his work.” - (Document Number 2233-PS.) - -How are we to interpret this statement in the light of your previous -answer? - -BÜHLER: This statement of the Governor General does not apply to these -50 and 150 people. It applies to the work in its entirety which was to -be done by Koppe in the Government General. And one of the principles -that was to be applied to that work—which I helped bring about—was -that shootings of hostages were to cease. It is quite possible that in -this case that principle had not yet been applied. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Would you please wait one minute. Just before -this you read Koppe’s report on the shooting of the hostages, Page 180. -And after that the Governor General expressed his approval. This means -that it was precisely this activity of Koppe’s that the Governor General -had approved? - -BÜHLER: Well, this was not the only statement made by Koppe. The -statement of the Governor General was in reference to all the statements -made by Koppe, and not to detached portions. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Very well. In that case he also approved, among -other things, of this statement, that is to say, this report. - -BÜHLER: But I know that the Governor General, together with me, was -exerting pressure on Koppe in order to stop the shooting of hostages. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you kindly inform me who, while Krüger was -still Chief of Police, issued instructions for the shooting of one male -inhabitant from each house which displayed a poster announcing a Polish -national holiday? - -BÜHLER: That is unknown to me. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask to have the corresponding document -submitted to you. It is in the document book, on Page 1, Paragraph 7: - - “The Governor General received District Chief, Dr. Waechter, who - reported on the appearance in some districts of inflammatory - posters on the occasion of the 11 November (the Polish Day of - Liberation). The Governor General ordered that from every house - where a poster remains exhibited one male inhabitant is to be - shot. This order is to be carried out by the Chief of Police. - Dr. Waechter has taken 120 hostages in Kraków as a precautionary - measure.” - -Do you remember that? Who then introduced this criminal practice of -taking hostages? - -BÜHLER: Are you trying to say that I was present during that conference? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to ask you about something else. - -BÜHLER: Please, will you answer my question? Was I there or was I not? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am not obliged to answer your question. It is -you, Witness, who have to answer mine. It is I who am interrogating you, -not you who are examining me. Kindly answer the next question. You -resided in Kraków. Acting on Frank’s orders, Dr. Waechter, as a -precautionary measure, detained 120 hostages. Do you wish to say that -you knew nothing about this either? - -BÜHLER: I know nothing about this measure; nor is it known to me that -hostages were shot. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer the following question. Have I -understood you correctly—did you state today that there was no famine -in Poland? - -BÜHLER: Yes, there was no famine in Poland. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am asking you to be shown the speech of Dr. -Bühler, State Secretary—that obviously means you—at a meeting on the -31 May 1943, in Kraków. I begin the quotation: - - “...The Government of the Government General has for a long time - been clear on the point that the scale of food rations allowed - to non-Germans cannot be continued any longer without the - population taking matters into its own hands or being driven to - insurrection... The difficulties of the food situation, which - naturally have a bad effect on the morale of the population, the - enormous rise in prices, the exaggerated and narrow-minded - salary and wage policy, have driven part of the Polish - population to despair.” (Document Number 2233-PS.) - -Did you say that? - -BÜHLER: I could follow the first part, but I could not find the last -sentence. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Would you kindly follow the text. In the text -you will find both the first part and the last sentence: “...have driven -part of the Polish population to despair.” Please study the text. - -BÜHLER: Where does it say so, please? Would you show it to me? - -[_The text was indicated to the witness._] - -I made these statements, and... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then I also have the following question to ask -you. Do you not think that your announcement in 1943 bears witness to -the fact that you have today testified falsely before the Tribunal? - -BÜHLER: No; no. What I meant by my statement was that the population -would take things into its own hands. When for instance a worker -remained away from his place of work for 3 days to go in search of food, -this was considered by me to be a desperate step on the part of the -worker. - -However, I said this morning that it was very difficult for the -population to obtain the necessary food supplies but that it was not -impossible, so that I did not notice famine at all in the Government -General. - -And please may I ask you to consider that 80 percent of the population -of the Government General were country people, so that there could be no -famine on a large scale unless the countryside had been completely -despoiled, and that was not the case. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You stated that as a result of the food quotas -established in the Government General a revolt might arise, and you said -that the population was driven to despair by hunger. Is that not -evidence that a famine was raging in the country? - -BÜHLER: By “revolt” I meant “unrest,” not an armed uprising. It is quite -clear that morale and the will to work did suffer by reason of the -insufficient rations. I stated this morning how it was that adequate -provisioning of the population could not be carried out. On the other -hand, however, there was such a widespread free market and black market -that even the worker, if he had sufficient time, could obtain food; and -if he did not have time, he took it. That was what I meant by the -workers taking things in their own hands. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please, answer this question. Were only such -educational possibilities left to the Poles as would—according to the -plan of Frank and Goebbels—merely emphasize the hopeless destiny of -their nation? - -BÜHLER: Efforts to keep down the level of education of the Polish -population were noticeable. These tendencies originated from Himmler in -Berlin. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to answer: What was done with -the Polish universities? - -BÜHLER: They were closed and they were not reopened. However, technical -courses were arranged in Warsaw and in Lvov in which these people -received university education; but, to be sure, these courses had to be -closed by demand of the Reich. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you will recollect under whose signature -the decree was issued to close the universities. Perhaps you will -recognize this signature? It is an official report. - -BÜHLER: The decree regarding the appointment of university trustees was -signed by the Governor General in November 1940. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please tell me whether technical -schools only were left in Poland? - -BÜHLER: Not technical schools alone remained open; there were, for -instance, commercial schools, and the attendance there was very large. -Apart from that, there were craft schools and elementary schools, which -were set up on a large scale. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In other words, only those schools were left -which trained artisans, and petty commercial clerks and tradesmen? - -BÜHLER: Whether only petty or also more important traders attended them -I do not know. At any rate commercial schools were permitted. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to know on whose initiative the -royal palace at Warsaw was destroyed? - -BÜHLER: I do not know for certain. I heard once that it had been the -Führer’s wish that the castle in Warsaw, which was heavily damaged, -should be razed to the ground. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And by whose personal order was this castle, the -royal castle of Warsaw destroyed? - -BÜHLER: I do not know whether it was blown up; that I do not know. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes. It was destroyed. Who ordered it to be -destroyed, do you know? - -BÜHLER: I do not know. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You do not know? - -BÜHLER: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The quotation which I want to read to you is on -Page 1 of the translation of the document submitted by us to the -Tribunal. It is a very short quotation. I shall proceed to read it into -the record: - - “...The Führer discussed the general situation with the Governor - General and he approved of the work of the Governor General in - Poland, especially the pulling down of the palace at Warsaw and - the intention not to reconstruct the city...” - -Was it not true that the palace in Warsaw was destroyed by order of -Frank? - -BÜHLER: It is not known to me that the castle was destroyed. As far as I -know there was at one time a project to pull it down, but the plan was -abandoned. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me, please, was it not in your presence -that the Defendant Frank on 21 April 1940 issued an order to apply -police measures during the so-called recruitment of labor. - -BÜHLER: I should have to see the minutes. I cannot remember it offhand. - -[_The document was handed to the witness._] - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The place which I should like to quote is on -Page 46 of the document, the last paragraph. I quote: - - “Discussion with State Secretary Dr. Bühler, SS - Obergruppenführer Krüger, and Dr. Frauendorfer in the presence - of Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart. - - “Subject of discussion is the deportation of workers, especially - agricultural workers, to the Reich. - - “The Governor General stated that, as all methods in the way of - appeals, _et cetera_, had been unsuccessful, one was now obliged - to come to the conclusion that the Poles evaded this duty of - work either out of malice, or with the intention of doing - Germany indirect harm by not placing themselves at her disposal. - He therefore asked Dr. Frauendorfer whether there were any - measures left which had not yet been taken to win the Poles over - voluntarily. - - “Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer answered this question - in the negative. - - “The Governor General stated emphatically that a final decision - was now required of him. The question now was whether one would - not have to resort to some form of coercive measure.” - -Was that not an order to apply coercive measures when recruiting labor? - -BÜHLER: I will not contradict the statement, as I have seen the minutes. -It is one of the utterances of the Governor General which, I believe, -were not altogether made voluntarily but which in no way altered the -course which I took on this question. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer the following question: Were you -present at a discussion with Sauckel on 18 August 1942, and was it in -your presence that Frank told Sauckel that he—as he put it—“joyfully” -informed him that he had shipped a fresh convoy of workers to the Reich -with the help of the Police. - -BÜHLER: Together with my departmental heads who dealt with the -recruitment of workers I had a conference with Reich Commissioner -Sauckel before the visit to the Governor General took place. I cannot -now remember whether I was present when Reich Commissioner Sauckel -visited the Governor General. I ask to see the minutes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please show the defendant, I mean the witness, -the passage. - -[_The document was handed to the witness._] - -I will now read into the record two short passages on Pages 918 and 920. -Doctor Frank says: - - “I am very glad that I can inform you officially that up to this - date we have sent to Germany over 800,000 workers. Only a short - time ago you asked for another 140,000. I am happy to inform you - officially that, in accordance with our agreement of yesterday, - 60 percent of these newly requested workers will be sent by the - end of October, and the other 40 percent will be dispatched to - the Reich by the end of the year.” - -Then I will ask you to pass on to Page 120. There is only one other -sentence I want to quote: - - “Besides the 140,000, you can count on a further number of - workers from the Government General during the coming year, for - we will use the Police to get them.” - -Does that not imply the use of Draconian police methods in the so-called -recruiting of manpower? - -BÜHLER: I do not recollect that I was present on that occasion, so I can -in no way confirm whether that was said in this way. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I have no more questions to put -to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: [_To Dr. Seidl._] Do you want to re-examine? - -DR. SEIDL: I have a few more questions to ask the witness. - -First of all, I should like to clarify a misunderstanding which seems to -have arisen. The question which I put to the witness in connection with -Document Number USSR-93 referred only to Appendix 1, which has the title -“Cultural Life in Poland.” That appendix deals with directives regarding -cultural policies which the administration of the Government General was -supposed to have issued, and the way I understood the witness was that -he only wanted to answer that particular question and not refer to the -other appendices, such as, for instance, those dealing with confiscated -art treasures. - -Perhaps it would have been better if he had not used the word “forged.” -At any rate, he wanted to say that he did not know the directives in -question. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, is it correct that by far the -greater number of Polish workers who were brought to the Reich were -volunteers? - -BÜHLER: May I, first of all, say that I by no means wished to accuse the -Prosecution of committing a forgery. I merely wanted to point out that -possibly they were using a forged document. I did not want to accuse the -Prosecution itself of a forgery. - -Now, regarding the question put by defense counsel, I want to say that -according to my observations by far the greater number of all the -workers from the Government General went to the Reich voluntarily. - -DR. SEIDL: So as to assist your memory, I am going to read a short -quotation from the diary, which deals with the recruiting of workers. - -On 4 March 1940 the Governor General addressed a meeting of the town -mayors of the Lublin district and stated the following regarding the -recruitment of workers: - - “He rejected the issue of a new decree, as demanded by Berlin, - containing particular coercive measures and threats of - punishment. Measures which attract attention abroad should be - avoided. The forcible transport of people had every argument - against it.” - -Does that conception reflect the true views of the Governor General? - -BÜHLER: I was not present during that conference, so I did not hear that -utterance by the Governor General, but it does tally with those -instructions and principles which the Governor General gave to me and -which I have always resolutely observed and carried out. - -DR. SEIDL: Were you present during a conference on 14 January 1944—I -see you were there—it was a conference with the State Secretary Dr. -Bühler, Dr. Koppe, and several others. I quote from it: - - “The Governor General resolutely opposes the employment of - Police for carrying out such measures. Such a task is not a - matter for the Police.” - -Is it correct that the Governor General repeatedly opposed the use of -Police in connection with the recruiting of workers? - -BÜHLER: That was not the only occasion. The deputy of Reich Commissioner -Sauckel was often attacked by him during public meetings when he talked -about raids for recruiting workers; but I must state that Sauckel’s -deputy always declared that it was not he who had given instructions for -these raids. - -DR. SEIDL: The first quotation which the prosecutor submitted to you was -an entry dated 25 January 1943. He asked you whether you regarded -yourself as a war criminal. I shall now put to you another passage from -that conference, at which you yourself were present. I quote from Page 7 -of that entry in the diary. The Governor General stated: - - “State Secretary Krüger, you know that orders of the - Reichsführer SS can be carried out by you only after you have - spoken with me. This was omitted in this instance. I express my - regret that you have carried out an order from the Reichsführer - without first informing me, in accordance with the orders of the - Führer. According to that order, instructions of the - Reichsführer SS may be carried out here in the Government - General only after I have previously given my approval. I hope - that this is the last time that that is overlooked; because I do - not want to trouble the Führer about every single case of this - kind.” (Document Number 2233-PS.) - -I shall skip a sentence and continue to quote: - - “It is not possible for us to disregard Führer orders, and it is - out of the question that in the sphere of police and security - direct orders from the Reichsführer should be carried out over - the head of the man who has been appointed here by the Führer; - otherwise I should be completely superfluous.” - -I now ask you, is it correct that there were very frequently such -disputes between the Governor General and the Higher SS Police Leader -Krüger, and that the Governor General terminated these disputes by -asking for co-operation, so that some sort of administration could -function in this territory? - -BÜHLER: Yes, that is correct, such disputes were our daily bread. - -DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has also submitted to you another exhibit, -USSR-335 (Document Number USSR-335), the Court-Martial Decree, dated -October 1943. I now ask you what the security situation was like in the -Government General then, and would it have been at all possible at that -time to control the situation with normal criminal procedure? - -THE PRESIDENT: Doctor Seidl, has that not already been dealt with very -fully in his examination in chief? - -DR. SEIDL: I forego having this question answered again. Now one last -question, which refers to art treasures. - -Is it correct that a portion of the art treasures which were found in -the region of Upper Silesia were taken to the last official residence of -the Governor General at Neuhaus to be safeguarded, and that the Governor -General gave you instructions to prepare a list of these articles and -send it to Reich Minister Lammers? - -BÜHLER: The Governor General dictated a report to Reich Minister Lammers -about the transfer of 20 of the most outstanding art treasures from the -property of the Polish State. I was present when it was dictated and I -took that report personally to State Secretary Kritzinger in Berlin. It -was stated therein that these art treasures, so as to save them from the -Russians, had been taken from Seichau, or whatever the place is called, -to Schliersee. These art treasures were left unguarded in the official -residence of the Governor General. - -DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions to put to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. - -DR. SEIDL: I have now completed the examination of witnesses, but as the -document books have not yet been bound, I would like to suggest that at -some later stage, perhaps after the case of Frick, I could submit these -document books. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, how many books are you presenting? - -DR. SEIDL: A total of five volumes, but I myself have not received them -yet. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has the Tribunal approved the documents in five volumes? - -DR. SEIDL: They are almost entirely documents which have already been -submitted by the Prosecution and an agreement has been reached with the -Prosecution regarding the documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, we need not wait now for the document books. -The document books will be considered by the Tribunal when they are put -in and then, if you have anything in particular you want to say upon -them in explanation, you may do so. - -DR. SEIDL: Very well. - -THE PRESIDENT: No doubt you will comment upon them in your final speech. -You say that they are mostly documents which have already been put in, -and therefore it would not be necessary to make any preliminary comment -upon them. You will be able to deal with them in your final speech. - -DR. SEIDL: But I should have liked to quote a few passages during my -submission of evidence, since this is necessary to establish the -connection, and as it would be impossible to do all that during my final -speech; but I do not think that too much time will be lost through that. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Seidl, it would not be very useful to the -Tribunal for you to make a commentary upon the documents at a later -stage, when your witnesses have been finished and somebody else’s—some -other defendant’s—witnesses have been interpolated; therefore, the -Tribunal thinks it will be much better and much more convenient to the -Tribunal if you defer your comments on the documents until your final -speech. - -Well, Dr. Seidl, as I understand, you have two books which are before us -now. Three is it? - -DR. SEIDL: There is a total of five books. The other three do not appear -to have been bound. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but you say that most of the documents in them are -documents which are already in evidence. - -DR. SEIDL: The diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank, which contains 42 -volumes, has been submitted, but the Prosecution has used only those -parts which appeared favorable for them. In my opinion it is, therefore, -necessary that the connections should to some extent be re-established -during the submission of evidence. Also, there are other documents in -the document book which I believe should be read, at least in extract, -before this Tribunal, but I shall, of course, limit myself to the -absolutely necessary passages when I read the documents. I should like -to suggest to the Tribunal that the matter be handled as it was in the -case of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, so that I submit the individual -documents to the Tribunal as exhibits. There are several speeches by the -Defendant Frank, there are decrees and legal regulations, there are two -affidavits, and I really think that somehow an opinion with regard to -them should be given during the submission of evidence; and, besides, -individual documents will have to be given exhibit numbers. Up to now -only one document has been submitted as evidence on behalf of the -Defendant Frank, and that is the affidavit of the witness Dr. Bühler; -but I have the intention of bringing a whole series of further documents -formally to the notice of the Tribunal and would like to postpone that -only because the Tribunal has not yet received the bound document books. - -THE PRESIDENT: When will these other books be ready, Dr. Seidl? - -DR. SEIDL: I was told that they would be completed by this evening. - -THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think you will take in dealing with these -books? - -DR. SEIDL: I think that two hours will be enough. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal would like you to deal with your -documents now, and insofar as they are documents which have already been -put in evidence, unless you wish to refer to other passages in them, -they think that you need only tell us what the documents are and put -them in evidence, unless it is very important to you to refer to any -particular document. So far as they are new documents, you will, no -doubt, offer them in evidence and make such short comments as you think -necessary. But the Tribunal hopes that you will be able to finish this -afternoon. With reference to the other books that you have, we -understand that you have all the documents in German yourself, and -therefore you can refer us to those documents now. - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, upon the wish of the Prosecution and also, I -believe, of the Tribunal, I have reduced the original bulk of my -document books considerably. The first five document books, as I had had -them prepared, contained more than eight hundred pages. The new form is -considerably shorter; but I have not received the German text of the new -form, so that I am not in a position just now to give the number of -pages to the Tribunal or to co-ordinate my page numbers with the -numbered pages of the translations. If I may express a wish, it is that -we should first wait until the five document books in their new form are -available, because otherwise it is very likely that the numbering of the -pages would not correspond to the numbering of the individual documents -as exactly as might be desired. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it best that you should begin now -with the first three volumes. We have them here. - -DR. SEIDL: If the Tribunal has the first three volumes, then I will -begin. I begin with Volume I. The first document on Page 1 is the decree -of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, dated 12 October 1939, concerning -the administration of the occupied Polish territories. This decree -defines in detail the authority of the Governor General. In Paragraphs 5 -and 6 some of the limitations to the authority of the Governor General -are included, which the witnesses Dr. Lammers and Dr. Bühler have -already pointed out. This document bears the number 2537-PS and it will -be Exhibit Frank-2. - -I pass to Page 3 of the document book. This document is the decree of -the Führer concerning the establishment of a State Secretariat for -Security in the Government General, dated 7 May 1942. I quote Paragraph -2: - - “The State Secretary for Security serves at the same time as - deputy of the Reichsführer SS in his capacity as Reich - Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality.” - -On Page 4 I quote Paragraph IV: - - “The Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police is - authorized to give the State Secretary for Security direct - instructions in the province of security and the preservation of - German Nationality.” - -This document will be Exhibit Frank-3 (Document Number Frank-3). - -Following the decree of the Führer of 7 May 1942 comes the decree for -the transfer of authority to the State Secretary for Security, of 23 -June 1942. I do not know whether that decree is already bound in that -volume. Apparently that decree, which was added later, has not yet been -translated. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the date? - -DR. SEIDL: 23 June 1942. - -THE PRESIDENT: We have one of 27 May 1942. - -DR. SEIDL: That decree apparently has not yet been translated because it -was added afterwards, and I will put it in the document book later. It -will be Document Frank-4. In Paragraph 1 of that decree, we find, “The -jurisdictions of the administrative and creative branches of the Police -referred to in appendices A and B are now transferred to the State -Secretary for Security.” In Appendix 1 the spheres of authority of the -Order Police are mentioned under 15 headings—no, I must correct -that—26 headings; and in Appendix B the spheres of authority of the -Order Police come under 21 headings. - -I pass now to Document Book I, Page 5. That is the decree of the Führer -concerning the appointment of officials and the termination of this -status as officials in the sphere of the Government General, of 20 May -1942. I quote from the figure 3, Paragraph 2: - - “The Governor General’s sphere of activity does not, in the - sense of this decree, include officials belonging to the - province of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police - in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, or those belonging to the - Customs Frontier Service.” (Document Number Frank-4(e).) - -I pass to Page 6 of the document book, the decree of the Führer and -Reich Chancellor, for the Preservation of German Nationality, of 7 -October 1939, which is already Exhibit USA-305 (Document Number 686-PS). - -The next document is the letter from Reich Marshal Göring to the Chief -of the Security Police and the SD, of July 1941. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, I suggest that an exhibit number be given as we -go along so that we can follow better, and later on have some track of -the exhibits as they go in. The last one and this one have not been -given any exhibit number. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): The -last one was Frank-5, was it not? - -THE PRESIDENT: No. Frank-5 was the one of the 27th of May 1942. - -MR. DODD: We did not know that; we did not get the number over the -speaker. I am sorry. - -THE PRESIDENT: It may not have been stated but I took it down as that -myself. Will you take care to state each time, Dr. Seidl, what the -exhibit number is that you are giving. You are dealing now with the -letter of the 31st of July 1941. - -DR. SEIDL: Yes. This letter has a USA number, namely, 509. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Wait a minute, perhaps I made a mistake. Yes, -Mr. Dodd, I think I made a mistake. The reason why Dr. Seidl did not -give a number was because it was already in evidence as USA-305. I made -a mistake. It was not Frank-5. He only got to Frank-4. The next one is -USA-509. - -DR. SEIDL: 509 (Document Number 710-PS). I pass to Page 10 of the -document book. That is an order, a directive rather, of the High Command -of the Armed Forces concerning Case Barbarossa, USA-135 (Document Number -447-PS), and I quote Paragraph 2: - - “It is not intended to declare East Prussia and the Government - General an operational area of the Army. On the other hand, on - the basis of the unpublished Führer decrees of 19 and 21 October - 1939 the Commander-in-Chief of the Army is authorized to enact - measures that are necessary for the execution of his military - task and for the security of his troops.” - -I pass to Page 11 of the document book, a directive for the execution of -the Führer decree concerning the Plenipotentiary General for the -Allocation of Labor, of 27 March 1942. I quote Paragraph 4: - - “The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor will - have at his disposal for the performance of his tasks the - authority delegated to me by the Führer to issue instructions to - the highest Reich authorities, their subordinate offices, as - well as to the offices of the Party and its formations and - affiliated organizations; to the Reich Protector; to the - Governor General; to the military commanders and the chiefs of - the civil administrations.” - -This document becomes Exhibit Number Frank-5 (Document Number Frank-5). - -The next document is on Page 12—the decree by the Führer, concerning a -Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, of 21 March 1942, -from which it can be seen that his authority to issue instructions -included the Government General. It becomes Exhibit Number Frank-6 -(Document Number Frank-6). - -The document on Page 13 of the document book deals also with the -authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor to -issue instructions. It is already Exhibit USA-206 (Document Number -3352-PS). - -The document on Page 15 is a letter from Professor Dr. Kubiowicz, -Chairman of the Ukrainian Control Committee, to the Defendant Dr. Frank. -It already has the Exhibit Number USA-178 (Document Number 1526-PS); and -I will read only the first sentence from that document, in order to show -what the relation was between the Defendant Dr. Frank and the author of -that letter. I quote: - - “Complying with your wish I send you this letter, in which I - should like to state the abuses and the painful incidents which - create an especially difficult position for the Ukrainian - population within the Government General.” - -Then I pass on to Page 16 of the document book. That is an excerpt from -Exhibit USA-275 (Document Number 1061-PS), namely, the report of SS -Brigadeführer Stroop about the destruction of the Warsaw ghetto. I quote -the second paragraph of Section II, from which it can be seen that the -order came directly from the Reichsführer SS Himmler: - - “When the Reichsführer SS visited Warsaw in January 1943, he - ordered the SS and Police Leader in the District of Warsaw to - transfer to Lublin the armament factories and other enterprises - of military importance which were installed within the ghetto, - including the workers and the machines.” - -The affidavit which the Prosecution submitted during the -cross-examination of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner should then really -follow after Page 16 of the document book. - -COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): As -far as I can gather, there has been some misunderstanding on this point. -Under the number mentioned by Dr. Seidl in his document book there is no -document referring to the Warsaw ghetto, but there is a document from -the Chief of Police and SS in Galicia relating to the solution of the -Jewish problem in Galicia. I should like this elucidated. - -DR. SEIDL: The document on Page 16 is the report by the SS Brigadeführer -Stroop which has already been submitted as Exhibit USA-275. The report -by SS Führer Katzmann, which the Russian Prosecutor apparently means, -concerning the solution of the Jewish question in Galicia, is on Page 17 -of the document book, that is, on the next page. Apparently the -insertion of Page 16 in the document book which was prepared for the -Russian Prosecution was overlooked. - -After that report by Brigadeführer Stroop, Exhibit USA-275 should be -inserted as Page 16a, the affidavit by SS Brigadeführer Stroop which was -submitted during the cross-examination of the Defendant Dr. -Kaltenbrunner under Exhibit Number USA-804. That affidavit bears the -Document Number 3841-PS. I could not include that affidavit in the -document book because it was submitted by the Prosecution only after I -had sent the document book to be translated. - -As Page 16b another document should be put in which was also submitted -during the cross-examination of Dr. Kaltenbrunner. That is the affidavit -by Karl Kaleske. That affidavit bears the Exhibit Number USA-803, -Document Number 3840-PS. That would be Page 16b of the document book. - -Now I come to the report which the Soviet Prosecutor had in mind and -which deals with the solution of the Jewish question in Galicia. It is -on Page 17 of the document book. That measure has the Exhibit Number -USA-277 and the Document Number L-18. I quote Pages 4 and 5, word for -word: - - “After it had been found in more and more cases that Jews had - succeeded in making themselves indispensable to their employers - by providing them with scarce goods, _et cetera_, it was - considered necessary to introduce really Draconic measures.” - -I pass to Paragraph 2 and quote: - - “As the administration was not in a position and showed itself - too weak to master this chaos, the SS and Police Leader simply - took over the whole question of the employment of Jewish labor. - The Jewish labor agencies, which were staffed by hundreds of - Jews, were dissolved. All employment certificates given by firms - or administrative offices were declared invalid, and cards given - Jews by the labor agencies were made valid again by being - stamped by the police offices.” - -I pass to Page 19 of the document book. That deals with the letter of -the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery to Reichsführer SS -and Chief of the German Police Himmler, of 17 April 1943. That document -is Number 2220-PS and Exhibit Number USA-175. I quote: - - “In our conference of 27 March of this year we had agreed to - prepare written memoranda about conditions in the Government - General on which to base our intended report to the Führer. - - “The material compiled for this purpose by SS Obergruppenführer - Krüger has already been submitted to you directly. On the basis - of this material I have had a report prepared which sums up the - most important points contained therein, subdivides them - clearly, and culminates in an explanation of the measures to be - taken. - - “The report has been checked with SS Obergruppenführer Krüger - and has his complete concurrence. I am submitting a part of it - to you herewith.”—It is signed—“Dr. Lammers.” - -I pass on to Page 20 of the document book and I quote: - - “Secret. Concerning conditions in the Government General... - - “The German administration in the Government General has to - accomplish the following tasks: 1) To increase agricultural - production for the purpose of securing food for the German - people and seize as much of it as possible, to allot sufficient - rations to the native population occupied with work essential to - the war effort, and to remove the rest for the Armed Forces and - the homeland.” - -I leave out the following points and pass to the letter “B”, where -Krüger or his assistant criticized the measures of the Governor General. -I quote: - - “German administration in the Government General has failed - grossly with respect to the tasks listed under “A”. Even if a - relatively high percentage, namely, over 90 percent, of the - delivery quota of agricultural products for the Armed Forces and - the homeland was successfully met in the year 1942 and if the - labor procurement requirements of the homeland were generally - satisfied, nevertheless, on the other hand, two things must be - made clear: First, these accomplishments were not achieved until - the year 1942. Before that, for example, only 40,000 tons of - bread grain had been delivered for the Wehrmacht. Secondly, and - above all, there was the omission to create for the attainment - of such performances those prerequisites of an organizational, - economic, and political character which are indispensable if - such performances are not to lead to a breakdown in the - situation as a whole, from which chaotic conditions in every - respect could eventually come about. This failure of the German - administration can be explained in the first place by the system - of the German administrative and governmental activity in the - Government General as embodied in the Governor General himself, - and secondly by the misguided principles of policy in all - questions decisive for conditions in the Government General. - - “I) The spirit of the German administration in the Government - General. - - “From the beginning it has been the endeavor of the Governor - General to make a state organization out of the Government - General which was to lead its own existence in complete - independence of the Reich.” - -Then I pass to Page 22 of the report, Paragraph 3 and I quote: - - “3) The treatment of the native population can only be led in - the right direction on the basis of clean and orderly - administrative and economic leadership. Only such a foundation - makes it possible to handle the native population firmly and if - necessary even severely, on the one hand; and, on the other - hand, to act generously with them and cause a certain amount of - satisfaction among the population by allowing certain liberties, - especially in the cultural field. Without such a foundation - severity strengthens the resistance movement, and meeting the - population halfway only undermines respect for the Germans. The - above-mentioned facts prove that this foundation is lacking. - Instead of trying to create this foundation, the Governor - General inaugurates a policy of encouraging the individual - cultural life of the Polish population, which in itself is - already overshooting the goal but which, under the existing - conditions and viewed in connection with our military situation - during the past winter, can only be interpreted as weakness, and - must achieve the opposite of the aim intended. - - “4) The relationship between racial Germans and the - Polish-Ukrainian population in the Government General. - - “The cases are numerous in which the German administration has - permitted the requirements of racial Germans in the Government - General to be put into the background in favor of the interests - of the Poles and Ruthenians, in its endeavor to win over the - latter. The opinion was advanced that racial Germans resettled - from somewhere else were not to be installed immediately as - settlers, but for the duration of the war were only to be - employed as farm workers. A legal foundation for the - expropriation of Polish property has not been created so far. - Bad treatment of racial Germans by their Polish employers was - not stopped. German citizens and racial German patients were - allowed to be treated in Polish hospitals by Polish physicians, - badly and at great expense. In German spas in the Government - General the sheltering of children of German citizenship from - territories threatened with bombing, and of veterans of - Stalingrad was hampered, while foreigners took convalescent - vacations there, and so on. - - “The big plans for resettlement in the Lublin district for the - benefit of racial Germans could have been carried out with less - friction if the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of - German Nationality had found the administration willing to - co-operate and assist in the proper manner.” - -I pass to Page 24 and quote, under C: - - “The administrative system, embodied in the Governor General - personally, and the material failure of the general German - administration in the most various fields of decisive importance - has not only shaken the confidence and the will to work of the - native population, but has also brought about the result that - the Poles, who have been socially divided and constantly - disunited throughout their history, have come together in a - united national body through their hostility to the Germans. In - a world of pretense, the real foundations are lacking on which - alone the achievements which the Reich requires from the - Government General, and the aims which it must see realized in - the latter, can be brought about and fulfilled in the long run. - The non-fulfillment of the tasks given to the general - administration—as happened, for example, in the field of the - Preservation of German Nationality—led to a condition which - made it necessary for other administrative bodies (the Reich - Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality...and - the Police) to take over these tasks.” - -Now I pass to Page 27 of the document book. That is the repeatedly -mentioned report by the Governor General to the Führer of 19 June 1943. -The document is Number 437-PS, Exhibit USA-610. Of this document the -Prosecution has so far quoted only Pages 10 and 11. These are the very -points in this memorandum which the Governor General most severely -criticized. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking now of the report which begins on Page -20? - -DR. SEIDL: I am speaking of the report which begins on Page 27. I have -already finished the report which begins on Page 20. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, what number did you give to that on Page 20? - -DR. SEIDL: The report on Page 20 is an integral part of the letter which -begins on Page 19, and which already has the number USA-175. - -THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see, yes. - -DR. SEIDL: Now I come to the document on Page 27. That is a memorandum -which has already been mentioned by various witnesses and was submitted -under Exhibit Number USA-610 (Document Number 437-PS) by the -Prosecution. Of this report the Prosecution has only read Pages 10 and -11, which are Pages 36 and 37 of the document book, that is to say, only -those passages in the report which were condemned as excesses of the -Police, and against which excesses the Governor General complained to -the Führer. - -I do not intend to read the whole memorandum; but I will pass on to Page -27 of the report, which is Page 53 of the document book, and I quote -under Section 2: - - “The almost complete discontinuation of the possibilities for - participation in the cultural field has led, even among the - lowest classes of the Polish people, to considerable discontent. - The Polish middle and upper classes have a great need for - self-expression. Experience shows that the possibility of - cultural activity would at the same time mean a diversion from - the political questions of the day. German propaganda frequently - comes across the objection, on the part of the Poles, that the - restriction of cultural activity enforced by the German - authorities not only prevents a contrast being made with the - Bolshevist lack of culture, but also shows that Polish cultural - activity falls below the degree of culture allowed to Soviet - citizens... - - “3. The closing of colleges, high schools, and secondary schools - is on the same level. Its well-considered purpose is without - doubt the lowering of the Polish educational standard. The - realization of this goal appears, from the point of view of the - necessities of war, not always beneficial to German interests. - As the war goes on the German interest increases in the - mobilization of able foreign replacements in the various fields - of knowledge. But more important than that is the fact that the - crippling of the school system and the severe hampering of - cultural activities foster the growth of a Polish national body, - led by the intelligentsia, to conspire against Germany. What was - not possible during the course of Polish national history, what - even the first years of German dominion could not bring about, - namely, the achievement of national unity in a common purpose to - hold together through thick and thin, now threatens to become a - reality, slowly but surely, because of the German measures. - German leadership cannot allow this process of unifying the - individual classes of the Polish population to pass unheeded in - the face of the growing power of resistance of the Poles. German - leadership should promote class distinction by certain cultural - concessions and should be able to play one class off against the - other. - - “4. The recruiting of labor and the methods employed, even - though often exercised under the unavoidable pressure of - circumstances, have, with the aid of clever Bolshevist - agitation, evoked a strong feeling of hatred among all classes. - The workers thus obtained often come to work with firm resolve - to engage in positive resistance, even active sabotage. - Improvement of recruiting methods, together with the continued - effort to arrest the abuses still practiced in the treatment of - Polish workers in the Reich, and lastly, some provision, however - meager it may be, for the families left behind, would cause a - rise in morale, and the result would be an increased desire to - work and increased production in the German interest. - - “5. When the German administration was set up at the beginning - of the war the Polish element was removed from all important - positions. The available German staff had always been inadequate - in quantity and quality. Besides, during the past year, a - considerable number of German personnel have had to be - transferred to meet the replacement needs of the armed forces. - Already an increased amount of non-German manpower has had to be - obtained compulsorily. An essential change in the treatment of - the Poles would enable the administration, while exercising all - necessary precaution, to induce a greater number of Poles to - collaborate. Without this the administration, in view of the - present amount of personnel—not to speak of future - transfers—cannot continue to function. The increased - participation of Poles would further help to raise the morale - itself. - - “Besides the positive changes set down in these proposals, a - number of methods employed up till now in the treatment of Poles - should be changed or even completely abandoned, at least for the - duration of the fighting in Europe. - - “1) I have already shown in special reports that confiscation - and evacuation of agricultural land have caused great and - irreparable damage to agricultural production. Not less great is - the damage to morale caused by such actions. Already the seizure - of a great part of the large Polish estates has understandably - embittered those affected by it, who naturally represent that - strata of the population which is always anti-Bolshevist. But, - because of their numerically small strength and their complete - isolation from the mass of the people, their opposition does not - count nearly as much as the attitude of the mass of the - population which consists mainly of small farmers. The - evacuation of Polish peasants from the defense zone, no doubt - necessary for military-political reasons, has already had an - unfavorable effect on the opinion and attitude of many farmers. - At any rate, this evacuation was kept within certain territorial - limits. It was carried out with careful preparation on the part - of the governmental offices with a view to avoiding unnecessary - hardship. The evacuation of Polish farmers from the Lublin - district, held to be necessary by the Reich Commissioner for the - Preservation of German Nationality, for the purpose of settling - racial Germans there, was much more serious. Moreover—as I have - already reported separately—the pace at which it was carried - out and the methods adopted caused immeasurable bitterness among - the populace. At short notice families were torn apart; those - able to work were sent to the Reich, while old people and - children were directed to evacuate Jewish ghettos. This happened - in the middle of the winter of 1942-43 and resulted in - considerable loss of life, especially among members of the last - mentioned group. The dispossession meant the complete - expropriation of the movable and immovable property of the - farmers. The entire population succumbed to the belief that - these deportations meant the beginning of a mass deportation of - the Poles from the region of the Government General. The general - impression was that the Poles would meet a fate similar to that - of the Jews. The evacuation from the Lublin District was a - welcome opportunity for communist agitation, with its own - peculiar skill, to poison the feeling in the entire Government - General, and even in the annexed Eastern territories, for a long - time. Thus it came about that considerable portions of the - population in the territories to be evacuated, but also in - territories not affected, fled into the woods and considerably - increased the strength of the guerrillas. The consequence was a - tremendous deterioration of the security situation. These - desperate people were incited by skillful agents to upset - agricultural and industrial production according to a definite - plan. - - “2) One has only to mention the crime of Katyn for it to become - obvious that the safeguarding of personal security is an - absolute condition for winning over the Polish population to the - fight against Bolshevism. The lack of protection against - seemingly arbitrary arrests and executions makes good copy for - communist propaganda slogans. The shooting of women, children, - and old men in public, which took place again and again without - the knowledge and against the will of the government, must be - prevented in all circumstances. Naturally this does not apply to - the public executions of bandits and partisans. In cases of - collective punishments, which nearly always hit innocent persons - and are applied against people who are fundamentally politically - indifferent, the unfavorable psychological effect cannot - possibly be overestimated. Serious punitive measures and - executions should be carried out only after a trial based at - least upon the elementary conceptions of justice and accompanied - by publication of the sentence. Even if the court procedure is - carried on in the most simple, imperfect and improvised manner, - it serves to avoid or to lessen the unfavorable effect of a - punitive measure which the population considers purely - arbitrary, and disarms Bolshevist agitation which claims that - these German measures are only the prelude to future events. - Moreover, collective punishment, which by its nature is directed - primarily against the innocent, in the worst case against forced - or desperate persons, is not exactly looked upon as a sign of - strength of the ruling power, which the population expects to - strike at the terrorists themselves and thereby liberate them - from the insecurity which burdens them.” - -I pass now to Page 37 of the report and quote under Section 3: - - “Besides the most important prerequisites mentioned in 1) and 2) - to restore calm in the Government General, security of property - among non-agricultural people must also be guaranteed, insofar - as it is not counter to the urgent needs of war. Expropriation - or confiscation without compensation in the industrial sector, - in commerce and trade, and of other private property, should not - take place in any case if the owner or the custodian has not - committed an offense against the German authorities. If the - taking over of industrial enterprises, commercial concerns, or - real estate is necessary for reasons connected with the war, one - should proceed in every case in such a way as to avoid hardship - and under guarantee of appropriate compensation. Such a - procedure would on the one hand further the initiative of Polish - business men, and on the other hand avoid damage to the - interests of German war economy. - - “4) In any attempt to influence the attitude of the Poles, - importance must be attached to the influence of the Catholic - Church which cannot be overestimated. I do not deny that the - Catholic Church has always been on the side of the leading - fighters for an independent national Poland. Numerous priests - also made their influence felt in this direction even after the - German occupation. Hundreds of arrests were carried out among - them. A number of priests were taken to concentration camps and - also shot. However, in order to win over the Polish population, - the Church must be given at least a legal status even though it - might not be possible to co-operate with it. It can without - doubt be won over to reinforce the struggle of the Polish people - against Bolshevism, especially today under the effect of the - crime of Katyn, for the Church would always oppose a Bolshevist - regime in the Vistula area, if only out of the instinct of - self-preservation. To achieve that end, however, it is necessary - to refrain in the future from all measures against its activity - and its property, insofar as they do not run directly counter to - war requirements. - - “Much harm has been done even quite recently by the closing of - monasteries, charitable institutions, and church - establishments.” - -THE PRESIDENT: I had thought that your extracts were going to be brief. -But you have now read from Page 53 to Page 65. - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, this document is the only one of this kind -which is available to me, and in view of the fact that the Prosecution -has quoted in full only those passages which the Defendant Dr. Frank -himself criticized most severely, I consider it my duty now to read a -number of passages, to quote them, in order to give the entire picture -correctly and to show what the Defendant Dr. Frank really intended to -achieve with this document. I shall only quote a few more lines and then -I will pass to another document. - -THE PRESIDENT: I had hoped that one or two extracts from that document -would show what the Defendant Frank was putting forward—one or two -paragraphs. - -DR. SEIDL: I will go on to the next document, Mr. President, that is on -Page 68, the affidavit by the witness Dr. Bühler, which I presented to -the witness today and which has been given the document number Frank-1; -Page 68 in the document book. - -On Page 70 there appears Exhibit USA-473 (Document Number L-49). If I -remember correctly this document has already been read in full by the -Prosecution, and I would like to ask the Court only to take judicial -notice of that also in the defense of Dr. Frank. - -On Page 72 of the document book is an affidavit of the former -Kreishauptmann, Dr. Albrecht. To be exact I have to state that this is -not really an affidavit in the true sense of the word. It is only a -letter which Kreishauptmann Dr. Albrecht sent to me through the General -Secretary of the Tribunal. I then returned the letter in order to have -it sworn to by the witness, but I have to say that until now that sworn -statement has not been returned, so that for the time being this exhibit -would only have the material value of a letter. Therefore I ask the -Tribunal to decide whether that document can be accepted by the Tribunal -as an exhibit in the form of a letter. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal did consider that matter before when -your application was before it. They will accept the document for what -it is worth. If you get the document in affidavit form you will no doubt -put it in. - -DR. SEIDL: Yes. That will be Document Number Frank-7. I forego the -quoting of the first points and proceed directly to Page 74 of the -document book and I quote under Section 4: - - “Dr. Frank’s fight against the exploitation and neglect of the - Government General in favor of the Reich. Conflict with Berlin. - - “The first meeting with Dr. Frank occurred shortly after the - establishment of the Government General in the autumn of 1939, - in the Polish district capital Radom, where the 10 Kreis chiefs - of this district had to report concerning the condition of the - population in their administrative district and the problem of - reconstructing, as quickly and effectively as possible, the - general as well as the administrative and economic life. What - struck one most was the keen awareness of Dr. Frank and his deep - concern about the area entrusted to him. This found expression - in the instructions not to consider or treat the Government - General or allow it to be treated, as an object of exploitation - or as a waste area, but rather to consider it as a center of - public order and an area of concentration at the back of the - fighting German front and at the gates of the German homeland, - forming a link between the two. Therefore the loyal native - inhabitants of this country should have claim to the full - protection of the German administration as citizens of the - Government General. To this end the constant efforts of all - authorities and economic agencies would be demanded by him, also - constant control through supervisors, which would be personally - superintended by him in periodical inspection trips with the - participation of the specialized central offices. In this way, - for instance, the two districts which were administered by me - were inspected by him personally three times in 4 years. - - “In face of the demands of the Berlin central authorities, who - believed it possible to import more from the Government General - into the Reich than the former could afford, Dr. Frank asserted - vigorously the political independence of the Government General - as an ‘adjunct of the Reich’ and his own independence as being - directly subordinated only to the Supreme Head of the State, and - not to the Reich Government. He also instructed us on no account - to comply with demands which might come to us on the basis of - personal relations with the authorities by whom we were sent, or - with the ministries concerned; and if by so doing we came into - conflict with our loyalty to the Reich, which was equally - expected of us, to report to him about it. This firm attitude - brought Dr. Frank the displeasure of the Berlin government - circles, and the Government General was dubbed ‘Frankreich.’ A - campaign of calumny was initiated in the Reich against him and - against the entire administration of the Government General by - systematically generalizing and exaggerating regrettable - ineptitudes and human weaknesses of individuals, at the same - time attempting to belittle the actual constructive - achievements.” - -I should like to ask the Tribunal merely to take official notice of -Section 5, also Section 6, and I will only quote from Section 7. - - “7) Dr. Frank as an opponent of acts of violence against the - native population, especially as an opponent of the SS. - - “Besides the exploitation and the pauperization of the - Government General, the accusation of the enslaving of the - native population as well as deporting it to the Reich, and many - atrocities of various kinds which have appeared in the newspaper - reports on the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, were interpreted as - serious evidence against Dr. Frank. As far as atrocities are - concerned, the guilt lies not with Dr. Frank but in some measure - with the numerous non-German agitators and provocateurs who, - with the growing pressure on the fighting German fronts, - increased their underground activity; but more especially with - the former State Secretary for Security in the Government - General, SS Obergruppenführer Krüger, and his agencies. My - observations in this respect are sketchy, because of the strict - secrecy of these offices. - - “On the other hand, Dr. Frank went so far in meeting the Polish - population that this was frequently objected to by his German - compatriots. That he did the correct thing by his stand for the - just interests of the Polish population is proved, for example, - by the impressive fact that barely a year and a half after the - defeat of the Polish people in a campaign of 18 days, the - concentration of German army masses against Russia in the Polish - area took place without any disturbance worth mentioning, and - that the Eastern railroad was able, with Polish personnel, to - move the troop transports up to the most forward unloading - points without being delayed by acts of sabotage.” - -I quote the last paragraph on Page 79: - - “This humane attitude of Dr. Frank, which earned him respect and - sympathy among considerable groups of the native population, - led, on the other hand, to bitter conflicts with the SS, in - whose ranks Himmler’s statement, ‘They shall not love us, but - fear us,’ was applied as the guiding principle of their thoughts - and deeds. - - “At times it came to a complete break. I still recall quite - clearly that during a government visit to the Carpathian areas - in the summer of 1943 in the district center of Stanislav, when - he took a walk alone with me and my wife in Zaremcze on the - Prut, Dr. Frank complained most bitterly about the arbitrary - acts of the SS, which quite frequently ran counter to the - political line taken by him. At that time he called the SS the - ‘Black Plague’; and when he noticed our astonishment at hearing - such criticism coming from his lips, he pointed out that if, for - example, my wife were to be wrongfully arrested one day or night - by agencies of the Gestapo and disappear, never to be seen - again, without having been given the opportunity of defense in a - court trial, absolutely nothing could be done about it. Some - time afterwards he made a speech to the students in Heidelberg, - which attracted much attention and was loudly applauded, about - the necessity for the re-establishment of a German - constitutional state such as had always met the real needs of - the German people. When he wanted to repeat this speech in - Berlin, he is said to have been forbidden by the Führer and - Reich Chancellor, at Himmler’s instigation, to make speeches for - 3 months, as reported to me by a reliable, but unfortunately - forgotten, source. The struggle against the methods of violence - used by the SS led to Dr. Frank’s having a nervous breakdown, - and he had to take a fairly long sick leave. As far as I can - remember this was in the winter of 1943-44.” - -I ask the Court to take official notice of Section 8, and I pass on to -Page 84 of the document book. That is an affidavit by SS -Obergruppenführer Erich Von dem Bach-Zelewski, of 21 February 1946. This -affidavit becomes Document Frank-8. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did this witness not give evidence? - -DR. SEIDL: The witness was questioned here by the Prosecution, and I -made the motion at that time that either I be allowed to interrogate the -witness again or be granted the use of an affidavit. On 8 March 1946 the -Tribunal made the decision, if I remember correctly, that I could use an -affidavit from that witness but that the Prosecution would be free if -they desired to question the witness again. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -DR. SEIDL: I shall read the statements of the witness concerning this -matter, and I quote: - - “1) Owing to the infiltration of Russian partisan groups over - the line of the river Bug into the Government General in 1943, - Himmler declared the Government General to be a ‘guerrilla - warfare territory.’ Thus it became my duty as Chief of - Anti-Partisan Units to travel about the Government General to - collect information and get experience, and to submit reports - and suggestions for fighting the partisans. - - “In the general information Himmler gave me, he called the - Governor General Dr. Frank a traitor to his country, who was - conspiring with the Poles and whom he would expose to the Führer - very shortly. I still remember two of the reproaches Himmler - made against Frank: - - “a) At a lawyer’s meeting in the Old Reich territory Frank is - said to have stated that ‘he preferred a bad constitutional - state to the best conducted police state’; and - - “b) During a speech to a Polish delegation Frank had disavowed - some of Himmler’s measures and had disparaged, in front of the - Poles, those charged with carrying them out, by calling them - ‘militant personalities.’ - - “After having, on a circular tour, personally obtained - information on the spot about the situation in the Government - General, I visited the higher SS and Police Führer Krüger and - the Governor General, Dr. Frank, in Kraków. - - “Krüger spoke very disapprovingly about Dr. Frank and blamed - Frank’s faltering and unstable policy towards the Poles for - conditions in the Government General. He called for harsher and - more ruthless measures and said that he would not rest until the - traitor Frank was overthrown. I had the impression, from - Krüger’s statements, that personal motives also influenced his - attitude, and that he himself would have liked to become - Governor General. - - “After that I had a long discussion with Dr. Frank. I told him - of my impressions; and he went into lengthy details about a new - policy for Poland, which aimed at appeasing the Poles by means - of concessions. In agreement with my personal impressions Dr. - Frank considered the following factors responsible for the - crisis in the Government General: - - “a) The ruthless resettlement action carried out now in the - midst of war, especially the senseless and purposeless - resettlement carried out by the SS and Police Führer Globocznik - in Lublin. - - “b) The insufficient food quota allotted to the Governor - General. - - “Dr. Frank called Krüger and Globocznik declared enemies of any - conciliatory policy, and said it was absolutely essential that - they should be recalled. - - “Being convinced that if Dr. Frank failed, he would be succeeded - only by a more ruthless and uncompromising person, I promised - him my support. Having been assured of strictest secrecy I told - Frank I shared his opinion that Krüger and Globocznik would have - to disappear. He, Dr. Frank, knew however that Himmler hated him - and that he was urging Hitler to have him removed. With such a - state of affairs any request on Frank’s part to have Krüger and - Globocznik recalled would not only be rejected but would even - strengthen their position with Himmler. Frank should give me a - free hand, then I could promise him that both would be relieved - of their posts within a short time. Dr. Frank agreed to that, - and I then made use of the military mistakes that Krüger and - Globocznik had committed in order to bring about their recall by - Himmler. - - “3) The Warsaw revolt of 1944...” - -THE PRESIDENT: I must point out to you that you said you were going to -be only 2 hours over five volumes. You have now been over an hour over -one volume, and you are reading practically everything in these -documents. It is not at all what the Tribunal has intended. You have -been told that you may make short comments showing how the documents are -connected with each other and how they are connected with all the -evidence. That is not what you are doing at all. - -DR. SEIDL: In that case I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of -Paragraph 3 of the affidavit by Von dem Bach-Zelewski. - -Paragraph 3 deals with the Warsaw revolt in the year 1944 and the -question as to whether the Governor General had anything to do with the -crushing of that revolt. - -Then I pass on to Page 92. - -THE PRESIDENT: As a matter of fact, does the Indictment charge anything -in connection with the crushing of the Warsaw revolt in 1944? - -DR. SEIDL: There is nothing in the Indictment itself about the part -played by the Governor General in the crushing of that revolt. The -Soviet Prosecution have, however, submitted a telegram which, while it -is not clear whether it was sent, nevertheless connects the Defendant -Dr. Frank in some way with the Warsaw revolt. But I shall not go into -details about that now. - -I pass on to Page 92 of the document book. - -This is an affidavit by the witness Wilhelm Ernst von Palezieux, in -whose case the Tribunal has approved an interrogatory. But I was told by -the Tribunal that in place of an interrogatory I could submit an -affidavit. I quote only the two main paragraphs as follows: - - “The art treasures stored in the castle in Kraków, from the - spring of 1943, were under official and legal supervision there. - When speaking to me Dr. Frank always referred to these art - treasures as state property of thy Government General. - Catalogues of the existing art treasures had already been made - before I came to Poland. The list of the first selection had - been printed in book form as a catalogue with descriptions and - statements of origin, and had been ordered by the Governor - General.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Now you are reading the affidavit all over again. We do -not want that sort of... - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President. I assumed that in those cases where a witness -does not appear before the Tribunal in person, it is admissible that -either the interrogatory or the affidavit be read, because otherwise the -contents of his testimony would not become part of the record nor, -therefore, part of the proceedings. - -THE PRESIDENT: That rule was in order that the defendants and their -counsel should have the document before them in German; that is the -reason for reading the documents through the earphones. The Tribunal -will adjourn now, but I want to tell you that you must shorten your -presentation of this documentary evidence. We have already been a good -deal more than an hour over one book and we have four more books to deal -with, and it does not do your case any good to read all these long -passages because we have some more weeks of the trial. It is only -necessary for you to give such connecting statements as make the -documents intelligible, and to correlate them with the oral evidence -that is being given. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 24 April 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH DAY - Wednesday, 24 April 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl. - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: I left off -yesterday at the last document of Volume I. It is the affidavit of the -witness Ernst von Palezieux, and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial -notice of it. The affidavit is given the document number Frank-9, and -that completes the first volume. - -THE PRESIDENT: The first volume, what page? - -DR. SEIDL: That was Page 92 of the first volume, Document Frank-9. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That is the end of the first volume, isn’t it? - -DR. SEIDL: Yes, that is the end of the first volume. Volumes II, III, -and IV of the document book comprise extracts from the diary of the -Defendant Dr. Frank. I do not propose to number all these extracts -individually, but I ask the Tribunal to accept the whole diary as -Document Frank-10 (Document 2233-PS), and I propose to quote only a few -short extracts. For example Pages 1 to 27, Mr. President, are extracts -from the diary which have already been submitted by the Prosecution. I -have put the extracts submitted by the Prosecution into a more extensive -context, and by quoting the entire passages I have attempted to prove -that some of these extracts do not represent the true and essential -content of the diary. Those are Exhibits USA-173, on Page 1 of the -document book, USSR-223 on Page 3, USA-271 on Page 8, USA-611 on Page 11 -of the document book. On Page 14 of the document book there appears to -be a misprint. The USA number is not 016 but 613. - -THE PRESIDENT: It begins on Page 13 in my copy, doesn’t it? - -DR. SEIDL: No, it is on Page 14. It is an entry dated 25 January 1943. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, the document that I have and which I think you are -referring to, is Document 2233 (aa)-PS, Exhibit USA-613. That is on Page -13. I don’t think it makes any difference. - -DR. SEIDL: In that case it must be an error by the Translation -Department. At any rate I do not think it is important, I mean this -quotation. - -I now turn to Page 20 of the document book, a quotation by the Soviet -Prosecution. On Page 22 there is a quotation by the Soviet Prosecution. -Page 24 of the document book contains quotations by the Prosecution of -both the United States and of the Soviet Union. Exhibit USA-295. Perhaps -I may point out that these extracts are only a few examples merely to -show that in a number of cases the impression obtained is different if -one reads either the entire speech or at least a portion of it. - -I then turn to Page 32 of the document book, an entry dated 10 October -1939, in which the Defendant Dr. Frank gives instructions for -negotiations with the Reich Food Ministry regarding the delivery of -5,000 tons of grain per week—Page 32 of the document book. - -On Page 34 there is an entry of 8 March 1940, and I quote the first -three lines. The Governor General states: - - “In close connection therewith is the actual governing of - Poland. The Führer has ordered me to regard the Government - General as the home of the Polish people. Accordingly, no - Germanization policy of any kind is possible.” - -I now pass on to Page 41 of the document book; an entry dated 19 January -1940. I quote the first five lines: - - “Dr. Walbaum (Chief of the Health Department): The state of - health in the Government General is satisfactory. Much has - already been accomplished in this field. In Warsaw alone 700,000 - typhus injections have been given. This is a huge total, even - for German standards; it is actually a record.” - -The next quotation is on Page 50 of the document book, an entry dated 19 -February 1940: - - “The Governor General is further of the opinion that the need - for official interpretation of Polish law may become greater. We - should probably have to come to some form of Polish government - or regency, and the head of the Polish legal system would then - be competent for such a task.” - -THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid there seems to have been some slight -difference in the paging and therefore if you would give us carefully -and somewhat more slowly the actual date of the document we should be -able to find it perhaps for ourselves. The pages do not seem to -correspond. - -DR. SEIDL: The last quotation which I read was dated 19 February 1940. - -I now turn to a quotation; that is, an entry of 26 February 1940, and I -quote: - - “In this connection the Governor General expresses...” - -This is on Page 51 in my book. The entry is of 26 February 1940. - -THE PRESIDENT: Page 40 in ours. - - DR. SEIDL: “In this connection the Governor General expresses - the wish of Field Marshal Göring that the German administration - should be built up in such a way that the Polish mode of living - as such is assured. It should not give the impression that - Warsaw is a fallen city which is becoming germanized, but rather - that Warsaw, according to the Führer’s will, is to be one of the - cities which would continue to exist as a Polish community in - the intended reduced Polish state.” - -A further entry, dated 26 February 1940, deals with the question of -higher education. I quote: - - “The Governor General points out in this connection that the - universities and high schools have been closed. However, in the - long run it would be an impossible state of affairs, for - instance, to discontinue medical education. The Polish system of - technical schools should also be revived and with the - participation of the city.” - -The next quotation is on Page 56 of my document book. An entry of 1 -March 1940. - - “The Governor General announces in this connection that the - directive has now been issued to give free rein to Polish - development as far as it is possible within the interests of the - German Reich. The attitude now to be adopted is that the - Government General is the home of the Polish people.” - -A further entry deals with the question of workers in the Reich -territory. Page 60 of my document book, entry of 19 September 1940—I -beg your pardon, 12 September 1940. I quote: - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment. You mean the first of September, do you? - -DR. SEIDL: 12 September—no, it should be 12 March; there is obviously a -misprint; 12 March 1940, Page 197 of the diary. I quote: - - “Governor General Dr. Frank emphasizes that one could actually - collect an adequate number of workers by force following the - methods of the slave trade, by using a sufficient number of - police, and by procuring sufficient means of transportation; but - that, for a number of reasons, however, the use of propaganda - deserves preference under all circumstances.” - -The next quotation is on Page 68 in my document book; an entry of 23 -April 1940. I quote the last five lines. The Governor General states: - - “The Governor General is merely attempting to offer the Polish - nation protection in an economic respect as well. He was almost - inclined to think that one could achieve better results with - Poles than with these autocratic trustees....” - -I now turn to Page 71 of my document book, an entry dated 25 May 1940. -Here the Governor General gives an explanation to the President of the -Polish Court of Appeal, Bronschinski. I quote the last four lines: - - “We do not wish to carry on a war of extermination here against - a people. The protection of the Polish people by the Reich in - the German zone of interest gives you the possibility of - continuing your development according to your national - traditions.” - -I turn to Page 77 of my document book, an entry from Volume III, July to -September, Page 692. I quote: - - “The Governor General then spoke of the food difficulties still - existing in the Government General”—this was to Generaloberst - von Küchler—“and asked the general to see to it that the - provisioning and other requirements of new troops arriving - should be as light a burden as possible on the food situation of - the Government General. Above all, no confiscation whatsoever - should take place.” - -I turn to Pages 85 and 86; entries in Volume III, July to September -1940, Page 819 of the diary. This entry deals with the establishment of -the medical academy which was planned by the Governor General. I ask the -Tribunal to take judicial notice of this fact. - -The next quotation is on Page 95 of the document book, an entry dated 9 -October 1940, from the speech of the Governor General on the occasion of -the opening of the autumn trade fair at Radom. I quote Line 5. - - “It is clear that we...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the important things for us are the page in -the diary and the date. We seem to have the pages in the diary and the -dates, so if you will tell us them that will be of the greatest help to -us. - -DR. SEIDL: The date is 9 October 1940; Pages 966-967 of the diary, I -quote Line 6: - - “It is clear that we do not wish to denationalize, nor shall we - germanize.” - -The next quotation... - -THE PRESIDENT: The translation in our book of that sentence is: - - “It is clear that we neither want to denationalize nor - degermanize.” - -DR. SEIDL: That is apparently an error in the translation. - -THE PRESIDENT: In which translation? In the one I have just read out? - -DR. SEIDL: In the English translation. I shall now quote literally: - - “It is clear that we neither wish to denationalize nor shall we - germanize.” - -The other makes no sense. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is what I read. Well, it is right in our book -anyhow. - -DR. SEIDL: The Governor General wished to say that we did not want to -deprive the Poles of their national character and that we did not intend -to turn them into Germans. - -I now turn to Page 101, to an entry dated 27 October 1940, Pages 1026 to -1027 of Volume IV of the diary. A conference with Reich Minister of -Labor Seldte. I quote, Line 7: - - “He, the Governor General, had complained to the Führer that the - wages of Polish agricultural laborers had been reduced by 50 - percent. In addition, their wages had for the most part been - used for purposes which were completely foreign to the idea of - this exchange of workers.” - -The next quotation is dated 29 November 1940. It is on Page 1085 in -Volume IV, of the year 1940. I quote: - - “Hofrat Watzke further states that Reichsleiter Rosenberg’s - office was attempting to confiscate the so-called Polish Library - in Paris, for inclusion in the Ahnenerbe in Berlin. The - Department of Schools was of the opinion that the books of this - Polish library belonged to the state library in Warsaw, as - 17,000 volumes were already in Warsaw. - - “The Governor General ordered that this Polish library should be - transferred from Paris to Warsaw without delay.” - -I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the next entry, dated 6 -and 7 June 1940, which refers to an economic conference. I shall not -read from the entry. - -The next quotation is dated 25 February 1940. It deals with a conference -of the department chiefs, prefects, and town majors of the district of -Radom. I quote Page 12: - - “Thereupon the Governor General spoke, and made the following - statements:” - -It goes on from Page 13: - - “I shall, therefore, again summarize all the points. - - “1. The Government General comprises that part of the occupied - Polish territory which is not an integral part of the German - Reich... - - “2. This territory has primarily been designated by the Führer - as the home of the Polish people. In Berlin the Führer, as well - as Field Marshal Göring, emphasized to me again and again that - this territory would not be subjected to Germanization. It is to - be set aside as the national territory of the Polish people. In - the name of the German people it is to be placed at the disposal - of the Polish nation as their reservation.” - -The speech of the Governor General ends two pages further. I quote the -last paragraph: - - “There is one thing I should like to tell you: The Führer has - urged me to guarantee the self-administration of the Poles as - far as possible. Under all circumstances they must be granted - the right to choose the Wojts and the minor mayors and village - magistrates from among the Poles, which would be to our interest - as well.” - -I now turn to the entry of 4 March 1940. From the volume of conferences, -February 1940 to November 1940, Page 8: - - “The Governor General submits for consideration the question of - whether a slight pressure could not be exerted through proper - use of the Compulsory Labor Order. He refuses to ask Berlin for - the promulgation of a new decree defining special measures for - the application of force and threats. Measures which might lead - to unrest should be avoided. The shipping of people by force has - nothing in its favor.” - -The last quotation in my document book is on Page 143. It is an entry -dated 27 January 1941, Volume I, Page 115. A conference between State -Secretary Dr. Bühler and the Reich Finance Minister, Count Schwerin von -Krosigk. I quote the last paragraph: - - “It is due to the efforts of all personnel employed in the - Government General that, after surmounting extraordinary and - unusual difficulties, a general improvement in the economic - situation can now be noted. The Government General, from the day - of its birth, has most conscientiously met the demands of the - Reich for strengthening the German war potential. It is, - therefore, permissible to ask that in future the Reich should - make no excessive demands on the Government General, so that a - sound and planned economy may be maintained in the Government - General, which, in turn, would prove of benefit to the Reich.” - -That completes Volume II of the document book. - -I now come to Volume III and I ask the Tribunal to refer to a quotation -on Page 17 in my document book. It is an entry following a government -meeting of 18 October 1941. I quote the eighth line from the bottom; it -is a statement of the Governor General: - - “I shall first of all state, when replying to these - demands”—that means, the demands of the Reich—“that our - strength has been exhausted and that we can no longer take any - responsibility as regards the Führer. No instructions, orders, - threats, _et cetera_, can induce me to answer anything but an - emphatic ‘no’ to demands which, even under the stress of wartime - conditions, are no longer tolerable. I will not permit a - situation to arise such as you, Mr. Naumann, so expressly - indicated, such as, for example, placing large areas at the - disposal of the troops for maneuvers and thus completely - disrupting the food supply which is already utterly - insufficient.” - -The next quotation is on Pages 36 and 37 of my document book. It is an -entry dated 16 January 1942, and the quotation to which I am referring -is on the next page—Pages 65 and 66 of the diary: - - “Later on a short discussion took place in the King’s Hall of - the Castle.” - -It took place with the chief of the Ukrainian committee. I quote: - - “The Governor General desires a larger employment of Ukrainians - in the administrative offices of the Government General. In all - offices in which Poles are employed there should also be - Ukrainians in proportion to the number of their population. He - asked Professor...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, if you will give us the page in your document -book now, that will be sufficient for the present, because they seem to -correspond. - -DR. SEIDL: Very well. May I continue, Mr. President? - -THE PRESIDENT: I think so, yes. - -DR. SEIDL: I then come to Page 38 in the document book. This entry deals -with a law drafted by Himmler, which has already been mentioned, -regarding the treatment of aliens in the community. I quote: - - “The Governor General orders the following letter to be sent to - Landgerichtsrat Taschner: - - “‘Please inform Reich Minister Dr. Lammers of my opinion which - follows with my signature certified by yourself: I am opposed to - the law on the treatment of people foreign to the German - community, and I request that an early date be set for a meeting - of leading officials with regard to the draft so that it may be - possible to set forth the principal legal viewpoints which today - still emphatically contradict this proposal in its details. I - shall personally attend this meeting. In my opinion it is - entirely impossible to circumvent the regular courts and to - transfer such far-reaching authority exclusively to police - organizations. The intended court at the Reich Security Main - Office cannot take the place of a regular court in the eyes of - the people.’” - -On Page 39 I quote the last paragraph but one: - - “For that reason I object to this draft in its present form, - especially with regard to Paragraph 1 of the decree concerning - the order of its execution.” - -Page 40 is an entry dated 7 June 1942 which also deals with that -question of denationalization so emphatically denied by the Governor -General. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. -The next quotation is on Page 47 and deals with the acquisition of -Chopin’s posthumous works. I quote Paragraph 2: - - “President Dr. Watzke reports that it would be possible to - procure in Paris the major part of Chopin’s posthumous wonks for - the State Library in Kraków. The Governor General approves of - the purchase of Chopin’s posthumous works through the government - of the Government General.” - -Page 50 deals with an entry in the diary which concerns the securing of -agricultural property. I quote Page 767 of the diary, Paragraph 2: - - “It is my aim to bring about agricultural reform in Galicia by - every possible means, even during the war. I thus have kept the - promises which I made a year ago in my proclamation to the - population of this territory. Further progress of a beneficial - nature can therefore result through the loyal co-operation of - the population with the German authorities. The German - administration in this area is willing, and has also been given - orders to treat the population well. It will protect the loyal - population of this area with the same decisive and fundamental - firmness with which it will suppress any attempt at resistance - against the order established by the Greater German Reich. For - this purpose, for the protection of the individual farmer, I - have issued an additional decree concerning the duties of the - German administration for food and agriculture in Galicia.” - -I turn to Page 55 of the document book. This concerns a speech, made by -the Governor General before the leaders of the Polish Delegation, and I -quote the last paragraph on Page 56, Line 6: - - “I hope that the new harvest will place us in a position to - assist the Polish Aid Committee. In any event we will do - whatever we can to check the crisis. It is also to our interest - that the Polish population should enjoy their work and - co-operate. We do not want to exterminate or annihilate - anybody...” - -Page 61 of the document book deals with a conference which the Governor -General held with the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of -Labor. I quote the last paragraph on Page 919 of the diary: - - “I would also like to take this opportunity of expressing to - you, Party Comrade Sauckel, our willingness to do everything - that is humanly possible. However, I should like to add one - request: The treatment of Polish workers in the Reich is still - subject to certain degrading restrictions.” - -I turn to Page 62 and quote Line 10: - - “I can assure you, Party Comrade Sauckel, that it would be a - tremendous help in recruiting workers, if at least part of the - degrading restrictions against the Poles in the Reich could be - abolished. I believe that could be effected.” - -I now turn to Page 66 of the document book. This is the only entry in -the diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank which he has signed personally. It -is a memorandum on the development in the Government General after he -had been relieved of all his positions in the Party, and had repeatedly -stated that he was resigning and hoped that now at last his resignation -would be accepted. - -I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this final survey, dated 1 -September 1942. It consists of five pages: Pages 66 to 71. - -The next quotation is on Page 75 and deals with the safeguarding of art -treasures. I quote the fifth line from the bottom. It is a statement -made by the Governor General: - - “The art treasures were carefully restored and cleaned, so that - approximately 90 percent of all the art treasures of the former - state of Poland in the territory of the Government General could - be made safe. These art treasures are entirely the property of - the Government General.” - -I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 92 of this volume. It is an entry -dated 8 December 1942, which was made on the occasion of a meeting of -departmental chiefs and which deals with the supply situation. - -I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of that entry. The same for -the entry on Page 93, in which the Governor General speaks of the -question of recruiting workers and most severely condemns all measures -of force. - -The next entry, which appears important to me and which should be read -into the record, is on Page 108. It concerns a press conference, and I -ask the Tribunal to turn directly to Page 110. I quote the third -paragraph: - - “The Governor General sums up the result of the conference and - states that, with the participation of the president of the - department for propaganda and the press chief of the Government, - all points will be comprised in a directive to be issued to all - leading editors of the Polish papers. Instructions for the - handling of matters concerning foreigners, in the press and in - the cultural field, will be included in this directive. The - conciliatory spirit of the Reich will serve as a model.” - -I now ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 127 of the document book, a -conference of 26 May 1943, which deals with the question of food. I -quote the eighth line: - - “We must understand that the first problem is the feeding of the - Polish population; but I would like to say, with complete - authority, that whatever happens with the coming rationing - period in the Government General, I shall, in any case, allot to - the largest possible number of the population such food rations - as we can justifiably afford in view of our commitments to the - Reich. Nothing and nobody will divert me from this goal...” - -Page 131 of the document book deals with a committee of the Governor -General for supplies for the non-German working population. I ask the -Tribunal to take judicial notice of these statements, and I now turn to -Page 141. This entry also deals with the food situation. I quote the -tenth line from the bottom: - - “After examining all possibilities I have now ordered that as - from 1 September of this year, the food situation of the Polish - population of this territory shall also be regulated on a - generous scale. By 1 September of this year we shall introduce, - for the population of this territory, the rations which are - called the ‘Warthegau rations.’” - -I ask permission to quote a few sentences from Page 142: - - “I should like to make a statement to you now. From the - seriousness with which I utter these words, you can judge what I - have in mind. I myself and the men of my Government are fully - aware of the needs also of the Polish population in this - district. We are not here to exterminate or annihilate it, or to - torment these people beyond the measure of suffering laid upon - them by fate. I hope that we shall come to a satisfactory - arrangement in all matters that sometimes separate us. I - personally have nothing against the Poles...” - -I now turn to Page 148. It is a conference which deals with young -medical students. I quote Page 149, Paragraph 2, which is a statement by -the Governor General: - - “This first—we can safely call it Ministry of Health, even - though this expression is not used—is something entirely new. - This department for health will have to deal with important - problems. For us, the physicians in this territory, there is - above all a lack of...” - -Mr. President, I have just discovered that an error may possibly have -occurred, since these statements on Page 672 were perhaps not made by -the Governor General himself but by the head of the Health Department. I -shall examine this question again and then submit the result to the -Tribunal in writing. - -I now turn to Page 155 of the document book. This entry seems to me of a -vital nature. It is dated 14 July 1943 and deals with the establishment -of the State Secretariat for Security. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is not in our book, apparently. We haven’t got a Page -155, and we haven’t got a date, I think, of the 14th of July. - -DR. SEIDL: It is July 1943. It has probably been omitted. With the -approval of the Tribunal I shall read the sentences in question into the -record. There are only three sentences: - - “The Governor General points out the disastrous effect which the - establishment of the State Secretariat for Security has had on - the authority of the Governor General. He said that a new police - and SS government had tried to establish itself in opposition to - the Governor General which it had been possible to suppress only - at the expense of a great deal of energy and at the very last - moment.” - -I then ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 166 of the document book. This -entry deals with general questions regarding the policy in Poland. I ask -the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. - -Page 193 deals with the establishment of the Chopin Museum which was -created by the Governor General. I quote Page 1157 of the diary, which -is an extract from the Governor General’s speech: - - “Today I have inaugurated the Chopin Museum in Kraków. We have - saved and brought to Kraków, under most difficult circumstances, - the most valuable mementos of the greatest of Polish musicians. - I merely wanted to say this in order to show you that I want to - make a personal effort to put things in order in this country as - far as possible.” - -The last quotation is on Page 199 of Volume II of the document book. It -is an extract from a speech which Reichsführer SS Himmler made on the -occasion of the installation of the new Higher SS and Police Leader in -Kraków, before the members of the Government and the Higher SS and -Police Leaders. This is the speech which the Defendant Frank mentioned -when he was examined. I quote the eighth line from the bottom: - - “You are all very familiar with the situation: 16 million aliens - and about 200,000 Germans live here; or if we include the - members of the Police and Wehrmacht, perhaps 300,000. These 16 - million aliens, who were augmented in the past by a large number - of Jews who have now emigrated or have been sent to the East, - consist largely of Poles and to a lesser degree of Ukrainians.” - -I turn to the last document of this volume, Page 200, an entry dated 14 -December 1943. It concerns a speech which the Governor General made to -officers of the Air Force. I quote the second paragraph: - - “Therefore, everything should be done to keep the population - quiet, peaceful, and in order. Nothing should be done to create - unnecessary agitation among the population. I mention only one - example here: - - “It would be wrong if now, during the war, we were to undertake - the establishment of large German settlements among the - peasantry in this territory. This attempt at colonizing, mostly - through force, would lead to tremendous unrest among the native - peasant population. This, in turn, from the point of view of - production, would result in a tremendous loss to the harvest, in - a curtailment of cultivation, and so on. It would also be wrong - forcibly to deprive the population of its Church, or of any - possibility for leading a simple cultural life.” - -I turn to Page 201, and I quote the last paragraph: - - “We must take care of these territories and their population. I - have found, to my pleasure and that of all of our colleagues, - that this point of view has prevailed and that everything that - was formerly said against the alleged friendship with the Poles - or the weakness of this attitude, has dwindled to nothing in - face of the facts.” - -That completes Volume II of the document book—I beg your pardon, I -meant Volume III. Now I come to Volume IV of the document book. - -Page 1 of the document book deals with a conversation which took place -on 25 January 1943 with the SS Obergruppenführer Krüger. I quote the -last paragraph: - - “The Governor General states that he had not been previously - informed about the large-scale action to seize asocial elements - and that this procedure was in opposition to the Führer’s decree - of 7 May 1942, according to which the State Secretary for - Security must obtain the approval of the Governor General before - carrying out instructions by the Reichsführer SS and Chief of - the German Police. State Secretary Krüger states that this - concerned secret instructions which had to be carried out - suddenly.” - -I ask the Tribunal to take cognizance of the fact that this is merely an -example of many similar discussions and differences of opinion. - -I now turn to Page 24 of the document book. This concerns a meeting of -the War Economy Staff and the Defense Committee on 22 September 1943. I -hope that the pages tally again. - -THE PRESIDENT: You said Page 24, didn’t you? - -DR. SEIDL: Page 24, an entry of 22 September 1943. - -THE PRESIDENT: It looks as though the paging is right. Our book is Page -24 at the top, so perhaps you will continue to quote the page for a -moment or two. We will see whether it goes on right. - -DR. SEIDL: This concerns an entry dated 22 September 1943, a meeting of -the War Economy Staff and the Defense Committee. I quote only the first -lines: - - “In the course of the past few months, in the face of the most - difficult and senseless struggles, I have had to insist on the - principle that the Poles should, at last, be given a sufficient - quantity of food. You all know the foolish attitude of - considering the nations we have conquered as inferior to us, and - that at a moment when the labor potential of these peoples - represents one of the most important factors in our fight for - victory. By my opposition to this absurdity, which has caused - most grievous harm to the German people, I personally—and many - men of my government and many of you—have incurred the charge - of being friendly or soft towards the Poles. - - “For years now people have not hesitated to attack my government - of this area with the foulest arguments of this kind, and behind - my back have hindered the fulfillment of these tasks. Now it has - been proved as clear as day that it is insane to want to - reconstruct Europe and at the same time to persecute the - European nations with such unparalleled chicanery.” - -I now turn to Page 34 of the document book, an entry dated 20 April -1943, concerning a government meeting. I ask the Tribunal to take -judicial notice of the final words only of the Governor General’s speech -on Page 38 of the document book and Page 41 of the diary. Then I turn to -Page 39 of the document book, a meeting of 22 July 1943; I quote from -the second paragraph, the tenth line: - - “The question of the resettlement was altogether particularly - difficult for us in this year. I can give you the good news that - resettlement in general has been completely discontinued for the - duration of the war. With regard to the transferring of - industries, we have just started to work at full speed. As you - know—I personally attach great importance to it—we have to - satisfy this need of the Reich, and in the coming months we - shall install great industrial concerns of international renown - in the Government General. - - “However, with regard to this question we must consider the - almost complete reconstruction of the Government General which - has consequently been forced upon us. While, until now, we have - always figured as a country supplying the Reich with labor, as - an agricultural country, and the granary of Europe, we shall - within a very short time become one of the most important - industrial centers of Europe. I remind you of such names as - Krupp, Heinkel, Henschel, whose industries will be moved into - the Government General.” - -I now ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 41 of the document book. It is -the statement which was made by the witness Doctor Bühler on 26 October -1943, in which he states that this report dealt with 4 years of -reconstruction in the Government General on the basis of reliable -information from the 13 chief departments. The statement includes Pages -42 to 69 of the document book. I do not propose to quote from this -statement, but I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. - -I go straight on to Page 70 of the document book, which concerns a -government meeting dated 16 February 1944. I quote the last paragraph, -Page 4 of the document book. - - “As opposed to this, the fact must be established that the - development, construction, and securing of that which today - gives this territory its importance were possible only because - it was necessary, in opposition to the ideas of the advocates of - brute force—so completely untimely during a war—to bring the - human and material resources of this area into the service of - the German war effort in as constructive a manner as possible.” - -The next quotation is Page 74; an entry dated 6 March 1944. I quote the -last paragraph on Page 75, Page 5 of the diary: - - “The Governor General does not, as a matter of principle, oppose - the training of the younger generation for the priesthood - because, if courses for doctors, _et cetera_, are arranged, - similar opportunities must also be created in the field of - religion.” - -Page 77 deals with an order by the Governor General prohibiting the -evacuation of the population, or a part of it, which was in the fighting -zone near Lublin. - -On Page 80 is an entry dated 12 April 1944. I quote the second -paragraph: - - “In this connection President Gerteis spoke of the treatment of - the Poles in the Reich. This treatment, said to be worse than - that of any other foreign workers, had led to the result that - practically no Poles would volunteer any more for work in - Germany. - - “There were 21 points on which the Polish workers in the Reich - were more badly treated than any other foreign workers. The - Governor General requested President Gerteis to acquaint him - with these 21 points which he would certainly attempt to have - abolished.” - -I now ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 100 of the document book. It -concerns a conference on 6 June 1944 regarding a large-scale action -against the partisans in the Bilgoraje Forest. I quote Page 101, Page 4 -of the diary: - - “The Governor General wants to be quite sure that protection is - given to the harmless population, which is itself suffering - under the partisan terror.” - -Page 102 deals with the views of the Governor General on concentration -camps. It is an entry dated 6 June 1944. I quote the last paragraph: - - “The Governor General declared that he would never sign such a - decree, since it meant sending the person concerned to a - concentration camp. He stated that he had always protested with - the utmost vigor against the system of concentration camps, for - it was the greatest offense against the sense of justice. He had - thought there would be no concentration camps for such matters, - but they had apparently been silently put into operation. It - could only be handled in such a manner that the persons - condemned would be pardoned to jail or prison for a certain - number of years. He pointed out that prison sentences, for - instance, were imposed and examined by state institutions. He - therefore requested that State Secretary Dr. Bühler should be - informed that he, the Governor General, would not sign such - decrees. He did not wish concentration camps to be officially - sanctioned. He went on to say that there was no pardon which - would commute a sentence into commitment to a concentration - camp. The courts-martial are state legal organs of a special - character and consist of police units; actually they should - normally be staffed by members of the Wehrmacht.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, can you explain the translation of the words -at the bottom of Page 102 which are in English, “It only could be -handled in such a manner that the persons would be pardoned to jail or -prison for a certain number of years.” Can you explain that from the -point of view of meaning? - -DR. SEIDL: The meaning of the words becomes clear from the statement -made by President Wille in the previous paragraph where, among others, -you will find the following statement. It is the tenth line from the -top. - - “The Reprieve Commission had asked the representative of the - Chief of the Security Police, who was present at the session, in - what form this pardon was to be effected. As far as he knew, - remittance of a sentence had been allowed in one case only. In - all other cases it was customary to couple Security Police - measures with the remittance of a sentence. It was feared that - otherwise these people might disappear.” - -Now the Governor General was of the opinion that, for example, to -transmute a death sentence to a term in prison or penitentiary was -possible but that he would have to refuse direct commutation of a death -penalty into a suspended prison penalty if the Police in that event were -to impose security measures. - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean that it meant that pardon from a death sentence -might be made by a reprieve for a sentence in prison for a certain -number of years, but not by sending to a concentration camp, which would -be for an indefinite period and under police methods? - -DR. SEIDL: Yes, that is the sense of it. - -I now turn to Page 104 of the document book. This quotation also deals -with the general question of treatment of the population in the -Government General. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you have been very much longer than you said, -and the Tribunal thinks you might be able to cut down a great deal of -this. It is all very much on the same lines. - -DR. SEIDL: Yes. In that case, I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 112 of -the document book, an entry dated 10 July 1944. This entry deals with -the official control of art treasures. I quote the second paragraph: - - “The Governor General instructs the expert Palezieux to have a - complete index made of these art treasures.” - -THE PRESIDENT: You have already told us and given us some evidence to -support the view that the Defendant Frank was preserving the art -treasures and was wishing them to be preserved in Poland, and it is not -necessary under those circumstances to go reading passages about it. - -DR. SEIDL: Very well. Then I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of -that entry; and if the Tribunal agrees, I shall merely give you the -pages of the documents in the document book which appear important to -me. That is page... - -[_The proceedings were interrupted by technical difficulties in the -interpreting system._] - -Gentlemen of the Tribunal, if the Court is agreeable I should like to -give only the numbers of the pages of Volume IV of the document book -which seem particularly important to me. These are the Pages 115, 121, -123, 134, 139, 152, and 182. That concludes Volume IV of the document -book and I come to the last volume of the document book which will be -finished considerably faster. - -Volume V deals exclusively with the accusations made by the Prosecution -of the United States against the Defendant Frank concerning his activity -as President of the Academy for German Law, as President of the National -Socialist Lawyers’ Association, and similar positions. Page 1 is a -document which has already been submitted by the Prosecution, 1391-PS. -It still has no USA number and will be Exhibit Number Frank-11. It is -the law regarding the Academy for German Law with the necessary statutes -and the tasks resulting therefrom. - -I turn to page 25 of the document book. This quotation becomes Exhibit -Frank-12 (Document Number Frank-12). It deals with a sentence which has -been ascribed to the defendant: “Right is that which is good for the -people.” This quotation should prove only that the Defendant Dr. Frank -wanted to express nothing more than that which is implied in the Roman -sentence: _Salus publica suprema lex_ (The supreme law is the welfare of -the people). I ask the Court to take cognizance of this and turn to Page -26 of the document book, an excerpt from the magazine of the Academy for -German Law of 1938. That will be Exhibit Frank-13 (Document Number -Frank-13). This quotation also deals with the afore-mentioned sentence: -“Right is that which is good for the people.” - -Page 30 is an excerpt from Exhibit USA-670 (Document Number 3459-PS) and -deals with the closing celebration of the “Congress of German Law 1939” -at Leipzig, where the Defendant Dr. Frank made the concluding speech -before 25,000 lawyers. I quote on Page 31, Line 10 from the bottom: - - “Only by applying legal security methods, by administering true - justice, and by clearly following the legislative ideal of law - can the national community continue to exist. This legal method - which permanently ensures the fulfillment of the tasks of the - community has been assigned to you, fellow guardians of the law, - as your mission. Ancient Germanic principles have come down to - us through the centuries. - - “1) No one shall be judged who has not had the opportunity to - defend himself. - - “2) No one shall be deprived of the incontestable rights which - he enjoys as a member of the national community, except by - decision of the judge. Honor, liberty, life, the profits of - labor are among those rights. - - “3) Regardless of the nature of the proceedings, the reasons for - the indictment, or the law which is applied, everyone who is - under indictment must be given the opportunity to have a defense - counsel who can make legal statements for him; he must be given - a legal and impartial hearing.” - -I turn to Page 35 of the document book, which deals with a speech, an -address by the Defendant Dr. Frank, made at a meeting of the heads of -the departments of the National Socialist Lawyer’s Association on 19 -November 1941. The speech—that is, the excerpt—becomes Exhibit Number -Frank-14 (Document Number Frank-14). I quote only a few sentences at the -top of Page 37. - - “Therefore, it is a very serious task which we have imposed upon - ourselves and we must always bear in mind that it can be - fulfilled only with courage and absolute readiness for - self-sacrifice. I observe the developments with great attention. - I watch every anti-juridical tendency. I know only too well from - history—as you all do—of the attempts made to gain - ever-increasing power in general directions because one has - weapons with which one can shoot, and authority on the basis of - which one can make people who have been arrested disappear. In - the first place, I mean by this not only the attempts made by - the SS, the SD, and by the police headquarters, but the attempts - of many other offices of the State and the Reich to exclude - themselves from general jurisdiction.” - -I turn to—I would like to quote the last five lines on Page 41. Those -were the last words spoken during that session: - - “One cannot debase law to an article of merchandise; one cannot - sell it; it exists or it does not exist. Law is not an exchange - commodity. If justice is not supported, the State loses its - moral foundation; it sinks into the abyss of darkness and - horror.” - -The next document is on Page 42. It is the first address which the -Defendant Dr. Frank made in Berlin at the university on 8 June 1942. It -will be Exhibit Number Frank-15 (Document Number Frank-15). I quote Page -44, second paragraph, seventh line: - - “On the other hand, however, a member of the community cannot be - deprived of honor, liberty, life, and property; he cannot be - expelled and condemned without first being able to defend - himself against the charges brought against him. The Armed - Forces serve us as a model in this respect. There everyone is a - free, honored member of the community, with equal rights, until - a judge—standing independently above him—has weighed and - judged between indictment and defense.” - -I then turn to Page 49 of the document book, the second of these four -long speeches. It was held in Vienna, and will become Exhibit Number -Frank-15. - -THE PRESIDENT: We have already had Exhibit Frank-15 on Page 41. - -DR. SEIDL: No, I beg your pardon, Mr. President; it will be Frank-16 -(Document Number Frank-16). I quote only one sentence on Page 51. - - “I shall continue to repeat with all the strength of my - conviction that it would be an evil thing if ideals advocating a - police state were to be presented as distinct National Socialist - ideals, while old Germanic ideals of law fell entirely into the - background.” - -Now I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 57 of the document book to the -speech made by the Defendant Dr. Frank at the University of Munich, on -20 July 1942. This will be Exhibit Frank-17 (Document Number Frank-17). -I quote on Page 58, Line 16: - - “It is, however, impossible to talk about a national community - and still regard the servants of the law as excluded from this - national community, and throw mud at them in the midst of the - war. The Führer has transferred the tasks of the Reich Leader of - the Reich Legal Office and that of the leader of the National - Socialist Lawyers’ Association to me, and therefore it is my - duty to state that it is detrimental to the German national - community if in the ‘Black Corps’ lawyers are called - ‘sewer-rats.’” - -I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 67 of the document book. That is the -speech which he made at Heidelberg on 21 July 1942. That will be Exhibit -Frank-18 (Document Number Frank-18). I ask the Tribunal to take official -notice of that speech. On Page 69 I quote only one sentence: “But never -must there be a police state, never. That I oppose.” - -I now come to the last document which the Prosecution of the United -States has already submitted under Exhibit Number USA-607 (Document -Number 2233(x)-PS), an excerpt from the diary: “Concluding reflections -on the events of the last three months.” - -In these reflections Dr. Frank once more definitely states his attitude -towards the concept of the legal state, and I ask the Tribunal to take -cognizance particularly of his basic assumptions on Pages 74 and 75 of -the document book. Here, Dr. Frank again formulated the prerequisites -which he considered necessary for the existence of any legal state. I -quote only a few lines from Page 74: - - “1) No fellow German can be convicted without regular court - procedure, and only on the basis of a law in effect before the - act was committed. - - “2) The proceedings must carry full guarantee that the accused - will be interrogated on all matters pertaining to the - indictment, and that he will be able to speak freely. - - “3) The accused must have the opportunity, at all stages of the - trial, to avail himself of the services of defense counsel - acquainted with the law. - - “4) The defense counsel must have complete freedom of action and - independence in carrying out his office in order to strike an - even balance between the State prosecutor and the defendant. - - “5) The judge or the court must make his or its decision quite - independently—that is, the verdict must not be influenced by - any irrelevant factors—in logical consideration of the subject - matter and in just application of the purport of the law. - - “6) When the penalty imposed by the sentence has been paid, the - act has been expiated. - - “7) Measures for protective custody and security custody may not - be undertaken or carried out by police organs, nor may measures - for the punishment of concentration camp inmates, except from - this aspect, that is, after confirmation of the intended - measures by regular, independent judges. - - “8) In the same manner, the administration of justice for fellow - Germans must guarantee full safeguarding of individual interests - in all relations pertaining to civil suits proper.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, are there any passages in these documents -which express the opinion that the same principles ought to be applied -to others than fellow Germans? - -DR. SEIDL: In this last quotation the Defendant Dr. Frank dealt -basically with questions of law without making any difference here -between Germans and people of foreign nationality. However, in his -capacity as Governor General he also fundamentally objected at all times -to the transfer of Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews to concentration camps. -This can be seen from a whole series of entries in the diary. - -With this I have come to the end of my evidence for Dr. Frank. There are -left only the answers to interrogatories by witnesses whose -interrogation before a commission has been approved by the Court. At a -later date I shall compile these interrogations in a small document book -and submit the translation thereof to the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: You are speaking of interrogatories where you have not -yet got the answers; is that right? - -DR. SEIDL: These are interrogatories to which the answers have not yet -been received. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, as soon as you have received them you will -furnish them to the Prosecution and to the Tribunal? - -DR. SEIDL: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker. - -DR. OTTO PANNENBECKER (Counsel for Defendant Frick): In presenting -evidence for the Defendant Frick, I shall forego calling the defendant -himself as a witness. The questions which require an explanation deal -mainly with problems relating to formal authority and also with problems -which differentiate between formal authority and actual responsibility. -These are problems, part of which have already been elucidated by the -interrogation of Dr. Lammers and the rest of which will be cleared up by -the submission of documents. One special field, however, cannot be -entirely clarified by documents; and that is the question of the actual -distribution of authority within the sphere of the Police; but for that -special field I have named the witness Dr. Gisevius. He is the only -witness whose interrogation seems to be necessary for the presentation -of evidence in the case of Frick. Therefore, in the meantime, I have -dispensed with other witnesses. - -I ask the Court to decide whether I should call the witness Dr. Gisevius -first or whether I should submit my documents first. If documents are to -be presented first, I believe that I could finish by the midday recess. - -THE PRESIDENT: You can finish your documents before the adjournment, do -you mean? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. I believe so. - -THE PRESIDENT: Until 1:00 o’clock? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you indifferent whether you call the witness first or -whether you present the documents first? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that perhaps it would be more -convenient to give the documents first. They hope that you will be able -to finish them reasonably quickly. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. - -Numbers 1, 2, and 3 of the document book (Documents Number 386-PS, L-79, -and 3726-PS) deal with evidence concerning the question of whether the -members of the Reich Cabinet knew about Hitler’s preparation for -aggressive war. I need not read the documents; they have already been -submitted, and they show that Hitler gave information of his plans for -aggression only to those of his assistants who had to know of these -plans for their own work, but did not inform Frick who, as Minister of -the Interior, was responsible for the internal policy. - -Within the scope of the war preparation, Frick was made Plenipotentiary -for Reich Administration by the Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938, -which has already been submitted, Exhibit Number USA-36 (Document Number -2194-PS). This law does not indicate that this position had anything to -do with the known preparation of an aggressive war; it shows only the -participation of the Administration of the Interior in a general -preparation and organization in the event of a future war. I have -therefore included in the document book an excerpt from this law under -Number 4 of the document book, in order to correct an error. The -Defendant Frick himself stated in an affidavit on 14 November 1945, that -he had held the position of Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration -from 21 May 1935. This is the date of the first Reich Defense Law, which -has already been submitted as Exhibit Number USA-24 (Document 2261-PS). -The first Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, however, does not provide -for the position of Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration; that is -contained only in the second law of 4 September 1938. - -This second law has been submitted under Exhibit Number USA-36. -Following this erroneous statement which the Defendant Frick made -without having the two laws on hand, the Prosecution has also stated -that Frick held the position of Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration -from 21 May 1935, while actually he held it only from 4 September 1938, -that is, the date of the second law. - -Numbers 5 and 6 of the document book have already been submitted by the -Prosecution. They also prove nothing except the participation of the -Defendant Frick in the establishment of civil administration with a view -to a possible future war. It is not necessary to read this either. - -The Prosecution considers Hitler’s aggressive intentions to be so well -known and so obvious as to require no further proof. The Prosecution on -that assumption came to the conclusion that participation in the -National Socialist Government, in any field whatsoever, would in itself -imply the conscious support of aggressive war. In opposition to that I -have referred to evidence in documents from Number 7 to 10 inclusive of -the Frick document book (Documents Number 2288-PS, 2292-PS, 2289-PS, and -3729-PS) which have already been submitted by the Prosecution and which -show that Hitler in public, as well as in private conversations, from -the time he came into power followed a definite policy of declaring his -peaceful intentions—a policy, therefore, which for considered reasons, -declared to all that to keep peace was right. - -I believe that these documents, which have already been submitted to the -Tribunal, must also be considered in order to decide whether or not -Hitler’s official policy, since his coming to power, indicated that he -had intentions of waging aggressive war. As evidence in that direction, -I should like to submit Number 11 and Number 12 of the document book, -which have not been presented until now, and which I will submit as -Documents Frick-1 and -2. - -The first is a telegram of 8 March 1936 from Cardinal Archbishop Schulte -to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces at the time of the -occupation of the Rhineland in 1936. The second document is a solemn -declaration by the Austrian bishops occasioned by the annexation of -Austria in March 1938. - -The first document states, and I quote: - - “Cardinal Archbishop Schulte has sent to General Von Blomberg, - the Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces, a telegram in - which, at the memorable hour when the Armed Forces of the Reich - are re-entering the German Rhineland as the guardians of peace - and order, he greets the soldiers of our nation with deep - emotion mindful of the magnificent example of self-sacrificing - love of fatherland, stern manly discipline, and upright fear of - God, which our Army has always given to the world.” - -I particularly selected these two documents because the Catholic Church -is not suspected of sanctioning aggressive wars, or of approving of -Hitler’s criminal intentions in any other way. These statements would -have been unthinkable if the accusations of the Prosecution were true, -namely, that the criminal aims of Hitler and particularly his aggressive -intentions had been known. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, the Tribunal would like to know what is -the source of this telegram from the Archbishop, Number Frick-11. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: I took the telegram, Number Frick-11, from the -_Völkischer Beobachter_ of 9 March 1936. - -THE PRESIDENT: And the other one? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: The other document is from the _Völkischer Beobachter_ -of 28 March 1938. - -Number 13 of the document book contains only one sentence, taken from a -speech made by Frick, from which it is evident that Frick shared the -same opinion. He states in this speech, and I quote: - - “The national revolution is the expression of the will to - eliminate by legal means every form of external and internal - foreign domination.” - -THE PRESIDENT: You gave that the number 13, did you? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. That should be 3. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes, that is what I wanted to say. I submit it as -Document Number Frick-3. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: The Defendant Frick has been accused particularly of -working for the League for Germans Abroad. The Prosecution saw in this -activity a contribution by the Defendant Frick to the preparation of -aggressive wars. Frick’s actual attitude regarding the aims of the -League for Germans Abroad can be seen from Number 14, which will be -Document Number Frick-4. In a speech made by Frick, it states, and I -quote: - - “The VDA (League for Germans Abroad) has nothing to do with - political aims or with frontier questions; it is, and is - intended to be, nothing more than a rallying point for German - cultural activities...the world over.” - -In Number 15, which is Exhibit Frick-5... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, I perhaps ought to say that in the -index of this document book it looks as though the exhibit numbers were -the numbers of the documents in the order in which they are put in the -book, but that will not be so. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: No, it will not be so. - -THE PRESIDENT: That last document which you just put in as Exhibit -Number 4 is shown in the book to be Exhibit Number 14, which is a -mistake. It is Document Number 14, but not Exhibit Number 14. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Number 14 of the document book, Exhibit Number Frick-4 -(Document Number Frick-4). - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Dealing with the same subject I have entered in Number -15, Exhibit Number Frick-5 (Document Number 3358-PS), a decree of the -Reich Minister of the Interior of 24 February 1933, which also deals -with the question of the work of the League for Germans Abroad. It -states, and I quote... - -THE PRESIDENT: Has that not already been put in? I see it has a PS -number. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: It has a PS number, but it was not then submitted as -evidence by the Prosecution. Therefore I quote: - - “The suffering and misery of the times, the lack of work and - food within Germany, cannot divert attention from the fact that - about 30 million Germans, living outside of the present - contracted borders of the Reich, are an integral part of the - entire German people; an integral part, which the Reich - Government is not able to help economically but to which it - considers itself under an obligation to offer cultural support - through the organization primarily concerned with this task—the - League of Germans Abroad.” - -In the documents from Number 16 to 24 inclusive of the document book, -which I need not read in detail, I have placed together the legal -decrees which deal with the competence of the Reich Ministry of the -Interior as a central office for certain occupied territories. The tasks -of this central office, which had no authority to issue orders and no -executive authority in any occupied territories, have already been -described by the witness Dr. Lammers; and these tasks are specially -entered in Number 24 of the document book. I do not need to submit it in -evidence. It is an official publication of the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ and -has, in addition, already been submitted as 3082-PS. In accordance with -the fact that the central office had no authority to issue orders in the -occupied territories, there is in the diary of Dr. Frank a confirmation -that the Governor General alone had authority to issue orders for the -administration of his territory. I do not need to quote this passage as -it has already been submitted to the Tribunal. - -Police authority in the occupied territories was transferred to -Reichsführer SS Himmler; but Frick as Reich Minister of the Interior had -nothing to do with this either, since that authority was vested -exclusively in Himmler in his capacity as Reichsführer SS. That can be -seen from Number 26 of the document book, which also already has been -submitted as Exhibit USA-319 (Document Number 1997-PS). - -The Prosecution further considers the Defendant Frick responsible for -the crimes committed in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia since -August 1943, on the grounds that Frick had been Reich Protector in -Bohemia and Moravia since August 1943. In this connection, I refer to -Numbers 28 and 29 of the document book (Documents Number 1366-PS and -3443-PS), from which it is evident that, at the time that Frick was -appointed, the former powers of the Reich Protector had been subdivided -between a so-called German State Minister in Bohemia and Moravia—who, -under the immediate supervision of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, had -to manage all government affairs—and the Reich Protector Frick who was -given some special powers and in principle had the right to grant -reprieves on sentences passed by the local courts. - -Frick has also been accused of being responsible for the Political -Police, that is, the Secret State Police, and the concentration camps. -Until 1936 police matters were the affair of the individual states in -Germany; consequently in Prussia, Göring as Prussian Prime Minister, and -Prussian Minister of the Interior, built up the Political Police and -established the concentration camps. Frick, therefore, as Reich Minister -of the Interior, had no connection with these things. - -In the spring of 1934 Frick also became Prussian Minister of the -Interior. Previously, however, Göring had by a special law taken the -affairs of the Political Police out of the jurisdiction of the office of -the Prussian Minister of the Interior and placed it under the immediate -supervision of the Prime Minister, an office which Göring retained for -himself. - -The corresponding decrees have already been submitted by the Prosecution -as Documents Number 2104-PS, 2105-PS, and 2113-PS. - -The same is evident from Document Number 30 in the document book, which -has also been submitted as Exhibit USA-233 (Document Number 2344-PS). - -Thus, in the Political Police sphere, Frick, until 1936, had only a -general right of supervision, such as the Reich had over the individual -states. He had, however, no special right of command in individual -cases, only the authority to issue general directives; and in Numbers -31-33 of the document book I have entered a few of these directives -issued by Frick. - -I quote Number 31, which will be Exhibit Frick-6 (Document Number -779-PS): - - “In order to correct the abuses resulting from the decree for - protective custody, the Reich Minister of the Interior, in his - directives of 12 April 1934 to the Land governments and - Reichsstatthalter anent the promulgation and execution of - decrees for protective custody, has determined that protective - custody may be ordered only: (a) for the protection of the - arrested person; (b) if the arrested person by his behavior, and - especially by activities directed against the State, has - directly endangered public security and order. Therefore, - protective custody is not permissible when the above-mentioned - cases do not apply, especially (a) for persons who merely - exercise their public and civil rights; (b) for lawyers for - representing the interests of their clients; (c) in the case of - personal matters, as for instance, insults; (d) because of - economic measures (questions of salary, dismissal of employees, - and similar cases). - - “Furthermore, protective custody is not permissible as a - countermeasure for punishable actions, for the courts are - competent to deal with those cases.” - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of that? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: It is a document which the Prosecution has submitted -as 779-PS and which was taken from the files of the ministry. There is -no date on the document but it must have been in the spring of 1934, as -can be seen from the first sentence of the document. The _Völkischer -Beobachter_ mentions the same decree in its issue of 14 April 1934. I -have included that as Number 32 in the document book; it will be Exhibit -Frick-7 (Document Number Frick-7). - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, are you offering that as an exhibit or -has it already been put in evidence? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: No, it has not, as yet, been submitted. I offer it as -Exhibit Number Frick-7. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am told the date is April 12. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: In the spring of 1934, yes, shortly after. - -THE PRESIDENT: 12th of April, 1934. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. - -The _Völkischer Beobachter_ also mentions this decree in its issue of 14 -April 1934. We are concerned with Document 32 of the document book, -which will be Exhibit Number Frick-7. I do not need to read it in -detail. - -The same is evident from Number 33 of the book, which will be Exhibit -Number Frick-8 (Document Number I-302). - -Number 34 of the book—which will be Exhibit Number Frick-9 (Document -Number 775-PS) shows that the Gestapo actually did not adhere to Frick’s -directives, and that Frick was powerless in that connection. -Nevertheless, the document appears important to me because it shows that -Frick tried repeatedly with great pains to counteract the abuses of the -Gestapo, which, however, with the support of Himmler, was stronger than -he—especially since Himmler enjoyed the direct confidence of the -Führer. - -On 17 June 1936, the affairs of the Political Police came under the -jurisdiction of the Reich. Himmler was appointed Chief of the German -Police and, though formally attached to the Reich Ministry of the -Interior, he functioned, in fact, as an independent Police Ministry -under the immediate authority of Hitler; and, as a minister, he was -privileged to look after his affairs in the Reich Cabinet himself. - -This can be seen from Document Number 35 of the document book—an -excerpt from the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ which has been submitted as -2073-PS. I do not believe that I have to give it an exhibit number; it -is an official announcement in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_. - -In this connection the Prosecution has submitted Document 1723-PS as -Exhibit USA-206. I have entered an extract from this document as Number -36 in the document book in order to correct an error. The document is an -extract from a book written by Dr. Ley in his capacity as Reich -Organization Leader. In that book Dr. Ley gives directives to the Party -offices regarding co-operation with the Gestapo, and at the end of the -extract Ley reprinted a decree by Frick which shows how Frick attempted -to counteract the arbitrary measures of the Gestapo. - -However, in presenting evidence on the morning of 13 December 1945, the -Prosecution read the entire document as an order by Frick. I should -therefore like to correct that error. - -Since Himmler and the chiefs of the Gestapo did not heed Frick’s general -directives, Frick tried, at least in individual cases, to alleviate -conditions in concentration camps; but generally he was not successful. -To quote an example, I have included—under Number 37 of the document -book—a letter by the former Reichstag Delegate Wulle, which he sent to -me of his own accord. This letter will be Exhibit Number Frick-10 -(Document Number Frick-10). The letter states, and I quote: - - “He”—Frick—“as my former counsel told me, has at various times - tried to persuade Hitler to release me; but without success as - it was Himmler who made all decisions regarding concentration - camps. However, I owe it to him that I have been treated in a - comparatively decent manner at the Sachsenhausen Concentration - Camp... He stood out from among the Nazi demagogues because of - his impartiality and reserve; he was a man who by nature - disapproved of any act of violence... Since the spring of 1925 I - have been involved in a sharp struggle against Hitler and his - party. I consider it even more to Frick’s credit that despite - this antagonism and his comparatively powerless position with - respect to Himmler, he tried in every way to help my wife and me - during the bitter years of my imprisonment in the concentration - camp...” - -The Prosecution has asserted, on the basis of the statements made by the -witness Blaha before this Tribunal, that Frick knew of the conditions in -the Dachau concentration camp through having visited it in the first -half of the year 1944. - -Therefore, with the permission of the Tribunal I submitted an -interrogatory to the witness Gillhuber, who accompanied Frick on all his -trips and... - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment, Dr. Pannenbecker. The Tribunal considers -that it cannot entertain an affidavit upon oath from the Defendant -Frick, who is not going into the witness box to give evidence on oath, -unless he is offered as a witness, in which case he may be -cross-examined. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes, but the last document was not an affidavit by -Frick, but by Gillhuber, a witness, who has received an interrogatory. -It is Number 40 of the document book. I am just informed that by an -oversight this exhibit has not been included in the book; I shall have -to submit it later. - -THE PRESIDENT: Oh, well! Tell us what it is. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: It is an interrogatory of, and the answers by, the -witness Gillhuber. Gillhuber, for the personal protection of the -Defendant Frick, accompanied him on all his official travels. In -answering the interrogatory, he confirmed the fact that Frick had never -visited the camp. The interrogatory, with the answers, has still to be -submitted in translation. It is contained in my book. - -THE PRESIDENT: You may read the interrogatory, unless the Prosecution -has any objection to its admissibility, or the terms of it, because the -interrogatory has already been provisionally allowed. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: I read, then, from Number 40 of the Frick document -book, which becomes Exhibit Frick-11 (Document Number Frick-11), the -following: - - “Question: From when until when, and in what capacity, were you - working for the Defendant Frick? - - “Answer: From the 18 March 1936 until the arrival of the Allied - Troops on 29 or 30 April 1945, as an employee of the Reich - Security Service, as guard and escort. - - “Question: Did you always accompany him on his travels for his - personal protection? - - “Answer: From 1936 until January 1942 only intermittently, but - from January 1942 as office chief, I accompanied him on all his - trips and flights. - - “Question: Do you know whether the Defendant Frick visited the - concentration camp of Dachau during the first six months of - 1944? - - “Answer: To my knowledge, Frick did not visit the Dachau - concentration camp. - - “Question: Would you have known it had that been the case, and - why would you have known it? - - “Answer: I would have had to know it had that been the case. I - was always close to him; and my employees would have reported it - if he had left during my absence. - - “Question: Do you still have the log book of the trips you made, - and can you produce it now? - - “Answer: From about 1941 log books were no longer kept. Instead - of that, monthly reports of trips were sent to the Reich - Security Service in Berlin. The copies which were kept in my - office were, according to orders, burned with all the rest of - the material in April 1945. - - “Question: Do you know whether the Defendant Frick ever visited - the Dachau camp? - - “Answer: To my knowledge Frick never visited the Dachau Camp. - - “Moosburg, 23 March 1946”.—Signed—“Max - Gillhuber”—Signed—“Leonard N. Dunkel, Lieutenant Colonel, - Infantry.” - -To comment on the question whether an official visitor to a -concentration camp could always get a correct picture of the actual -conditions existing there, I ask permission to read an unsolicited -letter which I received a few days ago from a Catholic priest, Bernard -Ketzlick. This letter which I have submitted as Supplement Frick -Number... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, the Prosecution makes objection to this -because it is a character of evidence that there is no way of testing. I -have a basket of such correspondence making charges against these -defendants, which I would not think the Tribunal would want to receive. -If the door is open to this kind of evidence, there is no end to it. - -This witness has none of the sanctions, of course, that assure the -verity of testimony, and I think it is objectionable to go into letters -received from unknown persons. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: May I say just one word on this subject? I received -the letter so late that I did not have an opportunity to ask the person -concerned to send me an affidavit. Of course, I am prepared to submit -such an affidavit later, if such an affidavit should have greater -probative value. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the letter cannot be admitted, -but an application can be made in the ordinary way for leave to put in -an affidavit or to call the witness. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. Then, at a later date, I shall submit a written -request. - -I shall not read Number 38 of the document book since it concerns a -statement made by Frick; and I refer, finally, to an excerpt from the -book _Inside Europe_ by John Gunther which will be submitted as Exhibit -Frick-12 (Document Number Frick-12). The excerpt is contained under -Number 39 in the document book I quote—it concerns a book which -appeared originally in the English language, and I therefore quote it in -English: - - “Born in the Palatinate in 1877, Frick studied law and became a - Beamter, an official. He is a bureaucrat through and through. - Hitler is not intimate with him, but he respects him. He became - Minister of the Interior because he was the only important Nazi - with civil service training. Precise, obedient, uninspired, he - turned out to be a faithful executive; he has been called the - ‘only honest Nazi?’” - -As the last document, may I be permitted to refer to an extract from the -book _To the Bitter End_ by Gisevius. I believe I do not need to quote -these passages individually, since the witness himself will be -questioned. The extract will be Exhibit Number Frick-13 (Document Number -Frick-13). - -There are still left two answers to interrogatories by the witnesses -Messersmith and Seger. I ask to be permitted to read these answers -later, as soon as the answers have been submitted to me. - -That concludes the presentation of documents. I believe there would be -no purpose in calling the witnesses now. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you prepared to call your witness, Dr. Pannenbecker? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes, Mr. President, that is my request. I now ask -permission to call the witness Gisevius. He is the sole witness in -Frick’s case. I have especially selected witness Gisevius to clarify the -question of the state of the police authority in Germany, as he, from -the very beginning, has been on the side of the opposition and is best -qualified to give a picture of the state of that authority in Germany at -that time. - -[_The witness Gisevius took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -HANS BERND GISEVIUS (Witness): Hans Bernd Gisevius. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, were you a member of the NSDAP or one of its -affiliated organizations? - -GISEVIUS: No. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Is it correct that you personally participated in the -events of 20 July 1944, and that you were also present in the OKW at -that time? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: How did you get into the police service? - -GISEVIUS: In July 1933 I passed the state examination in law. As a -descendant of an old family of civil servants I applied for a civil -service appointment in the Prussian administration. I belonged, at that -time, to the German National People’s Party and to the Stahlhelm, and by -the standards of that day I was considered politically reliable. -Consequently, at the first stage of my training as a civil servant I was -assigned to the Political Police, which meant my entry into the newly -created Secret State Police. In those days I was very glad to have been -assigned to the police service. I had already at that time heard that -abominations of all kinds were going on in Germany. I was inclined to -consider these as the final outburst of the situation, akin to civil -war, which we were experiencing at the end of 1932 and the beginning of -1933. So I hoped to contribute to the re-establishment of a proper -executive organization which would provide for law, decency, and order. -But this happiness was doomed to be short-lived. - -I had scarcely been 2 days in this new police office, when I discovered -that incredible conditions existed there. These were not police who took -action against riots, murder, illegal detention, and robbery; these were -police who protected those guilty of such crimes. It was not the guilty -persons who were arrested, but rather those who asked the police for -help. These were not police who took action against the crime, but -police whose task seemed to be to hush it up or, even worse, to sponsor -it; for those SA and SS Kommandos who played at being police in private -were encouraged by this so-called Secret State Police and were given all -possible aid. The most terrible and, even for a newcomer, most obvious -thing was that a system of unlawful detention was gaining more and more -ground—a worse and more dreadful system than which could not be -conceived. - -The offices of the new State Police were in a huge building which was, -however, not large enough to take all the prisoners. Special -concentration camps for the Gestapo were established, and their names -will go down in history as a mark of infamy. These were Oranienburg and -the Gestapo’s private prison in Papestrasse, Columbia House, or, as it -was cynically nicknamed, “Columbia Hall.” - -I should like to make it quite clear that this was certainly rather -amateurish compared with what all of us experienced later. But so it -started, and I can only convey my personal impression by describing a -brief incident I remember. After only 2 days I asked one of my -colleagues, who was also a professional civil servant—he had been taken -over from the old Political Police into the new one, and he was one of -those officials who were forced into it—I asked him, “Tell me, am I in -a police office here or in a robber’s den?” The answer I received was, -“You are in a robber’s den and you can expect to see much more yet.” - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Under whom was the Political Police at that time and -who was the superior authority? - -GISEVIUS: The Political Police was under one Rudolf Diels. He, too, came -from the old Prussian Political Police. He was a professional civil -servant, and one might have expected him still to retain the ideas of -law and decency: but in a brutal and cynical way he set his mind on -making the new rulers forget his political past as a democrat and on -ingratiating himself with his superior, the Prussian Prime Minister and -Minister of the Interior, Göring. It was Diels who created the Gestapo -office; he suggested to Göring the issue of the first decree for making -that office independent. It was Diels who let the SA and the SS enter -that office; he legalized the actions of these civil Kommandos. But soon -it became evident to me that such a bourgeois renegade could not do so -much wrong quite by himself. Some very important person must have been -backing him; in fact, I very quickly saw also that somebody was taking a -daily interest in everything that happened in that office. Reports were -written; telephone inquiries were received. Diels went several times -daily to give reports, and it was the Prussian Minister of the Interior -Göring who considered this Secret State Police as his special preserve. - -During those months nothing happened in this office which was not known -or ordered by Göring personally. I want to stress this, because in the -course of years the public formed a different idea of Göring because he -noticeably retired from his official functions. At that time, it was not -yet the Göring who finally suffocated, in his Karinhall. It was the -Göring who looked after everything personally and had not yet begun to -busy himself with the building of Karinhall or to don all sorts of -uniforms and decorations. It was Göring still in civilian clothes, who -was the real chief of an office, who inspired it, and who attached -importance to being the “iron” Göring. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I believe you can describe some points more -concisely. As to what you have just said, do you know this from your own -experience, or where did you learn of it? - -GISEVIUS: I not only heard and saw it myself, but I also learned much -from a man who in those days was also a member of the Secret State -Police, and whose information will play an important part in the course -of my statements. - -At that time a criminologist had been called into the Secret State -Police, probably the best known expert of the Prussian police, -Oberregierungsrat Nebe. Nebe was a National Socialist. He had been in -opposition to the former Prussian police and had joined the National -Socialist Party. He was a man who sincerely believed in the purity and -genuineness of the National Socialist aims. Thus I saw for myself how -this man found out on the spot what was actually going on and how he -inwardly recoiled. - -I can also state here, as it is important, the reasons why Nebe became a -strong opponent, who went with the opposition up to 20 July and later -suffered death by hanging. At that time, in August 1933, Nebe was -ordered by the Defendant Göring to murder Gregor Strasser, formerly a -leading member of the National Socialist Party, by means of a car or -hunting accident. Nebe was so shocked at this order that he refused to -carry it out and made an inquiry at the Reich Chancellery. The answer -from the Reich Chancellery was that the Führer knew nothing of this -order. Thereupon Nebe was summoned to Göring, who reproached him most -bitterly for having made an inquiry. Nevertheless, when he finished -these reproaches he considered it advisable to promote him, because he -thought he would thereby silence him. - -The second thing which happened at that time, and which is also very -important, was that the Defendant Göring gave the Political Police -so-called open warrants for murder. At that time there were not only -so-called amnesty laws which gave amnesty for infamous actions, but -there was also a special law according to which investigations, already -initiated by police authorities and by the public prosecutor, could be -quashed, on condition, however, that in these special cases the Reich -Chancellor, or Göring, personally signed the pertinent order. Göring -made use of this law by giving open warrants to the Chief of the -Gestapo, with which all that had to be done was to fill in the names of -those who were to be murdered. Nebe was so shocked by this that from -that moment on he felt it his duty to fight against the Gestapo. At our -request he remained with us there, and afterwards in the Criminal -Police, because we needed one man at least who could keep us informed -about police conditions in case our desire for a revolution should -materialize. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, what did you do yourself when you saw all -these things? - -GISEVIUS: I, for my part, tried to contact those bourgeois circles which -through my connections were open to me. I went to various ministries: to -the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, to State Secretary Grauert, and -several ministerial directors and counsellors. I went to the Reich -Ministry of the Interior, to the Ministry of Justice, to the Foreign -Office, and the Ministry of War. I spoke repeatedly to the Chief of the -Army High Command, Colonel General Von Hammerstein. Among all these -connections I formed at that time, there is one other who is -particularly important for my testimony. - -At that time I met in the newly formed intelligence department of the -OKW a Major Oster. I gave him all the material which by then had already -accumulated. We started a collection—which we continued until 20 -July—of all the documents we could get hold of; and Oster was the man -who from then on, in the Ministry of War never failed to warn every -officer he could contact officially or privately. In course of time, by -favor of Admiral Canaris, Oster became Chief of Staff of the -Intelligence. When he met his death by hanging he was a general. But I -consider it my duty to testify here, in view of all this man has -done—his unforgettable fight against the Gestapo and against all the -crimes which were committed against humanity and peace—that among the -inflation of German field marshals and generals there was one real -German general. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: How did the work develop, according to your -observations in the Gestapo? - -GISEVIUS: At that time conditions in Germany were still such that people -kept their eyes open in the ministries. There was still an opposition in -the bourgeois ministries; there was still the Reich President Von -Hindenburg. Thus, at the end of October 1933 the Defendant Göring was -forced to dismiss Diels, the Chief of the State Police. At the same time -a commission of investigation was set up in order to re-organize that -institution thoroughly. According to the ministerial decree, Nebe and I -were members of that commission. But that commission never met, for the -Defendant Göring found ways and means to thwart this measure. He -appointed as Chief and successor of Diels a still worse Nazi named -Hinkler, who some time before had been acquitted in a trial because of -irresponsibility; and this Hinkler acted in such a way that before 30 -days had passed he was dismissed. Then the Defendant Göring was able to -restore his Diels to the office. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Do you know anything of the events which led to the -Prussian law of 30 November 1933, by which the functions of the Gestapo -were taken away from the office of the Minister of the Interior and -transferred to the office of the Prussian Prime Minister? - -GISEVIUS: That was just the moment of which I am speaking. Göring -realized that it would not serve his purpose if other ministries were -too much concerned in his Secret State Police. Though he was Prussian -Minister of the Interior himself, he was disturbed by the fact that the -police department of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior could look -into the affairs of his private domain; and so he separated the Secret -State Police from the remaining police and placed it under his personal -direction, thereby excluding all other police authorities. From the -point of view of a proper police system this was nonsense, because you -cannot run a Political Police properly if you separate it from the -Criminal Police and the Order Police. But Göring knew why he did not -want any other police authority to look into the affairs of the Secret -State Police. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, did you remain in the police service -yourself? - -GISEVIUS: On that day when Göring carried out his little—and I can’t -find another word for it—_coup d’état_ by assigning to himself a state -police of his own, this Secret State Police issued a warrant of arrest -against me. I had expected this and had gone into hiding. The next -morning I went to the Chief of the Police Department of the Prussian -Ministry of the Interior, Ministerial Director Daluege—who was a high -SS general—and said that it was really not quite in order to issue a -warrant of arrest against me. - -A criminal commissioner of the Secret State Police came to arrest me in -the room of the Chief of the Prussian police. Daluege was kind enough to -allow me to escape through a back door to State Secretary Grauert. -Grauert intervened with Göring, and as always in cases of this kind, -Göring was very surprised and ordered a thorough investigation. That was -the usual way of saying that such incidents were to be pigeonholed. -After that I was no longer allowed to enter the Secret State Police, but -I was sent as an observer to the Reichstag Fire trial at Leipzig, which -was just drawing to an end. During these last days of November I was -able to get some insight into this obscure affair and having already -tried, together with Nebe, to investigate this crime, I was able to add -to my knowledge here. - -I assume that I shall again be questioned about that point and, -therefore, shall now confine myself to the statement that, if necessary, -I am prepared to refresh Defendant Göring’s memory concerning his -complicity in and his joint knowledge of this first “brown” _coup -d’état_ and the murder of the accomplices. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: On 1 May 1934 Frick became Prussian Minister of the -Interior. Did you get into touch with Frick himself or his ministries? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. Immediately after the Reichstag Fire trial was over—that -is, at the end of 1933—I was dismissed from the police service and -transferred to a Landrat office in East Prussia. I complained, however, -to State Secretary Grauert about this obvious disciplinary punishment. -As he and Ministerial Director Daluege knew of my quarrel with the -Secret State Police, they got me into the Ministry of the Interior and -assigned to me the task of collecting all those reports which were still -being incorrectly addressed to the Ministry of the Interior and of -forwarding them to the Prussian Prime Minister who was in charge of the -Secret State Police and who dealt with these matters. - -As soon as Göring found out about this he repeatedly protested against -my presence in the Ministry, but the Minister of the Interior was -adamant and I succeeded in keeping that post. - -When Frick came I did not get in touch with him immediately as I was -only a subordinate official. I assume, however, that the Defendant Frick -knew about my activity and my views, because I was now encouraged to -continue collecting all those requests for help which were wrongly -addressed to the Ministry of the Interior, and a large number of these -reports I submitted through official channels to Daluege, Grauert, and -Frick. There was, however, the difficulty that Göring, in his capacity -of Prime Minister of Prussia, had prohibited Frick, as his Prussian -Minister of the Interior, to take cognizance of such reports. Frick was -supposed to forward them to the Gestapo without comment. I saw no reason -for not submitting them to Frick all the same, and as Frick was also -Reich Minister of the Interior—and in this capacity could give -directives to the Länder and, therefore, also to Göring—he took -cognizance of these reports in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and -allowed me to forward them to Göring with the request for a report. -Göring protested repeatedly, and I know this resulted in heated disputes -between him and Frick. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Is anything known to you about the fact that at that -time the Reich Minister of the Interior issued certain directives to -restrict protective custody? - -GISEVIUS: It is correct that at that time a number of such directives -were issued, and the fact that I say that a number of such directives -were issued already implies that generally they were not complied with -by subordinate authorities. - -The Reich Minister of the Interior was a minister with no personal -executive power, and I will never forget the impression it made on me, -while training as a civil servant, that we officials in the Secret State -Police were instructed in principle not to answer any inquiries from the -Reich Ministry of the Interior. Naturally, at intervals the Reich -Minister of the Interior sent reminders, and the efficiency of a Gestapo -official was judged by the number of such reminders he could show his -chief, Diels, as proof that he did not pay any attention to such -matters. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: On 30 June 1934 the so-called Röhm Putsch took place. -Can you give a short description of the conditions prevailing before -this Putsch? - -GISEVIUS: First I have to say that there never was a Röhm Putsch. On 30 -June there was only a Göring-Himmler Putsch. - -I am in a position to give some information about that dark chapter, -because I dealt with and followed up this case in the Police Department -of the Ministry of the Interior, and because the radiograms sent during -these days by Göring and Himmler to the police authorities of the Reich -came into my hands. The last of these radiograms reads: “By order of -Göring all documents relating to 30 June shall be burned immediately.” - -At that time I took the liberty of putting these papers into my safe, -and to this day I do not know whether or not they survived -Kaltenbrunner’s attempts to get them. I still hope to recover these -papers, and if I do, I can prove that throughout the whole 30 June not a -single shot was fired by the SA. The SA did not revolt. By this, -however, I do not wish to utter a single word of excuse for the leaders -of the SA. On 30 June not one of the SA leaders died who did not deserve -death a hundred times—but after a proper trial. - -The situation on that 30 June was that of a civil war; on one side were -the SA headed by Röhm, and on the other side, Göring and Himmler. It had -been arranged for the SA, several days before 30 June, to be sent on -leave. The SA leaders had been purposely called by Hitler for a -conference at Wiessee that 30 June, and it is not usual for people who -intend to effect a _coup d’état_ to travel by sleeping car to a -conference. To their surprise they were seized at the station and at -once driven off to execution. - -The so-called Munich Putsch took place as follows: The Munich SA did not -come into it at all, and at 1 hour’s driving distance from Munich the -alleged traitors, Röhm and Heines, fell into the sleep of death -completely ignorant of the fact that, according to Hitler and Göring, a -revolt had taken place in Munich the previous night. - -I was able to observe the Putsch in Berlin very closely. It took place -without anything being known about it by the public and without any -participation by the SA. We in the police were unaware of it. It is -true, however, that 4 days before 30 June one of the alleged -ringleaders, SA Gruppenführer Karl Ernst of Berlin, came to Ministerial -Director Daluege looking very concerned and said that there were rumors -going round in Berlin that the SA were contemplating a Putsch. He asked -for an interview with Minister of the Interior Frick, so that he, Ernst, -could assure him that there was no such intention. - -Daluege sent me with this message to the Defendant Frick, and I arranged -for this strange conversation where an SA leader assured the Minister of -the Interior that he did not intend to stage a Putsch. - -Ernst then set out on a pleasure trip to Madeira. On 30 June he was -taken from the steamer and sent to Berlin for execution. I saw him -arrive at the Tempelhof airport. This struck me as particularly -interesting, because a few hours before I had read the official report -about his execution in the newspaper. - -That, then, was the so-called SA and Röhm Putsch. And because I am not -to withhold anything, I must add that I was present when on 30 June the -Defendant Göring informed the press of the event. On this occasion the -Defendant Göring made the cold-blooded remark that he had for days been -waiting for a code word which he had arranged with Hitler. He had then -struck, of course with lightning speed, and had also extended the scope -of his mission. This extension of his mission caused the death of a -large number of innocent people. To mention only a few, there were -Generals Schleicher—who was killed together with his wife—and Von -Bredow, Ministerial Director Klausner, Edgar Jung, and many others. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, you were in the Ministry of the Interior -yourself at that time. How did Frick hear about these measures, and was -he himself in any way involved in the quelling of this so-called Putsch? - -GISEVIUS: I was present when, at about half past 9, Ministerial Director -Daluege came back quite pale after seeing Göring and having just been -told what had happened. Daluege and I went to Grauert and we drove to -the Reich Ministry of the Interior, to Frick. Frick rushed out of the -room—it may have been about 10 o’clock—in order to go to Göring to -find out what had happened in the meantime, only to be told that he, as -Police Minister of the Reich, should go home now and not worry about -further developments. In fact, Frick did go home, and during those 2 -dramatic days he did not enter the ministry. - -Once during this time Daluege drove over with me to see him. For the -rest, it was given to me, the youngest official of the Reich Ministry of -the Interior, to inform the Reich Minister of the Interior on that -bloody Saturday and Sunday of the atrocious things which in the meantime -had happened in Germany. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, you just told us of an instruction Frick had -received not to worry about these things. Who gave him this instruction? - -GISEVIUS: As far as I know, Göring gave or conveyed to him an -instruction by Hitler. I do not know whether there was a written -instruction; neither do I know whether Frick had asked about it. I -should think that Frick, on that day, probably considered it would be -wise not to ask too many awkward questions. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: After these things had been concluded, did Frick in -any way attempt to smooth matters over? - -GISEVIUS: To answer this question correctly I have to say first that on -Saturday, 30 June, we at the Ministry of the Interior knew very little -about what had happened. On Sunday, 1 July, we learned much more, and -after these bloody days had passed, there is no doubt that Frick had on -the whole a clear idea of what had happened. Also, during these days he -made no secret of his indignation at the murders and unlawful arrests -which apparently had taken place. In order to stick to the truth I have -to answer your question by saying that the first reaction of the -Defendant Frick which I knew about was that Reich law in which the Reich -Ministers declared the events of June 30 to be lawful. This law had an -unprecedented psychological effect on the further developments in -Germany, and it has its place in the history of German terror. Apart -from this, many things happened in the Third Reich which a normal mortal -could not understand, but which were well understood in the circles of -ministers and state secretaries. And so, I have to admit that, after -that law, the Defendant Frick made a serious attempt to remedy at least -the most obvious abuses. Maybe he thought other ministers in the Reich -Cabinet should have spoken sooner. I am thinking now of Reich War -Minister Von Blomberg, two of whose generals were shot, and who, in -spite of that, signed this law. I intentionally mention Blomberg’s name, -and ask to be permitted to pause here to tell the Tribunal about an -incident which occurred this morning. I was in the room of the -defendants’ counsel and was speaking to Dr. Dix. Dr. Dix was interrupted -by Dr. Stahmer, counsel for Göring. I heard what Dr. Stahmer told Dr. -Dix... - -DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): May I ask whether a -personal conversation which I had with Dr. Dix has anything to do with -the taking of evidence? - -GISEVIUS: I am not speaking... - -THE PRESIDENT: Witness, don’t go on with your evidence whilst the -objection is being made. Yes, Dr. Stahmer. - -GISEVIUS: If you please. I didn’t understand... - -DR. STAHMER: I do not know whether it is in order when giving evidence -to reveal a conversation which I had with Dr. Dix in the Defense -Counsel’s room. - -GISEVIUS: May I say something to that? - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly keep silent. - -GISEVIUS: May I finish my statement? - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you keep silent, sir. - -DR. STAHMER: This morning in the room of the Defense Counsel, I had a -personal conversation with Dr. Dix concerning the Blomberg case. That -conversation was not intended to be heard by the witness. I do not know -the witness; I didn’t even see the witness, as far as I can remember, -and I don’t know whether this should come into the evidence by making -such a conversation public here. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This incident has been reported to me, and I think -it is important that this Tribunal know the influence—the threats that -were made at this witness in this courthouse while waiting to testify -here, threats not only against him but against the Defendant Schacht. -Now, the affair was reported to me. I think it is important that this -Tribunal know it. I think it is important that it come out. I should -have attempted to bring it out on cross-examination if it had not been -told, and I think that the witness should be permitted. These other -parties have had great latitude here. This witness has been subjected to -threats, as I understand it, which were uttered in his presence, whether -they were intended for him or not, and I ask that this Tribunal allow -Dr. Gisevius, who is the one representative of democratic forces in -Germany, to take this stand to tell his story. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal would like to hear first of all -anything further you have to say upon the matter. They will then hear -what Dr. Dix has to say, if he wishes to say anything; and they will -then hear whether the witness himself wishes to say anything in answer. - -DR. STAHMER: I have no qualms about telling the Court exactly what I -said. Last night I discussed the case with the Defendant Göring and told -him the witness Gisevius... - -THE PRESIDENT: We don’t want to hear any communications which you had -with the Defendant Göring other than those you choose to make in support -of your objection to this evidence that has been given. - -DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President; but I must say briefly that Göring told -me that it was of no interest to him if the witness Gisevius did -incriminate him, but that he did not want Blomberg, who died -recently—and I assumed it was only the question of Blomberg’s -marriage—he, Göring, did not want these facts concerning the marriage -of Blomberg to be discussed here in public. If that could not be -prevented, then of course Göring, in his turn—and it is only a question -of Schacht, because Schacht, as he had told me, wanted to speak about -these things—then he, Göring would not spare Schacht. - -That is what I told Dr. Dix this morning, and I am sure Dr. Dix will -confirm that, and if I may add... - -THE PRESIDENT: We will hear you in a moment, Dr. Dix. - -DR. STAHMER: I said—and I was not referring to Schacht, to the witness, -or to Herr Pannenbecker—I said, for reasons of professional etiquette, -that I should like to inform Dr. Dix. That is what I said and what I -did. In any case I did not even know that the witness Gisevius was -present at that moment. At any rate, it was not intended for him. -Moreover, I was speaking to Dr. Dix aside. - -THE PRESIDENT: So that I may understand what you are saying: You say you -had told Dr. Dix the substance of the conversation you had had with the -Defendant Göring, and said that Göring would withdraw his objection to -the facts being given if the Defendant Schacht wanted them to be given. -Is that right? - -DR. STAHMER: No, I only said that Göring did not care what was said -about himself; he merely wanted the deceased Blomberg to be spared, and -he did not want things concerning Blomberg’s marriage to be discussed. -If Schacht did not prevent that—I was speaking only of Schacht—then -he, Göring, in his turn, would have no consideration for Schacht—would -no longer have any consideration for Schacht. That is what I told Dr. -Dix for reasons of personal etiquette. - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait, wait, I can’t hear you. Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: As I said, that is what I told Dr. Dix, and that finished -the conversation. And I made it quite clear to Dr. Dix that I told him -that only as one colleague to another. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That is all you wish to say? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes. - -DR. DIX: I remember the facts, I believe, correctly and reliably, as -follows: This morning I was in the room of the Defense Counsel speaking -to the witness Dr. Gisevius. I believe my colleague, Professor Kraus, -was also taking part in the conversation. Then my colleague, Stahmer, -approached me and said he would like to speak to me. I replied that at -the moment I was having an important and urgent conversation with -Gisevius, and asked whether it could wait. Stahmer said “no,” and that -he must speak to me at once. I then took my colleague Stahmer aside, -probably five or six paces from the group with whom I had been speaking. -My colleague Stahmer told me the following—it is quite possible, I -don’t remember the actual words he used, that he started by saying that -he was telling me this for professional reasons, as one colleague to -another. If he says so now, I am sure that it is so. Anyhow I don’t -remember that any longer. He said to me, “Listen, Göring has an idea -that Gisevius will attack him as much as he can. If he attacks the dead -Blomberg, however, then Göring will disclose everything against -Schacht—and he knows lots of things about Schacht which may not be -pleasant for Schacht. He, Göring, had been very reticent in his -testimony; but if anything should be said against the dead Blomberg, -then he would have to reveal things against Schacht.” - -That was what he meant—that he would bring things up against Schacht. -That was the conversation. I cannot say with absolute certainty whether -my colleague told me I should call Gisevius’ attention to it. If he says -he did not say so, then it is certainly true, and I believe him; but I -could only interpret that information to mean that I should notify -Gisevius of this development promised by Göring. I therefore -thought—and did not have the slightest doubt—that I was voicing -Göring’s intention, and that I was acting as Dr. Stahmer wished, and -that that was the purpose of the whole thing. What else could be the -reason for Dr. Stahmer’s telling me at that moment, immediately before -my discussion with Gisevius, even while I was in conversation with -Gisevius, that he could not wait, that I must break off my conversation? -Why should he inform me at that time, unless he meant that the mischief -hinted at and threatened by Göring might possibly be avoided—in other -words, that the witness Gisevius, on whom everything depended, should -think twice before making his statement? I did not have the slightest -doubt that what Stahmer meant by his words to me was that I should -convey them to Gisevius. As I said, even if Stahmer had not asked -me—and he was certainly speaking the truth when he said he did not ask -me to take action—I would have replied, if I had been questioned before -he made this statement, and that probably with an equally good -conscience, that he had asked me to pass it on to Gisevius. But I will -not maintain that he actually used those words. Anyway, it is absolutely -certain that this conversation did take place, and it was in the firm -belief that I was acting as Dr. Stahmer and Göring intended that I went -straight to Gisevius. He was standing only five or six steps away from -me, or even nearer. I think I understood him to say, when I addressed -him, that he had heard parts of it. I don’t know whether I understood -him correctly. I then informed him of the gist of this conversation. -That is what happened early this morning. - -DR. STAHMER: May I say the following: It goes without saying, that I -neither asked Dr. Dix to pass it on to Gisevius, nor did I count upon -his doing so; but I surmised that Gisevius would be examined this -morning, and that Dr. Dix would question the witness concerning the -circumstances of Blomberg’s marriage. That is what I had been told -previously—namely, that Dr. Dix intended to put this question to the -witness. Therefore, I called Dr. Dix’s attention to it, assuming that he -would abstain from such a question concerning Blomberg’s marriage. That -was not intended for the witness in any way, and I know definitely that -I said to Dr. Dix that I was telling him this merely as one colleague to -another, and he thanked me for it. He said, “Thank you very much.” At -any rate, if he had said to me, “I am going to tell the witness,” I -would have said immediately, “For heaven’s sake; that is information -intended only for you personally.” Indeed, I am really surprised that -Dr. Dix has in this manner abused the confidence which I placed in him. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, we have heard the facts, and we do not think -we need hear anything more about it beyond considering the question as -to whether the witness is to go on with his evidence. - -Witness, has the explanation which has been given by Dr. Stahmer and Dr. -Dix sufficiently covered the matters with which you were proposing to -deal with reference to Field Marshal Von Blomberg? Is there anything -further that you need say about it? - -GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. Perhaps I did not quite understand the -question. - -Concerning Blomberg, at this point I did not want to say anything -further; I merely wanted, on the first occasion that Blomberg’s name -came up, to make it clear that the whole thing gave me the feeling that -I was under pressure. I was standing so near that I could not help -hearing what Dr. Stahmer said, and the manner in which Dr. Dix told me -about it—for I had heard at least half of it—could not be understood -in any other way than to mean that Dr. Dix in a very loyal manner was -instructing me, a witness for the Defendant Schacht, to be rather -reticent in my testimony on a point which I consider very important. -That point will come up later and has nothing whatsoever to do with the -marriage of Herr Von Blomberg. It has to do with the part which the -Defendant Göring played in it, and I know quite well why Göring does not -want me to speak about that affair. To my thinking, it is the most -corrupt thing Göring ever did, and Göring is just using the cloak of -chivalry by pretending that he wants to protect a dead man, whereas he -really wants to prevent me from testifying in full on an important -point—that is, the Fritsch crisis. - -THE PRESIDENT: [_Turning to Dr. Pannenbecker._] The Tribunal will hear -the evidence then, whatever evidence you wish the witness to give. - -GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. What I have to say in connection with the -Blomberg case is finished. I merely wanted to protest at the first -opportunity when the name was mentioned. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well then, counsel will continue his examination and you -will give such evidence as is relevant when you are examined or -cross-examined by Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant Schacht. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, after the events of 30 June 1934, had the -position of the Gestapo become so strong that no measures against it had -any chance of succeeding? - -GISEVIUS: I must answer this in the negative. The Secret State Police -doubtlessly gained in power after 30 June, but because of the many -excesses committed on 30 June, the opposition in the various ministries -against the Secret State Police had become so strong that through -collective action the majority of ministers could have used the events -of 30 June to eliminate the Secret State Police. I personally made -repeated efforts in that direction. With the knowledge of the Defendant -Frick I went to see the Minister of Justice Gürtner and begged him many -times to use the large number of illegal murders as a reason for action -against the Secret State Police. I personally went to Von Reichenau -also, who was Chief of the Armed Forces Offices at that time, and told -him the same thing. I know that my friend Oster brought the files -concerning this matter to the knowledge of Blomberg, and I wish to -testify here that, in spite of the excesses of the 30 of June, it would -have been quite possible at that time to return to law and order. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: After that, what did the Reich Minister of the -Interior do—that is, what did Frick do to steer the Secret State Police -to a course of legality? - -GISEVIUS: We started a struggle against the Secret State Police and -tried at least to prevent Himmler from getting into the Reich Ministry -of the Interior. Shortly before Göring had relinquished the Ministry of -the Interior to Frick, he had made Himmler Chief of the Secret State -Police in Prussia. Himmler, starting from that basis of power, had -attempted to assume police power in the other Länder of the Reich. Frick -tried to prevent that by taking the stand that he, as Reich Minister of -the Interior, had an equal voice in appointing police functionaries in -the Reich. At the same time, we tried to prevent an increase in the -numbers of the Secret State Police by systematically refusing all -requests by the Gestapo to increase its body of officials. Unfortunately -here also, as always, Himmler found ways and means to overcome this. He -went to the finance ministers of the individual states and told them -that he needed funds for the guard troops of the concentration camps, -for the so-called “Death’s-Head” units, and he drew up a scale whereby -five SS men were to guard one prisoner. With these funds Himmler -financed his Secret State Police, as, of course it rested with him how -many men he wanted to imprison. - -In other ways too, we in the Reich Ministry of the Interior attempted by -all possible means to block the way of the Gestapo; but unfortunately, -the numerous requests we sent to the Gestapo remained unanswered. Again -it was Göring who forbade Himmler to answer and who protected Himmler -when he refused to give any information in reply to our inquiries. - -Finally, a last effort was made during my term of office in the Reich -Ministry of the Interior. We tried to paralyze the Secret State Police -at least to some extent by introducing into protective custody the right -of supervision and complaint. If we could have achieved the right of -review of all cases of protective custody, we would also have been able -to get an insight into the individual actions of the Gestapo. A law was -formulated, and this law was first submitted to the Ministerial Council -of Prussia, the largest of the states. Again it was the Defendant Göring -who, by all available means, opposed the passing of such a law. A very -stormy cabinet meeting on the matter ended with my being asked to leave -the Ministry of the Interior. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I have shown you a memorandum... - -THE PRESIDENT: This will be a convenient time to break off. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal wishes me to say that -it anticipates that you will put any questions which you think necessary -with reference to the alleged intimidation of the witness when you come -to cross-examine. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, Sir; thank you. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I should like to talk about the efforts which -were made by the Ministry of the Interior to stop the arbitrary methods -of the Gestapo, particularly with reference to the concentration camps. -I therefore ask you to look at a memorandum which originates from the -Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior. It is Document 775-PS, -which I submitted this morning as Exhibit Frick-9 when I presented the -evidence for Frick. It is Number 34 in the document book. Do you know -that memorandum? - -GISEVIUS: No, I don’t. It appears that this memorandum was drawn up -after I had left the Ministry of the Interior. I assume this from the -fact that in this memorandum the Reich Minister of the Interior appears -to have already given up the fight, since he writes that as a matter of -principle it should be made clear who bears the responsibility, and, if -necessary, the responsibility for all the consequences must now—and I -quote—“be borne by the Reichsführer SS who, in fact, has already -claimed for himself the leadership of the Political Police in the -Reich.” - -At the time when I was at the Reich Ministry of the Interior, we tried -particularly to prevent this from happening—namely, that Himmler should -take over the Political Police. This is evidently a memorandum written -about 6 months later when the terror had become still greater. The facts -which are quoted here are known to me. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you say anything about this? Does it not deal with -the Pünder case and the case of Esterwege, Oldenburg? - -GISEVIUS: The Esterwege case can be told most briefly. It is one of -many. - -So far as I can recollect, an SA or local group leader was arrested by -the Gestapo because he got excited about the conditions in the Papenburg -concentration camp. This was not the first time either. I don’t know why -the Defendant Frick picked on this particular case. Nevertheless, one -day Daluege showed me one of those customary handwritten slips sent by -Frick to Himmler. Frick had written to Himmler in the margin in large -green letters that an SA man or local group leader, or whatever he was, -had been arrested illegally, that this man must be released at once, and -that if Himmler did that sort of thing again he, Frick, would institute -criminal proceedings against Himmler for illegal detention. - -I remember this story very well, because it was somewhat -peculiar—considering the police conditions which existed at the -time—that Himmler should be threatened by Frick with criminal -proceedings, and Daluege made some sneering remarks to me regarding -Frick’s action. - -That is the one case. - -THE PRESIDENT: What was the date? - -GISEVIUS: This must have happened in the spring of 1935, I should say in -March or April. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, do you know how Himmler reacted to that -threat of criminal proceedings? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. There was a second case. That is this Pünder affair which -is mentioned here. He reacted similarly to both, and therefore it might -be better if I first relate the Pünder affair in this connection. It -concerned a Berlin attorney, who was a lawyer of high standing and legal -adviser to the Swedish Embassy. The widow of the Ministerial Director -Klausner, who had been murdered on 30 June, approached Pünder, as she -wanted to sue the life insurance companies for payment of her annuity. -But as Klausner had allegedly committed suicide on that day, no director -of any insurance company dared pay the money to the widow. Consequently, -the attorney had to sue. But the Nazis had made a law according to which -all such awkward cases—awkward for the Nazis—were not to be tried in -court: they were to be taken to a so-called Spruchkammer in the Reich -Ministry of the Interior. If I am not mistaken, this law was called “Law -for the Settlement of Civilian Claims.” They were never at a loss for -fine-sounding names and titles at that time. This law forced the -attorney to submit his claim to the court first. He was apprehensive. He -went to the Ministry of the Interior and told the State Secretary, “If I -comply with the law and sue, I shall be arrested.” The State Secretary -in the Ministry of the Interior forced him to sue. Thereupon the very -wise attorney went to the Ministry of Justice and told State Secretary -Freisler that he did not want to sue as he would certainly be arrested -by the Gestapo. The Secretary in the Ministry of Justice informed him -that he would have to send in a claim in any case, but that nothing -would happen as the courts had been instructed to pass such cases on -without comment to the Spruchkammer in the Ministry of the Interior. -Thereupon, the attorney sued and the Gestapo promptly arrested him for -slander because he had stated that the Ministerial Director Klausner had -not met his death by suicide. This was for us a classical example of -what we had come to in Germany as far as protective custody was -concerned. - -I had taken the liberty of selecting this case from among hundreds, or I -should say thousands of similar cases and of suggesting to Frick that -this matter should be brought to the notice not only of Göring, but of -Hitler as well this time. Then I sat down and drafted a letter or a -report from Frick to Hitler, which also went to the Ministry of Justice. -There were more than five pages, and I discussed from every angle the -facts concerning Ministerial Director Klausner’s suicide, with the -assistance of the SS, and the ensuing lawsuit. This report to Hitler -concluded with Frick’s remark that the time had now come to have the -problem of protective custody settled by the Reich and by lawful means. - -And now I answer your question regarding what happened. It roughly -coincided with Frick’s letter to Himmler regarding deprivation of -liberty. Himmler took these two letters to a meeting of Reichsleiter, -that is, the so-called ministers of the movement, and he put the -question to them, whether it was proper to allow one Reichsleiter, -namely Frick, to write such letters to another Reichsleiter, that is, to -Himmler. These worthy gentlemen answered this question in the negative -and reprimanded Frick. Then Himmler went to the meeting of the Prussian -cabinet where the protective custody law, which I mentioned, was being -discussed. - -Perhaps I may draw your attention to the fact that at that time it was a -rare thing for Himmler to be allowed to attend a meeting of Prussian -ministers. There was a time in Germany—and it was quite a long -period—when Himmler was not the powerful man which he afterwards became -because the bourgeois ministers and the generals were cowards and gave -way to him. Thus, it was a rare thing for Himmler to be allowed to -attend a meeting of the Prussian Ministerial Council at all, and that -particular meeting ended by my being discharged from the Ministry of the -Interior. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I should like to quote to you two sentences -from the memorandum which I have just shown to you—that is, 775-PS—and -ask you to tell me whether the facts are stated correctly. I quote: - - “In this connection, I draw your attention to the case of the - attorney Pünder, who was taken into protective custody together - with his colleagues, merely because, after making inquiry at the - Reich Ministry of the Interior and at our ministry, he had filed - a suit, which he was obliged to do under a Reich law.” - -GISEVIUS: Yes, that is correct. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: And then the other sentence. I quote: - - “I mention here only the case of a teacher and Kreisleiter at - Esterwege who was kept in protective custody for 8 days - because...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, where is that sentence which you have -just read? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: In the Frick Document Book under Number 34, second -sentence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Which page? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: In my Document Book it is Page 80. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of Paragraph 3 on Page 70? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: No, Mr. President, I have just discovered that this -particular sentence in the document has not been translated. Perhaps I -may read one more sentence which apparently has been translated. It can -be found in Paragraph 3 of the same document. - - “I mention here only the case of a teacher and Kreisleiter at - Esterwege who was kept in protective custody for 8 days because, - as it turned out afterwards, he had sent a correct report to the - head of his district concerning abuses by the SS.” - -GISEVIUS: Yes, that corresponds to the facts. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, did you yourself have any support from Frick -for your personal protection? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. At that time, of course, I was such a suspect in the eyes -of the Secret State Police that all sorts of evil designs were being -made against me. Frick gave an order, therefore, that I should be -protected in my home by the local police. A direct telephone from my -home to the police station was installed, and I had only to pick up the -receiver and someone at least would know in case I had surprise -visitors. Furthermore, the Gestapo used their usual methods against me -by accusing me of criminal acts. Apparently the files were taken to -Hitler in the Reich Chancellery, and Frick intervened, and it was soon -discovered that this concerned a namesake of mine! Frick said quite -openly on the telephone that these fellows—as he put it—had once more -lied to the Führer. This was the signal for the Gestapo, who were, of -course, listening in on this telephone conversation, that they could no -longer use these methods. - -Then we advanced one step further through Heydrich. He was so kind as to -inform me by telephone that I probably had forgotten that he could -pursue his personal and political opponents to their very graves. I made -an official report of that threat to Frick, and Frick, either personally -or through Daluege, intervened with Heydrich, and there is no doubt that -he thereby rendered me a considerable service, for Heydrich never liked -it very much when his murderous intentions were talked about openly. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, would then, at least a minister of the Reich -have no cause for alarm about his own personal safety if he tried to -fight against the terror of the Gestapo and Himmler? - -GISEVIUS: If you ask me that now, I must say that Schacht was the only -one who was put into a concentration camp. But it is true that we all -asked ourselves just how long it would take for a Reich Minister to be -sent to a concentration camp. As regards Frick, he told me -confidentially, as far back as 1934, that the Reich Governor of Bavaria -had given him reliable information, according to which he was to be -murdered while taking a holiday in the country, in Bavaria, and he asked -me whether I could find out any details. At that time I went with my -friend Nebe to Bavaria by car, and we made a secret investigation which, -at any rate, proved that such plans had been discussed. But, as I said, -Frick survived. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: I have no further questions. - -DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): May I ask you to decide -on the following question? I have called Gisevius. He is a witness -called by me, and this is, therefore, not a subsequent question which I -am putting, but I am examining him as my witness. I am of the opinion, -therefore, that it is right and expedient that I should now follow up -the examination by my colleague Pannenbecker, and that my other -colleagues who also want to put questions follow the two of us. I ask -the Tribunal to decide on this question. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you the only defendants’ counsel who asked for this -witness to be called on behalf of your client? - -DR. DIX: I called him. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know; but are you the only defendants’ counsel who -asked to call him? - -DR. DIX: I believe, Sir, I am the only one who has called him. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Dix, you may examine him next. - -DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius, Dr. Pannenbecker has already mentioned the fact -that you have published a book entitled _To the Bitter End_. I have -submitted quotations from that book to the Tribunal as evidence, and -they have been accepted as documentary evidence by the Tribunal. For -this reason I now ask you: Are the contents of that book historically -true; did you write it only from memory, or is it based on notes which -you made at the time? - -GISEVIUS: I can say here to the best of my knowledge, and with a good -conscience, that the contents of the book are historically true. In -Germany I always made personal notes as far as it was possible. I have -said here that my dead friend Oster had in the War Ministry a -considerable collection of documents to which I had access at all times. -In writing about any important matter in which I made reference to -friends in the opposition group, I never did so without having first -consulted them many times about it. And since 1938 I have been in -Switzerland, first as a visitor and later on for professional reasons, -and there I was able to continue my notes undisturbed. The volume which -has been submitted to the Tribunal was practically completed in 1941, -and in 1942 had already been shown to several friends of mine abroad. - -THE PRESIDENT: If he says that the book is true, that is enough. - -DR. DIX: Since when have you known the Defendant Schacht? - -GISEVIUS: I have known the Defendant Schacht since the end of 1934. - -DR. DIX: On what occasion and in what circumstances did you meet him? - -GISEVIUS: I met him when I worked in the Reich Ministry of the Interior -and was collecting material against the Gestapo. I was consulted by -various parties, who either feared trouble with the Gestapo or who had -had trouble. Thus, one day Schacht, who was then Minister for Economy, -sent a man to me whom he trusted—it was his plenipotentiary Herbert -Göring—to ask me whether I would help Schacht. He, Schacht, had for -some time felt that he was being watched by Himmler and the Gestapo and -lately had had good reason to suspect that an informer, or at least a -microphone, had been installed in his own house. I was asked whether I -could help in this case. I agreed to do so and, with a microphone expert -from the Reich post administration, on the following morning I visited -Schacht’s ministerial residence. We went with the microphone expert from -room to room and—did not have to search very long. It had been done -very badly by the Gestapo. They had mounted the microphone all too -visibly and, moreover, had engaged a domestic servant to spy on Schacht. -She had a listening device attached to the house telephone installed in -her own bedroom, which was easy to discover, and so we were able to -unmask the whole thing. It was on that occasion that I first spoke to -Schacht. - -DR. DIX: And what was the subject of your conversation? Did you at that -time already speak about political matters to him? - -GISEVIUS: We spoke about the matters and the somewhat peculiar situation -which had brought us together. Schacht knew that I was very active in -opposing the Gestapo, and I, for my part, was aware that Schacht was -known for his utterances against the SS and the Gestapo on numberless -occasions. Many middle class people in Germany placed their hopes in him -as the only strong minister who could protect them if need be. -Particularly the industrialists and business men, who were very -important at the time, hoped for, and often found his support. So that -it was quite natural that immediately during the first conversation I -told him everything that was troubling me. - -The main problem at that time was the removal of the Gestapo and the -removal of the Nazi regime. Therefore our conversation was highly -political, and Schacht listened to everything with an open mind, which -made it possible for me to tell him everything. - -DR. DIX: And what did he say? - -GISEVIUS: I told Schacht that we were inevitably drifting towards -radicalism, and that it was doubtful whether, the way things were going, -the end of the present course would not be inflation, and, that being -so, whether it would not be better if he himself were to bring about -that inflation. That would enable him to know beforehand the exact date -of such a crisis, and together with the generals and anti-radical -ministers make timely arrangements to meet the situation when it became -really serious. I said to him, “You should bring about that inflation; -you yourself will then be able to determine the course of events instead -of allowing others to take things out of your hands.” He replied, “You -see, that is the difference which separates us: You want the crash, and -I do not want it.” - -DR. DIX: From that, one might draw the conclusion that at that time -Schacht still believed that the crash could be averted. What reasons did -he give for this view? - -GISEVIUS: I think that at the time the word “crash” was too strong for -him. Schacht was thinking along the traditional lines of former -governments, but he saw that here and there a change had come -about—especially since Brüning’s time—by emergency laws and certain -dictatorial measures. But as far as I could see at the time, and during -all our subsequent conversations, uppermost in his mind was still the -idea of a Reich government which met and passed resolutions, where the -majority of ministers were bourgeois, and where at a given moment—which -might be sooner or later—one might steer a radically changed course. - -DR. DIX: What was his attitude towards Hitler at that time? - -GISEVIUS: It was quite clear to me that at that time he still thought -very highly of Hitler. I might almost say that at that time Hitler was -to him a man of irreproachable integrity. - -THE PRESIDENT: What time are you speaking of? - -GISEVIUS: I am now speaking of the time of my first meetings with -Schacht, at the end of 1934 and the beginning of 1935. - -DR. DIX: What was your profession at that time? Where were you? Where -did you work? - -GISEVIUS: I had succeeded in leaving the Reich Ministry of the Interior -in the meantime and had been transferred to the Reich Criminal Office, -which was in the process of being formed. When we realized that the -Gestapo were extending their power, we believed we could establish some -sort of police apparatus side by side with the Gestapo—that is, purely -criminal police. My friend Nebe had been made Chief of the Reich -Criminal Department to build up a police apparatus there which would -enable us to resist the Gestapo if need be. The Ministry of the Interior -gave me the task of organizing and sent me to this government office -about to be formed, to give advice for its establishment. - -DR. DIX: We now slowly approach the year 1936—the year of the Olympic -Games. Did you have a special assignment there? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. At the beginning of 1936 it was decided to make me Chief -of Staff of the police at the Central Police Department on the occasion -of the Olympic Games in Berlin. That was an entirely nonpolitical and -technical affair. Count Helldorf, who was then Commissioner of the -Police, thought that because of my connections with the Ministry of the -Interior and the Ministry of Justice this would be useful. But I was -quickly removed from this position. Heydrich discovered it and -intervened. - -DR. DIX: Your book contains a letter from Heydrich, which I do not -propose to read in its entirety. It is addressed to Count Helldorf and -calls his attention to the fact that, during the time of your office at -the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, you always put every possible -difficulty in the way of the Secret State Police, and that relations -with you had been extremely unpleasant. He continues: - - “I fear that his participation in the police preparations for - the Olympic Games, even in this sphere, would not promote - co-operation with the Secret State Police, and it should, - therefore, be considered whether Gisevius should not be replaced - by another suitable official. Heil Hitler. Yours, Heydrich.” - -Is that the letter which affected your position? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. That was the reason why I was also dismissed from that -job. I had to wait only a few more weeks and Himmler became the Chief of -Police in the Reich. And on the very day that Himmler became the Reich -Police Chief I was definitely removed from any kind of police service. - -DR. DIX: And where did you go? - -GISEVIUS: After my discharge from the police service I was sent to the -government in Münster, where I was assigned to the price control office. - -DR. DIX: Could you, while in the price control office in Münster, -continue your political work in any way and make the necessary contacts? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. I had plenty of opportunity to make official journeys. I -made a thorough study not only of prices, but also of the political -situation, in the Rhineland and in Westphalia, and went to Berlin nearly -every week so as to keep in touch with my friends. - -DR. DIX: Were you in touch with Schacht? - -GISEVIUS: From that time on I met him very nearly every week. - -DR. DIX: Did you, from Münster, make contacts with other persons in -prominent positions to further the work you were doing? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. One of the reasons why I went to Münster was that the -president of the province, Freiherr Von Luening, was a man of the old -school—clean, correct, a professional civil servant, and politically a -man who upheld law and order. He, too, ended on the gallows after 20 -July 1944. I also got into touch in Düsseldorf with Regierungspräsident -State Secretary Schmidt, and immediately upon my arrival in Münster I -did everything to get into touch with the commanding general there, Von -Kluge, who later became Field Marshal. In this I succeeded. There, too, -I tried at once to continue my old political discussions. - -DR. DIX: We shall revert to General Kluge later on. I now ask you this: -At that time when you were working in Münster, did you perceive a change -in Schacht’s attitude towards the regime, and in his attitude towards -Hitler, as distinct from what you described to the Tribunal as existing -in 1934? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. By a steady process Schacht withdrew himself further and -further from the Nazis. If I were asked to describe the phases, I would -say that in the beginning—that is to say, in 1935—he was of the -opinion that the Gestapo only was the main evil and that Hitler was the -man who was the statesman—or could at least become the statesman—and -that Göring was the conservative strong man whose services one ought to -use, and could use, to oppose the terror of the Gestapo and the State by -establishing orderly conditions. I contradicted Schacht vehemently -regarding his views about the Defendant Göring. I warned him. I told him -that in my opinion Göring was the worst of all, precisely because he was -hiding under the middle class, conservative cloak. I implored him not to -effect his economic policy with Göring, since this could only come to a -bad end. - -Schacht—for whom much may be said, but not that he is a good -psychologist—denied this emphatically. Only then in the course of 1936 -he began to realize more and more that Göring was not supporting him -against the Party, but that Göring supported the radical elements -against him, only then did Schacht’s attitude begin to change gradually, -and he came to regard not only Himmler but also Göring as a great -danger. For him Hitler was still the one man with whom one could create -policy, provided the majority of the cabinet could succeed in bringing -him over to the side of law and order. - -DR. DIX: Are you now talking approximately of the time when Schacht was -handing over the foreign currency control to Göring? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. That was the moment when I warned him and, as I said, he -became apprehensive about Göring and realized that Göring was not -supporting him against the radical elements. That was the time I meant. - -DR. DIX: By handing over the foreign currency control to Göring he -showed a negative, a yielding attitude. But now that he was gradually -changing his views, did he not have any positive ideas as to how to -bring about a change? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. He was entirely taken up with the idea, like many other -people in Germany at that time—I might almost say the majority of the -people in Germany—the idea that everything depended on strengthening -the middle class influence in the cabinet, and above all, and as a -prerequisite, that the Reich Ministry of War, headed by Blomberg, should -be brought over to the side of the middle class ministers. Schacht had, -if you want to put it like that, the very constructive idea that one -must concentrate on the fight for Blomberg. That was precisely where I -agreed with him for it was the same battle which I, with my friend -Oster, had tried to fight in my small department, and in a far more -modest way. - -DR. DIX: Had he already done anything to achieve that end at that time? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. DIX: As a cue I mention the steps taken by Dreyse, the Vice -President of the Reichsbank. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. First of all, he tried to establish close contact with -the competent expert in the Ministry of War, General Thomas, who later -on became Chief of the Army Economic Staff. Thomas was a man who, right -from the beginning, was skeptical about National Socialism, or even -opposed it. As by a miracle, he later on emerged from the concentration -camp alive. - -Schacht at that time began to fight for Blomberg through Thomas. I took -part in that fight because Schacht used me as an intermediary through -Oster, and I was also informed about these connections through Herbert -Göring. Moreover, I learned about these things from many discussions -with Thomas. I can testify here that, even at that time, it was -extraordinarily difficult to establish connection between Schacht and -Blomberg, and I was naïve enough to tell Schacht repeatedly simply to -telephone Blomberg and ask him for an interview. Schacht replied that -Blomberg would certainly be evasive and that the only way was to prepare -the meeting via Oster and Thomas. This was done. - -I know how much we expected from the many discussions Schacht had with -Blomberg. I was, of course, not present as a witness, but we discussed -these conferences in great detail at the time. I took notes and was very -pleased when I found that these recollections of mine tallied absolutely -with the recollections of Thomas, whose handwritten notes I have in my -possession. Thomas was repeatedly reprimanded by Blomberg and was told -not to bother him with these qualms on Schacht’s part. He was told that -Schacht was querulous, and that he, Thomas, should... - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go into all this detail, Dr. Dix? - -DR. DIX: Yes, I believe, Your Lordship, that it will be necessary. This -change from a convinced follower of Hitler to a resolute opponent and -revolutionary, even a conspirator, is of course so complicated a -psychological process that I believe that I cannot spare the Tribunal -the details of that development. I shall certainly be economical with -nonessential matters, but I should be grateful if the witness could be -given a certain amount of freedom during this part of the testimony, as -he is the only witness I have on this subject. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal thinks that you can give the essence -of the matter without giving it in this great detail. You must try, at -any rate, to give as little unnecessary detail as possible. - -DR. DIX: I shall be glad to do that. - -Well, then, Dr. Gisevius, you have heard the wish of the Tribunal and -you will no doubt bring out only the essential facts. - -Is there any other essential fact in the affair of Blomberg via Thomas -that you wish to state, or can we conclude that chapter? - -GISEVIUS: No, I shall now try to give a brief description of the other -channels which were tried. I do not know how much the Tribunal wishes to -hear about it, but I will say that Schacht tried to approach Baron Von -Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. As, however, he was very -difficult to approach, he sent his Reichsbank vice president, Dreyse, to -establish the contact. We also made one big attempt to approach Fritsch -and Blomberg through General Von Kluge. - -DR. DIX: And, briefly, what was the object of that step? What were the -generals supposed to do—I mean these generals mentioned by you? - -GISEVIUS: This step had as its object to make it clear to Blomberg that -things were taking a more and more extreme turn, that the economy of the -country had deteriorated, and that the Gestapo terror must be stopped by -all possible means. - -DR. DIX: So that at the time there were only misgivings about the -economy and the terror which reigned—not about the danger of war, not -yet? - -GISEVIUS: No, only the fear of extremism. - -DR. DIX: We now turn to 1937. You know that was the year of Schacht’s -dismissal as Reich Minister of Economy. Did Schacht say anything to you -as to why he remained in office as President of the Reichsbank? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. I witnessed in detail the struggle for his release as -Reich Minister of Economy. On the one side there was his attempt to be -released from the Ministry, and I think I am right in saying that this -was not so easy. Schacht told Lammers one day that if he did not receive -the official notification of his release by a certain date, he would -consider himself dismissed and inform the press accordingly. On that -occasion scores of people implored Schacht not to resign. Throughout -those years, whenever a man wanted to resign from his post, there was -always the question whether his successor might not steer an even more -radical course. Schacht was implored not to leave, lest radicalism -should gain the upper hand in the economic field also. I only mention -here the name of Ley, as head of the labor front. Schacht replied that -he could not bear the responsibility, but that he hoped he would be able -as President of the Reichsbank to keep one foot in, as he expressed it. -He imagined that he would be able to have a general view of the overall -economic situation and that through the Reichsbank he would be able to -conserve certain economic-political measures. I can testify that many -men, who later became members of the opposition, implored Schacht to -take that line and to keep at least one foot in. - -DR. DIX: Was that decision of his not influenced by his attitude to, and -his judgment concerning some of the generals particularly Colonel -General Fritsch? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, that is quite right. One of the greatest disasters was -the fact that so many people in Germany imagined that Fritsch was a -strong man. I remember that not only high-ranking officers but also high -ministerial officials told me over and over again that there was no need -to worry: Fritsch was on the march; Fritsch was only waiting for the -right moment; Fritsch would one fine day bring about a revolt and end -the terror. General Von Kluge, for instance, told me this as a fact—and -he was a close friend of Fritsch. And so we all lived in the completely -mistaken belief—as I can now say—that one day the great revolt would -come of the Armed Forces against the SS. But instead of this, the exact -opposite occurred, namely, the bloodless revolt of the SS, the famous -Fritsch crisis, the result of which was that not only Fritsch was -relieved of his post but that the entire Armed Forces leadership was -beheaded, politically speaking, which meant that now all our hope... - -DR. DIX: Forgive me if I interrupt you, but we shall come to the Fritsch -crisis later, which was in 1938... - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. DIX: I should like now to finish speaking about Schacht’s efforts -and actions in 1937 and to ask you—it is mentioned in your -book—whether some unsuccessful attempt to approach General Von Kluge -and a journey by Schacht to Münster did not play a part? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. I thought that I was supposed to be brief about that. -Although Schacht made a great effort to get in touch with Fritsch, it -was not possible to arrange a conversation in Berlin. It was secretly -arranged that they should meet in Münster, as General Von Kluge was too -scared to meet Schacht publicly at the time. There was a lot of beating -about the bush, the net result was that the two gentlemen did not meet. -It was not possible to bring together a Reich minister and a commanding -general. It was all most depressing. - -DR. DIX: Where were you at the time? What were you doing? Were you still -at Münster, or was there a change? - -GISEVIUS: I was still in Münster at that time, but in the middle of 1937 -Schacht wanted me to return to Berlin. The greater his disappointment, -the more he was inclined to take seriously my warnings against an -increasing radicalism and an SS revolt. - -By the autumn of 1937 things in Germany had reached such a point that -everybody in the opposition group felt that evil plans were being made. -We thought at that time that there would be another day of blood like 30 -June, and we were trying to protect ourselves. It was Schacht who got in -touch with Canaris through Oster and expressed the wish that I should be -brought back to Berlin in one way or another. At that time there was no -government office which would have given me a post. I had no other -choice but to take a long leave from the civil service, alleging that I -wanted to devote myself to economic studies. Schacht, in agreement with -Canaris and Oster, arranged for me to be given such a post in a Bremen -factory, but I was not allowed to show myself there, and so I came to -Berlin to place myself completely at the disposal of my friends for -future happenings. - -DR. DIX: Your Lordship, we are now coming to January 1938 and the -Fritsch crisis. I do not think that it would be helpful to interrupt -that part of the witness’ testimony. If I may, I would suggest that Your -Lordship now adjourn the session, or else we would have to go on at -least another half hour. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, we’ll adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 25 April 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH DAY - Thursday, 25 April 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius! Yesterday we got as far as the year 1938. You had -returned to Berlin to a fictitious position which Schacht had arranged -for you and you were now in continuous contact with your political -confidants, Schacht, Oster, Canaris, and Nebe. You testified last that -within your circle, at that time, you all had the impression that a coup -was imminent. - -Now, we really come to the so-called Fritsch crisis; in my opinion the -decisive, inner-political first step toward the war. Will you please -describe the entire course and the background of that crisis, especially -bearing in mind the fact that while that crisis was taking place the -march into Austria was made and always remembering, of course, Schacht’s -position and activities which are the main concern. - -GISEVIUS: First, I shall describe the course of the crisis as such; and -it is correct that all my friends considered it the first decisive step -toward the war. I shall assemble the facts one by one. I consider it -advisable, in order not to confuse the picture, to leave Schacht out for -the time being, because the facts as such are extensive enough. -Furthermore, I will not indicate in the beginning the source of our -information or describe my own experiences; rather I shall wait until I -am questioned on those subjects. - -On 12 January 1938 the German public was surprised by the report that -Field Marshal Von Blomberg, at that time Reich Minister for War, had -married. No details about his wife nor any photographs were published. A -few days later one single picture appeared, a photograph of the Marshal -and his new wife in front of the monkey cage at the Leipzig Zoo. -Malicious rumors about the past life of the Marshal’s wife began to -circulate in Berlin. A few days later there appeared on the desk of the -Police Commissioner in Berlin a thick file which contained the following -information: Marshal Von Blomberg’s wife had been a previously convicted -prostitute who had been registered as a prostitute in the files of seven -large German cities; she was in the Berlin criminal files. I myself have -seen the fingerprints and the pictures. She had also been sentenced by -the Berlin courts for distributing indecent pictures. The Commissioner -of the Police in Berlin was obliged to submit this file, by official -channels, to the Chief of the Police, Himmler. - -DR. DIX: Excuse me, please; who was the Commissioner of the Police in -Berlin at that time? - -GISEVIUS: The Commissioner of the Police in Berlin was Count Helldorf. -Count Helldorf realized that if that material were transmitted to the -Reichsführer SS it would place the Wehrmacht in a very embarrassing -position. Himmler would then have in his possession the material he -needed to ruin Blomberg’s reputation and career, and strike a blow at -the leadership of the Armed Forces. Helldorf took this file to the -closest collaborator of Marshal Blomberg, the then Chief of the Armed -Forces Department, Keitel, who at that time had just become related to -Marshal Blomberg through the marriage of their respective children. -Marshal Keitel, or Generaloberst Keitel as he was at that time, looked -through the file carefully and demanded that Police Commissioner -Helldorf should hush up the entire scandal and suppress the file. - -DR. DIX: Perhaps you will tell the Tribunal the source of your -information. - -GISEVIUS: I got my information from Count Helldorf, who described the -entire affair to me, and from Nebe, Oberregierungsrat of the police -headquarters in Berlin at that time, and later Reich Criminal Director. - -Keitel refused to let Blomberg bear any of the consequences. He refused -to inform the Chief of the General Staff Beck, or the Chief of the Army -Generaloberst Von Fritsch. He sent Count Helldorf to Göring with the -file. Helldorf submitted the entire file to Defendant Göring. Göring -asserted he knew nothing about the various sections of the criminal -records and the previous sentences of Von Blomberg’s wife. Nevertheless -in that first conversation, and in later discussions, he admitted that -he already knew the following: - -First, that Marshal Blomberg had already asked Göring several months ago -whether it was permissible to have an affair with a woman of low birth, -and shortly thereafter he had asked Göring whether he would help him to -obtain a dispensation to marry this lady “with a past” as he put it. -Later Blomberg came again and told Göring that this lady of his choice -unfortunately had another lover and he must ask Göring to help him, -Blomberg, to get rid of that lover. - -DR. DIX: Excuse me. Göring told that to Helldorf and you learned it from -Helldorf? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, that is what Göring said, and in the further course of -the investigation we learned of it from other sources too. Göring then -got rid of that lover by giving him foreign currency and sending him off -to South America. In spite of that, Göring did not inform Hitler of this -incident. He even went with Hitler, as a witness, to the wedding of -Marshal Blomberg on 12 January. I should like to point out here... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal would wish to know how you suggest -that these matters, which appear to be personal, are relevant to the -charges and in what way they affect the Defendant Schacht or the -Defendant Göring or the Defendant Frick? - -DR. DIX: I am here only to serve the interests, the rightful interests, -of the Defendant Schacht. It is necessary to present that crisis in all -its horribleness in order to conceive what an effect, what a -revolutionary effect, it had on Schacht and his circle as far as the -regime was concerned, I have already said earlier that the Fritsch -crisis was the turning point in the transformation of Schacht from a -follower and, to a certain extent, an admirer of Hitler to a deadly -enemy who had designs on his life. The Tribunal cannot understand this -revulsion if the Tribunal does not receive the same impression as -Schacht had at that time. Indeed, I in no way desire to wash dirty linen -here unnecessarily. My decision to put these questions and to ask the -witness to describe the Fritsch crisis in full detail is only motivated -by the fact that the further development of Schacht, and of the Fritsch -crisis, or let us say, the Oster-Canaris circle to which Schacht -belonged, cannot be understood if one does not realize the monstrous -circumstances of that crisis. In the face of these facts, however -disagreeable, one must decide to bring these sometimes very personal -matters to the attention of the Tribunal. Unfortunately I cannot -dispense with it in my defense. It is the alpha and omega of my defense. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If the Tribunal please, it might be helpful at this -time to know our position in reference to this line of testimony, if it -is to be considered whether admissible or not now. - -I should desire, if this incident were not brought out, to bring it out -upon cross-examination upon several aspects. One is that it shows the -background of the incident of yesterday, which I think is important in -appraising the truthfulness of testimony in this case. - -Another thing is that it bears upon the conspiracy to seize power. There -were certain men in Germany that these conspirators had to get rid of. -Some of them they could kill safely. Some of them, as we see from the -Röhm Purge, when they went to killing they aroused some opposition. They -had to strike down by other means, and the means they used against -Fritsch and Blomberg show the conspiracy to seize power and to get rid -of the men who might stand in the way of aggressive warfare. - -It will appear, I think, that Fritsch and Blomberg were among the -reliants of the German people in allowing these Nazis to get as far as -they did, believing that here at least were two men who would guard -their interests; and the method by which those men were stricken down -and removed from the scene we would consider an important part of the -conspiracy story, and I would ask to go into it on cross-examination. - -That might perhaps be material to the Court in deciding whether it -should proceed now. - -DR. DIX: May I add one more thing? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Dix. - -The Tribunal thinks, in view of what you have said and what Mr. Justice -Jackson has said, that your examination must continue and you will no -doubt try to confine it as much as you can to the political aspects of -the matter. - -DR. DIX: Of course. But the personal matters are of such political -importance in this case that they cannot be omitted. - -Well then, Dr. Gisevius, you understand the difficulties of the -situation. We want only to give evidence, and not to bring in anything -sensational as an end in itself. However, when it is necessary to speak -on such subjects in order to explain the development to the Tribunal, I -ask you to speak quite frankly. - -GISEVIUS: I ask the Tribunal also to realize my difficulties. I myself -do not like speaking about these things. - -I must add that Göring was the only head of the Investigation -Department. That was the institution which took overall telephone -control in the Third Reich. This Investigation Department was not -satisfied, as has been described here, with merely tapping telephone -conversations and decoding messages; but it had its own intelligence -service, all the way down to its own employees, for obtaining -information. It was, therefore, also quite possible to obtain -confidential information about Marshal Von Blomberg’s wife. When -Helldorf gave the file to Göring, Göring considered himself compelled to -give that file to Hitler. Hitler had a nervous breakdown and decided to -dismiss Marshal Blomberg immediately. Hitler’s first thought, as he told -the generals later at a public meeting, was to appoint Generaloberst Von -Fritsch as Blomberg’s successor. The moment he made his decision known, -Göring and Himmler reminded him that it could not be done as according -to a file of the year 1935 Fritsch was badly incriminated. - -DR. DIX: Excuse me, Doctor. What is the source of your information -regarding this conversation between Hitler and the generals and also -Göring’s statement? - -GISEVIUS: Several generals who took part in that meeting told me about -it, and I have said already that in the course of events, which I have -yet to describe, Hitler himself made many statements. We also had in our -possession until 20 July the original documents of the Supreme -Court-Martial which convened later. - -The file of 1935, which was submitted to Hitler in January 1938, -referred to the fact that in 1934 the Gestapo conceived the idea of -prosecuting, among other enemies of the state, homosexuals as criminals. -In the search for evidence the Gestapo visited the penitentiaries and -asked convicted inmates, who had blackmailed homosexuals, for evidence -and for the names of homosexuals. One of the inmates reported a terrible -story, which was really so horrible that I will not repeat it here. It -will suffice to say that this prisoner believed the man in question had -been a certain Herr Von Fritsch or Frisch. The prisoner could not -remember the correct name. The Gestapo then turned over these files to -Hitler in 1935. Hitler was indignant about the contents. Talking to the -generals, he said he did not want to know about such a disgusting -affair. Hitler ordered the files to be burned immediately. - -Now, in January 1938, Göring and Himmler reminded Hitler of these files; -and it was left to Heydrich’s cleverness to submit to Hitler again these -files, which had allegedly been burned in 1935 and which had been -completed, in the meantime, by extensive investigations. Hitler -believed, as he said to the generals at the time, that after having been -so disappointed in Blomberg, many nasty things could be expected from -Fritsch also. The Defendant Göring offered to bring the convict from the -prison to Hitler and the Reich Chancellery. At Karinhall, Göring had -previously threatened this convict with death if he did not abide by his -statements. - -DR. DIX: How do you know that? - -GISEVIUS: That was mentioned at the Supreme Court-Martial. Then Fritsch -was summoned to the Reich Chancellery and Hitler told him of the -accusations which had been made against him. Fritsch, a gentleman -through and through, had received a confidential warning from Hitler’s -adjutant; but it had been so vague that Fritsch came to the Reich -Chancellery extremely alarmed. He had no idea of what Hitler was -accusing him. Indignantly he denied the crime he had allegedly -committed. In the presence of Göring, he gave Hitler his word of honor -that all the accusations were false. But Hitler went to the nearest -door, opened it, and the convict entered, raised his arm, pointed to -Fritsch and said, “That is he.” - -Fritsch was speechless. He was only able to ask that a judicial -investigation should be made. Hitler demanded his immediate resignation; -and on condition that Fritsch left in silence, he agreed to allow the -matter to rest where it was. Fritsch appealed to Beck, the Chief of the -General Staff. Chief of the General Staff Beck intervened with Hitler. A -hard struggle ensued for a judicial investigation of these terrible -accusations against Fritsch. That struggle lasted about a week. There -were dramatic disputes in the Reich Chancellery. At the end came the -famous 4 February when the generals, who until that day—that is to say, -10 days after the dismissal of Blomberg and the relief of Fritsch—were -completely unaware of the fact that both their superiors were no longer -in office, were ordered to come to Berlin. Hitler personally presented -the files to the generals in such a way that they also were completely -confused and said they were satisfied that the affair should be -investigated by the courts. At the same time Hitler surprised the -generals... - -DR. DIX: You know of this only through the participants of that meeting? - -GISEVIUS: From the participants of the meeting, yes. - -At the same time Hitler surprised the generals with the announcement -that they had a new Commander-in-Chief, Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch. -Some of the generals had, in the meantime, been relieved of their posts; -and also on the evening previous to that announcement, a report appeared -in the newspapers according to which Hitler, under the pretense of -drawing together the reins of government, had dismissed the Foreign -Minister, Von Neurath, effected a change in the Ministry of Economics, -relieved a number of diplomats of their posts, and then, as an appendix -to that report, announced a change in the War Ministry and in the -leadership of the Army. - -Then a new struggle arose, which lasted several weeks, regarding the -convening of the court-martial which should decide as to the -reinstatement of Generaloberst Von Fritsch. This was for all of us the -moment when we believed we would be able to prove before a German -supreme court the methods the Gestapo used to rid themselves of their -political adversaries. This was a unique opportunity of being able to -question witnesses under oath regarding the manner in which the entire -intrigue had been contrived. Therefore we set to work to prepare for our -parts in this trial. - -DR. DIX: What do you mean by “we” in this case? - -GISEVIUS: There was above all one man, who as an honest lawyer and judge -was himself a participator of this Supreme Court-Martial. This was the -Judge Advocate General at that time, and later Chief Judge of the Army, -Ministerial Director Dr. Sack. This man believed that he owed it to the -spirit of law to contribute in every possible way toward exposing these -matters. This he did, but he also paid with his life after 20 July. - -In the course of this investigation the judges of this Supreme -Court-Martial questioned the Gestapo witnesses. They investigated the -records of the Gestapo; they made local investigations; and, with the -aid of the criminologist Nebe, it was not long before they discovered -definitely that the entire affair had concerned a double; it was not -Generaloberst Von Fritsch but a retired Captain Von Frisch who had been -pensioned long before. - -In the course of that investigation the judges established another fact; -they were able to prove that the Gestapo had been in the residence of -this double Von Frisch as early as 15 January and had questioned his -housekeeper. May I compare the two dates once more. On 15 January the -Gestapo had proof that Fritsch was not guilty. On 24 January the -Defendant Göring brings the convict and witness for the prosecution into -the Reich Chancellery in order to incriminate Fritsch, the -Generaloberst. We believed that here indeed we were confronted with a -plot of incredible proportions, and we believed that now even the -skeptical general must see that it was not only in the lower ranks of -the Gestapo that there was scheming and contriving, invisible and -secret, without the knowledge of any of the ministers or of the Reich -Chancellery and which would compel any man of honor and justice to -intervene. This was the reason why we now formed into a larger group and -why we saw that we now no longer needed to collect material about the -Gestapo in secret. That, precisely, was the great difficulty we had had -to deal with. We heard a great deal; but if we had passed on that -evidence, we would in every case have exposed to the terror of the -Gestapo those men who had given us the evidence. - -Now we could proceed legally, and so we started our efforts to persuade -Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch to submit the necessary evidence to the -Supreme Court-Martial. - -DR. DIX: Whom do you mean by “we”? - -GISEVIUS: At that time there was a group, among whom I must mention Dr. -Schacht, who was then extremely active and who went to Admiral Raeder, -to Brauchitsch, to Rundstedt, and to Gürtner, and tried to explain -everywhere that the great crisis had now arisen; that we now had to act; -that it was now the task of the generals to rid us of this regime of -terror. - -But I must mention one more name in that connection. In 1936 Schacht had -already introduced me to Dr. Goerdeler. I had the honor of traveling the -same road with that brave man from then on until 20 July. And now I have -mentioned here for the first time, in this room where so many terrible -things are made known, the name of a German who was a brave and fearless -fighter for freedom, justice, and decency and who, I believe, will one -day be an example, and not only to Germany, to prove that one can also -do one’s duty faithfully until death, even under the terror of the -Gestapo. - -This Dr. Goerdeler, who had always been a fearless and untiring fighter, -had in those days unequaled courage. Like Dr. Schacht he went from one -ministry to another, from one general to the next, and he also believed -that now the hour had come when we could achieve a united front of -decent people led by the generals. Brauchitsch did not refuse then. He -did not refuse to act at Goerdeler’s request. In fact he assured -Goerdeler of his co-operation in a revolt with almost religious fervor. - -And as a witness I may mention that Brauchitsch also solemnly assured me -that he would now use this opportunity to fight against the Gestapo. -However, Brauchitsch made one condition, and that condition was accepted -by the generals as a whole. Brauchitsch said, “Hitler is still such a -popular man; we are afraid of the Hitler myth. We want to give to the -German people and to the world the final proof by means of the Supreme -Court-Martial and its verdict.” Therefore Brauchitsch postponed his -action until the day when the verdict of the Supreme Court-Martial -should be given. - -The Supreme Court-Martial met. It began its session. The session was -suddenly interrupted under dramatic circumstances. I must add that -Hitler appointed the Defendant Göring as president of that Supreme -Court-Martial. And now the Supreme Court-Martial, under the chairmanship -of Göring, convened. I know from Nebe that Göring during the preceding -days had had consultations with Himmler and Heydrich. I know that -Heydrich said to Nebe, “this Supreme Court-Martial will be the end of my -career.” - -DR. DIX: Did Nebe tell you that? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, on the same day. The Supreme Court-Martial would be the -great danger for the Gestapo. And now the Supreme Court-Martial sat for -several hours and was adjourned under dramatic circumstances, for that -was the day chosen for the German armies to march into Austria. Even at -that time we knew without any doubt why the chairman of that -court-martial was so unusually interested in having the troops on that -day receive the order to march, not to a goal within but outside the -Reich. Not until one week later could the Supreme Court-Martial -reconvene, and then Hitler was triumphant. The generals had their first -“campaign of flowers” behind them, a plebiscite had been proclaimed, the -jubilation was great, and the confusion among the generals was still -greater. So that court-martial was dissolved. Fritsch’s innocence was -definitely established, but Brauchitsch said that as a result of the -changed psychological atmosphere created by the annexation of Austria, -he could no longer take the responsibility for a revolt. - -That is roughly the story of how the War Ministry was practically -denuded of its leading men, and how the generals were thrown into -unequaled confusion. From that time on we took the steep downward path -to radicalism. - -DR. DIX: Perhaps I may ask the Tribunal to be permitted to read in this -connection one sentence from a document which I will submit as Exhibit -Number Schacht-15. My document book is still in the process of -translation, but I hope that it will be here on the day of the hearing -of Schacht. There is only one sentence which is of interest in this -connection. It is from the biannual report of the General Staff... - -THE PRESIDENT: Have the documents been submitted to the Prosecution and -to the Tribunal at all? - -DR. DIX: The documents have been discussed with the Prosecution twice in -detail, once with regard to the question of translation, and then on the -question of their admissibility as evidence; and Mr. Dodd discussed them -in open court. I am firmly convinced that the Prosecution is thoroughly -acquainted with the document. It is only one sentence and I do not -believe that the Prosecution would object to the reading of this one -sentence, since otherwise the connection with the documentary evidence -might be obscured. I will introduce a document now and then, wherever it -seems practical. This is only one sentence from the biannual report of -the General Staff of the United States... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not know what this document is, Your Honor. I -should like to know because we may want to ask some questions about it. -I do not want to delay Dr. Dix, but I do not have a copy of it and I do -not know just what it is yet. - -DR. DIX: I just wanted to shorten the proceedings; but as I see that -difficulties may arise, and that a long discussion may be needed, I will -omit it, and will present it later with my documentary evidence. It -would not serve my purpose otherwise. - -[_Turning to the witness._] For the additional information of the Court, -perhaps you will describe the position of the chairman in German -court-martial proceedings; that the control of the examination is in his -hands—that, as a matter of fact, the entire case is in his hands. - -GISEVIUS: Dr. Dix, I do not doubt that you could describe the authority -of such a chairman better and more clearly from the legal point of view. -I would, however, like to say the following: - -I read the minutes of that session, for it is one of those documents -which we thought we would one day submit to the public. This, too, I -hope we will find again. From the minutes it can be seen that the -Defendant Göring, as president, determined the tenor of the entire -proceedings and of the questions. - -He questioned the witnesses for the prosecution, and he took care that -no other questions were put which might have proved embarrassing. I must -say, from these voluminous minutes, that Göring knew how to cloak the -true facts by the manner in which he led the proceedings. - -DR. DIX: In my introductory words at the beginning of the session, I -called the Fritsch crisis the first decisive inner-political step of the -war; and you, Doctor, have adopted that term. After concluding the -description of the Fritsch crisis, will you give the reason for the -views you adopted, and what the effect was upon your group in this -connection, especially upon Schacht? - -GISEVIUS: I must point out again that until this Fritsch crisis it had -been difficult in the ranks of the German opposition to consider even -the possibility of war. That was due to the fact that in Germany the -opposition groups were so sure of the strength of the Army, and of the -leading men, that they believed it sufficed to have a man of honor, like -Fritsch, at the head of the German Army. It seemed inconceivable that -Fritsch would tolerate a sliding into terror or into war. Only a few -persons had pointed out that it was in the nature of every revolution -some day to go beyond the frontiers of a nation. We believed from -history that this theory should be pointed out as a danger threatening -the National Socialist revolution, and therefore we repeatedly warned -those who were convinced that they were faced with a revolution, not -only with a dictatorship, that one day those revolutionaries would -resort to war as a last recourse. As it became more evident in the -course of the Fritsch crisis that radicalism was predominant, a large -circle became aware that the danger of war could no longer be ignored. - -DR. DIX: And did the Defendant Schacht also belong to that circle? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. During those days of the Fritsch crisis, Schacht said, as -did many others: “That means war,” and that was also said plainly to the -then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Von Brauchitsch. - -DR. DIX: Now the question arises why Schacht had previously financed the -rearmament program, at least in the beginning? - -GISEVIUS: Schacht always told me that he had financed the rearmament -program for purposes of defense. Schacht was convinced for many years -that such a large nation in the center of Europe should at least have -means of defense. I may point out that at that time large groups of the -German people were possessed of the idea that there was a possible -danger of attack from the East. You must not forget the type of -propaganda with which the German people were inundated at that time, and -that the reasons given for this particular danger from the East were -based upon Polish aspirations concerning East Prussia. - -DR. DIX: Did Schacht also discuss with you at that time the fact that -this rearmament was serving his political purposes, as through it he -might be able to start discussions on general disarmament again? - -GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. Unfortunately I forgot to emphasize this -point myself. Schacht was of the opinion that all means should be used -to bring about discussions on rearmament again. He had an idea that very -soon—I think he had held that opinion since 1935—the attention of -opponent countries should be drawn to German rearmament; and then -Hitler, because his rearmament was now known, would be forced to resume -discussions at the disarmament conference. - -DR. DIX: Was that which you have just said the subject of your -conversation with Schacht at that time, or is that your judgment now? - -GISEVIUS: No, I remember this conversation very well, because I thought -Hitler’s inclinations lay in other directions than in attending a -disarmament conference. I thought Hitler to be of an entirely different -mentality, and was somewhat surprised that Schacht considered it -possible that Hitler might harbor such thoughts. - -DR. DIX: Did you have the impression from your conversations with -Schacht that he was informed in detail of the type, speed, and extent of -the rearmament? - -GISEVIUS: I well remember how often Schacht asked me and friends of mine -whether we could not help him to get information about the extent of -rearmament by inquiring at the Reich War Ministry. I have already -described yesterday the efforts he made to get details through Oster and -Thomas. - -DR. DIX: Could you tell the Tribunal whether Schacht made any attempt to -limit armament expenses, and thus limit the extent and speed of the -rearmament; and, if so, when he made these efforts? - -GISEVIUS: To my knowledge, he started to attempt this as early as 1936. -In the heated debates about Schacht’s resignation as Minister of -Economics in 1937, his efforts in this direction played a very important -part. I recall that practically every conversation was concerned with -that point. - -DR. DIX: Now, it is said—and quite understandably also by the -Prosecution—that the reasons Schacht gave, even in official reports and -so on, for the necessity of these limitations were primarily of a -financial-technical nature, that is to say, he spoke as an anxious -economic leader and an anxious president of the Reichsbank and not as an -anxious patriot afraid that his country might be plunged into war. - -Do you know of any discussions with Schacht, of which you can remember -anything, concerning the foregoing which might be useful to the -Tribunal? - -GISEVIUS: In all these preliminary discussions there were dozens of -drafts of the communications Schacht wrote. They were discussed in -friendly circles. To mention but one example, Schacht repeatedly -discussed these drafts also with Goerdeler. It was always one question -that was concerned: What could one say, so that such a letter should not -be considered a provocation but would serve rather to draw the other -non-Party ministers, and particularly the War Minister Blomberg, to -Schacht’s side? That was just the difficulty, for how could such -ministers as Blomberg, Neurath, or Schwerin-Krosigk, who were much more -loyal to Hitler, be persuaded to join Schacht rather than to say that -Schacht had once again provoked Hitler and Göring with his notoriously -sharp tongue. All these letters can only be understood by their tactical -reasons which, as I have said, had been discussed in detail with the -leading men of the opposition. - -DR. DIX: Now, after the Fritsch crisis, how did the political conspiracy -between you and your friends and Schacht take form? - -GISEVIUS: I want to deal with that word “conspiracy.” While up to that -moment our activity could only be called more or less oppositional, now -a conspiracy did indeed begin; and there appeared in the foreground a -man who was later to play an important part as head of that conspiracy. -The Chief of the General Staff at that time, Generaloberst Beck, -believed that the time had come for a German general to give the alarm -both inside and outside the country. I believe it is important for the -Tribunal to know also the ultimate reason which prompted Beck to take -that step. - -The Chief of the General Staff was present when Hitler, in May 1938, -made a speech to the generals at Jüterbog. That speech was intended to -reinstate Fritsch. A few words were said about Fritsch, but more was -said—and for the first time quite openly before a large group of German -generals—about Hitler’s intention to engulf Czechoslovakia in a war. -Beck heard that speech; and he was indignant that he, as Chief of the -General Staff, should hear of such an intention for the first time in -such an assembly without having been informed or consulted previously. -During that same meeting, Beck sent a letter to Brauchitsch asking him -for an immediate interview. Brauchitsch refused and deliberately kept -Beck waiting for several weeks. Beck became impatient and wrote a -comprehensive memorandum in which as Chief of the General Staff he -protested against the fact that the German people were being drawn into -war. At the end of that memorandum Beck announced his resignation, and -here I believe is the opportunity to say a word about this Chief of the -General Staff. - -DR. DIX: One moment, Doctor. Will you tell us the source of your -knowledge of what Beck thought, and the negotiations between Beck and -Brauchitsch? - -GISEVIUS: Beck confided in me, and during the latter years I worked in -very close collaboration with him, and I was by his side until the last -hour of his life on 20 July. I can testify here—and it is important for -the Tribunal to know this—that Beck struggled again and again with the -problem as to what a chief of the General Staff should do when he -realized that events were driving toward a war. Therefore I owe to his -memory, and to my oath here, not to conceal the fact that Beck took the -consequences of being the only German general to relinquish his post -voluntarily, in order to show that there is a limit beyond which even -generals in leading positions may not go; but at the sacrifice of their -position and their life, must resign and accept no further orders. Beck -was of the opinion that the General Staff was not only an organization -of war technicians; he saw in the German General Staff the conscience of -the German Army, and he trained his staff accordingly. He suffered -immensely during the later years of his life because men whom he had -trained in that spirit did not follow the dictates of their conscience. -I owe it to this man to say that he was a man of inflexible character. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think we might get on to what Beck actually -did. - -DR. DIX: Yes, Your Honor, but... - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps it would be a convenient time to break off. What -I mean is, the witness said that Beck protested in a memorandum and -offered to resign, and that was some minutes ago, and since then he was -talking and had not told us what Beck actually did. - -DR. DIX: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit in open session on Saturday -morning, but will be sitting in closed session. - -DR. DIX: [_Turning to the witness._] You were saying that Generaloberst -Beck carried out his decision to tender his resignation after the speech -at Jüterbog. What did he do then? - -GISEVIUS: Hitler and Brauchitsch urgently pressed him to remain in -office, but Beck refused and insisted upon resigning. Thereupon Hitler -and Brauchitsch urged Beck at least not to make his resignation public, -and they asked him if he would not formally defer his resignation for a -few months. Beck, who had not yet gone the way of high treason, thought -that he should comply with this request. Later he most deeply regretted -this loyal attitude. The fact is that as early as the end of May or the -beginning of June his successor, General Halder, took over the office of -Chief of General Staff; and from that moment Beck was actually no longer -in charge. - -DR. DIX: May I ask you once more, from what observations, and -conversations with whom, do you base the knowledge of these facts? - -GISEVIUS: From constant discussions I had with Beck, Oster, Goerdeler, -Schacht, and an entire group of people at that time; later, the question -why Beck did not make his retirement public depressed him to such an -extent that it was a continual subject of discussions between him and me -up to the end. - -DR. DIX: That was Beck’s resignation; but then the problem of the -possible resignation of Schacht was probably also brought up in -deliberations. To your knowledge, and from your observation, was the -question of the necessity or the opportuneness of Schacht’s resignation -discussed between Schacht and Beck? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, it was discussed in great detail. - -It was Beck’s opinion that his resignation alone might not be -sufficiently effective. He approached Schacht therefore and asked him -whether he would not join him, Beck, and resign also. This subject was -discussed in great detail, on the one hand between Beck and Schacht -personally, and on the other between Oster and myself, who were the two -intermediaries. During these conferences, I must confess that I, too, -was of the opinion that Schacht should resign under all circumstances; -and I also advised him to that effect. It was Oster’s opinion, however, -that Schacht must definitely remain in office and he asked him to do so; -in order to influence the generals Schacht was needed as an official -with a ministerial title. In retrospect I must say here that my advice -to Schacht was wrong. The events which I have yet to describe have -proved how important it was to Oster and others that Schacht should -remain in office. - -DR. DIX: That, of course, was a serious question for Schacht’s own -conscience. You have informed the Tribunal of your opinions and of -Oster’s opinions. Did Schacht discuss his scruples with you, and the -pros and cons of his deliberations in making his final decision? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I don’t object to the defendants trying their case -in their own way, but I do think we are passing beyond the limits of -profitable inquiry here. Schacht is present; he is the man who can tell -us about his conscience, and I know of no way that another witness can -do so, and I think it is not a question to which the answer would have -competent value, and I object respectfully. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think you had better tell us what Schacht -did—not tell us—but get from the witness what Schacht did. - -DR. DIX: If I may, I should like to make a brief remark. It is true, of -course, as Mr. Justice Jackson said, that Schacht knows his own reasons -best and can tell them to the Tribunal. On a question as difficult as -this, however, the justification of which is even subject to -argument—the Prosecution apparently is inclined to consider the train -of thought which led to Schacht’s decision to be unacceptable—it -appears to me, at least on the basis of our rules for evidence, that it -is relevant for the Tribunal to hear from an eye-and-ear witness what -the considerations were and whether they really were such at the time, -or whether Schacht, now in the defendants’ dock, is _ex post facto_, -devising some explanation, as every defendant is more or less suspected -of doing. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the witness can tell us what -Schacht said and what Schacht did, but not what Schacht thought. - -DR. DIX: Certainly. Your Lordship, I only want him to tell us what -Schacht said to the witness at that time about his opinion. - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need any further discussion about it. -The witness has heard what I have said and you can ask him what Schacht -said, and what Schacht did; but not what Schacht thought. - -DR. DIX: Very well then, what did Schacht say to you regarding the -reasons for his resignation? - -GISEVIUS: Schacht told me at the time that after all we had experienced -the generals could not be relied upon ever really to revolt. For that -reason, as a politician, he considered it his duty to think of some -possibility other than a revolt for bringing about a change in -conditions in Germany. For that reason he evolved a plan which he -explained to me at the time. Schacht said to me, “I have got Hitler by -the throat.” He meant by that, as he explained to me in great detail, -that now the day was approaching where the debts which had been incurred -by the Reich Minister of Finance, and thus by the Reich Cabinet, would -have to be repaid to the Reichsbank. Schacht doubted whether the -Minister of Finance, Schwerin-Krosigk, would be prepared without further -ado to carry out the moral and legal obligation of repaying the credits -which had been extended. - -Schacht thought that that was the moment in which he should come out -with his resignation, with a joint step by the Reichsbank Directorate; -and he hoped that, given that situation, the other ministers of the -Reich would join him, the majority of whom were still democratic at the -time. - -That is what he meant when he said to me, “I have still one more arrow I -can shoot, and that is the moment when not even a Neurath, a Gürtner, a -Seldte can refuse to follow me.” - -I answered Schacht at that time that I doubted whether there would ever -be such a meeting of the Cabinet. In my opinion, the steps which would -be taken to dispose of him would be much more brutal. Schacht did not -believe me, and above all he told me he would be certain of achieving -one thing; these matters would have to be discussed in the Cabinet, and -then he would cause a situation in Germany as alarming as the one which -existed in February 1938 at the time of the Fritsch crisis. He therefore -expected a radical reformation of the cabinet which would provide the -proper psychological atmosphere for the generals to intervene. - -DR. DIX: You said at the beginning that Schacht had said or hinted that -he could not absolutely rely on the generals to bring about a revolt. -Which generals was he referring to, and what did he mean? - -GISEVIUS: Schacht meant at the time the first revolutionary situation -which had arisen in Germany, during the months of May to September 1938, -when we drifted into the Czechoslovakia war crisis. Beck had assured us -at the time of his resignation—by us I mean Goerdeler, Schacht and -other politicians—that he would leave to us a successor who was more -energetic than himself, and who was firmly determined to precipitate a -revolt if Hitler should decide upon war. That man whom Beck trusted, and -to whom he introduced us, was General Halder. As a matter of fact, on -taking office, General Halder immediately took steps to start -discussions on the subject with Schacht, Goerdeler, Oster, and our -entire group. A few days after he took over his office he sent for Oster -and informed him that he considered that things were drifting toward -war, and that he would then undertake an overthrow of the Government. He -asked Oster what he, for his part, intended to do to bring civilians -into the plot. - -DR. DIX: Who were the civilians in question, apart from Goerdeler and -Schacht? - -GISEVIUS: Halder put that question to Oster, and under the circumstances -at that time, when we were still a very small circle, Oster replied that -to the best of his knowledge there were only two civilians with whom -Halder could have preliminary political conversations; one was -Goerdeler, the other, Schacht. - -Halder refused to speak personally to a man as suspect as Goerdeler. He -gave as his reason the fact that it was too dangerous for him to receive -now a man whom he did not yet know, whereas he could find some official -reason for having a conference with Schacht. Halder asked Oster to act -as intermediary for such a conference with Schacht. - -Oster approached Schacht through me. Schacht was willing. A meeting was -to be arranged at a third person’s place. I warned Schacht and said to -him, “Have Halder come to your house, so that you are quite sure of the -matter.” - -Halder then visited Schacht personally at the end of July 1938 at his -residence; and he informed him that matters had reached a stage where -war was imminent and that he, Halder, would then bring about a revolt, -and he asked Schacht whether he was prepared to aid him politically in a -leading position. - -That is what Schacht told me at the time, and Halder told it to Oster. - -DR. DIX: And Oster told it to you? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, as I continually acted as an intermediary in these -discussions. Schacht replied, as he assured me directly after Halder’s -visit, that he was prepared to do anything if the generals were to -decide to remove Hitler. - -The following morning, Halder sent for Oster. He told him of this -conversation, and he asked Oster whether police preparations had now -been made for this revolt. Oster suggested that Halder should talk to me -personally about these matters. I had a long talk in the darkness with -Halder about this revolt. I believe that it is important for me to state -here what Halder told me of his intentions at that time. First Halder -assured me that, in contrast to many other generals, he had no doubt -that Hitler wanted war. Halder described Hitler to me as being -bloodthirsty and referred to the blood bath of 30 June. However, Halder -told me that it was, unfortunately, terribly difficult to explain -Hitler’s real intentions to the generals, particularly to the junior -officers corps, because the saying which was influencing the officers -corps was ostensibly that it was all just a colossal bluff, that the -Army could be absolutely certain that Hitler did not want to start a -war, but rather that he was merely preparing a diplomatic maneuver of -blackmail on a large scale. - -For that reason, Halder believed that it was absolutely necessary to -prove, even to the last captain, that Hitler was not bluffing at all but -had actually given the order for war. Halder therefore decided at the -time that for the sake of informing the German nation and the officers -he would even risk the outbreak of war. But even then Halder feared the -Hitler myth; and he therefore suggested to me that the day after the -outbreak of war Hitler should be killed by means of a bomb; and the -German people should be made to believe, as far as possible, that Hitler -had been killed by an enemy bombing attack on the Führer’s train. I -replied to Halder at the time that perhaps I was still too young, but I -could not understand why he did not want to tell the German people, at -least afterwards, what the generals had done. - -Then for a few weeks there was no news from Halder. The press campaign -against Czechoslovakia assumed an ever more threatening character and we -felt that now it would be only a few days, or perhaps weeks, before war -would break out. At that very moment Schacht decided to visit Halder -again and to remind him of his promise. I thought it best that a witness -should be present during that conversation and therefore I accompanied -Schacht. It did not appear to me that Halder was any too pleased at the -presence of a witness. Halder once again declared his firm intention of -effecting a revolt; but again he wished to wait until the German nation -had received proof of Hitler’s warlike intentions by means of a definite -order for war. Schacht pointed out to Halder the tremendous danger of -such an experiment. He made it clear to Halder that a war could not be -started simply to destroy the Hitler legend in the eyes of the German -people. - -In a detailed and very excited conversation Halder then declared that he -was prepared to start the revolt, not after the official outbreak of the -war, but at the very moment that Hitler gave the army the final order to -march. - -We asked Halder whether he would then still be able to control the -situation or whether Hitler might not surprise him with some lightning -stroke. Halder replied literally, “No, he cannot deceive me. I have -designed my General Staff plans in such a way that I am bound to know it -48 hours in advance.” I think that is important, because during the -subsequent course of events the period of time between the order to -march and the actual march itself was considerably shortened. - -Halder assured us that besides the preparations in Berlin he had an -armored division ready in Thuringia under the command of General Von -Höppner, which might possibly have to halt the Leibstandarte, which was -in Munich, on the march to Berlin. - -Although Halder had told us all this, Schacht and I had a somewhat -bitter aftertaste of that conference. Halder had told Schacht that he, -Schacht, seemed to be urging him to effect this revolt prematurely; and -Schacht and I were of the opinion that Halder might abandon us at the -last moment. We informed Oster immediately of the bad impression we had -had, and we told Oster that something absolutely must be done to win -over another general in case Halder should not act at the last minute. -Oster agreed and these are the preliminary events which led to the later -General Field Marshal Von Witzleben first coming into our circle of -conspirators. - -DR. DIX: Who won Von Witzleben over? - -GISEVIUS: Schacht did. - -DR. DIX: Who did? - -GISEVIUS: Schacht won Witzleben over. Oster visited Witzleben and told -him everything that had happened. Thereupon Witzleben sent for me, and I -told him that in my opinion the police situation was such that he, as -commanding general of the Berlin Army Corps, could confidently risk a -revolt. Witzleben asked me the question which every general put to us at -that time: Whether a diplomatic incident in the East would really lead -to war or whether it was not true, as Hitler and Ribbentrop had -repeatedly told the generals in confidence, that there was a tacit -agreement with the Western Powers giving Germany a free hand in the -East. Witzleben said that if such an agreement really existed, then, of -course, he could not revolt. I told Witzleben that Schacht with his -excellent knowledge of the Anglo-Saxon mentality could no doubt give him -comprehensive information about that. - -A meeting between Schacht and Witzleben was arranged. Witzleben brought -with him his divisional general, Von Brockdorff, who was to carry out -the revolt in detail. Witzleben, Brockdorff, and I drove together to -Schacht’s country house for a conference which lasted for hours. The -final result was that Witzleben was convinced by Schacht that the -Western Powers would under no circumstances allow Germany to move into -the Eastern territories and that now Hitler’s policy of surprise had -come to an end. Witzleben decided that he, on his part and independently -of Halder, would make all preparations which would be necessary if he -should have to act. - -He issued me false papers and gave me a position at his district -headquarters so that there, under his personal protection, I could make -all the necessary police and political preparations. He delegated -General Von Brockdorff, and he and I visited all the points in Berlin -which Brockdorff was to occupy with his Potsdam Division. Frau Strünck -was at the wheel and traveling ostensibly as tourists we settled exactly -what had to be done. - -DR. DIX: That is the witness Strünck. Please excuse me. - -GISEVIUS: I believe I owe you a brief explanation as to why Witzleben’s -co-operation was absolutely necessary. It was not so easy to find a -general who had the actual authority to order his troops to march. For -instance, there were some generals in the provinces who could not give -their troops the order to march. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, is it necessary to go into the matter in such -detail as to why General Witzleben should be brought in? - -DR. DIX: The reasons why Witzleben was needed are perhaps not essential -for our case. We can therefore drop this subject. - -Will you please tell me, Dr. Gisevius, whether Schacht was kept -constantly informed of these military and police preparations which you -have described? - -GISEVIUS: Schacht was kept informed about all these matters. We met in -the evening in the residence of Von Witzleben and I showed everything -that I had worked out in writing during the day. It was then discussed -in full detail. - -DR. DIX: Apart from these military and police measures, which you have -mentioned, were there any political measures? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, of course. We had to decide carefully what the German -nation was to be told in such a case from the point of view of internal -politics, just as there were certain preparations which had to be made -regarding the external. - -DR. DIX: What do you mean by external—foreign politics? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, of course, foreign politics. - -DR. DIX: Why of course? Was the Foreign Office included or what is meant -by foreign politics in this case? - -GISEVIUS: It is very difficult to give an explanation, because the -co-operation with foreign countries during the time of war, or -immediately before a war, is a matter which is very difficult to discuss -as we are touching upon a very controversial subject. If I am to talk -about it, then it is at least as important for me to state the reasons -which led these people to carry on such discussions with foreign -countries, as it is to give times and dates. - -DR. DIX: I am sure that the Tribunal will permit you to do so. I think -that the Tribunal will permit that the motives... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal thinks you are going into too great -detail over these matters. If the Tribunal is prepared to accept this -witness’ evidence as true, it shows that Schacht was negotiating with -him and General Witzleben at this time with a view to prevent the war. I -say, if the Tribunal accepts it; and that seems to be a matter you will -not prove with the details of these negotiations, which seem to me not -very important. - -DR. DIX: Yes, but in my opinion the gravity and intensity of the -activities of these conspirators should be substantiated in detail. In -my opinion it is not sufficient that these plans... - -THE PRESIDENT: But you have touched upon them since 10 o’clock this -morning. - -DR. DIX: Your Lordship, I am now proceeding in connection with Schacht’s -point of view, as to whether a survey, a political survey of Schacht’s -part... - -THE PRESIDENT: I am told that you said last night that you would be half -an hour longer. Do you remember saying that? Perhaps it was a -mistranslation. - -DR. DIX: Oh no, that is quite a misunderstanding. I said that if I were -to touch upon the Fritsch crisis and complete it, it would take another -half hour—that is, the Fritsch crisis alone. Gentlemen of the Tribunal, -the position is this: We are now hearing the story of the political -opposition, in which Schacht played a leading role. If the Defendant -Göring and others had time for days to describe the entire course of -events from their point of view, I think that justice demands that those -men, represented in this courtroom by the Defendant Schacht, who fought -against that system under most dreadful conditions of terror, should -also be permitted to tell in detail the story of their opposition -movement. - -I would, therefore, ask the Tribunal—and I am not in favor of the -superfluous—to give me permission to allow the witness to make a few -more remarks on the measures taken by the group of conspirators, Beck, -Schacht, Canaris, and others, which he has already touched upon. I beg -the Tribunal to realize that I consider it of the greatest importance; -and I assume, Your Lordship, that if it is not done now, the Prosecution -will take the matter up during cross-examination. Moreover, I believe -that as it is now being told in sequence, it will take less time than if -we were to wait for the cross-examination. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not propose to tell you how you are to -prove your case, but hopes that you will deal with it as shortly as -possible and without unnecessary details. - -DR. DIX: Please be sure of that. - -Well then, Witness; you had mentioned foreign political measures, and -you were about to talk of the motives which caused some of you to enter -into relations with foreign countries for the support of your opposition -movement. Will you please continue with that? - -GISEVIUS: I should like simply to confine myself to the statement that -from that time on there were very detailed and weighty discussions with -foreign countries in order to try everything possible to prevent the -outbreak of war or at least to shorten it or keep it from spreading. -However, as long as I am not in a position to speak of the motives of -such a delicate matter—in connection with which people like us would be -accused of high treason, in Germany, at least—as long as that is the -case, I shall not say more than the fact that these conversations took -place. - -DR. DIX: I did not understand that the Tribunal would prevent you from -explaining your motives. You may state them therefore. - -GISEVIUS: I owe it to my conscience and above all to those who -participated and are now dead, to state here that those matters which I -have described weighed very heavily upon their consciences. We knew that -we would be accused of conspiring with foreign countries. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, of course, knows that these matters were -not conducted without danger; but we are not really here for the purpose -of considering people who have, unfortunately, lost their lives. We are -considering the case of the Defendant Schacht at the moment. - -DR. DIX: I think the intention of the witness has been misunderstood. He -does not wish to speak about those men who lost their lives, and he does -not want to speak of the dangers; he wishes rather to speak of the -conflicts of conscience suffered by those who planned and undertook -those steps. I think that that privilege should be granted the witness -if he is to speak of this very delicate matter here in public. I would, -therefore, beg you to allow it; otherwise the witness will confine -himself to general indications which will not be sufficient for my -defense, and I assume that the Prosecution will ask about these things -in the cross-examination. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you try and get him to come to the point? We, of -course, can’t tell what he wants to talk about. We can only tell about -what he does talk about. - -DR. DIX: Well, then, you will describe briefly the considerations which -swayed those who entered into those foreign relations, and also describe -the character of those relations. - -GISEVIUS: Mr. President, it was not merely a question of conscience. I -was concerned with the fact that there are relatives still alive today -who might become the subject of unjust accusations; and that is why I -had to say, with reference to those conferences abroad which I shall -describe, that even our intimate circle of friends did not agree in all -respects as to what measures were to be permitted. One wanted to go -further, while another held back. I owe it to the memory of the dead -Admiral Canaris, for instance, to rectify many erroneous press -announcements and state that he refused to conspire with foreign -countries. I must guard against the possibility that anything I say now -might be applied to men whom I have mentioned earlier. That is why I -wanted to make this statement, and at the same time I wanted to say that -our friends who did these things rejected the accusation of high -treason, because we felt that we were morally obliged to take these -steps. - -DR. DIX: Well then, what happened? - -GISEVIUS: The following happened: Immediately after Hitler announced his -intention to invade Czechoslovakia, friends tried to keep the British -Government informed, from the first intention to the final decision. The -chain of attempts began with the journey of Goerdeler in the spring of -1938 to London, where he gave information concerning the existence of an -opposition group which was resolved to go to any lengths. In the name of -this group the British Government was continuously informed of what was -happening and that it was absolutely necessary to make it clear, to the -German people and to the generals, that every step across the Czech -border would constitute for the Western Powers a reason for war. When -the crisis neared its climax and when our preparations for a revolt had -been completed to the last detail, we took a step unusual in form and -substance. We informed the British Government that the pending -diplomatic negotiations would not, as Hitler asserted, deal with the -question of the Sudeten countries but that Hitler’s intention was to -invade the whole of Czechoslovakia and that, if the British Government -on its side were to remain firm, we could give the assurance that there -would be no war. - -Those were, at the time, our attempts to obtain a certain amount of -assistance from abroad in our fight for the psychological preparation of -a revolt. - -DR. DIX: We now come to September of 1938 and the crisis which led to -the Munich Conference. What were the activities of your group of -conspirators at that time? - -GISEVIUS: The more the crisis moved towards the Munich conference, the -more we tried to convince Halder that he should start the revolt at -once. As Halder was somewhat uncertain, Witzleben prepared everything in -detail. I shall now describe only the last two dramatic days. On 27 -September it was clear that Hitler wanted to go to the utmost extremity. -In order to make the German people war-minded he ordered a parade of the -Berlin army through Berlin. Witzleben had to execute the order. The -parade had entirely the opposite effect. The population, which assumed -that the troops were marching to war, showed their open displeasure. The -troops, instead of jubilation, saw clenched fists; and Hitler, who was -watching the parade from the window of the Reich Chancellery, had a fit -of rage. He stepped back from the window and said, “With such people I -cannot wage war.” Witzleben came home indignant and said that he would -have liked to have had the guns unlimbered in front of the Reich -Chancellery. On the next morning... - -DR. DIX: One moment, Witzleben told you that he would have liked to have -had the guns unlimbered in front of the Chancellery? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. DIX: And what is the source of your knowledge regarding Hitler’s -remark when he stepped back from the balcony? - -GISEVIUS: Several people from the Reich Chancellery told us that. - -DR. DIX: Well then, go on. - -GISEVIUS: The following morning—that was the 28th—we believed that the -opportunity had now come to carry out the revolt. That morning we also -learned that Hitler had rejected the final offer from the British Prime -Minister, Chamberlain, and had sent the intermediary, Wilson, back with -a refusal. Witzleben got that letter and took it to Halder. He believed -that proof of Hitler’s desire for war had now been produced, and Halder -agreed. Halder went to see Brauchitsch while Witzleben waited in -Halder’s room. After a few moments Halder came back and said that -Brauchitsch now had also realized that the moment for action had arrived -and that he merely wanted to go over to the Reich Chancellery to make -quite sure that Witzleben and Halder’s account was correct. Brauchitsch -went to the Reich Chancellery after Witzleben had told him over the -telephone that everything was prepared; and it was that noon hour of 28 -September when suddenly, and contrary to expectations, Mussolini’s -intervention in the Reich Chancellery took place, and Hitler, impressed -by Mussolini’s step, agreed to go to Munich; so that actually at the -last moment the revolt was eliminated. - -DR. DIX: You mean through Munich, don’t you? - -GISEVIUS: Of course. - -DR. DIX: And now the Munich conference was over. How did matters stand -in your group of conspirators? - -GISEVIUS: We were extremely depressed. We were convinced that now Hitler -would soon go to the utmost lengths. We did not doubt that Munich was -the signal for a world war. Some of our friends wondered if we should -emigrate, and that was discussed with Goerdeler and Schacht. Goerdeler, -with this idea in mind, wrote a letter to a political friend in America -and asked particularly whether the opposition people should now -emigrate. Goerdeler said, - -“Otherwise to be able to continue our political work at all in Germany -in the future there is only one other possibility, and that is to employ -the methods of Talleyrand.” - -We decided to persevere, and then events followed in quick succession -from the Jewish pogroms to the conquest of Prague. - -DR. DIX: But before we come to Prague, Witness, you mentioned the Jewish -pogroms; and obviously you mean November 1938. Do you know or can you -recollect what Schacht’s reaction was to those events? - -GISEVIUS: Schacht was indignant about the Jewish pogroms, and he said so -in a public speech before the personnel of the Reichsbank. - -DR. DIX: I shall submit that speech later as documentary evidence. And -then how did things go on from there? We have come to the end of 1938. -Were there new political events on the horizon which had a stimulating -effect on your group of conspirators? - -GISEVIUS: First of all, there was Schacht’s sudden dismissal from the -Reichsbank Directorate. Schacht’s desire for a consultation of the -Cabinet on this matter did not materialize and our hopes of bringing -about a cabinet crisis were vain. Thus our opposition group had no -connecting point and we had to wait and see what would happen after the -conquest of Prague. - -DR. DIX: One moment; you mentioned Schacht’s dismissal from his position -as President of the Reichsbank. Can you tell us anything about this, -about the circumstances leading to it and the effect it had on Schacht, -and so on? - -GISEVIUS: I saw how the various letters and memoranda of the Reichsbank -Directorate were drafted, and how they were progressively toned down, -and how Schacht was then dismissed. A few minutes after the letter of -dismissal arrived from Hitler, Schacht read it to me; and he was -indignant at the contents. He repeated to me the passage in which Hitler -praised him for his participation in the German rearmament program; and -Schacht said, “And now he wants me to undertake to go on working with -him openly, and uphold his war policy.” - -DR. DIX: But then Schacht remained as a Minister without Portfolio. Was -the problem as to whether he should do so or whether he could act -differently ever discussed between you and Schacht at the time? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, but as far as I know it was the same type of discussion -which took place whenever he was to resign. He talked to Lammers, and I -assume that Lammers gave him the customary reply. - -DR. DIX: In other words, he thought he had to remain, that he was forced -to remain? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. DIX: Now, you have made several attempts to speak about Prague, but -I interrupted you. Will you please describe the effects upon your group -of conspirators, as far as Schacht was concerned? - -GISEVIUS: Since December our group had definite proof that Hitler would -attack Prague in March. This new action was cynically called the “March -whirlwind.” As it was quite openly discussed in Berlin circles, we hoped -that news of this action would also reach the British and French -Embassies. We were firmly convinced that this time results would not be -achieved by surprise; but Halder had already adopted a different view. -He thought that Hitler had been given free passage to Prague by the -Western Powers. He refused to have preliminary conferences and wanted to -wait and see whether this Prague action could be achieved without a -fight. And that is what happened. - -DR. DIX: In which direction? You have already spoken about the steps -with the British and French Embassies. - -GISEVIUS: No, there were no steps taken with regard to the British and -French Embassies. - -DR. DIX: Do you want to say anything further about it? Have you anything -to add? - -GISEVIUS: No, I have said that we did not take any steps. - -DR. DIX: Now, then, Prague is over; and I believe that you and Schacht -went to Switzerland together on behalf of your group. Is that correct? - -GISEVIUS: Not only together with Schacht but also with Goerdeler. We -were of the opinion that Schacht in Germany—excuse me—that Prague -would have incredible psychological effects in Germany. As far as -foreign countries were concerned, Prague was the signal that no peace -and no treaty could be kept with Hitler. Inside Germany unfortunately we -were forced to see that the generals and the people were now convinced -that this Hitler could do whatever he wished; nobody would stop him; he -was protected by Providence. This alarmed us. On one side we saw that -the Western Powers would no longer put up with these things; and on the -other side we saw that within Germany the illusion was growing that the -Western Powers would not go to war. We could see that a war could be -prevented only if the Western Powers would tell not only the Foreign -Minister, not only Hitler, but by every means of propaganda tell the -German nation that any further step towards the East would mean war. It -appeared to us that the only possibility was to warn the generals and to -get them to revolt, and that was the subject of the talks which Schacht, -Goerdeler, and I conducted in Switzerland, immediately after Prague. - -DR. DIX: With whom? - -GISEVIUS: We met a man who had excellent connections with the British -and French Governments. This man made very exact reports at least to the -French Government. I can testify to this because later after Paris was -conquered, I was able to find a copy of his report among Daladier’s -secret papers. We told this man very clearly that in autumn at the -latest, the fight for Danzig would start. We told him that, as good -Germans, we were without doubt of the opinion that Danzig was a German -city and that some day that point would have to be peacefully discussed; -but we also warned him against having conferences now regarding Danzig -alone because Hitler did not want only Danzig but the whole of Poland, -not the whole of Poland but the Ukraine, and that that was the reason -why the propaganda of foreign countries should make it abundantly clear -to Germany that the limit had now been reached and that the Western -Powers would intervene. We said that only then would a revolt be -possible for us. - -DR. DIX: And did this man who had your confidence make a report in the -way you stipulated? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, he did; and I must say that very soon public statements -on the part of the British, either on the radio or in the press or in -the House of Commons, began to remove these doubts among the German -generals and the German people. From that time on everything which could -be done was done by the British to alarm the German generals. - -DR. DIX: Did not Schacht meet his friend Montagu Norman in Switzerland -at that time and talk with him in the same vein? Do you know? Were you -there? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. We thought that the opportunity for Schacht to talk to a -close friend of the British Prime Minister, Chamberlain, should not be -allowed to pass; and Schacht had very detailed discussions with Montagu -Norman, so as to describe to him the psychological atmosphere in Germany -after Prague and to persuade him that the British Government should now -undertake the necessary clarifications. - -DR. DIX: Was not your slogan in reports to foreign countries at the -time: “You must play off the Nazis against Germans”? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, it was the tenor of all our discussions. We wanted it -made clear to the German people that the Western Powers were not against -Germany, but only against this Nazi policy of surprise and against the -Nazi methods of terror, within the country as well as without. - -DR. DIX: And now, having come back from Switzerland, what happened next, -particularly with reference to Schacht? - -GISEVIUS: We saw that things in Germany were rapidly drifting toward the -August crisis and that the generals could not be dissuaded from the view -that Hitler was only bluffing and that there would be another Munich or -another Prague. And now began all those desperate efforts which we made -in order to influence the leading generals, and particularly Keitel, to -prevent the decisive order being given to march against Poland. - -DR. DIX: Let us come back to Schacht’s return from the Swiss journey in -spring of 1939. You know that Schacht left Germany then and made a -journey to India? - -GISEVIUS: He went to India and hoped to stay there as long as possible -in order to go to China. But on the way Hitler’s order prohibiting him -from setting foot on Chinese soil reached him, and he had to return. As -far as I remember, he came back a few days before the outbreak of war. - -DR. DIX: You said China; did Schacht have sympathies with -Chiang-Kai-Chek in spite of the pact with Japan? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. He sympathized greatly with the Chinese Government, as -did our entire circle. We all had quite a number of good and dear -Chinese friends with whom we attempted to keep in touch in spite of the -Japanese pact. - -DR. DIX: About when did Schacht come back from India? - -GISEVIUS: I think it was the beginning of August; but I cannot... - -DR. DIX: Now matters were rapidly heading toward war. Did Schacht, -before the outbreak of war, take any steps to prevent its outbreak? - -GISEVIUS: He took a great number of steps, but they cannot be described -individually as that would create the impression that Schacht alone was -taking these steps. Actually the situation was such that a large group -of people were now in the struggle, and each one took those steps which -were most suited to him, and each one informed the group of what he had -done and what would be advisable for another to do. For that reason I am -afraid that it would present a completely erroneous picture if I were to -describe individually, and only with respect to Schacht, all those -desperate efforts made from August 1939 until the attack on Holland and -Belgium. - -DR. DIX: The Tribunal has taken cognizance of the fact that Schacht was -not acting alone; but here we are dealing with Schacht’s case, and I -should like to ask you, therefore, to confine yourself to the -description of Schacht’s efforts. - -GISEVIUS: In that case I must state first that Schacht knew of all these -other matters and was in a certain sense also an accomplice. Of Schacht -himself I can only say at this particular moment that he was co-author -of the Thomas memorandum addressed to General Keitel, or the two -memoranda, in which Schacht, together with our group, pointed out the -dangers of war to Keitel. Further, I can say that, through Thomas and -Canaris, Schacht took steps to intervene with Brauchitsch and Halder. -But I would like to emphasize expressly that all the steps taken by Beck -and Goerdeler were taken with the full knowledge of Schacht and also -with his participation. This was a very important undertaking. - -DR. DIX: A collective action? Does not Schacht’s attempt at the very -last moment, at the end of August, to make representations to -Brauchitsch through Canaris at headquarters play a part in this? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. After General Thomas had failed with both his memoranda -and after he had failed to persuade Keitel to receive Goerdeler or -Schacht, Schacht tried to approach Brauchitsch or Halder. For that -purpose Thomas paid frequent visits to General Halder, and it was -typical that during those critical days he could not get past the -anteroom of General Halder’s office, past General Von Stülpnagel. Halder -was not “at home,” and just said that he did not want to see Schacht. -Thereupon we took a further step on that dramatic 25 August, the day on -which Hitler had already once given the order to march. As soon as the -news reached us that Hitler had given Halder the order to march, Schacht -and I first got into touch with Thomas; and then, together with Thomas, -we went to Admiral Canaris so that both Thomas and Canaris should -accompany Schacht when he went unannounced to the headquarters in Zossen -in order to confront Brauchitsch and Halder with his presence. Schacht -intended to point out to Brauchitsch and Halder that, in accordance with -the existing constitution, the Reich Cabinet must be consulted before -waging war. Brauchitsch and Halder would be guilty of a breach of oath -if, without the knowledge of the competent political authorities, they -obeyed an order for war. That was roughly what Schacht intended to say -to explain his step. When Thomas and Schacht arrived at Bendlerstrasse, -Thomas went to Canaris. It was about 6 o’clock or... - -DR. DIX: The OKW is situated in Bendlerstrasse. The Tribunal should know -that Bendlerstrasse meant the OKW or the OKH. - -GISEVIUS: When we arrived at the OKW and were waiting at a corner of the -street, Canaris sent Oster to us. That was the moment when Hitler -between 6 and 7 o’clock suddenly ordered Halder to withdraw his order to -march. The Tribunal will no doubt remember that Hitler, influenced by -the renewed intervention of Mussolini, suddenly withdrew the order to -march which had already been given. Unfortunately, Canaris and Thomas -and all our friends were now under the impression that this withdrawal -of an order to march was an incredible loss of prestige for Hitler. -Oster thought that never before in the history of warfare had a supreme -commander withdrawn such a decisive order in the throes of a nervous -breakdown. And Canaris said to me, “Now the peace of Europe is saved for -50 years, because Hitler has now lost the respect of the generals.” And, -unfortunately, in the face of this psychological change, we all felt -that we could look forward to the following days in a quiet frame of -mind. So, when 3 days later, Hitler nevertheless gave the decisive order -to march, it came as a complete surprise for our group as well. Oster -called me to the OKW; Schacht accompanied me. We asked Canaris again -whether he could not arrange another meeting with Brauchitsch and -Halder, but Canaris said to me, “It is too late now.” He had tears in -his eyes and added, “That is the end of Germany.” - -DR. DIX: Your Lordship, we now come to the war, and I think that perhaps -we had better deal with the war after lunch. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius, before the noon recess we had just come to the -outbreak of the war, and so that your subsequent testimony may be -understood, I must ask you first in what capacity you served during the -war. - -GISEVIUS: On the day of the outbreak of war I was called to Security -Intelligence by General Oster by means of a forged order. However, as it -was a regulation that all officers or other members of the intelligence -service had to be examined by the Gestapo, and as I would never have -received permission to be a member of the intelligence, they simply gave -me a forged mobilization order. Then I was at the disposal of Oster and -Canaris without doing any direct service. - -DR. DIX: And after the outbreak of war what were the activities of your -group of conspirators, the members of which you have already mentioned? -Who took over the leadership, who participated, and what was done? - -GISEVIUS: Immediately after the outbreak of the war Generaloberst Beck -was at the head of all oppositional movements which could exist in -Germany at all, with the exception of the Communists with whom we had no -contact at that time. We were of the opinion that only a general could -be the leader during war, and Beck stood so far above purely military -matters that he was the suitable man to unify all groups from the left -to the right. Beck chose Dr. Goerdeler as his closest collaborator. - -DR. DIX: Consequently the only civilians who worked with this group of -conspirators were Schacht and Goerdeler as before? - -GISEVIUS: No, on the contrary; all the opposition groups, who had so far -had merely loose connections with each other, were now drawn together -under the pressure of war. This was especially so with the left -opposition movements, which had been greatly reduced in the early years -as all their leaders had been interned. These left groups especially now -came in with us. In this connection I shall merely mention Leuschner and -Dr. Karl Muehlendorf. However, I must also mention the Christian Trade -Unions, and Dr. Habermann, and Dr. Jacob Kaiser. Further I must mention -the Catholic circles, the leaders of the Confessional Church, and -individual political men such as Ambassador Von Hassell, State Secretary -Planck, Minister Popitz, and many, many others. - -DR. DIX: What was the attitude of these left circles, especially -concerning the question of a revolt, the forceful removal of Hitler or -even an attempt on his life? Did they also consider the possibility of -an attempt at assassination, which later was actually suggested in your -group? - -GISEVIUS: No, the left circles were very much under the impression that -the “stab in the back” legend had done much harm in Germany; and the -left circles thought that they ought not to expose themselves again to -the danger of having it said later that Hitler or the German Army had -not been defeated on the battlefield. The left-wing had long been of the -opinion that no matter how bitter an experience it might be for them, it -must now be proved absolutely to the German people that militarism was -committing suicide in Germany. - -DR. DIX: I have already submitted to the Tribunal, a letter which you, -Doctor, smuggled to Switzerland for Schacht at about this time—the end -of 1939. It is a letter to the former president of the International -Bank at Basel, later president of the First National Bank of New York; a -man of influence, who probably had access to President Roosevelt. - -In anticipation of the documentary evidence pertaining hereto I had -originally intended to read this letter to the Tribunal now. However, in -discussing the admissibility of evidence I informed the Tribunal of most -of the essential points, and as Mr. Justice Jackson could not yet have -the Schacht Document Book in hand, and as he remarked previously that he -did not like me to produce documentary evidence at this point, I will -not carry out my original intention to read this letter in its entirety. -I will come back to it when I present my documentary evidence. Just to -refresh the witness’ memory about this letter, I will give the -underlying reasons for it. Schacht suggested to President Fraser that -now the moment... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I make no objection to the use of the letter from -Schacht to Leon Fraser as one banker writing to another. If you want to -claim that Mr. Fraser was influential with President Roosevelt, I should -want you to prove it; but I have no objection to the letter. - -DR. DIX: The letter is dated 14 January 1946. I will not read it in its -entirety, for there are six long pages. Its contents are... - -THE PRESIDENT: What date was it? - -DR. DIX: I had the wrong letter. The 16 October 1939. It will be Exhibit -Number 31 in my document book. He writes that now would be an excellent -time to give peace to the world with President Roosevelt—that would be -a victory, also a German victory... - -THE PRESIDENT: Is the letter from Schacht? - -DR. DIX: From Schacht to Fraser. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you have proof for the letter? - -DR. DIX: If the Tribunal prefers, Schacht can also deal with the letter. -In that case I will only ask the witness whether it is true that he -smuggled this letter into Switzerland. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Please answer the question, Witness. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. I took this letter to Switzerland and mailed it there. - -DR. DIX: Very well. What did your group do to bring about peace, or -prevent the war from spreading? Did you undertake further activities in -foreign politics in that direction in your opposition group, that is, -your group of conspirators? - -GISEVIUS: The main thing for us was with all possible means to prevent -the war from spreading. It could only spread toward Holland and Belgium -or Norway. We recognized clearly that if a step was taken in this -direction, the consequences, not only for Germany, but for the whole of -Europe would be tremendous. Therefore, we wanted to prevent war in the -West by all means. - -Immediately after the Polish Campaign Hitler decided to move his troops -from the East to the West, and to launch the attack by violating the -neutrality of Holland and Belgium. - -We believed that if we could succeed in preventing this attack in -November we would in the coming winter months gain enough time to -convince the individual generals, above all Brauchitsch and Halder and -the leaders of the army groups, that they must at least oppose the -expansion of the war. - -Brauchitsch and Halder evaded the question and said it was now too late, -that the enemy would fight Germany to the end and destroy her. We did -not share this opinion. We believed a peace with honor was still -possible, and by honor I mean that we would of course eliminate the Nazi -hierarchy to the last man. In order to prove to the generals that the -foreign powers did not wish to destroy the German people, but wanted -only to protect themselves against the Nazi terror, we took all possible -steps abroad. The first attempt in that direction, or a small part of -that attempt, was the letter written by Schacht to Fraser, the object of -which was to point out that certain domestic political developments were -imminent and that if we could gain time, that is, if we could come -through the winter, we could perhaps persuade the generals to undertake -a revolt. - -DR. DIX: Thank you. May I interrupt you for a moment? I would like to -call the attention of the Tribunal now to the fact that the witness is -referring to a passage, to a suggestion, contained in the letter. This -letter is in English. I have no German translation, and I must therefore -read this sentence in English. “My feeling is that the earlier -discussions be opened, the easier it will be to influence the -development of certain existing conditions.” The question is now... - -Now, I would like to ask you: What did Dr. Schacht mean by the “certain -existing conditions” that were to be influenced? Did he mean your -efforts? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I must interpose an objection. I am not sure -whether you have misunderstood it. I think that what Schacht meant is -not a question to be addressed to this witness. I shall have no -objection to Dr. Schacht telling us what he meant by his cryptic -language, but I don’t think that this witness can interpret what Schacht -meant unless he has some information apart from anything that now -appears. I don’t want to be over technical about this, but it does seem -to me that this is the sort of question which should be reserved for Dr. -Schacht himself. - -DR. DIX: Mr. Justice Jackson, of course, is right, but this witness said -that he smuggled the letter into Switzerland, and I assume that he -discussed the contents of the letter with Schacht and was therefore in a -position to explain the cryptic words. - -THE PRESIDENT: He didn’t say this yet; he hasn’t said he ever saw the -letter except the outside of it. He hasn’t said he ever saw the letter. - -DR. DIX: Will you please tell us whether you saw the letter and knew its -contents? - -GISEVIUS: I am sorry that I did not so clearly at once, but I helped in -drafting the letter. I was there when the letter was drafted and -written. - -DR. DIX: Then I believe Justice Jackson will withdraw his objection. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. - -DR. DIX: Will you please answer my question; what is meant by those -cryptic words? - -GISEVIUS: We wanted to suggest that we, in Germany, were interested in -forcing certain developments and that we now expected an encouraging -word from the other side. I do not, however, want any misunderstanding -to arise here. In this letter it also states very clearly that President -Roosevelt had in the meantime been disappointed many times by the German -side, so that we had to beg, to urge him to take such a step. It is a -fact that President Roosevelt had taken various steps for peace. - -DR. DIX: Let us go on now. If I give you the cue “Vatican Action”?... - -GISEVIUS: In addition to this attempt to enter into discussions with -America, we believed we should ask for a statement from the British -Government. Again it was our aim solely to... - -THE PRESIDENT: Is the original of this letter still available or is this -only given from memory? - -DR. DIX: The original copy, yes; that is, a copy signed by Schacht is -here. It was kept during the war in Switzerland and was brought back to -us from Switzerland by this witness. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Now, let us go on to the “Vatican Action.” - -GISEVIUS: We tried in every possible way to prove to General Halder and -General Olbricht that their theory was wrong, that there could be no -longer a question of dealing with a decent German government. We -believed that we should now follow a particularly important and safe -road. The Holy Father made personal efforts in these matters, as the -British Government had, with justification, become uncertain whether -there really existed in Germany a trustworthy group of men with whom -talks could be undertaken. I remember that shortly afterwards the Venlo -incident took place when, with the excuse that there was a German -opposition group, officials of the English Secret Service were kidnapped -at the Dutch border. Therefore, we were anxious to prove that there was -a group here which was honestly trying to do its best and which, if the -occasion arose, would stand by its word under all circumstances. I -believe that we kept our word regarding the things we proposed to do, -while we said quite frankly that we could not bring about this revolt as -we had said previously we hoped to do. - -These negotiations began in October—November 1939. They were only -concluded later in the spring, and if I am asked I will continue. - -DR. DIX: Yes, please describe the conclusion. - -GISEVIUS: I believe I must add first that, during November of 1939, -General Halder actually had intended a revolt, but that these intentions -for a revolt again came to naught because at the very last minute Hitler -called off the western offensive. Strengthened by the attitude of Halder -at that time, we believed that we should continue these discussions at -the Vatican. We reached what you might call a gentleman’s agreement, on -the grounds of which I believe that I am entitled to state that we could -give the generals unequivocal proof that in the event of the overthrow -of the Hitler regime, an agreement could be reached with a decent civil -German government. - -DR. DIX: Did you read the documents yourself, Doctor? - -GISEVIUS: These were oral discussions which were then written down in a -comprehensive report. This report was read by the Ambassador Von Hassell -and by Dr. Schacht before it was given to Halder by General Thomas. -Halder was so taken aback by the contents that he gave this -comprehensive report to Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch. Brauchitsch was -enraged and threatened to arrest the intermediary, General Thomas, and -thus this action which had every prospect of success, failed. - -DR. DIX: Doctor, you have testified... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the last notes that I have got down in my -notebook are these: “That we knew that if Holland, Belgium, and the -other countries were attacked, it would have very grave consequences and -we therefore negotiated with Halder and Brauchitsch and they weren’t -prepared to help us to stop the war at that time. We wanted peace with -honor, eliminating politics. We took all possible steps.” Well, now, -since I took these notes down, I think we spent nearly 10 minutes in -details, which are utterly irrelevant, about further negotiations. If -they took all possible steps, what is the point of giving us these -details about it? - -DR. DIX: Yes, Your Lordship, if a witness is called in a matter of such -importance, where he as well as the defendants’ counsel must always take -into account that people who are of a different opinion may say “these -are just generalities, we want facts and particulars,” then I cannot -forego having the witness testify at least in broad outline that, for -example, a detailed action had been undertaken through His Holiness in -the Vatican. If he merely says that the result of this action was a -comprehensive report, if with Halder and Brauchitsch the above -mentioned... - -THE PRESIDENT: I agree with you that the one sentence about some -negotiations with the Vatican may have been properly given, but all the -rest of it were unnecessary details. - -DR. DIX: Anyway we have already concluded this chapter, Your Lordship. - -[_Turning to the witness._] You have already testified that the revolt -which was planned for November did not occur because the western -offensive did not take place. Therefore, we need not pursue this subject -any further. I would merely like to ask you at this point: Did your -group of conspirators remain inactive during the winter, and -particularly during the spring, or were further plans followed and acted -upon? - -GISEVIUS: Constant attempts were made to influence all generals within -our reach. Besides Halder and Brauchitsch we tried to reach the generals -of the armored divisions in the West. I remember, for instance, there -was a discussion between Schacht and General Hoeppner. - -DR. DIX: Hoeppner? - -GISEVIUS: Hoeppner. We also tried to influence Field Marshal Rundstedt, -Bock, and Leeb. Here, too, General Thomas and Admiral Canaris were the -intermediaries. - -DR. DIX: And how did the generals react? - -GISEVIUS: When everything was ready, they would not start. - -DR. DIX: Now, we come to the summer of 1941. Hitler is in Paris. The -aerial offensive against England is imminent. Tell us about your group -of conspirators and their activity during this period and the period -following. - -GISEVIUS: After the fall of Paris, our group had no influence at all for -months. Hitler’s success deluded everyone, and it took much effort on -our part, through all channels available, to try at least to prevent the -bombardment of England. Here again the group made united efforts and we -tried, through General Thomas and Admiral Canaris and others, to prevent -this evil. - -DR. DIX: Do I understand you correctly, when you use the word “group” -you mean the group which was led by Beck, in which Schacht collaborated? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. DIX: Now, at that time did Schacht have several talks, or one talk, -along the same line in Switzerland? - -GISEVIUS: That was a little later. We have now come to the year 1941, -and on this trip to Switzerland Schacht tried to urge that a peace -conference should be held as soon as possible. We knew that Hitler was -thinking about the attack on Russia, and we believed that we should do -everything to avert at least this disaster. With this thought in mind -Schacht’s discussions in Switzerland were conducted. I myself took part -in arranging a dinner in Basel with the president of the B. I. Z., Mr. -McKittrick, an American, and I was present when Schacht tried to express -at least the opinion that everything possible must now be done to -initiate negotiations. - -DR. DIX: In this connection I would respectfully like to remind the -Tribunal of the article in the _Basler Nachrichten_, of which I -presented the essential contents when we discussed the admissibility of -the document. It deals with a similar conversation between Schacht and -an American economist. That is the same trip which the witness is now -discussing. I will take the liberty of referring to this article later, -when presenting documentary evidences. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Now, the war continued. Do you have anything -to say about Russia; about the imminent war with Russia? - -GISEVIUS: I can say only that Schacht knew of all the many attempts -which we undertook to avert this catastrophe. - -DR. DIX: Now let us go further to the time of Stalingrad. What was done -by your group of conspirators after this critical period of the war? - -GISEVIUS: When we did not succeed in persuading the victorious generals -to engineer a revolt, we then tried at least to win them over to one -when they had obviously come up against their great catastrophe. This -catastrophe, which found its first visible signs in Stalingrad, had been -predicted in all its details by Generaloberst Beck since December of -1942. We immediately made all preparations so that at the moment, which -could be forecast with almost mathematical exactitude, when the army of -Paulus, completely defeated, would have to capitulate, then at least a -military revolt could be organized. I myself was called back from -Switzerland and participated in all discussions and preparations. I can -only testify that this time a great many preparations were made. Contact -was also made with the field marshals in the East, with Witzleben in the -West but again, things turned out differently, for Field Marshal Paulus -capitulated instead of giving us the cue at which Kluge, according to -plan, was to start the revolt in the East. - -DR. DIX: This was the time of the so-called Schlaberndorff attempt? - -GISEVIUS: No, a little later. - -DR. DIX: Now I shall interpose another question. Until now you have -always described the group led by Generaloberst Beck and supported by -Schacht, Goerdeler, _et cetera_, as a revolt movement, that is, a group -which wanted to overthrow the government. Did you not now more and more -aim at an assassination? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, from the moment when the generals again deserted us, we -realized that a revolt was not to be hoped for, and from that moment on -we took all the steps we could to instigate an assassination. - -DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the -German Armed Forces): Mr. President, I must object at this point to the -testimony of the witness. The witness, Dr. Gisevius, by his testimony -has incriminated the group which I represent. However, some of this -testimony is so general that it cannot be referred to as fact. -Furthermore, he has just testified that the field marshals in the East -had “deserted” the group of conspirators. These statements are opinions -which the witness is giving, but they are not facts, to which the -witness must limit his testimony, and therefore I ask—Mr. President, I -have not yet finished. I wanted to conclude with the request for a -resolution by the Court that the testimony given by the witness, where -he asserted that the generals had “deserted” the group of conspirators, -be stricken from the record. - -DR. DIX: May I please reply briefly? I cannot agree with the opinion of -my esteemed colleague Dr. Laternser that the statement “the generals -deserted us” was not a statement of fact... - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need to hear further argument upon it. -It certainly won’t be stricken from the record until we have had time to -consider it, and Dr. Laternser will have his opportunity of examining -this witness, and he can then elucidate any evidence he wants to. - -DR. LATERNSER: But, Mr. President, if I make the motion for the reason -that the witness is giving testimony which is beyond his scope as a -witness, and that he is giving his opinion, then to that extent it is -inadmissible testimony which would have to be stricken from the record. - -THE PRESIDENT: If you mean that the evidence is hearsay, that will be -perfectly obvious to the Tribunal, and doesn’t make the evidence -inadmissible, and you will be able to cross-examine him about it. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have been misunderstood. I did not say, -and I am not basing my request to strike the testimony from the record -on the allegation that the witness made statements from hearsay; but I -say that it is not a statement of fact, but an opinion which the witness -is giving when he says that “the generals in the East deserted the group -of conspirators.” - -DR. DIX: May I answer briefly to that? If I try to influence a group of -generals to organize a revolt and if they do not do so, that is a fact -and I can state this fact with the words, “They deserted us.” Naturally -I can also say, “They did not revolt,” but that is merely a matter of -expression. Both are facts and not an opinion. He is not appraising the -behavior of the generals in an ethical, military, or political sense, he -is merely pointing out, “They were not willing.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on. - -DR. DIX: [_Turning to the witness._] If I recall correctly, you were -just about to tell us that now the policy of the conspirators’ group -changed from a revolt to an assassination. Is that correct? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. DIX: Do you wish to state anything further? - -GISEVIUS: You had asked me about the first step in this direction after -Generaloberst Beck had given up all hope of being able to win over -another general to a revolt. It was said at that time that there was now -nothing left for us but to free Germany, Europe, and the world from the -tyrant by a bomb attack. Immediately after this decision, preparations -were started. Oster spoke to Lahousen and Lahousen furnished the bombs -from his arsenal. The bombs were taken to the headquarters of Kluge at -Smolensk, and with every possible means we tried to bring about the -assassination, which was unsuccessful only because at a time when Hitler -was visiting the front, the bomb which had been put in his airplane did -not explode. This was in the spring of 1943. - -DR. DIX: Now, an event took place in the Abwehr OKW, which as a result -of further developments, strongly affected Schacht’s further attitude -and also your remaining in Germany. Will you please describe that? - -GISEVIUS: Gradually even Himmler could not fail to see what was -happening in the OKW, and at the urgent request of SS General -Schellenberg a thorough investigation of the Canaris group was now -started. A special commissioner was appointed and on the first day of -this investigation Oster was relieved of his post and a number of his -collaborators were arrested. A short time afterwards Canaris was also -dismissed from his post. I myself could no longer remain in Germany and -thus this group, which until now had in a certain sense been the -directorate of all the conspiracies, was eliminated. - -DR. DIX: During that time, that is January 1943, Schacht was also -relieved of his position as Reich Minister without Portfolio. Did you -meet Schacht after that time? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. By chance I was in Berlin on the day this letter of -dismissal arrived. It was an unusually sharp letter and I remember that -that night I was asked to the country house of Schacht, and as the -letter had simply stated that Schacht was to be dismissed, we wondered -whether he was also going to be arrested. - -DR. DIX: I would like to remind the Tribunal that I read this letter -into the record when Lammers was examined and showed it to him. This -letter—I mean Schacht’s letter of dismissal signed by Lammers—has -already been read into the record and is probably contained in my -document book. - -[_Turning to the witness._] You were in Switzerland at that time, but on -20 July you were in Berlin. How did that happen? - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean the 20th of July 1944? - -DR. DIX: Yes, the well-known day of the 20th of July. We are rapidly -approaching the end now. - -GISEVIUS: A few months after the elimination of the Canaris-Oster circle -we formed a new group around General Olbricht. At that time Colonel -Count Von Stauffenberg also joined us. He replaced Oster in all -activities, and when after several months, and after many unsuccessful -attempts and discussions, the time finally arrived in July 1944, I -returned secretly to Berlin in order to participate in the events. - -DR. DIX: But you had no direct connection with Schacht at this attempted -assassination? - -GISEVIUS: No; I, personally, was in Berlin secretly and saw only -Goerdeler, Beck, and Stauffenberg; and it was agreed expressly at this -time that no other civilian except Goerdeler, Leuschner, and myself were -to be informed of the matter. We hoped thus to protect lives by not -burdening anyone unnecessarily with this knowledge. - -DR. DIX: Now I come to my last question. - -You know that Schacht had after all held high government positions under -the Hitler regime. You, Doctor, as is shown by your testimony today were -an arch enemy of the Hitler regime. Despite that you had, as can also be -seen from your testimony today, special confidence in Schacht. How do -you explain this fact which at first sight seems to be contradictory in -itself? - -GISEVIUS: My answer can, of course, only express a personal opinion and -I will formulate it as briefly as possible. However, I would like to -emphasize that the problem of Schacht was confusing not only to me but -to my friends as well; Schacht was always a problem and a puzzle to us. -Perhaps it was due to the contradictory nature of this man that he kept -his position in the Hitler government for so long. He undoubtedly -entered the Hitler regime for patriotic reasons, and I would like to -testify here that the moment his disappointment became obvious he -decided for the same patriotic reasons to join the opposition. Despite -Schacht’s many contradictions and the puzzles he gave us to solve, my -friends and I were strongly attracted to Schacht because of his -exceptional personal courage and the fact that he was undoubtedly a man -of strong moral character, and he did not think only of Germany but also -of the ideals of humanity. That is why we went with him, why we -considered him one of us; and, if you ask me personally, I can say that -the doubts which I often had about him were completely dispelled during -the dramatic events of 1938 and 1939. At that time he really fought, and -I will never forget that. It is a pleasure for me to be able to testify -to this here. - -DR. DIX: Your Lordship, I am now through with the questioning of this -witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants counsel want to -ask questions of the witness? - -HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for SA): Witness, yesterday you said that you -were a member of the Stahlhelm. When and for how long were you a member? - -GISEVIUS: I entered the Stahlhelm in 1929, I believe, and left that -organization in 1933. - -HERR BÖHM: You know the mentality of the members of the Stahlhelm. You -know that, almost without exception, they were people who had served in -the first World War, and I would like to ask you now whether the -internal and foreign political goals of the Stahlhelm were to be reached -by its members in a legal or in a revolutionary manner? - -GISEVIUS: To my knowledge the Stahlhelm always favored the legal way. - -HERR BÖHM: Yes. Was the fight of the Stahlhelm against the Treaty of -Versailles which every organization with national tendencies took up, to -be carried on by legal or revolutionary means, or means of force? - -GISEVIUS: It is very hard for me to answer for the entire Stahlhelm, but -I can only say that I, and the members of the Stahlhelm organization -with whom I was acquainted, knew that the Stahlhelm wanted to take the -legal way. - -HERR BÖHM: Is it correct to say that in the year 1932 and 1933 hundreds -of thousands, regardless of party and race, entered the Stahlhelm -organization? - -GISEVIUS: That is correct. The more critical matters became in Germany, -the more people went to the right. I myself having experienced this -growth of the Stahlhelm as an official speaker at public meetings, from -1929 to 1933, I would describe it in this way: That those who did not -want to join the NSDAP and the SA, deliberately entered the Stahlhelm so -that within the German rightist movement there would be a counterbalance -against the rising “brown” tide. That was the underlying reason of our -recruitment for the Stahlhelm at that time. - -HERR BÖHM: You know, of course, that in the year 1933 the Stahlhelm -organization as a whole was taken into the SA. Was it possible at that -time for the individual member of the Stahlhelm to say “no,” or to -protest against being taken over into the SA? - -GISEVIUS: That was possible, of course, as everything was possible also -in the Third Reich. - -HERR BÖHM: What would have been the possible consequences of such a -step? - -GISEVIUS: The possible consequences would have been a violent discussion -with the regional Party leaders or SA leaders. At that time I was no -longer a member of the Stahlhelm and I can merely say that it -undoubtedly must have been very difficult for many people, particularly -those living in the country, to refuse being transferred to the SA. -After they had been betrayed by their leader, Minister Seldte, or as it -was said at that time “sold” to the SA, refusal to transfer to the SA -was naturally a sign of open distrust toward National Socialism. - -HERR BÖHM: I gather from my correspondence with the former members of -the Stahlhelm, that these people who, as former members of the -Stahlhelm, were taken into the SA, remained a foreign body in it and -were in constant opposition to the NSDAP and the SA. Is that correct? - -GISEVIUS: As I myself no longer belonged to that organization, I can -only say that I assume that those members of the Stahlhelm felt very -uneasy in their new surroundings. - -HERR BÖHM: Do you know whether the members of the Stahlhelm, before 1934 -and from 1934, participated in Crimes against Peace, against the Jews, -against the Church, and so forth? - -GISEVIUS: No, I know nothing about that. - -HERR BÖHM: Now I would also like to question you about the SA as far as -you are able to give information. Yesterday at least you expressed -yourself freely with regard to the SA leaders. I would like to ask you, -in replying to a question I shall now ask, to confine yourself to a -circle of SA members which lies between the simple SA man and the -Standartenführer or the Brigadeführer. Could you tell from the attitude -and activity of the ordinary SA man and that of the Standartenführer or -Brigadeführer—and I do not go beyond that limit because I well remember -the statements you made yesterday concerning the Gruppenführer or -Obergruppenführer—that these people intended to commit Crimes against -Peace? - -GISEVIUS: It is, of course, very difficult to answer such a general -question. If you ask me about the majority of these SA men, I can only -say no. - -HERR BÖHM: Witness, did you notice that SA men were arrested and that SA -men were also put into concentration camps? - -GISEVIUS: I saw that many times. In 1933, 1934, and 1935, that was in -the years when it was my official duty to deal with these matters, many -SA men were arrested by the Gestapo, beaten to death, or at least -tortured, and put into concentration camps. - -HERR BÖHM: Could a man, who was in the SA, or anyone outside for that -matter, judge the SA as a whole from the activity of its members, or -from individual cases, and gather that the SA intended to commit Crimes -against Peace? - -GISEVIUS: No. When I consider what efforts even we in the High Command -of the Wehrmacht had to make to try and discover whether or not Hitler -was planning a war, I naturally cannot attribute to a simple SA man -knowledge of something which we ourselves did not know for certain. - -HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution asserted that the SA incited the youth and -the German people to war. Did you observe anything of that nature? You -were a member of the Gestapo and such activities could not have escaped -your notice. - -GISEVIUS: That is another extremely general question, and I do not know -to what extent certain songs, and other things, can be considered a -preparation for war. At any rate I cannot imagine that the mass of the -SA was of a different frame of mind than the mass of the German people -in the years up to 1938, and the general trend of opinion beyond a doubt -was that the mere thought of war was absolute madness. - -HERR BÖHM: Was there anything that made you think that the SA intended -to commit Crimes against Peace, or that they had committed such crimes? - -GISEVIUS: As far as the ordinary SA man is concerned, I must say “no” -again, and I say the same for the mass of the SA. I could not say to -what extent the higher leaders were involved in plotting all the -horrible things we have heard about here, but the majority undoubtedly -did not know of such things and were not trained for them. - -HERR BÖHM: Witness, it cannot be denied that mistakes were made by a -number of SA men, and criminal acts were committed for which these -people certainly should be punished. - -You know the SA and know what took place during the revolutionary period -and afterwards. Are you in a position to estimate or to give a -proportional figure as to what percentage of the numerous members of the -SA conducted themselves in a punishable manner? I call your attention to -the fact that up to, perhaps 1932 or 1933, the SA... - -THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, Dr. Böhm. The Tribunal doesn’t think that -is a proper question to put to a witness, what percentage of a group of -this sort, of hundreds of thousands of men, take a certain view. - -HERR BÖHM: However the explanation of this question would be very -important for my case, Mr. President. Here is a witness who was outside -the SA, who as a member of the Gestapo was perhaps one of the few people -who could look into the activities of the SA, and actually did look into -them, and he will certainly be believed by the Tribunal. He knew fairly -well what criminal procedures were carried out and also—and that is -what I want to say—the number of members of the SA, and he is one of -the few who are in a position to testify on this matter. I believe that -if the witness is in a position to testify hereto, the testimony given -by him will be of great importance to the Tribunal also. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that not only this -witness, but other witnesses, are not in a position to give such -evidence, and the question is denied. - -HERR BÖHM: Witness, do you know of cases in which SA members worked in -opposition to the SA? - -GISEVIUS: I answered that question when I said that quite a number of SA -members were arrested by the Gestapo. - -HERR BÖHM: Yes. Do you know what criminal proceedings were taken against -the members of the SA, and possibly how many? - -GISEVIUS: Far too few, I am sorry to say, if you put it that way. - -HERR BÖHM: Yes. - -GISEVIUS: Unfortunately there were many who committed misdeeds in the SA -and who went scot-free. I am sorry that I must answer in this way. - -HERR BÖHM: Certainly. And in what relation do they stand to the entire -SA? - -GISEVIUS: Now we have come again to the question... - -THE PRESIDENT: That is the same question over again. - -HERR BÖHM: Do you know under what circumstances one could resign from -the SA? - -GISEVIUS: In the same manner as one could resign from all organizations -of the Party. That was, of course, a brave decision to make. - -HERR BÖHM: Thank you. I have no further question. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in replying to a question of my colleague Dr. -Dix, you told the Tribunal that after the defeat at Stalingrad a -military revolt was to be organized. You testified on this point that -discussions had already taken place, that preparations had been made, -and that the execution of the military revolt was prevented because the -field marshals in the East had deserted the group of conspirators. - -I ask you now to give us more details on this question so that I can -understand why you came to the conclusion that the field marshals had -deserted the conspiracy group. - -GISEVIUS: From the outbreak of the war Generaloberst Beck tried to -contact one field marshal after another. He wrote letters and he sent -messengers to them. I particularly remember the correspondence with -General Field Marshal Von Manstein, and I saw with my own eyes General -Von Manstein’s answer of the year 1942. To Beck’s strictly military -explanations that the war had been lost and why, Manstein could reply -only: A war is not lost until one considers it as lost. - -Beck said that with an answer like that from a field marshal strategic -questions could certainly not be raised. Several months later another -attempt was made to win General Field Marshal Von Manstein. General Von -Tresckow, also a victim of the 20th of July, went to the headquarters of -Manstein. Oberstleutnant Count Von der Schulenburg also went to the -headquarters of Manstein, but we did not succeed in winning Herr Von -Manstein to our side. - -At the time of Stalingrad we contacted Field Marshal Von Kluge, and he, -in his turn, contacted Manstein. This time discussions reached a point -when Kluge definitely assured us that he would win over Field Marshal -Von Manstein at a discussion definitely fixed to take place in the -Führer’s headquarters. Because of the importance of that day, a special -telephone line was laid by the General of the Signal Corps, Fellgiebel, -between the headquarters and General Olbricht at the OKW in Berlin. I -myself was present when this telephone conversation took place. Even -today I can still see that paper which said, in plain language, that -Manstein, contrary to his previous assurances, had allowed himself to be -persuaded by Hitler to remain in office. And even Kluge expressed -himself as satisfied at the time with very small military strategic -concessions. This was a bitter disappointment to us, and, therefore, I -would like to repeat again what Beck said at that time: “We were -deserted.” - -DR. LATERNSER: What further preparations had been made in this special -connection? - -GISEVIUS: We had made definite agreements with Field Marshal Von -Witzleben. Witzleben was the Commander-in-Chief in the West, and -therefore he was very important for starting or protecting a revolt in -the West. We had made further definite agreements with the Military -Governor of Belgium, Generaloberst Von Falkenhausen. In addition, as on -20 July 1944, we had assembled a certain contingent of armored troops in -the vicinity of Berlin. Furthermore, those commanders of the troops who -were to participate in the action had been assembled in the OKW. - -DR. LATERNSER: All this happened after Stalingrad? - -GISEVIUS: At the time of the Stalingrad revolt. - -DR. LATERNSER: Please continue. - -GISEVIUS: We had made all other political preparations which were -necessary. It is difficult for me to tell here the entire story of the -revolts against the Third Reich. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes. What were the reasons why this intended military -revolt was not carried through? - -GISEVIUS: What was that? - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, what were the reasons why this revolt, which was -intended by the group of conspirators, was not carried through? - -GISEVIUS: Contrary to all expectations, Field Marshal Paulus -capitulated. This, as is known, was the first wholesale capitulation of -generals; whereas we had expected that Paulus with his generals would -issue, before his capitulation, a proclamation to the German people and -to the East Front, in which the strategy of Hitler and the sacrifice of -the Stalingrad army would be branded in suitable words. When this cue -had been given, Kluge was to declare that in future he would take no -further military orders from Hitler. We hoped with this plan to -circumvent the problem of the military oath which kept troubling us more -and more; the field marshals one after the other were to refuse military -obedience to Hitler, whereupon Beck was to take over the supreme -military command in Berlin. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you just mentioned the military oath. Do you -know whether Blomberg and Generaloberst Beck opposed, or tried to -oppose, the pledge the Armed Forces took to Hitler? - -GISEVIUS: I know only that Beck up to the last day of his life -considered the day he gave his pledge to Hitler as the blackest day of -his existence, and he gave me an exact description of how completely -taken unawares he had felt at the rendering of the oath. He told me that -he had been summoned to a military roll call; and that suddenly it was -announced that an oath of allegiance was to be given to the new head of -State; that unexpectedly a new form of oath was to be used. Beck could -never rid himself of the awful thought that at that time he perhaps -should not have given his oath. He told me that while he was on his way -home, he said to a comrade, “This is the blackest day of my life.” - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in your testimony, you also mentioned that -between the Polish campaign and the Western campaign, or with the -beginning of the Western campaign, a further military Putsch was to be -attempted, and that this Putsch failed because Halder and Field Marshal -Von Brauchitsch shirked it. You used the term “shirked” previously in -your testimony. Now I ask you to tell me on the basis of what facts did -you arrive at this opinion that both these generals shirked... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not raise an objection that this is harmful to -us if we have plenty of time, but this evidence as to these Putsche, and -threatened Putsche, and rumored Putsche, was all admissible here in our -view only as bearing on the attitude of the Defendant Schacht. We are -not trying these generals for being in a Putsch or not being in a -Putsch. For all purposes it is just as well as they should not be in a -Putsch. I do not know what purposes this can have in doing it over -again. I call the Tribunal’s attention for the limited purpose for which -this historical matter was admitted, and suggest that it is serving no -purpose in this connection to review it. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the answer to that, Dr. Laternser? - -DR. LATERNSER: Since the witness has talked about this matter and -testified that Halder as well as Brauchitsch shirked, and I cannot -establish whether the opinion expressed by this witness with “shirked” -is correct on the basis of the facts, I think I am obliged to clarify -this point. In a general sense I would like to add further that the -Prosecution is also justified in going into this point. I refer to the -contention of the French Prosecutor in which he stated that in the light -of all these circumstances it was beyond comprehension why Halder, as -well as the entire German nation, did not rise as one man against the -regime. Therefore, if I start from the viewpoint of the Prosecution, -then my question on this point, as I have just put it, is undoubtedly of -importance, and I, therefore, ask that this question be permitted. - -THE PRESIDENT: The charge against the High Command is that they were a -criminal organization within the meaning of the Charter; that is to say -that they planned an aggressive war, or that they committed War Crimes -or Crimes against Humanity in connection with an aggressive war. Well, -whether or not they took part, or were planning to take part in a Putsch -to stop the war does not seem very material to any of those questions. - -DR. LATERNSER: I agree with you entirely on this point, Mr. President, -that it cannot actually be considered of special importance; but on the -other hand... - -THE PRESIDENT: I did not say that it was not of special importance. I -say that it was not material to the relevancy. The Tribunal does not -think that any of these questions are relevant. - -DR. LATERNSER: Then I will withdraw my question. I have one final -question. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, can you tell me the names of those -generals who participated on the 20th of July? - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, what has that got to do with any charge against the -High Command? - -DR. LATERNSER: The General Staff is accused of having participated in a -conspiracy. The question... - -THE PRESIDENT: We are not here to consider the honor of the High -Command. We are here to consider whether or not they are a criminal -organization within the meaning of the Charter, and that is the only -question with which we are going to deal as far as you are concerned. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the General Staff and the OKW are accused -of having participated in a conspiracy. If I prove, as I am trying to do -with this question, that on the contrary, instead of participating in a -conspiracy, part of the General Staff took part in an action against the -regime, then the answer to this question on this point indicates that -precisely the opposite was the case; and, for that reason, I ask that -the question be permitted. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think what the General Staff did in -July 1944, when the circumstances were entirely different to what they -were in September 1939, has any relevancy to the question whether they -took part, either before or in September 1939. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I put myself in the place of the -Prosecution, I must assume that the Prosecution assumes that the -conspiracy continued. It cannot be inferred, from testimony by the -Prosecution or from anything that has been submitted, that the -conspiracy was to have stopped at a certain period of time. So that the -answer to this question would be of importance, I believe of decisive -importance. I would like to supplement my statement, Mr. President... - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Laternser. - -DR. LATERNSER: I would like to add that it is precisely for the members -of the group I represent that the period of time between 1938 and May -1940 is considered decisive. - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean the group changed; therefore, they might be -different in 1944? - -DR. LATERNSER: I wish to add that a particularly large number of the -members of this group only joined it in the course of 1944 because of -their official positions, and I do consider this point important. - -THE PRESIDENT: All right. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, my question was: Can you give me the names of -those generals who participated in the attempted assassination of the -20th of July 1944? - -GISEVIUS: Generaloberst Beck, General Field Marshal Von Witzleben, -General Olbricht, General Hoeppner. - -DR. LATERNSER: One question: General Hoeppner was previously -commander-in-chief of an armored army? - -GISEVIUS: I believe so; General Von Haase, and certainly a large number -of other generals whom I cannot enumerate offhand. Here I have mentioned -only the names of those who were at Bendlerstrasse that afternoon. - -DR. LATERNSER: One question, Witness: Do you know whether Field Marshal -Rommel also participated on the 20th of July 1944? - -GISEVIUS: I cannot answer by merely saying “yes,” for it is a fact that -Rommel, as well as Field Marshal Von Kluge, did participate. However, it -would give a wrong picture if Field Marshal Rommel were suddenly to -appear in the category of those who fought against Hitler. Herr Rommel, -as a typical Party general, sought to join us very late, and it gave us -a very painful impression when suddenly Herr Rommel in the face of his -own military catastrophe, proposed to us to have Hitler assassinated, -and then, if possible, Göring and Himmler as well. And, even then, he -did not want to join in at the first opportunity, but wanted to stay -somewhat in the background in order to allow us to profit by his -popularity later on. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to know -whether these gentlemen, when they joined our group, came as the fallen -might, as people who wished to save their pensions, or as people who, -from the beginning, stood for decency and honor. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you yourself ever speak to Field Marshal Rommel about -this? - -GISEVIUS: No. I never considered it worth while to make his -acquaintance. - -DR. LATERNSER: A further question: Did officers of the General Staff -participate in the 20th of July? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, a great number. - -DR. LATERNSER: About how many would you say? - -GISEVIUS: I cannot give you the number, for at that time I was not -informed of how many of the General Staff Stauffenberg had on his side. -I do not doubt that Stauffenberg, Colonel Hansen, and several other -stout-hearted men had discovered a number of clean, courageous officers -among the General Staff, and that they could count on the support of -very many decent members of the General Staff, but whom they naturally -could not initiate into their plans beforehand. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes, that will be sufficient for this point. Another -question has occurred to me. You mentioned General Von Tresckow -previously. Did you know General Von Tresckow personally? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: Do you know anything about the fact that, after he -learned that the commissar decree had been issued, General Von Tresckow -remonstrated with Rundstedt and that these remonstrances contributed to -the fact that the commissar decree was not passed on in General Field -Marshal Von Rundstedt’s sector? - -GISEVIUS: Tresckow belonged to our group for many years. There was no -action which made us so ashamed as this one, and from the very start he -courageously called the attention of his superiors to the -inadmissibility of such terrible decrees. I remember how at that time we -learned of the famous commissar decree at first through hearsay, and we -immediately sent a courier to Tresckow to inform him simply of the -intention of such an outrage, and how after the decree had been -published, Tresckow, at a given signal, remonstrated with General Field -Marshal Von Rundstedt in the way you described. - -THE PRESIDENT: You said a while ago that you were just going to ask your -last question. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I am sorry I could not keep to that. A -number of questions arose from the testimony of the witness, but this -was my last question. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel wish to -ask any questions of the witness? - -[_There was no response._] - -Then do the Prosecution desire to cross-examine? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I have a few questions -to put to you, Dr. Gisevius, and if you will answer them as nearly as -possible, “yes” or “no,” as you are capable of giving a truthful answer, -you will save a great deal of time. - -The Tribunal perhaps should know your relations with the Prosecution. Is -it not a fact that within 2 months of the surrender of Germany I met you -at Wiesbaden, and you related to me your experiences in the conspiracy -that you have related here? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were later brought here, and after coming -here were interrogated by the Prosecution as well as by the counsel for -Frick and for Schacht? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, your attitude and viewpoint are, as I -understand you, those of a German who felt that loyalty to the German -people required continuous opposition to the Nazi regime. Is that a -correct statement of your position? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you had a very large experience in police -matters in Germany. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If your Putsche or other moves to obtain power in -Germany were successful, it was planned that you would be in charge of -the police in the reorganization, was it not? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Either as Minister of the Interior or as Police -Commissioner, whatever it might be called. - -GISEVIUS: Yes, certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you represented the belief that it was not -necessary to govern Germany with concentration camps and with Gestapo -methods; is that correct? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you found all of the ways of presenting your -viewpoint to the German people cut off by the Gestapo methods which were -used by the Nazi regime; is that a fact? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So that there was no way open to you to obtain any -change in German policy except through revolt or assassination, or means -of that kind? - -GISEVIUS: No. I am convinced that until 1937 or the beginning of 1938 -the position could have been changed in Germany by a majority of votes -in the Reich Cabinet or through pressure by the Armed Forces. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you fix 1937 as the time when it ceased to be -possible by peaceful means to effect a change in Germany; is that -correct? - -GISEVIUS: That is how I would judge it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it was not until after 1937 that Schacht -joined your group; is that not a fact? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, as I said, the group was not formed until 1937, 1938; but -Schacht had already introduced me to Goerdeler in 1936, and Schacht and -Oster had known each other since 1936. And naturally Schacht had also -known a large number of other members of the group for a long time. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But Schacht did not become convinced, as I -understand your statement to us, until after 1937—until the Putsch -affair—that he wouldn’t be able to handle Hitler in some peaceful way; -is that not correct? - -GISEVIUS: In what manner? In a peaceful manner or... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In a peaceful manner. - -GISEVIUS: Yes, until the end of 1937 Schacht believed that it ought to -be possible to remove Hitler legally. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But by the end of 1937, as you now say, the -possibility of a peaceful removal of Hitler had become impossible in -fact? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, that is what we thought. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes; now, there was, as I understand your view in -going to the general—there was no power in Germany that could stop or -deal with the Gestapo, except the Army. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. I would answer that question in the affirmative. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, in addition to the Gestapo, this Nazi -regime also had a private army in the SS, did they not? And, for a -period, in the SA? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And if you were to combat successfully the Nazi -regime, you had to have manpower which only the Army had; is that right? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, only people who could be found in the Army; but at the -same time we also attempted to influence certain people in the Police, -and we needed all the decent officials in the ministries, and the broad -masses of the people altogether. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the Wehrmacht was the source of power capable -of dealing with the SS and the Gestapo if the generals had been willing? - -GISEVIUS: That was our conviction. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that is the reason you kept seeking the help of -the generals and felt let down when they wouldn’t give you their -assistance finally? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came a time when everybody connected -with your group knew that the war was lost. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was before these plots on Hitler’s life, -and it was apparent before the Schlaberndorff plot and before the July -20th plot, that the war was lost, was it not? - -GISEVIUS: I should like to make it quite clear that there was no one in -our group who did not already know, even when the war started, that -Hitler would never win this war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But it became very much more apparent as time went -on, not only that the war could not be won by Germany, but that Germany -was going to be physically destroyed as a result of the war; is that not -true? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yet, under the system which the Nazi regime had -installed, you had no way of changing the course of events in Germany -except by assassination or a revolt; is that true? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And so you resorted to those extreme measures, -knowing that Hitler could never make peace with the Allies; is that -true? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And your purpose in this was to save Germany the -last destroying blows, which unfortunately she received, from the point -of view of the Germans; is that not a fact? - -GISEVIUS: I should like to say that actually since the beginning of the -war, we no longer thought only of Germany. I think that I may say that -we bore a heavy share of responsibility towards Germany and towards the -world. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, what you were endeavoring to do was to get -the war to an end, since you had not been able to stop its commencement, -were you not? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was impossible as long as Hitler was at -the head of the government and this group of men behind him? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there was another plot on Hitler’s life that -you haven’t mentioned. Was there not a bomb that was later found to have -been a communist bomb? - -GISEVIUS: This happened on 9 November 1939, in the Bürgerbräukeller, in -Munich. It was a brave Communist who acted independently. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, at none of these times when Hitler’s life was -endangered, by a strange coincidence, was Göring or Himmler ever -present; is that not true? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you attach any importance to that fact? - -GISEVIUS: We sometimes regretted it. For instance, the attempt at -assassination would perhaps have succeeded, if Göring and Himmler had -been with Hitler on 17 July. But as the years went by, the members of -this clique separated to such an extent, and protected themselves so -much that they could hardly be found together anywhere. Göring, too, was -gradually so absorbed in his transactions and art collections at -Karinhall that he was hardly ever to be found at a serious conference. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the assassination of Hitler would have -accomplished nothing from your point of view if the Number 2 man had -stepped into Hitler’s place, would it? - -GISEVIUS: That was a debatable problem for a long time, because -Brauchitsch, for instance, imagined that we could create a transitional -regime with Göring. Our group always refused to come together with that -man even for an hour. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How did you plan—if you were successful—to deal -with the other defendants here, with the exception of the Defendant -Schacht, all of whom, I understand, you regard as a part of the Nazi -government? - -GISEVIUS: These gentlemen would have been behind lock and key in an -extremely short time, and I think they would not have had to wait long -for their sentences. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, does that apply to every man in this dock with -the exception of Schacht? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, every man. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, you recognized them, your group recognized -them all as parts and important parts of the Nazi regime—a Nazi -conspiracy. Is that a fact? - -GISEVIUS: I should not like to commit myself to the words “Nazi -conspiracy.” We considered them the men responsible for all the -unspeakable misery which that government had brought to Germany and the -world. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to ask you a few questions about the -Gestapo. You had testified generally in reference to the crimes which -were committed by that organization and I ask you to state whether that -included the torturing and burning to death of a large number of -persons? - -GISEVIUS: The question does not seem to have come through correctly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am asking you as to the crimes committed by the -Gestapo, and I am asking if it included the torturing and burning to -death of thousands of persons? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did it involve the unlawful detention of thousands -of innocent people? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The throwing of them into concentration camps where -they were tortured and beaten and killed? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the Gestapo engage in wholesale confiscation of -property? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, to a very large extent; they called it “property of -persons hostile to the State.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did it practice extortion against Jews and -against others? - -GISEVIUS: In masses and by the million. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the Gestapo hinder and molest the public -officials, who were too prominent to be murdered, until they resigned or -were driven from office? - -GISEVIUS: The Gestapo used every means, from murder to the extortion -which has just been described. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question arises here as to whether the -members of the Gestapo knew what the Gestapo was doing; and will you -please tell the Tribunal what the situation was as to the membership in -that organization and its knowledge of its program? - -GISEVIUS: I have already stated at the beginning of my testimony that -from the first or second day every member of the Gestapo really could -not help seeing and knowing what took place in that institution. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there were some people who were taken into the -Gestapo at the beginning, who were transferred from other branches of -the civil service, were they not; who were in a sense involuntary -members of the Gestapo? - -GISEVIUS: Yes; these members were eliminated in the course of the first -year as being politically unreliable. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the transfer took place at the time Göring set -up the Gestapo, did it not? - -THE PRESIDENT: What did the witness mean by “eliminated”? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think eliminated from the Gestapo. - -GISEVIUS: Gradually they were released from the service of the Gestapo. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after the purge of the 30th of June 1934, were -special pains taken to see that no one was permitted in the organization -who was not in sympathy with its program? - -GISEVIUS: These attempts started after 1 April 1934, when Himmler and -Heydrich took over affairs. Actually, from that date, no official was -allowed into the Gestapo any longer unless Himmler and Heydrich -considered that he held the opinions which they desired. It may be that -during the first months some officials, who had not yet been screened by -the SS, may have got in. The Gestapo was, of course, a large -organization and it naturally took quite a time until the SS had -educated and trained their own criminal officials. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: However, did there come a time, and if so, will you -fix it as nearly as possible, after which every member of the Gestapo -must have known the criminal program of that organization? - -GISEVIUS: For many years I have considered that question myself and -discussed it with Nebe and my friends. The reply entails very great -responsibility, and in the knowledge of that responsibility I would say -that from the beginning of 1935, at the latest, everyone must have known -what sort of organization he was joining and the type of orders he might -have to expect. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have testified as to the investigations which -you made when you were connected with the police administration and you -mentioned the Reichstag fire but you did not tell us what your findings -were when you investigated that. Will you please tell us? - -GISEVIUS: To speak briefly and to begin with the facts, we ascertained -that Hitler in a general way had expressed a wish for a large-scale -propaganda campaign. Goebbels undertook to prepare the necessary -proposals and it was Goebbels who first thought of setting the Reichstag -on fire. Goebbels discussed this with the leader of the Berlin SA -Brigade, Karl Ernst, and he suggested in detail how it should be done. - -A certain chemical, known to every maker of fireworks, was chosen. After -spraying it, it ignites after a certain time—hours or minutes. In order -to get inside the Reichstag, one had to go through the corridor leading -from the palace of the Reichstag President to the Reichstag itself. Ten -reliable SA men were provided, and then Göring was informed of all the -details of the plan, so that by chance he did not make an election -speech on that particular evening, but at such a late hour would still -be sitting at his desk in the Ministry of the Interior in Berlin. - -Göring—and he gave assurances that he would do so—was to put the -police on wrong trails in the first confusion. From the very beginning -it was intended that the Communists should be accused of this crime, and -the 10 SA men who had to carry out the crime were instructed -accordingly. - -That is, in a few words, the story of the events. To tell you how we got -hold of the details, I have only to add that one of these 10 who had to -spray the chemical was a notorious criminal. Six months later he was -dismissed from the SA, and when he did not receive the reward which he -had been promised he decided to tell what he knew to the Reich Court -sitting in Leipzig at the time. He was taken before an examining -magistrate who made a record of his statement, but the Gestapo heard of -it and the letter to the Reich Court was intercepted and destroyed. The -SA man, named Rail, who betrayed the plan, was murdered in a vile manner -with the knowledge of the Defendant Göring, by order of Gestapo chief -Diels. Through the finding of the body, we picked up the threads of the -whole story. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What happened to the 10 SA men who carried out the -Reichstag fire? Are any of them alive now? - -GISEVIUS: As far as we are aware none of them are still alive. Most of -them were murdered on 30 June under the pretext of the Röhm revolt. Only -one, a certain Heini Gewaehr, was taken over by the police as a police -officer, and we tracked him down as well. He was killed in the war, -while a police officer on the Eastern Front. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you testified that you also investigated, -with the entire affair of Röhm, the murders that followed the Röhm -affair. Didn’t you so testify? - -GISEVIUS: I cannot actually say that we carried out the investigation, -as we, of the Ministry of the Interior, had really been excluded from -the entire affair. However, matters were such that after 30 June, all -the appeals for help, and all the complaints of the people who were -affected reached us in the Ministry of the Interior; and during 30 June, -through the continual radio messages, incidental visits to Göring’s -palace, and the information received from Nebe, we discovered all the -details. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, about how many people were killed in that -purge? - -GISEVIUS: We have never been able to establish the number exactly, but I -estimate that no more than 150 to 200 persons lost their lives, which, -at that time, was an enormous figure. - -I myself with Minister of Justice Gürtner checked the list of the number -of the dead which had been given him by Hitler and Göring, and we -ascertained that the list which contained the names of 77 dead, who had -allegedly been justly killed, was exceeded by nearly double that number -only by those names which we had received through the prosecuting -authorities, or through the appeals for help coming from relatives to -the Ministry of the Interior. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did you ascertain who selected the men who -were killed in that purge? - -GISEVIUS: To begin with we ascertained that Himmler, Heydrich, and -Göring had compiled exact lists of those to be murdered; for I myself -heard in Göring’s palace—and it was confirmed by Daluege who was -present, and also by Nebe who was present from the very first -second—that not one of those who were killed was mentioned by name; -instead they just said: “Number so and so is now gone,” or, “Number so -and so is still missing,” and “It will soon be Number so and so’s turn.” - -There is, however, no doubt that Heydrich and Himmler also had a special -list. On that special list there were several Catholics, Klausner, and -others. I cannot, for instance, say here under oath whether Schleicher -was murdered by order of Göring, or whether he was a man who was on -Heydrich’s and Himmler’s special list. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was the Defendant Frick fully informed as to -the facts which you knew about the illegal conduct of the Gestapo? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. I had to submit to him all the material that arrived -which was important, and I have already described that we reported all -these matters to the Secret State Police or to the Ministries of the -Interior of the Länder. Naturally I could submit only the most important -of these things to Frick personally. I estimate that I received several -hundred such complaints daily, but the most important had to be -submitted to Frick, because he had to sign them personally; for Göring -always complained as soon as he saw that such a young official signed -reports and appeals to the Ministry and to himself. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was Frick informed of your conclusions about -the Röhm purge? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, because on the Sunday, while the murders were continuing, -I spoke to Frick about the murder of Strasser, Klausner, Schleicher and -the many other murders; and Frick was particularly disgusted at the -murder of Strasser, because he considered that an act of personal -revenge by Göring and Himmler. Likewise, Frick was extremely indignant -about the murders of Klausner, Bose, Edgar Jung, and the many other -innocent men who were murdered. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But when Frick signed the decree, along with -Hitler, declaring these murders legitimate and ordering no prosecutions -on account of those murders, Frick knew exactly what had happened from -you; is that the fact? - -GISEVIUS: He knew it from me, and he had seen it for himself. The story -of the 30th of June was undoubtedly known to Frick. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did Frick ever talk with you about Himmler and -Heydrich as being bad and dangerous, cruel persons? - -GISEVIUS: On that Sunday, the 1st of July, Frick said to me, “If Hitler -does not very soon do to the SS and Himmler what he has done to the SA -today, he will experience far worse things with the SS than he has -experienced now with the SA.” - -I was greatly struck by that prediction at the time, and by the fact -that Frick should speak so openly to me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But notwithstanding the estimate he made of those -men as dangerous persons, did he not thereafter appoint them both in his -Ministry of Interior? - -GISEVIUS: Well, of course, they were actually appointed by Hitler. -However, I can only say that when I took leave of Frick, at the time I -left the Ministry of the Interior in May 1935, Frick told me literally -that the constant difficulties he had had because of me had taught him -from now on to take Party members only in his Ministry, and as far as -possible those who had the Golden Party Emblem. He said that it was -possible that in the course of events he might even be forced to allow -Himmler into his Ministry, but in no case would he accept the murderer -Heydrich. Those were the last words I exchanged with Frick. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Both were put in charge of matters that were under -his legal control, were they not? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, they became members of the Reich Ministry of the Interior -and Frick remained their superior. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you say that those were the last words which you -exchanged with the Defendant Frick? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. That was in 1935 and I have not met him or talked to him -since. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after 1934 Frick was the Minister in charge of -the running and controlling of concentration camps, was he not, Dr. -Gisevius? - -GISEVIUS: In my opinion the Reich Minister of the Interior was -responsible from the beginning for all police matters in the Reich and -therefore also for the concentration camps, and I do not believe that -one can say he had that responsibility only since 1934. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I am willing to accept your amendment to my -question. I ask that you be shown Document Number 3751-PS of the United -States, which has not yet been offered in evidence. - -[_The document was submitted to the witness._] - -Now, this purports to be a communication from Dr. Gürtner, the Minister -of Justice, to the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior. That -would be from your friend Dr. Gürtner to Frick, would it not? - -GISEVIUS: I believe I heard you say “friend.” During the time he acted -as Minister, Gürtner did not conduct himself in such a way that I could -consider him my friend. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well then, tell us about Gürtner. Tell us about -Gürtner’s position in this situation because we have a communication -here apparently from him. - -GISEVIUS: Gürtner? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. - -GISEVIUS: At that time Gürtner without doubt made many attempts to -expose the cruelty in the camps and to initiate criminal proceedings. In -individual cases Gürtner did make many attempts; but after the 30th of -June he signed that law which legalized all those dreadful things, and -also in other respects Gürtner never acted consistently with his views. -But this document which you submit to me was just such an attempt by -Gürtner and the many decent officials in the Ministry of Justice to -bring the question of the Gestapo terror to discussion. As far as I -recollect this is one of those letters which we discussed unofficially -beforehand in order to provoke an answer, so to say. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I now desire to read some parts of this into the -record. It becomes Exhibit USA-828. I will offer it as such. - -Will you kindly follow the German text and see if I correctly quote: - - “My dear Reich Minister! - - “Enclosed you will find a copy of a report of the Inspector of - the Secret State Police, dated 28 March 1935. - - “This report gives me an occasion to state my fundamental - attitude towards the question of corporal punishment for - internees. The numerous instances of ill-treatment which have - come to the knowledge of the authorities of justice point to - three different reasons for such ill-treatment of prisoners: - - “1. Beating as a disciplinary punishment in concentration camps. - - “2. Ill-treatment, mostly of political internees, in order to - make them talk. - - “3. Ill-treatment of internees arising out of sheer wantonness - or for sadistic motives.” - -I think I will not take the Tribunal’s time to read his comment on -Number 1 or Number 2. About Number 3, you will find in the German text: - - “The experience of the first revolutionary years has shown that - the persons who are charged to administer the beatings generally - lose all sense of the purpose and meaning of their action after - a short time, and permit themselves to be governed by personal - feelings of revenge, or sadistic tendencies. Thus members of the - guard detail of the former concentration camp at Bredow, near - Stettin, completely stripped a prostitute who had an argument - with one of them and beat her with whips and cowhides in such a - fashion that the woman 2 months later still showed two open and - infected wounds.” - -I shall not go into the dimensions; they are not important. - - “In the concentration camp at Kemna near Wuppertal, prisoners - were locked up in a narrow clothing locker and were then - tortured by blowing in cigarette smoke, upsetting the locker, - _et cetera_. In some cases the prisoners were first given salt - herring to eat, in order to produce an especially strong and - torturing thirst. - - “In the Hohnstein Concentration Camp in Saxony, prisoners had to - stand under a dripping apparatus especially constructed for this - purpose, until the drops of water, which fell down at even - intervals, caused seriously infected wounds on their scalps. - - “In a concentration camp in Hamburg four prisoners were lashed - in the form of a cross to a grating for days, once without - interruption for 3 days and nights, once for 5 days and nights - and fed so meagerly with dry bread that they almost died of - hunger. - - “These few examples show a degree of cruelty which is such an - insult to every German feeling, that it is impossible to - consider any extenuating circumstances. - - “In conclusion, I should like to present my opinion about these - three points to you, my dear Herr Reich Minister, in your - capacity as departmental minister competent for the - establishment of protective custody, and the camps for - protective custody.” - -And he goes on to make certain recommendations for action by the -Minister. I do not know whether the Tribunal cares to have more of this -read. - -Was any improvement in conditions noted after the receipt of that -communication by Frick? - -GISEVIUS: The letter was received just at the time I left the Ministry -of the Interior. I should like to say only one thing concerning this -letter: What is described therein is really only a fraction of what we -knew. I helped prepare this letter in that I spoke to the officials -concerned in the Ministry of Justice. The Minister of Justice could -bring up only those matters which had by chance become known legally -through some criminal record. But there can be no doubt that this -communication was merely a motive, and the cause of a very bold letter -from Heydrich to Göring, dated 28 March 1935, in which he disputed the -right of the Minister of Justice to prosecute cases of ill-treatment. -The letter, therefore does not add anything new to my descriptions, and -no doubt all have been convinced that these conditions, which started at -that time, never ceased but became worse as time went on. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came a time when Heydrich was -assassinated in Prague, was there not? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, some very brave Czechs were able to do what we -unfortunately could not achieve. That will always be to their glory. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I suppose the Czechs expected, and did you -expect that the assassination of Heydrich would result in some -improvement in this condition? - -GISEVIUS: We doubted—we, Canaris, Oster, Nebe, and the others of the -group—whether it was possible at all for an even worse man to be found -to succeed such a monster as Heydrich, and to that extent we really did -think that the Gestapo terror would now subside, and that perhaps we -would return to a certain amount of honesty and integrity, or that at -least the cruelties might be lessened. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then came Kaltenbrunner. Did you notice any -improvement after the appointment of Kaltenbrunner? Tell us about that. - -GISEVIUS: Kaltenbrunner came and things became worse from day to day. -More and more we learned that perhaps the impulsive actions of a -murderer like Heydrich were not so bad as the cold, legal logic of a -lawyer who took over the administration of such a dangerous instrument -as the Gestapo. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Can you tell us whether Kaltenbrunner took an even -more sadistic attitude than Himmler and Schellenberg had done? Were you -informed about that? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. I know that Heydrich, in a certain sense, really had -something akin to a bad conscience when he committed his crimes. At any -rate, he did not like it when those things were discussed openly in -Gestapo circles. Nebe, who as Chief of the Criminal Police had the same -rank as the Chief of the Gestapo, Müller, always told me that Heydrich -took care to conceal his crimes. - -With the entry of Kaltenbrunner into that organization, this practice -ceased. All those things were now openly discussed among the department -chiefs of the Gestapo. By now the war had started, of course. These -gentlemen lunched together, and Nebe often came to me from such -luncheons so completely exhausted that he had a nervous breakdown. On -two occasions Nebe had to be sent on long sick leave because he simply -could not stand the open cynicism with which mass murder, and the -technique of mass murder, were discussed. - -I remind you only of the gruesome chapter of the installation of the -first gas chambers, which was discussed in detail in this circle, as -were the experiments as to how one could remove the Jews most quickly -and most thoroughly. These were the most horrible descriptions I have -ever heard in my life. It is, of course, so much worse when you hear -them first-hand from someone who is still under the direct impression of -such discussions—and who because of this is almost at the point of -physical and mental collapse, than when you hear of them now from -documents. Nebe became so ill that actually as early as 20 July he -suffered from a persecution mania and was a mere human wreck after -everything he had gone through. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it the custom to have daily dinner conferences -of the chiefs of the Main Security Office, those who happened to be in -town? - -GISEVIUS: Daily conferences; everything was discussed at luncheon. This -was of particular importance to us, because we heard details of the -methods used by the Gestapo in the fight against our group. - -To prove what I say, I can state here that, for instance, the order -issued for the arrest of Goerdeler on 17 July was decided upon during -such a luncheon conference, and Nebe warned us at once. That is the -reason why Goerdeler was able to escape, at least for some time, and why -we were able to know to what extent the Gestapo were aware of our plot. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who were the regular attendants at those -luncheon conferences? - -GISEVIUS: Kaltenbrunner presided. Then there were Gestapo Müller, -Schellenberg, Ohlendorf, and Nebe. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And do you know whether, at those meetings, the new -kinds of torture and the technique of killing by gas, and other measures -in the concentration camps, were discussed? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. That was discussed in great detail, and sometimes I -received the description only a few minutes later. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what is the situation with reference to the -information of the Foreign Office about the conduct of the Gestapo? Will -you tell us what was done to inform the Foreign Office from time to time -of the crimes that the Gestapo were committing? - -GISEVIUS: The Foreign Office, particularly during the earlier years, was -continually kept informed, as nearly every day some foreigner was half -beaten to death or robbed, and then the diplomatic missions would come -with their complaints, and these complaints were sent to the Ministry of -the Interior by the Foreign Office. These went through my office and -sometimes I had four or five such notes a day from the Foreign Office -regarding excesses by the Gestapo; and I can testify that in the course -of years there were no crimes by the Gestapo which were not set forth in -these notes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you make certain reports to the Foreign Office -which were so dispatched that you are reasonably certain they would -reach Neurath? - -GISEVIUS: Ribbentrop was not yet the Foreign Minister at that time... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, Neurath. - -GISEVIUS: I very often discussed these matters personally with the -officials of the Foreign Office, because they were of a particularly -difficult nature, and because the officials of the Foreign Office were -very indignant, I asked them repeatedly to put these matters before the -Minister through the official channels. In addition, I gave as much -material as I could to one of the closest collaborators of the Foreign -Minister at that time, the Chief of Protocol, “Minister” Von -Bülow-Schwante; and according to the information I received from -Bülow-Schwante, he very often submitted that material to Neurath. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, were certain of the collaborators close -collaborators of Von Papen? Was Von Papen subject to action by the -Gestapo? - -GISEVIUS: To start with, the entire group around Von Papen was -continuously under surveillance by the Gestapo because in the earlier -years there was an impression among great masses of people that Von -Papen was a special advocate for decency and right. A large group -collected around Von Papen and that, of course, was most carefully -watched by the Gestapo. As the complaints, which Von Papen received by -the score, were carefully compiled in his office, and as no doubt Von -Papen quite often took these papers either to Göring or to the -Hindenburg palace, the closest collaborators of Von Papen were -especially suspected by the Gestapo. So it was that on 30 June 1934 -Oberregierungsrat Von Bose, the closest collaborator of Von Papen, was -shot dead in the doorway of Von Papen’s office. The two other colleagues -of Von Papen were imprisoned, and the man who wrote Von Papen’s radio -speeches, Edgar Jung, was arrested weeks before the 30th of June; and on -the morning of 1 July, he was found murdered in a ditch along the -highway near Oranienburg. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did Von Papen continue in office after that? - -GISEVIUS: I have never heard that he resigned; and I know that very soon -after the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss was murdered, he was sent to -Vienna as Hitler’s ambassador. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he ever make any protests that you know of? - -GISEVIUS: I personally heard of none at the time, although, we were -naturally extremely eager to hear which minister would protest. However, -no letter from Papen arrived at the Ministry of the Interior. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were some of his collaborators murdered after the -Anschluss in Austria? - -GISEVIUS: On the day of the Anschluss, when the SS entered Austria, Von -Papen’s closest collaborator, Legation Counsellor Freiherr von Ketteler, -was kidnapped by the Gestapo. We searched for him for weeks, until 3 or -4 weeks later his body was washed up on the banks of the Danube. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After that did Papen continue to serve as a part of -the Hitler Government and accept further offices from Hitler’s hands? - -GISEVIUS: He was no longer a member of the Government at the time. -Immediately after the march into Austria Von Papen was disposed of by -being made envoy. However, it was not long before he continued his -activities as Ambassador at Ankara. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Does the Tribunal desire to rise at this point? - -THE PRESIDENT: You would like a little more time, wouldn’t you, with -this witness? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It will take a little more time, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 26 April 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH DAY - Friday, 26 April 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal: - -Dr. Gisevius, yesterday you made some reference to Herbert Göring in -saying that Schacht had sent word to you about the Gestapo microphones -in Schacht’s house. Will you tell us who Herbert Göring was in relation -to the defendant? - -GISEVIUS: Herbert Göring was a cousin of the Defendant Göring. I had -known him for many years. Herbert, as well as his brothers and sisters, -warned me already years ago about the disaster which would overtake -Germany if at any time a man like their cousin Hermann Göring should get -a position of even the smallest responsibility. They acquainted me with -the many characteristics of the defendant which all of us had come to -know in the meantime, starting with his vanity, and continuing with his -love of ostentation, his lack of responsibility, his lack of scruples, -even to the extent of walking over the dead. In this way I already had -some idea what to expect of the defendant. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, during the period when you were making these -investigations and having these early conversations with Schacht, and up -until about 1937, you, as I understand it, were very critical of Schacht -because he had helped the Nazis to power and continued to support them. -Is that true? - -GISEVIUS: I did not understand how an intelligent man, and one who was -as capable in economics as he was, could enter into such a close -relationship with Hitler. I was all the more bewildered because, on the -other hand, this man Schacht, from the very first day and in a thousand -small ways resisted the Nazis, and the German public took pleasure in -many sharp and humorous remarks which he made about the Nazis. Great was -my bewilderment, until I actually met the man Schacht. And then... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During this period Schacht did have great influence -with the German people, did he not, particularly with German people of -responsibility and power? - -GISEVIUS: He had great influence to the extent that many Germans hoped -to find a proponent of decency and justice in him, since they heard that -he undertook many steps in that direction. I remember his activity in -the Ministry of Economics, where officials who were not Party members... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think we have covered that, and I am anxious to -get along with this, if I may interrupt you. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During this period you reported to Dr. Schacht -fully concerning your findings about the criminal activities of the -Gestapo, did you not? - -GISEVIUS: Yes; from time to time I spoke more frankly, and it is obvious -that I... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he took the position, as I understand you, that -Hitler and Göring did not know about these things. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. He was of the opinion that Hitler did not know anything -about such terrible things, and that Göring knew at most only a part. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he stood by Göring until 1937, when Göring -pushed him out of the economics office, did he not? - -GISEVIUS: I believe that was at the end of 1936. I may be wrong. I -believe it would be more correct to say that he looked for support from -Göring and hoped that Göring would protect him from the Party and the -Gestapo. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, Schacht did not heed warnings about -Göring until late 1936 or 1937? - -GISEVIUS: That is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And during this period there would be no doubt, -would there, that Schacht was the dominant economic figure in the -rearmament program until he was superseded by Göring with the Four Year -Plan? - -GISEVIUS: I do not know whether everything went through like that -exactly. He was, of course, as Minister of Economics, the leading man in -German economy, not only for rearmament but for all questions of German -economy; rearmament was just one of them. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now Schacht believed, and as I understand it, you -too believed during all this period that under German constitutional law -no war could be declared except by authority of the Reich Cabinet. Is -that correct? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, from the point of view of the -German Constitution, the war was illegal, by German law, as declared and -carried out by Hitler, in your view. - -GISEVIUS: According to our firm conviction, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think we found out yesterday the position you -were to have if there was a successful overthrow of the Hitler regime. -Schacht was under consideration for Chancellor, was he not, if that -movement was successful? - -GISEVIUS: No. It is only correct as to the first offer that Halder made -in August of 1938, or perhaps July 1938, when he visited Schacht for the -first time. At that time, according to the information which I received, -Halder asked Schacht whether, in the case of an overthrow, he would be -ready to take over a position like that. Schacht replied that he would -be ready for anything if the generals would eliminate the Nazi regime -and Hitler. - -As early as the year 1939 individual opponents formed a group, and at -the last, when Beck was the acknowledged head of all conspirators from -the left to the right wing, Goerdeler emerged in the foreground together -with Beck as the leading candidate for the position of Reich Chancellor, -so that after that time we need speak only of Goerdeler in that regard. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to ask you some questions about the -Defendant Keitel. Of course, we have heard that Hitler was the actual -head of the state, but I want to ask you whether Keitel occupied a -position of real leadership and power in the Reich. - -GISEVIUS: Keitel occupied one of the most influential positions in the -Third Reich. I would like to say at this point that I was a very close -friend of four of the closest collaborators of Keitel. One was the Chief -of the Ordnance Office in the OKW, the murdered General Olbricht; the -second was the Chief of the Counterintelligence Service, Admiral -Canaris, who was also murdered; the third was the Chief of the Army -Legal Department, Ministerial Director Sack—he was also murdered—and -finally there was the chief of the armament economy department, General -Thomas, who escaped being murdered as though by a miracle. A close -friendship, I might say, bound me to these men, and thus from these men -I found out exactly what tremendous influence Keitel had over the OKW -and in all Army matters, and thereby what influence he wielded in -representing the Army in the eyes of the German people. - -It may be that Keitel did not influence Hitler to a great extent. But I -must testify here to the fact that Keitel influenced the OKW and the -Army all the more. Keitel decided which documents were to be transmitted -to Hitler. It was not possible for Admiral Canaris or one of the other -gentlemen I mentioned to submit an urgent report to Hitler of his own -accord. Keitel took it over, and what he did not like he did not -transmit, or he gave these men the official order to abstain from making -such a report. Also, Keitel repeatedly threatened these men, telling -them that they were to limit themselves exclusively to their own -specialized sectors, and that he would not protect them with respect to -any political utterance which was critical of the Party and the Gestapo, -of the persecution of the Jews, the murders in Russia, or the -anti-Church campaign, and, as he said later, he would not hesitate to -dismiss these gentlemen from the Wehrmacht and turn them over to the -Gestapo. I have read the notes in regard to this which Admiral Canaris -made in his diary. I have read the notes of General Oster in regard to -this from the conferences of commanders in the OKW. I have talked with -the Chief Judge of the Army, Dr. Sack, about this, and it is my strong -wish to testify here that Field Marshal Keitel, who should have -protected his officers, repeatedly threatened them with the Gestapo. He -put these men under pressure, and these gentlemen considered that a -special insult. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, whether Keitel could control Hitler -or not, he did have a very large control of the entire OKW underneath -him. Is that not true? - -GISEVIUS: Did you say Hitler? No, Keitel. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whether Keitel could control Hitler or not he did -control and command the entire OKW underneath him? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, whatever Hitler’s own inclinations -may have been, these men in this dock formed a ring around him which -kept out information from your group as to what was going on unless they -wanted Hitler to hear it, isn’t that a fact? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. I believe that I should cite two more examples which I -consider especially significant. First of all, every means was tried to -persuade Keitel to warn Hitler, before the invasion of Belgium and -Holland, and to tell him, that is Hitler, that the information which had -been submitted by Keitel regarding the alleged violation of neutrality -by the Dutch and Belgians was wrong. The counterintelligence was to -produce these reports which would incriminate the Dutch and Belgians. -Admiral Canaris at that time refused to sign these reports. I ask that -this be verified. He told Keitel repeatedly that these reports, which -were supposedly produced by the OKW, were wrong. That is one example -when Keitel did not transmit to Hitler what he should have transmitted. -The second was that Keitel was asked by Canaris and Thomas to submit to -Hitler the details of the murders in Poland and Russia. Admiral Canaris -and his friends were anxious to prevent even the beginning of these mass -murders and to inform Keitel while the first preparations by the Gestapo -were being made for these infamous actions. We received the documents, -through Nebe and others. Keitel was informed as to this in detail, and -here again he did not resist at the beginning; and he who did not stop -the Gestapo at the beginning can not be surprised if in the end a -millionfold injustice was the upshot. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, I think you put your question, “Did -not these men in the dock form a ring which prevented you getting to -Hitler,” and the question was answered rather as though it applied only -to Keitel. If you intended to put it with reference to all defendants, I -think it ought to be cleared up. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that is true. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Each of the defendants who held ministerial -positions of any kind controlled the reports which should go to Hitler -from that particular ministry, did he not? - -GISEVIUS: As far as this general question is concerned, I must reply -cautiously, for, first of all, it was a close clan which put a cordon of -silence around Hitler. A man like Von Papen or Von Neurath cannot be -included in this group, for it was obvious that Von Papen and Von -Neurath, and perhaps one or the other of the defendants, did not have -the possibility, or much later no longer had the possibility, of having -regular access to Hitler, for besides Von Neurath, Hitler already had -his Ribbentrop for a long time. Thus I can only say that a certain -group, which is surely well known, composed the close circle of which I -am speaking. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like you to identify those of the -defendants who had access to Hitler and those who were able to prevent -access to Hitler by their subordinates. That would apply, would it not, -to Göring, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Frick, and to -Schacht—during the period until he broke with them, as you have -testified—and to Dönitz, Raeder, Sauckel, and Speer? - -GISEVIUS: You mentioned a few too many and some are missing. Take the -Defendant Jodl, for instance. I would like to call your attention to the -strange influence which this defendant had and the position he had with -regard to controlling access to Hitler. I believe my testimony shows -that Schacht, on the other hand, did not control access to Hitler, but -that he could only be glad about each open and decent report which got -through to Hitler from his and other ministries. As far as the defendant -Frick is concerned, I do not believe that he was necessarily in a -position to control access to Hitler. I believe the problem of Frick -centers in the matter of responsibility. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Should I have included Funk in the group that had -access to Hitler? - -GISEVIUS: Funk, without a doubt, had access to Hitler for a long time, -and for his part Funk had of course the responsibility to see that -affairs in the Ministry of Economics and in the Reichsbank were -conducted in the way Hitler desired. Without a doubt Funk put his -surpassingly expert knowledge at the service of Hitler. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you prepare or participate in preparing reports -which were sent to Keitel as to the criminal activities of the Gestapo? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did others participate with you in the preparation -of those reports? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, it was the work of a group. We gathered reports about -plans and preparations of the Gestapo, and we gathered material about -the first infamous acts, so that some courageous men at the front, -officers of the General Staff and of the Army, went to the scene, -prepared reports, made photographs, and this material came then to both -Canaris and Oster. Then the problem arose: how can we bring this -material to Keitel? It was generally known that officers, even highly -placed officers like Canaris and Thomas, were forbidden to report on -political matters. The difficulty was, therefore, not to have Canaris -and the others come under the suspicion that they were dealing with -politics; we employed the roundabout method of preparing so-called -counterintelligence agents’ reports from foreign countries or from -occupied countries; and with the pretext that different agents from all -countries were here reporting about these outrages, or that agents -traveling through or in foreign countries had found such infamous -photographs we then submitted these reports to Field Marshal Keitel. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did Canaris and Oster participate in -submitting those reports to Keitel? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. Without Canaris and Oster the working out and the -gathering of this material would have been inconceivable. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what positions did Canaris and Oster hold with -reference to Keitel at this time when these reports were being -submitted? - -GISEVIUS: Canaris was the senior officer of the OKW. Formally he even -had to represent Keitel when Keitel was absent. Keitel was only -concerned that someone else should take his place at such times, usually -his Party general, Reinecke; and Oster, as the representative, Chief of -Staff for Canaris, was also in close association with Canaris. Keitel -could not have wished for closer contact with reality and truth than -through this connection with the Chief of his Wehrmacht -Counterintelligence Service. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So these reports which were sent to Keitel came -from the highest men in his own organization under himself? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what did they report to Keitel? Let me ask you -if they reported to him that there was a systematic program of murder of -the insane going on. - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. On these subjects, too, records were completed in -detail including the despairing reports of the directors of the lunatic -asylums. I recall this exactly because here, too, we had great -difficulties in giving a reason for these reports, and we actually put -them through as reports of foreign doctors who had heard of these things -with indignation. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he report to him the persecution and murder of -the Jews and the program of extermination of the Jews that was being -carried out? - -GISEVIUS: From the first Jewish pogroms in 1938 on Keitel was minutely -informed of each new action against the Jews, particularly about the -establishment of the first gas chamber, or rather, the establishment of -the first mass graves in the East, up to the erection of the murder -factories later. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did these reports mention the atrocities that were -committed in Poland against the Poles? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed, here I would say again that the atrocities in -Poland, too, started with isolated murders which were so horrible that -we were still able to report on single cases, and could add the names of -the responsible SS leaders. Here, too, Keitel was spared nothing of the -terrible truth. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did that condition of informing Keitel also -prevail as to the atrocities against nationals in other occupied -countries? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. First of all I must of course mention the atrocities in -Russia, because I must emphasize that Keitel now certainly, on the basis -of the Polish atrocities, had been warned sufficiently as to what was at -hand in Russia. And I remember how the preparation of these orders, such -as the order for the shooting of commissars and the Night and Fog -Decree, was continued for weeks in the OKW, so that, as soon as the -preparation of these orders was begun, we begged Canaris and Oster to -present a petition to Keitel. But I would like to add that I do not -doubt that other courageous men also presented a petition to Keitel in -this connection. Since I belonged to a certain group, the impression -might be created that only in this group were there persons who were -interested in these problems, and I would be withholding vital -information if I did not add that even in the High Command of the OKW -and in the General Staff there were excellent men who did everything to -reach Keitel through their separate channels, and that there were also -brave men in many ministries who tried to reach every officer whom they -saw in order to plead with him to order a stop to this injustice. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the reports to Keitel mention the forced -enslavement of millions of foreign workers and their deportation or -importation into Germany? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And those enslaved laborers are the displaced -persons, largely, of this day—that are plaguing Germany today, are they -not? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. In this connection I would also like to say that -in our reports it was already mentioned just what responsibility the -Wehrmacht would have to bear if these ill-treated people should be free -some day. We had an idea of what was to come, and those who made the -reports at that time can understand what has now taken place. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the reports to Keitel report the persecution of -the churches in the occupied countries? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, they did. I would like to cite as a special example how -we even once sent leading churchmen to Norway in the guise of agents. -They established contact with Bishop Bergraf, and brought back very -detailed reports of what Bishop Bergraf thought about the persecution of -the churches in Norway and other countries. I can still see this report -before me because Keitel also wrote one of his well-known National -Socialist Party phrases on this document. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, these reports consisted both of information -furnished by Canaris and Oster and of the reports coming in from the -field under this plan? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I want to ask you a few questions about the SA and -the SS organizations. In your book, which you have been asked about, I -think you have characterized the SA as a private army of the Nazi -organization. Is that a correct characterization? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During the early part of the struggle for power the -SA constituted a private army for carrying out the orders of the Nazi -Party, did it not? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They took in a good many people in the SA, and it -got pretty large, and there came a time when there was some danger it -would get away from them; wasn’t there? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, that is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the murder of Röhm and his associates was a -struggle for power, was it not, between Göring and Himmler and the Nazi -crowd associated with them on one hand and Röhm and his associates on -the other? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After the murder of Röhm, this SA organization, -which was very big at the time, rather lost importance, didn’t it? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, completely. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the SS, which was a smaller and more compact -organization, came in to take its place as a private army, didn’t it? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, as the decisive private army. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let’s go back to the SA during the period -before the struggle for power resulting in the Röhm purge. What part did -the SA play in the battle for power, the seizure of power? - -GISEVIUS: As is said in the song, “It cleared the streets for the Brown -Battalions,” and without a doubt the SA played a dominant role in the -so-called seizure of power. Without the SA Hitler would undoubtedly -never have come to power. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let’s take up their methods. Perhaps I can -shorten this by quoting from your book. I think you say that: - - “Whoever had not entirely made up his mind, had it made up for - him unequivocally by the SA. Their methods were primitive, - therefore all the more effective. For instance, one learned the - new Hitler salute very quickly when, on the sidewalks, beside - every marching SA column—and where were there no parades in - those days—a few stalwart SA men went along giving pedestrians - a crack on the head right and left if they failed to perform the - correct gesture at least three steps ahead of the SA flag. And - these Storm Troopers acted the same way in all things.” - -Is that a correct account of their activities and influence? - -GISEVIUS: I hope so. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you know so, don’t you? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, yes, of course, for it is my own description, I cannot -criticize it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, but you saw these things yourself, did you -not? You were in Germany at that time? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You see, it is very difficult for us, with all the -documents we have, Doctor, to get the picture of the day to day events, -and you were there and we were not. - -Now, let me make another question: - - “The chronicle of that private army is colorful and stirring. It - teemed with beer hall brawls, street fights, knifings, - shootings, and fist fights, altogether a mad rough and tumble - affair, where naturally there was no question of crises of - leadership or of mutinies. In this brotherhood of the wild men - of German nationalism there was undoubtedly much idealism, but - at the same time the SA was the repository for political - derelicts. The failures of all classes found refuge there. The - discontents, the disinherited, the desperados streamed to it - wholesale. The core, the paid permanent group, and particularly - the leaders, were recruited, as time went on, more and more from - the riffraff of a period of political and social decay.” - -Is that a correct statement of your observations of the SA at that time? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, quite. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I call your attention to another question: - - “The SA organized huge raids. The SA searched houses. The SA - confiscated property. The SA cross-examined people. The SA put - people in jail. In short, the SA appointed themselves permanent - auxiliary police and paid no attention to any of the principles - of the so-called system period (Weimar Republic). The worst - problem for the helpless authorities was that the SA never - returned its booty at all. Woe unto anyone who gets into their - clutches! - - “From this time dated the ‘Bunker,’ those dreaded private - prisons of which every SA Storm Troop had to have at least one. - ‘Taking away’ became the right of the SA. The efficiency of a - Standartenführer was measured by the number of arrests he had - made, and the good reputation of an SA man was based on the - effectiveness with which he ‘educated’”—in quotation marks, the - quotation marks being yours—“‘educated’ his prisoners. Brawls - could no longer be staged in the fight for power, yet the - ‘fight’ went on, only the blows were now struck in the full - enjoyment of power.” - -Is that a correct statement of your observations of the SA? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you also used the term “Bunker,” and it is -a slightly technical term with which some of us are not familiar. Will -you tell the Tribunal what this Bunker system of the SA was? - -GISEVIUS: Bunkers were those cellars or other dungeons with thick walls -in which the poor prisoners were locked up, where they were then beaten -and in a large measure beaten to death. They were these private jails in -which, during the first months, the leaders of the leftist parties and -of the trade unions were systematically rendered harmless, which -explains the phenomenon that the leftist groups did not act again for so -long a time, for there, at the outset and most thoroughly, the entire -leadership was done away with. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You also use the expression “‘taking away’ became -the inalienable right of the SA,” and “taking away” is in quotation -marks. Will you tell us about this “taking away,” what it means? - -GISEVIUS: That was the arbitrary arrest, whereby the relatives often for -periods of weeks or months did not know where the poor victims had -disappeared to, and could be glad if they ever returned home. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you also make this observation in your -book: - - “Every excess, pardoned as ‘overzealousness in the cause of the - National Socialist Revolution,’ was a demonstration of official - sanction and necessarily drew in its wake a new excess. It was - the bestiality tolerated during the first months that later - encouraged the sadistic murderers in the concentration camps. - The growth in brutality and insensibility of the general public, - which toward the end of the revolution extended far beyond the - domain of the Gestapo, was the unavoidable consequence of this - first irresponsible attempt to give free rein to the Brown - Shirts for their acts of violence.” - -Does that, too, represent your observation of the SA? - -GISEVIUS: Yes—not of the SA alone but also of general conditions in -Germany. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, will you tell us about—as I understand you, -after the Röhm Purge the SA was rather abandoned as the private army, -and a more reliable and smaller and more compact private army was -created under Himmler. - -GISEVIUS: A guard which had been established by Himmler long before this -time now actually came into action. I do not doubt that Himmler and his -closest circle for years had worked toward this very objective so that -one day, with their Schutztruppe (protective guard), they could -establish the terror system in Germany. But until 30 June the SS had -been a part of the SA, and Göring—excuse me, Röhm was also the chief of -the SS. The road for Himmler to police chief in Germany, to police chief -of evil, was only open after Röhm had been eliminated with his much -larger SA. But the will to power of the SS and all the confused and -unscrupulous ideas connected therewith must be assumed to have existed -in the leadership of the SS already for many years previous to that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, this SS organization selected its members with -great care, did it not? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Will you tell us something about the qualifications -for membership? What was necessary? - -GISEVIUS: The members had to be so-called Nordic types. Actually I -always considered these questionnaires as a good subject for a humorous -paper, and for that reason I am not in a position today to give you -exact particulars, except that, if I am not mistaken, the distinguishing -characteristics of men and women went so far as underarm perspiration. I -recall that Heydrich and Himmler, in selecting SS men who were to do -police duty, decided only after a picture had been submitted to them of -the future victim who would be charged with carrying out their evil -commands. I know that, for example, Nebe repeatedly saved officials in -the criminal police force (Kripo) from being transferred to the ranks of -the Gestapo by having poor photographs taken of these people so that, as -far as possible, they did not look Nordic. In that case, of course, they -were turned down immediately. But it would be going too far afield to -relate more about these dismal things in this courtroom. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, was the membership of the SS recruited only -from what we may call fanatical Nazis, reliable Nazis? - -GISEVIUS: I believe we have to make a distinction. In the first years of -the SS, many decent German people, especially farmers and people in the -country, felt drawn to the SS, because they believed Himmler’s assurance -that the SS was to bring order to Germany and to be a counterbalance to -the SA terror. In that way, to my knowledge, some people in the years -before 1933, and even in 1933 and 1934, entered the SS, because they -hoped that here would be a nucleus standing for order and right, and I -believe it is my duty to point out the tragedy of these people. Each and -every case should be examined before deciding whether, later on, a -member was guilty or whether he remained decent. - -But from a certain period of time on—I believe I specified yesterday -1935—no one could have any doubts as to the real SS objectives. From -then on—here I would like to take up your own expression—fanatical -National Socialists, that is, “super” National Socialists, entered the -SS. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And from 1935 on, was it, in your judgment as one -who was on the ground, necessarily so, that the persons who entered it -knew what its actual activities were? - -GISEVIUS: Yes; what he was entering into and what orders he had to -expect. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Tribunal wishes me to ask you in reference to -yesterday’s incident if you have anything to add. I know nothing further -on that incident, in reference to the threat made. Is there anything -that you wish to add about that incident in order to make it clear to -the Tribunal, anything that has not been told about it? - -GISEVIUS: I would like to make clear that Dr. Dix did not merely inform -me about a discussion he had with Dr. Stahmer. That morning I arrived in -the room of the attorneys, and I do not wish to state further -particulars, but the atmosphere there was not exactly cordial to begin -with. Then I went up to Dr. Dix to report something else. Dr. Stahmer -approached, obviously very excited, and asked Dr. Dix for an immediate -interview. Dr. Dix refused on the ground that he was talking to me. Dr. -Stahmer said in a loud voice that he must speak to Dr. Dix immediately -and urgently. Dr. Dix took only two steps aside and the conversation -that followed was carried on by Dr. Stahmer in such a loud voice, that I -was bound to hear most of it. I did hear it and said to attorney Dr. -Kraus who was standing nearby, “Just listen how Dr. Stahmer is carrying -on.” Dr. Dix then came over to me, very excited, and after all this -fuss, in response to my questions as to what precisely was the demand of -the Defendant Göring, he told me what I had half heard anyway. I would -like to underline that if I had had the opportunity to tell the story -first in my own way, I would have emphasized that I was under the -impression that Dr. Stahmer had merely transmitted a statement, or -rather what I would call a threat, by the Defendant Göring. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in this Nazi regime, after Hitler came to -power, will you state whether there was, as far as you could see, a -systematic practice of the Nazi ministers and Nazi officials enriching -themselves by reasons of their confiscation of property of Jews and -others? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. This became more cynical from year to year and we kept -lists as to which of the civil ministers and, above all, which of the -generals and field marshals participated in this system. We planned to -inquire of all the generals and ministers at a later date whether these -donations had been put into a bank account or whether they had possibly -used this money for their own personal interests. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And will you state to the Tribunal which of the -defendants were engaged in self-enrichment in the manner that you have -indicated? - -GISEVIUS: I am sorry I am only able to give a negative reply since we -repeatedly inquired from the Defendant Schacht... - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this will be a good time to adjourn for 10 -minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dr. Gisevius, I have just a few more questions -which I would like to put to you in reference to the war and the -resistance movement of which you were a part. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, there is just one question I should -like to ask the witness. You said that you kept lists of the ministers -and generals who participated in this system of spoils. What was your -source of information? - -GISEVIUS: We had information from the various ministries, from -antechambers of ministries, and from the Finance Ministry. But I did not -finish the answer before. I said that I could answer the question as to -which of the defendants had enriched himself only in the negative. - -Concerning the Defendant Schacht, I wanted to continue saying that I -personally did not look into these lists, and that I took part only in -the questioning of the Defendant Schacht and that he personally had not -enriched himself. I did not intend to say in any sense, therefore, that -all the defendants, especially Defendants Von Papen or Von Neurath, to -name only these two, had enriched themselves. I do not know. I wanted to -say only that about Schacht we know, or rather I know, that he did not -take part in that system. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, in addition to a system of spoils from -confiscated property, there were also open gifts from Hitler to the -generals and ministers, were there not, of large sums of property and -money? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. These were the famous donations with which, especially in -the years after the outbreak of the war, the top generals were -systematically corrupted. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did that hold true with reference to many of -the ministers? - -GISEVIUS: I do not doubt it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as I understood your testimony, whatever -doubts you may have had before 1938 when the affair Fritsch occurred, -that event or series of events convinced even Schacht that Hitler was -bent on aggressive warfare. - -GISEVIUS: After the Fritsch crisis Schacht was convinced that now -radicalism and the course toward war could no longer be stopped. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was never any doubt in the minds of all of -you men who were in the resistance movement, was there, that the attack -on Poland of September 1939 was aggression on Hitler’s part? - -GISEVIUS: No, no, there could be no doubt about that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that diplomatic means of righting whatever -wrongs Germany felt she suffered in reference to the Corridor and Danzig -had not been exhausted? - -GISEVIUS: I can only point to the existing documents. There was no will -for peace. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in the German resistance movement, as I -understand you, there was agreement that you wanted to obtain various -modifications of the Treaty of Versailles, and you also wanted various -economic betterments for Germany, just as other people wanted them. That -was always agreed upon, was it not? - -GISEVIUS: We were all agreed that a calm and a reasonable balance could -be achieved again in Europe only when certain modifications of the -Versailles Treaty were carried through by means of peaceful -negotiations. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your difference from the Nazi group was chiefly, in -reference to that matter, one of method. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: From the very beginning, as I understand you, it -was the position of your group that a war would result disastrously for -Germany as well as for the rest of the world. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that the necessary modifications, given a -little patience, could be brought about by peaceful means. - -GISEVIUS: Absolutely. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it was in the light of that difference of -opinion, I suppose, that your resistance movement against the regime in -power in Germany carried out these proposals for Putsche and -assassinations which you have described. - -GISEVIUS: Yes, but I would like to add that we were not only thinking of -the great dangers outside, but we also realized what dangers lay in such -a system of terror. From the very beginning there was a group of people -in Germany who still did not even think of the possibility of war, and -nevertheless protested against injustice, the deprivation of liberty, -and the fight against religion. - -In the beginning, therefore, it was not a fight against war, but if I -may say so, it was a fight for human rights. From the very first moment -on, among all classes of people, in all professional circles, and in all -age groups, there were people who were ready to fight, to suffer, and to -die for that idea. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question may arise here as to what your -motives and what your purposes in this resistance movement were with -reference to the German people, and I shall ask you to state to the -Tribunal your overall purpose in resisting the Government in power in -your country. - -GISEVIUS: I should like to say that death has reaped such a rich harvest -among the members of the resistance movement, that it is only for that -reason I can sit here, and that otherwise more worthy and able men could -give this answer. Having said this, I feel that I can answer that, -whether Jew or Christian, there were people in Germany who believed in -the freedom of religion, in justice, and human dignity, not only for -Germany but also, in their profound responsibility as Germans, for the -higher concept of Europe and the world. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was a group which composed this resistance, -as I understand it. - -GISEVIUS: It was not only just a group, but many individuals had to -carry the secret of their resistance silently to their death rather than -confide it to the Gestapo records; and only a very few persons have -enjoyed the distinction of being referred to now as a group. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Most of the men who were associated with you in -this movement are dead? - -GISEVIUS: Almost all of them. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there anything you would like to add to clarify -your position to the Tribunal, Dr. Gisevius? - -GISEVIUS: Excuse me, I did not understand you. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there anything you would like to add in order -that the Tribunal may understand your position in this, your feeling, -your very strong feeling in this matter, to understand and appraise your -own relation to this situation? - -GISEVIUS: I do not like to talk of myself, but I want to thank you, Mr. -Prosecutor, for giving me an opportunity to testify emphatically on -behalf of the dead and the living. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have concluded the examination. - -MAJOR GENERAL G. A. ALEXANDROV (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): -Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Was not the understanding arrived at with Counsel for the -Prosecution that the witness for the Defendant Frick should only be -cross-examined by one prosecutor? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, I have an agreement with the prosecutors -to the effect that the examination of the Defendant Schacht and his -witnesses will be carried out by the American Prosecution, but that, in -the presence of additional questions during cross-examination, the -prosecutor from the Soviet Prosecution could also join in the -examination. In view of the fact that the Soviet Prosecution has several -additional questions to ask the witness Gisevius, which are of great -importance to the case, I ask permission to address these questions to -the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: What are the questions which you say are of particular -importance to the Soviet Union? I do not mean the individual questions -but the general nature of them. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Questions in connection with the part played by the -Defendant Frick in the preparation for war, questions connected with the -attitude of the Defendant Schacht towards the Hitler regime, as well as -a number of other important questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn in order to consider whether -the Prosecution ought to be allowed to cross-examine this witness in -addition to the cross-examination which has already taken place. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has before it two documents which were -presented to it by the Chief Prosecutors upon the subject of -cross-examination. In the first of these documents it was provided that -the following procedure for the cross-examination of the Defendants -Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Frank, Frick, Streicher, and Funk was agreed; and -that with reference to Frick the American Prosecution was to conduct the -cross-examination of the defendant and his witness. The document was -presented because of the Tribunal’s express desire that too much time -should not be taken up by the cross-examination by more than one -prosecutor. - -In addition to that document there was another document, which was only -a tentative agreement, and with reference to the Defendant Schacht it -provided that the American delegation should conduct the principal -cross-examination and the Soviet and the French delegations should -consider whether either would wish to follow. - -In view of those two documents, the first of which suggests that the -Prosecution have agreed to only one cross-examination of the witnesses -of the Defendant Frick, and the second of which tentatively suggests -that, in addition to the American Prosecution, the Soviet and the French -might wish to cross-examine, the Tribunal propose to allow the -additional cross-examination in the present instance, and they are loath -to lay down any hard and fast rule concerning cross-examination. They -hope, however, that in the present instance, after the full -cross-examination by the Prosecutor of the United States, the Soviet -Prosecutor will make his cross-examination as short as possible. For the -future, the Tribunal hopes that the prosecutors may be able to agree -among themselves that in the case of witnesses one cross-examination -only will be sufficient, and that in any event the additional -cross-examination will be made as brief as possible. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Witness, in order to save time, I beg you to answer my -questions as briefly as possible. - -Tell me, what part did the German Ministry of the Interior and the -Defendant Frick personally play in the preparation for the second World -War? - -GISEVIUS: This question is very difficult for me to answer. I left the -Ministry of the Interior as early as May 1935, and I actually cannot say -any more about conditions after that time than any other German, that -is, that the Ministry of the Interior was part of the German government -machine and doubtlessly there, as in all other ministries, those -preparations for war were made which administrations have to make in -such cases. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: May I say something? The witness has just stated that -he could not say any more in answering that question than any other -German could. I believe that, under these circumstances, the witness is -not the right person to make any factual statements. - -THE PRESIDENT: He has just said so himself. That is exactly what he -said. I don’t see any reason for any intervention. The witness said so. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: I only meant that he could not even function as a -witness concerning these facts. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: For perfectly obvious reasons I am deprived of all -possibility to put these questions to any German, but I am perfectly -satisfied with the answers of the witness Gisevius. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Do you know anything about the so-called -“Three Man College”? It consisted of the Plenipotentiary for the -Administration of the Reich, of the Plenipotentiary for Economy, and of -a representative of the OKW. This Three Man College was entrusted with -the preparation of all fundamental questions pertaining to the war. - -GISEVIUS: I personally cannot give any information on that. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Do you know anything about the activities of the -Ministry of the Interior in territories occupied by the Germans? - -GISEVIUS: As far as I know, the Ministry of the Interior sent important -officials into the military administration, but it is not clear to me -whether these officials, from that moment on, were subordinate to the -Ministry of the Interior or the OKW. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you any special knowledge as to whether the -machinery of the Reich Commission in the occupied territories of the -Soviet Union was recruited from the Ministry of the Interior or at least -with considerable help from this ministry? - -GISEVIUS: I should assume so, yes. It holds good as far as help is -concerned, because the ministry for the occupied Russian territories -could take its officials only from the personnel department of the -Ministry of the Interior. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know of the visits paid by the Defendant -Frick to the concentration camps? - -GISEVIUS: At the time when I was in the Ministry of the Interior I did -not hear anything about that. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: And after that? - -GISEVIUS: After that I did not hear anything about it either. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Could a situation arise in which the Defendant Frick, -although Minister of the Interior, would not be informed regarding the -system of concentration camps established in Germany and of the violence -and lawlessness practiced in the camps? - -GISEVIUS: I believe that I have already yesterday given exhaustive -information as to the fact that we were informed about everything. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In this particular case I am interested in the -Defendant Frick. What do you know about him in this connection? - -GISEVIUS: I have said yesterday that the Reich Ministry of the Interior -received numberless calls for help from all over the country, and -yesterday we even saw a letter from the Ministry of Justice. Also I have -referred... - -THE PRESIDENT: This subject was fully covered yesterday. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall pass on to the next question. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Are you acquainted with the secret law -issued in Germany in 1940 concerning the killing of sick persons and the -old? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the attitude of the Defendant Frick towards -the promulgation and enforcing of this law? - -GISEVIUS: I assume that he, as Minister of the Interior, signed it. - -THE PRESIDENT: The law, if there was a law, was after 1935, was it not? -What is the law that you are putting? If it was in 1935, then this -witness was not in the Ministry of the Interior. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am speaking of the law which was promulgated in 1940. - -THE PRESIDENT: He would not know anything about it any more than anybody -else. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am satisfied with the answer which I have received -from the witness. Will you now allow me to proceed to questions -concerning the Defendant Schacht? - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, you were in close relations with -the Defendant Schacht for a considerable period of time; have I -understood you correctly? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Thus you were sufficiently acquainted with the state -and political activities of the Defendant Schacht? - -GISEVIUS: I believe so, yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell me, what do you know about the part played by the -Defendant Schacht in Hitler’s seizure of power? - -GISEVIUS: That was just the time when I did not yet know Schacht, and -about which I cannot give any information. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know about it? - -GISEVIUS: I knew only that he entered the Cabinet and that without doubt -he assisted Hitler in the preliminary political negotiations. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Do you know anything about the meeting engineered by -Schacht between Hitler and the big industrialists, in February 1933? - -GISEVIUS: No. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: As a result of this meeting a fund was created by the -industrialists with a view to guaranteeing the success of the Nazi Party -at the elections. What do you know about this meeting? - -GISEVIUS: I know nothing about this meeting. In my book I wrote that to -my knowledge the largest amount for the election campaign in 1932 was -given by Thyssen at that time and Grauert, a member of the Rhein-Hessian -iron and steel industry group. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the part played by the Defendant Schacht on -this occasion? - -GISEVIUS: At that time I did not see Schacht in the Ruhr district, and I -also do not know whether he was there at that time. I emphasize again -that I did not know him at all. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I know that. But in your book entitled _Until the -Bitter End_, published in 1946, and in your replies to preliminary -interrogations by defendant’s counsel Dix, you favorably described the -Defendant Schacht; is that correct? - -GISEVIUS: I did not understand the last words. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I repeat that you favorably described the Defendant -Schacht; is that correct? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You state that as from 1936, the Defendant Schacht was -in opposition to Hitlerite regime, and that he expressed these opinions -in a fairly open manner; is that true? - -GISEVIUS: No, I state expressly that beginning with 1936 his suspicions -were aroused, but that he only became an opponent of Hitler during the -Fritsch crisis. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In which year do you place this crisis? - -GISEVIUS: End of 1937 and beginning of 1938. The Fritsch crisis was at -the beginning of 1938. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell us, under the then existing regime in Germany, -could a situation arise where Hitler would not be informed as to these -opposite views of Schacht which, according to you, existed at the end of -1937? - -GISEVIUS: You mean that Hitler was not informed after 1938? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: No. I asked you, could it be possible, under the then -existing regime in Germany, that Hitler was not informed as to this -antagonistic attitude on the part of Schacht? - -GISEVIUS: Hitler knew very well that Schacht was very critical towards -the system and that he frequently expressed disapproval. He often -received letters from Schacht and of course heard a great deal, too. But -he did not know how far that opposition went. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then how could Schacht remain in the Government of the -Reich, as Minister without Portfolio and personal adviser to Hitler, -right up to January 1943, if Hitler, as you say, was fully aware of his -critical attitude towards his, Hitler’s, policy? - -GISEVIUS: Hitler always took care to let prominent individuals disappear -quietly or put them in the shade so that foreign propaganda could not -take advantage of these facts. The Schacht case is not the only one in -which Hitler tried to camouflage an open crisis. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Were you acquainted with a letter from Hitler of 19 -January 1939, addressed to Schacht, who at that time was being relieved -of his post as President of the Reichsbank? I should like to remind you -of the contents of that letter in which Hitler writes to Schacht as -follows: - - “I avail myself on the occasion of your release from the post of - President of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank to thank - you most warmly, most sincerely for the services you have - repeatedly rendered while in that position, to Germany and to me - personally, during long and arduous years. Above all else, your - name will be connected forever with the first period of national - rearmament. I am happy that you will now be able, as - Reichsminister, to proceed to the solution of new tasks...” - -THE PRESIDENT: This was all gone over yesterday by the witness. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Please forgive me, but I have a question to put to the -witness in connection with this letter. - -[_Turning to the witness._] It would appear, from the contents of this -letter, that in January 1939—and I stress the date, Witness—Hitler -expressed his appreciation of Schacht’s activities rather differently -from the manner in which you worded your evidence. How do you reconcile -this divergence of opinion with your assertion that the Defendant -Schacht was already in direct opposition to Hitler’s regime towards the -end of 1937 and the beginning of 1938? - -GISEVIUS: I should like to answer that I am not accustomed to consider -any written or oral proclamation by Hitler as truthful. That man always -said only that which seemed opportune to him at the moment to deceive -the world or Germany. In this particular case Hitler intended to avoid -the impression that Schacht’s resignation would cause a difficult -economic crisis. But I am only saying now what Hitler could have had in -his mind. Yesterday I described with what indignation Schacht received -that letter. He considered it derision and debasement. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then I shall refer to another document, to a letter -from Schacht himself addressed to Hitler. This is a memorandum of 7 -January 1939, in which Schacht wrote to Hitler: - - “From the very beginning the Reichsbank has realized that the - fruits of a successful foreign policy can only be obtained if - this policy is founded on the rebirth of the Wehrmacht. It - therefore took upon itself, to a very large extent, the - financing of the armament program, despite the monetary and - political difficulties involved. The justification of this - consisted in the necessity, which far outweighed all other - arguments, of manufacturing arms immediately, _ex nihilo_, often - even under disguise, in order to ensure a foreign policy which - would command respect.” - -Do you also consider this document as an expression of Schacht’s -attitude? - -GISEVIUS: As far as I have understood, you refer to a letter from the -year 1935, is that correct? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I refer to a letter of 7 January 1939. - -GISEVIUS: Please pardon me. Then I can say only what I said yesterday: -that all these letters were very carefully written so that they could -not be considered a provocation, and the factual contents of the letter -made illusory lest Hitler should simply say, “This is a personal attack -on me.” I said yesterday that the problem was to convince the other -conservative ministers, who were not so much against Hitler, about the -actual situation and neutralize any opposition. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the attitude of the Defendant Schacht towards -the Anschluss? - -GISEVIUS: The Anschluss happened right in the middle of the Fritsch -crisis, or probably at the dramatic climax, and that is why we were -firmly convinced that this was a particularly malevolent case of -camouflage, and in that sense we were indignant. We had no doubt that -the German Army was to be diverted outwards... - -THE PRESIDENT: Witness, wait a minute. You were asked if you knew what -the attitude of Schacht was to the Anschluss question at that time. You -are not answering that question. Do you or do you not know? - -GISEVIUS: I cannot give a definite answer about that, because all of us -saw clearly that the problem of Austria had to be solved in a legal way. -There were differences of opinion with regard to this question in our -group. Most of us hoped that the independence of Austria could be -preserved. Especially from the German point of view, it was desirable -that another independent German State should exist, if at any later time -there should be a League of Nations or diplomatic negotiations. However, -I cannot state under oath whether Schacht personally was of that opinion -or whether he was for an outright annexation. He was certainly against -the method. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall quote an excerpt from a speech made by Schacht -in Vienna, in March 1938: - - “Thank God, these matters could not, in the end, hinder the - forward march of the great German people, for Adolf Hitler has - created a community of German will and thought, he supported it - with the reborn strength of the Wehrmacht, and thereby gave an - outward form to this spiritual union of Germany and Austria.” - -Do you qualify these statements of Schacht’s also as expressions of his -opposition to the Hitler regime? - -GISEVIUS: I would have to be able to read the speech in its entirety. I -personally would not have said it, but I do not know whether pure -judgment on my part here serves any purpose. Would it not be better to -ask Schacht what he meant? - -THE PRESIDENT: The speech can be put to Schacht when he goes into the -witness box, if he does. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell me, Witness, you are currently residing in -Switzerland? In which town? - -GISEVIUS: I live near Geneva in a village called Commugny. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: How long have you lived in Switzerland? - -GISEVIUS: Since the first of October 1940. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did you know about Schacht’s arrival in Switzerland in -1943? - -GISEVIUS: No. He did not come to Switzerland in 1943. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In 1942? - -GISEVIUS: He did not come to Switzerland in 1942 either. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then Schacht was not in Switzerland either in 1942 or -1943? - -GISEVIUS: That is correct. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In all the time that you yourself lived in Switzerland, -did you ever meet the Defendant Schacht or not? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, repeatedly. I was in Berlin at least every 4 weeks or 8 -weeks and until 1943... - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: No. I am asking you about Schacht’s visit to -Switzerland. - -GISEVIUS: During the war there was only one visit to Switzerland by -Schacht—in 1941, on the occasion of his wedding trip, and then I saw -him. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: That was in 1941? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: On 14 January 1946, an article was published in the -newspaper _Basler Nachrichten_, entitled “What Schacht Thinks.” Do you -know anything about that article? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know about that article? - -GISEVIUS: Not more than I read in the paper about it. I have tried to -find out who that American was with whom Schacht had the conversation. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: The details do not interest me. - -One last question: Did you know anything about a conference held at -Hitler’s house in Berchtesgaden, in the summer of 1944, when the -advisability of killing imported foreign workers was discussed, in the -case of further successful advances by the Allied Forces? Did you hear -anything about that conference? - -GISEVIUS: No, at that time I could not go to Germany any more, because -there were proceedings against me, and I heard nothing about that. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I have no further questions to ask. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then do you wish to re-examine, or does any other member -of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask questions of the witness? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, yesterday during the cross-examination the -American prosecutor submitted to you a letter of 14 May 1935 by the -Reich Minister of Justice to the Reich and Prussian Minister of the -Interior. In that letter there is an enclosure which mentions a copy of -a letter by an inspector of the Secret State Police. Witness, did I -understand you correctly to say that you personally assisted in writing -that letter? - -GISEVIUS: We had cross-connections between the Ministry of the Interior -and the Ministry of Justice, and at times it was desirable, if a letter -of a severe nature came from another ministry, for me to present it to -my minister. And I do not doubt that Frick was also glad when he -received a sharp letter, so that he could submit a matter in a general -way and before the Cabinet. Thus I remember that the sending of that -letter was discussed in advance with several gentlemen of the Ministry -of Justice and with myself. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Do I understand you correctly then that the letter was -a joint effort of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the -Interior to do something against the Gestapo terror? - -GISEVIUS: As for myself, I can certainly say “yes.” I was at that time a -member of the Ministry of the Interior. Of course I did not speak to my -chief about that point. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: In that letter we find on Page 5 of the German text -the following sentence—I quote: - - “In the concentration camp at Hohnstein in Saxony, inmates had - to stand under a dripping apparatus especially constructed for - that purpose, until the drops of water, falling at regular - intervals, produced serious infected injuries on the scalp.” - -Do you know that the guards of that camp were heavily punished for that? - -GISEVIUS: No, and if that happened it was an astounding exception. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, then I have one more question. That is in -connection with the statement which you just made, that there was an -atmosphere of hostility toward you in the room of the attorneys due to -the incident which has been mentioned. A number of colleagues are deeply -shocked by that statement of yours, and these colleagues were glad that -you described conditions in Germany so openly. Could you tell me whether -that statement you made applies to all of the Defense Counsel? - -GISEVIUS: I am grateful to you that you give me the opportunity to -correct an apparent misstatement, or a misunderstanding which was -created by my statement. I meant a different incident which occurred as -I entered the counsel room, about which I do not want to speak any -further here. I wish to emphasize that I realize the difficult task of -the Defense Counsel, and that I want to apologize if in any way the -impression was created or might be created that I had reproached the -great majority of the Defense Counsel in the carrying out of their -difficult task. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: I thank you. I have no more questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gisevius, I want to ask you some questions to try and -get clear what your various positions were and where you were at various -times. - -As I understand it, in 1933 you were a civil servant, is that right? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: And then you became a member of the Gestapo? - -GISEVIUS: The first position I held as a qualified civil servant was in -the service of the Political Police. In Germany one is a civil servant -even in the training stage. Therefore I have to say that I received my -first real position as an official in August of 1933 when I entered the -Gestapo. - -THE PRESIDENT: And when did you leave that position? - -GISEVIUS: The end of December 1933. - -THE PRESIDENT: And to what position did you go? - -GISEVIUS: Then I entered the Ministry of the Interior; that is to say, -the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. In the course of the year 1934 I -also entered the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and in May of 1935 I -was dismissed from the Ministry of the Interior. - -Then I came into the newly created, or to-be-created, Reich Criminal -Office, which, at its beginning, was the Police Presidium in Berlin. On -the date when Himmler was appointed Reich Chief of Police, on 17 June -1936, I was finally dismissed from the police service. - -I was then transferred to the Government office in Münster, worked there -in price control supervision, and, in the middle of 1937, I took an -unpaid vacation, ostensibly to make studies in economics. That vacation -was canceled by the Ministry of the Interior at the beginning of 1939, -and I was attached to the Government office in Potsdam near Berlin. -There I had to do with road building... - -THE PRESIDENT: In the middle of 1937 you took unpaid service and studied -in economics, I think you said, or an unpaid vacation. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: You still remained a member of the civil service then, -did you? - -GISEVIUS: Yes; until the 20th of July I was continuously in the civil -service. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then, in the beginning of 1939 you were posted to the -Ministry of the Interior and attached to Potsdam? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on; after that? - -GISEVIUS: When war broke out the difficulty arose that I had no -mobilization order and, on the other hand, my friends wanted to have me -in the OKW. From the date of the outbreak of the war until 1 October -1940 I had only a forged mobilization order, and every day I expected to -be found out. At which time I would have had to take the consequences. - -After the fall of Paris I stated to Canaris and Oster that I would have -to ask them now to release me from that somewhat complicated situation. -At that time the position of Canaris, temporarily, was so strong that he -placed me in an intelligence position with the Consulate General in -Zürich. There I received the title of a Vice Consul with the Consulate -General in Zürich, and I stayed there as a counterintelligence man, -without belonging to the Abwehr formally, until 20 July. - -After 20 July I was dismissed from all posts, and I do not know whether -I was not even deprived of citizenship. I have found out nothing about -that. - -THE PRESIDENT: Between the time you went to Zürich and 20 July, were you -returning to Germany from time to time? - -GISEVIUS: During that time I was mainly in Germany, and only from time -to time Oster and Canaris sent me to Switzerland as a courier, on travel -orders. Schacht was still quite helpful to me at that time in getting me -a Swiss visa, through the Swiss Legation. - -THE PRESIDENT: During the time that you were in the Gestapo, from August -to December 1933, what was your actual job or function? - -GISEVIUS: When I received my first civil service position I was only in -training, and I was attached to the then Chief of the Executive -Department, Oberregierungsrat Nebe, for training. After the warrant for -arrest was issued, at the end of October 1933, I was sent to Leipzig as -a reporter for the Reichstag Fire trial. - -THE PRESIDENT: You spoke yesterday very often of a man whose name I am -not clear about, Nebe, I believe it was. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: What was his position? - -GISEVIUS: Nebe was a well-known criminologist at the Berlin Police -headquarters before 1933. As a National Socialist he was called into the -Gestapo in July 1933 and until the beginning of 1934; he was promoted -there to Oberregierungsrat. Then we were successful, with the aid of the -Defendant Frick, in having him transferred for some time to the Ministry -of the Interior. And then he became the founder and Chief of the Reich -Office of Criminology. On the day of the appointment of Himmler as Chief -of Police of the Reich he was put into the new Reich Security Main -Office. In the course of time he was taken over into the SS; he became -an SS Gruppenführer, SS General, and, until 20 July, he was one of the -closest subordinates of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. The Defendant -Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Gestapo as well as the Criminal Police -and the Information Service. So that thereby Nebe became a subordinate -of Kaltenbrunner and received continuously official orders from him, -just like the Gestapo Chief Müller. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you wish to ask any questions, Dr. Dix? - -DR. DIX: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps we had better do that after the adjournment -at a quarter past 2. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. DIX: The Soviet Prosecutor put a question to you in connection with -the annexation of Austria. While answering the question you were -interrupted. You had just said, I quote “But the form...” Would you -please complete your answer now? - -GISEVIUS: What I wanted to say was that Schacht was undoubtedly opposed -to the Anschluss in this form. - -DR. DIX: Then I have one last question, which concerns the so-called -incident of yesterday. I discussed this incident with you yesterday and -explained the situation as regards my colleague Dr. Stahmer. I also gave -you permission to make use of this explanation at any time. - -I now request you to give this explanation to the Tribunal. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I interpose an objection. I think that is a -most irregular way to inform the Tribunal, if there is anything the -Tribunal should be informed about, that Dr. Dix should tell the witness -what the witness should tell the Tribunal. - -Now, I have no objection to the witness’ relating to the Tribunal -anything that he knows from his own knowledge. I do object to the -witness’ being asked to relate what Dr. Dix has told him he may tell the -Tribunal. I think that is a most irregular way of clarifying it. - -DR. DIX: That is not the case. I made a remark about Dr. Stahmer to Dr. -Gisevius. That is a matter between the witness and myself; I consider it -important that this remark of mine be related and testified to by the -witness. It is an incident which he observed, and I prefer that the -witness should confirm the fact that I explained this to him. I cannot -see anything irregular about this procedure, and I ask for a decision by -the Tribunal. Otherwise I should make the explanation myself, but I -consider it better for the witness to say what I told him immediately -after that incident. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that you may properly put the -question to the witness. - -DR. DIX: I have already put the question, and you may answer it at this -time. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am not quite sure now what your question was, but the -Tribunal thinks that you may put the question. Was there anything in -connection with the incident which the witness has not already told us, -which he wishes to say? - -DR. DIX: Yes. The question relates to a conversation between the witness -and myself. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, what did I tell you yesterday? - -GISEVIUS: You told me immediately that, in your opinion, your colleague -Dr. Stahmer did not wish to put undue pressure upon me but that this -undue pressure came rather from the Defendant Göring. - -DR. DIX: I have no further questions. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, were you, during the war... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, are you attempting to re-examine? - -DR. SEIDL: I wanted to put a single question... - -THE PRESIDENT: I was not thinking of the time which you would take up, -but the question of whether you ought to be allowed to put any question. -Yes, go on, Dr. Seidl. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, during the war were you at any time active in the -intelligence service of a foreign power? - -GISEVIUS: At no time. - -DR. SEIDL: It is also not correct... - -THE PRESIDENT: That is not a question which you ought to put to this -witness in re-examination. - -DR. SEIDL: But, Mr. President, it is a question affecting the -credibility of this witness. If it should turn out that this witness, -who is or was a citizen of the German Reich, had been active in the -intelligence service of a foreign power, that fact would have an -important bearing on the credibility of the witness. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to be heard on that. In the first -place, I do not think that this witness should be subjected to any -attacks. In the second place, I respectfully submit that it does not -militate against the credibility of the witness that he should have -opposed this kind of an organization. I think that the attack upon the -credibility of this witness, if there were one to be made—he is sworn -on behalf of the defendants and is not the Prosecution’s witness—the -attack is not timely, is not a proper attack, and the substance of it -does not go to credibility. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will allow you to put the question. - -DR. SEIDL: Please answer my question and remember your oath. - -GISEVIUS: Mr. Attorney, it is not at all necessary for you to remind me -of my oath. I have said that I was never in the intelligence service of -a foreign power. I was in the service of a good, clean German cause. - -DR. SEIDL: During the war did you receive funds from any power at war -with Germany? - -GISEVIUS: No. - -DR. SEIDL: Do you know what the three letters OSS mean? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: What do they stand for? - -GISEVIUS: They stand for an American intelligence service. - -DR. SEIDL: You had nothing to do with that organization? - -GISEVIUS: I had friendly and political contacts with several members of -this organization. - -DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions to put to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: I hope the defendants’ counsel will remember that they -have all had a free opportunity to cross-examine this witness already -and have not... - -DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): The person of Herr -Von Papen was not mentioned until the cross-examination by the American -prosecutor. Therefore I could not ask questions before. - -Witness, you replied in the negative to a question put by the American -chief prosecutor yesterday as to whether the Defendant Von Papen at any -time protested. Of course, you modified this by pointing out that some -written communication by Von Papen had not been addressed to the -Ministry of the Interior. - -In order to clarify this problem, I should like to know whether this -assertion of yours refers only to the Ministry of the Interior. On Page -133 of your book you pointed out that one of the Defendant Von Papen’s -main activities as Vice Chancellor consisted in handing in protests and -that he addressed these protests above all to Hindenburg and Göring. - -GISEVIUS: I again emphasized the latter point yesterday or today. I have -no official knowledge of any protest made by Von Papen to the competent -police minister after 30 June 1934. I can say only that it would greatly -have strengthened the position of the ministry of police if a protest of -that nature, describing in detail the murder of Von Papen’s closest -co-workers, had reached the Ministry of the Interior. In that case, it -is unlikely that this rumor about the suicide or rather the suspicious -death of Von Bose and Jung would have reached the public. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you not think that it is understandable, especially -considering the position held by Frick, the comparatively insignificant -and uninfluential position held by Frick, that one should make such -protests to higher authorities if it is possible to do so? - -GISEVIUS: At the very moment when the ministers took the position that -they could apply only to higher authorities, that is, the dictator -himself, they, of their own accord, shattered the constitutional -competency of the individual ministries and the Cabinet. - -It would have meant a great deal if Herr Von Papen at that time had used -the prescribed channels. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: In agreement with your book, you do not dispute the fact -that Von Papen made many protests to these higher authorities in respect -to other questions as well? - -GISEVIUS: No; he did protest frequently. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yesterday, within the scope of your general statements -you gave an unfavorable characterization of the Defendant Von Papen. -This character sketch coincides with the one you gave in your book. In -your book you pay special attention to certain details and draw your -conclusions from them. - -Since the Defendant Von Papen only occupies a comparatively small amount -of space in your book and you probably had nothing to do with him in -your official capacity, you must have had to base your statements on -second-hand information. Since all these statements, as far as they -refer to Von Papen, are incorrect, I refer to them briefly. - -First, you proceed from the assumption that, in spite of the events of -30 June, Von Papen did not resign. - -On the contrary, it is historically significant that Papen did send in -his resignation after the suppression of his Marburg speech, that -negotiations about this resignation were pending between Hitler and -Hindenburg, and that Hitler accepted Papen’s resignation immediately -after the latter’s release on 3 July, when it was again tendered, but -did not intend to make it public until a later date, in spite of Papen’s -request to the contrary. - -Is it possible, Witness, that you were not correctly informed of this -internal event? - -GISEVIUS: It is perfectly possible for me not to have known of internal -events. I should like, however, to stress the fact that a minister or -vice chancellor is under an obligation to give a certain amount of -publicity to his opinion and to his decisions; and I can say only that, -whatever Papen may have said to Hitler in private, he contrived with -consummate skill to conceal from the German people the fact that he -intended to resign—or had already resigned; and that is the point. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Are you aware that this same Defendant Von Papen had had -a very bad experience a few weeks earlier, when the press was forbidden -to publish his speech at Marburg, which contained a frank statement of -his opinions, and warning was given that persons found circulating it -would be punished? - -GISEVIUS: I am aware of it because we were appalled that a Vice -Chancellor of the German Reich allowed himself to be silenced in such a -way. I believe that the 30th of June would not have involved such a -heavy death-roll for the middle classes if Vice Chancellor Von Papen had -given a manly “no”—a definite “no” at the proper time. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Your answer makes no reference to the point which I -raised before, that Von Papen had actually resigned because the -publication of his Marburg speech had been prohibited. - -Secondly, you make the assumption that Von Papen took part in the -Cabinet session of 3 July, in which the law was passed that the measures -involved by 30 June were legal as emergency measures for the protection -of the State. Is it known to you that Von Papen did not participate in -this session, that he had just been released and went into the -Chancellery while the session was in progress, that Hitler asked him to -go from the session-room into the adjoining room, that Von Papen again -tendered his resignation, which Hitler accepted, and that he left the -Chancellery immediately afterwards, without participating in the session -at all? - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether it is possible for the witness to -follow your questions, but they are so long and contain so many -statements of fact that it is very difficult for anybody else to follow -them; it is very difficult for the Tribunal. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: The gist of my question was that Von Papen did not attend -the Cabinet session on 3 July. My question to the witness... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, why do you not ask the witness whether he -knows whether he did participate or not? If that is the question you -want to ask why do you not ask it? - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: My question is simply an attempt to find out whether the -assertion to the contrary which appears in his book can also be -explained by an error in information obtained from a third party. - -GISEVIUS: It can be explained by false information, which, through the -silence of Herr Von Papen, became known to the public and by which I -myself was misled. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thirdly, you go on with the statement that Von Papen, -although he went to see Hindenburg afterwards, did not make a -sufficiently strong protest against the measures taken. Is it known to -you that Von Papen did everything in his power to reach Hindenburg but -was kept away from him and he did not reach Hindenburg’s estate at -Neudeck until after the 30th of June, after Hindenburg’s death? Can the -assertion to the contrary contained in your book be traced back to an -error in information? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, if you tell me that even in his capacity of Vice -Chancellor of the Reich he did not have access to the President of the -Reich and still remained in office, in spite of the fact that there were -foreign journalists, the foreign diplomatic corps, and even a large -number of Germans who heard of this attitude of a German vice -chancellor. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: But, Witness, you are forgetting that he was a retired -vice chancellor and had already been out of office for several weeks. - -Fourthly, you start with the premise that Von Papen attended the -Reichstag session at which the measures taken on 30 June were justified. -Do you know that Von Papen did not attend that session in spite of -Hitler’s summons to him to do so? Is it possible that you could have -been informed incorrectly on that point, too? - -GISEVIUS: I believe you have already asked me that. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, this is not the Cabinet session; this is the -Reichstag session. - -GISEVIUS: Yes, then I must be misinformed. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you. - -[_Dr. Laternser approached the lectern._] - -GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, it seems to me that the Defense has had -every opportunity to interrogate this witness. After the witness was -examined by the Prosecution, after his cross-examination, the Defense -makes again an application to cross-examine the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks, at any rate, that it is perfectly -able to manage its own proceedings without any interruptions of this -sort. We can deal with Dr. Laternser when he makes his application to -cross-examine. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. I merely wanted to say that -we would like to shorten the duration of the proceedings as much as -possible, and the Prosecution would like the Defense to consider that -the same way. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have several further questions to put to -the witness, arising from his cross-examination; I assume that the -Tribunal have no objection to my questioning him. - -THE PRESIDENT: No, if they arise out of the cross-examination of him. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, yesterday, in answer to a question of the -American prosecutor, you expressed the opinion that a Putsch against the -then existing regime would have been possible only with the co-operation -of the generals but that the many discussions which took place did not -achieve this co-operation. I should like to ask you, Witness, to which -generals you spoke personally about the existing plans for a Putsch on -the part of your group? - -THE PRESIDENT: You are not concerned with every general in the German -Army; you are only concerned with those who are charged with being a -criminal group. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Your question must be addressed to them, or with -reference to them. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. Then I ask the Court’s permission to -describe to the witness the OKW and General Staff circle so that he can -answer my question. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can put to him, I think, whether he had contact -with any members of the General Staff who are charged with being a -criminal group. You know who the generals are. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes. I should like to make a few preliminary remarks to -the witness and then put the question. Witness... - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, what is the question you want to put? - -DR. LATERNSER: So that the witness can answer the question within the -limits prescribed by the Tribunal, I should like to give the witness a -brief explanation as to the circle of persons actually belonging to this -group and then ask him with which of these persons he talked personally -in order to win them over for the Putsch intended by his groups. -Otherwise... - -THE PRESIDENT: If you do it shortly. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, the group General Staff and OKW is held to -include the holders of certain appointments from February 1938 to May -1945. These appointments are as follows: The Commanders-in-Chief of the -various branches of the Armed Forces... - -THE PRESIDENT: You are not going through the whole lot, are you, 130 of -them? - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the list is really quite short and -otherwise I cannot restrict my question as desired by the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what you mean. What I said was, are you -proposing to go through the whole 130 generals or officers? - -DR. LATERNSER: No, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on. - -DR. LATERNSER: The group includes those holding certain appointments; -briefly, all those who were commanders-in-chief during the period -February 1938 to May 1945. Now, I ask you, with which generals of this -group did you personally discuss the subject of Putsch plans, in order -to obtain their co-operation in a Putsch, if such were made? - -GISEVIUS: You mean commanders-in-chief of groups? - -DR. LATERNSER: Of armies, of army groups, branches of the Wehrmacht, and -General Staff chiefs of the Wehrmacht branches. - -GISEVIUS: I have already mentioned Halder and Brauchitsch. - -DR. LATERNSER: One question, Witness; did you discuss with Field Marshal -Von Brauchitsch an intended Putsch against the regime or only against -the Gestapo? - -GISEVIUS: I discussed both with him; and in both cases he answered in -the affirmative and acted in the negative. - -I spoke to Halder and Witzleben. I knew Kluge well from the old times. I -do not know at what period he entered the category to which you refer. -At any rate my connection with Kluge was never broken off. I may have -talked to other individuals falling within this category. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but to discuss Putsch plans with a high-ranking -military leader is an event of some importance; if you had had a -discussion of this kind with a field marshal you would surely remember -it. - -GISEVIUS: It was not such an important event as all that, Mr. Attorney. -Field marshals were not such important people in the Third Reich. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the fact that these generals were spoken -to and refused to join a Putsch is not a crime within the meaning of the -Charter. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, yesterday I explained that this point is -very important because it would exclude the assumption of a conspiracy. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid, Dr. Laternser, it is no good answering me -that a point is very important. What I asked you was, how is it relevant -to show that these generals discussed a revolt against the regime? That, -I am putting to you, is not a crime within the meaning of the Charter. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but this circumstance would exclude the assumption -of the conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution. - -THE PRESIDENT: But does it preclude the possibility of a conspiracy to -make aggressive war? It has nothing to do with it. - -DR. LATERNSER: I did not quite understand that. - -THE PRESIDENT: The question of a revolt against the regime in Germany -is, it seems to me, not necessarily connected with the conspiracy to -carry out aggressive war; therefore, anything which has to do with a -revolt against the regime in Germany is not relevant to the question -which you have to deal with. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the conspiracy is assumed precisely in -connection with the wars of aggression; and if the high military leaders -turned against the regime to such an extent that they discussed and even -attempted a Putsch, there would be no question of conspiracy. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal think the proper way of -putting the question, which they understand you want to put, is to ask -which of the generals were prepared to join in a revolt. You may put -that question. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, in order to decide how far the circle as a -whole was willing to take part I must ask the witness how many of them -he spoke to and how many of those declared themselves ready to act with -him. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you might put that to him—how many. Ask him how -many. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, that was the question I asked at the -beginning. - -THE PRESIDENT: I said you may put it. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, with how many generals of this -group did you discuss the matter? - -GISEVIUS: In the course of years it may have been a dozen or several -dozen, but I should like to say that it was the task of Generaloberst -Beck and Oster or Canaris to talk to these gentlemen rather than mine. -As regards names, I cannot give you much of the information you want; on -the other hand I can shorten your question by saying that, -unfortunately, very few of the leading generals in the appointments -referred to by the Prosecution ever seriously declared their intention -of helping to overthrow the system. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, that is exactly what I want to know. You spoke -to Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, Halder, and Witzleben? - -GISEVIUS: And Olbricht. - -DR. LATERNSER: He did not belong to this group. You did speak to these -three, then? - -GISEVIUS: Also to Kluge. - -DR. LATERNSER: Regarding the intended Putsch? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, of course. - -DR. LATERNSER: And of these four that you mentioned did Field Marshal -Von Witzleben agree? - -GISEVIUS: They all agreed to begin with. Witzleben was the only one who -stuck to his word. - -DR. LATERNSER: Then he did participate in this Putsch? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did I understand you correctly when you said yesterday -that the Putsch of 20 July originated mainly with the Wehrmacht, that -is, with the generals and the officers of the General Staff, and that -they intended to keep down as far as possible the number of those taking -part? - -GISEVIUS: No, I did not make such an exact statement as that. Under a -terror regime, only the military circles are in a position to carry out -a Putsch; to this extent it is true to say that these few generals who -participated were the mainstay of the Putsch. But on 20 July the main -weight lay with the wide front of the civilians who for years had fought -for the generals and were invariably disappointed by the generals. For -this reason alone, because the generals had repeatedly broken their -word, we decided this time that on 20 July we would wait until the -generals had really taken action, in order not to raise the hopes or -burden the conscience of many civilians all to no purpose. That is what -I meant by limitation. - -DR. LATERNSER: Then the only Putsch which was actually attempted was -effected by generals and General Staff officers? - -GISEVIUS: And civilians. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes. And the head of this group was, as you testified, -Generaloberst Beck? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: And he also belonged to the group indicated under the -name General Staff and OKW. Now, I have a further question: Do you know -of relations between these military leaders and the Minister of Finance -Popitz, who also had designs for a Putsch and is even said to have -negotiated with Himmler for the purpose of doing away with Hitler; and -do you know anything about that? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, that is true. Popitz made great efforts to incite the -generals to make a Putsch and to assassinate him. I regret that I did -not mention his name at the right time. He too was one of those who, -from 1938 or 1939 on, did their best to overthrow the regime. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you discuss that with Minister Popitz? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, repeatedly. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did he tell you anything about the identity of the high -military leaders he had contacted for this purpose? - -GISEVIUS: Popitz was in contact with Beck in particular. He is certain -to have been in contact with Witzleben; he was in touch with Halder and -Brauchitsch. The list of his disappointments is no shorter than the list -of disappointments which all the rest of us had. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did he himself call it a disappointment? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, he was bitterly disappointed. This bitter, everlasting -disappointment was our one topic of conversation, and that was the -difficulty confronting the civilians, Mr. Attorney. - -DR. LATERNSER: There were no other possible ways of doing away with -Hitler? - -GISEVIUS: No. Since, through the fault of the generals, there was no -other means of power, constitutional or otherwise, left in Germany, and -the generals, who were the only armed power of the nation, took their -orders from Hitler, it was impossible to organize opposition through any -other circles. I may remind you that after 1938 every attempt made by -the Leftists to organize a strike was punishable in the same way as -mutiny in time of war, and I remind you of the hundreds of death -sentences imposed on civilians under the war laws. - -DR. LATERNSER: Now, a different subject. When... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that this matter has been fully -covered and is really not relevant. You have already cross-examined this -witness at some length before this, and the Tribunal does not wish to -hear any further evidence on this subject in any further -cross-examination. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have just finished. - -Witness, as regards the Fritsch crisis, when did you... - -THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said you had concluded? - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I am afraid I was misunderstood. I have -concluded those questions referring to an intended Putsch and I should -like to pass on to another point now and put a question on the Fritsch -crisis. - -THE PRESIDENT: What question? - -DR. LATERNSER: As regards the Fritsch crisis I should like to ask the -witness when he learned of the exact state of affairs and whether he -transmitted his knowledge to high military leaders or caused that -knowledge to be transmitted to them. - -THE PRESIDENT: But the Fritsch crisis has nothing to do with the charges -against the High Command. The charges against the High Command are -crimes under the Charter, and the Fritsch crisis has nothing whatever to -do with that. - -DR. LATERNSER: Then I will withdraw that question. - -Witness, today in cross-examination... - -THE PRESIDENT: What are you going to put to him now? - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to ask the witness now about -some points which he made in reply to the American chief prosecutor’s -questions. I believe that some clarification is necessary here. - -THE PRESIDENT: The principle is not whether you think the clarification -is necessary, but whether the Tribunal thinks it; and, therefore, the -Tribunal wishes to know what points you wish to put to him. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes, indeed. In the course of his testimony today the -witness mentioned the fact that he had in his possession documentary -evidence of murders in Poland and Russia. I wanted to ask him who had -prepared these reports and in particular whether he is acquainted with a -very thorough and scientifically prepared report made by Blaskowitz, -commander in Poland, and intended for transmission to his superiors. -That would be an extremely important point. Generaloberst Blaskowitz is -a member of the group which I represent. From the facts to be shown, it -is clear that the members of this group have always taken a stand -against cruelty, if such cases were reported to them through official -channels. I must therefore establish whether these reports, the object -of which was to prevent atrocities, are to be ascribed to the -co-operation of generals belonging to the indicted group. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It seems to me, if I may suggest, Your Honors, that -counsel is under the apprehension that he has here to deal with -individual generals. We are dealing only with the group. If what counsel -says about General Blaskowitz is true, that is a defense for him, and I -am right to say that General Blaskowitz did defy this Nazi conspiracy. -And if that fact is ever verified, he certainly should not be subject to -penalties for the acts which he stood up against. - -It seems to me that we are going into individual defenses here under a -misapprehension that this is the occasion to try each and every one of -the generals. We made no charge against them that they either did or did -not have a Putsch or a Fritsch affair. The Fritsch affair is only -referred to here as fixing the time when the Defendant Schacht became -convinced that aggressive warfare was the purpose of the Nazi regime. -The Putsch is only introduced because in his defense Schacht says he -tried to induce a Putsch. It enters not at all into the case against the -General Staff. And most of the General Staff who took any part in the -Putsch were hanged and I cannot see how it could be any defense to those -who remained and are under trial that a Putsch was or was not conducted. -It seems that we are off the main track. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I would like to define my position with -regard to this point. Unless I am permitted to ask questions about the -attitude of the members of this group and in respect to such an -important point, from which it is clear that they combated atrocities, -it is impossible for me to make clear to the Tribunal the attitude -typical of the high military leaders. It is absolutely necessary for me -to follow up such points, especially since I have no other evidence -material at my disposal; for I cannot consider a group criminal -unless—for instance—the majority of its members actually committed -crimes. I must be in a position to ask in this case what position -Generaloberst Blaskowitz took in regard to the murders which took place -in Poland. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn to consider the matter. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal considers that the questions -that you have been putting, if relevant at all, are only extremely -remotely relevant, and they cannot allow the cross-examination to -continue for any length of time, or the time of the Tribunal would be -wasted further. They think, and they rule, that you may put the question -which they understand you desire to put in this form: The witness has -spoken of reports which were received by the group of which he has -spoken about atrocities in the East, and they think you may ask him who -submitted those reports. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I should like you to answer this question: With -whom did these reports of murders in Poland and Russia originate? - -GISEVIUS: I know of one report made by Generaloberst Blaskowitz during -the first few months of the Polish campaign on the basis of information -received by him and the military offices under him. Beyond that, as far -as I know, such reports were compiled only by the group Canaris-Oster. -But I should not care to assert that another report was not written by -someone else somewhere. - -DR. LATERNSER: What was the aim of the report which Generaloberst -Blaskowitz submitted? - -GISEVIUS: Generaloberst Blaskowitz intended... - -THE PRESIDENT: The report which one particular general made does not -tend to show that the group was either innocent or criminal. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, it helps us to find out what the attitude -of the group was. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the report of one general is not -evidence as to the criminality of the whole group. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, is that question approved? I asked about -the aim of the report. - -THE PRESIDENT: No; the Tribunal is of the opinion that what was -contained in that report is not admissible. - -DR. LATERNSER: I have no more questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may retire. - -Dr. Pannenbecker, that concludes your case, does it? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: The case of the Defendant Frick is hereby concluded, -except for the answers to the interrogatories which I have not yet -received. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Counsel for the Defendant Streicher, Dr. Marx, go -on. - -DR. HANNS MARX (Counsel for Defendant Streicher): With the permission of -the Tribunal, Mr. President, I now call the Defendant Julius Streicher -to the witness box. - -[_The Defendant Streicher took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -JULIUS STREICHER (Defendant): Julius Streicher. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. MARX: Witness, would you give the Tribunal first a short description -of your career? - -STREICHER: I should like to ask the Tribunal to let me make a brief -statement in respect to my defense. Firstly... - -THE PRESIDENT: You really ought to answer the questions that are put to -you. - -STREICHER: My Lord, my defense counsel cannot say what I must say now. I -should like to ask permission—in short, my defense counsel has not -conducted and was not in a position to conduct my defense in the way I -wanted; and I should like to state this to the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you understand that the Tribunal does not wish -to have its time taken up with unnecessary matters. It has no objection -to your stating what is material or to your reading it if necessary. It -hopes that you will be as brief as possible. - -STREICHER: I mention only facts, four facts. - -Firstly, the Charter created for this International Military Tribunal -guarantees the defendant the right to an unhampered and just defense. - -Secondly, before the Trial began the defendants received a list -containing the names of the attorneys from whom the defendant could -choose his counsel. Since the Munich attorney whom I had selected for my -defense could no longer be put at my disposal, I asked the Military -Tribunal to put the Nuremberg attorney Dr. Marx at my disposal. That was -done. - -Thirdly, when I met my counsel for the first time, I told him he must -expect, as my counsel, to be attacked before the public. Shortly -afterwards, an attack was made by a Communist newspaper published in the -Russian zone of Berlin. The International Tribunal was compelled to make -a public statement repudiating the attack of that newspaper and assuring -my counsel of the express protection of the Military Tribunal. - -Fourthly, although the statement made by the International Military -Tribunal left no doubt as to the fact that the Tribunal wished to see -the defense of the defendants unhampered, a renewed attack occurred, -this time by radio. The announcer said, “There are camouflaged Nazis and -anti-Semites among the defendants’ counsel.” That these terroristic -attacks were made with the intention of intimidating the defendants’ -counsel is clear. These terror attacks might have contributed to the -fact—that is my impression—that my own counsel had refused to submit -to the Tribunal a large number of pieces of evidence which I considered -important. - -Fifthly, I wish to state that I have not been afforded the possibility -of making an unhampered and just defense before this International -Military Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: You can rest assured that the Tribunal will see that -everything that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, bears upon the case or -is relevant to your case or is in any way material in your case will be -presented and that you will be given the fairest opportunity of making -your defense. - -STREICHER: I thank you. From my life... - -DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President; may I ask briefly to be permitted to -state my position. May it please the Court, when I was asked to take -over Herr Streicher’s defense, I naturally had grave misgivings. I -have... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, I do not think it is necessary, really, for you -to make any personal explanation at this stage. It is very possible that -the defendant may have different ideas about his own defense. I think we -had better let him go on with his defense. - -DR. MARX: Nevertheless, I should like to ask permission, Mr. President, -just to mention the following point: As attorney and as defense counsel -of a defendant I have to reserve for myself the right to decide how I -shall conduct the defense. If the client is of the opinion that certain -documents or books are relevant, and the attorney is of the opinion that -they are not, then that is a difference of opinion between the counsel -and his client. - -If Herr Streicher is of the opinion that I am incapable or not in a -position to conduct his defense, then he should ask for another defense -counsel. I am aware that at this stage of the proceedings it would be -very difficult for me to follow the matter to its logical conclusion and -ask to be relieved of this task of defense. I am not terrorized by any -journalist, but for a counsel to lose the confidence of his own client -is quite another matter; and for that reason I feel bound to ask the -Court to decide whether in these circumstances I am to continue to -defend my client. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks, Dr. Marx, that the explanation and -the statement which you have just made is in accordance with the -traditions of the legal profession and they think therefore that the -case ought to proceed and that you should proceed with the case. Now, -Defendant, will you go on? - -STREICHER: About my life: I was born on 12 February 1885 in a small -village in Bavaria Swabia. I was the youngest of nine children. My -father was an elementary school teacher. I too became a teacher at an -elementary school. In 1909, after I had taught for several years in my -native district, I was called to the municipal school in Nuremberg. Here -I had the opportunity of contact with the families of the working-class -children in the suburbs and of observing social contrasts. This -experience led to my decision in 1911 to go into politics. I became a -member of the Democratic Party. As a young democratic speaker, I spoke -at the Reichstag election in 1912. The car put at my disposal was paid -for by the banking firm of Kohn. I stress this point because at that -time I had occasion to associate a good deal with Jews, even in the -Democratic Party. I must therefore have been fated to become later on a -writer and speaker on racial politics. - -The World War came and I, too, went into the army as a lance corporal in -an infantry regiment. Then I became an officer in a machine-gun unit. I -returned home with both Iron Crosses, with the Bavarian Order, and the -rare Austrian Cross of Merit attached to the Ribbon for Gallantry. When -I had returned home, I had no desire to go into politics again. I -intended only to stay in private life and devote myself to my -profession. Then I saw the blood-red posters of revolution in Germany -and for the first time I joined the raging masses of that time. At a -meeting, when the speaker had finished, I asked to be heard as an -unknown person. An inner voice sent me onto the platform and I spoke. I -joined in the debate and I spoke on recent happenings in Germany. In the -November revolution of 1918 the Jews and their friends had seized the -political power in Germany. Jews were in the Reich Cabinet and in all -the provincial governments. In my native Bavaria the Minister President -was a Polish Jew called Eisner-Kosmanowsky. The reaction among the -middle classes in Germany manifested itself in the form of an -organization known as Schutz und Trutzbund (Society for Protective and -Offensive Action). Local branches of this organization were formed in -all the large cities in Germany; and fate willed that after I had again -spoken at a gathering, a man came up to me and asked me to come to the -Kulturverein (Cultural Society) in the Golden Hall and hear what they -had to say there. - -In this way, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I became involved in what brings -me here today. Destiny made of me what international propaganda thought -it had made. I was called a bloodhound—a blood czar of Franconia; my -honor was attacked, a criminal was paid 300 marks to swear in this very -hall that he had seen me, as an officer in France during the war, rape a -Madame Duquesne, a teacher’s wife in Atis, near Peronne. It was 2 years -before someone betrayed him and the truth came out. - -Gentlemen, the receipt for 300 marks was produced here in this court. -With 300 marks they tried to deprive me of my honor. - -I mention this case only because my case is a special case; and if it is -to be judged with justice, then I must be allowed to make such a remark -in passing. In this connection, I may say that it is no coincidence that -the first question asked me by the Soviet Russian officer who -interrogated me was whether I was a sex criminal. - -Gentlemen, I told you how I was fated to be drawn into the Schutz und -Trutzbund. I told you what conditions were like in Germany at the time, -and it was therefore quite a natural development that I no longer -visited the centers of revolution to join in debate. I felt myself -impelled to call meetings of my own and so I spoke for perhaps 15 years -almost every Friday before about 5,000 to 6,000 people. I admit quite -frankly that I went on making speeches over a period of 20 years in the -largest cities of Germany, sometimes at meetings on sport fields and on -public squares, to audiences of 150,000 to 200,000 people. I did that -for 20 years, and I state here that I was not paid by the Party. The -Prosecution will never succeed, not even through a public appeal, in -getting anybody into this room who could testify that I had ever been -paid. I still had a small salary which continued after I was relieved of -my position in 1924. Nonetheless, I remained the one and only unpaid -Gauleiter in the Movement. It goes without saying that my writing -supported myself and my assistants later on. - -And so, Gentlemen, in the year 1921—I return now to that period—I went -to Munich. I was curious because someone had said to me, “You must hear -Adolf Hitler some time.” And now destiny again takes a hand. This -tragedy can only be grasped by those whose vision is not limited to the -material, but who can perceive those higher vibrations which even today -have not had their full outcome. - -I went to the Munich Bürgerbräukeller. Adolf Hitler was speaking there. -I had only heard his name. I had never seen the man before. And there I -sat, an unknown among unknowns. I saw this man shortly before midnight, -after he had spoken for 3 hours, drenched in perspiration, radiant. My -neighbor said he thought he saw a halo around his head; and I, -Gentlemen, experienced something which transcended the commonplace. When -he finished his speech, an inner voice bade me get up. I went to the -platform. When Adolf Hitler came down, I approached him and told him my -name. - -The Prosecution has submitted a document to the Tribunal which recalls -that moment. Adolf Hitler wrote in his book, _Mein Kampf_, that it must -have cost me a great effort to hand over to him the movement which I had -created in Nuremberg. - -I mention this because the Prosecution thought that these things in -Hitler’s book, _Mein Kampf_, should be submitted and used against me. -Yes, I am proud of it; I forced myself to hand over to Hitler the -movement which I had created in Franconia. This Franconian movement gave -the movement which Adolf Hitler had created in Munich and southern -Bavaria a bridge to northern Germany. That was my doing. - -In 1923 I took part in the first National Socialist revolution or, -rather, attempted revolution. It will go down in history as the Hitler -Putsch. Adolf Hitler had asked me to come to Munich for it. I went to -Munich and took part in the meeting in which Adolf Hitler came to a -solemn agreement with representatives of the middle classes to go to -northern Germany and put an end to the chaos. - -I marched with them up to the Feldherrnhalle. Then I was arrested and, -like Adolf Hitler, Rudolf Hess, and others, was taken to Landsberg on -the Lech. After a few months I was put up as candidate for the Bavarian -Parliament by the Völkischer Block and was elected in the year 1924. - -In 1925 after the Movement had been permitted again and Adolf Hitler had -been released from jail, I was made Gauleiter of Franconia. In 1933 I -became a deputy to the Reichstag. In 1933 or 1934 the honorary title of -SA Gruppenführer was bestowed on me. - -In February 1940 I was given leave of absence. I lived for 5 years, -until the end of the war, on my estate. At the end of April I went to -southern Bavaria, to the Tyrol. I wanted to commit suicide. Then -something happened which I do not care to relate. But I can say one -thing: I said to friends, “I have proclaimed my views to the world for -20 years. I do not want to end my life by suicide. I will go my way -whatever happens as a fanatic in the cause of truth until the very end, -a fanatic in the cause of truth.” - -I might mention here that I deliberately gave my fighting paper, _Der -Stürmer_, the subtitle, _A Weekly for the Fight for Truth_. I was quite -conscious that I could not be in possession of the entire truth, but I -also know that 80 or 90 percent of what I proclaim with conviction was -the truth. - -DR. MARX: Witness, why were you dismissed from the teaching profession? -Did you ever commit any punishable or immoral act? - -STREICHER: Actually I have answered this question already. Everybody -knows that I could not have been active publicly in this profession if I -had committed a crime. That is not true. I was dismissed from my -profession because the majority of the parties in the Bavarian -Parliament in the fall of 1923, after the Hitler Putsch, demanded my -dismissal. That, Gentlemen, was my crime of indecent behavior. - -DR. MARX: You know that two charges are made against you. First, you are -accused that you were a party to the conspiracy which had the aim of -launching a war, or wars, of aggression generally, of breaking treaties -and by so doing, or even at an earlier stage, of committing Crimes -against Humanity. - -Secondly, you are accused of Crimes against Humanity as such. I should -like to ask various questions on the first point now. Did you ever have -discussions with Adolf Hitler or other leading men of the State or the -Party at which the question of a war of aggression was discussed? - -STREICHER: I can answer that with “no” right away, but I should like to -be permitted to make a short statement. - -In 1921, as I have already said, I went to Munich; and before the public -on the platform I handed over my movement to the Führer. I also wrote -him a letter in this connection later. No other conference took place -with Adolf Hitler or any other person. I returned to Nuremberg and went -on making speeches. When the Party program was proclaimed I was not -present. That announcement, too, was made in public; the conspiracy was -so public that political opponents could make attempts at terrorization. - -To sum up: At none of the secret meetings was any oath taken or anything -agreed upon which the public could not have known. The program stood; it -had been submitted to the Police; on the basis of the law governing -organizations the Party, like other parties, was entered in the register -of organizations. So that at that time there was no conspiracy. - -DR. MARX: Witness, one of the most important points of the Party program -was the demand, “Freedom from Versailles.” What were your ideas as to -the possibility of some day getting rid of the Versailles Treaty? - -STREICHER: I think I can state that very shortly. I believe the Tribunal -has known this for some time. Of course you will sometimes find one -traitor in a people—like the one who was sitting here today; and you -will also find unlimited numbers of decent people. And after the last -war these decent people themselves took up the slogan, “Freedom from -Versailles.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If Your Honor pleases, I think I must object to -this sort of procedure. This witness has no right to call another -witness a traitor. He has not been asked any question to which that is a -response, and I ask that the Tribunal admonish him in no uncertain terms -and that he confine himself to answering the questions here and that we -may have an orderly proceeding. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you will observe that injunction. - -STREICHER: I ask the Tribunal to excuse me. It was a slip of the tongue. - -THE PRESIDENT: The observation that you apparently made I did not catch -myself, but it was made with reference to a witness who has just given -evidence here and you had no right at all to call him a traitor or to -make any comment upon his evidence. - -DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, you will please refrain from making such -remarks. Adolf Hitler always spoke on the anniversary days of the Party -about a sworn fellowship. What do you say about that? - -STREICHER: Sworn fellowship—that meant that he, Hitler, was of the -conviction that his old supporters were one with him in thought, in -heart, and in political loyalty—a sworn fellowship sharing the same -views and united in their hearts. - -DR. MARX: Would not that mean that a conspiracy existed? - -STREICHER: Then he would have said we were a fellowship of conspirators. - -DR. MARX: Was there any kind of close relationship between you and the -other defendants which could be termed a conspiracy, and were you better -acquainted or did you have especially close relations with any one of -these defendants? - -STREICHER: Inasmuch as they were old members of the Party we were one -community of people with the same convictions. We met at Gauleiter -meetings; or when one of us spoke in the other’s Gaustadt, we saw one -another. But I had the honor of getting to know the Reich Ministers and -the gentlemen from the Army only here. A political group therefore—an -active group—certainly did not exist. - -DR. MARX: In the early days of the Party what solution was foreseen for -the Jewish problem? - -STREICHER: Well, in the early days of the Party, the solution of the -Jewish problem was never mentioned just as the question of solving the -problem of the Versailles Treaty was never mentioned. You must remember -the state of chaos that existed at that time in Germany. An Adolf Hitler -who said to his members in 1933, “I shall start to promote a war,” would -have been dubbed a fool. We had no arms in Germany. Our army of 100,000 -men had only a few big guns left. The possibility of making or of -prophesying war was out of the question, and to speak of a Jewish -problem at a time when, I might say, the public made distinctions with -respect to Jews only on the basis of religion, or to speak of the -solution of this problem, would have been absurd. Before 1933, -therefore, the solution of the Jewish problem was not a topic of -discussion. I never heard Adolf Hitler mention it; and there is no one -here of whom I could say I ever heard him say one word about it. - -DR. MARX: It is assumed that you had particularly close relations with -Adolf Hitler and that you had considerable influence on his decisions. I -should like to ask you to describe your relations with Adolf Hitler and -to clarify them. - -STREICHER: Anyone who had occasion to make Adolf Hitler’s acquaintance -knows that I am correct in saying that those who imagined they could -pave a way to his personal friendship were entirely mistaken. Adolf -Hitler was a little eccentric in every respect and I believe I can say -that friendship between him and other men did not exist—a friendship -that might have been described as intimate friendship. It was not easy -to approach Adolf Hitler; and any one who wanted to approach him could -do so only by performing some manly deed. - -If you ask me now—I know what you mean by that question—I may say that -before 1923 Adolf Hitler did not trust me. Although I had handed over my -movement to him unreservedly, he sent Göring—who later became Marshal -of the Reich—some time later to Nuremberg. Göring was then a young SA -leader—I think he was an SA leader—and he came to investigate matters -and to determine whether I or those who denounced me were in the right. -I do not mean this as an accusation, but merely as a statement of fact. -Soon after that he sent a second and then a third person—in short, he -did not trust me before 1923. - -Then came Munich and the Putsch. After midnight, when most of them had -left him, I appeared before him and told him that the public must be -told now when the next great day would come. He looked at me intently -and said, “Will you do it?” I said, “I will do it.” - -Maybe the Prosecution has the document before it. Then, after midnight, -he wrote on a piece of paper, “Streicher will be responsible for the -entire organization.” That was to be for the following day, 11 November; -and on 11 November I publicly conducted the propaganda, until an hour -before the march to the Feldherrnhalle. Then I returned and everything -was in readiness. Our banner—which was to become a banner of -blood—flew in front. I joined the second group and we marched into the -city towards the Feldherrnhalle. When I saw rifle after rifle ranged -before the Feldherrnhalle and knew that now there would be shooting, I -marched up 10 paces in front of the banner and marched straight up to -the rifles. Then came the massacre, and we were arrested. - -I have almost finished. - -At Landsberg—and this is the important part—Hitler declared to me and -to the men who were in prison with him, that he would never forget this -action of mine. Thus, because I took part in the march to the -Feldherrnhalle and marched at the head of the procession, Adolf Hitler -may have felt himself drawn to me more than to the others. - -That was the friendship born of the deed. - -DR. MARX: Have you finished? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Were you consulted by Adolf Hitler on important matters? - -STREICHER: I saw Adolf Hitler only at Gauleiter conferences; when he -came to Nuremberg for meetings we had meals together, along with five, -ten, or more people. I recall having been alone with him only once in -the Brown House at Munich, after the completion of the Brown House; and -our conversation was not a political one. All the conversations which I -had with Adolf Hitler, whether in Nuremberg, Munich, or elsewhere, took -place in the presence of Party circle members. - -DR. MARX: Now I come to 1933. On 1 April 1933 a boycott day was decreed -throughout the entire German Reich against the Jewish population. What -can you tell us about that and what part did you play in it? - -STREICHER: A few days before 1 April I was summoned to the Brown House -in Munich. Adolf Hitler explained to me something that I already knew, -namely, that a tremendous propaganda campaign against the new Germany -was being carried on by the foreign press. Although he himself had only -just become Chancellor, although Hindenburg was still at the head of the -Reich, although Parliament existed, a tremendous campaign of hate -against Germany had begun in the foreign press. - -The Führer told me that even the Reich flag, the emblem of sovereignty, -was being subjected to insults abroad and that we would have to tell -world Jewry, “Thus far and no farther.” We would have to show them that -we would not tolerate it any longer. - -Then he told me that a boycott day was to be fixed for 1 April and that -I was to organize it. Perhaps it would not be irrelevant to point out -the following facts: Adolf Hitler thought that it might be a good thing -to use my name in connection with this boycott day; that was not done in -the end. So I undertook the organization of the boycott and issued a -directive, which I believe is in the hands of the Court. There is no -need for me to say much about it. I gave instructions that no attempts -should be made on the lives of Jews, that one or more guards should be -posted in front of all Jewish premises—that is to say, in front of -every Jewish store—and that these guards should be responsible for -seeing that no damage was done to property. In short, I organized the -proceedings in a way which was perhaps not expected of me; and perhaps -not expected by many members of the Party. I frankly admit that. - -One thing is certain; except for minor incidents the boycott day passed -off perfectly. I believe that there is not even one Jew who can -contradict this. The boycott day was a disciplined proceeding and was -not “anti” in the sense of an attack on something. It has a purely -defensive connotation. - -DR. MARX: Was a committee formed at the time consisting of prominent, -that is, leading members of the Party and did that committee ever -appear? - -STREICHER: As to the committee, it was like the Secret Cabinet Council -in Berlin, which never met. In fact, I believe that all the members of -the Cabinet did not even see each other or get to know each other. - -DR. MARX: The committee members? - -STREICHER: The boycott committee, that was put in the newspapers in -Berlin by Goebbels. That was a newspaper story. I spoke to Goebbels on -the telephone once. He asked how things were going in Munich, where I -was. I said that everything was going perfectly. Thus no conference ever -took place; it was only done for effect, to make it appear a much bigger -thing than it was. - -DR. MARX: Witness, you made a mistake a few minutes ago, speaking of the -Munich affair in 1923. You meant 9 November—or did you not—9 November -1923, and what did you say? - -STREICHER: I do not remember. - -DR. MARX: It should be 9 November 1923? - -STREICHER: 9 November 1923. - -DR. MARX: Yes. The so-called “Racial Law” was promulgated at the Reich -Party Day in Nuremberg in 1935. Were you consulted about the planning -and preparation of the draft of that law; and did you have any part in -it, especially in its preparation? - -STREICHER: Yes, I believe I had a part in it insofar as for years I have -written that any further mixture of German blood with Jewish blood must -be avoided. I have written such articles again and again; and in my -articles I have repeatedly emphasized the fact that the Jews should -serve as an example to every race, for they created a racial law for -themselves—the law of Moses, which says, “If you come into a foreign -land you shall not take unto yourself foreign women.” And that, -Gentlemen, is of tremendous importance in judging the Nuremberg Laws. -These laws of the Jews were taken as a model for these laws. When, after -centuries, the Jewish lawgiver Ezra discovered that notwithstanding many -Jews had married non-Jewish women, these marriages were dissolved. That -was the beginning of Jewry which, because it introduced these racial -laws, has survived throughout the centuries, while all other races and -civilizations have perished. - -DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, this is rather too much of a digression. I -asked you whether you took part in planning and working out the draft of -the law, or whether you yourself were not taken by surprise when these -laws were promulgated. - -STREICHER: I was quite honest in saying that I believe I have -contributed indirectly to the making of these laws. - -DR. MARX: But you were not consulted on the law itself? - -STREICHER: No. I will make a statement, as follows: - -At the Reich Party Day in Nuremberg in 1935, we were summoned to the -hall without knowing what was going to happen—at least I myself had no -knowledge of it—and the racial laws were proclaimed. It was only then -that I heard of these laws; and I think that with the exception of Herr -Hess, _et cetera_, this is true of most of the gentlemen in the dock who -attended that Reich Party Day. The first we heard of these decrees was -at the Reich Party Day. I did not collaborate directly. I may say -frankly that I regarded it as a slight when I was not consulted in the -making of these laws. - -DR. MARX: It was thought that your assistance was not necessary? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Were you of the opinion that the 1935 legislation represented -the final solution of the Jewish question by the State? - -STREICHER: With reservations, yes. I was convinced that if the Party -program was carried out, the Jewish question would be solved. The Jews -became German citizens in 1848. Their rights as citizens were taken from -them by these laws. Sexual intercourse was prohibited. For me, this -represented the solution of the Jewish problem in Germany. But I -believed that another international solution would still be found, and -that some day discussions would take place between the various states -with regard to the demands made by Zionism. These demands aimed at a -Jewish state. - -DR. MARX: What can you tell us about the demonstrations against the -Jewish population during the night of 9 to 10 November 1938, and what -part did you play in it? - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, if you are going into that, it is now 5 -o’clock; and I think we had better adjourn now until Monday morning. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 29 April 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH DAY - Monday, 29 April 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -DR. MARX: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: Before continuing -with questions to the Defendant Streicher, may I ask permission to make -a statement? - -On Friday afternoon, Herr Streicher referred to a case, namely, that -press event which concerned me and my professional attitude. I thereupon -took the opportunity to refer to this case in my statement as well, and -I pointed out that at that time I had had to ask for the protection of -the Tribunal against this damaging attack on my work and that this -protection was given me very graciously. On that occasion and in that -extemporary explanation I used the expression “newspaper writer.” I used -it exclusively with reference to the particular journalist who had -written the article in question in that Berlin newspaper regarding my -person and my activity as a lawyer. - -By no means did I express, or mean to express, a reference to the press -in general. It was far from my intention in any way to attack the press, -the group of press experts, and particularly not the members of the -world press who are active here; nor did I wish to injure their -professional honor. - -The reason for this statement of mine is a statement made on the radio, -according to which I, the attorney Marx, had attacked and disparaged the -press in general. I am, of course, aware of the significance of the -press. I know precisely what the press has to contribute and I should be -the last person to fail to recognize fully the extremely difficult work -and the responsible task of the press. May I, therefore, quite publicly -before this Tribunal ask that this statement be accepted; and may I ask -the gentlemen of the press to receive my statement in the spirit in -which it is made, namely, that this was merely a special comment on that -particular gentleman and not in any way on the entire press. That is -what I wanted to say. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, the Tribunal understood your statement the -other day in the sense in which you have now explained it. - -DR. MARX: Yes. With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall then -continue with my examination. - -Witness, what aims did you pursue with your speeches and your articles -in _Der Stürmer_? - -STREICHER: The speeches and articles which I wrote were meant to inform -the public on a question which appeared to me one of the most important -questions. I did not intend to agitate or inflame but to enlighten. - -DR. MARX: Apart from your weekly journal, and particularly after the -Party came into power, were there any other publications in Germany -which treated the Jewish question in an anti-Semitic way? - -STREICHER: Anti-Semitic publications have existed in Germany for -centuries. A book I had, written by Dr. Martin Luther, was, for -instance, confiscated. Dr. Martin Luther would very probably sit in my -place in the defendants’ dock today, if this book had been taken into -consideration by the Prosecution. In the book _The Jews and Their Lies_, -Dr. Martin Luther writes that the Jews are a serpent’s brood and one -should burn down their synagogues and destroy them... - -DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, that is not my question, I am asking you to -answer my question in accordance with the way I put it. Please answer -now with “yes” or “no,” whether there were... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to interpose an objection to this -method of answering unresponsively and with speeches here. We are -utterly unable in this procedure to make objections when answers are not -responsive to questions. We have already got into this case, through -Streicher’s volunteered speeches, an attack on the United States which -will take considerable evidence to answer if we are to answer it. It -seems to me very improper that a witness should do anything but make a -responsive answer to a question, so that we may keep these proceedings -from getting into issues that have nothing to do with them. It will not -help this Tribunal, in deciding Streicher’s guilt or innocence, to go -into questions which he has raised here against us—matters that are -perfectly capable of explanation, if we take time to do it. - -It seems to me that this witness should be admonished, and admonished so -that he will understand it, if that is possible, that he is to answer -questions and stop, so that we can know and object in time to orations -on irrelevant subjects. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, will you try, when you put the questions to the -witness, to stop him if he is not answering the questions you put to -him? - -DR. MARX: Yes, Mr. President. I was just in the process... - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant Streicher, you understand, you have heard what -has been said and you will understand that the Tribunal cannot put up -with your long speeches which are not answers to questions which we put -to you. - -DR. MARX: I will now repeat the question and I want you to answer the -question first with “yes” or “no” and then to add a brief explanation -regarding the question. - -Apart from your weekly journal, and particularly after the Party came -into power, were there other publications in Germany which dealt with -the Jewish question in an anti-Semitic way? - -STREICHER: Yes, even before the coming to power there were in every Gau -weekly journals that were anti-Semitic and one daily paper called the -_Völkischer Beobachter_ in Munich. Apart from that, there were a number -of periodicals which were not working directly for the Party. There was -also anti-Semitic literature. After the seizure of power, the daily -press was co-ordinated, and now the Party found itself in control of -some 3,000 daily papers, numerous weekly journals, and all type of -periodicals; and orders were given by the Führer that every newspaper -should provide enlightening articles on the Jewish question. The -anti-Semitic enlightenment was, therefore, after the seizure of power, -carried out on a very large scale in the daily press as well as in the -weekly journals, periodicals, and books. Consequently, _Der Stürmer_ did -not stand alone in its enlightening activity. But I want to state quite -openly that I make the claim of having treated the question in the most -popular way. - -DR. MARX: Were the directives necessary for this issued by a central -office, say, for instance, by the National Socialist press service? - -STREICHER: Yes. The Propaganda Ministry in Berlin had a National -Socialist press service. In this service, in every issue, there were a -number of enlightening articles on the Jewish question. During the war -the Führer personally gave the order that the press, far more than -previously, should publish enlightening articles on the Jewish question. - -DR. MARX: The Prosecution accuse you of having contributed indirectly to -mass murders by incitation, and according to the minutes of 10 January -1946, the following charge has been made against you: No government in -the world could have undertaken a policy of mass extermination, as it -was done here, without having behind it a nation which agreed to it; and -you are supposed to have brought that about. What have you to say to -this? - -STREICHER: To that I have the following to say: Incitation means to -bring a person into condition of excitement which causes him to perform -an irresponsible act. Did the contents of _Der Stürmer_ incite, this is -the question? Briefly stated, the question must be answered, “What did -_Der Stürmer_ write?” Several volumes of _Der Stürmer_ are available -here, but one would have to look at all the issues of 20 years in order -to answer that question exhaustively. During those 20 years I published -enlightening articles dealing with the race, dealing with what the Jews -themselves write in the Old Testament, in their history, what they write -in the Talmud. I printed excerpts from Jewish historical works, works -for instance, written by a Professor Dr. Graetz and by a Jewish scholar, -Gutnot. - -In _Der Stürmer_ no editorial appeared written by me or written by -anyone of my main co-workers in which I did not include quotations from -the ancient history of the Jews, from the Old Testament or from Jewish -historical works of recent times. - -It is important, and I must emphasize that I pointed out in all -articles, that prominent Jews, leading authors themselves, admitted that -which during 20 years as author and public speaker I publicly -proclaimed. - -Allow me to add that it is my conviction that the contents of _Der -Stürmer_ as such were not incitation. During the whole 20 years I never -wrote in this connection, “Burn Jewish houses down; beat them to death.” -Never once did such an incitement appear in _Der Stürmer_. - -Now comes the question: Is there any proof to be furnished that any deed -was done from the time _Der Stürmer_ first appeared, a deed of which one -can say that it was the result of an incitement? As a deed due to an -incitement I might mention a pogrom. That is a spontaneous deed when -sections of the people suddenly rise up and kill other people. During -the 20 years no pogrom took place in Germany, during the 20 years, as -far as I know, no Jew was killed. No murder took place, of which one -could have said, “This is the result of an incitement which was caused -by anti-Semitic authors or public speakers.” - -Gentlemen, we are in Nuremberg. In the past there was a saying that -nowhere were the Jews in Germany so safe and so unmolested as in -Nuremberg. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, is not this becoming a rather lengthy speech? - -DR. MARX: Streicher, you have explained this now sufficiently, so that -one can form an opinion—you mean, “I have not incited in such a way -that any spontaneous action carried out against the Jews by any group of -people or by the masses resulted”? - -STREICHER: May I make a remark in this connection? Here we are concerned -with the most serious, the most decisive accusation raised against me by -the Prosecution, and here I ask the Tribunal to permit me to defend -myself against it objectively. Is it not of tremendous significance if I -can establish that in Nuremberg, of all places, no murder took place, no -single murder and no pogrom either? That is a fact. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have already said it. I have just written down, -before I intervened, saying that no Jews have been killed not only in -Nuremberg but anywhere else as a result of your incitement. - -DR. MARX: Witness, we shall make reference to these demonstrations of 9 -and 10 November 1938 later. - -STREICHER: Yes, but may I continue? The Indictment accuses me of having -indirectly contributed by incitation to mass murders, and I ask to be -allowed to make a statement on this: Something has been ascertained -today about which I myself did not know. I learned of the will left -behind by the Führer, and I assume that a few moments before his death -the Führer told the world the truth in that will. In it he says that -mass killings were carried out by his order; that the mass killings were -a reprisal. - -Thus it is demonstrated that I, myself, cannot have been a participant -in the incredible events which occurred here. - -DR. MARX: Finished? - -STREICHER: Yes. You said that the Indictment accuses me in saying that -these mass killings could never have taken place if behind the -Government and behind the leaders of the State there had not been an -informed people. - -Gentlemen, first of all, the question, “Did the German people really -know what was happening during the years of the war?” We know today... - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, that is a matter of argument and not a matter -upon which you can give evidence. You can say what you knew. - -STREICHER: I was a part of that nation during the war. During the war I -lived alone in the country. For 5 years I never left my farm. I was -watched by the Gestapo. From 1939 on I have been forbidden by the Führer -to speak. - -DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, we will certainly come to that later. I have -interrogated you now on this question, and I will proceed with my -questions. The other will come later. - -STREICHER: But I wish to state that I had no opportunity—that is why I -said this—to learn what was actually going on. - -I first heard of the mass murders and mass killings at Mondorf when I -was in prison. But I am stating here that if I had been told that 2 or 3 -million people had been killed, then I would not have believed it. I -would not have believed that it was technically possible to kill so many -people; and on the basis of the entire attitude and psychology of the -Führer, as I knew it, I would not have believed that mass killings, to -the extent to which they have taken place, could have taken place. -Finished. - -DR. MARX: The Prosecution also raise the charge against you that it was -the task of the educators of the nation to educate the people to murder -and to poison them with hatred, that you had devoted yourself -particularly to these tasks. What do you want to answer to this charge? - -STREICHER: That is an allegation. We educated no murderers. The contents -of the articles which I wrote could not have educated murderers. No -murders took place, and that is proof that we did not educate murderers. -What happened during the war—well, I certainly did not educate the -Führer. The Führer issued the order on his own initiative. - -DR. MARX: I now continue. The Prosecution further assert that the -Himmler-Kaltenbrunner groups and other SS leaders would have had no one -to carry out their orders to kill, if you had not made that propaganda -and if you had not conducted the education of the German people along -these lines. Will you make a statement on that? - -STREICHER: I do not believe that the National Socialists mentioned read -_Der Stürmer_ every week. I do not believe that those who received the -order from the Führer to carry out killings or to pass on the order to -kill, were led to do this by my periodical. Hitler’s book, _Mein Kampf_, -existed, and the content of that book was the authority, the spiritual -authority; nor do I believe that the persons mentioned read that book -and carried out the order on the strength of it. Based on my knowledge -of what went on in the Movement, I am convinced that if the Führer gave -an order everyone acted upon it; and I state here quite openly that -maybe fate has been kind to me. If the Führer had ordered me to do such -things, I would not have been able to kill; but perhaps today I would -face some indictment which it has not been possible to lodge against me. -Perhaps because fate has taken a hand in this. But the conditions were -thus, that the Führer had such a power of hypnotic suggestion that the -entire people believed in him; his way was so unusual that, if one knows -this fact, one can understand why everyone who received an order acted. -And thus I want to reject as untrue and incorrect what was here thought -fit to assert against me. - -DR. MARX: What do you know about the general attitude of Adolf Hitler to -the Jewish question? And when did Hitler first become hostile to the -Jews, according to your knowledge? - -STREICHER: Even before Adolf Hitler became publicly known at all I had -occupied myself journalistically with anti-Semitic articles. However, on -the strength of his book, _Mein Kampf_, I first learned about the -historic connections of the Jewish problem. Adolf Hitler wrote his book -in the prison in Landsberg. Anyone who knows this book will know that -Hitler many years back, either by study of anti-Semitic literature or -through other experiences, must have developed this knowledge in himself -in order then to be able to write that book in prison in so short a -time. In other words, in his book Adolf Hitler stated to the world -public that he was anti-Semitic and that he knew the Jewish problem -through and through. He himself often said to me personally... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, the book _Mein Kampf_ is in evidence, and it -speaks for itself. - -STREICHER: I will now answer your question, not with reference to the -book. You asked me whether Adolf Hitler had discussed the Jewish problem -with me. The answer is “yes.” Adolf Hitler always discussed the Jewish -problem in connection with Bolshevism. It is perhaps of importance in -answering that question to ask whether Adolf Hitler wanted a war with -Russia. Did he know long in advance that a war would come, or not? When -he was with us Adolf Hitler spoke of Stalin as a man whom he honored as -a man of action, but that he was actually surrounded by Jewish leaders, -and that Bolshevism... - -DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, that is going too far again. The question -which I put was quite exact, and I am asking you not to go so far -afield. You have heard the Tribunal object to it, and in the interest of -not delaying the proceedings you must not go into so many details. You -must not make speeches. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I believe that some time ago Mr. Justice -Jackson remarked, quite justly, quite reasonably, that the Defendant -Streicher became so intoxicated by his own speeches that he did not -answer the questions put to him or the charges made against him. I -therefore invite the attention of the Tribunal to this fact and suggest -that the defendant abstain from making lengthy speeches and merely give -brief replies to the charges brought against him. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you go on, Dr. Marx, and try to keep the witness to -an answer to the questions which you have no doubt prepared. - -DR. MARX: Very well, Mr. President. - -STREICHER: May I, please, as a defendant, say a few words, here? The -question was... - -THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing._] No, you may not. You will answer the -questions, please. - -DR. MARX: Next question. Is there reason for the assumption that Hitler, -when he decided to have the Jews in Europe killed in masses, was subject -to any influence, or what is to be considered the motive for that -dreadful decision? - -STREICHER: The Führer could not be influenced. As I know the Führer, if -somebody had gone to him and said that Jews should be killed, then he -would have turned him down. And if, during the war, somebody had gone to -him and said, “I have learned that you are giving the order that mass -killings are to be carried out,” then he would have turned that man down -too. I therefore answer your question by saying that the Führer could -not be influenced. - -DR. MARX: In other words, you want to say that the decision in this -matter was made entirely on his own initiative. - -STREICHER: I have already said that that becomes clear from his will. - -DR. MARX: In August 1938 the main synagogue in Nuremberg was demolished. -Was this done on your orders? - -STREICHER: Yes. In my Gau there were approximately 15 synagogues, in -Nuremberg one main synagogue, a somewhat smaller one, and I think -several other prayer rooms. The main synagogue stood in the outskirts of -the medieval Reichsstadt. Even before 1933, during the so-called period -of struggle, when we still had the other government, I stated publicly -during a meeting that it was a disgrace that there should be placed in -the Old City such an oriental monstrosity of a building. After the -seizure of power I told the Lord Mayor that he should have the synagogue -torn down, and at the same time the planetarium. I might point out that -after the World War, in the middle of the park grounds laid out for the -recreation of the citizens, a planetarium had been built, an ugly brick -building. I gave the order to tear down that building and said that the -main synagogue, too, should be razed. If it had been my intention to -deprive the Jews of their synagogue as a church or if I had wanted to -give a general signal, then I would have given the order, after the -seizure of power, that every synagogue in my Gau should be torn down. -Then I would likewise have had all the synagogues in Nuremberg torn -down. But it is a fact that in the spring of 1938 only the main -synagogue was torn down; the synagogue in the Essenweinstrasse, in the -new city, remained untouched. That the order was then given in November -of that year to set fire to the synagogues, that is no fault of mine. - -DR. MARX: In other words, you want to say that you did not order the -tearing down of this building for anti-Semitic reasons but because it -did not conform to the architectural style of the city? - -STREICHER: For reasons of city architecture. I wanted to submit a -picture to the Tribunal on this, but I have not received any. - -DR. MARX: Yes, we have a picture. - -STREICHER: But you cannot see the synagogue in it. I do not know whether -the Tribunal want to see the picture. The picture actually shows only -the old houses, but the front of the synagogue facing the -Hans-Sachs-Platz is not visible. I do not know whether I may submit the -picture to the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, the photograph can be put in. Let us see -the photograph. - -DR. MARX: In that case, I will submit it to the Tribunal as evidence and -I am asking you to accept it accordingly. - -THE PRESIDENT: What will it be, exhibit what? - -DR. MARX: I cannot say at the moment, Mr. President. I shall take the -liberty of stating the number later and for the moment I confine myself -to submitting it. I could not present it any earlier because I had not -come into possession of this picture. It was only in the last days... - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on. - -DR. MARX: In your measure in connection with the main synagogue did you -rely on any statements of art experts? - -STREICHER: I had frequent opportunities to discuss the subject with -architects. Every architect said that there must have been a city -council which had no feeling whatsoever for city architecture, that it -was impossible to explain it. - -These statements were not in any way directed against the synagogue as a -Jewish church, but rather against such a building in this part of the -city. Strangers, too, whom I guided—for on Party rally days I used to -accompany British and American people across the Hans-Sachs-Platz—and I -remember only one case where when I said “Do you not notice anything?” -that the person did not. But all other strangers said “How could that -building get there in the midst of these medieval buildings?” I could -also have submitted a book, written in 1877, which is in the prison -library, where a Professor Berneis, who was famous, wrote at that time -to the author, Uhde, in Switzerland, that he had now seen the Sachs -Platz... - -DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, that is enough now. In other words, you have -indicated that you believed you could rely on the judgment of architects -who seemed to you to be authorities? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: At the time when the synagogue was demolished, did you make a -speech? - -STREICHER: Yes, but I want to point out that the Prosecution have -submitted an article, a report from the _Tageszeitung_, that was written -by a simple young man. I want to state that this article does not -contain a true representation of the statements which I made. - -DR. MARX: I now come to the demonstrations on the night of 9 to 10 -November 1938. What can you say concerning those demonstrations and what -role did you play in that connection? Were those demonstrations -initiated by the population? - -STREICHER: Every year the Gauleiter and SA and SS leaders met the Führer -in Munich on the occasion of the historic day of 9 November. We sat down -to dinner in the old Town Hall, and it was customary for the Führer to -make a short speech after the dinner. On 9 November 1938, I did not feel -very well. I participated in the dinner and then I left; I drove back to -Nuremberg and went to bed. Toward midnight I was awakened. My chauffeur -told me that the SA leader Von Obernitz wanted to talk to the Gauleiter. -I received him and he said the following: “Gauleiter, you had left -already when the Minister of Propaganda, Dr. Goebbels, took the floor -and said”—I can now repeat it only approximately—“said, ‘Legation -Counsellor Vom Rath has been murdered in Paris. That is now the second -murder abroad of a prominent National Socialist. This murder is not the -murder by the Jew, Grünspan; this is rather the execution of a deed -which has been desired by all Jewry. Something should now be done.’” I -do not know now whether Goebbels said the Führer had ordered it; I -remember only that Von Obernitz told me that Goebbels had stated the -synagogues were to be set on fire; and I cannot now remember exactly, -but I think he told me that the windows of Jewish business houses were -to be smashed and that houses were to be demolished. - -Then I said to Obernitz—for I was surprised—“Obernitz, I think it is -wrong that synagogues be set on fire, and at this moment I think it is -wrong that Jewish business houses be demolished; I think these -demonstrations are wrong. If people are let loose during the night, -deeds can be perpetrated for which one cannot be responsible.” I said to -Obernitz that I considered the setting on fire of synagogues -particularly wrong because abroad and even among the German people the -opinion might arise that National Socialism had now started the fight -against religion. Obernitz replied, “I have the order.” I said, -“Obernitz, I will not assume any responsibility here.” Obernitz left and -the action took place. What I have said under oath here I have -previously stated in several interrogations; and my chauffeur will -confirm it, for he was witness to this night’s conversation, and shortly -afterwards when he went to bed told his wife what he had heard up there -in my bedroom. - -DR. MARX: Have you finished? - -STREICHER: Yes, but you asked another question... - -DR. MARX: Yes, whether it was a spontaneous act of force initiated by -the masses of the people? - -STREICHER: Yes. In the National Socialist press there appeared after -this action an article to the same effect, which stated that a -spontaneous demonstration of the people had revenged the murder of Herr -Vom Rath. It had therefore been deliberately ordered from Berlin that -there should be a public statement to the effect that the demonstration -of 1938 was spontaneous. That this was not the case I was also able to -learn in Nuremberg; and it is remarkable that the indignation at what -had happened during those demonstrations expressed itself even here in -Nuremberg, even among the Party members. - -The Prosecution have submitted an article which is a report on a speech -which I made on 10 November; and that is a remarkable piece of evidence -of the fact that the people were against this action. I was forced, -because of the atmosphere which prevailed in Nuremberg, to make a public -speech and say that one should not have so much sympathy for the Jews. -Such was the affair of November 1938. - -Perhaps it might also be important for you to ask me how I, of all -people, happened to oppose the idea of these demonstrations. - -DR. MARX: I thought you had explained that already. Very well. Who gave -the order then for the burning down of the synagogue still standing on -Essenweinstrasse? - -STREICHER: I do not know who gave the order; I believe it was SA leader -Von Obernitz. I do not know the details. - -DR. MARX: A further question: Did you yourself express publicly your -disapproval of these brutalities? - -STREICHER: Yes. In a small circle of leading Party members I said what I -have always said, what I have always said publicly: I stated that this -was wrong. I talked to lawyers during a meeting—I do not know whether -my defense counsel himself was there—I believe it was as early as -November 1938 that I stated, to the Nuremberg lawyers at a meeting, that -what had happened here during that action, was wrong; that it was wrong -as regards the people and as regards foreign countries. I said then that -anyone who knew the Jewish question as I knew it would understand why I -considered that demonstration a mistake. I do not know whether this was -reported to the Führer at that time, but after November 1938 I was never -again called to the Hotel Deutscher Hof when the Führer came to -Nuremberg. Whether this was the reason I do not know, but at any rate I -did criticize these demonstrations publicly. - -DR. MARX: It is assumed by the Prosecution that in 1938 a more severe -treatment of the Jews was introduced. Is that true, and what is the -explanation? - -STREICHER: Yes. In 1938 the Jewish question entered a new phase; that is -shown, indeed, by the demonstration. I myself can only say in this -connection that there was no preliminary conference on this subject. I -assume that the Führer, impulsive as he was and acting on the spur of -the moment, got around probably only on 9 November to saying to Dr. -Goebbels, “Tell the organizations that the synagogues must be burned -down.” As I said, I myself did not attend such a meeting; and I do not -know what happened to bring about this acceleration. - -DR. MARX: On 12 November 1938 the decree was published according to -which the Jews were to be eliminated from the economic life of the -country. Was there a connection between the orders for the -demonstrations of 9 November and that further decree of 12 November -1938, and would that decree be due to the same reason? - -STREICHER: Well, here I can say only that I am convinced that there was -a connection. The order, rather the decrees, which were to have such an -extensive effect in the economic field, came from Berlin. We did not -have any conference. I do not remember any Gauleiter meetings in which -that was discussed. I do not know of any. That happened just as -everything happened; we were not previously informed. - -DR. MARX: How was it that not you, but the Codefendant Rosenberg, was -given the task of attending to this matter? - -STREICHER: Rosenberg was the spiritual trustee of the Movement, but he -was not given this particular task nor the task of the demonstration nor -that of economic matters. - -DR. MARX: No, we are talking of different points. Rosenberg was the one -given the task by the Leaders of the State of taking care, as it was -called, of racial-political and other enlightenment tasks; and you were -not. How can that be explained? How can it be explained that you were -not chosen? - -STREICHER: Rosenberg, as he himself said, had met the Führer very early -and was anyway, because of his knowledge, intellectually suited to take -over this task. I devoted myself more to popular enlightenment. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, he has told us that he wasn’t given the task. -Unless he had some communication with Rosenberg he can’t tell us -anything more about it except that he wasn’t given the task. All the -rest is mere comment and argument. - -DR. MARX: Yes. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I now put the next question to you: Was an -order issued during the year 1939 forbidding you to make speeches? - -STREICHER: Yes. In the autumn of 1939 my enemies went so far that the -Führer, without my being asked beforehand, issued a written order -through Party Member Hess forbidding me to make speeches. The threat of -immediate arrest was made should I act against this order. - -DR. MARX: Is it also correct that in 1938 an effort was evidently made -to stop further publication of _Der Stürmer_, I mean in government -circles? - -STREICHER: Such intentions existed quite often, and also at that time. -Perhaps I might refer to two other documents in this connection in order -to save time. - -The Prosecution have submitted copies of a letter from Himmler and -Baldur von Schirach. Here I can give quite a simple explanation right -now. At that time, in 1939, there were intentions of prohibiting _Der -Stürmer_. Bormann had even issued some such order. Then the Chief Editor -of _Der Stürmer_ wrote to prominent members of the Party, asking them to -state their opinion about _Der Stürmer_. And thereupon letters were also -received from Himmler and Von Schirach. Altogether, I think about 15 -letters were received from prominent members of the Movement; they were -merely kind replies to an inquiry. - -DR. MARX: That is sufficient. Is it true that at the outbreak of the war -you were not made Armed Forces District Commissioner -(Wehrkreis-Kommissar) in your own Gau? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: How can that be explained? - -STREICHER: Well, maybe that is not so important; that is how conditions -were at the time. There were certain personal feelings, _et cetera_; it -is of no significance. At any rate, I did not become Armed Forces -District Commissioner. - -DR. MARX: The Prosecution have stated that after 1 September 1939 the -persecution of the Jews increased more and more. What was that due to? - -STREICHER: That question only the Führer could answer; I cannot. - -DR. MARX: But do you not think this had something to do with the -outbreak of war? - -STREICHER: The Führer always said so in public, yes. - -DR. MARX: A proceeding was instituted against you before the Supreme -Party Court. How did that happen? What was the development and the -result of that trial? - -STREICHER: I am grateful that I have an opportunity to state quite -briefly before the International Military Tribunal something which I -have had to keep silent about up to now because of a Führer order. I -myself had instituted proceedings against myself before the Supreme -Party Court in order to defend myself against people who were denouncing -me. I was being accused... - -THE PRESIDENT: Is the defendant talking about some order which Hitler -gave that he was not to be allowed to speak or is he talking about -something else? - -You remember, Dr. Marx, that certain allegations were struck out of the -record. If he is talking about those, it seems to me that we have got -nothing whatever to do with it. Am I right in recollecting that -something was struck out of the record? - -DR. MARX: Yes it was, Mr. President, but only certain things from the -Göring report were struck out, only the one passage which concerned the -affair with the three young persons; but everything else was retained by -the Prosecution. The Defense, therefore, must be able to take a stand in -regard to these points, if the Prosecution do not say that they are -dropping the entire Göring report; and in that connection this -proceeding before the Supreme Party Court also plays a part. He can make -a brief statement about it. - -THE PRESIDENT: All right. - -DR. MARX: Witness, be brief. - -STREICHER: Yes. It is important then that I instituted proceedings -against myself; about 10 points were involved which had been raised -against me, among them a matter referring to some shares. An affidavit -exists from the Göring report which states that I had been found guilty. -May I state here that the trial was never completed and no sentence was -passed. - -That is the answer to the question which you have put to me. - -DR. MARX: The matter referring to shares, does that have something to do -with the shares of the Mars works? - -STREICHER: We will come to it later. It was not the main point. - -DR. MARX: And then you were ordered to remain permanently at the -Pleikershof? Were you under the guard of the Gestapo there, and was -there also a check-up as far as visitors were concerned? - -STREICHER: It is not correct that I was ordered to stay at the -Pleikershof. What is true is that I retired voluntarily with the -intention of never again being active in the Movement. It is correct -that the Gestapo watched me, and every visitor was called to the police -station and interrogated as to his conversations he had had. That is a -fact. - -DR. MARX: During your stay at the Pleikershof did you have any -connections or correspondence with any leading personalities of the -Party or State? - -STREICHER: No. As far as prominent persons of the Movement and of the -State are concerned, I had no correspondence whatsoever with them; that -is why the Prosecution could hardly find any letters. I never stated in -letters my opinion on the Jewish problem or on other matters. I shall -have to state then, in order to answer your question exactly, that I had -no correspondence with prominent persons of the Party and the State. - -DR. MARX: After the outbreak of the war, were you informed of or -consulted in any way on any measures intended against the Jews? - -STREICHER: No. - -DR. MARX: What were your relations to Himmler? Did you know him at all -closely? Did you ever speak to him about measures against the Jews or -did he talk about intended mass executions of the Jews? - -STREICHER: I knew Himmler just as I knew the SA leaders, or other SS -leaders. I knew him from common meetings, Gauleiter conferences, _et -cetera_. I did not have a single political discussion with Himmler, -except in society when he may have touched on this or that, in the -presence of others. The last time I saw Himmler was in Nuremberg when he -spoke to the officers in their mess. When that was I cannot say exactly -but I think it was shortly before the war. I never had a talk with him -on the Jewish question. He himself was, of course, well informed on this -question. He had an organ of his own called the _Schwarze Korps_. And -what his inner attitude toward me was is something that I did not -discover until my stay on the farm. There were denunciations against me -which reached him. It was stated that I was being too humane with the -French prisoners. Shortly after that I received a letter in which he -reproached me and made serious representations against me. I gave no -answer at all. Without having made any previous inquiries with me as to -whether these denunciations were true, he made a serious charge against -me; and I state quite openly that it was actually my feeling at the time -that I might possibly lose my liberty through arrest. These were my -relations with Himmler. - -DR. MARX: That is enough. - -During this Trial you have heard mentioned the names of a great number -of Higher SS and Police Leaders who played a leading part in the Jewish -persecutions, as for instance, Heydrich, Eichmann, Ohlendorf, and so on. -Were there any connections between you and one of these Higher SS and -Police Leaders? - -STREICHER: I heard the names you have mentioned for the first time -during an interrogation here. I did not know these men; they may well -have seen me, but there was never a discussion involving me and the -senior SS or SA leaders. Furthermore, I never was in any of Himmler’s -offices in Berlin, or any Ministry in Berlin. Thus, no conference ever -took place. - -DR. MARX: The Prosecution have drawn the conclusion from numerous -articles in _Der Stürmer_, that as early as 1942 and 1943 you must have -had knowledge of the mass executions of Jews which had taken place. - -What statement can you make on this, and when, and in what way, did you -hear of the mass executions of Jews which took place in the East? - -STREICHER: I had subscribed to the Jewish weekly that appeared in -Switzerland. Sometimes in that weekly there were intimations that -something was not quite in order; and I think it was at the end of 1943 -or 1944—I believe 1944—that an article appeared in the Jewish weekly, -in which it said that in the East—I think it was said in Poland—Jews -were disappearing in masses. I then made reference to this in an article -which perhaps will be presented to me later. But I state quite frankly -that the Jewish weekly in Switzerland did not represent for me an -authoritative source, that I did not believe everything in it. This -article did not quote figures; it did not talk about mass executions, -but only about disappearances. - -DR. MARX: Have you finished? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Did you make proposals in _Der Stürmer_ for the solution of -the Jewish question, during the war? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: And in what sense? - -STREICHER: As I said yesterday, I represented the point of view that the -Jewish question could be solved only internationally, since there were -Jews in all countries. For that reason we published articles in my -weekly journal referring to the Zionist demand for the creation of a -Jewish state, such as had also been provided for or indicated in the -Balfour Declaration. There were therefore two possibilities for a -solution, a preliminary solution within the countries through -appropriate laws; and then the creation of a Jewish state. - -During the war, I think it was in 1941 or 1942, we had written another -article—we were subject to the Berlin censorship—and the censorship -office sent back the proof submitted with the remark that the article -must not be published in which we had proposed Madagascar as the place -for the establishment of a Jewish state. The political relations with -France were given as the reason why that article should not be -published. - -DR. MARX: If you had expected that question to be solved by mass -executions, would you then too have written this article? - -STREICHER: At that time, at any rate, it would still have been -nonsensical to publish it. - -DR. MARX: Did it not make you uneasy to deal with the Jewish question in -a biased way, in a way which left completely out of sight those -qualities of the Jews which can be described as great? - -STREICHER: I did not understand this question fully, perhaps I did not -hear it correctly. - -DR. MARX: You can be accused of treating, in a biased way, only those -qualities of the Jews that appear disadvantageous to you, whereas the -other qualities of the Jewish people you ignored. What is your -explanation? - -STREICHER: I think that this question is really superfluous here. It is -perfectly natural that I, as an anti-Semitic person and as I saw the -Jewish question, was in no way interested in that. Perhaps I did not see -the good traits which you or some others see in the Jews. That is -possible. But at any rate I was not interested in investigating as to -what particular good qualities might be recognized here. - -DR. MARX: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: This would seem a good time to break off. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. MARX: Did you visit concentration camps? - -STREICHER: Yes. I visited the Dachau Concentration Camp. - -DR. MARX: When was that? - -STREICHER: I believe the first time was when all the Gauleiter were -called together. I believe 1935, I do not know definitely, 1934 or 1935, -I do not know. - -DR. MARX: At what intervals did you then visit this camp? It is said -that you were in Dachau every 4 weeks. - -STREICHER: Altogether I was at Dachau four times. - -DR. MARX: It is asserted that after each of your visits in Dachau, Jews -disappeared there. - -STREICHER: I do not know whether Jews disappeared. - -DR. MARX: What caused you to visit the Dachau Camp repeatedly? - -STREICHER: I went to the Dachau Camp to visit Social Democratic and -Communist functionaries from my Gau who were in prison there to have -them introduced to me. I picked out—I do not know how many hundreds of -them there were—but every time I was in Dachau I picked out 10 or 20 of -those of whom it had been ascertained by the Police that they had no -criminal record; I had them picked out from among the inmates, and at -Christmas every year I had them brought in buses to Nuremberg to the -Hotel Deutscher Hof, where I brought them together with their wives and -children and had dinner with them. - -I should like to ask the Tribunal, for the benefit of the Nuremberg -public, to permit me to make a very short statement as to why I took -these Communists out. Party proceedings were initiated against me -because I did this. There were rumors which were not true. May I make a -very short statement as to why I did it? - -DR. MARX: I should like to ask the Tribunal to approve this, Mr. -President, so that the reasons why the defendant did this may be -ascertained. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, as long as it is brief. - -DR. MARX: Be brief. - -STREICHER: When I walked through the streets of Nuremberg children -approached me and said, “My father is in Dachau.” Women came to me and -asked to get their husbands back. I knew many of these officials from -the time when I spoke at revolutionary meetings, and I could vouch for -these people. I know of only one case where I was wrong in the selection -of those people. All the others behaved impeccably. They kept the word -which they had given me. Thus, perhaps my Party comrades, who sit here -in the dock, see now that I did not want to harm my country but that I -wanted to do, and did do, something humanely good. - -DR. MARX: Now I come to the picture books which appeared in _Der -Stürmer_ publishing house. You know that two picture books were -published, one with the title, _Trust No Fox in the Field_, and the -other one with the title, _The Poisonous Toadstool_. Do you assume -responsibility for these picture books? - -STREICHER: Yes. May I say, by way of summary, that I assume -responsibility for everything which was written by my assistants or -which came into my publishing house. - -DR. MARX: Who was the author of these picture books? - -STREICHER: The book _Trust No Fox in the Field_ and _No Jew Under His -Oath_ was done and illustrated by a young woman artist, and she also -wrote the text. The title which appears on the picture book is from Dr. -Martin Luther. - -The second picture book was done by the Editor-in-Chief of _Der -Stürmer_, who was a former schoolteacher. Two criminal cases in -Nuremberg, which were tried here in this courtroom, as far as I know, -were the occasion for my publishing these two books. There was a -manufacturer, Louis Schloss, a Jew, who with young Nuremberg girls some -of them still innocent, had... - -DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, we do not want to hear that now. My question -was only as to who was the author of these picture books and whether you -assumed the responsibility for them? - -STREICHER: It is important for the Tribunal, in fact, right for them to -know how it came about that all of a sudden two picture books for young -people appeared in my publishing house. I am making this statement -absolutely objectively. I am speaking here of legal cases. There are -gentlemen here, who are witnesses, who were here in this court and were -present during the proceedings. Only thus can one understand why these -books were published. They were the answer to deeds that had occurred. - -DR. MARX: Yes, but we are concerned here only with the accusation made -against you, that thereby you exerted an influence on the minds of young -people which was not beneficial and which could be considered designed -to have a poisonous effect. - -STREICHER: And I should like to prove by my statement that we wanted to -protect youth because things had, in fact, occurred. - -DR. MARX: Yes, but young persons could hardly understand the Schloss -case, or any such case, could they? - -STREICHER: It was a matter of public discussion in Nuremberg and beyond -that all over Germany. - -DR. MARX: As far as I am concerned, this question is answered, Mr. -President. - -STREICHER: But not for me as defendant. - -THE PRESIDENT: You told us that the books were published to answer -things which had occurred here. That is sufficient. - -DR. MARX: Witness, another serious accusation made by the Prosecution -against you is that a special issue concerning ritual murders was -published in the publishing house of _Der Stürmer_ and appeared in one -number of _Der Stürmer_. How did this special issue come about and what -was the cause for it? Were you the author of that special issue? - -STREICHER: No. - -DR. MARX: Who was the author? - -STREICHER: My collaborator, the Editor-in-Chief at that time, Karl Holz, -who is now dead. But I assume the responsibility. - -DR. MARX: Is it not true that even during the twenties you dealt with -that question in _Der Stürmer_? - -STREICHER: Yes, and in public speeches. - -DR. MARX: Yes, in public speeches. Why did you now in 1935 stir up again -this doubtlessly very grave matter? - -STREICHER: I should like to ask my counsel to express no judgment as to -what I have written; to question me, but not to express judgment. The -Prosecution are going to do that. - -You have asked me how this issue came about. I will explain very -briefly... - -DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. I have to protest against the fact -that Herr Streicher here, in the course of his interrogation by me, -thinks he can criticize the manner in which I put my questions. -Therefore, I ask the Court to give a decision on this, since otherwise I -am not in a position to ask my questions at all. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have already stated your position and the Tribunal -has given you full support in your position. Will you please continue? - -And let me tell you this, Defendant, that if you are insolent either to -your counsel or to the Tribunal, the Tribunal will not be able to -continue the hearing of your case at this moment. You will kindly treat -your counsel and the Tribunal with due courtesy. - -STREICHER: May I ask to say something about this? - -THE PRESIDENT: No. Answer the question, please. - -DR. MARX: I will go on now with my questioning. - -The Prosecution accuse you, in connection with this ritual murder -affair, of having treated the matter without documentary proof, by -referring to a story from the Middle Ages. What, in brief, was your -source? - -STREICHER: The sources were given in that issue. Nothing was written -without the sources being given at the same time. There was reference -made to a book written in Greek by a former Rabbi who had been converted -to Christianity. There was reference made to a publication of a high -clergymen of Milan, a book which has appeared in Germany for the last 50 -years. Not even under the democratic government did Jews raise -objections to that book. That ritual murder issue refers to court files -which are located in Rome, it refers to files which are in Court. There -are pictures in it which show that in 23 cases the Church itself has -dealt with this question. The Church has canonized 23 non-Jews killed by -ritual murder. Pictures of sculptures, that is, of stone monuments were -shown as illustrations; everywhere the source was pointed out; even a -case in England was mentioned, and one in Kiev, Russia. But in this -connection I should like to say, as I said to a Jewish officer here, -that we never wanted to assert that all Jewry was ready now to commit -ritual murders. But it is a fact that within Jewry there exists a sect -which engaged in these murders, and has done so up until the present. I -have asked my counsel to submit to the Court a file from Pisek in -Czechoslovakia, very recent proceedings. A court of appeal has confirmed -a case of ritual murder. Thus, in conclusion I must say... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I object to this statement, Your Honor. After his -counsel has refused to submit it, he insists on stating here the -contents of a court record. Now this is not an orderly way to make -charges against the Jewish people. Streicher says he is asking counsel -to submit. His counsel apparently has refused, whereupon he starts to -give evidence of what he knows, in any case, is a resumé of the matters -which his counsel has declined to submit here. It seems to me that, -having appointed counsel to conduct his case, he has shown repeatedly -that he is not willing to conduct his case in an orderly manner and he -ought to be returned to his cell and any further statements that he -wishes to make to this Court transmitted through his counsel in writing. -This is entirely unfair and in contempt of Court. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, I think you had better continue. - -DR. MARX: I should like to say that that closes this affair. The -essential thing is whether one can say that he treated the case without -documentary proof. The Defense is not interested in the affair at all; -and, according to my recollection, I even suggested to one of the -gentlemen of the Prosecution that this affair perhaps be left out -altogether, because it is really so gruesome and so horrible that it is -better not to treat it. But the defendant only wanted to say that it was -only on the basis of various pieces of evidence that he dealt with the -case, and I believe that is sufficient; that should close the matter. - -Now, Herr Streicher, you fall again and again into the mistake of going -too far in your explanations and of discussing things which can be -considered propaganda on your part. I should like to ask you now for the -last time to stick to the questions and leave out everything else. It is -in your own interest. You are accused of having carried on various -activities in your Gau, which were Crimes Against Humanity, of having -mistreated people who lived in your Gau. Thus you are accused of having -sought out a political prisoner, a certain Steinruck, in his cell and of -having beaten him. Is that correct? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Was Steinruck a Jew? - -STREICHER: No. - -DR. MARX: For what reason did you do that? - -STREICHER: Steinruck, in a public place, in the presence of many -witnesses, had made derogatory statements about the Führer, libelous -statements. He was at police headquarters. I had spoken to the Police -President about it and told him that I should like to look at that -Steinruck once. I went with my adjutant—the Göring report says that a -Party member, Holz, was there too, but that is not correct—I went with -my adjutant to police headquarters. The same Police President, who later -denounced me to Reich Marshal Göring, took me to Steinruck’s cell. We -went into the cell; I stated here that I had come with the intention of -talking to him, talking to him reasonably. We talked to him. But he -behaved so cowardly that it became necessary at the moment that he be -chastised. I do not mind stating here that I am sorry about that case, -that I regret it as a slip. - -DR. MARX: Then it is asserted that in August 1938 you beat up an editor, -Burger. Is that correct? - -STREICHER: No, that is not correct. If I had beaten him up, then I would -say so here. But I believe that my adjutant and somebody else had an -argument with him. - -DR. MARX: What about the incident in the Künstlerhaus in Munich? - -STREICHER: I went to Munich to the Inn Künstlerstätte, or something like -that. I was received by the manager. Then a young man came up to me, -drunk and quarrelsome, and shouted at me. The manager protested and -ordered him out of the place. But the drunken young fellow came back -again and again and then my chauffeur grabbed him and my son helped. -They took him into a room and beat him up and then the proprietor of the -inn thanked me for having rid him of the drunkard. - -And now I should like to have the Tribunal’s permission to state very -briefly my position on one case which I believe the Prosecution also -have dropped, where I was accused of sadistic tendencies... - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you know perfectly well that that incident has -been stricken from the record and is not, therefore, mentioned against -you, so that it is quite unnecessary to go into it. The Tribunal cannot -hear you on it. - -DR. MARX: Witness, from the so-called Göring report I should like to -submit to you some points which have been presented by the Prosecution. - -You know that after the action of November 1938, in the district of -Franconia, Aryanization of Jewish property was undertaken to the utmost -extent. Would you like to make a statement about that? - -STREICHER: Here in the Göring report is a reference to a statement of -the deceased Party member, Holz. In that statement it is pointed out -that Holz came to see me after that action, that he made a report about -the action and likewise declared the action to be wrong; he said -furthermore that now that this had happened, he considered it necessary -to go further and Aryanize the property. The Göring report states that I -then told Holz that could not be done and that I opposed it. Then it -states further that Holz said to me that he still thought it would be -right if one were to do it. We could then get out of it the means for -the establishment of a Gau school. Holz also states that I said -something like: “Well, Holz, if you believe you can do it, then go ahead -and do it.” - -I want to state here that what Party member Holz said is true. I was -opposed at first; and then, acting on a sudden impulse, which I cannot -understand today, I said, “Well, if you can do it, then go ahead and do -it.” I want to state that at that time when I said it, I did not believe -at all that it was to be done or would be done; but it was done. The -Reich Marshal, as Delegate for the Four Year Plan, later stated his -position on it in Berlin, sharply rejecting it. Only at that time did I -find out exactly how Holz accomplished this Aryanization. I had a talk -with him, got into a serious dispute; and our friendly relations were -broken off at that time. Holz volunteered in an armored unit, went to -the front, and resigned as deputy. I returned from Berlin to Nuremberg, -and later there appeared in Nuremberg a Police Inspector sent by the -Reich Marshal in his capacity as Delegate for the Four Year Plan. He -reported to me and asked me if I would agree to an investigation of the -whole matter, and I stated that I would welcome the investigation. Then -the investigation took place. The Aryanization was repealed, and it was -established that Holz personally had not gotten any material advantage -from it. Aryanization was then taken over by the State, repealed, and -taken over. - -I state frankly that in that affair I am at least guilty of negligence. - -DR. MARX: Did you know that the amounts paid in the Aryanization of -houses or real estate represented only about 20 percent, or even less, -of the actual value? - -STREICHER: Holz had not come to see me for weeks. He had carried on the -Aryanization in the Labor Front Office with the expert there. Not until -later, in Berlin during the meeting which the Reich Marshal held, did I -learn of the real facts; and thus the dispute and the break between Holz -and me came about, because I had to disapprove the manner in which the -Aryanization had been handled. - -DR. MARX: You are further accused of having had shares in the Mars Works -at Nuremberg acquired at an extraordinarily low price, for purposes of -enriching yourself and, in the course of this acquisition, of having -exerted an undue pressure on the owner of the shares? - -STREICHER: It says in the Göring report, literally, that I had -instructed and in another place that I had given the order that the Mars -shares be acquired for me. I state here that I neither instructed nor -ordered anyone to acquire the Mars shares. The whole thing was like -this. The director of my publishing house, who had power of attorney -because I, personally, never in all the years bothered with financial or -business matters, could do what he wanted. One day he came to see me -with my adjutant. I do not recollect now whether the adjutant or the -director of my publishing house was the one who spoke first. I was told -the following: An attorney had called and said that the Mars shares were -being offered for sale at an advantageous price. The director of my -publishing house asked me whether I agreed. I stated that never in my -life had I owned any shares, that I had never bothered about financial -matters in my publishing house. If he thought that the stock should be -bought, then he could do it. The shares were bought. It was the most -serious breach of confidence ever committed against me by any Party -comrade or employee. After a short time it turned out; that is, I was -informed how these shares had been acquired. I found out that the owner -had been threatened. When I found out under what conditions this stock -purchase had been made, I gave the order at once to return the stock. In -the Göring report it is noted that this return took place. Among the -confiscated files of my publishing house there is an official statement -about this affair which shows that these shares were returned. - -In this connection perhaps I may be permitted to say that my publishing -house was located until the end of the war in a rented house. At the -time of the Aryanization I was approached with the plan that an -Aryanized house be acquired for my publishing firm. I refused that. I -state here in conclusion that I have in my possession no Jewish -property. - -When those demonstrations occurred in 1938, jewels had been brought into -the Gau house. These pieces of jewelry were turned over to the police. A -man who was bearer of the honorary Party emblem was convicted and -sentenced to 6 years penal servitude because he had given his sweetheart -a ring and another piece of jewelry dating from that time. But I may add -one thing: The guilt of this bearer of the Party emblem rests perhaps -with those who gave the order: “Go into the Jewish houses.” That man, as -far as I knew him, had always been personally decent. Because of that -order, he got into a position in which he committed a crime. - -I have finished what I wanted to say. - -DR. MARX: Is it not true the allegations, made by the chief of the -publishing firm Fink before the Party Court and also even before that, -at a police interrogation, were different, in the main points, from your -present statements? - -STREICHER: The whole thing was that Fink, the publishing house manager, -was called to police headquarters and interrogated. The police Chief was -interested in the hearing since for many years he had been a friend of -mine and of my family. Fink returned from the interrogation completely -upset. He paced up and down in front of me and shouted, “I was -threatened, I have made statements which are not true. I am blackguard. -I am a criminal.” A witness of that incident was my chauffeur. I calmed -him down and told him, “I was called in for a hearing once, too. I was -even imprisoned once. I will give you opportunity...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go into such detail in this matter? - -DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. Perhaps this is necessary, because -in this very report reference is made to the testimony of Fink; and an -attempt is made to prove with this that the explanation made by the -Defendant Streicher is wrong, that he gave the order to purchase this -stock, possibly under pressure, and that he approved of it, whereas he -counters that he knew neither that these shares were to be bought at -such a low price nor that blackmail was to be used. - -If this is taken for granted, then, of course, we can close the matter. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is what he has already said. He has said that quite -clearly, has he not? I was only suggesting that it was not necessary to -go into such detail in the matter. - -DR. MARX: Witness, it may be of some importance to state what the -development of _Der Stürmer_ has been since 1933, as far as circulation -is concerned. Give us a short statement on the circulation of _Der -Stürmer_, and then I shall put another question to you. - -STREICHER: _Der Stürmer_ appeared in 1923 in octavo format, and in the -beginning it had a circulation of 2,000 to 3,000 copies. In the course -of time the circulation increased to 10,000. At that time _Der Stürmer_ -circulated—until 1933 really—only in Nuremberg, in my Gau, perhaps -also in Southern Bavaria. The publisher was a bookseller and he worked -first with one man, then with two. This is proof that the circulation -was really small. - -In 1933—but I say this with certain reservations because it may be that -the publisher did not always tell me the correct circulation figures and -I had no written contract with him—I say with reservations, that in -1933 the circulation was 25,000 copies. - -In 1935 the publisher died; and at that time it was, I believe, 40,000. -Then an expert took over the publishing house and organized it to cover -all of Germany. The circulation increased then to 100,000, and went up -as high as 600,000. It fluctuated, decreased, and then dropped during -the war; I cannot say exactly but I believe it was about 150,000 to -200,000. - -DR. MARX: You said that that new man organized the circulation to cover -all of Germany. Was the Party machinery utilized in this, and were not -industries and other offices—the German Labor Front, for -instance—utilized in order to increase the circulation forcibly? - -STREICHER: Well, the attitude of the Party was made manifest in a -letter, which was sent to all Gaue, signed by Bormann. There it was -expressly pointed out that _Der Stürmer_ was not a Party organ and had -nothing to do with the Party. Thereupon several Gauleiter saw this an -occasion for ordering that _Der Stürmer_ should not appear in their Gaue -any more. Now it is clear that within the organizations there were Party -members who, because of idealism or for other reasons, worked to -increase the distribution of _Der Stürmer_. However, I myself, neither -in writing nor orally, ever issued any order to any Party organization -to support _Der Stürmer_. - -DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, even, before 1933 you came in contact with the -courts on various occasions, both because of your articles and because -of your attitude as evidenced in _Der Stürmer_. Would you give us a -short statement as to how often that occurred and what consequences it -had for you? - -STREICHER: How often? I cannot answer that exactly now, but it was very -often. I was frequently given a court summons. You ask me about the -consequences. I was many times in prison, but I can say proudly that in -the sentences it repeatedly stated “an incorruptible fanatic for the -truth.” - -That was the consequence of my activity as a speaker and writer, but -perhaps it is important to add the following: I never was arraigned -because of criminal charges, but only because of my anti-Semitic -activity, and the charge was brought by an organization of citizens of -the Jewish faith. The chairman filed charges repeatedly when we made a -slip in speaking and thus exposed ourselves to prosecution on the basis -of the laws and regulations existing at that time. But perhaps I may -also point out here that the Jewish Justizrat, Dr. Süssheim, the -Prosecuting Attorney, stated before the court here in this courtroom, -“Your Honors, he is our inexorable enemy, but he is a fanatic for the -truth. He is convinced of what he does; he is honest about it.” - -THE PRESIDENT: What years were they that you were repeatedly in jail? - -STREICHER: That was, of course, before 1933. The first time I went to -Landsberg, to prison, because I had taken part in the Hitler Putsch. -Then I was sentenced to three and a half months in prison in Nuremberg, -where I am now. Then I got three months... - -THE PRESIDENT: You needn’t bother with the details. - -STREICHER: That is to say, before 1933 I was repeatedly given prison -sentences or fined. - -DR. MARX: Mr. President, the Göring report also mentions the fact that -the Defendant Streicher was personally interested in various Jewish -plants, allegedly in order to get some capital out of them. However, I -am of the opinion that it is not essential to deal with these points. -The same applies to the fact that the house on Lake of Constance was -sold, and to whom. I do not know whether the defendant should make any -statements about this here. In my opinion there is no cause to ask him -any questions concerning that. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you could leave that and see whether it is taken -up in cross-examination. If it is, then you may re-examine him. - -DR. MARX: Yes, certainly. - -Mr. President, this concludes my questions to the defendant. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any members of defendants’ counsel wish to ask -questions of the defendant? - -[_There was no response._] - -The Prosecution? - -LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior Counsel for the -United Kingdom): If the Tribunal pleases. - -When you handed over your Party to Hitler in 1922, did you know his -policy and what was to become the policy of the Nazi Party? - -STREICHER: The policy? First I should like to say, “no.” At that time -one could not speak of things which could not exist even as thoughts. -The policy then was to create a new faith for the German people, that -is, a faith which would deny the chaos and disorder and which would -bring about a return to order. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May I take it that, within a short course of -time, you knew the policy, the policy according to the Party program and -according to _Mein Kampf_? - -STREICHER: I did not need a Party program. I admit frankly that I never -read it in its entirety. At that time programs were not important, but -mass meetings... - -THE PRESIDENT: That’s not an answer to the question. The question was -whether, a short time after 1922, you knew the policy as indicated in -the Party program and in _Mein Kampf_. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You knew, did you not, that the policy included -the Anschluss with Austria? Can you answer that “yes” or “no”? - -STREICHER: No. There was never any talk about Austria. I do not remember -that the Führer ever spoke about the fact that Austria should be -annexed. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only want you to answer my question. My -question was: Did you know that the Führer’s policy was the annexation -of Austria to Germany? I understand your answer to be “no.” Is that -correct? - -STREICHER: That he intended it? No, that I did not know. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did you know that he intended to take over -Czechoslovakia or at least the Sudetenland? - -STREICHER: No. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did you know that from the beginning in _Mein -Kampf_ his ultimate objective was Lebensraum? - -STREICHER: What I read in _Mein Kampf_ is marked in red. The book has -been confiscated. I only read that. I read only what concerns the Jewish -question; I did not read anything else. However, that we had the -objective of acquiring Lebensraum for our people, that goes without -saying. I personally also had set myself the objective of contributing -in some way to providing a future for the surplus children. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. May I take it that during the years -1922 and 1923, as editor and owner of _Der Stürmer_, and as a Gauleiter -from 1925, you did everything you could to put the Nazi Party into -power? - -STREICHER: Yes; that is to be taken as a matter of course. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And after 1933 did you continuously support and -issue propaganda on behalf of the Nazi Party’s policy? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Not only in respect to the Jewish question, but -to the foreign policy as well? - -STREICHER: No, that is not correct. In _Der Stürmer_ there is not a -single article to be found which dealt with foreign policy. I devoted -myself exclusively... - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That is quite enough. I am not going to occupy -very much time with this matter. But I would ask you to look at Document -Number D-802. - -My Lord, this is a new exhibit. - -THE PRESIDENT: Which will be what? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Exhibit Number GB-327. - -My Lord, I am sorry, but the document seems to be missing for the -moment. Perhaps I might read the extract. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Let me just read to you an extract from an -article which you wrote in _Der Stürmer_ of March 1938, immediately -after the Anschluss with Austria. I want you to tell me whether or not -you are advocating the Nazi policy in regard to Austria. - - “Our Lord is making provision that the power of the Jews may not - extend to heaven itself. What was only a dream up to a few days - ago has now become reality. The brother nation of Austria has - returned home to the Reich.” - -And then, a few lines farther down: - - “We are entering into glorious times, a Greater Germany without - Jews.” - -Do you say that you are not there issuing propaganda on behalf of the -Nazi policy? - -STREICHER: I did not indulge in propaganda politics, for Austria was -already annexed. I just welcomed the fact. I did not need to make any -more propaganda about it. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Perhaps you’ll tell me what you mean -by the “Greater Germany” that you are approaching. What Greater Germany -are you approaching in March 1938, a Germany greater than it was after -the Anschluss with Austria? - -STREICHER: A Greater Germany, a living area in which all Germans, -German-speaking people, people of German blood, can live together. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do I understand that you are advocating -Lebensraum, greater space, not yet owned by Germany? - -STREICHER: Not at first, no. At first it was merely a question of -Austria and Germany. The Austrians are Germans and, therefore, belong to -a Greater Germany. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I won’t argue with you. I will just ask you -once more, what do you mean by the “Greater Germany” that you are -approaching in March of 1938? - -STREICHER: I have already explained, a Germany where all those can live -and work together who speak German and have German blood. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Would you look at Document Number D-818, which -will become Exhibit Number GB-328. Perhaps I can carry on. In November -of 1938, after Munich, did you yourself personally send a telegram to -Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten-German Party? - -STREICHER: If it says so here, then it is true. I do not recall it. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me refresh your recollection as to what you -said, “Without your courageous preparatory work the great task would not -have succeeded.” - -Are you there advocating and issuing propaganda in support of the policy -of the Nazi Government? - -STREICHER: I have to ask you again, would you please repeat your -question? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am asking you whether or not that telegram, -which you sent to Konrad Henlein and reprinted in your newspaper under a -picture of that gentleman—I am asking you whether or not that was -propaganda in support of the Nazi policy, Nazi foreign policy? - -STREICHER: I have to say the same to this as I said before. That was a -telegram of greeting, of thanks. I did not have to make propaganda any -more because the Munich Agreement had already taken place. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I put it to you and I’ll leave it. I’ll put it -to you that throughout the years from 1933 until 1944 or 1945 you were -in fact doing everything you could to support the policy of the -Government, both domestically and in regard to its foreign affairs. - -STREICHER: As far as possible within my field of activity, yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I want to turn now to the question of the Jews. -May I remind you of the speech that you made on 1 April 1933, that is to -say, the day of the boycott. - -My Lord, this will be found in the original document book, Document -Number M-33. It was not actually put in before. It now becomes Exhibit -Number GB-329. It is in the document book on Page 15, in the original -document book which the Tribunal have. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I give you the document book. If you -want to see the original, you may do so in every case. [_The document -book was submitted to the defendant._] - - “For 14 years we have been crying to the German nation, ‘German - people, learn to recognize your true enemy,’ and 14 years ago - the German Philistines listened and then declared that we - preached religious hatred. Today German people have awakened; - even all over the world there is talk of the eternal Jews. Never - since the beginning of the world and the creation of man has - there been a nation which dared to fight against the nation of - blood-suckers and extortioners who, for a thousand years, have - spread all over the world.” - -And then I go down to the last line of the next paragraph: - - “It was left to our Movement to expose the eternal Jew as a mass - murderer.” - -Is it right that for 14 years you had been repeating in Germany, “German -people, learn to recognize your true enemy”? - -STREICHER: I state first of all that what you have given me here has -nothing to do with that. You have given me an article... - -THE PRESIDENT: You are asked a question. You are asked whether it is -true that for 14 years you had been repeating, to Germany, “Learn to -recognize your true enemy.” Is that true? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And in doing so, is it true that you had been -preaching religious hatred? - -STREICHER: No. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at... - -STREICHER: May I be permitted to make a statement concerning this -answer? In my weekly, _Der Stürmer_, I repeatedly stated that for me the -Jews are not a religious group but a race, a people. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And do you think to call them “blood-suckers,” -“a nation of blood-suckers and extortioners”—do you think that’s -preaching hatred? - -STREICHER: I beg your pardon. I have not understood you? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You may call them a race or a nation, whichever -you like, now; but you were saying, on 1 April 1933, that they were a -“nation of blood-suckers and extortioners.” Do you call that preaching -hatred? - -STREICHER: That is a statement, the expression of a conviction which can -be proved on the basis of historical facts. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Understand me. I did not ask you whether it was -a fact or not. I am asking whether you called it preaching hatred. Your -answer is “yes” or “no.” - -STREICHER: No, it is not preaching hatred; it is just a statement of -facts. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look two pages further on in that last -document, M-33, and do you see the fourth paragraph from the end of the -extract? That is Page 17 of the document book: “As long as I stand at -the head of the struggle, this struggle will be conducted so honestly -that the eternal Jew will derive no joy from it.” - -STREICHER: That I wrote; that was right. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And you were, were you not, one of those who -did stand and continue to stand at the head of that struggle? - -STREICHER: Did I stand at the head? I am too modest a man for that. But -I do claim to have declared my conviction and my knowledge clearly and -unmistakably. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Why did you say that so long as you were at the -head of it, the Jew would derive no joy from it? - -STREICHER: Because I considered myself a man whom destiny had placed in -a position to enlighten people on the Jewish question. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And “enlightenment”—is that another word for -persecution? Do you mean by “enlightenment,” “persecution”? - -STREICHER: I did not understand that. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you mean by “enlightenment” the word -“persecution”? Is that why the Jew was to have no joy from it, from your -enlightenment? - -STREICHER: I ask to have the question repeated. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I can show it to you and we will repeat the -question as loud as you want it. Do you mean by “enlightenment” the word -“persecution”? Do you hear that? - -STREICHER: I hear “enlightenment” and “production.” I mean by -“enlightenment” telling another person something which he does not yet -know. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We won’t go on with that. You know, do you not, -that starting with the boycott which you led yourself in 1933, the Jews -thereafter were, during the course of the years, deprived of the right -to vote, deprived of holding any public office, excluded from the -professions; demonstrations were conducted against them in 1938, they -were fined a billion marks after that, they were forced to wear a yellow -star, they had their own separate seats to sit on, and they had their -houses and their businesses taken away from them. Do you call that -“enlightenment”? - -STREICHER: That has nothing to do with what I wrote, nothing to do with -it. I did not issue the orders. I did not make the laws. I was not asked -when laws were prepared. I had nothing to do with these laws and orders. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But as those laws and orders were passed you -were applauding them, and you were going on abusing the Jews and asking -for more and more orders to be passed; isn’t that a fact? - -STREICHER: I ask to have put to me which law I applauded. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, you told the Tribunal yesterday, did you -not, that you were responsible, you thought, for the Nuremberg Decrees, -which you had been advocating for years before they came into force; -isn’t that a fact? - -STREICHER: The Nuremberg Decrees? I did not make them. I was not asked -beforehand, and I did not sign them either. But I state here that these -laws are the same laws which the Jewish people have as their own. It is -the greatest and most important act of legislation which a modern nation -has at any time made for its protection. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think that is the time to break off. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): -My Lord, I wonder if the Tribunal would be good enough to consider -setting aside a half hour some time for the discussion of the documents -of the Defendant Von Schirach. We are ready to clear up outstanding -points at any time that is suitable to the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: [_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I just want -to ask you a few questions as to the part you played in the various -actions against the Jews between 1933 and 1939. - -Will you look at Document M-6, which is at Page 20 in the document book -that you have before you, Page 22 in the document book that the Tribunal -have in English. It is Page 20 in the German document book; M-6, which -is already Exhibit Number GB-170. - -Now, I just want to refer to what you said about the Nuremberg Decrees. -You told us this morning that you thought when they had been passed that -that was already the final solution of the Jewish question. Will you -look at the paragraph beginning in the center of the page, “However, to -those who believe...”: - - “However, to those who believe that the Jewish question has been - finally solved and the matter thus settled for Germany by the - Nuremberg Decrees, be it said that the battle continues—world - Jewry itself is seeing to that anyhow—and we shall only get - through this battle victoriously if every member of the German - people knows that his very existence is at stake. The work of - enlightenment carried on by the Party seems to me to be more - necessary than ever today, even though many Party members seem - to think that these matters are no longer real or urgent.” - -STREICHER: Yes, I wrote that. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: What do you mean by saying “the battle -continues,” if you have already solved the Jewish problem by the -issuance of the Nuremberg Decrees? - -STREICHER: I have already stated today that the solution of the Jewish -problem was regarded by me as having to be solved, first of all, within -the country and then in conjunction with other nations. Thus “the battle -continues” means that in the International Anti-Semitic Union, which I -had formed and which had representatives from all countries in it, the -question was discussed as to what could be done from an international -point of view to terminate the Jewish problem. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are we, therefore, to take it that everything -that you said and wrote after 1936 was in connection with an -international problem and had nothing to do with the Jews in Germany as -such? - -STREICHER: Yes, mainly international, of course. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me just refer you to half way through the -next paragraph, “_Der Stürmer’s_ 15 years’ work of enlightenment has -already led an army of those who know, millions strong, to National -Socialism.” Is that so? - -STREICHER: That is correct. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You see, you were telling the Tribunal this -morning that up to 1933, and indeed afterwards, you said the circulation -of your paper was only very small. Is it true, in fact, that your 15 -years’ work had led an army, millions strong, to National Socialism? - -STREICHER: I have said today that the moment the press was politically -co-ordinated, 3,000 daily newspapers were committed to the purpose of -enlightenment about the Jewish problem. There were 3,000 daily papers in -addition to _Der Stürmer_. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I don’t think you need go on. Let me -just finish reading through that paragraph: - - “The continued work of _Der Stürmer_ will help to insure that - down to the last man every German will, with heart and hand, - join the ranks of those whose aim it is to crush the head of the - serpent Pan-Judah.” - -Wait one moment, let me ask my question. There is nothing there about an -international problem. You are addressing yourself to the German people, -are you not? - -STREICHER: In that article? Yes. And if that article was read abroad, -then also to countries abroad, but as to the remark about crushing the -serpent’s head, that is a biblical expression. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you now let us discuss for a moment the -breaking up of the synagogue in Nuremberg, which you have told about, on -the 10th of August of 1938. Will you look at Page 41 of the book that -you have in front of you, Page 42 of the English document book that the -Tribunal has. - -Now we have heard your explanation of that breaking up of the synagogue. -The _Fränkische Tageszeitung_ at the 11th of August states this, “In -Nuremberg the synagogue is being demolished. Julius Streicher himself -inaugurated this work by a speech lasting more than an hour and a half.” -Were you talking to the inhabitants of Nuremberg upon the architectural -value of their city for an hour and a half on the 10th of August 1938? - -STREICHER: I no longer know in detail what I said, but I refer to what -you have remarked and what you find important. There was a branch of the -Propaganda Ministry in Nuremberg. The young Regierungsrat had press -conferences with the editors every day, and at that time he told the -editors during a press conference that Streicher would speak and that -the synagogue was being demolished and that this was to be kept secret. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I asked you, were you talking for that hour and -a half on the architectural beauties of Nuremberg and not against the -Jews? Is that what you are telling us? - -STREICHER: That, too, of course. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: At the press conference to which you -referred—you no doubt have seen the document; it is Page 40 of the -Tribunal’s document book—do you remember that it was arranged that the -show should be staged in a big way, the show of pulling down the -synagogue? What was the object of arranging the demonstration to -demolish that synagogue in such a big way? - -STREICHER: I was merely the speaker. What you are intimating here, that -was done by the representative of the Ministry of Propaganda; but I -would not object to it if you decided to assume, let me put it like -that, that I would naturally have been in favor of making a big show if -I had been asked. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me just ask you now a word about the -demonstrations which followed that in November of that year—My Lord, I -refer to Page 43 of the document book; 42 of the German—as I understand -it, you tell us that you disapproved of those demonstrations that took -place and they took place without your knowledge or previous knowledge. -Is that correct, “yes” or “no”? - -STREICHER: Yes, it is correct. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I just want to remind you of what you said on -the following day, the 10th of November. This is an account of what -happened: - - “In Nuremberg and Fürth there were demonstrations by the crowd - against the Jewish gang of murderers. These lasted until the - early hours of the morning.” - -I now pass to the end of that paragraph: - - “After midnight the excitement of the public had reached its - peak and a large crowd marched to the synagogues in Nuremberg - and Fürth and burned those two Jewish buildings where the murder - of Germans had been preached.” - -This is now what you say—it is on Page 44 of the document book, My -Lord: - - “From the cradle on, the Jew is not taught as we are: ‘Thou - shalt love thy neighbor as thyself’ or ‘If you are smitten on - the left cheek offer then your right one.’ No. He is told ‘With - the non-Jew you can do whatever you like.’ He is even taught - that the slaughtering of a non-Jew is an act pleasing to God. - For 20 years we have been writing about this in _Der Stürmer_. - For 20 years we have been preaching it throughout the world, and - we have made millions recognize the truth.” - -Does that sound as though you had disapproved of the demonstrations that -had taken place the night before? - -STREICHER: First of all I must state that the report, part of which you -read, appeared in a daily paper. Thus I am not to be held responsible -for this. If someone wrote that part of the populace rose up against the -gang of murderers then that is in keeping with the order from the -Ministry of Propaganda in Berlin; outwardly that action was described as -a spontaneous demonstration of the populace... - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That does not answer my question. Does that -passage that I have read sound as though you had disapproved of the -demonstrations that had taken place the night before? Does it or does it -not? - -STREICHER: I was against that demonstration. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Just let me read on: - - “But we know that we have in our midst people who take pity on - the Jews, people who are not worthy of living in this town, who - are not worthy of belonging to this people, of whom you are a - proud part.” - -Why should it have been necessary for people to have had pity on the -Jews, if you were not—you and the Nazi Party—persecuting them? - -STREICHER: I have already pointed out today that I was forced, after -this demonstration had taken place, to make a public comment and say -that one should not have so much pity. I wanted to prove thereby that -this was not a spontaneous action by the people; in other words, the -matter does not speak against me; it speaks for me. The people, as I -myself, were opposed to the demonstration and I found that I had cause -to—should I say—get public opinion to the point where one might -possibly not regard that action as something too severe. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But, why, if you were opposed to it and if the -people were opposed to it, should it have been your duty to try and -convert them so that they should be in favor of that kind of thing? Why -were you opposed to it and why should you try to turn them against the -Jew? - -STREICHER: I do not understand what you mean. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I understand you to say that you were opposed -to these demonstrations and that the people also were opposed to the -demonstrations; that, therefore, it was your duty to try to stir them up -and make them in favor of the demonstrations after they had happened. -Why should it have been your duty to do that? - -STREICHER: Today one can perhaps say that this or that was my duty, but -one must consider what those times were—the confusion that -existed—that to make a quick decision, as one might have to in this -courtroom, was quite impossible. What happened has happened. I was -against it and the public too. What was written about it otherwise was -done so for tactical reasons. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Were you in favor of the -Aryanization of Jewish houses and businesses? Were you in favor of that -or did you disapprove of that issue? - -STREICHER: I have answered that question today in great detail, in -connection with a statement of Party comrade Holz. I have stated and I -repeat that my deputy came to me... - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Just stop for a moment, I don’t want a speech. -I asked you a question which you could answer “yes” or “no.” Did you -approve or disapprove of the system of Aryanization of Jewish businesses -and houses? - -STREICHER: One cannot answer that quickly with “yes” or “no.” I have -made it clear today, and you must allow me to explain it so that there -is not any misunderstanding. My Party comrade... - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am not going to allow you to repeat it. I -will go on if you are not prepared to answer that question. The Tribunal -have heard it and I pass on. - -STREICHER: I certainly want to answer it. After my Party comrades... - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant... - -STREICHER: After the Party comrades came... - -THE PRESIDENT: You have refused to answer the question properly, a -question to which you can give either an affirmative or a negative -answer. Did you approve or did you not approve? You can give an answer -to that and then you can give any explanation afterwards. - -STREICHER: I personally was not for Aryanization. When Holz repeated -that, giving as a reason that the houses had been pretty badly damaged, -_et cetera_, that we might get material for a Gau (district) building, I -said “All right, if you can do it, go ahead.” I already stated today -that this was carelessness on my part. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There were in fact a very great number of -Jewish businesses and houses Aryanized in Nuremberg and Franconia, were -there not? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Would you just look at a new exhibit, Document -Number D-835, which becomes Exhibit GB-330. That is a list—it is an -original document—it is a list of Jewish property in Nuremberg and -Fürth which was Aryanized. Have you seen that list or anything like it -before? - -STREICHER: No. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, you can take it from me, that that list -contains the addresses of some 800 properties in Nuremberg and Fürth -which have been taken from the Jews and handed over to Aryans. Would you -agree that that would be at least 800 houses in your city here that were -Aryanized? - -STREICHER: I do not know about it in detail; but I must establish -something: I do not know—is that the official document? I have already -stated today that my Party comrade Holz started Aryanizing. That was -rescinded by Berlin. Then came the Aryanization carried out by the -State. I could not have had any influence here, either, so that this was -none of my business. This Aryanization, the expropriation of Jewish -property, was ordered by Berlin. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, you mentioned this morning that you were a -subscriber to a weekly newspaper called the _Israelitisches -Wochenblatt_; is that correct? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: When did you start subscribing to that -newspaper? - -STREICHER: What did you say? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: At what date did you start subscribing to that -newspaper? - -STREICHER: I do not know. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, I have no doubt you can tell the Tribunal -approximately. Have you always, since 1933, been a subscriber of that -newspaper? - -STREICHER: Well, I do not think I could have read every issue, since I -traveled a great deal. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You were, as I think it is stated in this -application of your wife to give evidence, a regular reader of it, were -you not? - -STREICHER: My friends, the editors, and I used to share in the reading -of this paper. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May I take it that between yourself and your -editors—I don’t say every copy was read—but it was regularly read from -1933 onwards; is that fair? - -STREICHER: You cannot say “read regularly.” - -LT. COL, GRIFFITH-JONES: A large number of the copies that you -subscribed for, which came weekly to you, were they read by yourself or -by your editors? - -STREICHER: Certainly. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I want to turn to something else for a -moment. I want to make myself perfectly clear to you. - -DR. MARX: Mr. President, I should like to draw the attention of the -Tribunal to the fact that the document which has just been presented, -“Confiscated Property and Real Estate,” has the heading “Aryanization -Department for Real Estate, Nuremberg.” That cannot mean anything except -that this document comes from the official department which was later -set up for the confiscation of such real estate. But by no means can -this be a document to prove that we are concerned here with the real -estate Aryanized by Holz, subsequent to 9 November. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I accept that that may be so. - -DR. MARX: I should like to ask, therefore, that the appropriate -correction be made. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If I was mistaken in saying that those -properties had been Aryanized, I would be right then, would I not, in -saying that that list of properties was prepared by the Aryanization -Department in Nuremberg for the purpose of Aryanizing them in the -future? Would that be a fair statement to make? - -STREICHER: No. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I won’t pursue that matter any further. - -I want to make myself quite clear to you in what I am suggesting. I am -suggesting that from 1939 onwards you set out to incite the German -people to murder and to accept the fact of the murder of the Jewish -race. Do you understand that? - -STREICHER: That is not true. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No doubt you will say it isn’t true. I just -wanted you to be quite clear on what my suggestion is going to be. - -I want you to look now at a bundle, which will be given to you, of -extracts from _Der Stürmer_. You can see the originals which are in -Court if you desire to do so, but it will save time if we use the -document books there. - -Now, will you look at Page 3-A. For convenience, the pages in this -bundle are all marked “A” to distinguish them from the numbers in the -original document book. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are they all in evidence? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: None of them are in evidence at the moment. -Perhaps the most convenient way would be for me to put the actual -documents in evidence together at the end, unless the Tribunal or the -defendant desire to see any copies of them. I will give them numbers as -I go along. - -Will you look at Page 3-A of that bundle, Document Number D-809, which -becomes Exhibit Number GB-331: - - “The Jewish problem is not yet solved, nor will it be solved - when one day the last Jew will have left Germany. Only when - world Jewry has been annihilated, will it have been solved.” - -Is that what you were working for when you say you were working for the -international solution to this problem, an annihilation of world Jewry? - -STREICHER: If that is how you understand “annihilation.” That was -written by my chief editor at the time. He says that the Jewish problem -will not yet be solved when the last Jew will have left Germany. And -when he suddenly says that only when world Jewry has been annihilated -will it be solved, then he certainly may have meant that the power of -world Jewry should be annihilated. But my Party comrade Holz did not -think of mass killing or the possibility of mass killing. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The German word used there is “vernichtet,” is -it not? Look at your copy. “Vernichtet” that means “to annihilate.” - -STREICHER: Today, when you look back, you could interpret it like that, -but not at that time. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, we won’t waste time because we have -quite a number to look through. Will you look on to the next page. That -was in January you were writing that. In April 1939, Document D-810, -Exhibit GB-332, I refer only to the last two lines. This is an article -again by your editor: “Then perhaps their graves will proclaim that this -murderous and criminal people has, after all, met its deserved fate.” - -What do you mean by “graves” there? Do you mean excluding them from the -business of the world? - -STREICHER: This is the first time that I have seen this article. That is -the statement of opinion of a man who was probably looking ahead and -making a play on words; but as far as I knew him, and as far as we -discussed the Jewish problem, there was no question of mass -extermination; we did not even think of it. Maybe it was his wish—I do -not know—but anyway, that is the way it happened to be written. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Just turn over, will you now, to May -1939, Document Number D-811, Exhibit Number GB-333. I quote the last six -lines: “There must be a punitive expedition against the Jews in Russia.” - -This, of course, was before the Russian invasion. - - “There must be a punitive expedition against the Jews in Russia, - a punitive expedition which will provide the same fate for them - that every murderer and criminal must expect, death sentence and - execution. The Jews in Russia must be killed. They must be - utterly exterminated. Then the world will see that the end of - the Jews is also the end of Bolshevism.” - -STREICHER: Who wrote that article? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is published in your _Stürmer_. We can find -out, if necessary. It is not written by you, but it is published in your -_Der Stürmer_; and you have told the Tribunal that you accept -responsibility for everything that was written in that newspaper. - -STREICHER: All right, I assume responsibility; but I want to state that, -here too, this is the private opinion of a man who in May 1939 could not -have thought that _ex nihilo_—for we had no soldiers—a “March to -Russia” could be started. This is a theoretic and very strongly-worded -expression of opinion of that anti-Semitic person. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: All I ask you about that is: Is that not -advocating the murder of Jews, that article; if it is not, what is it -advocating? - -STREICHER: The whole article would have to be read so that I could tell -what motives existed for writing something like that. I therefore ask -you to make public the whole article. Then one can form a proper -judgment. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, we’ll go on. We won’t waste time unless -you really want to see the whole article. - -My Lord, if I perhaps might be allowed to put these documents in -evidence. As Your Lordship will see, this bundle is a bundle of extracts -from _Der Stürmer_. - -DR. MARX: Mr. President, with the permission of the Tribunal, I would -like to make the following statements: A number of extracts from _Der -Stürmer_ have been mentioned here which have been put before me for the -first time. Some of them are articles which have not been written by the -defendant personally. Some are signed by Hiemer, and some by Holz, who -was particularly radical in his manner of writing, and passages are -being quoted which are perhaps taken out of context. - -I must ask, therefore, that I be afforded the opportunity of going over -these extracts together with the Defendant Streicher. Otherwise, he -might come to the conclusion that his defense is being made too -difficult for him and that it is being made impossible for him to -prepare himself appropriately. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, you will have an opportunity of checking up on -these various extracts, and then you will be able to introduce, if -necessary, any passages which explain the extracts. That is a matter -which has been explained to defendants’ counsel over and over again. - -Colonel Griffith-Jones, are there not certain of these extracts which -are written or signed by the defendant? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, with Your Lordship’s permission I will -refer to some of them, but so that I should not have to refer to all of -them, I was going to suggest that perhaps I might put them in and, if it -is necessary, let the Tribunal know afterwards the numbers of them to -save time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I put the whole bundle in evidence and will not -refer to all of them. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then you can give us the exhibit numbers later. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If that is suitable to the convenience of the -Court. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well now, the Tribunal will see by looking at -this bundle, from the first page—which I think is 3-A—to Page 25-A, -that there are various extracts which have been written either by -yourself or by members of your staff between January 1939 and January -1941. - -Do I understand you to say now, to have said in your evidence, that you -never knew that Jews were being exterminated in thousands and millions -in the Eastern territories? Did you never know that? - -STREICHER: No. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: As I understood your evidence about the -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ this morning you said this, as I have -written it down: - - “Sometimes that journal contained hints that everything was not - in order. Later in 1943 an article appeared stating that masses - of Jews were disappearing but the article did not quote any - figures and did not mention anything about murders.” - -Are you really saying that those copies of the _Israelitisches -Wochenblatt_, which you and your editors were reading, contained nothing -except for a hint of disappearance with no mention of figures or murder? -Is that what you are telling this Tribunal? - -STREICHER: Yes, I stick to that, certainly. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I want you, if you will, to take this -bundle and keep it in front of you. It is a bundle of extracts from the -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ from July 1941 until the end of the war. -The Tribunal will be able to see what a fanatic for the truth really -tells. - -[_The document was submitted to the defendant._] - -My Lord, this bundle, for convenience again, is marked “B.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you look at the first page? That is -an article on the 11th of July 1941. “Some 40,000 Jews died in Poland -during the last years. The hospitals are overfull.” - -Now, you need not turn over for the moment, Defendant. We will turn the -pages soon enough. - -Did you happen to read that sentence in the issue of the 11th of July -1941? - -STREICHER: No. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 3, 3-B? In November 1941: -“Very bad news comes from the Ukraine. Thousands of Jewish dead are -being mourned, among whom are many of the Galician Jews who were -expelled from Hungary.” - -Did you read that? - -STREICHER: That might be possible. It says “thousands,” thousands are -being mourned. That is no proof that millions were killed. There are no -details as to how they came to their end. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If that is the explanation you want us to -accept we will leave it. - -Just go on again to the next page, will you? The 12th of December 1941, -a month later: - - “According to news which has arrived from several sources, - thousands of Jews—one even speaks of many thousands—are said - to have been executed in Odessa”—and so on.—“Similar reports - reach us from Kiev and other Russian cities.” - -Did you read that? - -STREICHER: I do not know; and if I had read it then it would not change -a thing. That is no proof. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But you have told the Tribunal, you know, that -there was nothing except hints of disappearance. Doesn’t it show that -you were not telling the truth when you read these extracts? - -STREICHER: In that case may I say the following? When the war started we -no longer received the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_. During the later -years one could only get the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ through the -Police. We got that paper, toward the end, into Germany by smuggling. On -one occasion we asked the Police to provide us with foreign newspapers -and this weekly, and we were told that it was not possible. But we -nevertheless got it. What I mean to say by this is that I did not read -every one of those issues. The issues which I did read were confiscated -on my farm. Whatever is underlined has been read by me or it was read by -my editor in chief. I cannot, therefore, guarantee that I read every -article. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No, I appreciate that and that is why we have -quite a number of them. You see, we have an extract for practically -every week or month over the course of 3 years. - -I would just like you to turn to Page 30-A of the “A” bundle. I just -want you to see what you were writing after having heard, or after -having read, or anyway after those copies of the _Israelitisches -Wochenblatt_ had been published. This is a leading article by yourself. - - “If the danger of the reproduction of that curse of God in the - Jewish blood is finally to come to an end, then there is only - one way open—the extermination of that people whose father is - the devil.” - -And is the word that you use for extermination there “Ausrottung,” -rooting out, extirpation? - -STREICHER: First of all, I would like to ask whether this issue is known -to my defense counsel, and if the translation is correct? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It does not matter. He has copies of all this -and he will be able to protect your interests. We are now just testing -the truth of the evidence that you have given. - -Can you tell me, is that “extermination”? Does that mean murder of Jews? -What else can it mean? - -STREICHER: It depends on the whole context. In that case I want you to -read the whole article. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, if there is anything in the rest of the -article which can be helpful to you, your counsel will have an -opportunity to see the article and be able to put it before the -Tribunal. I can assure you that the remainder of your articles, as a -general rule, do not assist your case. - -STREICHER: When that article appeared, mass killing had already taken -place a long time ago. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Well now, we will not go through -this at any length. - -If you will look at your “B” bundle, your bundle of extracts from the -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you should draw his attention to the date on Page -30-A. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged to Your Lordship. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] The 25th of December 1941. - -If you will glance at “B” bundle you will see a number of extracts going -from Page A to Page 21. Now, I would like you to glance at Page 24 of -that “B” bundle. - -STREICHER: Page 24? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes, Page 24. This is an article which appeared -in the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ on the 27th of November 1942. I just -wondered whether you read this: - - “At the Zionist Congress of Switzerland the representative of - the ‘Jewish Agency’ in Geneva... gave a report on European - Jewry.... The number of victims goes into millions. If the - present conditions continue and the German program is carried - out, it is to be reckoned that, instead of 6 or 7 million Jews - in Europe only 2 million will still be left.” - -Then there are the three last lines of the extract: - - “The Jews who were there had mostly been deported to the - notorious unknown destination further to the East. At the end of - this winter the number of victims will be 4 million.” - -Is that what you call a hint of disappearance of Jews from the East? - -STREICHER: I cannot recollect that I have ever read that but I do want -to say that if I had read it I would not have believed it. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well now, let us just turn to the “A” bundle -again and look at the article that you wrote on the 17th of December -1942. It is Page 34-A. This is an article which is initialed “STR” so I -presume it was written by you. - -“The London newspaper, _The Times_, of the 16th of September 1942 -published a...” - -STREICHER: I have not got it yet. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Page 34-A. - -STREICHER: Just a minute. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Find it for him. It is headed: “Eye for Eye, -Tooth for Tooth.” - - “The London newspaper, _The Times_, of 16 September 1942 - published a resolution which had been unanimously passed by the - Board of Deputies of British Jews. This resolution expresses the - grief and horror of the Anglo-Jewish Community at the - unspeakable atrocities committed by Germany and her allies and - vassals against the Jews of Europe which had only one aim, to - exterminate the whole Jewish population of Europe in cold - blood.” - -Now, you must have read of that in _The Times_ because you say so. - -STREICHER: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: - - “Strange how the Jews of the Anglo-Jewish Community suddenly - begin to prick up their ears. When the second World War began - the Führer of the German nation warned the Jewish warmongers - against plunging the world into a blood bath again. Since then - the German Führer has warned and prophesied again and again that - the second World War, instigated by world Jewry, must - necessarily lead to the destruction of Jewry. In his last speech - too, the Führer again referred to his prophecies.” - -Did you write that? - -STREICHER: Yes, this is merely a quotation. It refers to a forecast from -the Führer, of which nobody could possibly tell what it really meant. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. - -If you had not even read that or the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, did -you ever hear of the declaration of the United Nations which was made on -the 17th of December 1942? - -[_The document was submitted to the defendant._] - -Do you remember hearing of that? You appear to have been reading _The -Times_; you appear to have been reading some copies of the -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_. Maybe you heard of this declaration which -was published in London, Washington, and Moscow at the same time with -the assent and support of all Allied nations and dominions. I will just -read it to you and see if you remember it: - - “The attention of the Belgian, Czechoslovak, Luxembourg, - Netherlands, Norwegian, Polish, Soviet, United Kingdom, United - States, and Yugoslav Governments and also the French National - Committee has been drawn to numerous reports from Europe that - the German authorities, not content with denying to persons of - Jewish race in all the territories over which their barbarous - rule has been extended the most elementary human rights, are now - carrying into effect Hitler’s often repeated intention to - exterminate the Jewish people in Europe. - - “From all the occupied countries Jews are being transported in - conditions of appalling horror and brutality to Eastern Europe. - In Poland, which has been made the principal Nazi - slaughterhouse, the ghettos established by the German invaders - are being systematically emptied of all Jews except a few highly - skilled workers required for war industries. None of those taken - away are ever heard of again. The able-bodied are slowly worked - to death in labor camps. The infirm are left to die of exposure - and starvation, or are deliberately massacred in mass - executions. - - “The number of victims of these bloody cruelties is reckoned in - many hundreds of thousands of entirely innocent men, women, and - children. - - “The above-mentioned Governments and the French National - Committee condemn, in the strongest possible terms, this bestial - policy of cold-blooded extermination. They declare that such - events can only strengthen the resolve of all freedom-loving - peoples to overthrow the barbarous Hitlerite tyranny. They - reaffirm their solemn resolution to ensure that those - responsible for the crimes shall not escape retribution, and to - press on with the necessary practical measures to this end.” - -Did you never hear of this declaration? - -STREICHER: I do not know, but if I should have heard of it, then I would -have to say the following: - -After the seizure of power the foreign press published so many atrocity -stories, which turned out to be rumors, that I would have had no reason -to believe anything like this; nor is there any mention here that -millions of Jews were killed. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, you see, it isn’t altogether -uncorroborated. You say you had no reason to believe it; but your -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, which you were subscribing to, was saying -exactly the same thing. - -Would you look at Page 26-B of the “B” bundle? That is the declaration -of the United Nations of the 17th of December. Just see what the -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ says on the 18th. And there I quote the -second paragraph: - - “At that time the Polish Government in London gave the number of - Jews executed as 700,000. The Berlin radio hereupon declared - that these reports were untrue, but admitted that in Poland - ‘Jews’ had had to be executed because they carried out acts of - sabotage.” - -Then the last paragraph quoted: - - “‘Up to the end of September 1942,’ writes the _Daily - Telegraph_, ‘2 million Jews have lost their lives in Germany and - in the countries occupied by the Axis, and it is to be feared - that the number of victims will be doubled by the end of this - year.’” - -Did you happen to read that article? - -STREICHER: I cannot remember having read it, but I would not have -believed it if I had. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You see, there is another article in that same -paper on the 23rd of December, in the same terms; another on the 30th of -December; and another on the 8th of January. Look at what it says on the -8th of January: - - “The Polish Government in London has issued a new declaration - which states that all the information received agrees that a - third of the 3 million odd Jews have lost their lives.” - -Did you read that? - -STREICHER: I do not know, but I have to repeat, I would not have -believed it. - -LT. COL GRIFFITH-JONES: Well now, just let’s see just what you were -writing on the 28th of January. Look at 35-A of your own bundle; 35-A. -Now just see what your Chief Editor, the witness you are going to call, -I understand, Hiemer—see what he has got to say first of all: - - “But the ghetto too, which has today been re-established in - nearly all European countries, is only an interim solution, for - mankind once awakened will not merely solve the ghetto question - but the Jewish question in its totality. A time will come when - the present demands, of the Jews will be fulfilled. The ghetto - will have disappeared—and with it Jewry.” - -What is he referring to, if he isn’t referring to the mass killing, -murder, of the Jewish race? - -STREICHER: That was a statement of his opinion, his conviction. That -conviction must be understood in the same way as something which a -Jewish author wrote in his book in America. Erich Kauffmann wrote that -German men capable of fathering children should be sterilized, and in -that manner the German people should be exterminated. It was at the same -time that Hiemer wrote his article, and I want to say that the very -severe tone in _Der Stürmer_ at that time was due to that book from -America. - -The interrogating officers know—and so does my counsel—that I have -repeatedly pointed out that I wanted that book to be produced. It was in -the _Völkischer Beobachter_. - -If in America an author called Erich Kauffmann can publicly demand that -all men in Germany capable of fathering children should be sterilized, -for the purpose of exterminating the German people, then I say, eye for -eye and tooth for tooth. This is a theoretical literary matter. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I am sure we have heard your -explanation. Let’s see what you have to say about your own article on -the same date. I quote from the middle of the next paragraph: - - “But now, in the fourth year of this war, world Jewry is - beginning in its retrospective considerations to understand that - the destiny of Jewry is finding its fulfillment at the hands of - German National Socialism.” - -What did you mean by that? Perhaps I should have quoted a little -earlier, going back to the beginning: - - “When, with the outbreak of the second World War, world Jewry - again began to manifest themselves as warmongers, Adolf Hitler - announced to the world from the platform of the German Reichstag - that the World War conjured up by world Jewry would result in - the self-destruction of Jewry. This prophecy was the first big - warning. It was met with derision from the Jews, as were all the - subsequent warnings.” - -And then you go on to say: - -“But now, in the fourth year of this war, world Jewry is beginning in -its retrospective considerations to understand that the destiny of Jewry -is finding its fulfillment at the hands of German National Socialism.” - -What did you mean by that? - -STREICHER: Pardon me? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: What do you mean by saying “World Jewry is -finding its fulfillment at the hands of National Socialism”? How did you -mean that National Socialism was finding the fulfillment of Jewry’s -destiny? - -STREICHER: National Socialism could not fulfill the fate, that is to -say, find the solution, since the Führer intervened with the hand of -destiny. That was not a solution. - -During an interrogation I pointed out that I who personally wanted a -total solution, was, right from the beginning, against trying to solve -the Jewish problem by means of pogroms. If I said that the destiny of -Jewry was to be fulfilled by National Socialism, then I wanted to say -that through National Socialism the world would gain the knowledge and -the realization that the Jewish problem must be solved internationally. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let’s just go on. - - “That which the Führer of the German people announced to the - world as a prophecy at the beginning of this second World War is - now being fulfilled with unrelenting inevitability. World Jewry, - which wanted to reap big dividends from the blood of the warring - nations, is rushing with gigantic steps toward its extirpation.” - -And again you use the word “Ausrottung.” - -Does that mean just as it sounds, as though the fulfillment that you -were aiming at was warning the world about Jewry? What do you mean by -it? “Rushing with gigantic steps toward its extirpation”—Ausrottung. -What did you mean by it? - -STREICHER: This is a warning. The Führer made a prophecy; nobody could -interpret that prophecy properly. The prophecy was not quoted only in -this article, but in 10 others. Again and again we referred to these -prophecies, the first of which had been made in 1929. Today we know what -the Führer wanted to say; at that time we did not. And I confess quite -openly that with this quotation we wanted to warn world Jewry: “Against -their threat, this threat.” - -So as to defend myself I might mention in this connection that the -author, Dr. Emil Ludwig Kohn, who had left Germany and emigrated to -France, had written in the paper _Le Fanal_, in 1934, “Hitler does not -want war, but he is being forced into it. Britain has the last word.” -Thus... - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We are not discussing war now. We are -discussing the extermination, the mass murder of Jews, by the National -Socialists. That is what we are discussing. Let me read on: - - “When Adolf Hitler stepped before the German people 20 years ago - to submit to them the National Socialist demands which pointed - the way into the future, he also made the promise which was to - have the gravest repercussions; that of freeing the world from - its Jewish tormentors. How wonderful it is to know that this - great man and leader is following up this promise with practical - action. It will be the greatest deed in the history of mankind.” - -Do you say that you are not putting forward propaganda for the policy of -mass extermination which the Nazi Government had set out to do? - -STREICHER: We too had freedom of the press like democratic countries. -Every author knew of the forecast, which perhaps later on turned out to -be a fact, and could write about it. That is what I did. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. - -STREICHER: But for my defense, Mr. Prosecutor, I want to be allowed to -say that wars too can be mass murder, with their bombs, _et cetera_. And -if it is proved that someone says that we are forcing Hitler into war, -then I can certainly say that a man who knows that Hitler is being -forced into war is a mass murderer. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: With the permission of the Tribunal I am going -to interrupt you again because we are not discussing whether or not -Hitler was forced into war. We will leave that now. - -Just let us go on and see if you are really speaking the truth in saying -that while you are writing these articles you are not perfectly well -aware of what was happening in the Eastern territories. - -We got as far as January 1943. I would like you to just look at one or -two more of the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ and see if you remember -reading any of these. Will you look at Page 30-B the 26th of February, -in your “B” bundle? - - “Exchange reports from the Polish Government circles in London - that Warsaw, Lvov, Lodz and other cities have been ‘liquidated,’ - and that nobody from the ghettos remained alive. The last - investigations have ascertained that only about 650,000 Jews - remain out of 2,800,000.” - -Listen to me. Did you read that? Do you remember it? - -STREICHER: I do not know. For months, perhaps half a year, we did not -get an issue, but if I had read it, I would not have believed that -either. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did you believe Hitler? If you will turn over -the page to 31-B, did you believe Hitler? According to the last two -lines quoted in the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ of the 5th of March -1943: “Hitler, in his proclamation of 24 February, again proclaimed the -extermination of the Jews in Europe as his goal.” - -Did you believe your own beloved Führer when he was saying the same -things as the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, the United Nations, and _The -Times_ newspaper in London? - -STREICHER: No, I declare that whoever got to know the Führer’s deepest -emotions and his soul, as I have personally, and then later had to learn -from his testament that he, in full possession of his faculties, -consciously gave the order for mass extermination, is confronted with a -riddle. I state here... - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We really don’t want another long speech about -the Führer. Just turn over the page and look at what is being said on -the 26th of March: - - “The report of the Polish Government on the measures against the - Jewish population is published in full in the English press. A - passage reads, ‘In the town of Vilna 50,000 Jews were murdered, - in Rovno 14,000; in Lvov half of the total Jewish population.’ - - “Many details are also given about the use of poison gas, as at - Chelm, of electricity in Belzec, of the deportations from - Warsaw, the surrounding of blocks of houses, and of the attacks - with machine guns.” - -Did you read that one? - -STREICHER: I do not know. However, that shootings must have occurred, of -course, where Jews committed sabotage, _et cetera_, is self-evident. -During a war that is considered as a matter of course. However, the -figures which are quoted here were just simply not believable. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. I understand you to say that now, but what -I do not understand is what you meant when you said this morning that -the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ made no mention of murders and gave no -figures. You didn’t say that the figures were unbelievable; you told -this Tribunal, on your oath, that the newspaper contained nothing except -the hints of disappearance, with no mention of figures. What did you -mean by that? - -STREICHER: I have said the truth under oath, but it is possible that one -might not remember everything. During an interrogation some time back I -stated, based on memory, that an issue must exist which mentions the -disappearance of Jews, and so on. It is in the _Israelitisches -Wochenblatt_, and I thought I said that it was in 1943 and it is true. -If one article after the other is put before me—well, even if I had -seen it, how can I remember it? But that I, under oath, should have -deliberately told you an untruth, that is, at any rate, not so. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We will deal with the article you mention in -1943 in one moment; but just before we do that, just see if you believe -your own staff. Turn, will you, to 38-A, M-139. Now, on the 6th of May -it so happens just after those last three extracts from the -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ we have looked at, within 2 or 3 months, 1 -or 2 months afterwards your newspaper is publishing this article. It is -headed “Children of the Devil.” - - “_Der Stürmer_ paid a visit to the ghettos in the East. _Der - Stürmer_ sent its photographic reporter to various ghettos in - the East; a member of _Der Stürmer’s_ staff is well acquainted - with the Jews. Nothing can surprise him easily. But what our - contributor saw in these ghettos was a unique experience for - him. He wrote, ‘What my eyes and my Leica camera saw here - convinced me that the Jews are not human beings but children of - the devil and the spawn of crime.... It is hard to see how it - was possible that this scum of humanity was for centuries looked - upon as God’s chosen people by the non-Jews. ... This satanic - race really has no right to exist.’” - -Now, you have heard of what was happening in the ghettos in the East -during 1942 and 1943? Are you really telling this Tribunal that your -photographer went with his camera to those ghettos and found out nothing -about the mass murder of Jews? - -STREICHER: Yes, otherwise he would have reported to us about it. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Warsaw ghetto, you remember, exterminated, -wiped out in April 1943. Your photographer must have been around just -about that time, if you were writing this on the 6th of May, if he had -just returned. Did you think he could have been there looking at ghettos -for _Der Stürmer_, for Julius Streicher, the Jew-baiter, and have -discovered nothing of what was happening in the ghetto in Warsaw and -elsewhere? - -STREICHER: I can only remember that immediately after the end of the -Polish campaign a Viennese reporter went over there, made films and made -reports, in 1942. I would like to ask—is there a name, a signature -there, to show by whom it was written? One thing I know is that the -ghetto was destroyed; I read it in a summary, an illustrated report -which I think originated in the Ministry of Propaganda. But as to the -destruction of the ghetto during an uprising—well, I consider that -legal; from my point of view it was right. But mass murders in the -ghetto in Warsaw are something I never heard of. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, just let’s look at the article to which -you referred a moment ago. Will you look at 44-A of the document book? - -My Lord, this is the same as was included at Page 53 in the original -document book; it was Document Number 1965-PS, Exhibit Number GB-176, -but there is slightly more of the extract quoted at Page 44-A. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I just want you to examine for the -last time whether or not you are speaking the truth in telling the -Tribunal that you did not know what was happening. You quote in that -article from the Swiss newspaper, the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, of -the 27th August 1943—you will see that date, My Lord, in the middle of -the first paragraph—I start now from that line in the middle: - - “The Swiss Jewish newspaper goes on to say, ‘The Jews of Europe, - with the exception of those in England and of insignificant - Jewish communities in the few neutral countries, have - disappeared, so to speak. The Jewish reservoir of the East that - was able to counterbalance the force of assimilation in the West - no longer exists.’” - -That is the end of your quotation from the newspaper, and you go on to -say: - - “This is not a Jewish lie; it is really true that the Jews have, - ‘so to speak,’ disappeared from Europe and that the ‘Jewish - reservoir of the East’ from which the Jewish pestilence spread - for centuries among the European nations has ceased to exist. If - the Swiss newspaper wishes to affirm that the Jews did not - expect this kind of development when they plunged the nations - into the second World War, this is to be believed; but already - at the beginning of the war the Führer of the German Nation - prophesied the events that have taken place. He said that the - second World War would swallow those who had conjured it.” - -Now, are you really saying that when that article was written you did -not know how to interpret the word “disappearance,” the disappearance of -the Jews from the East? Are you really telling the Tribunal that? - -STREICHER: Yes, the word “disappear” after all does not mean -extermination _en masse_. This deals with a quotation from the -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ and is a repeated quotation of what the -Führer had prophesied. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, now, would you look at the article from -which you quote there, which you will find at Page 36-B; and I would -like you to follow it, and we will read the two together. Now, the -particular paragraph which I want to read in the _Israelitisches -Wochenblatt_ is that quotation which I have just read to you and you -will find the same quotation. - -My Lord, it starts at the end of the eighth but last line, “The Jews -were” or rather “The Jews of Europe...” Have you got them in front of -you, Defendant? - -STREICHER: I shall listen to you. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It would be better, I think, if you followed -it. I want to help you as much as possible. Page 44-A and 36-B. I will -read slowly first of all from your _Stürmer_ again: - - “The Jews of Europe, with the exception of those in England and - of insignificant Jewish communities in the few neutral - countries, have, so to speak, disappeared...” - -and you will see that you then go on in the quotation and say: - - “...the Jewish reservoir of the East which was able to - counterbalance the force of assimilation in the West no longer - exists.” - -Now, would you look at the original article: - - “The Jews of Europe”—this is 36-B—“the Jews of Europe, with - the exception of those in England and of insignificant Jewish - communities in the few neutral countries, have, so to speak, - disappeared.” - -Now—there you go on, “The Jewish reservoir of the East”—the original -goes on—“three million dead, the same number outlawed; many thousands, -all over the world, mentally and physically broken.” - -Are you telling this Tribunal now that on the 27th of August, or when -you read that article of the 27th of August, you didn’t know that Jews -were being murdered in the East and that you had not read of those -things in the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_? - -STREICHER: Whether I had read it or not, I would not have believed it, -that 3 million Jews had been killed. That is something I would not have -believed, and that is why I left it out, at any rate. Anyhow, the German -censorship would not have allowed the spreading of something which is -not credible. - -THE PRESIDENT: You didn’t read the last part of the line, did you? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: [_Repeating._] “...were mentally and physically -broken. That is the result of the new order.” I am very much obliged to -you. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] “That is the result,” you say, “of the -‘new order’ in Europe...” - -You say you didn’t believe it. Is that what you say now, that you must -have read it—must you not? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But you just didn’t believe it; is that right? - -STREICHER: No, I did not believe it. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Even if you didn’t believe it, when you were -reading this newspaper more or less regularly, when your cameraman had -been to the ghettos in the East, did you think it right to go on, week -after week, in your newspaper crying for the extermination, murder, of -the Jews? - -STREICHER: That is not correct. It is not true that murder was demanded -week after week. And I repeat again, the sharpening of our tone was the -answer to the voice from America that called for our mass murder in -Germany—eye for eye, tooth for tooth. If a Jew, Erich Kauffmann, -demands mass murders in Germany, then perhaps I, as an author, can say -that the Jews too should be exterminated. That is a literary matter. But -the mass murders had taken place a long time before without our having -known about them; and I state here that if I had known what had in fact -happened in the East, then I would not have used these quotations at -all. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But, Defendant, you must have known then, must -you not, after reading that article, after sending your cameraman, after -the United Nations published their declaration, after Hitler’s -prophecies had been made again and again in his proclamations, after you -said his prophecy had been fulfilled? You really say you didn’t know? - -STREICHER: The cameraman is at your disposal. He is in Vienna, and I ask -to have him brought here. And I state that this cameraman reported -nothing, and could not have reported anything, about mass murders. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we might adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. MARX: Mr. President, with the permission of the Tribunal, and in the -interest of clarification of the facts, I should like to point out the -following: The Prosecutor, Sir Griffith-Jones, has mentioned a document, -Page 38-A from _Der Stürmer_ of 6 May 1943. That seems to be an error, -because we are dealing here with _Der Stürmer_ of 6 March 1943. - -That date is of the greatest importance because if the photographer of -_Der Stürmer_ published a report of 6 March in _Der Stürmer_, then he -must have been at the ghetto in Warsaw before 6 March 1943. -Presumably... - -THE PRESIDENT: Why do you say 6 March? The document I have before me has -6 May. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There has been a mistake, I am afraid, in the -German that Dr. Marx has. I have the original before me, which is 6 May -1943. - -DR. MARX: Excuse me. At the present moment I cannot recall when the -destruction of the ghetto of Warsaw took place. That was Document -1061-PS. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I cannot remember for the moment the number of -the document, but the date was, I think from memory, from the 1st to the -23rd of April. - -DR. MARX: Then, of course, my remark is without foundation. Please -excuse me. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now we had just dealt with the _Israelitisches -Wochenblatt_ issue for 27 August, the copy that you quoted from. I just -refer you to one more copy of that newspaper. Would you look at Page -37-B, which is an issue of 10 September 1943: - - “Statistics presented by the Convening Committee showed that 5 - millions out of the 8.5 million Jews of Europe had died or been - deported ... About 3 million Jews had lost their lives through - forced labor and deportation.” - -Did you read that one? - -STREICHER: I do not know, and again I would not have believed it. To -this day I do not believe that 5 million were killed. I consider it -technically impossible that that could have happened. I do not believe -it. I have not received proof of that up until now. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is quite clear that there were plenty of -figures for you, quoted in this _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ over the -period that we are discussing. Plenty of figures, it now turns out, -doesn’t it? - -STREICHER: Pardon? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We will go on. Now, I just want to put one or -two further articles of your own to you. You remember what I am -suggesting, that you are inciting the German people to murder. We know -now that at least you had read one article in the _Israelitisches -Wochenblatt_ where murder is mentioned. I just want to see what you go -on to publish in your own paper after that date. - -Would you look at Page 47-A. This is an article by yourself on 6 January -1944. This is after you had been living on your estate for some time. - - “After the National Socialist uprising in Germany, a development - began in Europe, too, from which one can expect that it will - free this continent for all time of the Jewish disintegrator and - exploiter of nations; and, over and above this, that the German - example will, after a victorious termination of the second World - War, bring about the destruction of the Jewish world tormentor - on the other continents as well.” - -What example was the German nation setting to the other nations of the -world? What example do you mean there? - -STREICHER: This article corroborates what I have been saying all along. -I spoke of an international solution of the Jewish question. I was -convinced that if Germany had won this war or had been victorious over -Bolshevism, then the world would have agreed that an understanding -should be reached with the other nations for an international solution -of the Jewish question. If I wrote here about destruction, it is not to -be understood as destruction by mass killing; as I have said, that is an -expression; I have to point out that I do not believe that Erich -Kauffmann really wanted to kill the German people by sterilization, but -he wrote it, and we sometimes wrote in the same manner, echoing the -sounds that we heard in the other camp. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You have not yet told us what is this -international solution that you are advocating by talking about -extermination; if it is not murder, what is it? What is the solution? - -STREICHER: I have already said that I founded the Anti-Semitic Union, -and through this Anti-Semitic Union we wanted to create movements among -the nations which should, above and beyond governments, act in such a -way that an international possibility would be created, such as has been -represented today here in this Trial—thus, I conceived it, to form an -international congress center which would solve the Jewish question by -the creation of a Jewish state and thereby destroy the power of the Jews -within the nations. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That is your answer—that you were advocating a -Jewish state? Is that all that this comes to? Is it simply that you were -advocating a Jewish national home? Is that what you have been talking -about in all these extracts that we have read? Is that the solution -which you are advocating? - -STREICHER: Well, I do not know what you want with that question. Of -course, that is the solution. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Let us just go on now. Turn to Page -48-A now, will you? This is 24 January 1944, “Whoever does what a Jew -does is a scoundrel, a criminal, and he who repeats and wishes to copy -him deserves the same fate—annihilation, death.” - -Are you still advocating a national Jewish home? - -STREICHER: Yes, that has nothing to do with the big political plan. If -you take every statement by a writer, every statement from a daily -newspaper, as an example, and want to prove a political aim by it, then -you miss the point. You have to distinguish between a newspaper article -and a great political aim. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, let us just turn now to the next -page, 2 March 1944, “Eternal night must come over the born criminal race -of Jews so that eternal day may bless awakening non-Jewish mankind.” - -Were they going to have eternal night in their national Jewish state? Is -that what you wanted? - -STREICHER: That is an anti-Semitic play of words. Again it has nothing -to do with the great political aim. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It may be an anti-Semitic play of words, but -the only meaning it can have is murder. Is that not true? - -STREICHER: No. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you turn to the next page, 25 May 1944; -and I remind you that these are all after you must have read of the -murder in _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_. I quote the second paragraph: - - “How can we overcome this danger and restore humanity to health? - Just as the individual human being is able to defend himself - against contagious diseases only if he proclaims war against the - cause of the disease, the germ, so the world can be restored to - health only when the most terrible germ of all times, the Jew, - has been removed. It is of no avail to battle against the - outward symptoms of the world disease without rendering the - morbific agents innocuous. The disease will break out again - sooner or later. The cause and the carrier of the disease, the - germ, will see to that. But if the nations are to be restored to - health and are to remain healthy in the future, then the germ of - the Jewish world plague must be destroyed, root and branch.” - -Is that what you mean? Are you saying there when you say “must be -destroyed root and branch”—did you mean to say “ought to be given a -Jewish national state”? - -STREICHER: Yes, it is a far cry from such a statement in an article to -the act, or to the will, to commit mass murder. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Turn over to the 10th of August. “When it loses -this struggle, Judaism will be ruined, then the Jew will be -extinguished. Then will Judaism be annihilated down to the last man.” - -Are we to read from these words: Provide the Jews with a Jewish national -state? - -STREICHER: That is a vision of the future. I would like to call it an -expression of a prophetic vision. But it is not incitement to kill 5 -million Jews. That is an opinion, a matter, of belief, of conviction. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is the prophetic vision of what you wanted, -is it not—of what you have been advocating now for the last 4 -years—the beginning of the war? Isn’t that what it is? - -STREICHER: Mr. Prosecutor, I cannot tell you today what I may have been -thinking years ago at a certain moment when writing an article. But -still I admit that when I saw lying before me on the table declarations -from the Jewish front, many declarations saying, “the German nation has -to be destroyed; bomb the cities, do not spare women, children, or old -men”—if one has declarations like these in front of one, it is possible -that things will come from one’s pen such as I have often written. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You know, do you not, now, even if you do not -believe the full figures, that millions of Jews have been murdered since -the beginning of the war? Do you know that? You have heard the evidence, -have you not? - -STREICHER: I believe it... - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only wanted to know whether you had heard -that evidence. You can answer “yes” or “no,” and I presume it will be -“yes.” - -STREICHER: Yes, I have to say, evidence for me is only the testament of -the Führer. There he states that the mass executions took place upon his -orders. That I believe. Now I believe it. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you think that it would have been possible -to carry out the extermination of 6 million Jews in 1921? Do you think -the German people would have stood for it? Do you think it would have -been possible under any regime in 1921 to have carried out the murder of -6 million men, women, and children of the Jewish race? - -STREICHER: Whether that would have been possible with the knowledge of -the people—no, it would not have been possible. The prosecutor himself -has said here that since 1937 the Party had full control over the -people. Now even if the people had known this, according to the opinion -of the Prosecution, they could not have done anything against that -dictatorship because of that control. But the people did not know it. -That is my belief, my conviction, and my knowledge. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Was it possible to exterminate people in that -way only after some 20 years of incitement and propaganda by you and -other Nazis? Is that what made that possible? - -STREICHER: I deny that the population was incited. It was enlightened, -and sometimes a harsh word may have been directed against the other side -as an answer. It was enlightenment, not incitement. And if we want to -keep our place before history I have to state again and again that the -German people did not want any killings, whether individually or _en -masse_. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am not going to let you go into another -history about the German people. I am going to remind you of what you -have said... - -STREICHER: Adolf Hitler... - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am going to remind you of what you said -yesterday. I read from the transcript: You speak of a Jewish question at -the time—that is 1923—“I would like to say that the public -distinguished Jews only by their religion; to speak about a Jewish -problem then would have been nonsense.” - -Was that because there was no Jewish problem then, and that the Jewish -problem had only been created by you and the Nazi regime? - -STREICHER: It was my aim, and I reached that goal in part: If the laws -which in the future should make impossible sexual intercourse between -different races, that is to say if that should become law—then it would -make the public realize that to be a Jew is not a point of religion but -of people and race. I helped to create that basis. But mass killings -were not the result of the enlightenment, or as the Prosecution say, -incitement. Mass killings were the last acts of will of a great man of -history who was probably desperate because he saw that he would not win. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I have no further questions. Perhaps I might be -allowed to just sort out the exhibits and then mention to the Tribunal -their numbers. If the Tribunal would agree, those that I have put in -evidence, which are the other parts of the bundle other than I have -actually quoted from—perhaps I could put them all in as one number and -hand the exhibits in to the clerk, if that would be the convenient -course. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think so, yes. If they are in one bundle and you are -going to give one number to a number of documents, it had better be in -one bundle, had it not? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, do you want to re-examine? - -DR. MARX: I do not consider it necessary any more. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to the dock. Dr. Marx, will -you continue the defendant’s case? - -DR. MARX: I call now, with the permission of the Court, the witness -Fritz Herrwerth. - -[_The witness Herrwerth took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -FRITZ HERRWERTH (Witness): Fritz Herrwerth. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing.” - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -You may sit down. - -DR. MARX: How long have you known the Defendant Streicher? - -HERRWERTH: Since the Party Rally in 1934. - -DR. MARX: When did you enter his service and in what capacity? - -HERRWERTH: I was employed on 15 October 1934, in Nuremberg, not in the -personal service of Herr Streicher himself, but in the municipal motor -pool. However, I worked for the then Gauleiter Streicher. - -DR. MARX: When did you leave that service? - -HERRWERTH: In August 1943. - -DR. MARX: For what reason? - -HERRWERTH: It was a personal dispute, and mainly due to my fault. - -DR. MARX: Did you have any other tasks to carry out for Herr Streicher? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. - -DR. MARX: And which? - -HERRWERTH: Well, whatever came up. I also did agricultural work at the -end. - -DR. MARX: Thus you were very often with Streicher? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. - -DR. MARX: And therefore you knew about the most important incidents -during that period? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. I do not know, however, what you call important -incidents. There were things that I do not know about, that is, at least -I assume that. - -DR. MARX: I will ask you later in detail. - -HERRWERTH: Yes, if you please. - -DR. MARX: The Defendant Streicher is accused of having caused acts of -violence against the Jews and of having participated in these acts. Do -you know of any such case? - -HERRWERTH: Not a single one. - -DR. MARX: Will you please wait until the end of my question, and then I -shall say “end of question.” On 9 November 1938, did you drive Streicher -back to Nuremberg from Munich, and when? End of question. - -HERRWERTH: It was on 9 November, yes. I do not know the time exactly. At -that time Streicher left Munich a bit earlier, and it may have been -about—I do not know for sure—9 o’clock perhaps. - -DR. MARX: Did Streicher know already during that ride back that -something was to be done that night against the Jewish population? - -HERRWERTH: No, he knew nothing about that. - -DR. MARX: Then, during the night of 9 November, did you witness a -conversation between Streicher and the SA Leader, Von Obernitz? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Where did that conversation take place? - -HERRWERTH: In order to answer that question, I have to explain a little -further. When Herr Streicher went to bed, I was usually with him or the -house superintendent. On that evening Herr Streicher went to bed earlier -than usual. I do not know the reason. And that concluded my work for the -day. I went from Herr Streicher to the Casino of the Gauleitung. That -was in the cellar of the Gauleitung building on Schlageterstrasse. I -played cards there. And then the former SA Obergruppenführer, Von -Obernitz, came and called me, as was customary, by the name of Fritz and -told me he had to speak to Herr Streicher very urgently; and I answered -him that Herr Streicher had already gone to bed. Then he said, “Then I -must rouse him,” and he told me he would assume the responsibility; it -was an important affair. Herr Von Obernitz went to Herr Streicher’s -apartment in my car. Herr Streicher’s bedroom is above my apartment. I -had the keys and of course I could get in at any time. - -On the way to the apartment at night I noticed that many SA men were in -the streets. I asked Herr Von Obernitz the reason for that. He told me -that that night something was going to happen; the Jewish homes were to -be destroyed. He did not say anything further to me. - -I accompanied Herr Von Obernitz all the way to the bed of Herr -Streicher. Herr Von Obernitz then reported to Streicher about what was -happening that night. I cannot recall the details very well any more, -but I believe that he said that that night the Jewish homes were to be -destroyed. Herr Streicher was, if I may say so, surprised. He had not -known anything about it. He said literally to Herr Von Obernitz, and I -remember that very clearly, “That is wrong. One does not solve the -Jewish question that way. Do what you have been ordered. I shall have no -part in it. If anything should occur so that you need me, then you may -come for me.” I can also mention that thereupon Herr Von Obernitz said -that Hitler had declared that the SA should be allowed to have a fling -as retribution for what had occurred in Paris in connection with Herr -Vorn Rath. Streicher stayed in bed and did not go out during that night. - -DR. MARX: Did Herr Von Obernitz mention anything about the fact that the -synagogues were to be set on fire? - -HERRWERTH: I believe so, yes. But, as far as I remember, Herr Streicher -refused to do that, too, because the synagogue, as far as I know, was -burned down by the regular fire department, and upon orders from Herr -Von Obernitz. - -DR. MARX: How do you know that? - -HERRWERTH: I was there. - -DR. MARX: Did you watch it? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. I was at the synagogue during the night. - -DR. MARX: And how could one assume that the regular fire department -started the fire? - -HERRWERTH: How that could be assumed I do not know, but I saw it. The -regular fire department started the fire. - -DR. MARX: Were you there in time to see how the fire was started or did -you arrive when the building was already on fire? - -HERRWERTH: The building was not yet on fire, but the fire department was -there already. - -DR. MARX: Is that right? - -HERRWERTH: I can say nothing else. - -DR. MARX: Did Herr Streicher at that time mention anything about the -fact that he was afraid of a new wave of excitement on the part of the -world press if the synagogue was burned? Did he say that that is why he -refused to do it? - -HERRWERTH: I believe so, yes, but I could not say definitely; but, if I -remember correctly, they spoke about that. - -DR. MARX: Did Obernitz say from whom he had received the order? - -HERRWERTH: He only repeated what Hitler had said—the SA should be -allowed to have a fling. - -DR. MARX: Is it correct that you, Witness, told your wife during the -same night about that conversation between Obernitz and Streicher? - -HERRWERTH: I believe I did not speak about the conversation; but when I -walked down from the second floor to the ground floor through my -apartment, I told my wife that I would probably be a little late because -that night that action was going to be started; I told her briefly what -was happening but nothing about the conversation. - -DR. MARX: Then, later you were at the Pleikershof when Streicher had -been forced to retire there or had retired? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Do you remember an incident where the future Frau Streicher -spoke about the incidents at Magdeburg which had occurred there the same -night? - -HERRWERTH: No, I know nothing of that. - -DR. MARX: Did you not tell the then Frau Merkel that she should not talk -about these incidents because Streicher always got very excited about -them? - -HERRWERTH: I can recall that Herr Streicher once said that he had been -right in his opinion, for, not long after that night he received -information—I do not know through whom—that, for instance, the glass -for the window panes had to be bought from Holland again. Herr Streicher -said then that that was the first confirmation of the correctness of the -opinion he had expressed at that time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, just one moment. - -Sir David, would it be convenient to you and the counsel for the -Defendant Von Schirach if we discussed the question about the documents -at 0930 tomorrow morning? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I will find out. Yes, counsel for Von -Schirach says that he thinks it is all right. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, 0930 tomorrow morning. - -DR. MARX: What observations did you make during your stay at Pleikershof -about the attitude of Streicher with regard to the Jewish question? What -was that about the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_? - -HERRWERTH: Well, what do you want to know about the _Israelitisches -Wochenblatt_? Herr Streicher received it. - -DR. MARX: Did he receive it regularly? - -HERRWERTH: Yes, I believe I can say that quite certainly. I always saw -large bundles of newspapers of the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_. They -came continuously. - -DR. MARX: Herr Streicher said that during the first years of the war he -had great difficulty in getting that paper and the Police did not -release it easily. - -HERRWERTH: Yes, that can very well be. For I do not know, after all, of -what year they were. I just saw them and it is difficult for me to tell -now of what date these papers were. - -DR. MARX: Yes, you said there were always large bundles of them. - -HERRWERTH: Yes, on and off, but there were other newspapers too. Swiss -newspapers were there, the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, and so on. -There were always so many newspapers lying about and among them I saw -here and there the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_. I mean to say that it -would not be possible for me to say how many there were. - -DR. MARX: All right. Did Streicher speak at times about his knowledge of -happenings in the East or of happenings in concentration camps in the -East? - -HERRWERTH: Well. Herr Streicher did not know anything at all about it. -Thus he could not say anything about it. At least that is my conviction. - -DR. MARX: Did you, then, ever speak to him about it? - -HERRWERTH: Not that I know of; I did not know anything about it myself. - -DR. MARX: Did you ever receive knowledge of a letter in which Streicher -was reproached by Reichsführer SS Himmler because he treated the French -prisoners too well? Did you understand me? - -HERRWERTH: Yes, I understood, but I have to think about it. I know quite -well that Herr Streicher once mentioned something about the treatment of -prisoners. I know that the Frenchmen were treated very well, but whether -the cause for that was a letter from Himmler I do not know. - -DR. MARX: No, no. The cause for the good treatment, you mean? - -HERRWERTH: No, the cause for Herr Streicher’s speaking about it. Herr -Streicher spoke about reproaches against the good treatment of the -Frenchmen; but I do not know whether the fact that he spoke about it was -due to a letter from Himmler. But I do not believe that there was a -single Frenchman who could complain in any way about the treatment. - -DR. MARX: You were no longer present when the Frenchmen left? - -HERRWERTH: No. - -DR. MARX: Do you know about an incident when the publisher Fink came -into the garden of Streicher’s home and admitted having lied to the -police in an affair concerning shares? - -HERRWERTH: The question must be put in detail, Mr. Attorney, for I do -not know all about it, only part of it. I know that the then Director -Fink stood in tears before Streicher, that he wailed, that he accused -himself, saying that he was a rascal and a traitor. But why, I do not -know. For Herr Streicher then walked farther into the garden with him, -and I only saw that Herr Fink wept, and again heard how he accused -himself. - -DR. MARX: Do you know that Streicher at certain intervals brought people -from the SPD and the KPD (Social Democratic Party and Communist Party) -from the Dachau Concentration Camp? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. - -DR. MARX: How many do you suppose there were? - -HERRWERTH: I do not know. It was every year around Christmas time. I -estimate that there were about 100 to 150 men every year. They came from -Dachau. Herr Streicher had dinner prepared for them in a separate room, -in the Hotel Deutscher Hof, and I believe that used to be the family -reunion—that is to say, the prisoners rejoined the members of their -family. Streicher also saw to it that released prisoners found work, and -he intervened personally for them. - -DR. MARX: Did he also get work for one or another of these released -persons? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. - -DR. MARX: What do you know about that? - -HERRWERTH: I remember that three men, I believe, came into the Mars -motorcycle factory. Herr Streicher at that time told the plenipotentiary -of the German Labor Front to find positions for these people, as far as -I remember. - -DR. MARX: What was the attitude of Streicher when he found out that -members of the Party had acquired cars and villas of Jewish property at -very low prices? - -HERRWERTH: I can still remember when Herr Streicher returned from -Berlin. I do not know how much Herr Streicher knew at that time about -these purchases; but at any rate, when Herr Streicher returned from -Berlin where Herr Göring had expressed his views about these low-priced -purchases of buildings, Herr Streicher, just arrived at the Nuremberg -railroad station, said—and I heard it myself—that these purchases had -to be nullified at once. - -Besides, I know only about one case where a Party member had to do with -the purchase of a house. I do not know whether there were more of them. - -DR. MARX: Do you know whether Streicher was under surveillance by the -Gestapo while on his farm and that there was a prohibition against -visiting him there? - -HERRWERTH: In answering the first question, I cannot say for sure that -Criminal Police agents were there. I cannot affirm categorically that -Herr Streicher was once under observation, but it could be safely -assumed. I know of a woman who even stated that she had been -photographed in the forest when she came from the railroad station to -the farm. And what was the second question? - -DR. MARX: Whether people were prohibited from visiting him. - -HERRWERTH: Yes. I met various members of the Party within the city and -whomever I asked said to me, “Impossible to get out there, impossible to -get out there.” And if I asked who had issued the prohibition, then no -one would talk about it; but as one heard it here and there, this -prohibition was said to have been issued by the Deputy of the Führer, -Herr Hess. - -DR. MARX: Do you know anything about the fact that Streicher, when he -found out that acts of violence against Jews or other political -adversaries were intended, stopped them immediately? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. At least, on the basis of his statements. He always said -that that was wrong. - -DR. MARX: Do you know of any case where he took measures against -somebody who had been a party to such acts of violence? If you do not -know it, say you do not know. - -HERRWERTH: Very well, at this moment I cannot recall any case. - -DR. MARX: Do you know anything about that affair concerning the Mars -Works shares? What do you know about it? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. I know about that case through statements made by -Streicher at that time. I was not a witness to these events myself, but -Herr Streicher once related to me what had happened. Shall I describe it -briefly? - -DR. MARX: Yes, but very condensed, please. - -HERRWERTH: Streicher was in a Turkish bath at the time when the Director -Fink and his adjutant, König, came and offered to sell the shares to -Herr Streicher. Herr Streicher said, “What kind of shares are they?” The -answer was, “They are shares of the Mars Works.” He said, “How many?” -The answer was “100,000 marks’ worth.” Then Streicher said, “What do the -shares cost?” He was told “5,000 marks.” Herr Streicher asked, “Why are -these shares so cheap?” Finally Herr Fink said, I believe, “Because they -are Jewish shares.” - -Whoever knows Herr Streicher as I do, knows that Herr Streicher has -never taken anything from a Jew. He protested very emphatically against -the fact that such an offer had been made to him at all. - -That seemed to settle the matter for the time being, and then suddenly -the then Gauleiter Herr Streicher had the thought that with that money -he could possibly construct the third Gau building. He mentioned that to -the gentlemen as they left, and they decided to buy the shares. Herr -Streicher forbade them to use Party money. Then both did not know what -to do. Herr Streicher said he would advance these 5,000 marks. - -That settled the case, but I had another experience later. It was about -one and a half years after that trial that Streicher had had in Munich, -when he was dismissed. At that time the wife of NSKK Obergruppenführer -Zühlen came to me and asked whether I already knew that the criminal -police was again in Nuremberg concerning the Streicher case. I said “no” -to Frau Zühlen and added, “If they want to find out something why do -they not come out to the farm to Herr Streicher himself? He will give -them all the necessary information.” - -After about 2 to 3 weeks, I met the Director of _Der Stürmer_, Fischer, -successor to Herr Fink. He told me—but I would like to mention first -that the shares, together with the 5,000 marks, were confiscated from -Herr Streicher. The then Director Fischer told me that on that same day -he had received a phone call from the trustee association, and that the -trustee association had reported to Director Fischer that they had -transferred to the account of _Der Stürmer_ the 5,000 marks which -Streicher at that time had advanced for the purchase of the shares. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, do you not think he is going into rather too -much detail about this? - -DR. MARX: Yes. - -HERRWERTH: Yes, I will make it shorter. - -The man from the trustee association said that the 5,000 marks were -released because the innocence of Streicher had been proved in this -matter. - -DR. MARX: You witnessed the Supreme Party Court session at that time? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. - -DR. MARX: What did Herr Fink say at that time? Did he not accuse himself -again of having made false statements? - -HERRWERTH: I was not present when Herr Fink was questioned. - -DR. MARX: Very well. Then I would like to ask you, were you present when -the incident in Munich occurred at the Künstlerhaus Inn—with the man -who accosted Streicher? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Can you give us a description of how that incident occurred? - -HERRWERTH: Well, Herr Streicher left the inn after dinner. I cannot -remember the exact words any more, but I am going to try to describe it -as well as possible. Herr Streicher left the inn, and as he went out -that man approached Herr Streicher in a—may I say—improper manner. -Streicher continued on his way and was silent at first. He asked the -people around him, myself also, whether we knew that man. Nobody knew -him. - -Then Herr Streicher sent his son, Lothar, back into the room again to -speak to the man and to ask him what the reason was for such behavior. -Lothar Streicher came out and said that the man had behaved in just the -same manner again. - -DR. MARX: Will you please be more brief? You should only tell us how -that incident occurred and what caused you and also Herr Streicher to -use violence against the man. - -HERRWERTH: You mean his behavior? - -DR. MARX: Yes. What happened then? - -HERRWERTH: Herr Streicher asked the landlord for a room, and in that -room Streicher spoke to the man personally. There again the man made -offensive remarks, and then it came to blows, first with Lothar -Streicher. Now, as it happened, he was a strong man, and of course all -of us helped to get him down. - -DR. MARX: All right. - -I am through with the questioning of this witness, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel want to ask any questions? -Do any of the Prosecution Counsel wish to cross-examine? Then the -witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -DR. MARX: Then I should like to call the witness Wurzbacher, if he is -available. Is he not? I do not know which one of the witnesses is still -in the witness room. Is there anyone? Wurzbacher? Hiemer? - -MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): Frau Streicher is available. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is not the witness Wurzbacher here? - -MARSHAL: I will see, Sir. He was not here a while ago. He was not called -for. - -THE PRESIDENT: What other witnesses have you got, Dr. Marx? - -DR. MARX: The wife of the defendant could be called as a witness now. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, let her be called then. - -MARSHAL: The witness Strobel is available now. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx wants to call Frau Streicher. - -DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. If it is rather difficult to call -Frau Streicher, then the witness... - -[_The witness Frau Streicher took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you give me your full name? - -FRAU ADELE STREICHER (Witness): Adele Streicher, born Tappe. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing.” - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -You may sit down. - -DR. MARX: Your maiden name is Tappe and you were born in Magdeburg? - -FRAU STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Were you a member of the NSDAP or of the Frauenschaft? - -FRAU STREICHER: No. - -DR. MARX: When did you become Herr Streicher’s secretary and for how -long were you in that job? - -FRAU STREICHER: On 7 June 1940, I became Julius Streicher’s secretary -and I remained in that job until the end of the war. - -DR. MARX: And during that period, you were continuously on his farm? - -FRAU STREICHER: Yes, I was always with him. - -DR. MARX: Were you also in charge of all the correspondence for Herr -Streicher? - -FRAU STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: What did that correspondence mainly consist of? - -FRAU STREICHER: Mainly letters to his sons and to relatives. - -DR. MARX: What were Streicher’s activities during that period of 5 -years? - -FRAU STREICHER: Julius Streicher did mainly physical work; that is, -agriculture and gardening, and from time to time he wrote articles for -_Der Stürmer_. - -DR. MARX: During these 5 years did he leave the farm at all or was he -ever absent from the farm for any length of time? - -FRAU STREICHER: During the first few years of his stay there Julius -Streicher did not leave the farm at all; later, once in a while, he -would pay a visit in the neighborhood. His longest absence did not -comprise an entire day and never a single night. - -DR. MARX: Did you know that it was prohibited for prominent Party -members to visit Herr Streicher? - -FRAU STREICHER: Yes, there was such a prohibition. - -DR. MARX: How did you know that? - -FRAU STREICHER: From conversations. Then, too, I myself remember, when -Dr. Goebbels visited the farm, that Julius Streicher said to him, -“Doctor, you dare to come here? Do you not know that it is prohibited by -the Party chiefs to visit me?” - -DR. MARX: When did the visits of Dr. Ley and Dr. Goebbels occur? - -FRAU STREICHER: Dr. Ley came to the farm on 7 May 1944. The visit of Dr. -Goebbels occurred on 4 June 1944. - -DR. MARX: Would you please describe the character of these visits and -what was the subject of the conversations? - -FRAU STREICHER: Both visits were of a rather unofficial character. Dr. -Ley wanted mainly to know how Julius Streicher was doing, personally. No -political questions were raised. Ley said only, “Streicher, the Führer -is waiting for you.” - -DR. MARX: And what did Streicher say to that? - -FRAU STREICHER: Julius Streicher answered that he had become accustomed -to his solitude, that he was happy as a farmer, and that Ley should tell -the Führer that he, Streicher, wanted nothing more. At the visit of Dr. -Goebbels the subject of the conversation dealt mainly with Julius -Streicher’s dismissal from his office as Gauleiter, and Dr. Goebbels was -of the opinion that Julius Streicher should return into the circle of -old Party members; but he gave him the same answer, “Tell the Führer I -wish for nothing.” - -DR. MARX: Were you always present during these conversations? - -FRAU STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Was not the Jewish question a subject of these conversations? - -FRAU STREICHER: No, they never spoke about the Jewish question. - -DR. MARX: Did they not speak about the happenings in the Eastern -territories, or in the concentration camps? - -FRAU STREICHER: No, that never came up any more. - -DR. MARX: Did not Streicher speak to you about the articles he intended -to write for _Der Stürmer_, and did he not also speak about what he -considered to be the solution of the Jewish problem? - -FRAU STREICHER: From all conversations with Julius Streicher I could see -with certainty that he never thought of the solution of the Jewish -question in terms of violence, but hoped for the emigration of Jews from -Europe and their settlement in territories outside Europe. - -DR. MARX: Was Herr Streicher in correspondence with leading -personalities of the Party or of the State? - -FRAU STREICHER: No, neither personally nor by correspondence was there -any such connection. - -DR. MARX: I will now mention several names, of whom I want you to tell -me whether they had any connection with him: Himmler, Heydrich, Bormann, -or other leading men of the Police or the SS or the Gestapo. - -FRAU STREICHER: No, I know nothing of any of these men. With the -exception of one letter from Herr Himmler there was never any mail. - -DR. MARX: What was the reason for that letter? - -FRAU STREICHER: In that letter Herr Himmler complained about the fact -that the French prisoners of war who were employed on our Pleikershof -farm were treated too well. - -DR. MARX: How was the treatment of the prisoners of war and the foreign -civilian workers on the farm? - -FRAU STREICHER: On the Pleikershof eight French prisoners of war, one -Polish girl, and one Slovene girl were employed. They were all treated -very well and very humanely. Each service for which Julius Streicher -asked, each piece of work for which he asked personally, was especially -rewarded with tobacco, pastry, fruit, or even money. Such cordial -relations developed with some of the Frenchmen during the years that -they were there that they assured us, with tears in their eyes at their -departure, that they would visit Julius Streicher after the war with -their families. - -DR. MARX: Did Streicher not finally receive credible information about -these mass executions in the East? - -FRAU STREICHER: I believe he found out about it through Swiss newspapers -in 1944. We were never informed about it officially. - -DR. MARX: But it is asserted that he already had knowledge before that. - -FRAU STREICHER: No. - -DR. MARX: You do not know anything about it? - -FRAU STREICHER: I only know about the Swiss newspapers. - -DR. MARX: Very well. You once brought up the subject, in a conversation, -that in Magdeburg, from the 9 to 10 November 1938, you witnessed the -demonstration against the Jews and that you were revolted by it. Is that -true? - -FRAU STREICHER: Yes, I spoke about it and said that I was shocked at -this action. Julius Streicher got very excited during that conversation -and said, “Such nonsense occurred in Nuremberg also. That is not -anti-Semitism; that is just great stupidity.” - -DR. MARX: Is it correct that Herr Streicher was hardly interested in the -financial affairs of the publishing firm and left these things to the -manager? - -FRAU STREICHER: Julius Streicher never bothered about financial affairs -at all, neither in the house nor in the firm. Again and again the -gentlemen of the firm were disappointed when they wanted to report about -annual balances or the like and Julius Streicher would tell them, “Do -not worry me with your business matters. There are other things besides -that are more important than money.” - -DR. MARX: How did he take care of the household expenses, then? - -FRAU STREICHER: I received 1,000 marks every month from the firm. That -provided for the household, presents, and so on. - -DR. MARX: Do you know that he is supposed to have acquired shares -through illegal pressure against a Jewish banker? - -FRAU STREICHER: That is completely out of the question. I consider it -quite impossible that Julius Streicher acquired shares that way. I -believe that he does not even know what a share looks like. - -DR. MARX: Did he not tell you anything about it? - -FRAU STREICHER: I only heard that he never received shares. - -DR. MARX: How did it come about that you and the defendant were married -as late as April 1945? - -Did you understand the question? - -FRAU STREICHER: Yes. Julius Streicher wanted to take part in the -fighting in Nuremberg. I wanted to accompany him, so he married me -before we left. We wanted to die together. - -DR. MARX: Then you left the Pleikershof with him, and where did you go -from there? - -FRAU STREICHER: First we wanted to go to Nuremberg, and that was refused -for fear of difficulties with the authorities. So we drove in the -direction of Munich. In Munich we were told to continue in the direction -of Passau. From Passau they sent us to Berchtesgaden; from Berchtesgaden -they sent us to Kitzbühel. - -DR. MARX: How did it happen that the original intention to die together -was not followed up? What caused him to change his mind? - -FRAU STREICHER: The cause for that was a conversation with three young -soldiers. - -DR. MARX: And what was that? I will be through right away, Mr. -President. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you should go into that, Dr. Marx. - -DR. MARX: Well, then. I will forego the question. Only one more -question: Is it correct that Streicher gave the managers of his -publishing firm a written power of attorney which meant that they could -dispose of the money as they saw fit? - -FRAU STREICHER: Yes, Julius Streicher gave the power of attorney to -whoever happened to be the manager of the firm, and thereby gave him his -full confidence without any restrictions. - -DR. MARX: Mr. President, I have no more questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any -questions? - -Does the Prosecution wish to ask any questions? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire, and the Court will adjourn -until 0930 tomorrow morning. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 30 April 1946 at 0930 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH DAY - Tuesday, 30 April 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, were you going to deal with these questions? - -MR. DODD: Yes, Mr. President, I am prepared to do so. Shall I proceed to -take up those documents about which we have some difficulty? - -THE PRESIDENT: If you will, yes. - -MR. DODD: Altogether, there are some 118 documents submitted on behalf -of the Defendant Von Schirach. As a result of our conversations we have -agreed on all but—I believe the number is twelve. - -The first group, Numbers 30, 31, 45, 68, 73, 101, 109, 124, and 133, are -all excerpts from a book entitled, _Look, the Heart of Europe_, written -by a man named Stanley McClatchie. They are excerpts referring to the -Hitler Youth organization, and we do object to them on the ground that -they are all irrelevant and immaterial here. They describe Hitler Youth -meetings at homes and Hitler health programs and Hitler athletic -competitions and Hitler Youth Land Service and that sort of thing. There -are general descriptions by Mr. McClatchie of some activities of the -Hitler Youth organization. They are all, I say, from that same -book—none of them written by the defendant himself. They were published -in 1937. - -Then, Document Number 118 (a) is a letter. It is unsigned, except that -it is typewritten. It is by Colin Ross and his wife and it appears to be -a suicide note setting forth the reasons why Ross and his wife intended -to commit suicide. We have been unable to determine its probative value -and do not see any probative value in it, insofar as the issues -concerning this defendant are concerned. He apparently was acquainted -with the Defendant Von Schirach and that is the claim, I assume, of -counsel for Von Schirach, that it sheds some light of some kind on Von -Schirach’s attitude. But it is not clear to us. - -The third document is Number 121. This is a quotation from the United -States Army newspaper, _The Stars and Stripes_, issue of the 21st of -February 1946. It is about the training of young people in Yugoslavia at -the present time. With respect to this we also say that we believe it to -be immaterial here and not relevant and not bearing on the issues -concerning this defendant as charged in the Indictment. - -Those three—the first group and the two, 118 and 121, are the only -documents concerning which we have any controversy. - -THE PRESIDENT: Eleven. - -MR. DODD: I am sorry. I said twelve. - -DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Von Schirach): Mr. President, -the first group of documents to which the Prosecution has objected are -from a book by an American, McClatchie. - -This American, as he himself writes in the book, is of Scottish descent, -and in the year 1936—that was the year of the Olympic Games—visited -Germany; he was able to see for himself the conditions in Germany and -the development of the German people during the first years of the -Hitler regime, and here he describes the impressions he received. - -Normally, I would not attach any special value to this book, if it were -not for the fact that the preface shows that the book was written on -suggestion of the Defendant Baldur von Schirach. - -The defendant, as he will explain in the course of his own examination, -began very early to build up a pleasant and friendly relationship -especially with the United States, and this book by McClatchie is one of -the many means which the Defendant Von Schirach used for that purpose. -The author himself admits in the preface of his book that he obtained a -large part of the material for the book from the Defendant Von Schirach. -This fact lends to the book an importance, with respect to its relevancy -for the purposes of this Trial in the defense of Von Schirach, entirely -different from what it would have been had it been written quite -independently of Von Schirach. That is, we have to evaluate the -statements and descriptions in this book more or less as though they -were statements of the Defendant Von Schirach himself. This is the main -reason why I have submitted the book with the request that I be -permitted to quote in evidence some short passages, particularly those -referring to the Youth Leadership. The rest of the book, which is also -interesting but has no direct connection with the Youth Leadership of -the Defendant Von Schirach, have not mentioned; I refer only to a few -short extracts which shed light exclusively on the activity and the aims -of the Defendant Von Schirach; and, besides, they are intended to show -you, Gentlemen, what impression even a foreigner gained of this -activity, although naturally he had come to Germany with a certain -prejudice which had to be overcome by his personal impressions. - -That, Mr. President, is what I wanted to say to the first group, which -the prosecutor listed individually from Numbers 30 to 133. - -The second group consists of Number 118(a) of the Document Book -Schirach, and that is a letter of farewell which the explorer, Dr. Colin -Ross, left behind. - -If the prosecutor objects that the letter bears no signature, the fact, -in my opinion, is not particularly important. What we have submitted is -the original copy of that last letter, and this original copy was found -among the papers of Dr. Colin Ross. - -Now, the Prosecution ask: What has that farewell letter by Dr. Colin -Ross to do with the charges against Schirach? I ask the Tribunal to -recall that the name of Dr. Colin Ross has been mentioned here -repeatedly. He is the explorer—I believe an American by birth but I am -not certain at the moment. He is the man who for many years was not only -a close friend of Schirach’s but one whom the Defendant Von Schirach -used again and again in order to prevent the outbreak of a war with the -United States, and later, to terminate the war and to bring about peace -with the United States. When the evidence is presented, these points -will be clarified in detail, I believe. I now submit the last letter of -Dr. Colin Ross... - -THE PRESIDENT: When was it dated? - -DR. SAUTER: One moment please. The date is 30 April 1945. I consider the -letter—it is only one page long—important for the reason that in it a -man, at a moment before he committed suicide with his wife because he -was desperate about the future of Germany, at this moment—in the face -of death, he again confirmed the fact that he, together with the -Defendant Von Schirach, continuously endeavored to maintain peace -particularly with the United States. I believe, Gentlemen, that such a -man... - -THE PRESIDENT: Where was he at the time when, as I understand you to -say, he committed suicide? - -DR. SAUTER: The Defendant Von Schirach... - -THE PRESIDENT: No, no, the man who wrote the letter. - -DR. SAUTER: One moment, please. The Defendant Von Schirach had a small -house in Upper Bavaria in Urfeld on the Walchensee, and in that house -Colin Ross lived at the time with his wife, and it was here in -Schirach’s house that he committed suicide. - -The letter is only one page, and it would not cause any considerable -delay in the proceedings if it were read. - -Then, Gentlemen, the third group to which the Prosecution objects again -consists of one number only—a comparatively short article from _The -Stars and Stripes_, Number 121. That edition of which I shall submit the -original in evidence is of 21 February 1946, that is, of this year. It -explains in detail how the education of youth in Yugoslavia has now been -reorganized by Marshal Tito, and the Defendant Von Schirach attaches -particular value to this document because it proves that in Yugoslavia a -definitely military education of youth has been decided upon this very -year. The Defendant Von Schirach therefore desires to make a comparison -between the kind of education which he promoted and the Yugoslav -education of youth which has been adopted only this year, and which goes -very much further than the program of the Defendant Von Schirach did at -any time. - -That is all. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, may I make just one or two short observations? -I realize that ordinarily the Tribunal does not want to hear from -counsel twice, but there are two matters I feel I should clear up. - -First of all, this book, _Look, the Heart of Europe_, which may have -been written by this man McClatchie, who, counsel says, is an American -of Scotch ancestry—I think it is important that the Tribunal know that -it was published in Germany. I am sure that counsel did not mean to -imply that it was an American publication because, other than having -been written by this man, it was published over here after he attended -the Olympic Games in 1936. - -THE PRESIDENT: And in the German language, I suppose? - -MR. DODD: Yes, and the German title was _Sieh: Das Herz Europas_. Then -with respect to the Colin Ross note. I think it is important to observe -that no one knows whether Ross committed suicide or not—at least -insofar as the Allied countries are concerned. His body has never been -found and only this note which counsel says was found among his effects. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I make another remark concerning the -first group? This book by McClatchie was published by a German -publisher. The efforts of the Defendant Von Schirach made the -publication possible. That again speaks for the fact that Von Schirach -in furthering the publication had a certain purpose in view. That -purpose was to bring about enlightenment between America and Germany and -to smooth over the difficulties which he was afraid could one day lead -to war. The book by McClatchie appeared not only in German, but also in -the English language, and it was sold in large numbers in England and in -the United States. Of course, it also appeared in German and the German -language edition was sold in Germany. - -That, I believe, is all I wish to say at this point. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would you tell the Tribunal what these other documents -are that Mr. Dodd has not objected to? Because we understand that there -are 160 documents which he has not objected to. What are they all about, -and how long are they? - -DR. SAUTER: They are short. I have submitted only one Document Book. -That is, I have limited myself to the absolute necessities, Gentlemen. - -THE PRESIDENT: Of how many pages? - -DR. SAUTER: Altogether, 134 pages. Of course, some cover only one-half -or one-third of a page, since the majority are relatively short -quotations. It was necessary for me to submit these excerpts, because I -can produce evidence of the activities of the Defendant Von Schirach as -Reich Youth Leader only by showing the Tribunal just what the Defendant -Von Schirach told the youth of the German nation, what his teachings -were, what his directives to his subordinate leaders were. And in order -to do so, I must submit, as I believe the Prosecution realizes, a short -report covering the entire period during which Von Schirach was Reich -Youth Leader, so as to show that the opinions and theories of the -Defendant Von Schirach during the last year of his activity as Reich -Youth Leader were exactly the same as those during his first year. He is -one of the few men within the Party who did not, in the course of the -years, allow themselves to become violent, he did not go to extremes as -did most of the others; and that is what I want to show by these -comparatively short excerpts. - -I believe that is all at the moment. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then you have the supplementary applications for -witnesses, have you not? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: You’d better deal with those, had you not? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, one of them, I understand, is a person who made an -affidavit which has been used by the Prosecution. - -DR. SAUTER: I believe that is the witness Uiberreither. - -THE PRESIDENT: No, I think it is the other one, is it not? Who are the -two? - -DR. SAUTER: One is, I believe... - -THE PRESIDENT: Marsalek. - -DR. SAUTER: No, not Marsalek, but Uiberreither. Marsalek, Mr. -President,... - -THE PRESIDENT: I have your application before me for Marsalek. You do -not want Marsalek? - -DR. SAUTER: No, that must be an error. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dated the 15th of April 1946. Anyhow, you do not want -him? - -DR. SAUTER: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, then you only want one, do you? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: And that is Uiberreither? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has the Prosecution any objection to him? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, we have not, Your Honor. That affidavit I -believe, was introduced by us in connection with the Kaltenbrunner case, -an affidavit by Uiberreither. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have no objection? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No objection. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you, Dr. Sauter. We will consider your -application in respect of documents and the witness. We will consider -your application, and we will now proceed with the case of Streicher. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I should like to make a -motion to the case of Streicher. I desire to move that Streicher’s -testimony found on Pages 8495, and 8496 of April 26th be expunged from -the Record, and on Page 8549 of yesterday’s testimony. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, do you wish to say anything about that? - -DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. Unfortunately, I did not completely -understand the motions made by the Chief Prosecutor, Mr. Justice -Jackson, because at that moment I was busy with something else. As far -as I understood, he dealt with the deletion. - -THE PRESIDENT: I can tell you what the motion was. The motion was that -passages on Pages 8494, 8495, and 8496, and on Page 8549 be expunged -from the record. - -DR. MARX: I understand. I would like to say, from the point of view of -the Defense, that I agree that these passages be expunged from the -record, because I am of the opinion that they are in no way relevant for -the defense of the defendant. - -THE PRESIDENT: The passages to which Mr. Justice Jackson has drawn our -attention are, in the opinion of the Tribunal, highly improper -statements made by the Defendant Streicher. They are, in the opinion of -the Tribunal, entirely irrelevant, and they have been admitted by -counsel for the Defendant Streicher to be entirely irrelevant, and they -will, therefore, be expunged from the record. - -And now, Dr. Marx. - -DR. MARX: May I now, with the permission of the Tribunal, continue with -the examination of witnesses? I now call the witness Friedrich Strobel -to the stand. - -[_The witness Strobel took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name. - -FRIEDRICH STROBEL (Witness): Friedrich Strobel. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -You may sit down. - -DR. MARX: Witness, on 3 December 1938 were you at a meeting of the -Jurists’ association (Rechtswahrerbund) in Nuremberg? - -STROBEL: Yes. - -DR. MARX: During that meeting the Defendant Streicher is supposed to -have spoken; is that correct? - -STROBEL: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Would you please tell us what the Defendant Streicher stated -on that occasion concerning the demonstrations of 9 November 1938? - -STROBEL: He said, “I should not have carried out this action in this -way. In such a manner it is impossible to fight a power like World -Jewry.” Then he added, “What has been done cannot be undone,” and some -more phrases of that kind. - -DR. MARX: Is it correct that at that time you were surprised that -Streicher in public objected against that action, which had been ordered -by the highest authorities? - -STROBEL: Yes. Streicher frequently spoke against measures and directives -of the Government when he was of a different opinion, as on this -occasion. I had the impression that apparently he had been passed over; -for in his speech there was a certain malicious undertone to the effect -that the matter was having unfavorable aftereffects. I wondered at the -time whether Streicher really had a lucid interval and realized how -harmful that anti-Jewish action was, or whether merely his vanity was -wounded, or whether he felt that a too quick and radical an -extermination of the Jews would put an end also to his own importance. - -DR. MARX: Witness, these are opinions which you are stating and not -facts; I did not ask you about that. - -STROBEL: Well, that was my impression. - -DR. MARX: All right, I ask you now: On 9 and 10 November 1938 were you -present in Nuremberg? - -STROBEL: Yes, I believe so. I do not remember exactly, but I believe it -was on the night of 8 to 9 November 1938 that that action was carried -out. It was on 7 November that Herr Vom Rath was shot, and on the 8th he -died, and the night after these things occurred. - -THE PRESIDENT: We needn’t argue about whether it was the 8th or the 9th. -It doesn’t matter, does it? - -DR. MARX: The question which I want to put to you now is: After that -night during which the demonstrations against the Jewish population took -place, what observations did you make on the following morning and -later, about the attitude of the population in Nuremberg toward these -demonstrations? - -STROBEL: I was informed about that action by the personnel in my office. -Thereupon I walked into the city and looked around in the streets. -People were standing in front of the damaged stores. I had the -impression that the vast majority of the population was benumbed and -speechless. People shook their heads, looked at each other, muttered -something, and then walked away. But, generally, I had the impression -that people could not speak aloud, and later I heard that those who had -objected to these things were treated rather badly, when they were -overheard by informers. - -DR. MARX: But the general impression was, was it not, that the -population definitely disapproved of that action, and that general -indignation was recognizable though not loudly expressed? - -STROBEL: Yes. The Russian radio at the time hit the nail on the head by -saying, “Let it be said to the credit of the German people that they had -no part in the events and that they were sleeping.” - -In fact most people heard of the events of the night only on the -following morning. - -THE PRESIDENT: What has this got to do with the Defendant Streicher? - -DR. MARX: Well, the Defendant Streicher has been accused of openly -approving this action in his speech on 10 November. The Defendant -Streicher also maintains in his defense that it was an action ordered by -the top authorities and not a spontaneous demonstration of the people. - -THE PRESIDENT: The fact that a number of people in Nuremberg, or even -the whole of the people of Nuremberg, disapproved of it wouldn’t show -that Streicher disapproved of it. - -DR. MARX: Yes, but he maintains that there could have been no question -of an incitement, since the action had been ordered and directed from -the top, whereas, in the case of an incitement, the action would have -been started by the people themselves. That was his conclusion. - -STROBEL: May I state my opinion about that? The action was definitely -not started by the people themselves, because even the majority of the -SA men who took part in it did so against their will. It was an order -from above; it was an organized affair. The assertion of Dr. Goebbels -that the German people had risen spontaneously was an intentional -incrimination of the German people. - -DR. MARX: I have no more questions to ask of this witness, Mr. -President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any other of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask him -any questions? - -[_There was no response._] - -Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? - -[_There was no response._] - -Then the witness can retire. - -DR. MARX: With the permission of the Tribunal, I now call the witness -Ernst Hiemer. - -MARSHAL: There is no witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is he not there? - -MARSHAL: We have no witness there. - -THE PRESIDENT: He says, Dr. Marx, that he is not there, and that there -are no witnesses there. - -DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. The witness Hiemer is in the prison -here, and I talked to him personally. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, did you inform the prison authorities yesterday -that you were going to call him? - -DR. MARX: I spoke to the Marshal on Monday and asked that Hiemer be -brought up on Tuesday, as far as I can recall. There must be a -misunderstanding. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, have you got any other witnesses besides Hiemer? - -DR. MARX: Yes, the witness Wurzbacher. - -THE PRESIDENT: Where is he? Where is Wurzbacher? - -DR. MARX: Wurzbacher is also here in prison. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, while he is being brought, can you take up the time -in dealing with your documents? - -DR. MARX: Yes. We can do that. - -MARSHAL: They will be here in about 5 minutes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Go on, Dr. Marx. - -DR. MARX: Mr. President, before coming to the question of the documents, -I should like to point out the following: During the session yesterday -afternoon the Prosecution submitted several documents which were new to -me, and I have not yet had an opportunity of stating my position with -regard to them. Nor have I yet had a chance of speaking to the Defendant -Streicher about them. From the point of view of the Defense, I consider -it necessary to explain my position with regard to these very important -documents; and I believe that I must now examine all the articles of -_Der Stürmer_ to see whether Streicher used in some way or other the -various pieces of information from the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_; for -his defense is, “I did not believe what I read there.” If he did not use -these items of information in any of his articles, then his answer is, -to a certain extent, corroborated. Therefore I have to review the -matter... - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. In one particular article it was -demonstrated yesterday in cross-examination, as I understood it, that he -had used an article from the Jewish paper. - -DR. MARX: Yes. I know that article. It is one of 4 November 1943. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Marx, what exactly are you applying for now? -What is your motion? - -DR. MARX: My motion is that the Tribunal permit me to supplement my -document book so as to be able to state my position with regard to -yesterday’s presentation of documents by the Prosecution by submitting -counter documents of my own. My presentation of documents would be -incomplete if I had no chance of replying to these new documents -submitted by the Prosecution. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Marx; the Tribunal grants your motion provided -you make it in the ordinary way, in writing, referring to any passages -which you contend throw light on the passages which have been put in by -the Prosecution. - -DR. MARX: Yes. May I now begin to discuss the individual documents? -Document Number Streicher-1 shows that the newspaper _Der Stürmer_, -according to the decision of the Führer, was not an official Party organ -and was not even entitled to carry the state insignia while all other -press organs displayed the insignia conspicuously. That is evidence that -the paper _Der Stürmer_ was a private publication of the Defendant -Streicher. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, you are going to offer these documents in -evidence and give them exhibit numbers, are you not? - -DR. MARX: I consider these documents as submitted; I have discussed the -subject with the Prosecution, and the Prosecution had no objections. - -THE PRESIDENT: You see, there is a written transcript being taken down, -and unless you offer each document in evidence and say that will be -exhibit number so-and-so, it does not get into the transcript. If you -like you can do it in a group and say, “I offer in evidence such and -such documents as Exhibits 1 to 100,” or whatever number you wish. - -DR. MARX: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: The book I have before me does contain certain exhibit -numbers; for instance, Page 1 to 4 appears to be Exhibit Number -Streicher-1 and Page 5 is Exhibit Number Streicher-5; Page 6 is Exhibit -Number Streicher-6; Page 7 is Exhibit Number Streicher-7. - -DR. MARX: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am told that Page 4 is Exhibit Number Streicher-1; is -it? - -DR. MARX: The pagination made here is completely different from the one -I made and consequently it is now arranged altogether differently. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, let us get on. You only have to tell us what -documents you are offering in evidence and under what exhibit numbers. -Dr. Marx, you can do it later if you want to. - -DR. MARX: I further submit Exhibit Number Streicher-5, an excerpt from -an editorial of _Der Stürmer_ of July 1938. Number 28. This article, -which was not written by the Defendant Streicher but by Karl Holz, is -worded in very sharp language and says that vengeance will break loose -one day and all Jewry will be exterminated. But the salient point -here—the article seems to have been provoked by a letter which was sent -from Nuremberg to New York, and which stated that Germany in the case of -war, would be destroyed from the air. And so this article also falls -under the claim which the defendant made yesterday, namely that his -sharp language was always caused by some preceding action from another -side. That is Document Number Streicher-5 and I ask permission to submit -it as an exhibit under that number. - -Then I submit as Document Number Streicher-6, an excerpt from Number 40 -of _Der Stürmer_ of October 1938. I think I can dispense with comment on -it because my argument can be seen from the document itself; or is it -necessary to speak about it? - -THE PRESIDENT: No, you need not speak about them; just put them in. - -DR. MARX: I submit as Document Number Streicher-7, an excerpt from the -_Völkischer Beobachter_ of 25 February 1942, in answer to Document M-31 -of the trial brief against the defendant. - -Then I submit Document Number Streicher-8, an excerpt from the -_Völkischer Beobachter_ of 8 February 1939, Page 2. - -Then as Document Number Streicher-9, an excerpt from the political -testament of Adolf Hitler, dated 29 April 1945. - -As Document Number Streicher-10, an excerpt from _Der Stürmer_, February -1935, Number 8, Page 4. - -As Document Number Streicher-11, an excerpt from _Der Stürmer_ of -September 1935, Number 38. - -I am giving the next page the Document Number Streicher-12. That is an -excerpt from _Der Stürmer_, of September 1935, Number 38, Page 9. - -Document Number Streicher-13 is an excerpt from _Der Stürmer_, of -January 1938. Number 1. - -Document Number Streicher-14, an excerpt from _Der Stürmer_ of May 1938, -Number 20. - -As Document Number Streicher-15, an excerpt from _Der Stürmer_ of 5 -November 1943, Number 45. - -As Document Number Streicher-16, of the Defense, a document submitted by -the Prosecution under number 759-PS. - -As Document Number Streicher-17, speeches made by Himmler in April 1943, -on 4 October 1943, and 23 September 1943 at Posen and Kharkov. - -As Document Number Streicher-18, a photostat of the special issue of -_Der Stürmer_ of May 1939, Number 20. - -I ask to have these documents admitted. I have limited myself to the -utmost. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is all, is it? - -DR. MARX: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are the witnesses ready yet? Perhaps we might as well -adjourn for 10 minutes now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -[_The witness Ernst Hiemer took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name. - -ERNST HIEMER (Witness): Ernst Hiemer. - -DR. MARX: May I just interrupt for a minute, Mr. President. First of all -I would like to state that I am by no means holding the Marshal -responsible for the mistake. The matter was as follows: The mistake in -requesting the witness... - -THE PRESIDENT: It is quite all right, Dr. Marx. - -DR. MARX: I consider it my duty to state here that the Marshal is not -responsible for the mistake about the bringing in of the witness. One of -my assistants spoke yesterday with a gentleman... - -THE PRESIDENT: We quite understand, Dr. Marx. - -DR. MARX: Then, Mr. President, I should like to submit Documents Number -Streicher 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 up to 18. I do not know whether it is clear -now. The numbers are 1 and 5, and from 6 through 18. Lacking are 2, 3, -and 4, which were dropped. All other exhibit numbers are contained -therein, Numbers 1 and from 5 through 18. - -THE PRESIDENT: You include 19, don’t you? - -DR. MARX: No, Numbers 19 and 20 are not necessary. - -THE PRESIDENT: No, I beg your pardon. I think I must have been wrong. I -have taken down 19, but you haven’t got 19, have you? - -DR. MARX: Number 18 is my last one, Your Honor, and I ask to have that -included in the record. - -THE PRESIDENT: And now you are going to go on with the witnesses? - -DR. MARX: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name. - -ERNST HIEMER: Ernst Hiemer. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -You may sit down. - -DR. MARX: Since when have you known Herr Streicher, how did you get into -contact with him, and what position did you have on _Der Stürmer_? - -HIEMER: At the end of 1934 I was introduced to the then Gauleiter Julius -Streicher in the Deutscher Hof in Nuremberg. Streicher gave me the -assignment of working for his public health journal, _Die Deutsche -Volksgesundheit_. In 1935 I also wrote reports for _Der Stürmer_. -Streicher then had me transferred to the editorial staff of _Der -Stürmer_. - -Eventually, under Streicher’s direction and the direction of other staff -members of _Der Stürmer_, I did editorial work as a co-editor. The -responsible editor of _Der Stürmer_ was Karl Holz, Streicher’s deputy, -but the leading spirit of the paper was Streicher himself. In the year -1938 instructions came from Berlin to the effect that Holz was permitted -to contribute to _Der Stürmer_, but in his capacity as state -official—he was the Deputy Gauleiter—he was no longer to be mentioned -in the editions of _Der Stürmer_. Thereupon, on instruction from -Streicher, my name was entered in _Der Stürmer_ as responsible editor. -The overall direction of the paper and all authority connected therewith -remained in Streicher’s hands, and Streicher retained this position -until the collapse. - -DR. MARX: What was the main idea of _Der Stürmer’s_ policy? What was the -Leitmotiv? - -HIEMER: Streicher wanted by means of _Der Stürmer_, in the simplest and -most popular language, to convey to every man and every woman of the -German nation knowledge about the Jews. Streicher wanted the entire -German people to realize that the Jew was a stranger among them. - -DR. MARX: Herr Hiemer, I do not want to know that. I want you to tell me -whether Herr Streicher, let us say, wished to advocate emigration or -whether he followed a different train of thought. Long expositions on -the Jewish problem are not required. - -HIEMER: Streicher was of the opinion that in Germany the Jewish question -should be solved by emigration. He repeatedly criticized the leadership -of the Reich because the emigration of Jews was not being carried -through in the manner desired by Streicher. When the war came, Streicher -asserted that the Jewish problem would no longer have had any -significance for a Germany at war if in accordance with his idea it had -been solved by complete emigration of the Jews during the preceding time -of peace. - -DR. MARX: Is it correct that the Palestine and Madagascar problem was -discussed in the journal? - -HIEMER: Yes. Streicher stated his opinion in word as well as in writing, -that Palestine and Madagascar would be suitable localities for absorbing -the Jews living in Germany. However, he did not follow up this thought, -since not Germany but only England and France could dispose of Palestine -and Madagascar. - -DR. MARX: What do you think about the influence exerted by Streicher and -_Der Stürmer_ since 1933? Is it not true that since 1933 its influence -among the German people was much in decline? - -HIEMER: Yes, that is correct. In many circles it was known that the -influence of Streicher and of his paper on the movement did decrease. -After 1933 Streicher had many conflicts with other Party leaders, and he -made many enemies. Particularly from the year 1937, Streicher was pushed -more and more into the background. Within the Party the Institute for -the Study of the Jewish Problem, under the leadership of Rosenberg, -dealt with the theory of the Jewish problem, and actual authority over -the Jews belonged, as is well known, exclusively to Himmler. - -When finally in the year 1940 Streicher was relieved of his post as -Gauleiter, he was completely isolated. From then on he lived on his farm -and worked there as a farmer; he wrote articles only for _Der Stürmer_. - -DR. MARX: What was the circulation of _Der Stürmer_ from 1933? Can you -give us figures? Of course, only after the date when you joined the -paper. - -HIEMER: This question of the circulation could, of course, be answered -best by the publication manager, who was concerned with it. However, I -remember approximate figures. _Der Stürmer_ was in 1933 a very small -paper; but by the year 1935 its circulation increased to about 800,000. -After that, however, there was a sharp decline. - -Of course, during the war _Der Stürmer_ had a smaller circulation. I -cannot give you any exact figures and during the last months the -circulation of the paper was, of course, extremely small. On the -average, I might say that _Der Stürmer_ had a circulation of perhaps -half a million. Of course, there were special issues which had a much -larger circulation. - -As I said, only the publisher could authenticate these figures. - -DR. MARX: What can be the reason for the increase in the year 1935? - -HIEMER: It is very difficult for me to answer that question. - -DR. MARX: Wasn’t it because Party authorities—because subscriptions -were made compulsory in factories and other places? - -HIEMER: You are putting questions to me which really only a publisher -can answer. I myself cannot answer the question with assurance, and -therefore must remain silent; my testimony would not be reliable. - -DR. MARX: Of course, if you don’t know, you are free to say, “My -knowledge on this point is not sufficient.” Did Herr Streicher know of -the happenings in the East, especially in the concentration camps, and -what did he personally tell you about these things? - -HIEMER: Streicher himself never told me that he knew about the -happenings in the concentration camps. On the contrary, Streicher said -he learned of these things only in 1944 through the Swiss press. -Streicher received the Swiss newspapers regularly, in particular the -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ of Switzerland, and in 1944 this journal -published rather detailed descriptions about what was going on in the -concentration camps. - -Streicher at first refused to credit these reports in the Swiss press -and called them premeditated lies. He declared that these reports were -being printed merely for the purpose of undermining the prestige of the -German people abroad. It is true Streicher soon changed his opinion. He -began to doubt that his opinion was right and finally he believed that -the occurrences in concentration camps, as pictured in the Swiss press, -did after all correspond to the facts. Streicher said that Himmler was -the only man who could have authorized such crimes. - -DR. MARX: You said that Streicher soon changed his opinion. What does -that mean? - -HIEMER: In the beginning he had decidedly said that these reports could -not be true. Then he became uncertain and said that perhaps they might -be true. I had the impression that either the detailed manner of the -reports in the Swiss press had convinced Streicher that these things had -actually occurred or that Streicher, from one source or another, either -through personal contact or through letters, had received knowledge that -these happenings were actually taking place in the concentration camps. -To that I ascribe his change of view. - -DR. MARX: And when was that, approximately? - -HIEMER: I cannot give you the exact date, but I believe it was in the -middle of 1944. - -DR. MARX: What attitude did he take when he was finally convinced? Did -he express satisfaction at the fact that so many people had been killed? - -HIEMER: No. Streicher definitely deprecated what was done in the -concentration camps. It did happen that Streicher, in anger—if he had -been especially upset by political events—often or at times, asserted -that Jews, as an enemy of the German people, should be exterminated. -However, Streicher talked in that way only in the first phase of -excitement. When he was calmed, he always opposed the extermination of -the Jews. - -DR. MARX: But repeatedly in articles of _Der Stürmer_ there is talk of -the extermination of the Jews? - -HIEMER: Yes. It is a fact that in reports of _Der Stürmer_ the -extermination of Jewry is spoken about. However, on the other hand, -Streicher again and again opposed the murder of the Jews, and I am quite -convinced that Streicher and _Der Stürmer_ had nothing whatever to do -with the happenings in concentration camps. I do not believe it. - -For it is known now that these crimes in the concentration camps were -committed on the instructions of individual leading men; that is, on -official orders, and it is my firm conviction that neither Streicher nor -_Der Stürmer_ had anything to do with them. - -DR. MARX: How were the articles which you wrote prepared? Did you -receive directives for the articles from Streicher and then merely edit -them, or were you the real author? - -HIEMER: Streicher was the founder and the publisher of _Der Stürmer_. -But he was in fact also the chief editor, and all his colleagues, no -matter whether it was his deputy, Holz, or others—all of them had to -submit their articles to Streicher before they were printed. Streicher -then ordered changes if the need arose; he also gave the editors -assignments for articles, that is, he told them with what arguments -these articles were to be drawn up; and Streicher knew of all the -articles which appeared in _Der Stürmer_. In fact, he was the -responsible head, the editor of _Der Stürmer_. All others were his -assistants. He himself was, as he often said with pride, one and the -same with _Der Stürmer_. “Streicher and _Der Stürmer_ are one and the -same.” That was his maxim. - -DR. MARX: That, of course, he admits; he says that he assumes the -responsibility. - -What can you tell us about the so-called pornographic library? - -HIEMER: _Der Stürmer_ was in possession of a large archive. This archive -consisted of many thousands of German and foreign-language books, -documents, edicts, and so forth. These books were either put at the -disposal of the _Stürmer_ archive by friends of _Der Stürmer_, or they -came from Jewish apartments. The police put books which were found in -Jewish houses at the disposal of Rosenberg’s Institute for the Study of -the Jewish problem for research purposes. Whatever remained in the -Jewish dwellings in Nuremberg was turned over to the _Stürmer_ archive. -Among these books there were also numerous which dealt with sexual -knowledge, books by Magnus Hirschfeld, Bloch, and some which were simply -pornographic. These, then, consisted both of books which had been sent -in by friends of the _Stürmer_, and books which had been found in Jewish -dwellings. - -These books were kept in a special section of the _Stürmer_ archive -under lock and key, and the public did not have access to them. This -literature was no personal pornographic library of Streicher, but formed -a part of _Der Stürmer’s_ archive. Streicher never read these books. -They were to be reviewed after the war in the course of the -reconstruction. All those which were not of direct Jewish origin were to -be removed, but as I said, Streicher did not read these books. - -DR. MARX: Where were these books kept? Were they in the publishing -house, or how is it that a part... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, there is no charge here with respect to this -particular sort of books. - -DR. MARX: This is my last question. I just wanted to clarify this -matter, since it played an important part in the public mind. I have no -further questions to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then, are there any questions from the other Defense -Counsel? - -DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): I have one question -only. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Did Rosenberg have any connections with the -editorial staff of _Der Stürmer_? - -HIEMER: To my knowledge, his connections were almost non-existent. I -knew personally only Dr. Ballensiefen, who worked with Rosenberg. I also -knew Dr. Pohl personally, but no relations existed between the _Der -Stürmer_ and the Institute for the Study of the Jewish Problem for the -purposes of co-operation. - -DR. THOMA: Did Ballensiefen and Pohl have connections with _Der -Stürmer_? - -HIEMER: Pohl had personal connections with me. He was a student of -Hebrew and had made translations of the Talmud; he had also published -the _Talmudgeist_. Through that I got to know him. Ballensiefen also had -no personal connection with _Der Stürmer_. - -DR. THOMA: Does this mean that Pohl did have personal connections... - -HIEMER: Only with me, not with _Der Stürmer_. - -DR. THOMA: ...or was he sent by Rosenberg in this matter? - -HIEMER: No. - -DR. THOMA: I have no further questions, Your Honor. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I have only one matter to ask you about. Do I -understand you to say that by the middle of 1944 Streicher had become -convinced that the reports in the Swiss newspaper, _Israelitisches -Wochenblatt_, were true? - -HIEMER: I did not understand you. Will you please repeat the question? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do I understand you to say that by the middle -of 1944 Streicher had become convinced of the truth of the reports he -was reading in the Swiss newspaper about concentration camps? - -HIEMER: Yes, I had the impression that Streicher in the middle of -1944... - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only wanted an answer “yes” or “no.” That is -quite sufficient. - -Let me just read to you three lines of an article which was published in -_Der Stürmer_ on the 14th of September 1944. - -HIEMER: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: - - “Bolshevism cannot be vanquished; it must be destroyed. The same - is true of Judaism; it cannot be vanquished, disarmed, or - rendered powerless; it must be exterminated.” - -That is Page 2. - -Then the word that you use or is cited for exterminated is ausgerottet, -which I understand means completely wiped out. Why was that article -appearing in _Der Stürmer_ in September 1944, when it was known by the -owner of _Der Stürmer_ what was going on in concentration camps in the -East? What was the purpose of that article? - -HIEMER: I personally did not write this article. I believe that -Streicher wrote it, therefore I myself am not able to judge the -intention of the article. But I do maintain that Streicher made -statements opposing the murders in the concentration camps, and that he -did not want the murder of Jewry. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I will leave that. - -My Lord, in the interest of time I do not propose to cross-examine this -witness any further. Perhaps I might be allowed to draw the Tribunal’s -attention to those articles contained in your bundle, which are articles -actually written by this witness. There are about seven of them. Page -3A, 35A, 38A, 40A, 49A, 50A and 51A, that is, covering a period from -January 1939 up to August 1944. - -And, My Lord, the other matter that I would draw the Tribunal’s -attention to was that this witness was the author of the disgusting -children’s book which I presented to the Tribunal in putting the -individual case against Streicher. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is there any further cross-examination? - -[_There was no response._] - -Dr. Marx, do you wish to re-examine? You heard what counsel said about -the various articles written by this witness. You wish to re-examine or -not? Have you any questions you wish to ask the witness? - -DR. MARX: Yes, please. - -Herr Hiemer, perhaps you did not quite understand the question a moment -ago. Please tell us again just when Herr Streicher received knowledge, -and when he told you that he was convinced of or believed in these mass -murders. - -HIEMER: It is my opinion and conviction that it was in the middle of -1944. - -DR. MARX: But there had been statements to that effect in the -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ for a number of years prior to that date. - -HIEMER: Yes; at that time Streicher did not believe these things. His -change of view took place only in the year 1944 and I remember it was -not before the middle of the year. - -DR. MARX: I have no further questions to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -DR. MARX: With the permission of the Tribunal I would like to call the -witness Philipp Wurzbacher. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -[_The witness Wurzbacher took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -PHILIPP WURZBACHER (Witness): Philipp Wurzbacher. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -You may sit down. - -DR. MARX: Witness, you were an SA Leader in Nuremberg? - -WURZBACHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: From when? - -WURZBACHER: From 1928. - -DR. MARX: And what position did you have? - -WURZBACHER: At that time I was an SA Standartenführer and had risen from -the lowest ranks. - -DR. MARX: Witness, please speak more slowly and pause as frequently as -possible, as your testimony has to be interpreted into several -languages. - -How long have you known the Defendant Streicher? - -WURZBACHER: I have known him from meetings, since 1923; personally, from -the time of my activity as an SA Leader in the year 1928. - -DR. MARX: Were you regularly present at the meetings at which Streicher -spoke? - -WURZBACHER: I cannot say that I was present regularly, but I attended -very frequently. - -DR. MARX: Did Streicher in his speeches advocate the use of violence -against the Jewish population, or did he predict it? - -WURZBACHER: At no meeting did I hear suggestions that violence should be -used against the Jewish population. Nor did I ever hear Streicher -suggest or announce that he had any such intentions in mind. - -DR. MARX: Did an act of violence against the Jewish population, -originating from and carried out by the people themselves, take place in -Nuremberg or the Gau Franconia at any time in the period from 1920 to -1933? - -WURZBACHER: No, I cannot remember any incident of that type. - -DR. MARX: Did the SA undertake any such action or was anything like that -ordered? - -WURZBACHER: The SA never undertook anything like that at that time. On -the contrary, the SA had instructions, unequivocal instructions, to -refrain from such acts of violence. Severe punishment would have -resulted for anyone who did anything like that, or for an SA Leader who -gave such orders. Besides, as I have already emphasized, there was never -any suggestion or any order to that effect. - -DR. MARX: What do you say to the events on the night of the 9 to 10 -November 1938? - -WURZBACHER: I was not in Nuremberg during the events from the 9 to 10 -November 1938. At that time I was in Bad Ems on account of chronic -laryngitis. I can only say what I know from stories which I heard -afterwards. - -DR. MARX: Did you talk with Obergruppenführer Obernitz? - -WURZBACHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: About these events? - -WURZBACHER: Yes, I talked with SA Obergruppenführer Von Obernitz in a -brief conversation, when I reported my return. We spoke only a few -words, since Obergruppenführer Von Obernitz was called away so that in -the course of the conversation I could not return to the subject. I -remember that Obergruppenführer Von Obernitz declared at the time that -as far as he was concerned the matter had been put in order. That was -the sense of what he said. - -DR. MARX: Was there within the SA a uniform opinion, or were there, even -in the circles of the SA, men who disapproved of these incredible -occurrences? - -WURZBACHER: Opinions were, as far as I could determine upon my return—I -believe it was on 23 or 24 November—very much divided. A part of the SA -was in favor, the other opposed what had happened, but at all events, -the majority in general considered it to be wrong and condemned what had -been done. - -DR. MARX: Was there an increase, I mean, an increase of brutality in -these circles after 1933 on account of the growing numbers of the SA? - -WURZBACHER: It goes without saying that after the accession to power, -when many doubtful elements joined, the situation was completely -different from what it had been before. Up to that time, as a -responsible Leader, one knew almost every member individually, but now -with the tremendous influx of new men, a general survey of the new -situation had first to be made. But I believe I may say that an increase -of brutality did not occur. Perhaps some undesirable elements which, in -the name of the SA, did this or that, had slipped in but in general I -cannot say that an overall increase of brutality took place. - -DR. MARX: Did you conclude that _Der Stürmer_ exerted an influence in -the SA with the result that an anti-Semitic tendency made itself felt -among the men under your command? Did you not read a different -publication, _Der SA Mann_? - -WURZBACHER: _Der Stürmer_ had a very divided reception, I might say, -especially among the people in Nuremberg and in particular in the SA. -There were large numbers in the SA who, if they did not exactly reject -_Der Stürmer_, were in fact not interested because of the tedious -repetitions contained in it, and for this reason the paper was of no -importance to them. Moreover, it was natural that members of the SA read -their own paper, _Der SA Mann_, first. - -DR. MARX: When you attended a meeting in which Streicher spoke, what -impression did you gain of the objectives which he pursued in his speech -with regard to the solution of the Jewish problem? - -WURZBACHER: The objectives which were stated by Streicher were, I should -say, unequivocal and clear. He pursued the policy that the strong -elements of the Jewish people which occupied positions in the German -economy and above all in public life and public offices should be -removed and that necessarily, expulsion or emigration should be -considered. - -DR. MARX: Did you participate in the boycott on 1 April 1933 in any way? - -WURZBACHER: Yes, I participated in the boycott. At that time I had -instructions from my Gruppenführer to see to it that this boycott should -be kept within the limits of order and propriety, and that in this way -the success of the boycott would be assured. I instructed the -Sturmführer under my command to assign to each department store a guard -of two SA men who were to see to it that nothing happened and everything -took its course in an orderly and unobjectionable fashion. - -DR. MARX: Were there not instructions from Streicher also? - -WURZBACHER: Yes. The instructions which I received from my Gruppenführer -had been issued by Gauleiter Streicher. - -DR. MARX: Were attacks on Jews not to be prevented by all means? - -WURZBACHER: That was so not only in this one case, but in all cases. It -was repeatedly pointed out that we were to refrain from attacks or -unauthorized acts of violence or other hostile acts against the Jewish -people or Jewish individuals, especially in Nuremberg, and that it was -strictly prohibited... - -DR. MARX: What was Streicher’s reaction when he heard that nevertheless -such acts of violence had been perpetrated by individuals? - -WURZBACHER: I can cite one example in which violence was used. I believe -it was a small scuffle, at any rate, something had happened, but I do -not recall the details of the case. In any event, he called us very -sharply to account, and we SA leaders were severely reprimanded and -rebuked. - -DR. MARX: And what did he say? Did he make a general statement? - -WURZBACHER: If I may give the essence of it, he said that he would not -tolerate that human beings be beaten or molested in any way in his Gau, -and for the SA leaders he had rather drastic expressions such as -ruffians or similar names—I do not recall them exactly. - -DR. MARX: But he was called the Bloody Czar of Franconia. How is that to -be explained? - -WURZBACHER: Perhaps it was his manner, the way he behaved at times. -Sometimes he could be very harsh and outspoken. At any rate I can only -say that during my activity I did not experience anything or hear -anything suggesting that he was a “bloody czar.” - -DR. MARX: Do you know what his attitude was toward concentration camps? -Did he visit Dachau? If so, how often, and what did he do about it? - -WURZBACHER: I cannot give you any information on that point. I know just -one thing and that is that he said repeatedly that people who had been -taken to Dachau should be freed as soon as possible if there was no -criminal or other charge against them. I also know of several cases of -release very soon after the arrest of the people or their removal to a -concentration camp. For example the teacher Matt, who was an old -adversary of his in the Town Hall of Nuremberg, was released after a -very short time—I believe three or four months. Another man, a certain -Defender, who had been active primarily in labor unions, was also -released after a very short period of time. If I remember correctly, it -was about the year 1935 or perhaps the beginning of 1936—I do not know -exactly—when the last inmates left the camp at Dachau and were greeted -with music upon their return. - -DR. MARX: Was it not held against him that he freed so many members of -the left-wing parties from Dachau? - -WURZBACHER: It was said here and there by members of the SA that the -Gauleiter’s action could hardly be justified, that he took too light a -view of these things and so on, but we also pointed out that after all -the Gauleiter bore the responsibility and that he ought to know just -what he had to do in this or that case. - -DR. MARX: Do you know that Himmler told Streicher of his displeasure at -these releases and said that disciplinary action would be taken against -him if he continued with them? If you know nothing about this matter, -please say: “No.” - -WURZBACHER: No. - -DR. MARX: Then I have concluded my questioning of the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any member of the Defense Counsel wish to ask -questions? - -Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Does that conclude your case, Dr. Marx? - -DR. MARX: Yes, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then we go on with Dr. Schacht’s case next. - -DR. DIX: I begin my presentation of evidence with the calling of Dr. -Schacht as a witness, and I ask Your Lordship to permit Dr. Schacht to -enter the witness box. - -[_The Defendant Schacht took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -HJALMAR SCHACHT (Defendant): Hjalmar Schacht. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -You may sit down. - -DR. DIX: Please tell the Tribunal briefly about your descent? - -SCHACHT: The families of both my parents have lived for centuries in -Schleswig-Holstein, which until 1864 belonged to Denmark. My parents -were both born as Danish citizens. After the annexation by Germany my -father emigrated to the United States, where three of his older brothers -had already emigrated, and he became an American citizen. My two -brothers, who were older than I, were born there. Later my mother’s -health prompted my father’s return to Germany. - -I was educated in Hamburg. I studied at universities in Germany and in -Paris, and after receiving my doctor’s degree I was active for 2 years -in economic organizations. Then I began my banking career, and for 13 -years I was at the Dresdner Bank, one of the large so-called “D” banks. -I then took over the management of a bank of my own, which was later -merged with one of the “D” banks, and in 1923 I abandoned my private -career and went into public service as Commissioner for German Currency -(Reichswährungskommissar). Soon afterwards I became President of the -Reichsbank, and I held that office until 1930, when I resigned. - -DR. DIX: Why did you resign as President of the Reichsbank at that time? - -SCHACHT: In two essential points there were differences of opinion -between the Government and me; one was the internal finance policy of -the Government. With the terrible catastrophe of the lost war and the -Dictate of Versailles behind us, it was necessary in my opinion to use -thrifty and modest methods in German politics. The democratic and -socialist governments of that period could not see that point, but -carried on an irresponsible financial policy, especially by incurring -debts which in particular were contracted to a very large extent abroad. -It was quite clear that Germany, already heavily burdened with -reparation payments, was under no circumstances in a position to build -up as much foreign currency as was necessary for the payment of these -debts. We were not even able to pay the reparations from our own -economy. - -Therefore I objected to the contraction of these debts in which the -various governments of that period indulged, and to which they also -encouraged communities and private companies. I objected to this -financial policy and continually, abroad and at home, warned against -such a policy of incurring foreign debts. The foreign bankers did not -listen nor did the German Government. It was during that period that if -in Berlin one passed the Adlon Hotel, Unter Den Linden, one could not be -sure that a financial agent would not emerge and ask whether one did not -need a loan. - -Later I was strongly opposed by these same people, when Germany was -forced to discontinue making payments of her debts. But I wish to state -here that I have always and on every occasion been against such a policy -of debts. That was the one reason. The other reason was in the field of -foreign policy. I had not only contributed my part toward the creation -of the Young Plan but in 1929 I also assisted in the setting up of the -Young Committee; the so-called Young Plan had resulted in a number of -improvements for Germany, which the German Government was now -sacrificing step by step during the subsequent negotiations at The -Hague. Thus the financial and economic condition of the nation again -deteriorated. I revolted against this, and for both these reasons I -resigned my office as Reichsbankpräsident in protest, in March 1930. - -DR. DIX: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, in this connection, may I call your -attention to Exhibit Number Schacht-6 of my Document Book. If the -Tribunal agrees, I should like, in order to shorten the presentation of -documents during the examination of the witness, to call your attention -to those documents which have a direct connection with the questions -with which the witness is dealing. I believe that this arrangement will -be agreeable to the Tribunal since it will shorten the presentation of -documents. It is Document Number Schacht-6, on Page 12 of the German -copy of my document book and on Page 8 of the English copy, Your -Lordship, Exhibit Number Schacht-6. That is a record of the statements -made by Dr. Schacht during the session of the subcommittee for monetary -and credit matters on 21 October 1926. I believe it is not necessary for -me to read these statements. They refer to the foreign debts which Dr. -Schacht has just mentioned, and contain the same thoughts which Dr. -Schacht has just expressed before the Tribunal, and are proof that these -thoughts are not views _ex post facto_. Therefore, without reading it, I -ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the whole of this document. - -I shall return to my examination. - -[_Turning to the witness._] You had resigned your office as President of -the Reichsbank. What did you do then? - -SCHACHT: I went to the small estate which I owned in the country and -lived there as a private citizen. Then in 1930 I made a trip to the -United States. I departed shortly or immediately after the Reichstag -elections of September 1930 and went to New York via London. There I -lectured for about two months on questions which were presented to me by -American friends. - -DR. DIX: When did you first get in touch with the National Socialist -ideology, with the Party, and with Hitler personally, and when, in -particular, did you read the Party program and Hitler’s _Mein Kampf_? - -SCHACHT: With the exception of a single occasion I have never in my life -concerned myself with Party politics. Even at the age of 26 I was -offered a sure electoral district in the Reichstag, which I did not -accept, since I have never been interested in Party politics. My -interest always lay in the field of economics and financial policy but, -of course, for public affairs I always had a general interest, arising -from a concern for the future of my country and my people. - -Therefore, in 1919, I participated in the foundation of the Democratic -Party. - -May I say a few words here about my background and spiritual upbringing? -My father, throughout his life, adhered to democratic ideals. He was a -Freemason. He was a cosmopolitan. I had, and I still have, numerous -relatives on my mother’s side in Denmark and on my father’s side in the -United States, and to this day I am on friendly terms with them. I grew -up among these ideas and I have never departed from these basic -conceptions of Freemasonry and democracy and humanitarian and -cosmopolitan ideals. Later I always remained in very close contact with -foreign countries. I traveled much, and with the exception of Ireland -and Finland there is no country in Europe which I have not visited. I -know Asia down to India, Ceylon, and Burma. I went to North America -frequently, and just before the Second World War broke out I intended to -travel to South America. - -I want to emphasize this in order to show that I was never interested in -Party politics. Nevertheless, when in the elections of September 1930 -Hitler’s party suddenly and surprisingly obtained 108 seats, I began to -take an interest in the phenomenon; and on board ship going to the -United States I read _Mein Kampf_ and, of course, also the Party -program. When I arrived on the other side the first question was what -was my opinion about Hitler and the Party, because naturally everyone -was talking about this event in Germany. In my first publication at that -time—it was an interview—I uttered an unequivocal warning and said, -“If you people abroad do not change your policy towards Germany, then -you will soon have very many more adherents of Hitler in Germany than -there are now.” Throughout that period of 2 months I spoke about 50 -times in public meetings, and I always met with understanding in the -question of reparations, the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty, and the -economic difficulties of Germany, and I returned with the impression -that the whole American attitude, the attitude of the American people -toward us, was indeed rather friendly. Not on my initiative but by -coincidence, I got in touch with the adherents of the National Socialist -Party. A friend of mine, a bank director, invited me at the beginning of -December 1930 to dine with him at his house and to meet Hermann Göring -there. I did so and gained no really definite impression from Göring’s -statements and conduct. He was in every respect reserved, modest, and -well-mannered, and he invited me to his house in order to meet Hitler. -At the beginning of January my wife and I dined with Göring and his wife -one evening at their home, and on that occasion, Fritz Thyssen was also -invited. It had been planned that Hitler should come also and talk with -us. I say again now that Göring’s apartment was extremely modestly and -simply styled. We had a plain pea soup and bacon and particularly -Göring’s first wife made an excellent impression. After supper Hitler -appeared, and the ensuing conversation was conducted in such a way that, -let us say, 5 percent of it was contributed by us, and 95 percent by -Hitler. What he said concerned national questions, in which he agreed -absolutely with us. No extravagant demands were stated, but on the other -hand the national necessities of Germany were definitely emphasized. In -social questions Hitler expressed a number of good ideas; he was -especially intent on avoiding class struggle and on eliminating strikes, -lock-outs, and wage disputes by decisive intervention of the State in -labor relations and the direction of economic affairs. There was no -demand for abolishing private enterprise, but merely for influence in -its conduct. It seemed to us these ideas were quite reasonable and -acceptable. Aside from that, he revealed practically no knowledge in the -field of economy and financial policy, though on that evening he did not -claim to know anything about these subjects. He merely asked that we as -representatives of economy should have understanding for his ideas and -give him factual advice. That was the purpose of that evening. - -DR. DIX: I shall refer to this first conversation with Adolf Hitler -later, but I should like to return now to the question I have put before -concerning your attitude to the Party program and the ideology developed -in the book, _Mein Kampf_. I am stressing this because, as you have -heard, the gentlemen of the Prosecution are of the opinion that certain -parts of the Party program as such and also parts of the book, _Mein -Kampf_, are of a criminal character, and that their criminal character -was recognizable immediately upon their publication. Therefore I should -like to ask you to explain in detail your attitude at the time, and -possibly also your attitude today, toward the Party program and the -ideology of National Socialism as it appears in the book _Mein Kampf_. - -SCHACHT: From the proceedings in this Court so far I have not gained the -impression that the opinion of the Prosecution concerning the criminal -character of the Party program is a uniform one. I am unable to see in -the Party program as such any sign of criminal intentions. - -Federation of all Germans, which always plays a great role, is always -claimed only on the basis of the right for self-determination. A -position for Germany in foreign politics is demanded as constituting -equality of the German nation with the other nations; that this involved -the abolition of the discriminations which were imposed upon the German -people by the Versailles Treaty is quite clear. - -Land and soil was demanded for the nutrition of our people and the -settlement of our excess population. I cannot see any crime in that, -because after land and soil was expressly added in brackets the word -“colonies.” I have always considered that as a demand for colonies, -which I myself supported a long time before National Socialism came into -existence. Rather strange and, in my opinion, going somewhat beyond the -limits were the points concerning the exclusion of Jews from civil -rights, but on the other hand it was reassuring that the Jews were to be -under the protection of the Aliens’ Law, that is, subject to the same -laws which applied to foreigners in Germany. I would have wished and -always demanded that this legal protection should under all -circumstances be given to the Jews. Unfortunately they were not given -that protection. For the rest it was emphasized that all citizens should -have equal rights and duties. - -Promotion of popular education was stressed as being beneficial, and -also gymnastics and sports were demanded for the improvement of public -health. The fight against deliberate political lies was demanded, which -Goebbels afterwards conducted very energetically. And, above all, demand -was made for the freedom of all religious denominations and for the -principle of positive Christianity. - -That is, in essence, the content of the National Socialist Party -program, and I cannot see anything criminal in it. It would, indeed, -have been quite peculiar if, had this been a criminal Party program, the -world had maintained continuous political and cultural contact with -Germany for two decades, and with the National Socialists for one -decade. - -As far as the book, _Mein Kampf_, is concerned, my judgment has always -been the same from the very beginning as it is today. It is a book -written in the worst kind of German, propaganda of a man who was -strongly interested in politics, not to say a fanatical, half educated -man, which to me Hitler has always been. In the book _Mein Kampf_ and in -part also in the Party program there was one point which worried me a -great deal, and that was the absolute lack of understanding for all -economic problems. The Party program contained a few slogans, such as -“Community interests come before private interests,” and so on, and then -the “breaking up of subjection to financial interests” and similar -phrases which could not possibly signify anything sensible. The same -held true for _Mein Kampf_, which is of no interest from the point of -view of economic policy and consequently had no interest for me. - -On the other hand, as regards foreign policy _Mein Kampf_ contained, in -my opinion, a great many mistakes, because it always toyed with the idea -that within the continent of Europe the living space for Germany ought -to be extended. And if nevertheless I did co-operate later on with a -National Socialist Reich Chancellor, then it was for the very simple -reason that expansion of the German space toward the East was in the -book made specifically dependent upon the approval of the British -Government. Therefore, to me, believing that I knew British policy very -well, this seemed Utopian and there was no danger of my taking these -theoretical extravagances of Hitler any more seriously than I did. It -was clear to me that every territorial change on European territory -attempted by force would be impossible for Germany, and would not be -approved by the other nations. - -Besides that, _Mein Kampf_ had a number of very silly and verbose -statements but, on the other hand, it had many a reasonable idea, too; I -want to point out that I liked two things especially: first, that anyone -who differs with the government in political matters is obliged to state -his opinion to the government; and secondly, that, though the democratic -or rather parliamentary government ought to be replaced by a Führer -government, nevertheless the Führer could only remain if he was sure of -the approval of the entire people, in other words, that a Führer also -depended on plebiscites of a democratic nature. - -DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, you have now described the impression which you -gained from your first conversation with Adolf Hitler, as well as from a -study of the Party program and _Mein Kampf_. Did you believe that you -would be able to work with Adolf Hitler and what practical conclusions -did you derive from that first conversation with Hitler? - -SCHACHT: To work with Adolf Hitler was out of the question for me -personally, since I was a private citizen and not interested in Party -politics and consequently after that conversation I did nothing at all -to create for myself any personal relations with the Hitler circles. I -simply went back to my farm and I continued to live there as a private -citizen. So personally, for myself I did not draw any conclusions but I -drew another conclusion. I have already said that naturally I had the -future of my country at heart. After that conversation I repeatedly -emphasized to Reich Chancellor Brüning and implored him when forming and -heading the Cabinet to include the National Socialists in it, because I -believed that only in this way the tremendous impetus, the tremendous -propagandistic fervor which I had noticed in Hitler, could be caught and -harnessed—by putting the National Socialists to practical government -work. One should not leave them in the opposition where they could only -become more dangerous, but one should take them into the government and -see what they could achieve and whether they would not acquire polish -within the government. That was the suggestion and the very urgent -request I made to Brüning, and I might say that according to my -impression Hitler would at that time have been quite ready to do that. -Brüning could under no circumstances be won over to such a policy and in -consequence was later crushed. - -DR. DIX: Let us stop for a moment and deal with the Party. The -Indictment states that you were a Party member. Now, Göring has already -said that Hitler conferred the Golden Party Emblem only as a sort of -decoration. Do you have anything new to add to that statement made by -Göring? - -SCHACHT: I do not know whether it has been mentioned here; the Golden -Party Emblem was in January 1937 given to all Ministers and also to all -military personalities in the Cabinet. The latter could not become Party -members at all; therefore the award of the Party emblem did not entail -membership. As to the rest I think Göring has testified from the witness -stand. I might mention one more thing. If I had been a Party member, -then doubtlessly when I was ousted from my position as Minister without -Portfolio in January 1943, the Party Court would have gone into action, -since a case of insubordination to Hitler would have been evident. I was -never before the Party Court and even when on the occasion of my -dismissal the return of the Golden Party Emblem was demanded from me, I -was not told that I was being dismissed from the Party, since I was not -in the Party. I was only told “return the Golden Emblem of the Party -which was conferred upon you,” and I promptly complied. - -I believe I could not add anything else to the statements already made. - -DR. DIX: Then the Indictment is wrong in this point? - -SCHACHT: Yes; in this point it is absolutely wrong. - -DR. DIX: Why did you not become a Party member? - -SCHACHT: Excuse me, but I was opposed to quite a number of points of the -National Socialist ideology. I do not believe that it would have been -compatible with my entirely democratic attitude to change over to a -different Party program, and one which, not in its wording but through -its execution by the Party had certainly not—in the course of -time—gained any more favor with me. - -DR. DIX: Therefore, you did not become a Party member for reasons of -principle? - -SCHACHT: Yes, for reasons of principle. - -DR. DIX: Now, a biography of you was published by one Dr. Reuther in -1937. There, also, it is correctly stated that you were not a Party -member; but the biographer gives different, more tactical reasons for -your refusing to join the Party; and he mentions the possibility of -being more influential from outside the Party and so on. Maybe it is -advisable, since the biography has been referred to in the course of the -proceedings, that you shortly state your views on this point? - -SCHACHT: I believe that at the time Hitler had the impression that I -could be useful to him outside of the Party and it may be that Dr. -Reuther got knowledge of this. But I would rather not be made -responsible for the writings of Dr. Reuther, and in particular I should -like to object to the fact that the Prosecutor who presented the brief -against me described this book by Dr. Reuther as an official -publication. Of course this book is the private work of a journalist for -whom I have respect but who certainly states his own opinions and ideas. - -DR. DIX: Did you speak in public on behalf of Hitler before the July -elections in 1932? - -SCHACHT: Before the July elections of 1932, which brought that -tremendous success for Hitler, I was never active either publicly or -privately on behalf of Hitler, except once, perhaps, or twice—I -remember now, it happened once—Hitler sent a Party member to me who had -plans on economic, financial, or currency policies; Hitler may have told -him that he should consult me as to whether or not these plans could be -put into practice. I might tell the story briefly: It was Gauleiter -Röwer of Oldenburg. In Oldenburg the Nazis had already come to power -before 1932 and he was the Minister President there. He wanted to -introduce an Oldenburg currency of its own, a consequence of which would -have been that Saxony would have introduced its own Saxon currency, -Württemberg would have introduced its own currency, and Baden would have -had its own currency, and so on. I ridiculed the whole thing at the time -and sent a telegram to Hitler, saying that the economic needs of the -German Reich could not be cured by such miracles. If I disregard this -case, which might have constituted some sort of private connection, then -I may say that neither privately nor publicly, neither in speeches nor -in writing, have I at all been concerned with Hitler or his Party and in -no way have I recommended the Party. - -DR. DIX: Did you vote National Socialist in July 1932? - -SCHACHT: No, I would not think of it. - -DR. DIX: The Prosecution now lists a number of points by which it wants -to prove that you were an adherent of the National Socialist ideology. I -am going to name them one by one, and I ask you to state your view on -each of them. First, that you were an opponent of the Treaty of -Versailles. Would you like to say something about that? - -SCHACHT: It surprised me indeed to hear that reproach from an American -Prosecutor. The lieutenant who spoke is perhaps too young to have -experienced it himself, but he should know it from his education; at any -rate, for all of us who have lived through that time, it was one of the -outstanding events that the Treaty of Versailles was rejected by the -United States, and, if I am not wrong, rejected with the resounding -approval of the entire American people. - -The reasons prompting that action were also my reasons for rejecting the -Treaty: it stood in contradiction to the Fourteen Points of Wilson, -which had been solemnly agreed upon, and in the field of economics it -contained absurdities which certainly could not work out to the -advantage of world economy. But I certainly would not accuse the -American people of having been adherents of the Nazi ideology, because -they rejected the Treaty. - -DR. DIX: The Prosecution also assert that you had already been for a -long time a German National Socialist, not merely a German patriot, but -a German nationalist and expansionist. Would you like to state your -position in that respect? - -SCHACHT: You, yourself, by emphasizing the word “patriot” have -recognized that one must be clear on just what a nationalist is. I have -always been proud to belong to a nation which for more than a thousand -years has been one of the leading civilized nations of the world. I was -proud to belong to a nation which has given to the world men like -Luther, Kant, Goethe, Beethoven, to mention only a few. I have always -interpreted nationalism as the desire of a nation to be an example to -other nations, and to maintain a leading position in the field of -spiritual and cultural achievement through high moral standards and -intellectual attainment. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If it please the Tribunal, it seems to me that we -are getting very far from the relevant charges in this case, and -particularly if they are going to be preceded by a statement of the -Prosecution’s position. - -We have no charge against Dr. Schacht because he opposed the Treaty of -Versailles; we concede it was the right of any German citizen to do that -by any means short of war. Nor do we object to his being a patriotic -German by any means short of war. The only purpose has been to find out -what his attitude in those matters was in connection with the charge -that he prepared and precipitated war. - -To deal with philosophical matters separately from the war charge seems -to me entirely irrelevant, and I assure the Tribunal we have no purpose -in charging that it is a crime to oppose the Treaty of Versailles. Many -Americans did that. It is no crime to be a German patriot. The crime is -the one defined in the Indictment, and it seems to me we are a long way -off from that here, and wasting time. - -THE PRESIDENT: What do you say to that, Dr. Dix? - -DR. DIX: I was eager and glad to hear what Justice Jackson just said, -but I must quote from Wallenstein, “Before dinner we heard another -version.” There was no doubt—and once, because I thought I had -misunderstood, I even asked again—that the criminal character of the -Party program, the criminal character of the contents of _Mein -Kampf_—reproachable in itself and, to say the least, indicative of -crimes committed later—the willful opposition to the Treaty of -Versailles—and further the accusation of having been an expansionist -and nationalist, all these things have repeatedly in the course of the -proceedings here been held against Dr. Schacht in order to strengthen -the foundation of the charges made against him. - -If Mr. Justice Jackson now with gratifying frankness states, “We do not -at all blame Schacht for opposing the Treaty of Versailles; we do not -assert that he was more than a patriot, that is to say, a nationalist in -the sense described before, and we do not maintain either that these our -statements are circumstantial evidence for his later co-operation, his -financial co-operation, in the rearmament program, which in turn is -proof indicative of his intent to assist in waging a war of -aggression”—if that is now stated unequivocally by the Prosecution, -then we can dispense with a great many questions which I intended to put -in the course of my examination of the witness; I would then gladly -leave the whole subject of Schacht’s expansionism and nationalism. We -have not yet mentioned expansionism; Mr. Justice Jackson has not -mentioned it either. I do not believe, however, that the Prosecution -will withdraw the accusation of expansionism, that is the expansion of -German living space in Europe. I am not sure of this but we shall -certainly hear about it. As I said, if these accusations which have been -made are withdrawn, then I can dispense with these questions and my -client need not answer them. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Of course, I made no such statement as Dr. Dix has -assumed. My statement was clearly made in the opening and clearly is -now, that he had a perfect right to be against the Treaty of Versailles -and to be a German nationalist and to follow those aims by all means -short of war. I do not want to have put in my mouth the very extensive -statements made by Dr. Dix. - -My statement was made clear in the opening, and these matters as to the -Versailles Treaty and nationalism and Lebensraum, as political and -philosophical matters, are not for the Court to determine. We are not -going to ask you to say whether the Treaty of Versailles was a just -document or not. It was a document. They had a right to do what they -could to get away from it by all means short of war. - -The charge against Dr. Schacht is that he prepared, knowingly, to -accomplish those things by means of aggressive warfare. That is the nub -of the case against him. - -DR. DIX: Then on this point there is... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think the case for the Prosecution has been -clear from the outset, that all these matters are only relied upon when -they were entered into with the intention of making war. - -DR. DIX: Very true. I need not put these questions if the Prosecution no -longer uses these accusations as circumstantial evidence for his intent -to wage a war of aggression, but Mr. Justice Jackson has not yet made a -statement to that effect. But there seems to be no doubt—and I do not -believe that I misunderstood the Prosecution—that in order to prove Dr. -Schacht’s intention to wage a war of aggression, the Prosecution did -refer to Schacht’s opposition to the Treaty of Versailles, to his -nationalism and expansionism that is, extension of Lebensraum. We do not -want to make academic or theoretical statements about the ideas of -Lebensraum and nationalism, but as long as these ideas, which the -Prosecution concedes he is justified in holding, as long as these -characteristics are considered to be in part proof of his intent, my -client must have the opportunity of telling the Tribunal just what he -meant by Lebensraum if he ever spoke of it, which I do not yet know. But -I think, nevertheless, that there is still a matter not quite clear -between Mr. Justice Jackson and me, and that I do not quite agree either -with what was said by Your Lordship... - -THE PRESIDENT: What you were asking him about was his views on -nationalism. That is what you were asking him about, his views upon -nationalism, and that seems to be a waste of time. - -DR. DIX: I put to him that he was accused of being a nationalist and an -expansionist, and that the Prosecution therefrom drew the conclusion -that he planned an aggressive war by financing armament; now he has to -show, of course, that... - -THE PRESIDENT: What Mr. Justice Jackson has pointed out is that the -Prosecution have never said that he simply held the views of a -nationalist and of an expansionist, but that he held those views and -intended to go to war in order to enforce them. - -DR. DIX: Yes, Your Lordship, but it is held that these opinions were -proof—one proof among others—that he had the intention of waging -aggressive war; that they therefore constitute what we jurists should -call circumstantial evidence for his intent, to wage war, and as long as -this argument—it is no longer a charge maintained by Justice Jackson -but it is an argument of the Prosecution... - -THE PRESIDENT: There is no issue about it. He agrees that he did hold -these views. Therefore it is quite unnecessary to go into the fact. The -Prosecution say he held the views; he agrees that he held the views. The -only question is whether he held them with the innocent intention of -achieving them by peaceful methods, or whether he had the alleged -criminal intention of achieving them by war. - -DR. DIX: I only wish to say one more thing to that. Expansionism has not -yet been discussed. Should Dr. Schacht have had expansionist tendencies, -then Mr. Justice Jackson certainly would not say that he has no -objection. Therefore... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think that you may ask him questions about the -expansionists, his ideas of what expansionists were, what he meant by -expansion, but for the rest it seems to me you are simply proving -exactly the same as the Prosecution have proved. - -DR. DIX: I fully agree. Dr. Schacht, were you... - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. DIX: I believe, Dr. Schacht, that both of us will have to speak a -little more slowly and pause between question and answer. - -Now, please reply to the accusation by the Prosecution that you were an -expansionist. Please define your position. - -SCHACHT: Never in my life have I demanded even a foot of space that did -not belong to Germany, nor would I ever entertain such an idea. - -I am of the opinion that neither is it national to try to dominate and -govern foreign peoples, nor is appropriation of foreign territory a -politically just action. - -These are two questions with which we are much concerned at present. - -I might perhaps add, in order to clarify my position, just what I -understand by nationalism, and just why I was against each and every -form of expansionism. Just one sentence will suffice, a sentence from a -speech which I made in August of 1935. On that occasion I said, and I -quote: - - “We want to express the belief that self-respect requires - respect for others, and the upholding of our national - individuality must not mean disparagement of the individuality - of others; by respecting the acts of others we respect our own - action; and a battle of economic competition can be won in the - end only through example and achievement and not through methods - of violence or craft.” - -DR. DIX: According to the opinion of the Prosecution, in the year 1936 -you made a public threat of war, on which occasion you are alleged to -have said that the spirit of Versailles was instrumental in keeping -alive war mania. I am referring to Document EC-415, a document to which -the Prosecution has referred. - -SCHACHT: I never understood, in the course of this proceeding, how there -could be a threat of war in this quotation. The quotation concludes with -the words—and I must quote in English because I just have the English -words before me: - - “The spirit of Versailles is perpetuated in the fury of war, and - there will not be a true peace, progress, or reconstruction - until the world desists from this spirit. The German people will - not tire of pronouncing this warning.” - -The conclusion says that the German people will not tire of pronouncing -this warning. It seems to be a matter of course that hereby expression -is given to the fact that I am warning others from persisting in war -mania. I am not warning ourselves, but the entire world, to avoid -perpetuating the spirit of Versailles. - -DR. DIX: The Prosecution further accuses you in this connection that you -publicly approved the idea of Lebensraum, for the German people. In this -special connection reference was made to the speech you made at -Frankfurt on 9 December 1936, in which you said: “Germany has too -limited Lebensraum for her population.” - -SCHACHT: This speech of 9 December 1936 was a speech which was solely -concerned with a restoration of the colonial rights of Germany. I have -never demanded any Lebensraum for Germany other than colonial space. And -in this instance, again, I am surprised that just the American -Prosecutor should accuse me on my efforts in this direction, because in -the Fourteen Points of Wilson, which regrettably were not adhered to -later on, the colonial interests of the Germans are taken into -consideration. In consequence, I said, again and again: “If you want -peace in Europe, give Germany an economic outlet into which Germany can -develop and from which she can satisfy her needs. Otherwise Germany will -be a center of unrest and a problem for Europe.” - -I would like to quote one sentence only from the speech I made: - - “Peace in Europe, together with the peace of the entire world, - is dependent upon whether or not the densely populated areas of - Central Europe will have the means of existence.” - -I emphasized this viewpoint again and again, but at no time did I -connect these views with the idea of an armed conflict. - -I would like to quote another sentence from this same speech: - - “I did not mention this consideration as to the parts of Germany - which were separated from her”—and I am speaking of the losses - suffered by Germany—“in order that we might draw the conclusion - of warlike intentions; my entire position and my work are - marshaled to the objective of bringing about peace in Europe - through peaceful and sensible considerations and measures.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you please give me the PS numbers and the exhibit -numbers of those two speeches? - -DR. DIX: I cannot at this moment, Your Lordship, I am sorry, but I will -try to get them and submit them in writing. The last is the speech at -Frankfurt, and the others... - -THE PRESIDENT: That is quite all right. You will let us know in writing, -will you? - -DR. DIX: Yes, indeed. - -SCHACHT: Perhaps if it is permitted I might refer to two other sentences -from my article which was published in _Foreign Affairs_, the well-known -American magazine, in the year 1937. I have the German translation -before me, which says, in the introduction, and I quote: - - “I am making these introductory remarks in order to clarify the - situation. The colonial problem today, as in the past, is for - Germany not a question of imperialism or militarism, but still - surely and simply a question of economic existence.” - -Perhaps I might refer to the point that very influential Americans were -in constant accord with this view. I have a statement made by the -collaborator of President Wilson, Colonel House, who made the well-known -distinction between the “haves” and “have nots,” and who was especially -influential in advocating consideration for German colonial interests. -Perhaps I can dispense with the quotation. - -DR. DIX: In this connection I should like to point to the document -submitted by the Prosecution, Document L-111, Exhibit USA-630. This -document is concerned with the conversation which you had with the -American Ambassador Davies, and in which you are accused of having -indirectly threatened a breach of peace. - -SCHACHT: I have already set forth just now that I constantly said that -Europe cannot have peaceful development if there are no means of -livelihood for the completely overpopulated Central Europe, and I -believe conditions at present show how absolutely right I was—just what -an impossibility it is to feed these masses of people within Europe. And -beyond that I had a keen interest in diverting Hitler’s quite misguided -ideas from Eastern Europe and therefore was constantly at pains to -direct his attention to the colonial problem so that I could turn his -thought from the mad ideas of expansionism in the East. I recall that in -1932, shortly before he assumed office, I had a conversation with him in -which for the first time I approached him on these facts and -particularly told him what utter nonsense it would be to think of an -expansion in the East. - -Then, constantly, in the subsequent years, again and again, I spoke -about the colonial problem, until at the last in the summer of 1936 I -had the possibility of pursuing my ideas and Hitler gave me the mission, -which I had suggested to him, of going to Paris to discuss with the -French Government the possibility of a satisfactory solution of the -question of colonies for Germany. This actually happened in the summer -of 1936. And for the satisfaction of myself and all other friends of -peace, I might say that the Government of Léon Blum, which was in office -at the time, showed gratifying appreciation of this solution for -Europe’s food and economic problems, and for their part stated that they -were ready to deal with the colonial problem with the aim of perhaps -returning one or two colonies to Germany. Léon Blum then undertook, in -agreement with me, to inform the British Government about these -conversations in order to secure their consent or to bring up a -discussion of this problem within the British Government. That actually -did take place, but the British Government hesitated for months before -they finally could decide on any position in this matter and so the -discussion dragged on up to the initial months of the Spanish civil war -and was eclipsed and supplanted by the problems of the Spanish civil -war, so that a continuation of the discussion on this colonial problem -never came about. - -At that time, in January of 1937, when the American Ambassador to -Moscow, Ambassador Joseph Davies, visited me at Berlin, I was rather -irritated by the slowness with which the British Government was meeting -these suggestions, and consequently I came forth with a request for -understanding and support and told Ambassador Davies about this whole -matter. I tried constantly and repeatedly to gain the understanding -support of representatives of the American Government. I tried again and -again to advise these gentlemen about domestic conditions and -developments within Germany, to tell them as much as was possible and -compatible with German interests and to keep them informed. That applies -to Ambassador Davies, Ambassador Dodd, Ambassador Bullitt when he was in -Berlin, and so on. - -This conversation with Ambassador Davies is referred to in the document -which the Prosecution has submitted, Document L-111, and which is taken -from the book which Ambassador Davies wrote about his mission in Moscow, -and we will perhaps come back to this book later. - -As the gist of my conversation with Davies I would like to quote just -one sentence again, which I must again quote in English, since I have -only the English book at my disposal. - - “Schacht earnestly urged that some such feasible plan could be - developed if discussions could be opened; and that, if - successful, would relieve the European war menace, relieve - peoples of enormous expenditures for armaments, restore free - flow of international commerce, give outlet to thrift and - natural abilities of his countrymen and change their present - desperation into future hope.” - -DR. DIX: In this connection the affidavit of Fuller plays an important -part, that is Exhibit USA-629, and Document EC-450. According to this -affidavit, you allegedly declared to Fuller that if Germany could not -get colonies through negotiations she would take them. Please define -your position as to this statement. - -SCHACHT: In a German drama an intriguer is being instructed by a tyrant -to bring a man of honor to ruin, and he says in reply, “Just give me one -word said by this man, and I will hang him thereby.” I believe, My Lord -Justices, that in this courtroom there is not a single person who at one -time or another in his life has not said a rather unfortunate word. And -how much easier is it when he is speaking in a foreign language of which -he is not completely master. - -Mr. Fuller is known to me as a respectable business man, and this -discussion which he has here reproduced is indubitably done according to -the best of his knowledge. He himself rightly says that even had he -tried to put down the exact words he could not guarantee that each and -every word has been said. But if I did say these words, then it seems -only that I said we Germans must have colonies and we shall have them. -Whether I said, “We shall take them,” or “We shall get them,” that, of -course, it is impossible for me to say with certainty today after a -period of 10 years. - -The representative of the Prosecution also thought the expression, “We -will take them,” a little colorless in effect and therefore I believe he -just added a trifle, for he said twice in his presentation of the -charges that I had said, “We will take these colonies by force,” and on -a second occasion he even said, “We will take these colonies by force of -arms.” But “force” or “force of arms” are not mentioned in the whole of -Fuller’s affidavit. And if I had used that word or even used it only by -implication, Mr. Fuller would have had to say with reason: “So you want -to take colonies by force; how do you expect to do that?” It would have -been utter nonsense to assert that Germany would ever have been able to -take overseas colonies by force. She lacked—and always will -lack—domination of the seas, which is necessary for this. - -Fuller did not take exception to my manner of expression and in his -conversation he immediately continued—and I quote: - - “You mentioned a little while ago that necessary raw materials - could not be obtained, owing to German lack of foreign exchange. - Would stabilization help you?” - -Therefore, rather than to become excited about the fact that I wanted to -take colonies by force—something which I never said and which is -contrary to my views, as I have already stated—he immediately goes on -to foreign exchange and to stabilization. - -DR. DIX: The prosecutor asserts further that you were interested in the -conquest of neighboring territory in Europe. - -SCHACHT: This matter is not quite so harmless as the previous mistake of -the Prosecution. In a previous interrogation, I was accused as follows, -and the prosecutor, in presenting his charges here, referred to the -fact—I quote the prosecutor: - - “On 16 April, on the occasion of the Paris conference on - reparation payments, Schacht said, ‘Germany in general can pay - only if the Corridor and Upper Silesia are returned to - Germany.’” - -This is the interrogation of 24 August 1945. According to the verbatim -record of the interrogation, I answered: - - “It may be that I said such a thing.” - -Of course, as far as the wording of a statement, which I had made 10 to -15 years before, I did not recall it. But I did remember that in -connection with the Corridor and Upper Silesia I had made a remark, and -since I had to assume that if the Prosecution submitted this record to -me it would be an accurate stenographic record, for that reason I did -not dispute this remark which I had allegedly made and said that it -might be that I said something to that effect. The Prosecution takes a -“maybe” and out of that reconstructed the following sentence: - - “This quotation was read to Schacht, and he said it was - correct.” - -This assertion by the Prosecution is therefore wrong. I said, “It may be -that I said something to that effect,” but I did not say that this -statement that was submitted to me was correct. - -Then, fortunately, in my imprisonment here, I succeeded in getting hold -of my book, a book which I wrote about the termination of reparation -payments, which was published in 1931 and in which I luckily put down -the text of my statement about the matter we are dealing with now. I -have the exact text, and I would like to say that this book has been -submitted in evidence, and from this text appears what I said verbatim: - - “Regarding the problem of German food and food supplies, it is - especially important that import of foodstuffs has been - decreased”—I beg your pardon—“that import will be - decreased.”—I am sorry again. I cannot read this—“that the - import of foodstuffs will be decreased and partially made up - through home production. Therefore, we cannot let the fact be - overlooked that important agricultural surplus territories in - the eastern part of Germany have been lost by cession and that a - large territory which was almost exclusively agrarian has been - separated from the Reich. Therefore the economic welfare of this - territory, East Prussia, is decreasing steadily and the Reich - Government must support and subsidize it. Constantly, therefore, - suitable measures should be taken to eliminate these injurious - conditions, which are hindering considerably Germany’s ability - to pay.” - -DR. DIX: Your Lordship, this is from our document book, Document -Schacht-16, German Page 38, English Page 44. - -SCHACHT: This quotation absolutely does not agree with the statement -submitted to me in the interrogation, and in no way can we draw the -conclusion in consequence that I was in favor of a return of these -areas. What I demanded was that the separation of these areas be taken -into consideration when Germany’s ability to pay and the payments were -determined. When the prosecutor in his speech added: “I would like to -point out that this is the same area over which the war started in -September 1939,” I believe it is an insinuation which characterizes the -prosecutor, rather than me, against whom it was intended. - -DR. DIX: As part of the circumstantial evidence, that is, the indirect -evidence for the will to aggression, with which you are charged, the -Prosecution includes your wish—your alleged wish—for the Anschluss of -Austria. Will you please take your position as to this accusation? - -SCHACHT: From 1919 I considered the Anschluss of Austria inevitable and, -in the national sense, that is, spiritually and culturally, it was -welcome. But that economically the Anschluss of Austria would not be for -Germany so much an aggrandizement as a liability. I always knew. But the -wish of the Austrian people to belong, to be incorporated into -Germany—I took that wish as my own and said that if here there are six -and a half million people who spontaneously in 1919 and later in -innumerable demonstrations expressed their wish of being incorporated -into the brotherhood of Greater Germany, that was an event to which no -German could be opposed, but in the interest of Austria must hail with -gladness. In that sense I always favored and respected the wish of -Austria to belong to the Reich and wanted it carried through as soon as -external political conditions permitted it. - -DR. DIX: My attention has just been called to the fact that you are -still speaking too fast and that the interpretation is lagging behind a -little bit. Will you please speak a little more slowly. - -What was your opinion as to the incorporation of the Sudetenland into -Germany? - -SCHACHT: Concerning the incorporation of the Sudetenland, I never -thought of any such thing. Of course, Czechoslovakia was a European -problem, and it was regrettable that in that state, which had five and a -half million Czechs, two and a half million Slovaks and about three and -a half million Germans, the German element had no means of expression. -But just because the Czechoslovakian problem was not a purely -German-Czech but also a Slovak-Czech problem, I sought a solution of -this problem in such a way and wished it to be in such a way that -Czechoslovakia should constitute a federated state, similar perhaps to -Switzerland, divided into three different, culturally separate, but -politically unified areas, which would be a guarantee for the unity of a -German-Czech-Slovak state. - -DR. DIX: What was your opinion and attitude to the problem of war; by -that I mean, as far as philosophical, ideological, and practical -considerations are concerned? - -SCHACHT: I always considered war as one of the most devastating things -to which mankind is exposed and on basic principles throughout my entire -life I was a pacifist. - -DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, during your meditative and thoughtful life you -have certainly considered the fundamental and profound differences -between legitimate and ethically based soldiership and militarism in its -various degenerate forms. What did you mean by the latter and what was -your attitude toward it, that is, militarism? - -SCHACHT: Of course I saw the necessity of a country’s defense in case of -war or threats, and I stood for that theory. In that sense I was always -in favor of a Wehrmacht, but the profession of a soldier I consider to -be full of deprivations and characterized by willingness and readiness -to sacrifice, not because perhaps during a war the soldier has to give -up his life—that is the duty of every citizen of military age—but -because his whole aim and aspiration must be directed to the end that -never must the craft which he has learned be exercised. A soldier, a -career officer, who is not intrinsically a pacifist, has really in my -opinion missed his calling. Consequently, I was always an opponent of -every military digression and excess. I was always against militarism, -but I consider that soldiership conscious of its responsibility is the -highest calling which a citizen can pursue. - -DR. DIX: Now, George Messersmith, as you know, the Consul General of the -United States at Berlin at one time, says in one of his various -affidavits produced by the Prosecution that you had told him, and -repeatedly told him, about Nazi intents of aggression. Will you please -state your position in that regard? - -SCHACHT: First of all, I would like to remark that of course I never -made a statement of that sort, neither to Mr. George Messersmith nor to -anyone else. As far as these three affidavits of Mr. Messersmith, which -were submitted by the Prosecution, are concerned, I would like to make a -further statement. - -Mr. Messersmith asserts that he had frequent contact and numerous -private conversations with me, and I would like to state here now that, -according to my exact memory, I saw Mr. George Messersmith perhaps two -or three times in my entire life. Mr. George Messersmith represents -himself as having had numerous contacts and many private conversations -with me, and he asserts further that his official capacity brought him -in contact with me as President of the Reichsbank and as Minister of -Economics. - -I do not recall once having received Mr. Messersmith in my office. Mr. -George Messersmith takes these two or three discussions and proceeds to -characterize me. He calls me cynical, ambitious, egotistic, vain, -two-faced. I am, unfortunately, not in a position to give an equally -comprehensive picture of the character of Mr. Messersmith. But I must -definitely dispute his trustworthiness. - -And as a first reason for this I should like to quote a general remark -by Mr. Messersmith. In his affidavit of 30 August 1945, Document -2385-PS, Mr. George Messersmith says, and I quote: “When the Nazi Party -took over Germany, it represented only a small part of the German -population.” - -Contrary to that, I say that before the Nazi Party took over Germany it -occupied about forty percent of all Reichstag seats. That percentage Mr. -Messersmith calls a small part of the German population. If diplomatic -reports are everywhere as reliable as in this instance, it is small -wonder that nations do not understand each other. - -I would still like to correct a specific remark by Mr. Messersmith. Mr. -Messersmith asserts, as I have quoted just a minute ago, that his duty -brought him in contact with me as Minister of Economics. In his -affidavit of 28 August, 1760-PS, Mr. Messersmith says, and I quote: -“During the wave of terrorist activity in May and June of 1934, I had -already assumed my duties as American Chargé d’Affaires in Vienna.” In -August of 1934 I became Minister of Economics, whereas, on the other -hand, Mr. Messersmith, already in May of 1934, assumed his official -duties in Vienna; but this does not prevent Mr. Messersmith from -asserting that his official duties brought him in frequent contact with -me as Minister of Economics. I believe this will suffice to gauge the -capacity of Mr. Messersmith’s memory correctly. - -DR. DIX: In a similar connection, the Prosecution repeatedly referred to -the diary of the former ambassador in Berlin, Mr. Dodd, which was -published on the basis of his private notes by his children after his -death. This document has the Document Number EC-461. The Prosecution -quotes from this diary repeatedly to prove that Mr. Dodd, too, -considered you a warmonger. I know, of course, that you were a friend of -Mr. Dodd’s, a fact which is shown in his diary. Can you tell me how the -two facts can be reconciled? - -SCHACHT: First of all, I might say that Ambassador Dodd was one of the -most undefiled personalities I have met, an upright character, a man of -unflinching fidelity to his convictions. He was a professor of history, -undoubtedly a good historian. He had studied at German universities. I -believe that he would turn in his grave if he could know that the notes -which he put down casually in his diary were put together by his two -children without commentary and printed without investigation. - -Mr. Dodd, I am sorry to say, had one characteristic which made dealing -with him a little difficult. I think the reason for this lay in his -steadfastness of conviction, which from the first often made him appear -averse to outside influence. He found it rather hard to make himself -understood easily and fluently, and he was even less in a position to -view opinions of others in the right light. Many things that were told -him he misunderstood and saw in a wrong light. - -On Page 176 in his diary, in the lower part, there is one sentence I -would like to quote to illustrate the point I am trying to make. Here he -says: “I talked fifteen minutes with Phipps”—the British Ambassador at -that time—“about the accumulated evidence of Germany’s intense war -activities.” This statement dates from the autumn of 1934 and I believe -no one is able to say that in the autumn of 1934 there was any talk of a -war activity on the part of Germany. Mr. Dodd uses the expression “war” -undoubtedly in the place of “armament”; he says “Krieg” instead of -“Aufrüstung.” In that sense, I believe he misunderstood the words. - -And, as further evidence for the difficulty which one had in making the -Ambassador understand, I might say that the Foreign Office asked him -once to bring a secretary who would take notes of discussions with -representatives of the Foreign Office, so that misunderstandings could -be avoided. - -I believe, therefore, that all these statements by Mr. Dodd are apt to -be misunderstood. As for myself I can only say what I have already said -about Mr. Messersmith, that of course I never talked about war -intentions. - -DR. DIX: Now, in this diary it says that he was favorably disposed -towards you. Do you have any proof for this friendly attitude to you? - -SCHACHT: May I perhaps refer to the correspondence with Henderson... - -DR. DIX: Yes, we can deal with that later. - -SCHACHT: Then I shall just confine myself to your question. Dodd was -entirely friendly to me, and I respected him deeply. I saw a sign of his -friendship in that shortly before his departure from Berlin in December -of 1937 he visited me at my home, and this incident is also dealt with -in his diary, and I would like to quote just one sentence: “I went to -Dr. Schacht’s house in Dahlem. I wished especially to see Schacht, whose -life is said to be in danger.” - -In other words, Mr. Dodd had heard of an imminent attack on my life on -the part of National Socialists, and considered it important enough and -a reason for coming to my home personally in order to warn me. - -A second piece of evidence of his friendship towards me can be seen from -the final visit he paid me just a few days before returning to America. -At that time he again called on me and told me urgently that I should go -to America with him, or as soon after him as possible, that I should -change my residence to America, and that I would find a pleasant welcome -there. I believe he would never have said that to me had he not felt a -certain degree of friendship for me. - -DR. DIX: These are express services of friendship, and it can hardly be -assumed that the deceased Ambassador would have done you these good -services if he had considered you a warmonger and friend of the Nazis, -and especially—and I would like to say this to the High Tribunal—if -one remembers that Mr. Dodd was one of the few accredited diplomats in -Berlin who very obviously had no sympathy of any sort for the regime in -power, in fact he was wholly and fully opposed to it. - -I intentionally say “the few diplomats” and, Dr. Schacht, I would like -you to define your opinion on what I am saying. You will remember that -those diplomats who kept aloof from Hitler’s regime politically and -socially, such as the Dutch Minister, the magnificent grand seigneur -Limburg-Stirum, or the Minister from Finland, the true-hearted and great -Social Democrat, Wuolijoki, that most of these diplomats were recalled -by their Governments. How is it that an opponent of the Nazis like Dodd -did such open services of friendship to someone whom he considered a -friend of the Nazis? Do you agree with my opinion? - -SCHACHT: Yes. I am entirely of the same opinion. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I certainly object to going into this kind of -sermonizing back and forth between the box and the bar. It seems to me -that the witness has been allowed to say everything that Mr. Dodd has -ever written and to put in his mind what he thinks Dodd meant. He has -allowed him to go to great lengths characterizing all American -representatives, but it seems to me that this is utterly off the track -and improper for this witness to give a characterization of him in -comparison with other ambassadors and other diplomatic representatives. - -There is no request here for information about facts. I reiterate, we -are not accusing Dr. Schacht here because of his opinions. We are -accusing him because of very specific facts which there seems great -reluctance to get to and deal with. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you should go on, Dr. Dix, and pass from this -part of it, pass on from these documents. - -DR. DIX: Perhaps I might mention very briefly that it is entirely far -from me or from Dr. Schacht to feel impelled to express here our -opinions on political or diplomatic personalities, but, on the other -hand, if the Prosecution produces affidavits or diaries of these -diplomats and uses these documents as pieces of evidence against the -defendant in this proceeding, the defendant... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you would put questions and -put them shortly, it would be much better, and we should get on much -faster. - -DR. DIX: Yes. In general I have put brief questions, Your Lordship. I -only said this now, because I would like to follow the procedure -approved, I believe, by the High Tribunal, of dealing with part of the -evidence at this stage; and so I would like to bring up the reliability -of Dodd’s Diary. That is Document Schacht-43 in my document book; German -text, Page 194; English text, Page 202. Here we are concerned with the -correspondence between the publisher of Dodd’s diary and Sir Nevile -Henderson, which deals with several misstatements in the diary. I will -dispense with the rather long letter by Sir Nevile Henderson—there are -five folio pages—and will cite just a few sentences. - -On Page 196 of the German text, Sir Nevile Henderson writes: - - “Take, for instance, the first statement attributed to me about - Neurath. It is entirely impossible, that I, in front of - Hitler...” - -and so on and so forth. - -Then on the same page, in the middle of the page, next paragraph: - - “And it is the same with the general discussion. It is quite - inconceivable that I should have spoken, as there recorded, - about Bismarck and the annexation of Czechoslovakia and other - countries.” - -And on the same page, a little further down, next to the last paragraph, -it says: - - “Nor could I possibly have said that ‘Germany must dominate the - Danube-Balkan zone.’” - -And on the next page, second paragraph: - - “The remark attributed to me that England and Germany ‘must - control the world’ is pure balderdash and hardly fits in with - the preceding sentence about the United States.” - -Now, there are other similar passages on this and the following page, -but I do not believe it necessary for me to quote them. I request the -High Tribunal to take official notice of this document in its entirety, -and I would like to submit it as such. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Dr. Schacht, a little while ago you -mentioned a warning on the part of Ambassador Dodd with regard to a -danger which was threatening you. Was it an attack on your life? - -SCHACHT: At that time—and I only heard about this in January after Mr. -Dodd told me—I was informed that the SS was planning an attack on my -person. The intent was, as the technical expression then had it, “to -remove” me. Something like that must have been in the air; otherwise, a -foreign ambassador and the circles close to me would not have known -about it. - -DR. DIX: Just a little while ago you set forth how your policy rejected -the use of arms in bringing about equality of German rights and means of -livelihood. Did you try to do anything in a practical way to further -your policy of peaceful agreement with foreign countries, for example, -when you were President of the bank? - -SCHACHT: My entire work as President of the Reichsbank was primarily -based on the principle of working with the banks in foreign countries as -harmoniously as possible, of pursuing a policy of mutual assistance and -support. - -Secondly, I tried to enter into personal, friendly relations with the -directors of all these banks in the hope of meeting understanding for -German problems, and thus of contributing to a solution by way of -co-operation and mutual solution of these difficult problems which had -arisen in Central Europe. The word “co-operation” (Zusammenarbeit) was -the leitmotif of our circle. - -DR. DIX: To turn from the directors of the banks, what about your -foreign creditors? - -SCHACHT: As I already said a little while ago, from the start I was in -disfavor with all the money makers, those people who had profited from -German loans in foreign countries for I was against Germany’s being -involved in debts abroad, and I took my stand very firmly on this point. - -Then later, after the misfortune which I had always predicted actually -did come to pass, after the financial crash in the year 1931, these -self-same financiers and money men blamed me for the fact that the -interest on their money was no longer being transferred to them. -Therefore in those circles I did not gain any friends, but among serious -bankers and large banking institutions which were interested in constant -and regulated business with Germany, I believe I made no enemies, -because all measures which I later had to take in order to protect the -German currency and to maintain Germany’s foreign trade, all these -measures I always discussed jointly with the representatives of foreign -creditors. Approximately every six months we met, and I always gave them -a detailed account of German conditions. They were permitted to look -into the books of the Reichsbank. They could examine and interrogate the -officials of the Reichsbank and they always confirmed that I told them -everything in the most frank and open manner. So that I may say that I -worked in a fair and friendly way also with these men. - -DR. DIX: And how did your policy of peaceful agreement affect foreign -trade, export, credit, and so forth? - -SCHACHT: I believe that after the happenings that have now taken place -it is today even clearer than before that Germany cannot and could not -live without foreign trade, and that the maintenance of export trade -must be the basis for the future existence of the German nation. -Consequently, I did everything in order to maintain German foreign -trade. I can cite a few specific examples to supplement the general -principles. I tried, for example, to do business with China in order -that we might export to China. I was ready to give China credit and did. -I hailed the fact that the Soviet Union kept up an extensive flow of -trade with us, and I always advocated expanding and stabilizing this -foreign trade in the case of Russia as well as China. About the ability -and readiness to pay and the promptness of payment of the opposite -parties I never had any doubts. - -THE PRESIDENT: He is going into unnecessary detail in support of the -allegation that he tried to maintain export trade. We do not surely need -details. - -DR. DIX: As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, this exposition is of -great significance and relevance. It shows Schacht contrary and in -opposition to the policy carried out by Hitler. Hitler was hostile to -the Soviet Union and this hostility is counterbalanced by open -friendliness on the part of and in the person of the Minister of -Economics. If I want to prove that Schacht was pioneer of a policy of -understanding between nations, even in phases where Hitler carried on a -peaceful battle, so to speak, with another country, such as the war of -propaganda against the Soviet Union, then, in my opinion, this point is -very important for Schacht’s fundamental attitude—on one side war and -on the other understanding. This is of absolute relevance. - -THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has made the allegation. It is for the -Prosecution to dispute it in cross-examination and if they do, then the -details might become material in re-examination. - -DR. DIX: I believe the question has been answered, and now I shall turn -to an entirely new phase of questioning. - -Since it is typical of his desire for understanding and his direct basic -opposition to the policy of Hitler, I would like to refer to Document -Number Schacht-34, which is an affidavit, of Schniewind, the banker and -Swedish Consul General at Munich. This is Exhibit 34, Page 114, of the -English translation, and I would like to quote a short paragraph on Page -112 of the German text, which confirms Dr. Schacht’s remarks. -Schniewind, who was a high official in the Ministry of Economics, says -here: - - “My department dealt with the Reich guarantees for deliveries to - Russia, and thus I was in position to know that Schacht - considered Hitler wrong in fighting Russia. Through much effort, - he obtained Hitler’s permission to send extensive supplies, - especially machines to Russia. Frequently I gained the - impression that Herr Schacht favored these deliveries because, - while instrumental in giving employment, they did not benefit - rearmament. Herr Schacht on several public occasions pointed out - with satisfaction that trade shipments to Russia were proceeding - promptly and smoothly.” - -There are just a few more minutes before the customary recess, Your -Honor, and before we take our recess, I ask that I be permitted to reply -shortly to Your Lordship’s remarks of a few minutes ago. The defendant -must conduct what is, to a certain degree, a very difficult defense. The -Prosecution very simply argued: “You helped to finance rearmament and -this rearmament in the final analysis ended in war and not only a war -but a war of aggression; therefore, you as a defendant are either a -conspirator or an accomplice, and that is a war crime.” - -As far as this argument is concerned, it must in my opinion be open to -the defendant, first—and we shall deal with that later—to point out -that rearmament as such by no means constitutes a desire for aggressive -war; and secondly, to show that his acts actually indicate the exact -opposite, namely, his desire for concord and peace; and for these -fundamental reasons, I do beg the Tribunal not to cut me short in this -evidence but rather to give me the time to carry it through in detail. -This explains my desire to set forth Schacht’s policy toward the Soviet -Union, a policy in which he was in direct opposition to Hitler, to bring -it forth in its entirety, and also my wish to show that he worked for -agreement on all levels—with directors of banks and credit -furnishers—that is, he advocated a policy of give and take rather than -one of unilateral terrorizing and strife. - -Gentlemen of the Bench, it is chiefly on a psychological plane on which -I have to conduct the defense; that is a very sensitive and delicate -field, and I again ask that my task may not be made more difficult. -Then, when the witnesses are called, I for my part will most likely -dispense with every witness except one, and I beg that you show me some -consideration. Does Your Lordship consider it time for a recess? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Dr. Dix. I thought that the Tribunal has -shown you every consideration, and we will now certainly have a recess. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, what was your attitude toward the Leadership -Principle? Did you not realize the danger of giving a blank check, the -danger of losing your own capacity of responsibility? You have heard -that Sir David considers the Leadership Principle in itself to be -criminal. - -SCHACHT: As to whether the Leadership Principle is criminal or not, -opinions throughout history have been much divided. If we look back -through Roman history we see that from time to time in dire periods of -distress a leader was selected to whom everyone else was subordinate. -And if I read _Failure of a Mission_ by Henderson there, too, I find -sentences in which he says: - - “People in England sometimes forget and fail to realize that - even dictators can be, up to a point, necessary for a period and - even extremely beneficial for a nation.” - -Another passage from the same book says: - - “Dictatorships are not always evil.” - -In other words, it depends on just what is attributed to a Führer, how -much confidence one has in a Führer, and for how long a time. Of course, -it is a sheer impossibility for someone to assume the leadership of a -country without giving the nation from time to time an opportunity of -saying whether it still wants to keep him as Führer or not. The election -of Hitler as Führer was in itself no political mistake; in my opinion -one could have introduced quite a number of precautionary limitations -with a view to averting the danger you have mentioned. I regret to say -that that was not done, and that was a great mistake. But perhaps one -was entitled to rely on the fact that from time to time a referendum, a -plebiscite, a new expression of the will of the people would take place -by which the Führer could have been corrected, because a leader who -cannot be corrected becomes a menace. I recognized that danger very -well, I was afraid of it, and I attempted to meet it. May I say one more -thing? Limitless Party propaganda attempted to introduce the idea of a -Führer as a lasting principle into politics. That of course is utter -nonsense, and I took the opportunity—I always took such opportunity -whenever it was possible—of expressing my dissenting opinions publicly. -I took the opportunity in an address to the Academy of German Law, of -which not only Nazis but lawyers of all groups were members, and in that -speech I lectured about the Leadership Principle in economics. And I -expressed myself ironically and satirically, as unfortunately is my -wont, and said that it was not necessary to have a leader in every -stocking factory, that in fact, this principle was not a principle at -all, but an exceptional rule which had to be handled very carefully. - -DR. DIX: I know that, because I was present on the occasion of that -address. What did you think about the ideology of the master race -(Herrenvolk)? - -SCHACHT: I have always considered it a very unhappy precedent to speak -of a “chosen people,” or of “God’s own country,” or of things like that. -As a convinced adherent to the Christian faith I believe in Christian -charity, which bids me extend love to all men without regard to race or -faith. I would like to mention also that the silly talk about the master -race, which some Party leaders made their own, was held up to constant -ridicule by the German public. That was not surprising, because most of -the leaders of the Hitler Party were not exactly ideal types of the -Nordic race. And in that connection, when these things were discussed -among the German population, little Goebbels was referred to as “Der -Schrumpfgermane”—the shrivelled Teuton. - -Only one thing—I have to say this to be just—did most of the leaders -of the Party have in common with the old Teutons—and that was drinking; -excessive drinking was a main part of the Nazi ideology. - -DR. DIX: What did you think of the so-called National Socialist -Weltanschauung? - -SCHACHT: Weltanschauung in my opinion is a summation of all those moral -principles which enable me to acquire a clear judgment on all aspects of -life. Therefore it is a matter of course that a Weltanschauung cannot -take root in the tangible world, but must rise above it; it is something -metaphysical, that is to say, it is based on faith, on religion. A -Weltanschauung which is not rooted in religion is in my opinion no -Weltanschauung at all. Consequently I reject the National Socialist -Weltanschauung which was not rooted in religion. - -DR. DIX: In the trial brief against you it is expressly stated that -there are no charges against you with regard to the Jewish question. -Nevertheless I am putting to you a few questions on this topic, because -the trial brief by its very words takes from you what in the Jewish -question it conceded you; that is to say, the trial brief accuses you -repeatedly of Nazi ideology, in which strict observance of anti-Semitism -is integral. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I simply cannot be bound by silence after this -flagrant misstatement of our position made in conjunction with this -witness’ testimony. It is not true that we make no charges against Dr. -Schacht with reference to the Jews. What is true is that we say that he -was not in complete sympathy with that aspect of the Nazi program which -involved a wholesale extermination of the Jews, and he was for that -reason attacked from time to time. It is further conceded that he gave -aid and comfort to individual Jews, but we do charge that he believed -the Jews of Germany should be stripped of their rights as citizens, and -that he aided and participated in their persecution. And I do not like -to have our position misstated and then be met with a claim of estoppel -by silence. - -DR. DIX: I have to thank you, Mr. Justice Jackson, for your clarifying -statement, and it is now all the more necessary that I put in questions -to Dr. Schacht, but at this moment I want to point out... - -THE PRESIDENT: Please put it then. - -DR. DIX: Your Lordship, it is not only a question, but it is a problem, -and I should like to ask the Prosecution to clarify it now, because it -still needs clarification even after the statement of Mr. Justice -Jackson. If the Tribunal do not think that this is the opportune time I -can bring it up later. I believe, however, that it would be right to -bring it up how. - -As I see it, there is a contradiction in the Indictment, and I would -like it clarified, so that we shall not be at cross-purposes in our -final speeches. - -I can put it quite briefly. It is the question of whether Dr. Schacht is -accused also of Crimes against Humanity, that is, not only the crime of -conspiracy concerning the war of aggression, but also the typical crimes -against humanity, for on this point the individual passages, both of the -Indictment and of the Prosecution speech in which the charges were -presented, are at variance. I wanted to take the liberty of pointing out -the contradictory passages and to ask the Prosecution to be kind enough -to state conclusively at some future occasion whether Schacht is accused -also on Count Three and Four of the Indictment. In presenting the -charges the Prosecution stated, and that indicates that the Prosecution -will limit itself to Counts One and Two: - - “Our evidence against the Defendant Schacht is limited to the - planning and preparation of aggressive war and his participation - in the conspiracy for aggressive war.” - -Similar statements are on Page 3 of the trial brief. Also, in Appendix A -of the Indictment the charges against Schacht are limited to Counts One -and Two. However, on Page 1 of the Indictment we find the following: - - “...accuse as guilty...of Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and - Crimes against Humanity, and of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to - commit those Crimes....” - -And then all the defendants are listed, including the Defendant Hjalmar -Schacht. - -On Page 17 of the German text of the Indictment we read: - - “On the basis of the facts previously stated, the - defendants”—that is, all the defendants—“are guilty.” - -That is, all the defendants are guilty of Counts One, Two, Three, Four. -It also states, on Page 18 of the Indictment: - - “All defendants committed, from 1 September 1939 to 8 May 1945, - War Crimes in Germany and in countries and territories occupied - by German troops after 1 September 1939 and in Austria, - Czechoslovakia, Italy, and on the high seas.” - -On Page 46 it reads: - - “During several years before the 8th of May 1945, all defendants - committed Crimes against Humanity in Germany” - -—and so forth. - -Therefore, some parts of the oral presentation and of the Indictment -show that the Prosecution limits its charges against Schacht to Counts -One and Two, but other passages express beyond doubt that he is also -accused of Crimes against Humanity. - -I think it would be helpful—it need not be done immediately, but I -wanted as a precaution to express it now—if at the proper time the -Prosecution would state to what extent the charges apply to Schacht. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, it will take only one moment to answer -that, and I think the cross-examination—the examination should not -proceed under any misapprehension. - -At all times, and in all documents that I am aware of, the Defendant -Schacht has been accused of being guilty of Count One. - -Count One, as the statement of the offense, states: - - “The Common Plan or Conspiracy embraced the commission of Crimes - against Peace in that the defendants planned, prepared, and - initiated wars of aggression... In the development and course of - the Common Plan it came to embrace the commission of War Crimes, - in that it contemplated, and the defendants determined upon, and - carried out ruthless war...” - -And that included also Crimes against Humanity. - -Our contention is that, while the Defendant Schacht himself was not in -the field perpetrating these individual atrocities, he is answerable for -every offense committed by any of the defendants or their -co-conspirators up to the time that he openly broke with this outfit -with which he became associated. - -That is our contention and Dr. Dix should conduct his examination on the -assumption that every charge is a charge against Schacht up to the time -that he openly, and on record so that somebody knew it, became separated -from the company with which he chose to travel. - -DR. DIX: It is probably my fault, but I still cannot see clearly. First, -I do not know what date the Prosecution means when it admits that -Schacht openly broke with the regime. I must, during my examination... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you must make up your own mind as to what time it -was, the time at which he openly broke. - -Are you not able to hear? - -DR. DIX: I have to make up my mind now? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I think you had better go on with the evidence. - -DR. DIX: All right. I can refer to the subject again later. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Well then, please do not make any -statements of principle concerning the Jewish question, but tell the -Tribunal, and give a few examples, of what your attitude was on the -Jewish question. - -SCHACHT: The Jewish question came up quite early, when, in 1933, a New -York banker, the late James Meier, announced his intention to visit me. -I went to Hitler at that time and told him, “Mr. James Meier, one of the -most respected New York bankers and a great benefactor of his old home -country, Germany, will come to visit me, and I intend to give a dinner -in his honor. I assume that you have no objection.” He immediately said, -in a very definite and pronounced manner, “Herr Schacht, you can do -everything.” I assumed that he gave me absolute freedom to keep in -contact with my Jewish friends, which I did. The dinner actually took -place. - -I only mention this because it was the first time the Jewish question -was brought up between us. At every occasion I took a definite position -on the Jewish question—and wherever possible, publicly—I have always -looked for that opportunity. - -I will give only two examples of that. - -There was a branch of the Reichsbank in Amswalde in the Province of -Brandenburg. The name of the manager of that branch office was one day -posted up in one of the public _Stürmer_ boxes in his town, and termed a -traitor to the people because his wife had bought 50 pfennings worth of -ribbon or the like in a Jewish store. I at once approached the competent -official at Amswalde and demanded the immediate removal of the placard -and an immediate correction to the effect that the man was no traitor to -the people. That was refused; whereupon, without asking anyone, I closed -the Reichsbank branch at Amswalde. It took a number of weeks until, in -the end, the Oberpräsident, who was of course also a Nazi boss, came to -me and asked me to reopen the branch office. I told him, “As soon as -they repudiate that affair publicly I shall reopen the branch office at -Amswalde.” It took only a few days before the Oberpräsident and -Gauleiter of Brandenburg, Grube, had the announcement made public in the -Amswalde newspaper, in large print, and so I reopened the branch office -in Amswalde. That is one example. - -The second example has been mentioned briefly; I just want to sum it up -once more because its effect was penetrating. - -On the occasion of a Christmas celebration for the office messengers of -the Reichsbank I referred to the pogrom of 9 November 1938, and I told -the boys, in the presence of many—parents, Party leaders, and Party -members—that I hoped they had nothing to do with these things, which -should make every decent German blush with shame. But if they did they -should leave the Reichsbank at once, because in an institution such as -the Reichsbank, which was built up on good faith, there was no place for -people who did not respect the property and life of others. - -DR. DIX: May I interrupt you, Dr. Schacht, and point out to the Tribunal -that in Document Number Schacht-34, which has been submitted and is an -affidavit of Dr. Schniewind, on Page 118 of the German text and on Page -126 of the English text the same incident which Dr. Schacht has just -related is mentioned. May I quote quite briefly: - - “It is known that at the Christmas celebration of the Reichsbank - in December of 1938 he”—that is Schacht—“said the following in - his address to the young office boys: - - “‘A few weeks ago things occurred in our fatherland which are a - disgrace to civilization and which must turn every decent - German’s face red with shame. I only hope that none of you - office boys participated in them, because for such an individual - there is no place in the Reichsbank.’” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Excuse me. Please continue. You wanted to -add something? - -SCHACHT: When in August of 1934 I took over the Reich Ministry of -Economics, of course I first put the question to Hitler: “How are the -Jews in our national economy to be treated?” Hitler told me then, -literally, “The Jews can be active in domestic economy in the same way -as before.” - -That was the directive that Hitler had promised to me, and during all -the time when I was in charge of the Ministry of Economics I acted -accordingly. - -However, I have to add that every few weeks there was a quarrel on some -Jewish question with some Gauleiter or other Party official. Also, I -could not protect Jews against physical mistreatment and the like, -because that came under the competence of the Public Prosecutor and not -mine; but in the economic field I helped all Jews who approached me to -obtain their rights, and in every individual case, I prevailed upon -Hitler and succeeded against the Gauleiters and Party officials, -sometimes even threatening to resign. - -I believe that it is notable that the pogrom of November 1938 could only -have taken place after I had resigned from my office. Had I still been -in office, then that pogrom doubtlessly would not have occurred. - -DR. DIX: The witness Gisevius has already testified that in the course -of developments from 1933 on, fundamental changes took place in your -judgment of Adolf Hitler. I ask you now, because this is a very decisive -question, to give the Tribunal a detailed description of your real -attitude and your judgment of Adolf Hitler in the course of the -years—as exhaustively, but also as briefly, as possible. - -SCHACHT: In former statements which I have made here, I have spoken of -Hitler as a semi-educated man. I still maintain that. He did not have -sufficient school education, but he read an enormous amount later, and -acquired a wide knowledge. He juggled with that knowledge in a masterly -manner in all debates, discussions, and speeches. - -No doubt he was a man of genius in certain respects. He had sudden ideas -of which nobody else had thought and which were at times useful in -solving great difficulties, sometimes with astounding simplicity, -sometimes, however, with equally astounding brutality. - -He was a mass psychologist of really diabolical genius. While I myself -and several others—for instance, General Von Witzleben told me so -once—while we were never captivated in personal conversations, still he -had a very peculiar influence on other people, and particularly he was -able—in spite of his screeching and occasionally breaking voice—to -stir up the utmost overwhelming enthusiasm of large masses in a filled -auditorium. - -I believe that originally he was not filled only with evil desires; -originally, no doubt, he believed he was aiming at good, but gradually -he himself fell victim to the same spell which he exercised over the -masses; because whoever ventures to seduce the masses is finally led and -seduced by them, and so this reciprocal relation between leader and -those led, in my opinion, contributed to ensnaring him in the evil ways -of mass instincts, which every political leader should avoid. - -One more thing was to be admired in Hitler. He was a man of unbending -energy, of a will power which overcame all obstacles, and in my estimate -only those two characteristics—mass psychology and his energy and will -power—explain that Hitler was able to rally up to 40 percent, and later -almost 50 percent, of the German people behind him. - -What else shall I say? - -DR. DIX: Well, I was mainly concerned with bringing up the subject of -your own change of opinion. You have said that the break in your -attitude toward Hitler was caused by the Fritsch incident. You are the -best witness who can give us an explanation not of Hitler’s but of your -own development and your changing attitude towards Hitler. - -SCHACHT: Excuse me. I think there is a basic error here. It appears from -this as if I had been a convinced adherent of Hitler at some time. I was -never that. On the contrary, out of concern for my people and my -country, after Hitler gained power, I endeavored with all my strength to -direct that power into an orderly channel, and to keep it within bounds. -Therefore, there was no question of a break with Hitler. A break could -only be spoken of had I been closely connected with him before. At heart -I was never closely connected with Hitler, but to all appearances I -worked in the Cabinet and I did so because he was after all in power, -and I considered it my duty to put myself at the disposal of my people -and my country for their good. - -DR. DIX: All right, but at what time, by what conditions, by what -realization were you influenced to begin that activity which the witness -Gisevius has described? - -SCHACHT: My serious criticism of Hitler’s doings started already at the -time of the so-called Röhm Putsch on 30 June 1934. I should like to -point out first that these things occurred quite unexpectedly and took -me by surprise, because I had not at all anticipated them. At that time -I had told Hitler, “How could you have these people just simply killed -off? Under all circumstances there should have been at least a summary -trial of some sort.” Hitler swallowed these remarks and merely mumbled -something about “revolutionary necessity,” but he did not really -contradict me. - -Then in the course of the second half of the year 1934 and the first -half of the year 1935 I noticed that I had been under a misconception -when I believed that Hitler did not approve of what might be considered -revolutionary and disorderly Party excesses, and that he was really -willing to restore a respectable atmosphere. Hitler did nothing to put a -stop to the excesses of individual Party members or Party groups. Very -likely the idea which recently—or I believe today—was mentioned by a -witness was always in his mind: let the SA have its fling for once. That -is to say, for the masses of the Party he sanctioned, as a means of -recreation, so to speak, behavior which is absolutely incompatible with -good order in the State. In the course of the following months my -suspicions were confirmed and increased, and then for the first time, in -May 1935, I took occasion to bring these matters up with him quite -openly. I do not know if you want me to discuss these things now, but I -am ready to tell about them. - -DR. DIX: I consider it important that the Tribunal should hear from you -how your original attitude towards Hitler, which you have just -described, changed, and you became a conspirator against him. - -SCHACHT: Well, the decisive change in my attitude came about by reason -of the Fritsch incident, at the very moment when I had to -recognize—and, of course, that did not come with lightning speed, but -in the course of weeks and months it crystallized—that Hitler aimed at -war, or at least was not prepared to do everything to avoid a war. At -that moment I told myself that this was a tremendous danger which was -raising its head, and that violence could be crushed only by violence. - -Any opportunity of political propaganda within the German people was of -course out of the question. There was no freedom of assembly. There was -no freedom of speech. There was no freedom of writing. There was no -possibility of discussing things even in a small group. From beginning -to end one was spied upon, and every word which was said among more than -two persons was spoken at the peril of one’s life. There was only one -possibility in the face of that terror, which was beyond democratic -reform and which barred every national criticism. That was to meet this -situation with violence. - -Then I came to the conclusion that in the face of Hitler’s terror only a -_coup d’état_, a Putsch, and finally an attempt at assassination was -possible. - -DR. DIX: And is Gisevius right in saying that the _peripeteia_, the -decisive turning point in your attitude resulted from your impressions -and experiences in the so-called Fritsch crisis? - -SCHACHT: Aside from the inherent falsehood which appeared in all actions -and measures of the Party men, the Fritsch crisis provided the absolute -assurance that a basic change was occurring in the conduct of political -affairs, for within about 10 days Blomberg was removed, Fritsch was -removed, Neurath was removed, and Hitler not only appointed so -unsuitable a person as Ribbentrop to be Foreign Minister, but also in -his speech in the Reichstag soon afterwards announced that from now on -rearmament had to be increased even more. Consequently the Fritsch -crisis was the decisive turning point in my attitude, and from then on I -knew that every further peaceful attempt at controlling the torrent -would fail and that only violent means could meet it. - -DR. DIX: For an estimate of the Fritsch crisis may I quote now from the -document which I already wanted to produce on the occasion of the -interrogation of Gisevius but could not because the document was not -then available to the Prosecution. The same view about the Fritsch -crisis which Gisevius and now Dr. Schacht have put here was also -expressed abroad by an intelligent officer with political foresight. May -I point to Exhibit Number 15 of my document book (Document Number -Schacht-15)? That is Page 41 of the English text, and 35 of the German -text. It is a biennial report of the Chief of Staff of the United States -Army to the Secretary of War for the period of 1 July 1943 to 30 June -1945. I quote one sentence from it: - - “The history of the German High Command from 1938 on is one of - constant conflict of personalities, in which military judgment - was increasingly subordinated to Hitler’s personal dictates. The - first clash occurred in 1938 and resulted in the removal of Von - Blomberg, Von Fritsch, and Beck and of the last effective - conservative influence on German foreign policy.” - -So here also that turning point has been clearly understood. And in -summary I would like to ask this question of Dr. Schacht. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Were you only disappointed by Hitler, or -did you consider yourself deceived by Hitler at that time? Will you -answer that? - -SCHACHT: The answer is that I have never felt disappointed by Hitler, -because I had not expected more of him than my appraisal of his -personality allowed me. But I certainly consider myself deceived, -swindled, and cheated by him to the highest degree, because whatever he -had previously promised to the German people and thereby to me, he did -not keep afterwards. - -He promised equal rights for all citizens, but his adherents, regardless -of their capabilities, enjoyed privileges before all other citizens. He -promised to put the Jews under the same protection which foreigners -enjoyed, yet he deprived them of every legal protection. He had promised -to fight against political lies, but together with his Minister Goebbels -he cultivated nothing but political lies and political fraud. He -promised the German people to maintain the principles of positive -Christianity yet he tolerated and sponsored measures by which -institutions of the Church were abused, reviled, and damaged. Also, in -the foreign political field he always spoke against a war on two -fronts—and then later undertook it himself. He despised and disregarded -all laws of the Weimar Republic, to which he had taken the oath when he -became Chancellor. He mobilized the Gestapo against personal liberty. He -gagged and bound all free exchange of ideas and information. He pardoned -criminals and enlisted them in his service. He did everything to break -his promises. He lied to and deceived the world, Germany, and me. - -DR. DIX: Let us return to the period of the seizure of power. In -November 1932, you stated publicly that Hitler would become Reich -Chancellor. What caused you to make that statement? - -SCHACHT: That statement was caused by the fact that Hitler in the July -elections of 1932 obtained 40 percent of all seats in the Reichstag for -his Party. That is an election result which, if I am informed correctly, -had never occurred since 1871, when the Reichstag was founded; and to -me, as a democrat and a follower of democratic parliamentary government, -it was quite inevitable that that man was now to be entrusted with -forming a cabinet. I do not know of any alternative at the time. There -was only one other possibility, one alternative, and that was a military -rule. But the Cabinet of Von Papen already had had some special -presidential authority and still could not maintain itself in the face -of the Reichstag; and when Herr Schleicher attempted to establish a -military regime without the participation of the Nazis, he failed after -just a few weeks, because he found himself confronted with the -alternative either of starting a civil war or of resigning. - -Hindenburg and at first Schleicher as well—although at the last moment -he acted differently—were always of the opinion that the Armed Forces -could not face a civil war, and Hindenburg was certainly not ready to -tolerate a civil war. But very unwillingly he saw himself forced by -necessity to put the reins of government into the hands of the man who, -thanks to his own propaganda and the incapability of all preceding -governments, thanks also to the inconsiderate policy of the foreign -countries toward Germany, had won the majority of German votes. - -DR. DIX: You know that the Prosecution accuses you of having assisted -Hitler and the Nazi regime to power. I therefore want to ask you now -whether between the July elections 1932, and the day when Hitler became -Chancellor—that is the 30th of January, 1933—you spoke publicly for -Hitler. - -SCHACHT: I want to state first that Hitler’s power was an accomplished -fact in July 1932, when he secured 230 Reichstag seats. Everything else -that followed must be viewed as a consequence of that Reichstag -election. During that entire period—with the exception of the one -interview you mentioned, in which I said that according to democratic -principles Hitler must become Reich Chancellor—I can say that I did not -write or publicly speak a single word for Hitler. - -DR. DIX: Did you, during the time when the reorganization of the Reich -Cabinet was discussed, speak to Hindenburg on behalf of Hitler’s -Chancellorship? - -SCHACHT: I have never in consultations with any of the competent -gentlemen, be it Hindenburg, Meissner, or anyone else, contributed -towards exerting any influence in favor of Hitler, nor did I participate -in any way in the nomination of Hitler to be Reich Chancellor. - -DR. DIX: The prosecutor accuses you in that connection of putting the -prestige of your name at the disposal of Hitler in November 1932, and he -refers to a statement made by Goebbels in the latter’s book, _From the -Kaiserhof to the Reich Chancellery_. What can you say about that? - -SCHACHT: I would never have expected that this apostle of truth, -Goebbels, would once more be mobilized against me here, but it is not my -fault if Herr Goebbels made a mistake. - -DR. DIX: The prosecutor also states that you provided the funds for -Hitler in the Reichstag elections of 5 March; that is said to have -happened in an industrial meeting on which there is an affidavit by the -industrialist Von Schnitzler, Document Number EC-439, Exhibit USA-618. -What do you have to say about that? It is our Number 3 of our document -book, Page 11 of the English copy. - -SCHACHT: In February of 1933, at the time when Hitler was already Reich -Chancellor and the elections of 5 March were to furnish a basis for the -shape of the new government, Hitler asked me whether, at the occasion of -a meeting which Göring was to call and which would have the purpose of -raising funds for the elections, I would be good enough to take the role -of his banker. I had no reason for refusing to do that. The meeting took -place on 26 February. - -And now the prosecutor has made it appear that during that meeting I had -solicited election funds. The Prosecution themselves, however, have -presented a document, D-203, which apparently is meant to be a record of -the election speech made by Hitler on that evening... - -DR. DIX: May I interrupt you and point out to the Tribunal that it is -our Exhibit Number Schacht-2, on Page 9 of the English text. Excuse me. -Please, will you kindly go on. - -SCHACHT: D-203. That document closes with the following sentence: - - “Göring then passed very cleverly to the necessity that other - circles not taking part in this political battle should at least - make the financial sacrifices required.” - -Therefore from that report which was submitted by the Prosecution, it -can be seen very clearly that not I but Göring pleaded for funds. I only -administered these funds later, and, in the affidavit by Schnitzler, -Document EC-439, Page 11, the Prosecution have carefully left out these -decisive passages which do not accuse, but exonerate me. I quote the two -sentences, therefore, as follows—I am sorry, I have to quote in English -because I have only the English text in front of me: - - “At the meeting Dr. Schacht proposed raising an election fund of - as far as I remember three million Reichsmarks. The fund was to - be distributed between the two ‘allies’ according to their - relative strength at the time. Dr. Stein suggested that the - Deutsche Volkspartei should be included, which suggestion, if I - remember rightly, was accepted. The amounts which the individual - firms were to contribute were not discussed.” - -It can be seen from this that the election fund was not collected only -for the Nazi Party, but for the Nazi Party and the national group which -was its ally and to which, for instance, also Herr Von Papen and -Hugenberg belonged, and which during that very meeting was extended to -comprise a third group, the German People’s Party. It was, therefore, a -collective fund for those parties who went into the election campaign -together, and not just a Nazi fund. - -DR. DIX: The Prosecution have mentioned those laws which were decreed -after the seizure of power, and which introduced and then established -the totalitarian rule of the Nazis and of Hitler. We have to consider -the question of your personal responsibility as a later member of the -cabinet and I must discuss these laws with you in detail; for the -present I just want to remind you of them generally: First, the Enabling -Act; then the law about the prohibition of parties and the establishment -of one Party; the law about the unity of Party and State; the law -decreeing the expropriation of the SPD and the trade unions; the law -about civil service associations; the law about the legal limitation of -professions for Jews; the law instituting the Peoples’ Court; the law -legalizing the murders of 30 June 1934; and the law about the merger of -the offices of the Reich Chancellor and the Reich President in the -person of Hitler. How do you, as a member of the Cabinet, define your -personal responsibility with respect to these laws? - -SCHACHT: When all these laws were issued I was not a Cabinet member. I -had no vote in the Cabinet. I had a vote in the Cabinet only after 1 -August 1934, at which time the last disastrous law, the merger of the -offices of Reich Chancellor and Reich President was decreed. I did not -participate in the discussions preceding this law, nor did I vote on it. -I had absolutely no part in any of these laws. - -DR. DIX: I do not know whether I mentioned it, but I want to protect you -against a misunderstanding. This does not apply to the merger of the -offices of the Reich President in the person of Hitler, after -Hindenburg’s death? - -SCHACHT: Of course, I did not take part in that either. - -DR. DIX: And why not? - -SCHACHT: Because I was not then in the Cabinet. I received my official -nomination as Minister on 3 or 4 August. I did not take part in the -deliberations on that law. I did not vote for it, and did not sign it. - -DR. DIX: But in the Indictment it is stated that you were a member of -the Reichstag. Then as a member of the Reichstag you would have voted -for these laws, inasmuch as, actually, after 1933 only unanimous votes -were cast in the Reichstag? - -SCHACHT: Yes. Unfortunately, there is much in the trial brief which is -not correct. During my entire life I was never a member of the -Reichstag. One look into the _Reichstag Handbook_ could have enlightened -the Prosecution that also during that time I was not a member of the -Reichstag. - -I had nothing to do with all these laws either as member of the Cabinet -or of the Reichstag, because I had been neither during that time. - -DR. DIX: Did Adolf Hitler actually take an oath to the Weimar -Constitution? - -SCHACHT: Of course Hitler took an oath to the Weimar Constitution when -he became Reich Chancellor, to Reich President Von Hindenburg. In taking -that oath he swore not only to respect the constitution but also to -observe and fulfill all laws unless they were lawfully changed. - -DR. DIX: Was the Weimar Constitution ever formally repealed? - -SCHACHT: No, the Weimar Constitution has never been repealed. - -DR. DIX: In your view was the Leadership Principle established anywhere -legally or constitutionally? - -SCHACHT: The Leadership Principle was not established by a single law, -and the subsequent attempt to reduce the responsibility of the -individual ministers—and that affects me, too—by saying that it had -become prescriptive law, is not correct. The responsibility of the -ministers continued to exist, my own also, and was kept down only by the -terror and the violent threats of Hitler. - -DR. DIX: The questions whether the Enabling Act referred to the Führer -or to the Cabinet; whether the first Cabinet after 1933 was a National -Socialist one or a combination of the parties of the right; and the -question of the development of Hitler into an autocratic dictator, all -these I have already put to the witness Lammers. I do not wish to repeat -them, but do you have to add anything new to what Lammers has testified? - -SCHACHT: I made only two notes. In Hitler’s Reichstag speech on 23 March -1933 he said, “It is the sincere desire of the National -Government...”—not the National Socialist, as it is always referred to -later, but the National Government. - -And the second point: In the proclamation to the Wehrmacht which Defense -Minister Von Blomberg issued on 1 February 1933 this sentence occurs: - - “I assume this office with the firm determination to maintain - the Reichswehr, in accordance with the testament of my - predecessors, as a power factor of the State, above Party - politics.” - -This and other factors already mentioned convinced me that the Cabinet -would be a national coalition cabinet, whereas Hitler, by his rule of -terror and violence, formed a pure Nazi dictatorship out of it. - -DR. DIX: The quotation mentioned by Schacht is in our document book, -Document Number Schacht-4, Page 14 of the English text. Now, when you -became Minister of Economics... - -THE PRESIDENT: It is 5 o’clock; the Tribunal will adjourn. - -DR. DIX: Mr. President, may I ask a question? Do we continue tomorrow, -because tomorrow is the first of May, and there is some uncertainty -whether there will be a session tomorrow or not? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal will go on tomorrow. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 1 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH DAY - Wednesday, 1 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Before we go on with the case of the Defendant Schacht, -the Tribunal wishes to announce its decision on the applications by Dr. -Sauter on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach: The first application to -which any objection was taken related to the group of documents Numbers -30, 31, 45, 68, 73, 101, 124, and 133. That application with respect to -that group of documents is denied. - -The next matter was an application in respect of Number 118(a). That -application is granted and the document is to be translated. - -The next was Number 121 and in that case the application is denied. As -regard to witnesses, Dr. Sauter withdrew his application for the witness -Marsalek. - -In connection with the other applications, the Tribunal grants the -application that Uiberreither should be called as a witness. - -That is all. - -DR. DIX: Yesterday, much to my regret, I neglected after an answer given -by Dr. Schacht to my question as to whether he was disappointed by -Hitler or whether he considered himself deceived by him, to read a -passage from a document which deals with the same point. I am referring -to a document which has been submitted to the High Tribunal and which -has been quoted several times—Exhibit Schacht-34, Page 114 of the -English text of the document book. This passage may be found on Page 124 -of the English document book and reads as follows: - - “Dr. Schacht, even in the years 1935-36, as may have been seen - from numerous statements, had fallen into the role of a man, who - in good faith had put his strength and ability at Hitler’s - disposal but who now felt himself betrayed. - - “Of the many statements made by Schacht, I quote only one which - Schacht made at the occasion of a supper with my wife and myself - in the summer of 1938. When Dr. Schacht made his appearance, it - was evident that he was in a state of inner excitement and - during the supper, he suddenly gave vent to his feelings, when, - in deep agitation he almost shouted at my wife, ‘My dear lady, - we have fallen into the hands of criminals—how could I ever - have suspected that?’” - -This is the affidavit made out by Schniewind. - -Yesterday I mentioned three documents: namely, a speech made by Schacht -on “Geography and Statistics” at Frankfurt-am-Main on 9 December 1936, -then an article Schacht had written on the colonial problem and a speech -given at Königsberg by Schacht. - -I wish to submit these documents: The speech on “Geography and -Statistics” at Frankfurt is the Document Schacht-19, Page 48, English -Page 54. The theme on the colonial question is Exhibit Schacht-21, -German version Page 53 and English version Page 59. The speech at -Königsberg is Exhibit Schacht-25 of my document book, German version on -Page 44 and English version Page 73. - -Dr. Schacht, we stopped in the middle of 1934, shortly before you -entered the Ministry of Economics, and when you became Minister of -Economics, you were familiar with the happenings of 30 June 1934 and -their legalization by the Cabinet. Did you not have any misgivings to -enter the Cabinet or what reasons prompted you to put aside these -misgivings? - -SCHACHT: As far as my personal composure and comfort would have been -concerned, it would have been very simple not to assume office and to -resign. Of course, I asked myself what help that would be for the future -development of German politics if I did refuse office. We were already -at a stage in which any public and open opposition and criticism against -the Hitler regime had been made impossible. Meetings could not be held, -societies could not be established, every press statement was subject to -censorship, and all political opposition, without which no government -can thrive, had been prevented by Hitler through his policy of terror. -There was only one possible way to exercise criticism and even form an -opposition which could prevent bad and faulty measures being taken by -the Government. And this opposition could solely be formed in the -Government itself. Thus convinced, I entered the Government and I hoped -in the course of the years to find a certain amount of support and -backing among the German people. There was still a large mass of -spiritual leaders, professors, scientists, and teachers, whom I did not -expect simply to acquiesce to a regime of coercion. There were also many -industrialists, leaders of economy, who I did not assume would bow to a -policy of coercion incompatible with free economy. I expected a certain -support from all these circles, support which would make it possible for -me to have a moderating, controlling influence in the Government. -Therefore, I entered Hitler’s Cabinet, not with enthusiastic assent, but -because it was necessary to keep on working for the German people and -exercise a moderating influence within the Government. - -DR. DIX: In the course of time was no opposition ever developed within -the Party? - -SCHACHT: In answering that question, I would like to say that within the -Party, of course, the decent elements were by far in majority; the -greater part of the population had joined the Party because of a healthy -instinct and with good intentions driven by the need in which the German -nation found itself. - -I would like to say about the SS, for instance, that in the beginning -numbers of decent people joined the SS because Himmler gave the SS the -appearance of fighting for a life of ideals. I would like to call your -attention to a book written by an SS man which appeared at that time -under the significant title, _Schafft anständige Kerle_ (_Let’s Make -Decent Men_). - -But, in the course of time, Hitler knew how to gather around him all bad -elements, within the Party and its organization, and to chain tightly -all those elements to himself, because he understood how to exploit -shrewdly any mistake, slip-up, or misdemeanor on their part. Yesterday I -talked about drunkenness as a constituent part of Nazi ideology; I did -not do that with the purpose of degrading anyone personally. I did it -for another quite definite reason. - -In the course of further developments, I observed that even many Party -members who had fallen into this net of Hitler and who occupied more or -less leading positions, gradually became afraid because of the -consequences of the injustices and the evil deeds to which they were -instigated by the regime. I had the definite feeling that these people -resorted to alcohol and various narcotics in order to flee from their -own conscience, and that it was only this flight from their own -conscience that permitted them to act the way they did. Otherwise, there -would be no explanation for the large number of suicides that took place -at the end of the Nazi regime. - -DR. DIX: You know that you are accused of being a participant in a -conspiracy which had as its object an illegal violation of the peace. -Did you at any time have secret discussions, or secret orders, or secret -directives, which worked toward this objective? - -SCHACHT: I may say that I myself never received any order or fulfilled -any wish which might have been contrary to the conception of right. -Never did Hitler request anything from me which he knew I would surely -not carry out because it did not agree with my moral point of view. But -neither did I ever notice or observe that one of my fellow ministers or -one of the other leading men who did not belong to Hitler’s inner -circle—of course, I could not control that circle—or anyone else whom -I met in official contacts, showed in any way that there was an intent -to commit a war crime; on the contrary, we were always very glad when -Hitler came off with one of his big speeches in which he assured, not -only the entire world, but above all the German people that he was -thinking of nothing except peace and peaceful work. The fact that Hitler -deceived the world and the German people, and many of his co-workers, is -one of the things that I mentioned yesterday. - -DR. DIX: Did you at any time—of course, I mean outside of your normal -oath of office—take any oath or bind yourself in any other way to the -Party or another National Socialist organization? - -SCHACHT: Not a single oath and not a single obligation beyond my oath of -office to the head of the State. - -DR. DIX: Did you have close private relations with leading National -Socialists, for example, with Hitler or Göring? - -SCHACHT: I assume you mean a close friendly or social contact? - -DR. DIX: Yes. - -SCHACHT: I never had relations of that sort with Hitler. He repeatedly -urged me in the first years to come to the luncheons at the Reich -Chancellery where he was lunching with closer friends. I tried to do -that twice. I attended twice at various intervals, and I must say that -not only the level of the discussion at the luncheon and the abject -humility shown to Hitler repulsed me but I also did not like the whole -crowd, and I never went back again. - -I never called on Hitler personally in a private matter. Of course, -naturally, I attended the large public functions which all the -ministers, the Diplomatic Corps and high officials, _et cetera_, -attended, but I never had any intimate, social, or other close contact -with him. That applies to the other gentlemen as well. - -As a matter of course, in the first months of our acquaintance we -visited each other on occasion, but all so-called social gatherings -which still took place in the first period had a more or less official -character. Close private relations simply did not exist. - -DR. DIX: And does this answer apply to all the other leading National -Socialists as well? - -SCHACHT: All of them. - -DR. DIX: When, for instance, did you speak for the last time with the -following persons? Let us start first with Bormann. - -SCHACHT: I gather from the use of the word “first” that you are going to -mention others also. - -DR. DIX: Yes, Himmler, Hess, Ley, and Ribbentrop. - -SCHACHT: In that case I would like to make a few preliminary remarks: At -the close of the French campaign, when Hitler returned triumphant and -victorious from Paris, all of us—the ministers and the Reichsleiter and -the other dignitaries of the Party as I assume, and state secretaries, -and so forth—received an invitation from the Reich Chancellery to be -present at the Anhalter Railway Station to greet Hitler on his arrival. -Since I was in Berlin at the time, it was impossible for me to refuse -this invitation. It was 1940, the conflict between Hitler and myself had -been going on for some time, and it would have been a veritable affront -if I had stayed at home. Consequently, I went to the station and saw a -very large number of Party dignitaries, ministers and so forth, but, of -course, I do not remember any more just who all these people were. - -DR. DIX: I beg your pardon for interrupting you. I have a rather poor -memory for films and especially for newsreels, but I believe that that -reception was shown in a newsreel and I believe that you were just about -the only civilian who was present among those people. - -SCHACHT: I personally did not see that film, but my friends told me -about it. They mentioned especially that among all the gold braid, I was -the only civilian in street clothes there. Of course, it could be -ascertained from the film who was present at the time. - -I mentioned this reception, for it might be possible that I said “Good -morning” to many people and inquired about their health and so forth, -and I also recall that I arrived at the station with the Codefendant -Rosenberg in the same car, because there were always two people to a -car. I did not attend the reception which followed at the Reich -Chancellery. Rosenberg did go but I said, “No, I would rather not go. I -am going home.” - -DR. DIX: Then, I may assume that you probably saw the leading men, Hess, -Ley, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Frick, Frank, Schirach, Speer, Sauckel, -Seyss-Inquart, Kaltenbrunner, _et cetera_, then for the last time? - -SCHACHT: It is possible that all these gentlemen were there, but I did -not speak at length with any of them except Hitler himself. - -DR. DIX: Did you speak with Hitler at that time? - -SCHACHT: Hitler addressed me, and that was one of the strangest scenes -of my life. We were all standing in line and Hitler passed everyone by -rather quickly. When he saw me, he came up to me with a triumphant smile -and extended his hand in a cordial manner, something which I had not -seen from him for a long time, and he said to me, “Now, Herr Schacht, -what do you have to say now?” Then, of course, he expected me to -congratulate him or express my admiration or a similar sentiment, and to -admit that my prognostication about the war and about the disaster of -the war was wrong, for he knew my attitude about the war quite exactly. -It was extremely hard for me to avoid such an answer and I searched my -mind for something else to say, finally replying: “I can only say to -you, ‘God protect you.’” That was the only significant conversation -which I had that day. I believed the best way to have kept my distance -was through just such a completely neutral and inconsequential remark. - -DR. DIX: Well... - -SCHACHT: But perhaps you would like me to refer to the individual -gentlemen, and I can tell you with this exception just when I spoke to -these gentlemen for the last time. - -DR. DIX: Himmler? - -SCHACHT: Himmler, I would judge that perhaps I talked to him last in -1936. - -DR. DIX: Hess? - -SCHACHT: Hess—of course I am not referring to the conversations here in -the prison. I had not spoken with Hess for years before the beginning of -the war. - -DR. DIX: Ley? - -SCHACHT: Ley, I had not seen him since the beginning of the war. - -DR. DIX: Ribbentrop? - -SCHACHT: I saw Ribbentrop last after my being thrown out of the -Reichsbank, because I had to talk with him about the imminent journey to -India, and that must have been, I would judge, February 1939. I have not -talked with him since. - -DR. DIX: Rosenberg? - -SCHACHT: Rosenberg, always aside from this reception of Hitler’s, -perhaps not since 1936. - -DR. DIX: Frick? - -SCHACHT: I perhaps saw Frick last in the year 1938. - -DR. DIX: Schirach? - -SCHACHT: I did not even know Schirach. - -DR. DIX: Speer? - -SCHACHT: I talked with Speer for the last time—and I can tell you this -exactly—when I went to the World Exposition in Paris in the year 1937. - -DR. DIX: Of course, you are always referring to the time before you were -taken prisoner? - -SCHACHT: Yes, of course, naturally here I have... - -DR. DIX: Sauckel? - -SCHACHT: Not since the beginning of the war. - -DR. DIX: Seyss-Inquart? - -SCHACHT: Seyss-Inquart, I would judge that I spoke to him for the last -time in 1936, when I visited a colleague in the National Bank in -Austria. - -DR. DIX: Kaltenbrunner? - -SCHACHT: I saw Kaltenbrunner for the first time here at the prison. - -DR. DIX: We will refer to Hitler later. Frank is still missing. - -SCHACHT: I saw Frank last perhaps 1937 or 1938. - -DR. DIX: Most likely at the occasion of the speech you mentioned -yesterday? - -SCHACHT: Yes, possibly also afterwards at an official reception, but I -do not believe that I saw him after 1938. - -DR. DIX: Now, how about the leading men of the Wehrmacht, Keitel, for -instance? - -SCHACHT: I never had any contact with Keitel. I perhaps saw him at some -social gathering, but never after 1938. - -DR. DIX: Jodl? - -SCHACHT: I made Herr Jodl’s acquaintance here in the prison. - -DR. DIX: Dönitz? - -SCHACHT: I met Dönitz for the first time here in the prison. - -DR. DIX: Raeder? - -SCHACHT: Herr Raeder, I believe I have known him for quite some time. In -the beginning we exchanged occasional visits within the family, visits -of a semiofficial character but always on a friendly basis; however, I -believe that I have also not seen him or talked to him since 1938. - -DR. DIX: Brauchitsch? - -SCHACHT: I have not talked with Brauchitsch since 1939, or since 1938, -since the Fritsch affair. - -DR. DIX: How about Halder? - -SCHACHT: As you know, I saw Halder in connection with the Putsch in the -fall of 1938 but not after that. - -DR. DIX: How often did you see Hitler after your dismissal as President -of the Reichsbank? - -SCHACHT: After my dismissal as President of the Reichsbank? - -DR. DIX: Since January 1939. - -SCHACHT: I saw him once more in January 1939 because I had to discuss my -future activity, _et cetera_, with him. And on that occasion he asked -me—he knew that I had long wished to take an extensive journey—that I -might avail myself of this opportunity to take this journey now, so -there would not be so much talk about my leaving the Reichsbank. Then we -agreed on the trip to India. On that occasion I also saw Göring for the -last time. And then—after my return in August, I did not see him -again—then the war came, during the course of which I saw him twice. - -Shall I tell you about those two occasions? - -DR. DIX: Yes. - -SCHACHT: I saw him once in February 1940. At that time various American -magazines and periodicals had requested me to write articles on -Germany’s interpretation of the situation, her desires, and her position -in general. I had the inclination to do this, but because we were at -war, I naturally could not do so without first informing the Foreign -Minister. The Foreign Minister advised me that he had nothing against my -writing an article for an American periodical, but that before sending -off this article, he wanted to have the article submitted for -censorship. Of course that did not appeal to me—I had not even thought -of that—and, consequently, I did not write this article. - -However, there were further inquiries from America and I said to myself, -“It is not sufficient for me to talk with the Foreign Minister, I must -go to Hitler in this matter.” So, with that aim, I called on Hitler, who -received me very soon after my request, and I told him at that time, -among other things, just what my experience with Herr Von Ribbentrop had -been, and I further told him that I thought it might be quite expedient -to write these articles; and that it seemed vital to me to have -constantly someone in America, who by means of the press, _et cetera_, -could enlighten public opinion as to Germany and her interests. - -Hitler was favorably impressed with this suggestion of mine and said to -me, “I shall discuss this matter with the Foreign Minister.” -Consequently, this entire matter came to naught. - -Then, later, through the good offices of my Codefendant, Funk, who -probably had a discussion at that time with Ribbentrop about this -matter, I tried to get at least an answer from Ribbentrop. This answer, -given to Funk, was to the effect that it was still too early for a step -of that sort. And that was my visit in 1940. Then I saw Hitler again in -February of 1941... - -DR. DIX: Pardon my interruption. So that we can avoid all -misunderstandings, if Hitler had given you permission that you could -have gone to America, just what would your activities have been? Tell us -very briefly. I want no misunderstanding. - -SCHACHT: First of all, I had not proposed going myself; I rather made a -general suggestion. But, naturally, I would have been very glad to go to -America for I saw a possibility... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think it is material to know what -he would have done if something had happened which did not happen. - -DR. DIX: I just wanted to preclude any misunderstanding. I said that -misunderstandings—Well let us drop the subject. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Then, let us go on to your second visit. - -SCHACHT: In 1941, in February, I called on Hitler once more because of a -private affair. The year before my wife had died and now I intended to -remarry. As Minister without Portfolio, which I still was, I naturally -had to inform the Reich Chancellor and head of the State of my intention -and I called on him for that reason. There was no political discussion -on this occasion. As I was going to the door, he asked me, “At one time -you had the intention, or you advised me, that someone should go to -America. It is probably too late for that, now.” I replied immediately, -“Of course, it is too late for that now.” And that was the only remark -of a political nature made. The conversation dealt mainly with my -marriage, and since then I did not see Hitler any more. - -DR. DIX: And now your relations with Göring? - -SCHACHT: I did not see Göring either since 1939. - -DR. DIX: Now, I am turning to a point which has been repeatedly stressed -by the Prosecution, that is, the propaganda value of your participation -at Party rallies, and I would like to remind you of what Mr. Justice -Jackson has already mentioned in his opening statement. I am translating -from the English because I have no German text: - - “Does anyone believe that Hjalmar Schacht, seated in the first - row at the Nazi Party Rally of 1935 and wearing the Party - emblem, was only included in the film for the purpose of making - an artistic effect? This great thinker, in lending his name to - this threadbare undertaking, gave it respectability in the eyes - of every hesitating German.” - -Will you please state your opinion on this? - -SCHACHT: First of all, I would like to make a few minor corrections. In -1935 I did not have a Party emblem. Secondly, Germans who were -hesitating were no longer of any importance in 1935, for Hitler’s -domination had been firmly established by 1935. There were only those -people who were turning away from Hitler but none who were still coming -to him. And then, I must really consider it as a compliment that I am -called a figure of importance, a great thinker, and so forth; but I -believe that the reasons for my being and working in the Hitler Cabinet -have been set forth by me in sufficient detail, so that I need not go -into that any more. - -The fact that in the first years especially I could not very well absent -myself from the Party rallies is understandable, I believe, for they -were Hitler’s principal display of show and ostentation for the outside -world, and not only did his ministers participate in the Party rallies -but also a great many other representative guests. - -May I add just a few more words? - -I stayed away from the later Party rallies. For example, the Party Rally -of 1935 mentioned by the Chief Prosecutor. That was the Party rally—and -this is why I happen to remember it—at which the Nuremberg Laws against -the Jews were proclaimed, and at the time I was not even in Nuremberg. - -I attended the Party Rally in 1933 and in 1934. I am not certain whether -I attended it in 1936 or 1937. I rather believe that I attended in 1936. -I was decidedly missing at the later rallies and the last visit that I -made at the Party Rally, which I have just mentioned, I attended only on -“Wehrmacht Day.” - -DR. DIX: At these Party Rallies were the prominent foreigners—you -already mentioned that. Was the Diplomatic Corps represented by the -chiefs of the diplomatic missions? - -SCHACHT: I believe that with the exception of the Soviet Ambassador, in -the course of years all other leading diplomats attended the Party -Rally, and I must say, in large numbers, with great ostentation and -seated in the first rows. - -DR. DIX: How did you explain that? The Diplomatic Corps only really -takes part in functions of State and this was a purely Party matter? How -was this participation explained? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think this is objectionable. If it please the -Tribunal, I am in a position to object, because I am not embarrassed by -it, if there is any embarrassment, but for this witness to explain the -conduct of the ambassadors of other countries seems utterly beyond -probative value. His opinion of what the ambassadors were doing, why -they attended a Party rally which he was lending his name to, doesn’t -seem to me has any probative value. The fact that they attended I don’t -object to, but it seems to me that for him to probe, unless he has some -fact—and I want to make clear I don’t object to any facts that this -witness knows, and I haven’t objected to most of his opinions which we -have been getting at great length. But I think for him to characterize -the action of foreign representatives is going beyond the pale of -relevant and material evidence. - -SCHACHT: May I make just one remark in reply? - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better pass on, Dr. Dix. - -DR. DIX: Yes, of course. However, I would ask to be given the permission -to answer Mr. Justice Jackson briefly, not because I want to be -stubborn, but I believe that if I answer now I can avoid later -discussions and can save time thereby. I did not ask the defendant for -his opinion. Of course Mr. Justice Jackson is right in saying that he is -not here to give opinions about the customs of the Diplomatic Corps; but -I asked him about a fact: How this participation on the part of the -Diplomatic Corps, which is significant, was explained at that time. I -consider this relevant, as will be seen more than once in the course of -my questioning, and that is why I am saying it now, that throughout his -and his political friends’ oppositional activities, it is of prime -importance to know who gave them moral, spiritual, or any other support, -and who did not support them. And thereby, of course, the outward -demeanor of the official representatives of foreign countries during the -whole period is of tremendous importance, with regard to the capacity of -this opposition group to act. One can support such a group; one can be -neutral to it, or one can also combat it from abroad. That is the only -reason why I put my question, and I deem myself obligated to consider -this angle of the problem also in the future. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I don’t think Mr. Justice Jackson’s objection -was to the fact that the diplomatic representatives were there but to -comment upon the reasons why they were there. If all you want to prove -is the fact that they were there, then I don’t think Mr. Justice Jackson -was objecting to that. What the defendant was going on to give, was his -opinion of why the diplomatic representatives were there. - -DR. DIX: I believe I do not need to make a further reply. He has already -said that he does not wish to give an explanation, but if Your Lordship -will permit me, I shall continue. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Around that time, you certainly came into -contact with prominent foreigners both officially and privately. What -position did they take towards the trend of events at the time the -National Socialists consolidated their power? And how did their attitude -influence your own attitude and activity? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal! I dislike to interrupt -with objections, but I can’t see how it exonerates or aids this -defendant, that prominent foreigners may have been deceived by a regime -for which he was furnishing the window dressings with his own name and -prestige. Undoubtedly there were foreigners, I am willing to stipulate -there were foreigners, like Dahlerus, who were deceived by this set-up -of which he was a prominent and slightly respectable part. But it does -seem to me that if we are going to go into the attitude of foreigners -who are not indicted here or accused that we approach endless questions. - -I see no relevance in this sort of testimony. - -The question is here, as I have tried to point out to Dr. Dix, the sole -thing that is charged against this defendant is that he participated in -the conspiracy to put this nation into war and to carry out the War -Crimes and Crimes against Humanity incidental to it. - -Now, I can’t see how the attitude of foreigners either exonerates or -helps the Court to decide that question. If it does, of course I don’t -object to it, but I can’t see the importance of it at this stage. - -DR. DIX: I do believe that Mr. Justice Jackson... - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Dr. Dix, what exactly was the question -that you were asking at that moment? What had it reference to? - -DR. DIX: I asked the witness what the attitude was that was taken by -prominent foreigners with whom he came into contact at that time, -officially and privately during the period that the regime consolidated -its power. Did they reject the regime, or were they sympathetic to it? -In other words, just how far did these foreigners influence him and his -thinking? And may I... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you know, Dr. Dix, that to ask one witness what -the attitude of other people is is a very much too general form of -question. Attitude—what does the word mean? It is far too general, and -I do not understand exactly what you are trying to prove. - -DR. DIX: I will make the question more precise. - -How, Dr. Schacht, through your exchange of thoughts with foreigners, was -your personal attitude influenced? How was your attitude and your -activity influenced through the attitude of these foreigners? - -[_Turning to the Tribunal._] That is something which Dr. Schacht can -testify to alone, because it is of an intimate nature and personal to -Schacht. Your Lordship, I want quite openly to state the point to be -proved which seems very relevant to the Defense and on which this -question is based. I do not wish to conceal anything. - -I, the Defense, maintain that this oppositional group—about which -Gisevius has already spoken, and of which Schacht was a prominent -member—that this group not only received no support from abroad, but -that foreigners rendered the opposition more difficult. That is not a -criticism that is leveled towards foreign governments. - -There is no doubt that the representatives of these countries took that -attitude in good faith and with a sense of duty in the service of their -countries. But it was of decisive value for the attitude of these men of -this oppositional group what position the foreign countries took to this -regime; whether they respected or whether they supported it by -precedence given its representatives, socially, as far as possible, or, -through caution and reserve, showed their disinclination to it, thereby -strengthening this oppositional group. - -This evidence is of the utmost importance to me in the carrying on of -the defense. I have stated it quite openly, and, as much as I can, I -will fight for this piece of evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal has considered the argument which -you have presented to it and they think that the investigation of these -facts is a waste of time and is irrelevant. They will, therefore, ask -you to go on with the further examination of the defendant. - -DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, you supported the rearmament through financing by -the Reichsbank. Why did you do that? - -SCHACHT: I considered that Germany absolutely had to have political -equality with other nations, and I am of the same opinion today; and in -order to reach this state, it was necessary that either the general -disarmament which had been promised by the Allied powers would come into -effect, or that if equal rights were to be obtained Germany would have -to rearm on a corresponding scale. - -DR. DIX: Was this financial help by the Reichsbank your work alone or -was that decreed through the Directorate of the Reichsbank? - -SCHACHT: In the Reichsbank, the Leadership Principle was never applied; -I rejected the Leadership Principle for the Reichsbank. The Reichsbank -was governed by a group of men all of whom had an equal power to vote -and if there was a “tie,” the vote of the chairman was the decisive -vote, and beyond that the chairman had no rights in this board. - -DR. DIX: You are familiar with the affidavit of the former Reichsbank -Director Puhl. Did—I put the question taking into consideration the -contents of this affidavit with which the Tribunal is acquainted—Puhl -also participate in giving financial help from the Reichsbank for -rearmament? - -SCHACHT: Herr Puhl participated in all decisions which were made by the -Reichsbank Directorate on this question and not once did he oppose the -decision reached. - -DR. DIX: It is known to you that the Reichsbank’s method of financing -consisted in the discounting of the so-called mefo bills. The -Prosecution have discussed this fact in detail and the afore-mentioned -affidavit signed by Puhl says that this method made it possible to keep -the extent of rearmament secret. Is that correct? - -SCHACHT: We cannot even talk about keeping the armament a secret. I call -your attention to some excerpts from documents presented and submitted -by the Prosecution themselves as exhibits. I quote first of all from the -affidavit by George Messersmith, dated 30 August 1945, Document Number -2385-PS, where it says on Page 3, Line 19: “Immediately after the Nazis -came into power they started a vast rearmament program.” And on Page 8 -it says: “The huge German armament program which was never a secret....” - -Thus, Mr. George Messersmith, who was in Berlin at the time, knew about -these matters and I am sure, informed his colleagues also. - -I continue quoting from Document Number EC-461. It is the diary of -Ambassador Dodd, where it says, under 19 September 1934, and I quote in -English for I just have the English text before me: - - “When Schacht declared that the Germans are not arming so - intensively, I said: Last January and February Germany bought - from American aircraft people one million dollars worth of - high-class war flying machinery and paid in gold.” - -This is from a conversation between Dodd and myself which took place in -September 1934 and he points out that already in January and February -1934 war aircraft... - -[_The proceedings were interrupted by technical difficulties in the -lighting system._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know how long you expect to be -with your examination-in-chief of the defendant. You have already been -nearly a whole day, and the Tribunal think, in view of the directions in -the Charter, that the examination of the defendant ought to finish -certainly in a day. - -DR. DIX: Your Lordship, there are two things I do not like to do, to -make prophecies which do not come true and to make a promise I cannot -keep. - -May I answer the question by saying that I consider it quite impossible -for me to finish today. I am fully aware of the rules of the Charter, -but on the other hand I am asking you to consider that the Prosecution -have tried to prove the accusations against Schacht by numerous pieces -of evidence, directly and indirectly relevant facts, and that it is my -duty to deal with these individual pieces of evidence offered by the -Prosecution. - -Please apply strict measures to my questions and if the Tribunal should -be of the opinion that there is something irrelevant, then I shall -certainly adhere to their ruling. However, I do think that I have not -only the right, but also the duty to put any questions which are -necessary to refute the evidence submitted by the Prosecution. - -I shall, therefore, certainly not be able to finish today. I think—I -should be extremely grateful if you would not make me prophesy, it may -go faster and tomorrow I may finish in the course of the day but it may -even take the whole day—I cannot say for certain. In any case, I shall -make every effort to put only relevant questions. If the Tribunal should -be of the opinion that something is not relevant, I ask to be told so -after I have explained my standpoint. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you had better get on at once then, Dr. Dix, and -we’ll tell you when we think your questions are too long or too -irrelevant. - -DR. DIX: Now, Dr. Schacht, we were considering the mefo bills, did you -consider them as a suitable means of keeping the rearmament secret? Have -you anything else to say to that question? - -SCHACHT: The mefo bills as such, as far as rearmament was concerned, had -of course no connection with the question of secrecy, for the mefo bills -were used to pay every supplier. And there were, of course, hundreds and -thousands of small and big suppliers all over the country. - -Apart from that, before they could be taken to the Reichsbank, the mefo -bills circulated among the public for at least 3 months and the -suppliers who required cash used the mefo bills to discount them in -their banks or to have advances made on the strength of them, so that -all banks participated in this system. - -But I should like to add also that all the mefo bills, which were taken -up by the Reichsbank, were listed on the bill account of the Reichsbank. -Furthermore, I should like to say that the keeping secret of State -expenditure—and armament expenditures were State expenditure—was not a -matter for the President of the Reichsbank but an affair concerning the -Reich Minister of Finance. If the Reich Minister of Finance did not -publish the guarantees which he had accepted for the mefo bills, then -that was his affair and not mine. I am not responsible for that. The -responsibility for that lies with the Reich Minister of Finance. - -DR. DIX: The next question, Your Lordship, might arouse doubts as to its -relevancy. I personally consider it irrelevant for the verdict in this -Trial. However, it has been mentioned by the Prosecution, and for that -reason alone I think it is my duty to give Dr. Schacht an opportunity to -reply and to justify himself. - -The Prosecution have represented the view that the financing by means of -mefo bills, from the point of view of a solid financial procedure, was -also very hazardous. One might adopt the view that that may have been -the case or not to make this verdict... - -THE PRESIDENT: Ask the question, Dr. Dix, ask the question. - -DR. DIX: You have heard what I have in mind. - -SCHACHT: It goes without saying that in normal times and under normal -economic conditions such means as mefo bills would not have been -resorted to. But if there is an emergency, then it has always been -customary, and it has always been a policy recommended by all experts, -that the issuing bank should furnish cheap money and credits so that the -economic system can, in turn, continue to function. - -Mefo bills, of course, were a thoroughly risky operation, but they were -absolutely not risky if they were connected with a reasonable financial -procedure and to prove this I would say that if Herr Hitler, after 1937, -had used the accruing funds to pay back the mefo bills, as had been -intended—the money was available—then this system would have come to -its end just as smoothly as I had put it in operation. But Herr Hitler -preferred simply to refuse to pay the bills back, and instead to invest -the money in further armament. I could not foresee that someone would -break his word in such a matter too, a purely business matter. - -DR. DIX: But, if the Reich had met the bills and had paid, then means -would no doubt have partly been lacking for further rearmaments and the -taking up of the bills would therefore have curtailed armament. Is that -a correct conclusion? - -SCHACHT: That, of course, was the very purpose of my wanting to -terminate the procedure. I said if the mefo bills were not met, it would -obviously show ill-will; then there would be further rearming, and that -cannot be. - -DR. DIX: Earlier you briefly dealt with the question of keeping armament -secret in another connection. Have you anything to add to that? - -SCHACHT: I think in a general manner it must be realized that State -expenditures do not come under the jurisdiction of the President of the -Reichsbank, and that the expenses and receipts of the State are under -the control of the Reich Minister of Finance, and consequently the -responsibility lies in his hands and it is his duty to publish the -figures. Every bill which the Reichsbank had in its possession was made -known every week. - -DR. DIX: Is that what you have to add to your answer to the basic -question of allegedly keeping the armament program secret? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -DR. DIX: You have also already explained on the side why you -fundamentally were in favor of rearmament. Have you anything to add to -that? - -SCHACHT: Yes. A few very important remarks are, of course, to be made on -that and since this question concerns the chief accusation against me, I -may perhaps deal with it in greater detail. - -I considered an unarmed Germany in the center of Europe, surrounded by -armed nations, as a menace to peace. I want to say that these states -were not only armed but that they were, to a very large part, continuing -to arm and arming anew. Especially two states which had not existed -before, Czechoslovakia and Poland, were beginning to arm, and England, -for example, was continuing to rearm, specifically with reference to her -naval rearmament in 1935, _et cetera_. - -I should like to say quite briefly that I myself was of the opinion that -a country which was not armed could not defend itself, and that -consequently it would have no voice in the concert of nations. The -British Prime Minister Baldwin once said, in 1935: - - “A country which is not willing to take necessary precautionary - measures for its own defense will never have power in this - world, neither moral power nor material power.” - -I considered the inequality of status between the countries surrounding -Germany and Germany as a permanent moral and material danger to Germany. - -I further want to point out—and this is not meant to be criticism, but -merely a statement of fact—that Germany, after the Treaty of -Versailles, was in a state of extreme disorganization and confusion. -Conditions in Europe were such that, for example, a latent conflict and -controversy existed between Russia and Finland and between Russia and -Poland which had considerable parts of Russian territory. There was -Russia’s latent conflict with Romania which had Bessarabia, and then -Romania had a conflict with Bulgaria about the Dobruja and one with -Hungary about Siebenbürgen. There were conflicts between Serbia and -Hungary, and between Hungary and nearly all her neighbors and between -Bulgaria and Greece. In short all of Eastern Europe was in a continuous -state of mutual suspicion and conflict of interests. - -In addition, there was the fact that in a number of countries there were -most serious internal conflicts. I remind you of the conflict between -the Czechs and the Slovaks. I remind you of the civil war conditions in -Spain. All that will make it possible to understand that I considered it -absolutely essential that in the event of the outbreak of any -conflagration in this devil’s punch bowl, it was an absolute necessity -for Germany to protect at least her neutral attitude. That could not -possibly be done with that small army of 100,000 men. For that an -adequate army had to be created. - -Here in prison I accidentally came across an edition of the _Daily -Mail_, dated April 1937, where the conditions in Europe were described, -and I beg you to allow me to quote one single sentence. I shall have to -quote it in English. It does not represent the views of the _Daily -Mail_; it only describes conditions in Europe. - -I quote: - - “All observers are agreed that there is continual peril of an - explosion and that the crazy frontiers of the peace treaties - cannot be indefinitely maintained. Here, too, rigorous - non-interference should be the King of the British chariot. What - vital interests have we in Austria or in Czechoslovakia, or in - Romania, or in Lithuania or Poland?” - -This merely describes the seething state of Europe at that time, and in -this overheated boiling pot which was always on the point of exploding, -there was Germany, unarmed. I considered that a most serious danger to -my country. - -Now, I shall probably be asked whether I considered Germany threatened -in any way. No, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I did not consider Germany -threatened directly with an attack, nor was I of the opinion that Russia -was likely to attack Germany. However, for example, we had experienced -the invasion of the Ruhr in 1923 and these past events and the actual -situation made it imperative for me to demand equality for Germany and -to support a policy that would attempt to achieve this. - -I assume that we shall deal with the reasons for the carrying out of the -rearmament and with the reaction of foreign countries, _et cetera_. - -DR. DIX: What did you know at the time about Germany’s efforts to cause -the other nations to disarm? Did that have anything to do with your -decisions? - -SCHACHT: Let me tell you the following: - -Fundamentally, I was not in favor of rearmament. I only wanted equality -for Germany. That German equality could be brought about either by means -of disarmament on the part of the other nations or by our own -rearmament. I would have preferred, in fact I desired disarmament on the -part of the others, which anyway had been promised to us. Consequently I -most zealously tried all along for years to prevent a rearmament, if -general disarmament could be brought about. - -The disarmament on the part of the others did not take place, although -the Disarmament Committee of the League of Nations had repeatedly -declared that Germany had met her obligations regarding disarmament. - -To all of us who were members of the so-called National Government at -the time, and to all Germans who participated in political life, it was -a considerable relief that during the first years Hitler, again and -again, strove for and suggested general disarmament. Afterwards, of -course, it is easy to say that that was a false pretense and a lie on -Hitler’s part, but that false pretense and that lie would have blown up -quite quickly if the countries abroad had shown the slightest -inclination to take up these suggestions. - -I remember quite well what was told Foreign Minister Eden of Great -Britain when he visited Germany at the beginning of 1934, because I was -present at the social festivities. Quite concrete proposals concerning -Germany’s obligations in all disarmament questions, in case disarmament -on the part of the others was begun and carried out, were made to him. -It was promised to Eden that all so-called half-military units, like the -SS, the SA, and the Hitler Youth, would be deprived of their military -character if only the general disarmament could be accelerated by those -means. - -I could produce a number of quotations regarding these offers to disarm, -but since it is the wish of the President not to delay the proceedings, -I can forego that. They are all well-known statements made by statesmen -and ministers, ambassadors, and such, all of which have the same tenor, -namely, that it was absolutely essential that the promise made by the -Allies should be kept; in other words, that disarmament should be -carried out. - -DR. DIX: Excuse me if I interrupt you, but we can do it more quickly and -more simply by asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of Exhibit -Number Schacht-12, which I have been granted, without my reading it, -Page 31 of the English translation of my document book. These are -pertinent remarks and speeches made by Lord Cecil and others, by the -Belgian Foreign Minister, _et cetera_. There is no need to read them; -they can be presented. I just hear that they have been presented, and I -can refer to them. - -Pardon me, please. Continue. - -SCHACHT: Well, in that case I am finished with my statement. Hitler made -still further offers but the other countries did not take up a single -one of these offers, and thus, unfortunately, only one alternative -remained, and that was rearmament. That rearmament carried out by Hitler -was financed with my assistance, and I assume responsibility for -everything I have done in that connection. - -DR. DIX: Do I understand you correctly? Can one draw the conclusion from -your statement that there were other reasons for your assistance in the -rearmament program, that you had the tactical consideration that, by -putting German rearmament up for discussion, the debate on disarmament -amongst the other governments might be started again? This debate, so to -say, had died down? - -SCHACHT: If I may, I will illustrate it briefly by means of an example: - -Two parties have a contract with each other. One party does not live up -to that contract, and the other party has no way of making him fulfill -his obligations. Thus the other party can do nothing except, in turn, -not adhere to the contract. That is what Germany did. That is what I -supported. Now, of course, I must say that I had expected a type of -reaction which in such a case must always be expected from the partner -to a contract, namely, that he would say, “Well, if you do not keep up -the contract either, then we shall have to discuss this contract again.” - -I must say—and I can quite safely use the word—it was a disappointment -to me that Germany’s rearmament was not in any way replied to by any -actions from the Allies. This so-called breach of contract on Germany’s -part against the Versailles Treaty was taken quite calmly. A note of -protest was all; nothing in the least was done, apart from that, to -bring up again the question of disarmament in which I was interested. - -Not only was Germany allowed to go on rearming but the Naval Agreement -with Great Britain did, in fact, give Germany the legal right to rearm -contrary to the Versailles Treaty. Military missions were sent to -Germany to look at this rearmament, and German military displays were -visited and everything else was done, but nothing at all was done to -stop Germany’s rearmament. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If the Tribunal please, I cannot see the point of -all this detail. We have conceded that rearmament here, except as it was -involved with aggressive purposes, is immaterial. As I said in the -opening, the United States does not care to try here the issues of -European politics, nor are they submitted to this Tribunal for decision. - -The sole question here is the Indictment, charging arming with the -purpose of aggression. - -I do not want to interfere with the defendant giving any facts that bear -on his aggressive intentions, but the details of negotiations, of -European politics and charges and countercharges between governments, it -seems to me, lies way back of any inquiry that we could possibly make, -and the details of this matter seem to me not helpful to the solution of -the issues here, and I think was ruled out by the Tribunal in the case -of Göring, if I am not mistaken. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Dix, it all seems to be a matter of argument, -and argument isn’t really the subject of evidence. - -DR. DIX: I do not believe so, Your Lordship. What Mr. Justice Jackson -said is quite correct. Schacht is accused of having assisted in bringing -about an aggressive war, but this assistance of his is supposed to have -consisted in the financing which he carried out. - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Dix, and do try to make it as short as -possible. - -DR. DIX: I think you had come to the end of that question anyway. - -May I refer in this connection to one of the motives for Dr. Schacht’s -assistance in rearmament. It was his hope to renew the debate on -disarmament. May I draw your attention to Exhibit Number Schacht-36, -Page 141 of the German text, and Page 149 of the English text? It is an -affidavit from Dr. Schacht’s son-in-law, Dr. Von Scherpenberg. On Page 2 -of that affidavit you will find the following brief paragraph which I -propose to read; in fact, I can confine myself to one sentence: - - “He”—that is to say, Schacht—“considered rearmament within - certain limits to be the only means for the re-establishing of - the disturbed equilibrium and the only means of inducing the - other European powers to participate in a limitation of - armaments which, in opposition to the Versailles Treaty, they - had sought to avoid.” - -That is a statement of Scherpenberg regarding conversations which -Schacht had had at that time. It is, therefore, not an _ex post facto_ -opinion; it is the report of a conversation which he, Scherpenberg, had -with his father-in-law Schacht at that time. That is just an additional -remark I wanted to make. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] You have spoken about the rearmament on -the part of the other states, particularly Czechoslovakia and Poland, -but can you tell us whether at the time you knew of or heard any exact -details regarding the state of armament of those two states? - -SCHACHT: I know only that it was known about Russia that in 1935 she -announced that her peacetime army should be increased to 960,000 men. - -Then I knew that in Czechoslovakia, for instance, the installation of -airdromes was one of the leading tasks of rearmament. We knew that Great -Britain’s Navy was to be stepped up. - -DR. DIX: Did you later on completely abandon your idea of general -disarmament? - -SCHACHT: To the contrary, I used every opportunity, in particular during -conversations with men from abroad, to say that the aim should always be -disarmament, that, of course, rearmament would always mean an economic -burden for us, which we considered a most unpleasant state of affairs. - -I remember a conversation which I had with the American Ambassador -Davies. His report of this conversation is incorporated in an exhibit -that has been submitted to the Tribunal. It is an entry in a diary which -is repeated in his book, _Mission to Moscow_, and it is dated as early -as 20 June 1937, Berlin. He is writing about the fact that among other -things he and I had talked about disarmament problems, and I need only -quote one sentence. I do not have the number of the document, Your -Lordship, but it has been submitted to the Tribunal. - -DR. DIX: It is Exhibit Schacht-18, German Page 43, English Page 49. - -SCHACHT: Since I have only the English text, I shall read from it. - -Davies writes: - - “When I outlined the President’s (Roosevelt) suggestion of - limitation of armament to defensive weapons only, such as a man - could carry on his shoulder, he (means Schacht) almost jumped - out of his seat with enthusiasm.” - -It becomes clear, therefore, from Ambassador Davies’ remark that I was -most enthusiastic about this renewed attempt and the possibility of an -imminent step towards disarmament as proposed by President Roosevelt. - -In this same book, Davies reports a few days later on 26 June 1937 about -the conversation he had with me, in a letter addressed to the President -of the United States. I quote only one very brief paragraph—in English -again: - - “I then stated to him (that is, Schacht) that the President in - conversation with me had analyzed the European situation and had - considered that a solution might be found in an agreement among - the European nations to a reduction of armaments to a purely - defensive military basis and this through the elimination of - aircraft, tanks, and heavy equipment, and the limitation of - armaments to such weapons only as a man could carry on his back, - with an agreement among the nations for adequate policing of the - plan by a neutral state. Schacht literally jumped at the idea. - He said: ‘That’s absolutely the solution.’ He said that in its - simplicity it had the earmarks of great genius. His enthusiasm - was extraordinary.” - -DR. DIX: To what extent did you want rearmament? - -SCHACHT: Not beyond equality with every single one of our neighbor -states. - -DR. DIX: And did Hitler talk to you of far-reaching intentions, or did -you hear of any? - -SCHACHT: At no time did he tell them to me, nor did I hear from anyone -else, whether he had made remarks about further intentions. - -DR. DIX: Were you informed about the extent, the type and speed of -rearmament? - -SCHACHT: No, I was never told about that. - -DR. DIX: Had you set yourself a limit regarding this financing or were -you prepared to advance any amount of money? - -SCHACHT: I was certainly, by no means, ready to advance any unlimited -amount of money, particularly as these were not contributions; they were -credits which had to be repaid. The limits for these credits were -twofold. One was that the Reichsbank was independent of the State -finance administration, and the supreme authority of the State as far as -the granting of the credits was concerned. The Board of Directors of the -Reichsbank could pass a resolution that credits were to be given, or -were not to be given, or that credits were to be stopped, if they -considered it right, and as I was perfectly certain of the policy of the -Board of Directors of the Reichsbank—all of these gentlemen agreed with -me perfectly on financial and banking policy—this was the first -possibility of applying a brake, if I considered it necessary. - -The second safeguard—limit was contained in the agreement which the -Minister of Finance, the Government, and of course Hitler had made—the -mefo bills, of which these credits consisted, were to be paid back when -they expired. They were repayable after 5 years, and I have already said -that if the repayments had been made, funds for rearmament would -naturally have had to decrease. Therein lay the second possibility of -limiting the rearmament. - -DR. DIX: Will you please give now to the Tribunal the figures which you -were dealing with at the time? - -SCHACHT: We went up to... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We have no desire to enter into controversy about -the figures of financing rearmament. It seems that the detail of dollars -and cents or Reichsmarks is unimportant to this, and terribly involved. -We aren’t trying whether it cost too much or too little; the purpose of -this rearmament is the only question we have in mind. I don’t see that -the statistics of cost have anything to do with it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, we would like to know what figures the accused -and you are talking about. - -DR. DIX: The amounts that Schacht as President of the Reichsbank was -ready to grant for the rearmament program; that, no doubt, is relevant, -because if those amounts remained within such limits as might possibly -be considered adequate for defensive rearmaments in case of emergency, -then, of course, the extent of that financial assistance is a very -important piece of evidence regarding the intentions which Schacht was -pursuing at the time. That is the very thing that, in the case of -Schacht, Mr. Justice Jackson considers relevant, namely, whether he -helped prepare for an aggressive war. If he were considering only the -possibility of a defensive war in his financing and placed only sums at -the disposal of the rearmament program which would never have allowed an -aggressive war, then that would refute the accusation raised by the -Prosecution against the defendant, and I think that the relevance of -that question cannot be doubted. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that if the Defendant Schacht placed at -the disposal of the Reich, say, 100 millions, or whatever the figure is, -it would be defensive, and if he placed 150 millions, it would be not -defensive, or what? Is it simply the amount? - -DR. DIX: No, I want to say that if, as will be proved, he only wanted to -give 9 and later on gave hesitatingly and unwillingly 12 millions for -the purpose, then that contribution can never have been aimed at an -aggressive war. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is simply the amount? - -DR. DIX: Yes, only the size of the amount. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, that can be stated very shortly, but as for details -of finance... - -DR. DIX: I am also of the opinion that we have talked about it too long. -I was only going to ask, “What amount did you give?” and then the -objection was raised, and thus the discussion was drawn out. May I put -the question? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Well, then, what amount did you -intend to grant? - -SCHACHT: Naturally as little as possible; however, what I contributed is -what is decisive. I placed at their disposal—to give one figure and to -be very brief—until 31 March 1938, credits amounting to a total of -12,000,000,000 Reichsmark. I have discussed that with one of the -interrogators of the British Prosecution, who asked me about the -subject, and I replied that that was about one-third of the amount which -was spent on rearmament. After that, without the Reichsbank, beginning -with 1 April 1938, the figure stated in that budget year for rearmament -was 11,000,000,000, and in the subsequent year, 20,500,000,000, and of -that not a pfennig came from the Reichsbank. - -DR. DIX: That was after your resignation, was it not? - -SCHACHT: That was after I had stopped credits. - -For the record I should like to say that I think I made a mistake -before. I said millions instead of milliards, but I think it is obvious -what I meant. I wanted only to correct it. - -DR. DIX: Now, then, Dr. Schacht, the Prosecution have stated that on 19 -February 1935 the Ministry of Finance received authority to borrow -unlimited amounts of money if Hitler ordered them to do so. - -SCHACHT: Here, again, the prosecutor did not see things in the proper -light. The President of the Reichsbank is not responsible for the -actions of the Reich Minister of Finance. I think the President of the -Federal Reserve Bank in New York can hardly be held responsible for the -things done by the Secretary of the Treasury in Washington. - -DR. DIX: You have also been accused that the debt of the Reich increased -three times during the time while you were President of the Reichsbank. - -SCHACHT: I might just as well be accused of being responsible for the -fact that the birth rate in Germany rose sharply during the time I was -President of the Reichsbank. I want to emphasize the fact that I had -nothing to do with either. - -DR. DIX: You were not responsible for the same reason. - -SCHACHT: No, of course I am not responsible for that. - -DR. DIX: And presumably the same applies to the point made by the -Prosecution that you allegedly drafted a new finance program in 1938? - -SCHACHT: On the contrary, I refused to do anything else for the -financing of rearmament; the finance program was drafted by a state -secretary in the Reich Finance Ministry, and it looked like it. - -DR. DIX: One of your economic policies, during the time you were -Minister of Economy, and which you have been accused of as being a -preparation for war, was the so-called “New Plan” (Neue Plan). What was -that? - -SCHACHT: May I first of all say that the New Plan had nothing at all to -do with rearmament. Germany, after the Treaty of Versailles, had fallen -into a state of distress, economically speaking and especially export... - -DR. DIX: Your Lordship, if the Tribunal is of the opinion that the New -Plan has nothing to do with the rearmament and preparations for war—I -think the Prosecution are of the opposite opinion—then, of course, the -question is irrelevant, and I will drop it. I am only putting it because -the New Plan has been used in the argumentation of the Prosecution. - -THE PRESIDENT: If you say, and the defendant has just said that the New -Plan had nothing to do with rearmament, I think you might leave it for -cross-examination and you can raise it again in re-examination if it is -cross-examined. - -DR. DIX [_Turning to the defendant_]: In that case I shall not ask you -about the barter agreements, either. I shall leave it to the Prosecution -to bring it out during the cross-examination. I cannot see what it has -to do with the preparation for war. - -Now, you have already stated that you strove to remove the Versailles -Treaty by means of peaceful negotiations, or at least, to modify it. In -the opinion which you held at that time did any such means for a -peaceful modification of the Versailles Treaty still exist? - -SCHACHT: In my opinion, there were no means other than peaceful ones. -The desire to modify the Versailles Treaty by means of a new war was a -crime. - -DR. DIX: Well. But now you are being accused that the alleged -preparations for war, which really were a countermeasure to the general -rearmament although not a preparation for an aggressive war, were -nevertheless a rearmament, and as such, were an infringement of the -Treaty of Versailles. I assume that you, at the time, decided to help -finance that rearmament only after giving the problem due legal and -moral considerations. What, exactly, were these considerations? - -SCHACHT: I think I have already answered that question in detail. I need -add nothing else. - -DR. DIX: Very well. Insofar as you know, was this attitude of yours, the -attitude of a pacifist and of someone who was definitely opposed to the -extension of living space in Europe, known abroad? - -SCHACHT: As long as I have been President of the Reichsbank, that is to -say from March 1933—and I am, of course, only talking about the Hitler -regime—my friends and acquaintances abroad were fully informed about my -attitude and views. I had a great many friends and acquaintances abroad, -not only because of my profession but also outside of that and -particularly in Basel, Switzerland, where we had our monthly meeting at -the International Bank, with all the presidents of the issuing banks of -all the great and certain neutral countries, and I always took occasion -at all these meetings to describe quite clearly the situation in Germany -to these gentlemen. - -Perhaps I may at this point refer to the so-called conducting of foreign -conferences or conversations. If one is not allowed to talk to -foreigners any more, then one cannot, of course, reach an understanding -with them. Those silly admonitions, that one had to avoid contact with -foreigners, seem entirely uncalled for to me, and if the witness -Gisevius deemed it necessary the other day to protect his dead comrades, -who were my comrades too, from being accused of committing high treason, -then I should like to say that I consider it quite unnecessary. Never at -any time did any member of our group betray any German interests. To the -contrary, he fought for the interests of Germany, and to prove that, I -should like to give you a good example: - -After we had occupied Paris, the files of the Quai d’Orsay were -confiscated and were carefully screened by officials from the German -Foreign Office. I need not assure you that they were primarily looking -for proof whether there were not any so-called defeatists circles in -Germany which had unmasked themselves somewhere abroad. All the files of -the Quai d’Orsay referring to my person and, of course, there were -records of many discussions which I had had with Frenchmen, were -examined by the Foreign Office officials at that time, without my -knowing it. - -One day—I think it probably happened in the course of 1941—I received -a letter from a German professor who had participated in this search -carried out by the Foreign Office. I shall mention the name so that, if -necessary, he can testify. He is a Professor of Finance and National -Economy, Professor Stückenbeck of Erlangen, and he wrote me that at this -investigation... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal cannot see any point in this, so far as this -Trial is concerned. In any event, if the defendant says that he did not, -in any way, give away the interests of Germany, surely that is -sufficient. We do not need all the details about it. What it has got to -do with this Trial, I do not know. - -DR. DIX: I think, Your Lordship, that that was not the point of the -statement. What he wants to say is that reliable men abroad knew him and -were acquainted with the fact that he was certainly a man of peace and -not a man who prepared aggressive wars, and that applies even to the -period of rearmament. - -THE PRESIDENT: But he said that 5 minutes ago. - -DR. DIX: I do not think the question of Professor Stückenbeck is so -important, but it certainly seems pertinent to me what Ambassador Davies -said about his conversation with the then Foreign Commissar of the -Soviet Republic, Litvinov. This is contained in Exhibit Schacht-18 of my -document book. It is Page 43 of the German text, and Page 49 of the -English text. May I read one paragraph, and then ask Dr. Schacht briefly -whether that statement of Ambassador Davies corresponds to his -recollection? It is Davies’ report, an extract from his book _Mission to -Moscow_. A report is there to the Secretary of State in the United -States. The passage is on Pages 108 and 109. - - “Pursuant to an appointment made, I called upon Commissar for - Foreign Affairs Litvinov to present my respects before departure - for the United States. - - “I then stated that the European situation in its elementals - looked simple and that it was difficult to understand why the - statesmanship of Europe could not provide that England, France, - Germany, Italy, and Russia should agree to preserve the - territorial integrity of Europe and through trade agreements - provide Germany with raw materials, thereby giving the assurance - that she could live, which would relieve the peoples of Europe - and the world of these terrific burdens of armament and of the - fear of catastrophic war. The prompt rejoinder was: ‘Do you - think Hitler would ever agree to anything like that?’ I said - that I did not know, but that it was my opinion that there was a - very substantial body of influential and responsible men in - Germany that such an idea would appeal to. Litvinov replied that - he thought that might be so; that Schacht was of that type; he - did not think they could prevail against Hitler and the - political and military forces dominant in Germany.” - -And now I ask you, do you remember that conversation with Davies? - -SCHACHT: I think there must be a mistake. I did not speak to Davies -about this, I spoke to Litvinov. This is a report of Davies to the -Secretary of State, about which I did not know. - -DR. DIX: Yes, you are perfectly right. - -It has been repeatedly emphasized by the Prosecution that your knowledge -of Hitler’s intentions of war resulted also from your being -Plenipotentiary for War Economy and a member of the Reich Defense -Counsel. Göring has made a detailed statement on it. Have you anything -new to add to Göring’s statement? - -SCHACHT: I think the witness Lammers has also talked about it. I should -like merely to confirm that the first Reich Defense Counsel of 1935 was -nothing other than the legalization of a committee which existed before -1933, made up of ministerial officials who were supposed to deal with -economic measures as well as administrative measures, which might have -to be taken in the event of a threat of war against Germany. - -DR. DIX: How often did you have a meeting especially with the Minister -of War and the Plenipotentiary for Administration? - -SCHACHT: This famous triumvirate, this Three Man College described by -one of the prosecutors as the cornerstone of war policy, never met at -all, and it is no wonder that we lost the war, if that was the -cornerstone. - -DR. DIX: The Prosecution have also referred to the report of the -Ministry of War regarding the task of the Reich Defense Counsel of 1934. -It is Document Number EC-128, Exhibit Number USA-623. Have you anything -in particular to add to that? - -SCHACHT: Yes, I should like to have permission to quote one very brief -paragraph. I see there are only two sentences. This report contains the -following statement: - -Referring to the experiences of World War I, that is 1914 to 1918, and I -quote—I shall have to do it in English since I have only the English, I -quote: - - “At that time we were able to extend our bases for raw materials - and production toward the West: Longwy, Briey, Tourcoing, - Roubaix, Antwerp (textiles), and toward the East, Lodz, and - Southeast (ore mines in Serbia and Turkey, mineral oils in - Romania). Today we have to reckon with the possibility of being - thrown back in our own country and even of being deprived - thereby of most valuable industrial and raw material in the West - and in the East.” - -I think that if anyone wanting to prepare an aggressive war had -calculated in September 1934 that one would have to protect oneself -against the possibility of such a situation arising, that this is the -best proof that there can be no question of an aggressive war at all. - -DR. DIX: In that connection, under the heading of “peaceful efforts,” -can you perhaps also tell the Tribunal what your peaceful efforts were, -to have the reparations clauses of the Versailles Treaty modified or -even abolished? - -SCHACHT: From the very first moment, after the reparations were -determined in 1921 or so, I fought against this nonsense with the -argument that the carrying out of those reparations would throw the -entire world into economic chaos. One cannot, during one generation, pay -120,000,000,000 Reichsmark or about 2,000,000,000 Reichsmark yearly, as -at that time... - -DR. DIX: We would like to make it brief. Will you please talk only about -your peaceful efforts and not about national economy? - -SCHACHT: All right, I will not talk about national economy. - -I fought against it and, as time went by, I did succeed in convincing -the people of almost all the countries that this was sheer nonsense. -Therefore in July of 1932, if I am not mistaken, the then Reich -Chancellor Papen was in a position to affix his signature to an -agreement at Lausanne, which reduced reparations, _de jure_, to a -pending sum of 3,000,000,000, and which, _de facto_, canceled -reparations altogether. - -DR. DIX: Did you then continue your definitely peaceful efforts in other -fields? You have already touched upon the negotiations in Paris -regarding the colonial question. I wonder if you have anything to add to -that in this connection? - -SCHACHT: I do not remember at the moment how far I had gone at the time, -but I think I reported on the negotiations in detail, so I need not -repeat. - -DR. DIX: George Messersmith, the often-mentioned former Consul General -of the United States in Berlin, states in his affidavit Document Number -EC-451, Exhibit Number USA-626, to which the Prosecution have referred, -that he is of the opinion that the National Socialist regime could not -have been in a position to stay in power and build up its war machine if -it had not been for your activity. At the end of the case for the -Prosecution, the Prosecution present that thesis of Messersmith. -Therefore I should like you to make a statement on this subject. - -SCHACHT: I do not know whether that completely unsubstantiated private -opinion of Mr. Messersmith has any value as evidence. Nevertheless, I -should like to contradict it by means of a few figures. I had stated -earlier that until 31 March 1938, the Reichsbank had given -12,000,000,000; that is to say, during the first fiscal year, about -2,250,000,000, and during the subsequent 3 years, 3,250,000,000 per -annum. During those years—the Codefendant Keitel was asked about that -when he was examined here—the armament expenditures, as Keitel said, -amounted to the following: - -In the fiscal year 1935-1936—5,000,000,000. - -In the fiscal year 1936-1937—7,000,000,000. - -In the following fiscal year—9,000,000,000. - -And at that stage the assistance from the Reichsbank ceased. In spite of -that, during the following year and without any assistance from the -Reichsbank, the expenditure for armament increased to 11,000,000,000, -and in the following year it climbed to 20,500,000,000. - -It appears, therefore, that even without the financial genius of Herr -Schacht, they managed to raise the funds. Just how they did so is -another question. - -DR. DIX: I duly put these figures to the Defendant Keitel. I do not -think that the Tribunal had the document at the time. It is now -available and has the Exhibit Number Schacht-7. It is Page 15 of the -German text and Page 21 of the English text. Herr Keitel could, of -course, only refer to the first column, that is to say, total -expenditure; but there is a second and a third column, in this account, -and these two are calculations made by Schacht, calculations regarding -what was raised with the help and without the help of the Reichsbank. - -I do not intend to go through it in detail now. I should merely like to -have your permission to ask Dr. Schacht whether the figures calculated -by him, in Columns 2 and 3 of the document, were calculated correctly. - -SCHACHT: I have these figures in the document before me. The figures are -absolutely correct and again I want to declare that they show that, -during the first year after the Reichsbank had discontinued its -assistance, no less than 5,125,000,000 more were spent without the -assistance of the Reichsbank, that is to say, a total of 11,000,000,000. - -DR. DIX: Up to now you have stated to the Tribunal that you were active -against a dangerous and extensive rearmament and you showed that by -tying up the money bag. Did you oppose excessive rearmament in any other -way, for instance, by giving lectures and such? - -SCHACHT: Many times I spoke not only before economists and professors -who were my main auditors, but I often spoke upon invitation of the -Minister of War and the head of the Army Academy before high-ranking -officers. In all these lectures I continually referred to the financial -and economic limitations to which German rearmament was subject and I -warned against excessive rearmament. - -DR. DIX: When did you first gather the impression that the extent of -German rearmament was excessive and exaggerated? - -SCHACHT: It is very difficult to give you a date. Beginning in 1935, I -made continuous attempts to slow down the speed of rearmament. On one -occasion Hitler had said—just a moment, I have it here—that until the -spring of 1936 the same speed would have to be maintained. I adhered to -that as much as possible, although, beginning with the second half of -1935, I continuously applied the brake. But after 1935 I told myself -that, since the Führer himself had said it, after the spring of 1936 the -same speed would no longer be necessary. This can be seen from Document -1301-PS in which these statements of mine are quoted, statements which I -communicated to the so-called “small Ministerial Council” (kleiner -Ministerrat). Göring contradicted me during that meeting, but I of -course maintain the things which I said at the time. - -After that I constantly tried to make the Minister of War do something -to slow down the speed of rearmament, if only in the interest of general -economy, since I wanted to see the economic system working for the -export trade. Proof for the fact of just how much I urged the Minister -of War is contained in my letter dated 24 December 1935, which I wrote -him when I saw the period desired by Hitler coming to an end, and when I -was already applying the brake. It has also been presented by the -Prosecution as Document Number EC-293. In the English version of the -document it is on Page 25. - -I beg to be allowed to quote very briefly—all my quotations are very -brief—from that document. I wrote a letter to the Reich Minister of -War, and I quote: - - “I gather from your letter dated 29 November”—and then come the - reference numbers—“that increased demands by the Armed Forces - for copper and lead are to be expected, which will amount to - practically double the present consumption. These are only - current demands, whereas the equally urgent provisions for the - future are not contained in the figures. You are expecting me to - obtain the necessary foreign currency for these demands, and to - that I respectfully reply that under the existing circumstances - I see no possibility of doing so.” - -In other words, Blomberg is asking that I should buy raw materials with -foreign currency, and I am stating quite clearly that I do not see any -possibility of doing so. - -The document goes on to say—and this is the sentence regarding the -limit up to 1 April. I quote: - - “In all the conferences held with the Führer and Reich - Chancellor up to now, as well as with the leading military - departments, I have expressed my conviction that it would be - possible to supply the necessary foreign currencies and raw - materials for the existing degree of rearmament until 1 April - 1936. Despite the fact that, due to our cultural and agrarian - policies which are being repudiated all over the world, this has - been made extremely difficult for me and continues to be - difficult, I still hope that my original plan may be carried - out.” - -That is to say, that I thought this proposed program could be carried -out up to 1 April, but not over and beyond that. - -DR. DIX: It is a fact that Minister of Transportation, Dorpmüller, was -trying to raise credits for railway purposes. What was your attitude as -President of the Reichsbank towards this? - -SCHACHT: During a conference between the Führer, Dorpmüller, and myself, -at which the Führer strongly supported Dorpmüller’s demands, I turned -that credit down straightway, and he did not get it. - -DR. DIX: The meeting of 27 May 1936 of the so-called “small Ministerial -Council,” presided over by Göring, has been discussed here. The -Prosecution contend that intentions of aggressive war became apparent -from that meeting. Did you have any knowledge of that meeting? - -SCHACHT: What was the date, please? - -DR. DIX: 27 May 1936. - -SCHACHT: No. I was present during that conference and I see nothing in -the entire document pointing to an aggressive war. I have studied the -document very carefully. - -DR. DIX: It has furthermore been stated against you what is contained in -the report of Ambassador Bullitt, Document Number L-151, Exhibit USA-70, -dated 23 November 1937. You have heard, of course, that the Prosecution -are also drawing the conclusion from that report that there were -aggressive intentions on Hitler’s part. Will you please make a statement -about that? - -SCHACHT: I see nothing in the entire report to the effect that Hitler -was about to start an aggressive war. I was simply talking about -Hitler’s intentions to bring about an Anschluss of Austria, if possible, -and to give the Sudeten Germans autonomy if possible. Neither of those -two actions would be aggressive war, and apart from that, Mr. Bullitt -says the following with reference to me in his report about this -conversation. I quote: “Schacht then went on to speak of the absolute -necessity for doing something to produce peace in Europe....” - -DR. DIX: The memorandum of this conversation is also contained in my -document book as Exhibit Number Schacht-22. It is on Page 64 of the -English text and Page 57 of the German text. - -We shall now have to deal in greater detail with your alleged knowledge -of Hitler’s intentions to start war. First of all, speaking generally, -did Hitler ever, as far as you know... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I asked Dr. Dix if he would object if -the Tribunal would allow me, since he is passing to a new point, to -mention the question of the Raeder documents. I had a discussion with -Dr. Siemers. There are still some outstanding points, and we should be -grateful if the Tribunal would hear us this afternoon, if possible, -because the translating division is waiting for the Raeder documents to -get on with their translations. - -THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think it will take, Sir David? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not more than a half hour, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: If the translation department are waiting, perhaps we had -better do it at 2 o’clock. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases. - -THE PRESIDENT: If it is only going to take a half hour. It isn’t likely, -I suppose, to take more than that? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t think it will take more than that. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will do that at 2 o’clock, and now we will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please Your Lordship, the Tribunal should -have in front of them a statement of our objections to certain of the -documents, arranged in six groups. Attached to that sheet they will find -an English summary of the documents, presenting shortly the contents of -each one of them. My Lord, with regard to the first group, might I make -two erasures from our objection to Number 19, which has been allowed in -the case of Schacht, and if I understand Dr. Siemers correctly he -doesn’t press for Number 76. - -Now, My Lord, the others in that group: - -Number 9 is a series of quotations from Lersner’s book on _Versailles_. - -Number 10, the quotation from a book by the German left-wing publicist, -Thomas Mann. - -Number 17 is the _Failure of a Mission_, by Nevile Henderson. - -Number 45 is a quotation from a book of Mr. Churchill’s. - -Number 47 is the report on a complaint to Lord Halifax about an article -in _News Chronicle_ criticizing Hitler. - -My Lord, Number 66 is rather different. If the Tribunal would be good -enough to look at it, it is a report by a German lawyer, Dr. Mosier I -think his name should be, who is an authority on international law, -dealing with the Norway action. Dr. Siemers has been, of course, -absolutely frank with me and he said that it would be convenient to him -to have this, which is really a legal argument, embodied in his document -book. Of course, that is not really the purpose of these document books; -but, of course, it is a matter for the Tribunal, and we felt we had to -draw attention to it. - -Then, My Lord, Number 76 comes out. - -Numbers 93 to 96 are quotations from Soviet newspapers. - -Number 101 is a quotation from Havas, the French News Agency. - -Numbers 102 to 107 are minor orders relating to the Low Countries which, -the Prosecution submit, have no evidential value. - -Then in the second group, there are a number of documents which, the -Prosecution submit, are not relevant to any of the issues in the case. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you didn’t deal with Number 109, did you? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord, it is on the second line. -That is another legal argument, the effect of the war on the legal -position of Iceland, which is a quotation from the _British Journal of -Information in Public Law and International La_w. - -THE PRESIDENT: All right. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the second group, the Prosecution -submit, is irrelevant. - -Number 22 is a Belgian decree of 1937 dealing with the possible -evacuation of the civil population in time of war. - -Number 39 is a French document of the Middle East. - -Numbers 63 and 64 are two speeches, one by Mr. Emery and another by Mr. -Churchill, dealing with the position in Greece at the end of 1940, some -two months after the beginning of the Italian campaign against Greece. - -Number 71 is an undated directive with regard to the study of routes in -Belgium, which doesn’t seem to us to have any evidential importance. - -Number 76 comes out as the _Altmark_. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 76 came out? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, that is the _Altmark_. It is the -same one that is in Number 71. I am sorry, My Lord, it should have been -marked out. - -Number 99 is the minutes of the ninth meeting of the combined Cabinet -Council on the 27th of April 1940, and it deals with a suggestion of M. -Reynaud with regard to the Swedish ore mines. As it was long after the -Norway campaign and it was never, of course, acted upon in Norway, it -seems to us to have no relevance for this Trial. - -Numbers 102 to 107 I have dealt with under one. They have certain very -small unimportant memoranda relating to the Low Countries. - -Number 112 is a French document in which Paul Reynaud quotes a statement -from Mr. Churchill that he will fight on to the end, which again doesn’t -seem of much importance in 1946. - -Now, My Lord, the next group are documents which were rejected by the -Tribunal when applied for by the Defendant Ribbentrop. The first two -deal with British rearmament and the others with the Balkans and Greece. -The Tribunal will probably remember the group which they did reject in -the Ribbentrop application; and the fourth group are other documents of -the same series as those rejected by the Tribunal in the case of the -Defendant Von Ribbentrop. The fifth group are really objectionable on -the _tu quoque_ basis. I think they are entirely French documents which -deal with proposals in a very tentative stage and which were arranged, -but never followed out, with regard to the destruction of oil fields or -the blocking of the Danube in the Middle East. My Lord, they are -documents dated in the spring of 1940 and, as I say, they deal with the -most tentative stages and were never put into operation. The plans were -never in operation. - -The sixth group are documents dealing with Norway, which were captured -after the occupation of France. As I understand Dr. Siemers’ argument, -it is not suggested that these documents were within the knowledge of -the defendants at the time that they carried out the aggression against -Norway; but it is stated that they had other information. Of course, as -to their own information, we have not made any objection at all; and -that these documents might be argued to be corroborative of their -agents’ reports. Actually, as is shown by Document Number 83, to which -we make no objection, they also deal with tentative proposals which were -not put into effect and were not proceeded with; but in the submission -of the Prosecution, the important matter must be what was within the -knowledge of the defendants before the 9th of April 1940; and it is -irrelevant to go into a large number of other documents which are only -arguably consistent with the information which the defendants stated -they had. - -My Lord, I tried to deal with them very shortly because I made a promise -to the Tribunal on the time, but I hope that I have indicated very -clearly what our objections were. - -DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Your Honors, it is -extremely difficult to define my position with reference to so many -documents, especially since I know that these documents have not yet -been translated and that the contents, in the main, are therefore not -known to those concerned. Therefore, I might point out that there is a -certain danger in treating documents in this way. In part they are basic -elements of my defense. - -Therefore, I should like to state now that in dealing with these -documents I shall be compelled, in order to give the reasons for the -relevancy of this evidence, to point out those passages which I shall -not need to read separately into the record, for as soon as the document -book is ready they will be known to the Tribunal and can be read there. - -I shall follow the order as outlined by Sir David. First of all, the -first group, Document Numbers 9 and 10. The note submitted by Sir David -to the Tribunal points out that the submission of these documents -conflicts with the ruling given by the Tribunal on 29 March. In reply I -should like to point out that this opinion of the Prosecution is an -error. The ruling of the Tribunal said that no documents might be -submitted concerning the injustice of the Versailles Treaty and the -pressure arising from it. These documents do not concern the injustice -and the pressure; rather they serve to give a few examples of the -subjective attitude of a man like Noske, who was a Social Democrat and -certainly did not want to conduct any wars of aggression. A few other -statements in Numbers 9 and 10 show the thought of the Government and -the ruling class at that time in regard to defensive measures and the -fear that in case of an attack on the part of Poland, for instance, the -German Armed Forces might be too weak. These are facts pure and simple; -and I give you my express assurance that I shall not quote any sentences -which might introduce a polemic. Moreover, I need this mainly as a basis -for my final pleading. - -Number 17 is a very brief excerpt from the book by Henderson, _Failure -of a Mission_, written in 1940. I believe there are no objections to my -quoting about 15 lines, if I wish to use them in my final pleading in -order to show that Henderson, who knew Germany well, still believed in -1940 that he had to recognize certain positive good points in the regime -at that time; and I believe that the conclusion is justified that one -cannot expect that a German military commander should be more sceptical -than the British Ambassador at that time. - -Then we turn to Document Number 45. It is true this document is taken -from a book by Churchill; but it deals with a fact which I should like -to prove, the fact that already many years before World War I there -existed a British Committee for Defense. In the table of contents which -Sir David has submitted, the word “Reichsverteidigungsausschuss” is -used, and I therefore conclude that this is a mistake on the part of the -Prosecution who took it to mean a German Reich Defense Committee; that -is not correct. This document shows how it came about that the -Prosecution wrongly overestimated the importance of the German Reich -Defense Committee, as the Prosecution naturally compared it with the -British Committee for Defense, which went very much further in its -activities. - -Number 47 is evidence to show that when the German Embassy pointed out -that an extremely scathing article on Hitler had appeared in the paper -_News Chronicle_, Lord Halifax pointed out in reply that it was not -possible for him to exert any influence on the newspaper. I should -merely like to compare this with the fact that the Prosecution made it -appear as though Raeder had had something to do with the regrettable -article in the _Völkischer Beobachter_: “Churchill sank the _Athenia_.” -Raeder was no more connected with that article than Lord Halifax with -the article in the _News Chronicle_ and was unfortunately even more -powerless, as far as this article was concerned, than the British -Government. - -Number 66 deals with the opinion given by Dr. Mosier, a specialist on -international law, an opinion on the Norway action in very compressed -form, as the Tribunal will surely admit. The Tribunal will also concede -that in my defense of the Norway action I must speak at length about the -underlying principles of international law. The underlying principles of -international law are not an altogether simple matter. I have nothing -against presenting this myself in all necessary detail. I was merely -guided by the thought that the Tribunal have asked again and again that -we save time. I believe that we can save considerable time if this -statement of opinion is granted me, so that I shall not have to cite -numerous excerpts and authors in detail in order to show the exact legal -justification. I could then perhaps deal with the legal questions in -half an hour, whereas without this statement of opinion it is utterly -impossible for me to treat such a problem in half an hour. If the -Prosecution do not object to more time being taken up, then I do not -object if the document is denied me. I will merely have to take the -consequences. - -Number 76 has meanwhile been crossed out, that is, it is granted me by -the Prosecution. - -Numbers 93 to 96 are excerpts on statements of the official Moscow -papers, _Isvestia_ and _Pravda_. These statements prove that, at least -at that time, Soviet opinion regarding the legality of the German action -in Norway coincided with the German opinion of that time. If the -Tribunal think that these very brief quotations should not be admitted -as documents, I would not be too insistent, since at this point in the -proceedings I shall in any case be compelled to discuss it. The Tribunal -will remember that at that time Germany and Russia were friends, and -Soviet opinion on a purely legal problem should, at any rate, be -considered as having a certain significance. - -Then, Number 101; I beg your pardon, Sir David, but if I am not mistaken -Dr. Braun said an hour and a half ago that Number 101 is to be rejected. -Very well, then, Numbers 101 to 107. The action against Norway, as I -have already said, involved a problem of international law. It involves -the problem of whether one country may violate the neutrality of another -country when it can be proved that another belligerent nation likewise -intends to violate the neutrality of the afore-mentioned neutral state. -When presenting my evidence I shall show that Grossadmiral Raeder, in -the autumn of 1939, received all sorts of reports to the effect that the -Allies were planning to take under their own protection the territorial -waters of Norway, that is, to land in Norway, in order to have Norwegian -bases. When I deal with the Norway documents, I shall return to this -point. I should like to say at this point that it is necessary to -explain and to prove that the legal attitude taken by the Allies to the -question of the possible violation of the neutrality of a country was in -the years 1939 and 1940 entirely the same as the attitude of the -Defendant Raeder in the case of Norway at the same time. - -Therefore it is necessary not only to deal with Norway; but also to show -that this was a basic conception, which can readily be proved by -reference to parallel cases on the strength of these documents. These -parallel cases deal in the first place with the plans of the Allies with -respect to the Balkans, and secondly with the plans of the Allies with -respect to the Caucasian oil fields. - -Your Honors, it is by no means my intention, as Sir David has suggested, -to use these documents from the _tu quoque_ point of view, from the -point of view that the defendant has done something, which the Allies -have also done or wanted to do. I am concerned only with a judgment of -the Defendant Raeder’s actions from the legal point of view. One can -understand such actions only when the entire matter is brought to light. - -It is my opinion—and in addition to this I should like to refer to the -statement of Dr. Mosier’s opinion, Exhibit Raeder-66—that this cannot -be made the subject of an accusation. - -We are concerned, Your Honors, with the right of self-preservation as -recognized in principle by international law. In this connection I -should like... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we don’t want to go into these matters in -great detail, you know, at this stage. If you state what your reasons -are in support and state them shortly, we shall be able to consider the -matter. - -DR. SIEMERS: I am very sorry that I have to go into these details, but -if through the objection of the Prosecution the principles... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal do not wish to hear you in detail. I have -said that the Tribunal do not wish to hear you in detail. - -DR. SIEMERS: I merely ask that the Tribunal take into consideration the -fact that this concerns the principle of international law laid down by -Kellogg himself in 1928, namely, the right of self-preservation, or “the -right of self-defense.” For that reason 1 should like to adduce these -documents showing that just as the Allies acted quite correctly -according to this principle, so also did the Defendant Raeder. - -Document Number 22 is next. I have given various statements of principle -which apply to a large number of the remaining documents, so that I can -refer to the statements I have already made. These statements also apply -to Documents Numbers 22 and 39. - -As far as Documents Numbers 63 and 64 are concerned, I should like to -point out that these documents deal with Greece; and not only these two, -but also a later group of perhaps 10 or 12 documents, with which I -should like to deal very briefly. - -As far as Greece is concerned, the situation is as follows: - -I must admit that I was more than surprised that the Prosecution -objected to these documents, about 14 in all. In Document Number C-12, -Exhibit Number GB-226, the Prosecution accuse Raeder of having decreed -on 30 December 1939; and I quote, “Greek merchantmen in the prohibited -area declared by the United States and England are to be treated as -enemy ships.” The accusation would be justified, if Greece had not -behaved in such a manner that Raeder had to resort to this order. - -If the documents concerning Greece which show that Greece did not -strictly keep to her neutrality are struck out, then I cannot bring any -counterevidence. I do not believe that it is the intention of the -Prosecution to restrict my presentation of evidence in this way. - -These are all documents which date back to this time and which show that -Greece put her merchantmen at the disposal of England who was at war -with Germany. Therefore they could be treated as enemy ships. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like to say that I should have told the -Tribunal I would make no objection to Documents Numbers 53 and 54, -because they do deal with the chartering of Greek steamers by the -British Government. - -THE PRESIDENT: But you made no objection to them; you didn’t object to -Numbers 53 or 54. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted to make clear that I don’t object to -them. - -THE PRESIDENT: There is no objection on the paper. What you are dealing -with, Dr. Siemers, is 63 and 64, not 53 and 54? - -Oh, I beg your pardon, I see it further on. Yes, I see; will you please -strike that out. - -DR. SIEMERS: There is no objection to Numbers 53 and 54? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no objection. My Lord, my friend was dealing -with the Greek fleet. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes; I beg your pardon, I misheard. - -DR. SIEMERS: The same things, as I have already stated regarding -Documents Numbers 101 to 107, apply also to Document Number 71. - -Number 99 belongs really to Group 6, to the Norwegian documents; and I -should like to refer to these collectively and then refer again later to -Number 99. All these documents concern Norway, that is, the planning by -the Allies with respect to Norway. These documents deal positively with -the planning of the landing in Narvik, the landing in Stavanger, the -landing in Bergen, and the absolute necessity of having Norwegian bases. -The documents mention that Germany should not be allowed to continue -getting ore supplies from Sweden. They also deal in some measure with -Finland. There are likewise documents which support the same plan after -the Finnish-Russian war had already been concluded. - -I should like to quote from these documents to prove their relevancy. -Since the Tribunal has told me that I cannot do that, I ask that these -brief references be considered sufficient. The facts contained in these -documents agree, point for point, with those reports which Grossadmiral -Raeder received from September 1939 until March 1940 from the -Intelligence Service of the German Wehrmacht headed by Admiral Canaris. -These plans agree with the information which Raeder received during the -same 6 months through the Naval Attaché in Oslo, Korvettenkapitän -Schreiber, and with the information which he received in a letter from -Admiral Carls at the end of September 1939. - -The information from these three sources caused the Defendant Raeder to -point out the great danger involved were Norway to fall into the hands -of the Allies, which would mean that Germany had lost the war. It is, -therefore, a purely strategic consideration. The occupation of Norway -did not, as contended by the British Prosecution, have anything to do -with the prestige or desire for conquest but was concerned solely with -these positive pieces of information. - -I must therefore prove, first of all, that the Defendant Raeder did -receive this information and, secondly, that these reports were -objective. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, you are dealing with Document Number 99, are -you not? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, 99, and all of Group 6. - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t know what you mean by Group 6; 99 is in Group B. - -DR. SIEMERS: The group under the letter “F,” which Sir David called -Group 6, the last on the page. - -THE PRESIDENT: The objection of the Prosecution to that document was -that it was a document of the 27th of April 1940, at a time after -Germany had invaded Norway. You haven’t said anything about that. - -DR. SIEMERS: I wanted to avoid dealing with each document singly, -because I believe that these can be treated generally. However, in this -specific case... - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t want you to deal with each document separately. I -thought you were dealing with Document Number 99. If you can deal with -them in groups, by all means do so. However, you are taking up a great -deal of the Tribunal’s time. - -DR. SIEMERS: This Document Number 99 is the Minutes of the Ninth Meeting -of the Supreme Council, that is, the military operational staff of -England and France, on 27 April. The heading shows beyond doubt that it -was after the occupation of Norway. However, that is only a formal -objection. The contents of the document show that at this session the -participants discussed the happenings during the period before the -occupation, and the most important leaders of the Allies took part in -this meeting. Chamberlain, Halifax, Churchill, Sir Samuel Hoare, Sir -Alexander Cadogan, _et cetera_ and, on the French side Reynaud, -Daladier, Gamelin, and Darlan were present; and these gentlemen -discussed the previous plans which, I admit, had misfired because of the -German occupation of Norway. But they did discuss about how necessary it -was that the iron-ore deposits in Sweden should fall into the hands of -the Allies and what was to be done now to prevent Germany’s getting this -ore and how the destruction of these iron-ore deposits could be brought -about. I believe, therefore, that though this happened at a later date, -the train of thought I have presented is of significance. - -Then we turn to Document Number 100. This deals with the session of the -French War Committee of 9 April 1940, which concerns the same problem: -what the Allies had planned and what could be planned now that the -report had just come in about the action on the part of Germany. - -Documents Numbers 102 to 107 have already been dealt with. For Document -Number 110 the same statements apply as for Documents 101 to 107. - -Document Number 112 is a document which shows that Churchill, as early -as May 1940, expected active intervention on the part of America. I -wanted to present this in connection with the accusation raised against -the Defendant Raeder, that in the spring of 1941 he was instrumental in -bringing about a war against the United States by way of Japan. For me -this document is not nearly so important as those basic documents which -I have referred to at greater length. Therefore, I leave this completely -to the discretion of the Prosecution or the Tribunal. - -The next group consists of documents which were turned down in the case -of Ribbentrop. I should like to point out that I did not have the -opportunity in the Ribbentrop case to define my position as to the -justification and relevancy of these documents. Therefore I consider it -insufficient simply to state that these documents were refused in the -case of Ribbentrop, that the charges against Ribbentrop... - -THE PRESIDENT: We have already carefully considered the arguments and -have decided those documents were inadmissible. - -DR. SIEMERS: I believed that the decision applied only to the Ribbentrop -case, since no other point of view was discussed during those -proceedings, namely, that of the charges raised against Raeder in which -connection it is expressly said in Document C-152 that Raeder brought -about the occupation of the whole of Greece. That is an accusation that -was not made against Ribbentrop but only against Raeder. How can I -refute this accusation if these documents are denied me? - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal know the documents and know the -charges against Raeder, and they don’t desire to hear any further -argument on it. They will consider the matter. - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg the pardon of the Tribunal. Under these circumstances -I am compelled to see whether all these documents were covered in -Ribbentrop’s case. My notes, as I told the Prosecution this morning, do -not agree with the statements of the Prosecution. Perhaps after the -session, if I am unable to do so at the moment, I might point out -whether or not the documents are identical. - -It is really a fact that in Ribbentrop’s case these documents were not -presented in their entirety and that the Tribunal therefore does not -know them in their entirety. Whether Dr. Horn had marked exactly the -same passages as I wish to use, I am not able to say as far as each -individual document is concerned. I know only that in the large majority -of cases Dr. Horn did not present the entire document because he was -presenting it only from the point of view of the Ribbentrop case. - -THE PRESIDENT: Presumably you have submitted your extracts to the -Prosecution. The Prosecution tell us that those extracts are the same -ones that were rejected in Ribbentrop’s case. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, we have only a list of those documents -so far. We haven’t seen the extracts. - -[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Prosecution -conferred._] - -My Lord, I am sorry. I spoke too quickly. We have seen the extracts in -German and we haven’t had them translated. We have done the best we -could in German. - -THE PRESIDENT: 24 and 25, at any rate, are both speeches in English. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, some of them are. I am sorry, My -Lord; these are. Your Lordship is quite right. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, as I understand it, Dr. Siemers says that -these are not the same passages of evidence, or suggested evidence, as -were rejected in Ribbentrop’s case. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I did not do the actual checking -myself, but Major Barrington, who checked the Ribbentrop documents, went -through these and compared the two, and he gave me that which forms the -basis of our note. That is the position. I can’t tell Your Lordship that -I have actually checked these myself. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers is telling us that that is untrue? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As I understood Dr. Siemers, he was saying that -he didn’t know whether they were the same extracts... - -DR. SIEMERS: May I just make one remark in connection with that, please? -I am not quite certain that I can say in each specific case which -extracts were contained in the Ribbentrop case, but they are not the -same. I know for certain that they are not the same because in order to -relieve the work of the Translation Division I compared the numbers and -in the few cases in which they were the same I told the Translation -Division that these documents were identical so that they would not be -translated a second time. But I am sorry to say that a large number of -the documents were not the same, as they were asked for by Dr. Horn and -Ribbentrop from a completely different point of view. - -I might also point out that the numbers under Group D which are -enumerated here as Ribbentrop Documents Numbers 29, 51, 56, 57, 60, 61, -62, although I made every effort to find them, could not be found in the -Ribbentrop Document Book. And the list does not show which numbers they -should be in the Ribbentrop Document Book. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is not suggested. What is said is -that they are in the same series which deals with the same subject—that -is, the question of Greece and the Balkans—as those documents which the -Tribunal ruled out in the case of Ribbentrop. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, I think the best course would be for -you to go through these documents this afternoon under the heading “C” -and find out whether they are the same ones rejected in Ribbentrop’s -case; and if they are not, indicate exactly in what they differ from the -documents rejected in Ribbentrop’s case, so as to show they have some -relevance to your case; and we shall expect to have that by 5 o’clock. - -Now will you go on with the others? - -DR. SIEMERS: May I perhaps make one remark about what Sir David said -regarding group “D”? They were not objected to because they have already -been mentioned in Ribbentrop’s case; but only because they deal with the -same subject matter, that is true. The same subject matter, namely, -Greece, is dealt with; and I can only reply that the Prosecution have -charged the Defendant Raeder in Document C-152 with having aimed at, and -brought about, the occupation of the whole of Greece. The facts -concerning this statement of three lines I can present only if I am -allowed some documents referring to Greece and only if these are not -refused on the grounds that the documents concerning Greece were turned -down quite generally in Ribbentrop’s case. - -Now, I come to group “E” which begins with Document 26. The same -statements apply which I have already set forth in regard to Documents -Numbers 101 to 107. The attacks planned by the Allies on the oil regions -in neutral Romania and in the neutral Caucasus—as I should like to -remark in parenthesis—have already been dealt with in these -proceedings. The Tribunal will remember that I asked Göring during his -examination about entries in Jodl’s diary pertaining to this question -and he has given information about the reports received by Germany, on -Pages 6031 and 6033 of the transcript of 18 March (Volume IX, Pages -402-404). This testimony too concerns only the subjective side, that is, -what was known by Germany. I must prove that the objective side, the -fact that this had actually been planned, agrees exactly with the -subjective side, that is, with these reports. These documents, Numbers -26, 30 to 32, 36, 37, 39, 40 to 44, are to prove that. Then comes Number -99 which has already been dealt with, which seems to be here in -duplicate; Number 101, and Number 110 which also seem to be duplicates. - -I turn now to Group 6, which is supposed to be irrelevant, dealing with -the attack on Norway. I have already, on principle, set forth my reasons -and I beg the Tribunal not to deny me these documents under any -circumstances. If I am not granted these documents, I shall simply not -be in a position to present evidence in a reasonable manner without -telling everything myself. I can present proof in regard to a question -of such importance only if documents are granted me just as they are -granted the Prosecution. But if all the documents, practically all the -documents concerning this question are refused, then I do not know how I -am to treat such a question. And I believe that the Tribunal will wish -to assist me in this matter. - -I am requesting this especially for the following reasons: When I gave -my reasons for wanting to present this particular evidence, I asked that -those files of the British Admiralty be brought in, which dealt with the -preparations and planning regarding Scandinavia, that is, Norway. Sir -David did not object at that time but said he would have to consult the -British Admiralty. The Tribunal decided accordingly and granted my -application. In the meantime the British Admiralty has answered, and I -assume that Sir David will agree to my reading the answer which has been -put at my disposal. This answer is as follows—it concerns, if I may say -that in advance... - -THE PRESIDENT: We have had the answer, I think, have we not? We have had -the answer and transmitted it to you. - -DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. From this reply it can be seen that -the files will not be submitted, that I cannot get the necessary -approval. It can also be seen that certain facts which will be important -for my presentation of evidence will be admitted by the British -Admiralty; but in reality I am not in a position to prove anything by -means of documents. Since I am unable to make use of this evidence, I -ask at least to be allowed the other means of presenting evidence, that -is, the documents contained in the German White Books. These are -documents recognized as being correct. In all cases they are facsimiles. -They can be carefully examined and I believe... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we are dealing with your application for -particular documents. We are not dealing with any general argument or -general criticism that you have to make. We are only hearing you in -answer to certain objections on behalf of the British Prosecution. - -DR: SIEMERS: Your Honor, unless I am very much mistaken—in which case -you will pleas correct me—Sir David, with a few exceptions, defined his -position regarding these documents under “F”—this is a large number, -from 59 to 91 with some omissions—as a whole and not his position -regarding each individual document. But I have to say the same thing to -practically each document and asked only that I be granted those -documents as a whole, for I cannot make headway without these -documents... - -THE PRESIDENT: You were not referring to these documents. You were -referring to the fact that the British Admiralty was not prepared to -disclose its files to you. It has nothing to do with these documents at -all. - -DR. SIEMERS: I believe I have been misunderstood, Your Honors. I have -already stated very clearly why I need these documents for my -presentation of evidence regarding the Norway action. Beyond that I said -merely that if these documents are not granted me, then I cannot present -any evidence. I am deprived of it. I asked the Tribunal merely to take -into consideration the fact that the documents from London, which I had -originally counted on, are not at my disposal. And I do not know why -this request, which I am submitting to the Tribunal and which is only in -explanation of my previous statements, is being taken amiss by the -Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you have to say? - -DR. SIEMERS: I have now finished, Your Honors. It is not at all my -intention to read all these documents or to spend too much time on them. -I believe that if I am granted these documents, the presentation of -evidence will be much easier, for these are groups of documents which -show the chronological development of certain plans; and if I have the -5th, 6th or 7th document, then I need not read each one. But if I am -granted just one document, I will be put in an extremely difficult -position and will have to speak in greater detail than I would if I -could simply refer to these documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider it. - -Now, Dr. Dix. - -DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Now, we come to the whole -question of your alleged knowledge of the direct war objectives of -Hitler. You have already mentioned in a general way that Hitler never -spoke about war to you. Have you anything to add to this? - -SCHACHT: No. - -DR. DIX: You also touched upon the question of the sincerity of his -peaceful assurances and his disarmament proposals. Have you anything to -add to that? - -SCHACHT: No, at the beginning I believed that. - -DR. DIX: And did the various members of the Cabinet ever speak to you -about warlike intentions? - -SCHACHT: Never did I hear anything from any of my fellow colleagues in -the Reich Cabinet which could lead me to believe that anyone had the -intention of going to war or would welcome it if Germany were to start a -war. - -DR. DIX: Now, we turn to your own attitude towards the war. You already -indicated your general attitude when you spoke about your philosophy as -a pacifist. I believe, therefore, that it is more expedient if I read -from my document book the opinion of a third person, one who knows you -very well, the former member of the Reichsbank Directorate, Huelse. It -is the Schacht Document 37-C, Page 160 of the German text, and 168 of -the English text. It is an affidavit. And there, beginning with -Paragraph 2, Huelse says: - - “I recall several chance talks with Dr. Schacht during the years - 1935 to 1939 about war and rearmament. In these talks he always - expressed his aversion to any war and any warlike conduct. He - held the firm opinion that even to the conqueror war brings only - disadvantages and that a new European war would, on the whole, - be a crime against culture and humanity. He hoped for a long - period of peace for Germany, as she needed it more than other - countries in order to improve and stabilize her unstable - economic situation. - - “To my knowledge, until the beginning of 1938, Dr. Schacht at - meetings of the Reichsbank Board of Directors and in private - conversations on the subject of armament always spoke only of - defense measures. I believe I can recall that he told me in the - middle of 1938 that Hitler’s provocative action against Austria - and the Sudeten country was worse than thoughtless from the - military point of view. - - “He said that Germany had undertaken only a defensive armament, - which would prove absolutely inadequate as a defense in case of - attack by one of the big powers, a possibility with which Hitler - had to reckon. He said that he had never heard that the - Wehrmacht was in any way designed or armed for an aggressive - war. - - “When the war did break out and spread more and more, he said - repeatedly that he had greatly erred in his judgment of Hitler’s - personality; he had hoped for a long time that Hitler would - develop into a real statesman who, after the experience of the - World War I, would avoid any war.” - -You have already touched upon the question of an annexation of Austria -and given your general opinion. I ask you now to make a concrete -statement about the Anschluss after it had actually taken place and -especially about the manner in which this Anschluss was carried out. - -SCHACHT: That this Anschluss would come at some time we Germans all -knew. As for the various political negotiations which took place between -Hitler, Schuschnigg and others, I naturally was as little informed as -were the other Cabinet Ministers, with the probable exception of Göring -and Ribbentrop and perhaps one or two more. The actual Anschluss in -March was a complete surprise to us, not the fact but the date. A great -surprise and we, at any rate my acquaintances and I myself, were -completely surprised. - -DR. DIX: How did you judge the manner, the nature and development of -this Anschluss? - -SCHACHT: I believe that much can be said about the manner. What we heard -subsequently and what I have learned in these proceedings is certainly -not very gratifying, but I believe that it would have had very little -practical influence on the Anschluss itself and the course of events. -The whole thing was more of a demonstration to the outside world, -similar perhaps to the marching into the Rhineland; but it had no great -effect in my opinion on the course of the negotiations. I am speaking -now of the marching in of the troops. This march was more or less a -festive reception. - -DR. DIX: The Prosecution have pointed out that in March 1938 you -regulated the relation of the schilling to the mark for the event of a -possible Anschluss, and by this the Prosecution obviously want to prove -that you had previous knowledge of this action. Will you tell us your -position as to this? - -SCHACHT: The fact to which the Prosecution refer is a communication from -a Lieutenant Colonel Wiedemann. March 11, at about 3 o’clock in the -afternoon—I believe I remember that but I cannot say whether it was by -telephone or in person—someone, it may have been Lieutenant Colonel -Wiedemann, inquired of me how the purchasing power for the troops in -Austria was to be regulated if German troops should march into Austria, -purely as a matter of currency policy, and whether it was necessary to -have any regulation prescribed. I told him that of course everything had -to be paid for, everything that the troops might buy there, and that the -rate of exchange; if they paid in schillings and not in marks, would be -1 mark to 2 schillings. That was the rate which obtained at the time, -which remained fairly steady and was the recognized ratio of the -schilling to the mark. The fact that in the afternoon of the 11th I was -approached about this matter is the best proof that I had no previous -knowledge of these matters. - -DR. DIX: The Prosecution further consider it an accusation against you -that in your speech to the Austrian National Bank after the marching in -of the troops, you used decidedly National Socialist phraseology and -thus welcomed the Anschluss. - -Perhaps we can use this opportunity to save time and reply to the -accusation made repeatedly by the Prosecution that in speeches, -petitions, _et cetera_, you sometimes thought fit to adopt a tone, of -which it could perhaps be said that it exuded National Socialist ideas. -That has been used as circumstantial evidence against you. Will you -please define your position to those arguments and give your reasons for -this attitude of yours? - -SCHACHT: If I did so in the first years, I did so only in order to -remind Party circles and the people of the original program of the -National Socialist Party, to which the actual attitude of the Party -members and functionaries stood in direct contrast. I always tried to -show that the principles which I upheld in many political matters agreed -completely with the principles of the National Socialist program as they -were stated in the Party program, namely, equal rights for all, the -dignity of the individual, esteem for the church, and so forth. - -In the later years I also repeatedly used National Socialist -phraseology, because from the time of my speech at Königsberg, the -contrast between my views and Hitler’s views regarding the Party was -entirely clear. And gradually within the Party I got the reputation of -being an enemy of the Party, a man whose views were contrary to those of -the Party. From that moment on not only the possibility of my -co-operation, but also my very existence was endangered; and in such -moments, when I saw my activity, my freedom, and my life seriously -threatened by the Party I utilized these moments to show by means of an -emphatically National Socialist phraseology that I was working entirely -within the framework of the traditional policies and that my activity -was in agreement with these policies—in order to protect myself against -these attacks. - -DR. DIX: In other words, recalling the testimony of the witness Gisevius -about a remark of Goerdeler’s, you used Talleyrand methods in this case? - -SCHACHT: I am not entirely familiar with Talleyrand’s methods, but at -any rate I did camouflage myself. - -DR. DIX: In this connection I should like to read a passage from the -affidavit of Schniewind which has been quoted repeatedly. It is Schacht -Number 34. I have often indicated this page. It is Page 118 of the -German, Page 126 of the English text. Schniewind says: - - “If Schacht on the other hand occasionally made statements, oral - or written, which could be construed as signifying that he went - a long way in identifying himself with the Hitler regime, these - statements were naturally known to us; but what Schacht thought - in reality was known to almost every official in the Reichsbank - and in the Reich Ministry of Economics, above all, of course, to - his closest colleagues. - - “On many occasions we asked Dr. Schacht if he had not gone too - far in these statements. He always replied that he was under - such heavy fire from the Party and the SS that he could - camouflage himself only with strong slogans and sly statements.” - -I might explain that Schniewind was a high official in the Reich -Ministry of Economics, and worked directly under Schacht and with him. - -The Prosecution have also referred to an affidavit by Tilly to the -effect that you admitted that you thought Hitler capable of aggressive -intentions. Will you make a statement about that? - -SCHACHT: That affidavit of the British Major Tilly is entirely correct. -I told Major Tilly during the preliminary interrogation that in 1938, -during the events of the Fritsch affair and afterwards, I had become -convinced that Hitler at any rate would not avoid a war at all costs and -that possibly he even sought to bring about a war. Looking back I -pondered over a number of statements by Hitler and asked myself the -reason why Hitler, in the course of the years, had reached the point -where he might not avoid a war. And I told Major Tilly that the only -reason which I could think of was that looking back I had the impression -that Hitler had fallen into the role which necessarily falls to each and -every dictator who does not want to relinquish his power in time, -namely, that of having to supply his people with some sort of victor’s -glory—that that was probably the development of Hitler’s thought. - -DR. DIX: That is the same explanation as given by Prince Metternich -about Napoleon? - -You have already remarked parenthetically that you first became -suspicious during the Fritsch affair. The witness Gisevius has described -the Fritsch affair to the Tribunal in detail. We do not wish to repeat -anything. Therefore, I am asking you only to state in regard to the -Fritsch affair anything you might have to say to supplement or to amend -Gisevius’ testimony. If that is to take a long time—which I cannot -judge—then I might suggest to the Tribunal that we have the recess now, -if the Tribunal so desires. - -SCHACHT: I have just a brief remark to make. - -DR. DIX: A brief remark. Then answer the question briefly. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if he can do it briefly, we had better have it now. - -SCHACHT: It is just a single remark that I should like to add. The -account given by Gisevius of the development of the Fritsch affair is, -according to my knowledge and my own experience, completely correct in -every detail. I have nothing to add to that. I can only confirm it. On -the other hand, I should like to refer to a speech of Hitler’s on 20 -February 1938 in the Reichstag which contains a remark which even at -that time aroused my attention. He said—and I quote this speech from -Die Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, of which all copies were available -here: - - “The changes in the Reich Cabinet and in the military - administration on 4 February”—that is, changes which were made - following the Fritsch and Blomberg affair—“were for the purpose - of achieving within the shortest time that intensification of - our military means of power, which the general conditions of the - present time indicate as advisable.” - -This remark also confirmed my opinion that the change from a peaceful to -a military policy on Hitler’s part was becoming obvious; I did not wish -to omit reference to this remark which completes the account given by -Gisevius. - -DR. DIX: This is Exhibit Number Schacht-28 of our document book, Page 81 -of the English text, Page 74 of the German text. There this passage is -quoted. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Several meetings have been -discussed here during which Hitler is said to have spoken directly or -indirectly about his war intentions. Did you participate in any such -meetings? - -SCHACHT: No, not in a single one. - -DR. DIX: You disagreed, as you have stated, with Hitler and the Party on -many issues. Did you express this disagreement or did you conform to -Hitler’s instructions at all times? Can you in particular make -statements about your critical attitude, for instance, to the Jewish -question, the Church question, the Gestapo question, the Free Mason -question, _et cetera_? - -SCHACHT: I might say in advance that Hitler never gave me any order or -any instructions which would have been in opposition to my inner views -and that I also never did anything which was in opposition to my inner -convictions. From the very beginning I did not conceal my convictions -concerning all these questions which you have mentioned, not only when -speaking to my circle of friends and to larger Party circles, but also -in addressing the public, and even when speaking to Hitler personally. I -have already stated here that as early as the Party purge of 30 June -1934 I called Hitler’s attention to the fact that his actions were -illegal. - -I refer, furthermore, to a document of which unfortunately only half has -been presented by the Prosecution. It is a written report which I -personally submitted to Hitler on 3 May 1935. I remember the date very -well because it happened during a trial run of the Lloyd Steamer -_Scharnhorst_, at which both Hitler and I were present. - -On that day I handed him two inter-related memoranda which together -formed a unit. In the one half I made it clear that I wanted to stop the -unrestrained and constant collections of money by various Party -organizations because it seemed to me that the money ought not to be -used for Party purposes, particularly Party installations, Party -buildings, and the like, but that we urgently needed this money for -State expenses which had to be paid and which of course included the -rearmament question as well. - -The second half of this report dealt with cultural questions. The -Defense and I have tried for months to get this second half of the -document from the Prosecution, since they had submitted the first half -of the document here as evidence. It has not been possible to obtain -that second half. I must therefore confine myself to communicating the -contents. - -I want to say in advance that, of course, I could only bring forward -such charges in regard to the mistaken cultural and legal policy of the -Party and of Hitler when reasons originating in my own department gave -me the excuse to submit these things to Hitler. I stated that very -serious harm was being done to my foreign trade policy by the arbitrary -and inhuman cultural and legal policy which was being carried out by -Hitler. I pointed in particular to the hostile attitude towards the -churches and the illegal treatment of the Jews and, furthermore, to the -absolute illegality and despotism of the whole Gestapo regime. I -remember in that connection that I referred to the British Habeas Corpus -Act, which for centuries protected the rights of the individual; and I -stated word for word that I considered this Gestapo despotism to be -something which would make us despised by the whole world. - -Hitler read both parts of this memorandum while still on board the -_Scharnhorst_. As soon as he had read it he called me and tried to calm -me down by making statements similar to those which he had already made -to me in July 1934, when he told me these were still the transitional -symptoms of a revolutionary development and that as time went on this -would be set right again and disappear. - -The events of July 1934 had taught me a lesson, however, and -consequently I was not satisfied with this explanation. A few weeks -afterwards, on 18 August 1935, I used the occasion of my visit to the -Eastern Fair Königsberg to mention these very things in the speech which -I had to make there; and here I gave clear expression to the same -objections which I had made to Hitler aboard the _Scharnhorst_ at the -beginning of May. - -I did not talk only about the Church question, the Jewish question, and -the question of despotism; I talked also about the Free Masons; and I -shall quote just a few sentences from that speech (Exhibit Number -Schacht-25), with the permission of the Tribunal. They are very short. I -am speaking about people, and I now quote... - -DR. DIX: Just one moment. I want to tell the Tribunal that this is the -Königsberg speech, which I submitted to the Tribunal this morning as a -document. - -SCHACHT: I am talking about people and I now quote: - - “...people who under cover of darkness heroically smear window - panes, who brand as a traitor every German who trades in a - Jewish store, who declare every former Free Mason to be a - scoundrel, and who in the fight against priests and ministers - who talk politics from the pulpit, cannot themselves distinguish - between religion and misuse of the pulpit.” - -End of quotation, and then another sentence. I quote: - - “In accordance with the present legislation and in accordance - with the various declarations made by the Führer’s Deputy, the - Reich Minister of the Interior, and the Reich Minister for - Public Enlightenment and Propaganda (not to mention the Ministry - of Economics), Jewish businesses are permitted to carry on their - business activities as heretofore.” - -End of quotation, and then, in the last sentences, I quote: - - “No one in Germany is without rights. According to Point 4 of - the National Socialist Party program the Jew can be neither a - citizen nor a fellow German. But Point 5 of the Party program - provides legislation for him too; that means, he must not be - subjected to arbitrary action but to the law.” - -I assumed the same attitude on every other further occasion that offered -itself. - -DR. DIX: One moment, Dr. Schacht; did the regime tolerate this speech? - -SCHACHT: It is a good thing that you remind me of that; because in the -course of the Gisevius testimony the same question was discussed with -reference to the Marburg speech of Herr Von Papen. Since up to then my -speeches were not subject to censorship—of course I would not have -allowed that—this speech was broadcast by mistake, so to speak, over -the Deutschlandsender. In that way the speech was brought to the notice -of Propaganda Minister Goebbels, and at once he issued an order -prohibiting the publication of the speech in the newspapers. As a -result, although the speech was broadcast by the Deutschlandsender it -did not appear in any newspaper. But as, fortunately, the Reichsbank had -its own printing press which was of course not subject to censorship, I -had the speech printed in the Reichsbank printing press; and 250,000 -copies of it were distributed to the 400 branches of the Reichsbank -throughout the country, and in that manner it became known to the entire -population. - -DR. DIX: You were going to continue, were you not? - -SCHACHT: I wanted to go on and say that on every future opportunity -which I could find I always returned to these points. I should like to -touch upon only two more things in this connection. - -This morning I referred to these things in connection with the letter -written by me on 24 December 1935 to the Reich Minister of War, which is -Document Number EC-293. I should merely like to add and point out the -words, which I shall now quote: - - “The economic and legal policy for the treatment of the Jews, - the anti-Church activities of certain Party organizations, and - the legal despotism associated with the Gestapo are detrimental - to our armament program...” - -The same attitude can also be seen from the minutes of the so-called -“small Ministerial Council” for 12 May 1936, which have been submitted -in evidence by the Prosecution. It says in these minutes, and I quote: -“Dr. Schacht emphasized openly again and again that a cultural and legal -policy must be pursued which does not interfere with economy.” - -I want to remark in this connection that, of course, as Minister of -Economics I always linked my arguments with the work of the departments -under the Minister of Economics. And, as a last example, one of many -others which I cannot mention today, there is the speech on the occasion -of a celebration for the apprentices at the Berlin Chamber of Artisans -on 11 May 1937 which is Exhibit Number Schacht-30. On that occasion I -said the following, and I quote: - - “No community and, above all, no state can flourish which is not - based on legality, order, and discipline.” - -And a second sentence, I quote: - - “For that reason you must not only respect the right and the - law, but you must also act against injustice and unlawful - actions everywhere, wherever you find them.” - -And because I made known my attitude not only to a close circle but also -to a wider public by using every opportunity to voice my views -frankly—because of this, a few weeks ago in this court, the Chief of -the RSHA, Department III, Security Service, the witness Ohlendorf, in -reply to a question, described me as an enemy of the Party, at least -since the year 1937-1938. I believe that the Chief of the Security -Service, the inland department, should know since he had the task of -combating political opponents inside Germany. - -DR. DIX: May I point out that the statements made during the meeting of -the small Ministerial Council on 12 May 1936 are contained in my -document book, Exhibit Schacht-20, Page 57 of the English text, Page 51 -of the German text and Schacht’s speech to the Chamber of Industry and -Commerce on 12 May 1937... - -SCHACHT: [_Interrupting._] You mean Chamber of Artisans. - -DR. DIX: I shall refer to that later when I have the proper document; -and I now continue. - -We have talked about your participation at the Party rallies, and I -should merely like to ask you in addition: Did you participate in any -other Party functions? - -SCHACHT: I do not remember that I ever participated in any other -functions of the Party. - -DR. DIX: The Indictment charges you, in substance, with using your -personal influence and your close connections with the Führer for the -aims as set forth. Did you, as far as you know and can judge from your -experience, have any influence on the Führer? - -SCHACHT: Unfortunately, I never had any influence on the Führer’s -actions and decisions. I had influence only insofar as he did not dare -to interfere with me in my special financial and economic policies. But -this lack of influence of all members of Hitler’s entourage has already -been mentioned by various witnesses and so much has been said about it -that I think I need not take up the Tribunal’s time with any further -statements on that subject. - -DR. DIX: What you have just said applies in the main to the question of -the influence of the Reich Cabinet, the last meetings of the Reich -Cabinet, and so forth. Various witnesses have made statements on that -subject. Have you anything new to add? - -SCHACHT: I can merely add that on the whole the Reich Cabinet did not -have the slightest influence on Hitler, and that from November 1937 -on—this has been stated repeatedly—there were no more meetings or -consultations of the Cabinet. The Reich Cabinet was an uncorrelated -group of politically powerless departmental ministers without the proper -professional qualifications. - -DR. DIX: I should like to add that the number of the speech to the -Chamber of Artisans is Exhibit Number 30, Page 89 of the English text -and Page 82 of the German text. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] What was the situation regarding -rearmament? Whose will was decisive and authoritative as regards the -extent of rearmament? - -SCHACHT: I am without any basis for judgment as far as that is -concerned. But I have no doubt that Hitler’s will, here too, was the -sole decisive and authoritative factor. - -DR. DIX: That is to say, you had no influence other than that of the -credit-giver? - -SCHACHT: Within my Ministry, insofar as I administered this Ministry, I -did nothing for which I would not assume responsibility myself. - -DR. DIX: Did you speak to prominent foreigners about your lack of -influence on Hitler? - -SCHACHT: In this connection I recall a conversation with Ambassador -Bullitt in November 1937. This conversation with Ambassador Bullitt has -already been mentioned in some other connection, and Ambassador -Bullitt’s memorandum has been presented in evidence to the Tribunal by -the Prosecution. I merely refer to the sentence which refers to me, and -I quote: - - “He”—that is to say Schacht—“prefaced his remarks by saying - that he himself today was ‘completely without influence on that - man’”—meaning Hitler. “He seemed to regard himself as - politically dead and to have small respect for ‘that man.’” - -That was said in November 1937. But if I am permitted to add to this, I -want to point out that my foreign friends were kept constantly informed -about my position and my entire activity as regards the directing of -public affairs in Germany, as I have already mentioned once before. This -will be seen on later occasions when various instances are mentioned. - -DR. DIX: This morning I submitted Exhibit Number Schacht-22, Page 64 of -the English text. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] And now a few special questions regarding -your position as Minister of Economics. You have already made statements -regarding the obtaining of foreign raw materials, that is, you have -quoted appropriate passages. Could these not be substituted by home -products in your opinion? - -SCHACHT: A portion of such raw materials could certainly be replaced by -home products. We had learned in the meantime how to produce a large -number of new materials which we did not know about before... - -DR. DIX: Please be brief. - -SCHACHT: ...to produce them synthetically. But a considerable part could -not be replaced in that way and could be obtained only through foreign -trade. - -DR. DIX: And what was your attitude towards the question of -self-sufficiency? - -SCHACHT: As far as self-sufficiency was concerned I believe that, if at -a reasonable cost, without undue expenditure, which would have meant a -waste of German public funds and German manpower, certain synthetic -materials could be produced in Germany, then one should do so, but that -apart from this the maintenance of foreign trade was an absolute -necessity for economic reasons, and that it was even more necessary for -reasons of international cultural relations so that nations might live -together. I always regarded the isolation of nations as a great -misfortune, just as I have always regarded commerce as the best means of -bringing about international understanding. - -DR. DIX: Who was the exponent in the Reich Cabinet of the -self-sufficiency principle? - -SCHACHT: As far as I know, the whole idea of self-sufficiency, which was -then formulated in the Four Year Plan, originated with Hitler alone; -after Göring was commissioned with the direction of the Four Year Plan, -then Göring too, of course, represented that line of thought. - -DR. DIX: Did you express your contradictory views to Göring and Hitler? - -SCHACHT: I think it is clear from the record that I did so at every -opportunity. - -DR. DIX: One incidental question: You will remember that Göring -exclaimed, “I should like to know where the ‘No men’ are.” - -I want to ask you now, do you claim this honorary title of “No man” for -yourself? I remind you particularly of your letter of November 1942. - -SCHACHT: On every occasion when I was no longer in a position to do what -my inner conviction demanded, I said, “No.” I was not content to be -silent in the face of the many misdeeds committed by the Party. In every -case I expressed my disapproval of these things, personally, officially, -and publicly. I said “No” to all those things. I blocked credits. I -opposed an excessive rearmament. I talked against the war and I took -steps to prevent the war. I do not know to whom else this honorary title -of “No man” might apply if not to me. - -DR. DIX: Did you not swear an oath of allegiance to Hitler? - -SCHACHT: I did not swear an oath of allegiance to a certain Herr Hitler. -I swore allegiance to Adolf Hitler as the head of the State of the -German people, just as I did not swear allegiance to the Kaiser or to -President Ebert or to President Hindenburg, except in their capacity as -head of the State; in the same way I did not swear an oath to Adolf -Hitler. The oath of allegiance which I did swear to the head of the -German State does not apply to the person of the head of the State; it -applies to what he represents, the German nation. Perhaps I might add -something in this connection. I would never keep an oath of allegiance -to a perjurer and Hitler has turned out to be a hundredfold perjurer. - -DR. DIX: Göring has made extremely detailed explanations regarding the -Four Year Plan, its origin, its preparation, technical opposition by -you, and the consequences you took because of this opposition. Therefore -we can be brief and deal only with new material, if you have something -new to say. Have you anything to add to Göring’s statements or do you -disagree on points which you remember or about views held? - -SCHACHT: I gather from Göring’s statements that he has described -conditions perfectly correctly and I myself have nothing at all to add -unless you have something special in mind. - -DR. DIX: According to your impressions and the experience you had, when -did Hitler realize that you were an obstacle in the way of a speedy and -extensive rearmament? Did he acknowledge your economic arguments? Was he -satisfied with your policy or not? - -SCHACHT: At that time, in 1936, when the Four Year Plan was introduced -in September I could not tell what Hitler’s inner attitude to me was in -regard to these questions of economic policy. I might say that it was -clear that after my speech at Königsberg in August 1935 he mistrusted -me. But his attitude to my activities in the field of economic policy -was something which I was not yet sure of in 1936. The fact that I had -not in any way participated in the preparation of the Four Year Plan but -heard about it quite by surprise during the Party Rally and that, quite -unexpectedly, Hermann Göring and not the Minister of Economics was -appointed head of the Four Year Plan, as I heard for the first time at -the Party Rally in September 1936—these facts naturally made it clear -to me that Hitler, as far as economic policy with reference to the -entire rearmament program was concerned, did not have that degree of -confidence in me which he thought necessary. Subsequently, here in this -prison, my fellow Defendant Speer showed me a memorandum which he -received from Hitler on the occasion of his taking over the post of -Minister and which, curiously enough, deals in great detail with the -Four Year Plan and my activities, and is dated August 1936. In August -1936 Hitler himself dictated this memorandum which has been shown to me -in prison by my fellow Defendant Speer, and I assume that if I read a -number of brief quotations from it with the permission of... - -DR. DIX: I just want to give an explanation to the Tribunal. We received -the original of this memorandum about three weeks ago from the Camp -Commander of the Camp Dustbin through the kind mediation of the -Prosecution. We then handed it in for translation so that we might -submit it now. But the translation has not yet been completed. I shall -submit the entire memorandum under a new exhibit number when I receive -it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has any application been made in respect to it? - -DR. DIX: No application has been made as yet. I wanted... - -THE PRESIDENT: Which memorandum? Who drew it up? - -DR. DIX: It is a Hitler memorandum of the year 1936, of which there -exist three copies; and one of them was in the Camp Dustbin. This copy -arrived here a fortnight or three weeks ago after we had discussed our -document books with the Prosecution. I intended to submit the -translation of the Hitler memorandum today and at the same time to ask -that this be admitted in evidence, but unfortunately I am not in a -position to do so because the translation is not yet ready. My -colleague, Professor Kraus, was in fact told that it has been mislaid. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, let the defendant go on, and you can submit the -document in evidence and a translation afterwards. - -DR. DIX: Very well. The defendant has a copy and he will quote the most -important, very brief passages. - -SCHACHT: I shall quote very brief passages. Hitler says in this -memorandum, among other things, and I quote: - - “It is, above all, not the task of State economic institutions - to rack their brains about methods of production. This does not - concern the Ministry of Economics at all.” - -The Ministry of Economics was under me, and this is therefore a reproach -for me. - -A further quotation: - - “It is furthermore essential that German iron production be - increased to the utmost. The objection that we are not in a - position to produce the same cheap raw iron from German ore, - which has only 26 percent of iron content, as from the 45 - percent Swedish ores, is unimportant... The objection that in - this case all the German smelting works would have to be - reconstructed is also irrelevant; and, in any case, this is none - of the business of the Ministry of Economics.” - -As is apparent from the statement, I had explained that from 26 percent -ore one could produce steel only at costs twice or three times those at -which one could produce steel from 45 percent ore. And I explained -further that, in order to use 26 percent ore, one would have to have -completely different plants from those using 45 percent ore. Herr Hitler -states that this is none of the business of the Ministry of Economics, -and that, of course, means Herr Schacht. - -There is one last, very brief quotation. I quote: - - “I want to emphasize in this connection that in these tasks I - see the only possible economic mobilization and not in the - curbing of the armament industry...” - -That statement, too, is directed, of course, against my policy. - -DR. DIX: We have now reached the stage of tension of technical -differences between you and Göring, the tension between you and Hitler -regarding your functions as Minister of Economics. What were your -thoughts at the time about resigning from your office as Minister of -Economics? Was it possible for you to resign? Please do not repeat -anything that Lammers and other witnesses have already told us about the -impossibility of resigning. Please talk only about your own special case -and what you yourself did. - -SCHACHT: First of all, I tried to continue my own economic policy, in -spite of the fact that Göring as head of the Four Year Plan tried, of -course, as time went on to take over as many of the tasks concerned with -economic policy as possible. But the very moment Göring encroached on my -rights as Minister of Economics I used it as an opportunity to force my -release from the Ministry of Economics. That was at the beginning of -August 1937. - -At the time I told Hitler very briefly the reason, namely, that if I was -to assume responsibility for economic policy, then I would also have to -be in command. But if I was not in command, then I did not wish to -assume responsibility. The fight for my resignation, fought by me at -times with very drastic measures, lasted approximately two and a half -months until eventually Hitler had to decide to grant me the desired -release in order to prevent the conflict from becoming known to the -public more than it already was. - -DR. DIX: When you say “drastic measures” do you mean your so-called -sit-down strike? - -In this connection I want to submit to the Tribunal Exhibit Number -Schacht-40 of my document book, an affidavit from another former -colleague of Dr. Schacht in the Reich Ministry of Economics, -Kammerdirektor Dr. Asmus. On Page 180 of the English version of this -long affidavit there is a brief passage. I quote: - - “When this was found to be unsuccessful”—it means his - fight—“and when developments continued along the course which - he considered wrong, he”—Schacht—“in the autumn of 1937, long - before the beginning of the war, acted as an upright man and - applied for release from his office as Reich Minister of - Economics and thereby from his co-responsibility. - - “He was obviously not able to resign his office in the normal - way, because for reasons of prestige the Party required the use - of his name. Therefore, in the autumn of 1937, he simply - remained away from the Ministry of Economics for several weeks. - He started this sit-down strike, as it was humorously called in - the Ministry, and went in his official capacity only to the - Reichsbank...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, is it necessary to trouble the Tribunal with all -this detail? There is no dispute that he did resign, and the only thing -that he has got to explain is why he continued to be a Minister. The -Prosecution have given evidence about his resignation and about the -conflict between him and the Defendant Göring. What is the good of going -into all the detail of it, as to this sit-down strike and that sort of -thing? That doesn’t interest the Tribunal. - -DR. DIX: He did not remain a Minister at that time. He resigned as -Minister. - -THE PRESIDENT: I thought he had remained a Minister until 1943. - -DR. DIX: Minister without Portfolio, yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: I didn’t say Minister with Portfolio, I said Minister. - -DR. DIX: Yes, but there is a difference, but I shall come to that later. -I understood you to mean an active Minister, but I shall not go into -that now. It was a misunderstanding. Anyway, I have already finished -that. I was merely trying to show how difficult it was to resign. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] We now come to the manner in which you -were released. Have you anything to add to the statements made by -Lammers in this connection or not? - -SCHACHT: I think we should inform the Tribunal of one matter about which -I also learned here in prison from my fellow Defendant Speer. He -overheard the argument between Hitler and myself on the occasion of that -decisive conference in which I managed to push through my resignation. - -If the Tribunal allow, I shall read it very briefly. There are two or -three sentences. Herr Speer informed me of the following: “I was on the -terrace of Berghof on the Obersalzberg, and I was waiting to submit my -building plans. In the summer of 1937 when Schacht came to the -Berghof...” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: [_Interposing._] Speer is present in the room. For -one defendant to testify as to a conversation with another defendant is -a very convenient way of getting testimony without access to -cross-examination, but it seems to me that it is a highly objectionable -method. I object to this on the ground that it has no probative value to -testify to a conversation of this character when the Defendant Speer is -in the courtroom and can be sworn and can give his testimony. He sits -here and is available. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the subject of the conversation? - -DR. DIX: The subject of this conversation is a matter which concerns the -Defendant Schacht. It is a statement of Hitler regarding Schacht; it is -not a matter which concerns the Defendant Speer. Therefore I consider it -expedient for him, since it is a matter which concerns Schacht, to be -able to make a statement about it. I would, of course, consider it more -appropriate that he should not read something which Speer has written to -him, but that he should give his own account of what happened between -Hitler and Schacht and merely say, “I heard that from Speer.” That -appears to be better than... - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Dix, you may give that. - -DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Will you please not read, then, -but tell of this incident and say you got it from Speer? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is even more objectionable to me than to have -a written statement from Speer. If we are to have Speer’s testimony, it -at least should be Speer’s and not a repetition of a conversation -between the two defendants. If Speer has made a written statement, it -can be submitted to us in the ordinary course. - -This is the second document that we have not had the privilege of seeing -before it has been used here; and it seems to me that if this is a -document signed by Speer—which I don’t understand it to be—if it is, -that is one thing. We can then see it and perhaps it can be used. If it -is a conversation, I should prefer Speer’s version. - -DR. DIX: May I add something? The question of procedure is not of basic -importance for me here. In that case it can be discussed when Speer is -examined. However, I do not know whether Speer is going to be called; -probably he will be. Actually it would be better for us to hear it now, -but I leave it to the Tribunal to decide. It is not a question of great -importance to me. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will allow the evidence. - -DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Well then, without reading, -please describe the incident. - -SCHACHT: The gentlemen on the terrace, among them Speer, heard this -discussion, which was conducted in very loud tones. At the end of the -discussion Hitler came out on the terrace and... - -THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. [_There was a brief pause in the -proceedings._] Very well, Dr. Dix, go on. - -SCHACHT: Hitler came out on the terrace after this conference and said -to those present, among them Speer, that he had had a very serious -argument with Schacht, that he could not work with Schacht, and that -Schacht was upsetting his financial plans. - -DR. DIX: Well then, after you had left your position as Minister of -Economics you were still left authority as Reichsbank President. Were -you approached by Hitler or the Minister of Finance in your capacity as -President of the Reichsbank and asked for credit? - -SCHACHT: After the Reichsbank had discontinued giving credits, on 31 -March 1938, the Reich Minister of Finance of course received more urgent -demands for money and toward the end of that year he found himself in -the awkward situation of not being able to pay even the salaries of the -civil servants from the treasury. He came to me and asked me to grant -him a special credit. According to its charter and laws the Reichsbank -was entitled and to a certain extent obliged, but actually only -entitled, to advance to the Reich up to 400 million marks per annum. The -Reich Minister of Finance had received these 400 million marks and he -was asking, over and above that, for further credits; the Reichsbank -refused to give him these credits. The Reich Minister of Finance had to -go to the private banks and all the large banks together gave him a -credit of a few hundred million marks. However, the Reichsbank did not -participate in this credit. - -DR. DIX: If you as President of the Reichsbank turned down those -credits, then it seems there was nothing for it but to print more notes. -Did Hitler or anyone else suggest to you that the note printing presses -should be set in motion? - -SCHACHT: After the events of November 1938 I paid one more visit to -London, in December, to attend a conference regarding the financing of -the Jewish emigration from Germany in an orderly manner—a thing which I -myself had suggested. On that occasion I also talked with Prime Minister -Chamberlain. On 2 January 1939 I arrived at the Berghof in Berchtesgaden -to report to Hitler about these matters. On that occasion we, of course, -also got to talk about the financial needs of the Reich. I still refused -to give credit to the Reich, and pointed out the very difficult -financial situation which called for, or should have called for, a -reduction of State expenditure and thus of armament expenditure. - -In particular, I pointed out that at the beginning of December the first -instalment of the so-called Jewish fine—which had been imposed on the -Jews after the murder of Herr Vorn Rath in Paris and which had been -collected to the extent of 250 million marks at the beginning of -December—that this first instalment of 250 million marks had not been -received entirely in the form of cash, but that the Reich Minister of -Finance had had to agree to accept a considerable part of it “in kind,” -as the English say, because it was not possible to make liquid the cash -necessary for this payment. Hitler replied: “But we can circulate notes -on the basis of these goods. I have looked into the question of our -future financial policy very carefully and when I get back to Berlin in -a few days I shall discuss my plans with you and the Minister of -Finance.” - -I saw at once that it was Hitler’s intention to resort to the printing -of notes to meet this expenditure with or without the necessary cover, -but at any rate against certain securities. The danger of inflation was -now definitely imminent. And since I realized at once that this was the -point where I and the Reichsbank had to say “stop,” I replied to him, -“Very well, in that case I will get the Reichsbank to submit a -memorandum to you, setting out the attitude of the Reichsbank to this -problem and which can be used at the joint meeting with the Finance -Minister.” - -After that I went back to Berlin and informed my colleagues in the -Reichsbank Directorate. We saw, to our personal satisfaction, that here -was an opportunity for us to divorce ourselves definitely from that type -of policy. - -The memorandum dated 7 January which the Reichsbank Directorate then -submitted to Hitler has, I think, also been submitted as evidence by the -Prosecution. - -In order to explain the statements which the Reichsbank Directorate made -to Hitler in this decisive moment regarding further State expenditure -and especially armament expenditure, I ask permission to read only two -very brief sentences from this memorandum. It says, and I quote: - - “Unrestrained public expenditure constitutes a definite threat - to our currency. The unlimited growth of government expenditure - defies any attempts to draw up a regulated budget. It brings - State finances to the verge of ruin despite a tremendous - increase in taxes, and it undermines the currency and the - issuing bank.” - -Then there is another sentence, and I quote: - - “...if during the two great foreign political actions in Austria - and the Sudetenland an increase in public expenditure was - necessary, the fact that after the termination of these two - foreign political actions a reduction of expenditure is not - noticeable and that everything seems rather to indicate that a - further increase of expenditure is planned, makes it now our - absolute duty to point out what the consequences will be for our - currency. - - “The undersigned Directors of the Reichsbank are sufficiently - conscious of the fact that in their co-operation they have - gladly devoted all their energy to the great aims that have been - set, but that a halt must now be called.” - -DR. DIX: This memorandum has already been submitted by the Prosecution -under the Document Number EC-369, but it is being submitted again as -Exhibit Schacht-24 in our document book, Page 70 of the English text, -and Page 63 of the German text. - -I shall have to put various questions to Dr. Schacht on that memorandum, -but I think that perhaps there is not time now and that I should do so -tomorrow. - -THE PRESIDENT: If you must, Dr. Dix; but do you think that is very -important? At any rate, you had better do it tomorrow, if you are going -to do it at all. - -DR. DIX: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, can you inform us whether those extracts are -the same as the extracts which were refused in the case of the Defendant -Ribbentrop? - -DR. SIEMERS: I have made a comparison, and I can hand it to the Tribunal -in writing. Some documents are the same, some do not tally, and some are -missing. I have done that in writing. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - -The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 2 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH DAY - Thursday, 2 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal would like to know exactly what -your letter means, which they received from you, relating to the -following documents which the letter says have been withdrawn. What I -want to know is, does it mean that they are not to be translated? Let me -read you the numbers: 18, 19, 48, 53, 76, 80, 81, 82, 86, and 101. Now, -does your letter mean that those documents are not to be translated? - -DR. SIEMERS: No, Your Lordship; that means that the British Delegation -informed me yesterday morning that the objections against those -documents on the part of the British Delegation are withdrawn. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see. - -DR. SIEMERS: I had written the letter on 30 April, in the afternoon, -after I had had a conversation with Sir David. The following morning I -was informed... - -THE PRESIDENT: We won’t bother with that. You say that their objections -no longer exist. If they agree to that, well and good. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, apparently there seems to have been -some misunderstanding about three of them, Numbers 80, 101, and 76. The -others were not objected to. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, on 76 there seemed to be some -misunderstanding between Dr. Siemers and myself. I understood that he -did not want to persist in the legal report on the _Altmark_ incident, -and I think Dr. Siemers thought that I wasn’t persisting. However, I -thought Dr. Siemers was withdrawing that. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, then, are you still objecting to that? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am still objecting to it if it is not -withdrawn, My Lord. However, the other ones in the list Your Lordship -mentioned—that is Numbers 18, 19, 48, 53, 81, 82, and 86—there is no -objection to. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Concerning Document 76, I agree with Sir David. Number 76 -can be struck out, as far as I am concerned. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. That’s all I wanted to know. - -DR. SIEMERS: Number 80 about which I have spoken in detail with the -British Delegation... - -THE PRESIDENT: You need not tell me about it. - -DR. SIEMERS: I assumed there would be no objection. I would like to ask -that it be admitted in any case. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is right. In order that the Translation -Division should get on as soon as possible, the Tribunal has decided -upon these documents and the only questions upon which the Tribunal has -decided is that they shall be translated. The question of their -admissibility will be decided after they have been translated, and I -will take them in the categories of objection which are set out in Sir -David’s memorandum. - -In Category A, the first category, Number 66 will be allowed. Number 76 -as Dr. Siemers has now said, goes out. Numbers 101 to 106 will be -allowed, the rest are disallowed in A. In B the following documents will -be allowed: Numbers 39, 63, 64, 99, and 100. And, of course, Numbers 102 -to 107, which are allowed under A. The rest will not be allowed. - -Category C: The following will be allowed: Numbers 38, 50, 55, and 58. -The remainder are not allowed. - -Category D: The following will be allowed: Numbers 29, 56, 57, 60, and -62. - -Category E: The following will be allowed: Numbers 31, 32, 36, 37, 39, -41, and of course 99 and 101 which have already been allowed. - -In the last category, Category F, the Tribunal has very great doubts as -to the relevance of any of the documents in that category, but it will -have them all translated with the exception of Document 73. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: My Lord, I wonder whether the Tribunal would -allow me to mention the document numbers of the additional extracts from -_Der Stürmer_ which were put in cross-examination of Streicher. I had -the numbers ready to present at a convenient time. - -THE PRESIDENT: The exhibit numbers? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean read them? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: With the permission of the Tribunal, I have -proposed to hand in that schedule, which is in effect a catalogue or -index to the two bundles which the Tribunal had—Bundle A and Bundle -B—and I proposed then putting this schedule in as an exhibit itself, -which will become GB-450, (Document Number D-833), and if the Tribunal -agrees, that would save reading any numbers out. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There is another request I would make. The -original of the newspaper, _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, was put in, or -has been put in. Those volumes I have borrowed from a library, and I was -going to ask the Tribunal’s permission to have the extracts photographed -and to substitute with the Tribunal’s Secretariat the photostats, and -then take back the originals so that they might be returned. - -THE PRESIDENT: There seems no objection to that. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have no objection to that, Dr. Marx? - -DR. MARX: No, Mr. President, I have no objection to that. I reserve the -right to submit some counter documents if it should be necessary. But -the presentation of these documents is in accordance with what Colonel -Griffith-Jones stated in the course of the proceedings—if they are -submitted... - -THE PRESIDENT: You have a copy of this document here, this exhibit. - -DR. MARX: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am asking you whether you had any objection to the -original of the Jewish newspaper being returned... - -DR. MARX: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: ...after it is photographed. - -DR. MARX: No, I have no objection to that. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Dix? - -DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, I believe you still had to supplement your answer -to a question I put to you yesterday. I put to you the point that -different memoranda, letters, _et cetera_ from you to Hitler were full -of National Socialist phraseology. I said you dealt with letters and -memoranda from the date of the seizure of power until later when you -went into opposition. The Prosecution, however, specifically in the oral -presentation of the charges, as I remember it, referred to at least one -letter which you addressed to Hitler before the seizure of power in -November 1932, and there is in the files another letter of similar -contents of August 1932. I think you should state your position with -respect to these two letters, supplementing your answer to my question. - -DR. SCHACHT: I explained to you yesterday already that up to the -decisive election of July 1932, I had in no way intervened in the -development of the National Socialist movement, but remained completely -aloof from it. After that movement achieved its overpowering success in -July 1932, of which I spoke yesterday, I foresaw very clearly the -development which would now result. According to the principles of the -democratic political concept there was only one possibility, namely, -that the leader of that overwhelmingly large party would now have to -form a new government. I rejected from the first the other theoretical -possibility of a military government and a possibly resulting civil war, -as being impossible and incompatible with my principles. - -Therefore, after I had recognized these facts I endeavored in everything -to gain influence over Hitler and his movement, and the two letters -which you have just mentioned were written in that spirit. - -DR. DIX: What did you know about Hitler’s plans against Austria? - -SCHACHT: I never knew anything about plans against Austria. Nor did I -know in detail the plans Hitler had for Austria. I only knew—like the -majority of all Germans—that he was in favor of an Anschluss of Austria -with Germany. - -DR. DIX: What did you know about his plans against Czechoslovakia? - -SCHACHT: I knew nothing of his plans against Czechoslovakia until about -the time of the Munich Conference. - -DR. DIX: Did you, after the Munich Conference, that is to say, after the -peaceful, so far peaceful settlement of the Sudeten question, hear a -remark of Hitler’s about Munich which was of importance in your later -personal attitude toward Hitler? Will you tell the Tribunal the remark -which you heard? - -SCHACHT: May I say first that, according to my knowledge of conditions -at that time, Hitler was conceded in Munich more than he had ever -expected. According to my information—and I expressed this also in the -conversation with Ambassador Bullitt at that time—it was Hitler’s -purpose to gain autonomy for the Germans in Czechoslovakia. In Munich -the Allies presented him with the transfer of the Sudeten-German -territories on a silver platter. I assumed, of course, that now Hitler’s -ambition would be more than satisfied and I can only say that I was -surprised and shocked when a few days after Munich I saw Hitler. I had -no further conversation with him at that time, but I met him with his -entourage, mostly SS men, and from the conversation between him and the -SS men I could only catch the remark: “That fellow has spoiled my entry -into Prague.” That is to say made it impossible. - -Apparently he was not satisfied with the great success which he had -achieved in foreign politics, but I mentioned when I spoke about it -yesterday the fact that I assumed from that remark that he lacked the -glory and a glamorous staging. - -DR. DIX: And what were your feelings in regard to your whole political -attitude towards Hitler after Munich? - -SCHACHT: In spite of the foreign political success I regretted very -deeply, and so did my close friends, that by this intervention on the -part of the Allied Powers, our attempt to remove the Hitler regime was -ruined for a long time to come—we did not know at that time of course -what would happen in the future—but, naturally, at that moment we had -to resign ourselves to it. - -DR. DIX: What did you know about Hitler’s plans against Memel? - -SCHACHT: I knew nothing at all and never heard anything about it. As far -as I know, I learned of the annexation of Memel by Germany on my trip to -India, which I had already started at that time. - -DR. DIX: And since you were in India at that time, you, of course, heard -nothing either about the negotiations, _et cetera_, which preceded the -attack on Poland? - -SCHACHT: I had no knowledge about that and therefore I also knew nothing -of the May meeting of 1939 which has been discussed several times. In -the beginning of March I left Berlin and then stayed for some time in -Switzerland; at the end of March I set out for India via Genoa, and so I -learned nothing at all about the Hacha affair, that is the establishment -of the protectorate in Czechoslovakia, nor of Memel, nor of Poland, -since I did not return from the trip to India until the beginning of -August. - -DR. DIX: The invasions of Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark have -been taken up here. Did you approve of these measures and actions? - -SCHACHT: Under no circumstances. - -DR. DIX: Were you ever able to express that disapproval anywhere and -how? - -SCHACHT: Before the invasion of Belgium I was visited on the order of -the Chief of the General Staff, Halder, by the Quartermaster General, -the then Colonel, later General Wagner who after the collapse committed -suicide. He informed me of the intended invasion of Belgium. I was -shocked and I replied at that time, “If you want to commit that insanity -too, then you are beyond help.” - -THE PRESIDENT: What time? - -SCHACHT: Before the march into Belgium. Exactly when it was I could not -say. It may have been already in November 1939. It may have been in -April 1940. I no longer know exactly when it was. - -DR. DIX: Even though you did not approve of that action, Germany was -after all engaged in a life and death struggle. Did not that cause you -to put your active co-operation at her disposal, since you were still -Minister without Portfolio, though you no longer held a special office? - -SCHACHT: I did not do that. - -DR. DIX: Did anyone ask you to do that? - -SCHACHT: The visit, which I have just mentioned, of Quartermaster -General Wagner, upon order of the Chief of General Staff Halder, was -intended to persuade me to act in Germany’s interest during the expected -occupation of Belgium. I was to supervise and direct currency, finance, -and banking matters in Belgium. I flatly refused that. Later I was -approached again by the then Military Governor of Belgium, General Von -Falkenhausen, for advice concerning the Belgian financial -administration. I again refused to give advice and did not make any -statements or participate in any way. - -DR. DIX: When did you for the first time... - -SCHACHT: I could perhaps relate another instance when I was approached. -One day, shortly after America was drawn into the war, I received a -request from the newspaper published by Goebbels, that, on account of my -knowledge of American conditions, I should write an article for _Das -Reich_, to assure the German people that the war potential of the United -States should not be overestimated. I refused to write that article for -the reason that precisely because I knew American conditions very well, -my statement could only amount to the exact opposite. And so I refused -in this instance also. - -DR. DIX: When did you hear for the first time of the meeting which we -call here simply the Hossbach meeting, or the meeting concerning the -Hossbach protocol? - -SCHACHT: To my great surprise, I was informed of that meeting on 20 -October 1945, here in my cell, and I was extremely astonished that -during all previous interrogations I had never been asked about this -record, because it can be seen clearly from it that the Reich Government -was not to be informed of Hitler’s intentions for war and therefore -could not know anything about them. - -DR. DIX: Did you take part in similar conferences which were preparatory -to attacks, for instance the meeting of November 1940 in which the -attack on Russia was discussed? I do not wish to be misunderstood—the -Speer document which you spoke of yesterday discusses an attack which -according to Hitler was threatened by Russia. I am speaking now of -discussions in which the subject was an attack on Russia. - -SCHACHT: The fear of an attack from Russia dates back to the fall of -1936 and therefore has as yet nothing to do with the war. I never took -part in any conference which indicated intentions of war, consequently -not in the conference on the intended attack on Russia, and I never -heard anything about it. - -DR. DIX: Does that also apply to the meeting of May 1941? - -SCHACHT: At the moment, I do not know which meeting that is, but I did -not in any way take part in any meeting in May 1941, as during the -entire period when I was Minister without Portfolio, I never took part -in any official conference. - -DR. DIX: Then you also did not get any information about the conferences -which the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka had in Berlin? - -SCHACHT: I did not have the slightest knowledge of the Matsuoka -conference except what may perhaps have been said on the radio or in the -press. - -DR. DIX: Mention has been made in some way that you at one time had made -available 200,000 marks for Nazi propaganda purposes in Austria. Is -there any truth in this? - -SCHACHT: I have not the slightest knowledge of that. - -DR. DIX: Now we come to your dismissal as President of the Reichsbank. -As you have heard, the Prosecution asserts that you finally brought -about your own dismissal in order to evade the financial responsibility. -I ask you to reply to that accusation and to tell the Tribunal briefly -but exhaustively the reasons and the tactical deliberations leading to -your dismissal and that of your assistants. They appear here in the -memorandum of the Reichsbank Directorate which has been under -consideration several times. - -SCHACHT: I should like to divide the question into two parts: The first -question is whether I tried to rid myself of my office as President of -the Reichsbank. My answer to that question is a most emphatic “yes.” -Since the middle of 1938, we in the Reichsbank always considered that if -there were no change in policy, we in no event wanted to continue in -office, because—and that brings me to the second part of the -question—we did not want to assume the responsibility which we were -then expected to bear. - -For everything which we did previously and for a defensive rearmament in -order to achieve equal rights for Germany in international politics, we -gladly assumed responsibility, and we assume it before history and this -Tribunal. But the responsibility for continuing rearmament which -possibly in itself constituted a serious potential danger of war or -which would ever aim at war intentionally—that responsibility none of -us wanted to assume. Consequently, when it became clear that Hitler was -working toward a further increase in rearmament—and I spoke about that -yesterday in connection with the conversation of 2 January 1939—when we -became aware of that we wrote the memorandum which was openly quoted and -is in the hands of this Tribunal as an exhibit. It indicates clearly -that we opposed every further increase of state expenditure and would -not assume responsibility for it. From that, Hitler gathered that he -would in no event be able to use the Reichsbank with its present -Directorate and President for any future financial purposes. Therefore, -there remained only one alternative; to change the Directorate, because -without the Reichsbank he could not go on. And he had to take a second -step; he had to change the Reichsbank Law. That is to say, an end had to -be put to the independence of the Reichsbank from government decrees. At -first he did that in a secret law—we had such things—of 19 or 20 -January 1939. That law was published only about 6 months later. That law -abolished the independence of the Reichsbank and the President of the -Reichsbank became a mere cashier for the credit demands of the Reich, -that is to say, of Hitler. - -The Reichsbank Directorate did not want to continue along this line of -development. Therefore, on 20 January the President of the Reichsbank, -the Vice President, and the main financial expert, Reichsbank Director -Huelse, were dismissed; three other members of the Directorate of the -Reichsbank, Geheimrat Vocke, Director Erhard, and Director Blessing -pressed insistently for their resignation from the Reichsbank until it -was also granted. Two other members of the Reichsbank Directorate, -Director Puhl, whose name has been mentioned here already, and an eighth -director, Director Poetschmann, remained in the Directorate even under -the new conditions. They were both Party members, the only ones in the -Directorate, and therefore they could not easily withdraw. - -DR. DIX: That is one accusation which is made by the Prosecution -concerning your reasons for writing the memorandum, that is to say, to -evade the financial responsibility. The second accusation is that not a -word of this memorandum expressly mentions limitation of armaments, but -that it essentially treats only matters of currency, technical questions -of finance, and economic considerations; and that it was therefore the -Dr. Schacht who in his capacity of Bank Director was concerned about the -currency, rather than the opponent of rearmament, who made himself heard -by this memorandum. - -It is necessary that as co-author of the memorandum—as its main -author—you state your position with regard to this incriminating -interpretation of the memorandum. - -SCHACHT: Even at an earlier time I said here that every objection which -I made and had to make to Hitler—and that applies not only to myself -but to all ministers—could only be made with arguments arising out of -the particular department administered. - -Had I said to Hitler, “I shall not give you any more money because you -intend to wage war,” I should not have the pleasure of conducting this -animated conversation here with you. I could then have consulted a -priest, and it would have been a very one-sided affair because I would -have lain silently in my tomb, and the priest would have delivered a -monologue. - -DR. DIX: This memorandum is certainly very important, and therefore we -have to pause here for a moment. In summarizing—and please check me—I -believe I can express your views in this way: This memorandum at the end -contained demands such as further means of raising funds by increase of -taxation or else by making use of the stock market—both impossible. -Taxation could not be increased any more. The stock market had just -unsuccessfully attempted a loan. - -If these actually impossible demands had been granted, the Reichsbank -would have created guarantees that no further funds would be used for -one or another form of rearmament. This success was not to be expected; -rather you could expect your dismissal. Did my brief but comprehensive -summary of this matter express your views correctly? - -SCHACHT: That entire letter was composed in such a way that there were -only two possible answers to it; either an alteration of financial -policy—and that meant a stop to rearmament, which would have amounted -to a complete change of Hitler’s policy—or else the dismissal of the -Reichsbank President; and that happened. We expected it because at that -time I no longer believed that Hitler would change his policy so -completely. - -DR. DIX: Therefore, the Prosecution are right in saying that your -mission ended with your dismissal. - -SCHACHT: Hitler certainly confirmed that himself and in the letter of -dismissal to me said it expressly. We heard from the testimony of Herr -Lammers in this Court that Hitler with his own hand wrote that addition -into the letter, that my name would remain connected with the first -stage of rearmament. The second stage of rearmament I rejected and -Hitler understood that very clearly, because when he received that -letter from the Reichsbank he said to those who were present: “This is -mutiny.” - -DR. DIX: How do you know that? - -SCHACHT: The witness Vocke who will, I hope, appear in this Court will -testify to that. - -DR. DIX: Furthermore, the Prosecution asserted that your exit from the -political stage could not be attributed to your policy of opposition to -a war but to disputes with Hermann Göring over power and rank. As such, -that accusation seems to me to have been refuted already by statements -which Göring and Lammers have made up to now. We do not wish to -recapitulate. I merely want to ask you whether you have anything to add -to the statements made on this subject by Göring and Lammers, or whether -you disagree with them. - -SCHACHT: In his oral presentation the prosecutor said that throughout -the entire material which he had studied he could not find one piece of -evidence for my opposition to a policy of war. I can only say in this -respect: If someone on account of his shortsightedness does not see a -tree on a level plain, there is surely no proof that the tree is not -there. - -DR. DIX: You have heard from the Prosecution that you are accused of -having remained a member of the Cabinet as a Reich Minister without -Portfolio. That was also the cause for misunderstanding yesterday. I -merely wanted to express yesterday that you had resigned as an active -minister and head of a department, that you resigned as Minister of -Economy and His Lordship correctly pointed out, that of course you -remained a Minister without Portfolio, that is without a special sphere -of activity until January 1943. Of that you are accused by the -Prosecution. What caused you to remain Reich Minister without Portfolio? -Why did you do that? Did you have any particular financial reasons? -Excuse my mentioning that, but the trial brief, on Page 5, charges you -with that motive. - -SCHACHT: I have already repeatedly explained here that my release from -office as Minister of Economy encountered very great difficulties, and -you have also submitted several affidavits confirming the fact. - -Hitler did not, under any circumstances, want it to be known that a -break or even so much as a difference of opinion had occurred between -one of his assistants and himself. When he finally approved my release, -he attached the condition that nominally I should remain Minister -without Portfolio. - -As regards the second accusation, it is as unworthy as it is wrong. -There was a law in Germany that if a person held two public offices he -could be paid only for one. Since I was in addition President of the -Reichsbank I continuously received my income from the Reichsbank, at -first my salary and later my pension; therefore as a minister I drew no -salary whatever. - -DR. DIX: Did you then, during the entire period of your position as -Reich Minister without Portfolio, have any other function to fulfill in -that capacity? Did you take any part in important decisions of the -Cabinet, did you participate in discussions—in brief, was the Minister -without Portfolio just a fancy dress major or was the position one of -substance? - -SCHACHT: I have already emphasized again and again in this Court—and I -can only repeat it again—that after I left the Reichsbank I had not a -single official discussion; I did not take part in a single ministerial -or official conference and that, unfortunately, it was not possible for -me to bring up any subject for discussion; for I had no factual basis or -pretext for such a possibility, for the very reason that I had no -particular field to administer. I believe that I was the only Minister -without Portfolio—there were also a few others—who was not active in -any way at all. As far as I know, Seyss-Inquart was undoubtedly Minister -without Portfolio; he had his administration in Holland. Frank was -Minister without Portfolio and had his administration in Poland. -Schirach—I do not know whether he was Minister without Portfolio; I -think it has been mentioned once, but I do not know if it is correct—he -had his Austrian administration in Vienna. I had nothing further to do -with the state administration or in any other way with the State or the -Party. - -DR. DIX: What about the ordinary course of affairs? Were there perhaps -any circulars sent out by Lammers on which you acted? - -SCHACHT: On the whole—and I think it is understandable after what I -have stated here—I watched carefully for every possibility of -intervening again in some way but I remember and state with absolute -certainty, that during the entire time until the collapse I received all -in all three official memoranda. The numerous invitations to state -funerals and similar social state functions really need not be mentioned -here as official communications. I did not participate in these -occasions either. However, these three instances are interesting. The -first time it was a letter from Hitler—pardon, from Himmler—a circular -or request or a bill proposed by Himmler who intended to transfer court -jurisdiction over the so-called asocial elements of the population to -the police, or rather the Gestapo, that is to say, a basic principle of -the administration of justice to separate the functions of prosecution -and judge... - -DR. DIX: Well, that is known, Dr. Schacht. You can assume that is known. - -SCHACHT: In regard to this question I immediately assented in the copy -of a letter which Reich Minister Frank had sent me in which he took a -stand against this basic violation of legal principles, and the bill was -not made law. It would indeed have been extremely regrettable, because I -am firmly convinced that I myself was a definite anti-social element in -Himmler’s sense. - -The second instance was a letter concerning some discussions about state -property in Yugoslavia, after we had occupied Yugoslavia. I answered -that since I had not taken part in the preliminary discussions on the -draft of the law I should not be counted upon to assist in this matter. - -Finally, the third incident—and this is the most important—occurred in -November 1942. Apparently by mistake there came into circulation the -draft for a law of the Reich Minister for Air, which contained the -suggestion of taking 15 and 16 year old students away from the high -school to enlist them for military service in the anti-aircraft defense, -the so-called Flakdienst. I answered this letter because it was a -welcome opportunity for me to state for once my opinion on the military -situation in a long detailed reply which I sent to Göring. - -DR. DIX: On the third of November? - -SCHACHT: It is a letter of 30 November, which on the second of December -I believe was given personally by my secretary to the adjutant of Göring -in a closed envelope, with the request that he himself open it. - -DR. DIX: One moment, Dr. Schacht. - -[_Turning to the Tribunal._] That letter has already been submitted -under Document Number 3700-PS by the Prosecution, but it is also in our -document book under Exhibit Number 23; Page 66 of the English text and -Page 59 of the German text. If we were not so pressed for time, it would -have been especially gratifying for me to read this letter here in full. -It is a very fine letter. However, I want to take time into -consideration and I merely ask you, Dr. Schacht, to state briefly your -opinion of its content. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will read the letter. It isn’t necessary for -you to read it now, is it? - -DR. DIX: Very well. Well, then, would he speak quite briefly about the -letter before the recess or do you not wish to say anything further? - -SCHACHT: Yes. I would like to say in this connection, if it is -permitted, that to my knowledge this letter has already been read here -by the American Chief Prosecutor, that is... - -DR. DIX: Read? - -SCHACHT: Or mentioned, or at least the most important points were read. -I believe it is sufficient if you submit the letter to the Court in -evidence. - -DR. DIX: Yes, that has been done. - -Now, that constituted your entire activity as Reich Minister without -Portfolio? - -SCHACHT: Yes, that was the end of it. - -DR. DIX: Therefore if one wanted to define your position in one word, -one would say, just a kind of retired major (Charaktermajor). - -SCHACHT: I don’t know what a “Charaktermajor” is, at any rate, I was -never a major, but I have always had character. - -DR. DIX: But, Dr. Schacht, that is a historical remark about authority -conferred by Kaiser Wilhelm, the First as German Emperor on Bismarck. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think this is a convenient time to break off. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, we spoke of the letter, dated 30 November 1942, to -Göring. Did that letter have any consequences? - -SCHACHT: Yes, the letter had very considerable consequences. It had the -result that on 22 January I did at last receive my long hoped-for -release from my position of a nominal Minister without Portfolio. The -reason given for it, however, was less pleasant. I believe the letter is -already in the files of the Tribunal. It is a letter attached to the -official document of release from Lammers. - -DR. DIX: Yes, very well. We put a question on that subject during -Lammers’ hearing. - -SCHACHT: Yes. But I should only like to refer to the statement which -says: “...in view of your entire conduct in the present fateful struggle -of the German nation...”—so that was my whole attitude. - -DR. DIX: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, it is Number 26 of the document -book. It is on Page 76 of the English text and on Page 69 of the German -text. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Please continue. - -SCHACHT: It was, therefore, my entire attitude during this war which led -to my dismissal, and the letter of dismissal also contained the -statement that I would be dismissed for the time being. According to -Lammers’ statement, as we have heard, this expression “for the time -being” was included in the letter, also on the Führer’s initiative. I -was very clearly aware of this wording when I received the letter. - -Two days later I was removed from the Prussian State Council, of which I -was a member—a body, incidentally, which had not met for at least 8 -years. At any rate, I was not at the meetings. Perhaps it was 6 years, I -do not know. The text of that decision was communicated to me by the -chairman of that State Council, Hermann Göring, and because of its -almost amusing contents, I still recollect it very clearly. It stated: - - “My answer to your defeatist letter undermining the power of - resistance of the German people is that I remove you from the - Prussian State Council.” - -I say it was amusing because a sealed letter written by me to Göring -could not possibly shake the power of resistance of the German people. A -further result was that Party Leader Bormann demanded from me the return -of the Golden Party Badge and I did that at once. After that I was -particularly closely watched by the Gestapo. I gave up my residence in -Berlin immediately, within 24 hours, and for the whole day the Gestapo -spies followed me all over Berlin both on foot and by car. Then I -quietly retired to my estate in the country. - -DR. DIX: Now, since the trial brief has mentioned material and pecuniary -reasons for the decisions which you made, it appears to me justified and -necessary to ask what was the position regarding your property and your -income after 1933? In your reply please take into consideration that it -is striking that in 1942 there was an increase in your income. - -SCHACHT: A few months ago, apparently with the approval of the Military -Government, there appeared in the press a list of donations which the -Party leaders and ministers in Germany received and, in that connection, -of their income and their property. I was also listed, not under -“donations,” but it was stated that in 1942 I had an unusually high -income. This list is incorrect, since it is a gross figure which is -mentioned and it does not take into consideration the fact that the war -profit tax was later deducted from it. When the list was compiled the -tax was not yet determined, so that about 80 percent must be deducted -from the sum which is given there. The income is then no longer striking -in any way. In regard to my property, the list shows that over a period -of 10 years it has hardly changed, and I want to emphasize here -particularly that in the last 20 years my property remained -approximately the same and did not increase. - -DR. DIX: If I remember rightly you reduced your own salary as President -of the Reichsbank at a certain time on your own initiative? - -SCHACHT: When, on Hitler’s suggestion, President Hindenburg in March of -1933 appointed me again to the position of President of the Reichsbank, -Hitler left it to me to fix my own income. At that time, I voluntarily -reduced my income to less than 25 percent of my former income from the -Reichsbank. - -DR. DIX: Did you ever receive presents or donations from Hitler, either -in money or in valuables? - -SCHACHT: As I have just mentioned, I have never received any kind of -donations from Hitler, and I think he would hardly have risked offering -me one. I did, indeed, receive one present from Hitler, on the occasion -of my 60th birthday. He gave me a picture which certainly had the value -of about 20,000 marks. It was an oil painting by a German painter -Spitzweg; and would have been worth approximately 200,000 marks if it -had been genuine. As soon as the picture was brought into my room I -recognized it as a forgery, but I succeeded about 3 months later in -tracing the original. I started proceedings on the subject of the -genuineness of the picture, and the forgery was established before a -court. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is not appropriate for the Tribunal to listen to this. - -DR. DIX: Did Hitler ever bestow on you the right to wear a uniform or -give you any kind of decoration or military rank? - -SCHACHT: If the Tribunal will permit me I would like to say that I -returned the forgery and it was never replaced; so that I have received -no presents from Hitler. - -Hitler offered me a uniform. He said I could have any uniform I desired -but I only raised my hands in refusal and did not accept any, not even -the uniform of an official, because I did not wish to have a uniform. - -DR. DIX: Now, another subject: Did you know anything about the -concentration camps? - -SCHACHT: Already in the year 1933, when Göring established concentration -camps, I heard several times that political opponents and other disliked -or inconvenient persons were taken away to a concentration camp. That -these people were deprived of their liberty perturbed me very much at -the time, of course, and I continuously demanded, as far as I was in a -position to do so during conversations, that the arrest and removal to -concentration camps should be followed by a clarification before the law -with a defense and so on, and suitable legal proceedings. At that early -time the Reich Minister of the Interior Frick also protested -energetically along the same lines. Subsequently this type of -imprisonment, _et cetera_, became less known in public, and in -consequence I assumed that things were slowly abating. Only much -later—let us say the second half of 1934 and 1935... - -DR. DIX: When you met Gisevius, you mean? - -SCHACHT: Yes, when I met Gisevius—I heard on repeated occasions that -not only were people still being deprived of their liberty, but that -sometimes they were being ill-treated, that beatings, _et cetera_, took -place. I have already said before this Tribunal that as a result, as -early as May 1935, I personally took the opportunity of drawing Hitler’s -attention to these conditions and that I told him at the time that such -a system was causing the whole world to despise us and must cease. I -have mentioned that I repeatedly took a stand against all these things -publicly, whenever there was a possibility of doing so. - -But I never heard anything of the serious ill-treatment and -outrages—murder and the like—which started later. Probably because, -firstly, these conditions did not begin until after the war, after the -outbreak of war, and because already from 1939 onwards I led a very -retired life. I heard of these things and of the dreadful form in which -they happened only here in prison. However, I did hear, as early as 1938 -and after, of the deportation of Jews; but because individual cases were -brought to my notice I could only ascertain that there were deportations -to Theresienstadt, where allegedly there was an assembly camp for Jews, -where Jews were accommodated until a later date when the Jewish problem -was to be dealt with again. Any physical ill-treatment, not to speak of -killing or the like, never came to my knowledge. - -DR. DIX: Did you ever take a look at a concentration camp? - -SCHACHT: I had an opportunity of acquainting myself with several -concentration camps when, on 23 July 1944, I myself was dragged into a -concentration camp. Before that date I did not visit a single -concentration camp at any time, but afterwards I got to know not only -the ordinary concentration camps but also the extermination camp in -Flossenbürg. - -DR. DIX: Did you not, while in Flossenbürg, receive a visit from a -“comrade-in-ideas”—if I may say so? - -SCHACHT: I know of this matter only from a letter which this gentleman -sent to you or to this Tribunal, I believe, and in which he describes -that visit. I can only, on my own observation... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think it is improper to give the contents of a -letter from a person unidentified. I have said to this Tribunal before -that these letters which come from unidentified persons—if he is -identified, it has not been done in evidence—come to all of us. I am -sure members of the Tribunal get a great many of them. If that is -evidence, then the Prosecution should reopen its case, because I have -baskets of them. - -I think it is highly improper to take communications and put them in -evidence directly and it is even more improper to relate all of them by -oral testimony when the document is not produced. I think this kind of -evidence has no probative value and I object to it. - -DR. DIX: May I be permitted to say that I would never do anything -improper nor have I done it. I do not intend in any way to submit this -very harmless jocular letter to the Tribunal as evidence. But this -letter, which reached me through quite regular channels, informed Dr. -Schacht and myself that there existed a plan to murder him in -Flossenbürg. That is why I also questioned the witness Kaltenbrunner on -this matter. The only reason why I am asking Dr. Schacht is that I -expect him to inform the Tribunal that according to this information -there was in fact at that time an order to murder him. This fact, not -the letter, is not without some significance, because if a regime wants -to kill a man then that is at least proof of the fact that it is not -particularly well-disposed toward him. That is the only reason why I -asked that this letter be submitted, and it is, of course, also at Mr. -Justice Jackson’s disposal. It is really quite an amusing letter, -written by a simple man. - -But I would never have considered submitting this letter as a document -in evidence. If the Tribunal have objections to hearing the matter, a -matter which was also discussed when Kaltenbrunner was examined, then I -shall willingly omit it. I am quite astonished that the matter should be -given so much significance. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal thinks that the letter isn’t being -offered in evidence, and therefore you ought not to refer to it. Well, -then, don’t refer to it. - -DR. DIX: All right, we shall leave it. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, now, at last you were released. What -did you do then? - -SCHACHT: After that time I did nothing more apart from continuing my -efforts towards the removal of Hitler. That was my only political -activity. For the rest, I was living on my estate. - -DR. DIX: Did you not go on a journey in the spring of 1939? - -SCHACHT: Excuse me, you are speaking of the time after the dismissal as -President of the Reichsbank, I thought you meant minister. I was just -talking of 1943. - -DR. DIX: No. No. - -SCHACHT: You are going back to the year 1939. After the dismissal in -January 1939 I already mentioned that Hitler suggested to me that I -should go on an extensive journey abroad and at the time I went to India -by way of Switzerland, where I again saw my friends. - -DR. DIX: Were you in any way politically active in India? - -SCHACHT: In India I merely traveled as a tourist. I was not politically -active but, of course, I visited several governors and I spent 3 days as -the Viceroy’s guest in his house in Simla. - -DR. DIX: Did you not have political connections with Chinese statesmen -in Rangoon? - -SCHACHT: When I was in Burma, after leaving India, I received a visit in -Rangoon from a Chinese friend who had visited me before in Berlin on -occasion and who had been commissioned by his government to talk to me -about the Situation of China. - -DR. DIX: That is Chiang Kai-Shek’s China? - -SCHACHT: Chiang Kai-Shek’s China which was already at war with Japan at -the time. The other China did not then exist and this gentleman asked me -upon the request of Chiang Kai-Shek and the Chinese Cabinet... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I can’t see the slightest relevancy to this. In the -first place, we heard it once and secondly, after we had heard it it has -no relevancy to the case. We have no charge against him that he did -anything in China and we will stipulate that he was as pure as snow all -the time he was in China. We haven’t a thing to do with that and it is -taking time here that just gets us nowhere and is keeping us away from -the real charge in the case. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal quite understands that you say it is -irrelevant. Why do you say it is relevant? - -DR. DIX: I regret that Mr. Justice Jackson and I understand each other -too little. The matter is relevant in the following connection: In this -testimony and also in an affidavit which has been read... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we heard three times that the Defendant Schacht -went to India. Three times in his evidence he dealt with the fact that -he went to India and China. How is it relevant? - -DR. DIX: I am not speaking of the journey to India. It had to be -mentioned only briefly to explain the connection of time. I put a -question, referring to Schacht’s negotiations in Rangoon with the envoy -from Chiang Kai-Shek—with the Chinese—and at that point Mr. Justice -Jackson raised his objection. But the fact that Schacht maintained -friendly connections with Chiang Kai-Shek’s Government and gave support -to it, that fact is relevant, and for the same reason for which I -attached importance to the fact that it became clear here that in regard -to the Union of Soviet Republics also Schacht pursued a pro-Soviet line -in his economic policy during the years when Hitler was conducting a -political campaign against Russia. Here we have a second instance, where -he is demanding relations which were contrary to the principles of -Hitler’s policy; that is relations with Chiang Kai-Shek, and so against -Hitler’s ally, Japan. It is in this connection that the negotiations -with the Chinese are of significance. They will take only a moment’s -time at most. They were merely to be mentioned in passing. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you consider his relations -with China of any importance, it can be stated in one sentence. - -DR. DIX: I am of the same opinion. - -SCHACHT: I will sum it up in one sentence. In a written memorandum I -advised Chiang Kai-Shek’s government to continue holding out against -Japan, giving as reason that the economic resources of China would last -longer than the economic resources of Japan; and I advised Chiang -Kai-Shek to rely primarily on the United States of America in his -foreign policy. - -DR. DIX: Then upon your return from India, that is, in August 1939, you -found a situation which must have appeared quite tense to someone who -was just coming back. Did you not then attempt to contact the Cabinet or -Hitler in order to discuss this situation? - -SCHACHT: Of course, I found a very tense situation in the question of -Poland and I used my return as an occasion for writing a letter to -Hitler, a letter to Göring, and a letter to Ribbentrop; that is to say, -the three leading men, in order to inform them that I had come back from -India, leaving it to their discretion and expecting that at least one of -them would ask me for an account of my experiences; and then, I should -have had an opportunity of talking to the leading men once again. To my -very great surprise, I did not get an answer from Hitler at all; I -received no reply from Göring; and Herr Von Ribbentrop answered me that -he had taken note of my letter. There was therefore no other way for me -but to make my own inquiries regarding the real state of affairs on -Poland, and when things became critical I took the well-known step, -which has already been described here by Herr Gisevius; namely the -attempt to gain access to the Führer’s headquarters. - -DR. DIX: We need not repeat that. The only question which I still want -to ask you is what were you going to tell the generals, particularly -General Von Brauchitsch, at that last moment? - -SCHACHT: That he still had a chance to avert a war. I knew perfectly -well that bare economic and general political statements would of course -accomplish nothing with Von Brauchitsch because he would then certainly -have referred to Hitler’s leadership. Therefore I wanted to say to him -something of quite a different nature and, in my opinion, that is of the -most decisive significance. I was going to remind him that he had sworn -an oath of allegiance to the Weimar Constitution. I wanted to remind him -that the Enabling Act did not delegate power to Hitler but to the Reich -Cabinet and I wanted to remind him that in the Weimar Constitution there -was and still is a clause, which has never been annulled and according -to which, war cannot be declared without previous approval by the -Reichstag. I was convinced that Brauchitsch would have referred me to -his oath sworn to Hitler and I would have told him: “I also have sworn -this oath. You have sworn no oath other than your military one, perhaps, -but this oath does not in any way invalidate the oath sworn to the -Weimar Constitution; on the contrary, the oath to the Weimar -Constitution is the one that is valid. It is your duty, therefore, to -see to it that this entire question of war or no war be brought before -the Cabinet and discussed there, and when the Reich Cabinet has made a -decision, the matter will go before the Reichstag.” If these two steps -had been taken, then I am firmly convinced that there would have been no -war. - -DR. DIX: You never reached Brauchitsch. We do not want to repeat the -description of that whole affair or of your attempts at the -Bendlerstrasse and so on. Have you anything to add to Gisevius’ -testimony or do you wish to change anything in it? - -SCHACHT: I can only confirm that Gisevius’ statement is correct in every -single point and I myself merely want to add that Canaris mentioned -among many reasons which then kept us from making the visit, that -Brauchitsch would probably have us arrested immediately if we said -anything to him against the war or if we wanted to prevent him from -fulfilling his oath of allegiance to Hitler. But the main reason why the -visit did not come about was quite correctly stated by Gisevius. -Moreover it is also mentioned by General Thomas in his affidavit which -we shall later submit. The main reason was: the war was canceled. And so -I went to Munich on a business matter and to my surprise while in -Munich, war was declared on Poland; the country was invaded. - -DR. DIX: You mentioned the Reichstag a short time ago. A meeting of the -Reichstag did in fact take place, though not before the war or before -the declaration of war, but immediately thereafter. At the time you were -still a Minister without Portfolio. - -Normally you would have had to sit on the minister’s bench during that -meeting. - -Did you take part in that meeting? - -SCHACHT: I did not participate in that meeting at all and I would like -to add at once that during the entire war, I was present at only one -meeting of the Reichstag. I could not avoid it, considering the matters -which I already mentioned here yesterday. It was after Hitler’s return -from Paris. I had to participate in this meeting of the Reichstag, which -followed the reception at the station because, as I said, it would -otherwise have been too obvious an affront. It was the meeting during -which political matters were not dealt with at all, but at which the -field marshal’s rank was granted by the dozen. - -DR. DIX: Now, this last effort which has just been mentioned to stop the -outbreak of war through Canaris brings us to the particular chapter of -your attempts at a coup to overthrow Hitler and his government. We want -to make it a rule, if possible, not to repeat what the witness Gisevius -has already stated but only to supplement or correct or state what you -know from your own memory. Before I touch upon that chapter, however, -may I ask you whether you know from information you received or from -other indications, that your oppositional attitude and that of your -similarly minded friends, and your oppositional aims, were known in -authoritative circles abroad? - -SCHACHT: I do not wish to repeat anything; I merely want to point out -that I have already stated repeatedly here that I continually discussed -the situation in Germany—thus also my own position—with my friends -abroad—not only with Americans, Englishmen, and Frenchmen but also with -neutrals—and I would like to add one more thing; foreign broadcasting -stations did not tire at all of speaking constantly about Schacht’s -opposition to Hitler. My friends and family received a shock whenever -information on this subject transpired in Germany. - -DR. DIX: When did your attempts to overthrow the Hitler government -begin? - -SCHACHT: As early as 1937 I tried to determine which groups in Germany -one might rely upon in an attempt to remove the Hitler regime. -Unfortunately in the years 1935, 1936, and 1937, I got to know that all -those circles in which I had placed my hope were failing, namely the -scientists, the educated middle class, and the leaders of economy. - -I need only mention that the scientists permitted themselves to listen -to the most nonsensical National Socialist lectures without opposing -them in the least. I call attention to the fact that when the economic -leaders saw that I was no longer a figure in economy, they disappeared -from my anteroom and thronged into that of Göring. In a word, one could -not rely upon these circles. Consequently, one could depend only on the -generals, on the military, because according to my conception at the -time, one could certainly count on an armed resistance even by the SS -bodyguard. - -Therefore, as has been stated here—and I do not want to pursue it -further—I tried at first to contact such generals as Kluge, for -instance, merely in order to ascertain whether among the military there -were people with whom one could speak openly. And this first occasion -led me to a great many generals whom I contacted in the course of time. - -DR. DIX: That was then in the year 1937; now we come to 1938, still -limiting ourselves by what Gisevius has already said, merely touching on -it briefly and confirming it. By the way, were you in any way directly -or indirectly involved in the negotiations at Godesberg or Munich? - -SCHACHT: In no way. - -DR. DIX: Now we continue with your political work, aiming at a revolt. -Is Gisevius’ account of the year 1938 correct or is there something to -be added to it? - -SCHACHT: Gisevius’ statement is complete and reliable. - -DR. DIX: That also applies to the attempt at a _coup d’état_ in the late -summer of 1938? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -DR. DIX: Then came the war. Did you fold your arms after war broke out? - -SCHACHT: No; throughout the entire war I pleaded with every general whom -I could contact. I used the same arguments which I have just mentioned -in connection with the prospective interview with Brauchitsch; -therefore, it was not merely theory, but I actually spoke to all these -generals. - -DR. DIX: Was not a visit to General Hoeppner significant in this -connection? - -SCHACHT: In 1941 I tried not only to get in touch with General Hoeppner -but in a whole series of conversations I attempted to make him take -action. Hoeppner was perfectly willing and prepared and later he too, -unfortunately, lost his life as a consequence of 20 July 1944. - -In the year 1942—and this has not been mentioned here up to now, -because Gisevius did not participate—I tried again to mobilize General -Von Witzleben to renewed activity. I went on a special journey to -Frankfurt-on-the-Main, where he had his headquarters at that time, and -Von Witzleben proved as ever to be completely resolved to act, but he -told me that, of course, he could only do so if he again received a -command at the front. Then I... - -DR. DIX: At that time Frau Strünck, who knew of these matters, was in -Frankfurt? - -SCHACHT: She knew of these things and can confirm them. - -DR. DIX: Perhaps I may tell the Tribunal at this point that Frau Strünck -was granted me as a witness and she was here. In order to save time, -however, I have decided to dispense with this witness since she could -make only cumulative statements on what Gisevius has already said and I -do not think it is necessary. Schacht himself has just stated the only -piece of information which she could have added, namely this trip, this -special journey to Frankfurt to Von Witzleben. On the strength of -experience the Tribunal will itself know that in the course of a -revolutionary movement, stretching over years such as this, many -journeys are made and in respect to this particular journey it is not -important to submit special evidence. In order to save time, therefore, -I have decided to dispense with the testimony of Frau Strünck. Excuse -me, I merely wanted to say this now. Then there is the next... - -SCHACHT: May I perhaps say one more thing? I of course always -participated in the conversations—mentioned by Gisevius here—with the -other generals, that is the group of Beck, Fromm, Olbricht, _et cetera_. -These things did not come about for some time on account of the -negotiations abroad for which the generals were always waiting. I think -that enough has been said here about this topic and I need not make -further report on it. I come then to one last point, which does not -become apparent from Gisevius’ statement but about which an affidavit -from Colonel Gronau will be submitted here. I can mention it quite -briefly in order to save time. Naturally, together with the group of -Beck, Goerdeler, my friend Strünck, Gisevius, and others I was -completely informed of, and initiated into, the affair of 20 July. -However, and I think it was mutual, we told each other whenever possible -only those things which the other absolutely had to know, in order not -to embarrass the other man, should he at any time be submitted to the -tortures of the Gestapo. For that reason, apart from being in touch with -Beck, Goerdeler, Gisevius, and Strünck, _et cetera_, I had another -connection with the generals who were at the head of this revolt and -that was the General of Artillery Lindemann, one of the main -participants in the coup, who unfortunately also lost his life later. - -DR. DIX: Perhaps it would be proper—and also more intelligible in -connection with your participation in 20 July—if I read a brief part of -Colonel Gronau’s affidavit which refers to Lindemann. - -[_Turning to the Tribunal._] It is Exhibit Number 39 of our document -book, Page 168 of the German text and Page 176 of the English text. I -shall omit the first part of the affidavit, but I ask the Tribunal to -take judicial notice of it; essentially it contains only matters on -which evidence has already been given. I shall read only the part that -deals with 20 July. It begins on Page 178 of the English text and on -Page 170 of the German text, and I start with Question 5: - - “Question 5) You brought Schacht and General Lindemann together. - When was that? - - “Answer 5) In the fall of 1943, for the first time in years, I - again saw General Lindemann, my former school and regiment - comrade. While discussing politics I told him that I knew - Schacht well, and General Lindemann asked to be introduced to - him, whereupon I established the connection. - - “Question 6) What did Lindemann expect from Schacht, and what - was Schacht’s attitude toward him? - - “Answer 6) The taking up of political relations with foreign - countries following a successful attempt at revolt. He promised - his future co-operation. At the beginning of 1944 Lindemann made - severe reproaches that the generals”—that should read “he - severely reproached Lindemann”; it is incorrectly copied - here—“because the generals were hesitating so long. The attempt - at revolt would have to be made prior to the landing of the - Allies.” - - “Question 7) Was Lindemann involved in the attempted - assassination of 20 July 1944? - - “Answer 7) Yes, he was one of the main figures. - - “Question 8) Did he inform Schacht of the details of this plan? - - “Answer 8) Nothing about the manner in which the attempt was to - be carried out; he did inform him, however, of what was to - happen thereafter. - - “Question 9) Did Schacht approve the plan? - - “Answer 9) Yes. - - “Question 10) Did Schacht put himself at the disposal of the - military in the event of a successful attempt? - - “Answer 10) Yes. - - “Question 11) Were you arrested after 20 July 1944? - - “Answer 11) Yes. - - “Question 12) How were you able to survive your imprisonment? - - “Answer 12) By stoically denying complicity.” - -Now, we have left the years 1941 and 1942 and to explain the Putsch in -logical sequence we reached the year 1944, something that could not be -avoided, but we must now go back again to the year 1941. You have -already mentioned, in passing, the efforts made abroad. In 1941 you were -in Switzerland. Did you make any efforts in that direction there? - -SCHACHT: Every time I went abroad I talked at length to my foreign -friends and again and again looked for some way by which one might -shorten the war and begin negotiations. - -DR. DIX: In this connection, the Fraser letter is of importance. I think -the Fraser letter and the way it was smuggled into Switzerland has been -sufficiently discussed by the witness Gisevius. I have on two occasions -stated the contents briefly, once when the translation was discussed and -again during the discussion on the admissibility of the letter as -evidence before the Court. I do not think I need do it here nor that I -need read it. I should merely like to submit it. It is Exhibit 31, on -Page 84 of the German and Page 91 of the English text. And—I say this -now, we shall discuss it later—the same applies to the article which -appeared this year in the _Basler Nachrichten_ and which deals with a -conversation which an American had with Schacht recently. I shall not -read that either since I have already stated the main points of its -contents. I submit it as Exhibit Number 32, Page 90 of the German text -and Page 99 of the English text. I might point out that this article has -already been the subject of certain accusations made during the -cross-examination of Gisevius by the representative of the Soviet -Prosecution. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to raise one objection in regard to Document -32; this is an article about Dr. Schacht and his ideas by an unknown -writer describing his conversations with an unknown economist. The -article in question was published in the _Basler Nachrichten_ on 14 -January 1946, that is, when the present Trial was already well under -way, and I cannot consider that this article can be presented in -evidence with regard to Schacht’s case. - -DR. DIX: I might—may I, before the Tribunal decides, say something very -briefly? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. - -DR. DIX: The article has already been admitted as evidence. We have -discussed it, and the Tribunal approved the article as evidence. The -Tribunal can, of course, revoke that decision. I think, for me it -would... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal has always made it clear that the -allowance of these documents is a provisional allowance and that when -the document is actually offered in evidence, they will then decide the -relevancy or its admissibility, rather, and its relevancy. - -DR. DIX: That is quite beyond doubt. I merely wanted to point out that -we have already discussed the question once before. Of course, the -Tribunal can today reject the document. I shall... - -THE PRESIDENT: The allowance is provisional. It is not a question of the -Tribunal’s reversing its previous decision. The previous decision was -merely provisional, and the question of admissibility now comes up for -decision. - -DR. DIX: It is quite clear to me, Your Lordship. I am merely surprised -at the objection raised by the Soviet Prosecution, inasmuch as the -representative of the Soviet Delegation himself referred to that article -in his observations during the cross-examination of the witness -Gisevius. It is true, he did not submit it to the Tribunal, but he -referred to it in his observations to the witness Gisevius. However, if -the Tribunal has the slightest objections to allowing the article as -documentary evidence, then I shall ask permission to leave it. I will -then—and I think I may—ask the witness Schacht whether it is true that -in 1941 he had a conversation with an American who was a professor of -national economy, a conversation which dealt with the possibility of -peace. I leave it to the Tribunal. For me, it is no—I thought it would -be simpler, if I submitted the article. - -THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, as you have raised the objection to this -document, what have you to say about the point that Dr. Dix makes that -you used the document yourself in cross-examination? - -GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, we did not use this document in the -cross-examination of the witness Gisevius. An explanatory question was -asked in order to reach a decision on this point and I particularly -emphasize... - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you say that again? I did not understand you. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I say, that we did not use this document during the -cross-examination of the witness Gisevius, but we did ask an explanatory -question in order that when the document was presented by Dr. Dix, we -could object to it as being of no probative value. I especially... - -THE PRESIDENT: But did you not put the contents of the document to -Gisevius? I do not remember. What I want to know is did you not put the -contents of the document? - -GEN. RUDENKO: No, no, we did not submit the contents, and we did not -discuss the substance of the document. We merely asked a question—did -the witness Gisevius know about the article in the _Basler Nachrichten_ -of 14 January 1946? That was the question, and the witness answered that -it was known to him. - -DR. DIX: May I say one more thing? It appears to me that the Soviet -Delegation does not desire to have the article submitted as evidence. I -therefore withdraw it as evidence. And since I have no due reasons to -the contrary, no factual reason to the contrary, 1 can certainly fulfill -this wish of the Soviet Delegation. I would like the Tribunal to -consider the matter as settled. - -May I now put my question? - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, you had conversations in -Switzerland? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -DR. DIX: What was the subject of these conversations, in broad outlines, -and with whom did you have them? - -SCHACHT: This article, which has just been discussed... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: First, Your Honor, may I interpose an objection? -The reason I did not join in the Soviet objection to this document was -that I want to know who this economist is. I want to check this thing. -There are very peculiar circumstances about this document, and I object -to his retelling a conversation with an unknown economist. All I ask is -that he identify time and place and person with whom he had his -conversation, so that we can do a little verifying of this effort to get -something before the Tribunal that did not appear until 1946. - -DR. DIX: The question is now being given a significance which its -comparative triviality really does not merit. I shall, therefore, -dispense with this question too. Please do not now refer to the -conversation with the professor, and I shall leave it to the Prosecution -to put the question which Mr. Justice Jackson has just mentioned during -cross-examination. - -Well, your conversations in Switzerland, then, excepting that with the -unknown professor. - -SCHACHT: Yes, I tried again and again to shorten the war and to bring -about some form of mediation which I always sought for particularly -through the good offices of the American President. That is all that I -can say here. I do not think I need go into details. - -DR. DIX: Very well. Did you in your letters to Ribbentrop and -Göring—you have already mentioned Hitler—or besides, did you, during -the war, state your views about the policy of the war in writing at any -time? First of all, as far as Hitler was concerned. - -SCHACHT: I mentioned my discussion with Hitler in February 1940. In the -summer of 1941 I wrote a detailed letter to Hitler, and the witness -Lammers has admitted its existence. I do not think he was asked about -the contents of this letter here, or he was not allowed to talk about -it. If I may come back to it; in that letter, I pointed out somewhat as -follows—I shall use direct language—“You are at present at the height -of your success.”—This was after the first Russian victories.—“The -enemy believes that you are stronger than you really are. The alliance -with Italy is rather a doubtful one, since Mussolini will one day fall -and then Italy will drop out. Whether Japan can still come to your aid -at all is questionable in view of Japan’s weakness in the face of -America. I assume that the Japanese will not be so foolish as to wage -war against America. The output of steel, for instance, in spite of -approximately similar population figures, amounts to one-tenth of the -American production. I do not think, therefore, that Japan will enter -into the war. I now recommend you at all events to reverse foreign -policy completely and to attempt with every means to conclude a peace.” - -DR. DIX: Did you state your views to Ribbentrop during the war? - -SCHACHT: I do not know when it was. On one occasion Herr Von Ribbentrop -conveyed to me through his State Secretary, Herr Von Weizsäcker, the -reproachful message that I should not indulge in defeatist remarks. That -may have been in 1940 or in 1941, during one of those 2 years. I asked -where I had made defeatist remarks and it appeared that I had talked to -my colleague Funk and had given him extensive reasons why Germany could -never win this war. I held this conviction unchangeable at all times -before and during the war, even after the fall of France. I answered -Ribbentrop through his State Secretary that I, as Minister without -Portfolio, considered it my duty to state my opinion to a ministerial -colleague in its true conception, and in this written reply I maintained -the view that Germany’s economic power was not sufficient to wage this -war. This letter, that is, a copy of this letter was sent both to -Minister Funk and to Minister Ribbentrop through his State Secretary. - -DR. DIX: I think, Your Lordship, this would be a suitable moment... - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. DIX: I spoke before of 20 July. Do you recall a statement made by -Hitler about you in connection with 20 July? - -SCHACHT: Codefendant Minister Speer was present and told me about it. It -was on 22 July 1944 when Hitler issued the order to his circle for my -arrest. At that time he made derogatory remarks about me and stated that -he had been greatly hindered in his rearmament program by my negative -activities, and that it would have been better if he had had me shot -before the war. - -DR. DIX: To conclude I come to a few general collective questions. -Voices were heard within the country, and also abroad—and even the -Prosecution, although recognizing your intellectual capacities and the -services you rendered, appears to consider it also—that it was -incomprehensible that a man as clever as you did not recognize the true -nature, the real intentions of Hitler in time. I would like you to state -your position with regard to that accusation. - -SCHACHT: I should like very much to have known the gentlemen who are now -judging me, at a time when it might have been of use. These are the -people who always know afterwards what ought to have been done before. I -can only state that first of all, from 1920 until the seizure of power -by Hitler, I tried to influence the nation and foreign countries in a -way which would have prevented the rise and seizure of power by a -Hitler. I warned the country to be thrifty but I was not heeded. I -repeatedly warned the foreign nations to develop an economic policy -which would enable Germany to live. I was not heeded, although as it now -appears, I was considered a clever and foresighted man. Hitler came to -power because my advice was not followed. The German people were reduced -to great economic need and neither... - -GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President. For 2 days now we have been listening to -lengthy explanations on the part of the Defendant Schacht, and I rather -think that the explanations which have just been given by the Defendant -Schacht are not definite answers to questions concerned with the -Indictment brought against him, but mere speeches. I consider that they -will only prolong the Trial. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal is, I think, fully apprised with -the case on behalf of Defendant Schacht. They don’t want to stop him -putting forward his defense fully, but they would be glad if you could -make it as short as possible and if he could make it as short as -possible. - -DR. DIX: My Lord, I am certain that I shall be through by the recess, -and perhaps even before the recess; but I beg you to bear in mind that -the defendant is accused of having assisted in the seizure of power. The -question arises, how was it that... - -THE PRESIDENT: I wasn’t ruling that this evidence was inadmissible. I -was only asking you to get on with it as quickly as you could. - -DR. DIX: Very well. Dr. Schacht, please continue and try to comply with -the suggestions of the representative of the Soviet Prosecution as far -as possible. - -SCHACHT: As briefly as possible. I will not go into detail; I will -merely state that due to the collapse of 1918 and the unsatisfactory -conditions of the Versailles Treaty, Germany was faced with a severe -depression. The democratic parties, which had a firm hold on the regime -at that time, were not able to improve the situation; and the other -nations did not know what policy to take towards Germany. I do not -reproach any one; I merely state facts. Consequently, in this state of -depression, Hitler received a larger majority in the Reichstag than had -ever been the case since the formation of the Reich. - -Now, I ask the people who, although silent at the time, can tell me now -what I should have done; I ask them what they would have done. I have -stated that I was against a military regime, that I wanted to avoid a -civil war, and that, in keeping with democratic principles, I saw only -the one possibility: To allow the man to lead the government once he had -come to power. I said further that from the moment I realized this I -tried to participate in the government, not with the intention of -supporting this man in his extremist ideas, but to act as a brake and, -if possible, to direct his policies back into normal channels. - -DR. DIX: Then there came a time later when you recognized the dangers, -when you yourself suffered under the unbearable conditions of terror and -of suppressed opinion, so that perhaps this question is pertinent and -admissible: Why did you not emigrate? - -SCHACHT: Had it been only a question of my personal fate, nothing would -have been simpler, especially since, as we have heard before, I would -have been offered that opportunity and it would have been made easy for -me. It was not merely a question of my own welfare; but as I had devoted -myself to the public interest since 1923, it was the question of the -existence of my people, of my country. I know of no instance in history -where emigrants were of help to their own nation. Of course, I speak of -those emigrants who leave of their own free will, not those that have -been expelled. It was not the case in 1792, at the time of the French -Revolution; it was not the case in 1917, during the Russian Revolution; -and it was not the case at the time of the National Socialist revolution -which we witnessed. To sit in a safe harbor abroad and to write articles -which no one reads in the home country... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, we don’t want a historical lecture, do we? - -DR. DIX: I believe we can stop here. He merely wanted to state why he -did not emigrate. [_Turning to the defendant._] You have been -understood. - -SCHACHT: Thank you. - -DR. DIX: In the course of these proceedings, either in a letter or in a -poem—I do not know which at the moment—there was some mention of your -thoughts on the possibility of dying a martyr’s death; whether it would -have served the cause of peace and the German nation, if you had done -more than you did; if you had sacrificed your life... - -SCHACHT: I think that you are referring to a quotation from one of my -notes, which a representative of the American Prosecution read here, in -which I spoke of the silence of death. - -DR. DIX: Yes. - -SCHACHT: If I had sacrificed myself, it would not have been of the -slightest use because the circumstances of my sacrifice would never have -become known. Either I would have disappeared in some prison or I would -have died there, and no one would have known whether I was alive or not; -or I would have been the victim of a planned accident, and it would not -have been possible to become a martyr. Martyrs can be effective only if -their martyrdom becomes known to the public. - -DR. DIX: May I ask for the attention of the Tribunal for a moment? -Yesterday I was denied a question concerning the social attitude of the -diplomatic corps and its influence on men like Schacht, for instance. -The question which I want to put now is not the same question; otherwise -I would not put it. But it has nevertheless... - -THE PRESIDENT: The objection that I made was to the use of the word -“attitude,” because I don’t see how witnesses can give evidence about -the attitude of a corps. I said I think especially that the fact that -the diplomatic corps were present at the Party rally might be given in -evidence, but I said that the word “attitude” was far too general. What -is it you want to put now? - -DR. DIX: Yesterday, the question which I framed in the following manner -was denied: “How was Schacht influenced by the collective attitude of -the diplomatic corps?” That question was denied, and that concludes the -matter. Now, I should like first to clarify the matter because I do not -want to create the impression of smuggling into the proceedings a -question which may raise the same objections. On the one hand, it is -essential for my line of defense to show that people from abroad with -judgment, who were above being suspected of wanting to prepare for an -aggressive war, had the same attitude toward the regime as Schacht had. -On the other hand, it is one of the strong points of my defense to show -that the work of these people in their opposition was not only not -supported by foreign countries but was actually made more difficult. -That is the _thema probandum_ that is important for me, and on this -theme—but please, Herr Schacht, do not answer before I have received -the permission of the Tribunal—this theme... - -THE PRESIDENT: State exactly what the question is. - -DR. DIX: Yes, I will put the question now. According to my notes I -intended to refer to the tokens of honor, which the Nazi regime received -from abroad, and to the representatives and numerous state visits paying -honor to the regime, which have already been mentioned here. I wanted to -ask the defendant what influence these frequent marks of great honor had -on the work and aims of this group of conspirators. However, since that -question is very similar to the one that has been rejected—and I prefer -to make my objections myself rather than to have them made to me—I -wanted to submit the question to the Tribunal first and make sure that -it is admissible. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the question being: “What effect did the -recognition of the Nazi regime from abroad have upon the group of -conspirators with whom the Defendant Schacht was in contact?” That is -the question, is it not? Well, that question, as the Tribunal thinks, -you may put. - -DR. DIX: It is admissible if “Anerkennung” is translated correctly as -“honor”—honor, not recognition in the sense of recognition of a -government in diplomatic official language, but honor, respect. It is a -difficulty of translation and I do not want a misunderstanding—may I -put to him, first, the individual official visits which I have noted, so -that he can answer the question? May I do that? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you may; actual visits? - -DR. DIX: Yes. The list will not be complete. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I remind you that in 1935, the delegate of -the Labor Party, Alan Hartwood... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that you ought to put the question in -the general way in which I put it to you, and not go into details of -each visit or the details of each number of visits. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If Your Honor pleases, I want to object to it as -generalities, because it already appears that the United States did not -participate in this and I tried to keep the European politics out of -this case, and this is the entering wedge. Now, I don’t want to get into -this sort of thing. I think it is entirely irrelevant that some -foreigner, deceived by the appearance which the Defendant Schacht was -assisting in putting up, didn’t start a war earlier. This thing is -entirely irrelevant. The United States has desired to keep this sort of -thing out of this case because it is endless if we go into it. It seems -to me, if Herr Schacht wants to put the responsibility for his conduct -on some foreigner, that foreigner should be named. He has already said -that the United States representatives, Mr. Messersmith and Mr. Dodd, -had no part in it because they were always against them. Now, it gets -into a situation here which seems to me impossible before this Tribunal, -and I cannot understand how it constitutes any defense for mitigation -for Schacht to show that the foreign powers maintained intercourse with -Germany even at a period of its degeneration. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question is relevant but should -be put without detail. - -DR. DIX: I will put the question without detail, and I would like to say -that I cannot, of course, speak of myself and America in the same -breath; but I, too, am trying to avoid foreign politics. However, my -question does not concern foreign politics. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Here is the one question: What influence -did the honors which were showered upon the Nazi regime by foreign -countries, in a manner well known to you, have on the work of your group -of conspirators? - -SCHACHT: Throughout the years from 1935, up to and including 1938, -numerous statesmen from almost all other nations came to Berlin to visit -Hitler, including some crowned heads. From America, for instance, there -was Under Secretary of State Phillips. - -DR. DIX: Do not mention any names. - -SCHACHT: I said that only because names were expressly mentioned here. -It is not limited to Europe. I do not intend to make any political -explanations, I merely say that there were so many visitors, which meant -not only recognition but respect for Hitler, that this man appeared a -very great man in the eyes of the German people. I still remember that -in 1925, I believe, the King of Afghanistan, Amanullah, appeared in -Berlin. He was the first foreigner to visit the Social Democratic -Government, and there was a celebration because at last a great man from -another country had visited us. In the case of Hitler, starting with -1935 there was one visitor after another; and Hitler went from one -foreign political success to another, which made it extremely difficult -to enlighten the German people and made it impossible to work for that -enlightenment within the German nation. - -DR. DIX: And now, two final questions. - -You have heard the speech by the British Attorney General Shawcross, who -said that there should have been a point where the servants of Hitler -refused to follow him. We want to accept that point of view, and I ask -you: Do you believe that you yourself acted in accord with that -postulate of the leader of the British Delegation? - -SCHACHT: I not only accept it, but I fully approve of it. From the very -moment when I recognized what a harmful individual Hitler was, what a -threat to world peace, I broke with him, not only secretly, but publicly -and personally. - -DR. DIX: So you consider that when you realized the truth you did -everything humanly possible to try and save humanity from the disaster -of this war and bring it to an end, once it had started. - -SCHACHT: I know of no one in Germany who would have done more in that -respect than I did. I warned against excessive armament. I impeded, and -if you like, sabotaged effective armament through my economic policy. I -resigned from the Ministry of Economics against the will of Hitler; I -publicly protested to Hitler against all the abuses of the Party; I -continuously warned people abroad and gave them information; I attempted -to influence the policy of other nations with respect to the colonial -question in order to achieve a more peaceful atmosphere. Credits for -continued armaments... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we have heard this more than once, you know. - -DR. DIX: Yes. - -SCHACHT: May I be permitted one sentence: I blocked Hitler’s credits and -I finally tried to remove him. - -DR. DIX: Gentlemen, I am now at the end of my presentation of evidence -for Schacht’s case, and I have only one request. During the last few -days, I have received a large number of letters and also affidavits from -well-known people who know Schacht. I will examine them; and if I should -decide that any of the affidavits are relevant, I will get in touch with -the Prosecution and discuss with them whether they have any objection to -having them translated, so that we can perhaps submit them to the -Tribunal—not to have them read, but merely to have them put in -evidence. May I request that I be granted this right. - -At the end of my entire presentation, I will briefly submit my -documents; this has been only partially done. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants’ counsel wish to ask any -questions? - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have only a few questions to put to Dr. Schacht. - -How long have you known Herr Von Neurath, Dr. Schacht? - -SCHACHT: I cannot state the exact year, but at any rate for a very long -time; for many, many years. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: For some time, for about 4 years, you were both -colleagues as ministers in the government. During that time, did you -have any contact with him other than in purely official capacity? - -SCHACHT: Unfortunately not enough, but of course I saw him from time to -time. I would have liked to have seen him more often. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But from conversations with him, or from what you -heard about him, you certainly formed an opinion about his political -views. - -SCHACHT: I was well acquainted with his views. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And what was the trend of his political thought? - -SCHACHT: I had the impression that basically Von Neurath believed in a -conservative policy, but was open to conviction where progressive -measures were concerned. He was above all in favor of peaceful -international co-operation. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you consider it possible, or do you have any -reason to believe, that under certain circumstances he would also resort -to belligerent methods or that he would even consider them, if the -peaceful understanding which he desired was quite impossible? - -SCHACHT: According to my understanding of Neurath, I think that he was -entirely averse to any aggressive policy. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You witnessed the various... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, will you kindly put the earphones on, -the Tribunal thinks these questions are not questions which can properly -be put because of their general nature. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you have the impression that in everything -that he achieved, particularly in the occupation of the Rhineland, Herr -Von Neurath... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, this is not a proper question to put to -a witness, “Did you have an impression about him?” You can ask him what -he said and what he did; what did Von Neurath do and what did he say? - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes; then I will not put this question. I have -only one last question. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] You know that on the 4th of February 1938 -Von Neurath resigned as Foreign Minister. What did you and your -immediate circle say to the resignation of Von Neurath from foreign -politics? What impression did it make upon you? - -SCHACHT: I believe I have already said in the course of the -interrogation that I considered Von Neurath’s resignation a very bad -sign, for it meant departing from the previous policy of understanding -in foreign politics. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Any other defendants’ counsel want to ask questions? - -Does the Prosecution desire to cross-examine? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think it might save time, Your Honor, if we could -take our recess at this time. It is a little early, I know, but it takes -some time to arrange our material. - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dr. Schacht, according to the transcript of the -testimony at Page 8698 (Volume XII, Page 460), you said that in 1938 you -told a certain lady while you were dining: “My dear lady, we have fallen -into the hands of criminals. How could I ever have suspected that!” You -recall that testimony? - -SCHACHT: It was not I who gave that testimony; it came from an affidavit -submitted here by my Defense Counsel, but it is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am sure you want to help the Tribunal by telling -us who those criminals were. - -SCHACHT: Hitler and his confederates. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you were there; you know who the co-operators -were. I am asking you to name all that you put in that category of -criminals with Hitler. Hitler, you know, is dead. - -SCHACHT: Mr. Justice, it is very difficult for me to answer that -question fully because I do not know who was in that close conspiracy -with Hitler. The Defendant Göring has told us here that he considered -himself one of that group. There were Himmler and Bormann, but I do not -know who else there was in the small circle of men who were trusted by -Hitler. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have only named three men. Let me put it this -way: You named four men criminals, three of whom are dead and one of -them you say admitted... - -SCHACHT: I can add one more, if you will permit me. I assume that the -Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop was also always acquainted with Hitler’s -plans. I must assume that; I cannot prove it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whom else did you include when you were talking to -the lady? - -SCHACHT: On that evening I did not mention any names. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But whom did you have in mind? You surely were not -making charges against your own people, who were in charge of your own -government, without having definite names in mind. - -SCHACHT: I have taken the liberty of mentioning the names to you. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Are those all? - -SCHACHT: I do not know, but I assume that there were more. I would add -without hesitation, Heydrich. But I cannot know with whom... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Heydrich is a dead man. - -SCHACHT: I regret that these people are dead, I would have liked to see -them die some other way; but... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, are those the only people that you included? - -SCHACHT: I have no proof of the fact that there was anyone else in this -conspiracy about whom I could say that there is proof that he was a -conspirator. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Dr. Schacht, at the time the Nazis seized -power you had a world-wide acquaintance and very great standing as a -leading banker in Germany and in the world, did you not? - -SCHACHT: I do not know whether that is so, but if that is your opinion I -do not wish to contradict you. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, at first you would admit that? Wouldn’t you? - -SCHACHT: I do not contradict. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And yet as we understand it, you made public -appearances in Germany before the German people in support of the Nazi -regime, alongside of characters such as Streicher and Bormann. - -SCHACHT: Mr. Justice, I have taken the liberty of explaining here that -until July 1932 I did not in any way come forward publicly for Hitler or -the Party and that, on the contrary, in America for instance, I warned -the people against Hitler. At that time I—the name Bormann was, of -course, unknown to me at the time; and Streicher’s paper, _Der Stürmer_, -was just as revolting to me before that time as afterwards. I did not -think that I had anything in common with Herr Streicher. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I didn’t either, but that is why I wondered -about your appearing with him publicly before the German people after -1933 when the Nazi regime was consolidating its power. You did that, -didn’t you? - -SCHACHT: What did I do, Mr. Justice? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I spoke of your appearances, publicly, before the -German people with Streicher and Bormann in support of the Nazi program -after the seizure of power. - -SCHACHT: I do not think so. I was never seen publicly with Herr -Streicher or with Mr. Bormann—certainly not at that time. It is quite -possible that he attended the same Party rallies as I, or that I sat -next to him; but, at any rate, in 1933 I was never seen publicly either -with Streicher or with Bormann. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask to have you shown the photograph from the -Hoffmann collection, marked Number 10. You have no difficulty -recognizing yourself in that, do you? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And on the right sits Bormann? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And next to him the Minister of Labor? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And on the other side of you is Hitler? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And beyond him, Streicher? - -SCHACHT: I do not recognize him; I do not know whether it is Streicher, -but perhaps it is. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I will offer the photograph in evidence. And -perhaps the identification will be sufficient. - -And also Frick is in that picture? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This becomes Exhibit Number USA-829. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I will ask to have you shown... - -THE PRESIDENT: Justice Jackson, what is the date of that photograph? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There is no date given on the photographs. Perhaps -the defendant can tell us. - -SCHACHT: Mr. Justice, you said that in 1933 I had permitted myself to be -seen publicly with Streicher and Bormann as a representative of the -National Socialist Party; and I should like to know, therefore, where -this picture was taken and when. I cannot identify it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I asked you about after 1933. Schacht, do you deny -this is a photograph... - -SCHACHT: No, no. By no means, I am merely asking when it was taken. I do -not think this refers to 1933 or 1934. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When was it, if you want to tell us? - -SCHACHT: I do not know; I cannot tell you. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will show you another photograph—two -photographs, Numbers 3 and 4. Number 3 shows you marching with Dr. -Robert Ley among others. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Number 4 shows you entering the hall, marching, and -giving the Nazi salute. - -SCHACHT: Yes, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Ley the man who suppressed the labor unions of -Germany? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And those are correct photographs, are they not? - -SCHACHT: Certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I offer them in evidence under Exhibit Number -USA-829. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I will show you photographs marked Numbers -1 and 2 and 6—and 7. Now let us look at Number 1. Do you recall where -that was taken? - -SCHACHT: Yes—one moment, if it is the number I have here—yes, just a -minute. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Where was it taken? - -SCHACHT: I think Number 1 is a picture from the Reich Chancellery, if I -am not mistaken. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Among the persons appearing in Number 1 is Frick? - -SCHACHT: Gürtner, Goebbels, Popitz, Schacht, Papen, Göring, and others, -and Hitler in the middle. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Neurath, do you recognize? - -SCHACHT: Neurath. Yes; I think he is immediately on Hitler’s right, in -the background. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Goebbels? - -SCHACHT: Yes, I said Goebbels. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You identify Funk as present in the picture, at the -extreme right, only a part of his body showing. - -SCHACHT: Who is that? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Funk, the Defendant Funk. - -SCHACHT: No, that is Göring. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Back of Göring and back of Neurath. - -SCHACHT: I beg your pardon. Perhaps I have a different picture. I beg -your pardon. That is Number 2. On Number 2 I see from left to right: -Popitz, Rust, Göring, Neurath, Hitler, Blomberg, Schacht, Gürtner, -Krosigk, Eltz von Rübenach, and then at the very back on the right, -Funk. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And let us take Number 7. Who do you identify as -your company in that photograph? - -SCHACHT: On the extreme left, my late wife; then the Vice President of -the Reichsbank, Dreyse, Hitler, and myself. There is an adjutant of -Hitler, and the heavy-set man on the right—I do not know who he is. - -This is a photograph taken when the foundation of the new Reichsbank -building was laid in 1934. Directly behind me, on the right, is -Blomberg. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Number 6? - -SCHACHT: One moment. That is the picture where I am walking alongside -Hitler, is that right? That is Hitler’s entrance in my company, on the -occasion when the foundation of the new Reichsbank building was laid. -Behind me, or rather behind Hitler, you can see Geheimrat Vocke, who is -to appear as a witness here tomorrow, and several other gentlemen from -the directorate of the Reichsbank. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I offer the remaining photographs, 1, 6, and 7 in -evidence under the same number. - -So that it would appear, Dr. Schacht, that a good deal of your present -company was the company that started off with you in 1933 and 1934? - -SCHACHT: Is that a question? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, is that not true? - -SCHACHT: No. If you had photographed me with my other acquaintances just -as often, the number would be 10 times as great. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified—and I refer to Page 8650 of the -record (Volume XII, Page 424)—that there were reasons of principle why -you did not become a Party member and that Party membership would not be -compatible with your principles? - -SCHACHT: That is right. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you also testified—I refer to Page 8692 of the -record (Volume XII, Page 455)—that from 1932 to the 30th of January -1933—I am quoting you, “I have not written or spoken a single word -publicly for Hitler.” - -SCHACHT: I think that is right, if you emphasize “publicly.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You must emphasize “publicly”? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I want yet to ask you about the next thing. You -also said: - - “I have never helped in any way to exert influence in favor of - Hitler through discussions with any of the competent gentlemen: - Hindenburg, Meissner, _et cetera_; and I did not participate in - any way in the appointment of Hitler to Reich Chancellor.” - -Is that correct? - -SCHACHT: That is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, are there any words that we have to emphasize -in that in order to understand it correctly? - -SCHACHT: No, in reference to Hitler’s becoming Chancellor, please note I -said, “competent men.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I don’t just know what you mean by that, but -I’ll give you a chance to explain. - -SCHACHT: Yes. When I say “competent,” I mean those people who could -decide as to who was to be Chancellor. Of course, I did say that Hitler -would be Chancellor and must become Chancellor, and I expressed those -convictions in private circles. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you say that in public? - -SCHACHT: No, I said that only in a circle of my friends, business -acquaintances, and such like. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to quote you a statement by Von Papen: - - “When I was Chancellor of Germany, in 1932, Schacht came to see - me in July or August while I was at home. He said, ‘here’s a - very intelligent man.’—It was in the presence of my wife and I - have never forgotten it.—He said, ‘Give him your position. Give - it to Hitler. He is the only man who can save Germany.’” - -Did you say that or didn’t you? - -SCHACHT: I do not know whether I said that he was the only man who could -save Germany, but I did tell him that Hitler would and must become -Chancellor. But that was in August or July of 1932, after the July -elections; and it has nothing to do with Hitler’s nomination, which did -not take place until after the Schleicher Cabinet, about which I have -been examined here. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Dr. Schacht, I just asked you if you had not -testified that you had nothing to do with his coming to the -Chancellorship and you said... - -SCHACHT: That is the truth. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ...and it is here said that you asked Von Papen to -give the place to him and... - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ...and do you contend—and I want you to say -anything you want to about this—do you contend that that was not aiding -Hitler to the Chancellorship? - -SCHACHT: I do not know whether it was aiding Hitler. In the course of my -examination here, I have been asked whether I had exerted any influence -in connection with Hitler’s election or his nomination for the -Chancellorship in January 1933. I have given the names of Hindenburg, -Meissner, and so forth, that is to say, Hindenburg’s circle. Since the -beginning of November 1932, Papen was no longer Chancellor and thus he -had no influence upon these matters at all. I did not talk to Papen at -all during those weeks. On the contrary, after the elections of 1932, I -said that it was inevitable that a man who had obtained so many votes in -the Reichstag must take over the political lead. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now let me get you correctly. When you saw Hitler -was going to win you joined him? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I’ll just make it clear what you do mean. You -did not assist him until he had already accumulated more votes than any -other Party in the Reichstag? - -SCHACHT: I did not join Hitler when I saw that he would win, but when I -had discovered that he had won. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Oh, well, I’ll accept the amendment. - -You have referred to your letter to Hitler on the 29th of August 1932... - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ...in which you advised him not to put forward any -detailed economic program? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You told him there was no such program on which 14 -millions could agree? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that economic policy is not a factor for -building up a party? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you added that, “You can always count on me as -your reliable assistant”; did you not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then that was after he had won? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then on the 12th of... - -SCHACHT: November. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, I just want to refer to that document as -EC-456, Exhibit Number USA-773. Now, then, on the 12th of November 1932, -you wrote a letter to him, in which you said, among other things, “I -have no doubt that the present development of things can only lead to -your becoming Chancellor.” - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “It seems as if our attempt to collect a number of -signatures from business circles for this purpose is not altogether in -vain...” - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were collecting signatures for this purpose? - -SCHACHT: Not I, but I participated. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were assisting. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was Document Number EC-456. - -Now, as of November 1932, a document was prepared for a large number of -industrialists to sign, urging the selection of Hitler as Chancellor, in -substance, was there not? - -SCHACHT: I no longer remember the document, but I assume that that is -the document. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And men like Schacht, Schröder, and Krupp, and a -great number of industrialists signed that document, did they not? - -SCHACHT: That is possible, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was sent to Von Hindenburg? - -SCHACHT: I do not know. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, the purpose of it was to aid Hitler in -obtaining the Chancellorship? - -SCHACHT: That is possible. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It is addressed to the Reich President, is it not? -Document Number 3901-PS, Exhibit Number USA-837. - -SCHACHT: I have not seen it; but it is probably correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you do not deny that that occurred? - -SCHACHT: I assume that it is correct. I have not seen it, but I do not -doubt it at all. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then, in November of 1932 you communicated to -Hitler the result of your money-raising campaign, did you not? - -SCHACHT: I do not know anything about that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I’ll remind you from your own interrogation. -Well, I’ll remind you first, of your testimony, in which you say that it -appears that you did not plead for funds but that Göring pleaded for -funds; and I ask if you did not, on the 9th of October 1945, give these -answers to these questions as to events of February 1933? - -SCHACHT: Events of what? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Events of February 1933. - -SCHACHT: Yes, thank you very much. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Going back to 1933. This is the question: - - “Prior to the time that Hitler appointed you as President of the - Reichsbank, do you recall a meeting in the home of Göring? - - “Answer: ‘Yes. That was a financial meeting. I have been - interrogated about that several times already.’ - - “Question: ‘Tell me about it.’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes, I will. Hitler had to go to the elections on 5 - March, if you will remember, and for these elections he wanted - money for the campaign. He asked me to procure the money and I - did. Göring called these men together and I made a speech—not a - speech, for Hitler made the speech—then I asked them to write - down the amounts and to subscribe for the elections, which they - did. They subscribed a total of 3 millions and they allocated - the sum among themselves.’ - - “Question: ‘Who were the people who made up that subscription - list?’ - - “Answer: ‘I think that all of them were bankers and - industrialists. They represented the chemical industry, iron - industry, textile industry, all of them.’ - - “Question: ‘Representatives of all the industries?’ - - “Answer: ‘All of them; all of the big industries.’ - - “Question: ‘Do you recall any of their names?’ - - “Answer: ‘Oh certainly; Krupp was there—the old gentleman, - Gustav. He arose from his seat and thanked Hitler and was very - enthusiastic about him at the time. And then there was - Schnitzler—I think it was he—and Vögler for the United Steel - Works.’” - -Did you give that testimony? - -SCHACHT: Certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, at that meeting you have referred to Document -Number D-203, which is a record of the meeting—at that meeting Göring -said this in substance, did he not? - - “The sacrifices which are required would be so much easier for - industry to bear if it knew that the election of 5 March would - surely be the last one for the next 10 years, probably even for - the next 100 years.” - -You heard that, did you not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now yesterday or the day before you were -interrogated about your support and about the tribute that Goebbels paid -to you; and you said to the Court, “It is not my fault if Goebbels made -a mistake.” Do you recall that? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I ask you, if testifying about Dr. Goebbels you -did not say this to the interrogator of the United States, on the 17th -day of October 1945, Exhibit Number USA-616 (Document Number 3729-PS)? - - “Question: ‘When did you become interested in becoming a - co-worker of Hitler?’ - - “Answer: ‘I should say in the years of 1931, 1932.’ - - “Question: ‘And that was when you saw that he had a mass - movement that was likely to take power?’ - - “Answer: ‘Quite right; it was growing continually.’ - - “Question: ‘And did you publicly record your support for Hitler - in those years?’ - - “Answer: ‘I think I made a statement in December 1930 once at - the Bavarian People’s Party, upon coming back from America. I - said that there was a choice for any future Government, either - to hold against 25 percent socialists, or against 20 percent - National Socialists.’ - - “Question: ‘But what I mean—to make it very brief indeed—did - you lend the prestige of your name to help Hitler come to - power?’ - - “Answer: ‘I stated publicly that I expected Hitler to come into - power for the first time that I remember in November 1932.’ - - “Question: ‘And you know, or perhaps you don’t, that Goebbels in - his diary, records with great affection...’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘...the help that you gave him at that time?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes, I know that.’ - - “Question: ‘November 1932?’ - - “Answer: ‘You say the book is called _From the Kaiserhof to the - Reich Chancellery_?’ - - “Question: ‘That’s right; you have read that?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘And you don’t deny that Goebbels was right?’ - - “Answer: ‘I think his impression was that he was correct at that - time.’” - -Did you give that testimony? - -SCHACHT: Yes. I never doubted that Goebbels was under this impression; I -merely said that he was mistaken. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you didn’t—Well, I won’t bother. Now, you -made some extensive quotations from Ambassador Dodd yesterday, the day -before. Did you not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And let’s have this understood: Ambassador Dodd was -consistently and at all times opposed to the entire Nazi outfit, wasn’t -he? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So you got no encouragement from him to be in this -outfit? - -SCHACHT: Oh, no. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you testified, as I understood you, that -Ambassador Dodd invited you to go to the United States of America and -you say—I am quoting from Page 8670 of the record (Volume XII, Page -439): - - “At that time, 1937, he called on me and urged me to go with - him, or follow him as soon as possible, and change my residence - to America. He said that I would find a very pleasant welcome in - America. I believe he never would have said that to me if he had - not had a friendly feeling towards me.” - -You said that to the Tribunal? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I think you intended to convey to the Tribunal -the impression that Ambassador Dodd had great confidence in you and -great friendship for you? - -SCHACHT: I had that impression. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Have you read his entire diary, or did you confine -yourself to reading extracts? - -SCHACHT: Yes. I also know of the passage where he said, “You would make -a very bad American,” or something like that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, yes, you didn’t mention that to the Tribunal. - -SCHACHT: I think that would be better for the Prosecution. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we are not disappointing you then. - -Are you not familiar with his entry under the date of December 21, 1937, -where he speaks of the luncheon at which you were present? - - “Schacht spoke of the defeat of Germany in 1918 as wholly due to - Woodrow Wilson’s bringing America into the World War. But I said - Wilson’s Fourteen Points were the one great promise of - international peace and co-operation, and every country on both - sides had helped to defeat his purpose. Don’t you think Wilson, - 50 years from now, will be regarded as one of the greatest - presidents the United States has ever had? He evaded an answer - but turned his attention to the Japanese-Chinese war and opposed - Germany’s alliance to Japan. Then he showed the true German - attitude, quoting, ‘If the United States would stop the Japanese - War and leave Germany to have her way in Europe, we would have - world peace.’” - -SCHACHT: What is the question? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you make those statements? - -SCHACHT: I do not know whether I said it, but even today it seems an -extremely reasonable statement. I am of the opinion that it was correct -with one exception, I believe... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, now let’s get this straight. As I understand -you correctly, you can have peace, world peace, if Germany was left to -have her way in Europe? - -SCHACHT: Yes. May I say that there were various opinions about the path -Germany was to take; mine was a peaceful one. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, he goes on: - - “I did not comment, and others also failed to make remarks. - Schacht meant what the Army Chiefs of 1914 meant when they - invaded Belgium, expecting to conquer France in 6 weeks, namely; - domination and annexation of neighboring little countries, - especially north and east.” - -SCHACHT: Am I to reply? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you say that? - -SCHACHT: No, no. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was that what Dodd said about your conversation? - -SCHACHT: But I did not say that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you? - -SCHACHT: No, may I... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was the impression? - -SCHACHT: No, may I answer please? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask you this question: What is the impression -received over the course of his acquaintance with you by a man whom you -describe as being a decent fellow and a friend of yours? - -SCHACHT: May I answer that I have already stated that Mr. Dodd was the -victim of many misconceptions. In this case, too, he does not say that I -said it; he says, “Schacht meant.” That was his opinion which he -attributed to me. I never said that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I so understood it; but it was the estimate of a -friendly observer, I take it from you. - -SCHACHT: A friendly observer who continually misunderstood; Ambassador -Henderson has proved that in his book. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He may have misunderstood Henderson; but there is -never any doubt that he understood the Nazi danger from the beginning, -is there? - -SCHACHT: Yes; but he misunderstood my attitude. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, when you went and asked first the Foreign -Minister and then Hitler to go to the United States, or have some one go -to the United States, you testified, on Page 8708 of the record (Volume -XII, Page 467) that you told Hitler this: - - “It seems vital to me that there should be someone constantly in - America who could clarify German interests publicly, in the - press, _et cetera_.” - -Did you say that? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, is that what you actually said to Hitler? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I call your attention to your own letter, -Document Number 3700-PS to the Reich Marshal. - - “In the beginning of 1940 I proposed to the Führer that I should - go to the United States in order to attempt to slow down - America’s assistance to England in the matter of armaments and, - if possible, to prevent America becoming involved more deeply in - the war.” - -I ask you, which of those is true? - -SCHACHT: Both of them. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Both? Then you did not reveal to the Tribunal -yesterday, when you reported the conversation, all that you had -pretended that you would do in the United States, did you? - -SCHACHT: No, certainly not. I wanted, for instance, to try to persuade -the President to intervene for peace. That, too, I did not mention here. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also testified yesterday that you were -never told about the extent, the type, and the speed of rearmament. Do -you recall that? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But although you had no such information, you said -it was too much? - -SCHACHT: I had the feeling that one ought to go slowly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let me remind you of certain statements made -by General Von Blomberg concerning 1937. - - “Answer: ‘At that time, the organization of the planned - Wehrmacht was about complete.’ - - “Question: ‘When? 1937?’ - - “Answer: ‘I believe it was 1937.’ - - “Question: ‘Was that a plan that had been discussed with Doctor - Schacht in connection with the financing, as to how big the - Wehrmacht would be?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes. Schacht knew the plan for the formation of the - Wehrmacht very well, since we informed him every year about the - creation of new formations for which we had been expending - money. I remember that, in the year 1937 we discussed what the - Wehrmacht would need for current expenses after a large amount - had been spent for creating it.’ - - “Question: ‘That means that you gave Schacht a clear statement - of how much money each year went into the creation of new units, - new installations, and so forth, and how much you were using for - the operating expenses of the Wehrmacht?’ - - “Answer: ‘Exactly right.’ - - “Question: ‘When you say that by 1937 the plan had been - fulfilled, do you mean in the main?’ - - “Answer: ‘In the main.’” - -Another question. I skip two or three irrelevant ones. - - “When you say that Schacht was familiar with those figures, how - were they brought to his attention? - - “Answer: ‘The demands for the money needed were handed to - Schacht in writing.’ - - “Question: ‘That means that in connection with the money which - Schacht was raising for the rearmament program, he was informed - of how many divisions and how many tanks and so forth would be - procured through these means?’ - - “Answer: ‘I don’t think we put down the amount of money we would - need for every tank and so forth, but we would put down how much - every branch of the Wehrmacht, like the Navy or Air Force, - needed, and then we would state how much was required for - activating and how much for operating.’ - - “Question: ‘That is, Doctor Schacht could see each year how much - of an increase there would be in the size of the Armed Forces as - a result of the money he was procuring?’ - - “Answer: ‘That is certain.’” - -I ask whether you deny the statements made by Von Blomberg as I have put -them to you? - -SCHACHT: Yes, unfortunately, I must say that I know nothing about this. -A member of the Reichsbank Directorate, Geheimrat Vocke, will testify -tomorrow; and I ask that you put this matter to him so that the question -will be clarified. The question was not one of informing me, but of -informing the Reichsbank Directorate. Everything that I knew the -Reichsbank Directorate naturally also knew. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dr. Schacht, I don’t care whether you know or -didn’t know as far as the Prosecution’s case is concerned. What I am -asking you these questions for is to know how far we can rely on your -testimony. - -SCHACHT: Yes, I understand. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So there will be no misunderstanding about that. -And you deny that Von Blomberg was telling the truth when he says, when -he reported to you in writing, those facts? - -SCHACHT: Yes, unfortunately I must deny it. Evidently he does not -remember. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you testified yesterday or the day before, -that the so-called New Plan had nothing to do with the armament program, -did you not? - -SCHACHT: Nothing in particular with armament. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Oh, nothing in particular. - -SCHACHT: No. I mean of course—the Tribunal was expressly asked whether -I was to speak about the New Plan here or not, and the Tribunal decided -that it was to be brought up at your cross-examination. I am prepared to -inform you now about the New Plan before you... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Dr. Schacht, you have no objection to -answering my questions, have you? - -SCHACHT: Certainly not. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am referring to the answer which you gave—the -one which you were not allowed to give—find the Page 8732 of this -record (Volume XII, Pages 484 and 485): - - “Question: ‘Some of your economic policies during the time you - were Minister of Economics, which have been accused as being in - preparation for war, were the so-called New Plan. What was - that?’” - -And your answer: - - “May I state first of all that the New Plan had nothing at all - to do with rearmament.” - -And then you went into an explanation of the New Plan which the Court -did not receive, and I am asking you only this question: Did you not -say, in your speech on the Miracle of Finance on the 29th day of -November 1938, this—after quoting a great number of figures: “These -figures show how much the New Plan contributed to the execution of the -armament program as well as to the securing of our food.” - -Did you say that or didn’t you? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is Document Number EC-611, Exhibit Number -USA-622. - -Now, I understood you to say in your testimony that you really didn’t -have anything to do socially with Hitler or with the other Nazis and -that you refused their invitation to lunch at the Reich Chancellery; and -one of the chief reasons was that those present showed such abject -humility to Hitler. Did you say that? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to read to you from your speech, -Document Number EC-501, your inaugural speech on the occasion of the -Führer’s birthday. This was a public speech, by the way, wasn’t it? - -SCHACHT: I do not know. I do not remember. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You made a speech on the Führer’s birthday on the -21st of April 1937, carried in the newspapers? - -SCHACHT: Maybe. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “We are meeting together here to remember - with respect and love the man to whom the German people - entrusted the control of its destiny more than 4 years ago.” - -And then, after some other remarks, you say, - - “With the limitless passion of a glowing heart and the - infallible instinct of a born statesman, Adolf Hitler, in a - struggle which he led for 14 years with calm logic, has won for - himself the soul of the German people.” - -Was that a part of your published and public speech? - -SCHACHT: I assume that you have quoted it quite correctly. I do not -believe that anyone, on the occasion of the birthday celebration of the -head of a state, could say anything very different. Mr. Justice, may I -make one request. You have completely passed over the New Plan, while -the Tribunal has pointed out that it was to be discussed here in -cross-examination. If you are not going to refer to the New Plan, may I -ask that the New Plan be discussed again in re-examination by my -attorney. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I did not ask you what the New Plan was; I asked -whether your statement that it had nothing to do with armaments was true -or not. But if your solicitor wants to ask about it, it is open to -ruling by the Tribunal. You quoted today Hitler’s letter of the 19th of -January 1939, in which you were dismissed from the presidency of the -Reichsbank; and you did not quote the concluding sentence, as I recall -it, which reads, “I am happy to be able to avail myself of your services -for the solution of new tasks in your position as Reich Minister.” That -is a correct quotation, is it not? - -SCHACHT: I refer to the testimony by the witness Gisevius, who has -already said that outwardly Hitler would never indicate that there was -dissension between himself and his collaborators but that he always -attempted to give a false impression to the world. After January 1939 -Hitler never asked for my opinion or my co-operation. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you asked by anyone else? - -SCHACHT: No. I cited this morning the occasions when I was asked for -assistance. That was in connection with Belgium, and in connection with -the periodical, _Das Reich_. I think that was all. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you performed no functions whatever in -reference to Belgium? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I quote your letter of the 17th of October -1940 to the Reich Minister of Economics, Document EC-504, USA-830. At -that time you had ceased to be President of the Reichsbank, had you not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. I was only a minister without portfolio. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “So that the German banks in the occupied - western territories need not work side-by-side, or rather - against each other, you had assigned the Deutsche Bank the task - of clearing the way for closer economic co-operation with - Holland; and you entrusted the Dresdner Bank with the same task - for Belgium.” - -And you go on to describe that situation and say: - - “In order to remove this difficulty, you, Herr Reich Minister, - have agreed that the undersigned comply with the requests of - both banking houses for a decisive expression of opinion in this - question. I have subsequently discussed the situation with both - banks and it was confirmed in the course of the conversation - that at present there is no tendency on the part of Dutch or - Belgian financial institutions to enter into general ties with - the German business men.” - -Do you recall? - -SCHACHT: Yes, I remember it, now that you have read it to me. May I make -a statement, or what was your question? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I just wondered if you remembered that. - -SCHACHT: Yes, and I ask permission to make a statement. It concerns... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If you think it needs explaining... - -SCHACHT: I would think so; but I leave that to the Tribunal. If I may -speak: It concerns a rivalry between two large banks. Both these large -banks approached me—as a former banker and President of the -Reichsbank—to decide the matter, and I did. I really do not see what -that has to do with the official participation in the Belgian -administration. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the purpose of your intervention was to avoid -misunderstanding in the occupied countries between the banking interests -of the occupied countries and the German banks, was it not? - -SCHACHT: Certainly, they were to work together peacefully. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. Although you have said to the Tribunal that -you were entirely opposed to the Germans being in there at all? - -SCHACHT: Of course. But now that they were there I tried to keep peace. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You also were approached by Krupp von Bohlen about -raising a fund known as the “Hitler spending fund,” were you not? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never were? - -SCHACHT: Never. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, that is most unfortunate—that your name -should be connected with... - -SCHACHT: Yes, I know the letter. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never received such a letter? - -SCHACHT: Yes, I know the letter, but I was not assigned the task of -raising that fund. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you assisted in raising it, didn’t you? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you contribute to it? - -SCHACHT: I personally, certainly not. I do not know what you are -accusing me of. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I thought you knew about the letter from Von -Bohlen. - -SCHACHT: Yes, but I ask you of what are you accusing me? Please tell me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you raise any money or help to organize a loan -with Krupp von Bohlen in May of 1933—the Hitler spending fund? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How did you answer Krupp von Bohlen’s letter asking -you to do so? - -SCHACHT: Would you please remind me of what Herr Von Krupp wrote to me -at the time? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Have you the letter of the 29th of May? - -SCHACHT: Yes, one moment, please, I have nearly finished. May I reply -now? From this... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: First of all, did you receive such a letter? - -SCHACHT: Yes, of course. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right. Tell us what happened. - -SCHACHT: In that letter Herr Von Krupp informed me that industry and -other economic circles, such as agriculture, _et cetera_, intended to -organize a joint Hitler fund in order to combine in one collection the -unrestrained Party collections which were making the entire country -insecure. He informed me of this, and also of the fact that a board of -trustees was to be appointed for this Hitler fund. I want to say that I -never joined the board of trustees and was not a member of it. He -further informed me that the representatives of the banks, Dr. Fischer -and Dr. Mosier, would contact me and inform me about these things. That -is all that the letter says. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That I offer as Exhibit Number USA-831, (Document -Number D-151). - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you look at the following letter of -the 30th of May 1933, which says they had the opportunity of mentioning -it to you? - -SCHACHT: One moment, please. I do not think the letter is in my document -book. No, it is not here. - -[_The document was handed to the defendant._] - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I asked you to read the letter of the 29th of May -first; one of the 29th of May and one of the 30th. The 29th of May has -not been translated. - -SCHACHT: I see. Just a minute. I read. - -This letter never reached me. It has been crossed out and apparently it -was not sent, because Krupp and I had a personal conversation to which -Krupp refers in the letter of the following day, 30 May; the letter -begins, “As Dr. Köttgen and I had the opportunity of mentioning to you -yesterday...” That apparently was a personal conversation. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, and you had also said: - - “You were kind enough to promise me to obtain from Messrs. Otto - Christian Fischer and Dr. Mosier...full particulars, and - especially information on how far banks which are public - corporations can participate in this task.” - -SCHACHT: No, Mr. Justice Jackson, it does not say that in the letter. -Please, will you be good enough to read the letter of 29 May? Where does -it say that I spoke to Dr. Fischer or would speak to Dr. Mosier? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you deny receiving the letter of the 29th? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never received it? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you deny having a conversation with Krupp von -Bohlen-Halbach, the substance of which is set forth in that letter? - -SCHACHT: No—One moment. Please, let me answer quietly. I do not wish to -be accused of anything without replying. - -I did not receive that letter on 29 May, nor did I receive it later. -Instead, there was a personal conversation. The subject of that -conversation is contained in the letter of 30 May, which we read before -and which I received. You have just asserted that I had promised Krupp -von Bohlen to speak to Dr. Fischer and Dr. Mosier. The letter makes no -mention of that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Does it not say so in the memorandum which you say -was replaced by a conversation? That is what I am trying to ask you. - -SCHACHT: At any rate, I did not promise to talk to the gentlemen. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Anything more you want to say? - -SCHACHT: No. That is enough. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, yesterday, I think it was, you testified that -you had made public statements against the terror policy of the regime; -and in evidence you quoted from your Königsberg speech. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Unfortunately, Dr. Schacht, you stopped just at the -point where I got interested in it. - -SCHACHT: Yes, that is generally the case. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After you had stated that there are people who ran -Germany—let me quote the part you quoted, because it is important in -connection... - -SCHACHT: Quote the whole thing. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. This is what you quoted: - - “Those are the people who heroically smear window panes in the - middle of the night; who brand every German who trades in a - Jewish store as a traitor; who condemn every former Freemason as - a scoundrel, and who, in the just fight against priests and - ministers who talk politics from the pulpit, cannot themselves - distinguish between religion and misuse of the pulpit. The goal - at which these people aim is generally correct and good.” - -That is what you quoted? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now let us go on: - - “The goal at which these people aim is generally correct and - good. There is no place in the Third Reich for secret societies, - regardless of how harmless they are. The priests and ministers - should take care of souls, and not meddle in politics. The Jews - must realize that their influence is gone for all time.” - -That was also a part of that speech, was it not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you pointed out in that speech that on the -Jewish problem, as you called it, legislation is being prepared and must -be awaited? - -SCHACHT: Yes, I had hoped so. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You assured them so, did you not? - -SCHACHT: I beg your pardon? Yes, that was the intention as I gathered -from my conversation with Hitler. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew that the laws on the Jewish subject -were on their way? - -SCHACHT: Not the laws which were passed later. I always urged Hitler to -give legal protection to the Jews. I wanted to see this law enacted, and -I assumed that it would be done; but instead the Racial Laws of -September or November, yes, November, 1935, were passed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have quoted from Exhibit Number USA-832, which is -Document EC-433, and you say the laws you were forecasting and promising -were laws for the protection of the Jews? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We will get to that later. - -You gave your reasons, which you said were reasons of principle, to the -Tribunal for not becoming a Party member? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR: JUSTICE JACKSON: Yesterday in Court, do you recall that? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now isn’t it a fact that you have told the United -States Prosecution Staff that you asked Hitler whether to join the -Party, and that to your great relief Hitler told you not to? - -SCHACHT: Yes. Before I co-operated with him I wanted to find out whether -he demanded that I should become a member of the Party. I was most -relieved when he said I need not. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So you remained out of the Party with Hitler’s -consent and approval? - -SCHACHT: Yes, of course. I think that is just another reason which will -prove that I have never been a member of the Party. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you did not mention that to the Tribunal when -you were giving your reasons for setting out, that Hitler had given -permission? - -SCHACHT: No, I thought the Tribunal would believe me anyway. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When you received the Party golden swastika, you -stated that it was the greatest honor that could be conferred by the -Third Reich, did you not? - -SCHACHT: I did, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And while you didn’t wear it in your daily life, -you did wear it on official occasions, you stated, did you not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. It was very convenient on railroad journeys, when ordering -a car, _et cetera_. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: From 1933 to 1942 you contributed a thousand -Reichsmark a year to the Nazi Party? - -SCHACHT: No. Yes, I beg your pardon; from 1937 to 1942. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Didn’t you say on interrogation that it was from -1933 to 1942? - -SCHACHT: No, that is an error. From 1937, after I had received the -swastika. Evidently that is a misunderstanding. After I had received it -I said to myself, “It would be fitting—give the people a thousand marks -a year, and have done with it.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: For upwards of ten years, not quite ten years, you -accepted and held office of one kind or another under this regime, did -you not? - -SCHACHT: From 17 March 1933 to 21 January 1943. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And as I understand you, that during this time, at -least a part of the time, Hitler deceived you, and all the time you -deceived Hitler. - -SCHACHT: No, oh no. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have misunderstood you? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well now... - -SCHACHT: I believe that in the first years, at least, I did not deceive -Hitler. - -I not only believe so, I know it. I only started to deceive him in 1938. -Until then, I always told him my honest opinion. I did not cheat him at -all; on the contrary... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What becomes, then, of your explanation that you -entered his government in order to put brakes on his program? Did you -tell him that? - -SCHACHT: Oh, no. I should hardly have done that or he would never have -admitted me into the government. But I did not deceive him about it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he know your purpose in joining his government -was to defeat his program by sabotage? - -SCHACHT: I did not say that I wanted to defeat his program. I said that -I wanted to direct it into orderly channels. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you have said that you wanted to put brakes -on it. You used that expression. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Which meant slow down? Didn’t it? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he wanted to speed it up, isn’t that right? - -SCHACHT: Yes, perhaps. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never allowed him to know that you had entered -his government for the purpose of slowing down his rearmament program, -did you? - -SCHACHT: It was not necessary to tell him what I was thinking. I did not -deceive him. I made no false statements, but I would hardly tell him -what I actually thought and wanted. He did not tell me his innermost -thoughts either, and you do not tell them to your political opponents -either. I never deceived Hitler except after 1938. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I daresay. I am not asking you about a political -opponent. I am asking you about the man in whose government you entered -and became a part. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You don’t tell your opponents; but is it customary -in Germany that members of the government enter for the purpose of -defeating the head of the government’s program? - -SCHACHT: I have already told you that the word defeat is incorrect. I -did not intend to defeat him. I intended to slow him down; and that is -indeed the custom, for that is how every coalition government is -constructed. If you enter into a coalition government, you must discuss -certain matters with your neighboring parties and come to an agreement -about them, and you must use your influence to check certain projects of -the other party. That is not a deception; it is an attempt at a -compromise solution. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You claim you entered as a coalition? - -SCHACHT: Yes. I explained that in a distinct and comprehensive manner. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You used the word yourself today, in describing -your activities, as sabotaging his rearmament program, did you not? - -SCHACHT: Yes, I did so, shall we say, after 1936. But he noticed it. -That was not a deception. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You take some part of the responsibility, I take -it, for the loss of the war by Germany. - -SCHACHT: That is a very strange question. Please, forgive me if I say -that I assume no responsibility. Since I am not responsible for the fact -that the war started I cannot assume any responsibility for the fact -that it was lost. I did not want war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when did your doubts about Hitler as a man, his -integrity, first arise? - -SCHACHT: I have explained that in such detail during the examination -that I do not think I need repeat it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did that occur—I’ll put it in the terms of your -interrogation, since your interrogation is a little clearer. - - “In 1934”—so your interrogation runs—“he killed many people - without having any legal justification or had them killed; and a - few days after, in the Reichstag, he said he was the highest - judge in Germany. He was certainly not, and for the first time I - was shaken by his conception. It seemed to me absolutely immoral - and inhuman.” - -Is that correct? - -SCHACHT: I said that here yesterday or the day before; exactly the same -thing. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I want to fix these dates, Dr. Schacht. You -see, your purpose in this trial and mine aren’t exactly the same. - -SCHACHT: No, no, I know that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also received full information about the -operation of the Gestapo from Gisevius in 1934 or 1935, as he testified, -did you not? - -SCHACHT: No, he did not say that. He said that he knew about these -matters. He did not tell me everything, but I admitted earlier -today—this morning—that he did inform me of certain things, and from -that I drew my conclusions. At the beginning of May 1935 I had already -discussed this matter with Hitler. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were informed about the Gestapo terrorism, -Reichstag Fire... - -SCHACHT: The Reichstag Fire? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ...the falsity of the purge claim... - -SCHACHT: One moment, please. May I take them in order? I was not told -about the Reichstag Fire until years later by the late Count Helldorf, -who has been mentioned by Gisevius. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You mean Gisevius never told you about that? - -SCHACHT: I think I heard it from Helldorf. I may have heard it from -Gisevius, but I think it was Helldorf. At any rate, it was after 1935 -that I heard about it. Until then, I did not think it was possible. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never doubted Gisevius’ word when he told you -in 1934 or 1935 as he testified, did you? - -SCHACHT: One moment. He told me this either in 1934 or 1935, but not -1934 and 1935, and if he did tell me—well if Gisevius said so, I assume -that it is true. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It was then that you knew about the persecution of -the churches and the destruction of the labor unions, wasn’t it? - -SCHACHT: The destruction of the labor unions took place as early as May -1933. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You knew all about that, didn’t you? - -SCHACHT: I did not know everything, only what was generally known. I -knew exactly what every other German knew about it and what the labor -unions themselves knew. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: As a matter of fact, that was one of the reasons -for the contributions by yourself and other industrialists to the Nazi -Party, wasn’t it? - -SCHACHT: Oh, no: oh, no. There was never any question of that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You mean that meetings of industrialists were held, -and as important a thing to industry as the destruction of the labor -unions was never mentioned in your conferences? - -SCHACHT: I know nothing about it. Will you please remind me of something -definite. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Confiscation of the properties; the putting of -labor union leaders into concentration camps. - -SCHACHT: I heard about that—one moment. I do not know exactly who was -put into the concentration camps. I was informed about the confiscation -of property because that was publicly announced; but, if I understand -you correctly, I do not know what the meetings of industrialists had to -do with it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also knew very early about the persecution -of the Jews, didn’t you? - -SCHACHT: I explained yesterday exactly what I knew about the persecution -of the Jews, how I acted in connection with the persecution of the Jews, -and I state that as long as I was a minister I did everything to prevent -these things. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I understood your generality, and I am trying to -get at a little more detail about it, Dr. Schacht. Did you not testify -as follows, on your interrogation on the 17th of October 1945: - - “The National Socialists, as I understood from the program, - intended to have a smaller percentage of Jews in the - governmental and cultural positions of Germany, with which I - agreed.” - -SCHACHT: Yes. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Question: ‘Well, now, you had read _Mein - Kampf_, had you not?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘And you knew the views of Hitler on the Jewish - question. Did you not?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’” - -You so testified, did you not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Question: ‘Well, now, during your time as - Reich Minister, statutes were passed, were they not, prohibiting - all Jewish lawyers, for example, from practicing in the courts?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes, that is what I said.’ - - “Question: ‘Did you agree with that?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’” - -Did you say that? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you did agree with excluding... - -SCHACHT: Yes, I always agreed with that principle. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. And you also agreed with the principle of -excluding all Jews from civil service positions, did you not? - -SCHACHT: No. I want to emphasize in this connection... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well... - -SCHACHT: May I finish? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. - -SCHACHT: With regard to the principle of the dominating Jewish influence -in government, legal, and cultural questions I have always said that I -did not consider this influence to be of advantage either to the German -people and Germany, which was a Christian state and based on Christian -conceptions, or to the Jews, since it increased the animosity against -them. For these reasons I was always in favor of limiting Jewish -participation in those fields, not actually according to the population, -but nevertheless limiting them to a certain percentage. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, let’s go on with the interrogation. The -interrogations are always so much briefer than the answers made in court -where the press is present, if I may say so. - -Did you not give these answers: - - “Question: ‘Now, with respect to civil service. There was this - Aryan clause that was put in. Did you agree with that - legislation?’ - - “Answer: ‘With the same limitation.’ - - “Question: ‘Now, did you ever express yourself in the Cabinet or - elsewhere to the point that you wanted these restrictions put - in, restrictions you have been talking about?’ - - “Answer: ‘I don’t think so; useless to do it.’ - - “Question: ‘You say “useless to do it?”’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘I thought you said at one time or another that the - reason you stayed in is because you thought you might have some - influence on policy.’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘You didn’t consider this as important enough a - matter to take a position on it?’ - - “Answer: ‘Not an important enough matter to risk a break.’” - -SCHACHT: To break, that is right. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then, you were asked this: - - “You certainly signed a law with respect to the prohibition of - Jews receiving licenses to deal in foreign currencies.” - -Do you remember that? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Answer: ‘Yes, maybe.’ - - “Question: ‘You were in favor of that?’ - - “Answer: ‘I don’t remember the details of that question.’ - - “Question: ‘Well, it is not a matter of details. The question is - a matter of discrimination.’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’” - -You said that? - -SCHACHT: Yes, certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were in favor of that legislation, or were you -not? - -SCHACHT: Is that the question now, or from the interrogation? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am asking you now. - -SCHACHT: Yes. I agreed to it. Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were in favor of it. Well, you were not when -you were interrogated. - -SCHACHT: You can see how difficult it is. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The question then was, you were in favor of it, and -you said: - - “‘I wasn’t in favor, but I had to sign it.’ - - “Question: ‘Well, you were the only one who signed it. You were - the Reich Minister of Economics?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘And, obviously, it was a bill which was put in by - your Ministry, was it not?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’” - -Is that correct? - -SCHACHT: Yes, I assume so. You see, in these matters it was a question -of degrees. I have just explained the principles of my policy. The -extent to which these individual laws went is a question of politics. -Today, you can say what you like about it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also favored the law, and signed the law, -prohibiting all Jews from being admitted to examinations for public -economic advisors, for co-operatives, for example. - -SCHACHT: Yes, possibly. I do not remember but probably it is right. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you also approved a law imposing the death -penalty on German subjects who transferred German property abroad, or -left German property abroad. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And of course you knew that that affected, chiefly -and most seriously, the Jews who were moving abroad. - -SCHACHT: I hope that the Jews did not cheat any more than the -Christians. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, the death penalty on German subjects for -transferring German property abroad was your idea of a just law? - -SCHACHT: I do not understand. My idea? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. - -SCHACHT: It was an idea of the Minister of Finance, and I signed it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question was then asked you after these -were recited: - - “Well, now, was there a matter of conscience involved, or was - there not?” - -And you answered: - - “To some extent, yes, but not important enough to risk a break.” - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the question: - - “Yes. In other words, you had quite another objective which was - more important?” - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Well what was that objective, Dr. Schacht?” I am -still reading. It saves time. - -SCHACHT: Oh, pardon me. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Answer: ‘Well, the objective was to stay - in power and to help carry this through in an ordinary and - reasonable way.’ - - “Question: ‘That is to say, the restoration of the German - economy?’ - - “Answer: ‘Quite.’ - - “Question: ‘And the completion of the armament program?’ - - “Answer: ‘The completion of the international equality, the - political equality of Germany.’ - - “Question: ‘By means of armament, as you yourself have said?’ - - “Answer: ‘Also by means of armament.’” - -SCHACHT: All correct, and I stand by that today. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. So the armament question was so important that -you didn’t want to risk any break about the Jews. - -SCHACHT: Not the armament question, but the equality of Germany. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, now, I just asked you “by means of armament, -as you yourself have said.” - -SCHACHT: And I say, also by means of armament. That is one of the means. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it is the only one that was used ultimately, -wasn’t it? - -SCHACHT: No, it was not. There were other ones. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We will get to that in time. - -Now, isn’t it a fact that you also approved the law dismissing all -Jewish officials and notaries public? - -SCHACHT: That is possible. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you wrote to Blomberg on the 24th of December -1935 giving your motives, did you not, saying this: - - “The economic and illegal treatment of the Jews, the anti-Church - movement of certain Party organizations, and the lawlessness - which centers in the Gestapo are a detriment to our rearmament - task which could be considerably lessened through the - application of more respectable methods, without abandoning the - goals in the least.” (Exhibit Number Schacht-13). - -You wrote that, did you not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. I quoted it myself yesterday. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as to the rearmament program, you participated -in that from three separate offices, did you not? - -SCHACHT: I do not know which offices you mean, but please go ahead. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will help you to list them. In the first place, -you were Plenipotentiary for War. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That was the secret office at first. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were President of the Reichsbank. That was the -financial office. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were Minister of Economics, in which -position you had control with the minister for the general economic -situation. - -SCHACHT: Yes. This word “control” is such a general term that I cannot -confirm your statement without question, but I was Minister of -Economics. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let us take up first this position of -Plenipotentiary for War. You have testified that this position was -created for two purposes: (a) Preparation for war; (b) Control of the -economy in event of war. - -Is that correct? - -SCHACHT: That means preliminary planning in case war should come, and -the direction of economy when war had broken out. In other words, a -preparatory period and a later period in the event of war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, you were asked about your functions and gave -these answers, did you not, “As the Chief of Staff provides for -mobilization from a military point of view... so you were concerned with -it from the economic point of view.” - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You answered, “certainly.” And your position as -Plenipotentiary for War was of equal rank with the War Ministry, was it -not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, as you told us, those charged with -responsibility in event of war were: First, the Minister of War and the -Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht; and, secondly, on an equal -footing, Dr. Schacht, as Plenipotentiary for Economics. Is that correct? - -SCHACHT: I assume so, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in January of 1937 you wrote this, did you not? - - “I am entrusted with the preparation of the war economy - according to the principle that our economic war organization - must be so organized in time of peace that the war economy can - be directly converted in case of emergency from this peacetime - organization and need not be created at the outbreak of war.” - -SCHACHT: I assume that that is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who was your Deputy in that office? Wohlthat? - -SCHACHT: I think Wohlthat. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, those being your functions as Plenipotentiary -for the War Economy, let’s turn to your functions as President of the -Reichsbank. - -You said that the carrying out of the armament program was the principal -task of the German policy in 1935, did you not? - -SCHACHT: Undoubtedly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There is no doubt that you voluntarily assumed the -responsibility for finding financial and economic means for doing that -thing. - -SCHACHT: No doubt. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were the financial and economic -administrator in charge of developing the armament industry of Germany. - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were not? - -SCHACHT: No, in no way. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I may have misunderstood you. - - “Question: ‘Now, in connection with this development’”—I am - referring to your interrogation of the 16th of October 1945, - Exhibit USA-636 (Document Number 3728-PS), Page 44—“‘Now in - connection with this development of the armament industry, you - charged yourself as the financial and economic administrator of - it.’ - - “Nodding your head.” - -SCHACHT: I beg your pardon? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Nodding your head. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “You charged yourself”—I will ask the whole -question so you will get it. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Now, in connection with this development of the -armament industry, you charged yourself as the financial and economic -administrator of it.” - -The record says that you nodded your head. The next question was: - - “And in that connection you took various steps. Would you be - good enough to describe for us the larger steps which you took - with reference to this goal of rearmament, first, internally, - and, second, with respect to foreign nations? - - “Answer: ‘Internally, I tried to collect all money available for - financing the mefo bills. Externally, I tried to maintain - foreign commerce as much as possible.’” - -Did you make those answers, and are they correct? - -SCHACHT: I am sure that you are correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And your purpose in maintaining foreign trade was -to obtain enough foreign exchange to permit the imports of raw -materials, not manufactured, which were required for the rearmament -program. Is that not correct? - -SCHACHT: That is the question that is put to me. Now comes the answer. -Please, will you read the answer? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What is your answer now? - -SCHACHT: My answer today is that that was not the only aim. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Not the only aim? - -SCHACHT: Right. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But that was the primary aim, was it not? - -SCHACHT: No, not at all. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right, what was the other aim? - -SCHACHT: To keep Germany alive, to assure employment for Germany, to -obtain sufficient food for Germany. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Which was your dominant aim? - -SCHACHT: The food supply in Germany and work for the export industry. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I should like to go over one or two of these -documents with you as to your aim. I refer to Document 1168-PS of May 3, -1935. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Title, “Financing of Armament,” Exhibit Number -USA-37. - - “The following comments are based on the assumption that the - completion of the armament program in regard to speed and extent - is the task of German policy and that accordingly everything - else must be subordinated to this aim, insofar as this main goal - is not endangered, by neglecting other questions.” - -Did you write that? - -SCHACHT: Not only did I write it, but I handed it to Hitler personally. -It is one of twin documents, one of which has already been submitted in -evidence and discussed in detail by the Prosecution. I did not receive -the second document. - -When my defense counsel examined me I stated here that I was intent on -stopping the Party collections and Party moneys, which were extracted -everywhere from the German people, because it was extremely difficult -for me to get the money to finance the armament program and the mefo -bills. - -I could only get that point across to Hitler if I told him that of -course this was being done in the interests of armament. If I had told -him that this was done... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, but... - -SCHACHT: No, please let me finish. If I had told him that this was done -for the building of theaters, or something similar, it would have made -no impression on him. However, if I said it must be done because -otherwise we could not arm, that was a point which influenced Hitler and -that is why I said it. I admitted that and explained it during the -examination by my attorney. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you didn’t call that misleading him? - -SCHACHT: I would not call it “misleading”; I would call it “leading.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But leading without telling him the true motives -which actuated you, at least. - -SCHACHT: I think you can be much more successful in leading a person if -you do not tell him the truth than if you do tell him the truth. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am very glad to have that frank statement of your -philosophy, Dr. Schacht. I am greatly indebted to you. Well, you devised -all kinds of plans, one for the control of foreign exchange, blocked -foreign accounts; and mefo bills was one of the principal ones of your -devices for financing was it not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I don’t care about the details of mefo bills, -but I would like to ask you this. Isn’t it correct, as you testified in -the inquiry of the 16th of October 1945—Exhibit Number USA-636—as -follows: - - “Question: ‘Actually, as a matter of fact, let me ask you this. - At the time when you started the mefo bills, for example, there - were no ready means available for financing the rearmament?’ - - “Answer: ‘Quite.’ - - “Question: ‘That is to say, through normal budget finance - methods?’ - - “Answer: ‘Not enough.’ - - “Question: ‘Also, you were limited at that time by the statute - of the Reichsbank which did not permit you to give anything near - the sufficient credit which was required by the armament - program.’ - - “Answer: ‘Quite.’ - - “Question: ‘And you found a way?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘And the way you found was by creating a device in - effect which enabled the Reichsbank to lend, by a subterfuge, to - the Government what it normally or legally could not do?’ - - “Answer: ‘Right.’” - -Is that true? - -SCHACHT: That was my answer. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The following questions were then asked: - - “I understand that basically what was built up in Germany in the - way of an armament industry, a domestic economy that was sound, - and a Wehrmacht, the efforts that you put in from 1934 to the - spring of 1938, when mefo financing stopped, were responsible in - large part for the success of the whole program. - - “Answer: ‘I don’t know whether they were responsible for it, but - I helped a great deal to achieve that.’” - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were asked as follows, on the 17th of -October 1945: - - “In other words, in effect you are not taking the position that - you are not largely responsible for the rearming of the German - Army? - - “Answer: ‘Oh no, I never did that.’ - - “Question: ‘You have always been proud of that fact, I take it.’ - - “Answer: ‘I wouldn’t say proud, but satisfied.’” - -Is that still your position? - -SCHACHT: In reply to that I should like to say: The question of mefo -bills was quite certainly a system of finance which normally would never -have been attempted. I made a detailed statement on this subject when I -was questioned by my attorney. On the other hand, however, I can say -that this question was examined by all legal experts in the Reichsbank -and by means of this subterfuge, as you put it, a way was found which -was legally possible. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, I didn’t put it that way; you said so. - -SCHACHT: No, no. I mean the sentence you have just quoted as being my -answer. I beg your pardon. The matter was investigated from a legal -viewpoint, and we assured ourselves that it could be done in this way. -Moreover, I am still satisfied today that I contributed to the -rearmament, but I wish that Hitler had made different use of it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, on your 60th birthday Minister of War -Blomberg said that, “Without your help, my dear Mr. Schacht, there could -have been no rearmament,” did he not? - -SCHACHT: Yes, those are the sort of pleasantries which one exchanges on -such occasions. But there is quite a bit of truth in it. I have never -denied it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is the way it looks to me. - -Now, when you finally made some suggestion that the armament should stop -or slow up, as I understand, you made that suggestion without knowing -what the armament was. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The only thing you were judging by was financial -conditions, was it not? - -SCHACHT: Oh, no. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, what was it? - -SCHACHT: I did, of course, have a general impression of these matters -because General Thomas always discussed them with me. However, I do not -remember that General Von Blomberg gave me detailed information about -what he thought. Of course, I was informed in a general way regarding -the progress made by the armament program, and that is why I said “more -slowly.” My opinion was strengthened because of the general conditions. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well now, let’s see what reasons you gave in -Document Number EC-286. That is Exhibit Number USA-833: - - “I am therefore of the opinion that we should promote our export - with all resources by a temporary”—and I emphasize the word - “temporary”—“decrease of armament.” - -SCHACHT: Decrease? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Decrease, yes, temporary. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I emphasize “temporary,” and you emphasize -“decrease.” - -SCHACHT: Oh no, no; I agree with you. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “And that further, with reference to the - Four Year Plan, we should solve only those problems which appear - most pressing. Among these I include the oil-fuel program, the - buna program, and the program of developing ore resources, - insofar as this development does not of itself require large - amounts of raw materials which must be withheld from export. - - “On the other hand, all other measures of the Four Year Plan - should be postponed for the time being. I am convinced that by - such a policy our export could be increased so greatly that - there would be a certain improvement in our exhausted stocks, - and that the resumption of the strengthened armament would again - be possible in the not too distant future, from the point of - view of raw materials. I am unable to judge to what extent a - temporary postponement of armament would have military - advantages. However, I presume that such a pause in armament - would not only have advantages for the training of officers and - men, which has yet to be done, but that this pause would also - afford an opportunity to survey the technical results of - previous armament and to perfect the technical aspect of - armament.” - -Now that you addressed to Göring, did you not? - -SCHACHT: That is perfectly possible. I cannot remember the letter, but -it looks quite like one of mine. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes; and you were correctly giving to Göring your -true views; were you not? - -SCHACHT: No; I believe that this was merely a tactical letter. I think -that I was mainly trying to limit armament. If I had told him that we -wanted to stop arming, Göring would probably have denounced me to the -Führer accordingly. Therefore I told him, “Let’s stop for the time -being”—temporary. I also emphasize “temporary.” It was a tactical -measure to convince Göring that for the time being it should be -temporary. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then, with your fellow officers in the Government -you were also using tactical statements which did not represent your -true views? - -SCHACHT: That was absolutely necessary. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When did it cease to be necessary, Dr. Schacht? - -SCHACHT: Cease? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes; when did it cease to be necessary? - -SCHACHT: I think it more important to ask when it commenced; when it -started. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well? - -SCHACHT: During the first years I did not do it, of course, but later on -I did to a considerable extent. I could say always; it never stopped. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Has it stopped now? - -SCHACHT: I have no more colleagues, and here before this Tribunal I have -nothing to tell but the truth. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, on the 24th of September, 1935—December—you -wrote EC-293, which is Exhibit Number USA-834, and used this language, -did you not: - - “If there is now a demand for greater armament, it is, of - course, not my intention to deny or change my attitude, which is - in favor of the greatest possible armament and which I have - expressed for years both before and since the seizure of power; - but it is my duty to point out the economic limitations of this - policy.” - -SCHACHT: That is very good. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that is true? - -SCHACHT: Certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came in the Four Year Plan in 1936? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did not like the appointment of Göring to that -position? - -SCHACHT: I thought he was unsuited and, of course, it made an opening -for a policy which was opposed to mine. I knew perfectly well that this -was the start of exaggerated armament, whereas I was in favor of -restricted rearmament. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Why do you say that Göring’s appointment meant -exaggeration of armament? Can you point to anything that Göring has said -in favor of rearmament that is any more extreme than the things you have -said? - -SCHACHT: Oh yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, will you do it? - -SCHACHT: Yes, I think if you read the record of the so-called “small -Ministerial Council,” of the year 1936, and in particular 1938, which -you yourself introduced, you will see at once that here the necessity of -increased armament was emphasized. For instance, those of November or -October 1936, I think. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it was also emphasized in your documents, was -it not, throughout? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You say that your statements of that sort were -merely tactical. - -SCHACHT: No, I beg your pardon. I said arm within the limits of what is -economically possible and reasonable. Göring, if I may say it again, -wanted to go beyond those limits. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is exactly the point I want to make. Your -difference with Göring over rearmament was entirely a question of what -the economy of Germany would stand, was it not? - -SCHACHT: No. I said that the most important thing was that Germany -should live and have foreign trade, and within those limits we could -arm. However, it is out of the question that Germany should arm for the -sake of arming, and thus ruin her economy. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well that’s the difference between you and Göring; -it was over what the economy would stand, was it not? - -SCHACHT: No, it was a question of the extent of rearmament. The point -is, Mr. Justice Jackson, that German economy paid the price for Göring’s -action. The only question is, was it reasonable or unreasonable? If I -may state it pointedly, I would say that I considered Göring’s economic -policy to be unreasonable and a burden to the German nation; while I -considered it most important that rearmament should not be extended and -that the German nation should have a normal, peacetime standard. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 3 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - TRANSCRIBER NOTES - -Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious -printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for -periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; -however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus -“Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes -French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals: -hence Führer, Göring, Kraków, and Ljoteč etc. throughout. - -Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb -tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the -tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations -between the German, English, French, and, most specifically with this -volume, Russian documents presented in the trial. - -An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as -possible to the original document presentation and layout. - -[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International -Military Tribunal Vol. 12_, by Various.] - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS -BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOL. 12 *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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margin-bottom: 0em; text-indent:2em; } - body { margin-left:8%; margin-right:10%; max-width:40em;} - </style> - </head> - <body> - -<div style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Vol. 12, by International Military Tribunal</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online -at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you -are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this eBook. -</div> - -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Vol. 12</p> -<p style='display:block; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:0;'>Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946</p> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: International Military Tribunal</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: August 9, 2021 [eBook #66028]</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: John Routh, Cindy Beyer, and the online Distributed Proofreaders Canada team at http://www.pgdpcanada.net.</div> - -<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOL. 12 ***</div> -<div class='figcenter' style='width:80%'> -<img src='images/cover.jpg' alt='' id='iid-0000' style='width:100%;height:auto;'/> -</div> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div class='lgc' style=''> <!-- rend=';' --> -<p class='line' style='margin-top:2em;font-size:1.5em;'>TRIAL</p> -<p class='line' style='margin-top:.2em;margin-bottom:.2em;font-size:.7em;'>OF</p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:1.5em;'>THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.7em;'>BEFORE</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'>THE INTERNATIONAL</p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'>MILITARY TRIBUNAL</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.7em;'><span class='gesp'>NUREMBERG</span></p> -<p class='line' style='margin-top:.2em;margin-bottom:2em;font-size:.7em;'>14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/title.jpg' alt='' id='iid-0001' style='width:80px;height:auto;'/> -</div> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='margin-top:4em;font-size:.7em;'><span class='gesp'>PUBLISHED AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY</span></p> -<p class='line' style='margin-top:.2em;font-size:.7em;'><span class='gesp'>1947</span></p> -</div> <!-- end rend --> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div class='literal-container' style='margin-top:4em;margin-bottom:20em;'><div class='literal'> <!-- rend=';fs:.8em;' --> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>This volume is published in accordance with the</p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>direction of the International Military Tribunal by</p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction</p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.</p> -</div></div> <!-- end rend --> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div class='lgc' style='margin-top:8em;margin-bottom:4em;'> <!-- rend=';' --> -<p class='line'>VOLUME XII</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<hr class='tbk100'/> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'><span class='gesp'>OFFICIAL TEXT</span></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'><span class='gesp'>IN THE</span></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'>ENGLISH LANGUAGE</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<hr class='tbk101'/> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'><span class='gesp'>PROCEEDINGS</span></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>18 April 1946—2 May 1946</p> -</div> <!-- end rend --> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<table id='tab1' summary='' class='center'> -<colgroup> -<col span='1' style='width: 6em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 20em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 2.5em;'/> -</colgroup> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle0' colspan='3'><span style='font-size:larger'>CONTENTS</span></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Eleventh Day, Thursday, 18 April 1946,</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_1'>1</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_33'>33</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Twelfth Day, Tuesday, 23 April 1946,</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_64'>64</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_97'>97</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirteenth Day, Wednesday, 24 April 1946,</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_136'>136</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_167'>167</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Fourteenth Day, Thursday, 25 April 1946,</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_196'>196</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_226'>226</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Fifteenth Day, Friday, 26 April 1946,</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_263'>263</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_292'>292</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Sixteenth Day, Monday, 29 April 1946,</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_317'>317</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_350'>350</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Seventeenth Day, Tuesday, 30 April 1946,</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_393'>393</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_429'>429</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Eighteenth Day, Wednesday, 1 May 1946,</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_460'>460</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_494'>494</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle1' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Nineteenth Day, Thursday, 2 May 1946,</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_527'>527</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle1'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle2'><a href='#Page_555'>555</a></td></tr> -</table> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='1' id='Page_1'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH DAY</span><br/> Thursday, 18 April 1946</h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Dr. Seidl.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Hans Frank): -Mr. President, Members of the Tribunal, on 9 April of this year, -deviating from the rule made by the Tribunal, I made the application -that I should first be allowed to present the documents, then -call the witnesses, and then at the end examine the defendant as a -witness. I do not know whether the Tribunal is already in possession -of the document books. I have ascertained that Volume I of the -document book was translated by 8 April, Volume II and III on -11 April, and Volume IV and V a few days later. At any rate, I -have not yet received any document books myself, for the reason -that the office concerned has not yet received permission to bind -the books.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, I thought I asked about this, not yesterday, -but the day before yesterday—yes; and you said you were -perfectly ready to go on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I had been told that the books had been translated, -and I naturally assumed that these books would also be bound. -Yesterday I discovered that this is not the case. At any rate, the -fault is not mine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I was not suggesting that there was any fault -on your part.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United -States): In the first place, we did not have much to go over with -Dr. Seidl. The agreement was reached with him the night before -last about 6 o’clock or a little afterwards. Thereafter the materials -were put into the process of preparation, and there are 500 pages. -They have just not been completed, and it is not so that the people -did not receive authority to go ahead. They have not been able to -complete their work and there will be some delay.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you can go on with your witnesses. -You have the defendant himself to call and several other witnesses.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And the documents will no doubt be ready -by then. We are rising this evening at half past four, and by the -<span class='pageno' title='2' id='Page_2'></span> -time that the Tribunal reassembles, by Tuesday morning, no doubt -all the documents will be ready. As to your application, the Tribunal -has considered the application and sees no reason to depart from its -ordinary rule that the defendant should be called first; that is to say, -if you intend to call the defendant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Oh yes, I intend to examine the defendant; but in -the interests of accelerating the proceedings, I suggested that the -other witnesses should be heard first so that the examination of the -defendant might be as short as possible. It is possible that he can -then answer a number of questions merely by saying “yes” or “no.” -Another reason why I consider this procedure to be the most expedient -is because a proper examination of the defendant is only -possible if I have the document books at hand at the same time. -That necessity does not apply to the other witnesses. I should, therefore, -beg the Tribunal to give me permission so that I can first -examine the witnesses who are already in the witnesses’ room.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The documents are all, or nearly all, I imagine, -in German and can be put to the defendant in the course of his -examination; and the Tribunal think, as they have already said, that -calling the defendant first is in the interests of expedition; and they, -therefore, feel they must adhere to their rule.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Very well. In that case, with the permission of the -Tribunal, I call the Defendant Dr. Hans Frank to the witness stand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Frank took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you give your full name?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HANS FRANK (Defendant): Hans Frank.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I, swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak -the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down, please.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, when and where were you born?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I was born on 23 May 1900 at Karlsruhe, in Baden.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Will you please give the Tribunal a brief outline of -your education?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: In 1919 I finished my studies at the Gymnasium, and in -1926 I passed the final state law examination, which completed my -legal training.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: And what profession did you follow after that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I had several legal posts. I worked as a lawyer; as a -member of the teaching staff of a technical college; and then I worked -<span class='pageno' title='3' id='Page_3'></span> -principally as legal adviser to Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist -German Workers Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Since when have you been a member of the NSDAP?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I joined the German Labor Party, which was the -forerunner of the National Socialist German Workers Party, in 1919, -but did not join the newly formed National Socialist Workers Party -at the time. In 1923 I joined the Movement in Munich as a member -of the SA; and eventually, so to speak, I joined the NSDAP for the -first time in 1927.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Were you ever a member of the SS?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I have never been a member of the SS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: That means you have never had a rank of an SS -Obergruppenführer or General of the SS?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I never had the rank of an SS Obergruppenführer or -SS General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Not even honorary?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: No, not even honorary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: You were a member of the SA. What was the last -position you held in that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I was Obergruppenführer in the SA at the end, and -this was an honorary position.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What posts did you hold in the NSDAP during the -various periods, and what functions did you exercise?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: In 1929 I became the head of the legal department of -the Supreme Party Directorate of the NSDAP. In that capacity I -was appointed Reichsleiter of the NSDAP by Adolf Hitler in 1931. I -held this position until I was recalled in 1942. These are the principal -offices I have held in the Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Until the seizure of power you concerned yourself -mainly with legal questions within the Party, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I dealt with legal questions in the interest of Adolf -Hitler and the NSDAP and its members during the difficult years of -struggle for the victory of the Movement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What were your basic ideas regarding the concept -of a state controlled by a legal system?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: That idea, as far as I was concerned, was contained in -Point 19 of the Party program, which speaks of German common -law to be created. In the interest of accelerating the proceedings, I -do not wish to present my ideas in detail. My first endeavor was -to save the core of the German system of justice: the independent -judiciary. -<span class='pageno' title='4' id='Page_4'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>My idea was that even in a highly developed Führer State, even -under a dictatorship, the danger to the community and to the legal -rights of the individual is at least lessened if judges who do not -depend on the State Leadership can still administer justice in the -community. That means, to my mind, that the question of a state -ruled by law is to all intents and purposes identical with the question -of the existence of the independent administration of law. Most -of my struggles and discussions with Hitler, Himmler, and Bormann -during these years were more and more focused on this particular -subject. Only after the independent judiciary in the National -Socialist Reich had been definitely done away with did I give up my -work and my efforts as hopeless.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: You were also a member of the Reichstag?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: In 1930 I became a member of the Reichstag.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What posts did you hold after 1933?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: First, I was Bavarian State Minister of Justice, and -after the ministries of justice in the various states were dissolved I -became Reich Minister without portfolio. In 1933 I became the -President of the Academy of German Law, which I had founded. I -was the Reich Leader of the National Socialist Jurists Association, -which was later on given the name of “Rechtswahrerbund.” In 1933 -and 1934 I was Reich Commissioner for Justice, and in 1939 I became -Governor General of the Government General in Kraków.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What were the aims of the Academy of German Law -of which you were the founder?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: These aims are written down in the Reich Law regarding -the Academy of German Law. The main task, the central task, -of that Academy was to carry out Point 19 of the Party program to -bring German Common Law into line with our national culture.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did the Academy of German Law have definite -functions, or could it act only in an advisory capacity?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: The Academy of German Law was the meeting place -of the most prominent legal minds in Germany in the theoretical -and practical fields. Right from the beginning I attached no importance -to the question whether the members were members of the -Party or not. Ninety percent of the members of the Academy of -German Law were not members of the Party. Their task was to -prepare laws, and they worked somewhat on the lines of an advisory -committee in a well-organized parliament. It was also my idea that -the advisory committees of the Academy should replace the legal -committees of the German Reichstag, which was gradually fading -into the background in the Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the main the Academy helped to frame only laws of an -economic or social nature, since owing to the development of the -<span class='pageno' title='5' id='Page_5'></span> -totalitarian regime it became more and more impossible to co-operate -in other spheres.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: If I understand you correctly, then the governmental -administration of law was solely in the hands of the Reich Minister -of Justice, and that was not you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: No, I was not Reich Minister of Justice. The Reich -Minister of Justice, Dr. Gürtner, was, however, not competent for -the entire field of legislation but merely for those laws which came -within the scope of his ministry. Legislation in the Reich, in accordance -with the Enabling Act, was in the hands of the Führer and -Reich Chancellor and the Reich Government as a body. Consequently -my name appears in the <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span> at the bottom of one law -only, and that is the law regarding the Reintroduction of Compulsory -Military Service. However, I am proud that my name stands at the -end of that law.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: You have stated earlier that during 1933 and 1934 -you were Bavarian Minister of Justice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: In that capacity did you have an opportunity of -voicing your opinion on the question of concentration camps, and -what were the circumstances?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I learned that the Dachau concentration camp was being -established in connection with a report which came to me from the -Senior Public Prosecutor’s Office in Munich on the occasion of the -killing of the Munich attorney, Dr. Strauss. This Public Prosecutor’s -Office complained to me, after I had given them orders to investigate -the killing, that the SS had refused them admission to the Dachau -concentration camp. Thereupon I had Reich Governor, General -Von Epp, call a meeting where I produced the files regarding this -killing and pointed out the illegality of such an action on the part of -the SS and stated that so far representatives from the German Public -Prosecutor’s Office had always been able to investigate any death -which evoked a suspicion that a crime had been committed and that -I had not become aware so far of any departure from this principle -in the Reich. After that I continued protesting against this method -to Dr. Gürtner, the Reich Minister of Justice and at the same time -Attorney General. I pointed out that this meant the beginning of a -development which threatened the legal system in an alarming -manner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At Heinrich Himmler’s request Adolf Hitler intervened personally -in this matter, and he used his power to quash any legal proceedings. -The proceedings were ordered to be quashed. I handed in -my resignation as Minister of Justice, but it was not accepted. -<span class='pageno' title='6' id='Page_6'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: When did you become Governor General of the -occupied Polish territories, and where were you when you were -informed of this appointment?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: On 24 August 1939, as an officer in the reserve, I had -to join my regiment in Potsdam. I was busy training my company; -and on 17 September, or it may have been 16, I was making my -final preparations before going to the front when a telephone call -came from the Führer’s special train ordering me to go to the Führer -at once.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The following day I traveled to Upper Silesia where the Führer’s -special train was stationed at that time; and in a very short conversation, -which lasted less than ten minutes, he gave me the mission, -as he put it, to take over the functions of Civil Governor for the -occupied Polish territories.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At that time the whole of the conquered Polish territories was -under the administrative supreme command of a military commander, -General Von Rundstedt. Toward the end of September I -was attached to General Von Rundstedt’s staff as Chief of Administration, -and my task was to do the administrative work in the -Military Government. In a short time, however, it was found that -this method did not work; and when the Polish territories were -divided into the part which was incorporated into the German Reich -and the part which then became the Government General, I was -appointed Governor General as from 26 October.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: You have mentioned the various positions which you -held over a number of years. I now ask you: Did you, in any of -the positions you held in the Party or the State, play any vital part -in the political events of the last 20 years?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: In my own sphere I did everything that could possibly -be expected of a man who believes in the greatness of his people -and who is filled with fanaticism for the greatness of his country, -in order to bring about the victory of Adolf Hitler and the National -Socialist movement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I never participated in far-reaching political decisions, since I -never belonged to the circle of the closest associates of Adolf Hitler, -neither was I consulted by Adolf Hitler on general political questions, -nor did I ever take part in conferences about such problems. -Proof of this is that throughout the period from 1933 to 1945 I was -received only six times by Adolf Hitler personally, to report to him -about my sphere of activities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What share did you have in the legislation of the -Reich?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I have already told you that, and there is no need to -give a further answer. -<span class='pageno' title='7' id='Page_7'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did you, as a Reich Minister or in any other State -or Party post want this war, or did you desire a war in violation -of treaties entered into?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: War is not a thing one wants. War is terrible. We -have lived through it; we did not want the war. We wanted a great -Germany and the restoration of the freedom and welfare, the health -and happiness of our people. It was my dream, and probably the -dream of every one of us, to bring about a revision of the Versailles -Treaty by peaceful means, which was provided for in that very -treaty. But as in the world of treaties, between nations also, it is -only the one who is strong who is listened to; Germany had to -become strong first before we could negotiate. This is how I saw the -development as a whole: the strengthening of the Reich, reinstatement -of its sovereignty in all spheres, and by these means to free -ourselves of the intolerable shackles which had been imposed upon -our people. I was happy, therefore, when Adolf Hitler, in a most -wonderful rise to power, unparalleled in the history of mankind, -succeeded by the end of 1938 in achieving most of these aims; and -I was equally unhappy when in 1939, to my dismay, I realized more -and more that Adolf Hitler appeared to be departing from that -course and to be following other methods.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This seems to have been covered by what the -Defendant Göring told us, by what the Defendant Ribbentrop told us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The witness has already completed his statement on -this point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, what was your share in the events of Poland after 1939?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I bear the responsibility; and when, on 30 April 1945, -Adolf Hitler ended his life, I resolved to reveal that responsibility -of mine to the world as clearly as possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I did not destroy the 43 volumes of my diary, which report on -all these events and the share I had in them; but of my own accord -I handed them voluntarily to the officers of the American Army -who arrested me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, do you feel guilty of having committed -crimes in violation of international conventions or crimes against -humanity?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is a question that the Tribunal has got -to decide.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Then I shall drop the question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, what do you have to say regarding the accusations -which have been brought against you in the Indictment?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: To these accusations I can only say that I ask the -Tribunal to decide upon the degree of my guilt at the end of -my case. -<span class='pageno' title='8' id='Page_8'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I myself, speaking from the very depths of my feelings and -having lived through the 5 months of this trial, want to say that -now after I have gained a full insight into all the horrible atrocities -which have been committed, I am possessed by a deep sense of guilt.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What were your aims when you took over the post -of Governor General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I was not informed about anything. I heard about -special action commandos of the SS here during this trial. In connection -with and immediately following my appointment, special -powers were given to Himmler, and my competence in many -essential matters was taken away from me. A number of Reich -offices governed directly in matters of economy, social policy, -currency policy, food policy, and therefore, all I could do was to lay -upon myself the task of seeing to it that amid the conflagration of -this war, some sort of an order should be built up which would -enable men to live. The work I did out there, therefore, cannot be -judged in the light of the moment, but must be judged in its entirety, -and we shall have to come to that later. My aim was to safeguard -justice, without doing harm to our war effort.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, did the police, and particularly the Security -Police and SD, come under your jurisdiction in the Government -General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: The Higher SS and Police Leaders were in principle -subordinate to the Reichsführer SS Himmler. The SS did not come -under my command, and any orders or instructions which I might -have given would not have been obeyed. Witness Bühler will cover -this question in detail.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The general arrangement was that the Higher SS and Police -Leader was formally attached to my office, but in fact, and by -reason of his activities, he was purely an agent of the Reichsführer -SS Himmler. This state of affairs, even as early as November 1939, -was the cause of my first offer to resign which I made to Adolf -Hitler. It was a state of affairs which made things extremely difficult -as time went by. In spite of all my attempts to gain control -of these matters, the drift continued. An administration without a -police executive is powerless and there were many proofs of this. -The police officers, so far as discipline, organization, pay, and orders -were concerned, came exclusively under the German Reich police -system and were in no way connected with the administration of -the Government General. The officials of the SS and Police therefore -did not consider that they were attached to the Government -General in matters concerning their duty, neither was the police -area called “Police Area, Government General.” Moreover the -Higher SS and Police Leader did not call himself “SS and Police -<span class='pageno' title='9' id='Page_9'></span> -Leader in the Government General” but “Higher SS and Police -Leader East.” However, I do not propose to go into details at this -point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, did the concentration camps in the Government -General come under you, and did you have anything to do -with their administration?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Concentration camps were entirely a matter for the -police and had nothing to do with the administration. Members of -the civil administration were officially prohibited from entering the -camps.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Have you yourself ever been in a concentration -camp?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: In 1935 I participated in a visit to the Dachau concentration -camp, which had been organized for the Gauleiters. That -was the only time that I have entered a concentration camp.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, in 1942, by a decree of the Führer, a State -Secretariat for Security in the Government General was created. -The date is 7 May 1942. What was the reason for creating that State -Secretariat?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: The establishment of this State Secretariat was one of -the many attempts to solve the problem of the police in the Government -General. I was very happy about it at the time, because I -thought now we had found the way to solve the problem. I am -certain it would have worked if Himmler and Krüger had adhered -to the principle of this decree, which was co-operation and not -working against each other. But before long it transpired that this -renewed attempt, too, was merely camouflage; and the old conditions -continued.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: On 3 June 1942, on the basis of this Führer decree, -another decree was issued regarding the transfer of official business -to the State Secretary for Security. Is that true?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I assume so, if you have the document. I cannot -remember the details of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: In that case I shall ask the witness Bilfinger about -this point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: But I should like to add something to that. Wherever -the SS is discussed here, the SS and the police are considered as -forming one body. It would not be right of me if I did not correct -that wrong conception. I have known during the course of these -years so many honest, clean, and upright soldiers among the SS, -and especially among the Waffen-SS and the police, that when -judging here the problem of the SS in regard to the criminal nature -of their activities, one can draw the same clear distinction as in the -<span class='pageno' title='10' id='Page_10'></span> -case of any of the other social groups. The SS, as such, behaved no -more criminally than any other social groups would behave when -taking part in political events. The dreadful thing was that the -responsible chief, and a number of other SS men who unfortunately -had been given considerable powers, were able to abuse the loyal -attitude which is so typical of the German soldier.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, another question. In the decree concerning -the creation of the State Secretariat for Security, it is ordered that -the State Secretary—which in this case was the Higher SS and Police -Leader—before making basic decisions, had to ask you for your -approval. Was that done?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: No, I was never called upon to give my approval and -that was the reason why before long this, my last, attempt proved -to be a failure.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did the Higher SS and Police Leader and the SS -Obergruppenführer Krüger, in particular, obey orders which you -had given them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Please, would you repeat the question? It did not come -through too well. And please, Dr. Seidl, do not speak quite so loudly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did the Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger, who -at the same time was the State Secretary for Security, obey orders -which you gave him in your capacity as Governor General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Not even a single order. On the strength of this new -decree I repeatedly gave orders. These orders were supposedly -communicated to Heinrich Himmler; and as his agreement was -necessary, these orders were never carried out. Some special cases -can be confirmed by the State Secretary Bühler when he is here -as a witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German -Police, before he carried out security police measures in the Government -General, ever obtain your approval?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Not in a single case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has submitted a document, L-37, as -Exhibit Number USA-506. It is a letter from the Commander of -the Security Police and SD of the District Radom, addressed to the -branch office at Tomassov. This document contains the following:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“On 28 June 1944 the Higher SS and Police Leader East issued -the following order:</p> - -<p>“The security situation in the Government General has deteriorated -so much during the recent months that the most -radical means and the most severe measures must now be -employed against these alien assassins and saboteurs. The -Reichsführer SS in agreement with the Governor General, has -<span class='pageno' title='11' id='Page_11'></span> -given order that in every case of assassination or attempted -assassination of Germans, not only the perpetrators shall be -shot when caught, but that in addition, all their male relatives -shall also be executed, and their female relatives above the -age of sixteen put into a concentration camp.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: As I have said that I was never called upon by the -Reichsführer SS Himmler to give my approval to such orders, your -question has already been answered. In this case, I was not called -upon either.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, were you at least informed of such orders -from the Reichsführer SS Himmler or from the Higher SS and -Police Leader East before they were carried out?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: The reason why this was not done was always the same. -I was told that as Poles were living not only in the Government -General but also in those territories which had been incorporated -into the Reich, the fight against the Polish resistance movement had -to be carried on by unified control from a central office, and this -central office was Heinrich Himmler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, what jurisdiction did you have in the -general administration?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I think it would accelerate the proceedings if the -Witness Bühler could testify to these details. If the Tribunal so -desires I will of course answer this question now. In the main I -was concerned with the setting up of the usual administrative -departments, such as food, culture, finance, science, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Were there representatives of the Polish and Ukrainian -population in the Government General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes. The representation of the Polish and Ukrainian -population was on a regional basis, and I united the heads of the bodies -of representatives from the various districts in the so-called subsidiary -committees. There was a Polish and an Ukrainian subsidiary -committee. Count Ronikier was the head of the Polish committee -for a number of years, and at the head of the Ukrainian committee -was Professor Kubiowicz. I made it obligatory for all my offices to -contact these subsidiary committees on all questions of a general -nature, and this they did. I myself was in constant contact with both -of them. Complaints were brought to me there and we had free discussions. -My complaints and memoranda to the Führer were mostly -based on the reports from these subsidiary committees.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A second form in which the population participated in the -administration of the Government General was by means of the -lowest administrative units, which throughout the Government -General were in the hands of the native population. Every ten to -<span class='pageno' title='12' id='Page_12'></span> -twenty villages had as their head a so-called <span class='it'>Wojt</span>. This Polish -word <span class='it'>Wojt</span> is the same as the German word “Vogt”—V-o-g-t. He -was, so to speak, the lowest administrative unit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A third form of participation by the population in the administration -was the employment of about 280,000 Poles and Ukrainians -as government officials or civil servants in the public services of the -Government General, including the postal and railway services.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: In what numerical proportion did the German civil -servants stand to the Polish and Ukrainian civil servants?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: The proportion varied. The number of German civil -servants was very small. There were times when, in the whole of -the Government General, the area of which is 150,000 square kilometers—that -means half the size of Italy—there were not more than -40,000 German civil servants. That means to one German civil -servant there were on the average at least six non-German civil -servants and employees.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Which territories did you rule as Governor General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Poland, which had been jointly conquered by Germany -and the Soviet Union, was divided first of all between the Soviet -Union and the German Reich. Of the 380,000 square kilometers, -which is the approximate size of the Polish State, approximately -200,000 square kilometers went to the Soviet Union and approximately -170,000 to 180,000 square kilometers to the German Reich. -Please do not ask me for exact figures; that was roughly the proportion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That part of Poland which was taken over into Soviet Russian -territory was immediately treated as an integral part of the Soviet -Union. The border signs in the east of the Government General -were the usual Reich border signs of the Soviet Union, as from -1939. That part which came to Germany was divided thus: 90,000 -square kilometers were left to the Government General and the -remainder was incorporated into the German Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think there is any charge against the -defendant on the ground that the civil administration was bad. The -charge is that crimes were committed, and the details of the administration -between the Government General and the department in -the Reich are not really in question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The only reason, Mr. President, why I put that question -was to demonstrate the difficulties with which the administration -had to cope right from the beginning in this territory, for an area -which originally represented one economic unit was now split into -three different parts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] I am coming now to the next question. -Did you ever have hostages shot? -<span class='pageno' title='13' id='Page_13'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: My diary contains the facts. I myself have never had -hostages shot.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did you ever participate in the annihilation of Jews?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I say “yes”; and the reason why I say “yes” is because, -having lived through the 5 months of this trial, and particularly -after having heard the testimony of the witness Hoess, my conscience -does not allow me to throw the responsibility solely on these minor -people. I myself have never installed an extermination camp for -Jews, or promoted the existence of such camps; but if Adolf Hitler -personally has laid that dreadful responsibility on his people, then -it is mine too, for we have fought against Jewry for years; and we -have indulged in the most horrible utterances—my own diary bears -witness against me. Therefore, it is no more than my duty to answer -your question in this connection with “yes.” A thousand years will -pass and still this guilt of Germany will not have been erased.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, what was your policy for the recruiting of -laborers for the Reich when you were Governor General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I beg your pardon?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What policy did you pursue for the recruiting of -labor for the Reich in your capacity as Governor General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: The policy is laid down in my decrees. No doubt they -will be held against me by the Prosecution, and I consider it will -save time if I answer that question later, with the permission of the -Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, did Hitler give you any instructions as to -how you should carry out your administration as Governor General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: During the first 10 minutes of the audience in his special -train Adolf Hitler instructed me to see to it that this territory, which -had been utterly devastated—all the bridges had been blown up; the -railways no longer functioned, and the population was in a complete -turmoil—was put into order somehow; and that I should see to it -that this territory should become a factor which would contribute to -the improvement of the terribly difficult economic and war situation -of the German Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did Adolf Hitler support you in your work as Governor -General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: All my complaints, everything I reported to him, were -unfortunately dropped into the wastepaper basket by him. I did -not send in my resignation 14 times for nothing. It was not for -nothing that I tried to join my brave troops as an officer. In his -heart he was always opposed to lawyers, and that was one of the -most serious shortcomings of this outstandingly great man. He did -not want to admit formal responsibility, and that, unfortunately, -<span class='pageno' title='14' id='Page_14'></span> -applied to his policy too, as I have found out now. Every lawyer -to him was a disturbing element working against his power. All I -can say, therefore, is that, by supporting Himmler’s and Bormann’s -aims to the utmost, he permanently jeopardized any attempt to find -a form of government worthy of the German name.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Which departments of the Reich gave instructions -to you regarding the administration of the Government General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: In order to expedite the proceedings I should like to -suggest that the witness Bühler give the whole list.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did you ever loot art treasures?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: An accusation which is one that touches my private life, -and affects me most deeply, is that I am supposed to have enriched -myself with the art treasures of the country entrusted to me. I did -not collect pictures and I did not find time during the war to appropriate -art treasures. I took care to see that all the art treasures of -the country entrusted to me were officially registered, and had that -official register incorporated in a document which was widely distributed; -and, above all, I saw to it that those art treasures remained -in the country right to the very end. In spite of that, art treasures -were removed from the Government General. A part was taken -away before my administration was established. Experience shows -that one cannot talk of responsibility for an administration until -some time after it has been functioning, namely, when the administration -has been built up from the bottom. So that from the -outbreak of the war, 1 September 1939, until this point, which was -about at the end of 1939, I am sure that art treasures were stolen -to an immeasurable extent either as war booty or under some other -pretext. During the registration of the art treasures, Adolf Hitler -gave the order that the Veit Stoss altar should be removed from -St. Mary’s Church in Kraków, and taken to the Reich. In September -1939 Mayor Liebel came from Nuremberg to Kraków for that purpose -with a group of SS men and removed this altar. A third instance -was the removal of the Dürer etchings in Lvov by a special deputy -before my administration was established there. In 1944, shortly -before the collapse, art treasures were removed to the Reich for -storage. In the Castle of Seichau, in Silesia, there was a collection -of art treasures which had been brought there by Professor Kneisl -for this purpose. One last group of art treasures was handed over -to the Americans by me personally.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, did you introduce ghettos, that is, Jewish -quarters in the Government General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I issued an instruction regarding the setting up of -Jewish quarters. I do not remember the date. As to the reasons -<span class='pageno' title='15' id='Page_15'></span> -and the necessity for that, I shall have to answer the Prosecutor’s -questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did you introduce badges to mark the Jews?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself introduce forced labor in the -Government General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Forced labor and compulsory labor service were introduced -by me in one of the first decrees; but it is quite clear from -all the decrees and their wording that I had in mind only a labor -service within the country for repairing the damage caused by the -war, and for carrying out work necessary for the country itself, as -was of course done by the labor service in the Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did you, as was stated by the Prosecution, plunder -libraries in the Government General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I can answer that question plainly with “no.” The -largest and most valuable library which we found, the Jagellon -University Library in Kraków, which thank God was not destroyed, -was transferred to a new library building on my own personal -orders; and the entire collection, including the most ancient documents, -was looked after with great care.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, did you as Governor General close down -the universities in the Government General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: The universities in the Government General were closed -because of the war when we arrived. The reopening of the universities -was prohibited by order of Adolf Hitler. I supplied the needs -of the Polish and Ukrainian population by introducing university -courses of instruction for Polish and Ukrainian students—which -were actually on a university level—in such a way that the Reich -Authorities could not criticize it. The fact that there was an urgent -need for native university-trained men, particularly doctors, technicians, -lawyers, teachers, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, was the best guarantee that the -Poles and Ukrainians would be allowed to continue university -teaching to the extent which war conditions would allow.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, we were last speaking of the universities. -Did you yourself, as Governor General, close the secondary schools?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: My suggestion to reopen the Gymnasiums and secondary -schools was rejected by Adolf Hitler. We helped to solve the problem -by permitting secondary school education in a large number of -private schools. -<span class='pageno' title='16' id='Page_16'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Now, a basic question. The Prosecution accuse you -of having plundered the country ruled by you as Governor General. -What do you have to say to that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Well, evidently by that accusation is meant everything -that happened in the economic sphere in that country as a result of -the arrangements between the German Reich and the Government -General. First, I would like to emphasize that the Government -General had to start with a balance sheet which revealed a frightful -economic situation. The country had approximately twelve million -inhabitants. The area of the Government General was the least -fertile part of the former Poland. Moreover, the boundary between -the Soviet Union, as well as the boundary between the German -Reich, had been drawn in such a way that the most essential -elements, indispensable for economy, were left outside. The frontiers -between the Soviet Union and the German Reich were immediately -closed; and so, right from the start, we had to make something out -of nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Galicia, the most important area in the Republic of Poland from -the viewpoint of food supplies, was given to the Soviet Union. The -province of Posen belonged to the German Reich. The coal and -industrial areas of Upper Silesia were within the German Reich. -The frontier with Germany was drawn in such a way that the iron -works in Czestochowa remained with the Government General, -whereas the iron-ore basins which were 10 kilometers from Czestochowa -were incorporated into the German Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The town of Lodz, the textile center of Poland, came within the -German Reich. The city of Warsaw with a population of several -millions became a frontier town because the German border came -as close as 15 kilometers to Warsaw, and the result was that the -entire agricultural hinterland was no longer at the disposal of that -city. A great many facts could be mentioned, but that would probably -take us too far. The first thing we had to do was to set things -going again somehow. During the first weeks the population of -Warsaw could only be fed with the aid of German equipment for -mass feeding. The German Reich at that time sent 600,000 tons of -grain, as a loan of course, and that created a heavy debt for me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I started the financial economy with 20 million zlotys which had -been advanced to me by the Reich. We started with a completely -impoverished economy due to the devastation caused by the war, -and by the first of January 1944 the savings bank accounts of the -native population had reached the amount of 11,500 million zlotys, -and we had succeeded by then in improving the feeding of the -population to a certain extent. Furthermore, at that time the factories -and industrial centers had been reconstructed, to which -<span class='pageno' title='17' id='Page_17'></span> -reconstruction the Reich authorities had made outstanding contributions; -Reich Marshal Göring and Minister Speer especially -deserve great credit for the help given in reviving the industry -of the country. More than two million fully paid workers were -employed; the harvest had increased to 1.6 million tons in a year; -the yearly budget had increased from 20 million zlotys in the year -1939 to 1,700 million zlotys. All this is only a sketch which I submit -here to describe the general development.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, in your capacity as Governor General did -you persecute churches and religion in the areas which you had -under your administration?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I was in constant personal contact with the Archbishop, -now Cardinal, Sapieha in Kraków. He told me of all his sufferings -and worries, and they were not few. I myself had to rescue the -Bishop of Lublin from the hands of Herr Globocznik in order to save -his life.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: You mean the SS Gruppenführer Globocznik?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes, that is the one I mean.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But I may summarize the situation by quoting the letter which -Archbishop Sapieha sent to me in 1942, in which, to use his own -words, he thanked me for my tireless efforts to protect the life of -the church. We reconstructed seminaries for priests; and we investigated -every case of arrest of a priest, as far as that was humanly -possible. The tragic incident when two assistants of the Archbishop -Sapieha were shot, which has been mentioned here by the Prosecution, -stirred my own emotions very deeply. I cannot say any -more. The churches were open; the seminaries were educating -priests; the priests were in no way prevented from carrying out -their functions. The monastery at Czestochowa was under my personal -protection. The Kraków monastery of the Camaldulians, which -is a religious order, was also under my personal protection. There -were large posters around the monastery indicating that these -monasteries were protected by me personally.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, when did you hear for the first time about -the concentration camp at Maidanek?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I heard the name Maidanek for the first time in 1944 -from foreign reports. But for years there had been contradictory -rumors about the camp near Lublin, or in the Lublin District, if I -may express myself in such a general way. Governor Zörner once -told me, I believe already in 1941, that the SS intended to build a -large concentration camp near Lublin and had applied for large -quantities of building materials, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. At that time I instructed -State Secretary Bühler to investigate the matter immediately, and -I was told, and I also received a report in writing from Reichsführer -<span class='pageno' title='18' id='Page_18'></span> -SS Himmler, that he had to build a large camp required by the -Waffen-SS to manufacture clothes, footwear, and underwear in large -SS-owned workshops. This camp went under the name of “SS -Works,” or something similar.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I have to say I was in a position to get information, whereas -the witnesses who have testified so far have said under oath that -in the circles around the Führer nothing was known about all these -things. We out there were more independent, and I heard quite a -lot through enemy broadcasts and enemy and neutral papers. In -answer to my repeated questions as to what happened to the Jews -who were deported, I was always told they were to be sent to the -East, to be assembled, and put to work there. But, the stench seemed -to penetrate the walls, and therefore I persisted in my investigations -as to what was going on. Once a report came to me that there was -something going on near Belcec. I went to Belcec the next day. -Globocznik showed me an enormous ditch which he was having -made as a protective wall and on which many thousands of workers, -apparently Jews, were engaged. I spoke to some of them, asked -them where they came from, how long they had been there, and he -told me, that is, Globocznik, “They are working here now, and when -they are through—they come from the Reich, or somewhere from -France—they will be sent further east.” I did not make any further -inquiries in that same area.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The rumor, however, that the Jews were being killed in the -manner which is now known to the entire world would not be -silenced. When I expressed the wish to visit the SS workshop near -Lublin, in order to get some idea of the value of the work that was -being done, I was told that special permission from Heinrich Himmler -was required.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I asked Heinrich Himmler for this special permission. He said -that he would urge me not to go to the camp. Again some time -passed. On 7 February 1944 I succeeded in being received by Adolf -Hitler personally—I might add that throughout the war he received -me three times only. In the presence of Bormann I put the question -to him: “My Führer, rumors about the extermination of the Jews -will not be silenced. They are heard everywhere. No one is allowed -in anywhere. Once I paid a surprise visit to Auschwitz in order to -see the camp, but I was told that there was an epidemic in the camp -and my car was diverted before I got there. Tell me, My Führer, is -there anything in it?” The Führer said, “You can very well imagine -that there are executions going on—of insurgents. Apart from that -I do not know anything. Why don’t you speak to Heinrich Himmler -about it?” And I said, “Well, Himmler made a speech to us in -Kraków and declared in front of all the people whom I had officially -<span class='pageno' title='19' id='Page_19'></span> -called to the meeting that these rumors about the systematic extermination -of the Jews were false; the Jews were merely being brought -to the East.” Thereupon the Führer said, “Then you must believe -that.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>When in 1944 I got the first details from the foreign press about -the things which were going on, my first question was to the SS -Obergruppenführer Koppe, who had replaced Krüger. “Now we -know,” I said, “you cannot deny that.” And he said that nothing -was known to him about these things, and that apparently it -was a matter directly between Heinrich Himmler and the camp -authorities. “But,” I said, “already in 1941 I heard of such plans, -and I spoke about them.” Then he said that was my business and -he could not worry about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Maidanek Camp must have been run solely by the SS, in the -way I have mentioned, and apparently, in the same manner as -stated by the witness Hoess.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is the only explanation that I can give.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Therefore you did not know of the conditions in -Treblinka, Auschwitz, and other camps? Did Treblinka belong to -Maidanek, or is that a separate camp?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I do not know; it seems to be a separate camp. Auschwitz -was not in the area of the Government General. I was never -in Maidanek, nor in Treblinka, nor in Auschwitz.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution has presented under Number -USA-275 the report of the SS Brigadeführer Stroop on the destruction -of the Warsaw Ghetto. Before that action was initiated, did you -know anything about it and did you ever come across this report?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I was surprised when the American Chief Prosecutor -said in his opening speech, while submitting a document here with -pictures about the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto, that that -report had been made to me. But that has been clarified in the -meantime. The report was never made for me, and was never sent -to me in that form. And, thank Heaven, during the last few days -it has been made clear by several witnesses and affidavits that this -destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto was carried out upon direct orders -of Himmler, and over the head of all competent authorities of the -Government General. When in our meetings anybody spoke about -this Ghetto, it was always said that there had been a revolt in the -Warsaw Ghetto which we had had to quell with artillery; reports -that were made on it never seemed to me to be authentic.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What measures did you take to see that the -population in the Government General was fed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: An abundance of measures were taken to get agriculture -going again, to import machinery, to teach farmers improved farming -<span class='pageno' title='20' id='Page_20'></span> -methods, to build up co-operative associations, to distribute seeds in -the usual way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The Witness Bühler will speak about that later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Moreover the Reich helped a great deal in that respect. -The Reich sent seeds to the value of many millions of marks, agricultural -experts, breeding cattle, machines, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, you have told us what you did for the -welfare of the population of the Government General. The Prosecution, -however, has charged you with a number of statements which -they found in your own diary, and which seem to contradict that. -How can you explain that contradiction?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: One has to take the diary as a whole. You can not go -through 43 volumes and pick out single sentences and separate them -from their context. I would like to say here that I do not want to -argue or quibble about individual phrases. It was a wild and stormy -period filled with terrible passions, and when a whole country is on -fire and a life and death struggle is going on, such words may easily -be used.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Some of the words are terrible. I myself must admit -that I was shocked at many of the words which I had used.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, under Number USA-297 the Prosecution -has submitted a document which deals with a conference which you -apparently had in 1939 or 1940 with an office of the Chief of the -Administration Ober-Ost. I shall have the document handed to you -and ask you to tell me whether the report of that man, as it is -contained in the document, agrees with what you have said. It is on -Page 1, at the bottom, the second paragraph.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: That is a shortened summary of a speech, which perhaps -in an address...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What is the PS number?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Dr. Frank, what is the number?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: 297, I believe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: No, on the cover, please.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: On the cover it says 344. I will return the document to -you. Would you kindly ask me about individual phrases. It is impossible -for me to read all of its contents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The number is 297, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it is USA-297. It is EC-344, (16) and -(17), is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes. -<span class='pageno' title='21' id='Page_21'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] It says here that during the first conversation -which the chief of the central department had with the -Reich Minister Dr. Frank on 3 October 1939 in Posen, the latter -explained the task which had been given him by the Führer and -the economic-political principles on which he intended to base his -administration of Poland. This could only be done by ruthless exploitation -of the country. Therefore, it would be necessary to -recruit manpower to be used in the Reich, and so on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have summarized it, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I am sure that these utterances were not made in the -way it is put here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: But you do not want to say that you have never -spoken to that man?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I cannot remember it at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Then, I come to the next question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Moreover, what actually happened seems to me to be -more important than what was said at the time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that your actions as Governor General, -and undoubtedly also many excesses by the police and the SD, were -due to the guerrilla activities?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Guerrilla activities? It can be said that it was the resistance -movement, which started from the very first day and was -supported by our enemies, which presented the most difficult problem -I had to cope with during all these years. For this resistance movement -perpetually supplied the police and the SS with pretexts and -excuses for all those measures which, from the viewpoint of an -orderly administration, were very regrettable. In fact, the resistance -movement—I will not call it guerrilla activity, because if a people -has been conquered during a war and organizes an active resistance -movement, that is something definitely to be respected—but the -methods of the resistance movement went far beyond the limits of -an heroic revolt. German women and children were slaughtered -under the most atrocious circumstances. German officials were shot; -trains were derailed; dairies were destroyed; and all measures taken -to bring about the recovery of the country were systematically -undermined.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And it is against the background of these incidents, which occurred -day after day, incessantly, during practically the entire period -of my activity, that the events in that country must be considered. -That is all I have to say to that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, in the year 1944 a revolt broke out in -Warsaw under the leadership of General Bor. What part did the -<span class='pageno' title='22' id='Page_22'></span> -administration of the Government General have, and what part did -you have in putting down that revolt?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: That revolt broke out, when the Soviet Russian Army -had advanced to within about 30 kilometers of Warsaw on the -eastern bank of the Vistula. It was a sort of combined operation; -and, as it seems to me, also a national Polish action, as the Poles at -the last moment wanted to carry out the liberation of their capital -themselves and did not want to owe it to the Soviet Russians. They -probably were thinking of how, in Paris, at the last moment the -resistance movement, even before the Allies had approached, had -accomplished the liberation of the city.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The operation was a strictly military one. As Senior Commander -of the German troops used to quell the revolt, I believe, they -appointed SS General Von dem Bach-Zelewski. The civil administration, -therefore, did not have any part in the fighting. The part -played by the civil administration began only after the capitulation -of General Bor, when the most atrocious orders for vengeance came -from the Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A letter came to my desk one day in which Hitler demanded the -deportation of the entire population of Warsaw into German concentration -camps. It took a struggle of 3 weeks, from which I emerged -victorious, to avert that act of insanity and to succeed in having the -fleeing population of Warsaw, which had had no part in the revolt, -distributed throughout the Government General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>During that revolt, unfortunately, the city of Warsaw was very -seriously damaged. All that had taken years to rebuild was burned -down in a few weeks. However, State Secretary Bühler, in order -to save time, will probably be in a better position to give us more -details.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, you are also accused of having suppressed -the cultural life of the population of the Government General, -especially as regards the theater, broadcasting, films. What have -you to say about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: The Government General presented the same picture -as every occupied country. We do not have to look far from this -courtroom to see what cultural life is like in an occupied country.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We had broadcasting in the Polish language under German supervision. -We had a Polish press which was supervised by Germans, -and we had a Polish school system, that is, elementary schools and -high schools, in which at the end, 80,000 teachers taught in the -service of the Government General. As far as it was possible Polish -theaters were reopened in the large cities, and where German -theaters were established we made sure that there was also a Polish -theater at the same time. After the proclamation of the so-called -<span class='pageno' title='23' id='Page_23'></span> -total war in August 1944, the absurd situation arose in which the -German theater in Kraków was closed, because all German theaters -were closed at that time, whereas the Polish theaters remained open.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I myself selected composers and virtuosos from a group of the -most well known musicians of Poland I found there in 1939 and -founded the Philharmonic Orchestra of the Government General. -This was in being until the end, and played an important part in -the cultural life of Poland. I established a Chopin Museum in -Kraków, and from all over Europe I collected relics of Chopin. I -believe that is sufficient on this point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, you deny, therefore, having taken any -measures which aimed at exterminating Polish and Ukrainian -culture.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Culture cannot be exterminated. Any measures taken -with that intention would be sheer nonsense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that as far as it was in your power you -did everything to avoid epidemics and to improve the health of the -population?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: That State Secretary Bühler will be able to confirm in -detail. I can say that everything humanly possible was done.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution, under Number USSR-223, -has submitted an excerpt from the diary, which deals with the -report about a police conference of 30 May 1940, and we find here -in Pages 33 to 38 the following...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: [<span class='it'>Interposing.</span>] Unless the Court orders it, it is not necessary -to read that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: No, I only want to read one sentence, which refers -to the Kraków professors. Apparently, if the diary is correct, you -said...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: [<span class='it'>Interposing.</span>] May I say something about the Kraków -professors right away?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: On 7 November 1939 I came to Kraków. On 5 November -1939 before my arrival, the SS and the police, as I found out -later, called the Kraków professors to a meeting. They thereupon -arrested the men, among them dignified old professors, and took -them to some concentration camp. I believe it was Oranienburg. I -found that report when I arrived and against everything which -may be found there in my diary, I want to emphasize here under -oath that I did not cease in my attempts to get every one of the -professors released whom I could reach, in March 1940. That is all -I have to say to this. -<span class='pageno' title='24' id='Page_24'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The same police meeting of 30 May 1940 also dealt -with the so-called “AB Action,” that is, with the Extraordinary -Pacification Action. Before I put to you the question which is concerned -with it, I would like to read to you two entries in the diary. -One is dated 16 May 1940, and here, after describing that extraordinary -tension then existing, you stated the following: That, first -of all, an action for pacification would have to be started, and then -you said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Any arbitrary actions must be avoided; in all cases the safeguarding -of the authority of the Führer and of the Reich has -to be kept in the foreground.”—I omit several sentences and -quote the end—“The action is timed for 15 June.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>On 12 July a conference took place with the Ministerialrat Wille, -who was the chief of the Department of Justice, and there you said -in your own words:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Regarding the question as to what should happen to the -political criminals who had been arrested during the AB -Action, there is to be a conference with State Secretary -Bühler, Obergruppenführer Krüger, Brigadeführer Streckenbach -and Ministerialrat Wille.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>End of quotation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>What actually happened during that AB Action?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I cannot say any more or any less than what is contained -in the diary. The situation was extremely tense. Month after -month attempted assassinations increased. The encouragement and -support given by the rest of the world to the resistance movement -to undermine all our efforts to pacify the country had succeeded to -an alarming degree, and this led to this general pacification action, -not only in the Government General, but also in other areas, and -which I believe was ordered by the Führer himself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My efforts were directed to limiting it as to extent and method, -and in this I was successful. Moreover I should like to point out -that I also made it clear that I intended to exercise the right of -reprieve in each individual case; for that purpose I wanted the -police and SS verdicts of death by shooting to be submitted to a -reprieve committee which I had formed in that connection. I believe -that can be seen from the diary also.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Probably the witness Bühler knows something -about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Nevertheless, I would like to say that the method used -at that time was a tremendous mistake.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, have you at any time recognized the -principle introduced by the SD and SS of the liability of kin? -<span class='pageno' title='25' id='Page_25'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: No, on the contrary. When I received the first reports -about it, I complained in writing to Reich Minister Lammers about -that peculiar development of the law.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The first SS and Police Leader East was Obergruppenführer -Krüger. When was this SS leader recalled and -how did it come about?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: The relations between him and myself became quite -impossible. He wanted a peculiar kind of SS and police regime, -and that state of affairs could be solved only in one way—either -he or I had to go. I think that at the last moment, by the intervention -of Kaltenbrunner, if I remember correctly, and of Bach-Zelewski, -this remarkable fellow was removed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution once mentioned that it was more -a personal struggle for power. But is it more correct to say that -there were differences of opinion on basic questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Of course it was a struggle for power. I wanted to -establish a power in the sense of my memoranda to the Führer, and -therefore I had to fight the power of violence, and here personal -viewpoints separated altogether.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The successor of SS Obergruppenführer Krüger -was SS Obergruppenführer Koppe. Was his basic attitude different?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes. I had that impression; and I am thinking of him -particularly when I say that even in the SS there were many decent -men who also had a sense of what was right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Were there Polish and Ukrainian Police in the -Government General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes, there were 25,000 men of the Polish security, -criminal, and uniformed police, and about 5,000 men of the -Ukrainian police. They also were under the German police chief.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, I now come to one of the most important -questions. In 1942, in Berlin, Vienna, Heidelberg, and Munich, you -made speeches before large audiences. What was the purpose of -these speeches, and what were the consequences for you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: The speeches can be read. It was the last effort that -I made to bring home to Hitler, by means of the tremendous response -of the German people, the truth that the rule of law was immortal. -I stated at that time that a Reich without law and without humanity -could not last long, and more in that vein. After I had been under -police surveillance for several days in Munich, I was relieved of -all my Party offices. As this was a matter of German domestic -politics under the sovereignty of the German Reich, I refrain from -making any more statements about it here. -<span class='pageno' title='26' id='Page_26'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that after this you tendered your resignation? -And what was the answer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I was, so to speak, in a permanent state of resigning, -and I received the same answer: that for reasons connected with -foreign policy I could not be released.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I originally intended to read to you from your -diary a number of quotations which the Prosecution has submitted; -but in view of the fact that the Prosecution may do that in the -course of the cross-examination, I forego it in order to save time. -I have no more questions to put to the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ -counsel wish to ask any questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>CHIEF COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE L. N. SMIRNOV (Assistant -Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Defendant, I should like to know what -precisely was your legal status and what exactly was the position -you occupied in the system of the fascist state. Please answer me: -When were you promoted to the post of Governor of occupied -Poland? To whom were you directly subordinated?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: The date is 26 October 1939. At least on that day the -directive concerning the Governor General became effective.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You will remember that by -Hitler’s order of 12 October 1939 you were directly subordinated -to Hitler, were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I did not get the first part. What was it, please?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you remember Hitler’s order -concerning your appointment as Governor General of Poland? This -order was dated 12 October 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: That was in no way effective, because the decree came -into force on 26 October 1939, and you can find it in the <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span>. -Before that I was Chief of Administration with the -military commander Von Rundstedt. I have explained that already.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: By this order of Hitler you -were directly subordinated to him. Do you remember? Paragraph 3, -Sub-paragraph 1, of this order.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: The chiefs of administration in the occupied territories -were all immediately under the Führer. I may say in elucidation -that Paragraph 3 states, “The Governor General is immediately -subordinate to me.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But Paragraph 9 of this decree states, “This decree becomes valid -as soon as I have withdrawn from the Commander-in-Chief of the -Army the task of carrying out the military administration.” And -<span class='pageno' title='27' id='Page_27'></span> -this withdrawal, that is, the coming into force of this decree took -place on 26 October.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I fully agree with you, and we -have information to that effect in the book which you evidently -remember. It is Book 5. You do remember this book of the -Government General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: It is of course in the decree.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, when this order came into -force, to whom were you directly subordinate?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: What shall I read here? There are several entries here. -What is your wish? To what do you wish me to answer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It states that this order came -into force on the 26 October. Well, when this order actually became -valid, to whom were you subordinated? Was there, or was there -not, any further order issued by Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: There is only one basic decree about the Governor -General. That is this one.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Quite correct. There were no -further instructions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Oh yes, there are some, for instance...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I understand that, but there was -no other decree determining the system of administration, was -there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: May I say that you can find it best on Page A-100 in -your book, and there you have the decree of the Führer verbatim.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Quite right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: And it says also in Paragraph 9, “This decree shall -come into effect...” and so on, and that date was the 26th of -October.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, that is quite correct. That -means that after 26 October you, as Governor General for occupied -Poland, were directly subordinate to Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then perhaps you may remember -when, and by whom, you were entrusted with the execution, in -occupied Poland, of the Four Year Plan?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: By Göring.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means that you were -Göring’s plenipotentiary for the execution of the Four Year Plan -in Poland, were you not? -<span class='pageno' title='28' id='Page_28'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: The story of that mission is very briefly told. The -activities of several plenipotentiaries of the Four Year Plan in the -Government General were such that I was greatly concerned about -it. Therefore, I approached the Reich Marshal and asked him to -appoint me trustee for the Four Year Plan. That was later—in -January...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, it was in December.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes, it was later, according to this decree.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This means that as from the -beginning of December 1939 you were Göring’s plenipotentiary for -the Four Year Plan?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Göring’s? I was the plenipotentiary for the Four -Year Plan.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Now perhaps you can remember -that in October 1939 the first decree regarding the organization of -administration in the Government General was promulgated?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes. That is here, is it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you recall Paragraph 3 -of that decree.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It says that “The sphere of -action of the State Secretary for Security will be determined by -the Governor General in agreement with the Reichsführer SS -and”—this is the passage which interests me—“the Chief of the -German Police.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Does that not coincide with Paragraph 3 insofar as from the first -day of your appointment as Governor General you undertook the -control of the Police and SS, and, consequently, the responsibility -for their actions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: No. I definitely answer that question with “no,” but I -would like to make an explanation....</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What interests me, Defendant; -is how could that be explained otherwise?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Let him make his explanation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Defendant, you may make your explanation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I want to make a very short statement. There is an -old legal principle which says that nobody can transfer more rights -to anybody else than he has himself. What I have stated here was -the ideal which I had before me and how it should have been. -Everybody has to admit that it is natural and logical that the police -should be subordinate to the Chief of Administration. The Führer, -who alone could have decided, did not make that decree. I did -<span class='pageno' title='29' id='Page_29'></span> -not have the power nor the authority to put into effect this decree -which I had so carefully formulated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then do I understand you to -say that this Paragraph 3 was an ideal which you strove to attain, -but which you were never able to attain?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I beg your pardon, but I could not understand that -question. A little slower please, and may I have the translation -into German a little slower?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Shall I repeat the question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I asked you a question; does -this mean that the statement can be interpreted as follows: Paragraph -3 of this decree was an ideal which you persistently strove to -attain, which you openly professed, but which you were never able -to attain? Would that be correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Which I could not attain; and that can be seen by -the fact that later it was found necessary to appoint a special -State Secretary for Security in a last effort to find a way out of -the difficulty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you will recall that in -April 1942, special negotiations took place between you and -Himmler. Did these negotiations take place in April 1942?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes; certainly. I do not know on what you base your -question. I cannot tell you the date offhand, but it was always my -endeavor...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: To confirm these facts, I can -turn to your diary. Perhaps you will recall that as a result of these -negotiations an understanding was reached between you and -Himmler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes, an understanding was reached.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In order to refresh your memory -on the subject I shall ask that the corresponding volume of your -diary be handed to you, so that you may have the text before you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes, I am ready.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would refer you to Paragraph 2 -of this agreement. It states:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Where can we find this? Is it under the date -21 April 1942?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes; that is quite right; -21 April 1942.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think we have got it. -<span class='pageno' title='30' id='Page_30'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is Document Number USSR-223. -It has been translated into English, and I shall hand it over -immediately.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think we have it now; we were only trying -to find the place.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is on Page 18 of the -English text.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Go on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would ask you to recall the -contents. It says: “The Higher SS and Police Leader (the State -Secretary) is directly subordinate to the Governor General, and, if -he is absent, then to his Deputy.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Does this not mean that Himmler, so to speak, agreed with -your ideal in the sense that the Police should be subordinate -to you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Certainly. On that day I was satisfied; but a few days -later the whole thing was changed. I can only say that these efforts -on my part were continued, but unfortunately it was never possible -to put them into effect.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You will find here in Paragraph 3, if you care to go on, that the -Reichsführer SS, according to the expected decree by the Führer, -could give orders to the State Secretary. So, you see, Himmler here -had reserved the right to give orders to Krüger direct. And then -comes the matter of the agreement...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is true, but in that case I -must ask you to refer to another part of the document...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: May I say in this connection that this agreement was -never put into effect, but that this decree was published in the -<span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span> in the form of a Führer decree. Unfortunately, I -do not know the date of that; but you can find the decree about the -regulation of security matters in the Government General, and that -is the only authoritative statement. Here, also, reference is made to -the “expected decree by the Führer,” and that agreement was just a -draft of what was to appear in the Führer decree.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, I was just proceeding to -that subject. You agree that this decision was practically a verbatim -decree of the Führer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I cannot say that offhand. If you will be good enough -to give me the words of the Führer decree, I will be able to tell you -about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the President.</span>] Incidentally this decree appears in -your document book, Mr. President. -<span class='pageno' title='31' id='Page_31'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I haven’t the document. It seems to me that the most -essential parts of that agreement have been taken and put into this -decree, with a few changes. However, the book has been taken -away from me and I cannot compare it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The book will be submitted to you now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The book was submitted to the defendant.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Very important changes have been made, unfortunately.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would request you to turn to -Paragraph 3 of Hitler’s decree, dated 7 May 1942. It is stated here -that the State Secretary for Security is directly subordinate to the -Governor General. And does this not confirm the fact that the police -of the Government General were, nevertheless, directly subordinate -to you? That is Paragraph 3 of the decree.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I would like to say that that is not so. The police were -not subordinate to me, even by reason of that decree—only the State -Secretary for Security. It does not say here that the police are subordinate -to the Governor General, only the State Secretary for -Security is subordinate to him. If you read Paragraph 4, then you -come to the difficulties again. Adolf Hitler’s decree was drawn up -in my absence, of course. I was not consulted by Hitler, otherwise -1 would have protested, but in any case it was found impracticable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Paragraph 4 says that the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the -German Police gave direct instructions to the State Secretary for -Security in the field of security and for the preservation of German -nationality. If you compare the original agreement with this, as contained -in the diary, you will find that in one of the most important -fields the Führer had changed his mind, that is, concerning the -Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality. This title -embraces the Jewish question and the question of colonization.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It appears to me, Defendant, -that you have only taken into consideration one aspect of this question, -and that you have given a rather one-sided interpretation of -the excerpt quoted. May I recall to your memory Paragraph 4 of -this decree which, in Sub-paragraph 2, reads as follows:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“The State Secretary”—this means Krüger—“must receive the -consent of the Governor General before carrying out the directives -of the Reichsführer SS and the German Police.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And now permit me to turn to Paragraph 5 of this self-same -decree of Hitler’s which states that “in cases of divergencies of -opinion between the Governor General and the Reichsführer of the -SS and the German Police, my decision is to be obtained through -the Reich Minister and the Head of the Reich Chancellery.” In this -connection I would ask you, does not this paragraph testify to the -<span class='pageno' title='32' id='Page_32'></span> -very considerable rights granted by you to the leaders of the police -and the SS in the Government General and to your own responsibility -for the activities of these organizations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: The wording of the decree testifies to it, but the actual -development was quite the contrary. I believe that we will come to -that in detail. I maintain therefore that this attempt to gain some -influence over the police and the SS also failed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then may I ask whose attempt -it was? In this case it is evidently an attempt by Hitler for he signed -this decree. Krüger was evidently more powerful than Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: That question is not quite clear to me. You mean that -Krüger went against the decree of the Führer? Of course he did, -but that has nothing to do with power. That was considered by -Himmler as a tremendous concession made to me. I want to refer to -a memorandum of the summer of 1942, I think, shortly after the -decree of the Führer came into force.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have the following question to -ask you: Is it possible that you...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='33' id='Page_33'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell us, Defendant, who was the -actual leader of the National Socialist Party in the Government -General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I hear nothing at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I hear nothing at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have the following question to -put to you: After 6 May 1940 in the Government General...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: 6 May?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, 6 May 1940, after the Nazi -organization had been completed in the Government General, who -was appointed its leader?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I was.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thus the leadership of the administration -of the National Socialist Party and of the Police was -concentrated in your hands. Therefore you are responsible for the -administration, the Police, and the political life of the Government -General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Before I answer that question, I must protest when you -say that I had control of the Police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I believe that that is the only -way one could interpret the Führer’s orders and the other documents -which I have put to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: No doubt, if one disregards the actual facts and the -realities of the situation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, then, let us pass on to -another group of questions. You heard of the existence of Maidanek -only in 1944, isn’t that so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: In 1944 the name Maidanek was brought to my knowledge -officially for the first time by the Press Chief Gassner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will now ask that you be -shown a document which was presented by your defense counsel, -which was compiled by you, and which is a report addressed to -Hitler, dated June 1943. I will read into the record one excerpt, and -I wish to remind you that this is dated 19 June 1943:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“As a proof of the mistrust shown to the German leadership, -I enclose a characteristic excerpt from the report of the Chief -of the Security Police and SD in the Government General...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='34' id='Page_34'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Just a moment. The wrong passage has been shown me. -I have the passage here on Page 35 of the German text, and it is -differently worded.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Have you found the place now?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes. But you started with a different sentence. The -sentence here starts “A considerable part of the Polish intelligentsia...”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Which page is it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Page 35 of the German text, last -paragraph.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: It starts here with the words “A considerable part...”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: All right. Then I will continue:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“As a proof of the degree of the mistrust shown to the -German leadership I enclose”—these are your own words, -this passage comes somewhat higher up in the quotation—“a -characteristic excerpt from the report of the Chief of -the Security Police and SD in the Government General for the -period from 1 to 31 May 1943, concerning the possibilities of -propaganda resulting from Katyn.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: That is not here. Would you be good enough to show -me the passage? Now, what you are presenting here is not in -my text.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, it is there; it comes somewhat -earlier in your text.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I think it has been omitted from my text.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I begin now at that part which -you find lower down at the bottom. Follow the text:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“A large part of the Polish intelligentsia, however, as before, -will not allow itself to be influenced by the news from Katyn -and holds against the Germans alleged similar cruelties, -especially in Auschwitz.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>I omit the next sentence and I continue:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Among that portion of the working classes which is not communistically -inclined, this is scarcely denied; at the same time -it is pointed out that the attitude of Germany towards the -Poles is not any better.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>Please note the next sentence:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is said that there are concentration camps at Auschwitz -and Maidanek where likewise the mass murder of Poles is -carried out systematically.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>How can one reconcile this part of your report which mentions -Auschwitz and Maidanek, where mass murder took place, with your -<span class='pageno' title='35' id='Page_35'></span> -statement that you heard of Maidanek only at the end of 1944. Well, -your report is dated June 1943; you mentioned there both Maidanek -and Auschwitz.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: With reference to Maidanek we were talking about the -extermination of Jews. The extermination of Jews in Maidanek -became known to me during the summer of 1944. Up to now the -word “Maidanek” has always been mentioned in connection with -extermination of Jews.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, we are to understand—I -refer to the text submitted to you—that in May 1943 you -heard of the mass murder of Poles in Maidanek, and in 1944 you -heard of the mass murder of Jews?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I beg your pardon? I heard about the extermination of -the Jews at Maidanek in 1944 from the official documents in the -foreign press.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And you heard of the mass -killings of the Poles in 1943?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: That is contained in my memorandum, and I protest: -these are the facts as I put them before the Führer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will ask that another document -be shown to you. Do you know this document, are you acquainted -with it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: It is a decree dated 2 October 1943. I assume that the -wording agrees with the text of the original decree.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, it is in full agreement with -the original text. In any case your defense counsel can follow the -text and will be able to verify it. I have to ask you one question. -What do you think of this law signed by you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes, it is here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You were President of the Reich -Academy of Law. From the standpoint of the most elementary -standards of law, what do you think of this law signed by you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the number of it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is Exhibit USSR-335, Mr. -President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: This is the general wording for a court-martial decree. -It provides that the proceedings should take place in the presence of -a judge, that a document should be drawn up, and that the proceedings -should be recorded in writing. Apart from that I had the -power to give pardons, so that every sentence had to be submitted -to me. -<span class='pageno' title='36' id='Page_36'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to tell us how -this court for court-martial proceedings was composed, who the -members of this court were. Would you please pay attention to -Paragraph 3, Point 1 of Paragraph 3?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: The Security Police, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You were telling us of your -hostile attitude to the SD. Why then did you give the SD the right -to exert oppression on the Polish population?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Because that was the only way in which I could exert -any influence on the sentences. If I had not published this decree, -there would have been no possibility of control; and the Police -would simply have acted at random.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You spoke of the right of -reprieve which was entrusted to you. Would you please note Paragraph -6 of this law. I remind you that a verdict of a summary court-martial -by the SD was to be put into effect immediately according -to the text. I remind you again that there was only one possible -verdict: “death.” How could you change it if the condemned person -was to be shot or hanged immediately after the verdict?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: The sentence would nevertheless have to come before me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, but a sentence had to be -carried out immediately.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Those were the general instructions which I had issued -in connection with the power given me to grant reprieves, and the -committee which dealt with reprieves was constantly sitting. Files -were sent in...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Since you have spoken of the -right to reprieve, I will put to you another question. Do you remember -the AB Action?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you remember that this -action signified the execution of thousands of Polish intellectuals?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then what did it signify?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: It came within the framework of the general action of -appeasement and it was my plan to eliminate, by means of a properly -regulated procedure, arbitrary actions on the part of the Police. -This was the meaning of that action.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I do not understand very well -what you mean. How did you treat persons who were subject to the -AB Action? What happened to them? -<span class='pageno' title='37' id='Page_37'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: This meeting really only dealt with the question of -arrests.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you what happened to -them later?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: They were arrested and taken into protective custody.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And then?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Then they were subjected to the proceedings which had -been established. At least, that is what I intended.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was this left to the Police exclusively?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: The Police were in charge.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In other words, the Police took -over the extermination of these people after they had been arrested, -is that so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, then tell us, please, why -you did not exercise your power of reprieve while they were -carrying out this inhuman action?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I did make use of it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will put before you your statement, -dated 30 May 1940. You certainly remember this meeting with -the Police on 30 May 1940, when you gave final instructions to the -police before carrying out this action?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You stated the following:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Any attempt on the part of the legal authorities to intervene -in the AB Action, undertaken with the help of the Police, -should be considered as treason to the State and to German -interests.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you remember this statement?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I do not remember it, but you must take into account -all the circumstances which spread over several weeks. You must -consider the statement in its entirety and not seize upon one single -sentence. This concerns a development which went on for weeks and -months, in the course of which the reprieve committee was established -by me for the first time. That was my way of protesting -against arbitrary actions and of introducing legal justice in all these -proceedings. That is a development extending over many weeks, -which you cannot, in my opinion, summarize in one sentence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am speaking of words which -in my opinion can have only one meaning for a jurist. You wrote: -<span class='pageno' title='38' id='Page_38'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The reprieve committee which is part of my office is not concerned -with these matters. The AB Action will be carried out -exclusively by Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger and his -organization. This is a purely internal action for quieting -the country which is necessary and lies outside the scope of -a normal legal trial.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That is to say you renounced your right of pardon?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: At that particular moment; but if you follow the further -development of the AB Action during the following weeks you will -see that this never became effective. That was an intention, a bad -intention, which, thank God, I gave up in time. Perhaps my defense -counsel will be able to say a few words on the subject later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One single question interests me. -Did you renounce your right of pardon while carrying out this -operation or not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well then, how can you account -for your words, this one sentence: “The reprieve committee is not -concerned with these matters.”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>How should we interpret these words?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: This is not a decree; it is not the final ruling on the -matter. It is a remark which was made on the spur of the moment -and was then negotiated on for days. But one must recognize the -final stage of the development, and not merely the various motives -as they came up during the development.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, I understand that very well, -Defendant. But I would like to ask you, was this statement made -during a conference with the Police and did you instruct the Police -in that matter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Not during that meeting. I assume it came up in some -other connection. Here we discussed only this one action. After all, -I also had to talk to State Secretary Bühler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, all right. While discussing -the AB Action with the Police you stated that the results of this -action would not concern the reprieve committee which was subordinated -to you, is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: That sentence is contained in the diary. It is not, however, -the final result, but rather an intermediate stage.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps I can recall to you -another sentence, in order that you may judge the results of this -action. Perhaps you can recall this part which I will put to you. You -stated the following: -<span class='pageno' title='39' id='Page_39'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“We need not bring these elements into German concentration -camps, for in that case we would only have difficulties and an -unnecessary correspondence with their families. We must -simply liquidate matters in the country, and in the simplest -way.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>What you mean is that this would simply be a question of -liquidation in the simplest form, is that not so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: That is a terrible word. But, thank God, it did not take -place in this way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, but these persons were executed. -What do you mean by saying that this was not carried out? -Obviously this was carried out, for the persons were executed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: When they were sentenced they were killed, if the right -to pardon them was not exercised.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And they were condemned without -application of the right of pardon?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I do not believe so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Unfortunately these people are -no more, and therefore obviously they were executed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Which people?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Those who were arrested under -the AB Action. I will remind you of another excerpt connected -with this AB Action. If you did not agree with the Police with -regard to certain police actions it would be difficult to explain the -celebrations in connection with the departure of Brigadeführer SS -Streckenbach when he left for Berlin. Does this not mean that you -were at least on friendly terms with the Police?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: In connection with political relations many words of -praise are spoken which are not in keeping with the truth. You -know that as well as any other person.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will allow myself to remind -you of only one passage of your speech addressed to the Brigadeführer -Streckenbach, one sentence only. You said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“What you, Brigadeführer Streckenbach, and your people, -have done in the Government General must not be forgotten; -and you need not be ashamed of it.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That testifies, does it not, to quite a different attitude toward -Streckenbach and his people?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: And it was not forgotten either.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no further questions to -put to the defendant. -<span class='pageno' title='40' id='Page_40'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does that conclude the cross-examination?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I have only one or two questions, if Your Honor -pleases.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] In the course of your examination I -understood you to say that you had never gathered to yourself any -of the art treasures of the Government General. By that I do not -suppose you to mean that you did not have them collected and -registered; you did have them collected and registered, isn’t that so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Art treasures in the Government General were officially -collected and registered. The book has been submitted here in Court.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. And you told the Tribunal that before you got -there one Dürer collection had already been seized—before you took -over your duties.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: May I ask you to understand that as follows:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These were the Dürers which were removed in Lvov before the -civilian administration was set up there. Herr Mühlmann went to -Lvov at the time and took them from the library. I had never been -in Lvov before that. These pictures were then taken directly to the -Führer headquarters or to Reich Marshal Göring, I am not sure -which.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: They were collected for Göring, that is what I am -driving at. Is that not a fact?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: State Secretary Mühlmann, when I asked him, told me -that he came on orders of the Reich Marshal and that he had taken -them away on orders of the Reich Marshal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And were there not some other art objects that were -collected by the Reich Marshal, and also by the Defendant Rosenberg, -at the time you told the Tribunal you were too busy with war -tasks to get involved in that sort of thing?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I know of nothing of that sort in the Government -General. The Einsatzstab Rosenberg had no jurisdiction in the -Government General; and apart from the collection of the composer -Elsner and a Jewish library from Lublin I had no official obligation -to demand the return of any art treasures from Rosenberg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: But there were some art treasures in your possession -when you were captured by the American forces.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes. They were not in my possession. I was safeguarding -them but not for myself. They were also not in my immediate -safekeeping; rather I had taken them along with me from burning -Silesia. They could not be safeguarded any other way. They were -art treasures which are so widely known that they are Numbers 1 to -10 in the list in the book—no one could have appropriated them. -You cannot steal a “Mona Lisa.” -<span class='pageno' title='41' id='Page_41'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I merely wanted to clear that up. I knew you -had said on interrogation there were some in your possession. I am -not trying to imply you were holding them for yourself, if you were -not. However, I think you have made that clear.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I should like to remark in this connection, since I attach -particular importance to the point, that these art treasures with -which we are concerned could be safeguarded only in this way. -Otherwise they would have been lost.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well. I have one other matter I would like to -clear up and I will not be long.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I understood you also to say this morning that you had struggled -for some time to effect the release of the Kraków professors who -were seized and sent to Oranienburg soon after the occupation of -Poland. Now, of course, you are probably familiar with what you -said about it yourself in your diary, are you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes, I said so this morning. Quite apart from what is -said in the diary, what I said this morning is the truth. You must -never forget that I had to speak among a circle of deadly enemies, -people who reported every word I said to the Führer and Himmler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, of course, you recall that you suggested that -they should have been retained in Poland, and liquidated or imprisoned -there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Never—not even if you confront me with this statement. -I never did that. On the contrary, I received the professors from -Kraków and talked to them quietly. Of all that happened I regretted -that most of all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Perhaps you do not understand me. I am talking -about what you wrote in your own diary about these professors, and -I shall be glad to read it to you and make it available to you if you -care to contest it. You are not denying that you said they should -either be returned for liquidation in Poland, or imprisoned in Poland, -are you? You do not deny that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I have just told you that I did say all that merely to -hoodwink my enemies; in reality I liberated the professors. Nothing -more happened to them after that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Were you also talking for special purposes when you gave General -Krüger, the SS and Higher Police official, that fond farewell?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: The same applies also in this case. Permit me to say, -sir, that I admit without reservation what can be admitted; but I -have also sworn to add nothing. No one can admit any more than I -have done by handing over these diaries. What I am asking is that -you do not ask me to add anything to that. -<span class='pageno' title='42' id='Page_42'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, I am not asking you to add anything to it; rather, -I was trying to clear it up, because you’ve made a rather difficult -situation, perhaps, for yourself and for others. You see, if we cannot -believe what you wrote in your diary, I don’t know how you can -ask us to believe what you say here. You were writing those things -yourself, and at the time you wrote them I assume you didn’t expect -that you would be confronted with them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does he not mean that this was a record of a -speech that he has made?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: In his diary, yes. It is recorded in his diary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: When he said, “I did that to hoodwink my -enemies”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I presume that that particular record is a -record of some speech that he made.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It is. It is entered in the diary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: May I say something about that. It wasn’t that I put -myself in a difficult position; rather the changing course of the war -made the situation difficult for every administrative official.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Finally, do you recall an entry in your diary in -which you stated that you had a long hour and a half talk with the -Führer and that you had...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: When was the last conference, please?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, this entry is on Monday, the 17th of March -1941. It’s in your diary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: That was probably one of the very few conferences; -whether I was alone with him, I don’t know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: ...in which you said you and the Führer had come -to a complete agreement and that he approved all the measures, including -all the decrees, especially also the entire organization of the -country. Would you stand by that today?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: No, but I might say the following: The Führer’s approval -was always very spontaneously given, but one always had to -wait a long while for it to be realized.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Was that one of the times you complained to him, as -you told us this morning?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I constantly complained. As you know, I offered to -resign on 14 occasions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I know; but on this occasion did you make -many complaints and did you have the approval of the Führer, or -<span class='pageno' title='43' id='Page_43'></span> -did he turn down your complaints on this occasion of the 17th of -March, 1941?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: The Führer took a very simple way out at the time by -saying, “You’ll have to settle that with Himmler.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, that isn’t really an answer. You’ve entered in -your diary that you talked it out with him and that he approved -everything, and you make no mention in your diary of any -disappointment over the filing of a complaint. Surely, this wasn’t a -speech that you were recording in your diary; it seems to be a -factual entry on your conversations with the Führer. And my question -is simply, do you now admit that that was the situation, or are -you saying that it was a false entry?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I beg your pardon, I didn’t say that I made false entries. -I never said that, and I’m not going to argue about words. I am -merely saying that you must judge the words according to the entire -context. If I emphasized in the presence of officials that the Führer -received me and agreed to my measures, then I did that to back up -my own authority. I couldn’t do that without the Führer’s agreement. -What my thoughts were, is not made clear from this. I should -like to emphasize that I’m not arguing about words and have not -asked to do that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well, I don’t care to press it any further.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, do you wish to re-examine?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, the first question put to you by the Soviet -Prosecutor was whether you were the chief of the NSDAP in the -Government General, and you answered “yes.” Did the Party have -any decisive influence in the Government General on political and -administrative life?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: No. The Party as an organization in that sphere was, of -course, only nominally under my jurisdiction, for all the Party -officials were appointed by Bormann without my being consulted. -There is no special Führer decree for the spheres of activity of the -NSDAP in the occupied territories, in which it says that these spheres -of activity are directly under Reichsleiter Bormann’s jurisdiction.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did your activity in that sphere of the NSDAP in -the territory of the Government General have anything at all to do -with any Security Police affairs?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: No, the Party was much too small to play any important -part; it had no state function.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The next question: The Soviet Prosecution showed -you Document USSR-335. It is the Decree on Drumhead Courts-Martial -of 1943. It states in Paragraph 6: “Drumhead court-martial -sentences are to be carried out at once.” Is it correct if I say that no -<span class='pageno' title='44' id='Page_44'></span> -formal legal appeal against these sentences was possible, but that a -pardon was entirely admissible?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Certainly; but, nevertheless, I must say that this decree -is impossible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What conditions in the Government General occasioned -the issuing of this decree of 2 October 1943? I am thinking in -particular of the security situation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Looking back from the more peaceful conditions of the -present time, I cannot think of any reason which might have made -such a demand possible; but if one recalls the events of war, and the -universal conflagration, it seems to have been a measure of desperation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I now come back to the AB Action. Is it true that in -1939 a court-martial decree was issued providing for considerably -greater legal guarantees than that of 1943?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that people arrested in the AB Action -were, on the strength of this court-martial decree, sentenced or -acquitted?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it also true that all sentences of these courts were, -as you saw fit, to be passed on to the competent reprieve committee -under State Secretary Bühler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The prosecutor of the United States has laid it to -your charge that in Neuhaus, where you were arrested after the -collapse of the German Armed Forces, various art treasures were -found, not in your house, but in the office of the Governor General. -Is it true that you sent State Secretary Dr. Bühler with a letter to -Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, and that this letter contained a list of -these art treasures?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Yes, not only that, I at once called the attention of the -head of the Pinakothek in Munich to the fact that these pictures -were there and that they should at once be safeguarded against -bombing. He also looked at the pictures and then they were put in -a bombproof cellar. I am glad I did so, for who knows what might -otherwise have happened to these valuable objects.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: And now one last question. The Prosecution has submitted -Document 661-PS. This document also has a USSR exhibit -number, which I don’t know at the moment. This is a document -which has been made to have a bearing on the activities of the -<span class='pageno' title='45' id='Page_45'></span> -Academy for German Law, of which you were president. The document -has the heading “Legal Formation of Germany’s Polish Policy -on Racial-Political Lines”; the legal part serves as a tect for the -Committee on the Law of Nationalities in the Academy for German -Law. I’m having this document submitted to you. Please, will you -tell me whether you’ve ever had this document in your hands before?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: From whom does it come?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: That is the extraordinary part; it has the Exhibit -Number USA-300.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: Does it state anywhere who drew it up or something of -the sort?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The document has no author; nor does it show on -whose order it was compiled.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: I can say merely that I’ve never seen the document; -that I never gave an order for it to be drawn up; so I can say really -nothing about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: It states here that it was found in the Ministry of -Justice in Kassel. Was there a Ministry of Justice in Kassel in 1940?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: A Ministry of Justice in Kassel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK: That has not been in existence since 1866.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to his seat.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: In that case, with the permission of the Tribunal, I -shall call witness Dr. Bilfinger.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Sir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This document which you produced as -USSR-223, which are extracts from Defendant Frank’s diary; are -you offering that in evidence? Apparently some entries from Frank’s -diary have already been offered in evidence; others have not. Are -you wishing to offer this in evidence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This document has already been -submitted in evidence under two numbers; the first number is -2233-PS, which was submitted by the American Prosecution, and the -second is Exhibit USSR-223, and was already submitted by us on -15 February, 1946.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I see. Have these entries which you have in -this document been submitted under USSR-223? You see, the PS -number does not necessarily mean that the documents have been -offered in evidence. The PS numbers were applied to documents -<span class='pageno' title='46' id='Page_46'></span> -before they were offered in evidence; but the USSR-223 does imply -that it has been offered in evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This document has already been -presented in evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, what the Tribunal wants to -know is whether you wish to offer this USSR-223 in evidence, -because unless it was read before it hasn’t been offered in evidence, -or it hasn’t gone into the record.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: We already read an excerpt on -15 February, and it is, therefore, already read into the record.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I retire, Mr. President?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Bilfinger took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you stand up, please, and will you tell -us your full name?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RUDOLF BILFINGER (Witness): Rudolf Bilfinger.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear -by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, since when were you active in the Reich -Security Main Office (RSHA), and in what position?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: From the end of 1937 until the beginning of 1943 I -was government councillor in the RSHA, and later senior government -councillor and expert on legal questions, and legal questions in connection -with the police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that on two occasions and at different -times you were head of the “Administration and Law” department -attached to the commander of the Security Police and SD in Kraków?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: Yes. In the autumn of 1940 and in 1944 I was head -of the department “Administration and Law” attached to the commander -of the Security Police and SD in Kraków.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What were the tasks you had to fulfil at different -times in the Government General—in broad outline.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: In 1940 I had the task of taking over from the -Government General a number of branches of the police administration -and working in that connection under the Higher SS and -Police Leader. -<span class='pageno' title='47' id='Page_47'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What was the legal position of the Higher SS and -Police Leader, and what was his relation to the Governor General? -Did the Higher SS and Police Leader receive his instructions concerning -the Security Police and the SD from the Governor General? -Or did he receive them direct from the Reichsführer SS and Chief of -the Police, that is, Himmler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: The Higher SS and Police Leader from the very -beginning received his instructions direct from the Reichsführer SS, -Himmler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it furthermore true that the commander of the -Security Police and of the SD in the Government General also -received direct orders and instructions from Amt IV, the Gestapo, -and from Amt V, the Criminal Police in the RSHA?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: Yes, the commander of the Security Police received -many orders direct from the various departments of the RSHA, -particularly from departments IV and V.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did the institution of the State Secretariat for -Security, which occurred in 1942, bring about a change in the legal -position of the Governor General with reference to measures of the -Security Police and the SD?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: The appointment of a State Secretary as such did -not alter the legal position of the Governor General or of the State -Secretary. New spheres of activity were merely added to the State -Secretariat for Security.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Do you know of a decree of Reichsführer SS and -Chief of the German Police, Himmler, in the year 1939, and what -were its contents?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: I knew of a decree, probably dated 1939, dealing -with the appointment of the Higher SS and Police Leader, which -ruled that the Higher SS and Police Leader would receive his instructions -direct from Himmler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The institution of the State Secretariat dated from -7 May 1942 and was based on a Führer decree. The application of -this decree called forth another decree dated 3 June 1942, which -dealt with the transfer of official business to the State Secretary for -Security. Do you know the contents of that decree?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: The essential contents of the decrees which you -have mentioned are known to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that on the basis of this decree the -entire Political Police and the Criminal Police, as had been the case -before, were again subordinated to the State Secretary for Security -within the framework of the Security Police? -<span class='pageno' title='48' id='Page_48'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: These two branches from the very beginning were -under the Higher SS and Police Leader, and later on under the State -Secretary for Security. To this extent the decree did not bring -about a change, but was merely a confirmation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it known to you that in Appendix B of that -decree there are 26 paragraphs in which all the branches of the -Security Police are transferred to the Higher SS and Police Chief -as State Secretary for Security?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Do you know that in this decree, in Appendix B, -Jewish matters are also mentioned specifically?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Do you know that in Paragraph 21 of Appendix B -it is ruled:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The special fields of the Security Police: Representation of -the Government General at conferences and meetings, particularly -with the central offices of the Reich, which deal with -the above-mentioned special fields.”?</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: I know that as far as the sense is concerned, such -a ruling was contained therein. Whether Paragraph 21 or another -paragraph was worded this way I don’t remember.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it also true that on the basis of this decree the last -remains of the administrative police were removed from the administration -of the Government General and handed over to the State -Secretary for Security, who was directly under Himmler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: That was the intention and the purpose of this -decree. But, contrary to the wording of that decree, only a few -branches were taken away from the administration; concerning the -remainder a fight ensued later. The result was, however, that all -branches of the police administration were taken away.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, did the administration of the Government -General have anything to do with the establishment and administration -of concentration camps?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: To the best of my knowledge, no.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: You were with the Chief of the Security Police and -SD in Kraków. When did you yourself hear of concentration camps -at Maidanek, Treblinka, and Lublin for the first time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: May I correct you, I was attached to the Commander -of Security Police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes, the Commander of the Security Police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: I heard of Maidanek for the first time when Lublin -and Maidanek were occupied by the Russians; and through -<span class='pageno' title='49' id='Page_49'></span> -propaganda I heard for the first time what the name Maidanek meant, -when the then Governor General Frank ordered an investigation -regarding events in Maidanek and responsibility for these events.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: According to your own observation, generally -speaking, what were the relations like between the Governor General -and the SS Obergruppenführer Krüger, and what were the -reasons for those relations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: Relations between them were very bad from the -beginning. The reasons were partly questions of organization and -of the use of the Police, and partly essential differences of opinion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What do you mean by essential differences of -opinion? Do you mean different opinions regarding the treatment -of the Polish population?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: I can still recollect one example which concerned -the confirmation of police court-martial sentences by Governor -General Frank. In opposition to Krüger’s opinion, he either failed to -confirm a number of sentences or else mitigated them considerably. -In this connection I remember such differences of opinion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Were these sentences which were passed in connection -with the so-called AB Action?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: I know nothing of an AB Action.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: You came to the Government General later, did you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: I came to the Government General in August 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions for this witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to -ask questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. RUDOLF MERKEL (Counsel for Gestapo): May I put a few -questions to the witness?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, the Prosecution states that the State Police was a circle -of persons formed in accordance with a common plan, and that -membership in it was voluntary. Since you had an especially high -position in the RSHA, I ask you to tell me briefly what you know -about these questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: Of the members of the Secret State Police only a -small part were volunteers. The former officials, the officials of the -former political department of the headquarters of the Commissioner -of the Police, constituted the nucleus of the membership of the Secret -State Police. The various local police head offices were created from -these former political departments of the central police headquarters, -and at the same time practically all the officials from these former -political departments were taken over. In Berlin, for example, it -was Department I-A of the central police headquarters. -<span class='pageno' title='50' id='Page_50'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Apart from that, administrative officials were transferred from -other administrative authorities to the Secret State Police, or were -detailed to go here. As time went on people from other administrations -and offices were forced to transfer to the Secret State -Police. Thus, for instance, the entire frontier customs service was -transferred to the Secret State Police in 1944 by order of the Führer. -At about the same time the whole of the intelligence service was -transferred.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the course of the war numerous members of the Waffen-SS -who were no longer eligible for active military service were detailed -to the Secret State Police. In addition many people who originally -had had nothing to do with police work were drafted as emergency -members to the Secret State Police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MERKEL: If I summarize it by saying that the Secret State -Police was a Reich authority and that the German civil service law -applied to its employees, is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MERKEL: Was it possible for the officials to resign from the -Secret State Police easily?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: It was extremely difficult and, in fact, impossible -to resign from the Secret State Police. One could resign only in very -special circumstances.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MERKEL: It has been stated here with reference to the composition -of the Secret State Police personnel that there was the -following proportion: executive officers about 20 percent; administrative -officials about 20 percent; and technical personnel approximately -60 percent. Are these figures about right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: I have no general information about the composition -of the personnel; but for certain offices about which I knew -more these figures would probably apply.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MERKEL: Under whose jurisdiction were the concentration -camps in Germany and in the occupied countries?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: The concentration camps were under the jurisdiction -of the Economic Administration Main Office under SS Gruppenführer -Pohl.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MERKEL: Did the Secret State Police have anything to do -with the administration of the concentration camps?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: No. It maybe that at the beginning certain concentration -camps here and there were administered directly by the -Secret State Police for a short period. That was probably the case -in individual instances. But in principle even at that time, and later -on without exception, the concentration camps were administered by -the Economic Administration Main Office. -<span class='pageno' title='51' id='Page_51'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MERKEL: Do you know at all who gave orders for the liquidations -which took place in the concentration camps?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: No, I know nothing about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MERKEL: Can you say anything about the grounds for -protective custody? On the strength of what legal rulings was protective -custody decreed after 1933?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: Protective custody was based on the Decree of the -Reich President for the Protection of the People and the State, of -February 1933, in which a number of the basic rights of the Weimar -Constitution were rescinded.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MERKEL: Was there later a decree by the Minister of the -Interior which dealt with protective custody, at the end of 1936 or -the beginning of 1937?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: Yes, at that time the Protective Custody Law was -drawn up. The legal basis as such remained in force. At that time -power to decree protective custody was confined to the Secret State -Police. Before that a number of other offices, rightly or wrongly, -had decreed protective custody. To prevent this, protective custody -was then confined to the Secret State Police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MERKEL: Is it correct that for some time you were in -France. In what capacity were you there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: In the late summer and autumn of 1943 I was commander -of the Security Police in France, in Toulouse.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything about an order from the -RSHA, or from the commander of the Sipo for France, or from -individual district commanders, to the effect that ill-treatment or -torture was to be applied when prisoners were interrogated?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: No, I do not know of such orders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MERKEL: Then how do you explain the ill-treatment and -atrocities which actually took place in connection with interrogations, -proof of which has been given by the Prosecution?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: It is possible that ill-treatment did occur; in a -number of cases this either took place in spite of its being forbidden, -or else it was committed by members of other German offices in -France which did not belong to the Security Police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MERKEL: Did you, while you were active in France, hear -of any such ill-treatment either officially or by hearsay?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: I never heard of any such ill-treatment at the hands -of members of the German police or the German Armed Forces. I -heard only of cases of ill-treatment carried out by groups consisting -of Frenchmen who were being employed by some German authority.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MERKEL: Were there so-called Gestapo prisons in France? -<span class='pageno' title='52' id='Page_52'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: No, the Security Police in France did not have -prisons of their own. They handed over their prisoners to the detention -camps of the German Armed Forces.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MERKEL: One last question: The Prosecution has given -proof of a large number of crimes against humanity and war crimes -which were committed with the participation of the Security Police. -Can one say that these crimes were perfectly obvious and were -known to all members of the Secret State Police, or were these -crimes known only to a small circle of persons who had been ordered -directly to carry out the measures concerned? Do you know anything -about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: I didn’t quite understand the question from the -beginning. Were you referring to France or to the Security Police -in general?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MERKEL: I was referring to the Security Police in general.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: No ill-treatment or torture of any kind was permitted; -and, as far as I know, nothing of the kind did happen, still -less was it known generally or to a larger circle of persons. I knew -nothing about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MERKEL: I have no further questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? -Is there nothing you wish to ask arising from Dr. Merkel’s cross-examination, -Dr. Seidl?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I have only one more question to ask the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, in Paragraph 4 of the decree of 23 June 1942 the following -ruling is made, and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The SS and Police Leaders in the districts are directly -subordinate to the governors of the districts, just as the State -Secretary for Security is subordinate to the Governor -General.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus it does not say that the entire police organization is subordinate, -but only the police leaders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now I ask you whether orders which had been issued by the -commanders of the Security Police and the SD were forwarded to -the governors or were sent directly to the district chiefs of the -Security Police and the SD?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: These orders were always sent directly from the -commander to the district chiefs of the Security Police and the SD. -The commander could give no instructions to the governors. -<span class='pageno' title='53' id='Page_53'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: If I understand you correctly you mean that the -Security Police and the SD had their own official channels which -had absolutely nothing to do with the administrative construction -of the Government General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BILFINGER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions for the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: With the permission of the Tribunal, I call as the -next witness the former Governor of Kraków, Dr. Kurt von Burgsdorff.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Von Burgsdorff took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>KURT VON BURGSDORFF (Witness): Kurt von Burgsdorff.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will -speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Government General was divided into -five districts at the head of each of which there was a governor; is -that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: From 1 December 1943 until the occupation of your -district by Soviet troops you were governor of the district Kraków?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. To use the correct official term, I -was...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): -Mr. President, the defense counsel has put the question of the “occupation” -of this region by Soviet troops. I energetically protest -against such terminology and consider it a hostile move.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I have just been told that perhaps a -mistake in the translation has crept in. All I intended to say was -that, in the course of the year 1944, the area of which this witness -was governor was occupied by the Soviet troops in the course of -military action. I do not know what the Soviet prosecutor is protesting -against; it is at any rate far from my intention to make any -hostile statement here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think the point was, it was not an occupation; -it was a liberation by the Russian Army.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Of course; I did not want to say any more than that -the German troops were driven out of this area by the Soviet troops.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, will you please continue with your answer? -<span class='pageno' title='54' id='Page_54'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: I was entrusted with exercising the duties -of a governor—that is the correct official expression. Until a few -months ago I was still an officer of the Wehrmacht, and during my -entire activity in Kraków I remained an officer of the Wehrmacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, according to your observations, what basically -was the attitude of the Governor General toward the Polish -and Ukrainian people?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: I want to emphasize that I can answer -only for the year 1944. At that time the attitude of the Governor -General was that he wished to live in peace with the people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that already in 1942 the Governor General -had given the governors the opportunity of setting up administrative -committees, comprised of Poles and Ukrainians, attached to -the district chiefs?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: There was a governmental decree to this -effect. Whether that was in 1942 or not I do not know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself make use of the authorization contained -therein, and did you establish such administrative committees?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: In the district of Kraków I had such a -committee established at once for every district chief.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, according to your observations what was -the food situation like in the Government General, and particularly -in your district?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: It was not unsatisfactory; but I must add -that the reason for that was that, in addition to the rations, the -Polish population had an extensive black market.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: According to your observations what was the attitude -of the Governor General on the question of the mobilization of labor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: He did not wish any workers sent outside -the Government General, because he was interested in retaining the -necessary manpower within the country.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Was the Church persecuted by the Governor General -in the Government General; and what basically was the attitude of -the Governor General to this question, according to your observations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Again I can answer only for my district and -for the year 1944. There was no persecution of the Church; on the -contrary, the relations with churches of all denominations were good -in my district. On my travels I always received the clergy, and I -never heard any complaint.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did you have any personal experience with the -Governor General with regard to this question? -<span class='pageno' title='55' id='Page_55'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. In the middle of January 1944 I was -appointed District Standortführer by the Governor General, who at -the same time was the Party Leader in the Government General; -that is, I was appointed to a Party office for the district of Kraków. -I pointed out to him, as I had pointed out to the Minister of the -Interior, Himmler, before, that I was a convinced church-going -Christian. The Governor General replied that he was in no way -perturbed by that and that he knew of no provision in the Party -program which prohibited it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What, according to your observations, were the -relations like between the Governor General and the administration -of the Government General on the one side, and the Security Police -and the SD on the other side?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Doubtlessly underneath they were bad, -because the Police always ended by doing only what it wanted and -did not concern itself with the administration. For that reason in -the country districts also there was real friction between the -administration offices and the Police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that when you took office, or shortly -after, the Governor General issued several instructions referring to -the Police? I quote from the diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank, the -entry of 4 January 1944:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General then gave some instructions to Dr. -Von Burgsdorff with reference to his new activities. His task -will be to inform himself, as a matter of principle, of all -decisive factors in the district. Above all the Governor should -direct his efforts to opposing energetically any encroachments -by the Police.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Today I no longer remember that conversation -of 4 January 1944, but it may have taken place. However, -I do remember that after I took office, at the end of November 1943, -I went to see the Governor General once more and told him that I -had heard that the relations with the Police were not good and were -scarcely tolerable for the administration. He replied that he was -doing what he could in order, as I might put it, to bring the Police -to reason. It was on the basis of this statement by the Governor -General that I definitely decided to remain in the Government General. -I had, as is known, told the Reich Minister of the Interior that -I was unwilling to go there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: In your capacity as Governor did you have any -authority to issue commands to the Security Police and the SD in -your district?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: None whatsoever. -<span class='pageno' title='56' id='Page_56'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself ever see a police directive?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Never. With the Police, orders are passed -down vertically, that is, directly from the Higher SS and Police -Leader to the SS and Police Leader respectively—and that is probably -the usual way—from the chief of the Security Police to the unit -commander of the Security Police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: In your activity as Governor did you have anything -to do with the administration of concentration camps?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Never.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Do you know who administered the concentration -camps?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: No, not from my own experience; but I -have heard that there was some central office in Berlin under the -Reichsführer SS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: When did you hear for the first time of the Maidanek -concentration camp?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: From you, about a fortnight ago.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: You want to tell the Tribunal under oath...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: ...that you, although you were Governor of Kraków -in the occupied Polish territory, did not learn about that until during -your captivity?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Yes, I am firmly convinced that I heard -about this concentration camp from you for the first time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: When did you for the first time hear of the Treblinka -concentration camp?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Also from you on the same occasion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Governor General is accused by the -Prosecution of issuing a summary court-martial decree in the year -1943. What at that time was the security situation in the Government -General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Again I can judge only for the year 1944. -As the German troops came back from the East, it became worse and -worse, so that in my district it became increasingly difficult to carry -out any kind of administration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: According to your observations what was the economic -situation like in the agricultural and industrial sectors of your -district, and is the statement justified that, allowing for wartime -conditions, the administration of the Government General had done -everything to promote economy? -<span class='pageno' title='57' id='Page_57'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Economy in my district was at full force in -1944 both in industry and in agriculture. Some industries had been -transferred from the Reich to the Government General; and, as far -as agriculture was concerned, the administration imported large -quantities of fertilizers and seeds and the like. Horse breeding was -also greatly promoted in my district.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The Defendant Dr. Frank is accused of not having -done everything that was necessary with regard to public health and -sanitary conditions. What can you say about this point?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: I can say that in my district—again -speaking of 1944—hospitals were improved and new ones installed. -A great deal was done, especially in the fighting of epidemics. -Typhus, dysentery, and typhoid were greatly reduced by inoculation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The Defendant Frank is also accused of having -neglected higher education. Do you know anything about the conditions -in the Government General in regard to this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: When I came into the Government General -there was no longer any higher education at all. On the basis of -other experiences I suggested immediately that Polish universities -be opened again. I contacted the president of the main department -for education, who told me that the government was already entertaining -such plans. In every one of my monthly reports I pointed -out the necessity for Polish universities, because within a short time, -or more correctly in a few years’ time, there would be a shortage of -technicians, doctors, and veterinaries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Now, one last question. There was a so-called sphere -of activity of the NSDAP in the Government General; you were the -District Standortführer in the Government General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, what, according to your observations, were -the relations between the Governor General and the Head of the -Party Chancellery, Bormann?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: I believe I can say without exaggeration -that they were extremely bad. As District Standortführer I combined -this office with that of District Governor and witnessed the last -great struggle of the Governor General against Bormann. The -Governor General held the view, and in this he was justified, that it -was wrong to combine the Party office with the government office. -He was afraid there would be too much interference not only by -the Police but also by the Party, and he wanted to prevent that. -Bormann, on the other hand, wanted to establish the predominance -<span class='pageno' title='58' id='Page_58'></span> -of the Party over the State in the Government General as well. That -led to the most serious conflict.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions for the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other Defense Counsel wish to -ask any other questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for -Defendant Von Neurath): Witness, you were at one time Under State -Secretary in the Government of the Protectorate of Bohemia and -Moravia? When was that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: From the end of March 1939 until the -middle of March 1942.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And to whom were you directly -subordinate as Under State Secretary? The State Secretary Frank or -the Reich Protector?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: State Secretary Frank.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: How did you come to know about -the activities of Von Neurath as Reich Protector?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: From conferences with him and personal -conversations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What kind of work did you have to -do as Under State Secretary?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: I was in charge of the administration -proper.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were the Police and the various SS -and police offices subordinate to you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: To whom were they subordinate?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: To State Secretary Frank.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was State Secretary Frank’s -attitude to Von Neurath?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: You mean officially?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Officially, yes, of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Herr Von Neurath tried at first to get on -with Herr Frank; but the stronger Frank’s position became, the -more impossible that was. State Secretary Frank, later Minister -Frank, had behind him the entire power of the SS and the Police, -and finally Hitler also.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: From whom did Frank get his -orders directly? -<span class='pageno' title='59' id='Page_59'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: As far as I know, from Himmler; however, -I saw that on one or two or three occasions he received direct orders -from Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And that happened mostly without -Von Neurath being consulted?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: That I cannot say, but I assume so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was it possible for Frank to perform -his political functions independently within his sphere of -activity, or did he have to have the approval of Herr Von Neurath?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Whether he was authorized or allowed to -do so, I should not like to decide, but at any rate he did so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were Herr Von Neurath and Herr -Frank of the same opinion concerning the policy towards the Czech -people?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: I did not understand your question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath agree with -the policy toward the Czech people pursued by Frank or his superior, -Himmler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Could he carry through his aims?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: He could not do anything, confronted as he -was by Himmler’s and Hitler’s immense power.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Herr Von Neurath’s own -policy and attitude?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: At the beginning I spoke very often about -these things to Herr Von Neurath. On the basis of the decree of -15 March he hoped and believed he could get the Germans and -Czechs in the Protectorate to live together reasonably and peacefully.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But as Frank’s position became -stronger, that became more and more difficult?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you remember that in the -middle of November 1939 serious disturbances broke out among the -students in Prague?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you also remember that on the -day after these incidents Herr Von Neurath and Frank flew to -Berlin?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. -<span class='pageno' title='60' id='Page_60'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you remember that Frank returned -from Berlin alone on the same day?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: I believe I can recall that Frank returned -on the same day, but I do not know whether he returned alone.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You don’t know whether Herr Von -Neurath returned with him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything else about -the incidents connected with the students’ disturbances and what the -consequences were?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: They resulted, as far as I remember, in the -execution of several students and in the closing of the universities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know whether the universities -were closed on Himmler’s order?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about the -attitude of Herr Von Neurath towards the Catholic and Protestant -Churches?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: His attitude was always above reproach, -and there were no difficulties with the churches during the time that -I was in the Protectorate.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that Herr Von Neurath -was in contact with the Archbishop of Prague until the latter’s -death?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: No, I don’t know anything about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything concerning -whether, during the term of office of Herr Von Neurath, with his -approval or upon his orders, art treasures of any kind, pictures, -monuments, sculptures, libraries, or the like, belonging either to the -State or to private owners, were confiscated and removed from the -country?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: It is certain, absolutely certain, that he did -not order anything of the sort. Whether he consented in any way to -this I do not know, but I do not believe so. I remember one incident -in the Malta Palace, where some Reich office—I don’t remember -today which it was—removed art treasures. Herr Von Neurath -immediately did everything to make good this damage.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that the customs -union which had been ordered by Berlin from the very beginning -between the Protectorate and Germany was not established for a -long time because of Herr Von Neurath’s intervention? -<span class='pageno' title='61' id='Page_61'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. I definitely know about that. However, -in the interest of the truth, I have to add that State Secretary -Frank also was against the customs union, because, like Herr Von -Neurath, he believed that the economy of the Protectorate would be -damaged by the stronger economy of Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: While Von Neurath was Reich Protector, -was there any compulsory deportation of workers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: I am convinced that that did not happen. -Workers were recruited, but in an entirely regular manner. That -was the case while I was in the Protectorate.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know whether Von Neurath -made travel in or out of the Protectorate dependent on official -approval?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Whether or not Von Neurath did that, I do -not know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about the -closing of the secondary schools?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: I remember that the closing of the secondary -schools was a necessary consequence of the closing of the universities. -There were too many secondary schools in the Protectorate. -Not all of them were closed by any means. On the other hand -technical schools were greatly expanded and new ones established. -I cannot remember anything more exact about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Von -Neurath’s attitude towards the Germanization of Czechoslovakia as -intended by Himmler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Yes, I remember the memorandum which -Von Neurath sent to Hitler about the whole affair. That memorandum -was intended to defer Himmler’s plans for forced -Germanization. Von Neurath expressed the view, which he had -frequently mentioned to me, that in the interest of peace in the -Protectorate he did not advocate these attempts at Germanization.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no more questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Tell us, please, when you first joined the National -Socialist Party?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: On 1 May 1933.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And did you achieve office in any of its affiliated -organizations? -<span class='pageno' title='62' id='Page_62'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: I was an honorary SA Gruppenführer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Any other honors?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Then for a few years, just as I had been -during the democratic regime, I was legal advisor to the administration -of Saxony.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Weren’t you also an Oberbannführer in the HJ, the -Hitler-Jugend?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: I once became Oberbannführer on the -occasion of the Reich Youth Leader’s visit to Prague. But that was -purely a gesture of courtesy, which had no consequences.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to mention again, since you speak of Party offices, -that, as was said before, because of my post as Governor of Kraków -I was District Standortführer from the middle of January 1944 until -the end, that is the middle of January 1945.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You also received the gold badge of the Hitler Youth, -did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Weren’t you in some way associated with Reinhard -Heydrich when you were in Prague?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: I was with Heydrich until the middle -of 1942. Then, as is generally known, because of the course pursued -by Heydrich, I left the Protectorate, and at 55 years of age I went -into the army.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What position did you occupy with relation to -Heydrich?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: The same as under Herr Von Neurath; I -was Under State Secretary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Let me put it to you this way: You told us that you -never heard of Maidanek, the concentration camp?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you never heard of Auschwitz?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Of Auschwitz, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Had you heard of an installation known as Lublin?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Of Lublin? Not of the concentration camp -but of the city of Lublin, of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you know of a concentration camp by the name -of Lublin?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You did know, I assume, of many other concentration -camps by name? -<span class='pageno' title='63' id='Page_63'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON BURGSDORFF: Only of German camps, yes—of Dachau -and Buchenwald.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you any questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions for the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Who is your next witness?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The next witness would be the former secretary of -the Governor General, Fräulein Kraffczyk. However, if I understood -the Tribunal correctly yesterday, this session will end at 1630 hours.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now until Tuesday -morning.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 23 April 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='64' id='Page_64'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND TWELFTH DAY</span><br/> Tuesday, 23 April 1946</h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I shall dispense with the hearing of -the witness Struve, Chief of the Central Department for Agriculture -and Food in the Government General. With the permission of the -Tribunal I am now calling witness Dr. Joseph Bühler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Bühler took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>JOSEPH BÜHLER (Witness): Joseph Bühler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear -by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, how long have you known Defendant -Dr. Hans Frank; and what were the positions in which you worked -with him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I have known Herr Frank since 1 October 1930. I -worked with him in government spheres of service from the end of -March 1933. I served under him officially when he was Minister of -Justice in Bavaria; later when he was Reich Commissioner for -Justice; and still later when he was Minister. From the end of -September 1939 Herr Frank employed me in an official capacity in -the Government General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: In what capacity did you serve in the Government -General at the end?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: From about the second half of 1940 I was state secretary -in the government of the Government General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Were you yourself a member of the Party?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I have been a Party member since 1 April 1933.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did you exercise any functions in the Party or any -of the affiliated organizations of the Party, particularly in the SA -or the SS? -<span class='pageno' title='65' id='Page_65'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I never held an office in the Party. I was never a -member of the SA or the SS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I now come to the time during which you were state -secretary to the chief of the government in the Government General. -Will you please tell me what the relations were between the -Governor General on the one side and the Higher SS and Police -Leader on the other side?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I might perhaps say in advance that my sphere of -activity did not touch upon police matters, matters relating to the -Party, or military matters in the Government General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The relations of the Governor General to the Higher SS and -Police Leader, Obergruppenführer Krüger, who was allocated to -him by the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police were, -from the very beginning, made difficult by essential differences of -opinion. These differences of opinion concerned the conception of the -task and the position of the Police in general in an orderly state -system, as well as the conception in particular of the position and -tasks of the Police in the Government General. The Governor -General held the view that the Police must be the servant and the -organ of the executive of the state and that accordingly he and -the state authorities should give orders to the Police and that this -assignment of tasks involved a limitation of the sphere of activity -of the Police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger, on the other hand, -held the view that the Police in general had, of course, to fulfill -tasks originating with the executive of the state but that in fulfilling -these tasks it was not bound by the instructions of the administrative -authorities, that this was a matter of technical police -questions, decisions about which administrative authorities could -not make and were not in a position to make.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Regarding the power to give orders to the Police, it was Krüger’s -view that because of the effectiveness and unity of police activity -in all occupied territories, such power to issue orders had to rest -with the central authority in Berlin and that he and only he could -issue orders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As far as the duties of the Police were concerned, it was Krüger’s -opinion that the Governor General’s view regarding the limitation -of these duties as unfounded for the very reason that he, as Higher -SS and Police Leader, was simultaneously the deputy of the Reichsführer -SS in the latter’s capacity as Reich Commissioner for the -Preservation of German Nationality.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As far as the relation of the Police to the question of Polish -policy was concerned, it was Krüger’s view that, in connection with -work in non-German territory, police considerations would have to -<span class='pageno' title='66' id='Page_66'></span> -play a predominant role and that with police methods everything -could be achieved and everything could be prevented. This overestimation -of the Police led, for instance, to the fact that, during -later arguments between the Police and the administration regarding -their respective spheres of work, matters concerning non-German -groups were listed among the competences of the Police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Do you know that as early as 1939 Reichsführer SS -Himmler issued a restricted decree, according to which the handling -of all police matters was his own concern or the concern of his -Higher SS and Police Leader?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: That this was the case became clear to me from the -actions taken by the Police. I did not see a decree to this effect, but -I can state this much: The Police in the Government General acted -exactly as in the directives which I have described before.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, in 1942, by decree of the Führer, a State -Secretariat for Security was instituted. At whose instigation was -this instituted and what was the position taken by the Governor -General in that connection?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: This decree was preceded by a frightful campaign of -hatred against the person of the Governor General. The institution -of the State Secretariat for Security was considered by the Police -a step, an important step, in the fight for the removal of the -Governor General. The matters specified in that decree, or at least -the majority of them, were not being transferred to the Police -now for the first time, but the actual state of affairs was—the -actual course of events had already been—in conformity to the -contents of this decree before it was issued.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: In the decree implementing this Führer decree and -dated 3 June 1942 all the police spheres of activities which were to -be transferred to the State Secretary were given in two lists; in an -Appendix A, the tasks of the Regular Police; and in an Appendix B, -the tasks of the Security Police. Were these police matters at that -time transferred completely to the State Secretary and thus to the -police sector?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The administration did not like giving up these -matters; so where the Police had not already got hold of them, they -were given up only with reluctance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: You are thinking first of all of the spheres of the -so-called administrative police, health police, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, are you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Yes, that is to say, the police in charge of communications, -health, food, and such matters.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: If I have understood your statements correctly, you -mean that the entire police system, Security Police as well as SD -<span class='pageno' title='67' id='Page_67'></span> -and Regular Police, was directed by the central office, either by -Himmler himself or by the Reich Security Main Office through the -Higher SS and Police Leader?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: In general according to my observations, it was -possible for the Security Police to receive orders direct from Berlin -without their going through Krüger.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: And now another question: Is it correct that resettlements -were carried out in the Government General, by Reichsführer -SS Himmler in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation -of German Nationality?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Resettlements, in the opinion of the Governor General, -even if carried out decently, always caused unrest among the population. -We had no use for that in the Government General. Also, -these resettlements always caused a falling off of agricultural production. -For these reasons, the Governor General and the Government -of the Government General did not, as a matter of principle, -carry out resettlements during the war. To the extent that such -resettlements were carried out, it was done exclusively by the Reich -Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General, because of -this arbitrary resettlement policy, repeatedly had serious arguments -with Himmler, Krüger, and SS Gruppenführer Globocznik?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: That is correct. The intention of preventing such -resettlements always led to arguments and friction between the -Higher SS and Police Leader and the Governor General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The Defendant Dr. Frank is accused by the Prosecution -of the seizure and confiscation of industrial and private -property. What basically was the attitude of the Governor General -to such questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The legal provisions in this sphere of the law originated -with the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. Confiscation of private -property and possessions in the annexed Eastern territories and in -the Government General was subject to the same regulations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The decree of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan provided for -the creation of a trust office—the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost—with its -central administration in Berlin. The Governor General did not -want to have the affairs of the Government General administered in -Berlin, and therefore he opposed the administration of property in -the Government General being entrusted to the Haupttreuhandstelle -Ost. Without interference by the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, -he established his own rules for confiscations in the Government -General and his own trust office. That trust office was headed by -an experienced higher official from the Ministry of Economy of -Saxony. -<span class='pageno' title='68' id='Page_68'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What happened to the factories and works which -were situated in the Government General and were formerly the -property of the Polish State?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Factories, as far as they were included in the armament -program, were taken over by the military sector, that is to -say, by the Inspector for Armaments, who was subordinate to the -OKW and later to Minister Speer. Factories outside the armament -sector, which had belonged to the former Polish State, the Governor -General tried to consolidate into a stock company and to administer -them separately as property of the Government General. The chief -shareholder in this company was the Treasury of the Government -General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: That is to say, these factories were administered -entirely separately by the Reich Treasury?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted an extract from Frank’s -diary in evidence under Number USA-281 (Document Number -2233(d)-PS.) This is a discussion of Jewish problems. In this connection -Frank said, among other things:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“My attitude towards the Jews is based on the expectation -that they will disappear; they must go away. I have started -negotiations for deporting them to the East. This question -will be discussed at a large meeting in Berlin in January, -to which I shall send State Secretary Dr. Bühler. This conference -is to take place at the Reich Security Main Office -in the office of SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich. In any case -Jewish emigration on a large scale will begin.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask you now, did the Governor General send you to Berlin for -that conference; and if so, what was the subject of the conference?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Yes, I was sent to the conference and the subject of -the conference was the Jewish problem. I might say in advance -that from the beginning Jewish questions in the Government General -were considered as coming under the jurisdiction of the Higher SS -and Police Leader and handled accordingly. The handling of Jewish -matters by the state administration was supervised and merely -tolerated by the Police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>During the years 1940 and 1941 incredible numbers of people, -mostly Jews, were brought into the Government General in spite -of the objections and protests of the Governor General and his -administration. This completely unexpected, unprepared for, and -undesired bringing in of the Jewish population from other territories -put the administration of the Government General in an extremely -difficult position. -<span class='pageno' title='69' id='Page_69'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Accommodating these masses, feeding them, and caring for their -health—combating epidemics for instance—almost, or rather, definitely -overtaxed the capacity of the territory. Particularly threatening -was the spread of typhus, not only in the ghettos but also -among the Polish population and the Germans in the Government -General. It appeared as if that epidemic would spread even to the -Reich and to the Eastern Front.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At that moment Heydrich’s invitation to the Governor General -was received. The conference was originally supposed to take place -in November 1941, but it was frequently postponed and it may have -taken place in February 1942.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Because of the special problems of the Government General I -had asked Heydrich for a personal interview and he received me. -On that occasion, among many other things, I described in particular -the catastrophic conditions which had resulted from the arbitrary -bringing of Jews into the Government General. He replied that for -this very reason he had invited the Governor General to the conference. -The Reichsführer SS, so he said, had received an order -from the Führer to round up all the Jews of Europe and to settle -them in the Northeast of Europe, in Russia. I asked him whether -this meant that the further arrival of Jews in the Government -General would cease, and whether the hundreds of thousands of -Jews who had been brought into the Government General without -the permission of the Governor General would be moved out again. -Heydrich promised me both these things. Heydrich said furthermore -that the Führer had given an order that Theresienstadt, a town in -the Protectorate, would become a reservation in which old and sick -Jews, and weak Jews who could not stand the strains of resettlement, -were to be accommodated in the future. This information -left me definitely convinced that the resettlement of the Jews, if -not for the sake of the Jews, then for the sake of the reputation -and prestige of the German people, would be carried out in a -humane fashion. The removal of the Jews from the Government -General was subsequently carried out exclusively by the Police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I might add that Heydrich demanded, particularly for himself, -his office, and its branches, the exclusive and uninterrupted competence -and control in this matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What concentration camps in the Government -General did you know about during your activity as State Secretary?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The publications in the press during the summer of -1944 called my attention to the Maidanek camp for the first time. -I did not know that this camp, not far from Lublin, was a concentration -camp. It had been installed as an economic establishment -of the Reichsführer SS, in 1941 I think. Governor Zörner came to -<span class='pageno' title='70' id='Page_70'></span> -visit me at that time and he told me that he had objected to the -establishment of this camp when he talked to Globocznik, as it -would endanger the power supply of the city of Lublin; and there -were objections, too, on the part of the Police with regard to the -danger of epidemics. I informed the Governor General of this and -he in turn sent for Globocznik. Globocznik stated to the Governor -General that certain workshops for the needs of the Waffen-SS at -the front had been erected on that site by him. He mentioned -workshops for dressing furs but he also mentioned a timber yard -which was located there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In these workshops for dressing furs, as I heard, fur articles -from the collection of furs were altered for use at the front. At -any rate, Globocznik stated that he had installed these workshops -in compliance with Himmler’s command.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Governor General prohibited the erection of any further -installations until all questions were settled with the police in charge -of building and blueprints had been submitted to the state offices, in -other words until all rules had been complied with, which apply to -the construction of buildings. Globocznik never submitted these -blueprints. With regard to the events inside the camp, no concrete -information ever reached the outside. It surprised the Governor -General just as much as it surprised me when the world press -released the news about Maidanek.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution has submitted a document, -Number 437-PS, Exhibit USA-610, which is a memorandum from -the Governor General to the Führer, dated 19 June 1943. I think -you yourself drafted that memorandum. On Page 35 a report of the -commander of the Security Police is mentioned and quoted verbatim -in part. This report of the Security Police mentions also the name -of Maidanek.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you at that time realize that this Maidanek was identical -or probably identical with that camp near Lublin?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: No. I assumed that, like Auschwitz, it was a camp -outside the territory of the Government General, because the -Governor General had repeatedly told the Police and the Higher SS -and Police Leader that he did not wish to have concentration camps -in the Government General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Under whose jurisdiction was the administration of -concentration camps in the Government General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I don’t know because I did not know of the existence -of the camps. In August, on the occasion of a visit to the reception -camp at Pruszkow, I heard about the administration of concentration -camps in general. At that time I brought instructions from -Himmler to the camp commandant, according to which transport -<span class='pageno' title='71' id='Page_71'></span> -of the inhabitants of Warsaw who had been removed from the city -to concentration camps was to cease forthwith.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Was that after the uprising in Warsaw?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: It was during it; it must have been on or about 18 or -19 August 1944. The camp commandant, whose name I have -forgotten, told me at the time that he did not know about that -order, and that he could receive instructions only from the Chief -of Concentration Camps.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Do you know whether the Governor General himself -ever sent a Pole, a Ukrainian, or a Jew to a concentration camp?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Nothing like that ever happened, when I was present.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it true that a large number of Jewish workmen -who were working in the castle at Kraków were taken away by -the Security Police against the wishes of the Governor General and -during his absence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: This Jewish workers’ colony is known to me because -I lived in that castle. I also know that the Governor General always -took care of the maintenance of this colony. And the chief of the -Chancellery of the Government General, Ministerial Counsellor Keit, -once told me that this group of Jewish workers had been taken -away by force by the Police during the absence of the Governor -General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I now come to the so-called AB Action, this extraordinary -pacification action. What were the circumstances which -occasioned this action?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: It may have been about the middle of May 1940 when -one morning I was called from the government building, where I -performed my official work, to visit the Governor General in the -castle. I think I remember that Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart had -also been called. There we met the Governor General together -with some officials of the Police. The Governor General stated that, -in the opinion of the Police, an extreme act of pacification was -necessary. The security situation at that time, as far as I remember, -was this: Certain remnants of the Polish armed forces were still -roaming about in deserted forest regions, causing unrest among -the population, and probably giving military training to young -Poles. At that time, that is May 1940, the Polish people had recovered -from the shock which they had suffered at the sudden -defeat in 1939; and they began openly, with little caution and -without experience, to start a resistance movement everywhere. -This picture I remember clearly because of the statement given by -the Police on that or some other occasion. -<span class='pageno' title='72' id='Page_72'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: May I interrupt you and quote from Frank’s diary, -an entry of 16 May 1940. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The general war situation forces us to regard the security -situation in the Government General very seriously. From -a number of symptoms and actions one can draw the conclusion -that a large organized wave of resistance among the -Poles is present in the country awaiting the outbreak of -greater and violent events. Thousands of Poles are reported -to have been organized secretly and to have been armed, -and are being incited to carry out acts of violence of all sorts.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then the Governor General quoted some recent examples, as, -for instance, an uprising in certain villages under the leadership of -Major Huballa in the district of Radom; the murder of families of -German blood in Józefów; the murder of the mayor of Grasienta, -<span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Illegal pamphlets, inciting to rebellion, are being distributed -and even posted up everywhere; and there can therefore be -no doubt that the security situation is extremely serious.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Did the Governor General express himself in that manner at the -time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: When I took part in that meeting, the Governor -General spoke about the situation for some time, but the details I -cannot recollect.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What happened after that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I had only one impression. In the previous months -the Governor General had succeeded, by taking great pains, in -imposing on the Police a procedure for courts-martial which had to -be observed in making arrests and dealing with suspicious persons. -Furthermore, the Police had to concede that the Governor General -could refer the sentences of a summary court-martial to a reprieve -commission and that the execution of sentences could take place -only after the sentences had been confirmed by the Governor -General. The statements of the Governor General during this -conference in the middle of May 1940 made me fear that the Police -might see in these statements the possibility for evading the court-martial -and reprieve procedure imposed on them. For that reason -I asked the Governor General for permission to speak after he had -finished his statement. The Governor General cut me short at first -and stated that he wanted to dictate something to the secretary in -a hurry, which the latter was then to dictate to a stenotypist at -once and then put it into its final version. Thereupon the Governor -General dictated some authorization, or order, or some such document; -and with absolute certainty I remember that after he had -finished dictating, the secretary and I think, quite definitely, -<span class='pageno' title='73' id='Page_73'></span> -Brigadeführer Streckenbach, the Commander of the Regular Police, -left the room. I am saying this in advance because it explains the -fact that everything that happened afterwards has not been recorded -in the minutes. The secretary was no longer present in the room. -I expressed my fears, saying that these requirements laid down for -court-martial procedure should be observed under all circumstances. -I am not claiming any particular merit in this connection, because -if I had not done it then this objection would have been raised, I -am convinced, by Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart, or the Governor -General himself would have realized the danger which his statements -might have caused in this respect. At any rate, in reply to -my objection, and without any debate, the Governor General stated -at once that arrests and shootings could take place only in accordance -with the court-martial procedure, and that sentences of the -summary courts-martial would have to be examined by the reprieve -commission.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the ensuing period these instructions were followed. I assume -that it is certain that the reprieve commission received all sentences -pronounced by these courts-martial and dealt with them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Another entry in Frank’s diary, 12 July 1940, leads -one to the conclusion that at first these leaders of the resistance -movement concerned were merely arrested. I quote a statement of -the Governor General:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Regarding the question what is to be done with the political -criminals caught in connection with the AB Action, a discussion -is to take place in the near future with State Secretary -Dr. Bühler, Obergruppenführer Krüger, Brigadeführer -Streckenbach, and Ministerial Counsellor Wille.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Who was Ministerial Counsellor Wille, and what task did he -have in that connection?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I might say in advance that there is a gap in my -memory which makes it impossible for me to say for certain when -the Governor General told Brigadeführer Streckenbach that in all -cases he would have to observe court-martial procedure and respect -the reprieve commission. On the other hand, I think I can remember -for certain that at the time this discussion took place between -Krüger, Streckenbach, Wille, and me, arrests only had taken place -and no executions. Ministerial Counsellor Wille was the head of the -Department of Justice in the Government and was the competent -official for all matters concerning reprieves. The Governor General -wanted these matters dealt with by a legally trained, experienced -man.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>During the conference with Krüger, Streckenbach, and Wille it -had been ruled that the persons who had been arrested up to -<span class='pageno' title='74' id='Page_74'></span> -that time were to be subjected to court-martial procedure and that -sentences had to be dealt with by the reprieve commission. The -Police were not exactly enthusiastic about this. I remember that -Krüger told me privately after the conference that the Governor -General was a jack-in-the-box with whom one couldn’t work, and -that in the future he would go his own way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal thinks that this has -been gone into in too great detail.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes, I am coming to the end of my questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, during a Police meeting in 1940 on 30 May, the Defendant -Dr. Frank mentioned among other things the following: “The -difficulties we had had with the Kraków professors were terrible. -If we had handled the matter here, it would have taken a different -course.” Who arrested these professors, and to what extent was the -Governor General concerned with this matter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: On 7 or 8 November 1939, when the Governor General -arrived in Kraków to begin his activities, all professors of the -University of Kraków were arrested by the Security Police without -his knowledge and taken away to concentration camps in the Reich. -Among them were acquaintances of the Governor General, with -whom shortly before he had had social and academic connections -through the Academy for German Law. The Governor General used -his influence on Obergruppenführer Krüger persistently and uninterruptedly -until he achieved the release of the majority of these professors -from concentration camps.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This statement of his, which contradicts this, was made, in my -opinion, for the purpose of placating the Police, for the Police did -not like releasing these professors.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What basically was the attitude of the Governor -General concerning mobilization of labor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The Governor General and the Government of the -Government General were always attempting to get as many Polish -workers for the Reich as possible. It was clear to us, however, that -the employment of force in recruiting workers might bring about -temporary advantages but that recruitment of workers in that way -would not promise much success in the long run. The Governor -General gave me instructions, therefore, to conduct extensive and -intensive propaganda in favor of employment in the Reich and to -oppose all use of force in the recruitment of workers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the other hand the Governor General wanted to make his -recruitment of workers for the Reich successful by demanding decent -treatment for Polish workers in the Reich. He negotiated for many -years with the Reich Commissioner for the Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter -Sauckel, and improvements were in fact achieved. The -<span class='pageno' title='75' id='Page_75'></span> -Governor General was especially opposed to the identifying of Jews -and Poles by distinguishing marks in the Reich. I remember a letter -from Reich Commissioner Sauckel in which he informed the -Governor General that he had made every effort to insure the same -treatment for Polish workers as for other foreign workers, but that -his efforts were no longer crowned by success whenever the influence -of the Reichsführer SS opposed them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, I now come to another point. Under Number -USA-275 the Prosecution has submitted Document 1061-PS, which -is a report of Brigadeführer Stroop on the destruction of the ghetto -in Warsaw. Were you, or the Governor General, informed beforehand -about the measures planned by the Security Police?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I certainly was not. As to the Governor General, I do -not know that he was informed about any such plans.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What did you learn afterwards about the events at -the ghetto in Warsaw in 1943?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I heard what practically everybody heard—that an -uprising had broken out in the ghetto which had long been prepared; -that the Jews had used the building materials given them for the -purpose of air-raid protection to set up defense works; and that -during the uprising violent resistance was encountered by the German -troops.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I now come to the Warsaw uprising of 1944. To what -extent did the administration of the Government General participate -in the quelling of that revolt?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: As our comrades in Warsaw were encircled by the -insurrectionists, we asked the Governor General to apply to the -Führer for assistance to bring about a speedy quelling of the Warsaw -revolt. Apart from that the administration assisted in the welfare of -the population in connection with the evacuation in the battle zone -of the quarters that were to be destroyed. But the administration -did not exercise any authority here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: On 4 November 1945 you made an affidavit. The -affidavit bears the number 2476-PS. I shall now read to you that -affidavit, which is very brief, and I shall ask you to tell me whether -the contents are correct. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In the course of the quelling of the Warsaw revolt in August -1944, approximately 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw -(a Polish estimate) were taken away to German concentration -camps. As a result of a <span class='it'>démarche</span> made by the Governor General, -Dr. Frank, to the office of Reichsführer SS Himmler, the -latter prohibited further deportations. The Governor General -<span class='pageno' title='76' id='Page_76'></span> -tried to secure the release of the 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants -of Warsaw who had already been taken to concentration -camps in the Reich. The Chief of the Reich Security Main -Office, Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner, refused this request, -made in writing as well as orally on the occasion of a -visit of mine to Berlin in September or October 1944, on the -grounds that these inhabitants of Warsaw were being used in -the secret manufacture of armaments in the Reich and that -therefore a general release was out of the question. However, -he would be willing to consider individual applications favorably. -Individual applications for release from concentration -camps were granted by Kaltenbrunner during the subsequent -months.</p> - -<p>“Contrary to the Polish estimate, the number of persons taken -from Warsaw to concentration camps in the Reich was estimated -to be small by Kaltenbrunner. I myself reported to my -office Kaltenbrunner’s statement regarding the number of -internees, and after a renewed investigation I found that the -above-mentioned figure of 50,000 to 60,000 was correct. These -were the people who had been taken to concentration camps -in Germany.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I now ask you, are the contents of this affidavit, made before an -American officer, correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I can supplement it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Before he supplements it, is it in evidence? -Has it yet been put in evidence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: It has the number 2476-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That doesn’t prove it has been put in evidence. -Has it been put in evidence? Dr. Seidl, you know quite well what -“put in evidence” means. Has it been put in evidence? Has it got a -USA exhibit number?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: No, it has not a USA exhibit number.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then you are offering it in evidence, are you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I don’t want to submit it formally in evidence; but -I do want to ask the witness about the contents of this affidavit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But it is a document, and if you are putting -it to the witness, you must put it in evidence and you must give it -an exhibit number. You cannot put documents to the witness and -not put them in evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: In that case I submit this document as Document -Number Frank-1. -<span class='pageno' title='77' id='Page_77'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now ask you, Witness, whether the contents of this affidavit are -correct, and, if so, whether you can supplement this affidavit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Yes, I should like to supplement it briefly. It is possible -that I went to see Kaltenbrunner twice about that question—not -only once—and after Kaltenbrunner had refused to release these -people the second time, on the strength of my experiences with the -camp commandant in Camp Pruszkow, I had the impression that it -was not in Kaltenbrunner’s power to order such a release. He didn’t -talk to me about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: But from his statements you had the impression that -perhaps he too did not have the power to release those people?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: During those conferences I had brought up questions -about the Polish policy, and from these conferences I had the impression -that I might gain Kaltenbrunner’s interest in a reasonable -Polish policy and win him over as an ally in negotiations with -Himmler. At any rate, talking to me, he condemned the methods of -force used by Krüger. I gathered from these statements that Kaltenbrunner -did not want to see methods of force employed against the -Poles and that he would have helped me if he could.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The Soviet Prosecution has submitted a document -bearing the Exhibit Number USSR-128 (Document Number 3305-PS). -It is a teleprinted message from the intelligence office of the Higher -SS and Police Leader East addressed to the Governor General and -signed by Dr. Fischer, then Governor of Warsaw. Under Figure 2 it -reads as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach has been given the new -task of pacifying Warsaw, that is to say, of laying Warsaw -level with the ground during the war, except where military -considerations of its value as a fortress are involved. Before -the destruction, all raw materials, all textiles, and all furniture -will be removed from Warsaw. The main task will fall to the -civil administration.</p> - -<p>“I herewith inform you that this new Führer decree regarding -the razing of Warsaw is of the greatest significance for the -further new policy regarding the Poles.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>As far as you can recollect, how did the Governor General receive -and view that telegram? And to what extent was his basic attitude -altered on the strength of that message?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: This telegram referred to instructions which Obergruppenführer -Von dem Bach had received from the Reichsführer -SS. The administration in the Government General did not welcome -the destruction of Warsaw. On the contrary, I remember that, -together with the Governor General, ways which might be used to -avoid the destruction of Warsaw were discussed. Just what was -<span class='pageno' title='78' id='Page_78'></span> -really tried I cannot recollect. It may be that further steps were not -taken because of the impossibility of achieving anything.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I now turn to another subject.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn now for 10 minutes.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors, before I continue the -interrogation of the witness Dr. Bühler, I should like to inform you -that I forego the interrogation of the witness Helene Kraffczyk; so -this witness will be the last one.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Defendant Dr. Frank has been accused -by the Prosecution of not having done everything within his power -to ensure the feeding of the population of the Government General. -What can you say about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The decisive reason, the real cause, why the population -in the Government General could not be supplied as efficiently and -as satisfactorily as in Germany was the lack of co-operation on the -part of the Polish population in the measures taken by the Germans -to bring about a just and equal distribution of food quotas. This lack -of co-operation was caused by patriotic considerations, the aversion -to German domination, and the continuous, effective propaganda -from the outside. I do not believe that there was a single country in -Europe where so much was pillaged, stolen, and diverted to the -black market, where so much was destroyed and so much damage -was done in order to sabotage the food program, as in the Government -General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To give one example: All the dairy machinery, which had been -provided with great pains, and the chain of dairies, which had been -organized with difficulty, were destroyed again and again so that a -more or less comprehensive control of milk and fat supplies could -not be carried out. I estimate that the fat sold on the free market -and the black market in the Government General was several times -the quantity of that controlled and distributed officially.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Another decisive reason may be seen in the fact that the Government -General had been carved out of a hitherto self-contained -governmental and economic structure and that no consideration had -been given effecting a proper economic balance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The large centers of consumption in the Government General, -that is to say, the cities such as Warsaw, Kraków, later Lvov, and -also the industrial area in the center of Poland, had previously -received their supplies to a very large extent directly from the -<span class='pageno' title='79' id='Page_79'></span> -country through the standing market. In these areas of the Government -General there was a lack of granaries; a lack of refrigerators; -there was no systematic chain of dairies; and storehouses of all kinds -were lacking—all necessary for the directing or controlling of a -supply economy by the state.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Government General had to construct all these things step -by step, and therefore the supplying of the population was proportionately -difficult. It was not intended to supply the population -fully right away; the supplies were to be improved gradually. I -always saw to it that the directives issued for combating the black -market allowed margins for the acquisition of foodstuffs and that -the inhabitants of the cities were given the opportunity of contacting -the producers. In 1942 the rations were to have been increased; then -an order came from the Delegate for the Four Year Plan that rations -were not to be increased and that certain quotas of foodstuffs were -to be allocated to the Reich. Most of these foodstuffs were not taken -out of the area, but were consumed by the Armed Forces on the -spot. The Governor General fought continually against the authorities -of the Four Year Plan, in order to achieve an increase and an -improvement in the food supplies for the Polish population. That -struggle was not without success. In many cases it was possible to -increase the rations considerably, especially those of the workers in -armament industries, and other privileged groups of the working -population.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To sum up I should like to say that it was not easy for the -population of the Government General to get its daily food requirements. -On the other hand there were no famines and no hunger -epidemics in the Government General. A Polish and Ukrainian -auxiliary committee, which had delegations in all districts of the -Government General, saw to the supply of foodstuffs for those parts -of the population which were in greatest need. I used my influence -to have this committee supplied with the largest possible amount of -foodstuffs, so that it should be able to pursue its welfare work -successfully, and it is known to me that that committee took special -care of the children of large cities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, what were the measures that the Governor -General took to safeguard art treasures in the areas under his -administration?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: With a decree of 16 December 1939 the Reichsführer -SS, in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of -German Nationality, had already ordered, without informing the -Governor General, that all art treasures of the Government General -were to be confiscated and transported to the Reich. The Government -General was successful in preventing this transport to a great -extent. -<span class='pageno' title='80' id='Page_80'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then a man arrived in the Government General from the Delegate -for the Four Year Plan, State Secretary Mühlmann, who -claimed to have plenary authority from the Delegate for the Four -Year Plan. I asked to see that authorization. It was signed, not by -Göring himself, but by somebody in his circle, Gritzbach. He was -entrusted with the task of safeguarding the art treasures of the -Government General in the interests of the Reich. In order to bring -this commissioner—provided as he was with plenary authority from -the Reich—into line with the Government General, the Governor -General entrusted to him, in addition, the task of collecting together -the art treasures of the Government General. He collected these art -treasures and also had catalogues printed; and I know, from conferences -which took place with the Governor General, that the -Governor always attached the greatest importance to having these -art treasures kept within the area of the Government General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The prosecution, under Number USA-378, that is -Document 1709-PS, submitted a report about the investigation of the -entire activity of the Special Commissioner for the Collection and -Safeguarding of Art and Cultural Treasures in the Government -General. On Page 6 of that report it reads, and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Reason for investigation: Order of the State Secretary of the -Government of the Government General of 30 June 1942 to -investigate the entire activity of the Special Commissioner -appointed for the collection and safeguarding of art and -cultural treasures in the Government General, according to -the decree of the Governor General of 16 December 1939.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask you now what caused you in 1942 to give this order for -investigation, and did the report lead to serious charges?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The investigation was found necessary because of the -possibility of a collision of duties, in the case of State Secretary -Mühlmann, between the order given by the Reich and the order -given by the Governor General. I had also heard that some museum -pieces had not been properly taken care of. The investigation showed -that State Secretary Mühlmann could not be blamed in any way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has submitted another document, -3042-PS, Exhibit USA-375. It is an affidavit by Dr. Mühlmann, and -I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I was the Special Commissioner of the Governor General of -Poland, Hans Frank, for the safeguarding of art treasures in -the Government General, from October 1939 to September -1943. Göring in his capacity as chairman of the Reich Defense -Council had commissioned me with this duty.</p> - -<p>“I confirm that it was the official policy of the Governor General, -Hans Frank, to take into safekeeping all important art -<span class='pageno' title='81' id='Page_81'></span> -treasures which belonged to Polish public institutions, private -collections, and the Church. I confirm that the art treasures -mentioned were actually confiscated; and it is clear to me that -in case of a German victory they would not have remained in -Poland, but would have been used to complement German art -collections.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask you now: Is it correct that the Governor General from the -very beginning considered all art treasures which had been safeguarded -the property of the Government General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Insofar as they were state property, yes; insofar as -they were private property, they were temporarily confiscated and -safeguarded; but the Governor General never thought of transferring -them to the Reich. If he had wanted to do that, he could have taken -advantage of the war situation itself in order to send these art -treasures to Germany. But where the witness obtained his information, -as contained in the last sentence of his affidavit, I do not -know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted a document, L-37, under -Exhibit Number USA-506. It is a letter of 19 July 1944 from the -commander of the Security Police and SD of the district of Radom, -to the branch office of Tomassov. There it says, among other things, -and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Higher SS and Police Leader East issued the following -order on 28 June 1944:”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>I skip a few sentences and then quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Reichsführer SS, with the approval of the Governor -General, has ordered that in all cases where assassinations of -Germans or attempts at such assassinations have occurred, or -where saboteurs have destroyed vital installations, not only -the perpetrators are to be shot but also all their kinsmen are -likewise to be executed and their female relatives above -16 years of age are to be put into concentration camps.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is it known to you whether the Governor General ever spoke -about this question with the Reichsführer SS and whether he had -given any such approval?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I know nothing about the issuing of an order of that -kind. Once during the second half of 1944, an order came through -my hands relating to the joint responsibility of kin, but I cannot say -whether that concerned the Reich or the Government General; it -was a police order, I should say. If it had had that formula, “with -the approval of the Government General,” I should have questioned -the Governor General on that point. -<span class='pageno' title='82' id='Page_82'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Would such an approval have been consistent with -the fundamental attitude of the Governor General to this question -as you knew it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The fundamental attitude of the Governor General -was on the contrary opposed to all executions without trial and -without legal reasons.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that from 1940 on the Governor General -complained continually to the Führer about the measures taken by -the Police and the SD?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Yes; I myself drew up at least half a dozen memoranda -of about the length of the one submitted, addressed to the -Führer direct or to him through the Chief of the Reich Chancellery. -They contained repeated complaints with regard to executions, encroachments -in connection with the recruiting of workers, the -importation of inhabitants of other regions without the permission -of the Governor General, the food situation, and happenings in -general which were contrary to the principles of an orderly -administration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted one of these memoranda -under the number USA-610. This is a memorandum to the Führer -of 19 June 1943. Is this memorandum essentially different to any -previous or later memoranda; and what, basically, was the attitude -of the Führer to such complaints and proposals?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: This memorandum, which has been submitted, is somewhat -different from the previous ones. The previous memoranda -contained direct accusations with regard to these happenings and -the encroachments by the Police. When these memoranda remained -unsuccessful, acting on the order of the Governor General, I drew -up the complaints contained in this memorandum of June in the -form of a political proposal. The grievances listed there were not -caused by the government of the Governor General; rather they -were complaints about interference by outside authorities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: In the diary we find on 26 October 1943 a long report -about the 4 years of German construction work in the Government -General which was made by you yourself. On the basis of what -documents did you compile that report?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I compiled that report on the basis of the material -which the 13 main departments of the government had given me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Now a question of principle: What, basically, was the -attitude of the Governor General to the Polish and Ukrainian -people, as you know it from your 5 years’ activity, as the head of -the government? -<span class='pageno' title='83' id='Page_83'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The first principle of all was that of keeping peace in -this area and of increasing the usefulness of this area as far as -possible by improving its resources, economically speaking. In order -to achieve that, decent treatment of the population was necessary; -freedom and property must not be infringed upon. Those were the -principles of policy according to which, acting on the order of the -Governor General, I always carried out my functions as state secretary -of the government.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General also tried -within the framework of wartime conditions to grant the population -a certain minimum of cultural development?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: That was the desire of the Governor General, but the -realization of this desire very frequently met with resistance on the -part of the Security Police, or the Propaganda Ministry of the Reich, -or it was made impossible by conditions themselves. But in principle -the Governor General did not wish to prohibit cultural activity -among the Polish and Ukrainian populations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that he tried particularly to revive -higher education and that, evading the directives from the Reich, -he instituted so-called technical courses in colleges?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Instruction was certainly given at the technical schools -by Polish professors in Warsaw and Lvov which corresponded -approximately to a university education. As a matter of principle, -the Governor General also wanted to open secondary schools and -seminaries for priests, but that always failed because of the objections -of the Security Police. As no agreement could be reached, and -acting on the order of the Governor General, in October 1941 on -my own authority I promised the opening of secondary schools and, -I believe, of seminaries for priests with a certain advisory autonomy -for the Poles. Two days after this announcement the Führer’s -opinion was transmitted to me that I had no authority to announce -such measures.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Dr. Frank’s diary often mentions the principle of -unity of administration and the fact that the Governor General was -the deputy of the Führer in this territory and the representative of -the authority of the Reich. Does this conception tally with the facts? -What other authorities of the Reich and the Party came into the -administration of the Government General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The authority of the Governor General was limited -from the very beginning in many important respects. Thus, for -instance, before the establishment of the Government General, the -Reichsführer SS had been invested with full power in the matter of -the preservation of German Nationality in all occupied territories. -The Delegate for the Four Year Plan had equal authority and power -<span class='pageno' title='84' id='Page_84'></span> -to issue decrees, in the Government General. But many other offices -as well, such as those for armaments, post, railways, building, and -other departments tried, and tried successfully, to take over parts of -the administration of the Government General or to gain some -influence over it. After the Governor General had lost his offices as -Reichsleiter in 1942, there was a special rush in this direction. I -might almost say that it became a kind of sport to diminish the -prestige of the King of Poland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Who appointed, dismissed, and paid the police -officials in the Government General and otherwise saw to their -interests from the point of view of the Civil Service?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: That was done exclusively by Himmler’s administrative -office in Berlin.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that even officials of the administration -of the Government General were arrested by Krüger and that it -was not possible for even the Governor General to effect their -release? I remind you of the case of Scipessi.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Yes. I can confirm that from my own experience. -Even from my own circle people were arrested without my being -notified. In one such case I instructed the commander of the Security -Police that the official was to be released within a certain space of -time. He was not released, and I demanded the recall of the commander -of the Security Police. The result was that Himmler expressed -his special confidence in this commander of the Security -Police and the recall was refused.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, how long was the Government General able -to work at all under normal conditions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I might almost say, never at any time. The first year -was taken up in repairing destruction caused by the war. There -were destroyed villages, destroyed cities, destroyed means of transport; -bridges had been blown up in very large numbers. After these -destroyed objects had been repaired, as far as it was possible under -war conditions, the Government General became again the deployment -area for the war against the East, against the Russians, and -then the transit area to the front and the line of communications -area. It was the great repair shop for the front.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Another question: During the war Himmler presented -to the Reich Government the draft of a law concerning the treatment -of anti-social elements. What was the attitude of Dr. Frank -towards this draft?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: As far as I can remember...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal thinks that the matters -which the witness is going into are really matters of common -<span class='pageno' title='85' id='Page_85'></span> -knowledge. Everyone knows about that. I think you might take the -witness over this ground a little bit faster than you are.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes, Sir. He has given the answer already.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, during the war did the government of the Reich...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But I am speaking of the future, Dr. Seidl.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes, Sir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] During the war, Himmler submitted to -the Reich Government, the draft of a law concerning the treatment -of anti-social elements.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What was the attitude of the Governor General -to this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The Governor General protested against this. At the -conference which I had with Heydrich in February 1942 the latter -asked me as a special request to ask the Governor General to retract -his protect against the law. The Governor General refused to do this.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has presented a chart which shows -Dr. Frank as having authority over the Reich Minister of Justice, -Dr. Thierack. Did such a situation ever exist?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: That must be an error; such a situation never existed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What, according to your observations, were the -relations between the Governor General and the Reichsführer SS -Himmler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The Governor General and the Reichsführer SS -Himmler as individuals were so different...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, I thought we had been hearing all -morning what the relations were between the Governor General -and the Reichsführer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Then I will not put that question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, the Soviet Prosecution, under Exhibit Number USSR-93, -(Document Number USSR-93), submitted an appendix to the report -of the Polish Government. The appendix is entitled “Cultural Life -in Poland.” I have shown it to you once before and would like you -to tell me whether the Governor General, or his government, ever -actually issued such directives?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I do not remember ever having signed such directives -or having seen any such directives signed by the Governor General. -This document submitted to me, seems to me to be a fake or a -forgery. That can be recognized from the contents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: In the diary we find a large number of entries -referring to the policies of the Governor General which seem to -<span class='pageno' title='86' id='Page_86'></span> -contradict what you yourself said before as a witness. How can you -explain these contradictions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: These statements by the Governor General, which have -also been called to my attention during previous interrogations, do -not merely seem to contradict what I said; they very clearly do -contradict what I had to say as a witness. As I myself heard such -statements frequently, I have tried to understand how he came to -make such statements; and I can only say that Frank perhaps took -part more than was necessary in the conferences and affairs of the -government officials. There was scarcely a conference in which he -did not take part. Thus it happened that he had to speak many -times during one day, and I might say that in 99 out of 100 cases he -spoke on the spur of the moment, without due reflection, and I -frequently witnessed how after making such grotesque statements -he would try in the next sentences, or at the next opportunity, to -retract them and straighten them out. I also witnessed how he -rescinded authority which he had delegated on the spur of the -moment. I am sure that if I could go through the diary for every -one of these statements, I would be able to give you a dozen—dozens -of other statements to the contrary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Frank’s diary includes...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I should like to say the following: When the Governor -General was working with the members of his administration, he -never made such statements; at least I cannot remember any. Those -statements were always made when the Higher SS and Police Leader -was sitting next to him, so that I had the impression that he was -not free at such moments.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank covers about -10,000 to 12,000 typewritten pages. Who kept this diary—he himself -or somebody else?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: According to my observations, the diary was kept by -stenographers. At first by one stenographer, Dr. Meidinger, later by -two stenographers, Nauk and Mohr. The procedure was that these -stenographers were in the room during conferences and took notes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that to a certain extent these stenographers -received reports from a third person as to what was said -at a conference?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I often noticed that these stenographers did not take -the trouble to record everything literally, but merely wrote summaries -of the sense. I was also sometimes asked what this or that -person, or what the Governor General, had said or thought in some -particular instance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did the Governor General see these entries in the -diary or read them later? -<span class='pageno' title='87' id='Page_87'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: From what I know of the Governor General I do not -believe that he read them over.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: How can this witness tell whether he read -the notes later?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the witness, Dr. Bühler, was the -Governor General’s closest collaborator.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you wanted to put that sort of question, -you should have asked the Defendant Frank.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: A further question, Witness. According to your -observations what caused the Governor General not to destroy that -diary, but to hand it over when he was arrested?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: On 15 March for the last time I was...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That, again is a matter which rests in the -mind of Dr. Frank, not of this witness, why he did not destroy it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: He has answered the question already, and I forego -the answer of the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Now, one last question. In 1942, after -the speeches made by Dr. Frank, he was deprived of all his Party -offices. What effect did that have on his position as Governor -General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I have already referred to that. It weakened his -authority considerably, and the administration in the Government -General became increasingly difficult.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it correct, that the Governor General repeatedly, -both in writing and orally, tendered his resignation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Yes, written applications for resignation I often -worded myself; and I know that he also asked orally many times -to be permitted to resign, but that this was never approved.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions for the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to ask -any questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): -Witness, is it correct that by far the largest number of the Polish -workers who came to Germany, came into the Reich before April -1942, that is, before Sauckel came into office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I cannot make any definite statement about that, but -I know that the recruitment of labor produced smaller and smaller -results and that the main quotas were probably delivered during -the first years.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were the labor quotas which had been demanded -from the Governor General reduced by Sauckel in view of -the fact that so many Poles were already working in the Reich? -<span class='pageno' title='88' id='Page_88'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I know of one such case; Sauckel’s deputy, President -Struve, talked to me about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Is it true that Himmler for his own purposes -recruited workers from the Polish area, without Sauckel’s knowledge -and without observing the conditions which Sauckel had laid -down?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I assume that that happened. Whenever I was told -about roundups of workers, I tried to clear matters up. The Police -always said, “That is the labor administration,” and the labor administration -said, “That is the Police.” But I know that once, on a visit -to Warsaw, Himmler was very annoyed at the loafers standing at -the street corners; and I consider it quite possible that these labor -raids in Warsaw were carried out arbitrarily by the Police without -the participation of the labor administration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know Sauckel’s directives with regard -to the carrying out of labor recruitment?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I have not seen them in detail, and I don’t remember -them. I know only that Sauckel stated, on the occasion of a visit in -Kraków, that he had not ordered the use of violence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was that a speech of Sauckel’s?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: No, it was a conference.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Do you recall an address which Sauckel made -in Kraków to the various authorities?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: He spoke as a Party speaker.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did he make any statements there about the -treatment of workers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: These statements were made at a conference which -preceded the visit to the Governor General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And what was the nature of his remarks?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: My people had told him and his people that there had -been encroachments, and he answered that he had not ordered the -use of violence and denied that these events—the arrest of people in -motion picture houses or other places of assembly—had ever been -ordered or decreed by him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know the structure of the labor administration -in the Government General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The Labor Department was part of my field of -authority.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have any immediate influence on -the carrying out of labor recruitment? -<span class='pageno' title='89' id='Page_89'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Not only did he have influence, but he also sent a -deputy who was not under my authority.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was it possible for that deputy to carry out -the recruitment of labor direct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: If he wanted to, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: In what manner? Could he give any instructions, -or direct orders?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The recruiting units set up by Sauckel were not under -my authority. I tried on several occasions to get these people within -my organization, but these attempts were always countered with -the argument that these recruiting units had to be used in all the -occupied territories and that they could not be attached to one particular -area.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In other words, Sauckel’s deputy in the Government General, -President Struve, who was also in charge of the Labor Department, -was on the one hand dependent on Sauckel’s directives and did not -need to pay attention to me but was also on the other hand responsible -to me to the extent that he acted as president of the Labor -Department.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What branches handled forced recruitment -whenever that became necessary? Could the recruiting units -do that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I do not know. The deputy always denied the fact of -forced recruitment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to -ask questions? Does the Prosecution desire to cross-examine?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, I should like to define -your official position more accurately. As from 1940 and until the -moment of the liberation of Poland you were Frank’s chief deputy, -were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: From the end of September until November 1939 I -served the Governor General in a leading position on his labor -staff. In November 1939 I became Chief of the Department of the -Governor General; that was the central administrative office of the -Governor General, in Kraków. During the second half of the year -1940 the designation of this function was changed to “State Secretary -of the Government,” and I was State Secretary of the Government -until I left Kraków on 18 January 1945.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently you were the -chief deputy of the Defendant Hans Frank.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: My field of activity was definitely limited. I had to -direct the administrative matters. Neither the Police, nor the Party, -<span class='pageno' title='90' id='Page_90'></span> -nor the Wehrmacht, nor the various Reich offices which were directly -active in the area of the Government General, were under my -authority.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: When Frank was away, who -was then his deputy?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The deputy of the Governor General was Seyss-Inquart, -Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And after Seyss-Inquart left?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: After the departure of Seyss-Inquart there was a -gap. I cannot recall the month, but I think it was in 1941 that I -was assigned as deputy of the Governor General. But that appointment -was approved only with certain modifications. I was supposed -to represent the Governor General only when he was neither -present in the area nor...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Answer me briefly. When -Frank was away, did you carry out his duties?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I answer as my conscience dictates. Whenever Frank -was not present within the area, and could not be reached outside -the area, then I was supposed to represent him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I understand. That means that -you took over when he was away.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Yes, whenever he could not be reached outside of the -area either.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, yes. That is precisely what -I am asking about.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like the witness to be shown the typed transcript of the -report on a conference of 25 January. Will you show him, first of -all, the list of those who were present. The Tribunal will find the -passage that I desire to quote...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What year? You said the 25th of January.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: 1943, Mr. President. Your Honors -will find it on Page 7, Exhibit Number USSR-223, (Document Number -USSR-223), Paragraph 6.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, is that your signature among the list of those present?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: My signature, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means you were present -at that conference.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: 1943, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I shall quote three sentences -from the typed transcript of the report. Please hand the original -to the witness. -<span class='pageno' title='91' id='Page_91'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I quote three sentences from this document. It is Dr. Frank’s -speech:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I should like to emphasize one thing. We must not be too -soft-hearted when we hear that 17,000 have been shot. These -persons who have been shot are also victims of the war.... -Let us now remember that all of us who are meeting together -here figure in Mr. Roosevelt’s list of war criminals. I have the -honor of being Number 1. We have thus, so to speak, become -accomplices in terms of world history”.</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Your name is second on the list of those present at the conference. -Do you not consider that Frank must have had sufficient -grounds to number you among the most active of his accomplices -in crime?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: About such statements of the Governor General I have -already said all that is necessary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then you ascribe this to the -Governor General’s temperament?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Witness, that is not an answer to the question. -The question was, do you consider yourself to be one of those -criminals?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I do not consider myself a criminal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: If you do not consider yourself -a war criminal, will you perhaps recollect who personally—I -emphasize the word “personally”—actively participated in one of -Frank’s most cruel orders with regard to the Polish population? I -am talking about the decree of 2 October 1942. Were you not one -of the participants?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Which measures? Which decree? I should like to be -shown it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am talking about the decree -signed 2 October and published 9 October 1943, Exhibit Number -USSR 335, (Document Number USSR-335), the decree about the -creation of the so-called courts-martial conducted by the Secret -Police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The draft of this decree did not come from my office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Does this mean that you deny -participation in rendering that cruel decree effective?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Yes, the decree comes from the Police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The passage I should like to -quote, Mr. President, is on Page 35, of our document book, and in -Paragraph 4 of the English translation. -<span class='pageno' title='92' id='Page_92'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Did you not, together with Dr. Weh, -at a time when even Frank was undecided about signing, succeed -in persuading him to do so and bring into force a decree of a frankly -terrorist nature to legalize tyranny by the Police?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I quote Page 142 of the minutes on the conference with State -Secretary Dr. Bühler (he evidently means you) and with Dr. Weh, -concerning the order issued by Dr. Weh for combating attacks on -the German work of reconstruction in the Government General:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“After some brief statements by the State Secretary Dr. Bühler -and Dr. Weh, the Governor General withdraws his objections -and signs the drafted decree.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Was it not you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I request the interpreter to repeat the question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am asking you: Was it you -who persuaded Frank to sign that decree as quickly as possible?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Does that mean that the entry -is false?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In that case, how am I to understand -you, if this is “no” and the other is “no”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I can explain that to you exactly. The draft for this -decree had been submitted to the Governor General by SS Oberführer -Bierkamp who had recently been assigned to the Government -General. The Governor General...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing] He is in the middle of his -answer. You must let the man answer. What were you saying? -You were saying the draft had been made by somebody?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: This draft had been submitted to the Governor General -by Bierkamp who had just recently come to the Government General. -The Governor General returned this draft and had it revised in the -legislative department. When it was presented to the Governor -General, the Governor General’s doubts were whether the legislative -department had revised it or not. I do not assume material responsibility -for this draft, and I did not have to.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You simply explained to Frank -that the project of the decree had been sufficiently worked over by -the competent technical department?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Yes, by the legislative department. -<span class='pageno' title='93' id='Page_93'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And after that the Governor -General signed the decree?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Obviously.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were you not the person who, -at the meeting of 23 October 1943, when a letter from Count -Ronikier, a person evidently known to you, was discussed, referred -to the practical interpretation of this cruel decree of 2 October and -stated that the application of the decree would in the future favor -the camouflaging of the murder of hostages by giving the shootings -of hostages the semblance of a legal sentence? Were you that person?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I ask that the question be repeated. I understood only -part of it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were you the person who, at -the meeting of 23 October 1943, stated that the application of the -decree of 2 October would, in the future, favor the camouflaging -of the shooting of hostages, since it would give them the semblance -of a legal sentence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: It is not quite clear to me. May I repeat what I understood?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: If you please.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: You want to ask me whether I was the one who, on -the occasion of a conference on the 23rd of October 1944...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: 1943.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: 1943—who, on the occasion of a conference on 23 October -1943 stated—stated what?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You stated that the application -of the decree of 2 October would help to camouflage the shooting of -hostages.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The place which I wish to quote -now, Your Honors, is on Page 26 of the English translation of Exhibit -Number USSR-223, (Document Number 2233-PS), Paragraph 4. I -shall now quote your own words to you:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“State Secretary Dr. Bühler considers it advisable that all -those Poles who are to be shot should first be tried by regular -court-martial proceedings. In the future one should also -refrain from referring to such Poles as hostages, for the -shooting of hostages is always a deplorable event and merely -provides foreign countries with evidence against the German -leadership in the Government General”.</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I said that, and thus I objected, and wanted to object, -to the shooting of hostages and to executions without court-martial -proceedings. -<span class='pageno' title='94' id='Page_94'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: So you consider that a court -consisting of high-ranking, police officials represents justice and is -not a travesty of the very idea of justice?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: To which court do you refer? I pleaded for courts-martial.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is the very court I am -talking about, the “Standgericht” or summary court-martial, composed -of Gestapo officials centralized in the Government General, -according to the decree of 2 October.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I can give you information about the reasons which -may have led to this stiffening of the summary court-martial order -of 2 October, so that you may understand how, psychologically, such -a decree came about.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR. SMIRNOV: I am not interested in psychology. -I am interested in knowing if a court, composed of secret -police officials and considered to be a court, is not in fact sheer -mockery of the very idea of a court of justice?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The summary courts-martial had to be appointed -exactly in accordance with the decree. I am not of the opinion that -a summary court-martial, simply because it is composed exclusively -of police, should not be considered a court. But I did not make -these statements which you have held against me now in reference -to this decree of 2 October; rather I demanded, in general, sentences -by courts-martial, and termed the shooting of hostages -a regrettable fact.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You are not giving me a direct -answer to my question. Perhaps you will remember Paragraph 3 -of the decree which stipulates how these courts were to be composed. -Show the witness Paragraphs 3 and 4. I am reading Paragraph -4 into the record:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The summary courts-martial of the Security Police are to -be composed of one SS Führer of the office of the commander -of the Security Police and the SD, and of two -members of these organizations”.</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Would a court of this composition not testify <span class='it'>a priori</span> to the -nature of the sentence which the court would impose?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Did you ask me?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Whether I consider a summary court-martial a court? -I think, you are asking me about things which have nothing to do -with my field of activity. I do not know what reasons were given -for composing these courts in this fashion. I cannot therefore say -anything about it. -<span class='pageno' title='95' id='Page_95'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you will look at the -signature to that decree. It is signed by Frank, and it was you who -persuaded Frank to sign that decree.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I thought that I had corrected that error before. I -did not persuade Herr Frank to sign that order. Rather, I told him -that that order had been worked out in the legislative department. -As before, I must now deny any responsibility for this order, because -it did not belong to my sphere of activity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I shall pass on to another series -of questions. Do you recollect the following subparagraph of that -decree, particularly the report of Obergruppenführer Bierkamp at -the conference of 27 October 1943 in Kraków?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I cannot remember without notes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please show him the passage -which I wish to quote. The passage I wish to quote, Your Honors, -is on Page 26 of our document, the last paragraph of the text. I -quote the passage in question:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Pursuant to the decree of even date, the Security Police have -detained many people who since 10 October have committed -criminal acts. They have been condemned to death and will -be shot as an expiation for their crimes. Their names will be -made known to the population by means of posters, and the -population will be told that such and such people may expect -a pardon, provided there are no further murders of Germans. -For every murdered German, 10 Poles will be executed....”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Does it not testify to the fact that from the very first days of -the enforcing of Frank’s decree, it merely served to mask mass -executions of hostages?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then to what does it testify if, -for each slain German, 10 Poles entirely unconnected with the -crime were to be executed in accordance with these so-called -“verdicts”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: In my opinion it testifies that 10 Poles would be shot -who had committed crimes punishable by death, and who had been -sentenced to death.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: For each German killed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: It is possible that these Poles were called hostages. -That is possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means that the decree -camouflaged the system of taking hostages? -<span class='pageno' title='96' id='Page_96'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: No, it was rather that real shootings of hostages no -longer occurred. Real shootings of hostages occur when people -who are not criminals, who are innocent, are shot because of an act -committed by someone else.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you think this will be a convenient time -to break off?</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='97' id='Page_97'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has heard with the deepest -regret of the death of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone of the Supreme -Court of the United States of America. His loss will be most deeply -felt in America, where he had proved himself to be a great public -servant. But it is fitting that this Tribunal, upon which the representatives -of the United States sit, should express its sympathy -with the American people in their great loss.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After serving as Dean of the Law School of Columbia University -he was appointed Attorney General of the United States in 1923, -and two years later he became Associate Justice of the Supreme -Court. In 1941 he became Chief Justice and discharged the duties -of that high office with great ability and in accordance with the -highest traditions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal desires that I should express its sympathy in -acknowledgement of the great loss the American people have -sustained.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. Justice Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor of the United States, -is a member of the Supreme Court over which the Chief Justice -presided, and perhaps he would like to add a few words.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the -United States): May it please the Tribunal: It is not only because -he was the head of the judicial system of the United States that -the news of the passing of Chief Justice Stone brings sadness to -every American heart in Nuremberg, but because he was the personal -friend of so many of us. He had a rare capacity for personal friendship. -No one was more kind to, and thoughtful of, the younger -men who from time to time came to Washington; and they found -in him a guide, philosopher, and friend.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I know that not only do I feel the loss of a personal friend -but that the American representatives on the Tribunal, Mr. Biddle -and Judge Parker, feel the same way, and many of the younger -men on the staff had intimate contact with the Chief Justice which -you might not expect if you had not known Harlan Stone.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As Attorney General he took over the Department of Justice -at one of its most difficult periods and imparted to it the impress -of his integrity, an impress which stayed with it and was traditional -in the department, as we well know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As a Justice of the Court he was a forward-looking man, open-minded, -always patient to hear the arguments of both sides and to -arrive at his decision with that complete disinterestedness and -detachment which is characteristic of the just judge. He presided -with great fairness and with kindness to his associates and to those -who appeared before him. -<span class='pageno' title='98' id='Page_98'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is the passing of a man who exemplified in public life those -sturdy qualities which we have come to associate with the New -Englander.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The consolation of his friends lies in this: He died exactly as he -would have chosen to die, in full possession of his faculties and in -the discharge of his duties.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I express great appreciation that this Tribunal has seen fit to -take note of his passing and to allow us to record on behalf of the -American Bar our appreciation of his talents and character.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, before proceeding -to a further examination of the witness, I feel that I ought -to make the following statement:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>During the examination of the witness by counsel for the defense -Dr. Seidl, the former stated that the document, which is an official -appendix to the report of the Government of the Polish Republic, -was a forgery. This document sets out the losses suffered by the -Polish Republic in objects of cultural value. The Soviet Prosecution -does not wish to enter into any controversies on the subject, but -it does request the Tribunal to note that this is an official appendix -to the report of the Government of the Polish Republic, and that it -considers the statement of the witness as libellous.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: [<span class='it'>To the witness.</span>] Did you say anything then?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I was going to say that it was a document that -contained a list of art treasures.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that the document, Colonel Smirnov, a -document which contains a list of art treasures?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: No, I do not mean that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, Mr. President. It is a list -of losses in cultural treasures. It is a list of libraries and of the -losses suffered by these libraries during the reign of the Germans -in Poland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is USSR-93, is it not, the document you -are referring to?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is an appendix to the Document -Number USSR-93, an official report by the Polish Government.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it deals with certain directives. That -was the evidence that was given this morning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, Mr. President. This is a list -of losses sustained. It is an official appendix to the report of the -Polish Government. It contains no directives, but it does state the -sum total of the losses sustained by the public libraries in Poland. -<span class='pageno' title='99' id='Page_99'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: [<span class='it'>To the witness.</span>] Is there anything you want -to say about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Yes. I do not think the description just given applies -to the document which I had in mind. The document which I -question contains directives regarding German cultural policy in -the Government General. It does not deal with art treasures or -details of library property.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What I took that you said this morning -was that the directives which you thought were referred to in the -document did not appear to have been made, or at any rate you had -not heard of them, and you thought they might be forgeries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I questioned the document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I proceed to the next -question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You state that you personally, -as well as the administration of the Government General, had no -close connection with the activities of the Police. Have I understood -you correctly?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: May I hear that question again, please?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You declare that neither you -personally nor the administration of the Government General were -in any way closely connected with the activities of the Police. Have -I understood you correctly?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: We had daily contact with the Police, but we had -differences of opinion. Moreover, the Police were not under my -jurisdiction; the Chief of Police was in no way under my orders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In that case the Police did -not come within your competence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: No, it was not one of my duties.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How then can you explain that -no one but you carried out successful negotiations with the Police -for the exploitation of the property of Jews executed in the concentration -camps? Do you remember these negotiations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I did not quite understand you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you: If you had no direct -relations with the Police, how can you explain the fact that you, -and none other but you, were the person who carried out successful -negotiations with the Police for the exploitation of property belonging -to Jews murdered in the concentration camps? Do you remember -these negotiations with the Police? -<span class='pageno' title='100' id='Page_100'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I do not remember any such negotiations, and I could -not have conducted them. In any case the Administration was the -department which, by order of the Four Year Plan, had to effect -the confiscation of Jewish property.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, have I your permission -to submit a document handed to us by the American -Prosecution, Document Number 2819-PS? It is a directive issued -by the Administration of the Economic Department of the Government -General and addressed to the Governors of Warsaw, Radom, -Lublin, and Galicia. May I submit this document?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I quote the following from the text of this document:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Subject: Transfer of Jewish movable property from the SS -to the Government.</p> - -<p>“I inform you herewith that, on 21 February 1944, in the -presence of various departmental directors, an agreement was -reached by State Secretary Dr. Bühler and the Higher SS and -Police Leader, Obergruppenführer Koppe, that movable -Jewish property, insofar as it is, or will be in the future, in -storehouses, will be placed at the disposal of the Government -by the SS. In execution of the agreement arrived at I have -ordered that the taking over of the goods stored in the various -SS depots shall take place in the shortest possible time. Goods -deriving from confiscation and safeguarding have likewise -been turned over to me by the commander of the Security -Police and the Security Service. Please get in touch with -the local SS and Police Leader in order to come to an understanding....”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Here I interrupt the quotation. After this, Witness, do you still -insist that you had no relations with the Police?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I was in touch with the Police daily in my work, I -do not want to deny that for a moment; but I had no right to give -orders to the Police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In any case the property of -Jews murdered in the concentration camps of Poland was, as a -result of your negotiations, transferred to warehouses in the Government -General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: That is not correct. The property mentioned was -not that which proceeded from Jews who were killed, but simply -property which came from Jews and which was removed by the -Police after having been converted through the administration -department in the regular way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But could the Security Police or -the SD be in possession of property belonging to Jews who were -not murdered? -<span class='pageno' title='101' id='Page_101'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Why not? Right from the beginning the Police had -taken over Jewish problems, and therefore also came into possession -of their property in this manner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But did the Auschwitz depot -in Chopin Street also keep the property of Jews who had not been -murdered? Of Jews who were still alive?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The depots which have been mentioned here are not -to be interpreted as being concentration camps, but as depots where -goods were stored.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What other depots were there -for storing the movable property of Jews besides those in the -concentration camps?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I do not know what things looked like in concentration -camps, as I have never entered or seen one; but that the -Police took possession of movable Jewish property is something I -was certainly told about by the director of my trustee department.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you this: In 1944 when -the machines of destruction were working at top speed at Auschwitz -and Maidanek, what depots or warehouses existed for the storage -of Jewish movable property besides those which stored the movable -property of Jews executed in concentration camps? Do you know -of any other warehouses and where they were located?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The Jews were deprived of their property on the -spot. I have never assumed that Jewish property was to be found -in concentration camps. I did not know anything at all about these -camps. Where the Police took that movable property was not clear -to me, but depots must have existed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would draw your attention -to the date—21 February 1944. At that time were there any Jews -still alive in Poland, or were the Jewish ghettos already quite empty?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The Jewish ghettos were empty, but there were still -some Jews; I know that because they were being used in one way -or another in the armament industry. Jewish property could not -have been removed from the territory, it must have been somewhere -in the Government General, very probably near the ghettos -or wherever else the evacuation of Jews took place. And this -telegram, I repeat, does not concern stores which were in concentration -camps; they were everywhere. Every place had property -stored somewhere which originated from the resettlement of the -Jews.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then the Jewish ghettos were -already empty. In that case, what happened to the Jews from -Poland? -<span class='pageno' title='102' id='Page_102'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: When these Jewish ghettos were emptied, I assumed -they were resettled in the northeast of Europe. The chief of the -RSHA had definitely told me at the conference in February 1942 -that this was the intention.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: On the 21 February 1944 the -front line ran through the Government General. How and where -could the Jews have been transferred to the northeast?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: According to the conference this was to have taken -place in 1942.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The document is dated 1944, -21 February 1944.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I pass on to the next question. Tell me, does not the fact that -the police chiefs attended all the conferences at the headquarters -of the Governor General and that the Governor General arranged -for special conferences to be held dealing exclusively with police -matters indicate that the very closest relations existed between the -administration department of the Governor General and the Gestapo?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I have already mentioned at the beginning that the -view of the Governor General was that he should have jurisdiction -over the Police. This is the reason why the Governor General -repeatedly called the Police for discussions around the conference -table. But that did not prevent the Police from going their own -way and using methods of their own.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But were no conferences held -by the Governor General for dealing directly and exclusively with -police problems, and with police problems only?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Yes, from time to time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Very well. Then will you tell -me who took Krüger’s place when he was removed from his post -as Chief of Police?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: As far as I can remember Krüger was removed from -his post in Kraków in November 1943 and was replaced by Obergruppenführer -Koppe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What were your personal relations -with Koppe?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The relationship with the Police under Krüger had -always been hostile, and whenever the administration department -had any wish that involved police jurisdiction, such wishes had -always been frustrated by Krüger; therefore, after Krüger had -left Kraków I tried to establish a comradely relationship with the -new Higher SS and Police Leader, so that in this manner I could -influence the work of the Police and the methods employed by them. -<span class='pageno' title='103' id='Page_103'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Could you answer briefly: What -exactly were your personal relations with Koppe? Were they good -or bad?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: They were comradely.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to show you one -document. You, Mr. President, will find the passage on Page 38, -Paragraph 2, of the English translation. I am reading the passage -into the record. It is a statement made by Frank to Himmler at -the conference with Himmler on the 12 February 1944:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Immediately after the exchange of greetings, Reichsführer SS -Himmler entered into conversation with me and SS Obergruppenführer -Koppe. The Reichsführer asked me right at -the beginning how I was co-operating with the new Secretary -of State for Security, SS Obergruppenführer Koppe. I -expressed my deep satisfaction at the fact that between -myself and SS Obergruppenführer Koppe, as well as between -him and State Secretary Dr. Bühler, there existed extraordinarily -good relations of friendly co-operation.” (Document -Number 2233-PS.)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Does that statement by Frank correspond to the fact, Witness?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: At that time Koppe had been in the Government -General only a few weeks. This statement confirms just what I -said here at the beginning, namely, that after Krüger had been -replaced by Koppe I tried through comradely relations with Koppe -to gain influence over the police powers in the Government General. -Thus there had been no friction up to that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And between Koppe and -Dr. Bühler, that is, between Koppe and yourself, there existed the -most comradely collaboration; is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I repeat, my relations with Koppe were comradely. -Apart from that, the problems with which we had to deal brought -me into daily contact with Koppe. For instance, there was this -question of Jewish property. One could not possibly have discussed -such a question with Krüger, as he held the view that all Jewish -property belonged to the SS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: When Koppe took over the post -of Chief of Police, was there any change with regard to the Polish -population? Did the police measures become less severe? Did they -become less repressive with Koppe’s arrival?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I believe they were milder.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to follow the -minutes of one particular administrative conference of the 16 December -1943, held at Kraków. -<span class='pageno' title='104' id='Page_104'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Please show the witness the original.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Incidentally, is that your signature on the list of those present? -On Page 154.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Government meeting, 16 December 1943? Yes, I signed -that; that is right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me, do you remember who -Ohlenbusch was?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Ohlenbusch was the President of the Department of -Propaganda.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was he in any way connected -with the Police or with the administration?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Ohlenbusch participated in the government meetings, -at which the Police were also present as a rule.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But he himself, in his own -function, did he have any connection with the Police or not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: As a state official and head of a government department -he did, of course, have connections with the Police, official -connections.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But he was an official of the -civilian administration of your organization?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Yes, of course. As far as his official position was -concerned, he was subordinate to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am reading into the record -a short extract from Page 176. Your Honors will find it on Page 33 -of our document book, Paragraph 3, Ohlenbusch’s speech:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It would be well to consider whether, for reasons of -expediency, one should not, as far as possible, carry out -executions on the spot where the attempt upon the life of a -German took place. One ought, perhaps, also to consider -whether special execution sites should not be created for this -purpose, for it has been confirmed that the Polish population -streamed to the execution grounds, which were accessible -to all, in order to put the blood-soaked earth into containers -and take them to the church.” (Document Number 2233-PS.)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you not consider this question a purely police question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: It does not mention buckets of blood in my translation. -It says containers. I do not think that the blood could be carried -away in buckets.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: We are talking here about -containers into which the blood-soaked soil was placed. Do you -not consider that the question of organizing secret execution grounds -was purely a matter for the Police? -<span class='pageno' title='105' id='Page_105'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I am of the same opinion. For this reason this matter -was by no means approved of. But perhaps I may add that at the same -time German pedestrians in Kraków and Warsaw were being shot -in the back daily, without any reason, and that this affair was due -to the excitement which...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am asking you about something -else, Witness. Do you not consider the fact that this question was -discussed at the initiative of Ohlenbusch as positive proof that even -the petty officials in the civilian administration interfered in police -matters and were in direct contact with the Police?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: No, I would not say so. This was not suggested as a -police measure. It arose from the threat under which all Germans -lived at that stage of the occupation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This question of secret execution -grounds—did it arise on Ohlenbusch’s initiative? I trust you are -not going to deny this.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: What do you mean by this question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did it arise on—was it provoked -by the initiative of Ohlenbusch? You are not going to deny it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I do not know whether this was discussed at all. In -my opinion there was not...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The typewritten report of that -conference is before you, and you were present at that conference.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Yes, there are statements made by Ohlenbusch, if I -am not mistaken. Yes, it mentions “President Ohlenbusch” here. -That is right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I shall proceed to the next -question. Did SS Obergruppenführer Koppe not report on the -subject at all during the conference? I will quote a brief excerpt -which Your Honors will find on Page 34, Paragraph 2. It is on -Page 180 of your document book.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“...For the railway outrage 150 and for the two German -officials, 50 Polish terrorists were executed either on the spot -or in the immediate vicinity. It must be remembered that -the shooting of 200 people affects at least 3,000 (nearest -relatives)...” (Document Number 2288-PS.)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you not consider this as evidence that with the arrival of -Koppe the same savage measures of repression were used against -the people of Poland?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Inasmuch as this mentions the shooting of 150 and 50 -people this obviously concerns the shooting of hostages, which never -did have the approval of the Governor General or my approval. -<span class='pageno' title='106' id='Page_106'></span> -If I have nevertheless stated that in its entirety Koppe’s regime -appeared milder to me, then I must stand by that statement of mine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Does this mean that the hostage -system did not meet either with your approval or with the approval -of the Governor General; is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: It did not have my approval, and I do not think it -had the approval of the Governor General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please look at Page 185 -of the document in your possession. I begin with the quotation:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General expressed his gratitude and recognition -to SS Obergruppenführer Koppe for his effective work -and spoke of his satisfaction that an expert with such high -qualifications should be at the head of the police organization -in the Government General. He promised SS Obergruppenführer -Koppe the active co-operation of all offices in the -Government General and expressed his best wishes for the -success of his work.” (Document Number 2233-PS.)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>How are we to interpret this statement in the light of your -previous answer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: This statement of the Governor General does not -apply to these 50 and 150 people. It applies to the work in its -entirety which was to be done by Koppe in the Government General. -And one of the principles that was to be applied to that work—which -I helped bring about—was that shootings of hostages were -to cease. It is quite possible that in this case that principle had -not yet been applied.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Would you please wait one -minute. Just before this you read Koppe’s report on the shooting -of the hostages, Page 180. And after that the Governor General -expressed his approval. This means that it was precisely this activity -of Koppe’s that the Governor General had approved?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Well, this was not the only statement made by Koppe. -The statement of the Governor General was in reference to all the -statements made by Koppe, and not to detached portions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Very well. In that case he also -approved, among other things, of this statement, that is to say, this -report.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: But I know that the Governor General, together with -me, was exerting pressure on Koppe in order to stop the shooting -of hostages.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you kindly inform me who, -while Krüger was still Chief of Police, issued instructions for the -<span class='pageno' title='107' id='Page_107'></span> -shooting of one male inhabitant from each house which displayed a -poster announcing a Polish national holiday?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: That is unknown to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask to have the corresponding -document submitted to you. It is in the document book, on Page 1, -Paragraph 7:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General received District Chief, Dr. Waechter, -who reported on the appearance in some districts of inflammatory -posters on the occasion of the 11 November (the Polish -Day of Liberation). The Governor General ordered that from -every house where a poster remains exhibited one male -inhabitant is to be shot. This order is to be carried out by -the Chief of Police. Dr. Waechter has taken 120 hostages in -Kraków as a precautionary measure.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you remember that? Who then introduced this criminal -practice of taking hostages?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Are you trying to say that I was present during that -conference?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to ask you about -something else.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Please, will you answer my question? Was I there -or was I not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am not obliged to answer -your question. It is you, Witness, who have to answer mine. It is -I who am interrogating you, not you who are examining me. Kindly -answer the next question. You resided in Kraków. Acting on -Frank’s orders, Dr. Waechter, as a precautionary measure, detained -120 hostages. Do you wish to say that you knew nothing about this -either?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I know nothing about this measure; nor is it known -to me that hostages were shot.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer the following -question. Have I understood you correctly—did you state today -that there was no famine in Poland?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Yes, there was no famine in Poland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am asking you to be shown -the speech of Dr. Bühler, State Secretary—that obviously means -you—at a meeting on the 31 May 1943, in Kraków. I begin the -quotation:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“...The Government of the Government General has for a -long time been clear on the point that the scale of food -rations allowed to non-Germans cannot be continued any -<span class='pageno' title='108' id='Page_108'></span> -longer without the population taking matters into its own -hands or being driven to insurrection... The difficulties of -the food situation, which naturally have a bad effect on the -morale of the population, the enormous rise in prices, the -exaggerated and narrow-minded salary and wage policy, have -driven part of the Polish population to despair.” (Document -Number 2233-PS.)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you say that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I could follow the first part, but I could not find the -last sentence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Would you kindly follow the -text. In the text you will find both the first part and the last -sentence: “...have driven part of the Polish population to despair.” -Please study the text.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Where does it say so, please? Would you show it to me?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The text was indicated to the witness.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I made these statements, and...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then I also have the following -question to ask you. Do you not think that your announcement in -1943 bears witness to the fact that you have today testified falsely -before the Tribunal?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: No; no. What I meant by my statement was that the -population would take things into its own hands. When for instance -a worker remained away from his place of work for 3 days to go -in search of food, this was considered by me to be a desperate step -on the part of the worker.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>However, I said this morning that it was very difficult for the -population to obtain the necessary food supplies but that it was -not impossible, so that I did not notice famine at all in the Government -General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And please may I ask you to consider that 80 percent of the -population of the Government General were country people, so -that there could be no famine on a large scale unless the countryside -had been completely despoiled, and that was not the case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You stated that as a result of -the food quotas established in the Government General a revolt -might arise, and you said that the population was driven to despair -by hunger. Is that not evidence that a famine was raging in the -country?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: By “revolt” I meant “unrest,” not an armed uprising. -It is quite clear that morale and the will to work did suffer by -reason of the insufficient rations. I stated this morning how it was -that adequate provisioning of the population could not be carried -<span class='pageno' title='109' id='Page_109'></span> -out. On the other hand, however, there was such a widespread -free market and black market that even the worker, if he had -sufficient time, could obtain food; and if he did not have time, he -took it. That was what I meant by the workers taking things in -their own hands.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please, answer this question. -Were only such educational possibilities left to the Poles as would—according -to the plan of Frank and Goebbels—merely emphasize -the hopeless destiny of their nation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Efforts to keep down the level of education of the -Polish population were noticeable. These tendencies originated from -Himmler in Berlin.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to answer: -What was done with the Polish universities?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: They were closed and they were not reopened. -However, technical courses were arranged in Warsaw and in Lvov -in which these people received university education; but, to be sure, -these courses had to be closed by demand of the Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you will recollect under -whose signature the decree was issued to close the universities. -Perhaps you will recognize this signature? It is an official report.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The decree regarding the appointment of university -trustees was signed by the Governor General in November 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please tell me whether -technical schools only were left in Poland?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Not technical schools alone remained open; there were, -for instance, commercial schools, and the attendance there was very -large. Apart from that, there were craft schools and elementary -schools, which were set up on a large scale.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In other words, only those schools -were left which trained artisans, and petty commercial clerks and -tradesmen?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Whether only petty or also more important traders -attended them I do not know. At any rate commercial schools were -permitted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to know on whose -initiative the royal palace at Warsaw was destroyed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I do not know for certain. I heard once that it had -been the Führer’s wish that the castle in Warsaw, which was -heavily damaged, should be razed to the ground.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And by whose personal order -was this castle, the royal castle of Warsaw destroyed? -<span class='pageno' title='110' id='Page_110'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I do not know whether it was blown up; that I do -not know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes. It was destroyed. Who -ordered it to be destroyed, do you know?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I do not know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You do not know?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The quotation which I want to -read to you is on Page 1 of the translation of the document submitted -by us to the Tribunal. It is a very short quotation. I shall -proceed to read it into the record:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“...The Führer discussed the general situation with the -Governor General and he approved of the work of the Governor -General in Poland, especially the pulling down of the -palace at Warsaw and the intention not to reconstruct the -city...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Was it not true that the palace in Warsaw was destroyed by -order of Frank?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: It is not known to me that the castle was destroyed. -As far as I know there was at one time a project to pull it down, -but the plan was abandoned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me, please, was it not in -your presence that the Defendant Frank on 21 April 1940 issued -an order to apply police measures during the so-called recruitment -of labor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I should have to see the minutes. I cannot remember -it offhand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The document was handed to the witness.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The place which I should like -to quote is on Page 46 of the document, the last paragraph. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Discussion with State Secretary Dr. Bühler, SS Obergruppenführer -Krüger, and Dr. Frauendorfer in the presence of Reich -Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart.</p> - -<p>“Subject of discussion is the deportation of workers, especially -agricultural workers, to the Reich.</p> - -<p>“The Governor General stated that, as all methods in the -way of appeals, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, had been unsuccessful, one was -now obliged to come to the conclusion that the Poles evaded -this duty of work either out of malice, or with the intention -of doing Germany indirect harm by not placing themselves -at her disposal. He therefore asked Dr. Frauendorfer whether -<span class='pageno' title='111' id='Page_111'></span> -there were any measures left which had not yet been taken -to win the Poles over voluntarily.</p> - -<p>“Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer answered this -question in the negative.</p> - -<p>“The Governor General stated emphatically that a final -decision was now required of him. The question now was -whether one would not have to resort to some form of -coercive measure.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Was that not an order to apply coercive measures when -recruiting labor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I will not contradict the statement, as I have seen -the minutes. It is one of the utterances of the Governor General -which, I believe, were not altogether made voluntarily but which -in no way altered the course which I took on this question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer the following -question: Were you present at a discussion with Sauckel on -18 August 1942, and was it in your presence that Frank told Sauckel -that he—as he put it—“joyfully” informed him that he had shipped -a fresh convoy of workers to the Reich with the help of the Police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Together with my departmental heads who dealt with -the recruitment of workers I had a conference with Reich Commissioner -Sauckel before the visit to the Governor General took place. -I cannot now remember whether I was present when Reich Commissioner -Sauckel visited the Governor General. I ask to see the -minutes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please show the defendant, I -mean the witness, the passage.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The document was handed to the witness.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I will now read into the record two short passages on Pages 918 -and 920. Doctor Frank says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I am very glad that I can inform you officially that up to -this date we have sent to Germany over 800,000 workers. -Only a short time ago you asked for another 140,000. I -am happy to inform you officially that, in accordance with -our agreement of yesterday, 60 percent of these newly -requested workers will be sent by the end of October, and -the other 40 percent will be dispatched to the Reich by the -end of the year.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then I will ask you to pass on to Page 120. There is only one -other sentence I want to quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Besides the 140,000, you can count on a further number of -workers from the Government General during the coming -year, for we will use the Police to get them.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='112' id='Page_112'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Does that not imply the use of Draconian police methods in -the so-called recruiting of manpower?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I do not recollect that I was present on that occasion, -so I can in no way confirm whether that was said in this way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I have no more -questions to put to the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: [<span class='it'>To Dr. Seidl.</span>] Do you want to re-examine?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I have a few more questions to ask the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First of all, I should like to clarify a misunderstanding which -seems to have arisen. The question which I put to the witness in -connection with Document Number USSR-93 referred only to -Appendix 1, which has the title “Cultural Life in Poland.” That -appendix deals with directives regarding cultural policies which -the administration of the Government General was supposed to have -issued, and the way I understood the witness was that he only -wanted to answer that particular question and not refer to the other -appendices, such as, for instance, those dealing with confiscated art -treasures.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Perhaps it would have been better if he had not used the word -“forged.” At any rate, he wanted to say that he did not know the -directives in question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Witness, is it correct that by far the -greater number of Polish workers who were brought to the Reich -were volunteers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: May I, first of all, say that I by no means wished to -accuse the Prosecution of committing a forgery. I merely wanted to -point out that possibly they were using a forged document. I did -not want to accuse the Prosecution itself of a forgery.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, regarding the question put by defense counsel, I want to -say that according to my observations by far the greater number of -all the workers from the Government General went to the Reich -voluntarily.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: So as to assist your memory, I am going to read -a short quotation from the diary, which deals with the recruiting -of workers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On 4 March 1940 the Governor General addressed a meeting of -the town mayors of the Lublin district and stated the following -regarding the recruitment of workers:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“He rejected the issue of a new decree, as demanded by -Berlin, containing particular coercive measures and threats -of punishment. Measures which attract attention abroad should -be avoided. The forcible transport of people had every argument -against it.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='113' id='Page_113'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Does that conception reflect the true views of the Governor -General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: I was not present during that conference, so I did not -hear that utterance by the Governor General, but it does tally with -those instructions and principles which the Governor General gave -to me and which I have always resolutely observed and carried out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Were you present during a conference on -14 January 1944—I see you were there—it was a conference with -the State Secretary Dr. Bühler, Dr. Koppe, and several others. I -quote from it:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General resolutely opposes the employment -of Police for carrying out such measures. Such a task is not -a matter for the Police.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is it correct that the Governor General repeatedly opposed the -use of Police in connection with the recruiting of workers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: That was not the only occasion. The deputy of Reich -Commissioner Sauckel was often attacked by him during public -meetings when he talked about raids for recruiting workers; but -I must state that Sauckel’s deputy always declared that it was not -he who had given instructions for these raids.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The first quotation which the prosecutor submitted -to you was an entry dated 25 January 1943. He asked you whether -you regarded yourself as a war criminal. I shall now put to you -another passage from that conference, at which you yourself were -present. I quote from Page 7 of that entry in the diary. The Governor -General stated:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“State Secretary Krüger, you know that orders of the Reichsführer -SS can be carried out by you only after you have -spoken with me. This was omitted in this instance. I express -my regret that you have carried out an order from the Reichsführer -without first informing me, in accordance with the -orders of the Führer. According to that order, instructions -of the Reichsführer SS may be carried out here in the Government -General only after I have previously given my approval. -I hope that this is the last time that that is overlooked; because -I do not want to trouble the Führer about every single case -of this kind.” (Document Number 2233-PS.)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I shall skip a sentence and continue to quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is not possible for us to disregard Führer orders, and it is -out of the question that in the sphere of police and security -direct orders from the Reichsführer should be carried out over -the head of the man who has been appointed here by the -Führer; otherwise I should be completely superfluous.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='114' id='Page_114'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now ask you, is it correct that there were very frequently -such disputes between the Governor General and the Higher SS -Police Leader Krüger, and that the Governor General terminated -these disputes by asking for co-operation, so that some sort of -administration could function in this territory?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: Yes, that is correct, such disputes were our daily bread.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has also submitted to you another -exhibit, USSR-335 (Document Number USSR-335), the Court-Martial -Decree, dated October 1943. I now ask you what the security situation -was like in the Government General then, and would it have -been at all possible at that time to control the situation with normal -criminal procedure?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Doctor Seidl, has that not already been dealt -with very fully in his examination in chief?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I forego having this question answered again. Now -one last question, which refers to art treasures.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Is it correct that a portion of the art treasures which were found -in the region of Upper Silesia were taken to the last official residence -of the Governor General at Neuhaus to be safeguarded, and that -the Governor General gave you instructions to prepare a list of -these articles and send it to Reich Minister Lammers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BÜHLER: The Governor General dictated a report to Reich -Minister Lammers about the transfer of 20 of the most outstanding -art treasures from the property of the Polish State. I was present -when it was dictated and I took that report personally to State -Secretary Kritzinger in Berlin. It was stated therein that these -art treasures, so as to save them from the Russians, had been taken -from Seichau, or whatever the place is called, to Schliersee. These -art treasures were left unguarded in the official residence of the -Governor General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions to put to the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I have now completed the examination of witnesses, -but as the document books have not yet been bound, I would like -to suggest that at some later stage, perhaps after the case of Frick, -I could submit these document books.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, how many books are you presenting?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: A total of five volumes, but I myself have not -received them yet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has the Tribunal approved the documents -in five volumes? -<span class='pageno' title='115' id='Page_115'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: They are almost entirely documents which have -already been submitted by the Prosecution and an agreement has -been reached with the Prosecution regarding the documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, we need not wait now for the -document books. The document books will be considered by the -Tribunal when they are put in and then, if you have anything in -particular you want to say upon them in explanation, you may do so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No doubt you will comment upon them in -your final speech. You say that they are mostly documents which -have already been put in, and therefore it would not be necessary -to make any preliminary comment upon them. You will be able -to deal with them in your final speech.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: But I should have liked to quote a few passages -during my submission of evidence, since this is necessary to establish -the connection, and as it would be impossible to do all that during -my final speech; but I do not think that too much time will be lost -through that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Seidl, it would not be very -useful to the Tribunal for you to make a commentary upon the -documents at a later stage, when your witnesses have been finished -and somebody else’s—some other defendant’s—witnesses have been -interpolated; therefore, the Tribunal thinks it will be much better -and much more convenient to the Tribunal if you defer your -comments on the documents until your final speech.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Well, Dr. Seidl, as I understand, you have two books which are -before us now. Three is it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: There is a total of five books. The other three do -not appear to have been bound.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but you say that most of the documents -in them are documents which are already in evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank, which -contains 42 volumes, has been submitted, but the Prosecution has -used only those parts which appeared favorable for them. In my -opinion it is, therefore, necessary that the connections should to -some extent be re-established during the submission of evidence. -Also, there are other documents in the document book which I -believe should be read, at least in extract, before this Tribunal, but -I shall, of course, limit myself to the absolutely necessary passages -when I read the documents. I should like to suggest to the Tribunal -that the matter be handled as it was in the case of the Defendant -Von Ribbentrop, so that I submit the individual documents to the -Tribunal as exhibits. There are several speeches by the Defendant -<span class='pageno' title='116' id='Page_116'></span> -Frank, there are decrees and legal regulations, there are two -affidavits, and I really think that somehow an opinion with regard -to them should be given during the submission of evidence; and, -besides, individual documents will have to be given exhibit numbers. -Up to now only one document has been submitted as evidence on -behalf of the Defendant Frank, and that is the affidavit of the -witness Dr. Bühler; but I have the intention of bringing a whole -series of further documents formally to the notice of the Tribunal -and would like to postpone that only because the Tribunal has not -yet received the bound document books.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: When will these other books be ready, -Dr. Seidl?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I was told that they would be completed by this -evening.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think you will take in -dealing with these books?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I think that two hours will be enough.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will adjourn now.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal would like you to -deal with your documents now, and insofar as they are documents -which have already been put in evidence, unless you wish to refer -to other passages in them, they think that you need only tell us -what the documents are and put them in evidence, unless it is very -important to you to refer to any particular document. So far as -they are new documents, you will, no doubt, offer them in evidence -and make such short comments as you think necessary. But the -Tribunal hopes that you will be able to finish this afternoon. With -reference to the other books that you have, we understand that you -have all the documents in German yourself, and therefore you can -refer us to those documents now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, upon the wish of the Prosecution -and also, I believe, of the Tribunal, I have reduced the original bulk -of my document books considerably. The first five document books, -as I had had them prepared, contained more than eight hundred -pages. The new form is considerably shorter; but I have not received -the German text of the new form, so that I am not in a position -just now to give the number of pages to the Tribunal or to co-ordinate -my page numbers with the numbered pages of the translations. -If I may express a wish, it is that we should first wait until -the five document books in their new form are available, because -<span class='pageno' title='117' id='Page_117'></span> -otherwise it is very likely that the numbering of the pages would -not correspond to the numbering of the individual documents as -exactly as might be desired.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it best that you should -begin now with the first three volumes. We have them here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: If the Tribunal has the first three volumes, then I -will begin. I begin with Volume I. The first document on Page 1 -is the decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, dated 12 October -1939, concerning the administration of the occupied Polish territories. -This decree defines in detail the authority of the Governor General. -In Paragraphs 5 and 6 some of the limitations to the authority of -the Governor General are included, which the witnesses Dr. Lammers -and Dr. Bühler have already pointed out. This document bears -the number 2537-PS and it will be Exhibit Frank-2.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I pass to Page 3 of the document book. This document is the -decree of the Führer concerning the establishment of a State -Secretariat for Security in the Government General, dated 7 May -1942. I quote Paragraph 2:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The State Secretary for Security serves at the same time -as deputy of the Reichsführer SS in his capacity as Reich Commissioner -for the Preservation of German Nationality.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>On Page 4 I quote Paragraph IV:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police is -authorized to give the State Secretary for Security direct -instructions in the province of security and the preservation -of German Nationality.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This document will be Exhibit Frank-3 (Document Number -Frank-3).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Following the decree of the Führer of 7 May 1942 comes the -decree for the transfer of authority to the State Secretary for -Security, of 23 June 1942. I do not know whether that decree is -already bound in that volume. Apparently that decree, which was -added later, has not yet been translated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What is the date?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: 23 June 1942.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have one of 27 May 1942.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: That decree apparently has not yet been translated -because it was added afterwards, and I will put it in the document -book later. It will be Document Frank-4. In Paragraph 1 of that -decree, we find, “The jurisdictions of the administrative and creative -branches of the Police referred to in appendices A and B are now -transferred to the State Secretary for Security.” In Appendix 1 -the spheres of authority of the Order Police are mentioned under -<span class='pageno' title='118' id='Page_118'></span> -15 headings—no, I must correct that—26 headings; and in Appendix -B the spheres of authority of the Order Police come under 21 -headings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I pass now to Document Book I, Page 5. That is the decree of -the Führer concerning the appointment of officials and the termination -of this status as officials in the sphere of the Government -General, of 20 May 1942. I quote from the figure 3, Paragraph 2:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General’s sphere of activity does not, in the -sense of this decree, include officials belonging to the province -of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police in -the Reich Ministry of the Interior, or those belonging to the -Customs Frontier Service.” (Document Number Frank-4(e).)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I pass to Page 6 of the document book, the decree of the Führer -and Reich Chancellor, for the Preservation of German Nationality, -of 7 October 1939, which is already Exhibit USA-305 (Document -Number 686-PS).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next document is the letter from Reich Marshal Göring to -the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, of July 1941.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, I suggest that an exhibit number -be given as we go along so that we can follow better, and later -on have some track of the exhibits as they go in. The last one and -this one have not been given any exhibit number.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United -States): The last one was Frank-5, was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No. Frank-5 was the one of the 27th of May -1942.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: We did not know that; we did not get the number -over the speaker. I am sorry.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It may not have been stated but I took it -down as that myself. Will you take care to state each time, Dr. Seidl, -what the exhibit number is that you are giving. You are dealing -now with the letter of the 31st of July 1941.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes. This letter has a USA number, namely, 509.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Wait a minute, perhaps I made -a mistake. Yes, Mr. Dodd, I think I made a mistake. The reason -why Dr. Seidl did not give a number was because it was already -in evidence as USA-305. I made a mistake. It was not Frank-5. -He only got to Frank-4. The next one is USA-509.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: 509 (Document Number 710-PS). I pass to Page 10 -of the document book. That is an order, a directive rather, of the -High Command of the Armed Forces concerning Case Barbarossa, -USA-135 (Document Number 447-PS), and I quote Paragraph 2: -<span class='pageno' title='119' id='Page_119'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is not intended to declare East Prussia and the Government -General an operational area of the Army. On the other -hand, on the basis of the unpublished Führer decrees of 19 -and 21 October 1939 the Commander-in-Chief of the Army -is authorized to enact measures that are necessary for the -execution of his military task and for the security of his -troops.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I pass to Page 11 of the document book, a directive for the -execution of the Führer decree concerning the Plenipotentiary -General for the Allocation of Labor, of 27 March 1942. I quote Paragraph -4:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor will -have at his disposal for the performance of his tasks the -authority delegated to me by the Führer to issue instructions -to the highest Reich authorities, their subordinate offices, -as well as to the offices of the Party and its formations and -affiliated organizations; to the Reich Protector; to the Governor -General; to the military commanders and the chiefs of -the civil administrations.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This document becomes Exhibit Number Frank-5 (Document -Number Frank-5).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next document is on Page 12—the decree by the Führer, -concerning a Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, -of 21 March 1942, from which it can be seen that his authority to -issue instructions included the Government General. It becomes -Exhibit Number Frank-6 (Document Number Frank-6).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The document on Page 13 of the document book deals also with -the authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of -Labor to issue instructions. It is already Exhibit USA-206 (Document -Number 3352-PS).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The document on Page 15 is a letter from Professor Dr. Kubiowicz, -Chairman of the Ukrainian Control Committee, to the Defendant -Dr. Frank. It already has the Exhibit Number USA-178 (Document -Number 1526-PS); and I will read only the first sentence from that -document, in order to show what the relation was between the -Defendant Dr. Frank and the author of that letter. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Complying with your wish I send you this letter, in which I -should like to state the abuses and the painful incidents which -create an especially difficult position for the Ukrainian -population within the Government General.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then I pass on to Page 16 of the document book. That is an -excerpt from Exhibit USA-275 (Document Number 1061-PS), namely, -the report of SS Brigadeführer Stroop about the destruction of the -Warsaw ghetto. I quote the second paragraph of Section II, from -<span class='pageno' title='120' id='Page_120'></span> -which it can be seen that the order came directly from the Reichsführer -SS Himmler:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“When the Reichsführer SS visited Warsaw in January 1943, -he ordered the SS and Police Leader in the District of Warsaw -to transfer to Lublin the armament factories and other enterprises -of military importance which were installed within the -ghetto, including the workers and the machines.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The affidavit which the Prosecution submitted during the cross-examination -of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner should then really -follow after Page 16 of the document book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for -the U.S.S.R.): As far as I can gather, there has been some misunderstanding -on this point. Under the number mentioned by -Dr. Seidl in his document book there is no document referring to -the Warsaw ghetto, but there is a document from the Chief of Police -and SS in Galicia relating to the solution of the Jewish problem -in Galicia. I should like this elucidated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The document on Page 16 is the report by the SS -Brigadeführer Stroop which has already been submitted as Exhibit -USA-275. The report by SS Führer Katzmann, which the Russian -Prosecutor apparently means, concerning the solution of the Jewish -question in Galicia, is on Page 17 of the document book, that is, -on the next page. Apparently the insertion of Page 16 in the document -book which was prepared for the Russian Prosecution was -overlooked.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After that report by Brigadeführer Stroop, Exhibit USA-275 -should be inserted as Page 16a, the affidavit by SS Brigadeführer -Stroop which was submitted during the cross-examination of the -Defendant Dr. Kaltenbrunner under Exhibit Number USA-804. That -affidavit bears the Document Number 3841-PS. I could not include -that affidavit in the document book because it was submitted by -the Prosecution only after I had sent the document book to be -translated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As Page 16b another document should be put in which was also -submitted during the cross-examination of Dr. Kaltenbrunner. That -is the affidavit by Karl Kaleske. That affidavit bears the Exhibit -Number USA-803, Document Number 3840-PS. That would be -Page 16b of the document book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now I come to the report which the Soviet Prosecutor had in -mind and which deals with the solution of the Jewish question in -Galicia. It is on Page 17 of the document book. That measure has -the Exhibit Number USA-277 and the Document Number L-18. I -quote Pages 4 and 5, word for word: -<span class='pageno' title='121' id='Page_121'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“After it had been found in more and more cases that Jews had -succeeded in making themselves indispensable to their -employers by providing them with scarce goods, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, it -was considered necessary to introduce really Draconic -measures.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I pass to Paragraph 2 and quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“As the administration was not in a position and showed -itself too weak to master this chaos, the SS and Police Leader -simply took over the whole question of the employment of -Jewish labor. The Jewish labor agencies, which were staffed -by hundreds of Jews, were dissolved. All employment certificates -given by firms or administrative offices were declared -invalid, and cards given Jews by the labor agencies were -made valid again by being stamped by the police offices.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I pass to Page 19 of the document book. That deals with the -letter of the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery to -Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police Himmler, of -17 April 1943. That document is Number 2220-PS and Exhibit -Number USA-175. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In our conference of 27 March of this year we had agreed to -prepare written memoranda about conditions in the Government -General on which to base our intended report to the -Führer.</p> - -<p>“The material compiled for this purpose by SS Obergruppenführer -Krüger has already been submitted to you directly. -On the basis of this material I have had a report prepared -which sums up the most important points contained therein, -subdivides them clearly, and culminates in an explanation of -the measures to be taken.</p> - -<p>“The report has been checked with SS Obergruppenführer -Krüger and has his complete concurrence. I am submitting a -part of it to you herewith.”—It is signed—“Dr. Lammers.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I pass on to Page 20 of the document book and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Secret. Concerning conditions in the Government General...</p> - -<p>“The German administration in the Government General has -to accomplish the following tasks: 1) To increase agricultural -production for the purpose of securing food for the German -people and seize as much of it as possible, to allot sufficient -rations to the native population occupied with work essential -to the war effort, and to remove the rest for the Armed Forces -and the homeland.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I leave out the following points and pass to the letter “B”, where -Krüger or his assistant criticized the measures of the Governor -General. I quote: -<span class='pageno' title='122' id='Page_122'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“German administration in the Government General has failed -grossly with respect to the tasks listed under “A”. Even if a -relatively high percentage, namely, over 90 percent, of the -delivery quota of agricultural products for the Armed Forces -and the homeland was successfully met in the year 1942 and -if the labor procurement requirements of the homeland were -generally satisfied, nevertheless, on the other hand, two things -must be made clear: First, these accomplishments were not -achieved until the year 1942. Before that, for example, only -40,000 tons of bread grain had been delivered for the Wehrmacht. -Secondly, and above all, there was the omission to -create for the attainment of such performances those prerequisites -of an organizational, economic, and political -character which are indispensable if such performances are not -to lead to a breakdown in the situation as a whole, from which -chaotic conditions in every respect could eventually come -about. This failure of the German administration can be -explained in the first place by the system of the German -administrative and governmental activity in the Government -General as embodied in the Governor General himself, and -secondly by the misguided principles of policy in all questions -decisive for conditions in the Government General.</p> - -<p>“I) The spirit of the German administration in the Government -General.</p> - -<p>“From the beginning it has been the endeavor of the Governor -General to make a state organization out of the Government -General which was to lead its own existence in complete -independence of the Reich.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then I pass to Page 22 of the report, Paragraph 3 and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“3) The treatment of the native population can only be led in -the right direction on the basis of clean and orderly administrative -and economic leadership. Only such a foundation -makes it possible to handle the native population firmly and -if necessary even severely, on the one hand; and, on the other -hand, to act generously with them and cause a certain amount -of satisfaction among the population by allowing certain -liberties, especially in the cultural field. Without such a -foundation severity strengthens the resistance movement, and -meeting the population halfway only undermines respect for -the Germans. The above-mentioned facts prove that this -foundation is lacking. Instead of trying to create this -foundation, the Governor General inaugurates a policy of -encouraging the individual cultural life of the Polish population, -which in itself is already overshooting the goal but which, -under the existing conditions and viewed in connection with -<span class='pageno' title='123' id='Page_123'></span> -our military situation during the past winter, can only be -interpreted as weakness, and must achieve the opposite of -the aim intended.</p> - -<p>“4) The relationship between racial Germans and the Polish-Ukrainian -population in the Government General.</p> - -<p>“The cases are numerous in which the German administration -has permitted the requirements of racial Germans in the -Government General to be put into the background in favor -of the interests of the Poles and Ruthenians, in its endeavor -to win over the latter. The opinion was advanced that racial -Germans resettled from somewhere else were not to be -installed immediately as settlers, but for the duration of the -war were only to be employed as farm workers. A legal -foundation for the expropriation of Polish property has not -been created so far. Bad treatment of racial Germans by -their Polish employers was not stopped. German citizens and -racial German patients were allowed to be treated in Polish -hospitals by Polish physicians, badly and at great expense. In -German spas in the Government General the sheltering of -children of German citizenship from territories threatened -with bombing, and of veterans of Stalingrad was hampered, -while foreigners took convalescent vacations there, and so on.</p> - -<p>“The big plans for resettlement in the Lublin district for the -benefit of racial Germans could have been carried out with -less friction if the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation -of German Nationality had found the administration willing -to co-operate and assist in the proper manner.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I pass to Page 24 and quote, under C:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The administrative system, embodied in the Governor -General personally, and the material failure of the general -German administration in the most various fields of decisive -importance has not only shaken the confidence and the will -to work of the native population, but has also brought about -the result that the Poles, who have been socially divided and -constantly disunited throughout their history, have come -together in a united national body through their hostility to -the Germans. In a world of pretense, the real foundations -are lacking on which alone the achievements which the Reich -requires from the Government General, and the aims which it -must see realized in the latter, can be brought about and -fulfilled in the long run. The non-fulfillment of the tasks -given to the general administration—as happened, for -example, in the field of the Preservation of German Nationality—led -to a condition which made it necessary for other -<span class='pageno' title='124' id='Page_124'></span> -administrative bodies (the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation -of German Nationality...and the Police) to take -over these tasks.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now I pass to Page 27 of the document book. That is the -repeatedly mentioned report by the Governor General to the Führer -of 19 June 1943. The document is Number 437-PS, Exhibit -USA-610. Of this document the Prosecution has so far quoted -only Pages 10 and 11. These are the very points in this memorandum -which the Governor General most severely criticized.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking now of the report which -begins on Page 20?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I am speaking of the report which begins on Page 27. -I have already finished the report which begins on Page 20.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, what number did you give to that on -Page 20?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The report on Page 20 is an integral part of the -letter which begins on Page 19, and which already has the number -USA-175.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Now I come to the document on Page 27. That is a -memorandum which has already been mentioned by various -witnesses and was submitted under Exhibit Number USA-610 -(Document Number 437-PS) by the Prosecution. Of this report the -Prosecution has only read Pages 10 and 11, which are Pages 36 and -37 of the document book, that is to say, only those passages in the -report which were condemned as excesses of the Police, and against -which excesses the Governor General complained to the Führer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I do not intend to read the whole memorandum; but I will pass -on to Page 27 of the report, which is Page 53 of the document book, -and I quote under Section 2:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The almost complete discontinuation of the possibilities for -participation in the cultural field has led, even among the -lowest classes of the Polish people, to considerable discontent. -The Polish middle and upper classes have a great need for -self-expression. Experience shows that the possibility of -cultural activity would at the same time mean a diversion -from the political questions of the day. German propaganda -frequently comes across the objection, on the part of the Poles, -that the restriction of cultural activity enforced by the German -authorities not only prevents a contrast being made with the -Bolshevist lack of culture, but also shows that Polish cultural -activity falls below the degree of culture allowed to Soviet -citizens... -<span class='pageno' title='125' id='Page_125'></span></p> - -<p>“3. The closing of colleges, high schools, and secondary schools -is on the same level. Its well-considered purpose is without -doubt the lowering of the Polish educational standard. The -realization of this goal appears, from the point of view of the -necessities of war, not always beneficial to German interests. -As the war goes on the German interest increases in the -mobilization of able foreign replacements in the various fields -of knowledge. But more important than that is the fact that the -crippling of the school system and the severe hampering of -cultural activities foster the growth of a Polish national body, -led by the intelligentsia, to conspire against Germany. What -was not possible during the course of Polish national history, -what even the first years of German dominion could not bring -about, namely, the achievement of national unity in a common -purpose to hold together through thick and thin, now -threatens to become a reality, slowly but surely, because of the -German measures. German leadership cannot allow this -process of unifying the individual classes of the Polish population -to pass unheeded in the face of the growing power of -resistance of the Poles. German leadership should promote -class distinction by certain cultural concessions and should be -able to play one class off against the other.</p> - -<p>“4. The recruiting of labor and the methods employed, even -though often exercised under the unavoidable pressure -of circumstances, have, with the aid of clever Bolshevist agitation, -evoked a strong feeling of hatred among all classes. The -workers thus obtained often come to work with firm resolve -to engage in positive resistance, even active sabotage. Improvement -of recruiting methods, together with the continued -effort to arrest the abuses still practiced in the treatment of -Polish workers in the Reich, and lastly, some provision, -however meager it may be, for the families left behind, -would cause a rise in morale, and the result would be an -increased desire to work and increased production in the -German interest.</p> - -<p>“5. When the German administration was set up at the beginning -of the war the Polish element was removed from all -important positions. The available German staff had always -been inadequate in quantity and quality. Besides, during the -past year, a considerable number of German personnel have -had to be transferred to meet the replacement needs of the -armed forces. Already an increased amount of non-German -manpower has had to be obtained compulsorily. An essential -change in the treatment of the Poles would enable the administration, -while exercising all necessary precaution, to induce -<span class='pageno' title='126' id='Page_126'></span> -a greater number of Poles to collaborate. Without this the -administration, in view of the present amount of personnel—not -to speak of future transfers—cannot continue to function. -The increased participation of Poles would further help to -raise the morale itself.</p> - -<p>“Besides the positive changes set down in these proposals, a -number of methods employed up till now in the treatment of -Poles should be changed or even completely abandoned, at -least for the duration of the fighting in Europe.</p> - -<p>“1) I have already shown in special reports that confiscation -and evacuation of agricultural land have caused great and -irreparable damage to agricultural production. Not less great -is the damage to morale caused by such actions. Already -the seizure of a great part of the large Polish estates has -understandably embittered those affected by it, who naturally -represent that strata of the population which is always anti-Bolshevist. -But, because of their numerically small strength -and their complete isolation from the mass of the people, their -opposition does not count nearly as much as the attitude of the -mass of the population which consists mainly of small farmers. -The evacuation of Polish peasants from the defense zone, no -doubt necessary for military-political reasons, has already had -an unfavorable effect on the opinion and attitude of many -farmers. At any rate, this evacuation was kept within certain -territorial limits. It was carried out with careful preparation -on the part of the governmental offices with a view to avoiding -unnecessary hardship. The evacuation of Polish farmers from -the Lublin district, held to be necessary by the Reich Commissioner -for the Preservation of German Nationality, for the -purpose of settling racial Germans there, was much more -serious. Moreover—as I have already reported separately—the -pace at which it was carried out and the methods adopted -caused immeasurable bitterness among the populace. At short -notice families were torn apart; those able to work were sent -to the Reich, while old people and children were directed to -evacuate Jewish ghettos. This happened in the middle -of the winter of 1942-43 and resulted in considerable -loss of life, especially among members of the last mentioned -group. The dispossession meant the complete expropriation -of the movable and immovable property of the farmers. The -entire population succumbed to the belief that these deportations -meant the beginning of a mass deportation of the Poles -from the region of the Government General. The general impression -was that the Poles would meet a fate similar to that -of the Jews. The evacuation from the Lublin District was a -<span class='pageno' title='127' id='Page_127'></span> -welcome opportunity for communist agitation, with its own -peculiar skill, to poison the feeling in the entire Government -General, and even in the annexed Eastern territories, for -a long time. Thus it came about that considerable portions -of the population in the territories to be evacuated, but also in -territories not affected, fled into the woods and considerably -increased the strength of the guerrillas. The consequence was -a tremendous deterioration of the security situation. These -desperate people were incited by skillful agents to upset agricultural -and industrial production according to a definite plan.</p> - -<p>“2) One has only to mention the crime of Katyn for it to -become obvious that the safeguarding of personal security -is an absolute condition for winning over the Polish population -to the fight against Bolshevism. The lack of protection -against seemingly arbitrary arrests and executions makes good -copy for communist propaganda slogans. The shooting of -women, children, and old men in public, which took place -again and again without the knowledge and against the will of -the government, must be prevented in all circumstances. -Naturally this does not apply to the public executions of -bandits and partisans. In cases of collective punishments, -which nearly always hit innocent persons and are applied -against people who are fundamentally politically indifferent, -the unfavorable psychological effect cannot possibly be overestimated. -Serious punitive measures and executions should -be carried out only after a trial based at least upon the -elementary conceptions of justice and accompanied by publication -of the sentence. Even if the court procedure is carried on -in the most simple, imperfect and improvised manner, it -serves to avoid or to lessen the unfavorable effect of a punitive -measure which the population considers purely arbitrary, and -disarms Bolshevist agitation which claims that these German -measures are only the prelude to future events. Moreover, -collective punishment, which by its nature is directed -primarily against the innocent, in the worst case against -forced or desperate persons, is not exactly looked upon as -a sign of strength of the ruling power, which the population -expects to strike at the terrorists themselves and thereby -liberate them from the insecurity which burdens them.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I pass now to Page 37 of the report and quote under Section 3:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Besides the most important prerequisites mentioned -in 1) and 2) to restore calm in the Government General, -security of property among non-agricultural people must also -be guaranteed, insofar as it is not counter to the urgent needs -of war. Expropriation or confiscation without compensation -<span class='pageno' title='128' id='Page_128'></span> -in the industrial sector, in commerce and trade, and of other -private property, should not take place in any case if the -owner or the custodian has not committed an offense against -the German authorities. If the taking over of industrial -enterprises, commercial concerns, or real estate is necessary -for reasons connected with the war, one should proceed in -every case in such a way as to avoid hardship and under -guarantee of appropriate compensation. Such a procedure -would on the one hand further the initiative of Polish business -men, and on the other hand avoid damage to the interests of -German war economy.</p> - -<p>“4) In any attempt to influence the attitude of the Poles, importance -must be attached to the influence of the Catholic -Church which cannot be overestimated. I do not deny that the -Catholic Church has always been on the side of the leading -fighters for an independent national Poland. Numerous -priests also made their influence felt in this direction even -after the German occupation. Hundreds of arrests were carried -out among them. A number of priests were taken to concentration -camps and also shot. However, in order to win over -the Polish population, the Church must be given at least a -legal status even though it might not be possible to co-operate -with it. It can without doubt be won over to reinforce the -struggle of the Polish people against Bolshevism, especially -today under the effect of the crime of Katyn, for the Church -would always oppose a Bolshevist regime in the Vistula area, -if only out of the instinct of self-preservation. To achieve -that end, however, it is necessary to refrain in the future from -all measures against its activity and its property, insofar as -they do not run directly counter to war requirements.</p> - -<p>“Much harm has been done even quite recently by the closing -of monasteries, charitable institutions, and church establishments.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I had thought that your extracts were going -to be brief. But you have now read from Page 53 to Page 65.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, this document is the only one of this -kind which is available to me, and in view of the fact that the -Prosecution has quoted in full only those passages which the Defendant -Dr. Frank himself criticized most severely, I consider it my -duty now to read a number of passages, to quote them, in order to -give the entire picture correctly and to show what the Defendant -Dr. Frank really intended to achieve with this document. I shall -only quote a few more lines and then I will pass to another -document. -<span class='pageno' title='129' id='Page_129'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I had hoped that one or two extracts from -that document would show what the Defendant Frank was putting -forward—one or two paragraphs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I will go on to the next document, Mr. President, -that is on Page 68, the affidavit by the witness Dr. Bühler, which -I presented to the witness today and which has been given the -document number Frank-1; Page 68 in the document book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On Page 70 there appears Exhibit USA-473 (Document Number -L-49). If I remember correctly this document has already been read -in full by the Prosecution, and I would like to ask the Court only -to take judicial notice of that also in the defense of Dr. Frank.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On Page 72 of the document book is an affidavit of the former -Kreishauptmann, Dr. Albrecht. To be exact I have to state that -this is not really an affidavit in the true sense of the word. It is -only a letter which Kreishauptmann Dr. Albrecht sent to me through -the General Secretary of the Tribunal. I then returned the letter -in order to have it sworn to by the witness, but I have to say that -until now that sworn statement has not been returned, so that for -the time being this exhibit would only have the material value of -a letter. Therefore I ask the Tribunal to decide whether that -document can be accepted by the Tribunal as an exhibit in the form -of a letter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal did consider that matter -before when your application was before it. They will accept the -document for what it is worth. If you get the document in affidavit -form you will no doubt put it in.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes. That will be Document Number Frank-7. I -forego the quoting of the first points and proceed directly to Page -74 of the document book and I quote under Section 4:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Dr. Frank’s fight against the exploitation and neglect of the -Government General in favor of the Reich. Conflict with -Berlin.</p> - -<p>“The first meeting with Dr. Frank occurred shortly after the -establishment of the Government General in the autumn of -1939, in the Polish district capital Radom, where the 10 Kreis -chiefs of this district had to report concerning the condition of -the population in their administrative district and the problem -of reconstructing, as quickly and effectively as possible, the -general as well as the administrative and economic life. What -struck one most was the keen awareness of Dr. Frank and his -deep concern about the area entrusted to him. This found -expression in the instructions not to consider or treat the -Government General or allow it to be treated, as an object of -exploitation or as a waste area, but rather to consider it as -<span class='pageno' title='130' id='Page_130'></span> -a center of public order and an area of concentration at the -back of the fighting German front and at the gates of the German -homeland, forming a link between the two. Therefore the -loyal native inhabitants of this country should have claim -to the full protection of the German administration as citizens -of the Government General. To this end the constant efforts -of all authorities and economic agencies would be demanded -by him, also constant control through supervisors, which -would be personally superintended by him in periodical inspection -trips with the participation of the specialized central -offices. In this way, for instance, the two districts which were -administered by me were inspected by him personally three -times in 4 years.</p> - -<p>“In face of the demands of the Berlin central authorities, who -believed it possible to import more from the Government -General into the Reich than the former could afford, Dr. Frank -asserted vigorously the political independence of the Government -General as an ‘adjunct of the Reich’ and his own independence -as being directly subordinated only to the Supreme -Head of the State, and not to the Reich Government. He also -instructed us on no account to comply with demands which -might come to us on the basis of personal relations with the -authorities by whom we were sent, or with the ministries -concerned; and if by so doing we came into conflict with our -loyalty to the Reich, which was equally expected of us, to -report to him about it. This firm attitude brought Dr. Frank -the displeasure of the Berlin government circles, and the -Government General was dubbed ‘Frankreich.’ A campaign of -calumny was initiated in the Reich against him and against -the entire administration of the Government General by systematically -generalizing and exaggerating regrettable ineptitudes -and human weaknesses of individuals, at the same time -attempting to belittle the actual constructive achievements.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to ask the Tribunal merely to take official notice of -Section 5, also Section 6, and I will only quote from Section 7.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“7) Dr. Frank as an opponent of acts of violence against the -native population, especially as an opponent of the SS.</p> - -<p>“Besides the exploitation and the pauperization of the Government -General, the accusation of the enslaving of the native -population as well as deporting it to the Reich, and many -atrocities of various kinds which have appeared in the newspaper -reports on the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, were -interpreted as serious evidence against Dr. Frank. As far -as atrocities are concerned, the guilt lies not with Dr. Frank -but in some measure with the numerous non-German agitators -<span class='pageno' title='131' id='Page_131'></span> -and provocateurs who, with the growing pressure on the -fighting German fronts, increased their underground activity; -but more especially with the former State Secretary for -Security in the Government General, SS Obergruppenführer -Krüger, and his agencies. My observations in this respect are -sketchy, because of the strict secrecy of these offices.</p> - -<p>“On the other hand, Dr. Frank went so far in meeting the -Polish population that this was frequently objected to by his -German compatriots. That he did the correct thing by his -stand for the just interests of the Polish population is proved, -for example, by the impressive fact that barely a year and a -half after the defeat of the Polish people in a campaign of -18 days, the concentration of German army masses against -Russia in the Polish area took place without any disturbance -worth mentioning, and that the Eastern railroad was able, -with Polish personnel, to move the troop transports up to the -most forward unloading points without being delayed by acts -of sabotage.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I quote the last paragraph on Page 79:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“This humane attitude of Dr. Frank, which earned him respect -and sympathy among considerable groups of the native -population, led, on the other hand, to bitter conflicts with the -SS, in whose ranks Himmler’s statement, ‘They shall not love -us, but fear us,’ was applied as the guiding principle of their -thoughts and deeds.</p> - -<p>“At times it came to a complete break. I still recall quite -clearly that during a government visit to the Carpathian areas -in the summer of 1943 in the district center of Stanislav, when -he took a walk alone with me and my wife in Zaremcze on -the Prut, Dr. Frank complained most bitterly about the -arbitrary acts of the SS, which quite frequently ran counter to -the political line taken by him. At that time he called the -SS the ‘Black Plague’; and when he noticed our astonishment at -hearing such criticism coming from his lips, he pointed out -that if, for example, my wife were to be wrongfully arrested -one day or night by agencies of the Gestapo and disappear, -never to be seen again, without having been given the opportunity -of defense in a court trial, absolutely nothing could be -done about it. Some time afterwards he made a speech to the -students in Heidelberg, which attracted much attention and -was loudly applauded, about the necessity for the re-establishment -of a German constitutional state such as had always met -the real needs of the German people. When he wanted to -repeat this speech in Berlin, he is said to have been forbidden -by the Führer and Reich Chancellor, at Himmler’s instigation, -<span class='pageno' title='132' id='Page_132'></span> -to make speeches for 3 months, as reported to me by a reliable, -but unfortunately forgotten, source. The struggle against -the methods of violence used by the SS led to Dr. Frank’s -having a nervous breakdown, and he had to take a fairly long -sick leave. As far as I can remember this was in the winter -of 1943-44.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask the Court to take official notice of Section 8, and I pass on -to Page 84 of the document book. That is an affidavit by SS Obergruppenführer -Erich Von dem Bach-Zelewski, of 21 February 1946. -This affidavit becomes Document Frank-8.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Did this witness not give evidence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The witness was questioned here by the Prosecution, -and I made the motion at that time that either I be allowed -to interrogate the witness again or be granted the use of an affidavit. -On 8 March 1946 the Tribunal made the decision, if I remember -correctly, that I could use an affidavit from that witness but that -the Prosecution would be free if they desired to question the -witness again.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I shall read the statements of the witness concerning -this matter, and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“1) Owing to the infiltration of Russian partisan groups over -the line of the river Bug into the Government General in 1943, -Himmler declared the Government General to be a ‘guerrilla -warfare territory.’ Thus it became my duty as Chief of Anti-Partisan -Units to travel about the Government General to -collect information and get experience, and to submit reports -and suggestions for fighting the partisans.</p> - -<p>“In the general information Himmler gave me, he called the -Governor General Dr. Frank a traitor to his country, who -was conspiring with the Poles and whom he would expose -to the Führer very shortly. I still remember two of the -reproaches Himmler made against Frank:</p> - -<p>“a) At a lawyer’s meeting in the Old Reich territory Frank -is said to have stated that ‘he preferred a bad constitutional -state to the best conducted police state’; and</p> - -<p>“b) During a speech to a Polish delegation Frank had -disavowed some of Himmler’s measures and had disparaged, in -front of the Poles, those charged with carrying them out, by -calling them ‘militant personalities.’</p> - -<p>“After having, on a circular tour, personally obtained information -on the spot about the situation in the Government -<span class='pageno' title='133' id='Page_133'></span> -General, I visited the higher SS and Police Führer Krüger -and the Governor General, Dr. Frank, in Kraków.</p> - -<p>“Krüger spoke very disapprovingly about Dr. Frank and -blamed Frank’s faltering and unstable policy towards the -Poles for conditions in the Government General. He called for -harsher and more ruthless measures and said that he would -not rest until the traitor Frank was overthrown. I had the -impression, from Krüger’s statements, that personal motives -also influenced his attitude, and that he himself would have -liked to become Governor General.</p> - -<p>“After that I had a long discussion with Dr. Frank. I told -him of my impressions; and he went into lengthy details about -a new policy for Poland, which aimed at appeasing the Poles -by means of concessions. In agreement with my personal -impressions Dr. Frank considered the following factors -responsible for the crisis in the Government General:</p> - -<p>“a) The ruthless resettlement action carried out now in the -midst of war, especially the senseless and purposeless resettlement -carried out by the SS and Police Führer Globocznik in -Lublin.</p> - -<p>“b) The insufficient food quota allotted to the Governor -General.</p> - -<p>“Dr. Frank called Krüger and Globocznik declared enemies -of any conciliatory policy, and said it was absolutely essential -that they should be recalled.</p> - -<p>“Being convinced that if Dr. Frank failed, he would be succeeded -only by a more ruthless and uncompromising person, -I promised him my support. Having been assured of strictest -secrecy I told Frank I shared his opinion that Krüger and -Globocznik would have to disappear. He, Dr. Frank, knew -however that Himmler hated him and that he was urging -Hitler to have him removed. With such a state of affairs any -request on Frank’s part to have Krüger and Globocznik recalled -would not only be rejected but would even strengthen -their position with Himmler. Frank should give me a free -hand, then I could promise him that both would be relieved -of their posts within a short time. Dr. Frank agreed to that, -and I then made use of the military mistakes that Krüger and -Globocznik had committed in order to bring about their recall -by Himmler.</p> - -<p>“3) The Warsaw revolt of 1944...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I must point out to you that you said you -were going to be only 2 hours over five volumes. You have now -been over an hour over one volume, and you are reading practically -<span class='pageno' title='134' id='Page_134'></span> -everything in these documents. It is not at all what the Tribunal -has intended. You have been told that you may make short comments -showing how the documents are connected with each other -and how they are connected with all the evidence. That is not -what you are doing at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: In that case I ask the Tribunal to take judicial -notice of Paragraph 3 of the affidavit by Von dem Bach-Zelewski.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Paragraph 3 deals with the Warsaw revolt in the year 1944 and -the question as to whether the Governor General had anything to -do with the crushing of that revolt.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then I pass on to Page 92.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: As a matter of fact, does the Indictment -charge anything in connection with the crushing of the Warsaw -revolt in 1944?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: There is nothing in the Indictment itself about -the part played by the Governor General in the crushing of that -revolt. The Soviet Prosecution have, however, submitted a telegram -which, while it is not clear whether it was sent, nevertheless -connects the Defendant Dr. Frank in some way with the Warsaw -revolt. But I shall not go into details about that now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I pass on to Page 92 of the document book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This is an affidavit by the witness Wilhelm Ernst von Palezieux, -in whose case the Tribunal has approved an interrogatory. But I -was told by the Tribunal that in place of an interrogatory I could -submit an affidavit. I quote only the two main paragraphs as -follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The art treasures stored in the castle in Kraków, from the -spring of 1943, were under official and legal supervision there. -When speaking to me Dr. Frank always referred to these art -treasures as state property of thy Government General. -Catalogues of the existing art treasures had already been -made before I came to Poland. The list of the first selection -had been printed in book form as a catalogue with descriptions -and statements of origin, and had been ordered by the -Governor General.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Now you are reading the affidavit all over -again. We do not want that sort of...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President. I assumed that in those cases where -a witness does not appear before the Tribunal in person, it is -admissible that either the interrogatory or the affidavit be read, -because otherwise the contents of his testimony would not become -part of the record nor, therefore, part of the proceedings. -<span class='pageno' title='135' id='Page_135'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That rule was in order that the defendants -and their counsel should have the document before them in German; -that is the reason for reading the documents through the earphones. -The Tribunal will adjourn now, but I want to tell you that you -must shorten your presentation of this documentary evidence. We -have already been a good deal more than an hour over one book -and we have four more books to deal with, and it does not do your -case any good to read all these long passages because we have some -more weeks of the trial. It is only necessary for you to give such -connecting statements as make the documents intelligible, and to -correlate them with the oral evidence that is being given.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 24 April 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='136' id='Page_136'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH DAY</span><br/> Wednesday, 24 April 1946</h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: I left off -yesterday at the last document of Volume I. It is the affidavit of -the witness Ernst von Palezieux, and I ask the Tribunal to take -judicial notice of it. The affidavit is given the document number -Frank-9, and that completes the first volume.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The first volume, what page?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: That was Page 92 of the first volume, Document -Frank-9.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That is the end of the first volume, isn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes, that is the end of the first volume. Volumes II, -III, and IV of the document book comprise extracts from the diary -of the Defendant Dr. Frank. I do not propose to number all these -extracts individually, but I ask the Tribunal to accept the whole -diary as Document Frank-10 (Document 2233-PS), and I propose to -quote only a few short extracts. For example Pages 1 to 27, Mr. President, -are extracts from the diary which have already been submitted -by the Prosecution. I have put the extracts submitted by the -Prosecution into a more extensive context, and by quoting the -entire passages I have attempted to prove that some of these extracts -do not represent the true and essential content of the diary. Those -are Exhibits USA-173, on Page 1 of the document book, USSR-223 -on Page 3, USA-271 on Page 8, USA-611 on Page 11 of the document -book. On Page 14 of the document book there appears to be a -misprint. The USA number is not 016 but 613.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It begins on Page 13 in my copy, doesn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: No, it is on Page 14. It is an entry dated -25 January 1943.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, the document that I have and which -I think you are referring to, is Document 2233 (aa)-PS, Exhibit -USA-613. That is on Page 13. I don’t think it makes any difference.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: In that case it must be an error by the Translation -Department. At any rate I do not think it is important, I mean this -quotation. -<span class='pageno' title='137' id='Page_137'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now turn to Page 20 of the document book, a quotation by the -Soviet Prosecution. On Page 22 there is a quotation by the Soviet -Prosecution. Page 24 of the document book contains quotations by -the Prosecution of both the United States and of the Soviet Union. -Exhibit USA-295. Perhaps I may point out that these extracts are -only a few examples merely to show that in a number of cases -the impression obtained is different if one reads either the entire -speech or at least a portion of it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I then turn to Page 32 of the document book, an entry dated -10 October 1939, in which the Defendant Dr. Frank gives instructions -for negotiations with the Reich Food Ministry regarding the -delivery of 5,000 tons of grain per week—Page 32 of the document -book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On Page 34 there is an entry of 8 March 1940, and I quote the -first three lines. The Governor General states:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In close connection therewith is the actual governing of -Poland. The Führer has ordered me to regard the Government -General as the home of the Polish people. Accordingly, no -Germanization policy of any kind is possible.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I now pass on to Page 41 of the document book; an entry dated -19 January 1940. I quote the first five lines:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Dr. Walbaum (Chief of the Health Department): The state of -health in the Government General is satisfactory. Much has -already been accomplished in this field. In Warsaw alone -700,000 typhus injections have been given. This is a huge total, -even for German standards; it is actually a record.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The next quotation is on Page 50 of the document book, an entry -dated 19 February 1940:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General is further of the opinion that the -need for official interpretation of Polish law may become -greater. We should probably have to come to some form of -Polish government or regency, and the head of the Polish -legal system would then be competent for such a task.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid there seems to have been some -slight difference in the paging and therefore if you would give us -carefully and somewhat more slowly the actual date of the document -we should be able to find it perhaps for ourselves. The pages -do not seem to correspond.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The last quotation which I read was dated 19 February -1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now turn to a quotation; that is, an entry of 26 February 1940, -and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In this connection the Governor General expresses...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='138' id='Page_138'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>This is on Page 51 in my book. The entry is of 26 February 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Page 40 in ours.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>DR. SEIDL: “In this connection the Governor General expresses -the wish of Field Marshal Göring that the German -administration should be built up in such a way that the -Polish mode of living as such is assured. It should not give -the impression that Warsaw is a fallen city which is becoming -germanized, but rather that Warsaw, according to the Führer’s -will, is to be one of the cities which would continue to exist as -a Polish community in the intended reduced Polish state.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>A further entry, dated 26 February 1940, deals with the question -of higher education. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General points out in this connection that the -universities and high schools have been closed. However, in -the long run it would be an impossible state of affairs, for instance, -to discontinue medical education. The Polish system -of technical schools should also be revived and with the -participation of the city.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The next quotation is on Page 56 of my document book. An entry -of 1 March 1940.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General announces in this connection that the -directive has now been issued to give free rein to Polish -development as far as it is possible within the interests of the -German Reich. The attitude now to be adopted is that the -Government General is the home of the Polish people.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>A further entry deals with the question of workers in the -Reich territory. Page 60 of my document book, entry of 19 September -1940—I beg your pardon, 12 September 1940. I quote:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment. You mean the first of September, -do you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: 12 September—no, it should be 12 March; there is -obviously a misprint; 12 March 1940, Page 197 of the diary. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Governor General Dr. Frank emphasizes that one could -actually collect an adequate number of workers by force following -the methods of the slave trade, by using a sufficient -number of police, and by procuring sufficient means of transportation; -but that, for a number of reasons, however, the -use of propaganda deserves preference under all circumstances.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The next quotation is on Page 68 in my document book; an -entry of 23 April 1940. I quote the last five lines. The Governor -General states: -<span class='pageno' title='139' id='Page_139'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General is merely attempting to offer the -Polish nation protection in an economic respect as well. He -was almost inclined to think that one could achieve better -results with Poles than with these autocratic trustees....”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I now turn to Page 71 of my document book, an entry dated -25 May 1940. Here the Governor General gives an explanation to the -President of the Polish Court of Appeal, Bronschinski. I quote the -last four lines:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“We do not wish to carry on a war of extermination here -against a people. The protection of the Polish people by the -Reich in the German zone of interest gives you the possibility -of continuing your development according to your national -traditions.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I turn to Page 77 of my document book, an entry from Volume III, -July to September, Page 692. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General then spoke of the food difficulties -still existing in the Government General”—this was to Generaloberst -von Küchler—“and asked the general to see to it -that the provisioning and other requirements of new troops -arriving should be as light a burden as possible on the food -situation of the Government General. Above all, no confiscation -whatsoever should take place.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I turn to Pages 85 and 86; entries in Volume III, July to September -1940, Page 819 of the diary. This entry deals with the -establishment of the medical academy which was planned by -the Governor General. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of -this fact.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next quotation is on Page 95 of the document book, an entry -dated 9 October 1940, from the speech of the Governor General on -the occasion of the opening of the autumn trade fair at Radom. -I quote Line 5.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is clear that we...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the important things for us are -the page in the diary and the date. We seem to have the pages in -the diary and the dates, so if you will tell us them that will be of -the greatest help to us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The date is 9 October 1940; Pages 966-967 of the -diary, I quote Line 6:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is clear that we do not wish to denationalize, nor shall -we germanize.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The next quotation...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The translation in our book of that sentence is: -<span class='pageno' title='140' id='Page_140'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is clear that we neither want to denationalize nor degermanize.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: That is apparently an error in the translation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: In which translation? In the one I have just -read out?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: In the English translation. I shall now quote -literally:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is clear that we neither wish to denationalize nor shall we -germanize.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>The other makes no sense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is what I read. Well, it is right in our -book anyhow.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The Governor General wished to say that we did -not want to deprive the Poles of their national character and that -we did not intend to turn them into Germans.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now turn to Page 101, to an entry dated 27 October 1940, -Pages 1026 to 1027 of Volume IV of the diary. A conference with -Reich Minister of Labor Seldte. I quote, Line 7:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“He, the Governor General, had complained to the Führer -that the wages of Polish agricultural laborers had been reduced -by 50 percent. In addition, their wages had for the most -part been used for purposes which were completely foreign -to the idea of this exchange of workers.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The next quotation is dated 29 November 1940. It is on Page 1085 -in Volume IV, of the year 1940. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Hofrat Watzke further states that Reichsleiter Rosenberg’s -office was attempting to confiscate the so-called Polish Library -in Paris, for inclusion in the Ahnenerbe in Berlin. The Department -of Schools was of the opinion that the books of this -Polish library belonged to the state library in Warsaw, as -17,000 volumes were already in Warsaw.</p> - -<p>“The Governor General ordered that this Polish library -should be transferred from Paris to Warsaw without delay.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the next entry, dated -6 and 7 June 1940, which refers to an economic conference. I shall -not read from the entry.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next quotation is dated 25 February 1940. It deals with a -conference of the department chiefs, prefects, and town majors of -the district of Radom. I quote Page 12:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Thereupon the Governor General spoke, and made the -following statements:”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>It goes on from Page 13:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I shall, therefore, again summarize all the points.</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='141' id='Page_141'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“1. The Government General comprises that part of the occupied -Polish territory which is not an integral part of the -German Reich...</p> - -<p>“2. This territory has primarily been designated by the Führer -as the home of the Polish people. In Berlin the Führer, as -well as Field Marshal Göring, emphasized to me again and -again that this territory would not be subjected to Germanization. -It is to be set aside as the national territory of the -Polish people. In the name of the German people it is to be -placed at the disposal of the Polish nation as their reservation.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The speech of the Governor General ends two pages further. -I quote the last paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“There is one thing I should like to tell you: The Führer has -urged me to guarantee the self-administration of the Poles -as far as possible. Under all circumstances they must be -granted the right to choose the Wojts and the minor mayors -and village magistrates from among the Poles, which would -be to our interest as well.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I now turn to the entry of 4 March 1940. From the volume of -conferences, February 1940 to November 1940, Page 8:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General submits for consideration the question -of whether a slight pressure could not be exerted through -proper use of the Compulsory Labor Order. He refuses to ask -Berlin for the promulgation of a new decree defining special -measures for the application of force and threats. Measures -which might lead to unrest should be avoided. The shipping -of people by force has nothing in its favor.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The last quotation in my document book is on Page 143. It is -an entry dated 27 January 1941, Volume I, Page 115. A conference -between State Secretary Dr. Bühler and the Reich Finance Minister, -Count Schwerin von Krosigk. I quote the last paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is due to the efforts of all personnel employed in the Government -General that, after surmounting extraordinary and -unusual difficulties, a general improvement in the economic -situation can now be noted. The Government General, from -the day of its birth, has most conscientiously met the demands -of the Reich for strengthening the German war potential. It -is, therefore, permissible to ask that in future the Reich should -make no excessive demands on the Government General, so -that a sound and planned economy may be maintained in the -Government General, which, in turn, would prove of benefit -to the Reich.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That completes Volume II of the document book. -<span class='pageno' title='142' id='Page_142'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now come to Volume III and I ask the Tribunal to refer to -a quotation on Page 17 in my document book. It is an entry following -a government meeting of 18 October 1941. I quote the eighth -line from the bottom; it is a statement of the Governor General:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I shall first of all state, when replying to these demands”—that -means, the demands of the Reich—“that our strength has -been exhausted and that we can no longer take any responsibility -as regards the Führer. No instructions, orders, threats, -<span class='it'>et cetera</span>, can induce me to answer anything but an emphatic -‘no’ to demands which, even under the stress of wartime -conditions, are no longer tolerable. I will not permit a situation -to arise such as you, Mr. Naumann, so expressly indicated, -such as, for example, placing large areas at the disposal of -the troops for maneuvers and thus completely disrupting -the food supply which is already utterly insufficient.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The next quotation is on Pages 36 and 37 of my document book. -It is an entry dated 16 January 1942, and the quotation to which -I am referring is on the next page—Pages 65 and 66 of the diary:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Later on a short discussion took place in the King’s Hall -of the Castle.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>It took place with the chief of the Ukrainian committee. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General desires a larger employment of Ukrainians -in the administrative offices of the Government General. -In all offices in which Poles are employed there should -also be Ukrainians in proportion to the number of their population. -He asked Professor...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, if you will give us the page in -your document book now, that will be sufficient for the present, -because they seem to correspond.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Very well. May I continue, Mr. President?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think so, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I then come to Page 38 in the document book. This -entry deals with a law drafted by Himmler, which has already been -mentioned, regarding the treatment of aliens in the community. -I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General orders the following letter to be sent -to Landgerichtsrat Taschner:</p> - -<p>“ ‘Please inform Reich Minister Dr. Lammers of my opinion -which follows with my signature certified by yourself: I am -opposed to the law on the treatment of people foreign to the -German community, and I request that an early date be set -for a meeting of leading officials with regard to the draft so -<span class='pageno' title='143' id='Page_143'></span> -that it may be possible to set forth the principal legal viewpoints -which today still emphatically contradict this proposal -in its details. I shall personally attend this meeting. In my -opinion it is entirely impossible to circumvent the regular -courts and to transfer such far-reaching authority exclusively -to police organizations. The intended court at the Reich Security -Main Office cannot take the place of a regular court in -the eyes of the people.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>On Page 39 I quote the last paragraph but one:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“For that reason I object to this draft in its present form, -especially with regard to Paragraph 1 of the decree concerning -the order of its execution.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Page 40 is an entry dated 7 June 1942 which also deals with that -question of denationalization so emphatically denied by the Governor -General. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. -The next quotation is on Page 47 and deals with the acquisition -of Chopin’s posthumous works. I quote Paragraph 2:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“President Dr. Watzke reports that it would be possible to -procure in Paris the major part of Chopin’s posthumous wonks -for the State Library in Kraków. The Governor General -approves of the purchase of Chopin’s posthumous works -through the government of the Government General.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Page 50 deals with an entry in the diary which concerns the -securing of agricultural property. I quote Page 767 of the diary, -Paragraph 2:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is my aim to bring about agricultural reform in Galicia -by every possible means, even during the war. I thus have -kept the promises which I made a year ago in my proclamation -to the population of this territory. Further progress of -a beneficial nature can therefore result through the loyal co-operation -of the population with the German authorities. The -German administration in this area is willing, and has also -been given orders to treat the population well. It will protect -the loyal population of this area with the same decisive and -fundamental firmness with which it will suppress any attempt -at resistance against the order established by the Greater -German Reich. For this purpose, for the protection of the individual -farmer, I have issued an additional decree concerning -the duties of the German administration for food and agriculture -in Galicia.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I turn to Page 55 of the document book. This concerns a speech, -made by the Governor General before the leaders of the Polish -Delegation, and I quote the last paragraph on Page 56, Line 6:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I hope that the new harvest will place us in a position to -assist the Polish Aid Committee. In any event we will do -<span class='pageno' title='144' id='Page_144'></span> -whatever we can to check the crisis. It is also to our interest -that the Polish population should enjoy their work and co-operate. -We do not want to exterminate or annihilate anybody...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Page 61 of the document book deals with a conference which -the Governor General held with the Plenipotentiary General for the -Allocation of Labor. I quote the last paragraph on Page 919 of the -diary:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I would also like to take this opportunity of expressing to -you, Party Comrade Sauckel, our willingness to do everything -that is humanly possible. However, I should like to add one -request: The treatment of Polish workers in the Reich is still -subject to certain degrading restrictions.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I turn to Page 62 and quote Line 10:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I can assure you, Party Comrade Sauckel, that it would -be a tremendous help in recruiting workers, if at least part of -the degrading restrictions against the Poles in the Reich could -be abolished. I believe that could be effected.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I now turn to Page 66 of the document book. This is the only -entry in the diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank which he has signed -personally. It is a memorandum on the development in the Government -General after he had been relieved of all his positions in the -Party, and had repeatedly stated that he was resigning and hoped -that now at last his resignation would be accepted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this final survey, -dated 1 September 1942. It consists of five pages: Pages 66 to 71.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next quotation is on Page 75 and deals with the safeguarding -of art treasures. I quote the fifth line from the bottom. It is a statement -made by the Governor General:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The art treasures were carefully restored and cleaned, so -that approximately 90 percent of all the art treasures of the -former state of Poland in the territory of the Government -General could be made safe. These art treasures are entirely -the property of the Government General.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 92 of this volume. It is -an entry dated 8 December 1942, which was made on the occasion -of a meeting of departmental chiefs and which deals with the supply -situation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of that entry. The same -for the entry on Page 93, in which the Governor General speaks -of the question of recruiting workers and most severely condemns -all measures of force. -<span class='pageno' title='145' id='Page_145'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next entry, which appears important to me and which should -be read into the record, is on Page 108. It concerns a press conference, -and I ask the Tribunal to turn directly to Page 110. I quote -the third paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General sums up the result of the conference -and states that, with the participation of the president of the -department for propaganda and the press chief of the Government, -all points will be comprised in a directive to be -issued to all leading editors of the Polish papers. Instructions -for the handling of matters concerning foreigners, in the press -and in the cultural field, will be included in this directive. -The conciliatory spirit of the Reich will serve as a model.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I now ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 127 of the document book, -a conference of 26 May 1943, which deals with the question of food. -I quote the eighth line:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“We must understand that the first problem is the feeding of -the Polish population; but I would like to say, with complete -authority, that whatever happens with the coming rationing -period in the Government General, I shall, in any case, allot -to the largest possible number of the population such food -rations as we can justifiably afford in view of our commitments -to the Reich. Nothing and nobody will divert me from -this goal...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Page 131 of the document book deals with a committee of the -Governor General for supplies for the non-German working population. -I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these statements, -and I now turn to Page 141. This entry also deals with the food -situation. I quote the tenth line from the bottom:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“After examining all possibilities I have now ordered that as -from 1 September of this year, the food situation of the Polish -population of this territory shall also be regulated on a -generous scale. By 1 September of this year we shall introduce, -for the population of this territory, the rations which are -called the ‘Warthegau rations.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask permission to quote a few sentences from Page 142:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I should like to make a statement to you now. From the -seriousness with which I utter these words, you can judge -what I have in mind. I myself and the men of my Government -are fully aware of the needs also of the Polish population -in this district. We are not here to exterminate or -annihilate it, or to torment these people beyond the measure -of suffering laid upon them by fate. I hope that we shall -come to a satisfactory arrangement in all matters that sometimes -separate us. I personally have nothing against the -Poles...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='146' id='Page_146'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now turn to Page 148. It is a conference which deals with -young medical students. I quote Page 149, Paragraph 2, which is -a statement by the Governor General:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“This first—we can safely call it Ministry of Health, even -though this expression is not used—is something entirely -new. This department for health will have to deal with -important problems. For us, the physicians in this territory, -there is above all a lack of...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, I have just discovered that an error may possibly -have occurred, since these statements on Page 672 were perhaps -not made by the Governor General himself but by the head of the -Health Department. I shall examine this question again and then -submit the result to the Tribunal in writing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now turn to Page 155 of the document book. This entry seems -to me of a vital nature. It is dated 14 July 1943 and deals with the -establishment of the State Secretariat for Security.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is not in our book, apparently. We haven’t -got a Page 155, and we haven’t got a date, I think, of the 14th of July.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: It is July 1943. It has probably been omitted. With -the approval of the Tribunal I shall read the sentences in question -into the record. There are only three sentences:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General points out the disastrous effect which -the establishment of the State Secretariat for Security has -had on the authority of the Governor General. He said that a -new police and SS government had tried to establish itself -in opposition to the Governor General which it had been -possible to suppress only at the expense of a great deal of -energy and at the very last moment.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I then ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 166 of the document -book. This entry deals with general questions regarding the policy -in Poland. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Page 193 deals with the establishment of the Chopin Museum -which was created by the Governor General. I quote Page 1157 of -the diary, which is an extract from the Governor General’s speech:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Today I have inaugurated the Chopin Museum in Kraków. -We have saved and brought to Kraków, under most difficult -circumstances, the most valuable mementos of the greatest of -Polish musicians. I merely wanted to say this in order to -show you that I want to make a personal effort to put things -in order in this country as far as possible.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The last quotation is on Page 199 of Volume II of the document -book. It is an extract from a speech which Reichsführer SS Himmler -made on the occasion of the installation of the new Higher SS -<span class='pageno' title='147' id='Page_147'></span> -and Police Leader in Kraków, before the members of the Government -and the Higher SS and Police Leaders. This is the speech which -the Defendant Frank mentioned when he was examined. I quote -the eighth line from the bottom:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“You are all very familiar with the situation: 16 million -aliens and about 200,000 Germans live here; or if we include -the members of the Police and Wehrmacht, perhaps 300,000. -These 16 million aliens, who were augmented in the past by -a large number of Jews who have now emigrated or have -been sent to the East, consist largely of Poles and to a lesser -degree of Ukrainians.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I turn to the last document of this volume, Page 200, an entry -dated 14 December 1943. It concerns a speech which the Governor -General made to officers of the Air Force. I quote the second paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Therefore, everything should be done to keep the population -quiet, peaceful, and in order. Nothing should be done to -create unnecessary agitation among the population. I mention -only one example here:</p> - -<p>“It would be wrong if now, during the war, we were to -undertake the establishment of large German settlements -among the peasantry in this territory. This attempt at colonizing, -mostly through force, would lead to tremendous -unrest among the native peasant population. This, in turn, -from the point of view of production, would result in a -tremendous loss to the harvest, in a curtailment of cultivation, -and so on. It would also be wrong forcibly to deprive the -population of its Church, or of any possibility for leading -a simple cultural life.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I turn to Page 201, and I quote the last paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“We must take care of these territories and their population. -I have found, to my pleasure and that of all of our colleagues, -that this point of view has prevailed and that everything that -was formerly said against the alleged friendship with the -Poles or the weakness of this attitude, has dwindled to nothing -in face of the facts.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That completes Volume II of the document book—I beg your -pardon, I meant Volume III. Now I come to Volume IV of the document -book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Page 1 of the document book deals with a conversation which -took place on 25 January 1943 with the SS Obergruppenführer -Krüger. I quote the last paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General states that he had not been previously -informed about the large-scale action to seize asocial elements -<span class='pageno' title='148' id='Page_148'></span> -and that this procedure was in opposition to the Führer’s -decree of 7 May 1942, according to which the State Secretary -for Security must obtain the approval of the Governor -General before carrying out instructions by the Reichsführer -SS and Chief of the German Police. State Secretary Krüger -states that this concerned secret instructions which had to -be carried out suddenly.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to take cognizance of the fact that this is -merely an example of many similar discussions and differences of -opinion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now turn to Page 24 of the document book. This concerns a -meeting of the War Economy Staff and the Defense Committee on -22 September 1943. I hope that the pages tally again.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You said Page 24, didn’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Page 24, an entry of 22 September 1943.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It looks as though the paging is right. Our -book is Page 24 at the top, so perhaps you will continue to quote -the page for a moment or two. We will see whether it goes on right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: This concerns an entry dated 22 September 1943, -a meeting of the War Economy Staff and the Defense Committee. -I quote only the first lines:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In the course of the past few months, in the face of the -most difficult and senseless struggles, I have had to insist on -the principle that the Poles should, at last, be given a sufficient -quantity of food. You all know the foolish attitude of -considering the nations we have conquered as inferior to us, -and that at a moment when the labor potential of these -peoples represents one of the most important factors in our -fight for victory. By my opposition to this absurdity, which -has caused most grievous harm to the German people, I personally—and -many men of my government and many of -you—have incurred the charge of being friendly or soft -towards the Poles.</p> - -<p>“For years now people have not hesitated to attack my government -of this area with the foulest arguments of this kind, -and behind my back have hindered the fulfillment of these -tasks. Now it has been proved as clear as day that it is insane -to want to reconstruct Europe and at the same time to -persecute the European nations with such unparalleled -chicanery.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I now turn to Page 34 of the document book, an entry dated -20 April 1943, concerning a government meeting. I ask the Tribunal -to take judicial notice of the final words only of the Governor -General’s speech on Page 38 of the document book and Page 41 of -<span class='pageno' title='149' id='Page_149'></span> -the diary. Then I turn to Page 39 of the document book, a meeting -of 22 July 1943; I quote from the second paragraph, the tenth line:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The question of the resettlement was altogether particularly -difficult for us in this year. I can give you the good news -that resettlement in general has been completely discontinued -for the duration of the war. With regard to the transferring -of industries, we have just started to work at full speed. As -you know—I personally attach great importance to it—we -have to satisfy this need of the Reich, and in the coming -months we shall install great industrial concerns of international -renown in the Government General.</p> - -<p>“However, with regard to this question we must consider the -almost complete reconstruction of the Government General -which has consequently been forced upon us. While, until -now, we have always figured as a country supplying the Reich -with labor, as an agricultural country, and the granary of -Europe, we shall within a very short time become one of -the most important industrial centers of Europe. I remind -you of such names as Krupp, Heinkel, Henschel, whose -industries will be moved into the Government General.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I now ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 41 of the document book. -It is the statement which was made by the witness Doctor Bühler on -26 October 1943, in which he states that this report dealt with -4 years of reconstruction in the Government General on the basis -of reliable information from the 13 chief departments. The statement -includes Pages 42 to 69 of the document book. I do not propose -to quote from this statement, but I ask the Tribunal to take judicial -notice of it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I go straight on to Page 70 of the document book, which concerns -a government meeting dated 16 February 1944. I quote the last -paragraph, Page 4 of the document book.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“As opposed to this, the fact must be established that the -development, construction, and securing of that which today -gives this territory its importance were possible only because -it was necessary, in opposition to the ideas of the advocates -of brute force—so completely untimely during a war—to -bring the human and material resources of this area into -the service of the German war effort in as constructive a -manner as possible.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The next quotation is Page 74; an entry dated 6 March 1944. -I quote the last paragraph on Page 75, Page 5 of the diary:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General does not, as a matter of principle, -oppose the training of the younger generation for the priesthood -because, if courses for doctors, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, are arranged, -<span class='pageno' title='150' id='Page_150'></span> -similar opportunities must also be created in the field of -religion.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Page 77 deals with an order by the Governor General prohibiting -the evacuation of the population, or a part of it, which was in the -fighting zone near Lublin.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On Page 80 is an entry dated 12 April 1944. I quote the second -paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In this connection President Gerteis spoke of the treatment -of the Poles in the Reich. This treatment, said to be worse -than that of any other foreign workers, had led to the result -that practically no Poles would volunteer any more for work -in Germany.</p> - -<p>“There were 21 points on which the Polish workers in the -Reich were more badly treated than any other foreign -workers. The Governor General requested President Gerteis -to acquaint him with these 21 points which he would certainly -attempt to have abolished.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I now ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 100 of the document -book. It concerns a conference on 6 June 1944 regarding a large-scale -action against the partisans in the Bilgoraje Forest. I quote -Page 101, Page 4 of the diary:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General wants to be quite sure that protection -is given to the harmless population, which is itself suffering -under the partisan terror.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Page 102 deals with the views of the Governor General on concentration -camps. It is an entry dated 6 June 1944. I quote the last -paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General declared that he would never sign -such a decree, since it meant sending the person concerned -to a concentration camp. He stated that he had always protested -with the utmost vigor against the system of concentration -camps, for it was the greatest offense against the sense -of justice. He had thought there would be no concentration -camps for such matters, but they had apparently been silently -put into operation. It could only be handled in such a manner -that the persons condemned would be pardoned to jail or prison -for a certain number of years. He pointed out that prison -sentences, for instance, were imposed and examined by state -institutions. He therefore requested that State Secretary -Dr. Bühler should be informed that he, the Governor General, -would not sign such decrees. He did not wish concentration -camps to be officially sanctioned. He went on to say that -there was no pardon which would commute a sentence into -commitment to a concentration camp. The courts-martial are -<span class='pageno' title='151' id='Page_151'></span> -state legal organs of a special character and consist of police -units; actually they should normally be staffed by members -of the Wehrmacht.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, can you explain the translation of -the words at the bottom of Page 102 which are in English, “It only -could be handled in such a manner that the persons would be -pardoned to jail or prison for a certain number of years.” Can you -explain that from the point of view of meaning?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The meaning of the words becomes clear from the -statement made by President Wille in the previous paragraph where, -among others, you will find the following statement. It is the tenth -line from the top.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Reprieve Commission had asked the representative of -the Chief of the Security Police, who was present at the -session, in what form this pardon was to be effected. As far -as he knew, remittance of a sentence had been allowed in one -case only. In all other cases it was customary to couple Security -Police measures with the remittance of a sentence. It -was feared that otherwise these people might disappear.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now the Governor General was of the opinion that, for example, -to transmute a death sentence to a term in prison or penitentiary -was possible but that he would have to refuse direct commutation -of a death penalty into a suspended prison penalty if the Police in -that event were to impose security measures.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean that it meant that pardon from a -death sentence might be made by a reprieve for a sentence in prison -for a certain number of years, but not by sending to a concentration -camp, which would be for an indefinite period and under police -methods?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes, that is the sense of it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now turn to Page 104 of the document book. This quotation -also deals with the general question of treatment of the population -in the Government General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you have been very much longer -than you said, and the Tribunal thinks you might be able to cut -down a great deal of this. It is all very much on the same lines.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes. In that case, I ask the Tribunal to turn to -Page 112 of the document book, an entry dated 10 July 1944. This -entry deals with the official control of art treasures. I quote the -second paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Governor General instructs the expert Palezieux to have -a complete index made of these art treasures.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='152' id='Page_152'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You have already told us and given us some -evidence to support the view that the Defendant Frank was preserving -the art treasures and was wishing them to be preserved in -Poland, and it is not necessary under those circumstances to go -reading passages about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Very well. Then I ask the Tribunal to take judicial -notice of that entry; and if the Tribunal agrees, I shall merely give -you the pages of the documents in the document book which appear -important to me. That is page...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The proceedings were interrupted by technical difficulties in the -interpreting system.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Gentlemen of the Tribunal, if the Court is agreeable I -should like to give only the numbers of the pages of Volume IV -of the document book which seem particularly important to me. -These are the Pages 115, 121, 123, 134, 139, 152, and 182. That concludes -Volume IV of the document book and I come to the last -volume of the document book which will be finished considerably -faster.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Volume V deals exclusively with the accusations made by the -Prosecution of the United States against the Defendant Frank concerning -his activity as President of the Academy for German Law, -as President of the National Socialist Lawyers’ Association, and -similar positions. Page 1 is a document which has already been submitted -by the Prosecution, 1391-PS. It still has no USA number and -will be Exhibit Number Frank-11. It is the law regarding the Academy -for German Law with the necessary statutes and the tasks -resulting therefrom.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I turn to page 25 of the document book. This quotation becomes -Exhibit Frank-12 (Document Number Frank-12). It deals with a -sentence which has been ascribed to the defendant: “Right is that -which is good for the people.” This quotation should prove only that -the Defendant Dr. Frank wanted to express nothing more than that -which is implied in the Roman sentence: <span class='it'>Salus publica suprema lex</span> -(The supreme law is the welfare of the people). I ask the Court to -take cognizance of this and turn to Page 26 of the document book, -an excerpt from the magazine of the Academy for German Law of -1938. That will be Exhibit Frank-13 (Document Number Frank-13). -This quotation also deals with the afore-mentioned sentence: “Right -is that which is good for the people.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Page 30 is an excerpt from Exhibit USA-670 (Document Number -3459-PS) and deals with the closing celebration of the “Congress of -German Law 1939” at Leipzig, where the Defendant Dr. Frank -made the concluding speech before 25,000 lawyers. I quote on -Page 31, Line 10 from the bottom: -<span class='pageno' title='153' id='Page_153'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Only by applying legal security methods, by administering -true justice, and by clearly following the legislative ideal of -law can the national community continue to exist. This legal -method which permanently ensures the fulfillment of the -tasks of the community has been assigned to you, fellow -guardians of the law, as your mission. Ancient Germanic principles -have come down to us through the centuries.</p> - -<p>“1) No one shall be judged who has not had the opportunity -to defend himself.</p> - -<p>“2) No one shall be deprived of the incontestable rights which -he enjoys as a member of the national community, except by -decision of the judge. Honor, liberty, life, the profits of labor -are among those rights.</p> - -<p>“3) Regardless of the nature of the proceedings, the reasons -for the indictment, or the law which is applied, everyone who -is under indictment must be given the opportunity to have a -defense counsel who can make legal statements for him; he -must be given a legal and impartial hearing.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I turn to Page 35 of the document book, which deals with a -speech, an address by the Defendant Dr. Frank, made at a meeting -of the heads of the departments of the National Socialist Lawyer’s -Association on 19 November 1941. The speech—that is, the excerpt—becomes -Exhibit Number Frank-14 (Document Number Frank-14). -I quote only a few sentences at the top of Page 37.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Therefore, it is a very serious task which we have imposed -upon ourselves and we must always bear in mind that it can -be fulfilled only with courage and absolute readiness for self-sacrifice. -I observe the developments with great attention. -I watch every anti-juridical tendency. I know only too well -from history—as you all do—of the attempts made to gain -ever-increasing power in general directions because one has -weapons with which one can shoot, and authority on the basis -of which one can make people who have been arrested disappear. -In the first place, I mean by this not only the attempts -made by the SS, the SD, and by the police headquarters, -but the attempts of many other offices of the State and the -Reich to exclude themselves from general jurisdiction.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I turn to—I would like to quote the last five lines on Page 41. -Those were the last words spoken during that session:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“One cannot debase law to an article of merchandise; one -cannot sell it; it exists or it does not exist. Law is not an -exchange commodity. If justice is not supported, the State -loses its moral foundation; it sinks into the abyss of darkness -and horror.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='154' id='Page_154'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next document is on Page 42. It is the first address which -the Defendant Dr. Frank made in Berlin at the university on 8 June -1942. It will be Exhibit Number Frank-15 (Document Number -Frank-15). I quote Page 44, second paragraph, seventh line:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“On the other hand, however, a member of the community -cannot be deprived of honor, liberty, life, and property; he -cannot be expelled and condemned without first being able to -defend himself against the charges brought against him. The -Armed Forces serve us as a model in this respect. There -everyone is a free, honored member of the community, with -equal rights, until a judge—standing independently above him—has -weighed and judged between indictment and defense.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I then turn to Page 49 of the document book, the second of these -four long speeches. It was held in Vienna, and will become Exhibit -Number Frank-15.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have already had Exhibit Frank-15 on -Page 41.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: No, I beg your pardon, Mr. President; it will be -Frank-16 (Document Number Frank-16). I quote only one sentence -on Page 51.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I shall continue to repeat with all the strength of my conviction -that it would be an evil thing if ideals advocating -a police state were to be presented as distinct National Socialist -ideals, while old Germanic ideals of law fell entirely into the -background.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 57 of the document book -to the speech made by the Defendant Dr. Frank at the University -of Munich, on 20 July 1942. This will be Exhibit Frank-17 (Document -Number Frank-17). I quote on Page 58, Line 16:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is, however, impossible to talk about a national community -and still regard the servants of the law as excluded from this -national community, and throw mud at them in the midst of -the war. The Führer has transferred the tasks of the Reich -Leader of the Reich Legal Office and that of the leader of the -National Socialist Lawyers’ Association to me, and therefore -it is my duty to state that it is detrimental to the German -national community if in the ‘Black Corps’ lawyers are called -‘sewer-rats.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 67 of the document book. -That is the speech which he made at Heidelberg on 21 July 1942. -That will be Exhibit Frank-18 (Document Number Frank-18). I ask -the Tribunal to take official notice of that speech. On Page 69 I -quote only one sentence: “But never must there be a police state, -never. That I oppose.” -<span class='pageno' title='155' id='Page_155'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now come to the last document which the Prosecution of the -United States has already submitted under Exhibit Number USA-607 -(Document Number 2233(x)-PS), an excerpt from the diary: “Concluding -reflections on the events of the last three months.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In these reflections Dr. Frank once more definitely states his -attitude towards the concept of the legal state, and I ask the Tribunal -to take cognizance particularly of his basic assumptions on Pages 74 -and 75 of the document book. Here, Dr. Frank again formulated the -prerequisites which he considered necessary for the existence of -any legal state. I quote only a few lines from Page 74:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“1) No fellow German can be convicted without regular court -procedure, and only on the basis of a law in effect before -the act was committed.</p> - -<p>“2) The proceedings must carry full guarantee that the accused -will be interrogated on all matters pertaining to the -indictment, and that he will be able to speak freely.</p> - -<p>“3) The accused must have the opportunity, at all stages of -the trial, to avail himself of the services of defense counsel -acquainted with the law.</p> - -<p>“4) The defense counsel must have complete freedom of action -and independence in carrying out his office in order to strike -an even balance between the State prosecutor and the -defendant.</p> - -<p>“5) The judge or the court must make his or its decision -quite independently—that is, the verdict must not be influenced -by any irrelevant factors—in logical consideration of the -subject matter and in just application of the purport of the -law.</p> - -<p>“6) When the penalty imposed by the sentence has been -paid, the act has been expiated.</p> - -<p>“7) Measures for protective custody and security custody -may not be undertaken or carried out by police organs, nor -may measures for the punishment of concentration camp -inmates, except from this aspect, that is, after confirmation -of the intended measures by regular, independent judges.</p> - -<p>“8) In the same manner, the administration of justice for -fellow Germans must guarantee full safeguarding of individual -interests in all relations pertaining to civil suits -proper.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, are there any passages in these -documents which express the opinion that the same principles ought -to be applied to others than fellow Germans?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: In this last quotation the Defendant Dr. Frank dealt -basically with questions of law without making any difference here -<span class='pageno' title='156' id='Page_156'></span> -between Germans and people of foreign nationality. However, in -his capacity as Governor General he also fundamentally objected -at all times to the transfer of Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews to concentration -camps. This can be seen from a whole series of entries in -the diary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With this I have come to the end of my evidence for Dr. Frank. -There are left only the answers to interrogatories by witnesses -whose interrogation before a commission has been approved by the -Court. At a later date I shall compile these interrogations in a -small document book and submit the translation thereof to the -Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You are speaking of interrogatories where -you have not yet got the answers; is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: These are interrogatories to which the answers -have not yet been received.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, as soon as you have received them -you will furnish them to the Prosecution and to the Tribunal?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. OTTO PANNENBECKER (Counsel for Defendant Frick): In -presenting evidence for the Defendant Frick, I shall forego calling -the defendant himself as a witness. The questions which require an -explanation deal mainly with problems relating to formal authority -and also with problems which differentiate between formal authority -and actual responsibility. These are problems, part of which have -already been elucidated by the interrogation of Dr. Lammers and -the rest of which will be cleared up by the submission of documents. -One special field, however, cannot be entirely clarified by -documents; and that is the question of the actual distribution of -authority within the sphere of the Police; but for that special field I -have named the witness Dr. Gisevius. He is the only witness whose -interrogation seems to be necessary for the presentation of evidence -in the case of Frick. Therefore, in the meantime, I have dispensed -with other witnesses.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask the Court to decide whether I should call the witness -Dr. Gisevius first or whether I should submit my documents first. -If documents are to be presented first, I believe that I could finish -by the midday recess.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You can finish your documents before the -adjournment, do you mean?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. I believe so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Until 1:00 o’clock?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. -<span class='pageno' title='157' id='Page_157'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you indifferent whether you call the -witness first or whether you present the documents first?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that perhaps it would -be more convenient to give the documents first. They hope that -you will be able to finish them reasonably quickly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Numbers 1, 2, and 3 of the document book (Documents Number -386-PS, L-79, and 3726-PS) deal with evidence concerning the -question of whether the members of the Reich Cabinet knew about -Hitler’s preparation for aggressive war. I need not read the documents; -they have already been submitted, and they show that Hitler -gave information of his plans for aggression only to those of his -assistants who had to know of these plans for their own work, but -did not inform Frick who, as Minister of the Interior, was responsible -for the internal policy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Within the scope of the war preparation, Frick was made Plenipotentiary -for Reich Administration by the Reich Defense Law of -4 September 1938, which has already been submitted, Exhibit -Number USA-36 (Document Number 2194-PS). This law does not -indicate that this position had anything to do with the known -preparation of an aggressive war; it shows only the participation -of the Administration of the Interior in a general preparation and -organization in the event of a future war. I have therefore included -in the document book an excerpt from this law under Number 4 of -the document book, in order to correct an error. The Defendant -Frick himself stated in an affidavit on 14 November 1945, that he -had held the position of Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration -from 21 May 1935. This is the date of the first Reich Defense Law, -which has already been submitted as Exhibit Number USA-24 -(Document 2261-PS). The first Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, -however, does not provide for the position of Plenipotentiary for -Reich Administration; that is contained only in the second law of -4 September 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This second law has been submitted under Exhibit Number -USA-36. Following this erroneous statement which the Defendant -Frick made without having the two laws on hand, the Prosecution -has also stated that Frick held the position of Plenipotentiary for -Reich Administration from 21 May 1935, while actually he held it -only from 4 September 1938, that is, the date of the second law.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Numbers 5 and 6 of the document book have already been submitted -by the Prosecution. They also prove nothing except the -participation of the Defendant Frick in the establishment of civil -<span class='pageno' title='158' id='Page_158'></span> -administration with a view to a possible future war. It is not necessary -to read this either.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution considers Hitler’s aggressive intentions to be so -well known and so obvious as to require no further proof. The -Prosecution on that assumption came to the conclusion that participation -in the National Socialist Government, in any field whatsoever, -would in itself imply the conscious support of aggressive -war. In opposition to that I have referred to evidence in documents -from Number 7 to 10 inclusive of the Frick document book (Documents -Number 2288-PS, 2292-PS, 2289-PS, and 3729-PS) which have -already been submitted by the Prosecution and which show that -Hitler in public, as well as in private conversations, from the time -he came into power followed a definite policy of declaring his -peaceful intentions—a policy, therefore, which for considered -reasons, declared to all that to keep peace was right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I believe that these documents, which have already been submitted -to the Tribunal, must also be considered in order to decide -whether or not Hitler’s official policy, since his coming to power, -indicated that he had intentions of waging aggressive war. As -evidence in that direction, I should like to submit Number 11 and -Number 12 of the document book, which have not been presented -until now, and which I will submit as Documents Frick-1 and -2.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The first is a telegram of 8 March 1936 from Cardinal Archbishop -Schulte to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces at the time -of the occupation of the Rhineland in 1936. The second document -is a solemn declaration by the Austrian bishops occasioned by the -annexation of Austria in March 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The first document states, and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Cardinal Archbishop Schulte has sent to General Von Blomberg, -the Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces, -a telegram in which, at the memorable hour when the Armed -Forces of the Reich are re-entering the German Rhineland as -the guardians of peace and order, he greets the soldiers of our -nation with deep emotion mindful of the magnificent example -of self-sacrificing love of fatherland, stern manly discipline, -and upright fear of God, which our Army has always given -to the world.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I particularly selected these two documents because the Catholic -Church is not suspected of sanctioning aggressive wars, or of -approving of Hitler’s criminal intentions in any other way. These -statements would have been unthinkable if the accusations of the -Prosecution were true, namely, that the criminal aims of Hitler and -particularly his aggressive intentions had been known. -<span class='pageno' title='159' id='Page_159'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, the Tribunal would like to -know what is the source of this telegram from the Archbishop, -Number Frick-11.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: I took the telegram, Number Frick-11, -from the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> of 9 March 1936.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And the other one?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: The other document is from the <span class='it'>Völkischer -Beobachter</span> of 28 March 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 13 of the document book contains only one sentence, -taken from a speech made by Frick, from which it is evident that -Frick shared the same opinion. He states in this speech, and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The national revolution is the expression of the will to eliminate -by legal means every form of external and internal -foreign domination.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You gave that the number 13, did you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. That should be 3.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes, that is what I wanted to say. I -submit it as Document Number Frick-3.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: The Defendant Frick has been accused -particularly of working for the League for Germans Abroad. The -Prosecution saw in this activity a contribution by the Defendant -Frick to the preparation of aggressive wars. Frick’s actual attitude -regarding the aims of the League for Germans Abroad can be seen -from Number 14, which will be Document Number Frick-4. In a -speech made by Frick, it states, and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The VDA (League for Germans Abroad) has nothing to do -with political aims or with frontier questions; it is, and is -intended to be, nothing more than a rallying point for German -cultural activities...the world over.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In Number 15, which is Exhibit Frick-5...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, I perhaps ought to say -that in the index of this document book it looks as though the -exhibit numbers were the numbers of the documents in the order in -which they are put in the book, but that will not be so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: No, it will not be so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That last document which you just put in as -Exhibit Number 4 is shown in the book to be Exhibit Number 14, -which is a mistake. It is Document Number 14, but not Exhibit -Number 14. -<span class='pageno' title='160' id='Page_160'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Number 14 of the document book, Exhibit -Number Frick-4 (Document Number Frick-4).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Dealing with the same subject I have -entered in Number 15, Exhibit Number Frick-5 (Document Number -3358-PS), a decree of the Reich Minister of the Interior of -24 February 1933, which also deals with the question of the work of -the League for Germans Abroad. It states, and I quote...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has that not already been put in? I see it has -a PS number.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: It has a PS number, but it was not then -submitted as evidence by the Prosecution. Therefore I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The suffering and misery of the times, the lack of work and -food within Germany, cannot divert attention from the fact -that about 30 million Germans, living outside of the present -contracted borders of the Reich, are an integral part of the -entire German people; an integral part, which the Reich -Government is not able to help economically but to which it -considers itself under an obligation to offer cultural support -through the organization primarily concerned with this task—the -League of Germans Abroad.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In the documents from Number 16 to 24 inclusive of the document -book, which I need not read in detail, I have placed together -the legal decrees which deal with the competence of the Reich -Ministry of the Interior as a central office for certain occupied territories. -The tasks of this central office, which had no authority to -issue orders and no executive authority in any occupied territories, -have already been described by the witness Dr. Lammers; and these -tasks are specially entered in Number 24 of the document book. I do -not need to submit it in evidence. It is an official publication of the -<span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span> and has, in addition, already been submitted as -3082-PS. In accordance with the fact that the central office had no -authority to issue orders in the occupied territories, there is in the -diary of Dr. Frank a confirmation that the Governor General alone -had authority to issue orders for the administration of his territory. -I do not need to quote this passage as it has already been submitted -to the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Police authority in the occupied territories was transferred -to Reichsführer SS Himmler; but Frick as Reich Minister of the -Interior had nothing to do with this either, since that authority was -vested exclusively in Himmler in his capacity as Reichsführer SS. -That can be seen from Number 26 of the document book, which also -already has been submitted as Exhibit USA-319 (Document Number -1997-PS). -<span class='pageno' title='161' id='Page_161'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution further considers the Defendant Frick responsible -for the crimes committed in the Protectorate of Bohemia and -Moravia since August 1943, on the grounds that Frick had been -Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia since August 1943. In this -connection, I refer to Numbers 28 and 29 of the document book -(Documents Number 1366-PS and 3443-PS), from which it is evident -that, at the time that Frick was appointed, the former powers of the -Reich Protector had been subdivided between a so-called German -State Minister in Bohemia and Moravia—who, under the immediate -supervision of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, had to manage all -government affairs—and the Reich Protector Frick who was given -some special powers and in principle had the right to grant reprieves -on sentences passed by the local courts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Frick has also been accused of being responsible for the Political -Police, that is, the Secret State Police, and the concentration camps. -Until 1936 police matters were the affair of the individual states in -Germany; consequently in Prussia, Göring as Prussian Prime -Minister, and Prussian Minister of the Interior, built up the Political -Police and established the concentration camps. Frick, therefore, as -Reich Minister of the Interior, had no connection with these things.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the spring of 1934 Frick also became Prussian Minister of the -Interior. Previously, however, Göring had by a special law taken -the affairs of the Political Police out of the jurisdiction of the office -of the Prussian Minister of the Interior and placed it under the -immediate supervision of the Prime Minister, an office which Göring -retained for himself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The corresponding decrees have already been submitted by the -Prosecution as Documents Number 2104-PS, 2105-PS, and 2113-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The same is evident from Document Number 30 in the document -book, which has also been submitted as Exhibit USA-233 (Document -Number 2344-PS).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus, in the Political Police sphere, Frick, until 1936, had only a -general right of supervision, such as the Reich had over the individual -states. He had, however, no special right of command in -individual cases, only the authority to issue general directives; and -in Numbers 31-33 of the document book I have entered a few of -these directives issued by Frick.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I quote Number 31, which will be Exhibit Frick-6 (Document -Number 779-PS):</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In order to correct the abuses resulting from the decree for -protective custody, the Reich Minister of the Interior, in his -directives of 12 April 1934 to the Land governments and -Reichsstatthalter anent the promulgation and execution of -decrees for protective custody, has determined that protective -custody may be ordered only: (a) for the protection of the -<span class='pageno' title='162' id='Page_162'></span> -arrested person; (b) if the arrested person by his behavior, -and especially by activities directed against the State, has -directly endangered public security and order. Therefore, -protective custody is not permissible when the above-mentioned -cases do not apply, especially (a) for persons who -merely exercise their public and civil rights; (b) for lawyers -for representing the interests of their clients; (c) in the case -of personal matters, as for instance, insults; (d) because of -economic measures (questions of salary, dismissal of -employees, and similar cases).</p> - -<p>“Furthermore, protective custody is not permissible as a -countermeasure for punishable actions, for the courts are -competent to deal with those cases.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: It is a document which the Prosecution -has submitted as 779-PS and which was taken from the files of the -ministry. There is no date on the document but it must have been -in the spring of 1934, as can be seen from the first sentence of the -document. The <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> mentions the same decree in -its issue of 14 April 1934. I have included that as Number 32 in the -document book; it will be Exhibit Frick-7 (Document Number -Frick-7).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, are you offering that as an -exhibit or has it already been put in evidence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: No, it has not, as yet, been submitted. -I offer it as Exhibit Number Frick-7.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am told the date is April 12.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: In the spring of 1934, yes, shortly after.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: 12th of April, 1934.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> also mentions this decree in its issue -of 14 April 1934. We are concerned with Document 32 of the document -book, which will be Exhibit Number Frick-7. I do not need -to read it in detail.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The same is evident from Number 33 of the book, which will be -Exhibit Number Frick-8 (Document Number I-302).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 34 of the book—which will be Exhibit Number Frick-9 -(Document Number 775-PS) shows that the Gestapo actually did not -adhere to Frick’s directives, and that Frick was powerless in that -connection. Nevertheless, the document appears important to me -because it shows that Frick tried repeatedly with great pains to -counteract the abuses of the Gestapo, which, however, with the -<span class='pageno' title='163' id='Page_163'></span> -support of Himmler, was stronger than he—especially since Himmler -enjoyed the direct confidence of the Führer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On 17 June 1936, the affairs of the Political Police came under -the jurisdiction of the Reich. Himmler was appointed Chief of the -German Police and, though formally attached to the Reich Ministry -of the Interior, he functioned, in fact, as an independent Police -Ministry under the immediate authority of Hitler; and, as a minister, -he was privileged to look after his affairs in the Reich Cabinet -himself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This can be seen from Document Number 35 of the document -book—an excerpt from the <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span> which has been submitted -as 2073-PS. I do not believe that I have to give it an exhibit -number; it is an official announcement in the <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this connection the Prosecution has submitted Document -1723-PS as Exhibit USA-206. I have entered an extract from this -document as Number 36 in the document book in order to correct -an error. The document is an extract from a book written by -Dr. Ley in his capacity as Reich Organization Leader. In that book -Dr. Ley gives directives to the Party offices regarding co-operation -with the Gestapo, and at the end of the extract Ley reprinted a -decree by Frick which shows how Frick attempted to counteract -the arbitrary measures of the Gestapo.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>However, in presenting evidence on the morning of 13 December -1945, the Prosecution read the entire document as an order -by Frick. I should therefore like to correct that error.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Since Himmler and the chiefs of the Gestapo did not heed Frick’s -general directives, Frick tried, at least in individual cases, to alleviate -conditions in concentration camps; but generally he was not -successful. To quote an example, I have included—under Number 37 -of the document book—a letter by the former Reichstag Delegate -Wulle, which he sent to me of his own accord. This letter will be -Exhibit Number Frick-10 (Document Number Frick-10). The letter -states, and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“He”—Frick—“as my former counsel told me, has at various -times tried to persuade Hitler to release me; but without -success as it was Himmler who made all decisions regarding -concentration camps. However, I owe it to him that I have -been treated in a comparatively decent manner at the Sachsenhausen -Concentration Camp... He stood out from among the -Nazi demagogues because of his impartiality and reserve; he -was a man who by nature disapproved of any act of violence... -Since the spring of 1925 I have been involved in a -sharp struggle against Hitler and his party. I consider it even -more to Frick’s credit that despite this antagonism and his -comparatively powerless position with respect to Himmler, -<span class='pageno' title='164' id='Page_164'></span> -he tried in every way to help my wife and me during the -bitter years of my imprisonment in the concentration camp...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution has asserted, on the basis of the statements -made by the witness Blaha before this Tribunal, that Frick knew of -the conditions in the Dachau concentration camp through having -visited it in the first half of the year 1944.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Therefore, with the permission of the Tribunal I submitted an -interrogatory to the witness Gillhuber, who accompanied Frick on -all his trips and...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment, Dr. Pannenbecker. The -Tribunal considers that it cannot entertain an affidavit upon oath -from the Defendant Frick, who is not going into the witness box to -give evidence on oath, unless he is offered as a witness, in which -case he may be cross-examined.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes, but the last document was not an -affidavit by Frick, but by Gillhuber, a witness, who has received -an interrogatory. It is Number 40 of the document book. I am just -informed that by an oversight this exhibit has not been included -in the book; I shall have to submit it later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Oh, well! Tell us what it is.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: It is an interrogatory of, and the -answers by, the witness Gillhuber. Gillhuber, for the personal protection -of the Defendant Frick, accompanied him on all his official -travels. In answering the interrogatory, he confirmed the fact that -Frick had never visited the camp. The interrogatory, with the -answers, has still to be submitted in translation. It is contained in -my book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may read the interrogatory, unless the -Prosecution has any objection to its admissibility, or the terms of it, -because the interrogatory has already been provisionally allowed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: I read, then, from Number 40 of the -Frick document book, which becomes Exhibit Frick-11 (Document -Number Frick-11), the following:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Question: From when until when, and in what capacity, -were you working for the Defendant Frick?</p> - -<p>“Answer: From the 18 March 1936 until the arrival of the -Allied Troops on 29 or 30 April 1945, as an employee of the -Reich Security Service, as guard and escort.</p> - -<p>“Question: Did you always accompany him on his travels for -his personal protection?</p> - -<p>“Answer: From 1936 until January 1942 only intermittently, -but from January 1942 as office chief, I accompanied him on -all his trips and flights. -<span class='pageno' title='165' id='Page_165'></span></p> - -<p>“Question: Do you know whether the Defendant Frick visited -the concentration camp of Dachau during the first six months -of 1944?</p> - -<p>“Answer: To my knowledge, Frick did not visit the Dachau -concentration camp.</p> - -<p>“Question: Would you have known it had that been the case, -and why would you have known it?</p> - -<p>“Answer: I would have had to know it had that been the case. -I was always close to him; and my employees would have -reported it if he had left during my absence.</p> - -<p>“Question: Do you still have the log book of the trips you -made, and can you produce it now?</p> - -<p>“Answer: From about 1941 log books were no longer kept. -Instead of that, monthly reports of trips were sent to the Reich -Security Service in Berlin. The copies which were kept in my -office were, according to orders, burned with all the rest of -the material in April 1945.</p> - -<p>“Question: Do you know whether the Defendant Frick ever -visited the Dachau camp?</p> - -<p>“Answer: To my knowledge Frick never visited the Dachau -Camp.</p> - -<p>“Moosburg, 23 March 1946”.—Signed—“Max Gillhuber”—Signed—“Leonard -N. Dunkel, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>To comment on the question whether an official visitor to a -concentration camp could always get a correct picture of the actual -conditions existing there, I ask permission to read an unsolicited -letter which I received a few days ago from a Catholic priest, -Bernard Ketzlick. This letter which I have submitted as Supplement -Frick Number...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, the Prosecution makes -objection to this because it is a character of evidence that there -is no way of testing. I have a basket of such correspondence -making charges against these defendants, which I would not think -the Tribunal would want to receive. If the door is open to this kind -of evidence, there is no end to it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This witness has none of the sanctions, of course, that assure the -verity of testimony, and I think it is objectionable to go into letters -received from unknown persons.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: May I say just one word on this subject? -I received the letter so late that I did not have an opportunity to -ask the person concerned to send me an affidavit. Of course, I am -prepared to submit such an affidavit later, if such an affidavit -should have greater probative value. -<span class='pageno' title='166' id='Page_166'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the letter cannot be -admitted, but an application can be made in the ordinary way for -leave to put in an affidavit or to call the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. Then, at a later date, I shall submit -a written request.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I shall not read Number 38 of the document book since it concerns -a statement made by Frick; and I refer, finally, to an excerpt -from the book <span class='it'>Inside Europe</span> by John Gunther which will be submitted -as Exhibit Frick-12 (Document Number Frick-12). The excerpt -is contained under Number 39 in the document book I quote—it -concerns a book which appeared originally in the English language, -and I therefore quote it in English:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Born in the Palatinate in 1877, Frick studied law and became -a Beamter, an official. He is a bureaucrat through and -through. Hitler is not intimate with him, but he respects him. -He became Minister of the Interior because he was the only -important Nazi with civil service training. Precise, obedient, -uninspired, he turned out to be a faithful executive; he has -been called the ‘only honest Nazi?’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>As the last document, may I be permitted to refer to an extract -from the book <span class='it'>To the Bitter End</span> by Gisevius. I believe I do not -need to quote these passages individually, since the witness himself -will be questioned. The extract will be Exhibit Number Frick-13 -(Document Number Frick-13).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There are still left two answers to interrogatories by the witnesses -Messersmith and Seger. I ask to be permitted to read these answers -later, as soon as the answers have been submitted to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That concludes the presentation of documents. I believe there -would be no purpose in calling the witnesses now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='167' id='Page_167'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you prepared to call your witness, -Dr. Pannenbecker?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes, Mr. President, that is my request. -I now ask permission to call the witness Gisevius. He is the sole -witness in Frick’s case. I have especially selected witness Gisevius to -clarify the question of the state of the police authority in Germany, -as he, from the very beginning, has been on the side of the opposition -and is best qualified to give a picture of the state of that -authority in Germany at that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Gisevius took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HANS BERND GISEVIUS (Witness): Hans Bernd Gisevius.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear -by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, were you a member of the -NSDAP or one of its affiliated organizations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Is it correct that you personally participated -in the events of 20 July 1944, and that you were also present -in the OKW at that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: How did you get into the police service?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: In July 1933 I passed the state examination in law. -As a descendant of an old family of civil servants I applied for a -civil service appointment in the Prussian administration. I belonged, -at that time, to the German National People’s Party and to -the Stahlhelm, and by the standards of that day I was considered -politically reliable. Consequently, at the first stage of my training -as a civil servant I was assigned to the Political Police, which meant -my entry into the newly created Secret State Police. In those days -I was very glad to have been assigned to the police service. I had -already at that time heard that abominations of all kinds were -going on in Germany. I was inclined to consider these as the final -outburst of the situation, akin to civil war, which we were experiencing -at the end of 1932 and the beginning of 1933. So I hoped -to contribute to the re-establishment of a proper executive organization -which would provide for law, decency, and order. But this -happiness was doomed to be short-lived. -<span class='pageno' title='168' id='Page_168'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I had scarcely been 2 days in this new police office, when I discovered -that incredible conditions existed there. These were not -police who took action against riots, murder, illegal detention, and -robbery; these were police who protected those guilty of such crimes. -It was not the guilty persons who were arrested, but rather those -who asked the police for help. These were not police who took -action against the crime, but police whose task seemed to be to -hush it up or, even worse, to sponsor it; for those SA and SS Kommandos -who played at being police in private were encouraged by -this so-called Secret State Police and were given all possible aid. -The most terrible and, even for a newcomer, most obvious thing -was that a system of unlawful detention was gaining more and -more ground—a worse and more dreadful system than which could -not be conceived.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The offices of the new State Police were in a huge building which -was, however, not large enough to take all the prisoners. Special -concentration camps for the Gestapo were established, and their -names will go down in history as a mark of infamy. These were -Oranienburg and the Gestapo’s private prison in Papestrasse, Columbia -House, or, as it was cynically nicknamed, “Columbia Hall.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to make it quite clear that this was certainly rather -amateurish compared with what all of us experienced later. But so -it started, and I can only convey my personal impression by describing -a brief incident I remember. After only 2 days I asked one -of my colleagues, who was also a professional civil servant—he had -been taken over from the old Political Police into the new one, and -he was one of those officials who were forced into it—I asked him, -“Tell me, am I in a police office here or in a robber’s den?” The -answer I received was, “You are in a robber’s den and you can -expect to see much more yet.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Under whom was the Political Police at -that time and who was the superior authority?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: The Political Police was under one Rudolf Diels. He, -too, came from the old Prussian Political Police. He was a professional -civil servant, and one might have expected him still to retain -the ideas of law and decency: but in a brutal and cynical way he -set his mind on making the new rulers forget his political past as a -democrat and on ingratiating himself with his superior, the Prussian -Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, Göring. It was Diels -who created the Gestapo office; he suggested to Göring the issue of -the first decree for making that office independent. It was Diels -who let the SA and the SS enter that office; he legalized the actions -of these civil Kommandos. But soon it became evident to me that -such a bourgeois renegade could not do so much wrong quite by -himself. Some very important person must have been backing him; -<span class='pageno' title='169' id='Page_169'></span> -in fact, I very quickly saw also that somebody was taking a daily -interest in everything that happened in that office. Reports were -written; telephone inquiries were received. Diels went several times -daily to give reports, and it was the Prussian Minister of the Interior -Göring who considered this Secret State Police as his special -preserve.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>During those months nothing happened in this office which was -not known or ordered by Göring personally. I want to stress this, -because in the course of years the public formed a different idea of -Göring because he noticeably retired from his official functions. At -that time, it was not yet the Göring who finally suffocated, in his -Karinhall. It was the Göring who looked after everything personally -and had not yet begun to busy himself with the building of -Karinhall or to don all sorts of uniforms and decorations. It was -Göring still in civilian clothes, who was the real chief of an office, -who inspired it, and who attached importance to being the “iron” -Göring.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I believe you can describe some -points more concisely. As to what you have just said, do you know -this from your own experience, or where did you learn of it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I not only heard and saw it myself, but I also learned -much from a man who in those days was also a member of the -Secret State Police, and whose information will play an important -part in the course of my statements.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At that time a criminologist had been called into the Secret State -Police, probably the best known expert of the Prussian police, Oberregierungsrat -Nebe. Nebe was a National Socialist. He had been in -opposition to the former Prussian police and had joined the National -Socialist Party. He was a man who sincerely believed in the purity -and genuineness of the National Socialist aims. Thus I saw for -myself how this man found out on the spot what was actually going -on and how he inwardly recoiled.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I can also state here, as it is important, the reasons why Nebe -became a strong opponent, who went with the opposition up to -20 July and later suffered death by hanging. At that time, in -August 1933, Nebe was ordered by the Defendant Göring to murder -Gregor Strasser, formerly a leading member of the National -Socialist Party, by means of a car or hunting accident. Nebe was -so shocked at this order that he refused to carry it out and made -an inquiry at the Reich Chancellery. The answer from the Reich -Chancellery was that the Führer knew nothing of this order. Thereupon -Nebe was summoned to Göring, who reproached him most -bitterly for having made an inquiry. Nevertheless, when he -finished these reproaches he considered it advisable to promote him, -because he thought he would thereby silence him. -<span class='pageno' title='170' id='Page_170'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The second thing which happened at that time, and which is -also very important, was that the Defendant Göring gave the -Political Police so-called open warrants for murder. At that time -there were not only so-called amnesty laws which gave amnesty -for infamous actions, but there was also a special law according -to which investigations, already initiated by police authorities and -by the public prosecutor, could be quashed, on condition, however, -that in these special cases the Reich Chancellor, or Göring, personally -signed the pertinent order. Göring made use of this law by -giving open warrants to the Chief of the Gestapo, with which all -that had to be done was to fill in the names of those who were to -be murdered. Nebe was so shocked by this that from that moment -on he felt it his duty to fight against the Gestapo. At our request -he remained with us there, and afterwards in the Criminal Police, -because we needed one man at least who could keep us informed -about police conditions in case our desire for a revolution should -materialize.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, what did you do yourself when -you saw all these things?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I, for my part, tried to contact those bourgeois circles -which through my connections were open to me. I went to various -ministries: to the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, to State Secretary -Grauert, and several ministerial directors and counsellors. I -went to the Reich Ministry of the Interior, to the Ministry of Justice, -to the Foreign Office, and the Ministry of War. I spoke repeatedly -to the Chief of the Army High Command, Colonel General Von -Hammerstein. Among all these connections I formed at that time, -there is one other who is particularly important for my testimony.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At that time I met in the newly formed intelligence department -of the OKW a Major Oster. I gave him all the material which by -then had already accumulated. We started a collection—which we -continued until 20 July—of all the documents we could get hold of; -and Oster was the man who from then on, in the Ministry of War -never failed to warn every officer he could contact officially or -privately. In course of time, by favor of Admiral Canaris, Oster -became Chief of Staff of the Intelligence. When he met his death -by hanging he was a general. But I consider it my duty to testify -here, in view of all this man has done—his unforgettable fight -against the Gestapo and against all the crimes which were committed -against humanity and peace—that among the inflation of -German field marshals and generals there was one real German -general.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: How did the work develop, according to -your observations in the Gestapo? -<span class='pageno' title='171' id='Page_171'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: At that time conditions in Germany were still such -that people kept their eyes open in the ministries. There was still -an opposition in the bourgeois ministries; there was still the Reich -President Von Hindenburg. Thus, at the end of October 1933 the -Defendant Göring was forced to dismiss Diels, the Chief of the State -Police. At the same time a commission of investigation was set up -in order to re-organize that institution thoroughly. According to -the ministerial decree, Nebe and I were members of that commission. -But that commission never met, for the Defendant Göring -found ways and means to thwart this measure. He appointed as -Chief and successor of Diels a still worse Nazi named Hinkler, who -some time before had been acquitted in a trial because of irresponsibility; -and this Hinkler acted in such a way that before 30 days -had passed he was dismissed. Then the Defendant Göring was able -to restore his Diels to the office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Do you know anything of the events -which led to the Prussian law of 30 November 1933, by which the -functions of the Gestapo were taken away from the office of the -Minister of the Interior and transferred to the office of the Prussian -Prime Minister?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: That was just the moment of which I am speaking. -Göring realized that it would not serve his purpose if other -ministries were too much concerned in his Secret State Police. -Though he was Prussian Minister of the Interior himself, he was -disturbed by the fact that the police department of the Prussian -Ministry of the Interior could look into the affairs of his private -domain; and so he separated the Secret State Police from the -remaining police and placed it under his personal direction, thereby -excluding all other police authorities. From the point of view of -a proper police system this was nonsense, because you cannot run -a Political Police properly if you separate it from the Criminal -Police and the Order Police. But Göring knew why he did not want -any other police authority to look into the affairs of the Secret State -Police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, did you remain in the police -service yourself?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: On that day when Göring carried out his little—and -I can’t find another word for it—<span class='it'>coup d’état</span> by assigning to -himself a state police of his own, this Secret State Police issued a -warrant of arrest against me. I had expected this and had gone -into hiding. The next morning I went to the Chief of the Police -Department of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, Ministerial -Director Daluege—who was a high SS general—and said that it was -really not quite in order to issue a warrant of arrest against me. -<span class='pageno' title='172' id='Page_172'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>A criminal commissioner of the Secret State Police came to -arrest me in the room of the Chief of the Prussian police. Daluege -was kind enough to allow me to escape through a back door to -State Secretary Grauert. Grauert intervened with Göring, and as -always in cases of this kind, Göring was very surprised and ordered -a thorough investigation. That was the usual way of saying that -such incidents were to be pigeonholed. After that I was no longer -allowed to enter the Secret State Police, but I was sent as an -observer to the Reichstag Fire trial at Leipzig, which was just -drawing to an end. During these last days of November I was able -to get some insight into this obscure affair and having already tried, -together with Nebe, to investigate this crime, I was able to add to -my knowledge here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I assume that I shall again be questioned about that point and, -therefore, shall now confine myself to the statement that, if necessary, -I am prepared to refresh Defendant Göring’s memory concerning -his complicity in and his joint knowledge of this first -“brown” <span class='it'>coup d’état</span> and the murder of the accomplices.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: On 1 May 1934 Frick became Prussian -Minister of the Interior. Did you get into touch with Frick himself -or his ministries?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. Immediately after the Reichstag Fire trial was -over—that is, at the end of 1933—I was dismissed from the police -service and transferred to a Landrat office in East Prussia. I complained, -however, to State Secretary Grauert about this obvious -disciplinary punishment. As he and Ministerial Director Daluege -knew of my quarrel with the Secret State Police, they got me into -the Ministry of the Interior and assigned to me the task of collecting -all those reports which were still being incorrectly addressed -to the Ministry of the Interior and of forwarding them to the -Prussian Prime Minister who was in charge of the Secret State -Police and who dealt with these matters.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As soon as Göring found out about this he repeatedly protested -against my presence in the Ministry, but the Minister of the Interior -was adamant and I succeeded in keeping that post.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>When Frick came I did not get in touch with him immediately -as I was only a subordinate official. I assume, however, that the -Defendant Frick knew about my activity and my views, because I -was now encouraged to continue collecting all those requests for -help which were wrongly addressed to the Ministry of the Interior, -and a large number of these reports I submitted through official -channels to Daluege, Grauert, and Frick. There was, however, the -difficulty that Göring, in his capacity of Prime Minister of Prussia, -had prohibited Frick, as his Prussian Minister of the Interior, to -<span class='pageno' title='173' id='Page_173'></span> -take cognizance of such reports. Frick was supposed to forward -them to the Gestapo without comment. I saw no reason for not -submitting them to Frick all the same, and as Frick was also Reich -Minister of the Interior—and in this capacity could give directives -to the Länder and, therefore, also to Göring—he took cognizance -of these reports in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and allowed -me to forward them to Göring with the request for a report. -Göring protested repeatedly, and I know this resulted in heated -disputes between him and Frick.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Is anything known to you about the -fact that at that time the Reich Minister of the Interior issued -certain directives to restrict protective custody?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: It is correct that at that time a number of such -directives were issued, and the fact that I say that a number of -such directives were issued already implies that generally they -were not complied with by subordinate authorities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Reich Minister of the Interior was a minister with no -personal executive power, and I will never forget the impression -it made on me, while training as a civil servant, that we officials -in the Secret State Police were instructed in principle not to -answer any inquiries from the Reich Ministry of the Interior. -Naturally, at intervals the Reich Minister of the Interior sent -reminders, and the efficiency of a Gestapo official was judged by -the number of such reminders he could show his chief, Diels, as -proof that he did not pay any attention to such matters.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: On 30 June 1934 the so-called Röhm -Putsch took place. Can you give a short description of the conditions -prevailing before this Putsch?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: First I have to say that there never was a Röhm -Putsch. On 30 June there was only a Göring-Himmler Putsch.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am in a position to give some information about that dark -chapter, because I dealt with and followed up this case in the -Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior, and because the -radiograms sent during these days by Göring and Himmler to the -police authorities of the Reich came into my hands. The last of -these radiograms reads: “By order of Göring all documents relating -to 30 June shall be burned immediately.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At that time I took the liberty of putting these papers into my -safe, and to this day I do not know whether or not they survived -Kaltenbrunner’s attempts to get them. I still hope to recover these -papers, and if I do, I can prove that throughout the whole 30 June -not a single shot was fired by the SA. The SA did not revolt. By -this, however, I do not wish to utter a single word of excuse for the -<span class='pageno' title='174' id='Page_174'></span> -leaders of the SA. On 30 June not one of the SA leaders died who -did not deserve death a hundred times—but after a proper trial.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The situation on that 30 June was that of a civil war; on one -side were the SA headed by Röhm, and on the other side, Göring and -Himmler. It had been arranged for the SA, several days before -30 June, to be sent on leave. The SA leaders had been purposely -called by Hitler for a conference at Wiessee that 30 June, and it -is not usual for people who intend to effect a <span class='it'>coup d’état</span> to travel -by sleeping car to a conference. To their surprise they were seized -at the station and at once driven off to execution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The so-called Munich Putsch took place as follows: The Munich -SA did not come into it at all, and at 1 hour’s driving distance -from Munich the alleged traitors, Röhm and Heines, fell into the -sleep of death completely ignorant of the fact that, according to -Hitler and Göring, a revolt had taken place in Munich the previous -night.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I was able to observe the Putsch in Berlin very closely. It took -place without anything being known about it by the public and -without any participation by the SA. We in the police were unaware -of it. It is true, however, that 4 days before 30 June one of the -alleged ringleaders, SA Gruppenführer Karl Ernst of Berlin, came -to Ministerial Director Daluege looking very concerned and said -that there were rumors going round in Berlin that the SA were -contemplating a Putsch. He asked for an interview with Minister -of the Interior Frick, so that he, Ernst, could assure him that there -was no such intention.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Daluege sent me with this message to the Defendant Frick, and -I arranged for this strange conversation where an SA leader assured -the Minister of the Interior that he did not intend to stage a Putsch.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Ernst then set out on a pleasure trip to Madeira. On 30 June he -was taken from the steamer and sent to Berlin for execution. I -saw him arrive at the Tempelhof airport. This struck me as particularly -interesting, because a few hours before I had read the -official report about his execution in the newspaper.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That, then, was the so-called SA and Röhm Putsch. And because -I am not to withhold anything, I must add that I was present when -on 30 June the Defendant Göring informed the press of the event. -On this occasion the Defendant Göring made the cold-blooded -remark that he had for days been waiting for a code word which -he had arranged with Hitler. He had then struck, of course with -lightning speed, and had also extended the scope of his mission. -This extension of his mission caused the death of a large number -of innocent people. To mention only a few, there were Generals -Schleicher—who was killed together with his wife—and Von Bredow, -Ministerial Director Klausner, Edgar Jung, and many others. -<span class='pageno' title='175' id='Page_175'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, you were in the Ministry of -the Interior yourself at that time. How did Frick hear about these -measures, and was he himself in any way involved in the quelling -of this so-called Putsch?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I was present when, at about half past 9, Ministerial -Director Daluege came back quite pale after seeing Göring and -having just been told what had happened. Daluege and I went to -Grauert and we drove to the Reich Ministry of the Interior, to Frick. -Frick rushed out of the room—it may have been about 10 o’clock—in -order to go to Göring to find out what had happened in the -meantime, only to be told that he, as Police Minister of the Reich, -should go home now and not worry about further developments. In -fact, Frick did go home, and during those 2 dramatic days he did -not enter the ministry.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Once during this time Daluege drove over with me to see him. -For the rest, it was given to me, the youngest official of the Reich -Ministry of the Interior, to inform the Reich Minister of the Interior -on that bloody Saturday and Sunday of the atrocious things -which in the meantime had happened in Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, you just told us of an instruction -Frick had received not to worry about these things. Who gave -him this instruction?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: As far as I know, Göring gave or conveyed to him -an instruction by Hitler. I do not know whether there was a -written instruction; neither do I know whether Frick had asked -about it. I should think that Frick, on that day, probably considered -it would be wise not to ask too many awkward questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: After these things had been concluded, -did Frick in any way attempt to smooth matters over?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: To answer this question correctly I have to say first -that on Saturday, 30 June, we at the Ministry of the Interior knew -very little about what had happened. On Sunday, 1 July, we -learned much more, and after these bloody days had passed, there -is no doubt that Frick had on the whole a clear idea of what had -happened. Also, during these days he made no secret of his indignation -at the murders and unlawful arrests which apparently -had taken place. In order to stick to the truth I have to answer -your question by saying that the first reaction of the Defendant -Frick which I knew about was that Reich law in which the -Reich Ministers declared the events of June 30 to be lawful. This -law had an unprecedented psychological effect on the further developments -in Germany, and it has its place in the history of -German terror. Apart from this, many things happened in the -Third Reich which a normal mortal could not understand, but which -<span class='pageno' title='176' id='Page_176'></span> -were well understood in the circles of ministers and state secretaries. -And so, I have to admit that, after that law, the Defendant -Frick made a serious attempt to remedy at least the most obvious -abuses. Maybe he thought other ministers in the Reich Cabinet -should have spoken sooner. I am thinking now of Reich War Minister -Von Blomberg, two of whose generals were shot, and who, in spite -of that, signed this law. I intentionally mention Blomberg’s name, -and ask to be permitted to pause here to tell the Tribunal about -an incident which occurred this morning. I was in the room of the -defendants’ counsel and was speaking to Dr. Dix. Dr. Dix was interrupted -by Dr. Stahmer, counsel for Göring. I heard what -Dr. Stahmer told Dr. Dix...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): May I -ask whether a personal conversation which I had with Dr. Dix has -anything to do with the taking of evidence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I am not speaking...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Witness, don’t go on with your evidence -whilst the objection is being made. Yes, Dr. Stahmer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: If you please. I didn’t understand...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: I do not know whether it is in order when giving -evidence to reveal a conversation which I had with Dr. Dix in the -Defense Counsel’s room.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: May I say something to that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly keep silent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: May I finish my statement?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you keep silent, sir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: This morning in the room of the Defense -Counsel, I had a personal conversation with Dr. Dix concerning the -Blomberg case. That conversation was not intended to be heard by -the witness. I do not know the witness; I didn’t even see the witness, -as far as I can remember, and I don’t know whether this -should come into the evidence by making such a conversation public -here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This incident has been reported to -me, and I think it is important that this Tribunal know the influence—the -threats that were made at this witness in this courthouse -while waiting to testify here, threats not only against him but -against the Defendant Schacht. Now, the affair was reported to me. -I think it is important that this Tribunal know it. I think it is -important that it come out. I should have attempted to bring it out -on cross-examination if it had not been told, and I think that the -witness should be permitted. These other parties have had great -<span class='pageno' title='177' id='Page_177'></span> -latitude here. This witness has been subjected to threats, as I understand -it, which were uttered in his presence, whether they were -intended for him or not, and I ask that this Tribunal allow -Dr. Gisevius, who is the one representative of democratic forces in -Germany, to take this stand to tell his story.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal would like to hear -first of all anything further you have to say upon the matter. They -will then hear what Dr. Dix has to say, if he wishes to say anything; -and they will then hear whether the witness himself wishes to say -anything in answer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: I have no qualms about telling the Court exactly -what I said. Last night I discussed the case with the Defendant -Göring and told him the witness Gisevius...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We don’t want to hear any communications -which you had with the Defendant Göring other than those you -choose to make in support of your objection to this evidence that -has been given.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President; but I must say briefly that -Göring told me that it was of no interest to him if the witness -Gisevius did incriminate him, but that he did not want Blomberg, -who died recently—and I assumed it was only the question of Blomberg’s -marriage—he, Göring, did not want these facts concerning -the marriage of Blomberg to be discussed here in public. If that -could not be prevented, then of course Göring, in his turn—and it is -only a question of Schacht, because Schacht, as he had told me, -wanted to speak about these things—then he, Göring would not -spare Schacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is what I told Dr. Dix this morning, and I am sure Dr. Dix -will confirm that, and if I may add...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will hear you in a moment, Dr. Dix.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: I said—and I was not referring to Schacht, to -the witness, or to Herr Pannenbecker—I said, for reasons of professional -etiquette, that I should like to inform Dr. Dix. That is -what I said and what I did. In any case I did not even know that -the witness Gisevius was present at that moment. At any rate, it -was not intended for him. Moreover, I was speaking to Dr. Dix -aside.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: So that I may understand what you are -saying: You say you had told Dr. Dix the substance of the conversation -you had had with the Defendant Göring, and said that -Göring would withdraw his objection to the facts being given if the -Defendant Schacht wanted them to be given. Is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: No, I only said that Göring did not care what -was said about himself; he merely wanted the deceased Blomberg -<span class='pageno' title='178' id='Page_178'></span> -to be spared, and he did not want things concerning Blomberg’s -marriage to be discussed. If Schacht did not prevent that—I was -speaking only of Schacht—then he, Göring, in his turn, would have -no consideration for Schacht—would no longer have any consideration -for Schacht. That is what I told Dr. Dix for reasons of personal -etiquette.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait, wait, I can’t hear you. Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: As I said, that is what I told Dr. Dix, and that -finished the conversation. And I made it quite clear to Dr. Dix that -I told him that only as one colleague to another.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That is all you wish to say?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I remember the facts, I believe, correctly and reliably, -as follows: This morning I was in the room of the Defense Counsel -speaking to the witness Dr. Gisevius. I believe my colleague, Professor -Kraus, was also taking part in the conversation. Then my -colleague, Stahmer, approached me and said he would like to speak -to me. I replied that at the moment I was having an important and -urgent conversation with Gisevius, and asked whether it could wait. -Stahmer said “no,” and that he must speak to me at once. I then -took my colleague Stahmer aside, probably five or six paces from -the group with whom I had been speaking. My colleague Stahmer -told me the following—it is quite possible, I don’t remember the -actual words he used, that he started by saying that he was telling -me this for professional reasons, as one colleague to another. If he -says so now, I am sure that it is so. Anyhow I don’t remember that -any longer. He said to me, “Listen, Göring has an idea that Gisevius -will attack him as much as he can. If he attacks the dead Blomberg, -however, then Göring will disclose everything against Schacht—and -he knows lots of things about Schacht which may not be pleasant for -Schacht. He, Göring, had been very reticent in his testimony; but if -anything should be said against the dead Blomberg, then he would -have to reveal things against Schacht.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That was what he meant—that he would bring things up against -Schacht. That was the conversation. I cannot say with absolute -certainty whether my colleague told me I should call Gisevius’ -attention to it. If he says he did not say so, then it is certainly true, -and I believe him; but I could only interpret that information to -mean that I should notify Gisevius of this development promised by -Göring. I therefore thought—and did not have the slightest doubt—that -I was voicing Göring’s intention, and that I was acting as -Dr. Stahmer wished, and that that was the purpose of the whole -thing. What else could be the reason for Dr. Stahmer’s telling me -at that moment, immediately before my discussion with Gisevius, -<span class='pageno' title='179' id='Page_179'></span> -even while I was in conversation with Gisevius, that he could not -wait, that I must break off my conversation? Why should he inform -me at that time, unless he meant that the mischief hinted at and -threatened by Göring might possibly be avoided—in other words, -that the witness Gisevius, on whom everything depended, should -think twice before making his statement? I did not have the slightest -doubt that what Stahmer meant by his words to me was that I -should convey them to Gisevius. As I said, even if Stahmer had not -asked me—and he was certainly speaking the truth when he said -he did not ask me to take action—I would have replied, if I had -been questioned before he made this statement, and that probably -with an equally good conscience, that he had asked me to pass it on -to Gisevius. But I will not maintain that he actually used those -words. Anyway, it is absolutely certain that this conversation did -take place, and it was in the firm belief that I was acting as -Dr. Stahmer and Göring intended that I went straight to Gisevius. -He was standing only five or six steps away from me, or even -nearer. I think I understood him to say, when I addressed him, that -he had heard parts of it. I don’t know whether I understood him -correctly. I then informed him of the gist of this conversation. That -is what happened early this morning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: May I say the following: It goes without saying, -that I neither asked Dr. Dix to pass it on to Gisevius, nor did I count -upon his doing so; but I surmised that Gisevius would be examined -this morning, and that Dr. Dix would question the witness concerning -the circumstances of Blomberg’s marriage. That is what I -had been told previously—namely, that Dr. Dix intended to put this -question to the witness. Therefore, I called Dr. Dix’s attention to it, -assuming that he would abstain from such a question concerning -Blomberg’s marriage. That was not intended for the witness in any -way, and I know definitely that I said to Dr. Dix that I was telling -him this merely as one colleague to another, and he thanked me for -it. He said, “Thank you very much.” At any rate, if he had said to -me, “I am going to tell the witness,” I would have said immediately, -“For heaven’s sake; that is information intended only for you -personally.” Indeed, I am really surprised that Dr. Dix has in this -manner abused the confidence which I placed in him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, we have heard the facts, and -we do not think we need hear anything more about it beyond -considering the question as to whether the witness is to go on with -his evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, has the explanation which has been given by Dr. Stahmer -and Dr. Dix sufficiently covered the matters with which you were -proposing to deal with reference to Field Marshal Von Blomberg? -Is there anything further that you need say about it? -<span class='pageno' title='180' id='Page_180'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. Perhaps I did not quite understand -the question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Concerning Blomberg, at this point I did not want to say -anything further; I merely wanted, on the first occasion that Blomberg’s -name came up, to make it clear that the whole thing gave me -the feeling that I was under pressure. I was standing so near that I -could not help hearing what Dr. Stahmer said, and the manner in -which Dr. Dix told me about it—for I had heard at least half of it—could -not be understood in any other way than to mean that Dr. Dix -in a very loyal manner was instructing me, a witness for the -Defendant Schacht, to be rather reticent in my testimony on a point -which I consider very important. That point will come up later and -has nothing whatsoever to do with the marriage of Herr Von Blomberg. -It has to do with the part which the Defendant Göring played -in it, and I know quite well why Göring does not want me to speak -about that affair. To my thinking, it is the most corrupt thing -Göring ever did, and Göring is just using the cloak of chivalry by -pretending that he wants to protect a dead man, whereas he really -wants to prevent me from testifying in full on an important point—that -is, the Fritsch crisis.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: [<span class='it'>Turning to Dr. Pannenbecker.</span>] The Tribunal -will hear the evidence then, whatever evidence you wish the -witness to give.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. What I have to say in connection -with the Blomberg case is finished. I merely wanted to protest at -the first opportunity when the name was mentioned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well then, counsel will continue his examination -and you will give such evidence as is relevant when you are -examined or cross-examined by Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant -Schacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, after the events of 30 June 1934, -had the position of the Gestapo become so strong that no measures -against it had any chance of succeeding?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I must answer this in the negative. The Secret State -Police doubtlessly gained in power after 30 June, but because of the -many excesses committed on 30 June, the opposition in the various -ministries against the Secret State Police had become so strong that -through collective action the majority of ministers could have used -the events of 30 June to eliminate the Secret State Police. I personally -made repeated efforts in that direction. With the knowledge of -the Defendant Frick I went to see the Minister of Justice Gürtner -and begged him many times to use the large number of illegal -murders as a reason for action against the Secret State Police. I -personally went to Von Reichenau also, who was Chief of the Armed -<span class='pageno' title='181' id='Page_181'></span> -Forces Offices at that time, and told him the same thing. I know -that my friend Oster brought the files concerning this matter to the -knowledge of Blomberg, and I wish to testify here that, in spite of -the excesses of the 30 of June, it would have been quite possible at -that time to return to law and order.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: After that, what did the Reich Minister -of the Interior do—that is, what did Frick do to steer the Secret -State Police to a course of legality?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: We started a struggle against the Secret State Police -and tried at least to prevent Himmler from getting into the Reich -Ministry of the Interior. Shortly before Göring had relinquished -the Ministry of the Interior to Frick, he had made Himmler Chief of -the Secret State Police in Prussia. Himmler, starting from that basis -of power, had attempted to assume police power in the other Länder -of the Reich. Frick tried to prevent that by taking the stand that -he, as Reich Minister of the Interior, had an equal voice in appointing -police functionaries in the Reich. At the same time, we tried to -prevent an increase in the numbers of the Secret State Police by -systematically refusing all requests by the Gestapo to increase its -body of officials. Unfortunately here also, as always, Himmler found -ways and means to overcome this. He went to the finance ministers -of the individual states and told them that he needed funds for the -guard troops of the concentration camps, for the so-called “Death’s-Head” -units, and he drew up a scale whereby five SS men were to -guard one prisoner. With these funds Himmler financed his Secret -State Police, as, of course it rested with him how many men he -wanted to imprison.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In other ways too, we in the Reich Ministry of the Interior -attempted by all possible means to block the way of the Gestapo; -but unfortunately, the numerous requests we sent to the Gestapo -remained unanswered. Again it was Göring who forbade Himmler -to answer and who protected Himmler when he refused to give any -information in reply to our inquiries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Finally, a last effort was made during my term of office in the -Reich Ministry of the Interior. We tried to paralyze the Secret State -Police at least to some extent by introducing into protective custody -the right of supervision and complaint. If we could have achieved -the right of review of all cases of protective custody, we would also -have been able to get an insight into the individual actions of the -Gestapo. A law was formulated, and this law was first submitted to -the Ministerial Council of Prussia, the largest of the states. Again -it was the Defendant Göring who, by all available means, opposed -the passing of such a law. A very stormy cabinet meeting on the -matter ended with my being asked to leave the Ministry of the -Interior. -<span class='pageno' title='182' id='Page_182'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I have shown you a memorandum...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This will be a convenient time to break off.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal wishes me -to say that it anticipates that you will put any questions which you -think necessary with reference to the alleged intimidation of the -witness when you come to cross-examine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, Sir; thank you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I should like to talk about the -efforts which were made by the Ministry of the Interior to stop the -arbitrary methods of the Gestapo, particularly with reference to the -concentration camps. I therefore ask you to look at a memorandum -which originates from the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the -Interior. It is Document 775-PS, which I submitted this morning as -Exhibit Frick-9 when I presented the evidence for Frick. It is -Number 34 in the document book. Do you know that memorandum?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No, I don’t. It appears that this memorandum was -drawn up after I had left the Ministry of the Interior. I assume this -from the fact that in this memorandum the Reich Minister of the -Interior appears to have already given up the fight, since he writes -that as a matter of principle it should be made clear who bears the -responsibility, and, if necessary, the responsibility for all the consequences -must now—and I quote—“be borne by the Reichsführer -SS who, in fact, has already claimed for himself the leadership of -the Political Police in the Reich.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At the time when I was at the Reich Ministry of the Interior, we -tried particularly to prevent this from happening—namely, that -Himmler should take over the Political Police. This is evidently a -memorandum written about 6 months later when the terror had -become still greater. The facts which are quoted here are known -to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you say anything about this? Does -it not deal with the Pünder case and the case of Esterwege, -Oldenburg?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: The Esterwege case can be told most briefly. It is -one of many.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>So far as I can recollect, an SA or local group leader was arrested -by the Gestapo because he got excited about the conditions in the -Papenburg concentration camp. This was not the first time either. -I don’t know why the Defendant Frick picked on this particular -<span class='pageno' title='183' id='Page_183'></span> -case. Nevertheless, one day Daluege showed me one of those customary -handwritten slips sent by Frick to Himmler. Frick had -written to Himmler in the margin in large green letters that an SA -man or local group leader, or whatever he was, had been arrested -illegally, that this man must be released at once, and that if -Himmler did that sort of thing again he, Frick, would institute -criminal proceedings against Himmler for illegal detention.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I remember this story very well, because it was somewhat peculiar—considering -the police conditions which existed at the time—that -Himmler should be threatened by Frick with criminal proceedings, -and Daluege made some sneering remarks to me regarding -Frick’s action.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is the one case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What was the date?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: This must have happened in the spring of 1935, I -should say in March or April.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, do you know how Himmler -reacted to that threat of criminal proceedings?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. There was a second case. That is this Pünder -affair which is mentioned here. He reacted similarly to both, and -therefore it might be better if I first relate the Pünder affair in this -connection. It concerned a Berlin attorney, who was a lawyer of -high standing and legal adviser to the Swedish Embassy. The -widow of the Ministerial Director Klausner, who had been murdered -on 30 June, approached Pünder, as she wanted to sue the life -insurance companies for payment of her annuity. But as Klausner -had allegedly committed suicide on that day, no director of any -insurance company dared pay the money to the widow. Consequently, -the attorney had to sue. But the Nazis had made a law -according to which all such awkward cases—awkward for the -Nazis—were not to be tried in court: they were to be taken to a -so-called Spruchkammer in the Reich Ministry of the Interior. If I -am not mistaken, this law was called “Law for the Settlement of -Civilian Claims.” They were never at a loss for fine-sounding names -and titles at that time. This law forced the attorney to submit his -claim to the court first. He was apprehensive. He went to the -Ministry of the Interior and told the State Secretary, “If I comply -with the law and sue, I shall be arrested.” The State Secretary in -the Ministry of the Interior forced him to sue. Thereupon the very -wise attorney went to the Ministry of Justice and told State Secretary -Freisler that he did not want to sue as he would certainly -be arrested by the Gestapo. The Secretary in the Ministry of Justice -informed him that he would have to send in a claim in any case, -but that nothing would happen as the courts had been instructed to -<span class='pageno' title='184' id='Page_184'></span> -pass such cases on without comment to the Spruchkammer in the -Ministry of the Interior. Thereupon, the attorney sued and the -Gestapo promptly arrested him for slander because he had stated -that the Ministerial Director Klausner had not met his death by -suicide. This was for us a classical example of what we had come -to in Germany as far as protective custody was concerned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I had taken the liberty of selecting this case from among -hundreds, or I should say thousands of similar cases and of suggesting -to Frick that this matter should be brought to the notice not -only of Göring, but of Hitler as well this time. Then I sat down and -drafted a letter or a report from Frick to Hitler, which also went to -the Ministry of Justice. There were more than five pages, and I -discussed from every angle the facts concerning Ministerial Director -Klausner’s suicide, with the assistance of the SS, and the ensuing -lawsuit. This report to Hitler concluded with Frick’s remark that -the time had now come to have the problem of protective custody -settled by the Reich and by lawful means.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And now I answer your question regarding what happened. It -roughly coincided with Frick’s letter to Himmler regarding deprivation -of liberty. Himmler took these two letters to a meeting -of Reichsleiter, that is, the so-called ministers of the movement, and -he put the question to them, whether it was proper to allow one -Reichsleiter, namely Frick, to write such letters to another Reichsleiter, -that is, to Himmler. These worthy gentlemen answered this -question in the negative and reprimanded Frick. Then Himmler -went to the meeting of the Prussian cabinet where the protective -custody law, which I mentioned, was being discussed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Perhaps I may draw your attention to the fact that at that time -it was a rare thing for Himmler to be allowed to attend a meeting -of Prussian ministers. There was a time in Germany—and it was -quite a long period—when Himmler was not the powerful man -which he afterwards became because the bourgeois ministers and -the generals were cowards and gave way to him. Thus, it was a -rare thing for Himmler to be allowed to attend a meeting of the -Prussian Ministerial Council at all, and that particular meeting -ended by my being discharged from the Ministry of the Interior.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I should like to quote to you -two sentences from the memorandum which I have just shown to -you—that is, 775-PS—and ask you to tell me whether the facts are -stated correctly. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In this connection, I draw your attention to the case of the -attorney Pünder, who was taken into protective custody together -with his colleagues, merely because, after making -inquiry at the Reich Ministry of the Interior and at our -<span class='pageno' title='185' id='Page_185'></span> -ministry, he had filed a suit, which he was obliged to do -under a Reich law.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, that is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: And then the other sentence. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I mention here only the case of a teacher and Kreisleiter at -Esterwege who was kept in protective custody for 8 days -because...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, where is that sentence -which you have just read?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: In the Frick Document Book under -Number 34, second sentence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Which page?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: In my Document Book it is Page 80.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of Paragraph 3 on Page 70?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: No, Mr. President, I have just discovered -that this particular sentence in the document has not been -translated. Perhaps I may read one more sentence which apparently -has been translated. It can be found in Paragraph 3 of the same -document.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I mention here only the case of a teacher and Kreisleiter -at Esterwege who was kept in protective custody for 8 days -because, as it turned out afterwards, he had sent a correct -report to the head of his district concerning abuses by -the SS.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, that corresponds to the facts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, did you yourself have any support -from Frick for your personal protection?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. At that time, of course, I was such a suspect -in the eyes of the Secret State Police that all sorts of evil designs -were being made against me. Frick gave an order, therefore, that -I should be protected in my home by the local police. A direct -telephone from my home to the police station was installed, and I -had only to pick up the receiver and someone at least would know -in case I had surprise visitors. Furthermore, the Gestapo used -their usual methods against me by accusing me of criminal acts. -Apparently the files were taken to Hitler in the Reich Chancellery, -and Frick intervened, and it was soon discovered that this concerned -a namesake of mine! Frick said quite openly on the telephone -that these fellows—as he put it—had once more lied to the -Führer. This was the signal for the Gestapo, who were, of course, -listening in on this telephone conversation, that they could no -longer use these methods. -<span class='pageno' title='186' id='Page_186'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then we advanced one step further through Heydrich. He was -so kind as to inform me by telephone that I probably had forgotten -that he could pursue his personal and political opponents to their -very graves. I made an official report of that threat to Frick, and -Frick, either personally or through Daluege, intervened with -Heydrich, and there is no doubt that he thereby rendered me a -considerable service, for Heydrich never liked it very much when -his murderous intentions were talked about openly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, would then, at least a minister -of the Reich have no cause for alarm about his own personal safety -if he tried to fight against the terror of the Gestapo and Himmler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: If you ask me that now, I must say that Schacht -was the only one who was put into a concentration camp. But it is -true that we all asked ourselves just how long it would take for a -Reich Minister to be sent to a concentration camp. As regards -Frick, he told me confidentially, as far back as 1934, that the Reich -Governor of Bavaria had given him reliable information, according -to which he was to be murdered while taking a holiday in the -country, in Bavaria, and he asked me whether I could find out any -details. At that time I went with my friend Nebe to Bavaria by -car, and we made a secret investigation which, at any rate, proved -that such plans had been discussed. But, as I said, Frick survived.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: I have no further questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): May I ask -you to decide on the following question? I have called Gisevius. He -is a witness called by me, and this is, therefore, not a subsequent -question which I am putting, but I am examining him as my -witness. I am of the opinion, therefore, that it is right and expedient -that I should now follow up the examination by my colleague -Pannenbecker, and that my other colleagues who also want -to put questions follow the two of us. I ask the Tribunal to decide -on this question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you the only defendants’ counsel who -asked for this witness to be called on behalf of your client?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I called him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know; but are you the only defendants’ -counsel who asked to call him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I believe, Sir, I am the only one who has called him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Dix, you may examine him -next.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius, Dr. Pannenbecker has already mentioned -the fact that you have published a book entitled <span class='it'>To the Bitter End</span>. -I have submitted quotations from that book to the Tribunal as -<span class='pageno' title='187' id='Page_187'></span> -evidence, and they have been accepted as documentary evidence by -the Tribunal. For this reason I now ask you: Are the contents of -that book historically true; did you write it only from memory, or -is it based on notes which you made at the time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I can say here to the best of my knowledge, and -with a good conscience, that the contents of the book are historically -true. In Germany I always made personal notes as far as it was -possible. I have said here that my dead friend Oster had in the -War Ministry a considerable collection of documents to which I -had access at all times. In writing about any important matter in -which I made reference to friends in the opposition group, I never -did so without having first consulted them many times about it. -And since 1938 I have been in Switzerland, first as a visitor and -later on for professional reasons, and there I was able to continue -my notes undisturbed. The volume which has been submitted to -the Tribunal was practically completed in 1941, and in 1942 had -already been shown to several friends of mine abroad.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If he says that the book is true, that is -enough.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Since when have you known the Defendant Schacht?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I have known the Defendant Schacht since the end -of 1934.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: On what occasion and in what circumstances did you -meet him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I met him when I worked in the Reich Ministry of -the Interior and was collecting material against the Gestapo. I -was consulted by various parties, who either feared trouble with -the Gestapo or who had had trouble. Thus, one day Schacht, who -was then Minister for Economy, sent a man to me whom he trusted—it -was his plenipotentiary Herbert Göring—to ask me whether -I would help Schacht. He, Schacht, had for some time felt that he -was being watched by Himmler and the Gestapo and lately had -had good reason to suspect that an informer, or at least a microphone, -had been installed in his own house. I was asked whether -I could help in this case. I agreed to do so and, with a microphone -expert from the Reich post administration, on the following morning -I visited Schacht’s ministerial residence. We went with the microphone -expert from room to room and—did not have to search very -long. It had been done very badly by the Gestapo. They had -mounted the microphone all too visibly and, moreover, had engaged -a domestic servant to spy on Schacht. She had a listening device -attached to the house telephone installed in her own bedroom, -which was easy to discover, and so we were able to unmask the -whole thing. It was on that occasion that I first spoke to Schacht. -<span class='pageno' title='188' id='Page_188'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And what was the subject of your conversation? Did -you at that time already speak about political matters to him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: We spoke about the matters and the somewhat -peculiar situation which had brought us together. Schacht knew -that I was very active in opposing the Gestapo, and I, for my part, -was aware that Schacht was known for his utterances against the -SS and the Gestapo on numberless occasions. Many middle class -people in Germany placed their hopes in him as the only strong -minister who could protect them if need be. Particularly the industrialists -and business men, who were very important at the time, -hoped for, and often found his support. So that it was quite natural -that immediately during the first conversation I told him everything -that was troubling me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The main problem at that time was the removal of the Gestapo -and the removal of the Nazi regime. Therefore our conversation -was highly political, and Schacht listened to everything with an -open mind, which made it possible for me to tell him everything.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And what did he say?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I told Schacht that we were inevitably drifting -towards radicalism, and that it was doubtful whether, the way -things were going, the end of the present course would not be -inflation, and, that being so, whether it would not be better if he -himself were to bring about that inflation. That would enable him -to know beforehand the exact date of such a crisis, and together -with the generals and anti-radical ministers make timely arrangements -to meet the situation when it became really serious. I said -to him, “You should bring about that inflation; you yourself will -then be able to determine the course of events instead of allowing -others to take things out of your hands.” He replied, “You see, -that is the difference which separates us: You want the crash, and -I do not want it.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: From that, one might draw the conclusion that at that -time Schacht still believed that the crash could be averted. What -reasons did he give for this view?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I think that at the time the word “crash” was too -strong for him. Schacht was thinking along the traditional lines -of former governments, but he saw that here and there a change had -come about—especially since Brüning’s time—by emergency laws and -certain dictatorial measures. But as far as I could see at the time, -and during all our subsequent conversations, uppermost in his mind -was still the idea of a Reich government which met and passed -resolutions, where the majority of ministers were bourgeois, and -where at a given moment—which might be sooner or later—one -might steer a radically changed course. -<span class='pageno' title='189' id='Page_189'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: What was his attitude towards Hitler at that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: It was quite clear to me that at that time he still -thought very highly of Hitler. I might almost say that at that time -Hitler was to him a man of irreproachable integrity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What time are you speaking of?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I am now speaking of the time of my first meetings -with Schacht, at the end of 1934 and the beginning of 1935.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: What was your profession at that time? Where were -you? Where did you work?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I had succeeded in leaving the Reich Ministry of -the Interior in the meantime and had been transferred to the Reich -Criminal Office, which was in the process of being formed. When -we realized that the Gestapo were extending their power, we -believed we could establish some sort of police apparatus side by -side with the Gestapo—that is, purely criminal police. My friend -Nebe had been made Chief of the Reich Criminal Department to -build up a police apparatus there which would enable us to resist -the Gestapo if need be. The Ministry of the Interior gave me the -task of organizing and sent me to this government office about to -be formed, to give advice for its establishment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: We now slowly approach the year 1936—the year of -the Olympic Games. Did you have a special assignment there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. At the beginning of 1936 it was decided to -make me Chief of Staff of the police at the Central Police Department -on the occasion of the Olympic Games in Berlin. That was an -entirely nonpolitical and technical affair. Count Helldorf, who was -then Commissioner of the Police, thought that because of my connections -with the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of -Justice this would be useful. But I was quickly removed from this -position. Heydrich discovered it and intervened.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Your book contains a letter from Heydrich, which I -do not propose to read in its entirety. It is addressed to Count -Helldorf and calls his attention to the fact that, during the time of -your office at the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, you always put -every possible difficulty in the way of the Secret State Police, and -that relations with you had been extremely unpleasant. He continues:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I fear that his participation in the police preparations for -the Olympic Games, even in this sphere, would not promote -co-operation with the Secret State Police, and it should, therefore, -be considered whether Gisevius should not be replaced -by another suitable official. Heil Hitler. Yours, Heydrich.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is that the letter which affected your position? -<span class='pageno' title='190' id='Page_190'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. That was the reason why I was also dismissed -from that job. I had to wait only a few more weeks and Himmler -became the Chief of Police in the Reich. And on the very day that -Himmler became the Reich Police Chief I was definitely removed -from any kind of police service.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And where did you go?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: After my discharge from the police service I was -sent to the government in Münster, where I was assigned to the -price control office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Could you, while in the price control office in Münster, -continue your political work in any way and make the necessary -contacts?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. I had plenty of opportunity to make official -journeys. I made a thorough study not only of prices, but also of -the political situation, in the Rhineland and in Westphalia, and went -to Berlin nearly every week so as to keep in touch with my friends.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Were you in touch with Schacht?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: From that time on I met him very nearly every -week.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you, from Münster, make contacts with other -persons in prominent positions to further the work you were doing?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. One of the reasons why I went to Münster was -that the president of the province, Freiherr Von Luening, was a -man of the old school—clean, correct, a professional civil servant, -and politically a man who upheld law and order. He, too, ended -on the gallows after 20 July 1944. I also got into touch in Düsseldorf -with Regierungspräsident State Secretary Schmidt, and immediately -upon my arrival in Münster I did everything to get into -touch with the commanding general there, Von Kluge, who later -became Field Marshal. In this I succeeded. There, too, I tried at -once to continue my old political discussions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: We shall revert to General Kluge later on. I now ask -you this: At that time when you were working in Münster, did -you perceive a change in Schacht’s attitude towards the regime, -and in his attitude towards Hitler, as distinct from what you described -to the Tribunal as existing in 1934?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. By a steady process Schacht withdrew himself -further and further from the Nazis. If I were asked to describe the -phases, I would say that in the beginning—that is to say, in 1935—he -was of the opinion that the Gestapo only was the main evil and -that Hitler was the man who was the statesman—or could at least -become the statesman—and that Göring was the conservative strong -<span class='pageno' title='191' id='Page_191'></span> -man whose services one ought to use, and could use, to oppose the -terror of the Gestapo and the State by establishing orderly conditions. -I contradicted Schacht vehemently regarding his views -about the Defendant Göring. I warned him. I told him that in my -opinion Göring was the worst of all, precisely because he was -hiding under the middle class, conservative cloak. I implored him -not to effect his economic policy with Göring, since this could only -come to a bad end.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Schacht—for whom much may be said, but not that he is a good -psychologist—denied this emphatically. Only then in the course -of 1936 he began to realize more and more that Göring was not -supporting him against the Party, but that Göring supported the -radical elements against him, only then did Schacht’s attitude begin -to change gradually, and he came to regard not only Himmler but -also Göring as a great danger. For him Hitler was still the one -man with whom one could create policy, provided the majority of -the cabinet could succeed in bringing him over to the side of law -and order.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Are you now talking approximately of the time when -Schacht was handing over the foreign currency control to Göring?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. That was the moment when I warned him and, -as I said, he became apprehensive about Göring and realized that -Göring was not supporting him against the radical elements. That -was the time I meant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: By handing over the foreign currency control to Göring -he showed a negative, a yielding attitude. But now that he was -gradually changing his views, did he not have any positive ideas -as to how to bring about a change?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. He was entirely taken up with the idea, like -many other people in Germany at that time—I might almost say -the majority of the people in Germany—the idea that everything -depended on strengthening the middle class influence in the cabinet, -and above all, and as a prerequisite, that the Reich Ministry of War, -headed by Blomberg, should be brought over to the side of the -middle class ministers. Schacht had, if you want to put it like that, -the very constructive idea that one must concentrate on the fight -for Blomberg. That was precisely where I agreed with him for it -was the same battle which I, with my friend Oster, had tried to -fight in my small department, and in a far more modest way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Had he already done anything to achieve that end at -that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: As a cue I mention the steps taken by Dreyse, the -Vice President of the Reichsbank. -<span class='pageno' title='192' id='Page_192'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. First of all, he tried to establish close contact -with the competent expert in the Ministry of War, General Thomas, -who later on became Chief of the Army Economic Staff. Thomas -was a man who, right from the beginning, was skeptical about -National Socialism, or even opposed it. As by a miracle, he later on -emerged from the concentration camp alive.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Schacht at that time began to fight for Blomberg through -Thomas. I took part in that fight because Schacht used me as an -intermediary through Oster, and I was also informed about these -connections through Herbert Göring. Moreover, I learned about -these things from many discussions with Thomas. I can testify here -that, even at that time, it was extraordinarily difficult to establish -connection between Schacht and Blomberg, and I was naïve enough -to tell Schacht repeatedly simply to telephone Blomberg and ask -him for an interview. Schacht replied that Blomberg would certainly -be evasive and that the only way was to prepare the meeting -via Oster and Thomas. This was done.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I know how much we expected from the many discussions -Schacht had with Blomberg. I was, of course, not present as a -witness, but we discussed these conferences in great detail at the -time. I took notes and was very pleased when I found that these -recollections of mine tallied absolutely with the recollections of -Thomas, whose handwritten notes I have in my possession. Thomas -was repeatedly reprimanded by Blomberg and was told not to -bother him with these qualms on Schacht’s part. He was told that -Schacht was querulous, and that he, Thomas, should...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go into all this detail, -Dr. Dix?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes, I believe, Your Lordship, that it will be necessary. -This change from a convinced follower of Hitler to a resolute opponent -and revolutionary, even a conspirator, is of course so complicated -a psychological process that I believe that I cannot spare -the Tribunal the details of that development. I shall certainly be -economical with nonessential matters, but I should be grateful if -the witness could be given a certain amount of freedom during this -part of the testimony, as he is the only witness I have on this -subject.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal thinks that you can give -the essence of the matter without giving it in this great detail. You -must try, at any rate, to give as little unnecessary detail as possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I shall be glad to do that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Well, then, Dr. Gisevius, you have heard the wish of the Tribunal -and you will no doubt bring out only the essential facts. -<span class='pageno' title='193' id='Page_193'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Is there any other essential fact in the affair of Blomberg via -Thomas that you wish to state, or can we conclude that chapter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No, I shall now try to give a brief description of the -other channels which were tried. I do not know how much the -Tribunal wishes to hear about it, but I will say that Schacht tried -to approach Baron Von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the -Army. As, however, he was very difficult to approach, he sent his -Reichsbank vice president, Dreyse, to establish the contact. We also -made one big attempt to approach Fritsch and Blomberg through -General Von Kluge.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And, briefly, what was the object of that step? What -were the generals supposed to do—I mean these generals mentioned -by you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: This step had as its object to make it clear to -Blomberg that things were taking a more and more extreme turn, -that the economy of the country had deteriorated, and that the -Gestapo terror must be stopped by all possible means.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: So that at the time there were only misgivings about -the economy and the terror which reigned—not about the danger -of war, not yet?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No, only the fear of extremism.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: We now turn to 1937. You know that was the year -of Schacht’s dismissal as Reich Minister of Economy. Did Schacht -say anything to you as to why he remained in office as President -of the Reichsbank?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. I witnessed in detail the struggle for his release -as Reich Minister of Economy. On the one side there was his -attempt to be released from the Ministry, and I think I am right -in saying that this was not so easy. Schacht told Lammers one day -that if he did not receive the official notification of his release by -a certain date, he would consider himself dismissed and inform the -press accordingly. On that occasion scores of people implored -Schacht not to resign. Throughout those years, whenever a man -wanted to resign from his post, there was always the question -whether his successor might not steer an even more radical course. -Schacht was implored not to leave, lest radicalism should gain the -upper hand in the economic field also. I only mention here the -name of Ley, as head of the labor front. Schacht replied that he -could not bear the responsibility, but that he hoped he would be -able as President of the Reichsbank to keep one foot in, as he -expressed it. He imagined that he would be able to have a general -view of the overall economic situation and that through the Reichsbank -he would be able to conserve certain economic-political -measures. I can testify that many men, who later became members -<span class='pageno' title='194' id='Page_194'></span> -of the opposition, implored Schacht to take that line and to keep -at least one foot in.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Was that decision of his not influenced by his attitude -to, and his judgment concerning some of the generals particularly -Colonel General Fritsch?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, that is quite right. One of the greatest disasters -was the fact that so many people in Germany imagined that Fritsch -was a strong man. I remember that not only high-ranking officers -but also high ministerial officials told me over and over again that -there was no need to worry: Fritsch was on the march; Fritsch was -only waiting for the right moment; Fritsch would one fine day -bring about a revolt and end the terror. General Von Kluge, for -instance, told me this as a fact—and he was a close friend of Fritsch. -And so we all lived in the completely mistaken belief—as I can -now say—that one day the great revolt would come of the Armed -Forces against the SS. But instead of this, the exact opposite -occurred, namely, the bloodless revolt of the SS, the famous Fritsch -crisis, the result of which was that not only Fritsch was relieved -of his post but that the entire Armed Forces leadership was -beheaded, politically speaking, which meant that now all our hope...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Forgive me if I interrupt you, but we shall come to -the Fritsch crisis later, which was in 1938...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I should like now to finish speaking about Schacht’s -efforts and actions in 1937 and to ask you—it is mentioned in your -book—whether some unsuccessful attempt to approach General -Von Kluge and a journey by Schacht to Münster did not play a part?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. I thought that I was supposed to be brief about -that. Although Schacht made a great effort to get in touch with -Fritsch, it was not possible to arrange a conversation in Berlin. It -was secretly arranged that they should meet in Münster, as General -Von Kluge was too scared to meet Schacht publicly at the time. -There was a lot of beating about the bush, the net result was that -the two gentlemen did not meet. It was not possible to bring -together a Reich minister and a commanding general. It was all -most depressing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Where were you at the time? What were you doing? -Were you still at Münster, or was there a change?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I was still in Münster at that time, but in the -middle of 1937 Schacht wanted me to return to Berlin. The greater -his disappointment, the more he was inclined to take seriously my -warnings against an increasing radicalism and an SS revolt. -<span class='pageno' title='195' id='Page_195'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>By the autumn of 1937 things in Germany had reached such a -point that everybody in the opposition group felt that evil plans -were being made. We thought at that time that there would be -another day of blood like 30 June, and we were trying to protect -ourselves. It was Schacht who got in touch with Canaris through -Oster and expressed the wish that I should be brought back to -Berlin in one way or another. At that time there was -no government office which would have given me a post. I had -no other choice but to take a long leave from the civil service, -alleging that I wanted to devote myself to economic studies. -Schacht, in agreement with Canaris and Oster, arranged for me to -be given such a post in a Bremen factory, but I was not allowed -to show myself there, and so I came to Berlin to place myself completely -at the disposal of my friends for future happenings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Your Lordship, we are now coming to January 1938 -and the Fritsch crisis. I do not think that it would be helpful to -interrupt that part of the witness’ testimony. If I may, I would -suggest that Your Lordship now adjourn the session, or else we -would have to go on at least another half hour.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, we’ll adjourn now.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 25 April 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='196' id='Page_196'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH DAY</span><br/> Thursday, 25 April 1946</h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius! Yesterday we got as far as the year 1938. -You had returned to Berlin to a fictitious position which Schacht -had arranged for you and you were now in continuous contact with -your political confidants, Schacht, Oster, Canaris, and Nebe. You -testified last that within your circle, at that time, you all had the -impression that a coup was imminent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, we really come to the so-called Fritsch crisis; in my opinion -the decisive, inner-political first step toward the war. Will you -please describe the entire course and the background of that crisis, -especially bearing in mind the fact that while that crisis was taking -place the march into Austria was made and always remembering, of -course, Schacht’s position and activities which are the main concern.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: First, I shall describe the course of the crisis as such; -and it is correct that all my friends considered it the first decisive -step toward the war. I shall assemble the facts one by one. I consider -it advisable, in order not to confuse the picture, to leave -Schacht out for the time being, because the facts as such are -extensive enough. Furthermore, I will not indicate in the beginning -the source of our information or describe my own experiences; -rather I shall wait until I am questioned on those subjects.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On 12 January 1938 the German public was surprised by the -report that Field Marshal Von Blomberg, at that time Reich Minister -for War, had married. No details about his wife nor any photographs -were published. A few days later one single picture appeared, a -photograph of the Marshal and his new wife in front of the monkey -cage at the Leipzig Zoo. Malicious rumors about the past life of the -Marshal’s wife began to circulate in Berlin. A few days later there -appeared on the desk of the Police Commissioner in Berlin a thick -file which contained the following information: Marshal Von Blomberg’s -wife had been a previously convicted prostitute who had -been registered as a prostitute in the files of seven large German -cities; she was in the Berlin criminal files. I myself have seen the -fingerprints and the pictures. She had also been sentenced by the -Berlin courts for distributing indecent pictures. The Commissioner -of the Police in Berlin was obliged to submit this file, by official -channels, to the Chief of the Police, Himmler. -<span class='pageno' title='197' id='Page_197'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Excuse me, please; who was the Commissioner of the -Police in Berlin at that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: The Commissioner of the Police in Berlin was Count -Helldorf. Count Helldorf realized that if that material were transmitted -to the Reichsführer SS it would place the Wehrmacht in a -very embarrassing position. Himmler would then have in his possession -the material he needed to ruin Blomberg’s reputation and -career, and strike a blow at the leadership of the Armed Forces. -Helldorf took this file to the closest collaborator of Marshal Blomberg, -the then Chief of the Armed Forces Department, Keitel, who -at that time had just become related to Marshal Blomberg through -the marriage of their respective children. Marshal Keitel, or Generaloberst -Keitel as he was at that time, looked through the file -carefully and demanded that Police Commissioner Helldorf should -hush up the entire scandal and suppress the file.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Perhaps you will tell the Tribunal the source of your -information.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I got my information from Count Helldorf, who described -the entire affair to me, and from Nebe, Oberregierungsrat of -the police headquarters in Berlin at that time, and later Reich -Criminal Director.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Keitel refused to let Blomberg bear any of the consequences. He -refused to inform the Chief of the General Staff Beck, or the Chief -of the Army Generaloberst Von Fritsch. He sent Count Helldorf to -Göring with the file. Helldorf submitted the entire file to Defendant -Göring. Göring asserted he knew nothing about the various sections -of the criminal records and the previous sentences of Von Blomberg’s -wife. Nevertheless in that first conversation, and in later discussions, -he admitted that he already knew the following:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First, that Marshal Blomberg had already asked Göring several -months ago whether it was permissible to have an affair with a -woman of low birth, and shortly thereafter he had asked Göring -whether he would help him to obtain a dispensation to marry this -lady “with a past” as he put it. Later Blomberg came again and -told Göring that this lady of his choice unfortunately had another -lover and he must ask Göring to help him, Blomberg, to get rid of -that lover.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Excuse me. Göring told that to Helldorf and you -learned it from Helldorf?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, that is what Göring said, and in the further -course of the investigation we learned of it from other sources too. -Göring then got rid of that lover by giving him foreign currency -and sending him off to South America. In spite of that, Göring did -not inform Hitler of this incident. He even went with Hitler, as a -<span class='pageno' title='198' id='Page_198'></span> -witness, to the wedding of Marshal Blomberg on 12 January. I -should like to point out here...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal would wish to know -how you suggest that these matters, which appear to be personal, -are relevant to the charges and in what way they affect the Defendant -Schacht or the Defendant Göring or the Defendant Frick?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I am here only to serve the interests, the rightful -interests, of the Defendant Schacht. It is necessary to present that -crisis in all its horribleness in order to conceive what an effect, what -a revolutionary effect, it had on Schacht and his circle as far as the -regime was concerned, I have already said earlier that the Fritsch -crisis was the turning point in the transformation of Schacht from a -follower and, to a certain extent, an admirer of Hitler to a deadly -enemy who had designs on his life. The Tribunal cannot understand -this revulsion if the Tribunal does not receive the same impression -as Schacht had at that time. Indeed, I in no way desire to wash -dirty linen here unnecessarily. My decision to put these questions -and to ask the witness to describe the Fritsch crisis in full detail is -only motivated by the fact that the further development of Schacht, -and of the Fritsch crisis, or let us say, the Oster-Canaris circle to -which Schacht belonged, cannot be understood if one does not realize -the monstrous circumstances of that crisis. In the face of these -facts, however disagreeable, one must decide to bring these sometimes -very personal matters to the attention of the Tribunal. Unfortunately -I cannot dispense with it in my defense. It is the alpha -and omega of my defense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If the Tribunal please, it might be -helpful at this time to know our position in reference to this line of -testimony, if it is to be considered whether admissible or not now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should desire, if this incident were not brought out, to bring it -out upon cross-examination upon several aspects. One is that it -shows the background of the incident of yesterday, which I think is -important in appraising the truthfulness of testimony in this case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Another thing is that it bears upon the conspiracy to seize power. -There were certain men in Germany that these conspirators had to -get rid of. Some of them they could kill safely. Some of them, as -we see from the Röhm Purge, when they went to killing they -aroused some opposition. They had to strike down by other means, -and the means they used against Fritsch and Blomberg show the -conspiracy to seize power and to get rid of the men who might stand -in the way of aggressive warfare.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It will appear, I think, that Fritsch and Blomberg were among -the reliants of the German people in allowing these Nazis to get as -far as they did, believing that here at least were two men who -<span class='pageno' title='199' id='Page_199'></span> -would guard their interests; and the method by which those men -were stricken down and removed from the scene we would consider -an important part of the conspiracy story, and I would ask to go -into it on cross-examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That might perhaps be material to the Court in deciding whether -it should proceed now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: May I add one more thing?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Dix.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal thinks, in view of what you have said and what -Mr. Justice Jackson has said, that your examination must continue -and you will no doubt try to confine it as much as you can to the -political aspects of the matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Of course. But the personal matters are of such political -importance in this case that they cannot be omitted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Well then, Dr. Gisevius, you understand the difficulties of the -situation. We want only to give evidence, and not to bring in anything -sensational as an end in itself. However, when it is necessary -to speak on such subjects in order to explain the development to the -Tribunal, I ask you to speak quite frankly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I ask the Tribunal also to realize my difficulties. I -myself do not like speaking about these things.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I must add that Göring was the only head of the Investigation -Department. That was the institution which took overall telephone -control in the Third Reich. This Investigation Department was not -satisfied, as has been described here, with merely tapping telephone -conversations and decoding messages; but it had its own intelligence -service, all the way down to its own employees, for obtaining information. -It was, therefore, also quite possible to obtain confidential -information about Marshal Von Blomberg’s wife. When Helldorf -gave the file to Göring, Göring considered himself compelled to give -that file to Hitler. Hitler had a nervous breakdown and decided to -dismiss Marshal Blomberg immediately. Hitler’s first thought, as he -told the generals later at a public meeting, was to appoint Generaloberst -Von Fritsch as Blomberg’s successor. The moment he made -his decision known, Göring and Himmler reminded him that it could -not be done as according to a file of the year 1935 Fritsch was badly -incriminated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Excuse me, Doctor. What is the source of your information -regarding this conversation between Hitler and the generals -and also Göring’s statement?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Several generals who took part in that meeting told -me about it, and I have said already that in the course of events, -which I have yet to describe, Hitler himself made many statements. -<span class='pageno' title='200' id='Page_200'></span> -We also had in our possession until 20 July the original documents -of the Supreme Court-Martial which convened later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The file of 1935, which was submitted to Hitler in January 1938, -referred to the fact that in 1934 the Gestapo conceived the idea of -prosecuting, among other enemies of the state, homosexuals as -criminals. In the search for evidence the Gestapo visited the penitentiaries -and asked convicted inmates, who had blackmailed homosexuals, -for evidence and for the names of homosexuals. One of the -inmates reported a terrible story, which was really so horrible that -I will not repeat it here. It will suffice to say that this prisoner -believed the man in question had been a certain Herr Von Fritsch -or Frisch. The prisoner could not remember the correct name. The -Gestapo then turned over these files to Hitler in 1935. Hitler was -indignant about the contents. Talking to the generals, he said he -did not want to know about such a disgusting affair. Hitler ordered -the files to be burned immediately.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, in January 1938, Göring and Himmler reminded Hitler of -these files; and it was left to Heydrich’s cleverness to submit to -Hitler again these files, which had allegedly been burned in 1935 -and which had been completed, in the meantime, by extensive -investigations. Hitler believed, as he said to the generals at the -time, that after having been so disappointed in Blomberg, many -nasty things could be expected from Fritsch also. The Defendant -Göring offered to bring the convict from the prison to Hitler and -the Reich Chancellery. At Karinhall, Göring had previously threatened -this convict with death if he did not abide by his statements.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: How do you know that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: That was mentioned at the Supreme Court-Martial. -Then Fritsch was summoned to the Reich Chancellery and Hitler -told him of the accusations which had been made against him. -Fritsch, a gentleman through and through, had received a confidential -warning from Hitler’s adjutant; but it had been so vague -that Fritsch came to the Reich Chancellery extremely alarmed. He -had no idea of what Hitler was accusing him. Indignantly he denied -the crime he had allegedly committed. In the presence of Göring, -he gave Hitler his word of honor that all the accusations were false. -But Hitler went to the nearest door, opened it, and the convict -entered, raised his arm, pointed to Fritsch and said, “That is he.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Fritsch was speechless. He was only able to ask that a judicial -investigation should be made. Hitler demanded his immediate -resignation; and on condition that Fritsch left in silence, he agreed -to allow the matter to rest where it was. Fritsch appealed to Beck, -the Chief of the General Staff. Chief of the General Staff Beck -intervened with Hitler. A hard struggle ensued for a judicial -investigation of these terrible accusations against Fritsch. That -<span class='pageno' title='201' id='Page_201'></span> -struggle lasted about a week. There were dramatic disputes in the -Reich Chancellery. At the end came the famous 4 February when -the generals, who until that day—that is to say, 10 days after the -dismissal of Blomberg and the relief of Fritsch—were completely -unaware of the fact that both their superiors were no longer in -office, were ordered to come to Berlin. Hitler personally presented -the files to the generals in such a way that they also were completely -confused and said they were satisfied that the affair should -be investigated by the courts. At the same time Hitler surprised -the generals...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: You know of this only through the participants of that -meeting?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: From the participants of the meeting, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At the same time Hitler surprised the generals with the announcement -that they had a new Commander-in-Chief, Generaloberst -Von Brauchitsch. Some of the generals had, in the meantime, been -relieved of their posts; and also on the evening previous to that -announcement, a report appeared in the newspapers according to -which Hitler, under the pretense of drawing together the reins of -government, had dismissed the Foreign Minister, Von Neurath, -effected a change in the Ministry of Economics, relieved a number -of diplomats of their posts, and then, as an appendix to that report, -announced a change in the War Ministry and in the leadership of -the Army.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then a new struggle arose, which lasted several weeks, regarding -the convening of the court-martial which should decide as to the -reinstatement of Generaloberst Von Fritsch. This was for all of us -the moment when we believed we would be able to prove before a -German supreme court the methods the Gestapo used to rid themselves -of their political adversaries. This was a unique opportunity -of being able to question witnesses under oath regarding the manner -in which the entire intrigue had been contrived. Therefore we set -to work to prepare for our parts in this trial.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: What do you mean by “we” in this case?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: There was above all one man, who as an honest -lawyer and judge was himself a participator of this Supreme Court-Martial. -This was the Judge Advocate General at that time, and -later Chief Judge of the Army, Ministerial Director Dr. Sack. This -man believed that he owed it to the spirit of law to contribute in -every possible way toward exposing these matters. This he did, but -he also paid with his life after 20 July.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the course of this investigation the judges of this Supreme -Court-Martial questioned the Gestapo witnesses. They investigated -the records of the Gestapo; they made local investigations; and, with -<span class='pageno' title='202' id='Page_202'></span> -the aid of the criminologist Nebe, it was not long before they -discovered definitely that the entire affair had concerned a double; -it was not Generaloberst Von Fritsch but a retired Captain Von -Frisch who had been pensioned long before.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the course of that investigation the judges established another -fact; they were able to prove that the Gestapo had been in the -residence of this double Von Frisch as early as 15 January and had -questioned his housekeeper. May I compare the two dates once -more. On 15 January the Gestapo had proof that Fritsch was not -guilty. On 24 January the Defendant Göring brings the convict and -witness for the prosecution into the Reich Chancellery in order to -incriminate Fritsch, the Generaloberst. We believed that here indeed -we were confronted with a plot of incredible proportions, and we -believed that now even the skeptical general must see that it was -not only in the lower ranks of the Gestapo that there was scheming -and contriving, invisible and secret, without the knowledge of any -of the ministers or of the Reich Chancellery and which would -compel any man of honor and justice to intervene. This was the -reason why we now formed into a larger group and why we saw -that we now no longer needed to collect material about the Gestapo -in secret. That, precisely, was the great difficulty we had had to -deal with. We heard a great deal; but if we had passed on that -evidence, we would in every case have exposed to the terror of the -Gestapo those men who had given us the evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now we could proceed legally, and so we started our efforts to -persuade Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch to submit the necessary -evidence to the Supreme Court-Martial.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Whom do you mean by “we”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: At that time there was a group, among whom I must -mention Dr. Schacht, who was then extremely active and who went -to Admiral Raeder, to Brauchitsch, to Rundstedt, and to Gürtner, -and tried to explain everywhere that the great crisis had now -arisen; that we now had to act; that it was now the task of the -generals to rid us of this regime of terror.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But I must mention one more name in that connection. In 1936 -Schacht had already introduced me to Dr. Goerdeler. I had the -honor of traveling the same road with that brave man from then on -until 20 July. And now I have mentioned here for the first time, in -this room where so many terrible things are made known, the name -of a German who was a brave and fearless fighter for freedom, -justice, and decency and who, I believe, will one day be an example, -and not only to Germany, to prove that one can also do one’s duty -faithfully until death, even under the terror of the Gestapo.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This Dr. Goerdeler, who had always been a fearless and untiring -fighter, had in those days unequaled courage. Like Dr. Schacht he -<span class='pageno' title='203' id='Page_203'></span> -went from one ministry to another, from one general to the next, -and he also believed that now the hour had come when we could -achieve a united front of decent people led by the generals. -Brauchitsch did not refuse then. He did not refuse to act at Goerdeler’s -request. In fact he assured Goerdeler of his co-operation in -a revolt with almost religious fervor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And as a witness I may mention that Brauchitsch also solemnly -assured me that he would now use this opportunity to fight against -the Gestapo. However, Brauchitsch made one condition, and that -condition was accepted by the generals as a whole. Brauchitsch -said, “Hitler is still such a popular man; we are afraid of the Hitler -myth. We want to give to the German people and to the world the -final proof by means of the Supreme Court-Martial and its verdict.” -Therefore Brauchitsch postponed his action until the day when the -verdict of the Supreme Court-Martial should be given.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Supreme Court-Martial met. It began its session. The -session was suddenly interrupted under dramatic circumstances. -I must add that Hitler appointed the Defendant Göring as president -of that Supreme Court-Martial. And now the Supreme Court-Martial, -under the chairmanship of Göring, convened. I know from -Nebe that Göring during the preceding days had had consultations -with Himmler and Heydrich. I know that Heydrich said to Nebe, -“this Supreme Court-Martial will be the end of my career.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did Nebe tell you that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, on the same day. The Supreme Court-Martial -would be the great danger for the Gestapo. And now the Supreme -Court-Martial sat for several hours and was adjourned under -dramatic circumstances, for that was the day chosen for the German -armies to march into Austria. Even at that time we knew without -any doubt why the chairman of that court-martial was so unusually -interested in having the troops on that day receive the order to -march, not to a goal within but outside the Reich. Not until one -week later could the Supreme Court-Martial reconvene, and then -Hitler was triumphant. The generals had their first “campaign of -flowers” behind them, a plebiscite had been proclaimed, the -jubilation was great, and the confusion among the generals was still -greater. So that court-martial was dissolved. Fritsch’s innocence -was definitely established, but Brauchitsch said that as a result of -the changed psychological atmosphere created by the annexation of -Austria, he could no longer take the responsibility for a revolt.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is roughly the story of how the War Ministry was practically -denuded of its leading men, and how the generals were thrown -into unequaled confusion. From that time on we took the steep -downward path to radicalism. -<span class='pageno' title='204' id='Page_204'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Perhaps I may ask the Tribunal to be permitted to -read in this connection one sentence from a document which I will -submit as Exhibit Number Schacht-15. My document book is still in -the process of translation, but I hope that it will be here on the day -of the hearing of Schacht. There is only one sentence which is of -interest in this connection. It is from the biannual report of the -General Staff...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have the documents been submitted to the -Prosecution and to the Tribunal at all?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The documents have been discussed with the Prosecution -twice in detail, once with regard to the question of translation, -and then on the question of their admissibility as evidence; -and Mr. Dodd discussed them in open court. I am firmly convinced -that the Prosecution is thoroughly acquainted with the document. -It is only one sentence and I do not believe that the Prosecution -would object to the reading of this one sentence, since otherwise the -connection with the documentary evidence might be obscured. I will -introduce a document now and then, wherever it seems practical. -This is only one sentence from the biannual report of the General -Staff of the United States...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not know what this document is, -Your Honor. I should like to know because we may want to ask -some questions about it. I do not want to delay Dr. Dix, but I do -not have a copy of it and I do not know just what it is yet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I just wanted to shorten the proceedings; but as I see -that difficulties may arise, and that a long discussion may be -needed, I will omit it, and will present it later with my documentary -evidence. It would not serve my purpose otherwise.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] For the additional information of the -Court, perhaps you will describe the position of the chairman in -German court-martial proceedings; that the control of the examination -is in his hands—that, as a matter of fact, the entire case is -in his hands.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Dr. Dix, I do not doubt that you could describe the -authority of such a chairman better and more clearly from the legal -point of view. I would, however, like to say the following:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I read the minutes of that session, for it is one of those documents -which we thought we would one day submit to the public. This, too, -I hope we will find again. From the minutes it can be seen that the -Defendant Göring, as president, determined the tenor of the entire -proceedings and of the questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He questioned the witnesses for the prosecution, and he took -care that no other questions were put which might have proved -<span class='pageno' title='205' id='Page_205'></span> -embarrassing. I must say, from these voluminous minutes, that -Göring knew how to cloak the true facts by the manner in which he -led the proceedings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: In my introductory words at the beginning of the -session, I called the Fritsch crisis the first decisive inner-political -step of the war; and you, Doctor, have adopted that term. After -concluding the description of the Fritsch crisis, will you give the -reason for the views you adopted, and what the effect was upon -your group in this connection, especially upon Schacht?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I must point out again that until this Fritsch crisis it -had been difficult in the ranks of the German opposition to consider -even the possibility of war. That was due to the fact that in Germany -the opposition groups were so sure of the strength of the -Army, and of the leading men, that they believed it sufficed to have -a man of honor, like Fritsch, at the head of the German Army. It -seemed inconceivable that Fritsch would tolerate a sliding into -terror or into war. Only a few persons had pointed out that it was -in the nature of every revolution some day to go beyond the frontiers -of a nation. We believed from history that this theory should -be pointed out as a danger threatening the National Socialist -revolution, and therefore we repeatedly warned those who were -convinced that they were faced with a revolution, not only with a -dictatorship, that one day those revolutionaries would resort to war -as a last recourse. As it became more evident in the course of the -Fritsch crisis that radicalism was predominant, a large circle became -aware that the danger of war could no longer be ignored.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And did the Defendant Schacht also belong to that -circle?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. During those days of the Fritsch crisis, Schacht -said, as did many others: “That means war,” and that was also said -plainly to the then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General -Von Brauchitsch.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now the question arises why Schacht had previously -financed the rearmament program, at least in the beginning?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Schacht always told me that he had financed the -rearmament program for purposes of defense. Schacht was convinced -for many years that such a large nation in the center of Europe -should at least have means of defense. I may point out that at that -time large groups of the German people were possessed of the idea -that there was a possible danger of attack from the East. You must -not forget the type of propaganda with which the German people -were inundated at that time, and that the reasons given for this -particular danger from the East were based upon Polish aspirations -concerning East Prussia. -<span class='pageno' title='206' id='Page_206'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did Schacht also discuss with you at that time the fact -that this rearmament was serving his political purposes, as through -it he might be able to start discussions on general disarmament -again?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. Unfortunately I forgot to emphasize -this point myself. Schacht was of the opinion that all means -should be used to bring about discussions on rearmament again. He -had an idea that very soon—I think he had held that opinion since -1935—the attention of opponent countries should be drawn to German -rearmament; and then Hitler, because his rearmament was now -known, would be forced to resume discussions at the disarmament -conference.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Was that which you have just said the subject of your -conversation with Schacht at that time, or is that your judgment now?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No, I remember this conversation very well, because -I thought Hitler’s inclinations lay in other directions than in attending -a disarmament conference. I thought Hitler to be of an entirely -different mentality, and was somewhat surprised that Schacht considered -it possible that Hitler might harbor such thoughts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you have the impression from your conversations -with Schacht that he was informed in detail of the type, speed, and -extent of the rearmament?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I well remember how often Schacht asked me and -friends of mine whether we could not help him to get information -about the extent of rearmament by inquiring at the Reich War -Ministry. I have already described yesterday the efforts he made to -get details through Oster and Thomas.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Could you tell the Tribunal whether Schacht made any -attempt to limit armament expenses, and thus limit the extent and -speed of the rearmament; and, if so, when he made these efforts?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: To my knowledge, he started to attempt this as early -as 1936. In the heated debates about Schacht’s resignation as -Minister of Economics in 1937, his efforts in this direction played a -very important part. I recall that practically every conversation was -concerned with that point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now, it is said—and quite understandably also by the -Prosecution—that the reasons Schacht gave, even in official reports -and so on, for the necessity of these limitations were primarily of a -financial-technical nature, that is to say, he spoke as an anxious -economic leader and an anxious president of the Reichsbank and not -as an anxious patriot afraid that his country might be plunged -into war. -<span class='pageno' title='207' id='Page_207'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you know of any discussions with Schacht, of which you can -remember anything, concerning the foregoing which might be -useful to the Tribunal?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: In all these preliminary discussions there were -dozens of drafts of the communications Schacht wrote. They were -discussed in friendly circles. To mention but one example, Schacht -repeatedly discussed these drafts also with Goerdeler. It was always -one question that was concerned: What could one say, so that such -a letter should not be considered a provocation but would serve -rather to draw the other non-Party ministers, and particularly the -War Minister Blomberg, to Schacht’s side? That was just the difficulty, -for how could such ministers as Blomberg, Neurath, or -Schwerin-Krosigk, who were much more loyal to Hitler, be persuaded -to join Schacht rather than to say that Schacht had once -again provoked Hitler and Göring with his notoriously sharp tongue. -All these letters can only be understood by their tactical reasons -which, as I have said, had been discussed in detail with the leading -men of the opposition.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now, after the Fritsch crisis, how did the political -conspiracy between you and your friends and Schacht take form?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I want to deal with that word “conspiracy.” While -up to that moment our activity could only be called more or less -oppositional, now a conspiracy did indeed begin; and there appeared -in the foreground a man who was later to play an important part -as head of that conspiracy. The Chief of the General Staff at that -time, Generaloberst Beck, believed that the time had come for a -German general to give the alarm both inside and outside the -country. I believe it is important for the Tribunal to know also the -ultimate reason which prompted Beck to take that step.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Chief of the General Staff was present when Hitler, in May -1938, made a speech to the generals at Jüterbog. That speech was -intended to reinstate Fritsch. A few words were said about Fritsch, -but more was said—and for the first time quite openly before a -large group of German generals—about Hitler’s intention to engulf -Czechoslovakia in a war. Beck heard that speech; and he was indignant -that he, as Chief of the General Staff, should hear of such -an intention for the first time in such an assembly without having -been informed or consulted previously. During that same meeting, -Beck sent a letter to Brauchitsch asking him for an immediate -interview. Brauchitsch refused and deliberately kept Beck waiting -for several weeks. Beck became impatient and wrote a comprehensive -memorandum in which as Chief of the General Staff he -protested against the fact that the German people were being -drawn into war. At the end of that memorandum Beck announced -<span class='pageno' title='208' id='Page_208'></span> -his resignation, and here I believe is the opportunity to say a word -about this Chief of the General Staff.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: One moment, Doctor. Will you tell us the source of -your knowledge of what Beck thought, and the negotiations between -Beck and Brauchitsch?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Beck confided in me, and during the latter years I -worked in very close collaboration with him, and I was by his side -until the last hour of his life on 20 July. I can testify here—and -it is important for the Tribunal to know this—that Beck struggled -again and again with the problem as to what a chief of the General -Staff should do when he realized that events were driving toward -a war. Therefore I owe to his memory, and to my oath here, not to -conceal the fact that Beck took the consequences of being the only -German general to relinquish his post voluntarily, in order to show -that there is a limit beyond which even generals in leading positions -may not go; but at the sacrifice of their position and their life, -must resign and accept no further orders. Beck was of the opinion -that the General Staff was not only an organization of war technicians; -he saw in the German General Staff the conscience of the -German Army, and he trained his staff accordingly. He suffered -immensely during the later years of his life because men whom he -had trained in that spirit did not follow the dictates of their -conscience. I owe it to this man to say that he was a man of inflexible -character.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think we might get on to what -Beck actually did.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes, Your Honor, but...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps it would be a convenient time to -break off. What I mean is, the witness said that Beck protested in -a memorandum and offered to resign, and that was some minutes -ago, and since then he was talking and had not told us what -Beck actually did.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit in open session on -Saturday morning, but will be sitting in closed session.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: [<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] You were saying that Generaloberst -Beck carried out his decision to tender his resignation -after the speech at Jüterbog. What did he do then? -<span class='pageno' title='209' id='Page_209'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Hitler and Brauchitsch urgently pressed him to -remain in office, but Beck refused and insisted upon resigning. -Thereupon Hitler and Brauchitsch urged Beck at least not to make -his resignation public, and they asked him if he would not formally -defer his resignation for a few months. Beck, who had not yet gone -the way of high treason, thought that he should comply with this -request. Later he most deeply regretted this loyal attitude. The -fact is that as early as the end of May or the beginning of June -his successor, General Halder, took over the office of Chief of -General Staff; and from that moment Beck was actually no longer -in charge.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: May I ask you once more, from what observations, -and conversations with whom, do you base the knowledge of these -facts?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: From constant discussions I had with Beck, Oster, -Goerdeler, Schacht, and an entire group of people at that time; -later, the question why Beck did not make his retirement public -depressed him to such an extent that it was a continual subject of -discussions between him and me up to the end.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: That was Beck’s resignation; but then the problem of -the possible resignation of Schacht was probably also brought up in -deliberations. To your knowledge, and from your observation, was -the question of the necessity or the opportuneness of Schacht’s -resignation discussed between Schacht and Beck?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, it was discussed in great detail.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It was Beck’s opinion that his resignation alone might not be -sufficiently effective. He approached Schacht therefore and asked -him whether he would not join him, Beck, and resign also. This -subject was discussed in great detail, on the one hand between -Beck and Schacht personally, and on the other between Oster and -myself, who were the two intermediaries. During these conferences, -I must confess that I, too, was of the opinion that Schacht should -resign under all circumstances; and I also advised him to that effect. -It was Oster’s opinion, however, that Schacht must definitely remain -in office and he asked him to do so; in order to influence the -generals Schacht was needed as an official with a ministerial title. -In retrospect I must say here that my advice to Schacht was wrong. -The events which I have yet to describe have proved how important -it was to Oster and others that Schacht should remain in office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: That, of course, was a serious question for Schacht’s -own conscience. You have informed the Tribunal of your opinions -and of Oster’s opinions. Did Schacht discuss his scruples with you, -and the pros and cons of his deliberations in making his final -decision? -<span class='pageno' title='210' id='Page_210'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I don’t object to the defendants -trying their case in their own way, but I do think we are passing -beyond the limits of profitable inquiry here. Schacht is present; he -is the man who can tell us about his conscience, and I know of no -way that another witness can do so, and I think it is not a question -to which the answer would have competent value, and I object -respectfully.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think you had better tell us what -Schacht did—not tell us—but get from the witness what Schacht did.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: If I may, I should like to make a brief remark. It is -true, of course, as Mr. Justice Jackson said, that Schacht knows his -own reasons best and can tell them to the Tribunal. On a question -as difficult as this, however, the justification of which is even subject -to argument—the Prosecution apparently is inclined to consider -the train of thought which led to Schacht’s decision to be unacceptable—it -appears to me, at least on the basis of our rules for -evidence, that it is relevant for the Tribunal to hear from an eye-and-ear -witness what the considerations were and whether they -really were such at the time, or whether Schacht, now in the -defendants’ dock, is <span class='it'>ex post facto</span>, devising some explanation, as -every defendant is more or less suspected of doing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the witness can tell -us what Schacht said and what Schacht did, but not what Schacht -thought.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Certainly. Your Lordship, I only want him to tell us -what Schacht said to the witness at that time about his opinion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need any further discussion -about it. The witness has heard what I have said and you can ask -him what Schacht said, and what Schacht did; but not what Schacht -thought.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Very well then, what did Schacht say to you regarding -the reasons for his resignation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Schacht told me at the time that after all we had -experienced the generals could not be relied upon ever really to -revolt. For that reason, as a politician, he considered it his duty to -think of some possibility other than a revolt for bringing about a -change in conditions in Germany. For that reason he evolved a -plan which he explained to me at the time. Schacht said to me, -“I have got Hitler by the throat.” He meant by that, as he explained -to me in great detail, that now the day was approaching -where the debts which had been incurred by the Reich Minister -of Finance, and thus by the Reich Cabinet, would have to be repaid -<span class='pageno' title='211' id='Page_211'></span> -to the Reichsbank. Schacht doubted whether the Minister of Finance, -Schwerin-Krosigk, would be prepared without further ado to carry -out the moral and legal obligation of repaying the credits which -had been extended.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Schacht thought that that was the moment in which he should -come out with his resignation, with a joint step by the Reichsbank -Directorate; and he hoped that, given that situation, the other -ministers of the Reich would join him, the majority of whom were -still democratic at the time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is what he meant when he said to me, “I have still one -more arrow I can shoot, and that is the moment when not even a -Neurath, a Gürtner, a Seldte can refuse to follow me.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I answered Schacht at that time that I doubted whether there -would ever be such a meeting of the Cabinet. In my opinion, the -steps which would be taken to dispose of him would be much more -brutal. Schacht did not believe me, and above all he told me he -would be certain of achieving one thing; these matters would have -to be discussed in the Cabinet, and then he would cause a situation -in Germany as alarming as the one which existed in February 1938 -at the time of the Fritsch crisis. He therefore expected a radical -reformation of the cabinet which would provide the proper psychological -atmosphere for the generals to intervene.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: You said at the beginning that Schacht had said or -hinted that he could not absolutely rely on the generals to bring -about a revolt. Which generals was he referring to, and what did -he mean?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Schacht meant at the time the first revolutionary -situation which had arisen in Germany, during the months of May -to September 1938, when we drifted into the Czechoslovakia war -crisis. Beck had assured us at the time of his resignation—by us I -mean Goerdeler, Schacht and other politicians—that he would leave -to us a successor who was more energetic than himself, and who -was firmly determined to precipitate a revolt if Hitler should decide -upon war. That man whom Beck trusted, and to whom he introduced -us, was General Halder. As a matter of fact, on taking office, -General Halder immediately took steps to start discussions on the -subject with Schacht, Goerdeler, Oster, and our entire group. A -few days after he took over his office he sent for Oster and informed -him that he considered that things were drifting toward -war, and that he would then undertake an overthrow of the Government. -He asked Oster what he, for his part, intended to do to bring -civilians into the plot.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Who were the civilians in question, apart from -Goerdeler and Schacht? -<span class='pageno' title='212' id='Page_212'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Halder put that question to Oster, and under the -circumstances at that time, when we were still a very small circle, -Oster replied that to the best of his knowledge there were only two -civilians with whom Halder could have preliminary political conversations; -one was Goerdeler, the other, Schacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Halder refused to speak personally to a man as suspect as -Goerdeler. He gave as his reason the fact that it was too dangerous -for him to receive now a man whom he did not yet know, whereas -he could find some official reason for having a conference with -Schacht. Halder asked Oster to act as intermediary for such a -conference with Schacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Oster approached Schacht through me. Schacht was willing. A -meeting was to be arranged at a third person’s place. I warned -Schacht and said to him, “Have Halder come to your house, so that -you are quite sure of the matter.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Halder then visited Schacht personally at the end of July 1938 -at his residence; and he informed him that matters had reached a -stage where war was imminent and that he, Halder, would then -bring about a revolt, and he asked Schacht whether he was prepared -to aid him politically in a leading position.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is what Schacht told me at the time, and Halder told it to -Oster.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And Oster told it to you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, as I continually acted as an intermediary in -these discussions. Schacht replied, as he assured me directly after -Halder’s visit, that he was prepared to do anything if the generals -were to decide to remove Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The following morning, Halder sent for Oster. He told him of -this conversation, and he asked Oster whether police preparations -had now been made for this revolt. Oster suggested that Halder -should talk to me personally about these matters. I had a long talk -in the darkness with Halder about this revolt. I believe that it is -important for me to state here what Halder told me of his intentions -at that time. First Halder assured me that, in contrast to -many other generals, he had no doubt that Hitler wanted war. -Halder described Hitler to me as being bloodthirsty and referred -to the blood bath of 30 June. However, Halder told me that it was, -unfortunately, terribly difficult to explain Hitler’s real intentions -to the generals, particularly to the junior officers corps, because -the saying which was influencing the officers corps was ostensibly -that it was all just a colossal bluff, that the Army could be absolutely -certain that Hitler did not want to start a war, but rather -that he was merely preparing a diplomatic maneuver of blackmail -on a large scale. -<span class='pageno' title='213' id='Page_213'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>For that reason, Halder believed that it was absolutely necessary -to prove, even to the last captain, that Hitler was not bluffing at -all but had actually given the order for war. Halder therefore -decided at the time that for the sake of informing the German -nation and the officers he would even risk the outbreak of war. -But even then Halder feared the Hitler myth; and he therefore -suggested to me that the day after the outbreak of war Hitler -should be killed by means of a bomb; and the German people -should be made to believe, as far as possible, that Hitler had been -killed by an enemy bombing attack on the Führer’s train. I replied -to Halder at the time that perhaps I was still too young, but I could -not understand why he did not want to tell the German people, at -least afterwards, what the generals had done.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then for a few weeks there was no news from Halder. The press -campaign against Czechoslovakia assumed an ever more threatening -character and we felt that now it would be only a few days, or -perhaps weeks, before war would break out. At that very moment -Schacht decided to visit Halder again and to remind him of his -promise. I thought it best that a witness should be present during -that conversation and therefore I accompanied Schacht. It did not -appear to me that Halder was any too pleased at the presence of a -witness. Halder once again declared his firm intention of effecting -a revolt; but again he wished to wait until the German nation had -received proof of Hitler’s warlike intentions by means of a definite -order for war. Schacht pointed out to Halder the tremendous -danger of such an experiment. He made it clear to Halder that a -war could not be started simply to destroy the Hitler legend in the -eyes of the German people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In a detailed and very excited conversation Halder then declared -that he was prepared to start the revolt, not after the official outbreak -of the war, but at the very moment that Hitler gave the -army the final order to march.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We asked Halder whether he would then still be able to control -the situation or whether Hitler might not surprise him with some -lightning stroke. Halder replied literally, “No, he cannot deceive -me. I have designed my General Staff plans in such a way that -I am bound to know it 48 hours in advance.” I think that is important, -because during the subsequent course of events the period -of time between the order to march and the actual march itself -was considerably shortened.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Halder assured us that besides the preparations in Berlin he had -an armored division ready in Thuringia under the command of -General Von Höppner, which might possibly have to halt the Leibstandarte, -which was in Munich, on the march to Berlin. -<span class='pageno' title='214' id='Page_214'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Although Halder had told us all this, Schacht and I had a somewhat -bitter aftertaste of that conference. Halder had told Schacht -that he, Schacht, seemed to be urging him to effect this revolt -prematurely; and Schacht and I were of the opinion that Halder -might abandon us at the last moment. We informed Oster immediately -of the bad impression we had had, and we told Oster that -something absolutely must be done to win over another general in -case Halder should not act at the last minute. Oster agreed and these -are the preliminary events which led to the later General Field -Marshal Von Witzleben first coming into our circle of conspirators.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Who won Von Witzleben over?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Schacht did.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Who did?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Schacht won Witzleben over. Oster visited Witzleben -and told him everything that had happened. Thereupon Witzleben -sent for me, and I told him that in my opinion the police situation -was such that he, as commanding general of the Berlin Army Corps, -could confidently risk a revolt. Witzleben asked me the question -which every general put to us at that time: Whether a diplomatic -incident in the East would really lead to war or whether it was not -true, as Hitler and Ribbentrop had repeatedly told the generals in -confidence, that there was a tacit agreement with the Western -Powers giving Germany a free hand in the East. Witzleben said -that if such an agreement really existed, then, of course, he could -not revolt. I told Witzleben that Schacht with his excellent knowledge -of the Anglo-Saxon mentality could no doubt give him comprehensive -information about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A meeting between Schacht and Witzleben was arranged. Witzleben -brought with him his divisional general, Von Brockdorff, who -was to carry out the revolt in detail. Witzleben, Brockdorff, and I -drove together to Schacht’s country house for a conference which -lasted for hours. The final result was that Witzleben was convinced -by Schacht that the Western Powers would under no circumstances -allow Germany to move into the Eastern territories and that now -Hitler’s policy of surprise had come to an end. Witzleben decided -that he, on his part and independently of Halder, would make all -preparations which would be necessary if he should have to act.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He issued me false papers and gave me a position at his district -headquarters so that there, under his personal protection, I could -make all the necessary police and political preparations. He delegated -General Von Brockdorff, and he and I visited all the points -in Berlin which Brockdorff was to occupy with his Potsdam Division. -Frau Strünck was at the wheel and traveling ostensibly as tourists -we settled exactly what had to be done. -<span class='pageno' title='215' id='Page_215'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: That is the witness Strünck. Please excuse me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I believe I owe you a brief explanation as to why -Witzleben’s co-operation was absolutely necessary. It was not so -easy to find a general who had the actual authority to order his -troops to march. For instance, there were some generals in the -provinces who could not give their troops the order to march.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, is it necessary to go into the matter -in such detail as to why General Witzleben should be brought in?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The reasons why Witzleben was needed are perhaps -not essential for our case. We can therefore drop this subject.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Will you please tell me, Dr. Gisevius, whether Schacht was kept -constantly informed of these military and police preparations which -you have described?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Schacht was kept informed about all these matters. -We met in the evening in the residence of Von Witzleben and I -showed everything that I had worked out in writing during the day. -It was then discussed in full detail.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Apart from these military and police measures, which -you have mentioned, were there any political measures?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, of course. We had to decide carefully what the -German nation was to be told in such a case from the point of -view of internal politics, just as there were certain preparations -which had to be made regarding the external.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: What do you mean by external—foreign politics?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, of course, foreign politics.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Why of course? Was the Foreign Office included or -what is meant by foreign politics in this case?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: It is very difficult to give an explanation, because -the co-operation with foreign countries during the time of war, or -immediately before a war, is a matter which is very difficult to -discuss as we are touching upon a very controversial subject. If I -am to talk about it, then it is at least as important for me to state -the reasons which led these people to carry on such discussions -with foreign countries, as it is to give times and dates.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I am sure that the Tribunal will permit you to do -so. I think that the Tribunal will permit that the motives...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal thinks you are going -into too great detail over these matters. If the Tribunal is prepared -to accept this witness’ evidence as true, it shows that Schacht was -negotiating with him and General Witzleben at this time with a -view to prevent the war. I say, if the Tribunal accepts it; and that -<span class='pageno' title='216' id='Page_216'></span> -seems to be a matter you will not prove with the details of these -negotiations, which seem to me not very important.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes, but in my opinion the gravity and intensity of -the activities of these conspirators should be substantiated in detail. -In my opinion it is not sufficient that these plans...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But you have touched upon them since -10 o’clock this morning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Your Lordship, I am now proceeding in connection -with Schacht’s point of view, as to whether a survey, a political -survey of Schacht’s part...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am told that you said last night that you -would be half an hour longer. Do you remember saying that? -Perhaps it was a mistranslation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Oh no, that is quite a misunderstanding. I said that if -I were to touch upon the Fritsch crisis and complete it, it would -take another half hour—that is, the Fritsch crisis alone. Gentlemen -of the Tribunal, the position is this: We are now hearing the story -of the political opposition, in which Schacht played a leading role. -If the Defendant Göring and others had time for days to describe -the entire course of events from their point of view, I think that -justice demands that those men, represented in this courtroom by -the Defendant Schacht, who fought against that system under most -dreadful conditions of terror, should also be permitted to tell in -detail the story of their opposition movement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I would, therefore, ask the Tribunal—and I am not in favor -of the superfluous—to give me permission to allow the witness to -make a few more remarks on the measures taken by the group of -conspirators, Beck, Schacht, Canaris, and others, which he has -already touched upon. I beg the Tribunal to realize that I consider -it of the greatest importance; and I assume, Your Lordship, that -if it is not done now, the Prosecution will take the matter up during -cross-examination. Moreover, I believe that as it is now being told -in sequence, it will take less time than if we were to wait for the -cross-examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not propose to tell you -how you are to prove your case, but hopes that you will deal with -it as shortly as possible and without unnecessary details.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Please be sure of that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Well then, Witness; you had mentioned foreign political measures, -and you were about to talk of the motives which caused some -of you to enter into relations with foreign countries for the support -of your opposition movement. Will you please continue with that? -<span class='pageno' title='217' id='Page_217'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I should like simply to confine myself to the statement -that from that time on there were very detailed and weighty -discussions with foreign countries in order to try everything possible -to prevent the outbreak of war or at least to shorten it or -keep it from spreading. However, as long as I am not in a position -to speak of the motives of such a delicate matter—in connection -with which people like us would be accused of high treason, in -Germany, at least—as long as that is the case, I shall not say more -than the fact that these conversations took place.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I did not understand that the Tribunal would prevent -you from explaining your motives. You may state them therefore.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I owe it to my conscience and above all to those -who participated and are now dead, to state here that those matters -which I have described weighed very heavily upon their consciences. -We knew that we would be accused of conspiring with -foreign countries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, of course, knows that these -matters were not conducted without danger; but we are not really -here for the purpose of considering people who have, unfortunately, -lost their lives. We are considering the case of the Defendant -Schacht at the moment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I think the intention of the witness has been misunderstood. -He does not wish to speak about those men who lost their -lives, and he does not want to speak of the dangers; he wishes -rather to speak of the conflicts of conscience suffered by those who -planned and undertook those steps. I think that that privilege -should be granted the witness if he is to speak of this very delicate -matter here in public. I would, therefore, beg you to allow it; -otherwise the witness will confine himself to general indications -which will not be sufficient for my defense, and I assume that the -Prosecution will ask about these things in the cross-examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you try and get him to come to the -point? We, of course, can’t tell what he wants to talk about. We can -only tell about what he does talk about.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Well, then, you will describe briefly the considerations -which swayed those who entered into those foreign relations, and -also describe the character of those relations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Mr. President, it was not merely a question of -conscience. I was concerned with the fact that there are relatives -still alive today who might become the subject of unjust accusations; -and that is why I had to say, with reference to those conferences -abroad which I shall describe, that even our intimate circle -of friends did not agree in all respects as to what measures were to -be permitted. One wanted to go further, while another held back. -<span class='pageno' title='218' id='Page_218'></span> -I owe it to the memory of the dead Admiral Canaris, for instance, -to rectify many erroneous press announcements and state that he -refused to conspire with foreign countries. I must guard against -the possibility that anything I say now might be applied to men -whom I have mentioned earlier. That is why I wanted to make this -statement, and at the same time I wanted to say that our friends -who did these things rejected the accusation of high treason, -because we felt that we were morally obliged to take these steps.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Well then, what happened?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: The following happened: Immediately after Hitler -announced his intention to invade Czechoslovakia, friends tried to -keep the British Government informed, from the first intention to -the final decision. The chain of attempts began with the journey -of Goerdeler in the spring of 1938 to London, where he gave information -concerning the existence of an opposition group which -was resolved to go to any lengths. In the name of this group the -British Government was continuously informed of what was happening -and that it was absolutely necessary to make it clear, to the -German people and to the generals, that every step across the Czech -border would constitute for the Western Powers a reason for war. -When the crisis neared its climax and when our preparations for -a revolt had been completed to the last detail, we took a step -unusual in form and substance. We informed the British Government -that the pending diplomatic negotiations would not, as Hitler -asserted, deal with the question of the Sudeten countries but that -Hitler’s intention was to invade the whole of Czechoslovakia and -that, if the British Government on its side were to remain firm, -we could give the assurance that there would be no war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Those were, at the time, our attempts to obtain a certain amount -of assistance from abroad in our fight for the psychological preparation -of a revolt.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: We now come to September of 1938 and the crisis -which led to the Munich Conference. What were the activities of -your group of conspirators at that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: The more the crisis moved towards the Munich -conference, the more we tried to convince Halder that he should -start the revolt at once. As Halder was somewhat uncertain, Witzleben -prepared everything in detail. I shall now describe only the -last two dramatic days. On 27 September it was clear that Hitler -wanted to go to the utmost extremity. In order to make the German -people war-minded he ordered a parade of the Berlin army through -Berlin. Witzleben had to execute the order. The parade had entirely -the opposite effect. The population, which assumed that the troops -were marching to war, showed their open displeasure. The troops, -<span class='pageno' title='219' id='Page_219'></span> -instead of jubilation, saw clenched fists; and Hitler, who was -watching the parade from the window of the Reich Chancellery, had -a fit of rage. He stepped back from the window and said, “With such -people I cannot wage war.” Witzleben came home indignant and -said that he would have liked to have had the guns unlimbered in -front of the Reich Chancellery. On the next morning...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: One moment, Witzleben told you that he would have -liked to have had the guns unlimbered in front of the Chancellery?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And what is the source of your knowledge regarding -Hitler’s remark when he stepped back from the balcony?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Several people from the Reich Chancellery told -us that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Well then, go on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: The following morning—that was the 28th—we -believed that the opportunity had now come to carry out the revolt. -That morning we also learned that Hitler had rejected the final offer -from the British Prime Minister, Chamberlain, and had sent the -intermediary, Wilson, back with a refusal. Witzleben got that letter -and took it to Halder. He believed that proof of Hitler’s desire for -war had now been produced, and Halder agreed. Halder went to -see Brauchitsch while Witzleben waited in Halder’s room. After a -few moments Halder came back and said that Brauchitsch now had -also realized that the moment for action had arrived and that he merely -wanted to go over to the Reich Chancellery to make quite sure that -Witzleben and Halder’s account was correct. Brauchitsch went to -the Reich Chancellery after Witzleben had told him over the telephone -that everything was prepared; and it was that noon hour of -28 September when suddenly, and contrary to expectations, -Mussolini’s intervention in the Reich Chancellery took place, and -Hitler, impressed by Mussolini’s step, agreed to go to Munich; so -that actually at the last moment the revolt was eliminated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: You mean through Munich, don’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And now the Munich conference was over. How did -matters stand in your group of conspirators?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: We were extremely depressed. We were convinced -that now Hitler would soon go to the utmost lengths. We did not -doubt that Munich was the signal for a world war. Some of our -friends wondered if we should emigrate, and that was discussed -with Goerdeler and Schacht. Goerdeler, with this idea in mind, -wrote a letter to a political friend in America and asked particularly -whether the opposition people should now emigrate. Goerdeler said, -<span class='pageno' title='220' id='Page_220'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>“Otherwise to be able to continue our political work at all in Germany -in the future there is only one other possibility, and that is to -employ the methods of Talleyrand.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We decided to persevere, and then events followed in quick -succession from the Jewish pogroms to the conquest of Prague.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: But before we come to Prague, Witness, you mentioned -the Jewish pogroms; and obviously you mean November 1938. Do -you know or can you recollect what Schacht’s reaction was to those -events?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Schacht was indignant about the Jewish pogroms, and -he said so in a public speech before the personnel of the Reichsbank.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I shall submit that speech later as documentary evidence. -And then how did things go on from there? We have come -to the end of 1938. Were there new political events on the horizon -which had a stimulating effect on your group of conspirators?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: First of all, there was Schacht’s sudden dismissal -from the Reichsbank Directorate. Schacht’s desire for a consultation -of the Cabinet on this matter did not materialize and our hopes of -bringing about a cabinet crisis were vain. Thus our opposition -group had no connecting point and we had to wait and see what -would happen after the conquest of Prague.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: One moment; you mentioned Schacht’s dismissal from -his position as President of the Reichsbank. Can you tell us anything -about this, about the circumstances leading to it and the effect it -had on Schacht, and so on?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I saw how the various letters and memoranda of the -Reichsbank Directorate were drafted, and how they were progressively -toned down, and how Schacht was then dismissed. A few -minutes after the letter of dismissal arrived from Hitler, Schacht -read it to me; and he was indignant at the contents. He repeated to -me the passage in which Hitler praised him for his participation in -the German rearmament program; and Schacht said, “And now he -wants me to undertake to go on working with him openly, and -uphold his war policy.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: But then Schacht remained as a Minister without -Portfolio. Was the problem as to whether he should do so or -whether he could act differently ever discussed between you and -Schacht at the time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, but as far as I know it was the same type of -discussion which took place whenever he was to resign. He talked -to Lammers, and I assume that Lammers gave him the customary -reply.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: In other words, he thought he had to remain, that he -was forced to remain? -<span class='pageno' title='221' id='Page_221'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now, you have made several attempts to speak about -Prague, but I interrupted you. Will you please describe the effects -upon your group of conspirators, as far as Schacht was concerned?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Since December our group had definite proof that -Hitler would attack Prague in March. This new action was cynically -called the “March whirlwind.” As it was quite openly discussed in -Berlin circles, we hoped that news of this action would also reach -the British and French Embassies. We were firmly convinced that -this time results would not be achieved by surprise; but Halder had -already adopted a different view. He thought that Hitler had been -given free passage to Prague by the Western Powers. He refused to -have preliminary conferences and wanted to wait and see whether -this Prague action could be achieved without a fight. And that is -what happened.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: In which direction? You have already spoken about the -steps with the British and French Embassies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No, there were no steps taken with regard to the -British and French Embassies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Do you want to say anything further about it? Have -you anything to add?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No, I have said that we did not take any steps.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now, then, Prague is over; and I believe that you and -Schacht went to Switzerland together on behalf of your group. Is -that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Not only together with Schacht but also with Goerdeler. -We were of the opinion that Schacht in Germany—excuse -me—that Prague would have incredible psychological effects in -Germany. As far as foreign countries were concerned, Prague was -the signal that no peace and no treaty could be kept with Hitler. -Inside Germany unfortunately we were forced to see that the generals -and the people were now convinced that this Hitler could do -whatever he wished; nobody would stop him; he was protected by -Providence. This alarmed us. On one side we saw that the Western -Powers would no longer put up with these things; and on the other -side we saw that within Germany the illusion was growing that the -Western Powers would not go to war. We could see that a war -could be prevented only if the Western Powers would tell not only -the Foreign Minister, not only Hitler, but by every means of propaganda -tell the German nation that any further step towards the -East would mean war. It appeared to us that the only possibility -was to warn the generals and to get them to revolt, and that was the -subject of the talks which Schacht, Goerdeler, and I conducted in -Switzerland, immediately after Prague. -<span class='pageno' title='222' id='Page_222'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: With whom?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: We met a man who had excellent connections with -the British and French Governments. This man made very exact -reports at least to the French Government. I can testify to this -because later after Paris was conquered, I was able to find a copy -of his report among Daladier’s secret papers. We told this man very -clearly that in autumn at the latest, the fight for Danzig would -start. We told him that, as good Germans, we were without doubt -of the opinion that Danzig was a German city and that some day -that point would have to be peacefully discussed; but we also -warned him against having conferences now regarding Danzig alone -because Hitler did not want only Danzig but the whole of Poland, -not the whole of Poland but the Ukraine, and that that was the -reason why the propaganda of foreign countries should make it -abundantly clear to Germany that the limit had now been reached -and that the Western Powers would intervene. We said that only -then would a revolt be possible for us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And did this man who had your confidence make a -report in the way you stipulated?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, he did; and I must say that very soon public -statements on the part of the British, either on the radio or in the -press or in the House of Commons, began to remove these doubts -among the German generals and the German people. From that -time on everything which could be done was done by the British to -alarm the German generals.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did not Schacht meet his friend Montagu Norman in -Switzerland at that time and talk with him in the same vein? Do -you know? Were you there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. We thought that the opportunity for Schacht to -talk to a close friend of the British Prime Minister, Chamberlain, -should not be allowed to pass; and Schacht had very detailed discussions -with Montagu Norman, so as to describe to him the psychological -atmosphere in Germany after Prague and to persuade him -that the British Government should now undertake the necessary -clarifications.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Was not your slogan in reports to foreign countries at -the time: “You must play off the Nazis against Germans”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, it was the tenor of all our discussions. We -wanted it made clear to the German people that the Western Powers -were not against Germany, but only against this Nazi policy of -surprise and against the Nazi methods of terror, within the country -as well as without.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And now, having come back from Switzerland, what -happened next, particularly with reference to Schacht? -<span class='pageno' title='223' id='Page_223'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: We saw that things in Germany were rapidly drifting -toward the August crisis and that the generals could not be dissuaded -from the view that Hitler was only bluffing and that there -would be another Munich or another Prague. And now began all -those desperate efforts which we made in order to influence the -leading generals, and particularly Keitel, to prevent the decisive -order being given to march against Poland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Let us come back to Schacht’s return from the Swiss -journey in spring of 1939. You know that Schacht left Germany then -and made a journey to India?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: He went to India and hoped to stay there as long as -possible in order to go to China. But on the way Hitler’s order -prohibiting him from setting foot on Chinese soil reached him, and -he had to return. As far as I remember, he came back a few days -before the outbreak of war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: You said China; did Schacht have sympathies with -Chiang-Kai-Chek in spite of the pact with Japan?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. He sympathized greatly with the Chinese -Government, as did our entire circle. We all had quite a number -of good and dear Chinese friends with whom we attempted to keep -in touch in spite of the Japanese pact.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: About when did Schacht come back from India?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I think it was the beginning of August; but I -cannot...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now matters were rapidly heading toward war. Did -Schacht, before the outbreak of war, take any steps to prevent its -outbreak?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: He took a great number of steps, but they cannot be -described individually as that would create the impression that -Schacht alone was taking these steps. Actually the situation was -such that a large group of people were now in the struggle, and -each one took those steps which were most suited to him, and each -one informed the group of what he had done and what would be -advisable for another to do. For that reason I am afraid that it -would present a completely erroneous picture if I were to describe -individually, and only with respect to Schacht, all those desperate -efforts made from August 1939 until the attack on Holland and -Belgium.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The Tribunal has taken cognizance of the fact that -Schacht was not acting alone; but here we are dealing with Schacht’s -case, and I should like to ask you, therefore, to confine yourself to -the description of Schacht’s efforts. -<span class='pageno' title='224' id='Page_224'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: In that case I must state first that Schacht knew of -all these other matters and was in a certain sense also an accomplice. -Of Schacht himself I can only say at this particular moment -that he was co-author of the Thomas memorandum addressed to -General Keitel, or the two memoranda, in which Schacht, together -with our group, pointed out the dangers of war to Keitel. Further, -I can say that, through Thomas and Canaris, Schacht took steps to -intervene with Brauchitsch and Halder. But I would like to -emphasize expressly that all the steps taken by Beck and Goerdeler -were taken with the full knowledge of Schacht and also with his -participation. This was a very important undertaking.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: A collective action? Does not Schacht’s attempt at the -very last moment, at the end of August, to make representations to -Brauchitsch through Canaris at headquarters play a part in this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. After General Thomas had failed with both his -memoranda and after he had failed to persuade Keitel to receive -Goerdeler or Schacht, Schacht tried to approach Brauchitsch or Halder. -For that purpose Thomas paid frequent visits to General -Halder, and it was typical that during those critical days he could -not get past the anteroom of General Halder’s office, past General -Von Stülpnagel. Halder was not “at home,” and just said that he -did not want to see Schacht. Thereupon we took a further step on -that dramatic 25 August, the day on which Hitler had already once -given the order to march. As soon as the news reached us that -Hitler had given Halder the order to march, Schacht and I first got -into touch with Thomas; and then, together with Thomas, we went -to Admiral Canaris so that both Thomas and Canaris should -accompany Schacht when he went unannounced to the headquarters -in Zossen in order to confront Brauchitsch and Halder with his -presence. Schacht intended to point out to Brauchitsch and Halder -that, in accordance with the existing constitution, the Reich Cabinet -must be consulted before waging war. Brauchitsch and Halder -would be guilty of a breach of oath if, without the knowledge of the -competent political authorities, they obeyed an order for war. That -was roughly what Schacht intended to say to explain his step. When -Thomas and Schacht arrived at Bendlerstrasse, Thomas went to -Canaris. It was about 6 o’clock or...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The OKW is situated in Bendlerstrasse. The Tribunal -should know that Bendlerstrasse meant the OKW or the OKH.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: When we arrived at the OKW and were waiting at a -corner of the street, Canaris sent Oster to us. That was the moment -when Hitler between 6 and 7 o’clock suddenly ordered Halder to -withdraw his order to march. The Tribunal will no doubt remember -that Hitler, influenced by the renewed intervention of Mussolini, -<span class='pageno' title='225' id='Page_225'></span> -suddenly withdrew the order to march which had already been -given. Unfortunately, Canaris and Thomas and all our friends were -now under the impression that this withdrawal of an order to march -was an incredible loss of prestige for Hitler. Oster thought that -never before in the history of warfare had a supreme commander -withdrawn such a decisive order in the throes of a nervous breakdown. -And Canaris said to me, “Now the peace of Europe is saved -for 50 years, because Hitler has now lost the respect of the generals.” -And, unfortunately, in the face of this psychological change, we all -felt that we could look forward to the following days in a quiet -frame of mind. So, when 3 days later, Hitler nevertheless gave the -decisive order to march, it came as a complete surprise for our -group as well. Oster called me to the OKW; Schacht accompanied -me. We asked Canaris again whether he could not arrange another -meeting with Brauchitsch and Halder, but Canaris said to me, “It is -too late now.” He had tears in his eyes and added, “That is the end -of Germany.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Your Lordship, we now come to the war, and I think -that perhaps we had better deal with the war after lunch.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='226' id='Page_226'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius, before the noon recess we had just come -to the outbreak of the war, and so that your subsequent testimony -may be understood, I must ask you first in what capacity you served -during the war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: On the day of the outbreak of war I was called to -Security Intelligence by General Oster by means of a forged order. -However, as it was a regulation that all officers or other members -of the intelligence service had to be examined by the Gestapo, and -as I would never have received permission to be a member of the -intelligence, they simply gave me a forged mobilization order. Then -I was at the disposal of Oster and Canaris without doing any direct -service.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And after the outbreak of war what were the activities -of your group of conspirators, the members of which you have -already mentioned? Who took over the leadership, who participated, -and what was done?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Immediately after the outbreak of the war Generaloberst -Beck was at the head of all oppositional movements which -could exist in Germany at all, with the exception of the Communists -with whom we had no contact at that time. We were of the opinion -that only a general could be the leader during war, and Beck stood -so far above purely military matters that he was the suitable man -to unify all groups from the left to the right. Beck chose Dr. Goerdeler -as his closest collaborator.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Consequently the only civilians who worked with this -group of conspirators were Schacht and Goerdeler as before?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No, on the contrary; all the opposition groups, who -had so far had merely loose connections with each other, were now -drawn together under the pressure of war. This was especially so -with the left opposition movements, which had been greatly reduced -in the early years as all their leaders had been interned. These left -groups especially now came in with us. In this connection I shall -merely mention Leuschner and Dr. Karl Muehlendorf. However, -I must also mention the Christian Trade Unions, and Dr. Habermann, -and Dr. Jacob Kaiser. Further I must mention the Catholic -circles, the leaders of the Confessional Church, and individual political -men such as Ambassador Von Hassell, State Secretary Planck, -Minister Popitz, and many, many others.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: What was the attitude of these left circles, especially -concerning the question of a revolt, the forceful removal of Hitler -or even an attempt on his life? Did they also consider the possibility -<span class='pageno' title='227' id='Page_227'></span> -of an attempt at assassination, which later was actually suggested -in your group?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No, the left circles were very much under the impression -that the “stab in the back” legend had done much harm in -Germany; and the left circles thought that they ought not to expose -themselves again to the danger of having it said later that Hitler or -the German Army had not been defeated on the battlefield. The left-wing -had long been of the opinion that no matter how bitter an -experience it might be for them, it must now be proved absolutely -to the German people that militarism was committing suicide in -Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I have already submitted to the Tribunal, a letter -which you, Doctor, smuggled to Switzerland for Schacht at about -this time—the end of 1939. It is a letter to the former president of -the International Bank at Basel, later president of the First National -Bank of New York; a man of influence, who probably had access -to President Roosevelt.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In anticipation of the documentary evidence pertaining hereto -I had originally intended to read this letter to the Tribunal now. -However, in discussing the admissibility of evidence I informed the -Tribunal of most of the essential points, and as Mr. Justice Jackson -could not yet have the Schacht Document Book in hand, and as he -remarked previously that he did not like me to produce documentary -evidence at this point, I will not carry out my original intention -to read this letter in its entirety. I will come back to it when I -present my documentary evidence. Just to refresh the witness’ -memory about this letter, I will give the underlying reasons for it. -Schacht suggested to President Fraser that now the moment...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I make no objection to the use of the -letter from Schacht to Leon Fraser as one banker writing to another. -If you want to claim that Mr. Fraser was influential with President -Roosevelt, I should want you to prove it; but I have no objection to -the letter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The letter is dated 14 January 1946. I will not read it -in its entirety, for there are six long pages. Its contents are...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What date was it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I had the wrong letter. The 16 October 1939. It will be -Exhibit Number 31 in my document book. He writes that now -would be an excellent time to give peace to the world with President -Roosevelt—that would be a victory, also a German victory...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is the letter from Schacht?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: From Schacht to Fraser.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you have proof for the letter? -<span class='pageno' title='228' id='Page_228'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: If the Tribunal prefers, Schacht can also deal with the -letter. In that case I will only ask the witness whether it is true -that he smuggled this letter into Switzerland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Please answer the question, Witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. I took this letter to Switzerland and mailed it -there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Very well. What did your group do to bring about -peace, or prevent the war from spreading? Did you undertake -further activities in foreign politics in that direction in your -opposition group, that is, your group of conspirators?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: The main thing for us was with all possible means to -prevent the war from spreading. It could only spread toward -Holland and Belgium or Norway. We recognized clearly that if a -step was taken in this direction, the consequences, not only for Germany, -but for the whole of Europe would be tremendous. Therefore, -we wanted to prevent war in the West by all means.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Immediately after the Polish Campaign Hitler decided to move -his troops from the East to the West, and to launch the attack by -violating the neutrality of Holland and Belgium.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We believed that if we could succeed in preventing this attack -in November we would in the coming winter months gain enough -time to convince the individual generals, above all Brauchitsch and -Halder and the leaders of the army groups, that they must at least -oppose the expansion of the war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Brauchitsch and Halder evaded the question and said it was -now too late, that the enemy would fight Germany to the end and -destroy her. We did not share this opinion. We believed a peace -with honor was still possible, and by honor I mean that we would -of course eliminate the Nazi hierarchy to the last man. In order to -prove to the generals that the foreign powers did not wish to -destroy the German people, but wanted only to protect themselves -against the Nazi terror, we took all possible steps abroad. The first -attempt in that direction, or a small part of that attempt, was the -letter written by Schacht to Fraser, the object of which was to -point out that certain domestic political developments were imminent -and that if we could gain time, that is, if we could come -through the winter, we could perhaps persuade the generals to -undertake a revolt.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Thank you. May I interrupt you for a moment? I would -like to call the attention of the Tribunal now to the fact that the -witness is referring to a passage, to a suggestion, contained in the -letter. This letter is in English. I have no German translation, and -I must therefore read this sentence in English. “My feeling is that -the earlier discussions be opened, the easier it will be to influence -<span class='pageno' title='229' id='Page_229'></span> -the development of certain existing conditions.” The question -is now...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I would like to ask you: What did Dr. Schacht mean by the -“certain existing conditions” that were to be influenced? Did he -mean your efforts?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I must interpose an objection. I am -not sure whether you have misunderstood it. I think that what -Schacht meant is not a question to be addressed to this witness. -I shall have no objection to Dr. Schacht telling us what he meant by -his cryptic language, but I don’t think that this witness can interpret -what Schacht meant unless he has some information apart from -anything that now appears. I don’t want to be over technical about -this, but it does seem to me that this is the sort of question which -should be reserved for Dr. Schacht himself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Mr. Justice Jackson, of course, is right, but this witness -said that he smuggled the letter into Switzerland, and I assume that -he discussed the contents of the letter with Schacht and was therefore -in a position to explain the cryptic words.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He didn’t say this yet; he hasn’t said he ever -saw the letter except the outside of it. He hasn’t said he ever saw -the letter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Will you please tell us whether you saw the letter and -knew its contents?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I am sorry that I did not so clearly at once, but -I helped in drafting the letter. I was there when the letter was -drafted and written.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Then I believe Justice Jackson will withdraw his -objection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Will you please answer my question; what is meant by -those cryptic words?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: We wanted to suggest that we, in Germany, were -interested in forcing certain developments and that we now expected -an encouraging word from the other side. I do not, however, want -any misunderstanding to arise here. In this letter it also states very -clearly that President Roosevelt had in the meantime been disappointed -many times by the German side, so that we had to beg, -to urge him to take such a step. It is a fact that President Roosevelt -had taken various steps for peace.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Let us go on now. If I give you the cue “Vatican -Action”?... -<span class='pageno' title='230' id='Page_230'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: In addition to this attempt to enter into discussions -with America, we believed we should ask for a statement from the -British Government. Again it was our aim solely to...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is the original of this letter still available or -is this only given from memory?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The original copy, yes; that is, a copy signed by Schacht -is here. It was kept during the war in Switzerland and was brought -back to us from Switzerland by this witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Now, let us go on to the “Vatican -Action.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: We tried in every possible way to prove to General -Halder and General Olbricht that their theory was wrong, that there -could be no longer a question of dealing with a decent German -government. We believed that we should now follow a particularly -important and safe road. The Holy Father made personal efforts in -these matters, as the British Government had, with justification, -become uncertain whether there really existed in Germany a trustworthy -group of men with whom talks could be undertaken. I -remember that shortly afterwards the Venlo incident took place -when, with the excuse that there was a German opposition group, -officials of the English Secret Service were kidnapped at the Dutch -border. Therefore, we were anxious to prove that there was a group -here which was honestly trying to do its best and which, if the -occasion arose, would stand by its word under all circumstances. -I believe that we kept our word regarding the things we proposed -to do, while we said quite frankly that we could not bring about -this revolt as we had said previously we hoped to do.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These negotiations began in October—November 1939. They were -only concluded later in the spring, and if I am asked I will continue.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes, please describe the conclusion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I believe I must add first that, during November of -1939, General Halder actually had intended a revolt, but that these -intentions for a revolt again came to naught because at the very last -minute Hitler called off the western offensive. Strengthened by the -attitude of Halder at that time, we believed that we should continue -these discussions at the Vatican. We reached what you might call -a gentleman’s agreement, on the grounds of which I believe that I -am entitled to state that we could give the generals unequivocal -proof that in the event of the overthrow of the Hitler regime, an -agreement could be reached with a decent civil German government.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you read the documents yourself, Doctor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: These were oral discussions which were then written -down in a comprehensive report. This report was read by the Ambassador -Von Hassell and by Dr. Schacht before it was given to -<span class='pageno' title='231' id='Page_231'></span> -Halder by General Thomas. Halder was so taken aback by the contents -that he gave this comprehensive report to Generaloberst Von -Brauchitsch. Brauchitsch was enraged and threatened to arrest the -intermediary, General Thomas, and thus this action which had every -prospect of success, failed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Doctor, you have testified...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the last notes that I have got down -in my notebook are these: “That we knew that if Holland, Belgium, -and the other countries were attacked, it would have very grave -consequences and we therefore negotiated with Halder and Brauchitsch -and they weren’t prepared to help us to stop the war at -that time. We wanted peace with honor, eliminating politics. We -took all possible steps.” Well, now, since I took these notes down, -I think we spent nearly 10 minutes in details, which are utterly -irrelevant, about further negotiations. If they took all possible steps, -what is the point of giving us these details about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes, Your Lordship, if a witness is called in a matter -of such importance, where he as well as the defendants’ counsel -must always take into account that people who are of a different -opinion may say “these are just generalities, we want facts and -particulars,” then I cannot forego having the witness testify at least -in broad outline that, for example, a detailed action had been undertaken -through His Holiness in the Vatican. If he merely says that -the result of this action was a comprehensive report, if with Halder -and Brauchitsch the above mentioned...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I agree with you that the one sentence about -some negotiations with the Vatican may have been properly given, -but all the rest of it were unnecessary details.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Anyway we have already concluded this chapter, Your -Lordship.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] You have already testified that the -revolt which was planned for November did not occur because the -western offensive did not take place. Therefore, we need not pursue -this subject any further. I would merely like to ask you at this -point: Did your group of conspirators remain inactive during the -winter, and particularly during the spring, or were further plans -followed and acted upon?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Constant attempts were made to influence all generals -within our reach. Besides Halder and Brauchitsch we tried to -reach the generals of the armored divisions in the West. I remember, -for instance, there was a discussion between Schacht and General -Hoeppner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Hoeppner? -<span class='pageno' title='232' id='Page_232'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Hoeppner. We also tried to influence Field Marshal -Rundstedt, Bock, and Leeb. Here, too, General Thomas and Admiral -Canaris were the intermediaries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And how did the generals react?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: When everything was ready, they would not start.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now, we come to the summer of 1941. Hitler is in -Paris. The aerial offensive against England is imminent. Tell us -about your group of conspirators and their activity during this -period and the period following.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: After the fall of Paris, our group had no influence at -all for months. Hitler’s success deluded everyone, and it took much -effort on our part, through all channels available, to try at least to -prevent the bombardment of England. Here again the group made -united efforts and we tried, through General Thomas and Admiral -Canaris and others, to prevent this evil.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Do I understand you correctly, when you use the word -“group” you mean the group which was led by Beck, in which -Schacht collaborated?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now, at that time did Schacht have several talks, or -one talk, along the same line in Switzerland?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: That was a little later. We have now come to the -year 1941, and on this trip to Switzerland Schacht tried to urge that -a peace conference should be held as soon as possible. We knew that -Hitler was thinking about the attack on Russia, and we believed -that we should do everything to avert at least this disaster. With -this thought in mind Schacht’s discussions in Switzerland were conducted. -I myself took part in arranging a dinner in Basel with the -president of the B. I. Z., Mr. McKittrick, an American, and I was -present when Schacht tried to express at least the opinion that -everything possible must now be done to initiate negotiations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: In this connection I would respectfully like to remind -the Tribunal of the article in the <span class='it'>Basler Nachrichten</span>, of which I -presented the essential contents when we discussed the admissibility -of the document. It deals with a similar conversation between -Schacht and an American economist. That is the same trip which -the witness is now discussing. I will take the liberty of referring to -this article later, when presenting documentary evidences.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Now, the war continued. Do you have -anything to say about Russia; about the imminent war with Russia?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I can say only that Schacht knew of all the many -attempts which we undertook to avert this catastrophe. -<span class='pageno' title='233' id='Page_233'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now let us go further to the time of Stalingrad. What -was done by your group of conspirators after this critical period -of the war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: When we did not succeed in persuading the victorious -generals to engineer a revolt, we then tried at least to win them -over to one when they had obviously come up against their great -catastrophe. This catastrophe, which found its first visible signs in -Stalingrad, had been predicted in all its details by Generaloberst -Beck since December of 1942. We immediately made all preparations -so that at the moment, which could be forecast with almost mathematical -exactitude, when the army of Paulus, completely defeated, -would have to capitulate, then at least a military revolt could be -organized. I myself was called back from Switzerland and participated -in all discussions and preparations. I can only testify that -this time a great many preparations were made. Contact was also -made with the field marshals in the East, with Witzleben in the -West but again, things turned out differently, for Field Marshal -Paulus capitulated instead of giving us the cue at which Kluge, -according to plan, was to start the revolt in the East.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: This was the time of the so-called Schlaberndorff -attempt?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No, a little later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now I shall interpose another question. Until now you -have always described the group led by Generaloberst Beck and -supported by Schacht, Goerdeler, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, as a revolt movement, -that is, a group which wanted to overthrow the government. Did -you not now more and more aim at an assassination?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, from the moment when the generals again -deserted us, we realized that a revolt was not to be hoped for, and -from that moment on we took all the steps we could to instigate an -assassination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High -Command of the German Armed Forces): Mr. President, I must -object at this point to the testimony of the witness. The witness, -Dr. Gisevius, by his testimony has incriminated the group which -I represent. However, some of this testimony is so general that it -cannot be referred to as fact. Furthermore, he has just testified that -the field marshals in the East had “deserted” the group of conspirators. -These statements are opinions which the witness is giving, -but they are not facts, to which the witness must limit his testimony, -and therefore I ask—Mr. President, I have not yet finished. -I wanted to conclude with the request for a resolution by the Court -that the testimony given by the witness, where he asserted that the -<span class='pageno' title='234' id='Page_234'></span> -generals had “deserted” the group of conspirators, be stricken from -the record.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: May I please reply briefly? I cannot agree with the -opinion of my esteemed colleague Dr. Laternser that the statement -“the generals deserted us” was not a statement of fact...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need to hear further argument -upon it. It certainly won’t be stricken from the record until -we have had time to consider it, and Dr. Laternser will have his -opportunity of examining this witness, and he can then elucidate -any evidence he wants to.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: But, Mr. President, if I make the motion for -the reason that the witness is giving testimony which is beyond his -scope as a witness, and that he is giving his opinion, then to that -extent it is inadmissible testimony which would have to be stricken -from the record.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you mean that the evidence is hearsay, -that will be perfectly obvious to the Tribunal, and doesn’t make the -evidence inadmissible, and you will be able to cross-examine him -about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have been misunderstood. I -did not say, and I am not basing my request to strike the testimony -from the record on the allegation that the witness made statements -from hearsay; but I say that it is not a statement of fact, but an -opinion which the witness is giving when he says that “the generals -in the East deserted the group of conspirators.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: May I answer briefly to that? If I try to influence a -group of generals to organize a revolt and if they do not do so, that -is a fact and I can state this fact with the words, “They deserted us.” -Naturally I can also say, “They did not revolt,” but that is merely a -matter of expression. Both are facts and not an opinion. He is not -appraising the behavior of the generals in an ethical, military, or -political sense, he is merely pointing out, “They were not willing.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Go on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: [<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] If I recall correctly, you were -just about to tell us that now the policy of the conspirators’ group -changed from a revolt to an assassination. Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Do you wish to state anything further?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: You had asked me about the first step in this direction -after Generaloberst Beck had given up all hope of being able -to win over another general to a revolt. It was said at that time -that there was now nothing left for us but to free Germany, Europe, -and the world from the tyrant by a bomb attack. Immediately after -<span class='pageno' title='235' id='Page_235'></span> -this decision, preparations were started. Oster spoke to Lahousen -and Lahousen furnished the bombs from his arsenal. The bombs -were taken to the headquarters of Kluge at Smolensk, and with -every possible means we tried to bring about the assassination, -which was unsuccessful only because at a time when Hitler was -visiting the front, the bomb which had been put in his airplane did -not explode. This was in the spring of 1943.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now, an event took place in the Abwehr OKW, which -as a result of further developments, strongly affected Schacht’s -further attitude and also your remaining in Germany. Will you -please describe that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Gradually even Himmler could not fail to see what -was happening in the OKW, and at the urgent request of SS General -Schellenberg a thorough investigation of the Canaris group was -now started. A special commissioner was appointed and on the first -day of this investigation Oster was relieved of his post and a number -of his collaborators were arrested. A short time afterwards Canaris -was also dismissed from his post. I myself could no longer remain -in Germany and thus this group, which until now had in a certain -sense been the directorate of all the conspiracies, was eliminated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: During that time, that is January 1943, Schacht was -also relieved of his position as Reich Minister without Portfolio. Did -you meet Schacht after that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. By chance I was in Berlin on the day this letter -of dismissal arrived. It was an unusually sharp letter and I remember -that that night I was asked to the country house of Schacht, and as -the letter had simply stated that Schacht was to be dismissed, we -wondered whether he was also going to be arrested.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I would like to remind the Tribunal that I read this -letter into the record when Lammers was examined and showed it -to him. This letter—I mean Schacht’s letter of dismissal signed by -Lammers—has already been read into the record and is probably -contained in my document book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] You were in Switzerland at that time, -but on 20 July you were in Berlin. How did that happen?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean the 20th of July 1944?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes, the well-known day of the 20th of July. We are -rapidly approaching the end now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: A few months after the elimination of the Canaris-Oster -circle we formed a new group around General Olbricht. At -that time Colonel Count Von Stauffenberg also joined us. He -replaced Oster in all activities, and when after several months, and -after many unsuccessful attempts and discussions, the time finally -<span class='pageno' title='236' id='Page_236'></span> -arrived in July 1944, I returned secretly to Berlin in order to participate -in the events.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: But you had no direct connection with Schacht at this -attempted assassination?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No; I, personally, was in Berlin secretly and saw -only Goerdeler, Beck, and Stauffenberg; and it was agreed expressly -at this time that no other civilian except Goerdeler, Leuschner, and -myself were to be informed of the matter. We hoped thus to protect -lives by not burdening anyone unnecessarily with this knowledge.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now I come to my last question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You know that Schacht had after all held high government -positions under the Hitler regime. You, Doctor, as is shown by your -testimony today were an arch enemy of the Hitler regime. Despite -that you had, as can also be seen from your testimony today, special -confidence in Schacht. How do you explain this fact which at first -sight seems to be contradictory in itself?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: My answer can, of course, only express a personal -opinion and I will formulate it as briefly as possible. However, I -would like to emphasize that the problem of Schacht was confusing -not only to me but to my friends as well; Schacht was always a -problem and a puzzle to us. Perhaps it was due to the contradictory -nature of this man that he kept his position in the Hitler -government for so long. He undoubtedly entered the Hitler regime -for patriotic reasons, and I would like to testify here that the -moment his disappointment became obvious he decided for the -same patriotic reasons to join the opposition. Despite Schacht’s -many contradictions and the puzzles he gave us to solve, my friends -and I were strongly attracted to Schacht because of his exceptional -personal courage and the fact that he was undoubtedly a man of -strong moral character, and he did not think only of Germany but -also of the ideals of humanity. That is why we went with him, -why we considered him one of us; and, if you ask me personally, I -can say that the doubts which I often had about him were completely -dispelled during the dramatic events of 1938 and 1939. At -that time he really fought, and I will never forget that. It is a -pleasure for me to be able to testify to this here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Your Lordship, I am now through with the questioning -of this witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants -counsel want to ask questions of the witness?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for SA): Witness, yesterday -you said that you were a member of the Stahlhelm. When and for -how long were you a member? -<span class='pageno' title='237' id='Page_237'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I entered the Stahlhelm in 1929, I believe, and left -that organization in 1933.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: You know the mentality of the members of the -Stahlhelm. You know that, almost without exception, they were -people who had served in the first World War, and I would like to -ask you now whether the internal and foreign political goals of the -Stahlhelm were to be reached by its members in a legal or in a -revolutionary manner?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: To my knowledge the Stahlhelm always favored the -legal way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: Yes. Was the fight of the Stahlhelm against the -Treaty of Versailles which every organization with national tendencies -took up, to be carried on by legal or revolutionary means, or -means of force?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: It is very hard for me to answer for the entire -Stahlhelm, but I can only say that I, and the members of the Stahlhelm -organization with whom I was acquainted, knew that the -Stahlhelm wanted to take the legal way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: Is it correct to say that in the year 1932 and 1933 -hundreds of thousands, regardless of party and race, entered the -Stahlhelm organization?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: That is correct. The more critical matters became in -Germany, the more people went to the right. I myself having experienced -this growth of the Stahlhelm as an official speaker at -public meetings, from 1929 to 1933, I would describe it in this way: -That those who did not want to join the NSDAP and the SA, deliberately -entered the Stahlhelm so that within the German rightist -movement there would be a counterbalance against the rising -“brown” tide. That was the underlying reason of our recruitment -for the Stahlhelm at that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: You know, of course, that in the year 1933 the -Stahlhelm organization as a whole was taken into the SA. Was it -possible at that time for the individual member of the Stahlhelm -to say “no,” or to protest against being taken over into the SA?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: That was possible, of course, as everything was -possible also in the Third Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: What would have been the possible consequences -of such a step?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: The possible consequences would have been a violent -discussion with the regional Party leaders or SA leaders. At that -time I was no longer a member of the Stahlhelm and I can merely -say that it undoubtedly must have been very difficult for many -people, particularly those living in the country, to refuse being -<span class='pageno' title='238' id='Page_238'></span> -transferred to the SA. After they had been betrayed by their -leader, Minister Seldte, or as it was said at that time “sold” to the -SA, refusal to transfer to the SA was naturally a sign of open -distrust toward National Socialism.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: I gather from my correspondence with the former -members of the Stahlhelm, that these people who, as former -members of the Stahlhelm, were taken into the SA, remained a -foreign body in it and were in constant opposition to the NSDAP -and the SA. Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: As I myself no longer belonged to that organization, -I can only say that I assume that those members of the Stahlhelm -felt very uneasy in their new surroundings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: Do you know whether the members of the Stahlhelm, -before 1934 and from 1934, participated in Crimes against -Peace, against the Jews, against the Church, and so forth?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No, I know nothing about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: Now I would also like to question you about the -SA as far as you are able to give information. Yesterday at least -you expressed yourself freely with regard to the SA leaders. I -would like to ask you, in replying to a question I shall now ask, to -confine yourself to a circle of SA members which lies between the -simple SA man and the Standartenführer or the Brigadeführer. -Could you tell from the attitude and activity of the ordinary SA -man and that of the Standartenführer or Brigadeführer—and I -do not go beyond that limit because I well remember the statements -you made yesterday concerning the Gruppenführer or Obergruppenführer—that -these people intended to commit Crimes against Peace?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: It is, of course, very difficult to answer such a -general question. If you ask me about the majority of these SA -men, I can only say no.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: Witness, did you notice that SA men were -arrested and that SA men were also put into concentration camps?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I saw that many times. In 1933, 1934, and 1935, that -was in the years when it was my official duty to deal with these -matters, many SA men were arrested by the Gestapo, beaten to -death, or at least tortured, and put into concentration camps.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: Could a man, who was in the SA, or anyone -outside for that matter, judge the SA as a whole from the activity -of its members, or from individual cases, and gather that the SA -intended to commit Crimes against Peace?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No. When I consider what efforts even we in the -High Command of the Wehrmacht had to make to try and discover -<span class='pageno' title='239' id='Page_239'></span> -whether or not Hitler was planning a war, I naturally cannot attribute -to a simple SA man knowledge of something which we ourselves -did not know for certain.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution asserted that the SA incited the -youth and the German people to war. Did you observe anything -of that nature? You were a member of the Gestapo and such -activities could not have escaped your notice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: That is another extremely general question, and I -do not know to what extent certain songs, and other things, can -be considered a preparation for war. At any rate I cannot imagine -that the mass of the SA was of a different frame of mind than the -mass of the German people in the years up to 1938, and the general -trend of opinion beyond a doubt was that the mere thought of war -was absolute madness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: Was there anything that made you think that -the SA intended to commit Crimes against Peace, or that they had -committed such crimes?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: As far as the ordinary SA man is concerned, I must -say “no” again, and I say the same for the mass of the SA. I could -not say to what extent the higher leaders were involved in plotting -all the horrible things we have heard about here, but the majority -undoubtedly did not know of such things and were not trained for -them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: Witness, it cannot be denied that mistakes were -made by a number of SA men, and criminal acts were committed -for which these people certainly should be punished.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You know the SA and know what took place during the revolutionary -period and afterwards. Are you in a position to estimate -or to give a proportional figure as to what percentage of the -numerous members of the SA conducted themselves in a punishable -manner? I call your attention to the fact that up to, perhaps 1932 -or 1933, the SA...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, Dr. Böhm. The Tribunal -doesn’t think that is a proper question to put to a witness, what -percentage of a group of this sort, of hundreds of thousands of men, -take a certain view.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: However the explanation of this question would -be very important for my case, Mr. President. Here is a witness -who was outside the SA, who as a member of the Gestapo was -perhaps one of the few people who could look into the activities -of the SA, and actually did look into them, and he will certainly -be believed by the Tribunal. He knew fairly well what criminal -procedures were carried out and also—and that is what I want to -say—the number of members of the SA, and he is one of the few -<span class='pageno' title='240' id='Page_240'></span> -who are in a position to testify on this matter. I believe that if the -witness is in a position to testify hereto, the testimony given by him -will be of great importance to the Tribunal also.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that not only -this witness, but other witnesses, are not in a position to give such -evidence, and the question is denied.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: Witness, do you know of cases in which SA -members worked in opposition to the SA?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I answered that question when I said that quite a -number of SA members were arrested by the Gestapo.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: Yes. Do you know what criminal proceedings -were taken against the members of the SA, and possibly how many?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Far too few, I am sorry to say, if you put it that way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Unfortunately there were many who committed -misdeeds in the SA and who went scot-free. I am sorry that I must -answer in this way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: Certainly. And in what relation do they stand -to the entire SA?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Now we have come again to the question...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is the same question over again.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: Do you know under what circumstances one -could resign from the SA?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: In the same manner as one could resign from all -organizations of the Party. That was, of course, a brave decision -to make.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERR BÖHM: Thank you. I have no further question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in replying to a question of my -colleague Dr. Dix, you told the Tribunal that after the defeat at -Stalingrad a military revolt was to be organized. You testified on -this point that discussions had already taken place, that preparations -had been made, and that the execution of the military revolt -was prevented because the field marshals in the East had deserted -the group of conspirators.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask you now to give us more details on this question so that I -can understand why you came to the conclusion that the field -marshals had deserted the conspiracy group.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: From the outbreak of the war Generaloberst Beck -tried to contact one field marshal after another. He wrote letters -and he sent messengers to them. I particularly remember the correspondence -with General Field Marshal Von Manstein, and I saw -<span class='pageno' title='241' id='Page_241'></span> -with my own eyes General Von Manstein’s answer of the year 1942. -To Beck’s strictly military explanations that the war had been lost -and why, Manstein could reply only: A war is not lost until one -considers it as lost.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Beck said that with an answer like that from a field marshal -strategic questions could certainly not be raised. Several months -later another attempt was made to win General Field Marshal Von -Manstein. General Von Tresckow, also a victim of the 20th of July, -went to the headquarters of Manstein. Oberstleutnant Count Von -der Schulenburg also went to the headquarters of Manstein, but we -did not succeed in winning Herr Von Manstein to our side.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At the time of Stalingrad we contacted Field Marshal Von Kluge, -and he, in his turn, contacted Manstein. This time discussions -reached a point when Kluge definitely assured us that he would -win over Field Marshal Von Manstein at a discussion definitely -fixed to take place in the Führer’s headquarters. Because of the -importance of that day, a special telephone line was laid by the -General of the Signal Corps, Fellgiebel, between the headquarters -and General Olbricht at the OKW in Berlin. I myself was present -when this telephone conversation took place. Even today I can -still see that paper which said, in plain language, that Manstein, -contrary to his previous assurances, had allowed himself to be -persuaded by Hitler to remain in office. And even Kluge expressed -himself as satisfied at the time with very small military strategic -concessions. This was a bitter disappointment to us, and, therefore, -I would like to repeat again what Beck said at that time: “We were -deserted.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: What further preparations had been made in -this special connection?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: We had made definite agreements with Field Marshal -Von Witzleben. Witzleben was the Commander-in-Chief in the West, -and therefore he was very important for starting or protecting a -revolt in the West. We had made further definite agreements with -the Military Governor of Belgium, Generaloberst Von Falkenhausen. -In addition, as on 20 July 1944, we had assembled a certain contingent -of armored troops in the vicinity of Berlin. Furthermore, -those commanders of the troops who were to participate in the -action had been assembled in the OKW.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: All this happened after Stalingrad?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: At the time of the Stalingrad revolt.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Please continue.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: We had made all other political preparations which -were necessary. It is difficult for me to tell here the entire story -of the revolts against the Third Reich. -<span class='pageno' title='242' id='Page_242'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes. What were the reasons why this intended -military revolt was not carried through?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: What was that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Witness, what were the reasons why this -revolt, which was intended by the group of conspirators, was not -carried through?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Contrary to all expectations, Field Marshal Paulus -capitulated. This, as is known, was the first wholesale capitulation -of generals; whereas we had expected that Paulus with his generals -would issue, before his capitulation, a proclamation to the German -people and to the East Front, in which the strategy of Hitler and -the sacrifice of the Stalingrad army would be branded in suitable -words. When this cue had been given, Kluge was to declare that -in future he would take no further military orders from Hitler. We -hoped with this plan to circumvent the problem of the military -oath which kept troubling us more and more; the field marshals one -after the other were to refuse military obedience to Hitler, whereupon -Beck was to take over the supreme military command in -Berlin.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you just mentioned the military oath. -Do you know whether Blomberg and Generaloberst Beck opposed, -or tried to oppose, the pledge the Armed Forces took to Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I know only that Beck up to the last day of his life -considered the day he gave his pledge to Hitler as the blackest day -of his existence, and he gave me an exact description of how completely -taken unawares he had felt at the rendering of the oath. -He told me that he had been summoned to a military roll call; and -that suddenly it was announced that an oath of allegiance was to -be given to the new head of State; that unexpectedly a new form -of oath was to be used. Beck could never rid himself of the awful -thought that at that time he perhaps should not have given his oath. -He told me that while he was on his way home, he said to a -comrade, “This is the blackest day of my life.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in your testimony, you also mentioned -that between the Polish campaign and the Western campaign, -or with the beginning of the Western campaign, a further military -Putsch was to be attempted, and that this Putsch failed because -Halder and Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch shirked it. You used the -term “shirked” previously in your testimony. Now I ask you to tell -me on the basis of what facts did you arrive at this opinion that -both these generals shirked...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not raise an objection that this -is harmful to us if we have plenty of time, but this evidence as to -these Putsche, and threatened Putsche, and rumored Putsche, was -<span class='pageno' title='243' id='Page_243'></span> -all admissible here in our view only as bearing on the attitude of -the Defendant Schacht. We are not trying these generals for being -in a Putsch or not being in a Putsch. For all purposes it is just as -well as they should not be in a Putsch. I do not know what purposes -this can have in doing it over again. I call the Tribunal’s -attention for the limited purpose for which this historical matter -was admitted, and suggest that it is serving no purpose in this -connection to review it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What is the answer to that, Dr. Laternser?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Since the witness has talked about this -matter and testified that Halder as well as Brauchitsch shirked, and -I cannot establish whether the opinion expressed by this witness -with “shirked” is correct on the basis of the facts, I think I am -obliged to clarify this point. In a general sense I would like to add -further that the Prosecution is also justified in going into this point. -I refer to the contention of the French Prosecutor in which he -stated that in the light of all these circumstances it was beyond -comprehension why Halder, as well as the entire German nation, -did not rise as one man against the regime. Therefore, if I start -from the viewpoint of the Prosecution, then my question on this -point, as I have just put it, is undoubtedly of importance, and I, -therefore, ask that this question be permitted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The charge against the High Command is -that they were a criminal organization within the meaning of the -Charter; that is to say that they planned an aggressive war, or that -they committed War Crimes or Crimes against Humanity in connection -with an aggressive war. Well, whether or not they took part, -or were planning to take part in a Putsch to stop the war does not -seem very material to any of those questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: I agree with you entirely on this point, -Mr. President, that it cannot actually be considered of special importance; -but on the other hand...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I did not say that it was not of special importance. -I say that it was not material to the relevancy. The -Tribunal does not think that any of these questions are relevant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Then I will withdraw my question. I have -one final question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Witness, can you tell me the names -of those generals who participated on the 20th of July?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, what has that got to do with any -charge against the High Command?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The General Staff is accused of having participated -in a conspiracy. The question... -<span class='pageno' title='244' id='Page_244'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We are not here to consider the honor of the -High Command. We are here to consider whether or not they are -a criminal organization within the meaning of the Charter, and -that is the only question with which we are going to deal as far as -you are concerned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the General Staff and the OKW -are accused of having participated in a conspiracy. If I prove, as -I am trying to do with this question, that on the contrary, instead -of participating in a conspiracy, part of the General Staff took part -in an action against the regime, then the answer to this question -on this point indicates that precisely the opposite was the case; -and, for that reason, I ask that the question be permitted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think what the -General Staff did in July 1944, when the circumstances were -entirely different to what they were in September 1939, has any -relevancy to the question whether they took part, either before or -in September 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I put myself in the place of -the Prosecution, I must assume that the Prosecution assumes that -the conspiracy continued. It cannot be inferred, from testimony by -the Prosecution or from anything that has been submitted, that the -conspiracy was to have stopped at a certain period of time. So that -the answer to this question would be of importance, I believe of -decisive importance. I would like to supplement my statement, -Mr. President...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Laternser.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: I would like to add that it is precisely for -the members of the group I represent that the period of time between -1938 and May 1940 is considered decisive.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean the group changed; therefore, -they might be different in 1944?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: I wish to add that a particularly large number -of the members of this group only joined it in the course of 1944 -because of their official positions, and I do consider this point important.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Witness, my question was: Can you give me -the names of those generals who participated in the attempted -assassination of the 20th of July 1944?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Generaloberst Beck, General Field Marshal Von -Witzleben, General Olbricht, General Hoeppner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: One question: General Hoeppner was previously -commander-in-chief of an armored army? -<span class='pageno' title='245' id='Page_245'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I believe so; General Von Haase, and certainly a -large number of other generals whom I cannot enumerate offhand. -Here I have mentioned only the names of those who were at -Bendlerstrasse that afternoon.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: One question, Witness: Do you know whether -Field Marshal Rommel also participated on the 20th of July 1944?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I cannot answer by merely saying “yes,” for it is -a fact that Rommel, as well as Field Marshal Von Kluge, did participate. -However, it would give a wrong picture if Field Marshal -Rommel were suddenly to appear in the category of those who -fought against Hitler. Herr Rommel, as a typical Party general, -sought to join us very late, and it gave us a very painful impression -when suddenly Herr Rommel in the face of his own military -catastrophe, proposed to us to have Hitler assassinated, and then, if -possible, Göring and Himmler as well. And, even then, he did not -want to join in at the first opportunity, but wanted to stay somewhat -in the background in order to allow us to profit by his popularity -later on. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to know whether -these gentlemen, when they joined our group, came as the fallen -might, as people who wished to save their pensions, or as people -who, from the beginning, stood for decency and honor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Did you yourself ever speak to Field Marshal -Rommel about this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No. I never considered it worth while to make his -acquaintance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: A further question: Did officers of the General -Staff participate in the 20th of July?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, a great number.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: About how many would you say?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I cannot give you the number, for at that time I -was not informed of how many of the General Staff Stauffenberg -had on his side. I do not doubt that Stauffenberg, Colonel Hansen, -and several other stout-hearted men had discovered a number of -clean, courageous officers among the General Staff, and that they -could count on the support of very many decent members of the -General Staff, but whom they naturally could not initiate into their -plans beforehand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes, that will be sufficient for this point. -Another question has occurred to me. You mentioned General -Von Tresckow previously. Did you know General Von Tresckow -personally?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. -<span class='pageno' title='246' id='Page_246'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Do you know anything about the fact that, -after he learned that the commissar decree had been issued, General -Von Tresckow remonstrated with Rundstedt and that these remonstrances -contributed to the fact that the commissar decree was not -passed on in General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt’s sector?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Tresckow belonged to our group for many years. -There was no action which made us so ashamed as this one, and -from the very start he courageously called the attention of his -superiors to the inadmissibility of such terrible decrees. I remember -how at that time we learned of the famous commissar decree at -first through hearsay, and we immediately sent a courier to Tresckow -to inform him simply of the intention of such an outrage, and how -after the decree had been published, Tresckow, at a given signal, -remonstrated with General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt in the -way you described.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You said a while ago that you were just -going to ask your last question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I am sorry I could not keep -to that. A number of questions arose from the testimony of the -witness, but this was my last question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ -counsel wish to ask any questions of the witness?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then do the Prosecution desire to cross-examine?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I have a -few questions to put to you, Dr. Gisevius, and if you will answer -them as nearly as possible, “yes” or “no,” as you are capable of -giving a truthful answer, you will save a great deal of time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal perhaps should know your relations with the -Prosecution. Is it not a fact that within 2 months of the surrender -of Germany I met you at Wiesbaden, and you related to me your -experiences in the conspiracy that you have related here?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were later brought here, -and after coming here were interrogated by the Prosecution as well -as by the counsel for Frick and for Schacht?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. -<span class='pageno' title='247' id='Page_247'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, your attitude and viewpoint -are, as I understand you, those of a German who felt that loyalty to -the German people required continuous opposition to the Nazi -regime. Is that a correct statement of your position?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you had a very large experience -in police matters in Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If your Putsche or other moves to -obtain power in Germany were successful, it was planned that you -would be in charge of the police in the reorganization, was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Either as Minister of the Interior or -as Police Commissioner, whatever it might be called.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, certainly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you represented the belief that -it was not necessary to govern Germany with concentration camps -and with Gestapo methods; is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you found all of the ways of presenting -your viewpoint to the German people cut off by the Gestapo -methods which were used by the Nazi regime; is that a fact?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So that there was no way open to -you to obtain any change in German policy except through revolt -or assassination, or means of that kind?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No. I am convinced that until 1937 or the beginning -of 1938 the position could have been changed in Germany by a -majority of votes in the Reich Cabinet or through pressure by the -Armed Forces.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you fix 1937 as the time when -it ceased to be possible by peaceful means to effect a change in -Germany; is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: That is how I would judge it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it was not until after 1937 that -Schacht joined your group; is that not a fact?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, as I said, the group was not formed until 1937, -1938; but Schacht had already introduced me to Goerdeler in 1936, -and Schacht and Oster had known each other since 1936. And -naturally Schacht had also known a large number of other members -of the group for a long time. -<span class='pageno' title='248' id='Page_248'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But Schacht did not become convinced, -as I understand your statement to us, until after 1937—until -the Putsch affair—that he wouldn’t be able to handle Hitler in some -peaceful way; is that not correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: In what manner? In a peaceful manner or...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In a peaceful manner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, until the end of 1937 Schacht believed that it -ought to be possible to remove Hitler legally.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But by the end of 1937, as you now -say, the possibility of a peaceful removal of Hitler had become -impossible in fact?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, that is what we thought.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes; now, there was, as I understand -your view in going to the general—there was no power in Germany -that could stop or deal with the Gestapo, except the Army.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. I would answer that question in the affirmative.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, in addition to the Gestapo, -this Nazi regime also had a private army in the SS, did they not? -And, for a period, in the SA?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And if you were to combat successfully -the Nazi regime, you had to have manpower which only the -Army had; is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, only people who could be found in the Army; -but at the same time we also attempted to influence certain people -in the Police, and we needed all the decent officials in the ministries, -and the broad masses of the people altogether.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the Wehrmacht was the source -of power capable of dealing with the SS and the Gestapo if the -generals had been willing?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: That was our conviction.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that is the reason you kept -seeking the help of the generals and felt let down when they -wouldn’t give you their assistance finally?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came a time when everybody -connected with your group knew that the war was lost.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was before these plots on -Hitler’s life, and it was apparent before the Schlaberndorff plot -and before the July 20th plot, that the war was lost, was it not? -<span class='pageno' title='249' id='Page_249'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I should like to make it quite clear that there was -no one in our group who did not already know, even when the war -started, that Hitler would never win this war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But it became very much more -apparent as time went on, not only that the war could not be won -by Germany, but that Germany was going to be physically -destroyed as a result of the war; is that not true?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yet, under the system which the Nazi -regime had installed, you had no way of changing the course of -events in Germany except by assassination or a revolt; is that true?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And so you resorted to those extreme -measures, knowing that Hitler could never make peace with the -Allies; is that true?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And your purpose in this was to save -Germany the last destroying blows, which unfortunately she -received, from the point of view of the Germans; is that not a fact?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I should like to say that actually since the beginning -of the war, we no longer thought only of Germany. I think that -I may say that we bore a heavy share of responsibility towards -Germany and towards the world.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, what you were endeavoring to -do was to get the war to an end, since you had not been able to -stop its commencement, were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was impossible as long as -Hitler was at the head of the government and this group of men -behind him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there was another plot on -Hitler’s life that you haven’t mentioned. Was there not a bomb -that was later found to have been a communist bomb?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: This happened on 9 November 1939, in the Bürgerbräukeller, -in Munich. It was a brave Communist who acted independently.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, at none of these times when -Hitler’s life was endangered, by a strange coincidence, was Göring -or Himmler ever present; is that not true?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. -<span class='pageno' title='250' id='Page_250'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you attach any importance to -that fact?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: We sometimes regretted it. For instance, the attempt -at assassination would perhaps have succeeded, if Göring and -Himmler had been with Hitler on 17 July. But as the years went by, -the members of this clique separated to such an extent, and protected -themselves so much that they could hardly be found together -anywhere. Göring, too, was gradually so absorbed in his transactions -and art collections at Karinhall that he was hardly ever to be -found at a serious conference.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the assassination of Hitler would -have accomplished nothing from your point of view if the Number 2 -man had stepped into Hitler’s place, would it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: That was a debatable problem for a long time, -because Brauchitsch, for instance, imagined that we could create a -transitional regime with Göring. Our group always refused to come -together with that man even for an hour.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How did you plan—if you were successful—to -deal with the other defendants here, with the exception -of the Defendant Schacht, all of whom, I understand, you regard as -a part of the Nazi government?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: These gentlemen would have been behind lock and -key in an extremely short time, and I think they would not have -had to wait long for their sentences.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, does that apply to every man in -this dock with the exception of Schacht?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, every man.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, you recognized them, your -group recognized them all as parts and important parts of the Nazi -regime—a Nazi conspiracy. Is that a fact?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I should not like to commit myself to the words -“Nazi conspiracy.” We considered them the men responsible for all -the unspeakable misery which that government had brought to Germany -and the world.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to ask you a few -questions about the Gestapo. You had testified generally in reference -to the crimes which were committed by that organization and I ask -you to state whether that included the torturing and burning to -death of a large number of persons?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: The question does not seem to have come through -correctly. -<span class='pageno' title='251' id='Page_251'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am asking you as to the crimes committed -by the Gestapo, and I am asking if it included the torturing -and burning to death of thousands of persons?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did it involve the unlawful detention -of thousands of innocent people?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The throwing of them into concentration -camps where they were tortured and beaten and killed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the Gestapo engage in wholesale -confiscation of property?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, to a very large extent; they called it “property -of persons hostile to the State.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did it practice extortion against -Jews and against others?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: In masses and by the million.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the Gestapo hinder and molest the -public officials, who were too prominent to be murdered, until they -resigned or were driven from office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: The Gestapo used every means, from murder to the -extortion which has just been described.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question arises here as to -whether the members of the Gestapo knew what the Gestapo was -doing; and will you please tell the Tribunal what the situation was -as to the membership in that organization and its knowledge of its -program?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I have already stated at the beginning of my testimony -that from the first or second day every member of the Gestapo -really could not help seeing and knowing what took place in that -institution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there were some people who -were taken into the Gestapo at the beginning, who were transferred -from other branches of the civil service, were they not; who were -in a sense involuntary members of the Gestapo?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes; these members were eliminated in the course of -the first year as being politically unreliable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the transfer took place at the -time Göring set up the Gestapo, did it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What did the witness mean by “eliminated”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think eliminated from the Gestapo. -<span class='pageno' title='252' id='Page_252'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Gradually they were released from the service of the -Gestapo.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after the purge of the 30th of -June 1934, were special pains taken to see that no one was permitted -in the organization who was not in sympathy with its -program?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: These attempts started after 1 April 1934, when -Himmler and Heydrich took over affairs. Actually, from that date, -no official was allowed into the Gestapo any longer unless Himmler -and Heydrich considered that he held the opinions which they -desired. It may be that during the first months some officials, who -had not yet been screened by the SS, may have got in. The Gestapo -was, of course, a large organization and it naturally took quite a -time until the SS had educated and trained their own criminal -officials.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: However, did there come a time, and -if so, will you fix it as nearly as possible, after which every member -of the Gestapo must have known the criminal program of that -organization?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: For many years I have considered that question -myself and discussed it with Nebe and my friends. The reply entails -very great responsibility, and in the knowledge of that responsibility -I would say that from the beginning of 1935, at the latest, everyone -must have known what sort of organization he was joining and the -type of orders he might have to expect.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have testified as to the investigations -which you made when you were connected with the police -administration and you mentioned the Reichstag fire but you did not -tell us what your findings were when you investigated that. Will -you please tell us?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: To speak briefly and to begin with the facts, we -ascertained that Hitler in a general way had expressed a wish for -a large-scale propaganda campaign. Goebbels undertook to prepare -the necessary proposals and it was Goebbels who first thought of -setting the Reichstag on fire. Goebbels discussed this with the leader -of the Berlin SA Brigade, Karl Ernst, and he suggested in detail -how it should be done.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A certain chemical, known to every maker of fireworks, was -chosen. After spraying it, it ignites after a certain time—hours or -minutes. In order to get inside the Reichstag, one had to go through -the corridor leading from the palace of the Reichstag President to -the Reichstag itself. Ten reliable SA men were provided, and then -Göring was informed of all the details of the plan, so that by -chance he did not make an election speech on that particular -<span class='pageno' title='253' id='Page_253'></span> -evening, but at such a late hour would still be sitting at his desk -in the Ministry of the Interior in Berlin.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Göring—and he gave assurances that he would do so—was to put -the police on wrong trails in the first confusion. From the very -beginning it was intended that the Communists should be accused of -this crime, and the 10 SA men who had to carry out the crime were -instructed accordingly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is, in a few words, the story of the events. To tell you how -we got hold of the details, I have only to add that one of these 10 -who had to spray the chemical was a notorious criminal. Six months -later he was dismissed from the SA, and when he did not receive -the reward which he had been promised he decided to tell what he -knew to the Reich Court sitting in Leipzig at the time. He was -taken before an examining magistrate who made a record of his -statement, but the Gestapo heard of it and the letter to the Reich -Court was intercepted and destroyed. The SA man, named Rail, -who betrayed the plan, was murdered in a vile manner with the -knowledge of the Defendant Göring, by order of Gestapo chief Diels. -Through the finding of the body, we picked up the threads of the -whole story.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What happened to the 10 SA men -who carried out the Reichstag fire? Are any of them alive now?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: As far as we are aware none of them are still alive. -Most of them were murdered on 30 June under the pretext of the -Röhm revolt. Only one, a certain Heini Gewaehr, was taken over -by the police as a police officer, and we tracked him down as well. -He was killed in the war, while a police officer on the Eastern Front.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you testified that you also -investigated, with the entire affair of Röhm, the murders that followed -the Röhm affair. Didn’t you so testify?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I cannot actually say that we carried out the investigation, -as we, of the Ministry of the Interior, had really been -excluded from the entire affair. However, matters were such that -after 30 June, all the appeals for help, and all the complaints of -the people who were affected reached us in the Ministry of the -Interior; and during 30 June, through the continual radio messages, -incidental visits to Göring’s palace, and the information received -from Nebe, we discovered all the details.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, about how many people were -killed in that purge?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: We have never been able to establish the number -exactly, but I estimate that no more than 150 to 200 persons lost -their lives, which, at that time, was an enormous figure. -<span class='pageno' title='254' id='Page_254'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I myself with Minister of Justice Gürtner checked the list of the -number of the dead which had been given him by Hitler and -Göring, and we ascertained that the list which contained the names -of 77 dead, who had allegedly been justly killed, was exceeded by -nearly double that number only by those names which we had -received through the prosecuting authorities, or through the appeals -for help coming from relatives to the Ministry of the Interior.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did you ascertain who selected -the men who were killed in that purge?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: To begin with we ascertained that Himmler, -Heydrich, and Göring had compiled exact lists of those to be -murdered; for I myself heard in Göring’s palace—and it was confirmed -by Daluege who was present, and also by Nebe who was -present from the very first second—that not one of those who were -killed was mentioned by name; instead they just said: “Number so -and so is now gone,” or, “Number so and so is still missing,” and -“It will soon be Number so and so’s turn.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There is, however, no doubt that Heydrich and Himmler also -had a special list. On that special list there were several Catholics, -Klausner, and others. I cannot, for instance, say here under oath -whether Schleicher was murdered by order of Göring, or whether -he was a man who was on Heydrich’s and Himmler’s special list.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was the Defendant Frick fully -informed as to the facts which you knew about the illegal conduct -of the Gestapo?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. I had to submit to him all the material that -arrived which was important, and I have already described that we -reported all these matters to the Secret State Police or to the -Ministries of the Interior of the Länder. Naturally I could submit -only the most important of these things to Frick personally. I -estimate that I received several hundred such complaints daily, but -the most important had to be submitted to Frick, because he had -to sign them personally; for Göring always complained as soon as -he saw that such a young official signed reports and appeals to the -Ministry and to himself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was Frick informed of your -conclusions about the Röhm purge?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, because on the Sunday, while the murders were -continuing, I spoke to Frick about the murder of Strasser, Klausner, -Schleicher and the many other murders; and Frick was particularly -disgusted at the murder of Strasser, because he considered that an -act of personal revenge by Göring and Himmler. Likewise, Frick -was extremely indignant about the murders of Klausner, Bose, -Edgar Jung, and the many other innocent men who were murdered. -<span class='pageno' title='255' id='Page_255'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But when Frick signed the decree, -along with Hitler, declaring these murders legitimate and ordering -no prosecutions on account of those murders, Frick knew exactly -what had happened from you; is that the fact?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: He knew it from me, and he had seen it for himself. -The story of the 30th of June was undoubtedly known to Frick.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did Frick ever talk with you -about Himmler and Heydrich as being bad and dangerous, cruel -persons?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: On that Sunday, the 1st of July, Frick said to me, -“If Hitler does not very soon do to the SS and Himmler what he -has done to the SA today, he will experience far worse things with -the SS than he has experienced now with the SA.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I was greatly struck by that prediction at the time, and by the -fact that Frick should speak so openly to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But notwithstanding the estimate he -made of those men as dangerous persons, did he not thereafter -appoint them both in his Ministry of Interior?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Well, of course, they were actually appointed by -Hitler. However, I can only say that when I took leave of Frick, -at the time I left the Ministry of the Interior in May 1935, Frick -told me literally that the constant difficulties he had had because -of me had taught him from now on to take Party members only -in his Ministry, and as far as possible those who had the Golden -Party Emblem. He said that it was possible that in the course of -events he might even be forced to allow Himmler into his Ministry, -but in no case would he accept the murderer Heydrich. Those were -the last words I exchanged with Frick.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Both were put in charge of matters -that were under his legal control, were they not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, they became members of the Reich Ministry of -the Interior and Frick remained their superior.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Did you say that those were the last words -which you exchanged with the Defendant Frick?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. That was in 1935 and I have not met him or -talked to him since.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after 1934 Frick was the -Minister in charge of the running and controlling of concentration -camps, was he not, Dr. Gisevius?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: In my opinion the Reich Minister of the Interior -was responsible from the beginning for all police matters in the -Reich and therefore also for the concentration camps, and I do not -believe that one can say he had that responsibility only since 1934.</p> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='256' id='Page_256'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I am willing to accept your -amendment to my question. I ask that you be shown Document -Number 3751-PS of the United States, which has not yet been -offered in evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The document was submitted to the witness.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, this purports to be a communication from Dr. Gürtner, -the Minister of Justice, to the Reich and Prussian Minister of the -Interior. That would be from your friend Dr. Gürtner to Frick, -would it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I believe I heard you say “friend.” During the time -he acted as Minister, Gürtner did not conduct himself in such a way -that I could consider him my friend.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well then, tell us about Gürtner. -Tell us about Gürtner’s position in this situation because we have a -communication here apparently from him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Gürtner?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: At that time Gürtner without doubt made many -attempts to expose the cruelty in the camps and to initiate criminal -proceedings. In individual cases Gürtner did make many attempts; -but after the 30th of June he signed that law which legalized all -those dreadful things, and also in other respects Gürtner never -acted consistently with his views. But this document which you -submit to me was just such an attempt by Gürtner and the many -decent officials in the Ministry of Justice to bring the question of -the Gestapo terror to discussion. As far as I recollect this is one of -those letters which we discussed unofficially beforehand in order -to provoke an answer, so to say.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I now desire to read some parts of -this into the record. It becomes Exhibit USA-828. I will offer it -as such.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Will you kindly follow the German text and see if I correctly -quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“My dear Reich Minister!</p> - -<p>“Enclosed you will find a copy of a report of the Inspector -of the Secret State Police, dated 28 March 1935.</p> - -<p>“This report gives me an occasion to state my fundamental -attitude towards the question of corporal punishment for -internees. The numerous instances of ill-treatment which -have come to the knowledge of the authorities of justice -point to three different reasons for such ill-treatment of -prisoners:</p> - -<p><span class='pageno' title='257' id='Page_257'></span> -“1. Beating as a disciplinary punishment in concentration -camps.</p> - -<p>“2. Ill-treatment, mostly of political internees, in order to -make them talk.</p> - -<p>“3. Ill-treatment of internees arising out of sheer wantonness -or for sadistic motives.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I think I will not take the Tribunal’s time to read his comment -on Number 1 or Number 2. About Number 3, you will find in the -German text:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The experience of the first revolutionary years has shown -that the persons who are charged to administer the beatings -generally lose all sense of the purpose and meaning of their -action after a short time, and permit themselves to be -governed by personal feelings of revenge, or sadistic tendencies. -Thus members of the guard detail of the former concentration -camp at Bredow, near Stettin, completely stripped -a prostitute who had an argument with one of them and beat -her with whips and cowhides in such a fashion that the -woman 2 months later still showed two open and infected -wounds.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I shall not go into the dimensions; they are not important.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In the concentration camp at Kemna near Wuppertal, -prisoners were locked up in a narrow clothing locker and were -then tortured by blowing in cigarette smoke, upsetting the -locker, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. In some cases the prisoners were first given -salt herring to eat, in order to produce an especially strong -and torturing thirst.</p> - -<p>“In the Hohnstein Concentration Camp in Saxony, prisoners -had to stand under a dripping apparatus especially constructed -for this purpose, until the drops of water, which fell -down at even intervals, caused seriously infected wounds on -their scalps.</p> - -<p>“In a concentration camp in Hamburg four prisoners were -lashed in the form of a cross to a grating for days, once -without interruption for 3 days and nights, once for 5 days -and nights and fed so meagerly with dry bread that they -almost died of hunger.</p> - -<p>“These few examples show a degree of cruelty which is such -an insult to every German feeling, that it is impossible to -consider any extenuating circumstances.</p> - -<p>“In conclusion, I should like to present my opinion about -these three points to you, my dear Herr Reich Minister, in -your capacity as departmental minister competent for the -<span class='pageno' title='258' id='Page_258'></span> -establishment of protective custody, and the camps for protective -custody.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And he goes on to make certain recommendations for action by -the Minister. I do not know whether the Tribunal cares to have -more of this read.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Was any improvement in conditions noted after the receipt of -that communication by Frick?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: The letter was received just at the time I left the -Ministry of the Interior. I should like to say only one thing concerning -this letter: What is described therein is really only a fraction -of what we knew. I helped prepare this letter in that I spoke -to the officials concerned in the Ministry of Justice. The Minister -of Justice could bring up only those matters which had by chance -become known legally through some criminal record. But there can -be no doubt that this communication was merely a motive, and the -cause of a very bold letter from Heydrich to Göring, dated 28 March -1935, in which he disputed the right of the Minister of Justice to -prosecute cases of ill-treatment. The letter, therefore does not add -anything new to my descriptions, and no doubt all have been convinced -that these conditions, which started at that time, never -ceased but became worse as time went on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came a time when -Heydrich was assassinated in Prague, was there not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, some very brave Czechs were able to do what -we unfortunately could not achieve. That will always be to their -glory.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I suppose the Czechs expected, -and did you expect that the assassination of Heydrich would result -in some improvement in this condition?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: We doubted—we, Canaris, Oster, Nebe, and the -others of the group—whether it was possible at all for an even -worse man to be found to succeed such a monster as Heydrich, and -to that extent we really did think that the Gestapo terror would -now subside, and that perhaps we would return to a certain amount -of honesty and integrity, or that at least the cruelties might be -lessened.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then came Kaltenbrunner. Did -you notice any improvement after the appointment of Kaltenbrunner? -Tell us about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Kaltenbrunner came and things became worse from -day to day. More and more we learned that perhaps the impulsive -actions of a murderer like Heydrich were not so bad as the cold, -legal logic of a lawyer who took over the administration of such a -dangerous instrument as the Gestapo. -<span class='pageno' title='259' id='Page_259'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Can you tell us whether Kaltenbrunner -took an even more sadistic attitude than Himmler and -Schellenberg had done? Were you informed about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. I know that Heydrich, in a certain sense, -really had something akin to a bad conscience when he committed -his crimes. At any rate, he did not like it when those things were -discussed openly in Gestapo circles. Nebe, who as Chief of the -Criminal Police had the same rank as the Chief of the Gestapo, -Müller, always told me that Heydrich took care to conceal his -crimes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With the entry of Kaltenbrunner into that organization, this -practice ceased. All those things were now openly discussed among -the department chiefs of the Gestapo. By now the war had started, -of course. These gentlemen lunched together, and Nebe often came -to me from such luncheons so completely exhausted that he had a -nervous breakdown. On two occasions Nebe had to be sent on long -sick leave because he simply could not stand the open cynicism -with which mass murder, and the technique of mass murder, were -discussed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I remind you only of the gruesome chapter of the installation -of the first gas chambers, which was discussed in detail in this -circle, as were the experiments as to how one could remove the -Jews most quickly and most thoroughly. These were the most -horrible descriptions I have ever heard in my life. It is, of course, -so much worse when you hear them first-hand from someone who -is still under the direct impression of such discussions—and who -because of this is almost at the point of physical and mental collapse, -than when you hear of them now from documents. Nebe became -so ill that actually as early as 20 July he suffered from a persecution -mania and was a mere human wreck after everything he had -gone through.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it the custom to have daily -dinner conferences of the chiefs of the Main Security Office, those -who happened to be in town?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Daily conferences; everything was discussed at -luncheon. This was of particular importance to us, because we -heard details of the methods used by the Gestapo in the fight -against our group.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To prove what I say, I can state here that, for instance, the -order issued for the arrest of Goerdeler on 17 July was decided -upon during such a luncheon conference, and Nebe warned us at -once. That is the reason why Goerdeler was able to escape, at least -for some time, and why we were able to know to what extent the -Gestapo were aware of our plot. -<span class='pageno' title='260' id='Page_260'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who were the regular attendants -at those luncheon conferences?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Kaltenbrunner presided. Then there were Gestapo -Müller, Schellenberg, Ohlendorf, and Nebe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And do you know whether, at those -meetings, the new kinds of torture and the technique of killing by -gas, and other measures in the concentration camps, were discussed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. That was discussed in great detail, and sometimes -I received the description only a few minutes later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what is the situation with -reference to the information of the Foreign Office about the conduct -of the Gestapo? Will you tell us what was done to inform the -Foreign Office from time to time of the crimes that the Gestapo -were committing?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: The Foreign Office, particularly during the earlier -years, was continually kept informed, as nearly every day some -foreigner was half beaten to death or robbed, and then the diplomatic -missions would come with their complaints, and these -complaints were sent to the Ministry of the Interior by the Foreign -Office. These went through my office and sometimes I had four -or five such notes a day from the Foreign Office regarding excesses -by the Gestapo; and I can testify that in the course of years there -were no crimes by the Gestapo which were not set forth in these -notes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you make certain reports to the -Foreign Office which were so dispatched that you are reasonably -certain they would reach Neurath?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Ribbentrop was not yet the Foreign Minister at -that time...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, Neurath.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I very often discussed these matters personally with -the officials of the Foreign Office, because they were of a particularly -difficult nature, and because the officials of the Foreign Office -were very indignant, I asked them repeatedly to put these matters -before the Minister through the official channels. In addition, I -gave as much material as I could to one of the closest collaborators -of the Foreign Minister at that time, the Chief of Protocol, “Minister” -Von Bülow-Schwante; and according to the information I received -from Bülow-Schwante, he very often submitted that material to -Neurath.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, were certain of the collaborators -close collaborators of Von Papen? Was Von Papen subject to -action by the Gestapo? -<span class='pageno' title='261' id='Page_261'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: To start with, the entire group around Von Papen -was continuously under surveillance by the Gestapo because in the -earlier years there was an impression among great masses of people -that Von Papen was a special advocate for decency and right. -A large group collected around Von Papen and that, of course, was -most carefully watched by the Gestapo. As the complaints, which -Von Papen received by the score, were carefully compiled in his -office, and as no doubt Von Papen quite often took these papers -either to Göring or to the Hindenburg palace, the closest collaborators -of Von Papen were especially suspected by the Gestapo. So it -was that on 30 June 1934 Oberregierungsrat Von Bose, the closest -collaborator of Von Papen, was shot dead in the doorway of Von -Papen’s office. The two other colleagues of Von Papen were imprisoned, -and the man who wrote Von Papen’s radio speeches, -Edgar Jung, was arrested weeks before the 30th of June; and on -the morning of 1 July, he was found murdered in a ditch along the -highway near Oranienburg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did Von Papen continue in office -after that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I have never heard that he resigned; and I know -that very soon after the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss was murdered, -he was sent to Vienna as Hitler’s ambassador.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he ever make any protests that -you know of?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I personally heard of none at the time, although, we -were naturally extremely eager to hear which minister would -protest. However, no letter from Papen arrived at the Ministry -of the Interior.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were some of his collaborators -murdered after the Anschluss in Austria?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: On the day of the Anschluss, when the SS entered -Austria, Von Papen’s closest collaborator, Legation Counsellor -Freiherr von Ketteler, was kidnapped by the Gestapo. We searched -for him for weeks, until 3 or 4 weeks later his body was washed -up on the banks of the Danube.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After that did Papen continue to -serve as a part of the Hitler Government and accept further offices -from Hitler’s hands?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: He was no longer a member of the Government at -the time. Immediately after the march into Austria Von Papen was -disposed of by being made envoy. However, it was not long before -he continued his activities as Ambassador at Ankara. -<span class='pageno' title='262' id='Page_262'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Does the Tribunal desire to rise at -this point?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You would like a little more time, wouldn’t -you, with this witness?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It will take a little more time, Your -Honor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We will adjourn now.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 26 April 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='263' id='Page_263'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH DAY</span><br/> Friday, 26 April 1946</h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Dr. Gisevius, yesterday you made some reference to Herbert -Göring in saying that Schacht had sent word to you about the -Gestapo microphones in Schacht’s house. Will you tell us who -Herbert Göring was in relation to the defendant?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Herbert Göring was a cousin of the Defendant -Göring. I had known him for many years. Herbert, as well as his -brothers and sisters, warned me already years ago about the -disaster which would overtake Germany if at any time a man like -their cousin Hermann Göring should get a position of even the -smallest responsibility. They acquainted me with the many characteristics -of the defendant which all of us had come to know in the -meantime, starting with his vanity, and continuing with his love of -ostentation, his lack of responsibility, his lack of scruples, even to -the extent of walking over the dead. In this way I already had -some idea what to expect of the defendant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, during the period when you -were making these investigations and having these early conversations -with Schacht, and up until about 1937, you, as I understand -it, were very critical of Schacht because he had helped the Nazis -to power and continued to support them. Is that true?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I did not understand how an intelligent man, and -one who was as capable in economics as he was, could enter into -such a close relationship with Hitler. I was all the more bewildered -because, on the other hand, this man Schacht, from the very first -day and in a thousand small ways resisted the Nazis, and the -German public took pleasure in many sharp and humorous remarks -which he made about the Nazis. Great was my bewilderment, until -I actually met the man Schacht. And then...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During this period Schacht did have -great influence with the German people, did he not, particularly -with German people of responsibility and power?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: He had great influence to the extent that many -Germans hoped to find a proponent of decency and justice in him, -since they heard that he undertook many steps in that direction. I -<span class='pageno' title='264' id='Page_264'></span> -remember his activity in the Ministry of Economics, where officials -who were not Party members...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think we have covered that, and I -am anxious to get along with this, if I may interrupt you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During this period you reported to -Dr. Schacht fully concerning your findings about the criminal activities -of the Gestapo, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes; from time to time I spoke more frankly, and -it is obvious that I...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he took the position, as I understand -you, that Hitler and Göring did not know about these things.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. He was of the opinion that Hitler did not know -anything about such terrible things, and that Göring knew at most -only a part.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he stood by Göring until 1937, -when Göring pushed him out of the economics office, did he not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I believe that was at the end of 1936. I may be -wrong. I believe it would be more correct to say that he looked for -support from Göring and hoped that Göring would protect him -from the Party and the Gestapo.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, Schacht did not heed -warnings about Göring until late 1936 or 1937?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: That is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And during this period there would -be no doubt, would there, that Schacht was the dominant economic -figure in the rearmament program until he was superseded by -Göring with the Four Year Plan?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I do not know whether everything went through like -that exactly. He was, of course, as Minister of Economics, the -leading man in German economy, not only for rearmament but for -all questions of German economy; rearmament was just one of them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now Schacht believed, and as I understand -it, you too believed during all this period that under German -constitutional law no war could be declared except by authority of -the Reich Cabinet. Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, from the point of view -of the German Constitution, the war was illegal, by German law, -as declared and carried out by Hitler, in your view.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: According to our firm conviction, yes. -<span class='pageno' title='265' id='Page_265'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think we found out yesterday the -position you were to have if there was a successful overthrow of the -Hitler regime. Schacht was under consideration for Chancellor, was -he not, if that movement was successful?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No. It is only correct as to the first offer that Halder -made in August of 1938, or perhaps July 1938, when he visited -Schacht for the first time. At that time, according to the information -which I received, Halder asked Schacht whether, in the case of an -overthrow, he would be ready to take over a position like that. -Schacht replied that he would be ready for anything if the generals -would eliminate the Nazi regime and Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As early as the year 1939 individual opponents formed a group, -and at the last, when Beck was the acknowledged head of all conspirators -from the left to the right wing, Goerdeler emerged in the -foreground together with Beck as the leading candidate for the -position of Reich Chancellor, so that after that time we need speak -only of Goerdeler in that regard.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to ask you some questions -about the Defendant Keitel. Of course, we have heard that Hitler -was the actual head of the state, but I want to ask you whether -Keitel occupied a position of real leadership and power in the Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Keitel occupied one of the most influential positions -in the Third Reich. I would like to say at this point that I was a -very close friend of four of the closest collaborators of Keitel. One -was the Chief of the Ordnance Office in the OKW, the murdered -General Olbricht; the second was the Chief of the Counterintelligence -Service, Admiral Canaris, who was also murdered; the third was the -Chief of the Army Legal Department, Ministerial Director Sack—he -was also murdered—and finally there was the chief of the armament -economy department, General Thomas, who escaped being murdered -as though by a miracle. A close friendship, I might say, bound me -to these men, and thus from these men I found out exactly what -tremendous influence Keitel had over the OKW and in all Army -matters, and thereby what influence he wielded in representing the -Army in the eyes of the German people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It may be that Keitel did not influence Hitler to a great extent. -But I must testify here to the fact that Keitel influenced the OKW -and the Army all the more. Keitel decided which documents were -to be transmitted to Hitler. It was not possible for Admiral Canaris -or one of the other gentlemen I mentioned to submit an urgent -report to Hitler of his own accord. Keitel took it over, and what he -did not like he did not transmit, or he gave these men the official -order to abstain from making such a report. Also, Keitel repeatedly -threatened these men, telling them that they were to limit themselves -exclusively to their own specialized sectors, and that he would -<span class='pageno' title='266' id='Page_266'></span> -not protect them with respect to any political utterance which was -critical of the Party and the Gestapo, of the persecution of the Jews, -the murders in Russia, or the anti-Church campaign, and, as he said -later, he would not hesitate to dismiss these gentlemen from the -Wehrmacht and turn them over to the Gestapo. I have read the -notes in regard to this which Admiral Canaris made in his diary. -I have read the notes of General Oster in regard to this from the -conferences of commanders in the OKW. I have talked with the -Chief Judge of the Army, Dr. Sack, about this, and it is my strong -wish to testify here that Field Marshal Keitel, who should have -protected his officers, repeatedly threatened them with the Gestapo. -He put these men under pressure, and these gentlemen considered -that a special insult.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, whether Keitel could -control Hitler or not, he did have a very large control of the entire -OKW underneath him. Is that not true?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Did you say Hitler? No, Keitel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whether Keitel could control Hitler or -not he did control and command the entire OKW underneath him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, whatever Hitler’s own -inclinations may have been, these men in this dock formed a ring -around him which kept out information from your group as to what -was going on unless they wanted Hitler to hear it, isn’t that a fact?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. I believe that I should cite two more examples -which I consider especially significant. First of all, every means was -tried to persuade Keitel to warn Hitler, before the invasion of Belgium -and Holland, and to tell him, that is Hitler, that the information -which had been submitted by Keitel regarding the alleged -violation of neutrality by the Dutch and Belgians was wrong. The -counterintelligence was to produce these reports which would incriminate -the Dutch and Belgians. Admiral Canaris at that time -refused to sign these reports. I ask that this be verified. He told -Keitel repeatedly that these reports, which were supposedly produced -by the OKW, were wrong. That is one example when Keitel did -not transmit to Hitler what he should have transmitted. The second -was that Keitel was asked by Canaris and Thomas to submit to -Hitler the details of the murders in Poland and Russia. Admiral -Canaris and his friends were anxious to prevent even the beginning -of these mass murders and to inform Keitel while the first preparations -by the Gestapo were being made for these infamous actions. -We received the documents, through Nebe and others. Keitel was -informed as to this in detail, and here again he did not resist at the -beginning; and he who did not stop the Gestapo at the beginning -<span class='pageno' title='267' id='Page_267'></span> -can not be surprised if in the end a millionfold injustice was the -upshot.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, I think you put your -question, “Did not these men in the dock form a ring which prevented -you getting to Hitler,” and the question was answered rather as -though it applied only to Keitel. If you intended to put it with -reference to all defendants, I think it ought to be cleared up.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that is true.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Each of the defendants who held -ministerial positions of any kind controlled the reports which should -go to Hitler from that particular ministry, did he not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: As far as this general question is concerned, I must -reply cautiously, for, first of all, it was a close clan which put a -cordon of silence around Hitler. A man like Von Papen or Von -Neurath cannot be included in this group, for it was obvious that -Von Papen and Von Neurath, and perhaps one or the other of the -defendants, did not have the possibility, or much later no longer had -the possibility, of having regular access to Hitler, for besides Von -Neurath, Hitler already had his Ribbentrop for a long time. Thus -I can only say that a certain group, which is surely well known, -composed the close circle of which I am speaking.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like you to identify those of -the defendants who had access to Hitler and those who were able to -prevent access to Hitler by their subordinates. That would apply, -would it not, to Göring, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Frick, -and to Schacht—during the period until he broke with them, as you -have testified—and to Dönitz, Raeder, Sauckel, and Speer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: You mentioned a few too many and some are -missing. Take the Defendant Jodl, for instance. I would like to call -your attention to the strange influence which this defendant had -and the position he had with regard to controlling access to Hitler. -I believe my testimony shows that Schacht, on the other hand, did -not control access to Hitler, but that he could only be glad about -each open and decent report which got through to Hitler from his -and other ministries. As far as the defendant Frick is concerned, I -do not believe that he was necessarily in a position to control access -to Hitler. I believe the problem of Frick centers in the matter of -responsibility.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Should I have included Funk in the -group that had access to Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Funk, without a doubt, had access to Hitler for a -long time, and for his part Funk had of course the responsibility to -see that affairs in the Ministry of Economics and in the Reichsbank -<span class='pageno' title='268' id='Page_268'></span> -were conducted in the way Hitler desired. Without a doubt Funk -put his surpassingly expert knowledge at the service of Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you prepare or participate in -preparing reports which were sent to Keitel as to the criminal -activities of the Gestapo?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did others participate with you in the -preparation of those reports?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, it was the work of a group. We gathered reports -about plans and preparations of the Gestapo, and we gathered -material about the first infamous acts, so that some courageous men -at the front, officers of the General Staff and of the Army, went to -the scene, prepared reports, made photographs, and this material -came then to both Canaris and Oster. Then the problem arose: how -can we bring this material to Keitel? It was generally known that -officers, even highly placed officers like Canaris and Thomas, were -forbidden to report on political matters. The difficulty was, therefore, -not to have Canaris and the others come under the suspicion -that they were dealing with politics; we employed the roundabout -method of preparing so-called counterintelligence agents’ reports -from foreign countries or from occupied countries; and with the -pretext that different agents from all countries were here reporting -about these outrages, or that agents traveling through or in foreign -countries had found such infamous photographs we then submitted -these reports to Field Marshal Keitel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did Canaris and Oster participate -in submitting those reports to Keitel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. Without Canaris and Oster the working out and -the gathering of this material would have been inconceivable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what positions did Canaris and -Oster hold with reference to Keitel at this time when these reports -were being submitted?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Canaris was the senior officer of the OKW. Formally -he even had to represent Keitel when Keitel was absent. Keitel was -only concerned that someone else should take his place at such -times, usually his Party general, Reinecke; and Oster, as the -representative, Chief of Staff for Canaris, was also in close association -with Canaris. Keitel could not have wished for closer contact -with reality and truth than through this connection with the Chief -of his Wehrmacht Counterintelligence Service.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So these reports which were sent to -Keitel came from the highest men in his own organization under -himself? -<span class='pageno' title='269' id='Page_269'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what did they report to Keitel? -Let me ask you if they reported to him that there was a systematic -program of murder of the insane going on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. On these subjects, too, records were -completed in detail including the despairing reports of the directors -of the lunatic asylums. I recall this exactly because here, too, we -had great difficulties in giving a reason for these reports, and we -actually put them through as reports of foreign doctors who had -heard of these things with indignation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he report to him the persecution -and murder of the Jews and the program of extermination of the -Jews that was being carried out?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: From the first Jewish pogroms in 1938 on Keitel was -minutely informed of each new action against the Jews, particularly -about the establishment of the first gas chamber, or rather, the -establishment of the first mass graves in the East, up to the erection -of the murder factories later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did these reports mention the atrocities -that were committed in Poland against the Poles?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed, here I would say again that the atrocities -in Poland, too, started with isolated murders which were so -horrible that we were still able to report on single cases, and could -add the names of the responsible SS leaders. Here, too, Keitel was -spared nothing of the terrible truth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did that condition of informing -Keitel also prevail as to the atrocities against nationals in other -occupied countries?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. First of all I must of course mention the atrocities -in Russia, because I must emphasize that Keitel now certainly, -on the basis of the Polish atrocities, had been warned sufficiently as -to what was at hand in Russia. And I remember how the preparation -of these orders, such as the order for the shooting of commissars -and the Night and Fog Decree, was continued for weeks in -the OKW, so that, as soon as the preparation of these orders was -begun, we begged Canaris and Oster to present a petition to Keitel. -But I would like to add that I do not doubt that other courageous -men also presented a petition to Keitel in this connection. Since I -belonged to a certain group, the impression might be created that -only in this group were there persons who were interested in these -problems, and I would be withholding vital information if I did not -add that even in the High Command of the OKW and in the General -Staff there were excellent men who did everything to reach Keitel -<span class='pageno' title='270' id='Page_270'></span> -through their separate channels, and that there were also brave -men in many ministries who tried to reach every officer whom they -saw in order to plead with him to order a stop to this injustice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the reports to Keitel mention the -forced enslavement of millions of foreign workers and their deportation -or importation into Germany?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And those enslaved laborers are the -displaced persons, largely, of this day—that are plaguing Germany -today, are they not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. In this connection I would also like to -say that in our reports it was already mentioned just what responsibility -the Wehrmacht would have to bear if these ill-treated people -should be free some day. We had an idea of what was to come, and -those who made the reports at that time can understand what has -now taken place.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the reports to Keitel report the -persecution of the churches in the occupied countries?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, they did. I would like to cite as a special -example how we even once sent leading churchmen to Norway in -the guise of agents. They established contact with Bishop Bergraf, -and brought back very detailed reports of what Bishop Bergraf -thought about the persecution of the churches in Norway and other -countries. I can still see this report before me because Keitel also -wrote one of his well-known National Socialist Party phrases on -this document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, these reports consisted both of -information furnished by Canaris and Oster and of the reports -coming in from the field under this plan?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I want to ask you a few questions -about the SA and the SS organizations. In your book, which you -have been asked about, I think you have characterized the SA as a -private army of the Nazi organization. Is that a correct characterization?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During the early part of the struggle -for power the SA constituted a private army for carrying out the -orders of the Nazi Party, did it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They took in a good many people in -the SA, and it got pretty large, and there came a time when there -was some danger it would get away from them; wasn’t there? -<span class='pageno' title='271' id='Page_271'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, that is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the murder of Röhm and his -associates was a struggle for power, was it not, between Göring and -Himmler and the Nazi crowd associated with them on one hand and -Röhm and his associates on the other?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After the murder of Röhm, this SA -organization, which was very big at the time, rather lost importance, -didn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, completely.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the SS, which was a smaller and -more compact organization, came in to take its place as a private -army, didn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, as the decisive private army.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let’s go back to the SA during -the period before the struggle for power resulting in the Röhm -purge. What part did the SA play in the battle for power, the -seizure of power?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: As is said in the song, “It cleared the streets for the -Brown Battalions,” and without a doubt the SA played a dominant -role in the so-called seizure of power. Without the SA Hitler would -undoubtedly never have come to power.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let’s take up their methods. -Perhaps I can shorten this by quoting from your book. I think you -say that:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Whoever had not entirely made up his mind, had it made up -for him unequivocally by the SA. Their methods were primitive, -therefore all the more effective. For instance, one learned -the new Hitler salute very quickly when, on the sidewalks, -beside every marching SA column—and where were there no -parades in those days—a few stalwart SA men went along -giving pedestrians a crack on the head right and left if they -failed to perform the correct gesture at least three steps -ahead of the SA flag. And these Storm Troopers acted the -same way in all things.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is that a correct account of their activities and influence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I hope so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you know so, don’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, yes, of course, for it is my own description, I -cannot criticize it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, but you saw these things yourself, -did you not? You were in Germany at that time? -<span class='pageno' title='272' id='Page_272'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, certainly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You see, it is very difficult for us, -with all the documents we have, Doctor, to get the picture of the -day to day events, and you were there and we were not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, let me make another question:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The chronicle of that private army is colorful and stirring. -It teemed with beer hall brawls, street fights, knifings, shootings, -and fist fights, altogether a mad rough and tumble -affair, where naturally there was no question of crises of -leadership or of mutinies. In this brotherhood of the wild -men of German nationalism there was undoubtedly much -idealism, but at the same time the SA was the repository for -political derelicts. The failures of all classes found refuge -there. The discontents, the disinherited, the desperados -streamed to it wholesale. The core, the paid permanent group, -and particularly the leaders, were recruited, as time went on, -more and more from the riffraff of a period of political and -social decay.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is that a correct statement of your observations of the SA at that -time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, quite.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I call your attention to another -question:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The SA organized huge raids. The SA searched houses. -The SA confiscated property. The SA cross-examined people. -The SA put people in jail. In short, the SA appointed themselves -permanent auxiliary police and paid no attention to -any of the principles of the so-called system period (Weimar -Republic). The worst problem for the helpless authorities was -that the SA never returned its booty at all. Woe unto anyone -who gets into their clutches!</p> - -<p>“From this time dated the ‘Bunker,’ those dreaded private -prisons of which every SA Storm Troop had to have at least -one. ‘Taking away’ became the right of the SA. The efficiency -of a Standartenführer was measured by the number -of arrests he had made, and the good reputation of an SA -man was based on the effectiveness with which he ‘educated’ ”—in -quotation marks, the quotation marks being -yours—“ ‘educated’ his prisoners. Brawls could no longer be -staged in the fight for power, yet the ‘fight’ went on, only -the blows were now struck in the full enjoyment of power.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is that a correct statement of your observations of the SA?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. -<span class='pageno' title='273' id='Page_273'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you also used the term -“Bunker,” and it is a slightly technical term with which some of us -are not familiar. Will you tell the Tribunal what this Bunker -system of the SA was?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Bunkers were those cellars or other dungeons with -thick walls in which the poor prisoners were locked up, where they -were then beaten and in a large measure beaten to death. They -were these private jails in which, during the first months, the -leaders of the leftist parties and of the trade unions were systematically -rendered harmless, which explains the phenomenon that the -leftist groups did not act again for so long a time, for there, at the -outset and most thoroughly, the entire leadership was done away -with.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You also use the expression “ ‘taking -away’ became the inalienable right of the SA,” and “taking away” -is in quotation marks. Will you tell us about this “taking away,” -what it means?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: That was the arbitrary arrest, whereby the relatives -often for periods of weeks or months did not know where the poor -victims had disappeared to, and could be glad if they ever returned -home.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you also make this observation -in your book:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Every excess, pardoned as ‘overzealousness in the cause of -the National Socialist Revolution,’ was a demonstration of -official sanction and necessarily drew in its wake a new -excess. It was the bestiality tolerated during the first months -that later encouraged the sadistic murderers in the concentration -camps. The growth in brutality and insensibility of -the general public, which toward the end of the revolution -extended far beyond the domain of the Gestapo, was the unavoidable -consequence of this first irresponsible attempt to -give free rein to the Brown Shirts for their acts of violence.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Does that, too, represent your observation of the SA?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes—not of the SA alone but also of general conditions -in Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, will you tell us about—as I -understand you, after the Röhm Purge the SA was rather abandoned -as the private army, and a more reliable and smaller and -more compact private army was created under Himmler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: A guard which had been established by Himmler -long before this time now actually came into action. I do not doubt -that Himmler and his closest circle for years had worked toward -<span class='pageno' title='274' id='Page_274'></span> -this very objective so that one day, with their Schutztruppe (protective -guard), they could establish the terror system in Germany. -But until 30 June the SS had been a part of the SA, and Göring—excuse -me, Röhm was also the chief of the SS. The road for -Himmler to police chief in Germany, to police chief of evil, was -only open after Röhm had been eliminated with his much larger -SA. But the will to power of the SS and all the confused and -unscrupulous ideas connected therewith must be assumed to have -existed in the leadership of the SS already for many years previous -to that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, this SS organization selected its -members with great care, did it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Will you tell us something about the -qualifications for membership? What was necessary?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: The members had to be so-called Nordic types. -Actually I always considered these questionnaires as a good subject -for a humorous paper, and for that reason I am not in a position -today to give you exact particulars, except that, if I am not -mistaken, the distinguishing characteristics of men and women went -so far as underarm perspiration. I recall that Heydrich and -Himmler, in selecting SS men who were to do police duty, decided -only after a picture had been submitted to them of the future -victim who would be charged with carrying out their evil commands. -I know that, for example, Nebe repeatedly saved officials -in the criminal police force (Kripo) from being transferred to the -ranks of the Gestapo by having poor photographs taken of these -people so that, as far as possible, they did not look Nordic. In that -case, of course, they were turned down immediately. But it would -be going too far afield to relate more about these dismal things in -this courtroom.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, was the membership of the SS -recruited only from what we may call fanatical Nazis, reliable -Nazis?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I believe we have to make a distinction. In the first -years of the SS, many decent German people, especially farmers -and people in the country, felt drawn to the SS, because they -believed Himmler’s assurance that the SS was to bring order to -Germany and to be a counterbalance to the SA terror. In that way, -to my knowledge, some people in the years before 1933, and even -in 1933 and 1934, entered the SS, because they hoped that here -would be a nucleus standing for order and right, and I believe it -is my duty to point out the tragedy of these people. Each and -<span class='pageno' title='275' id='Page_275'></span> -every case should be examined before deciding whether, later on, -a member was guilty or whether he remained decent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But from a certain period of time on—I believe I specified -yesterday 1935—no one could have any doubts as to the real SS -objectives. From then on—here I would like to take up your own -expression—fanatical National Socialists, that is, “super” National -Socialists, entered the SS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And from 1935 on, was it, in your -judgment as one who was on the ground, necessarily so, that the -persons who entered it knew what its actual activities were?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes; what he was entering into and what orders -he had to expect.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Tribunal wishes me to ask you -in reference to yesterday’s incident if you have anything to add. -I know nothing further on that incident, in reference to the threat -made. Is there anything that you wish to add about that incident -in order to make it clear to the Tribunal, anything that has not -been told about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I would like to make clear that Dr. Dix did not -merely inform me about a discussion he had with Dr. Stahmer. -That morning I arrived in the room of the attorneys, and I do not -wish to state further particulars, but the atmosphere there was not -exactly cordial to begin with. Then I went up to Dr. Dix to report -something else. Dr. Stahmer approached, obviously very excited, -and asked Dr. Dix for an immediate interview. Dr. Dix refused on -the ground that he was talking to me. Dr. Stahmer said in a loud -voice that he must speak to Dr. Dix immediately and urgently. -Dr. Dix took only two steps aside and the conversation that followed -was carried on by Dr. Stahmer in such a loud voice, that I -was bound to hear most of it. I did hear it and said to attorney -Dr. Kraus who was standing nearby, “Just listen how Dr. Stahmer -is carrying on.” Dr. Dix then came over to me, very excited, and -after all this fuss, in response to my questions as to what precisely -was the demand of the Defendant Göring, he told me what I had -half heard anyway. I would like to underline that if I had had the -opportunity to tell the story first in my own way, I would have -emphasized that I was under the impression that Dr. Stahmer had -merely transmitted a statement, or rather what I would call a -threat, by the Defendant Göring.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in this Nazi regime, after Hitler -came to power, will you state whether there was, as far as you -could see, a systematic practice of the Nazi ministers and Nazi -officials enriching themselves by reasons of their confiscation of -property of Jews and others? -<span class='pageno' title='276' id='Page_276'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. This became more cynical from year to year -and we kept lists as to which of the civil ministers and, above all, -which of the generals and field marshals participated in this system. -We planned to inquire of all the generals and ministers at a later -date whether these donations had been put into a bank account or -whether they had possibly used this money for their own personal -interests.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And will you state to the Tribunal -which of the defendants were engaged in self-enrichment in the -manner that you have indicated?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I am sorry I am only able to give a negative reply -since we repeatedly inquired from the Defendant Schacht...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this will be a good time to adjourn -for 10 minutes.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dr. Gisevius, I have just a few more -questions which I would like to put to you in reference to the war -and the resistance movement of which you were a part.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, there is just one question -I should like to ask the witness. You said that you kept lists -of the ministers and generals who participated in this system of -spoils. What was your source of information?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: We had information from the various ministries, -from antechambers of ministries, and from the Finance Ministry. -But I did not finish the answer before. I said that I could answer -the question as to which of the defendants had enriched himself -only in the negative.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Concerning the Defendant Schacht, I wanted to continue saying -that I personally did not look into these lists, and that I took part -only in the questioning of the Defendant Schacht and that he personally -had not enriched himself. I did not intend to say in any -sense, therefore, that all the defendants, especially Defendants -Von Papen or Von Neurath, to name only these two, had enriched -themselves. I do not know. I wanted to say only that about Schacht -we know, or rather I know, that he did not take part in that -system.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, in addition to a system of spoils -from confiscated property, there were also open gifts from Hitler to -the generals and ministers, were there not, of large sums of property -and money? -<span class='pageno' title='277' id='Page_277'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes. These were the famous donations with which, -especially in the years after the outbreak of the war, the top -generals were systematically corrupted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did that hold true with reference -to many of the ministers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I do not doubt it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as I understood your testimony, -whatever doubts you may have had before 1938 when the affair -Fritsch occurred, that event or series of events convinced even -Schacht that Hitler was bent on aggressive warfare.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: After the Fritsch crisis Schacht was convinced that -now radicalism and the course toward war could no longer be -stopped.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was never any doubt in the -minds of all of you men who were in the resistance movement, -was there, that the attack on Poland of September 1939 was aggression -on Hitler’s part?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No, no, there could be no doubt about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that diplomatic means of righting -whatever wrongs Germany felt she suffered in reference to the -Corridor and Danzig had not been exhausted?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I can only point to the existing documents. There -was no will for peace.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in the German resistance movement, -as I understand you, there was agreement that you wanted -to obtain various modifications of the Treaty of Versailles, and you -also wanted various economic betterments for Germany, just as -other people wanted them. That was always agreed upon, was -it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: We were all agreed that a calm and a reasonable -balance could be achieved again in Europe only when certain modifications -of the Versailles Treaty were carried through by means of -peaceful negotiations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your difference from the Nazi group -was chiefly, in reference to that matter, one of method.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: From the very beginning, as I understand -you, it was the position of your group that a war would -result disastrously for Germany as well as for the rest of the world.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that the necessary modifications, -given a little patience, could be brought about by peaceful means. -<span class='pageno' title='278' id='Page_278'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Absolutely.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it was in the light of that difference -of opinion, I suppose, that your resistance movement against -the regime in power in Germany carried out these proposals for -Putsche and assassinations which you have described.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, but I would like to add that we were not only -thinking of the great dangers outside, but we also realized what -dangers lay in such a system of terror. From the very beginning -there was a group of people in Germany who still did not even -think of the possibility of war, and nevertheless protested against -injustice, the deprivation of liberty, and the fight against religion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the beginning, therefore, it was not a fight against war, but -if I may say so, it was a fight for human rights. From the very -first moment on, among all classes of people, in all professional -circles, and in all age groups, there were people who were ready to -fight, to suffer, and to die for that idea.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question may arise here as -to what your motives and what your purposes in this resistance -movement were with reference to the German people, and I shall -ask you to state to the Tribunal your overall purpose in resisting -the Government in power in your country.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I should like to say that death has reaped such a -rich harvest among the members of the resistance movement, that -it is only for that reason I can sit here, and that otherwise more -worthy and able men could give this answer. Having said this, I -feel that I can answer that, whether Jew or Christian, there were -people in Germany who believed in the freedom of religion, in -justice, and human dignity, not only for Germany but also, in their -profound responsibility as Germans, for the higher concept of -Europe and the world.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was a group which composed -this resistance, as I understand it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: It was not only just a group, but many individuals -had to carry the secret of their resistance silently to their death -rather than confide it to the Gestapo records; and only a very few -persons have enjoyed the distinction of being referred to now as a -group.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Most of the men who were associated -with you in this movement are dead?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Almost all of them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there anything you would like to -add to clarify your position to the Tribunal, Dr. Gisevius?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Excuse me, I did not understand you. -<span class='pageno' title='279' id='Page_279'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there anything you would like to -add in order that the Tribunal may understand your position in -this, your feeling, your very strong feeling in this matter, to understand -and appraise your own relation to this situation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I do not like to talk of myself, but I want to thank -you, Mr. Prosecutor, for giving me an opportunity to testify -emphatically on behalf of the dead and the living.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have concluded the examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR GENERAL G. A. ALEXANDROV (Assistant Prosecutor -for the U.S.S.R.): Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Was not the understanding arrived at with -Counsel for the Prosecution that the witness for the Defendant -Frick should only be cross-examined by one prosecutor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, I have an agreement with -the prosecutors to the effect that the examination of the Defendant -Schacht and his witnesses will be carried out by the American -Prosecution, but that, in the presence of additional questions during -cross-examination, the prosecutor from the Soviet Prosecution could -also join in the examination. In view of the fact that the Soviet -Prosecution has several additional questions to ask the witness -Gisevius, which are of great importance to the case, I ask permission -to address these questions to the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What are the questions which you say are of -particular importance to the Soviet Union? I do not mean the individual -questions but the general nature of them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Questions in connection with the part -played by the Defendant Frick in the preparation for war, questions -connected with the attitude of the Defendant Schacht towards the -Hitler regime, as well as a number of other important questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn in order to consider -whether the Prosecution ought to be allowed to cross-examine -this witness in addition to the cross-examination which has already -taken place.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has before it two documents -which were presented to it by the Chief Prosecutors upon the subject -of cross-examination. In the first of these documents it was -provided that the following procedure for the cross-examination -of the Defendants Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Frank, Frick, Streicher, -and Funk was agreed; and that with reference to Frick the -American Prosecution was to conduct the cross-examination of the -defendant and his witness. The document was presented because -<span class='pageno' title='280' id='Page_280'></span> -of the Tribunal’s express desire that too much time should not be -taken up by the cross-examination by more than one prosecutor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In addition to that document there was another document, which -was only a tentative agreement, and with reference to the Defendant -Schacht it provided that the American delegation should conduct -the principal cross-examination and the Soviet and the French -delegations should consider whether either would wish to follow.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In view of those two documents, the first of which suggests that -the Prosecution have agreed to only one cross-examination of the -witnesses of the Defendant Frick, and the second of which tentatively -suggests that, in addition to the American Prosecution, the -Soviet and the French might wish to cross-examine, the Tribunal -propose to allow the additional cross-examination in the present -instance, and they are loath to lay down any hard and fast rule -concerning cross-examination. They hope, however, that in the -present instance, after the full cross-examination by the Prosecutor -of the United States, the Soviet Prosecutor will make his cross-examination -as short as possible. For the future, the Tribunal -hopes that the prosecutors may be able to agree among themselves -that in the case of witnesses one cross-examination only will be -sufficient, and that in any event the additional cross-examination -will be made as brief as possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Witness, in order to save time, I beg you -to answer my questions as briefly as possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Tell me, what part did the German Ministry of the Interior and -the Defendant Frick personally play in the preparation for the -second World War?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: This question is very difficult for me to answer. I -left the Ministry of the Interior as early as May 1935, and I actually -cannot say any more about conditions after that time than any -other German, that is, that the Ministry of the Interior was part of -the German government machine and doubtlessly there, as in all -other ministries, those preparations for war were made which -administrations have to make in such cases.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: May I say something? The witness has -just stated that he could not say any more in answering that question -than any other German could. I believe that, under these -circumstances, the witness is not the right person to make any -factual statements.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He has just said so himself. That is exactly -what he said. I don’t see any reason for any intervention. The -witness said so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: I only meant that he could not even -function as a witness concerning these facts. -<span class='pageno' title='281' id='Page_281'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: For perfectly obvious reasons I am deprived -of all possibility to put these questions to any German, but -I am perfectly satisfied with the answers of the witness Gisevius.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Do you know anything about the so-called -“Three Man College”? It consisted of the Plenipotentiary -for the Administration of the Reich, of the Plenipotentiary for -Economy, and of a representative of the OKW. This Three Man -College was entrusted with the preparation of all fundamental -questions pertaining to the war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I personally cannot give any information on that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Do you know anything about the activities -of the Ministry of the Interior in territories occupied by the -Germans?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: As far as I know, the Ministry of the Interior sent -important officials into the military administration, but it is not -clear to me whether these officials, from that moment on, were -subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior or the OKW.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you any special knowledge as to -whether the machinery of the Reich Commission in the occupied -territories of the Soviet Union was recruited from the Ministry of -the Interior or at least with considerable help from this ministry?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I should assume so, yes. It holds good as far as help -is concerned, because the ministry for the occupied Russian territories -could take its officials only from the personnel department -of the Ministry of the Interior.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know of the visits paid by -the Defendant Frick to the concentration camps?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: At the time when I was in the Ministry of the -Interior I did not hear anything about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: And after that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: After that I did not hear anything about it either.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Could a situation arise in which the Defendant -Frick, although Minister of the Interior, would not be -informed regarding the system of concentration camps established -in Germany and of the violence and lawlessness practiced in the -camps?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I believe that I have already yesterday given exhaustive -information as to the fact that we were informed about -everything.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: In this particular case I am interested -in the Defendant Frick. What do you know about him in this -connection? -<span class='pageno' title='282' id='Page_282'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I have said yesterday that the Reich Ministry of the -Interior received numberless calls for help from all over the -country, and yesterday we even saw a letter from the Ministry of -Justice. Also I have referred...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This subject was fully covered yesterday.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall pass on to the next question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Are you acquainted with the secret law -issued in Germany in 1940 concerning the killing of sick persons -and the old?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the attitude of the Defendant -Frick towards the promulgation and enforcing of this law?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I assume that he, as Minister of the Interior, signed it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The law, if there was a law, was after 1935, -was it not? What is the law that you are putting? If it was in -1935, then this witness was not in the Ministry of the Interior.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am speaking of the law which was -promulgated in 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He would not know anything about it any -more than anybody else.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am satisfied with the answer which I -have received from the witness. Will you now allow me to proceed -to questions concerning the Defendant Schacht?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Witness, you were in close relations -with the Defendant Schacht for a considerable period of time; have -I understood you correctly?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Thus you were sufficiently acquainted -with the state and political activities of the Defendant Schacht?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I believe so, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell me, what do you know about the -part played by the Defendant Schacht in Hitler’s seizure of power?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: That was just the time when I did not yet know -Schacht, and about which I cannot give any information.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I knew only that he entered the Cabinet and that -without doubt he assisted Hitler in the preliminary political negotiations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Do you know anything about the meeting -engineered by Schacht between Hitler and the big industrialists, in -February 1933? -<span class='pageno' title='283' id='Page_283'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: As a result of this meeting a fund was -created by the industrialists with a view to guaranteeing the success -of the Nazi Party at the elections. What do you know about this -meeting?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I know nothing about this meeting. In my book I -wrote that to my knowledge the largest amount for the election -campaign in 1932 was given by Thyssen at that time and Grauert, a -member of the Rhein-Hessian iron and steel industry group.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the part played by the Defendant -Schacht on this occasion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: At that time I did not see Schacht in the Ruhr -district, and I also do not know whether he was there at that time. -I emphasize again that I did not know him at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I know that. But in your book entitled -<span class='it'>Until the Bitter End</span>, published in 1946, and in your replies to preliminary -interrogations by defendant’s counsel Dix, you favorably -described the Defendant Schacht; is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I did not understand the last words.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I repeat that you favorably described the -Defendant Schacht; is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: You state that as from 1936, the Defendant -Schacht was in opposition to Hitlerite regime, and that he expressed -these opinions in a fairly open manner; is that true?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No, I state expressly that beginning with 1936 his -suspicions were aroused, but that he only became an opponent of -Hitler during the Fritsch crisis.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: In which year do you place this crisis?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: End of 1937 and beginning of 1938. The Fritsch -crisis was at the beginning of 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell us, under the then existing regime -in Germany, could a situation arise where Hitler would not be -informed as to these opposite views of Schacht which, according to -you, existed at the end of 1937?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: You mean that Hitler was not informed after 1938?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: No. I asked you, could it be possible, -under the then existing regime in Germany, that Hitler was not -informed as to this antagonistic attitude on the part of Schacht?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Hitler knew very well that Schacht was very critical -towards the system and that he frequently expressed disapproval. -<span class='pageno' title='284' id='Page_284'></span> -He often received letters from Schacht and of course heard a great -deal, too. But he did not know how far that opposition went.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then how could Schacht remain in the -Government of the Reich, as Minister without Portfolio and personal -adviser to Hitler, right up to January 1943, if Hitler, as you say, -was fully aware of his critical attitude towards his, Hitler’s, policy?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Hitler always took care to let prominent individuals -disappear quietly or put them in the shade so that foreign propaganda -could not take advantage of these facts. The Schacht case -is not the only one in which Hitler tried to camouflage an open -crisis.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Were you acquainted with a letter from -Hitler of 19 January 1939, addressed to Schacht, who at that time -was being relieved of his post as President of the Reichsbank? I -should like to remind you of the contents of that letter in which -Hitler writes to Schacht as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I avail myself on the occasion of your release from the post -of President of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank to -thank you most warmly, most sincerely for the services you -have repeatedly rendered while in that position, to Germany -and to me personally, during long and arduous years. Above -all else, your name will be connected forever with the first -period of national rearmament. I am happy that you will -now be able, as Reichsminister, to proceed to the solution -of new tasks...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This was all gone over yesterday by the -witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Please forgive me, but I have a question -to put to the witness in connection with this letter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] It would appear, from the contents of -this letter, that in January 1939—and I stress the date, Witness—Hitler -expressed his appreciation of Schacht’s activities rather differently -from the manner in which you worded your evidence. How -do you reconcile this divergence of opinion with your assertion that -the Defendant Schacht was already in direct opposition to Hitler’s -regime towards the end of 1937 and the beginning of 1938?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I should like to answer that I am not accustomed -to consider any written or oral proclamation by Hitler as truthful. -That man always said only that which seemed opportune to him at -the moment to deceive the world or Germany. In this particular -case Hitler intended to avoid the impression that Schacht’s resignation -would cause a difficult economic crisis. But I am only -saying now what Hitler could have had in his mind. Yesterday I -<span class='pageno' title='285' id='Page_285'></span> -described with what indignation Schacht received that letter. He -considered it derision and debasement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then I shall refer to another document, -to a letter from Schacht himself addressed to Hitler. This is a -memorandum of 7 January 1939, in which Schacht wrote to Hitler:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“From the very beginning the Reichsbank has realized that -the fruits of a successful foreign policy can only be obtained -if this policy is founded on the rebirth of the Wehrmacht. It -therefore took upon itself, to a very large extent, the financing -of the armament program, despite the monetary and -political difficulties involved. The justification of this consisted -in the necessity, which far outweighed all other arguments, -of manufacturing arms immediately, <span class='it'>ex nihilo</span>, often -even under disguise, in order to ensure a foreign policy which -would command respect.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you also consider this document as an expression of Schacht’s -attitude?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: As far as I have understood, you refer to a letter -from the year 1935, is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I refer to a letter of 7 January 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Please pardon me. Then I can say only what I said -yesterday: that all these letters were very carefully written so that -they could not be considered a provocation, and the factual contents -of the letter made illusory lest Hitler should simply say, “This is a -personal attack on me.” I said yesterday that the problem was to -convince the other conservative ministers, who were not so much -against Hitler, about the actual situation and neutralize any -opposition.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the attitude of the Defendant -Schacht towards the Anschluss?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: The Anschluss happened right in the middle of the -Fritsch crisis, or probably at the dramatic climax, and that is why -we were firmly convinced that this was a particularly malevolent -case of camouflage, and in that sense we were indignant. We had no -doubt that the German Army was to be diverted outwards...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Witness, wait a minute. You were asked if -you knew what the attitude of Schacht was to the Anschluss question -at that time. You are not answering that question. Do you or do -you not know?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I cannot give a definite answer about that, because -all of us saw clearly that the problem of Austria had to be solved in -a legal way. There were differences of opinion with regard to this -question in our group. Most of us hoped that the independence of -<span class='pageno' title='286' id='Page_286'></span> -Austria could be preserved. Especially from the German point of -view, it was desirable that another independent German State -should exist, if at any later time there should be a League of Nations -or diplomatic negotiations. However, I cannot state under oath -whether Schacht personally was of that opinion or whether he was -for an outright annexation. He was certainly against the method.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall quote an excerpt from a speech -made by Schacht in Vienna, in March 1938:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Thank God, these matters could not, in the end, hinder the -forward march of the great German people, for Adolf Hitler -has created a community of German will and thought, he -supported it with the reborn strength of the Wehrmacht, and -thereby gave an outward form to this spiritual union of Germany -and Austria.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you qualify these statements of Schacht’s also as expressions -of his opposition to the Hitler regime?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I would have to be able to read the speech in its -entirety. I personally would not have said it, but I do not know -whether pure judgment on my part here serves any purpose. -Would it not be better to ask Schacht what he meant?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The speech can be put to Schacht when he -goes into the witness box, if he does.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell me, Witness, you are currently residing -in Switzerland? In which town?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I live near Geneva in a village called Commugny.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: How long have you lived in Switzerland?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Since the first of October 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did you know about Schacht’s arrival in -Switzerland in 1943?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No. He did not come to Switzerland in 1943.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: In 1942?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: He did not come to Switzerland in 1942 either.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then Schacht was not in Switzerland -either in 1942 or 1943?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: That is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: In all the time that you yourself lived in -Switzerland, did you ever meet the Defendant Schacht or not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, repeatedly. I was in Berlin at least every 4 -weeks or 8 weeks and until 1943...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: No. I am asking you about Schacht’s visit -to Switzerland. -<span class='pageno' title='287' id='Page_287'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: During the war there was only one visit to Switzerland -by Schacht—in 1941, on the occasion of his wedding trip, and -then I saw him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: That was in 1941?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: On 14 January 1946, an article was -published in the newspaper <span class='it'>Basler Nachrichten</span>, entitled “What -Schacht Thinks.” Do you know anything about that article?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know about that article?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Not more than I read in the paper about it. I have -tried to find out who that American was with whom Schacht had the -conversation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: The details do not interest me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>One last question: Did you know anything about a conference -held at Hitler’s house in Berchtesgaden, in the summer of 1944, when -the advisability of killing imported foreign workers was discussed, -in the case of further successful advances by the Allied Forces? Did -you hear anything about that conference?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No, at that time I could not go to Germany any -more, because there were proceedings against me, and I heard -nothing about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I have no further questions to ask.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then do you wish to re-examine, or does any -other member of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask questions of -the witness?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, yesterday during the cross-examination -the American prosecutor submitted to you a letter of -14 May 1935 by the Reich Minister of Justice to the Reich and -Prussian Minister of the Interior. In that letter there is an enclosure -which mentions a copy of a letter by an inspector of the Secret -State Police. Witness, did I understand you correctly to say that -you personally assisted in writing that letter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: We had cross-connections between the Ministry of -the Interior and the Ministry of Justice, and at times it was desirable, -if a letter of a severe nature came from another ministry, -for me to present it to my minister. And I do not doubt that Frick -was also glad when he received a sharp letter, so that he could -submit a matter in a general way and before the Cabinet. Thus I -remember that the sending of that letter was discussed in advance -with several gentlemen of the Ministry of Justice and with myself. -<span class='pageno' title='288' id='Page_288'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Do I understand you correctly then that -the letter was a joint effort of the Ministry of Justice and the -Ministry of the Interior to do something against the Gestapo terror?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: As for myself, I can certainly say “yes.” I was at -that time a member of the Ministry of the Interior. Of course I did -not speak to my chief about that point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: In that letter we find on Page 5 of the -German text the following sentence—I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In the concentration camp at Hohnstein in Saxony, inmates -had to stand under a dripping apparatus especially constructed -for that purpose, until the drops of water, falling at -regular intervals, produced serious infected injuries on the -scalp.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you know that the guards of that camp were heavily punished -for that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No, and if that happened it was an astounding -exception.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, then I have one more question. -That is in connection with the statement which you just made, that -there was an atmosphere of hostility toward you in the room of -the attorneys due to the incident which has been mentioned. A -number of colleagues are deeply shocked by that statement of -yours, and these colleagues were glad that you described conditions -in Germany so openly. Could you tell me whether that statement -you made applies to all of the Defense Counsel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I am grateful to you that you give me the opportunity -to correct an apparent misstatement, or a misunderstanding -which was created by my statement. I meant a different incident -which occurred as I entered the counsel room, about which I do not -want to speak any further here. I wish to emphasize that I realize -the difficult task of the Defense Counsel, and that I want to apologize -if in any way the impression was created or might be created -that I had reproached the great majority of the Defense Counsel -in the carrying out of their difficult task.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: I thank you. I have no more questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gisevius, I want to ask you some -questions to try and get clear what your various positions were and -where you were at various times.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As I understand it, in 1933 you were a civil servant, is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And then you became a member of the -Gestapo? -<span class='pageno' title='289' id='Page_289'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: The first position I held as a qualified civil servant -was in the service of the Political Police. In Germany one is a civil -servant even in the training stage. Therefore I have to say that I -received my first real position as an official in August of 1933 when -I entered the Gestapo.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And when did you leave that position?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: The end of December 1933.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And to what position did you go?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Then I entered the Ministry of the Interior; that is -to say, the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. In the course of the -year 1934 I also entered the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and in -May of 1935 I was dismissed from the Ministry of the Interior.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then I came into the newly created, or to-be-created, Reich -Criminal Office, which, at its beginning, was the Police Presidium -in Berlin. On the date when Himmler was appointed Reich Chief -of Police, on 17 June 1936, I was finally dismissed from the police -service.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I was then transferred to the Government office in Münster, -worked there in price control supervision, and, in the middle of -1937, I took an unpaid vacation, ostensibly to make studies in -economics. That vacation was canceled by the Ministry of the -Interior at the beginning of 1939, and I was attached to the Government -office in Potsdam near Berlin. There I had to do with road -building...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: In the middle of 1937 you took unpaid -service and studied in economics, I think you said, or an unpaid -vacation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You still remained a member of the civil -service then, did you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes; until the 20th of July I was continuously in the -civil service.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then, in the beginning of 1939 you were -posted to the Ministry of the Interior and attached to Potsdam?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on; after that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: When war broke out the difficulty arose that I had -no mobilization order and, on the other hand, my friends wanted -to have me in the OKW. From the date of the outbreak of the war -until 1 October 1940 I had only a forged mobilization order, and -every day I expected to be found out. At which time I would have -had to take the consequences. -<span class='pageno' title='290' id='Page_290'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>After the fall of Paris I stated to Canaris and Oster that I would -have to ask them now to release me from that somewhat complicated -situation. At that time the position of Canaris, temporarily, -was so strong that he placed me in an intelligence position with the -Consulate General in Zürich. There I received the title of a Vice -Consul with the Consulate General in Zürich, and I stayed there as -a counterintelligence man, without belonging to the Abwehr formally, -until 20 July.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After 20 July I was dismissed from all posts, and I do not know -whether I was not even deprived of citizenship. I have found out -nothing about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Between the time you went to Zürich and -20 July, were you returning to Germany from time to time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: During that time I was mainly in Germany, and -only from time to time Oster and Canaris sent me to Switzerland -as a courier, on travel orders. Schacht was still quite helpful to me -at that time in getting me a Swiss visa, through the Swiss Legation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: During the time that you were in the Gestapo, -from August to December 1933, what was your actual job or -function?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: When I received my first civil service position I was -only in training, and I was attached to the then Chief of the Executive -Department, Oberregierungsrat Nebe, for training. After the -warrant for arrest was issued, at the end of October 1933, I was -sent to Leipzig as a reporter for the Reichstag Fire trial.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You spoke yesterday very often of a man -whose name I am not clear about, Nebe, I believe it was.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What was his position?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Nebe was a well-known criminologist at the Berlin -Police headquarters before 1933. As a National Socialist he was -called into the Gestapo in July 1933 and until the beginning of 1934; -he was promoted there to Oberregierungsrat. Then we were successful, -with the aid of the Defendant Frick, in having him transferred -for some time to the Ministry of the Interior. And then he became -the founder and Chief of the Reich Office of Criminology. On the -day of the appointment of Himmler as Chief of Police of the Reich -he was put into the new Reich Security Main Office. In the course -of time he was taken over into the SS; he became an SS Gruppenführer, -SS General, and, until 20 July, he was one of the closest -subordinates of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner -was Chief of the Gestapo as well as the Criminal Police -<span class='pageno' title='291' id='Page_291'></span> -and the Information Service. So that thereby Nebe became a subordinate -of Kaltenbrunner and received continuously official orders -from him, just like the Gestapo Chief Müller.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Did you wish to ask any questions, Dr. Dix?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps we had better do that after -the adjournment at a quarter past 2.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='292' id='Page_292'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The Soviet Prosecutor put a question to you in connection -with the annexation of Austria. While answering the -question you were interrupted. You had just said, I quote “But -the form...” Would you please complete your answer now?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: What I wanted to say was that Schacht was undoubtedly -opposed to the Anschluss in this form.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Then I have one last question, which concerns the -so-called incident of yesterday. I discussed this incident with you -yesterday and explained the situation as regards my colleague -Dr. Stahmer. I also gave you permission to make use of this explanation -at any time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now request you to give this explanation to the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I interpose an objection. I -think that is a most irregular way to inform the Tribunal, if there -is anything the Tribunal should be informed about, that Dr. Dix -should tell the witness what the witness should tell the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I have no objection to the witness’ relating to the Tribunal -anything that he knows from his own knowledge. I do object -to the witness’ being asked to relate what Dr. Dix has told him -he may tell the Tribunal. I think that is a most irregular way of -clarifying it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: That is not the case. I made a remark about -Dr. Stahmer to Dr. Gisevius. That is a matter between the witness -and myself; I consider it important that this remark of mine be -related and testified to by the witness. It is an incident which he -observed, and I prefer that the witness should confirm the fact -that I explained this to him. I cannot see anything irregular about -this procedure, and I ask for a decision by the Tribunal. Otherwise -I should make the explanation myself, but I consider it better for -the witness to say what I told him immediately after that incident.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that you may properly -put the question to the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I have already put the question, and you may answer -it at this time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am not quite sure now what your question -was, but the Tribunal thinks that you may put the question. Was -there anything in connection with the incident which the witness -has not already told us, which he wishes to say?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes. The question relates to a conversation between -the witness and myself. -<span class='pageno' title='293' id='Page_293'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Witness, what did I tell you yesterday?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: You told me immediately that, in your opinion, your -colleague Dr. Stahmer did not wish to put undue pressure upon -me but that this undue pressure came rather from the Defendant -Göring.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I have no further questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, were you, during the war...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, are you attempting to re-examine?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I wanted to put a single question...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I was not thinking of the time which you -would take up, but the question of whether you ought to be -allowed to put any question. Yes, go on, Dr. Seidl.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, during the war were you at any time -active in the intelligence service of a foreign power?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: At no time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: It is also not correct...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is not a question which you ought to -put to this witness in re-examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: But, Mr. President, it is a question affecting the -credibility of this witness. If it should turn out that this witness, -who is or was a citizen of the German Reich, had been active in -the intelligence service of a foreign power, that fact would have -an important bearing on the credibility of the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to be heard on that. In -the first place, I do not think that this witness should be subjected -to any attacks. In the second place, I respectfully submit that it -does not militate against the credibility of the witness that he -should have opposed this kind of an organization. I think that the -attack upon the credibility of this witness, if there were one to be -made—he is sworn on behalf of the defendants and is not the -Prosecution’s witness—the attack is not timely, is not a proper -attack, and the substance of it does not go to credibility.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will allow you to put the -question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Please answer my question and remember your -oath.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Mr. Attorney, it is not at all necessary for you to -remind me of my oath. I have said that I was never in the intelligence -service of a foreign power. I was in the service of a good, -clean German cause.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: During the war did you receive funds from any -power at war with Germany? -<span class='pageno' title='294' id='Page_294'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Do you know what the three letters OSS mean?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: What do they stand for?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: They stand for an American intelligence service.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: You had nothing to do with that organization?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I had friendly and political contacts with several -members of this organization.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions to put to the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I hope the defendants’ counsel will remember -that they have all had a free opportunity to cross-examine -this witness already and have not...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): -The person of Herr Von Papen was not mentioned until the cross-examination -by the American prosecutor. Therefore I could not -ask questions before.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, you replied in the negative to a question put by the -American chief prosecutor yesterday as to whether the Defendant -Von Papen at any time protested. Of course, you modified this -by pointing out that some written communication by Von Papen -had not been addressed to the Ministry of the Interior.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In order to clarify this problem, I should like to know whether -this assertion of yours refers only to the Ministry of the Interior. -On Page 133 of your book you pointed out that one of the Defendant -Von Papen’s main activities as Vice Chancellor consisted -in handing in protests and that he addressed these protests above -all to Hindenburg and Göring.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I again emphasized the latter point yesterday or -today. I have no official knowledge of any protest made by Von -Papen to the competent police minister after 30 June 1934. I can -say only that it would greatly have strengthened the position of -the ministry of police if a protest of that nature, describing in -detail the murder of Von Papen’s closest co-workers, had reached -the Ministry of the Interior. In that case, it is unlikely that this -rumor about the suicide or rather the suspicious death of Von Bose -and Jung would have reached the public.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you not think that it is understandable, -especially considering the position held by Frick, the comparatively -insignificant and uninfluential position held by Frick, that one -should make such protests to higher authorities if it is possible to -do so? -<span class='pageno' title='295' id='Page_295'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: At the very moment when the ministers took the -position that they could apply only to higher authorities, that is, -the dictator himself, they, of their own accord, shattered the constitutional -competency of the individual ministries and the Cabinet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It would have meant a great deal if Herr Von Papen at that -time had used the prescribed channels.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: In agreement with your book, you do not -dispute the fact that Von Papen made many protests to these -higher authorities in respect to other questions as well?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No; he did protest frequently.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yesterday, within the scope of your general -statements you gave an unfavorable characterization of the Defendant -Von Papen. This character sketch coincides with the one -you gave in your book. In your book you pay special attention -to certain details and draw your conclusions from them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Since the Defendant Von Papen only occupies a comparatively -small amount of space in your book and you probably had nothing -to do with him in your official capacity, you must have had to -base your statements on second-hand information. Since all these -statements, as far as they refer to Von Papen, are incorrect, I -refer to them briefly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First, you proceed from the assumption that, in spite of the -events of 30 June, Von Papen did not resign.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the contrary, it is historically significant that Papen did send -in his resignation after the suppression of his Marburg speech, that -negotiations about this resignation were pending between Hitler -and Hindenburg, and that Hitler accepted Papen’s resignation immediately -after the latter’s release on 3 July, when it was again -tendered, but did not intend to make it public until a later date, -in spite of Papen’s request to the contrary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Is it possible, Witness, that you were not correctly informed of -this internal event?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: It is perfectly possible for me not to have known -of internal events. I should like, however, to stress the fact that a -minister or vice chancellor is under an obligation to give a certain -amount of publicity to his opinion and to his decisions; and I can say -only that, whatever Papen may have said to Hitler in private, he -contrived with consummate skill to conceal from the German people -the fact that he intended to resign—or had already resigned; and -that is the point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Are you aware that this same Defendant -Von Papen had had a very bad experience a few weeks earlier, -when the press was forbidden to publish his speech at Marburg, -<span class='pageno' title='296' id='Page_296'></span> -which contained a frank statement of his opinions, and warning -was given that persons found circulating it would be punished?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I am aware of it because we were appalled that -a Vice Chancellor of the German Reich allowed himself to be -silenced in such a way. I believe that the 30th of June would not -have involved such a heavy death-roll for the middle classes if Vice -Chancellor Von Papen had given a manly “no”—a definite “no” -at the proper time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Your answer makes no reference to the -point which I raised before, that Von Papen had actually resigned -because the publication of his Marburg speech had been prohibited.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Secondly, you make the assumption that Von Papen took part -in the Cabinet session of 3 July, in which the law was passed that -the measures involved by 30 June were legal as emergency -measures for the protection of the State. Is it known to you that -Von Papen did not participate in this session, that he had just -been released and went into the Chancellery while the session was -in progress, that Hitler asked him to go from the session-room -into the adjoining room, that Von Papen again tendered his resignation, -which Hitler accepted, and that he left the Chancellery immediately -afterwards, without participating in the session at all?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether it is possible for the -witness to follow your questions, but they are so long and contain -so many statements of fact that it is very difficult for anybody -else to follow them; it is very difficult for the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: The gist of my question was that Von -Papen did not attend the Cabinet session on 3 July. My question -to the witness...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, why do you not ask the -witness whether he knows whether he did participate or not? If -that is the question you want to ask why do you not ask it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: My question is simply an attempt to find out -whether the assertion to the contrary which appears in his book -can also be explained by an error in information obtained from -a third party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: It can be explained by false information, which, -through the silence of Herr Von Papen, became known to the -public and by which I myself was misled.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thirdly, you go on with the statement that -Von Papen, although he went to see Hindenburg afterwards, did -not make a sufficiently strong protest against the measures taken. -Is it known to you that Von Papen did everything in his power -to reach Hindenburg but was kept away from him and he did not -<span class='pageno' title='297' id='Page_297'></span> -reach Hindenburg’s estate at Neudeck until after the 30th of June, -after Hindenburg’s death? Can the assertion to the contrary contained -in your book be traced back to an error in information?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, if you tell me that even in his capacity of Vice -Chancellor of the Reich he did not have access to the President -of the Reich and still remained in office, in spite of the fact that -there were foreign journalists, the foreign diplomatic corps, and -even a large number of Germans who heard of this attitude of a -German vice chancellor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: But, Witness, you are forgetting that he -was a retired vice chancellor and had already been out of office for -several weeks.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Fourthly, you start with the premise that Von Papen attended -the Reichstag session at which the measures taken on 30 June -were justified. Do you know that Von Papen did not attend that -session in spite of Hitler’s summons to him to do so? Is it possible -that you could have been informed incorrectly on that point, too?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I believe you have already asked me that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, this is not the Cabinet session; this is -the Reichstag session.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, then I must be misinformed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Dr. Laternser approached the lectern.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, it seems to me that the Defense -has had every opportunity to interrogate this witness. After -the witness was examined by the Prosecution, after his cross-examination, -the Defense makes again an application to cross-examine -the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks, at any rate, that it is -perfectly able to manage its own proceedings without any interruptions -of this sort. We can deal with Dr. Laternser when he -makes his application to cross-examine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. I merely wanted -to say that we would like to shorten the duration of the proceedings -as much as possible, and the Prosecution would like the -Defense to consider that the same way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have several further questions -to put to the witness, arising from his cross-examination; I -assume that the Tribunal have no objection to my questioning him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, if they arise out of the cross-examination -of him. -<span class='pageno' title='298' id='Page_298'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Witness, yesterday, in answer to a question -of the American prosecutor, you expressed the opinion that a -Putsch against the then existing regime would have been possible -only with the co-operation of the generals but that the many discussions -which took place did not achieve this co-operation. I -should like to ask you, Witness, to which generals you spoke personally -about the existing plans for a Putsch on the part of your -group?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You are not concerned with every general -in the German Army; you are only concerned with those who are -charged with being a criminal group.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Your question must be addressed to them, -or with reference to them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. Then I ask the Court’s -permission to describe to the witness the OKW and General Staff -circle so that he can answer my question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can put to him, I think, whether -he had contact with any members of the General Staff who are -charged with being a criminal group. You know who the generals -are.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes. I should like to make a few preliminary -remarks to the witness and then put the question. Witness...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Now, what is the question you want to put?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: So that the witness can answer the question -within the limits prescribed by the Tribunal, I should like to give -the witness a brief explanation as to the circle of persons actually -belonging to this group and then ask him with which of these -persons he talked personally in order to win them over for the -Putsch intended by his groups. Otherwise...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you do it shortly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Witness, the group General Staff and OKW -is held to include the holders of certain appointments from -February 1938 to May 1945. These appointments are as follows: -The Commanders-in-Chief of the various branches of the Armed -Forces...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You are not going through the whole lot, -are you, 130 of them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the list is really quite short -and otherwise I cannot restrict my question as desired by the -Tribunal. -<span class='pageno' title='299' id='Page_299'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what you mean. What I said -was, are you proposing to go through the whole 130 generals or -officers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: No, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The group includes those holding certain -appointments; briefly, all those who were commanders-in-chief -during the period February 1938 to May 1945. Now, I ask you, -with which generals of this group did you personally discuss the -subject of Putsch plans, in order to obtain their co-operation in a -Putsch, if such were made?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: You mean commanders-in-chief of groups?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Of armies, of army groups, branches of the -Wehrmacht, and General Staff chiefs of the Wehrmacht branches.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I have already mentioned Halder and Brauchitsch.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: One question, Witness; did you discuss with -Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch an intended Putsch against the -regime or only against the Gestapo?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I discussed both with him; and in both cases he -answered in the affirmative and acted in the negative.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I spoke to Halder and Witzleben. I knew Kluge well from the -old times. I do not know at what period he entered the category -to which you refer. At any rate my connection with Kluge was -never broken off. I may have talked to other individuals falling -within this category.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but to discuss Putsch plans with a -high-ranking military leader is an event of some importance; if -you had had a discussion of this kind with a field marshal you -would surely remember it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: It was not such an important event as all that, -Mr. Attorney. Field marshals were not such important people in -the Third Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the fact that these generals -were spoken to and refused to join a Putsch is not a crime within -the meaning of the Charter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, yesterday I explained that this -point is very important because it would exclude the assumption -of a conspiracy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid, Dr. Laternser, it is no good -answering me that a point is very important. What I asked you -was, how is it relevant to show that these generals discussed a -<span class='pageno' title='300' id='Page_300'></span> -revolt against the regime? That, I am putting to you, is not a crime -within the meaning of the Charter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but this circumstance would exclude the -assumption of the conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But does it preclude the possibility of a -conspiracy to make aggressive war? It has nothing to do with it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: I did not quite understand that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The question of a revolt against the regime -in Germany is, it seems to me, not necessarily connected with the -conspiracy to carry out aggressive war; therefore, anything which -has to do with a revolt against the regime in Germany is not -relevant to the question which you have to deal with.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the conspiracy is assumed -precisely in connection with the wars of aggression; and if the high -military leaders turned against the regime to such an extent that -they discussed and even attempted a Putsch, there would be no -question of conspiracy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal think the proper -way of putting the question, which they understand you want to -put, is to ask which of the generals were prepared to join in a -revolt. You may put that question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, in order to decide how far the -circle as a whole was willing to take part I must ask the witness -how many of them he spoke to and how many of those declared -themselves ready to act with him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think you might put that to him—how -many. Ask him how many.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, that was the question I asked -at the beginning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I said you may put it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Witness, with how many generals of -this group did you discuss the matter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: In the course of years it may have been a dozen or -several dozen, but I should like to say that it was the task of -Generaloberst Beck and Oster or Canaris to talk to these gentlemen -rather than mine. As regards names, I cannot give you much of -the information you want; on the other hand I can shorten your -question by saying that, unfortunately, very few of the leading -generals in the appointments referred to by the Prosecution ever -seriously declared their intention of helping to overthrow the -system. -<span class='pageno' title='301' id='Page_301'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Witness, that is exactly what I want to -know. You spoke to Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, Halder, and -Witzleben?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: And Olbricht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: He did not belong to this group. You did -speak to these three, then?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Also to Kluge.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Regarding the intended Putsch?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: And of these four that you mentioned did -Field Marshal Von Witzleben agree?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: They all agreed to begin with. Witzleben was the -only one who stuck to his word.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Then he did participate in this Putsch?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Did I understand you correctly when you -said yesterday that the Putsch of 20 July originated mainly with -the Wehrmacht, that is, with the generals and the officers of the -General Staff, and that they intended to keep down as far as -possible the number of those taking part?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No, I did not make such an exact statement as that. -Under a terror regime, only the military circles are in a position -to carry out a Putsch; to this extent it is true to say that these -few generals who participated were the mainstay of the Putsch. -But on 20 July the main weight lay with the wide front of the -civilians who for years had fought for the generals and were invariably -disappointed by the generals. For this reason alone, because -the generals had repeatedly broken their word, we decided -this time that on 20 July we would wait until the generals had -really taken action, in order not to raise the hopes or burden the -conscience of many civilians all to no purpose. That is what I -meant by limitation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Then the only Putsch which was actually -attempted was effected by generals and General Staff officers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: And civilians.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes. And the head of this group was, as you -testified, Generaloberst Beck?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: And he also belonged to the group indicated -under the name General Staff and OKW. Now, I have a further -question: Do you know of relations between these military leaders -<span class='pageno' title='302' id='Page_302'></span> -and the Minister of Finance Popitz, who also had designs for a -Putsch and is even said to have negotiated with Himmler for the -purpose of doing away with Hitler; and do you know anything -about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, that is true. Popitz made great efforts to incite -the generals to make a Putsch and to assassinate him. I regret -that I did not mention his name at the right time. He too was one -of those who, from 1938 or 1939 on, did their best to overthrow -the regime.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Did you discuss that with Minister Popitz?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, repeatedly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Did he tell you anything about the identity -of the high military leaders he had contacted for this purpose?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Popitz was in contact with Beck in particular. He -is certain to have been in contact with Witzleben; he was in touch -with Halder and Brauchitsch. The list of his disappointments is no -shorter than the list of disappointments which all the rest of us -had.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Did he himself call it a disappointment?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Yes, he was bitterly disappointed. This bitter, -everlasting disappointment was our one topic of conversation, and -that was the difficulty confronting the civilians, Mr. Attorney.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: There were no other possible ways of doing -away with Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: No. Since, through the fault of the generals, there -was no other means of power, constitutional or otherwise, left -in Germany, and the generals, who were the only armed power of -the nation, took their orders from Hitler, it was impossible to -organize opposition through any other circles. I may remind you -that after 1938 every attempt made by the Leftists to organize a -strike was punishable in the same way as mutiny in time of war, -and I remind you of the hundreds of death sentences imposed on -civilians under the war laws.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Now, a different subject. When...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that this matter has -been fully covered and is really not relevant. You have already -cross-examined this witness at some length before this, and the -Tribunal does not wish to hear any further evidence on this subject -in any further cross-examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have just finished.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, as regards the Fritsch crisis, when did you...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said you had concluded? -<span class='pageno' title='303' id='Page_303'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I am afraid I was misunderstood. -I have concluded those questions referring to an intended -Putsch and I should like to pass on to another point now and put a -question on the Fritsch crisis.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: As regards the Fritsch crisis I should like to -ask the witness when he learned of the exact state of affairs and -whether he transmitted his knowledge to high military leaders or -caused that knowledge to be transmitted to them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But the Fritsch crisis has nothing to do with -the charges against the High Command. The charges against the -High Command are crimes under the Charter, and the Fritsch -crisis has nothing whatever to do with that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Then I will withdraw that question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, today in cross-examination...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What are you going to put to him now?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to ask the witness -now about some points which he made in reply to the American -chief prosecutor’s questions. I believe that some clarification is -necessary here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The principle is not whether you think the -clarification is necessary, but whether the Tribunal thinks it; and, -therefore, the Tribunal wishes to know what points you wish to -put to him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes, indeed. In the course of his testimony -today the witness mentioned the fact that he had in his possession -documentary evidence of murders in Poland and Russia. I wanted -to ask him who had prepared these reports and in particular -whether he is acquainted with a very thorough and scientifically -prepared report made by Blaskowitz, commander in Poland, and -intended for transmission to his superiors. That would be an extremely -important point. Generaloberst Blaskowitz is a member -of the group which I represent. From the facts to be shown, it is -clear that the members of this group have always taken a stand -against cruelty, if such cases were reported to them through official -channels. I must therefore establish whether these reports, the object -of which was to prevent atrocities, are to be ascribed to the -co-operation of generals belonging to the indicted group.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It seems to me, if I may suggest, -Your Honors, that counsel is under the apprehension that he has -here to deal with individual generals. We are dealing only with -the group. If what counsel says about General Blaskowitz is true, -that is a defense for him, and I am right to say that General -<span class='pageno' title='304' id='Page_304'></span> -Blaskowitz did defy this Nazi conspiracy. And if that fact is ever -verified, he certainly should not be subject to penalties for the acts -which he stood up against.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It seems to me that we are going into individual defenses here -under a misapprehension that this is the occasion to try each and -every one of the generals. We made no charge against them that they -either did or did not have a Putsch or a Fritsch affair. The Fritsch -affair is only referred to here as fixing the time when the Defendant -Schacht became convinced that aggressive warfare was the -purpose of the Nazi regime. The Putsch is only introduced because -in his defense Schacht says he tried to induce a Putsch. It enters -not at all into the case against the General Staff. And most of the -General Staff who took any part in the Putsch were hanged and I -cannot see how it could be any defense to those who remained -and are under trial that a Putsch was or was not conducted. It -seems that we are off the main track.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I would like to define my -position with regard to this point. Unless I am permitted to ask -questions about the attitude of the members of this group and in -respect to such an important point, from which it is clear that they -combated atrocities, it is impossible for me to make clear to the -Tribunal the attitude typical of the high military leaders. It is -absolutely necessary for me to follow up such points, especially -since I have no other evidence material at my disposal; for I cannot -consider a group criminal unless—for instance—the majority of its -members actually committed crimes. I must be in a position to ask -in this case what position Generaloberst Blaskowitz took in regard -to the murders which took place in Poland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn to consider the -matter.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal considers that the -questions that you have been putting, if relevant at all, are only -extremely remotely relevant, and they cannot allow the cross-examination -to continue for any length of time, or the time of the -Tribunal would be wasted further. They think, and they rule, that -you may put the question which they understand you desire to put -in this form: The witness has spoken of reports which were received -by the group of which he has spoken about atrocities in the East, -and they think you may ask him who submitted those reports.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I should like you to answer this -question: With whom did these reports of murders in Poland and -Russia originate? -<span class='pageno' title='305' id='Page_305'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: I know of one report made by Generaloberst Blaskowitz -during the first few months of the Polish campaign on the -basis of information received by him and the military offices under -him. Beyond that, as far as I know, such reports were compiled -only by the group Canaris-Oster. But I should not care to assert -that another report was not written by someone else somewhere.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: What was the aim of the report which Generaloberst -Blaskowitz submitted?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GISEVIUS: Generaloberst Blaskowitz intended...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The report which one particular general -made does not tend to show that the group was either innocent or -criminal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, it helps us to find out what -the attitude of the group was.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the report of one -general is not evidence as to the criminality of the whole group.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, is that question approved? -I asked about the aim of the report.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No; the Tribunal is of the opinion that what -was contained in that report is not admissible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: I have no more questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may retire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Dr. Pannenbecker, that concludes your case, does it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. PANNENBECKER: The case of the Defendant Frick is -hereby concluded, except for the answers to the interrogatories -which I have not yet received.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Counsel for the Defendant Streicher, -Dr. Marx, go on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HANNS MARX (Counsel for Defendant Streicher): With the -permission of the Tribunal, Mr. President, I now call the Defendant -Julius Streicher to the witness box.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Streicher took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>JULIUS STREICHER (Defendant): Julius Streicher.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear -by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The defendant repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Witness, would you give the Tribunal first a short -description of your career? -<span class='pageno' title='306' id='Page_306'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I should like to ask the Tribunal to let me make -a brief statement in respect to my defense. Firstly...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You really ought to answer the questions that -are put to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: My Lord, my defense counsel cannot say what -I must say now. I should like to ask permission—in short, my -defense counsel has not conducted and was not in a position to -conduct my defense in the way I wanted; and I should like to state -this to the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you understand that the Tribunal -does not wish to have its time taken up with unnecessary matters. -It has no objection to your stating what is material or to your -reading it if necessary. It hopes that you will be as brief as possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I mention only facts, four facts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Firstly, the Charter created for this International Military -Tribunal guarantees the defendant the right to an unhampered and -just defense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Secondly, before the Trial began the defendants received a list -containing the names of the attorneys from whom the defendant -could choose his counsel. Since the Munich attorney whom I had -selected for my defense could no longer be put at my disposal, I -asked the Military Tribunal to put the Nuremberg attorney -Dr. Marx at my disposal. That was done.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thirdly, when I met my counsel for the first time, I told him he -must expect, as my counsel, to be attacked before the public. -Shortly afterwards, an attack was made by a Communist newspaper -published in the Russian zone of Berlin. The International Tribunal -was compelled to make a public statement repudiating the attack -of that newspaper and assuring my counsel of the express protection -of the Military Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Fourthly, although the statement made by the International -Military Tribunal left no doubt as to the fact that the Tribunal wished -to see the defense of the defendants unhampered, a renewed attack -occurred, this time by radio. The announcer said, “There are -camouflaged Nazis and anti-Semites among the defendants’ counsel.” -That these terroristic attacks were made with the intention of -intimidating the defendants’ counsel is clear. These terror attacks -might have contributed to the fact—that is my impression—that my -own counsel had refused to submit to the Tribunal a large number -of pieces of evidence which I considered important.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Fifthly, I wish to state that I have not been afforded the possibility -of making an unhampered and just defense before this -International Military Tribunal. -<span class='pageno' title='307' id='Page_307'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You can rest assured that the Tribunal will -see that everything that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, bears upon -the case or is relevant to your case or is in any way material in -your case will be presented and that you will be given the fairest -opportunity of making your defense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I thank you. From my life...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President; may I ask briefly to be -permitted to state my position. May it please the Court, when I -was asked to take over Herr Streicher’s defense, I naturally had -grave misgivings. I have...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, I do not think it is necessary, -really, for you to make any personal explanation at this stage. It is -very possible that the defendant may have different ideas about his -own defense. I think we had better let him go on with his defense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Nevertheless, I should like to ask permission, -Mr. President, just to mention the following point: As attorney and -as defense counsel of a defendant I have to reserve for myself the -right to decide how I shall conduct the defense. If the client is of -the opinion that certain documents or books are relevant, and the -attorney is of the opinion that they are not, then that is a difference -of opinion between the counsel and his client.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If Herr Streicher is of the opinion that I am incapable or not in -a position to conduct his defense, then he should ask for another -defense counsel. I am aware that at this stage of the proceedings -it would be very difficult for me to follow the matter to its logical -conclusion and ask to be relieved of this task of defense. I am not -terrorized by any journalist, but for a counsel to lose the confidence -of his own client is quite another matter; and for that reason I feel -bound to ask the Court to decide whether in these circumstances -I am to continue to defend my client.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks, Dr. Marx, that the -explanation and the statement which you have just made is in -accordance with the traditions of the legal profession and they -think therefore that the case ought to proceed and that you should -proceed with the case. Now, Defendant, will you go on?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: About my life: I was born on 12 February 1885 in -a small village in Bavaria Swabia. I was the youngest of nine -children. My father was an elementary school teacher. I too became -a teacher at an elementary school. In 1909, after I had taught for -several years in my native district, I was called to the municipal -school in Nuremberg. Here I had the opportunity of contact with -the families of the working-class children in the suburbs and of -observing social contrasts. This experience led to my decision in -1911 to go into politics. I became a member of the Democratic Party. -<span class='pageno' title='308' id='Page_308'></span> -As a young democratic speaker, I spoke at the Reichstag election -in 1912. The car put at my disposal was paid for by the banking -firm of Kohn. I stress this point because at that time I had occasion -to associate a good deal with Jews, even in the Democratic Party. -I must therefore have been fated to become later on a writer and -speaker on racial politics.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The World War came and I, too, went into the army as a lance -corporal in an infantry regiment. Then I became an officer in a -machine-gun unit. I returned home with both Iron Crosses, with -the Bavarian Order, and the rare Austrian Cross of Merit attached -to the Ribbon for Gallantry. When I had returned home, I had no -desire to go into politics again. I intended only to stay in private -life and devote myself to my profession. Then I saw the blood-red -posters of revolution in Germany and for the first time I joined the -raging masses of that time. At a meeting, when the speaker had -finished, I asked to be heard as an unknown person. An inner voice -sent me onto the platform and I spoke. I joined in the debate and -I spoke on recent happenings in Germany. In the November -revolution of 1918 the Jews and their friends had seized the political -power in Germany. Jews were in the Reich Cabinet and in all the -provincial governments. In my native Bavaria the Minister President -was a Polish Jew called Eisner-Kosmanowsky. The reaction -among the middle classes in Germany manifested itself in the form -of an organization known as Schutz und Trutzbund (Society for -Protective and Offensive Action). Local branches of this organization -were formed in all the large cities in Germany; and fate willed that -after I had again spoken at a gathering, a man came up to me and -asked me to come to the Kulturverein (Cultural Society) in the -Golden Hall and hear what they had to say there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this way, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I became involved in -what brings me here today. Destiny made of me what international -propaganda thought it had made. I was called a bloodhound—a -blood czar of Franconia; my honor was attacked, a criminal was -paid 300 marks to swear in this very hall that he had seen me, as -an officer in France during the war, rape a Madame Duquesne, a -teacher’s wife in Atis, near Peronne. It was 2 years before someone -betrayed him and the truth came out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Gentlemen, the receipt for 300 marks was produced here in this -court. With 300 marks they tried to deprive me of my honor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I mention this case only because my case is a special case; and -if it is to be judged with justice, then I must be allowed to make -such a remark in passing. In this connection, I may say that it is no -coincidence that the first question asked me by the Soviet Russian -officer who interrogated me was whether I was a sex criminal. -<span class='pageno' title='309' id='Page_309'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Gentlemen, I told you how I was fated to be drawn into the -Schutz und Trutzbund. I told you what conditions were like in -Germany at the time, and it was therefore quite a natural development -that I no longer visited the centers of revolution to join in -debate. I felt myself impelled to call meetings of my own and so -I spoke for perhaps 15 years almost every Friday before about 5,000 -to 6,000 people. I admit quite frankly that I went on making -speeches over a period of 20 years in the largest cities of Germany, -sometimes at meetings on sport fields and on public squares, to -audiences of 150,000 to 200,000 people. I did that for 20 years, and -I state here that I was not paid by the Party. The Prosecution will -never succeed, not even through a public appeal, in getting anybody -into this room who could testify that I had ever been paid. I still -had a small salary which continued after I was relieved of my -position in 1924. Nonetheless, I remained the one and only unpaid -Gauleiter in the Movement. It goes without saying that my writing -supported myself and my assistants later on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And so, Gentlemen, in the year 1921—I return now to that -period—I went to Munich. I was curious because someone had said -to me, “You must hear Adolf Hitler some time.” And now destiny -again takes a hand. This tragedy can only be grasped by those -whose vision is not limited to the material, but who can perceive -those higher vibrations which even today have not had their full -outcome.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I went to the Munich Bürgerbräukeller. Adolf Hitler was -speaking there. I had only heard his name. I had never seen the -man before. And there I sat, an unknown among unknowns. I saw -this man shortly before midnight, after he had spoken for 3 hours, -drenched in perspiration, radiant. My neighbor said he thought he -saw a halo around his head; and I, Gentlemen, experienced something -which transcended the commonplace. When he finished his -speech, an inner voice bade me get up. I went to the platform. -When Adolf Hitler came down, I approached him and told him my -name.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution has submitted a document to the Tribunal which -recalls that moment. Adolf Hitler wrote in his book, <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>, -that it must have cost me a great effort to hand over to him the -movement which I had created in Nuremberg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I mention this because the Prosecution thought that these things -in Hitler’s book, <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>, should be submitted and used against -me. Yes, I am proud of it; I forced myself to hand over to Hitler -the movement which I had created in Franconia. This Franconian -movement gave the movement which Adolf Hitler had created in -Munich and southern Bavaria a bridge to northern Germany. That -was my doing. -<span class='pageno' title='310' id='Page_310'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1923 I took part in the first National Socialist revolution or, -rather, attempted revolution. It will go down in history as the -Hitler Putsch. Adolf Hitler had asked me to come to Munich for it. -I went to Munich and took part in the meeting in which Adolf Hitler -came to a solemn agreement with representatives of the middle -classes to go to northern Germany and put an end to the chaos.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I marched with them up to the Feldherrnhalle. Then I was -arrested and, like Adolf Hitler, Rudolf Hess, and others, was taken -to Landsberg on the Lech. After a few months I was put up as -candidate for the Bavarian Parliament by the Völkischer Block and -was elected in the year 1924.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1925 after the Movement had been permitted again and Adolf -Hitler had been released from jail, I was made Gauleiter of Franconia. -In 1933 I became a deputy to the Reichstag. In 1933 or 1934 -the honorary title of SA Gruppenführer was bestowed on me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In February 1940 I was given leave of absence. I lived for -5 years, until the end of the war, on my estate. At the end of -April I went to southern Bavaria, to the Tyrol. I wanted to commit -suicide. Then something happened which I do not care to relate. -But I can say one thing: I said to friends, “I have proclaimed my -views to the world for 20 years. I do not want to end my life by -suicide. I will go my way whatever happens as a fanatic in the -cause of truth until the very end, a fanatic in the cause of truth.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I might mention here that I deliberately gave my fighting paper, -<span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, the subtitle, <span class='it'>A Weekly for the Fight for Truth</span>. I was -quite conscious that I could not be in possession of the entire truth, -but I also know that 80 or 90 percent of what I proclaim with conviction -was the truth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Witness, why were you dismissed from the teaching -profession? Did you ever commit any punishable or immoral act?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Actually I have answered this question already. -Everybody knows that I could not have been active publicly in this -profession if I had committed a crime. That is not true. I was -dismissed from my profession because the majority of the parties in -the Bavarian Parliament in the fall of 1923, after the Hitler Putsch, -demanded my dismissal. That, Gentlemen, was my crime of -indecent behavior.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: You know that two charges are made against you. -First, you are accused that you were a party to the conspiracy -which had the aim of launching a war, or wars, of aggression -generally, of breaking treaties and by so doing, or even at an earlier -stage, of committing Crimes against Humanity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Secondly, you are accused of Crimes against Humanity as such. -I should like to ask various questions on the first point now. Did -<span class='pageno' title='311' id='Page_311'></span> -you ever have discussions with Adolf Hitler or other leading men -of the State or the Party at which the question of a war of aggression -was discussed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I can answer that with “no” right away, but I -should like to be permitted to make a short statement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1921, as I have already said, I went to Munich; and before the -public on the platform I handed over my movement to the Führer. -I also wrote him a letter in this connection later. No other conference -took place with Adolf Hitler or any other person. I returned -to Nuremberg and went on making speeches. When the Party -program was proclaimed I was not present. That announcement, -too, was made in public; the conspiracy was so public that political -opponents could make attempts at terrorization.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To sum up: At none of the secret meetings was any oath taken -or anything agreed upon which the public could not have known. -The program stood; it had been submitted to the Police; on the -basis of the law governing organizations the Party, like other -parties, was entered in the register of organizations. So that at that -time there was no conspiracy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Witness, one of the most important points of the -Party program was the demand, “Freedom from Versailles.” What -were your ideas as to the possibility of some day getting rid of the -Versailles Treaty?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I think I can state that very shortly. I believe the -Tribunal has known this for some time. Of course you will sometimes -find one traitor in a people—like the one who was sitting here -today; and you will also find unlimited numbers of decent people. -And after the last war these decent people themselves took up the -slogan, “Freedom from Versailles.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If Your Honor pleases, I think I must -object to this sort of procedure. This witness has no right to call -another witness a traitor. He has not been asked any question to -which that is a response, and I ask that the Tribunal admonish him -in no uncertain terms and that he confine himself to answering the -questions here and that we may have an orderly proceeding.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you will observe that injunction.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I ask the Tribunal to excuse me. It was a slip of -the tongue.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The observation that you apparently made -I did not catch myself, but it was made with reference to a witness -who has just given evidence here and you had no right at all to -call him a traitor or to make any comment upon his evidence. -<span class='pageno' title='312' id='Page_312'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, you will please refrain from making -such remarks. Adolf Hitler always spoke on the anniversary days -of the Party about a sworn fellowship. What do you say about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Sworn fellowship—that meant that he, Hitler, was -of the conviction that his old supporters were one with him in -thought, in heart, and in political loyalty—a sworn fellowship -sharing the same views and united in their hearts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Would not that mean that a conspiracy existed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Then he would have said we were a fellowship of -conspirators.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Was there any kind of close relationship between -you and the other defendants which could be termed a conspiracy, -and were you better acquainted or did you have especially close -relations with any one of these defendants?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Inasmuch as they were old members of the Party -we were one community of people with the same convictions. We -met at Gauleiter meetings; or when one of us spoke in the other’s -Gaustadt, we saw one another. But I had the honor of getting to -know the Reich Ministers and the gentlemen from the Army only -here. A political group therefore—an active group—certainly did -not exist.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: In the early days of the Party what solution was -foreseen for the Jewish problem?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Well, in the early days of the Party, the solution -of the Jewish problem was never mentioned just as the question of -solving the problem of the Versailles Treaty was never mentioned. -You must remember the state of chaos that existed at that time in -Germany. An Adolf Hitler who said to his members in 1933, “I shall -start to promote a war,” would have been dubbed a fool. We had -no arms in Germany. Our army of 100,000 men had only a few -big guns left. The possibility of making or of prophesying war was -out of the question, and to speak of a Jewish problem at a time -when, I might say, the public made distinctions with respect to Jews -only on the basis of religion, or to speak of the solution of this -problem, would have been absurd. Before 1933, therefore, the -solution of the Jewish problem was not a topic of discussion. I never -heard Adolf Hitler mention it; and there is no one here of whom -I could say I ever heard him say one word about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: It is assumed that you had particularly close relations -with Adolf Hitler and that you had considerable influence on -his decisions. I should like to ask you to describe your relations -with Adolf Hitler and to clarify them. -<span class='pageno' title='313' id='Page_313'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Anyone who had occasion to make Adolf Hitler’s -acquaintance knows that I am correct in saying that those who -imagined they could pave a way to his personal friendship were -entirely mistaken. Adolf Hitler was a little eccentric in every -respect and I believe I can say that friendship between him and -other men did not exist—a friendship that might have been described -as intimate friendship. It was not easy to approach Adolf -Hitler; and any one who wanted to approach him could do so only -by performing some manly deed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If you ask me now—I know what you mean by that question—I -may say that before 1923 Adolf Hitler did not trust me. Although -I had handed over my movement to him unreservedly, he sent -Göring—who later became Marshal of the Reich—some time later to -Nuremberg. Göring was then a young SA leader—I think he was -an SA leader—and he came to investigate matters and to determine -whether I or those who denounced me were in the right. I do not -mean this as an accusation, but merely as a statement of fact. Soon -after that he sent a second and then a third person—in short, he did -not trust me before 1923.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then came Munich and the Putsch. After midnight, when most -of them had left him, I appeared before him and told him that the -public must be told now when the next great day would come. He -looked at me intently and said, “Will you do it?” I said, “I will do it.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Maybe the Prosecution has the document before it. Then, after -midnight, he wrote on a piece of paper, “Streicher will be responsible -for the entire organization.” That was to be for the following day, -11 November; and on 11 November I publicly conducted the propaganda, -until an hour before the march to the Feldherrnhalle. Then -I returned and everything was in readiness. Our banner—which was -to become a banner of blood—flew in front. I joined the second -group and we marched into the city towards the Feldherrnhalle. -When I saw rifle after rifle ranged before the Feldherrnhalle and -knew that now there would be shooting, I marched up 10 paces in -front of the banner and marched straight up to the rifles. Then -came the massacre, and we were arrested.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have almost finished.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At Landsberg—and this is the important part—Hitler declared -to me and to the men who were in prison with him, that he would -never forget this action of mine. Thus, because I took part in the -march to the Feldherrnhalle and marched at the head of the procession, -Adolf Hitler may have felt himself drawn to me more than -to the others.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That was the friendship born of the deed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Have you finished? -<span class='pageno' title='314' id='Page_314'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Were you consulted by Adolf Hitler on important -matters?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I saw Adolf Hitler only at Gauleiter conferences; -when he came to Nuremberg for meetings we had meals together, -along with five, ten, or more people. I recall having been alone with -him only once in the Brown House at Munich, after the completion -of the Brown House; and our conversation was not a political one. -All the conversations which I had with Adolf Hitler, whether in -Nuremberg, Munich, or elsewhere, took place in the presence of -Party circle members.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Now I come to 1933. On 1 April 1933 a boycott day -was decreed throughout the entire German Reich against the -Jewish population. What can you tell us about that and what part -did you play in it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: A few days before 1 April I was summoned to -the Brown House in Munich. Adolf Hitler explained to me something -that I already knew, namely, that a tremendous propaganda -campaign against the new Germany was being carried on by the -foreign press. Although he himself had only just become Chancellor, -although Hindenburg was still at the head of the Reich, although -Parliament existed, a tremendous campaign of hate against Germany -had begun in the foreign press.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Führer told me that even the Reich flag, the emblem of -sovereignty, was being subjected to insults abroad and that we -would have to tell world Jewry, “Thus far and no farther.” We -would have to show them that we would not tolerate it any longer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then he told me that a boycott day was to be fixed for 1 April -and that I was to organize it. Perhaps it would not be irrelevant -to point out the following facts: Adolf Hitler thought that it might -be a good thing to use my name in connection with this boycott -day; that was not done in the end. So I undertook the organization -of the boycott and issued a directive, which I believe is in the -hands of the Court. There is no need for me to say much about it. -I gave instructions that no attempts should be made on the lives -of Jews, that one or more guards should be posted in front of all -Jewish premises—that is to say, in front of every Jewish store—and -that these guards should be responsible for seeing that no -damage was done to property. In short, I organized the proceedings -in a way which was perhaps not expected of me; and perhaps not -expected by many members of the Party. I frankly admit that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>One thing is certain; except for minor incidents the boycott day -passed off perfectly. I believe that there is not even one Jew who -can contradict this. The boycott day was a disciplined proceeding -<span class='pageno' title='315' id='Page_315'></span> -and was not “anti” in the sense of an attack on something. It has -a purely defensive connotation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Was a committee formed at the time consisting -of prominent, that is, leading members of the Party and did that -committee ever appear?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: As to the committee, it was like the Secret Cabinet -Council in Berlin, which never met. In fact, I believe that all the -members of the Cabinet did not even see each other or get to know -each other.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: The committee members?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: The boycott committee, that was put in the newspapers -in Berlin by Goebbels. That was a newspaper story. I spoke -to Goebbels on the telephone once. He asked how things were -going in Munich, where I was. I said that everything was going -perfectly. Thus no conference ever took place; it was only done -for effect, to make it appear a much bigger thing than it was.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Witness, you made a mistake a few minutes ago, -speaking of the Munich affair in 1923. You meant 9 November—or -did you not—9 November 1923, and what did you say?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I do not remember.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: It should be 9 November 1923?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: 9 November 1923.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes. The so-called “Racial Law” was promulgated -at the Reich Party Day in Nuremberg in 1935. Were you consulted -about the planning and preparation of the draft of that law; and -did you have any part in it, especially in its preparation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes, I believe I had a part in it insofar as for -years I have written that any further mixture of German blood -with Jewish blood must be avoided. I have written such articles -again and again; and in my articles I have repeatedly emphasized -the fact that the Jews should serve as an example to every race, for -they created a racial law for themselves—the law of Moses, which -says, “If you come into a foreign land you shall not take unto yourself -foreign women.” And that, Gentlemen, is of tremendous importance -in judging the Nuremberg Laws. These laws of the Jews -were taken as a model for these laws. When, after centuries, the -Jewish lawgiver Ezra discovered that notwithstanding many Jews -had married non-Jewish women, these marriages were dissolved. -That was the beginning of Jewry which, because it introduced these -racial laws, has survived throughout the centuries, while all other -races and civilizations have perished.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, this is rather too much of a digression. -I asked you whether you took part in planning and working -<span class='pageno' title='316' id='Page_316'></span> -out the draft of the law, or whether you yourself were not taken -by surprise when these laws were promulgated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I was quite honest in saying that I believe I have -contributed indirectly to the making of these laws.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: But you were not consulted on the law itself?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: No. I will make a statement, as follows:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At the Reich Party Day in Nuremberg in 1935, we were summoned -to the hall without knowing what was going to happen—at -least I myself had no knowledge of it—and the racial laws were -proclaimed. It was only then that I heard of these laws; and I -think that with the exception of Herr Hess, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, this is true -of most of the gentlemen in the dock who attended that Reich -Party Day. The first we heard of these decrees was at the Reich -Party Day. I did not collaborate directly. I may say frankly that -I regarded it as a slight when I was not consulted in the making -of these laws.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: It was thought that your assistance was not necessary?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Were you of the opinion that the 1935 legislation -represented the final solution of the Jewish question by the State?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: With reservations, yes. I was convinced that if -the Party program was carried out, the Jewish question would be -solved. The Jews became German citizens in 1848. Their rights as -citizens were taken from them by these laws. Sexual intercourse -was prohibited. For me, this represented the solution of the Jewish -problem in Germany. But I believed that another international -solution would still be found, and that some day discussions would -take place between the various states with regard to the demands -made by Zionism. These demands aimed at a Jewish state.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: What can you tell us about the demonstrations -against the Jewish population during the night of 9 to 10 November -1938, and what part did you play in it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, if you are going into that, it is -now 5 o’clock; and I think we had better adjourn now until Monday -morning.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 29 April 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='317' id='Page_317'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH DAY</span><br/> Monday, 29 April 1946</h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: Before -continuing with questions to the Defendant Streicher, may I ask -permission to make a statement?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On Friday afternoon, Herr Streicher referred to a case, namely, -that press event which concerned me and my professional attitude. -I thereupon took the opportunity to refer to this case in my statement -as well, and I pointed out that at that time I had had to ask -for the protection of the Tribunal against this damaging attack on -my work and that this protection was given me very graciously. -On that occasion and in that extemporary explanation I used the -expression “newspaper writer.” I used it exclusively with reference -to the particular journalist who had written the article in question -in that Berlin newspaper regarding my person and my activity -as a lawyer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>By no means did I express, or mean to express, a reference to -the press in general. It was far from my intention in any way to -attack the press, the group of press experts, and particularly not -the members of the world press who are active here; nor did I wish -to injure their professional honor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The reason for this statement of mine is a statement made on -the radio, according to which I, the attorney Marx, had attacked -and disparaged the press in general. I am, of course, aware of the -significance of the press. I know precisely what the press has to -contribute and I should be the last person to fail to recognize fully -the extremely difficult work and the responsible task of the press. -May I, therefore, quite publicly before this Tribunal ask that this -statement be accepted; and may I ask the gentlemen of the press -to receive my statement in the spirit in which it is made, namely, -that this was merely a special comment on that particular gentleman -and not in any way on the entire press. That is what I -wanted to say.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, the Tribunal understood your -statement the other day in the sense in which you have now explained -it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes. With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall -then continue with my examination. -<span class='pageno' title='318' id='Page_318'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, what aims did you pursue with your speeches and -your articles in <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: The speeches and articles which I wrote were -meant to inform the public on a question which appeared to me -one of the most important questions. I did not intend to agitate -or inflame but to enlighten.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Apart from your weekly journal, and particularly -after the Party came into power, were there any other publications -in Germany which treated the Jewish question in an anti-Semitic -way?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Anti-Semitic publications have existed in Germany -for centuries. A book I had, written by Dr. Martin Luther, -was, for instance, confiscated. Dr. Martin Luther would very -probably sit in my place in the defendants’ dock today, if this book -had been taken into consideration by the Prosecution. In the book -<span class='it'>The Jews and Their Lies</span>, Dr. Martin Luther writes that the Jews -are a serpent’s brood and one should burn down their synagogues -and destroy them...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, that is not my question, I am -asking you to answer my question in accordance with the way I -put it. Please answer now with “yes” or “no,” whether there -were...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to interpose an objection -to this method of answering unresponsively and with speeches here. -We are utterly unable in this procedure to make objections when -answers are not responsive to questions. We have already got into -this case, through Streicher’s volunteered speeches, an attack on the -United States which will take considerable evidence to answer if -we are to answer it. It seems to me very improper that a witness -should do anything but make a responsive answer to a question, -so that we may keep these proceedings from getting into issues -that have nothing to do with them. It will not help this Tribunal, -in deciding Streicher’s guilt or innocence, to go into questions which -he has raised here against us—matters that are perfectly capable -of explanation, if we take time to do it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It seems to me that this witness should be admonished, and -admonished so that he will understand it, if that is possible, that -he is to answer questions and stop, so that we can know and -object in time to orations on irrelevant subjects.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, will you try, when you put the -questions to the witness, to stop him if he is not answering the -questions you put to him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes, Mr. President. I was just in the process... -<span class='pageno' title='319' id='Page_319'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Defendant Streicher, you understand, you -have heard what has been said and you will understand that the -Tribunal cannot put up with your long speeches which are not -answers to questions which we put to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I will now repeat the question and I want you to -answer the question first with “yes” or “no” and then to add a -brief explanation regarding the question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Apart from your weekly journal, and particularly after the -Party came into power, were there other publications in Germany -which dealt with the Jewish question in an anti-Semitic way?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes, even before the coming to power there were -in every Gau weekly journals that were anti-Semitic and one -daily paper called the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> in Munich. Apart -from that, there were a number of periodicals which were not -working directly for the Party. There was also anti-Semitic literature. -After the seizure of power, the daily press was co-ordinated, -and now the Party found itself in control of some 3,000 daily -papers, numerous weekly journals, and all type of periodicals; and -orders were given by the Führer that every newspaper should -provide enlightening articles on the Jewish question. The anti-Semitic -enlightenment was, therefore, after the seizure of power, -carried out on a very large scale in the daily press as well as in -the weekly journals, periodicals, and books. Consequently, <span class='it'>Der -Stürmer</span> did not stand alone in its enlightening activity. But I -want to state quite openly that I make the claim of having treated -the question in the most popular way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Were the directives necessary for this issued by a -central office, say, for instance, by the National Socialist press -service?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes. The Propaganda Ministry in Berlin had a -National Socialist press service. In this service, in every issue, there -were a number of enlightening articles on the Jewish question. -During the war the Führer personally gave the order that the -press, far more than previously, should publish enlightening articles -on the Jewish question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: The Prosecution accuse you of having contributed -indirectly to mass murders by incitation, and according to the -minutes of 10 January 1946, the following charge has been made -against you: No government in the world could have undertaken -a policy of mass extermination, as it was done here, without having -behind it a nation which agreed to it; and you are supposed to -have brought that about. What have you to say to this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: To that I have the following to say: Incitation -means to bring a person into condition of excitement which causes -<span class='pageno' title='320' id='Page_320'></span> -him to perform an irresponsible act. Did the contents of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> -incite, this is the question? Briefly stated, the question must be -answered, “What did <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> write?” Several volumes of -<span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> are available here, but one would have to look at -all the issues of 20 years in order to answer that question exhaustively. -During those 20 years I published enlightening articles -dealing with the race, dealing with what the Jews themselves -write in the Old Testament, in their history, what they write in -the Talmud. I printed excerpts from Jewish historical works, -works for instance, written by a Professor Dr. Graetz and by a -Jewish scholar, Gutnot.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> no editorial appeared written by me or written -by anyone of my main co-workers in which I did not include quotations -from the ancient history of the Jews, from the Old Testament -or from Jewish historical works of recent times.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is important, and I must emphasize that I pointed out in all -articles, that prominent Jews, leading authors themselves, admitted -that which during 20 years as author and public speaker I publicly -proclaimed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Allow me to add that it is my conviction that the contents of -<span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> as such were not incitation. During the whole 20 years -I never wrote in this connection, “Burn Jewish houses down; beat -them to death.” Never once did such an incitement appear in -<span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now comes the question: Is there any proof to be furnished that -any deed was done from the time <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> first appeared, a -deed of which one can say that it was the result of an incitement? -As a deed due to an incitement I might mention a pogrom. That -is a spontaneous deed when sections of the people suddenly rise up -and kill other people. During the 20 years no pogrom took place -in Germany, during the 20 years, as far as I know, no Jew was -killed. No murder took place, of which one could have said, “This -is the result of an incitement which was caused by anti-Semitic -authors or public speakers.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Gentlemen, we are in Nuremberg. In the past there was a -saying that nowhere were the Jews in Germany so safe and so -unmolested as in Nuremberg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, is not this becoming a rather -lengthy speech?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Streicher, you have explained this now sufficiently, -so that one can form an opinion—you mean, “I have not incited -in such a way that any spontaneous action carried out against the -Jews by any group of people or by the masses resulted”? -<span class='pageno' title='321' id='Page_321'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: May I make a remark in this connection? Here -we are concerned with the most serious, the most decisive accusation -raised against me by the Prosecution, and here I ask the -Tribunal to permit me to defend myself against it objectively. Is -it not of tremendous significance if I can establish that in Nuremberg, -of all places, no murder took place, no single murder and no -pogrom either? That is a fact.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You have already said it. I have just -written down, before I intervened, saying that no Jews have been -killed not only in Nuremberg but anywhere else as a result of your -incitement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Witness, we shall make reference to these demonstrations -of 9 and 10 November 1938 later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes, but may I continue? The Indictment accuses -me of having indirectly contributed by incitation to mass -murders, and I ask to be allowed to make a statement on this: -Something has been ascertained today about which I myself did -not know. I learned of the will left behind by the Führer, and I -assume that a few moments before his death the Führer told the -world the truth in that will. In it he says that mass killings were -carried out by his order; that the mass killings were a reprisal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus it is demonstrated that I, myself, cannot have been a -participant in the incredible events which occurred here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Finished?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes. You said that the Indictment accuses me in -saying that these mass killings could never have taken place if -behind the Government and behind the leaders of the State there -had not been an informed people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Gentlemen, first of all, the question, “Did the German people -really know what was happening during the years of the war?” We -know today...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, that is a matter of argument and -not a matter upon which you can give evidence. You can say what -you knew.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I was a part of that nation during the war. During -the war I lived alone in the country. For 5 years I never left my -farm. I was watched by the Gestapo. From 1939 on I have been -forbidden by the Führer to speak.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, we will certainly come to that later. -I have interrogated you now on this question, and I will proceed -with my questions. The other will come later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: But I wish to state that I had no opportunity—that -is why I said this—to learn what was actually going on. -<span class='pageno' title='322' id='Page_322'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I first heard of the mass murders and mass killings at Mondorf -when I was in prison. But I am stating here that if I had been -told that 2 or 3 million people had been killed, then I would not -have believed it. I would not have believed that it was technically -possible to kill so many people; and on the basis of the entire -attitude and psychology of the Führer, as I knew it, I would not -have believed that mass killings, to the extent to which they have -taken place, could have taken place. Finished.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: The Prosecution also raise the charge against you -that it was the task of the educators of the nation to educate the -people to murder and to poison them with hatred, that you had -devoted yourself particularly to these tasks. What do you want to -answer to this charge?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: That is an allegation. We educated no murderers. -The contents of the articles which I wrote could not have educated -murderers. No murders took place, and that is proof that we did -not educate murderers. What happened during the war—well, I -certainly did not educate the Führer. The Führer issued the order -on his own initiative.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I now continue. The Prosecution further assert -that the Himmler-Kaltenbrunner groups and other SS leaders -would have had no one to carry out their orders to kill, if you had -not made that propaganda and if you had not conducted the education -of the German people along these lines. Will you make a -statement on that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I do not believe that the National Socialists mentioned -read <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> every week. I do not believe that those -who received the order from the Führer to carry out killings or -to pass on the order to kill, were led to do this by my periodical. -Hitler’s book, <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>, existed, and the content of that book -was the authority, the spiritual authority; nor do I believe that the -persons mentioned read that book and carried out the order on the -strength of it. Based on my knowledge of what went on in the -Movement, I am convinced that if the Führer gave an order everyone -acted upon it; and I state here quite openly that maybe fate -has been kind to me. If the Führer had ordered me to do such -things, I would not have been able to kill; but perhaps today I -would face some indictment which it has not been possible to lodge -against me. Perhaps because fate has taken a hand in this. But -the conditions were thus, that the Führer had such a power of -hypnotic suggestion that the entire people believed in him; his way -was so unusual that, if one knows this fact, one can understand -why everyone who received an order acted. And thus I want to -reject as untrue and incorrect what was here thought fit to assert -against me. -<span class='pageno' title='323' id='Page_323'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: What do you know about the general attitude of -Adolf Hitler to the Jewish question? And when did Hitler first -become hostile to the Jews, according to your knowledge?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Even before Adolf Hitler became publicly known -at all I had occupied myself journalistically with anti-Semitic -articles. However, on the strength of his book, <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>, I first -learned about the historic connections of the Jewish problem. -Adolf Hitler wrote his book in the prison in Landsberg. Anyone -who knows this book will know that Hitler many years back, either -by study of anti-Semitic literature or through other experiences, -must have developed this knowledge in himself in order then to be -able to write that book in prison in so short a time. In other words, -in his book Adolf Hitler stated to the world public that he was -anti-Semitic and that he knew the Jewish problem through and -through. He himself often said to me personally...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, the book <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span> is in -evidence, and it speaks for itself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I will now answer your question, not with reference -to the book. You asked me whether Adolf Hitler had discussed -the Jewish problem with me. The answer is “yes.” Adolf -Hitler always discussed the Jewish problem in connection with -Bolshevism. It is perhaps of importance in answering that question -to ask whether Adolf Hitler wanted a war with Russia. Did he -know long in advance that a war would come, or not? When he -was with us Adolf Hitler spoke of Stalin as a man whom he honored -as a man of action, but that he was actually surrounded by Jewish -leaders, and that Bolshevism...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, that is going too far again. The -question which I put was quite exact, and I am asking you not to -go so far afield. You have heard the Tribunal object to it, and in -the interest of not delaying the proceedings you must not go into -so many details. You must not make speeches.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I believe that some time ago -Mr. Justice Jackson remarked, quite justly, quite reasonably, that -the Defendant Streicher became so intoxicated by his own speeches -that he did not answer the questions put to him or the charges -made against him. I therefore invite the attention of the Tribunal -to this fact and suggest that the defendant abstain from making -lengthy speeches and merely give brief replies to the charges -brought against him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you go on, Dr. Marx, and try to keep -the witness to an answer to the questions which you have no doubt -prepared.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Very well, Mr. President. -<span class='pageno' title='324' id='Page_324'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: May I, please, as a defendant, say a few words, -here? The question was...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: [<span class='it'>Interposing.</span>] No, you may not. You will -answer the questions, please.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Next question. Is there reason for the assumption -that Hitler, when he decided to have the Jews in Europe killed in -masses, was subject to any influence, or what is to be considered -the motive for that dreadful decision?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: The Führer could not be influenced. As I know -the Führer, if somebody had gone to him and said that Jews -should be killed, then he would have turned him down. And if, -during the war, somebody had gone to him and said, “I have -learned that you are giving the order that mass killings are to be -carried out,” then he would have turned that man down too. I -therefore answer your question by saying that the Führer could -not be influenced.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: In other words, you want to say that the decision -in this matter was made entirely on his own initiative.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I have already said that that becomes clear from -his will.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: In August 1938 the main synagogue in Nuremberg -was demolished. Was this done on your orders?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes. In my Gau there were approximately 15 synagogues, -in Nuremberg one main synagogue, a somewhat smaller one, -and I think several other prayer rooms. The main synagogue stood -in the outskirts of the medieval Reichsstadt. Even before 1933, -during the so-called period of struggle, when we still had the other -government, I stated publicly during a meeting that it was a -disgrace that there should be placed in the Old City such an oriental -monstrosity of a building. After the seizure of power I told the -Lord Mayor that he should have the synagogue torn down, and at -the same time the planetarium. I might point out that after the -World War, in the middle of the park grounds laid out for the -recreation of the citizens, a planetarium had been built, an ugly -brick building. I gave the order to tear down that building and -said that the main synagogue, too, should be razed. If it had been -my intention to deprive the Jews of their synagogue as a church -or if I had wanted to give a general signal, then I would have -given the order, after the seizure of power, that every synagogue in -my Gau should be torn down. Then I would likewise have had all -the synagogues in Nuremberg torn down. But it is a fact that in -the spring of 1938 only the main synagogue was torn down; the -synagogue in the Essenweinstrasse, in the new city, remained untouched. -That the order was then given in November of that year -to set fire to the synagogues, that is no fault of mine. -<span class='pageno' title='325' id='Page_325'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: In other words, you want to say that you did not -order the tearing down of this building for anti-Semitic reasons -but because it did not conform to the architectural style of -the city?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: For reasons of city architecture. I wanted to submit -a picture to the Tribunal on this, but I have not received any.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes, we have a picture.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: But you cannot see the synagogue in it. I do not -know whether the Tribunal want to see the picture. The picture -actually shows only the old houses, but the front of the synagogue -facing the Hans-Sachs-Platz is not visible. I do not know whether -I may submit the picture to the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, the photograph can be put in. -Let us see the photograph.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: In that case, I will submit it to the Tribunal as -evidence and I am asking you to accept it accordingly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What will it be, exhibit what?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I cannot say at the moment, Mr. President. I shall -take the liberty of stating the number later and for the moment -I confine myself to submitting it. I could not present it any earlier -because I had not come into possession of this picture. It was -only in the last days...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: In your measure in connection with the main -synagogue did you rely on any statements of art experts?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I had frequent opportunities to discuss the subject -with architects. Every architect said that there must have been a -city council which had no feeling whatsoever for city architecture, -that it was impossible to explain it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These statements were not in any way directed against the -synagogue as a Jewish church, but rather against such a building -in this part of the city. Strangers, too, whom I guided—for on -Party rally days I used to accompany British and American people -across the Hans-Sachs-Platz—and I remember only one case where -when I said “Do you not notice anything?” that the person did -not. But all other strangers said “How could that building get -there in the midst of these medieval buildings?” I could also have -submitted a book, written in 1877, which is in the prison library, -where a Professor Berneis, who was famous, wrote at that time -to the author, Uhde, in Switzerland, that he had now seen the -Sachs Platz... -<span class='pageno' title='326' id='Page_326'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, that is enough now. In other words, -you have indicated that you believed you could rely on the judgment -of architects who seemed to you to be authorities?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: At the time when the synagogue was demolished, -did you make a speech?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes, but I want to point out that the Prosecution -have submitted an article, a report from the <span class='it'>Tageszeitung</span>, that -was written by a simple young man. I want to state that this article -does not contain a true representation of the statements which -I made.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I now come to the demonstrations on the night of -9 to 10 November 1938. What can you say concerning those demonstrations -and what role did you play in that connection? Were -those demonstrations initiated by the population?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Every year the Gauleiter and SA and SS leaders -met the Führer in Munich on the occasion of the historic day of -9 November. We sat down to dinner in the old Town Hall, and it -was customary for the Führer to make a short speech after the -dinner. On 9 November 1938, I did not feel very well. I participated -in the dinner and then I left; I drove back to Nuremberg -and went to bed. Toward midnight I was awakened. My chauffeur -told me that the SA leader Von Obernitz wanted to talk to the -Gauleiter. I received him and he said the following: “Gauleiter, -you had left already when the Minister of Propaganda, Dr. Goebbels, -took the floor and said”—I can now repeat it only approximately—“said, -‘Legation Counsellor Vom Rath has been murdered -in Paris. That is now the second murder abroad of a prominent -National Socialist. This murder is not the murder by the Jew, -Grünspan; this is rather the execution of a deed which has been -desired by all Jewry. Something should now be done.’ ” I do not -know now whether Goebbels said the Führer had ordered it; I -remember only that Von Obernitz told me that Goebbels had stated -the synagogues were to be set on fire; and I cannot now remember -exactly, but I think he told me that the windows of Jewish business -houses were to be smashed and that houses were to be demolished.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then I said to Obernitz—for I was surprised—“Obernitz, I think -it is wrong that synagogues be set on fire, and at this moment I -think it is wrong that Jewish business houses be demolished; I -think these demonstrations are wrong. If people are let loose during -the night, deeds can be perpetrated for which one cannot be responsible.” -I said to Obernitz that I considered the setting on fire -of synagogues particularly wrong because abroad and even among -the German people the opinion might arise that National Socialism -<span class='pageno' title='327' id='Page_327'></span> -had now started the fight against religion. Obernitz replied, “I -have the order.” I said, “Obernitz, I will not assume any responsibility -here.” Obernitz left and the action took place. What I -have said under oath here I have previously stated in several interrogations; -and my chauffeur will confirm it, for he was witness to -this night’s conversation, and shortly afterwards when he went to -bed told his wife what he had heard up there in my bedroom.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Have you finished?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes, but you asked another question...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes, whether it was a spontaneous act of force -initiated by the masses of the people?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes. In the National Socialist press there appeared -after this action an article to the same effect, which stated that -a spontaneous demonstration of the people had revenged the murder -of Herr Vom Rath. It had therefore been deliberately ordered -from Berlin that there should be a public statement to the effect -that the demonstration of 1938 was spontaneous. That this was -not the case I was also able to learn in Nuremberg; and it is remarkable -that the indignation at what had happened during those -demonstrations expressed itself even here in Nuremberg, even -among the Party members.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution have submitted an article which is a report on -a speech which I made on 10 November; and that is a remarkable -piece of evidence of the fact that the people were against this -action. I was forced, because of the atmosphere which prevailed in -Nuremberg, to make a public speech and say that one should not -have so much sympathy for the Jews. Such was the affair of -November 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Perhaps it might also be important for you to ask me how I, -of all people, happened to oppose the idea of these demonstrations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I thought you had explained that already. Very -well. Who gave the order then for the burning down of the synagogue -still standing on Essenweinstrasse?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I do not know who gave the order; I believe it was -SA leader Von Obernitz. I do not know the details.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: A further question: Did you yourself express -publicly your disapproval of these brutalities?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes. In a small circle of leading Party members -I said what I have always said, what I have always said publicly: -I stated that this was wrong. I talked to lawyers during a meeting—I -do not know whether my defense counsel himself was there—I -believe it was as early as November 1938 that I stated, to the -Nuremberg lawyers at a meeting, that what had happened here -<span class='pageno' title='328' id='Page_328'></span> -during that action, was wrong; that it was wrong as regards the -people and as regards foreign countries. I said then that anyone -who knew the Jewish question as I knew it would understand why I -considered that demonstration a mistake. I do not know whether this -was reported to the Führer at that time, but after November 1938 -I was never again called to the Hotel Deutscher Hof when the -Führer came to Nuremberg. Whether this was the reason I do not -know, but at any rate I did criticize these demonstrations publicly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: It is assumed by the Prosecution that in 1938 a more -severe treatment of the Jews was introduced. Is that true, and what -is the explanation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes. In 1938 the Jewish question entered a new -phase; that is shown, indeed, by the demonstration. I myself can -only say in this connection that there was no preliminary conference -on this subject. I assume that the Führer, impulsive as he was and -acting on the spur of the moment, got around probably only on -9 November to saying to Dr. Goebbels, “Tell the organizations that -the synagogues must be burned down.” As I said, I myself did not -attend such a meeting; and I do not know what happened to bring -about this acceleration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: On 12 November 1938 the decree was published -according to which the Jews were to be eliminated from the economic -life of the country. Was there a connection between the orders -for the demonstrations of 9 November and that further decree of -12 November 1938, and would that decree be due to the same -reason?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Well, here I can say only that I am convinced that -there was a connection. The order, rather the decrees, which were -to have such an extensive effect in the economic field, came from -Berlin. We did not have any conference. I do not remember any -Gauleiter meetings in which that was discussed. I do not know of -any. That happened just as everything happened; we were not -previously informed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: How was it that not you, but the Codefendant -Rosenberg, was given the task of attending to this matter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Rosenberg was the spiritual trustee of the Movement, -but he was not given this particular task nor the task of the -demonstration nor that of economic matters.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: No, we are talking of different points. Rosenberg -was the one given the task by the Leaders of the State of taking -care, as it was called, of racial-political and other enlightenment -tasks; and you were not. How can that be explained? How can -it be explained that you were not chosen? -<span class='pageno' title='329' id='Page_329'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Rosenberg, as he himself said, had met the Führer -very early and was anyway, because of his knowledge, intellectually -suited to take over this task. I devoted myself more to popular -enlightenment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, he has told us that he wasn’t given -the task. Unless he had some communication with Rosenberg he -can’t tell us anything more about it except that he wasn’t given -the task. All the rest is mere comment and argument.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] I now put the next question to you: -Was an order issued during the year 1939 forbidding you to make -speeches?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes. In the autumn of 1939 my enemies went so -far that the Führer, without my being asked beforehand, issued a -written order through Party Member Hess forbidding me to make -speeches. The threat of immediate arrest was made should I act -against this order.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Is it also correct that in 1938 an effort was evidently -made to stop further publication of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, I mean in government -circles?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Such intentions existed quite often, and also at -that time. Perhaps I might refer to two other documents in this -connection in order to save time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution have submitted copies of a letter from Himmler -and Baldur von Schirach. Here I can give quite a simple explanation -right now. At that time, in 1939, there were intentions of prohibiting -<span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>. Bormann had even issued some such order. -Then the Chief Editor of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> wrote to prominent members -of the Party, asking them to state their opinion about <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>. -And thereupon letters were also received from Himmler and Von -Schirach. Altogether, I think about 15 letters were received from -prominent members of the Movement; they were merely kind -replies to an inquiry.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: That is sufficient. Is it true that at the outbreak of -the war you were not made Armed Forces District Commissioner -(Wehrkreis-Kommissar) in your own Gau?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: How can that be explained?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Well, maybe that is not so important; that is how -conditions were at the time. There were certain personal feelings, -<span class='it'>et cetera</span>; it is of no significance. At any rate, I did not become -Armed Forces District Commissioner. -<span class='pageno' title='330' id='Page_330'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: The Prosecution have stated that after 1 September -1939 the persecution of the Jews increased more and more. What -was that due to?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: That question only the Führer could answer; I -cannot.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: But do you not think this had something to do with -the outbreak of war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: The Führer always said so in public, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: A proceeding was instituted against you before the -Supreme Party Court. How did that happen? What was the development -and the result of that trial?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I am grateful that I have an opportunity to state -quite briefly before the International Military Tribunal something -which I have had to keep silent about up to now because of a -Führer order. I myself had instituted proceedings against myself -before the Supreme Party Court in order to defend myself against -people who were denouncing me. I was being accused...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is the defendant talking about some order -which Hitler gave that he was not to be allowed to speak or is he -talking about something else?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You remember, Dr. Marx, that certain allegations were struck -out of the record. If he is talking about those, it seems to me that -we have got nothing whatever to do with it. Am I right in recollecting -that something was struck out of the record?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes it was, Mr. President, but only certain things -from the Göring report were struck out, only the one passage which -concerned the affair with the three young persons; but everything -else was retained by the Prosecution. The Defense, therefore, must -be able to take a stand in regard to these points, if the Prosecution -do not say that they are dropping the entire Göring report; and in -that connection this proceeding before the Supreme Party Court -also plays a part. He can make a brief statement about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Witness, be brief.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes. It is important then that I instituted proceedings -against myself; about 10 points were involved which had -been raised against me, among them a matter referring to some -shares. An affidavit exists from the Göring report which states that -I had been found guilty. May I state here that the trial was never -completed and no sentence was passed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is the answer to the question which you have put to me. -<span class='pageno' title='331' id='Page_331'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: The matter referring to shares, does that have -something to do with the shares of the Mars works?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: We will come to it later. It was not the main -point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: And then you were ordered to remain permanently -at the Pleikershof? Were you under the guard of the Gestapo -there, and was there also a check-up as far as visitors were concerned?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: It is not correct that I was ordered to stay at the -Pleikershof. What is true is that I retired voluntarily with the -intention of never again being active in the Movement. It is correct -that the Gestapo watched me, and every visitor was called to the -police station and interrogated as to his conversations he had had. -That is a fact.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: During your stay at the Pleikershof did you have -any connections or correspondence with any leading personalities -of the Party or State?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: No. As far as prominent persons of the Movement -and of the State are concerned, I had no correspondence whatsoever -with them; that is why the Prosecution could hardly find any -letters. I never stated in letters my opinion on the Jewish problem -or on other matters. I shall have to state then, in order to answer -your question exactly, that I had no correspondence with prominent -persons of the Party and the State.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: After the outbreak of the war, were you informed -of or consulted in any way on any measures intended against the -Jews?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: What were your relations to Himmler? Did you -know him at all closely? Did you ever speak to him about measures -against the Jews or did he talk about intended mass executions of -the Jews?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I knew Himmler just as I knew the SA leaders, -or other SS leaders. I knew him from common meetings, Gauleiter -conferences, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. I did not have a single political discussion -with Himmler, except in society when he may have touched on this -or that, in the presence of others. The last time I saw Himmler -was in Nuremberg when he spoke to the officers in their mess. -When that was I cannot say exactly but I think it was shortly before -the war. I never had a talk with him on the Jewish question. He -himself was, of course, well informed on this question. He had an -organ of his own called the <span class='it'>Schwarze Korps</span>. And what his inner -attitude toward me was is something that I did not discover until -<span class='pageno' title='332' id='Page_332'></span> -my stay on the farm. There were denunciations against me which -reached him. It was stated that I was being too humane with the -French prisoners. Shortly after that I received a letter in which -he reproached me and made serious representations against me. I -gave no answer at all. Without having made any previous inquiries -with me as to whether these denunciations were true, he -made a serious charge against me; and I state quite openly that it -was actually my feeling at the time that I might possibly lose my -liberty through arrest. These were my relations with Himmler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: That is enough.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>During this Trial you have heard mentioned the names of a -great number of Higher SS and Police Leaders who played a -leading part in the Jewish persecutions, as for instance, Heydrich, -Eichmann, Ohlendorf, and so on. Were there any connections between -you and one of these Higher SS and Police Leaders?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I heard the names you have mentioned for the -first time during an interrogation here. I did not know these men; -they may well have seen me, but there was never a discussion -involving me and the senior SS or SA leaders. Furthermore, I -never was in any of Himmler’s offices in Berlin, or any Ministry -in Berlin. Thus, no conference ever took place.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: The Prosecution have drawn the conclusion from -numerous articles in <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, that as early as 1942 and 1943 -you must have had knowledge of the mass executions of Jews -which had taken place.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>What statement can you make on this, and when, and in what -way, did you hear of the mass executions of Jews which took place -in the East?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I had subscribed to the Jewish weekly that appeared -in Switzerland. Sometimes in that weekly there were intimations -that something was not quite in order; and I think it was at the -end of 1943 or 1944—I believe 1944—that an article appeared in -the Jewish weekly, in which it said that in the East—I think it was -said in Poland—Jews were disappearing in masses. I then made -reference to this in an article which perhaps will be presented to -me later. But I state quite frankly that the Jewish weekly in -Switzerland did not represent for me an authoritative source, that -I did not believe everything in it. This article did not quote figures; -it did not talk about mass executions, but only about disappearances.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Have you finished?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did you make proposals in <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> for the -solution of the Jewish question, during the war? -<span class='pageno' title='333' id='Page_333'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: And in what sense?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: As I said yesterday, I represented the point of -view that the Jewish question could be solved only internationally, -since there were Jews in all countries. For that reason we published -articles in my weekly journal referring to the Zionist demand -for the creation of a Jewish state, such as had also been provided -for or indicated in the Balfour Declaration. There were therefore -two possibilities for a solution, a preliminary solution within the -countries through appropriate laws; and then the creation of a -Jewish state.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>During the war, I think it was in 1941 or 1942, we had written -another article—we were subject to the Berlin censorship—and the -censorship office sent back the proof submitted with the remark -that the article must not be published in which we had proposed -Madagascar as the place for the establishment of a Jewish state. -The political relations with France were given as the reason why -that article should not be published.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: If you had expected that question to be solved by -mass executions, would you then too have written this article?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: At that time, at any rate, it would still have been -nonsensical to publish it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did it not make you uneasy to deal with the Jewish -question in a biased way, in a way which left completely out of -sight those qualities of the Jews which can be described as great?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I did not understand this question fully, perhaps -I did not hear it correctly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: You can be accused of treating, in a biased way, -only those qualities of the Jews that appear disadvantageous to -you, whereas the other qualities of the Jewish people you ignored. -What is your explanation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I think that this question is really superfluous here. -It is perfectly natural that I, as an anti-Semitic person and as I -saw the Jewish question, was in no way interested in that. Perhaps -I did not see the good traits which you or some others see -in the Jews. That is possible. But at any rate I was not interested -in investigating as to what particular good qualities might be recognized -here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Thank you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This would seem a good time to break off.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='334' id='Page_334'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did you visit concentration camps?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes. I visited the Dachau Concentration Camp.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: When was that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I believe the first time was when all the Gauleiter -were called together. I believe 1935, I do not know definitely, 1934 -or 1935, I do not know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: At what intervals did you then visit this camp? -It is said that you were in Dachau every 4 weeks.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Altogether I was at Dachau four times.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: It is asserted that after each of your visits in -Dachau, Jews disappeared there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I do not know whether Jews disappeared.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: What caused you to visit the Dachau Camp repeatedly?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I went to the Dachau Camp to visit Social Democratic -and Communist functionaries from my Gau who were in -prison there to have them introduced to me. I picked out—I do not -know how many hundreds of them there were—but every time I -was in Dachau I picked out 10 or 20 of those of whom it had been -ascertained by the Police that they had no criminal record; I had -them picked out from among the inmates, and at Christmas every -year I had them brought in buses to Nuremberg to the Hotel -Deutscher Hof, where I brought them together with their wives -and children and had dinner with them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to ask the Tribunal, for the benefit of the Nuremberg -public, to permit me to make a very short statement as to -why I took these Communists out. Party proceedings were initiated -against me because I did this. There were rumors which were not -true. May I make a very short statement as to why I did it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I should like to ask the Tribunal to approve this, -Mr. President, so that the reasons why the defendant did this may -be ascertained.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, as long as it is brief.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Be brief.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: When I walked through the streets of Nuremberg -children approached me and said, “My father is in Dachau.” Women -came to me and asked to get their husbands back. I knew many -of these officials from the time when I spoke at revolutionary -meetings, and I could vouch for these people. I know of only one -case where I was wrong in the selection of those people. All the -others behaved impeccably. They kept the word which they had -given me. Thus, perhaps my Party comrades, who sit here in the -<span class='pageno' title='335' id='Page_335'></span> -dock, see now that I did not want to harm my country but that -I wanted to do, and did do, something humanely good.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Now I come to the picture books which appeared -in <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> publishing house. You know that two picture -books were published, one with the title, <span class='it'>Trust No Fox in the Field</span>, -and the other one with the title, <span class='it'>The Poisonous Toadstool</span>. Do -you assume responsibility for these picture books?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes. May I say, by way of summary, that I -assume responsibility for everything which was written by my -assistants or which came into my publishing house.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Who was the author of these picture books?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: The book <span class='it'>Trust No Fox in the Field</span> and <span class='it'>No Jew -Under His Oath</span> was done and illustrated by a young woman artist, -and she also wrote the text. The title which appears on the picture -book is from Dr. Martin Luther.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The second picture book was done by the Editor-in-Chief of -<span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, who was a former schoolteacher. Two criminal cases -in Nuremberg, which were tried here in this courtroom, as far as I -know, were the occasion for my publishing these two books. There -was a manufacturer, Louis Schloss, a Jew, who with young Nuremberg -girls some of them still innocent, had...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, we do not want to hear that now. -My question was only as to who was the author of these picture -books and whether you assumed the responsibility for them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: It is important for the Tribunal, in fact, right for -them to know how it came about that all of a sudden two picture -books for young people appeared in my publishing house. I am -making this statement absolutely objectively. I am speaking here -of legal cases. There are gentlemen here, who are witnesses, who -were here in this court and were present during the proceedings. -Only thus can one understand why these books were published. -They were the answer to deeds that had occurred.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes, but we are concerned here only with the accusation -made against you, that thereby you exerted an influence on -the minds of young people which was not beneficial and which -could be considered designed to have a poisonous effect.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: And I should like to prove by my statement that -we wanted to protect youth because things had, in fact, occurred.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes, but young persons could hardly understand -the Schloss case, or any such case, could they?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: It was a matter of public discussion in Nuremberg -and beyond that all over Germany. -<span class='pageno' title='336' id='Page_336'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: As far as I am concerned, this question is answered, -Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: But not for me as defendant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You told us that the books were published -to answer things which had occurred here. That is sufficient.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Witness, another serious accusation made by the -Prosecution against you is that a special issue concerning ritual -murders was published in the publishing house of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> -and appeared in one number of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>. How did this special -issue come about and what was the cause for it? Were you the -author of that special issue?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Who was the author?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: My collaborator, the Editor-in-Chief at that time, -Karl Holz, who is now dead. But I assume the responsibility.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Is it not true that even during the twenties you -dealt with that question in <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes, and in public speeches.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes, in public speeches. Why did you now in 1935 -stir up again this doubtlessly very grave matter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I should like to ask my counsel to express no -judgment as to what I have written; to question me, but not to -express judgment. The Prosecution are going to do that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You have asked me how this issue came about. I will explain -very briefly...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. I have to protest against -the fact that Herr Streicher here, in the course of his interrogation -by me, thinks he can criticize the manner in which I put my -questions. Therefore, I ask the Court to give a decision on this, -since otherwise I am not in a position to ask my questions at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You have already stated your position and -the Tribunal has given you full support in your position. Will you -please continue?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And let me tell you this, Defendant, that if you are insolent -either to your counsel or to the Tribunal, the Tribunal will not -be able to continue the hearing of your case at this moment. You -will kindly treat your counsel and the Tribunal with due courtesy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: May I ask to say something about this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No. Answer the question, please.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I will go on now with my questioning. -<span class='pageno' title='337' id='Page_337'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution accuse you, in connection with this ritual -murder affair, of having treated the matter without documentary -proof, by referring to a story from the Middle Ages. What, in brief, -was your source?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: The sources were given in that issue. Nothing -was written without the sources being given at the same time. -There was reference made to a book written in Greek by a former -Rabbi who had been converted to Christianity. There was reference -made to a publication of a high clergymen of Milan, a book -which has appeared in Germany for the last 50 years. Not even -under the democratic government did Jews raise objections to that -book. That ritual murder issue refers to court files which are -located in Rome, it refers to files which are in Court. There are -pictures in it which show that in 23 cases the Church itself has -dealt with this question. The Church has canonized 23 non-Jews -killed by ritual murder. Pictures of sculptures, that is, of stone -monuments were shown as illustrations; everywhere the source was -pointed out; even a case in England was mentioned, and one in -Kiev, Russia. But in this connection I should like to say, as I said -to a Jewish officer here, that we never wanted to assert that all -Jewry was ready now to commit ritual murders. But it is a fact -that within Jewry there exists a sect which engaged in these -murders, and has done so up until the present. I have asked my -counsel to submit to the Court a file from Pisek in Czechoslovakia, -very recent proceedings. A court of appeal has confirmed a case of -ritual murder. Thus, in conclusion I must say...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I object to this statement, Your -Honor. After his counsel has refused to submit it, he insists on -stating here the contents of a court record. Now this is not an -orderly way to make charges against the Jewish people. Streicher -says he is asking counsel to submit. His counsel apparently has -refused, whereupon he starts to give evidence of what he knows, -in any case, is a resumé of the matters which his counsel has -declined to submit here. It seems to me that, having appointed -counsel to conduct his case, he has shown repeatedly that he is not -willing to conduct his case in an orderly manner and he ought to -be returned to his cell and any further statements that he wishes -to make to this Court transmitted through his counsel in writing. -This is entirely unfair and in contempt of Court.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, I think you had better continue.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I should like to say that that closes this affair. -The essential thing is whether one can say that he treated the case -without documentary proof. The Defense is not interested in the -affair at all; and, according to my recollection, I even suggested to -<span class='pageno' title='338' id='Page_338'></span> -one of the gentlemen of the Prosecution that this affair perhaps be -left out altogether, because it is really so gruesome and so horrible -that it is better not to treat it. But the defendant only wanted to -say that it was only on the basis of various pieces of evidence that -he dealt with the case, and I believe that is sufficient; that should -close the matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, Herr Streicher, you fall again and again into the mistake -of going too far in your explanations and of discussing things which -can be considered propaganda on your part. I should like to ask -you now for the last time to stick to the questions and leave out -everything else. It is in your own interest. You are accused of -having carried on various activities in your Gau, which were -Crimes Against Humanity, of having mistreated people who lived -in your Gau. Thus you are accused of having sought out a political -prisoner, a certain Steinruck, in his cell and of having beaten him. -Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Was Steinruck a Jew?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: For what reason did you do that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Steinruck, in a public place, in the presence of -many witnesses, had made derogatory statements about the Führer, -libelous statements. He was at police headquarters. I had spoken -to the Police President about it and told him that I should like to -look at that Steinruck once. I went with my adjutant—the Göring -report says that a Party member, Holz, was there too, but that is -not correct—I went with my adjutant to police headquarters. The -same Police President, who later denounced me to Reich Marshal -Göring, took me to Steinruck’s cell. We went into the cell; I stated -here that I had come with the intention of talking to him, talking -to him reasonably. We talked to him. But he behaved so cowardly -that it became necessary at the moment that he be chastised. I -do not mind stating here that I am sorry about that case, that I -regret it as a slip.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Then it is asserted that in August 1938 you beat -up an editor, Burger. Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: No, that is not correct. If I had beaten him up, -then I would say so here. But I believe that my adjutant and -somebody else had an argument with him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: What about the incident in the Künstlerhaus in -Munich?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I went to Munich to the Inn Künstlerstätte, or -something like that. I was received by the manager. Then a young -<span class='pageno' title='339' id='Page_339'></span> -man came up to me, drunk and quarrelsome, and shouted at me. -The manager protested and ordered him out of the place. But the -drunken young fellow came back again and again and then my -chauffeur grabbed him and my son helped. They took him into a -room and beat him up and then the proprietor of the inn thanked -me for having rid him of the drunkard.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And now I should like to have the Tribunal’s permission to state -very briefly my position on one case which I believe the Prosecution -also have dropped, where I was accused of sadistic tendencies...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you know perfectly well that -that incident has been stricken from the record and is not, therefore, -mentioned against you, so that it is quite unnecessary to go -into it. The Tribunal cannot hear you on it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Witness, from the so-called Göring report I should -like to submit to you some points which have been presented by -the Prosecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You know that after the action of November 1938, in the district -of Franconia, Aryanization of Jewish property was undertaken to -the utmost extent. Would you like to make a statement about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Here in the Göring report is a reference to a -statement of the deceased Party member, Holz. In that statement -it is pointed out that Holz came to see me after that action, that -he made a report about the action and likewise declared the action -to be wrong; he said furthermore that now that this had happened, -he considered it necessary to go further and Aryanize the property. -The Göring report states that I then told Holz that could not be done -and that I opposed it. Then it states further that Holz said to me -that he still thought it would be right if one were to do it. We -could then get out of it the means for the establishment of a Gau -school. Holz also states that I said something like: “Well, Holz, if -you believe you can do it, then go ahead and do it.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I want to state here that what Party member Holz said is true. -I was opposed at first; and then, acting on a sudden impulse, which -I cannot understand today, I said, “Well, if you can do it, then go -ahead and do it.” I want to state that at that time when I said -it, I did not believe at all that it was to be done or would be done; -but it was done. The Reich Marshal, as Delegate for the Four Year -Plan, later stated his position on it in Berlin, sharply rejecting it. -Only at that time did I find out exactly how Holz accomplished this -Aryanization. I had a talk with him, got into a serious dispute; -and our friendly relations were broken off at that time. Holz -volunteered in an armored unit, went to the front, and resigned -as deputy. I returned from Berlin to Nuremberg, and later there -<span class='pageno' title='340' id='Page_340'></span> -appeared in Nuremberg a Police Inspector sent by the Reich -Marshal in his capacity as Delegate for the Four Year Plan. He -reported to me and asked me if I would agree to an investigation of -the whole matter, and I stated that I would welcome the investigation. -Then the investigation took place. The Aryanization was -repealed, and it was established that Holz personally had not gotten -any material advantage from it. Aryanization was then taken over -by the State, repealed, and taken over.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I state frankly that in that affair I am at least guilty of -negligence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did you know that the amounts paid in the Aryanization -of houses or real estate represented only about 20 percent, or -even less, of the actual value?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Holz had not come to see me for weeks. He had -carried on the Aryanization in the Labor Front Office with the -expert there. Not until later, in Berlin during the meeting which -the Reich Marshal held, did I learn of the real facts; and thus the -dispute and the break between Holz and me came about, because -I had to disapprove the manner in which the Aryanization had been -handled.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: You are further accused of having had shares in the -Mars Works at Nuremberg acquired at an extraordinarily low -price, for purposes of enriching yourself and, in the course of this -acquisition, of having exerted an undue pressure on the owner of -the shares?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: It says in the Göring report, literally, that I had -instructed and in another place that I had given the order that the -Mars shares be acquired for me. I state here that I neither instructed -nor ordered anyone to acquire the Mars shares. The whole -thing was like this. The director of my publishing house, who had -power of attorney because I, personally, never in all the years -bothered with financial or business matters, could do what he -wanted. One day he came to see me with my adjutant. I do not -recollect now whether the adjutant or the director of my publishing -house was the one who spoke first. I was told the following: -An attorney had called and said that the Mars shares were being -offered for sale at an advantageous price. The director of my -publishing house asked me whether I agreed. I stated that never -in my life had I owned any shares, that I had never bothered -about financial matters in my publishing house. If he thought that -the stock should be bought, then he could do it. The shares were -bought. It was the most serious breach of confidence ever committed -against me by any Party comrade or employee. After a -short time it turned out; that is, I was informed how these shares -<span class='pageno' title='341' id='Page_341'></span> -had been acquired. I found out that the owner had been threatened. -When I found out under what conditions this stock purchase had -been made, I gave the order at once to return the stock. In the -Göring report it is noted that this return took place. Among the -confiscated files of my publishing house there is an official statement -about this affair which shows that these shares were returned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this connection perhaps I may be permitted to say that my -publishing house was located until the end of the war in a rented -house. At the time of the Aryanization I was approached with the -plan that an Aryanized house be acquired for my publishing firm. -I refused that. I state here in conclusion that I have in my possession -no Jewish property.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>When those demonstrations occurred in 1938, jewels had been -brought into the Gau house. These pieces of jewelry were turned -over to the police. A man who was bearer of the honorary Party -emblem was convicted and sentenced to 6 years penal servitude -because he had given his sweetheart a ring and another piece of -jewelry dating from that time. But I may add one thing: The guilt -of this bearer of the Party emblem rests perhaps with those who -gave the order: “Go into the Jewish houses.” That man, as far as -I knew him, had always been personally decent. Because of that -order, he got into a position in which he committed a crime.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have finished what I wanted to say.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Is it not true the allegations, made by the chief -of the publishing firm Fink before the Party Court and also even -before that, at a police interrogation, were different, in the main -points, from your present statements?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: The whole thing was that Fink, the publishing -house manager, was called to police headquarters and interrogated. -The police Chief was interested in the hearing since for many years -he had been a friend of mine and of my family. Fink returned -from the interrogation completely upset. He paced up and down -in front of me and shouted, “I was threatened, I have made statements -which are not true. I am blackguard. I am a criminal.” -A witness of that incident was my chauffeur. I calmed him down -and told him, “I was called in for a hearing once, too. I was even -imprisoned once. I will give you opportunity...”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go into such detail in this -matter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. Perhaps this is necessary, -because in this very report reference is made to the testimony of -Fink; and an attempt is made to prove with this that the explanation -made by the Defendant Streicher is wrong, that he gave the -order to purchase this stock, possibly under pressure, and that he -<span class='pageno' title='342' id='Page_342'></span> -approved of it, whereas he counters that he knew neither that these -shares were to be bought at such a low price nor that blackmail -was to be used.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If this is taken for granted, then, of course, we can close the -matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is what he has already said. He has -said that quite clearly, has he not? I was only suggesting that it -was not necessary to go into such detail in the matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Witness, it may be of some importance to state -what the development of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> has been since 1933, as far -as circulation is concerned. Give us a short statement on the -circulation of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, and then I shall put another question -to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> appeared in 1923 in octavo format, -and in the beginning it had a circulation of 2,000 to 3,000 copies. -In the course of time the circulation increased to 10,000. At that -time <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> circulated—until 1933 really—only in Nuremberg, -in my Gau, perhaps also in Southern Bavaria. The publisher -was a bookseller and he worked first with one man, then with two. -This is proof that the circulation was really small.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1933—but I say this with certain reservations because it may -be that the publisher did not always tell me the correct circulation -figures and I had no written contract with him—I say with reservations, -that in 1933 the circulation was 25,000 copies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1935 the publisher died; and at that time it was, I believe, -40,000. Then an expert took over the publishing house and organized -it to cover all of Germany. The circulation increased then to -100,000, and went up as high as 600,000. It fluctuated, decreased, -and then dropped during the war; I cannot say exactly but I believe -it was about 150,000 to 200,000.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: You said that that new man organized the circulation -to cover all of Germany. Was the Party machinery utilized in -this, and were not industries and other offices—the German Labor -Front, for instance—utilized in order to increase the circulation -forcibly?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Well, the attitude of the Party was made manifest -in a letter, which was sent to all Gaue, signed by Bormann. There -it was expressly pointed out that <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> was not a Party organ -and had nothing to do with the Party. Thereupon several Gauleiter -saw this an occasion for ordering that <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> should not -appear in their Gaue any more. Now it is clear that within the -organizations there were Party members who, because of idealism -or for other reasons, worked to increase the distribution of <span class='it'>Der -Stürmer</span>. However, I myself, neither in writing nor orally, ever -issued any order to any Party organization to support <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>. -<span class='pageno' title='343' id='Page_343'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, even, before 1933 you came in contact -with the courts on various occasions, both because of your -articles and because of your attitude as evidenced in <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>. -Would you give us a short statement as to how often that occurred -and what consequences it had for you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: How often? I cannot answer that exactly now, but -it was very often. I was frequently given a court summons. You -ask me about the consequences. I was many times in prison, but -I can say proudly that in the sentences it repeatedly stated “an incorruptible -fanatic for the truth.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That was the consequence of my activity as a speaker and -writer, but perhaps it is important to add the following: I never -was arraigned because of criminal charges, but only because of my -anti-Semitic activity, and the charge was brought by an organization -of citizens of the Jewish faith. The chairman filed charges -repeatedly when we made a slip in speaking and thus exposed -ourselves to prosecution on the basis of the laws and regulations -existing at that time. But perhaps I may also point out here that -the Jewish Justizrat, Dr. Süssheim, the Prosecuting Attorney, -stated before the court here in this courtroom, “Your Honors, he -is our inexorable enemy, but he is a fanatic for the truth. He is -convinced of what he does; he is honest about it.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What years were they that you were repeatedly -in jail?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: That was, of course, before 1933. The first time I -went to Landsberg, to prison, because I had taken part in the Hitler -Putsch. Then I was sentenced to three and a half months in prison -in Nuremberg, where I am now. Then I got three months...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You needn’t bother with the details.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: That is to say, before 1933 I was repeatedly given -prison sentences or fined.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Mr. President, the Göring report also mentions the -fact that the Defendant Streicher was personally interested in -various Jewish plants, allegedly in order to get some capital out -of them. However, I am of the opinion that it is not essential to -deal with these points. The same applies to the fact that the house -on Lake of Constance was sold, and to whom. I do not know -whether the defendant should make any statements about this here. -In my opinion there is no cause to ask him any questions concerning -that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think you could leave that and see whether -it is taken up in cross-examination. If it is, then you may re-examine -him. -<span class='pageno' title='344' id='Page_344'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes, certainly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, this concludes my questions to the defendant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any members of defendants’ counsel wish -to ask questions of the defendant?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior -Counsel for the United Kingdom): If the Tribunal pleases.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>When you handed over your Party to Hitler in 1922, did you -know his policy and what was to become the policy of the Nazi -Party?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: The policy? First I should like to say, “no.” At -that time one could not speak of things which could not exist even -as thoughts. The policy then was to create a new faith for the -German people, that is, a faith which would deny the chaos and -disorder and which would bring about a return to order.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May I take it that, within a short -course of time, you knew the policy, the policy according to the -Party program and according to <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I did not need a Party program. I admit frankly -that I never read it in its entirety. At that time programs were -not important, but mass meetings...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That’s not an answer to the question. The -question was whether, a short time after 1922, you knew the policy -as indicated in the Party program and in <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You knew, did you not, that the -policy included the Anschluss with Austria? Can you answer that -“yes” or “no”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: No. There was never any talk about Austria. I -do not remember that the Führer ever spoke about the fact that -Austria should be annexed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only want you to answer my -question. My question was: Did you know that the Führer’s policy -was the annexation of Austria to Germany? I understand your -answer to be “no.” Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: That he intended it? No, that I did not know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did you know that he intended to -take over Czechoslovakia or at least the Sudetenland?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did you know that from the beginning -in <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span> his ultimate objective was Lebensraum? -<span class='pageno' title='345' id='Page_345'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: What I read in <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span> is marked in red. -The book has been confiscated. I only read that. I read only what -concerns the Jewish question; I did not read anything else. However, -that we had the objective of acquiring Lebensraum for our -people, that goes without saying. I personally also had set myself -the objective of contributing in some way to providing a future for -the surplus children.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. May I take it that -during the years 1922 and 1923, as editor and owner of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, -and as a Gauleiter from 1925, you did everything you could to put -the Nazi Party into power?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes; that is to be taken as a matter of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And after 1933 did you continuously -support and issue propaganda on behalf of the Nazi Party’s -policy?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Not only in respect to the Jewish -question, but to the foreign policy as well?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: No, that is not correct. In <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> there is -not a single article to be found which dealt with foreign policy. -I devoted myself exclusively...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That is quite enough. I am not -going to occupy very much time with this matter. But I would ask -you to look at Document Number D-802.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, this is a new exhibit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Which will be what?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Exhibit Number GB-327.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, I am sorry, but the document seems to be missing for -the moment. Perhaps I might read the extract.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Let me just read to you an extract -from an article which you wrote in <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> of March 1938, immediately -after the Anschluss with Austria. I want you to tell me -whether or not you are advocating the Nazi policy in regard to -Austria.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Our Lord is making provision that the power of the Jews -may not extend to heaven itself. What was only a dream -up to a few days ago has now become reality. The brother -nation of Austria has returned home to the Reich.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>And then, a few lines farther down:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“We are entering into glorious times, a Greater Germany -without Jews.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='346' id='Page_346'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you say that you are not there issuing propaganda on behalf -of the Nazi policy?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I did not indulge in propaganda politics, for -Austria was already annexed. I just welcomed the fact. I did not -need to make any more propaganda about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Perhaps you’ll tell -me what you mean by the “Greater Germany” that you are approaching. -What Greater Germany are you approaching in March -1938, a Germany greater than it was after the Anschluss with -Austria?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: A Greater Germany, a living area in which all -Germans, German-speaking people, people of German blood, can -live together.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do I understand that you are advocating -Lebensraum, greater space, not yet owned by Germany?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Not at first, no. At first it was merely a question -of Austria and Germany. The Austrians are Germans and, therefore, -belong to a Greater Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I won’t argue with you. I will -just ask you once more, what do you mean by the “Greater Germany” -that you are approaching in March of 1938?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I have already explained, a Germany where all -those can live and work together who speak German and have -German blood.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Would you look at Document -Number D-818, which will become Exhibit Number GB-328. Perhaps -I can carry on. In November of 1938, after Munich, did you -yourself personally send a telegram to Konrad Henlein, the leader -of the Sudeten-German Party?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: If it says so here, then it is true. I do not recall it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me refresh your recollection -as to what you said, “Without your courageous preparatory work -the great task would not have succeeded.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Are you there advocating and issuing propaganda in support of -the policy of the Nazi Government?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I have to ask you again, would you please repeat -your question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am asking you whether or not -that telegram, which you sent to Konrad Henlein and reprinted in -your newspaper under a picture of that gentleman—I am asking -you whether or not that was propaganda in support of the Nazi -policy, Nazi foreign policy? -<span class='pageno' title='347' id='Page_347'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I have to say the same to this as I said before. -That was a telegram of greeting, of thanks. I did not have to make -propaganda any more because the Munich Agreement had already -taken place.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I put it to you and I’ll leave it. -I’ll put it to you that throughout the years from 1933 until 1944 or -1945 you were in fact doing everything you could to support the -policy of the Government, both domestically and in regard to its -foreign affairs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: As far as possible within my field of activity, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I want to turn now to the question -of the Jews. May I remind you of the speech that you made -on 1 April 1933, that is to say, the day of the boycott.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, this will be found in the original document book, -Document Number M-33. It was not actually put in before. It -now becomes Exhibit Number GB-329. It is in the document book -on Page 15, in the original document book which the Tribunal have.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, I give you the document book. -If you want to see the original, you may do so in every case. -[<span class='it'>The document book was submitted to the defendant.</span>]</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“For 14 years we have been crying to the German nation, -‘German people, learn to recognize your true enemy,’ and -14 years ago the German Philistines listened and then declared -that we preached religious hatred. Today German -people have awakened; even all over the world there is talk -of the eternal Jews. Never since the beginning of the world -and the creation of man has there been a nation which -dared to fight against the nation of blood-suckers and extortioners -who, for a thousand years, have spread all over the -world.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And then I go down to the last line of the next paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It was left to our Movement to expose the eternal Jew as -a mass murderer.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is it right that for 14 years you had been repeating in Germany, -“German people, learn to recognize your true enemy”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I state first of all that what you have given me -here has nothing to do with that. You have given me an article...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You are asked a question. You are asked -whether it is true that for 14 years you had been repeating, -to Germany, “Learn to recognize your true enemy.” Is that true?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And in doing so, is it true that -you had been preaching religious hatred? -<span class='pageno' title='348' id='Page_348'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: May I be permitted to make a statement concerning -this answer? In my weekly, <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, I repeatedly -stated that for me the Jews are not a religious group but a race, a -people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And do you think to call them -“blood-suckers,” “a nation of blood-suckers and extortioners”—do -you think that’s preaching hatred?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I beg your pardon. I have not understood you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You may call them a race or a -nation, whichever you like, now; but you were saying, on 1 April -1933, that they were a “nation of blood-suckers and extortioners.” -Do you call that preaching hatred?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: That is a statement, the expression of a conviction -which can be proved on the basis of historical facts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Understand me. I did not ask you -whether it was a fact or not. I am asking whether you called it -preaching hatred. Your answer is “yes” or “no.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: No, it is not preaching hatred; it is just a statement -of facts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look two pages further -on in that last document, M-33, and do you see the fourth paragraph -from the end of the extract? That is Page 17 of the document -book: “As long as I stand at the head of the struggle, this struggle -will be conducted so honestly that the eternal Jew will derive no -joy from it.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: That I wrote; that was right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And you were, were you not, one -of those who did stand and continue to stand at the head of that -struggle?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Did I stand at the head? I am too modest a man -for that. But I do claim to have declared my conviction and my -knowledge clearly and unmistakably.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Why did you say that so long as -you were at the head of it, the Jew would derive no joy from it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Because I considered myself a man whom destiny -had placed in a position to enlighten people on the Jewish question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And “enlightenment”—is that another -word for persecution? Do you mean by “enlightenment,” -“persecution”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I did not understand that. -<span class='pageno' title='349' id='Page_349'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you mean by “enlightenment” -the word “persecution”? Is that why the Jew was to have no joy -from it, from your enlightenment?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I ask to have the question repeated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I can show it to you and we will -repeat the question as loud as you want it. Do you mean by -“enlightenment” the word “persecution”? Do you hear that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I hear “enlightenment” and “production.” I mean -by “enlightenment” telling another person something which he does -not yet know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We won’t go on with that. You -know, do you not, that starting with the boycott which you led -yourself in 1933, the Jews thereafter were, during the course of -the years, deprived of the right to vote, deprived of holding any -public office, excluded from the professions; demonstrations were -conducted against them in 1938, they were fined a billion marks -after that, they were forced to wear a yellow star, they had their -own separate seats to sit on, and they had their houses and their -businesses taken away from them. Do you call that “enlightenment”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: That has nothing to do with what I wrote, nothing -to do with it. I did not issue the orders. I did not make the laws. -I was not asked when laws were prepared. I had nothing to do -with these laws and orders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But as those laws and orders were -passed you were applauding them, and you were going on abusing -the Jews and asking for more and more orders to be passed; isn’t -that a fact?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I ask to have put to me which law I applauded.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, you told the Tribunal yesterday, -did you not, that you were responsible, you thought, for the -Nuremberg Decrees, which you had been advocating for years -before they came into force; isn’t that a fact?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: The Nuremberg Decrees? I did not make them. -I was not asked beforehand, and I did not sign them either. But -I state here that these laws are the same laws which the Jewish -people have as their own. It is the greatest and most important -act of legislation which a modern nation has at any time made -for its protection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think that is the time to break off.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='350' id='Page_350'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for -the United Kingdom): My Lord, I wonder if the Tribunal would be -good enough to consider setting aside a half hour some time for -the discussion of the documents of the Defendant Von Schirach. -We are ready to clear up outstanding points at any time that is -suitable to the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, -I just want to ask you a few questions as to the part you played -in the various actions against the Jews between 1933 and 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Will you look at Document M-6, which is at Page 20 in the -document book that you have before you, Page 22 in the document -book that the Tribunal have in English. It is Page 20 in the German -document book; M-6, which is already Exhibit Number GB-170.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I just want to refer to what you said about the Nuremberg -Decrees. You told us this morning that you thought when -they had been passed that that was already the final solution of the -Jewish question. Will you look at the paragraph beginning in the -center of the page, “However, to those who believe...”:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“However, to those who believe that the Jewish question has -been finally solved and the matter thus settled for Germany -by the Nuremberg Decrees, be it said that the battle continues—world -Jewry itself is seeing to that anyhow—and we -shall only get through this battle victoriously if every member -of the German people knows that his very existence is at stake. -The work of enlightenment carried on by the Party seems to -me to be more necessary than ever today, even though many -Party members seem to think that these matters are no -longer real or urgent.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes, I wrote that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: What do you mean by saying “the -battle continues,” if you have already solved the Jewish problem -by the issuance of the Nuremberg Decrees?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I have already stated today that the solution of the -Jewish problem was regarded by me as having to be solved, first -of all, within the country and then in conjunction with other nations. -Thus “the battle continues” means that in the International Anti-Semitic -Union, which I had formed and which had representatives -from all countries in it, the question was discussed as to what could -be done from an international point of view to terminate the Jewish -problem. -<span class='pageno' title='351' id='Page_351'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are we, therefore, to take it that -everything that you said and wrote after 1936 was in connection -with an international problem and had nothing to do with the Jews -in Germany as such?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes, mainly international, of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me just refer you to half way -through the next paragraph, “<span class='it'>Der Stürmer’s</span> 15 years’ work of -enlightenment has already led an army of those who know, millions -strong, to National Socialism.” Is that so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: That is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You see, you were telling the -Tribunal this morning that up to 1933, and indeed afterwards, you -said the circulation of your paper was only very small. Is it true, -in fact, that your 15 years’ work had led an army, millions strong, -to National Socialism?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I have said today that the moment the press was -politically co-ordinated, 3,000 daily newspapers were committed to -the purpose of enlightenment about the Jewish problem. There were -3,000 daily papers in addition to <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I don’t think you need -go on. Let me just finish reading through that paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The continued work of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> will help to insure that -down to the last man every German will, with heart and -hand, join the ranks of those whose aim it is to crush the -head of the serpent Pan-Judah.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Wait one moment, let me ask my question. There is nothing -there about an international problem. You are addressing yourself -to the German people, are you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: In that article? Yes. And if that article was read -abroad, then also to countries abroad, but as to the remark about -crushing the serpent’s head, that is a biblical expression.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you now let us discuss for a -moment the breaking up of the synagogue in Nuremberg, which -you have told about, on the 10th of August of 1938. Will you look -at Page 41 of the book that you have in front of you, Page 42 of the -English document book that the Tribunal has.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now we have heard your explanation of that breaking up of the -synagogue. The <span class='it'>Fränkische Tageszeitung</span> at the 11th of August -states this, “In Nuremberg the synagogue is being demolished. -Julius Streicher himself inaugurated this work by a speech lasting -more than an hour and a half.” Were you talking to the inhabitants -of Nuremberg upon the architectural value of their city for an hour -and a half on the 10th of August 1938? -<span class='pageno' title='352' id='Page_352'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I no longer know in detail what I said, but I refer -to what you have remarked and what you find important. There -was a branch of the Propaganda Ministry in Nuremberg. The young -Regierungsrat had press conferences with the editors every day, -and at that time he told the editors during a press conference that -Streicher would speak and that the synagogue was being demolished -and that this was to be kept secret.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I asked you, were you talking for -that hour and a half on the architectural beauties of Nuremberg -and not against the Jews? Is that what you are telling us?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: That, too, of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: At the press conference to which -you referred—you no doubt have seen the document; it is Page 40 -of the Tribunal’s document book—do you remember that it was -arranged that the show should be staged in a big way, the show of -pulling down the synagogue? What was the object of arranging the -demonstration to demolish that synagogue in such a big way?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I was merely the speaker. What you are intimating -here, that was done by the representative of the Ministry of Propaganda; -but I would not object to it if you decided to assume, let -me put it like that, that I would naturally have been in favor of -making a big show if I had been asked.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me just ask you now a word -about the demonstrations which followed that in November of that -year—My Lord, I refer to Page 43 of the document book; 42 of the -German—as I understand it, you tell us that you disapproved of -those demonstrations that took place and they took place without -your knowledge or previous knowledge. Is that correct, “yes” or “no”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes, it is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I just want to remind you of what -you said on the following day, the 10th of November. This is an -account of what happened:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In Nuremberg and Fürth there were demonstrations by the -crowd against the Jewish gang of murderers. These lasted -until the early hours of the morning.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>I now pass to the end of that paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“After midnight the excitement of the public had reached its -peak and a large crowd marched to the synagogues in Nuremberg -and Fürth and burned those two Jewish buildings where -the murder of Germans had been preached.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This is now what you say—it is on Page 44 of the document -book, My Lord: -<span class='pageno' title='353' id='Page_353'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“From the cradle on, the Jew is not taught as we are: ‘Thou -shalt love thy neighbor as thyself’ or ‘If you are smitten on -the left cheek offer then your right one.’ No. He is told ‘With -the non-Jew you can do whatever you like.’ He is even taught -that the slaughtering of a non-Jew is an act pleasing to God. -For 20 years we have been writing about this in <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>. -For 20 years we have been preaching it throughout the world, -and we have made millions recognize the truth.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Does that sound as though you had disapproved of the demonstrations -that had taken place the night before?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: First of all I must state that the report, part of -which you read, appeared in a daily paper. Thus I am not to be -held responsible for this. If someone wrote that part of the populace -rose up against the gang of murderers then that is in keeping with -the order from the Ministry of Propaganda in Berlin; outwardly -that action was described as a spontaneous demonstration of the -populace...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That does not answer my question. -Does that passage that I have read sound as though you had -disapproved of the demonstrations that had taken place the night -before? Does it or does it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I was against that demonstration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Just let me read on:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“But we know that we have in our midst people who take -pity on the Jews, people who are not worthy of living in this -town, who are not worthy of belonging to this people, of -whom you are a proud part.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Why should it have been necessary for people to have had pity -on the Jews, if you were not—you and the Nazi Party—persecuting -them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I have already pointed out today that I was forced, -after this demonstration had taken place, to make a public comment -and say that one should not have so much pity. I wanted to prove -thereby that this was not a spontaneous action by the people; in -other words, the matter does not speak against me; it speaks for -me. The people, as I myself, were opposed to the demonstration and -I found that I had cause to—should I say—get public opinion to the -point where one might possibly not regard that action as something -too severe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But, why, if you were opposed to -it and if the people were opposed to it, should it have been your -duty to try and convert them so that they should be in favor of that -kind of thing? Why were you opposed to it and why should you -try to turn them against the Jew? -<span class='pageno' title='354' id='Page_354'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I do not understand what you mean.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I understand you to say that you -were opposed to these demonstrations and that the people also were -opposed to the demonstrations; that, therefore, it was your duty to -try to stir them up and make them in favor of the demonstrations -after they had happened. Why should it have been your duty to do -that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Today one can perhaps say that this or that was -my duty, but one must consider what those times were—the confusion -that existed—that to make a quick decision, as one might -have to in this courtroom, was quite impossible. What happened -has happened. I was against it and the public too. What was written -about it otherwise was done so for tactical reasons.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Were you in favor of -the Aryanization of Jewish houses and businesses? Were you in -favor of that or did you disapprove of that issue?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I have answered that question today in great -detail, in connection with a statement of Party comrade Holz. I -have stated and I repeat that my deputy came to me...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Just stop for a moment, I don’t -want a speech. I asked you a question which you could answer -“yes” or “no.” Did you approve or disapprove of the system of -Aryanization of Jewish businesses and houses?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: One cannot answer that quickly with “yes” or -“no.” I have made it clear today, and you must allow me to explain -it so that there is not any misunderstanding. My Party comrade...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am not going to allow you to -repeat it. I will go on if you are not prepared to answer that -question. The Tribunal have heard it and I pass on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I certainly want to answer it. After my Party -comrades...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Defendant...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: After the Party comrades came...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You have refused to answer the question -properly, a question to which you can give either an affirmative or -a negative answer. Did you approve or did you not approve? You -can give an answer to that and then you can give any explanation -afterwards.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I personally was not for Aryanization. When -Holz repeated that, giving as a reason that the houses had been -pretty badly damaged, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, that we might get material for a -Gau (district) building, I said “All right, if you can do it, go ahead.” -I already stated today that this was carelessness on my part. -<span class='pageno' title='355' id='Page_355'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There were in fact a very great -number of Jewish businesses and houses Aryanized in Nuremberg -and Franconia, were there not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Would you just look at a new -exhibit, Document Number D-835, which becomes Exhibit GB-330. -That is a list—it is an original document—it is a list of Jewish -property in Nuremberg and Fürth which was Aryanized. Have you -seen that list or anything like it before?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, you can take it from me, -that that list contains the addresses of some 800 properties in -Nuremberg and Fürth which have been taken from the Jews and -handed over to Aryans. Would you agree that that would be at least -800 houses in your city here that were Aryanized?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I do not know about it in detail; but I must -establish something: I do not know—is that the official document? -I have already stated today that my Party comrade Holz started -Aryanizing. That was rescinded by Berlin. Then came the Aryanization -carried out by the State. I could not have had any influence -here, either, so that this was none of my business. This Aryanization, -the expropriation of Jewish property, was ordered by Berlin.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, you mentioned this morning -that you were a subscriber to a weekly newspaper called the -<span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span>; is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: When did you start subscribing to -that newspaper?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: What did you say?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: At what date did you start subscribing -to that newspaper?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I do not know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, I have no doubt you can tell -the Tribunal approximately. Have you always, since 1933, been a -subscriber of that newspaper?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Well, I do not think I could have read every issue, -since I traveled a great deal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You were, as I think it is stated in -this application of your wife to give evidence, a regular reader of -it, were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: My friends, the editors, and I used to share in the -reading of this paper. -<span class='pageno' title='356' id='Page_356'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May I take it that between yourself -and your editors—I don’t say every copy was read—but it was -regularly read from 1933 onwards; is that fair?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: You cannot say “read regularly.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL, GRIFFITH-JONES: A large number of the copies that -you subscribed for, which came weekly to you, were they read by -yourself or by your editors?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Certainly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I want to turn to something -else for a moment. I want to make myself perfectly clear to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Mr. President, I should like to draw the attention of -the Tribunal to the fact that the document which has just been -presented, “Confiscated Property and Real Estate,” has the heading -“Aryanization Department for Real Estate, Nuremberg.” That -cannot mean anything except that this document comes from the -official department which was later set up for the confiscation of -such real estate. But by no means can this be a document to prove -that we are concerned here with the real estate Aryanized by Holz, -subsequent to 9 November.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I accept that that may be so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I should like to ask, therefore, that the appropriate -correction be made.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If I was mistaken in saying that -those properties had been Aryanized, I would be right then, would -I not, in saying that that list of properties was prepared by the -Aryanization Department in Nuremberg for the purpose of Aryanizing -them in the future? Would that be a fair statement to make?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I won’t pursue that matter any -further.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I want to make myself quite clear to you in what I am suggesting. -I am suggesting that from 1939 onwards you set out to -incite the German people to murder and to accept the fact of the -murder of the Jewish race. Do you understand that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: That is not true.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No doubt you will say it isn’t true. -I just wanted you to be quite clear on what my suggestion is going -to be.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I want you to look now at a bundle, which will be given to you, -of extracts from <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>. You can see the originals which are -in Court if you desire to do so, but it will save time if we use the -document books there. -<span class='pageno' title='357' id='Page_357'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, will you look at Page 3-A. For convenience, the pages in -this bundle are all marked “A” to distinguish them from the numbers -in the original document book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are they all in evidence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: None of them are in evidence at -the moment. Perhaps the most convenient way would be for me to -put the actual documents in evidence together at the end, unless -the Tribunal or the defendant desire to see any copies of them. I -will give them numbers as I go along.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Will you look at Page 3-A of that bundle, Document Number -D-809, which becomes Exhibit Number GB-331:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Jewish problem is not yet solved, nor will it be solved -when one day the last Jew will have left Germany. Only when -world Jewry has been annihilated, will it have been solved.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is that what you were working for when you say you were -working for the international solution to this problem, an annihilation -of world Jewry?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: If that is how you understand “annihilation.” That -was written by my chief editor at the time. He says that the Jewish -problem will not yet be solved when the last Jew will have left -Germany. And when he suddenly says that only when world Jewry -has been annihilated will it be solved, then he certainly may have -meant that the power of world Jewry should be annihilated. But -my Party comrade Holz did not think of mass killing or the possibility -of mass killing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The German word used there is -“vernichtet,” is it not? Look at your copy. “Vernichtet” that means -“to annihilate.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Today, when you look back, you could interpret it -like that, but not at that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, we won’t waste time -because we have quite a number to look through. Will you look on -to the next page. That was in January you were writing that. In -April 1939, Document D-810, Exhibit GB-332, I refer only to the last -two lines. This is an article again by your editor: “Then perhaps -their graves will proclaim that this murderous and criminal people -has, after all, met its deserved fate.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>What do you mean by “graves” there? Do you mean excluding -them from the business of the world?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: This is the first time that I have seen this article. -That is the statement of opinion of a man who was probably looking -ahead and making a play on words; but as far as I knew him, and -as far as we discussed the Jewish problem, there was no question -<span class='pageno' title='358' id='Page_358'></span> -of mass extermination; we did not even think of it. Maybe it was -his wish—I do not know—but anyway, that is the way it happened -to be written.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Just turn over, will -you now, to May 1939, Document Number D-811, Exhibit Number -GB-333. I quote the last six lines: “There must be a punitive -expedition against the Jews in Russia.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This, of course, was before the Russian invasion.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“There must be a punitive expedition against the Jews in -Russia, a punitive expedition which will provide the same -fate for them that every murderer and criminal must expect, -death sentence and execution. The Jews in Russia must be -killed. They must be utterly exterminated. Then the world -will see that the end of the Jews is also the end of -Bolshevism.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Who wrote that article?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is published in your <span class='it'>Stürmer</span>. -We can find out, if necessary. It is not written by you, but it is -published in your <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>; and you have told the Tribunal -that you accept responsibility for everything that was written in -that newspaper.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: All right, I assume responsibility; but I want to -state that, here too, this is the private opinion of a man who in -May 1939 could not have thought that <span class='it'>ex nihilo</span>—for we had no -soldiers—a “March to Russia” could be started. This is a theoretic -and very strongly-worded expression of opinion of that anti-Semitic -person.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: All I ask you about that is: Is that -not advocating the murder of Jews, that article; if it is not, what -is it advocating?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: The whole article would have to be read so that I -could tell what motives existed for writing something like that. I -therefore ask you to make public the whole article. Then one can -form a proper judgment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, we’ll go on. We won’t waste -time unless you really want to see the whole article.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, if I perhaps might be allowed to put these documents -in evidence. As Your Lordship will see, this bundle is a bundle of -extracts from <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Mr. President, with the permission of the Tribunal, -I would like to make the following statements: A number of extracts -from <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> have been mentioned here which have -been put before me for the first time. Some of them are articles -<span class='pageno' title='359' id='Page_359'></span> -which have not been written by the defendant personally. Some -are signed by Hiemer, and some by Holz, who was particularly -radical in his manner of writing, and passages are being quoted -which are perhaps taken out of context.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I must ask, therefore, that I be afforded the opportunity of going -over these extracts together with the Defendant Streicher. Otherwise, -he might come to the conclusion that his defense is being -made too difficult for him and that it is being made impossible for -him to prepare himself appropriately.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, you will have an opportunity of -checking up on these various extracts, and then you will be able -to introduce, if necessary, any passages which explain the extracts. -That is a matter which has been explained to defendants’ counsel -over and over again.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Colonel Griffith-Jones, are there not certain of these extracts -which are written or signed by the defendant?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, with Your Lordship’s permission -I will refer to some of them, but so that I should not have -to refer to all of them, I was going to suggest that perhaps I might -put them in and, if it is necessary, let the Tribunal know afterwards -the numbers of them to save time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I put the whole bundle in evidence -and will not refer to all of them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then you can give us the exhibit numbers -later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If that is suitable to the convenience -of the Court.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well now, the Tribunal will see -by looking at this bundle, from the first page—which I think is -3-A—to Page 25-A, that there are various extracts which have been -written either by yourself or by members of your staff between -January 1939 and January 1941.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do I understand you to say now, to have said in your evidence, -that you never knew that Jews were being exterminated in thousands -and millions in the Eastern territories? Did you never know -that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: As I understood your evidence -about the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span> this morning you said this, as -I have written it down: -<span class='pageno' title='360' id='Page_360'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Sometimes that journal contained hints that everything was -not in order. Later in 1943 an article appeared stating that -masses of Jews were disappearing but the article did not -quote any figures and did not mention anything about -murders.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Are you really saying that those copies of the <span class='it'>Israelitisches -Wochenblatt</span>, which you and your editors were reading, contained -nothing except for a hint of disappearance with no mention of -figures or murder? Is that what you are telling this Tribunal?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes, I stick to that, certainly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I want you, if you will, to -take this bundle and keep it in front of you. It is a bundle of -extracts from the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span> from July 1941 until -the end of the war. The Tribunal will be able to see what a fanatic -for the truth really tells.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The document was submitted to the defendant.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, this bundle, for convenience again, is marked “B.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Will you look at the first page? That -is an article on the 11th of July 1941. “Some 40,000 Jews died in -Poland during the last years. The hospitals are overfull.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, you need not turn over for the moment, Defendant. We -will turn the pages soon enough.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you happen to read that sentence in the issue of the 11th -of July 1941?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 3, 3-B? In -November 1941: “Very bad news comes from the Ukraine. Thousands -of Jewish dead are being mourned, among whom are many -of the Galician Jews who were expelled from Hungary.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you read that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: That might be possible. It says “thousands,” -thousands are being mourned. That is no proof that millions were -killed. There are no details as to how they came to their end.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If that is the explanation you want -us to accept we will leave it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Just go on again to the next page, will you? The 12th of December -1941, a month later:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“According to news which has arrived from several sources, -thousands of Jews—one even speaks of many thousands—are -said to have been executed in Odessa”—and so on.—“Similar -reports reach us from Kiev and other Russian cities.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you read that? -<span class='pageno' title='361' id='Page_361'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I do not know; and if I had read it then it would -not change a thing. That is no proof.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But you have told the Tribunal, -you know, that there was nothing except hints of disappearance. -Doesn’t it show that you were not telling the truth when you read -these extracts?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: In that case may I say the following? When the -war started we no longer received the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span>. -During the later years one could only get the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span> -through the Police. We got that paper, toward the end, into -Germany by smuggling. On one occasion we asked the Police to -provide us with foreign newspapers and this weekly, and we were -told that it was not possible. But we nevertheless got it. What -I mean to say by this is that I did not read every one of those -issues. The issues which I did read were confiscated on my farm. -Whatever is underlined has been read by me or it was read by my -editor in chief. I cannot, therefore, guarantee that I read every article.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No, I appreciate that and that is -why we have quite a number of them. You see, we have an extract -for practically every week or month over the course of 3 years.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I would just like you to turn to Page 30-A of the “A” bundle. -I just want you to see what you were writing after having heard, -or after having read, or anyway after those copies of the <span class='it'>Israelitisches -Wochenblatt</span> had been published. This is a leading article -by yourself.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“If the danger of the reproduction of that curse of God in the -Jewish blood is finally to come to an end, then there is only -one way open—the extermination of that people whose father -is the devil.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And is the word that you use for extermination there “Ausrottung,” -rooting out, extirpation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: First of all, I would like to ask whether this issue -is known to my defense counsel, and if the translation is correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It does not matter. He has copies -of all this and he will be able to protect your interests. We are -now just testing the truth of the evidence that you have given.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Can you tell me, is that “extermination”? Does that mean -murder of Jews? What else can it mean?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: It depends on the whole context. In that case I -want you to read the whole article.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, if there is anything in the -rest of the article which can be helpful to you, your counsel will -have an opportunity to see the article and be able to put it before -<span class='pageno' title='362' id='Page_362'></span> -the Tribunal. I can assure you that the remainder of your articles, -as a general rule, do not assist your case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: When that article appeared, mass killing had -already taken place a long time ago.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Well now, we will not -go through this at any length.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If you will look at your “B” bundle, your bundle of extracts -from the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span>...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think you should draw his attention to the -date on Page 30-A.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged to Your -Lordship.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] The 25th of December 1941.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If you will glance at “B” bundle you will see a number of extracts -going from Page A to Page 21. Now, I would like you to -glance at Page 24 of that “B” bundle.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Page 24?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes, Page 24. This is an article -which appeared in the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span> on the 27th of -November 1942. I just wondered whether you read this:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“At the Zionist Congress of Switzerland the representative -of the ‘Jewish Agency’ in Geneva... gave a report on European -Jewry.... The number of victims goes into millions. -If the present conditions continue and the German program -is carried out, it is to be reckoned that, instead of 6 or 7 -million Jews in Europe only 2 million will still be left.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>Then there are the three last lines of the extract:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Jews who were there had mostly been deported to the -notorious unknown destination further to the East. At the -end of this winter the number of victims will be 4 million.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is that what you call a hint of disappearance of Jews from the -East?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I cannot recollect that I have ever read that but -I do want to say that if I had read it I would not have believed it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well now, let us just turn to the -“A” bundle again and look at the article that you wrote on the -17th of December 1942. It is Page 34-A. This is an article which is -initialed “STR” so I presume it was written by you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“The London newspaper, <span class='it'>The Times</span>, of the 16th of September -1942 published a...”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I have not got it yet. -<span class='pageno' title='363' id='Page_363'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Page 34-A.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Just a minute.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Find it for him. It is headed: -“Eye for Eye, Tooth for Tooth.”</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The London newspaper, <span class='it'>The Times</span>, of 16 September 1942 -published a resolution which had been unanimously passed -by the Board of Deputies of British Jews. This resolution -expresses the grief and horror of the Anglo-Jewish Community -at the unspeakable atrocities committed by Germany -and her allies and vassals against the Jews of Europe which -had only one aim, to exterminate the whole Jewish population -of Europe in cold blood.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, you must have read of that in <span class='it'>The Times</span> because you -say so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Strange how the Jews of the Anglo-Jewish Community -suddenly begin to prick up their ears. When the second -World War began the Führer of the German nation warned -the Jewish warmongers against plunging the world into -a blood bath again. Since then the German Führer has -warned and prophesied again and again that the second -World War, instigated by world Jewry, must necessarily lead -to the destruction of Jewry. In his last speech too, the Führer -again referred to his prophecies.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you write that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes, this is merely a quotation. It refers to a -forecast from the Führer, of which nobody could possibly tell what -it really meant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If you had not even read that or the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span>, -did you ever hear of the declaration of the United Nations which -was made on the 17th of December 1942?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The document was submitted to the defendant.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you remember hearing of that? You appear to have been -reading <span class='it'>The Times</span>; you appear to have been reading some copies -of the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span>. Maybe you heard of this declaration -which was published in London, Washington, and Moscow -at the same time with the assent and support of all Allied nations -and dominions. I will just read it to you and see if you remember it:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The attention of the Belgian, Czechoslovak, Luxembourg, -Netherlands, Norwegian, Polish, Soviet, United Kingdom, -United States, and Yugoslav Governments and also the French -<span class='pageno' title='364' id='Page_364'></span> -National Committee has been drawn to numerous reports -from Europe that the German authorities, not content with -denying to persons of Jewish race in all the territories over -which their barbarous rule has been extended the most -elementary human rights, are now carrying into effect -Hitler’s often repeated intention to exterminate the Jewish -people in Europe.</p> - -<p>“From all the occupied countries Jews are being transported -in conditions of appalling horror and brutality to Eastern -Europe. In Poland, which has been made the principal Nazi -slaughterhouse, the ghettos established by the German invaders -are being systematically emptied of all Jews except -a few highly skilled workers required for war industries. -None of those taken away are ever heard of again. The able-bodied -are slowly worked to death in labor camps. The infirm -are left to die of exposure and starvation, or are deliberately -massacred in mass executions.</p> - -<p>“The number of victims of these bloody cruelties is reckoned -in many hundreds of thousands of entirely innocent men, -women, and children.</p> - -<p>“The above-mentioned Governments and the French National -Committee condemn, in the strongest possible terms, this -bestial policy of cold-blooded extermination. They declare -that such events can only strengthen the resolve of all freedom-loving -peoples to overthrow the barbarous Hitlerite -tyranny. They reaffirm their solemn resolution to ensure -that those responsible for the crimes shall not escape retribution, -and to press on with the necessary practical measures -to this end.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you never hear of this declaration?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I do not know, but if I should have heard of it, -then I would have to say the following:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After the seizure of power the foreign press published so many -atrocity stories, which turned out to be rumors, that I would have -had no reason to believe anything like this; nor is there any mention -here that millions of Jews were killed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, you see, it isn’t altogether -uncorroborated. You say you had no reason to believe it; but your -<span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span>, which you were subscribing to, was -saying exactly the same thing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Would you look at Page 26-B of the “B” bundle? That is the -declaration of the United Nations of the 17th of December. Just -see what the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span> says on the 18th. And -there I quote the second paragraph: -<span class='pageno' title='365' id='Page_365'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“At that time the Polish Government in London gave the -number of Jews executed as 700,000. The Berlin radio hereupon -declared that these reports were untrue, but admitted -that in Poland ‘Jews’ had had to be executed because they -carried out acts of sabotage.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>Then the last paragraph quoted:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“ ‘Up to the end of September 1942,’ writes the <span class='it'>Daily Telegraph</span>, -‘2 million Jews have lost their lives in Germany and -in the countries occupied by the Axis, and it is to be feared -that the number of victims will be doubled by the end of -this year.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you happen to read that article?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I cannot remember having read it, but I would -not have believed it if I had.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You see, there is another article -in that same paper on the 23rd of December, in the same terms; -another on the 30th of December; and another on the 8th of January. -Look at what it says on the 8th of January:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Polish Government in London has issued a new declaration -which states that all the information received agrees -that a third of the 3 million odd Jews have lost their lives.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you read that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I do not know, but I have to repeat, I would not -have believed it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL GRIFFITH-JONES: Well now, just let’s see just what -you were writing on the 28th of January. Look at 35-A of your -own bundle; 35-A. Now just see what your Chief Editor, the -witness you are going to call, I understand, Hiemer—see what he -has got to say first of all:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“But the ghetto too, which has today been re-established in -nearly all European countries, is only an interim solution, -for mankind once awakened will not merely solve the ghetto -question but the Jewish question in its totality. A time will -come when the present demands, of the Jews will be fulfilled. -The ghetto will have disappeared—and with it Jewry.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>What is he referring to, if he isn’t referring to the mass killing, -murder, of the Jewish race?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: That was a statement of his opinion, his conviction. -That conviction must be understood in the same way as something -which a Jewish author wrote in his book in America. Erich -Kauffmann wrote that German men capable of fathering children -should be sterilized, and in that manner the German people should -be exterminated. It was at the same time that Hiemer wrote his -<span class='pageno' title='366' id='Page_366'></span> -article, and I want to say that the very severe tone in <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> -at that time was due to that book from America.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The interrogating officers know—and so does my counsel—that -I have repeatedly pointed out that I wanted that book to be produced. -It was in the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If in America an author called Erich Kauffmann can publicly -demand that all men in Germany capable of fathering children -should be sterilized, for the purpose of exterminating the German -people, then I say, eye for eye and tooth for tooth. This is a -theoretical literary matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I am sure we have -heard your explanation. Let’s see what you have to say about your -own article on the same date. I quote from the middle of the next -paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“But now, in the fourth year of this war, world Jewry is -beginning in its retrospective considerations to understand -that the destiny of Jewry is finding its fulfillment at the -hands of German National Socialism.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>What did you mean by that? Perhaps I should have quoted a -little earlier, going back to the beginning:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“When, with the outbreak of the second World War, world -Jewry again began to manifest themselves as warmongers, -Adolf Hitler announced to the world from the platform of -the German Reichstag that the World War conjured up by -world Jewry would result in the self-destruction of Jewry. -This prophecy was the first big warning. It was met with -derision from the Jews, as were all the subsequent warnings.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>And then you go on to say:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“But now, in the fourth year of this war, world Jewry is -beginning in its retrospective considerations to understand -that the destiny of Jewry is finding its fulfillment at the -hands of German National Socialism.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>What did you mean by that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Pardon me?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: What do you mean by saying -“World Jewry is finding its fulfillment at the hands of National -Socialism”? How did you mean that National Socialism was finding -the fulfillment of Jewry’s destiny?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: National Socialism could not fulfill the fate, that -is to say, find the solution, since the Führer intervened with the -hand of destiny. That was not a solution. -<span class='pageno' title='367' id='Page_367'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>During an interrogation I pointed out that I who personally -wanted a total solution, was, right from the beginning, against -trying to solve the Jewish problem by means of pogroms. If I said -that the destiny of Jewry was to be fulfilled by National Socialism, -then I wanted to say that through National Socialism the world -would gain the knowledge and the realization that the Jewish -problem must be solved internationally.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let’s just go on.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“That which the Führer of the German people announced to -the world as a prophecy at the beginning of this second -World War is now being fulfilled with unrelenting inevitability. -World Jewry, which wanted to reap big dividends -from the blood of the warring nations, is rushing with gigantic -steps toward its extirpation.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And again you use the word “Ausrottung.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Does that mean just as it sounds, as though the fulfillment that -you were aiming at was warning the world about Jewry? What do -you mean by it? “Rushing with gigantic steps toward its extirpation”—Ausrottung. -What did you mean by it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: This is a warning. The Führer made a prophecy; -nobody could interpret that prophecy properly. The prophecy was -not quoted only in this article, but in 10 others. Again and again -we referred to these prophecies, the first of which had been made -in 1929. Today we know what the Führer wanted to say; at that -time we did not. And I confess quite openly that with this quotation -we wanted to warn world Jewry: “Against their threat, this -threat.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>So as to defend myself I might mention in this connection that -the author, Dr. Emil Ludwig Kohn, who had left Germany and -emigrated to France, had written in the paper <span class='it'>Le Fanal</span>, in 1934, -“Hitler does not want war, but he is being forced into it. Britain -has the last word.” Thus...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We are not discussing war now. -We are discussing the extermination, the mass murder of Jews, by -the National Socialists. That is what we are discussing. Let me -read on:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“When Adolf Hitler stepped before the German people -20 years ago to submit to them the National Socialist demands -which pointed the way into the future, he also made -the promise which was to have the gravest repercussions; -that of freeing the world from its Jewish tormentors. How -wonderful it is to know that this great man and leader is -following up this promise with practical action. It will be -the greatest deed in the history of mankind.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='368' id='Page_368'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you say that you are not putting forward propaganda for the -policy of mass extermination which the Nazi Government had set -out to do?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: We too had freedom of the press like democratic -countries. Every author knew of the forecast, which perhaps later -on turned out to be a fact, and could write about it. That is what -I did.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: But for my defense, Mr. Prosecutor, I want to be -allowed to say that wars too can be mass murder, with their bombs, -<span class='it'>et cetera</span>. And if it is proved that someone says that we are forcing -Hitler into war, then I can certainly say that a man who knows -that Hitler is being forced into war is a mass murderer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: With the permission of the Tribunal -I am going to interrupt you again because we are not discussing -whether or not Hitler was forced into war. We will leave that now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Just let us go on and see if you are really speaking the truth in -saying that while you are writing these articles you are not perfectly -well aware of what was happening in the Eastern territories.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We got as far as January 1943. I would like you to just look -at one or two more of the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span> and see if you -remember reading any of these. Will you look at Page 30-B the 26th -of February, in your “B” bundle?</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Exchange reports from the Polish Government circles in -London that Warsaw, Lvov, Lodz and other cities have been -‘liquidated,’ and that nobody from the ghettos remained alive. -The last investigations have ascertained that only about -650,000 Jews remain out of 2,800,000.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Listen to me. Did you read that? Do you remember it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I do not know. For months, perhaps half a year, -we did not get an issue, but if I had read it, I would not have -believed that either.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did you believe Hitler? If you will -turn over the page to 31-B, did you believe Hitler? According to -the last two lines quoted in the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span> of the -5th of March 1943: “Hitler, in his proclamation of 24 February, -again proclaimed the extermination of the Jews in Europe as his -goal.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you believe your own beloved Führer when he was saying -the same things as the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span>, the United -Nations, and <span class='it'>The Times</span> newspaper in London?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: No, I declare that whoever got to know the -Führer’s deepest emotions and his soul, as I have personally, and -<span class='pageno' title='369' id='Page_369'></span> -then later had to learn from his testament that he, in full possession -of his faculties, consciously gave the order for mass extermination, -is confronted with a riddle. I state here...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We really don’t want another long -speech about the Führer. Just turn over the page and look at what -is being said on the 26th of March:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The report of the Polish Government on the measures -against the Jewish population is published in full in the -English press. A passage reads, ‘In the town of Vilna 50,000 -Jews were murdered, in Rovno 14,000; in Lvov half of the -total Jewish population.’</p> - -<p>“Many details are also given about the use of poison gas, as -at Chelm, of electricity in Belzec, of the deportations from -Warsaw, the surrounding of blocks of houses, and of the -attacks with machine guns.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you read that one?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I do not know. However, that shootings must -have occurred, of course, where Jews committed sabotage, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, -is self-evident. During a war that is considered as a matter of -course. However, the figures which are quoted here were just -simply not believable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. I understand you to say that -now, but what I do not understand is what you meant when you -said this morning that the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span> made no mention -of murders and gave no figures. You didn’t say that the figures -were unbelievable; you told this Tribunal, on your oath, that the -newspaper contained nothing except the hints of disappearance, -with no mention of figures. What did you mean by that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I have said the truth under oath, but it is possible -that one might not remember everything. During an interrogation -some time back I stated, based on memory, that an issue must exist -which mentions the disappearance of Jews, and so on. It is in the -<span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span>, and I thought I said that it was in 1943 -and it is true. If one article after the other is put before me—well, -even if I had seen it, how can I remember it? But that I, under -oath, should have deliberately told you an untruth, that is, at any -rate, not so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We will deal with the article you -mention in 1943 in one moment; but just before we do that, just -see if you believe your own staff. Turn, will you, to 38-A, M-139. -Now, on the 6th of May it so happens just after those last three -extracts from the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span> we have looked at, -within 2 or 3 months, 1 or 2 months afterwards your newspaper is -publishing this article. It is headed “Children of the Devil.” -<span class='pageno' title='370' id='Page_370'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“<span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> paid a visit to the ghettos in the East. <span class='it'>Der -Stürmer</span> sent its photographic reporter to various ghettos in -the East; a member of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer’s</span> staff is well acquainted -with the Jews. Nothing can surprise him easily. But what -our contributor saw in these ghettos was a unique experience -for him. He wrote, ‘What my eyes and my Leica camera saw -here convinced me that the Jews are not human beings but -children of the devil and the spawn of crime.... It is hard to -see how it was possible that this scum of humanity was for -centuries looked upon as God’s chosen people by the non-Jews. -... This satanic race really has no right to exist.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, you have heard of what was happening in the ghettos in -the East during 1942 and 1943? Are you really telling this Tribunal -that your photographer went with his camera to those ghettos and -found out nothing about the mass murder of Jews?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes, otherwise he would have reported to us -about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Warsaw ghetto, you remember, -exterminated, wiped out in April 1943. Your photographer must -have been around just about that time, if you were writing this on -the 6th of May, if he had just returned. Did you think he could have -been there looking at ghettos for <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, for Julius Streicher, -the Jew-baiter, and have discovered nothing of what was happening -in the ghetto in Warsaw and elsewhere?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I can only remember that immediately after the -end of the Polish campaign a Viennese reporter went over there, -made films and made reports, in 1942. I would like to ask—is there -a name, a signature there, to show by whom it was written? One -thing I know is that the ghetto was destroyed; I read it in a summary, -an illustrated report which I think originated in the Ministry -of Propaganda. But as to the destruction of the ghetto during an -uprising—well, I consider that legal; from my point of view it was -right. But mass murders in the ghetto in Warsaw are something -I never heard of.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, just let’s look at the article -to which you referred a moment ago. Will you look at 44-A of the -document book?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, this is the same as was included at Page 53 in the -original document book; it was Document Number 1965-PS, Exhibit -Number GB-176, but there is slightly more of the extract quoted at -Page 44-A.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, I just want you to examine for -the last time whether or not you are speaking the truth in telling -the Tribunal that you did not know what was happening. You quote -<span class='pageno' title='371' id='Page_371'></span> -in that article from the Swiss newspaper, the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span>, -of the 27th August 1943—you will see that date, My Lord, in -the middle of the first paragraph—I start now from that line in the -middle:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Swiss Jewish newspaper goes on to say, ‘The Jews of -Europe, with the exception of those in England and of insignificant -Jewish communities in the few neutral countries, -have disappeared, so to speak. The Jewish reservoir of the -East that was able to counterbalance the force of assimilation -in the West no longer exists.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That is the end of your quotation from the newspaper, and you -go on to say:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“This is not a Jewish lie; it is really true that the Jews have, -‘so to speak,’ disappeared from Europe and that the ‘Jewish -reservoir of the East’ from which the Jewish pestilence spread -for centuries among the European nations has ceased to exist. -If the Swiss newspaper wishes to affirm that the Jews did not -expect this kind of development when they plunged the -nations into the second World War, this is to be believed; but -already at the beginning of the war the Führer of the German -Nation prophesied the events that have taken place. He -said that the second World War would swallow those who -had conjured it.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, are you really saying that when that article was written -you did not know how to interpret the word “disappearance,” the -disappearance of the Jews from the East? Are you really telling the -Tribunal that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes, the word “disappear” after all does not mean -extermination <span class='it'>en masse</span>. This deals with a quotation from the -<span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span> and is a repeated quotation of what the -Führer had prophesied.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, now, would you look at the -article from which you quote there, which you will find at Page -36-B; and I would like you to follow it, and we will read the two -together. Now, the particular paragraph which I want to read in -the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span> is that quotation which I have just -read to you and you will find the same quotation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, it starts at the end of the eighth but last line, “The -Jews were” or rather “The Jews of Europe...” Have you got them -in front of you, Defendant?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I shall listen to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It would be better, I think, if you -followed it. I want to help you as much as possible. Page 44-A -and 36-B. I will read slowly first of all from your <span class='it'>Stürmer</span> again: -<span class='pageno' title='372' id='Page_372'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Jews of Europe, with the exception of those in England -and of insignificant Jewish communities in the few neutral -countries, have, so to speak, disappeared...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>and you will see that you then go on in the quotation and say:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“...the Jewish reservoir of the East which was able to counterbalance -the force of assimilation in the West no longer exists.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, would you look at the original article:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Jews of Europe”—this is 36-B—“the Jews of Europe, -with the exception of those in England and of insignificant -Jewish communities in the few neutral countries, have, so to -speak, disappeared.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now—there you go on, “The Jewish reservoir of the East”—the -original goes on—“three million dead, the same number outlawed; -many thousands, all over the world, mentally and physically -broken.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Are you telling this Tribunal now that on the 27th of August, or -when you read that article of the 27th of August, you didn’t know -that Jews were being murdered in the East and that you had not -read of those things in the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Whether I had read it or not, I would not have -believed it, that 3 million Jews had been killed. That is something -I would not have believed, and that is why I left it out, at any rate. -Anyhow, the German censorship would not have allowed the -spreading of something which is not credible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You didn’t read the last part of the line, did -you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: [<span class='it'>Repeating.</span>] “...were mentally and -physically broken. That is the result of the new order.” I am very -much obliged to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] “That is the result,” you say, “of the -‘new order’ in Europe...”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You say you didn’t believe it. Is that what you say now, that -you must have read it—must you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But you just didn’t believe it; is -that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: No, I did not believe it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Even if you didn’t believe it, when -you were reading this newspaper more or less regularly, when your -cameraman had been to the ghettos in the East, did you think it -right to go on, week after week, in your newspaper crying for the -extermination, murder, of the Jews? -<span class='pageno' title='373' id='Page_373'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: That is not correct. It is not true that murder was -demanded week after week. And I repeat again, the sharpening of -our tone was the answer to the voice from America that called for -our mass murder in Germany—eye for eye, tooth for tooth. If a -Jew, Erich Kauffmann, demands mass murders in Germany, then -perhaps I, as an author, can say that the Jews too should be exterminated. -That is a literary matter. But the mass murders had -taken place a long time before without our having known about -them; and I state here that if I had known what had in fact -happened in the East, then I would not have used these quotations -at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But, Defendant, you must have -known then, must you not, after reading that article, after sending -your cameraman, after the United Nations published their declaration, -after Hitler’s prophecies had been made again and again -in his proclamations, after you said his prophecy had been fulfilled? -You really say you didn’t know?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: The cameraman is at your disposal. He is in -Vienna, and I ask to have him brought here. And I state that this -cameraman reported nothing, and could not have reported anything, -about mass murders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think we might adjourn now.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Mr. President, with the permission of the Tribunal, -and in the interest of clarification of the facts, I should like to point -out the following: The Prosecutor, Sir Griffith-Jones, has mentioned -a document, Page 38-A from <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> of 6 May 1943. That -seems to be an error, because we are dealing here with <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> -of 6 March 1943.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That date is of the greatest importance because if the photographer -of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> published a report of 6 March in <span class='it'>Der -Stürmer</span>, then he must have been at the ghetto in Warsaw before -6 March 1943. Presumably...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Why do you say 6 March? The document I -have before me has 6 May.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There has been a mistake, I am -afraid, in the German that Dr. Marx has. I have the original before -me, which is 6 May 1943.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Excuse me. At the present moment I cannot recall -when the destruction of the ghetto of Warsaw took place. That was -Document 1061-PS. -<span class='pageno' title='374' id='Page_374'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I cannot remember for the moment -the number of the document, but the date was, I think from -memory, from the 1st to the 23rd of April.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Then, of course, my remark is without foundation. -Please excuse me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now we had just dealt with the -<span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span> issue for 27 August, the copy that you -quoted from. I just refer you to one more copy of that newspaper. -Would you look at Page 37-B, which is an issue of 10 September -1943:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Statistics presented by the Convening Committee showed -that 5 millions out of the 8.5 million Jews of Europe had died -or been deported ... About 3 million Jews had lost their -lives through forced labor and deportation.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you read that one?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I do not know, and again I would not have believed -it. To this day I do not believe that 5 million were killed. -I consider it technically impossible that that could have happened. -I do not believe it. I have not received proof of that up until now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is quite clear that there were -plenty of figures for you, quoted in this <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span> -over the period that we are discussing. Plenty of figures, it now -turns out, doesn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Pardon?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We will go on. Now, I just want -to put one or two further articles of your own to you. You remember -what I am suggesting, that you are inciting the German people -to murder. We know now that at least you had read one article in -the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span> where murder is mentioned. I just -want to see what you go on to publish in your own paper after -that date.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Would you look at Page 47-A. This is an article by yourself on -6 January 1944. This is after you had been living on your estate -for some time.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“After the National Socialist uprising in Germany, a development -began in Europe, too, from which one can expect that -it will free this continent for all time of the Jewish disintegrator -and exploiter of nations; and, over and above this, -that the German example will, after a victorious termination -of the second World War, bring about the destruction of the -Jewish world tormentor on the other continents as well.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>What example was the German nation setting to the other -nations of the world? What example do you mean there? -<span class='pageno' title='375' id='Page_375'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: This article corroborates what I have been saying -all along. I spoke of an international solution of the Jewish question. -I was convinced that if Germany had won this war or had been -victorious over Bolshevism, then the world would have agreed that -an understanding should be reached with the other nations for an -international solution of the Jewish question. If I wrote here about -destruction, it is not to be understood as destruction by mass killing; -as I have said, that is an expression; I have to point out that I do -not believe that Erich Kauffmann really wanted to kill the German -people by sterilization, but he wrote it, and we sometimes wrote -in the same manner, echoing the sounds that we heard in the other -camp.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You have not yet told us what is -this international solution that you are advocating by talking about -extermination; if it is not murder, what is it? What is the solution?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I have already said that I founded the Anti-Semitic -Union, and through this Anti-Semitic Union we wanted to create -movements among the nations which should, above and beyond -governments, act in such a way that an international possibility -would be created, such as has been represented today here in this -Trial—thus, I conceived it, to form an international congress center -which would solve the Jewish question by the creation of a Jewish -state and thereby destroy the power of the Jews within the nations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That is your answer—that you -were advocating a Jewish state? Is that all that this comes to? Is -it simply that you were advocating a Jewish national home? Is that -what you have been talking about in all these extracts that we have -read? Is that the solution which you are advocating?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Well, I do not know what you want with that -question. Of course, that is the solution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Let us just go on now. -Turn to Page 48-A now, will you? This is 24 January 1944, -“Whoever does what a Jew does is a scoundrel, a criminal, and he -who repeats and wishes to copy him deserves the same fate—annihilation, -death.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Are you still advocating a national Jewish home?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes, that has nothing to do with the big political -plan. If you take every statement by a writer, every statement -from a daily newspaper, as an example, and want to prove a political -aim by it, then you miss the point. You have to distinguish -between a newspaper article and a great political aim.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, let us just turn now to -the next page, 2 March 1944, “Eternal night must come over the -<span class='pageno' title='376' id='Page_376'></span> -born criminal race of Jews so that eternal day may bless awakening -non-Jewish mankind.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Were they going to have eternal night in their national Jewish -state? Is that what you wanted?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: That is an anti-Semitic play of words. Again it -has nothing to do with the great political aim.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It may be an anti-Semitic play of -words, but the only meaning it can have is murder. Is that not true?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you turn to the next page, -25 May 1944; and I remind you that these are all after you must -have read of the murder in <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span>. I quote the -second paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“How can we overcome this danger and restore humanity to -health? Just as the individual human being is able to defend -himself against contagious diseases only if he proclaims war -against the cause of the disease, the germ, so the world can -be restored to health only when the most terrible germ of all -times, the Jew, has been removed. It is of no avail to battle -against the outward symptoms of the world disease without -rendering the morbific agents innocuous. The disease will -break out again sooner or later. The cause and the carrier of -the disease, the germ, will see to that. But if the nations are -to be restored to health and are to remain healthy in the -future, then the germ of the Jewish world plague must be -destroyed, root and branch.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is that what you mean? Are you saying there when you say -“must be destroyed root and branch”—did you mean to say “ought -to be given a Jewish national state”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes, it is a far cry from such a statement in an -article to the act, or to the will, to commit mass murder.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Turn over to the 10th of August. -“When it loses this struggle, Judaism will be ruined, then the Jew -will be extinguished. Then will Judaism be annihilated down to -the last man.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Are we to read from these words: Provide the Jews with a -Jewish national state?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: That is a vision of the future. I would like to call -it an expression of a prophetic vision. But it is not incitement to -kill 5 million Jews. That is an opinion, a matter, of belief, of conviction. -<span class='pageno' title='377' id='Page_377'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is the prophetic vision of what -you wanted, is it not—of what you have been advocating now for -the last 4 years—the beginning of the war? Isn’t that what it is?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Mr. Prosecutor, I cannot tell you today what I -may have been thinking years ago at a certain moment when -writing an article. But still I admit that when I saw lying before -me on the table declarations from the Jewish front, many declarations -saying, “the German nation has to be destroyed; bomb the -cities, do not spare women, children, or old men”—if one has declarations -like these in front of one, it is possible that things will come -from one’s pen such as I have often written.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You know, do you not, now, even -if you do not believe the full figures, that millions of Jews have -been murdered since the beginning of the war? Do you know that? -You have heard the evidence, have you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I believe it...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only wanted to know whether -you had heard that evidence. You can answer “yes” or “no,” and -I presume it will be “yes.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Yes, I have to say, evidence for me is only the -testament of the Führer. There he states that the mass executions -took place upon his orders. That I believe. Now I believe it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you think that it would have -been possible to carry out the extermination of 6 million Jews in -1921? Do you think the German people would have stood for it? -Do you think it would have been possible under any regime in 1921 -to have carried out the murder of 6 million men, women, and -children of the Jewish race?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Whether that would have been possible with the -knowledge of the people—no, it would not have been possible. The -prosecutor himself has said here that since 1937 the Party had full -control over the people. Now even if the people had known this, -according to the opinion of the Prosecution, they could not have -done anything against that dictatorship because of that control. -But the people did not know it. That is my belief, my conviction, -and my knowledge.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Was it possible to exterminate -people in that way only after some 20 years of incitement and -propaganda by you and other Nazis? Is that what made that -possible?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: I deny that the population was incited. It was -enlightened, and sometimes a harsh word may have been directed -<span class='pageno' title='378' id='Page_378'></span> -against the other side as an answer. It was enlightenment, not -incitement. And if we want to keep our place before history I have -to state again and again that the German people did not want any -killings, whether individually or <span class='it'>en masse</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am not going to let you go into -another history about the German people. I am going to remind -you of what you have said...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: Adolf Hitler...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am going to remind you of what -you said yesterday. I read from the transcript: You speak of a -Jewish question at the time—that is 1923—“I would like to say that -the public distinguished Jews only by their religion; to speak about -a Jewish problem then would have been nonsense.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Was that because there was no Jewish problem then, and that -the Jewish problem had only been created by you and the Nazi -regime?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER: It was my aim, and I reached that goal in part: -If the laws which in the future should make impossible sexual -intercourse between different races, that is to say if that should -become law—then it would make the public realize that to be a Jew -is not a point of religion but of people and race. I helped to create -that basis. But mass killings were not the result of the enlightenment, -or as the Prosecution say, incitement. Mass killings were -the last acts of will of a great man of history who was probably -desperate because he saw that he would not win.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I have no further questions. Perhaps -I might be allowed to just sort out the exhibits and then -mention to the Tribunal their numbers. If the Tribunal would -agree, those that I have put in evidence, which are the other parts -of the bundle other than I have actually quoted from—perhaps I -could put them all in as one number and hand the exhibits in to -the clerk, if that would be the convenient course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think so, yes. If they are in one bundle -and you are going to give one number to a number of documents, -it had better be in one bundle, had it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, do you want to re-examine?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I do not consider it necessary any more.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to the dock. -Dr. Marx, will you continue the defendant’s case?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I call now, with the permission of the Court, the -witness Fritz Herrwerth. -<span class='pageno' title='379' id='Page_379'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Herrwerth took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRITZ HERRWERTH (Witness): Fritz Herrwerth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear -by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You may sit down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: How long have you known the Defendant Streicher?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Since the Party Rally in 1934.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: When did you enter his service and in what -capacity?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: I was employed on 15 October 1934, in Nuremberg, -not in the personal service of Herr Streicher himself, but in -the municipal motor pool. However, I worked for the then Gauleiter -Streicher.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: When did you leave that service?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: In August 1943.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: For what reason?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: It was a personal dispute, and mainly due to -my fault.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did you have any other tasks to carry out for Herr -Streicher?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: And which?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Well, whatever came up. I also did agricultural -work at the end.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Thus you were very often with Streicher?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: And therefore you knew about the most important -incidents during that period?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Yes. I do not know, however, what you call -important incidents. There were things that I do not know about, -that is, at least I assume that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I will ask you later in detail.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Yes, if you please.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: The Defendant Streicher is accused of having caused -acts of violence against the Jews and of having participated in -these acts. Do you know of any such case? -<span class='pageno' title='380' id='Page_380'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Not a single one.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Will you please wait until the end of my question, -and then I shall say “end of question.” On 9 November 1938, did -you drive Streicher back to Nuremberg from Munich, and when? -End of question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: It was on 9 November, yes. I do not know the -time exactly. At that time Streicher left Munich a bit earlier, and -it may have been about—I do not know for sure—9 o’clock perhaps.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did Streicher know already during that ride back -that something was to be done that night against the Jewish -population?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: No, he knew nothing about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Then, during the night of 9 November, did you -witness a conversation between Streicher and the SA Leader, Von -Obernitz?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Where did that conversation take place?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: In order to answer that question, I have to -explain a little further. When Herr Streicher went to bed, I was -usually with him or the house superintendent. On that evening -Herr Streicher went to bed earlier than usual. I do not know the -reason. And that concluded my work for the day. I went from Herr -Streicher to the Casino of the Gauleitung. That was in the cellar -of the Gauleitung building on Schlageterstrasse. I played cards -there. And then the former SA Obergruppenführer, Von Obernitz, -came and called me, as was customary, by the name of Fritz and -told me he had to speak to Herr Streicher very urgently; and I -answered him that Herr Streicher had already gone to bed. Then -he said, “Then I must rouse him,” and he told me he would assume -the responsibility; it was an important affair. Herr Von Obernitz -went to Herr Streicher’s apartment in my car. Herr Streicher’s -bedroom is above my apartment. I had the keys and of course I -could get in at any time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the way to the apartment at night I noticed that many SA -men were in the streets. I asked Herr Von Obernitz the reason -for that. He told me that that night something was going to happen; -the Jewish homes were to be destroyed. He did not say anything -further to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I accompanied Herr Von Obernitz all the way to the bed of -Herr Streicher. Herr Von Obernitz then reported to Streicher about -what was happening that night. I cannot recall the details very -well any more, but I believe that he said that that night the Jewish -homes were to be destroyed. Herr Streicher was, if I may say so, -<span class='pageno' title='381' id='Page_381'></span> -surprised. He had not known anything about it. He said literally -to Herr Von Obernitz, and I remember that very clearly, “That is -wrong. One does not solve the Jewish question that way. Do what -you have been ordered. I shall have no part in it. If anything -should occur so that you need me, then you may come for me.” -I can also mention that thereupon Herr Von Obernitz said that -Hitler had declared that the SA should be allowed to have a fling -as retribution for what had occurred in Paris in connection with -Herr Vorn Rath. Streicher stayed in bed and did not go out during -that night.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did Herr Von Obernitz mention anything about the -fact that the synagogues were to be set on fire?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: I believe so, yes. But, as far as I remember, -Herr Streicher refused to do that, too, because the synagogue, as -far as I know, was burned down by the regular fire department, -and upon orders from Herr Von Obernitz.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: How do you know that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: I was there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did you watch it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Yes. I was at the synagogue during the night.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: And how could one assume that the regular fire -department started the fire?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: How that could be assumed I do not know, but -I saw it. The regular fire department started the fire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Were you there in time to see how the fire was -started or did you arrive when the building was already on fire?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: The building was not yet on fire, but the fire -department was there already.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: I can say nothing else.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did Herr Streicher at that time mention anything -about the fact that he was afraid of a new wave of excitement on -the part of the world press if the synagogue was burned? Did he -say that that is why he refused to do it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: I believe so, yes, but I could not say definitely; -but, if I remember correctly, they spoke about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did Obernitz say from whom he had received the -order?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: He only repeated what Hitler had said—the SA -should be allowed to have a fling. -<span class='pageno' title='382' id='Page_382'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Is it correct that you, Witness, told your wife -during the same night about that conversation between Obernitz -and Streicher?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: I believe I did not speak about the conversation; -but when I walked down from the second floor to the ground floor -through my apartment, I told my wife that I would probably be a -little late because that night that action was going to be started; -I told her briefly what was happening but nothing about the conversation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Then, later you were at the Pleikershof when -Streicher had been forced to retire there or had retired?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Do you remember an incident where the future -Frau Streicher spoke about the incidents at Magdeburg which had -occurred there the same night?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: No, I know nothing of that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did you not tell the then Frau Merkel that she -should not talk about these incidents because Streicher always got -very excited about them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: I can recall that Herr Streicher once said that -he had been right in his opinion, for, not long after that night he -received information—I do not know through whom—that, for -instance, the glass for the window panes had to be bought from -Holland again. Herr Streicher said then that that was the first confirmation -of the correctness of the opinion he had expressed at -that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, just one moment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Sir David, would it be convenient to you and the counsel for the -Defendant Von Schirach if we discussed the question about the -documents at 0930 tomorrow morning?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I will find out. Yes, -counsel for Von Schirach says that he thinks it is all right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, 0930 tomorrow morning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: What observations did you make during your stay -at Pleikershof about the attitude of Streicher with regard to the -Jewish question? What was that about the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Well, what do you want to know about the -<span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span>? Herr Streicher received it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did he receive it regularly? -<span class='pageno' title='383' id='Page_383'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Yes, I believe I can say that quite certainly. I -always saw large bundles of newspapers of the <span class='it'>Israelitisches -Wochenblatt</span>. They came continuously.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Herr Streicher said that during the first years of -the war he had great difficulty in getting that paper and the Police -did not release it easily.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Yes, that can very well be. For I do not know, -after all, of what year they were. I just saw them and it is difficult -for me to tell now of what date these papers were.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes, you said there were always large bundles -of them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Yes, on and off, but there were other newspapers -too. Swiss newspapers were there, the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span>, -and so on. There were always so many newspapers lying -about and among them I saw here and there the <span class='it'>Israelitisches -Wochenblatt</span>. I mean to say that it would not be possible for me -to say how many there were.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: All right. Did Streicher speak at times about his -knowledge of happenings in the East or of happenings in concentration -camps in the East?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Well. Herr Streicher did not know anything at -all about it. Thus he could not say anything about it. At least that -is my conviction.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did you, then, ever speak to him about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Not that I know of; I did not know anything -about it myself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did you ever receive knowledge of a letter in which -Streicher was reproached by Reichsführer SS Himmler because he -treated the French prisoners too well? Did you understand me?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Yes, I understood, but I have to think about it. -I know quite well that Herr Streicher once mentioned something -about the treatment of prisoners. I know that the Frenchmen were -treated very well, but whether the cause for that was a letter from -Himmler I do not know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: No, no. The cause for the good treatment, you mean?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: No, the cause for Herr Streicher’s speaking about -it. Herr Streicher spoke about reproaches against the good treatment -of the Frenchmen; but I do not know whether the fact that -he spoke about it was due to a letter from Himmler. But I do not -believe that there was a single Frenchman who could complain in -any way about the treatment. -<span class='pageno' title='384' id='Page_384'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: You were no longer present when the Frenchmen -left?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Do you know about an incident when the publisher -Fink came into the garden of Streicher’s home and admitted having -lied to the police in an affair concerning shares?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: The question must be put in detail, Mr. Attorney, -for I do not know all about it, only part of it. I know that the -then Director Fink stood in tears before Streicher, that he wailed, -that he accused himself, saying that he was a rascal and a traitor. -But why, I do not know. For Herr Streicher then walked farther -into the garden with him, and I only saw that Herr Fink wept, and -again heard how he accused himself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Do you know that Streicher at certain intervals -brought people from the SPD and the KPD (Social Democratic -Party and Communist Party) from the Dachau Concentration Camp?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: How many do you suppose there were?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: I do not know. It was every year around Christmas -time. I estimate that there were about 100 to 150 men every -year. They came from Dachau. Herr Streicher had dinner prepared -for them in a separate room, in the Hotel Deutscher Hof, and I -believe that used to be the family reunion—that is to say, the -prisoners rejoined the members of their family. Streicher also saw -to it that released prisoners found work, and he intervened personally -for them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did he also get work for one or another of these -released persons?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: What do you know about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: I remember that three men, I believe, came into -the Mars motorcycle factory. Herr Streicher at that time told the -plenipotentiary of the German Labor Front to find positions for -these people, as far as I remember.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: What was the attitude of Streicher when he found -out that members of the Party had acquired cars and villas of -Jewish property at very low prices?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: I can still remember when Herr Streicher returned -from Berlin. I do not know how much Herr Streicher knew -at that time about these purchases; but at any rate, when Herr -Streicher returned from Berlin where Herr Göring had expressed -his views about these low-priced purchases of buildings, Herr -<span class='pageno' title='385' id='Page_385'></span> -Streicher, just arrived at the Nuremberg railroad station, said—and -I heard it myself—that these purchases had to be nullified -at once.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Besides, I know only about one case where a Party member had -to do with the purchase of a house. I do not know whether there -were more of them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Do you know whether Streicher was under surveillance -by the Gestapo while on his farm and that there was a prohibition -against visiting him there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: In answering the first question, I cannot say for -sure that Criminal Police agents were there. I cannot affirm categorically -that Herr Streicher was once under observation, but it -could be safely assumed. I know of a woman who even stated that -she had been photographed in the forest when she came from the -railroad station to the farm. And what was the second question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Whether people were prohibited from visiting him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Yes. I met various members of the Party within -the city and whomever I asked said to me, “Impossible to get out -there, impossible to get out there.” And if I asked who had issued -the prohibition, then no one would talk about it; but as one heard -it here and there, this prohibition was said to have been issued -by the Deputy of the Führer, Herr Hess.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Do you know anything about the fact that Streicher, -when he found out that acts of violence against Jews or other -political adversaries were intended, stopped them immediately?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Yes. At least, on the basis of his statements. -He always said that that was wrong.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Do you know of any case where he took measures -against somebody who had been a party to such acts of violence? -If you do not know it, say you do not know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Very well, at this moment I cannot recall any -case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Do you know anything about that affair concerning -the Mars Works shares? What do you know about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Yes. I know about that case through statements -made by Streicher at that time. I was not a witness to these events -myself, but Herr Streicher once related to me what had happened. -Shall I describe it briefly?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes, but very condensed, please.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Streicher was in a Turkish bath at the time -when the Director Fink and his adjutant, König, came and offered -to sell the shares to Herr Streicher. Herr Streicher said, “What -<span class='pageno' title='386' id='Page_386'></span> -kind of shares are they?” The answer was, “They are shares of -the Mars Works.” He said, “How many?” The answer was “100,000 -marks’ worth.” Then Streicher said, “What do the shares cost?” -He was told “5,000 marks.” Herr Streicher asked, “Why are these -shares so cheap?” Finally Herr Fink said, I believe, “Because they -are Jewish shares.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Whoever knows Herr Streicher as I do, knows that Herr Streicher -has never taken anything from a Jew. He protested very emphatically -against the fact that such an offer had been made to him -at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That seemed to settle the matter for the time being, and then -suddenly the then Gauleiter Herr Streicher had the thought that -with that money he could possibly construct the third Gau building. -He mentioned that to the gentlemen as they left, and they -decided to buy the shares. Herr Streicher forbade them to use Party -money. Then both did not know what to do. Herr Streicher said -he would advance these 5,000 marks.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That settled the case, but I had another experience later. It -was about one and a half years after that trial that Streicher had -had in Munich, when he was dismissed. At that time the wife of -NSKK Obergruppenführer Zühlen came to me and asked whether -I already knew that the criminal police was again in Nuremberg -concerning the Streicher case. I said “no” to Frau Zühlen and -added, “If they want to find out something why do they not come -out to the farm to Herr Streicher himself? He will give them all -the necessary information.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After about 2 to 3 weeks, I met the Director of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, -Fischer, successor to Herr Fink. He told me—but I would like to -mention first that the shares, together with the 5,000 marks, were -confiscated from Herr Streicher. The then Director Fischer told -me that on that same day he had received a phone call from the -trustee association, and that the trustee association had reported -to Director Fischer that they had transferred to the account of -<span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> the 5,000 marks which Streicher at that time had advanced -for the purchase of the shares.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, do you not think he is going into -rather too much detail about this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Yes, I will make it shorter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The man from the trustee association said that the 5,000 marks -were released because the innocence of Streicher had been proved -in this matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: You witnessed the Supreme Party Court session at -that time? -<span class='pageno' title='387' id='Page_387'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: What did Herr Fink say at that time? Did he not -accuse himself again of having made false statements?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: I was not present when Herr Fink was questioned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Very well. Then I would like to ask you, were you -present when the incident in Munich occurred at the Künstlerhaus -Inn—with the man who accosted Streicher?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Can you give us a description of how that incident -occurred?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Well, Herr Streicher left the inn after dinner. -I cannot remember the exact words any more, but I am going to -try to describe it as well as possible. Herr Streicher left the inn, -and as he went out that man approached Herr Streicher in a—may -I say—improper manner. Streicher continued on his way and was -silent at first. He asked the people around him, myself also, whether -we knew that man. Nobody knew him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then Herr Streicher sent his son, Lothar, back into the room -again to speak to the man and to ask him what the reason was for -such behavior. Lothar Streicher came out and said that the man -had behaved in just the same manner again.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Will you please be more brief? You should only -tell us how that incident occurred and what caused you and also -Herr Streicher to use violence against the man.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: You mean his behavior?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes. What happened then?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERRWERTH: Herr Streicher asked the landlord for a room, -and in that room Streicher spoke to the man personally. There -again the man made offensive remarks, and then it came to blows, -first with Lothar Streicher. Now, as it happened, he was a strong -man, and of course all of us helped to get him down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: All right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am through with the questioning of this witness, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel want to ask -any questions? Do any of the Prosecution Counsel wish to cross-examine? -Then the witness can retire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness left the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Then I should like to call the witness Wurzbacher, -if he is available. Is he not? I do not know which one of the -witnesses is still in the witness room. Is there anyone? Wurzbacher? -Hiemer? -<span class='pageno' title='388' id='Page_388'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): Frau Streicher is available.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is not the witness Wurzbacher here?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL: I will see, Sir. He was not here a while ago. He -was not called for.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What other witnesses have you got, Dr. Marx?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: The wife of the defendant could be called as a -witness now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, let her be called then.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL: The witness Strobel is available now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx wants to call Frau Streicher.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. If it is rather difficult -to call Frau Streicher, then the witness...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Frau Streicher took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you give me your full name?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU ADELE STREICHER (Witness): Adele Streicher, born -Tappe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear -by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You may sit down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Your maiden name is Tappe and you were born -in Magdeburg?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Were you a member of the NSDAP or of the -Frauenschaft?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: When did you become Herr Streicher’s secretary -and for how long were you in that job?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: On 7 June 1940, I became Julius Streicher’s -secretary and I remained in that job until the end of the war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: And during that period, you were continuously on -his farm?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: Yes, I was always with him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Were you also in charge of all the correspondence -for Herr Streicher?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: What did that correspondence mainly consist of? -<span class='pageno' title='389' id='Page_389'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: Mainly letters to his sons and to relatives.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: What were Streicher’s activities during that period -of 5 years?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: Julius Streicher did mainly physical work; -that is, agriculture and gardening, and from time to time he wrote -articles for <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: During these 5 years did he leave the farm at all -or was he ever absent from the farm for any length of time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: During the first few years of his stay -there Julius Streicher did not leave the farm at all; later, once in -a while, he would pay a visit in the neighborhood. His longest -absence did not comprise an entire day and never a single night.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did you know that it was prohibited for prominent -Party members to visit Herr Streicher?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: Yes, there was such a prohibition.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: How did you know that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: From conversations. Then, too, I myself -remember, when Dr. Goebbels visited the farm, that Julius Streicher -said to him, “Doctor, you dare to come here? Do you not know -that it is prohibited by the Party chiefs to visit me?”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: When did the visits of Dr. Ley and Dr. Goebbels -occur?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: Dr. Ley came to the farm on 7 May 1944. -The visit of Dr. Goebbels occurred on 4 June 1944.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Would you please describe the character of these -visits and what was the subject of the conversations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: Both visits were of a rather unofficial -character. Dr. Ley wanted mainly to know how Julius Streicher -was doing, personally. No political questions were raised. Ley -said only, “Streicher, the Führer is waiting for you.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: And what did Streicher say to that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: Julius Streicher answered that he had -become accustomed to his solitude, that he was happy as a farmer, -and that Ley should tell the Führer that he, Streicher, wanted -nothing more. At the visit of Dr. Goebbels the subject of the conversation -dealt mainly with Julius Streicher’s dismissal from his -office as Gauleiter, and Dr. Goebbels was of the opinion that Julius -Streicher should return into the circle of old Party members; but -he gave him the same answer, “Tell the Führer I wish for nothing.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Were you always present during these conversations? -<span class='pageno' title='390' id='Page_390'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Was not the Jewish question a subject of these conversations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: No, they never spoke about the Jewish -question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did they not speak about the happenings in the -Eastern territories, or in the concentration camps?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: No, that never came up any more.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did not Streicher speak to you about the articles he -intended to write for <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, and did he not also speak about -what he considered to be the solution of the Jewish problem?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: From all conversations with Julius -Streicher I could see with certainty that he never thought of the -solution of the Jewish question in terms of violence, but hoped -for the emigration of Jews from Europe and their settlement in -territories outside Europe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Was Herr Streicher in correspondence with leading -personalities of the Party or of the State?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: No, neither personally nor by correspondence -was there any such connection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I will now mention several names, of whom I want -you to tell me whether they had any connection with him: Himmler, -Heydrich, Bormann, or other leading men of the Police or the SS -or the Gestapo.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: No, I know nothing of any of these men. -With the exception of one letter from Herr Himmler there was -never any mail.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: What was the reason for that letter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: In that letter Herr Himmler complained -about the fact that the French prisoners of war who were employed -on our Pleikershof farm were treated too well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: How was the treatment of the prisoners of war and -the foreign civilian workers on the farm?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: On the Pleikershof eight French prisoners -of war, one Polish girl, and one Slovene girl were employed. They -were all treated very well and very humanely. Each service for -which Julius Streicher asked, each piece of work for which he asked -personally, was especially rewarded with tobacco, pastry, fruit, or -even money. Such cordial relations developed with some of the -Frenchmen during the years that they were there that they assured -us, with tears in their eyes at their departure, that they would -visit Julius Streicher after the war with their families. -<span class='pageno' title='391' id='Page_391'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did Streicher not finally receive credible information -about these mass executions in the East?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: I believe he found out about it through -Swiss newspapers in 1944. We were never informed about it officially.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: But it is asserted that he already had knowledge -before that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: You do not know anything about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: I only know about the Swiss newspapers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Very well. You once brought up the subject, in a -conversation, that in Magdeburg, from the 9 to 10 November 1938, -you witnessed the demonstration against the Jews and that you -were revolted by it. Is that true?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: Yes, I spoke about it and said that I was -shocked at this action. Julius Streicher got very excited during -that conversation and said, “Such nonsense occurred in Nuremberg -also. That is not anti-Semitism; that is just great stupidity.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Is it correct that Herr Streicher was hardly interested -in the financial affairs of the publishing firm and left these -things to the manager?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: Julius Streicher never bothered about -financial affairs at all, neither in the house nor in the firm. Again -and again the gentlemen of the firm were disappointed when they -wanted to report about annual balances or the like and Julius -Streicher would tell them, “Do not worry me with your business -matters. There are other things besides that are more important -than money.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: How did he take care of the household expenses, -then?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: I received 1,000 marks every month from -the firm. That provided for the household, presents, and so on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Do you know that he is supposed to have acquired -shares through illegal pressure against a Jewish banker?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: That is completely out of the question. I -consider it quite impossible that Julius Streicher acquired shares -that way. I believe that he does not even know what a share looks -like.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did he not tell you anything about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: I only heard that he never received shares. -<span class='pageno' title='392' id='Page_392'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: How did it come about that you and the defendant -were married as late as April 1945?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you understand the question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: Yes. Julius Streicher wanted to take part in -the fighting in Nuremberg. I wanted to accompany him, so he -married me before we left. We wanted to die together.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Then you left the Pleikershof with him, and where -did you go from there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: First we wanted to go to Nuremberg, and -that was refused for fear of difficulties with the authorities. So we -drove in the direction of Munich. In Munich we were told to continue -in the direction of Passau. From Passau they sent us to -Berchtesgaden; from Berchtesgaden they sent us to Kitzbühel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: How did it happen that the original intention to die -together was not followed up? What caused him to change his mind?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: The cause for that was a conversation with -three young soldiers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: And what was that? I will be through right away, -Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you should go into that, -Dr. Marx.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Well, then. I will forego the question. Only one more -question: Is it correct that Streicher gave the managers of his -publishing firm a written power of attorney which meant that they -could dispose of the money as they saw fit?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRAU STREICHER: Yes, Julius Streicher gave the power of -attorney to whoever happened to be the manager of the firm, and -thereby gave him his full confidence without any restrictions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Mr. President, I have no more questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to -ask any questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Does the Prosecution wish to ask any questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire, and the Court -will adjourn until 0930 tomorrow morning.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 30 April 1946 at 0930 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='393' id='Page_393'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH DAY</span><br/> Tuesday, 30 April 1946</h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, were you going to deal with these -questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, Mr. President, I am prepared to do so. Shall I -proceed to take up those documents about which we have some -difficulty?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you will, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Altogether, there are some 118 documents submitted -on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach. As a result of our conversations -we have agreed on all but—I believe the number is -twelve.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The first group, Numbers 30, 31, 45, 68, 73, 101, 109, 124, and 133, -are all excerpts from a book entitled, <span class='it'>Look, the Heart of Europe</span>, -written by a man named Stanley McClatchie. They are excerpts -referring to the Hitler Youth organization, and we do object to -them on the ground that they are all irrelevant and immaterial here. -They describe Hitler Youth meetings at homes and Hitler health -programs and Hitler athletic competitions and Hitler Youth Land -Service and that sort of thing. There are general descriptions by -Mr. McClatchie of some activities of the Hitler Youth organization. -They are all, I say, from that same book—none of them written by -the defendant himself. They were published in 1937.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, Document Number 118 (a) is a letter. It is unsigned, -except that it is typewritten. It is by Colin Ross and his wife and -it appears to be a suicide note setting forth the reasons why Ross -and his wife intended to commit suicide. We have been unable to -determine its probative value and do not see any probative value in -it, insofar as the issues concerning this defendant are concerned. He -apparently was acquainted with the Defendant Von Schirach and -that is the claim, I assume, of counsel for Von Schirach, that it sheds -some light of some kind on Von Schirach’s attitude. But it is not -clear to us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The third document is Number 121. This is a quotation from the -United States Army newspaper, <span class='it'>The Stars and Stripes</span>, issue of the -21st of February 1946. It is about the training of young people in -<span class='pageno' title='394' id='Page_394'></span> -Yugoslavia at the present time. With respect to this we also say -that we believe it to be immaterial here and not relevant and not -bearing on the issues concerning this defendant as charged in the -Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Those three—the first group and the two, 118 and 121, are the -only documents concerning which we have any controversy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Eleven.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am sorry. I said twelve.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Von Schirach): Mr. -President, the first group of documents to which the Prosecution -has objected are from a book by an American, McClatchie.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This American, as he himself writes in the book, is of Scottish -descent, and in the year 1936—that was the year of the Olympic -Games—visited Germany; he was able to see for himself the conditions -in Germany and the development of the German people -during the first years of the Hitler regime, and here he describes -the impressions he received.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Normally, I would not attach any special value to this book, if it -were not for the fact that the preface shows that the book was -written on suggestion of the Defendant Baldur von Schirach.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The defendant, as he will explain in the course of his own -examination, began very early to build up a pleasant and friendly -relationship especially with the United States, and this book by -McClatchie is one of the many means which the Defendant Von -Schirach used for that purpose. The author himself admits in the -preface of his book that he obtained a large part of the material for -the book from the Defendant Von Schirach. This fact lends to the -book an importance, with respect to its relevancy for the purposes -of this Trial in the defense of Von Schirach, entirely different from -what it would have been had it been written quite independently -of Von Schirach. That is, we have to evaluate the statements and -descriptions in this book more or less as though they were statements -of the Defendant Von Schirach himself. This is the main -reason why I have submitted the book with the request that I be -permitted to quote in evidence some short passages, particularly -those referring to the Youth Leadership. The rest of the book, -which is also interesting but has no direct connection with the -Youth Leadership of the Defendant Von Schirach, have not mentioned; -I refer only to a few short extracts which shed light exclusively -on the activity and the aims of the Defendant Von -Schirach; and, besides, they are intended to show you, Gentlemen, -what impression even a foreigner gained of this activity, although -naturally he had come to Germany with a certain prejudice which -had to be overcome by his personal impressions. -<span class='pageno' title='395' id='Page_395'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>That, Mr. President, is what I wanted to say to the first group, -which the prosecutor listed individually from Numbers 30 to 133.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The second group consists of Number 118(a) of the Document -Book Schirach, and that is a letter of farewell which the explorer, -Dr. Colin Ross, left behind.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If the prosecutor objects that the letter bears no signature, the -fact, in my opinion, is not particularly important. What we have -submitted is the original copy of that last letter, and this original -copy was found among the papers of Dr. Colin Ross.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, the Prosecution ask: What has that farewell letter by -Dr. Colin Ross to do with the charges against Schirach? I ask the -Tribunal to recall that the name of Dr. Colin Ross has been mentioned -here repeatedly. He is the explorer—I believe an American -by birth but I am not certain at the moment. He is the man who -for many years was not only a close friend of Schirach’s but one -whom the Defendant Von Schirach used again and again in order -to prevent the outbreak of a war with the United States, and later, -to terminate the war and to bring about peace with the United -States. When the evidence is presented, these points will be clarified -in detail, I believe. I now submit the last letter of Dr. Colin -Ross...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: When was it dated?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: One moment please. The date is 30 April 1945. -I consider the letter—it is only one page long—important for the -reason that in it a man, at a moment before he committed suicide -with his wife because he was desperate about the future of Germany, -at this moment—in the face of death, he again confirmed the -fact that he, together with the Defendant Von Schirach, continuously -endeavored to maintain peace particularly with the United States. -I believe, Gentlemen, that such a man...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Where was he at the time when, as I understand -you to say, he committed suicide?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Defendant Von Schirach...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, no, the man who wrote the letter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: One moment, please. The Defendant Von Schirach -had a small house in Upper Bavaria in Urfeld on the Walchensee, -and in that house Colin Ross lived at the time with his wife, and -it was here in Schirach’s house that he committed suicide.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The letter is only one page, and it would not cause any considerable -delay in the proceedings if it were read.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, Gentlemen, the third group to which the Prosecution -objects again consists of one number only—a comparatively short -article from <span class='it'>The Stars and Stripes</span>, Number 121. That edition of -<span class='pageno' title='396' id='Page_396'></span> -which I shall submit the original in evidence is of 21 February 1946, -that is, of this year. It explains in detail how the education of youth -in Yugoslavia has now been reorganized by Marshal Tito, and the -Defendant Von Schirach attaches particular value to this document -because it proves that in Yugoslavia a definitely military education -of youth has been decided upon this very year. The Defendant Von -Schirach therefore desires to make a comparison between the kind -of education which he promoted and the Yugoslav education of -youth which has been adopted only this year, and which goes very -much further than the program of the Defendant Von Schirach did -at any time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, may I make just one or two short -observations? I realize that ordinarily the Tribunal does not want -to hear from counsel twice, but there are two matters I feel I -should clear up.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First of all, this book, <span class='it'>Look, the Heart of Europe</span>, which may -have been written by this man McClatchie, who, counsel says, is an -American of Scotch ancestry—I think it is important that the -Tribunal know that it was published in Germany. I am sure that -counsel did not mean to imply that it was an American publication -because, other than having been written by this man, it was -published over here after he attended the Olympic Games in 1936.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And in the German language, I suppose?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, and the German title was <span class='it'>Sieh: Das Herz -Europas</span>. Then with respect to the Colin Ross note. I think it is -important to observe that no one knows whether Ross committed -suicide or not—at least insofar as the Allied countries are concerned. -His body has never been found and only this note which counsel -says was found among his effects.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I make another remark concerning -the first group? This book by McClatchie was published by -a German publisher. The efforts of the Defendant Von Schirach -made the publication possible. That again speaks for the fact that -Von Schirach in furthering the publication had a certain purpose in -view. That purpose was to bring about enlightenment between -America and Germany and to smooth over the difficulties which he -was afraid could one day lead to war. The book by McClatchie -appeared not only in German, but also in the English language, and -it was sold in large numbers in England and in the United States. -Of course, it also appeared in German and the German language -edition was sold in Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That, I believe, is all I wish to say at this point. -<span class='pageno' title='397' id='Page_397'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would you tell the Tribunal what these other -documents are that Mr. Dodd has not objected to? Because we -understand that there are 160 documents which he has not objected -to. What are they all about, and how long are they?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: They are short. I have submitted only one Document -Book. That is, I have limited myself to the absolute necessities, -Gentlemen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Of how many pages?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Altogether, 134 pages. Of course, some cover only -one-half or one-third of a page, since the majority are relatively -short quotations. It was necessary for me to submit these excerpts, -because I can produce evidence of the activities of the Defendant -Von Schirach as Reich Youth Leader only by showing the Tribunal -just what the Defendant Von Schirach told the youth of the German -nation, what his teachings were, what his directives to his subordinate -leaders were. And in order to do so, I must submit, as I -believe the Prosecution realizes, a short report covering the entire -period during which Von Schirach was Reich Youth Leader, so as -to show that the opinions and theories of the Defendant Von -Schirach during the last year of his activity as Reich Youth Leader -were exactly the same as those during his first year. He is one of -the few men within the Party who did not, in the course of the -years, allow themselves to become violent, he did not go to extremes -as did most of the others; and that is what I want to show by these -comparatively short excerpts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I believe that is all at the moment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then you have the supplementary applications -for witnesses, have you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You’d better deal with those, had you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, one of them, I understand, is a person -who made an affidavit which has been used by the Prosecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I believe that is the witness Uiberreither.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, I think it is the other one, is it not? Who -are the two?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: One is, I believe...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Marsalek.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: No, not Marsalek, but Uiberreither. Marsalek, Mr. -President,...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I have your application before me for Marsalek. -You do not want Marsalek? -<span class='pageno' title='398' id='Page_398'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: No, that must be an error.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dated the 15th of April 1946. Anyhow, you -do not want him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, then you only want one, do you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And that is Uiberreither?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has the Prosecution any objection to him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, we have not, Your Honor. That -affidavit I believe, was introduced by us in connection with the -Kaltenbrunner case, an affidavit by Uiberreither.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You have no objection?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No objection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you, Dr. Sauter. We will -consider your application in respect of documents and the witness. -We will consider your application, and we will now proceed with -the case of Streicher.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I should -like to make a motion to the case of Streicher. I desire to move that -Streicher’s testimony found on Pages 8495, and 8496 of April 26th -be expunged from the Record, and on Page 8549 of yesterday’s -testimony.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, do you wish to say anything about -that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. Unfortunately, I did not -completely understand the motions made by the Chief Prosecutor, -Mr. Justice Jackson, because at that moment I was busy with -something else. As far as I understood, he dealt with the deletion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I can tell you what the motion was. The -motion was that passages on Pages 8494, 8495, and 8496, and on -Page 8549 be expunged from the record.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I understand. I would like to say, from the point of -view of the Defense, that I agree that these passages be expunged -from the record, because I am of the opinion that they are in no -way relevant for the defense of the defendant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The passages to which Mr. Justice Jackson -has drawn our attention are, in the opinion of the Tribunal, highly -improper statements made by the Defendant Streicher. They are, -in the opinion of the Tribunal, entirely irrelevant, and they have -<span class='pageno' title='399' id='Page_399'></span> -been admitted by counsel for the Defendant Streicher to be entirely -irrelevant, and they will, therefore, be expunged from the record.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And now, Dr. Marx.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: May I now, with the permission of the Tribunal, -continue with the examination of witnesses? I now call the witness -Friedrich Strobel to the stand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Strobel took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRIEDRICH STROBEL (Witness): Friedrich Strobel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear -by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You may sit down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Witness, on 3 December 1938 were you at a meeting -of the Jurists’ association (Rechtswahrerbund) in Nuremberg?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STROBEL: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: During that meeting the Defendant Streicher is -supposed to have spoken; is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STROBEL: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Would you please tell us what the Defendant -Streicher stated on that occasion concerning the demonstrations of -9 November 1938?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STROBEL: He said, “I should not have carried out this action in -this way. In such a manner it is impossible to fight a power like -World Jewry.” Then he added, “What has been done cannot be -undone,” and some more phrases of that kind.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Is it correct that at that time you were surprised -that Streicher in public objected against that action, which had been -ordered by the highest authorities?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STROBEL: Yes. Streicher frequently spoke against measures and -directives of the Government when he was of a different opinion, -as on this occasion. I had the impression that apparently he had -been passed over; for in his speech there was a certain malicious -undertone to the effect that the matter was having unfavorable -aftereffects. I wondered at the time whether Streicher really had -a lucid interval and realized how harmful that anti-Jewish action -was, or whether merely his vanity was wounded, or whether he felt -that a too quick and radical an extermination of the Jews would -put an end also to his own importance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Witness, these are opinions which you are stating -and not facts; I did not ask you about that. -<span class='pageno' title='400' id='Page_400'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>STROBEL: Well, that was my impression.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: All right, I ask you now: On 9 and 10 November -1938 were you present in Nuremberg?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STROBEL: Yes, I believe so. I do not remember exactly, but I -believe it was on the night of 8 to 9 November 1938 that that action -was carried out. It was on 7 November that Herr Vom Rath was -shot, and on the 8th he died, and the night after these things -occurred.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We needn’t argue about whether it was the -8th or the 9th. It doesn’t matter, does it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: The question which I want to put to you now is: -After that night during which the demonstrations against the Jewish -population took place, what observations did you make on the -following morning and later, about the attitude of the population -in Nuremberg toward these demonstrations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STROBEL: I was informed about that action by the personnel -in my office. Thereupon I walked into the city and looked around -in the streets. People were standing in front of the damaged stores. -I had the impression that the vast majority of the population was -benumbed and speechless. People shook their heads, looked at each -other, muttered something, and then walked away. But, generally, -I had the impression that people could not speak aloud, and later -I heard that those who had objected to these things were treated -rather badly, when they were overheard by informers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: But the general impression was, was it not, that the -population definitely disapproved of that action, and that general -indignation was recognizable though not loudly expressed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STROBEL: Yes. The Russian radio at the time hit the nail on -the head by saying, “Let it be said to the credit of the German -people that they had no part in the events and that they were -sleeping.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In fact most people heard of the events of the night only on the -following morning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What has this got to do with the Defendant -Streicher?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Well, the Defendant Streicher has been accused of -openly approving this action in his speech on 10 November. The -Defendant Streicher also maintains in his defense that it was an -action ordered by the top authorities and not a spontaneous demonstration -of the people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The fact that a number of people in Nuremberg, -or even the whole of the people of Nuremberg, disapproved of -it wouldn’t show that Streicher disapproved of it. -<span class='pageno' title='401' id='Page_401'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes, but he maintains that there could have been no -question of an incitement, since the action had been ordered and -directed from the top, whereas, in the case of an incitement, the -action would have been started by the people themselves. That was -his conclusion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>STROBEL: May I state my opinion about that? The action was -definitely not started by the people themselves, because even the -majority of the SA men who took part in it did so against their -will. It was an order from above; it was an organized affair. The -assertion of Dr. Goebbels that the German people had risen spontaneously -was an intentional incrimination of the German people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I have no more questions to ask of this witness, -Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any other of the defendants’ counsel wish -to ask him any questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then the witness can retire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: With the permission of the Tribunal, I now call the -witness Ernst Hiemer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL: There is no witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is he not there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL: We have no witness there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He says, Dr. Marx, that he is not there, and -that there are no witnesses there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. The witness Hiemer is in -the prison here, and I talked to him personally.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, did you inform the prison authorities -yesterday that you were going to call him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I spoke to the Marshal on Monday and asked that -Hiemer be brought up on Tuesday, as far as I can recall. There -must be a misunderstanding.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, have you got any other witnesses -besides Hiemer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes, the witness Wurzbacher.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Where is he? Where is Wurzbacher?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Wurzbacher is also here in prison.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, while he is being brought, can you take -up the time in dealing with your documents? -<span class='pageno' title='402' id='Page_402'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes. We can do that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL: They will be here in about 5 minutes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Go on, Dr. Marx.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Mr. President, before coming to the question of the -documents, I should like to point out the following: During the -session yesterday afternoon the Prosecution submitted several documents -which were new to me, and I have not yet had an opportunity -of stating my position with regard to them. Nor have I yet -had a chance of speaking to the Defendant Streicher about them. -From the point of view of the Defense, I consider it necessary to -explain my position with regard to these very important documents; -and I believe that I must now examine all the articles of <span class='it'>Der -Stürmer</span> to see whether Streicher used in some way or other the -various pieces of information from the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span>; -for his defense is, “I did not believe what I read there.” If he did -not use these items of information in any of his articles, then his -answer is, to a certain extent, corroborated. Therefore I have to -review the matter...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. In one particular article it -was demonstrated yesterday in cross-examination, as I understood -it, that he had used an article from the Jewish paper.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes. I know that article. It is one of 4 November 1943.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Marx, what exactly are you applying -for now? What is your motion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: My motion is that the Tribunal permit me to supplement -my document book so as to be able to state my position with -regard to yesterday’s presentation of documents by the Prosecution -by submitting counter documents of my own. My presentation of -documents would be incomplete if I had no chance of replying to -these new documents submitted by the Prosecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Marx; the Tribunal grants your -motion provided you make it in the ordinary way, in writing, -referring to any passages which you contend throw light on the -passages which have been put in by the Prosecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes. May I now begin to discuss the individual -documents? Document Number Streicher-1 shows that the newspaper -<span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, according to the decision of the Führer, was -not an official Party organ and was not even entitled to carry the -state insignia while all other press organs displayed the insignia -conspicuously. That is evidence that the paper <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> was a -private publication of the Defendant Streicher.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, you are going to offer these documents -in evidence and give them exhibit numbers, are you not? -<span class='pageno' title='403' id='Page_403'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I consider these documents as submitted; I have -discussed the subject with the Prosecution, and the Prosecution had -no objections.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You see, there is a written transcript being -taken down, and unless you offer each document in evidence and -say that will be exhibit number so-and-so, it does not get into the -transcript. If you like you can do it in a group and say, “I offer in -evidence such and such documents as Exhibits 1 to 100,” or whatever -number you wish.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The book I have before me does contain -certain exhibit numbers; for instance, Page 1 to 4 appears to be -Exhibit Number Streicher-1 and Page 5 is Exhibit Number -Streicher-5; Page 6 is Exhibit Number Streicher-6; Page 7 is Exhibit -Number Streicher-7.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am told that Page 4 is Exhibit Number -Streicher-1; is it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: The pagination made here is completely different -from the one I made and consequently it is now arranged altogether -differently.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, let us get on. You only have to -tell us what documents you are offering in evidence and under what -exhibit numbers. Dr. Marx, you can do it later if you want to.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I further submit Exhibit Number Streicher-5, an -excerpt from an editorial of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> of July 1938. Number 28. -This article, which was not written by the Defendant Streicher but -by Karl Holz, is worded in very sharp language and says that -vengeance will break loose one day and all Jewry will be exterminated. -But the salient point here—the article seems to have been -provoked by a letter which was sent from Nuremberg to New York, -and which stated that Germany in the case of war, would be -destroyed from the air. And so this article also falls under the -claim which the defendant made yesterday, namely that his sharp -language was always caused by some preceding action from another -side. That is Document Number Streicher-5 and I ask permission to -submit it as an exhibit under that number.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then I submit as Document Number Streicher-6, an excerpt -from Number 40 of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> of October 1938. I think I can -dispense with comment on it because my argument can be seen -from the document itself; or is it necessary to speak about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, you need not speak about them; just put -them in. -<span class='pageno' title='404' id='Page_404'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I submit as Document Number Streicher-7, an excerpt -from the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> of 25 February 1942, in answer -to Document M-31 of the trial brief against the defendant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then I submit Document Number Streicher-8, an excerpt from -the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> of 8 February 1939, Page 2.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then as Document Number Streicher-9, an excerpt from the -political testament of Adolf Hitler, dated 29 April 1945.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As Document Number Streicher-10, an excerpt from <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, -February 1935, Number 8, Page 4.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As Document Number Streicher-11, an excerpt from <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> -of September 1935, Number 38.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am giving the next page the Document Number Streicher-12. -That is an excerpt from <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, of September 1935, Number -38, Page 9.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Document Number Streicher-13 is an excerpt from <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, -of January 1938. Number 1.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Document Number Streicher-14, an excerpt from <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> -of May 1938, Number 20.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As Document Number Streicher-15, an excerpt from <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> -of 5 November 1943, Number 45.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As Document Number Streicher-16, of the Defense, a document -submitted by the Prosecution under number 759-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As Document Number Streicher-17, speeches made by Himmler -in April 1943, on 4 October 1943, and 23 September 1943 at Posen -and Kharkov.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As Document Number Streicher-18, a photostat of the special -issue of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> of May 1939, Number 20.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask to have these documents admitted. I have limited myself -to the utmost.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is all, is it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are the witnesses ready yet? Perhaps we -might as well adjourn for 10 minutes now.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Ernst Hiemer took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>ERNST HIEMER (Witness): Ernst Hiemer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: May I just interrupt for a minute, Mr. President. -First of all I would like to state that I am by no means holding -<span class='pageno' title='405' id='Page_405'></span> -the Marshal responsible for the mistake. The matter was as follows: -The mistake in requesting the witness...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is quite all right, Dr. Marx.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I consider it my duty to state here that the Marshal -is not responsible for the mistake about the bringing in of the -witness. One of my assistants spoke yesterday with a gentleman...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We quite understand, Dr. Marx.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Then, Mr. President, I should like to submit Documents -Number Streicher 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 up to 18. I do not know -whether it is clear now. The numbers are 1 and 5, and from 6 -through 18. Lacking are 2, 3, and 4, which were dropped. All other -exhibit numbers are contained therein, Numbers 1 and from 5 -through 18.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You include 19, don’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: No, Numbers 19 and 20 are not necessary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, I beg your pardon. I think I must have -been wrong. I have taken down 19, but you haven’t got 19, have -you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Number 18 is my last one, Your Honor, and I ask to -have that included in the record.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And now you are going to go on with the -witnesses?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>ERNST HIEMER: Ernst Hiemer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear -by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You may sit down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Since when have you known Herr Streicher, how -did you get into contact with him, and what position did you have -on <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: At the end of 1934 I was introduced to the then Gauleiter -Julius Streicher in the Deutscher Hof in Nuremberg. Streicher -gave me the assignment of working for his public health journal, -<span class='it'>Die Deutsche Volksgesundheit</span>. In 1935 I also wrote reports for -<span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>. Streicher then had me transferred to the editorial -staff of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>. -<span class='pageno' title='406' id='Page_406'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Eventually, under Streicher’s direction and the direction of other -staff members of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, I did editorial work as a co-editor. -The responsible editor of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> was Karl Holz, Streicher’s -deputy, but the leading spirit of the paper was Streicher himself. -In the year 1938 instructions came from Berlin to the effect that -Holz was permitted to contribute to <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, but in his capacity -as state official—he was the Deputy Gauleiter—he was no longer -to be mentioned in the editions of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>. Thereupon, on -instruction from Streicher, my name was entered in <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> -as responsible editor. The overall direction of the paper and all -authority connected therewith remained in Streicher’s hands, and -Streicher retained this position until the collapse.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: What was the main idea of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer’s</span> policy? -What was the Leitmotiv?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: Streicher wanted by means of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, in the -simplest and most popular language, to convey to every man and -every woman of the German nation knowledge about the Jews. -Streicher wanted the entire German people to realize that the Jew -was a stranger among them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Herr Hiemer, I do not want to know that. I want -you to tell me whether Herr Streicher, let us say, wished to advocate -emigration or whether he followed a different train of thought. -Long expositions on the Jewish problem are not required.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: Streicher was of the opinion that in Germany the -Jewish question should be solved by emigration. He repeatedly -criticized the leadership of the Reich because the emigration of -Jews was not being carried through in the manner desired by -Streicher. When the war came, Streicher asserted that the Jewish -problem would no longer have had any significance for a Germany -at war if in accordance with his idea it had been solved by complete -emigration of the Jews during the preceding time of peace.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Is it correct that the Palestine and Madagascar -problem was discussed in the journal?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: Yes. Streicher stated his opinion in word as well as -in writing, that Palestine and Madagascar would be suitable localities -for absorbing the Jews living in Germany. However, he did -not follow up this thought, since not Germany but only England -and France could dispose of Palestine and Madagascar.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: What do you think about the influence exerted by -Streicher and <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> since 1933? Is it not true that since 1933 -its influence among the German people was much in decline?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: Yes, that is correct. In many circles it was known -that the influence of Streicher and of his paper on the movement -<span class='pageno' title='407' id='Page_407'></span> -did decrease. After 1933 Streicher had many conflicts with other -Party leaders, and he made many enemies. Particularly from the -year 1937, Streicher was pushed more and more into the background. -Within the Party the Institute for the Study of the Jewish -Problem, under the leadership of Rosenberg, dealt with the theory -of the Jewish problem, and actual authority over the Jews belonged, -as is well known, exclusively to Himmler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>When finally in the year 1940 Streicher was relieved of his post -as Gauleiter, he was completely isolated. From then on he lived -on his farm and worked there as a farmer; he wrote articles only -for <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: What was the circulation of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> from -1933? Can you give us figures? Of course, only after the date when -you joined the paper.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: This question of the circulation could, of course, be -answered best by the publication manager, who was concerned -with it. However, I remember approximate figures. <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> -was in 1933 a very small paper; but by the year 1935 its circulation -increased to about 800,000. After that, however, there was a sharp -decline.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Of course, during the war <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> had a smaller circulation. -I cannot give you any exact figures and during the last months the -circulation of the paper was, of course, extremely small. On the -average, I might say that <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> had a circulation of perhaps -half a million. Of course, there were special issues which had a -much larger circulation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As I said, only the publisher could authenticate these figures.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: What can be the reason for the increase in the -year 1935?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: It is very difficult for me to answer that question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Wasn’t it because Party authorities—because subscriptions -were made compulsory in factories and other places?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: You are putting questions to me which really only a -publisher can answer. I myself cannot answer the question with -assurance, and therefore must remain silent; my testimony would -not be reliable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Of course, if you don’t know, you are free to say, -“My knowledge on this point is not sufficient.” Did Herr Streicher -know of the happenings in the East, especially in the concentration -camps, and what did he personally tell you about these things?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: Streicher himself never told me that he knew about -the happenings in the concentration camps. On the contrary, -<span class='pageno' title='408' id='Page_408'></span> -Streicher said he learned of these things only in 1944 through the -Swiss press. Streicher received the Swiss newspapers regularly, in -particular the <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span> of Switzerland, and in -1944 this journal published rather detailed descriptions about what -was going on in the concentration camps.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Streicher at first refused to credit these reports in the Swiss -press and called them premeditated lies. He declared that these -reports were being printed merely for the purpose of undermining -the prestige of the German people abroad. It is true Streicher soon -changed his opinion. He began to doubt that his opinion was right -and finally he believed that the occurrences in concentration camps, -as pictured in the Swiss press, did after all correspond to the facts. -Streicher said that Himmler was the only man who could have -authorized such crimes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: You said that Streicher soon changed his opinion. -What does that mean?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: In the beginning he had decidedly said that these -reports could not be true. Then he became uncertain and said that -perhaps they might be true. I had the impression that either the -detailed manner of the reports in the Swiss press had convinced -Streicher that these things had actually occurred or that Streicher, -from one source or another, either through personal contact or -through letters, had received knowledge that these happenings were -actually taking place in the concentration camps. To that I ascribe -his change of view.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: And when was that, approximately?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: I cannot give you the exact date, but I believe it was -in the middle of 1944.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: What attitude did he take when he was finally -convinced? Did he express satisfaction at the fact that so many -people had been killed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: No. Streicher definitely deprecated what was done in -the concentration camps. It did happen that Streicher, in anger—if -he had been especially upset by political events—often or at times, -asserted that Jews, as an enemy of the German people, should be -exterminated. However, Streicher talked in that way only in the -first phase of excitement. When he was calmed, he always opposed -the extermination of the Jews.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: But repeatedly in articles of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> there is -talk of the extermination of the Jews?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: Yes. It is a fact that in reports of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> the -extermination of Jewry is spoken about. However, on the other -hand, Streicher again and again opposed the murder of the Jews, -<span class='pageno' title='409' id='Page_409'></span> -and I am quite convinced that Streicher and <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> had -nothing whatever to do with the happenings in concentration camps. -I do not believe it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For it is known now that these crimes in the concentration -camps were committed on the instructions of individual leading -men; that is, on official orders, and it is my firm conviction that -neither Streicher nor <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> had anything to do with them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: How were the articles which you wrote prepared? -Did you receive directives for the articles from Streicher and then -merely edit them, or were you the real author?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: Streicher was the founder and the publisher of -<span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>. But he was in fact also the chief editor, and all his -colleagues, no matter whether it was his deputy, Holz, or others—all -of them had to submit their articles to Streicher before they -were printed. Streicher then ordered changes if the need arose; -he also gave the editors assignments for articles, that is, he told -them with what arguments these articles were to be drawn up; -and Streicher knew of all the articles which appeared in <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>. -In fact, he was the responsible head, the editor of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>. -All others were his assistants. He himself was, as he often said with -pride, one and the same with <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>. “Streicher and -<span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> are one and the same.” That was his maxim.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: That, of course, he admits; he says that he assumes -the responsibility.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>What can you tell us about the so-called pornographic library?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> was in possession of a large archive. -This archive consisted of many thousands of German and foreign-language -books, documents, edicts, and so forth. These books were -either put at the disposal of the <span class='it'>Stürmer</span> archive by friends of -<span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, or they came from Jewish apartments. The police -put books which were found in Jewish houses at the disposal of -Rosenberg’s Institute for the Study of the Jewish problem for -research purposes. Whatever remained in the Jewish dwellings in -Nuremberg was turned over to the <span class='it'>Stürmer</span> archive. Among these -books there were also numerous which dealt with sexual knowledge, -books by Magnus Hirschfeld, Bloch, and some which were simply -pornographic. These, then, consisted both of books which had been -sent in by friends of the <span class='it'>Stürmer</span>, and books which had been found -in Jewish dwellings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These books were kept in a special section of the <span class='it'>Stürmer</span> -archive under lock and key, and the public did not have access to -them. This literature was no personal pornographic library of -Streicher, but formed a part of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer’s</span> archive. Streicher -never read these books. They were to be reviewed after the war in -<span class='pageno' title='410' id='Page_410'></span> -the course of the reconstruction. All those which were not of direct -Jewish origin were to be removed, but as I said, Streicher did not -read these books.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Where were these books kept? Were they in the -publishing house, or how is it that a part...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, there is no charge here with respect -to this particular sort of books.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: This is my last question. I just wanted to clarify -this matter, since it played an important part in the public mind. -I have no further questions to the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then, are there any questions from the other -Defense Counsel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): I -have one question only.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Did Rosenberg have any connections -with the editorial staff of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: To my knowledge, his connections were almost non-existent. -I knew personally only Dr. Ballensiefen, who worked with -Rosenberg. I also knew Dr. Pohl personally, but no relations existed -between the <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> and the Institute for the Study of the -Jewish Problem for the purposes of co-operation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Did Ballensiefen and Pohl have connections with -<span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: Pohl had personal connections with me. He was a -student of Hebrew and had made translations of the Talmud; he -had also published the <span class='it'>Talmudgeist</span>. Through that I got to know -him. Ballensiefen also had no personal connection with <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Does this mean that Pohl did have personal connections...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: Only with me, not with <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: ...or was he sent by Rosenberg in this matter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: I have no further questions, Your Honor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I have only one matter to ask -you about. Do I understand you to say that by the middle of 1944 -Streicher had become convinced that the reports in the Swiss newspaper, -<span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span>, were true?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: I did not understand you. Will you please repeat the -question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do I understand you to say that -by the middle of 1944 Streicher had become convinced of the truth -<span class='pageno' title='411' id='Page_411'></span> -of the reports he was reading in the Swiss newspaper about concentration -camps?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: Yes, I had the impression that Streicher in the middle -of 1944...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only wanted an answer “yes” -or “no.” That is quite sufficient.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Let me just read to you three lines of an article which was -published in <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> on the 14th of September 1944.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Bolshevism cannot be vanquished; it must be destroyed. -The same is true of Judaism; it cannot be vanquished, disarmed, -or rendered powerless; it must be exterminated.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That is Page 2.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then the word that you use or is cited for exterminated is ausgerottet, -which I understand means completely wiped out. Why -was that article appearing in <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> in September 1944, when -it was known by the owner of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> what was going on in -concentration camps in the East? What was the purpose of that -article?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: I personally did not write this article. I believe that -Streicher wrote it, therefore I myself am not able to judge the -intention of the article. But I do maintain that Streicher made -statements opposing the murders in the concentration camps, and -that he did not want the murder of Jewry.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I will leave that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, in the interest of time I do not propose to cross-examine -this witness any further. Perhaps I might be allowed to -draw the Tribunal’s attention to those articles contained in your -bundle, which are articles actually written by this witness. There -are about seven of them. Page 3A, 35A, 38A, 40A, 49A, 50A and 51A, -that is, covering a period from January 1939 up to August 1944.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And, My Lord, the other matter that I would draw the Tribunal’s -attention to was that this witness was the author of the disgusting -children’s book which I presented to the Tribunal in putting -the individual case against Streicher.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is there any further cross-examination?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Dr. Marx, do you wish to re-examine? You heard what counsel -said about the various articles written by this witness. You wish -to re-examine or not? Have you any questions you wish to ask the -witness? -<span class='pageno' title='412' id='Page_412'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes, please.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Herr Hiemer, perhaps you did not quite understand the question -a moment ago. Please tell us again just when Herr Streicher received -knowledge, and when he told you that he was convinced of -or believed in these mass murders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: It is my opinion and conviction that it was in the -middle of 1944.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: But there had been statements to that effect in the -<span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span> for a number of years prior to that date.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HIEMER: Yes; at that time Streicher did not believe these -things. His change of view took place only in the year 1944 and I -remember it was not before the middle of the year.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: I have no further questions to the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness left the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: With the permission of the Tribunal I would like -to call the witness Philipp Wurzbacher.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Wurzbacher took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>PHILIPP WURZBACHER (Witness): Philipp Wurzbacher.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear -by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You may sit down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Witness, you were an SA Leader in Nuremberg?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: From when?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: From 1928.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: And what position did you have?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: At that time I was an SA Standartenführer -and had risen from the lowest ranks.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Witness, please speak more slowly and pause as -frequently as possible, as your testimony has to be interpreted into -several languages.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>How long have you known the Defendant Streicher?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: I have known him from meetings, since 1923; -personally, from the time of my activity as an SA Leader in the -year 1928. -<span class='pageno' title='413' id='Page_413'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Were you regularly present at the meetings at -which Streicher spoke?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: I cannot say that I was present regularly, but -I attended very frequently.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did Streicher in his speeches advocate the use of -violence against the Jewish population, or did he predict it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: At no meeting did I hear suggestions that -violence should be used against the Jewish population. Nor did I -ever hear Streicher suggest or announce that he had any such intentions -in mind.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did an act of violence against the Jewish population, -originating from and carried out by the people themselves, -take place in Nuremberg or the Gau Franconia at any time in the -period from 1920 to 1933?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: No, I cannot remember any incident of that -type.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did the SA undertake any such action or was anything -like that ordered?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: The SA never undertook anything like that at -that time. On the contrary, the SA had instructions, unequivocal -instructions, to refrain from such acts of violence. Severe punishment -would have resulted for anyone who did anything like that, -or for an SA Leader who gave such orders. Besides, as I have -already emphasized, there was never any suggestion or any order -to that effect.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: What do you say to the events on the night of the -9 to 10 November 1938?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: I was not in Nuremberg during the events -from the 9 to 10 November 1938. At that time I was in Bad Ems -on account of chronic laryngitis. I can only say what I know from -stories which I heard afterwards.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did you talk with Obergruppenführer Obernitz?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: About these events?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: Yes, I talked with SA Obergruppenführer -Von Obernitz in a brief conversation, when I reported my return. -We spoke only a few words, since Obergruppenführer Von Obernitz -was called away so that in the course of the conversation I could -not return to the subject. I remember that Obergruppenführer -Von Obernitz declared at the time that as far as he was concerned -the matter had been put in order. That was the sense of what he -said. -<span class='pageno' title='414' id='Page_414'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Was there within the SA a uniform opinion, or were -there, even in the circles of the SA, men who disapproved of these -incredible occurrences?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: Opinions were, as far as I could determine -upon my return—I believe it was on 23 or 24 November—very -much divided. A part of the SA was in favor, the other opposed -what had happened, but at all events, the majority in general considered -it to be wrong and condemned what had been done.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Was there an increase, I mean, an increase of -brutality in these circles after 1933 on account of the growing -numbers of the SA?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: It goes without saying that after the accession -to power, when many doubtful elements joined, the situation was -completely different from what it had been before. Up to that time, -as a responsible Leader, one knew almost every member individually, -but now with the tremendous influx of new men, a general -survey of the new situation had first to be made. But I believe I -may say that an increase of brutality did not occur. Perhaps some -undesirable elements which, in the name of the SA, did this or that, -had slipped in but in general I cannot say that an overall increase -of brutality took place.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did you conclude that <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> exerted an influence -in the SA with the result that an anti-Semitic tendency -made itself felt among the men under your command? Did you -not read a different publication, <span class='it'>Der SA Mann</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> had a very divided reception, I -might say, especially among the people in Nuremberg and in particular -in the SA. There were large numbers in the SA who, if -they did not exactly reject <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, were in fact not interested -because of the tedious repetitions contained in it, and for -this reason the paper was of no importance to them. Moreover, -it was natural that members of the SA read their own paper, -<span class='it'>Der SA Mann</span>, first.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: When you attended a meeting in which Streicher -spoke, what impression did you gain of the objectives which he -pursued in his speech with regard to the solution of the Jewish -problem?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: The objectives which were stated by Streicher -were, I should say, unequivocal and clear. He pursued the policy -that the strong elements of the Jewish people which occupied -positions in the German economy and above all in public life and -public offices should be removed and that necessarily, expulsion -or emigration should be considered. -<span class='pageno' title='415' id='Page_415'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Did you participate in the boycott on 1 April 1933 -in any way?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: Yes, I participated in the boycott. At that -time I had instructions from my Gruppenführer to see to it that this -boycott should be kept within the limits of order and propriety, -and that in this way the success of the boycott would be assured. -I instructed the Sturmführer under my command to assign to each -department store a guard of two SA men who were to see to it that -nothing happened and everything took its course in an orderly -and unobjectionable fashion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Were there not instructions from Streicher also?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: Yes. The instructions which I received from my -Gruppenführer had been issued by Gauleiter Streicher.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Were attacks on Jews not to be prevented by all -means?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: That was so not only in this one case, but in -all cases. It was repeatedly pointed out that we were to refrain -from attacks or unauthorized acts of violence or other hostile acts -against the Jewish people or Jewish individuals, especially in -Nuremberg, and that it was strictly prohibited...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: What was Streicher’s reaction when he heard that -nevertheless such acts of violence had been perpetrated by -individuals?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: I can cite one example in which violence was -used. I believe it was a small scuffle, at any rate, something had -happened, but I do not recall the details of the case. In any event, -he called us very sharply to account, and we SA leaders were -severely reprimanded and rebuked.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: And what did he say? Did he make a general -statement?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: If I may give the essence of it, he said that he -would not tolerate that human beings be beaten or molested in -any way in his Gau, and for the SA leaders he had rather drastic -expressions such as ruffians or similar names—I do not recall them -exactly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: But he was called the Bloody Czar of Franconia. -How is that to be explained?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: Perhaps it was his manner, the way he behaved -at times. Sometimes he could be very harsh and outspoken. At any -rate I can only say that during my activity I did not experience -anything or hear anything suggesting that he was a “bloody czar.” -<span class='pageno' title='416' id='Page_416'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Do you know what his attitude was toward concentration -camps? Did he visit Dachau? If so, how often, and what -did he do about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: I cannot give you any information on that -point. I know just one thing and that is that he said repeatedly -that people who had been taken to Dachau should be freed as soon -as possible if there was no criminal or other charge against them. -I also know of several cases of release very soon after the arrest of -the people or their removal to a concentration camp. For example -the teacher Matt, who was an old adversary of his in the Town Hall -of Nuremberg, was released after a very short time—I believe three -or four months. Another man, a certain Defender, who had been -active primarily in labor unions, was also released after a very -short period of time. If I remember correctly, it was about the year -1935 or perhaps the beginning of 1936—I do not know exactly—when -the last inmates left the camp at Dachau and were greeted -with music upon their return.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Was it not held against him that he freed so many -members of the left-wing parties from Dachau?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: It was said here and there by members of the -SA that the Gauleiter’s action could hardly be justified, that he -took too light a view of these things and so on, but we also pointed -out that after all the Gauleiter bore the responsibility and that he -ought to know just what he had to do in this or that case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Do you know that Himmler told Streicher of his -displeasure at these releases and said that disciplinary action would -be taken against him if he continued with them? If you know -nothing about this matter, please say: “No.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WURZBACHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Then I have concluded my questioning of the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any member of the Defense Counsel -wish to ask questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness left the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does that conclude your case, Dr. Marx?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes, Your Honor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then we go on with Dr. Schacht’s case next.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I begin my presentation of evidence with the calling -of Dr. Schacht as a witness, and I ask Your Lordship to permit -Dr. Schacht to enter the witness box. -<span class='pageno' title='417' id='Page_417'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Schacht took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HJALMAR SCHACHT (Defendant): Hjalmar Schacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear -by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You may sit down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Please tell the Tribunal briefly about your descent?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: The families of both my parents have lived for centuries -in Schleswig-Holstein, which until 1864 belonged to Denmark. -My parents were both born as Danish citizens. After the annexation -by Germany my father emigrated to the United States, where three -of his older brothers had already emigrated, and he became an -American citizen. My two brothers, who were older than I, were -born there. Later my mother’s health prompted my father’s return -to Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I was educated in Hamburg. I studied at universities in Germany -and in Paris, and after receiving my doctor’s degree I was active -for 2 years in economic organizations. Then I began my banking -career, and for 13 years I was at the Dresdner Bank, one of the -large so-called “D” banks. I then took over the management of a -bank of my own, which was later merged with one of the “D” -banks, and in 1923 I abandoned my private career and went into -public service as Commissioner for German Currency (Reichswährungskommissar). -Soon afterwards I became President of the -Reichsbank, and I held that office until 1930, when I resigned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Why did you resign as President of the Reichsbank at -that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: In two essential points there were differences of -opinion between the Government and me; one was the internal -finance policy of the Government. With the terrible catastrophe of -the lost war and the Dictate of Versailles behind us, it was necessary -in my opinion to use thrifty and modest methods in German politics. -The democratic and socialist governments of that period could not -see that point, but carried on an irresponsible financial policy, especially -by incurring debts which in particular were contracted to a -very large extent abroad. It was quite clear that Germany, already -heavily burdened with reparation payments, was under no circumstances -in a position to build up as much foreign currency as was -necessary for the payment of these debts. We were not even able -to pay the reparations from our own economy. -<span class='pageno' title='418' id='Page_418'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Therefore I objected to the contraction of these debts in which -the various governments of that period indulged, and to which they -also encouraged communities and private companies. I objected to -this financial policy and continually, abroad and at home, warned -against such a policy of incurring foreign debts. The foreign bankers -did not listen nor did the German Government. It was during -that period that if in Berlin one passed the Adlon Hotel, Unter Den -Linden, one could not be sure that a financial agent would not -emerge and ask whether one did not need a loan.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Later I was strongly opposed by these same people, when Germany -was forced to discontinue making payments of her debts. But -I wish to state here that I have always and on every occasion been -against such a policy of debts. That was the one reason. The other -reason was in the field of foreign policy. I had not only contributed -my part toward the creation of the Young Plan but in 1929 I also -assisted in the setting up of the Young Committee; the so-called -Young Plan had resulted in a number of improvements for Germany, -which the German Government was now sacrificing step by -step during the subsequent negotiations at The Hague. Thus the -financial and economic condition of the nation again deteriorated. -I revolted against this, and for both these reasons I resigned my -office as Reichsbankpräsident in protest, in March 1930.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, in this connection, may I -call your attention to Exhibit Number Schacht-6 of my Document -Book. If the Tribunal agrees, I should like, in order to shorten the -presentation of documents during the examination of the witness, -to call your attention to those documents which have a direct connection -with the questions with which the witness is dealing. I -believe that this arrangement will be agreeable to the Tribunal -since it will shorten the presentation of documents. It is Document -Number Schacht-6, on Page 12 of the German copy of my document -book and on Page 8 of the English copy, Your Lordship, Exhibit -Number Schacht-6. That is a record of the statements made by -Dr. Schacht during the session of the subcommittee for monetary -and credit matters on 21 October 1926. I believe it is not necessary -for me to read these statements. They refer to the foreign debts -which Dr. Schacht has just mentioned, and contain the same -thoughts which Dr. Schacht has just expressed before the Tribunal, -and are proof that these thoughts are not views <span class='it'>ex post facto</span>. -Therefore, without reading it, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial -notice of the whole of this document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I shall return to my examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] You had resigned your office as President -of the Reichsbank. What did you do then? -<span class='pageno' title='419' id='Page_419'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I went to the small estate which I owned in the -country and lived there as a private citizen. Then in 1930 I made a -trip to the United States. I departed shortly or immediately after -the Reichstag elections of September 1930 and went to New York via -London. There I lectured for about two months on questions which -were presented to me by American friends.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: When did you first get in touch with the National -Socialist ideology, with the Party, and with Hitler personally, and -when, in particular, did you read the Party program and Hitler’s -<span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: With the exception of a single occasion I have never -in my life concerned myself with Party politics. Even at the age of -26 I was offered a sure electoral district in the Reichstag, which I -did not accept, since I have never been interested in Party politics. -My interest always lay in the field of economics and financial policy -but, of course, for public affairs I always had a general interest, -arising from a concern for the future of my country and my people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Therefore, in 1919, I participated in the foundation of the Democratic -Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I say a few words here about my background and spiritual -upbringing? My father, throughout his life, adhered to democratic -ideals. He was a Freemason. He was a cosmopolitan. I had, and -I still have, numerous relatives on my mother’s side in Denmark -and on my father’s side in the United States, and to this day I am -on friendly terms with them. I grew up among these ideas and I -have never departed from these basic conceptions of Freemasonry -and democracy and humanitarian and cosmopolitan ideals. Later -I always remained in very close contact with foreign countries. -I traveled much, and with the exception of Ireland and Finland -there is no country in Europe which I have not visited. I know Asia -down to India, Ceylon, and Burma. I went to North America frequently, -and just before the Second World War broke out I intended -to travel to South America.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I want to emphasize this in order to show that I was never -interested in Party politics. Nevertheless, when in the elections of -September 1930 Hitler’s party suddenly and surprisingly obtained -108 seats, I began to take an interest in the phenomenon; and on -board ship going to the United States I read <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span> and, of -course, also the Party program. When I arrived on the other side -the first question was what was my opinion about Hitler and the -Party, because naturally everyone was talking about this event in -Germany. In my first publication at that time—it was an interview—I -uttered an unequivocal warning and said, “If you people -abroad do not change your policy towards Germany, then you will -<span class='pageno' title='420' id='Page_420'></span> -soon have very many more adherents of Hitler in Germany than -there are now.” Throughout that period of 2 months I spoke about -50 times in public meetings, and I always met with understanding -in the question of reparations, the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty, -and the economic difficulties of Germany, and I returned with the -impression that the whole American attitude, the attitude of the -American people toward us, was indeed rather friendly. Not on my -initiative but by coincidence, I got in touch with the adherents of -the National Socialist Party. A friend of mine, a bank director, -invited me at the beginning of December 1930 to dine with him at -his house and to meet Hermann Göring there. I did so and gained -no really definite impression from Göring’s statements and conduct. -He was in every respect reserved, modest, and well-mannered, and -he invited me to his house in order to meet Hitler. At the beginning -of January my wife and I dined with Göring and his wife one -evening at their home, and on that occasion, Fritz Thyssen was also -invited. It had been planned that Hitler should come also and talk -with us. I say again now that Göring’s apartment was extremely -modestly and simply styled. We had a plain pea soup and bacon -and particularly Göring’s first wife made an excellent impression. -After supper Hitler appeared, and the ensuing conversation was -conducted in such a way that, let us say, 5 percent of it was contributed -by us, and 95 percent by Hitler. What he said concerned -national questions, in which he agreed absolutely with us. No -extravagant demands were stated, but on the other hand the -national necessities of Germany were definitely emphasized. In -social questions Hitler expressed a number of good ideas; he was -especially intent on avoiding class struggle and on eliminating -strikes, lock-outs, and wage disputes by decisive intervention of the -State in labor relations and the direction of economic affairs. There -was no demand for abolishing private enterprise, but merely for -influence in its conduct. It seemed to us these ideas were quite -reasonable and acceptable. Aside from that, he revealed practically -no knowledge in the field of economy and financial policy, though -on that evening he did not claim to know anything about these -subjects. He merely asked that we as representatives of economy -should have understanding for his ideas and give him factual advice. -That was the purpose of that evening.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I shall refer to this first conversation with Adolf Hitler -later, but I should like to return now to the question I have put -before concerning your attitude to the Party program and the -ideology developed in the book, <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>. I am stressing this -because, as you have heard, the gentlemen of the Prosecution are -of the opinion that certain parts of the Party program as such and -also parts of the book, <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>, are of a criminal character, and -<span class='pageno' title='421' id='Page_421'></span> -that their criminal character was recognizable immediately upon -their publication. Therefore I should like to ask you to explain in -detail your attitude at the time, and possibly also your attitude -today, toward the Party program and the ideology of National -Socialism as it appears in the book <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: From the proceedings in this Court so far I have not -gained the impression that the opinion of the Prosecution concerning -the criminal character of the Party program is a uniform -one. I am unable to see in the Party program as such any sign of -criminal intentions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Federation of all Germans, which always plays a great role, is -always claimed only on the basis of the right for self-determination. -A position for Germany in foreign politics is demanded as constituting -equality of the German nation with the other nations; -that this involved the abolition of the discriminations which were -imposed upon the German people by the Versailles Treaty is quite -clear.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Land and soil was demanded for the nutrition of our people and -the settlement of our excess population. I cannot see any crime in -that, because after land and soil was expressly added in brackets -the word “colonies.” I have always considered that as a demand -for colonies, which I myself supported a long time before National -Socialism came into existence. Rather strange and, in my opinion, -going somewhat beyond the limits were the points concerning the -exclusion of Jews from civil rights, but on the other hand it was -reassuring that the Jews were to be under the protection of the -Aliens’ Law, that is, subject to the same laws which applied to -foreigners in Germany. I would have wished and always demanded -that this legal protection should under all circumstances be given -to the Jews. Unfortunately they were not given that protection. -For the rest it was emphasized that all citizens should have equal -rights and duties.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Promotion of popular education was stressed as being beneficial, -and also gymnastics and sports were demanded for the improvement -of public health. The fight against deliberate political lies -was demanded, which Goebbels afterwards conducted very energetically. -And, above all, demand was made for the freedom of all -religious denominations and for the principle of positive Christianity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is, in essence, the content of the National Socialist Party -program, and I cannot see anything criminal in it. It would, indeed, -have been quite peculiar if, had this been a criminal Party program, -the world had maintained continuous political and cultural -contact with Germany for two decades, and with the National -Socialists for one decade. -<span class='pageno' title='422' id='Page_422'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>As far as the book, <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>, is concerned, my judgment has -always been the same from the very beginning as it is today. It -is a book written in the worst kind of German, propaganda of a -man who was strongly interested in politics, not to say a fanatical, -half educated man, which to me Hitler has always been. In the book -<span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span> and in part also in the Party program there was one -point which worried me a great deal, and that was the absolute -lack of understanding for all economic problems. The Party program -contained a few slogans, such as “Community interests come -before private interests,” and so on, and then the “breaking up of -subjection to financial interests” and similar phrases which could -not possibly signify anything sensible. The same held true for -<span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>, which is of no interest from the point of view of -economic policy and consequently had no interest for me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the other hand, as regards foreign policy <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span> contained, -in my opinion, a great many mistakes, because it always -toyed with the idea that within the continent of Europe the living -space for Germany ought to be extended. And if nevertheless I -did co-operate later on with a National Socialist Reich Chancellor, -then it was for the very simple reason that expansion of the German -space toward the East was in the book made specifically dependent -upon the approval of the British Government. Therefore, to me, -believing that I knew British policy very well, this seemed Utopian -and there was no danger of my taking these theoretical extravagances -of Hitler any more seriously than I did. It was clear to me -that every territorial change on European territory attempted by -force would be impossible for Germany, and would not be approved -by the other nations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Besides that, <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span> had a number of very silly and verbose -statements but, on the other hand, it had many a reasonable -idea, too; I want to point out that I liked two things especially: -first, that anyone who differs with the government in political -matters is obliged to state his opinion to the government; and -secondly, that, though the democratic or rather parliamentary -government ought to be replaced by a Führer government, nevertheless -the Führer could only remain if he was sure of the approval -of the entire people, in other words, that a Führer also depended -on plebiscites of a democratic nature.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, you have now described the impression -which you gained from your first conversation with Adolf Hitler, -as well as from a study of the Party program and <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>. -Did you believe that you would be able to work with Adolf Hitler -and what practical conclusions did you derive from that first conversation -with Hitler? -<span class='pageno' title='423' id='Page_423'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: To work with Adolf Hitler was out of the question -for me personally, since I was a private citizen and not interested -in Party politics and consequently after that conversation I did -nothing at all to create for myself any personal relations with the -Hitler circles. I simply went back to my farm and I continued to -live there as a private citizen. So personally, for myself I did not -draw any conclusions but I drew another conclusion. I have -already said that naturally I had the future of my country at heart. -After that conversation I repeatedly emphasized to Reich Chancellor -Brüning and implored him when forming and heading the Cabinet -to include the National Socialists in it, because I believed that only -in this way the tremendous impetus, the tremendous propagandistic -fervor which I had noticed in Hitler, could be caught and harnessed—by -putting the National Socialists to practical government -work. One should not leave them in the opposition where they -could only become more dangerous, but one should take them into -the government and see what they could achieve and whether they -would not acquire polish within the government. That was the -suggestion and the very urgent request I made to Brüning, and I -might say that according to my impression Hitler would at that -time have been quite ready to do that. Brüning could under no -circumstances be won over to such a policy and in consequence was -later crushed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Let us stop for a moment and deal with the Party. -The Indictment states that you were a Party member. Now, Göring -has already said that Hitler conferred the Golden Party Emblem -only as a sort of decoration. Do you have anything new to add to -that statement made by Göring?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not know whether it has been mentioned here; -the Golden Party Emblem was in January 1937 given to all Ministers -and also to all military personalities in the Cabinet. The latter -could not become Party members at all; therefore the award of the -Party emblem did not entail membership. As to the rest I think -Göring has testified from the witness stand. I might mention one -more thing. If I had been a Party member, then doubtlessly when -I was ousted from my position as Minister without Portfolio in -January 1943, the Party Court would have gone into action, since a -case of insubordination to Hitler would have been evident. I was -never before the Party Court and even when on the occasion of my -dismissal the return of the Golden Party Emblem was demanded -from me, I was not told that I was being dismissed from the Party, -since I was not in the Party. I was only told “return the Golden -Emblem of the Party which was conferred upon you,” and I -promptly complied. -<span class='pageno' title='424' id='Page_424'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I believe I could not add anything else to the statements already -made.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Then the Indictment is wrong in this point?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes; in this point it is absolutely wrong.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Why did you not become a Party member?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Excuse me, but I was opposed to quite a number -of points of the National Socialist ideology. I do not believe that it -would have been compatible with my entirely democratic attitude -to change over to a different Party program, and one which, not in -its wording but through its execution by the Party had certainly -not—in the course of time—gained any more favor with me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Therefore, you did not become a Party member for -reasons of principle?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, for reasons of principle.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now, a biography of you was published by one -Dr. Reuther in 1937. There, also, it is correctly stated that you -were not a Party member; but the biographer gives different, more -tactical reasons for your refusing to join the Party; and he mentions -the possibility of being more influential from outside the Party -and so on. Maybe it is advisable, since the biography has been -referred to in the course of the proceedings, that you shortly state -your views on this point?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I believe that at the time Hitler had the impression -that I could be useful to him outside of the Party and it may be -that Dr. Reuther got knowledge of this. But I would rather not -be made responsible for the writings of Dr. Reuther, and in particular -I should like to object to the fact that the Prosecutor who -presented the brief against me described this book by Dr. Reuther -as an official publication. Of course this book is the private work -of a journalist for whom I have respect but who certainly states -his own opinions and ideas.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you speak in public on behalf of Hitler before -the July elections in 1932?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Before the July elections of 1932, which brought -that tremendous success for Hitler, I was never active either -publicly or privately on behalf of Hitler, except once, perhaps, or -twice—I remember now, it happened once—Hitler sent a Party -member to me who had plans on economic, financial, or currency -policies; Hitler may have told him that he should consult me as to -whether or not these plans could be put into practice. I might tell -the story briefly: It was Gauleiter Röwer of Oldenburg. In Oldenburg -the Nazis had already come to power before 1932 and he -<span class='pageno' title='425' id='Page_425'></span> -was the Minister President there. He wanted to introduce an -Oldenburg currency of its own, a consequence of which would have -been that Saxony would have introduced its own Saxon currency, -Württemberg would have introduced its own currency, and Baden -would have had its own currency, and so on. I ridiculed the whole -thing at the time and sent a telegram to Hitler, saying that the -economic needs of the German Reich could not be cured by such -miracles. If I disregard this case, which might have constituted some -sort of private connection, then I may say that neither privately nor -publicly, neither in speeches nor in writing, have I at all been concerned -with Hitler or his Party and in no way have I recommended -the Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you vote National Socialist in July 1932?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, I would not think of it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The Prosecution now lists a number of points by which -it wants to prove that you were an adherent of the National -Socialist ideology. I am going to name them one by one, and I ask -you to state your view on each of them. First, that you were an -opponent of the Treaty of Versailles. Would you like to say something -about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: It surprised me indeed to hear that reproach from -an American Prosecutor. The lieutenant who spoke is perhaps too -young to have experienced it himself, but he should know it from -his education; at any rate, for all of us who have lived through -that time, it was one of the outstanding events that the Treaty of -Versailles was rejected by the United States, and, if I am not -wrong, rejected with the resounding approval of the entire American -people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The reasons prompting that action were also my reasons for -rejecting the Treaty: it stood in contradiction to the Fourteen -Points of Wilson, which had been solemnly agreed upon, and in the -field of economics it contained absurdities which certainly could -not work out to the advantage of world economy. But I certainly -would not accuse the American people of having been adherents -of the Nazi ideology, because they rejected the Treaty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The Prosecution also assert that you had already -been for a long time a German National Socialist, not merely a -German patriot, but a German nationalist and expansionist. Would -you like to state your position in that respect?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: You, yourself, by emphasizing the word “patriot” -have recognized that one must be clear on just what a nationalist -is. I have always been proud to belong to a nation which for more -than a thousand years has been one of the leading civilized nations -<span class='pageno' title='426' id='Page_426'></span> -of the world. I was proud to belong to a nation which has given -to the world men like Luther, Kant, Goethe, Beethoven, to mention -only a few. I have always interpreted nationalism as the desire of -a nation to be an example to other nations, and to maintain a -leading position in the field of spiritual and cultural achievement -through high moral standards and intellectual attainment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If it please the Tribunal, it seems to -me that we are getting very far from the relevant charges in this -case, and particularly if they are going to be preceded by a statement -of the Prosecution’s position.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have no charge against Dr. Schacht because he opposed the -Treaty of Versailles; we concede it was the right of any German -citizen to do that by any means short of war. Nor do we object -to his being a patriotic German by any means short of war. The -only purpose has been to find out what his attitude in those matters -was in connection with the charge that he prepared and precipitated -war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To deal with philosophical matters separately from the war -charge seems to me entirely irrelevant, and I assure the Tribunal -we have no purpose in charging that it is a crime to oppose the -Treaty of Versailles. Many Americans did that. It is no crime to -be a German patriot. The crime is the one defined in the Indictment, -and it seems to me we are a long way off from that here, -and wasting time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What do you say to that, Dr. Dix?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I was eager and glad to hear what Justice Jackson -just said, but I must quote from Wallenstein, “Before dinner we -heard another version.” There was no doubt—and once, because I -thought I had misunderstood, I even asked again—that the criminal -character of the Party program, the criminal character of the contents -of <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>—reproachable in itself and, to say the least, -indicative of crimes committed later—the willful opposition to the -Treaty of Versailles—and further the accusation of having been -an expansionist and nationalist, all these things have repeatedly -in the course of the proceedings here been held against Dr. Schacht -in order to strengthen the foundation of the charges made against -him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If Mr. Justice Jackson now with gratifying frankness states, “We -do not at all blame Schacht for opposing the Treaty of Versailles; -we do not assert that he was more than a patriot, that is to say, a -nationalist in the sense described before, and we do not maintain -either that these our statements are circumstantial evidence for his -later co-operation, his financial co-operation, in the rearmament -program, which in turn is proof indicative of his intent to assist in -<span class='pageno' title='427' id='Page_427'></span> -waging a war of aggression”—if that is now stated unequivocally -by the Prosecution, then we can dispense with a great many questions -which I intended to put in the course of my examination of -the witness; I would then gladly leave the whole subject of Schacht’s -expansionism and nationalism. We have not yet mentioned expansionism; -Mr. Justice Jackson has not mentioned it either. I do not -believe, however, that the Prosecution will withdraw the accusation -of expansionism, that is the expansion of German living -space in Europe. I am not sure of this but we shall certainly hear -about it. As I said, if these accusations which have been made are -withdrawn, then I can dispense with these questions and my client -need not answer them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Of course, I made no such statement -as Dr. Dix has assumed. My statement was clearly made in the -opening and clearly is now, that he had a perfect right to be against -the Treaty of Versailles and to be a German nationalist and to -follow those aims by all means short of war. I do not want to have -put in my mouth the very extensive statements made by Dr. Dix.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My statement was made clear in the opening, and these matters -as to the Versailles Treaty and nationalism and Lebensraum, as -political and philosophical matters, are not for the Court to determine. -We are not going to ask you to say whether the Treaty of -Versailles was a just document or not. It was a document. They -had a right to do what they could to get away from it by all means -short of war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The charge against Dr. Schacht is that he prepared, knowingly, -to accomplish those things by means of aggressive warfare. That is -the nub of the case against him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Then on this point there is...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think the case for the Prosecution -has been clear from the outset, that all these matters are only -relied upon when they were entered into with the intention of -making war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Very true. I need not put these questions if the Prosecution -no longer uses these accusations as circumstantial evidence -for his intent to wage a war of aggression, but Mr. Justice Jackson -has not yet made a statement to that effect. But there seems to be -no doubt—and I do not believe that I misunderstood the Prosecution—that -in order to prove Dr. Schacht’s intention to wage a -war of aggression, the Prosecution did refer to Schacht’s opposition -to the Treaty of Versailles, to his nationalism and expansionism -that is, extension of Lebensraum. We do not want to make academic -or theoretical statements about the ideas of Lebensraum -and nationalism, but as long as these ideas, which the Prosecution -<span class='pageno' title='428' id='Page_428'></span> -concedes he is justified in holding, as long as these characteristics -are considered to be in part proof of his intent, my client must -have the opportunity of telling the Tribunal just what he meant -by Lebensraum if he ever spoke of it, which I do not yet know. -But I think, nevertheless, that there is still a matter not quite -clear between Mr. Justice Jackson and me, and that I do not quite -agree either with what was said by Your Lordship...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What you were asking him about was his -views on nationalism. That is what you were asking him about, -his views upon nationalism, and that seems to be a waste of time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I put to him that he was accused of being a nationalist -and an expansionist, and that the Prosecution therefrom drew the -conclusion that he planned an aggressive war by financing armament; -now he has to show, of course, that...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What Mr. Justice Jackson has pointed out -is that the Prosecution have never said that he simply held the -views of a nationalist and of an expansionist, but that he held -those views and intended to go to war in order to enforce them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes, Your Lordship, but it is held that these opinions -were proof—one proof among others—that he had the intention of -waging aggressive war; that they therefore constitute what we -jurists should call circumstantial evidence for his intent, to wage -war, and as long as this argument—it is no longer a charge maintained -by Justice Jackson but it is an argument of the Prosecution...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: There is no issue about it. He agrees that -he did hold these views. Therefore it is quite unnecessary to go -into the fact. The Prosecution say he held the views; he agrees -that he held the views. The only question is whether he held them -with the innocent intention of achieving them by peaceful methods, -or whether he had the alleged criminal intention of achieving -them by war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I only wish to say one more thing to that. Expansionism -has not yet been discussed. Should Dr. Schacht have had -expansionist tendencies, then Mr. Justice Jackson certainly would -not say that he has no objection. Therefore...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think that you may ask him questions -about the expansionists, his ideas of what expansionists were, -what he meant by expansion, but for the rest it seems to me you -are simply proving exactly the same as the Prosecution have proved.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I fully agree. Dr. Schacht, were you...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='429' id='Page_429'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I believe, Dr. Schacht, that both of us will have to -speak a little more slowly and pause between question and answer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, please reply to the accusation by the Prosecution that -you were an expansionist. Please define your position.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Never in my life have I demanded even a foot of -space that did not belong to Germany, nor would I ever entertain -such an idea.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am of the opinion that neither is it national to try to dominate -and govern foreign peoples, nor is appropriation of foreign territory -a politically just action.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These are two questions with which we are much concerned at -present.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I might perhaps add, in order to clarify my position, just what -I understand by nationalism, and just why I was against each and -every form of expansionism. Just one sentence will suffice, a -sentence from a speech which I made in August of 1935. On that -occasion I said, and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“We want to express the belief that self-respect requires -respect for others, and the upholding of our national individuality -must not mean disparagement of the individuality -of others; by respecting the acts of others we respect our -own action; and a battle of economic competition can be -won in the end only through example and achievement and -not through methods of violence or craft.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: According to the opinion of the Prosecution, in the -year 1936 you made a public threat of war, on which occasion you -are alleged to have said that the spirit of Versailles was instrumental -in keeping alive war mania. I am referring to Document -EC-415, a document to which the Prosecution has referred.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I never understood, in the course of this proceeding, -how there could be a threat of war in this quotation. The quotation -concludes with the words—and I must quote in English because -I just have the English words before me:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The spirit of Versailles is perpetuated in the fury of war, -and there will not be a true peace, progress, or reconstruction -until the world desists from this spirit. The German -people will not tire of pronouncing this warning.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The conclusion says that the German people will not tire of -pronouncing this warning. It seems to be a matter of course that -hereby expression is given to the fact that I am warning others -from persisting in war mania. I am not warning ourselves, but the -entire world, to avoid perpetuating the spirit of Versailles. -<span class='pageno' title='430' id='Page_430'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The Prosecution further accuses you in this connection -that you publicly approved the idea of Lebensraum, for the German -people. In this special connection reference was made to the speech -you made at Frankfurt on 9 December 1936, in which you said: -“Germany has too limited Lebensraum for her population.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: This speech of 9 December 1936 was a speech which -was solely concerned with a restoration of the colonial rights of -Germany. I have never demanded any Lebensraum for Germany -other than colonial space. And in this instance, again, I am surprised -that just the American Prosecutor should accuse me on -my efforts in this direction, because in the Fourteen Points of -Wilson, which regrettably were not adhered to later on, the colonial -interests of the Germans are taken into consideration. In consequence, -I said, again and again: “If you want peace in Europe, give -Germany an economic outlet into which Germany can develop and -from which she can satisfy her needs. Otherwise Germany will -be a center of unrest and a problem for Europe.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I would like to quote one sentence only from the speech I made:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Peace in Europe, together with the peace of the entire -world, is dependent upon whether or not the densely populated -areas of Central Europe will have the means of existence.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I emphasized this viewpoint again and again, but at no time -did I connect these views with the idea of an armed conflict.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I would like to quote another sentence from this same speech:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I did not mention this consideration as to the parts of -Germany which were separated from her”—and I am -speaking of the losses suffered by Germany—“in order that -we might draw the conclusion of warlike intentions; my -entire position and my work are marshaled to the objective -of bringing about peace in Europe through peaceful and -sensible considerations and measures.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you please give me the PS numbers -and the exhibit numbers of those two speeches?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I cannot at this moment, Your Lordship, I am sorry, -but I will try to get them and submit them in writing. The last -is the speech at Frankfurt, and the others...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is quite all right. You will let us know -in writing, will you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes, indeed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Perhaps if it is permitted I might refer to two -other sentences from my article which was published in <span class='it'>Foreign -Affairs</span>, the well-known American magazine, in the year 1937. I -<span class='pageno' title='431' id='Page_431'></span> -have the German translation before me, which says, in the introduction, -and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I am making these introductory remarks in order to clarify -the situation. The colonial problem today, as in the past, is -for Germany not a question of imperialism or militarism, -but still surely and simply a question of economic existence.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Perhaps I might refer to the point that very influential Americans -were in constant accord with this view. I have a statement -made by the collaborator of President Wilson, Colonel House, who -made the well-known distinction between the “haves” and “have -nots,” and who was especially influential in advocating consideration -for German colonial interests. Perhaps I can dispense with -the quotation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: In this connection I should like to point to the document -submitted by the Prosecution, Document L-111, Exhibit -USA-630. This document is concerned with the conversation which -you had with the American Ambassador Davies, and in which you -are accused of having indirectly threatened a breach of peace.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I have already set forth just now that I constantly -said that Europe cannot have peaceful development if there are no -means of livelihood for the completely overpopulated Central -Europe, and I believe conditions at present show how absolutely -right I was—just what an impossibility it is to feed these masses -of people within Europe. And beyond that I had a keen interest -in diverting Hitler’s quite misguided ideas from Eastern Europe -and therefore was constantly at pains to direct his attention to the -colonial problem so that I could turn his thought from the mad -ideas of expansionism in the East. I recall that in 1932, shortly -before he assumed office, I had a conversation with him in which -for the first time I approached him on these facts and particularly -told him what utter nonsense it would be to think of an expansion -in the East.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, constantly, in the subsequent years, again and again, I -spoke about the colonial problem, until at the last in the summer -of 1936 I had the possibility of pursuing my ideas and Hitler gave -me the mission, which I had suggested to him, of going to Paris -to discuss with the French Government the possibility of a satisfactory -solution of the question of colonies for Germany. This -actually happened in the summer of 1936. And for the satisfaction -of myself and all other friends of peace, I might say that the -Government of Léon Blum, which was in office at the time, showed -gratifying appreciation of this solution for Europe’s food and economic -problems, and for their part stated that they were ready -to deal with the colonial problem with the aim of perhaps returning -<span class='pageno' title='432' id='Page_432'></span> -one or two colonies to Germany. Léon Blum then undertook, in -agreement with me, to inform the British Government about these -conversations in order to secure their consent or to bring up a -discussion of this problem within the British Government. That -actually did take place, but the British Government hesitated for -months before they finally could decide on any position in this -matter and so the discussion dragged on up to the initial months -of the Spanish civil war and was eclipsed and supplanted by the -problems of the Spanish civil war, so that a continuation of the -discussion on this colonial problem never came about.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At that time, in January of 1937, when the American Ambassador -to Moscow, Ambassador Joseph Davies, visited me at Berlin, -I was rather irritated by the slowness with which the British Government -was meeting these suggestions, and consequently I came -forth with a request for understanding and support and told Ambassador -Davies about this whole matter. I tried constantly and -repeatedly to gain the understanding support of representatives of -the American Government. I tried again and again to advise these -gentlemen about domestic conditions and developments within Germany, -to tell them as much as was possible and compatible with -German interests and to keep them informed. That applies to -Ambassador Davies, Ambassador Dodd, Ambassador Bullitt when -he was in Berlin, and so on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This conversation with Ambassador Davies is referred to in the -document which the Prosecution has submitted, Document L-111, -and which is taken from the book which Ambassador Davies wrote -about his mission in Moscow, and we will perhaps come back to this -book later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As the gist of my conversation with Davies I would like to quote -just one sentence again, which I must again quote in English, since -I have only the English book at my disposal.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Schacht earnestly urged that some such feasible plan could -be developed if discussions could be opened; and that, if -successful, would relieve the European war menace, relieve -peoples of enormous expenditures for armaments, restore free -flow of international commerce, give outlet to thrift and -natural abilities of his countrymen and change their present -desperation into future hope.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: In this connection the affidavit of Fuller plays an -important part, that is Exhibit USA-629, and Document EC-450. -According to this affidavit, you allegedly declared to Fuller that if -Germany could not get colonies through negotiations she would -take them. Please define your position as to this statement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: In a German drama an intriguer is being instructed -by a tyrant to bring a man of honor to ruin, and he says in reply, -<span class='pageno' title='433' id='Page_433'></span> -“Just give me one word said by this man, and I will hang him -thereby.” I believe, My Lord Justices, that in this courtroom there -is not a single person who at one time or another in his life has not -said a rather unfortunate word. And how much easier is it when he -is speaking in a foreign language of which he is not completely -master.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. Fuller is known to me as a respectable business man, and -this discussion which he has here reproduced is indubitably done -according to the best of his knowledge. He himself rightly says that -even had he tried to put down the exact words he could not -guarantee that each and every word has been said. But if I did say -these words, then it seems only that I said we Germans must have -colonies and we shall have them. Whether I said, “We shall take -them,” or “We shall get them,” that, of course, it is impossible for -me to say with certainty today after a period of 10 years.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The representative of the Prosecution also thought the expression, -“We will take them,” a little colorless in effect and therefore -I believe he just added a trifle, for he said twice in his presentation -of the charges that I had said, “We will take these colonies by -force,” and on a second occasion he even said, “We will take these -colonies by force of arms.” But “force” or “force of arms” are not -mentioned in the whole of Fuller’s affidavit. And if I had used that -word or even used it only by implication, Mr. Fuller would have -had to say with reason: “So you want to take colonies by force; -how do you expect to do that?” It would have been utter nonsense -to assert that Germany would ever have been able to take overseas -colonies by force. She lacked—and always will lack—domination of -the seas, which is necessary for this.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Fuller did not take exception to my manner of expression and -in his conversation he immediately continued—and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“You mentioned a little while ago that necessary raw -materials could not be obtained, owing to German lack of -foreign exchange. Would stabilization help you?”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Therefore, rather than to become excited about the fact that I -wanted to take colonies by force—something which I never said -and which is contrary to my views, as I have already stated—he -immediately goes on to foreign exchange and to stabilization.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The prosecutor asserts further that you were interested -in the conquest of neighboring territory in Europe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: This matter is not quite so harmless as the previous -mistake of the Prosecution. In a previous interrogation, I was -accused as follows, and the prosecutor, in presenting his charges -here, referred to the fact—I quote the prosecutor: -<span class='pageno' title='434' id='Page_434'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“On 16 April, on the occasion of the Paris conference on -reparation payments, Schacht said, ‘Germany in general can -pay only if the Corridor and Upper Silesia are returned to -Germany.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This is the interrogation of 24 August 1945. According to the -verbatim record of the interrogation, I answered:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It may be that I said such a thing.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Of course, as far as the wording of a statement, which I had -made 10 to 15 years before, I did not recall it. But I did remember -that in connection with the Corridor and Upper Silesia I had made -a remark, and since I had to assume that if the Prosecution submitted -this record to me it would be an accurate stenographic -record, for that reason I did not dispute this remark which I had -allegedly made and said that it might be that I said something to -that effect. The Prosecution takes a “maybe” and out of that reconstructed -the following sentence:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“This quotation was read to Schacht, and he said it was -correct.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This assertion by the Prosecution is therefore wrong. I said, “It -may be that I said something to that effect,” but I did not say that -this statement that was submitted to me was correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, fortunately, in my imprisonment here, I succeeded in getting -hold of my book, a book which I wrote about the termination of -reparation payments, which was published in 1931 and in which I -luckily put down the text of my statement about the matter we are -dealing with now. I have the exact text, and I would like to say -that this book has been submitted in evidence, and from this text -appears what I said verbatim:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Regarding the problem of German food and food supplies, -it is especially important that import of foodstuffs has been -decreased”—I beg your pardon—“that import will be decreased.”—I -am sorry again. I cannot read this—“that the -import of foodstuffs will be decreased and partially made up -through home production. Therefore, we cannot let the fact -be overlooked that important agricultural surplus territories -in the eastern part of Germany have been lost by cession and -that a large territory which was almost exclusively agrarian -has been separated from the Reich. Therefore the economic -welfare of this territory, East Prussia, is decreasing steadily -and the Reich Government must support and subsidize it. -Constantly, therefore, suitable measures should be taken to -eliminate these injurious conditions, which are hindering considerably -Germany’s ability to pay.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='435' id='Page_435'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Your Lordship, this is from our document book, Document -Schacht-16, German Page 38, English Page 44.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: This quotation absolutely does not agree with the -statement submitted to me in the interrogation, and in no way can -we draw the conclusion in consequence that I was in favor of a -return of these areas. What I demanded was that the separation of -these areas be taken into consideration when Germany’s ability to -pay and the payments were determined. When the prosecutor in -his speech added: “I would like to point out that this is the same -area over which the war started in September 1939,” I believe it is -an insinuation which characterizes the prosecutor, rather than me, -against whom it was intended.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: As part of the circumstantial evidence, that is, the -indirect evidence for the will to aggression, with which you are -charged, the Prosecution includes your wish—your alleged wish—for -the Anschluss of Austria. Will you please take your position as -to this accusation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: From 1919 I considered the Anschluss of Austria -inevitable and, in the national sense, that is, spiritually and culturally, -it was welcome. But that economically the Anschluss of -Austria would not be for Germany so much an aggrandizement as a -liability. I always knew. But the wish of the Austrian people to -belong, to be incorporated into Germany—I took that wish as my -own and said that if here there are six and a half million people -who spontaneously in 1919 and later in innumerable demonstrations -expressed their wish of being incorporated into the brotherhood of -Greater Germany, that was an event to which no German could be -opposed, but in the interest of Austria must hail with gladness. In -that sense I always favored and respected the wish of Austria to -belong to the Reich and wanted it carried through as soon as -external political conditions permitted it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: My attention has just been called to the fact that you -are still speaking too fast and that the interpretation is lagging -behind a little bit. Will you please speak a little more slowly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>What was your opinion as to the incorporation of the Sudetenland -into Germany?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Concerning the incorporation of the Sudetenland, -I never thought of any such thing. Of course, Czechoslovakia was a -European problem, and it was regrettable that in that state, which -had five and a half million Czechs, two and a half million Slovaks -and about three and a half million Germans, the German element -had no means of expression. But just because the Czechoslovakian -problem was not a purely German-Czech but also a Slovak-Czech -problem, I sought a solution of this problem in such a way and -<span class='pageno' title='436' id='Page_436'></span> -wished it to be in such a way that Czechoslovakia should constitute -a federated state, similar perhaps to Switzerland, divided into three -different, culturally separate, but politically unified areas, which -would be a guarantee for the unity of a German-Czech-Slovak state.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: What was your opinion and attitude to the problem of -war; by that I mean, as far as philosophical, ideological, and practical -considerations are concerned?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I always considered war as one of the most devastating -things to which mankind is exposed and on basic principles -throughout my entire life I was a pacifist.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, during your meditative and thoughtful -life you have certainly considered the fundamental and profound -differences between legitimate and ethically based soldiership and -militarism in its various degenerate forms. What did you mean by -the latter and what was your attitude toward it, that is, militarism?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Of course I saw the necessity of a country’s defense -in case of war or threats, and I stood for that theory. In that sense -I was always in favor of a Wehrmacht, but the profession of a -soldier I consider to be full of deprivations and characterized by -willingness and readiness to sacrifice, not because perhaps during a -war the soldier has to give up his life—that is the duty of every -citizen of military age—but because his whole aim and aspiration -must be directed to the end that never must the craft which he has -learned be exercised. A soldier, a career officer, who is not intrinsically -a pacifist, has really in my opinion missed his calling. -Consequently, I was always an opponent of every military digression -and excess. I was always against militarism, but I consider that -soldiership conscious of its responsibility is the highest calling -which a citizen can pursue.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now, George Messersmith, as you know, the Consul -General of the United States at Berlin at one time, says in one of -his various affidavits produced by the Prosecution that you had told -him, and repeatedly told him, about Nazi intents of aggression. Will -you please state your position in that regard?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: First of all, I would like to remark that of course I -never made a statement of that sort, neither to Mr. George Messersmith -nor to anyone else. As far as these three affidavits of Mr. -Messersmith, which were submitted by the Prosecution, are concerned, -I would like to make a further statement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. Messersmith asserts that he had frequent contact and -numerous private conversations with me, and I would like to state -here now that, according to my exact memory, I saw Mr. George -Messersmith perhaps two or three times in my entire life. Mr. -<span class='pageno' title='437' id='Page_437'></span> -George Messersmith represents himself as having had numerous -contacts and many private conversations with me, and he asserts -further that his official capacity brought him in contact with me as -President of the Reichsbank and as Minister of Economics.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I do not recall once having received Mr. Messersmith in my -office. Mr. George Messersmith takes these two or three discussions -and proceeds to characterize me. He calls me cynical, ambitious, -egotistic, vain, two-faced. I am, unfortunately, not in a position to -give an equally comprehensive picture of the character of Mr. Messersmith. -But I must definitely dispute his trustworthiness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And as a first reason for this I should like to quote a general -remark by Mr. Messersmith. In his affidavit of 30 August 1945, -Document 2385-PS, Mr. George Messersmith says, and I quote: -“When the Nazi Party took over Germany, it represented only a -small part of the German population.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Contrary to that, I say that before the Nazi Party took over -Germany it occupied about forty percent of all Reichstag seats. That -percentage Mr. Messersmith calls a small part of the German -population. If diplomatic reports are everywhere as reliable as in -this instance, it is small wonder that nations do not understand each -other.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I would still like to correct a specific remark by Mr. Messersmith. -Mr. Messersmith asserts, as I have quoted just a minute ago, -that his duty brought him in contact with me as Minister of -Economics. In his affidavit of 28 August, 1760-PS, Mr. Messersmith -says, and I quote: “During the wave of terrorist activity in May -and June of 1934, I had already assumed my duties as American -Chargé d’Affaires in Vienna.” In August of 1934 I became Minister -of Economics, whereas, on the other hand, Mr. Messersmith, already -in May of 1934, assumed his official duties in Vienna; but this does -not prevent Mr. Messersmith from asserting that his official duties -brought him in frequent contact with me as Minister of Economics. -I believe this will suffice to gauge the capacity of Mr. Messersmith’s -memory correctly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: In a similar connection, the Prosecution repeatedly -referred to the diary of the former ambassador in Berlin, Mr. Dodd, -which was published on the basis of his private notes by his children -after his death. This document has the Document Number EC-461. -The Prosecution quotes from this diary repeatedly to prove that -Mr. Dodd, too, considered you a warmonger. I know, of course, that -you were a friend of Mr. Dodd’s, a fact which is shown in his diary. -Can you tell me how the two facts can be reconciled?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: First of all, I might say that Ambassador Dodd was -one of the most undefiled personalities I have met, an upright -<span class='pageno' title='438' id='Page_438'></span> -character, a man of unflinching fidelity to his convictions. He was -a professor of history, undoubtedly a good historian. He had studied -at German universities. I believe that he would turn in his grave -if he could know that the notes which he put down casually in his -diary were put together by his two children without commentary -and printed without investigation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. Dodd, I am sorry to say, had one characteristic which made -dealing with him a little difficult. I think the reason for this lay in -his steadfastness of conviction, which from the first often made him -appear averse to outside influence. He found it rather hard to make -himself understood easily and fluently, and he was even less in a -position to view opinions of others in the right light. Many things -that were told him he misunderstood and saw in a wrong light.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On Page 176 in his diary, in the lower part, there is one sentence -I would like to quote to illustrate the point I am trying to make. -Here he says: “I talked fifteen minutes with Phipps”—the British -Ambassador at that time—“about the accumulated evidence of -Germany’s intense war activities.” This statement dates from the -autumn of 1934 and I believe no one is able to say that in the -autumn of 1934 there was any talk of a war activity on the part of -Germany. Mr. Dodd uses the expression “war” undoubtedly in the -place of “armament”; he says “Krieg” instead of “Aufrüstung.” In -that sense, I believe he misunderstood the words.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And, as further evidence for the difficulty which one had in -making the Ambassador understand, I might say that the Foreign -Office asked him once to bring a secretary who would take notes -of discussions with representatives of the Foreign Office, so that -misunderstandings could be avoided.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I believe, therefore, that all these statements by Mr. Dodd are -apt to be misunderstood. As for myself I can only say what I have -already said about Mr. Messersmith, that of course I never talked -about war intentions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now, in this diary it says that he was favorably -disposed towards you. Do you have any proof for this friendly -attitude to you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: May I perhaps refer to the correspondence with -Henderson...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes, we can deal with that later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Then I shall just confine myself to your question. -Dodd was entirely friendly to me, and I respected him deeply. -I saw a sign of his friendship in that shortly before his departure -from Berlin in December of 1937 he visited me at my home, and -this incident is also dealt with in his diary, and I would like to -<span class='pageno' title='439' id='Page_439'></span> -quote just one sentence: “I went to Dr. Schacht’s house in Dahlem. -I wished especially to see Schacht, whose life is said to be in danger.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In other words, Mr. Dodd had heard of an imminent attack on -my life on the part of National Socialists, and considered it important -enough and a reason for coming to my home personally in -order to warn me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A second piece of evidence of his friendship towards me can be -seen from the final visit he paid me just a few days before returning -to America. At that time he again called on me and told me urgently -that I should go to America with him, or as soon after him as -possible, that I should change my residence to America, and that I -would find a pleasant welcome there. I believe he would never -have said that to me had he not felt a certain degree of friendship -for me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: These are express services of friendship, and it can -hardly be assumed that the deceased Ambassador would have done -you these good services if he had considered you a warmonger and -friend of the Nazis, and especially—and I would like to say this to -the High Tribunal—if one remembers that Mr. Dodd was one of the -few accredited diplomats in Berlin who very obviously had no -sympathy of any sort for the regime in power, in fact he was -wholly and fully opposed to it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I intentionally say “the few diplomats” and, Dr. Schacht, I would -like you to define your opinion on what I am saying. You will -remember that those diplomats who kept aloof from Hitler’s regime -politically and socially, such as the Dutch Minister, the magnificent -grand seigneur Limburg-Stirum, or the Minister from Finland, the -true-hearted and great Social Democrat, Wuolijoki, that most of -these diplomats were recalled by their Governments. How is it that -an opponent of the Nazis like Dodd did such open services of -friendship to someone whom he considered a friend of the Nazis? -Do you agree with my opinion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes. I am entirely of the same opinion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I certainly object to going into this -kind of sermonizing back and forth between the box and the bar. -It seems to me that the witness has been allowed to say everything -that Mr. Dodd has ever written and to put in his mind what he -thinks Dodd meant. He has allowed him to go to great lengths -characterizing all American representatives, but it seems to me that -this is utterly off the track and improper for this witness to give -a characterization of him in comparison with other ambassadors and -other diplomatic representatives.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There is no request here for information about facts. I reiterate, -we are not accusing Dr. Schacht here because of his opinions. We -<span class='pageno' title='440' id='Page_440'></span> -are accusing him because of very specific facts which there seems -great reluctance to get to and deal with.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think you should go on, Dr. Dix, and pass -from this part of it, pass on from these documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Perhaps I might mention very briefly that it is entirely -far from me or from Dr. Schacht to feel impelled to express here -our opinions on political or diplomatic personalities, but, on the -other hand, if the Prosecution produces affidavits or diaries of these -diplomats and uses these documents as pieces of evidence against -the defendant in this proceeding, the defendant...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you would put -questions and put them shortly, it would be much better, and we -should get on much faster.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes. In general I have put brief questions, Your Lordship. -I only said this now, because I would like to follow the procedure -approved, I believe, by the High Tribunal, of dealing with -part of the evidence at this stage; and so I would like to bring up -the reliability of Dodd’s Diary. That is Document Schacht-43 in my -document book; German text, Page 194; English text, Page 202. -Here we are concerned with the correspondence between the -publisher of Dodd’s diary and Sir Nevile Henderson, which deals -with several misstatements in the diary. I will dispense with the -rather long letter by Sir Nevile Henderson—there are five folio -pages—and will cite just a few sentences.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On Page 196 of the German text, Sir Nevile Henderson writes:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Take, for instance, the first statement attributed to me about -Neurath. It is entirely impossible, that I, in front of Hitler...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>and so on and so forth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then on the same page, in the middle of the page, next paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“And it is the same with the general discussion. It is quite -inconceivable that I should have spoken, as there recorded, -about Bismarck and the annexation of Czechoslovakia and -other countries.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And on the same page, a little further down, next to the last -paragraph, it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Nor could I possibly have said that ‘Germany must dominate -the Danube-Balkan zone.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And on the next page, second paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The remark attributed to me that England and Germany -‘must control the world’ is pure balderdash and hardly fits in -with the preceding sentence about the United States.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='441' id='Page_441'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, there are other similar passages on this and the following -page, but I do not believe it necessary for me to quote them. I -request the High Tribunal to take official notice of this document -in its entirety, and I would like to submit it as such.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Dr. Schacht, a little while ago you -mentioned a warning on the part of Ambassador Dodd with regard -to a danger which was threatening you. Was it an attack on your -life?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: At that time—and I only heard about this in -January after Mr. Dodd told me—I was informed that the SS was -planning an attack on my person. The intent was, as the technical -expression then had it, “to remove” me. Something like that must -have been in the air; otherwise, a foreign ambassador and the -circles close to me would not have known about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Just a little while ago you set forth how your policy -rejected the use of arms in bringing about equality of German -rights and means of livelihood. Did you try to do anything in a -practical way to further your policy of peaceful agreement with -foreign countries, for example, when you were President of the -bank?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: My entire work as President of the Reichsbank was -primarily based on the principle of working with the banks in -foreign countries as harmoniously as possible, of pursuing a policy -of mutual assistance and support.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Secondly, I tried to enter into personal, friendly relations with -the directors of all these banks in the hope of meeting understanding -for German problems, and thus of contributing to a solution by -way of co-operation and mutual solution of these difficult problems -which had arisen in Central Europe. The word “co-operation” (Zusammenarbeit) -was the leitmotif of our circle.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: To turn from the directors of the banks, what about -your foreign creditors?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: As I already said a little while ago, from the start -I was in disfavor with all the money makers, those people who had -profited from German loans in foreign countries for I was against -Germany’s being involved in debts abroad, and I took my stand -very firmly on this point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then later, after the misfortune which I had always predicted -actually did come to pass, after the financial crash in the year 1931, -these self-same financiers and money men blamed me for the fact -that the interest on their money was no longer being transferred to -them. Therefore in those circles I did not gain any friends, but -<span class='pageno' title='442' id='Page_442'></span> -among serious bankers and large banking institutions which were -interested in constant and regulated business with Germany, I -believe I made no enemies, because all measures which I later had -to take in order to protect the German currency and to maintain -Germany’s foreign trade, all these measures I always discussed -jointly with the representatives of foreign creditors. Approximately -every six months we met, and I always gave them a detailed -account of German conditions. They were permitted to look into -the books of the Reichsbank. They could examine and interrogate -the officials of the Reichsbank and they always confirmed that I -told them everything in the most frank and open manner. So that -I may say that I worked in a fair and friendly way also with -these men.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And how did your policy of peaceful agreement affect -foreign trade, export, credit, and so forth?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I believe that after the happenings that have now -taken place it is today even clearer than before that Germany -cannot and could not live without foreign trade, and that the maintenance -of export trade must be the basis for the future existence -of the German nation. Consequently, I did everything in order to -maintain German foreign trade. I can cite a few specific examples -to supplement the general principles. I tried, for example, to do -business with China in order that we might export to China. I was -ready to give China credit and did. I hailed the fact that the Soviet -Union kept up an extensive flow of trade with us, and I always -advocated expanding and stabilizing this foreign trade in the case -of Russia as well as China. About the ability and readiness to pay -and the promptness of payment of the opposite parties I never had -any doubts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He is going into unnecessary detail in support -of the allegation that he tried to maintain export trade. We do not -surely need details.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, this exposition -is of great significance and relevance. It shows Schacht contrary -and in opposition to the policy carried out by Hitler. Hitler was -hostile to the Soviet Union and this hostility is counterbalanced by -open friendliness on the part of and in the person of the Minister of -Economics. If I want to prove that Schacht was pioneer of a policy -of understanding between nations, even in phases where Hitler -carried on a peaceful battle, so to speak, with another country, -such as the war of propaganda against the Soviet Union, then, in -my opinion, this point is very important for Schacht’s fundamental -attitude—on one side war and on the other understanding. This is -of absolute relevance. -<span class='pageno' title='443' id='Page_443'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has made the allegation. It is -for the Prosecution to dispute it in cross-examination and if they do, -then the details might become material in re-examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I believe the question has been answered, and now -I shall turn to an entirely new phase of questioning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Since it is typical of his desire for understanding and his direct -basic opposition to the policy of Hitler, I would like to refer to -Document Number Schacht-34, which is an affidavit, of Schniewind, -the banker and Swedish Consul General at Munich. This is Exhibit 34, -Page 114, of the English translation, and I would like to quote -a short paragraph on Page 112 of the German text, which confirms -Dr. Schacht’s remarks. Schniewind, who was a high official in the -Ministry of Economics, says here:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“My department dealt with the Reich guarantees for deliveries -to Russia, and thus I was in position to know that -Schacht considered Hitler wrong in fighting Russia. Through -much effort, he obtained Hitler’s permission to send extensive -supplies, especially machines to Russia. Frequently I gained -the impression that Herr Schacht favored these deliveries -because, while instrumental in giving employment, they did -not benefit rearmament. Herr Schacht on several public -occasions pointed out with satisfaction that trade shipments -to Russia were proceeding promptly and smoothly.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>There are just a few more minutes before the customary recess, -Your Honor, and before we take our recess, I ask that I be permitted -to reply shortly to Your Lordship’s remarks of a few minutes ago. -The defendant must conduct what is, to a certain degree, a very -difficult defense. The Prosecution very simply argued: “You helped -to finance rearmament and this rearmament in the final analysis -ended in war and not only a war but a war of aggression; therefore, -you as a defendant are either a conspirator or an accomplice, and -that is a war crime.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As far as this argument is concerned, it must in my opinion be -open to the defendant, first—and we shall deal with that later—to -point out that rearmament as such by no means constitutes a desire -for aggressive war; and secondly, to show that his acts actually -indicate the exact opposite, namely, his desire for concord and -peace; and for these fundamental reasons, I do beg the Tribunal not -to cut me short in this evidence but rather to give me the time to -carry it through in detail. This explains my desire to set forth -Schacht’s policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy in which he was -in direct opposition to Hitler, to bring it forth in its entirety, and -also my wish to show that he worked for agreement on all levels—with -directors of banks and credit furnishers—that is, he advocated -<span class='pageno' title='444' id='Page_444'></span> -a policy of give and take rather than one of unilateral terrorizing -and strife.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Gentlemen of the Bench, it is chiefly on a psychological plane on -which I have to conduct the defense; that is a very sensitive and -delicate field, and I again ask that my task may not be made more -difficult. Then, when the witnesses are called, I for my part will -most likely dispense with every witness except one, and I beg that -you show me some consideration. Does Your Lordship consider it -time for a recess?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Dr. Dix. I thought that the -Tribunal has shown you every consideration, and we will now certainly -have a recess.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, what was your attitude toward the -Leadership Principle? Did you not realize the danger of giving a -blank check, the danger of losing your own capacity of responsibility? -You have heard that Sir David considers the Leadership -Principle in itself to be criminal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: As to whether the Leadership Principle is criminal -or not, opinions throughout history have been much divided. If we -look back through Roman history we see that from time to time in -dire periods of distress a leader was selected to whom everyone -else was subordinate. And if I read <span class='it'>Failure of a Mission</span> by Henderson -there, too, I find sentences in which he says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“People in England sometimes forget and fail to realize that -even dictators can be, up to a point, necessary for a period -and even extremely beneficial for a nation.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Another passage from the same book says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Dictatorships are not always evil.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In other words, it depends on just what is attributed to a Führer, -how much confidence one has in a Führer, and for how long a time. -Of course, it is a sheer impossibility for someone to assume the -leadership of a country without giving the nation from time to -time an opportunity of saying whether it still wants to keep him -as Führer or not. The election of Hitler as Führer was in itself -no political mistake; in my opinion one could have introduced -quite a number of precautionary limitations with a view to averting -the danger you have mentioned. I regret to say that that was not -done, and that was a great mistake. But perhaps one was entitled -to rely on the fact that from time to time a referendum, a plebiscite, -a new expression of the will of the people would take place by -which the Führer could have been corrected, because a leader who -<span class='pageno' title='445' id='Page_445'></span> -cannot be corrected becomes a menace. I recognized that danger -very well, I was afraid of it, and I attempted to meet it. May I say -one more thing? Limitless Party propaganda attempted to introduce -the idea of a Führer as a lasting principle into politics. That of -course is utter nonsense, and I took the opportunity—I always took -such opportunity whenever it was possible—of expressing my dissenting -opinions publicly. I took the opportunity in an address to -the Academy of German Law, of which not only Nazis but lawyers -of all groups were members, and in that speech I lectured about -the Leadership Principle in economics. And I expressed myself -ironically and satirically, as unfortunately is my wont, and said -that it was not necessary to have a leader in every stocking factory, -that in fact, this principle was not a principle at all, but an exceptional -rule which had to be handled very carefully.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I know that, because I was present on the occasion -of that address. What did you think about the ideology of the -master race (Herrenvolk)?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I have always considered it a very unhappy precedent -to speak of a “chosen people,” or of “God’s own country,” or -of things like that. As a convinced adherent to the Christian faith -I believe in Christian charity, which bids me extend love to all men -without regard to race or faith. I would like to mention also that -the silly talk about the master race, which some Party leaders -made their own, was held up to constant ridicule by the German -public. That was not surprising, because most of the leaders of -the Hitler Party were not exactly ideal types of the Nordic race. -And in that connection, when these things were discussed among -the German population, little Goebbels was referred to as “Der -Schrumpfgermane”—the shrivelled Teuton.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Only one thing—I have to say this to be just—did most of the -leaders of the Party have in common with the old Teutons—and -that was drinking; excessive drinking was a main part of the Nazi -ideology.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: What did you think of the so-called National Socialist -Weltanschauung?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Weltanschauung in my opinion is a summation of -all those moral principles which enable me to acquire a clear judgment -on all aspects of life. Therefore it is a matter of course that -a Weltanschauung cannot take root in the tangible world, but -must rise above it; it is something metaphysical, that is to say, it is -based on faith, on religion. A Weltanschauung which is not rooted -in religion is in my opinion no Weltanschauung at all. Consequently -I reject the National Socialist Weltanschauung which was not rooted -in religion. -<span class='pageno' title='446' id='Page_446'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: In the trial brief against you it is expressly stated -that there are no charges against you with regard to the Jewish -question. Nevertheless I am putting to you a few questions on this -topic, because the trial brief by its very words takes from you what -in the Jewish question it conceded you; that is to say, the trial -brief accuses you repeatedly of Nazi ideology, in which strict observance -of anti-Semitism is integral.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I simply cannot be bound by silence -after this flagrant misstatement of our position made in conjunction -with this witness’ testimony. It is not true that we make no charges -against Dr. Schacht with reference to the Jews. What is true is that -we say that he was not in complete sympathy with that aspect of -the Nazi program which involved a wholesale extermination of the -Jews, and he was for that reason attacked from time to time. It -is further conceded that he gave aid and comfort to individual -Jews, but we do charge that he believed the Jews of Germany -should be stripped of their rights as citizens, and that he aided -and participated in their persecution. And I do not like to have -our position misstated and then be met with a claim of estoppel -by silence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I have to thank you, Mr. Justice Jackson, for your -clarifying statement, and it is now all the more necessary that I -put in questions to Dr. Schacht, but at this moment I want to point -out...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Please put it then.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Your Lordship, it is not only a question, but it is -a problem, and I should like to ask the Prosecution to clarify it now, -because it still needs clarification even after the statement of Mr. -Justice Jackson. If the Tribunal do not think that this is the -opportune time I can bring it up later. I believe, however, that it -would be right to bring it up how.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As I see it, there is a contradiction in the Indictment, and I -would like it clarified, so that we shall not be at cross-purposes in -our final speeches.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I can put it quite briefly. It is the question of whether -Dr. Schacht is accused also of Crimes against Humanity, that is, -not only the crime of conspiracy concerning the war of aggression, -but also the typical crimes against humanity, for on this point the -individual passages, both of the Indictment and of the Prosecution -speech in which the charges were presented, are at variance. I -wanted to take the liberty of pointing out the contradictory passages -and to ask the Prosecution to be kind enough to state conclusively -at some future occasion whether Schacht is accused also -on Count Three and Four of the Indictment. In presenting the -<span class='pageno' title='447' id='Page_447'></span> -charges the Prosecution stated, and that indicates that the Prosecution -will limit itself to Counts One and Two:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Our evidence against the Defendant Schacht is limited to -the planning and preparation of aggressive war and his -participation in the conspiracy for aggressive war.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Similar statements are on Page 3 of the trial brief. Also, in -Appendix A of the Indictment the charges against Schacht are -limited to Counts One and Two. However, on Page 1 of the Indictment -we find the following:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“...accuse as guilty...of Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, -and Crimes against Humanity, and of a Common Plan or -Conspiracy to commit those Crimes....”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And then all the defendants are listed, including the Defendant -Hjalmar Schacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On Page 17 of the German text of the Indictment we read:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“On the basis of the facts previously stated, the defendants”—that -is, all the defendants—“are guilty.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That is, all the defendants are guilty of Counts One, Two, Three, -Four. It also states, on Page 18 of the Indictment:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“All defendants committed, from 1 September 1939 to 8 May -1945, War Crimes in Germany and in countries and territories -occupied by German troops after 1 September 1939 and in -Austria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and on the high seas.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>On Page 46 it reads:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“During several years before the 8th of May 1945, all defendants -committed Crimes against Humanity in Germany”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>—and so forth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Therefore, some parts of the oral presentation and of the Indictment -show that the Prosecution limits its charges against Schacht -to Counts One and Two, but other passages express beyond doubt -that he is also accused of Crimes against Humanity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I think it would be helpful—it need not be done immediately, -but I wanted as a precaution to express it now—if at the proper -time the Prosecution would state to what extent the charges apply -to Schacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, it will take only one -moment to answer that, and I think the cross-examination—the -examination should not proceed under any misapprehension.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At all times, and in all documents that I am aware of, the Defendant -Schacht has been accused of being guilty of Count One.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Count One, as the statement of the offense, states:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Common Plan or Conspiracy embraced the commission -of Crimes against Peace in that the defendants planned, -<span class='pageno' title='448' id='Page_448'></span> -prepared, and initiated wars of aggression... In the development -and course of the Common Plan it came to embrace -the commission of War Crimes, in that it contemplated, and -the defendants determined upon, and carried out ruthless -war...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And that included also Crimes against Humanity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Our contention is that, while the Defendant Schacht himself was -not in the field perpetrating these individual atrocities, he is -answerable for every offense committed by any of the defendants -or their co-conspirators up to the time that he openly broke with -this outfit with which he became associated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is our contention and Dr. Dix should conduct his examination -on the assumption that every charge is a charge against -Schacht up to the time that he openly, and on record so that somebody -knew it, became separated from the company with which he -chose to travel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: It is probably my fault, but I still cannot see clearly. -First, I do not know what date the Prosecution means when it -admits that Schacht openly broke with the regime. I must, during -my examination...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think you must make up your own mind -as to what time it was, the time at which he openly broke.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Are you not able to hear?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I have to make up my mind now?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I think you had better go on with the -evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: All right. I can refer to the subject again later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Well then, please do not make any -statements of principle concerning the Jewish question, but tell the -Tribunal, and give a few examples, of what your attitude was on -the Jewish question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: The Jewish question came up quite early, when, -in 1933, a New York banker, the late James Meier, announced his -intention to visit me. I went to Hitler at that time and told him, -“Mr. James Meier, one of the most respected New York bankers -and a great benefactor of his old home country, Germany, will -come to visit me, and I intend to give a dinner in his honor. I -assume that you have no objection.” He immediately said, in a -very definite and pronounced manner, “Herr Schacht, you can do -everything.” I assumed that he gave me absolute freedom to keep -in contact with my Jewish friends, which I did. The dinner actually -took place. -<span class='pageno' title='449' id='Page_449'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I only mention this because it was the first time the Jewish -question was brought up between us. At every occasion I took a -definite position on the Jewish question—and wherever possible, -publicly—I have always looked for that opportunity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I will give only two examples of that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There was a branch of the Reichsbank in Amswalde in the -Province of Brandenburg. The name of the manager of that branch -office was one day posted up in one of the public <span class='it'>Stürmer</span> boxes in -his town, and termed a traitor to the people because his wife had -bought 50 pfennings worth of ribbon or the like in a Jewish store. -I at once approached the competent official at Amswalde and demanded -the immediate removal of the placard and an immediate -correction to the effect that the man was no traitor to the people. -That was refused; whereupon, without asking anyone, I closed -the Reichsbank branch at Amswalde. It took a number of weeks -until, in the end, the Oberpräsident, who was of course also a Nazi -boss, came to me and asked me to reopen the branch office. I told -him, “As soon as they repudiate that affair publicly I shall reopen -the branch office at Amswalde.” It took only a few days before the -Oberpräsident and Gauleiter of Brandenburg, Grube, had the announcement -made public in the Amswalde newspaper, in large -print, and so I reopened the branch office in Amswalde. That is -one example.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The second example has been mentioned briefly; I just want to -sum it up once more because its effect was penetrating.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the occasion of a Christmas celebration for the office messengers -of the Reichsbank I referred to the pogrom of 9 November -1938, and I told the boys, in the presence of many—parents, Party -leaders, and Party members—that I hoped they had nothing to do -with these things, which should make every decent German blush -with shame. But if they did they should leave the Reichsbank at -once, because in an institution such as the Reichsbank, which was -built up on good faith, there was no place for people who did not -respect the property and life of others.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: May I interrupt you, Dr. Schacht, and point out to -the Tribunal that in Document Number Schacht-34, which has been -submitted and is an affidavit of Dr. Schniewind, on Page 118 of the -German text and on Page 126 of the English text the same incident -which Dr. Schacht has just related is mentioned. May I quote quite -briefly:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is known that at the Christmas celebration of the Reichsbank -in December of 1938 he”—that is Schacht—“said the following -in his address to the young office boys: -<span class='pageno' title='450' id='Page_450'></span></p> - -<p>“ ‘A few weeks ago things occurred in our fatherland which -are a disgrace to civilization and which must turn every -decent German’s face red with shame. I only hope that none -of you office boys participated in them, because for such an -individual there is no place in the Reichsbank.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Excuse me. Please continue. You -wanted to add something?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: When in August of 1934 I took over the Reich -Ministry of Economics, of course I first put the question to Hitler: -“How are the Jews in our national economy to be treated?” Hitler -told me then, literally, “The Jews can be active in domestic economy -in the same way as before.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That was the directive that Hitler had promised to me, and -during all the time when I was in charge of the Ministry of Economics -I acted accordingly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>However, I have to add that every few weeks there was a -quarrel on some Jewish question with some Gauleiter or other -Party official. Also, I could not protect Jews against physical mistreatment -and the like, because that came under the competence of -the Public Prosecutor and not mine; but in the economic field I -helped all Jews who approached me to obtain their rights, and in -every individual case, I prevailed upon Hitler and succeeded against -the Gauleiters and Party officials, sometimes even threatening to -resign.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I believe that it is notable that the pogrom of November 1938 -could only have taken place after I had resigned from my office. -Had I still been in office, then that pogrom doubtlessly would not -have occurred.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The witness Gisevius has already testified that in the -course of developments from 1933 on, fundamental changes took -place in your judgment of Adolf Hitler. I ask you now, because -this is a very decisive question, to give the Tribunal a detailed -description of your real attitude and your judgment of Adolf Hitler -in the course of the years—as exhaustively, but also as briefly, -as possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: In former statements which I have made here, I -have spoken of Hitler as a semi-educated man. I still maintain that. -He did not have sufficient school education, but he read an enormous -amount later, and acquired a wide knowledge. He juggled with that -knowledge in a masterly manner in all debates, discussions, and -speeches.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>No doubt he was a man of genius in certain respects. He had -sudden ideas of which nobody else had thought and which were -at times useful in solving great difficulties, sometimes with -<span class='pageno' title='451' id='Page_451'></span> -astounding simplicity, sometimes, however, with equally astounding -brutality.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He was a mass psychologist of really diabolical genius. While -I myself and several others—for instance, General Von Witzleben -told me so once—while we were never captivated in personal conversations, -still he had a very peculiar influence on other people, -and particularly he was able—in spite of his screeching and occasionally -breaking voice—to stir up the utmost overwhelming -enthusiasm of large masses in a filled auditorium.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I believe that originally he was not filled only with evil desires; -originally, no doubt, he believed he was aiming at good, but gradually -he himself fell victim to the same spell which he exercised -over the masses; because whoever ventures to seduce the masses -is finally led and seduced by them, and so this reciprocal relation -between leader and those led, in my opinion, contributed to -ensnaring him in the evil ways of mass instincts, which every -political leader should avoid.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>One more thing was to be admired in Hitler. He was a man of -unbending energy, of a will power which overcame all obstacles, -and in my estimate only those two characteristics—mass psychology -and his energy and will power—explain that Hitler was able to -rally up to 40 percent, and later almost 50 percent, of the German -people behind him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>What else shall I say?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Well, I was mainly concerned with bringing up the -subject of your own change of opinion. You have said that the -break in your attitude toward Hitler was caused by the Fritsch -incident. You are the best witness who can give us an explanation -not of Hitler’s but of your own development and your changing -attitude towards Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Excuse me. I think there is a basic error here. It -appears from this as if I had been a convinced adherent of Hitler -at some time. I was never that. On the contrary, out of concern -for my people and my country, after Hitler gained power, I -endeavored with all my strength to direct that power into an -orderly channel, and to keep it within bounds. Therefore, there -was no question of a break with Hitler. A break could only be -spoken of had I been closely connected with him before. At heart -I was never closely connected with Hitler, but to all appearances -I worked in the Cabinet and I did so because he was after all in -power, and I considered it my duty to put myself at the disposal -of my people and my country for their good.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: All right, but at what time, by what conditions, by -what realization were you influenced to begin that activity which -the witness Gisevius has described? -<span class='pageno' title='452' id='Page_452'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: My serious criticism of Hitler’s doings started -already at the time of the so-called Röhm Putsch on 30 June 1934. -I should like to point out first that these things occurred quite -unexpectedly and took me by surprise, because I had not at all anticipated -them. At that time I had told Hitler, “How could you have -these people just simply killed off? Under all circumstances there -should have been at least a summary trial of some sort.” Hitler -swallowed these remarks and merely mumbled something about -“revolutionary necessity,” but he did not really contradict me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then in the course of the second half of the year 1934 and the -first half of the year 1935 I noticed that I had been under a misconception -when I believed that Hitler did not approve of what might -be considered revolutionary and disorderly Party excesses, and that -he was really willing to restore a respectable atmosphere. Hitler -did nothing to put a stop to the excesses of individual Party -members or Party groups. Very likely the idea which recently—or -I believe today—was mentioned by a witness was always in -his mind: let the SA have its fling for once. That is to say, for the -masses of the Party he sanctioned, as a means of recreation, so to -speak, behavior which is absolutely incompatible with good order -in the State. In the course of the following months my suspicions -were confirmed and increased, and then for the first time, in May -1935, I took occasion to bring these matters up with him quite -openly. I do not know if you want me to discuss these things now, -but I am ready to tell about them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I consider it important that the Tribunal should hear -from you how your original attitude towards Hitler, which you -have just described, changed, and you became a conspirator against -him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Well, the decisive change in my attitude came about -by reason of the Fritsch incident, at the very moment when I had -to recognize—and, of course, that did not come with lightning -speed, but in the course of weeks and months it crystallized—that -Hitler aimed at war, or at least was not prepared to do everything -to avoid a war. At that moment I told myself that this was a -tremendous danger which was raising its head, and that violence -could be crushed only by violence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Any opportunity of political propaganda within the German -people was of course out of the question. There was no freedom -of assembly. There was no freedom of speech. There was no freedom -of writing. There was no possibility of discussing things even -in a small group. From beginning to end one was spied upon, and -every word which was said among more than two persons was -spoken at the peril of one’s life. There was only one possibility in -the face of that terror, which was beyond democratic reform and -<span class='pageno' title='453' id='Page_453'></span> -which barred every national criticism. That was to meet this -situation with violence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then I came to the conclusion that in the face of Hitler’s terror -only a <span class='it'>coup d’état</span>, a Putsch, and finally an attempt at assassination -was possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And is Gisevius right in saying that the <span class='it'>peripeteia</span>, -the decisive turning point in your attitude resulted from your impressions -and experiences in the so-called Fritsch crisis?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Aside from the inherent falsehood which appeared -in all actions and measures of the Party men, the Fritsch crisis -provided the absolute assurance that a basic change was occurring -in the conduct of political affairs, for within about 10 days Blomberg -was removed, Fritsch was removed, Neurath was removed, -and Hitler not only appointed so unsuitable a person as Ribbentrop -to be Foreign Minister, but also in his speech in the Reichstag soon -afterwards announced that from now on rearmament had to be -increased even more. Consequently the Fritsch crisis was the decisive -turning point in my attitude, and from then on I knew that -every further peaceful attempt at controlling the torrent would fail -and that only violent means could meet it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: For an estimate of the Fritsch crisis may I quote now -from the document which I already wanted to produce on the -occasion of the interrogation of Gisevius but could not because the -document was not then available to the Prosecution. The same -view about the Fritsch crisis which Gisevius and now Dr. Schacht -have put here was also expressed abroad by an intelligent officer -with political foresight. May I point to Exhibit Number 15 of my -document book (Document Number Schacht-15)? That is Page 41 -of the English text, and 35 of the German text. It is a biennial -report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the -Secretary of War for the period of 1 July 1943 to 30 June 1945. I -quote one sentence from it:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The history of the German High Command from 1938 on is -one of constant conflict of personalities, in which military -judgment was increasingly subordinated to Hitler’s personal -dictates. The first clash occurred in 1938 and resulted in the -removal of Von Blomberg, Von Fritsch, and Beck and of the -last effective conservative influence on German foreign -policy.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>So here also that turning point has been clearly understood. And -in summary I would like to ask this question of Dr. Schacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Were you only disappointed by -Hitler, or did you consider yourself deceived by Hitler at that time? -Will you answer that? -<span class='pageno' title='454' id='Page_454'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: The answer is that I have never felt disappointed -by Hitler, because I had not expected more of him than my appraisal -of his personality allowed me. But I certainly consider -myself deceived, swindled, and cheated by him to the highest -degree, because whatever he had previously promised to the -German people and thereby to me, he did not keep afterwards.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promised equal rights for all citizens, but his adherents, -regardless of their capabilities, enjoyed privileges before all other -citizens. He promised to put the Jews under the same protection -which foreigners enjoyed, yet he deprived them of every legal -protection. He had promised to fight against political lies, but -together with his Minister Goebbels he cultivated nothing but -political lies and political fraud. He promised the German people -to maintain the principles of positive Christianity yet he tolerated -and sponsored measures by which institutions of the Church were -abused, reviled, and damaged. Also, in the foreign political field -he always spoke against a war on two fronts—and then later -undertook it himself. He despised and disregarded all laws of the -Weimar Republic, to which he had taken the oath when he became -Chancellor. He mobilized the Gestapo against personal liberty. He -gagged and bound all free exchange of ideas and information. He -pardoned criminals and enlisted them in his service. He did everything -to break his promises. He lied to and deceived the world, -Germany, and me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Let us return to the period of the seizure of power. -In November 1932, you stated publicly that Hitler would become -Reich Chancellor. What caused you to make that statement?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: That statement was caused by the fact that Hitler -in the July elections of 1932 obtained 40 percent of all seats in the -Reichstag for his Party. That is an election result which, if I am -informed correctly, had never occurred since 1871, when the Reichstag -was founded; and to me, as a democrat and a follower of -democratic parliamentary government, it was quite inevitable that -that man was now to be entrusted with forming a cabinet. I do not -know of any alternative at the time. There was only one other -possibility, one alternative, and that was a military rule. But the -Cabinet of Von Papen already had had some special presidential -authority and still could not maintain itself in the face of the -Reichstag; and when Herr Schleicher attempted to establish a -military regime without the participation of the Nazis, he failed -after just a few weeks, because he found himself confronted with -the alternative either of starting a civil war or of resigning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hindenburg and at first Schleicher as well—although at the last -moment he acted differently—were always of the opinion that the -<span class='pageno' title='455' id='Page_455'></span> -Armed Forces could not face a civil war, and Hindenburg was certainly -not ready to tolerate a civil war. But very unwillingly he -saw himself forced by necessity to put the reins of government into -the hands of the man who, thanks to his own propaganda and the -incapability of all preceding governments, thanks also to the inconsiderate -policy of the foreign countries toward Germany, had -won the majority of German votes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: You know that the Prosecution accuses you of having -assisted Hitler and the Nazi regime to power. I therefore want to -ask you now whether between the July elections 1932, and the day -when Hitler became Chancellor—that is the 30th of January, 1933—you -spoke publicly for Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I want to state first that Hitler’s power was an -accomplished fact in July 1932, when he secured 230 Reichstag -seats. Everything else that followed must be viewed as a consequence -of that Reichstag election. During that entire period—with -the exception of the one interview you mentioned, in which I said -that according to democratic principles Hitler must become Reich -Chancellor—I can say that I did not write or publicly speak a single -word for Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you, during the time when the reorganization of -the Reich Cabinet was discussed, speak to Hindenburg on behalf of -Hitler’s Chancellorship?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I have never in consultations with any of the competent -gentlemen, be it Hindenburg, Meissner, or anyone else, -contributed towards exerting any influence in favor of Hitler, nor -did I participate in any way in the nomination of Hitler to be Reich -Chancellor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The prosecutor accuses you in that connection of -putting the prestige of your name at the disposal of Hitler in -November 1932, and he refers to a statement made by Goebbels in -the latter’s book, <span class='it'>From the Kaiserhof to the Reich Chancellery</span>. -What can you say about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I would never have expected that this apostle of -truth, Goebbels, would once more be mobilized against me here, -but it is not my fault if Herr Goebbels made a mistake.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The prosecutor also states that you provided the funds -for Hitler in the Reichstag elections of 5 March; that is said to have -happened in an industrial meeting on which there is an affidavit by -the industrialist Von Schnitzler, Document Number EC-439, Exhibit -USA-618. What do you have to say about that? It is our Number 3 -of our document book, Page 11 of the English copy. -<span class='pageno' title='456' id='Page_456'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: In February of 1933, at the time when Hitler was -already Reich Chancellor and the elections of 5 March were to -furnish a basis for the shape of the new government, Hitler asked -me whether, at the occasion of a meeting which Göring was to call -and which would have the purpose of raising funds for the elections, -I would be good enough to take the role of his banker. I had no -reason for refusing to do that. The meeting took place on 26 February.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And now the prosecutor has made it appear that during that -meeting I had solicited election funds. The Prosecution themselves, -however, have presented a document, D-203, which apparently is -meant to be a record of the election speech made by Hitler on that -evening...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: May I interrupt you and point out to the Tribunal that -it is our Exhibit Number Schacht-2, on Page 9 of the English text. -Excuse me. Please, will you kindly go on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: D-203. That document closes with the following -sentence:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Göring then passed very cleverly to the necessity that other -circles not taking part in this political battle should at least -make the financial sacrifices required.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Therefore from that report which was submitted by the Prosecution, -it can be seen very clearly that not I but Göring pleaded for -funds. I only administered these funds later, and, in the affidavit by -Schnitzler, Document EC-439, Page 11, the Prosecution have carefully -left out these decisive passages which do not accuse, but exonerate -me. I quote the two sentences, therefore, as follows—I am -sorry, I have to quote in English because I have only the English -text in front of me:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“At the meeting Dr. Schacht proposed raising an election fund -of as far as I remember three million Reichsmarks. The fund -was to be distributed between the two ‘allies’ according to -their relative strength at the time. Dr. Stein suggested that -the Deutsche Volkspartei should be included, which suggestion, -if I remember rightly, was accepted. The amounts -which the individual firms were to contribute were not discussed.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>It can be seen from this that the election fund was not collected -only for the Nazi Party, but for the Nazi Party and the national -group which was its ally and to which, for instance, also Herr Von -Papen and Hugenberg belonged, and which during that very meeting -was extended to comprise a third group, the German People’s -Party. It was, therefore, a collective fund for those parties who -went into the election campaign together, and not just a Nazi fund. -<span class='pageno' title='457' id='Page_457'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The Prosecution have mentioned those laws which -were decreed after the seizure of power, and which introduced and -then established the totalitarian rule of the Nazis and of Hitler. We -have to consider the question of your personal responsibility as a -later member of the cabinet and I must discuss these laws with you -in detail; for the present I just want to remind you of them generally: -First, the Enabling Act; then the law about the prohibition of -parties and the establishment of one Party; the law about the unity -of Party and State; the law decreeing the expropriation of the SPD -and the trade unions; the law about civil service associations; the -law about the legal limitation of professions for Jews; the law -instituting the Peoples’ Court; the law legalizing the murders of -30 June 1934; and the law about the merger of the offices of the -Reich Chancellor and the Reich President in the person of Hitler. -How do you, as a member of the Cabinet, define your personal -responsibility with respect to these laws?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: When all these laws were issued I was not a Cabinet -member. I had no vote in the Cabinet. I had a vote in the Cabinet -only after 1 August 1934, at which time the last disastrous law, the -merger of the offices of Reich Chancellor and Reich President was -decreed. I did not participate in the discussions preceding this law, -nor did I vote on it. I had absolutely no part in any of these laws.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I do not know whether I mentioned it, but I want to -protect you against a misunderstanding. This does not apply to the -merger of the offices of the Reich President in the person of Hitler, -after Hindenburg’s death?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Of course, I did not take part in that either.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And why not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Because I was not then in the Cabinet. I received -my official nomination as Minister on 3 or 4 August. I did not take -part in the deliberations on that law. I did not vote for it, and did -not sign it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: But in the Indictment it is stated that you were a -member of the Reichstag. Then as a member of the Reichstag you -would have voted for these laws, inasmuch as, actually, after 1933 -only unanimous votes were cast in the Reichstag?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes. Unfortunately, there is much in the trial brief -which is not correct. During my entire life I was never a member -of the Reichstag. One look into the <span class='it'>Reichstag Handbook</span> could have -enlightened the Prosecution that also during that time I was not -a member of the Reichstag.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I had nothing to do with all these laws either as member of the -Cabinet or of the Reichstag, because I had been neither during that -time. -<span class='pageno' title='458' id='Page_458'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did Adolf Hitler actually take an oath to the Weimar -Constitution?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Of course Hitler took an oath to the Weimar Constitution -when he became Reich Chancellor, to Reich President -Von Hindenburg. In taking that oath he swore not only to respect -the constitution but also to observe and fulfill all laws unless they -were lawfully changed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Was the Weimar Constitution ever formally repealed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, the Weimar Constitution has never been repealed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: In your view was the Leadership Principle established -anywhere legally or constitutionally?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: The Leadership Principle was not established by a -single law, and the subsequent attempt to reduce the responsibility -of the individual ministers—and that affects me, too—by saying that -it had become prescriptive law, is not correct. The responsibility of -the ministers continued to exist, my own also, and was kept down -only by the terror and the violent threats of Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The questions whether the Enabling Act referred to the -Führer or to the Cabinet; whether the first Cabinet after 1933 was -a National Socialist one or a combination of the parties of the right; -and the question of the development of Hitler into an autocratic -dictator, all these I have already put to the witness Lammers. I do -not wish to repeat them, but do you have to add anything new to -what Lammers has testified?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I made only two notes. In Hitler’s Reichstag speech -on 23 March 1933 he said, “It is the sincere desire of the National -Government...”—not the National Socialist, as it is always referred -to later, but the National Government.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And the second point: In the proclamation to the Wehrmacht -which Defense Minister Von Blomberg issued on 1 February 1933 -this sentence occurs:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I assume this office with the firm determination to maintain -the Reichswehr, in accordance with the testament of my -predecessors, as a power factor of the State, above Party -politics.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This and other factors already mentioned convinced me that -the Cabinet would be a national coalition cabinet, whereas Hitler, -by his rule of terror and violence, formed a pure Nazi dictatorship -out of it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The quotation mentioned by Schacht is in our document -book, Document Number Schacht-4, Page 14 of the English text. -Now, when you became Minister of Economics... -<span class='pageno' title='459' id='Page_459'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is 5 o’clock; the Tribunal will adjourn.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Mr. President, may I ask a question? Do we continue -tomorrow, because tomorrow is the first of May, and there is some -uncertainty whether there will be a session tomorrow or not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal will go on tomorrow.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 1 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='460' id='Page_460'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH DAY</span><br/> Wednesday, 1 May 1946</h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Before we go on with the case of the Defendant -Schacht, the Tribunal wishes to announce its decision on the -applications by Dr. Sauter on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach: -The first application to which any objection was taken related to the -group of documents Numbers 30, 31, 45, 68, 73, 101, 124, and 133. -That application with respect to that group of documents is denied.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next matter was an application in respect of Number 118(a). -That application is granted and the document is to be translated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next was Number 121 and in that case the application is -denied. As regard to witnesses, Dr. Sauter withdrew his application -for the witness Marsalek.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In connection with the other applications, the Tribunal grants the -application that Uiberreither should be called as a witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yesterday, much to my regret, I neglected after an -answer given by Dr. Schacht to my question as to whether he was -disappointed by Hitler or whether he considered himself deceived -by him, to read a passage from a document which deals with the -same point. I am referring to a document which has been submitted -to the High Tribunal and which has been quoted several times—Exhibit -Schacht-34, Page 114 of the English text of the document -book. This passage may be found on Page 124 of the English document -book and reads as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Dr. Schacht, even in the years 1935-36, as may have been -seen from numerous statements, had fallen into the role of a -man, who in good faith had put his strength and ability at -Hitler’s disposal but who now felt himself betrayed.</p> - -<p>“Of the many statements made by Schacht, I quote only one -which Schacht made at the occasion of a supper with my wife -and myself in the summer of 1938. When Dr. Schacht made -his appearance, it was evident that he was in a state of inner -excitement and during the supper, he suddenly gave vent to -his feelings, when, in deep agitation he almost shouted at my -wife, ‘My dear lady, we have fallen into the hands of criminals—how -could I ever have suspected that?’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='461' id='Page_461'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>This is the affidavit made out by Schniewind.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Yesterday I mentioned three documents: namely, a speech made -by Schacht on “Geography and Statistics” at Frankfurt-am-Main on -9 December 1936, then an article Schacht had written on the colonial -problem and a speech given at Königsberg by Schacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I wish to submit these documents: The speech on “Geography -and Statistics” at Frankfurt is the Document Schacht-19, Page 48, -English Page 54. The theme on the colonial question is Exhibit -Schacht-21, German version Page 53 and English version Page 59. -The speech at Königsberg is Exhibit Schacht-25 of my document -book, German version on Page 44 and English version Page 73.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Dr. Schacht, we stopped in the middle of 1934, shortly before you -entered the Ministry of Economics, and when you became Minister of -Economics, you were familiar with the happenings of 30 June 1934 -and their legalization by the Cabinet. Did you not have any misgivings -to enter the Cabinet or what reasons prompted you to put -aside these misgivings?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: As far as my personal composure and comfort would -have been concerned, it would have been very simple not to assume -office and to resign. Of course, I asked myself what help that would -be for the future development of German politics if I did refuse -office. We were already at a stage in which any public and open -opposition and criticism against the Hitler regime had been made -impossible. Meetings could not be held, societies could not be established, -every press statement was subject to censorship, and all -political opposition, without which no government can thrive, had -been prevented by Hitler through his policy of terror. There was -only one possible way to exercise criticism and even form an opposition -which could prevent bad and faulty measures being taken by -the Government. And this opposition could solely be formed in the -Government itself. Thus convinced, I entered the Government and -I hoped in the course of the years to find a certain amount of support -and backing among the German people. There was still a large -mass of spiritual leaders, professors, scientists, and teachers, whom -I did not expect simply to acquiesce to a regime of coercion. There -were also many industrialists, leaders of economy, who I did not -assume would bow to a policy of coercion incompatible with free -economy. I expected a certain support from all these circles, support -which would make it possible for me to have a moderating, controlling -influence in the Government. Therefore, I entered Hitler’s -Cabinet, not with enthusiastic assent, but because it was necessary -to keep on working for the German people and exercise a moderating -influence within the Government.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: In the course of time was no opposition ever developed -within the Party? -<span class='pageno' title='462' id='Page_462'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: In answering that question, I would like to say that -within the Party, of course, the decent elements were by far in -majority; the greater part of the population had joined the Party -because of a healthy instinct and with good intentions driven by -the need in which the German nation found itself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I would like to say about the SS, for instance, that in the beginning -numbers of decent people joined the SS because Himmler gave -the SS the appearance of fighting for a life of ideals. I would like -to call your attention to a book written by an SS man which -appeared at that time under the significant title, <span class='it'>Schafft anständige -Kerle</span> (<span class='it'>Let’s Make Decent Men</span>).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But, in the course of time, Hitler knew how to gather around -him all bad elements, within the Party and its organization, and to -chain tightly all those elements to himself, because he understood -how to exploit shrewdly any mistake, slip-up, or misdemeanor on -their part. Yesterday I talked about drunkenness as a constituent -part of Nazi ideology; I did not do that with the purpose of degrading -anyone personally. I did it for another quite definite reason.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the course of further developments, I observed that even -many Party members who had fallen into this net of Hitler and -who occupied more or less leading positions, gradually became afraid -because of the consequences of the injustices and the evil deeds to -which they were instigated by the regime. I had the definite feeling -that these people resorted to alcohol and various narcotics in order -to flee from their own conscience, and that it was only this flight -from their own conscience that permitted them to act the way they -did. Otherwise, there would be no explanation for the large number -of suicides that took place at the end of the Nazi regime.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: You know that you are accused of being a participant -in a conspiracy which had as its object an illegal violation of the -peace. Did you at any time have secret discussions, or secret orders, -or secret directives, which worked toward this objective?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I may say that I myself never received any order or -fulfilled any wish which might have been contrary to the conception -of right. Never did Hitler request anything from me which he knew -I would surely not carry out because it did not agree with my moral -point of view. But neither did I ever notice or observe that one of -my fellow ministers or one of the other leading men who did not -belong to Hitler’s inner circle—of course, I could not control that -circle—or anyone else whom I met in official contacts, showed in -any way that there was an intent to commit a war crime; on the -contrary, we were always very glad when Hitler came off with one -of his big speeches in which he assured, not only the entire world, -but above all the German people that he was thinking of nothing -except peace and peaceful work. The fact that Hitler deceived the -<span class='pageno' title='463' id='Page_463'></span> -world and the German people, and many of his co-workers, is one -of the things that I mentioned yesterday.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you at any time—of course, I mean outside of your -normal oath of office—take any oath or bind yourself in any other -way to the Party or another National Socialist organization?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Not a single oath and not a single obligation beyond -my oath of office to the head of the State.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you have close private relations with leading -National Socialists, for example, with Hitler or Göring?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I assume you mean a close friendly or social contact?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I never had relations of that sort with Hitler. He -repeatedly urged me in the first years to come to the luncheons at -the Reich Chancellery where he was lunching with closer friends. -I tried to do that twice. I attended twice at various intervals, and -I must say that not only the level of the discussion at the luncheon -and the abject humility shown to Hitler repulsed me but I also did -not like the whole crowd, and I never went back again.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I never called on Hitler personally in a private matter. Of course, -naturally, I attended the large public functions which all the ministers, -the Diplomatic Corps and high officials, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, attended, -but I never had any intimate, social, or other close contact with him. -That applies to the other gentlemen as well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As a matter of course, in the first months of our acquaintance we -visited each other on occasion, but all so-called social gatherings -which still took place in the first period had a more or less official -character. Close private relations simply did not exist.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And does this answer apply to all the other leading -National Socialists as well?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: All of them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: When, for instance, did you speak for the last time -with the following persons? Let us start first with Bormann.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I gather from the use of the word “first” that you -are going to mention others also.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes, Himmler, Hess, Ley, and Ribbentrop.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: In that case I would like to make a few preliminary -remarks: At the close of the French campaign, when Hitler returned -triumphant and victorious from Paris, all of us—the ministers and -the Reichsleiter and the other dignitaries of the Party as I assume, -and state secretaries, and so forth—received an invitation from the -Reich Chancellery to be present at the Anhalter Railway Station to -greet Hitler on his arrival. Since I was in Berlin at the time, it was -<span class='pageno' title='464' id='Page_464'></span> -impossible for me to refuse this invitation. It was 1940, the conflict -between Hitler and myself had been going on for some time, and it -would have been a veritable affront if I had stayed at home. Consequently, -I went to the station and saw a very large number of Party -dignitaries, ministers and so forth, but, of course, I do not remember -any more just who all these people were.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I beg your pardon for interrupting you. I have a rather -poor memory for films and especially for newsreels, but I believe -that that reception was shown in a newsreel and I believe that you -were just about the only civilian who was present among those -people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I personally did not see that film, but my friends -told me about it. They mentioned especially that among all the gold -braid, I was the only civilian in street clothes there. Of course, it -could be ascertained from the film who was present at the time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I mentioned this reception, for it might be possible that I said -“Good morning” to many people and inquired about their health -and so forth, and I also recall that I arrived at the station with the -Codefendant Rosenberg in the same car, because there were always -two people to a car. I did not attend the reception which followed -at the Reich Chancellery. Rosenberg did go but I said, “No, I would -rather not go. I am going home.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Then, I may assume that you probably saw the leading -men, Hess, Ley, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Frick, Frank, Schirach, Speer, -Sauckel, Seyss-Inquart, Kaltenbrunner, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, then for the last -time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: It is possible that all these gentlemen were there, -but I did not speak at length with any of them except Hitler himself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you speak with Hitler at that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Hitler addressed me, and that was one of the strangest -scenes of my life. We were all standing in line and Hitler passed -everyone by rather quickly. When he saw me, he came up to me -with a triumphant smile and extended his hand in a cordial manner, -something which I had not seen from him for a long time, and he -said to me, “Now, Herr Schacht, what do you have to say now?” Then, -of course, he expected me to congratulate him or express my admiration -or a similar sentiment, and to admit that my prognostication -about the war and about the disaster of the war was wrong, -for he knew my attitude about the war quite exactly. It was -extremely hard for me to avoid such an answer and I searched my -mind for something else to say, finally replying: “I can only say to -you, ‘God protect you.’ ” That was the only significant conversation -which I had that day. I believed the best way to have kept my -<span class='pageno' title='465' id='Page_465'></span> -distance was through just such a completely neutral and inconsequential -remark.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Well...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: But perhaps you would like me to refer to the individual -gentlemen, and I can tell you with this exception just when -I spoke to these gentlemen for the last time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Himmler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Himmler, I would judge that perhaps I talked to him -last in 1936.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Hess?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Hess—of course I am not referring to the conversations -here in the prison. I had not spoken with Hess for years -before the beginning of the war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Ley?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Ley, I had not seen him since the beginning of -the war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Ribbentrop?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I saw Ribbentrop last after my being thrown out of -the Reichsbank, because I had to talk with him about the imminent -journey to India, and that must have been, I would judge, February -1939. I have not talked with him since.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Rosenberg?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Rosenberg, always aside from this reception of Hitler’s, -perhaps not since 1936.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Frick?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I perhaps saw Frick last in the year 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Schirach?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I did not even know Schirach.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Speer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I talked with Speer for the last time—and I can tell -you this exactly—when I went to the World Exposition in Paris in -the year 1937.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Of course, you are always referring to the time before -you were taken prisoner?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, of course, naturally here I have...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Sauckel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Not since the beginning of the war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Seyss-Inquart? -<span class='pageno' title='466' id='Page_466'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Seyss-Inquart, I would judge that I spoke to him -for the last time in 1936, when I visited a colleague in the National -Bank in Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Kaltenbrunner?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I saw Kaltenbrunner for the first time here at the -prison.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: We will refer to Hitler later. Frank is still missing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I saw Frank last perhaps 1937 or 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Most likely at the occasion of the speech you mentioned -yesterday?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, possibly also afterwards at an official reception, -but I do not believe that I saw him after 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now, how about the leading men of the Wehrmacht, -Keitel, for instance?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I never had any contact with Keitel. I perhaps saw -him at some social gathering, but never after 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Jodl?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I made Herr Jodl’s acquaintance here in the prison.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Dönitz?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I met Dönitz for the first time here in the prison.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Raeder?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Herr Raeder, I believe I have known him for quite -some time. In the beginning we exchanged occasional visits within -the family, visits of a semiofficial character but always on a friendly -basis; however, I believe that I have also not seen him or talked -to him since 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Brauchitsch?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I have not talked with Brauchitsch since 1939, or -since 1938, since the Fritsch affair.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: How about Halder?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: As you know, I saw Halder in connection with the -Putsch in the fall of 1938 but not after that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: How often did you see Hitler after your dismissal as -President of the Reichsbank?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: After my dismissal as President of the Reichsbank?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Since January 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I saw him once more in January 1939 because I had -to discuss my future activity, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, with him. And on that occasion -he asked me—he knew that I had long wished to take an -extensive journey—that I might avail myself of this opportunity to -<span class='pageno' title='467' id='Page_467'></span> -take this journey now, so there would not be so much talk about my -leaving the Reichsbank. Then we agreed on the trip to India. On -that occasion I also saw Göring for the last time. And then—after -my return in August, I did not see him again—then the war came, -during the course of which I saw him twice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Shall I tell you about those two occasions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I saw him once in February 1940. At that time -various American magazines and periodicals had requested me to -write articles on Germany’s interpretation of the situation, her -desires, and her position in general. I had the inclination to do this, -but because we were at war, I naturally could not do so without -first informing the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister advised -me that he had nothing against my writing an article for an American -periodical, but that before sending off this article, he wanted -to have the article submitted for censorship. Of course that did not -appeal to me—I had not even thought of that—and, consequently, -I did not write this article.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>However, there were further inquiries from America and I said -to myself, “It is not sufficient for me to talk with the Foreign -Minister, I must go to Hitler in this matter.” So, with that aim, -I called on Hitler, who received me very soon after my request, -and I told him at that time, among other things, just what my -experience with Herr Von Ribbentrop had been, and I further told -him that I thought it might be quite expedient to write these -articles; and that it seemed vital to me to have constantly someone -in America, who by means of the press, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, could enlighten -public opinion as to Germany and her interests.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hitler was favorably impressed with this suggestion of mine -and said to me, “I shall discuss this matter with the Foreign -Minister.” Consequently, this entire matter came to naught.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, later, through the good offices of my Codefendant, Funk, -who probably had a discussion at that time with Ribbentrop about -this matter, I tried to get at least an answer from Ribbentrop. This -answer, given to Funk, was to the effect that it was still too early -for a step of that sort. And that was my visit in 1940. Then I saw -Hitler again in February of 1941...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Pardon my interruption. So that we can avoid all -misunderstandings, if Hitler had given you permission that you -could have gone to America, just what would your activities have -been? Tell us very briefly. I want no misunderstanding.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: First of all, I had not proposed going myself; I -rather made a general suggestion. But, naturally, I would have -been very glad to go to America for I saw a possibility... -<span class='pageno' title='468' id='Page_468'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think it is material -to know what he would have done if something had happened -which did not happen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I just wanted to preclude any misunderstanding. I -said that misunderstandings—Well let us drop the subject.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Then, let us go on to your second -visit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: In 1941, in February, I called on Hitler once more -because of a private affair. The year before my wife had died and -now I intended to remarry. As Minister without Portfolio, which -I still was, I naturally had to inform the Reich Chancellor and head -of the State of my intention and I called on him for that reason. -There was no political discussion on this occasion. As I was going -to the door, he asked me, “At one time you had the intention, or -you advised me, that someone should go to America. It is probably -too late for that, now.” I replied immediately, “Of course, it is -too late for that now.” And that was the only remark of a political -nature made. The conversation dealt mainly with my marriage, -and since then I did not see Hitler any more.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And now your relations with Göring?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I did not see Göring either since 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now, I am turning to a point which has been repeatedly -stressed by the Prosecution, that is, the propaganda value of -your participation at Party rallies, and I would like to remind -you of what Mr. Justice Jackson has already mentioned in his -opening statement. I am translating from the English because I -have no German text:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Does anyone believe that Hjalmar Schacht, seated in the -first row at the Nazi Party Rally of 1935 and wearing the -Party emblem, was only included in the film for the purpose -of making an artistic effect? This great thinker, in lending -his name to this threadbare undertaking, gave it respectability -in the eyes of every hesitating German.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Will you please state your opinion on this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: First of all, I would like to make a few minor -corrections. In 1935 I did not have a Party emblem. Secondly, -Germans who were hesitating were no longer of any importance -in 1935, for Hitler’s domination had been firmly established by -1935. There were only those people who were turning away from -Hitler but none who were still coming to him. And then, I must -really consider it as a compliment that I am called a figure of -importance, a great thinker, and so forth; but I believe that the -reasons for my being and working in the Hitler Cabinet have -<span class='pageno' title='469' id='Page_469'></span> -been set forth by me in sufficient detail, so that I need not go -into that any more.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The fact that in the first years especially I could not very -well absent myself from the Party rallies is understandable, I -believe, for they were Hitler’s principal display of show and -ostentation for the outside world, and not only did his ministers -participate in the Party rallies but also a great many other representative -guests.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I add just a few more words?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I stayed away from the later Party rallies. For example, the -Party Rally of 1935 mentioned by the Chief Prosecutor. That was -the Party rally—and this is why I happen to remember it—at -which the Nuremberg Laws against the Jews were proclaimed, and -at the time I was not even in Nuremberg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I attended the Party Rally in 1933 and in 1934. I am not certain -whether I attended it in 1936 or 1937. I rather believe that I -attended in 1936. I was decidedly missing at the later rallies and -the last visit that I made at the Party Rally, which I have just -mentioned, I attended only on “Wehrmacht Day.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: At these Party Rallies were the prominent foreigners—you -already mentioned that. Was the Diplomatic Corps represented -by the chiefs of the diplomatic missions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I believe that with the exception of the Soviet -Ambassador, in the course of years all other leading diplomats -attended the Party Rally, and I must say, in large numbers, with -great ostentation and seated in the first rows.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: How did you explain that? The Diplomatic Corps -only really takes part in functions of State and this was a purely -Party matter? How was this participation explained?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think this is objectionable. If it -please the Tribunal, I am in a position to object, because I am not -embarrassed by it, if there is any embarrassment, but for this witness -to explain the conduct of the ambassadors of other countries -seems utterly beyond probative value. His opinion of what the -ambassadors were doing, why they attended a Party rally which -he was lending his name to, doesn’t seem to me has any probative -value. The fact that they attended I don’t object to, but it seems -to me that for him to probe, unless he has some fact—and I want -to make clear I don’t object to any facts that this witness knows, -and I haven’t objected to most of his opinions which we have been -getting at great length. But I think for him to characterize the -action of foreign representatives is going beyond the pale of relevant -and material evidence. -<span class='pageno' title='470' id='Page_470'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: May I make just one remark in reply?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better pass on, Dr. Dix.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes, of course. However, I would ask to be given -the permission to answer Mr. Justice Jackson briefly, not because -I want to be stubborn, but I believe that if I answer now I can -avoid later discussions and can save time thereby. I did not ask -the defendant for his opinion. Of course Mr. Justice Jackson -is right in saying that he is not here to give opinions about the -customs of the Diplomatic Corps; but I asked him about a fact: -How this participation on the part of the Diplomatic Corps, which -is significant, was explained at that time. I consider this relevant, -as will be seen more than once in the course of my questioning, -and that is why I am saying it now, that throughout his and his -political friends’ oppositional activities, it is of prime importance -to know who gave them moral, spiritual, or any other support, -and who did not support them. And thereby, of course, the outward -demeanor of the official representatives of foreign countries during -the whole period is of tremendous importance, with regard to the -capacity of this opposition group to act. One can support such a -group; one can be neutral to it, or one can also combat it from -abroad. That is the only reason why I put my question, and I -deem myself obligated to consider this angle of the problem also -in the future.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I don’t think Mr. Justice Jackson’s -objection was to the fact that the diplomatic representatives were -there but to comment upon the reasons why they were there. If -all you want to prove is the fact that they were there, then I don’t -think Mr. Justice Jackson was objecting to that. What the defendant -was going on to give, was his opinion of why the diplomatic -representatives were there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I believe I do not need to make a further reply. He -has already said that he does not wish to give an explanation, but -if Your Lordship will permit me, I shall continue.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Around that time, you certainly -came into contact with prominent foreigners both officially and -privately. What position did they take towards the trend of events -at the time the National Socialists consolidated their power? And -how did their attitude influence your own attitude and activity?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal! I dislike -to interrupt with objections, but I can’t see how it exonerates or -aids this defendant, that prominent foreigners may have been -deceived by a regime for which he was furnishing the window -dressings with his own name and prestige. Undoubtedly there -<span class='pageno' title='471' id='Page_471'></span> -were foreigners, I am willing to stipulate there were foreigners, -like Dahlerus, who were deceived by this set-up of which he was -a prominent and slightly respectable part. But it does seem to -me that if we are going to go into the attitude of foreigners who -are not indicted here or accused that we approach endless questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I see no relevance in this sort of testimony.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The question is here, as I have tried to point out to Dr. Dix, -the sole thing that is charged against this defendant is that he -participated in the conspiracy to put this nation into war and -to carry out the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity incidental -to it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I can’t see how the attitude of foreigners either exonerates -or helps the Court to decide that question. If it does, of course -I don’t object to it, but I can’t see the importance of it at this stage.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I do believe that Mr. Justice Jackson...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Dr. Dix, what exactly was -the question that you were asking at that moment? What had it -reference to?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I asked the witness what the attitude was that was -taken by prominent foreigners with whom he came into contact at -that time, officially and privately during the period that the regime -consolidated its power. Did they reject the regime, or were they -sympathetic to it? In other words, just how far did these foreigners -influence him and his thinking? And may I...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think you know, Dr. Dix, that to ask one -witness what the attitude of other people is is a very much too -general form of question. Attitude—what does the word mean? -It is far too general, and I do not understand exactly what you -are trying to prove.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I will make the question more precise.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>How, Dr. Schacht, through your exchange of thoughts with foreigners, -was your personal attitude influenced? How was your -attitude and your activity influenced through the attitude of these -foreigners?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the Tribunal.</span>] That is something which Dr. Schacht -can testify to alone, because it is of an intimate nature and personal -to Schacht. Your Lordship, I want quite openly to state the point -to be proved which seems very relevant to the Defense and on -which this question is based. I do not wish to conceal anything.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I, the Defense, maintain that this oppositional group—about -which Gisevius has already spoken, and of which Schacht was a -prominent member—that this group not only received no support -from abroad, but that foreigners rendered the opposition more -<span class='pageno' title='472' id='Page_472'></span> -difficult. That is not a criticism that is leveled towards foreign -governments.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There is no doubt that the representatives of these countries -took that attitude in good faith and with a sense of duty in the -service of their countries. But it was of decisive value for the -attitude of these men of this oppositional group what position the -foreign countries took to this regime; whether they respected or -whether they supported it by precedence given its representatives, -socially, as far as possible, or, through caution and reserve, -showed their disinclination to it, thereby strengthening this oppositional -group.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This evidence is of the utmost importance to me in the carrying -on of the defense. I have stated it quite openly, and, as much as -I can, I will fight for this piece of evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal has considered the -argument which you have presented to it and they think that the -investigation of these facts is a waste of time and is irrelevant. -They will, therefore, ask you to go on with the further examination -of the defendant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, you supported the rearmament through -financing by the Reichsbank. Why did you do that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I considered that Germany absolutely had to have -political equality with other nations, and I am of the same opinion -today; and in order to reach this state, it was necessary that either -the general disarmament which had been promised by the Allied -powers would come into effect, or that if equal rights were to be -obtained Germany would have to rearm on a corresponding scale.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Was this financial help by the Reichsbank your work -alone or was that decreed through the Directorate of the Reichsbank?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: In the Reichsbank, the Leadership Principle was -never applied; I rejected the Leadership Principle for the Reichsbank. -The Reichsbank was governed by a group of men all of -whom had an equal power to vote and if there was a “tie,” the -vote of the chairman was the decisive vote, and beyond that the -chairman had no rights in this board.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: You are familiar with the affidavit of the former -Reichsbank Director Puhl. Did—I put the question taking into -consideration the contents of this affidavit with which the Tribunal -is acquainted—Puhl also participate in giving financial help from -the Reichsbank for rearmament?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Herr Puhl participated in all decisions which were -made by the Reichsbank Directorate on this question and not -once did he oppose the decision reached. -<span class='pageno' title='473' id='Page_473'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: It is known to you that the Reichsbank’s method -of financing consisted in the discounting of the so-called mefo bills. -The Prosecution have discussed this fact in detail and the afore-mentioned -affidavit signed by Puhl says that this method made -it possible to keep the extent of rearmament secret. Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: We cannot even talk about keeping the armament -a secret. I call your attention to some excerpts from documents -presented and submitted by the Prosecution themselves as exhibits. -I quote first of all from the affidavit by George Messersmith, dated -30 August 1945, Document Number 2385-PS, where it says on Page 3, -Line 19: “Immediately after the Nazis came into power they started -a vast rearmament program.” And on Page 8 it says: “The huge -German armament program which was never a secret....”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus, Mr. George Messersmith, who was in Berlin at the -time, knew about these matters and I am sure, informed his colleagues -also.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I continue quoting from Document Number EC-461. It is the -diary of Ambassador Dodd, where it says, under 19 September 1934, -and I quote in English for I just have the English text before me:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“When Schacht declared that the Germans are not arming -so intensively, I said: Last January and February Germany -bought from American aircraft people one million dollars -worth of high-class war flying machinery and paid in gold.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This is from a conversation between Dodd and myself which -took place in September 1934 and he points out that already in -January and February 1934 war aircraft...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The proceedings were interrupted by technical difficulties in -the lighting system.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know how long -you expect to be with your examination-in-chief of the defendant. -You have already been nearly a whole day, and the Tribunal think, -in view of the directions in the Charter, that the examination of -the defendant ought to finish certainly in a day.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Your Lordship, there are two things I do not like -to do, to make prophecies which do not come true and to make a -promise I cannot keep.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I answer the question by saying that I consider it quite -impossible for me to finish today. I am fully aware of the rules -<span class='pageno' title='474' id='Page_474'></span> -of the Charter, but on the other hand I am asking you to consider -that the Prosecution have tried to prove the accusations -against Schacht by numerous pieces of evidence, directly and -indirectly relevant facts, and that it is my duty to deal with these -individual pieces of evidence offered by the Prosecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Please apply strict measures to my questions and if the Tribunal -should be of the opinion that there is something irrelevant, then -I shall certainly adhere to their ruling. However, I do think that -I have not only the right, but also the duty to put any questions -which are necessary to refute the evidence submitted by the -Prosecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I shall, therefore, certainly not be able to finish today. I think—I -should be extremely grateful if you would not make me prophesy, -it may go faster and tomorrow I may finish in the course of the -day but it may even take the whole day—I cannot say for certain. -In any case, I shall make every effort to put only relevant questions. -If the Tribunal should be of the opinion that something is not -relevant, I ask to be told so after I have explained my standpoint.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think you had better get on at once then, -Dr. Dix, and we’ll tell you when we think your questions are -too long or too irrelevant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now, Dr. Schacht, we were considering the mefo bills, -did you consider them as a suitable means of keeping the rearmament -secret? Have you anything else to say to that question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: The mefo bills as such, as far as rearmament was -concerned, had of course no connection with the question of secrecy, -for the mefo bills were used to pay every supplier. And there -were, of course, hundreds and thousands of small and big suppliers -all over the country.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Apart from that, before they could be taken to the Reichsbank, -the mefo bills circulated among the public for at least 3 months -and the suppliers who required cash used the mefo bills to discount -them in their banks or to have advances made on the strength -of them, so that all banks participated in this system.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But I should like to add also that all the mefo bills, which -were taken up by the Reichsbank, were listed on the bill account -of the Reichsbank. Furthermore, I should like to say that the -keeping secret of State expenditure—and armament expenditures -were State expenditure—was not a matter for the President of -the Reichsbank but an affair concerning the Reich Minister of -Finance. If the Reich Minister of Finance did not publish the -guarantees which he had accepted for the mefo bills, then that -was his affair and not mine. I am not responsible for that. The -responsibility for that lies with the Reich Minister of Finance. -<span class='pageno' title='475' id='Page_475'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The next question, Your Lordship, might arouse doubts -as to its relevancy. I personally consider it irrelevant for the verdict -in this Trial. However, it has been mentioned by the Prosecution, -and for that reason alone I think it is my duty to give Dr. Schacht -an opportunity to reply and to justify himself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution have represented the view that the financing -by means of mefo bills, from the point of view of a solid financial -procedure, was also very hazardous. One might adopt the view that -that may have been the case or not to make this verdict...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Ask the question, Dr. Dix, ask the question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: You have heard what I have in mind.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: It goes without saying that in normal times and -under normal economic conditions such means as mefo bills would -not have been resorted to. But if there is an emergency, then -it has always been customary, and it has always been a policy -recommended by all experts, that the issuing bank should furnish -cheap money and credits so that the economic system can, in turn, -continue to function.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mefo bills, of course, were a thoroughly risky operation, but -they were absolutely not risky if they were connected with a -reasonable financial procedure and to prove this I would say that -if Herr Hitler, after 1937, had used the accruing funds to pay -back the mefo bills, as had been intended—the money was available—then -this system would have come to its end just as smoothly -as I had put it in operation. But Herr Hitler preferred simply to -refuse to pay the bills back, and instead to invest the money in -further armament. I could not foresee that someone would break -his word in such a matter too, a purely business matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: But, if the Reich had met the bills and had paid, then -means would no doubt have partly been lacking for further rearmaments -and the taking up of the bills would therefore have -curtailed armament. Is that a correct conclusion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: That, of course, was the very purpose of my wanting -to terminate the procedure. I said if the mefo bills were not met, -it would obviously show ill-will; then there would be further -rearming, and that cannot be.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Earlier you briefly dealt with the question of keeping -armament secret in another connection. Have you anything to -add to that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I think in a general manner it must be realized -that State expenditures do not come under the jurisdiction of -the President of the Reichsbank, and that the expenses and receipts -of the State are under the control of the Reich Minister of Finance, -<span class='pageno' title='476' id='Page_476'></span> -and consequently the responsibility lies in his hands and it is -his duty to publish the figures. Every bill which the Reichsbank -had in its possession was made known every week.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Is that what you have to add to your answer to the -basic question of allegedly keeping the armament program secret?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: You have also already explained on the side why you -fundamentally were in favor of rearmament. Have you anything -to add to that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes. A few very important remarks are, of course, -to be made on that and since this question concerns the chief -accusation against me, I may perhaps deal with it in greater detail.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I considered an unarmed Germany in the center of Europe, surrounded -by armed nations, as a menace to peace. I want to say -that these states were not only armed but that they were, to a very -large part, continuing to arm and arming anew. Especially two -states which had not existed before, Czechoslovakia and Poland, -were beginning to arm, and England, for example, was continuing -to rearm, specifically with reference to her naval rearmament in -1935, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to say quite briefly that I myself was of the opinion -that a country which was not armed could not defend itself, and -that consequently it would have no voice in the concert of nations. -The British Prime Minister Baldwin once said, in 1935:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“A country which is not willing to take necessary precautionary -measures for its own defense will never have power -in this world, neither moral power nor material power.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I considered the inequality of status between the countries surrounding -Germany and Germany as a permanent moral and -material danger to Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I further want to point out—and this is not meant to be criticism, -but merely a statement of fact—that Germany, after the Treaty of -Versailles, was in a state of extreme disorganization and confusion. -Conditions in Europe were such that, for example, a latent conflict -and controversy existed between Russia and Finland and between -Russia and Poland which had considerable parts of Russian territory. -There was Russia’s latent conflict with Romania which -had Bessarabia, and then Romania had a conflict with Bulgaria -about the Dobruja and one with Hungary about Siebenbürgen. -There were conflicts between Serbia and Hungary, and between -Hungary and nearly all her neighbors and between Bulgaria and -Greece. In short all of Eastern Europe was in a continuous state -of mutual suspicion and conflict of interests. -<span class='pageno' title='477' id='Page_477'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>In addition, there was the fact that in a number of countries -there were most serious internal conflicts. I remind you of the -conflict between the Czechs and the Slovaks. I remind you of -the civil war conditions in Spain. All that will make it possible -to understand that I considered it absolutely essential that in the -event of the outbreak of any conflagration in this devil’s punch -bowl, it was an absolute necessity for Germany to protect at least -her neutral attitude. That could not possibly be done with that -small army of 100,000 men. For that an adequate army had to -be created.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Here in prison I accidentally came across an edition of the -<span class='it'>Daily Mail</span>, dated April 1937, where the conditions in Europe were -described, and I beg you to allow me to quote one single sentence. -I shall have to quote it in English. It does not represent the views -of the <span class='it'>Daily Mail</span>; it only describes conditions in Europe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“All observers are agreed that there is continual peril of an -explosion and that the crazy frontiers of the peace treaties -cannot be indefinitely maintained. Here, too, rigorous non-interference -should be the King of the British chariot. What -vital interests have we in Austria or in Czechoslovakia, -or in Romania, or in Lithuania or Poland?”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This merely describes the seething state of Europe at that -time, and in this overheated boiling pot which was always on the -point of exploding, there was Germany, unarmed. I considered -that a most serious danger to my country.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I shall probably be asked whether I considered Germany -threatened in any way. No, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I did not -consider Germany threatened directly with an attack, nor was I of -the opinion that Russia was likely to attack Germany. However, for -example, we had experienced the invasion of the Ruhr in 1923 and -these past events and the actual situation made it imperative for me -to demand equality for Germany and to support a policy that would -attempt to achieve this.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I assume that we shall deal with the reasons for the carrying -out of the rearmament and with the reaction of foreign countries, -<span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: What did you know at the time about Germany’s efforts -to cause the other nations to disarm? Did that have anything to do -with your decisions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Let me tell you the following:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Fundamentally, I was not in favor of rearmament. I only wanted -equality for Germany. That German equality could be brought -about either by means of disarmament on the part of the other -<span class='pageno' title='478' id='Page_478'></span> -nations or by our own rearmament. I would have preferred, in fact -I desired disarmament on the part of the others, which anyway had -been promised to us. Consequently I most zealously tried all along -for years to prevent a rearmament, if general disarmament could be -brought about.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The disarmament on the part of the others did not take place, -although the Disarmament Committee of the League of Nations had -repeatedly declared that Germany had met her obligations regarding -disarmament.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To all of us who were members of the so-called National Government -at the time, and to all Germans who participated in political -life, it was a considerable relief that during the first years Hitler, -again and again, strove for and suggested general disarmament. -Afterwards, of course, it is easy to say that that was a false pretense -and a lie on Hitler’s part, but that false pretense and that lie would -have blown up quite quickly if the countries abroad had shown the -slightest inclination to take up these suggestions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I remember quite well what was told Foreign Minister Eden of -Great Britain when he visited Germany at the beginning of 1934, -because I was present at the social festivities. Quite concrete proposals -concerning Germany’s obligations in all disarmament questions, -in case disarmament on the part of the others was begun and carried -out, were made to him. It was promised to Eden that all so-called -half-military units, like the SS, the SA, and the Hitler Youth, would -be deprived of their military character if only the general disarmament -could be accelerated by those means.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I could produce a number of quotations regarding these offers to -disarm, but since it is the wish of the President not to delay the -proceedings, I can forego that. They are all well-known statements -made by statesmen and ministers, ambassadors, and such, all of -which have the same tenor, namely, that it was absolutely essential -that the promise made by the Allies should be kept; in other words, -that disarmament should be carried out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Excuse me if I interrupt you, but we can do it more -quickly and more simply by asking the Tribunal to take judicial -notice of Exhibit Number Schacht-12, which I have been granted, -without my reading it, Page 31 of the English translation of my -document book. These are pertinent remarks and speeches made by -Lord Cecil and others, by the Belgian Foreign Minister, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. -There is no need to read them; they can be presented. I just hear -that they have been presented, and I can refer to them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Pardon me, please. Continue.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Well, in that case I am finished with my statement. -Hitler made still further offers but the other countries did not take -<span class='pageno' title='479' id='Page_479'></span> -up a single one of these offers, and thus, unfortunately, only one -alternative remained, and that was rearmament. That rearmament -carried out by Hitler was financed with my assistance, and I assume -responsibility for everything I have done in that connection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Do I understand you correctly? Can one draw the conclusion -from your statement that there were other reasons for your -assistance in the rearmament program, that you had the tactical -consideration that, by putting German rearmament up for discussion, -the debate on disarmament amongst the other governments might -be started again? This debate, so to say, had died down?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: If I may, I will illustrate it briefly by means of an -example:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Two parties have a contract with each other. One party does not -live up to that contract, and the other party has no way of making -him fulfill his obligations. Thus the other party can do nothing -except, in turn, not adhere to the contract. That is what Germany -did. That is what I supported. Now, of course, I must say that I -had expected a type of reaction which in such a case must always -be expected from the partner to a contract, namely, that he would -say, “Well, if you do not keep up the contract either, then we shall -have to discuss this contract again.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I must say—and I can quite safely use the word—it was a disappointment -to me that Germany’s rearmament was not in any way -replied to by any actions from the Allies. This so-called breach of -contract on Germany’s part against the Versailles Treaty was taken -quite calmly. A note of protest was all; nothing in the least was -done, apart from that, to bring up again the question of disarmament -in which I was interested.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Not only was Germany allowed to go on rearming but the Naval -Agreement with Great Britain did, in fact, give Germany the legal -right to rearm contrary to the Versailles Treaty. Military missions -were sent to Germany to look at this rearmament, and German military -displays were visited and everything else was done, but nothing -at all was done to stop Germany’s rearmament.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If the Tribunal please, I cannot see -the point of all this detail. We have conceded that rearmament here, -except as it was involved with aggressive purposes, is immaterial. -As I said in the opening, the United States does not care to try here -the issues of European politics, nor are they submitted to this Tribunal -for decision.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The sole question here is the Indictment, charging arming with -the purpose of aggression.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I do not want to interfere with the defendant giving any facts -that bear on his aggressive intentions, but the details of negotiations, -<span class='pageno' title='480' id='Page_480'></span> -of European politics and charges and countercharges between governments, -it seems to me, lies way back of any inquiry that we could -possibly make, and the details of this matter seem to me not helpful -to the solution of the issues here, and I think was ruled out by the -Tribunal in the case of Göring, if I am not mistaken.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Dix, it all seems to be a matter of -argument, and argument isn’t really the subject of evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I do not believe so, Your Lordship. What Mr. Justice -Jackson said is quite correct. Schacht is accused of having assisted -in bringing about an aggressive war, but this assistance of his is -supposed to have consisted in the financing which he carried out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Dix, and do try to make it as short -as possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I think you had come to the end of that question -anyway.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I refer in this connection to one of the motives for -Dr. Schacht’s assistance in rearmament. It was his hope to renew -the debate on disarmament. May I draw your attention to Exhibit -Number Schacht-36, Page 141 of the German text, and Page 149 of -the English text? It is an affidavit from Dr. Schacht’s son-in-law, -Dr. Von Scherpenberg. On Page 2 of that affidavit you will find the -following brief paragraph which I propose to read; in fact, I can -confine myself to one sentence:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“He”—that is to say, Schacht—“considered rearmament within -certain limits to be the only means for the re-establishing of -the disturbed equilibrium and the only means of inducing -the other European powers to participate in a limitation -of armaments which, in opposition to the Versailles Treaty, -they had sought to avoid.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That is a statement of Scherpenberg regarding conversations -which Schacht had had at that time. It is, therefore, not an <span class='it'>ex -post facto</span> opinion; it is the report of a conversation which he, -Scherpenberg, had with his father-in-law Schacht at that time. That -is just an additional remark I wanted to make.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] You have spoken about the rearmament -on the part of the other states, particularly Czechoslovakia and -Poland, but can you tell us whether at the time you knew of or -heard any exact details regarding the state of armament of those -two states?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I know only that it was known about Russia that in -1935 she announced that her peacetime army should be increased to -960,000 men. -<span class='pageno' title='481' id='Page_481'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then I knew that in Czechoslovakia, for instance, the installation -of airdromes was one of the leading tasks of rearmament. We knew -that Great Britain’s Navy was to be stepped up.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you later on completely abandon your idea of general -disarmament?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: To the contrary, I used every opportunity, in particular -during conversations with men from abroad, to say that the -aim should always be disarmament, that, of course, rearmament -would always mean an economic burden for us, which we considered -a most unpleasant state of affairs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I remember a conversation which I had with the American Ambassador -Davies. His report of this conversation is incorporated in -an exhibit that has been submitted to the Tribunal. It is an entry -in a diary which is repeated in his book, <span class='it'>Mission to Moscow</span>, and it -is dated as early as 20 June 1937, Berlin. He is writing about the -fact that among other things he and I had talked about disarmament -problems, and I need only quote one sentence. I do not have the -number of the document, Your Lordship, but it has been submitted -to the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: It is Exhibit Schacht-18, German Page 43, English -Page 49.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Since I have only the English text, I shall read -from it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Davies writes:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“When I outlined the President’s (Roosevelt) suggestion of -limitation of armament to defensive weapons only, such as -a man could carry on his shoulder, he (means Schacht) almost -jumped out of his seat with enthusiasm.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>It becomes clear, therefore, from Ambassador Davies’ remark -that I was most enthusiastic about this renewed attempt and the -possibility of an imminent step towards disarmament as proposed -by President Roosevelt.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this same book, Davies reports a few days later on 26 June -1937 about the conversation he had with me, in a letter addressed -to the President of the United States. I quote only one very brief -paragraph—in English again:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I then stated to him (that is, Schacht) that the President in -conversation with me had analyzed the European situation -and had considered that a solution might be found in an -agreement among the European nations to a reduction of -armaments to a purely defensive military basis and this -through the elimination of aircraft, tanks, and heavy equipment, -and the limitation of armaments to such weapons only -<span class='pageno' title='482' id='Page_482'></span> -as a man could carry on his back, with an agreement among -the nations for adequate policing of the plan by a neutral -state. Schacht literally jumped at the idea. He said: ‘That’s -absolutely the solution.’ He said that in its simplicity it had -the earmarks of great genius. His enthusiasm was extraordinary.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: To what extent did you want rearmament?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Not beyond equality with every single one of our -neighbor states.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And did Hitler talk to you of far-reaching intentions, -or did you hear of any?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: At no time did he tell them to me, nor did I hear -from anyone else, whether he had made remarks about further -intentions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Were you informed about the extent, the type and speed -of rearmament?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, I was never told about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Had you set yourself a limit regarding this financing -or were you prepared to advance any amount of money?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I was certainly, by no means, ready to advance any -unlimited amount of money, particularly as these were not contributions; -they were credits which had to be repaid. The limits for -these credits were twofold. One was that the Reichsbank was independent -of the State finance administration, and the supreme authority -of the State as far as the granting of the credits was concerned. -The Board of Directors of the Reichsbank could pass a resolution -that credits were to be given, or were not to be given, or that credits -were to be stopped, if they considered it right, and as I was perfectly -certain of the policy of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank—all -of these gentlemen agreed with me perfectly on financial -and banking policy—this was the first possibility of applying a -brake, if I considered it necessary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The second safeguard—limit was contained in the agreement -which the Minister of Finance, the Government, and of course Hitler -had made—the mefo bills, of which these credits consisted, were to -be paid back when they expired. They were repayable after 5 years, -and I have already said that if the repayments had been made, funds -for rearmament would naturally have had to decrease. Therein lay -the second possibility of limiting the rearmament.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Will you please give now to the Tribunal the figures -which you were dealing with at the time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: We went up to... -<span class='pageno' title='483' id='Page_483'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We have no desire to enter into controversy -about the figures of financing rearmament. It seems that the -detail of dollars and cents or Reichsmarks is unimportant to this, -and terribly involved. We aren’t trying whether it cost too much -or too little; the purpose of this rearmament is the only question we -have in mind. I don’t see that the statistics of cost have anything -to do with it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, we would like to know what figures -the accused and you are talking about.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The amounts that Schacht as President of the Reichsbank -was ready to grant for the rearmament program; that, no -doubt, is relevant, because if those amounts remained within such -limits as might possibly be considered adequate for defensive -rearmaments in case of emergency, then, of course, the extent of -that financial assistance is a very important piece of evidence -regarding the intentions which Schacht was pursuing at the time. -That is the very thing that, in the case of Schacht, Mr. Justice -Jackson considers relevant, namely, whether he helped prepare for -an aggressive war. If he were considering only the possibility of a -defensive war in his financing and placed only sums at the disposal -of the rearmament program which would never have allowed an -aggressive war, then that would refute the accusation raised by the -Prosecution against the defendant, and I think that the relevance of -that question cannot be doubted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that if the Defendant Schacht -placed at the disposal of the Reich, say, 100 millions, or whatever -the figure is, it would be defensive, and if he placed 150 millions, it -would be not defensive, or what? Is it simply the amount?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: No, I want to say that if, as will be proved, he only -wanted to give 9 and later on gave hesitatingly and unwillingly -12 millions for the purpose, then that contribution can never have -been aimed at an aggressive war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is simply the amount?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes, only the size of the amount.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, that can be stated very shortly, but as -for details of finance...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I am also of the opinion that we have talked about it -too long. I was only going to ask, “What amount did you give?” -and then the objection was raised, and thus the discussion was -drawn out. May I put the question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Well, then, what amount -did you intend to grant? -<span class='pageno' title='484' id='Page_484'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Naturally as little as possible; however, what I contributed -is what is decisive. I placed at their disposal—to give one -figure and to be very brief—until 31 March 1938, credits amounting -to a total of 12,000,000,000 Reichsmark. I have discussed that with -one of the interrogators of the British Prosecution, who asked me -about the subject, and I replied that that was about one-third of the -amount which was spent on rearmament. After that, without the -Reichsbank, beginning with 1 April 1938, the figure stated in that -budget year for rearmament was 11,000,000,000, and in the subsequent -year, 20,500,000,000, and of that not a pfennig came from the -Reichsbank.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: That was after your resignation, was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: That was after I had stopped credits.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For the record I should like to say that I think I made a mistake -before. I said millions instead of milliards, but I think it is obvious -what I meant. I wanted only to correct it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now, then, Dr. Schacht, the Prosecution have stated that -on 19 February 1935 the Ministry of Finance received authority to -borrow unlimited amounts of money if Hitler ordered them to do so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Here, again, the prosecutor did not see things in the -proper light. The President of the Reichsbank is not responsible for -the actions of the Reich Minister of Finance. I think the President -of the Federal Reserve Bank in New York can hardly be held -responsible for the things done by the Secretary of the Treasury in -Washington.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: You have also been accused that the debt of the Reich -increased three times during the time while you were President of -the Reichsbank.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I might just as well be accused of being responsible -for the fact that the birth rate in Germany rose sharply during the -time I was President of the Reichsbank. I want to emphasize the -fact that I had nothing to do with either.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: You were not responsible for the same reason.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, of course I am not responsible for that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And presumably the same applies to the point made -by the Prosecution that you allegedly drafted a new finance program -in 1938?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: On the contrary, I refused to do anything else for -the financing of rearmament; the finance program was drafted by a -state secretary in the Reich Finance Ministry, and it looked like it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: One of your economic policies, during the time you -were Minister of Economy, and which you have been accused of as -<span class='pageno' title='485' id='Page_485'></span> -being a preparation for war, was the so-called “New Plan” (Neue -Plan). What was that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: May I first of all say that the New Plan had -nothing at all to do with rearmament. Germany, after the Treaty -of Versailles, had fallen into a state of distress, economically speaking -and especially export...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Your Lordship, if the Tribunal is of the opinion that -the New Plan has nothing to do with the rearmament and preparations -for war—I think the Prosecution are of the opposite opinion—then, -of course, the question is irrelevant, and I will drop it. I am -only putting it because the New Plan has been used in the argumentation -of the Prosecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you say, and the defendant has just said -that the New Plan had nothing to do with rearmament, I think you -might leave it for cross-examination and you can raise it again in -re-examination if it is cross-examined.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant</span>]: In that case I shall not ask -you about the barter agreements, either. I shall leave it to the -Prosecution to bring it out during the cross-examination. I cannot -see what it has to do with the preparation for war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, you have already stated that you strove to remove the Versailles -Treaty by means of peaceful negotiations, or at least, to -modify it. In the opinion which you held at that time did any such -means for a peaceful modification of the Versailles Treaty still exist?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: In my opinion, there were no means other than -peaceful ones. The desire to modify the Versailles Treaty by means -of a new war was a crime.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Well. But now you are being accused that the alleged -preparations for war, which really were a countermeasure to the -general rearmament although not a preparation for an aggressive -war, were nevertheless a rearmament, and as such, were an infringement -of the Treaty of Versailles. I assume that you, at the time, -decided to help finance that rearmament only after giving the problem -due legal and moral considerations. What, exactly, were these -considerations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I think I have already answered that question in -detail. I need add nothing else.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Very well. Insofar as you know, was this attitude of -yours, the attitude of a pacifist and of someone who was definitely -opposed to the extension of living space in Europe, known abroad?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: As long as I have been President of the Reichsbank, -that is to say from March 1933—and I am, of course, only talking -<span class='pageno' title='486' id='Page_486'></span> -about the Hitler regime—my friends and acquaintances abroad were -fully informed about my attitude and views. I had a great many -friends and acquaintances abroad, not only because of my profession -but also outside of that and particularly in Basel, Switzerland, where -we had our monthly meeting at the International Bank, with all the -presidents of the issuing banks of all the great and certain neutral -countries, and I always took occasion at all these meetings to describe -quite clearly the situation in Germany to these gentlemen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Perhaps I may at this point refer to the so-called conducting of -foreign conferences or conversations. If one is not allowed to talk -to foreigners any more, then one cannot, of course, reach an understanding -with them. Those silly admonitions, that one had to avoid -contact with foreigners, seem entirely uncalled for to me, and if the -witness Gisevius deemed it necessary the other day to protect his -dead comrades, who were my comrades too, from being accused of -committing high treason, then I should like to say that I consider -it quite unnecessary. Never at any time did any member of our -group betray any German interests. To the contrary, he fought for -the interests of Germany, and to prove that, I should like to give -you a good example:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After we had occupied Paris, the files of the Quai d’Orsay were -confiscated and were carefully screened by officials from the German -Foreign Office. I need not assure you that they were primarily -looking for proof whether there were not any so-called defeatists -circles in Germany which had unmasked themselves somewhere -abroad. All the files of the Quai d’Orsay referring to my person -and, of course, there were records of many discussions which I had -had with Frenchmen, were examined by the Foreign Office officials -at that time, without my knowing it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>One day—I think it probably happened in the course of 1941—I -received a letter from a German professor who had participated in -this search carried out by the Foreign Office. I shall mention the -name so that, if necessary, he can testify. He is a Professor of -Finance and National Economy, Professor Stückenbeck of Erlangen, -and he wrote me that at this investigation...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal cannot see any point in this, so -far as this Trial is concerned. In any event, if the defendant says -that he did not, in any way, give away the interests of Germany, -surely that is sufficient. We do not need all the details about it. -What it has got to do with this Trial, I do not know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I think, Your Lordship, that that was not the point of -the statement. What he wants to say is that reliable men abroad -knew him and were acquainted with the fact that he was certainly -a man of peace and not a man who prepared aggressive wars, and -that applies even to the period of rearmament. -<span class='pageno' title='487' id='Page_487'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But he said that 5 minutes ago.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I do not think the question of Professor Stückenbeck -is so important, but it certainly seems pertinent to me what Ambassador -Davies said about his conversation with the then Foreign -Commissar of the Soviet Republic, Litvinov. This is contained in -Exhibit Schacht-18 of my document book. It is Page 43 of the German -text, and Page 49 of the English text. May I read one paragraph, -and then ask Dr. Schacht briefly whether that statement of -Ambassador Davies corresponds to his recollection? It is Davies’ -report, an extract from his book <span class='it'>Mission to Moscow</span>. A report is -there to the Secretary of State in the United States. The passage is -on Pages 108 and 109.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Pursuant to an appointment made, I called upon Commissar -for Foreign Affairs Litvinov to present my respects before -departure for the United States.</p> - -<p>“I then stated that the European situation in its elementals -looked simple and that it was difficult to understand why the -statesmanship of Europe could not provide that England, -France, Germany, Italy, and Russia should agree to preserve -the territorial integrity of Europe and through trade agreements -provide Germany with raw materials, thereby giving -the assurance that she could live, which would relieve the -peoples of Europe and the world of these terrific burdens of -armament and of the fear of catastrophic war. The prompt -rejoinder was: ‘Do you think Hitler would ever agree to anything -like that?’ I said that I did not know, but that it was -my opinion that there was a very substantial body of influential -and responsible men in Germany that such an idea would -appeal to. Litvinov replied that he thought that might be so; -that Schacht was of that type; he did not think they could -prevail against Hitler and the political and military forces -dominant in Germany.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And now I ask you, do you remember that conversation with -Davies?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I think there must be a mistake. I did not speak to -Davies about this, I spoke to Litvinov. This is a report of Davies -to the Secretary of State, about which I did not know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes, you are perfectly right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It has been repeatedly emphasized by the Prosecution that your -knowledge of Hitler’s intentions of war resulted also from your -being Plenipotentiary for War Economy and a member of the Reich -Defense Counsel. Göring has made a detailed statement on it. Have -you anything new to add to Göring’s statement? -<span class='pageno' title='488' id='Page_488'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I think the witness Lammers has also talked about -it. I should like merely to confirm that the first Reich Defense -Counsel of 1935 was nothing other than the legalization of a committee -which existed before 1933, made up of ministerial officials -who were supposed to deal with economic measures as well as -administrative measures, which might have to be taken in the event -of a threat of war against Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: How often did you have a meeting especially with the -Minister of War and the Plenipotentiary for Administration?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: This famous triumvirate, this Three Man College -described by one of the prosecutors as the cornerstone of war policy, -never met at all, and it is no wonder that we lost the war, if that -was the cornerstone.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The Prosecution have also referred to the report of the -Ministry of War regarding the task of the Reich Defense Counsel of -1934. It is Document Number EC-128, Exhibit Number USA-623. -Have you anything in particular to add to that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, I should like to have permission to quote one -very brief paragraph. I see there are only two sentences. This -report contains the following statement:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Referring to the experiences of World War I, that is 1914 to 1918, -and I quote—I shall have to do it in English since I have only the -English, I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“At that time we were able to extend our bases for raw -materials and production toward the West: Longwy, Briey, -Tourcoing, Roubaix, Antwerp (textiles), and toward the East, -Lodz, and Southeast (ore mines in Serbia and Turkey, mineral -oils in Romania). Today we have to reckon with the possibility -of being thrown back in our own country and even of -being deprived thereby of most valuable industrial and raw -material in the West and in the East.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I think that if anyone wanting to prepare an aggressive war had -calculated in September 1934 that one would have to protect oneself -against the possibility of such a situation arising, that this is the best -proof that there can be no question of an aggressive war at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: In that connection, under the heading of “peaceful -efforts,” can you perhaps also tell the Tribunal what your peaceful -efforts were, to have the reparations clauses of the Versailles Treaty -modified or even abolished?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: From the very first moment, after the reparations -were determined in 1921 or so, I fought against this nonsense with -the argument that the carrying out of those reparations would throw -the entire world into economic chaos. One cannot, during one -<span class='pageno' title='489' id='Page_489'></span> -generation, pay 120,000,000,000 Reichsmark or about 2,000,000,000 -Reichsmark yearly, as at that time...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: We would like to make it brief. Will you please talk -only about your peaceful efforts and not about national economy?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: All right, I will not talk about national economy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I fought against it and, as time went by, I did succeed in convincing -the people of almost all the countries that this was sheer -nonsense. Therefore in July of 1932, if I am not mistaken, the then -Reich Chancellor Papen was in a position to affix his signature to -an agreement at Lausanne, which reduced reparations, <span class='it'>de jure</span>, to -a pending sum of 3,000,000,000, and which, <span class='it'>de facto</span>, canceled reparations -altogether.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you then continue your definitely peaceful efforts -in other fields? You have already touched upon the negotiations in -Paris regarding the colonial question. I wonder if you have anything -to add to that in this connection?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not remember at the moment how far I had -gone at the time, but I think I reported on the negotiations in detail, -so I need not repeat.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: George Messersmith, the often-mentioned former Consul -General of the United States in Berlin, states in his affidavit -Document Number EC-451, Exhibit Number USA-626, to which the -Prosecution have referred, that he is of the opinion that the National -Socialist regime could not have been in a position to stay in power -and build up its war machine if it had not been for your activity. -At the end of the case for the Prosecution, the Prosecution present -that thesis of Messersmith. Therefore I should like you to make a -statement on this subject.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not know whether that completely unsubstantiated -private opinion of Mr. Messersmith has any value as evidence. -Nevertheless, I should like to contradict it by means of a few figures. -I had stated earlier that until 31 March 1938, the Reichsbank had -given 12,000,000,000; that is to say, during the first fiscal year, about -2,250,000,000, and during the subsequent 3 years, 3,250,000,000 per -annum. During those years—the Codefendant Keitel was asked -about that when he was examined here—the armament expenditures, -as Keitel said, amounted to the following:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the fiscal year 1935-1936—5,000,000,000.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the fiscal year 1936-1937—7,000,000,000.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the following fiscal year—9,000,000,000.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>And at that stage the assistance from the Reichsbank ceased. In -spite of that, during the following year and without any assistance -<span class='pageno' title='490' id='Page_490'></span> -from the Reichsbank, the expenditure for armament increased to -11,000,000,000, and in the following year it climbed to 20,500,000,000.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It appears, therefore, that even without the financial genius of -Herr Schacht, they managed to raise the funds. Just how they did -so is another question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I duly put these figures to the Defendant Keitel. I do -not think that the Tribunal had the document at the time. It is now -available and has the Exhibit Number Schacht-7. It is Page 15 of -the German text and Page 21 of the English text. Herr Keitel could, -of course, only refer to the first column, that is to say, total expenditure; -but there is a second and a third column, in this account, -and these two are calculations made by Schacht, calculations regarding -what was raised with the help and without the help of the -Reichsbank.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I do not intend to go through it in detail now. I should merely -like to have your permission to ask Dr. Schacht whether the figures -calculated by him, in Columns 2 and 3 of the document, were calculated -correctly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I have these figures in the document before me. The -figures are absolutely correct and again I want to declare that they -show that, during the first year after the Reichsbank had discontinued -its assistance, no less than 5,125,000,000 more were spent -without the assistance of the Reichsbank, that is to say, a total of -11,000,000,000.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Up to now you have stated to the Tribunal that you -were active against a dangerous and extensive rearmament and you -showed that by tying up the money bag. Did you oppose excessive -rearmament in any other way, for instance, by giving lectures -and such?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Many times I spoke not only before economists and -professors who were my main auditors, but I often spoke upon invitation -of the Minister of War and the head of the Army Academy -before high-ranking officers. In all these lectures I continually -referred to the financial and economic limitations to which German -rearmament was subject and I warned against excessive rearmament.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: When did you first gather the impression that the -extent of German rearmament was excessive and exaggerated?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: It is very difficult to give you a date. Beginning -in 1935, I made continuous attempts to slow down the speed of -rearmament. On one occasion Hitler had said—just a moment, I -have it here—that until the spring of 1936 the same speed would -have to be maintained. I adhered to that as much as possible, -<span class='pageno' title='491' id='Page_491'></span> -although, beginning with the second half of 1935, I continuously -applied the brake. But after 1935 I told myself that, since the -Führer himself had said it, after the spring of 1936 the same speed -would no longer be necessary. This can be seen from Document -1301-PS in which these statements of mine are quoted, statements -which I communicated to the so-called “small Ministerial Council” -(kleiner Ministerrat). Göring contradicted me during that meeting, -but I of course maintain the things which I said at the time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After that I constantly tried to make the Minister of War do -something to slow down the speed of rearmament, if only in the -interest of general economy, since I wanted to see the economic -system working for the export trade. Proof for the fact of just -how much I urged the Minister of War is contained in my letter -dated 24 December 1935, which I wrote him when I saw the period -desired by Hitler coming to an end, and when I was already applying -the brake. It has also been presented by the Prosecution as -Document Number EC-293. In the English version of the document -it is on Page 25.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I beg to be allowed to quote very briefly—all my quotations -are very brief—from that document. I wrote a letter to the Reich -Minister of War, and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I gather from your letter dated 29 November”—and then -come the reference numbers—“that increased demands by the -Armed Forces for copper and lead are to be expected, which -will amount to practically double the present consumption. -These are only current demands, whereas the equally urgent -provisions for the future are not contained in the figures. -You are expecting me to obtain the necessary foreign currency -for these demands, and to that I respectfully reply that -under the existing circumstances I see no possibility of -doing so.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In other words, Blomberg is asking that I should buy raw -materials with foreign currency, and I am stating quite clearly -that I do not see any possibility of doing so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The document goes on to say—and this is the sentence regarding -the limit up to 1 April. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In all the conferences held with the Führer and Reich -Chancellor up to now, as well as with the leading military -departments, I have expressed my conviction that it would -be possible to supply the necessary foreign currencies and -raw materials for the existing degree of rearmament until -1 April 1936. Despite the fact that, due to our cultural and -agrarian policies which are being repudiated all over the -world, this has been made extremely difficult for me and -<span class='pageno' title='492' id='Page_492'></span> -continues to be difficult, I still hope that my original plan -may be carried out.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That is to say, that I thought this proposed program could -be carried out up to 1 April, but not over and beyond that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: It is a fact that Minister of Transportation, Dorpmüller, -was trying to raise credits for railway purposes. What -was your attitude as President of the Reichsbank towards this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: During a conference between the Führer, Dorpmüller, -and myself, at which the Führer strongly supported Dorpmüller’s -demands, I turned that credit down straightway, and he -did not get it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The meeting of 27 May 1936 of the so-called “small -Ministerial Council,” presided over by Göring, has been discussed -here. The Prosecution contend that intentions of aggressive war -became apparent from that meeting. Did you have any knowledge -of that meeting?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: What was the date, please?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: 27 May 1936.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No. I was present during that conference and I -see nothing in the entire document pointing to an aggressive war. -I have studied the document very carefully.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: It has furthermore been stated against you what is -contained in the report of Ambassador Bullitt, Document Number -L-151, Exhibit USA-70, dated 23 November 1937. You have heard, -of course, that the Prosecution are also drawing the conclusion -from that report that there were aggressive intentions on Hitler’s -part. Will you please make a statement about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I see nothing in the entire report to the effect -that Hitler was about to start an aggressive war. I was simply -talking about Hitler’s intentions to bring about an Anschluss of -Austria, if possible, and to give the Sudeten Germans autonomy -if possible. Neither of those two actions would be aggressive war, -and apart from that, Mr. Bullitt says the following with reference -to me in his report about this conversation. I quote: “Schacht then -went on to speak of the absolute necessity for doing something -to produce peace in Europe....”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The memorandum of this conversation is also contained -in my document book as Exhibit Number Schacht-22. It -is on Page 64 of the English text and Page 57 of the German text.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We shall now have to deal in greater detail with your alleged -knowledge of Hitler’s intentions to start war. First of all, speaking -generally, did Hitler ever, as far as you know... -<span class='pageno' title='493' id='Page_493'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I asked Dr. Dix if -he would object if the Tribunal would allow me, since he is passing -to a new point, to mention the question of the Raeder documents. -I had a discussion with Dr. Siemers. There are still some -outstanding points, and we should be grateful if the Tribunal would -hear us this afternoon, if possible, because the translating division -is waiting for the Raeder documents to get on with their translations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think it will take, Sir -David?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not more than a half hour, -My Lord.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If the translation department are waiting, -perhaps we had better do it at 2 o’clock.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If it is only going to take a half hour. It -isn’t likely, I suppose, to take more than that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t think it will take more -than that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will do that at 2 o’clock, and now we -will adjourn.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='494' id='Page_494'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please Your Lordship, -the Tribunal should have in front of them a statement of our -objections to certain of the documents, arranged in six groups. -Attached to that sheet they will find an English summary of the -documents, presenting shortly the contents of each one of them. -My Lord, with regard to the first group, might I make two erasures -from our objection to Number 19, which has been allowed in the -case of Schacht, and if I understand Dr. Siemers correctly he doesn’t -press for Number 76.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, My Lord, the others in that group:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 9 is a series of quotations from Lersner’s book on -<span class='it'>Versailles</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 10, the quotation from a book by the German left-wing -publicist, Thomas Mann.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 17 is the <span class='it'>Failure of a Mission</span>, by Nevile Henderson.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 45 is a quotation from a book of Mr. Churchill’s.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 47 is the report on a complaint to Lord Halifax about -an article in <span class='it'>News Chronicle</span> criticizing Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, Number 66 is rather different. If the Tribunal would -be good enough to look at it, it is a report by a German lawyer, -Dr. Mosier I think his name should be, who is an authority on -international law, dealing with the Norway action. Dr. Siemers has -been, of course, absolutely frank with me and he said that it would -be convenient to him to have this, which is really a legal argument, -embodied in his document book. Of course, that is not really the -purpose of these document books; but, of course, it is a matter for -the Tribunal, and we felt we had to draw attention to it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, My Lord, Number 76 comes out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Numbers 93 to 96 are quotations from Soviet newspapers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 101 is a quotation from Havas, the French News Agency.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Numbers 102 to 107 are minor orders relating to the Low Countries -which, the Prosecution submit, have no evidential value.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then in the second group, there are a number of documents -which, the Prosecution submit, are not relevant to any of the issues -in the case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you didn’t deal with Number 109, -did you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord, it is on -the second line. That is another legal argument, the effect of the -war on the legal position of Iceland, which is a quotation from the -<span class='it'>British Journal of Information in Public Law and International La</span>w. -<span class='pageno' title='495' id='Page_495'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the second group, the -Prosecution submit, is irrelevant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 22 is a Belgian decree of 1937 dealing with the possible -evacuation of the civil population in time of war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 39 is a French document of the Middle East.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Numbers 63 and 64 are two speeches, one by Mr. Emery and -another by Mr. Churchill, dealing with the position in Greece at -the end of 1940, some two months after the beginning of the Italian -campaign against Greece.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 71 is an undated directive with regard to the study of -routes in Belgium, which doesn’t seem to us to have any evidential -importance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 76 comes out as the <span class='it'>Altmark</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 76 came out?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, that is the -<span class='it'>Altmark</span>. It is the same one that is in Number 71. I am sorry, -My Lord, it should have been marked out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 99 is the minutes of the ninth meeting of the combined -Cabinet Council on the 27th of April 1940, and it deals with a -suggestion of M. Reynaud with regard to the Swedish ore mines. -As it was long after the Norway campaign and it was never, of -course, acted upon in Norway, it seems to us to have no relevance -for this Trial.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Numbers 102 to 107 I have dealt with under one. They have -certain very small unimportant memoranda relating to the Low -Countries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 112 is a French document in which Paul Reynaud quotes -a statement from Mr. Churchill that he will fight on to the end, -which again doesn’t seem of much importance in 1946.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, My Lord, the next group are documents which were rejected -by the Tribunal when applied for by the Defendant Ribbentrop. -The first two deal with British rearmament and the others -with the Balkans and Greece. The Tribunal will probably remember -the group which they did reject in the Ribbentrop application; and -the fourth group are other documents of the same series as those -rejected by the Tribunal in the case of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. -The fifth group are really objectionable on the <span class='it'>tu quoque</span> -basis. I think they are entirely French documents which deal with -proposals in a very tentative stage and which were arranged, but -never followed out, with regard to the destruction of oil fields or -the blocking of the Danube in the Middle East. My Lord, they are -documents dated in the spring of 1940 and, as I say, they deal with -<span class='pageno' title='496' id='Page_496'></span> -the most tentative stages and were never put into operation. The -plans were never in operation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The sixth group are documents dealing with Norway, which were -captured after the occupation of France. As I understand -Dr. Siemers’ argument, it is not suggested that these documents -were within the knowledge of the defendants at the time that they -carried out the aggression against Norway; but it is stated that they -had other information. Of course, as to their own information, we -have not made any objection at all; and that these documents might -be argued to be corroborative of their agents’ reports. Actually, as -is shown by Document Number 83, to which we make no objection, -they also deal with tentative proposals which were not put into -effect and were not proceeded with; but in the submission of the -Prosecution, the important matter must be what was within the -knowledge of the defendants before the 9th of April 1940; and it -is irrelevant to go into a large number of other documents which -are only arguably consistent with the information which the defendants -stated they had.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, I tried to deal with them very shortly because I made -a promise to the Tribunal on the time, but I hope that I have -indicated very clearly what our objections were.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Your -Honors, it is extremely difficult to define my position with reference -to so many documents, especially since I know that these documents -have not yet been translated and that the contents, in the main, -are therefore not known to those concerned. Therefore, I might -point out that there is a certain danger in treating documents in -this way. In part they are basic elements of my defense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Therefore, I should like to state now that in dealing with these -documents I shall be compelled, in order to give the reasons for the -relevancy of this evidence, to point out those passages which I shall -not need to read separately into the record, for as soon as the document -book is ready they will be known to the Tribunal and can be -read there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I shall follow the order as outlined by Sir David. First of all, -the first group, Document Numbers 9 and 10. The note submitted -by Sir David to the Tribunal points out that the submission of -these documents conflicts with the ruling given by the Tribunal on -29 March. In reply I should like to point out that this opinion of -the Prosecution is an error. The ruling of the Tribunal said that no -documents might be submitted concerning the injustice of the Versailles -Treaty and the pressure arising from it. These documents -do not concern the injustice and the pressure; rather they serve to -give a few examples of the subjective attitude of a man like Noske, -<span class='pageno' title='497' id='Page_497'></span> -who was a Social Democrat and certainly did not want to conduct -any wars of aggression. A few other statements in Numbers 9 and -10 show the thought of the Government and the ruling class at that -time in regard to defensive measures and the fear that in case of -an attack on the part of Poland, for instance, the German Armed -Forces might be too weak. These are facts pure and simple; and I -give you my express assurance that I shall not quote any sentences -which might introduce a polemic. Moreover, I need this mainly as -a basis for my final pleading.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 17 is a very brief excerpt from the book by Henderson, -<span class='it'>Failure of a Mission</span>, written in 1940. I believe there are no objections -to my quoting about 15 lines, if I wish to use them in my final -pleading in order to show that Henderson, who knew Germany -well, still believed in 1940 that he had to recognize certain positive -good points in the regime at that time; and I believe that the conclusion -is justified that one cannot expect that a German military -commander should be more sceptical than the British Ambassador -at that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then we turn to Document Number 45. It is true this document -is taken from a book by Churchill; but it deals with a fact which -I should like to prove, the fact that already many years before -World War I there existed a British Committee for Defense. In the -table of contents which Sir David has submitted, the word “Reichsverteidigungsausschuss” -is used, and I therefore conclude that this -is a mistake on the part of the Prosecution who took it to mean a -German Reich Defense Committee; that is not correct. This document -shows how it came about that the Prosecution wrongly overestimated -the importance of the German Reich Defense Committee, -as the Prosecution naturally compared it with the British Committee -for Defense, which went very much further in its activities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 47 is evidence to show that when the German Embassy -pointed out that an extremely scathing article on Hitler had appeared -in the paper <span class='it'>News Chronicle</span>, Lord Halifax pointed out in -reply that it was not possible for him to exert any influence on the -newspaper. I should merely like to compare this with the fact that -the Prosecution made it appear as though Raeder had had something -to do with the regrettable article in the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>: -“Churchill sank the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>.” Raeder was no more connected with -that article than Lord Halifax with the article in the <span class='it'>News Chronicle</span> -and was unfortunately even more powerless, as far as this article -was concerned, than the British Government.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 66 deals with the opinion given by Dr. Mosier, a -specialist on international law, an opinion on the Norway action in -very compressed form, as the Tribunal will surely admit. The -Tribunal will also concede that in my defense of the Norway action -<span class='pageno' title='498' id='Page_498'></span> -I must speak at length about the underlying principles of international -law. The underlying principles of international law are -not an altogether simple matter. I have nothing against presenting -this myself in all necessary detail. I was merely guided by the -thought that the Tribunal have asked again and again that we save -time. I believe that we can save considerable time if this statement -of opinion is granted me, so that I shall not have to cite -numerous excerpts and authors in detail in order to show the exact -legal justification. I could then perhaps deal with the legal questions -in half an hour, whereas without this statement of opinion it -is utterly impossible for me to treat such a problem in half an hour. -If the Prosecution do not object to more time being taken up, then -I do not object if the document is denied me. I will merely have -to take the consequences.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 76 has meanwhile been crossed out, that is, it is granted -me by the Prosecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Numbers 93 to 96 are excerpts on statements of the official -Moscow papers, <span class='it'>Isvestia</span> and <span class='it'>Pravda</span>. These statements prove that, -at least at that time, Soviet opinion regarding the legality of the -German action in Norway coincided with the German opinion of -that time. If the Tribunal think that these very brief quotations -should not be admitted as documents, I would not be too insistent, -since at this point in the proceedings I shall in any case be compelled -to discuss it. The Tribunal will remember that at that time -Germany and Russia were friends, and Soviet opinion on a purely -legal problem should, at any rate, be considered as having a certain -significance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, Number 101; I beg your pardon, Sir David, but if I am -not mistaken Dr. Braun said an hour and a half ago that Number -101 is to be rejected. Very well, then, Numbers 101 to 107. The -action against Norway, as I have already said, involved a problem -of international law. It involves the problem of whether one -country may violate the neutrality of another country when it -can be proved that another belligerent nation likewise intends to -violate the neutrality of the afore-mentioned neutral state. When -presenting my evidence I shall show that Grossadmiral Raeder, in -the autumn of 1939, received all sorts of reports to the effect that -the Allies were planning to take under their own protection the -territorial waters of Norway, that is, to land in Norway, in order -to have Norwegian bases. When I deal with the Norway documents, -I shall return to this point. I should like to say at this point that -it is necessary to explain and to prove that the legal attitude taken -by the Allies to the question of the possible violation of the neutrality -of a country was in the years 1939 and 1940 entirely the same as -<span class='pageno' title='499' id='Page_499'></span> -the attitude of the Defendant Raeder in the case of Norway at the -same time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Therefore it is necessary not only to deal with Norway; but also -to show that this was a basic conception, which can readily be -proved by reference to parallel cases on the strength of these documents. -These parallel cases deal in the first place with the plans -of the Allies with respect to the Balkans, and secondly with the -plans of the Allies with respect to the Caucasian oil fields.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Your Honors, it is by no means my intention, as Sir David has -suggested, to use these documents from the <span class='it'>tu quoque</span> point of view, -from the point of view that the defendant has done something, -which the Allies have also done or wanted to do. I am concerned -only with a judgment of the Defendant Raeder’s actions from the -legal point of view. One can understand such actions only when -the entire matter is brought to light.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is my opinion—and in addition to this I should like to refer -to the statement of Dr. Mosier’s opinion, Exhibit Raeder-66—that -this cannot be made the subject of an accusation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We are concerned, Your Honors, with the right of self-preservation -as recognized in principle by international law. In this connection -I should like...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we don’t want to go into these -matters in great detail, you know, at this stage. If you state what -your reasons are in support and state them shortly, we shall be able -to consider the matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I am very sorry that I have to go into these -details, but if through the objection of the Prosecution the principles...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal do not wish to hear you in -detail. I have said that the Tribunal do not wish to hear you in -detail.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I merely ask that the Tribunal take into consideration -the fact that this concerns the principle of international -law laid down by Kellogg himself in 1928, namely, the right of -self-preservation, or “the right of self-defense.” For that reason -1 should like to adduce these documents showing that just as the -Allies acted quite correctly according to this principle, so also did -the Defendant Raeder.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Document Number 22 is next. I have given various statements -of principle which apply to a large number of the remaining documents, -so that I can refer to the statements I have already made. -These statements also apply to Documents Numbers 22 and 39.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As far as Documents Numbers 63 and 64 are concerned, I should -like to point out that these documents deal with Greece; and not -<span class='pageno' title='500' id='Page_500'></span> -only these two, but also a later group of perhaps 10 or 12 documents, -with which I should like to deal very briefly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As far as Greece is concerned, the situation is as follows:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I must admit that I was more than surprised that the Prosecution -objected to these documents, about 14 in all. In Document Number -C-12, Exhibit Number GB-226, the Prosecution accuse Raeder of -having decreed on 30 December 1939; and I quote, “Greek merchantmen -in the prohibited area declared by the United States and -England are to be treated as enemy ships.” The accusation would -be justified, if Greece had not behaved in such a manner that -Raeder had to resort to this order.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If the documents concerning Greece which show that Greece -did not strictly keep to her neutrality are struck out, then I cannot -bring any counterevidence. I do not believe that it is the intention -of the Prosecution to restrict my presentation of evidence in this -way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These are all documents which date back to this time and which -show that Greece put her merchantmen at the disposal of England -who was at war with Germany. Therefore they could be treated -as enemy ships.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like to say that I -should have told the Tribunal I would make no objection to Documents -Numbers 53 and 54, because they do deal with the chartering -of Greek steamers by the British Government.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But you made no objection to them; you -didn’t object to Numbers 53 or 54.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted to make clear that I -don’t object to them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: There is no objection on the paper. What -you are dealing with, Dr. Siemers, is 63 and 64, not 53 and 54?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Oh, I beg your pardon, I see it further on. Yes, I see; will you -please strike that out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: There is no objection to Numbers 53 and 54?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no objection. My Lord, my -friend was dealing with the Greek fleet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes; I beg your pardon, I misheard.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The same things, as I have already stated regarding -Documents Numbers 101 to 107, apply also to Document -Number 71.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 99 belongs really to Group 6, to the Norwegian documents; -and I should like to refer to these collectively and then refer -<span class='pageno' title='501' id='Page_501'></span> -again later to Number 99. All these documents concern Norway, -that is, the planning by the Allies with respect to Norway. These -documents deal positively with the planning of the landing in -Narvik, the landing in Stavanger, the landing in Bergen, and the -absolute necessity of having Norwegian bases. The documents -mention that Germany should not be allowed to continue getting -ore supplies from Sweden. They also deal in some measure with -Finland. There are likewise documents which support the same -plan after the Finnish-Russian war had already been concluded.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to quote from these documents to prove their -relevancy. Since the Tribunal has told me that I cannot do that, -I ask that these brief references be considered sufficient. The facts -contained in these documents agree, point for point, with those -reports which Grossadmiral Raeder received from September 1939 -until March 1940 from the Intelligence Service of the German -Wehrmacht headed by Admiral Canaris. These plans agree with the -information which Raeder received during the same 6 months -through the Naval Attaché in Oslo, Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, -and with the information which he received in a letter from -Admiral Carls at the end of September 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The information from these three sources caused the Defendant -Raeder to point out the great danger involved were Norway to fall -into the hands of the Allies, which would mean that Germany had -lost the war. It is, therefore, a purely strategic consideration. The -occupation of Norway did not, as contended by the British Prosecution, -have anything to do with the prestige or desire for conquest -but was concerned solely with these positive pieces of information.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I must therefore prove, first of all, that the Defendant Raeder -did receive this information and, secondly, that these reports were -objective.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, you are dealing with Document -Number 99, are you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, 99, and all of Group 6.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I don’t know what you mean by Group 6; -99 is in Group B.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The group under the letter “F,” which Sir David -called Group 6, the last on the page.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The objection of the Prosecution to that -document was that it was a document of the 27th of April 1940, at -a time after Germany had invaded Norway. You haven’t said -anything about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I wanted to avoid dealing with each document -singly, because I believe that these can be treated generally. -However, in this specific case... -<span class='pageno' title='502' id='Page_502'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I don’t want you to deal with each document -separately. I thought you were dealing with Document -Number 99. If you can deal with them in groups, by all means do -so. However, you are taking up a great deal of the Tribunal’s time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: This Document Number 99 is the Minutes of the -Ninth Meeting of the Supreme Council, that is, the military operational -staff of England and France, on 27 April. The heading shows beyond -doubt that it was after the occupation of Norway. However, that -is only a formal objection. The contents of the document show -that at this session the participants discussed the happenings -during the period before the occupation, and the most important -leaders of the Allies took part in this meeting. Chamberlain, -Halifax, Churchill, Sir Samuel Hoare, Sir Alexander Cadogan, -<span class='it'>et cetera</span> and, on the French side Reynaud, Daladier, Gamelin, and -Darlan were present; and these gentlemen discussed the previous -plans which, I admit, had misfired because of the German occupation -of Norway. But they did discuss about how necessary it -was that the iron-ore deposits in Sweden should fall into the hands -of the Allies and what was to be done now to prevent Germany’s -getting this ore and how the destruction of these iron-ore deposits -could be brought about. I believe, therefore, that though this -happened at a later date, the train of thought I have presented is -of significance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then we turn to Document Number 100. This deals with the -session of the French War Committee of 9 April 1940, which concerns -the same problem: what the Allies had planned and what -could be planned now that the report had just come in about the -action on the part of Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Documents Numbers 102 to 107 have already been dealt with. -For Document Number 110 the same statements apply as for Documents -101 to 107.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Document Number 112 is a document which shows that Churchill, -as early as May 1940, expected active intervention on the part of -America. I wanted to present this in connection with the accusation -raised against the Defendant Raeder, that in the spring of 1941 he -was instrumental in bringing about a war against the United States -by way of Japan. For me this document is not nearly so important -as those basic documents which I have referred to at greater length. -Therefore, I leave this completely to the discretion of the Prosecution -or the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next group consists of documents which were turned down -in the case of Ribbentrop. I should like to point out that I did not -have the opportunity in the Ribbentrop case to define my position -as to the justification and relevancy of these documents. Therefore -<span class='pageno' title='503' id='Page_503'></span> -I consider it insufficient simply to state that these documents were -refused in the case of Ribbentrop, that the charges against Ribbentrop...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have already carefully considered the -arguments and have decided those documents were inadmissible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believed that the decision applied only to the -Ribbentrop case, since no other point of view was discussed during -those proceedings, namely, that of the charges raised against -Raeder in which connection it is expressly said in Document C-152 -that Raeder brought about the occupation of the whole of Greece. -That is an accusation that was not made against Ribbentrop but -only against Raeder. How can I refute this accusation if these -documents are denied me?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal know the documents -and know the charges against Raeder, and they don’t desire -to hear any further argument on it. They will consider the matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg the pardon of the Tribunal. Under these -circumstances I am compelled to see whether all these documents -were covered in Ribbentrop’s case. My notes, as I told the Prosecution -this morning, do not agree with the statements of the Prosecution. -Perhaps after the session, if I am unable to do so at the -moment, I might point out whether or not the documents are -identical.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is really a fact that in Ribbentrop’s case these documents were -not presented in their entirety and that the Tribunal therefore does -not know them in their entirety. Whether Dr. Horn had marked -exactly the same passages as I wish to use, I am not able to say -as far as each individual document is concerned. I know only that -in the large majority of cases Dr. Horn did not present the entire -document because he was presenting it only from the point of view -of the Ribbentrop case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Presumably you have submitted your extracts -to the Prosecution. The Prosecution tell us that those extracts -are the same ones that were rejected in Ribbentrop’s case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, we have only a list -of those documents so far. We haven’t seen the extracts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was a pause in the proceedings while the Prosecution -conferred.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, I am sorry. I spoke too quickly. We have seen the -extracts in German and we haven’t had them translated. We have -done the best we could in German.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: 24 and 25, at any rate, are both speeches in -English. -<span class='pageno' title='504' id='Page_504'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, some of them -are. I am sorry, My Lord; these are. Your Lordship is quite right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, as I understand it, Dr. Siemers -says that these are not the same passages of evidence, or suggested -evidence, as were rejected in Ribbentrop’s case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I did not do the -actual checking myself, but Major Barrington, who checked the -Ribbentrop documents, went through these and compared the two, -and he gave me that which forms the basis of our note. That is the -position. I can’t tell Your Lordship that I have actually checked -these myself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers is telling us that that is -untrue?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As I understood Dr. Siemers, -he was saying that he didn’t know whether they were the same -extracts...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I just make one remark in connection with -that, please? I am not quite certain that I can say in each specific -case which extracts were contained in the Ribbentrop case, but -they are not the same. I know for certain that they are not the -same because in order to relieve the work of the Translation -Division I compared the numbers and in the few cases in which -they were the same I told the Translation Division that these documents -were identical so that they would not be translated a second -time. But I am sorry to say that a large number of the documents -were not the same, as they were asked for by Dr. Horn and -Ribbentrop from a completely different point of view.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I might also point out that the numbers under Group D which -are enumerated here as Ribbentrop Documents Numbers 29, 51, 56, -57, 60, 61, 62, although I made every effort to find them, could not -be found in the Ribbentrop Document Book. And the list does not -show which numbers they should be in the Ribbentrop Document -Book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is not suggested. -What is said is that they are in the same series which deals with -the same subject—that is, the question of Greece and the Balkans—as -those documents which the Tribunal ruled out in the case of -Ribbentrop.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, I think the best course -would be for you to go through these documents this afternoon -under the heading “C” and find out whether they are the same -ones rejected in Ribbentrop’s case; and if they are not, indicate -<span class='pageno' title='505' id='Page_505'></span> -exactly in what they differ from the documents rejected in Ribbentrop’s -case, so as to show they have some relevance to your case; -and we shall expect to have that by 5 o’clock.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now will you go on with the others?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I perhaps make one remark about what -Sir David said regarding group “D”? They were not objected to -because they have already been mentioned in Ribbentrop’s case; -but only because they deal with the same subject matter, that is -true. The same subject matter, namely, Greece, is dealt with; and -I can only reply that the Prosecution have charged the Defendant -Raeder in Document C-152 with having aimed at, and brought -about, the occupation of the whole of Greece. The facts concerning -this statement of three lines I can present only if I am allowed -some documents referring to Greece and only if these are not -refused on the grounds that the documents concerning Greece were -turned down quite generally in Ribbentrop’s case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I come to group “E” which begins with Document 26. The -same statements apply which I have already set forth in regard -to Documents Numbers 101 to 107. The attacks planned by the -Allies on the oil regions in neutral Romania and in the neutral -Caucasus—as I should like to remark in parenthesis—have already -been dealt with in these proceedings. The Tribunal will remember -that I asked Göring during his examination about entries in Jodl’s -diary pertaining to this question and he has given information -about the reports received by Germany, on Pages 6031 and 6033 -of the transcript of 18 March (Volume IX, Pages 402-404). This testimony -too concerns only the subjective side, that is, what was -known by Germany. I must prove that the objective side, the fact -that this had actually been planned, agrees exactly with the subjective -side, that is, with these reports. These documents, Numbers -26, 30 to 32, 36, 37, 39, 40 to 44, are to prove that. Then -comes Number 99 which has already been dealt with, which seems -to be here in duplicate; Number 101, and Number 110 which also -seem to be duplicates.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I turn now to Group 6, which is supposed to be irrelevant, -dealing with the attack on Norway. I have already, on principle, -set forth my reasons and I beg the Tribunal not to deny me these -documents under any circumstances. If I am not granted these documents, -I shall simply not be in a position to present evidence in a -reasonable manner without telling everything myself. I can present -proof in regard to a question of such importance only if documents -are granted me just as they are granted the Prosecution. -But if all the documents, practically all the documents concerning -this question are refused, then I do not know how I am to treat -<span class='pageno' title='506' id='Page_506'></span> -such a question. And I believe that the Tribunal will wish to assist -me in this matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am requesting this especially for the following reasons: When -I gave my reasons for wanting to present this particular evidence, -I asked that those files of the British Admiralty be brought in, which -dealt with the preparations and planning regarding Scandinavia, -that is, Norway. Sir David did not object at that time but said he -would have to consult the British Admiralty. The Tribunal decided -accordingly and granted my application. In the meantime the -British Admiralty has answered, and I assume that Sir David will -agree to my reading the answer which has been put at my disposal. -This answer is as follows—it concerns, if I may say that in advance...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have had the answer, I think, have we -not? We have had the answer and transmitted it to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. From this reply it can -be seen that the files will not be submitted, that I cannot get the -necessary approval. It can also be seen that certain facts which -will be important for my presentation of evidence will be admitted -by the British Admiralty; but in reality I am not in a position to -prove anything by means of documents. Since I am unable to make -use of this evidence, I ask at least to be allowed the other means -of presenting evidence, that is, the documents contained in the -German White Books. These are documents recognized as being -correct. In all cases they are facsimiles. They can be carefully -examined and I believe...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we are dealing with your -application for particular documents. We are not dealing with any -general argument or general criticism that you have to make. We -are only hearing you in answer to certain objections on behalf of -the British Prosecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR: SIEMERS: Your Honor, unless I am very much mistaken—in -which case you will pleas correct me—Sir David, with a few exceptions, -defined his position regarding these documents under “F”—this -is a large number, from 59 to 91 with some omissions—as a -whole and not his position regarding each individual document. But -I have to say the same thing to practically each document and -asked only that I be granted those documents as a whole, for I cannot -make headway without these documents...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You were not referring to these documents. -You were referring to the fact that the British Admiralty was not -prepared to disclose its files to you. It has nothing to do with these -documents at all. -<span class='pageno' title='507' id='Page_507'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe I have been misunderstood, Your -Honors. I have already stated very clearly why I need these documents -for my presentation of evidence regarding the Norway -action. Beyond that I said merely that if these documents are not -granted me, then I cannot present any evidence. I am deprived of -it. I asked the Tribunal merely to take into consideration the fact -that the documents from London, which I had originally counted -on, are not at my disposal. And I do not know why this request, -which I am submitting to the Tribunal and which is only in explanation -of my previous statements, is being taken amiss by the -Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you have to say?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I have now finished, Your Honors. It is not at -all my intention to read all these documents or to spend too much -time on them. I believe that if I am granted these documents, the -presentation of evidence will be much easier, for these are groups -of documents which show the chronological development of certain -plans; and if I have the 5th, 6th or 7th document, then I need not -read each one. But if I am granted just one document, I will be -put in an extremely difficult position and will have to speak in -greater detail than I would if I could simply refer to these documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, Dr. Dix.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, we come to the -whole question of your alleged knowledge of the direct war objectives -of Hitler. You have already mentioned in a general way -that Hitler never spoke about war to you. Have you anything to -add to this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: You also touched upon the question of the sincerity -of his peaceful assurances and his disarmament proposals. Have -you anything to add to that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, at the beginning I believed that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And did the various members of the Cabinet ever -speak to you about warlike intentions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Never did I hear anything from any of my fellow -colleagues in the Reich Cabinet which could lead me to believe that -anyone had the intention of going to war or would welcome it if -Germany were to start a war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now, we turn to your own attitude towards the war. -You already indicated your general attitude when you spoke about -<span class='pageno' title='508' id='Page_508'></span> -your philosophy as a pacifist. I believe, therefore, that it is more -expedient if I read from my document book the opinion of a third -person, one who knows you very well, the former member of the -Reichsbank Directorate, Huelse. It is the Schacht Document 37-C, -Page 160 of the German text, and 168 of the English text. It is an -affidavit. And there, beginning with Paragraph 2, Huelse says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I recall several chance talks with Dr. Schacht during the -years 1935 to 1939 about war and rearmament. In these talks -he always expressed his aversion to any war and any warlike -conduct. He held the firm opinion that even to the -conqueror war brings only disadvantages and that a new -European war would, on the whole, be a crime against culture -and humanity. He hoped for a long period of peace for Germany, -as she needed it more than other countries in order -to improve and stabilize her unstable economic situation.</p> - -<p>“To my knowledge, until the beginning of 1938, Dr. Schacht -at meetings of the Reichsbank Board of Directors and in -private conversations on the subject of armament always -spoke only of defense measures. I believe I can recall that -he told me in the middle of 1938 that Hitler’s provocative -action against Austria and the Sudeten country was worse -than thoughtless from the military point of view.</p> - -<p>“He said that Germany had undertaken only a defensive -armament, which would prove absolutely inadequate as a -defense in case of attack by one of the big powers, a possibility -with which Hitler had to reckon. He said that he had -never heard that the Wehrmacht was in any way designed -or armed for an aggressive war.</p> - -<p>“When the war did break out and spread more and more, he -said repeatedly that he had greatly erred in his judgment -of Hitler’s personality; he had hoped for a long time that -Hitler would develop into a real statesman who, after the -experience of the World War I, would avoid any war.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>You have already touched upon the question of an annexation -of Austria and given your general opinion. I ask you now to make -a concrete statement about the Anschluss after it had actually taken -place and especially about the manner in which this Anschluss was -carried out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: That this Anschluss would come at some time we -Germans all knew. As for the various political negotiations which -took place between Hitler, Schuschnigg and others, I naturally was -as little informed as were the other Cabinet Ministers, with the -probable exception of Göring and Ribbentrop and perhaps one or -two more. The actual Anschluss in March was a complete surprise -<span class='pageno' title='509' id='Page_509'></span> -to us, not the fact but the date. A great surprise and we, at any -rate my acquaintances and I myself, were completely surprised.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: How did you judge the manner, the nature and development -of this Anschluss?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I believe that much can be said about the manner. -What we heard subsequently and what I have learned in these -proceedings is certainly not very gratifying, but I believe that it -would have had very little practical influence on the Anschluss -itself and the course of events. The whole thing was more of a -demonstration to the outside world, similar perhaps to the marching -into the Rhineland; but it had no great effect in my opinion on the -course of the negotiations. I am speaking now of the marching in -of the troops. This march was more or less a festive reception.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The Prosecution have pointed out that in March 1938 -you regulated the relation of the schilling to the mark for the event -of a possible Anschluss, and by this the Prosecution obviously want -to prove that you had previous knowledge of this action. Will you -tell us your position as to this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: The fact to which the Prosecution refer is a communication -from a Lieutenant Colonel Wiedemann. March 11, at about -3 o’clock in the afternoon—I believe I remember that but I cannot -say whether it was by telephone or in person—someone, it may -have been Lieutenant Colonel Wiedemann, inquired of me how -the purchasing power for the troops in Austria was to be regulated -if German troops should march into Austria, purely as a matter of -currency policy, and whether it was necessary to have any regulation -prescribed. I told him that of course everything had to be -paid for, everything that the troops might buy there, and that the -rate of exchange; if they paid in schillings and not in marks, would -be 1 mark to 2 schillings. That was the rate which obtained at the -time, which remained fairly steady and was the recognized ratio -of the schilling to the mark. The fact that in the afternoon of the -11th I was approached about this matter is the best proof that I -had no previous knowledge of these matters.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The Prosecution further consider it an accusation -against you that in your speech to the Austrian National Bank after -the marching in of the troops, you used decidedly National Socialist -phraseology and thus welcomed the Anschluss.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Perhaps we can use this opportunity to save time and reply to -the accusation made repeatedly by the Prosecution that in speeches, -petitions, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, you sometimes thought fit to adopt a tone, of -which it could perhaps be said that it exuded National Socialist -ideas. That has been used as circumstantial evidence against you. -<span class='pageno' title='510' id='Page_510'></span> -Will you please define your position to those arguments and give -your reasons for this attitude of yours?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: If I did so in the first years, I did so only in order -to remind Party circles and the people of the original program of -the National Socialist Party, to which the actual attitude of the -Party members and functionaries stood in direct contrast. I always -tried to show that the principles which I upheld in many political -matters agreed completely with the principles of the National -Socialist program as they were stated in the Party program, namely, -equal rights for all, the dignity of the individual, esteem for the -church, and so forth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the later years I also repeatedly used National Socialist -phraseology, because from the time of my speech at Königsberg, -the contrast between my views and Hitler’s views regarding the -Party was entirely clear. And gradually within the Party I got the -reputation of being an enemy of the Party, a man whose views -were contrary to those of the Party. From that moment on not -only the possibility of my co-operation, but also my very existence -was endangered; and in such moments, when I saw my activity, -my freedom, and my life seriously threatened by the Party I utilized -these moments to show by means of an emphatically National -Socialist phraseology that I was working entirely within the framework -of the traditional policies and that my activity was in agreement -with these policies—in order to protect myself against these -attacks.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: In other words, recalling the testimony of the witness -Gisevius about a remark of Goerdeler’s, you used Talleyrand -methods in this case?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I am not entirely familiar with Talleyrand’s methods, -but at any rate I did camouflage myself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: In this connection I should like to read a passage from -the affidavit of Schniewind which has been quoted repeatedly. It -is Schacht Number 34. I have often indicated this page. It is -Page 118 of the German, Page 126 of the English text. Schniewind -says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“If Schacht on the other hand occasionally made statements, -oral or written, which could be construed as signifying that -he went a long way in identifying himself with the Hitler -regime, these statements were naturally known to us; but -what Schacht thought in reality was known to almost every -official in the Reichsbank and in the Reich Ministry of Economics, -above all, of course, to his closest colleagues.</p> - -<p>“On many occasions we asked Dr. Schacht if he had not gone -too far in these statements. He always replied that he was -<span class='pageno' title='511' id='Page_511'></span> -under such heavy fire from the Party and the SS that he -could camouflage himself only with strong slogans and sly -statements.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I might explain that Schniewind was a high official in the Reich -Ministry of Economics, and worked directly under Schacht and -with him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution have also referred to an affidavit by Tilly to -the effect that you admitted that you thought Hitler capable of -aggressive intentions. Will you make a statement about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: That affidavit of the British Major Tilly is entirely -correct. I told Major Tilly during the preliminary interrogation -that in 1938, during the events of the Fritsch affair and afterwards, -I had become convinced that Hitler at any rate would not avoid a -war at all costs and that possibly he even sought to bring about a -war. Looking back I pondered over a number of statements by -Hitler and asked myself the reason why Hitler, in the course of the -years, had reached the point where he might not avoid a war. And -I told Major Tilly that the only reason which I could think of was -that looking back I had the impression that Hitler had fallen into -the role which necessarily falls to each and every dictator who does -not want to relinquish his power in time, namely, that of having -to supply his people with some sort of victor’s glory—that that was -probably the development of Hitler’s thought.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: That is the same explanation as given by Prince -Metternich about Napoleon?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You have already remarked parenthetically that you first became -suspicious during the Fritsch affair. The witness Gisevius has described -the Fritsch affair to the Tribunal in detail. We do not wish -to repeat anything. Therefore, I am asking you only to state in -regard to the Fritsch affair anything you might have to say to -supplement or to amend Gisevius’ testimony. If that is to take a -long time—which I cannot judge—then I might suggest to the -Tribunal that we have the recess now, if the Tribunal so desires.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I have just a brief remark to make.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: A brief remark. Then answer the question briefly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if he can do it briefly, we had better -have it now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: It is just a single remark that I should like to add. -The account given by Gisevius of the development of the Fritsch -affair is, according to my knowledge and my own experience, -completely correct in every detail. I have nothing to add to that. -I can only confirm it. On the other hand, I should like to refer to a -speech of Hitler’s on 20 February 1938 in the Reichstag which -<span class='pageno' title='512' id='Page_512'></span> -contains a remark which even at that time aroused my attention. -He said—and I quote this speech from Die Dokumente der Deutschen -Politik, of which all copies were available here:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The changes in the Reich Cabinet and in the military administration -on 4 February”—that is, changes which were -made following the Fritsch and Blomberg affair—“were for -the purpose of achieving within the shortest time that intensification -of our military means of power, which the general -conditions of the present time indicate as advisable.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This remark also confirmed my opinion that the change from a -peaceful to a military policy on Hitler’s part was becoming obvious; -I did not wish to omit reference to this remark which completes the -account given by Gisevius.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: This is Exhibit Number Schacht-28 of our document -book, Page 81 of the English text, Page 74 of the German text. -There this passage is quoted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn now for 10 minutes.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Several meetings have -been discussed here during which Hitler is said to have spoken -directly or indirectly about his war intentions. Did you participate -in any such meetings?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, not in a single one.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: You disagreed, as you have stated, with Hitler and the -Party on many issues. Did you express this disagreement or did -you conform to Hitler’s instructions at all times? Can you in particular -make statements about your critical attitude, for instance, to -the Jewish question, the Church question, the Gestapo question, the -Free Mason question, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I might say in advance that Hitler never gave me -any order or any instructions which would have been in opposition -to my inner views and that I also never did anything which was -in opposition to my inner convictions. From the very beginning I -did not conceal my convictions concerning all these questions which -you have mentioned, not only when speaking to my circle of friends -and to larger Party circles, but also in addressing the public, and -even when speaking to Hitler personally. I have already stated here -that as early as the Party purge of 30 June 1934 I called Hitler’s -attention to the fact that his actions were illegal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I refer, furthermore, to a document of which unfortunately only -half has been presented by the Prosecution. It is a written report -<span class='pageno' title='513' id='Page_513'></span> -which I personally submitted to Hitler on 3 May 1935. I remember -the date very well because it happened during a trial run of the -Lloyd Steamer <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span>, at which both Hitler and I were present.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On that day I handed him two inter-related memoranda which -together formed a unit. In the one half I made it clear that I -wanted to stop the unrestrained and constant collections of money -by various Party organizations because it seemed to me that the -money ought not to be used for Party purposes, particularly Party -installations, Party buildings, and the like, but that we urgently -needed this money for State expenses which had to be paid and -which of course included the rearmament question as well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The second half of this report dealt with cultural questions. The -Defense and I have tried for months to get this second half of the -document from the Prosecution, since they had submitted the first -half of the document here as evidence. It has not been possible to -obtain that second half. I must therefore confine myself to communicating -the contents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I want to say in advance that, of course, I could only bring -forward such charges in regard to the mistaken cultural and legal -policy of the Party and of Hitler when reasons originating in my -own department gave me the excuse to submit these things to -Hitler. I stated that very serious harm was being done to my -foreign trade policy by the arbitrary and inhuman cultural and legal -policy which was being carried out by Hitler. I pointed in particular -to the hostile attitude towards the churches and the illegal -treatment of the Jews and, furthermore, to the absolute illegality -and despotism of the whole Gestapo regime. I remember in that -connection that I referred to the British Habeas Corpus Act, which -for centuries protected the rights of the individual; and I stated -word for word that I considered this Gestapo despotism to be -something which would make us despised by the whole world.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hitler read both parts of this memorandum while still on board -the <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span>. As soon as he had read it he called me and tried -to calm me down by making statements similar to those which he -had already made to me in July 1934, when he told me these were -still the transitional symptoms of a revolutionary development and -that as time went on this would be set right again and disappear.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The events of July 1934 had taught me a lesson, however, and -consequently I was not satisfied with this explanation. A few -weeks afterwards, on 18 August 1935, I used the occasion of my -visit to the Eastern Fair Königsberg to mention these very things -in the speech which I had to make there; and here I gave clear -expression to the same objections which I had made to Hitler aboard -the <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span> at the beginning of May. -<span class='pageno' title='514' id='Page_514'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I did not talk only about the Church question, the Jewish -question, and the question of despotism; I talked also about the -Free Masons; and I shall quote just a few sentences from that -speech (Exhibit Number Schacht-25), with the permission of the -Tribunal. They are very short. I am speaking about people, and I -now quote...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Just one moment. I want to tell the Tribunal that this -is the Königsberg speech, which I submitted to the Tribunal this -morning as a document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I am talking about people and I now quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“...people who under cover of darkness heroically smear -window panes, who brand as a traitor every German who -trades in a Jewish store, who declare every former Free -Mason to be a scoundrel, and who in the fight against priests -and ministers who talk politics from the pulpit, cannot -themselves distinguish between religion and misuse of the -pulpit.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>End of quotation, and then another sentence. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In accordance with the present legislation and in accordance -with the various declarations made by the Führer’s Deputy, -the Reich Minister of the Interior, and the Reich Minister for -Public Enlightenment and Propaganda (not to mention the -Ministry of Economics), Jewish businesses are permitted to -carry on their business activities as heretofore.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>End of quotation, and then, in the last sentences, I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“No one in Germany is without rights. According to Point 4 -of the National Socialist Party program the Jew can be -neither a citizen nor a fellow German. But Point 5 of the -Party program provides legislation for him too; that means, -he must not be subjected to arbitrary action but to the law.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I assumed the same attitude on every other further occasion -that offered itself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: One moment, Dr. Schacht; did the regime tolerate this -speech?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: It is a good thing that you remind me of that; because -in the course of the Gisevius testimony the same question was -discussed with reference to the Marburg speech of Herr Von Papen. -Since up to then my speeches were not subject to censorship—of -course I would not have allowed that—this speech was broadcast -by mistake, so to speak, over the Deutschlandsender. In that way -the speech was brought to the notice of Propaganda Minister -Goebbels, and at once he issued an order prohibiting the publication -of the speech in the newspapers. As a result, although the speech -<span class='pageno' title='515' id='Page_515'></span> -was broadcast by the Deutschlandsender it did not appear in any -newspaper. But as, fortunately, the Reichsbank had its own printing -press which was of course not subject to censorship, I had the -speech printed in the Reichsbank printing press; and 250,000 copies -of it were distributed to the 400 branches of the Reichsbank throughout -the country, and in that manner it became known to the entire -population.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: You were going to continue, were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I wanted to go on and say that on every future -opportunity which I could find I always returned to these points. -I should like to touch upon only two more things in this connection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This morning I referred to these things in connection with the -letter written by me on 24 December 1935 to the Reich Minister of -War, which is Document Number EC-293. I should merely like to -add and point out the words, which I shall now quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The economic and legal policy for the treatment of the Jews, -the anti-Church activities of certain Party organizations, and -the legal despotism associated with the Gestapo are detrimental -to our armament program...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The same attitude can also be seen from the minutes of the so-called -“small Ministerial Council” for 12 May 1936, which have been -submitted in evidence by the Prosecution. It says in these minutes, -and I quote: “Dr. Schacht emphasized openly again and again that -a cultural and legal policy must be pursued which does not interfere -with economy.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I want to remark in this connection that, of course, as Minister -of Economics I always linked my arguments with the work of the -departments under the Minister of Economics. And, as a last -example, one of many others which I cannot mention today, there -is the speech on the occasion of a celebration for the apprentices at -the Berlin Chamber of Artisans on 11 May 1937 which is Exhibit -Number Schacht-30. On that occasion I said the following, and I -quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“No community and, above all, no state can flourish which is -not based on legality, order, and discipline.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>And a second sentence, I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“For that reason you must not only respect the right and the -law, but you must also act against injustice and unlawful -actions everywhere, wherever you find them.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And because I made known my attitude not only to a close -circle but also to a wider public by using every opportunity to -voice my views frankly—because of this, a few weeks ago in this -court, the Chief of the RSHA, Department III, Security Service, the -<span class='pageno' title='516' id='Page_516'></span> -witness Ohlendorf, in reply to a question, described me as an enemy -of the Party, at least since the year 1937-1938. I believe that the -Chief of the Security Service, the inland department, should know -since he had the task of combating political opponents inside -Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: May I point out that the statements made during the -meeting of the small Ministerial Council on 12 May 1936 are contained -in my document book, Exhibit Schacht-20, Page 57 of the -English text, Page 51 of the German text and Schacht’s speech to the -Chamber of Industry and Commerce on 12 May 1937...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: [<span class='it'>Interrupting.</span>] You mean Chamber of Artisans.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I shall refer to that later when I have the proper document; -and I now continue.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have talked about your participation at the Party rallies, -and I should merely like to ask you in addition: Did you participate -in any other Party functions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not remember that I ever participated in any -other functions of the Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The Indictment charges you, in substance, with using -your personal influence and your close connections with the Führer -for the aims as set forth. Did you, as far as you know and can judge -from your experience, have any influence on the Führer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Unfortunately, I never had any influence on the -Führer’s actions and decisions. I had influence only insofar as he -did not dare to interfere with me in my special financial and economic -policies. But this lack of influence of all members of Hitler’s -entourage has already been mentioned by various witnesses and so -much has been said about it that I think I need not take up the -Tribunal’s time with any further statements on that subject.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: What you have just said applies in the main to the -question of the influence of the Reich Cabinet, the last meetings of -the Reich Cabinet, and so forth. Various witnesses have made statements -on that subject. Have you anything new to add?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I can merely add that on the whole the Reich Cabinet -did not have the slightest influence on Hitler, and that from -November 1937 on—this has been stated repeatedly—there were no -more meetings or consultations of the Cabinet. The Reich Cabinet -was an uncorrelated group of politically powerless departmental -ministers without the proper professional qualifications.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I should like to add that the number of the speech to -the Chamber of Artisans is Exhibit Number 30, Page 89 of the -English text and Page 82 of the German text. -<span class='pageno' title='517' id='Page_517'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] What was the situation regarding -rearmament? Whose will was decisive and authoritative as regards -the extent of rearmament?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I am without any basis for judgment as far as that -is concerned. But I have no doubt that Hitler’s will, here too, was -the sole decisive and authoritative factor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: That is to say, you had no influence other than that of -the credit-giver?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Within my Ministry, insofar as I administered this -Ministry, I did nothing for which I would not assume responsibility -myself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you speak to prominent foreigners about your lack -of influence on Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: In this connection I recall a conversation with Ambassador -Bullitt in November 1937. This conversation with Ambassador -Bullitt has already been mentioned in some other connection, -and Ambassador Bullitt’s memorandum has been presented in -evidence to the Tribunal by the Prosecution. I merely refer to the -sentence which refers to me, and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“He”—that is to say Schacht—“prefaced his remarks by -saying that he himself today was ‘completely without -influence on that man’ ”—meaning Hitler. “He seemed to -regard himself as politically dead and to have small respect -for ‘that man.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That was said in November 1937. But if I am permitted to add -to this, I want to point out that my foreign friends were kept constantly -informed about my position and my entire activity as -regards the directing of public affairs in Germany, as I have already -mentioned once before. This will be seen on later occasions when -various instances are mentioned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: This morning I submitted Exhibit Number Schacht-22, -Page 64 of the English text.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] And now a few special questions -regarding your position as Minister of Economics. You have already -made statements regarding the obtaining of foreign raw materials, -that is, you have quoted appropriate passages. Could these not be -substituted by home products in your opinion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: A portion of such raw materials could certainly be -replaced by home products. We had learned in the meantime how -to produce a large number of new materials which we did not know -about before...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Please be brief. -<span class='pageno' title='518' id='Page_518'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: ...to produce them synthetically. But a considerable -part could not be replaced in that way and could be obtained only -through foreign trade.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And what was your attitude towards the question of -self-sufficiency?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: As far as self-sufficiency was concerned I believe -that, if at a reasonable cost, without undue expenditure, which -would have meant a waste of German public funds and German -manpower, certain synthetic materials could be produced in Germany, -then one should do so, but that apart from this the maintenance -of foreign trade was an absolute necessity for economic -reasons, and that it was even more necessary for reasons of international -cultural relations so that nations might live together. I -always regarded the isolation of nations as a great misfortune, just -as I have always regarded commerce as the best means of bringing -about international understanding.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Who was the exponent in the Reich Cabinet of the -self-sufficiency principle?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: As far as I know, the whole idea of self-sufficiency, -which was then formulated in the Four Year Plan, originated with -Hitler alone; after Göring was commissioned with the direction of -the Four Year Plan, then Göring too, of course, represented that -line of thought.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you express your contradictory views to Göring -and Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I think it is clear from the record that I did so at -every opportunity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: One incidental question: You will remember that -Göring exclaimed, “I should like to know where the ‘No men’ are.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I want to ask you now, do you claim this honorary title of “No -man” for yourself? I remind you particularly of your letter of -November 1942.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: On every occasion when I was no longer in a position -to do what my inner conviction demanded, I said, “No.” I was not -content to be silent in the face of the many misdeeds committed by -the Party. In every case I expressed my disapproval of these things, -personally, officially, and publicly. I said “No” to all those things. -I blocked credits. I opposed an excessive rearmament. I talked -against the war and I took steps to prevent the war. I do not know -to whom else this honorary title of “No man” might apply if -not to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you not swear an oath of allegiance to Hitler? -<span class='pageno' title='519' id='Page_519'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I did not swear an oath of allegiance to a certain -Herr Hitler. I swore allegiance to Adolf Hitler as the head of the -State of the German people, just as I did not swear allegiance to the -Kaiser or to President Ebert or to President Hindenburg, except in -their capacity as head of the State; in the same way I did not swear -an oath to Adolf Hitler. The oath of allegiance which I did swear -to the head of the German State does not apply to the person of the -head of the State; it applies to what he represents, the German -nation. Perhaps I might add something in this connection. I would -never keep an oath of allegiance to a perjurer and Hitler has turned -out to be a hundredfold perjurer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Göring has made extremely detailed explanations -regarding the Four Year Plan, its origin, its preparation, technical -opposition by you, and the consequences you took because of this -opposition. Therefore we can be brief and deal only with new -material, if you have something new to say. Have you anything to -add to Göring’s statements or do you disagree on points which you -remember or about views held?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I gather from Göring’s statements that he has described -conditions perfectly correctly and I myself have nothing at -all to add unless you have something special in mind.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: According to your impressions and the experience you -had, when did Hitler realize that you were an obstacle in the way -of a speedy and extensive rearmament? Did he acknowledge your -economic arguments? Was he satisfied with your policy or not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: At that time, in 1936, when the Four Year Plan was -introduced in September I could not tell what Hitler’s inner attitude -to me was in regard to these questions of economic policy. I might -say that it was clear that after my speech at Königsberg in August -1935 he mistrusted me. But his attitude to my activities in the field -of economic policy was something which I was not yet sure of in -1936. The fact that I had not in any way participated in the preparation -of the Four Year Plan but heard about it quite by surprise -during the Party Rally and that, quite unexpectedly, Hermann -Göring and not the Minister of Economics was appointed head of -the Four Year Plan, as I heard for the first time at the Party Rally -in September 1936—these facts naturally made it clear to me that -Hitler, as far as economic policy with reference to the entire rearmament -program was concerned, did not have that degree of confidence -in me which he thought necessary. Subsequently, here in -this prison, my fellow Defendant Speer showed me a memorandum -which he received from Hitler on the occasion of his taking over the -post of Minister and which, curiously enough, deals in great detail -with the Four Year Plan and my activities, and is dated August 1936. -<span class='pageno' title='520' id='Page_520'></span> -In August 1936 Hitler himself dictated this memorandum which has -been shown to me in prison by my fellow Defendant Speer, and I -assume that if I read a number of brief quotations from it with the -permission of...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I just want to give an explanation to the Tribunal. We -received the original of this memorandum about three weeks ago -from the Camp Commander of the Camp Dustbin through the kind -mediation of the Prosecution. We then handed it in for translation -so that we might submit it now. But the translation has not yet -been completed. I shall submit the entire memorandum under a -new exhibit number when I receive it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has any application been made in respect -to it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: No application has been made as yet. I wanted...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Which memorandum? Who drew it up?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: It is a Hitler memorandum of the year 1936, of which -there exist three copies; and one of them was in the Camp Dustbin. -This copy arrived here a fortnight or three weeks ago after we had -discussed our document books with the Prosecution. I intended to -submit the translation of the Hitler memorandum today and at the -same time to ask that this be admitted in evidence, but unfortunately -I am not in a position to do so because the translation is not -yet ready. My colleague, Professor Kraus, was in fact told that it -has been mislaid.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, let the defendant go on, and you -can submit the document in evidence and a translation afterwards.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Very well. The defendant has a copy and he will -quote the most important, very brief passages.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I shall quote very brief passages. Hitler says in this -memorandum, among other things, and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is, above all, not the task of State economic institutions -to rack their brains about methods of production. This does -not concern the Ministry of Economics at all.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The Ministry of Economics was under me, and this is therefore -a reproach for me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A further quotation:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is furthermore essential that German iron production be -increased to the utmost. The objection that we are not in a -position to produce the same cheap raw iron from German -ore, which has only 26 percent of iron content, as from the -45 percent Swedish ores, is unimportant... The objection that -in this case all the German smelting works would have to be -<span class='pageno' title='521' id='Page_521'></span> -reconstructed is also irrelevant; and, in any case, this is none -of the business of the Ministry of Economics.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>As is apparent from the statement, I had explained that from -26 percent ore one could produce steel only at costs twice or three -times those at which one could produce steel from 45 percent ore. -And I explained further that, in order to use 26 percent ore, one -would have to have completely different plants from those using -45 percent ore. Herr Hitler states that this is none of the business -of the Ministry of Economics, and that, of course, means Herr -Schacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There is one last, very brief quotation. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I want to emphasize in this connection that in these tasks -I see the only possible economic mobilization and not in the -curbing of the armament industry...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That statement, too, is directed, of course, against my policy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: We have now reached the stage of tension of technical -differences between you and Göring, the tension between you and -Hitler regarding your functions as Minister of Economics. What -were your thoughts at the time about resigning from your office -as Minister of Economics? Was it possible for you to resign? Please -do not repeat anything that Lammers and other witnesses have -already told us about the impossibility of resigning. Please talk -only about your own special case and what you yourself did.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: First of all, I tried to continue my own economic -policy, in spite of the fact that Göring as head of the Four Year -Plan tried, of course, as time went on to take over as many of the -tasks concerned with economic policy as possible. But the very -moment Göring encroached on my rights as Minister of Economics -I used it as an opportunity to force my release from the Ministry -of Economics. That was at the beginning of August 1937.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At the time I told Hitler very briefly the reason, namely, that -if I was to assume responsibility for economic policy, then I would -also have to be in command. But if I was not in command, then -I did not wish to assume responsibility. The fight for my resignation, -fought by me at times with very drastic measures, lasted -approximately two and a half months until eventually Hitler had -to decide to grant me the desired release in order to prevent the -conflict from becoming known to the public more than it already -was.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: When you say “drastic measures” do you mean your -so-called sit-down strike?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this connection I want to submit to the Tribunal Exhibit -Number Schacht-40 of my document book, an affidavit from another -<span class='pageno' title='522' id='Page_522'></span> -former colleague of Dr. Schacht in the Reich Ministry of Economics, -Kammerdirektor Dr. Asmus. On Page 180 of the English version -of this long affidavit there is a brief passage. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“When this was found to be unsuccessful”—it means his -fight—“and when developments continued along the course -which he considered wrong, he”—Schacht—“in the autumn -of 1937, long before the beginning of the war, acted as an -upright man and applied for release from his office as Reich -Minister of Economics and thereby from his co-responsibility.</p> - -<p>“He was obviously not able to resign his office in the normal -way, because for reasons of prestige the Party required the -use of his name. Therefore, in the autumn of 1937, he -simply remained away from the Ministry of Economics for -several weeks. He started this sit-down strike, as it was -humorously called in the Ministry, and went in his official -capacity only to the Reichsbank...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, is it necessary to trouble the Tribunal -with all this detail? There is no dispute that he did resign, -and the only thing that he has got to explain is why he continued -to be a Minister. The Prosecution have given evidence about his -resignation and about the conflict between him and the Defendant -Göring. What is the good of going into all the detail of it, as -to this sit-down strike and that sort of thing? That doesn’t interest -the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: He did not remain a Minister at that time. He resigned -as Minister.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I thought he had remained a Minister until -1943.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Minister without Portfolio, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I didn’t say Minister with Portfolio, I said -Minister.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes, but there is a difference, but I shall come to that -later. I understood you to mean an active Minister, but I shall not -go into that now. It was a misunderstanding. Anyway, I have -already finished that. I was merely trying to show how difficult -it was to resign.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] We now come to the manner in -which you were released. Have you anything to add to the statements -made by Lammers in this connection or not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I think we should inform the Tribunal of one matter -about which I also learned here in prison from my fellow Defendant -Speer. He overheard the argument between Hitler and -<span class='pageno' title='523' id='Page_523'></span> -myself on the occasion of that decisive conference in which I -managed to push through my resignation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If the Tribunal allow, I shall read it very briefly. There are -two or three sentences. Herr Speer informed me of the following: -“I was on the terrace of Berghof on the Obersalzberg, and I was -waiting to submit my building plans. In the summer of 1937 when -Schacht came to the Berghof...”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: [<span class='it'>Interposing.</span>] Speer is present in the -room. For one defendant to testify as to a conversation with -another defendant is a very convenient way of getting testimony -without access to cross-examination, but it seems to me that it is -a highly objectionable method. I object to this on the ground that -it has no probative value to testify to a conversation of this -character when the Defendant Speer is in the courtroom and can be -sworn and can give his testimony. He sits here and is available.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What is the subject of the conversation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The subject of this conversation is a matter which -concerns the Defendant Schacht. It is a statement of Hitler regarding -Schacht; it is not a matter which concerns the Defendant Speer. -Therefore I consider it expedient for him, since it is a matter which -concerns Schacht, to be able to make a statement about it. I would, -of course, consider it more appropriate that he should not read -something which Speer has written to him, but that he should -give his own account of what happened between Hitler and Schacht -and merely say, “I heard that from Speer.” That appears to be -better than...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Dix, you may give that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Will you please not read, -then, but tell of this incident and say you got it from Speer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is even more objectionable to -me than to have a written statement from Speer. If we are to -have Speer’s testimony, it at least should be Speer’s and not a -repetition of a conversation between the two defendants. If Speer -has made a written statement, it can be submitted to us in the -ordinary course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This is the second document that we have not had the privilege -of seeing before it has been used here; and it seems to me that if -this is a document signed by Speer—which I don’t understand it to -be—if it is, that is one thing. We can then see it and perhaps it -can be used. If it is a conversation, I should prefer Speer’s version.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: May I add something? The question of procedure is -not of basic importance for me here. In that case it can be discussed -when Speer is examined. However, I do not know whether -<span class='pageno' title='524' id='Page_524'></span> -Speer is going to be called; probably he will be. Actually it would -be better for us to hear it now, but I leave it to the Tribunal to -decide. It is not a question of great importance to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will allow the evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Well then, without reading, -please describe the incident.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: The gentlemen on the terrace, among them Speer, -heard this discussion, which was conducted in very loud tones. -At the end of the discussion Hitler came out on the terrace and...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. [<span class='it'>There was a brief pause in -the proceedings.</span>] Very well, Dr. Dix, go on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Hitler came out on the terrace after this conference -and said to those present, among them Speer, that he had had a -very serious argument with Schacht, that he could not work with -Schacht, and that Schacht was upsetting his financial plans.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Well then, after you had left your position as Minister -of Economics you were still left authority as Reichsbank President. -Were you approached by Hitler or the Minister of Finance in your -capacity as President of the Reichsbank and asked for credit?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: After the Reichsbank had discontinued giving -credits, on 31 March 1938, the Reich Minister of Finance of course -received more urgent demands for money and toward the end of -that year he found himself in the awkward situation of not being -able to pay even the salaries of the civil servants from the treasury. -He came to me and asked me to grant him a special credit. According -to its charter and laws the Reichsbank was entitled and to -a certain extent obliged, but actually only entitled, to advance to -the Reich up to 400 million marks per annum. The Reich Minister -of Finance had received these 400 million marks and he was asking, -over and above that, for further credits; the Reichsbank refused -to give him these credits. The Reich Minister of Finance had to go -to the private banks and all the large banks together gave him a -credit of a few hundred million marks. However, the Reichsbank -did not participate in this credit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: If you as President of the Reichsbank turned down -those credits, then it seems there was nothing for it but to print -more notes. Did Hitler or anyone else suggest to you that the note -printing presses should be set in motion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: After the events of November 1938 I paid one more -visit to London, in December, to attend a conference regarding the -financing of the Jewish emigration from Germany in an orderly -manner—a thing which I myself had suggested. On that occasion -<span class='pageno' title='525' id='Page_525'></span> -I also talked with Prime Minister Chamberlain. On 2 January -1939 I arrived at the Berghof in Berchtesgaden to report to Hitler -about these matters. On that occasion we, of course, also got to -talk about the financial needs of the Reich. I still refused to give -credit to the Reich, and pointed out the very difficult financial -situation which called for, or should have called for, a reduction -of State expenditure and thus of armament expenditure.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In particular, I pointed out that at the beginning of December -the first instalment of the so-called Jewish fine—which had been -imposed on the Jews after the murder of Herr Vorn Rath in Paris -and which had been collected to the extent of 250 million marks -at the beginning of December—that this first instalment of 250 million -marks had not been received entirely in the form of cash, but -that the Reich Minister of Finance had had to agree to accept a -considerable part of it “in kind,” as the English say, because it was -not possible to make liquid the cash necessary for this payment. -Hitler replied: “But we can circulate notes on the basis of these -goods. I have looked into the question of our future financial policy -very carefully and when I get back to Berlin in a few days I shall -discuss my plans with you and the Minister of Finance.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I saw at once that it was Hitler’s intention to resort to the -printing of notes to meet this expenditure with or without the -necessary cover, but at any rate against certain securities. The -danger of inflation was now definitely imminent. And since I -realized at once that this was the point where I and the Reichsbank -had to say “stop,” I replied to him, “Very well, in that case I will -get the Reichsbank to submit a memorandum to you, setting out -the attitude of the Reichsbank to this problem and which can be -used at the joint meeting with the Finance Minister.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After that I went back to Berlin and informed my colleagues -in the Reichsbank Directorate. We saw, to our personal satisfaction, -that here was an opportunity for us to divorce ourselves definitely -from that type of policy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The memorandum dated 7 January which the Reichsbank Directorate -then submitted to Hitler has, I think, also been submitted as -evidence by the Prosecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In order to explain the statements which the Reichsbank Directorate -made to Hitler in this decisive moment regarding further -State expenditure and especially armament expenditure, I ask -permission to read only two very brief sentences from this memorandum. -It says, and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Unrestrained public expenditure constitutes a definite threat -to our currency. The unlimited growth of government expenditure -defies any attempts to draw up a regulated budget. -<span class='pageno' title='526' id='Page_526'></span> -It brings State finances to the verge of ruin despite a -tremendous increase in taxes, and it undermines the -currency and the issuing bank.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>Then there is another sentence, and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“...if during the two great foreign political actions in -Austria and the Sudetenland an increase in public expenditure -was necessary, the fact that after the termination of these -two foreign political actions a reduction of expenditure is -not noticeable and that everything seems rather to indicate -that a further increase of expenditure is planned, makes it -now our absolute duty to point out what the consequences -will be for our currency.</p> - -<p>“The undersigned Directors of the Reichsbank are sufficiently -conscious of the fact that in their co-operation they have -gladly devoted all their energy to the great aims that have -been set, but that a halt must now be called.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: This memorandum has already been submitted by -the Prosecution under the Document Number EC-369, but it is -being submitted again as Exhibit Schacht-24 in our document book, -Page 70 of the English text, and Page 63 of the German text.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I shall have to put various questions to Dr. Schacht on that -memorandum, but I think that perhaps there is not time now and -that I should do so tomorrow.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you must, Dr. Dix; but do you think that -is very important? At any rate, you had better do it tomorrow, -if you are going to do it at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Sir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, can you inform us whether -those extracts are the same as the extracts which were refused in -the case of the Defendant Ribbentrop?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I have made a comparison, and I can hand it to -the Tribunal in writing. Some documents are the same, some do -not tally, and some are missing. I have done that in writing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal will adjourn.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 2 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='527' id='Page_527'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH DAY</span><br/> Thursday, 2 May 1946</h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal would like to -know exactly what your letter means, which they received from -you, relating to the following documents which the letter says have -been withdrawn. What I want to know is, does it mean that they -are not to be translated? Let me read you the numbers: 18, 19, 48, -53, 76, 80, 81, 82, 86, and 101. Now, does your letter mean that -those documents are not to be translated?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No, Your Lordship; that means that the British -Delegation informed me yesterday morning that the objections -against those documents on the part of the British Delegation are -withdrawn.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I see.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I had written the letter on 30 April, in the afternoon, -after I had had a conversation with Sir David. The following -morning I was informed...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We won’t bother with that. You say that -their objections no longer exist. If they agree to that, well -and good.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, apparently there -seems to have been some misunderstanding about three of them, -Numbers 80, 101, and 76. The others were not objected to.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, on 76 there seemed -to be some misunderstanding between Dr. Siemers and myself. -I understood that he did not want to persist in the legal report -on the <span class='it'>Altmark</span> incident, and I think Dr. Siemers thought that I -wasn’t persisting. However, I thought Dr. Siemers was withdrawing -that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, then, are you still objecting -to that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am still objecting to it if it is -not withdrawn, My Lord. However, the other ones in the list Your -Lordship mentioned—that is Numbers 18, 19, 48, 53, 81, 82, and -86—there is no objection to. -<span class='pageno' title='528' id='Page_528'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Concerning Document 76, I agree with Sir David. -Number 76 can be struck out, as far as I am concerned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well. That’s all I wanted to know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Number 80 about which I have spoken in detail -with the British Delegation...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You need not tell me about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I assumed there would be no objection. I would -like to ask that it be admitted in any case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is right. In order that the Translation -Division should get on as soon as possible, the Tribunal has -decided upon these documents and the only questions upon which -the Tribunal has decided is that they shall be translated. The -question of their admissibility will be decided after they have -been translated, and I will take them in the categories of objection -which are set out in Sir David’s memorandum.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Category A, the first category, Number 66 will be allowed. -Number 76 as Dr. Siemers has now said, goes out. Numbers 101 to -106 will be allowed, the rest are disallowed in A. In B the following -documents will be allowed: Numbers 39, 63, 64, 99, and 100. -And, of course, Numbers 102 to 107, which are allowed under A. -The rest will not be allowed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Category C: The following will be allowed: Numbers 38, 50, -55, and 58. The remainder are not allowed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Category D: The following will be allowed: Numbers 29, 56, 57, -60, and 62.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Category E: The following will be allowed: Numbers 31, 32, 36, -37, 39, 41, and of course 99 and 101 which have already been -allowed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the last category, Category F, the Tribunal has very great -doubts as to the relevance of any of the documents in that category, -but it will have them all translated with the exception of Document -73.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: My Lord, I wonder whether the -Tribunal would allow me to mention the document numbers of the -additional extracts from <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> which were put in cross-examination -of Streicher. I had the numbers ready to present at a -convenient time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The exhibit numbers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean read them? -<span class='pageno' title='529' id='Page_529'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: With the permission of the Tribunal, -I have proposed to hand in that schedule, which is in effect -a catalogue or index to the two bundles which the Tribunal had—Bundle -A and Bundle B—and I proposed then putting this schedule -in as an exhibit itself, which will become GB-450, (Document Number -D-833), and if the Tribunal agrees, that would save reading -any numbers out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There is another request I would -make. The original of the newspaper, <span class='it'>Israelitisches Wochenblatt</span>, -was put in, or has been put in. Those volumes I have borrowed -from a library, and I was going to ask the Tribunal’s permission -to have the extracts photographed and to substitute with the -Tribunal’s Secretariat the photostats, and then take back the -originals so that they might be returned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: There seems no objection to that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You have no objection to that, Dr. Marx?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: No, Mr. President, I have no objection to that. I -reserve the right to submit some counter documents if it should be -necessary. But the presentation of these documents is in accordance -with what Colonel Griffith-Jones stated in the course of the proceedings—if -they are submitted...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You have a copy of this document here, this -exhibit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am asking you whether you had any objection -to the original of the Jewish newspaper being returned...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: ...after it is photographed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: No, I have no objection to that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Dix?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, I believe you still had to supplement your -answer to a question I put to you yesterday. I put to you the point -that different memoranda, letters, <span class='it'>et cetera</span> from you to Hitler were -full of National Socialist phraseology. I said you dealt with letters -and memoranda from the date of the seizure of power until later -when you went into opposition. The Prosecution, however, specifically -in the oral presentation of the charges, as I remember it, -<span class='pageno' title='530' id='Page_530'></span> -referred to at least one letter which you addressed to Hitler before -the seizure of power in November 1932, and there is in the files -another letter of similar contents of August 1932. I think you should -state your position with respect to these two letters, supplementing -your answer to my question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SCHACHT: I explained to you yesterday already that up -to the decisive election of July 1932, I had in no way intervened -in the development of the National Socialist movement, but -remained completely aloof from it. After that movement achieved -its overpowering success in July 1932, of which I spoke yesterday, -I foresaw very clearly the development which would now result. -According to the principles of the democratic political concept -there was only one possibility, namely, that the leader of that -overwhelmingly large party would now have to form a new government. -I rejected from the first the other theoretical possibility -of a military government and a possibly resulting civil war, as -being impossible and incompatible with my principles.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Therefore, after I had recognized these facts I endeavored in -everything to gain influence over Hitler and his movement, and the -two letters which you have just mentioned were written in -that spirit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: What did you know about Hitler’s plans against Austria?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I never knew anything about plans against Austria. -Nor did I know in detail the plans Hitler had for Austria. I only -knew—like the majority of all Germans—that he was in favor of -an Anschluss of Austria with Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: What did you know about his plans against Czechoslovakia?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I knew nothing of his plans against Czechoslovakia -until about the time of the Munich Conference.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you, after the Munich Conference, that is to say, -after the peaceful, so far peaceful settlement of the Sudeten -question, hear a remark of Hitler’s about Munich which was of -importance in your later personal attitude toward Hitler? Will -you tell the Tribunal the remark which you heard?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: May I say first that, according to my knowledge -of conditions at that time, Hitler was conceded in Munich more -than he had ever expected. According to my information—and I -expressed this also in the conversation with Ambassador Bullitt -at that time—it was Hitler’s purpose to gain autonomy for the -Germans in Czechoslovakia. In Munich the Allies presented him -with the transfer of the Sudeten-German territories on a silver -<span class='pageno' title='531' id='Page_531'></span> -platter. I assumed, of course, that now Hitler’s ambition would be -more than satisfied and I can only say that I was surprised and -shocked when a few days after Munich I saw Hitler. I had no -further conversation with him at that time, but I met him with -his entourage, mostly SS men, and from the conversation between -him and the SS men I could only catch the remark: “That fellow -has spoiled my entry into Prague.” That is to say made it -impossible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Apparently he was not satisfied with the great success which -he had achieved in foreign politics, but I mentioned when I spoke -about it yesterday the fact that I assumed from that remark that -he lacked the glory and a glamorous staging.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And what were your feelings in regard to your whole -political attitude towards Hitler after Munich?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: In spite of the foreign political success I regretted -very deeply, and so did my close friends, that by this intervention -on the part of the Allied Powers, our attempt to remove the Hitler -regime was ruined for a long time to come—we did not know at -that time of course what would happen in the future—but, naturally, -at that moment we had to resign ourselves to it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: What did you know about Hitler’s plans against Memel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I knew nothing at all and never heard anything -about it. As far as I know, I learned of the annexation of Memel -by Germany on my trip to India, which I had already started at -that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And since you were in India at that time, you, of -course, heard nothing either about the negotiations, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, which -preceded the attack on Poland?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I had no knowledge about that and therefore I also -knew nothing of the May meeting of 1939 which has been discussed -several times. In the beginning of March I left Berlin and -then stayed for some time in Switzerland; at the end of March I -set out for India via Genoa, and so I learned nothing at all about -the Hacha affair, that is the establishment of the protectorate in -Czechoslovakia, nor of Memel, nor of Poland, since I did not return -from the trip to India until the beginning of August.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The invasions of Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark -have been taken up here. Did you approve of these measures -and actions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Under no circumstances.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Were you ever able to express that disapproval anywhere -and how? -<span class='pageno' title='532' id='Page_532'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Before the invasion of Belgium I was visited on -the order of the Chief of the General Staff, Halder, by the Quartermaster -General, the then Colonel, later General Wagner who after -the collapse committed suicide. He informed me of the intended -invasion of Belgium. I was shocked and I replied at that time, -“If you want to commit that insanity too, then you are beyond help.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Before the march into Belgium. Exactly when it -was I could not say. It may have been already in November 1939. -It may have been in April 1940. I no longer know exactly when -it was.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Even though you did not approve of that action, -Germany was after all engaged in a life and death struggle. Did -not that cause you to put your active co-operation at her disposal, -since you were still Minister without Portfolio, though you no -longer held a special office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I did not do that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did anyone ask you to do that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: The visit, which I have just mentioned, of Quartermaster -General Wagner, upon order of the Chief of General Staff -Halder, was intended to persuade me to act in Germany’s interest -during the expected occupation of Belgium. I was to supervise and -direct currency, finance, and banking matters in Belgium. I flatly -refused that. Later I was approached again by the then Military -Governor of Belgium, General Von Falkenhausen, for advice concerning -the Belgian financial administration. I again refused to give -advice and did not make any statements or participate in any way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: When did you for the first time...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I could perhaps relate another instance when I was -approached. One day, shortly after America was drawn into -the war, I received a request from the newspaper published by -Goebbels, that, on account of my knowledge of American conditions, -I should write an article for <span class='it'>Das Reich</span>, to assure the German people -that the war potential of the United States should not be overestimated. -I refused to write that article for the reason that precisely -because I knew American conditions very well, my statement could -only amount to the exact opposite. And so I refused in this instance -also.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: When did you hear for the first time of the meeting -which we call here simply the Hossbach meeting, or the meeting -concerning the Hossbach protocol?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: To my great surprise, I was informed of that meeting -on 20 October 1945, here in my cell, and I was extremely -<span class='pageno' title='533' id='Page_533'></span> -astonished that during all previous interrogations I had never been -asked about this record, because it can be seen clearly from it that -the Reich Government was not to be informed of Hitler’s intentions -for war and therefore could not know anything about them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you take part in similar conferences which were -preparatory to attacks, for instance the meeting of November 1940 -in which the attack on Russia was discussed? I do not wish to be -misunderstood—the Speer document which you spoke of yesterday -discusses an attack which according to Hitler was threatened by -Russia. I am speaking now of discussions in which the subject was -an attack on Russia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: The fear of an attack from Russia dates back to -the fall of 1936 and therefore has as yet nothing to do with the -war. I never took part in any conference which indicated intentions -of war, consequently not in the conference on the intended -attack on Russia, and I never heard anything about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Does that also apply to the meeting of May 1941?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: At the moment, I do not know which meeting that -is, but I did not in any way take part in any meeting in May 1941, -as during the entire period when I was Minister without Portfolio, -I never took part in any official conference.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Then you also did not get any information about the -conferences which the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka had -in Berlin?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I did not have the slightest knowledge of the -Matsuoka conference except what may perhaps have been said on -the radio or in the press.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Mention has been made in some way that you at one -time had made available 200,000 marks for Nazi propaganda purposes -in Austria. Is there any truth in this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I have not the slightest knowledge of that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now we come to your dismissal as President of the -Reichsbank. As you have heard, the Prosecution asserts that you -finally brought about your own dismissal in order to evade the -financial responsibility. I ask you to reply to that accusation and -to tell the Tribunal briefly but exhaustively the reasons and the -tactical deliberations leading to your dismissal and that of your -assistants. They appear here in the memorandum of the Reichsbank -Directorate which has been under consideration several times.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I should like to divide the question into two parts: -The first question is whether I tried to rid myself of my office as -President of the Reichsbank. My answer to that question is a most -emphatic “yes.” Since the middle of 1938, we in the Reichsbank -<span class='pageno' title='534' id='Page_534'></span> -always considered that if there were no change in policy, we in -no event wanted to continue in office, because—and that brings -me to the second part of the question—we did not want to assume -the responsibility which we were then expected to bear.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For everything which we did previously and for a defensive -rearmament in order to achieve equal rights for Germany in international -politics, we gladly assumed responsibility, and we assume -it before history and this Tribunal. But the responsibility for continuing -rearmament which possibly in itself constituted a serious -potential danger of war or which would ever aim at war intentionally—that -responsibility none of us wanted to assume. Consequently, -when it became clear that Hitler was working toward a -further increase in rearmament—and I spoke about that yesterday -in connection with the conversation of 2 January 1939—when we -became aware of that we wrote the memorandum which was openly -quoted and is in the hands of this Tribunal as an exhibit. It indicates -clearly that we opposed every further increase of state expenditure -and would not assume responsibility for it. From that, Hitler -gathered that he would in no event be able to use the Reichsbank -with its present Directorate and President for any future financial -purposes. Therefore, there remained only one alternative; to change -the Directorate, because without the Reichsbank he could not go on. -And he had to take a second step; he had to change the Reichsbank -Law. That is to say, an end had to be put to the independence of -the Reichsbank from government decrees. At first he did that in a -secret law—we had such things—of 19 or 20 January 1939. That law -was published only about 6 months later. That law abolished the -independence of the Reichsbank and the President of the Reichsbank -became a mere cashier for the credit demands of the Reich, that is -to say, of Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Reichsbank Directorate did not want to continue along this -line of development. Therefore, on 20 January the President of the -Reichsbank, the Vice President, and the main financial expert, Reichsbank -Director Huelse, were dismissed; three other members of the -Directorate of the Reichsbank, Geheimrat Vocke, Director Erhard, -and Director Blessing pressed insistently for their resignation from -the Reichsbank until it was also granted. Two other members of -the Reichsbank Directorate, Director Puhl, whose name has been -mentioned here already, and an eighth director, Director Poetschmann, -remained in the Directorate even under the new conditions. -They were both Party members, the only ones in the Directorate, -and therefore they could not easily withdraw.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: That is one accusation which is made by the Prosecution -concerning your reasons for writing the memorandum, that -<span class='pageno' title='535' id='Page_535'></span> -is to say, to evade the financial responsibility. The second accusation -is that not a word of this memorandum expressly mentions -limitation of armaments, but that it essentially treats only matters -of currency, technical questions of finance, and economic considerations; -and that it was therefore the Dr. Schacht who in his capacity -of Bank Director was concerned about the currency, rather than the -opponent of rearmament, who made himself heard by this memorandum.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is necessary that as co-author of the memorandum—as its -main author—you state your position with regard to this incriminating -interpretation of the memorandum.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Even at an earlier time I said here that every objection -which I made and had to make to Hitler—and that applies not -only to myself but to all ministers—could only be made with arguments -arising out of the particular department administered.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Had I said to Hitler, “I shall not give you any more money -because you intend to wage war,” I should not have the pleasure -of conducting this animated conversation here with you. I could -then have consulted a priest, and it would have been a very one-sided -affair because I would have lain silently in my tomb, and the -priest would have delivered a monologue.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: This memorandum is certainly very important, and -therefore we have to pause here for a moment. In summarizing—and -please check me—I believe I can express your views in this -way: This memorandum at the end contained demands such as -further means of raising funds by increase of taxation or else by -making use of the stock market—both impossible. Taxation could -not be increased any more. The stock market had just unsuccessfully -attempted a loan.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If these actually impossible demands had been granted, the -Reichsbank would have created guarantees that no further funds -would be used for one or another form of rearmament. This success -was not to be expected; rather you could expect your dismissal. Did -my brief but comprehensive summary of this matter express your -views correctly?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: That entire letter was composed in such a way that -there were only two possible answers to it; either an alteration of -financial policy—and that meant a stop to rearmament, which would -have amounted to a complete change of Hitler’s policy—or else the -dismissal of the Reichsbank President; and that happened. We expected -it because at that time I no longer believed that Hitler would -change his policy so completely.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Therefore, the Prosecution are right in saying that your -mission ended with your dismissal. -<span class='pageno' title='536' id='Page_536'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Hitler certainly confirmed that himself and in the -letter of dismissal to me said it expressly. We heard from the testimony -of Herr Lammers in this Court that Hitler with his own hand -wrote that addition into the letter, that my name would remain -connected with the first stage of rearmament. The second stage of -rearmament I rejected and Hitler understood that very clearly, -because when he received that letter from the Reichsbank he said -to those who were present: “This is mutiny.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: How do you know that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: The witness Vocke who will, I hope, appear in this -Court will testify to that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Furthermore, the Prosecution asserted that your exit -from the political stage could not be attributed to your policy of -opposition to a war but to disputes with Hermann Göring over -power and rank. As such, that accusation seems to me to have been -refuted already by statements which Göring and Lammers have -made up to now. We do not wish to recapitulate. I merely want -to ask you whether you have anything to add to the statements -made on this subject by Göring and Lammers, or whether you disagree -with them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: In his oral presentation the prosecutor said that -throughout the entire material which he had studied he could not -find one piece of evidence for my opposition to a policy of war. I -can only say in this respect: If someone on account of his shortsightedness -does not see a tree on a level plain, there is surely no -proof that the tree is not there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: You have heard from the Prosecution that you are -accused of having remained a member of the Cabinet as a Reich -Minister without Portfolio. That was also the cause for misunderstanding -yesterday. I merely wanted to express yesterday that you -had resigned as an active minister and head of a department, that -you resigned as Minister of Economy and His Lordship correctly -pointed out, that of course you remained a Minister without Portfolio, -that is without a special sphere of activity until January 1943. -Of that you are accused by the Prosecution. What caused you to -remain Reich Minister without Portfolio? Why did you do that? -Did you have any particular financial reasons? Excuse my mentioning -that, but the trial brief, on Page 5, charges you with that -motive.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I have already repeatedly explained here that my -release from office as Minister of Economy encountered very great -difficulties, and you have also submitted several affidavits confirming -the fact. -<span class='pageno' title='537' id='Page_537'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hitler did not, under any circumstances, want it to be known -that a break or even so much as a difference of opinion had occurred -between one of his assistants and himself. When he finally approved -my release, he attached the condition that nominally I should remain -Minister without Portfolio.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As regards the second accusation, it is as unworthy as it is wrong. -There was a law in Germany that if a person held two public offices -he could be paid only for one. Since I was in addition President of -the Reichsbank I continuously received my income from the Reichsbank, -at first my salary and later my pension; therefore as a minister -I drew no salary whatever.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you then, during the entire period of your position -as Reich Minister without Portfolio, have any other function to fulfill -in that capacity? Did you take any part in important decisions -of the Cabinet, did you participate in discussions—in brief, was the -Minister without Portfolio just a fancy dress major or was the position -one of substance?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I have already emphasized again and again in this -Court—and I can only repeat it again—that after I left the Reichsbank -I had not a single official discussion; I did not take part in a -single ministerial or official conference and that, unfortunately, it -was not possible for me to bring up any subject for discussion; for -I had no factual basis or pretext for such a possibility, for the very -reason that I had no particular field to administer. I believe that I -was the only Minister without Portfolio—there were also a few -others—who was not active in any way at all. As far as I know, -Seyss-Inquart was undoubtedly Minister without Portfolio; he had -his administration in Holland. Frank was Minister without Portfolio -and had his administration in Poland. Schirach—I do not know -whether he was Minister without Portfolio; I think it has been mentioned -once, but I do not know if it is correct—he had his Austrian -administration in Vienna. I had nothing further to do with the state -administration or in any other way with the State or the Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: What about the ordinary course of affairs? Were there -perhaps any circulars sent out by Lammers on which you acted?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: On the whole—and I think it is understandable after -what I have stated here—I watched carefully for every possibility -of intervening again in some way but I remember and state with -absolute certainty, that during the entire time until the collapse I -received all in all three official memoranda. The numerous invitations -to state funerals and similar social state functions really need -not be mentioned here as official communications. I did not participate -in these occasions either. However, these three instances are -interesting. The first time it was a letter from Hitler—pardon, from -<span class='pageno' title='538' id='Page_538'></span> -Himmler—a circular or request or a bill proposed by Himmler who -intended to transfer court jurisdiction over the so-called asocial -elements of the population to the police, or rather the Gestapo, that -is to say, a basic principle of the administration of justice to separate -the functions of prosecution and judge...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Well, that is known, Dr. Schacht. You can assume that -is known.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: In regard to this question I immediately assented in -the copy of a letter which Reich Minister Frank had sent me in -which he took a stand against this basic violation of legal principles, -and the bill was not made law. It would indeed have been extremely -regrettable, because I am firmly convinced that I myself was a definite -anti-social element in Himmler’s sense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The second instance was a letter concerning some discussions -about state property in Yugoslavia, after we had occupied Yugoslavia. -I answered that since I had not taken part in the preliminary -discussions on the draft of the law I should not be counted upon to -assist in this matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Finally, the third incident—and this is the most important—occurred -in November 1942. Apparently by mistake there came into -circulation the draft for a law of the Reich Minister for Air, which -contained the suggestion of taking 15 and 16 year old students away -from the high school to enlist them for military service in the anti-aircraft -defense, the so-called Flakdienst. I answered this letter -because it was a welcome opportunity for me to state for once my -opinion on the military situation in a long detailed reply which I -sent to Göring.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: On the third of November?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: It is a letter of 30 November, which on the second -of December I believe was given personally by my secretary to the -adjutant of Göring in a closed envelope, with the request that he -himself open it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: One moment, Dr. Schacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the Tribunal.</span>] That letter has already been submitted -under Document Number 3700-PS by the Prosecution, but -it is also in our document book under Exhibit Number 23; Page 66 -of the English text and Page 59 of the German text. If we were not -so pressed for time, it would have been especially gratifying for -me to read this letter here in full. It is a very fine letter. However, -I want to take time into consideration and I merely ask you, -Dr. Schacht, to state briefly your opinion of its content.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will read the letter. It isn’t -necessary for you to read it now, is it? -<span class='pageno' title='539' id='Page_539'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Very well. Well, then, would he speak quite briefly -about the letter before the recess or do you not wish to say anything -further?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes. I would like to say in this connection, if it is -permitted, that to my knowledge this letter has already been read -here by the American Chief Prosecutor, that is...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Read?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Or mentioned, or at least the most important points -were read. I believe it is sufficient if you submit the letter to the -Court in evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes, that has been done.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, that constituted your entire activity as Reich Minister without -Portfolio?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, that was the end of it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Therefore if one wanted to define your position in one -word, one would say, just a kind of retired major (Charaktermajor).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I don’t know what a “Charaktermajor” is, at any -rate, I was never a major, but I have always had character.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: But, Dr. Schacht, that is a historical remark about -authority conferred by Kaiser Wilhelm, the First as German Emperor -on Bismarck.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think this is a convenient time to break off.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, we spoke of the letter, dated 30 November -1942, to Göring. Did that letter have any consequences?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, the letter had very considerable consequences. -It had the result that on 22 January I did at last receive my long -hoped-for release from my position of a nominal Minister without -Portfolio. The reason given for it, however, was less pleasant. I -believe the letter is already in the files of the Tribunal. It is a letter -attached to the official document of release from Lammers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes, very well. We put a question on that subject -during Lammers’ hearing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes. But I should only like to refer to the statement -which says: “...in view of your entire conduct in the present fateful -struggle of the German nation...”—so that was my whole attitude.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, it is Number 26 of the -document book. It is on Page 76 of the English text and on Page 69 -of the German text. -<span class='pageno' title='540' id='Page_540'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Please continue.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: It was, therefore, my entire attitude during this war -which led to my dismissal, and the letter of dismissal also contained -the statement that I would be dismissed for the time being. According -to Lammers’ statement, as we have heard, this expression “for -the time being” was included in the letter, also on the Führer’s initiative. -I was very clearly aware of this wording when I received -the letter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Two days later I was removed from the Prussian State Council, -of which I was a member—a body, incidentally, which had not met -for at least 8 years. At any rate, I was not at the meetings. Perhaps -it was 6 years, I do not know. The text of that decision was -communicated to me by the chairman of that State Council, Hermann -Göring, and because of its almost amusing contents, I still -recollect it very clearly. It stated:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“My answer to your defeatist letter undermining the power of -resistance of the German people is that I remove you from the -Prussian State Council.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I say it was amusing because a sealed letter written by me to -Göring could not possibly shake the power of resistance of the German -people. A further result was that Party Leader Bormann -demanded from me the return of the Golden Party Badge and I did -that at once. After that I was particularly closely watched by the -Gestapo. I gave up my residence in Berlin immediately, within -24 hours, and for the whole day the Gestapo spies followed me all -over Berlin both on foot and by car. Then I quietly retired to my -estate in the country.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now, since the trial brief has mentioned material and -pecuniary reasons for the decisions which you made, it appears to -me justified and necessary to ask what was the position regarding -your property and your income after 1933? In your reply please -take into consideration that it is striking that in 1942 there was an -increase in your income.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: A few months ago, apparently with the approval of -the Military Government, there appeared in the press a list of donations -which the Party leaders and ministers in Germany received -and, in that connection, of their income and their property. I was -also listed, not under “donations,” but it was stated that in 1942 I -had an unusually high income. This list is incorrect, since it is a -gross figure which is mentioned and it does not take into consideration -the fact that the war profit tax was later deducted from -it. When the list was compiled the tax was not yet determined, so -that about 80 percent must be deducted from the sum which is given -there. The income is then no longer striking in any way. In regard -<span class='pageno' title='541' id='Page_541'></span> -to my property, the list shows that over a period of 10 years it has -hardly changed, and I want to emphasize here particularly that in -the last 20 years my property remained approximately the same and -did not increase.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: If I remember rightly you reduced your own salary as -President of the Reichsbank at a certain time on your own initiative?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: When, on Hitler’s suggestion, President Hindenburg -in March of 1933 appointed me again to the position of President of -the Reichsbank, Hitler left it to me to fix my own income. At that -time, I voluntarily reduced my income to less than 25 percent of -my former income from the Reichsbank.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you ever receive presents or donations from Hitler, -either in money or in valuables?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: As I have just mentioned, I have never received any -kind of donations from Hitler, and I think he would hardly have -risked offering me one. I did, indeed, receive one present from -Hitler, on the occasion of my 60th birthday. He gave me a picture -which certainly had the value of about 20,000 marks. It was an oil -painting by a German painter Spitzweg; and would have been worth -approximately 200,000 marks if it had been genuine. As soon as the -picture was brought into my room I recognized it as a forgery, but -I succeeded about 3 months later in tracing the original. I started -proceedings on the subject of the genuineness of the picture, and the -forgery was established before a court.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is not appropriate for the Tribunal to listen -to this.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did Hitler ever bestow on you the right to wear a uniform -or give you any kind of decoration or military rank?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: If the Tribunal will permit me I would like to say -that I returned the forgery and it was never replaced; so that I have -received no presents from Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hitler offered me a uniform. He said I could have any uniform -I desired but I only raised my hands in refusal and did not accept -any, not even the uniform of an official, because I did not wish to -have a uniform.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now, another subject: Did you know anything about -the concentration camps?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Already in the year 1933, when Göring established -concentration camps, I heard several times that political opponents -and other disliked or inconvenient persons were taken away to a -concentration camp. That these people were deprived of their liberty -perturbed me very much at the time, of course, and I continuously -<span class='pageno' title='542' id='Page_542'></span> -demanded, as far as I was in a position to do so during conversations, -that the arrest and removal to concentration camps should -be followed by a clarification before the law with a defense and so -on, and suitable legal proceedings. At that early time the Reich -Minister of the Interior Frick also protested energetically along the -same lines. Subsequently this type of imprisonment, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, -became less known in public, and in consequence I assumed that -things were slowly abating. Only much later—let us say the second -half of 1934 and 1935...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: When you met Gisevius, you mean?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, when I met Gisevius—I heard on repeated occasions -that not only were people still being deprived of their liberty, -but that sometimes they were being ill-treated, that beatings, <span class='it'>et -cetera</span>, took place. I have already said before this Tribunal that as -a result, as early as May 1935, I personally took the opportunity of -drawing Hitler’s attention to these conditions and that I told him -at the time that such a system was causing the whole world to -despise us and must cease. I have mentioned that I repeatedly took -a stand against all these things publicly, whenever there was a possibility -of doing so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But I never heard anything of the serious ill-treatment and -outrages—murder and the like—which started later. Probably because, -firstly, these conditions did not begin until after the war, -after the outbreak of war, and because already from 1939 onwards -I led a very retired life. I heard of these things and of the dreadful -form in which they happened only here in prison. However, I did -hear, as early as 1938 and after, of the deportation of Jews; but -because individual cases were brought to my notice I could only -ascertain that there were deportations to Theresienstadt, where -allegedly there was an assembly camp for Jews, where Jews were -accommodated until a later date when the Jewish problem was to -be dealt with again. Any physical ill-treatment, not to speak of -killing or the like, never came to my knowledge.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you ever take a look at a concentration camp?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I had an opportunity of acquainting myself with -several concentration camps when, on 23 July 1944, I myself was -dragged into a concentration camp. Before that date I did not visit -a single concentration camp at any time, but afterwards I got to -know not only the ordinary concentration camps but also the extermination -camp in Flossenbürg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you not, while in Flossenbürg, receive a visit from -a “comrade-in-ideas”—if I may say so? -<span class='pageno' title='543' id='Page_543'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I know of this matter only from a letter which this -gentleman sent to you or to this Tribunal, I believe, and in which -he describes that visit. I can only, on my own observation...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think it is improper to give the contents -of a letter from a person unidentified. I have said to this Tribunal -before that these letters which come from unidentified persons—if -he is identified, it has not been done in evidence—come to all -of us. I am sure members of the Tribunal get a great many of them. -If that is evidence, then the Prosecution should reopen its case, -because I have baskets of them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I think it is highly improper to take communications and put -them in evidence directly and it is even more improper to relate all -of them by oral testimony when the document is not produced. I -think this kind of evidence has no probative value and I object to it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: May I be permitted to say that I would never do anything -improper nor have I done it. I do not intend in any way to -submit this very harmless jocular letter to the Tribunal as evidence. -But this letter, which reached me through quite regular channels, -informed Dr. Schacht and myself that there existed a plan to murder -him in Flossenbürg. That is why I also questioned the witness -Kaltenbrunner on this matter. The only reason why I am asking -Dr. Schacht is that I expect him to inform the Tribunal that according -to this information there was in fact at that time an order to -murder him. This fact, not the letter, is not without some significance, -because if a regime wants to kill a man then that is at least -proof of the fact that it is not particularly well-disposed toward -him. That is the only reason why I asked that this letter be submitted, -and it is, of course, also at Mr. Justice Jackson’s disposal. -It is really quite an amusing letter, written by a simple man.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But I would never have considered submitting this letter as a -document in evidence. If the Tribunal have objections to hearing -the matter, a matter which was also discussed when Kaltenbrunner -was examined, then I shall willingly omit it. I am quite astonished -that the matter should be given so much significance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal thinks that the letter -isn’t being offered in evidence, and therefore you ought not to refer -to it. Well, then, don’t refer to it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: All right, we shall leave it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Well, now, at last you were released. -What did you do then?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: After that time I did nothing more apart from continuing -my efforts towards the removal of Hitler. That was my -only political activity. For the rest, I was living on my estate. -<span class='pageno' title='544' id='Page_544'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you not go on a journey in the spring of 1939?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Excuse me, you are speaking of the time after the -dismissal as President of the Reichsbank, I thought you meant minister. -I was just talking of 1943.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: No. No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: You are going back to the year 1939. After the dismissal -in January 1939 I already mentioned that Hitler suggested -to me that I should go on an extensive journey abroad and at the -time I went to India by way of Switzerland, where I again saw -my friends.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Were you in any way politically active in India?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: In India I merely traveled as a tourist. I was not -politically active but, of course, I visited several governors and I -spent 3 days as the Viceroy’s guest in his house in Simla.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you not have political connections with Chinese -statesmen in Rangoon?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: When I was in Burma, after leaving India, I received -a visit in Rangoon from a Chinese friend who had visited me before -in Berlin on occasion and who had been commissioned by his government -to talk to me about the Situation of China.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: That is Chiang Kai-Shek’s China?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Chiang Kai-Shek’s China which was already at war -with Japan at the time. The other China did not then exist and this -gentleman asked me upon the request of Chiang Kai-Shek and the -Chinese Cabinet...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I can’t see the slightest relevancy to -this. In the first place, we heard it once and secondly, after we had -heard it it has no relevancy to the case. We have no charge against -him that he did anything in China and we will stipulate that he -was as pure as snow all the time he was in China. We haven’t a -thing to do with that and it is taking time here that just gets us -nowhere and is keeping us away from the real charge in the case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal quite understands that you say -it is irrelevant. Why do you say it is relevant?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I regret that Mr. Justice Jackson and I understand each -other too little. The matter is relevant in the following connection: -In this testimony and also in an affidavit which has been read...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think we heard three times that the Defendant -Schacht went to India. Three times in his evidence he dealt -with the fact that he went to India and China. How is it relevant?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I am not speaking of the journey to India. It had to -be mentioned only briefly to explain the connection of time. I put -<span class='pageno' title='545' id='Page_545'></span> -a question, referring to Schacht’s negotiations in Rangoon with the -envoy from Chiang Kai-Shek—with the Chinese—and at that point -Mr. Justice Jackson raised his objection. But the fact that Schacht -maintained friendly connections with Chiang Kai-Shek’s Government -and gave support to it, that fact is relevant, and for the same -reason for which I attached importance to the fact that it became -clear here that in regard to the Union of Soviet Republics also -Schacht pursued a pro-Soviet line in his economic policy during the -years when Hitler was conducting a political campaign against -Russia. Here we have a second instance, where he is demanding -relations which were contrary to the principles of Hitler’s policy; -that is relations with Chiang Kai-Shek, and so against Hitler’s ally, -Japan. It is in this connection that the negotiations with the -Chinese are of significance. They will take only a moment’s time -at most. They were merely to be mentioned in passing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you consider his -relations with China of any importance, it can be stated in one -sentence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I am of the same opinion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I will sum it up in one sentence. In a written -memorandum I advised Chiang Kai-Shek’s government to continue -holding out against Japan, giving as reason that the economic -resources of China would last longer than the economic resources -of Japan; and I advised Chiang Kai-Shek to rely primarily -on the United States of America in his foreign policy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Then upon your return from India, that is, in August -1939, you found a situation which must have appeared quite tense -to someone who was just coming back. Did you not then attempt to -contact the Cabinet or Hitler in order to discuss this situation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Of course, I found a very tense situation in the question -of Poland and I used my return as an occasion for writing a -letter to Hitler, a letter to Göring, and a letter to Ribbentrop; that -is to say, the three leading men, in order to inform them that I had -come back from India, leaving it to their discretion and expecting -that at least one of them would ask me for an account of my -experiences; and then, I should have had an opportunity of talking -to the leading men once again. To my very great surprise, I did -not get an answer from Hitler at all; I received no reply from -Göring; and Herr Von Ribbentrop answered me that he had taken -note of my letter. There was therefore no other way for me but -to make my own inquiries regarding the real state of affairs on -Poland, and when things became critical I took the well-known step, -which has already been described here by Herr Gisevius; namely -the attempt to gain access to the Führer’s headquarters. -<span class='pageno' title='546' id='Page_546'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: We need not repeat that. The only question which I -still want to ask you is what were you going to tell the generals, -particularly General Von Brauchitsch, at that last moment?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: That he still had a chance to avert a war. I knew -perfectly well that bare economic and general political statements -would of course accomplish nothing with Von Brauchitsch because -he would then certainly have referred to Hitler’s leadership. Therefore -I wanted to say to him something of quite a different nature -and, in my opinion, that is of the most decisive significance. I was -going to remind him that he had sworn an oath of allegiance to -the Weimar Constitution. I wanted to remind him that the -Enabling Act did not delegate power to Hitler but to the Reich -Cabinet and I wanted to remind him that in the Weimar Constitution -there was and still is a clause, which has never been annulled -and according to which, war cannot be declared without previous -approval by the Reichstag. I was convinced that Brauchitsch would -have referred me to his oath sworn to Hitler and I would have -told him: “I also have sworn this oath. You have sworn no oath -other than your military one, perhaps, but this oath does not in -any way invalidate the oath sworn to the Weimar Constitution; on -the contrary, the oath to the Weimar Constitution is the one that -is valid. It is your duty, therefore, to see to it that this entire question -of war or no war be brought before the Cabinet and discussed -there, and when the Reich Cabinet has made a decision, the matter -will go before the Reichstag.” If these two steps had been taken, -then I am firmly convinced that there would have been no war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: You never reached Brauchitsch. We do not want to -repeat the description of that whole affair or of your attempts at -the Bendlerstrasse and so on. Have you anything to add to -Gisevius’ testimony or do you wish to change anything in it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I can only confirm that Gisevius’ statement is correct -in every single point and I myself merely want to add that Canaris -mentioned among many reasons which then kept us from making -the visit, that Brauchitsch would probably have us arrested immediately -if we said anything to him against the war or if we wanted -to prevent him from fulfilling his oath of allegiance to Hitler. But -the main reason why the visit did not come about was quite correctly -stated by Gisevius. Moreover it is also mentioned by General -Thomas in his affidavit which we shall later submit. The main -reason was: the war was canceled. And so I went to Munich on -a business matter and to my surprise while in Munich, war was -declared on Poland; the country was invaded.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: You mentioned the Reichstag a short time ago. A -meeting of the Reichstag did in fact take place, though not before -<span class='pageno' title='547' id='Page_547'></span> -the war or before the declaration of war, but immediately thereafter. -At the time you were still a Minister without Portfolio.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Normally you would have had to sit on the minister’s bench -during that meeting.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you take part in that meeting?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I did not participate in that meeting at all and I -would like to add at once that during the entire war, I was present -at only one meeting of the Reichstag. I could not avoid it, considering -the matters which I already mentioned here yesterday. It -was after Hitler’s return from Paris. I had to participate in this -meeting of the Reichstag, which followed the reception at the -station because, as I said, it would otherwise have been too obvious -an affront. It was the meeting during which political matters were -not dealt with at all, but at which the field marshal’s rank was -granted by the dozen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now, this last effort which has just been mentioned -to stop the outbreak of war through Canaris brings us to the -particular chapter of your attempts at a coup to overthrow Hitler -and his government. We want to make it a rule, if possible, not -to repeat what the witness Gisevius has already stated but only -to supplement or correct or state what you know from your own -memory. Before I touch upon that chapter, however, may I ask -you whether you know from information you received or from -other indications, that your oppositional attitude and that of your -similarly minded friends, and your oppositional aims, were known -in authoritative circles abroad?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not wish to repeat anything; I merely want -to point out that I have already stated repeatedly here that I -continually discussed the situation in Germany—thus also my own -position—with my friends abroad—not only with Americans, -Englishmen, and Frenchmen but also with neutrals—and I would -like to add one more thing; foreign broadcasting stations did not -tire at all of speaking constantly about Schacht’s opposition to -Hitler. My friends and family received a shock whenever information -on this subject transpired in Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: When did your attempts to overthrow the Hitler government -begin?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: As early as 1937 I tried to determine which groups -in Germany one might rely upon in an attempt to remove the -Hitler regime. Unfortunately in the years 1935, 1936, and 1937, I -got to know that all those circles in which I had placed my hope -were failing, namely the scientists, the educated middle class, and -the leaders of economy. -<span class='pageno' title='548' id='Page_548'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I need only mention that the scientists permitted themselves -to listen to the most nonsensical National Socialist lectures without -opposing them in the least. I call attention to the fact that when -the economic leaders saw that I was no longer a figure in economy, -they disappeared from my anteroom and thronged into that of -Göring. In a word, one could not rely upon these circles. Consequently, -one could depend only on the generals, on the military, -because according to my conception at the time, one could certainly -count on an armed resistance even by the SS bodyguard.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Therefore, as has been stated here—and I do not want to pursue -it further—I tried at first to contact such generals as Kluge, for -instance, merely in order to ascertain whether among the military -there were people with whom one could speak openly. And this -first occasion led me to a great many generals whom I contacted in -the course of time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: That was then in the year 1937; now we come to -1938, still limiting ourselves by what Gisevius has already said, -merely touching on it briefly and confirming it. By the way, were -you in any way directly or indirectly involved in the negotiations -at Godesberg or Munich?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: In no way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Now we continue with your political work, aiming -at a revolt. Is Gisevius’ account of the year 1938 correct or is there -something to be added to it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Gisevius’ statement is complete and reliable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: That also applies to the attempt at a <span class='it'>coup d’état</span> in -the late summer of 1938?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Then came the war. Did you fold your arms after -war broke out?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No; throughout the entire war I pleaded with every -general whom I could contact. I used the same arguments which -I have just mentioned in connection with the prospective interview -with Brauchitsch; therefore, it was not merely theory, but I actually -spoke to all these generals.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Was not a visit to General Hoeppner significant in -this connection?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: In 1941 I tried not only to get in touch with General -Hoeppner but in a whole series of conversations I attempted -to make him take action. Hoeppner was perfectly willing and prepared -and later he too, unfortunately, lost his life as a consequence -of 20 July 1944. -<span class='pageno' title='549' id='Page_549'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the year 1942—and this has not been mentioned here up to -now, because Gisevius did not participate—I tried again to mobilize -General Von Witzleben to renewed activity. I went on a special -journey to Frankfurt-on-the-Main, where he had his headquarters -at that time, and Von Witzleben proved as ever to be completely -resolved to act, but he told me that, of course, he could only do so -if he again received a command at the front. Then I...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: At that time Frau Strünck, who knew of these matters, -was in Frankfurt?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: She knew of these things and can confirm them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Perhaps I may tell the Tribunal at this point that -Frau Strünck was granted me as a witness and she was here. In -order to save time, however, I have decided to dispense with this -witness since she could make only cumulative statements on what -Gisevius has already said and I do not think it is necessary. Schacht -himself has just stated the only piece of information which she could -have added, namely this trip, this special journey to Frankfurt to -Von Witzleben. On the strength of experience the Tribunal will -itself know that in the course of a revolutionary movement, -stretching over years such as this, many journeys are made and -in respect to this particular journey it is not important to submit -special evidence. In order to save time, therefore, I have decided -to dispense with the testimony of Frau Strünck. Excuse me, I -merely wanted to say this now. Then there is the next...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: May I perhaps say one more thing? I of course -always participated in the conversations—mentioned by Gisevius -here—with the other generals, that is the group of Beck, Fromm, -Olbricht, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. These things did not come about for some time -on account of the negotiations abroad for which the generals were -always waiting. I think that enough has been said here about this -topic and I need not make further report on it. I come then to one -last point, which does not become apparent from Gisevius’ statement -but about which an affidavit from Colonel Gronau will be -submitted here. I can mention it quite briefly in order to save time. -Naturally, together with the group of Beck, Goerdeler, my friend -Strünck, Gisevius, and others I was completely informed of, and -initiated into, the affair of 20 July. However, and I think it was -mutual, we told each other whenever possible only those things -which the other absolutely had to know, in order not to embarrass -the other man, should he at any time be submitted to the tortures -of the Gestapo. For that reason, apart from being in touch with -Beck, Goerdeler, Gisevius, and Strünck, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, I had another -connection with the generals who were at the head of this revolt -and that was the General of Artillery Lindemann, one of the main -participants in the coup, who unfortunately also lost his life later. -<span class='pageno' title='550' id='Page_550'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Perhaps it would be proper—and also more intelligible -in connection with your participation in 20 July—if I read a brief -part of Colonel Gronau’s affidavit which refers to Lindemann.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the Tribunal.</span>] It is Exhibit Number 39 of our document -book, Page 168 of the German text and Page 176 of the -English text. I shall omit the first part of the affidavit, but I ask -the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it; essentially it contains -only matters on which evidence has already been given. I shall -read only the part that deals with 20 July. It begins on Page 178 -of the English text and on Page 170 of the German text, and I -start with Question 5:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Question 5) You brought Schacht and General Lindemann -together. When was that?</p> - -<p>“Answer 5) In the fall of 1943, for the first time in years, -I again saw General Lindemann, my former school and regiment -comrade. While discussing politics I told him that I -knew Schacht well, and General Lindemann asked to be introduced -to him, whereupon I established the connection.</p> - -<p>“Question 6) What did Lindemann expect from Schacht, and -what was Schacht’s attitude toward him?</p> - -<p>“Answer 6) The taking up of political relations with foreign -countries following a successful attempt at revolt. He promised -his future co-operation. At the beginning of 1944 -Lindemann made severe reproaches that the generals”—that -should read “he severely reproached Lindemann”; it is -incorrectly copied here—“because the generals were hesitating -so long. The attempt at revolt would have to be made -prior to the landing of the Allies.”</p> - -<p>“Question 7) Was Lindemann involved in the attempted assassination -of 20 July 1944?</p> - -<p>“Answer 7) Yes, he was one of the main figures.</p> - -<p>“Question 8) Did he inform Schacht of the details of this plan?</p> - -<p>“Answer 8) Nothing about the manner in which the attempt -was to be carried out; he did inform him, however, of what -was to happen thereafter.</p> - -<p>“Question 9) Did Schacht approve the plan?</p> - -<p>“Answer 9) Yes.</p> - -<p>“Question 10) Did Schacht put himself at the disposal of the -military in the event of a successful attempt?</p> - -<p>“Answer 10) Yes.</p> - -<p>“Question 11) Were you arrested after 20 July 1944?</p> - -<p>“Answer 11) Yes. -<span class='pageno' title='551' id='Page_551'></span></p> - -<p>“Question 12) How were you able to survive your imprisonment?</p> - -<p>“Answer 12) By stoically denying complicity.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, we have left the years 1941 and 1942 and to explain the -Putsch in logical sequence we reached the year 1944, something that -could not be avoided, but we must now go back again to the year -1941. You have already mentioned, in passing, the efforts made -abroad. In 1941 you were in Switzerland. Did you make any efforts -in that direction there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Every time I went abroad I talked at length to my -foreign friends and again and again looked for some way by which -one might shorten the war and begin negotiations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: In this connection, the Fraser letter is of importance. -I think the Fraser letter and the way it was smuggled into Switzerland -has been sufficiently discussed by the witness Gisevius. I have -on two occasions stated the contents briefly, once when the translation -was discussed and again during the discussion on the admissibility -of the letter as evidence before the Court. I do not think -I need do it here nor that I need read it. I should merely like to -submit it. It is Exhibit 31, on Page 84 of the German and Page 91 -of the English text. And—I say this now, we shall discuss it later—the -same applies to the article which appeared this year in the -<span class='it'>Basler Nachrichten</span> and which deals with a conversation which an -American had with Schacht recently. I shall not read that either -since I have already stated the main points of its contents. I submit -it as Exhibit Number 32, Page 90 of the German text and Page 99 -of the English text. I might point out that this article has already -been the subject of certain accusations made during the cross-examination -of Gisevius by the representative of the Soviet Prosecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to raise one objection in regard -to Document 32; this is an article about Dr. Schacht and his ideas by -an unknown writer describing his conversations with an unknown -economist. The article in question was published in the <span class='it'>Basler -Nachrichten</span> on 14 January 1946, that is, when the present Trial was -already well under way, and I cannot consider that this article can -be presented in evidence with regard to Schacht’s case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I might—may I, before the Tribunal decides, say something -very briefly?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The article has already been admitted as evidence. We -have discussed it, and the Tribunal approved the article as evidence. -The Tribunal can, of course, revoke that decision. I think, for me -it would... -<span class='pageno' title='552' id='Page_552'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal has always made it -clear that the allowance of these documents is a provisional allowance -and that when the document is actually offered in evidence, -they will then decide the relevancy or its admissibility, rather, and -its relevancy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: That is quite beyond doubt. I merely wanted to point -out that we have already discussed the question once before. Of -course, the Tribunal can today reject the document. I shall...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The allowance is provisional. It is not a question -of the Tribunal’s reversing its previous decision. The previous -decision was merely provisional, and the question of admissibility -now comes up for decision.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: It is quite clear to me, Your Lordship. I am merely -surprised at the objection raised by the Soviet Prosecution, inasmuch -as the representative of the Soviet Delegation himself referred to -that article in his observations during the cross-examination of the -witness Gisevius. It is true, he did not submit it to the Tribunal, -but he referred to it in his observations to the witness Gisevius. -However, if the Tribunal has the slightest objections to allowing -the article as documentary evidence, then I shall ask permission to -leave it. I will then—and I think I may—ask the witness Schacht -whether it is true that in 1941 he had a conversation with an -American who was a professor of national economy, a conversation -which dealt with the possibility of peace. I leave it to the Tribunal. -For me, it is no—I thought it would be simpler, if I submitted the -article.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, as you have raised the -objection to this document, what have you to say about the point -that Dr. Dix makes that you used the document yourself in cross-examination?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, we did not use this document -in the cross-examination of the witness Gisevius. An explanatory -question was asked in order to reach a decision on this point and -I particularly emphasize...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you say that again? I did not understand -you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: I say, that we did not use this document -during the cross-examination of the witness Gisevius, but we did -ask an explanatory question in order that when the document was -presented by Dr. Dix, we could object to it as being of no probative -value. I especially...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But did you not put the contents of the -document to Gisevius? I do not remember. What I want to know -is did you not put the contents of the document? -<span class='pageno' title='553' id='Page_553'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: No, no, we did not submit the contents, and -we did not discuss the substance of the document. We merely -asked a question—did the witness Gisevius know about the article -in the <span class='it'>Basler Nachrichten</span> of 14 January 1946? That was the question, -and the witness answered that it was known to him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: May I say one more thing? It appears to me that the -Soviet Delegation does not desire to have the article submitted as -evidence. I therefore withdraw it as evidence. And since I have -no due reasons to the contrary, no factual reason to the contrary, -1 can certainly fulfill this wish of the Soviet Delegation. I would -like the Tribunal to consider the matter as settled.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I now put my question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Well, you had conversations in -Switzerland?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: What was the subject of these conversations, in broad -outlines, and with whom did you have them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: This article, which has just been discussed...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: First, Your Honor, may I interpose -an objection? The reason I did not join in the Soviet objection to -this document was that I want to know who this economist is. I -want to check this thing. There are very peculiar circumstances -about this document, and I object to his retelling a conversation -with an unknown economist. All I ask is that he identify time and -place and person with whom he had his conversation, so that we -can do a little verifying of this effort to get something before the -Tribunal that did not appear until 1946.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: The question is now being given a significance which -its comparative triviality really does not merit. I shall, therefore, -dispense with this question too. Please do not now refer to the -conversation with the professor, and I shall leave it to the Prosecution -to put the question which Mr. Justice Jackson has just mentioned -during cross-examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Well, your conversations in Switzerland, then, excepting that -with the unknown professor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, I tried again and again to shorten the war and -to bring about some form of mediation which I always sought for -particularly through the good offices of the American President. -That is all that I can say here. I do not think I need go into details.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Very well. Did you in your letters to Ribbentrop and -Göring—you have already mentioned Hitler—or besides, did you, -<span class='pageno' title='554' id='Page_554'></span> -during the war, state your views about the policy of the war in -writing at any time? First of all, as far as Hitler was concerned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I mentioned my discussion with Hitler in February -1940. In the summer of 1941 I wrote a detailed letter to Hitler, and -the witness Lammers has admitted its existence. I do not think -he was asked about the contents of this letter here, or he was not -allowed to talk about it. If I may come back to it; in that letter, -I pointed out somewhat as follows—I shall use direct language—“You -are at present at the height of your success.”—This was after -the first Russian victories.—“The enemy believes that you are -stronger than you really are. The alliance with Italy is rather a -doubtful one, since Mussolini will one day fall and then Italy will -drop out. Whether Japan can still come to your aid at all is questionable -in view of Japan’s weakness in the face of America. I -assume that the Japanese will not be so foolish as to wage war -against America. The output of steel, for instance, in spite of -approximately similar population figures, amounts to one-tenth of -the American production. I do not think, therefore, that Japan will -enter into the war. I now recommend you at all events to reverse -foreign policy completely and to attempt with every means to conclude -a peace.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Did you state your views to Ribbentrop during the war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not know when it was. On one occasion Herr -Von Ribbentrop conveyed to me through his State Secretary, Herr -Von Weizsäcker, the reproachful message that I should not indulge -in defeatist remarks. That may have been in 1940 or in 1941, -during one of those 2 years. I asked where I had made defeatist -remarks and it appeared that I had talked to my colleague Funk -and had given him extensive reasons why Germany could never -win this war. I held this conviction unchangeable at all times -before and during the war, even after the fall of France. I answered -Ribbentrop through his State Secretary that I, as Minister without -Portfolio, considered it my duty to state my opinion to a ministerial -colleague in its true conception, and in this written reply I maintained -the view that Germany’s economic power was not sufficient -to wage this war. This letter, that is, a copy of this letter was sent -both to Minister Funk and to Minister Ribbentrop through his State -Secretary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I think, Your Lordship, this would be a suitable -moment...</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='555' id='Page_555'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I spoke before of 20 July. Do you recall a statement -made by Hitler about you in connection with 20 July?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Codefendant Minister Speer was present and told -me about it. It was on 22 July 1944 when Hitler issued the order -to his circle for my arrest. At that time he made derogatory -remarks about me and stated that he had been greatly hindered -in his rearmament program by my negative activities, and that it -would have been better if he had had me shot before the war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: To conclude I come to a few general collective questions. -Voices were heard within the country, and also abroad—and -even the Prosecution, although recognizing your intellectual capacities -and the services you rendered, appears to consider it also—that -it was incomprehensible that a man as clever as you did not -recognize the true nature, the real intentions of Hitler in time. I -would like you to state your position with regard to that accusation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I should like very much to have known the gentlemen -who are now judging me, at a time when it might have been -of use. These are the people who always know afterwards what -ought to have been done before. I can only state that first of all, -from 1920 until the seizure of power by Hitler, I tried to influence -the nation and foreign countries in a way which would have prevented -the rise and seizure of power by a Hitler. I warned the -country to be thrifty but I was not heeded. I repeatedly warned -the foreign nations to develop an economic policy which would -enable Germany to live. I was not heeded, although as it now -appears, I was considered a clever and foresighted man. Hitler came -to power because my advice was not followed. The German people -were reduced to great economic need and neither...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President. For 2 days now we have been -listening to lengthy explanations on the part of the Defendant -Schacht, and I rather think that the explanations which have just -been given by the Defendant Schacht are not definite answers to -questions concerned with the Indictment brought against him, but -mere speeches. I consider that they will only prolong the Trial.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal is, I think, fully apprised -with the case on behalf of Defendant Schacht. They don’t want to -stop him putting forward his defense fully, but they would be glad -if you could make it as short as possible and if he could make it -as short as possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: My Lord, I am certain that I shall be through by the -recess, and perhaps even before the recess; but I beg you to bear -<span class='pageno' title='556' id='Page_556'></span> -in mind that the defendant is accused of having assisted in the seizure -of power. The question arises, how was it that...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I wasn’t ruling that this evidence was inadmissible. -I was only asking you to get on with it as quickly as you -could.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Very well. Dr. Schacht, please continue and try to -comply with the suggestions of the representative of the Soviet -Prosecution as far as possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: As briefly as possible. I will not go into detail; I will -merely state that due to the collapse of 1918 and the unsatisfactory -conditions of the Versailles Treaty, Germany was faced with a severe -depression. The democratic parties, which had a firm hold on the -regime at that time, were not able to improve the situation; and the -other nations did not know what policy to take towards Germany. -I do not reproach any one; I merely state facts. Consequently, in -this state of depression, Hitler received a larger majority in the -Reichstag than had ever been the case since the formation of the -Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I ask the people who, although silent at the time, can tell -me now what I should have done; I ask them what they would have -done. I have stated that I was against a military regime, that I -wanted to avoid a civil war, and that, in keeping with democratic -principles, I saw only the one possibility: To allow the man to lead -the government once he had come to power. I said further that from -the moment I realized this I tried to participate in the government, -not with the intention of supporting this man in his extremist ideas, -but to act as a brake and, if possible, to direct his policies back into -normal channels.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Then there came a time later when you recognized the -dangers, when you yourself suffered under the unbearable conditions -of terror and of suppressed opinion, so that perhaps this question is -pertinent and admissible: Why did you not emigrate?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Had it been only a question of my personal fate, -nothing would have been simpler, especially since, as we have heard -before, I would have been offered that opportunity and it would -have been made easy for me. It was not merely a question of my -own welfare; but as I had devoted myself to the public interest since -1923, it was the question of the existence of my people, of my -country. I know of no instance in history where emigrants were of -help to their own nation. Of course, I speak of those emigrants who -leave of their own free will, not those that have been expelled. It -was not the case in 1792, at the time of the French Revolution; it -was not the case in 1917, during the Russian Revolution; and it was -not the case at the time of the National Socialist revolution which -<span class='pageno' title='557' id='Page_557'></span> -we witnessed. To sit in a safe harbor abroad and to write articles -which no one reads in the home country...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, we don’t want a historical lecture, -do we?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I believe we can stop here. He merely wanted to state -why he did not emigrate. [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] You have -been understood.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Thank you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: In the course of these proceedings, either in a letter -or in a poem—I do not know which at the moment—there was -some mention of your thoughts on the possibility of dying a martyr’s -death; whether it would have served the cause of peace and -the German nation, if you had done more than you did; if you had -sacrificed your life...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I think that you are referring to a quotation from -one of my notes, which a representative of the American Prosecution -read here, in which I spoke of the silence of death.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: If I had sacrificed myself, it would not have been -of the slightest use because the circumstances of my sacrifice would -never have become known. Either I would have disappeared in -some prison or I would have died there, and no one would have -known whether I was alive or not; or I would have been the victim -of a planned accident, and it would not have been possible to become -a martyr. Martyrs can be effective only if their martyrdom -becomes known to the public.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: May I ask for the attention of the Tribunal for a -moment? Yesterday I was denied a question concerning the social -attitude of the diplomatic corps and its influence on men like -Schacht, for instance. The question which I want to put now is not -the same question; otherwise I would not put it. But it has nevertheless...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The objection that I made was to the use of -the word “attitude,” because I don’t see how witnesses can give -evidence about the attitude of a corps. I said I think especially -that the fact that the diplomatic corps were present at the Party -rally might be given in evidence, but I said that the word “attitude” -was far too general. What is it you want to put now?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yesterday, the question which I framed in the following -manner was denied: “How was Schacht influenced by the -collective attitude of the diplomatic corps?” That question was -denied, and that concludes the matter. Now, I should like first to -clarify the matter because I do not want to create the impression -<span class='pageno' title='558' id='Page_558'></span> -of smuggling into the proceedings a question which may raise the -same objections. On the one hand, it is essential for my line of -defense to show that people from abroad with judgment, who were -above being suspected of wanting to prepare for an aggressive war, -had the same attitude toward the regime as Schacht had. On the -other hand, it is one of the strong points of my defense to show that -the work of these people in their opposition was not only not supported -by foreign countries but was actually made more difficult. -That is the <span class='it'>thema probandum</span> that is important for me, and on this -theme—but please, Herr Schacht, do not answer before I have -received the permission of the Tribunal—this theme...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: State exactly what the question is.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes, I will put the question now. According to my -notes I intended to refer to the tokens of honor, which the Nazi -regime received from abroad, and to the representatives and -numerous state visits paying honor to the regime, which have -already been mentioned here. I wanted to ask the defendant -what influence these frequent marks of great honor had on the -work and aims of this group of conspirators. However, since that -question is very similar to the one that has been rejected—and I -prefer to make my objections myself rather than to have them -made to me—I wanted to submit the question to the Tribunal first -and make sure that it is admissible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the question being: “What effect did -the recognition of the Nazi regime from abroad have upon the -group of conspirators with whom the Defendant Schacht was in -contact?” That is the question, is it not? Well, that question, as -the Tribunal thinks, you may put.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: It is admissible if “Anerkennung” is translated correctly -as “honor”—honor, not recognition in the sense of recognition -of a government in diplomatic official language, but honor, -respect. It is a difficulty of translation and I do not want a misunderstanding—may -I put to him, first, the individual official visits -which I have noted, so that he can answer the question? May I -do that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you may; actual visits?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes. The list will not be complete.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] I remind you that in 1935, the delegate -of the Labor Party, Alan Hartwood...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that you ought to put -the question in the general way in which I put it to you, and not -go into details of each visit or the details of each number of visits. -<span class='pageno' title='559' id='Page_559'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If Your Honor pleases, I want to -object to it as generalities, because it already appears that the -United States did not participate in this and I tried to keep the -European politics out of this case, and this is the entering wedge. -Now, I don’t want to get into this sort of thing. I think it is entirely -irrelevant that some foreigner, deceived by the appearance which -the Defendant Schacht was assisting in putting up, didn’t start a -war earlier. This thing is entirely irrelevant. The United States -has desired to keep this sort of thing out of this case because it -is endless if we go into it. It seems to me, if Herr Schacht wants -to put the responsibility for his conduct on some foreigner, that -foreigner should be named. He has already said that the United -States representatives, Mr. Messersmith and Mr. Dodd, had no part -in it because they were always against them. Now, it gets into a -situation here which seems to me impossible before this Tribunal, -and I cannot understand how it constitutes any defense for mitigation -for Schacht to show that the foreign powers maintained intercourse -with Germany even at a period of its degeneration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question is relevant -but should be put without detail.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I will put the question without detail, and I would -like to say that I cannot, of course, speak of myself and America -in the same breath; but I, too, am trying to avoid foreign politics. -However, my question does not concern foreign politics.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Here is the one question: What -influence did the honors which were showered upon the Nazi regime -by foreign countries, in a manner well known to you, have on -the work of your group of conspirators?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Throughout the years from 1935, up to and including -1938, numerous statesmen from almost all other nations came to -Berlin to visit Hitler, including some crowned heads. From America, -for instance, there was Under Secretary of State Phillips.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Do not mention any names.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I said that only because names were expressly -mentioned here. It is not limited to Europe. I do not intend to -make any political explanations, I merely say that there were so -many visitors, which meant not only recognition but respect for -Hitler, that this man appeared a very great man in the eyes of -the German people. I still remember that in 1925, I believe, the -King of Afghanistan, Amanullah, appeared in Berlin. He was the -first foreigner to visit the Social Democratic Government, and there -was a celebration because at last a great man from another country -had visited us. In the case of Hitler, starting with 1935 there was -one visitor after another; and Hitler went from one foreign political -<span class='pageno' title='560' id='Page_560'></span> -success to another, which made it extremely difficult to enlighten -the German people and made it impossible to work for that -enlightenment within the German nation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: And now, two final questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You have heard the speech by the British Attorney General -Shawcross, who said that there should have been a point where -the servants of Hitler refused to follow him. We want to accept -that point of view, and I ask you: Do you believe that you yourself -acted in accord with that postulate of the leader of the British -Delegation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I not only accept it, but I fully approve of it. From -the very moment when I recognized what a harmful individual -Hitler was, what a threat to world peace, I broke with him, not -only secretly, but publicly and personally.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: So you consider that when you realized the truth -you did everything humanly possible to try and save humanity -from the disaster of this war and bring it to an end, once it had -started.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I know of no one in Germany who would have -done more in that respect than I did. I warned against excessive -armament. I impeded, and if you like, sabotaged effective armament -through my economic policy. I resigned from the Ministry of -Economics against the will of Hitler; I publicly protested to Hitler -against all the abuses of the Party; I continuously warned people -abroad and gave them information; I attempted to influence the -policy of other nations with respect to the colonial question in -order to achieve a more peaceful atmosphere. Credits for continued -armaments...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think we have heard this more than once, -you know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: May I be permitted one sentence: I blocked Hitler’s -credits and I finally tried to remove him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Gentlemen, I am now at the end of my presentation -of evidence for Schacht’s case, and I have only one request. During -the last few days, I have received a large number of letters and -also affidavits from well-known people who know Schacht. I will -examine them; and if I should decide that any of the affidavits -are relevant, I will get in touch with the Prosecution and discuss -with them whether they have any objection to having them translated, -so that we can perhaps submit them to the Tribunal—not -to have them read, but merely to have them put in evidence. May -I request that I be granted this right. -<span class='pageno' title='561' id='Page_561'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>At the end of my entire presentation, I will briefly submit my -documents; this has been only partially done.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants’ counsel wish -to ask any questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have only a few questions to -put to Dr. Schacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>How long have you known Herr Von Neurath, Dr. Schacht?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I cannot state the exact year, but at any rate for -a very long time; for many, many years.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: For some time, for about 4 years, -you were both colleagues as ministers in the government. During -that time, did you have any contact with him other than in purely -official capacity?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Unfortunately not enough, but of course I saw him -from time to time. I would have liked to have seen him more often.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But from conversations with him, -or from what you heard about him, you certainly formed an opinion -about his political views.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I was well acquainted with his views.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And what was the trend of his -political thought?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I had the impression that basically Von Neurath -believed in a conservative policy, but was open to conviction where -progressive measures were concerned. He was above all in favor -of peaceful international co-operation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you consider it possible, or do -you have any reason to believe, that under certain circumstances -he would also resort to belligerent methods or that he would even -consider them, if the peaceful understanding which he desired -was quite impossible?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: According to my understanding of Neurath, I think -that he was entirely averse to any aggressive policy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You witnessed the various...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, will you kindly put the -earphones on, the Tribunal thinks these questions are not questions -which can properly be put because of their general nature.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you have the impression that -in everything that he achieved, particularly in the occupation of -the Rhineland, Herr Von Neurath...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, this is not a proper question -to put to a witness, “Did you have an impression about him?” -<span class='pageno' title='562' id='Page_562'></span> -You can ask him what he said and what he did; what did Von -Neurath do and what did he say?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes; then I will not put this question. -I have only one last question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] You know that on the 4th of February -1938 Von Neurath resigned as Foreign Minister. What did -you and your immediate circle say to the resignation of Von Neurath -from foreign politics? What impression did it make upon you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I believe I have already said in the course of the -interrogation that I considered Von Neurath’s resignation a very -bad sign, for it meant departing from the previous policy of understanding -in foreign politics.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no further questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Any other defendants’ counsel want to ask -questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Does the Prosecution desire to cross-examine?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think it might save time, Your -Honor, if we could take our recess at this time. It is a little early, -I know, but it takes some time to arrange our material.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dr. Schacht, according to the transcript -of the testimony at Page 8698 (Volume XII, Page 460), you said -that in 1938 you told a certain lady while you were dining: “My -dear lady, we have fallen into the hands of criminals. How could -I ever have suspected that!” You recall that testimony?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: It was not I who gave that testimony; it came from -an affidavit submitted here by my Defense Counsel, but it is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am sure you want to help the Tribunal -by telling us who those criminals were.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Hitler and his confederates.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you were there; you know who -the co-operators were. I am asking you to name all that you put -in that category of criminals with Hitler. Hitler, you know, is dead.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Mr. Justice, it is very difficult for me to answer that -question fully because I do not know who was in that close conspiracy -with Hitler. The Defendant Göring has told us here that -he considered himself one of that group. There were Himmler -and Bormann, but I do not know who else there was in the small -circle of men who were trusted by Hitler. -<span class='pageno' title='563' id='Page_563'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have only named three men. Let -me put it this way: You named four men criminals, three of whom -are dead and one of them you say admitted...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I can add one more, if you will permit me. I assume -that the Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop was also always acquainted -with Hitler’s plans. I must assume that; I cannot prove it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whom else did you include when you -were talking to the lady?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: On that evening I did not mention any names.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But whom did you have in mind? -You surely were not making charges against your own people, who -were in charge of your own government, without having definite -names in mind.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I have taken the liberty of mentioning the names -to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Are those all?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not know, but I assume that there were more. -I would add without hesitation, Heydrich. But I cannot know with -whom...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Heydrich is a dead man.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I regret that these people are dead, I would have -liked to see them die some other way; but...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, are those the only people that -you included?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I have no proof of the fact that there was anyone -else in this conspiracy about whom I could say that there is proof -that he was a conspirator.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Dr. Schacht, at the time the -Nazis seized power you had a world-wide acquaintance and very -great standing as a leading banker in Germany and in the world, -did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not know whether that is so, but if that is -your opinion I do not wish to contradict you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, at first you would admit that? -Wouldn’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not contradict.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And yet as we understand it, you -made public appearances in Germany before the German people -in support of the Nazi regime, alongside of characters such as -Streicher and Bormann. -<span class='pageno' title='564' id='Page_564'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Mr. Justice, I have taken the liberty of explaining -here that until July 1932 I did not in any way come forward publicly -for Hitler or the Party and that, on the contrary, in America for -instance, I warned the people against Hitler. At that time I—the -name Bormann was, of course, unknown to me at the time; and -Streicher’s paper, <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, was just as revolting to me before -that time as afterwards. I did not think that I had anything in -common with Herr Streicher.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I didn’t either, but that is why -I wondered about your appearing with him publicly before the -German people after 1933 when the Nazi regime was consolidating -its power. You did that, didn’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: What did I do, Mr. Justice?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I spoke of your appearances, publicly, -before the German people with Streicher and Bormann in support -of the Nazi program after the seizure of power.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not think so. I was never seen publicly with -Herr Streicher or with Mr. Bormann—certainly not at that time. -It is quite possible that he attended the same Party rallies as I, -or that I sat next to him; but, at any rate, in 1933 I was never -seen publicly either with Streicher or with Bormann.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask to have you shown the photograph -from the Hoffmann collection, marked Number 10. You have -no difficulty recognizing yourself in that, do you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And on the right sits Bormann?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And next to him the Minister of -Labor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And on the other side of you is -Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And beyond him, Streicher?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not recognize him; I do not know whether -it is Streicher, but perhaps it is.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I will offer the photograph in -evidence. And perhaps the identification will be sufficient.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And also Frick is in that picture?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes. -<span class='pageno' title='565' id='Page_565'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This becomes Exhibit Number -USA-829.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] I will ask to have you shown...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Justice Jackson, what is the date of that -photograph?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There is no date given on the photographs. -Perhaps the defendant can tell us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Mr. Justice, you said that in 1933 I had permitted -myself to be seen publicly with Streicher and Bormann as a -representative of the National Socialist Party; and I should like -to know, therefore, where this picture was taken and when. I -cannot identify it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I asked you about after 1933. Schacht, -do you deny this is a photograph...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, no. By no means, I am merely asking when -it was taken. I do not think this refers to 1933 or 1934.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When was it, if you want to tell us?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not know; I cannot tell you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will show you another photograph—two -photographs, Numbers 3 and 4. Number 3 shows you marching -with Dr. Robert Ley among others.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Number 4 shows you entering the -hall, marching, and giving the Nazi salute.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Ley the man who suppressed -the labor unions of Germany?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And those are correct photographs, -are they not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Certainly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I offer them in evidence under Exhibit -Number USA-829.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] I will show you photographs marked -Numbers 1 and 2 and 6—and 7. Now let us look at Number 1. -Do you recall where that was taken?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes—one moment, if it is the number I have here—yes, -just a minute.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Where was it taken? -<span class='pageno' title='566' id='Page_566'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I think Number 1 is a picture from the Reich Chancellery, -if I am not mistaken.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Among the persons appearing in -Number 1 is Frick?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Gürtner, Goebbels, Popitz, Schacht, Papen, Göring, -and others, and Hitler in the middle.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Neurath, do you recognize?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Neurath. Yes; I think he is immediately on Hitler’s -right, in the background.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Goebbels?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, I said Goebbels.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You identify Funk as present in the -picture, at the extreme right, only a part of his body showing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Who is that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Funk, the Defendant Funk.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, that is Göring.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Back of Göring and back of Neurath.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I beg your pardon. Perhaps I have a different picture. -I beg your pardon. That is Number 2. On Number 2 I see -from left to right: Popitz, Rust, Göring, Neurath, Hitler, Blomberg, -Schacht, Gürtner, Krosigk, Eltz von Rübenach, and then at the very -back on the right, Funk.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And let us take Number 7. Who do -you identify as your company in that photograph?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: On the extreme left, my late wife; then the Vice -President of the Reichsbank, Dreyse, Hitler, and myself. There -is an adjutant of Hitler, and the heavy-set man on the right—I do -not know who he is.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This is a photograph taken when the foundation of the new -Reichsbank building was laid in 1934. Directly behind me, on the -right, is Blomberg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Number 6?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: One moment. That is the picture where I am walking -alongside Hitler, is that right? That is Hitler’s entrance in my -company, on the occasion when the foundation of the new Reichsbank -building was laid. Behind me, or rather behind Hitler, you -can see Geheimrat Vocke, who is to appear as a witness here -tomorrow, and several other gentlemen from the directorate of the -Reichsbank.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I offer the remaining photographs, 1, -6, and 7 in evidence under the same number. -<span class='pageno' title='567' id='Page_567'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>So that it would appear, Dr. Schacht, that a good deal of your -present company was the company that started off with you in -1933 and 1934?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Is that a question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, is that not true?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No. If you had photographed me with my other -acquaintances just as often, the number would be 10 times as great.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified—and I refer to Page 8650 -of the record (Volume XII, Page 424)—that there were reasons of -principle why you did not become a Party member and that Party -membership would not be compatible with your principles?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: That is right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you also testified—I refer to -Page 8692 of the record (Volume XII, Page 455)—that from 1932 to -the 30th of January 1933—I am quoting you, “I have not written -or spoken a single word publicly for Hitler.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I think that is right, if you emphasize “publicly.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You must emphasize “publicly”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I want yet to ask you about the next -thing. You also said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I have never helped in any way to exert influence in favor -of Hitler through discussions with any of the competent -gentlemen: Hindenburg, Meissner, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>; and I did not -participate in any way in the appointment of Hitler to -Reich Chancellor.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: That is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, are there any words that we -have to emphasize in that in order to understand it correctly?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, in reference to Hitler’s becoming Chancellor, -please note I said, “competent men.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I don’t just know what you -mean by that, but I’ll give you a chance to explain.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes. When I say “competent,” I mean those people -who could decide as to who was to be Chancellor. Of course, I -did say that Hitler would be Chancellor and must become Chancellor, -and I expressed those convictions in private circles.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you say that in public?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, I said that only in a circle of my friends, -business acquaintances, and such like. -<span class='pageno' title='568' id='Page_568'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to quote you a statement -by Von Papen:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“When I was Chancellor of Germany, in 1932, Schacht came -to see me in July or August while I was at home. He said, -‘here’s a very intelligent man.’—It was in the presence of -my wife and I have never forgotten it.—He said, ‘Give him -your position. Give it to Hitler. He is the only man who -can save Germany.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you say that or didn’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not know whether I said that he was the only -man who could save Germany, but I did tell him that Hitler would -and must become Chancellor. But that was in August or July of -1932, after the July elections; and it has nothing to do with Hitler’s -nomination, which did not take place until after the Schleicher -Cabinet, about which I have been examined here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Dr. Schacht, I just asked you -if you had not testified that you had nothing to do with his coming -to the Chancellorship and you said...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: That is the truth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ...and it is here said that you asked -Von Papen to give the place to him and...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ...and do you contend—and I want -you to say anything you want to about this—do you contend that -that was not aiding Hitler to the Chancellorship?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not know whether it was aiding Hitler. In -the course of my examination here, I have been asked whether I -had exerted any influence in connection with Hitler’s election or -his nomination for the Chancellorship in January 1933. I have -given the names of Hindenburg, Meissner, and so forth, that is -to say, Hindenburg’s circle. Since the beginning of November 1932, -Papen was no longer Chancellor and thus he had no influence upon -these matters at all. I did not talk to Papen at all during those -weeks. On the contrary, after the elections of 1932, I said that -it was inevitable that a man who had obtained so many votes in -the Reichstag must take over the political lead.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now let me get you correctly. When -you saw Hitler was going to win you joined him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I’ll just make it clear what -you do mean. You did not assist him until he had already accumulated -more votes than any other Party in the Reichstag? -<span class='pageno' title='569' id='Page_569'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I did not join Hitler when I saw that he would -win, but when I had discovered that he had won.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Oh, well, I’ll accept the amendment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You have referred to your letter to Hitler on the 29th of -August 1932...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ...in which you advised him not to -put forward any detailed economic program?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You told him there was no such -program on which 14 millions could agree?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that economic policy is not a -factor for building up a party?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you added that, “You can always -count on me as your reliable assistant”; did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then that was after he had won?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then on the 12th of...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: November.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, I just want to refer to that document -as EC-456, Exhibit Number USA-773. Now, then, on the -12th of November 1932, you wrote a letter to him, in which you -said, among other things, “I have no doubt that the present development -of things can only lead to your becoming Chancellor.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “It seems as if our attempt to collect -a number of signatures from business circles for this purpose is -not altogether in vain...”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were collecting signatures for -this purpose?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Not I, but I participated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were assisting.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was Document Number -EC-456. -<span class='pageno' title='570' id='Page_570'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, as of November 1932, a document was prepared for a -large number of industrialists to sign, urging the selection of Hitler -as Chancellor, in substance, was there not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I no longer remember the document, but I assume -that that is the document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And men like Schacht, Schröder, and -Krupp, and a great number of industrialists signed that document, -did they not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: That is possible, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was sent to Von Hindenburg?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, the purpose of it was to aid -Hitler in obtaining the Chancellorship?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: That is possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It is addressed to the Reich President, -is it not? Document Number 3901-PS, Exhibit Number USA-837.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I have not seen it; but it is probably correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you do not deny that that -occurred?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I assume that it is correct. I have not seen it, but -I do not doubt it at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then, in November of 1932 you communicated -to Hitler the result of your money-raising campaign, did -you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not know anything about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I’ll remind you from your own -interrogation. Well, I’ll remind you first, of your testimony, in -which you say that it appears that you did not plead for funds but -that Göring pleaded for funds; and I ask if you did not, on the -9th of October 1945, give these answers to these questions as to -events of February 1933?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Events of what?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Events of February 1933.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, thank you very much.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Going back to 1933. This is the -question:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Prior to the time that Hitler appointed you as President -of the Reichsbank, do you recall a meeting in the home of -Göring? -<span class='pageno' title='571' id='Page_571'></span></p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Yes. That was a financial meeting. I have been -interrogated about that several times already.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘Tell me about it.’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Yes, I will. Hitler had to go to the elections on -5 March, if you will remember, and for these elections he -wanted money for the campaign. He asked me to procure the -money and I did. Göring called these men together and I made -a speech—not a speech, for Hitler made the speech—then I -asked them to write down the amounts and to subscribe for -the elections, which they did. They subscribed a total of -3 millions and they allocated the sum among themselves.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘Who were the people who made up that subscription -list?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘I think that all of them were bankers and industrialists. -They represented the chemical industry, iron industry, -textile industry, all of them.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘Representatives of all the industries?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘All of them; all of the big industries.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘Do you recall any of their names?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Oh certainly; Krupp was there—the old gentleman, -Gustav. He arose from his seat and thanked Hitler and was -very enthusiastic about him at the time. And then there was -Schnitzler—I think it was he—and Vögler for the United Steel -Works.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you give that testimony?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Certainly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, at that meeting you have referred -to Document Number D-203, which is a record of the meeting—at -that meeting Göring said this in substance, did he not?</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The sacrifices which are required would be so much easier -for industry to bear if it knew that the election of 5 March -would surely be the last one for the next 10 years, probably -even for the next 100 years.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>You heard that, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now yesterday or the day before you -were interrogated about your support and about the tribute that -Goebbels paid to you; and you said to the Court, “It is not my fault -if Goebbels made a mistake.” Do you recall that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I ask you, if testifying about -Dr. Goebbels you did not say this to the interrogator of the United -<span class='pageno' title='572' id='Page_572'></span> -States, on the 17th day of October 1945, Exhibit Number USA-616 -(Document Number 3729-PS)?</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Question: ‘When did you become interested in becoming a -co-worker of Hitler?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘I should say in the years of 1931, 1932.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘And that was when you saw that he had a mass -movement that was likely to take power?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Quite right; it was growing continually.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘And did you publicly record your support for -Hitler in those years?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘I think I made a statement in December 1930 once -at the Bavarian People’s Party, upon coming back from -America. I said that there was a choice for any future -Government, either to hold against 25 percent socialists, or -against 20 percent National Socialists.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘But what I mean—to make it very brief indeed—did -you lend the prestige of your name to help Hitler come -to power?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘I stated publicly that I expected Hitler to come -into power for the first time that I remember in November -1932.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘And you know, or perhaps you don’t, that Goebbels -in his diary, records with great affection...’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Yes.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘...the help that you gave him at that time?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Yes, I know that.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘November 1932?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘You say the book is called <span class='it'>From the Kaiserhof -to the Reich Chancellery</span>?’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘That’s right; you have read that?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Yes.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘And you don’t deny that Goebbels was right?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘I think his impression was that he was correct at -that time.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you give that testimony?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes. I never doubted that Goebbels was under this -impression; I merely said that he was mistaken.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you didn’t—Well, I won’t -bother. Now, you made some extensive quotations from Ambassador -Dodd yesterday, the day before. Did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes. -<span class='pageno' title='573' id='Page_573'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And let’s have this understood: Ambassador -Dodd was consistently and at all times opposed to the -entire Nazi outfit, wasn’t he?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So you got no encouragement from -him to be in this outfit?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Oh, no.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you testified, as I understood -you, that Ambassador Dodd invited you to go to the United States -of America and you say—I am quoting from Page 8670 of the record -(Volume XII, Page 439):</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“At that time, 1937, he called on me and urged me to go with -him, or follow him as soon as possible, and change my residence -to America. He said that I would find a very pleasant -welcome in America. I believe he never would have said that -to me if he had not had a friendly feeling towards me.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>You said that to the Tribunal?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I think you intended to convey -to the Tribunal the impression that Ambassador Dodd had great -confidence in you and great friendship for you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I had that impression.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Have you read his entire diary, or did -you confine yourself to reading extracts?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes. I also know of the passage where he said, “You -would make a very bad American,” or something like that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, yes, you didn’t mention that to -the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I think that would be better for the Prosecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we are not disappointing you -then.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Are you not familiar with his entry under the date of December -21, 1937, where he speaks of the luncheon at which you were -present?</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Schacht spoke of the defeat of Germany in 1918 as wholly -due to Woodrow Wilson’s bringing America into the World -War. But I said Wilson’s Fourteen Points were the one great -promise of international peace and co-operation, and every -country on both sides had helped to defeat his purpose. Don’t -you think Wilson, 50 years from now, will be regarded as one -of the greatest presidents the United States has ever had? He -<span class='pageno' title='574' id='Page_574'></span> -evaded an answer but turned his attention to the Japanese-Chinese -war and opposed Germany’s alliance to Japan. Then -he showed the true German attitude, quoting, ‘If the United -States would stop the Japanese War and leave Germany to -have her way in Europe, we would have world peace.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: What is the question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you make those statements?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not know whether I said it, but even today it -seems an extremely reasonable statement. I am of the opinion that -it was correct with one exception, I believe...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, now let’s get this straight. As -I understand you correctly, you can have peace, world peace, if Germany -was left to have her way in Europe?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes. May I say that there were various opinions -about the path Germany was to take; mine was a peaceful one.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, he goes on:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I did not comment, and others also failed to make remarks. -Schacht meant what the Army Chiefs of 1914 meant when -they invaded Belgium, expecting to conquer France in 6 weeks, -namely; domination and annexation of neighboring little countries, -especially north and east.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Am I to reply?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you say that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, no.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was that what Dodd said about your -conversation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: But I did not say that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, may I...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was the impression?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, may I answer please?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask you this question: What is the -impression received over the course of his acquaintance with you -by a man whom you describe as being a decent fellow and a friend -of yours?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: May I answer that I have already stated that Mr. Dodd -was the victim of many misconceptions. In this case, too, he does -not say that I said it; he says, “Schacht meant.” That was his opinion -which he attributed to me. I never said that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I so understood it; but it was the estimate -of a friendly observer, I take it from you. -<span class='pageno' title='575' id='Page_575'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: A friendly observer who continually misunderstood; -Ambassador Henderson has proved that in his book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He may have misunderstood Henderson; -but there is never any doubt that he understood the Nazi danger -from the beginning, is there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes; but he misunderstood my attitude.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, when you went and asked first -the Foreign Minister and then Hitler to go to the United States, or -have some one go to the United States, you testified, on Page 8708 -of the record (Volume XII, Page 467) that you told Hitler this:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It seems vital to me that there should be someone constantly -in America who could clarify German interests publicly, in -the press, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you say that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, is that what you actually said -to Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I call your attention to your -own letter, Document Number 3700-PS to the Reich Marshal.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In the beginning of 1940 I proposed to the Führer that I -should go to the United States in order to attempt to slow -down America’s assistance to England in the matter of -armaments and, if possible, to prevent America becoming -involved more deeply in the war.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask you, which of those is true?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Both of them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Both? Then you did not reveal to the -Tribunal yesterday, when you reported the conversation, all that -you had pretended that you would do in the United States, did you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, certainly not. I wanted, for instance, to try to -persuade the President to intervene for peace. That, too, I did not -mention here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also testified yesterday that -you were never told about the extent, the type, and the speed of -rearmament. Do you recall that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But although you had no such information, -you said it was too much?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I had the feeling that one ought to go slowly. -<span class='pageno' title='576' id='Page_576'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let me remind you of certain -statements made by General Von Blomberg concerning 1937.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Answer: ‘At that time, the organization of the planned -Wehrmacht was about complete.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘When? 1937?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘I believe it was 1937.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘Was that a plan that had been discussed with -Doctor Schacht in connection with the financing, as to how -big the Wehrmacht would be?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Yes. Schacht knew the plan for the formation of -the Wehrmacht very well, since we informed him every year -about the creation of new formations for which we had been -expending money. I remember that, in the year 1937 we -discussed what the Wehrmacht would need for current -expenses after a large amount had been spent for creating -it.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘That means that you gave Schacht a clear statement -of how much money each year went into the creation -of new units, new installations, and so forth, and how -much you were using for the operating expenses of the -Wehrmacht?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Exactly right.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘When you say that by 1937 the plan had been -fulfilled, do you mean in the main?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘In the main.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Another question. I skip two or three irrelevant ones.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“When you say that Schacht was familiar with those figures, -how were they brought to his attention?</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘The demands for the money needed were handed -to Schacht in writing.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘That means that in connection with the money -which Schacht was raising for the rearmament program, he -was informed of how many divisions and how many tanks -and so forth would be procured through these means?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘I don’t think we put down the amount of money -we would need for every tank and so forth, but we would -put down how much every branch of the Wehrmacht, like -the Navy or Air Force, needed, and then we would state -how much was required for activating and how much for -operating.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘That is, Doctor Schacht could see each year how -much of an increase there would be in the size of the Armed -Forces as a result of the money he was procuring?’ -<span class='pageno' title='577' id='Page_577'></span></p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘That is certain.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask whether you deny the statements made by Von Blomberg -as I have put them to you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, unfortunately, I must say that I know nothing -about this. A member of the Reichsbank Directorate, Geheimrat -Vocke, will testify tomorrow; and I ask that you put this matter -to him so that the question will be clarified. The question was -not one of informing me, but of informing the Reichsbank Directorate. -Everything that I knew the Reichsbank Directorate naturally -also knew.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dr. Schacht, I don’t care whether you -know or didn’t know as far as the Prosecution’s case is concerned. -What I am asking you these questions for is to know how far we -can rely on your testimony.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, I understand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So there will be no misunderstanding -about that. And you deny that Von Blomberg was telling the -truth when he says, when he reported to you in writing, those -facts?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, unfortunately I must deny it. Evidently he -does not remember.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you testified yesterday or the -day before, that the so-called New Plan had nothing to do with the -armament program, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Nothing in particular with armament.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Oh, nothing in particular.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No. I mean of course—the Tribunal was expressly -asked whether I was to speak about the New Plan here or not, and -the Tribunal decided that it was to be brought up at your cross-examination. -I am prepared to inform you now about the New -Plan before you...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Dr. Schacht, you have no objection -to answering my questions, have you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Certainly not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am referring to the answer which -you gave—the one which you were not allowed to give—find the -Page 8732 of this record (Volume XII, Pages 484 and 485):</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Question: ‘Some of your economic policies during the time -you were Minister of Economics, which have been accused -as being in preparation for war, were the so-called New Plan. -What was that?’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='578' id='Page_578'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>And your answer:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“May I state first of all that the New Plan had nothing at all -to do with rearmament.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And then you went into an explanation of the New Plan which -the Court did not receive, and I am asking you only this question: -Did you not say, in your speech on the Miracle of Finance on the -29th day of November 1938, this—after quoting a great number of -figures: “These figures show how much the New Plan contributed -to the execution of the armament program as well as to the securing -of our food.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you say that or didn’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is Document Number EC-611, -Exhibit Number USA-622.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I understood you to say in your testimony that you really -didn’t have anything to do socially with Hitler or with the other -Nazis and that you refused their invitation to lunch at the Reich -Chancellery; and one of the chief reasons was that those present -showed such abject humility to Hitler. Did you say that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to read to you from -your speech, Document Number EC-501, your inaugural speech on -the occasion of the Führer’s birthday. This was a public speech, -by the way, wasn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not know. I do not remember.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You made a speech on the Führer’s -birthday on the 21st of April 1937, carried in the newspapers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Maybe.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “We are meeting together here -to remember with respect and love the man to whom the -German people entrusted the control of its destiny more than -4 years ago.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And then, after some other remarks, you say,</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“With the limitless passion of a glowing heart and the infallible -instinct of a born statesman, Adolf Hitler, in a struggle -which he led for 14 years with calm logic, has won for himself -the soul of the German people.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Was that a part of your published and public speech?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I assume that you have quoted it quite correctly. -I do not believe that anyone, on the occasion of the birthday celebration -of the head of a state, could say anything very different. -<span class='pageno' title='579' id='Page_579'></span> -Mr. Justice, may I make one request. You have completely passed -over the New Plan, while the Tribunal has pointed out that it was -to be discussed here in cross-examination. If you are not going to -refer to the New Plan, may I ask that the New Plan be discussed -again in re-examination by my attorney.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I did not ask you what the New Plan -was; I asked whether your statement that it had nothing to do -with armaments was true or not. But if your solicitor wants to -ask about it, it is open to ruling by the Tribunal. You quoted -today Hitler’s letter of the 19th of January 1939, in which you were -dismissed from the presidency of the Reichsbank; and you did not -quote the concluding sentence, as I recall it, which reads, “I am -happy to be able to avail myself of your services for the solution -of new tasks in your position as Reich Minister.” That is a correct -quotation, is it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I refer to the testimony by the witness Gisevius, -who has already said that outwardly Hitler would never indicate -that there was dissension between himself and his collaborators but -that he always attempted to give a false impression to the world. -After January 1939 Hitler never asked for my opinion or my co-operation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you asked by anyone else?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No. I cited this morning the occasions when I was -asked for assistance. That was in connection with Belgium, and -in connection with the periodical, <span class='it'>Das Reich</span>. I think that was all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you performed no functions -whatever in reference to Belgium?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I quote your letter of the 17th -of October 1940 to the Reich Minister of Economics, Document -EC-504, USA-830. At that time you had ceased to be President of -the Reichsbank, had you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes. I was only a minister without portfolio.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “So that the German banks in the -occupied western territories need not work side-by-side, or -rather against each other, you had assigned the Deutsche -Bank the task of clearing the way for closer economic co-operation -with Holland; and you entrusted the Dresdner Bank -with the same task for Belgium.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>And you go on to describe that situation and say:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In order to remove this difficulty, you, Herr Reich Minister, -have agreed that the undersigned comply with the requests of -both banking houses for a decisive expression of opinion in -<span class='pageno' title='580' id='Page_580'></span> -this question. I have subsequently discussed the situation -with both banks and it was confirmed in the course of the -conversation that at present there is no tendency on the -part of Dutch or Belgian financial institutions to enter into -general ties with the German business men.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you recall?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, I remember it, now that you have read it to -me. May I make a statement, or what was your question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I just wondered if you remembered -that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, and I ask permission to make a statement. It -concerns...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If you think it needs explaining...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I would think so; but I leave that to the Tribunal. -If I may speak: It concerns a rivalry between two large banks. -Both these large banks approached me—as a former banker and -President of the Reichsbank—to decide the matter, and I did. I -really do not see what that has to do with the official participation -in the Belgian administration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the purpose of your intervention -was to avoid misunderstanding in the occupied countries between -the banking interests of the occupied countries and the German -banks, was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Certainly, they were to work together peacefully.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. Although you have said to the -Tribunal that you were entirely opposed to the Germans being -in there at all?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Of course. But now that they were there I tried -to keep peace.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You also were approached by Krupp -von Bohlen about raising a fund known as the “Hitler spending -fund,” were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never were?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Never.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, that is most unfortunate—that -your name should be connected with...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, I know the letter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never received such a letter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, I know the letter, but I was not assigned the -task of raising that fund. -<span class='pageno' title='581' id='Page_581'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you assisted in raising it, -didn’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you contribute to it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I personally, certainly not. I do not know what -you are accusing me of.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I thought you knew about the letter -from Von Bohlen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, but I ask you of what are you accusing me? -Please tell me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you raise any money or help to -organize a loan with Krupp von Bohlen in May of 1933—the Hitler -spending fund?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How did you answer Krupp von -Bohlen’s letter asking you to do so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Would you please remind me of what Herr Von -Krupp wrote to me at the time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Have you the letter of the 29th -of May?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, one moment, please, I have nearly finished. -May I reply now? From this...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: First of all, did you receive such a -letter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right. Tell us what happened.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: In that letter Herr Von Krupp informed me that -industry and other economic circles, such as agriculture, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, -intended to organize a joint Hitler fund in order to combine in -one collection the unrestrained Party collections which were making -the entire country insecure. He informed me of this, and also of -the fact that a board of trustees was to be appointed for this Hitler -fund. I want to say that I never joined the board of trustees and -was not a member of it. He further informed me that the representatives -of the banks, Dr. Fischer and Dr. Mosier, would contact me -and inform me about these things. That is all that the letter says.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That I offer as Exhibit Number -USA-831, (Document Number D-151).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Will you look at the following letter -of the 30th of May 1933, which says they had the opportunity of -mentioning it to you? -<span class='pageno' title='582' id='Page_582'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: One moment, please. I do not think the letter is in -my document book. No, it is not here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The document was handed to the defendant.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I asked you to read the letter of the -29th of May first; one of the 29th of May and one of the 30th. The -29th of May has not been translated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I see. Just a minute. I read.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This letter never reached me. It has been crossed out and -apparently it was not sent, because Krupp and I had a personal -conversation to which Krupp refers in the letter of the following -day, 30 May; the letter begins, “As Dr. Köttgen and I had the -opportunity of mentioning to you yesterday...” That apparently -was a personal conversation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, and you had also said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“You were kind enough to promise me to obtain from Messrs. -Otto Christian Fischer and Dr. Mosier...full particulars, -and especially information on how far banks which are public -corporations can participate in this task.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, Mr. Justice Jackson, it does not say that in -the letter. Please, will you be good enough to read the letter of -29 May? Where does it say that I spoke to Dr. Fischer or would -speak to Dr. Mosier?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you deny receiving the letter of -the 29th?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never received it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you deny having a conversation -with Krupp von Bohlen-Halbach, the substance of which is set -forth in that letter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No—One moment. Please, let me answer quietly. -I do not wish to be accused of anything without replying.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I did not receive that letter on 29 May, nor did I receive it later. -Instead, there was a personal conversation. The subject of that -conversation is contained in the letter of 30 May, which we read -before and which I received. You have just asserted that I had -promised Krupp von Bohlen to speak to Dr. Fischer and Dr. Mosier. -The letter makes no mention of that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Does it not say so in the memorandum -which you say was replaced by a conversation? That is what I -am trying to ask you. -<span class='pageno' title='583' id='Page_583'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: At any rate, I did not promise to talk to the -gentlemen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Anything more you want to say?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No. That is enough.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, yesterday, I think it was, you -testified that you had made public statements against the terror -policy of the regime; and in evidence you quoted from your Königsberg -speech.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Unfortunately, Dr. Schacht, you -stopped just at the point where I got interested in it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, that is generally the case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After you had stated that there are -people who ran Germany—let me quote the part you quoted, because -it is important in connection...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Quote the whole thing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. This is what you quoted:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Those are the people who heroically smear window panes in -the middle of the night; who brand every German who trades -in a Jewish store as a traitor; who condemn every former -Freemason as a scoundrel, and who, in the just fight against -priests and ministers who talk politics from the pulpit, cannot -themselves distinguish between religion and misuse of -the pulpit. The goal at which these people aim is generally -correct and good.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That is what you quoted?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now let us go on:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The goal at which these people aim is generally correct and -good. There is no place in the Third Reich for secret societies, -regardless of how harmless they are. The priests and ministers -should take care of souls, and not meddle in politics. The -Jews must realize that their influence is gone for all time.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That was also a part of that speech, was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you pointed out in that speech -that on the Jewish problem, as you called it, legislation is being -prepared and must be awaited?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, I had hoped so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You assured them so, did you not? -<span class='pageno' title='584' id='Page_584'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I beg your pardon? Yes, that was the intention as -I gathered from my conversation with Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew that the laws on the -Jewish subject were on their way?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Not the laws which were passed later. I always -urged Hitler to give legal protection to the Jews. I wanted to see -this law enacted, and I assumed that it would be done; but instead -the Racial Laws of September or November, yes, November, 1935, -were passed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have quoted from Exhibit Number -USA-832, which is Document EC-433, and you say the laws you -were forecasting and promising were laws for the protection of the -Jews?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We will get to that later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You gave your reasons, which you said were reasons of principle, -to the Tribunal for not becoming a Party member?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR: JUSTICE JACKSON: Yesterday in Court, do you recall -that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now isn’t it a fact that you have told -the United States Prosecution Staff that you asked Hitler whether -to join the Party, and that to your great relief Hitler told you -not to?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes. Before I co-operated with him I wanted to find -out whether he demanded that I should become a member of the -Party. I was most relieved when he said I need not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So you remained out of the Party -with Hitler’s consent and approval?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, of course. I think that is just another reason -which will prove that I have never been a member of the Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you did not mention that to the -Tribunal when you were giving your reasons for setting out, that -Hitler had given permission?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, I thought the Tribunal would believe me -anyway.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When you received the Party golden -swastika, you stated that it was the greatest honor that could be -conferred by the Third Reich, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I did, yes. -<span class='pageno' title='585' id='Page_585'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And while you didn’t wear it in your -daily life, you did wear it on official occasions, you stated, did -you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes. It was very convenient on railroad journeys, -when ordering a car, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: From 1933 to 1942 you contributed -a thousand Reichsmark a year to the Nazi Party?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No. Yes, I beg your pardon; from 1937 to 1942.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Didn’t you say on interrogation that -it was from 1933 to 1942?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, that is an error. From 1937, after I had received -the swastika. Evidently that is a misunderstanding. After I had -received it I said to myself, “It would be fitting—give the people -a thousand marks a year, and have done with it.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: For upwards of ten years, not quite -ten years, you accepted and held office of one kind or another -under this regime, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: From 17 March 1933 to 21 January 1943.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And as I understand you, that during -this time, at least a part of the time, Hitler deceived you, and all -the time you deceived Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, oh no.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have misunderstood you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well now...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I believe that in the first years, at least, I did not -deceive Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I not only believe so, I know it. I only started to deceive him -in 1938. Until then, I always told him my honest opinion. I did -not cheat him at all; on the contrary...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What becomes, then, of your explanation -that you entered his government in order to put brakes on -his program? Did you tell him that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Oh, no. I should hardly have done that or he -would never have admitted me into the government. But I did -not deceive him about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he know your purpose in joining -his government was to defeat his program by sabotage?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I did not say that I wanted to defeat his program. -I said that I wanted to direct it into orderly channels. -<span class='pageno' title='586' id='Page_586'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you have said that you wanted -to put brakes on it. You used that expression.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Which meant slow down? Didn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he wanted to speed it up, isn’t -that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, perhaps.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never allowed him to know that -you had entered his government for the purpose of slowing down -his rearmament program, did you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: It was not necessary to tell him what I was thinking. -I did not deceive him. I made no false statements, but I would -hardly tell him what I actually thought and wanted. He did not -tell me his innermost thoughts either, and you do not tell them -to your political opponents either. I never deceived Hitler except -after 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I daresay. I am not asking you about -a political opponent. I am asking you about the man in whose -government you entered and became a part.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You don’t tell your opponents; but is -it customary in Germany that members of the government enter -for the purpose of defeating the head of the government’s program?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I have already told you that the word defeat is -incorrect. I did not intend to defeat him. I intended to slow him -down; and that is indeed the custom, for that is how every coalition -government is constructed. If you enter into a coalition government, -you must discuss certain matters with your neighboring parties -and come to an agreement about them, and you must use your -influence to check certain projects of the other party. That is not -a deception; it is an attempt at a compromise solution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You claim you entered as a coalition?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes. I explained that in a distinct and comprehensive -manner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You used the word yourself today, -in describing your activities, as sabotaging his rearmament program, -did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, I did so, shall we say, after 1936. But he -noticed it. That was not a deception. -<span class='pageno' title='587' id='Page_587'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You take some part of the responsibility, -I take it, for the loss of the war by Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: That is a very strange question. Please, forgive me -if I say that I assume no responsibility. Since I am not responsible -for the fact that the war started I cannot assume any responsibility -for the fact that it was lost. I did not want war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when did your doubts about -Hitler as a man, his integrity, first arise?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I have explained that in such detail during the -examination that I do not think I need repeat it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did that occur—I’ll put it in the -terms of your interrogation, since your interrogation is a little -clearer.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In 1934”—so your interrogation runs—“he killed many -people without having any legal justification or had them -killed; and a few days after, in the Reichstag, he said he -was the highest judge in Germany. He was certainly not, -and for the first time I was shaken by his conception. It -seemed to me absolutely immoral and inhuman.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I said that here yesterday or the day before; exactly -the same thing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I want to fix these dates, -Dr. Schacht. You see, your purpose in this trial and mine aren’t -exactly the same.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, no, I know that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also received full information -about the operation of the Gestapo from Gisevius in 1934 -or 1935, as he testified, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, he did not say that. He said that he knew -about these matters. He did not tell me everything, but I admitted -earlier today—this morning—that he did inform me of certain -things, and from that I drew my conclusions. At the beginning of -May 1935 I had already discussed this matter with Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were informed about the Gestapo -terrorism, Reichstag Fire...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: The Reichstag Fire?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ...the falsity of the purge claim...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: One moment, please. May I take them in order? -I was not told about the Reichstag Fire until years later by the -late Count Helldorf, who has been mentioned by Gisevius. -<span class='pageno' title='588' id='Page_588'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You mean Gisevius never told you -about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I think I heard it from Helldorf. I may have heard -it from Gisevius, but I think it was Helldorf. At any rate, it was -after 1935 that I heard about it. Until then, I did not think it was -possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never doubted Gisevius’ word -when he told you in 1934 or 1935 as he testified, did you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: One moment. He told me this either in 1934 or -1935, but not 1934 and 1935, and if he did tell me—well if Gisevius -said so, I assume that it is true.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It was then that you knew about the -persecution of the churches and the destruction of the labor unions, -wasn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: The destruction of the labor unions took place as -early as May 1933.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You knew all about that, didn’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I did not know everything, only what was generally -known. I knew exactly what every other German knew about it -and what the labor unions themselves knew.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: As a matter of fact, that was one -of the reasons for the contributions by yourself and other industrialists -to the Nazi Party, wasn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Oh, no: oh, no. There was never any question of -that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You mean that meetings of industrialists -were held, and as important a thing to industry as the -destruction of the labor unions was never mentioned in your conferences?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I know nothing about it. Will you please remind -me of something definite.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Confiscation of the properties; the -putting of labor union leaders into concentration camps.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I heard about that—one moment. I do not know -exactly who was put into the concentration camps. I was -informed about the confiscation of property because that was -publicly announced; but, if I understand you correctly, I do not -know what the meetings of industrialists had to do with it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also knew very early about -the persecution of the Jews, didn’t you? -<span class='pageno' title='589' id='Page_589'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I explained yesterday exactly what I knew about -the persecution of the Jews, how I acted in connection with the -persecution of the Jews, and I state that as long as I was a minister -I did everything to prevent these things.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I understood your generality, and I -am trying to get at a little more detail about it, Dr. Schacht. -Did you not testify as follows, on your interrogation on the 17th -of October 1945:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The National Socialists, as I understood from the program, -intended to have a smaller percentage of Jews in the governmental -and cultural positions of Germany, with which I -agreed.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Question: ‘Well, now, you had -read <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>, had you not?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Yes.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘And you knew the views of Hitler on the Jewish -question. Did you not?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Yes.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>You so testified, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Question: ‘Well, now, during -your time as Reich Minister, statutes were passed, were they -not, prohibiting all Jewish lawyers, for example, from practicing -in the courts?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Yes, that is what I said.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘Did you agree with that?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Yes.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you say that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you did agree with excluding...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, I always agreed with that principle.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. And you also agreed with the -principle of excluding all Jews from civil service positions, did -you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No. I want to emphasize in this connection...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: May I finish?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. -<span class='pageno' title='590' id='Page_590'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: With regard to the principle of the dominating -Jewish influence in government, legal, and cultural questions I have -always said that I did not consider this influence to be of advantage -either to the German people and Germany, which was a Christian -state and based on Christian conceptions, or to the Jews, since it -increased the animosity against them. For these reasons I was -always in favor of limiting Jewish participation in those fields, not -actually according to the population, but nevertheless limiting them -to a certain percentage.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, let’s go on with the interrogation. -The interrogations are always so much briefer than the -answers made in court where the press is present, if I may say so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you not give these answers:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Question: ‘Now, with respect to civil service. There was -this Aryan clause that was put in. Did you agree with that -legislation?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘With the same limitation.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘Now, did you ever express yourself in the Cabinet -or elsewhere to the point that you wanted these restrictions -put in, restrictions you have been talking about?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘I don’t think so; useless to do it.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘You say “useless to do it?” ’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Yes.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘I thought you said at one time or another that -the reason you stayed in is because you thought you might -have some influence on policy.’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Yes.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘You didn’t consider this as important enough a -matter to take a position on it?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Not an important enough matter to risk a break.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: To break, that is right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then, you were asked this:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“You certainly signed a law with respect to the prohibition -of Jews receiving licenses to deal in foreign currencies.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you remember that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Answer: ‘Yes, maybe.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘You were in favor of that?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘I don’t remember the details of that question.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘Well, it is not a matter of details. The question is -a matter of discrimination.’ -<span class='pageno' title='591' id='Page_591'></span></p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Yes.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>You said that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, certainly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were in favor of that legislation, -or were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Is that the question now, or from the interrogation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am asking you now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes. I agreed to it. Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were in favor of it. Well, you -were not when you were interrogated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: You can see how difficult it is.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The question then was, you were in -favor of it, and you said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“ ‘I wasn’t in favor, but I had to sign it.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘Well, you were the only one who signed it. You -were the Reich Minister of Economics?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Yes.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘And, obviously, it was a bill which was put in -by your Ministry, was it not?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Yes.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, I assume so. You see, in these matters it was -a question of degrees. I have just explained the principles of my -policy. The extent to which these individual laws went is a question -of politics. Today, you can say what you like about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also favored the law, and -signed the law, prohibiting all Jews from being admitted to examinations -for public economic advisors, for co-operatives, for example.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, possibly. I do not remember but probably it is -right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you also approved a law imposing -the death penalty on German subjects who transferred German -property abroad, or left German property abroad.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And of course you knew that that -affected, chiefly and most seriously, the Jews who were moving -abroad.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I hope that the Jews did not cheat any more than -the Christians. -<span class='pageno' title='592' id='Page_592'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, the death penalty on German -subjects for transferring German property abroad was your idea of -a just law?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not understand. My idea?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: It was an idea of the Minister of Finance, and I -signed it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question was then asked -you after these were recited:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Well, now, was there a matter of conscience involved, or -was there not?”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>And you answered:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“To some extent, yes, but not important enough to risk a -break.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the question:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Yes. In other words, you had quite another objective which -was more important?”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Well what was that objective, -Dr. Schacht?” I am still reading. It saves time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Oh, pardon me.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Answer: ‘Well, the objective was -to stay in power and to help carry this through in an ordinary -and reasonable way.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘That is to say, the restoration of the German -economy?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Quite.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘And the completion of the armament program?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘The completion of the international equality, the -political equality of Germany.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘By means of armament, as you yourself have -said?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Also by means of armament.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: All correct, and I stand by that today.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. So the armament question was -so important that you didn’t want to risk any break about the -Jews. -<span class='pageno' title='593' id='Page_593'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Not the armament question, but the equality of -Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, now, I just asked you “by -means of armament, as you yourself have said.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: And I say, also by means of armament. That is one -of the means.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it is the only one that was used -ultimately, wasn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, it was not. There were other ones.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We will get to that in time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, isn’t it a fact that you also approved the law dismissing -all Jewish officials and notaries public?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: That is possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you wrote to Blomberg on the -24th of December 1935 giving your motives, did you not, saying -this:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The economic and illegal treatment of the Jews, the anti-Church -movement of certain Party organizations, and the -lawlessness which centers in the Gestapo are a detriment to -our rearmament task which could be considerably lessened -through the application of more respectable methods, -without abandoning the goals in the least.” (Exhibit Number -Schacht-13).</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>You wrote that, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes. I quoted it myself yesterday.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as to the rearmament program, -you participated in that from three separate offices, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I do not know which offices you mean, but please -go ahead.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will help you to list them. In the -first place, you were Plenipotentiary for War.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That was the secret office at first.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were President of the Reichsbank. -That was the financial office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were Minister of Economics, -in which position you had control with the minister for the general -economic situation. -<span class='pageno' title='594' id='Page_594'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes. This word “control” is such a general term -that I cannot confirm your statement without question, but I was -Minister of Economics.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let us take up first this position -of Plenipotentiary for War. You have testified that this position -was created for two purposes: (a) Preparation for war; (b) Control -of the economy in event of war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: That means preliminary planning in case war -should come, and the direction of economy when war had broken -out. In other words, a preparatory period and a later period in -the event of war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, you were asked about your -functions and gave these answers, did you not, “As the Chief of -Staff provides for mobilization from a military point of view... -so you were concerned with it from the economic point of view.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You answered, “certainly.” And your -position as Plenipotentiary for War was of equal rank with the -War Ministry, was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, as you told us, those charged -with responsibility in event of war were: First, the Minister of War -and the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht; and, secondly, -on an equal footing, Dr. Schacht, as Plenipotentiary for Economics. -Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I assume so, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in January of 1937 you wrote -this, did you not?</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I am entrusted with the preparation of the war economy -according to the principle that our economic war organization -must be so organized in time of peace that the war -economy can be directly converted in case of emergency from -this peacetime organization and need not be created at the -outbreak of war.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I assume that that is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who was your Deputy in that -office? Wohlthat?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I think Wohlthat.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, those being your functions as -Plenipotentiary for the War Economy, let’s turn to your functions -as President of the Reichsbank. -<span class='pageno' title='595' id='Page_595'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>You said that the carrying out of the armament program was -the principal task of the German policy in 1935, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Undoubtedly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There is no doubt that you voluntarily -assumed the responsibility for finding financial and economic -means for doing that thing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No doubt.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were the financial and economic -administrator in charge of developing the armament industry -of Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, in no way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I may have misunderstood you.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Question: ‘Now, in connection with this development’ ”—I -am referring to your interrogation of the 16th of October 1945, -Exhibit USA-636 (Document Number 3728-PS), Page 44—“ ‘Now -in connection with this development of the armament -industry, you charged yourself as the financial and economic -administrator of it.’</p> - -<p>“Nodding your head.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I beg your pardon?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Nodding your head.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “You charged yourself”—I will ask -the whole question so you will get it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Now, in connection with this -development of the armament industry, you charged yourself -as the financial and economic administrator of it.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The record says that you nodded your head. The next question -was:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“And in that connection you took various steps. Would you -be good enough to describe for us the larger steps which you -took with reference to this goal of rearmament, first, internally, -and, second, with respect to foreign nations?</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Internally, I tried to collect all money available -for financing the mefo bills. Externally, I tried to maintain -foreign commerce as much as possible.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you make those answers, and are they correct? -<span class='pageno' title='596' id='Page_596'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I am sure that you are correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And your purpose in maintaining -foreign trade was to obtain enough foreign exchange to permit the -imports of raw materials, not manufactured, which were required -for the rearmament program. Is that not correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: That is the question that is put to me. Now comes -the answer. Please, will you read the answer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What is your answer now?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: My answer today is that that was not the only aim.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Not the only aim?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But that was the primary aim, was -it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, not at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right, what was the other aim?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: To keep Germany alive, to assure employment for -Germany, to obtain sufficient food for Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Which was your dominant aim?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: The food supply in Germany and work for the -export industry.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I should like to go over one or -two of these documents with you as to your aim. I refer to Document -1168-PS of May 3, 1935.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Title, “Financing of Armament,” Exhibit -Number USA-37.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The following comments are based on the assumption that -the completion of the armament program in regard to speed -and extent is the task of German policy and that accordingly -everything else must be subordinated to this aim, insofar -as this main goal is not endangered, by neglecting other -questions.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you write that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Not only did I write it, but I handed it to Hitler -personally. It is one of twin documents, one of which has already -been submitted in evidence and discussed in detail by the Prosecution. -I did not receive the second document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>When my defense counsel examined me I stated here that I was -intent on stopping the Party collections and Party moneys, which -<span class='pageno' title='597' id='Page_597'></span> -were extracted everywhere from the German people, because it -was extremely difficult for me to get the money to finance the -armament program and the mefo bills.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I could only get that point across to Hitler if I told him that -of course this was being done in the interests of armament. If -I had told him that this was done...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, but...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, please let me finish. If I had told him that this -was done for the building of theaters, or something similar, it -would have made no impression on him. However, if I said it -must be done because otherwise we could not arm, that was a -point which influenced Hitler and that is why I said it. I admitted -that and explained it during the examination by my attorney.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you didn’t call that misleading -him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I would not call it “misleading”; I would call it -“leading.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But leading without telling him the -true motives which actuated you, at least.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I think you can be much more successful in leading -a person if you do not tell him the truth than if you do tell him -the truth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am very glad to have that frank -statement of your philosophy, Dr. Schacht. I am greatly indebted -to you. Well, you devised all kinds of plans, one for the control -of foreign exchange, blocked foreign accounts; and mefo bills was -one of the principal ones of your devices for financing was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I don’t care about the details -of mefo bills, but I would like to ask you this. Isn’t it correct, as -you testified in the inquiry of the 16th of October 1945—Exhibit -Number USA-636—as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Question: ‘Actually, as a matter of fact, let me ask you this. -At the time when you started the mefo bills, for example, -there were no ready means available for financing the rearmament?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Quite.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘That is to say, through normal budget finance -methods?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Not enough.’ -<span class='pageno' title='598' id='Page_598'></span></p> - -<p>“Question: ‘Also, you were limited at that time by the statute -of the Reichsbank which did not permit you to give anything -near the sufficient credit which was required by the -armament program.’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Quite.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘And you found a way?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Yes.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘And the way you found was by creating a device -in effect which enabled the Reichsbank to lend, by a subterfuge, -to the Government what it normally or legally could -not do?’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Right.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p>Is that true?</p> - -<p>SCHACHT: That was my answer.</p> - -<p>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The following questions were then -asked:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I understand that basically what was built up in Germany -in the way of an armament industry, a domestic economy -that was sound, and a Wehrmacht, the efforts that you put -in from 1934 to the spring of 1938, when mefo financing -stopped, were responsible in large part for the success of the -whole program.</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘I don’t know whether they were responsible for -it, but I helped a great deal to achieve that.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were asked as follows, on -the 17th of October 1945:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In other words, in effect you are not taking the position that -you are not largely responsible for the rearming of the -German Army?</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘Oh no, I never did that.’</p> - -<p>“Question: ‘You have always been proud of that fact, I -take it.’</p> - -<p>“Answer: ‘I wouldn’t say proud, but satisfied.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is that still your position?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: In reply to that I should like to say: The question -of mefo bills was quite certainly a system of finance which normally -would never have been attempted. I made a detailed statement -on this subject when I was questioned by my attorney. On the -other hand, however, I can say that this question was examined -by all legal experts in the Reichsbank and by means of this -<span class='pageno' title='599' id='Page_599'></span> -subterfuge, as you put it, a way was found which was legally -possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, I didn’t put it that way; you -said so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, no. I mean the sentence you have just quoted -as being my answer. I beg your pardon. The matter was investigated -from a legal viewpoint, and we assured ourselves that it -could be done in this way. Moreover, I am still satisfied today -that I contributed to the rearmament, but I wish that Hitler had -made different use of it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, on your 60th birthday Minister -of War Blomberg said that, “Without your help, my dear Mr. -Schacht, there could have been no rearmament,” did he not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, those are the sort of pleasantries which one -exchanges on such occasions. But there is quite a bit of truth in -it. I have never denied it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is the way it looks to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, when you finally made some suggestion that the armament -should stop or slow up, as I understand, you made that suggestion -without knowing what the armament was.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The only thing you were judging by -was financial conditions, was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Oh, no.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, what was it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I did, of course, have a general impression of these -matters because General Thomas always discussed them with me. -However, I do not remember that General Von Blomberg gave -me detailed information about what he thought. Of course, I was -informed in a general way regarding the progress made by the -armament program, and that is why I said “more slowly.” My -opinion was strengthened because of the general conditions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well now, let’s see what reasons you -gave in Document Number EC-286. That is Exhibit Number -USA-833:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I am therefore of the opinion that we should promote -our export with all resources by a temporary”—and I emphasize -the word “temporary”—“decrease of armament.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Decrease?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Decrease, yes, temporary. -<span class='pageno' title='600' id='Page_600'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I emphasize “temporary,” and you -emphasize “decrease.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Oh no, no; I agree with you.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “And that further, with reference -to the Four Year Plan, we should solve only those problems -which appear most pressing. Among these I include the -oil-fuel program, the buna program, and the program of -developing ore resources, insofar as this development does -not of itself require large amounts of raw materials which -must be withheld from export.</p> - -<p>“On the other hand, all other measures of the Four Year Plan -should be postponed for the time being. I am convinced -that by such a policy our export could be increased so greatly -that there would be a certain improvement in our exhausted -stocks, and that the resumption of the strengthened armament -would again be possible in the not too distant future, from -the point of view of raw materials. I am unable to judge -to what extent a temporary postponement of armament would -have military advantages. However, I presume that such -a pause in armament would not only have advantages for -the training of officers and men, which has yet to be done, -but that this pause would also afford an opportunity to -survey the technical results of previous armament and to -perfect the technical aspect of armament.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now that you addressed to Göring, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: That is perfectly possible. I cannot remember the -letter, but it looks quite like one of mine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes; and you were correctly giving -to Göring your true views; were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No; I believe that this was merely a tactical letter. -I think that I was mainly trying to limit armament. If I had -told him that we wanted to stop arming, Göring would probably -have denounced me to the Führer accordingly. Therefore I told -him, “Let’s stop for the time being”—temporary. I also emphasize -“temporary.” It was a tactical measure to convince Göring that -for the time being it should be temporary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then, with your fellow officers in -the Government you were also using tactical statements which did -not represent your true views?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: That was absolutely necessary. -<span class='pageno' title='601' id='Page_601'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When did it cease to be necessary, -Dr. Schacht?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Cease?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes; when did it cease to be necessary?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I think it more important to ask when it commenced; -when it started.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: During the first years I did not do it, of course, -but later on I did to a considerable extent. I could say always; -it never stopped.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Has it stopped now?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I have no more colleagues, and here before this -Tribunal I have nothing to tell but the truth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, on the 24th of September, -1935—December—you wrote EC-293, which is Exhibit Number -USA-834, and used this language, did you not:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“If there is now a demand for greater armament, it is, of -course, not my intention to deny or change my attitude, -which is in favor of the greatest possible armament and -which I have expressed for years both before and since -the seizure of power; but it is my duty to point out the -economic limitations of this policy.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: That is very good.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that is true?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Certainly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came in the Four Year -Plan in 1936?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did not like the appointment of -Göring to that position?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: I thought he was unsuited and, of course, it made -an opening for a policy which was opposed to mine. I knew perfectly -well that this was the start of exaggerated armament, whereas -I was in favor of restricted rearmament.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Why do you say that Göring’s appointment -meant exaggeration of armament? Can you point to anything -that Göring has said in favor of rearmament that is any more -extreme than the things you have said? -<span class='pageno' title='602' id='Page_602'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Oh yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, will you do it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: Yes, I think if you read the record of the so-called -“small Ministerial Council,” of the year 1936, and in particular -1938, which you yourself introduced, you will see at once that -here the necessity of increased armament was emphasized. For -instance, those of November or October 1936, I think.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it was also emphasized in your -documents, was it not, throughout?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You say that your statements of that -sort were merely tactical.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, I beg your pardon. I said arm within the -limits of what is economically possible and reasonable. Göring, -if I may say it again, wanted to go beyond those limits.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is exactly the point I want to -make. Your difference with Göring over rearmament was entirely -a question of what the economy of Germany would stand, was -it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No. I said that the most important thing was that -Germany should live and have foreign trade, and within those -limits we could arm. However, it is out of the question that -Germany should arm for the sake of arming, and thus ruin her -economy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well that’s the difference between you -and Göring; it was over what the economy would stand, was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT: No, it was a question of the extent of rearmament. -The point is, Mr. Justice Jackson, that German economy paid the -price for Göring’s action. The only question is, was it reasonable -or unreasonable? If I may state it pointedly, I would say that I -considered Göring’s economic policy to be unreasonable and a -burden to the German nation; while I considered it most important -that rearmament should not be extended and that the German -nation should have a normal, peacetime standard.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 3 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:4em;margin-bottom:2em;font-size:1.2em;'>TRANSCRIBER NOTES</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious -printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for -periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; -however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus -“Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes -French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals: -hence Führer, Göring, Kraków, and Ljoteč etc. throughout.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb -tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the -tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations -between the German, English, French, and, most specifically with this -volume, Russian documents presented in the trial.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as -possible to the original document presentation and layout.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='noindent'>[The end of <span class='it'>Trial of the Major War Criminals -Before the International Military Tribunal Vol. 12</span>, -by Various.]</p> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOL. 12 ***</div> -<div style='text-align:left'> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will -be renamed. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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