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diff --git a/old/66028-0.txt b/old/66028-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 4b58644..0000000 --- a/old/66028-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30547 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the -International Military Tribunal, Vol. 12, by International Military -Tribunal - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International - Military Tribunal, Vol. 12 - Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 - -Author: International Military Tribunal - -Release Date: August 9, 2021 [eBook #66028] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -Produced by: John Routh, Cindy Beyer, and the online Distributed - Proofreaders Canada team at http://www.pgdpcanada.net. - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS -BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOL. 12 *** - - [Cover Illustration] - - - - - TRIAL - OF - THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS - - BEFORE - - THE INTERNATIONAL - MILITARY TRIBUNAL - - N U R E M B E R G - 14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946 - - - [Illustration] - - - P U B L I S H E D A T N U R E M B E R G , G E R M A N Y - 1 9 4 7 - - - - - This volume is published in accordance with the - direction of the International Military Tribunal by - the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction - of the Allied Control Authority for Germany. - - - - - VOLUME XII - - - - O F F I C I A L T E X T - - I N T H E - - ENGLISH LANGUAGE - - - - P R O C E E D I N G S - - 18 April 1946—2 May 1946 - - - - - CONTENTS - - - One Hundred and Eleventh Day, Thursday, 18 April 1946, - Morning Session 1 - Afternoon Session 33 - - One Hundred and Twelfth Day, Tuesday, 23 April 1946, - Morning Session 64 - Afternoon Session 97 - - One Hundred and Thirteenth Day, Wednesday, 24 April 1946, - Morning Session 136 - Afternoon Session 167 - - One Hundred and Fourteenth Day, Thursday, 25 April 1946, - Morning Session 196 - Afternoon Session 226 - - One Hundred and Fifteenth Day, Friday, 26 April 1946, - Morning Session 263 - Afternoon Session 292 - - One Hundred and Sixteenth Day, Monday, 29 April 1946, - Morning Session 317 - Afternoon Session 350 - - One Hundred and Seventeenth Day, Tuesday, 30 April 1946, - Morning Session 393 - Afternoon Session 429 - - One Hundred and Eighteenth Day, Wednesday, 1 May 1946, - Morning Session 460 - Afternoon Session 494 - - One Hundred and Nineteenth Day, Thursday, 2 May 1946, - Morning Session 527 - Afternoon Session 555 - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH DAY - Thursday, 18 April 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Dr. Seidl. - -DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Hans Frank): Mr. President, -Members of the Tribunal, on 9 April of this year, deviating from the -rule made by the Tribunal, I made the application that I should first be -allowed to present the documents, then call the witnesses, and then at -the end examine the defendant as a witness. I do not know whether the -Tribunal is already in possession of the document books. I have -ascertained that Volume I of the document book was translated by 8 -April, Volume II and III on 11 April, and Volume IV and V a few days -later. At any rate, I have not yet received any document books myself, -for the reason that the office concerned has not yet received permission -to bind the books. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, I thought I asked about this, not yesterday, but -the day before yesterday—yes; and you said you were perfectly ready to -go on. - -DR. SEIDL: I had been told that the books had been translated, and I -naturally assumed that these books would also be bound. Yesterday I -discovered that this is not the case. At any rate, the fault is not -mine. - -THE PRESIDENT: I was not suggesting that there was any fault on your -part. - -MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): In -the first place, we did not have much to go over with Dr. Seidl. The -agreement was reached with him the night before last about 6 o’clock or -a little afterwards. Thereafter the materials were put into the process -of preparation, and there are 500 pages. They have just not been -completed, and it is not so that the people did not receive authority to -go ahead. They have not been able to complete their work and there will -be some delay. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you can go on with your witnesses. You have -the defendant himself to call and several other witnesses. - -DR. SEIDL: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: And the documents will no doubt be ready by then. We are -rising this evening at half past four, and by the time that the Tribunal -reassembles, by Tuesday morning, no doubt all the documents will be -ready. As to your application, the Tribunal has considered the -application and sees no reason to depart from its ordinary rule that the -defendant should be called first; that is to say, if you intend to call -the defendant. - -DR. SEIDL: Oh yes, I intend to examine the defendant; but in the -interests of accelerating the proceedings, I suggested that the other -witnesses should be heard first so that the examination of the defendant -might be as short as possible. It is possible that he can then answer a -number of questions merely by saying “yes” or “no.” Another reason why I -consider this procedure to be the most expedient is because a proper -examination of the defendant is only possible if I have the document -books at hand at the same time. That necessity does not apply to the -other witnesses. I should, therefore, beg the Tribunal to give me -permission so that I can first examine the witnesses who are already in -the witnesses’ room. - -THE PRESIDENT: The documents are all, or nearly all, I imagine, in -German and can be put to the defendant in the course of his examination; -and the Tribunal think, as they have already said, that calling the -defendant first is in the interests of expedition; and they, therefore, -feel they must adhere to their rule. - -DR. SEIDL: Very well. In that case, with the permission of the Tribunal, -I call the Defendant Dr. Hans Frank to the witness stand. - -[_The Defendant Frank took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you give your full name? - -HANS FRANK (Defendant): Hans Frank. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: - -I, swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down, please. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, when and where were you born? - -FRANK: I was born on 23 May 1900 at Karlsruhe, in Baden. - -DR. SEIDL: Will you please give the Tribunal a brief outline of your -education? - -FRANK: In 1919 I finished my studies at the Gymnasium, and in 1926 I -passed the final state law examination, which completed my legal -training. - -DR. SEIDL: And what profession did you follow after that? - -FRANK: I had several legal posts. I worked as a lawyer; as a member of -the teaching staff of a technical college; and then I worked principally -as legal adviser to Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist German -Workers Party. - -DR. SEIDL: Since when have you been a member of the NSDAP? - -FRANK: I joined the German Labor Party, which was the forerunner of the -National Socialist German Workers Party, in 1919, but did not join the -newly formed National Socialist Workers Party at the time. In 1923 I -joined the Movement in Munich as a member of the SA; and eventually, so -to speak, I joined the NSDAP for the first time in 1927. - -DR. SEIDL: Were you ever a member of the SS? - -FRANK: I have never been a member of the SS. - -DR. SEIDL: That means you have never had a rank of an SS -Obergruppenführer or General of the SS? - -FRANK: I never had the rank of an SS Obergruppenführer or SS General. - -DR. SEIDL: Not even honorary? - -FRANK: No, not even honorary. - -DR. SEIDL: You were a member of the SA. What was the last position you -held in that? - -FRANK: I was Obergruppenführer in the SA at the end, and this was an -honorary position. - -DR. SEIDL: What posts did you hold in the NSDAP during the various -periods, and what functions did you exercise? - -FRANK: In 1929 I became the head of the legal department of the Supreme -Party Directorate of the NSDAP. In that capacity I was appointed -Reichsleiter of the NSDAP by Adolf Hitler in 1931. I held this position -until I was recalled in 1942. These are the principal offices I have -held in the Party. - -DR. SEIDL: Until the seizure of power you concerned yourself mainly with -legal questions within the Party, did you not? - -FRANK: I dealt with legal questions in the interest of Adolf Hitler and -the NSDAP and its members during the difficult years of struggle for the -victory of the Movement. - -DR. SEIDL: What were your basic ideas regarding the concept of a state -controlled by a legal system? - -FRANK: That idea, as far as I was concerned, was contained in Point 19 -of the Party program, which speaks of German common law to be created. -In the interest of accelerating the proceedings, I do not wish to -present my ideas in detail. My first endeavor was to save the core of -the German system of justice: the independent judiciary. - -My idea was that even in a highly developed Führer State, even under a -dictatorship, the danger to the community and to the legal rights of the -individual is at least lessened if judges who do not depend on the State -Leadership can still administer justice in the community. That means, to -my mind, that the question of a state ruled by law is to all intents and -purposes identical with the question of the existence of the independent -administration of law. Most of my struggles and discussions with Hitler, -Himmler, and Bormann during these years were more and more focused on -this particular subject. Only after the independent judiciary in the -National Socialist Reich had been definitely done away with did I give -up my work and my efforts as hopeless. - -DR. SEIDL: You were also a member of the Reichstag? - -FRANK: In 1930 I became a member of the Reichstag. - -DR. SEIDL: What posts did you hold after 1933? - -FRANK: First, I was Bavarian State Minister of Justice, and after the -ministries of justice in the various states were dissolved I became -Reich Minister without portfolio. In 1933 I became the President of the -Academy of German Law, which I had founded. I was the Reich Leader of -the National Socialist Jurists Association, which was later on given the -name of “Rechtswahrerbund.” In 1933 and 1934 I was Reich Commissioner -for Justice, and in 1939 I became Governor General of the Government -General in Kraków. - -DR. SEIDL: What were the aims of the Academy of German Law of which you -were the founder? - -FRANK: These aims are written down in the Reich Law regarding the -Academy of German Law. The main task, the central task, of that Academy -was to carry out Point 19 of the Party program to bring German Common -Law into line with our national culture. - -DR. SEIDL: Did the Academy of German Law have definite functions, or -could it act only in an advisory capacity? - -FRANK: The Academy of German Law was the meeting place of the most -prominent legal minds in Germany in the theoretical and practical -fields. Right from the beginning I attached no importance to the -question whether the members were members of the Party or not. Ninety -percent of the members of the Academy of German Law were not members of -the Party. Their task was to prepare laws, and they worked somewhat on -the lines of an advisory committee in a well-organized parliament. It -was also my idea that the advisory committees of the Academy should -replace the legal committees of the German Reichstag, which was -gradually fading into the background in the Reich. - -In the main the Academy helped to frame only laws of an economic or -social nature, since owing to the development of the totalitarian regime -it became more and more impossible to co-operate in other spheres. - -DR. SEIDL: If I understand you correctly, then the governmental -administration of law was solely in the hands of the Reich Minister of -Justice, and that was not you. - -FRANK: No, I was not Reich Minister of Justice. The Reich Minister of -Justice, Dr. Gürtner, was, however, not competent for the entire field -of legislation but merely for those laws which came within the scope of -his ministry. Legislation in the Reich, in accordance with the Enabling -Act, was in the hands of the Führer and Reich Chancellor and the Reich -Government as a body. Consequently my name appears in the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_ at the bottom of one law only, and that is the law -regarding the Reintroduction of Compulsory Military Service. However, I -am proud that my name stands at the end of that law. - -DR. SEIDL: You have stated earlier that during 1933 and 1934 you were -Bavarian Minister of Justice. - -FRANK: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: In that capacity did you have an opportunity of voicing your -opinion on the question of concentration camps, and what were the -circumstances? - -FRANK: I learned that the Dachau concentration camp was being -established in connection with a report which came to me from the Senior -Public Prosecutor’s Office in Munich on the occasion of the killing of -the Munich attorney, Dr. Strauss. This Public Prosecutor’s Office -complained to me, after I had given them orders to investigate the -killing, that the SS had refused them admission to the Dachau -concentration camp. Thereupon I had Reich Governor, General Von Epp, -call a meeting where I produced the files regarding this killing and -pointed out the illegality of such an action on the part of the SS and -stated that so far representatives from the German Public Prosecutor’s -Office had always been able to investigate any death which evoked a -suspicion that a crime had been committed and that I had not become -aware so far of any departure from this principle in the Reich. After -that I continued protesting against this method to Dr. Gürtner, the -Reich Minister of Justice and at the same time Attorney General. I -pointed out that this meant the beginning of a development which -threatened the legal system in an alarming manner. - -At Heinrich Himmler’s request Adolf Hitler intervened personally in this -matter, and he used his power to quash any legal proceedings. The -proceedings were ordered to be quashed. I handed in my resignation as -Minister of Justice, but it was not accepted. - -DR. SEIDL: When did you become Governor General of the occupied Polish -territories, and where were you when you were informed of this -appointment? - -FRANK: On 24 August 1939, as an officer in the reserve, I had to join my -regiment in Potsdam. I was busy training my company; and on 17 -September, or it may have been 16, I was making my final preparations -before going to the front when a telephone call came from the Führer’s -special train ordering me to go to the Führer at once. - -The following day I traveled to Upper Silesia where the Führer’s special -train was stationed at that time; and in a very short conversation, -which lasted less than ten minutes, he gave me the mission, as he put -it, to take over the functions of Civil Governor for the occupied Polish -territories. - -At that time the whole of the conquered Polish territories was under the -administrative supreme command of a military commander, General Von -Rundstedt. Toward the end of September I was attached to General Von -Rundstedt’s staff as Chief of Administration, and my task was to do the -administrative work in the Military Government. In a short time, -however, it was found that this method did not work; and when the Polish -territories were divided into the part which was incorporated into the -German Reich and the part which then became the Government General, I -was appointed Governor General as from 26 October. - -DR. SEIDL: You have mentioned the various positions which you held over -a number of years. I now ask you: Did you, in any of the positions you -held in the Party or the State, play any vital part in the political -events of the last 20 years? - -FRANK: In my own sphere I did everything that could possibly be expected -of a man who believes in the greatness of his people and who is filled -with fanaticism for the greatness of his country, in order to bring -about the victory of Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist movement. - -I never participated in far-reaching political decisions, since I never -belonged to the circle of the closest associates of Adolf Hitler, -neither was I consulted by Adolf Hitler on general political questions, -nor did I ever take part in conferences about such problems. Proof of -this is that throughout the period from 1933 to 1945 I was received only -six times by Adolf Hitler personally, to report to him about my sphere -of activities. - -DR. SEIDL: What share did you have in the legislation of the Reich? - -FRANK: I have already told you that, and there is no need to give a -further answer. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you, as a Reich Minister or in any other State or Party -post want this war, or did you desire a war in violation of treaties -entered into? - -FRANK: War is not a thing one wants. War is terrible. We have lived -through it; we did not want the war. We wanted a great Germany and the -restoration of the freedom and welfare, the health and happiness of our -people. It was my dream, and probably the dream of every one of us, to -bring about a revision of the Versailles Treaty by peaceful means, which -was provided for in that very treaty. But as in the world of treaties, -between nations also, it is only the one who is strong who is listened -to; Germany had to become strong first before we could negotiate. This -is how I saw the development as a whole: the strengthening of the Reich, -reinstatement of its sovereignty in all spheres, and by these means to -free ourselves of the intolerable shackles which had been imposed upon -our people. I was happy, therefore, when Adolf Hitler, in a most -wonderful rise to power, unparalleled in the history of mankind, -succeeded by the end of 1938 in achieving most of these aims; and I was -equally unhappy when in 1939, to my dismay, I realized more and more -that Adolf Hitler appeared to be departing from that course and to be -following other methods. - -THE PRESIDENT: This seems to have been covered by what the Defendant -Göring told us, by what the Defendant Ribbentrop told us. - -DR. SEIDL: The witness has already completed his statement on this -point. - -Witness, what was your share in the events of Poland after 1939? - -FRANK: I bear the responsibility; and when, on 30 April 1945, Adolf -Hitler ended his life, I resolved to reveal that responsibility of mine -to the world as clearly as possible. - -I did not destroy the 43 volumes of my diary, which report on all these -events and the share I had in them; but of my own accord I handed them -voluntarily to the officers of the American Army who arrested me. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, do you feel guilty of having committed crimes in -violation of international conventions or crimes against humanity? - -THE PRESIDENT: That is a question that the Tribunal has got to decide. - -DR. SEIDL: Then I shall drop the question. - -Witness, what do you have to say regarding the accusations which have -been brought against you in the Indictment? - -FRANK: To these accusations I can only say that I ask the Tribunal to -decide upon the degree of my guilt at the end of my case. - -I myself, speaking from the very depths of my feelings and having lived -through the 5 months of this trial, want to say that now after I have -gained a full insight into all the horrible atrocities which have been -committed, I am possessed by a deep sense of guilt. - -DR. SEIDL: What were your aims when you took over the post of Governor -General? - -FRANK: I was not informed about anything. I heard about special action -commandos of the SS here during this trial. In connection with and -immediately following my appointment, special powers were given to -Himmler, and my competence in many essential matters was taken away from -me. A number of Reich offices governed directly in matters of economy, -social policy, currency policy, food policy, and therefore, all I could -do was to lay upon myself the task of seeing to it that amid the -conflagration of this war, some sort of an order should be built up -which would enable men to live. The work I did out there, therefore, -cannot be judged in the light of the moment, but must be judged in its -entirety, and we shall have to come to that later. My aim was to -safeguard justice, without doing harm to our war effort. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, did the police, and particularly the Security Police -and SD, come under your jurisdiction in the Government General? - -FRANK: The Higher SS and Police Leaders were in principle subordinate to -the Reichsführer SS Himmler. The SS did not come under my command, and -any orders or instructions which I might have given would not have been -obeyed. Witness Bühler will cover this question in detail. - -The general arrangement was that the Higher SS and Police Leader was -formally attached to my office, but in fact, and by reason of his -activities, he was purely an agent of the Reichsführer SS Himmler. This -state of affairs, even as early as November 1939, was the cause of my -first offer to resign which I made to Adolf Hitler. It was a state of -affairs which made things extremely difficult as time went by. In spite -of all my attempts to gain control of these matters, the drift -continued. An administration without a police executive is powerless and -there were many proofs of this. The police officers, so far as -discipline, organization, pay, and orders were concerned, came -exclusively under the German Reich police system and were in no way -connected with the administration of the Government General. The -officials of the SS and Police therefore did not consider that they were -attached to the Government General in matters concerning their duty, -neither was the police area called “Police Area, Government General.” -Moreover the Higher SS and Police Leader did not call himself “SS and -Police Leader in the Government General” but “Higher SS and Police -Leader East.” However, I do not propose to go into details at this -point. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, did the concentration camps in the Government -General come under you, and did you have anything to do with their -administration? - -FRANK: Concentration camps were entirely a matter for the police and had -nothing to do with the administration. Members of the civil -administration were officially prohibited from entering the camps. - -DR. SEIDL: Have you yourself ever been in a concentration camp? - -FRANK: In 1935 I participated in a visit to the Dachau concentration -camp, which had been organized for the Gauleiters. That was the only -time that I have entered a concentration camp. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, in 1942, by a decree of the Führer, a State -Secretariat for Security in the Government General was created. The date -is 7 May 1942. What was the reason for creating that State Secretariat? - -FRANK: The establishment of this State Secretariat was one of the many -attempts to solve the problem of the police in the Government General. I -was very happy about it at the time, because I thought now we had found -the way to solve the problem. I am certain it would have worked if -Himmler and Krüger had adhered to the principle of this decree, which -was co-operation and not working against each other. But before long it -transpired that this renewed attempt, too, was merely camouflage; and -the old conditions continued. - -DR. SEIDL: On 3 June 1942, on the basis of this Führer decree, another -decree was issued regarding the transfer of official business to the -State Secretary for Security. Is that true? - -FRANK: I assume so, if you have the document. I cannot remember the -details of course. - -DR. SEIDL: In that case I shall ask the witness Bilfinger about this -point. - -FRANK: But I should like to add something to that. Wherever the SS is -discussed here, the SS and the police are considered as forming one -body. It would not be right of me if I did not correct that wrong -conception. I have known during the course of these years so many -honest, clean, and upright soldiers among the SS, and especially among -the Waffen-SS and the police, that when judging here the problem of the -SS in regard to the criminal nature of their activities, one can draw -the same clear distinction as in the case of any of the other social -groups. The SS, as such, behaved no more criminally than any other -social groups would behave when taking part in political events. The -dreadful thing was that the responsible chief, and a number of other SS -men who unfortunately had been given considerable powers, were able to -abuse the loyal attitude which is so typical of the German soldier. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, another question. In the decree concerning the -creation of the State Secretariat for Security, it is ordered that the -State Secretary—which in this case was the Higher SS and Police -Leader—before making basic decisions, had to ask you for your approval. -Was that done? - -FRANK: No, I was never called upon to give my approval and that was the -reason why before long this, my last, attempt proved to be a failure. - -DR. SEIDL: Did the Higher SS and Police Leader and the SS -Obergruppenführer Krüger, in particular, obey orders which you had given -them? - -FRANK: Please, would you repeat the question? It did not come through -too well. And please, Dr. Seidl, do not speak quite so loudly. - -DR. SEIDL: Did the Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger, who at the same -time was the State Secretary for Security, obey orders which you gave -him in your capacity as Governor General? - -FRANK: Not even a single order. On the strength of this new decree I -repeatedly gave orders. These orders were supposedly communicated to -Heinrich Himmler; and as his agreement was necessary, these orders were -never carried out. Some special cases can be confirmed by the State -Secretary Bühler when he is here as a witness. - -DR. SEIDL: Did the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police, -before he carried out security police measures in the Government -General, ever obtain your approval? - -FRANK: Not in a single case. - -DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has submitted a document, L-37, as Exhibit -Number USA-506. It is a letter from the Commander of the Security Police -and SD of the District Radom, addressed to the branch office at -Tomassov. This document contains the following: - - “On 28 June 1944 the Higher SS and Police Leader East issued the - following order: - - “The security situation in the Government General has - deteriorated so much during the recent months that the most - radical means and the most severe measures must now be employed - against these alien assassins and saboteurs. The Reichsführer SS - in agreement with the Governor General, has given order that in - every case of assassination or attempted assassination of - Germans, not only the perpetrators shall be shot when caught, - but that in addition, all their male relatives shall also be - executed, and their female relatives above the age of sixteen - put into a concentration camp.” - -FRANK: As I have said that I was never called upon by the Reichsführer -SS Himmler to give my approval to such orders, your question has already -been answered. In this case, I was not called upon either. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, were you at least informed of such orders from the -Reichsführer SS Himmler or from the Higher SS and Police Leader East -before they were carried out? - -FRANK: The reason why this was not done was always the same. I was told -that as Poles were living not only in the Government General but also in -those territories which had been incorporated into the Reich, the fight -against the Polish resistance movement had to be carried on by unified -control from a central office, and this central office was Heinrich -Himmler. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, what jurisdiction did you have in the general -administration? - -FRANK: I think it would accelerate the proceedings if the Witness Bühler -could testify to these details. If the Tribunal so desires I will of -course answer this question now. In the main I was concerned with the -setting up of the usual administrative departments, such as food, -culture, finance, science, _et cetera_. - -DR. SEIDL: Were there representatives of the Polish and Ukrainian -population in the Government General? - -FRANK: Yes. The representation of the Polish and Ukrainian population -was on a regional basis, and I united the heads of the bodies of -representatives from the various districts in the so-called subsidiary -committees. There was a Polish and an Ukrainian subsidiary committee. -Count Ronikier was the head of the Polish committee for a number of -years, and at the head of the Ukrainian committee was Professor -Kubiowicz. I made it obligatory for all my offices to contact these -subsidiary committees on all questions of a general nature, and this -they did. I myself was in constant contact with both of them. Complaints -were brought to me there and we had free discussions. My complaints and -memoranda to the Führer were mostly based on the reports from these -subsidiary committees. - -A second form in which the population participated in the administration -of the Government General was by means of the lowest administrative -units, which throughout the Government General were in the hands of the -native population. Every ten to twenty villages had as their head a -so-called _Wojt_. This Polish word _Wojt_ is the same as the German word -“Vogt”—V-o-g-t. He was, so to speak, the lowest administrative unit. - -A third form of participation by the population in the administration -was the employment of about 280,000 Poles and Ukrainians as government -officials or civil servants in the public services of the Government -General, including the postal and railway services. - -DR. SEIDL: In what numerical proportion did the German civil servants -stand to the Polish and Ukrainian civil servants? - -FRANK: The proportion varied. The number of German civil servants was -very small. There were times when, in the whole of the Government -General, the area of which is 150,000 square kilometers—that means half -the size of Italy—there were not more than 40,000 German civil -servants. That means to one German civil servant there were on the -average at least six non-German civil servants and employees. - -DR. SEIDL: Which territories did you rule as Governor General? - -FRANK: Poland, which had been jointly conquered by Germany and the -Soviet Union, was divided first of all between the Soviet Union and the -German Reich. Of the 380,000 square kilometers, which is the approximate -size of the Polish State, approximately 200,000 square kilometers went -to the Soviet Union and approximately 170,000 to 180,000 square -kilometers to the German Reich. Please do not ask me for exact figures; -that was roughly the proportion. - -That part of Poland which was taken over into Soviet Russian territory -was immediately treated as an integral part of the Soviet Union. The -border signs in the east of the Government General were the usual Reich -border signs of the Soviet Union, as from 1939. That part which came to -Germany was divided thus: 90,000 square kilometers were left to the -Government General and the remainder was incorporated into the German -Reich. - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think there is any charge against the defendant -on the ground that the civil administration was bad. The charge is that -crimes were committed, and the details of the administration between the -Government General and the department in the Reich are not really in -question. - -DR. SEIDL: The only reason, Mr. President, why I put that question was -to demonstrate the difficulties with which the administration had to -cope right from the beginning in this territory, for an area which -originally represented one economic unit was now split into three -different parts. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I am coming now to the next question. Did -you ever have hostages shot? - -FRANK: My diary contains the facts. I myself have never had hostages -shot. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you ever participate in the annihilation of Jews? - -FRANK: I say “yes”; and the reason why I say “yes” is because, having -lived through the 5 months of this trial, and particularly after having -heard the testimony of the witness Hoess, my conscience does not allow -me to throw the responsibility solely on these minor people. I myself -have never installed an extermination camp for Jews, or promoted the -existence of such camps; but if Adolf Hitler personally has laid that -dreadful responsibility on his people, then it is mine too, for we have -fought against Jewry for years; and we have indulged in the most -horrible utterances—my own diary bears witness against me. Therefore, -it is no more than my duty to answer your question in this connection -with “yes.” A thousand years will pass and still this guilt of Germany -will not have been erased. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, what was your policy for the recruiting of laborers -for the Reich when you were Governor General? - -FRANK: I beg your pardon? - -DR. SEIDL: What policy did you pursue for the recruiting of labor for -the Reich in your capacity as Governor General? - -FRANK: The policy is laid down in my decrees. No doubt they will be held -against me by the Prosecution, and I consider it will save time if I -answer that question later, with the permission of the Tribunal. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, did Hitler give you any instructions as to how you -should carry out your administration as Governor General? - -FRANK: During the first 10 minutes of the audience in his special train -Adolf Hitler instructed me to see to it that this territory, which had -been utterly devastated—all the bridges had been blown up; the railways -no longer functioned, and the population was in a complete turmoil—was -put into order somehow; and that I should see to it that this territory -should become a factor which would contribute to the improvement of the -terribly difficult economic and war situation of the German Reich. - -DR. SEIDL: Did Adolf Hitler support you in your work as Governor -General? - -FRANK: All my complaints, everything I reported to him, were -unfortunately dropped into the wastepaper basket by him. I did not send -in my resignation 14 times for nothing. It was not for nothing that I -tried to join my brave troops as an officer. In his heart he was always -opposed to lawyers, and that was one of the most serious shortcomings of -this outstandingly great man. He did not want to admit formal -responsibility, and that, unfortunately, applied to his policy too, as I -have found out now. Every lawyer to him was a disturbing element working -against his power. All I can say, therefore, is that, by supporting -Himmler’s and Bormann’s aims to the utmost, he permanently jeopardized -any attempt to find a form of government worthy of the German name. - -DR. SEIDL: Which departments of the Reich gave instructions to you -regarding the administration of the Government General? - -FRANK: In order to expedite the proceedings I should like to suggest -that the witness Bühler give the whole list. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you ever loot art treasures? - -FRANK: An accusation which is one that touches my private life, and -affects me most deeply, is that I am supposed to have enriched myself -with the art treasures of the country entrusted to me. I did not collect -pictures and I did not find time during the war to appropriate art -treasures. I took care to see that all the art treasures of the country -entrusted to me were officially registered, and had that official -register incorporated in a document which was widely distributed; and, -above all, I saw to it that those art treasures remained in the country -right to the very end. In spite of that, art treasures were removed from -the Government General. A part was taken away before my administration -was established. Experience shows that one cannot talk of responsibility -for an administration until some time after it has been functioning, -namely, when the administration has been built up from the bottom. So -that from the outbreak of the war, 1 September 1939, until this point, -which was about at the end of 1939, I am sure that art treasures were -stolen to an immeasurable extent either as war booty or under some other -pretext. During the registration of the art treasures, Adolf Hitler gave -the order that the Veit Stoss altar should be removed from St. Mary’s -Church in Kraków, and taken to the Reich. In September 1939 Mayor Liebel -came from Nuremberg to Kraków for that purpose with a group of SS men -and removed this altar. A third instance was the removal of the Dürer -etchings in Lvov by a special deputy before my administration was -established there. In 1944, shortly before the collapse, art treasures -were removed to the Reich for storage. In the Castle of Seichau, in -Silesia, there was a collection of art treasures which had been brought -there by Professor Kneisl for this purpose. One last group of art -treasures was handed over to the Americans by me personally. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, did you introduce ghettos, that is, Jewish quarters -in the Government General? - -FRANK: I issued an instruction regarding the setting up of Jewish -quarters. I do not remember the date. As to the reasons and the -necessity for that, I shall have to answer the Prosecutor’s questions. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you introduce badges to mark the Jews? - -FRANK: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself introduce forced labor in the Government -General? - -FRANK: Forced labor and compulsory labor service were introduced by me -in one of the first decrees; but it is quite clear from all the decrees -and their wording that I had in mind only a labor service within the -country for repairing the damage caused by the war, and for carrying out -work necessary for the country itself, as was of course done by the -labor service in the Reich. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you, as was stated by the Prosecution, plunder libraries -in the Government General? - -FRANK: I can answer that question plainly with “no.” The largest and -most valuable library which we found, the Jagellon University Library in -Kraków, which thank God was not destroyed, was transferred to a new -library building on my own personal orders; and the entire collection, -including the most ancient documents, was looked after with great care. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, did you as Governor General close down the -universities in the Government General? - -FRANK: The universities in the Government General were closed because of -the war when we arrived. The reopening of the universities was -prohibited by order of Adolf Hitler. I supplied the needs of the Polish -and Ukrainian population by introducing university courses of -instruction for Polish and Ukrainian students—which were actually on a -university level—in such a way that the Reich Authorities could not -criticize it. The fact that there was an urgent need for native -university-trained men, particularly doctors, technicians, lawyers, -teachers, _et cetera_, was the best guarantee that the Poles and -Ukrainians would be allowed to continue university teaching to the -extent which war conditions would allow. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, we were last speaking of the universities. Did you -yourself, as Governor General, close the secondary schools? - -FRANK: My suggestion to reopen the Gymnasiums and secondary schools was -rejected by Adolf Hitler. We helped to solve the problem by permitting -secondary school education in a large number of private schools. - -DR. SEIDL: Now, a basic question. The Prosecution accuse you of having -plundered the country ruled by you as Governor General. What do you have -to say to that? - -FRANK: Well, evidently by that accusation is meant everything that -happened in the economic sphere in that country as a result of the -arrangements between the German Reich and the Government General. First, -I would like to emphasize that the Government General had to start with -a balance sheet which revealed a frightful economic situation. The -country had approximately twelve million inhabitants. The area of the -Government General was the least fertile part of the former Poland. -Moreover, the boundary between the Soviet Union, as well as the boundary -between the German Reich, had been drawn in such a way that the most -essential elements, indispensable for economy, were left outside. The -frontiers between the Soviet Union and the German Reich were immediately -closed; and so, right from the start, we had to make something out of -nothing. - -Galicia, the most important area in the Republic of Poland from the -viewpoint of food supplies, was given to the Soviet Union. The province -of Posen belonged to the German Reich. The coal and industrial areas of -Upper Silesia were within the German Reich. The frontier with Germany -was drawn in such a way that the iron works in Czestochowa remained with -the Government General, whereas the iron-ore basins which were 10 -kilometers from Czestochowa were incorporated into the German Reich. - -The town of Lodz, the textile center of Poland, came within the German -Reich. The city of Warsaw with a population of several millions became a -frontier town because the German border came as close as 15 kilometers -to Warsaw, and the result was that the entire agricultural hinterland -was no longer at the disposal of that city. A great many facts could be -mentioned, but that would probably take us too far. The first thing we -had to do was to set things going again somehow. During the first weeks -the population of Warsaw could only be fed with the aid of German -equipment for mass feeding. The German Reich at that time sent 600,000 -tons of grain, as a loan of course, and that created a heavy debt for -me. - -I started the financial economy with 20 million zlotys which had been -advanced to me by the Reich. We started with a completely impoverished -economy due to the devastation caused by the war, and by the first of -January 1944 the savings bank accounts of the native population had -reached the amount of 11,500 million zlotys, and we had succeeded by -then in improving the feeding of the population to a certain extent. -Furthermore, at that time the factories and industrial centers had been -reconstructed, to which reconstruction the Reich authorities had made -outstanding contributions; Reich Marshal Göring and Minister Speer -especially deserve great credit for the help given in reviving the -industry of the country. More than two million fully paid workers were -employed; the harvest had increased to 1.6 million tons in a year; the -yearly budget had increased from 20 million zlotys in the year 1939 to -1,700 million zlotys. All this is only a sketch which I submit here to -describe the general development. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, in your capacity as Governor General did you -persecute churches and religion in the areas which you had under your -administration? - -FRANK: I was in constant personal contact with the Archbishop, now -Cardinal, Sapieha in Kraków. He told me of all his sufferings and -worries, and they were not few. I myself had to rescue the Bishop of -Lublin from the hands of Herr Globocznik in order to save his life. - -DR. SEIDL: You mean the SS Gruppenführer Globocznik? - -FRANK: Yes, that is the one I mean. - -But I may summarize the situation by quoting the letter which Archbishop -Sapieha sent to me in 1942, in which, to use his own words, he thanked -me for my tireless efforts to protect the life of the church. We -reconstructed seminaries for priests; and we investigated every case of -arrest of a priest, as far as that was humanly possible. The tragic -incident when two assistants of the Archbishop Sapieha were shot, which -has been mentioned here by the Prosecution, stirred my own emotions very -deeply. I cannot say any more. The churches were open; the seminaries -were educating priests; the priests were in no way prevented from -carrying out their functions. The monastery at Czestochowa was under my -personal protection. The Kraków monastery of the Camaldulians, which is -a religious order, was also under my personal protection. There were -large posters around the monastery indicating that these monasteries -were protected by me personally. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, when did you hear for the first time about the -concentration camp at Maidanek? - -FRANK: I heard the name Maidanek for the first time in 1944 from foreign -reports. But for years there had been contradictory rumors about the -camp near Lublin, or in the Lublin District, if I may express myself in -such a general way. Governor Zörner once told me, I believe already in -1941, that the SS intended to build a large concentration camp near -Lublin and had applied for large quantities of building materials, _et -cetera_. At that time I instructed State Secretary Bühler to investigate -the matter immediately, and I was told, and I also received a report in -writing from Reichsführer SS Himmler, that he had to build a large camp -required by the Waffen-SS to manufacture clothes, footwear, and -underwear in large SS-owned workshops. This camp went under the name of -“SS Works,” or something similar. - -Now, I have to say I was in a position to get information, whereas the -witnesses who have testified so far have said under oath that in the -circles around the Führer nothing was known about all these things. We -out there were more independent, and I heard quite a lot through enemy -broadcasts and enemy and neutral papers. In answer to my repeated -questions as to what happened to the Jews who were deported, I was -always told they were to be sent to the East, to be assembled, and put -to work there. But, the stench seemed to penetrate the walls, and -therefore I persisted in my investigations as to what was going on. Once -a report came to me that there was something going on near Belcec. I -went to Belcec the next day. Globocznik showed me an enormous ditch -which he was having made as a protective wall and on which many -thousands of workers, apparently Jews, were engaged. I spoke to some of -them, asked them where they came from, how long they had been there, and -he told me, that is, Globocznik, “They are working here now, and when -they are through—they come from the Reich, or somewhere from -France—they will be sent further east.” I did not make any further -inquiries in that same area. - -The rumor, however, that the Jews were being killed in the manner which -is now known to the entire world would not be silenced. When I expressed -the wish to visit the SS workshop near Lublin, in order to get some idea -of the value of the work that was being done, I was told that special -permission from Heinrich Himmler was required. - -I asked Heinrich Himmler for this special permission. He said that he -would urge me not to go to the camp. Again some time passed. On 7 -February 1944 I succeeded in being received by Adolf Hitler -personally—I might add that throughout the war he received me three -times only. In the presence of Bormann I put the question to him: “My -Führer, rumors about the extermination of the Jews will not be silenced. -They are heard everywhere. No one is allowed in anywhere. Once I paid a -surprise visit to Auschwitz in order to see the camp, but I was told -that there was an epidemic in the camp and my car was diverted before I -got there. Tell me, My Führer, is there anything in it?” The Führer -said, “You can very well imagine that there are executions going on—of -insurgents. Apart from that I do not know anything. Why don’t you speak -to Heinrich Himmler about it?” And I said, “Well, Himmler made a speech -to us in Kraków and declared in front of all the people whom I had -officially called to the meeting that these rumors about the systematic -extermination of the Jews were false; the Jews were merely being brought -to the East.” Thereupon the Führer said, “Then you must believe that.” - -When in 1944 I got the first details from the foreign press about the -things which were going on, my first question was to the SS -Obergruppenführer Koppe, who had replaced Krüger. “Now we know,” I said, -“you cannot deny that.” And he said that nothing was known to him about -these things, and that apparently it was a matter directly between -Heinrich Himmler and the camp authorities. “But,” I said, “already in -1941 I heard of such plans, and I spoke about them.” Then he said that -was my business and he could not worry about it. - -The Maidanek Camp must have been run solely by the SS, in the way I have -mentioned, and apparently, in the same manner as stated by the witness -Hoess. - -That is the only explanation that I can give. - -DR. SEIDL: Therefore you did not know of the conditions in Treblinka, -Auschwitz, and other camps? Did Treblinka belong to Maidanek, or is that -a separate camp? - -FRANK: I do not know; it seems to be a separate camp. Auschwitz was not -in the area of the Government General. I was never in Maidanek, nor in -Treblinka, nor in Auschwitz. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution has presented under Number USA-275 -the report of the SS Brigadeführer Stroop on the destruction of the -Warsaw Ghetto. Before that action was initiated, did you know anything -about it and did you ever come across this report? - -FRANK: I was surprised when the American Chief Prosecutor said in his -opening speech, while submitting a document here with pictures about the -destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto, that that report had been made to me. -But that has been clarified in the meantime. The report was never made -for me, and was never sent to me in that form. And, thank Heaven, during -the last few days it has been made clear by several witnesses and -affidavits that this destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto was carried out -upon direct orders of Himmler, and over the head of all competent -authorities of the Government General. When in our meetings anybody -spoke about this Ghetto, it was always said that there had been a revolt -in the Warsaw Ghetto which we had had to quell with artillery; reports -that were made on it never seemed to me to be authentic. - -DR. SEIDL: What measures did you take to see that the population in the -Government General was fed? - -FRANK: An abundance of measures were taken to get agriculture going -again, to import machinery, to teach farmers improved farming methods, -to build up co-operative associations, to distribute seeds in the usual -way. - -DR. SEIDL: The Witness Bühler will speak about that later. - -FRANK: Moreover the Reich helped a great deal in that respect. The Reich -sent seeds to the value of many millions of marks, agricultural experts, -breeding cattle, machines, _et cetera_. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, you have told us what you did for the welfare of the -population of the Government General. The Prosecution, however, has -charged you with a number of statements which they found in your own -diary, and which seem to contradict that. How can you explain that -contradiction? - -FRANK: One has to take the diary as a whole. You can not go through 43 -volumes and pick out single sentences and separate them from their -context. I would like to say here that I do not want to argue or quibble -about individual phrases. It was a wild and stormy period filled with -terrible passions, and when a whole country is on fire and a life and -death struggle is going on, such words may easily be used. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness... - -FRANK: Some of the words are terrible. I myself must admit that I was -shocked at many of the words which I had used. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, under Number USA-297 the Prosecution has submitted a -document which deals with a conference which you apparently had in 1939 -or 1940 with an office of the Chief of the Administration Ober-Ost. I -shall have the document handed to you and ask you to tell me whether the -report of that man, as it is contained in the document, agrees with what -you have said. It is on Page 1, at the bottom, the second paragraph. - -FRANK: That is a shortened summary of a speech, which perhaps in an -address... - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the PS number? - -DR. SEIDL: Dr. Frank, what is the number? - -FRANK: 297, I believe. - -DR. SEIDL: No, on the cover, please. - -FRANK: On the cover it says 344. I will return the document to you. -Would you kindly ask me about individual phrases. It is impossible for -me to read all of its contents. - -DR. SEIDL: The number is 297, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it is USA-297. It is EC-344, (16) and (17), is that -right? - -DR. SEIDL: Yes. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] It says here that during the first -conversation which the chief of the central department had with the -Reich Minister Dr. Frank on 3 October 1939 in Posen, the latter -explained the task which had been given him by the Führer and the -economic-political principles on which he intended to base his -administration of Poland. This could only be done by ruthless -exploitation of the country. Therefore, it would be necessary to recruit -manpower to be used in the Reich, and so on. - -I have summarized it, Mr. President. - -FRANK: I am sure that these utterances were not made in the way it is -put here. - -DR. SEIDL: But you do not want to say that you have never spoken to that -man? - -FRANK: I cannot remember it at all. - -DR. SEIDL: Then, I come to the next question. - -FRANK: Moreover, what actually happened seems to me to be more important -than what was said at the time. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that your actions as Governor General, and -undoubtedly also many excesses by the police and the SD, were due to the -guerrilla activities? - -FRANK: Guerrilla activities? It can be said that it was the resistance -movement, which started from the very first day and was supported by our -enemies, which presented the most difficult problem I had to cope with -during all these years. For this resistance movement perpetually -supplied the police and the SS with pretexts and excuses for all those -measures which, from the viewpoint of an orderly administration, were -very regrettable. In fact, the resistance movement—I will not call it -guerrilla activity, because if a people has been conquered during a war -and organizes an active resistance movement, that is something -definitely to be respected—but the methods of the resistance movement -went far beyond the limits of an heroic revolt. German women and -children were slaughtered under the most atrocious circumstances. German -officials were shot; trains were derailed; dairies were destroyed; and -all measures taken to bring about the recovery of the country were -systematically undermined. - -And it is against the background of these incidents, which occurred day -after day, incessantly, during practically the entire period of my -activity, that the events in that country must be considered. That is -all I have to say to that. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, in the year 1944 a revolt broke out in Warsaw under -the leadership of General Bor. What part did the administration of the -Government General have, and what part did you have in putting down that -revolt? - -FRANK: That revolt broke out, when the Soviet Russian Army had advanced -to within about 30 kilometers of Warsaw on the eastern bank of the -Vistula. It was a sort of combined operation; and, as it seems to me, -also a national Polish action, as the Poles at the last moment wanted to -carry out the liberation of their capital themselves and did not want to -owe it to the Soviet Russians. They probably were thinking of how, in -Paris, at the last moment the resistance movement, even before the -Allies had approached, had accomplished the liberation of the city. - -The operation was a strictly military one. As Senior Commander of the -German troops used to quell the revolt, I believe, they appointed SS -General Von dem Bach-Zelewski. The civil administration, therefore, did -not have any part in the fighting. The part played by the civil -administration began only after the capitulation of General Bor, when -the most atrocious orders for vengeance came from the Reich. - -A letter came to my desk one day in which Hitler demanded the -deportation of the entire population of Warsaw into German concentration -camps. It took a struggle of 3 weeks, from which I emerged victorious, -to avert that act of insanity and to succeed in having the fleeing -population of Warsaw, which had had no part in the revolt, distributed -throughout the Government General. - -During that revolt, unfortunately, the city of Warsaw was very seriously -damaged. All that had taken years to rebuild was burned down in a few -weeks. However, State Secretary Bühler, in order to save time, will -probably be in a better position to give us more details. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, you are also accused of having suppressed the -cultural life of the population of the Government General, especially as -regards the theater, broadcasting, films. What have you to say about -that? - -FRANK: The Government General presented the same picture as every -occupied country. We do not have to look far from this courtroom to see -what cultural life is like in an occupied country. - -We had broadcasting in the Polish language under German supervision. We -had a Polish press which was supervised by Germans, and we had a Polish -school system, that is, elementary schools and high schools, in which at -the end, 80,000 teachers taught in the service of the Government -General. As far as it was possible Polish theaters were reopened in the -large cities, and where German theaters were established we made sure -that there was also a Polish theater at the same time. After the -proclamation of the so-called total war in August 1944, the absurd -situation arose in which the German theater in Kraków was closed, -because all German theaters were closed at that time, whereas the Polish -theaters remained open. - -I myself selected composers and virtuosos from a group of the most well -known musicians of Poland I found there in 1939 and founded the -Philharmonic Orchestra of the Government General. This was in being -until the end, and played an important part in the cultural life of -Poland. I established a Chopin Museum in Kraków, and from all over -Europe I collected relics of Chopin. I believe that is sufficient on -this point. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, you deny, therefore, having taken any measures which -aimed at exterminating Polish and Ukrainian culture. - -FRANK: Culture cannot be exterminated. Any measures taken with that -intention would be sheer nonsense. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that as far as it was in your power you did -everything to avoid epidemics and to improve the health of the -population? - -FRANK: That State Secretary Bühler will be able to confirm in detail. I -can say that everything humanly possible was done. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution, under Number USSR-223, has -submitted an excerpt from the diary, which deals with the report about a -police conference of 30 May 1940, and we find here in Pages 33 to 38 the -following... - -FRANK: [_Interposing._] Unless the Court orders it, it is not necessary -to read that. - -DR. SEIDL: No, I only want to read one sentence, which refers to the -Kraków professors. Apparently, if the diary is correct, you said... - -FRANK: [_Interposing._] May I say something about the Kraków professors -right away? - -DR. SEIDL: Yes. - -FRANK: On 7 November 1939 I came to Kraków. On 5 November 1939 before my -arrival, the SS and the police, as I found out later, called the Kraków -professors to a meeting. They thereupon arrested the men, among them -dignified old professors, and took them to some concentration camp. I -believe it was Oranienburg. I found that report when I arrived and -against everything which may be found there in my diary, I want to -emphasize here under oath that I did not cease in my attempts to get -every one of the professors released whom I could reach, in March 1940. -That is all I have to say to this. - -DR. SEIDL: The same police meeting of 30 May 1940 also dealt with the -so-called “AB Action,” that is, with the Extraordinary Pacification -Action. Before I put to you the question which is concerned with it, I -would like to read to you two entries in the diary. One is dated 16 May -1940, and here, after describing that extraordinary tension then -existing, you stated the following: That, first of all, an action for -pacification would have to be started, and then you said: - - “Any arbitrary actions must be avoided; in all cases the - safeguarding of the authority of the Führer and of the Reich has - to be kept in the foreground.”—I omit several sentences and - quote the end—“The action is timed for 15 June.” - -On 12 July a conference took place with the Ministerialrat Wille, who -was the chief of the Department of Justice, and there you said in your -own words: - - “Regarding the question as to what should happen to the - political criminals who had been arrested during the AB Action, - there is to be a conference with State Secretary Bühler, - Obergruppenführer Krüger, Brigadeführer Streckenbach and - Ministerialrat Wille.” - -End of quotation. - -What actually happened during that AB Action? - -FRANK: I cannot say any more or any less than what is contained in the -diary. The situation was extremely tense. Month after month attempted -assassinations increased. The encouragement and support given by the -rest of the world to the resistance movement to undermine all our -efforts to pacify the country had succeeded to an alarming degree, and -this led to this general pacification action, not only in the Government -General, but also in other areas, and which I believe was ordered by the -Führer himself. - -My efforts were directed to limiting it as to extent and method, and in -this I was successful. Moreover I should like to point out that I also -made it clear that I intended to exercise the right of reprieve in each -individual case; for that purpose I wanted the police and SS verdicts of -death by shooting to be submitted to a reprieve committee which I had -formed in that connection. I believe that can be seen from the diary -also. - -DR. SEIDL: Probably the witness Bühler knows something about it. - -FRANK: Nevertheless, I would like to say that the method used at that -time was a tremendous mistake. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, have you at any time recognized the principle -introduced by the SD and SS of the liability of kin? - -FRANK: No, on the contrary. When I received the first reports about it, -I complained in writing to Reich Minister Lammers about that peculiar -development of the law. - -DR. SEIDL: The first SS and Police Leader East was Obergruppenführer -Krüger. When was this SS leader recalled and how did it come about? - -FRANK: The relations between him and myself became quite impossible. He -wanted a peculiar kind of SS and police regime, and that state of -affairs could be solved only in one way—either he or I had to go. I -think that at the last moment, by the intervention of Kaltenbrunner, if -I remember correctly, and of Bach-Zelewski, this remarkable fellow was -removed. - -DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution once mentioned that it was more a personal -struggle for power. But is it more correct to say that there were -differences of opinion on basic questions? - -FRANK: Of course it was a struggle for power. I wanted to establish a -power in the sense of my memoranda to the Führer, and therefore I had to -fight the power of violence, and here personal viewpoints separated -altogether. - -DR. SEIDL: The successor of SS Obergruppenführer Krüger was SS -Obergruppenführer Koppe. Was his basic attitude different? - -FRANK: Yes. I had that impression; and I am thinking of him particularly -when I say that even in the SS there were many decent men who also had a -sense of what was right. - -DR. SEIDL: Were there Polish and Ukrainian Police in the Government -General? - -FRANK: Yes, there were 25,000 men of the Polish security, criminal, and -uniformed police, and about 5,000 men of the Ukrainian police. They also -were under the German police chief. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, I now come to one of the most important questions. -In 1942, in Berlin, Vienna, Heidelberg, and Munich, you made speeches -before large audiences. What was the purpose of these speeches, and what -were the consequences for you? - -FRANK: The speeches can be read. It was the last effort that I made to -bring home to Hitler, by means of the tremendous response of the German -people, the truth that the rule of law was immortal. I stated at that -time that a Reich without law and without humanity could not last long, -and more in that vein. After I had been under police surveillance for -several days in Munich, I was relieved of all my Party offices. As this -was a matter of German domestic politics under the sovereignty of the -German Reich, I refrain from making any more statements about it here. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that after this you tendered your resignation? -And what was the answer? - -FRANK: I was, so to speak, in a permanent state of resigning, and I -received the same answer: that for reasons connected with foreign policy -I could not be released. - -DR. SEIDL: I originally intended to read to you from your diary a number -of quotations which the Prosecution has submitted; but in view of the -fact that the Prosecution may do that in the course of the -cross-examination, I forego it in order to save time. I have no more -questions to put to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel wish to -ask any questions? - -Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? - -CHIEF COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE L. N. SMIRNOV (Assistant Prosecutor for the -U.S.S.R.): Defendant, I should like to know what precisely was your -legal status and what exactly was the position you occupied in the -system of the fascist state. Please answer me: When were you promoted to -the post of Governor of occupied Poland? To whom were you directly -subordinated? - -FRANK: The date is 26 October 1939. At least on that day the directive -concerning the Governor General became effective. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You will remember that by Hitler’s order of 12 -October 1939 you were directly subordinated to Hitler, were you not? - -FRANK: I did not get the first part. What was it, please? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you remember Hitler’s order concerning your -appointment as Governor General of Poland? This order was dated 12 -October 1939. - -FRANK: That was in no way effective, because the decree came into force -on 26 October 1939, and you can find it in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_. -Before that I was Chief of Administration with the military commander -Von Rundstedt. I have explained that already. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: By this order of Hitler you were directly -subordinated to him. Do you remember? Paragraph 3, Sub-paragraph 1, of -this order. - -FRANK: The chiefs of administration in the occupied territories were all -immediately under the Führer. I may say in elucidation that Paragraph 3 -states, “The Governor General is immediately subordinate to me.” - -But Paragraph 9 of this decree states, “This decree becomes valid as -soon as I have withdrawn from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army the -task of carrying out the military administration.” And this withdrawal, -that is, the coming into force of this decree took place on 26 October. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I fully agree with you, and we have information -to that effect in the book which you evidently remember. It is Book 5. -You do remember this book of the Government General? - -FRANK: It is of course in the decree. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, when this order came into force, to whom -were you directly subordinate? - -FRANK: What shall I read here? There are several entries here. What is -your wish? To what do you wish me to answer? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It states that this order came into force on the -26 October. Well, when this order actually became valid, to whom were -you subordinated? Was there, or was there not, any further order issued -by Hitler? - -FRANK: There is only one basic decree about the Governor General. That -is this one. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Quite correct. There were no further -instructions? - -FRANK: Oh yes, there are some, for instance... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I understand that, but there was no other decree -determining the system of administration, was there? - -FRANK: May I say that you can find it best on Page A-100 in your book, -and there you have the decree of the Führer verbatim. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Quite right. - -FRANK: And it says also in Paragraph 9, “This decree shall come into -effect...” and so on, and that date was the 26th of October. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, that is quite correct. That means that -after 26 October you, as Governor General for occupied Poland, were -directly subordinate to Hitler? - -FRANK: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then perhaps you may remember when, and by whom, -you were entrusted with the execution, in occupied Poland, of the Four -Year Plan? - -FRANK: By Göring. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means that you were Göring’s -plenipotentiary for the execution of the Four Year Plan in Poland, were -you not? - -FRANK: The story of that mission is very briefly told. The activities of -several plenipotentiaries of the Four Year Plan in the Government -General were such that I was greatly concerned about it. Therefore, I -approached the Reich Marshal and asked him to appoint me trustee for the -Four Year Plan. That was later—in January... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, it was in December. - -FRANK: Yes, it was later, according to this decree. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This means that as from the beginning of -December 1939 you were Göring’s plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan? - -FRANK: Göring’s? I was the plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Now perhaps you can remember that in October -1939 the first decree regarding the organization of administration in -the Government General was promulgated? - -FRANK: Yes. That is here, is it not? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you recall Paragraph 3 of that decree. - -FRANK: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It says that “The sphere of action of the State -Secretary for Security will be determined by the Governor General in -agreement with the Reichsführer SS and”—this is the passage which -interests me—“the Chief of the German Police.” - -Does that not coincide with Paragraph 3 insofar as from the first day of -your appointment as Governor General you undertook the control of the -Police and SS, and, consequently, the responsibility for their actions? - -FRANK: No. I definitely answer that question with “no,” but I would like -to make an explanation.... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What interests me, Defendant; is how could that -be explained otherwise? - -THE PRESIDENT: Let him make his explanation. - -Defendant, you may make your explanation. - -FRANK: I want to make a very short statement. There is an old legal -principle which says that nobody can transfer more rights to anybody -else than he has himself. What I have stated here was the ideal which I -had before me and how it should have been. Everybody has to admit that -it is natural and logical that the police should be subordinate to the -Chief of Administration. The Führer, who alone could have decided, did -not make that decree. I did not have the power nor the authority to put -into effect this decree which I had so carefully formulated. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then do I understand you to say that this -Paragraph 3 was an ideal which you strove to attain, but which you were -never able to attain? - -FRANK: I beg your pardon, but I could not understand that question. A -little slower please, and may I have the translation into German a -little slower? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Shall I repeat the question? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I asked you a question; does this mean that the -statement can be interpreted as follows: Paragraph 3 of this decree was -an ideal which you persistently strove to attain, which you openly -professed, but which you were never able to attain? Would that be -correct? - -FRANK: Which I could not attain; and that can be seen by the fact that -later it was found necessary to appoint a special State Secretary for -Security in a last effort to find a way out of the difficulty. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you will recall that in April 1942, -special negotiations took place between you and Himmler. Did these -negotiations take place in April 1942? - -FRANK: Yes; certainly. I do not know on what you base your question. I -cannot tell you the date offhand, but it was always my endeavor... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: To confirm these facts, I can turn to your -diary. Perhaps you will recall that as a result of these negotiations an -understanding was reached between you and Himmler. - -FRANK: Yes, an understanding was reached. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In order to refresh your memory on the subject I -shall ask that the corresponding volume of your diary be handed to you, -so that you may have the text before you. - -FRANK: Yes, I am ready. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would refer you to Paragraph 2 of this -agreement. It states: - -THE PRESIDENT: Where can we find this? Is it under the date 21 April -1942? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes; that is quite right; 21 April 1942. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we have got it. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is Document Number USSR-223. It has been -translated into English, and I shall hand it over immediately. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we have it now; we were only trying to find the -place. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is on Page 18 of the English text. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Go on. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would ask you to recall the contents. It says: -“The Higher SS and Police Leader (the State Secretary) is directly -subordinate to the Governor General, and, if he is absent, then to his -Deputy.” - -Does this not mean that Himmler, so to speak, agreed with your ideal in -the sense that the Police should be subordinate to you? - -FRANK: Certainly. On that day I was satisfied; but a few days later the -whole thing was changed. I can only say that these efforts on my part -were continued, but unfortunately it was never possible to put them into -effect. - -You will find here in Paragraph 3, if you care to go on, that the -Reichsführer SS, according to the expected decree by the Führer, could -give orders to the State Secretary. So, you see, Himmler here had -reserved the right to give orders to Krüger direct. And then comes the -matter of the agreement... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is true, but in that case I must ask you to -refer to another part of the document... - -FRANK: May I say in this connection that this agreement was never put -into effect, but that this decree was published in the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_ in the form of a Führer decree. Unfortunately, I do -not know the date of that; but you can find the decree about the -regulation of security matters in the Government General, and that is -the only authoritative statement. Here, also, reference is made to the -“expected decree by the Führer,” and that agreement was just a draft of -what was to appear in the Führer decree. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, I was just proceeding to that subject. You -agree that this decision was practically a verbatim decree of the -Führer? - -FRANK: I cannot say that offhand. If you will be good enough to give me -the words of the Führer decree, I will be able to tell you about that. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes. - -[_Turning to the President._] Incidentally this decree appears in your -document book, Mr. President. - -FRANK: I haven’t the document. It seems to me that the most essential -parts of that agreement have been taken and put into this decree, with a -few changes. However, the book has been taken away from me and I cannot -compare it. - -THE PRESIDENT: The book will be submitted to you now. - -[_The book was submitted to the defendant._] - -FRANK: Very important changes have been made, unfortunately. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would request you to turn to Paragraph 3 of -Hitler’s decree, dated 7 May 1942. It is stated here that the State -Secretary for Security is directly subordinate to the Governor General. -And does this not confirm the fact that the police of the Government -General were, nevertheless, directly subordinate to you? That is -Paragraph 3 of the decree. - -FRANK: I would like to say that that is not so. The police were not -subordinate to me, even by reason of that decree—only the State -Secretary for Security. It does not say here that the police are -subordinate to the Governor General, only the State Secretary for -Security is subordinate to him. If you read Paragraph 4, then you come -to the difficulties again. Adolf Hitler’s decree was drawn up in my -absence, of course. I was not consulted by Hitler, otherwise 1 would -have protested, but in any case it was found impracticable. - -Paragraph 4 says that the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police -gave direct instructions to the State Secretary for Security in the -field of security and for the preservation of German nationality. If you -compare the original agreement with this, as contained in the diary, you -will find that in one of the most important fields the Führer had -changed his mind, that is, concerning the Commissioner for the -Preservation of German Nationality. This title embraces the Jewish -question and the question of colonization. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It appears to me, Defendant, that you have only -taken into consideration one aspect of this question, and that you have -given a rather one-sided interpretation of the excerpt quoted. May I -recall to your memory Paragraph 4 of this decree which, in Sub-paragraph -2, reads as follows: - -“The State Secretary”—this means Krüger—“must receive the consent of -the Governor General before carrying out the directives of the -Reichsführer SS and the German Police.” - -And now permit me to turn to Paragraph 5 of this self-same decree of -Hitler’s which states that “in cases of divergencies of opinion between -the Governor General and the Reichsführer of the SS and the German -Police, my decision is to be obtained through the Reich Minister and the -Head of the Reich Chancellery.” In this connection I would ask you, does -not this paragraph testify to the very considerable rights granted by -you to the leaders of the police and the SS in the Government General -and to your own responsibility for the activities of these -organizations? - -FRANK: The wording of the decree testifies to it, but the actual -development was quite the contrary. I believe that we will come to that -in detail. I maintain therefore that this attempt to gain some influence -over the police and the SS also failed. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then may I ask whose attempt it was? In this -case it is evidently an attempt by Hitler for he signed this decree. -Krüger was evidently more powerful than Hitler? - -FRANK: That question is not quite clear to me. You mean that Krüger went -against the decree of the Führer? Of course he did, but that has nothing -to do with power. That was considered by Himmler as a tremendous -concession made to me. I want to refer to a memorandum of the summer of -1942, I think, shortly after the decree of the Führer came into force. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have the following question to ask you: Is it -possible that you... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell us, Defendant, who was the actual leader of -the National Socialist Party in the Government General? - -FRANK: I hear nothing at all. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you... - -FRANK: I hear nothing at all. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have the following question to put to you: -After 6 May 1940 in the Government General... - -FRANK: 6 May? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, 6 May 1940, after the Nazi organization had -been completed in the Government General, who was appointed its leader? - -FRANK: I was. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thus the leadership of the administration of the -National Socialist Party and of the Police was concentrated in your -hands. Therefore you are responsible for the administration, the Police, -and the political life of the Government General. - -FRANK: Before I answer that question, I must protest when you say that I -had control of the Police. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I believe that that is the only way one could -interpret the Führer’s orders and the other documents which I have put -to you. - -FRANK: No doubt, if one disregards the actual facts and the realities of -the situation. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, then, let us pass on to another group of -questions. You heard of the existence of Maidanek only in 1944, isn’t -that so? - -FRANK: In 1944 the name Maidanek was brought to my knowledge officially -for the first time by the Press Chief Gassner. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will now ask that you be shown a document -which was presented by your defense counsel, which was compiled by you, -and which is a report addressed to Hitler, dated June 1943. I will read -into the record one excerpt, and I wish to remind you that this is dated -19 June 1943: - - “As a proof of the mistrust shown to the German leadership, I - enclose a characteristic excerpt from the report of the Chief of - the Security Police and SD in the Government General...” - -FRANK: Just a moment. The wrong passage has been shown me. I have the -passage here on Page 35 of the German text, and it is differently -worded. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Have you found the place now? - -FRANK: Yes. But you started with a different sentence. The sentence here -starts “A considerable part of the Polish intelligentsia...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Which page is it? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Page 35 of the German text, last paragraph. - -FRANK: It starts here with the words “A considerable part...” - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: All right. Then I will continue: - - “As a proof of the degree of the mistrust shown to the German - leadership I enclose”—these are your own words, this passage - comes somewhat higher up in the quotation—“a characteristic - excerpt from the report of the Chief of the Security Police and - SD in the Government General for the period from 1 to 31 May - 1943, concerning the possibilities of propaganda resulting from - Katyn.” - -FRANK: That is not here. Would you be good enough to show me the -passage? Now, what you are presenting here is not in my text. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, it is there; it comes somewhat earlier in -your text. - -FRANK: I think it has been omitted from my text. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I begin now at that part which you find lower -down at the bottom. Follow the text: - - “A large part of the Polish intelligentsia, however, as before, - will not allow itself to be influenced by the news from Katyn - and holds against the Germans alleged similar cruelties, - especially in Auschwitz.” - -I omit the next sentence and I continue: - - “Among that portion of the working classes which is not - communistically inclined, this is scarcely denied; at the same - time it is pointed out that the attitude of Germany towards the - Poles is not any better.” - -Please note the next sentence: - - “It is said that there are concentration camps at Auschwitz and - Maidanek where likewise the mass murder of Poles is carried out - systematically.” - -How can one reconcile this part of your report which mentions Auschwitz -and Maidanek, where mass murder took place, with your statement that you -heard of Maidanek only at the end of 1944. Well, your report is dated -June 1943; you mentioned there both Maidanek and Auschwitz. - -FRANK: With reference to Maidanek we were talking about the -extermination of Jews. The extermination of Jews in Maidanek became -known to me during the summer of 1944. Up to now the word “Maidanek” has -always been mentioned in connection with extermination of Jews. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, we are to understand—I refer to -the text submitted to you—that in May 1943 you heard of the mass murder -of Poles in Maidanek, and in 1944 you heard of the mass murder of Jews? - -FRANK: I beg your pardon? I heard about the extermination of the Jews at -Maidanek in 1944 from the official documents in the foreign press. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And you heard of the mass killings of the Poles -in 1943? - -FRANK: That is contained in my memorandum, and I protest: these are the -facts as I put them before the Führer. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will ask that another document be shown to -you. Do you know this document, are you acquainted with it? - -FRANK: It is a decree dated 2 October 1943. I assume that the wording -agrees with the text of the original decree. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, it is in full agreement with the original -text. In any case your defense counsel can follow the text and will be -able to verify it. I have to ask you one question. What do you think of -this law signed by you? - -FRANK: Yes, it is here. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You were President of the Reich Academy of Law. -From the standpoint of the most elementary standards of law, what do you -think of this law signed by you? - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the number of it? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is Exhibit USSR-335, Mr. President. - -FRANK: This is the general wording for a court-martial decree. It -provides that the proceedings should take place in the presence of a -judge, that a document should be drawn up, and that the proceedings -should be recorded in writing. Apart from that I had the power to give -pardons, so that every sentence had to be submitted to me. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to tell us how this court for -court-martial proceedings was composed, who the members of this court -were. Would you please pay attention to Paragraph 3, Point 1 of -Paragraph 3? - -FRANK: The Security Police, yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You were telling us of your hostile attitude to -the SD. Why then did you give the SD the right to exert oppression on -the Polish population? - -FRANK: Because that was the only way in which I could exert any -influence on the sentences. If I had not published this decree, there -would have been no possibility of control; and the Police would simply -have acted at random. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You spoke of the right of reprieve which was -entrusted to you. Would you please note Paragraph 6 of this law. I -remind you that a verdict of a summary court-martial by the SD was to be -put into effect immediately according to the text. I remind you again -that there was only one possible verdict: “death.” How could you change -it if the condemned person was to be shot or hanged immediately after -the verdict? - -FRANK: The sentence would nevertheless have to come before me. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, but a sentence had to be carried out -immediately. - -FRANK: Those were the general instructions which I had issued in -connection with the power given me to grant reprieves, and the committee -which dealt with reprieves was constantly sitting. Files were sent in... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Since you have spoken of the right to reprieve, -I will put to you another question. Do you remember the AB Action? - -FRANK: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you remember that this action signified the -execution of thousands of Polish intellectuals? - -FRANK: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then what did it signify? - -FRANK: It came within the framework of the general action of appeasement -and it was my plan to eliminate, by means of a properly regulated -procedure, arbitrary actions on the part of the Police. This was the -meaning of that action. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I do not understand very well what you mean. How -did you treat persons who were subject to the AB Action? What happened -to them? - -FRANK: This meeting really only dealt with the question of arrests. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you what happened to them later? - -FRANK: They were arrested and taken into protective custody. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And then? - -FRANK: Then they were subjected to the proceedings which had been -established. At least, that is what I intended. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was this left to the Police exclusively? - -FRANK: The Police were in charge. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In other words, the Police took over the -extermination of these people after they had been arrested, is that so? - -FRANK: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, then tell us, please, why you did not -exercise your power of reprieve while they were carrying out this -inhuman action? - -FRANK: I did make use of it. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will put before you your statement, dated 30 -May 1940. You certainly remember this meeting with the Police on 30 May -1940, when you gave final instructions to the police before carrying out -this action? - -FRANK: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You stated the following: - - “Any attempt on the part of the legal authorities to intervene - in the AB Action, undertaken with the help of the Police, should - be considered as treason to the State and to German interests.” - -Do you remember this statement? - -FRANK: I do not remember it, but you must take into account all the -circumstances which spread over several weeks. You must consider the -statement in its entirety and not seize upon one single sentence. This -concerns a development which went on for weeks and months, in the course -of which the reprieve committee was established by me for the first -time. That was my way of protesting against arbitrary actions and of -introducing legal justice in all these proceedings. That is a -development extending over many weeks, which you cannot, in my opinion, -summarize in one sentence. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am speaking of words which in my opinion can -have only one meaning for a jurist. You wrote: - - “The reprieve committee which is part of my office is not - concerned with these matters. The AB Action will be carried out - exclusively by Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger and his - organization. This is a purely internal action for quieting the - country which is necessary and lies outside the scope of a - normal legal trial.” - -That is to say you renounced your right of pardon? - -FRANK: At that particular moment; but if you follow the further -development of the AB Action during the following weeks you will see -that this never became effective. That was an intention, a bad -intention, which, thank God, I gave up in time. Perhaps my defense -counsel will be able to say a few words on the subject later. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One single question interests me. Did you -renounce your right of pardon while carrying out this operation or not? - -FRANK: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well then, how can you account for your words, -this one sentence: “The reprieve committee is not concerned with these -matters.”? - -How should we interpret these words? - -FRANK: This is not a decree; it is not the final ruling on the matter. -It is a remark which was made on the spur of the moment and was then -negotiated on for days. But one must recognize the final stage of the -development, and not merely the various motives as they came up during -the development. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, I understand that very well, Defendant. But -I would like to ask you, was this statement made during a conference -with the Police and did you instruct the Police in that matter? - -FRANK: Not during that meeting. I assume it came up in some other -connection. Here we discussed only this one action. After all, I also -had to talk to State Secretary Bühler. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, all right. While discussing the AB Action -with the Police you stated that the results of this action would not -concern the reprieve committee which was subordinated to you, is that -right? - -FRANK: That sentence is contained in the diary. It is not, however, the -final result, but rather an intermediate stage. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps I can recall to you another sentence, in -order that you may judge the results of this action. Perhaps you can -recall this part which I will put to you. You stated the following: - - “We need not bring these elements into German concentration - camps, for in that case we would only have difficulties and an - unnecessary correspondence with their families. We must simply - liquidate matters in the country, and in the simplest way.” - -What you mean is that this would simply be a question of liquidation in -the simplest form, is that not so? - -FRANK: That is a terrible word. But, thank God, it did not take place in -this way. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, but these persons were executed. What do -you mean by saying that this was not carried out? Obviously this was -carried out, for the persons were executed. - -FRANK: When they were sentenced they were killed, if the right to pardon -them was not exercised. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And they were condemned without application of -the right of pardon? - -FRANK: I do not believe so. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Unfortunately these people are no more, and -therefore obviously they were executed. - -FRANK: Which people? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Those who were arrested under the AB Action. I -will remind you of another excerpt connected with this AB Action. If you -did not agree with the Police with regard to certain police actions it -would be difficult to explain the celebrations in connection with the -departure of Brigadeführer SS Streckenbach when he left for Berlin. Does -this not mean that you were at least on friendly terms with the Police? - -FRANK: In connection with political relations many words of praise are -spoken which are not in keeping with the truth. You know that as well as -any other person. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will allow myself to remind you of only one -passage of your speech addressed to the Brigadeführer Streckenbach, one -sentence only. You said: - - “What you, Brigadeführer Streckenbach, and your people, have - done in the Government General must not be forgotten; and you - need not be ashamed of it.” - -That testifies, does it not, to quite a different attitude toward -Streckenbach and his people? - -FRANK: And it was not forgotten either. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no further questions to put to the -defendant. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does that conclude the cross-examination? - -MR. DODD: I have only one or two questions, if Your Honor pleases. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] In the course of your examination I -understood you to say that you had never gathered to yourself any of the -art treasures of the Government General. By that I do not suppose you to -mean that you did not have them collected and registered; you did have -them collected and registered, isn’t that so? - -FRANK: Art treasures in the Government General were officially collected -and registered. The book has been submitted here in Court. - -MR. DODD: Yes. And you told the Tribunal that before you got there one -Dürer collection had already been seized—before you took over your -duties. - -FRANK: May I ask you to understand that as follows: - -These were the Dürers which were removed in Lvov before the civilian -administration was set up there. Herr Mühlmann went to Lvov at the time -and took them from the library. I had never been in Lvov before that. -These pictures were then taken directly to the Führer headquarters or to -Reich Marshal Göring, I am not sure which. - -MR. DODD: They were collected for Göring, that is what I am driving at. -Is that not a fact? - -FRANK: State Secretary Mühlmann, when I asked him, told me that he came -on orders of the Reich Marshal and that he had taken them away on orders -of the Reich Marshal. - -MR. DODD: And were there not some other art objects that were collected -by the Reich Marshal, and also by the Defendant Rosenberg, at the time -you told the Tribunal you were too busy with war tasks to get involved -in that sort of thing? - -FRANK: I know of nothing of that sort in the Government General. The -Einsatzstab Rosenberg had no jurisdiction in the Government General; and -apart from the collection of the composer Elsner and a Jewish library -from Lublin I had no official obligation to demand the return of any art -treasures from Rosenberg. - -MR. DODD: But there were some art treasures in your possession when you -were captured by the American forces. - -FRANK: Yes. They were not in my possession. I was safeguarding them but -not for myself. They were also not in my immediate safekeeping; rather I -had taken them along with me from burning Silesia. They could not be -safeguarded any other way. They were art treasures which are so widely -known that they are Numbers 1 to 10 in the list in the book—no one -could have appropriated them. You cannot steal a “Mona Lisa.” - -MR. DODD: Well, I merely wanted to clear that up. I knew you had said on -interrogation there were some in your possession. I am not trying to -imply you were holding them for yourself, if you were not. However, I -think you have made that clear. - -FRANK: I should like to remark in this connection, since I attach -particular importance to the point, that these art treasures with which -we are concerned could be safeguarded only in this way. Otherwise they -would have been lost. - -MR. DODD: Very well. I have one other matter I would like to clear up -and I will not be long. - -I understood you also to say this morning that you had struggled for -some time to effect the release of the Kraków professors who were seized -and sent to Oranienburg soon after the occupation of Poland. Now, of -course, you are probably familiar with what you said about it yourself -in your diary, are you? - -FRANK: Yes, I said so this morning. Quite apart from what is said in the -diary, what I said this morning is the truth. You must never forget that -I had to speak among a circle of deadly enemies, people who reported -every word I said to the Führer and Himmler. - -MR. DODD: Well, of course, you recall that you suggested that they -should have been retained in Poland, and liquidated or imprisoned there. - -FRANK: Never—not even if you confront me with this statement. I never -did that. On the contrary, I received the professors from Kraków and -talked to them quietly. Of all that happened I regretted that most of -all. - -MR. DODD: Perhaps you do not understand me. I am talking about what you -wrote in your own diary about these professors, and I shall be glad to -read it to you and make it available to you if you care to contest it. -You are not denying that you said they should either be returned for -liquidation in Poland, or imprisoned in Poland, are you? You do not deny -that? - -FRANK: I have just told you that I did say all that merely to hoodwink -my enemies; in reality I liberated the professors. Nothing more happened -to them after that. - -MR. DODD: All right. - -Were you also talking for special purposes when you gave General Krüger, -the SS and Higher Police official, that fond farewell? - -FRANK: The same applies also in this case. Permit me to say, sir, that I -admit without reservation what can be admitted; but I have also sworn to -add nothing. No one can admit any more than I have done by handing over -these diaries. What I am asking is that you do not ask me to add -anything to that. - -MR. DODD: No, I am not asking you to add anything to it; rather, I was -trying to clear it up, because you’ve made a rather difficult situation, -perhaps, for yourself and for others. You see, if we cannot believe what -you wrote in your diary, I don’t know how you can ask us to believe what -you say here. You were writing those things yourself, and at the time -you wrote them I assume you didn’t expect that you would be confronted -with them. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does he not mean that this was a record of a speech that -he has made? - -MR. DODD: In his diary, yes. It is recorded in his diary. - -THE PRESIDENT: When he said, “I did that to hoodwink my enemies”? - -MR. DODD: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: I presume that that particular record is a record of some -speech that he made. - -MR. DODD: It is. It is entered in the diary. - -FRANK: May I say something about that. It wasn’t that I put myself in a -difficult position; rather the changing course of the war made the -situation difficult for every administrative official. - -MR. DODD: Finally, do you recall an entry in your diary in which you -stated that you had a long hour and a half talk with the Führer and that -you had... - -FRANK: When was the last conference, please? - -MR. DODD: Well, this entry is on Monday, the 17th of March 1941. It’s in -your diary. - -FRANK: That was probably one of the very few conferences; whether I was -alone with him, I don’t know. - -MR. DODD: ...in which you said you and the Führer had come to a complete -agreement and that he approved all the measures, including all the -decrees, especially also the entire organization of the country. Would -you stand by that today? - -FRANK: No, but I might say the following: The Führer’s approval was -always very spontaneously given, but one always had to wait a long while -for it to be realized. - -MR. DODD: Was that one of the times you complained to him, as you told -us this morning? - -FRANK: I constantly complained. As you know, I offered to resign on 14 -occasions. - -MR. DODD: Yes, I know; but on this occasion did you make many complaints -and did you have the approval of the Führer, or did he turn down your -complaints on this occasion of the 17th of March, 1941? - -FRANK: The Führer took a very simple way out at the time by saying, -“You’ll have to settle that with Himmler.” - -MR. DODD: Well, that isn’t really an answer. You’ve entered in your -diary that you talked it out with him and that he approved everything, -and you make no mention in your diary of any disappointment over the -filing of a complaint. Surely, this wasn’t a speech that you were -recording in your diary; it seems to be a factual entry on your -conversations with the Führer. And my question is simply, do you now -admit that that was the situation, or are you saying that it was a false -entry? - -FRANK: I beg your pardon, I didn’t say that I made false entries. I -never said that, and I’m not going to argue about words. I am merely -saying that you must judge the words according to the entire context. If -I emphasized in the presence of officials that the Führer received me -and agreed to my measures, then I did that to back up my own authority. -I couldn’t do that without the Führer’s agreement. What my thoughts -were, is not made clear from this. I should like to emphasize that I’m -not arguing about words and have not asked to do that. - -MR. DODD: Very well, I don’t care to press it any further. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, do you wish to re-examine? - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, the first question put to you by the Soviet -Prosecutor was whether you were the chief of the NSDAP in the Government -General, and you answered “yes.” Did the Party have any decisive -influence in the Government General on political and administrative -life? - -FRANK: No. The Party as an organization in that sphere was, of course, -only nominally under my jurisdiction, for all the Party officials were -appointed by Bormann without my being consulted. There is no special -Führer decree for the spheres of activity of the NSDAP in the occupied -territories, in which it says that these spheres of activity are -directly under Reichsleiter Bormann’s jurisdiction. - -DR. SEIDL: Did your activity in that sphere of the NSDAP in the -territory of the Government General have anything at all to do with any -Security Police affairs? - -FRANK: No, the Party was much too small to play any important part; it -had no state function. - -DR. SEIDL: The next question: The Soviet Prosecution showed you Document -USSR-335. It is the Decree on Drumhead Courts-Martial of 1943. It states -in Paragraph 6: “Drumhead court-martial sentences are to be carried out -at once.” Is it correct if I say that no formal legal appeal against -these sentences was possible, but that a pardon was entirely admissible? - -FRANK: Certainly; but, nevertheless, I must say that this decree is -impossible. - -DR. SEIDL: What conditions in the Government General occasioned the -issuing of this decree of 2 October 1943? I am thinking in particular of -the security situation. - -FRANK: Looking back from the more peaceful conditions of the present -time, I cannot think of any reason which might have made such a demand -possible; but if one recalls the events of war, and the universal -conflagration, it seems to have been a measure of desperation. - -DR. SEIDL: I now come back to the AB Action. Is it true that in 1939 a -court-martial decree was issued providing for considerably greater legal -guarantees than that of 1943? - -FRANK: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that people arrested in the AB Action were, on -the strength of this court-martial decree, sentenced or acquitted? - -FRANK: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it also true that all sentences of these courts were, as -you saw fit, to be passed on to the competent reprieve committee under -State Secretary Bühler? - -FRANK: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: The prosecutor of the United States has laid it to your -charge that in Neuhaus, where you were arrested after the collapse of -the German Armed Forces, various art treasures were found, not in your -house, but in the office of the Governor General. Is it true that you -sent State Secretary Dr. Bühler with a letter to Reich Minister Dr. -Lammers, and that this letter contained a list of these art treasures? - -FRANK: Yes, not only that, I at once called the attention of the head of -the Pinakothek in Munich to the fact that these pictures were there and -that they should at once be safeguarded against bombing. He also looked -at the pictures and then they were put in a bombproof cellar. I am glad -I did so, for who knows what might otherwise have happened to these -valuable objects. - -DR. SEIDL: And now one last question. The Prosecution has submitted -Document 661-PS. This document also has a USSR exhibit number, which I -don’t know at the moment. This is a document which has been made to have -a bearing on the activities of the Academy for German Law, of which you -were president. The document has the heading “Legal Formation of -Germany’s Polish Policy on Racial-Political Lines”; the legal part -serves as a tect for the Committee on the Law of Nationalities in the -Academy for German Law. I’m having this document submitted to you. -Please, will you tell me whether you’ve ever had this document in your -hands before? - -FRANK: From whom does it come? - -DR. SEIDL: That is the extraordinary part; it has the Exhibit Number -USA-300. - -FRANK: Does it state anywhere who drew it up or something of the sort? - -DR. SEIDL: The document has no author; nor does it show on whose order -it was compiled. - -FRANK: I can say merely that I’ve never seen the document; that I never -gave an order for it to be drawn up; so I can say really nothing about -it. - -DR. SEIDL: It states here that it was found in the Ministry of Justice -in Kassel. Was there a Ministry of Justice in Kassel in 1940? - -FRANK: A Ministry of Justice in Kassel? - -DR. SEIDL: Yes. - -FRANK: That has not been in existence since 1866. - -DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to his seat. - -DR. SEIDL: In that case, with the permission of the Tribunal, I shall -call witness Dr. Bilfinger. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: This document which you produced as USSR-223, which are -extracts from Defendant Frank’s diary; are you offering that in -evidence? Apparently some entries from Frank’s diary have already been -offered in evidence; others have not. Are you wishing to offer this in -evidence? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This document has already been submitted in -evidence under two numbers; the first number is 2233-PS, which was -submitted by the American Prosecution, and the second is Exhibit -USSR-223, and was already submitted by us on 15 February, 1946. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see. Have these entries which you have in this document -been submitted under USSR-223? You see, the PS number does not -necessarily mean that the documents have been offered in evidence. The -PS numbers were applied to documents before they were offered in -evidence; but the USSR-223 does imply that it has been offered in -evidence. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This document has already been presented in -evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, what the Tribunal wants to know is -whether you wish to offer this USSR-223 in evidence, because unless it -was read before it hasn’t been offered in evidence, or it hasn’t gone -into the record. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: We already read an excerpt on 15 February, and -it is, therefore, already read into the record. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I retire, Mr. President? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -[_The witness Bilfinger took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you stand up, please, and will you tell us your full -name? - -RUDOLF BILFINGER (Witness): Rudolf Bilfinger. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, since when were you active in the Reich Security -Main Office (RSHA), and in what position? - -BILFINGER: From the end of 1937 until the beginning of 1943 I was -government councillor in the RSHA, and later senior government -councillor and expert on legal questions, and legal questions in -connection with the police. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that on two occasions and at different times -you were head of the “Administration and Law” department attached to the -commander of the Security Police and SD in Kraków? - -BILFINGER: Yes. In the autumn of 1940 and in 1944 I was head of the -department “Administration and Law” attached to the commander of the -Security Police and SD in Kraków. - -DR. SEIDL: What were the tasks you had to fulfil at different times in -the Government General—in broad outline. - -BILFINGER: In 1940 I had the task of taking over from the Government -General a number of branches of the police administration and working in -that connection under the Higher SS and Police Leader. - -DR. SEIDL: What was the legal position of the Higher SS and Police -Leader, and what was his relation to the Governor General? Did the -Higher SS and Police Leader receive his instructions concerning the -Security Police and the SD from the Governor General? Or did he receive -them direct from the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the Police, that is, -Himmler? - -BILFINGER: The Higher SS and Police Leader from the very beginning -received his instructions direct from the Reichsführer SS, Himmler. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it furthermore true that the commander of the Security -Police and of the SD in the Government General also received direct -orders and instructions from Amt IV, the Gestapo, and from Amt V, the -Criminal Police in the RSHA? - -BILFINGER: Yes, the commander of the Security Police received many -orders direct from the various departments of the RSHA, particularly -from departments IV and V. - -DR. SEIDL: Did the institution of the State Secretariat for Security, -which occurred in 1942, bring about a change in the legal position of -the Governor General with reference to measures of the Security Police -and the SD? - -BILFINGER: The appointment of a State Secretary as such did not alter -the legal position of the Governor General or of the State Secretary. -New spheres of activity were merely added to the State Secretariat for -Security. - -DR. SEIDL: Do you know of a decree of Reichsführer SS and Chief of the -German Police, Himmler, in the year 1939, and what were its contents? - -BILFINGER: I knew of a decree, probably dated 1939, dealing with the -appointment of the Higher SS and Police Leader, which ruled that the -Higher SS and Police Leader would receive his instructions direct from -Himmler. - -DR. SEIDL: The institution of the State Secretariat dated from 7 May -1942 and was based on a Führer decree. The application of this decree -called forth another decree dated 3 June 1942, which dealt with the -transfer of official business to the State Secretary for Security. Do -you know the contents of that decree? - -BILFINGER: The essential contents of the decrees which you have -mentioned are known to me. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that on the basis of this decree the entire -Political Police and the Criminal Police, as had been the case before, -were again subordinated to the State Secretary for Security within the -framework of the Security Police? - -BILFINGER: These two branches from the very beginning were under the -Higher SS and Police Leader, and later on under the State Secretary for -Security. To this extent the decree did not bring about a change, but -was merely a confirmation. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it known to you that in Appendix B of that decree there -are 26 paragraphs in which all the branches of the Security Police are -transferred to the Higher SS and Police Chief as State Secretary for -Security? - -BILFINGER: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: Do you know that in this decree, in Appendix B, Jewish -matters are also mentioned specifically? - -BILFINGER: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: Do you know that in Paragraph 21 of Appendix B it is ruled: - - “The special fields of the Security Police: Representation of - the Government General at conferences and meetings, particularly - with the central offices of the Reich, which deal with the - above-mentioned special fields.”? - -BILFINGER: I know that as far as the sense is concerned, such a ruling -was contained therein. Whether Paragraph 21 or another paragraph was -worded this way I don’t remember. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it also true that on the basis of this decree the last -remains of the administrative police were removed from the -administration of the Government General and handed over to the State -Secretary for Security, who was directly under Himmler. - -BILFINGER: That was the intention and the purpose of this decree. But, -contrary to the wording of that decree, only a few branches were taken -away from the administration; concerning the remainder a fight ensued -later. The result was, however, that all branches of the police -administration were taken away. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, did the administration of the Government General -have anything to do with the establishment and administration of -concentration camps? - -BILFINGER: To the best of my knowledge, no. - -DR. SEIDL: You were with the Chief of the Security Police and SD in -Kraków. When did you yourself hear of concentration camps at Maidanek, -Treblinka, and Lublin for the first time? - -BILFINGER: May I correct you, I was attached to the Commander of -Security Police. - -DR. SEIDL: Yes, the Commander of the Security Police. - -BILFINGER: I heard of Maidanek for the first time when Lublin and -Maidanek were occupied by the Russians; and through propaganda I heard -for the first time what the name Maidanek meant, when the then Governor -General Frank ordered an investigation regarding events in Maidanek and -responsibility for these events. - -DR. SEIDL: According to your own observation, generally speaking, what -were the relations like between the Governor General and the SS -Obergruppenführer Krüger, and what were the reasons for those relations? - -BILFINGER: Relations between them were very bad from the beginning. The -reasons were partly questions of organization and of the use of the -Police, and partly essential differences of opinion. - -DR. SEIDL: What do you mean by essential differences of opinion? Do you -mean different opinions regarding the treatment of the Polish -population? - -BILFINGER: I can still recollect one example which concerned the -confirmation of police court-martial sentences by Governor General -Frank. In opposition to Krüger’s opinion, he either failed to confirm a -number of sentences or else mitigated them considerably. In this -connection I remember such differences of opinion. - -DR. SEIDL: Were these sentences which were passed in connection with the -so-called AB Action? - -BILFINGER: I know nothing of an AB Action. - -DR. SEIDL: You came to the Government General later, did you? - -BILFINGER: I came to the Government General in August 1940. - -DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions for this witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask questions? - -DR. RUDOLF MERKEL (Counsel for Gestapo): May I put a few questions to -the witness? - -Witness, the Prosecution states that the State Police was a circle of -persons formed in accordance with a common plan, and that membership in -it was voluntary. Since you had an especially high position in the RSHA, -I ask you to tell me briefly what you know about these questions? - -BILFINGER: Of the members of the Secret State Police only a small part -were volunteers. The former officials, the officials of the former -political department of the headquarters of the Commissioner of the -Police, constituted the nucleus of the membership of the Secret State -Police. The various local police head offices were created from these -former political departments of the central police headquarters, and at -the same time practically all the officials from these former political -departments were taken over. In Berlin, for example, it was Department -I-A of the central police headquarters. - -Apart from that, administrative officials were transferred from other -administrative authorities to the Secret State Police, or were detailed -to go here. As time went on people from other administrations and -offices were forced to transfer to the Secret State Police. Thus, for -instance, the entire frontier customs service was transferred to the -Secret State Police in 1944 by order of the Führer. At about the same -time the whole of the intelligence service was transferred. - -In the course of the war numerous members of the Waffen-SS who were no -longer eligible for active military service were detailed to the Secret -State Police. In addition many people who originally had had nothing to -do with police work were drafted as emergency members to the Secret -State Police. - -DR. MERKEL: If I summarize it by saying that the Secret State Police was -a Reich authority and that the German civil service law applied to its -employees, is that correct? - -BILFINGER: Yes. - -DR. MERKEL: Was it possible for the officials to resign from the Secret -State Police easily? - -BILFINGER: It was extremely difficult and, in fact, impossible to resign -from the Secret State Police. One could resign only in very special -circumstances. - -DR. MERKEL: It has been stated here with reference to the composition of -the Secret State Police personnel that there was the following -proportion: executive officers about 20 percent; administrative -officials about 20 percent; and technical personnel approximately 60 -percent. Are these figures about right? - -BILFINGER: I have no general information about the composition of the -personnel; but for certain offices about which I knew more these figures -would probably apply. - -DR. MERKEL: Under whose jurisdiction were the concentration camps in -Germany and in the occupied countries? - -BILFINGER: The concentration camps were under the jurisdiction of the -Economic Administration Main Office under SS Gruppenführer Pohl. - -DR. MERKEL: Did the Secret State Police have anything to do with the -administration of the concentration camps? - -BILFINGER: No. It maybe that at the beginning certain concentration -camps here and there were administered directly by the Secret State -Police for a short period. That was probably the case in individual -instances. But in principle even at that time, and later on without -exception, the concentration camps were administered by the Economic -Administration Main Office. - -DR. MERKEL: Do you know at all who gave orders for the liquidations -which took place in the concentration camps? - -BILFINGER: No, I know nothing about that. - -DR. MERKEL: Can you say anything about the grounds for protective -custody? On the strength of what legal rulings was protective custody -decreed after 1933? - -BILFINGER: Protective custody was based on the Decree of the Reich -President for the Protection of the People and the State, of February -1933, in which a number of the basic rights of the Weimar Constitution -were rescinded. - -DR. MERKEL: Was there later a decree by the Minister of the Interior -which dealt with protective custody, at the end of 1936 or the beginning -of 1937? - -BILFINGER: Yes, at that time the Protective Custody Law was drawn up. -The legal basis as such remained in force. At that time power to decree -protective custody was confined to the Secret State Police. Before that -a number of other offices, rightly or wrongly, had decreed protective -custody. To prevent this, protective custody was then confined to the -Secret State Police. - -DR. MERKEL: Is it correct that for some time you were in France. In what -capacity were you there? - -BILFINGER: In the late summer and autumn of 1943 I was commander of the -Security Police in France, in Toulouse. - -DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything about an order from the RSHA, or from -the commander of the Sipo for France, or from individual district -commanders, to the effect that ill-treatment or torture was to be -applied when prisoners were interrogated? - -BILFINGER: No, I do not know of such orders. - -DR. MERKEL: Then how do you explain the ill-treatment and atrocities -which actually took place in connection with interrogations, proof of -which has been given by the Prosecution? - -BILFINGER: It is possible that ill-treatment did occur; in a number of -cases this either took place in spite of its being forbidden, or else it -was committed by members of other German offices in France which did not -belong to the Security Police. - -DR. MERKEL: Did you, while you were active in France, hear of any such -ill-treatment either officially or by hearsay? - -BILFINGER: I never heard of any such ill-treatment at the hands of -members of the German police or the German Armed Forces. I heard only of -cases of ill-treatment carried out by groups consisting of Frenchmen who -were being employed by some German authority. - -DR. MERKEL: Were there so-called Gestapo prisons in France? - -BILFINGER: No, the Security Police in France did not have prisons of -their own. They handed over their prisoners to the detention camps of -the German Armed Forces. - -DR. MERKEL: One last question: The Prosecution has given proof of a -large number of crimes against humanity and war crimes which were -committed with the participation of the Security Police. Can one say -that these crimes were perfectly obvious and were known to all members -of the Secret State Police, or were these crimes known only to a small -circle of persons who had been ordered directly to carry out the -measures concerned? Do you know anything about that? - -BILFINGER: I didn’t quite understand the question from the beginning. -Were you referring to France or to the Security Police in general? - -DR. MERKEL: I was referring to the Security Police in general. - -BILFINGER: No ill-treatment or torture of any kind was permitted; and, -as far as I know, nothing of the kind did happen, still less was it -known generally or to a larger circle of persons. I knew nothing about -it. - -DR. MERKEL: I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? Is there -nothing you wish to ask arising from Dr. Merkel’s cross-examination, Dr. -Seidl? - -DR. SEIDL: I have only one more question to ask the witness. - -Witness, in Paragraph 4 of the decree of 23 June 1942 the following -ruling is made, and I quote: - - “The SS and Police Leaders in the districts are directly - subordinate to the governors of the districts, just as the State - Secretary for Security is subordinate to the Governor General.” - -Thus it does not say that the entire police organization is subordinate, -but only the police leaders. - -Now I ask you whether orders which had been issued by the commanders of -the Security Police and the SD were forwarded to the governors or were -sent directly to the district chiefs of the Security Police and the SD? - -BILFINGER: These orders were always sent directly from the commander to -the district chiefs of the Security Police and the SD. The commander -could give no instructions to the governors. - -DR. SEIDL: If I understand you correctly you mean that the Security -Police and the SD had their own official channels which had absolutely -nothing to do with the administrative construction of the Government -General. - -BILFINGER: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions for the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. - -DR. SEIDL: With the permission of the Tribunal, I call as the next -witness the former Governor of Kraków, Dr. Kurt von Burgsdorff. - -[_The witness Von Burgsdorff took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -KURT VON BURGSDORFF (Witness): Kurt von Burgsdorff. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: - -“I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing.” - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Government General was divided into five -districts at the head of each of which there was a governor; is that -correct? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: From 1 December 1943 until the occupation of your district by -Soviet troops you were governor of the district Kraków? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. To use the correct official term, I was... - -GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Mr. -President, the defense counsel has put the question of the “occupation” -of this region by Soviet troops. I energetically protest against such -terminology and consider it a hostile move. - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I have just been told that perhaps a mistake -in the translation has crept in. All I intended to say was that, in the -course of the year 1944, the area of which this witness was governor was -occupied by the Soviet troops in the course of military action. I do not -know what the Soviet prosecutor is protesting against; it is at any rate -far from my intention to make any hostile statement here. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think the point was, it was not an occupation; it was a -liberation by the Russian Army. - -DR. SEIDL: Of course; I did not want to say any more than that the -German troops were driven out of this area by the Soviet troops. - -Witness, will you please continue with your answer? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I was entrusted with exercising the duties of a -governor—that is the correct official expression. Until a few months -ago I was still an officer of the Wehrmacht, and during my entire -activity in Kraków I remained an officer of the Wehrmacht. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, according to your observations, what basically was -the attitude of the Governor General toward the Polish and Ukrainian -people? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I want to emphasize that I can answer only for the year -1944. At that time the attitude of the Governor General was that he -wished to live in peace with the people. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that already in 1942 the Governor General had -given the governors the opportunity of setting up administrative -committees, comprised of Poles and Ukrainians, attached to the district -chiefs? - -VON BURGSDORFF: There was a governmental decree to this effect. Whether -that was in 1942 or not I do not know. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself make use of the authorization contained -therein, and did you establish such administrative committees? - -VON BURGSDORFF: In the district of Kraków I had such a committee -established at once for every district chief. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, according to your observations what was the food -situation like in the Government General, and particularly in your -district? - -VON BURGSDORFF: It was not unsatisfactory; but I must add that the -reason for that was that, in addition to the rations, the Polish -population had an extensive black market. - -DR. SEIDL: According to your observations what was the attitude of the -Governor General on the question of the mobilization of labor? - -VON BURGSDORFF: He did not wish any workers sent outside the Government -General, because he was interested in retaining the necessary manpower -within the country. - -DR. SEIDL: Was the Church persecuted by the Governor General in the -Government General; and what basically was the attitude of the Governor -General to this question, according to your observations? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Again I can answer only for my district and for the year -1944. There was no persecution of the Church; on the contrary, the -relations with churches of all denominations were good in my district. -On my travels I always received the clergy, and I never heard any -complaint. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you have any personal experience with the Governor -General with regard to this question? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. In the middle of January 1944 I was appointed -District Standortführer by the Governor General, who at the same time -was the Party Leader in the Government General; that is, I was appointed -to a Party office for the district of Kraków. I pointed out to him, as I -had pointed out to the Minister of the Interior, Himmler, before, that I -was a convinced church-going Christian. The Governor General replied -that he was in no way perturbed by that and that he knew of no provision -in the Party program which prohibited it. - -DR. SEIDL: What, according to your observations, were the relations like -between the Governor General and the administration of the Government -General on the one side, and the Security Police and the SD on the other -side? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Doubtlessly underneath they were bad, because the Police -always ended by doing only what it wanted and did not concern itself -with the administration. For that reason in the country districts also -there was real friction between the administration offices and the -Police. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that when you took office, or shortly after, -the Governor General issued several instructions referring to the -Police? I quote from the diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank, the entry of -4 January 1944: - - “The Governor General then gave some instructions to Dr. Von - Burgsdorff with reference to his new activities. His task will - be to inform himself, as a matter of principle, of all decisive - factors in the district. Above all the Governor should direct - his efforts to opposing energetically any encroachments by the - Police.” - -VON BURGSDORFF: Today I no longer remember that conversation of 4 -January 1944, but it may have taken place. However, I do remember that -after I took office, at the end of November 1943, I went to see the -Governor General once more and told him that I had heard that the -relations with the Police were not good and were scarcely tolerable for -the administration. He replied that he was doing what he could in order, -as I might put it, to bring the Police to reason. It was on the basis of -this statement by the Governor General that I definitely decided to -remain in the Government General. I had, as is known, told the Reich -Minister of the Interior that I was unwilling to go there. - -DR. SEIDL: In your capacity as Governor did you have any authority to -issue commands to the Security Police and the SD in your district? - -VON BURGSDORFF: None whatsoever. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself ever see a police directive? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Never. With the Police, orders are passed down -vertically, that is, directly from the Higher SS and Police Leader to -the SS and Police Leader respectively—and that is probably the usual -way—from the chief of the Security Police to the unit commander of the -Security Police. - -DR. SEIDL: In your activity as Governor did you have anything to do with -the administration of concentration camps? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Never. - -DR. SEIDL: Do you know who administered the concentration camps? - -VON BURGSDORFF: No, not from my own experience; but I have heard that -there was some central office in Berlin under the Reichsführer SS. - -DR. SEIDL: When did you hear for the first time of the Maidanek -concentration camp? - -VON BURGSDORFF: From you, about a fortnight ago. - -DR. SEIDL: You want to tell the Tribunal under oath... - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: ...that you, although you were Governor of Kraków in the -occupied Polish territory, did not learn about that until during your -captivity? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes, I am firmly convinced that I heard about this -concentration camp from you for the first time. - -DR. SEIDL: When did you for the first time hear of the Treblinka -concentration camp? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Also from you on the same occasion. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Governor General is accused by the Prosecution -of issuing a summary court-martial decree in the year 1943. What at that -time was the security situation in the Government General? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Again I can judge only for the year 1944. As the German -troops came back from the East, it became worse and worse, so that in my -district it became increasingly difficult to carry out any kind of -administration. - -DR. SEIDL: According to your observations what was the economic -situation like in the agricultural and industrial sectors of your -district, and is the statement justified that, allowing for wartime -conditions, the administration of the Government General had done -everything to promote economy? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Economy in my district was at full force in 1944 both in -industry and in agriculture. Some industries had been transferred from -the Reich to the Government General; and, as far as agriculture was -concerned, the administration imported large quantities of fertilizers -and seeds and the like. Horse breeding was also greatly promoted in my -district. - -DR. SEIDL: The Defendant Dr. Frank is accused of not having done -everything that was necessary with regard to public health and sanitary -conditions. What can you say about this point? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I can say that in my district—again speaking of -1944—hospitals were improved and new ones installed. A great deal was -done, especially in the fighting of epidemics. Typhus, dysentery, and -typhoid were greatly reduced by inoculation. - -DR. SEIDL: The Defendant Frank is also accused of having neglected -higher education. Do you know anything about the conditions in the -Government General in regard to this? - -VON BURGSDORFF: When I came into the Government General there was no -longer any higher education at all. On the basis of other experiences I -suggested immediately that Polish universities be opened again. I -contacted the president of the main department for education, who told -me that the government was already entertaining such plans. In every one -of my monthly reports I pointed out the necessity for Polish -universities, because within a short time, or more correctly in a few -years’ time, there would be a shortage of technicians, doctors, and -veterinaries. - -DR. SEIDL: Now, one last question. There was a so-called sphere of -activity of the NSDAP in the Government General; you were the District -Standortführer in the Government General? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, what, according to your observations, were the -relations between the Governor General and the Head of the Party -Chancellery, Bormann? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I believe I can say without exaggeration that they were -extremely bad. As District Standortführer I combined this office with -that of District Governor and witnessed the last great struggle of the -Governor General against Bormann. The Governor General held the view, -and in this he was justified, that it was wrong to combine the Party -office with the government office. He was afraid there would be too much -interference not only by the Police but also by the Party, and he wanted -to prevent that. Bormann, on the other hand, wanted to establish the -predominance of the Party over the State in the Government General as -well. That led to the most serious conflict. - -DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions for the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other Defense Counsel wish to ask any other -questions? - -DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): -Witness, you were at one time Under State Secretary in the Government of -the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia? When was that? - -VON BURGSDORFF: From the end of March 1939 until the middle of March -1942. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And to whom were you directly subordinate as Under -State Secretary? The State Secretary Frank or the Reich Protector? - -VON BURGSDORFF: State Secretary Frank. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: How did you come to know about the activities of -Von Neurath as Reich Protector? - -VON BURGSDORFF: From conferences with him and personal conversations. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What kind of work did you have to do as Under -State Secretary? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I was in charge of the administration proper. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were the Police and the various SS and police -offices subordinate to you? - -VON BURGSDORFF: No. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: To whom were they subordinate? - -VON BURGSDORFF: To State Secretary Frank. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was State Secretary Frank’s attitude to Von -Neurath? - -VON BURGSDORFF: You mean officially? - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Officially, yes, of course. - -VON BURGSDORFF: Herr Von Neurath tried at first to get on with Herr -Frank; but the stronger Frank’s position became, the more impossible -that was. State Secretary Frank, later Minister Frank, had behind him -the entire power of the SS and the Police, and finally Hitler also. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: From whom did Frank get his orders directly? - -VON BURGSDORFF: As far as I know, from Himmler; however, I saw that on -one or two or three occasions he received direct orders from Hitler. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And that happened mostly without Von Neurath being -consulted? - -VON BURGSDORFF: That I cannot say, but I assume so. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was it possible for Frank to perform his political -functions independently within his sphere of activity, or did he have to -have the approval of Herr Von Neurath? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Whether he was authorized or allowed to do so, I should -not like to decide, but at any rate he did so. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were Herr Von Neurath and Herr Frank of the same -opinion concerning the policy towards the Czech people? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I did not understand your question. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath agree with the policy toward -the Czech people pursued by Frank or his superior, Himmler? - -VON BURGSDORFF: No. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Could he carry through his aims? - -VON BURGSDORFF: He could not do anything, confronted as he was by -Himmler’s and Hitler’s immense power. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Herr Von Neurath’s own policy and -attitude? - -VON BURGSDORFF: At the beginning I spoke very often about these things -to Herr Von Neurath. On the basis of the decree of 15 March he hoped and -believed he could get the Germans and Czechs in the Protectorate to live -together reasonably and peacefully. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But as Frank’s position became stronger, that -became more and more difficult? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you remember that in the middle of November -1939 serious disturbances broke out among the students in Prague? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you also remember that on the day after these -incidents Herr Von Neurath and Frank flew to Berlin? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you remember that Frank returned from Berlin -alone on the same day? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I believe I can recall that Frank returned on the same -day, but I do not know whether he returned alone. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You don’t know whether Herr Von Neurath returned -with him? - -VON BURGSDORFF: No. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything else about the incidents -connected with the students’ disturbances and what the consequences -were? - -VON BURGSDORFF: They resulted, as far as I remember, in the execution of -several students and in the closing of the universities. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know whether the universities were closed -on Himmler’s order? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about the attitude of Herr -Von Neurath towards the Catholic and Protestant Churches? - -VON BURGSDORFF: His attitude was always above reproach, and there were -no difficulties with the churches during the time that I was in the -Protectorate. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that Herr Von Neurath was in contact -with the Archbishop of Prague until the latter’s death? - -VON BURGSDORFF: No, I don’t know anything about that. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything concerning whether, during -the term of office of Herr Von Neurath, with his approval or upon his -orders, art treasures of any kind, pictures, monuments, sculptures, -libraries, or the like, belonging either to the State or to private -owners, were confiscated and removed from the country? - -VON BURGSDORFF: It is certain, absolutely certain, that he did not order -anything of the sort. Whether he consented in any way to this I do not -know, but I do not believe so. I remember one incident in the Malta -Palace, where some Reich office—I don’t remember today which it -was—removed art treasures. Herr Von Neurath immediately did everything -to make good this damage. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that the customs union which had been -ordered by Berlin from the very beginning between the Protectorate and -Germany was not established for a long time because of Herr Von -Neurath’s intervention? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. I definitely know about that. However, in the -interest of the truth, I have to add that State Secretary Frank also was -against the customs union, because, like Herr Von Neurath, he believed -that the economy of the Protectorate would be damaged by the stronger -economy of Germany. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: While Von Neurath was Reich Protector, was there -any compulsory deportation of workers? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I am convinced that that did not happen. Workers were -recruited, but in an entirely regular manner. That was the case while I -was in the Protectorate. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know whether Von Neurath made travel in or -out of the Protectorate dependent on official approval? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Whether or not Von Neurath did that, I do not know. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about the closing of the -secondary schools? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about it? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I remember that the closing of the secondary schools was -a necessary consequence of the closing of the universities. There were -too many secondary schools in the Protectorate. Not all of them were -closed by any means. On the other hand technical schools were greatly -expanded and new ones established. I cannot remember anything more exact -about it. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Von Neurath’s attitude -towards the Germanization of Czechoslovakia as intended by Himmler? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes, I remember the memorandum which Von Neurath sent to -Hitler about the whole affair. That memorandum was intended to defer -Himmler’s plans for forced Germanization. Von Neurath expressed the -view, which he had frequently mentioned to me, that in the interest of -peace in the Protectorate he did not advocate these attempts at -Germanization. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no more questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? - -MR. DODD: Tell us, please, when you first joined the National Socialist -Party? - -VON BURGSDORFF: On 1 May 1933. - -MR. DODD: And did you achieve office in any of its affiliated -organizations? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I was an honorary SA Gruppenführer. - -MR. DODD: Any other honors? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Then for a few years, just as I had been during the -democratic regime, I was legal advisor to the administration of Saxony. - -MR. DODD: Weren’t you also an Oberbannführer in the HJ, the -Hitler-Jugend? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I once became Oberbannführer on the occasion of the -Reich Youth Leader’s visit to Prague. But that was purely a gesture of -courtesy, which had no consequences. - -I should like to mention again, since you speak of Party offices, that, -as was said before, because of my post as Governor of Kraków I was -District Standortführer from the middle of January 1944 until the end, -that is the middle of January 1945. - -MR. DODD: You also received the gold badge of the Hitler Youth, did you -not? - -VON BURGSDORFF: No. - -MR. DODD: Weren’t you in some way associated with Reinhard Heydrich when -you were in Prague? - -VON BURGSDORFF: I was with Heydrich until the middle of 1942. Then, as -is generally known, because of the course pursued by Heydrich, I left -the Protectorate, and at 55 years of age I went into the army. - -MR. DODD: What position did you occupy with relation to Heydrich? - -VON BURGSDORFF: The same as under Herr Von Neurath; I was Under State -Secretary. - -MR. DODD: Let me put it to you this way: You told us that you never -heard of Maidanek, the concentration camp? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And you never heard of Auschwitz? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Of Auschwitz, yes. - -MR. DODD: Had you heard of an installation known as Lublin? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Of Lublin? Not of the concentration camp but of the city -of Lublin, of course. - -MR. DODD: Did you know of a concentration camp by the name of Lublin? - -VON BURGSDORFF: No. - -MR. DODD: You did know, I assume, of many other concentration camps by -name? - -VON BURGSDORFF: Only of German camps, yes—of Dachau and Buchenwald. - -MR. DODD: That is all. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you any questions? - -DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions for the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Who is your next witness? - -DR. SEIDL: The next witness would be the former secretary of the -Governor General, Fräulein Kraffczyk. However, if I understood the -Tribunal correctly yesterday, this session will end at 1630 hours. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now until Tuesday morning. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 23 April 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND TWELFTH DAY - Tuesday, 23 April 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl. - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I shall dispense with the hearing of the -witness Struve, Chief of the Central Department for Agriculture and Food -in the Government General. With the permission of the Tribunal I am now -calling witness Dr. Joseph Bühler. - -[_The witness Bühler took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please? - -JOSEPH BÜHLER (Witness): Joseph Bühler. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, how long have you known Defendant Dr. Hans Frank; -and what were the positions in which you worked with him? - -BÜHLER: I have known Herr Frank since 1 October 1930. I worked with him -in government spheres of service from the end of March 1933. I served -under him officially when he was Minister of Justice in Bavaria; later -when he was Reich Commissioner for Justice; and still later when he was -Minister. From the end of September 1939 Herr Frank employed me in an -official capacity in the Government General. - -DR. SEIDL: In what capacity did you serve in the Government General at -the end? - -BÜHLER: From about the second half of 1940 I was state secretary in the -government of the Government General. - -DR. SEIDL: Were you yourself a member of the Party? - -BÜHLER: I have been a Party member since 1 April 1933. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you exercise any functions in the Party or any of the -affiliated organizations of the Party, particularly in the SA or the SS? - -BÜHLER: I never held an office in the Party. I was never a member of the -SA or the SS. - -DR. SEIDL: I now come to the time during which you were state secretary -to the chief of the government in the Government General. Will you -please tell me what the relations were between the Governor General on -the one side and the Higher SS and Police Leader on the other side? - -BÜHLER: I might perhaps say in advance that my sphere of activity did -not touch upon police matters, matters relating to the Party, or -military matters in the Government General. - -The relations of the Governor General to the Higher SS and Police -Leader, Obergruppenführer Krüger, who was allocated to him by the -Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police were, from the very -beginning, made difficult by essential differences of opinion. These -differences of opinion concerned the conception of the task and the -position of the Police in general in an orderly state system, as well as -the conception in particular of the position and tasks of the Police in -the Government General. The Governor General held the view that the -Police must be the servant and the organ of the executive of the state -and that accordingly he and the state authorities should give orders to -the Police and that this assignment of tasks involved a limitation of -the sphere of activity of the Police. - -The Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger, on the other hand, held the view -that the Police in general had, of course, to fulfill tasks originating -with the executive of the state but that in fulfilling these tasks it -was not bound by the instructions of the administrative authorities, -that this was a matter of technical police questions, decisions about -which administrative authorities could not make and were not in a -position to make. - -Regarding the power to give orders to the Police, it was Krüger’s view -that because of the effectiveness and unity of police activity in all -occupied territories, such power to issue orders had to rest with the -central authority in Berlin and that he and only he could issue orders. - -As far as the duties of the Police were concerned, it was Krüger’s -opinion that the Governor General’s view regarding the limitation of -these duties as unfounded for the very reason that he, as Higher SS and -Police Leader, was simultaneously the deputy of the Reichsführer SS in -the latter’s capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of -German Nationality. - -As far as the relation of the Police to the question of Polish policy -was concerned, it was Krüger’s view that, in connection with work in -non-German territory, police considerations would have to play a -predominant role and that with police methods everything could be -achieved and everything could be prevented. This overestimation of the -Police led, for instance, to the fact that, during later arguments -between the Police and the administration regarding their respective -spheres of work, matters concerning non-German groups were listed among -the competences of the Police. - -DR. SEIDL: Do you know that as early as 1939 Reichsführer SS Himmler -issued a restricted decree, according to which the handling of all -police matters was his own concern or the concern of his Higher SS and -Police Leader? - -BÜHLER: That this was the case became clear to me from the actions taken -by the Police. I did not see a decree to this effect, but I can state -this much: The Police in the Government General acted exactly as in the -directives which I have described before. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, in 1942, by decree of the Führer, a State -Secretariat for Security was instituted. At whose instigation was this -instituted and what was the position taken by the Governor General in -that connection? - -BÜHLER: This decree was preceded by a frightful campaign of hatred -against the person of the Governor General. The institution of the State -Secretariat for Security was considered by the Police a step, an -important step, in the fight for the removal of the Governor General. -The matters specified in that decree, or at least the majority of them, -were not being transferred to the Police now for the first time, but the -actual state of affairs was—the actual course of events had already -been—in conformity to the contents of this decree before it was issued. - -DR. SEIDL: In the decree implementing this Führer decree and dated 3 -June 1942 all the police spheres of activities which were to be -transferred to the State Secretary were given in two lists; in an -Appendix A, the tasks of the Regular Police; and in an Appendix B, the -tasks of the Security Police. Were these police matters at that time -transferred completely to the State Secretary and thus to the police -sector? - -BÜHLER: The administration did not like giving up these matters; so -where the Police had not already got hold of them, they were given up -only with reluctance. - -DR. SEIDL: You are thinking first of all of the spheres of the so-called -administrative police, health police, _et cetera_, are you not? - -BÜHLER: Yes, that is to say, the police in charge of communications, -health, food, and such matters. - -DR. SEIDL: If I have understood your statements correctly, you mean that -the entire police system, Security Police as well as SD and Regular -Police, was directed by the central office, either by Himmler himself or -by the Reich Security Main Office through the Higher SS and Police -Leader? - -BÜHLER: In general according to my observations, it was possible for the -Security Police to receive orders direct from Berlin without their going -through Krüger. - -DR. SEIDL: And now another question: Is it correct that resettlements -were carried out in the Government General, by Reichsführer SS Himmler -in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German -Nationality? - -BÜHLER: Resettlements, in the opinion of the Governor General, even if -carried out decently, always caused unrest among the population. We had -no use for that in the Government General. Also, these resettlements -always caused a falling off of agricultural production. For these -reasons, the Governor General and the Government of the Government -General did not, as a matter of principle, carry out resettlements -during the war. To the extent that such resettlements were carried out, -it was done exclusively by the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation -of German Nationality. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General, because of this -arbitrary resettlement policy, repeatedly had serious arguments with -Himmler, Krüger, and SS Gruppenführer Globocznik? - -BÜHLER: That is correct. The intention of preventing such resettlements -always led to arguments and friction between the Higher SS and Police -Leader and the Governor General. - -DR. SEIDL: The Defendant Dr. Frank is accused by the Prosecution of the -seizure and confiscation of industrial and private property. What -basically was the attitude of the Governor General to such questions? - -BÜHLER: The legal provisions in this sphere of the law originated with -the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. Confiscation of private property -and possessions in the annexed Eastern territories and in the Government -General was subject to the same regulations. - -The decree of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan provided for the -creation of a trust office—the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost—with its -central administration in Berlin. The Governor General did not want to -have the affairs of the Government General administered in Berlin, and -therefore he opposed the administration of property in the Government -General being entrusted to the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost. Without -interference by the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, he established his -own rules for confiscations in the Government General and his own trust -office. That trust office was headed by an experienced higher official -from the Ministry of Economy of Saxony. - -DR. SEIDL: What happened to the factories and works which were situated -in the Government General and were formerly the property of the Polish -State? - -BÜHLER: Factories, as far as they were included in the armament program, -were taken over by the military sector, that is to say, by the Inspector -for Armaments, who was subordinate to the OKW and later to Minister -Speer. Factories outside the armament sector, which had belonged to the -former Polish State, the Governor General tried to consolidate into a -stock company and to administer them separately as property of the -Government General. The chief shareholder in this company was the -Treasury of the Government General. - -DR. SEIDL: That is to say, these factories were administered entirely -separately by the Reich Treasury? - -BÜHLER: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted an extract from Frank’s diary in -evidence under Number USA-281 (Document Number 2233(d)-PS.) This is a -discussion of Jewish problems. In this connection Frank said, among -other things: - - “My attitude towards the Jews is based on the expectation that - they will disappear; they must go away. I have started - negotiations for deporting them to the East. This question will - be discussed at a large meeting in Berlin in January, to which I - shall send State Secretary Dr. Bühler. This conference is to - take place at the Reich Security Main Office in the office of SS - Obergruppenführer Heydrich. In any case Jewish emigration on a - large scale will begin.” - -I ask you now, did the Governor General send you to Berlin for that -conference; and if so, what was the subject of the conference? - -BÜHLER: Yes, I was sent to the conference and the subject of the -conference was the Jewish problem. I might say in advance that from the -beginning Jewish questions in the Government General were considered as -coming under the jurisdiction of the Higher SS and Police Leader and -handled accordingly. The handling of Jewish matters by the state -administration was supervised and merely tolerated by the Police. - -During the years 1940 and 1941 incredible numbers of people, mostly -Jews, were brought into the Government General in spite of the -objections and protests of the Governor General and his administration. -This completely unexpected, unprepared for, and undesired bringing in of -the Jewish population from other territories put the administration of -the Government General in an extremely difficult position. - -Accommodating these masses, feeding them, and caring for their -health—combating epidemics for instance—almost, or rather, definitely -overtaxed the capacity of the territory. Particularly threatening was -the spread of typhus, not only in the ghettos but also among the Polish -population and the Germans in the Government General. It appeared as if -that epidemic would spread even to the Reich and to the Eastern Front. - -At that moment Heydrich’s invitation to the Governor General was -received. The conference was originally supposed to take place in -November 1941, but it was frequently postponed and it may have taken -place in February 1942. - -Because of the special problems of the Government General I had asked -Heydrich for a personal interview and he received me. On that occasion, -among many other things, I described in particular the catastrophic -conditions which had resulted from the arbitrary bringing of Jews into -the Government General. He replied that for this very reason he had -invited the Governor General to the conference. The Reichsführer SS, so -he said, had received an order from the Führer to round up all the Jews -of Europe and to settle them in the Northeast of Europe, in Russia. I -asked him whether this meant that the further arrival of Jews in the -Government General would cease, and whether the hundreds of thousands of -Jews who had been brought into the Government General without the -permission of the Governor General would be moved out again. Heydrich -promised me both these things. Heydrich said furthermore that the Führer -had given an order that Theresienstadt, a town in the Protectorate, -would become a reservation in which old and sick Jews, and weak Jews who -could not stand the strains of resettlement, were to be accommodated in -the future. This information left me definitely convinced that the -resettlement of the Jews, if not for the sake of the Jews, then for the -sake of the reputation and prestige of the German people, would be -carried out in a humane fashion. The removal of the Jews from the -Government General was subsequently carried out exclusively by the -Police. - -I might add that Heydrich demanded, particularly for himself, his -office, and its branches, the exclusive and uninterrupted competence and -control in this matter. - -DR. SEIDL: What concentration camps in the Government General did you -know about during your activity as State Secretary? - -BÜHLER: The publications in the press during the summer of 1944 called -my attention to the Maidanek camp for the first time. I did not know -that this camp, not far from Lublin, was a concentration camp. It had -been installed as an economic establishment of the Reichsführer SS, in -1941 I think. Governor Zörner came to visit me at that time and he told -me that he had objected to the establishment of this camp when he talked -to Globocznik, as it would endanger the power supply of the city of -Lublin; and there were objections, too, on the part of the Police with -regard to the danger of epidemics. I informed the Governor General of -this and he in turn sent for Globocznik. Globocznik stated to the -Governor General that certain workshops for the needs of the Waffen-SS -at the front had been erected on that site by him. He mentioned -workshops for dressing furs but he also mentioned a timber yard which -was located there. - -In these workshops for dressing furs, as I heard, fur articles from the -collection of furs were altered for use at the front. At any rate, -Globocznik stated that he had installed these workshops in compliance -with Himmler’s command. - -The Governor General prohibited the erection of any further -installations until all questions were settled with the police in charge -of building and blueprints had been submitted to the state offices, in -other words until all rules had been complied with, which apply to the -construction of buildings. Globocznik never submitted these blueprints. -With regard to the events inside the camp, no concrete information ever -reached the outside. It surprised the Governor General just as much as -it surprised me when the world press released the news about Maidanek. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution has submitted a document, Number -437-PS, Exhibit USA-610, which is a memorandum from the Governor General -to the Führer, dated 19 June 1943. I think you yourself drafted that -memorandum. On Page 35 a report of the commander of the Security Police -is mentioned and quoted verbatim in part. This report of the Security -Police mentions also the name of Maidanek. - -Did you at that time realize that this Maidanek was identical or -probably identical with that camp near Lublin? - -BÜHLER: No. I assumed that, like Auschwitz, it was a camp outside the -territory of the Government General, because the Governor General had -repeatedly told the Police and the Higher SS and Police Leader that he -did not wish to have concentration camps in the Government General. - -DR. SEIDL: Under whose jurisdiction was the administration of -concentration camps in the Government General? - -BÜHLER: I don’t know because I did not know of the existence of the -camps. In August, on the occasion of a visit to the reception camp at -Pruszkow, I heard about the administration of concentration camps in -general. At that time I brought instructions from Himmler to the camp -commandant, according to which transport of the inhabitants of Warsaw -who had been removed from the city to concentration camps was to cease -forthwith. - -DR. SEIDL: Was that after the uprising in Warsaw? - -BÜHLER: It was during it; it must have been on or about 18 or 19 August -1944. The camp commandant, whose name I have forgotten, told me at the -time that he did not know about that order, and that he could receive -instructions only from the Chief of Concentration Camps. - -DR. SEIDL: Do you know whether the Governor General himself ever sent a -Pole, a Ukrainian, or a Jew to a concentration camp? - -BÜHLER: Nothing like that ever happened, when I was present. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it true that a large number of Jewish workmen who were -working in the castle at Kraków were taken away by the Security Police -against the wishes of the Governor General and during his absence? - -BÜHLER: This Jewish workers’ colony is known to me because I lived in -that castle. I also know that the Governor General always took care of -the maintenance of this colony. And the chief of the Chancellery of the -Government General, Ministerial Counsellor Keit, once told me that this -group of Jewish workers had been taken away by force by the Police -during the absence of the Governor General. - -DR. SEIDL: I now come to the so-called AB Action, this extraordinary -pacification action. What were the circumstances which occasioned this -action? - -BÜHLER: It may have been about the middle of May 1940 when one morning I -was called from the government building, where I performed my official -work, to visit the Governor General in the castle. I think I remember -that Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart had also been called. There we met the -Governor General together with some officials of the Police. The -Governor General stated that, in the opinion of the Police, an extreme -act of pacification was necessary. The security situation at that time, -as far as I remember, was this: Certain remnants of the Polish armed -forces were still roaming about in deserted forest regions, causing -unrest among the population, and probably giving military training to -young Poles. At that time, that is May 1940, the Polish people had -recovered from the shock which they had suffered at the sudden defeat in -1939; and they began openly, with little caution and without experience, -to start a resistance movement everywhere. This picture I remember -clearly because of the statement given by the Police on that or some -other occasion. - -DR. SEIDL: May I interrupt you and quote from Frank’s diary, an entry of -16 May 1940. I quote: - - “The general war situation forces us to regard the security - situation in the Government General very seriously. From a - number of symptoms and actions one can draw the conclusion that - a large organized wave of resistance among the Poles is present - in the country awaiting the outbreak of greater and violent - events. Thousands of Poles are reported to have been organized - secretly and to have been armed, and are being incited to carry - out acts of violence of all sorts.” - -Then the Governor General quoted some recent examples, as, for instance, -an uprising in certain villages under the leadership of Major Huballa in -the district of Radom; the murder of families of German blood in -Józefów; the murder of the mayor of Grasienta, _et cetera_. - - “Illegal pamphlets, inciting to rebellion, are being distributed - and even posted up everywhere; and there can therefore be no - doubt that the security situation is extremely serious.” - -Did the Governor General express himself in that manner at the time? - -BÜHLER: When I took part in that meeting, the Governor General spoke -about the situation for some time, but the details I cannot recollect. - -DR. SEIDL: What happened after that? - -BÜHLER: I had only one impression. In the previous months the Governor -General had succeeded, by taking great pains, in imposing on the Police -a procedure for courts-martial which had to be observed in making -arrests and dealing with suspicious persons. Furthermore, the Police had -to concede that the Governor General could refer the sentences of a -summary court-martial to a reprieve commission and that the execution of -sentences could take place only after the sentences had been confirmed -by the Governor General. The statements of the Governor General during -this conference in the middle of May 1940 made me fear that the Police -might see in these statements the possibility for evading the -court-martial and reprieve procedure imposed on them. For that reason I -asked the Governor General for permission to speak after he had finished -his statement. The Governor General cut me short at first and stated -that he wanted to dictate something to the secretary in a hurry, which -the latter was then to dictate to a stenotypist at once and then put it -into its final version. Thereupon the Governor General dictated some -authorization, or order, or some such document; and with absolute -certainty I remember that after he had finished dictating, the secretary -and I think, quite definitely, Brigadeführer Streckenbach, the Commander -of the Regular Police, left the room. I am saying this in advance -because it explains the fact that everything that happened afterwards -has not been recorded in the minutes. The secretary was no longer -present in the room. I expressed my fears, saying that these -requirements laid down for court-martial procedure should be observed -under all circumstances. I am not claiming any particular merit in this -connection, because if I had not done it then this objection would have -been raised, I am convinced, by Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart, or the -Governor General himself would have realized the danger which his -statements might have caused in this respect. At any rate, in reply to -my objection, and without any debate, the Governor General stated at -once that arrests and shootings could take place only in accordance with -the court-martial procedure, and that sentences of the summary -courts-martial would have to be examined by the reprieve commission. - -In the ensuing period these instructions were followed. I assume that it -is certain that the reprieve commission received all sentences -pronounced by these courts-martial and dealt with them. - -DR. SEIDL: Another entry in Frank’s diary, 12 July 1940, leads one to -the conclusion that at first these leaders of the resistance movement -concerned were merely arrested. I quote a statement of the Governor -General: - - “Regarding the question what is to be done with the political - criminals caught in connection with the AB Action, a discussion - is to take place in the near future with State Secretary Dr. - Bühler, Obergruppenführer Krüger, Brigadeführer Streckenbach, - and Ministerial Counsellor Wille.” - -Who was Ministerial Counsellor Wille, and what task did he have in that -connection? - -BÜHLER: I might say in advance that there is a gap in my memory which -makes it impossible for me to say for certain when the Governor General -told Brigadeführer Streckenbach that in all cases he would have to -observe court-martial procedure and respect the reprieve commission. On -the other hand, I think I can remember for certain that at the time this -discussion took place between Krüger, Streckenbach, Wille, and me, -arrests only had taken place and no executions. Ministerial Counsellor -Wille was the head of the Department of Justice in the Government and -was the competent official for all matters concerning reprieves. The -Governor General wanted these matters dealt with by a legally trained, -experienced man. - -During the conference with Krüger, Streckenbach, and Wille it had been -ruled that the persons who had been arrested up to that time were to be -subjected to court-martial procedure and that sentences had to be dealt -with by the reprieve commission. The Police were not exactly -enthusiastic about this. I remember that Krüger told me privately after -the conference that the Governor General was a jack-in-the-box with whom -one couldn’t work, and that in the future he would go his own way. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal thinks that this has been gone -into in too great detail. - -DR. SEIDL: Yes, I am coming to the end of my questions. - -Witness, during a Police meeting in 1940 on 30 May, the Defendant Dr. -Frank mentioned among other things the following: “The difficulties we -had had with the Kraków professors were terrible. If we had handled the -matter here, it would have taken a different course.” Who arrested these -professors, and to what extent was the Governor General concerned with -this matter? - -BÜHLER: On 7 or 8 November 1939, when the Governor General arrived in -Kraków to begin his activities, all professors of the University of -Kraków were arrested by the Security Police without his knowledge and -taken away to concentration camps in the Reich. Among them were -acquaintances of the Governor General, with whom shortly before he had -had social and academic connections through the Academy for German Law. -The Governor General used his influence on Obergruppenführer Krüger -persistently and uninterruptedly until he achieved the release of the -majority of these professors from concentration camps. - -This statement of his, which contradicts this, was made, in my opinion, -for the purpose of placating the Police, for the Police did not like -releasing these professors. - -DR. SEIDL: What basically was the attitude of the Governor General -concerning mobilization of labor? - -BÜHLER: The Governor General and the Government of the Government -General were always attempting to get as many Polish workers for the -Reich as possible. It was clear to us, however, that the employment of -force in recruiting workers might bring about temporary advantages but -that recruitment of workers in that way would not promise much success -in the long run. The Governor General gave me instructions, therefore, -to conduct extensive and intensive propaganda in favor of employment in -the Reich and to oppose all use of force in the recruitment of workers. - -On the other hand the Governor General wanted to make his recruitment of -workers for the Reich successful by demanding decent treatment for -Polish workers in the Reich. He negotiated for many years with the Reich -Commissioner for the Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, and -improvements were in fact achieved. The Governor General was especially -opposed to the identifying of Jews and Poles by distinguishing marks in -the Reich. I remember a letter from Reich Commissioner Sauckel in which -he informed the Governor General that he had made every effort to insure -the same treatment for Polish workers as for other foreign workers, but -that his efforts were no longer crowned by success whenever the -influence of the Reichsführer SS opposed them. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, I now come to another point. Under Number USA-275 -the Prosecution has submitted Document 1061-PS, which is a report of -Brigadeführer Stroop on the destruction of the ghetto in Warsaw. Were -you, or the Governor General, informed beforehand about the measures -planned by the Security Police? - -BÜHLER: I certainly was not. As to the Governor General, I do not know -that he was informed about any such plans. - -DR. SEIDL: What did you learn afterwards about the events at the ghetto -in Warsaw in 1943? - -BÜHLER: I heard what practically everybody heard—that an uprising had -broken out in the ghetto which had long been prepared; that the Jews had -used the building materials given them for the purpose of air-raid -protection to set up defense works; and that during the uprising violent -resistance was encountered by the German troops. - -DR. SEIDL: I now come to the Warsaw uprising of 1944. To what extent did -the administration of the Government General participate in the quelling -of that revolt? - -BÜHLER: As our comrades in Warsaw were encircled by the -insurrectionists, we asked the Governor General to apply to the Führer -for assistance to bring about a speedy quelling of the Warsaw revolt. -Apart from that the administration assisted in the welfare of the -population in connection with the evacuation in the battle zone of the -quarters that were to be destroyed. But the administration did not -exercise any authority here. - -DR. SEIDL: On 4 November 1945 you made an affidavit. The affidavit bears -the number 2476-PS. I shall now read to you that affidavit, which is -very brief, and I shall ask you to tell me whether the contents are -correct. I quote: - - “In the course of the quelling of the Warsaw revolt in August - 1944, approximately 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw (a - Polish estimate) were taken away to German concentration camps. - As a result of a _démarche_ made by the Governor General, Dr. - Frank, to the office of Reichsführer SS Himmler, the latter - prohibited further deportations. The Governor General tried to - secure the release of the 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw - who had already been taken to concentration camps in the Reich. - The Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, Obergruppenführer - Kaltenbrunner, refused this request, made in writing as well as - orally on the occasion of a visit of mine to Berlin in September - or October 1944, on the grounds that these inhabitants of Warsaw - were being used in the secret manufacture of armaments in the - Reich and that therefore a general release was out of the - question. However, he would be willing to consider individual - applications favorably. Individual applications for release from - concentration camps were granted by Kaltenbrunner during the - subsequent months. - - “Contrary to the Polish estimate, the number of persons taken - from Warsaw to concentration camps in the Reich was estimated to - be small by Kaltenbrunner. I myself reported to my office - Kaltenbrunner’s statement regarding the number of internees, and - after a renewed investigation I found that the above-mentioned - figure of 50,000 to 60,000 was correct. These were the people - who had been taken to concentration camps in Germany.” - -I now ask you, are the contents of this affidavit, made before an -American officer, correct? - -BÜHLER: I can supplement it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Before he supplements it, is it in evidence? Has it yet -been put in evidence? - -DR. SEIDL: It has the number 2476-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: That doesn’t prove it has been put in evidence. Has it -been put in evidence? Dr. Seidl, you know quite well what “put in -evidence” means. Has it been put in evidence? Has it got a USA exhibit -number? - -DR. SEIDL: No, it has not a USA exhibit number. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then you are offering it in evidence, are you? - -DR. SEIDL: I don’t want to submit it formally in evidence; but I do want -to ask the witness about the contents of this affidavit. - -THE PRESIDENT: But it is a document, and if you are putting it to the -witness, you must put it in evidence and you must give it an exhibit -number. You cannot put documents to the witness and not put them in -evidence. - -DR. SEIDL: In that case I submit this document as Document Number -Frank-1. - -I now ask you, Witness, whether the contents of this affidavit are -correct, and, if so, whether you can supplement this affidavit. - -BÜHLER: Yes, I should like to supplement it briefly. It is possible that -I went to see Kaltenbrunner twice about that question—not only -once—and after Kaltenbrunner had refused to release these people the -second time, on the strength of my experiences with the camp commandant -in Camp Pruszkow, I had the impression that it was not in -Kaltenbrunner’s power to order such a release. He didn’t talk to me -about that. - -DR. SEIDL: But from his statements you had the impression that perhaps -he too did not have the power to release those people? - -BÜHLER: During those conferences I had brought up questions about the -Polish policy, and from these conferences I had the impression that I -might gain Kaltenbrunner’s interest in a reasonable Polish policy and -win him over as an ally in negotiations with Himmler. At any rate, -talking to me, he condemned the methods of force used by Krüger. I -gathered from these statements that Kaltenbrunner did not want to see -methods of force employed against the Poles and that he would have -helped me if he could. - -DR. SEIDL: The Soviet Prosecution has submitted a document bearing the -Exhibit Number USSR-128 (Document Number 3305-PS). It is a teleprinted -message from the intelligence office of the Higher SS and Police Leader -East addressed to the Governor General and signed by Dr. Fischer, then -Governor of Warsaw. Under Figure 2 it reads as follows: - - “Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach has been given the new task of - pacifying Warsaw, that is to say, of laying Warsaw level with - the ground during the war, except where military considerations - of its value as a fortress are involved. Before the destruction, - all raw materials, all textiles, and all furniture will be - removed from Warsaw. The main task will fall to the civil - administration. - - “I herewith inform you that this new Führer decree regarding the - razing of Warsaw is of the greatest significance for the further - new policy regarding the Poles.” - -As far as you can recollect, how did the Governor General receive and -view that telegram? And to what extent was his basic attitude altered on -the strength of that message? - -BÜHLER: This telegram referred to instructions which Obergruppenführer -Von dem Bach had received from the Reichsführer SS. The administration -in the Government General did not welcome the destruction of Warsaw. On -the contrary, I remember that, together with the Governor General, ways -which might be used to avoid the destruction of Warsaw were discussed. -Just what was really tried I cannot recollect. It may be that further -steps were not taken because of the impossibility of achieving anything. - -DR. SEIDL: I now turn to another subject. - -THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors, before I continue the -interrogation of the witness Dr. Bühler, I should like to inform you -that I forego the interrogation of the witness Helene Kraffczyk; so this -witness will be the last one. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Defendant Dr. Frank has been accused by the -Prosecution of not having done everything within his power to ensure the -feeding of the population of the Government General. What can you say -about that? - -BÜHLER: The decisive reason, the real cause, why the population in the -Government General could not be supplied as efficiently and as -satisfactorily as in Germany was the lack of co-operation on the part of -the Polish population in the measures taken by the Germans to bring -about a just and equal distribution of food quotas. This lack of -co-operation was caused by patriotic considerations, the aversion to -German domination, and the continuous, effective propaganda from the -outside. I do not believe that there was a single country in Europe -where so much was pillaged, stolen, and diverted to the black market, -where so much was destroyed and so much damage was done in order to -sabotage the food program, as in the Government General. - -To give one example: All the dairy machinery, which had been provided -with great pains, and the chain of dairies, which had been organized -with difficulty, were destroyed again and again so that a more or less -comprehensive control of milk and fat supplies could not be carried out. -I estimate that the fat sold on the free market and the black market in -the Government General was several times the quantity of that controlled -and distributed officially. - -Another decisive reason may be seen in the fact that the Government -General had been carved out of a hitherto self-contained governmental -and economic structure and that no consideration had been given -effecting a proper economic balance. - -The large centers of consumption in the Government General, that is to -say, the cities such as Warsaw, Kraków, later Lvov, and also the -industrial area in the center of Poland, had previously received their -supplies to a very large extent directly from the country through the -standing market. In these areas of the Government General there was a -lack of granaries; a lack of refrigerators; there was no systematic -chain of dairies; and storehouses of all kinds were lacking—all -necessary for the directing or controlling of a supply economy by the -state. - -The Government General had to construct all these things step by step, -and therefore the supplying of the population was proportionately -difficult. It was not intended to supply the population fully right -away; the supplies were to be improved gradually. I always saw to it -that the directives issued for combating the black market allowed -margins for the acquisition of foodstuffs and that the inhabitants of -the cities were given the opportunity of contacting the producers. In -1942 the rations were to have been increased; then an order came from -the Delegate for the Four Year Plan that rations were not to be -increased and that certain quotas of foodstuffs were to be allocated to -the Reich. Most of these foodstuffs were not taken out of the area, but -were consumed by the Armed Forces on the spot. The Governor General -fought continually against the authorities of the Four Year Plan, in -order to achieve an increase and an improvement in the food supplies for -the Polish population. That struggle was not without success. In many -cases it was possible to increase the rations considerably, especially -those of the workers in armament industries, and other privileged groups -of the working population. - -To sum up I should like to say that it was not easy for the population -of the Government General to get its daily food requirements. On the -other hand there were no famines and no hunger epidemics in the -Government General. A Polish and Ukrainian auxiliary committee, which -had delegations in all districts of the Government General, saw to the -supply of foodstuffs for those parts of the population which were in -greatest need. I used my influence to have this committee supplied with -the largest possible amount of foodstuffs, so that it should be able to -pursue its welfare work successfully, and it is known to me that that -committee took special care of the children of large cities. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, what were the measures that the Governor General -took to safeguard art treasures in the areas under his administration? - -BÜHLER: With a decree of 16 December 1939 the Reichsführer SS, in his -capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German -Nationality, had already ordered, without informing the Governor -General, that all art treasures of the Government General were to be -confiscated and transported to the Reich. The Government General was -successful in preventing this transport to a great extent. - -Then a man arrived in the Government General from the Delegate for the -Four Year Plan, State Secretary Mühlmann, who claimed to have plenary -authority from the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. I asked to see that -authorization. It was signed, not by Göring himself, but by somebody in -his circle, Gritzbach. He was entrusted with the task of safeguarding -the art treasures of the Government General in the interests of the -Reich. In order to bring this commissioner—provided as he was with -plenary authority from the Reich—into line with the Government General, -the Governor General entrusted to him, in addition, the task of -collecting together the art treasures of the Government General. He -collected these art treasures and also had catalogues printed; and I -know, from conferences which took place with the Governor General, that -the Governor always attached the greatest importance to having these art -treasures kept within the area of the Government General. - -DR. SEIDL: The prosecution, under Number USA-378, that is Document -1709-PS, submitted a report about the investigation of the entire -activity of the Special Commissioner for the Collection and Safeguarding -of Art and Cultural Treasures in the Government General. On Page 6 of -that report it reads, and I quote: - - “Reason for investigation: Order of the State Secretary of the - Government of the Government General of 30 June 1942 to - investigate the entire activity of the Special Commissioner - appointed for the collection and safeguarding of art and - cultural treasures in the Government General, according to the - decree of the Governor General of 16 December 1939.” - -I ask you now what caused you in 1942 to give this order for -investigation, and did the report lead to serious charges? - -BÜHLER: The investigation was found necessary because of the possibility -of a collision of duties, in the case of State Secretary Mühlmann, -between the order given by the Reich and the order given by the Governor -General. I had also heard that some museum pieces had not been properly -taken care of. The investigation showed that State Secretary Mühlmann -could not be blamed in any way. - -DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has submitted another document, 3042-PS, -Exhibit USA-375. It is an affidavit by Dr. Mühlmann, and I quote: - - “I was the Special Commissioner of the Governor General of - Poland, Hans Frank, for the safeguarding of art treasures in the - Government General, from October 1939 to September 1943. Göring - in his capacity as chairman of the Reich Defense Council had - commissioned me with this duty. - - “I confirm that it was the official policy of the Governor - General, Hans Frank, to take into safekeeping all important art - treasures which belonged to Polish public institutions, private - collections, and the Church. I confirm that the art treasures - mentioned were actually confiscated; and it is clear to me that - in case of a German victory they would not have remained in - Poland, but would have been used to complement German art - collections.” - -I ask you now: Is it correct that the Governor General from the very -beginning considered all art treasures which had been safeguarded the -property of the Government General? - -BÜHLER: Insofar as they were state property, yes; insofar as they were -private property, they were temporarily confiscated and safeguarded; but -the Governor General never thought of transferring them to the Reich. If -he had wanted to do that, he could have taken advantage of the war -situation itself in order to send these art treasures to Germany. But -where the witness obtained his information, as contained in the last -sentence of his affidavit, I do not know. - -DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted a document, L-37, under Exhibit -Number USA-506. It is a letter of 19 July 1944 from the commander of the -Security Police and SD of the district of Radom, to the branch office of -Tomassov. There it says, among other things, and I quote: - - “The Higher SS and Police Leader East issued the following order - on 28 June 1944:” - -I skip a few sentences and then quote: - - “The Reichsführer SS, with the approval of the Governor General, - has ordered that in all cases where assassinations of Germans or - attempts at such assassinations have occurred, or where - saboteurs have destroyed vital installations, not only the - perpetrators are to be shot but also all their kinsmen are - likewise to be executed and their female relatives above 16 - years of age are to be put into concentration camps.” - -Is it known to you whether the Governor General ever spoke about this -question with the Reichsführer SS and whether he had given any such -approval? - -BÜHLER: I know nothing about the issuing of an order of that kind. Once -during the second half of 1944, an order came through my hands relating -to the joint responsibility of kin, but I cannot say whether that -concerned the Reich or the Government General; it was a police order, I -should say. If it had had that formula, “with the approval of the -Government General,” I should have questioned the Governor General on -that point. - -DR. SEIDL: Would such an approval have been consistent with the -fundamental attitude of the Governor General to this question as you -knew it? - -BÜHLER: The fundamental attitude of the Governor General was on the -contrary opposed to all executions without trial and without legal -reasons. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that from 1940 on the Governor General -complained continually to the Führer about the measures taken by the -Police and the SD? - -BÜHLER: Yes; I myself drew up at least half a dozen memoranda of about -the length of the one submitted, addressed to the Führer direct or to -him through the Chief of the Reich Chancellery. They contained repeated -complaints with regard to executions, encroachments in connection with -the recruiting of workers, the importation of inhabitants of other -regions without the permission of the Governor General, the food -situation, and happenings in general which were contrary to the -principles of an orderly administration. - -DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted one of these memoranda under the -number USA-610. This is a memorandum to the Führer of 19 June 1943. Is -this memorandum essentially different to any previous or later -memoranda; and what, basically, was the attitude of the Führer to such -complaints and proposals? - -BÜHLER: This memorandum, which has been submitted, is somewhat different -from the previous ones. The previous memoranda contained direct -accusations with regard to these happenings and the encroachments by the -Police. When these memoranda remained unsuccessful, acting on the order -of the Governor General, I drew up the complaints contained in this -memorandum of June in the form of a political proposal. The grievances -listed there were not caused by the government of the Governor General; -rather they were complaints about interference by outside authorities. - -DR. SEIDL: In the diary we find on 26 October 1943 a long report about -the 4 years of German construction work in the Government General which -was made by you yourself. On the basis of what documents did you compile -that report? - -BÜHLER: I compiled that report on the basis of the material which the 13 -main departments of the government had given me. - -DR. SEIDL: Now a question of principle: What, basically, was the -attitude of the Governor General to the Polish and Ukrainian people, as -you know it from your 5 years’ activity, as the head of the government? - -BÜHLER: The first principle of all was that of keeping peace in this -area and of increasing the usefulness of this area as far as possible by -improving its resources, economically speaking. In order to achieve -that, decent treatment of the population was necessary; freedom and -property must not be infringed upon. Those were the principles of policy -according to which, acting on the order of the Governor General, I -always carried out my functions as state secretary of the government. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General also tried within the -framework of wartime conditions to grant the population a certain -minimum of cultural development? - -BÜHLER: That was the desire of the Governor General, but the realization -of this desire very frequently met with resistance on the part of the -Security Police, or the Propaganda Ministry of the Reich, or it was made -impossible by conditions themselves. But in principle the Governor -General did not wish to prohibit cultural activity among the Polish and -Ukrainian populations. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that he tried particularly to revive higher -education and that, evading the directives from the Reich, he instituted -so-called technical courses in colleges? - -BÜHLER: Instruction was certainly given at the technical schools by -Polish professors in Warsaw and Lvov which corresponded approximately to -a university education. As a matter of principle, the Governor General -also wanted to open secondary schools and seminaries for priests, but -that always failed because of the objections of the Security Police. As -no agreement could be reached, and acting on the order of the Governor -General, in October 1941 on my own authority I promised the opening of -secondary schools and, I believe, of seminaries for priests with a -certain advisory autonomy for the Poles. Two days after this -announcement the Führer’s opinion was transmitted to me that I had no -authority to announce such measures. - -DR. SEIDL: Dr. Frank’s diary often mentions the principle of unity of -administration and the fact that the Governor General was the deputy of -the Führer in this territory and the representative of the authority of -the Reich. Does this conception tally with the facts? What other -authorities of the Reich and the Party came into the administration of -the Government General? - -BÜHLER: The authority of the Governor General was limited from the very -beginning in many important respects. Thus, for instance, before the -establishment of the Government General, the Reichsführer SS had been -invested with full power in the matter of the preservation of German -Nationality in all occupied territories. The Delegate for the Four Year -Plan had equal authority and power to issue decrees, in the Government -General. But many other offices as well, such as those for armaments, -post, railways, building, and other departments tried, and tried -successfully, to take over parts of the administration of the Government -General or to gain some influence over it. After the Governor General -had lost his offices as Reichsleiter in 1942, there was a special rush -in this direction. I might almost say that it became a kind of sport to -diminish the prestige of the King of Poland. - -DR. SEIDL: Who appointed, dismissed, and paid the police officials in -the Government General and otherwise saw to their interests from the -point of view of the Civil Service? - -BÜHLER: That was done exclusively by Himmler’s administrative office in -Berlin. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that even officials of the administration of -the Government General were arrested by Krüger and that it was not -possible for even the Governor General to effect their release? I remind -you of the case of Scipessi. - -BÜHLER: Yes. I can confirm that from my own experience. Even from my own -circle people were arrested without my being notified. In one such case -I instructed the commander of the Security Police that the official was -to be released within a certain space of time. He was not released, and -I demanded the recall of the commander of the Security Police. The -result was that Himmler expressed his special confidence in this -commander of the Security Police and the recall was refused. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, how long was the Government General able to work at -all under normal conditions? - -BÜHLER: I might almost say, never at any time. The first year was taken -up in repairing destruction caused by the war. There were destroyed -villages, destroyed cities, destroyed means of transport; bridges had -been blown up in very large numbers. After these destroyed objects had -been repaired, as far as it was possible under war conditions, the -Government General became again the deployment area for the war against -the East, against the Russians, and then the transit area to the front -and the line of communications area. It was the great repair shop for -the front. - -DR. SEIDL: Another question: During the war Himmler presented to the -Reich Government the draft of a law concerning the treatment of -anti-social elements. What was the attitude of Dr. Frank towards this -draft? - -BÜHLER: As far as I can remember... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal thinks that the matters which the -witness is going into are really matters of common knowledge. Everyone -knows about that. I think you might take the witness over this ground a -little bit faster than you are. - -DR. SEIDL: Yes, Sir. He has given the answer already. - -Witness, during the war did the government of the Reich... - -THE PRESIDENT: But I am speaking of the future, Dr. Seidl. - -DR. SEIDL: Yes, Sir. - -[_Turning to the witness._] During the war, Himmler submitted to the -Reich Government, the draft of a law concerning the treatment of -anti-social elements. - -BÜHLER: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: What was the attitude of the Governor General to this? - -BÜHLER: The Governor General protested against this. At the conference -which I had with Heydrich in February 1942 the latter asked me as a -special request to ask the Governor General to retract his protect -against the law. The Governor General refused to do this. - -DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has presented a chart which shows Dr. Frank -as having authority over the Reich Minister of Justice, Dr. Thierack. -Did such a situation ever exist? - -BÜHLER: That must be an error; such a situation never existed. - -DR. SEIDL: What, according to your observations, were the relations -between the Governor General and the Reichsführer SS Himmler? - -BÜHLER: The Governor General and the Reichsführer SS Himmler as -individuals were so different... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, I thought we had been hearing all morning what -the relations were between the Governor General and the Reichsführer. - -DR. SEIDL: Then I will not put that question. - -Witness, the Soviet Prosecution, under Exhibit Number USSR-93, (Document -Number USSR-93), submitted an appendix to the report of the Polish -Government. The appendix is entitled “Cultural Life in Poland.” I have -shown it to you once before and would like you to tell me whether the -Governor General, or his government, ever actually issued such -directives? - -BÜHLER: I do not remember ever having signed such directives or having -seen any such directives signed by the Governor General. This document -submitted to me, seems to me to be a fake or a forgery. That can be -recognized from the contents. - -DR. SEIDL: In the diary we find a large number of entries referring to -the policies of the Governor General which seem to contradict what you -yourself said before as a witness. How can you explain these -contradictions? - -BÜHLER: These statements by the Governor General, which have also been -called to my attention during previous interrogations, do not merely -seem to contradict what I said; they very clearly do contradict what I -had to say as a witness. As I myself heard such statements frequently, I -have tried to understand how he came to make such statements; and I can -only say that Frank perhaps took part more than was necessary in the -conferences and affairs of the government officials. There was scarcely -a conference in which he did not take part. Thus it happened that he had -to speak many times during one day, and I might say that in 99 out of -100 cases he spoke on the spur of the moment, without due reflection, -and I frequently witnessed how after making such grotesque statements he -would try in the next sentences, or at the next opportunity, to retract -them and straighten them out. I also witnessed how he rescinded -authority which he had delegated on the spur of the moment. I am sure -that if I could go through the diary for every one of these statements, -I would be able to give you a dozen—dozens of other statements to the -contrary. - -DR. SEIDL: Frank’s diary includes... - -BÜHLER: I should like to say the following: When the Governor General -was working with the members of his administration, he never made such -statements; at least I cannot remember any. Those statements were always -made when the Higher SS and Police Leader was sitting next to him, so -that I had the impression that he was not free at such moments. - -DR. SEIDL: The diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank covers about 10,000 to -12,000 typewritten pages. Who kept this diary—he himself or somebody -else? - -BÜHLER: According to my observations, the diary was kept by -stenographers. At first by one stenographer, Dr. Meidinger, later by two -stenographers, Nauk and Mohr. The procedure was that these stenographers -were in the room during conferences and took notes. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that to a certain extent these stenographers -received reports from a third person as to what was said at a -conference? - -BÜHLER: I often noticed that these stenographers did not take the -trouble to record everything literally, but merely wrote summaries of -the sense. I was also sometimes asked what this or that person, or what -the Governor General, had said or thought in some particular instance. - -DR. SEIDL: Did the Governor General see these entries in the diary or -read them later? - -BÜHLER: From what I know of the Governor General I do not believe that -he read them over. - -THE PRESIDENT: How can this witness tell whether he read the notes -later? - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the witness, Dr. Bühler, was the Governor -General’s closest collaborator. - -THE PRESIDENT: If you wanted to put that sort of question, you should -have asked the Defendant Frank. - -DR. SEIDL: A further question, Witness. According to your observations -what caused the Governor General not to destroy that diary, but to hand -it over when he was arrested? - -BÜHLER: On 15 March for the last time I was... - -THE PRESIDENT: That, again is a matter which rests in the mind of Dr. -Frank, not of this witness, why he did not destroy it. - -DR. SEIDL: He has answered the question already, and I forego the answer -of the witness. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Now, one last question. In 1942, after the -speeches made by Dr. Frank, he was deprived of all his Party offices. -What effect did that have on his position as Governor General? - -BÜHLER: I have already referred to that. It weakened his authority -considerably, and the administration in the Government General became -increasingly difficult. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it correct, that the Governor General repeatedly, both in -writing and orally, tendered his resignation? - -BÜHLER: Yes, written applications for resignation I often worded myself; -and I know that he also asked orally many times to be permitted to -resign, but that this was never approved. - -DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions for the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to ask any -questions? - -DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): Witness, is it -correct that by far the largest number of the Polish workers who came to -Germany, came into the Reich before April 1942, that is, before Sauckel -came into office? - -BÜHLER: I cannot make any definite statement about that, but I know that -the recruitment of labor produced smaller and smaller results and that -the main quotas were probably delivered during the first years. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were the labor quotas which had been demanded from the -Governor General reduced by Sauckel in view of the fact that so many -Poles were already working in the Reich? - -BÜHLER: I know of one such case; Sauckel’s deputy, President Struve, -talked to me about it. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Is it true that Himmler for his own purposes recruited -workers from the Polish area, without Sauckel’s knowledge and without -observing the conditions which Sauckel had laid down? - -BÜHLER: I assume that that happened. Whenever I was told about roundups -of workers, I tried to clear matters up. The Police always said, “That -is the labor administration,” and the labor administration said, “That -is the Police.” But I know that once, on a visit to Warsaw, Himmler was -very annoyed at the loafers standing at the street corners; and I -consider it quite possible that these labor raids in Warsaw were carried -out arbitrarily by the Police without the participation of the labor -administration. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know Sauckel’s directives with regard to the -carrying out of labor recruitment? - -BÜHLER: I have not seen them in detail, and I don’t remember them. I -know only that Sauckel stated, on the occasion of a visit in Kraków, -that he had not ordered the use of violence. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was that a speech of Sauckel’s? - -BÜHLER: No, it was a conference. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Do you recall an address which Sauckel made in Kraków to -the various authorities? - -BÜHLER: He spoke as a Party speaker. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did he make any statements there about the treatment of -workers? - -BÜHLER: These statements were made at a conference which preceded the -visit to the Governor General. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what was the nature of his remarks? - -BÜHLER: My people had told him and his people that there had been -encroachments, and he answered that he had not ordered the use of -violence and denied that these events—the arrest of people in motion -picture houses or other places of assembly—had ever been ordered or -decreed by him. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know the structure of the labor administration in -the Government General? - -BÜHLER: The Labor Department was part of my field of authority. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have any immediate influence on the carrying -out of labor recruitment? - -BÜHLER: Not only did he have influence, but he also sent a deputy who -was not under my authority. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was it possible for that deputy to carry out the -recruitment of labor direct? - -BÜHLER: If he wanted to, yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: In what manner? Could he give any instructions, or direct -orders? - -BÜHLER: The recruiting units set up by Sauckel were not under my -authority. I tried on several occasions to get these people within my -organization, but these attempts were always countered with the argument -that these recruiting units had to be used in all the occupied -territories and that they could not be attached to one particular area. - -In other words, Sauckel’s deputy in the Government General, President -Struve, who was also in charge of the Labor Department, was on the one -hand dependent on Sauckel’s directives and did not need to pay attention -to me but was also on the other hand responsible to me to the extent -that he acted as president of the Labor Department. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What branches handled forced recruitment whenever that -became necessary? Could the recruiting units do that? - -BÜHLER: I do not know. The deputy always denied the fact of forced -recruitment. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask questions? -Does the Prosecution desire to cross-examine? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, I should like to define your official -position more accurately. As from 1940 and until the moment of the -liberation of Poland you were Frank’s chief deputy, were you not? - -BÜHLER: From the end of September until November 1939 I served the -Governor General in a leading position on his labor staff. In November -1939 I became Chief of the Department of the Governor General; that was -the central administrative office of the Governor General, in Kraków. -During the second half of the year 1940 the designation of this function -was changed to “State Secretary of the Government,” and I was State -Secretary of the Government until I left Kraków on 18 January 1945. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently you were the chief deputy of the -Defendant Hans Frank. - -BÜHLER: My field of activity was definitely limited. I had to direct the -administrative matters. Neither the Police, nor the Party, nor the -Wehrmacht, nor the various Reich offices which were directly active in -the area of the Government General, were under my authority. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: When Frank was away, who was then his deputy? - -BÜHLER: The deputy of the Governor General was Seyss-Inquart, Reich -Minister Seyss-Inquart. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And after Seyss-Inquart left? - -BÜHLER: After the departure of Seyss-Inquart there was a gap. I cannot -recall the month, but I think it was in 1941 that I was assigned as -deputy of the Governor General. But that appointment was approved only -with certain modifications. I was supposed to represent the Governor -General only when he was neither present in the area nor... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Answer me briefly. When Frank was away, did you -carry out his duties? - -BÜHLER: I answer as my conscience dictates. Whenever Frank was not -present within the area, and could not be reached outside the area, then -I was supposed to represent him. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I understand. That means that you took over when -he was away. - -BÜHLER: Yes, whenever he could not be reached outside of the area -either. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, yes. That is precisely what I am asking -about. - -I should like the witness to be shown the typed transcript of the report -on a conference of 25 January. Will you show him, first of all, the list -of those who were present. The Tribunal will find the passage that I -desire to quote... - -THE PRESIDENT: What year? You said the 25th of January. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: 1943, Mr. President. Your Honors will find it on -Page 7, Exhibit Number USSR-223, (Document Number USSR-223), Paragraph -6. - -Witness, is that your signature among the list of those present? - -BÜHLER: My signature, yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means you were present at that conference. - -BÜHLER: 1943, yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I shall quote three sentences from the typed -transcript of the report. Please hand the original to the witness. - -I quote three sentences from this document. It is Dr. Frank’s speech: - - “I should like to emphasize one thing. We must not be too - soft-hearted when we hear that 17,000 have been shot. These - persons who have been shot are also victims of the war.... Let - us now remember that all of us who are meeting together here - figure in Mr. Roosevelt’s list of war criminals. I have the - honor of being Number 1. We have thus, so to speak, become - accomplices in terms of world history”. - -Your name is second on the list of those present at the conference. Do -you not consider that Frank must have had sufficient grounds to number -you among the most active of his accomplices in crime? - -BÜHLER: About such statements of the Governor General I have already -said all that is necessary. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then you ascribe this to the Governor General’s -temperament? - -THE PRESIDENT: Witness, that is not an answer to the question. The -question was, do you consider yourself to be one of those criminals? - -BÜHLER: I do not consider myself a criminal. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: If you do not consider yourself a war criminal, -will you perhaps recollect who personally—I emphasize the word -“personally”—actively participated in one of Frank’s most cruel orders -with regard to the Polish population? I am talking about the decree of 2 -October 1942. Were you not one of the participants? - -BÜHLER: Which measures? Which decree? I should like to be shown it. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am talking about the decree signed 2 October -and published 9 October 1943, Exhibit Number USSR 335, (Document Number -USSR-335), the decree about the creation of the so-called courts-martial -conducted by the Secret Police. - -BÜHLER: The draft of this decree did not come from my office. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Does this mean that you deny participation in -rendering that cruel decree effective? - -BÜHLER: Yes, the decree comes from the Police. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The passage I should like to quote, Mr. -President, is on Page 35, of our document book, and in Paragraph 4 of -the English translation. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Did you not, together with Dr. Weh, at a -time when even Frank was undecided about signing, succeed in persuading -him to do so and bring into force a decree of a frankly terrorist nature -to legalize tyranny by the Police? - -I quote Page 142 of the minutes on the conference with State Secretary -Dr. Bühler (he evidently means you) and with Dr. Weh, concerning the -order issued by Dr. Weh for combating attacks on the German work of -reconstruction in the Government General: - - “After some brief statements by the State Secretary Dr. Bühler - and Dr. Weh, the Governor General withdraws his objections and - signs the drafted decree.” - -Was it not you? - -BÜHLER: I request the interpreter to repeat the question. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am asking you: Was it you who persuaded Frank -to sign that decree as quickly as possible? - -BÜHLER: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Does that mean that the entry is false? - -BÜHLER: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In that case, how am I to understand you, if -this is “no” and the other is “no”? - -BÜHLER: I can explain that to you exactly. The draft for this decree had -been submitted to the Governor General by SS Oberführer Bierkamp who had -recently been assigned to the Government General. The Governor -General... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please... - -THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing] He is in the middle of his answer. You must -let the man answer. What were you saying? You were saying the draft had -been made by somebody? - -BÜHLER: This draft had been submitted to the Governor General by -Bierkamp who had just recently come to the Government General. The -Governor General returned this draft and had it revised in the -legislative department. When it was presented to the Governor General, -the Governor General’s doubts were whether the legislative department -had revised it or not. I do not assume material responsibility for this -draft, and I did not have to. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You simply explained to Frank that the project -of the decree had been sufficiently worked over by the competent -technical department? - -BÜHLER: Yes, by the legislative department. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And after that the Governor General signed the -decree? - -BÜHLER: Obviously. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were you not the person who, at the meeting of -23 October 1943, when a letter from Count Ronikier, a person evidently -known to you, was discussed, referred to the practical interpretation of -this cruel decree of 2 October and stated that the application of the -decree would in the future favor the camouflaging of the murder of -hostages by giving the shootings of hostages the semblance of a legal -sentence? Were you that person? - -BÜHLER: I ask that the question be repeated. I understood only part of -it. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were you the person who, at the meeting of 23 -October 1943, stated that the application of the decree of 2 October -would, in the future, favor the camouflaging of the shooting of -hostages, since it would give them the semblance of a legal sentence? - -BÜHLER: It is not quite clear to me. May I repeat what I understood? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: If you please. - -BÜHLER: You want to ask me whether I was the one who, on the occasion of -a conference on the 23rd of October 1944... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: 1943. - -BÜHLER: 1943—who, on the occasion of a conference on 23 October 1943 -stated—stated what? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You stated that the application of the decree of -2 October would help to camouflage the shooting of hostages. - -BÜHLER: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The place which I wish to quote now, Your -Honors, is on Page 26 of the English translation of Exhibit Number -USSR-223, (Document Number 2233-PS), Paragraph 4. I shall now quote your -own words to you: - - “State Secretary Dr. Bühler considers it advisable that all - those Poles who are to be shot should first be tried by regular - court-martial proceedings. In the future one should also refrain - from referring to such Poles as hostages, for the shooting of - hostages is always a deplorable event and merely provides - foreign countries with evidence against the German leadership in - the Government General”. - -BÜHLER: I said that, and thus I objected, and wanted to object, to the -shooting of hostages and to executions without court-martial -proceedings. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: So you consider that a court consisting of -high-ranking, police officials represents justice and is not a travesty -of the very idea of justice? - -BÜHLER: To which court do you refer? I pleaded for courts-martial. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is the very court I am talking about, the -“Standgericht” or summary court-martial, composed of Gestapo officials -centralized in the Government General, according to the decree of 2 -October. - -BÜHLER: I can give you information about the reasons which may have led -to this stiffening of the summary court-martial order of 2 October, so -that you may understand how, psychologically, such a decree came about. - -MR. COUNSELLOR. SMIRNOV: I am not interested in psychology. I am -interested in knowing if a court, composed of secret police officials -and considered to be a court, is not in fact sheer mockery of the very -idea of a court of justice? - -BÜHLER: The summary courts-martial had to be appointed exactly in -accordance with the decree. I am not of the opinion that a summary -court-martial, simply because it is composed exclusively of police, -should not be considered a court. But I did not make these statements -which you have held against me now in reference to this decree of 2 -October; rather I demanded, in general, sentences by courts-martial, and -termed the shooting of hostages a regrettable fact. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You are not giving me a direct answer to my -question. Perhaps you will remember Paragraph 3 of the decree which -stipulates how these courts were to be composed. Show the witness -Paragraphs 3 and 4. I am reading Paragraph 4 into the record: - - “The summary courts-martial of the Security Police are to be - composed of one SS Führer of the office of the commander of the - Security Police and the SD, and of two members of these - organizations”. - -Would a court of this composition not testify _a priori_ to the nature -of the sentence which the court would impose? - -BÜHLER: Did you ask me? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, yes. - -BÜHLER: Whether I consider a summary court-martial a court? I think, you -are asking me about things which have nothing to do with my field of -activity. I do not know what reasons were given for composing these -courts in this fashion. I cannot therefore say anything about it. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you will look at the signature to that -decree. It is signed by Frank, and it was you who persuaded Frank to -sign that decree. - -BÜHLER: I thought that I had corrected that error before. I did not -persuade Herr Frank to sign that order. Rather, I told him that that -order had been worked out in the legislative department. As before, I -must now deny any responsibility for this order, because it did not -belong to my sphere of activity. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I shall pass on to another series of questions. -Do you recollect the following subparagraph of that decree, particularly -the report of Obergruppenführer Bierkamp at the conference of 27 October -1943 in Kraków? - -BÜHLER: I cannot remember without notes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please show him the passage which I wish to -quote. The passage I wish to quote, Your Honors, is on Page 26 of our -document, the last paragraph of the text. I quote the passage in -question: - - “Pursuant to the decree of even date, the Security Police have - detained many people who since 10 October have committed - criminal acts. They have been condemned to death and will be - shot as an expiation for their crimes. Their names will be made - known to the population by means of posters, and the population - will be told that such and such people may expect a pardon, - provided there are no further murders of Germans. For every - murdered German, 10 Poles will be executed....” - -Does it not testify to the fact that from the very first days of the -enforcing of Frank’s decree, it merely served to mask mass executions of -hostages? - -BÜHLER: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then to what does it testify if, for each slain -German, 10 Poles entirely unconnected with the crime were to be executed -in accordance with these so-called “verdicts”? - -BÜHLER: In my opinion it testifies that 10 Poles would be shot who had -committed crimes punishable by death, and who had been sentenced to -death. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: For each German killed? - -BÜHLER: It is possible that these Poles were called hostages. That is -possible. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means that the decree camouflaged the -system of taking hostages? - -BÜHLER: No, it was rather that real shootings of hostages no longer -occurred. Real shootings of hostages occur when people who are not -criminals, who are innocent, are shot because of an act committed by -someone else. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you think this will be a convenient time to break off? - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has heard with the deepest regret of the -death of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone of the Supreme Court of the -United States of America. His loss will be most deeply felt in America, -where he had proved himself to be a great public servant. But it is -fitting that this Tribunal, upon which the representatives of the United -States sit, should express its sympathy with the American people in -their great loss. - -After serving as Dean of the Law School of Columbia University he was -appointed Attorney General of the United States in 1923, and two years -later he became Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. In 1941 he -became Chief Justice and discharged the duties of that high office with -great ability and in accordance with the highest traditions. - -The Tribunal desires that I should express its sympathy in -acknowledgement of the great loss the American people have sustained. - -Mr. Justice Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor of the United States, is a -member of the Supreme Court over which the Chief Justice presided, and -perhaps he would like to add a few words. - -MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States): -May it please the Tribunal: It is not only because he was the head of -the judicial system of the United States that the news of the passing of -Chief Justice Stone brings sadness to every American heart in Nuremberg, -but because he was the personal friend of so many of us. He had a rare -capacity for personal friendship. No one was more kind to, and -thoughtful of, the younger men who from time to time came to Washington; -and they found in him a guide, philosopher, and friend. - -Now, I know that not only do I feel the loss of a personal friend but -that the American representatives on the Tribunal, Mr. Biddle and Judge -Parker, feel the same way, and many of the younger men on the staff had -intimate contact with the Chief Justice which you might not expect if -you had not known Harlan Stone. - -As Attorney General he took over the Department of Justice at one of its -most difficult periods and imparted to it the impress of his integrity, -an impress which stayed with it and was traditional in the department, -as we well know. - -As a Justice of the Court he was a forward-looking man, open-minded, -always patient to hear the arguments of both sides and to arrive at his -decision with that complete disinterestedness and detachment which is -characteristic of the just judge. He presided with great fairness and -with kindness to his associates and to those who appeared before him. - -It is the passing of a man who exemplified in public life those sturdy -qualities which we have come to associate with the New Englander. - -The consolation of his friends lies in this: He died exactly as he would -have chosen to die, in full possession of his faculties and in the -discharge of his duties. - -I express great appreciation that this Tribunal has seen fit to take -note of his passing and to allow us to record on behalf of the American -Bar our appreciation of his talents and character. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, before proceeding to a further -examination of the witness, I feel that I ought to make the following -statement: - -During the examination of the witness by counsel for the defense Dr. -Seidl, the former stated that the document, which is an official -appendix to the report of the Government of the Polish Republic, was a -forgery. This document sets out the losses suffered by the Polish -Republic in objects of cultural value. The Soviet Prosecution does not -wish to enter into any controversies on the subject, but it does request -the Tribunal to note that this is an official appendix to the report of -the Government of the Polish Republic, and that it considers the -statement of the witness as libellous. - -THE PRESIDENT: [_To the witness._] Did you say anything then? - -BÜHLER: I was going to say that it was a document that contained a list -of art treasures. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that the document, Colonel Smirnov, a document which -contains a list of art treasures? - -BÜHLER: No, I do not mean that. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, Mr. President. It is a list of losses in -cultural treasures. It is a list of libraries and of the losses suffered -by these libraries during the reign of the Germans in Poland. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is USSR-93, is it not, the document you are referring -to? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is an appendix to the Document Number -USSR-93, an official report by the Polish Government. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it deals with certain directives. That was the -evidence that was given this morning. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, Mr. President. This is a list of losses -sustained. It is an official appendix to the report of the Polish -Government. It contains no directives, but it does state the sum total -of the losses sustained by the public libraries in Poland. - -THE PRESIDENT: [_To the witness._] Is there anything you want to say -about it? - -BÜHLER: Yes. I do not think the description just given applies to the -document which I had in mind. The document which I question contains -directives regarding German cultural policy in the Government General. -It does not deal with art treasures or details of library property. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What I took that you said this morning was that the -directives which you thought were referred to in the document did not -appear to have been made, or at any rate you had not heard of them, and -you thought they might be forgeries. - -BÜHLER: I questioned the document. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the document. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I proceed to the next question? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You state that you personally, as well as the -administration of the Government General, had no close connection with -the activities of the Police. Have I understood you correctly? - -BÜHLER: May I hear that question again, please? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You declare that neither you personally nor the -administration of the Government General were in any way closely -connected with the activities of the Police. Have I understood you -correctly? - -BÜHLER: We had daily contact with the Police, but we had differences of -opinion. Moreover, the Police were not under my jurisdiction; the Chief -of Police was in no way under my orders. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In that case the Police did not come within your -competence? - -BÜHLER: No, it was not one of my duties. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How then can you explain that no one but you -carried out successful negotiations with the Police for the exploitation -of the property of Jews executed in the concentration camps? Do you -remember these negotiations? - -BÜHLER: I did not quite understand you. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you: If you had no direct relations with -the Police, how can you explain the fact that you, and none other but -you, were the person who carried out successful negotiations with the -Police for the exploitation of property belonging to Jews murdered in -the concentration camps? Do you remember these negotiations with the -Police? - -BÜHLER: I do not remember any such negotiations, and I could not have -conducted them. In any case the Administration was the department which, -by order of the Four Year Plan, had to effect the confiscation of Jewish -property. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, have I your permission to submit -a document handed to us by the American Prosecution, Document Number -2819-PS? It is a directive issued by the Administration of the Economic -Department of the Government General and addressed to the Governors of -Warsaw, Radom, Lublin, and Galicia. May I submit this document? - -I quote the following from the text of this document: - - “Subject: Transfer of Jewish movable property from the SS to the - Government. - - “I inform you herewith that, on 21 February 1944, in the - presence of various departmental directors, an agreement was - reached by State Secretary Dr. Bühler and the Higher SS and - Police Leader, Obergruppenführer Koppe, that movable Jewish - property, insofar as it is, or will be in the future, in - storehouses, will be placed at the disposal of the Government by - the SS. In execution of the agreement arrived at I have ordered - that the taking over of the goods stored in the various SS - depots shall take place in the shortest possible time. Goods - deriving from confiscation and safeguarding have likewise been - turned over to me by the commander of the Security Police and - the Security Service. Please get in touch with the local SS and - Police Leader in order to come to an understanding....” - -Here I interrupt the quotation. After this, Witness, do you still insist -that you had no relations with the Police? - -BÜHLER: I was in touch with the Police daily in my work, I do not want -to deny that for a moment; but I had no right to give orders to the -Police. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In any case the property of Jews murdered in the -concentration camps of Poland was, as a result of your negotiations, -transferred to warehouses in the Government General? - -BÜHLER: That is not correct. The property mentioned was not that which -proceeded from Jews who were killed, but simply property which came from -Jews and which was removed by the Police after having been converted -through the administration department in the regular way. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But could the Security Police or the SD be in -possession of property belonging to Jews who were not murdered? - -BÜHLER: Why not? Right from the beginning the Police had taken over -Jewish problems, and therefore also came into possession of their -property in this manner. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But did the Auschwitz depot in Chopin Street -also keep the property of Jews who had not been murdered? Of Jews who -were still alive? - -BÜHLER: The depots which have been mentioned here are not to be -interpreted as being concentration camps, but as depots where goods were -stored. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What other depots were there for storing the -movable property of Jews besides those in the concentration camps? - -BÜHLER: I do not know what things looked like in concentration camps, as -I have never entered or seen one; but that the Police took possession of -movable Jewish property is something I was certainly told about by the -director of my trustee department. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you this: In 1944 when the machines of -destruction were working at top speed at Auschwitz and Maidanek, what -depots or warehouses existed for the storage of Jewish movable property -besides those which stored the movable property of Jews executed in -concentration camps? Do you know of any other warehouses and where they -were located? - -BÜHLER: The Jews were deprived of their property on the spot. I have -never assumed that Jewish property was to be found in concentration -camps. I did not know anything at all about these camps. Where the -Police took that movable property was not clear to me, but depots must -have existed. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would draw your attention to the date—21 -February 1944. At that time were there any Jews still alive in Poland, -or were the Jewish ghettos already quite empty? - -BÜHLER: The Jewish ghettos were empty, but there were still some Jews; I -know that because they were being used in one way or another in the -armament industry. Jewish property could not have been removed from the -territory, it must have been somewhere in the Government General, very -probably near the ghettos or wherever else the evacuation of Jews took -place. And this telegram, I repeat, does not concern stores which were -in concentration camps; they were everywhere. Every place had property -stored somewhere which originated from the resettlement of the Jews. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then the Jewish ghettos were already empty. In -that case, what happened to the Jews from Poland? - -BÜHLER: When these Jewish ghettos were emptied, I assumed they were -resettled in the northeast of Europe. The chief of the RSHA had -definitely told me at the conference in February 1942 that this was the -intention. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: On the 21 February 1944 the front line ran -through the Government General. How and where could the Jews have been -transferred to the northeast? - -BÜHLER: According to the conference this was to have taken place in -1942. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The document is dated 1944, 21 February 1944. - -I pass on to the next question. Tell me, does not the fact that the -police chiefs attended all the conferences at the headquarters of the -Governor General and that the Governor General arranged for special -conferences to be held dealing exclusively with police matters indicate -that the very closest relations existed between the administration -department of the Governor General and the Gestapo? - -BÜHLER: I have already mentioned at the beginning that the view of the -Governor General was that he should have jurisdiction over the Police. -This is the reason why the Governor General repeatedly called the Police -for discussions around the conference table. But that did not prevent -the Police from going their own way and using methods of their own. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But were no conferences held by the Governor -General for dealing directly and exclusively with police problems, and -with police problems only? - -BÜHLER: Yes, from time to time. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Very well. Then will you tell me who took -Krüger’s place when he was removed from his post as Chief of Police? - -BÜHLER: As far as I can remember Krüger was removed from his post in -Kraków in November 1943 and was replaced by Obergruppenführer Koppe. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What were your personal relations with Koppe? - -BÜHLER: The relationship with the Police under Krüger had always been -hostile, and whenever the administration department had any wish that -involved police jurisdiction, such wishes had always been frustrated by -Krüger; therefore, after Krüger had left Kraków I tried to establish a -comradely relationship with the new Higher SS and Police Leader, so that -in this manner I could influence the work of the Police and the methods -employed by them. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Could you answer briefly: What exactly were your -personal relations with Koppe? Were they good or bad? - -BÜHLER: They were comradely. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to show you one document. You, Mr. -President, will find the passage on Page 38, Paragraph 2, of the English -translation. I am reading the passage into the record. It is a statement -made by Frank to Himmler at the conference with Himmler on the 12 -February 1944: - - “Immediately after the exchange of greetings, Reichsführer SS - Himmler entered into conversation with me and SS - Obergruppenführer Koppe. The Reichsführer asked me right at the - beginning how I was co-operating with the new Secretary of State - for Security, SS Obergruppenführer Koppe. I expressed my deep - satisfaction at the fact that between myself and SS - Obergruppenführer Koppe, as well as between him and State - Secretary Dr. Bühler, there existed extraordinarily good - relations of friendly co-operation.” (Document Number 2233-PS.) - -Does that statement by Frank correspond to the fact, Witness? - -BÜHLER: At that time Koppe had been in the Government General only a few -weeks. This statement confirms just what I said here at the beginning, -namely, that after Krüger had been replaced by Koppe I tried through -comradely relations with Koppe to gain influence over the police powers -in the Government General. Thus there had been no friction up to that -time. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And between Koppe and Dr. Bühler, that is, -between Koppe and yourself, there existed the most comradely -collaboration; is that correct? - -BÜHLER: I repeat, my relations with Koppe were comradely. Apart from -that, the problems with which we had to deal brought me into daily -contact with Koppe. For instance, there was this question of Jewish -property. One could not possibly have discussed such a question with -Krüger, as he held the view that all Jewish property belonged to the SS. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: When Koppe took over the post of Chief of -Police, was there any change with regard to the Polish population? Did -the police measures become less severe? Did they become less repressive -with Koppe’s arrival? - -BÜHLER: I believe they were milder. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to follow the minutes of one -particular administrative conference of the 16 December 1943, held at -Kraków. - -Please show the witness the original. - -Incidentally, is that your signature on the list of those present? On -Page 154. - -BÜHLER: Government meeting, 16 December 1943? Yes, I signed that; that -is right. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me, do you remember who Ohlenbusch was? - -BÜHLER: Ohlenbusch was the President of the Department of Propaganda. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was he in any way connected with the Police or -with the administration? - -BÜHLER: Ohlenbusch participated in the government meetings, at which the -Police were also present as a rule. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But he himself, in his own function, did he have -any connection with the Police or not? - -BÜHLER: As a state official and head of a government department he did, -of course, have connections with the Police, official connections. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But he was an official of the civilian -administration of your organization? - -BÜHLER: Yes, of course. As far as his official position was concerned, -he was subordinate to me. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am reading into the record a short extract -from Page 176. Your Honors will find it on Page 33 of our document book, -Paragraph 3, Ohlenbusch’s speech: - - “It would be well to consider whether, for reasons of - expediency, one should not, as far as possible, carry out - executions on the spot where the attempt upon the life of a - German took place. One ought, perhaps, also to consider whether - special execution sites should not be created for this purpose, - for it has been confirmed that the Polish population streamed to - the execution grounds, which were accessible to all, in order to - put the blood-soaked earth into containers and take them to the - church.” (Document Number 2233-PS.) - -Do you not consider this question a purely police question? - -BÜHLER: It does not mention buckets of blood in my translation. It says -containers. I do not think that the blood could be carried away in -buckets. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: We are talking here about containers into which -the blood-soaked soil was placed. Do you not consider that the question -of organizing secret execution grounds was purely a matter for the -Police? - -BÜHLER: I am of the same opinion. For this reason this matter was by no -means approved of. But perhaps I may add that at the same time German -pedestrians in Kraków and Warsaw were being shot in the back daily, -without any reason, and that this affair was due to the excitement -which... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am asking you about something else, Witness. -Do you not consider the fact that this question was discussed at the -initiative of Ohlenbusch as positive proof that even the petty officials -in the civilian administration interfered in police matters and were in -direct contact with the Police? - -BÜHLER: No, I would not say so. This was not suggested as a police -measure. It arose from the threat under which all Germans lived at that -stage of the occupation. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This question of secret execution grounds—did -it arise on Ohlenbusch’s initiative? I trust you are not going to deny -this. - -BÜHLER: What do you mean by this question? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did it arise on—was it provoked by the -initiative of Ohlenbusch? You are not going to deny it? - -BÜHLER: I do not know whether this was discussed at all. In my opinion -there was not... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The typewritten report of that conference is -before you, and you were present at that conference. - -BÜHLER: Yes, there are statements made by Ohlenbusch, if I am not -mistaken. Yes, it mentions “President Ohlenbusch” here. That is right. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I shall proceed to the next question. Did SS -Obergruppenführer Koppe not report on the subject at all during the -conference? I will quote a brief excerpt which Your Honors will find on -Page 34, Paragraph 2. It is on Page 180 of your document book. - - “...For the railway outrage 150 and for the two German - officials, 50 Polish terrorists were executed either on the spot - or in the immediate vicinity. It must be remembered that the - shooting of 200 people affects at least 3,000 (nearest - relatives)...” (Document Number 2288-PS.) - -Do you not consider this as evidence that with the arrival of Koppe the -same savage measures of repression were used against the people of -Poland? - -BÜHLER: Inasmuch as this mentions the shooting of 150 and 50 people this -obviously concerns the shooting of hostages, which never did have the -approval of the Governor General or my approval. If I have nevertheless -stated that in its entirety Koppe’s regime appeared milder to me, then I -must stand by that statement of mine. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Does this mean that the hostage system did not -meet either with your approval or with the approval of the Governor -General; is that correct? - -BÜHLER: It did not have my approval, and I do not think it had the -approval of the Governor General. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please look at Page 185 of the document -in your possession. I begin with the quotation: - - “The Governor General expressed his gratitude and recognition to - SS Obergruppenführer Koppe for his effective work and spoke of - his satisfaction that an expert with such high qualifications - should be at the head of the police organization in the - Government General. He promised SS Obergruppenführer Koppe the - active co-operation of all offices in the Government General and - expressed his best wishes for the success of his work.” - (Document Number 2233-PS.) - -How are we to interpret this statement in the light of your previous -answer? - -BÜHLER: This statement of the Governor General does not apply to these -50 and 150 people. It applies to the work in its entirety which was to -be done by Koppe in the Government General. And one of the principles -that was to be applied to that work—which I helped bring about—was -that shootings of hostages were to cease. It is quite possible that in -this case that principle had not yet been applied. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Would you please wait one minute. Just before -this you read Koppe’s report on the shooting of the hostages, Page 180. -And after that the Governor General expressed his approval. This means -that it was precisely this activity of Koppe’s that the Governor General -had approved? - -BÜHLER: Well, this was not the only statement made by Koppe. The -statement of the Governor General was in reference to all the statements -made by Koppe, and not to detached portions. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Very well. In that case he also approved, among -other things, of this statement, that is to say, this report. - -BÜHLER: But I know that the Governor General, together with me, was -exerting pressure on Koppe in order to stop the shooting of hostages. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you kindly inform me who, while Krüger was -still Chief of Police, issued instructions for the shooting of one male -inhabitant from each house which displayed a poster announcing a Polish -national holiday? - -BÜHLER: That is unknown to me. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask to have the corresponding document -submitted to you. It is in the document book, on Page 1, Paragraph 7: - - “The Governor General received District Chief, Dr. Waechter, who - reported on the appearance in some districts of inflammatory - posters on the occasion of the 11 November (the Polish Day of - Liberation). The Governor General ordered that from every house - where a poster remains exhibited one male inhabitant is to be - shot. This order is to be carried out by the Chief of Police. - Dr. Waechter has taken 120 hostages in Kraków as a precautionary - measure.” - -Do you remember that? Who then introduced this criminal practice of -taking hostages? - -BÜHLER: Are you trying to say that I was present during that conference? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to ask you about something else. - -BÜHLER: Please, will you answer my question? Was I there or was I not? - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am not obliged to answer your question. It is -you, Witness, who have to answer mine. It is I who am interrogating you, -not you who are examining me. Kindly answer the next question. You -resided in Kraków. Acting on Frank’s orders, Dr. Waechter, as a -precautionary measure, detained 120 hostages. Do you wish to say that -you knew nothing about this either? - -BÜHLER: I know nothing about this measure; nor is it known to me that -hostages were shot. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer the following question. Have I -understood you correctly—did you state today that there was no famine -in Poland? - -BÜHLER: Yes, there was no famine in Poland. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am asking you to be shown the speech of Dr. -Bühler, State Secretary—that obviously means you—at a meeting on the -31 May 1943, in Kraków. I begin the quotation: - - “...The Government of the Government General has for a long time - been clear on the point that the scale of food rations allowed - to non-Germans cannot be continued any longer without the - population taking matters into its own hands or being driven to - insurrection... The difficulties of the food situation, which - naturally have a bad effect on the morale of the population, the - enormous rise in prices, the exaggerated and narrow-minded - salary and wage policy, have driven part of the Polish - population to despair.” (Document Number 2233-PS.) - -Did you say that? - -BÜHLER: I could follow the first part, but I could not find the last -sentence. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Would you kindly follow the text. In the text -you will find both the first part and the last sentence: “...have driven -part of the Polish population to despair.” Please study the text. - -BÜHLER: Where does it say so, please? Would you show it to me? - -[_The text was indicated to the witness._] - -I made these statements, and... - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then I also have the following question to ask -you. Do you not think that your announcement in 1943 bears witness to -the fact that you have today testified falsely before the Tribunal? - -BÜHLER: No; no. What I meant by my statement was that the population -would take things into its own hands. When for instance a worker -remained away from his place of work for 3 days to go in search of food, -this was considered by me to be a desperate step on the part of the -worker. - -However, I said this morning that it was very difficult for the -population to obtain the necessary food supplies but that it was not -impossible, so that I did not notice famine at all in the Government -General. - -And please may I ask you to consider that 80 percent of the population -of the Government General were country people, so that there could be no -famine on a large scale unless the countryside had been completely -despoiled, and that was not the case. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You stated that as a result of the food quotas -established in the Government General a revolt might arise, and you said -that the population was driven to despair by hunger. Is that not -evidence that a famine was raging in the country? - -BÜHLER: By “revolt” I meant “unrest,” not an armed uprising. It is quite -clear that morale and the will to work did suffer by reason of the -insufficient rations. I stated this morning how it was that adequate -provisioning of the population could not be carried out. On the other -hand, however, there was such a widespread free market and black market -that even the worker, if he had sufficient time, could obtain food; and -if he did not have time, he took it. That was what I meant by the -workers taking things in their own hands. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please, answer this question. Were only such -educational possibilities left to the Poles as would—according to the -plan of Frank and Goebbels—merely emphasize the hopeless destiny of -their nation? - -BÜHLER: Efforts to keep down the level of education of the Polish -population were noticeable. These tendencies originated from Himmler in -Berlin. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to answer: What was done with -the Polish universities? - -BÜHLER: They were closed and they were not reopened. However, technical -courses were arranged in Warsaw and in Lvov in which these people -received university education; but, to be sure, these courses had to be -closed by demand of the Reich. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you will recollect under whose signature -the decree was issued to close the universities. Perhaps you will -recognize this signature? It is an official report. - -BÜHLER: The decree regarding the appointment of university trustees was -signed by the Governor General in November 1940. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please tell me whether technical -schools only were left in Poland? - -BÜHLER: Not technical schools alone remained open; there were, for -instance, commercial schools, and the attendance there was very large. -Apart from that, there were craft schools and elementary schools, which -were set up on a large scale. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In other words, only those schools were left -which trained artisans, and petty commercial clerks and tradesmen? - -BÜHLER: Whether only petty or also more important traders attended them -I do not know. At any rate commercial schools were permitted. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to know on whose initiative the -royal palace at Warsaw was destroyed? - -BÜHLER: I do not know for certain. I heard once that it had been the -Führer’s wish that the castle in Warsaw, which was heavily damaged, -should be razed to the ground. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And by whose personal order was this castle, the -royal castle of Warsaw destroyed? - -BÜHLER: I do not know whether it was blown up; that I do not know. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes. It was destroyed. Who ordered it to be -destroyed, do you know? - -BÜHLER: I do not know. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You do not know? - -BÜHLER: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The quotation which I want to read to you is on -Page 1 of the translation of the document submitted by us to the -Tribunal. It is a very short quotation. I shall proceed to read it into -the record: - - “...The Führer discussed the general situation with the Governor - General and he approved of the work of the Governor General in - Poland, especially the pulling down of the palace at Warsaw and - the intention not to reconstruct the city...” - -Was it not true that the palace in Warsaw was destroyed by order of -Frank? - -BÜHLER: It is not known to me that the castle was destroyed. As far as I -know there was at one time a project to pull it down, but the plan was -abandoned. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me, please, was it not in your presence -that the Defendant Frank on 21 April 1940 issued an order to apply -police measures during the so-called recruitment of labor. - -BÜHLER: I should have to see the minutes. I cannot remember it offhand. - -[_The document was handed to the witness._] - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The place which I should like to quote is on -Page 46 of the document, the last paragraph. I quote: - - “Discussion with State Secretary Dr. Bühler, SS - Obergruppenführer Krüger, and Dr. Frauendorfer in the presence - of Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart. - - “Subject of discussion is the deportation of workers, especially - agricultural workers, to the Reich. - - “The Governor General stated that, as all methods in the way of - appeals, _et cetera_, had been unsuccessful, one was now obliged - to come to the conclusion that the Poles evaded this duty of - work either out of malice, or with the intention of doing - Germany indirect harm by not placing themselves at her disposal. - He therefore asked Dr. Frauendorfer whether there were any - measures left which had not yet been taken to win the Poles over - voluntarily. - - “Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer answered this question - in the negative. - - “The Governor General stated emphatically that a final decision - was now required of him. The question now was whether one would - not have to resort to some form of coercive measure.” - -Was that not an order to apply coercive measures when recruiting labor? - -BÜHLER: I will not contradict the statement, as I have seen the minutes. -It is one of the utterances of the Governor General which, I believe, -were not altogether made voluntarily but which in no way altered the -course which I took on this question. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer the following question: Were you -present at a discussion with Sauckel on 18 August 1942, and was it in -your presence that Frank told Sauckel that he—as he put it—“joyfully” -informed him that he had shipped a fresh convoy of workers to the Reich -with the help of the Police. - -BÜHLER: Together with my departmental heads who dealt with the -recruitment of workers I had a conference with Reich Commissioner -Sauckel before the visit to the Governor General took place. I cannot -now remember whether I was present when Reich Commissioner Sauckel -visited the Governor General. I ask to see the minutes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please show the defendant, I mean the witness, -the passage. - -[_The document was handed to the witness._] - -I will now read into the record two short passages on Pages 918 and 920. -Doctor Frank says: - - “I am very glad that I can inform you officially that up to this - date we have sent to Germany over 800,000 workers. Only a short - time ago you asked for another 140,000. I am happy to inform you - officially that, in accordance with our agreement of yesterday, - 60 percent of these newly requested workers will be sent by the - end of October, and the other 40 percent will be dispatched to - the Reich by the end of the year.” - -Then I will ask you to pass on to Page 120. There is only one other -sentence I want to quote: - - “Besides the 140,000, you can count on a further number of - workers from the Government General during the coming year, for - we will use the Police to get them.” - -Does that not imply the use of Draconian police methods in the so-called -recruiting of manpower? - -BÜHLER: I do not recollect that I was present on that occasion, so I can -in no way confirm whether that was said in this way. - -MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I have no more questions to put -to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: [_To Dr. Seidl._] Do you want to re-examine? - -DR. SEIDL: I have a few more questions to ask the witness. - -First of all, I should like to clarify a misunderstanding which seems to -have arisen. The question which I put to the witness in connection with -Document Number USSR-93 referred only to Appendix 1, which has the title -“Cultural Life in Poland.” That appendix deals with directives regarding -cultural policies which the administration of the Government General was -supposed to have issued, and the way I understood the witness was that -he only wanted to answer that particular question and not refer to the -other appendices, such as, for instance, those dealing with confiscated -art treasures. - -Perhaps it would have been better if he had not used the word “forged.” -At any rate, he wanted to say that he did not know the directives in -question. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, is it correct that by far the -greater number of Polish workers who were brought to the Reich were -volunteers? - -BÜHLER: May I, first of all, say that I by no means wished to accuse the -Prosecution of committing a forgery. I merely wanted to point out that -possibly they were using a forged document. I did not want to accuse the -Prosecution itself of a forgery. - -Now, regarding the question put by defense counsel, I want to say that -according to my observations by far the greater number of all the -workers from the Government General went to the Reich voluntarily. - -DR. SEIDL: So as to assist your memory, I am going to read a short -quotation from the diary, which deals with the recruiting of workers. - -On 4 March 1940 the Governor General addressed a meeting of the town -mayors of the Lublin district and stated the following regarding the -recruitment of workers: - - “He rejected the issue of a new decree, as demanded by Berlin, - containing particular coercive measures and threats of - punishment. Measures which attract attention abroad should be - avoided. The forcible transport of people had every argument - against it.” - -Does that conception reflect the true views of the Governor General? - -BÜHLER: I was not present during that conference, so I did not hear that -utterance by the Governor General, but it does tally with those -instructions and principles which the Governor General gave to me and -which I have always resolutely observed and carried out. - -DR. SEIDL: Were you present during a conference on 14 January 1944—I -see you were there—it was a conference with the State Secretary Dr. -Bühler, Dr. Koppe, and several others. I quote from it: - - “The Governor General resolutely opposes the employment of - Police for carrying out such measures. Such a task is not a - matter for the Police.” - -Is it correct that the Governor General repeatedly opposed the use of -Police in connection with the recruiting of workers? - -BÜHLER: That was not the only occasion. The deputy of Reich Commissioner -Sauckel was often attacked by him during public meetings when he talked -about raids for recruiting workers; but I must state that Sauckel’s -deputy always declared that it was not he who had given instructions for -these raids. - -DR. SEIDL: The first quotation which the prosecutor submitted to you was -an entry dated 25 January 1943. He asked you whether you regarded -yourself as a war criminal. I shall now put to you another passage from -that conference, at which you yourself were present. I quote from Page 7 -of that entry in the diary. The Governor General stated: - - “State Secretary Krüger, you know that orders of the - Reichsführer SS can be carried out by you only after you have - spoken with me. This was omitted in this instance. I express my - regret that you have carried out an order from the Reichsführer - without first informing me, in accordance with the orders of the - Führer. According to that order, instructions of the - Reichsführer SS may be carried out here in the Government - General only after I have previously given my approval. I hope - that this is the last time that that is overlooked; because I do - not want to trouble the Führer about every single case of this - kind.” (Document Number 2233-PS.) - -I shall skip a sentence and continue to quote: - - “It is not possible for us to disregard Führer orders, and it is - out of the question that in the sphere of police and security - direct orders from the Reichsführer should be carried out over - the head of the man who has been appointed here by the Führer; - otherwise I should be completely superfluous.” - -I now ask you, is it correct that there were very frequently such -disputes between the Governor General and the Higher SS Police Leader -Krüger, and that the Governor General terminated these disputes by -asking for co-operation, so that some sort of administration could -function in this territory? - -BÜHLER: Yes, that is correct, such disputes were our daily bread. - -DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has also submitted to you another exhibit, -USSR-335 (Document Number USSR-335), the Court-Martial Decree, dated -October 1943. I now ask you what the security situation was like in the -Government General then, and would it have been at all possible at that -time to control the situation with normal criminal procedure? - -THE PRESIDENT: Doctor Seidl, has that not already been dealt with very -fully in his examination in chief? - -DR. SEIDL: I forego having this question answered again. Now one last -question, which refers to art treasures. - -Is it correct that a portion of the art treasures which were found in -the region of Upper Silesia were taken to the last official residence of -the Governor General at Neuhaus to be safeguarded, and that the Governor -General gave you instructions to prepare a list of these articles and -send it to Reich Minister Lammers? - -BÜHLER: The Governor General dictated a report to Reich Minister Lammers -about the transfer of 20 of the most outstanding art treasures from the -property of the Polish State. I was present when it was dictated and I -took that report personally to State Secretary Kritzinger in Berlin. It -was stated therein that these art treasures, so as to save them from the -Russians, had been taken from Seichau, or whatever the place is called, -to Schliersee. These art treasures were left unguarded in the official -residence of the Governor General. - -DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions to put to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. - -DR. SEIDL: I have now completed the examination of witnesses, but as the -document books have not yet been bound, I would like to suggest that at -some later stage, perhaps after the case of Frick, I could submit these -document books. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, how many books are you presenting? - -DR. SEIDL: A total of five volumes, but I myself have not received them -yet. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has the Tribunal approved the documents in five volumes? - -DR. SEIDL: They are almost entirely documents which have already been -submitted by the Prosecution and an agreement has been reached with the -Prosecution regarding the documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, we need not wait now for the document books. -The document books will be considered by the Tribunal when they are put -in and then, if you have anything in particular you want to say upon -them in explanation, you may do so. - -DR. SEIDL: Very well. - -THE PRESIDENT: No doubt you will comment upon them in your final speech. -You say that they are mostly documents which have already been put in, -and therefore it would not be necessary to make any preliminary comment -upon them. You will be able to deal with them in your final speech. - -DR. SEIDL: But I should have liked to quote a few passages during my -submission of evidence, since this is necessary to establish the -connection, and as it would be impossible to do all that during my final -speech; but I do not think that too much time will be lost through that. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Seidl, it would not be very useful to the -Tribunal for you to make a commentary upon the documents at a later -stage, when your witnesses have been finished and somebody else’s—some -other defendant’s—witnesses have been interpolated; therefore, the -Tribunal thinks it will be much better and much more convenient to the -Tribunal if you defer your comments on the documents until your final -speech. - -Well, Dr. Seidl, as I understand, you have two books which are before us -now. Three is it? - -DR. SEIDL: There is a total of five books. The other three do not appear -to have been bound. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but you say that most of the documents in them are -documents which are already in evidence. - -DR. SEIDL: The diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank, which contains 42 -volumes, has been submitted, but the Prosecution has used only those -parts which appeared favorable for them. In my opinion it is, therefore, -necessary that the connections should to some extent be re-established -during the submission of evidence. Also, there are other documents in -the document book which I believe should be read, at least in extract, -before this Tribunal, but I shall, of course, limit myself to the -absolutely necessary passages when I read the documents. I should like -to suggest to the Tribunal that the matter be handled as it was in the -case of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, so that I submit the individual -documents to the Tribunal as exhibits. There are several speeches by the -Defendant Frank, there are decrees and legal regulations, there are two -affidavits, and I really think that somehow an opinion with regard to -them should be given during the submission of evidence; and, besides, -individual documents will have to be given exhibit numbers. Up to now -only one document has been submitted as evidence on behalf of the -Defendant Frank, and that is the affidavit of the witness Dr. Bühler; -but I have the intention of bringing a whole series of further documents -formally to the notice of the Tribunal and would like to postpone that -only because the Tribunal has not yet received the bound document books. - -THE PRESIDENT: When will these other books be ready, Dr. Seidl? - -DR. SEIDL: I was told that they would be completed by this evening. - -THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think you will take in dealing with these -books? - -DR. SEIDL: I think that two hours will be enough. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal would like you to deal with your -documents now, and insofar as they are documents which have already been -put in evidence, unless you wish to refer to other passages in them, -they think that you need only tell us what the documents are and put -them in evidence, unless it is very important to you to refer to any -particular document. So far as they are new documents, you will, no -doubt, offer them in evidence and make such short comments as you think -necessary. But the Tribunal hopes that you will be able to finish this -afternoon. With reference to the other books that you have, we -understand that you have all the documents in German yourself, and -therefore you can refer us to those documents now. - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, upon the wish of the Prosecution and also, I -believe, of the Tribunal, I have reduced the original bulk of my -document books considerably. The first five document books, as I had had -them prepared, contained more than eight hundred pages. The new form is -considerably shorter; but I have not received the German text of the new -form, so that I am not in a position just now to give the number of -pages to the Tribunal or to co-ordinate my page numbers with the -numbered pages of the translations. If I may express a wish, it is that -we should first wait until the five document books in their new form are -available, because otherwise it is very likely that the numbering of the -pages would not correspond to the numbering of the individual documents -as exactly as might be desired. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it best that you should begin now -with the first three volumes. We have them here. - -DR. SEIDL: If the Tribunal has the first three volumes, then I will -begin. I begin with Volume I. The first document on Page 1 is the decree -of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, dated 12 October 1939, concerning -the administration of the occupied Polish territories. This decree -defines in detail the authority of the Governor General. In Paragraphs 5 -and 6 some of the limitations to the authority of the Governor General -are included, which the witnesses Dr. Lammers and Dr. Bühler have -already pointed out. This document bears the number 2537-PS and it will -be Exhibit Frank-2. - -I pass to Page 3 of the document book. This document is the decree of -the Führer concerning the establishment of a State Secretariat for -Security in the Government General, dated 7 May 1942. I quote Paragraph -2: - - “The State Secretary for Security serves at the same time as - deputy of the Reichsführer SS in his capacity as Reich - Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality.” - -On Page 4 I quote Paragraph IV: - - “The Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police is - authorized to give the State Secretary for Security direct - instructions in the province of security and the preservation of - German Nationality.” - -This document will be Exhibit Frank-3 (Document Number Frank-3). - -Following the decree of the Führer of 7 May 1942 comes the decree for -the transfer of authority to the State Secretary for Security, of 23 -June 1942. I do not know whether that decree is already bound in that -volume. Apparently that decree, which was added later, has not yet been -translated. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the date? - -DR. SEIDL: 23 June 1942. - -THE PRESIDENT: We have one of 27 May 1942. - -DR. SEIDL: That decree apparently has not yet been translated because it -was added afterwards, and I will put it in the document book later. It -will be Document Frank-4. In Paragraph 1 of that decree, we find, “The -jurisdictions of the administrative and creative branches of the Police -referred to in appendices A and B are now transferred to the State -Secretary for Security.” In Appendix 1 the spheres of authority of the -Order Police are mentioned under 15 headings—no, I must correct -that—26 headings; and in Appendix B the spheres of authority of the -Order Police come under 21 headings. - -I pass now to Document Book I, Page 5. That is the decree of the Führer -concerning the appointment of officials and the termination of this -status as officials in the sphere of the Government General, of 20 May -1942. I quote from the figure 3, Paragraph 2: - - “The Governor General’s sphere of activity does not, in the - sense of this decree, include officials belonging to the - province of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police - in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, or those belonging to the - Customs Frontier Service.” (Document Number Frank-4(e).) - -I pass to Page 6 of the document book, the decree of the Führer and -Reich Chancellor, for the Preservation of German Nationality, of 7 -October 1939, which is already Exhibit USA-305 (Document Number 686-PS). - -The next document is the letter from Reich Marshal Göring to the Chief -of the Security Police and the SD, of July 1941. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, I suggest that an exhibit number be given as we -go along so that we can follow better, and later on have some track of -the exhibits as they go in. The last one and this one have not been -given any exhibit number. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): The -last one was Frank-5, was it not? - -THE PRESIDENT: No. Frank-5 was the one of the 27th of May 1942. - -MR. DODD: We did not know that; we did not get the number over the -speaker. I am sorry. - -THE PRESIDENT: It may not have been stated but I took it down as that -myself. Will you take care to state each time, Dr. Seidl, what the -exhibit number is that you are giving. You are dealing now with the -letter of the 31st of July 1941. - -DR. SEIDL: Yes. This letter has a USA number, namely, 509. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Wait a minute, perhaps I made a mistake. Yes, -Mr. Dodd, I think I made a mistake. The reason why Dr. Seidl did not -give a number was because it was already in evidence as USA-305. I made -a mistake. It was not Frank-5. He only got to Frank-4. The next one is -USA-509. - -DR. SEIDL: 509 (Document Number 710-PS). I pass to Page 10 of the -document book. That is an order, a directive rather, of the High Command -of the Armed Forces concerning Case Barbarossa, USA-135 (Document Number -447-PS), and I quote Paragraph 2: - - “It is not intended to declare East Prussia and the Government - General an operational area of the Army. On the other hand, on - the basis of the unpublished Führer decrees of 19 and 21 October - 1939 the Commander-in-Chief of the Army is authorized to enact - measures that are necessary for the execution of his military - task and for the security of his troops.” - -I pass to Page 11 of the document book, a directive for the execution of -the Führer decree concerning the Plenipotentiary General for the -Allocation of Labor, of 27 March 1942. I quote Paragraph 4: - - “The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor will - have at his disposal for the performance of his tasks the - authority delegated to me by the Führer to issue instructions to - the highest Reich authorities, their subordinate offices, as - well as to the offices of the Party and its formations and - affiliated organizations; to the Reich Protector; to the - Governor General; to the military commanders and the chiefs of - the civil administrations.” - -This document becomes Exhibit Number Frank-5 (Document Number Frank-5). - -The next document is on Page 12—the decree by the Führer, concerning a -Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, of 21 March 1942, -from which it can be seen that his authority to issue instructions -included the Government General. It becomes Exhibit Number Frank-6 -(Document Number Frank-6). - -The document on Page 13 of the document book deals also with the -authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor to -issue instructions. It is already Exhibit USA-206 (Document Number -3352-PS). - -The document on Page 15 is a letter from Professor Dr. Kubiowicz, -Chairman of the Ukrainian Control Committee, to the Defendant Dr. Frank. -It already has the Exhibit Number USA-178 (Document Number 1526-PS); and -I will read only the first sentence from that document, in order to show -what the relation was between the Defendant Dr. Frank and the author of -that letter. I quote: - - “Complying with your wish I send you this letter, in which I - should like to state the abuses and the painful incidents which - create an especially difficult position for the Ukrainian - population within the Government General.” - -Then I pass on to Page 16 of the document book. That is an excerpt from -Exhibit USA-275 (Document Number 1061-PS), namely, the report of SS -Brigadeführer Stroop about the destruction of the Warsaw ghetto. I quote -the second paragraph of Section II, from which it can be seen that the -order came directly from the Reichsführer SS Himmler: - - “When the Reichsführer SS visited Warsaw in January 1943, he - ordered the SS and Police Leader in the District of Warsaw to - transfer to Lublin the armament factories and other enterprises - of military importance which were installed within the ghetto, - including the workers and the machines.” - -The affidavit which the Prosecution submitted during the -cross-examination of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner should then really -follow after Page 16 of the document book. - -COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): As -far as I can gather, there has been some misunderstanding on this point. -Under the number mentioned by Dr. Seidl in his document book there is no -document referring to the Warsaw ghetto, but there is a document from -the Chief of Police and SS in Galicia relating to the solution of the -Jewish problem in Galicia. I should like this elucidated. - -DR. SEIDL: The document on Page 16 is the report by the SS Brigadeführer -Stroop which has already been submitted as Exhibit USA-275. The report -by SS Führer Katzmann, which the Russian Prosecutor apparently means, -concerning the solution of the Jewish question in Galicia, is on Page 17 -of the document book, that is, on the next page. Apparently the -insertion of Page 16 in the document book which was prepared for the -Russian Prosecution was overlooked. - -After that report by Brigadeführer Stroop, Exhibit USA-275 should be -inserted as Page 16a, the affidavit by SS Brigadeführer Stroop which was -submitted during the cross-examination of the Defendant Dr. -Kaltenbrunner under Exhibit Number USA-804. That affidavit bears the -Document Number 3841-PS. I could not include that affidavit in the -document book because it was submitted by the Prosecution only after I -had sent the document book to be translated. - -As Page 16b another document should be put in which was also submitted -during the cross-examination of Dr. Kaltenbrunner. That is the affidavit -by Karl Kaleske. That affidavit bears the Exhibit Number USA-803, -Document Number 3840-PS. That would be Page 16b of the document book. - -Now I come to the report which the Soviet Prosecutor had in mind and -which deals with the solution of the Jewish question in Galicia. It is -on Page 17 of the document book. That measure has the Exhibit Number -USA-277 and the Document Number L-18. I quote Pages 4 and 5, word for -word: - - “After it had been found in more and more cases that Jews had - succeeded in making themselves indispensable to their employers - by providing them with scarce goods, _et cetera_, it was - considered necessary to introduce really Draconic measures.” - -I pass to Paragraph 2 and quote: - - “As the administration was not in a position and showed itself - too weak to master this chaos, the SS and Police Leader simply - took over the whole question of the employment of Jewish labor. - The Jewish labor agencies, which were staffed by hundreds of - Jews, were dissolved. All employment certificates given by firms - or administrative offices were declared invalid, and cards given - Jews by the labor agencies were made valid again by being - stamped by the police offices.” - -I pass to Page 19 of the document book. That deals with the letter of -the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery to Reichsführer SS -and Chief of the German Police Himmler, of 17 April 1943. That document -is Number 2220-PS and Exhibit Number USA-175. I quote: - - “In our conference of 27 March of this year we had agreed to - prepare written memoranda about conditions in the Government - General on which to base our intended report to the Führer. - - “The material compiled for this purpose by SS Obergruppenführer - Krüger has already been submitted to you directly. On the basis - of this material I have had a report prepared which sums up the - most important points contained therein, subdivides them - clearly, and culminates in an explanation of the measures to be - taken. - - “The report has been checked with SS Obergruppenführer Krüger - and has his complete concurrence. I am submitting a part of it - to you herewith.”—It is signed—“Dr. Lammers.” - -I pass on to Page 20 of the document book and I quote: - - “Secret. Concerning conditions in the Government General... - - “The German administration in the Government General has to - accomplish the following tasks: 1) To increase agricultural - production for the purpose of securing food for the German - people and seize as much of it as possible, to allot sufficient - rations to the native population occupied with work essential to - the war effort, and to remove the rest for the Armed Forces and - the homeland.” - -I leave out the following points and pass to the letter “B”, where -Krüger or his assistant criticized the measures of the Governor General. -I quote: - - “German administration in the Government General has failed - grossly with respect to the tasks listed under “A”. Even if a - relatively high percentage, namely, over 90 percent, of the - delivery quota of agricultural products for the Armed Forces and - the homeland was successfully met in the year 1942 and if the - labor procurement requirements of the homeland were generally - satisfied, nevertheless, on the other hand, two things must be - made clear: First, these accomplishments were not achieved until - the year 1942. Before that, for example, only 40,000 tons of - bread grain had been delivered for the Wehrmacht. Secondly, and - above all, there was the omission to create for the attainment - of such performances those prerequisites of an organizational, - economic, and political character which are indispensable if - such performances are not to lead to a breakdown in the - situation as a whole, from which chaotic conditions in every - respect could eventually come about. This failure of the German - administration can be explained in the first place by the system - of the German administrative and governmental activity in the - Government General as embodied in the Governor General himself, - and secondly by the misguided principles of policy in all - questions decisive for conditions in the Government General. - - “I) The spirit of the German administration in the Government - General. - - “From the beginning it has been the endeavor of the Governor - General to make a state organization out of the Government - General which was to lead its own existence in complete - independence of the Reich.” - -Then I pass to Page 22 of the report, Paragraph 3 and I quote: - - “3) The treatment of the native population can only be led in - the right direction on the basis of clean and orderly - administrative and economic leadership. Only such a foundation - makes it possible to handle the native population firmly and if - necessary even severely, on the one hand; and, on the other - hand, to act generously with them and cause a certain amount of - satisfaction among the population by allowing certain liberties, - especially in the cultural field. Without such a foundation - severity strengthens the resistance movement, and meeting the - population halfway only undermines respect for the Germans. The - above-mentioned facts prove that this foundation is lacking. - Instead of trying to create this foundation, the Governor - General inaugurates a policy of encouraging the individual - cultural life of the Polish population, which in itself is - already overshooting the goal but which, under the existing - conditions and viewed in connection with our military situation - during the past winter, can only be interpreted as weakness, and - must achieve the opposite of the aim intended. - - “4) The relationship between racial Germans and the - Polish-Ukrainian population in the Government General. - - “The cases are numerous in which the German administration has - permitted the requirements of racial Germans in the Government - General to be put into the background in favor of the interests - of the Poles and Ruthenians, in its endeavor to win over the - latter. The opinion was advanced that racial Germans resettled - from somewhere else were not to be installed immediately as - settlers, but for the duration of the war were only to be - employed as farm workers. A legal foundation for the - expropriation of Polish property has not been created so far. - Bad treatment of racial Germans by their Polish employers was - not stopped. German citizens and racial German patients were - allowed to be treated in Polish hospitals by Polish physicians, - badly and at great expense. In German spas in the Government - General the sheltering of children of German citizenship from - territories threatened with bombing, and of veterans of - Stalingrad was hampered, while foreigners took convalescent - vacations there, and so on. - - “The big plans for resettlement in the Lublin district for the - benefit of racial Germans could have been carried out with less - friction if the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of - German Nationality had found the administration willing to - co-operate and assist in the proper manner.” - -I pass to Page 24 and quote, under C: - - “The administrative system, embodied in the Governor General - personally, and the material failure of the general German - administration in the most various fields of decisive importance - has not only shaken the confidence and the will to work of the - native population, but has also brought about the result that - the Poles, who have been socially divided and constantly - disunited throughout their history, have come together in a - united national body through their hostility to the Germans. In - a world of pretense, the real foundations are lacking on which - alone the achievements which the Reich requires from the - Government General, and the aims which it must see realized in - the latter, can be brought about and fulfilled in the long run. - The non-fulfillment of the tasks given to the general - administration—as happened, for example, in the field of the - Preservation of German Nationality—led to a condition which - made it necessary for other administrative bodies (the Reich - Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality...and - the Police) to take over these tasks.” - -Now I pass to Page 27 of the document book. That is the repeatedly -mentioned report by the Governor General to the Führer of 19 June 1943. -The document is Number 437-PS, Exhibit USA-610. Of this document the -Prosecution has so far quoted only Pages 10 and 11. These are the very -points in this memorandum which the Governor General most severely -criticized. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking now of the report which begins on Page -20? - -DR. SEIDL: I am speaking of the report which begins on Page 27. I have -already finished the report which begins on Page 20. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, what number did you give to that on Page 20? - -DR. SEIDL: The report on Page 20 is an integral part of the letter which -begins on Page 19, and which already has the number USA-175. - -THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see, yes. - -DR. SEIDL: Now I come to the document on Page 27. That is a memorandum -which has already been mentioned by various witnesses and was submitted -under Exhibit Number USA-610 (Document Number 437-PS) by the -Prosecution. Of this report the Prosecution has only read Pages 10 and -11, which are Pages 36 and 37 of the document book, that is to say, only -those passages in the report which were condemned as excesses of the -Police, and against which excesses the Governor General complained to -the Führer. - -I do not intend to read the whole memorandum; but I will pass on to Page -27 of the report, which is Page 53 of the document book, and I quote -under Section 2: - - “The almost complete discontinuation of the possibilities for - participation in the cultural field has led, even among the - lowest classes of the Polish people, to considerable discontent. - The Polish middle and upper classes have a great need for - self-expression. Experience shows that the possibility of - cultural activity would at the same time mean a diversion from - the political questions of the day. German propaganda frequently - comes across the objection, on the part of the Poles, that the - restriction of cultural activity enforced by the German - authorities not only prevents a contrast being made with the - Bolshevist lack of culture, but also shows that Polish cultural - activity falls below the degree of culture allowed to Soviet - citizens... - - “3. The closing of colleges, high schools, and secondary schools - is on the same level. Its well-considered purpose is without - doubt the lowering of the Polish educational standard. The - realization of this goal appears, from the point of view of the - necessities of war, not always beneficial to German interests. - As the war goes on the German interest increases in the - mobilization of able foreign replacements in the various fields - of knowledge. But more important than that is the fact that the - crippling of the school system and the severe hampering of - cultural activities foster the growth of a Polish national body, - led by the intelligentsia, to conspire against Germany. What was - not possible during the course of Polish national history, what - even the first years of German dominion could not bring about, - namely, the achievement of national unity in a common purpose to - hold together through thick and thin, now threatens to become a - reality, slowly but surely, because of the German measures. - German leadership cannot allow this process of unifying the - individual classes of the Polish population to pass unheeded in - the face of the growing power of resistance of the Poles. German - leadership should promote class distinction by certain cultural - concessions and should be able to play one class off against the - other. - - “4. The recruiting of labor and the methods employed, even - though often exercised under the unavoidable pressure of - circumstances, have, with the aid of clever Bolshevist - agitation, evoked a strong feeling of hatred among all classes. - The workers thus obtained often come to work with firm resolve - to engage in positive resistance, even active sabotage. - Improvement of recruiting methods, together with the continued - effort to arrest the abuses still practiced in the treatment of - Polish workers in the Reich, and lastly, some provision, however - meager it may be, for the families left behind, would cause a - rise in morale, and the result would be an increased desire to - work and increased production in the German interest. - - “5. When the German administration was set up at the beginning - of the war the Polish element was removed from all important - positions. The available German staff had always been inadequate - in quantity and quality. Besides, during the past year, a - considerable number of German personnel have had to be - transferred to meet the replacement needs of the armed forces. - Already an increased amount of non-German manpower has had to be - obtained compulsorily. An essential change in the treatment of - the Poles would enable the administration, while exercising all - necessary precaution, to induce a greater number of Poles to - collaborate. Without this the administration, in view of the - present amount of personnel—not to speak of future - transfers—cannot continue to function. The increased - participation of Poles would further help to raise the morale - itself. - - “Besides the positive changes set down in these proposals, a - number of methods employed up till now in the treatment of Poles - should be changed or even completely abandoned, at least for the - duration of the fighting in Europe. - - “1) I have already shown in special reports that confiscation - and evacuation of agricultural land have caused great and - irreparable damage to agricultural production. Not less great is - the damage to morale caused by such actions. Already the seizure - of a great part of the large Polish estates has understandably - embittered those affected by it, who naturally represent that - strata of the population which is always anti-Bolshevist. But, - because of their numerically small strength and their complete - isolation from the mass of the people, their opposition does not - count nearly as much as the attitude of the mass of the - population which consists mainly of small farmers. The - evacuation of Polish peasants from the defense zone, no doubt - necessary for military-political reasons, has already had an - unfavorable effect on the opinion and attitude of many farmers. - At any rate, this evacuation was kept within certain territorial - limits. It was carried out with careful preparation on the part - of the governmental offices with a view to avoiding unnecessary - hardship. The evacuation of Polish farmers from the Lublin - district, held to be necessary by the Reich Commissioner for the - Preservation of German Nationality, for the purpose of settling - racial Germans there, was much more serious. Moreover—as I have - already reported separately—the pace at which it was carried - out and the methods adopted caused immeasurable bitterness among - the populace. At short notice families were torn apart; those - able to work were sent to the Reich, while old people and - children were directed to evacuate Jewish ghettos. This happened - in the middle of the winter of 1942-43 and resulted in - considerable loss of life, especially among members of the last - mentioned group. The dispossession meant the complete - expropriation of the movable and immovable property of the - farmers. The entire population succumbed to the belief that - these deportations meant the beginning of a mass deportation of - the Poles from the region of the Government General. The general - impression was that the Poles would meet a fate similar to that - of the Jews. The evacuation from the Lublin District was a - welcome opportunity for communist agitation, with its own - peculiar skill, to poison the feeling in the entire Government - General, and even in the annexed Eastern territories, for a long - time. Thus it came about that considerable portions of the - population in the territories to be evacuated, but also in - territories not affected, fled into the woods and considerably - increased the strength of the guerrillas. The consequence was a - tremendous deterioration of the security situation. These - desperate people were incited by skillful agents to upset - agricultural and industrial production according to a definite - plan. - - “2) One has only to mention the crime of Katyn for it to become - obvious that the safeguarding of personal security is an - absolute condition for winning over the Polish population to the - fight against Bolshevism. The lack of protection against - seemingly arbitrary arrests and executions makes good copy for - communist propaganda slogans. The shooting of women, children, - and old men in public, which took place again and again without - the knowledge and against the will of the government, must be - prevented in all circumstances. Naturally this does not apply to - the public executions of bandits and partisans. In cases of - collective punishments, which nearly always hit innocent persons - and are applied against people who are fundamentally politically - indifferent, the unfavorable psychological effect cannot - possibly be overestimated. Serious punitive measures and - executions should be carried out only after a trial based at - least upon the elementary conceptions of justice and accompanied - by publication of the sentence. Even if the court procedure is - carried on in the most simple, imperfect and improvised manner, - it serves to avoid or to lessen the unfavorable effect of a - punitive measure which the population considers purely - arbitrary, and disarms Bolshevist agitation which claims that - these German measures are only the prelude to future events. - Moreover, collective punishment, which by its nature is directed - primarily against the innocent, in the worst case against forced - or desperate persons, is not exactly looked upon as a sign of - strength of the ruling power, which the population expects to - strike at the terrorists themselves and thereby liberate them - from the insecurity which burdens them.” - -I pass now to Page 37 of the report and quote under Section 3: - - “Besides the most important prerequisites mentioned in 1) and 2) - to restore calm in the Government General, security of property - among non-agricultural people must also be guaranteed, insofar - as it is not counter to the urgent needs of war. Expropriation - or confiscation without compensation in the industrial sector, - in commerce and trade, and of other private property, should not - take place in any case if the owner or the custodian has not - committed an offense against the German authorities. If the - taking over of industrial enterprises, commercial concerns, or - real estate is necessary for reasons connected with the war, one - should proceed in every case in such a way as to avoid hardship - and under guarantee of appropriate compensation. Such a - procedure would on the one hand further the initiative of Polish - business men, and on the other hand avoid damage to the - interests of German war economy. - - “4) In any attempt to influence the attitude of the Poles, - importance must be attached to the influence of the Catholic - Church which cannot be overestimated. I do not deny that the - Catholic Church has always been on the side of the leading - fighters for an independent national Poland. Numerous priests - also made their influence felt in this direction even after the - German occupation. Hundreds of arrests were carried out among - them. A number of priests were taken to concentration camps and - also shot. However, in order to win over the Polish population, - the Church must be given at least a legal status even though it - might not be possible to co-operate with it. It can without - doubt be won over to reinforce the struggle of the Polish people - against Bolshevism, especially today under the effect of the - crime of Katyn, for the Church would always oppose a Bolshevist - regime in the Vistula area, if only out of the instinct of - self-preservation. To achieve that end, however, it is necessary - to refrain in the future from all measures against its activity - and its property, insofar as they do not run directly counter to - war requirements. - - “Much harm has been done even quite recently by the closing of - monasteries, charitable institutions, and church - establishments.” - -THE PRESIDENT: I had thought that your extracts were going to be brief. -But you have now read from Page 53 to Page 65. - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, this document is the only one of this kind -which is available to me, and in view of the fact that the Prosecution -has quoted in full only those passages which the Defendant Dr. Frank -himself criticized most severely, I consider it my duty now to read a -number of passages, to quote them, in order to give the entire picture -correctly and to show what the Defendant Dr. Frank really intended to -achieve with this document. I shall only quote a few more lines and then -I will pass to another document. - -THE PRESIDENT: I had hoped that one or two extracts from that document -would show what the Defendant Frank was putting forward—one or two -paragraphs. - -DR. SEIDL: I will go on to the next document, Mr. President, that is on -Page 68, the affidavit by the witness Dr. Bühler, which I presented to -the witness today and which has been given the document number Frank-1; -Page 68 in the document book. - -On Page 70 there appears Exhibit USA-473 (Document Number L-49). If I -remember correctly this document has already been read in full by the -Prosecution, and I would like to ask the Court only to take judicial -notice of that also in the defense of Dr. Frank. - -On Page 72 of the document book is an affidavit of the former -Kreishauptmann, Dr. Albrecht. To be exact I have to state that this is -not really an affidavit in the true sense of the word. It is only a -letter which Kreishauptmann Dr. Albrecht sent to me through the General -Secretary of the Tribunal. I then returned the letter in order to have -it sworn to by the witness, but I have to say that until now that sworn -statement has not been returned, so that for the time being this exhibit -would only have the material value of a letter. Therefore I ask the -Tribunal to decide whether that document can be accepted by the Tribunal -as an exhibit in the form of a letter. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal did consider that matter before when -your application was before it. They will accept the document for what -it is worth. If you get the document in affidavit form you will no doubt -put it in. - -DR. SEIDL: Yes. That will be Document Number Frank-7. I forego the -quoting of the first points and proceed directly to Page 74 of the -document book and I quote under Section 4: - - “Dr. Frank’s fight against the exploitation and neglect of the - Government General in favor of the Reich. Conflict with Berlin. - - “The first meeting with Dr. Frank occurred shortly after the - establishment of the Government General in the autumn of 1939, - in the Polish district capital Radom, where the 10 Kreis chiefs - of this district had to report concerning the condition of the - population in their administrative district and the problem of - reconstructing, as quickly and effectively as possible, the - general as well as the administrative and economic life. What - struck one most was the keen awareness of Dr. Frank and his deep - concern about the area entrusted to him. This found expression - in the instructions not to consider or treat the Government - General or allow it to be treated, as an object of exploitation - or as a waste area, but rather to consider it as a center of - public order and an area of concentration at the back of the - fighting German front and at the gates of the German homeland, - forming a link between the two. Therefore the loyal native - inhabitants of this country should have claim to the full - protection of the German administration as citizens of the - Government General. To this end the constant efforts of all - authorities and economic agencies would be demanded by him, also - constant control through supervisors, which would be personally - superintended by him in periodical inspection trips with the - participation of the specialized central offices. In this way, - for instance, the two districts which were administered by me - were inspected by him personally three times in 4 years. - - “In face of the demands of the Berlin central authorities, who - believed it possible to import more from the Government General - into the Reich than the former could afford, Dr. Frank asserted - vigorously the political independence of the Government General - as an ‘adjunct of the Reich’ and his own independence as being - directly subordinated only to the Supreme Head of the State, and - not to the Reich Government. He also instructed us on no account - to comply with demands which might come to us on the basis of - personal relations with the authorities by whom we were sent, or - with the ministries concerned; and if by so doing we came into - conflict with our loyalty to the Reich, which was equally - expected of us, to report to him about it. This firm attitude - brought Dr. Frank the displeasure of the Berlin government - circles, and the Government General was dubbed ‘Frankreich.’ A - campaign of calumny was initiated in the Reich against him and - against the entire administration of the Government General by - systematically generalizing and exaggerating regrettable - ineptitudes and human weaknesses of individuals, at the same - time attempting to belittle the actual constructive - achievements.” - -I should like to ask the Tribunal merely to take official notice of -Section 5, also Section 6, and I will only quote from Section 7. - - “7) Dr. Frank as an opponent of acts of violence against the - native population, especially as an opponent of the SS. - - “Besides the exploitation and the pauperization of the - Government General, the accusation of the enslaving of the - native population as well as deporting it to the Reich, and many - atrocities of various kinds which have appeared in the newspaper - reports on the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, were interpreted as - serious evidence against Dr. Frank. As far as atrocities are - concerned, the guilt lies not with Dr. Frank but in some measure - with the numerous non-German agitators and provocateurs who, - with the growing pressure on the fighting German fronts, - increased their underground activity; but more especially with - the former State Secretary for Security in the Government - General, SS Obergruppenführer Krüger, and his agencies. My - observations in this respect are sketchy, because of the strict - secrecy of these offices. - - “On the other hand, Dr. Frank went so far in meeting the Polish - population that this was frequently objected to by his German - compatriots. That he did the correct thing by his stand for the - just interests of the Polish population is proved, for example, - by the impressive fact that barely a year and a half after the - defeat of the Polish people in a campaign of 18 days, the - concentration of German army masses against Russia in the Polish - area took place without any disturbance worth mentioning, and - that the Eastern railroad was able, with Polish personnel, to - move the troop transports up to the most forward unloading - points without being delayed by acts of sabotage.” - -I quote the last paragraph on Page 79: - - “This humane attitude of Dr. Frank, which earned him respect and - sympathy among considerable groups of the native population, - led, on the other hand, to bitter conflicts with the SS, in - whose ranks Himmler’s statement, ‘They shall not love us, but - fear us,’ was applied as the guiding principle of their thoughts - and deeds. - - “At times it came to a complete break. I still recall quite - clearly that during a government visit to the Carpathian areas - in the summer of 1943 in the district center of Stanislav, when - he took a walk alone with me and my wife in Zaremcze on the - Prut, Dr. Frank complained most bitterly about the arbitrary - acts of the SS, which quite frequently ran counter to the - political line taken by him. At that time he called the SS the - ‘Black Plague’; and when he noticed our astonishment at hearing - such criticism coming from his lips, he pointed out that if, for - example, my wife were to be wrongfully arrested one day or night - by agencies of the Gestapo and disappear, never to be seen - again, without having been given the opportunity of defense in a - court trial, absolutely nothing could be done about it. Some - time afterwards he made a speech to the students in Heidelberg, - which attracted much attention and was loudly applauded, about - the necessity for the re-establishment of a German - constitutional state such as had always met the real needs of - the German people. When he wanted to repeat this speech in - Berlin, he is said to have been forbidden by the Führer and - Reich Chancellor, at Himmler’s instigation, to make speeches for - 3 months, as reported to me by a reliable, but unfortunately - forgotten, source. The struggle against the methods of violence - used by the SS led to Dr. Frank’s having a nervous breakdown, - and he had to take a fairly long sick leave. As far as I can - remember this was in the winter of 1943-44.” - -I ask the Court to take official notice of Section 8, and I pass on to -Page 84 of the document book. That is an affidavit by SS -Obergruppenführer Erich Von dem Bach-Zelewski, of 21 February 1946. This -affidavit becomes Document Frank-8. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did this witness not give evidence? - -DR. SEIDL: The witness was questioned here by the Prosecution, and I -made the motion at that time that either I be allowed to interrogate the -witness again or be granted the use of an affidavit. On 8 March 1946 the -Tribunal made the decision, if I remember correctly, that I could use an -affidavit from that witness but that the Prosecution would be free if -they desired to question the witness again. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -DR. SEIDL: I shall read the statements of the witness concerning this -matter, and I quote: - - “1) Owing to the infiltration of Russian partisan groups over - the line of the river Bug into the Government General in 1943, - Himmler declared the Government General to be a ‘guerrilla - warfare territory.’ Thus it became my duty as Chief of - Anti-Partisan Units to travel about the Government General to - collect information and get experience, and to submit reports - and suggestions for fighting the partisans. - - “In the general information Himmler gave me, he called the - Governor General Dr. Frank a traitor to his country, who was - conspiring with the Poles and whom he would expose to the Führer - very shortly. I still remember two of the reproaches Himmler - made against Frank: - - “a) At a lawyer’s meeting in the Old Reich territory Frank is - said to have stated that ‘he preferred a bad constitutional - state to the best conducted police state’; and - - “b) During a speech to a Polish delegation Frank had disavowed - some of Himmler’s measures and had disparaged, in front of the - Poles, those charged with carrying them out, by calling them - ‘militant personalities.’ - - “After having, on a circular tour, personally obtained - information on the spot about the situation in the Government - General, I visited the higher SS and Police Führer Krüger and - the Governor General, Dr. Frank, in Kraków. - - “Krüger spoke very disapprovingly about Dr. Frank and blamed - Frank’s faltering and unstable policy towards the Poles for - conditions in the Government General. He called for harsher and - more ruthless measures and said that he would not rest until the - traitor Frank was overthrown. I had the impression, from - Krüger’s statements, that personal motives also influenced his - attitude, and that he himself would have liked to become - Governor General. - - “After that I had a long discussion with Dr. Frank. I told him - of my impressions; and he went into lengthy details about a new - policy for Poland, which aimed at appeasing the Poles by means - of concessions. In agreement with my personal impressions Dr. - Frank considered the following factors responsible for the - crisis in the Government General: - - “a) The ruthless resettlement action carried out now in the - midst of war, especially the senseless and purposeless - resettlement carried out by the SS and Police Führer Globocznik - in Lublin. - - “b) The insufficient food quota allotted to the Governor - General. - - “Dr. Frank called Krüger and Globocznik declared enemies of any - conciliatory policy, and said it was absolutely essential that - they should be recalled. - - “Being convinced that if Dr. Frank failed, he would be succeeded - only by a more ruthless and uncompromising person, I promised - him my support. Having been assured of strictest secrecy I told - Frank I shared his opinion that Krüger and Globocznik would have - to disappear. He, Dr. Frank, knew however that Himmler hated him - and that he was urging Hitler to have him removed. With such a - state of affairs any request on Frank’s part to have Krüger and - Globocznik recalled would not only be rejected but would even - strengthen their position with Himmler. Frank should give me a - free hand, then I could promise him that both would be relieved - of their posts within a short time. Dr. Frank agreed to that, - and I then made use of the military mistakes that Krüger and - Globocznik had committed in order to bring about their recall by - Himmler. - - “3) The Warsaw revolt of 1944...” - -THE PRESIDENT: I must point out to you that you said you were going to -be only 2 hours over five volumes. You have now been over an hour over -one volume, and you are reading practically everything in these -documents. It is not at all what the Tribunal has intended. You have -been told that you may make short comments showing how the documents are -connected with each other and how they are connected with all the -evidence. That is not what you are doing at all. - -DR. SEIDL: In that case I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of -Paragraph 3 of the affidavit by Von dem Bach-Zelewski. - -Paragraph 3 deals with the Warsaw revolt in the year 1944 and the -question as to whether the Governor General had anything to do with the -crushing of that revolt. - -Then I pass on to Page 92. - -THE PRESIDENT: As a matter of fact, does the Indictment charge anything -in connection with the crushing of the Warsaw revolt in 1944? - -DR. SEIDL: There is nothing in the Indictment itself about the part -played by the Governor General in the crushing of that revolt. The -Soviet Prosecution have, however, submitted a telegram which, while it -is not clear whether it was sent, nevertheless connects the Defendant -Dr. Frank in some way with the Warsaw revolt. But I shall not go into -details about that now. - -I pass on to Page 92 of the document book. - -This is an affidavit by the witness Wilhelm Ernst von Palezieux, in -whose case the Tribunal has approved an interrogatory. But I was told by -the Tribunal that in place of an interrogatory I could submit an -affidavit. I quote only the two main paragraphs as follows: - - “The art treasures stored in the castle in Kraków, from the - spring of 1943, were under official and legal supervision there. - When speaking to me Dr. Frank always referred to these art - treasures as state property of thy Government General. - Catalogues of the existing art treasures had already been made - before I came to Poland. The list of the first selection had - been printed in book form as a catalogue with descriptions and - statements of origin, and had been ordered by the Governor - General.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Now you are reading the affidavit all over again. We do -not want that sort of... - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President. I assumed that in those cases where a witness -does not appear before the Tribunal in person, it is admissible that -either the interrogatory or the affidavit be read, because otherwise the -contents of his testimony would not become part of the record nor, -therefore, part of the proceedings. - -THE PRESIDENT: That rule was in order that the defendants and their -counsel should have the document before them in German; that is the -reason for reading the documents through the earphones. The Tribunal -will adjourn now, but I want to tell you that you must shorten your -presentation of this documentary evidence. We have already been a good -deal more than an hour over one book and we have four more books to deal -with, and it does not do your case any good to read all these long -passages because we have some more weeks of the trial. It is only -necessary for you to give such connecting statements as make the -documents intelligible, and to correlate them with the oral evidence -that is being given. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 24 April 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH DAY - Wednesday, 24 April 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl. - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: I left off -yesterday at the last document of Volume I. It is the affidavit of the -witness Ernst von Palezieux, and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial -notice of it. The affidavit is given the document number Frank-9, and -that completes the first volume. - -THE PRESIDENT: The first volume, what page? - -DR. SEIDL: That was Page 92 of the first volume, Document Frank-9. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That is the end of the first volume, isn’t it? - -DR. SEIDL: Yes, that is the end of the first volume. Volumes II, III, -and IV of the document book comprise extracts from the diary of the -Defendant Dr. Frank. I do not propose to number all these extracts -individually, but I ask the Tribunal to accept the whole diary as -Document Frank-10 (Document 2233-PS), and I propose to quote only a few -short extracts. For example Pages 1 to 27, Mr. President, are extracts -from the diary which have already been submitted by the Prosecution. I -have put the extracts submitted by the Prosecution into a more extensive -context, and by quoting the entire passages I have attempted to prove -that some of these extracts do not represent the true and essential -content of the diary. Those are Exhibits USA-173, on Page 1 of the -document book, USSR-223 on Page 3, USA-271 on Page 8, USA-611 on Page 11 -of the document book. On Page 14 of the document book there appears to -be a misprint. The USA number is not 016 but 613. - -THE PRESIDENT: It begins on Page 13 in my copy, doesn’t it? - -DR. SEIDL: No, it is on Page 14. It is an entry dated 25 January 1943. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, the document that I have and which I think you are -referring to, is Document 2233 (aa)-PS, Exhibit USA-613. That is on Page -13. I don’t think it makes any difference. - -DR. SEIDL: In that case it must be an error by the Translation -Department. At any rate I do not think it is important, I mean this -quotation. - -I now turn to Page 20 of the document book, a quotation by the Soviet -Prosecution. On Page 22 there is a quotation by the Soviet Prosecution. -Page 24 of the document book contains quotations by the Prosecution of -both the United States and of the Soviet Union. Exhibit USA-295. Perhaps -I may point out that these extracts are only a few examples merely to -show that in a number of cases the impression obtained is different if -one reads either the entire speech or at least a portion of it. - -I then turn to Page 32 of the document book, an entry dated 10 October -1939, in which the Defendant Dr. Frank gives instructions for -negotiations with the Reich Food Ministry regarding the delivery of -5,000 tons of grain per week—Page 32 of the document book. - -On Page 34 there is an entry of 8 March 1940, and I quote the first -three lines. The Governor General states: - - “In close connection therewith is the actual governing of - Poland. The Führer has ordered me to regard the Government - General as the home of the Polish people. Accordingly, no - Germanization policy of any kind is possible.” - -I now pass on to Page 41 of the document book; an entry dated 19 January -1940. I quote the first five lines: - - “Dr. Walbaum (Chief of the Health Department): The state of - health in the Government General is satisfactory. Much has - already been accomplished in this field. In Warsaw alone 700,000 - typhus injections have been given. This is a huge total, even - for German standards; it is actually a record.” - -The next quotation is on Page 50 of the document book, an entry dated 19 -February 1940: - - “The Governor General is further of the opinion that the need - for official interpretation of Polish law may become greater. We - should probably have to come to some form of Polish government - or regency, and the head of the Polish legal system would then - be competent for such a task.” - -THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid there seems to have been some slight -difference in the paging and therefore if you would give us carefully -and somewhat more slowly the actual date of the document we should be -able to find it perhaps for ourselves. The pages do not seem to -correspond. - -DR. SEIDL: The last quotation which I read was dated 19 February 1940. - -I now turn to a quotation; that is, an entry of 26 February 1940, and I -quote: - - “In this connection the Governor General expresses...” - -This is on Page 51 in my book. The entry is of 26 February 1940. - -THE PRESIDENT: Page 40 in ours. - - DR. SEIDL: “In this connection the Governor General expresses - the wish of Field Marshal Göring that the German administration - should be built up in such a way that the Polish mode of living - as such is assured. It should not give the impression that - Warsaw is a fallen city which is becoming germanized, but rather - that Warsaw, according to the Führer’s will, is to be one of the - cities which would continue to exist as a Polish community in - the intended reduced Polish state.” - -A further entry, dated 26 February 1940, deals with the question of -higher education. I quote: - - “The Governor General points out in this connection that the - universities and high schools have been closed. However, in the - long run it would be an impossible state of affairs, for - instance, to discontinue medical education. The Polish system of - technical schools should also be revived and with the - participation of the city.” - -The next quotation is on Page 56 of my document book. An entry of 1 -March 1940. - - “The Governor General announces in this connection that the - directive has now been issued to give free rein to Polish - development as far as it is possible within the interests of the - German Reich. The attitude now to be adopted is that the - Government General is the home of the Polish people.” - -A further entry deals with the question of workers in the Reich -territory. Page 60 of my document book, entry of 19 September 1940—I -beg your pardon, 12 September 1940. I quote: - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment. You mean the first of September, do you? - -DR. SEIDL: 12 September—no, it should be 12 March; there is obviously a -misprint; 12 March 1940, Page 197 of the diary. I quote: - - “Governor General Dr. Frank emphasizes that one could actually - collect an adequate number of workers by force following the - methods of the slave trade, by using a sufficient number of - police, and by procuring sufficient means of transportation; but - that, for a number of reasons, however, the use of propaganda - deserves preference under all circumstances.” - -The next quotation is on Page 68 in my document book; an entry of 23 -April 1940. I quote the last five lines. The Governor General states: - - “The Governor General is merely attempting to offer the Polish - nation protection in an economic respect as well. He was almost - inclined to think that one could achieve better results with - Poles than with these autocratic trustees....” - -I now turn to Page 71 of my document book, an entry dated 25 May 1940. -Here the Governor General gives an explanation to the President of the -Polish Court of Appeal, Bronschinski. I quote the last four lines: - - “We do not wish to carry on a war of extermination here against - a people. The protection of the Polish people by the Reich in - the German zone of interest gives you the possibility of - continuing your development according to your national - traditions.” - -I turn to Page 77 of my document book, an entry from Volume III, July to -September, Page 692. I quote: - - “The Governor General then spoke of the food difficulties still - existing in the Government General”—this was to Generaloberst - von Küchler—“and asked the general to see to it that the - provisioning and other requirements of new troops arriving - should be as light a burden as possible on the food situation of - the Government General. Above all, no confiscation whatsoever - should take place.” - -I turn to Pages 85 and 86; entries in Volume III, July to September -1940, Page 819 of the diary. This entry deals with the establishment of -the medical academy which was planned by the Governor General. I ask the -Tribunal to take judicial notice of this fact. - -The next quotation is on Page 95 of the document book, an entry dated 9 -October 1940, from the speech of the Governor General on the occasion of -the opening of the autumn trade fair at Radom. I quote Line 5. - - “It is clear that we...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the important things for us are the page in -the diary and the date. We seem to have the pages in the diary and the -dates, so if you will tell us them that will be of the greatest help to -us. - -DR. SEIDL: The date is 9 October 1940; Pages 966-967 of the diary, I -quote Line 6: - - “It is clear that we do not wish to denationalize, nor shall we - germanize.” - -The next quotation... - -THE PRESIDENT: The translation in our book of that sentence is: - - “It is clear that we neither want to denationalize nor - degermanize.” - -DR. SEIDL: That is apparently an error in the translation. - -THE PRESIDENT: In which translation? In the one I have just read out? - -DR. SEIDL: In the English translation. I shall now quote literally: - - “It is clear that we neither wish to denationalize nor shall we - germanize.” - -The other makes no sense. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is what I read. Well, it is right in our book -anyhow. - -DR. SEIDL: The Governor General wished to say that we did not want to -deprive the Poles of their national character and that we did not intend -to turn them into Germans. - -I now turn to Page 101, to an entry dated 27 October 1940, Pages 1026 to -1027 of Volume IV of the diary. A conference with Reich Minister of -Labor Seldte. I quote, Line 7: - - “He, the Governor General, had complained to the Führer that the - wages of Polish agricultural laborers had been reduced by 50 - percent. In addition, their wages had for the most part been - used for purposes which were completely foreign to the idea of - this exchange of workers.” - -The next quotation is dated 29 November 1940. It is on Page 1085 in -Volume IV, of the year 1940. I quote: - - “Hofrat Watzke further states that Reichsleiter Rosenberg’s - office was attempting to confiscate the so-called Polish Library - in Paris, for inclusion in the Ahnenerbe in Berlin. The - Department of Schools was of the opinion that the books of this - Polish library belonged to the state library in Warsaw, as - 17,000 volumes were already in Warsaw. - - “The Governor General ordered that this Polish library should be - transferred from Paris to Warsaw without delay.” - -I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the next entry, dated 6 -and 7 June 1940, which refers to an economic conference. I shall not -read from the entry. - -The next quotation is dated 25 February 1940. It deals with a conference -of the department chiefs, prefects, and town majors of the district of -Radom. I quote Page 12: - - “Thereupon the Governor General spoke, and made the following - statements:” - -It goes on from Page 13: - - “I shall, therefore, again summarize all the points. - - “1. The Government General comprises that part of the occupied - Polish territory which is not an integral part of the German - Reich... - - “2. This territory has primarily been designated by the Führer - as the home of the Polish people. In Berlin the Führer, as well - as Field Marshal Göring, emphasized to me again and again that - this territory would not be subjected to Germanization. It is to - be set aside as the national territory of the Polish people. In - the name of the German people it is to be placed at the disposal - of the Polish nation as their reservation.” - -The speech of the Governor General ends two pages further. I quote the -last paragraph: - - “There is one thing I should like to tell you: The Führer has - urged me to guarantee the self-administration of the Poles as - far as possible. Under all circumstances they must be granted - the right to choose the Wojts and the minor mayors and village - magistrates from among the Poles, which would be to our interest - as well.” - -I now turn to the entry of 4 March 1940. From the volume of conferences, -February 1940 to November 1940, Page 8: - - “The Governor General submits for consideration the question of - whether a slight pressure could not be exerted through proper - use of the Compulsory Labor Order. He refuses to ask Berlin for - the promulgation of a new decree defining special measures for - the application of force and threats. Measures which might lead - to unrest should be avoided. The shipping of people by force has - nothing in its favor.” - -The last quotation in my document book is on Page 143. It is an entry -dated 27 January 1941, Volume I, Page 115. A conference between State -Secretary Dr. Bühler and the Reich Finance Minister, Count Schwerin von -Krosigk. I quote the last paragraph: - - “It is due to the efforts of all personnel employed in the - Government General that, after surmounting extraordinary and - unusual difficulties, a general improvement in the economic - situation can now be noted. The Government General, from the day - of its birth, has most conscientiously met the demands of the - Reich for strengthening the German war potential. It is, - therefore, permissible to ask that in future the Reich should - make no excessive demands on the Government General, so that a - sound and planned economy may be maintained in the Government - General, which, in turn, would prove of benefit to the Reich.” - -That completes Volume II of the document book. - -I now come to Volume III and I ask the Tribunal to refer to a quotation -on Page 17 in my document book. It is an entry following a government -meeting of 18 October 1941. I quote the eighth line from the bottom; it -is a statement of the Governor General: - - “I shall first of all state, when replying to these - demands”—that means, the demands of the Reich—“that our - strength has been exhausted and that we can no longer take any - responsibility as regards the Führer. No instructions, orders, - threats, _et cetera_, can induce me to answer anything but an - emphatic ‘no’ to demands which, even under the stress of wartime - conditions, are no longer tolerable. I will not permit a - situation to arise such as you, Mr. Naumann, so expressly - indicated, such as, for example, placing large areas at the - disposal of the troops for maneuvers and thus completely - disrupting the food supply which is already utterly - insufficient.” - -The next quotation is on Pages 36 and 37 of my document book. It is an -entry dated 16 January 1942, and the quotation to which I am referring -is on the next page—Pages 65 and 66 of the diary: - - “Later on a short discussion took place in the King’s Hall of - the Castle.” - -It took place with the chief of the Ukrainian committee. I quote: - - “The Governor General desires a larger employment of Ukrainians - in the administrative offices of the Government General. In all - offices in which Poles are employed there should also be - Ukrainians in proportion to the number of their population. He - asked Professor...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, if you will give us the page in your document -book now, that will be sufficient for the present, because they seem to -correspond. - -DR. SEIDL: Very well. May I continue, Mr. President? - -THE PRESIDENT: I think so, yes. - -DR. SEIDL: I then come to Page 38 in the document book. This entry deals -with a law drafted by Himmler, which has already been mentioned, -regarding the treatment of aliens in the community. I quote: - - “The Governor General orders the following letter to be sent to - Landgerichtsrat Taschner: - - “‘Please inform Reich Minister Dr. Lammers of my opinion which - follows with my signature certified by yourself: I am opposed to - the law on the treatment of people foreign to the German - community, and I request that an early date be set for a meeting - of leading officials with regard to the draft so that it may be - possible to set forth the principal legal viewpoints which today - still emphatically contradict this proposal in its details. I - shall personally attend this meeting. In my opinion it is - entirely impossible to circumvent the regular courts and to - transfer such far-reaching authority exclusively to police - organizations. The intended court at the Reich Security Main - Office cannot take the place of a regular court in the eyes of - the people.’” - -On Page 39 I quote the last paragraph but one: - - “For that reason I object to this draft in its present form, - especially with regard to Paragraph 1 of the decree concerning - the order of its execution.” - -Page 40 is an entry dated 7 June 1942 which also deals with that -question of denationalization so emphatically denied by the Governor -General. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. -The next quotation is on Page 47 and deals with the acquisition of -Chopin’s posthumous works. I quote Paragraph 2: - - “President Dr. Watzke reports that it would be possible to - procure in Paris the major part of Chopin’s posthumous wonks for - the State Library in Kraków. The Governor General approves of - the purchase of Chopin’s posthumous works through the government - of the Government General.” - -Page 50 deals with an entry in the diary which concerns the securing of -agricultural property. I quote Page 767 of the diary, Paragraph 2: - - “It is my aim to bring about agricultural reform in Galicia by - every possible means, even during the war. I thus have kept the - promises which I made a year ago in my proclamation to the - population of this territory. Further progress of a beneficial - nature can therefore result through the loyal co-operation of - the population with the German authorities. The German - administration in this area is willing, and has also been given - orders to treat the population well. It will protect the loyal - population of this area with the same decisive and fundamental - firmness with which it will suppress any attempt at resistance - against the order established by the Greater German Reich. For - this purpose, for the protection of the individual farmer, I - have issued an additional decree concerning the duties of the - German administration for food and agriculture in Galicia.” - -I turn to Page 55 of the document book. This concerns a speech, made by -the Governor General before the leaders of the Polish Delegation, and I -quote the last paragraph on Page 56, Line 6: - - “I hope that the new harvest will place us in a position to - assist the Polish Aid Committee. In any event we will do - whatever we can to check the crisis. It is also to our interest - that the Polish population should enjoy their work and - co-operate. We do not want to exterminate or annihilate - anybody...” - -Page 61 of the document book deals with a conference which the Governor -General held with the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of -Labor. I quote the last paragraph on Page 919 of the diary: - - “I would also like to take this opportunity of expressing to - you, Party Comrade Sauckel, our willingness to do everything - that is humanly possible. However, I should like to add one - request: The treatment of Polish workers in the Reich is still - subject to certain degrading restrictions.” - -I turn to Page 62 and quote Line 10: - - “I can assure you, Party Comrade Sauckel, that it would be a - tremendous help in recruiting workers, if at least part of the - degrading restrictions against the Poles in the Reich could be - abolished. I believe that could be effected.” - -I now turn to Page 66 of the document book. This is the only entry in -the diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank which he has signed personally. It -is a memorandum on the development in the Government General after he -had been relieved of all his positions in the Party, and had repeatedly -stated that he was resigning and hoped that now at last his resignation -would be accepted. - -I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this final survey, dated 1 -September 1942. It consists of five pages: Pages 66 to 71. - -The next quotation is on Page 75 and deals with the safeguarding of art -treasures. I quote the fifth line from the bottom. It is a statement -made by the Governor General: - - “The art treasures were carefully restored and cleaned, so that - approximately 90 percent of all the art treasures of the former - state of Poland in the territory of the Government General could - be made safe. These art treasures are entirely the property of - the Government General.” - -I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 92 of this volume. It is an entry -dated 8 December 1942, which was made on the occasion of a meeting of -departmental chiefs and which deals with the supply situation. - -I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of that entry. The same for -the entry on Page 93, in which the Governor General speaks of the -question of recruiting workers and most severely condemns all measures -of force. - -The next entry, which appears important to me and which should be read -into the record, is on Page 108. It concerns a press conference, and I -ask the Tribunal to turn directly to Page 110. I quote the third -paragraph: - - “The Governor General sums up the result of the conference and - states that, with the participation of the president of the - department for propaganda and the press chief of the Government, - all points will be comprised in a directive to be issued to all - leading editors of the Polish papers. Instructions for the - handling of matters concerning foreigners, in the press and in - the cultural field, will be included in this directive. The - conciliatory spirit of the Reich will serve as a model.” - -I now ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 127 of the document book, a -conference of 26 May 1943, which deals with the question of food. I -quote the eighth line: - - “We must understand that the first problem is the feeding of the - Polish population; but I would like to say, with complete - authority, that whatever happens with the coming rationing - period in the Government General, I shall, in any case, allot to - the largest possible number of the population such food rations - as we can justifiably afford in view of our commitments to the - Reich. Nothing and nobody will divert me from this goal...” - -Page 131 of the document book deals with a committee of the Governor -General for supplies for the non-German working population. I ask the -Tribunal to take judicial notice of these statements, and I now turn to -Page 141. This entry also deals with the food situation. I quote the -tenth line from the bottom: - - “After examining all possibilities I have now ordered that as - from 1 September of this year, the food situation of the Polish - population of this territory shall also be regulated on a - generous scale. By 1 September of this year we shall introduce, - for the population of this territory, the rations which are - called the ‘Warthegau rations.’” - -I ask permission to quote a few sentences from Page 142: - - “I should like to make a statement to you now. From the - seriousness with which I utter these words, you can judge what I - have in mind. I myself and the men of my Government are fully - aware of the needs also of the Polish population in this - district. We are not here to exterminate or annihilate it, or to - torment these people beyond the measure of suffering laid upon - them by fate. I hope that we shall come to a satisfactory - arrangement in all matters that sometimes separate us. I - personally have nothing against the Poles...” - -I now turn to Page 148. It is a conference which deals with young -medical students. I quote Page 149, Paragraph 2, which is a statement by -the Governor General: - - “This first—we can safely call it Ministry of Health, even - though this expression is not used—is something entirely new. - This department for health will have to deal with important - problems. For us, the physicians in this territory, there is - above all a lack of...” - -Mr. President, I have just discovered that an error may possibly have -occurred, since these statements on Page 672 were perhaps not made by -the Governor General himself but by the head of the Health Department. I -shall examine this question again and then submit the result to the -Tribunal in writing. - -I now turn to Page 155 of the document book. This entry seems to me of a -vital nature. It is dated 14 July 1943 and deals with the establishment -of the State Secretariat for Security. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is not in our book, apparently. We haven’t got a Page -155, and we haven’t got a date, I think, of the 14th of July. - -DR. SEIDL: It is July 1943. It has probably been omitted. With the -approval of the Tribunal I shall read the sentences in question into the -record. There are only three sentences: - - “The Governor General points out the disastrous effect which the - establishment of the State Secretariat for Security has had on - the authority of the Governor General. He said that a new police - and SS government had tried to establish itself in opposition to - the Governor General which it had been possible to suppress only - at the expense of a great deal of energy and at the very last - moment.” - -I then ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 166 of the document book. This -entry deals with general questions regarding the policy in Poland. I ask -the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. - -Page 193 deals with the establishment of the Chopin Museum which was -created by the Governor General. I quote Page 1157 of the diary, which -is an extract from the Governor General’s speech: - - “Today I have inaugurated the Chopin Museum in Kraków. We have - saved and brought to Kraków, under most difficult circumstances, - the most valuable mementos of the greatest of Polish musicians. - I merely wanted to say this in order to show you that I want to - make a personal effort to put things in order in this country as - far as possible.” - -The last quotation is on Page 199 of Volume II of the document book. It -is an extract from a speech which Reichsführer SS Himmler made on the -occasion of the installation of the new Higher SS and Police Leader in -Kraków, before the members of the Government and the Higher SS and -Police Leaders. This is the speech which the Defendant Frank mentioned -when he was examined. I quote the eighth line from the bottom: - - “You are all very familiar with the situation: 16 million aliens - and about 200,000 Germans live here; or if we include the - members of the Police and Wehrmacht, perhaps 300,000. These 16 - million aliens, who were augmented in the past by a large number - of Jews who have now emigrated or have been sent to the East, - consist largely of Poles and to a lesser degree of Ukrainians.” - -I turn to the last document of this volume, Page 200, an entry dated 14 -December 1943. It concerns a speech which the Governor General made to -officers of the Air Force. I quote the second paragraph: - - “Therefore, everything should be done to keep the population - quiet, peaceful, and in order. Nothing should be done to create - unnecessary agitation among the population. I mention only one - example here: - - “It would be wrong if now, during the war, we were to undertake - the establishment of large German settlements among the - peasantry in this territory. This attempt at colonizing, mostly - through force, would lead to tremendous unrest among the native - peasant population. This, in turn, from the point of view of - production, would result in a tremendous loss to the harvest, in - a curtailment of cultivation, and so on. It would also be wrong - forcibly to deprive the population of its Church, or of any - possibility for leading a simple cultural life.” - -I turn to Page 201, and I quote the last paragraph: - - “We must take care of these territories and their population. I - have found, to my pleasure and that of all of our colleagues, - that this point of view has prevailed and that everything that - was formerly said against the alleged friendship with the Poles - or the weakness of this attitude, has dwindled to nothing in - face of the facts.” - -That completes Volume II of the document book—I beg your pardon, I -meant Volume III. Now I come to Volume IV of the document book. - -Page 1 of the document book deals with a conversation which took place -on 25 January 1943 with the SS Obergruppenführer Krüger. I quote the -last paragraph: - - “The Governor General states that he had not been previously - informed about the large-scale action to seize asocial elements - and that this procedure was in opposition to the Führer’s decree - of 7 May 1942, according to which the State Secretary for - Security must obtain the approval of the Governor General before - carrying out instructions by the Reichsführer SS and Chief of - the German Police. State Secretary Krüger states that this - concerned secret instructions which had to be carried out - suddenly.” - -I ask the Tribunal to take cognizance of the fact that this is merely an -example of many similar discussions and differences of opinion. - -I now turn to Page 24 of the document book. This concerns a meeting of -the War Economy Staff and the Defense Committee on 22 September 1943. I -hope that the pages tally again. - -THE PRESIDENT: You said Page 24, didn’t you? - -DR. SEIDL: Page 24, an entry of 22 September 1943. - -THE PRESIDENT: It looks as though the paging is right. Our book is Page -24 at the top, so perhaps you will continue to quote the page for a -moment or two. We will see whether it goes on right. - -DR. SEIDL: This concerns an entry dated 22 September 1943, a meeting of -the War Economy Staff and the Defense Committee. I quote only the first -lines: - - “In the course of the past few months, in the face of the most - difficult and senseless struggles, I have had to insist on the - principle that the Poles should, at last, be given a sufficient - quantity of food. You all know the foolish attitude of - considering the nations we have conquered as inferior to us, and - that at a moment when the labor potential of these peoples - represents one of the most important factors in our fight for - victory. By my opposition to this absurdity, which has caused - most grievous harm to the German people, I personally—and many - men of my government and many of you—have incurred the charge - of being friendly or soft towards the Poles. - - “For years now people have not hesitated to attack my government - of this area with the foulest arguments of this kind, and behind - my back have hindered the fulfillment of these tasks. Now it has - been proved as clear as day that it is insane to want to - reconstruct Europe and at the same time to persecute the - European nations with such unparalleled chicanery.” - -I now turn to Page 34 of the document book, an entry dated 20 April -1943, concerning a government meeting. I ask the Tribunal to take -judicial notice of the final words only of the Governor General’s speech -on Page 38 of the document book and Page 41 of the diary. Then I turn to -Page 39 of the document book, a meeting of 22 July 1943; I quote from -the second paragraph, the tenth line: - - “The question of the resettlement was altogether particularly - difficult for us in this year. I can give you the good news that - resettlement in general has been completely discontinued for the - duration of the war. With regard to the transferring of - industries, we have just started to work at full speed. As you - know—I personally attach great importance to it—we have to - satisfy this need of the Reich, and in the coming months we - shall install great industrial concerns of international renown - in the Government General. - - “However, with regard to this question we must consider the - almost complete reconstruction of the Government General which - has consequently been forced upon us. While, until now, we have - always figured as a country supplying the Reich with labor, as - an agricultural country, and the granary of Europe, we shall - within a very short time become one of the most important - industrial centers of Europe. I remind you of such names as - Krupp, Heinkel, Henschel, whose industries will be moved into - the Government General.” - -I now ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 41 of the document book. It is -the statement which was made by the witness Doctor Bühler on 26 October -1943, in which he states that this report dealt with 4 years of -reconstruction in the Government General on the basis of reliable -information from the 13 chief departments. The statement includes Pages -42 to 69 of the document book. I do not propose to quote from this -statement, but I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. - -I go straight on to Page 70 of the document book, which concerns a -government meeting dated 16 February 1944. I quote the last paragraph, -Page 4 of the document book. - - “As opposed to this, the fact must be established that the - development, construction, and securing of that which today - gives this territory its importance were possible only because - it was necessary, in opposition to the ideas of the advocates of - brute force—so completely untimely during a war—to bring the - human and material resources of this area into the service of - the German war effort in as constructive a manner as possible.” - -The next quotation is Page 74; an entry dated 6 March 1944. I quote the -last paragraph on Page 75, Page 5 of the diary: - - “The Governor General does not, as a matter of principle, oppose - the training of the younger generation for the priesthood - because, if courses for doctors, _et cetera_, are arranged, - similar opportunities must also be created in the field of - religion.” - -Page 77 deals with an order by the Governor General prohibiting the -evacuation of the population, or a part of it, which was in the fighting -zone near Lublin. - -On Page 80 is an entry dated 12 April 1944. I quote the second -paragraph: - - “In this connection President Gerteis spoke of the treatment of - the Poles in the Reich. This treatment, said to be worse than - that of any other foreign workers, had led to the result that - practically no Poles would volunteer any more for work in - Germany. - - “There were 21 points on which the Polish workers in the Reich - were more badly treated than any other foreign workers. The - Governor General requested President Gerteis to acquaint him - with these 21 points which he would certainly attempt to have - abolished.” - -I now ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 100 of the document book. It -concerns a conference on 6 June 1944 regarding a large-scale action -against the partisans in the Bilgoraje Forest. I quote Page 101, Page 4 -of the diary: - - “The Governor General wants to be quite sure that protection is - given to the harmless population, which is itself suffering - under the partisan terror.” - -Page 102 deals with the views of the Governor General on concentration -camps. It is an entry dated 6 June 1944. I quote the last paragraph: - - “The Governor General declared that he would never sign such a - decree, since it meant sending the person concerned to a - concentration camp. He stated that he had always protested with - the utmost vigor against the system of concentration camps, for - it was the greatest offense against the sense of justice. He had - thought there would be no concentration camps for such matters, - but they had apparently been silently put into operation. It - could only be handled in such a manner that the persons - condemned would be pardoned to jail or prison for a certain - number of years. He pointed out that prison sentences, for - instance, were imposed and examined by state institutions. He - therefore requested that State Secretary Dr. Bühler should be - informed that he, the Governor General, would not sign such - decrees. He did not wish concentration camps to be officially - sanctioned. He went on to say that there was no pardon which - would commute a sentence into commitment to a concentration - camp. The courts-martial are state legal organs of a special - character and consist of police units; actually they should - normally be staffed by members of the Wehrmacht.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, can you explain the translation of the words -at the bottom of Page 102 which are in English, “It only could be -handled in such a manner that the persons would be pardoned to jail or -prison for a certain number of years.” Can you explain that from the -point of view of meaning? - -DR. SEIDL: The meaning of the words becomes clear from the statement -made by President Wille in the previous paragraph where, among others, -you will find the following statement. It is the tenth line from the -top. - - “The Reprieve Commission had asked the representative of the - Chief of the Security Police, who was present at the session, in - what form this pardon was to be effected. As far as he knew, - remittance of a sentence had been allowed in one case only. In - all other cases it was customary to couple Security Police - measures with the remittance of a sentence. It was feared that - otherwise these people might disappear.” - -Now the Governor General was of the opinion that, for example, to -transmute a death sentence to a term in prison or penitentiary was -possible but that he would have to refuse direct commutation of a death -penalty into a suspended prison penalty if the Police in that event were -to impose security measures. - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean that it meant that pardon from a death sentence -might be made by a reprieve for a sentence in prison for a certain -number of years, but not by sending to a concentration camp, which would -be for an indefinite period and under police methods? - -DR. SEIDL: Yes, that is the sense of it. - -I now turn to Page 104 of the document book. This quotation also deals -with the general question of treatment of the population in the -Government General. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you have been very much longer than you said, -and the Tribunal thinks you might be able to cut down a great deal of -this. It is all very much on the same lines. - -DR. SEIDL: Yes. In that case, I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 112 of -the document book, an entry dated 10 July 1944. This entry deals with -the official control of art treasures. I quote the second paragraph: - - “The Governor General instructs the expert Palezieux to have a - complete index made of these art treasures.” - -THE PRESIDENT: You have already told us and given us some evidence to -support the view that the Defendant Frank was preserving the art -treasures and was wishing them to be preserved in Poland, and it is not -necessary under those circumstances to go reading passages about it. - -DR. SEIDL: Very well. Then I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of -that entry; and if the Tribunal agrees, I shall merely give you the -pages of the documents in the document book which appear important to -me. That is page... - -[_The proceedings were interrupted by technical difficulties in the -interpreting system._] - -Gentlemen of the Tribunal, if the Court is agreeable I should like to -give only the numbers of the pages of Volume IV of the document book -which seem particularly important to me. These are the Pages 115, 121, -123, 134, 139, 152, and 182. That concludes Volume IV of the document -book and I come to the last volume of the document book which will be -finished considerably faster. - -Volume V deals exclusively with the accusations made by the Prosecution -of the United States against the Defendant Frank concerning his activity -as President of the Academy for German Law, as President of the National -Socialist Lawyers’ Association, and similar positions. Page 1 is a -document which has already been submitted by the Prosecution, 1391-PS. -It still has no USA number and will be Exhibit Number Frank-11. It is -the law regarding the Academy for German Law with the necessary statutes -and the tasks resulting therefrom. - -I turn to page 25 of the document book. This quotation becomes Exhibit -Frank-12 (Document Number Frank-12). It deals with a sentence which has -been ascribed to the defendant: “Right is that which is good for the -people.” This quotation should prove only that the Defendant Dr. Frank -wanted to express nothing more than that which is implied in the Roman -sentence: _Salus publica suprema lex_ (The supreme law is the welfare of -the people). I ask the Court to take cognizance of this and turn to Page -26 of the document book, an excerpt from the magazine of the Academy for -German Law of 1938. That will be Exhibit Frank-13 (Document Number -Frank-13). This quotation also deals with the afore-mentioned sentence: -“Right is that which is good for the people.” - -Page 30 is an excerpt from Exhibit USA-670 (Document Number 3459-PS) and -deals with the closing celebration of the “Congress of German Law 1939” -at Leipzig, where the Defendant Dr. Frank made the concluding speech -before 25,000 lawyers. I quote on Page 31, Line 10 from the bottom: - - “Only by applying legal security methods, by administering true - justice, and by clearly following the legislative ideal of law - can the national community continue to exist. This legal method - which permanently ensures the fulfillment of the tasks of the - community has been assigned to you, fellow guardians of the law, - as your mission. Ancient Germanic principles have come down to - us through the centuries. - - “1) No one shall be judged who has not had the opportunity to - defend himself. - - “2) No one shall be deprived of the incontestable rights which - he enjoys as a member of the national community, except by - decision of the judge. Honor, liberty, life, the profits of - labor are among those rights. - - “3) Regardless of the nature of the proceedings, the reasons for - the indictment, or the law which is applied, everyone who is - under indictment must be given the opportunity to have a defense - counsel who can make legal statements for him; he must be given - a legal and impartial hearing.” - -I turn to Page 35 of the document book, which deals with a speech, an -address by the Defendant Dr. Frank, made at a meeting of the heads of -the departments of the National Socialist Lawyer’s Association on 19 -November 1941. The speech—that is, the excerpt—becomes Exhibit Number -Frank-14 (Document Number Frank-14). I quote only a few sentences at the -top of Page 37. - - “Therefore, it is a very serious task which we have imposed upon - ourselves and we must always bear in mind that it can be - fulfilled only with courage and absolute readiness for - self-sacrifice. I observe the developments with great attention. - I watch every anti-juridical tendency. I know only too well from - history—as you all do—of the attempts made to gain - ever-increasing power in general directions because one has - weapons with which one can shoot, and authority on the basis of - which one can make people who have been arrested disappear. In - the first place, I mean by this not only the attempts made by - the SS, the SD, and by the police headquarters, but the attempts - of many other offices of the State and the Reich to exclude - themselves from general jurisdiction.” - -I turn to—I would like to quote the last five lines on Page 41. Those -were the last words spoken during that session: - - “One cannot debase law to an article of merchandise; one cannot - sell it; it exists or it does not exist. Law is not an exchange - commodity. If justice is not supported, the State loses its - moral foundation; it sinks into the abyss of darkness and - horror.” - -The next document is on Page 42. It is the first address which the -Defendant Dr. Frank made in Berlin at the university on 8 June 1942. It -will be Exhibit Number Frank-15 (Document Number Frank-15). I quote Page -44, second paragraph, seventh line: - - “On the other hand, however, a member of the community cannot be - deprived of honor, liberty, life, and property; he cannot be - expelled and condemned without first being able to defend - himself against the charges brought against him. The Armed - Forces serve us as a model in this respect. There everyone is a - free, honored member of the community, with equal rights, until - a judge—standing independently above him—has weighed and - judged between indictment and defense.” - -I then turn to Page 49 of the document book, the second of these four -long speeches. It was held in Vienna, and will become Exhibit Number -Frank-15. - -THE PRESIDENT: We have already had Exhibit Frank-15 on Page 41. - -DR. SEIDL: No, I beg your pardon, Mr. President; it will be Frank-16 -(Document Number Frank-16). I quote only one sentence on Page 51. - - “I shall continue to repeat with all the strength of my - conviction that it would be an evil thing if ideals advocating a - police state were to be presented as distinct National Socialist - ideals, while old Germanic ideals of law fell entirely into the - background.” - -Now I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 57 of the document book to the -speech made by the Defendant Dr. Frank at the University of Munich, on -20 July 1942. This will be Exhibit Frank-17 (Document Number Frank-17). -I quote on Page 58, Line 16: - - “It is, however, impossible to talk about a national community - and still regard the servants of the law as excluded from this - national community, and throw mud at them in the midst of the - war. The Führer has transferred the tasks of the Reich Leader of - the Reich Legal Office and that of the leader of the National - Socialist Lawyers’ Association to me, and therefore it is my - duty to state that it is detrimental to the German national - community if in the ‘Black Corps’ lawyers are called - ‘sewer-rats.’” - -I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 67 of the document book. That is the -speech which he made at Heidelberg on 21 July 1942. That will be Exhibit -Frank-18 (Document Number Frank-18). I ask the Tribunal to take official -notice of that speech. On Page 69 I quote only one sentence: “But never -must there be a police state, never. That I oppose.” - -I now come to the last document which the Prosecution of the United -States has already submitted under Exhibit Number USA-607 (Document -Number 2233(x)-PS), an excerpt from the diary: “Concluding reflections -on the events of the last three months.” - -In these reflections Dr. Frank once more definitely states his attitude -towards the concept of the legal state, and I ask the Tribunal to take -cognizance particularly of his basic assumptions on Pages 74 and 75 of -the document book. Here, Dr. Frank again formulated the prerequisites -which he considered necessary for the existence of any legal state. I -quote only a few lines from Page 74: - - “1) No fellow German can be convicted without regular court - procedure, and only on the basis of a law in effect before the - act was committed. - - “2) The proceedings must carry full guarantee that the accused - will be interrogated on all matters pertaining to the - indictment, and that he will be able to speak freely. - - “3) The accused must have the opportunity, at all stages of the - trial, to avail himself of the services of defense counsel - acquainted with the law. - - “4) The defense counsel must have complete freedom of action and - independence in carrying out his office in order to strike an - even balance between the State prosecutor and the defendant. - - “5) The judge or the court must make his or its decision quite - independently—that is, the verdict must not be influenced by - any irrelevant factors—in logical consideration of the subject - matter and in just application of the purport of the law. - - “6) When the penalty imposed by the sentence has been paid, the - act has been expiated. - - “7) Measures for protective custody and security custody may not - be undertaken or carried out by police organs, nor may measures - for the punishment of concentration camp inmates, except from - this aspect, that is, after confirmation of the intended - measures by regular, independent judges. - - “8) In the same manner, the administration of justice for fellow - Germans must guarantee full safeguarding of individual interests - in all relations pertaining to civil suits proper.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, are there any passages in these documents -which express the opinion that the same principles ought to be applied -to others than fellow Germans? - -DR. SEIDL: In this last quotation the Defendant Dr. Frank dealt -basically with questions of law without making any difference here -between Germans and people of foreign nationality. However, in his -capacity as Governor General he also fundamentally objected at all times -to the transfer of Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews to concentration camps. -This can be seen from a whole series of entries in the diary. - -With this I have come to the end of my evidence for Dr. Frank. There are -left only the answers to interrogatories by witnesses whose -interrogation before a commission has been approved by the Court. At a -later date I shall compile these interrogations in a small document book -and submit the translation thereof to the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: You are speaking of interrogatories where you have not -yet got the answers; is that right? - -DR. SEIDL: These are interrogatories to which the answers have not yet -been received. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, as soon as you have received them you will -furnish them to the Prosecution and to the Tribunal? - -DR. SEIDL: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker. - -DR. OTTO PANNENBECKER (Counsel for Defendant Frick): In presenting -evidence for the Defendant Frick, I shall forego calling the defendant -himself as a witness. The questions which require an explanation deal -mainly with problems relating to formal authority and also with problems -which differentiate between formal authority and actual responsibility. -These are problems, part of which have already been elucidated by the -interrogation of Dr. Lammers and the rest of which will be cleared up by -the submission of documents. One special field, however, cannot be -entirely clarified by documents; and that is the question of the actual -distribution of authority within the sphere of the Police; but for that -special field I have named the witness Dr. Gisevius. He is the only -witness whose interrogation seems to be necessary for the presentation -of evidence in the case of Frick. Therefore, in the meantime, I have -dispensed with other witnesses. - -I ask the Court to decide whether I should call the witness Dr. Gisevius -first or whether I should submit my documents first. If documents are to -be presented first, I believe that I could finish by the midday recess. - -THE PRESIDENT: You can finish your documents before the adjournment, do -you mean? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. I believe so. - -THE PRESIDENT: Until 1:00 o’clock? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you indifferent whether you call the witness first or -whether you present the documents first? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that perhaps it would be more -convenient to give the documents first. They hope that you will be able -to finish them reasonably quickly. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. - -Numbers 1, 2, and 3 of the document book (Documents Number 386-PS, L-79, -and 3726-PS) deal with evidence concerning the question of whether the -members of the Reich Cabinet knew about Hitler’s preparation for -aggressive war. I need not read the documents; they have already been -submitted, and they show that Hitler gave information of his plans for -aggression only to those of his assistants who had to know of these -plans for their own work, but did not inform Frick who, as Minister of -the Interior, was responsible for the internal policy. - -Within the scope of the war preparation, Frick was made Plenipotentiary -for Reich Administration by the Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938, -which has already been submitted, Exhibit Number USA-36 (Document Number -2194-PS). This law does not indicate that this position had anything to -do with the known preparation of an aggressive war; it shows only the -participation of the Administration of the Interior in a general -preparation and organization in the event of a future war. I have -therefore included in the document book an excerpt from this law under -Number 4 of the document book, in order to correct an error. The -Defendant Frick himself stated in an affidavit on 14 November 1945, that -he had held the position of Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration -from 21 May 1935. This is the date of the first Reich Defense Law, which -has already been submitted as Exhibit Number USA-24 (Document 2261-PS). -The first Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, however, does not provide -for the position of Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration; that is -contained only in the second law of 4 September 1938. - -This second law has been submitted under Exhibit Number USA-36. -Following this erroneous statement which the Defendant Frick made -without having the two laws on hand, the Prosecution has also stated -that Frick held the position of Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration -from 21 May 1935, while actually he held it only from 4 September 1938, -that is, the date of the second law. - -Numbers 5 and 6 of the document book have already been submitted by the -Prosecution. They also prove nothing except the participation of the -Defendant Frick in the establishment of civil administration with a view -to a possible future war. It is not necessary to read this either. - -The Prosecution considers Hitler’s aggressive intentions to be so well -known and so obvious as to require no further proof. The Prosecution on -that assumption came to the conclusion that participation in the -National Socialist Government, in any field whatsoever, would in itself -imply the conscious support of aggressive war. In opposition to that I -have referred to evidence in documents from Number 7 to 10 inclusive of -the Frick document book (Documents Number 2288-PS, 2292-PS, 2289-PS, and -3729-PS) which have already been submitted by the Prosecution and which -show that Hitler in public, as well as in private conversations, from -the time he came into power followed a definite policy of declaring his -peaceful intentions—a policy, therefore, which for considered reasons, -declared to all that to keep peace was right. - -I believe that these documents, which have already been submitted to the -Tribunal, must also be considered in order to decide whether or not -Hitler’s official policy, since his coming to power, indicated that he -had intentions of waging aggressive war. As evidence in that direction, -I should like to submit Number 11 and Number 12 of the document book, -which have not been presented until now, and which I will submit as -Documents Frick-1 and -2. - -The first is a telegram of 8 March 1936 from Cardinal Archbishop Schulte -to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces at the time of the -occupation of the Rhineland in 1936. The second document is a solemn -declaration by the Austrian bishops occasioned by the annexation of -Austria in March 1938. - -The first document states, and I quote: - - “Cardinal Archbishop Schulte has sent to General Von Blomberg, - the Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces, a telegram in - which, at the memorable hour when the Armed Forces of the Reich - are re-entering the German Rhineland as the guardians of peace - and order, he greets the soldiers of our nation with deep - emotion mindful of the magnificent example of self-sacrificing - love of fatherland, stern manly discipline, and upright fear of - God, which our Army has always given to the world.” - -I particularly selected these two documents because the Catholic Church -is not suspected of sanctioning aggressive wars, or of approving of -Hitler’s criminal intentions in any other way. These statements would -have been unthinkable if the accusations of the Prosecution were true, -namely, that the criminal aims of Hitler and particularly his aggressive -intentions had been known. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, the Tribunal would like to know what is -the source of this telegram from the Archbishop, Number Frick-11. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: I took the telegram, Number Frick-11, from the -_Völkischer Beobachter_ of 9 March 1936. - -THE PRESIDENT: And the other one? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: The other document is from the _Völkischer Beobachter_ -of 28 March 1938. - -Number 13 of the document book contains only one sentence, taken from a -speech made by Frick, from which it is evident that Frick shared the -same opinion. He states in this speech, and I quote: - - “The national revolution is the expression of the will to - eliminate by legal means every form of external and internal - foreign domination.” - -THE PRESIDENT: You gave that the number 13, did you? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. That should be 3. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes, that is what I wanted to say. I submit it as -Document Number Frick-3. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: The Defendant Frick has been accused particularly of -working for the League for Germans Abroad. The Prosecution saw in this -activity a contribution by the Defendant Frick to the preparation of -aggressive wars. Frick’s actual attitude regarding the aims of the -League for Germans Abroad can be seen from Number 14, which will be -Document Number Frick-4. In a speech made by Frick, it states, and I -quote: - - “The VDA (League for Germans Abroad) has nothing to do with - political aims or with frontier questions; it is, and is - intended to be, nothing more than a rallying point for German - cultural activities...the world over.” - -In Number 15, which is Exhibit Frick-5... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, I perhaps ought to say that in the -index of this document book it looks as though the exhibit numbers were -the numbers of the documents in the order in which they are put in the -book, but that will not be so. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: No, it will not be so. - -THE PRESIDENT: That last document which you just put in as Exhibit -Number 4 is shown in the book to be Exhibit Number 14, which is a -mistake. It is Document Number 14, but not Exhibit Number 14. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Number 14 of the document book, Exhibit Number Frick-4 -(Document Number Frick-4). - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Dealing with the same subject I have entered in Number -15, Exhibit Number Frick-5 (Document Number 3358-PS), a decree of the -Reich Minister of the Interior of 24 February 1933, which also deals -with the question of the work of the League for Germans Abroad. It -states, and I quote... - -THE PRESIDENT: Has that not already been put in? I see it has a PS -number. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: It has a PS number, but it was not then submitted as -evidence by the Prosecution. Therefore I quote: - - “The suffering and misery of the times, the lack of work and - food within Germany, cannot divert attention from the fact that - about 30 million Germans, living outside of the present - contracted borders of the Reich, are an integral part of the - entire German people; an integral part, which the Reich - Government is not able to help economically but to which it - considers itself under an obligation to offer cultural support - through the organization primarily concerned with this task—the - League of Germans Abroad.” - -In the documents from Number 16 to 24 inclusive of the document book, -which I need not read in detail, I have placed together the legal -decrees which deal with the competence of the Reich Ministry of the -Interior as a central office for certain occupied territories. The tasks -of this central office, which had no authority to issue orders and no -executive authority in any occupied territories, have already been -described by the witness Dr. Lammers; and these tasks are specially -entered in Number 24 of the document book. I do not need to submit it in -evidence. It is an official publication of the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ and -has, in addition, already been submitted as 3082-PS. In accordance with -the fact that the central office had no authority to issue orders in the -occupied territories, there is in the diary of Dr. Frank a confirmation -that the Governor General alone had authority to issue orders for the -administration of his territory. I do not need to quote this passage as -it has already been submitted to the Tribunal. - -Police authority in the occupied territories was transferred to -Reichsführer SS Himmler; but Frick as Reich Minister of the Interior had -nothing to do with this either, since that authority was vested -exclusively in Himmler in his capacity as Reichsführer SS. That can be -seen from Number 26 of the document book, which also already has been -submitted as Exhibit USA-319 (Document Number 1997-PS). - -The Prosecution further considers the Defendant Frick responsible for -the crimes committed in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia since -August 1943, on the grounds that Frick had been Reich Protector in -Bohemia and Moravia since August 1943. In this connection, I refer to -Numbers 28 and 29 of the document book (Documents Number 1366-PS and -3443-PS), from which it is evident that, at the time that Frick was -appointed, the former powers of the Reich Protector had been subdivided -between a so-called German State Minister in Bohemia and Moravia—who, -under the immediate supervision of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, had -to manage all government affairs—and the Reich Protector Frick who was -given some special powers and in principle had the right to grant -reprieves on sentences passed by the local courts. - -Frick has also been accused of being responsible for the Political -Police, that is, the Secret State Police, and the concentration camps. -Until 1936 police matters were the affair of the individual states in -Germany; consequently in Prussia, Göring as Prussian Prime Minister, and -Prussian Minister of the Interior, built up the Political Police and -established the concentration camps. Frick, therefore, as Reich Minister -of the Interior, had no connection with these things. - -In the spring of 1934 Frick also became Prussian Minister of the -Interior. Previously, however, Göring had by a special law taken the -affairs of the Political Police out of the jurisdiction of the office of -the Prussian Minister of the Interior and placed it under the immediate -supervision of the Prime Minister, an office which Göring retained for -himself. - -The corresponding decrees have already been submitted by the Prosecution -as Documents Number 2104-PS, 2105-PS, and 2113-PS. - -The same is evident from Document Number 30 in the document book, which -has also been submitted as Exhibit USA-233 (Document Number 2344-PS). - -Thus, in the Political Police sphere, Frick, until 1936, had only a -general right of supervision, such as the Reich had over the individual -states. He had, however, no special right of command in individual -cases, only the authority to issue general directives; and in Numbers -31-33 of the document book I have entered a few of these directives -issued by Frick. - -I quote Number 31, which will be Exhibit Frick-6 (Document Number -779-PS): - - “In order to correct the abuses resulting from the decree for - protective custody, the Reich Minister of the Interior, in his - directives of 12 April 1934 to the Land governments and - Reichsstatthalter anent the promulgation and execution of - decrees for protective custody, has determined that protective - custody may be ordered only: (a) for the protection of the - arrested person; (b) if the arrested person by his behavior, and - especially by activities directed against the State, has - directly endangered public security and order. Therefore, - protective custody is not permissible when the above-mentioned - cases do not apply, especially (a) for persons who merely - exercise their public and civil rights; (b) for lawyers for - representing the interests of their clients; (c) in the case of - personal matters, as for instance, insults; (d) because of - economic measures (questions of salary, dismissal of employees, - and similar cases). - - “Furthermore, protective custody is not permissible as a - countermeasure for punishable actions, for the courts are - competent to deal with those cases.” - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of that? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: It is a document which the Prosecution has submitted -as 779-PS and which was taken from the files of the ministry. There is -no date on the document but it must have been in the spring of 1934, as -can be seen from the first sentence of the document. The _Völkischer -Beobachter_ mentions the same decree in its issue of 14 April 1934. I -have included that as Number 32 in the document book; it will be Exhibit -Frick-7 (Document Number Frick-7). - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, are you offering that as an exhibit or -has it already been put in evidence? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: No, it has not, as yet, been submitted. I offer it as -Exhibit Number Frick-7. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am told the date is April 12. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: In the spring of 1934, yes, shortly after. - -THE PRESIDENT: 12th of April, 1934. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. - -The _Völkischer Beobachter_ also mentions this decree in its issue of 14 -April 1934. We are concerned with Document 32 of the document book, -which will be Exhibit Number Frick-7. I do not need to read it in -detail. - -The same is evident from Number 33 of the book, which will be Exhibit -Number Frick-8 (Document Number I-302). - -Number 34 of the book—which will be Exhibit Number Frick-9 (Document -Number 775-PS) shows that the Gestapo actually did not adhere to Frick’s -directives, and that Frick was powerless in that connection. -Nevertheless, the document appears important to me because it shows that -Frick tried repeatedly with great pains to counteract the abuses of the -Gestapo, which, however, with the support of Himmler, was stronger than -he—especially since Himmler enjoyed the direct confidence of the -Führer. - -On 17 June 1936, the affairs of the Political Police came under the -jurisdiction of the Reich. Himmler was appointed Chief of the German -Police and, though formally attached to the Reich Ministry of the -Interior, he functioned, in fact, as an independent Police Ministry -under the immediate authority of Hitler; and, as a minister, he was -privileged to look after his affairs in the Reich Cabinet himself. - -This can be seen from Document Number 35 of the document book—an -excerpt from the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ which has been submitted as -2073-PS. I do not believe that I have to give it an exhibit number; it -is an official announcement in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_. - -In this connection the Prosecution has submitted Document 1723-PS as -Exhibit USA-206. I have entered an extract from this document as Number -36 in the document book in order to correct an error. The document is an -extract from a book written by Dr. Ley in his capacity as Reich -Organization Leader. In that book Dr. Ley gives directives to the Party -offices regarding co-operation with the Gestapo, and at the end of the -extract Ley reprinted a decree by Frick which shows how Frick attempted -to counteract the arbitrary measures of the Gestapo. - -However, in presenting evidence on the morning of 13 December 1945, the -Prosecution read the entire document as an order by Frick. I should -therefore like to correct that error. - -Since Himmler and the chiefs of the Gestapo did not heed Frick’s general -directives, Frick tried, at least in individual cases, to alleviate -conditions in concentration camps; but generally he was not successful. -To quote an example, I have included—under Number 37 of the document -book—a letter by the former Reichstag Delegate Wulle, which he sent to -me of his own accord. This letter will be Exhibit Number Frick-10 -(Document Number Frick-10). The letter states, and I quote: - - “He”—Frick—“as my former counsel told me, has at various times - tried to persuade Hitler to release me; but without success as - it was Himmler who made all decisions regarding concentration - camps. However, I owe it to him that I have been treated in a - comparatively decent manner at the Sachsenhausen Concentration - Camp... He stood out from among the Nazi demagogues because of - his impartiality and reserve; he was a man who by nature - disapproved of any act of violence... Since the spring of 1925 I - have been involved in a sharp struggle against Hitler and his - party. I consider it even more to Frick’s credit that despite - this antagonism and his comparatively powerless position with - respect to Himmler, he tried in every way to help my wife and me - during the bitter years of my imprisonment in the concentration - camp...” - -The Prosecution has asserted, on the basis of the statements made by the -witness Blaha before this Tribunal, that Frick knew of the conditions in -the Dachau concentration camp through having visited it in the first -half of the year 1944. - -Therefore, with the permission of the Tribunal I submitted an -interrogatory to the witness Gillhuber, who accompanied Frick on all his -trips and... - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment, Dr. Pannenbecker. The Tribunal considers -that it cannot entertain an affidavit upon oath from the Defendant -Frick, who is not going into the witness box to give evidence on oath, -unless he is offered as a witness, in which case he may be -cross-examined. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes, but the last document was not an affidavit by -Frick, but by Gillhuber, a witness, who has received an interrogatory. -It is Number 40 of the document book. I am just informed that by an -oversight this exhibit has not been included in the book; I shall have -to submit it later. - -THE PRESIDENT: Oh, well! Tell us what it is. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: It is an interrogatory of, and the answers by, the -witness Gillhuber. Gillhuber, for the personal protection of the -Defendant Frick, accompanied him on all his official travels. In -answering the interrogatory, he confirmed the fact that Frick had never -visited the camp. The interrogatory, with the answers, has still to be -submitted in translation. It is contained in my book. - -THE PRESIDENT: You may read the interrogatory, unless the Prosecution -has any objection to its admissibility, or the terms of it, because the -interrogatory has already been provisionally allowed. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: I read, then, from Number 40 of the Frick document -book, which becomes Exhibit Frick-11 (Document Number Frick-11), the -following: - - “Question: From when until when, and in what capacity, were you - working for the Defendant Frick? - - “Answer: From the 18 March 1936 until the arrival of the Allied - Troops on 29 or 30 April 1945, as an employee of the Reich - Security Service, as guard and escort. - - “Question: Did you always accompany him on his travels for his - personal protection? - - “Answer: From 1936 until January 1942 only intermittently, but - from January 1942 as office chief, I accompanied him on all his - trips and flights. - - “Question: Do you know whether the Defendant Frick visited the - concentration camp of Dachau during the first six months of - 1944? - - “Answer: To my knowledge, Frick did not visit the Dachau - concentration camp. - - “Question: Would you have known it had that been the case, and - why would you have known it? - - “Answer: I would have had to know it had that been the case. I - was always close to him; and my employees would have reported it - if he had left during my absence. - - “Question: Do you still have the log book of the trips you made, - and can you produce it now? - - “Answer: From about 1941 log books were no longer kept. Instead - of that, monthly reports of trips were sent to the Reich - Security Service in Berlin. The copies which were kept in my - office were, according to orders, burned with all the rest of - the material in April 1945. - - “Question: Do you know whether the Defendant Frick ever visited - the Dachau camp? - - “Answer: To my knowledge Frick never visited the Dachau Camp. - - “Moosburg, 23 March 1946”.—Signed—“Max - Gillhuber”—Signed—“Leonard N. Dunkel, Lieutenant Colonel, - Infantry.” - -To comment on the question whether an official visitor to a -concentration camp could always get a correct picture of the actual -conditions existing there, I ask permission to read an unsolicited -letter which I received a few days ago from a Catholic priest, Bernard -Ketzlick. This letter which I have submitted as Supplement Frick -Number... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, the Prosecution makes objection to this -because it is a character of evidence that there is no way of testing. I -have a basket of such correspondence making charges against these -defendants, which I would not think the Tribunal would want to receive. -If the door is open to this kind of evidence, there is no end to it. - -This witness has none of the sanctions, of course, that assure the -verity of testimony, and I think it is objectionable to go into letters -received from unknown persons. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: May I say just one word on this subject? I received -the letter so late that I did not have an opportunity to ask the person -concerned to send me an affidavit. Of course, I am prepared to submit -such an affidavit later, if such an affidavit should have greater -probative value. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the letter cannot be admitted, -but an application can be made in the ordinary way for leave to put in -an affidavit or to call the witness. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. Then, at a later date, I shall submit a written -request. - -I shall not read Number 38 of the document book since it concerns a -statement made by Frick; and I refer, finally, to an excerpt from the -book _Inside Europe_ by John Gunther which will be submitted as Exhibit -Frick-12 (Document Number Frick-12). The excerpt is contained under -Number 39 in the document book I quote—it concerns a book which -appeared originally in the English language, and I therefore quote it in -English: - - “Born in the Palatinate in 1877, Frick studied law and became a - Beamter, an official. He is a bureaucrat through and through. - Hitler is not intimate with him, but he respects him. He became - Minister of the Interior because he was the only important Nazi - with civil service training. Precise, obedient, uninspired, he - turned out to be a faithful executive; he has been called the - ‘only honest Nazi?’” - -As the last document, may I be permitted to refer to an extract from the -book _To the Bitter End_ by Gisevius. I believe I do not need to quote -these passages individually, since the witness himself will be -questioned. The extract will be Exhibit Number Frick-13 (Document Number -Frick-13). - -There are still left two answers to interrogatories by the witnesses -Messersmith and Seger. I ask to be permitted to read these answers -later, as soon as the answers have been submitted to me. - -That concludes the presentation of documents. I believe there would be -no purpose in calling the witnesses now. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you prepared to call your witness, Dr. Pannenbecker? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes, Mr. President, that is my request. I now ask -permission to call the witness Gisevius. He is the sole witness in -Frick’s case. I have especially selected witness Gisevius to clarify the -question of the state of the police authority in Germany, as he, from -the very beginning, has been on the side of the opposition and is best -qualified to give a picture of the state of that authority in Germany at -that time. - -[_The witness Gisevius took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -HANS BERND GISEVIUS (Witness): Hans Bernd Gisevius. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, were you a member of the NSDAP or one of its -affiliated organizations? - -GISEVIUS: No. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Is it correct that you personally participated in the -events of 20 July 1944, and that you were also present in the OKW at -that time? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: How did you get into the police service? - -GISEVIUS: In July 1933 I passed the state examination in law. As a -descendant of an old family of civil servants I applied for a civil -service appointment in the Prussian administration. I belonged, at that -time, to the German National People’s Party and to the Stahlhelm, and by -the standards of that day I was considered politically reliable. -Consequently, at the first stage of my training as a civil servant I was -assigned to the Political Police, which meant my entry into the newly -created Secret State Police. In those days I was very glad to have been -assigned to the police service. I had already at that time heard that -abominations of all kinds were going on in Germany. I was inclined to -consider these as the final outburst of the situation, akin to civil -war, which we were experiencing at the end of 1932 and the beginning of -1933. So I hoped to contribute to the re-establishment of a proper -executive organization which would provide for law, decency, and order. -But this happiness was doomed to be short-lived. - -I had scarcely been 2 days in this new police office, when I discovered -that incredible conditions existed there. These were not police who took -action against riots, murder, illegal detention, and robbery; these were -police who protected those guilty of such crimes. It was not the guilty -persons who were arrested, but rather those who asked the police for -help. These were not police who took action against the crime, but -police whose task seemed to be to hush it up or, even worse, to sponsor -it; for those SA and SS Kommandos who played at being police in private -were encouraged by this so-called Secret State Police and were given all -possible aid. The most terrible and, even for a newcomer, most obvious -thing was that a system of unlawful detention was gaining more and more -ground—a worse and more dreadful system than which could not be -conceived. - -The offices of the new State Police were in a huge building which was, -however, not large enough to take all the prisoners. Special -concentration camps for the Gestapo were established, and their names -will go down in history as a mark of infamy. These were Oranienburg and -the Gestapo’s private prison in Papestrasse, Columbia House, or, as it -was cynically nicknamed, “Columbia Hall.” - -I should like to make it quite clear that this was certainly rather -amateurish compared with what all of us experienced later. But so it -started, and I can only convey my personal impression by describing a -brief incident I remember. After only 2 days I asked one of my -colleagues, who was also a professional civil servant—he had been taken -over from the old Political Police into the new one, and he was one of -those officials who were forced into it—I asked him, “Tell me, am I in -a police office here or in a robber’s den?” The answer I received was, -“You are in a robber’s den and you can expect to see much more yet.” - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Under whom was the Political Police at that time and -who was the superior authority? - -GISEVIUS: The Political Police was under one Rudolf Diels. He, too, came -from the old Prussian Political Police. He was a professional civil -servant, and one might have expected him still to retain the ideas of -law and decency: but in a brutal and cynical way he set his mind on -making the new rulers forget his political past as a democrat and on -ingratiating himself with his superior, the Prussian Prime Minister and -Minister of the Interior, Göring. It was Diels who created the Gestapo -office; he suggested to Göring the issue of the first decree for making -that office independent. It was Diels who let the SA and the SS enter -that office; he legalized the actions of these civil Kommandos. But soon -it became evident to me that such a bourgeois renegade could not do so -much wrong quite by himself. Some very important person must have been -backing him; in fact, I very quickly saw also that somebody was taking a -daily interest in everything that happened in that office. Reports were -written; telephone inquiries were received. Diels went several times -daily to give reports, and it was the Prussian Minister of the Interior -Göring who considered this Secret State Police as his special preserve. - -During those months nothing happened in this office which was not known -or ordered by Göring personally. I want to stress this, because in the -course of years the public formed a different idea of Göring because he -noticeably retired from his official functions. At that time, it was not -yet the Göring who finally suffocated, in his Karinhall. It was the -Göring who looked after everything personally and had not yet begun to -busy himself with the building of Karinhall or to don all sorts of -uniforms and decorations. It was Göring still in civilian clothes, who -was the real chief of an office, who inspired it, and who attached -importance to being the “iron” Göring. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I believe you can describe some points more -concisely. As to what you have just said, do you know this from your own -experience, or where did you learn of it? - -GISEVIUS: I not only heard and saw it myself, but I also learned much -from a man who in those days was also a member of the Secret State -Police, and whose information will play an important part in the course -of my statements. - -At that time a criminologist had been called into the Secret State -Police, probably the best known expert of the Prussian police, -Oberregierungsrat Nebe. Nebe was a National Socialist. He had been in -opposition to the former Prussian police and had joined the National -Socialist Party. He was a man who sincerely believed in the purity and -genuineness of the National Socialist aims. Thus I saw for myself how -this man found out on the spot what was actually going on and how he -inwardly recoiled. - -I can also state here, as it is important, the reasons why Nebe became a -strong opponent, who went with the opposition up to 20 July and later -suffered death by hanging. At that time, in August 1933, Nebe was -ordered by the Defendant Göring to murder Gregor Strasser, formerly a -leading member of the National Socialist Party, by means of a car or -hunting accident. Nebe was so shocked at this order that he refused to -carry it out and made an inquiry at the Reich Chancellery. The answer -from the Reich Chancellery was that the Führer knew nothing of this -order. Thereupon Nebe was summoned to Göring, who reproached him most -bitterly for having made an inquiry. Nevertheless, when he finished -these reproaches he considered it advisable to promote him, because he -thought he would thereby silence him. - -The second thing which happened at that time, and which is also very -important, was that the Defendant Göring gave the Political Police -so-called open warrants for murder. At that time there were not only -so-called amnesty laws which gave amnesty for infamous actions, but -there was also a special law according to which investigations, already -initiated by police authorities and by the public prosecutor, could be -quashed, on condition, however, that in these special cases the Reich -Chancellor, or Göring, personally signed the pertinent order. Göring -made use of this law by giving open warrants to the Chief of the -Gestapo, with which all that had to be done was to fill in the names of -those who were to be murdered. Nebe was so shocked by this that from -that moment on he felt it his duty to fight against the Gestapo. At our -request he remained with us there, and afterwards in the Criminal -Police, because we needed one man at least who could keep us informed -about police conditions in case our desire for a revolution should -materialize. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, what did you do yourself when you saw all -these things? - -GISEVIUS: I, for my part, tried to contact those bourgeois circles which -through my connections were open to me. I went to various ministries: to -the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, to State Secretary Grauert, and -several ministerial directors and counsellors. I went to the Reich -Ministry of the Interior, to the Ministry of Justice, to the Foreign -Office, and the Ministry of War. I spoke repeatedly to the Chief of the -Army High Command, Colonel General Von Hammerstein. Among all these -connections I formed at that time, there is one other who is -particularly important for my testimony. - -At that time I met in the newly formed intelligence department of the -OKW a Major Oster. I gave him all the material which by then had already -accumulated. We started a collection—which we continued until 20 -July—of all the documents we could get hold of; and Oster was the man -who from then on, in the Ministry of War never failed to warn every -officer he could contact officially or privately. In course of time, by -favor of Admiral Canaris, Oster became Chief of Staff of the -Intelligence. When he met his death by hanging he was a general. But I -consider it my duty to testify here, in view of all this man has -done—his unforgettable fight against the Gestapo and against all the -crimes which were committed against humanity and peace—that among the -inflation of German field marshals and generals there was one real -German general. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: How did the work develop, according to your -observations in the Gestapo? - -GISEVIUS: At that time conditions in Germany were still such that people -kept their eyes open in the ministries. There was still an opposition in -the bourgeois ministries; there was still the Reich President Von -Hindenburg. Thus, at the end of October 1933 the Defendant Göring was -forced to dismiss Diels, the Chief of the State Police. At the same time -a commission of investigation was set up in order to re-organize that -institution thoroughly. According to the ministerial decree, Nebe and I -were members of that commission. But that commission never met, for the -Defendant Göring found ways and means to thwart this measure. He -appointed as Chief and successor of Diels a still worse Nazi named -Hinkler, who some time before had been acquitted in a trial because of -irresponsibility; and this Hinkler acted in such a way that before 30 -days had passed he was dismissed. Then the Defendant Göring was able to -restore his Diels to the office. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Do you know anything of the events which led to the -Prussian law of 30 November 1933, by which the functions of the Gestapo -were taken away from the office of the Minister of the Interior and -transferred to the office of the Prussian Prime Minister? - -GISEVIUS: That was just the moment of which I am speaking. Göring -realized that it would not serve his purpose if other ministries were -too much concerned in his Secret State Police. Though he was Prussian -Minister of the Interior himself, he was disturbed by the fact that the -police department of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior could look -into the affairs of his private domain; and so he separated the Secret -State Police from the remaining police and placed it under his personal -direction, thereby excluding all other police authorities. From the -point of view of a proper police system this was nonsense, because you -cannot run a Political Police properly if you separate it from the -Criminal Police and the Order Police. But Göring knew why he did not -want any other police authority to look into the affairs of the Secret -State Police. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, did you remain in the police service -yourself? - -GISEVIUS: On that day when Göring carried out his little—and I can’t -find another word for it—_coup d’état_ by assigning to himself a state -police of his own, this Secret State Police issued a warrant of arrest -against me. I had expected this and had gone into hiding. The next -morning I went to the Chief of the Police Department of the Prussian -Ministry of the Interior, Ministerial Director Daluege—who was a high -SS general—and said that it was really not quite in order to issue a -warrant of arrest against me. - -A criminal commissioner of the Secret State Police came to arrest me in -the room of the Chief of the Prussian police. Daluege was kind enough to -allow me to escape through a back door to State Secretary Grauert. -Grauert intervened with Göring, and as always in cases of this kind, -Göring was very surprised and ordered a thorough investigation. That was -the usual way of saying that such incidents were to be pigeonholed. -After that I was no longer allowed to enter the Secret State Police, but -I was sent as an observer to the Reichstag Fire trial at Leipzig, which -was just drawing to an end. During these last days of November I was -able to get some insight into this obscure affair and having already -tried, together with Nebe, to investigate this crime, I was able to add -to my knowledge here. - -I assume that I shall again be questioned about that point and, -therefore, shall now confine myself to the statement that, if necessary, -I am prepared to refresh Defendant Göring’s memory concerning his -complicity in and his joint knowledge of this first “brown” _coup -d’état_ and the murder of the accomplices. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: On 1 May 1934 Frick became Prussian Minister of the -Interior. Did you get into touch with Frick himself or his ministries? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. Immediately after the Reichstag Fire trial was over—that -is, at the end of 1933—I was dismissed from the police service and -transferred to a Landrat office in East Prussia. I complained, however, -to State Secretary Grauert about this obvious disciplinary punishment. -As he and Ministerial Director Daluege knew of my quarrel with the -Secret State Police, they got me into the Ministry of the Interior and -assigned to me the task of collecting all those reports which were still -being incorrectly addressed to the Ministry of the Interior and of -forwarding them to the Prussian Prime Minister who was in charge of the -Secret State Police and who dealt with these matters. - -As soon as Göring found out about this he repeatedly protested against -my presence in the Ministry, but the Minister of the Interior was -adamant and I succeeded in keeping that post. - -When Frick came I did not get in touch with him immediately as I was -only a subordinate official. I assume, however, that the Defendant Frick -knew about my activity and my views, because I was now encouraged to -continue collecting all those requests for help which were wrongly -addressed to the Ministry of the Interior, and a large number of these -reports I submitted through official channels to Daluege, Grauert, and -Frick. There was, however, the difficulty that Göring, in his capacity -of Prime Minister of Prussia, had prohibited Frick, as his Prussian -Minister of the Interior, to take cognizance of such reports. Frick was -supposed to forward them to the Gestapo without comment. I saw no reason -for not submitting them to Frick all the same, and as Frick was also -Reich Minister of the Interior—and in this capacity could give -directives to the Länder and, therefore, also to Göring—he took -cognizance of these reports in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and -allowed me to forward them to Göring with the request for a report. -Göring protested repeatedly, and I know this resulted in heated disputes -between him and Frick. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Is anything known to you about the fact that at that -time the Reich Minister of the Interior issued certain directives to -restrict protective custody? - -GISEVIUS: It is correct that at that time a number of such directives -were issued, and the fact that I say that a number of such directives -were issued already implies that generally they were not complied with -by subordinate authorities. - -The Reich Minister of the Interior was a minister with no personal -executive power, and I will never forget the impression it made on me, -while training as a civil servant, that we officials in the Secret State -Police were instructed in principle not to answer any inquiries from the -Reich Ministry of the Interior. Naturally, at intervals the Reich -Minister of the Interior sent reminders, and the efficiency of a Gestapo -official was judged by the number of such reminders he could show his -chief, Diels, as proof that he did not pay any attention to such -matters. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: On 30 June 1934 the so-called Röhm Putsch took place. -Can you give a short description of the conditions prevailing before -this Putsch? - -GISEVIUS: First I have to say that there never was a Röhm Putsch. On 30 -June there was only a Göring-Himmler Putsch. - -I am in a position to give some information about that dark chapter, -because I dealt with and followed up this case in the Police Department -of the Ministry of the Interior, and because the radiograms sent during -these days by Göring and Himmler to the police authorities of the Reich -came into my hands. The last of these radiograms reads: “By order of -Göring all documents relating to 30 June shall be burned immediately.” - -At that time I took the liberty of putting these papers into my safe, -and to this day I do not know whether or not they survived -Kaltenbrunner’s attempts to get them. I still hope to recover these -papers, and if I do, I can prove that throughout the whole 30 June not a -single shot was fired by the SA. The SA did not revolt. By this, -however, I do not wish to utter a single word of excuse for the leaders -of the SA. On 30 June not one of the SA leaders died who did not deserve -death a hundred times—but after a proper trial. - -The situation on that 30 June was that of a civil war; on one side were -the SA headed by Röhm, and on the other side, Göring and Himmler. It had -been arranged for the SA, several days before 30 June, to be sent on -leave. The SA leaders had been purposely called by Hitler for a -conference at Wiessee that 30 June, and it is not usual for people who -intend to effect a _coup d’état_ to travel by sleeping car to a -conference. To their surprise they were seized at the station and at -once driven off to execution. - -The so-called Munich Putsch took place as follows: The Munich SA did not -come into it at all, and at 1 hour’s driving distance from Munich the -alleged traitors, Röhm and Heines, fell into the sleep of death -completely ignorant of the fact that, according to Hitler and Göring, a -revolt had taken place in Munich the previous night. - -I was able to observe the Putsch in Berlin very closely. It took place -without anything being known about it by the public and without any -participation by the SA. We in the police were unaware of it. It is -true, however, that 4 days before 30 June one of the alleged -ringleaders, SA Gruppenführer Karl Ernst of Berlin, came to Ministerial -Director Daluege looking very concerned and said that there were rumors -going round in Berlin that the SA were contemplating a Putsch. He asked -for an interview with Minister of the Interior Frick, so that he, Ernst, -could assure him that there was no such intention. - -Daluege sent me with this message to the Defendant Frick, and I arranged -for this strange conversation where an SA leader assured the Minister of -the Interior that he did not intend to stage a Putsch. - -Ernst then set out on a pleasure trip to Madeira. On 30 June he was -taken from the steamer and sent to Berlin for execution. I saw him -arrive at the Tempelhof airport. This struck me as particularly -interesting, because a few hours before I had read the official report -about his execution in the newspaper. - -That, then, was the so-called SA and Röhm Putsch. And because I am not -to withhold anything, I must add that I was present when on 30 June the -Defendant Göring informed the press of the event. On this occasion the -Defendant Göring made the cold-blooded remark that he had for days been -waiting for a code word which he had arranged with Hitler. He had then -struck, of course with lightning speed, and had also extended the scope -of his mission. This extension of his mission caused the death of a -large number of innocent people. To mention only a few, there were -Generals Schleicher—who was killed together with his wife—and Von -Bredow, Ministerial Director Klausner, Edgar Jung, and many others. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, you were in the Ministry of the Interior -yourself at that time. How did Frick hear about these measures, and was -he himself in any way involved in the quelling of this so-called Putsch? - -GISEVIUS: I was present when, at about half past 9, Ministerial Director -Daluege came back quite pale after seeing Göring and having just been -told what had happened. Daluege and I went to Grauert and we drove to -the Reich Ministry of the Interior, to Frick. Frick rushed out of the -room—it may have been about 10 o’clock—in order to go to Göring to -find out what had happened in the meantime, only to be told that he, as -Police Minister of the Reich, should go home now and not worry about -further developments. In fact, Frick did go home, and during those 2 -dramatic days he did not enter the ministry. - -Once during this time Daluege drove over with me to see him. For the -rest, it was given to me, the youngest official of the Reich Ministry of -the Interior, to inform the Reich Minister of the Interior on that -bloody Saturday and Sunday of the atrocious things which in the meantime -had happened in Germany. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, you just told us of an instruction Frick had -received not to worry about these things. Who gave him this instruction? - -GISEVIUS: As far as I know, Göring gave or conveyed to him an -instruction by Hitler. I do not know whether there was a written -instruction; neither do I know whether Frick had asked about it. I -should think that Frick, on that day, probably considered it would be -wise not to ask too many awkward questions. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: After these things had been concluded, did Frick in -any way attempt to smooth matters over? - -GISEVIUS: To answer this question correctly I have to say first that on -Saturday, 30 June, we at the Ministry of the Interior knew very little -about what had happened. On Sunday, 1 July, we learned much more, and -after these bloody days had passed, there is no doubt that Frick had on -the whole a clear idea of what had happened. Also, during these days he -made no secret of his indignation at the murders and unlawful arrests -which apparently had taken place. In order to stick to the truth I have -to answer your question by saying that the first reaction of the -Defendant Frick which I knew about was that Reich law in which the Reich -Ministers declared the events of June 30 to be lawful. This law had an -unprecedented psychological effect on the further developments in -Germany, and it has its place in the history of German terror. Apart -from this, many things happened in the Third Reich which a normal mortal -could not understand, but which were well understood in the circles of -ministers and state secretaries. And so, I have to admit that, after -that law, the Defendant Frick made a serious attempt to remedy at least -the most obvious abuses. Maybe he thought other ministers in the Reich -Cabinet should have spoken sooner. I am thinking now of Reich War -Minister Von Blomberg, two of whose generals were shot, and who, in -spite of that, signed this law. I intentionally mention Blomberg’s name, -and ask to be permitted to pause here to tell the Tribunal about an -incident which occurred this morning. I was in the room of the -defendants’ counsel and was speaking to Dr. Dix. Dr. Dix was interrupted -by Dr. Stahmer, counsel for Göring. I heard what Dr. Stahmer told Dr. -Dix... - -DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): May I ask whether a -personal conversation which I had with Dr. Dix has anything to do with -the taking of evidence? - -GISEVIUS: I am not speaking... - -THE PRESIDENT: Witness, don’t go on with your evidence whilst the -objection is being made. Yes, Dr. Stahmer. - -GISEVIUS: If you please. I didn’t understand... - -DR. STAHMER: I do not know whether it is in order when giving evidence -to reveal a conversation which I had with Dr. Dix in the Defense -Counsel’s room. - -GISEVIUS: May I say something to that? - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly keep silent. - -GISEVIUS: May I finish my statement? - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you keep silent, sir. - -DR. STAHMER: This morning in the room of the Defense Counsel, I had a -personal conversation with Dr. Dix concerning the Blomberg case. That -conversation was not intended to be heard by the witness. I do not know -the witness; I didn’t even see the witness, as far as I can remember, -and I don’t know whether this should come into the evidence by making -such a conversation public here. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This incident has been reported to me, and I think -it is important that this Tribunal know the influence—the threats that -were made at this witness in this courthouse while waiting to testify -here, threats not only against him but against the Defendant Schacht. -Now, the affair was reported to me. I think it is important that this -Tribunal know it. I think it is important that it come out. I should -have attempted to bring it out on cross-examination if it had not been -told, and I think that the witness should be permitted. These other -parties have had great latitude here. This witness has been subjected to -threats, as I understand it, which were uttered in his presence, whether -they were intended for him or not, and I ask that this Tribunal allow -Dr. Gisevius, who is the one representative of democratic forces in -Germany, to take this stand to tell his story. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal would like to hear first of all -anything further you have to say upon the matter. They will then hear -what Dr. Dix has to say, if he wishes to say anything; and they will -then hear whether the witness himself wishes to say anything in answer. - -DR. STAHMER: I have no qualms about telling the Court exactly what I -said. Last night I discussed the case with the Defendant Göring and told -him the witness Gisevius... - -THE PRESIDENT: We don’t want to hear any communications which you had -with the Defendant Göring other than those you choose to make in support -of your objection to this evidence that has been given. - -DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President; but I must say briefly that Göring told -me that it was of no interest to him if the witness Gisevius did -incriminate him, but that he did not want Blomberg, who died -recently—and I assumed it was only the question of Blomberg’s -marriage—he, Göring, did not want these facts concerning the marriage -of Blomberg to be discussed here in public. If that could not be -prevented, then of course Göring, in his turn—and it is only a question -of Schacht, because Schacht, as he had told me, wanted to speak about -these things—then he, Göring would not spare Schacht. - -That is what I told Dr. Dix this morning, and I am sure Dr. Dix will -confirm that, and if I may add... - -THE PRESIDENT: We will hear you in a moment, Dr. Dix. - -DR. STAHMER: I said—and I was not referring to Schacht, to the witness, -or to Herr Pannenbecker—I said, for reasons of professional etiquette, -that I should like to inform Dr. Dix. That is what I said and what I -did. In any case I did not even know that the witness Gisevius was -present at that moment. At any rate, it was not intended for him. -Moreover, I was speaking to Dr. Dix aside. - -THE PRESIDENT: So that I may understand what you are saying: You say you -had told Dr. Dix the substance of the conversation you had had with the -Defendant Göring, and said that Göring would withdraw his objection to -the facts being given if the Defendant Schacht wanted them to be given. -Is that right? - -DR. STAHMER: No, I only said that Göring did not care what was said -about himself; he merely wanted the deceased Blomberg to be spared, and -he did not want things concerning Blomberg’s marriage to be discussed. -If Schacht did not prevent that—I was speaking only of Schacht—then -he, Göring, in his turn, would have no consideration for Schacht—would -no longer have any consideration for Schacht. That is what I told Dr. -Dix for reasons of personal etiquette. - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait, wait, I can’t hear you. Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: As I said, that is what I told Dr. Dix, and that finished -the conversation. And I made it quite clear to Dr. Dix that I told him -that only as one colleague to another. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That is all you wish to say? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes. - -DR. DIX: I remember the facts, I believe, correctly and reliably, as -follows: This morning I was in the room of the Defense Counsel speaking -to the witness Dr. Gisevius. I believe my colleague, Professor Kraus, -was also taking part in the conversation. Then my colleague, Stahmer, -approached me and said he would like to speak to me. I replied that at -the moment I was having an important and urgent conversation with -Gisevius, and asked whether it could wait. Stahmer said “no,” and that -he must speak to me at once. I then took my colleague Stahmer aside, -probably five or six paces from the group with whom I had been speaking. -My colleague Stahmer told me the following—it is quite possible, I -don’t remember the actual words he used, that he started by saying that -he was telling me this for professional reasons, as one colleague to -another. If he says so now, I am sure that it is so. Anyhow I don’t -remember that any longer. He said to me, “Listen, Göring has an idea -that Gisevius will attack him as much as he can. If he attacks the dead -Blomberg, however, then Göring will disclose everything against -Schacht—and he knows lots of things about Schacht which may not be -pleasant for Schacht. He, Göring, had been very reticent in his -testimony; but if anything should be said against the dead Blomberg, -then he would have to reveal things against Schacht.” - -That was what he meant—that he would bring things up against Schacht. -That was the conversation. I cannot say with absolute certainty whether -my colleague told me I should call Gisevius’ attention to it. If he says -he did not say so, then it is certainly true, and I believe him; but I -could only interpret that information to mean that I should notify -Gisevius of this development promised by Göring. I therefore -thought—and did not have the slightest doubt—that I was voicing -Göring’s intention, and that I was acting as Dr. Stahmer wished, and -that that was the purpose of the whole thing. What else could be the -reason for Dr. Stahmer’s telling me at that moment, immediately before -my discussion with Gisevius, even while I was in conversation with -Gisevius, that he could not wait, that I must break off my conversation? -Why should he inform me at that time, unless he meant that the mischief -hinted at and threatened by Göring might possibly be avoided—in other -words, that the witness Gisevius, on whom everything depended, should -think twice before making his statement? I did not have the slightest -doubt that what Stahmer meant by his words to me was that I should -convey them to Gisevius. As I said, even if Stahmer had not asked -me—and he was certainly speaking the truth when he said he did not ask -me to take action—I would have replied, if I had been questioned before -he made this statement, and that probably with an equally good -conscience, that he had asked me to pass it on to Gisevius. But I will -not maintain that he actually used those words. Anyway, it is absolutely -certain that this conversation did take place, and it was in the firm -belief that I was acting as Dr. Stahmer and Göring intended that I went -straight to Gisevius. He was standing only five or six steps away from -me, or even nearer. I think I understood him to say, when I addressed -him, that he had heard parts of it. I don’t know whether I understood -him correctly. I then informed him of the gist of this conversation. -That is what happened early this morning. - -DR. STAHMER: May I say the following: It goes without saying, that I -neither asked Dr. Dix to pass it on to Gisevius, nor did I count upon -his doing so; but I surmised that Gisevius would be examined this -morning, and that Dr. Dix would question the witness concerning the -circumstances of Blomberg’s marriage. That is what I had been told -previously—namely, that Dr. Dix intended to put this question to the -witness. Therefore, I called Dr. Dix’s attention to it, assuming that he -would abstain from such a question concerning Blomberg’s marriage. That -was not intended for the witness in any way, and I know definitely that -I said to Dr. Dix that I was telling him this merely as one colleague to -another, and he thanked me for it. He said, “Thank you very much.” At -any rate, if he had said to me, “I am going to tell the witness,” I -would have said immediately, “For heaven’s sake; that is information -intended only for you personally.” Indeed, I am really surprised that -Dr. Dix has in this manner abused the confidence which I placed in him. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, we have heard the facts, and we do not think -we need hear anything more about it beyond considering the question as -to whether the witness is to go on with his evidence. - -Witness, has the explanation which has been given by Dr. Stahmer and Dr. -Dix sufficiently covered the matters with which you were proposing to -deal with reference to Field Marshal Von Blomberg? Is there anything -further that you need say about it? - -GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. Perhaps I did not quite understand the -question. - -Concerning Blomberg, at this point I did not want to say anything -further; I merely wanted, on the first occasion that Blomberg’s name -came up, to make it clear that the whole thing gave me the feeling that -I was under pressure. I was standing so near that I could not help -hearing what Dr. Stahmer said, and the manner in which Dr. Dix told me -about it—for I had heard at least half of it—could not be understood -in any other way than to mean that Dr. Dix in a very loyal manner was -instructing me, a witness for the Defendant Schacht, to be rather -reticent in my testimony on a point which I consider very important. -That point will come up later and has nothing whatsoever to do with the -marriage of Herr Von Blomberg. It has to do with the part which the -Defendant Göring played in it, and I know quite well why Göring does not -want me to speak about that affair. To my thinking, it is the most -corrupt thing Göring ever did, and Göring is just using the cloak of -chivalry by pretending that he wants to protect a dead man, whereas he -really wants to prevent me from testifying in full on an important -point—that is, the Fritsch crisis. - -THE PRESIDENT: [_Turning to Dr. Pannenbecker._] The Tribunal will hear -the evidence then, whatever evidence you wish the witness to give. - -GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. What I have to say in connection with the -Blomberg case is finished. I merely wanted to protest at the first -opportunity when the name was mentioned. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well then, counsel will continue his examination and you -will give such evidence as is relevant when you are examined or -cross-examined by Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant Schacht. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, after the events of 30 June 1934, had the -position of the Gestapo become so strong that no measures against it had -any chance of succeeding? - -GISEVIUS: I must answer this in the negative. The Secret State Police -doubtlessly gained in power after 30 June, but because of the many -excesses committed on 30 June, the opposition in the various ministries -against the Secret State Police had become so strong that through -collective action the majority of ministers could have used the events -of 30 June to eliminate the Secret State Police. I personally made -repeated efforts in that direction. With the knowledge of the Defendant -Frick I went to see the Minister of Justice Gürtner and begged him many -times to use the large number of illegal murders as a reason for action -against the Secret State Police. I personally went to Von Reichenau -also, who was Chief of the Armed Forces Offices at that time, and told -him the same thing. I know that my friend Oster brought the files -concerning this matter to the knowledge of Blomberg, and I wish to -testify here that, in spite of the excesses of the 30 of June, it would -have been quite possible at that time to return to law and order. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: After that, what did the Reich Minister of the -Interior do—that is, what did Frick do to steer the Secret State Police -to a course of legality? - -GISEVIUS: We started a struggle against the Secret State Police and -tried at least to prevent Himmler from getting into the Reich Ministry -of the Interior. Shortly before Göring had relinquished the Ministry of -the Interior to Frick, he had made Himmler Chief of the Secret State -Police in Prussia. Himmler, starting from that basis of power, had -attempted to assume police power in the other Länder of the Reich. Frick -tried to prevent that by taking the stand that he, as Reich Minister of -the Interior, had an equal voice in appointing police functionaries in -the Reich. At the same time, we tried to prevent an increase in the -numbers of the Secret State Police by systematically refusing all -requests by the Gestapo to increase its body of officials. Unfortunately -here also, as always, Himmler found ways and means to overcome this. He -went to the finance ministers of the individual states and told them -that he needed funds for the guard troops of the concentration camps, -for the so-called “Death’s-Head” units, and he drew up a scale whereby -five SS men were to guard one prisoner. With these funds Himmler -financed his Secret State Police, as, of course it rested with him how -many men he wanted to imprison. - -In other ways too, we in the Reich Ministry of the Interior attempted by -all possible means to block the way of the Gestapo; but unfortunately, -the numerous requests we sent to the Gestapo remained unanswered. Again -it was Göring who forbade Himmler to answer and who protected Himmler -when he refused to give any information in reply to our inquiries. - -Finally, a last effort was made during my term of office in the Reich -Ministry of the Interior. We tried to paralyze the Secret State Police -at least to some extent by introducing into protective custody the right -of supervision and complaint. If we could have achieved the right of -review of all cases of protective custody, we would also have been able -to get an insight into the individual actions of the Gestapo. A law was -formulated, and this law was first submitted to the Ministerial Council -of Prussia, the largest of the states. Again it was the Defendant Göring -who, by all available means, opposed the passing of such a law. A very -stormy cabinet meeting on the matter ended with my being asked to leave -the Ministry of the Interior. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I have shown you a memorandum... - -THE PRESIDENT: This will be a convenient time to break off. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal wishes me to say that -it anticipates that you will put any questions which you think necessary -with reference to the alleged intimidation of the witness when you come -to cross-examine. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, Sir; thank you. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I should like to talk about the efforts which -were made by the Ministry of the Interior to stop the arbitrary methods -of the Gestapo, particularly with reference to the concentration camps. -I therefore ask you to look at a memorandum which originates from the -Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior. It is Document 775-PS, -which I submitted this morning as Exhibit Frick-9 when I presented the -evidence for Frick. It is Number 34 in the document book. Do you know -that memorandum? - -GISEVIUS: No, I don’t. It appears that this memorandum was drawn up -after I had left the Ministry of the Interior. I assume this from the -fact that in this memorandum the Reich Minister of the Interior appears -to have already given up the fight, since he writes that as a matter of -principle it should be made clear who bears the responsibility, and, if -necessary, the responsibility for all the consequences must now—and I -quote—“be borne by the Reichsführer SS who, in fact, has already -claimed for himself the leadership of the Political Police in the -Reich.” - -At the time when I was at the Reich Ministry of the Interior, we tried -particularly to prevent this from happening—namely, that Himmler should -take over the Political Police. This is evidently a memorandum written -about 6 months later when the terror had become still greater. The facts -which are quoted here are known to me. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you say anything about this? Does it not deal with -the Pünder case and the case of Esterwege, Oldenburg? - -GISEVIUS: The Esterwege case can be told most briefly. It is one of -many. - -So far as I can recollect, an SA or local group leader was arrested by -the Gestapo because he got excited about the conditions in the Papenburg -concentration camp. This was not the first time either. I don’t know why -the Defendant Frick picked on this particular case. Nevertheless, one -day Daluege showed me one of those customary handwritten slips sent by -Frick to Himmler. Frick had written to Himmler in the margin in large -green letters that an SA man or local group leader, or whatever he was, -had been arrested illegally, that this man must be released at once, and -that if Himmler did that sort of thing again he, Frick, would institute -criminal proceedings against Himmler for illegal detention. - -I remember this story very well, because it was somewhat -peculiar—considering the police conditions which existed at the -time—that Himmler should be threatened by Frick with criminal -proceedings, and Daluege made some sneering remarks to me regarding -Frick’s action. - -That is the one case. - -THE PRESIDENT: What was the date? - -GISEVIUS: This must have happened in the spring of 1935, I should say in -March or April. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, do you know how Himmler reacted to that -threat of criminal proceedings? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. There was a second case. That is this Pünder affair which -is mentioned here. He reacted similarly to both, and therefore it might -be better if I first relate the Pünder affair in this connection. It -concerned a Berlin attorney, who was a lawyer of high standing and legal -adviser to the Swedish Embassy. The widow of the Ministerial Director -Klausner, who had been murdered on 30 June, approached Pünder, as she -wanted to sue the life insurance companies for payment of her annuity. -But as Klausner had allegedly committed suicide on that day, no director -of any insurance company dared pay the money to the widow. Consequently, -the attorney had to sue. But the Nazis had made a law according to which -all such awkward cases—awkward for the Nazis—were not to be tried in -court: they were to be taken to a so-called Spruchkammer in the Reich -Ministry of the Interior. If I am not mistaken, this law was called “Law -for the Settlement of Civilian Claims.” They were never at a loss for -fine-sounding names and titles at that time. This law forced the -attorney to submit his claim to the court first. He was apprehensive. He -went to the Ministry of the Interior and told the State Secretary, “If I -comply with the law and sue, I shall be arrested.” The State Secretary -in the Ministry of the Interior forced him to sue. Thereupon the very -wise attorney went to the Ministry of Justice and told State Secretary -Freisler that he did not want to sue as he would certainly be arrested -by the Gestapo. The Secretary in the Ministry of Justice informed him -that he would have to send in a claim in any case, but that nothing -would happen as the courts had been instructed to pass such cases on -without comment to the Spruchkammer in the Ministry of the Interior. -Thereupon, the attorney sued and the Gestapo promptly arrested him for -slander because he had stated that the Ministerial Director Klausner had -not met his death by suicide. This was for us a classical example of -what we had come to in Germany as far as protective custody was -concerned. - -I had taken the liberty of selecting this case from among hundreds, or I -should say thousands of similar cases and of suggesting to Frick that -this matter should be brought to the notice not only of Göring, but of -Hitler as well this time. Then I sat down and drafted a letter or a -report from Frick to Hitler, which also went to the Ministry of Justice. -There were more than five pages, and I discussed from every angle the -facts concerning Ministerial Director Klausner’s suicide, with the -assistance of the SS, and the ensuing lawsuit. This report to Hitler -concluded with Frick’s remark that the time had now come to have the -problem of protective custody settled by the Reich and by lawful means. - -And now I answer your question regarding what happened. It roughly -coincided with Frick’s letter to Himmler regarding deprivation of -liberty. Himmler took these two letters to a meeting of Reichsleiter, -that is, the so-called ministers of the movement, and he put the -question to them, whether it was proper to allow one Reichsleiter, -namely Frick, to write such letters to another Reichsleiter, that is, to -Himmler. These worthy gentlemen answered this question in the negative -and reprimanded Frick. Then Himmler went to the meeting of the Prussian -cabinet where the protective custody law, which I mentioned, was being -discussed. - -Perhaps I may draw your attention to the fact that at that time it was a -rare thing for Himmler to be allowed to attend a meeting of Prussian -ministers. There was a time in Germany—and it was quite a long -period—when Himmler was not the powerful man which he afterwards became -because the bourgeois ministers and the generals were cowards and gave -way to him. Thus, it was a rare thing for Himmler to be allowed to -attend a meeting of the Prussian Ministerial Council at all, and that -particular meeting ended by my being discharged from the Ministry of the -Interior. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I should like to quote to you two sentences -from the memorandum which I have just shown to you—that is, 775-PS—and -ask you to tell me whether the facts are stated correctly. I quote: - - “In this connection, I draw your attention to the case of the - attorney Pünder, who was taken into protective custody together - with his colleagues, merely because, after making inquiry at the - Reich Ministry of the Interior and at our ministry, he had filed - a suit, which he was obliged to do under a Reich law.” - -GISEVIUS: Yes, that is correct. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: And then the other sentence. I quote: - - “I mention here only the case of a teacher and Kreisleiter at - Esterwege who was kept in protective custody for 8 days - because...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, where is that sentence which you have -just read? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: In the Frick Document Book under Number 34, second -sentence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Which page? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: In my Document Book it is Page 80. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of Paragraph 3 on Page 70? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: No, Mr. President, I have just discovered that this -particular sentence in the document has not been translated. Perhaps I -may read one more sentence which apparently has been translated. It can -be found in Paragraph 3 of the same document. - - “I mention here only the case of a teacher and Kreisleiter at - Esterwege who was kept in protective custody for 8 days because, - as it turned out afterwards, he had sent a correct report to the - head of his district concerning abuses by the SS.” - -GISEVIUS: Yes, that corresponds to the facts. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, did you yourself have any support from Frick -for your personal protection? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. At that time, of course, I was such a suspect in the eyes -of the Secret State Police that all sorts of evil designs were being -made against me. Frick gave an order, therefore, that I should be -protected in my home by the local police. A direct telephone from my -home to the police station was installed, and I had only to pick up the -receiver and someone at least would know in case I had surprise -visitors. Furthermore, the Gestapo used their usual methods against me -by accusing me of criminal acts. Apparently the files were taken to -Hitler in the Reich Chancellery, and Frick intervened, and it was soon -discovered that this concerned a namesake of mine! Frick said quite -openly on the telephone that these fellows—as he put it—had once more -lied to the Führer. This was the signal for the Gestapo, who were, of -course, listening in on this telephone conversation, that they could no -longer use these methods. - -Then we advanced one step further through Heydrich. He was so kind as to -inform me by telephone that I probably had forgotten that he could -pursue his personal and political opponents to their very graves. I made -an official report of that threat to Frick, and Frick, either personally -or through Daluege, intervened with Heydrich, and there is no doubt that -he thereby rendered me a considerable service, for Heydrich never liked -it very much when his murderous intentions were talked about openly. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, would then, at least a minister of the Reich -have no cause for alarm about his own personal safety if he tried to -fight against the terror of the Gestapo and Himmler? - -GISEVIUS: If you ask me that now, I must say that Schacht was the only -one who was put into a concentration camp. But it is true that we all -asked ourselves just how long it would take for a Reich Minister to be -sent to a concentration camp. As regards Frick, he told me -confidentially, as far back as 1934, that the Reich Governor of Bavaria -had given him reliable information, according to which he was to be -murdered while taking a holiday in the country, in Bavaria, and he asked -me whether I could find out any details. At that time I went with my -friend Nebe to Bavaria by car, and we made a secret investigation which, -at any rate, proved that such plans had been discussed. But, as I said, -Frick survived. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: I have no further questions. - -DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): May I ask you to decide -on the following question? I have called Gisevius. He is a witness -called by me, and this is, therefore, not a subsequent question which I -am putting, but I am examining him as my witness. I am of the opinion, -therefore, that it is right and expedient that I should now follow up -the examination by my colleague Pannenbecker, and that my other -colleagues who also want to put questions follow the two of us. I ask -the Tribunal to decide on this question. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you the only defendants’ counsel who asked for this -witness to be called on behalf of your client? - -DR. DIX: I called him. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know; but are you the only defendants’ counsel who -asked to call him? - -DR. DIX: I believe, Sir, I am the only one who has called him. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Dix, you may examine him next. - -DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius, Dr. Pannenbecker has already mentioned the fact -that you have published a book entitled _To the Bitter End_. I have -submitted quotations from that book to the Tribunal as evidence, and -they have been accepted as documentary evidence by the Tribunal. For -this reason I now ask you: Are the contents of that book historically -true; did you write it only from memory, or is it based on notes which -you made at the time? - -GISEVIUS: I can say here to the best of my knowledge, and with a good -conscience, that the contents of the book are historically true. In -Germany I always made personal notes as far as it was possible. I have -said here that my dead friend Oster had in the War Ministry a -considerable collection of documents to which I had access at all times. -In writing about any important matter in which I made reference to -friends in the opposition group, I never did so without having first -consulted them many times about it. And since 1938 I have been in -Switzerland, first as a visitor and later on for professional reasons, -and there I was able to continue my notes undisturbed. The volume which -has been submitted to the Tribunal was practically completed in 1941, -and in 1942 had already been shown to several friends of mine abroad. - -THE PRESIDENT: If he says that the book is true, that is enough. - -DR. DIX: Since when have you known the Defendant Schacht? - -GISEVIUS: I have known the Defendant Schacht since the end of 1934. - -DR. DIX: On what occasion and in what circumstances did you meet him? - -GISEVIUS: I met him when I worked in the Reich Ministry of the Interior -and was collecting material against the Gestapo. I was consulted by -various parties, who either feared trouble with the Gestapo or who had -had trouble. Thus, one day Schacht, who was then Minister for Economy, -sent a man to me whom he trusted—it was his plenipotentiary Herbert -Göring—to ask me whether I would help Schacht. He, Schacht, had for -some time felt that he was being watched by Himmler and the Gestapo and -lately had had good reason to suspect that an informer, or at least a -microphone, had been installed in his own house. I was asked whether I -could help in this case. I agreed to do so and, with a microphone expert -from the Reich post administration, on the following morning I visited -Schacht’s ministerial residence. We went with the microphone expert from -room to room and—did not have to search very long. It had been done -very badly by the Gestapo. They had mounted the microphone all too -visibly and, moreover, had engaged a domestic servant to spy on Schacht. -She had a listening device attached to the house telephone installed in -her own bedroom, which was easy to discover, and so we were able to -unmask the whole thing. It was on that occasion that I first spoke to -Schacht. - -DR. DIX: And what was the subject of your conversation? Did you at that -time already speak about political matters to him? - -GISEVIUS: We spoke about the matters and the somewhat peculiar situation -which had brought us together. Schacht knew that I was very active in -opposing the Gestapo, and I, for my part, was aware that Schacht was -known for his utterances against the SS and the Gestapo on numberless -occasions. Many middle class people in Germany placed their hopes in him -as the only strong minister who could protect them if need be. -Particularly the industrialists and business men, who were very -important at the time, hoped for, and often found his support. So that -it was quite natural that immediately during the first conversation I -told him everything that was troubling me. - -The main problem at that time was the removal of the Gestapo and the -removal of the Nazi regime. Therefore our conversation was highly -political, and Schacht listened to everything with an open mind, which -made it possible for me to tell him everything. - -DR. DIX: And what did he say? - -GISEVIUS: I told Schacht that we were inevitably drifting towards -radicalism, and that it was doubtful whether, the way things were going, -the end of the present course would not be inflation, and, that being -so, whether it would not be better if he himself were to bring about -that inflation. That would enable him to know beforehand the exact date -of such a crisis, and together with the generals and anti-radical -ministers make timely arrangements to meet the situation when it became -really serious. I said to him, “You should bring about that inflation; -you yourself will then be able to determine the course of events instead -of allowing others to take things out of your hands.” He replied, “You -see, that is the difference which separates us: You want the crash, and -I do not want it.” - -DR. DIX: From that, one might draw the conclusion that at that time -Schacht still believed that the crash could be averted. What reasons did -he give for this view? - -GISEVIUS: I think that at the time the word “crash” was too strong for -him. Schacht was thinking along the traditional lines of former -governments, but he saw that here and there a change had come -about—especially since Brüning’s time—by emergency laws and certain -dictatorial measures. But as far as I could see at the time, and during -all our subsequent conversations, uppermost in his mind was still the -idea of a Reich government which met and passed resolutions, where the -majority of ministers were bourgeois, and where at a given moment—which -might be sooner or later—one might steer a radically changed course. - -DR. DIX: What was his attitude towards Hitler at that time? - -GISEVIUS: It was quite clear to me that at that time he still thought -very highly of Hitler. I might almost say that at that time Hitler was -to him a man of irreproachable integrity. - -THE PRESIDENT: What time are you speaking of? - -GISEVIUS: I am now speaking of the time of my first meetings with -Schacht, at the end of 1934 and the beginning of 1935. - -DR. DIX: What was your profession at that time? Where were you? Where -did you work? - -GISEVIUS: I had succeeded in leaving the Reich Ministry of the Interior -in the meantime and had been transferred to the Reich Criminal Office, -which was in the process of being formed. When we realized that the -Gestapo were extending their power, we believed we could establish some -sort of police apparatus side by side with the Gestapo—that is, purely -criminal police. My friend Nebe had been made Chief of the Reich -Criminal Department to build up a police apparatus there which would -enable us to resist the Gestapo if need be. The Ministry of the Interior -gave me the task of organizing and sent me to this government office -about to be formed, to give advice for its establishment. - -DR. DIX: We now slowly approach the year 1936—the year of the Olympic -Games. Did you have a special assignment there? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. At the beginning of 1936 it was decided to make me Chief -of Staff of the police at the Central Police Department on the occasion -of the Olympic Games in Berlin. That was an entirely nonpolitical and -technical affair. Count Helldorf, who was then Commissioner of the -Police, thought that because of my connections with the Ministry of the -Interior and the Ministry of Justice this would be useful. But I was -quickly removed from this position. Heydrich discovered it and -intervened. - -DR. DIX: Your book contains a letter from Heydrich, which I do not -propose to read in its entirety. It is addressed to Count Helldorf and -calls his attention to the fact that, during the time of your office at -the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, you always put every possible -difficulty in the way of the Secret State Police, and that relations -with you had been extremely unpleasant. He continues: - - “I fear that his participation in the police preparations for - the Olympic Games, even in this sphere, would not promote - co-operation with the Secret State Police, and it should, - therefore, be considered whether Gisevius should not be replaced - by another suitable official. Heil Hitler. Yours, Heydrich.” - -Is that the letter which affected your position? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. That was the reason why I was also dismissed from that -job. I had to wait only a few more weeks and Himmler became the Chief of -Police in the Reich. And on the very day that Himmler became the Reich -Police Chief I was definitely removed from any kind of police service. - -DR. DIX: And where did you go? - -GISEVIUS: After my discharge from the police service I was sent to the -government in Münster, where I was assigned to the price control office. - -DR. DIX: Could you, while in the price control office in Münster, -continue your political work in any way and make the necessary contacts? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. I had plenty of opportunity to make official journeys. I -made a thorough study not only of prices, but also of the political -situation, in the Rhineland and in Westphalia, and went to Berlin nearly -every week so as to keep in touch with my friends. - -DR. DIX: Were you in touch with Schacht? - -GISEVIUS: From that time on I met him very nearly every week. - -DR. DIX: Did you, from Münster, make contacts with other persons in -prominent positions to further the work you were doing? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. One of the reasons why I went to Münster was that the -president of the province, Freiherr Von Luening, was a man of the old -school—clean, correct, a professional civil servant, and politically a -man who upheld law and order. He, too, ended on the gallows after 20 -July 1944. I also got into touch in Düsseldorf with Regierungspräsident -State Secretary Schmidt, and immediately upon my arrival in Münster I -did everything to get into touch with the commanding general there, Von -Kluge, who later became Field Marshal. In this I succeeded. There, too, -I tried at once to continue my old political discussions. - -DR. DIX: We shall revert to General Kluge later on. I now ask you this: -At that time when you were working in Münster, did you perceive a change -in Schacht’s attitude towards the regime, and in his attitude towards -Hitler, as distinct from what you described to the Tribunal as existing -in 1934? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. By a steady process Schacht withdrew himself further and -further from the Nazis. If I were asked to describe the phases, I would -say that in the beginning—that is to say, in 1935—he was of the -opinion that the Gestapo only was the main evil and that Hitler was the -man who was the statesman—or could at least become the statesman—and -that Göring was the conservative strong man whose services one ought to -use, and could use, to oppose the terror of the Gestapo and the State by -establishing orderly conditions. I contradicted Schacht vehemently -regarding his views about the Defendant Göring. I warned him. I told him -that in my opinion Göring was the worst of all, precisely because he was -hiding under the middle class, conservative cloak. I implored him not to -effect his economic policy with Göring, since this could only come to a -bad end. - -Schacht—for whom much may be said, but not that he is a good -psychologist—denied this emphatically. Only then in the course of 1936 -he began to realize more and more that Göring was not supporting him -against the Party, but that Göring supported the radical elements -against him, only then did Schacht’s attitude begin to change gradually, -and he came to regard not only Himmler but also Göring as a great -danger. For him Hitler was still the one man with whom one could create -policy, provided the majority of the cabinet could succeed in bringing -him over to the side of law and order. - -DR. DIX: Are you now talking approximately of the time when Schacht was -handing over the foreign currency control to Göring? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. That was the moment when I warned him and, as I said, he -became apprehensive about Göring and realized that Göring was not -supporting him against the radical elements. That was the time I meant. - -DR. DIX: By handing over the foreign currency control to Göring he -showed a negative, a yielding attitude. But now that he was gradually -changing his views, did he not have any positive ideas as to how to -bring about a change? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. He was entirely taken up with the idea, like many other -people in Germany at that time—I might almost say the majority of the -people in Germany—the idea that everything depended on strengthening -the middle class influence in the cabinet, and above all, and as a -prerequisite, that the Reich Ministry of War, headed by Blomberg, should -be brought over to the side of the middle class ministers. Schacht had, -if you want to put it like that, the very constructive idea that one -must concentrate on the fight for Blomberg. That was precisely where I -agreed with him for it was the same battle which I, with my friend -Oster, had tried to fight in my small department, and in a far more -modest way. - -DR. DIX: Had he already done anything to achieve that end at that time? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. DIX: As a cue I mention the steps taken by Dreyse, the Vice -President of the Reichsbank. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. First of all, he tried to establish close contact with -the competent expert in the Ministry of War, General Thomas, who later -on became Chief of the Army Economic Staff. Thomas was a man who, right -from the beginning, was skeptical about National Socialism, or even -opposed it. As by a miracle, he later on emerged from the concentration -camp alive. - -Schacht at that time began to fight for Blomberg through Thomas. I took -part in that fight because Schacht used me as an intermediary through -Oster, and I was also informed about these connections through Herbert -Göring. Moreover, I learned about these things from many discussions -with Thomas. I can testify here that, even at that time, it was -extraordinarily difficult to establish connection between Schacht and -Blomberg, and I was naïve enough to tell Schacht repeatedly simply to -telephone Blomberg and ask him for an interview. Schacht replied that -Blomberg would certainly be evasive and that the only way was to prepare -the meeting via Oster and Thomas. This was done. - -I know how much we expected from the many discussions Schacht had with -Blomberg. I was, of course, not present as a witness, but we discussed -these conferences in great detail at the time. I took notes and was very -pleased when I found that these recollections of mine tallied absolutely -with the recollections of Thomas, whose handwritten notes I have in my -possession. Thomas was repeatedly reprimanded by Blomberg and was told -not to bother him with these qualms on Schacht’s part. He was told that -Schacht was querulous, and that he, Thomas, should... - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go into all this detail, Dr. Dix? - -DR. DIX: Yes, I believe, Your Lordship, that it will be necessary. This -change from a convinced follower of Hitler to a resolute opponent and -revolutionary, even a conspirator, is of course so complicated a -psychological process that I believe that I cannot spare the Tribunal -the details of that development. I shall certainly be economical with -nonessential matters, but I should be grateful if the witness could be -given a certain amount of freedom during this part of the testimony, as -he is the only witness I have on this subject. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal thinks that you can give the essence -of the matter without giving it in this great detail. You must try, at -any rate, to give as little unnecessary detail as possible. - -DR. DIX: I shall be glad to do that. - -Well, then, Dr. Gisevius, you have heard the wish of the Tribunal and -you will no doubt bring out only the essential facts. - -Is there any other essential fact in the affair of Blomberg via Thomas -that you wish to state, or can we conclude that chapter? - -GISEVIUS: No, I shall now try to give a brief description of the other -channels which were tried. I do not know how much the Tribunal wishes to -hear about it, but I will say that Schacht tried to approach Baron Von -Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. As, however, he was very -difficult to approach, he sent his Reichsbank vice president, Dreyse, to -establish the contact. We also made one big attempt to approach Fritsch -and Blomberg through General Von Kluge. - -DR. DIX: And, briefly, what was the object of that step? What were the -generals supposed to do—I mean these generals mentioned by you? - -GISEVIUS: This step had as its object to make it clear to Blomberg that -things were taking a more and more extreme turn, that the economy of the -country had deteriorated, and that the Gestapo terror must be stopped by -all possible means. - -DR. DIX: So that at the time there were only misgivings about the -economy and the terror which reigned—not about the danger of war, not -yet? - -GISEVIUS: No, only the fear of extremism. - -DR. DIX: We now turn to 1937. You know that was the year of Schacht’s -dismissal as Reich Minister of Economy. Did Schacht say anything to you -as to why he remained in office as President of the Reichsbank? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. I witnessed in detail the struggle for his release as -Reich Minister of Economy. On the one side there was his attempt to be -released from the Ministry, and I think I am right in saying that this -was not so easy. Schacht told Lammers one day that if he did not receive -the official notification of his release by a certain date, he would -consider himself dismissed and inform the press accordingly. On that -occasion scores of people implored Schacht not to resign. Throughout -those years, whenever a man wanted to resign from his post, there was -always the question whether his successor might not steer an even more -radical course. Schacht was implored not to leave, lest radicalism -should gain the upper hand in the economic field also. I only mention -here the name of Ley, as head of the labor front. Schacht replied that -he could not bear the responsibility, but that he hoped he would be able -as President of the Reichsbank to keep one foot in, as he expressed it. -He imagined that he would be able to have a general view of the overall -economic situation and that through the Reichsbank he would be able to -conserve certain economic-political measures. I can testify that many -men, who later became members of the opposition, implored Schacht to -take that line and to keep at least one foot in. - -DR. DIX: Was that decision of his not influenced by his attitude to, and -his judgment concerning some of the generals particularly Colonel -General Fritsch? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, that is quite right. One of the greatest disasters was -the fact that so many people in Germany imagined that Fritsch was a -strong man. I remember that not only high-ranking officers but also high -ministerial officials told me over and over again that there was no need -to worry: Fritsch was on the march; Fritsch was only waiting for the -right moment; Fritsch would one fine day bring about a revolt and end -the terror. General Von Kluge, for instance, told me this as a fact—and -he was a close friend of Fritsch. And so we all lived in the completely -mistaken belief—as I can now say—that one day the great revolt would -come of the Armed Forces against the SS. But instead of this, the exact -opposite occurred, namely, the bloodless revolt of the SS, the famous -Fritsch crisis, the result of which was that not only Fritsch was -relieved of his post but that the entire Armed Forces leadership was -beheaded, politically speaking, which meant that now all our hope... - -DR. DIX: Forgive me if I interrupt you, but we shall come to the Fritsch -crisis later, which was in 1938... - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. DIX: I should like now to finish speaking about Schacht’s efforts -and actions in 1937 and to ask you—it is mentioned in your -book—whether some unsuccessful attempt to approach General Von Kluge -and a journey by Schacht to Münster did not play a part? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. I thought that I was supposed to be brief about that. -Although Schacht made a great effort to get in touch with Fritsch, it -was not possible to arrange a conversation in Berlin. It was secretly -arranged that they should meet in Münster, as General Von Kluge was too -scared to meet Schacht publicly at the time. There was a lot of beating -about the bush, the net result was that the two gentlemen did not meet. -It was not possible to bring together a Reich minister and a commanding -general. It was all most depressing. - -DR. DIX: Where were you at the time? What were you doing? Were you still -at Münster, or was there a change? - -GISEVIUS: I was still in Münster at that time, but in the middle of 1937 -Schacht wanted me to return to Berlin. The greater his disappointment, -the more he was inclined to take seriously my warnings against an -increasing radicalism and an SS revolt. - -By the autumn of 1937 things in Germany had reached such a point that -everybody in the opposition group felt that evil plans were being made. -We thought at that time that there would be another day of blood like 30 -June, and we were trying to protect ourselves. It was Schacht who got in -touch with Canaris through Oster and expressed the wish that I should be -brought back to Berlin in one way or another. At that time there was no -government office which would have given me a post. I had no other -choice but to take a long leave from the civil service, alleging that I -wanted to devote myself to economic studies. Schacht, in agreement with -Canaris and Oster, arranged for me to be given such a post in a Bremen -factory, but I was not allowed to show myself there, and so I came to -Berlin to place myself completely at the disposal of my friends for -future happenings. - -DR. DIX: Your Lordship, we are now coming to January 1938 and the -Fritsch crisis. I do not think that it would be helpful to interrupt -that part of the witness’ testimony. If I may, I would suggest that Your -Lordship now adjourn the session, or else we would have to go on at -least another half hour. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, we’ll adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 25 April 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH DAY - Thursday, 25 April 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius! Yesterday we got as far as the year 1938. You had -returned to Berlin to a fictitious position which Schacht had arranged -for you and you were now in continuous contact with your political -confidants, Schacht, Oster, Canaris, and Nebe. You testified last that -within your circle, at that time, you all had the impression that a coup -was imminent. - -Now, we really come to the so-called Fritsch crisis; in my opinion the -decisive, inner-political first step toward the war. Will you please -describe the entire course and the background of that crisis, especially -bearing in mind the fact that while that crisis was taking place the -march into Austria was made and always remembering, of course, Schacht’s -position and activities which are the main concern. - -GISEVIUS: First, I shall describe the course of the crisis as such; and -it is correct that all my friends considered it the first decisive step -toward the war. I shall assemble the facts one by one. I consider it -advisable, in order not to confuse the picture, to leave Schacht out for -the time being, because the facts as such are extensive enough. -Furthermore, I will not indicate in the beginning the source of our -information or describe my own experiences; rather I shall wait until I -am questioned on those subjects. - -On 12 January 1938 the German public was surprised by the report that -Field Marshal Von Blomberg, at that time Reich Minister for War, had -married. No details about his wife nor any photographs were published. A -few days later one single picture appeared, a photograph of the Marshal -and his new wife in front of the monkey cage at the Leipzig Zoo. -Malicious rumors about the past life of the Marshal’s wife began to -circulate in Berlin. A few days later there appeared on the desk of the -Police Commissioner in Berlin a thick file which contained the following -information: Marshal Von Blomberg’s wife had been a previously convicted -prostitute who had been registered as a prostitute in the files of seven -large German cities; she was in the Berlin criminal files. I myself have -seen the fingerprints and the pictures. She had also been sentenced by -the Berlin courts for distributing indecent pictures. The Commissioner -of the Police in Berlin was obliged to submit this file, by official -channels, to the Chief of the Police, Himmler. - -DR. DIX: Excuse me, please; who was the Commissioner of the Police in -Berlin at that time? - -GISEVIUS: The Commissioner of the Police in Berlin was Count Helldorf. -Count Helldorf realized that if that material were transmitted to the -Reichsführer SS it would place the Wehrmacht in a very embarrassing -position. Himmler would then have in his possession the material he -needed to ruin Blomberg’s reputation and career, and strike a blow at -the leadership of the Armed Forces. Helldorf took this file to the -closest collaborator of Marshal Blomberg, the then Chief of the Armed -Forces Department, Keitel, who at that time had just become related to -Marshal Blomberg through the marriage of their respective children. -Marshal Keitel, or Generaloberst Keitel as he was at that time, looked -through the file carefully and demanded that Police Commissioner -Helldorf should hush up the entire scandal and suppress the file. - -DR. DIX: Perhaps you will tell the Tribunal the source of your -information. - -GISEVIUS: I got my information from Count Helldorf, who described the -entire affair to me, and from Nebe, Oberregierungsrat of the police -headquarters in Berlin at that time, and later Reich Criminal Director. - -Keitel refused to let Blomberg bear any of the consequences. He refused -to inform the Chief of the General Staff Beck, or the Chief of the Army -Generaloberst Von Fritsch. He sent Count Helldorf to Göring with the -file. Helldorf submitted the entire file to Defendant Göring. Göring -asserted he knew nothing about the various sections of the criminal -records and the previous sentences of Von Blomberg’s wife. Nevertheless -in that first conversation, and in later discussions, he admitted that -he already knew the following: - -First, that Marshal Blomberg had already asked Göring several months ago -whether it was permissible to have an affair with a woman of low birth, -and shortly thereafter he had asked Göring whether he would help him to -obtain a dispensation to marry this lady “with a past” as he put it. -Later Blomberg came again and told Göring that this lady of his choice -unfortunately had another lover and he must ask Göring to help him, -Blomberg, to get rid of that lover. - -DR. DIX: Excuse me. Göring told that to Helldorf and you learned it from -Helldorf? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, that is what Göring said, and in the further course of -the investigation we learned of it from other sources too. Göring then -got rid of that lover by giving him foreign currency and sending him off -to South America. In spite of that, Göring did not inform Hitler of this -incident. He even went with Hitler, as a witness, to the wedding of -Marshal Blomberg on 12 January. I should like to point out here... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal would wish to know how you suggest -that these matters, which appear to be personal, are relevant to the -charges and in what way they affect the Defendant Schacht or the -Defendant Göring or the Defendant Frick? - -DR. DIX: I am here only to serve the interests, the rightful interests, -of the Defendant Schacht. It is necessary to present that crisis in all -its horribleness in order to conceive what an effect, what a -revolutionary effect, it had on Schacht and his circle as far as the -regime was concerned, I have already said earlier that the Fritsch -crisis was the turning point in the transformation of Schacht from a -follower and, to a certain extent, an admirer of Hitler to a deadly -enemy who had designs on his life. The Tribunal cannot understand this -revulsion if the Tribunal does not receive the same impression as -Schacht had at that time. Indeed, I in no way desire to wash dirty linen -here unnecessarily. My decision to put these questions and to ask the -witness to describe the Fritsch crisis in full detail is only motivated -by the fact that the further development of Schacht, and of the Fritsch -crisis, or let us say, the Oster-Canaris circle to which Schacht -belonged, cannot be understood if one does not realize the monstrous -circumstances of that crisis. In the face of these facts, however -disagreeable, one must decide to bring these sometimes very personal -matters to the attention of the Tribunal. Unfortunately I cannot -dispense with it in my defense. It is the alpha and omega of my defense. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If the Tribunal please, it might be helpful at this -time to know our position in reference to this line of testimony, if it -is to be considered whether admissible or not now. - -I should desire, if this incident were not brought out, to bring it out -upon cross-examination upon several aspects. One is that it shows the -background of the incident of yesterday, which I think is important in -appraising the truthfulness of testimony in this case. - -Another thing is that it bears upon the conspiracy to seize power. There -were certain men in Germany that these conspirators had to get rid of. -Some of them they could kill safely. Some of them, as we see from the -Röhm Purge, when they went to killing they aroused some opposition. They -had to strike down by other means, and the means they used against -Fritsch and Blomberg show the conspiracy to seize power and to get rid -of the men who might stand in the way of aggressive warfare. - -It will appear, I think, that Fritsch and Blomberg were among the -reliants of the German people in allowing these Nazis to get as far as -they did, believing that here at least were two men who would guard -their interests; and the method by which those men were stricken down -and removed from the scene we would consider an important part of the -conspiracy story, and I would ask to go into it on cross-examination. - -That might perhaps be material to the Court in deciding whether it -should proceed now. - -DR. DIX: May I add one more thing? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Dix. - -The Tribunal thinks, in view of what you have said and what Mr. Justice -Jackson has said, that your examination must continue and you will no -doubt try to confine it as much as you can to the political aspects of -the matter. - -DR. DIX: Of course. But the personal matters are of such political -importance in this case that they cannot be omitted. - -Well then, Dr. Gisevius, you understand the difficulties of the -situation. We want only to give evidence, and not to bring in anything -sensational as an end in itself. However, when it is necessary to speak -on such subjects in order to explain the development to the Tribunal, I -ask you to speak quite frankly. - -GISEVIUS: I ask the Tribunal also to realize my difficulties. I myself -do not like speaking about these things. - -I must add that Göring was the only head of the Investigation -Department. That was the institution which took overall telephone -control in the Third Reich. This Investigation Department was not -satisfied, as has been described here, with merely tapping telephone -conversations and decoding messages; but it had its own intelligence -service, all the way down to its own employees, for obtaining -information. It was, therefore, also quite possible to obtain -confidential information about Marshal Von Blomberg’s wife. When -Helldorf gave the file to Göring, Göring considered himself compelled to -give that file to Hitler. Hitler had a nervous breakdown and decided to -dismiss Marshal Blomberg immediately. Hitler’s first thought, as he told -the generals later at a public meeting, was to appoint Generaloberst Von -Fritsch as Blomberg’s successor. The moment he made his decision known, -Göring and Himmler reminded him that it could not be done as according -to a file of the year 1935 Fritsch was badly incriminated. - -DR. DIX: Excuse me, Doctor. What is the source of your information -regarding this conversation between Hitler and the generals and also -Göring’s statement? - -GISEVIUS: Several generals who took part in that meeting told me about -it, and I have said already that in the course of events, which I have -yet to describe, Hitler himself made many statements. We also had in our -possession until 20 July the original documents of the Supreme -Court-Martial which convened later. - -The file of 1935, which was submitted to Hitler in January 1938, -referred to the fact that in 1934 the Gestapo conceived the idea of -prosecuting, among other enemies of the state, homosexuals as criminals. -In the search for evidence the Gestapo visited the penitentiaries and -asked convicted inmates, who had blackmailed homosexuals, for evidence -and for the names of homosexuals. One of the inmates reported a terrible -story, which was really so horrible that I will not repeat it here. It -will suffice to say that this prisoner believed the man in question had -been a certain Herr Von Fritsch or Frisch. The prisoner could not -remember the correct name. The Gestapo then turned over these files to -Hitler in 1935. Hitler was indignant about the contents. Talking to the -generals, he said he did not want to know about such a disgusting -affair. Hitler ordered the files to be burned immediately. - -Now, in January 1938, Göring and Himmler reminded Hitler of these files; -and it was left to Heydrich’s cleverness to submit to Hitler again these -files, which had allegedly been burned in 1935 and which had been -completed, in the meantime, by extensive investigations. Hitler -believed, as he said to the generals at the time, that after having been -so disappointed in Blomberg, many nasty things could be expected from -Fritsch also. The Defendant Göring offered to bring the convict from the -prison to Hitler and the Reich Chancellery. At Karinhall, Göring had -previously threatened this convict with death if he did not abide by his -statements. - -DR. DIX: How do you know that? - -GISEVIUS: That was mentioned at the Supreme Court-Martial. Then Fritsch -was summoned to the Reich Chancellery and Hitler told him of the -accusations which had been made against him. Fritsch, a gentleman -through and through, had received a confidential warning from Hitler’s -adjutant; but it had been so vague that Fritsch came to the Reich -Chancellery extremely alarmed. He had no idea of what Hitler was -accusing him. Indignantly he denied the crime he had allegedly -committed. In the presence of Göring, he gave Hitler his word of honor -that all the accusations were false. But Hitler went to the nearest -door, opened it, and the convict entered, raised his arm, pointed to -Fritsch and said, “That is he.” - -Fritsch was speechless. He was only able to ask that a judicial -investigation should be made. Hitler demanded his immediate resignation; -and on condition that Fritsch left in silence, he agreed to allow the -matter to rest where it was. Fritsch appealed to Beck, the Chief of the -General Staff. Chief of the General Staff Beck intervened with Hitler. A -hard struggle ensued for a judicial investigation of these terrible -accusations against Fritsch. That struggle lasted about a week. There -were dramatic disputes in the Reich Chancellery. At the end came the -famous 4 February when the generals, who until that day—that is to say, -10 days after the dismissal of Blomberg and the relief of Fritsch—were -completely unaware of the fact that both their superiors were no longer -in office, were ordered to come to Berlin. Hitler personally presented -the files to the generals in such a way that they also were completely -confused and said they were satisfied that the affair should be -investigated by the courts. At the same time Hitler surprised the -generals... - -DR. DIX: You know of this only through the participants of that meeting? - -GISEVIUS: From the participants of the meeting, yes. - -At the same time Hitler surprised the generals with the announcement -that they had a new Commander-in-Chief, Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch. -Some of the generals had, in the meantime, been relieved of their posts; -and also on the evening previous to that announcement, a report appeared -in the newspapers according to which Hitler, under the pretense of -drawing together the reins of government, had dismissed the Foreign -Minister, Von Neurath, effected a change in the Ministry of Economics, -relieved a number of diplomats of their posts, and then, as an appendix -to that report, announced a change in the War Ministry and in the -leadership of the Army. - -Then a new struggle arose, which lasted several weeks, regarding the -convening of the court-martial which should decide as to the -reinstatement of Generaloberst Von Fritsch. This was for all of us the -moment when we believed we would be able to prove before a German -supreme court the methods the Gestapo used to rid themselves of their -political adversaries. This was a unique opportunity of being able to -question witnesses under oath regarding the manner in which the entire -intrigue had been contrived. Therefore we set to work to prepare for our -parts in this trial. - -DR. DIX: What do you mean by “we” in this case? - -GISEVIUS: There was above all one man, who as an honest lawyer and judge -was himself a participator of this Supreme Court-Martial. This was the -Judge Advocate General at that time, and later Chief Judge of the Army, -Ministerial Director Dr. Sack. This man believed that he owed it to the -spirit of law to contribute in every possible way toward exposing these -matters. This he did, but he also paid with his life after 20 July. - -In the course of this investigation the judges of this Supreme -Court-Martial questioned the Gestapo witnesses. They investigated the -records of the Gestapo; they made local investigations; and, with the -aid of the criminologist Nebe, it was not long before they discovered -definitely that the entire affair had concerned a double; it was not -Generaloberst Von Fritsch but a retired Captain Von Frisch who had been -pensioned long before. - -In the course of that investigation the judges established another fact; -they were able to prove that the Gestapo had been in the residence of -this double Von Frisch as early as 15 January and had questioned his -housekeeper. May I compare the two dates once more. On 15 January the -Gestapo had proof that Fritsch was not guilty. On 24 January the -Defendant Göring brings the convict and witness for the prosecution into -the Reich Chancellery in order to incriminate Fritsch, the -Generaloberst. We believed that here indeed we were confronted with a -plot of incredible proportions, and we believed that now even the -skeptical general must see that it was not only in the lower ranks of -the Gestapo that there was scheming and contriving, invisible and -secret, without the knowledge of any of the ministers or of the Reich -Chancellery and which would compel any man of honor and justice to -intervene. This was the reason why we now formed into a larger group and -why we saw that we now no longer needed to collect material about the -Gestapo in secret. That, precisely, was the great difficulty we had had -to deal with. We heard a great deal; but if we had passed on that -evidence, we would in every case have exposed to the terror of the -Gestapo those men who had given us the evidence. - -Now we could proceed legally, and so we started our efforts to persuade -Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch to submit the necessary evidence to the -Supreme Court-Martial. - -DR. DIX: Whom do you mean by “we”? - -GISEVIUS: At that time there was a group, among whom I must mention Dr. -Schacht, who was then extremely active and who went to Admiral Raeder, -to Brauchitsch, to Rundstedt, and to Gürtner, and tried to explain -everywhere that the great crisis had now arisen; that we now had to act; -that it was now the task of the generals to rid us of this regime of -terror. - -But I must mention one more name in that connection. In 1936 Schacht had -already introduced me to Dr. Goerdeler. I had the honor of traveling the -same road with that brave man from then on until 20 July. And now I have -mentioned here for the first time, in this room where so many terrible -things are made known, the name of a German who was a brave and fearless -fighter for freedom, justice, and decency and who, I believe, will one -day be an example, and not only to Germany, to prove that one can also -do one’s duty faithfully until death, even under the terror of the -Gestapo. - -This Dr. Goerdeler, who had always been a fearless and untiring fighter, -had in those days unequaled courage. Like Dr. Schacht he went from one -ministry to another, from one general to the next, and he also believed -that now the hour had come when we could achieve a united front of -decent people led by the generals. Brauchitsch did not refuse then. He -did not refuse to act at Goerdeler’s request. In fact he assured -Goerdeler of his co-operation in a revolt with almost religious fervor. - -And as a witness I may mention that Brauchitsch also solemnly assured me -that he would now use this opportunity to fight against the Gestapo. -However, Brauchitsch made one condition, and that condition was accepted -by the generals as a whole. Brauchitsch said, “Hitler is still such a -popular man; we are afraid of the Hitler myth. We want to give to the -German people and to the world the final proof by means of the Supreme -Court-Martial and its verdict.” Therefore Brauchitsch postponed his -action until the day when the verdict of the Supreme Court-Martial -should be given. - -The Supreme Court-Martial met. It began its session. The session was -suddenly interrupted under dramatic circumstances. I must add that -Hitler appointed the Defendant Göring as president of that Supreme -Court-Martial. And now the Supreme Court-Martial, under the chairmanship -of Göring, convened. I know from Nebe that Göring during the preceding -days had had consultations with Himmler and Heydrich. I know that -Heydrich said to Nebe, “this Supreme Court-Martial will be the end of my -career.” - -DR. DIX: Did Nebe tell you that? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, on the same day. The Supreme Court-Martial would be the -great danger for the Gestapo. And now the Supreme Court-Martial sat for -several hours and was adjourned under dramatic circumstances, for that -was the day chosen for the German armies to march into Austria. Even at -that time we knew without any doubt why the chairman of that -court-martial was so unusually interested in having the troops on that -day receive the order to march, not to a goal within but outside the -Reich. Not until one week later could the Supreme Court-Martial -reconvene, and then Hitler was triumphant. The generals had their first -“campaign of flowers” behind them, a plebiscite had been proclaimed, the -jubilation was great, and the confusion among the generals was still -greater. So that court-martial was dissolved. Fritsch’s innocence was -definitely established, but Brauchitsch said that as a result of the -changed psychological atmosphere created by the annexation of Austria, -he could no longer take the responsibility for a revolt. - -That is roughly the story of how the War Ministry was practically -denuded of its leading men, and how the generals were thrown into -unequaled confusion. From that time on we took the steep downward path -to radicalism. - -DR. DIX: Perhaps I may ask the Tribunal to be permitted to read in this -connection one sentence from a document which I will submit as Exhibit -Number Schacht-15. My document book is still in the process of -translation, but I hope that it will be here on the day of the hearing -of Schacht. There is only one sentence which is of interest in this -connection. It is from the biannual report of the General Staff... - -THE PRESIDENT: Have the documents been submitted to the Prosecution and -to the Tribunal at all? - -DR. DIX: The documents have been discussed with the Prosecution twice in -detail, once with regard to the question of translation, and then on the -question of their admissibility as evidence; and Mr. Dodd discussed them -in open court. I am firmly convinced that the Prosecution is thoroughly -acquainted with the document. It is only one sentence and I do not -believe that the Prosecution would object to the reading of this one -sentence, since otherwise the connection with the documentary evidence -might be obscured. I will introduce a document now and then, wherever it -seems practical. This is only one sentence from the biannual report of -the General Staff of the United States... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not know what this document is, Your Honor. I -should like to know because we may want to ask some questions about it. -I do not want to delay Dr. Dix, but I do not have a copy of it and I do -not know just what it is yet. - -DR. DIX: I just wanted to shorten the proceedings; but as I see that -difficulties may arise, and that a long discussion may be needed, I will -omit it, and will present it later with my documentary evidence. It -would not serve my purpose otherwise. - -[_Turning to the witness._] For the additional information of the Court, -perhaps you will describe the position of the chairman in German -court-martial proceedings; that the control of the examination is in his -hands—that, as a matter of fact, the entire case is in his hands. - -GISEVIUS: Dr. Dix, I do not doubt that you could describe the authority -of such a chairman better and more clearly from the legal point of view. -I would, however, like to say the following: - -I read the minutes of that session, for it is one of those documents -which we thought we would one day submit to the public. This, too, I -hope we will find again. From the minutes it can be seen that the -Defendant Göring, as president, determined the tenor of the entire -proceedings and of the questions. - -He questioned the witnesses for the prosecution, and he took care that -no other questions were put which might have proved embarrassing. I must -say, from these voluminous minutes, that Göring knew how to cloak the -true facts by the manner in which he led the proceedings. - -DR. DIX: In my introductory words at the beginning of the session, I -called the Fritsch crisis the first decisive inner-political step of the -war; and you, Doctor, have adopted that term. After concluding the -description of the Fritsch crisis, will you give the reason for the -views you adopted, and what the effect was upon your group in this -connection, especially upon Schacht? - -GISEVIUS: I must point out again that until this Fritsch crisis it had -been difficult in the ranks of the German opposition to consider even -the possibility of war. That was due to the fact that in Germany the -opposition groups were so sure of the strength of the Army, and of the -leading men, that they believed it sufficed to have a man of honor, like -Fritsch, at the head of the German Army. It seemed inconceivable that -Fritsch would tolerate a sliding into terror or into war. Only a few -persons had pointed out that it was in the nature of every revolution -some day to go beyond the frontiers of a nation. We believed from -history that this theory should be pointed out as a danger threatening -the National Socialist revolution, and therefore we repeatedly warned -those who were convinced that they were faced with a revolution, not -only with a dictatorship, that one day those revolutionaries would -resort to war as a last recourse. As it became more evident in the -course of the Fritsch crisis that radicalism was predominant, a large -circle became aware that the danger of war could no longer be ignored. - -DR. DIX: And did the Defendant Schacht also belong to that circle? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. During those days of the Fritsch crisis, Schacht said, as -did many others: “That means war,” and that was also said plainly to the -then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Von Brauchitsch. - -DR. DIX: Now the question arises why Schacht had previously financed the -rearmament program, at least in the beginning? - -GISEVIUS: Schacht always told me that he had financed the rearmament -program for purposes of defense. Schacht was convinced for many years -that such a large nation in the center of Europe should at least have -means of defense. I may point out that at that time large groups of the -German people were possessed of the idea that there was a possible -danger of attack from the East. You must not forget the type of -propaganda with which the German people were inundated at that time, and -that the reasons given for this particular danger from the East were -based upon Polish aspirations concerning East Prussia. - -DR. DIX: Did Schacht also discuss with you at that time the fact that -this rearmament was serving his political purposes, as through it he -might be able to start discussions on general disarmament again? - -GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. Unfortunately I forgot to emphasize this -point myself. Schacht was of the opinion that all means should be used -to bring about discussions on rearmament again. He had an idea that very -soon—I think he had held that opinion since 1935—the attention of -opponent countries should be drawn to German rearmament; and then -Hitler, because his rearmament was now known, would be forced to resume -discussions at the disarmament conference. - -DR. DIX: Was that which you have just said the subject of your -conversation with Schacht at that time, or is that your judgment now? - -GISEVIUS: No, I remember this conversation very well, because I thought -Hitler’s inclinations lay in other directions than in attending a -disarmament conference. I thought Hitler to be of an entirely different -mentality, and was somewhat surprised that Schacht considered it -possible that Hitler might harbor such thoughts. - -DR. DIX: Did you have the impression from your conversations with -Schacht that he was informed in detail of the type, speed, and extent of -the rearmament? - -GISEVIUS: I well remember how often Schacht asked me and friends of mine -whether we could not help him to get information about the extent of -rearmament by inquiring at the Reich War Ministry. I have already -described yesterday the efforts he made to get details through Oster and -Thomas. - -DR. DIX: Could you tell the Tribunal whether Schacht made any attempt to -limit armament expenses, and thus limit the extent and speed of the -rearmament; and, if so, when he made these efforts? - -GISEVIUS: To my knowledge, he started to attempt this as early as 1936. -In the heated debates about Schacht’s resignation as Minister of -Economics in 1937, his efforts in this direction played a very important -part. I recall that practically every conversation was concerned with -that point. - -DR. DIX: Now, it is said—and quite understandably also by the -Prosecution—that the reasons Schacht gave, even in official reports and -so on, for the necessity of these limitations were primarily of a -financial-technical nature, that is to say, he spoke as an anxious -economic leader and an anxious president of the Reichsbank and not as an -anxious patriot afraid that his country might be plunged into war. - -Do you know of any discussions with Schacht, of which you can remember -anything, concerning the foregoing which might be useful to the -Tribunal? - -GISEVIUS: In all these preliminary discussions there were dozens of -drafts of the communications Schacht wrote. They were discussed in -friendly circles. To mention but one example, Schacht repeatedly -discussed these drafts also with Goerdeler. It was always one question -that was concerned: What could one say, so that such a letter should not -be considered a provocation but would serve rather to draw the other -non-Party ministers, and particularly the War Minister Blomberg, to -Schacht’s side? That was just the difficulty, for how could such -ministers as Blomberg, Neurath, or Schwerin-Krosigk, who were much more -loyal to Hitler, be persuaded to join Schacht rather than to say that -Schacht had once again provoked Hitler and Göring with his notoriously -sharp tongue. All these letters can only be understood by their tactical -reasons which, as I have said, had been discussed in detail with the -leading men of the opposition. - -DR. DIX: Now, after the Fritsch crisis, how did the political conspiracy -between you and your friends and Schacht take form? - -GISEVIUS: I want to deal with that word “conspiracy.” While up to that -moment our activity could only be called more or less oppositional, now -a conspiracy did indeed begin; and there appeared in the foreground a -man who was later to play an important part as head of that conspiracy. -The Chief of the General Staff at that time, Generaloberst Beck, -believed that the time had come for a German general to give the alarm -both inside and outside the country. I believe it is important for the -Tribunal to know also the ultimate reason which prompted Beck to take -that step. - -The Chief of the General Staff was present when Hitler, in May 1938, -made a speech to the generals at Jüterbog. That speech was intended to -reinstate Fritsch. A few words were said about Fritsch, but more was -said—and for the first time quite openly before a large group of German -generals—about Hitler’s intention to engulf Czechoslovakia in a war. -Beck heard that speech; and he was indignant that he, as Chief of the -General Staff, should hear of such an intention for the first time in -such an assembly without having been informed or consulted previously. -During that same meeting, Beck sent a letter to Brauchitsch asking him -for an immediate interview. Brauchitsch refused and deliberately kept -Beck waiting for several weeks. Beck became impatient and wrote a -comprehensive memorandum in which as Chief of the General Staff he -protested against the fact that the German people were being drawn into -war. At the end of that memorandum Beck announced his resignation, and -here I believe is the opportunity to say a word about this Chief of the -General Staff. - -DR. DIX: One moment, Doctor. Will you tell us the source of your -knowledge of what Beck thought, and the negotiations between Beck and -Brauchitsch? - -GISEVIUS: Beck confided in me, and during the latter years I worked in -very close collaboration with him, and I was by his side until the last -hour of his life on 20 July. I can testify here—and it is important for -the Tribunal to know this—that Beck struggled again and again with the -problem as to what a chief of the General Staff should do when he -realized that events were driving toward a war. Therefore I owe to his -memory, and to my oath here, not to conceal the fact that Beck took the -consequences of being the only German general to relinquish his post -voluntarily, in order to show that there is a limit beyond which even -generals in leading positions may not go; but at the sacrifice of their -position and their life, must resign and accept no further orders. Beck -was of the opinion that the General Staff was not only an organization -of war technicians; he saw in the German General Staff the conscience of -the German Army, and he trained his staff accordingly. He suffered -immensely during the later years of his life because men whom he had -trained in that spirit did not follow the dictates of their conscience. -I owe it to this man to say that he was a man of inflexible character. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think we might get on to what Beck actually -did. - -DR. DIX: Yes, Your Honor, but... - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps it would be a convenient time to break off. What -I mean is, the witness said that Beck protested in a memorandum and -offered to resign, and that was some minutes ago, and since then he was -talking and had not told us what Beck actually did. - -DR. DIX: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit in open session on Saturday -morning, but will be sitting in closed session. - -DR. DIX: [_Turning to the witness._] You were saying that Generaloberst -Beck carried out his decision to tender his resignation after the speech -at Jüterbog. What did he do then? - -GISEVIUS: Hitler and Brauchitsch urgently pressed him to remain in -office, but Beck refused and insisted upon resigning. Thereupon Hitler -and Brauchitsch urged Beck at least not to make his resignation public, -and they asked him if he would not formally defer his resignation for a -few months. Beck, who had not yet gone the way of high treason, thought -that he should comply with this request. Later he most deeply regretted -this loyal attitude. The fact is that as early as the end of May or the -beginning of June his successor, General Halder, took over the office of -Chief of General Staff; and from that moment Beck was actually no longer -in charge. - -DR. DIX: May I ask you once more, from what observations, and -conversations with whom, do you base the knowledge of these facts? - -GISEVIUS: From constant discussions I had with Beck, Oster, Goerdeler, -Schacht, and an entire group of people at that time; later, the question -why Beck did not make his retirement public depressed him to such an -extent that it was a continual subject of discussions between him and me -up to the end. - -DR. DIX: That was Beck’s resignation; but then the problem of the -possible resignation of Schacht was probably also brought up in -deliberations. To your knowledge, and from your observation, was the -question of the necessity or the opportuneness of Schacht’s resignation -discussed between Schacht and Beck? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, it was discussed in great detail. - -It was Beck’s opinion that his resignation alone might not be -sufficiently effective. He approached Schacht therefore and asked him -whether he would not join him, Beck, and resign also. This subject was -discussed in great detail, on the one hand between Beck and Schacht -personally, and on the other between Oster and myself, who were the two -intermediaries. During these conferences, I must confess that I, too, -was of the opinion that Schacht should resign under all circumstances; -and I also advised him to that effect. It was Oster’s opinion, however, -that Schacht must definitely remain in office and he asked him to do so; -in order to influence the generals Schacht was needed as an official -with a ministerial title. In retrospect I must say here that my advice -to Schacht was wrong. The events which I have yet to describe have -proved how important it was to Oster and others that Schacht should -remain in office. - -DR. DIX: That, of course, was a serious question for Schacht’s own -conscience. You have informed the Tribunal of your opinions and of -Oster’s opinions. Did Schacht discuss his scruples with you, and the -pros and cons of his deliberations in making his final decision? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I don’t object to the defendants trying their case -in their own way, but I do think we are passing beyond the limits of -profitable inquiry here. Schacht is present; he is the man who can tell -us about his conscience, and I know of no way that another witness can -do so, and I think it is not a question to which the answer would have -competent value, and I object respectfully. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think you had better tell us what Schacht -did—not tell us—but get from the witness what Schacht did. - -DR. DIX: If I may, I should like to make a brief remark. It is true, of -course, as Mr. Justice Jackson said, that Schacht knows his own reasons -best and can tell them to the Tribunal. On a question as difficult as -this, however, the justification of which is even subject to -argument—the Prosecution apparently is inclined to consider the train -of thought which led to Schacht’s decision to be unacceptable—it -appears to me, at least on the basis of our rules for evidence, that it -is relevant for the Tribunal to hear from an eye-and-ear witness what -the considerations were and whether they really were such at the time, -or whether Schacht, now in the defendants’ dock, is _ex post facto_, -devising some explanation, as every defendant is more or less suspected -of doing. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the witness can tell us what -Schacht said and what Schacht did, but not what Schacht thought. - -DR. DIX: Certainly. Your Lordship, I only want him to tell us what -Schacht said to the witness at that time about his opinion. - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need any further discussion about it. -The witness has heard what I have said and you can ask him what Schacht -said, and what Schacht did; but not what Schacht thought. - -DR. DIX: Very well then, what did Schacht say to you regarding the -reasons for his resignation? - -GISEVIUS: Schacht told me at the time that after all we had experienced -the generals could not be relied upon ever really to revolt. For that -reason, as a politician, he considered it his duty to think of some -possibility other than a revolt for bringing about a change in -conditions in Germany. For that reason he evolved a plan which he -explained to me at the time. Schacht said to me, “I have got Hitler by -the throat.” He meant by that, as he explained to me in great detail, -that now the day was approaching where the debts which had been incurred -by the Reich Minister of Finance, and thus by the Reich Cabinet, would -have to be repaid to the Reichsbank. Schacht doubted whether the -Minister of Finance, Schwerin-Krosigk, would be prepared without further -ado to carry out the moral and legal obligation of repaying the credits -which had been extended. - -Schacht thought that that was the moment in which he should come out -with his resignation, with a joint step by the Reichsbank Directorate; -and he hoped that, given that situation, the other ministers of the -Reich would join him, the majority of whom were still democratic at the -time. - -That is what he meant when he said to me, “I have still one more arrow I -can shoot, and that is the moment when not even a Neurath, a Gürtner, a -Seldte can refuse to follow me.” - -I answered Schacht at that time that I doubted whether there would ever -be such a meeting of the Cabinet. In my opinion, the steps which would -be taken to dispose of him would be much more brutal. Schacht did not -believe me, and above all he told me he would be certain of achieving -one thing; these matters would have to be discussed in the Cabinet, and -then he would cause a situation in Germany as alarming as the one which -existed in February 1938 at the time of the Fritsch crisis. He therefore -expected a radical reformation of the cabinet which would provide the -proper psychological atmosphere for the generals to intervene. - -DR. DIX: You said at the beginning that Schacht had said or hinted that -he could not absolutely rely on the generals to bring about a revolt. -Which generals was he referring to, and what did he mean? - -GISEVIUS: Schacht meant at the time the first revolutionary situation -which had arisen in Germany, during the months of May to September 1938, -when we drifted into the Czechoslovakia war crisis. Beck had assured us -at the time of his resignation—by us I mean Goerdeler, Schacht and -other politicians—that he would leave to us a successor who was more -energetic than himself, and who was firmly determined to precipitate a -revolt if Hitler should decide upon war. That man whom Beck trusted, and -to whom he introduced us, was General Halder. As a matter of fact, on -taking office, General Halder immediately took steps to start -discussions on the subject with Schacht, Goerdeler, Oster, and our -entire group. A few days after he took over his office he sent for Oster -and informed him that he considered that things were drifting toward -war, and that he would then undertake an overthrow of the Government. He -asked Oster what he, for his part, intended to do to bring civilians -into the plot. - -DR. DIX: Who were the civilians in question, apart from Goerdeler and -Schacht? - -GISEVIUS: Halder put that question to Oster, and under the circumstances -at that time, when we were still a very small circle, Oster replied that -to the best of his knowledge there were only two civilians with whom -Halder could have preliminary political conversations; one was -Goerdeler, the other, Schacht. - -Halder refused to speak personally to a man as suspect as Goerdeler. He -gave as his reason the fact that it was too dangerous for him to receive -now a man whom he did not yet know, whereas he could find some official -reason for having a conference with Schacht. Halder asked Oster to act -as intermediary for such a conference with Schacht. - -Oster approached Schacht through me. Schacht was willing. A meeting was -to be arranged at a third person’s place. I warned Schacht and said to -him, “Have Halder come to your house, so that you are quite sure of the -matter.” - -Halder then visited Schacht personally at the end of July 1938 at his -residence; and he informed him that matters had reached a stage where -war was imminent and that he, Halder, would then bring about a revolt, -and he asked Schacht whether he was prepared to aid him politically in a -leading position. - -That is what Schacht told me at the time, and Halder told it to Oster. - -DR. DIX: And Oster told it to you? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, as I continually acted as an intermediary in these -discussions. Schacht replied, as he assured me directly after Halder’s -visit, that he was prepared to do anything if the generals were to -decide to remove Hitler. - -The following morning, Halder sent for Oster. He told him of this -conversation, and he asked Oster whether police preparations had now -been made for this revolt. Oster suggested that Halder should talk to me -personally about these matters. I had a long talk in the darkness with -Halder about this revolt. I believe that it is important for me to state -here what Halder told me of his intentions at that time. First Halder -assured me that, in contrast to many other generals, he had no doubt -that Hitler wanted war. Halder described Hitler to me as being -bloodthirsty and referred to the blood bath of 30 June. However, Halder -told me that it was, unfortunately, terribly difficult to explain -Hitler’s real intentions to the generals, particularly to the junior -officers corps, because the saying which was influencing the officers -corps was ostensibly that it was all just a colossal bluff, that the -Army could be absolutely certain that Hitler did not want to start a -war, but rather that he was merely preparing a diplomatic maneuver of -blackmail on a large scale. - -For that reason, Halder believed that it was absolutely necessary to -prove, even to the last captain, that Hitler was not bluffing at all but -had actually given the order for war. Halder therefore decided at the -time that for the sake of informing the German nation and the officers -he would even risk the outbreak of war. But even then Halder feared the -Hitler myth; and he therefore suggested to me that the day after the -outbreak of war Hitler should be killed by means of a bomb; and the -German people should be made to believe, as far as possible, that Hitler -had been killed by an enemy bombing attack on the Führer’s train. I -replied to Halder at the time that perhaps I was still too young, but I -could not understand why he did not want to tell the German people, at -least afterwards, what the generals had done. - -Then for a few weeks there was no news from Halder. The press campaign -against Czechoslovakia assumed an ever more threatening character and we -felt that now it would be only a few days, or perhaps weeks, before war -would break out. At that very moment Schacht decided to visit Halder -again and to remind him of his promise. I thought it best that a witness -should be present during that conversation and therefore I accompanied -Schacht. It did not appear to me that Halder was any too pleased at the -presence of a witness. Halder once again declared his firm intention of -effecting a revolt; but again he wished to wait until the German nation -had received proof of Hitler’s warlike intentions by means of a definite -order for war. Schacht pointed out to Halder the tremendous danger of -such an experiment. He made it clear to Halder that a war could not be -started simply to destroy the Hitler legend in the eyes of the German -people. - -In a detailed and very excited conversation Halder then declared that he -was prepared to start the revolt, not after the official outbreak of the -war, but at the very moment that Hitler gave the army the final order to -march. - -We asked Halder whether he would then still be able to control the -situation or whether Hitler might not surprise him with some lightning -stroke. Halder replied literally, “No, he cannot deceive me. I have -designed my General Staff plans in such a way that I am bound to know it -48 hours in advance.” I think that is important, because during the -subsequent course of events the period of time between the order to -march and the actual march itself was considerably shortened. - -Halder assured us that besides the preparations in Berlin he had an -armored division ready in Thuringia under the command of General Von -Höppner, which might possibly have to halt the Leibstandarte, which was -in Munich, on the march to Berlin. - -Although Halder had told us all this, Schacht and I had a somewhat -bitter aftertaste of that conference. Halder had told Schacht that he, -Schacht, seemed to be urging him to effect this revolt prematurely; and -Schacht and I were of the opinion that Halder might abandon us at the -last moment. We informed Oster immediately of the bad impression we had -had, and we told Oster that something absolutely must be done to win -over another general in case Halder should not act at the last minute. -Oster agreed and these are the preliminary events which led to the later -General Field Marshal Von Witzleben first coming into our circle of -conspirators. - -DR. DIX: Who won Von Witzleben over? - -GISEVIUS: Schacht did. - -DR. DIX: Who did? - -GISEVIUS: Schacht won Witzleben over. Oster visited Witzleben and told -him everything that had happened. Thereupon Witzleben sent for me, and I -told him that in my opinion the police situation was such that he, as -commanding general of the Berlin Army Corps, could confidently risk a -revolt. Witzleben asked me the question which every general put to us at -that time: Whether a diplomatic incident in the East would really lead -to war or whether it was not true, as Hitler and Ribbentrop had -repeatedly told the generals in confidence, that there was a tacit -agreement with the Western Powers giving Germany a free hand in the -East. Witzleben said that if such an agreement really existed, then, of -course, he could not revolt. I told Witzleben that Schacht with his -excellent knowledge of the Anglo-Saxon mentality could no doubt give him -comprehensive information about that. - -A meeting between Schacht and Witzleben was arranged. Witzleben brought -with him his divisional general, Von Brockdorff, who was to carry out -the revolt in detail. Witzleben, Brockdorff, and I drove together to -Schacht’s country house for a conference which lasted for hours. The -final result was that Witzleben was convinced by Schacht that the -Western Powers would under no circumstances allow Germany to move into -the Eastern territories and that now Hitler’s policy of surprise had -come to an end. Witzleben decided that he, on his part and independently -of Halder, would make all preparations which would be necessary if he -should have to act. - -He issued me false papers and gave me a position at his district -headquarters so that there, under his personal protection, I could make -all the necessary police and political preparations. He delegated -General Von Brockdorff, and he and I visited all the points in Berlin -which Brockdorff was to occupy with his Potsdam Division. Frau Strünck -was at the wheel and traveling ostensibly as tourists we settled exactly -what had to be done. - -DR. DIX: That is the witness Strünck. Please excuse me. - -GISEVIUS: I believe I owe you a brief explanation as to why Witzleben’s -co-operation was absolutely necessary. It was not so easy to find a -general who had the actual authority to order his troops to march. For -instance, there were some generals in the provinces who could not give -their troops the order to march. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, is it necessary to go into the matter in such -detail as to why General Witzleben should be brought in? - -DR. DIX: The reasons why Witzleben was needed are perhaps not essential -for our case. We can therefore drop this subject. - -Will you please tell me, Dr. Gisevius, whether Schacht was kept -constantly informed of these military and police preparations which you -have described? - -GISEVIUS: Schacht was kept informed about all these matters. We met in -the evening in the residence of Von Witzleben and I showed everything -that I had worked out in writing during the day. It was then discussed -in full detail. - -DR. DIX: Apart from these military and police measures, which you have -mentioned, were there any political measures? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, of course. We had to decide carefully what the German -nation was to be told in such a case from the point of view of internal -politics, just as there were certain preparations which had to be made -regarding the external. - -DR. DIX: What do you mean by external—foreign politics? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, of course, foreign politics. - -DR. DIX: Why of course? Was the Foreign Office included or what is meant -by foreign politics in this case? - -GISEVIUS: It is very difficult to give an explanation, because the -co-operation with foreign countries during the time of war, or -immediately before a war, is a matter which is very difficult to discuss -as we are touching upon a very controversial subject. If I am to talk -about it, then it is at least as important for me to state the reasons -which led these people to carry on such discussions with foreign -countries, as it is to give times and dates. - -DR. DIX: I am sure that the Tribunal will permit you to do so. I think -that the Tribunal will permit that the motives... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal thinks you are going into too great -detail over these matters. If the Tribunal is prepared to accept this -witness’ evidence as true, it shows that Schacht was negotiating with -him and General Witzleben at this time with a view to prevent the war. I -say, if the Tribunal accepts it; and that seems to be a matter you will -not prove with the details of these negotiations, which seem to me not -very important. - -DR. DIX: Yes, but in my opinion the gravity and intensity of the -activities of these conspirators should be substantiated in detail. In -my opinion it is not sufficient that these plans... - -THE PRESIDENT: But you have touched upon them since 10 o’clock this -morning. - -DR. DIX: Your Lordship, I am now proceeding in connection with Schacht’s -point of view, as to whether a survey, a political survey of Schacht’s -part... - -THE PRESIDENT: I am told that you said last night that you would be half -an hour longer. Do you remember saying that? Perhaps it was a -mistranslation. - -DR. DIX: Oh no, that is quite a misunderstanding. I said that if I were -to touch upon the Fritsch crisis and complete it, it would take another -half hour—that is, the Fritsch crisis alone. Gentlemen of the Tribunal, -the position is this: We are now hearing the story of the political -opposition, in which Schacht played a leading role. If the Defendant -Göring and others had time for days to describe the entire course of -events from their point of view, I think that justice demands that those -men, represented in this courtroom by the Defendant Schacht, who fought -against that system under most dreadful conditions of terror, should -also be permitted to tell in detail the story of their opposition -movement. - -I would, therefore, ask the Tribunal—and I am not in favor of the -superfluous—to give me permission to allow the witness to make a few -more remarks on the measures taken by the group of conspirators, Beck, -Schacht, Canaris, and others, which he has already touched upon. I beg -the Tribunal to realize that I consider it of the greatest importance; -and I assume, Your Lordship, that if it is not done now, the Prosecution -will take the matter up during cross-examination. Moreover, I believe -that as it is now being told in sequence, it will take less time than if -we were to wait for the cross-examination. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not propose to tell you how you are to -prove your case, but hopes that you will deal with it as shortly as -possible and without unnecessary details. - -DR. DIX: Please be sure of that. - -Well then, Witness; you had mentioned foreign political measures, and -you were about to talk of the motives which caused some of you to enter -into relations with foreign countries for the support of your opposition -movement. Will you please continue with that? - -GISEVIUS: I should like simply to confine myself to the statement that -from that time on there were very detailed and weighty discussions with -foreign countries in order to try everything possible to prevent the -outbreak of war or at least to shorten it or keep it from spreading. -However, as long as I am not in a position to speak of the motives of -such a delicate matter—in connection with which people like us would be -accused of high treason, in Germany, at least—as long as that is the -case, I shall not say more than the fact that these conversations took -place. - -DR. DIX: I did not understand that the Tribunal would prevent you from -explaining your motives. You may state them therefore. - -GISEVIUS: I owe it to my conscience and above all to those who -participated and are now dead, to state here that those matters which I -have described weighed very heavily upon their consciences. We knew that -we would be accused of conspiring with foreign countries. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, of course, knows that these matters were -not conducted without danger; but we are not really here for the purpose -of considering people who have, unfortunately, lost their lives. We are -considering the case of the Defendant Schacht at the moment. - -DR. DIX: I think the intention of the witness has been misunderstood. He -does not wish to speak about those men who lost their lives, and he does -not want to speak of the dangers; he wishes rather to speak of the -conflicts of conscience suffered by those who planned and undertook -those steps. I think that that privilege should be granted the witness -if he is to speak of this very delicate matter here in public. I would, -therefore, beg you to allow it; otherwise the witness will confine -himself to general indications which will not be sufficient for my -defense, and I assume that the Prosecution will ask about these things -in the cross-examination. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you try and get him to come to the point? We, of -course, can’t tell what he wants to talk about. We can only tell about -what he does talk about. - -DR. DIX: Well, then, you will describe briefly the considerations which -swayed those who entered into those foreign relations, and also describe -the character of those relations. - -GISEVIUS: Mr. President, it was not merely a question of conscience. I -was concerned with the fact that there are relatives still alive today -who might become the subject of unjust accusations; and that is why I -had to say, with reference to those conferences abroad which I shall -describe, that even our intimate circle of friends did not agree in all -respects as to what measures were to be permitted. One wanted to go -further, while another held back. I owe it to the memory of the dead -Admiral Canaris, for instance, to rectify many erroneous press -announcements and state that he refused to conspire with foreign -countries. I must guard against the possibility that anything I say now -might be applied to men whom I have mentioned earlier. That is why I -wanted to make this statement, and at the same time I wanted to say that -our friends who did these things rejected the accusation of high -treason, because we felt that we were morally obliged to take these -steps. - -DR. DIX: Well then, what happened? - -GISEVIUS: The following happened: Immediately after Hitler announced his -intention to invade Czechoslovakia, friends tried to keep the British -Government informed, from the first intention to the final decision. The -chain of attempts began with the journey of Goerdeler in the spring of -1938 to London, where he gave information concerning the existence of an -opposition group which was resolved to go to any lengths. In the name of -this group the British Government was continuously informed of what was -happening and that it was absolutely necessary to make it clear, to the -German people and to the generals, that every step across the Czech -border would constitute for the Western Powers a reason for war. When -the crisis neared its climax and when our preparations for a revolt had -been completed to the last detail, we took a step unusual in form and -substance. We informed the British Government that the pending -diplomatic negotiations would not, as Hitler asserted, deal with the -question of the Sudeten countries but that Hitler’s intention was to -invade the whole of Czechoslovakia and that, if the British Government -on its side were to remain firm, we could give the assurance that there -would be no war. - -Those were, at the time, our attempts to obtain a certain amount of -assistance from abroad in our fight for the psychological preparation of -a revolt. - -DR. DIX: We now come to September of 1938 and the crisis which led to -the Munich Conference. What were the activities of your group of -conspirators at that time? - -GISEVIUS: The more the crisis moved towards the Munich conference, the -more we tried to convince Halder that he should start the revolt at -once. As Halder was somewhat uncertain, Witzleben prepared everything in -detail. I shall now describe only the last two dramatic days. On 27 -September it was clear that Hitler wanted to go to the utmost extremity. -In order to make the German people war-minded he ordered a parade of the -Berlin army through Berlin. Witzleben had to execute the order. The -parade had entirely the opposite effect. The population, which assumed -that the troops were marching to war, showed their open displeasure. The -troops, instead of jubilation, saw clenched fists; and Hitler, who was -watching the parade from the window of the Reich Chancellery, had a fit -of rage. He stepped back from the window and said, “With such people I -cannot wage war.” Witzleben came home indignant and said that he would -have liked to have had the guns unlimbered in front of the Reich -Chancellery. On the next morning... - -DR. DIX: One moment, Witzleben told you that he would have liked to have -had the guns unlimbered in front of the Chancellery? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. DIX: And what is the source of your knowledge regarding Hitler’s -remark when he stepped back from the balcony? - -GISEVIUS: Several people from the Reich Chancellery told us that. - -DR. DIX: Well then, go on. - -GISEVIUS: The following morning—that was the 28th—we believed that the -opportunity had now come to carry out the revolt. That morning we also -learned that Hitler had rejected the final offer from the British Prime -Minister, Chamberlain, and had sent the intermediary, Wilson, back with -a refusal. Witzleben got that letter and took it to Halder. He believed -that proof of Hitler’s desire for war had now been produced, and Halder -agreed. Halder went to see Brauchitsch while Witzleben waited in -Halder’s room. After a few moments Halder came back and said that -Brauchitsch now had also realized that the moment for action had arrived -and that he merely wanted to go over to the Reich Chancellery to make -quite sure that Witzleben and Halder’s account was correct. Brauchitsch -went to the Reich Chancellery after Witzleben had told him over the -telephone that everything was prepared; and it was that noon hour of 28 -September when suddenly, and contrary to expectations, Mussolini’s -intervention in the Reich Chancellery took place, and Hitler, impressed -by Mussolini’s step, agreed to go to Munich; so that actually at the -last moment the revolt was eliminated. - -DR. DIX: You mean through Munich, don’t you? - -GISEVIUS: Of course. - -DR. DIX: And now the Munich conference was over. How did matters stand -in your group of conspirators? - -GISEVIUS: We were extremely depressed. We were convinced that now Hitler -would soon go to the utmost lengths. We did not doubt that Munich was -the signal for a world war. Some of our friends wondered if we should -emigrate, and that was discussed with Goerdeler and Schacht. Goerdeler, -with this idea in mind, wrote a letter to a political friend in America -and asked particularly whether the opposition people should now -emigrate. Goerdeler said, - -“Otherwise to be able to continue our political work at all in Germany -in the future there is only one other possibility, and that is to employ -the methods of Talleyrand.” - -We decided to persevere, and then events followed in quick succession -from the Jewish pogroms to the conquest of Prague. - -DR. DIX: But before we come to Prague, Witness, you mentioned the Jewish -pogroms; and obviously you mean November 1938. Do you know or can you -recollect what Schacht’s reaction was to those events? - -GISEVIUS: Schacht was indignant about the Jewish pogroms, and he said so -in a public speech before the personnel of the Reichsbank. - -DR. DIX: I shall submit that speech later as documentary evidence. And -then how did things go on from there? We have come to the end of 1938. -Were there new political events on the horizon which had a stimulating -effect on your group of conspirators? - -GISEVIUS: First of all, there was Schacht’s sudden dismissal from the -Reichsbank Directorate. Schacht’s desire for a consultation of the -Cabinet on this matter did not materialize and our hopes of bringing -about a cabinet crisis were vain. Thus our opposition group had no -connecting point and we had to wait and see what would happen after the -conquest of Prague. - -DR. DIX: One moment; you mentioned Schacht’s dismissal from his position -as President of the Reichsbank. Can you tell us anything about this, -about the circumstances leading to it and the effect it had on Schacht, -and so on? - -GISEVIUS: I saw how the various letters and memoranda of the Reichsbank -Directorate were drafted, and how they were progressively toned down, -and how Schacht was then dismissed. A few minutes after the letter of -dismissal arrived from Hitler, Schacht read it to me; and he was -indignant at the contents. He repeated to me the passage in which Hitler -praised him for his participation in the German rearmament program; and -Schacht said, “And now he wants me to undertake to go on working with -him openly, and uphold his war policy.” - -DR. DIX: But then Schacht remained as a Minister without Portfolio. Was -the problem as to whether he should do so or whether he could act -differently ever discussed between you and Schacht at the time? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, but as far as I know it was the same type of discussion -which took place whenever he was to resign. He talked to Lammers, and I -assume that Lammers gave him the customary reply. - -DR. DIX: In other words, he thought he had to remain, that he was forced -to remain? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. DIX: Now, you have made several attempts to speak about Prague, but -I interrupted you. Will you please describe the effects upon your group -of conspirators, as far as Schacht was concerned? - -GISEVIUS: Since December our group had definite proof that Hitler would -attack Prague in March. This new action was cynically called the “March -whirlwind.” As it was quite openly discussed in Berlin circles, we hoped -that news of this action would also reach the British and French -Embassies. We were firmly convinced that this time results would not be -achieved by surprise; but Halder had already adopted a different view. -He thought that Hitler had been given free passage to Prague by the -Western Powers. He refused to have preliminary conferences and wanted to -wait and see whether this Prague action could be achieved without a -fight. And that is what happened. - -DR. DIX: In which direction? You have already spoken about the steps -with the British and French Embassies. - -GISEVIUS: No, there were no steps taken with regard to the British and -French Embassies. - -DR. DIX: Do you want to say anything further about it? Have you anything -to add? - -GISEVIUS: No, I have said that we did not take any steps. - -DR. DIX: Now, then, Prague is over; and I believe that you and Schacht -went to Switzerland together on behalf of your group. Is that correct? - -GISEVIUS: Not only together with Schacht but also with Goerdeler. We -were of the opinion that Schacht in Germany—excuse me—that Prague -would have incredible psychological effects in Germany. As far as -foreign countries were concerned, Prague was the signal that no peace -and no treaty could be kept with Hitler. Inside Germany unfortunately we -were forced to see that the generals and the people were now convinced -that this Hitler could do whatever he wished; nobody would stop him; he -was protected by Providence. This alarmed us. On one side we saw that -the Western Powers would no longer put up with these things; and on the -other side we saw that within Germany the illusion was growing that the -Western Powers would not go to war. We could see that a war could be -prevented only if the Western Powers would tell not only the Foreign -Minister, not only Hitler, but by every means of propaganda tell the -German nation that any further step towards the East would mean war. It -appeared to us that the only possibility was to warn the generals and to -get them to revolt, and that was the subject of the talks which Schacht, -Goerdeler, and I conducted in Switzerland, immediately after Prague. - -DR. DIX: With whom? - -GISEVIUS: We met a man who had excellent connections with the British -and French Governments. This man made very exact reports at least to the -French Government. I can testify to this because later after Paris was -conquered, I was able to find a copy of his report among Daladier’s -secret papers. We told this man very clearly that in autumn at the -latest, the fight for Danzig would start. We told him that, as good -Germans, we were without doubt of the opinion that Danzig was a German -city and that some day that point would have to be peacefully discussed; -but we also warned him against having conferences now regarding Danzig -alone because Hitler did not want only Danzig but the whole of Poland, -not the whole of Poland but the Ukraine, and that that was the reason -why the propaganda of foreign countries should make it abundantly clear -to Germany that the limit had now been reached and that the Western -Powers would intervene. We said that only then would a revolt be -possible for us. - -DR. DIX: And did this man who had your confidence make a report in the -way you stipulated? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, he did; and I must say that very soon public statements -on the part of the British, either on the radio or in the press or in -the House of Commons, began to remove these doubts among the German -generals and the German people. From that time on everything which could -be done was done by the British to alarm the German generals. - -DR. DIX: Did not Schacht meet his friend Montagu Norman in Switzerland -at that time and talk with him in the same vein? Do you know? Were you -there? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. We thought that the opportunity for Schacht to talk to a -close friend of the British Prime Minister, Chamberlain, should not be -allowed to pass; and Schacht had very detailed discussions with Montagu -Norman, so as to describe to him the psychological atmosphere in Germany -after Prague and to persuade him that the British Government should now -undertake the necessary clarifications. - -DR. DIX: Was not your slogan in reports to foreign countries at the -time: “You must play off the Nazis against Germans”? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, it was the tenor of all our discussions. We wanted it -made clear to the German people that the Western Powers were not against -Germany, but only against this Nazi policy of surprise and against the -Nazi methods of terror, within the country as well as without. - -DR. DIX: And now, having come back from Switzerland, what happened next, -particularly with reference to Schacht? - -GISEVIUS: We saw that things in Germany were rapidly drifting toward the -August crisis and that the generals could not be dissuaded from the view -that Hitler was only bluffing and that there would be another Munich or -another Prague. And now began all those desperate efforts which we made -in order to influence the leading generals, and particularly Keitel, to -prevent the decisive order being given to march against Poland. - -DR. DIX: Let us come back to Schacht’s return from the Swiss journey in -spring of 1939. You know that Schacht left Germany then and made a -journey to India? - -GISEVIUS: He went to India and hoped to stay there as long as possible -in order to go to China. But on the way Hitler’s order prohibiting him -from setting foot on Chinese soil reached him, and he had to return. As -far as I remember, he came back a few days before the outbreak of war. - -DR. DIX: You said China; did Schacht have sympathies with -Chiang-Kai-Chek in spite of the pact with Japan? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. He sympathized greatly with the Chinese Government, as -did our entire circle. We all had quite a number of good and dear -Chinese friends with whom we attempted to keep in touch in spite of the -Japanese pact. - -DR. DIX: About when did Schacht come back from India? - -GISEVIUS: I think it was the beginning of August; but I cannot... - -DR. DIX: Now matters were rapidly heading toward war. Did Schacht, -before the outbreak of war, take any steps to prevent its outbreak? - -GISEVIUS: He took a great number of steps, but they cannot be described -individually as that would create the impression that Schacht alone was -taking these steps. Actually the situation was such that a large group -of people were now in the struggle, and each one took those steps which -were most suited to him, and each one informed the group of what he had -done and what would be advisable for another to do. For that reason I am -afraid that it would present a completely erroneous picture if I were to -describe individually, and only with respect to Schacht, all those -desperate efforts made from August 1939 until the attack on Holland and -Belgium. - -DR. DIX: The Tribunal has taken cognizance of the fact that Schacht was -not acting alone; but here we are dealing with Schacht’s case, and I -should like to ask you, therefore, to confine yourself to the -description of Schacht’s efforts. - -GISEVIUS: In that case I must state first that Schacht knew of all these -other matters and was in a certain sense also an accomplice. Of Schacht -himself I can only say at this particular moment that he was co-author -of the Thomas memorandum addressed to General Keitel, or the two -memoranda, in which Schacht, together with our group, pointed out the -dangers of war to Keitel. Further, I can say that, through Thomas and -Canaris, Schacht took steps to intervene with Brauchitsch and Halder. -But I would like to emphasize expressly that all the steps taken by Beck -and Goerdeler were taken with the full knowledge of Schacht and also -with his participation. This was a very important undertaking. - -DR. DIX: A collective action? Does not Schacht’s attempt at the very -last moment, at the end of August, to make representations to -Brauchitsch through Canaris at headquarters play a part in this? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. After General Thomas had failed with both his memoranda -and after he had failed to persuade Keitel to receive Goerdeler or -Schacht, Schacht tried to approach Brauchitsch or Halder. For that -purpose Thomas paid frequent visits to General Halder, and it was -typical that during those critical days he could not get past the -anteroom of General Halder’s office, past General Von Stülpnagel. Halder -was not “at home,” and just said that he did not want to see Schacht. -Thereupon we took a further step on that dramatic 25 August, the day on -which Hitler had already once given the order to march. As soon as the -news reached us that Hitler had given Halder the order to march, Schacht -and I first got into touch with Thomas; and then, together with Thomas, -we went to Admiral Canaris so that both Thomas and Canaris should -accompany Schacht when he went unannounced to the headquarters in Zossen -in order to confront Brauchitsch and Halder with his presence. Schacht -intended to point out to Brauchitsch and Halder that, in accordance with -the existing constitution, the Reich Cabinet must be consulted before -waging war. Brauchitsch and Halder would be guilty of a breach of oath -if, without the knowledge of the competent political authorities, they -obeyed an order for war. That was roughly what Schacht intended to say -to explain his step. When Thomas and Schacht arrived at Bendlerstrasse, -Thomas went to Canaris. It was about 6 o’clock or... - -DR. DIX: The OKW is situated in Bendlerstrasse. The Tribunal should know -that Bendlerstrasse meant the OKW or the OKH. - -GISEVIUS: When we arrived at the OKW and were waiting at a corner of the -street, Canaris sent Oster to us. That was the moment when Hitler -between 6 and 7 o’clock suddenly ordered Halder to withdraw his order to -march. The Tribunal will no doubt remember that Hitler, influenced by -the renewed intervention of Mussolini, suddenly withdrew the order to -march which had already been given. Unfortunately, Canaris and Thomas -and all our friends were now under the impression that this withdrawal -of an order to march was an incredible loss of prestige for Hitler. -Oster thought that never before in the history of warfare had a supreme -commander withdrawn such a decisive order in the throes of a nervous -breakdown. And Canaris said to me, “Now the peace of Europe is saved for -50 years, because Hitler has now lost the respect of the generals.” And, -unfortunately, in the face of this psychological change, we all felt -that we could look forward to the following days in a quiet frame of -mind. So, when 3 days later, Hitler nevertheless gave the decisive order -to march, it came as a complete surprise for our group as well. Oster -called me to the OKW; Schacht accompanied me. We asked Canaris again -whether he could not arrange another meeting with Brauchitsch and -Halder, but Canaris said to me, “It is too late now.” He had tears in -his eyes and added, “That is the end of Germany.” - -DR. DIX: Your Lordship, we now come to the war, and I think that perhaps -we had better deal with the war after lunch. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius, before the noon recess we had just come to the -outbreak of the war, and so that your subsequent testimony may be -understood, I must ask you first in what capacity you served during the -war. - -GISEVIUS: On the day of the outbreak of war I was called to Security -Intelligence by General Oster by means of a forged order. However, as it -was a regulation that all officers or other members of the intelligence -service had to be examined by the Gestapo, and as I would never have -received permission to be a member of the intelligence, they simply gave -me a forged mobilization order. Then I was at the disposal of Oster and -Canaris without doing any direct service. - -DR. DIX: And after the outbreak of war what were the activities of your -group of conspirators, the members of which you have already mentioned? -Who took over the leadership, who participated, and what was done? - -GISEVIUS: Immediately after the outbreak of the war Generaloberst Beck -was at the head of all oppositional movements which could exist in -Germany at all, with the exception of the Communists with whom we had no -contact at that time. We were of the opinion that only a general could -be the leader during war, and Beck stood so far above purely military -matters that he was the suitable man to unify all groups from the left -to the right. Beck chose Dr. Goerdeler as his closest collaborator. - -DR. DIX: Consequently the only civilians who worked with this group of -conspirators were Schacht and Goerdeler as before? - -GISEVIUS: No, on the contrary; all the opposition groups, who had so far -had merely loose connections with each other, were now drawn together -under the pressure of war. This was especially so with the left -opposition movements, which had been greatly reduced in the early years -as all their leaders had been interned. These left groups especially now -came in with us. In this connection I shall merely mention Leuschner and -Dr. Karl Muehlendorf. However, I must also mention the Christian Trade -Unions, and Dr. Habermann, and Dr. Jacob Kaiser. Further I must mention -the Catholic circles, the leaders of the Confessional Church, and -individual political men such as Ambassador Von Hassell, State Secretary -Planck, Minister Popitz, and many, many others. - -DR. DIX: What was the attitude of these left circles, especially -concerning the question of a revolt, the forceful removal of Hitler or -even an attempt on his life? Did they also consider the possibility of -an attempt at assassination, which later was actually suggested in your -group? - -GISEVIUS: No, the left circles were very much under the impression that -the “stab in the back” legend had done much harm in Germany; and the -left circles thought that they ought not to expose themselves again to -the danger of having it said later that Hitler or the German Army had -not been defeated on the battlefield. The left-wing had long been of the -opinion that no matter how bitter an experience it might be for them, it -must now be proved absolutely to the German people that militarism was -committing suicide in Germany. - -DR. DIX: I have already submitted to the Tribunal, a letter which you, -Doctor, smuggled to Switzerland for Schacht at about this time—the end -of 1939. It is a letter to the former president of the International -Bank at Basel, later president of the First National Bank of New York; a -man of influence, who probably had access to President Roosevelt. - -In anticipation of the documentary evidence pertaining hereto I had -originally intended to read this letter to the Tribunal now. However, in -discussing the admissibility of evidence I informed the Tribunal of most -of the essential points, and as Mr. Justice Jackson could not yet have -the Schacht Document Book in hand, and as he remarked previously that he -did not like me to produce documentary evidence at this point, I will -not carry out my original intention to read this letter in its entirety. -I will come back to it when I present my documentary evidence. Just to -refresh the witness’ memory about this letter, I will give the -underlying reasons for it. Schacht suggested to President Fraser that -now the moment... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I make no objection to the use of the letter from -Schacht to Leon Fraser as one banker writing to another. If you want to -claim that Mr. Fraser was influential with President Roosevelt, I should -want you to prove it; but I have no objection to the letter. - -DR. DIX: The letter is dated 14 January 1946. I will not read it in its -entirety, for there are six long pages. Its contents are... - -THE PRESIDENT: What date was it? - -DR. DIX: I had the wrong letter. The 16 October 1939. It will be Exhibit -Number 31 in my document book. He writes that now would be an excellent -time to give peace to the world with President Roosevelt—that would be -a victory, also a German victory... - -THE PRESIDENT: Is the letter from Schacht? - -DR. DIX: From Schacht to Fraser. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you have proof for the letter? - -DR. DIX: If the Tribunal prefers, Schacht can also deal with the letter. -In that case I will only ask the witness whether it is true that he -smuggled this letter into Switzerland. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Please answer the question, Witness. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. I took this letter to Switzerland and mailed it there. - -DR. DIX: Very well. What did your group do to bring about peace, or -prevent the war from spreading? Did you undertake further activities in -foreign politics in that direction in your opposition group, that is, -your group of conspirators? - -GISEVIUS: The main thing for us was with all possible means to prevent -the war from spreading. It could only spread toward Holland and Belgium -or Norway. We recognized clearly that if a step was taken in this -direction, the consequences, not only for Germany, but for the whole of -Europe would be tremendous. Therefore, we wanted to prevent war in the -West by all means. - -Immediately after the Polish Campaign Hitler decided to move his troops -from the East to the West, and to launch the attack by violating the -neutrality of Holland and Belgium. - -We believed that if we could succeed in preventing this attack in -November we would in the coming winter months gain enough time to -convince the individual generals, above all Brauchitsch and Halder and -the leaders of the army groups, that they must at least oppose the -expansion of the war. - -Brauchitsch and Halder evaded the question and said it was now too late, -that the enemy would fight Germany to the end and destroy her. We did -not share this opinion. We believed a peace with honor was still -possible, and by honor I mean that we would of course eliminate the Nazi -hierarchy to the last man. In order to prove to the generals that the -foreign powers did not wish to destroy the German people, but wanted -only to protect themselves against the Nazi terror, we took all possible -steps abroad. The first attempt in that direction, or a small part of -that attempt, was the letter written by Schacht to Fraser, the object of -which was to point out that certain domestic political developments were -imminent and that if we could gain time, that is, if we could come -through the winter, we could perhaps persuade the generals to undertake -a revolt. - -DR. DIX: Thank you. May I interrupt you for a moment? I would like to -call the attention of the Tribunal now to the fact that the witness is -referring to a passage, to a suggestion, contained in the letter. This -letter is in English. I have no German translation, and I must therefore -read this sentence in English. “My feeling is that the earlier -discussions be opened, the easier it will be to influence the -development of certain existing conditions.” The question is now... - -Now, I would like to ask you: What did Dr. Schacht mean by the “certain -existing conditions” that were to be influenced? Did he mean your -efforts? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I must interpose an objection. I am not sure -whether you have misunderstood it. I think that what Schacht meant is -not a question to be addressed to this witness. I shall have no -objection to Dr. Schacht telling us what he meant by his cryptic -language, but I don’t think that this witness can interpret what Schacht -meant unless he has some information apart from anything that now -appears. I don’t want to be over technical about this, but it does seem -to me that this is the sort of question which should be reserved for Dr. -Schacht himself. - -DR. DIX: Mr. Justice Jackson, of course, is right, but this witness said -that he smuggled the letter into Switzerland, and I assume that he -discussed the contents of the letter with Schacht and was therefore in a -position to explain the cryptic words. - -THE PRESIDENT: He didn’t say this yet; he hasn’t said he ever saw the -letter except the outside of it. He hasn’t said he ever saw the letter. - -DR. DIX: Will you please tell us whether you saw the letter and knew its -contents? - -GISEVIUS: I am sorry that I did not so clearly at once, but I helped in -drafting the letter. I was there when the letter was drafted and -written. - -DR. DIX: Then I believe Justice Jackson will withdraw his objection. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. - -DR. DIX: Will you please answer my question; what is meant by those -cryptic words? - -GISEVIUS: We wanted to suggest that we, in Germany, were interested in -forcing certain developments and that we now expected an encouraging -word from the other side. I do not, however, want any misunderstanding -to arise here. In this letter it also states very clearly that President -Roosevelt had in the meantime been disappointed many times by the German -side, so that we had to beg, to urge him to take such a step. It is a -fact that President Roosevelt had taken various steps for peace. - -DR. DIX: Let us go on now. If I give you the cue “Vatican Action”?... - -GISEVIUS: In addition to this attempt to enter into discussions with -America, we believed we should ask for a statement from the British -Government. Again it was our aim solely to... - -THE PRESIDENT: Is the original of this letter still available or is this -only given from memory? - -DR. DIX: The original copy, yes; that is, a copy signed by Schacht is -here. It was kept during the war in Switzerland and was brought back to -us from Switzerland by this witness. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Now, let us go on to the “Vatican Action.” - -GISEVIUS: We tried in every possible way to prove to General Halder and -General Olbricht that their theory was wrong, that there could be no -longer a question of dealing with a decent German government. We -believed that we should now follow a particularly important and safe -road. The Holy Father made personal efforts in these matters, as the -British Government had, with justification, become uncertain whether -there really existed in Germany a trustworthy group of men with whom -talks could be undertaken. I remember that shortly afterwards the Venlo -incident took place when, with the excuse that there was a German -opposition group, officials of the English Secret Service were kidnapped -at the Dutch border. Therefore, we were anxious to prove that there was -a group here which was honestly trying to do its best and which, if the -occasion arose, would stand by its word under all circumstances. I -believe that we kept our word regarding the things we proposed to do, -while we said quite frankly that we could not bring about this revolt as -we had said previously we hoped to do. - -These negotiations began in October—November 1939. They were only -concluded later in the spring, and if I am asked I will continue. - -DR. DIX: Yes, please describe the conclusion. - -GISEVIUS: I believe I must add first that, during November of 1939, -General Halder actually had intended a revolt, but that these intentions -for a revolt again came to naught because at the very last minute Hitler -called off the western offensive. Strengthened by the attitude of Halder -at that time, we believed that we should continue these discussions at -the Vatican. We reached what you might call a gentleman’s agreement, on -the grounds of which I believe that I am entitled to state that we could -give the generals unequivocal proof that in the event of the overthrow -of the Hitler regime, an agreement could be reached with a decent civil -German government. - -DR. DIX: Did you read the documents yourself, Doctor? - -GISEVIUS: These were oral discussions which were then written down in a -comprehensive report. This report was read by the Ambassador Von Hassell -and by Dr. Schacht before it was given to Halder by General Thomas. -Halder was so taken aback by the contents that he gave this -comprehensive report to Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch. Brauchitsch was -enraged and threatened to arrest the intermediary, General Thomas, and -thus this action which had every prospect of success, failed. - -DR. DIX: Doctor, you have testified... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the last notes that I have got down in my -notebook are these: “That we knew that if Holland, Belgium, and the -other countries were attacked, it would have very grave consequences and -we therefore negotiated with Halder and Brauchitsch and they weren’t -prepared to help us to stop the war at that time. We wanted peace with -honor, eliminating politics. We took all possible steps.” Well, now, -since I took these notes down, I think we spent nearly 10 minutes in -details, which are utterly irrelevant, about further negotiations. If -they took all possible steps, what is the point of giving us these -details about it? - -DR. DIX: Yes, Your Lordship, if a witness is called in a matter of such -importance, where he as well as the defendants’ counsel must always take -into account that people who are of a different opinion may say “these -are just generalities, we want facts and particulars,” then I cannot -forego having the witness testify at least in broad outline that, for -example, a detailed action had been undertaken through His Holiness in -the Vatican. If he merely says that the result of this action was a -comprehensive report, if with Halder and Brauchitsch the above -mentioned... - -THE PRESIDENT: I agree with you that the one sentence about some -negotiations with the Vatican may have been properly given, but all the -rest of it were unnecessary details. - -DR. DIX: Anyway we have already concluded this chapter, Your Lordship. - -[_Turning to the witness._] You have already testified that the revolt -which was planned for November did not occur because the western -offensive did not take place. Therefore, we need not pursue this subject -any further. I would merely like to ask you at this point: Did your -group of conspirators remain inactive during the winter, and -particularly during the spring, or were further plans followed and acted -upon? - -GISEVIUS: Constant attempts were made to influence all generals within -our reach. Besides Halder and Brauchitsch we tried to reach the generals -of the armored divisions in the West. I remember, for instance, there -was a discussion between Schacht and General Hoeppner. - -DR. DIX: Hoeppner? - -GISEVIUS: Hoeppner. We also tried to influence Field Marshal Rundstedt, -Bock, and Leeb. Here, too, General Thomas and Admiral Canaris were the -intermediaries. - -DR. DIX: And how did the generals react? - -GISEVIUS: When everything was ready, they would not start. - -DR. DIX: Now, we come to the summer of 1941. Hitler is in Paris. The -aerial offensive against England is imminent. Tell us about your group -of conspirators and their activity during this period and the period -following. - -GISEVIUS: After the fall of Paris, our group had no influence at all for -months. Hitler’s success deluded everyone, and it took much effort on -our part, through all channels available, to try at least to prevent the -bombardment of England. Here again the group made united efforts and we -tried, through General Thomas and Admiral Canaris and others, to prevent -this evil. - -DR. DIX: Do I understand you correctly, when you use the word “group” -you mean the group which was led by Beck, in which Schacht collaborated? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. DIX: Now, at that time did Schacht have several talks, or one talk, -along the same line in Switzerland? - -GISEVIUS: That was a little later. We have now come to the year 1941, -and on this trip to Switzerland Schacht tried to urge that a peace -conference should be held as soon as possible. We knew that Hitler was -thinking about the attack on Russia, and we believed that we should do -everything to avert at least this disaster. With this thought in mind -Schacht’s discussions in Switzerland were conducted. I myself took part -in arranging a dinner in Basel with the president of the B. I. Z., Mr. -McKittrick, an American, and I was present when Schacht tried to express -at least the opinion that everything possible must now be done to -initiate negotiations. - -DR. DIX: In this connection I would respectfully like to remind the -Tribunal of the article in the _Basler Nachrichten_, of which I -presented the essential contents when we discussed the admissibility of -the document. It deals with a similar conversation between Schacht and -an American economist. That is the same trip which the witness is now -discussing. I will take the liberty of referring to this article later, -when presenting documentary evidences. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Now, the war continued. Do you have anything -to say about Russia; about the imminent war with Russia? - -GISEVIUS: I can say only that Schacht knew of all the many attempts -which we undertook to avert this catastrophe. - -DR. DIX: Now let us go further to the time of Stalingrad. What was done -by your group of conspirators after this critical period of the war? - -GISEVIUS: When we did not succeed in persuading the victorious generals -to engineer a revolt, we then tried at least to win them over to one -when they had obviously come up against their great catastrophe. This -catastrophe, which found its first visible signs in Stalingrad, had been -predicted in all its details by Generaloberst Beck since December of -1942. We immediately made all preparations so that at the moment, which -could be forecast with almost mathematical exactitude, when the army of -Paulus, completely defeated, would have to capitulate, then at least a -military revolt could be organized. I myself was called back from -Switzerland and participated in all discussions and preparations. I can -only testify that this time a great many preparations were made. Contact -was also made with the field marshals in the East, with Witzleben in the -West but again, things turned out differently, for Field Marshal Paulus -capitulated instead of giving us the cue at which Kluge, according to -plan, was to start the revolt in the East. - -DR. DIX: This was the time of the so-called Schlaberndorff attempt? - -GISEVIUS: No, a little later. - -DR. DIX: Now I shall interpose another question. Until now you have -always described the group led by Generaloberst Beck and supported by -Schacht, Goerdeler, _et cetera_, as a revolt movement, that is, a group -which wanted to overthrow the government. Did you not now more and more -aim at an assassination? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, from the moment when the generals again deserted us, we -realized that a revolt was not to be hoped for, and from that moment on -we took all the steps we could to instigate an assassination. - -DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the -German Armed Forces): Mr. President, I must object at this point to the -testimony of the witness. The witness, Dr. Gisevius, by his testimony -has incriminated the group which I represent. However, some of this -testimony is so general that it cannot be referred to as fact. -Furthermore, he has just testified that the field marshals in the East -had “deserted” the group of conspirators. These statements are opinions -which the witness is giving, but they are not facts, to which the -witness must limit his testimony, and therefore I ask—Mr. President, I -have not yet finished. I wanted to conclude with the request for a -resolution by the Court that the testimony given by the witness, where -he asserted that the generals had “deserted” the group of conspirators, -be stricken from the record. - -DR. DIX: May I please reply briefly? I cannot agree with the opinion of -my esteemed colleague Dr. Laternser that the statement “the generals -deserted us” was not a statement of fact... - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need to hear further argument upon it. -It certainly won’t be stricken from the record until we have had time to -consider it, and Dr. Laternser will have his opportunity of examining -this witness, and he can then elucidate any evidence he wants to. - -DR. LATERNSER: But, Mr. President, if I make the motion for the reason -that the witness is giving testimony which is beyond his scope as a -witness, and that he is giving his opinion, then to that extent it is -inadmissible testimony which would have to be stricken from the record. - -THE PRESIDENT: If you mean that the evidence is hearsay, that will be -perfectly obvious to the Tribunal, and doesn’t make the evidence -inadmissible, and you will be able to cross-examine him about it. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have been misunderstood. I did not say, -and I am not basing my request to strike the testimony from the record -on the allegation that the witness made statements from hearsay; but I -say that it is not a statement of fact, but an opinion which the witness -is giving when he says that “the generals in the East deserted the group -of conspirators.” - -DR. DIX: May I answer briefly to that? If I try to influence a group of -generals to organize a revolt and if they do not do so, that is a fact -and I can state this fact with the words, “They deserted us.” Naturally -I can also say, “They did not revolt,” but that is merely a matter of -expression. Both are facts and not an opinion. He is not appraising the -behavior of the generals in an ethical, military, or political sense, he -is merely pointing out, “They were not willing.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on. - -DR. DIX: [_Turning to the witness._] If I recall correctly, you were -just about to tell us that now the policy of the conspirators’ group -changed from a revolt to an assassination. Is that correct? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. DIX: Do you wish to state anything further? - -GISEVIUS: You had asked me about the first step in this direction after -Generaloberst Beck had given up all hope of being able to win over -another general to a revolt. It was said at that time that there was now -nothing left for us but to free Germany, Europe, and the world from the -tyrant by a bomb attack. Immediately after this decision, preparations -were started. Oster spoke to Lahousen and Lahousen furnished the bombs -from his arsenal. The bombs were taken to the headquarters of Kluge at -Smolensk, and with every possible means we tried to bring about the -assassination, which was unsuccessful only because at a time when Hitler -was visiting the front, the bomb which had been put in his airplane did -not explode. This was in the spring of 1943. - -DR. DIX: Now, an event took place in the Abwehr OKW, which as a result -of further developments, strongly affected Schacht’s further attitude -and also your remaining in Germany. Will you please describe that? - -GISEVIUS: Gradually even Himmler could not fail to see what was -happening in the OKW, and at the urgent request of SS General -Schellenberg a thorough investigation of the Canaris group was now -started. A special commissioner was appointed and on the first day of -this investigation Oster was relieved of his post and a number of his -collaborators were arrested. A short time afterwards Canaris was also -dismissed from his post. I myself could no longer remain in Germany and -thus this group, which until now had in a certain sense been the -directorate of all the conspiracies, was eliminated. - -DR. DIX: During that time, that is January 1943, Schacht was also -relieved of his position as Reich Minister without Portfolio. Did you -meet Schacht after that time? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. By chance I was in Berlin on the day this letter of -dismissal arrived. It was an unusually sharp letter and I remember that -that night I was asked to the country house of Schacht, and as the -letter had simply stated that Schacht was to be dismissed, we wondered -whether he was also going to be arrested. - -DR. DIX: I would like to remind the Tribunal that I read this letter -into the record when Lammers was examined and showed it to him. This -letter—I mean Schacht’s letter of dismissal signed by Lammers—has -already been read into the record and is probably contained in my -document book. - -[_Turning to the witness._] You were in Switzerland at that time, but on -20 July you were in Berlin. How did that happen? - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean the 20th of July 1944? - -DR. DIX: Yes, the well-known day of the 20th of July. We are rapidly -approaching the end now. - -GISEVIUS: A few months after the elimination of the Canaris-Oster circle -we formed a new group around General Olbricht. At that time Colonel -Count Von Stauffenberg also joined us. He replaced Oster in all -activities, and when after several months, and after many unsuccessful -attempts and discussions, the time finally arrived in July 1944, I -returned secretly to Berlin in order to participate in the events. - -DR. DIX: But you had no direct connection with Schacht at this attempted -assassination? - -GISEVIUS: No; I, personally, was in Berlin secretly and saw only -Goerdeler, Beck, and Stauffenberg; and it was agreed expressly at this -time that no other civilian except Goerdeler, Leuschner, and myself were -to be informed of the matter. We hoped thus to protect lives by not -burdening anyone unnecessarily with this knowledge. - -DR. DIX: Now I come to my last question. - -You know that Schacht had after all held high government positions under -the Hitler regime. You, Doctor, as is shown by your testimony today were -an arch enemy of the Hitler regime. Despite that you had, as can also be -seen from your testimony today, special confidence in Schacht. How do -you explain this fact which at first sight seems to be contradictory in -itself? - -GISEVIUS: My answer can, of course, only express a personal opinion and -I will formulate it as briefly as possible. However, I would like to -emphasize that the problem of Schacht was confusing not only to me but -to my friends as well; Schacht was always a problem and a puzzle to us. -Perhaps it was due to the contradictory nature of this man that he kept -his position in the Hitler government for so long. He undoubtedly -entered the Hitler regime for patriotic reasons, and I would like to -testify here that the moment his disappointment became obvious he -decided for the same patriotic reasons to join the opposition. Despite -Schacht’s many contradictions and the puzzles he gave us to solve, my -friends and I were strongly attracted to Schacht because of his -exceptional personal courage and the fact that he was undoubtedly a man -of strong moral character, and he did not think only of Germany but also -of the ideals of humanity. That is why we went with him, why we -considered him one of us; and, if you ask me personally, I can say that -the doubts which I often had about him were completely dispelled during -the dramatic events of 1938 and 1939. At that time he really fought, and -I will never forget that. It is a pleasure for me to be able to testify -to this here. - -DR. DIX: Your Lordship, I am now through with the questioning of this -witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants counsel want to -ask questions of the witness? - -HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for SA): Witness, yesterday you said that you -were a member of the Stahlhelm. When and for how long were you a member? - -GISEVIUS: I entered the Stahlhelm in 1929, I believe, and left that -organization in 1933. - -HERR BÖHM: You know the mentality of the members of the Stahlhelm. You -know that, almost without exception, they were people who had served in -the first World War, and I would like to ask you now whether the -internal and foreign political goals of the Stahlhelm were to be reached -by its members in a legal or in a revolutionary manner? - -GISEVIUS: To my knowledge the Stahlhelm always favored the legal way. - -HERR BÖHM: Yes. Was the fight of the Stahlhelm against the Treaty of -Versailles which every organization with national tendencies took up, to -be carried on by legal or revolutionary means, or means of force? - -GISEVIUS: It is very hard for me to answer for the entire Stahlhelm, but -I can only say that I, and the members of the Stahlhelm organization -with whom I was acquainted, knew that the Stahlhelm wanted to take the -legal way. - -HERR BÖHM: Is it correct to say that in the year 1932 and 1933 hundreds -of thousands, regardless of party and race, entered the Stahlhelm -organization? - -GISEVIUS: That is correct. The more critical matters became in Germany, -the more people went to the right. I myself having experienced this -growth of the Stahlhelm as an official speaker at public meetings, from -1929 to 1933, I would describe it in this way: That those who did not -want to join the NSDAP and the SA, deliberately entered the Stahlhelm so -that within the German rightist movement there would be a counterbalance -against the rising “brown” tide. That was the underlying reason of our -recruitment for the Stahlhelm at that time. - -HERR BÖHM: You know, of course, that in the year 1933 the Stahlhelm -organization as a whole was taken into the SA. Was it possible at that -time for the individual member of the Stahlhelm to say “no,” or to -protest against being taken over into the SA? - -GISEVIUS: That was possible, of course, as everything was possible also -in the Third Reich. - -HERR BÖHM: What would have been the possible consequences of such a -step? - -GISEVIUS: The possible consequences would have been a violent discussion -with the regional Party leaders or SA leaders. At that time I was no -longer a member of the Stahlhelm and I can merely say that it -undoubtedly must have been very difficult for many people, particularly -those living in the country, to refuse being transferred to the SA. -After they had been betrayed by their leader, Minister Seldte, or as it -was said at that time “sold” to the SA, refusal to transfer to the SA -was naturally a sign of open distrust toward National Socialism. - -HERR BÖHM: I gather from my correspondence with the former members of -the Stahlhelm, that these people who, as former members of the -Stahlhelm, were taken into the SA, remained a foreign body in it and -were in constant opposition to the NSDAP and the SA. Is that correct? - -GISEVIUS: As I myself no longer belonged to that organization, I can -only say that I assume that those members of the Stahlhelm felt very -uneasy in their new surroundings. - -HERR BÖHM: Do you know whether the members of the Stahlhelm, before 1934 -and from 1934, participated in Crimes against Peace, against the Jews, -against the Church, and so forth? - -GISEVIUS: No, I know nothing about that. - -HERR BÖHM: Now I would also like to question you about the SA as far as -you are able to give information. Yesterday at least you expressed -yourself freely with regard to the SA leaders. I would like to ask you, -in replying to a question I shall now ask, to confine yourself to a -circle of SA members which lies between the simple SA man and the -Standartenführer or the Brigadeführer. Could you tell from the attitude -and activity of the ordinary SA man and that of the Standartenführer or -Brigadeführer—and I do not go beyond that limit because I well remember -the statements you made yesterday concerning the Gruppenführer or -Obergruppenführer—that these people intended to commit Crimes against -Peace? - -GISEVIUS: It is, of course, very difficult to answer such a general -question. If you ask me about the majority of these SA men, I can only -say no. - -HERR BÖHM: Witness, did you notice that SA men were arrested and that SA -men were also put into concentration camps? - -GISEVIUS: I saw that many times. In 1933, 1934, and 1935, that was in -the years when it was my official duty to deal with these matters, many -SA men were arrested by the Gestapo, beaten to death, or at least -tortured, and put into concentration camps. - -HERR BÖHM: Could a man, who was in the SA, or anyone outside for that -matter, judge the SA as a whole from the activity of its members, or -from individual cases, and gather that the SA intended to commit Crimes -against Peace? - -GISEVIUS: No. When I consider what efforts even we in the High Command -of the Wehrmacht had to make to try and discover whether or not Hitler -was planning a war, I naturally cannot attribute to a simple SA man -knowledge of something which we ourselves did not know for certain. - -HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution asserted that the SA incited the youth and -the German people to war. Did you observe anything of that nature? You -were a member of the Gestapo and such activities could not have escaped -your notice. - -GISEVIUS: That is another extremely general question, and I do not know -to what extent certain songs, and other things, can be considered a -preparation for war. At any rate I cannot imagine that the mass of the -SA was of a different frame of mind than the mass of the German people -in the years up to 1938, and the general trend of opinion beyond a doubt -was that the mere thought of war was absolute madness. - -HERR BÖHM: Was there anything that made you think that the SA intended -to commit Crimes against Peace, or that they had committed such crimes? - -GISEVIUS: As far as the ordinary SA man is concerned, I must say “no” -again, and I say the same for the mass of the SA. I could not say to -what extent the higher leaders were involved in plotting all the -horrible things we have heard about here, but the majority undoubtedly -did not know of such things and were not trained for them. - -HERR BÖHM: Witness, it cannot be denied that mistakes were made by a -number of SA men, and criminal acts were committed for which these -people certainly should be punished. - -You know the SA and know what took place during the revolutionary period -and afterwards. Are you in a position to estimate or to give a -proportional figure as to what percentage of the numerous members of the -SA conducted themselves in a punishable manner? I call your attention to -the fact that up to, perhaps 1932 or 1933, the SA... - -THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, Dr. Böhm. The Tribunal doesn’t think that -is a proper question to put to a witness, what percentage of a group of -this sort, of hundreds of thousands of men, take a certain view. - -HERR BÖHM: However the explanation of this question would be very -important for my case, Mr. President. Here is a witness who was outside -the SA, who as a member of the Gestapo was perhaps one of the few people -who could look into the activities of the SA, and actually did look into -them, and he will certainly be believed by the Tribunal. He knew fairly -well what criminal procedures were carried out and also—and that is -what I want to say—the number of members of the SA, and he is one of -the few who are in a position to testify on this matter. I believe that -if the witness is in a position to testify hereto, the testimony given -by him will be of great importance to the Tribunal also. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that not only this -witness, but other witnesses, are not in a position to give such -evidence, and the question is denied. - -HERR BÖHM: Witness, do you know of cases in which SA members worked in -opposition to the SA? - -GISEVIUS: I answered that question when I said that quite a number of SA -members were arrested by the Gestapo. - -HERR BÖHM: Yes. Do you know what criminal proceedings were taken against -the members of the SA, and possibly how many? - -GISEVIUS: Far too few, I am sorry to say, if you put it that way. - -HERR BÖHM: Yes. - -GISEVIUS: Unfortunately there were many who committed misdeeds in the SA -and who went scot-free. I am sorry that I must answer in this way. - -HERR BÖHM: Certainly. And in what relation do they stand to the entire -SA? - -GISEVIUS: Now we have come again to the question... - -THE PRESIDENT: That is the same question over again. - -HERR BÖHM: Do you know under what circumstances one could resign from -the SA? - -GISEVIUS: In the same manner as one could resign from all organizations -of the Party. That was, of course, a brave decision to make. - -HERR BÖHM: Thank you. I have no further question. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in replying to a question of my colleague Dr. -Dix, you told the Tribunal that after the defeat at Stalingrad a -military revolt was to be organized. You testified on this point that -discussions had already taken place, that preparations had been made, -and that the execution of the military revolt was prevented because the -field marshals in the East had deserted the group of conspirators. - -I ask you now to give us more details on this question so that I can -understand why you came to the conclusion that the field marshals had -deserted the conspiracy group. - -GISEVIUS: From the outbreak of the war Generaloberst Beck tried to -contact one field marshal after another. He wrote letters and he sent -messengers to them. I particularly remember the correspondence with -General Field Marshal Von Manstein, and I saw with my own eyes General -Von Manstein’s answer of the year 1942. To Beck’s strictly military -explanations that the war had been lost and why, Manstein could reply -only: A war is not lost until one considers it as lost. - -Beck said that with an answer like that from a field marshal strategic -questions could certainly not be raised. Several months later another -attempt was made to win General Field Marshal Von Manstein. General Von -Tresckow, also a victim of the 20th of July, went to the headquarters of -Manstein. Oberstleutnant Count Von der Schulenburg also went to the -headquarters of Manstein, but we did not succeed in winning Herr Von -Manstein to our side. - -At the time of Stalingrad we contacted Field Marshal Von Kluge, and he, -in his turn, contacted Manstein. This time discussions reached a point -when Kluge definitely assured us that he would win over Field Marshal -Von Manstein at a discussion definitely fixed to take place in the -Führer’s headquarters. Because of the importance of that day, a special -telephone line was laid by the General of the Signal Corps, Fellgiebel, -between the headquarters and General Olbricht at the OKW in Berlin. I -myself was present when this telephone conversation took place. Even -today I can still see that paper which said, in plain language, that -Manstein, contrary to his previous assurances, had allowed himself to be -persuaded by Hitler to remain in office. And even Kluge expressed -himself as satisfied at the time with very small military strategic -concessions. This was a bitter disappointment to us, and, therefore, I -would like to repeat again what Beck said at that time: “We were -deserted.” - -DR. LATERNSER: What further preparations had been made in this special -connection? - -GISEVIUS: We had made definite agreements with Field Marshal Von -Witzleben. Witzleben was the Commander-in-Chief in the West, and -therefore he was very important for starting or protecting a revolt in -the West. We had made further definite agreements with the Military -Governor of Belgium, Generaloberst Von Falkenhausen. In addition, as on -20 July 1944, we had assembled a certain contingent of armored troops in -the vicinity of Berlin. Furthermore, those commanders of the troops who -were to participate in the action had been assembled in the OKW. - -DR. LATERNSER: All this happened after Stalingrad? - -GISEVIUS: At the time of the Stalingrad revolt. - -DR. LATERNSER: Please continue. - -GISEVIUS: We had made all other political preparations which were -necessary. It is difficult for me to tell here the entire story of the -revolts against the Third Reich. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes. What were the reasons why this intended military -revolt was not carried through? - -GISEVIUS: What was that? - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, what were the reasons why this revolt, which was -intended by the group of conspirators, was not carried through? - -GISEVIUS: Contrary to all expectations, Field Marshal Paulus -capitulated. This, as is known, was the first wholesale capitulation of -generals; whereas we had expected that Paulus with his generals would -issue, before his capitulation, a proclamation to the German people and -to the East Front, in which the strategy of Hitler and the sacrifice of -the Stalingrad army would be branded in suitable words. When this cue -had been given, Kluge was to declare that in future he would take no -further military orders from Hitler. We hoped with this plan to -circumvent the problem of the military oath which kept troubling us more -and more; the field marshals one after the other were to refuse military -obedience to Hitler, whereupon Beck was to take over the supreme -military command in Berlin. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you just mentioned the military oath. Do you -know whether Blomberg and Generaloberst Beck opposed, or tried to -oppose, the pledge the Armed Forces took to Hitler? - -GISEVIUS: I know only that Beck up to the last day of his life -considered the day he gave his pledge to Hitler as the blackest day of -his existence, and he gave me an exact description of how completely -taken unawares he had felt at the rendering of the oath. He told me that -he had been summoned to a military roll call; and that suddenly it was -announced that an oath of allegiance was to be given to the new head of -State; that unexpectedly a new form of oath was to be used. Beck could -never rid himself of the awful thought that at that time he perhaps -should not have given his oath. He told me that while he was on his way -home, he said to a comrade, “This is the blackest day of my life.” - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in your testimony, you also mentioned that -between the Polish campaign and the Western campaign, or with the -beginning of the Western campaign, a further military Putsch was to be -attempted, and that this Putsch failed because Halder and Field Marshal -Von Brauchitsch shirked it. You used the term “shirked” previously in -your testimony. Now I ask you to tell me on the basis of what facts did -you arrive at this opinion that both these generals shirked... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not raise an objection that this is harmful to -us if we have plenty of time, but this evidence as to these Putsche, and -threatened Putsche, and rumored Putsche, was all admissible here in our -view only as bearing on the attitude of the Defendant Schacht. We are -not trying these generals for being in a Putsch or not being in a -Putsch. For all purposes it is just as well as they should not be in a -Putsch. I do not know what purposes this can have in doing it over -again. I call the Tribunal’s attention for the limited purpose for which -this historical matter was admitted, and suggest that it is serving no -purpose in this connection to review it. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the answer to that, Dr. Laternser? - -DR. LATERNSER: Since the witness has talked about this matter and -testified that Halder as well as Brauchitsch shirked, and I cannot -establish whether the opinion expressed by this witness with “shirked” -is correct on the basis of the facts, I think I am obliged to clarify -this point. In a general sense I would like to add further that the -Prosecution is also justified in going into this point. I refer to the -contention of the French Prosecutor in which he stated that in the light -of all these circumstances it was beyond comprehension why Halder, as -well as the entire German nation, did not rise as one man against the -regime. Therefore, if I start from the viewpoint of the Prosecution, -then my question on this point, as I have just put it, is undoubtedly of -importance, and I, therefore, ask that this question be permitted. - -THE PRESIDENT: The charge against the High Command is that they were a -criminal organization within the meaning of the Charter; that is to say -that they planned an aggressive war, or that they committed War Crimes -or Crimes against Humanity in connection with an aggressive war. Well, -whether or not they took part, or were planning to take part in a Putsch -to stop the war does not seem very material to any of those questions. - -DR. LATERNSER: I agree with you entirely on this point, Mr. President, -that it cannot actually be considered of special importance; but on the -other hand... - -THE PRESIDENT: I did not say that it was not of special importance. I -say that it was not material to the relevancy. The Tribunal does not -think that any of these questions are relevant. - -DR. LATERNSER: Then I will withdraw my question. I have one final -question. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, can you tell me the names of those -generals who participated on the 20th of July? - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, what has that got to do with any charge against the -High Command? - -DR. LATERNSER: The General Staff is accused of having participated in a -conspiracy. The question... - -THE PRESIDENT: We are not here to consider the honor of the High -Command. We are here to consider whether or not they are a criminal -organization within the meaning of the Charter, and that is the only -question with which we are going to deal as far as you are concerned. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the General Staff and the OKW are accused -of having participated in a conspiracy. If I prove, as I am trying to do -with this question, that on the contrary, instead of participating in a -conspiracy, part of the General Staff took part in an action against the -regime, then the answer to this question on this point indicates that -precisely the opposite was the case; and, for that reason, I ask that -the question be permitted. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think what the General Staff did in -July 1944, when the circumstances were entirely different to what they -were in September 1939, has any relevancy to the question whether they -took part, either before or in September 1939. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I put myself in the place of the -Prosecution, I must assume that the Prosecution assumes that the -conspiracy continued. It cannot be inferred, from testimony by the -Prosecution or from anything that has been submitted, that the -conspiracy was to have stopped at a certain period of time. So that the -answer to this question would be of importance, I believe of decisive -importance. I would like to supplement my statement, Mr. President... - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Laternser. - -DR. LATERNSER: I would like to add that it is precisely for the members -of the group I represent that the period of time between 1938 and May -1940 is considered decisive. - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean the group changed; therefore, they might be -different in 1944? - -DR. LATERNSER: I wish to add that a particularly large number of the -members of this group only joined it in the course of 1944 because of -their official positions, and I do consider this point important. - -THE PRESIDENT: All right. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, my question was: Can you give me the names of -those generals who participated in the attempted assassination of the -20th of July 1944? - -GISEVIUS: Generaloberst Beck, General Field Marshal Von Witzleben, -General Olbricht, General Hoeppner. - -DR. LATERNSER: One question: General Hoeppner was previously -commander-in-chief of an armored army? - -GISEVIUS: I believe so; General Von Haase, and certainly a large number -of other generals whom I cannot enumerate offhand. Here I have mentioned -only the names of those who were at Bendlerstrasse that afternoon. - -DR. LATERNSER: One question, Witness: Do you know whether Field Marshal -Rommel also participated on the 20th of July 1944? - -GISEVIUS: I cannot answer by merely saying “yes,” for it is a fact that -Rommel, as well as Field Marshal Von Kluge, did participate. However, it -would give a wrong picture if Field Marshal Rommel were suddenly to -appear in the category of those who fought against Hitler. Herr Rommel, -as a typical Party general, sought to join us very late, and it gave us -a very painful impression when suddenly Herr Rommel in the face of his -own military catastrophe, proposed to us to have Hitler assassinated, -and then, if possible, Göring and Himmler as well. And, even then, he -did not want to join in at the first opportunity, but wanted to stay -somewhat in the background in order to allow us to profit by his -popularity later on. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to know -whether these gentlemen, when they joined our group, came as the fallen -might, as people who wished to save their pensions, or as people who, -from the beginning, stood for decency and honor. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you yourself ever speak to Field Marshal Rommel about -this? - -GISEVIUS: No. I never considered it worth while to make his -acquaintance. - -DR. LATERNSER: A further question: Did officers of the General Staff -participate in the 20th of July? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, a great number. - -DR. LATERNSER: About how many would you say? - -GISEVIUS: I cannot give you the number, for at that time I was not -informed of how many of the General Staff Stauffenberg had on his side. -I do not doubt that Stauffenberg, Colonel Hansen, and several other -stout-hearted men had discovered a number of clean, courageous officers -among the General Staff, and that they could count on the support of -very many decent members of the General Staff, but whom they naturally -could not initiate into their plans beforehand. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes, that will be sufficient for this point. Another -question has occurred to me. You mentioned General Von Tresckow -previously. Did you know General Von Tresckow personally? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: Do you know anything about the fact that, after he -learned that the commissar decree had been issued, General Von Tresckow -remonstrated with Rundstedt and that these remonstrances contributed to -the fact that the commissar decree was not passed on in General Field -Marshal Von Rundstedt’s sector? - -GISEVIUS: Tresckow belonged to our group for many years. There was no -action which made us so ashamed as this one, and from the very start he -courageously called the attention of his superiors to the -inadmissibility of such terrible decrees. I remember how at that time we -learned of the famous commissar decree at first through hearsay, and we -immediately sent a courier to Tresckow to inform him simply of the -intention of such an outrage, and how after the decree had been -published, Tresckow, at a given signal, remonstrated with General Field -Marshal Von Rundstedt in the way you described. - -THE PRESIDENT: You said a while ago that you were just going to ask your -last question. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I am sorry I could not keep to that. A -number of questions arose from the testimony of the witness, but this -was my last question. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel wish to -ask any questions of the witness? - -[_There was no response._] - -Then do the Prosecution desire to cross-examine? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I have a few questions -to put to you, Dr. Gisevius, and if you will answer them as nearly as -possible, “yes” or “no,” as you are capable of giving a truthful answer, -you will save a great deal of time. - -The Tribunal perhaps should know your relations with the Prosecution. Is -it not a fact that within 2 months of the surrender of Germany I met you -at Wiesbaden, and you related to me your experiences in the conspiracy -that you have related here? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were later brought here, and after coming -here were interrogated by the Prosecution as well as by the counsel for -Frick and for Schacht? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, your attitude and viewpoint are, as I -understand you, those of a German who felt that loyalty to the German -people required continuous opposition to the Nazi regime. Is that a -correct statement of your position? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you had a very large experience in police -matters in Germany. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If your Putsche or other moves to obtain power in -Germany were successful, it was planned that you would be in charge of -the police in the reorganization, was it not? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Either as Minister of the Interior or as Police -Commissioner, whatever it might be called. - -GISEVIUS: Yes, certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you represented the belief that it was not -necessary to govern Germany with concentration camps and with Gestapo -methods; is that correct? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you found all of the ways of presenting your -viewpoint to the German people cut off by the Gestapo methods which were -used by the Nazi regime; is that a fact? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So that there was no way open to you to obtain any -change in German policy except through revolt or assassination, or means -of that kind? - -GISEVIUS: No. I am convinced that until 1937 or the beginning of 1938 -the position could have been changed in Germany by a majority of votes -in the Reich Cabinet or through pressure by the Armed Forces. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you fix 1937 as the time when it ceased to be -possible by peaceful means to effect a change in Germany; is that -correct? - -GISEVIUS: That is how I would judge it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it was not until after 1937 that Schacht -joined your group; is that not a fact? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, as I said, the group was not formed until 1937, 1938; but -Schacht had already introduced me to Goerdeler in 1936, and Schacht and -Oster had known each other since 1936. And naturally Schacht had also -known a large number of other members of the group for a long time. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But Schacht did not become convinced, as I -understand your statement to us, until after 1937—until the Putsch -affair—that he wouldn’t be able to handle Hitler in some peaceful way; -is that not correct? - -GISEVIUS: In what manner? In a peaceful manner or... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In a peaceful manner. - -GISEVIUS: Yes, until the end of 1937 Schacht believed that it ought to -be possible to remove Hitler legally. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But by the end of 1937, as you now say, the -possibility of a peaceful removal of Hitler had become impossible in -fact? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, that is what we thought. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes; now, there was, as I understand your view in -going to the general—there was no power in Germany that could stop or -deal with the Gestapo, except the Army. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. I would answer that question in the affirmative. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, in addition to the Gestapo, this Nazi -regime also had a private army in the SS, did they not? And, for a -period, in the SA? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And if you were to combat successfully the Nazi -regime, you had to have manpower which only the Army had; is that right? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, only people who could be found in the Army; but at the -same time we also attempted to influence certain people in the Police, -and we needed all the decent officials in the ministries, and the broad -masses of the people altogether. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the Wehrmacht was the source of power capable -of dealing with the SS and the Gestapo if the generals had been willing? - -GISEVIUS: That was our conviction. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that is the reason you kept seeking the help of -the generals and felt let down when they wouldn’t give you their -assistance finally? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came a time when everybody connected -with your group knew that the war was lost. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was before these plots on Hitler’s life, -and it was apparent before the Schlaberndorff plot and before the July -20th plot, that the war was lost, was it not? - -GISEVIUS: I should like to make it quite clear that there was no one in -our group who did not already know, even when the war started, that -Hitler would never win this war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But it became very much more apparent as time went -on, not only that the war could not be won by Germany, but that Germany -was going to be physically destroyed as a result of the war; is that not -true? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yet, under the system which the Nazi regime had -installed, you had no way of changing the course of events in Germany -except by assassination or a revolt; is that true? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And so you resorted to those extreme measures, -knowing that Hitler could never make peace with the Allies; is that -true? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And your purpose in this was to save Germany the -last destroying blows, which unfortunately she received, from the point -of view of the Germans; is that not a fact? - -GISEVIUS: I should like to say that actually since the beginning of the -war, we no longer thought only of Germany. I think that I may say that -we bore a heavy share of responsibility towards Germany and towards the -world. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, what you were endeavoring to do was to get -the war to an end, since you had not been able to stop its commencement, -were you not? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was impossible as long as Hitler was at -the head of the government and this group of men behind him? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there was another plot on Hitler’s life that -you haven’t mentioned. Was there not a bomb that was later found to have -been a communist bomb? - -GISEVIUS: This happened on 9 November 1939, in the Bürgerbräukeller, in -Munich. It was a brave Communist who acted independently. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, at none of these times when Hitler’s life was -endangered, by a strange coincidence, was Göring or Himmler ever -present; is that not true? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you attach any importance to that fact? - -GISEVIUS: We sometimes regretted it. For instance, the attempt at -assassination would perhaps have succeeded, if Göring and Himmler had -been with Hitler on 17 July. But as the years went by, the members of -this clique separated to such an extent, and protected themselves so -much that they could hardly be found together anywhere. Göring, too, was -gradually so absorbed in his transactions and art collections at -Karinhall that he was hardly ever to be found at a serious conference. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the assassination of Hitler would have -accomplished nothing from your point of view if the Number 2 man had -stepped into Hitler’s place, would it? - -GISEVIUS: That was a debatable problem for a long time, because -Brauchitsch, for instance, imagined that we could create a transitional -regime with Göring. Our group always refused to come together with that -man even for an hour. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How did you plan—if you were successful—to deal -with the other defendants here, with the exception of the Defendant -Schacht, all of whom, I understand, you regard as a part of the Nazi -government? - -GISEVIUS: These gentlemen would have been behind lock and key in an -extremely short time, and I think they would not have had to wait long -for their sentences. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, does that apply to every man in this dock with -the exception of Schacht? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, every man. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, you recognized them, your group recognized -them all as parts and important parts of the Nazi regime—a Nazi -conspiracy. Is that a fact? - -GISEVIUS: I should not like to commit myself to the words “Nazi -conspiracy.” We considered them the men responsible for all the -unspeakable misery which that government had brought to Germany and the -world. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to ask you a few questions about the -Gestapo. You had testified generally in reference to the crimes which -were committed by that organization and I ask you to state whether that -included the torturing and burning to death of a large number of -persons? - -GISEVIUS: The question does not seem to have come through correctly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am asking you as to the crimes committed by the -Gestapo, and I am asking if it included the torturing and burning to -death of thousands of persons? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did it involve the unlawful detention of thousands -of innocent people? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The throwing of them into concentration camps where -they were tortured and beaten and killed? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the Gestapo engage in wholesale confiscation of -property? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, to a very large extent; they called it “property of -persons hostile to the State.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did it practice extortion against Jews and -against others? - -GISEVIUS: In masses and by the million. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the Gestapo hinder and molest the public -officials, who were too prominent to be murdered, until they resigned or -were driven from office? - -GISEVIUS: The Gestapo used every means, from murder to the extortion -which has just been described. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question arises here as to whether the -members of the Gestapo knew what the Gestapo was doing; and will you -please tell the Tribunal what the situation was as to the membership in -that organization and its knowledge of its program? - -GISEVIUS: I have already stated at the beginning of my testimony that -from the first or second day every member of the Gestapo really could -not help seeing and knowing what took place in that institution. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there were some people who were taken into the -Gestapo at the beginning, who were transferred from other branches of -the civil service, were they not; who were in a sense involuntary -members of the Gestapo? - -GISEVIUS: Yes; these members were eliminated in the course of the first -year as being politically unreliable. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the transfer took place at the time Göring set -up the Gestapo, did it not? - -THE PRESIDENT: What did the witness mean by “eliminated”? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think eliminated from the Gestapo. - -GISEVIUS: Gradually they were released from the service of the Gestapo. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after the purge of the 30th of June 1934, were -special pains taken to see that no one was permitted in the organization -who was not in sympathy with its program? - -GISEVIUS: These attempts started after 1 April 1934, when Himmler and -Heydrich took over affairs. Actually, from that date, no official was -allowed into the Gestapo any longer unless Himmler and Heydrich -considered that he held the opinions which they desired. It may be that -during the first months some officials, who had not yet been screened by -the SS, may have got in. The Gestapo was, of course, a large -organization and it naturally took quite a time until the SS had -educated and trained their own criminal officials. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: However, did there come a time, and if so, will you -fix it as nearly as possible, after which every member of the Gestapo -must have known the criminal program of that organization? - -GISEVIUS: For many years I have considered that question myself and -discussed it with Nebe and my friends. The reply entails very great -responsibility, and in the knowledge of that responsibility I would say -that from the beginning of 1935, at the latest, everyone must have known -what sort of organization he was joining and the type of orders he might -have to expect. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have testified as to the investigations which -you made when you were connected with the police administration and you -mentioned the Reichstag fire but you did not tell us what your findings -were when you investigated that. Will you please tell us? - -GISEVIUS: To speak briefly and to begin with the facts, we ascertained -that Hitler in a general way had expressed a wish for a large-scale -propaganda campaign. Goebbels undertook to prepare the necessary -proposals and it was Goebbels who first thought of setting the Reichstag -on fire. Goebbels discussed this with the leader of the Berlin SA -Brigade, Karl Ernst, and he suggested in detail how it should be done. - -A certain chemical, known to every maker of fireworks, was chosen. After -spraying it, it ignites after a certain time—hours or minutes. In order -to get inside the Reichstag, one had to go through the corridor leading -from the palace of the Reichstag President to the Reichstag itself. Ten -reliable SA men were provided, and then Göring was informed of all the -details of the plan, so that by chance he did not make an election -speech on that particular evening, but at such a late hour would still -be sitting at his desk in the Ministry of the Interior in Berlin. - -Göring—and he gave assurances that he would do so—was to put the -police on wrong trails in the first confusion. From the very beginning -it was intended that the Communists should be accused of this crime, and -the 10 SA men who had to carry out the crime were instructed -accordingly. - -That is, in a few words, the story of the events. To tell you how we got -hold of the details, I have only to add that one of these 10 who had to -spray the chemical was a notorious criminal. Six months later he was -dismissed from the SA, and when he did not receive the reward which he -had been promised he decided to tell what he knew to the Reich Court -sitting in Leipzig at the time. He was taken before an examining -magistrate who made a record of his statement, but the Gestapo heard of -it and the letter to the Reich Court was intercepted and destroyed. The -SA man, named Rail, who betrayed the plan, was murdered in a vile manner -with the knowledge of the Defendant Göring, by order of Gestapo chief -Diels. Through the finding of the body, we picked up the threads of the -whole story. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What happened to the 10 SA men who carried out the -Reichstag fire? Are any of them alive now? - -GISEVIUS: As far as we are aware none of them are still alive. Most of -them were murdered on 30 June under the pretext of the Röhm revolt. Only -one, a certain Heini Gewaehr, was taken over by the police as a police -officer, and we tracked him down as well. He was killed in the war, -while a police officer on the Eastern Front. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you testified that you also investigated, -with the entire affair of Röhm, the murders that followed the Röhm -affair. Didn’t you so testify? - -GISEVIUS: I cannot actually say that we carried out the investigation, -as we, of the Ministry of the Interior, had really been excluded from -the entire affair. However, matters were such that after 30 June, all -the appeals for help, and all the complaints of the people who were -affected reached us in the Ministry of the Interior; and during 30 June, -through the continual radio messages, incidental visits to Göring’s -palace, and the information received from Nebe, we discovered all the -details. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, about how many people were killed in that -purge? - -GISEVIUS: We have never been able to establish the number exactly, but I -estimate that no more than 150 to 200 persons lost their lives, which, -at that time, was an enormous figure. - -I myself with Minister of Justice Gürtner checked the list of the number -of the dead which had been given him by Hitler and Göring, and we -ascertained that the list which contained the names of 77 dead, who had -allegedly been justly killed, was exceeded by nearly double that number -only by those names which we had received through the prosecuting -authorities, or through the appeals for help coming from relatives to -the Ministry of the Interior. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did you ascertain who selected the men who -were killed in that purge? - -GISEVIUS: To begin with we ascertained that Himmler, Heydrich, and -Göring had compiled exact lists of those to be murdered; for I myself -heard in Göring’s palace—and it was confirmed by Daluege who was -present, and also by Nebe who was present from the very first -second—that not one of those who were killed was mentioned by name; -instead they just said: “Number so and so is now gone,” or, “Number so -and so is still missing,” and “It will soon be Number so and so’s turn.” - -There is, however, no doubt that Heydrich and Himmler also had a special -list. On that special list there were several Catholics, Klausner, and -others. I cannot, for instance, say here under oath whether Schleicher -was murdered by order of Göring, or whether he was a man who was on -Heydrich’s and Himmler’s special list. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was the Defendant Frick fully informed as to -the facts which you knew about the illegal conduct of the Gestapo? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. I had to submit to him all the material that arrived -which was important, and I have already described that we reported all -these matters to the Secret State Police or to the Ministries of the -Interior of the Länder. Naturally I could submit only the most important -of these things to Frick personally. I estimate that I received several -hundred such complaints daily, but the most important had to be -submitted to Frick, because he had to sign them personally; for Göring -always complained as soon as he saw that such a young official signed -reports and appeals to the Ministry and to himself. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was Frick informed of your conclusions about -the Röhm purge? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, because on the Sunday, while the murders were continuing, -I spoke to Frick about the murder of Strasser, Klausner, Schleicher and -the many other murders; and Frick was particularly disgusted at the -murder of Strasser, because he considered that an act of personal -revenge by Göring and Himmler. Likewise, Frick was extremely indignant -about the murders of Klausner, Bose, Edgar Jung, and the many other -innocent men who were murdered. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But when Frick signed the decree, along with -Hitler, declaring these murders legitimate and ordering no prosecutions -on account of those murders, Frick knew exactly what had happened from -you; is that the fact? - -GISEVIUS: He knew it from me, and he had seen it for himself. The story -of the 30th of June was undoubtedly known to Frick. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did Frick ever talk with you about Himmler and -Heydrich as being bad and dangerous, cruel persons? - -GISEVIUS: On that Sunday, the 1st of July, Frick said to me, “If Hitler -does not very soon do to the SS and Himmler what he has done to the SA -today, he will experience far worse things with the SS than he has -experienced now with the SA.” - -I was greatly struck by that prediction at the time, and by the fact -that Frick should speak so openly to me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But notwithstanding the estimate he made of those -men as dangerous persons, did he not thereafter appoint them both in his -Ministry of Interior? - -GISEVIUS: Well, of course, they were actually appointed by Hitler. -However, I can only say that when I took leave of Frick, at the time I -left the Ministry of the Interior in May 1935, Frick told me literally -that the constant difficulties he had had because of me had taught him -from now on to take Party members only in his Ministry, and as far as -possible those who had the Golden Party Emblem. He said that it was -possible that in the course of events he might even be forced to allow -Himmler into his Ministry, but in no case would he accept the murderer -Heydrich. Those were the last words I exchanged with Frick. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Both were put in charge of matters that were under -his legal control, were they not? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, they became members of the Reich Ministry of the Interior -and Frick remained their superior. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you say that those were the last words which you -exchanged with the Defendant Frick? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. That was in 1935 and I have not met him or talked to him -since. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after 1934 Frick was the Minister in charge of -the running and controlling of concentration camps, was he not, Dr. -Gisevius? - -GISEVIUS: In my opinion the Reich Minister of the Interior was -responsible from the beginning for all police matters in the Reich and -therefore also for the concentration camps, and I do not believe that -one can say he had that responsibility only since 1934. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I am willing to accept your amendment to my -question. I ask that you be shown Document Number 3751-PS of the United -States, which has not yet been offered in evidence. - -[_The document was submitted to the witness._] - -Now, this purports to be a communication from Dr. Gürtner, the Minister -of Justice, to the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior. That -would be from your friend Dr. Gürtner to Frick, would it not? - -GISEVIUS: I believe I heard you say “friend.” During the time he acted -as Minister, Gürtner did not conduct himself in such a way that I could -consider him my friend. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well then, tell us about Gürtner. Tell us about -Gürtner’s position in this situation because we have a communication -here apparently from him. - -GISEVIUS: Gürtner? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. - -GISEVIUS: At that time Gürtner without doubt made many attempts to -expose the cruelty in the camps and to initiate criminal proceedings. In -individual cases Gürtner did make many attempts; but after the 30th of -June he signed that law which legalized all those dreadful things, and -also in other respects Gürtner never acted consistently with his views. -But this document which you submit to me was just such an attempt by -Gürtner and the many decent officials in the Ministry of Justice to -bring the question of the Gestapo terror to discussion. As far as I -recollect this is one of those letters which we discussed unofficially -beforehand in order to provoke an answer, so to say. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I now desire to read some parts of this into the -record. It becomes Exhibit USA-828. I will offer it as such. - -Will you kindly follow the German text and see if I correctly quote: - - “My dear Reich Minister! - - “Enclosed you will find a copy of a report of the Inspector of - the Secret State Police, dated 28 March 1935. - - “This report gives me an occasion to state my fundamental - attitude towards the question of corporal punishment for - internees. The numerous instances of ill-treatment which have - come to the knowledge of the authorities of justice point to - three different reasons for such ill-treatment of prisoners: - - “1. Beating as a disciplinary punishment in concentration camps. - - “2. Ill-treatment, mostly of political internees, in order to - make them talk. - - “3. Ill-treatment of internees arising out of sheer wantonness - or for sadistic motives.” - -I think I will not take the Tribunal’s time to read his comment on -Number 1 or Number 2. About Number 3, you will find in the German text: - - “The experience of the first revolutionary years has shown that - the persons who are charged to administer the beatings generally - lose all sense of the purpose and meaning of their action after - a short time, and permit themselves to be governed by personal - feelings of revenge, or sadistic tendencies. Thus members of the - guard detail of the former concentration camp at Bredow, near - Stettin, completely stripped a prostitute who had an argument - with one of them and beat her with whips and cowhides in such a - fashion that the woman 2 months later still showed two open and - infected wounds.” - -I shall not go into the dimensions; they are not important. - - “In the concentration camp at Kemna near Wuppertal, prisoners - were locked up in a narrow clothing locker and were then - tortured by blowing in cigarette smoke, upsetting the locker, - _et cetera_. In some cases the prisoners were first given salt - herring to eat, in order to produce an especially strong and - torturing thirst. - - “In the Hohnstein Concentration Camp in Saxony, prisoners had to - stand under a dripping apparatus especially constructed for this - purpose, until the drops of water, which fell down at even - intervals, caused seriously infected wounds on their scalps. - - “In a concentration camp in Hamburg four prisoners were lashed - in the form of a cross to a grating for days, once without - interruption for 3 days and nights, once for 5 days and nights - and fed so meagerly with dry bread that they almost died of - hunger. - - “These few examples show a degree of cruelty which is such an - insult to every German feeling, that it is impossible to - consider any extenuating circumstances. - - “In conclusion, I should like to present my opinion about these - three points to you, my dear Herr Reich Minister, in your - capacity as departmental minister competent for the - establishment of protective custody, and the camps for - protective custody.” - -And he goes on to make certain recommendations for action by the -Minister. I do not know whether the Tribunal cares to have more of this -read. - -Was any improvement in conditions noted after the receipt of that -communication by Frick? - -GISEVIUS: The letter was received just at the time I left the Ministry -of the Interior. I should like to say only one thing concerning this -letter: What is described therein is really only a fraction of what we -knew. I helped prepare this letter in that I spoke to the officials -concerned in the Ministry of Justice. The Minister of Justice could -bring up only those matters which had by chance become known legally -through some criminal record. But there can be no doubt that this -communication was merely a motive, and the cause of a very bold letter -from Heydrich to Göring, dated 28 March 1935, in which he disputed the -right of the Minister of Justice to prosecute cases of ill-treatment. -The letter, therefore does not add anything new to my descriptions, and -no doubt all have been convinced that these conditions, which started at -that time, never ceased but became worse as time went on. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came a time when Heydrich was -assassinated in Prague, was there not? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, some very brave Czechs were able to do what we -unfortunately could not achieve. That will always be to their glory. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I suppose the Czechs expected, and did you -expect that the assassination of Heydrich would result in some -improvement in this condition? - -GISEVIUS: We doubted—we, Canaris, Oster, Nebe, and the others of the -group—whether it was possible at all for an even worse man to be found -to succeed such a monster as Heydrich, and to that extent we really did -think that the Gestapo terror would now subside, and that perhaps we -would return to a certain amount of honesty and integrity, or that at -least the cruelties might be lessened. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then came Kaltenbrunner. Did you notice any -improvement after the appointment of Kaltenbrunner? Tell us about that. - -GISEVIUS: Kaltenbrunner came and things became worse from day to day. -More and more we learned that perhaps the impulsive actions of a -murderer like Heydrich were not so bad as the cold, legal logic of a -lawyer who took over the administration of such a dangerous instrument -as the Gestapo. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Can you tell us whether Kaltenbrunner took an even -more sadistic attitude than Himmler and Schellenberg had done? Were you -informed about that? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. I know that Heydrich, in a certain sense, really had -something akin to a bad conscience when he committed his crimes. At any -rate, he did not like it when those things were discussed openly in -Gestapo circles. Nebe, who as Chief of the Criminal Police had the same -rank as the Chief of the Gestapo, Müller, always told me that Heydrich -took care to conceal his crimes. - -With the entry of Kaltenbrunner into that organization, this practice -ceased. All those things were now openly discussed among the department -chiefs of the Gestapo. By now the war had started, of course. These -gentlemen lunched together, and Nebe often came to me from such -luncheons so completely exhausted that he had a nervous breakdown. On -two occasions Nebe had to be sent on long sick leave because he simply -could not stand the open cynicism with which mass murder, and the -technique of mass murder, were discussed. - -I remind you only of the gruesome chapter of the installation of the -first gas chambers, which was discussed in detail in this circle, as -were the experiments as to how one could remove the Jews most quickly -and most thoroughly. These were the most horrible descriptions I have -ever heard in my life. It is, of course, so much worse when you hear -them first-hand from someone who is still under the direct impression of -such discussions—and who because of this is almost at the point of -physical and mental collapse, than when you hear of them now from -documents. Nebe became so ill that actually as early as 20 July he -suffered from a persecution mania and was a mere human wreck after -everything he had gone through. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it the custom to have daily dinner conferences -of the chiefs of the Main Security Office, those who happened to be in -town? - -GISEVIUS: Daily conferences; everything was discussed at luncheon. This -was of particular importance to us, because we heard details of the -methods used by the Gestapo in the fight against our group. - -To prove what I say, I can state here that, for instance, the order -issued for the arrest of Goerdeler on 17 July was decided upon during -such a luncheon conference, and Nebe warned us at once. That is the -reason why Goerdeler was able to escape, at least for some time, and why -we were able to know to what extent the Gestapo were aware of our plot. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who were the regular attendants at those -luncheon conferences? - -GISEVIUS: Kaltenbrunner presided. Then there were Gestapo Müller, -Schellenberg, Ohlendorf, and Nebe. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And do you know whether, at those meetings, the new -kinds of torture and the technique of killing by gas, and other measures -in the concentration camps, were discussed? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. That was discussed in great detail, and sometimes I -received the description only a few minutes later. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what is the situation with reference to the -information of the Foreign Office about the conduct of the Gestapo? Will -you tell us what was done to inform the Foreign Office from time to time -of the crimes that the Gestapo were committing? - -GISEVIUS: The Foreign Office, particularly during the earlier years, was -continually kept informed, as nearly every day some foreigner was half -beaten to death or robbed, and then the diplomatic missions would come -with their complaints, and these complaints were sent to the Ministry of -the Interior by the Foreign Office. These went through my office and -sometimes I had four or five such notes a day from the Foreign Office -regarding excesses by the Gestapo; and I can testify that in the course -of years there were no crimes by the Gestapo which were not set forth in -these notes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you make certain reports to the Foreign Office -which were so dispatched that you are reasonably certain they would -reach Neurath? - -GISEVIUS: Ribbentrop was not yet the Foreign Minister at that time... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, Neurath. - -GISEVIUS: I very often discussed these matters personally with the -officials of the Foreign Office, because they were of a particularly -difficult nature, and because the officials of the Foreign Office were -very indignant, I asked them repeatedly to put these matters before the -Minister through the official channels. In addition, I gave as much -material as I could to one of the closest collaborators of the Foreign -Minister at that time, the Chief of Protocol, “Minister” Von -Bülow-Schwante; and according to the information I received from -Bülow-Schwante, he very often submitted that material to Neurath. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, were certain of the collaborators close -collaborators of Von Papen? Was Von Papen subject to action by the -Gestapo? - -GISEVIUS: To start with, the entire group around Von Papen was -continuously under surveillance by the Gestapo because in the earlier -years there was an impression among great masses of people that Von -Papen was a special advocate for decency and right. A large group -collected around Von Papen and that, of course, was most carefully -watched by the Gestapo. As the complaints, which Von Papen received by -the score, were carefully compiled in his office, and as no doubt Von -Papen quite often took these papers either to Göring or to the -Hindenburg palace, the closest collaborators of Von Papen were -especially suspected by the Gestapo. So it was that on 30 June 1934 -Oberregierungsrat Von Bose, the closest collaborator of Von Papen, was -shot dead in the doorway of Von Papen’s office. The two other colleagues -of Von Papen were imprisoned, and the man who wrote Von Papen’s radio -speeches, Edgar Jung, was arrested weeks before the 30th of June; and on -the morning of 1 July, he was found murdered in a ditch along the -highway near Oranienburg. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did Von Papen continue in office after that? - -GISEVIUS: I have never heard that he resigned; and I know that very soon -after the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss was murdered, he was sent to -Vienna as Hitler’s ambassador. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he ever make any protests that you know of? - -GISEVIUS: I personally heard of none at the time, although, we were -naturally extremely eager to hear which minister would protest. However, -no letter from Papen arrived at the Ministry of the Interior. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were some of his collaborators murdered after the -Anschluss in Austria? - -GISEVIUS: On the day of the Anschluss, when the SS entered Austria, Von -Papen’s closest collaborator, Legation Counsellor Freiherr von Ketteler, -was kidnapped by the Gestapo. We searched for him for weeks, until 3 or -4 weeks later his body was washed up on the banks of the Danube. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After that did Papen continue to serve as a part of -the Hitler Government and accept further offices from Hitler’s hands? - -GISEVIUS: He was no longer a member of the Government at the time. -Immediately after the march into Austria Von Papen was disposed of by -being made envoy. However, it was not long before he continued his -activities as Ambassador at Ankara. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Does the Tribunal desire to rise at this point? - -THE PRESIDENT: You would like a little more time, wouldn’t you, with -this witness? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It will take a little more time, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 26 April 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH DAY - Friday, 26 April 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal: - -Dr. Gisevius, yesterday you made some reference to Herbert Göring in -saying that Schacht had sent word to you about the Gestapo microphones -in Schacht’s house. Will you tell us who Herbert Göring was in relation -to the defendant? - -GISEVIUS: Herbert Göring was a cousin of the Defendant Göring. I had -known him for many years. Herbert, as well as his brothers and sisters, -warned me already years ago about the disaster which would overtake -Germany if at any time a man like their cousin Hermann Göring should get -a position of even the smallest responsibility. They acquainted me with -the many characteristics of the defendant which all of us had come to -know in the meantime, starting with his vanity, and continuing with his -love of ostentation, his lack of responsibility, his lack of scruples, -even to the extent of walking over the dead. In this way I already had -some idea what to expect of the defendant. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, during the period when you were making these -investigations and having these early conversations with Schacht, and up -until about 1937, you, as I understand it, were very critical of Schacht -because he had helped the Nazis to power and continued to support them. -Is that true? - -GISEVIUS: I did not understand how an intelligent man, and one who was -as capable in economics as he was, could enter into such a close -relationship with Hitler. I was all the more bewildered because, on the -other hand, this man Schacht, from the very first day and in a thousand -small ways resisted the Nazis, and the German public took pleasure in -many sharp and humorous remarks which he made about the Nazis. Great was -my bewilderment, until I actually met the man Schacht. And then... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During this period Schacht did have great influence -with the German people, did he not, particularly with German people of -responsibility and power? - -GISEVIUS: He had great influence to the extent that many Germans hoped -to find a proponent of decency and justice in him, since they heard that -he undertook many steps in that direction. I remember his activity in -the Ministry of Economics, where officials who were not Party members... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think we have covered that, and I am anxious to -get along with this, if I may interrupt you. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During this period you reported to Dr. Schacht -fully concerning your findings about the criminal activities of the -Gestapo, did you not? - -GISEVIUS: Yes; from time to time I spoke more frankly, and it is obvious -that I... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he took the position, as I understand you, that -Hitler and Göring did not know about these things. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. He was of the opinion that Hitler did not know anything -about such terrible things, and that Göring knew at most only a part. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he stood by Göring until 1937, when Göring -pushed him out of the economics office, did he not? - -GISEVIUS: I believe that was at the end of 1936. I may be wrong. I -believe it would be more correct to say that he looked for support from -Göring and hoped that Göring would protect him from the Party and the -Gestapo. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, Schacht did not heed warnings about -Göring until late 1936 or 1937? - -GISEVIUS: That is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And during this period there would be no doubt, -would there, that Schacht was the dominant economic figure in the -rearmament program until he was superseded by Göring with the Four Year -Plan? - -GISEVIUS: I do not know whether everything went through like that -exactly. He was, of course, as Minister of Economics, the leading man in -German economy, not only for rearmament but for all questions of German -economy; rearmament was just one of them. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now Schacht believed, and as I understand it, you -too believed during all this period that under German constitutional law -no war could be declared except by authority of the Reich Cabinet. Is -that correct? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, from the point of view of the -German Constitution, the war was illegal, by German law, as declared and -carried out by Hitler, in your view. - -GISEVIUS: According to our firm conviction, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think we found out yesterday the position you -were to have if there was a successful overthrow of the Hitler regime. -Schacht was under consideration for Chancellor, was he not, if that -movement was successful? - -GISEVIUS: No. It is only correct as to the first offer that Halder made -in August of 1938, or perhaps July 1938, when he visited Schacht for the -first time. At that time, according to the information which I received, -Halder asked Schacht whether, in the case of an overthrow, he would be -ready to take over a position like that. Schacht replied that he would -be ready for anything if the generals would eliminate the Nazi regime -and Hitler. - -As early as the year 1939 individual opponents formed a group, and at -the last, when Beck was the acknowledged head of all conspirators from -the left to the right wing, Goerdeler emerged in the foreground together -with Beck as the leading candidate for the position of Reich Chancellor, -so that after that time we need speak only of Goerdeler in that regard. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to ask you some questions about the -Defendant Keitel. Of course, we have heard that Hitler was the actual -head of the state, but I want to ask you whether Keitel occupied a -position of real leadership and power in the Reich. - -GISEVIUS: Keitel occupied one of the most influential positions in the -Third Reich. I would like to say at this point that I was a very close -friend of four of the closest collaborators of Keitel. One was the Chief -of the Ordnance Office in the OKW, the murdered General Olbricht; the -second was the Chief of the Counterintelligence Service, Admiral -Canaris, who was also murdered; the third was the Chief of the Army -Legal Department, Ministerial Director Sack—he was also murdered—and -finally there was the chief of the armament economy department, General -Thomas, who escaped being murdered as though by a miracle. A close -friendship, I might say, bound me to these men, and thus from these men -I found out exactly what tremendous influence Keitel had over the OKW -and in all Army matters, and thereby what influence he wielded in -representing the Army in the eyes of the German people. - -It may be that Keitel did not influence Hitler to a great extent. But I -must testify here to the fact that Keitel influenced the OKW and the -Army all the more. Keitel decided which documents were to be transmitted -to Hitler. It was not possible for Admiral Canaris or one of the other -gentlemen I mentioned to submit an urgent report to Hitler of his own -accord. Keitel took it over, and what he did not like he did not -transmit, or he gave these men the official order to abstain from making -such a report. Also, Keitel repeatedly threatened these men, telling -them that they were to limit themselves exclusively to their own -specialized sectors, and that he would not protect them with respect to -any political utterance which was critical of the Party and the Gestapo, -of the persecution of the Jews, the murders in Russia, or the -anti-Church campaign, and, as he said later, he would not hesitate to -dismiss these gentlemen from the Wehrmacht and turn them over to the -Gestapo. I have read the notes in regard to this which Admiral Canaris -made in his diary. I have read the notes of General Oster in regard to -this from the conferences of commanders in the OKW. I have talked with -the Chief Judge of the Army, Dr. Sack, about this, and it is my strong -wish to testify here that Field Marshal Keitel, who should have -protected his officers, repeatedly threatened them with the Gestapo. He -put these men under pressure, and these gentlemen considered that a -special insult. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, whether Keitel could control Hitler -or not, he did have a very large control of the entire OKW underneath -him. Is that not true? - -GISEVIUS: Did you say Hitler? No, Keitel. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whether Keitel could control Hitler or not he did -control and command the entire OKW underneath him? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, whatever Hitler’s own inclinations -may have been, these men in this dock formed a ring around him which -kept out information from your group as to what was going on unless they -wanted Hitler to hear it, isn’t that a fact? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. I believe that I should cite two more examples which I -consider especially significant. First of all, every means was tried to -persuade Keitel to warn Hitler, before the invasion of Belgium and -Holland, and to tell him, that is Hitler, that the information which had -been submitted by Keitel regarding the alleged violation of neutrality -by the Dutch and Belgians was wrong. The counterintelligence was to -produce these reports which would incriminate the Dutch and Belgians. -Admiral Canaris at that time refused to sign these reports. I ask that -this be verified. He told Keitel repeatedly that these reports, which -were supposedly produced by the OKW, were wrong. That is one example -when Keitel did not transmit to Hitler what he should have transmitted. -The second was that Keitel was asked by Canaris and Thomas to submit to -Hitler the details of the murders in Poland and Russia. Admiral Canaris -and his friends were anxious to prevent even the beginning of these mass -murders and to inform Keitel while the first preparations by the Gestapo -were being made for these infamous actions. We received the documents, -through Nebe and others. Keitel was informed as to this in detail, and -here again he did not resist at the beginning; and he who did not stop -the Gestapo at the beginning can not be surprised if in the end a -millionfold injustice was the upshot. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, I think you put your question, “Did -not these men in the dock form a ring which prevented you getting to -Hitler,” and the question was answered rather as though it applied only -to Keitel. If you intended to put it with reference to all defendants, I -think it ought to be cleared up. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that is true. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Each of the defendants who held ministerial -positions of any kind controlled the reports which should go to Hitler -from that particular ministry, did he not? - -GISEVIUS: As far as this general question is concerned, I must reply -cautiously, for, first of all, it was a close clan which put a cordon of -silence around Hitler. A man like Von Papen or Von Neurath cannot be -included in this group, for it was obvious that Von Papen and Von -Neurath, and perhaps one or the other of the defendants, did not have -the possibility, or much later no longer had the possibility, of having -regular access to Hitler, for besides Von Neurath, Hitler already had -his Ribbentrop for a long time. Thus I can only say that a certain -group, which is surely well known, composed the close circle of which I -am speaking. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like you to identify those of the -defendants who had access to Hitler and those who were able to prevent -access to Hitler by their subordinates. That would apply, would it not, -to Göring, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Frick, and to -Schacht—during the period until he broke with them, as you have -testified—and to Dönitz, Raeder, Sauckel, and Speer? - -GISEVIUS: You mentioned a few too many and some are missing. Take the -Defendant Jodl, for instance. I would like to call your attention to the -strange influence which this defendant had and the position he had with -regard to controlling access to Hitler. I believe my testimony shows -that Schacht, on the other hand, did not control access to Hitler, but -that he could only be glad about each open and decent report which got -through to Hitler from his and other ministries. As far as the defendant -Frick is concerned, I do not believe that he was necessarily in a -position to control access to Hitler. I believe the problem of Frick -centers in the matter of responsibility. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Should I have included Funk in the group that had -access to Hitler? - -GISEVIUS: Funk, without a doubt, had access to Hitler for a long time, -and for his part Funk had of course the responsibility to see that -affairs in the Ministry of Economics and in the Reichsbank were -conducted in the way Hitler desired. Without a doubt Funk put his -surpassingly expert knowledge at the service of Hitler. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you prepare or participate in preparing reports -which were sent to Keitel as to the criminal activities of the Gestapo? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did others participate with you in the preparation -of those reports? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, it was the work of a group. We gathered reports about -plans and preparations of the Gestapo, and we gathered material about -the first infamous acts, so that some courageous men at the front, -officers of the General Staff and of the Army, went to the scene, -prepared reports, made photographs, and this material came then to both -Canaris and Oster. Then the problem arose: how can we bring this -material to Keitel? It was generally known that officers, even highly -placed officers like Canaris and Thomas, were forbidden to report on -political matters. The difficulty was, therefore, not to have Canaris -and the others come under the suspicion that they were dealing with -politics; we employed the roundabout method of preparing so-called -counterintelligence agents’ reports from foreign countries or from -occupied countries; and with the pretext that different agents from all -countries were here reporting about these outrages, or that agents -traveling through or in foreign countries had found such infamous -photographs we then submitted these reports to Field Marshal Keitel. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did Canaris and Oster participate in -submitting those reports to Keitel? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. Without Canaris and Oster the working out and the -gathering of this material would have been inconceivable. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what positions did Canaris and Oster hold with -reference to Keitel at this time when these reports were being -submitted? - -GISEVIUS: Canaris was the senior officer of the OKW. Formally he even -had to represent Keitel when Keitel was absent. Keitel was only -concerned that someone else should take his place at such times, usually -his Party general, Reinecke; and Oster, as the representative, Chief of -Staff for Canaris, was also in close association with Canaris. Keitel -could not have wished for closer contact with reality and truth than -through this connection with the Chief of his Wehrmacht -Counterintelligence Service. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So these reports which were sent to Keitel came -from the highest men in his own organization under himself? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what did they report to Keitel? Let me ask you -if they reported to him that there was a systematic program of murder of -the insane going on. - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. On these subjects, too, records were completed in -detail including the despairing reports of the directors of the lunatic -asylums. I recall this exactly because here, too, we had great -difficulties in giving a reason for these reports, and we actually put -them through as reports of foreign doctors who had heard of these things -with indignation. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he report to him the persecution and murder of -the Jews and the program of extermination of the Jews that was being -carried out? - -GISEVIUS: From the first Jewish pogroms in 1938 on Keitel was minutely -informed of each new action against the Jews, particularly about the -establishment of the first gas chamber, or rather, the establishment of -the first mass graves in the East, up to the erection of the murder -factories later. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did these reports mention the atrocities that were -committed in Poland against the Poles? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed, here I would say again that the atrocities in -Poland, too, started with isolated murders which were so horrible that -we were still able to report on single cases, and could add the names of -the responsible SS leaders. Here, too, Keitel was spared nothing of the -terrible truth. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did that condition of informing Keitel also -prevail as to the atrocities against nationals in other occupied -countries? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. First of all I must of course mention the atrocities in -Russia, because I must emphasize that Keitel now certainly, on the basis -of the Polish atrocities, had been warned sufficiently as to what was at -hand in Russia. And I remember how the preparation of these orders, such -as the order for the shooting of commissars and the Night and Fog -Decree, was continued for weeks in the OKW, so that, as soon as the -preparation of these orders was begun, we begged Canaris and Oster to -present a petition to Keitel. But I would like to add that I do not -doubt that other courageous men also presented a petition to Keitel in -this connection. Since I belonged to a certain group, the impression -might be created that only in this group were there persons who were -interested in these problems, and I would be withholding vital -information if I did not add that even in the High Command of the OKW -and in the General Staff there were excellent men who did everything to -reach Keitel through their separate channels, and that there were also -brave men in many ministries who tried to reach every officer whom they -saw in order to plead with him to order a stop to this injustice. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the reports to Keitel mention the forced -enslavement of millions of foreign workers and their deportation or -importation into Germany? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And those enslaved laborers are the displaced -persons, largely, of this day—that are plaguing Germany today, are they -not? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. In this connection I would also like to say that -in our reports it was already mentioned just what responsibility the -Wehrmacht would have to bear if these ill-treated people should be free -some day. We had an idea of what was to come, and those who made the -reports at that time can understand what has now taken place. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the reports to Keitel report the persecution of -the churches in the occupied countries? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, they did. I would like to cite as a special example how -we even once sent leading churchmen to Norway in the guise of agents. -They established contact with Bishop Bergraf, and brought back very -detailed reports of what Bishop Bergraf thought about the persecution of -the churches in Norway and other countries. I can still see this report -before me because Keitel also wrote one of his well-known National -Socialist Party phrases on this document. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, these reports consisted both of information -furnished by Canaris and Oster and of the reports coming in from the -field under this plan? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I want to ask you a few questions about the SA and -the SS organizations. In your book, which you have been asked about, I -think you have characterized the SA as a private army of the Nazi -organization. Is that a correct characterization? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During the early part of the struggle for power the -SA constituted a private army for carrying out the orders of the Nazi -Party, did it not? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They took in a good many people in the SA, and it -got pretty large, and there came a time when there was some danger it -would get away from them; wasn’t there? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, that is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the murder of Röhm and his associates was a -struggle for power, was it not, between Göring and Himmler and the Nazi -crowd associated with them on one hand and Röhm and his associates on -the other? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After the murder of Röhm, this SA organization, -which was very big at the time, rather lost importance, didn’t it? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, completely. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the SS, which was a smaller and more compact -organization, came in to take its place as a private army, didn’t it? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, as the decisive private army. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let’s go back to the SA during the period -before the struggle for power resulting in the Röhm purge. What part did -the SA play in the battle for power, the seizure of power? - -GISEVIUS: As is said in the song, “It cleared the streets for the Brown -Battalions,” and without a doubt the SA played a dominant role in the -so-called seizure of power. Without the SA Hitler would undoubtedly -never have come to power. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let’s take up their methods. Perhaps I can -shorten this by quoting from your book. I think you say that: - - “Whoever had not entirely made up his mind, had it made up for - him unequivocally by the SA. Their methods were primitive, - therefore all the more effective. For instance, one learned the - new Hitler salute very quickly when, on the sidewalks, beside - every marching SA column—and where were there no parades in - those days—a few stalwart SA men went along giving pedestrians - a crack on the head right and left if they failed to perform the - correct gesture at least three steps ahead of the SA flag. And - these Storm Troopers acted the same way in all things.” - -Is that a correct account of their activities and influence? - -GISEVIUS: I hope so. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you know so, don’t you? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, yes, of course, for it is my own description, I cannot -criticize it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, but you saw these things yourself, did you -not? You were in Germany at that time? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You see, it is very difficult for us, with all the -documents we have, Doctor, to get the picture of the day to day events, -and you were there and we were not. - -Now, let me make another question: - - “The chronicle of that private army is colorful and stirring. It - teemed with beer hall brawls, street fights, knifings, - shootings, and fist fights, altogether a mad rough and tumble - affair, where naturally there was no question of crises of - leadership or of mutinies. In this brotherhood of the wild men - of German nationalism there was undoubtedly much idealism, but - at the same time the SA was the repository for political - derelicts. The failures of all classes found refuge there. The - discontents, the disinherited, the desperados streamed to it - wholesale. The core, the paid permanent group, and particularly - the leaders, were recruited, as time went on, more and more from - the riffraff of a period of political and social decay.” - -Is that a correct statement of your observations of the SA at that time? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, quite. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I call your attention to another question: - - “The SA organized huge raids. The SA searched houses. The SA - confiscated property. The SA cross-examined people. The SA put - people in jail. In short, the SA appointed themselves permanent - auxiliary police and paid no attention to any of the principles - of the so-called system period (Weimar Republic). The worst - problem for the helpless authorities was that the SA never - returned its booty at all. Woe unto anyone who gets into their - clutches! - - “From this time dated the ‘Bunker,’ those dreaded private - prisons of which every SA Storm Troop had to have at least one. - ‘Taking away’ became the right of the SA. The efficiency of a - Standartenführer was measured by the number of arrests he had - made, and the good reputation of an SA man was based on the - effectiveness with which he ‘educated’”—in quotation marks, the - quotation marks being yours—“‘educated’ his prisoners. Brawls - could no longer be staged in the fight for power, yet the - ‘fight’ went on, only the blows were now struck in the full - enjoyment of power.” - -Is that a correct statement of your observations of the SA? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you also used the term “Bunker,” and it is -a slightly technical term with which some of us are not familiar. Will -you tell the Tribunal what this Bunker system of the SA was? - -GISEVIUS: Bunkers were those cellars or other dungeons with thick walls -in which the poor prisoners were locked up, where they were then beaten -and in a large measure beaten to death. They were these private jails in -which, during the first months, the leaders of the leftist parties and -of the trade unions were systematically rendered harmless, which -explains the phenomenon that the leftist groups did not act again for so -long a time, for there, at the outset and most thoroughly, the entire -leadership was done away with. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You also use the expression “‘taking away’ became -the inalienable right of the SA,” and “taking away” is in quotation -marks. Will you tell us about this “taking away,” what it means? - -GISEVIUS: That was the arbitrary arrest, whereby the relatives often for -periods of weeks or months did not know where the poor victims had -disappeared to, and could be glad if they ever returned home. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you also make this observation in your -book: - - “Every excess, pardoned as ‘overzealousness in the cause of the - National Socialist Revolution,’ was a demonstration of official - sanction and necessarily drew in its wake a new excess. It was - the bestiality tolerated during the first months that later - encouraged the sadistic murderers in the concentration camps. - The growth in brutality and insensibility of the general public, - which toward the end of the revolution extended far beyond the - domain of the Gestapo, was the unavoidable consequence of this - first irresponsible attempt to give free rein to the Brown - Shirts for their acts of violence.” - -Does that, too, represent your observation of the SA? - -GISEVIUS: Yes—not of the SA alone but also of general conditions in -Germany. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, will you tell us about—as I understand you, -after the Röhm Purge the SA was rather abandoned as the private army, -and a more reliable and smaller and more compact private army was -created under Himmler. - -GISEVIUS: A guard which had been established by Himmler long before this -time now actually came into action. I do not doubt that Himmler and his -closest circle for years had worked toward this very objective so that -one day, with their Schutztruppe (protective guard), they could -establish the terror system in Germany. But until 30 June the SS had -been a part of the SA, and Göring—excuse me, Röhm was also the chief of -the SS. The road for Himmler to police chief in Germany, to police chief -of evil, was only open after Röhm had been eliminated with his much -larger SA. But the will to power of the SS and all the confused and -unscrupulous ideas connected therewith must be assumed to have existed -in the leadership of the SS already for many years previous to that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, this SS organization selected its members with -great care, did it not? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Will you tell us something about the qualifications -for membership? What was necessary? - -GISEVIUS: The members had to be so-called Nordic types. Actually I -always considered these questionnaires as a good subject for a humorous -paper, and for that reason I am not in a position today to give you -exact particulars, except that, if I am not mistaken, the distinguishing -characteristics of men and women went so far as underarm perspiration. I -recall that Heydrich and Himmler, in selecting SS men who were to do -police duty, decided only after a picture had been submitted to them of -the future victim who would be charged with carrying out their evil -commands. I know that, for example, Nebe repeatedly saved officials in -the criminal police force (Kripo) from being transferred to the ranks of -the Gestapo by having poor photographs taken of these people so that, as -far as possible, they did not look Nordic. In that case, of course, they -were turned down immediately. But it would be going too far afield to -relate more about these dismal things in this courtroom. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, was the membership of the SS recruited only -from what we may call fanatical Nazis, reliable Nazis? - -GISEVIUS: I believe we have to make a distinction. In the first years of -the SS, many decent German people, especially farmers and people in the -country, felt drawn to the SS, because they believed Himmler’s assurance -that the SS was to bring order to Germany and to be a counterbalance to -the SA terror. In that way, to my knowledge, some people in the years -before 1933, and even in 1933 and 1934, entered the SS, because they -hoped that here would be a nucleus standing for order and right, and I -believe it is my duty to point out the tragedy of these people. Each and -every case should be examined before deciding whether, later on, a -member was guilty or whether he remained decent. - -But from a certain period of time on—I believe I specified yesterday -1935—no one could have any doubts as to the real SS objectives. From -then on—here I would like to take up your own expression—fanatical -National Socialists, that is, “super” National Socialists, entered the -SS. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And from 1935 on, was it, in your judgment as one -who was on the ground, necessarily so, that the persons who entered it -knew what its actual activities were? - -GISEVIUS: Yes; what he was entering into and what orders he had to -expect. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Tribunal wishes me to ask you in reference to -yesterday’s incident if you have anything to add. I know nothing further -on that incident, in reference to the threat made. Is there anything -that you wish to add about that incident in order to make it clear to -the Tribunal, anything that has not been told about it? - -GISEVIUS: I would like to make clear that Dr. Dix did not merely inform -me about a discussion he had with Dr. Stahmer. That morning I arrived in -the room of the attorneys, and I do not wish to state further -particulars, but the atmosphere there was not exactly cordial to begin -with. Then I went up to Dr. Dix to report something else. Dr. Stahmer -approached, obviously very excited, and asked Dr. Dix for an immediate -interview. Dr. Dix refused on the ground that he was talking to me. Dr. -Stahmer said in a loud voice that he must speak to Dr. Dix immediately -and urgently. Dr. Dix took only two steps aside and the conversation -that followed was carried on by Dr. Stahmer in such a loud voice, that I -was bound to hear most of it. I did hear it and said to attorney Dr. -Kraus who was standing nearby, “Just listen how Dr. Stahmer is carrying -on.” Dr. Dix then came over to me, very excited, and after all this -fuss, in response to my questions as to what precisely was the demand of -the Defendant Göring, he told me what I had half heard anyway. I would -like to underline that if I had had the opportunity to tell the story -first in my own way, I would have emphasized that I was under the -impression that Dr. Stahmer had merely transmitted a statement, or -rather what I would call a threat, by the Defendant Göring. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in this Nazi regime, after Hitler came to -power, will you state whether there was, as far as you could see, a -systematic practice of the Nazi ministers and Nazi officials enriching -themselves by reasons of their confiscation of property of Jews and -others? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. This became more cynical from year to year and we kept -lists as to which of the civil ministers and, above all, which of the -generals and field marshals participated in this system. We planned to -inquire of all the generals and ministers at a later date whether these -donations had been put into a bank account or whether they had possibly -used this money for their own personal interests. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And will you state to the Tribunal which of the -defendants were engaged in self-enrichment in the manner that you have -indicated? - -GISEVIUS: I am sorry I am only able to give a negative reply since we -repeatedly inquired from the Defendant Schacht... - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this will be a good time to adjourn for 10 -minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dr. Gisevius, I have just a few more questions -which I would like to put to you in reference to the war and the -resistance movement of which you were a part. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, there is just one question I should -like to ask the witness. You said that you kept lists of the ministers -and generals who participated in this system of spoils. What was your -source of information? - -GISEVIUS: We had information from the various ministries, from -antechambers of ministries, and from the Finance Ministry. But I did not -finish the answer before. I said that I could answer the question as to -which of the defendants had enriched himself only in the negative. - -Concerning the Defendant Schacht, I wanted to continue saying that I -personally did not look into these lists, and that I took part only in -the questioning of the Defendant Schacht and that he personally had not -enriched himself. I did not intend to say in any sense, therefore, that -all the defendants, especially Defendants Von Papen or Von Neurath, to -name only these two, had enriched themselves. I do not know. I wanted to -say only that about Schacht we know, or rather I know, that he did not -take part in that system. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, in addition to a system of spoils from -confiscated property, there were also open gifts from Hitler to the -generals and ministers, were there not, of large sums of property and -money? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. These were the famous donations with which, especially in -the years after the outbreak of the war, the top generals were -systematically corrupted. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did that hold true with reference to many of -the ministers? - -GISEVIUS: I do not doubt it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as I understood your testimony, whatever -doubts you may have had before 1938 when the affair Fritsch occurred, -that event or series of events convinced even Schacht that Hitler was -bent on aggressive warfare. - -GISEVIUS: After the Fritsch crisis Schacht was convinced that now -radicalism and the course toward war could no longer be stopped. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was never any doubt in the minds of all of -you men who were in the resistance movement, was there, that the attack -on Poland of September 1939 was aggression on Hitler’s part? - -GISEVIUS: No, no, there could be no doubt about that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that diplomatic means of righting whatever -wrongs Germany felt she suffered in reference to the Corridor and Danzig -had not been exhausted? - -GISEVIUS: I can only point to the existing documents. There was no will -for peace. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in the German resistance movement, as I -understand you, there was agreement that you wanted to obtain various -modifications of the Treaty of Versailles, and you also wanted various -economic betterments for Germany, just as other people wanted them. That -was always agreed upon, was it not? - -GISEVIUS: We were all agreed that a calm and a reasonable balance could -be achieved again in Europe only when certain modifications of the -Versailles Treaty were carried through by means of peaceful -negotiations. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your difference from the Nazi group was chiefly, in -reference to that matter, one of method. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: From the very beginning, as I understand you, it -was the position of your group that a war would result disastrously for -Germany as well as for the rest of the world. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that the necessary modifications, given a -little patience, could be brought about by peaceful means. - -GISEVIUS: Absolutely. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it was in the light of that difference of -opinion, I suppose, that your resistance movement against the regime in -power in Germany carried out these proposals for Putsche and -assassinations which you have described. - -GISEVIUS: Yes, but I would like to add that we were not only thinking of -the great dangers outside, but we also realized what dangers lay in such -a system of terror. From the very beginning there was a group of people -in Germany who still did not even think of the possibility of war, and -nevertheless protested against injustice, the deprivation of liberty, -and the fight against religion. - -In the beginning, therefore, it was not a fight against war, but if I -may say so, it was a fight for human rights. From the very first moment -on, among all classes of people, in all professional circles, and in all -age groups, there were people who were ready to fight, to suffer, and to -die for that idea. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question may arise here as to what your -motives and what your purposes in this resistance movement were with -reference to the German people, and I shall ask you to state to the -Tribunal your overall purpose in resisting the Government in power in -your country. - -GISEVIUS: I should like to say that death has reaped such a rich harvest -among the members of the resistance movement, that it is only for that -reason I can sit here, and that otherwise more worthy and able men could -give this answer. Having said this, I feel that I can answer that, -whether Jew or Christian, there were people in Germany who believed in -the freedom of religion, in justice, and human dignity, not only for -Germany but also, in their profound responsibility as Germans, for the -higher concept of Europe and the world. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was a group which composed this resistance, -as I understand it. - -GISEVIUS: It was not only just a group, but many individuals had to -carry the secret of their resistance silently to their death rather than -confide it to the Gestapo records; and only a very few persons have -enjoyed the distinction of being referred to now as a group. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Most of the men who were associated with you in -this movement are dead? - -GISEVIUS: Almost all of them. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there anything you would like to add to clarify -your position to the Tribunal, Dr. Gisevius? - -GISEVIUS: Excuse me, I did not understand you. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there anything you would like to add in order -that the Tribunal may understand your position in this, your feeling, -your very strong feeling in this matter, to understand and appraise your -own relation to this situation? - -GISEVIUS: I do not like to talk of myself, but I want to thank you, Mr. -Prosecutor, for giving me an opportunity to testify emphatically on -behalf of the dead and the living. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have concluded the examination. - -MAJOR GENERAL G. A. ALEXANDROV (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): -Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Was not the understanding arrived at with Counsel for the -Prosecution that the witness for the Defendant Frick should only be -cross-examined by one prosecutor? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, I have an agreement with the prosecutors -to the effect that the examination of the Defendant Schacht and his -witnesses will be carried out by the American Prosecution, but that, in -the presence of additional questions during cross-examination, the -prosecutor from the Soviet Prosecution could also join in the -examination. In view of the fact that the Soviet Prosecution has several -additional questions to ask the witness Gisevius, which are of great -importance to the case, I ask permission to address these questions to -the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: What are the questions which you say are of particular -importance to the Soviet Union? I do not mean the individual questions -but the general nature of them. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Questions in connection with the part played by the -Defendant Frick in the preparation for war, questions connected with the -attitude of the Defendant Schacht towards the Hitler regime, as well as -a number of other important questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn in order to consider whether -the Prosecution ought to be allowed to cross-examine this witness in -addition to the cross-examination which has already taken place. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has before it two documents which were -presented to it by the Chief Prosecutors upon the subject of -cross-examination. In the first of these documents it was provided that -the following procedure for the cross-examination of the Defendants -Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Frank, Frick, Streicher, and Funk was agreed; and -that with reference to Frick the American Prosecution was to conduct the -cross-examination of the defendant and his witness. The document was -presented because of the Tribunal’s express desire that too much time -should not be taken up by the cross-examination by more than one -prosecutor. - -In addition to that document there was another document, which was only -a tentative agreement, and with reference to the Defendant Schacht it -provided that the American delegation should conduct the principal -cross-examination and the Soviet and the French delegations should -consider whether either would wish to follow. - -In view of those two documents, the first of which suggests that the -Prosecution have agreed to only one cross-examination of the witnesses -of the Defendant Frick, and the second of which tentatively suggests -that, in addition to the American Prosecution, the Soviet and the French -might wish to cross-examine, the Tribunal propose to allow the -additional cross-examination in the present instance, and they are loath -to lay down any hard and fast rule concerning cross-examination. They -hope, however, that in the present instance, after the full -cross-examination by the Prosecutor of the United States, the Soviet -Prosecutor will make his cross-examination as short as possible. For the -future, the Tribunal hopes that the prosecutors may be able to agree -among themselves that in the case of witnesses one cross-examination -only will be sufficient, and that in any event the additional -cross-examination will be made as brief as possible. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Witness, in order to save time, I beg you to answer my -questions as briefly as possible. - -Tell me, what part did the German Ministry of the Interior and the -Defendant Frick personally play in the preparation for the second World -War? - -GISEVIUS: This question is very difficult for me to answer. I left the -Ministry of the Interior as early as May 1935, and I actually cannot say -any more about conditions after that time than any other German, that -is, that the Ministry of the Interior was part of the German government -machine and doubtlessly there, as in all other ministries, those -preparations for war were made which administrations have to make in -such cases. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: May I say something? The witness has just stated that -he could not say any more in answering that question than any other -German could. I believe that, under these circumstances, the witness is -not the right person to make any factual statements. - -THE PRESIDENT: He has just said so himself. That is exactly what he -said. I don’t see any reason for any intervention. The witness said so. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: I only meant that he could not even function as a -witness concerning these facts. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: For perfectly obvious reasons I am deprived of all -possibility to put these questions to any German, but I am perfectly -satisfied with the answers of the witness Gisevius. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Do you know anything about the so-called -“Three Man College”? It consisted of the Plenipotentiary for the -Administration of the Reich, of the Plenipotentiary for Economy, and of -a representative of the OKW. This Three Man College was entrusted with -the preparation of all fundamental questions pertaining to the war. - -GISEVIUS: I personally cannot give any information on that. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Do you know anything about the activities of the -Ministry of the Interior in territories occupied by the Germans? - -GISEVIUS: As far as I know, the Ministry of the Interior sent important -officials into the military administration, but it is not clear to me -whether these officials, from that moment on, were subordinate to the -Ministry of the Interior or the OKW. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you any special knowledge as to whether the -machinery of the Reich Commission in the occupied territories of the -Soviet Union was recruited from the Ministry of the Interior or at least -with considerable help from this ministry? - -GISEVIUS: I should assume so, yes. It holds good as far as help is -concerned, because the ministry for the occupied Russian territories -could take its officials only from the personnel department of the -Ministry of the Interior. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know of the visits paid by the Defendant -Frick to the concentration camps? - -GISEVIUS: At the time when I was in the Ministry of the Interior I did -not hear anything about that. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: And after that? - -GISEVIUS: After that I did not hear anything about it either. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Could a situation arise in which the Defendant Frick, -although Minister of the Interior, would not be informed regarding the -system of concentration camps established in Germany and of the violence -and lawlessness practiced in the camps? - -GISEVIUS: I believe that I have already yesterday given exhaustive -information as to the fact that we were informed about everything. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In this particular case I am interested in the -Defendant Frick. What do you know about him in this connection? - -GISEVIUS: I have said yesterday that the Reich Ministry of the Interior -received numberless calls for help from all over the country, and -yesterday we even saw a letter from the Ministry of Justice. Also I have -referred... - -THE PRESIDENT: This subject was fully covered yesterday. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall pass on to the next question. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Are you acquainted with the secret law -issued in Germany in 1940 concerning the killing of sick persons and the -old? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the attitude of the Defendant Frick towards -the promulgation and enforcing of this law? - -GISEVIUS: I assume that he, as Minister of the Interior, signed it. - -THE PRESIDENT: The law, if there was a law, was after 1935, was it not? -What is the law that you are putting? If it was in 1935, then this -witness was not in the Ministry of the Interior. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am speaking of the law which was promulgated in 1940. - -THE PRESIDENT: He would not know anything about it any more than anybody -else. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am satisfied with the answer which I have received -from the witness. Will you now allow me to proceed to questions -concerning the Defendant Schacht? - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, you were in close relations with -the Defendant Schacht for a considerable period of time; have I -understood you correctly? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Thus you were sufficiently acquainted with the state -and political activities of the Defendant Schacht? - -GISEVIUS: I believe so, yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell me, what do you know about the part played by the -Defendant Schacht in Hitler’s seizure of power? - -GISEVIUS: That was just the time when I did not yet know Schacht, and -about which I cannot give any information. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know about it? - -GISEVIUS: I knew only that he entered the Cabinet and that without doubt -he assisted Hitler in the preliminary political negotiations. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Do you know anything about the meeting engineered by -Schacht between Hitler and the big industrialists, in February 1933? - -GISEVIUS: No. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: As a result of this meeting a fund was created by the -industrialists with a view to guaranteeing the success of the Nazi Party -at the elections. What do you know about this meeting? - -GISEVIUS: I know nothing about this meeting. In my book I wrote that to -my knowledge the largest amount for the election campaign in 1932 was -given by Thyssen at that time and Grauert, a member of the Rhein-Hessian -iron and steel industry group. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the part played by the Defendant Schacht on -this occasion? - -GISEVIUS: At that time I did not see Schacht in the Ruhr district, and I -also do not know whether he was there at that time. I emphasize again -that I did not know him at all. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I know that. But in your book entitled _Until the -Bitter End_, published in 1946, and in your replies to preliminary -interrogations by defendant’s counsel Dix, you favorably described the -Defendant Schacht; is that correct? - -GISEVIUS: I did not understand the last words. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I repeat that you favorably described the Defendant -Schacht; is that correct? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You state that as from 1936, the Defendant Schacht was -in opposition to Hitlerite regime, and that he expressed these opinions -in a fairly open manner; is that true? - -GISEVIUS: No, I state expressly that beginning with 1936 his suspicions -were aroused, but that he only became an opponent of Hitler during the -Fritsch crisis. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In which year do you place this crisis? - -GISEVIUS: End of 1937 and beginning of 1938. The Fritsch crisis was at -the beginning of 1938. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell us, under the then existing regime in Germany, -could a situation arise where Hitler would not be informed as to these -opposite views of Schacht which, according to you, existed at the end of -1937? - -GISEVIUS: You mean that Hitler was not informed after 1938? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: No. I asked you, could it be possible, under the then -existing regime in Germany, that Hitler was not informed as to this -antagonistic attitude on the part of Schacht? - -GISEVIUS: Hitler knew very well that Schacht was very critical towards -the system and that he frequently expressed disapproval. He often -received letters from Schacht and of course heard a great deal, too. But -he did not know how far that opposition went. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then how could Schacht remain in the Government of the -Reich, as Minister without Portfolio and personal adviser to Hitler, -right up to January 1943, if Hitler, as you say, was fully aware of his -critical attitude towards his, Hitler’s, policy? - -GISEVIUS: Hitler always took care to let prominent individuals disappear -quietly or put them in the shade so that foreign propaganda could not -take advantage of these facts. The Schacht case is not the only one in -which Hitler tried to camouflage an open crisis. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Were you acquainted with a letter from Hitler of 19 -January 1939, addressed to Schacht, who at that time was being relieved -of his post as President of the Reichsbank? I should like to remind you -of the contents of that letter in which Hitler writes to Schacht as -follows: - - “I avail myself on the occasion of your release from the post of - President of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank to thank - you most warmly, most sincerely for the services you have - repeatedly rendered while in that position, to Germany and to me - personally, during long and arduous years. Above all else, your - name will be connected forever with the first period of national - rearmament. I am happy that you will now be able, as - Reichsminister, to proceed to the solution of new tasks...” - -THE PRESIDENT: This was all gone over yesterday by the witness. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Please forgive me, but I have a question to put to the -witness in connection with this letter. - -[_Turning to the witness._] It would appear, from the contents of this -letter, that in January 1939—and I stress the date, Witness—Hitler -expressed his appreciation of Schacht’s activities rather differently -from the manner in which you worded your evidence. How do you reconcile -this divergence of opinion with your assertion that the Defendant -Schacht was already in direct opposition to Hitler’s regime towards the -end of 1937 and the beginning of 1938? - -GISEVIUS: I should like to answer that I am not accustomed to consider -any written or oral proclamation by Hitler as truthful. That man always -said only that which seemed opportune to him at the moment to deceive -the world or Germany. In this particular case Hitler intended to avoid -the impression that Schacht’s resignation would cause a difficult -economic crisis. But I am only saying now what Hitler could have had in -his mind. Yesterday I described with what indignation Schacht received -that letter. He considered it derision and debasement. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then I shall refer to another document, to a letter -from Schacht himself addressed to Hitler. This is a memorandum of 7 -January 1939, in which Schacht wrote to Hitler: - - “From the very beginning the Reichsbank has realized that the - fruits of a successful foreign policy can only be obtained if - this policy is founded on the rebirth of the Wehrmacht. It - therefore took upon itself, to a very large extent, the - financing of the armament program, despite the monetary and - political difficulties involved. The justification of this - consisted in the necessity, which far outweighed all other - arguments, of manufacturing arms immediately, _ex nihilo_, often - even under disguise, in order to ensure a foreign policy which - would command respect.” - -Do you also consider this document as an expression of Schacht’s -attitude? - -GISEVIUS: As far as I have understood, you refer to a letter from the -year 1935, is that correct? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I refer to a letter of 7 January 1939. - -GISEVIUS: Please pardon me. Then I can say only what I said yesterday: -that all these letters were very carefully written so that they could -not be considered a provocation, and the factual contents of the letter -made illusory lest Hitler should simply say, “This is a personal attack -on me.” I said yesterday that the problem was to convince the other -conservative ministers, who were not so much against Hitler, about the -actual situation and neutralize any opposition. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the attitude of the Defendant Schacht towards -the Anschluss? - -GISEVIUS: The Anschluss happened right in the middle of the Fritsch -crisis, or probably at the dramatic climax, and that is why we were -firmly convinced that this was a particularly malevolent case of -camouflage, and in that sense we were indignant. We had no doubt that -the German Army was to be diverted outwards... - -THE PRESIDENT: Witness, wait a minute. You were asked if you knew what -the attitude of Schacht was to the Anschluss question at that time. You -are not answering that question. Do you or do you not know? - -GISEVIUS: I cannot give a definite answer about that, because all of us -saw clearly that the problem of Austria had to be solved in a legal way. -There were differences of opinion with regard to this question in our -group. Most of us hoped that the independence of Austria could be -preserved. Especially from the German point of view, it was desirable -that another independent German State should exist, if at any later time -there should be a League of Nations or diplomatic negotiations. However, -I cannot state under oath whether Schacht personally was of that opinion -or whether he was for an outright annexation. He was certainly against -the method. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall quote an excerpt from a speech made by Schacht -in Vienna, in March 1938: - - “Thank God, these matters could not, in the end, hinder the - forward march of the great German people, for Adolf Hitler has - created a community of German will and thought, he supported it - with the reborn strength of the Wehrmacht, and thereby gave an - outward form to this spiritual union of Germany and Austria.” - -Do you qualify these statements of Schacht’s also as expressions of his -opposition to the Hitler regime? - -GISEVIUS: I would have to be able to read the speech in its entirety. I -personally would not have said it, but I do not know whether pure -judgment on my part here serves any purpose. Would it not be better to -ask Schacht what he meant? - -THE PRESIDENT: The speech can be put to Schacht when he goes into the -witness box, if he does. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell me, Witness, you are currently residing in -Switzerland? In which town? - -GISEVIUS: I live near Geneva in a village called Commugny. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: How long have you lived in Switzerland? - -GISEVIUS: Since the first of October 1940. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did you know about Schacht’s arrival in Switzerland in -1943? - -GISEVIUS: No. He did not come to Switzerland in 1943. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In 1942? - -GISEVIUS: He did not come to Switzerland in 1942 either. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then Schacht was not in Switzerland either in 1942 or -1943? - -GISEVIUS: That is correct. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In all the time that you yourself lived in Switzerland, -did you ever meet the Defendant Schacht or not? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, repeatedly. I was in Berlin at least every 4 weeks or 8 -weeks and until 1943... - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: No. I am asking you about Schacht’s visit to -Switzerland. - -GISEVIUS: During the war there was only one visit to Switzerland by -Schacht—in 1941, on the occasion of his wedding trip, and then I saw -him. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: That was in 1941? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: On 14 January 1946, an article was published in the -newspaper _Basler Nachrichten_, entitled “What Schacht Thinks.” Do you -know anything about that article? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know about that article? - -GISEVIUS: Not more than I read in the paper about it. I have tried to -find out who that American was with whom Schacht had the conversation. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: The details do not interest me. - -One last question: Did you know anything about a conference held at -Hitler’s house in Berchtesgaden, in the summer of 1944, when the -advisability of killing imported foreign workers was discussed, in the -case of further successful advances by the Allied Forces? Did you hear -anything about that conference? - -GISEVIUS: No, at that time I could not go to Germany any more, because -there were proceedings against me, and I heard nothing about that. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I have no further questions to ask. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then do you wish to re-examine, or does any other member -of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask questions of the witness? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, yesterday during the cross-examination the -American prosecutor submitted to you a letter of 14 May 1935 by the -Reich Minister of Justice to the Reich and Prussian Minister of the -Interior. In that letter there is an enclosure which mentions a copy of -a letter by an inspector of the Secret State Police. Witness, did I -understand you correctly to say that you personally assisted in writing -that letter? - -GISEVIUS: We had cross-connections between the Ministry of the Interior -and the Ministry of Justice, and at times it was desirable, if a letter -of a severe nature came from another ministry, for me to present it to -my minister. And I do not doubt that Frick was also glad when he -received a sharp letter, so that he could submit a matter in a general -way and before the Cabinet. Thus I remember that the sending of that -letter was discussed in advance with several gentlemen of the Ministry -of Justice and with myself. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Do I understand you correctly then that the letter was -a joint effort of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the -Interior to do something against the Gestapo terror? - -GISEVIUS: As for myself, I can certainly say “yes.” I was at that time a -member of the Ministry of the Interior. Of course I did not speak to my -chief about that point. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: In that letter we find on Page 5 of the German text -the following sentence—I quote: - - “In the concentration camp at Hohnstein in Saxony, inmates had - to stand under a dripping apparatus especially constructed for - that purpose, until the drops of water, falling at regular - intervals, produced serious infected injuries on the scalp.” - -Do you know that the guards of that camp were heavily punished for that? - -GISEVIUS: No, and if that happened it was an astounding exception. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, then I have one more question. That is in -connection with the statement which you just made, that there was an -atmosphere of hostility toward you in the room of the attorneys due to -the incident which has been mentioned. A number of colleagues are deeply -shocked by that statement of yours, and these colleagues were glad that -you described conditions in Germany so openly. Could you tell me whether -that statement you made applies to all of the Defense Counsel? - -GISEVIUS: I am grateful to you that you give me the opportunity to -correct an apparent misstatement, or a misunderstanding which was -created by my statement. I meant a different incident which occurred as -I entered the counsel room, about which I do not want to speak any -further here. I wish to emphasize that I realize the difficult task of -the Defense Counsel, and that I want to apologize if in any way the -impression was created or might be created that I had reproached the -great majority of the Defense Counsel in the carrying out of their -difficult task. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: I thank you. I have no more questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gisevius, I want to ask you some questions to try and -get clear what your various positions were and where you were at various -times. - -As I understand it, in 1933 you were a civil servant, is that right? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: And then you became a member of the Gestapo? - -GISEVIUS: The first position I held as a qualified civil servant was in -the service of the Political Police. In Germany one is a civil servant -even in the training stage. Therefore I have to say that I received my -first real position as an official in August of 1933 when I entered the -Gestapo. - -THE PRESIDENT: And when did you leave that position? - -GISEVIUS: The end of December 1933. - -THE PRESIDENT: And to what position did you go? - -GISEVIUS: Then I entered the Ministry of the Interior; that is to say, -the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. In the course of the year 1934 I -also entered the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and in May of 1935 I -was dismissed from the Ministry of the Interior. - -Then I came into the newly created, or to-be-created, Reich Criminal -Office, which, at its beginning, was the Police Presidium in Berlin. On -the date when Himmler was appointed Reich Chief of Police, on 17 June -1936, I was finally dismissed from the police service. - -I was then transferred to the Government office in Münster, worked there -in price control supervision, and, in the middle of 1937, I took an -unpaid vacation, ostensibly to make studies in economics. That vacation -was canceled by the Ministry of the Interior at the beginning of 1939, -and I was attached to the Government office in Potsdam near Berlin. -There I had to do with road building... - -THE PRESIDENT: In the middle of 1937 you took unpaid service and studied -in economics, I think you said, or an unpaid vacation. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: You still remained a member of the civil service then, -did you? - -GISEVIUS: Yes; until the 20th of July I was continuously in the civil -service. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then, in the beginning of 1939 you were posted to the -Ministry of the Interior and attached to Potsdam? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on; after that? - -GISEVIUS: When war broke out the difficulty arose that I had no -mobilization order and, on the other hand, my friends wanted to have me -in the OKW. From the date of the outbreak of the war until 1 October -1940 I had only a forged mobilization order, and every day I expected to -be found out. At which time I would have had to take the consequences. - -After the fall of Paris I stated to Canaris and Oster that I would have -to ask them now to release me from that somewhat complicated situation. -At that time the position of Canaris, temporarily, was so strong that he -placed me in an intelligence position with the Consulate General in -Zürich. There I received the title of a Vice Consul with the Consulate -General in Zürich, and I stayed there as a counterintelligence man, -without belonging to the Abwehr formally, until 20 July. - -After 20 July I was dismissed from all posts, and I do not know whether -I was not even deprived of citizenship. I have found out nothing about -that. - -THE PRESIDENT: Between the time you went to Zürich and 20 July, were you -returning to Germany from time to time? - -GISEVIUS: During that time I was mainly in Germany, and only from time -to time Oster and Canaris sent me to Switzerland as a courier, on travel -orders. Schacht was still quite helpful to me at that time in getting me -a Swiss visa, through the Swiss Legation. - -THE PRESIDENT: During the time that you were in the Gestapo, from August -to December 1933, what was your actual job or function? - -GISEVIUS: When I received my first civil service position I was only in -training, and I was attached to the then Chief of the Executive -Department, Oberregierungsrat Nebe, for training. After the warrant for -arrest was issued, at the end of October 1933, I was sent to Leipzig as -a reporter for the Reichstag Fire trial. - -THE PRESIDENT: You spoke yesterday very often of a man whose name I am -not clear about, Nebe, I believe it was. - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: What was his position? - -GISEVIUS: Nebe was a well-known criminologist at the Berlin Police -headquarters before 1933. As a National Socialist he was called into the -Gestapo in July 1933 and until the beginning of 1934; he was promoted -there to Oberregierungsrat. Then we were successful, with the aid of the -Defendant Frick, in having him transferred for some time to the Ministry -of the Interior. And then he became the founder and Chief of the Reich -Office of Criminology. On the day of the appointment of Himmler as Chief -of Police of the Reich he was put into the new Reich Security Main -Office. In the course of time he was taken over into the SS; he became -an SS Gruppenführer, SS General, and, until 20 July, he was one of the -closest subordinates of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. The Defendant -Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Gestapo as well as the Criminal Police -and the Information Service. So that thereby Nebe became a subordinate -of Kaltenbrunner and received continuously official orders from him, -just like the Gestapo Chief Müller. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you wish to ask any questions, Dr. Dix? - -DR. DIX: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps we had better do that after the adjournment -at a quarter past 2. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. DIX: The Soviet Prosecutor put a question to you in connection with -the annexation of Austria. While answering the question you were -interrupted. You had just said, I quote “But the form...” Would you -please complete your answer now? - -GISEVIUS: What I wanted to say was that Schacht was undoubtedly opposed -to the Anschluss in this form. - -DR. DIX: Then I have one last question, which concerns the so-called -incident of yesterday. I discussed this incident with you yesterday and -explained the situation as regards my colleague Dr. Stahmer. I also gave -you permission to make use of this explanation at any time. - -I now request you to give this explanation to the Tribunal. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I interpose an objection. I think that is a -most irregular way to inform the Tribunal, if there is anything the -Tribunal should be informed about, that Dr. Dix should tell the witness -what the witness should tell the Tribunal. - -Now, I have no objection to the witness’ relating to the Tribunal -anything that he knows from his own knowledge. I do object to the -witness’ being asked to relate what Dr. Dix has told him he may tell the -Tribunal. I think that is a most irregular way of clarifying it. - -DR. DIX: That is not the case. I made a remark about Dr. Stahmer to Dr. -Gisevius. That is a matter between the witness and myself; I consider it -important that this remark of mine be related and testified to by the -witness. It is an incident which he observed, and I prefer that the -witness should confirm the fact that I explained this to him. I cannot -see anything irregular about this procedure, and I ask for a decision by -the Tribunal. Otherwise I should make the explanation myself, but I -consider it better for the witness to say what I told him immediately -after that incident. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that you may properly put the -question to the witness. - -DR. DIX: I have already put the question, and you may answer it at this -time. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am not quite sure now what your question was, but the -Tribunal thinks that you may put the question. Was there anything in -connection with the incident which the witness has not already told us, -which he wishes to say? - -DR. DIX: Yes. The question relates to a conversation between the witness -and myself. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, what did I tell you yesterday? - -GISEVIUS: You told me immediately that, in your opinion, your colleague -Dr. Stahmer did not wish to put undue pressure upon me but that this -undue pressure came rather from the Defendant Göring. - -DR. DIX: I have no further questions. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, were you, during the war... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, are you attempting to re-examine? - -DR. SEIDL: I wanted to put a single question... - -THE PRESIDENT: I was not thinking of the time which you would take up, -but the question of whether you ought to be allowed to put any question. -Yes, go on, Dr. Seidl. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, during the war were you at any time active in the -intelligence service of a foreign power? - -GISEVIUS: At no time. - -DR. SEIDL: It is also not correct... - -THE PRESIDENT: That is not a question which you ought to put to this -witness in re-examination. - -DR. SEIDL: But, Mr. President, it is a question affecting the -credibility of this witness. If it should turn out that this witness, -who is or was a citizen of the German Reich, had been active in the -intelligence service of a foreign power, that fact would have an -important bearing on the credibility of the witness. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to be heard on that. In the first -place, I do not think that this witness should be subjected to any -attacks. In the second place, I respectfully submit that it does not -militate against the credibility of the witness that he should have -opposed this kind of an organization. I think that the attack upon the -credibility of this witness, if there were one to be made—he is sworn -on behalf of the defendants and is not the Prosecution’s witness—the -attack is not timely, is not a proper attack, and the substance of it -does not go to credibility. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will allow you to put the question. - -DR. SEIDL: Please answer my question and remember your oath. - -GISEVIUS: Mr. Attorney, it is not at all necessary for you to remind me -of my oath. I have said that I was never in the intelligence service of -a foreign power. I was in the service of a good, clean German cause. - -DR. SEIDL: During the war did you receive funds from any power at war -with Germany? - -GISEVIUS: No. - -DR. SEIDL: Do you know what the three letters OSS mean? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: What do they stand for? - -GISEVIUS: They stand for an American intelligence service. - -DR. SEIDL: You had nothing to do with that organization? - -GISEVIUS: I had friendly and political contacts with several members of -this organization. - -DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions to put to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: I hope the defendants’ counsel will remember that they -have all had a free opportunity to cross-examine this witness already -and have not... - -DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): The person of Herr -Von Papen was not mentioned until the cross-examination by the American -prosecutor. Therefore I could not ask questions before. - -Witness, you replied in the negative to a question put by the American -chief prosecutor yesterday as to whether the Defendant Von Papen at any -time protested. Of course, you modified this by pointing out that some -written communication by Von Papen had not been addressed to the -Ministry of the Interior. - -In order to clarify this problem, I should like to know whether this -assertion of yours refers only to the Ministry of the Interior. On Page -133 of your book you pointed out that one of the Defendant Von Papen’s -main activities as Vice Chancellor consisted in handing in protests and -that he addressed these protests above all to Hindenburg and Göring. - -GISEVIUS: I again emphasized the latter point yesterday or today. I have -no official knowledge of any protest made by Von Papen to the competent -police minister after 30 June 1934. I can say only that it would greatly -have strengthened the position of the ministry of police if a protest of -that nature, describing in detail the murder of Von Papen’s closest -co-workers, had reached the Ministry of the Interior. In that case, it -is unlikely that this rumor about the suicide or rather the suspicious -death of Von Bose and Jung would have reached the public. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you not think that it is understandable, especially -considering the position held by Frick, the comparatively insignificant -and uninfluential position held by Frick, that one should make such -protests to higher authorities if it is possible to do so? - -GISEVIUS: At the very moment when the ministers took the position that -they could apply only to higher authorities, that is, the dictator -himself, they, of their own accord, shattered the constitutional -competency of the individual ministries and the Cabinet. - -It would have meant a great deal if Herr Von Papen at that time had used -the prescribed channels. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: In agreement with your book, you do not dispute the fact -that Von Papen made many protests to these higher authorities in respect -to other questions as well? - -GISEVIUS: No; he did protest frequently. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yesterday, within the scope of your general statements -you gave an unfavorable characterization of the Defendant Von Papen. -This character sketch coincides with the one you gave in your book. In -your book you pay special attention to certain details and draw your -conclusions from them. - -Since the Defendant Von Papen only occupies a comparatively small amount -of space in your book and you probably had nothing to do with him in -your official capacity, you must have had to base your statements on -second-hand information. Since all these statements, as far as they -refer to Von Papen, are incorrect, I refer to them briefly. - -First, you proceed from the assumption that, in spite of the events of -30 June, Von Papen did not resign. - -On the contrary, it is historically significant that Papen did send in -his resignation after the suppression of his Marburg speech, that -negotiations about this resignation were pending between Hitler and -Hindenburg, and that Hitler accepted Papen’s resignation immediately -after the latter’s release on 3 July, when it was again tendered, but -did not intend to make it public until a later date, in spite of Papen’s -request to the contrary. - -Is it possible, Witness, that you were not correctly informed of this -internal event? - -GISEVIUS: It is perfectly possible for me not to have known of internal -events. I should like, however, to stress the fact that a minister or -vice chancellor is under an obligation to give a certain amount of -publicity to his opinion and to his decisions; and I can say only that, -whatever Papen may have said to Hitler in private, he contrived with -consummate skill to conceal from the German people the fact that he -intended to resign—or had already resigned; and that is the point. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Are you aware that this same Defendant Von Papen had had -a very bad experience a few weeks earlier, when the press was forbidden -to publish his speech at Marburg, which contained a frank statement of -his opinions, and warning was given that persons found circulating it -would be punished? - -GISEVIUS: I am aware of it because we were appalled that a Vice -Chancellor of the German Reich allowed himself to be silenced in such a -way. I believe that the 30th of June would not have involved such a -heavy death-roll for the middle classes if Vice Chancellor Von Papen had -given a manly “no”—a definite “no” at the proper time. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Your answer makes no reference to the point which I -raised before, that Von Papen had actually resigned because the -publication of his Marburg speech had been prohibited. - -Secondly, you make the assumption that Von Papen took part in the -Cabinet session of 3 July, in which the law was passed that the measures -involved by 30 June were legal as emergency measures for the protection -of the State. Is it known to you that Von Papen did not participate in -this session, that he had just been released and went into the -Chancellery while the session was in progress, that Hitler asked him to -go from the session-room into the adjoining room, that Von Papen again -tendered his resignation, which Hitler accepted, and that he left the -Chancellery immediately afterwards, without participating in the session -at all? - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether it is possible for the witness to -follow your questions, but they are so long and contain so many -statements of fact that it is very difficult for anybody else to follow -them; it is very difficult for the Tribunal. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: The gist of my question was that Von Papen did not attend -the Cabinet session on 3 July. My question to the witness... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, why do you not ask the witness whether he -knows whether he did participate or not? If that is the question you -want to ask why do you not ask it? - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: My question is simply an attempt to find out whether the -assertion to the contrary which appears in his book can also be -explained by an error in information obtained from a third party. - -GISEVIUS: It can be explained by false information, which, through the -silence of Herr Von Papen, became known to the public and by which I -myself was misled. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thirdly, you go on with the statement that Von Papen, -although he went to see Hindenburg afterwards, did not make a -sufficiently strong protest against the measures taken. Is it known to -you that Von Papen did everything in his power to reach Hindenburg but -was kept away from him and he did not reach Hindenburg’s estate at -Neudeck until after the 30th of June, after Hindenburg’s death? Can the -assertion to the contrary contained in your book be traced back to an -error in information? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, if you tell me that even in his capacity of Vice -Chancellor of the Reich he did not have access to the President of the -Reich and still remained in office, in spite of the fact that there were -foreign journalists, the foreign diplomatic corps, and even a large -number of Germans who heard of this attitude of a German vice -chancellor. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: But, Witness, you are forgetting that he was a retired -vice chancellor and had already been out of office for several weeks. - -Fourthly, you start with the premise that Von Papen attended the -Reichstag session at which the measures taken on 30 June were justified. -Do you know that Von Papen did not attend that session in spite of -Hitler’s summons to him to do so? Is it possible that you could have -been informed incorrectly on that point, too? - -GISEVIUS: I believe you have already asked me that. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, this is not the Cabinet session; this is the -Reichstag session. - -GISEVIUS: Yes, then I must be misinformed. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you. - -[_Dr. Laternser approached the lectern._] - -GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, it seems to me that the Defense has had -every opportunity to interrogate this witness. After the witness was -examined by the Prosecution, after his cross-examination, the Defense -makes again an application to cross-examine the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks, at any rate, that it is perfectly -able to manage its own proceedings without any interruptions of this -sort. We can deal with Dr. Laternser when he makes his application to -cross-examine. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. I merely wanted to say that -we would like to shorten the duration of the proceedings as much as -possible, and the Prosecution would like the Defense to consider that -the same way. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have several further questions to put to -the witness, arising from his cross-examination; I assume that the -Tribunal have no objection to my questioning him. - -THE PRESIDENT: No, if they arise out of the cross-examination of him. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, yesterday, in answer to a question of the -American prosecutor, you expressed the opinion that a Putsch against the -then existing regime would have been possible only with the co-operation -of the generals but that the many discussions which took place did not -achieve this co-operation. I should like to ask you, Witness, to which -generals you spoke personally about the existing plans for a Putsch on -the part of your group? - -THE PRESIDENT: You are not concerned with every general in the German -Army; you are only concerned with those who are charged with being a -criminal group. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Your question must be addressed to them, or with -reference to them. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. Then I ask the Court’s permission to -describe to the witness the OKW and General Staff circle so that he can -answer my question. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can put to him, I think, whether he had contact -with any members of the General Staff who are charged with being a -criminal group. You know who the generals are. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes. I should like to make a few preliminary remarks to -the witness and then put the question. Witness... - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, what is the question you want to put? - -DR. LATERNSER: So that the witness can answer the question within the -limits prescribed by the Tribunal, I should like to give the witness a -brief explanation as to the circle of persons actually belonging to this -group and then ask him with which of these persons he talked personally -in order to win them over for the Putsch intended by his groups. -Otherwise... - -THE PRESIDENT: If you do it shortly. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, the group General Staff and OKW is held to -include the holders of certain appointments from February 1938 to May -1945. These appointments are as follows: The Commanders-in-Chief of the -various branches of the Armed Forces... - -THE PRESIDENT: You are not going through the whole lot, are you, 130 of -them? - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the list is really quite short and -otherwise I cannot restrict my question as desired by the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what you mean. What I said was, are you -proposing to go through the whole 130 generals or officers? - -DR. LATERNSER: No, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on. - -DR. LATERNSER: The group includes those holding certain appointments; -briefly, all those who were commanders-in-chief during the period -February 1938 to May 1945. Now, I ask you, with which generals of this -group did you personally discuss the subject of Putsch plans, in order -to obtain their co-operation in a Putsch, if such were made? - -GISEVIUS: You mean commanders-in-chief of groups? - -DR. LATERNSER: Of armies, of army groups, branches of the Wehrmacht, and -General Staff chiefs of the Wehrmacht branches. - -GISEVIUS: I have already mentioned Halder and Brauchitsch. - -DR. LATERNSER: One question, Witness; did you discuss with Field Marshal -Von Brauchitsch an intended Putsch against the regime or only against -the Gestapo? - -GISEVIUS: I discussed both with him; and in both cases he answered in -the affirmative and acted in the negative. - -I spoke to Halder and Witzleben. I knew Kluge well from the old times. I -do not know at what period he entered the category to which you refer. -At any rate my connection with Kluge was never broken off. I may have -talked to other individuals falling within this category. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but to discuss Putsch plans with a high-ranking -military leader is an event of some importance; if you had had a -discussion of this kind with a field marshal you would surely remember -it. - -GISEVIUS: It was not such an important event as all that, Mr. Attorney. -Field marshals were not such important people in the Third Reich. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the fact that these generals were spoken -to and refused to join a Putsch is not a crime within the meaning of the -Charter. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, yesterday I explained that this point is -very important because it would exclude the assumption of a conspiracy. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid, Dr. Laternser, it is no good answering me -that a point is very important. What I asked you was, how is it relevant -to show that these generals discussed a revolt against the regime? That, -I am putting to you, is not a crime within the meaning of the Charter. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but this circumstance would exclude the assumption -of the conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution. - -THE PRESIDENT: But does it preclude the possibility of a conspiracy to -make aggressive war? It has nothing to do with it. - -DR. LATERNSER: I did not quite understand that. - -THE PRESIDENT: The question of a revolt against the regime in Germany -is, it seems to me, not necessarily connected with the conspiracy to -carry out aggressive war; therefore, anything which has to do with a -revolt against the regime in Germany is not relevant to the question -which you have to deal with. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the conspiracy is assumed precisely in -connection with the wars of aggression; and if the high military leaders -turned against the regime to such an extent that they discussed and even -attempted a Putsch, there would be no question of conspiracy. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal think the proper way of -putting the question, which they understand you want to put, is to ask -which of the generals were prepared to join in a revolt. You may put -that question. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, in order to decide how far the circle as a -whole was willing to take part I must ask the witness how many of them -he spoke to and how many of those declared themselves ready to act with -him. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you might put that to him—how many. Ask him how -many. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, that was the question I asked at the -beginning. - -THE PRESIDENT: I said you may put it. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, with how many generals of this -group did you discuss the matter? - -GISEVIUS: In the course of years it may have been a dozen or several -dozen, but I should like to say that it was the task of Generaloberst -Beck and Oster or Canaris to talk to these gentlemen rather than mine. -As regards names, I cannot give you much of the information you want; on -the other hand I can shorten your question by saying that, -unfortunately, very few of the leading generals in the appointments -referred to by the Prosecution ever seriously declared their intention -of helping to overthrow the system. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, that is exactly what I want to know. You spoke -to Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, Halder, and Witzleben? - -GISEVIUS: And Olbricht. - -DR. LATERNSER: He did not belong to this group. You did speak to these -three, then? - -GISEVIUS: Also to Kluge. - -DR. LATERNSER: Regarding the intended Putsch? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, of course. - -DR. LATERNSER: And of these four that you mentioned did Field Marshal -Von Witzleben agree? - -GISEVIUS: They all agreed to begin with. Witzleben was the only one who -stuck to his word. - -DR. LATERNSER: Then he did participate in this Putsch? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did I understand you correctly when you said yesterday -that the Putsch of 20 July originated mainly with the Wehrmacht, that -is, with the generals and the officers of the General Staff, and that -they intended to keep down as far as possible the number of those taking -part? - -GISEVIUS: No, I did not make such an exact statement as that. Under a -terror regime, only the military circles are in a position to carry out -a Putsch; to this extent it is true to say that these few generals who -participated were the mainstay of the Putsch. But on 20 July the main -weight lay with the wide front of the civilians who for years had fought -for the generals and were invariably disappointed by the generals. For -this reason alone, because the generals had repeatedly broken their -word, we decided this time that on 20 July we would wait until the -generals had really taken action, in order not to raise the hopes or -burden the conscience of many civilians all to no purpose. That is what -I meant by limitation. - -DR. LATERNSER: Then the only Putsch which was actually attempted was -effected by generals and General Staff officers? - -GISEVIUS: And civilians. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes. And the head of this group was, as you testified, -Generaloberst Beck? - -GISEVIUS: Yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: And he also belonged to the group indicated under the -name General Staff and OKW. Now, I have a further question: Do you know -of relations between these military leaders and the Minister of Finance -Popitz, who also had designs for a Putsch and is even said to have -negotiated with Himmler for the purpose of doing away with Hitler; and -do you know anything about that? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, that is true. Popitz made great efforts to incite the -generals to make a Putsch and to assassinate him. I regret that I did -not mention his name at the right time. He too was one of those who, -from 1938 or 1939 on, did their best to overthrow the regime. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you discuss that with Minister Popitz? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, repeatedly. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did he tell you anything about the identity of the high -military leaders he had contacted for this purpose? - -GISEVIUS: Popitz was in contact with Beck in particular. He is certain -to have been in contact with Witzleben; he was in touch with Halder and -Brauchitsch. The list of his disappointments is no shorter than the list -of disappointments which all the rest of us had. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did he himself call it a disappointment? - -GISEVIUS: Yes, he was bitterly disappointed. This bitter, everlasting -disappointment was our one topic of conversation, and that was the -difficulty confronting the civilians, Mr. Attorney. - -DR. LATERNSER: There were no other possible ways of doing away with -Hitler? - -GISEVIUS: No. Since, through the fault of the generals, there was no -other means of power, constitutional or otherwise, left in Germany, and -the generals, who were the only armed power of the nation, took their -orders from Hitler, it was impossible to organize opposition through any -other circles. I may remind you that after 1938 every attempt made by -the Leftists to organize a strike was punishable in the same way as -mutiny in time of war, and I remind you of the hundreds of death -sentences imposed on civilians under the war laws. - -DR. LATERNSER: Now, a different subject. When... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that this matter has been fully -covered and is really not relevant. You have already cross-examined this -witness at some length before this, and the Tribunal does not wish to -hear any further evidence on this subject in any further -cross-examination. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have just finished. - -Witness, as regards the Fritsch crisis, when did you... - -THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said you had concluded? - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I am afraid I was misunderstood. I have -concluded those questions referring to an intended Putsch and I should -like to pass on to another point now and put a question on the Fritsch -crisis. - -THE PRESIDENT: What question? - -DR. LATERNSER: As regards the Fritsch crisis I should like to ask the -witness when he learned of the exact state of affairs and whether he -transmitted his knowledge to high military leaders or caused that -knowledge to be transmitted to them. - -THE PRESIDENT: But the Fritsch crisis has nothing to do with the charges -against the High Command. The charges against the High Command are -crimes under the Charter, and the Fritsch crisis has nothing whatever to -do with that. - -DR. LATERNSER: Then I will withdraw that question. - -Witness, today in cross-examination... - -THE PRESIDENT: What are you going to put to him now? - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to ask the witness now about -some points which he made in reply to the American chief prosecutor’s -questions. I believe that some clarification is necessary here. - -THE PRESIDENT: The principle is not whether you think the clarification -is necessary, but whether the Tribunal thinks it; and, therefore, the -Tribunal wishes to know what points you wish to put to him. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes, indeed. In the course of his testimony today the -witness mentioned the fact that he had in his possession documentary -evidence of murders in Poland and Russia. I wanted to ask him who had -prepared these reports and in particular whether he is acquainted with a -very thorough and scientifically prepared report made by Blaskowitz, -commander in Poland, and intended for transmission to his superiors. -That would be an extremely important point. Generaloberst Blaskowitz is -a member of the group which I represent. From the facts to be shown, it -is clear that the members of this group have always taken a stand -against cruelty, if such cases were reported to them through official -channels. I must therefore establish whether these reports, the object -of which was to prevent atrocities, are to be ascribed to the -co-operation of generals belonging to the indicted group. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It seems to me, if I may suggest, Your Honors, that -counsel is under the apprehension that he has here to deal with -individual generals. We are dealing only with the group. If what counsel -says about General Blaskowitz is true, that is a defense for him, and I -am right to say that General Blaskowitz did defy this Nazi conspiracy. -And if that fact is ever verified, he certainly should not be subject to -penalties for the acts which he stood up against. - -It seems to me that we are going into individual defenses here under a -misapprehension that this is the occasion to try each and every one of -the generals. We made no charge against them that they either did or did -not have a Putsch or a Fritsch affair. The Fritsch affair is only -referred to here as fixing the time when the Defendant Schacht became -convinced that aggressive warfare was the purpose of the Nazi regime. -The Putsch is only introduced because in his defense Schacht says he -tried to induce a Putsch. It enters not at all into the case against the -General Staff. And most of the General Staff who took any part in the -Putsch were hanged and I cannot see how it could be any defense to those -who remained and are under trial that a Putsch was or was not conducted. -It seems that we are off the main track. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I would like to define my position with -regard to this point. Unless I am permitted to ask questions about the -attitude of the members of this group and in respect to such an -important point, from which it is clear that they combated atrocities, -it is impossible for me to make clear to the Tribunal the attitude -typical of the high military leaders. It is absolutely necessary for me -to follow up such points, especially since I have no other evidence -material at my disposal; for I cannot consider a group criminal -unless—for instance—the majority of its members actually committed -crimes. I must be in a position to ask in this case what position -Generaloberst Blaskowitz took in regard to the murders which took place -in Poland. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn to consider the matter. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal considers that the questions -that you have been putting, if relevant at all, are only extremely -remotely relevant, and they cannot allow the cross-examination to -continue for any length of time, or the time of the Tribunal would be -wasted further. They think, and they rule, that you may put the question -which they understand you desire to put in this form: The witness has -spoken of reports which were received by the group of which he has -spoken about atrocities in the East, and they think you may ask him who -submitted those reports. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I should like you to answer this question: With -whom did these reports of murders in Poland and Russia originate? - -GISEVIUS: I know of one report made by Generaloberst Blaskowitz during -the first few months of the Polish campaign on the basis of information -received by him and the military offices under him. Beyond that, as far -as I know, such reports were compiled only by the group Canaris-Oster. -But I should not care to assert that another report was not written by -someone else somewhere. - -DR. LATERNSER: What was the aim of the report which Generaloberst -Blaskowitz submitted? - -GISEVIUS: Generaloberst Blaskowitz intended... - -THE PRESIDENT: The report which one particular general made does not -tend to show that the group was either innocent or criminal. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, it helps us to find out what the attitude -of the group was. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the report of one general is not -evidence as to the criminality of the whole group. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, is that question approved? I asked about -the aim of the report. - -THE PRESIDENT: No; the Tribunal is of the opinion that what was -contained in that report is not admissible. - -DR. LATERNSER: I have no more questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may retire. - -Dr. Pannenbecker, that concludes your case, does it? - -DR. PANNENBECKER: The case of the Defendant Frick is hereby concluded, -except for the answers to the interrogatories which I have not yet -received. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Counsel for the Defendant Streicher, Dr. Marx, go -on. - -DR. HANNS MARX (Counsel for Defendant Streicher): With the permission of -the Tribunal, Mr. President, I now call the Defendant Julius Streicher -to the witness box. - -[_The Defendant Streicher took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -JULIUS STREICHER (Defendant): Julius Streicher. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. MARX: Witness, would you give the Tribunal first a short description -of your career? - -STREICHER: I should like to ask the Tribunal to let me make a brief -statement in respect to my defense. Firstly... - -THE PRESIDENT: You really ought to answer the questions that are put to -you. - -STREICHER: My Lord, my defense counsel cannot say what I must say now. I -should like to ask permission—in short, my defense counsel has not -conducted and was not in a position to conduct my defense in the way I -wanted; and I should like to state this to the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you understand that the Tribunal does not wish -to have its time taken up with unnecessary matters. It has no objection -to your stating what is material or to your reading it if necessary. It -hopes that you will be as brief as possible. - -STREICHER: I mention only facts, four facts. - -Firstly, the Charter created for this International Military Tribunal -guarantees the defendant the right to an unhampered and just defense. - -Secondly, before the Trial began the defendants received a list -containing the names of the attorneys from whom the defendant could -choose his counsel. Since the Munich attorney whom I had selected for my -defense could no longer be put at my disposal, I asked the Military -Tribunal to put the Nuremberg attorney Dr. Marx at my disposal. That was -done. - -Thirdly, when I met my counsel for the first time, I told him he must -expect, as my counsel, to be attacked before the public. Shortly -afterwards, an attack was made by a Communist newspaper published in the -Russian zone of Berlin. The International Tribunal was compelled to make -a public statement repudiating the attack of that newspaper and assuring -my counsel of the express protection of the Military Tribunal. - -Fourthly, although the statement made by the International Military -Tribunal left no doubt as to the fact that the Tribunal wished to see -the defense of the defendants unhampered, a renewed attack occurred, -this time by radio. The announcer said, “There are camouflaged Nazis and -anti-Semites among the defendants’ counsel.” That these terroristic -attacks were made with the intention of intimidating the defendants’ -counsel is clear. These terror attacks might have contributed to the -fact—that is my impression—that my own counsel had refused to submit -to the Tribunal a large number of pieces of evidence which I considered -important. - -Fifthly, I wish to state that I have not been afforded the possibility -of making an unhampered and just defense before this International -Military Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: You can rest assured that the Tribunal will see that -everything that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, bears upon the case or -is relevant to your case or is in any way material in your case will be -presented and that you will be given the fairest opportunity of making -your defense. - -STREICHER: I thank you. From my life... - -DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President; may I ask briefly to be permitted to -state my position. May it please the Court, when I was asked to take -over Herr Streicher’s defense, I naturally had grave misgivings. I -have... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, I do not think it is necessary, really, for you -to make any personal explanation at this stage. It is very possible that -the defendant may have different ideas about his own defense. I think we -had better let him go on with his defense. - -DR. MARX: Nevertheless, I should like to ask permission, Mr. President, -just to mention the following point: As attorney and as defense counsel -of a defendant I have to reserve for myself the right to decide how I -shall conduct the defense. If the client is of the opinion that certain -documents or books are relevant, and the attorney is of the opinion that -they are not, then that is a difference of opinion between the counsel -and his client. - -If Herr Streicher is of the opinion that I am incapable or not in a -position to conduct his defense, then he should ask for another defense -counsel. I am aware that at this stage of the proceedings it would be -very difficult for me to follow the matter to its logical conclusion and -ask to be relieved of this task of defense. I am not terrorized by any -journalist, but for a counsel to lose the confidence of his own client -is quite another matter; and for that reason I feel bound to ask the -Court to decide whether in these circumstances I am to continue to -defend my client. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks, Dr. Marx, that the explanation and -the statement which you have just made is in accordance with the -traditions of the legal profession and they think therefore that the -case ought to proceed and that you should proceed with the case. Now, -Defendant, will you go on? - -STREICHER: About my life: I was born on 12 February 1885 in a small -village in Bavaria Swabia. I was the youngest of nine children. My -father was an elementary school teacher. I too became a teacher at an -elementary school. In 1909, after I had taught for several years in my -native district, I was called to the municipal school in Nuremberg. Here -I had the opportunity of contact with the families of the working-class -children in the suburbs and of observing social contrasts. This -experience led to my decision in 1911 to go into politics. I became a -member of the Democratic Party. As a young democratic speaker, I spoke -at the Reichstag election in 1912. The car put at my disposal was paid -for by the banking firm of Kohn. I stress this point because at that -time I had occasion to associate a good deal with Jews, even in the -Democratic Party. I must therefore have been fated to become later on a -writer and speaker on racial politics. - -The World War came and I, too, went into the army as a lance corporal in -an infantry regiment. Then I became an officer in a machine-gun unit. I -returned home with both Iron Crosses, with the Bavarian Order, and the -rare Austrian Cross of Merit attached to the Ribbon for Gallantry. When -I had returned home, I had no desire to go into politics again. I -intended only to stay in private life and devote myself to my -profession. Then I saw the blood-red posters of revolution in Germany -and for the first time I joined the raging masses of that time. At a -meeting, when the speaker had finished, I asked to be heard as an -unknown person. An inner voice sent me onto the platform and I spoke. I -joined in the debate and I spoke on recent happenings in Germany. In the -November revolution of 1918 the Jews and their friends had seized the -political power in Germany. Jews were in the Reich Cabinet and in all -the provincial governments. In my native Bavaria the Minister President -was a Polish Jew called Eisner-Kosmanowsky. The reaction among the -middle classes in Germany manifested itself in the form of an -organization known as Schutz und Trutzbund (Society for Protective and -Offensive Action). Local branches of this organization were formed in -all the large cities in Germany; and fate willed that after I had again -spoken at a gathering, a man came up to me and asked me to come to the -Kulturverein (Cultural Society) in the Golden Hall and hear what they -had to say there. - -In this way, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I became involved in what brings -me here today. Destiny made of me what international propaganda thought -it had made. I was called a bloodhound—a blood czar of Franconia; my -honor was attacked, a criminal was paid 300 marks to swear in this very -hall that he had seen me, as an officer in France during the war, rape a -Madame Duquesne, a teacher’s wife in Atis, near Peronne. It was 2 years -before someone betrayed him and the truth came out. - -Gentlemen, the receipt for 300 marks was produced here in this court. -With 300 marks they tried to deprive me of my honor. - -I mention this case only because my case is a special case; and if it is -to be judged with justice, then I must be allowed to make such a remark -in passing. In this connection, I may say that it is no coincidence that -the first question asked me by the Soviet Russian officer who -interrogated me was whether I was a sex criminal. - -Gentlemen, I told you how I was fated to be drawn into the Schutz und -Trutzbund. I told you what conditions were like in Germany at the time, -and it was therefore quite a natural development that I no longer -visited the centers of revolution to join in debate. I felt myself -impelled to call meetings of my own and so I spoke for perhaps 15 years -almost every Friday before about 5,000 to 6,000 people. I admit quite -frankly that I went on making speeches over a period of 20 years in the -largest cities of Germany, sometimes at meetings on sport fields and on -public squares, to audiences of 150,000 to 200,000 people. I did that -for 20 years, and I state here that I was not paid by the Party. The -Prosecution will never succeed, not even through a public appeal, in -getting anybody into this room who could testify that I had ever been -paid. I still had a small salary which continued after I was relieved of -my position in 1924. Nonetheless, I remained the one and only unpaid -Gauleiter in the Movement. It goes without saying that my writing -supported myself and my assistants later on. - -And so, Gentlemen, in the year 1921—I return now to that period—I went -to Munich. I was curious because someone had said to me, “You must hear -Adolf Hitler some time.” And now destiny again takes a hand. This -tragedy can only be grasped by those whose vision is not limited to the -material, but who can perceive those higher vibrations which even today -have not had their full outcome. - -I went to the Munich Bürgerbräukeller. Adolf Hitler was speaking there. -I had only heard his name. I had never seen the man before. And there I -sat, an unknown among unknowns. I saw this man shortly before midnight, -after he had spoken for 3 hours, drenched in perspiration, radiant. My -neighbor said he thought he saw a halo around his head; and I, -Gentlemen, experienced something which transcended the commonplace. When -he finished his speech, an inner voice bade me get up. I went to the -platform. When Adolf Hitler came down, I approached him and told him my -name. - -The Prosecution has submitted a document to the Tribunal which recalls -that moment. Adolf Hitler wrote in his book, _Mein Kampf_, that it must -have cost me a great effort to hand over to him the movement which I had -created in Nuremberg. - -I mention this because the Prosecution thought that these things in -Hitler’s book, _Mein Kampf_, should be submitted and used against me. -Yes, I am proud of it; I forced myself to hand over to Hitler the -movement which I had created in Franconia. This Franconian movement gave -the movement which Adolf Hitler had created in Munich and southern -Bavaria a bridge to northern Germany. That was my doing. - -In 1923 I took part in the first National Socialist revolution or, -rather, attempted revolution. It will go down in history as the Hitler -Putsch. Adolf Hitler had asked me to come to Munich for it. I went to -Munich and took part in the meeting in which Adolf Hitler came to a -solemn agreement with representatives of the middle classes to go to -northern Germany and put an end to the chaos. - -I marched with them up to the Feldherrnhalle. Then I was arrested and, -like Adolf Hitler, Rudolf Hess, and others, was taken to Landsberg on -the Lech. After a few months I was put up as candidate for the Bavarian -Parliament by the Völkischer Block and was elected in the year 1924. - -In 1925 after the Movement had been permitted again and Adolf Hitler had -been released from jail, I was made Gauleiter of Franconia. In 1933 I -became a deputy to the Reichstag. In 1933 or 1934 the honorary title of -SA Gruppenführer was bestowed on me. - -In February 1940 I was given leave of absence. I lived for 5 years, -until the end of the war, on my estate. At the end of April I went to -southern Bavaria, to the Tyrol. I wanted to commit suicide. Then -something happened which I do not care to relate. But I can say one -thing: I said to friends, “I have proclaimed my views to the world for -20 years. I do not want to end my life by suicide. I will go my way -whatever happens as a fanatic in the cause of truth until the very end, -a fanatic in the cause of truth.” - -I might mention here that I deliberately gave my fighting paper, _Der -Stürmer_, the subtitle, _A Weekly for the Fight for Truth_. I was quite -conscious that I could not be in possession of the entire truth, but I -also know that 80 or 90 percent of what I proclaim with conviction was -the truth. - -DR. MARX: Witness, why were you dismissed from the teaching profession? -Did you ever commit any punishable or immoral act? - -STREICHER: Actually I have answered this question already. Everybody -knows that I could not have been active publicly in this profession if I -had committed a crime. That is not true. I was dismissed from my -profession because the majority of the parties in the Bavarian -Parliament in the fall of 1923, after the Hitler Putsch, demanded my -dismissal. That, Gentlemen, was my crime of indecent behavior. - -DR. MARX: You know that two charges are made against you. First, you are -accused that you were a party to the conspiracy which had the aim of -launching a war, or wars, of aggression generally, of breaking treaties -and by so doing, or even at an earlier stage, of committing Crimes -against Humanity. - -Secondly, you are accused of Crimes against Humanity as such. I should -like to ask various questions on the first point now. Did you ever have -discussions with Adolf Hitler or other leading men of the State or the -Party at which the question of a war of aggression was discussed? - -STREICHER: I can answer that with “no” right away, but I should like to -be permitted to make a short statement. - -In 1921, as I have already said, I went to Munich; and before the public -on the platform I handed over my movement to the Führer. I also wrote -him a letter in this connection later. No other conference took place -with Adolf Hitler or any other person. I returned to Nuremberg and went -on making speeches. When the Party program was proclaimed I was not -present. That announcement, too, was made in public; the conspiracy was -so public that political opponents could make attempts at terrorization. - -To sum up: At none of the secret meetings was any oath taken or anything -agreed upon which the public could not have known. The program stood; it -had been submitted to the Police; on the basis of the law governing -organizations the Party, like other parties, was entered in the register -of organizations. So that at that time there was no conspiracy. - -DR. MARX: Witness, one of the most important points of the Party program -was the demand, “Freedom from Versailles.” What were your ideas as to -the possibility of some day getting rid of the Versailles Treaty? - -STREICHER: I think I can state that very shortly. I believe the Tribunal -has known this for some time. Of course you will sometimes find one -traitor in a people—like the one who was sitting here today; and you -will also find unlimited numbers of decent people. And after the last -war these decent people themselves took up the slogan, “Freedom from -Versailles.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If Your Honor pleases, I think I must object to -this sort of procedure. This witness has no right to call another -witness a traitor. He has not been asked any question to which that is a -response, and I ask that the Tribunal admonish him in no uncertain terms -and that he confine himself to answering the questions here and that we -may have an orderly proceeding. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you will observe that injunction. - -STREICHER: I ask the Tribunal to excuse me. It was a slip of the tongue. - -THE PRESIDENT: The observation that you apparently made I did not catch -myself, but it was made with reference to a witness who has just given -evidence here and you had no right at all to call him a traitor or to -make any comment upon his evidence. - -DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, you will please refrain from making such -remarks. Adolf Hitler always spoke on the anniversary days of the Party -about a sworn fellowship. What do you say about that? - -STREICHER: Sworn fellowship—that meant that he, Hitler, was of the -conviction that his old supporters were one with him in thought, in -heart, and in political loyalty—a sworn fellowship sharing the same -views and united in their hearts. - -DR. MARX: Would not that mean that a conspiracy existed? - -STREICHER: Then he would have said we were a fellowship of conspirators. - -DR. MARX: Was there any kind of close relationship between you and the -other defendants which could be termed a conspiracy, and were you better -acquainted or did you have especially close relations with any one of -these defendants? - -STREICHER: Inasmuch as they were old members of the Party we were one -community of people with the same convictions. We met at Gauleiter -meetings; or when one of us spoke in the other’s Gaustadt, we saw one -another. But I had the honor of getting to know the Reich Ministers and -the gentlemen from the Army only here. A political group therefore—an -active group—certainly did not exist. - -DR. MARX: In the early days of the Party what solution was foreseen for -the Jewish problem? - -STREICHER: Well, in the early days of the Party, the solution of the -Jewish problem was never mentioned just as the question of solving the -problem of the Versailles Treaty was never mentioned. You must remember -the state of chaos that existed at that time in Germany. An Adolf Hitler -who said to his members in 1933, “I shall start to promote a war,” would -have been dubbed a fool. We had no arms in Germany. Our army of 100,000 -men had only a few big guns left. The possibility of making or of -prophesying war was out of the question, and to speak of a Jewish -problem at a time when, I might say, the public made distinctions with -respect to Jews only on the basis of religion, or to speak of the -solution of this problem, would have been absurd. Before 1933, -therefore, the solution of the Jewish problem was not a topic of -discussion. I never heard Adolf Hitler mention it; and there is no one -here of whom I could say I ever heard him say one word about it. - -DR. MARX: It is assumed that you had particularly close relations with -Adolf Hitler and that you had considerable influence on his decisions. I -should like to ask you to describe your relations with Adolf Hitler and -to clarify them. - -STREICHER: Anyone who had occasion to make Adolf Hitler’s acquaintance -knows that I am correct in saying that those who imagined they could -pave a way to his personal friendship were entirely mistaken. Adolf -Hitler was a little eccentric in every respect and I believe I can say -that friendship between him and other men did not exist—a friendship -that might have been described as intimate friendship. It was not easy -to approach Adolf Hitler; and any one who wanted to approach him could -do so only by performing some manly deed. - -If you ask me now—I know what you mean by that question—I may say that -before 1923 Adolf Hitler did not trust me. Although I had handed over my -movement to him unreservedly, he sent Göring—who later became Marshal -of the Reich—some time later to Nuremberg. Göring was then a young SA -leader—I think he was an SA leader—and he came to investigate matters -and to determine whether I or those who denounced me were in the right. -I do not mean this as an accusation, but merely as a statement of fact. -Soon after that he sent a second and then a third person—in short, he -did not trust me before 1923. - -Then came Munich and the Putsch. After midnight, when most of them had -left him, I appeared before him and told him that the public must be -told now when the next great day would come. He looked at me intently -and said, “Will you do it?” I said, “I will do it.” - -Maybe the Prosecution has the document before it. Then, after midnight, -he wrote on a piece of paper, “Streicher will be responsible for the -entire organization.” That was to be for the following day, 11 November; -and on 11 November I publicly conducted the propaganda, until an hour -before the march to the Feldherrnhalle. Then I returned and everything -was in readiness. Our banner—which was to become a banner of -blood—flew in front. I joined the second group and we marched into the -city towards the Feldherrnhalle. When I saw rifle after rifle ranged -before the Feldherrnhalle and knew that now there would be shooting, I -marched up 10 paces in front of the banner and marched straight up to -the rifles. Then came the massacre, and we were arrested. - -I have almost finished. - -At Landsberg—and this is the important part—Hitler declared to me and -to the men who were in prison with him, that he would never forget this -action of mine. Thus, because I took part in the march to the -Feldherrnhalle and marched at the head of the procession, Adolf Hitler -may have felt himself drawn to me more than to the others. - -That was the friendship born of the deed. - -DR. MARX: Have you finished? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Were you consulted by Adolf Hitler on important matters? - -STREICHER: I saw Adolf Hitler only at Gauleiter conferences; when he -came to Nuremberg for meetings we had meals together, along with five, -ten, or more people. I recall having been alone with him only once in -the Brown House at Munich, after the completion of the Brown House; and -our conversation was not a political one. All the conversations which I -had with Adolf Hitler, whether in Nuremberg, Munich, or elsewhere, took -place in the presence of Party circle members. - -DR. MARX: Now I come to 1933. On 1 April 1933 a boycott day was decreed -throughout the entire German Reich against the Jewish population. What -can you tell us about that and what part did you play in it? - -STREICHER: A few days before 1 April I was summoned to the Brown House -in Munich. Adolf Hitler explained to me something that I already knew, -namely, that a tremendous propaganda campaign against the new Germany -was being carried on by the foreign press. Although he himself had only -just become Chancellor, although Hindenburg was still at the head of the -Reich, although Parliament existed, a tremendous campaign of hate -against Germany had begun in the foreign press. - -The Führer told me that even the Reich flag, the emblem of sovereignty, -was being subjected to insults abroad and that we would have to tell -world Jewry, “Thus far and no farther.” We would have to show them that -we would not tolerate it any longer. - -Then he told me that a boycott day was to be fixed for 1 April and that -I was to organize it. Perhaps it would not be irrelevant to point out -the following facts: Adolf Hitler thought that it might be a good thing -to use my name in connection with this boycott day; that was not done in -the end. So I undertook the organization of the boycott and issued a -directive, which I believe is in the hands of the Court. There is no -need for me to say much about it. I gave instructions that no attempts -should be made on the lives of Jews, that one or more guards should be -posted in front of all Jewish premises—that is to say, in front of -every Jewish store—and that these guards should be responsible for -seeing that no damage was done to property. In short, I organized the -proceedings in a way which was perhaps not expected of me; and perhaps -not expected by many members of the Party. I frankly admit that. - -One thing is certain; except for minor incidents the boycott day passed -off perfectly. I believe that there is not even one Jew who can -contradict this. The boycott day was a disciplined proceeding and was -not “anti” in the sense of an attack on something. It has a purely -defensive connotation. - -DR. MARX: Was a committee formed at the time consisting of prominent, -that is, leading members of the Party and did that committee ever -appear? - -STREICHER: As to the committee, it was like the Secret Cabinet Council -in Berlin, which never met. In fact, I believe that all the members of -the Cabinet did not even see each other or get to know each other. - -DR. MARX: The committee members? - -STREICHER: The boycott committee, that was put in the newspapers in -Berlin by Goebbels. That was a newspaper story. I spoke to Goebbels on -the telephone once. He asked how things were going in Munich, where I -was. I said that everything was going perfectly. Thus no conference ever -took place; it was only done for effect, to make it appear a much bigger -thing than it was. - -DR. MARX: Witness, you made a mistake a few minutes ago, speaking of the -Munich affair in 1923. You meant 9 November—or did you not—9 November -1923, and what did you say? - -STREICHER: I do not remember. - -DR. MARX: It should be 9 November 1923? - -STREICHER: 9 November 1923. - -DR. MARX: Yes. The so-called “Racial Law” was promulgated at the Reich -Party Day in Nuremberg in 1935. Were you consulted about the planning -and preparation of the draft of that law; and did you have any part in -it, especially in its preparation? - -STREICHER: Yes, I believe I had a part in it insofar as for years I have -written that any further mixture of German blood with Jewish blood must -be avoided. I have written such articles again and again; and in my -articles I have repeatedly emphasized the fact that the Jews should -serve as an example to every race, for they created a racial law for -themselves—the law of Moses, which says, “If you come into a foreign -land you shall not take unto yourself foreign women.” And that, -Gentlemen, is of tremendous importance in judging the Nuremberg Laws. -These laws of the Jews were taken as a model for these laws. When, after -centuries, the Jewish lawgiver Ezra discovered that notwithstanding many -Jews had married non-Jewish women, these marriages were dissolved. That -was the beginning of Jewry which, because it introduced these racial -laws, has survived throughout the centuries, while all other races and -civilizations have perished. - -DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, this is rather too much of a digression. I -asked you whether you took part in planning and working out the draft of -the law, or whether you yourself were not taken by surprise when these -laws were promulgated. - -STREICHER: I was quite honest in saying that I believe I have -contributed indirectly to the making of these laws. - -DR. MARX: But you were not consulted on the law itself? - -STREICHER: No. I will make a statement, as follows: - -At the Reich Party Day in Nuremberg in 1935, we were summoned to the -hall without knowing what was going to happen—at least I myself had no -knowledge of it—and the racial laws were proclaimed. It was only then -that I heard of these laws; and I think that with the exception of Herr -Hess, _et cetera_, this is true of most of the gentlemen in the dock who -attended that Reich Party Day. The first we heard of these decrees was -at the Reich Party Day. I did not collaborate directly. I may say -frankly that I regarded it as a slight when I was not consulted in the -making of these laws. - -DR. MARX: It was thought that your assistance was not necessary? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Were you of the opinion that the 1935 legislation represented -the final solution of the Jewish question by the State? - -STREICHER: With reservations, yes. I was convinced that if the Party -program was carried out, the Jewish question would be solved. The Jews -became German citizens in 1848. Their rights as citizens were taken from -them by these laws. Sexual intercourse was prohibited. For me, this -represented the solution of the Jewish problem in Germany. But I -believed that another international solution would still be found, and -that some day discussions would take place between the various states -with regard to the demands made by Zionism. These demands aimed at a -Jewish state. - -DR. MARX: What can you tell us about the demonstrations against the -Jewish population during the night of 9 to 10 November 1938, and what -part did you play in it? - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, if you are going into that, it is now 5 -o’clock; and I think we had better adjourn now until Monday morning. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 29 April 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH DAY - Monday, 29 April 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -DR. MARX: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: Before continuing -with questions to the Defendant Streicher, may I ask permission to make -a statement? - -On Friday afternoon, Herr Streicher referred to a case, namely, that -press event which concerned me and my professional attitude. I thereupon -took the opportunity to refer to this case in my statement as well, and -I pointed out that at that time I had had to ask for the protection of -the Tribunal against this damaging attack on my work and that this -protection was given me very graciously. On that occasion and in that -extemporary explanation I used the expression “newspaper writer.” I used -it exclusively with reference to the particular journalist who had -written the article in question in that Berlin newspaper regarding my -person and my activity as a lawyer. - -By no means did I express, or mean to express, a reference to the press -in general. It was far from my intention in any way to attack the press, -the group of press experts, and particularly not the members of the -world press who are active here; nor did I wish to injure their -professional honor. - -The reason for this statement of mine is a statement made on the radio, -according to which I, the attorney Marx, had attacked and disparaged the -press in general. I am, of course, aware of the significance of the -press. I know precisely what the press has to contribute and I should be -the last person to fail to recognize fully the extremely difficult work -and the responsible task of the press. May I, therefore, quite publicly -before this Tribunal ask that this statement be accepted; and may I ask -the gentlemen of the press to receive my statement in the spirit in -which it is made, namely, that this was merely a special comment on that -particular gentleman and not in any way on the entire press. That is -what I wanted to say. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, the Tribunal understood your statement the -other day in the sense in which you have now explained it. - -DR. MARX: Yes. With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall then -continue with my examination. - -Witness, what aims did you pursue with your speeches and your articles -in _Der Stürmer_? - -STREICHER: The speeches and articles which I wrote were meant to inform -the public on a question which appeared to me one of the most important -questions. I did not intend to agitate or inflame but to enlighten. - -DR. MARX: Apart from your weekly journal, and particularly after the -Party came into power, were there any other publications in Germany -which treated the Jewish question in an anti-Semitic way? - -STREICHER: Anti-Semitic publications have existed in Germany for -centuries. A book I had, written by Dr. Martin Luther, was, for -instance, confiscated. Dr. Martin Luther would very probably sit in my -place in the defendants’ dock today, if this book had been taken into -consideration by the Prosecution. In the book _The Jews and Their Lies_, -Dr. Martin Luther writes that the Jews are a serpent’s brood and one -should burn down their synagogues and destroy them... - -DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, that is not my question, I am asking you to -answer my question in accordance with the way I put it. Please answer -now with “yes” or “no,” whether there were... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to interpose an objection to this -method of answering unresponsively and with speeches here. We are -utterly unable in this procedure to make objections when answers are not -responsive to questions. We have already got into this case, through -Streicher’s volunteered speeches, an attack on the United States which -will take considerable evidence to answer if we are to answer it. It -seems to me very improper that a witness should do anything but make a -responsive answer to a question, so that we may keep these proceedings -from getting into issues that have nothing to do with them. It will not -help this Tribunal, in deciding Streicher’s guilt or innocence, to go -into questions which he has raised here against us—matters that are -perfectly capable of explanation, if we take time to do it. - -It seems to me that this witness should be admonished, and admonished so -that he will understand it, if that is possible, that he is to answer -questions and stop, so that we can know and object in time to orations -on irrelevant subjects. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, will you try, when you put the questions to the -witness, to stop him if he is not answering the questions you put to -him? - -DR. MARX: Yes, Mr. President. I was just in the process... - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant Streicher, you understand, you have heard what -has been said and you will understand that the Tribunal cannot put up -with your long speeches which are not answers to questions which we put -to you. - -DR. MARX: I will now repeat the question and I want you to answer the -question first with “yes” or “no” and then to add a brief explanation -regarding the question. - -Apart from your weekly journal, and particularly after the Party came -into power, were there other publications in Germany which dealt with -the Jewish question in an anti-Semitic way? - -STREICHER: Yes, even before the coming to power there were in every Gau -weekly journals that were anti-Semitic and one daily paper called the -_Völkischer Beobachter_ in Munich. Apart from that, there were a number -of periodicals which were not working directly for the Party. There was -also anti-Semitic literature. After the seizure of power, the daily -press was co-ordinated, and now the Party found itself in control of -some 3,000 daily papers, numerous weekly journals, and all type of -periodicals; and orders were given by the Führer that every newspaper -should provide enlightening articles on the Jewish question. The -anti-Semitic enlightenment was, therefore, after the seizure of power, -carried out on a very large scale in the daily press as well as in the -weekly journals, periodicals, and books. Consequently, _Der Stürmer_ did -not stand alone in its enlightening activity. But I want to state quite -openly that I make the claim of having treated the question in the most -popular way. - -DR. MARX: Were the directives necessary for this issued by a central -office, say, for instance, by the National Socialist press service? - -STREICHER: Yes. The Propaganda Ministry in Berlin had a National -Socialist press service. In this service, in every issue, there were a -number of enlightening articles on the Jewish question. During the war -the Führer personally gave the order that the press, far more than -previously, should publish enlightening articles on the Jewish question. - -DR. MARX: The Prosecution accuse you of having contributed indirectly to -mass murders by incitation, and according to the minutes of 10 January -1946, the following charge has been made against you: No government in -the world could have undertaken a policy of mass extermination, as it -was done here, without having behind it a nation which agreed to it; and -you are supposed to have brought that about. What have you to say to -this? - -STREICHER: To that I have the following to say: Incitation means to -bring a person into condition of excitement which causes him to perform -an irresponsible act. Did the contents of _Der Stürmer_ incite, this is -the question? Briefly stated, the question must be answered, “What did -_Der Stürmer_ write?” Several volumes of _Der Stürmer_ are available -here, but one would have to look at all the issues of 20 years in order -to answer that question exhaustively. During those 20 years I published -enlightening articles dealing with the race, dealing with what the Jews -themselves write in the Old Testament, in their history, what they write -in the Talmud. I printed excerpts from Jewish historical works, works -for instance, written by a Professor Dr. Graetz and by a Jewish scholar, -Gutnot. - -In _Der Stürmer_ no editorial appeared written by me or written by -anyone of my main co-workers in which I did not include quotations from -the ancient history of the Jews, from the Old Testament or from Jewish -historical works of recent times. - -It is important, and I must emphasize that I pointed out in all -articles, that prominent Jews, leading authors themselves, admitted that -which during 20 years as author and public speaker I publicly -proclaimed. - -Allow me to add that it is my conviction that the contents of _Der -Stürmer_ as such were not incitation. During the whole 20 years I never -wrote in this connection, “Burn Jewish houses down; beat them to death.” -Never once did such an incitement appear in _Der Stürmer_. - -Now comes the question: Is there any proof to be furnished that any deed -was done from the time _Der Stürmer_ first appeared, a deed of which one -can say that it was the result of an incitement? As a deed due to an -incitement I might mention a pogrom. That is a spontaneous deed when -sections of the people suddenly rise up and kill other people. During -the 20 years no pogrom took place in Germany, during the 20 years, as -far as I know, no Jew was killed. No murder took place, of which one -could have said, “This is the result of an incitement which was caused -by anti-Semitic authors or public speakers.” - -Gentlemen, we are in Nuremberg. In the past there was a saying that -nowhere were the Jews in Germany so safe and so unmolested as in -Nuremberg. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, is not this becoming a rather lengthy speech? - -DR. MARX: Streicher, you have explained this now sufficiently, so that -one can form an opinion—you mean, “I have not incited in such a way -that any spontaneous action carried out against the Jews by any group of -people or by the masses resulted”? - -STREICHER: May I make a remark in this connection? Here we are concerned -with the most serious, the most decisive accusation raised against me by -the Prosecution, and here I ask the Tribunal to permit me to defend -myself against it objectively. Is it not of tremendous significance if I -can establish that in Nuremberg, of all places, no murder took place, no -single murder and no pogrom either? That is a fact. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have already said it. I have just written down, -before I intervened, saying that no Jews have been killed not only in -Nuremberg but anywhere else as a result of your incitement. - -DR. MARX: Witness, we shall make reference to these demonstrations of 9 -and 10 November 1938 later. - -STREICHER: Yes, but may I continue? The Indictment accuses me of having -indirectly contributed by incitation to mass murders, and I ask to be -allowed to make a statement on this: Something has been ascertained -today about which I myself did not know. I learned of the will left -behind by the Führer, and I assume that a few moments before his death -the Führer told the world the truth in that will. In it he says that -mass killings were carried out by his order; that the mass killings were -a reprisal. - -Thus it is demonstrated that I, myself, cannot have been a participant -in the incredible events which occurred here. - -DR. MARX: Finished? - -STREICHER: Yes. You said that the Indictment accuses me in saying that -these mass killings could never have taken place if behind the -Government and behind the leaders of the State there had not been an -informed people. - -Gentlemen, first of all, the question, “Did the German people really -know what was happening during the years of the war?” We know today... - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, that is a matter of argument and not a matter -upon which you can give evidence. You can say what you knew. - -STREICHER: I was a part of that nation during the war. During the war I -lived alone in the country. For 5 years I never left my farm. I was -watched by the Gestapo. From 1939 on I have been forbidden by the Führer -to speak. - -DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, we will certainly come to that later. I have -interrogated you now on this question, and I will proceed with my -questions. The other will come later. - -STREICHER: But I wish to state that I had no opportunity—that is why I -said this—to learn what was actually going on. - -I first heard of the mass murders and mass killings at Mondorf when I -was in prison. But I am stating here that if I had been told that 2 or 3 -million people had been killed, then I would not have believed it. I -would not have believed that it was technically possible to kill so many -people; and on the basis of the entire attitude and psychology of the -Führer, as I knew it, I would not have believed that mass killings, to -the extent to which they have taken place, could have taken place. -Finished. - -DR. MARX: The Prosecution also raise the charge against you that it was -the task of the educators of the nation to educate the people to murder -and to poison them with hatred, that you had devoted yourself -particularly to these tasks. What do you want to answer to this charge? - -STREICHER: That is an allegation. We educated no murderers. The contents -of the articles which I wrote could not have educated murderers. No -murders took place, and that is proof that we did not educate murderers. -What happened during the war—well, I certainly did not educate the -Führer. The Führer issued the order on his own initiative. - -DR. MARX: I now continue. The Prosecution further assert that the -Himmler-Kaltenbrunner groups and other SS leaders would have had no one -to carry out their orders to kill, if you had not made that propaganda -and if you had not conducted the education of the German people along -these lines. Will you make a statement on that? - -STREICHER: I do not believe that the National Socialists mentioned read -_Der Stürmer_ every week. I do not believe that those who received the -order from the Führer to carry out killings or to pass on the order to -kill, were led to do this by my periodical. Hitler’s book, _Mein Kampf_, -existed, and the content of that book was the authority, the spiritual -authority; nor do I believe that the persons mentioned read that book -and carried out the order on the strength of it. Based on my knowledge -of what went on in the Movement, I am convinced that if the Führer gave -an order everyone acted upon it; and I state here quite openly that -maybe fate has been kind to me. If the Führer had ordered me to do such -things, I would not have been able to kill; but perhaps today I would -face some indictment which it has not been possible to lodge against me. -Perhaps because fate has taken a hand in this. But the conditions were -thus, that the Führer had such a power of hypnotic suggestion that the -entire people believed in him; his way was so unusual that, if one knows -this fact, one can understand why everyone who received an order acted. -And thus I want to reject as untrue and incorrect what was here thought -fit to assert against me. - -DR. MARX: What do you know about the general attitude of Adolf Hitler to -the Jewish question? And when did Hitler first become hostile to the -Jews, according to your knowledge? - -STREICHER: Even before Adolf Hitler became publicly known at all I had -occupied myself journalistically with anti-Semitic articles. However, on -the strength of his book, _Mein Kampf_, I first learned about the -historic connections of the Jewish problem. Adolf Hitler wrote his book -in the prison in Landsberg. Anyone who knows this book will know that -Hitler many years back, either by study of anti-Semitic literature or -through other experiences, must have developed this knowledge in himself -in order then to be able to write that book in prison in so short a -time. In other words, in his book Adolf Hitler stated to the world -public that he was anti-Semitic and that he knew the Jewish problem -through and through. He himself often said to me personally... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, the book _Mein Kampf_ is in evidence, and it -speaks for itself. - -STREICHER: I will now answer your question, not with reference to the -book. You asked me whether Adolf Hitler had discussed the Jewish problem -with me. The answer is “yes.” Adolf Hitler always discussed the Jewish -problem in connection with Bolshevism. It is perhaps of importance in -answering that question to ask whether Adolf Hitler wanted a war with -Russia. Did he know long in advance that a war would come, or not? When -he was with us Adolf Hitler spoke of Stalin as a man whom he honored as -a man of action, but that he was actually surrounded by Jewish leaders, -and that Bolshevism... - -DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, that is going too far again. The question -which I put was quite exact, and I am asking you not to go so far -afield. You have heard the Tribunal object to it, and in the interest of -not delaying the proceedings you must not go into so many details. You -must not make speeches. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I believe that some time ago Mr. Justice -Jackson remarked, quite justly, quite reasonably, that the Defendant -Streicher became so intoxicated by his own speeches that he did not -answer the questions put to him or the charges made against him. I -therefore invite the attention of the Tribunal to this fact and suggest -that the defendant abstain from making lengthy speeches and merely give -brief replies to the charges brought against him. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you go on, Dr. Marx, and try to keep the witness to -an answer to the questions which you have no doubt prepared. - -DR. MARX: Very well, Mr. President. - -STREICHER: May I, please, as a defendant, say a few words, here? The -question was... - -THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing._] No, you may not. You will answer the -questions, please. - -DR. MARX: Next question. Is there reason for the assumption that Hitler, -when he decided to have the Jews in Europe killed in masses, was subject -to any influence, or what is to be considered the motive for that -dreadful decision? - -STREICHER: The Führer could not be influenced. As I know the Führer, if -somebody had gone to him and said that Jews should be killed, then he -would have turned him down. And if, during the war, somebody had gone to -him and said, “I have learned that you are giving the order that mass -killings are to be carried out,” then he would have turned that man down -too. I therefore answer your question by saying that the Führer could -not be influenced. - -DR. MARX: In other words, you want to say that the decision in this -matter was made entirely on his own initiative. - -STREICHER: I have already said that that becomes clear from his will. - -DR. MARX: In August 1938 the main synagogue in Nuremberg was demolished. -Was this done on your orders? - -STREICHER: Yes. In my Gau there were approximately 15 synagogues, in -Nuremberg one main synagogue, a somewhat smaller one, and I think -several other prayer rooms. The main synagogue stood in the outskirts of -the medieval Reichsstadt. Even before 1933, during the so-called period -of struggle, when we still had the other government, I stated publicly -during a meeting that it was a disgrace that there should be placed in -the Old City such an oriental monstrosity of a building. After the -seizure of power I told the Lord Mayor that he should have the synagogue -torn down, and at the same time the planetarium. I might point out that -after the World War, in the middle of the park grounds laid out for the -recreation of the citizens, a planetarium had been built, an ugly brick -building. I gave the order to tear down that building and said that the -main synagogue, too, should be razed. If it had been my intention to -deprive the Jews of their synagogue as a church or if I had wanted to -give a general signal, then I would have given the order, after the -seizure of power, that every synagogue in my Gau should be torn down. -Then I would likewise have had all the synagogues in Nuremberg torn -down. But it is a fact that in the spring of 1938 only the main -synagogue was torn down; the synagogue in the Essenweinstrasse, in the -new city, remained untouched. That the order was then given in November -of that year to set fire to the synagogues, that is no fault of mine. - -DR. MARX: In other words, you want to say that you did not order the -tearing down of this building for anti-Semitic reasons but because it -did not conform to the architectural style of the city? - -STREICHER: For reasons of city architecture. I wanted to submit a -picture to the Tribunal on this, but I have not received any. - -DR. MARX: Yes, we have a picture. - -STREICHER: But you cannot see the synagogue in it. I do not know whether -the Tribunal want to see the picture. The picture actually shows only -the old houses, but the front of the synagogue facing the -Hans-Sachs-Platz is not visible. I do not know whether I may submit the -picture to the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, the photograph can be put in. Let us see -the photograph. - -DR. MARX: In that case, I will submit it to the Tribunal as evidence and -I am asking you to accept it accordingly. - -THE PRESIDENT: What will it be, exhibit what? - -DR. MARX: I cannot say at the moment, Mr. President. I shall take the -liberty of stating the number later and for the moment I confine myself -to submitting it. I could not present it any earlier because I had not -come into possession of this picture. It was only in the last days... - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on. - -DR. MARX: In your measure in connection with the main synagogue did you -rely on any statements of art experts? - -STREICHER: I had frequent opportunities to discuss the subject with -architects. Every architect said that there must have been a city -council which had no feeling whatsoever for city architecture, that it -was impossible to explain it. - -These statements were not in any way directed against the synagogue as a -Jewish church, but rather against such a building in this part of the -city. Strangers, too, whom I guided—for on Party rally days I used to -accompany British and American people across the Hans-Sachs-Platz—and I -remember only one case where when I said “Do you not notice anything?” -that the person did not. But all other strangers said “How could that -building get there in the midst of these medieval buildings?” I could -also have submitted a book, written in 1877, which is in the prison -library, where a Professor Berneis, who was famous, wrote at that time -to the author, Uhde, in Switzerland, that he had now seen the Sachs -Platz... - -DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, that is enough now. In other words, you have -indicated that you believed you could rely on the judgment of architects -who seemed to you to be authorities? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: At the time when the synagogue was demolished, did you make a -speech? - -STREICHER: Yes, but I want to point out that the Prosecution have -submitted an article, a report from the _Tageszeitung_, that was written -by a simple young man. I want to state that this article does not -contain a true representation of the statements which I made. - -DR. MARX: I now come to the demonstrations on the night of 9 to 10 -November 1938. What can you say concerning those demonstrations and what -role did you play in that connection? Were those demonstrations -initiated by the population? - -STREICHER: Every year the Gauleiter and SA and SS leaders met the Führer -in Munich on the occasion of the historic day of 9 November. We sat down -to dinner in the old Town Hall, and it was customary for the Führer to -make a short speech after the dinner. On 9 November 1938, I did not feel -very well. I participated in the dinner and then I left; I drove back to -Nuremberg and went to bed. Toward midnight I was awakened. My chauffeur -told me that the SA leader Von Obernitz wanted to talk to the Gauleiter. -I received him and he said the following: “Gauleiter, you had left -already when the Minister of Propaganda, Dr. Goebbels, took the floor -and said”—I can now repeat it only approximately—“said, ‘Legation -Counsellor Vom Rath has been murdered in Paris. That is now the second -murder abroad of a prominent National Socialist. This murder is not the -murder by the Jew, Grünspan; this is rather the execution of a deed -which has been desired by all Jewry. Something should now be done.’” I -do not know now whether Goebbels said the Führer had ordered it; I -remember only that Von Obernitz told me that Goebbels had stated the -synagogues were to be set on fire; and I cannot now remember exactly, -but I think he told me that the windows of Jewish business houses were -to be smashed and that houses were to be demolished. - -Then I said to Obernitz—for I was surprised—“Obernitz, I think it is -wrong that synagogues be set on fire, and at this moment I think it is -wrong that Jewish business houses be demolished; I think these -demonstrations are wrong. If people are let loose during the night, -deeds can be perpetrated for which one cannot be responsible.” I said to -Obernitz that I considered the setting on fire of synagogues -particularly wrong because abroad and even among the German people the -opinion might arise that National Socialism had now started the fight -against religion. Obernitz replied, “I have the order.” I said, -“Obernitz, I will not assume any responsibility here.” Obernitz left and -the action took place. What I have said under oath here I have -previously stated in several interrogations; and my chauffeur will -confirm it, for he was witness to this night’s conversation, and shortly -afterwards when he went to bed told his wife what he had heard up there -in my bedroom. - -DR. MARX: Have you finished? - -STREICHER: Yes, but you asked another question... - -DR. MARX: Yes, whether it was a spontaneous act of force initiated by -the masses of the people? - -STREICHER: Yes. In the National Socialist press there appeared after -this action an article to the same effect, which stated that a -spontaneous demonstration of the people had revenged the murder of Herr -Vom Rath. It had therefore been deliberately ordered from Berlin that -there should be a public statement to the effect that the demonstration -of 1938 was spontaneous. That this was not the case I was also able to -learn in Nuremberg; and it is remarkable that the indignation at what -had happened during those demonstrations expressed itself even here in -Nuremberg, even among the Party members. - -The Prosecution have submitted an article which is a report on a speech -which I made on 10 November; and that is a remarkable piece of evidence -of the fact that the people were against this action. I was forced, -because of the atmosphere which prevailed in Nuremberg, to make a public -speech and say that one should not have so much sympathy for the Jews. -Such was the affair of November 1938. - -Perhaps it might also be important for you to ask me how I, of all -people, happened to oppose the idea of these demonstrations. - -DR. MARX: I thought you had explained that already. Very well. Who gave -the order then for the burning down of the synagogue still standing on -Essenweinstrasse? - -STREICHER: I do not know who gave the order; I believe it was SA leader -Von Obernitz. I do not know the details. - -DR. MARX: A further question: Did you yourself express publicly your -disapproval of these brutalities? - -STREICHER: Yes. In a small circle of leading Party members I said what I -have always said, what I have always said publicly: I stated that this -was wrong. I talked to lawyers during a meeting—I do not know whether -my defense counsel himself was there—I believe it was as early as -November 1938 that I stated, to the Nuremberg lawyers at a meeting, that -what had happened here during that action, was wrong; that it was wrong -as regards the people and as regards foreign countries. I said then that -anyone who knew the Jewish question as I knew it would understand why I -considered that demonstration a mistake. I do not know whether this was -reported to the Führer at that time, but after November 1938 I was never -again called to the Hotel Deutscher Hof when the Führer came to -Nuremberg. Whether this was the reason I do not know, but at any rate I -did criticize these demonstrations publicly. - -DR. MARX: It is assumed by the Prosecution that in 1938 a more severe -treatment of the Jews was introduced. Is that true, and what is the -explanation? - -STREICHER: Yes. In 1938 the Jewish question entered a new phase; that is -shown, indeed, by the demonstration. I myself can only say in this -connection that there was no preliminary conference on this subject. I -assume that the Führer, impulsive as he was and acting on the spur of -the moment, got around probably only on 9 November to saying to Dr. -Goebbels, “Tell the organizations that the synagogues must be burned -down.” As I said, I myself did not attend such a meeting; and I do not -know what happened to bring about this acceleration. - -DR. MARX: On 12 November 1938 the decree was published according to -which the Jews were to be eliminated from the economic life of the -country. Was there a connection between the orders for the -demonstrations of 9 November and that further decree of 12 November -1938, and would that decree be due to the same reason? - -STREICHER: Well, here I can say only that I am convinced that there was -a connection. The order, rather the decrees, which were to have such an -extensive effect in the economic field, came from Berlin. We did not -have any conference. I do not remember any Gauleiter meetings in which -that was discussed. I do not know of any. That happened just as -everything happened; we were not previously informed. - -DR. MARX: How was it that not you, but the Codefendant Rosenberg, was -given the task of attending to this matter? - -STREICHER: Rosenberg was the spiritual trustee of the Movement, but he -was not given this particular task nor the task of the demonstration nor -that of economic matters. - -DR. MARX: No, we are talking of different points. Rosenberg was the one -given the task by the Leaders of the State of taking care, as it was -called, of racial-political and other enlightenment tasks; and you were -not. How can that be explained? How can it be explained that you were -not chosen? - -STREICHER: Rosenberg, as he himself said, had met the Führer very early -and was anyway, because of his knowledge, intellectually suited to take -over this task. I devoted myself more to popular enlightenment. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, he has told us that he wasn’t given the task. -Unless he had some communication with Rosenberg he can’t tell us -anything more about it except that he wasn’t given the task. All the -rest is mere comment and argument. - -DR. MARX: Yes. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I now put the next question to you: Was an -order issued during the year 1939 forbidding you to make speeches? - -STREICHER: Yes. In the autumn of 1939 my enemies went so far that the -Führer, without my being asked beforehand, issued a written order -through Party Member Hess forbidding me to make speeches. The threat of -immediate arrest was made should I act against this order. - -DR. MARX: Is it also correct that in 1938 an effort was evidently made -to stop further publication of _Der Stürmer_, I mean in government -circles? - -STREICHER: Such intentions existed quite often, and also at that time. -Perhaps I might refer to two other documents in this connection in order -to save time. - -The Prosecution have submitted copies of a letter from Himmler and -Baldur von Schirach. Here I can give quite a simple explanation right -now. At that time, in 1939, there were intentions of prohibiting _Der -Stürmer_. Bormann had even issued some such order. Then the Chief Editor -of _Der Stürmer_ wrote to prominent members of the Party, asking them to -state their opinion about _Der Stürmer_. And thereupon letters were also -received from Himmler and Von Schirach. Altogether, I think about 15 -letters were received from prominent members of the Movement; they were -merely kind replies to an inquiry. - -DR. MARX: That is sufficient. Is it true that at the outbreak of the war -you were not made Armed Forces District Commissioner -(Wehrkreis-Kommissar) in your own Gau? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: How can that be explained? - -STREICHER: Well, maybe that is not so important; that is how conditions -were at the time. There were certain personal feelings, _et cetera_; it -is of no significance. At any rate, I did not become Armed Forces -District Commissioner. - -DR. MARX: The Prosecution have stated that after 1 September 1939 the -persecution of the Jews increased more and more. What was that due to? - -STREICHER: That question only the Führer could answer; I cannot. - -DR. MARX: But do you not think this had something to do with the -outbreak of war? - -STREICHER: The Führer always said so in public, yes. - -DR. MARX: A proceeding was instituted against you before the Supreme -Party Court. How did that happen? What was the development and the -result of that trial? - -STREICHER: I am grateful that I have an opportunity to state quite -briefly before the International Military Tribunal something which I -have had to keep silent about up to now because of a Führer order. I -myself had instituted proceedings against myself before the Supreme -Party Court in order to defend myself against people who were denouncing -me. I was being accused... - -THE PRESIDENT: Is the defendant talking about some order which Hitler -gave that he was not to be allowed to speak or is he talking about -something else? - -You remember, Dr. Marx, that certain allegations were struck out of the -record. If he is talking about those, it seems to me that we have got -nothing whatever to do with it. Am I right in recollecting that -something was struck out of the record? - -DR. MARX: Yes it was, Mr. President, but only certain things from the -Göring report were struck out, only the one passage which concerned the -affair with the three young persons; but everything else was retained by -the Prosecution. The Defense, therefore, must be able to take a stand in -regard to these points, if the Prosecution do not say that they are -dropping the entire Göring report; and in that connection this -proceeding before the Supreme Party Court also plays a part. He can make -a brief statement about it. - -THE PRESIDENT: All right. - -DR. MARX: Witness, be brief. - -STREICHER: Yes. It is important then that I instituted proceedings -against myself; about 10 points were involved which had been raised -against me, among them a matter referring to some shares. An affidavit -exists from the Göring report which states that I had been found guilty. -May I state here that the trial was never completed and no sentence was -passed. - -That is the answer to the question which you have put to me. - -DR. MARX: The matter referring to shares, does that have something to do -with the shares of the Mars works? - -STREICHER: We will come to it later. It was not the main point. - -DR. MARX: And then you were ordered to remain permanently at the -Pleikershof? Were you under the guard of the Gestapo there, and was -there also a check-up as far as visitors were concerned? - -STREICHER: It is not correct that I was ordered to stay at the -Pleikershof. What is true is that I retired voluntarily with the -intention of never again being active in the Movement. It is correct -that the Gestapo watched me, and every visitor was called to the police -station and interrogated as to his conversations he had had. That is a -fact. - -DR. MARX: During your stay at the Pleikershof did you have any -connections or correspondence with any leading personalities of the -Party or State? - -STREICHER: No. As far as prominent persons of the Movement and of the -State are concerned, I had no correspondence whatsoever with them; that -is why the Prosecution could hardly find any letters. I never stated in -letters my opinion on the Jewish problem or on other matters. I shall -have to state then, in order to answer your question exactly, that I had -no correspondence with prominent persons of the Party and the State. - -DR. MARX: After the outbreak of the war, were you informed of or -consulted in any way on any measures intended against the Jews? - -STREICHER: No. - -DR. MARX: What were your relations to Himmler? Did you know him at all -closely? Did you ever speak to him about measures against the Jews or -did he talk about intended mass executions of the Jews? - -STREICHER: I knew Himmler just as I knew the SA leaders, or other SS -leaders. I knew him from common meetings, Gauleiter conferences, _et -cetera_. I did not have a single political discussion with Himmler, -except in society when he may have touched on this or that, in the -presence of others. The last time I saw Himmler was in Nuremberg when he -spoke to the officers in their mess. When that was I cannot say exactly -but I think it was shortly before the war. I never had a talk with him -on the Jewish question. He himself was, of course, well informed on this -question. He had an organ of his own called the _Schwarze Korps_. And -what his inner attitude toward me was is something that I did not -discover until my stay on the farm. There were denunciations against me -which reached him. It was stated that I was being too humane with the -French prisoners. Shortly after that I received a letter in which he -reproached me and made serious representations against me. I gave no -answer at all. Without having made any previous inquiries with me as to -whether these denunciations were true, he made a serious charge against -me; and I state quite openly that it was actually my feeling at the time -that I might possibly lose my liberty through arrest. These were my -relations with Himmler. - -DR. MARX: That is enough. - -During this Trial you have heard mentioned the names of a great number -of Higher SS and Police Leaders who played a leading part in the Jewish -persecutions, as for instance, Heydrich, Eichmann, Ohlendorf, and so on. -Were there any connections between you and one of these Higher SS and -Police Leaders? - -STREICHER: I heard the names you have mentioned for the first time -during an interrogation here. I did not know these men; they may well -have seen me, but there was never a discussion involving me and the -senior SS or SA leaders. Furthermore, I never was in any of Himmler’s -offices in Berlin, or any Ministry in Berlin. Thus, no conference ever -took place. - -DR. MARX: The Prosecution have drawn the conclusion from numerous -articles in _Der Stürmer_, that as early as 1942 and 1943 you must have -had knowledge of the mass executions of Jews which had taken place. - -What statement can you make on this, and when, and in what way, did you -hear of the mass executions of Jews which took place in the East? - -STREICHER: I had subscribed to the Jewish weekly that appeared in -Switzerland. Sometimes in that weekly there were intimations that -something was not quite in order; and I think it was at the end of 1943 -or 1944—I believe 1944—that an article appeared in the Jewish weekly, -in which it said that in the East—I think it was said in Poland—Jews -were disappearing in masses. I then made reference to this in an article -which perhaps will be presented to me later. But I state quite frankly -that the Jewish weekly in Switzerland did not represent for me an -authoritative source, that I did not believe everything in it. This -article did not quote figures; it did not talk about mass executions, -but only about disappearances. - -DR. MARX: Have you finished? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Did you make proposals in _Der Stürmer_ for the solution of -the Jewish question, during the war? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: And in what sense? - -STREICHER: As I said yesterday, I represented the point of view that the -Jewish question could be solved only internationally, since there were -Jews in all countries. For that reason we published articles in my -weekly journal referring to the Zionist demand for the creation of a -Jewish state, such as had also been provided for or indicated in the -Balfour Declaration. There were therefore two possibilities for a -solution, a preliminary solution within the countries through -appropriate laws; and then the creation of a Jewish state. - -During the war, I think it was in 1941 or 1942, we had written another -article—we were subject to the Berlin censorship—and the censorship -office sent back the proof submitted with the remark that the article -must not be published in which we had proposed Madagascar as the place -for the establishment of a Jewish state. The political relations with -France were given as the reason why that article should not be -published. - -DR. MARX: If you had expected that question to be solved by mass -executions, would you then too have written this article? - -STREICHER: At that time, at any rate, it would still have been -nonsensical to publish it. - -DR. MARX: Did it not make you uneasy to deal with the Jewish question in -a biased way, in a way which left completely out of sight those -qualities of the Jews which can be described as great? - -STREICHER: I did not understand this question fully, perhaps I did not -hear it correctly. - -DR. MARX: You can be accused of treating, in a biased way, only those -qualities of the Jews that appear disadvantageous to you, whereas the -other qualities of the Jewish people you ignored. What is your -explanation? - -STREICHER: I think that this question is really superfluous here. It is -perfectly natural that I, as an anti-Semitic person and as I saw the -Jewish question, was in no way interested in that. Perhaps I did not see -the good traits which you or some others see in the Jews. That is -possible. But at any rate I was not interested in investigating as to -what particular good qualities might be recognized here. - -DR. MARX: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: This would seem a good time to break off. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. MARX: Did you visit concentration camps? - -STREICHER: Yes. I visited the Dachau Concentration Camp. - -DR. MARX: When was that? - -STREICHER: I believe the first time was when all the Gauleiter were -called together. I believe 1935, I do not know definitely, 1934 or 1935, -I do not know. - -DR. MARX: At what intervals did you then visit this camp? It is said -that you were in Dachau every 4 weeks. - -STREICHER: Altogether I was at Dachau four times. - -DR. MARX: It is asserted that after each of your visits in Dachau, Jews -disappeared there. - -STREICHER: I do not know whether Jews disappeared. - -DR. MARX: What caused you to visit the Dachau Camp repeatedly? - -STREICHER: I went to the Dachau Camp to visit Social Democratic and -Communist functionaries from my Gau who were in prison there to have -them introduced to me. I picked out—I do not know how many hundreds of -them there were—but every time I was in Dachau I picked out 10 or 20 of -those of whom it had been ascertained by the Police that they had no -criminal record; I had them picked out from among the inmates, and at -Christmas every year I had them brought in buses to Nuremberg to the -Hotel Deutscher Hof, where I brought them together with their wives and -children and had dinner with them. - -I should like to ask the Tribunal, for the benefit of the Nuremberg -public, to permit me to make a very short statement as to why I took -these Communists out. Party proceedings were initiated against me -because I did this. There were rumors which were not true. May I make a -very short statement as to why I did it? - -DR. MARX: I should like to ask the Tribunal to approve this, Mr. -President, so that the reasons why the defendant did this may be -ascertained. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, as long as it is brief. - -DR. MARX: Be brief. - -STREICHER: When I walked through the streets of Nuremberg children -approached me and said, “My father is in Dachau.” Women came to me and -asked to get their husbands back. I knew many of these officials from -the time when I spoke at revolutionary meetings, and I could vouch for -these people. I know of only one case where I was wrong in the selection -of those people. All the others behaved impeccably. They kept the word -which they had given me. Thus, perhaps my Party comrades, who sit here -in the dock, see now that I did not want to harm my country but that I -wanted to do, and did do, something humanely good. - -DR. MARX: Now I come to the picture books which appeared in _Der -Stürmer_ publishing house. You know that two picture books were -published, one with the title, _Trust No Fox in the Field_, and the -other one with the title, _The Poisonous Toadstool_. Do you assume -responsibility for these picture books? - -STREICHER: Yes. May I say, by way of summary, that I assume -responsibility for everything which was written by my assistants or -which came into my publishing house. - -DR. MARX: Who was the author of these picture books? - -STREICHER: The book _Trust No Fox in the Field_ and _No Jew Under His -Oath_ was done and illustrated by a young woman artist, and she also -wrote the text. The title which appears on the picture book is from Dr. -Martin Luther. - -The second picture book was done by the Editor-in-Chief of _Der -Stürmer_, who was a former schoolteacher. Two criminal cases in -Nuremberg, which were tried here in this courtroom, as far as I know, -were the occasion for my publishing these two books. There was a -manufacturer, Louis Schloss, a Jew, who with young Nuremberg girls some -of them still innocent, had... - -DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, we do not want to hear that now. My question -was only as to who was the author of these picture books and whether you -assumed the responsibility for them? - -STREICHER: It is important for the Tribunal, in fact, right for them to -know how it came about that all of a sudden two picture books for young -people appeared in my publishing house. I am making this statement -absolutely objectively. I am speaking here of legal cases. There are -gentlemen here, who are witnesses, who were here in this court and were -present during the proceedings. Only thus can one understand why these -books were published. They were the answer to deeds that had occurred. - -DR. MARX: Yes, but we are concerned here only with the accusation made -against you, that thereby you exerted an influence on the minds of young -people which was not beneficial and which could be considered designed -to have a poisonous effect. - -STREICHER: And I should like to prove by my statement that we wanted to -protect youth because things had, in fact, occurred. - -DR. MARX: Yes, but young persons could hardly understand the Schloss -case, or any such case, could they? - -STREICHER: It was a matter of public discussion in Nuremberg and beyond -that all over Germany. - -DR. MARX: As far as I am concerned, this question is answered, Mr. -President. - -STREICHER: But not for me as defendant. - -THE PRESIDENT: You told us that the books were published to answer -things which had occurred here. That is sufficient. - -DR. MARX: Witness, another serious accusation made by the Prosecution -against you is that a special issue concerning ritual murders was -published in the publishing house of _Der Stürmer_ and appeared in one -number of _Der Stürmer_. How did this special issue come about and what -was the cause for it? Were you the author of that special issue? - -STREICHER: No. - -DR. MARX: Who was the author? - -STREICHER: My collaborator, the Editor-in-Chief at that time, Karl Holz, -who is now dead. But I assume the responsibility. - -DR. MARX: Is it not true that even during the twenties you dealt with -that question in _Der Stürmer_? - -STREICHER: Yes, and in public speeches. - -DR. MARX: Yes, in public speeches. Why did you now in 1935 stir up again -this doubtlessly very grave matter? - -STREICHER: I should like to ask my counsel to express no judgment as to -what I have written; to question me, but not to express judgment. The -Prosecution are going to do that. - -You have asked me how this issue came about. I will explain very -briefly... - -DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. I have to protest against the fact -that Herr Streicher here, in the course of his interrogation by me, -thinks he can criticize the manner in which I put my questions. -Therefore, I ask the Court to give a decision on this, since otherwise I -am not in a position to ask my questions at all. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have already stated your position and the Tribunal -has given you full support in your position. Will you please continue? - -And let me tell you this, Defendant, that if you are insolent either to -your counsel or to the Tribunal, the Tribunal will not be able to -continue the hearing of your case at this moment. You will kindly treat -your counsel and the Tribunal with due courtesy. - -STREICHER: May I ask to say something about this? - -THE PRESIDENT: No. Answer the question, please. - -DR. MARX: I will go on now with my questioning. - -The Prosecution accuse you, in connection with this ritual murder -affair, of having treated the matter without documentary proof, by -referring to a story from the Middle Ages. What, in brief, was your -source? - -STREICHER: The sources were given in that issue. Nothing was written -without the sources being given at the same time. There was reference -made to a book written in Greek by a former Rabbi who had been converted -to Christianity. There was reference made to a publication of a high -clergymen of Milan, a book which has appeared in Germany for the last 50 -years. Not even under the democratic government did Jews raise -objections to that book. That ritual murder issue refers to court files -which are located in Rome, it refers to files which are in Court. There -are pictures in it which show that in 23 cases the Church itself has -dealt with this question. The Church has canonized 23 non-Jews killed by -ritual murder. Pictures of sculptures, that is, of stone monuments were -shown as illustrations; everywhere the source was pointed out; even a -case in England was mentioned, and one in Kiev, Russia. But in this -connection I should like to say, as I said to a Jewish officer here, -that we never wanted to assert that all Jewry was ready now to commit -ritual murders. But it is a fact that within Jewry there exists a sect -which engaged in these murders, and has done so up until the present. I -have asked my counsel to submit to the Court a file from Pisek in -Czechoslovakia, very recent proceedings. A court of appeal has confirmed -a case of ritual murder. Thus, in conclusion I must say... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I object to this statement, Your Honor. After his -counsel has refused to submit it, he insists on stating here the -contents of a court record. Now this is not an orderly way to make -charges against the Jewish people. Streicher says he is asking counsel -to submit. His counsel apparently has refused, whereupon he starts to -give evidence of what he knows, in any case, is a resumé of the matters -which his counsel has declined to submit here. It seems to me that, -having appointed counsel to conduct his case, he has shown repeatedly -that he is not willing to conduct his case in an orderly manner and he -ought to be returned to his cell and any further statements that he -wishes to make to this Court transmitted through his counsel in writing. -This is entirely unfair and in contempt of Court. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, I think you had better continue. - -DR. MARX: I should like to say that that closes this affair. The -essential thing is whether one can say that he treated the case without -documentary proof. The Defense is not interested in the affair at all; -and, according to my recollection, I even suggested to one of the -gentlemen of the Prosecution that this affair perhaps be left out -altogether, because it is really so gruesome and so horrible that it is -better not to treat it. But the defendant only wanted to say that it was -only on the basis of various pieces of evidence that he dealt with the -case, and I believe that is sufficient; that should close the matter. - -Now, Herr Streicher, you fall again and again into the mistake of going -too far in your explanations and of discussing things which can be -considered propaganda on your part. I should like to ask you now for the -last time to stick to the questions and leave out everything else. It is -in your own interest. You are accused of having carried on various -activities in your Gau, which were Crimes Against Humanity, of having -mistreated people who lived in your Gau. Thus you are accused of having -sought out a political prisoner, a certain Steinruck, in his cell and of -having beaten him. Is that correct? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Was Steinruck a Jew? - -STREICHER: No. - -DR. MARX: For what reason did you do that? - -STREICHER: Steinruck, in a public place, in the presence of many -witnesses, had made derogatory statements about the Führer, libelous -statements. He was at police headquarters. I had spoken to the Police -President about it and told him that I should like to look at that -Steinruck once. I went with my adjutant—the Göring report says that a -Party member, Holz, was there too, but that is not correct—I went with -my adjutant to police headquarters. The same Police President, who later -denounced me to Reich Marshal Göring, took me to Steinruck’s cell. We -went into the cell; I stated here that I had come with the intention of -talking to him, talking to him reasonably. We talked to him. But he -behaved so cowardly that it became necessary at the moment that he be -chastised. I do not mind stating here that I am sorry about that case, -that I regret it as a slip. - -DR. MARX: Then it is asserted that in August 1938 you beat up an editor, -Burger. Is that correct? - -STREICHER: No, that is not correct. If I had beaten him up, then I would -say so here. But I believe that my adjutant and somebody else had an -argument with him. - -DR. MARX: What about the incident in the Künstlerhaus in Munich? - -STREICHER: I went to Munich to the Inn Künstlerstätte, or something like -that. I was received by the manager. Then a young man came up to me, -drunk and quarrelsome, and shouted at me. The manager protested and -ordered him out of the place. But the drunken young fellow came back -again and again and then my chauffeur grabbed him and my son helped. -They took him into a room and beat him up and then the proprietor of the -inn thanked me for having rid him of the drunkard. - -And now I should like to have the Tribunal’s permission to state very -briefly my position on one case which I believe the Prosecution also -have dropped, where I was accused of sadistic tendencies... - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you know perfectly well that that incident has -been stricken from the record and is not, therefore, mentioned against -you, so that it is quite unnecessary to go into it. The Tribunal cannot -hear you on it. - -DR. MARX: Witness, from the so-called Göring report I should like to -submit to you some points which have been presented by the Prosecution. - -You know that after the action of November 1938, in the district of -Franconia, Aryanization of Jewish property was undertaken to the utmost -extent. Would you like to make a statement about that? - -STREICHER: Here in the Göring report is a reference to a statement of -the deceased Party member, Holz. In that statement it is pointed out -that Holz came to see me after that action, that he made a report about -the action and likewise declared the action to be wrong; he said -furthermore that now that this had happened, he considered it necessary -to go further and Aryanize the property. The Göring report states that I -then told Holz that could not be done and that I opposed it. Then it -states further that Holz said to me that he still thought it would be -right if one were to do it. We could then get out of it the means for -the establishment of a Gau school. Holz also states that I said -something like: “Well, Holz, if you believe you can do it, then go ahead -and do it.” - -I want to state here that what Party member Holz said is true. I was -opposed at first; and then, acting on a sudden impulse, which I cannot -understand today, I said, “Well, if you can do it, then go ahead and do -it.” I want to state that at that time when I said it, I did not believe -at all that it was to be done or would be done; but it was done. The -Reich Marshal, as Delegate for the Four Year Plan, later stated his -position on it in Berlin, sharply rejecting it. Only at that time did I -find out exactly how Holz accomplished this Aryanization. I had a talk -with him, got into a serious dispute; and our friendly relations were -broken off at that time. Holz volunteered in an armored unit, went to -the front, and resigned as deputy. I returned from Berlin to Nuremberg, -and later there appeared in Nuremberg a Police Inspector sent by the -Reich Marshal in his capacity as Delegate for the Four Year Plan. He -reported to me and asked me if I would agree to an investigation of the -whole matter, and I stated that I would welcome the investigation. Then -the investigation took place. The Aryanization was repealed, and it was -established that Holz personally had not gotten any material advantage -from it. Aryanization was then taken over by the State, repealed, and -taken over. - -I state frankly that in that affair I am at least guilty of negligence. - -DR. MARX: Did you know that the amounts paid in the Aryanization of -houses or real estate represented only about 20 percent, or even less, -of the actual value? - -STREICHER: Holz had not come to see me for weeks. He had carried on the -Aryanization in the Labor Front Office with the expert there. Not until -later, in Berlin during the meeting which the Reich Marshal held, did I -learn of the real facts; and thus the dispute and the break between Holz -and me came about, because I had to disapprove the manner in which the -Aryanization had been handled. - -DR. MARX: You are further accused of having had shares in the Mars Works -at Nuremberg acquired at an extraordinarily low price, for purposes of -enriching yourself and, in the course of this acquisition, of having -exerted an undue pressure on the owner of the shares? - -STREICHER: It says in the Göring report, literally, that I had -instructed and in another place that I had given the order that the Mars -shares be acquired for me. I state here that I neither instructed nor -ordered anyone to acquire the Mars shares. The whole thing was like -this. The director of my publishing house, who had power of attorney -because I, personally, never in all the years bothered with financial or -business matters, could do what he wanted. One day he came to see me -with my adjutant. I do not recollect now whether the adjutant or the -director of my publishing house was the one who spoke first. I was told -the following: An attorney had called and said that the Mars shares were -being offered for sale at an advantageous price. The director of my -publishing house asked me whether I agreed. I stated that never in my -life had I owned any shares, that I had never bothered about financial -matters in my publishing house. If he thought that the stock should be -bought, then he could do it. The shares were bought. It was the most -serious breach of confidence ever committed against me by any Party -comrade or employee. After a short time it turned out; that is, I was -informed how these shares had been acquired. I found out that the owner -had been threatened. When I found out under what conditions this stock -purchase had been made, I gave the order at once to return the stock. In -the Göring report it is noted that this return took place. Among the -confiscated files of my publishing house there is an official statement -about this affair which shows that these shares were returned. - -In this connection perhaps I may be permitted to say that my publishing -house was located until the end of the war in a rented house. At the -time of the Aryanization I was approached with the plan that an -Aryanized house be acquired for my publishing firm. I refused that. I -state here in conclusion that I have in my possession no Jewish -property. - -When those demonstrations occurred in 1938, jewels had been brought into -the Gau house. These pieces of jewelry were turned over to the police. A -man who was bearer of the honorary Party emblem was convicted and -sentenced to 6 years penal servitude because he had given his sweetheart -a ring and another piece of jewelry dating from that time. But I may add -one thing: The guilt of this bearer of the Party emblem rests perhaps -with those who gave the order: “Go into the Jewish houses.” That man, as -far as I knew him, had always been personally decent. Because of that -order, he got into a position in which he committed a crime. - -I have finished what I wanted to say. - -DR. MARX: Is it not true the allegations, made by the chief of the -publishing firm Fink before the Party Court and also even before that, -at a police interrogation, were different, in the main points, from your -present statements? - -STREICHER: The whole thing was that Fink, the publishing house manager, -was called to police headquarters and interrogated. The police Chief was -interested in the hearing since for many years he had been a friend of -mine and of my family. Fink returned from the interrogation completely -upset. He paced up and down in front of me and shouted, “I was -threatened, I have made statements which are not true. I am blackguard. -I am a criminal.” A witness of that incident was my chauffeur. I calmed -him down and told him, “I was called in for a hearing once, too. I was -even imprisoned once. I will give you opportunity...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go into such detail in this matter? - -DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. Perhaps this is necessary, because -in this very report reference is made to the testimony of Fink; and an -attempt is made to prove with this that the explanation made by the -Defendant Streicher is wrong, that he gave the order to purchase this -stock, possibly under pressure, and that he approved of it, whereas he -counters that he knew neither that these shares were to be bought at -such a low price nor that blackmail was to be used. - -If this is taken for granted, then, of course, we can close the matter. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is what he has already said. He has said that quite -clearly, has he not? I was only suggesting that it was not necessary to -go into such detail in the matter. - -DR. MARX: Witness, it may be of some importance to state what the -development of _Der Stürmer_ has been since 1933, as far as circulation -is concerned. Give us a short statement on the circulation of _Der -Stürmer_, and then I shall put another question to you. - -STREICHER: _Der Stürmer_ appeared in 1923 in octavo format, and in the -beginning it had a circulation of 2,000 to 3,000 copies. In the course -of time the circulation increased to 10,000. At that time _Der Stürmer_ -circulated—until 1933 really—only in Nuremberg, in my Gau, perhaps -also in Southern Bavaria. The publisher was a bookseller and he worked -first with one man, then with two. This is proof that the circulation -was really small. - -In 1933—but I say this with certain reservations because it may be that -the publisher did not always tell me the correct circulation figures and -I had no written contract with him—I say with reservations, that in -1933 the circulation was 25,000 copies. - -In 1935 the publisher died; and at that time it was, I believe, 40,000. -Then an expert took over the publishing house and organized it to cover -all of Germany. The circulation increased then to 100,000, and went up -as high as 600,000. It fluctuated, decreased, and then dropped during -the war; I cannot say exactly but I believe it was about 150,000 to -200,000. - -DR. MARX: You said that that new man organized the circulation to cover -all of Germany. Was the Party machinery utilized in this, and were not -industries and other offices—the German Labor Front, for -instance—utilized in order to increase the circulation forcibly? - -STREICHER: Well, the attitude of the Party was made manifest in a -letter, which was sent to all Gaue, signed by Bormann. There it was -expressly pointed out that _Der Stürmer_ was not a Party organ and had -nothing to do with the Party. Thereupon several Gauleiter saw this an -occasion for ordering that _Der Stürmer_ should not appear in their Gaue -any more. Now it is clear that within the organizations there were Party -members who, because of idealism or for other reasons, worked to -increase the distribution of _Der Stürmer_. However, I myself, neither -in writing nor orally, ever issued any order to any Party organization -to support _Der Stürmer_. - -DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, even, before 1933 you came in contact with the -courts on various occasions, both because of your articles and because -of your attitude as evidenced in _Der Stürmer_. Would you give us a -short statement as to how often that occurred and what consequences it -had for you? - -STREICHER: How often? I cannot answer that exactly now, but it was very -often. I was frequently given a court summons. You ask me about the -consequences. I was many times in prison, but I can say proudly that in -the sentences it repeatedly stated “an incorruptible fanatic for the -truth.” - -That was the consequence of my activity as a speaker and writer, but -perhaps it is important to add the following: I never was arraigned -because of criminal charges, but only because of my anti-Semitic -activity, and the charge was brought by an organization of citizens of -the Jewish faith. The chairman filed charges repeatedly when we made a -slip in speaking and thus exposed ourselves to prosecution on the basis -of the laws and regulations existing at that time. But perhaps I may -also point out here that the Jewish Justizrat, Dr. Süssheim, the -Prosecuting Attorney, stated before the court here in this courtroom, -“Your Honors, he is our inexorable enemy, but he is a fanatic for the -truth. He is convinced of what he does; he is honest about it.” - -THE PRESIDENT: What years were they that you were repeatedly in jail? - -STREICHER: That was, of course, before 1933. The first time I went to -Landsberg, to prison, because I had taken part in the Hitler Putsch. -Then I was sentenced to three and a half months in prison in Nuremberg, -where I am now. Then I got three months... - -THE PRESIDENT: You needn’t bother with the details. - -STREICHER: That is to say, before 1933 I was repeatedly given prison -sentences or fined. - -DR. MARX: Mr. President, the Göring report also mentions the fact that -the Defendant Streicher was personally interested in various Jewish -plants, allegedly in order to get some capital out of them. However, I -am of the opinion that it is not essential to deal with these points. -The same applies to the fact that the house on Lake of Constance was -sold, and to whom. I do not know whether the defendant should make any -statements about this here. In my opinion there is no cause to ask him -any questions concerning that. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you could leave that and see whether it is taken -up in cross-examination. If it is, then you may re-examine him. - -DR. MARX: Yes, certainly. - -Mr. President, this concludes my questions to the defendant. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any members of defendants’ counsel wish to ask -questions of the defendant? - -[_There was no response._] - -The Prosecution? - -LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior Counsel for the -United Kingdom): If the Tribunal pleases. - -When you handed over your Party to Hitler in 1922, did you know his -policy and what was to become the policy of the Nazi Party? - -STREICHER: The policy? First I should like to say, “no.” At that time -one could not speak of things which could not exist even as thoughts. -The policy then was to create a new faith for the German people, that -is, a faith which would deny the chaos and disorder and which would -bring about a return to order. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May I take it that, within a short course of -time, you knew the policy, the policy according to the Party program and -according to _Mein Kampf_? - -STREICHER: I did not need a Party program. I admit frankly that I never -read it in its entirety. At that time programs were not important, but -mass meetings... - -THE PRESIDENT: That’s not an answer to the question. The question was -whether, a short time after 1922, you knew the policy as indicated in -the Party program and in _Mein Kampf_. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You knew, did you not, that the policy included -the Anschluss with Austria? Can you answer that “yes” or “no”? - -STREICHER: No. There was never any talk about Austria. I do not remember -that the Führer ever spoke about the fact that Austria should be -annexed. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only want you to answer my question. My -question was: Did you know that the Führer’s policy was the annexation -of Austria to Germany? I understand your answer to be “no.” Is that -correct? - -STREICHER: That he intended it? No, that I did not know. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did you know that he intended to take over -Czechoslovakia or at least the Sudetenland? - -STREICHER: No. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did you know that from the beginning in _Mein -Kampf_ his ultimate objective was Lebensraum? - -STREICHER: What I read in _Mein Kampf_ is marked in red. The book has -been confiscated. I only read that. I read only what concerns the Jewish -question; I did not read anything else. However, that we had the -objective of acquiring Lebensraum for our people, that goes without -saying. I personally also had set myself the objective of contributing -in some way to providing a future for the surplus children. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. May I take it that during the years -1922 and 1923, as editor and owner of _Der Stürmer_, and as a Gauleiter -from 1925, you did everything you could to put the Nazi Party into -power? - -STREICHER: Yes; that is to be taken as a matter of course. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And after 1933 did you continuously support and -issue propaganda on behalf of the Nazi Party’s policy? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Not only in respect to the Jewish question, but -to the foreign policy as well? - -STREICHER: No, that is not correct. In _Der Stürmer_ there is not a -single article to be found which dealt with foreign policy. I devoted -myself exclusively... - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That is quite enough. I am not going to occupy -very much time with this matter. But I would ask you to look at Document -Number D-802. - -My Lord, this is a new exhibit. - -THE PRESIDENT: Which will be what? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Exhibit Number GB-327. - -My Lord, I am sorry, but the document seems to be missing for the -moment. Perhaps I might read the extract. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Let me just read to you an extract from an -article which you wrote in _Der Stürmer_ of March 1938, immediately -after the Anschluss with Austria. I want you to tell me whether or not -you are advocating the Nazi policy in regard to Austria. - - “Our Lord is making provision that the power of the Jews may not - extend to heaven itself. What was only a dream up to a few days - ago has now become reality. The brother nation of Austria has - returned home to the Reich.” - -And then, a few lines farther down: - - “We are entering into glorious times, a Greater Germany without - Jews.” - -Do you say that you are not there issuing propaganda on behalf of the -Nazi policy? - -STREICHER: I did not indulge in propaganda politics, for Austria was -already annexed. I just welcomed the fact. I did not need to make any -more propaganda about it. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Perhaps you’ll tell me what you mean -by the “Greater Germany” that you are approaching. What Greater Germany -are you approaching in March 1938, a Germany greater than it was after -the Anschluss with Austria? - -STREICHER: A Greater Germany, a living area in which all Germans, -German-speaking people, people of German blood, can live together. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do I understand that you are advocating -Lebensraum, greater space, not yet owned by Germany? - -STREICHER: Not at first, no. At first it was merely a question of -Austria and Germany. The Austrians are Germans and, therefore, belong to -a Greater Germany. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I won’t argue with you. I will just ask you -once more, what do you mean by the “Greater Germany” that you are -approaching in March of 1938? - -STREICHER: I have already explained, a Germany where all those can live -and work together who speak German and have German blood. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Would you look at Document Number D-818, which -will become Exhibit Number GB-328. Perhaps I can carry on. In November -of 1938, after Munich, did you yourself personally send a telegram to -Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten-German Party? - -STREICHER: If it says so here, then it is true. I do not recall it. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me refresh your recollection as to what you -said, “Without your courageous preparatory work the great task would not -have succeeded.” - -Are you there advocating and issuing propaganda in support of the policy -of the Nazi Government? - -STREICHER: I have to ask you again, would you please repeat your -question? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am asking you whether or not that telegram, -which you sent to Konrad Henlein and reprinted in your newspaper under a -picture of that gentleman—I am asking you whether or not that was -propaganda in support of the Nazi policy, Nazi foreign policy? - -STREICHER: I have to say the same to this as I said before. That was a -telegram of greeting, of thanks. I did not have to make propaganda any -more because the Munich Agreement had already taken place. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I put it to you and I’ll leave it. I’ll put it -to you that throughout the years from 1933 until 1944 or 1945 you were -in fact doing everything you could to support the policy of the -Government, both domestically and in regard to its foreign affairs. - -STREICHER: As far as possible within my field of activity, yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I want to turn now to the question of the Jews. -May I remind you of the speech that you made on 1 April 1933, that is to -say, the day of the boycott. - -My Lord, this will be found in the original document book, Document -Number M-33. It was not actually put in before. It now becomes Exhibit -Number GB-329. It is in the document book on Page 15, in the original -document book which the Tribunal have. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I give you the document book. If you -want to see the original, you may do so in every case. [_The document -book was submitted to the defendant._] - - “For 14 years we have been crying to the German nation, ‘German - people, learn to recognize your true enemy,’ and 14 years ago - the German Philistines listened and then declared that we - preached religious hatred. Today German people have awakened; - even all over the world there is talk of the eternal Jews. Never - since the beginning of the world and the creation of man has - there been a nation which dared to fight against the nation of - blood-suckers and extortioners who, for a thousand years, have - spread all over the world.” - -And then I go down to the last line of the next paragraph: - - “It was left to our Movement to expose the eternal Jew as a mass - murderer.” - -Is it right that for 14 years you had been repeating in Germany, “German -people, learn to recognize your true enemy”? - -STREICHER: I state first of all that what you have given me here has -nothing to do with that. You have given me an article... - -THE PRESIDENT: You are asked a question. You are asked whether it is -true that for 14 years you had been repeating, to Germany, “Learn to -recognize your true enemy.” Is that true? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And in doing so, is it true that you had been -preaching religious hatred? - -STREICHER: No. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at... - -STREICHER: May I be permitted to make a statement concerning this -answer? In my weekly, _Der Stürmer_, I repeatedly stated that for me the -Jews are not a religious group but a race, a people. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And do you think to call them “blood-suckers,” -“a nation of blood-suckers and extortioners”—do you think that’s -preaching hatred? - -STREICHER: I beg your pardon. I have not understood you? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You may call them a race or a nation, whichever -you like, now; but you were saying, on 1 April 1933, that they were a -“nation of blood-suckers and extortioners.” Do you call that preaching -hatred? - -STREICHER: That is a statement, the expression of a conviction which can -be proved on the basis of historical facts. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Understand me. I did not ask you whether it was -a fact or not. I am asking whether you called it preaching hatred. Your -answer is “yes” or “no.” - -STREICHER: No, it is not preaching hatred; it is just a statement of -facts. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look two pages further on in that last -document, M-33, and do you see the fourth paragraph from the end of the -extract? That is Page 17 of the document book: “As long as I stand at -the head of the struggle, this struggle will be conducted so honestly -that the eternal Jew will derive no joy from it.” - -STREICHER: That I wrote; that was right. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And you were, were you not, one of those who -did stand and continue to stand at the head of that struggle? - -STREICHER: Did I stand at the head? I am too modest a man for that. But -I do claim to have declared my conviction and my knowledge clearly and -unmistakably. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Why did you say that so long as you were at the -head of it, the Jew would derive no joy from it? - -STREICHER: Because I considered myself a man whom destiny had placed in -a position to enlighten people on the Jewish question. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And “enlightenment”—is that another word for -persecution? Do you mean by “enlightenment,” “persecution”? - -STREICHER: I did not understand that. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you mean by “enlightenment” the word -“persecution”? Is that why the Jew was to have no joy from it, from your -enlightenment? - -STREICHER: I ask to have the question repeated. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I can show it to you and we will repeat the -question as loud as you want it. Do you mean by “enlightenment” the word -“persecution”? Do you hear that? - -STREICHER: I hear “enlightenment” and “production.” I mean by -“enlightenment” telling another person something which he does not yet -know. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We won’t go on with that. You know, do you not, -that starting with the boycott which you led yourself in 1933, the Jews -thereafter were, during the course of the years, deprived of the right -to vote, deprived of holding any public office, excluded from the -professions; demonstrations were conducted against them in 1938, they -were fined a billion marks after that, they were forced to wear a yellow -star, they had their own separate seats to sit on, and they had their -houses and their businesses taken away from them. Do you call that -“enlightenment”? - -STREICHER: That has nothing to do with what I wrote, nothing to do with -it. I did not issue the orders. I did not make the laws. I was not asked -when laws were prepared. I had nothing to do with these laws and orders. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But as those laws and orders were passed you -were applauding them, and you were going on abusing the Jews and asking -for more and more orders to be passed; isn’t that a fact? - -STREICHER: I ask to have put to me which law I applauded. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, you told the Tribunal yesterday, did you -not, that you were responsible, you thought, for the Nuremberg Decrees, -which you had been advocating for years before they came into force; -isn’t that a fact? - -STREICHER: The Nuremberg Decrees? I did not make them. I was not asked -beforehand, and I did not sign them either. But I state here that these -laws are the same laws which the Jewish people have as their own. It is -the greatest and most important act of legislation which a modern nation -has at any time made for its protection. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think that is the time to break off. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): -My Lord, I wonder if the Tribunal would be good enough to consider -setting aside a half hour some time for the discussion of the documents -of the Defendant Von Schirach. We are ready to clear up outstanding -points at any time that is suitable to the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: [_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I just want -to ask you a few questions as to the part you played in the various -actions against the Jews between 1933 and 1939. - -Will you look at Document M-6, which is at Page 20 in the document book -that you have before you, Page 22 in the document book that the Tribunal -have in English. It is Page 20 in the German document book; M-6, which -is already Exhibit Number GB-170. - -Now, I just want to refer to what you said about the Nuremberg Decrees. -You told us this morning that you thought when they had been passed that -that was already the final solution of the Jewish question. Will you -look at the paragraph beginning in the center of the page, “However, to -those who believe...”: - - “However, to those who believe that the Jewish question has been - finally solved and the matter thus settled for Germany by the - Nuremberg Decrees, be it said that the battle continues—world - Jewry itself is seeing to that anyhow—and we shall only get - through this battle victoriously if every member of the German - people knows that his very existence is at stake. The work of - enlightenment carried on by the Party seems to me to be more - necessary than ever today, even though many Party members seem - to think that these matters are no longer real or urgent.” - -STREICHER: Yes, I wrote that. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: What do you mean by saying “the battle -continues,” if you have already solved the Jewish problem by the -issuance of the Nuremberg Decrees? - -STREICHER: I have already stated today that the solution of the Jewish -problem was regarded by me as having to be solved, first of all, within -the country and then in conjunction with other nations. Thus “the battle -continues” means that in the International Anti-Semitic Union, which I -had formed and which had representatives from all countries in it, the -question was discussed as to what could be done from an international -point of view to terminate the Jewish problem. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are we, therefore, to take it that everything -that you said and wrote after 1936 was in connection with an -international problem and had nothing to do with the Jews in Germany as -such? - -STREICHER: Yes, mainly international, of course. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me just refer you to half way through the -next paragraph, “_Der Stürmer’s_ 15 years’ work of enlightenment has -already led an army of those who know, millions strong, to National -Socialism.” Is that so? - -STREICHER: That is correct. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You see, you were telling the Tribunal this -morning that up to 1933, and indeed afterwards, you said the circulation -of your paper was only very small. Is it true, in fact, that your 15 -years’ work had led an army, millions strong, to National Socialism? - -STREICHER: I have said today that the moment the press was politically -co-ordinated, 3,000 daily newspapers were committed to the purpose of -enlightenment about the Jewish problem. There were 3,000 daily papers in -addition to _Der Stürmer_. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I don’t think you need go on. Let me -just finish reading through that paragraph: - - “The continued work of _Der Stürmer_ will help to insure that - down to the last man every German will, with heart and hand, - join the ranks of those whose aim it is to crush the head of the - serpent Pan-Judah.” - -Wait one moment, let me ask my question. There is nothing there about an -international problem. You are addressing yourself to the German people, -are you not? - -STREICHER: In that article? Yes. And if that article was read abroad, -then also to countries abroad, but as to the remark about crushing the -serpent’s head, that is a biblical expression. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you now let us discuss for a moment the -breaking up of the synagogue in Nuremberg, which you have told about, on -the 10th of August of 1938. Will you look at Page 41 of the book that -you have in front of you, Page 42 of the English document book that the -Tribunal has. - -Now we have heard your explanation of that breaking up of the synagogue. -The _Fränkische Tageszeitung_ at the 11th of August states this, “In -Nuremberg the synagogue is being demolished. Julius Streicher himself -inaugurated this work by a speech lasting more than an hour and a half.” -Were you talking to the inhabitants of Nuremberg upon the architectural -value of their city for an hour and a half on the 10th of August 1938? - -STREICHER: I no longer know in detail what I said, but I refer to what -you have remarked and what you find important. There was a branch of the -Propaganda Ministry in Nuremberg. The young Regierungsrat had press -conferences with the editors every day, and at that time he told the -editors during a press conference that Streicher would speak and that -the synagogue was being demolished and that this was to be kept secret. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I asked you, were you talking for that hour and -a half on the architectural beauties of Nuremberg and not against the -Jews? Is that what you are telling us? - -STREICHER: That, too, of course. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: At the press conference to which you -referred—you no doubt have seen the document; it is Page 40 of the -Tribunal’s document book—do you remember that it was arranged that the -show should be staged in a big way, the show of pulling down the -synagogue? What was the object of arranging the demonstration to -demolish that synagogue in such a big way? - -STREICHER: I was merely the speaker. What you are intimating here, that -was done by the representative of the Ministry of Propaganda; but I -would not object to it if you decided to assume, let me put it like -that, that I would naturally have been in favor of making a big show if -I had been asked. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me just ask you now a word about the -demonstrations which followed that in November of that year—My Lord, I -refer to Page 43 of the document book; 42 of the German—as I understand -it, you tell us that you disapproved of those demonstrations that took -place and they took place without your knowledge or previous knowledge. -Is that correct, “yes” or “no”? - -STREICHER: Yes, it is correct. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I just want to remind you of what you said on -the following day, the 10th of November. This is an account of what -happened: - - “In Nuremberg and Fürth there were demonstrations by the crowd - against the Jewish gang of murderers. These lasted until the - early hours of the morning.” - -I now pass to the end of that paragraph: - - “After midnight the excitement of the public had reached its - peak and a large crowd marched to the synagogues in Nuremberg - and Fürth and burned those two Jewish buildings where the murder - of Germans had been preached.” - -This is now what you say—it is on Page 44 of the document book, My -Lord: - - “From the cradle on, the Jew is not taught as we are: ‘Thou - shalt love thy neighbor as thyself’ or ‘If you are smitten on - the left cheek offer then your right one.’ No. He is told ‘With - the non-Jew you can do whatever you like.’ He is even taught - that the slaughtering of a non-Jew is an act pleasing to God. - For 20 years we have been writing about this in _Der Stürmer_. - For 20 years we have been preaching it throughout the world, and - we have made millions recognize the truth.” - -Does that sound as though you had disapproved of the demonstrations that -had taken place the night before? - -STREICHER: First of all I must state that the report, part of which you -read, appeared in a daily paper. Thus I am not to be held responsible -for this. If someone wrote that part of the populace rose up against the -gang of murderers then that is in keeping with the order from the -Ministry of Propaganda in Berlin; outwardly that action was described as -a spontaneous demonstration of the populace... - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That does not answer my question. Does that -passage that I have read sound as though you had disapproved of the -demonstrations that had taken place the night before? Does it or does it -not? - -STREICHER: I was against that demonstration. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Just let me read on: - - “But we know that we have in our midst people who take pity on - the Jews, people who are not worthy of living in this town, who - are not worthy of belonging to this people, of whom you are a - proud part.” - -Why should it have been necessary for people to have had pity on the -Jews, if you were not—you and the Nazi Party—persecuting them? - -STREICHER: I have already pointed out today that I was forced, after -this demonstration had taken place, to make a public comment and say -that one should not have so much pity. I wanted to prove thereby that -this was not a spontaneous action by the people; in other words, the -matter does not speak against me; it speaks for me. The people, as I -myself, were opposed to the demonstration and I found that I had cause -to—should I say—get public opinion to the point where one might -possibly not regard that action as something too severe. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But, why, if you were opposed to it and if the -people were opposed to it, should it have been your duty to try and -convert them so that they should be in favor of that kind of thing? Why -were you opposed to it and why should you try to turn them against the -Jew? - -STREICHER: I do not understand what you mean. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I understand you to say that you were opposed -to these demonstrations and that the people also were opposed to the -demonstrations; that, therefore, it was your duty to try to stir them up -and make them in favor of the demonstrations after they had happened. -Why should it have been your duty to do that? - -STREICHER: Today one can perhaps say that this or that was my duty, but -one must consider what those times were—the confusion that -existed—that to make a quick decision, as one might have to in this -courtroom, was quite impossible. What happened has happened. I was -against it and the public too. What was written about it otherwise was -done so for tactical reasons. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Were you in favor of the -Aryanization of Jewish houses and businesses? Were you in favor of that -or did you disapprove of that issue? - -STREICHER: I have answered that question today in great detail, in -connection with a statement of Party comrade Holz. I have stated and I -repeat that my deputy came to me... - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Just stop for a moment, I don’t want a speech. -I asked you a question which you could answer “yes” or “no.” Did you -approve or disapprove of the system of Aryanization of Jewish businesses -and houses? - -STREICHER: One cannot answer that quickly with “yes” or “no.” I have -made it clear today, and you must allow me to explain it so that there -is not any misunderstanding. My Party comrade... - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am not going to allow you to repeat it. I -will go on if you are not prepared to answer that question. The Tribunal -have heard it and I pass on. - -STREICHER: I certainly want to answer it. After my Party comrades... - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant... - -STREICHER: After the Party comrades came... - -THE PRESIDENT: You have refused to answer the question properly, a -question to which you can give either an affirmative or a negative -answer. Did you approve or did you not approve? You can give an answer -to that and then you can give any explanation afterwards. - -STREICHER: I personally was not for Aryanization. When Holz repeated -that, giving as a reason that the houses had been pretty badly damaged, -_et cetera_, that we might get material for a Gau (district) building, I -said “All right, if you can do it, go ahead.” I already stated today -that this was carelessness on my part. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There were in fact a very great number of -Jewish businesses and houses Aryanized in Nuremberg and Franconia, were -there not? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Would you just look at a new exhibit, Document -Number D-835, which becomes Exhibit GB-330. That is a list—it is an -original document—it is a list of Jewish property in Nuremberg and -Fürth which was Aryanized. Have you seen that list or anything like it -before? - -STREICHER: No. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, you can take it from me, that that list -contains the addresses of some 800 properties in Nuremberg and Fürth -which have been taken from the Jews and handed over to Aryans. Would you -agree that that would be at least 800 houses in your city here that were -Aryanized? - -STREICHER: I do not know about it in detail; but I must establish -something: I do not know—is that the official document? I have already -stated today that my Party comrade Holz started Aryanizing. That was -rescinded by Berlin. Then came the Aryanization carried out by the -State. I could not have had any influence here, either, so that this was -none of my business. This Aryanization, the expropriation of Jewish -property, was ordered by Berlin. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, you mentioned this morning that you were a -subscriber to a weekly newspaper called the _Israelitisches -Wochenblatt_; is that correct? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: When did you start subscribing to that -newspaper? - -STREICHER: What did you say? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: At what date did you start subscribing to that -newspaper? - -STREICHER: I do not know. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, I have no doubt you can tell the Tribunal -approximately. Have you always, since 1933, been a subscriber of that -newspaper? - -STREICHER: Well, I do not think I could have read every issue, since I -traveled a great deal. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You were, as I think it is stated in this -application of your wife to give evidence, a regular reader of it, were -you not? - -STREICHER: My friends, the editors, and I used to share in the reading -of this paper. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May I take it that between yourself and your -editors—I don’t say every copy was read—but it was regularly read from -1933 onwards; is that fair? - -STREICHER: You cannot say “read regularly.” - -LT. COL, GRIFFITH-JONES: A large number of the copies that you -subscribed for, which came weekly to you, were they read by yourself or -by your editors? - -STREICHER: Certainly. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I want to turn to something else for a -moment. I want to make myself perfectly clear to you. - -DR. MARX: Mr. President, I should like to draw the attention of the -Tribunal to the fact that the document which has just been presented, -“Confiscated Property and Real Estate,” has the heading “Aryanization -Department for Real Estate, Nuremberg.” That cannot mean anything except -that this document comes from the official department which was later -set up for the confiscation of such real estate. But by no means can -this be a document to prove that we are concerned here with the real -estate Aryanized by Holz, subsequent to 9 November. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I accept that that may be so. - -DR. MARX: I should like to ask, therefore, that the appropriate -correction be made. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If I was mistaken in saying that those -properties had been Aryanized, I would be right then, would I not, in -saying that that list of properties was prepared by the Aryanization -Department in Nuremberg for the purpose of Aryanizing them in the -future? Would that be a fair statement to make? - -STREICHER: No. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I won’t pursue that matter any further. - -I want to make myself quite clear to you in what I am suggesting. I am -suggesting that from 1939 onwards you set out to incite the German -people to murder and to accept the fact of the murder of the Jewish -race. Do you understand that? - -STREICHER: That is not true. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No doubt you will say it isn’t true. I just -wanted you to be quite clear on what my suggestion is going to be. - -I want you to look now at a bundle, which will be given to you, of -extracts from _Der Stürmer_. You can see the originals which are in -Court if you desire to do so, but it will save time if we use the -document books there. - -Now, will you look at Page 3-A. For convenience, the pages in this -bundle are all marked “A” to distinguish them from the numbers in the -original document book. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are they all in evidence? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: None of them are in evidence at the moment. -Perhaps the most convenient way would be for me to put the actual -documents in evidence together at the end, unless the Tribunal or the -defendant desire to see any copies of them. I will give them numbers as -I go along. - -Will you look at Page 3-A of that bundle, Document Number D-809, which -becomes Exhibit Number GB-331: - - “The Jewish problem is not yet solved, nor will it be solved - when one day the last Jew will have left Germany. Only when - world Jewry has been annihilated, will it have been solved.” - -Is that what you were working for when you say you were working for the -international solution to this problem, an annihilation of world Jewry? - -STREICHER: If that is how you understand “annihilation.” That was -written by my chief editor at the time. He says that the Jewish problem -will not yet be solved when the last Jew will have left Germany. And -when he suddenly says that only when world Jewry has been annihilated -will it be solved, then he certainly may have meant that the power of -world Jewry should be annihilated. But my Party comrade Holz did not -think of mass killing or the possibility of mass killing. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The German word used there is “vernichtet,” is -it not? Look at your copy. “Vernichtet” that means “to annihilate.” - -STREICHER: Today, when you look back, you could interpret it like that, -but not at that time. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, we won’t waste time because we have -quite a number to look through. Will you look on to the next page. That -was in January you were writing that. In April 1939, Document D-810, -Exhibit GB-332, I refer only to the last two lines. This is an article -again by your editor: “Then perhaps their graves will proclaim that this -murderous and criminal people has, after all, met its deserved fate.” - -What do you mean by “graves” there? Do you mean excluding them from the -business of the world? - -STREICHER: This is the first time that I have seen this article. That is -the statement of opinion of a man who was probably looking ahead and -making a play on words; but as far as I knew him, and as far as we -discussed the Jewish problem, there was no question of mass -extermination; we did not even think of it. Maybe it was his wish—I do -not know—but anyway, that is the way it happened to be written. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Just turn over, will you now, to May -1939, Document Number D-811, Exhibit Number GB-333. I quote the last six -lines: “There must be a punitive expedition against the Jews in Russia.” - -This, of course, was before the Russian invasion. - - “There must be a punitive expedition against the Jews in Russia, - a punitive expedition which will provide the same fate for them - that every murderer and criminal must expect, death sentence and - execution. The Jews in Russia must be killed. They must be - utterly exterminated. Then the world will see that the end of - the Jews is also the end of Bolshevism.” - -STREICHER: Who wrote that article? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is published in your _Stürmer_. We can find -out, if necessary. It is not written by you, but it is published in your -_Der Stürmer_; and you have told the Tribunal that you accept -responsibility for everything that was written in that newspaper. - -STREICHER: All right, I assume responsibility; but I want to state that, -here too, this is the private opinion of a man who in May 1939 could not -have thought that _ex nihilo_—for we had no soldiers—a “March to -Russia” could be started. This is a theoretic and very strongly-worded -expression of opinion of that anti-Semitic person. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: All I ask you about that is: Is that not -advocating the murder of Jews, that article; if it is not, what is it -advocating? - -STREICHER: The whole article would have to be read so that I could tell -what motives existed for writing something like that. I therefore ask -you to make public the whole article. Then one can form a proper -judgment. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, we’ll go on. We won’t waste time unless -you really want to see the whole article. - -My Lord, if I perhaps might be allowed to put these documents in -evidence. As Your Lordship will see, this bundle is a bundle of extracts -from _Der Stürmer_. - -DR. MARX: Mr. President, with the permission of the Tribunal, I would -like to make the following statements: A number of extracts from _Der -Stürmer_ have been mentioned here which have been put before me for the -first time. Some of them are articles which have not been written by the -defendant personally. Some are signed by Hiemer, and some by Holz, who -was particularly radical in his manner of writing, and passages are -being quoted which are perhaps taken out of context. - -I must ask, therefore, that I be afforded the opportunity of going over -these extracts together with the Defendant Streicher. Otherwise, he -might come to the conclusion that his defense is being made too -difficult for him and that it is being made impossible for him to -prepare himself appropriately. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, you will have an opportunity of checking up on -these various extracts, and then you will be able to introduce, if -necessary, any passages which explain the extracts. That is a matter -which has been explained to defendants’ counsel over and over again. - -Colonel Griffith-Jones, are there not certain of these extracts which -are written or signed by the defendant? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, with Your Lordship’s permission I will -refer to some of them, but so that I should not have to refer to all of -them, I was going to suggest that perhaps I might put them in and, if it -is necessary, let the Tribunal know afterwards the numbers of them to -save time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I put the whole bundle in evidence and will not -refer to all of them. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then you can give us the exhibit numbers later. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If that is suitable to the convenience of the -Court. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well now, the Tribunal will see by looking at -this bundle, from the first page—which I think is 3-A—to Page 25-A, -that there are various extracts which have been written either by -yourself or by members of your staff between January 1939 and January -1941. - -Do I understand you to say now, to have said in your evidence, that you -never knew that Jews were being exterminated in thousands and millions -in the Eastern territories? Did you never know that? - -STREICHER: No. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: As I understood your evidence about the -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ this morning you said this, as I have -written it down: - - “Sometimes that journal contained hints that everything was not - in order. Later in 1943 an article appeared stating that masses - of Jews were disappearing but the article did not quote any - figures and did not mention anything about murders.” - -Are you really saying that those copies of the _Israelitisches -Wochenblatt_, which you and your editors were reading, contained nothing -except for a hint of disappearance with no mention of figures or murder? -Is that what you are telling this Tribunal? - -STREICHER: Yes, I stick to that, certainly. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I want you, if you will, to take this -bundle and keep it in front of you. It is a bundle of extracts from the -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ from July 1941 until the end of the war. -The Tribunal will be able to see what a fanatic for the truth really -tells. - -[_The document was submitted to the defendant._] - -My Lord, this bundle, for convenience again, is marked “B.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you look at the first page? That is -an article on the 11th of July 1941. “Some 40,000 Jews died in Poland -during the last years. The hospitals are overfull.” - -Now, you need not turn over for the moment, Defendant. We will turn the -pages soon enough. - -Did you happen to read that sentence in the issue of the 11th of July -1941? - -STREICHER: No. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 3, 3-B? In November 1941: -“Very bad news comes from the Ukraine. Thousands of Jewish dead are -being mourned, among whom are many of the Galician Jews who were -expelled from Hungary.” - -Did you read that? - -STREICHER: That might be possible. It says “thousands,” thousands are -being mourned. That is no proof that millions were killed. There are no -details as to how they came to their end. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If that is the explanation you want us to -accept we will leave it. - -Just go on again to the next page, will you? The 12th of December 1941, -a month later: - - “According to news which has arrived from several sources, - thousands of Jews—one even speaks of many thousands—are said - to have been executed in Odessa”—and so on.—“Similar reports - reach us from Kiev and other Russian cities.” - -Did you read that? - -STREICHER: I do not know; and if I had read it then it would not change -a thing. That is no proof. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But you have told the Tribunal, you know, that -there was nothing except hints of disappearance. Doesn’t it show that -you were not telling the truth when you read these extracts? - -STREICHER: In that case may I say the following? When the war started we -no longer received the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_. During the later -years one could only get the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ through the -Police. We got that paper, toward the end, into Germany by smuggling. On -one occasion we asked the Police to provide us with foreign newspapers -and this weekly, and we were told that it was not possible. But we -nevertheless got it. What I mean to say by this is that I did not read -every one of those issues. The issues which I did read were confiscated -on my farm. Whatever is underlined has been read by me or it was read by -my editor in chief. I cannot, therefore, guarantee that I read every -article. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No, I appreciate that and that is why we have -quite a number of them. You see, we have an extract for practically -every week or month over the course of 3 years. - -I would just like you to turn to Page 30-A of the “A” bundle. I just -want you to see what you were writing after having heard, or after -having read, or anyway after those copies of the _Israelitisches -Wochenblatt_ had been published. This is a leading article by yourself. - - “If the danger of the reproduction of that curse of God in the - Jewish blood is finally to come to an end, then there is only - one way open—the extermination of that people whose father is - the devil.” - -And is the word that you use for extermination there “Ausrottung,” -rooting out, extirpation? - -STREICHER: First of all, I would like to ask whether this issue is known -to my defense counsel, and if the translation is correct? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It does not matter. He has copies of all this -and he will be able to protect your interests. We are now just testing -the truth of the evidence that you have given. - -Can you tell me, is that “extermination”? Does that mean murder of Jews? -What else can it mean? - -STREICHER: It depends on the whole context. In that case I want you to -read the whole article. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, if there is anything in the rest of the -article which can be helpful to you, your counsel will have an -opportunity to see the article and be able to put it before the -Tribunal. I can assure you that the remainder of your articles, as a -general rule, do not assist your case. - -STREICHER: When that article appeared, mass killing had already taken -place a long time ago. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Well now, we will not go through -this at any length. - -If you will look at your “B” bundle, your bundle of extracts from the -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you should draw his attention to the date on Page -30-A. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged to Your Lordship. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] The 25th of December 1941. - -If you will glance at “B” bundle you will see a number of extracts going -from Page A to Page 21. Now, I would like you to glance at Page 24 of -that “B” bundle. - -STREICHER: Page 24? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes, Page 24. This is an article which appeared -in the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ on the 27th of November 1942. I just -wondered whether you read this: - - “At the Zionist Congress of Switzerland the representative of - the ‘Jewish Agency’ in Geneva... gave a report on European - Jewry.... The number of victims goes into millions. If the - present conditions continue and the German program is carried - out, it is to be reckoned that, instead of 6 or 7 million Jews - in Europe only 2 million will still be left.” - -Then there are the three last lines of the extract: - - “The Jews who were there had mostly been deported to the - notorious unknown destination further to the East. At the end of - this winter the number of victims will be 4 million.” - -Is that what you call a hint of disappearance of Jews from the East? - -STREICHER: I cannot recollect that I have ever read that but I do want -to say that if I had read it I would not have believed it. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well now, let us just turn to the “A” bundle -again and look at the article that you wrote on the 17th of December -1942. It is Page 34-A. This is an article which is initialed “STR” so I -presume it was written by you. - -“The London newspaper, _The Times_, of the 16th of September 1942 -published a...” - -STREICHER: I have not got it yet. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Page 34-A. - -STREICHER: Just a minute. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Find it for him. It is headed: “Eye for Eye, -Tooth for Tooth.” - - “The London newspaper, _The Times_, of 16 September 1942 - published a resolution which had been unanimously passed by the - Board of Deputies of British Jews. This resolution expresses the - grief and horror of the Anglo-Jewish Community at the - unspeakable atrocities committed by Germany and her allies and - vassals against the Jews of Europe which had only one aim, to - exterminate the whole Jewish population of Europe in cold - blood.” - -Now, you must have read of that in _The Times_ because you say so. - -STREICHER: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: - - “Strange how the Jews of the Anglo-Jewish Community suddenly - begin to prick up their ears. When the second World War began - the Führer of the German nation warned the Jewish warmongers - against plunging the world into a blood bath again. Since then - the German Führer has warned and prophesied again and again that - the second World War, instigated by world Jewry, must - necessarily lead to the destruction of Jewry. In his last speech - too, the Führer again referred to his prophecies.” - -Did you write that? - -STREICHER: Yes, this is merely a quotation. It refers to a forecast from -the Führer, of which nobody could possibly tell what it really meant. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. - -If you had not even read that or the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, did -you ever hear of the declaration of the United Nations which was made on -the 17th of December 1942? - -[_The document was submitted to the defendant._] - -Do you remember hearing of that? You appear to have been reading _The -Times_; you appear to have been reading some copies of the -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_. Maybe you heard of this declaration which -was published in London, Washington, and Moscow at the same time with -the assent and support of all Allied nations and dominions. I will just -read it to you and see if you remember it: - - “The attention of the Belgian, Czechoslovak, Luxembourg, - Netherlands, Norwegian, Polish, Soviet, United Kingdom, United - States, and Yugoslav Governments and also the French National - Committee has been drawn to numerous reports from Europe that - the German authorities, not content with denying to persons of - Jewish race in all the territories over which their barbarous - rule has been extended the most elementary human rights, are now - carrying into effect Hitler’s often repeated intention to - exterminate the Jewish people in Europe. - - “From all the occupied countries Jews are being transported in - conditions of appalling horror and brutality to Eastern Europe. - In Poland, which has been made the principal Nazi - slaughterhouse, the ghettos established by the German invaders - are being systematically emptied of all Jews except a few highly - skilled workers required for war industries. None of those taken - away are ever heard of again. The able-bodied are slowly worked - to death in labor camps. The infirm are left to die of exposure - and starvation, or are deliberately massacred in mass - executions. - - “The number of victims of these bloody cruelties is reckoned in - many hundreds of thousands of entirely innocent men, women, and - children. - - “The above-mentioned Governments and the French National - Committee condemn, in the strongest possible terms, this bestial - policy of cold-blooded extermination. They declare that such - events can only strengthen the resolve of all freedom-loving - peoples to overthrow the barbarous Hitlerite tyranny. They - reaffirm their solemn resolution to ensure that those - responsible for the crimes shall not escape retribution, and to - press on with the necessary practical measures to this end.” - -Did you never hear of this declaration? - -STREICHER: I do not know, but if I should have heard of it, then I would -have to say the following: - -After the seizure of power the foreign press published so many atrocity -stories, which turned out to be rumors, that I would have had no reason -to believe anything like this; nor is there any mention here that -millions of Jews were killed. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, you see, it isn’t altogether -uncorroborated. You say you had no reason to believe it; but your -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, which you were subscribing to, was saying -exactly the same thing. - -Would you look at Page 26-B of the “B” bundle? That is the declaration -of the United Nations of the 17th of December. Just see what the -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ says on the 18th. And there I quote the -second paragraph: - - “At that time the Polish Government in London gave the number of - Jews executed as 700,000. The Berlin radio hereupon declared - that these reports were untrue, but admitted that in Poland - ‘Jews’ had had to be executed because they carried out acts of - sabotage.” - -Then the last paragraph quoted: - - “‘Up to the end of September 1942,’ writes the _Daily - Telegraph_, ‘2 million Jews have lost their lives in Germany and - in the countries occupied by the Axis, and it is to be feared - that the number of victims will be doubled by the end of this - year.’” - -Did you happen to read that article? - -STREICHER: I cannot remember having read it, but I would not have -believed it if I had. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You see, there is another article in that same -paper on the 23rd of December, in the same terms; another on the 30th of -December; and another on the 8th of January. Look at what it says on the -8th of January: - - “The Polish Government in London has issued a new declaration - which states that all the information received agrees that a - third of the 3 million odd Jews have lost their lives.” - -Did you read that? - -STREICHER: I do not know, but I have to repeat, I would not have -believed it. - -LT. COL GRIFFITH-JONES: Well now, just let’s see just what you were -writing on the 28th of January. Look at 35-A of your own bundle; 35-A. -Now just see what your Chief Editor, the witness you are going to call, -I understand, Hiemer—see what he has got to say first of all: - - “But the ghetto too, which has today been re-established in - nearly all European countries, is only an interim solution, for - mankind once awakened will not merely solve the ghetto question - but the Jewish question in its totality. A time will come when - the present demands, of the Jews will be fulfilled. The ghetto - will have disappeared—and with it Jewry.” - -What is he referring to, if he isn’t referring to the mass killing, -murder, of the Jewish race? - -STREICHER: That was a statement of his opinion, his conviction. That -conviction must be understood in the same way as something which a -Jewish author wrote in his book in America. Erich Kauffmann wrote that -German men capable of fathering children should be sterilized, and in -that manner the German people should be exterminated. It was at the same -time that Hiemer wrote his article, and I want to say that the very -severe tone in _Der Stürmer_ at that time was due to that book from -America. - -The interrogating officers know—and so does my counsel—that I have -repeatedly pointed out that I wanted that book to be produced. It was in -the _Völkischer Beobachter_. - -If in America an author called Erich Kauffmann can publicly demand that -all men in Germany capable of fathering children should be sterilized, -for the purpose of exterminating the German people, then I say, eye for -eye and tooth for tooth. This is a theoretical literary matter. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I am sure we have heard your -explanation. Let’s see what you have to say about your own article on -the same date. I quote from the middle of the next paragraph: - - “But now, in the fourth year of this war, world Jewry is - beginning in its retrospective considerations to understand that - the destiny of Jewry is finding its fulfillment at the hands of - German National Socialism.” - -What did you mean by that? Perhaps I should have quoted a little -earlier, going back to the beginning: - - “When, with the outbreak of the second World War, world Jewry - again began to manifest themselves as warmongers, Adolf Hitler - announced to the world from the platform of the German Reichstag - that the World War conjured up by world Jewry would result in - the self-destruction of Jewry. This prophecy was the first big - warning. It was met with derision from the Jews, as were all the - subsequent warnings.” - -And then you go on to say: - -“But now, in the fourth year of this war, world Jewry is beginning in -its retrospective considerations to understand that the destiny of Jewry -is finding its fulfillment at the hands of German National Socialism.” - -What did you mean by that? - -STREICHER: Pardon me? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: What do you mean by saying “World Jewry is -finding its fulfillment at the hands of National Socialism”? How did you -mean that National Socialism was finding the fulfillment of Jewry’s -destiny? - -STREICHER: National Socialism could not fulfill the fate, that is to -say, find the solution, since the Führer intervened with the hand of -destiny. That was not a solution. - -During an interrogation I pointed out that I who personally wanted a -total solution, was, right from the beginning, against trying to solve -the Jewish problem by means of pogroms. If I said that the destiny of -Jewry was to be fulfilled by National Socialism, then I wanted to say -that through National Socialism the world would gain the knowledge and -the realization that the Jewish problem must be solved internationally. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let’s just go on. - - “That which the Führer of the German people announced to the - world as a prophecy at the beginning of this second World War is - now being fulfilled with unrelenting inevitability. World Jewry, - which wanted to reap big dividends from the blood of the warring - nations, is rushing with gigantic steps toward its extirpation.” - -And again you use the word “Ausrottung.” - -Does that mean just as it sounds, as though the fulfillment that you -were aiming at was warning the world about Jewry? What do you mean by -it? “Rushing with gigantic steps toward its extirpation”—Ausrottung. -What did you mean by it? - -STREICHER: This is a warning. The Führer made a prophecy; nobody could -interpret that prophecy properly. The prophecy was not quoted only in -this article, but in 10 others. Again and again we referred to these -prophecies, the first of which had been made in 1929. Today we know what -the Führer wanted to say; at that time we did not. And I confess quite -openly that with this quotation we wanted to warn world Jewry: “Against -their threat, this threat.” - -So as to defend myself I might mention in this connection that the -author, Dr. Emil Ludwig Kohn, who had left Germany and emigrated to -France, had written in the paper _Le Fanal_, in 1934, “Hitler does not -want war, but he is being forced into it. Britain has the last word.” -Thus... - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We are not discussing war now. We are -discussing the extermination, the mass murder of Jews, by the National -Socialists. That is what we are discussing. Let me read on: - - “When Adolf Hitler stepped before the German people 20 years ago - to submit to them the National Socialist demands which pointed - the way into the future, he also made the promise which was to - have the gravest repercussions; that of freeing the world from - its Jewish tormentors. How wonderful it is to know that this - great man and leader is following up this promise with practical - action. It will be the greatest deed in the history of mankind.” - -Do you say that you are not putting forward propaganda for the policy of -mass extermination which the Nazi Government had set out to do? - -STREICHER: We too had freedom of the press like democratic countries. -Every author knew of the forecast, which perhaps later on turned out to -be a fact, and could write about it. That is what I did. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. - -STREICHER: But for my defense, Mr. Prosecutor, I want to be allowed to -say that wars too can be mass murder, with their bombs, _et cetera_. And -if it is proved that someone says that we are forcing Hitler into war, -then I can certainly say that a man who knows that Hitler is being -forced into war is a mass murderer. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: With the permission of the Tribunal I am going -to interrupt you again because we are not discussing whether or not -Hitler was forced into war. We will leave that now. - -Just let us go on and see if you are really speaking the truth in saying -that while you are writing these articles you are not perfectly well -aware of what was happening in the Eastern territories. - -We got as far as January 1943. I would like you to just look at one or -two more of the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ and see if you remember -reading any of these. Will you look at Page 30-B the 26th of February, -in your “B” bundle? - - “Exchange reports from the Polish Government circles in London - that Warsaw, Lvov, Lodz and other cities have been ‘liquidated,’ - and that nobody from the ghettos remained alive. The last - investigations have ascertained that only about 650,000 Jews - remain out of 2,800,000.” - -Listen to me. Did you read that? Do you remember it? - -STREICHER: I do not know. For months, perhaps half a year, we did not -get an issue, but if I had read it, I would not have believed that -either. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did you believe Hitler? If you will turn over -the page to 31-B, did you believe Hitler? According to the last two -lines quoted in the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ of the 5th of March -1943: “Hitler, in his proclamation of 24 February, again proclaimed the -extermination of the Jews in Europe as his goal.” - -Did you believe your own beloved Führer when he was saying the same -things as the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, the United Nations, and _The -Times_ newspaper in London? - -STREICHER: No, I declare that whoever got to know the Führer’s deepest -emotions and his soul, as I have personally, and then later had to learn -from his testament that he, in full possession of his faculties, -consciously gave the order for mass extermination, is confronted with a -riddle. I state here... - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We really don’t want another long speech about -the Führer. Just turn over the page and look at what is being said on -the 26th of March: - - “The report of the Polish Government on the measures against the - Jewish population is published in full in the English press. A - passage reads, ‘In the town of Vilna 50,000 Jews were murdered, - in Rovno 14,000; in Lvov half of the total Jewish population.’ - - “Many details are also given about the use of poison gas, as at - Chelm, of electricity in Belzec, of the deportations from - Warsaw, the surrounding of blocks of houses, and of the attacks - with machine guns.” - -Did you read that one? - -STREICHER: I do not know. However, that shootings must have occurred, of -course, where Jews committed sabotage, _et cetera_, is self-evident. -During a war that is considered as a matter of course. However, the -figures which are quoted here were just simply not believable. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. I understand you to say that now, but what -I do not understand is what you meant when you said this morning that -the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ made no mention of murders and gave no -figures. You didn’t say that the figures were unbelievable; you told -this Tribunal, on your oath, that the newspaper contained nothing except -the hints of disappearance, with no mention of figures. What did you -mean by that? - -STREICHER: I have said the truth under oath, but it is possible that one -might not remember everything. During an interrogation some time back I -stated, based on memory, that an issue must exist which mentions the -disappearance of Jews, and so on. It is in the _Israelitisches -Wochenblatt_, and I thought I said that it was in 1943 and it is true. -If one article after the other is put before me—well, even if I had -seen it, how can I remember it? But that I, under oath, should have -deliberately told you an untruth, that is, at any rate, not so. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We will deal with the article you mention in -1943 in one moment; but just before we do that, just see if you believe -your own staff. Turn, will you, to 38-A, M-139. Now, on the 6th of May -it so happens just after those last three extracts from the -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ we have looked at, within 2 or 3 months, 1 -or 2 months afterwards your newspaper is publishing this article. It is -headed “Children of the Devil.” - - “_Der Stürmer_ paid a visit to the ghettos in the East. _Der - Stürmer_ sent its photographic reporter to various ghettos in - the East; a member of _Der Stürmer’s_ staff is well acquainted - with the Jews. Nothing can surprise him easily. But what our - contributor saw in these ghettos was a unique experience for - him. He wrote, ‘What my eyes and my Leica camera saw here - convinced me that the Jews are not human beings but children of - the devil and the spawn of crime.... It is hard to see how it - was possible that this scum of humanity was for centuries looked - upon as God’s chosen people by the non-Jews. ... This satanic - race really has no right to exist.’” - -Now, you have heard of what was happening in the ghettos in the East -during 1942 and 1943? Are you really telling this Tribunal that your -photographer went with his camera to those ghettos and found out nothing -about the mass murder of Jews? - -STREICHER: Yes, otherwise he would have reported to us about it. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Warsaw ghetto, you remember, exterminated, -wiped out in April 1943. Your photographer must have been around just -about that time, if you were writing this on the 6th of May, if he had -just returned. Did you think he could have been there looking at ghettos -for _Der Stürmer_, for Julius Streicher, the Jew-baiter, and have -discovered nothing of what was happening in the ghetto in Warsaw and -elsewhere? - -STREICHER: I can only remember that immediately after the end of the -Polish campaign a Viennese reporter went over there, made films and made -reports, in 1942. I would like to ask—is there a name, a signature -there, to show by whom it was written? One thing I know is that the -ghetto was destroyed; I read it in a summary, an illustrated report -which I think originated in the Ministry of Propaganda. But as to the -destruction of the ghetto during an uprising—well, I consider that -legal; from my point of view it was right. But mass murders in the -ghetto in Warsaw are something I never heard of. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, just let’s look at the article to which -you referred a moment ago. Will you look at 44-A of the document book? - -My Lord, this is the same as was included at Page 53 in the original -document book; it was Document Number 1965-PS, Exhibit Number GB-176, -but there is slightly more of the extract quoted at Page 44-A. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I just want you to examine for the -last time whether or not you are speaking the truth in telling the -Tribunal that you did not know what was happening. You quote in that -article from the Swiss newspaper, the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, of -the 27th August 1943—you will see that date, My Lord, in the middle of -the first paragraph—I start now from that line in the middle: - - “The Swiss Jewish newspaper goes on to say, ‘The Jews of Europe, - with the exception of those in England and of insignificant - Jewish communities in the few neutral countries, have - disappeared, so to speak. The Jewish reservoir of the East that - was able to counterbalance the force of assimilation in the West - no longer exists.’” - -That is the end of your quotation from the newspaper, and you go on to -say: - - “This is not a Jewish lie; it is really true that the Jews have, - ‘so to speak,’ disappeared from Europe and that the ‘Jewish - reservoir of the East’ from which the Jewish pestilence spread - for centuries among the European nations has ceased to exist. If - the Swiss newspaper wishes to affirm that the Jews did not - expect this kind of development when they plunged the nations - into the second World War, this is to be believed; but already - at the beginning of the war the Führer of the German Nation - prophesied the events that have taken place. He said that the - second World War would swallow those who had conjured it.” - -Now, are you really saying that when that article was written you did -not know how to interpret the word “disappearance,” the disappearance of -the Jews from the East? Are you really telling the Tribunal that? - -STREICHER: Yes, the word “disappear” after all does not mean -extermination _en masse_. This deals with a quotation from the -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ and is a repeated quotation of what the -Führer had prophesied. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, now, would you look at the article from -which you quote there, which you will find at Page 36-B; and I would -like you to follow it, and we will read the two together. Now, the -particular paragraph which I want to read in the _Israelitisches -Wochenblatt_ is that quotation which I have just read to you and you -will find the same quotation. - -My Lord, it starts at the end of the eighth but last line, “The Jews -were” or rather “The Jews of Europe...” Have you got them in front of -you, Defendant? - -STREICHER: I shall listen to you. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It would be better, I think, if you followed -it. I want to help you as much as possible. Page 44-A and 36-B. I will -read slowly first of all from your _Stürmer_ again: - - “The Jews of Europe, with the exception of those in England and - of insignificant Jewish communities in the few neutral - countries, have, so to speak, disappeared...” - -and you will see that you then go on in the quotation and say: - - “...the Jewish reservoir of the East which was able to - counterbalance the force of assimilation in the West no longer - exists.” - -Now, would you look at the original article: - - “The Jews of Europe”—this is 36-B—“the Jews of Europe, with - the exception of those in England and of insignificant Jewish - communities in the few neutral countries, have, so to speak, - disappeared.” - -Now—there you go on, “The Jewish reservoir of the East”—the original -goes on—“three million dead, the same number outlawed; many thousands, -all over the world, mentally and physically broken.” - -Are you telling this Tribunal now that on the 27th of August, or when -you read that article of the 27th of August, you didn’t know that Jews -were being murdered in the East and that you had not read of those -things in the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_? - -STREICHER: Whether I had read it or not, I would not have believed it, -that 3 million Jews had been killed. That is something I would not have -believed, and that is why I left it out, at any rate. Anyhow, the German -censorship would not have allowed the spreading of something which is -not credible. - -THE PRESIDENT: You didn’t read the last part of the line, did you? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: [_Repeating._] “...were mentally and physically -broken. That is the result of the new order.” I am very much obliged to -you. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] “That is the result,” you say, “of the -‘new order’ in Europe...” - -You say you didn’t believe it. Is that what you say now, that you must -have read it—must you not? - -STREICHER: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But you just didn’t believe it; is that right? - -STREICHER: No, I did not believe it. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Even if you didn’t believe it, when you were -reading this newspaper more or less regularly, when your cameraman had -been to the ghettos in the East, did you think it right to go on, week -after week, in your newspaper crying for the extermination, murder, of -the Jews? - -STREICHER: That is not correct. It is not true that murder was demanded -week after week. And I repeat again, the sharpening of our tone was the -answer to the voice from America that called for our mass murder in -Germany—eye for eye, tooth for tooth. If a Jew, Erich Kauffmann, -demands mass murders in Germany, then perhaps I, as an author, can say -that the Jews too should be exterminated. That is a literary matter. But -the mass murders had taken place a long time before without our having -known about them; and I state here that if I had known what had in fact -happened in the East, then I would not have used these quotations at -all. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But, Defendant, you must have known then, must -you not, after reading that article, after sending your cameraman, after -the United Nations published their declaration, after Hitler’s -prophecies had been made again and again in his proclamations, after you -said his prophecy had been fulfilled? You really say you didn’t know? - -STREICHER: The cameraman is at your disposal. He is in Vienna, and I ask -to have him brought here. And I state that this cameraman reported -nothing, and could not have reported anything, about mass murders. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we might adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. MARX: Mr. President, with the permission of the Tribunal, and in the -interest of clarification of the facts, I should like to point out the -following: The Prosecutor, Sir Griffith-Jones, has mentioned a document, -Page 38-A from _Der Stürmer_ of 6 May 1943. That seems to be an error, -because we are dealing here with _Der Stürmer_ of 6 March 1943. - -That date is of the greatest importance because if the photographer of -_Der Stürmer_ published a report of 6 March in _Der Stürmer_, then he -must have been at the ghetto in Warsaw before 6 March 1943. -Presumably... - -THE PRESIDENT: Why do you say 6 March? The document I have before me has -6 May. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There has been a mistake, I am afraid, in the -German that Dr. Marx has. I have the original before me, which is 6 May -1943. - -DR. MARX: Excuse me. At the present moment I cannot recall when the -destruction of the ghetto of Warsaw took place. That was Document -1061-PS. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I cannot remember for the moment the number of -the document, but the date was, I think from memory, from the 1st to the -23rd of April. - -DR. MARX: Then, of course, my remark is without foundation. Please -excuse me. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now we had just dealt with the _Israelitisches -Wochenblatt_ issue for 27 August, the copy that you quoted from. I just -refer you to one more copy of that newspaper. Would you look at Page -37-B, which is an issue of 10 September 1943: - - “Statistics presented by the Convening Committee showed that 5 - millions out of the 8.5 million Jews of Europe had died or been - deported ... About 3 million Jews had lost their lives through - forced labor and deportation.” - -Did you read that one? - -STREICHER: I do not know, and again I would not have believed it. To -this day I do not believe that 5 million were killed. I consider it -technically impossible that that could have happened. I do not believe -it. I have not received proof of that up until now. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is quite clear that there were plenty of -figures for you, quoted in this _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ over the -period that we are discussing. Plenty of figures, it now turns out, -doesn’t it? - -STREICHER: Pardon? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We will go on. Now, I just want to put one or -two further articles of your own to you. You remember what I am -suggesting, that you are inciting the German people to murder. We know -now that at least you had read one article in the _Israelitisches -Wochenblatt_ where murder is mentioned. I just want to see what you go -on to publish in your own paper after that date. - -Would you look at Page 47-A. This is an article by yourself on 6 January -1944. This is after you had been living on your estate for some time. - - “After the National Socialist uprising in Germany, a development - began in Europe, too, from which one can expect that it will - free this continent for all time of the Jewish disintegrator and - exploiter of nations; and, over and above this, that the German - example will, after a victorious termination of the second World - War, bring about the destruction of the Jewish world tormentor - on the other continents as well.” - -What example was the German nation setting to the other nations of the -world? What example do you mean there? - -STREICHER: This article corroborates what I have been saying all along. -I spoke of an international solution of the Jewish question. I was -convinced that if Germany had won this war or had been victorious over -Bolshevism, then the world would have agreed that an understanding -should be reached with the other nations for an international solution -of the Jewish question. If I wrote here about destruction, it is not to -be understood as destruction by mass killing; as I have said, that is an -expression; I have to point out that I do not believe that Erich -Kauffmann really wanted to kill the German people by sterilization, but -he wrote it, and we sometimes wrote in the same manner, echoing the -sounds that we heard in the other camp. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You have not yet told us what is this -international solution that you are advocating by talking about -extermination; if it is not murder, what is it? What is the solution? - -STREICHER: I have already said that I founded the Anti-Semitic Union, -and through this Anti-Semitic Union we wanted to create movements among -the nations which should, above and beyond governments, act in such a -way that an international possibility would be created, such as has been -represented today here in this Trial—thus, I conceived it, to form an -international congress center which would solve the Jewish question by -the creation of a Jewish state and thereby destroy the power of the Jews -within the nations. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That is your answer—that you were advocating a -Jewish state? Is that all that this comes to? Is it simply that you were -advocating a Jewish national home? Is that what you have been talking -about in all these extracts that we have read? Is that the solution -which you are advocating? - -STREICHER: Well, I do not know what you want with that question. Of -course, that is the solution. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Let us just go on now. Turn to Page -48-A now, will you? This is 24 January 1944, “Whoever does what a Jew -does is a scoundrel, a criminal, and he who repeats and wishes to copy -him deserves the same fate—annihilation, death.” - -Are you still advocating a national Jewish home? - -STREICHER: Yes, that has nothing to do with the big political plan. If -you take every statement by a writer, every statement from a daily -newspaper, as an example, and want to prove a political aim by it, then -you miss the point. You have to distinguish between a newspaper article -and a great political aim. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, let us just turn now to the next -page, 2 March 1944, “Eternal night must come over the born criminal race -of Jews so that eternal day may bless awakening non-Jewish mankind.” - -Were they going to have eternal night in their national Jewish state? Is -that what you wanted? - -STREICHER: That is an anti-Semitic play of words. Again it has nothing -to do with the great political aim. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It may be an anti-Semitic play of words, but -the only meaning it can have is murder. Is that not true? - -STREICHER: No. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you turn to the next page, 25 May 1944; -and I remind you that these are all after you must have read of the -murder in _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_. I quote the second paragraph: - - “How can we overcome this danger and restore humanity to health? - Just as the individual human being is able to defend himself - against contagious diseases only if he proclaims war against the - cause of the disease, the germ, so the world can be restored to - health only when the most terrible germ of all times, the Jew, - has been removed. It is of no avail to battle against the - outward symptoms of the world disease without rendering the - morbific agents innocuous. The disease will break out again - sooner or later. The cause and the carrier of the disease, the - germ, will see to that. But if the nations are to be restored to - health and are to remain healthy in the future, then the germ of - the Jewish world plague must be destroyed, root and branch.” - -Is that what you mean? Are you saying there when you say “must be -destroyed root and branch”—did you mean to say “ought to be given a -Jewish national state”? - -STREICHER: Yes, it is a far cry from such a statement in an article to -the act, or to the will, to commit mass murder. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Turn over to the 10th of August. “When it loses -this struggle, Judaism will be ruined, then the Jew will be -extinguished. Then will Judaism be annihilated down to the last man.” - -Are we to read from these words: Provide the Jews with a Jewish national -state? - -STREICHER: That is a vision of the future. I would like to call it an -expression of a prophetic vision. But it is not incitement to kill 5 -million Jews. That is an opinion, a matter, of belief, of conviction. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is the prophetic vision of what you wanted, -is it not—of what you have been advocating now for the last 4 -years—the beginning of the war? Isn’t that what it is? - -STREICHER: Mr. Prosecutor, I cannot tell you today what I may have been -thinking years ago at a certain moment when writing an article. But -still I admit that when I saw lying before me on the table declarations -from the Jewish front, many declarations saying, “the German nation has -to be destroyed; bomb the cities, do not spare women, children, or old -men”—if one has declarations like these in front of one, it is possible -that things will come from one’s pen such as I have often written. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You know, do you not, now, even if you do not -believe the full figures, that millions of Jews have been murdered since -the beginning of the war? Do you know that? You have heard the evidence, -have you not? - -STREICHER: I believe it... - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only wanted to know whether you had heard -that evidence. You can answer “yes” or “no,” and I presume it will be -“yes.” - -STREICHER: Yes, I have to say, evidence for me is only the testament of -the Führer. There he states that the mass executions took place upon his -orders. That I believe. Now I believe it. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you think that it would have been possible -to carry out the extermination of 6 million Jews in 1921? Do you think -the German people would have stood for it? Do you think it would have -been possible under any regime in 1921 to have carried out the murder of -6 million men, women, and children of the Jewish race? - -STREICHER: Whether that would have been possible with the knowledge of -the people—no, it would not have been possible. The prosecutor himself -has said here that since 1937 the Party had full control over the -people. Now even if the people had known this, according to the opinion -of the Prosecution, they could not have done anything against that -dictatorship because of that control. But the people did not know it. -That is my belief, my conviction, and my knowledge. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Was it possible to exterminate people in that -way only after some 20 years of incitement and propaganda by you and -other Nazis? Is that what made that possible? - -STREICHER: I deny that the population was incited. It was enlightened, -and sometimes a harsh word may have been directed against the other side -as an answer. It was enlightenment, not incitement. And if we want to -keep our place before history I have to state again and again that the -German people did not want any killings, whether individually or _en -masse_. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am not going to let you go into another -history about the German people. I am going to remind you of what you -have said... - -STREICHER: Adolf Hitler... - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am going to remind you of what you said -yesterday. I read from the transcript: You speak of a Jewish question at -the time—that is 1923—“I would like to say that the public -distinguished Jews only by their religion; to speak about a Jewish -problem then would have been nonsense.” - -Was that because there was no Jewish problem then, and that the Jewish -problem had only been created by you and the Nazi regime? - -STREICHER: It was my aim, and I reached that goal in part: If the laws -which in the future should make impossible sexual intercourse between -different races, that is to say if that should become law—then it would -make the public realize that to be a Jew is not a point of religion but -of people and race. I helped to create that basis. But mass killings -were not the result of the enlightenment, or as the Prosecution say, -incitement. Mass killings were the last acts of will of a great man of -history who was probably desperate because he saw that he would not win. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I have no further questions. Perhaps I might be -allowed to just sort out the exhibits and then mention to the Tribunal -their numbers. If the Tribunal would agree, those that I have put in -evidence, which are the other parts of the bundle other than I have -actually quoted from—perhaps I could put them all in as one number and -hand the exhibits in to the clerk, if that would be the convenient -course. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think so, yes. If they are in one bundle and you are -going to give one number to a number of documents, it had better be in -one bundle, had it not? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, do you want to re-examine? - -DR. MARX: I do not consider it necessary any more. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to the dock. Dr. Marx, will -you continue the defendant’s case? - -DR. MARX: I call now, with the permission of the Court, the witness -Fritz Herrwerth. - -[_The witness Herrwerth took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -FRITZ HERRWERTH (Witness): Fritz Herrwerth. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing.” - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -You may sit down. - -DR. MARX: How long have you known the Defendant Streicher? - -HERRWERTH: Since the Party Rally in 1934. - -DR. MARX: When did you enter his service and in what capacity? - -HERRWERTH: I was employed on 15 October 1934, in Nuremberg, not in the -personal service of Herr Streicher himself, but in the municipal motor -pool. However, I worked for the then Gauleiter Streicher. - -DR. MARX: When did you leave that service? - -HERRWERTH: In August 1943. - -DR. MARX: For what reason? - -HERRWERTH: It was a personal dispute, and mainly due to my fault. - -DR. MARX: Did you have any other tasks to carry out for Herr Streicher? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. - -DR. MARX: And which? - -HERRWERTH: Well, whatever came up. I also did agricultural work at the -end. - -DR. MARX: Thus you were very often with Streicher? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. - -DR. MARX: And therefore you knew about the most important incidents -during that period? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. I do not know, however, what you call important -incidents. There were things that I do not know about, that is, at least -I assume that. - -DR. MARX: I will ask you later in detail. - -HERRWERTH: Yes, if you please. - -DR. MARX: The Defendant Streicher is accused of having caused acts of -violence against the Jews and of having participated in these acts. Do -you know of any such case? - -HERRWERTH: Not a single one. - -DR. MARX: Will you please wait until the end of my question, and then I -shall say “end of question.” On 9 November 1938, did you drive Streicher -back to Nuremberg from Munich, and when? End of question. - -HERRWERTH: It was on 9 November, yes. I do not know the time exactly. At -that time Streicher left Munich a bit earlier, and it may have been -about—I do not know for sure—9 o’clock perhaps. - -DR. MARX: Did Streicher know already during that ride back that -something was to be done that night against the Jewish population? - -HERRWERTH: No, he knew nothing about that. - -DR. MARX: Then, during the night of 9 November, did you witness a -conversation between Streicher and the SA Leader, Von Obernitz? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Where did that conversation take place? - -HERRWERTH: In order to answer that question, I have to explain a little -further. When Herr Streicher went to bed, I was usually with him or the -house superintendent. On that evening Herr Streicher went to bed earlier -than usual. I do not know the reason. And that concluded my work for the -day. I went from Herr Streicher to the Casino of the Gauleitung. That -was in the cellar of the Gauleitung building on Schlageterstrasse. I -played cards there. And then the former SA Obergruppenführer, Von -Obernitz, came and called me, as was customary, by the name of Fritz and -told me he had to speak to Herr Streicher very urgently; and I answered -him that Herr Streicher had already gone to bed. Then he said, “Then I -must rouse him,” and he told me he would assume the responsibility; it -was an important affair. Herr Von Obernitz went to Herr Streicher’s -apartment in my car. Herr Streicher’s bedroom is above my apartment. I -had the keys and of course I could get in at any time. - -On the way to the apartment at night I noticed that many SA men were in -the streets. I asked Herr Von Obernitz the reason for that. He told me -that that night something was going to happen; the Jewish homes were to -be destroyed. He did not say anything further to me. - -I accompanied Herr Von Obernitz all the way to the bed of Herr -Streicher. Herr Von Obernitz then reported to Streicher about what was -happening that night. I cannot recall the details very well any more, -but I believe that he said that that night the Jewish homes were to be -destroyed. Herr Streicher was, if I may say so, surprised. He had not -known anything about it. He said literally to Herr Von Obernitz, and I -remember that very clearly, “That is wrong. One does not solve the -Jewish question that way. Do what you have been ordered. I shall have no -part in it. If anything should occur so that you need me, then you may -come for me.” I can also mention that thereupon Herr Von Obernitz said -that Hitler had declared that the SA should be allowed to have a fling -as retribution for what had occurred in Paris in connection with Herr -Vorn Rath. Streicher stayed in bed and did not go out during that night. - -DR. MARX: Did Herr Von Obernitz mention anything about the fact that the -synagogues were to be set on fire? - -HERRWERTH: I believe so, yes. But, as far as I remember, Herr Streicher -refused to do that, too, because the synagogue, as far as I know, was -burned down by the regular fire department, and upon orders from Herr -Von Obernitz. - -DR. MARX: How do you know that? - -HERRWERTH: I was there. - -DR. MARX: Did you watch it? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. I was at the synagogue during the night. - -DR. MARX: And how could one assume that the regular fire department -started the fire? - -HERRWERTH: How that could be assumed I do not know, but I saw it. The -regular fire department started the fire. - -DR. MARX: Were you there in time to see how the fire was started or did -you arrive when the building was already on fire? - -HERRWERTH: The building was not yet on fire, but the fire department was -there already. - -DR. MARX: Is that right? - -HERRWERTH: I can say nothing else. - -DR. MARX: Did Herr Streicher at that time mention anything about the -fact that he was afraid of a new wave of excitement on the part of the -world press if the synagogue was burned? Did he say that that is why he -refused to do it? - -HERRWERTH: I believe so, yes, but I could not say definitely; but, if I -remember correctly, they spoke about that. - -DR. MARX: Did Obernitz say from whom he had received the order? - -HERRWERTH: He only repeated what Hitler had said—the SA should be -allowed to have a fling. - -DR. MARX: Is it correct that you, Witness, told your wife during the -same night about that conversation between Obernitz and Streicher? - -HERRWERTH: I believe I did not speak about the conversation; but when I -walked down from the second floor to the ground floor through my -apartment, I told my wife that I would probably be a little late because -that night that action was going to be started; I told her briefly what -was happening but nothing about the conversation. - -DR. MARX: Then, later you were at the Pleikershof when Streicher had -been forced to retire there or had retired? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Do you remember an incident where the future Frau Streicher -spoke about the incidents at Magdeburg which had occurred there the same -night? - -HERRWERTH: No, I know nothing of that. - -DR. MARX: Did you not tell the then Frau Merkel that she should not talk -about these incidents because Streicher always got very excited about -them? - -HERRWERTH: I can recall that Herr Streicher once said that he had been -right in his opinion, for, not long after that night he received -information—I do not know through whom—that, for instance, the glass -for the window panes had to be bought from Holland again. Herr Streicher -said then that that was the first confirmation of the correctness of the -opinion he had expressed at that time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, just one moment. - -Sir David, would it be convenient to you and the counsel for the -Defendant Von Schirach if we discussed the question about the documents -at 0930 tomorrow morning? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I will find out. Yes, counsel for Von -Schirach says that he thinks it is all right. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, 0930 tomorrow morning. - -DR. MARX: What observations did you make during your stay at Pleikershof -about the attitude of Streicher with regard to the Jewish question? What -was that about the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_? - -HERRWERTH: Well, what do you want to know about the _Israelitisches -Wochenblatt_? Herr Streicher received it. - -DR. MARX: Did he receive it regularly? - -HERRWERTH: Yes, I believe I can say that quite certainly. I always saw -large bundles of newspapers of the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_. They -came continuously. - -DR. MARX: Herr Streicher said that during the first years of the war he -had great difficulty in getting that paper and the Police did not -release it easily. - -HERRWERTH: Yes, that can very well be. For I do not know, after all, of -what year they were. I just saw them and it is difficult for me to tell -now of what date these papers were. - -DR. MARX: Yes, you said there were always large bundles of them. - -HERRWERTH: Yes, on and off, but there were other newspapers too. Swiss -newspapers were there, the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, and so on. -There were always so many newspapers lying about and among them I saw -here and there the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_. I mean to say that it -would not be possible for me to say how many there were. - -DR. MARX: All right. Did Streicher speak at times about his knowledge of -happenings in the East or of happenings in concentration camps in the -East? - -HERRWERTH: Well. Herr Streicher did not know anything at all about it. -Thus he could not say anything about it. At least that is my conviction. - -DR. MARX: Did you, then, ever speak to him about it? - -HERRWERTH: Not that I know of; I did not know anything about it myself. - -DR. MARX: Did you ever receive knowledge of a letter in which Streicher -was reproached by Reichsführer SS Himmler because he treated the French -prisoners too well? Did you understand me? - -HERRWERTH: Yes, I understood, but I have to think about it. I know quite -well that Herr Streicher once mentioned something about the treatment of -prisoners. I know that the Frenchmen were treated very well, but whether -the cause for that was a letter from Himmler I do not know. - -DR. MARX: No, no. The cause for the good treatment, you mean? - -HERRWERTH: No, the cause for Herr Streicher’s speaking about it. Herr -Streicher spoke about reproaches against the good treatment of the -Frenchmen; but I do not know whether the fact that he spoke about it was -due to a letter from Himmler. But I do not believe that there was a -single Frenchman who could complain in any way about the treatment. - -DR. MARX: You were no longer present when the Frenchmen left? - -HERRWERTH: No. - -DR. MARX: Do you know about an incident when the publisher Fink came -into the garden of Streicher’s home and admitted having lied to the -police in an affair concerning shares? - -HERRWERTH: The question must be put in detail, Mr. Attorney, for I do -not know all about it, only part of it. I know that the then Director -Fink stood in tears before Streicher, that he wailed, that he accused -himself, saying that he was a rascal and a traitor. But why, I do not -know. For Herr Streicher then walked farther into the garden with him, -and I only saw that Herr Fink wept, and again heard how he accused -himself. - -DR. MARX: Do you know that Streicher at certain intervals brought people -from the SPD and the KPD (Social Democratic Party and Communist Party) -from the Dachau Concentration Camp? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. - -DR. MARX: How many do you suppose there were? - -HERRWERTH: I do not know. It was every year around Christmas time. I -estimate that there were about 100 to 150 men every year. They came from -Dachau. Herr Streicher had dinner prepared for them in a separate room, -in the Hotel Deutscher Hof, and I believe that used to be the family -reunion—that is to say, the prisoners rejoined the members of their -family. Streicher also saw to it that released prisoners found work, and -he intervened personally for them. - -DR. MARX: Did he also get work for one or another of these released -persons? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. - -DR. MARX: What do you know about that? - -HERRWERTH: I remember that three men, I believe, came into the Mars -motorcycle factory. Herr Streicher at that time told the plenipotentiary -of the German Labor Front to find positions for these people, as far as -I remember. - -DR. MARX: What was the attitude of Streicher when he found out that -members of the Party had acquired cars and villas of Jewish property at -very low prices? - -HERRWERTH: I can still remember when Herr Streicher returned from -Berlin. I do not know how much Herr Streicher knew at that time about -these purchases; but at any rate, when Herr Streicher returned from -Berlin where Herr Göring had expressed his views about these low-priced -purchases of buildings, Herr Streicher, just arrived at the Nuremberg -railroad station, said—and I heard it myself—that these purchases had -to be nullified at once. - -Besides, I know only about one case where a Party member had to do with -the purchase of a house. I do not know whether there were more of them. - -DR. MARX: Do you know whether Streicher was under surveillance by the -Gestapo while on his farm and that there was a prohibition against -visiting him there? - -HERRWERTH: In answering the first question, I cannot say for sure that -Criminal Police agents were there. I cannot affirm categorically that -Herr Streicher was once under observation, but it could be safely -assumed. I know of a woman who even stated that she had been -photographed in the forest when she came from the railroad station to -the farm. And what was the second question? - -DR. MARX: Whether people were prohibited from visiting him. - -HERRWERTH: Yes. I met various members of the Party within the city and -whomever I asked said to me, “Impossible to get out there, impossible to -get out there.” And if I asked who had issued the prohibition, then no -one would talk about it; but as one heard it here and there, this -prohibition was said to have been issued by the Deputy of the Führer, -Herr Hess. - -DR. MARX: Do you know anything about the fact that Streicher, when he -found out that acts of violence against Jews or other political -adversaries were intended, stopped them immediately? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. At least, on the basis of his statements. He always said -that that was wrong. - -DR. MARX: Do you know of any case where he took measures against -somebody who had been a party to such acts of violence? If you do not -know it, say you do not know. - -HERRWERTH: Very well, at this moment I cannot recall any case. - -DR. MARX: Do you know anything about that affair concerning the Mars -Works shares? What do you know about it? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. I know about that case through statements made by -Streicher at that time. I was not a witness to these events myself, but -Herr Streicher once related to me what had happened. Shall I describe it -briefly? - -DR. MARX: Yes, but very condensed, please. - -HERRWERTH: Streicher was in a Turkish bath at the time when the Director -Fink and his adjutant, König, came and offered to sell the shares to -Herr Streicher. Herr Streicher said, “What kind of shares are they?” The -answer was, “They are shares of the Mars Works.” He said, “How many?” -The answer was “100,000 marks’ worth.” Then Streicher said, “What do the -shares cost?” He was told “5,000 marks.” Herr Streicher asked, “Why are -these shares so cheap?” Finally Herr Fink said, I believe, “Because they -are Jewish shares.” - -Whoever knows Herr Streicher as I do, knows that Herr Streicher has -never taken anything from a Jew. He protested very emphatically against -the fact that such an offer had been made to him at all. - -That seemed to settle the matter for the time being, and then suddenly -the then Gauleiter Herr Streicher had the thought that with that money -he could possibly construct the third Gau building. He mentioned that to -the gentlemen as they left, and they decided to buy the shares. Herr -Streicher forbade them to use Party money. Then both did not know what -to do. Herr Streicher said he would advance these 5,000 marks. - -That settled the case, but I had another experience later. It was about -one and a half years after that trial that Streicher had had in Munich, -when he was dismissed. At that time the wife of NSKK Obergruppenführer -Zühlen came to me and asked whether I already knew that the criminal -police was again in Nuremberg concerning the Streicher case. I said “no” -to Frau Zühlen and added, “If they want to find out something why do -they not come out to the farm to Herr Streicher himself? He will give -them all the necessary information.” - -After about 2 to 3 weeks, I met the Director of _Der Stürmer_, Fischer, -successor to Herr Fink. He told me—but I would like to mention first -that the shares, together with the 5,000 marks, were confiscated from -Herr Streicher. The then Director Fischer told me that on that same day -he had received a phone call from the trustee association, and that the -trustee association had reported to Director Fischer that they had -transferred to the account of _Der Stürmer_ the 5,000 marks which -Streicher at that time had advanced for the purchase of the shares. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, do you not think he is going into rather too -much detail about this? - -DR. MARX: Yes. - -HERRWERTH: Yes, I will make it shorter. - -The man from the trustee association said that the 5,000 marks were -released because the innocence of Streicher had been proved in this -matter. - -DR. MARX: You witnessed the Supreme Party Court session at that time? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. - -DR. MARX: What did Herr Fink say at that time? Did he not accuse himself -again of having made false statements? - -HERRWERTH: I was not present when Herr Fink was questioned. - -DR. MARX: Very well. Then I would like to ask you, were you present when -the incident in Munich occurred at the Künstlerhaus Inn—with the man -who accosted Streicher? - -HERRWERTH: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Can you give us a description of how that incident occurred? - -HERRWERTH: Well, Herr Streicher left the inn after dinner. I cannot -remember the exact words any more, but I am going to try to describe it -as well as possible. Herr Streicher left the inn, and as he went out -that man approached Herr Streicher in a—may I say—improper manner. -Streicher continued on his way and was silent at first. He asked the -people around him, myself also, whether we knew that man. Nobody knew -him. - -Then Herr Streicher sent his son, Lothar, back into the room again to -speak to the man and to ask him what the reason was for such behavior. -Lothar Streicher came out and said that the man had behaved in just the -same manner again. - -DR. MARX: Will you please be more brief? You should only tell us how -that incident occurred and what caused you and also Herr Streicher to -use violence against the man. - -HERRWERTH: You mean his behavior? - -DR. MARX: Yes. What happened then? - -HERRWERTH: Herr Streicher asked the landlord for a room, and in that -room Streicher spoke to the man personally. There again the man made -offensive remarks, and then it came to blows, first with Lothar -Streicher. Now, as it happened, he was a strong man, and of course all -of us helped to get him down. - -DR. MARX: All right. - -I am through with the questioning of this witness, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel want to ask any questions? -Do any of the Prosecution Counsel wish to cross-examine? Then the -witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -DR. MARX: Then I should like to call the witness Wurzbacher, if he is -available. Is he not? I do not know which one of the witnesses is still -in the witness room. Is there anyone? Wurzbacher? Hiemer? - -MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): Frau Streicher is available. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is not the witness Wurzbacher here? - -MARSHAL: I will see, Sir. He was not here a while ago. He was not called -for. - -THE PRESIDENT: What other witnesses have you got, Dr. Marx? - -DR. MARX: The wife of the defendant could be called as a witness now. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, let her be called then. - -MARSHAL: The witness Strobel is available now. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx wants to call Frau Streicher. - -DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. If it is rather difficult to call -Frau Streicher, then the witness... - -[_The witness Frau Streicher took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you give me your full name? - -FRAU ADELE STREICHER (Witness): Adele Streicher, born Tappe. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing.” - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -You may sit down. - -DR. MARX: Your maiden name is Tappe and you were born in Magdeburg? - -FRAU STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Were you a member of the NSDAP or of the Frauenschaft? - -FRAU STREICHER: No. - -DR. MARX: When did you become Herr Streicher’s secretary and for how -long were you in that job? - -FRAU STREICHER: On 7 June 1940, I became Julius Streicher’s secretary -and I remained in that job until the end of the war. - -DR. MARX: And during that period, you were continuously on his farm? - -FRAU STREICHER: Yes, I was always with him. - -DR. MARX: Were you also in charge of all the correspondence for Herr -Streicher? - -FRAU STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: What did that correspondence mainly consist of? - -FRAU STREICHER: Mainly letters to his sons and to relatives. - -DR. MARX: What were Streicher’s activities during that period of 5 -years? - -FRAU STREICHER: Julius Streicher did mainly physical work; that is, -agriculture and gardening, and from time to time he wrote articles for -_Der Stürmer_. - -DR. MARX: During these 5 years did he leave the farm at all or was he -ever absent from the farm for any length of time? - -FRAU STREICHER: During the first few years of his stay there Julius -Streicher did not leave the farm at all; later, once in a while, he -would pay a visit in the neighborhood. His longest absence did not -comprise an entire day and never a single night. - -DR. MARX: Did you know that it was prohibited for prominent Party -members to visit Herr Streicher? - -FRAU STREICHER: Yes, there was such a prohibition. - -DR. MARX: How did you know that? - -FRAU STREICHER: From conversations. Then, too, I myself remember, when -Dr. Goebbels visited the farm, that Julius Streicher said to him, -“Doctor, you dare to come here? Do you not know that it is prohibited by -the Party chiefs to visit me?” - -DR. MARX: When did the visits of Dr. Ley and Dr. Goebbels occur? - -FRAU STREICHER: Dr. Ley came to the farm on 7 May 1944. The visit of Dr. -Goebbels occurred on 4 June 1944. - -DR. MARX: Would you please describe the character of these visits and -what was the subject of the conversations? - -FRAU STREICHER: Both visits were of a rather unofficial character. Dr. -Ley wanted mainly to know how Julius Streicher was doing, personally. No -political questions were raised. Ley said only, “Streicher, the Führer -is waiting for you.” - -DR. MARX: And what did Streicher say to that? - -FRAU STREICHER: Julius Streicher answered that he had become accustomed -to his solitude, that he was happy as a farmer, and that Ley should tell -the Führer that he, Streicher, wanted nothing more. At the visit of Dr. -Goebbels the subject of the conversation dealt mainly with Julius -Streicher’s dismissal from his office as Gauleiter, and Dr. Goebbels was -of the opinion that Julius Streicher should return into the circle of -old Party members; but he gave him the same answer, “Tell the Führer I -wish for nothing.” - -DR. MARX: Were you always present during these conversations? - -FRAU STREICHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Was not the Jewish question a subject of these conversations? - -FRAU STREICHER: No, they never spoke about the Jewish question. - -DR. MARX: Did they not speak about the happenings in the Eastern -territories, or in the concentration camps? - -FRAU STREICHER: No, that never came up any more. - -DR. MARX: Did not Streicher speak to you about the articles he intended -to write for _Der Stürmer_, and did he not also speak about what he -considered to be the solution of the Jewish problem? - -FRAU STREICHER: From all conversations with Julius Streicher I could see -with certainty that he never thought of the solution of the Jewish -question in terms of violence, but hoped for the emigration of Jews from -Europe and their settlement in territories outside Europe. - -DR. MARX: Was Herr Streicher in correspondence with leading -personalities of the Party or of the State? - -FRAU STREICHER: No, neither personally nor by correspondence was there -any such connection. - -DR. MARX: I will now mention several names, of whom I want you to tell -me whether they had any connection with him: Himmler, Heydrich, Bormann, -or other leading men of the Police or the SS or the Gestapo. - -FRAU STREICHER: No, I know nothing of any of these men. With the -exception of one letter from Herr Himmler there was never any mail. - -DR. MARX: What was the reason for that letter? - -FRAU STREICHER: In that letter Herr Himmler complained about the fact -that the French prisoners of war who were employed on our Pleikershof -farm were treated too well. - -DR. MARX: How was the treatment of the prisoners of war and the foreign -civilian workers on the farm? - -FRAU STREICHER: On the Pleikershof eight French prisoners of war, one -Polish girl, and one Slovene girl were employed. They were all treated -very well and very humanely. Each service for which Julius Streicher -asked, each piece of work for which he asked personally, was especially -rewarded with tobacco, pastry, fruit, or even money. Such cordial -relations developed with some of the Frenchmen during the years that -they were there that they assured us, with tears in their eyes at their -departure, that they would visit Julius Streicher after the war with -their families. - -DR. MARX: Did Streicher not finally receive credible information about -these mass executions in the East? - -FRAU STREICHER: I believe he found out about it through Swiss newspapers -in 1944. We were never informed about it officially. - -DR. MARX: But it is asserted that he already had knowledge before that. - -FRAU STREICHER: No. - -DR. MARX: You do not know anything about it? - -FRAU STREICHER: I only know about the Swiss newspapers. - -DR. MARX: Very well. You once brought up the subject, in a conversation, -that in Magdeburg, from the 9 to 10 November 1938, you witnessed the -demonstration against the Jews and that you were revolted by it. Is that -true? - -FRAU STREICHER: Yes, I spoke about it and said that I was shocked at -this action. Julius Streicher got very excited during that conversation -and said, “Such nonsense occurred in Nuremberg also. That is not -anti-Semitism; that is just great stupidity.” - -DR. MARX: Is it correct that Herr Streicher was hardly interested in the -financial affairs of the publishing firm and left these things to the -manager? - -FRAU STREICHER: Julius Streicher never bothered about financial affairs -at all, neither in the house nor in the firm. Again and again the -gentlemen of the firm were disappointed when they wanted to report about -annual balances or the like and Julius Streicher would tell them, “Do -not worry me with your business matters. There are other things besides -that are more important than money.” - -DR. MARX: How did he take care of the household expenses, then? - -FRAU STREICHER: I received 1,000 marks every month from the firm. That -provided for the household, presents, and so on. - -DR. MARX: Do you know that he is supposed to have acquired shares -through illegal pressure against a Jewish banker? - -FRAU STREICHER: That is completely out of the question. I consider it -quite impossible that Julius Streicher acquired shares that way. I -believe that he does not even know what a share looks like. - -DR. MARX: Did he not tell you anything about it? - -FRAU STREICHER: I only heard that he never received shares. - -DR. MARX: How did it come about that you and the defendant were married -as late as April 1945? - -Did you understand the question? - -FRAU STREICHER: Yes. Julius Streicher wanted to take part in the -fighting in Nuremberg. I wanted to accompany him, so he married me -before we left. We wanted to die together. - -DR. MARX: Then you left the Pleikershof with him, and where did you go -from there? - -FRAU STREICHER: First we wanted to go to Nuremberg, and that was refused -for fear of difficulties with the authorities. So we drove in the -direction of Munich. In Munich we were told to continue in the direction -of Passau. From Passau they sent us to Berchtesgaden; from Berchtesgaden -they sent us to Kitzbühel. - -DR. MARX: How did it happen that the original intention to die together -was not followed up? What caused him to change his mind? - -FRAU STREICHER: The cause for that was a conversation with three young -soldiers. - -DR. MARX: And what was that? I will be through right away, Mr. -President. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you should go into that, Dr. Marx. - -DR. MARX: Well, then. I will forego the question. Only one more -question: Is it correct that Streicher gave the managers of his -publishing firm a written power of attorney which meant that they could -dispose of the money as they saw fit? - -FRAU STREICHER: Yes, Julius Streicher gave the power of attorney to -whoever happened to be the manager of the firm, and thereby gave him his -full confidence without any restrictions. - -DR. MARX: Mr. President, I have no more questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any -questions? - -Does the Prosecution wish to ask any questions? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire, and the Court will adjourn -until 0930 tomorrow morning. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 30 April 1946 at 0930 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH DAY - Tuesday, 30 April 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, were you going to deal with these questions? - -MR. DODD: Yes, Mr. President, I am prepared to do so. Shall I proceed to -take up those documents about which we have some difficulty? - -THE PRESIDENT: If you will, yes. - -MR. DODD: Altogether, there are some 118 documents submitted on behalf -of the Defendant Von Schirach. As a result of our conversations we have -agreed on all but—I believe the number is twelve. - -The first group, Numbers 30, 31, 45, 68, 73, 101, 109, 124, and 133, are -all excerpts from a book entitled, _Look, the Heart of Europe_, written -by a man named Stanley McClatchie. They are excerpts referring to the -Hitler Youth organization, and we do object to them on the ground that -they are all irrelevant and immaterial here. They describe Hitler Youth -meetings at homes and Hitler health programs and Hitler athletic -competitions and Hitler Youth Land Service and that sort of thing. There -are general descriptions by Mr. McClatchie of some activities of the -Hitler Youth organization. They are all, I say, from that same -book—none of them written by the defendant himself. They were published -in 1937. - -Then, Document Number 118 (a) is a letter. It is unsigned, except that -it is typewritten. It is by Colin Ross and his wife and it appears to be -a suicide note setting forth the reasons why Ross and his wife intended -to commit suicide. We have been unable to determine its probative value -and do not see any probative value in it, insofar as the issues -concerning this defendant are concerned. He apparently was acquainted -with the Defendant Von Schirach and that is the claim, I assume, of -counsel for Von Schirach, that it sheds some light of some kind on Von -Schirach’s attitude. But it is not clear to us. - -The third document is Number 121. This is a quotation from the United -States Army newspaper, _The Stars and Stripes_, issue of the 21st of -February 1946. It is about the training of young people in Yugoslavia at -the present time. With respect to this we also say that we believe it to -be immaterial here and not relevant and not bearing on the issues -concerning this defendant as charged in the Indictment. - -Those three—the first group and the two, 118 and 121, are the only -documents concerning which we have any controversy. - -THE PRESIDENT: Eleven. - -MR. DODD: I am sorry. I said twelve. - -DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Von Schirach): Mr. President, -the first group of documents to which the Prosecution has objected are -from a book by an American, McClatchie. - -This American, as he himself writes in the book, is of Scottish descent, -and in the year 1936—that was the year of the Olympic Games—visited -Germany; he was able to see for himself the conditions in Germany and -the development of the German people during the first years of the -Hitler regime, and here he describes the impressions he received. - -Normally, I would not attach any special value to this book, if it were -not for the fact that the preface shows that the book was written on -suggestion of the Defendant Baldur von Schirach. - -The defendant, as he will explain in the course of his own examination, -began very early to build up a pleasant and friendly relationship -especially with the United States, and this book by McClatchie is one of -the many means which the Defendant Von Schirach used for that purpose. -The author himself admits in the preface of his book that he obtained a -large part of the material for the book from the Defendant Von Schirach. -This fact lends to the book an importance, with respect to its relevancy -for the purposes of this Trial in the defense of Von Schirach, entirely -different from what it would have been had it been written quite -independently of Von Schirach. That is, we have to evaluate the -statements and descriptions in this book more or less as though they -were statements of the Defendant Von Schirach himself. This is the main -reason why I have submitted the book with the request that I be -permitted to quote in evidence some short passages, particularly those -referring to the Youth Leadership. The rest of the book, which is also -interesting but has no direct connection with the Youth Leadership of -the Defendant Von Schirach, have not mentioned; I refer only to a few -short extracts which shed light exclusively on the activity and the aims -of the Defendant Von Schirach; and, besides, they are intended to show -you, Gentlemen, what impression even a foreigner gained of this -activity, although naturally he had come to Germany with a certain -prejudice which had to be overcome by his personal impressions. - -That, Mr. President, is what I wanted to say to the first group, which -the prosecutor listed individually from Numbers 30 to 133. - -The second group consists of Number 118(a) of the Document Book -Schirach, and that is a letter of farewell which the explorer, Dr. Colin -Ross, left behind. - -If the prosecutor objects that the letter bears no signature, the fact, -in my opinion, is not particularly important. What we have submitted is -the original copy of that last letter, and this original copy was found -among the papers of Dr. Colin Ross. - -Now, the Prosecution ask: What has that farewell letter by Dr. Colin -Ross to do with the charges against Schirach? I ask the Tribunal to -recall that the name of Dr. Colin Ross has been mentioned here -repeatedly. He is the explorer—I believe an American by birth but I am -not certain at the moment. He is the man who for many years was not only -a close friend of Schirach’s but one whom the Defendant Von Schirach -used again and again in order to prevent the outbreak of a war with the -United States, and later, to terminate the war and to bring about peace -with the United States. When the evidence is presented, these points -will be clarified in detail, I believe. I now submit the last letter of -Dr. Colin Ross... - -THE PRESIDENT: When was it dated? - -DR. SAUTER: One moment please. The date is 30 April 1945. I consider the -letter—it is only one page long—important for the reason that in it a -man, at a moment before he committed suicide with his wife because he -was desperate about the future of Germany, at this moment—in the face -of death, he again confirmed the fact that he, together with the -Defendant Von Schirach, continuously endeavored to maintain peace -particularly with the United States. I believe, Gentlemen, that such a -man... - -THE PRESIDENT: Where was he at the time when, as I understand you to -say, he committed suicide? - -DR. SAUTER: The Defendant Von Schirach... - -THE PRESIDENT: No, no, the man who wrote the letter. - -DR. SAUTER: One moment, please. The Defendant Von Schirach had a small -house in Upper Bavaria in Urfeld on the Walchensee, and in that house -Colin Ross lived at the time with his wife, and it was here in -Schirach’s house that he committed suicide. - -The letter is only one page, and it would not cause any considerable -delay in the proceedings if it were read. - -Then, Gentlemen, the third group to which the Prosecution objects again -consists of one number only—a comparatively short article from _The -Stars and Stripes_, Number 121. That edition of which I shall submit the -original in evidence is of 21 February 1946, that is, of this year. It -explains in detail how the education of youth in Yugoslavia has now been -reorganized by Marshal Tito, and the Defendant Von Schirach attaches -particular value to this document because it proves that in Yugoslavia a -definitely military education of youth has been decided upon this very -year. The Defendant Von Schirach therefore desires to make a comparison -between the kind of education which he promoted and the Yugoslav -education of youth which has been adopted only this year, and which goes -very much further than the program of the Defendant Von Schirach did at -any time. - -That is all. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, may I make just one or two short observations? -I realize that ordinarily the Tribunal does not want to hear from -counsel twice, but there are two matters I feel I should clear up. - -First of all, this book, _Look, the Heart of Europe_, which may have -been written by this man McClatchie, who, counsel says, is an American -of Scotch ancestry—I think it is important that the Tribunal know that -it was published in Germany. I am sure that counsel did not mean to -imply that it was an American publication because, other than having -been written by this man, it was published over here after he attended -the Olympic Games in 1936. - -THE PRESIDENT: And in the German language, I suppose? - -MR. DODD: Yes, and the German title was _Sieh: Das Herz Europas_. Then -with respect to the Colin Ross note. I think it is important to observe -that no one knows whether Ross committed suicide or not—at least -insofar as the Allied countries are concerned. His body has never been -found and only this note which counsel says was found among his effects. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I make another remark concerning the -first group? This book by McClatchie was published by a German -publisher. The efforts of the Defendant Von Schirach made the -publication possible. That again speaks for the fact that Von Schirach -in furthering the publication had a certain purpose in view. That -purpose was to bring about enlightenment between America and Germany and -to smooth over the difficulties which he was afraid could one day lead -to war. The book by McClatchie appeared not only in German, but also in -the English language, and it was sold in large numbers in England and in -the United States. Of course, it also appeared in German and the German -language edition was sold in Germany. - -That, I believe, is all I wish to say at this point. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would you tell the Tribunal what these other documents -are that Mr. Dodd has not objected to? Because we understand that there -are 160 documents which he has not objected to. What are they all about, -and how long are they? - -DR. SAUTER: They are short. I have submitted only one Document Book. -That is, I have limited myself to the absolute necessities, Gentlemen. - -THE PRESIDENT: Of how many pages? - -DR. SAUTER: Altogether, 134 pages. Of course, some cover only one-half -or one-third of a page, since the majority are relatively short -quotations. It was necessary for me to submit these excerpts, because I -can produce evidence of the activities of the Defendant Von Schirach as -Reich Youth Leader only by showing the Tribunal just what the Defendant -Von Schirach told the youth of the German nation, what his teachings -were, what his directives to his subordinate leaders were. And in order -to do so, I must submit, as I believe the Prosecution realizes, a short -report covering the entire period during which Von Schirach was Reich -Youth Leader, so as to show that the opinions and theories of the -Defendant Von Schirach during the last year of his activity as Reich -Youth Leader were exactly the same as those during his first year. He is -one of the few men within the Party who did not, in the course of the -years, allow themselves to become violent, he did not go to extremes as -did most of the others; and that is what I want to show by these -comparatively short excerpts. - -I believe that is all at the moment. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then you have the supplementary applications for -witnesses, have you not? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: You’d better deal with those, had you not? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, one of them, I understand, is a person who made an -affidavit which has been used by the Prosecution. - -DR. SAUTER: I believe that is the witness Uiberreither. - -THE PRESIDENT: No, I think it is the other one, is it not? Who are the -two? - -DR. SAUTER: One is, I believe... - -THE PRESIDENT: Marsalek. - -DR. SAUTER: No, not Marsalek, but Uiberreither. Marsalek, Mr. -President,... - -THE PRESIDENT: I have your application before me for Marsalek. You do -not want Marsalek? - -DR. SAUTER: No, that must be an error. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dated the 15th of April 1946. Anyhow, you do not want -him? - -DR. SAUTER: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, then you only want one, do you? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: And that is Uiberreither? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has the Prosecution any objection to him? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, we have not, Your Honor. That affidavit I -believe, was introduced by us in connection with the Kaltenbrunner case, -an affidavit by Uiberreither. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have no objection? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No objection. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you, Dr. Sauter. We will consider your -application in respect of documents and the witness. We will consider -your application, and we will now proceed with the case of Streicher. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I should like to make a -motion to the case of Streicher. I desire to move that Streicher’s -testimony found on Pages 8495, and 8496 of April 26th be expunged from -the Record, and on Page 8549 of yesterday’s testimony. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, do you wish to say anything about that? - -DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. Unfortunately, I did not completely -understand the motions made by the Chief Prosecutor, Mr. Justice -Jackson, because at that moment I was busy with something else. As far -as I understood, he dealt with the deletion. - -THE PRESIDENT: I can tell you what the motion was. The motion was that -passages on Pages 8494, 8495, and 8496, and on Page 8549 be expunged -from the record. - -DR. MARX: I understand. I would like to say, from the point of view of -the Defense, that I agree that these passages be expunged from the -record, because I am of the opinion that they are in no way relevant for -the defense of the defendant. - -THE PRESIDENT: The passages to which Mr. Justice Jackson has drawn our -attention are, in the opinion of the Tribunal, highly improper -statements made by the Defendant Streicher. They are, in the opinion of -the Tribunal, entirely irrelevant, and they have been admitted by -counsel for the Defendant Streicher to be entirely irrelevant, and they -will, therefore, be expunged from the record. - -And now, Dr. Marx. - -DR. MARX: May I now, with the permission of the Tribunal, continue with -the examination of witnesses? I now call the witness Friedrich Strobel -to the stand. - -[_The witness Strobel took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name. - -FRIEDRICH STROBEL (Witness): Friedrich Strobel. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -You may sit down. - -DR. MARX: Witness, on 3 December 1938 were you at a meeting of the -Jurists’ association (Rechtswahrerbund) in Nuremberg? - -STROBEL: Yes. - -DR. MARX: During that meeting the Defendant Streicher is supposed to -have spoken; is that correct? - -STROBEL: Yes. - -DR. MARX: Would you please tell us what the Defendant Streicher stated -on that occasion concerning the demonstrations of 9 November 1938? - -STROBEL: He said, “I should not have carried out this action in this -way. In such a manner it is impossible to fight a power like World -Jewry.” Then he added, “What has been done cannot be undone,” and some -more phrases of that kind. - -DR. MARX: Is it correct that at that time you were surprised that -Streicher in public objected against that action, which had been ordered -by the highest authorities? - -STROBEL: Yes. Streicher frequently spoke against measures and directives -of the Government when he was of a different opinion, as on this -occasion. I had the impression that apparently he had been passed over; -for in his speech there was a certain malicious undertone to the effect -that the matter was having unfavorable aftereffects. I wondered at the -time whether Streicher really had a lucid interval and realized how -harmful that anti-Jewish action was, or whether merely his vanity was -wounded, or whether he felt that a too quick and radical an -extermination of the Jews would put an end also to his own importance. - -DR. MARX: Witness, these are opinions which you are stating and not -facts; I did not ask you about that. - -STROBEL: Well, that was my impression. - -DR. MARX: All right, I ask you now: On 9 and 10 November 1938 were you -present in Nuremberg? - -STROBEL: Yes, I believe so. I do not remember exactly, but I believe it -was on the night of 8 to 9 November 1938 that that action was carried -out. It was on 7 November that Herr Vom Rath was shot, and on the 8th he -died, and the night after these things occurred. - -THE PRESIDENT: We needn’t argue about whether it was the 8th or the 9th. -It doesn’t matter, does it? - -DR. MARX: The question which I want to put to you now is: After that -night during which the demonstrations against the Jewish population took -place, what observations did you make on the following morning and -later, about the attitude of the population in Nuremberg toward these -demonstrations? - -STROBEL: I was informed about that action by the personnel in my office. -Thereupon I walked into the city and looked around in the streets. -People were standing in front of the damaged stores. I had the -impression that the vast majority of the population was benumbed and -speechless. People shook their heads, looked at each other, muttered -something, and then walked away. But, generally, I had the impression -that people could not speak aloud, and later I heard that those who had -objected to these things were treated rather badly, when they were -overheard by informers. - -DR. MARX: But the general impression was, was it not, that the -population definitely disapproved of that action, and that general -indignation was recognizable though not loudly expressed? - -STROBEL: Yes. The Russian radio at the time hit the nail on the head by -saying, “Let it be said to the credit of the German people that they had -no part in the events and that they were sleeping.” - -In fact most people heard of the events of the night only on the -following morning. - -THE PRESIDENT: What has this got to do with the Defendant Streicher? - -DR. MARX: Well, the Defendant Streicher has been accused of openly -approving this action in his speech on 10 November. The Defendant -Streicher also maintains in his defense that it was an action ordered by -the top authorities and not a spontaneous demonstration of the people. - -THE PRESIDENT: The fact that a number of people in Nuremberg, or even -the whole of the people of Nuremberg, disapproved of it wouldn’t show -that Streicher disapproved of it. - -DR. MARX: Yes, but he maintains that there could have been no question -of an incitement, since the action had been ordered and directed from -the top, whereas, in the case of an incitement, the action would have -been started by the people themselves. That was his conclusion. - -STROBEL: May I state my opinion about that? The action was definitely -not started by the people themselves, because even the majority of the -SA men who took part in it did so against their will. It was an order -from above; it was an organized affair. The assertion of Dr. Goebbels -that the German people had risen spontaneously was an intentional -incrimination of the German people. - -DR. MARX: I have no more questions to ask of this witness, Mr. -President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any other of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask him -any questions? - -[_There was no response._] - -Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? - -[_There was no response._] - -Then the witness can retire. - -DR. MARX: With the permission of the Tribunal, I now call the witness -Ernst Hiemer. - -MARSHAL: There is no witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is he not there? - -MARSHAL: We have no witness there. - -THE PRESIDENT: He says, Dr. Marx, that he is not there, and that there -are no witnesses there. - -DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. The witness Hiemer is in the prison -here, and I talked to him personally. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, did you inform the prison authorities yesterday -that you were going to call him? - -DR. MARX: I spoke to the Marshal on Monday and asked that Hiemer be -brought up on Tuesday, as far as I can recall. There must be a -misunderstanding. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, have you got any other witnesses besides Hiemer? - -DR. MARX: Yes, the witness Wurzbacher. - -THE PRESIDENT: Where is he? Where is Wurzbacher? - -DR. MARX: Wurzbacher is also here in prison. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, while he is being brought, can you take up the time -in dealing with your documents? - -DR. MARX: Yes. We can do that. - -MARSHAL: They will be here in about 5 minutes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Go on, Dr. Marx. - -DR. MARX: Mr. President, before coming to the question of the documents, -I should like to point out the following: During the session yesterday -afternoon the Prosecution submitted several documents which were new to -me, and I have not yet had an opportunity of stating my position with -regard to them. Nor have I yet had a chance of speaking to the Defendant -Streicher about them. From the point of view of the Defense, I consider -it necessary to explain my position with regard to these very important -documents; and I believe that I must now examine all the articles of -_Der Stürmer_ to see whether Streicher used in some way or other the -various pieces of information from the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_; for -his defense is, “I did not believe what I read there.” If he did not use -these items of information in any of his articles, then his answer is, -to a certain extent, corroborated. Therefore I have to review the -matter... - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. In one particular article it was -demonstrated yesterday in cross-examination, as I understood it, that he -had used an article from the Jewish paper. - -DR. MARX: Yes. I know that article. It is one of 4 November 1943. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Marx, what exactly are you applying for now? -What is your motion? - -DR. MARX: My motion is that the Tribunal permit me to supplement my -document book so as to be able to state my position with regard to -yesterday’s presentation of documents by the Prosecution by submitting -counter documents of my own. My presentation of documents would be -incomplete if I had no chance of replying to these new documents -submitted by the Prosecution. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Marx; the Tribunal grants your motion provided -you make it in the ordinary way, in writing, referring to any passages -which you contend throw light on the passages which have been put in by -the Prosecution. - -DR. MARX: Yes. May I now begin to discuss the individual documents? -Document Number Streicher-1 shows that the newspaper _Der Stürmer_, -according to the decision of the Führer, was not an official Party organ -and was not even entitled to carry the state insignia while all other -press organs displayed the insignia conspicuously. That is evidence that -the paper _Der Stürmer_ was a private publication of the Defendant -Streicher. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, you are going to offer these documents in -evidence and give them exhibit numbers, are you not? - -DR. MARX: I consider these documents as submitted; I have discussed the -subject with the Prosecution, and the Prosecution had no objections. - -THE PRESIDENT: You see, there is a written transcript being taken down, -and unless you offer each document in evidence and say that will be -exhibit number so-and-so, it does not get into the transcript. If you -like you can do it in a group and say, “I offer in evidence such and -such documents as Exhibits 1 to 100,” or whatever number you wish. - -DR. MARX: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: The book I have before me does contain certain exhibit -numbers; for instance, Page 1 to 4 appears to be Exhibit Number -Streicher-1 and Page 5 is Exhibit Number Streicher-5; Page 6 is Exhibit -Number Streicher-6; Page 7 is Exhibit Number Streicher-7. - -DR. MARX: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am told that Page 4 is Exhibit Number Streicher-1; is -it? - -DR. MARX: The pagination made here is completely different from the one -I made and consequently it is now arranged altogether differently. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, let us get on. You only have to tell us what -documents you are offering in evidence and under what exhibit numbers. -Dr. Marx, you can do it later if you want to. - -DR. MARX: I further submit Exhibit Number Streicher-5, an excerpt from -an editorial of _Der Stürmer_ of July 1938. Number 28. This article, -which was not written by the Defendant Streicher but by Karl Holz, is -worded in very sharp language and says that vengeance will break loose -one day and all Jewry will be exterminated. But the salient point -here—the article seems to have been provoked by a letter which was sent -from Nuremberg to New York, and which stated that Germany in the case of -war, would be destroyed from the air. And so this article also falls -under the claim which the defendant made yesterday, namely that his -sharp language was always caused by some preceding action from another -side. That is Document Number Streicher-5 and I ask permission to submit -it as an exhibit under that number. - -Then I submit as Document Number Streicher-6, an excerpt from Number 40 -of _Der Stürmer_ of October 1938. I think I can dispense with comment on -it because my argument can be seen from the document itself; or is it -necessary to speak about it? - -THE PRESIDENT: No, you need not speak about them; just put them in. - -DR. MARX: I submit as Document Number Streicher-7, an excerpt from the -_Völkischer Beobachter_ of 25 February 1942, in answer to Document M-31 -of the trial brief against the defendant. - -Then I submit Document Number Streicher-8, an excerpt from the -_Völkischer Beobachter_ of 8 February 1939, Page 2. - -Then as Document Number Streicher-9, an excerpt from the political -testament of Adolf Hitler, dated 29 April 1945. - -As Document Number Streicher-10, an excerpt from _Der Stürmer_, February -1935, Number 8, Page 4. - -As Document Number Streicher-11, an excerpt from _Der Stürmer_ of -September 1935, Number 38. - -I am giving the next page the Document Number Streicher-12. That is an -excerpt from _Der Stürmer_, of September 1935, Number 38, Page 9. - -Document Number Streicher-13 is an excerpt from _Der Stürmer_, of -January 1938. Number 1. - -Document Number Streicher-14, an excerpt from _Der Stürmer_ of May 1938, -Number 20. - -As Document Number Streicher-15, an excerpt from _Der Stürmer_ of 5 -November 1943, Number 45. - -As Document Number Streicher-16, of the Defense, a document submitted by -the Prosecution under number 759-PS. - -As Document Number Streicher-17, speeches made by Himmler in April 1943, -on 4 October 1943, and 23 September 1943 at Posen and Kharkov. - -As Document Number Streicher-18, a photostat of the special issue of -_Der Stürmer_ of May 1939, Number 20. - -I ask to have these documents admitted. I have limited myself to the -utmost. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is all, is it? - -DR. MARX: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are the witnesses ready yet? Perhaps we might as well -adjourn for 10 minutes now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -[_The witness Ernst Hiemer took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name. - -ERNST HIEMER (Witness): Ernst Hiemer. - -DR. MARX: May I just interrupt for a minute, Mr. President. First of all -I would like to state that I am by no means holding the Marshal -responsible for the mistake. The matter was as follows: The mistake in -requesting the witness... - -THE PRESIDENT: It is quite all right, Dr. Marx. - -DR. MARX: I consider it my duty to state here that the Marshal is not -responsible for the mistake about the bringing in of the witness. One of -my assistants spoke yesterday with a gentleman... - -THE PRESIDENT: We quite understand, Dr. Marx. - -DR. MARX: Then, Mr. President, I should like to submit Documents Number -Streicher 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 up to 18. I do not know whether it is clear -now. The numbers are 1 and 5, and from 6 through 18. Lacking are 2, 3, -and 4, which were dropped. All other exhibit numbers are contained -therein, Numbers 1 and from 5 through 18. - -THE PRESIDENT: You include 19, don’t you? - -DR. MARX: No, Numbers 19 and 20 are not necessary. - -THE PRESIDENT: No, I beg your pardon. I think I must have been wrong. I -have taken down 19, but you haven’t got 19, have you? - -DR. MARX: Number 18 is my last one, Your Honor, and I ask to have that -included in the record. - -THE PRESIDENT: And now you are going to go on with the witnesses? - -DR. MARX: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name. - -ERNST HIEMER: Ernst Hiemer. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -You may sit down. - -DR. MARX: Since when have you known Herr Streicher, how did you get into -contact with him, and what position did you have on _Der Stürmer_? - -HIEMER: At the end of 1934 I was introduced to the then Gauleiter Julius -Streicher in the Deutscher Hof in Nuremberg. Streicher gave me the -assignment of working for his public health journal, _Die Deutsche -Volksgesundheit_. In 1935 I also wrote reports for _Der Stürmer_. -Streicher then had me transferred to the editorial staff of _Der -Stürmer_. - -Eventually, under Streicher’s direction and the direction of other staff -members of _Der Stürmer_, I did editorial work as a co-editor. The -responsible editor of _Der Stürmer_ was Karl Holz, Streicher’s deputy, -but the leading spirit of the paper was Streicher himself. In the year -1938 instructions came from Berlin to the effect that Holz was permitted -to contribute to _Der Stürmer_, but in his capacity as state -official—he was the Deputy Gauleiter—he was no longer to be mentioned -in the editions of _Der Stürmer_. Thereupon, on instruction from -Streicher, my name was entered in _Der Stürmer_ as responsible editor. -The overall direction of the paper and all authority connected therewith -remained in Streicher’s hands, and Streicher retained this position -until the collapse. - -DR. MARX: What was the main idea of _Der Stürmer’s_ policy? What was the -Leitmotiv? - -HIEMER: Streicher wanted by means of _Der Stürmer_, in the simplest and -most popular language, to convey to every man and every woman of the -German nation knowledge about the Jews. Streicher wanted the entire -German people to realize that the Jew was a stranger among them. - -DR. MARX: Herr Hiemer, I do not want to know that. I want you to tell me -whether Herr Streicher, let us say, wished to advocate emigration or -whether he followed a different train of thought. Long expositions on -the Jewish problem are not required. - -HIEMER: Streicher was of the opinion that in Germany the Jewish question -should be solved by emigration. He repeatedly criticized the leadership -of the Reich because the emigration of Jews was not being carried -through in the manner desired by Streicher. When the war came, Streicher -asserted that the Jewish problem would no longer have had any -significance for a Germany at war if in accordance with his idea it had -been solved by complete emigration of the Jews during the preceding time -of peace. - -DR. MARX: Is it correct that the Palestine and Madagascar problem was -discussed in the journal? - -HIEMER: Yes. Streicher stated his opinion in word as well as in writing, -that Palestine and Madagascar would be suitable localities for absorbing -the Jews living in Germany. However, he did not follow up this thought, -since not Germany but only England and France could dispose of Palestine -and Madagascar. - -DR. MARX: What do you think about the influence exerted by Streicher and -_Der Stürmer_ since 1933? Is it not true that since 1933 its influence -among the German people was much in decline? - -HIEMER: Yes, that is correct. In many circles it was known that the -influence of Streicher and of his paper on the movement did decrease. -After 1933 Streicher had many conflicts with other Party leaders, and he -made many enemies. Particularly from the year 1937, Streicher was pushed -more and more into the background. Within the Party the Institute for -the Study of the Jewish Problem, under the leadership of Rosenberg, -dealt with the theory of the Jewish problem, and actual authority over -the Jews belonged, as is well known, exclusively to Himmler. - -When finally in the year 1940 Streicher was relieved of his post as -Gauleiter, he was completely isolated. From then on he lived on his farm -and worked there as a farmer; he wrote articles only for _Der Stürmer_. - -DR. MARX: What was the circulation of _Der Stürmer_ from 1933? Can you -give us figures? Of course, only after the date when you joined the -paper. - -HIEMER: This question of the circulation could, of course, be answered -best by the publication manager, who was concerned with it. However, I -remember approximate figures. _Der Stürmer_ was in 1933 a very small -paper; but by the year 1935 its circulation increased to about 800,000. -After that, however, there was a sharp decline. - -Of course, during the war _Der Stürmer_ had a smaller circulation. I -cannot give you any exact figures and during the last months the -circulation of the paper was, of course, extremely small. On the -average, I might say that _Der Stürmer_ had a circulation of perhaps -half a million. Of course, there were special issues which had a much -larger circulation. - -As I said, only the publisher could authenticate these figures. - -DR. MARX: What can be the reason for the increase in the year 1935? - -HIEMER: It is very difficult for me to answer that question. - -DR. MARX: Wasn’t it because Party authorities—because subscriptions -were made compulsory in factories and other places? - -HIEMER: You are putting questions to me which really only a publisher -can answer. I myself cannot answer the question with assurance, and -therefore must remain silent; my testimony would not be reliable. - -DR. MARX: Of course, if you don’t know, you are free to say, “My -knowledge on this point is not sufficient.” Did Herr Streicher know of -the happenings in the East, especially in the concentration camps, and -what did he personally tell you about these things? - -HIEMER: Streicher himself never told me that he knew about the -happenings in the concentration camps. On the contrary, Streicher said -he learned of these things only in 1944 through the Swiss press. -Streicher received the Swiss newspapers regularly, in particular the -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ of Switzerland, and in 1944 this journal -published rather detailed descriptions about what was going on in the -concentration camps. - -Streicher at first refused to credit these reports in the Swiss press -and called them premeditated lies. He declared that these reports were -being printed merely for the purpose of undermining the prestige of the -German people abroad. It is true Streicher soon changed his opinion. He -began to doubt that his opinion was right and finally he believed that -the occurrences in concentration camps, as pictured in the Swiss press, -did after all correspond to the facts. Streicher said that Himmler was -the only man who could have authorized such crimes. - -DR. MARX: You said that Streicher soon changed his opinion. What does -that mean? - -HIEMER: In the beginning he had decidedly said that these reports could -not be true. Then he became uncertain and said that perhaps they might -be true. I had the impression that either the detailed manner of the -reports in the Swiss press had convinced Streicher that these things had -actually occurred or that Streicher, from one source or another, either -through personal contact or through letters, had received knowledge that -these happenings were actually taking place in the concentration camps. -To that I ascribe his change of view. - -DR. MARX: And when was that, approximately? - -HIEMER: I cannot give you the exact date, but I believe it was in the -middle of 1944. - -DR. MARX: What attitude did he take when he was finally convinced? Did -he express satisfaction at the fact that so many people had been killed? - -HIEMER: No. Streicher definitely deprecated what was done in the -concentration camps. It did happen that Streicher, in anger—if he had -been especially upset by political events—often or at times, asserted -that Jews, as an enemy of the German people, should be exterminated. -However, Streicher talked in that way only in the first phase of -excitement. When he was calmed, he always opposed the extermination of -the Jews. - -DR. MARX: But repeatedly in articles of _Der Stürmer_ there is talk of -the extermination of the Jews? - -HIEMER: Yes. It is a fact that in reports of _Der Stürmer_ the -extermination of Jewry is spoken about. However, on the other hand, -Streicher again and again opposed the murder of the Jews, and I am quite -convinced that Streicher and _Der Stürmer_ had nothing whatever to do -with the happenings in concentration camps. I do not believe it. - -For it is known now that these crimes in the concentration camps were -committed on the instructions of individual leading men; that is, on -official orders, and it is my firm conviction that neither Streicher nor -_Der Stürmer_ had anything to do with them. - -DR. MARX: How were the articles which you wrote prepared? Did you -receive directives for the articles from Streicher and then merely edit -them, or were you the real author? - -HIEMER: Streicher was the founder and the publisher of _Der Stürmer_. -But he was in fact also the chief editor, and all his colleagues, no -matter whether it was his deputy, Holz, or others—all of them had to -submit their articles to Streicher before they were printed. Streicher -then ordered changes if the need arose; he also gave the editors -assignments for articles, that is, he told them with what arguments -these articles were to be drawn up; and Streicher knew of all the -articles which appeared in _Der Stürmer_. In fact, he was the -responsible head, the editor of _Der Stürmer_. All others were his -assistants. He himself was, as he often said with pride, one and the -same with _Der Stürmer_. “Streicher and _Der Stürmer_ are one and the -same.” That was his maxim. - -DR. MARX: That, of course, he admits; he says that he assumes the -responsibility. - -What can you tell us about the so-called pornographic library? - -HIEMER: _Der Stürmer_ was in possession of a large archive. This archive -consisted of many thousands of German and foreign-language books, -documents, edicts, and so forth. These books were either put at the -disposal of the _Stürmer_ archive by friends of _Der Stürmer_, or they -came from Jewish apartments. The police put books which were found in -Jewish houses at the disposal of Rosenberg’s Institute for the Study of -the Jewish problem for research purposes. Whatever remained in the -Jewish dwellings in Nuremberg was turned over to the _Stürmer_ archive. -Among these books there were also numerous which dealt with sexual -knowledge, books by Magnus Hirschfeld, Bloch, and some which were simply -pornographic. These, then, consisted both of books which had been sent -in by friends of the _Stürmer_, and books which had been found in Jewish -dwellings. - -These books were kept in a special section of the _Stürmer_ archive -under lock and key, and the public did not have access to them. This -literature was no personal pornographic library of Streicher, but formed -a part of _Der Stürmer’s_ archive. Streicher never read these books. -They were to be reviewed after the war in the course of the -reconstruction. All those which were not of direct Jewish origin were to -be removed, but as I said, Streicher did not read these books. - -DR. MARX: Where were these books kept? Were they in the publishing -house, or how is it that a part... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, there is no charge here with respect to this -particular sort of books. - -DR. MARX: This is my last question. I just wanted to clarify this -matter, since it played an important part in the public mind. I have no -further questions to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then, are there any questions from the other Defense -Counsel? - -DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): I have one question -only. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Did Rosenberg have any connections with the -editorial staff of _Der Stürmer_? - -HIEMER: To my knowledge, his connections were almost non-existent. I -knew personally only Dr. Ballensiefen, who worked with Rosenberg. I also -knew Dr. Pohl personally, but no relations existed between the _Der -Stürmer_ and the Institute for the Study of the Jewish Problem for the -purposes of co-operation. - -DR. THOMA: Did Ballensiefen and Pohl have connections with _Der -Stürmer_? - -HIEMER: Pohl had personal connections with me. He was a student of -Hebrew and had made translations of the Talmud; he had also published -the _Talmudgeist_. Through that I got to know him. Ballensiefen also had -no personal connection with _Der Stürmer_. - -DR. THOMA: Does this mean that Pohl did have personal connections... - -HIEMER: Only with me, not with _Der Stürmer_. - -DR. THOMA: ...or was he sent by Rosenberg in this matter? - -HIEMER: No. - -DR. THOMA: I have no further questions, Your Honor. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I have only one matter to ask you about. Do I -understand you to say that by the middle of 1944 Streicher had become -convinced that the reports in the Swiss newspaper, _Israelitisches -Wochenblatt_, were true? - -HIEMER: I did not understand you. Will you please repeat the question? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do I understand you to say that by the middle -of 1944 Streicher had become convinced of the truth of the reports he -was reading in the Swiss newspaper about concentration camps? - -HIEMER: Yes, I had the impression that Streicher in the middle of -1944... - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only wanted an answer “yes” or “no.” That is -quite sufficient. - -Let me just read to you three lines of an article which was published in -_Der Stürmer_ on the 14th of September 1944. - -HIEMER: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: - - “Bolshevism cannot be vanquished; it must be destroyed. The same - is true of Judaism; it cannot be vanquished, disarmed, or - rendered powerless; it must be exterminated.” - -That is Page 2. - -Then the word that you use or is cited for exterminated is ausgerottet, -which I understand means completely wiped out. Why was that article -appearing in _Der Stürmer_ in September 1944, when it was known by the -owner of _Der Stürmer_ what was going on in concentration camps in the -East? What was the purpose of that article? - -HIEMER: I personally did not write this article. I believe that -Streicher wrote it, therefore I myself am not able to judge the -intention of the article. But I do maintain that Streicher made -statements opposing the murders in the concentration camps, and that he -did not want the murder of Jewry. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I will leave that. - -My Lord, in the interest of time I do not propose to cross-examine this -witness any further. Perhaps I might be allowed to draw the Tribunal’s -attention to those articles contained in your bundle, which are articles -actually written by this witness. There are about seven of them. Page -3A, 35A, 38A, 40A, 49A, 50A and 51A, that is, covering a period from -January 1939 up to August 1944. - -And, My Lord, the other matter that I would draw the Tribunal’s -attention to was that this witness was the author of the disgusting -children’s book which I presented to the Tribunal in putting the -individual case against Streicher. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is there any further cross-examination? - -[_There was no response._] - -Dr. Marx, do you wish to re-examine? You heard what counsel said about -the various articles written by this witness. You wish to re-examine or -not? Have you any questions you wish to ask the witness? - -DR. MARX: Yes, please. - -Herr Hiemer, perhaps you did not quite understand the question a moment -ago. Please tell us again just when Herr Streicher received knowledge, -and when he told you that he was convinced of or believed in these mass -murders. - -HIEMER: It is my opinion and conviction that it was in the middle of -1944. - -DR. MARX: But there had been statements to that effect in the -_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ for a number of years prior to that date. - -HIEMER: Yes; at that time Streicher did not believe these things. His -change of view took place only in the year 1944 and I remember it was -not before the middle of the year. - -DR. MARX: I have no further questions to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -DR. MARX: With the permission of the Tribunal I would like to call the -witness Philipp Wurzbacher. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -[_The witness Wurzbacher took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -PHILIPP WURZBACHER (Witness): Philipp Wurzbacher. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -You may sit down. - -DR. MARX: Witness, you were an SA Leader in Nuremberg? - -WURZBACHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: From when? - -WURZBACHER: From 1928. - -DR. MARX: And what position did you have? - -WURZBACHER: At that time I was an SA Standartenführer and had risen from -the lowest ranks. - -DR. MARX: Witness, please speak more slowly and pause as frequently as -possible, as your testimony has to be interpreted into several -languages. - -How long have you known the Defendant Streicher? - -WURZBACHER: I have known him from meetings, since 1923; personally, from -the time of my activity as an SA Leader in the year 1928. - -DR. MARX: Were you regularly present at the meetings at which Streicher -spoke? - -WURZBACHER: I cannot say that I was present regularly, but I attended -very frequently. - -DR. MARX: Did Streicher in his speeches advocate the use of violence -against the Jewish population, or did he predict it? - -WURZBACHER: At no meeting did I hear suggestions that violence should be -used against the Jewish population. Nor did I ever hear Streicher -suggest or announce that he had any such intentions in mind. - -DR. MARX: Did an act of violence against the Jewish population, -originating from and carried out by the people themselves, take place in -Nuremberg or the Gau Franconia at any time in the period from 1920 to -1933? - -WURZBACHER: No, I cannot remember any incident of that type. - -DR. MARX: Did the SA undertake any such action or was anything like that -ordered? - -WURZBACHER: The SA never undertook anything like that at that time. On -the contrary, the SA had instructions, unequivocal instructions, to -refrain from such acts of violence. Severe punishment would have -resulted for anyone who did anything like that, or for an SA Leader who -gave such orders. Besides, as I have already emphasized, there was never -any suggestion or any order to that effect. - -DR. MARX: What do you say to the events on the night of the 9 to 10 -November 1938? - -WURZBACHER: I was not in Nuremberg during the events from the 9 to 10 -November 1938. At that time I was in Bad Ems on account of chronic -laryngitis. I can only say what I know from stories which I heard -afterwards. - -DR. MARX: Did you talk with Obergruppenführer Obernitz? - -WURZBACHER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: About these events? - -WURZBACHER: Yes, I talked with SA Obergruppenführer Von Obernitz in a -brief conversation, when I reported my return. We spoke only a few -words, since Obergruppenführer Von Obernitz was called away so that in -the course of the conversation I could not return to the subject. I -remember that Obergruppenführer Von Obernitz declared at the time that -as far as he was concerned the matter had been put in order. That was -the sense of what he said. - -DR. MARX: Was there within the SA a uniform opinion, or were there, even -in the circles of the SA, men who disapproved of these incredible -occurrences? - -WURZBACHER: Opinions were, as far as I could determine upon my return—I -believe it was on 23 or 24 November—very much divided. A part of the SA -was in favor, the other opposed what had happened, but at all events, -the majority in general considered it to be wrong and condemned what had -been done. - -DR. MARX: Was there an increase, I mean, an increase of brutality in -these circles after 1933 on account of the growing numbers of the SA? - -WURZBACHER: It goes without saying that after the accession to power, -when many doubtful elements joined, the situation was completely -different from what it had been before. Up to that time, as a -responsible Leader, one knew almost every member individually, but now -with the tremendous influx of new men, a general survey of the new -situation had first to be made. But I believe I may say that an increase -of brutality did not occur. Perhaps some undesirable elements which, in -the name of the SA, did this or that, had slipped in but in general I -cannot say that an overall increase of brutality took place. - -DR. MARX: Did you conclude that _Der Stürmer_ exerted an influence in -the SA with the result that an anti-Semitic tendency made itself felt -among the men under your command? Did you not read a different -publication, _Der SA Mann_? - -WURZBACHER: _Der Stürmer_ had a very divided reception, I might say, -especially among the people in Nuremberg and in particular in the SA. -There were large numbers in the SA who, if they did not exactly reject -_Der Stürmer_, were in fact not interested because of the tedious -repetitions contained in it, and for this reason the paper was of no -importance to them. Moreover, it was natural that members of the SA read -their own paper, _Der SA Mann_, first. - -DR. MARX: When you attended a meeting in which Streicher spoke, what -impression did you gain of the objectives which he pursued in his speech -with regard to the solution of the Jewish problem? - -WURZBACHER: The objectives which were stated by Streicher were, I should -say, unequivocal and clear. He pursued the policy that the strong -elements of the Jewish people which occupied positions in the German -economy and above all in public life and public offices should be -removed and that necessarily, expulsion or emigration should be -considered. - -DR. MARX: Did you participate in the boycott on 1 April 1933 in any way? - -WURZBACHER: Yes, I participated in the boycott. At that time I had -instructions from my Gruppenführer to see to it that this boycott should -be kept within the limits of order and propriety, and that in this way -the success of the boycott would be assured. I instructed the -Sturmführer under my command to assign to each department store a guard -of two SA men who were to see to it that nothing happened and everything -took its course in an orderly and unobjectionable fashion. - -DR. MARX: Were there not instructions from Streicher also? - -WURZBACHER: Yes. The instructions which I received from my Gruppenführer -had been issued by Gauleiter Streicher. - -DR. MARX: Were attacks on Jews not to be prevented by all means? - -WURZBACHER: That was so not only in this one case, but in all cases. It -was repeatedly pointed out that we were to refrain from attacks or -unauthorized acts of violence or other hostile acts against the Jewish -people or Jewish individuals, especially in Nuremberg, and that it was -strictly prohibited... - -DR. MARX: What was Streicher’s reaction when he heard that nevertheless -such acts of violence had been perpetrated by individuals? - -WURZBACHER: I can cite one example in which violence was used. I believe -it was a small scuffle, at any rate, something had happened, but I do -not recall the details of the case. In any event, he called us very -sharply to account, and we SA leaders were severely reprimanded and -rebuked. - -DR. MARX: And what did he say? Did he make a general statement? - -WURZBACHER: If I may give the essence of it, he said that he would not -tolerate that human beings be beaten or molested in any way in his Gau, -and for the SA leaders he had rather drastic expressions such as -ruffians or similar names—I do not recall them exactly. - -DR. MARX: But he was called the Bloody Czar of Franconia. How is that to -be explained? - -WURZBACHER: Perhaps it was his manner, the way he behaved at times. -Sometimes he could be very harsh and outspoken. At any rate I can only -say that during my activity I did not experience anything or hear -anything suggesting that he was a “bloody czar.” - -DR. MARX: Do you know what his attitude was toward concentration camps? -Did he visit Dachau? If so, how often, and what did he do about it? - -WURZBACHER: I cannot give you any information on that point. I know just -one thing and that is that he said repeatedly that people who had been -taken to Dachau should be freed as soon as possible if there was no -criminal or other charge against them. I also know of several cases of -release very soon after the arrest of the people or their removal to a -concentration camp. For example the teacher Matt, who was an old -adversary of his in the Town Hall of Nuremberg, was released after a -very short time—I believe three or four months. Another man, a certain -Defender, who had been active primarily in labor unions, was also -released after a very short period of time. If I remember correctly, it -was about the year 1935 or perhaps the beginning of 1936—I do not know -exactly—when the last inmates left the camp at Dachau and were greeted -with music upon their return. - -DR. MARX: Was it not held against him that he freed so many members of -the left-wing parties from Dachau? - -WURZBACHER: It was said here and there by members of the SA that the -Gauleiter’s action could hardly be justified, that he took too light a -view of these things and so on, but we also pointed out that after all -the Gauleiter bore the responsibility and that he ought to know just -what he had to do in this or that case. - -DR. MARX: Do you know that Himmler told Streicher of his displeasure at -these releases and said that disciplinary action would be taken against -him if he continued with them? If you know nothing about this matter, -please say: “No.” - -WURZBACHER: No. - -DR. MARX: Then I have concluded my questioning of the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any member of the Defense Counsel wish to ask -questions? - -Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Does that conclude your case, Dr. Marx? - -DR. MARX: Yes, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then we go on with Dr. Schacht’s case next. - -DR. DIX: I begin my presentation of evidence with the calling of Dr. -Schacht as a witness, and I ask Your Lordship to permit Dr. Schacht to -enter the witness box. - -[_The Defendant Schacht took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -HJALMAR SCHACHT (Defendant): Hjalmar Schacht. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -You may sit down. - -DR. DIX: Please tell the Tribunal briefly about your descent? - -SCHACHT: The families of both my parents have lived for centuries in -Schleswig-Holstein, which until 1864 belonged to Denmark. My parents -were both born as Danish citizens. After the annexation by Germany my -father emigrated to the United States, where three of his older brothers -had already emigrated, and he became an American citizen. My two -brothers, who were older than I, were born there. Later my mother’s -health prompted my father’s return to Germany. - -I was educated in Hamburg. I studied at universities in Germany and in -Paris, and after receiving my doctor’s degree I was active for 2 years -in economic organizations. Then I began my banking career, and for 13 -years I was at the Dresdner Bank, one of the large so-called “D” banks. -I then took over the management of a bank of my own, which was later -merged with one of the “D” banks, and in 1923 I abandoned my private -career and went into public service as Commissioner for German Currency -(Reichswährungskommissar). Soon afterwards I became President of the -Reichsbank, and I held that office until 1930, when I resigned. - -DR. DIX: Why did you resign as President of the Reichsbank at that time? - -SCHACHT: In two essential points there were differences of opinion -between the Government and me; one was the internal finance policy of -the Government. With the terrible catastrophe of the lost war and the -Dictate of Versailles behind us, it was necessary in my opinion to use -thrifty and modest methods in German politics. The democratic and -socialist governments of that period could not see that point, but -carried on an irresponsible financial policy, especially by incurring -debts which in particular were contracted to a very large extent abroad. -It was quite clear that Germany, already heavily burdened with -reparation payments, was under no circumstances in a position to build -up as much foreign currency as was necessary for the payment of these -debts. We were not even able to pay the reparations from our own -economy. - -Therefore I objected to the contraction of these debts in which the -various governments of that period indulged, and to which they also -encouraged communities and private companies. I objected to this -financial policy and continually, abroad and at home, warned against -such a policy of incurring foreign debts. The foreign bankers did not -listen nor did the German Government. It was during that period that if -in Berlin one passed the Adlon Hotel, Unter Den Linden, one could not be -sure that a financial agent would not emerge and ask whether one did not -need a loan. - -Later I was strongly opposed by these same people, when Germany was -forced to discontinue making payments of her debts. But I wish to state -here that I have always and on every occasion been against such a policy -of debts. That was the one reason. The other reason was in the field of -foreign policy. I had not only contributed my part toward the creation -of the Young Plan but in 1929 I also assisted in the setting up of the -Young Committee; the so-called Young Plan had resulted in a number of -improvements for Germany, which the German Government was now -sacrificing step by step during the subsequent negotiations at The -Hague. Thus the financial and economic condition of the nation again -deteriorated. I revolted against this, and for both these reasons I -resigned my office as Reichsbankpräsident in protest, in March 1930. - -DR. DIX: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, in this connection, may I call your -attention to Exhibit Number Schacht-6 of my Document Book. If the -Tribunal agrees, I should like, in order to shorten the presentation of -documents during the examination of the witness, to call your attention -to those documents which have a direct connection with the questions -with which the witness is dealing. I believe that this arrangement will -be agreeable to the Tribunal since it will shorten the presentation of -documents. It is Document Number Schacht-6, on Page 12 of the German -copy of my document book and on Page 8 of the English copy, Your -Lordship, Exhibit Number Schacht-6. That is a record of the statements -made by Dr. Schacht during the session of the subcommittee for monetary -and credit matters on 21 October 1926. I believe it is not necessary for -me to read these statements. They refer to the foreign debts which Dr. -Schacht has just mentioned, and contain the same thoughts which Dr. -Schacht has just expressed before the Tribunal, and are proof that these -thoughts are not views _ex post facto_. Therefore, without reading it, I -ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the whole of this document. - -I shall return to my examination. - -[_Turning to the witness._] You had resigned your office as President of -the Reichsbank. What did you do then? - -SCHACHT: I went to the small estate which I owned in the country and -lived there as a private citizen. Then in 1930 I made a trip to the -United States. I departed shortly or immediately after the Reichstag -elections of September 1930 and went to New York via London. There I -lectured for about two months on questions which were presented to me by -American friends. - -DR. DIX: When did you first get in touch with the National Socialist -ideology, with the Party, and with Hitler personally, and when, in -particular, did you read the Party program and Hitler’s _Mein Kampf_? - -SCHACHT: With the exception of a single occasion I have never in my life -concerned myself with Party politics. Even at the age of 26 I was -offered a sure electoral district in the Reichstag, which I did not -accept, since I have never been interested in Party politics. My -interest always lay in the field of economics and financial policy but, -of course, for public affairs I always had a general interest, arising -from a concern for the future of my country and my people. - -Therefore, in 1919, I participated in the foundation of the Democratic -Party. - -May I say a few words here about my background and spiritual upbringing? -My father, throughout his life, adhered to democratic ideals. He was a -Freemason. He was a cosmopolitan. I had, and I still have, numerous -relatives on my mother’s side in Denmark and on my father’s side in the -United States, and to this day I am on friendly terms with them. I grew -up among these ideas and I have never departed from these basic -conceptions of Freemasonry and democracy and humanitarian and -cosmopolitan ideals. Later I always remained in very close contact with -foreign countries. I traveled much, and with the exception of Ireland -and Finland there is no country in Europe which I have not visited. I -know Asia down to India, Ceylon, and Burma. I went to North America -frequently, and just before the Second World War broke out I intended to -travel to South America. - -I want to emphasize this in order to show that I was never interested in -Party politics. Nevertheless, when in the elections of September 1930 -Hitler’s party suddenly and surprisingly obtained 108 seats, I began to -take an interest in the phenomenon; and on board ship going to the -United States I read _Mein Kampf_ and, of course, also the Party -program. When I arrived on the other side the first question was what -was my opinion about Hitler and the Party, because naturally everyone -was talking about this event in Germany. In my first publication at that -time—it was an interview—I uttered an unequivocal warning and said, -“If you people abroad do not change your policy towards Germany, then -you will soon have very many more adherents of Hitler in Germany than -there are now.” Throughout that period of 2 months I spoke about 50 -times in public meetings, and I always met with understanding in the -question of reparations, the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty, and the -economic difficulties of Germany, and I returned with the impression -that the whole American attitude, the attitude of the American people -toward us, was indeed rather friendly. Not on my initiative but by -coincidence, I got in touch with the adherents of the National Socialist -Party. A friend of mine, a bank director, invited me at the beginning of -December 1930 to dine with him at his house and to meet Hermann Göring -there. I did so and gained no really definite impression from Göring’s -statements and conduct. He was in every respect reserved, modest, and -well-mannered, and he invited me to his house in order to meet Hitler. -At the beginning of January my wife and I dined with Göring and his wife -one evening at their home, and on that occasion, Fritz Thyssen was also -invited. It had been planned that Hitler should come also and talk with -us. I say again now that Göring’s apartment was extremely modestly and -simply styled. We had a plain pea soup and bacon and particularly -Göring’s first wife made an excellent impression. After supper Hitler -appeared, and the ensuing conversation was conducted in such a way that, -let us say, 5 percent of it was contributed by us, and 95 percent by -Hitler. What he said concerned national questions, in which he agreed -absolutely with us. No extravagant demands were stated, but on the other -hand the national necessities of Germany were definitely emphasized. In -social questions Hitler expressed a number of good ideas; he was -especially intent on avoiding class struggle and on eliminating strikes, -lock-outs, and wage disputes by decisive intervention of the State in -labor relations and the direction of economic affairs. There was no -demand for abolishing private enterprise, but merely for influence in -its conduct. It seemed to us these ideas were quite reasonable and -acceptable. Aside from that, he revealed practically no knowledge in the -field of economy and financial policy, though on that evening he did not -claim to know anything about these subjects. He merely asked that we as -representatives of economy should have understanding for his ideas and -give him factual advice. That was the purpose of that evening. - -DR. DIX: I shall refer to this first conversation with Adolf Hitler -later, but I should like to return now to the question I have put before -concerning your attitude to the Party program and the ideology developed -in the book, _Mein Kampf_. I am stressing this because, as you have -heard, the gentlemen of the Prosecution are of the opinion that certain -parts of the Party program as such and also parts of the book, _Mein -Kampf_, are of a criminal character, and that their criminal character -was recognizable immediately upon their publication. Therefore I should -like to ask you to explain in detail your attitude at the time, and -possibly also your attitude today, toward the Party program and the -ideology of National Socialism as it appears in the book _Mein Kampf_. - -SCHACHT: From the proceedings in this Court so far I have not gained the -impression that the opinion of the Prosecution concerning the criminal -character of the Party program is a uniform one. I am unable to see in -the Party program as such any sign of criminal intentions. - -Federation of all Germans, which always plays a great role, is always -claimed only on the basis of the right for self-determination. A -position for Germany in foreign politics is demanded as constituting -equality of the German nation with the other nations; that this involved -the abolition of the discriminations which were imposed upon the German -people by the Versailles Treaty is quite clear. - -Land and soil was demanded for the nutrition of our people and the -settlement of our excess population. I cannot see any crime in that, -because after land and soil was expressly added in brackets the word -“colonies.” I have always considered that as a demand for colonies, -which I myself supported a long time before National Socialism came into -existence. Rather strange and, in my opinion, going somewhat beyond the -limits were the points concerning the exclusion of Jews from civil -rights, but on the other hand it was reassuring that the Jews were to be -under the protection of the Aliens’ Law, that is, subject to the same -laws which applied to foreigners in Germany. I would have wished and -always demanded that this legal protection should under all -circumstances be given to the Jews. Unfortunately they were not given -that protection. For the rest it was emphasized that all citizens should -have equal rights and duties. - -Promotion of popular education was stressed as being beneficial, and -also gymnastics and sports were demanded for the improvement of public -health. The fight against deliberate political lies was demanded, which -Goebbels afterwards conducted very energetically. And, above all, demand -was made for the freedom of all religious denominations and for the -principle of positive Christianity. - -That is, in essence, the content of the National Socialist Party -program, and I cannot see anything criminal in it. It would, indeed, -have been quite peculiar if, had this been a criminal Party program, the -world had maintained continuous political and cultural contact with -Germany for two decades, and with the National Socialists for one -decade. - -As far as the book, _Mein Kampf_, is concerned, my judgment has always -been the same from the very beginning as it is today. It is a book -written in the worst kind of German, propaganda of a man who was -strongly interested in politics, not to say a fanatical, half educated -man, which to me Hitler has always been. In the book _Mein Kampf_ and in -part also in the Party program there was one point which worried me a -great deal, and that was the absolute lack of understanding for all -economic problems. The Party program contained a few slogans, such as -“Community interests come before private interests,” and so on, and then -the “breaking up of subjection to financial interests” and similar -phrases which could not possibly signify anything sensible. The same -held true for _Mein Kampf_, which is of no interest from the point of -view of economic policy and consequently had no interest for me. - -On the other hand, as regards foreign policy _Mein Kampf_ contained, in -my opinion, a great many mistakes, because it always toyed with the idea -that within the continent of Europe the living space for Germany ought -to be extended. And if nevertheless I did co-operate later on with a -National Socialist Reich Chancellor, then it was for the very simple -reason that expansion of the German space toward the East was in the -book made specifically dependent upon the approval of the British -Government. Therefore, to me, believing that I knew British policy very -well, this seemed Utopian and there was no danger of my taking these -theoretical extravagances of Hitler any more seriously than I did. It -was clear to me that every territorial change on European territory -attempted by force would be impossible for Germany, and would not be -approved by the other nations. - -Besides that, _Mein Kampf_ had a number of very silly and verbose -statements but, on the other hand, it had many a reasonable idea, too; I -want to point out that I liked two things especially: first, that anyone -who differs with the government in political matters is obliged to state -his opinion to the government; and secondly, that, though the democratic -or rather parliamentary government ought to be replaced by a Führer -government, nevertheless the Führer could only remain if he was sure of -the approval of the entire people, in other words, that a Führer also -depended on plebiscites of a democratic nature. - -DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, you have now described the impression which you -gained from your first conversation with Adolf Hitler, as well as from a -study of the Party program and _Mein Kampf_. Did you believe that you -would be able to work with Adolf Hitler and what practical conclusions -did you derive from that first conversation with Hitler? - -SCHACHT: To work with Adolf Hitler was out of the question for me -personally, since I was a private citizen and not interested in Party -politics and consequently after that conversation I did nothing at all -to create for myself any personal relations with the Hitler circles. I -simply went back to my farm and I continued to live there as a private -citizen. So personally, for myself I did not draw any conclusions but I -drew another conclusion. I have already said that naturally I had the -future of my country at heart. After that conversation I repeatedly -emphasized to Reich Chancellor Brüning and implored him when forming and -heading the Cabinet to include the National Socialists in it, because I -believed that only in this way the tremendous impetus, the tremendous -propagandistic fervor which I had noticed in Hitler, could be caught and -harnessed—by putting the National Socialists to practical government -work. One should not leave them in the opposition where they could only -become more dangerous, but one should take them into the government and -see what they could achieve and whether they would not acquire polish -within the government. That was the suggestion and the very urgent -request I made to Brüning, and I might say that according to my -impression Hitler would at that time have been quite ready to do that. -Brüning could under no circumstances be won over to such a policy and in -consequence was later crushed. - -DR. DIX: Let us stop for a moment and deal with the Party. The -Indictment states that you were a Party member. Now, Göring has already -said that Hitler conferred the Golden Party Emblem only as a sort of -decoration. Do you have anything new to add to that statement made by -Göring? - -SCHACHT: I do not know whether it has been mentioned here; the Golden -Party Emblem was in January 1937 given to all Ministers and also to all -military personalities in the Cabinet. The latter could not become Party -members at all; therefore the award of the Party emblem did not entail -membership. As to the rest I think Göring has testified from the witness -stand. I might mention one more thing. If I had been a Party member, -then doubtlessly when I was ousted from my position as Minister without -Portfolio in January 1943, the Party Court would have gone into action, -since a case of insubordination to Hitler would have been evident. I was -never before the Party Court and even when on the occasion of my -dismissal the return of the Golden Party Emblem was demanded from me, I -was not told that I was being dismissed from the Party, since I was not -in the Party. I was only told “return the Golden Emblem of the Party -which was conferred upon you,” and I promptly complied. - -I believe I could not add anything else to the statements already made. - -DR. DIX: Then the Indictment is wrong in this point? - -SCHACHT: Yes; in this point it is absolutely wrong. - -DR. DIX: Why did you not become a Party member? - -SCHACHT: Excuse me, but I was opposed to quite a number of points of the -National Socialist ideology. I do not believe that it would have been -compatible with my entirely democratic attitude to change over to a -different Party program, and one which, not in its wording but through -its execution by the Party had certainly not—in the course of -time—gained any more favor with me. - -DR. DIX: Therefore, you did not become a Party member for reasons of -principle? - -SCHACHT: Yes, for reasons of principle. - -DR. DIX: Now, a biography of you was published by one Dr. Reuther in -1937. There, also, it is correctly stated that you were not a Party -member; but the biographer gives different, more tactical reasons for -your refusing to join the Party; and he mentions the possibility of -being more influential from outside the Party and so on. Maybe it is -advisable, since the biography has been referred to in the course of the -proceedings, that you shortly state your views on this point? - -SCHACHT: I believe that at the time Hitler had the impression that I -could be useful to him outside of the Party and it may be that Dr. -Reuther got knowledge of this. But I would rather not be made -responsible for the writings of Dr. Reuther, and in particular I should -like to object to the fact that the Prosecutor who presented the brief -against me described this book by Dr. Reuther as an official -publication. Of course this book is the private work of a journalist for -whom I have respect but who certainly states his own opinions and ideas. - -DR. DIX: Did you speak in public on behalf of Hitler before the July -elections in 1932? - -SCHACHT: Before the July elections of 1932, which brought that -tremendous success for Hitler, I was never active either publicly or -privately on behalf of Hitler, except once, perhaps, or twice—I -remember now, it happened once—Hitler sent a Party member to me who had -plans on economic, financial, or currency policies; Hitler may have told -him that he should consult me as to whether or not these plans could be -put into practice. I might tell the story briefly: It was Gauleiter -Röwer of Oldenburg. In Oldenburg the Nazis had already come to power -before 1932 and he was the Minister President there. He wanted to -introduce an Oldenburg currency of its own, a consequence of which would -have been that Saxony would have introduced its own Saxon currency, -Württemberg would have introduced its own currency, and Baden would have -had its own currency, and so on. I ridiculed the whole thing at the time -and sent a telegram to Hitler, saying that the economic needs of the -German Reich could not be cured by such miracles. If I disregard this -case, which might have constituted some sort of private connection, then -I may say that neither privately nor publicly, neither in speeches nor -in writing, have I at all been concerned with Hitler or his Party and in -no way have I recommended the Party. - -DR. DIX: Did you vote National Socialist in July 1932? - -SCHACHT: No, I would not think of it. - -DR. DIX: The Prosecution now lists a number of points by which it wants -to prove that you were an adherent of the National Socialist ideology. I -am going to name them one by one, and I ask you to state your view on -each of them. First, that you were an opponent of the Treaty of -Versailles. Would you like to say something about that? - -SCHACHT: It surprised me indeed to hear that reproach from an American -Prosecutor. The lieutenant who spoke is perhaps too young to have -experienced it himself, but he should know it from his education; at any -rate, for all of us who have lived through that time, it was one of the -outstanding events that the Treaty of Versailles was rejected by the -United States, and, if I am not wrong, rejected with the resounding -approval of the entire American people. - -The reasons prompting that action were also my reasons for rejecting the -Treaty: it stood in contradiction to the Fourteen Points of Wilson, -which had been solemnly agreed upon, and in the field of economics it -contained absurdities which certainly could not work out to the -advantage of world economy. But I certainly would not accuse the -American people of having been adherents of the Nazi ideology, because -they rejected the Treaty. - -DR. DIX: The Prosecution also assert that you had already been for a -long time a German National Socialist, not merely a German patriot, but -a German nationalist and expansionist. Would you like to state your -position in that respect? - -SCHACHT: You, yourself, by emphasizing the word “patriot” have -recognized that one must be clear on just what a nationalist is. I have -always been proud to belong to a nation which for more than a thousand -years has been one of the leading civilized nations of the world. I was -proud to belong to a nation which has given to the world men like -Luther, Kant, Goethe, Beethoven, to mention only a few. I have always -interpreted nationalism as the desire of a nation to be an example to -other nations, and to maintain a leading position in the field of -spiritual and cultural achievement through high moral standards and -intellectual attainment. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If it please the Tribunal, it seems to me that we -are getting very far from the relevant charges in this case, and -particularly if they are going to be preceded by a statement of the -Prosecution’s position. - -We have no charge against Dr. Schacht because he opposed the Treaty of -Versailles; we concede it was the right of any German citizen to do that -by any means short of war. Nor do we object to his being a patriotic -German by any means short of war. The only purpose has been to find out -what his attitude in those matters was in connection with the charge -that he prepared and precipitated war. - -To deal with philosophical matters separately from the war charge seems -to me entirely irrelevant, and I assure the Tribunal we have no purpose -in charging that it is a crime to oppose the Treaty of Versailles. Many -Americans did that. It is no crime to be a German patriot. The crime is -the one defined in the Indictment, and it seems to me we are a long way -off from that here, and wasting time. - -THE PRESIDENT: What do you say to that, Dr. Dix? - -DR. DIX: I was eager and glad to hear what Justice Jackson just said, -but I must quote from Wallenstein, “Before dinner we heard another -version.” There was no doubt—and once, because I thought I had -misunderstood, I even asked again—that the criminal character of the -Party program, the criminal character of the contents of _Mein -Kampf_—reproachable in itself and, to say the least, indicative of -crimes committed later—the willful opposition to the Treaty of -Versailles—and further the accusation of having been an expansionist -and nationalist, all these things have repeatedly in the course of the -proceedings here been held against Dr. Schacht in order to strengthen -the foundation of the charges made against him. - -If Mr. Justice Jackson now with gratifying frankness states, “We do not -at all blame Schacht for opposing the Treaty of Versailles; we do not -assert that he was more than a patriot, that is to say, a nationalist in -the sense described before, and we do not maintain either that these our -statements are circumstantial evidence for his later co-operation, his -financial co-operation, in the rearmament program, which in turn is -proof indicative of his intent to assist in waging a war of -aggression”—if that is now stated unequivocally by the Prosecution, -then we can dispense with a great many questions which I intended to put -in the course of my examination of the witness; I would then gladly -leave the whole subject of Schacht’s expansionism and nationalism. We -have not yet mentioned expansionism; Mr. Justice Jackson has not -mentioned it either. I do not believe, however, that the Prosecution -will withdraw the accusation of expansionism, that is the expansion of -German living space in Europe. I am not sure of this but we shall -certainly hear about it. As I said, if these accusations which have been -made are withdrawn, then I can dispense with these questions and my -client need not answer them. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Of course, I made no such statement as Dr. Dix has -assumed. My statement was clearly made in the opening and clearly is -now, that he had a perfect right to be against the Treaty of Versailles -and to be a German nationalist and to follow those aims by all means -short of war. I do not want to have put in my mouth the very extensive -statements made by Dr. Dix. - -My statement was made clear in the opening, and these matters as to the -Versailles Treaty and nationalism and Lebensraum, as political and -philosophical matters, are not for the Court to determine. We are not -going to ask you to say whether the Treaty of Versailles was a just -document or not. It was a document. They had a right to do what they -could to get away from it by all means short of war. - -The charge against Dr. Schacht is that he prepared, knowingly, to -accomplish those things by means of aggressive warfare. That is the nub -of the case against him. - -DR. DIX: Then on this point there is... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think the case for the Prosecution has been -clear from the outset, that all these matters are only relied upon when -they were entered into with the intention of making war. - -DR. DIX: Very true. I need not put these questions if the Prosecution no -longer uses these accusations as circumstantial evidence for his intent -to wage a war of aggression, but Mr. Justice Jackson has not yet made a -statement to that effect. But there seems to be no doubt—and I do not -believe that I misunderstood the Prosecution—that in order to prove Dr. -Schacht’s intention to wage a war of aggression, the Prosecution did -refer to Schacht’s opposition to the Treaty of Versailles, to his -nationalism and expansionism that is, extension of Lebensraum. We do not -want to make academic or theoretical statements about the ideas of -Lebensraum and nationalism, but as long as these ideas, which the -Prosecution concedes he is justified in holding, as long as these -characteristics are considered to be in part proof of his intent, my -client must have the opportunity of telling the Tribunal just what he -meant by Lebensraum if he ever spoke of it, which I do not yet know. But -I think, nevertheless, that there is still a matter not quite clear -between Mr. Justice Jackson and me, and that I do not quite agree either -with what was said by Your Lordship... - -THE PRESIDENT: What you were asking him about was his views on -nationalism. That is what you were asking him about, his views upon -nationalism, and that seems to be a waste of time. - -DR. DIX: I put to him that he was accused of being a nationalist and an -expansionist, and that the Prosecution therefrom drew the conclusion -that he planned an aggressive war by financing armament; now he has to -show, of course, that... - -THE PRESIDENT: What Mr. Justice Jackson has pointed out is that the -Prosecution have never said that he simply held the views of a -nationalist and of an expansionist, but that he held those views and -intended to go to war in order to enforce them. - -DR. DIX: Yes, Your Lordship, but it is held that these opinions were -proof—one proof among others—that he had the intention of waging -aggressive war; that they therefore constitute what we jurists should -call circumstantial evidence for his intent, to wage war, and as long as -this argument—it is no longer a charge maintained by Justice Jackson -but it is an argument of the Prosecution... - -THE PRESIDENT: There is no issue about it. He agrees that he did hold -these views. Therefore it is quite unnecessary to go into the fact. The -Prosecution say he held the views; he agrees that he held the views. The -only question is whether he held them with the innocent intention of -achieving them by peaceful methods, or whether he had the alleged -criminal intention of achieving them by war. - -DR. DIX: I only wish to say one more thing to that. Expansionism has not -yet been discussed. Should Dr. Schacht have had expansionist tendencies, -then Mr. Justice Jackson certainly would not say that he has no -objection. Therefore... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think that you may ask him questions about the -expansionists, his ideas of what expansionists were, what he meant by -expansion, but for the rest it seems to me you are simply proving -exactly the same as the Prosecution have proved. - -DR. DIX: I fully agree. Dr. Schacht, were you... - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. DIX: I believe, Dr. Schacht, that both of us will have to speak a -little more slowly and pause between question and answer. - -Now, please reply to the accusation by the Prosecution that you were an -expansionist. Please define your position. - -SCHACHT: Never in my life have I demanded even a foot of space that did -not belong to Germany, nor would I ever entertain such an idea. - -I am of the opinion that neither is it national to try to dominate and -govern foreign peoples, nor is appropriation of foreign territory a -politically just action. - -These are two questions with which we are much concerned at present. - -I might perhaps add, in order to clarify my position, just what I -understand by nationalism, and just why I was against each and every -form of expansionism. Just one sentence will suffice, a sentence from a -speech which I made in August of 1935. On that occasion I said, and I -quote: - - “We want to express the belief that self-respect requires - respect for others, and the upholding of our national - individuality must not mean disparagement of the individuality - of others; by respecting the acts of others we respect our own - action; and a battle of economic competition can be won in the - end only through example and achievement and not through methods - of violence or craft.” - -DR. DIX: According to the opinion of the Prosecution, in the year 1936 -you made a public threat of war, on which occasion you are alleged to -have said that the spirit of Versailles was instrumental in keeping -alive war mania. I am referring to Document EC-415, a document to which -the Prosecution has referred. - -SCHACHT: I never understood, in the course of this proceeding, how there -could be a threat of war in this quotation. The quotation concludes with -the words—and I must quote in English because I just have the English -words before me: - - “The spirit of Versailles is perpetuated in the fury of war, and - there will not be a true peace, progress, or reconstruction - until the world desists from this spirit. The German people will - not tire of pronouncing this warning.” - -The conclusion says that the German people will not tire of pronouncing -this warning. It seems to be a matter of course that hereby expression -is given to the fact that I am warning others from persisting in war -mania. I am not warning ourselves, but the entire world, to avoid -perpetuating the spirit of Versailles. - -DR. DIX: The Prosecution further accuses you in this connection that you -publicly approved the idea of Lebensraum, for the German people. In this -special connection reference was made to the speech you made at -Frankfurt on 9 December 1936, in which you said: “Germany has too -limited Lebensraum for her population.” - -SCHACHT: This speech of 9 December 1936 was a speech which was solely -concerned with a restoration of the colonial rights of Germany. I have -never demanded any Lebensraum for Germany other than colonial space. And -in this instance, again, I am surprised that just the American -Prosecutor should accuse me on my efforts in this direction, because in -the Fourteen Points of Wilson, which regrettably were not adhered to -later on, the colonial interests of the Germans are taken into -consideration. In consequence, I said, again and again: “If you want -peace in Europe, give Germany an economic outlet into which Germany can -develop and from which she can satisfy her needs. Otherwise Germany will -be a center of unrest and a problem for Europe.” - -I would like to quote one sentence only from the speech I made: - - “Peace in Europe, together with the peace of the entire world, - is dependent upon whether or not the densely populated areas of - Central Europe will have the means of existence.” - -I emphasized this viewpoint again and again, but at no time did I -connect these views with the idea of an armed conflict. - -I would like to quote another sentence from this same speech: - - “I did not mention this consideration as to the parts of Germany - which were separated from her”—and I am speaking of the losses - suffered by Germany—“in order that we might draw the conclusion - of warlike intentions; my entire position and my work are - marshaled to the objective of bringing about peace in Europe - through peaceful and sensible considerations and measures.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you please give me the PS numbers and the exhibit -numbers of those two speeches? - -DR. DIX: I cannot at this moment, Your Lordship, I am sorry, but I will -try to get them and submit them in writing. The last is the speech at -Frankfurt, and the others... - -THE PRESIDENT: That is quite all right. You will let us know in writing, -will you? - -DR. DIX: Yes, indeed. - -SCHACHT: Perhaps if it is permitted I might refer to two other sentences -from my article which was published in _Foreign Affairs_, the well-known -American magazine, in the year 1937. I have the German translation -before me, which says, in the introduction, and I quote: - - “I am making these introductory remarks in order to clarify the - situation. The colonial problem today, as in the past, is for - Germany not a question of imperialism or militarism, but still - surely and simply a question of economic existence.” - -Perhaps I might refer to the point that very influential Americans were -in constant accord with this view. I have a statement made by the -collaborator of President Wilson, Colonel House, who made the well-known -distinction between the “haves” and “have nots,” and who was especially -influential in advocating consideration for German colonial interests. -Perhaps I can dispense with the quotation. - -DR. DIX: In this connection I should like to point to the document -submitted by the Prosecution, Document L-111, Exhibit USA-630. This -document is concerned with the conversation which you had with the -American Ambassador Davies, and in which you are accused of having -indirectly threatened a breach of peace. - -SCHACHT: I have already set forth just now that I constantly said that -Europe cannot have peaceful development if there are no means of -livelihood for the completely overpopulated Central Europe, and I -believe conditions at present show how absolutely right I was—just what -an impossibility it is to feed these masses of people within Europe. And -beyond that I had a keen interest in diverting Hitler’s quite misguided -ideas from Eastern Europe and therefore was constantly at pains to -direct his attention to the colonial problem so that I could turn his -thought from the mad ideas of expansionism in the East. I recall that in -1932, shortly before he assumed office, I had a conversation with him in -which for the first time I approached him on these facts and -particularly told him what utter nonsense it would be to think of an -expansion in the East. - -Then, constantly, in the subsequent years, again and again, I spoke -about the colonial problem, until at the last in the summer of 1936 I -had the possibility of pursuing my ideas and Hitler gave me the mission, -which I had suggested to him, of going to Paris to discuss with the -French Government the possibility of a satisfactory solution of the -question of colonies for Germany. This actually happened in the summer -of 1936. And for the satisfaction of myself and all other friends of -peace, I might say that the Government of Léon Blum, which was in office -at the time, showed gratifying appreciation of this solution for -Europe’s food and economic problems, and for their part stated that they -were ready to deal with the colonial problem with the aim of perhaps -returning one or two colonies to Germany. Léon Blum then undertook, in -agreement with me, to inform the British Government about these -conversations in order to secure their consent or to bring up a -discussion of this problem within the British Government. That actually -did take place, but the British Government hesitated for months before -they finally could decide on any position in this matter and so the -discussion dragged on up to the initial months of the Spanish civil war -and was eclipsed and supplanted by the problems of the Spanish civil -war, so that a continuation of the discussion on this colonial problem -never came about. - -At that time, in January of 1937, when the American Ambassador to -Moscow, Ambassador Joseph Davies, visited me at Berlin, I was rather -irritated by the slowness with which the British Government was meeting -these suggestions, and consequently I came forth with a request for -understanding and support and told Ambassador Davies about this whole -matter. I tried constantly and repeatedly to gain the understanding -support of representatives of the American Government. I tried again and -again to advise these gentlemen about domestic conditions and -developments within Germany, to tell them as much as was possible and -compatible with German interests and to keep them informed. That applies -to Ambassador Davies, Ambassador Dodd, Ambassador Bullitt when he was in -Berlin, and so on. - -This conversation with Ambassador Davies is referred to in the document -which the Prosecution has submitted, Document L-111, and which is taken -from the book which Ambassador Davies wrote about his mission in Moscow, -and we will perhaps come back to this book later. - -As the gist of my conversation with Davies I would like to quote just -one sentence again, which I must again quote in English, since I have -only the English book at my disposal. - - “Schacht earnestly urged that some such feasible plan could be - developed if discussions could be opened; and that, if - successful, would relieve the European war menace, relieve - peoples of enormous expenditures for armaments, restore free - flow of international commerce, give outlet to thrift and - natural abilities of his countrymen and change their present - desperation into future hope.” - -DR. DIX: In this connection the affidavit of Fuller plays an important -part, that is Exhibit USA-629, and Document EC-450. According to this -affidavit, you allegedly declared to Fuller that if Germany could not -get colonies through negotiations she would take them. Please define -your position as to this statement. - -SCHACHT: In a German drama an intriguer is being instructed by a tyrant -to bring a man of honor to ruin, and he says in reply, “Just give me one -word said by this man, and I will hang him thereby.” I believe, My Lord -Justices, that in this courtroom there is not a single person who at one -time or another in his life has not said a rather unfortunate word. And -how much easier is it when he is speaking in a foreign language of which -he is not completely master. - -Mr. Fuller is known to me as a respectable business man, and this -discussion which he has here reproduced is indubitably done according to -the best of his knowledge. He himself rightly says that even had he -tried to put down the exact words he could not guarantee that each and -every word has been said. But if I did say these words, then it seems -only that I said we Germans must have colonies and we shall have them. -Whether I said, “We shall take them,” or “We shall get them,” that, of -course, it is impossible for me to say with certainty today after a -period of 10 years. - -The representative of the Prosecution also thought the expression, “We -will take them,” a little colorless in effect and therefore I believe he -just added a trifle, for he said twice in his presentation of the -charges that I had said, “We will take these colonies by force,” and on -a second occasion he even said, “We will take these colonies by force of -arms.” But “force” or “force of arms” are not mentioned in the whole of -Fuller’s affidavit. And if I had used that word or even used it only by -implication, Mr. Fuller would have had to say with reason: “So you want -to take colonies by force; how do you expect to do that?” It would have -been utter nonsense to assert that Germany would ever have been able to -take overseas colonies by force. She lacked—and always will -lack—domination of the seas, which is necessary for this. - -Fuller did not take exception to my manner of expression and in his -conversation he immediately continued—and I quote: - - “You mentioned a little while ago that necessary raw materials - could not be obtained, owing to German lack of foreign exchange. - Would stabilization help you?” - -Therefore, rather than to become excited about the fact that I wanted to -take colonies by force—something which I never said and which is -contrary to my views, as I have already stated—he immediately goes on -to foreign exchange and to stabilization. - -DR. DIX: The prosecutor asserts further that you were interested in the -conquest of neighboring territory in Europe. - -SCHACHT: This matter is not quite so harmless as the previous mistake of -the Prosecution. In a previous interrogation, I was accused as follows, -and the prosecutor, in presenting his charges here, referred to the -fact—I quote the prosecutor: - - “On 16 April, on the occasion of the Paris conference on - reparation payments, Schacht said, ‘Germany in general can pay - only if the Corridor and Upper Silesia are returned to - Germany.’” - -This is the interrogation of 24 August 1945. According to the verbatim -record of the interrogation, I answered: - - “It may be that I said such a thing.” - -Of course, as far as the wording of a statement, which I had made 10 to -15 years before, I did not recall it. But I did remember that in -connection with the Corridor and Upper Silesia I had made a remark, and -since I had to assume that if the Prosecution submitted this record to -me it would be an accurate stenographic record, for that reason I did -not dispute this remark which I had allegedly made and said that it -might be that I said something to that effect. The Prosecution takes a -“maybe” and out of that reconstructed the following sentence: - - “This quotation was read to Schacht, and he said it was - correct.” - -This assertion by the Prosecution is therefore wrong. I said, “It may be -that I said something to that effect,” but I did not say that this -statement that was submitted to me was correct. - -Then, fortunately, in my imprisonment here, I succeeded in getting hold -of my book, a book which I wrote about the termination of reparation -payments, which was published in 1931 and in which I luckily put down -the text of my statement about the matter we are dealing with now. I -have the exact text, and I would like to say that this book has been -submitted in evidence, and from this text appears what I said verbatim: - - “Regarding the problem of German food and food supplies, it is - especially important that import of foodstuffs has been - decreased”—I beg your pardon—“that import will be - decreased.”—I am sorry again. I cannot read this—“that the - import of foodstuffs will be decreased and partially made up - through home production. Therefore, we cannot let the fact be - overlooked that important agricultural surplus territories in - the eastern part of Germany have been lost by cession and that a - large territory which was almost exclusively agrarian has been - separated from the Reich. Therefore the economic welfare of this - territory, East Prussia, is decreasing steadily and the Reich - Government must support and subsidize it. Constantly, therefore, - suitable measures should be taken to eliminate these injurious - conditions, which are hindering considerably Germany’s ability - to pay.” - -DR. DIX: Your Lordship, this is from our document book, Document -Schacht-16, German Page 38, English Page 44. - -SCHACHT: This quotation absolutely does not agree with the statement -submitted to me in the interrogation, and in no way can we draw the -conclusion in consequence that I was in favor of a return of these -areas. What I demanded was that the separation of these areas be taken -into consideration when Germany’s ability to pay and the payments were -determined. When the prosecutor in his speech added: “I would like to -point out that this is the same area over which the war started in -September 1939,” I believe it is an insinuation which characterizes the -prosecutor, rather than me, against whom it was intended. - -DR. DIX: As part of the circumstantial evidence, that is, the indirect -evidence for the will to aggression, with which you are charged, the -Prosecution includes your wish—your alleged wish—for the Anschluss of -Austria. Will you please take your position as to this accusation? - -SCHACHT: From 1919 I considered the Anschluss of Austria inevitable and, -in the national sense, that is, spiritually and culturally, it was -welcome. But that economically the Anschluss of Austria would not be for -Germany so much an aggrandizement as a liability. I always knew. But the -wish of the Austrian people to belong, to be incorporated into -Germany—I took that wish as my own and said that if here there are six -and a half million people who spontaneously in 1919 and later in -innumerable demonstrations expressed their wish of being incorporated -into the brotherhood of Greater Germany, that was an event to which no -German could be opposed, but in the interest of Austria must hail with -gladness. In that sense I always favored and respected the wish of -Austria to belong to the Reich and wanted it carried through as soon as -external political conditions permitted it. - -DR. DIX: My attention has just been called to the fact that you are -still speaking too fast and that the interpretation is lagging behind a -little bit. Will you please speak a little more slowly. - -What was your opinion as to the incorporation of the Sudetenland into -Germany? - -SCHACHT: Concerning the incorporation of the Sudetenland, I never -thought of any such thing. Of course, Czechoslovakia was a European -problem, and it was regrettable that in that state, which had five and a -half million Czechs, two and a half million Slovaks and about three and -a half million Germans, the German element had no means of expression. -But just because the Czechoslovakian problem was not a purely -German-Czech but also a Slovak-Czech problem, I sought a solution of -this problem in such a way and wished it to be in such a way that -Czechoslovakia should constitute a federated state, similar perhaps to -Switzerland, divided into three different, culturally separate, but -politically unified areas, which would be a guarantee for the unity of a -German-Czech-Slovak state. - -DR. DIX: What was your opinion and attitude to the problem of war; by -that I mean, as far as philosophical, ideological, and practical -considerations are concerned? - -SCHACHT: I always considered war as one of the most devastating things -to which mankind is exposed and on basic principles throughout my entire -life I was a pacifist. - -DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, during your meditative and thoughtful life you -have certainly considered the fundamental and profound differences -between legitimate and ethically based soldiership and militarism in its -various degenerate forms. What did you mean by the latter and what was -your attitude toward it, that is, militarism? - -SCHACHT: Of course I saw the necessity of a country’s defense in case of -war or threats, and I stood for that theory. In that sense I was always -in favor of a Wehrmacht, but the profession of a soldier I consider to -be full of deprivations and characterized by willingness and readiness -to sacrifice, not because perhaps during a war the soldier has to give -up his life—that is the duty of every citizen of military age—but -because his whole aim and aspiration must be directed to the end that -never must the craft which he has learned be exercised. A soldier, a -career officer, who is not intrinsically a pacifist, has really in my -opinion missed his calling. Consequently, I was always an opponent of -every military digression and excess. I was always against militarism, -but I consider that soldiership conscious of its responsibility is the -highest calling which a citizen can pursue. - -DR. DIX: Now, George Messersmith, as you know, the Consul General of the -United States at Berlin at one time, says in one of his various -affidavits produced by the Prosecution that you had told him, and -repeatedly told him, about Nazi intents of aggression. Will you please -state your position in that regard? - -SCHACHT: First of all, I would like to remark that of course I never -made a statement of that sort, neither to Mr. George Messersmith nor to -anyone else. As far as these three affidavits of Mr. Messersmith, which -were submitted by the Prosecution, are concerned, I would like to make a -further statement. - -Mr. Messersmith asserts that he had frequent contact and numerous -private conversations with me, and I would like to state here now that, -according to my exact memory, I saw Mr. George Messersmith perhaps two -or three times in my entire life. Mr. George Messersmith represents -himself as having had numerous contacts and many private conversations -with me, and he asserts further that his official capacity brought him -in contact with me as President of the Reichsbank and as Minister of -Economics. - -I do not recall once having received Mr. Messersmith in my office. Mr. -George Messersmith takes these two or three discussions and proceeds to -characterize me. He calls me cynical, ambitious, egotistic, vain, -two-faced. I am, unfortunately, not in a position to give an equally -comprehensive picture of the character of Mr. Messersmith. But I must -definitely dispute his trustworthiness. - -And as a first reason for this I should like to quote a general remark -by Mr. Messersmith. In his affidavit of 30 August 1945, Document -2385-PS, Mr. George Messersmith says, and I quote: “When the Nazi Party -took over Germany, it represented only a small part of the German -population.” - -Contrary to that, I say that before the Nazi Party took over Germany it -occupied about forty percent of all Reichstag seats. That percentage Mr. -Messersmith calls a small part of the German population. If diplomatic -reports are everywhere as reliable as in this instance, it is small -wonder that nations do not understand each other. - -I would still like to correct a specific remark by Mr. Messersmith. Mr. -Messersmith asserts, as I have quoted just a minute ago, that his duty -brought him in contact with me as Minister of Economics. In his -affidavit of 28 August, 1760-PS, Mr. Messersmith says, and I quote: -“During the wave of terrorist activity in May and June of 1934, I had -already assumed my duties as American Chargé d’Affaires in Vienna.” In -August of 1934 I became Minister of Economics, whereas, on the other -hand, Mr. Messersmith, already in May of 1934, assumed his official -duties in Vienna; but this does not prevent Mr. Messersmith from -asserting that his official duties brought him in frequent contact with -me as Minister of Economics. I believe this will suffice to gauge the -capacity of Mr. Messersmith’s memory correctly. - -DR. DIX: In a similar connection, the Prosecution repeatedly referred to -the diary of the former ambassador in Berlin, Mr. Dodd, which was -published on the basis of his private notes by his children after his -death. This document has the Document Number EC-461. The Prosecution -quotes from this diary repeatedly to prove that Mr. Dodd, too, -considered you a warmonger. I know, of course, that you were a friend of -Mr. Dodd’s, a fact which is shown in his diary. Can you tell me how the -two facts can be reconciled? - -SCHACHT: First of all, I might say that Ambassador Dodd was one of the -most undefiled personalities I have met, an upright character, a man of -unflinching fidelity to his convictions. He was a professor of history, -undoubtedly a good historian. He had studied at German universities. I -believe that he would turn in his grave if he could know that the notes -which he put down casually in his diary were put together by his two -children without commentary and printed without investigation. - -Mr. Dodd, I am sorry to say, had one characteristic which made dealing -with him a little difficult. I think the reason for this lay in his -steadfastness of conviction, which from the first often made him appear -averse to outside influence. He found it rather hard to make himself -understood easily and fluently, and he was even less in a position to -view opinions of others in the right light. Many things that were told -him he misunderstood and saw in a wrong light. - -On Page 176 in his diary, in the lower part, there is one sentence I -would like to quote to illustrate the point I am trying to make. Here he -says: “I talked fifteen minutes with Phipps”—the British Ambassador at -that time—“about the accumulated evidence of Germany’s intense war -activities.” This statement dates from the autumn of 1934 and I believe -no one is able to say that in the autumn of 1934 there was any talk of a -war activity on the part of Germany. Mr. Dodd uses the expression “war” -undoubtedly in the place of “armament”; he says “Krieg” instead of -“Aufrüstung.” In that sense, I believe he misunderstood the words. - -And, as further evidence for the difficulty which one had in making the -Ambassador understand, I might say that the Foreign Office asked him -once to bring a secretary who would take notes of discussions with -representatives of the Foreign Office, so that misunderstandings could -be avoided. - -I believe, therefore, that all these statements by Mr. Dodd are apt to -be misunderstood. As for myself I can only say what I have already said -about Mr. Messersmith, that of course I never talked about war -intentions. - -DR. DIX: Now, in this diary it says that he was favorably disposed -towards you. Do you have any proof for this friendly attitude to you? - -SCHACHT: May I perhaps refer to the correspondence with Henderson... - -DR. DIX: Yes, we can deal with that later. - -SCHACHT: Then I shall just confine myself to your question. Dodd was -entirely friendly to me, and I respected him deeply. I saw a sign of his -friendship in that shortly before his departure from Berlin in December -of 1937 he visited me at my home, and this incident is also dealt with -in his diary, and I would like to quote just one sentence: “I went to -Dr. Schacht’s house in Dahlem. I wished especially to see Schacht, whose -life is said to be in danger.” - -In other words, Mr. Dodd had heard of an imminent attack on my life on -the part of National Socialists, and considered it important enough and -a reason for coming to my home personally in order to warn me. - -A second piece of evidence of his friendship towards me can be seen from -the final visit he paid me just a few days before returning to America. -At that time he again called on me and told me urgently that I should go -to America with him, or as soon after him as possible, that I should -change my residence to America, and that I would find a pleasant welcome -there. I believe he would never have said that to me had he not felt a -certain degree of friendship for me. - -DR. DIX: These are express services of friendship, and it can hardly be -assumed that the deceased Ambassador would have done you these good -services if he had considered you a warmonger and friend of the Nazis, -and especially—and I would like to say this to the High Tribunal—if -one remembers that Mr. Dodd was one of the few accredited diplomats in -Berlin who very obviously had no sympathy of any sort for the regime in -power, in fact he was wholly and fully opposed to it. - -I intentionally say “the few diplomats” and, Dr. Schacht, I would like -you to define your opinion on what I am saying. You will remember that -those diplomats who kept aloof from Hitler’s regime politically and -socially, such as the Dutch Minister, the magnificent grand seigneur -Limburg-Stirum, or the Minister from Finland, the true-hearted and great -Social Democrat, Wuolijoki, that most of these diplomats were recalled -by their Governments. How is it that an opponent of the Nazis like Dodd -did such open services of friendship to someone whom he considered a -friend of the Nazis? Do you agree with my opinion? - -SCHACHT: Yes. I am entirely of the same opinion. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I certainly object to going into this kind of -sermonizing back and forth between the box and the bar. It seems to me -that the witness has been allowed to say everything that Mr. Dodd has -ever written and to put in his mind what he thinks Dodd meant. He has -allowed him to go to great lengths characterizing all American -representatives, but it seems to me that this is utterly off the track -and improper for this witness to give a characterization of him in -comparison with other ambassadors and other diplomatic representatives. - -There is no request here for information about facts. I reiterate, we -are not accusing Dr. Schacht here because of his opinions. We are -accusing him because of very specific facts which there seems great -reluctance to get to and deal with. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you should go on, Dr. Dix, and pass from this -part of it, pass on from these documents. - -DR. DIX: Perhaps I might mention very briefly that it is entirely far -from me or from Dr. Schacht to feel impelled to express here our -opinions on political or diplomatic personalities, but, on the other -hand, if the Prosecution produces affidavits or diaries of these -diplomats and uses these documents as pieces of evidence against the -defendant in this proceeding, the defendant... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you would put questions and -put them shortly, it would be much better, and we should get on much -faster. - -DR. DIX: Yes. In general I have put brief questions, Your Lordship. I -only said this now, because I would like to follow the procedure -approved, I believe, by the High Tribunal, of dealing with part of the -evidence at this stage; and so I would like to bring up the reliability -of Dodd’s Diary. That is Document Schacht-43 in my document book; German -text, Page 194; English text, Page 202. Here we are concerned with the -correspondence between the publisher of Dodd’s diary and Sir Nevile -Henderson, which deals with several misstatements in the diary. I will -dispense with the rather long letter by Sir Nevile Henderson—there are -five folio pages—and will cite just a few sentences. - -On Page 196 of the German text, Sir Nevile Henderson writes: - - “Take, for instance, the first statement attributed to me about - Neurath. It is entirely impossible, that I, in front of - Hitler...” - -and so on and so forth. - -Then on the same page, in the middle of the page, next paragraph: - - “And it is the same with the general discussion. It is quite - inconceivable that I should have spoken, as there recorded, - about Bismarck and the annexation of Czechoslovakia and other - countries.” - -And on the same page, a little further down, next to the last paragraph, -it says: - - “Nor could I possibly have said that ‘Germany must dominate the - Danube-Balkan zone.’” - -And on the next page, second paragraph: - - “The remark attributed to me that England and Germany ‘must - control the world’ is pure balderdash and hardly fits in with - the preceding sentence about the United States.” - -Now, there are other similar passages on this and the following page, -but I do not believe it necessary for me to quote them. I request the -High Tribunal to take official notice of this document in its entirety, -and I would like to submit it as such. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Dr. Schacht, a little while ago you -mentioned a warning on the part of Ambassador Dodd with regard to a -danger which was threatening you. Was it an attack on your life? - -SCHACHT: At that time—and I only heard about this in January after Mr. -Dodd told me—I was informed that the SS was planning an attack on my -person. The intent was, as the technical expression then had it, “to -remove” me. Something like that must have been in the air; otherwise, a -foreign ambassador and the circles close to me would not have known -about it. - -DR. DIX: Just a little while ago you set forth how your policy rejected -the use of arms in bringing about equality of German rights and means of -livelihood. Did you try to do anything in a practical way to further -your policy of peaceful agreement with foreign countries, for example, -when you were President of the bank? - -SCHACHT: My entire work as President of the Reichsbank was primarily -based on the principle of working with the banks in foreign countries as -harmoniously as possible, of pursuing a policy of mutual assistance and -support. - -Secondly, I tried to enter into personal, friendly relations with the -directors of all these banks in the hope of meeting understanding for -German problems, and thus of contributing to a solution by way of -co-operation and mutual solution of these difficult problems which had -arisen in Central Europe. The word “co-operation” (Zusammenarbeit) was -the leitmotif of our circle. - -DR. DIX: To turn from the directors of the banks, what about your -foreign creditors? - -SCHACHT: As I already said a little while ago, from the start I was in -disfavor with all the money makers, those people who had profited from -German loans in foreign countries for I was against Germany’s being -involved in debts abroad, and I took my stand very firmly on this point. - -Then later, after the misfortune which I had always predicted actually -did come to pass, after the financial crash in the year 1931, these -self-same financiers and money men blamed me for the fact that the -interest on their money was no longer being transferred to them. -Therefore in those circles I did not gain any friends, but among serious -bankers and large banking institutions which were interested in constant -and regulated business with Germany, I believe I made no enemies, -because all measures which I later had to take in order to protect the -German currency and to maintain Germany’s foreign trade, all these -measures I always discussed jointly with the representatives of foreign -creditors. Approximately every six months we met, and I always gave them -a detailed account of German conditions. They were permitted to look -into the books of the Reichsbank. They could examine and interrogate the -officials of the Reichsbank and they always confirmed that I told them -everything in the most frank and open manner. So that I may say that I -worked in a fair and friendly way also with these men. - -DR. DIX: And how did your policy of peaceful agreement affect foreign -trade, export, credit, and so forth? - -SCHACHT: I believe that after the happenings that have now taken place -it is today even clearer than before that Germany cannot and could not -live without foreign trade, and that the maintenance of export trade -must be the basis for the future existence of the German nation. -Consequently, I did everything in order to maintain German foreign -trade. I can cite a few specific examples to supplement the general -principles. I tried, for example, to do business with China in order -that we might export to China. I was ready to give China credit and did. -I hailed the fact that the Soviet Union kept up an extensive flow of -trade with us, and I always advocated expanding and stabilizing this -foreign trade in the case of Russia as well as China. About the ability -and readiness to pay and the promptness of payment of the opposite -parties I never had any doubts. - -THE PRESIDENT: He is going into unnecessary detail in support of the -allegation that he tried to maintain export trade. We do not surely need -details. - -DR. DIX: As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, this exposition is of -great significance and relevance. It shows Schacht contrary and in -opposition to the policy carried out by Hitler. Hitler was hostile to -the Soviet Union and this hostility is counterbalanced by open -friendliness on the part of and in the person of the Minister of -Economics. If I want to prove that Schacht was pioneer of a policy of -understanding between nations, even in phases where Hitler carried on a -peaceful battle, so to speak, with another country, such as the war of -propaganda against the Soviet Union, then, in my opinion, this point is -very important for Schacht’s fundamental attitude—on one side war and -on the other understanding. This is of absolute relevance. - -THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has made the allegation. It is for the -Prosecution to dispute it in cross-examination and if they do, then the -details might become material in re-examination. - -DR. DIX: I believe the question has been answered, and now I shall turn -to an entirely new phase of questioning. - -Since it is typical of his desire for understanding and his direct basic -opposition to the policy of Hitler, I would like to refer to Document -Number Schacht-34, which is an affidavit, of Schniewind, the banker and -Swedish Consul General at Munich. This is Exhibit 34, Page 114, of the -English translation, and I would like to quote a short paragraph on Page -112 of the German text, which confirms Dr. Schacht’s remarks. -Schniewind, who was a high official in the Ministry of Economics, says -here: - - “My department dealt with the Reich guarantees for deliveries to - Russia, and thus I was in position to know that Schacht - considered Hitler wrong in fighting Russia. Through much effort, - he obtained Hitler’s permission to send extensive supplies, - especially machines to Russia. Frequently I gained the - impression that Herr Schacht favored these deliveries because, - while instrumental in giving employment, they did not benefit - rearmament. Herr Schacht on several public occasions pointed out - with satisfaction that trade shipments to Russia were proceeding - promptly and smoothly.” - -There are just a few more minutes before the customary recess, Your -Honor, and before we take our recess, I ask that I be permitted to reply -shortly to Your Lordship’s remarks of a few minutes ago. The defendant -must conduct what is, to a certain degree, a very difficult defense. The -Prosecution very simply argued: “You helped to finance rearmament and -this rearmament in the final analysis ended in war and not only a war -but a war of aggression; therefore, you as a defendant are either a -conspirator or an accomplice, and that is a war crime.” - -As far as this argument is concerned, it must in my opinion be open to -the defendant, first—and we shall deal with that later—to point out -that rearmament as such by no means constitutes a desire for aggressive -war; and secondly, to show that his acts actually indicate the exact -opposite, namely, his desire for concord and peace; and for these -fundamental reasons, I do beg the Tribunal not to cut me short in this -evidence but rather to give me the time to carry it through in detail. -This explains my desire to set forth Schacht’s policy toward the Soviet -Union, a policy in which he was in direct opposition to Hitler, to bring -it forth in its entirety, and also my wish to show that he worked for -agreement on all levels—with directors of banks and credit -furnishers—that is, he advocated a policy of give and take rather than -one of unilateral terrorizing and strife. - -Gentlemen of the Bench, it is chiefly on a psychological plane on which -I have to conduct the defense; that is a very sensitive and delicate -field, and I again ask that my task may not be made more difficult. -Then, when the witnesses are called, I for my part will most likely -dispense with every witness except one, and I beg that you show me some -consideration. Does Your Lordship consider it time for a recess? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Dr. Dix. I thought that the Tribunal has -shown you every consideration, and we will now certainly have a recess. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, what was your attitude toward the Leadership -Principle? Did you not realize the danger of giving a blank check, the -danger of losing your own capacity of responsibility? You have heard -that Sir David considers the Leadership Principle in itself to be -criminal. - -SCHACHT: As to whether the Leadership Principle is criminal or not, -opinions throughout history have been much divided. If we look back -through Roman history we see that from time to time in dire periods of -distress a leader was selected to whom everyone else was subordinate. -And if I read _Failure of a Mission_ by Henderson there, too, I find -sentences in which he says: - - “People in England sometimes forget and fail to realize that - even dictators can be, up to a point, necessary for a period and - even extremely beneficial for a nation.” - -Another passage from the same book says: - - “Dictatorships are not always evil.” - -In other words, it depends on just what is attributed to a Führer, how -much confidence one has in a Führer, and for how long a time. Of course, -it is a sheer impossibility for someone to assume the leadership of a -country without giving the nation from time to time an opportunity of -saying whether it still wants to keep him as Führer or not. The election -of Hitler as Führer was in itself no political mistake; in my opinion -one could have introduced quite a number of precautionary limitations -with a view to averting the danger you have mentioned. I regret to say -that that was not done, and that was a great mistake. But perhaps one -was entitled to rely on the fact that from time to time a referendum, a -plebiscite, a new expression of the will of the people would take place -by which the Führer could have been corrected, because a leader who -cannot be corrected becomes a menace. I recognized that danger very -well, I was afraid of it, and I attempted to meet it. May I say one more -thing? Limitless Party propaganda attempted to introduce the idea of a -Führer as a lasting principle into politics. That of course is utter -nonsense, and I took the opportunity—I always took such opportunity -whenever it was possible—of expressing my dissenting opinions publicly. -I took the opportunity in an address to the Academy of German Law, of -which not only Nazis but lawyers of all groups were members, and in that -speech I lectured about the Leadership Principle in economics. And I -expressed myself ironically and satirically, as unfortunately is my -wont, and said that it was not necessary to have a leader in every -stocking factory, that in fact, this principle was not a principle at -all, but an exceptional rule which had to be handled very carefully. - -DR. DIX: I know that, because I was present on the occasion of that -address. What did you think about the ideology of the master race -(Herrenvolk)? - -SCHACHT: I have always considered it a very unhappy precedent to speak -of a “chosen people,” or of “God’s own country,” or of things like that. -As a convinced adherent to the Christian faith I believe in Christian -charity, which bids me extend love to all men without regard to race or -faith. I would like to mention also that the silly talk about the master -race, which some Party leaders made their own, was held up to constant -ridicule by the German public. That was not surprising, because most of -the leaders of the Hitler Party were not exactly ideal types of the -Nordic race. And in that connection, when these things were discussed -among the German population, little Goebbels was referred to as “Der -Schrumpfgermane”—the shrivelled Teuton. - -Only one thing—I have to say this to be just—did most of the leaders -of the Party have in common with the old Teutons—and that was drinking; -excessive drinking was a main part of the Nazi ideology. - -DR. DIX: What did you think of the so-called National Socialist -Weltanschauung? - -SCHACHT: Weltanschauung in my opinion is a summation of all those moral -principles which enable me to acquire a clear judgment on all aspects of -life. Therefore it is a matter of course that a Weltanschauung cannot -take root in the tangible world, but must rise above it; it is something -metaphysical, that is to say, it is based on faith, on religion. A -Weltanschauung which is not rooted in religion is in my opinion no -Weltanschauung at all. Consequently I reject the National Socialist -Weltanschauung which was not rooted in religion. - -DR. DIX: In the trial brief against you it is expressly stated that -there are no charges against you with regard to the Jewish question. -Nevertheless I am putting to you a few questions on this topic, because -the trial brief by its very words takes from you what in the Jewish -question it conceded you; that is to say, the trial brief accuses you -repeatedly of Nazi ideology, in which strict observance of anti-Semitism -is integral. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I simply cannot be bound by silence after this -flagrant misstatement of our position made in conjunction with this -witness’ testimony. It is not true that we make no charges against Dr. -Schacht with reference to the Jews. What is true is that we say that he -was not in complete sympathy with that aspect of the Nazi program which -involved a wholesale extermination of the Jews, and he was for that -reason attacked from time to time. It is further conceded that he gave -aid and comfort to individual Jews, but we do charge that he believed -the Jews of Germany should be stripped of their rights as citizens, and -that he aided and participated in their persecution. And I do not like -to have our position misstated and then be met with a claim of estoppel -by silence. - -DR. DIX: I have to thank you, Mr. Justice Jackson, for your clarifying -statement, and it is now all the more necessary that I put in questions -to Dr. Schacht, but at this moment I want to point out... - -THE PRESIDENT: Please put it then. - -DR. DIX: Your Lordship, it is not only a question, but it is a problem, -and I should like to ask the Prosecution to clarify it now, because it -still needs clarification even after the statement of Mr. Justice -Jackson. If the Tribunal do not think that this is the opportune time I -can bring it up later. I believe, however, that it would be right to -bring it up how. - -As I see it, there is a contradiction in the Indictment, and I would -like it clarified, so that we shall not be at cross-purposes in our -final speeches. - -I can put it quite briefly. It is the question of whether Dr. Schacht is -accused also of Crimes against Humanity, that is, not only the crime of -conspiracy concerning the war of aggression, but also the typical crimes -against humanity, for on this point the individual passages, both of the -Indictment and of the Prosecution speech in which the charges were -presented, are at variance. I wanted to take the liberty of pointing out -the contradictory passages and to ask the Prosecution to be kind enough -to state conclusively at some future occasion whether Schacht is accused -also on Count Three and Four of the Indictment. In presenting the -charges the Prosecution stated, and that indicates that the Prosecution -will limit itself to Counts One and Two: - - “Our evidence against the Defendant Schacht is limited to the - planning and preparation of aggressive war and his participation - in the conspiracy for aggressive war.” - -Similar statements are on Page 3 of the trial brief. Also, in Appendix A -of the Indictment the charges against Schacht are limited to Counts One -and Two. However, on Page 1 of the Indictment we find the following: - - “...accuse as guilty...of Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and - Crimes against Humanity, and of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to - commit those Crimes....” - -And then all the defendants are listed, including the Defendant Hjalmar -Schacht. - -On Page 17 of the German text of the Indictment we read: - - “On the basis of the facts previously stated, the - defendants”—that is, all the defendants—“are guilty.” - -That is, all the defendants are guilty of Counts One, Two, Three, Four. -It also states, on Page 18 of the Indictment: - - “All defendants committed, from 1 September 1939 to 8 May 1945, - War Crimes in Germany and in countries and territories occupied - by German troops after 1 September 1939 and in Austria, - Czechoslovakia, Italy, and on the high seas.” - -On Page 46 it reads: - - “During several years before the 8th of May 1945, all defendants - committed Crimes against Humanity in Germany” - -—and so forth. - -Therefore, some parts of the oral presentation and of the Indictment -show that the Prosecution limits its charges against Schacht to Counts -One and Two, but other passages express beyond doubt that he is also -accused of Crimes against Humanity. - -I think it would be helpful—it need not be done immediately, but I -wanted as a precaution to express it now—if at the proper time the -Prosecution would state to what extent the charges apply to Schacht. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, it will take only one moment to answer -that, and I think the cross-examination—the examination should not -proceed under any misapprehension. - -At all times, and in all documents that I am aware of, the Defendant -Schacht has been accused of being guilty of Count One. - -Count One, as the statement of the offense, states: - - “The Common Plan or Conspiracy embraced the commission of Crimes - against Peace in that the defendants planned, prepared, and - initiated wars of aggression... In the development and course of - the Common Plan it came to embrace the commission of War Crimes, - in that it contemplated, and the defendants determined upon, and - carried out ruthless war...” - -And that included also Crimes against Humanity. - -Our contention is that, while the Defendant Schacht himself was not in -the field perpetrating these individual atrocities, he is answerable for -every offense committed by any of the defendants or their -co-conspirators up to the time that he openly broke with this outfit -with which he became associated. - -That is our contention and Dr. Dix should conduct his examination on the -assumption that every charge is a charge against Schacht up to the time -that he openly, and on record so that somebody knew it, became separated -from the company with which he chose to travel. - -DR. DIX: It is probably my fault, but I still cannot see clearly. First, -I do not know what date the Prosecution means when it admits that -Schacht openly broke with the regime. I must, during my examination... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you must make up your own mind as to what time it -was, the time at which he openly broke. - -Are you not able to hear? - -DR. DIX: I have to make up my mind now? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I think you had better go on with the evidence. - -DR. DIX: All right. I can refer to the subject again later. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Well then, please do not make any -statements of principle concerning the Jewish question, but tell the -Tribunal, and give a few examples, of what your attitude was on the -Jewish question. - -SCHACHT: The Jewish question came up quite early, when, in 1933, a New -York banker, the late James Meier, announced his intention to visit me. -I went to Hitler at that time and told him, “Mr. James Meier, one of the -most respected New York bankers and a great benefactor of his old home -country, Germany, will come to visit me, and I intend to give a dinner -in his honor. I assume that you have no objection.” He immediately said, -in a very definite and pronounced manner, “Herr Schacht, you can do -everything.” I assumed that he gave me absolute freedom to keep in -contact with my Jewish friends, which I did. The dinner actually took -place. - -I only mention this because it was the first time the Jewish question -was brought up between us. At every occasion I took a definite position -on the Jewish question—and wherever possible, publicly—I have always -looked for that opportunity. - -I will give only two examples of that. - -There was a branch of the Reichsbank in Amswalde in the Province of -Brandenburg. The name of the manager of that branch office was one day -posted up in one of the public _Stürmer_ boxes in his town, and termed a -traitor to the people because his wife had bought 50 pfennings worth of -ribbon or the like in a Jewish store. I at once approached the competent -official at Amswalde and demanded the immediate removal of the placard -and an immediate correction to the effect that the man was no traitor to -the people. That was refused; whereupon, without asking anyone, I closed -the Reichsbank branch at Amswalde. It took a number of weeks until, in -the end, the Oberpräsident, who was of course also a Nazi boss, came to -me and asked me to reopen the branch office. I told him, “As soon as -they repudiate that affair publicly I shall reopen the branch office at -Amswalde.” It took only a few days before the Oberpräsident and -Gauleiter of Brandenburg, Grube, had the announcement made public in the -Amswalde newspaper, in large print, and so I reopened the branch office -in Amswalde. That is one example. - -The second example has been mentioned briefly; I just want to sum it up -once more because its effect was penetrating. - -On the occasion of a Christmas celebration for the office messengers of -the Reichsbank I referred to the pogrom of 9 November 1938, and I told -the boys, in the presence of many—parents, Party leaders, and Party -members—that I hoped they had nothing to do with these things, which -should make every decent German blush with shame. But if they did they -should leave the Reichsbank at once, because in an institution such as -the Reichsbank, which was built up on good faith, there was no place for -people who did not respect the property and life of others. - -DR. DIX: May I interrupt you, Dr. Schacht, and point out to the Tribunal -that in Document Number Schacht-34, which has been submitted and is an -affidavit of Dr. Schniewind, on Page 118 of the German text and on Page -126 of the English text the same incident which Dr. Schacht has just -related is mentioned. May I quote quite briefly: - - “It is known that at the Christmas celebration of the Reichsbank - in December of 1938 he”—that is Schacht—“said the following in - his address to the young office boys: - - “‘A few weeks ago things occurred in our fatherland which are a - disgrace to civilization and which must turn every decent - German’s face red with shame. I only hope that none of you - office boys participated in them, because for such an individual - there is no place in the Reichsbank.’” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Excuse me. Please continue. You wanted to -add something? - -SCHACHT: When in August of 1934 I took over the Reich Ministry of -Economics, of course I first put the question to Hitler: “How are the -Jews in our national economy to be treated?” Hitler told me then, -literally, “The Jews can be active in domestic economy in the same way -as before.” - -That was the directive that Hitler had promised to me, and during all -the time when I was in charge of the Ministry of Economics I acted -accordingly. - -However, I have to add that every few weeks there was a quarrel on some -Jewish question with some Gauleiter or other Party official. Also, I -could not protect Jews against physical mistreatment and the like, -because that came under the competence of the Public Prosecutor and not -mine; but in the economic field I helped all Jews who approached me to -obtain their rights, and in every individual case, I prevailed upon -Hitler and succeeded against the Gauleiters and Party officials, -sometimes even threatening to resign. - -I believe that it is notable that the pogrom of November 1938 could only -have taken place after I had resigned from my office. Had I still been -in office, then that pogrom doubtlessly would not have occurred. - -DR. DIX: The witness Gisevius has already testified that in the course -of developments from 1933 on, fundamental changes took place in your -judgment of Adolf Hitler. I ask you now, because this is a very decisive -question, to give the Tribunal a detailed description of your real -attitude and your judgment of Adolf Hitler in the course of the -years—as exhaustively, but also as briefly, as possible. - -SCHACHT: In former statements which I have made here, I have spoken of -Hitler as a semi-educated man. I still maintain that. He did not have -sufficient school education, but he read an enormous amount later, and -acquired a wide knowledge. He juggled with that knowledge in a masterly -manner in all debates, discussions, and speeches. - -No doubt he was a man of genius in certain respects. He had sudden ideas -of which nobody else had thought and which were at times useful in -solving great difficulties, sometimes with astounding simplicity, -sometimes, however, with equally astounding brutality. - -He was a mass psychologist of really diabolical genius. While I myself -and several others—for instance, General Von Witzleben told me so -once—while we were never captivated in personal conversations, still he -had a very peculiar influence on other people, and particularly he was -able—in spite of his screeching and occasionally breaking voice—to -stir up the utmost overwhelming enthusiasm of large masses in a filled -auditorium. - -I believe that originally he was not filled only with evil desires; -originally, no doubt, he believed he was aiming at good, but gradually -he himself fell victim to the same spell which he exercised over the -masses; because whoever ventures to seduce the masses is finally led and -seduced by them, and so this reciprocal relation between leader and -those led, in my opinion, contributed to ensnaring him in the evil ways -of mass instincts, which every political leader should avoid. - -One more thing was to be admired in Hitler. He was a man of unbending -energy, of a will power which overcame all obstacles, and in my estimate -only those two characteristics—mass psychology and his energy and will -power—explain that Hitler was able to rally up to 40 percent, and later -almost 50 percent, of the German people behind him. - -What else shall I say? - -DR. DIX: Well, I was mainly concerned with bringing up the subject of -your own change of opinion. You have said that the break in your -attitude toward Hitler was caused by the Fritsch incident. You are the -best witness who can give us an explanation not of Hitler’s but of your -own development and your changing attitude towards Hitler. - -SCHACHT: Excuse me. I think there is a basic error here. It appears from -this as if I had been a convinced adherent of Hitler at some time. I was -never that. On the contrary, out of concern for my people and my -country, after Hitler gained power, I endeavored with all my strength to -direct that power into an orderly channel, and to keep it within bounds. -Therefore, there was no question of a break with Hitler. A break could -only be spoken of had I been closely connected with him before. At heart -I was never closely connected with Hitler, but to all appearances I -worked in the Cabinet and I did so because he was after all in power, -and I considered it my duty to put myself at the disposal of my people -and my country for their good. - -DR. DIX: All right, but at what time, by what conditions, by what -realization were you influenced to begin that activity which the witness -Gisevius has described? - -SCHACHT: My serious criticism of Hitler’s doings started already at the -time of the so-called Röhm Putsch on 30 June 1934. I should like to -point out first that these things occurred quite unexpectedly and took -me by surprise, because I had not at all anticipated them. At that time -I had told Hitler, “How could you have these people just simply killed -off? Under all circumstances there should have been at least a summary -trial of some sort.” Hitler swallowed these remarks and merely mumbled -something about “revolutionary necessity,” but he did not really -contradict me. - -Then in the course of the second half of the year 1934 and the first -half of the year 1935 I noticed that I had been under a misconception -when I believed that Hitler did not approve of what might be considered -revolutionary and disorderly Party excesses, and that he was really -willing to restore a respectable atmosphere. Hitler did nothing to put a -stop to the excesses of individual Party members or Party groups. Very -likely the idea which recently—or I believe today—was mentioned by a -witness was always in his mind: let the SA have its fling for once. That -is to say, for the masses of the Party he sanctioned, as a means of -recreation, so to speak, behavior which is absolutely incompatible with -good order in the State. In the course of the following months my -suspicions were confirmed and increased, and then for the first time, in -May 1935, I took occasion to bring these matters up with him quite -openly. I do not know if you want me to discuss these things now, but I -am ready to tell about them. - -DR. DIX: I consider it important that the Tribunal should hear from you -how your original attitude towards Hitler, which you have just -described, changed, and you became a conspirator against him. - -SCHACHT: Well, the decisive change in my attitude came about by reason -of the Fritsch incident, at the very moment when I had to -recognize—and, of course, that did not come with lightning speed, but -in the course of weeks and months it crystallized—that Hitler aimed at -war, or at least was not prepared to do everything to avoid a war. At -that moment I told myself that this was a tremendous danger which was -raising its head, and that violence could be crushed only by violence. - -Any opportunity of political propaganda within the German people was of -course out of the question. There was no freedom of assembly. There was -no freedom of speech. There was no freedom of writing. There was no -possibility of discussing things even in a small group. From beginning -to end one was spied upon, and every word which was said among more than -two persons was spoken at the peril of one’s life. There was only one -possibility in the face of that terror, which was beyond democratic -reform and which barred every national criticism. That was to meet this -situation with violence. - -Then I came to the conclusion that in the face of Hitler’s terror only a -_coup d’état_, a Putsch, and finally an attempt at assassination was -possible. - -DR. DIX: And is Gisevius right in saying that the _peripeteia_, the -decisive turning point in your attitude resulted from your impressions -and experiences in the so-called Fritsch crisis? - -SCHACHT: Aside from the inherent falsehood which appeared in all actions -and measures of the Party men, the Fritsch crisis provided the absolute -assurance that a basic change was occurring in the conduct of political -affairs, for within about 10 days Blomberg was removed, Fritsch was -removed, Neurath was removed, and Hitler not only appointed so -unsuitable a person as Ribbentrop to be Foreign Minister, but also in -his speech in the Reichstag soon afterwards announced that from now on -rearmament had to be increased even more. Consequently the Fritsch -crisis was the decisive turning point in my attitude, and from then on I -knew that every further peaceful attempt at controlling the torrent -would fail and that only violent means could meet it. - -DR. DIX: For an estimate of the Fritsch crisis may I quote now from the -document which I already wanted to produce on the occasion of the -interrogation of Gisevius but could not because the document was not -then available to the Prosecution. The same view about the Fritsch -crisis which Gisevius and now Dr. Schacht have put here was also -expressed abroad by an intelligent officer with political foresight. May -I point to Exhibit Number 15 of my document book (Document Number -Schacht-15)? That is Page 41 of the English text, and 35 of the German -text. It is a biennial report of the Chief of Staff of the United States -Army to the Secretary of War for the period of 1 July 1943 to 30 June -1945. I quote one sentence from it: - - “The history of the German High Command from 1938 on is one of - constant conflict of personalities, in which military judgment - was increasingly subordinated to Hitler’s personal dictates. The - first clash occurred in 1938 and resulted in the removal of Von - Blomberg, Von Fritsch, and Beck and of the last effective - conservative influence on German foreign policy.” - -So here also that turning point has been clearly understood. And in -summary I would like to ask this question of Dr. Schacht. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Were you only disappointed by Hitler, or -did you consider yourself deceived by Hitler at that time? Will you -answer that? - -SCHACHT: The answer is that I have never felt disappointed by Hitler, -because I had not expected more of him than my appraisal of his -personality allowed me. But I certainly consider myself deceived, -swindled, and cheated by him to the highest degree, because whatever he -had previously promised to the German people and thereby to me, he did -not keep afterwards. - -He promised equal rights for all citizens, but his adherents, regardless -of their capabilities, enjoyed privileges before all other citizens. He -promised to put the Jews under the same protection which foreigners -enjoyed, yet he deprived them of every legal protection. He had promised -to fight against political lies, but together with his Minister Goebbels -he cultivated nothing but political lies and political fraud. He -promised the German people to maintain the principles of positive -Christianity yet he tolerated and sponsored measures by which -institutions of the Church were abused, reviled, and damaged. Also, in -the foreign political field he always spoke against a war on two -fronts—and then later undertook it himself. He despised and disregarded -all laws of the Weimar Republic, to which he had taken the oath when he -became Chancellor. He mobilized the Gestapo against personal liberty. He -gagged and bound all free exchange of ideas and information. He pardoned -criminals and enlisted them in his service. He did everything to break -his promises. He lied to and deceived the world, Germany, and me. - -DR. DIX: Let us return to the period of the seizure of power. In -November 1932, you stated publicly that Hitler would become Reich -Chancellor. What caused you to make that statement? - -SCHACHT: That statement was caused by the fact that Hitler in the July -elections of 1932 obtained 40 percent of all seats in the Reichstag for -his Party. That is an election result which, if I am informed correctly, -had never occurred since 1871, when the Reichstag was founded; and to -me, as a democrat and a follower of democratic parliamentary government, -it was quite inevitable that that man was now to be entrusted with -forming a cabinet. I do not know of any alternative at the time. There -was only one other possibility, one alternative, and that was a military -rule. But the Cabinet of Von Papen already had had some special -presidential authority and still could not maintain itself in the face -of the Reichstag; and when Herr Schleicher attempted to establish a -military regime without the participation of the Nazis, he failed after -just a few weeks, because he found himself confronted with the -alternative either of starting a civil war or of resigning. - -Hindenburg and at first Schleicher as well—although at the last moment -he acted differently—were always of the opinion that the Armed Forces -could not face a civil war, and Hindenburg was certainly not ready to -tolerate a civil war. But very unwillingly he saw himself forced by -necessity to put the reins of government into the hands of the man who, -thanks to his own propaganda and the incapability of all preceding -governments, thanks also to the inconsiderate policy of the foreign -countries toward Germany, had won the majority of German votes. - -DR. DIX: You know that the Prosecution accuses you of having assisted -Hitler and the Nazi regime to power. I therefore want to ask you now -whether between the July elections 1932, and the day when Hitler became -Chancellor—that is the 30th of January, 1933—you spoke publicly for -Hitler. - -SCHACHT: I want to state first that Hitler’s power was an accomplished -fact in July 1932, when he secured 230 Reichstag seats. Everything else -that followed must be viewed as a consequence of that Reichstag -election. During that entire period—with the exception of the one -interview you mentioned, in which I said that according to democratic -principles Hitler must become Reich Chancellor—I can say that I did not -write or publicly speak a single word for Hitler. - -DR. DIX: Did you, during the time when the reorganization of the Reich -Cabinet was discussed, speak to Hindenburg on behalf of Hitler’s -Chancellorship? - -SCHACHT: I have never in consultations with any of the competent -gentlemen, be it Hindenburg, Meissner, or anyone else, contributed -towards exerting any influence in favor of Hitler, nor did I participate -in any way in the nomination of Hitler to be Reich Chancellor. - -DR. DIX: The prosecutor accuses you in that connection of putting the -prestige of your name at the disposal of Hitler in November 1932, and he -refers to a statement made by Goebbels in the latter’s book, _From the -Kaiserhof to the Reich Chancellery_. What can you say about that? - -SCHACHT: I would never have expected that this apostle of truth, -Goebbels, would once more be mobilized against me here, but it is not my -fault if Herr Goebbels made a mistake. - -DR. DIX: The prosecutor also states that you provided the funds for -Hitler in the Reichstag elections of 5 March; that is said to have -happened in an industrial meeting on which there is an affidavit by the -industrialist Von Schnitzler, Document Number EC-439, Exhibit USA-618. -What do you have to say about that? It is our Number 3 of our document -book, Page 11 of the English copy. - -SCHACHT: In February of 1933, at the time when Hitler was already Reich -Chancellor and the elections of 5 March were to furnish a basis for the -shape of the new government, Hitler asked me whether, at the occasion of -a meeting which Göring was to call and which would have the purpose of -raising funds for the elections, I would be good enough to take the role -of his banker. I had no reason for refusing to do that. The meeting took -place on 26 February. - -And now the prosecutor has made it appear that during that meeting I had -solicited election funds. The Prosecution themselves, however, have -presented a document, D-203, which apparently is meant to be a record of -the election speech made by Hitler on that evening... - -DR. DIX: May I interrupt you and point out to the Tribunal that it is -our Exhibit Number Schacht-2, on Page 9 of the English text. Excuse me. -Please, will you kindly go on. - -SCHACHT: D-203. That document closes with the following sentence: - - “Göring then passed very cleverly to the necessity that other - circles not taking part in this political battle should at least - make the financial sacrifices required.” - -Therefore from that report which was submitted by the Prosecution, it -can be seen very clearly that not I but Göring pleaded for funds. I only -administered these funds later, and, in the affidavit by Schnitzler, -Document EC-439, Page 11, the Prosecution have carefully left out these -decisive passages which do not accuse, but exonerate me. I quote the two -sentences, therefore, as follows—I am sorry, I have to quote in English -because I have only the English text in front of me: - - “At the meeting Dr. Schacht proposed raising an election fund of - as far as I remember three million Reichsmarks. The fund was to - be distributed between the two ‘allies’ according to their - relative strength at the time. Dr. Stein suggested that the - Deutsche Volkspartei should be included, which suggestion, if I - remember rightly, was accepted. The amounts which the individual - firms were to contribute were not discussed.” - -It can be seen from this that the election fund was not collected only -for the Nazi Party, but for the Nazi Party and the national group which -was its ally and to which, for instance, also Herr Von Papen and -Hugenberg belonged, and which during that very meeting was extended to -comprise a third group, the German People’s Party. It was, therefore, a -collective fund for those parties who went into the election campaign -together, and not just a Nazi fund. - -DR. DIX: The Prosecution have mentioned those laws which were decreed -after the seizure of power, and which introduced and then established -the totalitarian rule of the Nazis and of Hitler. We have to consider -the question of your personal responsibility as a later member of the -cabinet and I must discuss these laws with you in detail; for the -present I just want to remind you of them generally: First, the Enabling -Act; then the law about the prohibition of parties and the establishment -of one Party; the law about the unity of Party and State; the law -decreeing the expropriation of the SPD and the trade unions; the law -about civil service associations; the law about the legal limitation of -professions for Jews; the law instituting the Peoples’ Court; the law -legalizing the murders of 30 June 1934; and the law about the merger of -the offices of the Reich Chancellor and the Reich President in the -person of Hitler. How do you, as a member of the Cabinet, define your -personal responsibility with respect to these laws? - -SCHACHT: When all these laws were issued I was not a Cabinet member. I -had no vote in the Cabinet. I had a vote in the Cabinet only after 1 -August 1934, at which time the last disastrous law, the merger of the -offices of Reich Chancellor and Reich President was decreed. I did not -participate in the discussions preceding this law, nor did I vote on it. -I had absolutely no part in any of these laws. - -DR. DIX: I do not know whether I mentioned it, but I want to protect you -against a misunderstanding. This does not apply to the merger of the -offices of the Reich President in the person of Hitler, after -Hindenburg’s death? - -SCHACHT: Of course, I did not take part in that either. - -DR. DIX: And why not? - -SCHACHT: Because I was not then in the Cabinet. I received my official -nomination as Minister on 3 or 4 August. I did not take part in the -deliberations on that law. I did not vote for it, and did not sign it. - -DR. DIX: But in the Indictment it is stated that you were a member of -the Reichstag. Then as a member of the Reichstag you would have voted -for these laws, inasmuch as, actually, after 1933 only unanimous votes -were cast in the Reichstag? - -SCHACHT: Yes. Unfortunately, there is much in the trial brief which is -not correct. During my entire life I was never a member of the -Reichstag. One look into the _Reichstag Handbook_ could have enlightened -the Prosecution that also during that time I was not a member of the -Reichstag. - -I had nothing to do with all these laws either as member of the Cabinet -or of the Reichstag, because I had been neither during that time. - -DR. DIX: Did Adolf Hitler actually take an oath to the Weimar -Constitution? - -SCHACHT: Of course Hitler took an oath to the Weimar Constitution when -he became Reich Chancellor, to Reich President Von Hindenburg. In taking -that oath he swore not only to respect the constitution but also to -observe and fulfill all laws unless they were lawfully changed. - -DR. DIX: Was the Weimar Constitution ever formally repealed? - -SCHACHT: No, the Weimar Constitution has never been repealed. - -DR. DIX: In your view was the Leadership Principle established anywhere -legally or constitutionally? - -SCHACHT: The Leadership Principle was not established by a single law, -and the subsequent attempt to reduce the responsibility of the -individual ministers—and that affects me, too—by saying that it had -become prescriptive law, is not correct. The responsibility of the -ministers continued to exist, my own also, and was kept down only by the -terror and the violent threats of Hitler. - -DR. DIX: The questions whether the Enabling Act referred to the Führer -or to the Cabinet; whether the first Cabinet after 1933 was a National -Socialist one or a combination of the parties of the right; and the -question of the development of Hitler into an autocratic dictator, all -these I have already put to the witness Lammers. I do not wish to repeat -them, but do you have to add anything new to what Lammers has testified? - -SCHACHT: I made only two notes. In Hitler’s Reichstag speech on 23 March -1933 he said, “It is the sincere desire of the National -Government...”—not the National Socialist, as it is always referred to -later, but the National Government. - -And the second point: In the proclamation to the Wehrmacht which Defense -Minister Von Blomberg issued on 1 February 1933 this sentence occurs: - - “I assume this office with the firm determination to maintain - the Reichswehr, in accordance with the testament of my - predecessors, as a power factor of the State, above Party - politics.” - -This and other factors already mentioned convinced me that the Cabinet -would be a national coalition cabinet, whereas Hitler, by his rule of -terror and violence, formed a pure Nazi dictatorship out of it. - -DR. DIX: The quotation mentioned by Schacht is in our document book, -Document Number Schacht-4, Page 14 of the English text. Now, when you -became Minister of Economics... - -THE PRESIDENT: It is 5 o’clock; the Tribunal will adjourn. - -DR. DIX: Mr. President, may I ask a question? Do we continue tomorrow, -because tomorrow is the first of May, and there is some uncertainty -whether there will be a session tomorrow or not? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal will go on tomorrow. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 1 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH DAY - Wednesday, 1 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Before we go on with the case of the Defendant Schacht, -the Tribunal wishes to announce its decision on the applications by Dr. -Sauter on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach: The first application to -which any objection was taken related to the group of documents Numbers -30, 31, 45, 68, 73, 101, 124, and 133. That application with respect to -that group of documents is denied. - -The next matter was an application in respect of Number 118(a). That -application is granted and the document is to be translated. - -The next was Number 121 and in that case the application is denied. As -regard to witnesses, Dr. Sauter withdrew his application for the witness -Marsalek. - -In connection with the other applications, the Tribunal grants the -application that Uiberreither should be called as a witness. - -That is all. - -DR. DIX: Yesterday, much to my regret, I neglected after an answer given -by Dr. Schacht to my question as to whether he was disappointed by -Hitler or whether he considered himself deceived by him, to read a -passage from a document which deals with the same point. I am referring -to a document which has been submitted to the High Tribunal and which -has been quoted several times—Exhibit Schacht-34, Page 114 of the -English text of the document book. This passage may be found on Page 124 -of the English document book and reads as follows: - - “Dr. Schacht, even in the years 1935-36, as may have been seen - from numerous statements, had fallen into the role of a man, who - in good faith had put his strength and ability at Hitler’s - disposal but who now felt himself betrayed. - - “Of the many statements made by Schacht, I quote only one which - Schacht made at the occasion of a supper with my wife and myself - in the summer of 1938. When Dr. Schacht made his appearance, it - was evident that he was in a state of inner excitement and - during the supper, he suddenly gave vent to his feelings, when, - in deep agitation he almost shouted at my wife, ‘My dear lady, - we have fallen into the hands of criminals—how could I ever - have suspected that?’” - -This is the affidavit made out by Schniewind. - -Yesterday I mentioned three documents: namely, a speech made by Schacht -on “Geography and Statistics” at Frankfurt-am-Main on 9 December 1936, -then an article Schacht had written on the colonial problem and a speech -given at Königsberg by Schacht. - -I wish to submit these documents: The speech on “Geography and -Statistics” at Frankfurt is the Document Schacht-19, Page 48, English -Page 54. The theme on the colonial question is Exhibit Schacht-21, -German version Page 53 and English version Page 59. The speech at -Königsberg is Exhibit Schacht-25 of my document book, German version on -Page 44 and English version Page 73. - -Dr. Schacht, we stopped in the middle of 1934, shortly before you -entered the Ministry of Economics, and when you became Minister of -Economics, you were familiar with the happenings of 30 June 1934 and -their legalization by the Cabinet. Did you not have any misgivings to -enter the Cabinet or what reasons prompted you to put aside these -misgivings? - -SCHACHT: As far as my personal composure and comfort would have been -concerned, it would have been very simple not to assume office and to -resign. Of course, I asked myself what help that would be for the future -development of German politics if I did refuse office. We were already -at a stage in which any public and open opposition and criticism against -the Hitler regime had been made impossible. Meetings could not be held, -societies could not be established, every press statement was subject to -censorship, and all political opposition, without which no government -can thrive, had been prevented by Hitler through his policy of terror. -There was only one possible way to exercise criticism and even form an -opposition which could prevent bad and faulty measures being taken by -the Government. And this opposition could solely be formed in the -Government itself. Thus convinced, I entered the Government and I hoped -in the course of the years to find a certain amount of support and -backing among the German people. There was still a large mass of -spiritual leaders, professors, scientists, and teachers, whom I did not -expect simply to acquiesce to a regime of coercion. There were also many -industrialists, leaders of economy, who I did not assume would bow to a -policy of coercion incompatible with free economy. I expected a certain -support from all these circles, support which would make it possible for -me to have a moderating, controlling influence in the Government. -Therefore, I entered Hitler’s Cabinet, not with enthusiastic assent, but -because it was necessary to keep on working for the German people and -exercise a moderating influence within the Government. - -DR. DIX: In the course of time was no opposition ever developed within -the Party? - -SCHACHT: In answering that question, I would like to say that within the -Party, of course, the decent elements were by far in majority; the -greater part of the population had joined the Party because of a healthy -instinct and with good intentions driven by the need in which the German -nation found itself. - -I would like to say about the SS, for instance, that in the beginning -numbers of decent people joined the SS because Himmler gave the SS the -appearance of fighting for a life of ideals. I would like to call your -attention to a book written by an SS man which appeared at that time -under the significant title, _Schafft anständige Kerle_ (_Let’s Make -Decent Men_). - -But, in the course of time, Hitler knew how to gather around him all bad -elements, within the Party and its organization, and to chain tightly -all those elements to himself, because he understood how to exploit -shrewdly any mistake, slip-up, or misdemeanor on their part. Yesterday I -talked about drunkenness as a constituent part of Nazi ideology; I did -not do that with the purpose of degrading anyone personally. I did it -for another quite definite reason. - -In the course of further developments, I observed that even many Party -members who had fallen into this net of Hitler and who occupied more or -less leading positions, gradually became afraid because of the -consequences of the injustices and the evil deeds to which they were -instigated by the regime. I had the definite feeling that these people -resorted to alcohol and various narcotics in order to flee from their -own conscience, and that it was only this flight from their own -conscience that permitted them to act the way they did. Otherwise, there -would be no explanation for the large number of suicides that took place -at the end of the Nazi regime. - -DR. DIX: You know that you are accused of being a participant in a -conspiracy which had as its object an illegal violation of the peace. -Did you at any time have secret discussions, or secret orders, or secret -directives, which worked toward this objective? - -SCHACHT: I may say that I myself never received any order or fulfilled -any wish which might have been contrary to the conception of right. -Never did Hitler request anything from me which he knew I would surely -not carry out because it did not agree with my moral point of view. But -neither did I ever notice or observe that one of my fellow ministers or -one of the other leading men who did not belong to Hitler’s inner -circle—of course, I could not control that circle—or anyone else whom -I met in official contacts, showed in any way that there was an intent -to commit a war crime; on the contrary, we were always very glad when -Hitler came off with one of his big speeches in which he assured, not -only the entire world, but above all the German people that he was -thinking of nothing except peace and peaceful work. The fact that Hitler -deceived the world and the German people, and many of his co-workers, is -one of the things that I mentioned yesterday. - -DR. DIX: Did you at any time—of course, I mean outside of your normal -oath of office—take any oath or bind yourself in any other way to the -Party or another National Socialist organization? - -SCHACHT: Not a single oath and not a single obligation beyond my oath of -office to the head of the State. - -DR. DIX: Did you have close private relations with leading National -Socialists, for example, with Hitler or Göring? - -SCHACHT: I assume you mean a close friendly or social contact? - -DR. DIX: Yes. - -SCHACHT: I never had relations of that sort with Hitler. He repeatedly -urged me in the first years to come to the luncheons at the Reich -Chancellery where he was lunching with closer friends. I tried to do -that twice. I attended twice at various intervals, and I must say that -not only the level of the discussion at the luncheon and the abject -humility shown to Hitler repulsed me but I also did not like the whole -crowd, and I never went back again. - -I never called on Hitler personally in a private matter. Of course, -naturally, I attended the large public functions which all the -ministers, the Diplomatic Corps and high officials, _et cetera_, -attended, but I never had any intimate, social, or other close contact -with him. That applies to the other gentlemen as well. - -As a matter of course, in the first months of our acquaintance we -visited each other on occasion, but all so-called social gatherings -which still took place in the first period had a more or less official -character. Close private relations simply did not exist. - -DR. DIX: And does this answer apply to all the other leading National -Socialists as well? - -SCHACHT: All of them. - -DR. DIX: When, for instance, did you speak for the last time with the -following persons? Let us start first with Bormann. - -SCHACHT: I gather from the use of the word “first” that you are going to -mention others also. - -DR. DIX: Yes, Himmler, Hess, Ley, and Ribbentrop. - -SCHACHT: In that case I would like to make a few preliminary remarks: At -the close of the French campaign, when Hitler returned triumphant and -victorious from Paris, all of us—the ministers and the Reichsleiter and -the other dignitaries of the Party as I assume, and state secretaries, -and so forth—received an invitation from the Reich Chancellery to be -present at the Anhalter Railway Station to greet Hitler on his arrival. -Since I was in Berlin at the time, it was impossible for me to refuse -this invitation. It was 1940, the conflict between Hitler and myself had -been going on for some time, and it would have been a veritable affront -if I had stayed at home. Consequently, I went to the station and saw a -very large number of Party dignitaries, ministers and so forth, but, of -course, I do not remember any more just who all these people were. - -DR. DIX: I beg your pardon for interrupting you. I have a rather poor -memory for films and especially for newsreels, but I believe that that -reception was shown in a newsreel and I believe that you were just about -the only civilian who was present among those people. - -SCHACHT: I personally did not see that film, but my friends told me -about it. They mentioned especially that among all the gold braid, I was -the only civilian in street clothes there. Of course, it could be -ascertained from the film who was present at the time. - -I mentioned this reception, for it might be possible that I said “Good -morning” to many people and inquired about their health and so forth, -and I also recall that I arrived at the station with the Codefendant -Rosenberg in the same car, because there were always two people to a -car. I did not attend the reception which followed at the Reich -Chancellery. Rosenberg did go but I said, “No, I would rather not go. I -am going home.” - -DR. DIX: Then, I may assume that you probably saw the leading men, Hess, -Ley, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Frick, Frank, Schirach, Speer, Sauckel, -Seyss-Inquart, Kaltenbrunner, _et cetera_, then for the last time? - -SCHACHT: It is possible that all these gentlemen were there, but I did -not speak at length with any of them except Hitler himself. - -DR. DIX: Did you speak with Hitler at that time? - -SCHACHT: Hitler addressed me, and that was one of the strangest scenes -of my life. We were all standing in line and Hitler passed everyone by -rather quickly. When he saw me, he came up to me with a triumphant smile -and extended his hand in a cordial manner, something which I had not -seen from him for a long time, and he said to me, “Now, Herr Schacht, -what do you have to say now?” Then, of course, he expected me to -congratulate him or express my admiration or a similar sentiment, and to -admit that my prognostication about the war and about the disaster of -the war was wrong, for he knew my attitude about the war quite exactly. -It was extremely hard for me to avoid such an answer and I searched my -mind for something else to say, finally replying: “I can only say to -you, ‘God protect you.’” That was the only significant conversation -which I had that day. I believed the best way to have kept my distance -was through just such a completely neutral and inconsequential remark. - -DR. DIX: Well... - -SCHACHT: But perhaps you would like me to refer to the individual -gentlemen, and I can tell you with this exception just when I spoke to -these gentlemen for the last time. - -DR. DIX: Himmler? - -SCHACHT: Himmler, I would judge that perhaps I talked to him last in -1936. - -DR. DIX: Hess? - -SCHACHT: Hess—of course I am not referring to the conversations here in -the prison. I had not spoken with Hess for years before the beginning of -the war. - -DR. DIX: Ley? - -SCHACHT: Ley, I had not seen him since the beginning of the war. - -DR. DIX: Ribbentrop? - -SCHACHT: I saw Ribbentrop last after my being thrown out of the -Reichsbank, because I had to talk with him about the imminent journey to -India, and that must have been, I would judge, February 1939. I have not -talked with him since. - -DR. DIX: Rosenberg? - -SCHACHT: Rosenberg, always aside from this reception of Hitler’s, -perhaps not since 1936. - -DR. DIX: Frick? - -SCHACHT: I perhaps saw Frick last in the year 1938. - -DR. DIX: Schirach? - -SCHACHT: I did not even know Schirach. - -DR. DIX: Speer? - -SCHACHT: I talked with Speer for the last time—and I can tell you this -exactly—when I went to the World Exposition in Paris in the year 1937. - -DR. DIX: Of course, you are always referring to the time before you were -taken prisoner? - -SCHACHT: Yes, of course, naturally here I have... - -DR. DIX: Sauckel? - -SCHACHT: Not since the beginning of the war. - -DR. DIX: Seyss-Inquart? - -SCHACHT: Seyss-Inquart, I would judge that I spoke to him for the last -time in 1936, when I visited a colleague in the National Bank in -Austria. - -DR. DIX: Kaltenbrunner? - -SCHACHT: I saw Kaltenbrunner for the first time here at the prison. - -DR. DIX: We will refer to Hitler later. Frank is still missing. - -SCHACHT: I saw Frank last perhaps 1937 or 1938. - -DR. DIX: Most likely at the occasion of the speech you mentioned -yesterday? - -SCHACHT: Yes, possibly also afterwards at an official reception, but I -do not believe that I saw him after 1938. - -DR. DIX: Now, how about the leading men of the Wehrmacht, Keitel, for -instance? - -SCHACHT: I never had any contact with Keitel. I perhaps saw him at some -social gathering, but never after 1938. - -DR. DIX: Jodl? - -SCHACHT: I made Herr Jodl’s acquaintance here in the prison. - -DR. DIX: Dönitz? - -SCHACHT: I met Dönitz for the first time here in the prison. - -DR. DIX: Raeder? - -SCHACHT: Herr Raeder, I believe I have known him for quite some time. In -the beginning we exchanged occasional visits within the family, visits -of a semiofficial character but always on a friendly basis; however, I -believe that I have also not seen him or talked to him since 1938. - -DR. DIX: Brauchitsch? - -SCHACHT: I have not talked with Brauchitsch since 1939, or since 1938, -since the Fritsch affair. - -DR. DIX: How about Halder? - -SCHACHT: As you know, I saw Halder in connection with the Putsch in the -fall of 1938 but not after that. - -DR. DIX: How often did you see Hitler after your dismissal as President -of the Reichsbank? - -SCHACHT: After my dismissal as President of the Reichsbank? - -DR. DIX: Since January 1939. - -SCHACHT: I saw him once more in January 1939 because I had to discuss my -future activity, _et cetera_, with him. And on that occasion he asked -me—he knew that I had long wished to take an extensive journey—that I -might avail myself of this opportunity to take this journey now, so -there would not be so much talk about my leaving the Reichsbank. Then we -agreed on the trip to India. On that occasion I also saw Göring for the -last time. And then—after my return in August, I did not see him -again—then the war came, during the course of which I saw him twice. - -Shall I tell you about those two occasions? - -DR. DIX: Yes. - -SCHACHT: I saw him once in February 1940. At that time various American -magazines and periodicals had requested me to write articles on -Germany’s interpretation of the situation, her desires, and her position -in general. I had the inclination to do this, but because we were at -war, I naturally could not do so without first informing the Foreign -Minister. The Foreign Minister advised me that he had nothing against my -writing an article for an American periodical, but that before sending -off this article, he wanted to have the article submitted for -censorship. Of course that did not appeal to me—I had not even thought -of that—and, consequently, I did not write this article. - -However, there were further inquiries from America and I said to myself, -“It is not sufficient for me to talk with the Foreign Minister, I must -go to Hitler in this matter.” So, with that aim, I called on Hitler, who -received me very soon after my request, and I told him at that time, -among other things, just what my experience with Herr Von Ribbentrop had -been, and I further told him that I thought it might be quite expedient -to write these articles; and that it seemed vital to me to have -constantly someone in America, who by means of the press, _et cetera_, -could enlighten public opinion as to Germany and her interests. - -Hitler was favorably impressed with this suggestion of mine and said to -me, “I shall discuss this matter with the Foreign Minister.” -Consequently, this entire matter came to naught. - -Then, later, through the good offices of my Codefendant, Funk, who -probably had a discussion at that time with Ribbentrop about this -matter, I tried to get at least an answer from Ribbentrop. This answer, -given to Funk, was to the effect that it was still too early for a step -of that sort. And that was my visit in 1940. Then I saw Hitler again in -February of 1941... - -DR. DIX: Pardon my interruption. So that we can avoid all -misunderstandings, if Hitler had given you permission that you could -have gone to America, just what would your activities have been? Tell us -very briefly. I want no misunderstanding. - -SCHACHT: First of all, I had not proposed going myself; I rather made a -general suggestion. But, naturally, I would have been very glad to go to -America for I saw a possibility... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think it is material to know what -he would have done if something had happened which did not happen. - -DR. DIX: I just wanted to preclude any misunderstanding. I said that -misunderstandings—Well let us drop the subject. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Then, let us go on to your second visit. - -SCHACHT: In 1941, in February, I called on Hitler once more because of a -private affair. The year before my wife had died and now I intended to -remarry. As Minister without Portfolio, which I still was, I naturally -had to inform the Reich Chancellor and head of the State of my intention -and I called on him for that reason. There was no political discussion -on this occasion. As I was going to the door, he asked me, “At one time -you had the intention, or you advised me, that someone should go to -America. It is probably too late for that, now.” I replied immediately, -“Of course, it is too late for that now.” And that was the only remark -of a political nature made. The conversation dealt mainly with my -marriage, and since then I did not see Hitler any more. - -DR. DIX: And now your relations with Göring? - -SCHACHT: I did not see Göring either since 1939. - -DR. DIX: Now, I am turning to a point which has been repeatedly stressed -by the Prosecution, that is, the propaganda value of your participation -at Party rallies, and I would like to remind you of what Mr. Justice -Jackson has already mentioned in his opening statement. I am translating -from the English because I have no German text: - - “Does anyone believe that Hjalmar Schacht, seated in the first - row at the Nazi Party Rally of 1935 and wearing the Party - emblem, was only included in the film for the purpose of making - an artistic effect? This great thinker, in lending his name to - this threadbare undertaking, gave it respectability in the eyes - of every hesitating German.” - -Will you please state your opinion on this? - -SCHACHT: First of all, I would like to make a few minor corrections. In -1935 I did not have a Party emblem. Secondly, Germans who were -hesitating were no longer of any importance in 1935, for Hitler’s -domination had been firmly established by 1935. There were only those -people who were turning away from Hitler but none who were still coming -to him. And then, I must really consider it as a compliment that I am -called a figure of importance, a great thinker, and so forth; but I -believe that the reasons for my being and working in the Hitler Cabinet -have been set forth by me in sufficient detail, so that I need not go -into that any more. - -The fact that in the first years especially I could not very well absent -myself from the Party rallies is understandable, I believe, for they -were Hitler’s principal display of show and ostentation for the outside -world, and not only did his ministers participate in the Party rallies -but also a great many other representative guests. - -May I add just a few more words? - -I stayed away from the later Party rallies. For example, the Party Rally -of 1935 mentioned by the Chief Prosecutor. That was the Party rally—and -this is why I happen to remember it—at which the Nuremberg Laws against -the Jews were proclaimed, and at the time I was not even in Nuremberg. - -I attended the Party Rally in 1933 and in 1934. I am not certain whether -I attended it in 1936 or 1937. I rather believe that I attended in 1936. -I was decidedly missing at the later rallies and the last visit that I -made at the Party Rally, which I have just mentioned, I attended only on -“Wehrmacht Day.” - -DR. DIX: At these Party Rallies were the prominent foreigners—you -already mentioned that. Was the Diplomatic Corps represented by the -chiefs of the diplomatic missions? - -SCHACHT: I believe that with the exception of the Soviet Ambassador, in -the course of years all other leading diplomats attended the Party -Rally, and I must say, in large numbers, with great ostentation and -seated in the first rows. - -DR. DIX: How did you explain that? The Diplomatic Corps only really -takes part in functions of State and this was a purely Party matter? How -was this participation explained? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think this is objectionable. If it please the -Tribunal, I am in a position to object, because I am not embarrassed by -it, if there is any embarrassment, but for this witness to explain the -conduct of the ambassadors of other countries seems utterly beyond -probative value. His opinion of what the ambassadors were doing, why -they attended a Party rally which he was lending his name to, doesn’t -seem to me has any probative value. The fact that they attended I don’t -object to, but it seems to me that for him to probe, unless he has some -fact—and I want to make clear I don’t object to any facts that this -witness knows, and I haven’t objected to most of his opinions which we -have been getting at great length. But I think for him to characterize -the action of foreign representatives is going beyond the pale of -relevant and material evidence. - -SCHACHT: May I make just one remark in reply? - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better pass on, Dr. Dix. - -DR. DIX: Yes, of course. However, I would ask to be given the permission -to answer Mr. Justice Jackson briefly, not because I want to be -stubborn, but I believe that if I answer now I can avoid later -discussions and can save time thereby. I did not ask the defendant for -his opinion. Of course Mr. Justice Jackson is right in saying that he is -not here to give opinions about the customs of the Diplomatic Corps; but -I asked him about a fact: How this participation on the part of the -Diplomatic Corps, which is significant, was explained at that time. I -consider this relevant, as will be seen more than once in the course of -my questioning, and that is why I am saying it now, that throughout his -and his political friends’ oppositional activities, it is of prime -importance to know who gave them moral, spiritual, or any other support, -and who did not support them. And thereby, of course, the outward -demeanor of the official representatives of foreign countries during the -whole period is of tremendous importance, with regard to the capacity of -this opposition group to act. One can support such a group; one can be -neutral to it, or one can also combat it from abroad. That is the only -reason why I put my question, and I deem myself obligated to consider -this angle of the problem also in the future. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I don’t think Mr. Justice Jackson’s objection -was to the fact that the diplomatic representatives were there but to -comment upon the reasons why they were there. If all you want to prove -is the fact that they were there, then I don’t think Mr. Justice Jackson -was objecting to that. What the defendant was going on to give, was his -opinion of why the diplomatic representatives were there. - -DR. DIX: I believe I do not need to make a further reply. He has already -said that he does not wish to give an explanation, but if Your Lordship -will permit me, I shall continue. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Around that time, you certainly came into -contact with prominent foreigners both officially and privately. What -position did they take towards the trend of events at the time the -National Socialists consolidated their power? And how did their attitude -influence your own attitude and activity? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal! I dislike to interrupt -with objections, but I can’t see how it exonerates or aids this -defendant, that prominent foreigners may have been deceived by a regime -for which he was furnishing the window dressings with his own name and -prestige. Undoubtedly there were foreigners, I am willing to stipulate -there were foreigners, like Dahlerus, who were deceived by this set-up -of which he was a prominent and slightly respectable part. But it does -seem to me that if we are going to go into the attitude of foreigners -who are not indicted here or accused that we approach endless questions. - -I see no relevance in this sort of testimony. - -The question is here, as I have tried to point out to Dr. Dix, the sole -thing that is charged against this defendant is that he participated in -the conspiracy to put this nation into war and to carry out the War -Crimes and Crimes against Humanity incidental to it. - -Now, I can’t see how the attitude of foreigners either exonerates or -helps the Court to decide that question. If it does, of course I don’t -object to it, but I can’t see the importance of it at this stage. - -DR. DIX: I do believe that Mr. Justice Jackson... - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Dr. Dix, what exactly was the question -that you were asking at that moment? What had it reference to? - -DR. DIX: I asked the witness what the attitude was that was taken by -prominent foreigners with whom he came into contact at that time, -officially and privately during the period that the regime consolidated -its power. Did they reject the regime, or were they sympathetic to it? -In other words, just how far did these foreigners influence him and his -thinking? And may I... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you know, Dr. Dix, that to ask one witness what -the attitude of other people is is a very much too general form of -question. Attitude—what does the word mean? It is far too general, and -I do not understand exactly what you are trying to prove. - -DR. DIX: I will make the question more precise. - -How, Dr. Schacht, through your exchange of thoughts with foreigners, was -your personal attitude influenced? How was your attitude and your -activity influenced through the attitude of these foreigners? - -[_Turning to the Tribunal._] That is something which Dr. Schacht can -testify to alone, because it is of an intimate nature and personal to -Schacht. Your Lordship, I want quite openly to state the point to be -proved which seems very relevant to the Defense and on which this -question is based. I do not wish to conceal anything. - -I, the Defense, maintain that this oppositional group—about which -Gisevius has already spoken, and of which Schacht was a prominent -member—that this group not only received no support from abroad, but -that foreigners rendered the opposition more difficult. That is not a -criticism that is leveled towards foreign governments. - -There is no doubt that the representatives of these countries took that -attitude in good faith and with a sense of duty in the service of their -countries. But it was of decisive value for the attitude of these men of -this oppositional group what position the foreign countries took to this -regime; whether they respected or whether they supported it by -precedence given its representatives, socially, as far as possible, or, -through caution and reserve, showed their disinclination to it, thereby -strengthening this oppositional group. - -This evidence is of the utmost importance to me in the carrying on of -the defense. I have stated it quite openly, and, as much as I can, I -will fight for this piece of evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal has considered the argument which -you have presented to it and they think that the investigation of these -facts is a waste of time and is irrelevant. They will, therefore, ask -you to go on with the further examination of the defendant. - -DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, you supported the rearmament through financing by -the Reichsbank. Why did you do that? - -SCHACHT: I considered that Germany absolutely had to have political -equality with other nations, and I am of the same opinion today; and in -order to reach this state, it was necessary that either the general -disarmament which had been promised by the Allied powers would come into -effect, or that if equal rights were to be obtained Germany would have -to rearm on a corresponding scale. - -DR. DIX: Was this financial help by the Reichsbank your work alone or -was that decreed through the Directorate of the Reichsbank? - -SCHACHT: In the Reichsbank, the Leadership Principle was never applied; -I rejected the Leadership Principle for the Reichsbank. The Reichsbank -was governed by a group of men all of whom had an equal power to vote -and if there was a “tie,” the vote of the chairman was the decisive -vote, and beyond that the chairman had no rights in this board. - -DR. DIX: You are familiar with the affidavit of the former Reichsbank -Director Puhl. Did—I put the question taking into consideration the -contents of this affidavit with which the Tribunal is acquainted—Puhl -also participate in giving financial help from the Reichsbank for -rearmament? - -SCHACHT: Herr Puhl participated in all decisions which were made by the -Reichsbank Directorate on this question and not once did he oppose the -decision reached. - -DR. DIX: It is known to you that the Reichsbank’s method of financing -consisted in the discounting of the so-called mefo bills. The -Prosecution have discussed this fact in detail and the afore-mentioned -affidavit signed by Puhl says that this method made it possible to keep -the extent of rearmament secret. Is that correct? - -SCHACHT: We cannot even talk about keeping the armament a secret. I call -your attention to some excerpts from documents presented and submitted -by the Prosecution themselves as exhibits. I quote first of all from the -affidavit by George Messersmith, dated 30 August 1945, Document Number -2385-PS, where it says on Page 3, Line 19: “Immediately after the Nazis -came into power they started a vast rearmament program.” And on Page 8 -it says: “The huge German armament program which was never a secret....” - -Thus, Mr. George Messersmith, who was in Berlin at the time, knew about -these matters and I am sure, informed his colleagues also. - -I continue quoting from Document Number EC-461. It is the diary of -Ambassador Dodd, where it says, under 19 September 1934, and I quote in -English for I just have the English text before me: - - “When Schacht declared that the Germans are not arming so - intensively, I said: Last January and February Germany bought - from American aircraft people one million dollars worth of - high-class war flying machinery and paid in gold.” - -This is from a conversation between Dodd and myself which took place in -September 1934 and he points out that already in January and February -1934 war aircraft... - -[_The proceedings were interrupted by technical difficulties in the -lighting system._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know how long you expect to be -with your examination-in-chief of the defendant. You have already been -nearly a whole day, and the Tribunal think, in view of the directions in -the Charter, that the examination of the defendant ought to finish -certainly in a day. - -DR. DIX: Your Lordship, there are two things I do not like to do, to -make prophecies which do not come true and to make a promise I cannot -keep. - -May I answer the question by saying that I consider it quite impossible -for me to finish today. I am fully aware of the rules of the Charter, -but on the other hand I am asking you to consider that the Prosecution -have tried to prove the accusations against Schacht by numerous pieces -of evidence, directly and indirectly relevant facts, and that it is my -duty to deal with these individual pieces of evidence offered by the -Prosecution. - -Please apply strict measures to my questions and if the Tribunal should -be of the opinion that there is something irrelevant, then I shall -certainly adhere to their ruling. However, I do think that I have not -only the right, but also the duty to put any questions which are -necessary to refute the evidence submitted by the Prosecution. - -I shall, therefore, certainly not be able to finish today. I think—I -should be extremely grateful if you would not make me prophesy, it may -go faster and tomorrow I may finish in the course of the day but it may -even take the whole day—I cannot say for certain. In any case, I shall -make every effort to put only relevant questions. If the Tribunal should -be of the opinion that something is not relevant, I ask to be told so -after I have explained my standpoint. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you had better get on at once then, Dr. Dix, and -we’ll tell you when we think your questions are too long or too -irrelevant. - -DR. DIX: Now, Dr. Schacht, we were considering the mefo bills, did you -consider them as a suitable means of keeping the rearmament secret? Have -you anything else to say to that question? - -SCHACHT: The mefo bills as such, as far as rearmament was concerned, had -of course no connection with the question of secrecy, for the mefo bills -were used to pay every supplier. And there were, of course, hundreds and -thousands of small and big suppliers all over the country. - -Apart from that, before they could be taken to the Reichsbank, the mefo -bills circulated among the public for at least 3 months and the -suppliers who required cash used the mefo bills to discount them in -their banks or to have advances made on the strength of them, so that -all banks participated in this system. - -But I should like to add also that all the mefo bills, which were taken -up by the Reichsbank, were listed on the bill account of the Reichsbank. -Furthermore, I should like to say that the keeping secret of State -expenditure—and armament expenditures were State expenditure—was not a -matter for the President of the Reichsbank but an affair concerning the -Reich Minister of Finance. If the Reich Minister of Finance did not -publish the guarantees which he had accepted for the mefo bills, then -that was his affair and not mine. I am not responsible for that. The -responsibility for that lies with the Reich Minister of Finance. - -DR. DIX: The next question, Your Lordship, might arouse doubts as to its -relevancy. I personally consider it irrelevant for the verdict in this -Trial. However, it has been mentioned by the Prosecution, and for that -reason alone I think it is my duty to give Dr. Schacht an opportunity to -reply and to justify himself. - -The Prosecution have represented the view that the financing by means of -mefo bills, from the point of view of a solid financial procedure, was -also very hazardous. One might adopt the view that that may have been -the case or not to make this verdict... - -THE PRESIDENT: Ask the question, Dr. Dix, ask the question. - -DR. DIX: You have heard what I have in mind. - -SCHACHT: It goes without saying that in normal times and under normal -economic conditions such means as mefo bills would not have been -resorted to. But if there is an emergency, then it has always been -customary, and it has always been a policy recommended by all experts, -that the issuing bank should furnish cheap money and credits so that the -economic system can, in turn, continue to function. - -Mefo bills, of course, were a thoroughly risky operation, but they were -absolutely not risky if they were connected with a reasonable financial -procedure and to prove this I would say that if Herr Hitler, after 1937, -had used the accruing funds to pay back the mefo bills, as had been -intended—the money was available—then this system would have come to -its end just as smoothly as I had put it in operation. But Herr Hitler -preferred simply to refuse to pay the bills back, and instead to invest -the money in further armament. I could not foresee that someone would -break his word in such a matter too, a purely business matter. - -DR. DIX: But, if the Reich had met the bills and had paid, then means -would no doubt have partly been lacking for further rearmaments and the -taking up of the bills would therefore have curtailed armament. Is that -a correct conclusion? - -SCHACHT: That, of course, was the very purpose of my wanting to -terminate the procedure. I said if the mefo bills were not met, it would -obviously show ill-will; then there would be further rearming, and that -cannot be. - -DR. DIX: Earlier you briefly dealt with the question of keeping armament -secret in another connection. Have you anything to add to that? - -SCHACHT: I think in a general manner it must be realized that State -expenditures do not come under the jurisdiction of the President of the -Reichsbank, and that the expenses and receipts of the State are under -the control of the Reich Minister of Finance, and consequently the -responsibility lies in his hands and it is his duty to publish the -figures. Every bill which the Reichsbank had in its possession was made -known every week. - -DR. DIX: Is that what you have to add to your answer to the basic -question of allegedly keeping the armament program secret? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -DR. DIX: You have also already explained on the side why you -fundamentally were in favor of rearmament. Have you anything to add to -that? - -SCHACHT: Yes. A few very important remarks are, of course, to be made on -that and since this question concerns the chief accusation against me, I -may perhaps deal with it in greater detail. - -I considered an unarmed Germany in the center of Europe, surrounded by -armed nations, as a menace to peace. I want to say that these states -were not only armed but that they were, to a very large part, continuing -to arm and arming anew. Especially two states which had not existed -before, Czechoslovakia and Poland, were beginning to arm, and England, -for example, was continuing to rearm, specifically with reference to her -naval rearmament in 1935, _et cetera_. - -I should like to say quite briefly that I myself was of the opinion that -a country which was not armed could not defend itself, and that -consequently it would have no voice in the concert of nations. The -British Prime Minister Baldwin once said, in 1935: - - “A country which is not willing to take necessary precautionary - measures for its own defense will never have power in this - world, neither moral power nor material power.” - -I considered the inequality of status between the countries surrounding -Germany and Germany as a permanent moral and material danger to Germany. - -I further want to point out—and this is not meant to be criticism, but -merely a statement of fact—that Germany, after the Treaty of -Versailles, was in a state of extreme disorganization and confusion. -Conditions in Europe were such that, for example, a latent conflict and -controversy existed between Russia and Finland and between Russia and -Poland which had considerable parts of Russian territory. There was -Russia’s latent conflict with Romania which had Bessarabia, and then -Romania had a conflict with Bulgaria about the Dobruja and one with -Hungary about Siebenbürgen. There were conflicts between Serbia and -Hungary, and between Hungary and nearly all her neighbors and between -Bulgaria and Greece. In short all of Eastern Europe was in a continuous -state of mutual suspicion and conflict of interests. - -In addition, there was the fact that in a number of countries there were -most serious internal conflicts. I remind you of the conflict between -the Czechs and the Slovaks. I remind you of the civil war conditions in -Spain. All that will make it possible to understand that I considered it -absolutely essential that in the event of the outbreak of any -conflagration in this devil’s punch bowl, it was an absolute necessity -for Germany to protect at least her neutral attitude. That could not -possibly be done with that small army of 100,000 men. For that an -adequate army had to be created. - -Here in prison I accidentally came across an edition of the _Daily -Mail_, dated April 1937, where the conditions in Europe were described, -and I beg you to allow me to quote one single sentence. I shall have to -quote it in English. It does not represent the views of the _Daily -Mail_; it only describes conditions in Europe. - -I quote: - - “All observers are agreed that there is continual peril of an - explosion and that the crazy frontiers of the peace treaties - cannot be indefinitely maintained. Here, too, rigorous - non-interference should be the King of the British chariot. What - vital interests have we in Austria or in Czechoslovakia, or in - Romania, or in Lithuania or Poland?” - -This merely describes the seething state of Europe at that time, and in -this overheated boiling pot which was always on the point of exploding, -there was Germany, unarmed. I considered that a most serious danger to -my country. - -Now, I shall probably be asked whether I considered Germany threatened -in any way. No, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I did not consider Germany -threatened directly with an attack, nor was I of the opinion that Russia -was likely to attack Germany. However, for example, we had experienced -the invasion of the Ruhr in 1923 and these past events and the actual -situation made it imperative for me to demand equality for Germany and -to support a policy that would attempt to achieve this. - -I assume that we shall deal with the reasons for the carrying out of the -rearmament and with the reaction of foreign countries, _et cetera_. - -DR. DIX: What did you know at the time about Germany’s efforts to cause -the other nations to disarm? Did that have anything to do with your -decisions? - -SCHACHT: Let me tell you the following: - -Fundamentally, I was not in favor of rearmament. I only wanted equality -for Germany. That German equality could be brought about either by means -of disarmament on the part of the other nations or by our own -rearmament. I would have preferred, in fact I desired disarmament on the -part of the others, which anyway had been promised to us. Consequently I -most zealously tried all along for years to prevent a rearmament, if -general disarmament could be brought about. - -The disarmament on the part of the others did not take place, although -the Disarmament Committee of the League of Nations had repeatedly -declared that Germany had met her obligations regarding disarmament. - -To all of us who were members of the so-called National Government at -the time, and to all Germans who participated in political life, it was -a considerable relief that during the first years Hitler, again and -again, strove for and suggested general disarmament. Afterwards, of -course, it is easy to say that that was a false pretense and a lie on -Hitler’s part, but that false pretense and that lie would have blown up -quite quickly if the countries abroad had shown the slightest -inclination to take up these suggestions. - -I remember quite well what was told Foreign Minister Eden of Great -Britain when he visited Germany at the beginning of 1934, because I was -present at the social festivities. Quite concrete proposals concerning -Germany’s obligations in all disarmament questions, in case disarmament -on the part of the others was begun and carried out, were made to him. -It was promised to Eden that all so-called half-military units, like the -SS, the SA, and the Hitler Youth, would be deprived of their military -character if only the general disarmament could be accelerated by those -means. - -I could produce a number of quotations regarding these offers to disarm, -but since it is the wish of the President not to delay the proceedings, -I can forego that. They are all well-known statements made by statesmen -and ministers, ambassadors, and such, all of which have the same tenor, -namely, that it was absolutely essential that the promise made by the -Allies should be kept; in other words, that disarmament should be -carried out. - -DR. DIX: Excuse me if I interrupt you, but we can do it more quickly and -more simply by asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of Exhibit -Number Schacht-12, which I have been granted, without my reading it, -Page 31 of the English translation of my document book. These are -pertinent remarks and speeches made by Lord Cecil and others, by the -Belgian Foreign Minister, _et cetera_. There is no need to read them; -they can be presented. I just hear that they have been presented, and I -can refer to them. - -Pardon me, please. Continue. - -SCHACHT: Well, in that case I am finished with my statement. Hitler made -still further offers but the other countries did not take up a single -one of these offers, and thus, unfortunately, only one alternative -remained, and that was rearmament. That rearmament carried out by Hitler -was financed with my assistance, and I assume responsibility for -everything I have done in that connection. - -DR. DIX: Do I understand you correctly? Can one draw the conclusion from -your statement that there were other reasons for your assistance in the -rearmament program, that you had the tactical consideration that, by -putting German rearmament up for discussion, the debate on disarmament -amongst the other governments might be started again? This debate, so to -say, had died down? - -SCHACHT: If I may, I will illustrate it briefly by means of an example: - -Two parties have a contract with each other. One party does not live up -to that contract, and the other party has no way of making him fulfill -his obligations. Thus the other party can do nothing except, in turn, -not adhere to the contract. That is what Germany did. That is what I -supported. Now, of course, I must say that I had expected a type of -reaction which in such a case must always be expected from the partner -to a contract, namely, that he would say, “Well, if you do not keep up -the contract either, then we shall have to discuss this contract again.” - -I must say—and I can quite safely use the word—it was a disappointment -to me that Germany’s rearmament was not in any way replied to by any -actions from the Allies. This so-called breach of contract on Germany’s -part against the Versailles Treaty was taken quite calmly. A note of -protest was all; nothing in the least was done, apart from that, to -bring up again the question of disarmament in which I was interested. - -Not only was Germany allowed to go on rearming but the Naval Agreement -with Great Britain did, in fact, give Germany the legal right to rearm -contrary to the Versailles Treaty. Military missions were sent to -Germany to look at this rearmament, and German military displays were -visited and everything else was done, but nothing at all was done to -stop Germany’s rearmament. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If the Tribunal please, I cannot see the point of -all this detail. We have conceded that rearmament here, except as it was -involved with aggressive purposes, is immaterial. As I said in the -opening, the United States does not care to try here the issues of -European politics, nor are they submitted to this Tribunal for decision. - -The sole question here is the Indictment, charging arming with the -purpose of aggression. - -I do not want to interfere with the defendant giving any facts that bear -on his aggressive intentions, but the details of negotiations, of -European politics and charges and countercharges between governments, it -seems to me, lies way back of any inquiry that we could possibly make, -and the details of this matter seem to me not helpful to the solution of -the issues here, and I think was ruled out by the Tribunal in the case -of Göring, if I am not mistaken. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Dix, it all seems to be a matter of argument, -and argument isn’t really the subject of evidence. - -DR. DIX: I do not believe so, Your Lordship. What Mr. Justice Jackson -said is quite correct. Schacht is accused of having assisted in bringing -about an aggressive war, but this assistance of his is supposed to have -consisted in the financing which he carried out. - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Dix, and do try to make it as short as -possible. - -DR. DIX: I think you had come to the end of that question anyway. - -May I refer in this connection to one of the motives for Dr. Schacht’s -assistance in rearmament. It was his hope to renew the debate on -disarmament. May I draw your attention to Exhibit Number Schacht-36, -Page 141 of the German text, and Page 149 of the English text? It is an -affidavit from Dr. Schacht’s son-in-law, Dr. Von Scherpenberg. On Page 2 -of that affidavit you will find the following brief paragraph which I -propose to read; in fact, I can confine myself to one sentence: - - “He”—that is to say, Schacht—“considered rearmament within - certain limits to be the only means for the re-establishing of - the disturbed equilibrium and the only means of inducing the - other European powers to participate in a limitation of - armaments which, in opposition to the Versailles Treaty, they - had sought to avoid.” - -That is a statement of Scherpenberg regarding conversations which -Schacht had had at that time. It is, therefore, not an _ex post facto_ -opinion; it is the report of a conversation which he, Scherpenberg, had -with his father-in-law Schacht at that time. That is just an additional -remark I wanted to make. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] You have spoken about the rearmament on -the part of the other states, particularly Czechoslovakia and Poland, -but can you tell us whether at the time you knew of or heard any exact -details regarding the state of armament of those two states? - -SCHACHT: I know only that it was known about Russia that in 1935 she -announced that her peacetime army should be increased to 960,000 men. - -Then I knew that in Czechoslovakia, for instance, the installation of -airdromes was one of the leading tasks of rearmament. We knew that Great -Britain’s Navy was to be stepped up. - -DR. DIX: Did you later on completely abandon your idea of general -disarmament? - -SCHACHT: To the contrary, I used every opportunity, in particular during -conversations with men from abroad, to say that the aim should always be -disarmament, that, of course, rearmament would always mean an economic -burden for us, which we considered a most unpleasant state of affairs. - -I remember a conversation which I had with the American Ambassador -Davies. His report of this conversation is incorporated in an exhibit -that has been submitted to the Tribunal. It is an entry in a diary which -is repeated in his book, _Mission to Moscow_, and it is dated as early -as 20 June 1937, Berlin. He is writing about the fact that among other -things he and I had talked about disarmament problems, and I need only -quote one sentence. I do not have the number of the document, Your -Lordship, but it has been submitted to the Tribunal. - -DR. DIX: It is Exhibit Schacht-18, German Page 43, English Page 49. - -SCHACHT: Since I have only the English text, I shall read from it. - -Davies writes: - - “When I outlined the President’s (Roosevelt) suggestion of - limitation of armament to defensive weapons only, such as a man - could carry on his shoulder, he (means Schacht) almost jumped - out of his seat with enthusiasm.” - -It becomes clear, therefore, from Ambassador Davies’ remark that I was -most enthusiastic about this renewed attempt and the possibility of an -imminent step towards disarmament as proposed by President Roosevelt. - -In this same book, Davies reports a few days later on 26 June 1937 about -the conversation he had with me, in a letter addressed to the President -of the United States. I quote only one very brief paragraph—in English -again: - - “I then stated to him (that is, Schacht) that the President in - conversation with me had analyzed the European situation and had - considered that a solution might be found in an agreement among - the European nations to a reduction of armaments to a purely - defensive military basis and this through the elimination of - aircraft, tanks, and heavy equipment, and the limitation of - armaments to such weapons only as a man could carry on his back, - with an agreement among the nations for adequate policing of the - plan by a neutral state. Schacht literally jumped at the idea. - He said: ‘That’s absolutely the solution.’ He said that in its - simplicity it had the earmarks of great genius. His enthusiasm - was extraordinary.” - -DR. DIX: To what extent did you want rearmament? - -SCHACHT: Not beyond equality with every single one of our neighbor -states. - -DR. DIX: And did Hitler talk to you of far-reaching intentions, or did -you hear of any? - -SCHACHT: At no time did he tell them to me, nor did I hear from anyone -else, whether he had made remarks about further intentions. - -DR. DIX: Were you informed about the extent, the type and speed of -rearmament? - -SCHACHT: No, I was never told about that. - -DR. DIX: Had you set yourself a limit regarding this financing or were -you prepared to advance any amount of money? - -SCHACHT: I was certainly, by no means, ready to advance any unlimited -amount of money, particularly as these were not contributions; they were -credits which had to be repaid. The limits for these credits were -twofold. One was that the Reichsbank was independent of the State -finance administration, and the supreme authority of the State as far as -the granting of the credits was concerned. The Board of Directors of the -Reichsbank could pass a resolution that credits were to be given, or -were not to be given, or that credits were to be stopped, if they -considered it right, and as I was perfectly certain of the policy of the -Board of Directors of the Reichsbank—all of these gentlemen agreed with -me perfectly on financial and banking policy—this was the first -possibility of applying a brake, if I considered it necessary. - -The second safeguard—limit was contained in the agreement which the -Minister of Finance, the Government, and of course Hitler had made—the -mefo bills, of which these credits consisted, were to be paid back when -they expired. They were repayable after 5 years, and I have already said -that if the repayments had been made, funds for rearmament would -naturally have had to decrease. Therein lay the second possibility of -limiting the rearmament. - -DR. DIX: Will you please give now to the Tribunal the figures which you -were dealing with at the time? - -SCHACHT: We went up to... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We have no desire to enter into controversy about -the figures of financing rearmament. It seems that the detail of dollars -and cents or Reichsmarks is unimportant to this, and terribly involved. -We aren’t trying whether it cost too much or too little; the purpose of -this rearmament is the only question we have in mind. I don’t see that -the statistics of cost have anything to do with it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, we would like to know what figures the accused -and you are talking about. - -DR. DIX: The amounts that Schacht as President of the Reichsbank was -ready to grant for the rearmament program; that, no doubt, is relevant, -because if those amounts remained within such limits as might possibly -be considered adequate for defensive rearmaments in case of emergency, -then, of course, the extent of that financial assistance is a very -important piece of evidence regarding the intentions which Schacht was -pursuing at the time. That is the very thing that, in the case of -Schacht, Mr. Justice Jackson considers relevant, namely, whether he -helped prepare for an aggressive war. If he were considering only the -possibility of a defensive war in his financing and placed only sums at -the disposal of the rearmament program which would never have allowed an -aggressive war, then that would refute the accusation raised by the -Prosecution against the defendant, and I think that the relevance of -that question cannot be doubted. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that if the Defendant Schacht placed at -the disposal of the Reich, say, 100 millions, or whatever the figure is, -it would be defensive, and if he placed 150 millions, it would be not -defensive, or what? Is it simply the amount? - -DR. DIX: No, I want to say that if, as will be proved, he only wanted to -give 9 and later on gave hesitatingly and unwillingly 12 millions for -the purpose, then that contribution can never have been aimed at an -aggressive war. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is simply the amount? - -DR. DIX: Yes, only the size of the amount. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, that can be stated very shortly, but as for details -of finance... - -DR. DIX: I am also of the opinion that we have talked about it too long. -I was only going to ask, “What amount did you give?” and then the -objection was raised, and thus the discussion was drawn out. May I put -the question? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Well, then, what amount did you -intend to grant? - -SCHACHT: Naturally as little as possible; however, what I contributed is -what is decisive. I placed at their disposal—to give one figure and to -be very brief—until 31 March 1938, credits amounting to a total of -12,000,000,000 Reichsmark. I have discussed that with one of the -interrogators of the British Prosecution, who asked me about the -subject, and I replied that that was about one-third of the amount which -was spent on rearmament. After that, without the Reichsbank, beginning -with 1 April 1938, the figure stated in that budget year for rearmament -was 11,000,000,000, and in the subsequent year, 20,500,000,000, and of -that not a pfennig came from the Reichsbank. - -DR. DIX: That was after your resignation, was it not? - -SCHACHT: That was after I had stopped credits. - -For the record I should like to say that I think I made a mistake -before. I said millions instead of milliards, but I think it is obvious -what I meant. I wanted only to correct it. - -DR. DIX: Now, then, Dr. Schacht, the Prosecution have stated that on 19 -February 1935 the Ministry of Finance received authority to borrow -unlimited amounts of money if Hitler ordered them to do so. - -SCHACHT: Here, again, the prosecutor did not see things in the proper -light. The President of the Reichsbank is not responsible for the -actions of the Reich Minister of Finance. I think the President of the -Federal Reserve Bank in New York can hardly be held responsible for the -things done by the Secretary of the Treasury in Washington. - -DR. DIX: You have also been accused that the debt of the Reich increased -three times during the time while you were President of the Reichsbank. - -SCHACHT: I might just as well be accused of being responsible for the -fact that the birth rate in Germany rose sharply during the time I was -President of the Reichsbank. I want to emphasize the fact that I had -nothing to do with either. - -DR. DIX: You were not responsible for the same reason. - -SCHACHT: No, of course I am not responsible for that. - -DR. DIX: And presumably the same applies to the point made by the -Prosecution that you allegedly drafted a new finance program in 1938? - -SCHACHT: On the contrary, I refused to do anything else for the -financing of rearmament; the finance program was drafted by a state -secretary in the Reich Finance Ministry, and it looked like it. - -DR. DIX: One of your economic policies, during the time you were -Minister of Economy, and which you have been accused of as being a -preparation for war, was the so-called “New Plan” (Neue Plan). What was -that? - -SCHACHT: May I first of all say that the New Plan had nothing at all to -do with rearmament. Germany, after the Treaty of Versailles, had fallen -into a state of distress, economically speaking and especially export... - -DR. DIX: Your Lordship, if the Tribunal is of the opinion that the New -Plan has nothing to do with the rearmament and preparations for war—I -think the Prosecution are of the opposite opinion—then, of course, the -question is irrelevant, and I will drop it. I am only putting it because -the New Plan has been used in the argumentation of the Prosecution. - -THE PRESIDENT: If you say, and the defendant has just said that the New -Plan had nothing to do with rearmament, I think you might leave it for -cross-examination and you can raise it again in re-examination if it is -cross-examined. - -DR. DIX [_Turning to the defendant_]: In that case I shall not ask you -about the barter agreements, either. I shall leave it to the Prosecution -to bring it out during the cross-examination. I cannot see what it has -to do with the preparation for war. - -Now, you have already stated that you strove to remove the Versailles -Treaty by means of peaceful negotiations, or at least, to modify it. In -the opinion which you held at that time did any such means for a -peaceful modification of the Versailles Treaty still exist? - -SCHACHT: In my opinion, there were no means other than peaceful ones. -The desire to modify the Versailles Treaty by means of a new war was a -crime. - -DR. DIX: Well. But now you are being accused that the alleged -preparations for war, which really were a countermeasure to the general -rearmament although not a preparation for an aggressive war, were -nevertheless a rearmament, and as such, were an infringement of the -Treaty of Versailles. I assume that you, at the time, decided to help -finance that rearmament only after giving the problem due legal and -moral considerations. What, exactly, were these considerations? - -SCHACHT: I think I have already answered that question in detail. I need -add nothing else. - -DR. DIX: Very well. Insofar as you know, was this attitude of yours, the -attitude of a pacifist and of someone who was definitely opposed to the -extension of living space in Europe, known abroad? - -SCHACHT: As long as I have been President of the Reichsbank, that is to -say from March 1933—and I am, of course, only talking about the Hitler -regime—my friends and acquaintances abroad were fully informed about my -attitude and views. I had a great many friends and acquaintances abroad, -not only because of my profession but also outside of that and -particularly in Basel, Switzerland, where we had our monthly meeting at -the International Bank, with all the presidents of the issuing banks of -all the great and certain neutral countries, and I always took occasion -at all these meetings to describe quite clearly the situation in Germany -to these gentlemen. - -Perhaps I may at this point refer to the so-called conducting of foreign -conferences or conversations. If one is not allowed to talk to -foreigners any more, then one cannot, of course, reach an understanding -with them. Those silly admonitions, that one had to avoid contact with -foreigners, seem entirely uncalled for to me, and if the witness -Gisevius deemed it necessary the other day to protect his dead comrades, -who were my comrades too, from being accused of committing high treason, -then I should like to say that I consider it quite unnecessary. Never at -any time did any member of our group betray any German interests. To the -contrary, he fought for the interests of Germany, and to prove that, I -should like to give you a good example: - -After we had occupied Paris, the files of the Quai d’Orsay were -confiscated and were carefully screened by officials from the German -Foreign Office. I need not assure you that they were primarily looking -for proof whether there were not any so-called defeatists circles in -Germany which had unmasked themselves somewhere abroad. All the files of -the Quai d’Orsay referring to my person and, of course, there were -records of many discussions which I had had with Frenchmen, were -examined by the Foreign Office officials at that time, without my -knowing it. - -One day—I think it probably happened in the course of 1941—I received -a letter from a German professor who had participated in this search -carried out by the Foreign Office. I shall mention the name so that, if -necessary, he can testify. He is a Professor of Finance and National -Economy, Professor Stückenbeck of Erlangen, and he wrote me that at this -investigation... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal cannot see any point in this, so far as this -Trial is concerned. In any event, if the defendant says that he did not, -in any way, give away the interests of Germany, surely that is -sufficient. We do not need all the details about it. What it has got to -do with this Trial, I do not know. - -DR. DIX: I think, Your Lordship, that that was not the point of the -statement. What he wants to say is that reliable men abroad knew him and -were acquainted with the fact that he was certainly a man of peace and -not a man who prepared aggressive wars, and that applies even to the -period of rearmament. - -THE PRESIDENT: But he said that 5 minutes ago. - -DR. DIX: I do not think the question of Professor Stückenbeck is so -important, but it certainly seems pertinent to me what Ambassador Davies -said about his conversation with the then Foreign Commissar of the -Soviet Republic, Litvinov. This is contained in Exhibit Schacht-18 of my -document book. It is Page 43 of the German text, and Page 49 of the -English text. May I read one paragraph, and then ask Dr. Schacht briefly -whether that statement of Ambassador Davies corresponds to his -recollection? It is Davies’ report, an extract from his book _Mission to -Moscow_. A report is there to the Secretary of State in the United -States. The passage is on Pages 108 and 109. - - “Pursuant to an appointment made, I called upon Commissar for - Foreign Affairs Litvinov to present my respects before departure - for the United States. - - “I then stated that the European situation in its elementals - looked simple and that it was difficult to understand why the - statesmanship of Europe could not provide that England, France, - Germany, Italy, and Russia should agree to preserve the - territorial integrity of Europe and through trade agreements - provide Germany with raw materials, thereby giving the assurance - that she could live, which would relieve the peoples of Europe - and the world of these terrific burdens of armament and of the - fear of catastrophic war. The prompt rejoinder was: ‘Do you - think Hitler would ever agree to anything like that?’ I said - that I did not know, but that it was my opinion that there was a - very substantial body of influential and responsible men in - Germany that such an idea would appeal to. Litvinov replied that - he thought that might be so; that Schacht was of that type; he - did not think they could prevail against Hitler and the - political and military forces dominant in Germany.” - -And now I ask you, do you remember that conversation with Davies? - -SCHACHT: I think there must be a mistake. I did not speak to Davies -about this, I spoke to Litvinov. This is a report of Davies to the -Secretary of State, about which I did not know. - -DR. DIX: Yes, you are perfectly right. - -It has been repeatedly emphasized by the Prosecution that your knowledge -of Hitler’s intentions of war resulted also from your being -Plenipotentiary for War Economy and a member of the Reich Defense -Counsel. Göring has made a detailed statement on it. Have you anything -new to add to Göring’s statement? - -SCHACHT: I think the witness Lammers has also talked about it. I should -like merely to confirm that the first Reich Defense Counsel of 1935 was -nothing other than the legalization of a committee which existed before -1933, made up of ministerial officials who were supposed to deal with -economic measures as well as administrative measures, which might have -to be taken in the event of a threat of war against Germany. - -DR. DIX: How often did you have a meeting especially with the Minister -of War and the Plenipotentiary for Administration? - -SCHACHT: This famous triumvirate, this Three Man College described by -one of the prosecutors as the cornerstone of war policy, never met at -all, and it is no wonder that we lost the war, if that was the -cornerstone. - -DR. DIX: The Prosecution have also referred to the report of the -Ministry of War regarding the task of the Reich Defense Counsel of 1934. -It is Document Number EC-128, Exhibit Number USA-623. Have you anything -in particular to add to that? - -SCHACHT: Yes, I should like to have permission to quote one very brief -paragraph. I see there are only two sentences. This report contains the -following statement: - -Referring to the experiences of World War I, that is 1914 to 1918, and I -quote—I shall have to do it in English since I have only the English, I -quote: - - “At that time we were able to extend our bases for raw materials - and production toward the West: Longwy, Briey, Tourcoing, - Roubaix, Antwerp (textiles), and toward the East, Lodz, and - Southeast (ore mines in Serbia and Turkey, mineral oils in - Romania). Today we have to reckon with the possibility of being - thrown back in our own country and even of being deprived - thereby of most valuable industrial and raw material in the West - and in the East.” - -I think that if anyone wanting to prepare an aggressive war had -calculated in September 1934 that one would have to protect oneself -against the possibility of such a situation arising, that this is the -best proof that there can be no question of an aggressive war at all. - -DR. DIX: In that connection, under the heading of “peaceful efforts,” -can you perhaps also tell the Tribunal what your peaceful efforts were, -to have the reparations clauses of the Versailles Treaty modified or -even abolished? - -SCHACHT: From the very first moment, after the reparations were -determined in 1921 or so, I fought against this nonsense with the -argument that the carrying out of those reparations would throw the -entire world into economic chaos. One cannot, during one generation, pay -120,000,000,000 Reichsmark or about 2,000,000,000 Reichsmark yearly, as -at that time... - -DR. DIX: We would like to make it brief. Will you please talk only about -your peaceful efforts and not about national economy? - -SCHACHT: All right, I will not talk about national economy. - -I fought against it and, as time went by, I did succeed in convincing -the people of almost all the countries that this was sheer nonsense. -Therefore in July of 1932, if I am not mistaken, the then Reich -Chancellor Papen was in a position to affix his signature to an -agreement at Lausanne, which reduced reparations, _de jure_, to a -pending sum of 3,000,000,000, and which, _de facto_, canceled -reparations altogether. - -DR. DIX: Did you then continue your definitely peaceful efforts in other -fields? You have already touched upon the negotiations in Paris -regarding the colonial question. I wonder if you have anything to add to -that in this connection? - -SCHACHT: I do not remember at the moment how far I had gone at the time, -but I think I reported on the negotiations in detail, so I need not -repeat. - -DR. DIX: George Messersmith, the often-mentioned former Consul General -of the United States in Berlin, states in his affidavit Document Number -EC-451, Exhibit Number USA-626, to which the Prosecution have referred, -that he is of the opinion that the National Socialist regime could not -have been in a position to stay in power and build up its war machine if -it had not been for your activity. At the end of the case for the -Prosecution, the Prosecution present that thesis of Messersmith. -Therefore I should like you to make a statement on this subject. - -SCHACHT: I do not know whether that completely unsubstantiated private -opinion of Mr. Messersmith has any value as evidence. Nevertheless, I -should like to contradict it by means of a few figures. I had stated -earlier that until 31 March 1938, the Reichsbank had given -12,000,000,000; that is to say, during the first fiscal year, about -2,250,000,000, and during the subsequent 3 years, 3,250,000,000 per -annum. During those years—the Codefendant Keitel was asked about that -when he was examined here—the armament expenditures, as Keitel said, -amounted to the following: - -In the fiscal year 1935-1936—5,000,000,000. - -In the fiscal year 1936-1937—7,000,000,000. - -In the following fiscal year—9,000,000,000. - -And at that stage the assistance from the Reichsbank ceased. In spite of -that, during the following year and without any assistance from the -Reichsbank, the expenditure for armament increased to 11,000,000,000, -and in the following year it climbed to 20,500,000,000. - -It appears, therefore, that even without the financial genius of Herr -Schacht, they managed to raise the funds. Just how they did so is -another question. - -DR. DIX: I duly put these figures to the Defendant Keitel. I do not -think that the Tribunal had the document at the time. It is now -available and has the Exhibit Number Schacht-7. It is Page 15 of the -German text and Page 21 of the English text. Herr Keitel could, of -course, only refer to the first column, that is to say, total -expenditure; but there is a second and a third column, in this account, -and these two are calculations made by Schacht, calculations regarding -what was raised with the help and without the help of the Reichsbank. - -I do not intend to go through it in detail now. I should merely like to -have your permission to ask Dr. Schacht whether the figures calculated -by him, in Columns 2 and 3 of the document, were calculated correctly. - -SCHACHT: I have these figures in the document before me. The figures are -absolutely correct and again I want to declare that they show that, -during the first year after the Reichsbank had discontinued its -assistance, no less than 5,125,000,000 more were spent without the -assistance of the Reichsbank, that is to say, a total of 11,000,000,000. - -DR. DIX: Up to now you have stated to the Tribunal that you were active -against a dangerous and extensive rearmament and you showed that by -tying up the money bag. Did you oppose excessive rearmament in any other -way, for instance, by giving lectures and such? - -SCHACHT: Many times I spoke not only before economists and professors -who were my main auditors, but I often spoke upon invitation of the -Minister of War and the head of the Army Academy before high-ranking -officers. In all these lectures I continually referred to the financial -and economic limitations to which German rearmament was subject and I -warned against excessive rearmament. - -DR. DIX: When did you first gather the impression that the extent of -German rearmament was excessive and exaggerated? - -SCHACHT: It is very difficult to give you a date. Beginning in 1935, I -made continuous attempts to slow down the speed of rearmament. On one -occasion Hitler had said—just a moment, I have it here—that until the -spring of 1936 the same speed would have to be maintained. I adhered to -that as much as possible, although, beginning with the second half of -1935, I continuously applied the brake. But after 1935 I told myself -that, since the Führer himself had said it, after the spring of 1936 the -same speed would no longer be necessary. This can be seen from Document -1301-PS in which these statements of mine are quoted, statements which I -communicated to the so-called “small Ministerial Council” (kleiner -Ministerrat). Göring contradicted me during that meeting, but I of -course maintain the things which I said at the time. - -After that I constantly tried to make the Minister of War do something -to slow down the speed of rearmament, if only in the interest of general -economy, since I wanted to see the economic system working for the -export trade. Proof for the fact of just how much I urged the Minister -of War is contained in my letter dated 24 December 1935, which I wrote -him when I saw the period desired by Hitler coming to an end, and when I -was already applying the brake. It has also been presented by the -Prosecution as Document Number EC-293. In the English version of the -document it is on Page 25. - -I beg to be allowed to quote very briefly—all my quotations are very -brief—from that document. I wrote a letter to the Reich Minister of -War, and I quote: - - “I gather from your letter dated 29 November”—and then come the - reference numbers—“that increased demands by the Armed Forces - for copper and lead are to be expected, which will amount to - practically double the present consumption. These are only - current demands, whereas the equally urgent provisions for the - future are not contained in the figures. You are expecting me to - obtain the necessary foreign currency for these demands, and to - that I respectfully reply that under the existing circumstances - I see no possibility of doing so.” - -In other words, Blomberg is asking that I should buy raw materials with -foreign currency, and I am stating quite clearly that I do not see any -possibility of doing so. - -The document goes on to say—and this is the sentence regarding the -limit up to 1 April. I quote: - - “In all the conferences held with the Führer and Reich - Chancellor up to now, as well as with the leading military - departments, I have expressed my conviction that it would be - possible to supply the necessary foreign currencies and raw - materials for the existing degree of rearmament until 1 April - 1936. Despite the fact that, due to our cultural and agrarian - policies which are being repudiated all over the world, this has - been made extremely difficult for me and continues to be - difficult, I still hope that my original plan may be carried - out.” - -That is to say, that I thought this proposed program could be carried -out up to 1 April, but not over and beyond that. - -DR. DIX: It is a fact that Minister of Transportation, Dorpmüller, was -trying to raise credits for railway purposes. What was your attitude as -President of the Reichsbank towards this? - -SCHACHT: During a conference between the Führer, Dorpmüller, and myself, -at which the Führer strongly supported Dorpmüller’s demands, I turned -that credit down straightway, and he did not get it. - -DR. DIX: The meeting of 27 May 1936 of the so-called “small Ministerial -Council,” presided over by Göring, has been discussed here. The -Prosecution contend that intentions of aggressive war became apparent -from that meeting. Did you have any knowledge of that meeting? - -SCHACHT: What was the date, please? - -DR. DIX: 27 May 1936. - -SCHACHT: No. I was present during that conference and I see nothing in -the entire document pointing to an aggressive war. I have studied the -document very carefully. - -DR. DIX: It has furthermore been stated against you what is contained in -the report of Ambassador Bullitt, Document Number L-151, Exhibit USA-70, -dated 23 November 1937. You have heard, of course, that the Prosecution -are also drawing the conclusion from that report that there were -aggressive intentions on Hitler’s part. Will you please make a statement -about that? - -SCHACHT: I see nothing in the entire report to the effect that Hitler -was about to start an aggressive war. I was simply talking about -Hitler’s intentions to bring about an Anschluss of Austria, if possible, -and to give the Sudeten Germans autonomy if possible. Neither of those -two actions would be aggressive war, and apart from that, Mr. Bullitt -says the following with reference to me in his report about this -conversation. I quote: “Schacht then went on to speak of the absolute -necessity for doing something to produce peace in Europe....” - -DR. DIX: The memorandum of this conversation is also contained in my -document book as Exhibit Number Schacht-22. It is on Page 64 of the -English text and Page 57 of the German text. - -We shall now have to deal in greater detail with your alleged knowledge -of Hitler’s intentions to start war. First of all, speaking generally, -did Hitler ever, as far as you know... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I asked Dr. Dix if he would object if -the Tribunal would allow me, since he is passing to a new point, to -mention the question of the Raeder documents. I had a discussion with -Dr. Siemers. There are still some outstanding points, and we should be -grateful if the Tribunal would hear us this afternoon, if possible, -because the translating division is waiting for the Raeder documents to -get on with their translations. - -THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think it will take, Sir David? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not more than a half hour, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: If the translation department are waiting, perhaps we had -better do it at 2 o’clock. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases. - -THE PRESIDENT: If it is only going to take a half hour. It isn’t likely, -I suppose, to take more than that? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t think it will take more than that. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will do that at 2 o’clock, and now we will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please Your Lordship, the Tribunal should -have in front of them a statement of our objections to certain of the -documents, arranged in six groups. Attached to that sheet they will find -an English summary of the documents, presenting shortly the contents of -each one of them. My Lord, with regard to the first group, might I make -two erasures from our objection to Number 19, which has been allowed in -the case of Schacht, and if I understand Dr. Siemers correctly he -doesn’t press for Number 76. - -Now, My Lord, the others in that group: - -Number 9 is a series of quotations from Lersner’s book on _Versailles_. - -Number 10, the quotation from a book by the German left-wing publicist, -Thomas Mann. - -Number 17 is the _Failure of a Mission_, by Nevile Henderson. - -Number 45 is a quotation from a book of Mr. Churchill’s. - -Number 47 is the report on a complaint to Lord Halifax about an article -in _News Chronicle_ criticizing Hitler. - -My Lord, Number 66 is rather different. If the Tribunal would be good -enough to look at it, it is a report by a German lawyer, Dr. Mosier I -think his name should be, who is an authority on international law, -dealing with the Norway action. Dr. Siemers has been, of course, -absolutely frank with me and he said that it would be convenient to him -to have this, which is really a legal argument, embodied in his document -book. Of course, that is not really the purpose of these document books; -but, of course, it is a matter for the Tribunal, and we felt we had to -draw attention to it. - -Then, My Lord, Number 76 comes out. - -Numbers 93 to 96 are quotations from Soviet newspapers. - -Number 101 is a quotation from Havas, the French News Agency. - -Numbers 102 to 107 are minor orders relating to the Low Countries which, -the Prosecution submit, have no evidential value. - -Then in the second group, there are a number of documents which, the -Prosecution submit, are not relevant to any of the issues in the case. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you didn’t deal with Number 109, did you? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord, it is on the second line. -That is another legal argument, the effect of the war on the legal -position of Iceland, which is a quotation from the _British Journal of -Information in Public Law and International La_w. - -THE PRESIDENT: All right. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the second group, the Prosecution -submit, is irrelevant. - -Number 22 is a Belgian decree of 1937 dealing with the possible -evacuation of the civil population in time of war. - -Number 39 is a French document of the Middle East. - -Numbers 63 and 64 are two speeches, one by Mr. Emery and another by Mr. -Churchill, dealing with the position in Greece at the end of 1940, some -two months after the beginning of the Italian campaign against Greece. - -Number 71 is an undated directive with regard to the study of routes in -Belgium, which doesn’t seem to us to have any evidential importance. - -Number 76 comes out as the _Altmark_. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 76 came out? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, that is the _Altmark_. It is the -same one that is in Number 71. I am sorry, My Lord, it should have been -marked out. - -Number 99 is the minutes of the ninth meeting of the combined Cabinet -Council on the 27th of April 1940, and it deals with a suggestion of M. -Reynaud with regard to the Swedish ore mines. As it was long after the -Norway campaign and it was never, of course, acted upon in Norway, it -seems to us to have no relevance for this Trial. - -Numbers 102 to 107 I have dealt with under one. They have certain very -small unimportant memoranda relating to the Low Countries. - -Number 112 is a French document in which Paul Reynaud quotes a statement -from Mr. Churchill that he will fight on to the end, which again doesn’t -seem of much importance in 1946. - -Now, My Lord, the next group are documents which were rejected by the -Tribunal when applied for by the Defendant Ribbentrop. The first two -deal with British rearmament and the others with the Balkans and Greece. -The Tribunal will probably remember the group which they did reject in -the Ribbentrop application; and the fourth group are other documents of -the same series as those rejected by the Tribunal in the case of the -Defendant Von Ribbentrop. The fifth group are really objectionable on -the _tu quoque_ basis. I think they are entirely French documents which -deal with proposals in a very tentative stage and which were arranged, -but never followed out, with regard to the destruction of oil fields or -the blocking of the Danube in the Middle East. My Lord, they are -documents dated in the spring of 1940 and, as I say, they deal with the -most tentative stages and were never put into operation. The plans were -never in operation. - -The sixth group are documents dealing with Norway, which were captured -after the occupation of France. As I understand Dr. Siemers’ argument, -it is not suggested that these documents were within the knowledge of -the defendants at the time that they carried out the aggression against -Norway; but it is stated that they had other information. Of course, as -to their own information, we have not made any objection at all; and -that these documents might be argued to be corroborative of their -agents’ reports. Actually, as is shown by Document Number 83, to which -we make no objection, they also deal with tentative proposals which were -not put into effect and were not proceeded with; but in the submission -of the Prosecution, the important matter must be what was within the -knowledge of the defendants before the 9th of April 1940; and it is -irrelevant to go into a large number of other documents which are only -arguably consistent with the information which the defendants stated -they had. - -My Lord, I tried to deal with them very shortly because I made a promise -to the Tribunal on the time, but I hope that I have indicated very -clearly what our objections were. - -DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Your Honors, it is -extremely difficult to define my position with reference to so many -documents, especially since I know that these documents have not yet -been translated and that the contents, in the main, are therefore not -known to those concerned. Therefore, I might point out that there is a -certain danger in treating documents in this way. In part they are basic -elements of my defense. - -Therefore, I should like to state now that in dealing with these -documents I shall be compelled, in order to give the reasons for the -relevancy of this evidence, to point out those passages which I shall -not need to read separately into the record, for as soon as the document -book is ready they will be known to the Tribunal and can be read there. - -I shall follow the order as outlined by Sir David. First of all, the -first group, Document Numbers 9 and 10. The note submitted by Sir David -to the Tribunal points out that the submission of these documents -conflicts with the ruling given by the Tribunal on 29 March. In reply I -should like to point out that this opinion of the Prosecution is an -error. The ruling of the Tribunal said that no documents might be -submitted concerning the injustice of the Versailles Treaty and the -pressure arising from it. These documents do not concern the injustice -and the pressure; rather they serve to give a few examples of the -subjective attitude of a man like Noske, who was a Social Democrat and -certainly did not want to conduct any wars of aggression. A few other -statements in Numbers 9 and 10 show the thought of the Government and -the ruling class at that time in regard to defensive measures and the -fear that in case of an attack on the part of Poland, for instance, the -German Armed Forces might be too weak. These are facts pure and simple; -and I give you my express assurance that I shall not quote any sentences -which might introduce a polemic. Moreover, I need this mainly as a basis -for my final pleading. - -Number 17 is a very brief excerpt from the book by Henderson, _Failure -of a Mission_, written in 1940. I believe there are no objections to my -quoting about 15 lines, if I wish to use them in my final pleading in -order to show that Henderson, who knew Germany well, still believed in -1940 that he had to recognize certain positive good points in the regime -at that time; and I believe that the conclusion is justified that one -cannot expect that a German military commander should be more sceptical -than the British Ambassador at that time. - -Then we turn to Document Number 45. It is true this document is taken -from a book by Churchill; but it deals with a fact which I should like -to prove, the fact that already many years before World War I there -existed a British Committee for Defense. In the table of contents which -Sir David has submitted, the word “Reichsverteidigungsausschuss” is -used, and I therefore conclude that this is a mistake on the part of the -Prosecution who took it to mean a German Reich Defense Committee; that -is not correct. This document shows how it came about that the -Prosecution wrongly overestimated the importance of the German Reich -Defense Committee, as the Prosecution naturally compared it with the -British Committee for Defense, which went very much further in its -activities. - -Number 47 is evidence to show that when the German Embassy pointed out -that an extremely scathing article on Hitler had appeared in the paper -_News Chronicle_, Lord Halifax pointed out in reply that it was not -possible for him to exert any influence on the newspaper. I should -merely like to compare this with the fact that the Prosecution made it -appear as though Raeder had had something to do with the regrettable -article in the _Völkischer Beobachter_: “Churchill sank the _Athenia_.” -Raeder was no more connected with that article than Lord Halifax with -the article in the _News Chronicle_ and was unfortunately even more -powerless, as far as this article was concerned, than the British -Government. - -Number 66 deals with the opinion given by Dr. Mosier, a specialist on -international law, an opinion on the Norway action in very compressed -form, as the Tribunal will surely admit. The Tribunal will also concede -that in my defense of the Norway action I must speak at length about the -underlying principles of international law. The underlying principles of -international law are not an altogether simple matter. I have nothing -against presenting this myself in all necessary detail. I was merely -guided by the thought that the Tribunal have asked again and again that -we save time. I believe that we can save considerable time if this -statement of opinion is granted me, so that I shall not have to cite -numerous excerpts and authors in detail in order to show the exact legal -justification. I could then perhaps deal with the legal questions in -half an hour, whereas without this statement of opinion it is utterly -impossible for me to treat such a problem in half an hour. If the -Prosecution do not object to more time being taken up, then I do not -object if the document is denied me. I will merely have to take the -consequences. - -Number 76 has meanwhile been crossed out, that is, it is granted me by -the Prosecution. - -Numbers 93 to 96 are excerpts on statements of the official Moscow -papers, _Isvestia_ and _Pravda_. These statements prove that, at least -at that time, Soviet opinion regarding the legality of the German action -in Norway coincided with the German opinion of that time. If the -Tribunal think that these very brief quotations should not be admitted -as documents, I would not be too insistent, since at this point in the -proceedings I shall in any case be compelled to discuss it. The Tribunal -will remember that at that time Germany and Russia were friends, and -Soviet opinion on a purely legal problem should, at any rate, be -considered as having a certain significance. - -Then, Number 101; I beg your pardon, Sir David, but if I am not mistaken -Dr. Braun said an hour and a half ago that Number 101 is to be rejected. -Very well, then, Numbers 101 to 107. The action against Norway, as I -have already said, involved a problem of international law. It involves -the problem of whether one country may violate the neutrality of another -country when it can be proved that another belligerent nation likewise -intends to violate the neutrality of the afore-mentioned neutral state. -When presenting my evidence I shall show that Grossadmiral Raeder, in -the autumn of 1939, received all sorts of reports to the effect that the -Allies were planning to take under their own protection the territorial -waters of Norway, that is, to land in Norway, in order to have Norwegian -bases. When I deal with the Norway documents, I shall return to this -point. I should like to say at this point that it is necessary to -explain and to prove that the legal attitude taken by the Allies to the -question of the possible violation of the neutrality of a country was in -the years 1939 and 1940 entirely the same as the attitude of the -Defendant Raeder in the case of Norway at the same time. - -Therefore it is necessary not only to deal with Norway; but also to show -that this was a basic conception, which can readily be proved by -reference to parallel cases on the strength of these documents. These -parallel cases deal in the first place with the plans of the Allies with -respect to the Balkans, and secondly with the plans of the Allies with -respect to the Caucasian oil fields. - -Your Honors, it is by no means my intention, as Sir David has suggested, -to use these documents from the _tu quoque_ point of view, from the -point of view that the defendant has done something, which the Allies -have also done or wanted to do. I am concerned only with a judgment of -the Defendant Raeder’s actions from the legal point of view. One can -understand such actions only when the entire matter is brought to light. - -It is my opinion—and in addition to this I should like to refer to the -statement of Dr. Mosier’s opinion, Exhibit Raeder-66—that this cannot -be made the subject of an accusation. - -We are concerned, Your Honors, with the right of self-preservation as -recognized in principle by international law. In this connection I -should like... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we don’t want to go into these matters in -great detail, you know, at this stage. If you state what your reasons -are in support and state them shortly, we shall be able to consider the -matter. - -DR. SIEMERS: I am very sorry that I have to go into these details, but -if through the objection of the Prosecution the principles... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal do not wish to hear you in detail. I have -said that the Tribunal do not wish to hear you in detail. - -DR. SIEMERS: I merely ask that the Tribunal take into consideration the -fact that this concerns the principle of international law laid down by -Kellogg himself in 1928, namely, the right of self-preservation, or “the -right of self-defense.” For that reason 1 should like to adduce these -documents showing that just as the Allies acted quite correctly -according to this principle, so also did the Defendant Raeder. - -Document Number 22 is next. I have given various statements of principle -which apply to a large number of the remaining documents, so that I can -refer to the statements I have already made. These statements also apply -to Documents Numbers 22 and 39. - -As far as Documents Numbers 63 and 64 are concerned, I should like to -point out that these documents deal with Greece; and not only these two, -but also a later group of perhaps 10 or 12 documents, with which I -should like to deal very briefly. - -As far as Greece is concerned, the situation is as follows: - -I must admit that I was more than surprised that the Prosecution -objected to these documents, about 14 in all. In Document Number C-12, -Exhibit Number GB-226, the Prosecution accuse Raeder of having decreed -on 30 December 1939; and I quote, “Greek merchantmen in the prohibited -area declared by the United States and England are to be treated as -enemy ships.” The accusation would be justified, if Greece had not -behaved in such a manner that Raeder had to resort to this order. - -If the documents concerning Greece which show that Greece did not -strictly keep to her neutrality are struck out, then I cannot bring any -counterevidence. I do not believe that it is the intention of the -Prosecution to restrict my presentation of evidence in this way. - -These are all documents which date back to this time and which show that -Greece put her merchantmen at the disposal of England who was at war -with Germany. Therefore they could be treated as enemy ships. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like to say that I should have told the -Tribunal I would make no objection to Documents Numbers 53 and 54, -because they do deal with the chartering of Greek steamers by the -British Government. - -THE PRESIDENT: But you made no objection to them; you didn’t object to -Numbers 53 or 54. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted to make clear that I don’t object to -them. - -THE PRESIDENT: There is no objection on the paper. What you are dealing -with, Dr. Siemers, is 63 and 64, not 53 and 54? - -Oh, I beg your pardon, I see it further on. Yes, I see; will you please -strike that out. - -DR. SIEMERS: There is no objection to Numbers 53 and 54? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no objection. My Lord, my friend was dealing -with the Greek fleet. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes; I beg your pardon, I misheard. - -DR. SIEMERS: The same things, as I have already stated regarding -Documents Numbers 101 to 107, apply also to Document Number 71. - -Number 99 belongs really to Group 6, to the Norwegian documents; and I -should like to refer to these collectively and then refer again later to -Number 99. All these documents concern Norway, that is, the planning by -the Allies with respect to Norway. These documents deal positively with -the planning of the landing in Narvik, the landing in Stavanger, the -landing in Bergen, and the absolute necessity of having Norwegian bases. -The documents mention that Germany should not be allowed to continue -getting ore supplies from Sweden. They also deal in some measure with -Finland. There are likewise documents which support the same plan after -the Finnish-Russian war had already been concluded. - -I should like to quote from these documents to prove their relevancy. -Since the Tribunal has told me that I cannot do that, I ask that these -brief references be considered sufficient. The facts contained in these -documents agree, point for point, with those reports which Grossadmiral -Raeder received from September 1939 until March 1940 from the -Intelligence Service of the German Wehrmacht headed by Admiral Canaris. -These plans agree with the information which Raeder received during the -same 6 months through the Naval Attaché in Oslo, Korvettenkapitän -Schreiber, and with the information which he received in a letter from -Admiral Carls at the end of September 1939. - -The information from these three sources caused the Defendant Raeder to -point out the great danger involved were Norway to fall into the hands -of the Allies, which would mean that Germany had lost the war. It is, -therefore, a purely strategic consideration. The occupation of Norway -did not, as contended by the British Prosecution, have anything to do -with the prestige or desire for conquest but was concerned solely with -these positive pieces of information. - -I must therefore prove, first of all, that the Defendant Raeder did -receive this information and, secondly, that these reports were -objective. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, you are dealing with Document Number 99, are -you not? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, 99, and all of Group 6. - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t know what you mean by Group 6; 99 is in Group B. - -DR. SIEMERS: The group under the letter “F,” which Sir David called -Group 6, the last on the page. - -THE PRESIDENT: The objection of the Prosecution to that document was -that it was a document of the 27th of April 1940, at a time after -Germany had invaded Norway. You haven’t said anything about that. - -DR. SIEMERS: I wanted to avoid dealing with each document singly, -because I believe that these can be treated generally. However, in this -specific case... - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t want you to deal with each document separately. I -thought you were dealing with Document Number 99. If you can deal with -them in groups, by all means do so. However, you are taking up a great -deal of the Tribunal’s time. - -DR. SIEMERS: This Document Number 99 is the Minutes of the Ninth Meeting -of the Supreme Council, that is, the military operational staff of -England and France, on 27 April. The heading shows beyond doubt that it -was after the occupation of Norway. However, that is only a formal -objection. The contents of the document show that at this session the -participants discussed the happenings during the period before the -occupation, and the most important leaders of the Allies took part in -this meeting. Chamberlain, Halifax, Churchill, Sir Samuel Hoare, Sir -Alexander Cadogan, _et cetera_ and, on the French side Reynaud, -Daladier, Gamelin, and Darlan were present; and these gentlemen -discussed the previous plans which, I admit, had misfired because of the -German occupation of Norway. But they did discuss about how necessary it -was that the iron-ore deposits in Sweden should fall into the hands of -the Allies and what was to be done now to prevent Germany’s getting this -ore and how the destruction of these iron-ore deposits could be brought -about. I believe, therefore, that though this happened at a later date, -the train of thought I have presented is of significance. - -Then we turn to Document Number 100. This deals with the session of the -French War Committee of 9 April 1940, which concerns the same problem: -what the Allies had planned and what could be planned now that the -report had just come in about the action on the part of Germany. - -Documents Numbers 102 to 107 have already been dealt with. For Document -Number 110 the same statements apply as for Documents 101 to 107. - -Document Number 112 is a document which shows that Churchill, as early -as May 1940, expected active intervention on the part of America. I -wanted to present this in connection with the accusation raised against -the Defendant Raeder, that in the spring of 1941 he was instrumental in -bringing about a war against the United States by way of Japan. For me -this document is not nearly so important as those basic documents which -I have referred to at greater length. Therefore, I leave this completely -to the discretion of the Prosecution or the Tribunal. - -The next group consists of documents which were turned down in the case -of Ribbentrop. I should like to point out that I did not have the -opportunity in the Ribbentrop case to define my position as to the -justification and relevancy of these documents. Therefore I consider it -insufficient simply to state that these documents were refused in the -case of Ribbentrop, that the charges against Ribbentrop... - -THE PRESIDENT: We have already carefully considered the arguments and -have decided those documents were inadmissible. - -DR. SIEMERS: I believed that the decision applied only to the Ribbentrop -case, since no other point of view was discussed during those -proceedings, namely, that of the charges raised against Raeder in which -connection it is expressly said in Document C-152 that Raeder brought -about the occupation of the whole of Greece. That is an accusation that -was not made against Ribbentrop but only against Raeder. How can I -refute this accusation if these documents are denied me? - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal know the documents and know the -charges against Raeder, and they don’t desire to hear any further -argument on it. They will consider the matter. - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg the pardon of the Tribunal. Under these circumstances -I am compelled to see whether all these documents were covered in -Ribbentrop’s case. My notes, as I told the Prosecution this morning, do -not agree with the statements of the Prosecution. Perhaps after the -session, if I am unable to do so at the moment, I might point out -whether or not the documents are identical. - -It is really a fact that in Ribbentrop’s case these documents were not -presented in their entirety and that the Tribunal therefore does not -know them in their entirety. Whether Dr. Horn had marked exactly the -same passages as I wish to use, I am not able to say as far as each -individual document is concerned. I know only that in the large majority -of cases Dr. Horn did not present the entire document because he was -presenting it only from the point of view of the Ribbentrop case. - -THE PRESIDENT: Presumably you have submitted your extracts to the -Prosecution. The Prosecution tell us that those extracts are the same -ones that were rejected in Ribbentrop’s case. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, we have only a list of those documents -so far. We haven’t seen the extracts. - -[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Prosecution -conferred._] - -My Lord, I am sorry. I spoke too quickly. We have seen the extracts in -German and we haven’t had them translated. We have done the best we -could in German. - -THE PRESIDENT: 24 and 25, at any rate, are both speeches in English. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, some of them are. I am sorry, My -Lord; these are. Your Lordship is quite right. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, as I understand it, Dr. Siemers says that -these are not the same passages of evidence, or suggested evidence, as -were rejected in Ribbentrop’s case. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I did not do the actual checking -myself, but Major Barrington, who checked the Ribbentrop documents, went -through these and compared the two, and he gave me that which forms the -basis of our note. That is the position. I can’t tell Your Lordship that -I have actually checked these myself. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers is telling us that that is untrue? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As I understood Dr. Siemers, he was saying that -he didn’t know whether they were the same extracts... - -DR. SIEMERS: May I just make one remark in connection with that, please? -I am not quite certain that I can say in each specific case which -extracts were contained in the Ribbentrop case, but they are not the -same. I know for certain that they are not the same because in order to -relieve the work of the Translation Division I compared the numbers and -in the few cases in which they were the same I told the Translation -Division that these documents were identical so that they would not be -translated a second time. But I am sorry to say that a large number of -the documents were not the same, as they were asked for by Dr. Horn and -Ribbentrop from a completely different point of view. - -I might also point out that the numbers under Group D which are -enumerated here as Ribbentrop Documents Numbers 29, 51, 56, 57, 60, 61, -62, although I made every effort to find them, could not be found in the -Ribbentrop Document Book. And the list does not show which numbers they -should be in the Ribbentrop Document Book. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is not suggested. What is said is -that they are in the same series which deals with the same subject—that -is, the question of Greece and the Balkans—as those documents which the -Tribunal ruled out in the case of Ribbentrop. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, I think the best course would be for -you to go through these documents this afternoon under the heading “C” -and find out whether they are the same ones rejected in Ribbentrop’s -case; and if they are not, indicate exactly in what they differ from the -documents rejected in Ribbentrop’s case, so as to show they have some -relevance to your case; and we shall expect to have that by 5 o’clock. - -Now will you go on with the others? - -DR. SIEMERS: May I perhaps make one remark about what Sir David said -regarding group “D”? They were not objected to because they have already -been mentioned in Ribbentrop’s case; but only because they deal with the -same subject matter, that is true. The same subject matter, namely, -Greece, is dealt with; and I can only reply that the Prosecution have -charged the Defendant Raeder in Document C-152 with having aimed at, and -brought about, the occupation of the whole of Greece. The facts -concerning this statement of three lines I can present only if I am -allowed some documents referring to Greece and only if these are not -refused on the grounds that the documents concerning Greece were turned -down quite generally in Ribbentrop’s case. - -Now, I come to group “E” which begins with Document 26. The same -statements apply which I have already set forth in regard to Documents -Numbers 101 to 107. The attacks planned by the Allies on the oil regions -in neutral Romania and in the neutral Caucasus—as I should like to -remark in parenthesis—have already been dealt with in these -proceedings. The Tribunal will remember that I asked Göring during his -examination about entries in Jodl’s diary pertaining to this question -and he has given information about the reports received by Germany, on -Pages 6031 and 6033 of the transcript of 18 March (Volume IX, Pages -402-404). This testimony too concerns only the subjective side, that is, -what was known by Germany. I must prove that the objective side, the -fact that this had actually been planned, agrees exactly with the -subjective side, that is, with these reports. These documents, Numbers -26, 30 to 32, 36, 37, 39, 40 to 44, are to prove that. Then comes Number -99 which has already been dealt with, which seems to be here in -duplicate; Number 101, and Number 110 which also seem to be duplicates. - -I turn now to Group 6, which is supposed to be irrelevant, dealing with -the attack on Norway. I have already, on principle, set forth my reasons -and I beg the Tribunal not to deny me these documents under any -circumstances. If I am not granted these documents, I shall simply not -be in a position to present evidence in a reasonable manner without -telling everything myself. I can present proof in regard to a question -of such importance only if documents are granted me just as they are -granted the Prosecution. But if all the documents, practically all the -documents concerning this question are refused, then I do not know how I -am to treat such a question. And I believe that the Tribunal will wish -to assist me in this matter. - -I am requesting this especially for the following reasons: When I gave -my reasons for wanting to present this particular evidence, I asked that -those files of the British Admiralty be brought in, which dealt with the -preparations and planning regarding Scandinavia, that is, Norway. Sir -David did not object at that time but said he would have to consult the -British Admiralty. The Tribunal decided accordingly and granted my -application. In the meantime the British Admiralty has answered, and I -assume that Sir David will agree to my reading the answer which has been -put at my disposal. This answer is as follows—it concerns, if I may say -that in advance... - -THE PRESIDENT: We have had the answer, I think, have we not? We have had -the answer and transmitted it to you. - -DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. From this reply it can be seen that -the files will not be submitted, that I cannot get the necessary -approval. It can also be seen that certain facts which will be important -for my presentation of evidence will be admitted by the British -Admiralty; but in reality I am not in a position to prove anything by -means of documents. Since I am unable to make use of this evidence, I -ask at least to be allowed the other means of presenting evidence, that -is, the documents contained in the German White Books. These are -documents recognized as being correct. In all cases they are facsimiles. -They can be carefully examined and I believe... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we are dealing with your application for -particular documents. We are not dealing with any general argument or -general criticism that you have to make. We are only hearing you in -answer to certain objections on behalf of the British Prosecution. - -DR: SIEMERS: Your Honor, unless I am very much mistaken—in which case -you will pleas correct me—Sir David, with a few exceptions, defined his -position regarding these documents under “F”—this is a large number, -from 59 to 91 with some omissions—as a whole and not his position -regarding each individual document. But I have to say the same thing to -practically each document and asked only that I be granted those -documents as a whole, for I cannot make headway without these -documents... - -THE PRESIDENT: You were not referring to these documents. You were -referring to the fact that the British Admiralty was not prepared to -disclose its files to you. It has nothing to do with these documents at -all. - -DR. SIEMERS: I believe I have been misunderstood, Your Honors. I have -already stated very clearly why I need these documents for my -presentation of evidence regarding the Norway action. Beyond that I said -merely that if these documents are not granted me, then I cannot present -any evidence. I am deprived of it. I asked the Tribunal merely to take -into consideration the fact that the documents from London, which I had -originally counted on, are not at my disposal. And I do not know why -this request, which I am submitting to the Tribunal and which is only in -explanation of my previous statements, is being taken amiss by the -Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you have to say? - -DR. SIEMERS: I have now finished, Your Honors. It is not at all my -intention to read all these documents or to spend too much time on them. -I believe that if I am granted these documents, the presentation of -evidence will be much easier, for these are groups of documents which -show the chronological development of certain plans; and if I have the -5th, 6th or 7th document, then I need not read each one. But if I am -granted just one document, I will be put in an extremely difficult -position and will have to speak in greater detail than I would if I -could simply refer to these documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider it. - -Now, Dr. Dix. - -DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Now, we come to the whole -question of your alleged knowledge of the direct war objectives of -Hitler. You have already mentioned in a general way that Hitler never -spoke about war to you. Have you anything to add to this? - -SCHACHT: No. - -DR. DIX: You also touched upon the question of the sincerity of his -peaceful assurances and his disarmament proposals. Have you anything to -add to that? - -SCHACHT: No, at the beginning I believed that. - -DR. DIX: And did the various members of the Cabinet ever speak to you -about warlike intentions? - -SCHACHT: Never did I hear anything from any of my fellow colleagues in -the Reich Cabinet which could lead me to believe that anyone had the -intention of going to war or would welcome it if Germany were to start a -war. - -DR. DIX: Now, we turn to your own attitude towards the war. You already -indicated your general attitude when you spoke about your philosophy as -a pacifist. I believe, therefore, that it is more expedient if I read -from my document book the opinion of a third person, one who knows you -very well, the former member of the Reichsbank Directorate, Huelse. It -is the Schacht Document 37-C, Page 160 of the German text, and 168 of -the English text. It is an affidavit. And there, beginning with -Paragraph 2, Huelse says: - - “I recall several chance talks with Dr. Schacht during the years - 1935 to 1939 about war and rearmament. In these talks he always - expressed his aversion to any war and any warlike conduct. He - held the firm opinion that even to the conqueror war brings only - disadvantages and that a new European war would, on the whole, - be a crime against culture and humanity. He hoped for a long - period of peace for Germany, as she needed it more than other - countries in order to improve and stabilize her unstable - economic situation. - - “To my knowledge, until the beginning of 1938, Dr. Schacht at - meetings of the Reichsbank Board of Directors and in private - conversations on the subject of armament always spoke only of - defense measures. I believe I can recall that he told me in the - middle of 1938 that Hitler’s provocative action against Austria - and the Sudeten country was worse than thoughtless from the - military point of view. - - “He said that Germany had undertaken only a defensive armament, - which would prove absolutely inadequate as a defense in case of - attack by one of the big powers, a possibility with which Hitler - had to reckon. He said that he had never heard that the - Wehrmacht was in any way designed or armed for an aggressive - war. - - “When the war did break out and spread more and more, he said - repeatedly that he had greatly erred in his judgment of Hitler’s - personality; he had hoped for a long time that Hitler would - develop into a real statesman who, after the experience of the - World War I, would avoid any war.” - -You have already touched upon the question of an annexation of Austria -and given your general opinion. I ask you now to make a concrete -statement about the Anschluss after it had actually taken place and -especially about the manner in which this Anschluss was carried out. - -SCHACHT: That this Anschluss would come at some time we Germans all -knew. As for the various political negotiations which took place between -Hitler, Schuschnigg and others, I naturally was as little informed as -were the other Cabinet Ministers, with the probable exception of Göring -and Ribbentrop and perhaps one or two more. The actual Anschluss in -March was a complete surprise to us, not the fact but the date. A great -surprise and we, at any rate my acquaintances and I myself, were -completely surprised. - -DR. DIX: How did you judge the manner, the nature and development of -this Anschluss? - -SCHACHT: I believe that much can be said about the manner. What we heard -subsequently and what I have learned in these proceedings is certainly -not very gratifying, but I believe that it would have had very little -practical influence on the Anschluss itself and the course of events. -The whole thing was more of a demonstration to the outside world, -similar perhaps to the marching into the Rhineland; but it had no great -effect in my opinion on the course of the negotiations. I am speaking -now of the marching in of the troops. This march was more or less a -festive reception. - -DR. DIX: The Prosecution have pointed out that in March 1938 you -regulated the relation of the schilling to the mark for the event of a -possible Anschluss, and by this the Prosecution obviously want to prove -that you had previous knowledge of this action. Will you tell us your -position as to this? - -SCHACHT: The fact to which the Prosecution refer is a communication from -a Lieutenant Colonel Wiedemann. March 11, at about 3 o’clock in the -afternoon—I believe I remember that but I cannot say whether it was by -telephone or in person—someone, it may have been Lieutenant Colonel -Wiedemann, inquired of me how the purchasing power for the troops in -Austria was to be regulated if German troops should march into Austria, -purely as a matter of currency policy, and whether it was necessary to -have any regulation prescribed. I told him that of course everything had -to be paid for, everything that the troops might buy there, and that the -rate of exchange; if they paid in schillings and not in marks, would be -1 mark to 2 schillings. That was the rate which obtained at the time, -which remained fairly steady and was the recognized ratio of the -schilling to the mark. The fact that in the afternoon of the 11th I was -approached about this matter is the best proof that I had no previous -knowledge of these matters. - -DR. DIX: The Prosecution further consider it an accusation against you -that in your speech to the Austrian National Bank after the marching in -of the troops, you used decidedly National Socialist phraseology and -thus welcomed the Anschluss. - -Perhaps we can use this opportunity to save time and reply to the -accusation made repeatedly by the Prosecution that in speeches, -petitions, _et cetera_, you sometimes thought fit to adopt a tone, of -which it could perhaps be said that it exuded National Socialist ideas. -That has been used as circumstantial evidence against you. Will you -please define your position to those arguments and give your reasons for -this attitude of yours? - -SCHACHT: If I did so in the first years, I did so only in order to -remind Party circles and the people of the original program of the -National Socialist Party, to which the actual attitude of the Party -members and functionaries stood in direct contrast. I always tried to -show that the principles which I upheld in many political matters agreed -completely with the principles of the National Socialist program as they -were stated in the Party program, namely, equal rights for all, the -dignity of the individual, esteem for the church, and so forth. - -In the later years I also repeatedly used National Socialist -phraseology, because from the time of my speech at Königsberg, the -contrast between my views and Hitler’s views regarding the Party was -entirely clear. And gradually within the Party I got the reputation of -being an enemy of the Party, a man whose views were contrary to those of -the Party. From that moment on not only the possibility of my -co-operation, but also my very existence was endangered; and in such -moments, when I saw my activity, my freedom, and my life seriously -threatened by the Party I utilized these moments to show by means of an -emphatically National Socialist phraseology that I was working entirely -within the framework of the traditional policies and that my activity -was in agreement with these policies—in order to protect myself against -these attacks. - -DR. DIX: In other words, recalling the testimony of the witness Gisevius -about a remark of Goerdeler’s, you used Talleyrand methods in this case? - -SCHACHT: I am not entirely familiar with Talleyrand’s methods, but at -any rate I did camouflage myself. - -DR. DIX: In this connection I should like to read a passage from the -affidavit of Schniewind which has been quoted repeatedly. It is Schacht -Number 34. I have often indicated this page. It is Page 118 of the -German, Page 126 of the English text. Schniewind says: - - “If Schacht on the other hand occasionally made statements, oral - or written, which could be construed as signifying that he went - a long way in identifying himself with the Hitler regime, these - statements were naturally known to us; but what Schacht thought - in reality was known to almost every official in the Reichsbank - and in the Reich Ministry of Economics, above all, of course, to - his closest colleagues. - - “On many occasions we asked Dr. Schacht if he had not gone too - far in these statements. He always replied that he was under - such heavy fire from the Party and the SS that he could - camouflage himself only with strong slogans and sly statements.” - -I might explain that Schniewind was a high official in the Reich -Ministry of Economics, and worked directly under Schacht and with him. - -The Prosecution have also referred to an affidavit by Tilly to the -effect that you admitted that you thought Hitler capable of aggressive -intentions. Will you make a statement about that? - -SCHACHT: That affidavit of the British Major Tilly is entirely correct. -I told Major Tilly during the preliminary interrogation that in 1938, -during the events of the Fritsch affair and afterwards, I had become -convinced that Hitler at any rate would not avoid a war at all costs and -that possibly he even sought to bring about a war. Looking back I -pondered over a number of statements by Hitler and asked myself the -reason why Hitler, in the course of the years, had reached the point -where he might not avoid a war. And I told Major Tilly that the only -reason which I could think of was that looking back I had the impression -that Hitler had fallen into the role which necessarily falls to each and -every dictator who does not want to relinquish his power in time, -namely, that of having to supply his people with some sort of victor’s -glory—that that was probably the development of Hitler’s thought. - -DR. DIX: That is the same explanation as given by Prince Metternich -about Napoleon? - -You have already remarked parenthetically that you first became -suspicious during the Fritsch affair. The witness Gisevius has described -the Fritsch affair to the Tribunal in detail. We do not wish to repeat -anything. Therefore, I am asking you only to state in regard to the -Fritsch affair anything you might have to say to supplement or to amend -Gisevius’ testimony. If that is to take a long time—which I cannot -judge—then I might suggest to the Tribunal that we have the recess now, -if the Tribunal so desires. - -SCHACHT: I have just a brief remark to make. - -DR. DIX: A brief remark. Then answer the question briefly. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if he can do it briefly, we had better have it now. - -SCHACHT: It is just a single remark that I should like to add. The -account given by Gisevius of the development of the Fritsch affair is, -according to my knowledge and my own experience, completely correct in -every detail. I have nothing to add to that. I can only confirm it. On -the other hand, I should like to refer to a speech of Hitler’s on 20 -February 1938 in the Reichstag which contains a remark which even at -that time aroused my attention. He said—and I quote this speech from -Die Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, of which all copies were available -here: - - “The changes in the Reich Cabinet and in the military - administration on 4 February”—that is, changes which were made - following the Fritsch and Blomberg affair—“were for the purpose - of achieving within the shortest time that intensification of - our military means of power, which the general conditions of the - present time indicate as advisable.” - -This remark also confirmed my opinion that the change from a peaceful to -a military policy on Hitler’s part was becoming obvious; I did not wish -to omit reference to this remark which completes the account given by -Gisevius. - -DR. DIX: This is Exhibit Number Schacht-28 of our document book, Page 81 -of the English text, Page 74 of the German text. There this passage is -quoted. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Several meetings have been -discussed here during which Hitler is said to have spoken directly or -indirectly about his war intentions. Did you participate in any such -meetings? - -SCHACHT: No, not in a single one. - -DR. DIX: You disagreed, as you have stated, with Hitler and the Party on -many issues. Did you express this disagreement or did you conform to -Hitler’s instructions at all times? Can you in particular make -statements about your critical attitude, for instance, to the Jewish -question, the Church question, the Gestapo question, the Free Mason -question, _et cetera_? - -SCHACHT: I might say in advance that Hitler never gave me any order or -any instructions which would have been in opposition to my inner views -and that I also never did anything which was in opposition to my inner -convictions. From the very beginning I did not conceal my convictions -concerning all these questions which you have mentioned, not only when -speaking to my circle of friends and to larger Party circles, but also -in addressing the public, and even when speaking to Hitler personally. I -have already stated here that as early as the Party purge of 30 June -1934 I called Hitler’s attention to the fact that his actions were -illegal. - -I refer, furthermore, to a document of which unfortunately only half has -been presented by the Prosecution. It is a written report which I -personally submitted to Hitler on 3 May 1935. I remember the date very -well because it happened during a trial run of the Lloyd Steamer -_Scharnhorst_, at which both Hitler and I were present. - -On that day I handed him two inter-related memoranda which together -formed a unit. In the one half I made it clear that I wanted to stop the -unrestrained and constant collections of money by various Party -organizations because it seemed to me that the money ought not to be -used for Party purposes, particularly Party installations, Party -buildings, and the like, but that we urgently needed this money for -State expenses which had to be paid and which of course included the -rearmament question as well. - -The second half of this report dealt with cultural questions. The -Defense and I have tried for months to get this second half of the -document from the Prosecution, since they had submitted the first half -of the document here as evidence. It has not been possible to obtain -that second half. I must therefore confine myself to communicating the -contents. - -I want to say in advance that, of course, I could only bring forward -such charges in regard to the mistaken cultural and legal policy of the -Party and of Hitler when reasons originating in my own department gave -me the excuse to submit these things to Hitler. I stated that very -serious harm was being done to my foreign trade policy by the arbitrary -and inhuman cultural and legal policy which was being carried out by -Hitler. I pointed in particular to the hostile attitude towards the -churches and the illegal treatment of the Jews and, furthermore, to the -absolute illegality and despotism of the whole Gestapo regime. I -remember in that connection that I referred to the British Habeas Corpus -Act, which for centuries protected the rights of the individual; and I -stated word for word that I considered this Gestapo despotism to be -something which would make us despised by the whole world. - -Hitler read both parts of this memorandum while still on board the -_Scharnhorst_. As soon as he had read it he called me and tried to calm -me down by making statements similar to those which he had already made -to me in July 1934, when he told me these were still the transitional -symptoms of a revolutionary development and that as time went on this -would be set right again and disappear. - -The events of July 1934 had taught me a lesson, however, and -consequently I was not satisfied with this explanation. A few weeks -afterwards, on 18 August 1935, I used the occasion of my visit to the -Eastern Fair Königsberg to mention these very things in the speech which -I had to make there; and here I gave clear expression to the same -objections which I had made to Hitler aboard the _Scharnhorst_ at the -beginning of May. - -I did not talk only about the Church question, the Jewish question, and -the question of despotism; I talked also about the Free Masons; and I -shall quote just a few sentences from that speech (Exhibit Number -Schacht-25), with the permission of the Tribunal. They are very short. I -am speaking about people, and I now quote... - -DR. DIX: Just one moment. I want to tell the Tribunal that this is the -Königsberg speech, which I submitted to the Tribunal this morning as a -document. - -SCHACHT: I am talking about people and I now quote: - - “...people who under cover of darkness heroically smear window - panes, who brand as a traitor every German who trades in a - Jewish store, who declare every former Free Mason to be a - scoundrel, and who in the fight against priests and ministers - who talk politics from the pulpit, cannot themselves distinguish - between religion and misuse of the pulpit.” - -End of quotation, and then another sentence. I quote: - - “In accordance with the present legislation and in accordance - with the various declarations made by the Führer’s Deputy, the - Reich Minister of the Interior, and the Reich Minister for - Public Enlightenment and Propaganda (not to mention the Ministry - of Economics), Jewish businesses are permitted to carry on their - business activities as heretofore.” - -End of quotation, and then, in the last sentences, I quote: - - “No one in Germany is without rights. According to Point 4 of - the National Socialist Party program the Jew can be neither a - citizen nor a fellow German. But Point 5 of the Party program - provides legislation for him too; that means, he must not be - subjected to arbitrary action but to the law.” - -I assumed the same attitude on every other further occasion that offered -itself. - -DR. DIX: One moment, Dr. Schacht; did the regime tolerate this speech? - -SCHACHT: It is a good thing that you remind me of that; because in the -course of the Gisevius testimony the same question was discussed with -reference to the Marburg speech of Herr Von Papen. Since up to then my -speeches were not subject to censorship—of course I would not have -allowed that—this speech was broadcast by mistake, so to speak, over -the Deutschlandsender. In that way the speech was brought to the notice -of Propaganda Minister Goebbels, and at once he issued an order -prohibiting the publication of the speech in the newspapers. As a -result, although the speech was broadcast by the Deutschlandsender it -did not appear in any newspaper. But as, fortunately, the Reichsbank had -its own printing press which was of course not subject to censorship, I -had the speech printed in the Reichsbank printing press; and 250,000 -copies of it were distributed to the 400 branches of the Reichsbank -throughout the country, and in that manner it became known to the entire -population. - -DR. DIX: You were going to continue, were you not? - -SCHACHT: I wanted to go on and say that on every future opportunity -which I could find I always returned to these points. I should like to -touch upon only two more things in this connection. - -This morning I referred to these things in connection with the letter -written by me on 24 December 1935 to the Reich Minister of War, which is -Document Number EC-293. I should merely like to add and point out the -words, which I shall now quote: - - “The economic and legal policy for the treatment of the Jews, - the anti-Church activities of certain Party organizations, and - the legal despotism associated with the Gestapo are detrimental - to our armament program...” - -The same attitude can also be seen from the minutes of the so-called -“small Ministerial Council” for 12 May 1936, which have been submitted -in evidence by the Prosecution. It says in these minutes, and I quote: -“Dr. Schacht emphasized openly again and again that a cultural and legal -policy must be pursued which does not interfere with economy.” - -I want to remark in this connection that, of course, as Minister of -Economics I always linked my arguments with the work of the departments -under the Minister of Economics. And, as a last example, one of many -others which I cannot mention today, there is the speech on the occasion -of a celebration for the apprentices at the Berlin Chamber of Artisans -on 11 May 1937 which is Exhibit Number Schacht-30. On that occasion I -said the following, and I quote: - - “No community and, above all, no state can flourish which is not - based on legality, order, and discipline.” - -And a second sentence, I quote: - - “For that reason you must not only respect the right and the - law, but you must also act against injustice and unlawful - actions everywhere, wherever you find them.” - -And because I made known my attitude not only to a close circle but also -to a wider public by using every opportunity to voice my views -frankly—because of this, a few weeks ago in this court, the Chief of -the RSHA, Department III, Security Service, the witness Ohlendorf, in -reply to a question, described me as an enemy of the Party, at least -since the year 1937-1938. I believe that the Chief of the Security -Service, the inland department, should know since he had the task of -combating political opponents inside Germany. - -DR. DIX: May I point out that the statements made during the meeting of -the small Ministerial Council on 12 May 1936 are contained in my -document book, Exhibit Schacht-20, Page 57 of the English text, Page 51 -of the German text and Schacht’s speech to the Chamber of Industry and -Commerce on 12 May 1937... - -SCHACHT: [_Interrupting._] You mean Chamber of Artisans. - -DR. DIX: I shall refer to that later when I have the proper document; -and I now continue. - -We have talked about your participation at the Party rallies, and I -should merely like to ask you in addition: Did you participate in any -other Party functions? - -SCHACHT: I do not remember that I ever participated in any other -functions of the Party. - -DR. DIX: The Indictment charges you, in substance, with using your -personal influence and your close connections with the Führer for the -aims as set forth. Did you, as far as you know and can judge from your -experience, have any influence on the Führer? - -SCHACHT: Unfortunately, I never had any influence on the Führer’s -actions and decisions. I had influence only insofar as he did not dare -to interfere with me in my special financial and economic policies. But -this lack of influence of all members of Hitler’s entourage has already -been mentioned by various witnesses and so much has been said about it -that I think I need not take up the Tribunal’s time with any further -statements on that subject. - -DR. DIX: What you have just said applies in the main to the question of -the influence of the Reich Cabinet, the last meetings of the Reich -Cabinet, and so forth. Various witnesses have made statements on that -subject. Have you anything new to add? - -SCHACHT: I can merely add that on the whole the Reich Cabinet did not -have the slightest influence on Hitler, and that from November 1937 -on—this has been stated repeatedly—there were no more meetings or -consultations of the Cabinet. The Reich Cabinet was an uncorrelated -group of politically powerless departmental ministers without the proper -professional qualifications. - -DR. DIX: I should like to add that the number of the speech to the -Chamber of Artisans is Exhibit Number 30, Page 89 of the English text -and Page 82 of the German text. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] What was the situation regarding -rearmament? Whose will was decisive and authoritative as regards the -extent of rearmament? - -SCHACHT: I am without any basis for judgment as far as that is -concerned. But I have no doubt that Hitler’s will, here too, was the -sole decisive and authoritative factor. - -DR. DIX: That is to say, you had no influence other than that of the -credit-giver? - -SCHACHT: Within my Ministry, insofar as I administered this Ministry, I -did nothing for which I would not assume responsibility myself. - -DR. DIX: Did you speak to prominent foreigners about your lack of -influence on Hitler? - -SCHACHT: In this connection I recall a conversation with Ambassador -Bullitt in November 1937. This conversation with Ambassador Bullitt has -already been mentioned in some other connection, and Ambassador -Bullitt’s memorandum has been presented in evidence to the Tribunal by -the Prosecution. I merely refer to the sentence which refers to me, and -I quote: - - “He”—that is to say Schacht—“prefaced his remarks by saying - that he himself today was ‘completely without influence on that - man’”—meaning Hitler. “He seemed to regard himself as - politically dead and to have small respect for ‘that man.’” - -That was said in November 1937. But if I am permitted to add to this, I -want to point out that my foreign friends were kept constantly informed -about my position and my entire activity as regards the directing of -public affairs in Germany, as I have already mentioned once before. This -will be seen on later occasions when various instances are mentioned. - -DR. DIX: This morning I submitted Exhibit Number Schacht-22, Page 64 of -the English text. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] And now a few special questions regarding -your position as Minister of Economics. You have already made statements -regarding the obtaining of foreign raw materials, that is, you have -quoted appropriate passages. Could these not be substituted by home -products in your opinion? - -SCHACHT: A portion of such raw materials could certainly be replaced by -home products. We had learned in the meantime how to produce a large -number of new materials which we did not know about before... - -DR. DIX: Please be brief. - -SCHACHT: ...to produce them synthetically. But a considerable part could -not be replaced in that way and could be obtained only through foreign -trade. - -DR. DIX: And what was your attitude towards the question of -self-sufficiency? - -SCHACHT: As far as self-sufficiency was concerned I believe that, if at -a reasonable cost, without undue expenditure, which would have meant a -waste of German public funds and German manpower, certain synthetic -materials could be produced in Germany, then one should do so, but that -apart from this the maintenance of foreign trade was an absolute -necessity for economic reasons, and that it was even more necessary for -reasons of international cultural relations so that nations might live -together. I always regarded the isolation of nations as a great -misfortune, just as I have always regarded commerce as the best means of -bringing about international understanding. - -DR. DIX: Who was the exponent in the Reich Cabinet of the -self-sufficiency principle? - -SCHACHT: As far as I know, the whole idea of self-sufficiency, which was -then formulated in the Four Year Plan, originated with Hitler alone; -after Göring was commissioned with the direction of the Four Year Plan, -then Göring too, of course, represented that line of thought. - -DR. DIX: Did you express your contradictory views to Göring and Hitler? - -SCHACHT: I think it is clear from the record that I did so at every -opportunity. - -DR. DIX: One incidental question: You will remember that Göring -exclaimed, “I should like to know where the ‘No men’ are.” - -I want to ask you now, do you claim this honorary title of “No man” for -yourself? I remind you particularly of your letter of November 1942. - -SCHACHT: On every occasion when I was no longer in a position to do what -my inner conviction demanded, I said, “No.” I was not content to be -silent in the face of the many misdeeds committed by the Party. In every -case I expressed my disapproval of these things, personally, officially, -and publicly. I said “No” to all those things. I blocked credits. I -opposed an excessive rearmament. I talked against the war and I took -steps to prevent the war. I do not know to whom else this honorary title -of “No man” might apply if not to me. - -DR. DIX: Did you not swear an oath of allegiance to Hitler? - -SCHACHT: I did not swear an oath of allegiance to a certain Herr Hitler. -I swore allegiance to Adolf Hitler as the head of the State of the -German people, just as I did not swear allegiance to the Kaiser or to -President Ebert or to President Hindenburg, except in their capacity as -head of the State; in the same way I did not swear an oath to Adolf -Hitler. The oath of allegiance which I did swear to the head of the -German State does not apply to the person of the head of the State; it -applies to what he represents, the German nation. Perhaps I might add -something in this connection. I would never keep an oath of allegiance -to a perjurer and Hitler has turned out to be a hundredfold perjurer. - -DR. DIX: Göring has made extremely detailed explanations regarding the -Four Year Plan, its origin, its preparation, technical opposition by -you, and the consequences you took because of this opposition. Therefore -we can be brief and deal only with new material, if you have something -new to say. Have you anything to add to Göring’s statements or do you -disagree on points which you remember or about views held? - -SCHACHT: I gather from Göring’s statements that he has described -conditions perfectly correctly and I myself have nothing at all to add -unless you have something special in mind. - -DR. DIX: According to your impressions and the experience you had, when -did Hitler realize that you were an obstacle in the way of a speedy and -extensive rearmament? Did he acknowledge your economic arguments? Was he -satisfied with your policy or not? - -SCHACHT: At that time, in 1936, when the Four Year Plan was introduced -in September I could not tell what Hitler’s inner attitude to me was in -regard to these questions of economic policy. I might say that it was -clear that after my speech at Königsberg in August 1935 he mistrusted -me. But his attitude to my activities in the field of economic policy -was something which I was not yet sure of in 1936. The fact that I had -not in any way participated in the preparation of the Four Year Plan but -heard about it quite by surprise during the Party Rally and that, quite -unexpectedly, Hermann Göring and not the Minister of Economics was -appointed head of the Four Year Plan, as I heard for the first time at -the Party Rally in September 1936—these facts naturally made it clear -to me that Hitler, as far as economic policy with reference to the -entire rearmament program was concerned, did not have that degree of -confidence in me which he thought necessary. Subsequently, here in this -prison, my fellow Defendant Speer showed me a memorandum which he -received from Hitler on the occasion of his taking over the post of -Minister and which, curiously enough, deals in great detail with the -Four Year Plan and my activities, and is dated August 1936. In August -1936 Hitler himself dictated this memorandum which has been shown to me -in prison by my fellow Defendant Speer, and I assume that if I read a -number of brief quotations from it with the permission of... - -DR. DIX: I just want to give an explanation to the Tribunal. We received -the original of this memorandum about three weeks ago from the Camp -Commander of the Camp Dustbin through the kind mediation of the -Prosecution. We then handed it in for translation so that we might -submit it now. But the translation has not yet been completed. I shall -submit the entire memorandum under a new exhibit number when I receive -it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has any application been made in respect to it? - -DR. DIX: No application has been made as yet. I wanted... - -THE PRESIDENT: Which memorandum? Who drew it up? - -DR. DIX: It is a Hitler memorandum of the year 1936, of which there -exist three copies; and one of them was in the Camp Dustbin. This copy -arrived here a fortnight or three weeks ago after we had discussed our -document books with the Prosecution. I intended to submit the -translation of the Hitler memorandum today and at the same time to ask -that this be admitted in evidence, but unfortunately I am not in a -position to do so because the translation is not yet ready. My -colleague, Professor Kraus, was in fact told that it has been mislaid. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, let the defendant go on, and you can submit the -document in evidence and a translation afterwards. - -DR. DIX: Very well. The defendant has a copy and he will quote the most -important, very brief passages. - -SCHACHT: I shall quote very brief passages. Hitler says in this -memorandum, among other things, and I quote: - - “It is, above all, not the task of State economic institutions - to rack their brains about methods of production. This does not - concern the Ministry of Economics at all.” - -The Ministry of Economics was under me, and this is therefore a reproach -for me. - -A further quotation: - - “It is furthermore essential that German iron production be - increased to the utmost. The objection that we are not in a - position to produce the same cheap raw iron from German ore, - which has only 26 percent of iron content, as from the 45 - percent Swedish ores, is unimportant... The objection that in - this case all the German smelting works would have to be - reconstructed is also irrelevant; and, in any case, this is none - of the business of the Ministry of Economics.” - -As is apparent from the statement, I had explained that from 26 percent -ore one could produce steel only at costs twice or three times those at -which one could produce steel from 45 percent ore. And I explained -further that, in order to use 26 percent ore, one would have to have -completely different plants from those using 45 percent ore. Herr Hitler -states that this is none of the business of the Ministry of Economics, -and that, of course, means Herr Schacht. - -There is one last, very brief quotation. I quote: - - “I want to emphasize in this connection that in these tasks I - see the only possible economic mobilization and not in the - curbing of the armament industry...” - -That statement, too, is directed, of course, against my policy. - -DR. DIX: We have now reached the stage of tension of technical -differences between you and Göring, the tension between you and Hitler -regarding your functions as Minister of Economics. What were your -thoughts at the time about resigning from your office as Minister of -Economics? Was it possible for you to resign? Please do not repeat -anything that Lammers and other witnesses have already told us about the -impossibility of resigning. Please talk only about your own special case -and what you yourself did. - -SCHACHT: First of all, I tried to continue my own economic policy, in -spite of the fact that Göring as head of the Four Year Plan tried, of -course, as time went on to take over as many of the tasks concerned with -economic policy as possible. But the very moment Göring encroached on my -rights as Minister of Economics I used it as an opportunity to force my -release from the Ministry of Economics. That was at the beginning of -August 1937. - -At the time I told Hitler very briefly the reason, namely, that if I was -to assume responsibility for economic policy, then I would also have to -be in command. But if I was not in command, then I did not wish to -assume responsibility. The fight for my resignation, fought by me at -times with very drastic measures, lasted approximately two and a half -months until eventually Hitler had to decide to grant me the desired -release in order to prevent the conflict from becoming known to the -public more than it already was. - -DR. DIX: When you say “drastic measures” do you mean your so-called -sit-down strike? - -In this connection I want to submit to the Tribunal Exhibit Number -Schacht-40 of my document book, an affidavit from another former -colleague of Dr. Schacht in the Reich Ministry of Economics, -Kammerdirektor Dr. Asmus. On Page 180 of the English version of this -long affidavit there is a brief passage. I quote: - - “When this was found to be unsuccessful”—it means his - fight—“and when developments continued along the course which - he considered wrong, he”—Schacht—“in the autumn of 1937, long - before the beginning of the war, acted as an upright man and - applied for release from his office as Reich Minister of - Economics and thereby from his co-responsibility. - - “He was obviously not able to resign his office in the normal - way, because for reasons of prestige the Party required the use - of his name. Therefore, in the autumn of 1937, he simply - remained away from the Ministry of Economics for several weeks. - He started this sit-down strike, as it was humorously called in - the Ministry, and went in his official capacity only to the - Reichsbank...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, is it necessary to trouble the Tribunal with all -this detail? There is no dispute that he did resign, and the only thing -that he has got to explain is why he continued to be a Minister. The -Prosecution have given evidence about his resignation and about the -conflict between him and the Defendant Göring. What is the good of going -into all the detail of it, as to this sit-down strike and that sort of -thing? That doesn’t interest the Tribunal. - -DR. DIX: He did not remain a Minister at that time. He resigned as -Minister. - -THE PRESIDENT: I thought he had remained a Minister until 1943. - -DR. DIX: Minister without Portfolio, yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: I didn’t say Minister with Portfolio, I said Minister. - -DR. DIX: Yes, but there is a difference, but I shall come to that later. -I understood you to mean an active Minister, but I shall not go into -that now. It was a misunderstanding. Anyway, I have already finished -that. I was merely trying to show how difficult it was to resign. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] We now come to the manner in which you -were released. Have you anything to add to the statements made by -Lammers in this connection or not? - -SCHACHT: I think we should inform the Tribunal of one matter about which -I also learned here in prison from my fellow Defendant Speer. He -overheard the argument between Hitler and myself on the occasion of that -decisive conference in which I managed to push through my resignation. - -If the Tribunal allow, I shall read it very briefly. There are two or -three sentences. Herr Speer informed me of the following: “I was on the -terrace of Berghof on the Obersalzberg, and I was waiting to submit my -building plans. In the summer of 1937 when Schacht came to the -Berghof...” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: [_Interposing._] Speer is present in the room. For -one defendant to testify as to a conversation with another defendant is -a very convenient way of getting testimony without access to -cross-examination, but it seems to me that it is a highly objectionable -method. I object to this on the ground that it has no probative value to -testify to a conversation of this character when the Defendant Speer is -in the courtroom and can be sworn and can give his testimony. He sits -here and is available. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the subject of the conversation? - -DR. DIX: The subject of this conversation is a matter which concerns the -Defendant Schacht. It is a statement of Hitler regarding Schacht; it is -not a matter which concerns the Defendant Speer. Therefore I consider it -expedient for him, since it is a matter which concerns Schacht, to be -able to make a statement about it. I would, of course, consider it more -appropriate that he should not read something which Speer has written to -him, but that he should give his own account of what happened between -Hitler and Schacht and merely say, “I heard that from Speer.” That -appears to be better than... - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Dix, you may give that. - -DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Will you please not read, then, -but tell of this incident and say you got it from Speer? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is even more objectionable to me than to have -a written statement from Speer. If we are to have Speer’s testimony, it -at least should be Speer’s and not a repetition of a conversation -between the two defendants. If Speer has made a written statement, it -can be submitted to us in the ordinary course. - -This is the second document that we have not had the privilege of seeing -before it has been used here; and it seems to me that if this is a -document signed by Speer—which I don’t understand it to be—if it is, -that is one thing. We can then see it and perhaps it can be used. If it -is a conversation, I should prefer Speer’s version. - -DR. DIX: May I add something? The question of procedure is not of basic -importance for me here. In that case it can be discussed when Speer is -examined. However, I do not know whether Speer is going to be called; -probably he will be. Actually it would be better for us to hear it now, -but I leave it to the Tribunal to decide. It is not a question of great -importance to me. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will allow the evidence. - -DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Well then, without reading, -please describe the incident. - -SCHACHT: The gentlemen on the terrace, among them Speer, heard this -discussion, which was conducted in very loud tones. At the end of the -discussion Hitler came out on the terrace and... - -THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. [_There was a brief pause in the -proceedings._] Very well, Dr. Dix, go on. - -SCHACHT: Hitler came out on the terrace after this conference and said -to those present, among them Speer, that he had had a very serious -argument with Schacht, that he could not work with Schacht, and that -Schacht was upsetting his financial plans. - -DR. DIX: Well then, after you had left your position as Minister of -Economics you were still left authority as Reichsbank President. Were -you approached by Hitler or the Minister of Finance in your capacity as -President of the Reichsbank and asked for credit? - -SCHACHT: After the Reichsbank had discontinued giving credits, on 31 -March 1938, the Reich Minister of Finance of course received more urgent -demands for money and toward the end of that year he found himself in -the awkward situation of not being able to pay even the salaries of the -civil servants from the treasury. He came to me and asked me to grant -him a special credit. According to its charter and laws the Reichsbank -was entitled and to a certain extent obliged, but actually only -entitled, to advance to the Reich up to 400 million marks per annum. The -Reich Minister of Finance had received these 400 million marks and he -was asking, over and above that, for further credits; the Reichsbank -refused to give him these credits. The Reich Minister of Finance had to -go to the private banks and all the large banks together gave him a -credit of a few hundred million marks. However, the Reichsbank did not -participate in this credit. - -DR. DIX: If you as President of the Reichsbank turned down those -credits, then it seems there was nothing for it but to print more notes. -Did Hitler or anyone else suggest to you that the note printing presses -should be set in motion? - -SCHACHT: After the events of November 1938 I paid one more visit to -London, in December, to attend a conference regarding the financing of -the Jewish emigration from Germany in an orderly manner—a thing which I -myself had suggested. On that occasion I also talked with Prime Minister -Chamberlain. On 2 January 1939 I arrived at the Berghof in Berchtesgaden -to report to Hitler about these matters. On that occasion we, of course, -also got to talk about the financial needs of the Reich. I still refused -to give credit to the Reich, and pointed out the very difficult -financial situation which called for, or should have called for, a -reduction of State expenditure and thus of armament expenditure. - -In particular, I pointed out that at the beginning of December the first -instalment of the so-called Jewish fine—which had been imposed on the -Jews after the murder of Herr Vorn Rath in Paris and which had been -collected to the extent of 250 million marks at the beginning of -December—that this first instalment of 250 million marks had not been -received entirely in the form of cash, but that the Reich Minister of -Finance had had to agree to accept a considerable part of it “in kind,” -as the English say, because it was not possible to make liquid the cash -necessary for this payment. Hitler replied: “But we can circulate notes -on the basis of these goods. I have looked into the question of our -future financial policy very carefully and when I get back to Berlin in -a few days I shall discuss my plans with you and the Minister of -Finance.” - -I saw at once that it was Hitler’s intention to resort to the printing -of notes to meet this expenditure with or without the necessary cover, -but at any rate against certain securities. The danger of inflation was -now definitely imminent. And since I realized at once that this was the -point where I and the Reichsbank had to say “stop,” I replied to him, -“Very well, in that case I will get the Reichsbank to submit a -memorandum to you, setting out the attitude of the Reichsbank to this -problem and which can be used at the joint meeting with the Finance -Minister.” - -After that I went back to Berlin and informed my colleagues in the -Reichsbank Directorate. We saw, to our personal satisfaction, that here -was an opportunity for us to divorce ourselves definitely from that type -of policy. - -The memorandum dated 7 January which the Reichsbank Directorate then -submitted to Hitler has, I think, also been submitted as evidence by the -Prosecution. - -In order to explain the statements which the Reichsbank Directorate made -to Hitler in this decisive moment regarding further State expenditure -and especially armament expenditure, I ask permission to read only two -very brief sentences from this memorandum. It says, and I quote: - - “Unrestrained public expenditure constitutes a definite threat - to our currency. The unlimited growth of government expenditure - defies any attempts to draw up a regulated budget. It brings - State finances to the verge of ruin despite a tremendous - increase in taxes, and it undermines the currency and the - issuing bank.” - -Then there is another sentence, and I quote: - - “...if during the two great foreign political actions in Austria - and the Sudetenland an increase in public expenditure was - necessary, the fact that after the termination of these two - foreign political actions a reduction of expenditure is not - noticeable and that everything seems rather to indicate that a - further increase of expenditure is planned, makes it now our - absolute duty to point out what the consequences will be for our - currency. - - “The undersigned Directors of the Reichsbank are sufficiently - conscious of the fact that in their co-operation they have - gladly devoted all their energy to the great aims that have been - set, but that a halt must now be called.” - -DR. DIX: This memorandum has already been submitted by the Prosecution -under the Document Number EC-369, but it is being submitted again as -Exhibit Schacht-24 in our document book, Page 70 of the English text, -and Page 63 of the German text. - -I shall have to put various questions to Dr. Schacht on that memorandum, -but I think that perhaps there is not time now and that I should do so -tomorrow. - -THE PRESIDENT: If you must, Dr. Dix; but do you think that is very -important? At any rate, you had better do it tomorrow, if you are going -to do it at all. - -DR. DIX: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, can you inform us whether those extracts are -the same as the extracts which were refused in the case of the Defendant -Ribbentrop? - -DR. SIEMERS: I have made a comparison, and I can hand it to the Tribunal -in writing. Some documents are the same, some do not tally, and some are -missing. I have done that in writing. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - -The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 2 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH DAY - Thursday, 2 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal would like to know exactly what -your letter means, which they received from you, relating to the -following documents which the letter says have been withdrawn. What I -want to know is, does it mean that they are not to be translated? Let me -read you the numbers: 18, 19, 48, 53, 76, 80, 81, 82, 86, and 101. Now, -does your letter mean that those documents are not to be translated? - -DR. SIEMERS: No, Your Lordship; that means that the British Delegation -informed me yesterday morning that the objections against those -documents on the part of the British Delegation are withdrawn. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see. - -DR. SIEMERS: I had written the letter on 30 April, in the afternoon, -after I had had a conversation with Sir David. The following morning I -was informed... - -THE PRESIDENT: We won’t bother with that. You say that their objections -no longer exist. If they agree to that, well and good. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, apparently there seems to have been -some misunderstanding about three of them, Numbers 80, 101, and 76. The -others were not objected to. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, on 76 there seemed to be some -misunderstanding between Dr. Siemers and myself. I understood that he -did not want to persist in the legal report on the _Altmark_ incident, -and I think Dr. Siemers thought that I wasn’t persisting. However, I -thought Dr. Siemers was withdrawing that. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, then, are you still objecting to that? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am still objecting to it if it is not -withdrawn, My Lord. However, the other ones in the list Your Lordship -mentioned—that is Numbers 18, 19, 48, 53, 81, 82, and 86—there is no -objection to. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Concerning Document 76, I agree with Sir David. Number 76 -can be struck out, as far as I am concerned. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. That’s all I wanted to know. - -DR. SIEMERS: Number 80 about which I have spoken in detail with the -British Delegation... - -THE PRESIDENT: You need not tell me about it. - -DR. SIEMERS: I assumed there would be no objection. I would like to ask -that it be admitted in any case. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is right. In order that the Translation -Division should get on as soon as possible, the Tribunal has decided -upon these documents and the only questions upon which the Tribunal has -decided is that they shall be translated. The question of their -admissibility will be decided after they have been translated, and I -will take them in the categories of objection which are set out in Sir -David’s memorandum. - -In Category A, the first category, Number 66 will be allowed. Number 76 -as Dr. Siemers has now said, goes out. Numbers 101 to 106 will be -allowed, the rest are disallowed in A. In B the following documents will -be allowed: Numbers 39, 63, 64, 99, and 100. And, of course, Numbers 102 -to 107, which are allowed under A. The rest will not be allowed. - -Category C: The following will be allowed: Numbers 38, 50, 55, and 58. -The remainder are not allowed. - -Category D: The following will be allowed: Numbers 29, 56, 57, 60, and -62. - -Category E: The following will be allowed: Numbers 31, 32, 36, 37, 39, -41, and of course 99 and 101 which have already been allowed. - -In the last category, Category F, the Tribunal has very great doubts as -to the relevance of any of the documents in that category, but it will -have them all translated with the exception of Document 73. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: My Lord, I wonder whether the Tribunal would -allow me to mention the document numbers of the additional extracts from -_Der Stürmer_ which were put in cross-examination of Streicher. I had -the numbers ready to present at a convenient time. - -THE PRESIDENT: The exhibit numbers? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean read them? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: With the permission of the Tribunal, I have -proposed to hand in that schedule, which is in effect a catalogue or -index to the two bundles which the Tribunal had—Bundle A and Bundle -B—and I proposed then putting this schedule in as an exhibit itself, -which will become GB-450, (Document Number D-833), and if the Tribunal -agrees, that would save reading any numbers out. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There is another request I would make. The -original of the newspaper, _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, was put in, or -has been put in. Those volumes I have borrowed from a library, and I was -going to ask the Tribunal’s permission to have the extracts photographed -and to substitute with the Tribunal’s Secretariat the photostats, and -then take back the originals so that they might be returned. - -THE PRESIDENT: There seems no objection to that. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have no objection to that, Dr. Marx? - -DR. MARX: No, Mr. President, I have no objection to that. I reserve the -right to submit some counter documents if it should be necessary. But -the presentation of these documents is in accordance with what Colonel -Griffith-Jones stated in the course of the proceedings—if they are -submitted... - -THE PRESIDENT: You have a copy of this document here, this exhibit. - -DR. MARX: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am asking you whether you had any objection to the -original of the Jewish newspaper being returned... - -DR. MARX: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: ...after it is photographed. - -DR. MARX: No, I have no objection to that. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Dix? - -DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, I believe you still had to supplement your answer -to a question I put to you yesterday. I put to you the point that -different memoranda, letters, _et cetera_ from you to Hitler were full -of National Socialist phraseology. I said you dealt with letters and -memoranda from the date of the seizure of power until later when you -went into opposition. The Prosecution, however, specifically in the oral -presentation of the charges, as I remember it, referred to at least one -letter which you addressed to Hitler before the seizure of power in -November 1932, and there is in the files another letter of similar -contents of August 1932. I think you should state your position with -respect to these two letters, supplementing your answer to my question. - -DR. SCHACHT: I explained to you yesterday already that up to the -decisive election of July 1932, I had in no way intervened in the -development of the National Socialist movement, but remained completely -aloof from it. After that movement achieved its overpowering success in -July 1932, of which I spoke yesterday, I foresaw very clearly the -development which would now result. According to the principles of the -democratic political concept there was only one possibility, namely, -that the leader of that overwhelmingly large party would now have to -form a new government. I rejected from the first the other theoretical -possibility of a military government and a possibly resulting civil war, -as being impossible and incompatible with my principles. - -Therefore, after I had recognized these facts I endeavored in everything -to gain influence over Hitler and his movement, and the two letters -which you have just mentioned were written in that spirit. - -DR. DIX: What did you know about Hitler’s plans against Austria? - -SCHACHT: I never knew anything about plans against Austria. Nor did I -know in detail the plans Hitler had for Austria. I only knew—like the -majority of all Germans—that he was in favor of an Anschluss of Austria -with Germany. - -DR. DIX: What did you know about his plans against Czechoslovakia? - -SCHACHT: I knew nothing of his plans against Czechoslovakia until about -the time of the Munich Conference. - -DR. DIX: Did you, after the Munich Conference, that is to say, after the -peaceful, so far peaceful settlement of the Sudeten question, hear a -remark of Hitler’s about Munich which was of importance in your later -personal attitude toward Hitler? Will you tell the Tribunal the remark -which you heard? - -SCHACHT: May I say first that, according to my knowledge of conditions -at that time, Hitler was conceded in Munich more than he had ever -expected. According to my information—and I expressed this also in the -conversation with Ambassador Bullitt at that time—it was Hitler’s -purpose to gain autonomy for the Germans in Czechoslovakia. In Munich -the Allies presented him with the transfer of the Sudeten-German -territories on a silver platter. I assumed, of course, that now Hitler’s -ambition would be more than satisfied and I can only say that I was -surprised and shocked when a few days after Munich I saw Hitler. I had -no further conversation with him at that time, but I met him with his -entourage, mostly SS men, and from the conversation between him and the -SS men I could only catch the remark: “That fellow has spoiled my entry -into Prague.” That is to say made it impossible. - -Apparently he was not satisfied with the great success which he had -achieved in foreign politics, but I mentioned when I spoke about it -yesterday the fact that I assumed from that remark that he lacked the -glory and a glamorous staging. - -DR. DIX: And what were your feelings in regard to your whole political -attitude towards Hitler after Munich? - -SCHACHT: In spite of the foreign political success I regretted very -deeply, and so did my close friends, that by this intervention on the -part of the Allied Powers, our attempt to remove the Hitler regime was -ruined for a long time to come—we did not know at that time of course -what would happen in the future—but, naturally, at that moment we had -to resign ourselves to it. - -DR. DIX: What did you know about Hitler’s plans against Memel? - -SCHACHT: I knew nothing at all and never heard anything about it. As far -as I know, I learned of the annexation of Memel by Germany on my trip to -India, which I had already started at that time. - -DR. DIX: And since you were in India at that time, you, of course, heard -nothing either about the negotiations, _et cetera_, which preceded the -attack on Poland? - -SCHACHT: I had no knowledge about that and therefore I also knew nothing -of the May meeting of 1939 which has been discussed several times. In -the beginning of March I left Berlin and then stayed for some time in -Switzerland; at the end of March I set out for India via Genoa, and so I -learned nothing at all about the Hacha affair, that is the establishment -of the protectorate in Czechoslovakia, nor of Memel, nor of Poland, -since I did not return from the trip to India until the beginning of -August. - -DR. DIX: The invasions of Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark have -been taken up here. Did you approve of these measures and actions? - -SCHACHT: Under no circumstances. - -DR. DIX: Were you ever able to express that disapproval anywhere and -how? - -SCHACHT: Before the invasion of Belgium I was visited on the order of -the Chief of the General Staff, Halder, by the Quartermaster General, -the then Colonel, later General Wagner who after the collapse committed -suicide. He informed me of the intended invasion of Belgium. I was -shocked and I replied at that time, “If you want to commit that insanity -too, then you are beyond help.” - -THE PRESIDENT: What time? - -SCHACHT: Before the march into Belgium. Exactly when it was I could not -say. It may have been already in November 1939. It may have been in -April 1940. I no longer know exactly when it was. - -DR. DIX: Even though you did not approve of that action, Germany was -after all engaged in a life and death struggle. Did not that cause you -to put your active co-operation at her disposal, since you were still -Minister without Portfolio, though you no longer held a special office? - -SCHACHT: I did not do that. - -DR. DIX: Did anyone ask you to do that? - -SCHACHT: The visit, which I have just mentioned, of Quartermaster -General Wagner, upon order of the Chief of General Staff Halder, was -intended to persuade me to act in Germany’s interest during the expected -occupation of Belgium. I was to supervise and direct currency, finance, -and banking matters in Belgium. I flatly refused that. Later I was -approached again by the then Military Governor of Belgium, General Von -Falkenhausen, for advice concerning the Belgian financial -administration. I again refused to give advice and did not make any -statements or participate in any way. - -DR. DIX: When did you for the first time... - -SCHACHT: I could perhaps relate another instance when I was approached. -One day, shortly after America was drawn into the war, I received a -request from the newspaper published by Goebbels, that, on account of my -knowledge of American conditions, I should write an article for _Das -Reich_, to assure the German people that the war potential of the United -States should not be overestimated. I refused to write that article for -the reason that precisely because I knew American conditions very well, -my statement could only amount to the exact opposite. And so I refused -in this instance also. - -DR. DIX: When did you hear for the first time of the meeting which we -call here simply the Hossbach meeting, or the meeting concerning the -Hossbach protocol? - -SCHACHT: To my great surprise, I was informed of that meeting on 20 -October 1945, here in my cell, and I was extremely astonished that -during all previous interrogations I had never been asked about this -record, because it can be seen clearly from it that the Reich Government -was not to be informed of Hitler’s intentions for war and therefore -could not know anything about them. - -DR. DIX: Did you take part in similar conferences which were preparatory -to attacks, for instance the meeting of November 1940 in which the -attack on Russia was discussed? I do not wish to be misunderstood—the -Speer document which you spoke of yesterday discusses an attack which -according to Hitler was threatened by Russia. I am speaking now of -discussions in which the subject was an attack on Russia. - -SCHACHT: The fear of an attack from Russia dates back to the fall of -1936 and therefore has as yet nothing to do with the war. I never took -part in any conference which indicated intentions of war, consequently -not in the conference on the intended attack on Russia, and I never -heard anything about it. - -DR. DIX: Does that also apply to the meeting of May 1941? - -SCHACHT: At the moment, I do not know which meeting that is, but I did -not in any way take part in any meeting in May 1941, as during the -entire period when I was Minister without Portfolio, I never took part -in any official conference. - -DR. DIX: Then you also did not get any information about the conferences -which the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka had in Berlin? - -SCHACHT: I did not have the slightest knowledge of the Matsuoka -conference except what may perhaps have been said on the radio or in the -press. - -DR. DIX: Mention has been made in some way that you at one time had made -available 200,000 marks for Nazi propaganda purposes in Austria. Is -there any truth in this? - -SCHACHT: I have not the slightest knowledge of that. - -DR. DIX: Now we come to your dismissal as President of the Reichsbank. -As you have heard, the Prosecution asserts that you finally brought -about your own dismissal in order to evade the financial responsibility. -I ask you to reply to that accusation and to tell the Tribunal briefly -but exhaustively the reasons and the tactical deliberations leading to -your dismissal and that of your assistants. They appear here in the -memorandum of the Reichsbank Directorate which has been under -consideration several times. - -SCHACHT: I should like to divide the question into two parts: The first -question is whether I tried to rid myself of my office as President of -the Reichsbank. My answer to that question is a most emphatic “yes.” -Since the middle of 1938, we in the Reichsbank always considered that if -there were no change in policy, we in no event wanted to continue in -office, because—and that brings me to the second part of the -question—we did not want to assume the responsibility which we were -then expected to bear. - -For everything which we did previously and for a defensive rearmament in -order to achieve equal rights for Germany in international politics, we -gladly assumed responsibility, and we assume it before history and this -Tribunal. But the responsibility for continuing rearmament which -possibly in itself constituted a serious potential danger of war or -which would ever aim at war intentionally—that responsibility none of -us wanted to assume. Consequently, when it became clear that Hitler was -working toward a further increase in rearmament—and I spoke about that -yesterday in connection with the conversation of 2 January 1939—when we -became aware of that we wrote the memorandum which was openly quoted and -is in the hands of this Tribunal as an exhibit. It indicates clearly -that we opposed every further increase of state expenditure and would -not assume responsibility for it. From that, Hitler gathered that he -would in no event be able to use the Reichsbank with its present -Directorate and President for any future financial purposes. Therefore, -there remained only one alternative; to change the Directorate, because -without the Reichsbank he could not go on. And he had to take a second -step; he had to change the Reichsbank Law. That is to say, an end had to -be put to the independence of the Reichsbank from government decrees. At -first he did that in a secret law—we had such things—of 19 or 20 -January 1939. That law was published only about 6 months later. That law -abolished the independence of the Reichsbank and the President of the -Reichsbank became a mere cashier for the credit demands of the Reich, -that is to say, of Hitler. - -The Reichsbank Directorate did not want to continue along this line of -development. Therefore, on 20 January the President of the Reichsbank, -the Vice President, and the main financial expert, Reichsbank Director -Huelse, were dismissed; three other members of the Directorate of the -Reichsbank, Geheimrat Vocke, Director Erhard, and Director Blessing -pressed insistently for their resignation from the Reichsbank until it -was also granted. Two other members of the Reichsbank Directorate, -Director Puhl, whose name has been mentioned here already, and an eighth -director, Director Poetschmann, remained in the Directorate even under -the new conditions. They were both Party members, the only ones in the -Directorate, and therefore they could not easily withdraw. - -DR. DIX: That is one accusation which is made by the Prosecution -concerning your reasons for writing the memorandum, that is to say, to -evade the financial responsibility. The second accusation is that not a -word of this memorandum expressly mentions limitation of armaments, but -that it essentially treats only matters of currency, technical questions -of finance, and economic considerations; and that it was therefore the -Dr. Schacht who in his capacity of Bank Director was concerned about the -currency, rather than the opponent of rearmament, who made himself heard -by this memorandum. - -It is necessary that as co-author of the memorandum—as its main -author—you state your position with regard to this incriminating -interpretation of the memorandum. - -SCHACHT: Even at an earlier time I said here that every objection which -I made and had to make to Hitler—and that applies not only to myself -but to all ministers—could only be made with arguments arising out of -the particular department administered. - -Had I said to Hitler, “I shall not give you any more money because you -intend to wage war,” I should not have the pleasure of conducting this -animated conversation here with you. I could then have consulted a -priest, and it would have been a very one-sided affair because I would -have lain silently in my tomb, and the priest would have delivered a -monologue. - -DR. DIX: This memorandum is certainly very important, and therefore we -have to pause here for a moment. In summarizing—and please check me—I -believe I can express your views in this way: This memorandum at the end -contained demands such as further means of raising funds by increase of -taxation or else by making use of the stock market—both impossible. -Taxation could not be increased any more. The stock market had just -unsuccessfully attempted a loan. - -If these actually impossible demands had been granted, the Reichsbank -would have created guarantees that no further funds would be used for -one or another form of rearmament. This success was not to be expected; -rather you could expect your dismissal. Did my brief but comprehensive -summary of this matter express your views correctly? - -SCHACHT: That entire letter was composed in such a way that there were -only two possible answers to it; either an alteration of financial -policy—and that meant a stop to rearmament, which would have amounted -to a complete change of Hitler’s policy—or else the dismissal of the -Reichsbank President; and that happened. We expected it because at that -time I no longer believed that Hitler would change his policy so -completely. - -DR. DIX: Therefore, the Prosecution are right in saying that your -mission ended with your dismissal. - -SCHACHT: Hitler certainly confirmed that himself and in the letter of -dismissal to me said it expressly. We heard from the testimony of Herr -Lammers in this Court that Hitler with his own hand wrote that addition -into the letter, that my name would remain connected with the first -stage of rearmament. The second stage of rearmament I rejected and -Hitler understood that very clearly, because when he received that -letter from the Reichsbank he said to those who were present: “This is -mutiny.” - -DR. DIX: How do you know that? - -SCHACHT: The witness Vocke who will, I hope, appear in this Court will -testify to that. - -DR. DIX: Furthermore, the Prosecution asserted that your exit from the -political stage could not be attributed to your policy of opposition to -a war but to disputes with Hermann Göring over power and rank. As such, -that accusation seems to me to have been refuted already by statements -which Göring and Lammers have made up to now. We do not wish to -recapitulate. I merely want to ask you whether you have anything to add -to the statements made on this subject by Göring and Lammers, or whether -you disagree with them. - -SCHACHT: In his oral presentation the prosecutor said that throughout -the entire material which he had studied he could not find one piece of -evidence for my opposition to a policy of war. I can only say in this -respect: If someone on account of his shortsightedness does not see a -tree on a level plain, there is surely no proof that the tree is not -there. - -DR. DIX: You have heard from the Prosecution that you are accused of -having remained a member of the Cabinet as a Reich Minister without -Portfolio. That was also the cause for misunderstanding yesterday. I -merely wanted to express yesterday that you had resigned as an active -minister and head of a department, that you resigned as Minister of -Economy and His Lordship correctly pointed out, that of course you -remained a Minister without Portfolio, that is without a special sphere -of activity until January 1943. Of that you are accused by the -Prosecution. What caused you to remain Reich Minister without Portfolio? -Why did you do that? Did you have any particular financial reasons? -Excuse my mentioning that, but the trial brief, on Page 5, charges you -with that motive. - -SCHACHT: I have already repeatedly explained here that my release from -office as Minister of Economy encountered very great difficulties, and -you have also submitted several affidavits confirming the fact. - -Hitler did not, under any circumstances, want it to be known that a -break or even so much as a difference of opinion had occurred between -one of his assistants and himself. When he finally approved my release, -he attached the condition that nominally I should remain Minister -without Portfolio. - -As regards the second accusation, it is as unworthy as it is wrong. -There was a law in Germany that if a person held two public offices he -could be paid only for one. Since I was in addition President of the -Reichsbank I continuously received my income from the Reichsbank, at -first my salary and later my pension; therefore as a minister I drew no -salary whatever. - -DR. DIX: Did you then, during the entire period of your position as -Reich Minister without Portfolio, have any other function to fulfill in -that capacity? Did you take any part in important decisions of the -Cabinet, did you participate in discussions—in brief, was the Minister -without Portfolio just a fancy dress major or was the position one of -substance? - -SCHACHT: I have already emphasized again and again in this Court—and I -can only repeat it again—that after I left the Reichsbank I had not a -single official discussion; I did not take part in a single ministerial -or official conference and that, unfortunately, it was not possible for -me to bring up any subject for discussion; for I had no factual basis or -pretext for such a possibility, for the very reason that I had no -particular field to administer. I believe that I was the only Minister -without Portfolio—there were also a few others—who was not active in -any way at all. As far as I know, Seyss-Inquart was undoubtedly Minister -without Portfolio; he had his administration in Holland. Frank was -Minister without Portfolio and had his administration in Poland. -Schirach—I do not know whether he was Minister without Portfolio; I -think it has been mentioned once, but I do not know if it is correct—he -had his Austrian administration in Vienna. I had nothing further to do -with the state administration or in any other way with the State or the -Party. - -DR. DIX: What about the ordinary course of affairs? Were there perhaps -any circulars sent out by Lammers on which you acted? - -SCHACHT: On the whole—and I think it is understandable after what I -have stated here—I watched carefully for every possibility of -intervening again in some way but I remember and state with absolute -certainty, that during the entire time until the collapse I received all -in all three official memoranda. The numerous invitations to state -funerals and similar social state functions really need not be mentioned -here as official communications. I did not participate in these -occasions either. However, these three instances are interesting. The -first time it was a letter from Hitler—pardon, from Himmler—a circular -or request or a bill proposed by Himmler who intended to transfer court -jurisdiction over the so-called asocial elements of the population to -the police, or rather the Gestapo, that is to say, a basic principle of -the administration of justice to separate the functions of prosecution -and judge... - -DR. DIX: Well, that is known, Dr. Schacht. You can assume that is known. - -SCHACHT: In regard to this question I immediately assented in the copy -of a letter which Reich Minister Frank had sent me in which he took a -stand against this basic violation of legal principles, and the bill was -not made law. It would indeed have been extremely regrettable, because I -am firmly convinced that I myself was a definite anti-social element in -Himmler’s sense. - -The second instance was a letter concerning some discussions about state -property in Yugoslavia, after we had occupied Yugoslavia. I answered -that since I had not taken part in the preliminary discussions on the -draft of the law I should not be counted upon to assist in this matter. - -Finally, the third incident—and this is the most important—occurred in -November 1942. Apparently by mistake there came into circulation the -draft for a law of the Reich Minister for Air, which contained the -suggestion of taking 15 and 16 year old students away from the high -school to enlist them for military service in the anti-aircraft defense, -the so-called Flakdienst. I answered this letter because it was a -welcome opportunity for me to state for once my opinion on the military -situation in a long detailed reply which I sent to Göring. - -DR. DIX: On the third of November? - -SCHACHT: It is a letter of 30 November, which on the second of December -I believe was given personally by my secretary to the adjutant of Göring -in a closed envelope, with the request that he himself open it. - -DR. DIX: One moment, Dr. Schacht. - -[_Turning to the Tribunal._] That letter has already been submitted -under Document Number 3700-PS by the Prosecution, but it is also in our -document book under Exhibit Number 23; Page 66 of the English text and -Page 59 of the German text. If we were not so pressed for time, it would -have been especially gratifying for me to read this letter here in full. -It is a very fine letter. However, I want to take time into -consideration and I merely ask you, Dr. Schacht, to state briefly your -opinion of its content. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will read the letter. It isn’t necessary for -you to read it now, is it? - -DR. DIX: Very well. Well, then, would he speak quite briefly about the -letter before the recess or do you not wish to say anything further? - -SCHACHT: Yes. I would like to say in this connection, if it is -permitted, that to my knowledge this letter has already been read here -by the American Chief Prosecutor, that is... - -DR. DIX: Read? - -SCHACHT: Or mentioned, or at least the most important points were read. -I believe it is sufficient if you submit the letter to the Court in -evidence. - -DR. DIX: Yes, that has been done. - -Now, that constituted your entire activity as Reich Minister without -Portfolio? - -SCHACHT: Yes, that was the end of it. - -DR. DIX: Therefore if one wanted to define your position in one word, -one would say, just a kind of retired major (Charaktermajor). - -SCHACHT: I don’t know what a “Charaktermajor” is, at any rate, I was -never a major, but I have always had character. - -DR. DIX: But, Dr. Schacht, that is a historical remark about authority -conferred by Kaiser Wilhelm, the First as German Emperor on Bismarck. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think this is a convenient time to break off. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, we spoke of the letter, dated 30 November 1942, to -Göring. Did that letter have any consequences? - -SCHACHT: Yes, the letter had very considerable consequences. It had the -result that on 22 January I did at last receive my long hoped-for -release from my position of a nominal Minister without Portfolio. The -reason given for it, however, was less pleasant. I believe the letter is -already in the files of the Tribunal. It is a letter attached to the -official document of release from Lammers. - -DR. DIX: Yes, very well. We put a question on that subject during -Lammers’ hearing. - -SCHACHT: Yes. But I should only like to refer to the statement which -says: “...in view of your entire conduct in the present fateful struggle -of the German nation...”—so that was my whole attitude. - -DR. DIX: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, it is Number 26 of the document -book. It is on Page 76 of the English text and on Page 69 of the German -text. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Please continue. - -SCHACHT: It was, therefore, my entire attitude during this war which led -to my dismissal, and the letter of dismissal also contained the -statement that I would be dismissed for the time being. According to -Lammers’ statement, as we have heard, this expression “for the time -being” was included in the letter, also on the Führer’s initiative. I -was very clearly aware of this wording when I received the letter. - -Two days later I was removed from the Prussian State Council, of which I -was a member—a body, incidentally, which had not met for at least 8 -years. At any rate, I was not at the meetings. Perhaps it was 6 years, I -do not know. The text of that decision was communicated to me by the -chairman of that State Council, Hermann Göring, and because of its -almost amusing contents, I still recollect it very clearly. It stated: - - “My answer to your defeatist letter undermining the power of - resistance of the German people is that I remove you from the - Prussian State Council.” - -I say it was amusing because a sealed letter written by me to Göring -could not possibly shake the power of resistance of the German people. A -further result was that Party Leader Bormann demanded from me the return -of the Golden Party Badge and I did that at once. After that I was -particularly closely watched by the Gestapo. I gave up my residence in -Berlin immediately, within 24 hours, and for the whole day the Gestapo -spies followed me all over Berlin both on foot and by car. Then I -quietly retired to my estate in the country. - -DR. DIX: Now, since the trial brief has mentioned material and pecuniary -reasons for the decisions which you made, it appears to me justified and -necessary to ask what was the position regarding your property and your -income after 1933? In your reply please take into consideration that it -is striking that in 1942 there was an increase in your income. - -SCHACHT: A few months ago, apparently with the approval of the Military -Government, there appeared in the press a list of donations which the -Party leaders and ministers in Germany received and, in that connection, -of their income and their property. I was also listed, not under -“donations,” but it was stated that in 1942 I had an unusually high -income. This list is incorrect, since it is a gross figure which is -mentioned and it does not take into consideration the fact that the war -profit tax was later deducted from it. When the list was compiled the -tax was not yet determined, so that about 80 percent must be deducted -from the sum which is given there. The income is then no longer striking -in any way. In regard to my property, the list shows that over a period -of 10 years it has hardly changed, and I want to emphasize here -particularly that in the last 20 years my property remained -approximately the same and did not increase. - -DR. DIX: If I remember rightly you reduced your own salary as President -of the Reichsbank at a certain time on your own initiative? - -SCHACHT: When, on Hitler’s suggestion, President Hindenburg in March of -1933 appointed me again to the position of President of the Reichsbank, -Hitler left it to me to fix my own income. At that time, I voluntarily -reduced my income to less than 25 percent of my former income from the -Reichsbank. - -DR. DIX: Did you ever receive presents or donations from Hitler, either -in money or in valuables? - -SCHACHT: As I have just mentioned, I have never received any kind of -donations from Hitler, and I think he would hardly have risked offering -me one. I did, indeed, receive one present from Hitler, on the occasion -of my 60th birthday. He gave me a picture which certainly had the value -of about 20,000 marks. It was an oil painting by a German painter -Spitzweg; and would have been worth approximately 200,000 marks if it -had been genuine. As soon as the picture was brought into my room I -recognized it as a forgery, but I succeeded about 3 months later in -tracing the original. I started proceedings on the subject of the -genuineness of the picture, and the forgery was established before a -court. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is not appropriate for the Tribunal to listen to this. - -DR. DIX: Did Hitler ever bestow on you the right to wear a uniform or -give you any kind of decoration or military rank? - -SCHACHT: If the Tribunal will permit me I would like to say that I -returned the forgery and it was never replaced; so that I have received -no presents from Hitler. - -Hitler offered me a uniform. He said I could have any uniform I desired -but I only raised my hands in refusal and did not accept any, not even -the uniform of an official, because I did not wish to have a uniform. - -DR. DIX: Now, another subject: Did you know anything about the -concentration camps? - -SCHACHT: Already in the year 1933, when Göring established concentration -camps, I heard several times that political opponents and other disliked -or inconvenient persons were taken away to a concentration camp. That -these people were deprived of their liberty perturbed me very much at -the time, of course, and I continuously demanded, as far as I was in a -position to do so during conversations, that the arrest and removal to -concentration camps should be followed by a clarification before the law -with a defense and so on, and suitable legal proceedings. At that early -time the Reich Minister of the Interior Frick also protested -energetically along the same lines. Subsequently this type of -imprisonment, _et cetera_, became less known in public, and in -consequence I assumed that things were slowly abating. Only much -later—let us say the second half of 1934 and 1935... - -DR. DIX: When you met Gisevius, you mean? - -SCHACHT: Yes, when I met Gisevius—I heard on repeated occasions that -not only were people still being deprived of their liberty, but that -sometimes they were being ill-treated, that beatings, _et cetera_, took -place. I have already said before this Tribunal that as a result, as -early as May 1935, I personally took the opportunity of drawing Hitler’s -attention to these conditions and that I told him at the time that such -a system was causing the whole world to despise us and must cease. I -have mentioned that I repeatedly took a stand against all these things -publicly, whenever there was a possibility of doing so. - -But I never heard anything of the serious ill-treatment and -outrages—murder and the like—which started later. Probably because, -firstly, these conditions did not begin until after the war, after the -outbreak of war, and because already from 1939 onwards I led a very -retired life. I heard of these things and of the dreadful form in which -they happened only here in prison. However, I did hear, as early as 1938 -and after, of the deportation of Jews; but because individual cases were -brought to my notice I could only ascertain that there were deportations -to Theresienstadt, where allegedly there was an assembly camp for Jews, -where Jews were accommodated until a later date when the Jewish problem -was to be dealt with again. Any physical ill-treatment, not to speak of -killing or the like, never came to my knowledge. - -DR. DIX: Did you ever take a look at a concentration camp? - -SCHACHT: I had an opportunity of acquainting myself with several -concentration camps when, on 23 July 1944, I myself was dragged into a -concentration camp. Before that date I did not visit a single -concentration camp at any time, but afterwards I got to know not only -the ordinary concentration camps but also the extermination camp in -Flossenbürg. - -DR. DIX: Did you not, while in Flossenbürg, receive a visit from a -“comrade-in-ideas”—if I may say so? - -SCHACHT: I know of this matter only from a letter which this gentleman -sent to you or to this Tribunal, I believe, and in which he describes -that visit. I can only, on my own observation... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think it is improper to give the contents of a -letter from a person unidentified. I have said to this Tribunal before -that these letters which come from unidentified persons—if he is -identified, it has not been done in evidence—come to all of us. I am -sure members of the Tribunal get a great many of them. If that is -evidence, then the Prosecution should reopen its case, because I have -baskets of them. - -I think it is highly improper to take communications and put them in -evidence directly and it is even more improper to relate all of them by -oral testimony when the document is not produced. I think this kind of -evidence has no probative value and I object to it. - -DR. DIX: May I be permitted to say that I would never do anything -improper nor have I done it. I do not intend in any way to submit this -very harmless jocular letter to the Tribunal as evidence. But this -letter, which reached me through quite regular channels, informed Dr. -Schacht and myself that there existed a plan to murder him in -Flossenbürg. That is why I also questioned the witness Kaltenbrunner on -this matter. The only reason why I am asking Dr. Schacht is that I -expect him to inform the Tribunal that according to this information -there was in fact at that time an order to murder him. This fact, not -the letter, is not without some significance, because if a regime wants -to kill a man then that is at least proof of the fact that it is not -particularly well-disposed toward him. That is the only reason why I -asked that this letter be submitted, and it is, of course, also at Mr. -Justice Jackson’s disposal. It is really quite an amusing letter, -written by a simple man. - -But I would never have considered submitting this letter as a document -in evidence. If the Tribunal have objections to hearing the matter, a -matter which was also discussed when Kaltenbrunner was examined, then I -shall willingly omit it. I am quite astonished that the matter should be -given so much significance. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal thinks that the letter isn’t being -offered in evidence, and therefore you ought not to refer to it. Well, -then, don’t refer to it. - -DR. DIX: All right, we shall leave it. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, now, at last you were released. What -did you do then? - -SCHACHT: After that time I did nothing more apart from continuing my -efforts towards the removal of Hitler. That was my only political -activity. For the rest, I was living on my estate. - -DR. DIX: Did you not go on a journey in the spring of 1939? - -SCHACHT: Excuse me, you are speaking of the time after the dismissal as -President of the Reichsbank, I thought you meant minister. I was just -talking of 1943. - -DR. DIX: No. No. - -SCHACHT: You are going back to the year 1939. After the dismissal in -January 1939 I already mentioned that Hitler suggested to me that I -should go on an extensive journey abroad and at the time I went to India -by way of Switzerland, where I again saw my friends. - -DR. DIX: Were you in any way politically active in India? - -SCHACHT: In India I merely traveled as a tourist. I was not politically -active but, of course, I visited several governors and I spent 3 days as -the Viceroy’s guest in his house in Simla. - -DR. DIX: Did you not have political connections with Chinese statesmen -in Rangoon? - -SCHACHT: When I was in Burma, after leaving India, I received a visit in -Rangoon from a Chinese friend who had visited me before in Berlin on -occasion and who had been commissioned by his government to talk to me -about the Situation of China. - -DR. DIX: That is Chiang Kai-Shek’s China? - -SCHACHT: Chiang Kai-Shek’s China which was already at war with Japan at -the time. The other China did not then exist and this gentleman asked me -upon the request of Chiang Kai-Shek and the Chinese Cabinet... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I can’t see the slightest relevancy to this. In the -first place, we heard it once and secondly, after we had heard it it has -no relevancy to the case. We have no charge against him that he did -anything in China and we will stipulate that he was as pure as snow all -the time he was in China. We haven’t a thing to do with that and it is -taking time here that just gets us nowhere and is keeping us away from -the real charge in the case. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal quite understands that you say it is -irrelevant. Why do you say it is relevant? - -DR. DIX: I regret that Mr. Justice Jackson and I understand each other -too little. The matter is relevant in the following connection: In this -testimony and also in an affidavit which has been read... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we heard three times that the Defendant Schacht -went to India. Three times in his evidence he dealt with the fact that -he went to India and China. How is it relevant? - -DR. DIX: I am not speaking of the journey to India. It had to be -mentioned only briefly to explain the connection of time. I put a -question, referring to Schacht’s negotiations in Rangoon with the envoy -from Chiang Kai-Shek—with the Chinese—and at that point Mr. Justice -Jackson raised his objection. But the fact that Schacht maintained -friendly connections with Chiang Kai-Shek’s Government and gave support -to it, that fact is relevant, and for the same reason for which I -attached importance to the fact that it became clear here that in regard -to the Union of Soviet Republics also Schacht pursued a pro-Soviet line -in his economic policy during the years when Hitler was conducting a -political campaign against Russia. Here we have a second instance, where -he is demanding relations which were contrary to the principles of -Hitler’s policy; that is relations with Chiang Kai-Shek, and so against -Hitler’s ally, Japan. It is in this connection that the negotiations -with the Chinese are of significance. They will take only a moment’s -time at most. They were merely to be mentioned in passing. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you consider his relations -with China of any importance, it can be stated in one sentence. - -DR. DIX: I am of the same opinion. - -SCHACHT: I will sum it up in one sentence. In a written memorandum I -advised Chiang Kai-Shek’s government to continue holding out against -Japan, giving as reason that the economic resources of China would last -longer than the economic resources of Japan; and I advised Chiang -Kai-Shek to rely primarily on the United States of America in his -foreign policy. - -DR. DIX: Then upon your return from India, that is, in August 1939, you -found a situation which must have appeared quite tense to someone who -was just coming back. Did you not then attempt to contact the Cabinet or -Hitler in order to discuss this situation? - -SCHACHT: Of course, I found a very tense situation in the question of -Poland and I used my return as an occasion for writing a letter to -Hitler, a letter to Göring, and a letter to Ribbentrop; that is to say, -the three leading men, in order to inform them that I had come back from -India, leaving it to their discretion and expecting that at least one of -them would ask me for an account of my experiences; and then, I should -have had an opportunity of talking to the leading men once again. To my -very great surprise, I did not get an answer from Hitler at all; I -received no reply from Göring; and Herr Von Ribbentrop answered me that -he had taken note of my letter. There was therefore no other way for me -but to make my own inquiries regarding the real state of affairs on -Poland, and when things became critical I took the well-known step, -which has already been described here by Herr Gisevius; namely the -attempt to gain access to the Führer’s headquarters. - -DR. DIX: We need not repeat that. The only question which I still want -to ask you is what were you going to tell the generals, particularly -General Von Brauchitsch, at that last moment? - -SCHACHT: That he still had a chance to avert a war. I knew perfectly -well that bare economic and general political statements would of course -accomplish nothing with Von Brauchitsch because he would then certainly -have referred to Hitler’s leadership. Therefore I wanted to say to him -something of quite a different nature and, in my opinion, that is of the -most decisive significance. I was going to remind him that he had sworn -an oath of allegiance to the Weimar Constitution. I wanted to remind him -that the Enabling Act did not delegate power to Hitler but to the Reich -Cabinet and I wanted to remind him that in the Weimar Constitution there -was and still is a clause, which has never been annulled and according -to which, war cannot be declared without previous approval by the -Reichstag. I was convinced that Brauchitsch would have referred me to -his oath sworn to Hitler and I would have told him: “I also have sworn -this oath. You have sworn no oath other than your military one, perhaps, -but this oath does not in any way invalidate the oath sworn to the -Weimar Constitution; on the contrary, the oath to the Weimar -Constitution is the one that is valid. It is your duty, therefore, to -see to it that this entire question of war or no war be brought before -the Cabinet and discussed there, and when the Reich Cabinet has made a -decision, the matter will go before the Reichstag.” If these two steps -had been taken, then I am firmly convinced that there would have been no -war. - -DR. DIX: You never reached Brauchitsch. We do not want to repeat the -description of that whole affair or of your attempts at the -Bendlerstrasse and so on. Have you anything to add to Gisevius’ -testimony or do you wish to change anything in it? - -SCHACHT: I can only confirm that Gisevius’ statement is correct in every -single point and I myself merely want to add that Canaris mentioned -among many reasons which then kept us from making the visit, that -Brauchitsch would probably have us arrested immediately if we said -anything to him against the war or if we wanted to prevent him from -fulfilling his oath of allegiance to Hitler. But the main reason why the -visit did not come about was quite correctly stated by Gisevius. -Moreover it is also mentioned by General Thomas in his affidavit which -we shall later submit. The main reason was: the war was canceled. And so -I went to Munich on a business matter and to my surprise while in -Munich, war was declared on Poland; the country was invaded. - -DR. DIX: You mentioned the Reichstag a short time ago. A meeting of the -Reichstag did in fact take place, though not before the war or before -the declaration of war, but immediately thereafter. At the time you were -still a Minister without Portfolio. - -Normally you would have had to sit on the minister’s bench during that -meeting. - -Did you take part in that meeting? - -SCHACHT: I did not participate in that meeting at all and I would like -to add at once that during the entire war, I was present at only one -meeting of the Reichstag. I could not avoid it, considering the matters -which I already mentioned here yesterday. It was after Hitler’s return -from Paris. I had to participate in this meeting of the Reichstag, which -followed the reception at the station because, as I said, it would -otherwise have been too obvious an affront. It was the meeting during -which political matters were not dealt with at all, but at which the -field marshal’s rank was granted by the dozen. - -DR. DIX: Now, this last effort which has just been mentioned to stop the -outbreak of war through Canaris brings us to the particular chapter of -your attempts at a coup to overthrow Hitler and his government. We want -to make it a rule, if possible, not to repeat what the witness Gisevius -has already stated but only to supplement or correct or state what you -know from your own memory. Before I touch upon that chapter, however, -may I ask you whether you know from information you received or from -other indications, that your oppositional attitude and that of your -similarly minded friends, and your oppositional aims, were known in -authoritative circles abroad? - -SCHACHT: I do not wish to repeat anything; I merely want to point out -that I have already stated repeatedly here that I continually discussed -the situation in Germany—thus also my own position—with my friends -abroad—not only with Americans, Englishmen, and Frenchmen but also with -neutrals—and I would like to add one more thing; foreign broadcasting -stations did not tire at all of speaking constantly about Schacht’s -opposition to Hitler. My friends and family received a shock whenever -information on this subject transpired in Germany. - -DR. DIX: When did your attempts to overthrow the Hitler government -begin? - -SCHACHT: As early as 1937 I tried to determine which groups in Germany -one might rely upon in an attempt to remove the Hitler regime. -Unfortunately in the years 1935, 1936, and 1937, I got to know that all -those circles in which I had placed my hope were failing, namely the -scientists, the educated middle class, and the leaders of economy. - -I need only mention that the scientists permitted themselves to listen -to the most nonsensical National Socialist lectures without opposing -them in the least. I call attention to the fact that when the economic -leaders saw that I was no longer a figure in economy, they disappeared -from my anteroom and thronged into that of Göring. In a word, one could -not rely upon these circles. Consequently, one could depend only on the -generals, on the military, because according to my conception at the -time, one could certainly count on an armed resistance even by the SS -bodyguard. - -Therefore, as has been stated here—and I do not want to pursue it -further—I tried at first to contact such generals as Kluge, for -instance, merely in order to ascertain whether among the military there -were people with whom one could speak openly. And this first occasion -led me to a great many generals whom I contacted in the course of time. - -DR. DIX: That was then in the year 1937; now we come to 1938, still -limiting ourselves by what Gisevius has already said, merely touching on -it briefly and confirming it. By the way, were you in any way directly -or indirectly involved in the negotiations at Godesberg or Munich? - -SCHACHT: In no way. - -DR. DIX: Now we continue with your political work, aiming at a revolt. -Is Gisevius’ account of the year 1938 correct or is there something to -be added to it? - -SCHACHT: Gisevius’ statement is complete and reliable. - -DR. DIX: That also applies to the attempt at a _coup d’état_ in the late -summer of 1938? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -DR. DIX: Then came the war. Did you fold your arms after war broke out? - -SCHACHT: No; throughout the entire war I pleaded with every general whom -I could contact. I used the same arguments which I have just mentioned -in connection with the prospective interview with Brauchitsch; -therefore, it was not merely theory, but I actually spoke to all these -generals. - -DR. DIX: Was not a visit to General Hoeppner significant in this -connection? - -SCHACHT: In 1941 I tried not only to get in touch with General Hoeppner -but in a whole series of conversations I attempted to make him take -action. Hoeppner was perfectly willing and prepared and later he too, -unfortunately, lost his life as a consequence of 20 July 1944. - -In the year 1942—and this has not been mentioned here up to now, -because Gisevius did not participate—I tried again to mobilize General -Von Witzleben to renewed activity. I went on a special journey to -Frankfurt-on-the-Main, where he had his headquarters at that time, and -Von Witzleben proved as ever to be completely resolved to act, but he -told me that, of course, he could only do so if he again received a -command at the front. Then I... - -DR. DIX: At that time Frau Strünck, who knew of these matters, was in -Frankfurt? - -SCHACHT: She knew of these things and can confirm them. - -DR. DIX: Perhaps I may tell the Tribunal at this point that Frau Strünck -was granted me as a witness and she was here. In order to save time, -however, I have decided to dispense with this witness since she could -make only cumulative statements on what Gisevius has already said and I -do not think it is necessary. Schacht himself has just stated the only -piece of information which she could have added, namely this trip, this -special journey to Frankfurt to Von Witzleben. On the strength of -experience the Tribunal will itself know that in the course of a -revolutionary movement, stretching over years such as this, many -journeys are made and in respect to this particular journey it is not -important to submit special evidence. In order to save time, therefore, -I have decided to dispense with the testimony of Frau Strünck. Excuse -me, I merely wanted to say this now. Then there is the next... - -SCHACHT: May I perhaps say one more thing? I of course always -participated in the conversations—mentioned by Gisevius here—with the -other generals, that is the group of Beck, Fromm, Olbricht, _et cetera_. -These things did not come about for some time on account of the -negotiations abroad for which the generals were always waiting. I think -that enough has been said here about this topic and I need not make -further report on it. I come then to one last point, which does not -become apparent from Gisevius’ statement but about which an affidavit -from Colonel Gronau will be submitted here. I can mention it quite -briefly in order to save time. Naturally, together with the group of -Beck, Goerdeler, my friend Strünck, Gisevius, and others I was -completely informed of, and initiated into, the affair of 20 July. -However, and I think it was mutual, we told each other whenever possible -only those things which the other absolutely had to know, in order not -to embarrass the other man, should he at any time be submitted to the -tortures of the Gestapo. For that reason, apart from being in touch with -Beck, Goerdeler, Gisevius, and Strünck, _et cetera_, I had another -connection with the generals who were at the head of this revolt and -that was the General of Artillery Lindemann, one of the main -participants in the coup, who unfortunately also lost his life later. - -DR. DIX: Perhaps it would be proper—and also more intelligible in -connection with your participation in 20 July—if I read a brief part of -Colonel Gronau’s affidavit which refers to Lindemann. - -[_Turning to the Tribunal._] It is Exhibit Number 39 of our document -book, Page 168 of the German text and Page 176 of the English text. I -shall omit the first part of the affidavit, but I ask the Tribunal to -take judicial notice of it; essentially it contains only matters on -which evidence has already been given. I shall read only the part that -deals with 20 July. It begins on Page 178 of the English text and on -Page 170 of the German text, and I start with Question 5: - - “Question 5) You brought Schacht and General Lindemann together. - When was that? - - “Answer 5) In the fall of 1943, for the first time in years, I - again saw General Lindemann, my former school and regiment - comrade. While discussing politics I told him that I knew - Schacht well, and General Lindemann asked to be introduced to - him, whereupon I established the connection. - - “Question 6) What did Lindemann expect from Schacht, and what - was Schacht’s attitude toward him? - - “Answer 6) The taking up of political relations with foreign - countries following a successful attempt at revolt. He promised - his future co-operation. At the beginning of 1944 Lindemann made - severe reproaches that the generals”—that should read “he - severely reproached Lindemann”; it is incorrectly copied - here—“because the generals were hesitating so long. The attempt - at revolt would have to be made prior to the landing of the - Allies.” - - “Question 7) Was Lindemann involved in the attempted - assassination of 20 July 1944? - - “Answer 7) Yes, he was one of the main figures. - - “Question 8) Did he inform Schacht of the details of this plan? - - “Answer 8) Nothing about the manner in which the attempt was to - be carried out; he did inform him, however, of what was to - happen thereafter. - - “Question 9) Did Schacht approve the plan? - - “Answer 9) Yes. - - “Question 10) Did Schacht put himself at the disposal of the - military in the event of a successful attempt? - - “Answer 10) Yes. - - “Question 11) Were you arrested after 20 July 1944? - - “Answer 11) Yes. - - “Question 12) How were you able to survive your imprisonment? - - “Answer 12) By stoically denying complicity.” - -Now, we have left the years 1941 and 1942 and to explain the Putsch in -logical sequence we reached the year 1944, something that could not be -avoided, but we must now go back again to the year 1941. You have -already mentioned, in passing, the efforts made abroad. In 1941 you were -in Switzerland. Did you make any efforts in that direction there? - -SCHACHT: Every time I went abroad I talked at length to my foreign -friends and again and again looked for some way by which one might -shorten the war and begin negotiations. - -DR. DIX: In this connection, the Fraser letter is of importance. I think -the Fraser letter and the way it was smuggled into Switzerland has been -sufficiently discussed by the witness Gisevius. I have on two occasions -stated the contents briefly, once when the translation was discussed and -again during the discussion on the admissibility of the letter as -evidence before the Court. I do not think I need do it here nor that I -need read it. I should merely like to submit it. It is Exhibit 31, on -Page 84 of the German and Page 91 of the English text. And—I say this -now, we shall discuss it later—the same applies to the article which -appeared this year in the _Basler Nachrichten_ and which deals with a -conversation which an American had with Schacht recently. I shall not -read that either since I have already stated the main points of its -contents. I submit it as Exhibit Number 32, Page 90 of the German text -and Page 99 of the English text. I might point out that this article has -already been the subject of certain accusations made during the -cross-examination of Gisevius by the representative of the Soviet -Prosecution. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to raise one objection in regard to Document -32; this is an article about Dr. Schacht and his ideas by an unknown -writer describing his conversations with an unknown economist. The -article in question was published in the _Basler Nachrichten_ on 14 -January 1946, that is, when the present Trial was already well under -way, and I cannot consider that this article can be presented in -evidence with regard to Schacht’s case. - -DR. DIX: I might—may I, before the Tribunal decides, say something very -briefly? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. - -DR. DIX: The article has already been admitted as evidence. We have -discussed it, and the Tribunal approved the article as evidence. The -Tribunal can, of course, revoke that decision. I think, for me it -would... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal has always made it clear that the -allowance of these documents is a provisional allowance and that when -the document is actually offered in evidence, they will then decide the -relevancy or its admissibility, rather, and its relevancy. - -DR. DIX: That is quite beyond doubt. I merely wanted to point out that -we have already discussed the question once before. Of course, the -Tribunal can today reject the document. I shall... - -THE PRESIDENT: The allowance is provisional. It is not a question of the -Tribunal’s reversing its previous decision. The previous decision was -merely provisional, and the question of admissibility now comes up for -decision. - -DR. DIX: It is quite clear to me, Your Lordship. I am merely surprised -at the objection raised by the Soviet Prosecution, inasmuch as the -representative of the Soviet Delegation himself referred to that article -in his observations during the cross-examination of the witness -Gisevius. It is true, he did not submit it to the Tribunal, but he -referred to it in his observations to the witness Gisevius. However, if -the Tribunal has the slightest objections to allowing the article as -documentary evidence, then I shall ask permission to leave it. I will -then—and I think I may—ask the witness Schacht whether it is true that -in 1941 he had a conversation with an American who was a professor of -national economy, a conversation which dealt with the possibility of -peace. I leave it to the Tribunal. For me, it is no—I thought it would -be simpler, if I submitted the article. - -THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, as you have raised the objection to this -document, what have you to say about the point that Dr. Dix makes that -you used the document yourself in cross-examination? - -GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, we did not use this document in the -cross-examination of the witness Gisevius. An explanatory question was -asked in order to reach a decision on this point and I particularly -emphasize... - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you say that again? I did not understand you. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I say, that we did not use this document during the -cross-examination of the witness Gisevius, but we did ask an explanatory -question in order that when the document was presented by Dr. Dix, we -could object to it as being of no probative value. I especially... - -THE PRESIDENT: But did you not put the contents of the document to -Gisevius? I do not remember. What I want to know is did you not put the -contents of the document? - -GEN. RUDENKO: No, no, we did not submit the contents, and we did not -discuss the substance of the document. We merely asked a question—did -the witness Gisevius know about the article in the _Basler Nachrichten_ -of 14 January 1946? That was the question, and the witness answered that -it was known to him. - -DR. DIX: May I say one more thing? It appears to me that the Soviet -Delegation does not desire to have the article submitted as evidence. I -therefore withdraw it as evidence. And since I have no due reasons to -the contrary, no factual reason to the contrary, 1 can certainly fulfill -this wish of the Soviet Delegation. I would like the Tribunal to -consider the matter as settled. - -May I now put my question? - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, you had conversations in -Switzerland? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -DR. DIX: What was the subject of these conversations, in broad outlines, -and with whom did you have them? - -SCHACHT: This article, which has just been discussed... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: First, Your Honor, may I interpose an objection? -The reason I did not join in the Soviet objection to this document was -that I want to know who this economist is. I want to check this thing. -There are very peculiar circumstances about this document, and I object -to his retelling a conversation with an unknown economist. All I ask is -that he identify time and place and person with whom he had his -conversation, so that we can do a little verifying of this effort to get -something before the Tribunal that did not appear until 1946. - -DR. DIX: The question is now being given a significance which its -comparative triviality really does not merit. I shall, therefore, -dispense with this question too. Please do not now refer to the -conversation with the professor, and I shall leave it to the Prosecution -to put the question which Mr. Justice Jackson has just mentioned during -cross-examination. - -Well, your conversations in Switzerland, then, excepting that with the -unknown professor. - -SCHACHT: Yes, I tried again and again to shorten the war and to bring -about some form of mediation which I always sought for particularly -through the good offices of the American President. That is all that I -can say here. I do not think I need go into details. - -DR. DIX: Very well. Did you in your letters to Ribbentrop and -Göring—you have already mentioned Hitler—or besides, did you, during -the war, state your views about the policy of the war in writing at any -time? First of all, as far as Hitler was concerned. - -SCHACHT: I mentioned my discussion with Hitler in February 1940. In the -summer of 1941 I wrote a detailed letter to Hitler, and the witness -Lammers has admitted its existence. I do not think he was asked about -the contents of this letter here, or he was not allowed to talk about -it. If I may come back to it; in that letter, I pointed out somewhat as -follows—I shall use direct language—“You are at present at the height -of your success.”—This was after the first Russian victories.—“The -enemy believes that you are stronger than you really are. The alliance -with Italy is rather a doubtful one, since Mussolini will one day fall -and then Italy will drop out. Whether Japan can still come to your aid -at all is questionable in view of Japan’s weakness in the face of -America. I assume that the Japanese will not be so foolish as to wage -war against America. The output of steel, for instance, in spite of -approximately similar population figures, amounts to one-tenth of the -American production. I do not think, therefore, that Japan will enter -into the war. I now recommend you at all events to reverse foreign -policy completely and to attempt with every means to conclude a peace.” - -DR. DIX: Did you state your views to Ribbentrop during the war? - -SCHACHT: I do not know when it was. On one occasion Herr Von Ribbentrop -conveyed to me through his State Secretary, Herr Von Weizsäcker, the -reproachful message that I should not indulge in defeatist remarks. That -may have been in 1940 or in 1941, during one of those 2 years. I asked -where I had made defeatist remarks and it appeared that I had talked to -my colleague Funk and had given him extensive reasons why Germany could -never win this war. I held this conviction unchangeable at all times -before and during the war, even after the fall of France. I answered -Ribbentrop through his State Secretary that I, as Minister without -Portfolio, considered it my duty to state my opinion to a ministerial -colleague in its true conception, and in this written reply I maintained -the view that Germany’s economic power was not sufficient to wage this -war. This letter, that is, a copy of this letter was sent both to -Minister Funk and to Minister Ribbentrop through his State Secretary. - -DR. DIX: I think, Your Lordship, this would be a suitable moment... - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. DIX: I spoke before of 20 July. Do you recall a statement made by -Hitler about you in connection with 20 July? - -SCHACHT: Codefendant Minister Speer was present and told me about it. It -was on 22 July 1944 when Hitler issued the order to his circle for my -arrest. At that time he made derogatory remarks about me and stated that -he had been greatly hindered in his rearmament program by my negative -activities, and that it would have been better if he had had me shot -before the war. - -DR. DIX: To conclude I come to a few general collective questions. -Voices were heard within the country, and also abroad—and even the -Prosecution, although recognizing your intellectual capacities and the -services you rendered, appears to consider it also—that it was -incomprehensible that a man as clever as you did not recognize the true -nature, the real intentions of Hitler in time. I would like you to state -your position with regard to that accusation. - -SCHACHT: I should like very much to have known the gentlemen who are now -judging me, at a time when it might have been of use. These are the -people who always know afterwards what ought to have been done before. I -can only state that first of all, from 1920 until the seizure of power -by Hitler, I tried to influence the nation and foreign countries in a -way which would have prevented the rise and seizure of power by a -Hitler. I warned the country to be thrifty but I was not heeded. I -repeatedly warned the foreign nations to develop an economic policy -which would enable Germany to live. I was not heeded, although as it now -appears, I was considered a clever and foresighted man. Hitler came to -power because my advice was not followed. The German people were reduced -to great economic need and neither... - -GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President. For 2 days now we have been listening to -lengthy explanations on the part of the Defendant Schacht, and I rather -think that the explanations which have just been given by the Defendant -Schacht are not definite answers to questions concerned with the -Indictment brought against him, but mere speeches. I consider that they -will only prolong the Trial. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal is, I think, fully apprised with -the case on behalf of Defendant Schacht. They don’t want to stop him -putting forward his defense fully, but they would be glad if you could -make it as short as possible and if he could make it as short as -possible. - -DR. DIX: My Lord, I am certain that I shall be through by the recess, -and perhaps even before the recess; but I beg you to bear in mind that -the defendant is accused of having assisted in the seizure of power. The -question arises, how was it that... - -THE PRESIDENT: I wasn’t ruling that this evidence was inadmissible. I -was only asking you to get on with it as quickly as you could. - -DR. DIX: Very well. Dr. Schacht, please continue and try to comply with -the suggestions of the representative of the Soviet Prosecution as far -as possible. - -SCHACHT: As briefly as possible. I will not go into detail; I will -merely state that due to the collapse of 1918 and the unsatisfactory -conditions of the Versailles Treaty, Germany was faced with a severe -depression. The democratic parties, which had a firm hold on the regime -at that time, were not able to improve the situation; and the other -nations did not know what policy to take towards Germany. I do not -reproach any one; I merely state facts. Consequently, in this state of -depression, Hitler received a larger majority in the Reichstag than had -ever been the case since the formation of the Reich. - -Now, I ask the people who, although silent at the time, can tell me now -what I should have done; I ask them what they would have done. I have -stated that I was against a military regime, that I wanted to avoid a -civil war, and that, in keeping with democratic principles, I saw only -the one possibility: To allow the man to lead the government once he had -come to power. I said further that from the moment I realized this I -tried to participate in the government, not with the intention of -supporting this man in his extremist ideas, but to act as a brake and, -if possible, to direct his policies back into normal channels. - -DR. DIX: Then there came a time later when you recognized the dangers, -when you yourself suffered under the unbearable conditions of terror and -of suppressed opinion, so that perhaps this question is pertinent and -admissible: Why did you not emigrate? - -SCHACHT: Had it been only a question of my personal fate, nothing would -have been simpler, especially since, as we have heard before, I would -have been offered that opportunity and it would have been made easy for -me. It was not merely a question of my own welfare; but as I had devoted -myself to the public interest since 1923, it was the question of the -existence of my people, of my country. I know of no instance in history -where emigrants were of help to their own nation. Of course, I speak of -those emigrants who leave of their own free will, not those that have -been expelled. It was not the case in 1792, at the time of the French -Revolution; it was not the case in 1917, during the Russian Revolution; -and it was not the case at the time of the National Socialist revolution -which we witnessed. To sit in a safe harbor abroad and to write articles -which no one reads in the home country... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, we don’t want a historical lecture, do we? - -DR. DIX: I believe we can stop here. He merely wanted to state why he -did not emigrate. [_Turning to the defendant._] You have been -understood. - -SCHACHT: Thank you. - -DR. DIX: In the course of these proceedings, either in a letter or in a -poem—I do not know which at the moment—there was some mention of your -thoughts on the possibility of dying a martyr’s death; whether it would -have served the cause of peace and the German nation, if you had done -more than you did; if you had sacrificed your life... - -SCHACHT: I think that you are referring to a quotation from one of my -notes, which a representative of the American Prosecution read here, in -which I spoke of the silence of death. - -DR. DIX: Yes. - -SCHACHT: If I had sacrificed myself, it would not have been of the -slightest use because the circumstances of my sacrifice would never have -become known. Either I would have disappeared in some prison or I would -have died there, and no one would have known whether I was alive or not; -or I would have been the victim of a planned accident, and it would not -have been possible to become a martyr. Martyrs can be effective only if -their martyrdom becomes known to the public. - -DR. DIX: May I ask for the attention of the Tribunal for a moment? -Yesterday I was denied a question concerning the social attitude of the -diplomatic corps and its influence on men like Schacht, for instance. -The question which I want to put now is not the same question; otherwise -I would not put it. But it has nevertheless... - -THE PRESIDENT: The objection that I made was to the use of the word -“attitude,” because I don’t see how witnesses can give evidence about -the attitude of a corps. I said I think especially that the fact that -the diplomatic corps were present at the Party rally might be given in -evidence, but I said that the word “attitude” was far too general. What -is it you want to put now? - -DR. DIX: Yesterday, the question which I framed in the following manner -was denied: “How was Schacht influenced by the collective attitude of -the diplomatic corps?” That question was denied, and that concludes the -matter. Now, I should like first to clarify the matter because I do not -want to create the impression of smuggling into the proceedings a -question which may raise the same objections. On the one hand, it is -essential for my line of defense to show that people from abroad with -judgment, who were above being suspected of wanting to prepare for an -aggressive war, had the same attitude toward the regime as Schacht had. -On the other hand, it is one of the strong points of my defense to show -that the work of these people in their opposition was not only not -supported by foreign countries but was actually made more difficult. -That is the _thema probandum_ that is important for me, and on this -theme—but please, Herr Schacht, do not answer before I have received -the permission of the Tribunal—this theme... - -THE PRESIDENT: State exactly what the question is. - -DR. DIX: Yes, I will put the question now. According to my notes I -intended to refer to the tokens of honor, which the Nazi regime received -from abroad, and to the representatives and numerous state visits paying -honor to the regime, which have already been mentioned here. I wanted to -ask the defendant what influence these frequent marks of great honor had -on the work and aims of this group of conspirators. However, since that -question is very similar to the one that has been rejected—and I prefer -to make my objections myself rather than to have them made to me—I -wanted to submit the question to the Tribunal first and make sure that -it is admissible. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the question being: “What effect did the -recognition of the Nazi regime from abroad have upon the group of -conspirators with whom the Defendant Schacht was in contact?” That is -the question, is it not? Well, that question, as the Tribunal thinks, -you may put. - -DR. DIX: It is admissible if “Anerkennung” is translated correctly as -“honor”—honor, not recognition in the sense of recognition of a -government in diplomatic official language, but honor, respect. It is a -difficulty of translation and I do not want a misunderstanding—may I -put to him, first, the individual official visits which I have noted, so -that he can answer the question? May I do that? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you may; actual visits? - -DR. DIX: Yes. The list will not be complete. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I remind you that in 1935, the delegate of -the Labor Party, Alan Hartwood... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that you ought to put the question in -the general way in which I put it to you, and not go into details of -each visit or the details of each number of visits. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If Your Honor pleases, I want to object to it as -generalities, because it already appears that the United States did not -participate in this and I tried to keep the European politics out of -this case, and this is the entering wedge. Now, I don’t want to get into -this sort of thing. I think it is entirely irrelevant that some -foreigner, deceived by the appearance which the Defendant Schacht was -assisting in putting up, didn’t start a war earlier. This thing is -entirely irrelevant. The United States has desired to keep this sort of -thing out of this case because it is endless if we go into it. It seems -to me, if Herr Schacht wants to put the responsibility for his conduct -on some foreigner, that foreigner should be named. He has already said -that the United States representatives, Mr. Messersmith and Mr. Dodd, -had no part in it because they were always against them. Now, it gets -into a situation here which seems to me impossible before this Tribunal, -and I cannot understand how it constitutes any defense for mitigation -for Schacht to show that the foreign powers maintained intercourse with -Germany even at a period of its degeneration. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question is relevant but should -be put without detail. - -DR. DIX: I will put the question without detail, and I would like to say -that I cannot, of course, speak of myself and America in the same -breath; but I, too, am trying to avoid foreign politics. However, my -question does not concern foreign politics. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Here is the one question: What influence -did the honors which were showered upon the Nazi regime by foreign -countries, in a manner well known to you, have on the work of your group -of conspirators? - -SCHACHT: Throughout the years from 1935, up to and including 1938, -numerous statesmen from almost all other nations came to Berlin to visit -Hitler, including some crowned heads. From America, for instance, there -was Under Secretary of State Phillips. - -DR. DIX: Do not mention any names. - -SCHACHT: I said that only because names were expressly mentioned here. -It is not limited to Europe. I do not intend to make any political -explanations, I merely say that there were so many visitors, which meant -not only recognition but respect for Hitler, that this man appeared a -very great man in the eyes of the German people. I still remember that -in 1925, I believe, the King of Afghanistan, Amanullah, appeared in -Berlin. He was the first foreigner to visit the Social Democratic -Government, and there was a celebration because at last a great man from -another country had visited us. In the case of Hitler, starting with -1935 there was one visitor after another; and Hitler went from one -foreign political success to another, which made it extremely difficult -to enlighten the German people and made it impossible to work for that -enlightenment within the German nation. - -DR. DIX: And now, two final questions. - -You have heard the speech by the British Attorney General Shawcross, who -said that there should have been a point where the servants of Hitler -refused to follow him. We want to accept that point of view, and I ask -you: Do you believe that you yourself acted in accord with that -postulate of the leader of the British Delegation? - -SCHACHT: I not only accept it, but I fully approve of it. From the very -moment when I recognized what a harmful individual Hitler was, what a -threat to world peace, I broke with him, not only secretly, but publicly -and personally. - -DR. DIX: So you consider that when you realized the truth you did -everything humanly possible to try and save humanity from the disaster -of this war and bring it to an end, once it had started. - -SCHACHT: I know of no one in Germany who would have done more in that -respect than I did. I warned against excessive armament. I impeded, and -if you like, sabotaged effective armament through my economic policy. I -resigned from the Ministry of Economics against the will of Hitler; I -publicly protested to Hitler against all the abuses of the Party; I -continuously warned people abroad and gave them information; I attempted -to influence the policy of other nations with respect to the colonial -question in order to achieve a more peaceful atmosphere. Credits for -continued armaments... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we have heard this more than once, you know. - -DR. DIX: Yes. - -SCHACHT: May I be permitted one sentence: I blocked Hitler’s credits and -I finally tried to remove him. - -DR. DIX: Gentlemen, I am now at the end of my presentation of evidence -for Schacht’s case, and I have only one request. During the last few -days, I have received a large number of letters and also affidavits from -well-known people who know Schacht. I will examine them; and if I should -decide that any of the affidavits are relevant, I will get in touch with -the Prosecution and discuss with them whether they have any objection to -having them translated, so that we can perhaps submit them to the -Tribunal—not to have them read, but merely to have them put in -evidence. May I request that I be granted this right. - -At the end of my entire presentation, I will briefly submit my -documents; this has been only partially done. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants’ counsel wish to ask any -questions? - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have only a few questions to put to Dr. Schacht. - -How long have you known Herr Von Neurath, Dr. Schacht? - -SCHACHT: I cannot state the exact year, but at any rate for a very long -time; for many, many years. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: For some time, for about 4 years, you were both -colleagues as ministers in the government. During that time, did you -have any contact with him other than in purely official capacity? - -SCHACHT: Unfortunately not enough, but of course I saw him from time to -time. I would have liked to have seen him more often. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But from conversations with him, or from what you -heard about him, you certainly formed an opinion about his political -views. - -SCHACHT: I was well acquainted with his views. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And what was the trend of his political thought? - -SCHACHT: I had the impression that basically Von Neurath believed in a -conservative policy, but was open to conviction where progressive -measures were concerned. He was above all in favor of peaceful -international co-operation. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you consider it possible, or do you have any -reason to believe, that under certain circumstances he would also resort -to belligerent methods or that he would even consider them, if the -peaceful understanding which he desired was quite impossible? - -SCHACHT: According to my understanding of Neurath, I think that he was -entirely averse to any aggressive policy. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You witnessed the various... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, will you kindly put the earphones on, -the Tribunal thinks these questions are not questions which can properly -be put because of their general nature. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you have the impression that in everything -that he achieved, particularly in the occupation of the Rhineland, Herr -Von Neurath... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, this is not a proper question to put to -a witness, “Did you have an impression about him?” You can ask him what -he said and what he did; what did Von Neurath do and what did he say? - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes; then I will not put this question. I have -only one last question. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] You know that on the 4th of February 1938 -Von Neurath resigned as Foreign Minister. What did you and your -immediate circle say to the resignation of Von Neurath from foreign -politics? What impression did it make upon you? - -SCHACHT: I believe I have already said in the course of the -interrogation that I considered Von Neurath’s resignation a very bad -sign, for it meant departing from the previous policy of understanding -in foreign politics. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Any other defendants’ counsel want to ask questions? - -Does the Prosecution desire to cross-examine? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think it might save time, Your Honor, if we could -take our recess at this time. It is a little early, I know, but it takes -some time to arrange our material. - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dr. Schacht, according to the transcript of the -testimony at Page 8698 (Volume XII, Page 460), you said that in 1938 you -told a certain lady while you were dining: “My dear lady, we have fallen -into the hands of criminals. How could I ever have suspected that!” You -recall that testimony? - -SCHACHT: It was not I who gave that testimony; it came from an affidavit -submitted here by my Defense Counsel, but it is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am sure you want to help the Tribunal by telling -us who those criminals were. - -SCHACHT: Hitler and his confederates. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you were there; you know who the co-operators -were. I am asking you to name all that you put in that category of -criminals with Hitler. Hitler, you know, is dead. - -SCHACHT: Mr. Justice, it is very difficult for me to answer that -question fully because I do not know who was in that close conspiracy -with Hitler. The Defendant Göring has told us here that he considered -himself one of that group. There were Himmler and Bormann, but I do not -know who else there was in the small circle of men who were trusted by -Hitler. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have only named three men. Let me put it this -way: You named four men criminals, three of whom are dead and one of -them you say admitted... - -SCHACHT: I can add one more, if you will permit me. I assume that the -Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop was also always acquainted with Hitler’s -plans. I must assume that; I cannot prove it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whom else did you include when you were talking to -the lady? - -SCHACHT: On that evening I did not mention any names. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But whom did you have in mind? You surely were not -making charges against your own people, who were in charge of your own -government, without having definite names in mind. - -SCHACHT: I have taken the liberty of mentioning the names to you. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Are those all? - -SCHACHT: I do not know, but I assume that there were more. I would add -without hesitation, Heydrich. But I cannot know with whom... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Heydrich is a dead man. - -SCHACHT: I regret that these people are dead, I would have liked to see -them die some other way; but... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, are those the only people that you included? - -SCHACHT: I have no proof of the fact that there was anyone else in this -conspiracy about whom I could say that there is proof that he was a -conspirator. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Dr. Schacht, at the time the Nazis seized -power you had a world-wide acquaintance and very great standing as a -leading banker in Germany and in the world, did you not? - -SCHACHT: I do not know whether that is so, but if that is your opinion I -do not wish to contradict you. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, at first you would admit that? Wouldn’t you? - -SCHACHT: I do not contradict. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And yet as we understand it, you made public -appearances in Germany before the German people in support of the Nazi -regime, alongside of characters such as Streicher and Bormann. - -SCHACHT: Mr. Justice, I have taken the liberty of explaining here that -until July 1932 I did not in any way come forward publicly for Hitler or -the Party and that, on the contrary, in America for instance, I warned -the people against Hitler. At that time I—the name Bormann was, of -course, unknown to me at the time; and Streicher’s paper, _Der Stürmer_, -was just as revolting to me before that time as afterwards. I did not -think that I had anything in common with Herr Streicher. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I didn’t either, but that is why I wondered -about your appearing with him publicly before the German people after -1933 when the Nazi regime was consolidating its power. You did that, -didn’t you? - -SCHACHT: What did I do, Mr. Justice? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I spoke of your appearances, publicly, before the -German people with Streicher and Bormann in support of the Nazi program -after the seizure of power. - -SCHACHT: I do not think so. I was never seen publicly with Herr -Streicher or with Mr. Bormann—certainly not at that time. It is quite -possible that he attended the same Party rallies as I, or that I sat -next to him; but, at any rate, in 1933 I was never seen publicly either -with Streicher or with Bormann. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask to have you shown the photograph from the -Hoffmann collection, marked Number 10. You have no difficulty -recognizing yourself in that, do you? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And on the right sits Bormann? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And next to him the Minister of Labor? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And on the other side of you is Hitler? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And beyond him, Streicher? - -SCHACHT: I do not recognize him; I do not know whether it is Streicher, -but perhaps it is. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I will offer the photograph in evidence. And -perhaps the identification will be sufficient. - -And also Frick is in that picture? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This becomes Exhibit Number USA-829. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I will ask to have you shown... - -THE PRESIDENT: Justice Jackson, what is the date of that photograph? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There is no date given on the photographs. Perhaps -the defendant can tell us. - -SCHACHT: Mr. Justice, you said that in 1933 I had permitted myself to be -seen publicly with Streicher and Bormann as a representative of the -National Socialist Party; and I should like to know, therefore, where -this picture was taken and when. I cannot identify it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I asked you about after 1933. Schacht, do you deny -this is a photograph... - -SCHACHT: No, no. By no means, I am merely asking when it was taken. I do -not think this refers to 1933 or 1934. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When was it, if you want to tell us? - -SCHACHT: I do not know; I cannot tell you. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will show you another photograph—two -photographs, Numbers 3 and 4. Number 3 shows you marching with Dr. -Robert Ley among others. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Number 4 shows you entering the hall, marching, and -giving the Nazi salute. - -SCHACHT: Yes, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Ley the man who suppressed the labor unions of -Germany? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And those are correct photographs, are they not? - -SCHACHT: Certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I offer them in evidence under Exhibit Number -USA-829. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I will show you photographs marked Numbers -1 and 2 and 6—and 7. Now let us look at Number 1. Do you recall where -that was taken? - -SCHACHT: Yes—one moment, if it is the number I have here—yes, just a -minute. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Where was it taken? - -SCHACHT: I think Number 1 is a picture from the Reich Chancellery, if I -am not mistaken. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Among the persons appearing in Number 1 is Frick? - -SCHACHT: Gürtner, Goebbels, Popitz, Schacht, Papen, Göring, and others, -and Hitler in the middle. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Neurath, do you recognize? - -SCHACHT: Neurath. Yes; I think he is immediately on Hitler’s right, in -the background. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Goebbels? - -SCHACHT: Yes, I said Goebbels. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You identify Funk as present in the picture, at the -extreme right, only a part of his body showing. - -SCHACHT: Who is that? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Funk, the Defendant Funk. - -SCHACHT: No, that is Göring. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Back of Göring and back of Neurath. - -SCHACHT: I beg your pardon. Perhaps I have a different picture. I beg -your pardon. That is Number 2. On Number 2 I see from left to right: -Popitz, Rust, Göring, Neurath, Hitler, Blomberg, Schacht, Gürtner, -Krosigk, Eltz von Rübenach, and then at the very back on the right, -Funk. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And let us take Number 7. Who do you identify as -your company in that photograph? - -SCHACHT: On the extreme left, my late wife; then the Vice President of -the Reichsbank, Dreyse, Hitler, and myself. There is an adjutant of -Hitler, and the heavy-set man on the right—I do not know who he is. - -This is a photograph taken when the foundation of the new Reichsbank -building was laid in 1934. Directly behind me, on the right, is -Blomberg. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Number 6? - -SCHACHT: One moment. That is the picture where I am walking alongside -Hitler, is that right? That is Hitler’s entrance in my company, on the -occasion when the foundation of the new Reichsbank building was laid. -Behind me, or rather behind Hitler, you can see Geheimrat Vocke, who is -to appear as a witness here tomorrow, and several other gentlemen from -the directorate of the Reichsbank. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I offer the remaining photographs, 1, 6, and 7 in -evidence under the same number. - -So that it would appear, Dr. Schacht, that a good deal of your present -company was the company that started off with you in 1933 and 1934? - -SCHACHT: Is that a question? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, is that not true? - -SCHACHT: No. If you had photographed me with my other acquaintances just -as often, the number would be 10 times as great. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified—and I refer to Page 8650 of the -record (Volume XII, Page 424)—that there were reasons of principle why -you did not become a Party member and that Party membership would not be -compatible with your principles? - -SCHACHT: That is right. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you also testified—I refer to Page 8692 of the -record (Volume XII, Page 455)—that from 1932 to the 30th of January -1933—I am quoting you, “I have not written or spoken a single word -publicly for Hitler.” - -SCHACHT: I think that is right, if you emphasize “publicly.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You must emphasize “publicly”? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I want yet to ask you about the next thing. You -also said: - - “I have never helped in any way to exert influence in favor of - Hitler through discussions with any of the competent gentlemen: - Hindenburg, Meissner, _et cetera_; and I did not participate in - any way in the appointment of Hitler to Reich Chancellor.” - -Is that correct? - -SCHACHT: That is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, are there any words that we have to emphasize -in that in order to understand it correctly? - -SCHACHT: No, in reference to Hitler’s becoming Chancellor, please note I -said, “competent men.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I don’t just know what you mean by that, but -I’ll give you a chance to explain. - -SCHACHT: Yes. When I say “competent,” I mean those people who could -decide as to who was to be Chancellor. Of course, I did say that Hitler -would be Chancellor and must become Chancellor, and I expressed those -convictions in private circles. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you say that in public? - -SCHACHT: No, I said that only in a circle of my friends, business -acquaintances, and such like. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to quote you a statement by Von Papen: - - “When I was Chancellor of Germany, in 1932, Schacht came to see - me in July or August while I was at home. He said, ‘here’s a - very intelligent man.’—It was in the presence of my wife and I - have never forgotten it.—He said, ‘Give him your position. Give - it to Hitler. He is the only man who can save Germany.’” - -Did you say that or didn’t you? - -SCHACHT: I do not know whether I said that he was the only man who could -save Germany, but I did tell him that Hitler would and must become -Chancellor. But that was in August or July of 1932, after the July -elections; and it has nothing to do with Hitler’s nomination, which did -not take place until after the Schleicher Cabinet, about which I have -been examined here. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Dr. Schacht, I just asked you if you had not -testified that you had nothing to do with his coming to the -Chancellorship and you said... - -SCHACHT: That is the truth. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ...and it is here said that you asked Von Papen to -give the place to him and... - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ...and do you contend—and I want you to say -anything you want to about this—do you contend that that was not aiding -Hitler to the Chancellorship? - -SCHACHT: I do not know whether it was aiding Hitler. In the course of my -examination here, I have been asked whether I had exerted any influence -in connection with Hitler’s election or his nomination for the -Chancellorship in January 1933. I have given the names of Hindenburg, -Meissner, and so forth, that is to say, Hindenburg’s circle. Since the -beginning of November 1932, Papen was no longer Chancellor and thus he -had no influence upon these matters at all. I did not talk to Papen at -all during those weeks. On the contrary, after the elections of 1932, I -said that it was inevitable that a man who had obtained so many votes in -the Reichstag must take over the political lead. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now let me get you correctly. When you saw Hitler -was going to win you joined him? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I’ll just make it clear what you do mean. You -did not assist him until he had already accumulated more votes than any -other Party in the Reichstag? - -SCHACHT: I did not join Hitler when I saw that he would win, but when I -had discovered that he had won. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Oh, well, I’ll accept the amendment. - -You have referred to your letter to Hitler on the 29th of August 1932... - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ...in which you advised him not to put forward any -detailed economic program? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You told him there was no such program on which 14 -millions could agree? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that economic policy is not a factor for -building up a party? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you added that, “You can always count on me as -your reliable assistant”; did you not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then that was after he had won? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then on the 12th of... - -SCHACHT: November. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, I just want to refer to that document as -EC-456, Exhibit Number USA-773. Now, then, on the 12th of November 1932, -you wrote a letter to him, in which you said, among other things, “I -have no doubt that the present development of things can only lead to -your becoming Chancellor.” - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “It seems as if our attempt to collect a number of -signatures from business circles for this purpose is not altogether in -vain...” - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were collecting signatures for this purpose? - -SCHACHT: Not I, but I participated. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were assisting. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was Document Number EC-456. - -Now, as of November 1932, a document was prepared for a large number of -industrialists to sign, urging the selection of Hitler as Chancellor, in -substance, was there not? - -SCHACHT: I no longer remember the document, but I assume that that is -the document. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And men like Schacht, Schröder, and Krupp, and a -great number of industrialists signed that document, did they not? - -SCHACHT: That is possible, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was sent to Von Hindenburg? - -SCHACHT: I do not know. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, the purpose of it was to aid Hitler in -obtaining the Chancellorship? - -SCHACHT: That is possible. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It is addressed to the Reich President, is it not? -Document Number 3901-PS, Exhibit Number USA-837. - -SCHACHT: I have not seen it; but it is probably correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you do not deny that that occurred? - -SCHACHT: I assume that it is correct. I have not seen it, but I do not -doubt it at all. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then, in November of 1932 you communicated to -Hitler the result of your money-raising campaign, did you not? - -SCHACHT: I do not know anything about that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I’ll remind you from your own interrogation. -Well, I’ll remind you first, of your testimony, in which you say that it -appears that you did not plead for funds but that Göring pleaded for -funds; and I ask if you did not, on the 9th of October 1945, give these -answers to these questions as to events of February 1933? - -SCHACHT: Events of what? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Events of February 1933. - -SCHACHT: Yes, thank you very much. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Going back to 1933. This is the question: - - “Prior to the time that Hitler appointed you as President of the - Reichsbank, do you recall a meeting in the home of Göring? - - “Answer: ‘Yes. That was a financial meeting. I have been - interrogated about that several times already.’ - - “Question: ‘Tell me about it.’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes, I will. Hitler had to go to the elections on 5 - March, if you will remember, and for these elections he wanted - money for the campaign. He asked me to procure the money and I - did. Göring called these men together and I made a speech—not a - speech, for Hitler made the speech—then I asked them to write - down the amounts and to subscribe for the elections, which they - did. They subscribed a total of 3 millions and they allocated - the sum among themselves.’ - - “Question: ‘Who were the people who made up that subscription - list?’ - - “Answer: ‘I think that all of them were bankers and - industrialists. They represented the chemical industry, iron - industry, textile industry, all of them.’ - - “Question: ‘Representatives of all the industries?’ - - “Answer: ‘All of them; all of the big industries.’ - - “Question: ‘Do you recall any of their names?’ - - “Answer: ‘Oh certainly; Krupp was there—the old gentleman, - Gustav. He arose from his seat and thanked Hitler and was very - enthusiastic about him at the time. And then there was - Schnitzler—I think it was he—and Vögler for the United Steel - Works.’” - -Did you give that testimony? - -SCHACHT: Certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, at that meeting you have referred to Document -Number D-203, which is a record of the meeting—at that meeting Göring -said this in substance, did he not? - - “The sacrifices which are required would be so much easier for - industry to bear if it knew that the election of 5 March would - surely be the last one for the next 10 years, probably even for - the next 100 years.” - -You heard that, did you not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now yesterday or the day before you were -interrogated about your support and about the tribute that Goebbels paid -to you; and you said to the Court, “It is not my fault if Goebbels made -a mistake.” Do you recall that? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I ask you, if testifying about Dr. Goebbels you -did not say this to the interrogator of the United States, on the 17th -day of October 1945, Exhibit Number USA-616 (Document Number 3729-PS)? - - “Question: ‘When did you become interested in becoming a - co-worker of Hitler?’ - - “Answer: ‘I should say in the years of 1931, 1932.’ - - “Question: ‘And that was when you saw that he had a mass - movement that was likely to take power?’ - - “Answer: ‘Quite right; it was growing continually.’ - - “Question: ‘And did you publicly record your support for Hitler - in those years?’ - - “Answer: ‘I think I made a statement in December 1930 once at - the Bavarian People’s Party, upon coming back from America. I - said that there was a choice for any future Government, either - to hold against 25 percent socialists, or against 20 percent - National Socialists.’ - - “Question: ‘But what I mean—to make it very brief indeed—did - you lend the prestige of your name to help Hitler come to - power?’ - - “Answer: ‘I stated publicly that I expected Hitler to come into - power for the first time that I remember in November 1932.’ - - “Question: ‘And you know, or perhaps you don’t, that Goebbels in - his diary, records with great affection...’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘...the help that you gave him at that time?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes, I know that.’ - - “Question: ‘November 1932?’ - - “Answer: ‘You say the book is called _From the Kaiserhof to the - Reich Chancellery_?’ - - “Question: ‘That’s right; you have read that?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘And you don’t deny that Goebbels was right?’ - - “Answer: ‘I think his impression was that he was correct at that - time.’” - -Did you give that testimony? - -SCHACHT: Yes. I never doubted that Goebbels was under this impression; I -merely said that he was mistaken. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you didn’t—Well, I won’t bother. Now, you -made some extensive quotations from Ambassador Dodd yesterday, the day -before. Did you not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And let’s have this understood: Ambassador Dodd was -consistently and at all times opposed to the entire Nazi outfit, wasn’t -he? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So you got no encouragement from him to be in this -outfit? - -SCHACHT: Oh, no. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you testified, as I understood you, that -Ambassador Dodd invited you to go to the United States of America and -you say—I am quoting from Page 8670 of the record (Volume XII, Page -439): - - “At that time, 1937, he called on me and urged me to go with - him, or follow him as soon as possible, and change my residence - to America. He said that I would find a very pleasant welcome in - America. I believe he never would have said that to me if he had - not had a friendly feeling towards me.” - -You said that to the Tribunal? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I think you intended to convey to the Tribunal -the impression that Ambassador Dodd had great confidence in you and -great friendship for you? - -SCHACHT: I had that impression. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Have you read his entire diary, or did you confine -yourself to reading extracts? - -SCHACHT: Yes. I also know of the passage where he said, “You would make -a very bad American,” or something like that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, yes, you didn’t mention that to the Tribunal. - -SCHACHT: I think that would be better for the Prosecution. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we are not disappointing you then. - -Are you not familiar with his entry under the date of December 21, 1937, -where he speaks of the luncheon at which you were present? - - “Schacht spoke of the defeat of Germany in 1918 as wholly due to - Woodrow Wilson’s bringing America into the World War. But I said - Wilson’s Fourteen Points were the one great promise of - international peace and co-operation, and every country on both - sides had helped to defeat his purpose. Don’t you think Wilson, - 50 years from now, will be regarded as one of the greatest - presidents the United States has ever had? He evaded an answer - but turned his attention to the Japanese-Chinese war and opposed - Germany’s alliance to Japan. Then he showed the true German - attitude, quoting, ‘If the United States would stop the Japanese - War and leave Germany to have her way in Europe, we would have - world peace.’” - -SCHACHT: What is the question? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you make those statements? - -SCHACHT: I do not know whether I said it, but even today it seems an -extremely reasonable statement. I am of the opinion that it was correct -with one exception, I believe... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, now let’s get this straight. As I understand -you correctly, you can have peace, world peace, if Germany was left to -have her way in Europe? - -SCHACHT: Yes. May I say that there were various opinions about the path -Germany was to take; mine was a peaceful one. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, he goes on: - - “I did not comment, and others also failed to make remarks. - Schacht meant what the Army Chiefs of 1914 meant when they - invaded Belgium, expecting to conquer France in 6 weeks, namely; - domination and annexation of neighboring little countries, - especially north and east.” - -SCHACHT: Am I to reply? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you say that? - -SCHACHT: No, no. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was that what Dodd said about your conversation? - -SCHACHT: But I did not say that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you? - -SCHACHT: No, may I... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was the impression? - -SCHACHT: No, may I answer please? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask you this question: What is the impression -received over the course of his acquaintance with you by a man whom you -describe as being a decent fellow and a friend of yours? - -SCHACHT: May I answer that I have already stated that Mr. Dodd was the -victim of many misconceptions. In this case, too, he does not say that I -said it; he says, “Schacht meant.” That was his opinion which he -attributed to me. I never said that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I so understood it; but it was the estimate of a -friendly observer, I take it from you. - -SCHACHT: A friendly observer who continually misunderstood; Ambassador -Henderson has proved that in his book. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He may have misunderstood Henderson; but there is -never any doubt that he understood the Nazi danger from the beginning, -is there? - -SCHACHT: Yes; but he misunderstood my attitude. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, when you went and asked first the Foreign -Minister and then Hitler to go to the United States, or have some one go -to the United States, you testified, on Page 8708 of the record (Volume -XII, Page 467) that you told Hitler this: - - “It seems vital to me that there should be someone constantly in - America who could clarify German interests publicly, in the - press, _et cetera_.” - -Did you say that? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, is that what you actually said to Hitler? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I call your attention to your own letter, -Document Number 3700-PS to the Reich Marshal. - - “In the beginning of 1940 I proposed to the Führer that I should - go to the United States in order to attempt to slow down - America’s assistance to England in the matter of armaments and, - if possible, to prevent America becoming involved more deeply in - the war.” - -I ask you, which of those is true? - -SCHACHT: Both of them. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Both? Then you did not reveal to the Tribunal -yesterday, when you reported the conversation, all that you had -pretended that you would do in the United States, did you? - -SCHACHT: No, certainly not. I wanted, for instance, to try to persuade -the President to intervene for peace. That, too, I did not mention here. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also testified yesterday that you were -never told about the extent, the type, and the speed of rearmament. Do -you recall that? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But although you had no such information, you said -it was too much? - -SCHACHT: I had the feeling that one ought to go slowly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let me remind you of certain statements made -by General Von Blomberg concerning 1937. - - “Answer: ‘At that time, the organization of the planned - Wehrmacht was about complete.’ - - “Question: ‘When? 1937?’ - - “Answer: ‘I believe it was 1937.’ - - “Question: ‘Was that a plan that had been discussed with Doctor - Schacht in connection with the financing, as to how big the - Wehrmacht would be?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes. Schacht knew the plan for the formation of the - Wehrmacht very well, since we informed him every year about the - creation of new formations for which we had been expending - money. I remember that, in the year 1937 we discussed what the - Wehrmacht would need for current expenses after a large amount - had been spent for creating it.’ - - “Question: ‘That means that you gave Schacht a clear statement - of how much money each year went into the creation of new units, - new installations, and so forth, and how much you were using for - the operating expenses of the Wehrmacht?’ - - “Answer: ‘Exactly right.’ - - “Question: ‘When you say that by 1937 the plan had been - fulfilled, do you mean in the main?’ - - “Answer: ‘In the main.’” - -Another question. I skip two or three irrelevant ones. - - “When you say that Schacht was familiar with those figures, how - were they brought to his attention? - - “Answer: ‘The demands for the money needed were handed to - Schacht in writing.’ - - “Question: ‘That means that in connection with the money which - Schacht was raising for the rearmament program, he was informed - of how many divisions and how many tanks and so forth would be - procured through these means?’ - - “Answer: ‘I don’t think we put down the amount of money we would - need for every tank and so forth, but we would put down how much - every branch of the Wehrmacht, like the Navy or Air Force, - needed, and then we would state how much was required for - activating and how much for operating.’ - - “Question: ‘That is, Doctor Schacht could see each year how much - of an increase there would be in the size of the Armed Forces as - a result of the money he was procuring?’ - - “Answer: ‘That is certain.’” - -I ask whether you deny the statements made by Von Blomberg as I have put -them to you? - -SCHACHT: Yes, unfortunately, I must say that I know nothing about this. -A member of the Reichsbank Directorate, Geheimrat Vocke, will testify -tomorrow; and I ask that you put this matter to him so that the question -will be clarified. The question was not one of informing me, but of -informing the Reichsbank Directorate. Everything that I knew the -Reichsbank Directorate naturally also knew. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dr. Schacht, I don’t care whether you know or -didn’t know as far as the Prosecution’s case is concerned. What I am -asking you these questions for is to know how far we can rely on your -testimony. - -SCHACHT: Yes, I understand. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So there will be no misunderstanding about that. -And you deny that Von Blomberg was telling the truth when he says, when -he reported to you in writing, those facts? - -SCHACHT: Yes, unfortunately I must deny it. Evidently he does not -remember. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you testified yesterday or the day before, -that the so-called New Plan had nothing to do with the armament program, -did you not? - -SCHACHT: Nothing in particular with armament. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Oh, nothing in particular. - -SCHACHT: No. I mean of course—the Tribunal was expressly asked whether -I was to speak about the New Plan here or not, and the Tribunal decided -that it was to be brought up at your cross-examination. I am prepared to -inform you now about the New Plan before you... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Dr. Schacht, you have no objection to -answering my questions, have you? - -SCHACHT: Certainly not. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am referring to the answer which you gave—the -one which you were not allowed to give—find the Page 8732 of this -record (Volume XII, Pages 484 and 485): - - “Question: ‘Some of your economic policies during the time you - were Minister of Economics, which have been accused as being in - preparation for war, were the so-called New Plan. What was - that?’” - -And your answer: - - “May I state first of all that the New Plan had nothing at all - to do with rearmament.” - -And then you went into an explanation of the New Plan which the Court -did not receive, and I am asking you only this question: Did you not -say, in your speech on the Miracle of Finance on the 29th day of -November 1938, this—after quoting a great number of figures: “These -figures show how much the New Plan contributed to the execution of the -armament program as well as to the securing of our food.” - -Did you say that or didn’t you? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is Document Number EC-611, Exhibit Number -USA-622. - -Now, I understood you to say in your testimony that you really didn’t -have anything to do socially with Hitler or with the other Nazis and -that you refused their invitation to lunch at the Reich Chancellery; and -one of the chief reasons was that those present showed such abject -humility to Hitler. Did you say that? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to read to you from your speech, -Document Number EC-501, your inaugural speech on the occasion of the -Führer’s birthday. This was a public speech, by the way, wasn’t it? - -SCHACHT: I do not know. I do not remember. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You made a speech on the Führer’s birthday on the -21st of April 1937, carried in the newspapers? - -SCHACHT: Maybe. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “We are meeting together here to remember - with respect and love the man to whom the German people - entrusted the control of its destiny more than 4 years ago.” - -And then, after some other remarks, you say, - - “With the limitless passion of a glowing heart and the - infallible instinct of a born statesman, Adolf Hitler, in a - struggle which he led for 14 years with calm logic, has won for - himself the soul of the German people.” - -Was that a part of your published and public speech? - -SCHACHT: I assume that you have quoted it quite correctly. I do not -believe that anyone, on the occasion of the birthday celebration of the -head of a state, could say anything very different. Mr. Justice, may I -make one request. You have completely passed over the New Plan, while -the Tribunal has pointed out that it was to be discussed here in -cross-examination. If you are not going to refer to the New Plan, may I -ask that the New Plan be discussed again in re-examination by my -attorney. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I did not ask you what the New Plan was; I asked -whether your statement that it had nothing to do with armaments was true -or not. But if your solicitor wants to ask about it, it is open to -ruling by the Tribunal. You quoted today Hitler’s letter of the 19th of -January 1939, in which you were dismissed from the presidency of the -Reichsbank; and you did not quote the concluding sentence, as I recall -it, which reads, “I am happy to be able to avail myself of your services -for the solution of new tasks in your position as Reich Minister.” That -is a correct quotation, is it not? - -SCHACHT: I refer to the testimony by the witness Gisevius, who has -already said that outwardly Hitler would never indicate that there was -dissension between himself and his collaborators but that he always -attempted to give a false impression to the world. After January 1939 -Hitler never asked for my opinion or my co-operation. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you asked by anyone else? - -SCHACHT: No. I cited this morning the occasions when I was asked for -assistance. That was in connection with Belgium, and in connection with -the periodical, _Das Reich_. I think that was all. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you performed no functions whatever in -reference to Belgium? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I quote your letter of the 17th of October -1940 to the Reich Minister of Economics, Document EC-504, USA-830. At -that time you had ceased to be President of the Reichsbank, had you not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. I was only a minister without portfolio. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “So that the German banks in the occupied - western territories need not work side-by-side, or rather - against each other, you had assigned the Deutsche Bank the task - of clearing the way for closer economic co-operation with - Holland; and you entrusted the Dresdner Bank with the same task - for Belgium.” - -And you go on to describe that situation and say: - - “In order to remove this difficulty, you, Herr Reich Minister, - have agreed that the undersigned comply with the requests of - both banking houses for a decisive expression of opinion in this - question. I have subsequently discussed the situation with both - banks and it was confirmed in the course of the conversation - that at present there is no tendency on the part of Dutch or - Belgian financial institutions to enter into general ties with - the German business men.” - -Do you recall? - -SCHACHT: Yes, I remember it, now that you have read it to me. May I make -a statement, or what was your question? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I just wondered if you remembered that. - -SCHACHT: Yes, and I ask permission to make a statement. It concerns... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If you think it needs explaining... - -SCHACHT: I would think so; but I leave that to the Tribunal. If I may -speak: It concerns a rivalry between two large banks. Both these large -banks approached me—as a former banker and President of the -Reichsbank—to decide the matter, and I did. I really do not see what -that has to do with the official participation in the Belgian -administration. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the purpose of your intervention was to avoid -misunderstanding in the occupied countries between the banking interests -of the occupied countries and the German banks, was it not? - -SCHACHT: Certainly, they were to work together peacefully. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. Although you have said to the Tribunal that -you were entirely opposed to the Germans being in there at all? - -SCHACHT: Of course. But now that they were there I tried to keep peace. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You also were approached by Krupp von Bohlen about -raising a fund known as the “Hitler spending fund,” were you not? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never were? - -SCHACHT: Never. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, that is most unfortunate—that your name -should be connected with... - -SCHACHT: Yes, I know the letter. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never received such a letter? - -SCHACHT: Yes, I know the letter, but I was not assigned the task of -raising that fund. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you assisted in raising it, didn’t you? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you contribute to it? - -SCHACHT: I personally, certainly not. I do not know what you are -accusing me of. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I thought you knew about the letter from Von -Bohlen. - -SCHACHT: Yes, but I ask you of what are you accusing me? Please tell me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you raise any money or help to organize a loan -with Krupp von Bohlen in May of 1933—the Hitler spending fund? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How did you answer Krupp von Bohlen’s letter asking -you to do so? - -SCHACHT: Would you please remind me of what Herr Von Krupp wrote to me -at the time? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Have you the letter of the 29th of May? - -SCHACHT: Yes, one moment, please, I have nearly finished. May I reply -now? From this... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: First of all, did you receive such a letter? - -SCHACHT: Yes, of course. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right. Tell us what happened. - -SCHACHT: In that letter Herr Von Krupp informed me that industry and -other economic circles, such as agriculture, _et cetera_, intended to -organize a joint Hitler fund in order to combine in one collection the -unrestrained Party collections which were making the entire country -insecure. He informed me of this, and also of the fact that a board of -trustees was to be appointed for this Hitler fund. I want to say that I -never joined the board of trustees and was not a member of it. He -further informed me that the representatives of the banks, Dr. Fischer -and Dr. Mosier, would contact me and inform me about these things. That -is all that the letter says. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That I offer as Exhibit Number USA-831, (Document -Number D-151). - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you look at the following letter of -the 30th of May 1933, which says they had the opportunity of mentioning -it to you? - -SCHACHT: One moment, please. I do not think the letter is in my document -book. No, it is not here. - -[_The document was handed to the defendant._] - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I asked you to read the letter of the 29th of May -first; one of the 29th of May and one of the 30th. The 29th of May has -not been translated. - -SCHACHT: I see. Just a minute. I read. - -This letter never reached me. It has been crossed out and apparently it -was not sent, because Krupp and I had a personal conversation to which -Krupp refers in the letter of the following day, 30 May; the letter -begins, “As Dr. Köttgen and I had the opportunity of mentioning to you -yesterday...” That apparently was a personal conversation. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, and you had also said: - - “You were kind enough to promise me to obtain from Messrs. Otto - Christian Fischer and Dr. Mosier...full particulars, and - especially information on how far banks which are public - corporations can participate in this task.” - -SCHACHT: No, Mr. Justice Jackson, it does not say that in the letter. -Please, will you be good enough to read the letter of 29 May? Where does -it say that I spoke to Dr. Fischer or would speak to Dr. Mosier? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you deny receiving the letter of the 29th? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never received it? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you deny having a conversation with Krupp von -Bohlen-Halbach, the substance of which is set forth in that letter? - -SCHACHT: No—One moment. Please, let me answer quietly. I do not wish to -be accused of anything without replying. - -I did not receive that letter on 29 May, nor did I receive it later. -Instead, there was a personal conversation. The subject of that -conversation is contained in the letter of 30 May, which we read before -and which I received. You have just asserted that I had promised Krupp -von Bohlen to speak to Dr. Fischer and Dr. Mosier. The letter makes no -mention of that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Does it not say so in the memorandum which you say -was replaced by a conversation? That is what I am trying to ask you. - -SCHACHT: At any rate, I did not promise to talk to the gentlemen. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Anything more you want to say? - -SCHACHT: No. That is enough. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, yesterday, I think it was, you testified that -you had made public statements against the terror policy of the regime; -and in evidence you quoted from your Königsberg speech. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Unfortunately, Dr. Schacht, you stopped just at the -point where I got interested in it. - -SCHACHT: Yes, that is generally the case. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After you had stated that there are people who ran -Germany—let me quote the part you quoted, because it is important in -connection... - -SCHACHT: Quote the whole thing. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. This is what you quoted: - - “Those are the people who heroically smear window panes in the - middle of the night; who brand every German who trades in a - Jewish store as a traitor; who condemn every former Freemason as - a scoundrel, and who, in the just fight against priests and - ministers who talk politics from the pulpit, cannot themselves - distinguish between religion and misuse of the pulpit. The goal - at which these people aim is generally correct and good.” - -That is what you quoted? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now let us go on: - - “The goal at which these people aim is generally correct and - good. There is no place in the Third Reich for secret societies, - regardless of how harmless they are. The priests and ministers - should take care of souls, and not meddle in politics. The Jews - must realize that their influence is gone for all time.” - -That was also a part of that speech, was it not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you pointed out in that speech that on the -Jewish problem, as you called it, legislation is being prepared and must -be awaited? - -SCHACHT: Yes, I had hoped so. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You assured them so, did you not? - -SCHACHT: I beg your pardon? Yes, that was the intention as I gathered -from my conversation with Hitler. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew that the laws on the Jewish subject -were on their way? - -SCHACHT: Not the laws which were passed later. I always urged Hitler to -give legal protection to the Jews. I wanted to see this law enacted, and -I assumed that it would be done; but instead the Racial Laws of -September or November, yes, November, 1935, were passed. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have quoted from Exhibit Number USA-832, which is -Document EC-433, and you say the laws you were forecasting and promising -were laws for the protection of the Jews? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We will get to that later. - -You gave your reasons, which you said were reasons of principle, to the -Tribunal for not becoming a Party member? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR: JUSTICE JACKSON: Yesterday in Court, do you recall that? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now isn’t it a fact that you have told the United -States Prosecution Staff that you asked Hitler whether to join the -Party, and that to your great relief Hitler told you not to? - -SCHACHT: Yes. Before I co-operated with him I wanted to find out whether -he demanded that I should become a member of the Party. I was most -relieved when he said I need not. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So you remained out of the Party with Hitler’s -consent and approval? - -SCHACHT: Yes, of course. I think that is just another reason which will -prove that I have never been a member of the Party. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you did not mention that to the Tribunal when -you were giving your reasons for setting out, that Hitler had given -permission? - -SCHACHT: No, I thought the Tribunal would believe me anyway. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When you received the Party golden swastika, you -stated that it was the greatest honor that could be conferred by the -Third Reich, did you not? - -SCHACHT: I did, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And while you didn’t wear it in your daily life, -you did wear it on official occasions, you stated, did you not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. It was very convenient on railroad journeys, when ordering -a car, _et cetera_. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: From 1933 to 1942 you contributed a thousand -Reichsmark a year to the Nazi Party? - -SCHACHT: No. Yes, I beg your pardon; from 1937 to 1942. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Didn’t you say on interrogation that it was from -1933 to 1942? - -SCHACHT: No, that is an error. From 1937, after I had received the -swastika. Evidently that is a misunderstanding. After I had received it -I said to myself, “It would be fitting—give the people a thousand marks -a year, and have done with it.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: For upwards of ten years, not quite ten years, you -accepted and held office of one kind or another under this regime, did -you not? - -SCHACHT: From 17 March 1933 to 21 January 1943. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And as I understand you, that during this time, at -least a part of the time, Hitler deceived you, and all the time you -deceived Hitler. - -SCHACHT: No, oh no. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have misunderstood you? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well now... - -SCHACHT: I believe that in the first years, at least, I did not deceive -Hitler. - -I not only believe so, I know it. I only started to deceive him in 1938. -Until then, I always told him my honest opinion. I did not cheat him at -all; on the contrary... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What becomes, then, of your explanation that you -entered his government in order to put brakes on his program? Did you -tell him that? - -SCHACHT: Oh, no. I should hardly have done that or he would never have -admitted me into the government. But I did not deceive him about it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he know your purpose in joining his government -was to defeat his program by sabotage? - -SCHACHT: I did not say that I wanted to defeat his program. I said that -I wanted to direct it into orderly channels. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you have said that you wanted to put brakes -on it. You used that expression. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Which meant slow down? Didn’t it? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he wanted to speed it up, isn’t that right? - -SCHACHT: Yes, perhaps. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never allowed him to know that you had entered -his government for the purpose of slowing down his rearmament program, -did you? - -SCHACHT: It was not necessary to tell him what I was thinking. I did not -deceive him. I made no false statements, but I would hardly tell him -what I actually thought and wanted. He did not tell me his innermost -thoughts either, and you do not tell them to your political opponents -either. I never deceived Hitler except after 1938. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I daresay. I am not asking you about a political -opponent. I am asking you about the man in whose government you entered -and became a part. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You don’t tell your opponents; but is it customary -in Germany that members of the government enter for the purpose of -defeating the head of the government’s program? - -SCHACHT: I have already told you that the word defeat is incorrect. I -did not intend to defeat him. I intended to slow him down; and that is -indeed the custom, for that is how every coalition government is -constructed. If you enter into a coalition government, you must discuss -certain matters with your neighboring parties and come to an agreement -about them, and you must use your influence to check certain projects of -the other party. That is not a deception; it is an attempt at a -compromise solution. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You claim you entered as a coalition? - -SCHACHT: Yes. I explained that in a distinct and comprehensive manner. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You used the word yourself today, in describing -your activities, as sabotaging his rearmament program, did you not? - -SCHACHT: Yes, I did so, shall we say, after 1936. But he noticed it. -That was not a deception. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You take some part of the responsibility, I take -it, for the loss of the war by Germany. - -SCHACHT: That is a very strange question. Please, forgive me if I say -that I assume no responsibility. Since I am not responsible for the fact -that the war started I cannot assume any responsibility for the fact -that it was lost. I did not want war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when did your doubts about Hitler as a man, his -integrity, first arise? - -SCHACHT: I have explained that in such detail during the examination -that I do not think I need repeat it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did that occur—I’ll put it in the terms of your -interrogation, since your interrogation is a little clearer. - - “In 1934”—so your interrogation runs—“he killed many people - without having any legal justification or had them killed; and a - few days after, in the Reichstag, he said he was the highest - judge in Germany. He was certainly not, and for the first time I - was shaken by his conception. It seemed to me absolutely immoral - and inhuman.” - -Is that correct? - -SCHACHT: I said that here yesterday or the day before; exactly the same -thing. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I want to fix these dates, Dr. Schacht. You -see, your purpose in this trial and mine aren’t exactly the same. - -SCHACHT: No, no, I know that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also received full information about the -operation of the Gestapo from Gisevius in 1934 or 1935, as he testified, -did you not? - -SCHACHT: No, he did not say that. He said that he knew about these -matters. He did not tell me everything, but I admitted earlier -today—this morning—that he did inform me of certain things, and from -that I drew my conclusions. At the beginning of May 1935 I had already -discussed this matter with Hitler. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were informed about the Gestapo terrorism, -Reichstag Fire... - -SCHACHT: The Reichstag Fire? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ...the falsity of the purge claim... - -SCHACHT: One moment, please. May I take them in order? I was not told -about the Reichstag Fire until years later by the late Count Helldorf, -who has been mentioned by Gisevius. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You mean Gisevius never told you about that? - -SCHACHT: I think I heard it from Helldorf. I may have heard it from -Gisevius, but I think it was Helldorf. At any rate, it was after 1935 -that I heard about it. Until then, I did not think it was possible. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never doubted Gisevius’ word when he told you -in 1934 or 1935 as he testified, did you? - -SCHACHT: One moment. He told me this either in 1934 or 1935, but not -1934 and 1935, and if he did tell me—well if Gisevius said so, I assume -that it is true. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It was then that you knew about the persecution of -the churches and the destruction of the labor unions, wasn’t it? - -SCHACHT: The destruction of the labor unions took place as early as May -1933. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You knew all about that, didn’t you? - -SCHACHT: I did not know everything, only what was generally known. I -knew exactly what every other German knew about it and what the labor -unions themselves knew. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: As a matter of fact, that was one of the reasons -for the contributions by yourself and other industrialists to the Nazi -Party, wasn’t it? - -SCHACHT: Oh, no: oh, no. There was never any question of that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You mean that meetings of industrialists were held, -and as important a thing to industry as the destruction of the labor -unions was never mentioned in your conferences? - -SCHACHT: I know nothing about it. Will you please remind me of something -definite. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Confiscation of the properties; the putting of -labor union leaders into concentration camps. - -SCHACHT: I heard about that—one moment. I do not know exactly who was -put into the concentration camps. I was informed about the confiscation -of property because that was publicly announced; but, if I understand -you correctly, I do not know what the meetings of industrialists had to -do with it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also knew very early about the persecution -of the Jews, didn’t you? - -SCHACHT: I explained yesterday exactly what I knew about the persecution -of the Jews, how I acted in connection with the persecution of the Jews, -and I state that as long as I was a minister I did everything to prevent -these things. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I understood your generality, and I am trying to -get at a little more detail about it, Dr. Schacht. Did you not testify -as follows, on your interrogation on the 17th of October 1945: - - “The National Socialists, as I understood from the program, - intended to have a smaller percentage of Jews in the - governmental and cultural positions of Germany, with which I - agreed.” - -SCHACHT: Yes. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Question: ‘Well, now, you had read _Mein - Kampf_, had you not?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘And you knew the views of Hitler on the Jewish - question. Did you not?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’” - -You so testified, did you not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Question: ‘Well, now, during your time as - Reich Minister, statutes were passed, were they not, prohibiting - all Jewish lawyers, for example, from practicing in the courts?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes, that is what I said.’ - - “Question: ‘Did you agree with that?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’” - -Did you say that? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you did agree with excluding... - -SCHACHT: Yes, I always agreed with that principle. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. And you also agreed with the principle of -excluding all Jews from civil service positions, did you not? - -SCHACHT: No. I want to emphasize in this connection... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well... - -SCHACHT: May I finish? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. - -SCHACHT: With regard to the principle of the dominating Jewish influence -in government, legal, and cultural questions I have always said that I -did not consider this influence to be of advantage either to the German -people and Germany, which was a Christian state and based on Christian -conceptions, or to the Jews, since it increased the animosity against -them. For these reasons I was always in favor of limiting Jewish -participation in those fields, not actually according to the population, -but nevertheless limiting them to a certain percentage. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, let’s go on with the interrogation. The -interrogations are always so much briefer than the answers made in court -where the press is present, if I may say so. - -Did you not give these answers: - - “Question: ‘Now, with respect to civil service. There was this - Aryan clause that was put in. Did you agree with that - legislation?’ - - “Answer: ‘With the same limitation.’ - - “Question: ‘Now, did you ever express yourself in the Cabinet or - elsewhere to the point that you wanted these restrictions put - in, restrictions you have been talking about?’ - - “Answer: ‘I don’t think so; useless to do it.’ - - “Question: ‘You say “useless to do it?”’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘I thought you said at one time or another that the - reason you stayed in is because you thought you might have some - influence on policy.’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘You didn’t consider this as important enough a - matter to take a position on it?’ - - “Answer: ‘Not an important enough matter to risk a break.’” - -SCHACHT: To break, that is right. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then, you were asked this: - - “You certainly signed a law with respect to the prohibition of - Jews receiving licenses to deal in foreign currencies.” - -Do you remember that? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Answer: ‘Yes, maybe.’ - - “Question: ‘You were in favor of that?’ - - “Answer: ‘I don’t remember the details of that question.’ - - “Question: ‘Well, it is not a matter of details. The question is - a matter of discrimination.’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’” - -You said that? - -SCHACHT: Yes, certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were in favor of that legislation, or were you -not? - -SCHACHT: Is that the question now, or from the interrogation? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am asking you now. - -SCHACHT: Yes. I agreed to it. Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were in favor of it. Well, you were not when -you were interrogated. - -SCHACHT: You can see how difficult it is. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The question then was, you were in favor of it, and -you said: - - “‘I wasn’t in favor, but I had to sign it.’ - - “Question: ‘Well, you were the only one who signed it. You were - the Reich Minister of Economics?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘And, obviously, it was a bill which was put in by - your Ministry, was it not?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’” - -Is that correct? - -SCHACHT: Yes, I assume so. You see, in these matters it was a question -of degrees. I have just explained the principles of my policy. The -extent to which these individual laws went is a question of politics. -Today, you can say what you like about it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also favored the law, and signed the law, -prohibiting all Jews from being admitted to examinations for public -economic advisors, for co-operatives, for example. - -SCHACHT: Yes, possibly. I do not remember but probably it is right. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you also approved a law imposing the death -penalty on German subjects who transferred German property abroad, or -left German property abroad. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And of course you knew that that affected, chiefly -and most seriously, the Jews who were moving abroad. - -SCHACHT: I hope that the Jews did not cheat any more than the -Christians. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, the death penalty on German subjects for -transferring German property abroad was your idea of a just law? - -SCHACHT: I do not understand. My idea? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. - -SCHACHT: It was an idea of the Minister of Finance, and I signed it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question was then asked you after these -were recited: - - “Well, now, was there a matter of conscience involved, or was - there not?” - -And you answered: - - “To some extent, yes, but not important enough to risk a break.” - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the question: - - “Yes. In other words, you had quite another objective which was - more important?” - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Well what was that objective, Dr. Schacht?” I am -still reading. It saves time. - -SCHACHT: Oh, pardon me. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Answer: ‘Well, the objective was to stay - in power and to help carry this through in an ordinary and - reasonable way.’ - - “Question: ‘That is to say, the restoration of the German - economy?’ - - “Answer: ‘Quite.’ - - “Question: ‘And the completion of the armament program?’ - - “Answer: ‘The completion of the international equality, the - political equality of Germany.’ - - “Question: ‘By means of armament, as you yourself have said?’ - - “Answer: ‘Also by means of armament.’” - -SCHACHT: All correct, and I stand by that today. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. So the armament question was so important that -you didn’t want to risk any break about the Jews. - -SCHACHT: Not the armament question, but the equality of Germany. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, now, I just asked you “by means of armament, -as you yourself have said.” - -SCHACHT: And I say, also by means of armament. That is one of the means. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it is the only one that was used ultimately, -wasn’t it? - -SCHACHT: No, it was not. There were other ones. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We will get to that in time. - -Now, isn’t it a fact that you also approved the law dismissing all -Jewish officials and notaries public? - -SCHACHT: That is possible. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you wrote to Blomberg on the 24th of December -1935 giving your motives, did you not, saying this: - - “The economic and illegal treatment of the Jews, the anti-Church - movement of certain Party organizations, and the lawlessness - which centers in the Gestapo are a detriment to our rearmament - task which could be considerably lessened through the - application of more respectable methods, without abandoning the - goals in the least.” (Exhibit Number Schacht-13). - -You wrote that, did you not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. I quoted it myself yesterday. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as to the rearmament program, you participated -in that from three separate offices, did you not? - -SCHACHT: I do not know which offices you mean, but please go ahead. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will help you to list them. In the first place, -you were Plenipotentiary for War. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That was the secret office at first. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were President of the Reichsbank. That was the -financial office. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were Minister of Economics, in which -position you had control with the minister for the general economic -situation. - -SCHACHT: Yes. This word “control” is such a general term that I cannot -confirm your statement without question, but I was Minister of -Economics. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let us take up first this position of -Plenipotentiary for War. You have testified that this position was -created for two purposes: (a) Preparation for war; (b) Control of the -economy in event of war. - -Is that correct? - -SCHACHT: That means preliminary planning in case war should come, and -the direction of economy when war had broken out. In other words, a -preparatory period and a later period in the event of war. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, you were asked about your functions and gave -these answers, did you not, “As the Chief of Staff provides for -mobilization from a military point of view... so you were concerned with -it from the economic point of view.” - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You answered, “certainly.” And your position as -Plenipotentiary for War was of equal rank with the War Ministry, was it -not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, as you told us, those charged with -responsibility in event of war were: First, the Minister of War and the -Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht; and, secondly, on an equal -footing, Dr. Schacht, as Plenipotentiary for Economics. Is that correct? - -SCHACHT: I assume so, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in January of 1937 you wrote this, did you not? - - “I am entrusted with the preparation of the war economy - according to the principle that our economic war organization - must be so organized in time of peace that the war economy can - be directly converted in case of emergency from this peacetime - organization and need not be created at the outbreak of war.” - -SCHACHT: I assume that that is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who was your Deputy in that office? Wohlthat? - -SCHACHT: I think Wohlthat. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, those being your functions as Plenipotentiary -for the War Economy, let’s turn to your functions as President of the -Reichsbank. - -You said that the carrying out of the armament program was the principal -task of the German policy in 1935, did you not? - -SCHACHT: Undoubtedly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There is no doubt that you voluntarily assumed the -responsibility for finding financial and economic means for doing that -thing. - -SCHACHT: No doubt. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were the financial and economic -administrator in charge of developing the armament industry of Germany. - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were not? - -SCHACHT: No, in no way. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I may have misunderstood you. - - “Question: ‘Now, in connection with this development’”—I am - referring to your interrogation of the 16th of October 1945, - Exhibit USA-636 (Document Number 3728-PS), Page 44—“‘Now in - connection with this development of the armament industry, you - charged yourself as the financial and economic administrator of - it.’ - - “Nodding your head.” - -SCHACHT: I beg your pardon? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Nodding your head. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “You charged yourself”—I will ask the whole -question so you will get it. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Now, in connection with this development of the -armament industry, you charged yourself as the financial and economic -administrator of it.” - -The record says that you nodded your head. The next question was: - - “And in that connection you took various steps. Would you be - good enough to describe for us the larger steps which you took - with reference to this goal of rearmament, first, internally, - and, second, with respect to foreign nations? - - “Answer: ‘Internally, I tried to collect all money available for - financing the mefo bills. Externally, I tried to maintain - foreign commerce as much as possible.’” - -Did you make those answers, and are they correct? - -SCHACHT: I am sure that you are correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And your purpose in maintaining foreign trade was -to obtain enough foreign exchange to permit the imports of raw -materials, not manufactured, which were required for the rearmament -program. Is that not correct? - -SCHACHT: That is the question that is put to me. Now comes the answer. -Please, will you read the answer? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What is your answer now? - -SCHACHT: My answer today is that that was not the only aim. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Not the only aim? - -SCHACHT: Right. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But that was the primary aim, was it not? - -SCHACHT: No, not at all. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right, what was the other aim? - -SCHACHT: To keep Germany alive, to assure employment for Germany, to -obtain sufficient food for Germany. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Which was your dominant aim? - -SCHACHT: The food supply in Germany and work for the export industry. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I should like to go over one or two of these -documents with you as to your aim. I refer to Document 1168-PS of May 3, -1935. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Title, “Financing of Armament,” Exhibit Number -USA-37. - - “The following comments are based on the assumption that the - completion of the armament program in regard to speed and extent - is the task of German policy and that accordingly everything - else must be subordinated to this aim, insofar as this main goal - is not endangered, by neglecting other questions.” - -Did you write that? - -SCHACHT: Not only did I write it, but I handed it to Hitler personally. -It is one of twin documents, one of which has already been submitted in -evidence and discussed in detail by the Prosecution. I did not receive -the second document. - -When my defense counsel examined me I stated here that I was intent on -stopping the Party collections and Party moneys, which were extracted -everywhere from the German people, because it was extremely difficult -for me to get the money to finance the armament program and the mefo -bills. - -I could only get that point across to Hitler if I told him that of -course this was being done in the interests of armament. If I had told -him that this was done... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, but... - -SCHACHT: No, please let me finish. If I had told him that this was done -for the building of theaters, or something similar, it would have made -no impression on him. However, if I said it must be done because -otherwise we could not arm, that was a point which influenced Hitler and -that is why I said it. I admitted that and explained it during the -examination by my attorney. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you didn’t call that misleading him? - -SCHACHT: I would not call it “misleading”; I would call it “leading.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But leading without telling him the true motives -which actuated you, at least. - -SCHACHT: I think you can be much more successful in leading a person if -you do not tell him the truth than if you do tell him the truth. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am very glad to have that frank statement of your -philosophy, Dr. Schacht. I am greatly indebted to you. Well, you devised -all kinds of plans, one for the control of foreign exchange, blocked -foreign accounts; and mefo bills was one of the principal ones of your -devices for financing was it not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I don’t care about the details of mefo bills, -but I would like to ask you this. Isn’t it correct, as you testified in -the inquiry of the 16th of October 1945—Exhibit Number USA-636—as -follows: - - “Question: ‘Actually, as a matter of fact, let me ask you this. - At the time when you started the mefo bills, for example, there - were no ready means available for financing the rearmament?’ - - “Answer: ‘Quite.’ - - “Question: ‘That is to say, through normal budget finance - methods?’ - - “Answer: ‘Not enough.’ - - “Question: ‘Also, you were limited at that time by the statute - of the Reichsbank which did not permit you to give anything near - the sufficient credit which was required by the armament - program.’ - - “Answer: ‘Quite.’ - - “Question: ‘And you found a way?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘And the way you found was by creating a device in - effect which enabled the Reichsbank to lend, by a subterfuge, to - the Government what it normally or legally could not do?’ - - “Answer: ‘Right.’” - -Is that true? - -SCHACHT: That was my answer. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The following questions were then asked: - - “I understand that basically what was built up in Germany in the - way of an armament industry, a domestic economy that was sound, - and a Wehrmacht, the efforts that you put in from 1934 to the - spring of 1938, when mefo financing stopped, were responsible in - large part for the success of the whole program. - - “Answer: ‘I don’t know whether they were responsible for it, but - I helped a great deal to achieve that.’” - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were asked as follows, on the 17th of -October 1945: - - “In other words, in effect you are not taking the position that - you are not largely responsible for the rearming of the German - Army? - - “Answer: ‘Oh no, I never did that.’ - - “Question: ‘You have always been proud of that fact, I take it.’ - - “Answer: ‘I wouldn’t say proud, but satisfied.’” - -Is that still your position? - -SCHACHT: In reply to that I should like to say: The question of mefo -bills was quite certainly a system of finance which normally would never -have been attempted. I made a detailed statement on this subject when I -was questioned by my attorney. On the other hand, however, I can say -that this question was examined by all legal experts in the Reichsbank -and by means of this subterfuge, as you put it, a way was found which -was legally possible. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, I didn’t put it that way; you said so. - -SCHACHT: No, no. I mean the sentence you have just quoted as being my -answer. I beg your pardon. The matter was investigated from a legal -viewpoint, and we assured ourselves that it could be done in this way. -Moreover, I am still satisfied today that I contributed to the -rearmament, but I wish that Hitler had made different use of it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, on your 60th birthday Minister of War -Blomberg said that, “Without your help, my dear Mr. Schacht, there could -have been no rearmament,” did he not? - -SCHACHT: Yes, those are the sort of pleasantries which one exchanges on -such occasions. But there is quite a bit of truth in it. I have never -denied it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is the way it looks to me. - -Now, when you finally made some suggestion that the armament should stop -or slow up, as I understand, you made that suggestion without knowing -what the armament was. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The only thing you were judging by was financial -conditions, was it not? - -SCHACHT: Oh, no. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, what was it? - -SCHACHT: I did, of course, have a general impression of these matters -because General Thomas always discussed them with me. However, I do not -remember that General Von Blomberg gave me detailed information about -what he thought. Of course, I was informed in a general way regarding -the progress made by the armament program, and that is why I said “more -slowly.” My opinion was strengthened because of the general conditions. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well now, let’s see what reasons you gave in -Document Number EC-286. That is Exhibit Number USA-833: - - “I am therefore of the opinion that we should promote our export - with all resources by a temporary”—and I emphasize the word - “temporary”—“decrease of armament.” - -SCHACHT: Decrease? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Decrease, yes, temporary. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I emphasize “temporary,” and you emphasize -“decrease.” - -SCHACHT: Oh no, no; I agree with you. - - MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “And that further, with reference to the - Four Year Plan, we should solve only those problems which appear - most pressing. Among these I include the oil-fuel program, the - buna program, and the program of developing ore resources, - insofar as this development does not of itself require large - amounts of raw materials which must be withheld from export. - - “On the other hand, all other measures of the Four Year Plan - should be postponed for the time being. I am convinced that by - such a policy our export could be increased so greatly that - there would be a certain improvement in our exhausted stocks, - and that the resumption of the strengthened armament would again - be possible in the not too distant future, from the point of - view of raw materials. I am unable to judge to what extent a - temporary postponement of armament would have military - advantages. However, I presume that such a pause in armament - would not only have advantages for the training of officers and - men, which has yet to be done, but that this pause would also - afford an opportunity to survey the technical results of - previous armament and to perfect the technical aspect of - armament.” - -Now that you addressed to Göring, did you not? - -SCHACHT: That is perfectly possible. I cannot remember the letter, but -it looks quite like one of mine. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes; and you were correctly giving to Göring your -true views; were you not? - -SCHACHT: No; I believe that this was merely a tactical letter. I think -that I was mainly trying to limit armament. If I had told him that we -wanted to stop arming, Göring would probably have denounced me to the -Führer accordingly. Therefore I told him, “Let’s stop for the time -being”—temporary. I also emphasize “temporary.” It was a tactical -measure to convince Göring that for the time being it should be -temporary. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then, with your fellow officers in the Government -you were also using tactical statements which did not represent your -true views? - -SCHACHT: That was absolutely necessary. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When did it cease to be necessary, Dr. Schacht? - -SCHACHT: Cease? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes; when did it cease to be necessary? - -SCHACHT: I think it more important to ask when it commenced; when it -started. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well? - -SCHACHT: During the first years I did not do it, of course, but later on -I did to a considerable extent. I could say always; it never stopped. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Has it stopped now? - -SCHACHT: I have no more colleagues, and here before this Tribunal I have -nothing to tell but the truth. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, on the 24th of September, 1935—December—you -wrote EC-293, which is Exhibit Number USA-834, and used this language, -did you not: - - “If there is now a demand for greater armament, it is, of - course, not my intention to deny or change my attitude, which is - in favor of the greatest possible armament and which I have - expressed for years both before and since the seizure of power; - but it is my duty to point out the economic limitations of this - policy.” - -SCHACHT: That is very good. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that is true? - -SCHACHT: Certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came in the Four Year Plan in 1936? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did not like the appointment of Göring to that -position? - -SCHACHT: I thought he was unsuited and, of course, it made an opening -for a policy which was opposed to mine. I knew perfectly well that this -was the start of exaggerated armament, whereas I was in favor of -restricted rearmament. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Why do you say that Göring’s appointment meant -exaggeration of armament? Can you point to anything that Göring has said -in favor of rearmament that is any more extreme than the things you have -said? - -SCHACHT: Oh yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, will you do it? - -SCHACHT: Yes, I think if you read the record of the so-called “small -Ministerial Council,” of the year 1936, and in particular 1938, which -you yourself introduced, you will see at once that here the necessity of -increased armament was emphasized. For instance, those of November or -October 1936, I think. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it was also emphasized in your documents, was -it not, throughout? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You say that your statements of that sort were -merely tactical. - -SCHACHT: No, I beg your pardon. I said arm within the limits of what is -economically possible and reasonable. Göring, if I may say it again, -wanted to go beyond those limits. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is exactly the point I want to make. Your -difference with Göring over rearmament was entirely a question of what -the economy of Germany would stand, was it not? - -SCHACHT: No. I said that the most important thing was that Germany -should live and have foreign trade, and within those limits we could -arm. However, it is out of the question that Germany should arm for the -sake of arming, and thus ruin her economy. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well that’s the difference between you and Göring; -it was over what the economy would stand, was it not? - -SCHACHT: No, it was a question of the extent of rearmament. The point -is, Mr. Justice Jackson, that German economy paid the price for Göring’s -action. The only question is, was it reasonable or unreasonable? If I -may state it pointedly, I would say that I considered Göring’s economic -policy to be unreasonable and a burden to the German nation; while I -considered it most important that rearmament should not be extended and -that the German nation should have a normal, peacetime standard. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 3 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - TRANSCRIBER NOTES - -Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious -printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for -periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; -however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus -“Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes -French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals: -hence Führer, Göring, Kraków, and Ljoteč etc. throughout. - -Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb -tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the -tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations -between the German, English, French, and, most specifically with this -volume, Russian documents presented in the trial. - -An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as -possible to the original document presentation and layout. - -[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International -Military Tribunal Vol. 12_, by Various.] - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS -BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOL. 12 *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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