diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'old/61791-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | old/61791-0.txt | 3900 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 3900 deletions
diff --git a/old/61791-0.txt b/old/61791-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index b1e59aa..0000000 --- a/old/61791-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3900 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Arab conquests in Central Asia, by -Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Arab conquests in Central Asia - -Author: Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb - -Release Date: April 8, 2020 [EBook #61791] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ARAB CONQUESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA *** - - - - -Produced by Turgut Dincer and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive) - - - - - -Transcriber’s Note: This text makes use of an uncommon system for -transcription of Arabic. Italics, sometimes on a _s_ingle le_t_ter, -are semantically meaningful; and you’ll need a font that can display -macrons (āēīōū) and the characters for the transliterations of -Arabic letters ain (ʿ) and hamza (ʾ). - - - - - -THE ARAB CONQUESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA - - - - - JAMES G. FORLONG FUND - VOL. II. - - THE ARAB CONQUESTS - IN - CENTRAL ASIA - - H. A. R. GIBB, M.A. - (EDIN. AND LOND.) - Lecturer in Arabic, School of Oriental Studies, London. - - THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY - 74 GROSVENOR STREET, LONDON, W.1. - 1923 - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PAGE - - PREFACE vii - - I. THE OXUS BASIN - Early History—Political Divisions—The - Arabic Sources 1 - - II. THE EARLY RAIDS 15 - - III. THE CONQUESTS OF QUTAYBA 29 - - IV. THE TURKISH COUNTERSTROKE 59 - - V. THE RECONQUEST OF TRANSOXANIA 88 - - BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CHIEF WORKS CITED 100 - - - - -PREFACE - - -The first draft of this work was presented to the University of London in -December 1921, under the title of “The Arab Conquest of Transoxania”, as -a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts, and was approved by the Senate -in January 1922, for publication as such. During the year my attention -was taken up in other directions and, except for the publication of two -studies on the subject in the Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, -nothing further was done until by the generosity of the Trustees of the -Forlong Bequest Fund an opportunity of publication was offered. In its -present form the work has been largely rewritten and revised. It makes no -claim to present a complete historical account of the Arabs in Central -Asia, but is intended solely as a critical study of the authorities in -greater detail than has hitherto been made. Much is therefore omitted -because it has already been dealt with in the standard histories. In -order to keep down the cost of publication, the extensive references -which originally accompanied the text have been cut down to a few notes -at the end of each chapter. No references are given when, as in the great -majority of cases, the authority for the statements made can easily be -found in the appropriate place either in _T_abarī or Balādhurī. - -I regret that several works which are indispensable for a thorough study -of the subject have, for linguistic reasons, been inaccessible to me. -Such are van Vloten’s _Opkomst der Abbasiden_, and almost the whole range -of Russian research work. Through the kindness of Sir Denison Ross, -however, I have been able to avail myself of a draft MS. translation of -the most important and valuable of them all, Professor W. Barthold’s -_Turkestan_, as well as of his as yet unpublished London lectures on -“The Nomads of Central Asia.” My sincere thanks are due to Sir Denison -Ross also for his continued interest and material assistance ever -since he first introduced me to the subject; to Sir Thomas Arnold for -much encouragement and helpful counsel; to Professor Barthold, who has -read the MS. through and made a number of valuable suggestions; to the -Trustees of the Forlong Bequest Fund for their kindness in undertaking -the publication; and in no small measure to my wife, who has given much -time and labour to preparing the MS. for publication. - - London, April, 1923. - - - - -I. INTRODUCTION - -THE OXUS BASIN - - -_Early History._ - -The Oxus is a boundary of tradition rather than of history. Lying -midway between the old frontier of Aryan civilisation formed by the -Jaxartes and the Pamīr and the natural strategic frontier offered by the -north-eastern escarpment of the plateau of Īrān, it has never proved a -barrier to imperial armies from either side. It was not on the Oxus but -on the Jaxartes that Alexander’s strategic insight fixed the position of -Alexander Eschate, and when the outposts of Persian dominion were thrust -back by the constant pressure of the Central Asian hordes, their retreat -was stayed not on the Oxus but on the Murghāb. Thus when the tide of -conquest turned and the Arabs won back her ancient heritage for Persia, -they, like Alexander, were compelled to carry their arms ever further to -the East and all unknowing re-establish the frontiers of the Achaemenid -Empire. It was from the legends of Sāsānian times, enshrined in the pages -of the historians and the national epic of Firdawsī, that the Oxus came -to be regarded as the boundary between Īrān and Tūrān. - -Through all the centuries of invasion, however, the peoples of Sogdiana -and the Oxus basin remained Iranian at bottom, preserving an Iranian -speech and Iranian institutions. But the political conditions of the -country at the period of the Arab conquests were so complex that it is -necessary to trace briefly the course of their development. - -The second century B.C. was a period of upheaval in Central Asia: the -powerful Hiung-Nu peoples were dispossessing weaker tribes of their -pasture lands and forcing them to migrate westwards. Between 150 and -125 B.C. a succession of nomadic tribes, the last and most powerful of -which were a branch of the Yueh-Chi, were driven down into Sogdiana. It -is now generally held that these tribes were of Aryan origin, though the -question is not perhaps settled with absolute certainty. Before long, -however, a second group, the K’ang, possessed themselves of Sogdiana, -driving the Yueh Chi on into Bactria and the Afghan mountains[1]. In -these districts they found, alongside the Iranian peasantry, a settled -population of Tukhari (in Chinese, Ta-Hia), already noted in the Chinese -annals for their commercial enterprise[2], and while at first the nomad -tribes introduced complete confusion, it would seem that they rapidly -absorbed, or were absorbed by, the native elements, and thus assimilated -the Hellenistic civilisation of Bactria. From this fusion arose, about -50 A.D., the powerful Kushan Empire which spread into India on the one -side and probably maintained some form of suzerainty over the K’ang -kingdoms of Sogdiana on the other. Under the new empire, Buddhism was -acclimatised in Turkestan, and Sogdiana developed into a great _entrepôt_ -for Chinese trade with the West. Towards the close of the third century -the Kushan Empire, weakened by attacks from the new national dynasties -in India and Persia, reverted to its primitive form of small independent -principalities, which, however, retained sufficient cohesion to prevent -a Persian reconquest. It is practically certain that Sāsānian authority -never extended beyond Balkh and rarely as far. In the fourth and -fifth centuries references are made to a fresh horde of nomads in the -north-east, the Juan-Juan (Chionitae, Avars)[3], but it does not appear -that any new settlements were made in the Oxus countries. - -In the middle of the fifth century, another people, the Ephthalites -(Arabic Hay_t_al, Chinese Ye-Tha), perhaps a branch of the Hiung-nu, -not only completely overran the former Kushan territories, but by -successive defeats of the Persian armies forced the Sāsānid Kings to pay -tribute. The Ephthalites appear to have been a nomadic people organised -as a military caste of the familiar Turkish type, and the existing -institutions and principalities, in large part at least, continued side -by side with them[4]. Their rule was too transitory to produce any -lasting effects, or to inflict any serious injury on the commerce and -prosperity of Sogdiana. - -The rise of the Central Asian empire of the Turks proper (Tu-Kueh) dates -from their overthrow of the Juan-Juan in Mongolia in 552, under their -great Khan, Mokan. His brother Istämi (the Silzibul of the Byzantine -historians), the semi-independent jabghu of the ten tribes of Western -Turks, after consolidating his power in the Ili and Chu valleys, formed -an alliance with Khusrū Anūshīrwān, and in a joint attack between 563 -and 568 the two powers completely overthrew the Ephthalite kingdom and -divided their territories. For a brief moment the Oxus was the actual -boundary between Īrān and Tūrān; under pressure from the silk traders of -Sogdiana, however, the alliance was broken and the weaker successors of -Anūshīrwān could scarcely do more than maintain their outpost garrisons -on the Murghāb. From this time the Ephthalites, like the Kushans, were -gradually assimilating to the Iranian population[5], though the change -was less rapid in the Cisoxine lands of Lower _T_ukhāristān, Bādghīs, -and Herāt, where Ephthalite principalities were re-constituted, probably -with Turkish support, and continued to give Persia much trouble on her -north-eastern frontiers[6]. On the other hand the Turks of the five -western tribes (Nu-she-pi), who became independent after the break up of -the Great Khanate about 582, maintained their suzerainty over Sogdiana -and the middle Oxus basin by frequent expeditions, in one case at least -as far as Balkh. There is no trace in our records of extensive Turkish -immigration into the conquered lands; at most, small groups of Turks -wandered south with their herds, especially, it would seem, south of the -Iron Gate[7]. In general, Turkish interference in the administration -of the subject principalities was at first limited to the appointment -of military governors and the collection of tribute. Thus, in the -semi-legendary account given by An-Naysābūrī of the Turkish conquest of -Bukhārā the Bukhār Khudāh is represented as the chief dihqān under the -Turkish governor. It is possible also that the native princes maintained -guards of Turkish mercenaries. - -At this period, therefore, so far from the Oxus being a barrier, there -was considerable intercommunication between the peoples on either side, -and at least the elements of a racial and cultural unity, in spite of -political divisions. This is a factor of importance in the history of the -Arab conquests: the conquest of Transoxania is intimately linked with the -fortunes of Lower _T_ukhāristān, and only became possible when the latter -country was completely subdued. On the other hand, the Jaxartes formed -a natural racial and political frontier. “Shāsh and _S_ughd have seldom -run together” says Vámbéry, and in spite of nominal annexations on more -than one occasion Muslim rule was not effectively imposed on Shāsh and -Farghāna until some time after the final conquest of Transoxania. Their -chief importance for the history of Transoxania is that they formed the -jumping-off place for counter-invasions from the East. It is not without -significance that of the two battles which were decisive in establishing -Arab rule in Sogdiana one was fought to the west of Balkh and the other -on the Talas river, far into the Turkish lands beyond the Jaxartes (see -pp. 84 and 96). - - -_Political Divisions._ - -Researches into Chinese records have now made it possible to obtain -a more definite idea of the political conditions of these frontier -provinces in the seventh century. All the principalities acknowledged -the Khan of the Western Turks as overlord and paid tribute to him under -compulsion, though, as will appear, there is good cause for doubting -whether a Turkish army ever came in response to their appeals for support -until the rise of the Türgesh power in 716. - -Geographically the cultivated lands to the west and south-west of the -middle Jaxartes are divided by the Hissar mountains into two well-defined -areas. The northern area includes the rich valley of the Zarafshān and -the lesser streams which descend the northern slope of the watershed, -the southern comprises the broad basin formed by the Oxus and its -tributaries between the mountains of the Pamīr and the steppelands. The -former, which as a whole is called Sogdiana in distinction from the -smaller principality of _S_ughd, was at this period divided between -a number of small states, each independent of the others but forming -together a loose confederacy in a manner strikingly reminiscent of the -Hellenic city-states. The strongest bond of union was formed by their -mutual interest in the Chinese silk trade, the chief stations of which -were at Samarqand, Paykand, and Kish. The premier city was Samarqand, the -pre-eminence of which and high culture of whose population is vouched -for by Yuan Chwang. Special emphasis is laid on their enterprise and -success in trade, and a number of early embassies, doubtless commercial -missions, are recorded from Samarqand and Bukhārā to the Chinese court. -The merchant families of Paykand, according to Tomaschek’s rendering of -Narshakhī[8], were Kushans, but Iranian elements, reinforced by emigrants -from the Sāsānid dominions, formed the majority in the cities. The -agricultural population was almost if not entirely Iranian. - -A second link between the majority of the cities was formed by the ruling -house of the Shao-wu, if, as the Chinese records assert, these all -belonged to one royal family. The head of the clan governed Samarqand -and was allied by marriage to the Turkish Khan; cadet branches ruled in -Ushrūsana, Kish, Bukhārā, and the lesser principalities in the basin of -the Zarafshān. In the later lists the rulers of Shāsh and Farghāna as -well as the Khwārizm Shāh are shown as belonging to the clan also, though -with less probability[9]. Whether the family were of K’ang origin, or, -as the Chinese records state, belonged to the Yueh-Chi, they appear in -the Arabic histories with Persian territorial titles (Khudāh, Shāh, and -the general term dihqān). Some of the princes also possessed Turkish -titles, probably conferred on them as vassals of the Khan. The ruler -of Samarqand, as king of _S_ughd, is called the Ikhshīdh or Ikhshēdh, -which is easily recognised as the Persian _khshayathiya_. This title was -borne also, as is well known, by the king of Farghāna. It is certain -at least from both Chinese and Arabic accounts that these rulers were -not Turks. The Turkish names by which they are sometimes called were -given out of deference or compliment to their Turkish suzerains, just -as Arabic names begin to appear amongst them immediately after the -Arab conquests. Particularly misleading is the name _T_arkhūn which -appears more than once in the list of princes of Samarqand and has been -erroneously taken as the title Tarkhān, though it is in reality only the -Arabic transcription of a personal name spelt in the Chinese records -Tu-hoen. During the six or seven hundred years of their rule all these -princes had become fully identified with their Iranian subjects[10]. The -“kingship” moreover was not a real monarchy but rather the primacy in -an oligarchical system. Their authority was far from absolute, and the -landed aristocracy (dihqāns) and rich merchants possessed, as will be -seen later, not only a large measure of independence but also on occasion -the power to depose the ruling prince and elect his successor. As the -succession appears to have been largely hereditary it is probable that, -according to Iranian custom, eligibility was confined to a single royal -house. In some cases, it would seem, the succession was regulated during -the lifetime of the reigning prince by some such method as association in -the principate, probably combined with the appointment of the remaining -princes to other fiefs[11]. - -The “confederacy” of these states, however, was in no sense an alliance -and probably amounted to little more than a _modus vivendi_. Besides -the more important princes there existed an enormous number of petty -autocrats, some possibly Turkish, others probably descended from former -conquerors, whose authority may sometimes have scarcely extended beyond -the limits of their own villages. In lands subject to the Turks and -patrolled by nomadic tribes an effective centralised government was -hardly possible. Mutual antagonisms and wars cannot have been uncommon -though we have now no record of them, except that during the early Arab -period there was hostility between Bukhārā and Wardāna, but the latter -cannot be reckoned among the Shao-wu principalities since, according -to Narshakhī, it was founded by a Sāsānid prince about 300 A.D. Until -the profitable Chinese trade was threatened by the Arabs we find no -trustworthy record of combined resistance offered by the country to its -piecemeal reduction, and only long after the conquests of Qutayba is -there any hint of a concerted rising. At the same time, the strength of -the cities and warlike nature of their inhabitants may be gauged from the -way in which they not only preserved themselves from destruction at the -hands of their successive nomad invaders, but even gained their respect, -while this, in some respects perhaps the most highly civilised of all -the lands subdued by the Arabs[12], proved also the most difficult to -conquer, and most intractable to hold. - -The same lack of unity is apparent in the districts south of the Iron -Gate, though nominally subject to a single authority. It is important -to bear in mind that the Zarafshān and Oxus valleys were completely -independent of one another—that the difference between them was not -merely one of government, but also of language, and even, to some extent, -of blood, owing to the greater mixture of races in the southern basin. -When, occasionally, as in the “Mūsā legend”, reference is made in the -Arabic histories to common action by _S_ughd and _T_ukhāristān, it is -due to a complete misunderstanding of the state of the country prior to -the conquest, and it is worthy of notice that no such reference is to -be found in any narrative otherwise reliable. On his outward journey in -630, Yuan Chwang found the country divided into twenty-seven petty states -under separate rulers, with the chief military authority vested in the -Turkish Shād, the eldest son of the Jabghu of the Western Turks, who -had his seat near the modern Qunduz. During the period of anarchy which -befell the Western Turks in the following years, the whole district was -formed into an independent kingdom under a son of the former Shād, who -founded the dynasty of Jabghus of _T_ukhāristān. Minor Turkish chiefs -and intendants probably seized similar authority in their own districts, -and though the Jabghu was recognised as suzerain of all the lands from -the Iron Gate to Zābulistān and Kapisa and from Herāt to Khuttal[13], -his authority was little more than nominal except within his immediate -district of Upper _T_ukhāristān. The lesser princes, in Shūmān, Khuttal, -&c., many of whom were Turkish, appear to have acted quite independently -and did not hesitate to defy their Suzerain on occasion. The name -_T_ukhāristān is used very loosely in the Arabic records, with misleading -effect[14]. How relatively unimportant to the Arabs _T_ukhāristān proper -was is shown by the fact that its annexation (see below p. 38) is passed -over in silence. The brunt of the resistance offered to the early Arab -conquests was borne by the princes of _Lower_ _T_ukhāristān, _i.e._, -the riverain districts south of the Iron Gate, including Chaghāniān and -Balkh, together with the Ephthalite principalities in Jūzjān, Bādghīs, -and Herāt, and possibly the mountainous fringe of Gharjistān. This -explains why the Arabs always regarded Balkh, the old religious capital -of the Kushan Empire and site of the famous Buddhist shrine of Nawbahār, -as the capital of the “Turks”; it was in fact the centre of what we -might almost term the “amphictyony” of Lower _T_ukhāristān, combining -strategic and commercial importance with religious veneration. Long after -the Nawbahār had been destroyed by Ibn ʿĀmir this sentiment continued to -exist in the country[15]. - -A chance narrative in _T_abarī (II. 1224 f.), which, though of Bāhilite -origin, can scarcely have been invented, indicates the situation in Lower -_T_ukhāristān in 710. In the presence of Qutayba, the Shād and as-Sabal -(King of Khuttal) do homage to the Jabghu, the former excusing himself -on the ground that though he has joined Qutayba against the Jabghu, yet -he is the Jabghu’s vassal. The Ephthalite prince of Bādghīs then does -homage to the Shād, who must consequently be regarded as the chief prince -in Lower _T_ukhāristān. His identification with the Jabghu himself in -another passage (_T_ab. II. 1206. 9) is obviously impossible. Though -certainty on the point is hardly to be expected, the description best -suits the king of Chaghāniān (Chāghān Khudāh), who consistently adopted -an attitude of co-operation with the Arabs. It would seem too that the -king of Chaghāniān commanded the armies of Lower _T_ukhāristān in 652 and -again in 737. Moreover, an embassy to China on behalf of _T_ukhāristān -in 719 was actually despatched by the king of Chaghāniān, which implies -that he held a status in the kingdom consonant with the high title of -Shād. The conclusion drawn by Marquart and Chavannes that the king of -Chaghāniān and the Jabghu were identical is disproved by the Chinese -records[16]. - -Such conditions of political disunion were naturally all in favour of the -Arabs. It might have seemed also that the general insecurity, together -with the burden of maintaining armies and courts and the ever-recurring -ravages of invasion, would move the mass of the population to welcome -the prospect of a strong and united government, more especially as so -large a proportion of the Muslim armies were composed of their Persian -kin. For the Arabic records in general are misleading on two important -points. By their use of the word “Turk” for all the non-Persian peoples -of the East, they give the impression (due perhaps to the circumstances -of the time in which the chief histories were composed) that the -opponents of the Arabs in Transoxania were the historical Turks. The -truth is that until 720 the Arab invaders were resisted only by the -local princes with armies composed almost entirely of Iranians, except -perhaps on one or two special occasions when Turkish forces may have -intervened. The other error is in interpreting the conquests as primarily -wars for the Faith. Rebellion, for instance, is expressed in terms of -apostasy. It is now well established that this conception is exaggerated; -religious questions did not, in fact, enter until much later and even -then chiefly as expressions of political relationships. To the Iranian -peasantry, themselves steadfastly attached to the national cults, the -advent of another faith in this meeting-place of all the cultures and -religions of Asia at first carried little significance. Two factors in -particular combined to provoke a resistance so stubborn that it took the -Arabs a century merely to reduce the country to sullen submission. The -first of these was the proud national spirit of the Iranians which was -eventually to break down the supremacy of the Arabs and give birth to -the first Persian dynasties in Islām. The few wise governors of Khurāsān -found in this their strongest support, but, outraged again and again by -an arrogant and rapacious administration, the subject peoples became -embittered and sought all means of escape from its tyranny. The second -was the interest of the commercial relations on which the wealth and -prosperity of the country depended. This again might have disposed the -cities to accept a rule which promised not only stability, but a wide -extension of opportunity. The Arab governors, as we shall see, were -not indeed blind to this, but the exactions of the treasury, and still -more the greed of local officials, combined with the unsettlement of -constant invasion to create an attitude of distrust, which deepened later -into despair. It must not be forgotten that the commercial ties of the -Sogdians were much stronger with the East than with the West, and that -this too prompted them to cultivate relations with the Turks and Chinese -rather than with the Arabs when the necessity of making a choice was -forced upon them. - - -_The Arabic Sources._ - -The early Arabic sources are remarkably rich in material for the -reconstruction of the conquests in Khurāsān and Transoxania. For the -earlier period the narratives of Yaʿqūbī and Balādhurī are nearly as full -as those of _T_abarī, but the special value of the latter lies in his -method of compilation which renders the traditions amenable to critical -study and thus provides a control for all the others. Moreover, while -the other historians, regarding the conquests of Qutayba as definitely -completing the reduction of Transoxania, provide only meagre notices for -the later period, _T_abarī more than compensates for their silence by -the enormous wealth of detail embodied in the accounts he quotes from -Al-Madāʾinī and others of the last thirty years of Umayyad rule. As a -general rule, these three historians rely on different authorities, -though all use the earlier histories of Al-Madāʾinī and Abū ʿUbayda -to some extent. The monograph of Narshakhī (d. 959 A.D.) based on -both Arabic and local sources, with some resemblance to Balādhurī, is -unfortunately preserved only in a Persian version of two centuries -later which has obviously been edited, to what extent is unknown, but -which probably represents the original as unsatisfactorily as Balʿamī’s -Persian version of _T_abarī. Even so it preserves to us some account of -the peoples against whom the Arab invaders were matched, and thus does a -little to remedy the defects of the other historians in this respect. It -may well be doubted, however, whether some of its narratives merit the -reliance placed upon them by van Vloten[17]. The much later historian Ibn -al-Athīr introduces very little new material, but confines himself for -the most part to abridging and re-editing the narratives in _T_abarī, -with a tendency to follow the more exaggerated accounts. The geographer -Ibn Khūrdādhbih gives a list of titles and names, which is, however, too -confused to supply any reliable evidence. - -Reference has already been made to certain aspects of the conquests -in which the Arab historians are misleading. Their information on the -Turks and the principalities of Sogdiana can now, fortunately, be -supplemented and parts of their narratives controlled from Chinese -sources, chiefly through Chavannes’ valuable “Documents sur les Tou-Kiue -(Turcs) Occidentaux.” But there are two other facts which also demand -attention: one, that the Arabic authorities, as we possess them, and -even with all allowance made for their limitations, are by no means -exhaustive; _i.e._, reliance on omissions in the narratives is an unsafe -principle of criticism: the other, that by critical study it is possible -to distinguish at certain points several lines of tendentious tradition -or legend, directed to the interests of national feeling or of some -particular tribe or faction, and centred in some cases round specific -persons. These may most conveniently be summarised as follows: - - 1. A Qaysite tradition, centred on the family of Ibn Khāzim: - - 2. An Azd-Rabīʿa tradition, centred on Muhallab and hostile - to _H_ajjāj. This became the most popular tradition among the - Arabs, and is followed by Balādhurī, but opposed by Yaʿqūbī: - - 3. A Bāhilite tradition, centred on the tribal hero, Qutayba b. - Muslim. In general it found little favour but is occasionally - quoted somewhat sarcastically by _T_abarī. - - 4. A local Bukhārā tradition, followed by Yaʿqūbī, Balādhurī - and Narshakhī. It presents the early conquests under the form - of an historical romance, centred on the Queen Khātūn in the - part of a national Boadicea. Other local traditions, which are - frequently utilised by _T_abarī, seem to be much more free from - serious exaggeration: - - 5. The few notices in Dīnawarī follow an entirely divergent and - extremely garbled tradition from unknown sources, which may for - the most part be neglected: - - 6. The quotations made by Balādhurī (_e.g._ 422. 10) from Abū - ʿUbayda show the influence of a rewriting of episodes with an - anti-Arab bias, directed to the interests of the Shuʿūbīya - movement, in which Abū ʿUbayda was a prominent figure[18]. - - 7. In the later period, there appears also the fragments of a - tradition of which Nasr b. Sayyār is the hero. - -Some, if not all, of these traditions developed in some detail, and -where they are not balanced by other versions they present a distorted -narrative of events, verging in some cases on the fictitious. The most -noteworthy examples of this are the Khātūn legend (see below p. 18) and -the typical story of the exploits of Mūsā b. Khāzim in Transoxania in a -style not unworthy of Bedouin romance[19]. It is therefore most important -to disentangle these variant traditions and assign its proper value to -each. The Bāhilite accounts of Qutayba’s conquests, for instance, contain -wild exaggerations of fact, which, nevertheless, have sometimes been -utilised in all seriousness by modern historians, amongst other purposes -to establish synchronisms with the Turkish inscriptions[20]. - -With these precautions, it is possible to follow up and reconstruct, with -comparative certainty and completeness, that progress of the Arab arms -in Central Asia whose vicissitudes are outlined in the following pages. - - -NOTES - -(Full Titles in Bibliography) - -[1] Franke, Beiträge 41 ff., 67. Cordier, Chine I, 225. - -[2] If Marquart’s identification (Ērānshahr, 201 f.) is correct. - -[3] Cordier I. 229: Ērānshahr 50 ff. - -[4] Yuan Chwang I. 103. Prof. Barthold suggests that the connection -between the Ephthalites and the Huns may have been political only, not -racial. - -[5] Chavannes, Documents 155: Ērānshahr 89. - -[6] _T_ab. I. 2885. 13 and 2886. 3: Yaʿqūbī, History, II, 193: Yāqūt -(ed. Wüstenfeld) I. 492: Balādhurī 403: Ērānshahr 65 f., 77 f., and -150. Bādghīs was still a nomad pasture-ground in the XIVth century: Ibn -Ba_tt_ū_t_a, III, 67 f. - -[7] Yuan Chwang I. 105; II. 266; Chav. Doc. 161: Ērānshahr 250 ff. - -[8] Tomaschek, Soghdiana, 170. - -[9] See Marquart, Chronologie, 71: Shiratori in Keleti Szemle III (1902) -footnote to pp. 122-3. - -[10] _Cf._ Narshakhī 29. 4. On the Iranisation of nomadic elements, -Blochet, Introduction à l’Histoire des Mongols, (Leyden, 1910) p. 211 -note; Peisker, The Asiatic Background, pp. 353-6. - -[11] Chavannes, Notes 91, and _cf._ below p. 80. - -[12] _Cf._ Barthold, in Zeitschrift für Assyriologie XXVI (1911) p. 262. - -[13] Yuan Chwang I, 75 n. 2, 102 ff: II 270: Chav. Doc. 200 f. - -[14] _E.g._ _T_ab. II, 1448, 7-10: _cf._ Ērānshahr 228. - -[15] _Cf._ Yaʿqūbī, Geog. 287: _T_ab. II 1205. 12: Ērānshahr 66, 87 ff. - -[16] Chavannes, Doc. 201, Note 37. - -[17] Narshakhī’s unreliability is even more marked in his account of the -origins of the Sāmānid dynasty: _cf._ Barthold, Turkestan 215 n. 3. - -[18] See Goldziher, Muhammadanische Studien, I, 195 ff. - -[19] Prof. Barthold has drawn my attention to the fact that the story of -Mūsā also includes (twice over) an episode from the popular legend of -Zopyrus. See his article in Zapiski XVII (1906) 0141, and Wellhausen, -Arabische Reich, 257, 265. - -[20] _E.g._ Marquart, Chronologie, p. 8. - - - - -II. THE EARLY RAIDS - - -_The Conquest of Lower _T_ukhāristān._ - -Arab legend relates that the Muslim forces, pursuing Yazdigird from the -field of Nihāwand in 21/642, had already come in contact with the “Turks” -of _T_ukhāristān before the death of ʿOmar. But the final destruction -of the Sāsānid power and first imposition of Arab rule on Khurāsān only -followed ten years later, by the troops of ʿAbdullah ibn ʿĀmir, ʿOthmān’s -governor in Ba_s_ra. The Ephthalites of Herāt and Bādghīs submitted -without a blow, and the first serious check to their advance was met in -the Murghāb valley, when al-A_h_naf b. Qays with an army of 4,000 Arabs -and 1,000 Persians found himself opposed by the organised forces of -Lower _T_ukhāristān and was compelled to retire on Merv-Rūdh. A second -expedition under al-Aqraʿ b. _H_ābis, however, defeated a weaker force in -Jūzjān, and subsequently occupied Jūzjān, Fāryāb, _T_ālaqān, and Balkh. -Small divisions made plundering raids into the neighbouring territories, -_e.g._, to Siminjān (a town within the frontiers of _T_ukhāristān proper, -governed by a Turkish prince, the Ruʿb Khān), and to Khwārizm, not always -with success; on the other hand, a successful raid was made on Māyamurgh -in Sogdiana in 33/654, which is mentioned by Abū ʿUbayda alone of the -Arabic authorities[21]. A general insurrection which broke out shortly -afterwards, headed by a certain Qārin, apparently a member of the noble -Persian family bearing that name, seems to have been instrumental in -causing the Arabs to evacuate Khurāsān for a time[22], though several -raids are recorded of ʿAlī’s governors between 35 and 38 A.H. These -earliest “conquests,” in fact, were little more than plundering raids on -a large scale, the effect of that movement of expansion whose momentum -was carrying forward the Arabs irresistibly. According to the Chinese -records, which, however, require to be used with caution at this -point, the retreat of the Arabs in 655 was followed up by the army of -_T_ukhāristān who reinstated Pērōz, the son of Yazdigird, as titular king -of Persia[23]. - -When peace was restored to Islām by the recognition of Muʿāwiya in -41/661, Ibn ʿĀmir was again entrusted with the conquest of Khurāsān. The -same rough and ready methods were adopted as before; there appears to -have been no definite plan of invasion, and even the order of governors -is uncertain. Not only are traditions relating to A.H. 32 and 42 confused -by the different authorities, but a vast amount of the whole is affected -by tribal legends. Hints of fierce resistance are given from time to -time. Qays b. al-Haytham, the governor’s first legate, was faced with a -fresh revolt in Bādghīs, Herāt, and Balkh. He recaptured the latter and -in retaliation destroyed the famous shrine of Nawbahār, but left the -Ephthalites to be dealt with by his successor, ʿAbdullah ibn Khāzim. -It is clear that there was no ordered progress of the Arab arms until -Khurāsān was brought under the administration of Ziyād b. Abīhi. After -an experimental division of the province under tribal leaders, a policy -obviously dangerous and quickly abandoned, Ziyād, realising the danger of -allowing Persian nationalism a free hand in the East, backed up by the -resources of _T_ukhāristān, centralised the administration at Merv, and -organised a preventive campaign. In 47/667 his lieutenant, al-_H_akam b. -ʿAmr al-Ghifārī, opened a series of campaigns directed to the conquest of -Lower _T_ukhāristān and Gharjistān, in the course of which he crossed the -Oxus and carried his arms into Chaghāniān, and drove Pērōz back to China -in discomfiture. On his death, three years later, the conquered provinces -rose in revolt, but the new governor, Rabīʿ b. Ziyād al-_H_ārithī, the -first conqueror of Sijistān, after reducing Balkh, pursued the Ephthalite -army into Quhistān and dispersed it with great slaughter. Again an -expedition was sent across the Oxus into Chaghāniān (clearly indicating -the connection between Chaghāniān and Lower _T_ukhāristān), while another -directed down the left bank of the river secured Zamm and Āmul, the two -chief ferry points for Sogdiana. Mention is also made of a conquest of -Khwārizm. All these expeditions seem to point to a methodical plan of -conquest, arranged between Ziyād and his governors; the Arab power was -thus firmly established, for the moment at least, in the Cisoxanian -lands, and the way prepared for the invasion of Sogdiana. A further -important step was the colonisation of Khurāsān by fifty thousand -families from Ba_s_ra and Kūfa[24], settled according to Arab practice -in five garrison towns, for the double purpose of securing the conquests -already made, and providing the forces for their further extension. - - -_The First Invasion of Bukhārā and _S_ughd._ - -Although at this junction Ziyād himself died, his policy was carried on -by his sons, in particular by ʿUbaydullah. Scarcely any governor, not -even _H_ajjāj, has suffered so much at the hands of the traditionists -as the “Murderer of _H_usayn,” though his ability and devotion to the -Umayyads are beyond question. It is not surprising therefore that his -earlier military successes should be so briefly related, in spite of -their importance. Yet as he was no more than 25 years of age when -appointed by Muʿāwiya to the province of Khurāsān on probation, and only -two years later was selected to fill his father’s position in ʿIrāq, his -administration must have been markedly successful. The policy of Ziyād -had now firmly secured Khurāsān and made it feasible to use it as a base -for the extension of the conquests into the rich lands across the river. -On his arrival at Merv, therefore, in the autumn of 53/673, the new -governor began preparations for an invasion of Bukhārā. - -The Shao-wu principality of Bukhārā was at this time second in importance -only to Samarqand. It included not only the greater part of the oasis -(“al-Bukhārīya”) then much more thickly populated than now, but also -the great emporium of Paykand, which controlled the trade route across -the Oxus at Āmul. Of its early history we have two accounts, both -confused, inaccurate in detail, and often conflicting. From these it -may be gathered that the prince, who held the high Turkish title of -Shād[25], resided at Paykand, the citadel of Bukhārā being either founded -or restored by the Bukhār Khudāh Bidūn, probably in consequence of the -Arab invasions. This prince at his death left a son only a few months -old on whose behalf the regency was exercised by the Queen-Mother. This -princess, known under the title of Khātūn (a Turkish form of the Sogdian -word for “lady”) became the central figure in the local traditions, -which represent the Arab invasions as occurring precisely during the -period of her regency. This version is the one accepted by Balādhurī, -Yaʿqūbī, and Narshakhī, but though not altogether devoid of historical -value, it is certainly misplaced, and the true account of the early -conquests must, for cogent reasons, be sought in the brief and widely -divergent narratives of _T_abarī. In the first place the Khātūn-legend, -like all such legends, has grown by natural elaboration of detail, -as in the account given by Narshakhī of Khātūn’s administration of -justice and by continual accretions from other streams of tradition, as -seen, on comparing the narratives of Balādhurī and Narshakhī, in the -introduction of episodes of Ibn Khāzim and Muhallab. Critical examination -also reveals alternative traditions and chronological inconsistencies, -as, for example, the birth of _T_ughshāda after the invasion of Saʿīd -b. ʿOthmān, Khātūn’s reign of 15 years, and others mentioned below. -There is clear evidence of the late compilation of the tradition in the -frequent references to “_T_arkhūn, King of _S_ughd,” though his reign -did not begin until considerably after 696[26]. It may be noticed that -in the variant account of the conquests prefixed to the Persian edition -of Narshakhī and ascribed to An-Naysābūrī there is no reference at all -to Khātūn. Moreover there are indications that _T_abarī was aware of the -local tradition and completely rejected it; this, at least, would account -for the unusual practice of specifying Qabaj-Khātūn as “the wife of the -king” in 54 A.H. Even Balādhurī rejects the more fantastic developments -of the legend. _T_abarī’s narratives, however, require to be collated -with the additional material in Balādhurī, who has not relied entirely -on the local tradition. The germ of the native version is probably to be -found in a confusion of the Arab conquests with the later war between -Bukhārā and Wardāna[27], whose echoes are heard in Qutayba’s invasions -thirty years after. - -In the spring of 54/674 ʿUbaydullah b. Ziyād crossed the river and -marched directly on Paykand. After a partial success, he led his forces -forward towards Bukhārā and severely defeated the army of the Bukhār -Khudāh. From _T_abarī’s narrative, which relates only that two thousand -men of Bukhārā, skilful archers, were taken by ʿUbaydullah to Ba_s_ra, -where they formed his personal guard, it is left to be inferred that a -treaty was concluded under which the Bukhār Khudāh became tributary. The -local tradition magnifies the expedition by adding a siege of Bukhārā -(during the winter) and bringing in an army of Turks to assist Khātūn, -but confirms the success of the Arabs. ʿUbaydullah’s practice on this -occasion of forming a bodyguard or retinue of captives appears to have -been a common one. ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān ibn Samura had previously brought -captives from Sijistān to Ba_s_ra, where they built him a mosque, and -later governors of Khurāsān continued the practice, as will be seen. In -this may be recognised perhaps the germ of the Turkish guards recruited -by the later ʿAbbāsid Caliphs. - -ʿUbaydullah’s successor, Aslam b. Zurʿa, remained inactive, but in -56/676 Saʿīd b. ʿOthmān, who had obtained the governorship of Khurāsān -by importuning Muʿāwiya, carried the Arab arms more deeply into -Transoxania, defeated the _S_ughdians in the open field and reduced -their city. Taking fifty young nobles as hostages, he retired from -_S_ughd and subsequently occupied Tirmidh, an important fortress on the -Oxus controlling the main North and South trade route, having presumably -marched through the Iron Gate. The conquest of _S_ughd was thus -definitely co-ordinated with that of Chaghāniān. _T_abarī’s narrative is -strangely vague and abrupt; it contains no mention of Bukhārā nor any -definite reference to Samarqand, except for the statement that it was the -objective of Saʿīd’s expedition. Using this narrative alone, one would be -inclined to suspect that the city captured by Saʿīd was not Samarqand but -Kish (since it has been established by Marquart that Kish was formerly -called _S_ughd), and that the reference to Samarqand was due to a later -misunderstanding of the name[28]. On the other hand, both the local -tradition and Abū ʿUbayda speak of a siege of Samarqand by Saʿīd, though -their narratives are far from being in agreement in detail, and there -are other indications of confusion between Saʿīd and Salm b. Ziyād. All -accounts except Narshakhī’s, however, agree that the hostages who were -carried by Saʿīd to Madīna and there murdered him were _S_ughdians[29]. -Balādhurī’s tradition of Saʿīd’s expedition is as follows. On his -crossing the river, Khātūn at first renewed her allegiance, only to -withdraw it again on the approach of an army of Turks, _S_ughdians, -and men of Kish and Nasaf, 120,000 strong. Saʿīd, however, completely -defeated the enemy and after a triumphal entry into Bukhārā, marched on -Samarqand, his forces swelled by Khātūn’s army, besieged it for three -days and made it tributary. On his return he captured Tirmidh and while -there received the tribute due from Khātūn and the allegiance of Khuttal. -Narshakhī’s account is the same in essentials, adding only a number of -imaginative details. - -Saʿīd was unable to retain his position in Khurāsān, and for five -years the conquests were stayed (except for summer raids) under the -indolent Aslam b. Zurʿa and the avaricious ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān b. Ziyād. -In 61/680-681 Yazīd I appointed Salm, another son of Ziyād, to Khurāsān -and Sijistān. Eager to emulate his brother, Salm, even before leaving -Ba_s_ra, announced his intention of renewing the expeditions into -Transoxania and enlisted a picked force on the spot, including such -tried leaders as Muhallab b. Abī _S_ufra and ʿAbdullah b. Khāzim. From -a poem preserved in the _H_amāsa of Abū Tammām[30] it would appear -that somewhat unwilling levies for this expedition were raised even in -Mesopotamia. Towards the close of the winter a surprise attack was made -on Khwārizm, with some success. _T_abarī gives two versions of this -expedition, the first of which is a highly embroidered one from the -Muhallabite tradition. During the same year, Salm marched into _S_ughd -and occupied Samarqand, where he appears to have made his headquarters -over the winter. Balādhurī mentions a subsidiary raid on Khujanda under -Aʿshā Hamdān, in which, however, the Muslims were defeated, and a -_S_ughdian revolt which was crushed with the loss of its leader, here -called Bandūn. The name is almost certainly to be read as that of the -Bukhār-Khudāh, Bīdūn[31], and in view of the silence of _T_abarī raises -rather a difficult problem. It may be conjectured that what Balādhurī -intended was a revolt of the Bukhariots, combined with _S_ughdian forces. -The origin of this statement may perhaps be sought for in the Bukhārā -tradition, which Balādhurī does not follow in his general account of the -expeditions of Salm, but which he may have tried to work in with the -other. On the other hand he nowhere refers to Bīdūn as the Bukhār Khudāh. -As related by Narshakhī and Yaʿqūbī Salm’s expedition is directed solely -against Bukhārā. Khātūn, on promising her hand to _T_arkhūn, receives a -reinforcement of 120,000 men from _S_ughd, and Bīdūn (here still alive) -recruits an army in “Turkistān,” including the “Prince of Khotan.” After -severe fighting, the Muslim forces, numbering 6,000, kill Bīdūn and rout -the unbelievers, taking so much booty that the share of each horseman -amounts to 2,400 dirhems. Khātūn, thoroughly humbled by this decisive -proof of Arab invincibility, sues for peace and pays a heavy tribute. -Beyond the fantastic exaggerations and incoherencies of the legend, there -is nothing inherently improbable in a Bukhariot revolt. In support of -this view, it may be remarked that the death of Bīdūn at this point would -agree with the slender data we have for the internal wars which probably -formed the original basis of the Khātūn-legend, and would also provide -a foothold for the later developments of the tradition. Without fuller -evidence, however, we can get no further than reasonable conjecture. - -After the conquests made by Salm, which probably occupied the years 682 -and 683, it seemed as though the Arabs were on the verge of imposing -their rule on Transoxania when civil war broke out in the heart of the -Empire. Even allowing for the fact that these expeditions were little -more than raids, the comparative ease with which the Arabs held to ransom -the richest cities in the country is astonishing. The explanation can -lie only in their mutual exclusiveness. There is not a hint of united -action in the field in _T_abarī’s accounts[32]. A factor which may have -exercised some influence was that Sogdiana was completely isolated during -these years and unable to look for support from without. The power of -the Western Turks was broken by the Chinese armies between 645 and 658; -Chinese forces are said to have reached as far west as Kish, and the -Emperor Kao-Tsung had officially annexed all the territories formerly -included in the Turkish dominions. In the latter year the provinces of -Sogdiana and the Jaxartes were organized in sixteen districts, including -a “Government of Persia” under the Pērōz already mentioned, situated -apparently in Sijistān, possibly even in Eastern Khurāsān[33]. The -immediate practical effect of this change of status was of little moment, -but her nominal annexation gave China a prestige which was destined to -exercise immense influence in determining the attitude of the peoples -of Sogdiana to the Arabs. From 670 to 692, however, the new power of -Tibet held the Chinese armies in check in the Tarim basin and cut off -all possibility of Chinese intervention in the West. The Sogdian princes -were thus thrown on their own resources, and, ignorant as yet of the -danger behind the Arab raids, they seem to have bowed to the storm. It -must not be forgotten that the cities had never before met such an enemy -as the Arabs. They had been accustomed to plundering raids by Turks, who -disappeared as quickly as they came, and who, disliking to undertake -a lengthy siege, were easily appeased by a ransom. Familiar with such -nominal annexations, they would naturally adopt the same tactics against -the new invaders. Had the Arabs maintained their pressure, there was thus -every prospect that Transoxania would have been colonised with a tithe of -the expense and loss incurred in its reconquest and would have become as -integral a part of the Muslim dominions as Khurāsān. But the opportunity -was lost in the fratricidal struggles of the factions, and when the Arabs -recommenced their encroachments, the determined resistance offered to -their advance showed that the lessons of the first invasion had not been -lost on the native princes. - - -_The Withdrawal of the Arabs._ - -The tribal feuds which occupied the Arabs of Khurāsān left the princes of -Transoxania free to regain their independence. It would seem even that -Lower _T_ukhāristān was not only in part lost to the Arabs but that local -forces took the offensive and raided Khurāsān. On the gradual restoration -of order under Umayya, however, Lower _T_ukhāristān again recognised, -at least in name, the Arab suzerainty[34]. Meanwhile, a strange episode -had occurred in Chaghāniān. Mūsā, the son of ʿAbdullah ibn Khāzim, sent -by his father to secure a safe place of retreat, had captured the strong -fortress of Tirmidh, from which he continually raided the neighbouring -districts. His exploits were worked up in popular story into an epic -of adventure, in which legend has almost overlaid historical fact. The -most fantastic exaggerations were devised in order to provide a suitable -background for the incredible deeds of valour indulged in by the hero. -But in truth his actual exploits were sufficiently amazing, and all -the efforts of the forces of the local rulers (magnified in the legend -to huge armies of “Turks and Hay_t_al and Tibetans”), although aided -on one occasion by a force of Khuzāʿites, were unable to dislodge him. -For fifteen years he remained in secure possession of his stronghold, a -refuge for the disaffected from all sides, and a standing example of the -helplessness of the rulers across the river. - -In 77/696 Umayya re-opened the campaigns into Transoxania. An expedition -to Khwārizm was successful[35], another across the Oxus narrowly escaped -destruction. Balādhurī mentions, with doubtful accuracy, a successful -raid on Khuttal, which may, however, only be a variant on this. An -expedition directed against Bukhārā, which is said to have had Tirmidh -as a second objective, was hurriedly abandoned on the fresh outbreak of -revolt under Bukayr b. Wishā_h_ in Khurāsān. Though the revolt failed -in its immediate object, a most serious situation had been created. -Bukayr had endeavoured to rally the Persians to his side by promising -all converts remission of Kharāj. The opportunity was undoubtedly seized -by large numbers, and the pacification occasioned some negotiations -between Umayya and Thābit b. Qu_t_ba, an influential noble who acted as -spokesman for the mawālī of Eastern Khurāsān. Umayya’s reimposition of -Kharāj, however, caused widespread unrest[36] and made prompt action -necessary. ʿAbdul-Malik at once recalled his hapless kinsman (in 78) and -made Khurāsān a dependency of ʿIrāq under the government of _H_ajjāj. -This far-sighted governor had already dealt with a desperate situation -of the same sort in ʿIrāq and reduced it to outward tranquillity. The -same extreme measures that had been adopted there were not necessary in -Khurāsān; its troubles were due less to insurgent mawālī than to the -factions of Qays. _H_ajjāj was himself a strong Qaysite, but he was -not the man to put party before the interests of the State. The first -necessity was to appoint a governor who could be trusted to repress both -forms of anarchy and in Muhallab such a man was available. His tribe of -Azd was not yet strong enough in Khurāsān to cause the risk of opening a -new channel for factional strife, and his military reputation fitted him -for carrying out _H_ajjāj’s policy of active campaigning as an antidote -to internal dissension. It is possible that _H_ajjāj had in mind from the -first a definite conquest of Transoxania, but for a few years nothing -more than sporadic raids took place. - -Muhallab’s first care, however, was to encourage the settlement of Azd -in Khurāsān, until he was supported by a division equal in size to any -other. After securing the crossing at Zamm in 80/699 he marched into the -district of Kish and there established his headquarters for two years, -besieging the city and sending out minor expeditions under his sons -in various directions[37]. Yazīd was sent with a force into Khuttal, -nominally to co-operate with a pretender to the throne, but met with -little success; _H_abīb, sent against Rabinjān, found himself countered -by the forces of Bukhārā. Balādhurī’s account of Muhallab’s campaigns is -ludicrously exaggerated; _T_abarī quotes Muhallab himself as discouraging -any attempts at effecting a conquest. On the death of his son al-Mughīra -in Rajab 82, he came to terms with Kish and abandoned his expeditions, -but died in the following Dhuʾl-_H_ijja (Jan. 702) near Merv Rūdh, and -was succeeded by his son Yazīd. - -The Muhallabite tradition which represents the appointment as distasteful -to _H_ajjāj but popular in Khurāsān is almost certainly influenced -by the later hostility between Yazīd and _H_ajjāj. It is probable, -however, that _H_ajjāj, whose policy was to keep his governors dependent -on himself, viewed with suspicion the concentration of authority in -the hands of the leader of a powerful hostile clan, but he was content -to wait for the meantime and give Yazīd sufficient rope to hang -himself. Except for an attempted raid on Khwārizm Yazīd carried out no -expeditions, while under his government the precarious internal balance -of Khurāsān was soon upset. The quarrels of Qays had been composed by -Muhallab, but they were in no mood to bear with the leadership of the -parvenu Azd; already before the death of Muhallab, in spite of the -Tamīmite eulogy quoted by _T_abarī, there was a moment when the feud -threatened to break out. The pronounced factional leanings of Yazīd -strained the situation still further. Even more serious was the attitude -of the mawālī. _H_urayth, the brother of Thābit ibn Qu_t_ba, had been -left behind at Kish by Muhallab to collect the tribute, but on his return -was scourged for disobedience. The disgrace cut _H_urayth deeply; too -late Muhallab realised the gravity of his act, but _H_urayth spurned his -overtures and with Thābit fled to Mūsā at Tirmidh. Yazīd retaliated with -foolish severity by maltreating their families, which only inflamed the -general resentment. _H_urayth and Thābit used their influence to stir -up an insurrection to act in concert with Mūsā; the king of Chaghāniān -and his Ephthalite confederates headed by Nēzak, prince of Bādghīs, -readily responded, while Persian interest was excited by the return to -_T_ukhāristān of the son of Pērōz, the heir of the Sāsānids. It seems -probable that even some of Qays were a party to the scheme[38]. Seizing -an opportunity when Yazīd was occupied with the rebel forces of Ibn -al-Ashath on the borders of Khurāsān the revolt broke out. Yazīd was -powerless to prevent the expulsion of his residents from Chaghāniān and -Lower _T_ukhāristān, and Mūsā is said to have refrained from invading -Khurāsān only from fear that it would fall into the hands of Thābit and -_H_urayth. Even the success claimed for Yazīd in Bādghīs can have been -of little effect[39]. Fortunately for the Arabs, Mūsā’s jealousy of -Thābit and _H_urayth caused a division in the ranks of their enemies, but -though the brothers both fell in battle, the danger remained acute. The -son of Pērōz still lingered in _T_ukhāristān, and even at Damascus there -was some uneasiness about the situation in Khurāsān[40]. - -To _H_ajjāj it was obvious that the first essential was to reunite -the Arabs and that so long as Yazīd was in power that was impossible. -The only difficulty was to find a governor acceptable to Qays and to -substitute him without risking a revolt of Azd. It was solved with -admirable ingenuity. By ordering Yazīd to transfer his authority to -his weaker brother Mufa_dd_al, _H_ajjāj at one stroke removed the man -from whom he had most to fear and prevented him from uniting Azd in -opposition, although Yazīd realised that the fall of his house was -imminent. At the same time the Caliph’s permission was sought for the -nomination of Qutayba ibn Muslim as governor of Khurāsān. Belonging to -the neutral tribe of Bāhila, Qutayba was reckoned as allied to Qays, -but might be trusted to hold the scales evenly between the factions; he -had already distinguished himself in ʿIrāq and in his governorship of -Rayy, and was the more devoted to _H_ajjāj in that he was protected by -no strong party of his own. The accepted belief that _H_ajjāj took no -steps to remove the family of Muhallab until Mūsā was put out of the way -is based on a remark attributed to Muhallab in the Mūsā-legend, which is -frequently contradicted elsewhere both expressly and by implication. - -Mufa_dd_al, during his nine months of office in 85/704, seems to have -endeavoured to impress _H_ajjāj by a show of military activity against -the rebels in Bādghīs. At the same time, acting in concert with the local -princes (magnified in the legend to “_T_arkhūn and as-Sabal”), he sent -an expedition to Tirmidh under ʿOthmān b. Ma_s_ʿūd. Mūsā was cut off and -killed in a sortie and his nephew Sulaymān surrendered at discretion, -_H_ajjāj’s first exclamation on hearing the news is said to have been -one of anger at the insult to Qays, but the last hindrance to the -appointment of the new governor was now removed and towards the close of -the year Qutayba b. Muslim arrived in Merv. - - -NOTES - -[21] Bal. 408. 5: Chav., Doc. 172, n. 1. There were two localities called -Māyamurgh in _S_ughd: one near Samarqand (I_st_akhrī 321. 6), and the -other one day’s march from Nasaf on the Bukhārā road (ibid. 337. 7). -According to the Chinese records the former is the one in question here. - -[22] Yāqūt, ed. Wüstenfeld, II. 411. 21: _cf._ Caetani, “Annali” VIII. 4 -ff. On Qārin, Nöldeke, Sasaniden 127, 437: Marquart, Ērānshahr 134. - -[23] Chav., Doc. 172. - -[24] _Cf._ Lammens, “Ziād b. Abīhi” (R.S.O. 1912) p. 664. - -[25] _Cf._ with _T_ughshāda the name of the reigning prince in 658, -Chav., Doc. 137. - -[26] Chav., Doc. 136. - -[27] Narshakhī 8 and 30. - -[28] Chronologie 57: Ērānshahr 303 f. This view is supported also by the -letter from the king of Samarqand to the Emperor of China in 718 (see p. -60), which puts the first Arab conquest some 35 years before, _i.e._ in -682 or 683. - -[29] Accounts also in Kitāb al-Aghānī I. 18: Ibn Qutayba 101. - -[30] _H_amāsa, ed. Freytag, I. 363-4. - -[31] _Cf._ Barthold, “Turkestan” 103 n. 1. - -[32] The account given in _T_ab. II. 394 of the annual meeting of the -“Kings of Khurāsān” near Khwārizm for mutual counsel not only possesses -little intrinsic probability, but is obviously intended to magnify the -exploits of Muhallab. In this case, fortunately, the authorities quoted -by _T_ab. leave no doubt as to the Azdite origin of the narrative. -Madāʾinī’s version is given _ib._ ll. 19 sq. - -[33] Wieger, Textes Historiques, 1608 f: Chav., Doc. 273 ff: Marquart, -Ēran. 68. - -[34] _T_ab. II. 490, 860 ff.: Bal. 414 f.: I. Athīr, IV. 66: Anon. (ed. -Ahlwardt), 195. - -[35] Abū ʿUbayda ap. Bal. 426. 10: _cf._ Lestrange, “Lands of the Eastern -Caliphate” p. 448, note. - -[36] _T_ab. 1031: _cf._ Anon. 310 f. - -[37] _T_ab. 1040 f., 1078. 5: Yaʿqūbī, Hist. II. 330. - -[38] _Cf._ _T_ab. 1152 with 1185. 5. For the son of Pērōz, Chav., Doc. -172. - -[39] _Cf._ _T_ab. 1129 with 1144 and 1184. - -[40] Anon. 337. - - - - -III. THE CONQUESTS OF QUTAYBA - - -The achievements of the Muslim armies in Central Asia during the reign of -Walīd I were due in the first place to the complete co-operation between -the directive genius of _H_ajjāj and the military capacity of Qutayba. -Qutayba’s strategic abilities have been somewhat overrated, though the -Arabic texts are at no pains to conceal the fact that his gifts fell -something short of genius. On more than one occasion we are shown in what -constant touch the viceroy was kept with the progress of his armies, -and how large a part he took in drawing up the plan of campaign, though -the credit of carrying it through to a successful issue rightly belongs -to Qutayba. _H_ajjāj seems to have had the fullest confidence in his -lieutenant, and if he did not hesitate to utter reproof and warning -when occasion required, he was equally quick to express appreciation of -Qutayba’s success. The Arabs of all parties soon realised that behind -their general lay the authority of _H_ajjāj, the wholesome respect -inspired by whom prevented any open breach during his lifetime. The -second factor which materially assisted the conquests was that in their -prosecution Qutayba united all parties in Khurāsān, Persians and Arabs, -Qays and Yemen. It was no small matter to keep their enthusiasm unabated -in the face of campaigns so protracted and severe, nor can the enthusiasm -be explained only by the attraction of a rich booty. It is by no means -improbable that Qutayba’s success was really due more to his talent for -administration than to his generalship. He seems to have realised, as no -other Arab governor in the east had yet done, that in such a province -as Khurāsān the safety and security of the Arab government must depend -in the long run on the co-operation of the Persian populace, who formed -so great a majority in the country. The bitterness of factional strife -had shown how unsafe it was to rely on the support of the Arabs alone, -especially in the face of such a movement as Yazīd had provoked. By his -conciliatory attitude, therefore, Qutayba earned the confidence of the -Persians and repaid it with confidence; from his constant employment -of Persian agents and his growing preference for Persian governors, it -would seem even that he came to regard them as forming the “ʿAshīra” -he lacked among the Arabs. Although it earned him the ill-will of the -Arabs and played a great part in his fall, it may be that in this he was -instrumental in giving the first impulse to the recovery of a national -sentiment amongst the Persians of Khurāsān. - -The situation in Central Asia was also favourable for a renewal of the -attempt to annex to the Arab dominions the rich lands of Transoxania, -though it is doubtful how much information the Arabs possessed on this -point. In 682, while China, weakened internally by the intrigues of the -Empress Wu, had her hands tied by the wars with Tibet, the Eastern or -Northern Turks had re-asserted their independence. The new Empire never -regained its authority over all the western territories of the former -Khans, but by constant campaigns had extended its rule over the Ten -Tribes of the Ili and Chu, who, we are told, were “almost annihilated.” -In 701 the Eastern Turks invaded Sogdiana, but there is no reason to -assume, though it has frequently been suggested, that Muhallab’s forces -at Kish were affected by this raid. As the necessity of securing hostages -for the safety even of the lines of communication shows, the hostility of -the local forces is sufficient to explain all the encounters narrated. -The devastation and loss that invariably accompanied these raids must -have still further weakened the resources of the subject princes, to -whom there was small consolation in the appointment of a son of the Khan -to command the Ten Tribes. In any case the unceasing warfare which the -Eastern Turks had to wage against the Türgesh from 699 to 711 effectually -prevented them from sending assistance in response to any appeals for -support which may have reached them from Sogdiana[41]. Equally if not -more impossible was it for the Türgesh to intervene in Sogdiana during -the same period[42]. By the “Turks,” as we have seen, the Arab historians -mean as a general rule the local inhabitants, amongst whom there may -quite possibly have been included at that time Turkish elements. -Occasional references to the Khāqān (unless they may be taken to refer -to local chiefs, which is improbable) are obvious _fakhr_-developments. -The narrative of 98 A.H. on which the theory of Türgesh intervention is -mainly based, is a pure Bāhilite invention. Finally, the experience of -the Arabs in later years shows us that, if the resistance of Sogdiana had -been backed by large forces of Turks, it would have been impossible for -Qutayba to achieve so large a measure of success. - -The conquests of Qutayba fall naturally into four periods: - - 1. 86/705: The recovery of Lower _T_ukhāristān; - - 2. From 87/706 to 90/709: The conquest of Bukhārā; - - 3. From 91/710 to 93/712: Consolidation of the Arab authority - in the Oxus valley and its extension into _S_ughd; - - 4. From 94/713 to 96/715: Expeditions into the Jaxartes - provinces. - - -_The recovery of Lower _T_ukhāristān._ - -The first task before Qutayba was to crush the revolt of Lower -_T_ukhāristān. In the spring of 86/705 the army was assembled and marched -through Merv Rūdh and _T_ālaqān on Balkh. According to one of _T_abarī’s -narratives the city was surrendered without a blow. A second account, -which, though not explicitly given as Bāhilite, may be regarded as such, -since it centres on Qutayba’s brother and is intended to establish a -Bāhilite claim on the Barmakids, speaks of a revolt amongst some of the -inhabitants. This may perhaps be the more correct version, since we hear -of Balkh being in a ruinous condition four years later (_T_ab. 1206. 1). -The submission of Balkh was followed by that of Tīsh, king of Chaghāniān, -who had probably cooperated with Mufa_dd_al in the attack on Tirmidh the -year before. His action was, it seems, inspired by a feud with the king -of Shūmān and Ākharūn, in the upper valleys of the Surkhan and Penjab -rivers, against whom he hoped to use the Arab troops in return for his -assistance to them. Mufa_dd_al had actually projected an expedition -against Shūmān before his recall, and it was now carried out by Qutayba, -who was perhaps the more ready to undertake it since it assured the -safety of the southern approach to the Iron Gate. After the submission -of the King Ghīslashtān, who was of Turkish blood, according to Yuan -Chwang, Qutayba returned to Merv alone, leaving the army to follow under -his brother Sāli_h_, who carried out a number of minor raids on the way. -It is obvious that, in spite of Balādhurī’s imaginative account, these -raids must be located in the districts neighbouring on the Oxus. The -readings in _T_abarī’s narrative are, however, defective[43]. Having thus -isolated Nēzak in Bādghīs, the heart of the revolt, Qutayba spent the -winter months in negotiating with him through Sulaym “the Counsellor,” -an influential Persian whose skill in conducting the most difficult -negotiations proved more than once of the utmost value to Qutayba. Nēzak -was persuaded to surrender and was conducted to Merv, where peace was -concluded on condition that Qutayba would not enter Bādghīs in person. As -a precautionary measure however the governor arranged that Nēzak should -accompany him in all his expeditions. Thus for the moment at least, the -danger of an outbreak in Khurāsān was averted, in a manner honourable to -both parties, and the son of Pērōz took his way back to China to await a -more favourable opportunity[44]. - - -_The Conquest of Bukhārā._ - -In the following year, Qutayba, first making sure of the crossings at -Āmul and Zamm, opened his campaigns in Bukhārā with an attack on Paykand. -From the expressions of Narshakhī, on whose history of this period we -may place more reliance since his details as a rule fit in with and -supplement the other histories, it can be gathered that the principality -of Bukhārā was weakened by civil war and invasion. During the minority of -_T_ughshāda and the regency of Khātūn, the ambitious nobles had struggled -between themselves for the chief power; most of the territories, -including Bukhārā itself, had been seized by the prince of Wardāna -and the remaining districts seem to have been brought under the rule -of Khunuk Khudāh, a noble who assumed the title of Bukhār Khudāh[45]. -Paykand was thus more or less isolated and, from Narshakhī’s account, -seems to have been left to its fate. The battle with the _S_ughdians -related in _T_abarī is an obvious anticipation from the events of the -following year. After a siege of some two months the city came to terms -with Qutayba, who left it under a small garrison and, according to -_T_abarī’s version, began the return march to Merv. An émeute in Paykand, -however, brought him back at once. It seems reasonable to assume that -the citizens, imagining Qutayba’s attack to have been no more than an -isolated raid, tried to expel the garrison as soon as he retired. The -details given in Narshakhī, that on Qutayba’s advance towards Bukhārā a -certain citizen, enraged by the insulting conduct of the governor, Warqāʾ -b. Nasr al-Bāhili, attempted to murder him, are trivial and unconvincing. -Whatever the cause of the revolt may have been, however, Qutayba took a -terrible revenge. In accordance with mediaeval practice the renegade city -was sacked, its fighting men put to death, and its women and children -enslaved. The booty taken from this, the first of the great trading -cities of Central Asia to be forcibly captured by the Arabs, furnished -inexhaustible material for the exaggerated details of later tradition. -The most important part of the spoil was an arsenal of weapons and -armour, the excellence of which was such that the “forging of _S_ughd” -appears in contemporary verse alongside the traditional “forging of -David” for superlative craftsmanship[46]. With the consent of _H_ajjāj, -these weapons were not included in the division of the booty but used -to re-equip the army. The statement that there were only 350 suits of -armour in the whole army before this is, however, of Bāhilite provenance -and scarcely worthy of credence. The exemplary punishment thus meted -out by Qutayba to Paykand at the beginning of his career was a stern -warning to Nēzak and the Sogdians. Those who accepted Arab dominion would -be humanely treated, but any attempt at rebellion would be inexorably -crushed. Nevertheless the sentence on Paykand was somewhat mitigated in -the sequel, as Narshakhī adds that the captives were ransomed by the -merchants of Paykand on their return from the annual trading expedition -to China, and the city, after lying in ruins for many years, was -eventually rebuilt. - -The disaster at Paykand roused the princes and merchants of Transoxania -to the danger of neglecting the invaders. The feud between Wardāna and -Bukhārā was patched up; round Wardān Khudāh, the central figure and -organiser of the struggle for independence, gathered the forces of all -the nearer principalities. Thus when Qutayba, on renewing his expedition -in 88/707, had taken the outlying town of Tūmushkath (not Nūmushkath, -which was the earlier name of Bukhārā) and Rāmīthana (or Rāmtīn), he -found his communications cut by the troops of Wardāna, Bukhārā, and -_S_ughd. It is not, perhaps, impossible that the prince of Farghāna -should have cooperated with the _S_ughdians, as stated in Madāʾinī’s -account. On the other hand the Arabic narratives are far from explicit, -and the _S_ughdians here referred to are much more probably those of -Kish than of Samarqand, a suspicion which is confirmed by the famous -punning order of _H_ajjāj: “Crush Kish, destroy Nasaf, and drive Wardān -back.” Narshakhī and Yaʿqūbī give an account of the negotiations between -_H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, representing Qutayba, and _T_arkhūn king of -_S_ughd, which is certainly to be put, with _T_abarī, after the conquest -of Bukhārā two years later. Throughout all these campaigns there is -manifest a tendency, common to the early chronicles of all nations, -to exaggerate the numbers and composition of the opposing forces. As -usual the Bāhilite account carries this to the point of absurdity by -introducing a Türgesh force of no less than 200,000 men, an obvious -anachronism, influenced by the later Türgesh invasions. The connection -is made clear by the mention of Kūr Maghānūn, whom we find nearly thirty -years later (_T_ab. II. 1602. 2) as “one of the chiefs of the Türgesh.” -The true account would seem to be that Qutayba did not attempt to fight -a pitched battle, but by dilatory tactics wearied out the allies and -gave time for their natural inclination towards disunion to operate, -then evaded them by a rapid march through the Iron Gate and, except for -a rearguard skirmish with the enemy’s cavalry, got his army clear across -the river at Tirmidh. The appointment of ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān ibn Muslim -to command the rearguard gives us the clue, as it was to this brother -that Qutayba regularly entrusted all the most difficult commands. In -the following year Qutayba was still unable to make headway against the -united forces of Wardān Khudāh, Kish and Nasaf, and after protracted -fighting (in spite of the double victory claimed by the Bāhilites) -returned to Merv. For this weakness he was severely reprimanded by -_H_ajjāj, who, with the aid of a map, drew up a plan of attack. The -invasion of 90/709 seems to have taken Wardān Khudāh by surprise, as the -Muslim army was able to advance at once to the siege of Bukhārā. There -is some ground for the conjecture, however, that the death of Wardān -Khudāh had occurred in the interval and that Qutayba was opposed only -by the local forces[47]. This may also explain the hesitation of the -forces of Samarqand to intervene. The battle before the walls of Bukhārā -is described by _T_abarī in a long Tamīmite tradition reminiscent of -the ancient “days,” but the actual capture of the city is left to be -inferred. This siege is transferred to Wardāna by Vámbéry (_cf._ _Heart -of Asia_ p. 52) probably on the authority of the Persian _T_abarī -(Zotenberg IV. 165), but Narshakhī, _T_abarī and all other authorities -quite definitely refer to Bukhārā. Abū ʿUbayda’s tradition (Bal. 420) -of capture by treachery is at best a confusion with the capture of -Samarqand. All the details given in Narshakhī relative to Qutayba’s -organisation of Bukhārā do not refer to this year; most probably the only -immediate measures taken were the imposition of a tribute of 200,000 -dirhems and the occupation of the citadel by an Arab garrison. - -A diplomatic success followed the victory at Bukhārā. _T_arkhūn, king -of Samarqand, opened negotiations with Qutayba, who was represented by -the commander of his Persian corps, _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, and terms were -agreed upon, probably on the basis of the old treaty made by Salm ibn -Ziyād. _T_arkhūn gave hostages for the payment of tribute and Qutayba -began the march back to Merv. - - -_Consolidation and Advance._ - -If the Arabs returned in the autumn of 90/709 elated with their success, -they were soon given fresh cause for anxiety. Nēzak, finally realising -that all hope of recovering independence must be extinguished if Arab -rule was strengthened in Khurāsān, and perhaps putting down to weakness -Qutayba’s willingness to gain his ends if possible by diplomacy, -determined on a last effort to overthrow Muslim sovereignty in Lower -_T_ukhāristān, at the moment when it was least to be expected. Having -obtained permission to revisit his home, he left Qutayba at Āmul and made -for Balkh, but escaped to _T_ukhāristān in order to avoid re-arrest. From -here he corresponded with the rulers of Balkh, Merv Rūdh, _T_ālaqān, -Fāryāb, and Jūzjān, urging them to undertake a concerted rising in the -spring. The king of Chaghāniān seems to have refused to countenance the -conspiracy, but the weak Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān was induced, possibly by -force, to make common cause with Nēzak, who hoped doubtless by this means -to unite all the subject princes in defence of their suzerain. - -Qutayba’s army was already disbanded and the winter was setting in. -All that he could do was to despatch the garrison at Merv, some 12,000 -men, under ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān, with instructions to winter in Balkh, -where they could counter any immediate move by Nēzak, and advance into -_T_ukhāristān in the spring. This resolute action made Qutayba master -of the situation and so intimidated the rebels that when, in the early -spring, the Arabs marched through the disaffected districts, scarcely a -blow was struck and the princes either submitted or fled. The inhabitants -were granted a complete amnesty except at _T_alāqān, concerning which -the traditions are hopelessly confused. According to one account, a band -of robbers were there executed and crucified, but it is possible that -it was selected for special severity because there alone the revolt had -openly broken out[48]. There was probably also some reorganization of the -administration of Lower _T_ukhāristān, in the direction of conferring -fuller powers on the Arab governors installed in each district, though -the native princes continued to exercise a nominal authority. From -Balkh, Qutayba marched forward and rejoined ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān. With the -assistance of the lesser princes they pursued and captured Nēzak, who was -subsequently executed on direct orders from _H_ajjāj, in violation of -Qutayba’s promise of pardon[49]. How little this action was condemned by -the prevailing spirit of the age, however, is shown by the contemporary -poems quoted by _T_abarī, lauding the “defender of the precincts of -Islam” and comparing his action to the measures formerly adopted against -the Jewish tribes of Madīna. Yet even at this time we find traces of -the new spirit that was to make itself more felt in later years, and -hear voices raised, like Thābit Qu_t_na’s, against the “treachery that -calls itself resolution.” _T_abarī inserts at this point the narrative of -the putting to death of the hostages of Jūzjān, in retaliation for the -murder of the Arab hostage in Jūzjān, a much more excusable incident. -Balādhurī puts it at the beginning of Qutayba’s career, however, as -though it belonged to the first pacification of Lower _T_ukhāristān, so -that its position in _T_abarī may possibly be due to its superficial -similarity with the case of Nēzak. The results of this expedition were -of the greatest importance: not only was Nēzak’s scheme crushed and -Lower _T_ukhāristān henceforth incorporated in the Arab Empire, but also -for the first time Arab authority was extended over the Jabghu and his -immediate vassals in the Oxus basin. The former, exiled to Damascus, -formed a valuable hostage against any attempt to regain independence, -and it seems not improbable that the king of Chaghāniān was made regent -for the young Jabghu (see above, p. 9), ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān was appointed -governor of Balkh, in order to supervise the administration of the new -province. - -Qutayba had hardly returned to Merv before he was called to deal -with yet another revolt. The king of Shūmān, taking advantage of the -difficulties of the Arabs, or of their absence in the southern mountains, -had re-asserted his independence in spite of the conciliatory offers of -Sāli_h_ ibn Muslim. The full weight of Qutayba’s power was now employed -to crush him. His stronghold was attacked with siege artillery, the -king himself killed in a sortie and the garrison put to the sword. -From this point Shūmān and Ākharūn gradually drop out of the Arabic -narratives altogether. Qutayba then resumed his march through the Iron -Gate, reduced the districts of Kish and Nasaf, and revisited Bukhārā. -There seems to have been continual friction between the Arab garrison -and the population[50] and it was felt that a drastic re-organisation -was necessary. _T_ughshāda, though still a youth, was restored to the -position of Bukhār-Khudāh, and the leaders of the hostile party (more -probably that of Khunuk Khudāh than Wardān Khudāh) were put to death. -By this means, Qutayba no doubt hoped to secure compliance and docility -in the native administration. _T_ughshāda had been raised to the throne -by the Arabs and it might be expected that he would side with them in -consequence. A more solid guarantee for the permanence of the conquest, -however, was the establishment of a military colony in Bukhārā. Following -the precedent set in the colonization of Merv, Arabs were lodged in the -houses of the inhabitants, and it is said that the latter were encouraged -to attend the Friday prayer and behave as Muslims by the distribution -of a small gratuity. The Kushan merchants left their homes and property -rather than comply with these orders and founded a new city outside the -walls, but it is evident that the Islamization of the city was not yet so -thorough as the traditions assert[51]. The building of the Mosque and the -organization of the Friday services are dated by Narshakhī in 94 A.H., -which points to a further organization of the city after the capture of -Samarqand. The organization of the new territories proceeded, in fact, -_pari passu_ with the extension and consolidation of the conquests. -So long as the Arab authority was insecure in Cisoxania, it was out -of the question to establish either military colonies or an elaborate -administration beyond the river. Consequently, it was only now that the -failure of Nēzak’s revolt had definitely secured the Arab dominion in the -former Ephthalite lands that it was possible to take the decisive step of -settling an Arab garrison in Bukhārā. The regularity with which each step -followed the last suggests that it was done according to a prearranged -plan, or at least that some attention had been devoted to the question -of the administration of the occupied territories in the event of the -success of the military operations. - -Qutayba’s reorganization was not confined to the civil government, -however, but extended to the army as well. Hitherto the jealousy of -the Arabs for their exclusive rights as a warrior caste had strictly -limited the number of Persians in the armies, apart from the clients -and camp followers. Thus we are told (_T_ab. 1290. 20) that the armies -of Khurāsān at this period were composed as follows: from Ba_s_ra-Ahl -al-ʿĀliya, 9,000; Bakr, 7,000; Tamīm, 10,000; ʿAbd al Qays, 4,000; Azd, -10,000: from Kūfa, 7,000: and alongside these 47,000 Arabs only 7,000 -Mawālī, commanded by _H_ayyān-an-Naba_t_ī, who is called variously a -Daylamite and a native of Khurāsān. Now, however, Qutayba imposed, -first on Bukhārā, and later on each successive conquest, the obligation -of providing an auxiliary corps of local troops, amounting usually to -some ten or twenty thousand men, to serve with the Arab armies. It is -possible, if the story be true, that this was suggested by the precedent -set by Saʿīd b. ʿOthmān in the conquest of Samarqand, but more probable -that it represents an entirely new departure in the East, though it had -long been a practice in other spheres of the Arab conquests. - -We are given no hint of the motives which led to the adoption of the -new system, though it would seem that they must have been of some -force. Possibly it was no more than a desire to keep the native armies -occupied in the service of the Arabs rather than risk a revolt in their -rear. _H_ajjāj and Qutayba perhaps realised too that the Arab forces -by themselves, after taking four years to reduce Bukhārā alone, were -insufficient to ensure success in the greater task of subduing Samarqand. -Under the new system—which recalls Pan-chʿao’s famous aphorism “Use -barbarians to attack barbarians”—each conquest in turn made the next more -easy. The rapidity of Qutayba’s later conquests in contrast with the -early period is thus explained. It is just possible that in this plan -Qutayba had an ulterior motive as well: the formation of a Persian army, -trained on the same lines as the Arab forces, but more devoted to the -person of the governor and able to take his part against the Arabs. How -very nearly this plan succeeded, even in Qutayba’s own case, the sequel -was to show. - -The practice of raising native levies, once started, appears to have -become general in Khurāsān. We have no information as to when the local -forces of Khurāsān and Lower _T_ukhāristān were incorporated in the army, -nor in what proportions, but we have frequent evidence of their presence -and increasing prestige in the wars of the next forty years[52]. On the -other hand, though contingents from the towns of Sogdiana were used by -later governors if they were available, as in 106 and 112 A.H., in view -of the weaker hold of the Arabs on Transoxania Sogdian troops never -formed a regular division of the Arab forces up to the end of the Umayyad -period. This distinction between the two subject Iranian groups became, -as will be seen, of some importance when the ʿAbbāsid propaganda began to -tamper with the loyalty of the armies of Khurāsān. - -While Qutayba was occupied with the new organization of Bukhārā, a -detached force, sent under ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān from Kish to Samarqand to -exact from _T_arkhūn the tribute agreed upon in the previous year, -successfully accomplished its mission. ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān, after restoring -the hostages to _T_arkhūn, rejoined his brother at Bukhārā, whence they -returned to Merv for the winter. - -One important vassal of _T_ukhāristān, who had long been a thorn in the -side of _H_ajjāj, still remained unsubdued. This was Rutbīl or Zunbīl, -the Turkish ruler of Zābulistān[53]. In 91, the viceroy united Sijistān -to the province of Khurāsān, with instructions to Qutayba to undertake a -campaign in person against Rutbīl. In the following year, therefore, the -expeditions into Transoxania were interrupted, and the army again marched -southwards. To Qutayba’s great relief (for he disliked to undertake a -campaign against this formidable foe who had made Sijistān “an ill-omened -frontier”) Rutbīl hastened to tender his submission, and at the same -time sent an embassy to convey his homage to the Emperor of China[54]. -Recognition of Arab suzerainty over Zābulistān involved of course only -the payment of a fixed tribute, and no attempt was made at a permanent -occupation. - -Meanwhile a serious situation had arisen in _S_ughd. The merchants and -nobles of Samarqand had resented the weakness of their king and the -payment of tribute: in Qutayba’s absence the party for resistance _à -outrance_ gained the upper hand, and _T_arkhūn, deposed on the ground -of incapacity, committed suicide. The choice of the electors fell on -Ghūrak[55], a prince of whom we would gladly have known more. Under -the ever increasing difficulties with which he was confronted during -his twenty-seven years of rule, his consummate handling of the most -confused situations shows him to have been at once statesman and patriot, -and preserved his kingdom from repeated disaster. The action of the -_S_ughdian nobles, however, the Arabic account of which is confirmed by -the Chinese records, constituted a challenge to Arab pretensions which -Qutayba could not be slow in answering. These considerations clearly -disprove the partial tradition of Abū ʿUbayda (Bal. 422), to the effect -that Qutayba treacherously attacked Khwārizm and Samarqand in spite of -the treaties of Saʿīd ibn ʿOthmān, and the argument based upon it by van -Vloten in _La Domination Arabe_, must also, in consequence, be somewhat -modified. - -The winter of 93/711, therefore, was spent in preparations for an -expedition against Samarqand, but before the opening of the campaigning -season, Qutayba received a secret mission from the Khwārizm Shāh, who -offered to become tributary if the Arabs would rid him of his rebellious -brother Khurrazādh. Qutayba agreed, and after publicly announcing his -intention of invading _S_ughd, suddenly appeared at Hazārasp. The -followers of the Khwārizm Shāh were persuaded to offer no resistance -for this year, at least, and accepted the terms, which included, in -accordance with the new scheme, the provision of a corps of 10,000 -ablebodied men as well as the usual tribute. Qutayba remained at the -capital[56] until the army was collected, while ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān was -employed, according to _T_abarī, in reducing the king of Khāmjird, who -from the parallel account in Balādhurī is to be identified either with -Khurrazādh, or at least with his party. The Persian _T_abarī adds a -long and doubtless legendary narrative of his surrender. Four thousand -prisoners were taken and butchered, probably by order of the Khwārizm -Shāh. - -The later history of Khwārizm under Qutayba’s rule is an unhappy one. -His first governor Iyās b. ʿAbdullah, proved too weak for his post, -and on Qutayba’s withdrawal the Khwārizmians rose in revolt and put to -death the king who had betrayed them. Iyās was recalled in disgrace, -together with the Persian _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, who had been associated -with him, and Qutayba’s brother ʿAbdullah (in Balādhurī ʿUbaydullah) was -appointed as temporary regent until, after the capture of Samarqand, a -strong force under al-Mughīra b. ʿAbdullah could be sent to effect a -reconquest. Qutayba’s retribution on this occasion exceeded even the -terror of Paykand and Shūmān. We are told by Al-Bīrūnī that the educated -classes and more cultured elements in Khwārizm were slaughtered almost -to extinction. He refers this by implication to the second expedition of -Qutayba (though it does not appear that the governor led the expedition -in person), which is borne out by what we know of Qutayba’s methods in -similar cases, while there is no instance in his career of such an action -on a first conquest. It was in all probability the educated classes -(including no doubt the hierarchy) who led the revolt against the traitor -king and thus met with the severest punishment. The dynasty, however, was -maintained, and it is not improbable that the Arab colony of which we -hear shortly afterwards was settled in Khwārizm at the same time[57]. - -The booty from the first expedition into Khwārizm was enough to satisfy -Qutayba’s troops, who demanded to be allowed to return to their homes, -but a sudden thrust at Samarqand promised such success that Qutayba -and his leaders decided to make the attempt. The _S_ughdian army had -apparently been disbanded, and under cover of a false movement of the -advance guard, the Arabs marched directly on Samarqand. The advance guard -under ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān numbered 20,000 men, while the main body included -the new Persian contingents from Khwārizm and Bukhārā. The march occupied -only a few days and the slight resistance encountered did not prevent -the Arabs from proceeding at once to invest the city. Ghūrak conducted -the defence with vigour, however, and appealed to Shāsh and Farghāna for -assistance, reminding them that Samarqand was the bulwark of the Jaxartes -valley. A strong force was despatched from Shāsh with the intention of -making a surprise attack on the Arab camp, but was ambushed at night by a -picked troop of Arabs and almost annihilated. This reverse, together with -the continuous bombardment to which they were subjected, disheartened -the _S_ughdians, but the wall had been breached and an entrance almost -effected by the Arabs, stoutly assisted by their new Iranian divisions, -before Ghūrak sued for peace. Qutayba’s demands were unexpectedly -light—an annual tribute, stated in widely varying amounts, and a strong -corps of _S_ughdians, together with a stipulation that the city should be -cleared of its fighting men while the Arabs built a mosque and celebrated -the ritual prayers. Once within the gates, however, Qutayba refused to -restore the city to Ghūrak: a strong garrison was established in the -citadel, under the command of ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān (so Yaʿqūbī; in _T_abarī -ʿAbdullah) and drastic orders were issued excluding all unbelievers -except under strict surveillance, doubtless with the intention of -avoiding a repetition of the friction that had occurred at Bukhārā. -Ghūrak either could not or would not place himself in the humiliating -position of _T_ughshāda, and with his retinue, accompanied possibly by -the merchants, withdrew from Samarqand altogether and built a new city, -Farankath, some four farsakhs distant in the direction of Ishtīkhan[58]. -Qutayba’s double-dealing on this occasion, however, tarnished his -reputation among both Persians and Arabs, far more than his severity to -Paykand and Khwārizm, and left a rankling memory in _S_ughd. In order -to avoid the stigma of treachery attaching to their hero the Bāhilite -tradition relates this expedition in an entirely different version[59]. -Qutayba, we are told, after marching down the right bank of the Oxus -and collecting his army at Bukhārā, advanced to Rabinjān where he was -met by the _S_ughdians under Ghūrak, supported by the troops of Shāsh -and Farghāna and the Turks. The enemy retired on Samarqand but engaged -in constant rearguard actions, the city being finally entered by force -after a decisive battle in the suburbs. Though this account is at first -sight borne out to some extent by Ghūrak’s own narrative in his letter -to the Emperor of China, in which he claims an initial success against -the Arabs, but was unable to prevent their advance, both statements must -be regarded as exaggerations in opposite interests. At all events it is -quite certain that none but _S_ughdian troops were involved at first. - -A further development of the Bāhilite tradition has given rise to some -controversy. According to this, Ghūrak appealed for help not only to -Shāsh but also to the Khāqān, and the squadron sent from Shāsh appears -as a force of Turks, commanded by a son of the Khāqān. This is, of -course, an obvious exaggeration on the former narrative. In the Turkish -Orkhon inscriptions, however, an expedition under the prince Kül-tegin -into Sogdiana “to organize the Sogdian people” is mentioned, following -on a successful campaign against the Türgesh in 710/711. Marquart -endeavours to prove that this expedition occurred in 712 and is, in -fact, corroborated by the Bāhilite tradition. Professor Houtsma has -raised several objections to this view, the most important being that -the chronology of the inscriptions has to be manipulated to allow of -this date, as the natural date to assume from the context is at latest -711. These, together with the considerations mentioned above, render -Marquart’s hypothesis absolutely untenable. - -A second suggestion has been put forward by Professor Barthold, to which, -however, Professor Houtsma’s objections would apply with equal force[60]. -In the narrative of the historian Yaʿqūbī (II. 344), there is a brief -notice as follows: “Qutayba appointed his brother ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān ibn -Muslim governor of Samarqand, but the men of Samarqand treacherously -revolted against him, and Khāqān, king of the Turks, attacked him also. -He wrote to Qutayba, but Qutayba waited until the winter cleared, then -marched to join him and routed the army of the Turks.” Professor Barthold -takes the view, therefore, that this is the expedition referred to in the -inscriptions, and attributes the failure of the Turks to the disastrous -effects of a winter campaign in a devastated land, which so severely -disabled them that they could not face the formidable army that took the -field under Qutayba in the spring. It is questionable, however, how far -Yaʿqūbī’s narrative may be trusted. None of the other historians give the -slightest hint of this invasion, nor were the results such as we should -expect after a _S_ughdian revolt. There was no ruthless reconquest, no -stamping out of rebellion in blood. Neither does the general tenor of -Yaʿqūbī’s accounts of Qutayba inspire confidence. They are not only -confused in detail and chronology—the capture of Samarqand, for instance, -is dated 94 A.H.—but in some cases are taken from what we know to be the -Bāhilite tradition, and in others, such as the narrative under discussion -and the account of the conquest of Khwārizm, follow a tradition which -seems irreconcilable with our other information. While it cannot be said -definitely therefore, that Yaʿqūbī’s statements in this case contain no -truth, it is certainly preferable to regard them as a later development -of the narrative, on the lines of the Bāhilite tradition. - -If the chronological objections raised by Professor Houtsma are sound, -there remains still a third possible solution, which, however, as there -is no corroborative evidence from either the Arabic or Chinese sources, -must remain nothing but a hypothesis. It is surely quite tenable that -Kül-tegin’s “organization of the Sogdian people” had something to do -with the deposition of _T_arkhūn and appointment of Ghūrak. With Sogdian -trade playing the most important part which we know in the Turkish lands, -it would be well worth while to try to prevent the Arabs from obtaining -control over it. The very unexpectedness of the description given to this -expedition shows clearly that there was some motive for “organization” -and it is difficult to see what other motive there could have been. These -circumstances would render it quite probable that Ghūrak did, in fact, -appeal to the Khāqān for assistance against the Arabs, but it seems that -the growing power of the Türgesh barred the way into Sogdiana against the -Northern Khanate for the remainder of its short existence. - -By the conquest of Samarqand Qutayba finally established his position -in Transoxania. It must not be assumed, however, as many of the Arab -historians give the impression of assuming, that the holding of Samarqand -meant the conquest of _S_ughd. All that had been done was to settle an -Arab garrison in a country as yet unfriendly. It was the duty of the -commanders at Samarqand gradually to extend their authority over the -whole district of _S_ughd by expeditions and razzias[61]. There was -thus a radical difference between the conquest of Bukhārā and that of -Samarqand. The former was the result of a series of campaigns in which -the resources of the country had been exhausted and the province annexed -piecemeal. The whole population had become subjects of the Arabs and -were under constant surveillance: _T_ughshāda himself held his rank on -sufferance and was compelled to maintain at least an outward show of -loyalty. But Samarqand had been captured in one swift thrust; _S_ughd -as a whole was still unsubdued and only from policy acknowledged the -suzerainty of the Arabs for the time being. “Ghūrak at Ishtīkhan was -free to turn either to the Arabs or to the Turks”[58]. Nevertheless -in the years that followed there is evidence that friendly relations -were formed between the Arab garrison and many of the local leaders and -inhabitants[62]. The whole country, however, had suffered terribly in the -constant invasions and counter invasions. A contemporary poet gives a -vivid picture of its dissipated wealth, its ruined and desolate lands: - - “Daily Qutayba gathers spoil, increasing our wealth with new - wealth: A Bāhilite who has worn the crown till the hair that - was black has whitened. _S_ughd is subdued by his squadrons, - its people left sitting in nakedness.... As oft as he lights in - a land, his horse leave it furrowed and scarred.” - - -_The Expeditions into the Jaxartes Provinces._ - -It might perhaps have been expected that Qutayba’s next object after the -capture of Samarqand would be to establish Arab authority in _S_ughd as -firmly as had been done in Bukhārā. It would probably have been better -in the end had he done so, but for the moment the attractions of the -“forward policy” which had already proved so successful were too strong. -Instead of concentrating on the reduction of _S_ughd, it was decided to -push the frontiers of the Empire further into Central Asia, and leave -the former to be carried out at leisure. Qutayba therefore crossed to -Bukhārā, where 20,000 levies from Khwārizm, Bukhārā, Kish, and Nasaf -had been summoned to meet him, and marched into _S_ughd. If there was -a Turkish army wintering in the country, it offered no considerable -resistance to the advance of the Arabs. In _S_ughd Qutayba divided his -forces into two corps. The Persian levies were sent in the direction -of Shāsh, while he himself with the Arabs marched on Khujanda and -Farghāna. Our information is brief and lacking in detail. Of the northern -expedition we are told only that they captured Shāsh and burnt the -greater part of it. Qutayba’s own force had to overcome some resistance -at Khujanda, but eventually reached Kāsān, where it was rejoined by the -other. The geographers refer also to a battle fought by Qutayba at Mīnak -in Ushrūsana, but against whom is not clear[63]. _T_abarī (1440. 7) -preserves a tradition that Qutayba appointed an Arab resident, ʿI_s_ām b. -ʿAbdullah al-Bāhilī, in Farghāna. If this is true, as seems not unlikely, -the appointment was probably made during this year. The details of the -tradition are quite unacceptable, however. No Arab governor would ever -have taken up his residence in a hill-pass in the remotest district -of Farghāna, completely cut off from his fellow-countrymen. One of -Balādhurī’s authorities carries this or a similar tradition further by -crediting Qutayba with the establishment of Arab colonies as far as Shāsh -and Farghāna. Here again at most only temporary military outposts can be -in question. On the other hand, the extraordinary success achieved by the -Arabs on this expedition is apt to be overlooked, and Qutayba might well -have imagined, as he returned to Merv, that the latest conquests were as -permanently annexed to Khurāsān as Samarqand and Khwārizm. - -The helplessness of their Turkish suzerain in face of the victorious -Arabs, however, caused a revival in Transoxania of the tradition of -Chinese overlordship. Appeals to the Khāqān were of no avail, and in the -minds of the Sogdian princes, seeking for some counterpoise to the rapid -extension of the Arab conquests, the idea of appealing directly to the -Emperor was slowly maturing. Though no definite steps in this direction -had as yet been taken, some inkling of it may have reached Qutayba. The -Arabs were now familiar with China through the sea-borne trade of the -Persian Gulf and at least after, if not before, their conquest of the -cities which were already becoming the headquarters of Central Asian -commerce, must have become aware of the close commercial relations -which these cities maintained with China. Under these circumstances, -Qutayba (or possibly _H_ajjāj) decided to send a mission overland to -the Chinese court, possibly to prevent their intervention in the West, -but more probably with the intention of promoting trade relations. As -the princes of Sogdiana and _T_ukhāristān were much more alive to the -advantages of preserving their commerce and to the dangers which might -befall it under the new government than the Arabs could have been, it was -probably on their suggestion that the embassy was sent. They would, of -course, have no difficulty in persuading governors of the character of -_H_ajjāj and Qutayba that their own interests also lay in safeguarding -and encouraging the trade which brought such wealth to Transoxania. -If the intervention of the Turks had been caused by their concern for -Sogdian trade, it became doubly important for the Arabs to show their -practical interest in its welfare. Apart from the immediate gain to the -treasury which would accrue, such an action might reasonably be expected -to secure the acquiescence of the Sogdians in Arab rule. The date of the -mission is fixed as 713 by the Chinese records, which add also that in -spite of the refusal of the envoys to perform the customary kow-tow it -was favourably received by the Emperor. Both statements are confirmed by -_T_abarī’s remark that the leader was sent to Walīd on his return, which -must therefore be dated between the death of _H_ajjāj and the end of -714[64]. Unfortunately the Arab records of the mission have been confused -with the legendary exploits of Qutayba two years later, becoming so -disfigured in the process as to be almost worthless. The wisdom of this -step must have been justified by its results, though there are no effects -apparent in our histories and the relentless march of Chinese policy was -not affected. This embassy is mentioned by the Arabic historians as if it -were an isolated incident, but it was, as I have shown elsewhere[65], -only the first of many such sent by the governors of Khurāsān to maintain -friendly relations with the Chinese court. It cannot be doubted that -in the majority of cases at least the object of these missions was -commercial, particularly where joint embassies were sent with one or -other of the Sogdian principalities. - -In the following year 95/714 the raids on the Jaxartes provinces were -renewed. It would seem on comparing Balādhurī’s account with _T_abarī -that Qutayba made Shāsh his headquarters and worked northwards as far -as Isbījāb. The prince of Shāsh appealed to China for assistance, but -without effect[66]. Qutayba’s plan therefore was to follow up the -important trade-route which led from Turfan down the Ili valley, along -the northern edge of the Thian-Shan mountains, through Tokmak and Tarāz -into Shāsh and Samarqand. Though the economic importance of controlling -this trade-route may have had its part in this decision, especially in -view of their new patronage of Sogdian trade, it is probable that this -was less in the mind of the Arabs than its strategic value as the road -by which the Central Asian Turks debouched on Transoxania. Towards the -end of the summer, the expeditions were abruptly interrupted by the news -of the death of _H_ajjāj, which had occurred in Shawwāl (June). Deeply -affected by the loss of his patron and not a little uncertain of the -effect on his own fortunes, Qutayba disbanded the army, sending garrisons -to Bukhārā, Kish, and Nasaf, and returned to Merv. Walīd, however, -allayed his fears by an encouraging letter, and made his province -independent of ʿIrāq. But the death of _H_ajjāj had affected Khurāsān too -deeply for such a simple remedy. The Arabs had gained wealth in their -expeditions, they were weary of the constant campaigns and anxious to -enjoy the comforts of peace. Factional feeling was merely slumbering, -and a new element of unrest had been added by a Kūfan corps under Jahm -b. Za_h_r, which had been transferred to Khurāsān from India by _H_ajjāj -in his last year. All parties among the Arabs were alienated from -Qutayba; even Qays had been estranged by his highhanded action in the -first place with the house of Al-Ahtam and again by his feud with Wakīʿ -b. Abī Sūd, the chief of Tamīm[67]; moreover, they were suspicious of his -medizing tendencies. Amongst the Persians he was popular, but _H_ayyān -an-Naba_t_ī, though restored to his position in command of the Persian -troops, had not forgiven Qutayba for his disgrace at Khwārizm. It seems -extraordinary that the general himself should have been blind to any -internal danger and was entirely confident in the loyalty of his army. - -On re-opening the campaign in 96/715, therefore, his only precautions -consisted in the removal of his family and personal property from Merv to -Samarqand and the posting of a guard on the Oxus, in view of a possible -restoration to favour of Yazīd b. Muhallab. It is unlikely that Qutayba -could have had in mind the possibility of Walīd’s death; what he feared -was more probably a _rapprochement_ between the Caliph and his heir -Sulaymān, who was his bitter enemy. - -The object of this last campaign was probably the complete subjugation -of Farghāna. Having established his authority over the important section -of the Middle Jaxartes and its trade route, it remained now to round off -his conquests by extending it also over the central trade route between -Farghāna and Kashgaria. The account which _T_abarī intends to convey, -however, is that Qutayba marched first into Farghāna and from there led -an expedition against Kashgar, with complete success. In an article -of mine published in the _Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies_ -(II. 467 ff.), all our evidence for this expedition has been critically -discussed, and shown to be against the authenticity of the tradition. It -is unnecessary, therefore, to do more than summarise very briefly the -arguments there put forward. (1) None of the historians earlier than or -contemporary with _T_abarī contain any reference to a raid on Kashgar, -and even _T_abarī’s own statement is not borne out by the authorities -on which it professedly rests. Only one of these relates an expedition -to Kashgar, and that under the command of an unknown leader. (2) The -interval between the opening of the campaign and the death of Qutayba -in Farghāna in August or September does not allow time for such an -expedition, especially in view of the mutinous attitude of the army after -the death of the Caliph. (3) The Chinese account of Arab interference -in Farghāna cannot refer, for chronological reasons, to Qutayba’s -expedition, and in any case is silent on any attack on Kashgaria. - -That an expedition of this sort should have been attributed to Qutayba -is not surprising, in view of the tradition of the embassy to China, and -of the great renown which attached to his memory. Later tradition[68] -recounted that _H_ajjāj pledged the governorship of China to the first -to reach it of his two governors in the East, Mu_h_ammad b. Qāsim and -Qutayba. “_S_īn” was, of course, not the sharply defined country of -our days, but rather a loose term for the Far East, including even the -Turkish lands in the North-East. Qutayba had probably done little more -than make preparations for his campaign, perhaps to the extent of sending -out minor raiding expeditions, when the news of the death of Walīd -brought everything to a standstill. - -The historians give the most contradictory accounts of the events that -followed; according to Balādhurī the new Caliph Sulaymān confirmed -Qutayba in his command but gave permission to the army to disband. -_T_abarī’s narrative, with which Yaʿqūbī’s in general agrees, is fully -discussed by Wellhausen (274 ff.), together with a valuable analysis -of Qutayba’s position. The story of his highhanded negotiations with -Sulaymān is too well known to need repetition. Finding the army -disinclined to follow him, he completely lost his head and roused the -mutiny in which he was killed. The Persian levies, who were inclined to -side with him, were dissuaded by _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, and at the last -only his own family and bodyguard of Sogdian princes remained faithful. - -The death of Qutayba marked not merely the end of the Arab conquests in -Central Asia for a quarter of a century, but the beginning of a period -of retrogression. Under Wakīʿ b. Abī Sūd, his successor[69], the armies -melted away. Mukhallad, the son of Yazīd b. Muhallab and his lieutenant -in Transoxania, carried out summer raids on the villages of _S_ughd, -but an isolated attempt on the Jaxartes provinces by ʿOmar’s governor, -Al-Jarrā_h_ b. ʿAbdullah, met with ignominious failure. It is possibly -to this that the tradition, mentioned by Barthold (_Turkestan_ 160), -of the disaster met with by a Muslim army refers. On the other hand an -embassy was sent in the name of the Caliph to renew relations with the -Chinese court, and a third in concert with the kingdoms of _T_ukhāristān -and Samarqand, etc., during the reign of ʿOmar[65]. There is mention also -of an expedition into Khuttal which regained some territory. But it was -Qutayba, with _H_ajjāj at his back, who had held his conquests together, -and when he disappeared there was neither leader nor organisation to take -his place. The history of the next decade clearly shows how loose and -unstable was the authority of the Arabs. It was force that had made the -conquests, and only a settled policy of force or conciliation could hold -them. The first was absent. “Qutayba in chains at the world’s end is more -terrible to us than Yazīd as governor in our very midst” is the graphic -summary put into the mouths of the conquered, while of Rutbīl, king of -Zābulistān, we are told expressly that after the death of _H_ajjāj “he -paid not a cent of tribute to any of the governors of Sijistān on behalf -of the Umayyads nor on behalf of Abū Muslim.”[70]. - -Nor was ʿOmar’s policy a true policy of conciliation, based as it was not -on the maintenance of the Arab conquests but on the complete evacuation -of Transoxania. His orders to that effect were of course indignantly -rejected by the Arab colonists in Bukhārā and Samarqand, but together -with his appointment of the feeble and ineffective ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān b. -Nuʿaym al-Qushayrī as governor, such a policy was naturally construed -by the Sogdians as mere weakness, and an invitation to regain their -independence. In addition to the embassies to China, to be related in -the next chapter, and possibly also some negotiations with the Türgesh, -Ghūrak sought to win back his capital by playing on ʿOmar’s piety. -The Caliph sent envoys to the princes of Sogdiana calling on them to -accept Islām, and Ghūrak, outwardly professing his adherence, sent a -deputation to ʿOmar urging that as “Qutayba dealt with us treacherously -and tyrannically, but God has now caused justice and equity to reign” the -city should be restored to the _S_ughdians. The commonsense of the judge -appointed to try the case on ʿOmar’s instructions by the governor of -Samarqand, Sulaymān b. Abiʾs-Sarī (himself a mawlā), solved the problem -in an eminently practical manner, and we are told that his decision, so -far from being “malicious,” was satisfactory to both the Arabs and the -_S_ughdians, if not perhaps to Ghūrak. Beyond the remission of kharāj, it -is doubtful whether ʿOmar’s administration benefited the subject peoples -in the slightest, and the reaction which followed his brief reign only -aggravated the situation. Already before its close the _S_ughdians had -withdrawn their allegiance[71]. - -Thus within six years from the death of Qutayba, much of his work was -undone. He had laid the foundations on which the later rule of Islām -was built, and laid them well, though his own superstructure was too -flimsy to withstand the tempests of the years ahead. But the fault was -not entirely, perhaps not even chiefly, the fault of the builder. He was -snatched away before his work was done, even if in his latter years he -tended to neglect everything else for military glory. As we shall see, -there was no peace in Transoxania until other men arose, great and strong -enough to adopt and carry out the best of his plans. The ruthlessness -and ferocity of his conquests, however, have been much exaggerated. -He was always ready to use diplomacy rather than force if it offered -any hope of success, so much so that his lenience was misconstrued on -occasion by both friends and foes. Only in cases of treachery and revolt -his punishment came swift and terrible. That he did not hesitate to take -vengeance on his private enemies is to say no more than that he was an -Arab. It was not without reason that in later days the Muslims of Central -Asia added Qutayba’s name to the roll of martyrs and that his tomb in -Farghāna became a favourite place of pilgrimage[72]. - -To sum up the position in Central Asia in the years immediately following -Qutayba’s conquests:— - - (1) Lower _T_ukhāristān and Chaghāniān formed an integral part - of the Arab Empire. - - (2) _T_ukhāristān, now in the decay of its power, was held - as a vassal state, together with the Transoxine provinces of - Khuttal, Kumādh, etc., where, however, the Arab authority was - much weaker. - - (3) In Sogdiana, Bukhārā was regarded as a permanent conquest - and gradually colonized; _S_ughd was still hostile territory - held by strong outpost garrisons in Samarqand and Kish, - connected to Bukhārā by minor posts. - - (4) Khwārizm as a military power was negligible and was - permanently colonized. - - (5) The kingdoms beyond the Jaxartes remained independent, - hostile, and relatively strong, supported by the Turkish power - to the North East and also by the intervention of China. - - (6) Ushrūsana, though unsubdued, does not seem to have offered - any obstacle to the passage of Arab armies. - - (7) The existing dynastic houses were everywhere maintained, as - the representatives of the conquered peoples and vehicle of the - civil administration. The actual administrative and financial - authority in their territories, however, passed to the Wāli, - or agent of the Arab governor of Khurāsān[73]. - - -NOTES - -[41] Chav. Doc. 42, 282 f.: Marquart Chronologie 15: _T_abarī II. 1078, -1080. - -[42] As was suggested by Prof. Houtsma, Gotting. Gelehrt. Anz., 1899, -386-7. - -[43] Suggested readings in Barthold, Turkestan, p. 71 n. 5, and p. 76. - -[44] _T_ab. 1184 f., 1195: Chav. Doc. 172: Hamadhānī, Kitāb al-Buldān -(Bibl. Geog. Arab. V) 209. 7: _cf._ _T_ab. 1874. - -[45] Narshakhī 8, 15, 30, 37, 44: _T_ab. 1199. 1: Yaʿqūbī Hist. II. 342. -9. _Cf._ Marquart, Chronologie 63 and Barthold, Arab. Quellen 7. - -[46] _H_amāsa, ed. Freytag, I. 349. - -[47] Narshakhī 8. 15. - -[48] _T_ab. 1207. 16: _cf._ Yaʿqūbī loc. cit. On the Arab method of -crucifixion, Nöldeke Z.D.M.G. LVI (1902) 433; _cf._ _T_ab. 1691 and -Dīnawarī 336. 18. - -[49] Detailed accounts of this are readily accessible in “The Heart of -Asia”, and “The Caliph’s Last Heritage” by Sir Mark Sykes, the latter -in a richly imaginative vein. Very full geographical data are given by -Marquart, Ērānshahr 219 f. - -[50] Narsh. 46. 12, 50. 15. - -[51] _E.g._ Narsh. 58. 5. On the new city, Barthold Turkestan 110 f. - -[52] _E.g._ _T_ab. 1544. 9, 1600 ff. - -[53] On this dynasty see Ērānshahr 37 f., 248 ff. and de Goeje in -W.Z.K.M. XVI (1902) 192-195. - -[54] Yaʿqūbī Geog. 283: Chav. Doc. 161. - -[55] The pronunciation of this name, usually pointed Ghūzak, is fixed by -the Chinese transcription U-le-kia (Chav. Doc. 136). - -[56] On the city of Khwārizm (Fīl, Kath) see Sachau “Zur Geschichte usw. -von Khwārizm” pp. 23-25. - -[57] _T_ab. 1252 f., 1525: Bal. 421: Al-Bīrūnī, “Chronology of Ancient -Nations” (trans. Sachau, London 1879) pp. 41 f. Prof. Barthold is -inclined to regard Al-Bīrūnī’s narrative as fictitious (perhaps intended -to account for the absence of written records of Khwārizm dating from -pre-Muslim times?) _cf._ “Turkestan” p. 1. - -[58] Barthold, Arab. Quellen 21 f. - -[59] _T_ab. 1247 f., 1249. For Ghūrak’s latter, Chav. Doc. 204 f. - -[60] Marquart, Chronologie 5 ff.: Barthold, Arab. Quell. 11 f.: Houtsma -as note 2 above. - -[61] _Cf._ _T_ab. 1418: Bal. 425. - -[62] _T_ab. 1365. 8, 1518, 1542. 1. - -[63] Ibn Hawqal 383; I_st_akhrī 328. 4. The latter’s statement that -Qutayba here beleaguered the Afshīn of Ushrūsana is almost certainly due -to the omission of some words or perversion of the text. On the other -hand, there could not be, as in Ibn Hawqal’s account, any question of -Musawwida (“Black Robes”) in the ordinary sense of the term as early as -94 A.H. and above all in Ushrūsana. - -The absence of any reference to levies from _S_ughd in this expedition -would seem to favour Prof. Barthold’s theory of a _S_ughdian rising in -co-operation with the Turks. The evidence in favour of an accidental -omission is, however, very strong. At this point _T_abarī’s narratives, -in contrast to the preceding period, become extremely brief. The levies -from the four states mentioned met Qutayba at Bukhārā and marched with -him into _S_ughd. Naturally the _S_ughdian levies would have awaited his -arrival there. Had the omission been intentional it would be difficult -to explain why _T_abarī did not include some account of the reasons why -_S_ughdian troops were not summoned. In any case it is certain that -Qutayba would not have left a hostile _S_ughdian army in his rear, and -they must therefore have taken part in the march to the Jaxartes. - -[64] Cordier, Hist. gen. de la Chine, I. 460: Wieger 1642: _T_ab. 1280. 3. - -[65] Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, II. 619 ff. For another -view of these embassies see Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches (1910), -II. 247 f. - -[66] Hirth, Nachworte 81. - -[67] Bal. 425 f.: Yaʿqūbī, Hist. II. 354: Wellhausen, Arab. Reich 275. - -[68] Yaʿqūbī, Hist. II. 346. 7. - -[69] See his character-sketch in Wellhausen 277. - -[70] Bal. 401. 5: _T_ab. 1353. - -[71] _T_ab. 1364 f., 1356. 13, 1364. 13, 1421. 7, 1418. 13: Bal. 422, 426. - -[72] Narsh. 57. 4: Fa_z_āʾil Balkh, ap. Schefer, Chrest. Persane, I. 71. -2. - -[73] Sachau, Khwārizm I, 29: Barthold, Turkestan 189. - - - - -IV. THE TURKISH COUNTERSTROKE.[74] - - -The princes of Transoxania had so long been accustomed to regard the -Arabs as mere marauders that it was some time before they could realise -the loss of their independence. Though necessity forced them at first -to adopt a conciliatory spirit (as, for example, in their acceptance -of Islām under ʿOmar II), they were dismayed to find all the machinery -of permanent occupation set in motion, and their authority flouted -by tactless and greedy Arab officials. Such a state of affairs was -tolerable only in the absence of any countering force. The situation -was not stationary for long, however; even before Qutayba’s death -other and disturbing factors had begun to enter. Our best clue to the -complications in Transoxania during this period is the attitude of -Ghūrak, king of _S_ughd, of whose movements, fortunately, sufficient -indications have been preserved. In maintaining a precarious balance -between the Türgesh and the Arabs, his true statesman’s instinct seldom -misled him in judging how and when to act to advantage throughout his -troubled reign. In addition to this we have the evidence, unreliable -in detail but confirmatory in the mass, of the embassies sent by the -subject principalities to the Chinese court. Doubtless they were -despatched in the guise of commercial missions and in many cases were -truly so, but that they frequently possessed a political character -can hardly be denied. The dates of these embassies as given in the -authorities translated by Chavannes fall naturally into four periods. In -the following list all embassies have been omitted in which the Arabs -are known to have participated or whose object is known to have had no -connection with the Arab conquests, as well as those which appear to be -duplicated, and those from the minor states: - -NUMBER OF EMBASSIES FROM:— - - 1. 717-731 _S_ughd 11, _T_ukhāristān 5, Bukhārā 2, Arabs 4. - 2. 732-740 ” none ” 2 ” none ” 1 (733). - 3. 741-747 ” 4 ” 3 ” 1 ” 4 - 4. 750-755 ” 4 ” 2 ” 3 ” 6 - -These four periods, as will be seen, closely correspond to the -fluctuations of Arab authority in Transoxania. - -In the same year, 713, that Qutayba first led his army across the -Jaxartes, a new era of westward expansion opened in China with the -accession of Hiuen-Tsong. In 714 the Chinese intervened in the affairs -of the Ten Tribes and obtained their immediate submission, while in the -following year they restored the deposed king of Farghāna. In 716, on -the death of Me-chuʾo, Khan of the Northern Turks, the powerful tribes -of the Türgesh asserted their independence, and under their chief Su-Lu -established, with Chinese assistance, a new kingdom in the Ili basin. The -princes of Transoxania eagerly sought to profit by these developments -to free themselves from the Arab yoke. In 718 a joint embassy was sent -to China by _T_ughshāda, Ghūrak, Narayāna king of Kumādh, and the king -of Chaghāniān. The first three presented petitions for aid against the -Arabs, which are given in full in Chavannes’ _Documents_. _T_ughshāda -asked that the Türgesh might be ordered to attack the Arabs, Ghūrak -related the capture of Samarqand and asked for Chinese troops, Narayāna -complained of the seizure of all his treasures by the Arabs and asked -that representations might be made to induce them to remit their crushing -taxation. It is significant that the king of Chaghāniān, acting for his -suzerain, the Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān, did not compromise himself by -joining in these requests. But beyond “fair words” the son of Heaven took -no action, and no Chinese forces appeared West of the Jaxartes, in spite -of the repeated entreaties addressed by the princes to their self-elected -suzerain. - -The Türgesh, however, were not long in intervening on their own account. -Whatever opportunity the Arab government had to pacify the _S_ughdians -was lost by a succession of incompetent governors. Already in the reign -of ʿOmar II, as has been seen, they had withdrawn their allegiance from -the weak ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān b. Nuʿaym. For a moment the situation seemed -to improve at the beginning of the governorship of Saʿīd “Khudhayna” -(102/720) owing to the firm handling of Samarqand by his lieutenant -Shuʿba b. _Z_uhayr. But disturbances broke out and Shuʿba was recalled, -perhaps in a vain attempt to appease the insurgents. It would seem that -the _S_ughdians appealed to the new Turkish power in the East and Su-Lu, -unable to make headway against the growing influence of China, willingly -seized the opportunity of diverting his armies into Transoxania. A small -Türgesh force was sent under Köl-chur (called by _T_abarī Kūr_s_ūl)[75] -to make common cause with the _S_ughdian rebels in the following -spring (end of 102). Saʿīd awoke to find the whole country in arms, a -Turkish force marching on Samarqand, and the local princes, with few -exceptions, aiding the invaders. The Arab commanders could not rely on -their levies and a small garrison at Qa_s_r al-Bāhilī was evacuated only -with the utmost difficulty. The tale of their relief by a small force -of volunteers is one of the most spirited narratives of adventure in -_T_abarī. But such episodes did not affect the general success of the -Turkish forces. Kūr_s_ūl continued his advance through _S_ughd without -opposition, avoiding Samarqand, until at last Saʿīd was roused by public -reproach to march against the Turks. After a small initial success, which -he refused to follow up, he was severely defeated and confined to the -neighbourhood of Samarqand. The Turks were not strong enough to undertake -a siege of the city, as the whole operation seems to have been little -more than a reconnaissance in force combined with a raiding expedition. -As the Türgesh retired, the Arab cavalry followed them up as far as -Waraghsar, the head of the canal system of _S_ughd. Ghūrak appears to -have refrained from committing himself by openly aiding the rebels, and -doubtless recognised that the Arabs were not so easily to be dislodged. -From the fact that Saʿīd’s camp was pitched at Ishtīkhan, in close -proximity to him, it may even be conjectured that he outwardly supported -the Arabs. - -But the new governor of ʿIrāq, ʿOmar b. Hubayra, was not the man to stand -idly by in face of the danger that threatened Khurāsān. The weakness -shown by Khudhayna and the complaints of oppression from his subjects, -were sufficient reason for his recall, and Saʿīd b. ʿAmr al-_H_arashī, -a man of very different stamp, was installed in his place. The transfer -may be placed in the late autumn of 103/721. The new governor’s first -act was to summon the rebels to submit, but a large number of nobles and -merchants, with their retainers, either fearing that they could expect -no mercy, or anxious to free themselves altogether from the Arab yoke, -prepared to emigrate to Farghāna. Ghūrak did his utmost to persuade -them to remain, but without effect; their absence would no doubt affect -the revenues, and a certain emphasis is laid on the point in _T_abarī’s -account. Leaving hostages behind, the malcontents marched towards -Farghāna and opened negotiations with the king for the occupation of -ʿI_s_ām. The majority settled in the interval at Khujanda, but other -parties actually entered Farghāna, and one body at least occupied a -fortified position on the Zarafshān. Al-_H_arashī followed up his demands -by marching into _S_ughd and encamped near Dabūsia, where he was with -difficulty persuaded to stay until sufficient contingents arrived. On -advancing, he was met by a messenger from the king of Farghāna, who, -outwardly professing to assist the _S_ughdians, had secretly decided to -rid himself of them by calling in the Arabs against them. Al-_H_arashī -eagerly seized the opportunity and pressed forward, receiving the -allegiance of Ushrūsana as he passed. The emigrants, although urged by -their leader Karzanj either to take active measures or to submit, decided -to risk a siege in Khujanda, trusting to the protection of the king -of Farghāna. But when Saʿīd set about the siege in earnest, and they -realised that they had been betrayed, they surrendered on unexpectedly -easy terms. Saʿīd divided them, placing the nobles and merchants in a -camp apart from the soldiers. By the execution of Thābit, a noble from -Ishtīkhan, he provoked a revolt, under pretext of which he massacred the -nobles and the troops, sparing the merchants, who numbered four hundred, -only in order to squeeze them of their wealth. _T_abarī’s account very -thinly veils al-_H_arashī’s responsibility for this wanton act of -atrocious cruelty, which could not fail to embitter the feelings of the -whole population of Transoxania. It is curious that the Persian _T_abarī -(Zotenberg IV. 268) has an entirely different story, which is found in -none of the Arabic authorities. The refugees who escaped eventually took -refuge with the Khāqān of the Türgesh, where they formed a regiment -(no doubt continually recruited from new emigrants) which particularly -distinguished itself in the war against the Arabs[76]. - -The expedition to Khujanda may be put in the spring and summer of -722 (end of 103, beginning of 104), though the chronology here, and -indeed for all this period, is uncertain. The piecemeal reduction of -the fortresses in _S_ughd occupied the remainder of the year, a series -of operations whose difficulty is sufficient witness to the effect of -the news from Khujanda in stiffening the resistance to the Arabs. The -first fortress to be attacked was that of Abghar, in which a band of -the emigrants had settled. The attack was entrusted to Sulaymān b. -Abiʾs-Sarī, with an army composed largely of native levies from Bukhārā, -Khwārizm, and Shūmān, accompanied by their princes. Sulaymān persuaded -the dihqān to surrender, and sent him to al-_H_arashī, who at first -treated him well in order to counteract the effect of the massacre of -Khujanda, but put him to death after recapturing Kish and Rabinjān. The -most inaccessible fortress and the crowning example of Al-_H_arashī’s -perfidy were left to the last. The dihqān Subuqrī still held out in the -fortress of Khuzar, to the south of Nasaf; unable to take it by force, -Al-_H_arashī sent Musarbal b. Al-Khirrīt, a personal friend of Subuqrī, -to offer him a pardon. On his surrender, he was sent to Merv and put to -death, although the amnesty, it is said, had been confirmed by ʿOmar b. -Hubayra. - -The whole of _S_ughd was thus once more in the hands of the Arabs. The -nearer districts, Khwārizm and Bukhārā, had remained loyal and the Oxus -basin seems to have been unaffected. But to make a solitude and call it -peace did not suit the aims of the Arab government and Al-_H_arashī found -that his “policy of thorough” only provided Ibn Hubayra with an excuse -for superseding him. During the winter, therefore, he was replaced by -Muslim b. Saʿīd al-Kilābī, who, as the grandson of Aslam b. Zurʿa, came -of a house long familiar with Khurāsān. The danger of the movement of -revolt spreading to the Iranians of Khurāsān seems to have preoccupied -the Arab government during all this period. Saʿīd Khudhayna had poisoned -the too-influential _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī on suspicion of rousing the -Persians against the government and that it was felt even in Ba_s_ra -may be seen from Ibn Hubayra’s advice to his new governor, “Let your -chamberlain be one who can make peace with your mawālī.” Muslim, in fact, -favoured the Persians and did all in his power to appoint officials -acceptable to them, the Mazdean Bahrām Sīs, for example, being appointed -Marzubān of Merv[77]. But all such measures were merely palliatives -and could not materially affect the growing discontent in _S_ughd and -_T_ukhāristān. During his first year of office it is recorded (if the -narrative is not, as Wellhausen thinks, a duplicate of the raid on -Farghāna in the following year) that Muslim marched across the river -but was met and pushed back into Khurāsān by a Turkish army, narrowly -escaping disaster. It is not improbable that the local forces were again -assisted by Türgesh on this occasion. In the following year, however, -before the close of 105, a second expedition gained some success at -Afshīna, near Samarqand. Meanwhile Hishām had succeeded Yazīd II as -Caliph, and ʿOmar b. Hubayra, whose Qaysite leanings were too pronounced, -was recalled in favour of Khālid b. ʿAbdullah al-Qasrī of Bajīla. The -transfer took place most probably in March (724), though another account -places it some months later. Muslim was now preparing an expedition into -Farghāna, but the Yemenite troops at Balkh held back partly through -dislike of the campaign and doubtless expecting the governor’s recall. -Na_s_r b. Sayyār was sent with a Mu_d_arite force to use compulsion; -the mutinous Yemenites were defeated at Barūqān and unwillingly joined -the army. It is noteworthy that troops from Chaghāniān fought alongside -Na_s_r in this engagement. Before leaving Bukhārā Muslim learned that -he was to be superseded, at the same time receiving orders to continue -his expedition. Four thousand Azdites, however, took the opportunity of -withdrawing. The remainder, accompanied by _S_ughdian levies, marched -into Farghāna, crossed the Jaxartes, and besieged the capital, cutting -down the fruit trees and devastating the land. Here news was brought -that Khāqān was advancing against them, and Muslim hurriedly ordered a -retreat. The Arabic accounts graphically describe the headlong flight of -the Arabs. On the first day they retired three stages, the next day they -crossed the Wādī Sabū_h_, closely pursued by the Türgesh; a detachment, -largely composed of mawālī, which encamped separately, was attacked and -suffered heavy losses, the brother of Ghūrak being amongst the killed. -After a further eight days’ march, continually harassed by the light -Turkish horse, they were reduced to burning all the baggage, to the -value of a million dirhems. On reaching the Jaxartes the following day, -they found the way barred by the forces of Shāsh and Farghāna, together -with the _S_ughdians who had escaped from Saʿīd al-_H_arashī, but the -desperate and thirsty troops, hemmed in by the Türgesh from behind, cut -their way through. The rearguard made a stand, but lost its commander. At -length the remnants of the army reached Khujanda, where ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān -b. Nuʿaym took command on behalf of Asad b. ʿAbdullah, and made good his -retreat to Samarqand. - -This disaster, which is known as the “Day of Thirst,” marks a period in -the history of the Arab conquests. It was practically the last aggressive -expedition of the Arabs into Transoxania for fifteen years, but of -much greater importance was the blow which it struck at Arab prestige. -The rôles were reversed; from now onwards the Arabs found themselves -on the defensive and were gradually ousted from almost every district -across the Oxus. No wonder, therefore, that the memory of the “Day of -Thirst” rankled even long after it had been avenged[78]. According to -the Arab tradition, the Türgesh armies were led on this occasion not by -Su-Lu himself, but by one of his sons. Unfortunately the accounts of -Su-Lu in such Chinese works as have been translated are silent on his -Western expeditions, and the Arab historians are our only authorities. -The immediate result of the Arab defeat, not only in _S_ughd but in -_T_ukhāristān and the southern basin as well, was to stiffen the attitude -of passive resistance to the Arabs to the point at which it only needed -active support to break into a general conflagration. From this time, -if not before, the subject princes regarded the Türgesh as the agents -of their deliverance, commissioned by China in response to the urgent -entreaties they had addressed to the Emperor for aid in their struggle. -We find this actually expressed in a letter sent three years later by -the Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān, which is, in Chavannes’ words “but one long -cry of distress”[79]. “I am loaded with heavy taxation by the Arabs; -in truth, their oppression and our misery are extreme. If I do not -obtain the help of the (Chinese) Kagan ... my kingdom will certainly be -destroyed and dismembered.... I have been told that the Celestial Kagan -has given this order to the Kagan of the Türgesh: To you I delegate the -affairs of the Far West; you must at once send soldiers to drive out -the Arabs.” The point of view here expressed is of course that of the -ruling princes, whose resentment at the curtailment of their authority is -understandable. Besides making allowance for some natural exaggeration, -it would be dangerous to assume that this was as yet fully shared by the -people. In all probability, if we may judge from historical analogies, -there was also a pro-Arab party in Sogdiana, who felt that the best -interests of the country lay, not in an opposition whose final issue -could scarcely be in doubt, but in co-operation with their new masters as -far as was possible. The tragedy of the Arab administration was that by -alternately giving and refusing co-operation on its side, it drove its -supporters in the end to make common cause with its opponents. - -But though the situation was steadily deteriorating the decisive moment -had not yet come. The new governor, Asad b. ʿAbdullah, seems to have -seen something of the danger though factional feeling was running so -high that the administration was almost helpless in face of it. He -tried to continue Muslim’s policy of conciliation by appointing agents -of known probity. Tawba b. Abī Usayd, a mawlā who had been intendant -for Muslim, and who “treated the people fairly, made himself easily -accessible, dealt uprightly with the army and maintained their supplies,” -he persuaded to remain in office under him. Hāniʾ b. Hāniʾ, the financial -intendant at Samarqand, was unpopular; he was recalled and Al-_H_asan -b. Abiʾl-ʿAmarra_t_a of Kinda, who was in sympathy with the mawālī, -appointed in his place. With him was associated Thābit Qu_t_na, who had -been a leader of some repute under Saʿīd Khudhayna, “gallant warrior, -distinguished poet, confidant of Yazīd b. Muhallab, and universally -popular”[80]. Still more significant is the fact that one of Asad’s -earliest actions was to renew the practice, neglected since the days -of ʿOmar II, of sending an embassy to the Chinese court. As before, -however, the Arabs resented the favour shown to the Persians, and the -military weakness of Ibn Abiʾl-ʿAmarra_t_a roused them to open anger. -Strong Turkish forces, probably guerilla bands swollen by refugees -and malcontents from the wasted districts, spread over the country -and appeared even before Samarqand. The governor made some show of -opposition, but avoided coming to grips with them, thus intensifying his -unpopularity. - -Samarqand indeed was gradually becoming more and more isolated, but no -assistance could be given from Khurāsān. During his three years of office -Asad’s attention was wholly engaged with the situation in _T_ukhāristān -and the South. Even here his constant expeditions, to Gharjistān, -Khuttal, and elsewhere, met with no success. Worse still, in 108/726 he -found his forces in Khuttal opposed by the Khāqān with his Türgesh. The -princes of _T_ukhāristān had taken to heart the lessons of the “Day of -Thirst”, and the powerful chief who had already all but driven the Arabs -out of Sogdiana was now called in to expel them from the Oxus basin as -well. Asad visited his failure on the Mu_d_arites, whom he may have -suspected of treachery, but the indignation called out by his treatment -of such men as Na_s_r b. Sayyār, ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān b. Nuʿaym, Sawra b. -Al-_H_urr, and Al-Bakhtarī, made his recall inevitable. Nor had his -measures removed the distrust and hatred of the subject peoples. The land -was wasted and desolate[81], the crushing taxation was not lightened, and -all Persian governors were not of the stamp of Tawba; many of them were -but too ready to rival their Arab rulers in greed and cruelty. Asad may -have gained the friendship of many dihqāns[82], but that was an easier -matter than to placate the population. In such an atmosphere it was only -to be expected that Shīʿite and ʿAbbāsid propaganda, though actively -combated by the administration, found a fertile field among the Muslim -converts in Khurāsān and Lower _T_ukhāristān, and was already beginning -to undermine the whole fabric of Arab government. - -For a moment the hopes of a radical change of policy entertained by the -mawālī and the clearer-sighted Arabs were raised to the highest pitch by -the appointment (in 109) of Ashras b. ʿAbdullah as-Sulami, accompanied by -the separation of Khurāsān from Khālid al-Qasrī’s province of ʿIrāq. It -is unnecessary to recapitulate here the far-reaching concessions by which -he hoped to secure, and actually did for a time secure the allegiance of -the _S_ughdians, or the methods by which the local princes, especially -Ghūrak, succeeded in checking the movement[83]. It is generally assumed -that the hostility of Ghūrak was due to the serious fall in revenue -which would result. Though this was doubtless the plea put forward and -accepted by Ashras it can scarcely have been the true issue. Ghūrak’s -aim was not to maintain himself on good terms with the Arab governors -but to recover his independence. If once the people became “Arabs” all -hope of success must have been lost. It was a game with high stakes and -Ghūrak won. It must not be overlooked, however, that the account as we -have it is traditional and may often be mistaken on the sequence of -cause and effect. The astonishing reversal of the measures adopted by -Ashras is more probably to be explained by pressure from above, not from -below, and our tradition may really present only the popular view of -the Caliph Hishām’s reorganization of the financial administration[84]. -The Arabs resorted to brutal methods to wring the taxes from the new -converts, and with incredible blindness selected the dihqāns for -special indignities. It is not unlikely that Narshakhī’s story of the -martyrdom of native Muslims in Bukhārā is connected with this event, -though there are many other possible explanations, such as, for example, -an attempted _H_ārithite movement (see below, p. 76 f.) The reaction -swung the whole population of Transoxania, dihqāns and peasantry alike, -into open rebellion. The first small party of emigrants who quitted -Samarqand, although supported by a few Arabs, were induced to surrender -and return[85], but within a few months the dreaded Khāqān with his -Türgesh had joined forces with the rebels and swept the Arabs across the -Oxus. Even Bukhārā was lost[86] and only Samarqand with two minor posts -on the Zarafshān, Kamarja and Dabūsia, held out. Ghūrak, however, still -supported the Arabs, as Samarqand, although besieged, seems to have been -in no danger, while his son Mukhtār, doubtless to keep a footing in the -opposite camp, joined with the Türgesh. - -The pressing danger sobered the Arabs and temporarily united all parties -and factions. The army was concentrated at Āmul but for three months was -unable to cross the river in the face of the combined native and Türgesh -armies. A small body under Qa_t_an b. Qutayba which had already crossed -and fortified itself before the arrival of the Turks was beleaguered. The -Turkish cavalry even made raids on Khurāsān with an excess of boldness -which was punished by a mounted force under Thābit Qu_t_na. At length -Ashras got his forces across and, joining with Qa_t_an b. Qutayba, -advanced on Paykand. The enemy cut off the water supply, and had it not -been for the gallantry and self-sacrifice of _H_ārith b. Surayj, Thābit -Qu_t_na, and their companions, an even greater and more irretrievable -“Day of Thirst” had resulted. In spite of their weakness, Qa_t_an and the -cavalry of Qays and Tamīm charged the enemy and forced them back, so that -Ashras was able to continue his advance towards Bukhārā. In the heavy -fighting the Muslim forces were divided, Ashras and Qa_t_an gave each -other up for lost, and Ghūrak judged that the time had come to throw in -his lot with the Turks. Two days later, however, the armies were reunited -and on the retiral of the Turks encamped at Bawādara outside the walls of -Bukhārā, whence they prepared to besiege the city. Ghūrak also retrieved -his error and rejoined Ashras. The Khāqān withdrew towards Samarqand, -but sat down before Kamarja, expecting to take it by storm in a few -days at the most. The Arabic narratives of these events are confused in -several places, which has given rise to many incorrect statements, such -as that Ghūrak was beleaguered with the Arabs in Kamarja and that the -garrison consisted of Qa_t_an and his forces. Kamarja was not in the -neighbourhood of Paykand, as Wellhausen states, but a few farsakhs west -of Samarqand[87]. When the garrison would not yield to assault Khāqān -tried other methods. Accompanying his expedition was Khusrū the son of -Pērōz and grandson of Yazdigird, heir of the Sāsānid kings. This prince -was sent to parley with the garrison, but when he claimed the restoration -of his kingdom and promised them an amnesty, it is not surprising that -the Arabs indignantly refused to hear him. Nor would the appearance of a -Sāsānid prince evoke much enthusiasm amongst the Iranians of Transoxania. -As the Sāsānid house had taken refuge in China, however, the presence of -Khusrū might be taken as an indication that the rebels were receiving -encouragement from China also, though the Chinese records are silent on -this expedition. Khāqān’s second proposal, that he should hire the Arabs -as mercenaries, was rejected as derisively as the first. The siege was -then pressed with renewed vigour, both sides putting their prisoners and -hostages to death, but after fifty-eight days Khāqān, on the advice of -the son of Ghūrak and the other _S_ughdian princes, allowed the garrison -to transfer either to Samarqand or Dabūsia. On their choosing the latter, -the terms were faithfully carried out after an exchange of hostages. - -The fame of the defence of Kamarja spread far and wide, but it brought -little relief to the pressure on the Arabs in Transoxania. Even Khwārizm -was affected by the movement of revolt, but at the first symptoms of open -rebellion it was crushed by the local Muslims, probably Arabs settled -in the district, with the aid of a small force despatched by Ashras. -The reference made in _T_abarī to assistance given to the rebels by the -Turks is probably to be discounted, as is done by Ibn al-Athīr. It is of -course quite possible that the movement was instigated by the Türgesh, -though no such explanation is necessary, but if any Turks were engaged -they were probably local nomadic tribes. Ashras seems to have remained -before Bukhārā during the winter, possibly in Paykand; the Türgesh -probably withdrew towards Shāsh and Farghāna. - -In the following year, 730/111-112[88], the attacks on the army of -Ashras were renewed. The course of events can only be gathered from the -accounts given of the difficulties experienced by the new governor, -Junayd b. ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān al-Murrī, in joining the army before Bukhārā. -His guide advised him to levy a force from Zamm and the neighbouring -districts before crossing the Oxus but Junayd refused, only to find -himself after crossing put to the necessity of calling on Ashras for a -bodyguard of cavalry. This force narrowly escaped disaster on its way to -meet Junayd and fought a second severe engagement on the return journey -before reaching Paykand. The enemy are variously described as “men of -Bukhārā and _S_ughd” and “Turks and _S_ughdians”; it may therefore be -assumed that they were the same forces against whom Ashras had fought the -previous year. Wellhausen is probably correct in supposing that Ashras -was practically beleaguered, though not in Bukhārā. The recapture of this -city and the retiral of Khāqān took place shortly after Junayd’s arrival, -in circumstances which are not described[89]. The attitude of Tugshāda -during this episode is not recorded. It is practically certain, however, -that he remained in Bukhārā, and after the reconquest was able to make -his peace with the Arabs, probably on the excuse of _force majeure_. At -all events he retained his position, possibly because Junayd thought it -impolitic in the face of the situation to victimise the nobles in the -reconquered territories and thus provoke a more stubborn resistance in -the rest of the country. The Arabs seem to have followed up the Turks -towards Samarqand, probably to relieve the garrison; the two armies met -again at Zarmān, seven farsakhs from Samarqand, where the Arabs claimed -a success, one of their prisoners being a nephew of Khāqān. From _S_ughd -the army marched to Tirmidh where Junayd halted for two months in the -friendly atmosphere of Chaghāniān before returning to Merv. His intention -was no doubt to make arrangements for the pacification or reconquest of -_T_ukhāristān and Khuttal; in the following year his troops were actually -engaged in this direction when the Türgesh invasion of _S_ughd forced him -to change his plans. Balādhurī quotes Abū ʿUbayda for the statement that -Junayd reconquered certain districts in _T_ukhāristān which had revolted. - -How lightly even yet factional feeling was slumbering was shown after the -return of the army, when the Bāhilites of Balkh had a chance to retaliate -on Na_s_r b. Sayyār for their discomfiture at Barūqān. Though Junayd was -prompt to punish the offending governor, the incident throws a strong -light on one cause of the weakness of the Arabs in these campaigns. - -Early in 731/112-113, the Türgesh and _S_ughdians gathered their forces -for the investment of Samarqand. Ghūrak now openly joined the Khāqān. -Sawra b. Al-_H_urr, the governor of Samarqand, unable to face the enemy -in the field, sent an urgent message to Junayd for assistance. The -governor hastily recalled his troops, but crossed the river without -waiting for them against the advice of his generals. “No governor of -Khurāsān,” said al-Mujashshar b. Muzā_h_im, one of the ablest of the Arab -commanders, “should cross the river with less than fifty thousand men.” -Accompanied only by a small force, Junayd reached Kish, where he raised -some local levies and prepared to march on Samarqand. The enemy in the -meantime, after blocking up the water supplies on his road, interposed -their forces between Samarqand and the army of relief. Junayd thereupon -decided to follow the direct route across the Shāwdār mountains in -the hope of avoiding an engagement, but when only four farsakhs from -Samarqand was surprised in the defiles by Khāqān. The advance-guard -was driven in and the main body engaged in a furious struggle in which -both sides fought to a standstill. The Arabs, hemmed in on all sides, -were forced to entrench; stragglers, refugees, and baggage, collected -near Kish, were attacked by a detachment of Turks and severely handled. -Khāqān renewed his attacks on the camp the next day, all but overwhelming -Junayd, and settled down thereafter to beleaguer him. In this predicament -there was only one course open to Junayd. Had his force perished, -Samarqand would certainly have fallen in the end and two disasters taken -the place of one. He therefore adopted the more prudent, if unheroic, -course of ordering Sawra to leave a skeleton garrison in Samarqand and -march out to join him by way of the river: Sawra, however, took the short -cut across the mountains, and was actually within four miles of Junayd, -when the Turkish forces bore down on him. The battle lasted into the heat -of the day, when the Turks, on Ghūrak’s advice it is said, having first -set the grass on fire, drew up so as to shut Sawra off from the water. -Maddened by heat and thirst, the Arabs charged the enemy and broke their -ranks, only to perish miserably in the fire, Turks and Muslims together. -The scattered remnants were pursued by the Turkish cavalry and of twelve -thousand men scarcely a thousand escaped. While the enemy were engaged -with Sawra, Junayd freed himself from his perilous position in the -defiles, though not without severe fighting, and completed his march to -Samarqand. _T_abarī gives also a variant account of the “Battle of the -Pass,” the main difference in which is the inclusion of the Jabghu on the -side of the Turks. In view of the Arab expeditions into _T_ukhāristān, it -is improbable that the Jabghu, even if he was present personally, which -is doubtful, was accompanied by any of his troops. The Persian _T_abarī -also contains an entirely different version of the Battle of the Pass and -the fate of Sawra. The original version is amply attested by contemporary -poets, who show no mercy to Junayd. Whatever credit the Arabs gained -in this battle is reflected on Na_s_r b. Sayyār and the mawālī. Junayd -remained at Samarqand for some time, recuperating his forces, while -couriers were sent to Hishām with the news of the disaster. The Caliph -immediately ordered twenty thousand reinforcements from Ba_s_ra and Kūfa -to be sent to Khurāsān, together with a large number of weapons and a -draft on the treasury, at the same time giving Junayd a free hand in -enlistment. - -The Turks, disappointed in their attack on Samarqand, withdrew to -Bukhārā, where they laid siege to Qa_t_an b. Qutayba. Here they were also -on the natural lines of communication between Samarqand and Khurāsān. -Junayd held a council, and of three alternatives, either to remain in -Samarqand and await reinforcements, or to retire on Khurāsān _via_ Kish -and Zamm, or to attack the enemy, chose the last. But the morale of the -Arabs was sadly shaken; a garrison of eight hundred men for Samarqand -was scraped together only by granting a considerable increase in their -pay, while the troops openly regarded the decision to face Khāqān and -the Turkish hordes as equivalent to courting destruction. Junayd now -marched with the utmost circumspection, however, and easily defeated a -small body of the enemy in a skirmish near Karmīnīa. The following day -Khāqān attacked his rearguard near _T_awāwīs (on the edge of the oasis -of Bukhārā), but the attack had been foreseen and was beaten off. As it -was now well into November, the Türgesh were compelled to withdraw from -Sogdiana, while Junayd entered Bukhārā in triumph on the festival of -Mihrjān. In Chaghāniān he was joined by the reinforcements, whom he sent -on to Samarqand, the remainder of the troops returning to their winter -quarters. - -Junayd seems to have been content with saving Samarqand and Bukhārā. As -no further expeditions are recorded of his two remaining years of office -it must be assumed that the situation in _S_ughd remained unchanged and -that the Türgesh irruptions also were suspended. Though the Arabs still -held Samarqand and the territories of Bukhārā and Kish, they were in -all probability confined to these, while in the southern basin their -authority hardly extended beyond Balkh and Chaghāniān. Both sides may -have awaited the first move by the other, but were surprised by the -appearance of a new factor, which threatened the existence of Arab -sovereignty in the Far East more seriously than any external danger. It -is noteworthy that in his last year of office (115/733) Junayd resumed -relations with the Chinese court. The Turkish title of the leader of the -embassy, Mo-se-lan Tarkan, suggests that none of the ambassadors were -actually Arabs, but that the governor had commissioned some dignitaries -from the subject states to represent the Arab government. The only -embassy recorded in this year from a native state, however, came from -Khuttal. In the same year Khurāsān was visited by a severe drought -and famine, and to provide for the needs of Merv, Junayd commandeered -supplies from all the surrounding districts. This, added to the military -disasters of the last few years and the insinuations of Shīʿite -propaganda, provoked open discontent in the district which had hitherto -been outwardly faithful to Merv, namely the principalities of Lower -_T_ukhāristān. The leader of the malcontents was Al-_H_ārith b. Surayj, -who was flogged in consequence by the governor of Balkh. The discontent -flared into open revolt on the death of Junayd in Mu_h_arram 716 (Feb. -734). _H_ārith, assisted by the princes and people of Jūzjān, Fāryāb, and -_T_ālaqān, marched on Balkh and captured it from Na_s_r b. Sayyār. The -versions leave it uncertain whether _H_ārith defeated Na_s_r and then -captured the city or whether he entered the city first and beat off an -attempt at recapture by Na_s_r. (Wellhausen’s reference to the Oxus is -due to his so misunderstanding the “river of Balkh” in _T_ab. 1560. 2. -That it refers here, as frequently, to the Dehas river is clear from the -distance to the city (2 farsakhs, whereas the Oxus lay twelve farsakhs -from Balkh) as well as from the mention of the bridge of ʿA_t_ā.) From -Balkh he moved against the new governor ʿĀ_s_im b. ʿAbdullah al-Hilālī, -at Merv, capturing Merv-Rūdh on the way. ʿĀ_s_im found a large section -of the inhabitants in league with _H_ārith, but on his threatening to -evacuate Merv and to call for Syrian troops, the local forces rallied -round him. At the first reverse, the princes of Lower _T_ukhāristān -deserted _H_ārith, whose army fell from sixty thousand to three thousand. -He was thus reduced to making terms with ʿĀsim, but early in the -following year renewed his revolt. ʿĀsim, hearing that Asad b. ʿAbdullah -was on the way as his successor, began to intrigue with _H_ārith against -him. The plan miscarried, however; _H_ārith seized the governor and held -him to ransom, so that Asad on his arrival found the rebels in possession -of all Eastern Khurāsān, and Merv threatened both from the East and from -the South. Sending a force under ʿAbdur Ra_h_mān b. Nuʿaym towards Merv -Rūdh to keep _H_ārith’s main body in check, he marched himself against -the rebel forces at Āmul and Zamm. These took refuge in the citadel of -Zamm, and Asad, having thus checked the insurgents in this quarter, -continued his march on Balkh. Meanwhile _H_ārith seems to have retreated -before ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān towards Balkh and thence across the Oxus, where he -laid siege to Tirmidh. Lower _T_ukhāristān returned to its allegiance; -on the other hand _H_ārith was now supported not only by the kings of -Khuttal and Nasaf, but also, as appears from later events, by the Jabghu -of _T_ukhāristān. The government troops were unable to cross the Oxus -in the face of _H_ārith’s army; finding, however, that the garrison was -well able to defend itself, they returned to Balkh, while _H_ārith, -after falling out with the king of Khuttal, seems to have retired into -_T_ukhāristān. Here, following the example of Mūsā b. Khāzim at Tirmidh, -he made a safe retreat for himself in Badakhshān. - -The motives of _H_ārith’s rebellion have been most variously estimated. -In spite of the unctuous sentiments which he is represented as uttering -on all occasions, it is hard to find in him the “pious Muslim, ascetic -and reformer” whom van Vloten too sharply contrasts with the government -officials[90]. In spite too of the prominent position given to him in -the Arabic chronicles, it may even be questioned whether he and his -small personal following were not rather the tools than the leaders of -the elements making for the overthrow of the Umayyad administration in -Khurāsān. At all events the weakness of his hold over his temporary -followers is much more striking than his transient success. Further -evidence of this is given in a most important narrative prefaced by -_T_abarī to his account of Asad’s expedition into _S_ughd. Except for the -scantiest notices, the Arabic historians have nothing to say regarding -the effects of the war in Khurāsān on the situation in Transoxania. -Wellhausen’s conclusion (based apparently on _T_abarī 1890. 6) that -“_H_ārith first unfurled the black flag in Transoxania in the last -year of Junayd” is scarcely tenable. There is further no evidence at -all for his assumption that Samarqand had fallen into the hands of the -_H_ārithites, especially as Bukhārā remained loyal to the administration. -That Asad’s expedition was not, in fact, directed against _H_ārith -follows in the clearest possible manner from the narrative referred to -(_T_ab. 1585. 6-16). - - “Then Asad marched towards Samarqand by way of Zamm, and when - he reached Zamm, he sent to Al-Haytham ash-Shaybānī, one of - _H_ārith’s followers, who was in Bādhkar (the citadel of Zamm), - saying “That which you have disowned in your own people is only - their evil ways, but that does not extend to the women ... - _nor to the conquest by the unbelievers of such as Samarqand_. - Now I am on my way to Samarqand and I take an oath before God - that no harm shall befall you on my initiative, but you shall - have friendly and honourable treatment and pardon, you and - those with you....” So Al-Haytham came out to join him on the - condition of pardon which he had given him, and Asad pardoned - him, and Al-Haytham marched with him to Samarqand and Asad gave - them double pay.” - -The expedition therefore was obviously against unbelievers. That the -whole of _S_ughd was lost to the Arabs is clear from the fact that Asad -found it necessary to take provisions for the army with him from Bukhārā. -He was not successful in recapturing the city, however, and attempted no -more than the damming of the canal sluices at Waraghsar. - -The fate of the garrison of Samarqand has thus been passed over in -silence, unless, perhaps, it is hinted at in Asad’s reference to the -capture of Muslim women. Whether Ghūrak recaptured it with his own troops -or with the aid of the Türgesh, it can scarcely be doubted that he had -taken advantage of the dissensions in Khurāsān to realise his ambition -and at last drive the Arabs out of his capital. Of all the conquests -of Qutayba beyond the Oxus, Bukhārā, Chaghāniān, and perhaps Kish -alone remained to the Arabs. A confirmatory detail is the cessation of -_S_ughdian embassies to China between 731 and 740: now that independence -(even if under Türgesh suzerainty) had been won again, there was no need -to invoke Chinese support. Negative evidence of the same kind is afforded -by the absence of any Arab embassy during the same period. Had the Arabs -been in possession of _S_ughd, it is practically certain that Asad, -as he had done before, would have renewed relations with the Chinese -court. Against this view may be set the statement in _T_ab. 1613. 5 that -Khāqān was preparing an army to invest Samarqand at the time of his -assassination. This report is, however, from its nature untrustworthy, -and is contradicted by the presence of the king of _S_ughd with -_S_ughdian troops in the Türgesh army in 119/737 as well as by Na_s_r b. -Sayyār’s expedition to Samarqand two years later. _S_ughd thus enjoyed -once more a brief period of independence. In 737 or 738 Ghūrak died and -his kingdom was divided amongst his heirs. He was succeeded at Samarqand -by his son Tu-ho (? _T_arkhūn), formerly prince of Kabudhān. Another son -Me-chuʾo (? Mukhtār) was already king of Māyamurgh, while the king of -Ishtīkhan in 742 was a certain Ko-lo-pu-lo who may perhaps be identified -with Ghūrak’s brother Afarūn[91]. - -The year after the campaigns against _H_ārith, 118/736, was devoted by -Asad to the re-organisation of his province, including a measure which, -it seems, he had already projected in his first term of office. This was -the removal of the provincial capital from Merv to Balkh[92]. Since no -other governor of Khurāsān followed his example we must seek the motive -for the innovation either in the contemporary situation in Khurāsān -and Transoxania or in Asad’s personal views. Explanations based on the -former are not hard to find. Asad, on taking office, had been faced with -a serious situation both in Lower _T_ukhāristān and across the river. He -had obviously to establish a strong point _d’appui_. The loyalty of the -garrison at Merv was not above suspicion but the garrison at Balkh was -composed of Syrian troops, who could be trusted to the uttermost[93]. -Merv was also less convenient for reaching _T_ukhāristān, which was at -the moment the main area of operations. More important still, perhaps, -Balkh was the centre from which all disturbances spread in Eastern -Khurāsān, as in the revolt of Nēzak and the recent attempt of _H_ārith. -As the holding of Balkh had enabled Qutayba to forestall Nēzak, it is -possible that Asad felt that in Balkh he would be in a position to check -all similar movements at the beginning. Other considerations may also -have disposed him to take this view. Balkh was the traditional capital -and on it, as we have seen, was focussed the local sentiment of Eastern -Khurāsān. Merv, on the other hand, had always been the capital of the -foreigners, of the Sāsānians before the Arabs. Asad’s personal friendship -with the dihqāns may have given him some insight into the moral effect -which would follow from the transference of the administration to the -centre of the national life. Still greater would this effect be when the -rebuilding was carried out not by the Arabs themselves but by their own -people under the supervision of the Barmak, the hereditary priest-ruler -of the ancient shrine. Quite apart from this, however, the rebuilding -of Balkh was an event of the greatest significance, and once restored -it soon equalled, if it did not eclipse, its rival Merv in size and -importance. While the new city was being built, the army was employed in -expeditions into _T_ukhāristān, for the most part under the command of -Judayʿ al-Karmānī, who achieved some successes against the followers of -_H_ārith and even succeeded in capturing their fortress in Badakhshān. -Other raids were undertaken by the governor himself, but without results -of military importance. - -Asad now planned a more ambitious expedition against Khuttal, partly in -retaliation for the assistance given to _H_ārith, partly, it may be, to -wipe off an old score. The chronology presents some difficulties at this -point. _T_abarī relates two expeditions into Khuttal in the same year -119/737, both from the same source, but that which is undoubtedly the -earlier is dated towards the close of the year (Rama_d_ān = September). -Wellhausen avoids the difficulty by referring this expedition to 118, -reckoning back from the appointment of Na_s_r b. Sayyār, the data -for which are full and unimpeachable. This would seem the obvious -solution were it not that the date given in the Chinese records for -the assassination of Su-Lu, 738[94], agrees perfectly with _T_abarī’s -dating of the Battle of Kharīstān in Dec. 737. The presence of Asad -on the second expedition would then hang together with the “somewhat -legendary” narrative of the Mihrjān feast. There seems reason, therefore, -for dating this expedition in 120/738 and regarding it as having been -despatched by Asad, though not actually accompanied by him. _T_abarī -fortunately preserves also a short notice of the situation in Khuttal. -The heir of as-Sabal, whose name is to be read as Al-Hanash, from the -Chinese transcription Lo-kin-tsie[95], had fled to China, possibly on -account of factional disturbances. On his deathbed as-Sabal appointed a -regent, Ibn As-Sāʿijī, to govern the country until Al-Hanash could be -restored. The moment was certainly opportune for making an expedition and -Asad at first carried all before him. On his first appearance, however, -Ibn As-Sāʿijī had appealed for aid to Su-Lu, who was at his capital -Nawākath (on the Chu). The Khāqān, with a small mounted force including -the _S_ughdian refugees, marched from Sūyāb (near Tokmak, on the Chu) -to Khuttal in seventeen days, only to find Asad, warned of his approach -by the regent, who was endeavouring to play both sides off against each -other, in precipitate retreat. The baggage train had been despatched in -advance under Ibrāhīm b. ʿĀ_s_im with a guard of Arabs and native troops -from Chaghāniān but the main body was overtaken by the Turks as it was -crossing the river and suffered severe losses. Asad, considering himself -safe with the river between his army and the enemy, encamped and sent -orders to Ibrāhīm to halt and entrench his position. The Turks, however, -were able to effect a crossing; after an unsuccessful assault on Asad’s -camp, they hastened to overtake the richer prize while the governor’s -troops were too worn out to protect it. By sending a party under cover -to fall on the troops of Chaghāniān from the rear while he himself -attacked in front, the Khāqān forced an entrance into Ibrāhīm’s camp. -Chāghān Khudāh, faithful to the last, himself fell with the greater part -of his forces but the remainder of the garrison were saved by the timely -arrival of Asad. According to the main account, the Arabs were allowed -to withdraw to Balkh without further serious fighting. A variant account -given by _T_abarī relates an unsuccessful assault by the Türgesh on -Asad’s camp on the morning following the “Battle of the Baggage,” which -happened to be the feast of Fi_t_r (1st October 737). On the retiral of -the Arabs, the Khāqān, instead of returning to his capital with the -honours of the day, remained in _T_ukhāristān. - -Here he was joined by _H_ārith, who advised him to undertake a winter -raid into Lower _T_ukhāristān while the Arab troops were disbanded, -undoubtedly in the expectation that the local princes would again unite -with him against Asad. The governor retained his army at Balkh until -the winter had set in, and in the meantime the Khāqān summoned forces -to join him from _S_ughd and the territories subject to _T_ukhāristān. -The enumeration which _T_abarī gives of the troops accompanying the -Khāqān on this expedition shows very clearly how completely Arab rule in -Transoxania and the Oxus basin had been supplanted by that of the Turks. -We are told that besides the Khāqān’s own Turkish troops and _H_ārith -with his followers there were present the Jabghu, the king of _S_ughd, -the prince of Usrūshana, and the rulers of Shāsh and Khuttal. It is -fairly certain, of course, that the list is exaggerated in so far as the -actual presence of the princes is concerned (it is in fact partially -contradicted in other parts of the narrative), but it can scarcely be -doubted that forces from some, if not all, of these principalities -were engaged. On the evening of the 9th Dhuʾl-_H_ijja (7th Dec.) news -reached Balkh that the Türgesh with their auxiliaries, numbering some -30,000, were at Jazza. Asad ordered signal fires to be lit and with the -Syrian garrison of Balkh and what other troops he could muster from -the district marched out against them. The governor of Khulm sent in a -second report that the Khāqān, having been repulsed in an attack on the -town, had marched on towards Pērōz Nakhshēr, in the neighbourhood of -Balkh. From this point the enemy, avoiding Balkh, moved on Jūzjān and -occupied the capital[96]. Instead of continuing his advance immediately, -the Khāqān halted here and sent out raiding parties of cavalry in all -directions, an action which put it beyond doubt that the immediate object -of the expedition was not the capture of Merv but the rousing of Lower -_T_ukhāristān against the Arabs. Contrary to _H_ārith’s expectations, -however, the king of Jūzjān joined with the Arabs, who marched towards -Shubūrqān by way of Sidra and Kharīstān. From the conflicting narratives -in _T_abarī, it seems that Asad surprised the Khāqān in the neighbourhood -of Kharīstān (or Sān) at a moment when his available forces amounted only -to 4,000. A furious struggle ensued, which was decided in favour of the -Arabs by an assault on the Khāqān from the rear, on the initiative of the -king of Jūzjān. It is in connection with the battle, which he describes -as if it were a set engagement in which the whole of the opposing forces -were engaged, that _T_abarī gives his list of the combatants. But as only -4,000 out of the total of 30,000 troops with the Khāqān were involved, -the list is obviously out of place and the whole narrative shows the -marks of rehandling. The Muslims gained an overwhelming success: the -Khāqān and _H_ārith, having narrowly escaped capture in the confusion, -were closely followed by Asad as far as Jazza, when a storm of rain and -snow prevented further pursuit. They were thus able to regain the Jabghu -in _T_ukhāristān, with happier fortune than the raiding parties, whose -retreat was cut off by the vigilance of Al-Karmānī, and of whom only a -single band of _S_ughdians made good their escape. - -On this skirmish at Kharīstān, for it was little more, hung the fate of -Arab rule, not only in Transoxania, but possibly even in Khurāsān, at -least for the immediate future. Though the princes of Lower _T_ukhāristān -fought for Asad in the first place, there can be little doubt that a -victory for Su-Lu would have swung them back to the side of _H_ārith -and the Turks, who would then have been in a position to follow up -their attacks with the advantage of a base at Balkh, solidly supported -by the Oxus provinces. From such a danger the Arabs were saved only by -Asad’s resolution and fortunate selection of Balkh as his residence. The -account given of Hishām’s incredulity on hearing the report shows how -very serious the outlook had been and the extent to which the name of -the Khāqān had become an omen of disaster. Kharīstān was not only the -turning point in the fortunes of the Arabs in Central Asia, but gave the -signal for the downfall of the Türgesh power, which was bound up with the -personal prestige of Su-Lu. The princes of _T_ukhāristān and Transoxania -found it expedient to treat him with respect as he was returning to -Nawākath, but in his own country the dissensions long fomented in secret -by the Chinese broke out. Su-Lu was assassinated by the Baga Tarkhan -(Kūr_s_ūl); the kingdom fell to pieces. “The Turks split up and began to -raid one another,” and the _coup de grâce_ of the Khanate was delivered -at Sūyāb in 739 by the faction of Kūr_s_ūl, supported by the Chinese -and with the assistance of Al-Ishkand and contingents from Shāsh and -Farghāna[97][98]. With the collapse of the Türgesh kingdom disappeared -the last great Turkish confederation in Western Asia for more than two -centuries to come. The battle of Kharīstān assured the supremacy of -the Muslim civilisation in Sogdiana, but it could not have attained -the richness of its full development there unless all danger from the -steppes had been removed. That this security was attained was due not -to the Arabs, but to the Chinese diplomacy, which, by breaking down the -greatest external obstacle to the Muhammadan penetration of Central Asia, -brought itself face to face with the Arabs. This could scarcely have been -realised at once, however, by the Arab government, whose immediate task -was to restore its lost authority in Transoxania. - - -NOTES - -[74] As the history of this and the following period has been given -in considerable detail by Wellhausen (Arab. Reich 280 ff.) from the -Arab point of view, it is intended in these chapters to follow only -the situation in Transoxania and the course of the Türgesh conquests, -avoiding as far as possible a simple recapitulation of familiar matter. -Thus little reference is made to the factional strife among the Arabs, -though it naturally played a very important part in limiting their power -to deal with the insurgents. - -[75] See Chavannes, Documents 285, n. 3. - -[76] _Cf._ _T_ab. II. 1718. 3 ff. - -[77] _T_ab. 1462. 11; _cf._ 1688. 10, 1481 f. - -[78] _T_ab. 1690. 16. - -[79] Chav. Doc. 206 f., 293 f. - -[80] Van Vloten, La Domination Arabe 28. - -[81] _T_ab. 1533. 15. - -[82] _T_ab. 1501. 2. - -[83] Wellhausen 284 f.: van Vloten 22 f.: _T_ab. 1507 f.: Bal. 428 f. - -[84] See Wellhausen 218. - -[85] The variant readings in _T_ab. 1509. 11. (_cf._ Ibn al-Athīr) make -it doubtful whether the taxes were reimposed on them or not. - -[86] _T_ab. 1514. 11. - -[87] See Yāqūt s.v.: Barthold, Turkestan 127: and _cf._ _T_ab. 1523. 3. -The chief difficulty in _T_abarī’s text is the abrupt change at the last -word of l. 14 on p. 1516: thumma ta_h_awwala (ashrashu) ilā marjin yuqālu -lahu bawādaratun _faʿatāhum_ sabābatun ... wahum nuzūlun bikamarjata. -The context shows that it was not to Ashras that Sabāba came but to the -garrison of Kamarja with the news that the Khāqān was retiring past them -(mārrun bikum). - -[88] The chronological difficulties are explained by Wellhausen 285 ff. -They are of small importance however, and it seems preferable to follow -his dates for these campaigns. - -[89] _Cf._ _T_ab. 1528. 9. with 1529. 5 f. 14 f. - -[90] Van Vloten, _op. cit._ 29 ff.: Wellhausen 289 ff. (_cf._ 302 f.). -Another account of _H_ārith is given by Gardīzī ap. Barthold Turkestan, -Texts pp. 1-2. - -[91] Chav. Doc. 210, 136, 140; Barthold, Arab. Quellen 21. n. 8. - -[92] _T_ab. 1490, 1591. 18: Wellhausen 292 and 284 n.: Barthold in -Zeitschrift für Assyriologie XXVI (1911) 261. - -[93] _T_ab. 1590. 5. There does not seem to be any record of when these -Syrians were settled at Balkh. - -[94] Wieger 1643: Chav. Doc. 284 f. - -[95] Chav. Doc. 168. - -[96] As Jūzjān is distinguished from Shubūrqān in _T_ab. 1608. 17, it -is probable that this was the town Kundurm or Qurzumān mentioned in -Yaʿqūbī’s Geog. 287. - -[97] _T_ab. 1613: Chav. Doc. 83 f., 122 n. As regards the adjective -Kharlukhī applied to the Jabghu in 1612. 16, the most satisfactory -explanation is that given by Marquart, Hist. Glossen 183 f. - -[98] The frequent references in the Chinese annals to the association of -Se-kin-tʾi, king of Kish, with the Türgesh raise an interesting problem. -There can be no doubt that he is the same prince as Al-Ishkand, ruler -of Nasaf, in the Arabic records. The name is Iranian and personal, -not dynastic. (See Justi’s Iranisches Namenbuch.) Al-Ishkand is first -mentioned in the account of the Battle of the Pass, (_T_ab. 1542. 8) -where he appears in command of a cavalry force on the side of the Khāqān, -though Kish and Nasaf were both in the hands of the Arabs (1545. 1). The -forces which he commanded were therefore not the ordinary local troops. -During _H_ārith’s siege of Tirmidh he received reinforcements from -Al-Ishkand, but no statement is made on the composition of his forces. -He is mentioned again as accompanying the Khāqān and the _S_ughdians in -the attack on Asad before the “Battle of the Baggage” (1597. 17-18,) -where the reading ‘I_s_pahbadh of Nasā’ is probably an error in the -tradition. Again there can be no question here of local troops from Nasaf -or Kish. In the Chinese records Se-kin-tʾi appears as the commander of an -independent force, not merely a detachment of Turks or levies from Shāsh -or Farghāna. The most reasonable conclusion is that Al-Ishkand was the -commander of the corps of _S_ughdian refugees. This would explain the -title “King of the Warriors” by which he is sometimes mentioned in the -Chinese records (Chav. Doc. 147 n. 1 and 313). The actual term (Chākar) -from which the title was derived does not appear in the Arabic histories -in this connection, but it is perhaps possible that a variant of the name -(derived from _razm_) is to be read in _T_ab. 1614. 2 for the meaningless -“razābin al-Kissī.” In 1609. 15 a force of “Bābīya” is mentioned along -with the _S_ughdians, and the name, though unrecognisable, probably -refers to some forces connected with _S_ughd. Wellhausen’s conclusion -that the _S_ughdians and “Bābīya” formed part of the personal following -of _H_ārith b. Surayj seems to force the connection in the text too far -(_h_amala ʾl-_h_ārithu waman maʿahu min ahliʾs-sughdi wal-bābīyati). On -the other hand, since al-Ishkand appears as the ally of _H_ārith, we -may conclude that some understanding existed between the latter and the -_S_ughdians (and therefore the Turks) at the time of his revolt. It is -probable that the _S_ughdian corps assisted in the recovery of Samarqand -from the Arabs. - - - - -V. THE RECONQUEST OF TRANSOXANIA. - - -The reaction produced by the downfall of the Türgesh power was manifested -in Transoxania in the first place by an increased regard for China. The -princes had found the Türgesh yoke no less galling in the end than that -of the Arabs[99]; the country was as wasted and impoverished by their -continual raids as it had been under the latter. The profitable native -and transit trade, the source of the entire wealth of the cities, must -have shrunk to negligible proportions if it had not wholly ceased. All -classes of the people therefore were weary of war and sought only a -peace consonant with their self-respect. For the attainment of these -aims it was vain to look to China; the granting of bombastic titles -to a few princes brought neither comfort nor aid. A final opportunity -was thus offered to wise statesmanship to swing the whole country -round to the Arabs almost without a blow. For two years, however, the -situation seemed to remain much as it was, except for an expedition into -Khuttal, probably on the pretext of assisting the ruling house against -a usurper from Bamiyān. Nevertheless some progress had been made by the -administration in regaining the prestige it had lost. This was due not -merely to the effect of the victories over _H_ārith and the Türgesh, but -even more to Asad’s personal relations with the dihqāns. He had, as we -have seen, gratified the national pride of the people of _T_ukhāristān by -transferring the seat of power from Merv, the capital of the foreigners, -to Balkh, the centre of their national life. As had been the case even -in his first term of office, he was able to attract to his side many of -the more influential elements in Lower _T_ukhāristān and the Ephthalite -lands—to this, in fact, was largely due his success in the struggle with -the Turks. More striking evidence still is afforded by the conversion of -the dihqāns at this period, amongst them the minor chief Sāmān-Khudāh and -probably also the Barmak. By this means Asad laid the foundations for a -true reconciliation and Narshakhī’s work amply attests the honour which -later generations attached to his name. His work was of course incomplete -in that it was practically confined to the ruling classes and naturally -did not extend to the now independent dihqāns of _S_ughd. - -Early in 120/738 Asad died, and after a lapse of some months the -governorship was conferred by Hishām on Na_s_r b. Sayyār. For the subject -peoples no choice could have been more opportunely made. Na_s_r was -one of the few men who had come with honour and reputation through the -external and internal conflicts of the last thirty years. Belonging -to the small and almost neutral tribe of Kināna, his position bore a -strong similarity to that of Qutayba in that both were more dependent on -the support of a powerful patron than on their tribal connexions, and -therefore, though favouring Qays, less frantically partisan. In contrast -to Qutayba, however, Na_s_r, after thirty years of active leadership, -knew the situation in Khurāsān, Transoxania, and Central Asia as no -Arab governor had ever done. He had seen the futility of trying to hold -the country by mere brute force, and the equal futility of trying to -dispense with force. While he held the support of Hishām, therefore, he -set himself to restore Arab authority in Transoxania. The appointment -of Qa_t_an b. Qutayba, who had inherited much of his father’s ability, -to command the forces beyond the river gave earnest of an aggressive -policy. The appointment was not to Samarqand, as Wellhausen says, but -“over _S_ughd,” _i.e._, the garrisons in Bukhārā and probably Kish, who -were responsible in the first place for keeping the surrounding districts -in subjection. The governor himself then carried out a brief expedition, -intended apparently to punish some rebels in the neighbourhood of the -Iron Gate, possibly in Shūmān. Having thus vindicated the authority of -the administration, Na_s_r returned to Merv and delivered the famous -Khu_t_ba in which the system of taxation and conditions of amnesty were -at last laid down in a form satisfactory to the mawālī and the subject -peoples[100]. The results were as he had foreseen. The princes and people -of Transoxania submitted, as far as we can judge, without opposition when -Na_s_r with his army marched through _S_ughd to re-establish the Arab -garrison and administration in Samarqand. - -This expedition may in all probability be dated in 121/739. A year or -two later, Na_s_r collected his forces, which included levies from -Transoxania, for an attack on Shāsh. Wellhausen considers that the first -two expeditions were only stages of the third, but the expedition to -Shāsh can hardly have taken place earlier than 122/740, in view of the -fact that the armies of Shāsh and Farghāna were engaged with the Türgesh -in 739, and of Narshakhī’s statement[101], which there is no reason to -dispute, that _T_ughshāda was assassinated in the thirty-second year of -his reign. Reckoning in lunar years this gives 122 (91-122), in solar -years 123 (710-741), as the date. This is confirmed by the Chinese -record of an embassy from Shāsh in 741 complaining that “Now that the -Turks have become subject to China, it is only the Arabs that are a -curse to the Kingdoms”[102]. 123 is also the date given for the return -of the _S_ughdians[103]. It is most unlikely that the intervening year -or years passed without expeditions altogether, and the most reasonable -supposition is that they were occupied in the pacification of _S_ughd. -The expedition marched eastward through Ushrūsana, whose prince, as -usual, paid his allegiance to the victor on his passage, but on reaching -the Jaxartes Na_s_r found his crossing opposed by the army of Shāsh, -together with _H_ārith b. Surayj and some Turkish troops. It would seem -that he was unable to come to blows with the main body of the enemy, -but made a treaty with the king by which the latter agreed to accept an -Arab resident and to expel _H_ārith, who was accordingly deported to -Fārāb. As usual, later tradition magnified the exploits of the Arabs by -crediting Na_s_r with the capture and execution of Kūr_s_ūl, the Türgesh -leader who had been scarcely less redoubtable than the Khāqān himself. -If the story has any foundation it is probably a legendary development -from the capture of a Turkish chief Al-Akhram, related by _T_abarī in a -variant account. The presence of Kūr_s_ūl with a Türgesh force on this -occasion is not in itself impossible, but if his identification with -Baga Tarkhan is sound, we know that he was executed by the Chinese in -744/126[104]. The expulsion of _H_ārith was probably the object for which -the expedition had been undertaken; before returning, however, the Arabs -entered Farghāna and pursued its king as far as Qubā before bringing him -to terms. The negotiations were carried out between Sulaymān b. _S_ūl, -one of the princes of Jūrjān, and the Queen-Mother. This invasion of -Farghāna is related in three (or four) different versions, some of which -may possibly refer to a second expedition mentioned by _T_abarī later. -In the same year, on returning from the expedition to Shāsh, Na_s_r was -met at Samarqand by the Bukhār Khudāh _T_ughshāda and two of his dihqāns. -The nobles laid a complaint against the prince, but as Na_s_r seemed -indisposed to redress their grievance, they attempted to assassinate both -the Bukhār Khudāh and the Arab intendant at Bukhārā, Wā_s_il b. ʿAmr. The -former was mortally wounded, and succeeded by his son Qutayba, so named -in honour of the conqueror. The incident is related also by Narshakhī -with some additional details which profess to explain the assassination. -The two narratives present such a remarkable similarity of phrase, -however, even though they are in different languages, that it is rather -more likely that the Persian version has elaborated the story than that -_T_abarī deliberately suppressed any offensive statements, as argued by -van Vloten[105]. - -Except for a possible second expedition to Farghāna, no other campaigns -into Transoxania are recorded of Na_s_r, unless Balādhurī’s tradition -(from Abū ʿUbayda) of an unsuccessful attack on Ushrūsana refers to a -separate expedition. This is unlikely, and the account conflicts with -that given in _T_abarī. Ushrūsana, however, was never really subdued -until nearly a century later. _T_ukhāristān, if it had not already been -recovered by Asad, may have made submission of its own accord. Since the -defeat of the Türgesh and the flight of _H_ārith it had ceased to hold -any menace to the Arabs, and Na_s_r had accordingly retransferred the -capital to Merv on his appointment. - -The governor now turned his attention to restoring the prosperity of the -country and developing a policy of co-operation with the subject peoples. -Na_s_r was the first Arab ruler of Transoxania to realise that the -government depended for support in the last resort on the middle classes -and agriculturalists. Both these classes were of greater political -importance perhaps in Transoxania, with its centuries of mercantile -tradition, than any other were in the Empire. It was in the same way -that in later years the _T_āhirids and Sāmānids established their -ascendancy[106]. He was thus able not only to complete the work begun by -Asad b. ʿAbdullah, but to settle it on more stable foundations. Shortly -after his recapture of Samarqand he had sent an embassy to China. This -was followed up in 126/744 by a much more elaborate embassy, obviously -intended to regulate commercial relations in the most complete manner -possible, in which the Arabs were accompanied by ambassadors not only -from the Sogdian cities and _T_ukhāristān, but even from Zābulistān, -Shāsh, and the Türgesh. Two other Arab embassies are also recorded in -745 and 747. There can be no doubt that it was not so much the justice -of Na_s_r’s rule as his personal influence and honesty that reconciled -the peoples of Transoxania. Even the _S_ughdian refugees, stranded after -the dissolution of the Türgesh confederacy, trusted him to honour the -conditions upon which they had agreed to return, and were not deceived -although his concessions raised a storm of protest, and the Caliph -himself was brought to confirm them only for the sake of restoring peace. - -It is not surprising, however, that the princes were dissatisfied with -the success which had attended the pacification of Transoxania. The -people were “becoming Arabs” too rapidly and their own authority was -menaced in consequence. They were still hopeful of regaining their -independence, especially when Na_s_r’s position became less secure after -the death of Hishām. We hear therefore of sporadic embassies to China, -such as that sent from Ishtīkhan in 745 asking for annexation to China -“like a little circumscription.” That the governor was aware of this -undercurrent may be judged from the fact that he felt it necessary to -have _H_ārith b. Surayj pardoned, in case he should again bring in the -Turks to attack the government[107]. But the people as a whole held -for Na_s_r. The respect and even affection which he inspired held all -Transoxania true to him during the last troubled years. No tribute could -be more eloquent than the facts that not a single city in Transoxania -took advantage of the revolutionary movements in Khurāsān to withdraw -its allegiance, that Abū Muslim’s missionaries went no further than -the Arab colonies at Āmul, Bukhārā, and Khwārizm, and that the loyal -garrison of Balkh found first support and then refuge in Chaghāniān and -_T_ukhāristān. On these facts the various authorities whose narratives -are related by _T_abarī completely agree, and by their agreement -disprove the exaggerated account given by Dīnawarī (359 f.) that “Abū -Muslim sent his envoys (duʿāt) to all quarters of Khurāsān, and the -people rallied _en masse_ to Abū Muslim from Herāt, Būshanj, Merv-Rūdh, -_T_ālaqān, Merv, Nasā, Abīward, _T_ūs, Naysābūr, Sarakhs, Balkh, -Chaghāniān, _T_ukhāristān, Khuttalān, Kish, and Nasaf.” Dīnawarī himself -states a little later that Samarqand joined Abū Muslim only after the -death of Na_s_r. Abū Muslim’s main strength, in fact, was drawn from -Lower _T_ukhāristān and the neighbourhood of Merv-Rūdh, several of the -princes of which, including the ruler of Būshanj and Khālid b. Barmak, -declared for him. But even here the people were not solidly against -the administration. We are told that a camp was established at Jīranj -(south of Merv) “to cut off the reinforcements of Na_s_r b. Sayyār from -Merv-Rūdh, Balkh, and the districts of (Lower) _T_ukhāristān.” Herāt fell -to Abū Muslim by force of arms. The Syrian garrison of Balkh, together -with the Mu_d_arite party, were supported by the rulers of both Upper and -Lower _T_ukhāristān, and twice recaptured the city from their stronghold -at Tirmidh. An example of Abū Muslim’s efforts to gain over the Iranians -is afforded by an incident when, having taken 300 Khwārizmian prisoners -in an engagement, he treated them well and set them free[108]. - -The tradition of the enthusiasm of the Iranians for Abū Muslim is true -only of the period after his success. In our most authentic records there -is no trace of a mass movement such as has so often been portrayed. His -following was at first comparatively so small that had the Arabs been -more willing to support Na_s_r at the outset, it is practically certain -that it would have melted away as rapidly as the following of _H_ārith -b. Surayj at the first reverse. “Nothing succeeds like success,” and -Abū Muslim, once victorious on so imposing a scale, and that with the -aid of Iranians, became a heroic figure among the peoples of Eastern -Khurāsān. The legend penetrated but slowly into Transoxania. When by -130/748, however, the whole of Eastern Khurāsān had fallen to Abū Muslim -and Na_s_r no longer held authority, his governors in Transoxania were -replaced by the nominees of Abū Muslim without outward disturbance. But -the recrudescence of embassies to China shows that under the surface -currents were stirring. Shāsh had already thrown off its allegiance -and the Sogdian princes had by no means lost all hope of regaining -independence in spite of the tranquillity of the last few years. As it -happened, however, the first revolt was not on their part but by the Arab -garrison of Bukhārā under Sharīk b. Shaykh in 133/750-751. The rising, -which was due to their resentment at the seizure of the Caliphate by the -ʿAbbāsids and the passing over of the ʿAlid house, was suppressed with -some difficulty by Abū Muslim’s lieutenant Ziyād b. Sāli_h_ assisted by -the Bukhār Khudāh. The fact that the Bukhār-Khudāh assisted the troops -of Abū Muslim against Sharīk might be regarded as an indication that -he belonged to the party of the former. This inference is more than -doubtful, however. Of the 30,000 men, who, we are told, joined the -rebels, probably the greater part were the townsmen, or “popular party,” -of Bukhārā. The revolt thus assumed the domestic character of a movement -against the aristocratic party, who, led by the Bukhār-Khudāh, naturally -cooperated with the Government in its suppression. The events of the -following year are sufficient evidence against any other explanation. -According to Narshakhī, who gives by far the fullest account of this -revolt, Ziyād had also to suppress a similar movement in Samarqand. In -the same year an expedition was sent into Khuttal by Abū Dāwud, the -governor of Balkh. Al-_H_anash at first offered no opposition; later in -the campaign he attempted to hold out against the Arabs but was forced -to fly to the Turks and thence to China where he was given the title of -Jabghu in recompense for his resistance[109]. By this expedition Khuttal -was effectively annexed to the Arab government for the first time. - -Of much greater, and indeed decisive, importance were the results of -an expedition under Ziyād b. Sāli_h_ into the Turkish lands beyond -the Jaxartes. It is surprising to find no reference to this either in -_T_abarī or any other of the early historians. A short notice is given -by Ibn al-Athīr, drawn from some source which is now apparently lost. -The earliest reference which we find in the Arabic histories seems to -be a passing mention of Ziyād b. Sāli_h_’s expedition “into _S_īn” -in a monograph on Baghdād by Ibn _T_ayfūr (d. 250/983)[110]. For a -detailed account of the battle we are therefore dependent on the Chinese -sources[111]. In 747 and 749 the Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān had appealed -to China for aid against certain petty chiefs who were giving trouble -in the Gilghit and Chitral valleys. The governor of Kucha despatched on -this duty a Corean officer, Kao-hsien-shih, who punished the offenders -in a series of amazing campaigns over the high passes of the Karakorum. -Before returning to Kucha after the last campaign he was called in by the -King of Farghāna to assist him against the king of Shāsh. Kao-hsien-shih -at first came to terms with the king of Shāsh but when on some pretext -he broke his word and seized the city, the heir to the kingdom fled to -_S_ughd for assistance and persuaded Abū Muslim to intervene. A strong -force was accordingly despatched under Ziyād b. Sāli_h_. The Chinese, -with the army of Farghāna and the Karluks (who had succeeded the Türgesh -in the hegemony of the Western Turks), gave battle at Athlakh, near -_T_arāz, in July 751 (Dhuʾl-_h_ijja 133). During the engagement the -Karluks deserted and Kao-hsien-shih, caught between them and the Arabs, -suffered a crushing defeat. Though this battle marks the end of Chinese -power in the West, it was in consequence of internal disruption rather -than external pressure. Nothing was further at first from the minds of -the princes of _S_ughd than the passing of the long tradition of Chinese -sovereignty, indeed it blazed up more strongly than ever. For had not -a Chinese army actually visited Shāsh on their very borders; even if -the Arabs had won the first battle, would they not return to avenge the -defeat? For the last time the Shao-wu princes planned a concerted rising -in Bukhārā, Kish, _S_ughd, and Ushrūsana. But China gave neither aid -nor encouragement; the presence of Abū Muslim at Samarqand overawed the -_S_ughdians, and only at Kish did the revolt assume serious proportions. -Abū Dāwud’s army easily crushed the insurgents in a pitched battle at -Kandak, near Kish, killing the king Al-Ikhrīd and many of the other -dihqāns. Amongst the treasures of the royal palace which were sent to -Samarqand were “many articles of rare Chinese workmanship, vessels inlaid -with gold, saddles, brocades, and other objects d’art.” The Bukhār-Khudāh -Qutayba and the dihqāns of _S_ughd also paid for their complicity with -their lives[112]. - -So ended the last attempt at restoring an independent Sogdiana under -the old régime. For some years yet the princes of _S_ughd, Khwārizm, -and _T_ukhāristān continued to send appeals to China. The Emperor, -however, “preoccupied with maintaining peace, praised them all and gave -them consolation, then having warned them sent them back to assure -tranquillity in the Western lands.” Abū Muslim had also, it would seem, -realised the importance of maintaining relations with the Chinese court, -for a succession of embassies from “the Arabs with black garments” is -reported, beginning in the year following the battle of the Talas. -As many as three are mentioned in a single year. It is possible that -these embassies were in part intended to keep the government informed -on the progress of the civil wars in China, though the active interest -of the new administration in their commerce would, as before, tend to -reconcile the influential mercantile communities to ʿAbbāsid rule. The -actual deathblow to the tradition of Chinese overlordship in Western -Central Asia was given, not by any such isolated incident as the battle -of the Talas, but by the participation of Central Asian contingents in -the restoration of the Emperor to his capital in 757[113]. Men from the -distant lands to whom China had seemed an immeasurably powerful and -unconquerable Empire now saw with their own eyes the fatal weaknesses -that Chinese diplomacy had so skilfully concealed. From this blow Chinese -prestige never recovered. - -The complete shattering of the Western Turkish empires by the Chinese -policy had also put an end to all possibility of intervention from that -side. Transoxania, therefore, was unable to look for outside support, -while the reorganization of the Muslim Empire by the early ʿAbbāsid -Caliphs prevented, not indeed sporadic though sometimes serious risings, -but any repetition of the concerted efforts at national independence. -The Shao-wu princes and the more important dihqāns continued to exercise -a nominal rule until the advent of the Sāmānids, but many of them -found that the new policy of the Empire offered them an opportunity of -honourable and lucrative service in its behalf and were quick to take -advantage of it. On the other hand the frequent revolts in Eastern -Khurāsān under the guise of religious movements show that the mass of the -people remained unalterably hostile to their conquerors[114]. In none of -these, however, was the whole of Transoxania involved until the rising -organized by Rāfiʿ b. Layth three years after the fall of the Barmakids. -The extraordinary success of his movement may partly be ascribed to -resentment at their disgrace, but it perhaps counted for something that -he was the grandson of Na_s_r b. Sayyār. Though the revolt failed it led -directly to the only solution by which Transoxania could ever become -reconciled to inclusion in the Empire of the ʿAbbāsids. Whether by wise -judgment or happy chance, to Maʿmūn belongs the credit of laying the -foundations of the brilliant Muhammadan civilisation which the Iranian -peoples of Central Asia were to enjoy under the rule of a dynasty of -their own race. - - -NOTES - -[99] _Cf._ _T_abarī 1594. 14: 1613. 3: Chavannes, Documents 142. - -[100] The details of this measure are discussed by Wellhausen, Das -Arabische Reich 297 ff., and van Vloten, Domination Arabe 71 f. Note that -_T_ab. 1689. 5 expressly refers to them as “conditions of peace.” - -[101] Narshakhī 8. 19. - -[102] Chav., Doc. 142. - -[103] _T_ab. 1717 f. - -[104] Chav., Doc. 286. - -[105] Van Vloten, _op. cit._ 20. _Cf._ _e.g._ _T_ab. 1694. 1 with Narsh. -60. 3-5. - -[106] Barthold, Turkestan 219. - -[107] _T_ab. 1867. - -[108] _T_ab. 1956. 17; 1966.10; 1997 ff. (this passage is unfortunately -defective and has been supplemented by the editor from Ibn al-Athīr); -1970. 9. The popularity of Na_s_r is demonstrated also by the growth of a -tradition round his name. This appears in _T_abarī somewhat unobtrusively -in isolated passages, unfortunately without quotation of Madāʾinī’s -authorities. According to the “Fihrist” (103. 12) Madāʾinī wrote two -books on the administrations of Asad b. ʿAbdullah and Na_s_r b. Sayyār, a -fact which confirms the special importance of these two governors in the -history of Khurāsān. Probably Asad was more popular with the dihqāns and -Na_s_r with the people. - -[109] Chav., Doc. 168: _cf._ Marquart, Ērānshahr 303. - -[110] Kitāb Baghdād, Band VI ed. H. Keller, p. 8. 12. - -[111] Chav., Doc. 297 f.; Wieger, Textes Historiques 1647. - -[112] _T_ab. III. 79 f.: Narsh. 8 fin.: Chav., Doc. 140, Notes Addit. 86 -and 91. - -[113] Wieger 1684 ff.: Chav., Doc. 158 n. 4 and 298 f. _Cf._ my article -“Chinese records of the Arabs in Central Asia” in the Bulletin of the -School of Oriental Studies, II. 618 f. - -[114] A full account of these risings is given by Prof. E. G. Browne in -“Literary History of Persia” vol. I, 308 ff. - - - - -BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CHIEF WORKS CITED. - - -A. ORIENTAL AUTHORITIES. - -Al-Balādhurī: (1) (_Kitāb al-Ansāb_) _Anonyme Arabische Chronik_, Band -XI, ed. W. Ahlwardt, Greifswald, 1883. - -—— (2) _Kitāb Futū_h_ al Buldān_, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leyden, 1865. - -Ad-Dīnawarī: _Kitāb al-Akhbār a_t_-_T_iwāl_, ed. V. Guirgass, Leyden, -1888. - -_Fragmenta Historicorum Arabicorum_, vol. I, from Kitāb al-ʿUyūn, ed. M. -J. de Goeje and P. de Jong, Leyden, 1869. - -Ibn al-Athīr: _Taʿrīkh al-Kāmil_, 12 vols., Cairo 1290 A.H. - -Ibn Khalliqān, _Biographical Dictionary_, trans. by Baron MacGuckin de -Slane, 4 vols., Paris, 1842-1871. - -Ibn Khūrdādhbih: _Kitāb al-Masālik wal-Mamālik_, ed. M. J. de Goeje, -(Bibl. Geog. Arab. VI), Leyden, 1889. - -Ibn Qutayba: _Kitāb al-Maʿārif_, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Göttingen, 1850. - -Al-I_st_akhrī: _Kitāb Masālik al-Mamālik_, ed. M. J. de Goeje, (Bibl. -Geog. Arab. I), Leyden, 1870. - -An-Narshakhī: _Description Topographique et Historique de Boukhara par -Mohammed Nerchakhy_, ed. C. Schefer, Paris, 1892. - -A_t_-_T_abarī: (1) _Annales quos scripsit Abū Jaʿfar ... a_t_-_T_abarī_, -ed. M. J. de Goeje et alii, 15 vols., Leyden, 1879-1901. - -—— (2) _Chronique de Tabari traduite sur la version persane de ... -Belʿami par H. Zotenberg_, 4 vols., Paris, 1867-1874. - -Al-Yaʿqūbī: (1) _Kitāb al-Buldān_, ed. M. J. de Goeje, (Bibl. Geog. Arab. -VII), Leyden, 1892. - -—— (2) _Ibn Wadhih qui dicitur Al-Jaʿkubi Historiae_, ed. M. Th. Houtsma, -2 vols., Leyden, 1883. - -Yāqūt: _Geographisches Wörterbuch_, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, 6 vols., Leipzig, -1866-1873. - - -B. EUROPEAN WORKS. - -W. Barthold: (1) _Turkyestan v’Epokhu Mongolskavo Nashyestviya_, St. -Petersburg, 1898. - -—— (2) _Zur Geschichte des Christenthums in Mittel-Asien bis zur -Mongolischen Eroberungen_, German trans. by R. Stübe, Tubingen and -Leipzig, 1901. - -—— (3) See under Radloff. - -—— (4) Articles in _Encyclopaedia of Islām_. - -L. Caetani: _Chronographia Islamica_, Paris, 1912-(proceeding). - -Léon Cahun: _Introduction à l’Histoire de l’Asie: Turcs et Mongols des -Origines à 1450_, Paris, 1896. - -E. Chavannes: (1) _Documents sur les Tou-Kiue (Turcs) Occidentaux_, St. -Petersburg, 1903. - -—— (2) _Notes Additionnelles sur les Tou-Kiue Occidentaux, T’oung Pao_, -vol. V (1904). - -H. Cordier: _Histoire Générale de la Chine_, tome I, Paris, 1920. - -M. A. Czaplicka: _The Turks of Central Asia_, Oxford U.P., 1918 (contains -a very full bibliography). - -_Encyclopaedia Britannica_, Eleventh Edition, 1910-1911. - -_Encyclopaedia of Islām_, Leyden and London, 1913-(proceeding). - -O. Franke: _Beiträge aus Chinesischen Quellen zur Kenntnis der Türkvölker -und Skythen Zentralasiens_, Berlin, 1904. - -I. Goldziher: _Muhammandanische Studien_, Band I, Halle, 1888. - -A. von Kremer: _Culturgeschichte des Orients unter den Chalifen_, 2 -vols., Vienna, 1875-1877. - -G. Le Strange: _The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate_, Cambridge, 1905. - -J. Marquart: (1) _Die Chronologie der Alttürkischen Inschriften_, -Leipzig, 1898. - -—— (2) _Historische Glossen zu den Alttürkischen Inschriften_, W.Z.K.M., -vol. XII (1898) pp. 157-200. - -—— (3) _Ērānshahr ..._, Berlin, 1901, with notices by:— - - W. Bang, in Keleti Szemle III (1902). - - E. Chavannes in J.A. Ser. IX t. XVIII (1901). - - M. J. de Goeje, in W.Z.K.M. XVI (1902). - - Th. Nöldeke, in Z.D.M.G. LVI (1902). - -Sir W. Muir: _The Caliphate, its Rise, Decline, and Fall_: New edition, -ed. T. H. Weir, Edinburgh, 1915. - -Th. Nöldeke: _Geschichte der Perser und Araber zur Zeit der Sasaniden -..._, Leyden, 1879. - -_Pauly’s Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft, Neue -Bearbeitung_, Stuttgart, 1895-(proceeding). - -T. Peisker: “The Asiatic Background,” _Cambridge Mediaeval History_, vol. -I (1911). - -W. Radloff: (1) _Die Alttürkischen Inschriften der Mongolei, Neue Folge_, -St. Petersburg, 1897: with appendix by— - - W. Barthold: _Die Historische Bedeutung der Alttürk. Inschr._ - -—— (2) _Die Alttürkischen Inschriften der Mongolei, Zweite Folge_, St. -Petersburg, 1899: with appendices by— - - W. Barthold: _Die Alttürk. Insch. und die Arabischen Quellen_. - - Fr. Hirth: _Nachworte zur Inschrift des Tonjukuk_. - -E. Sachau: _Zur Geschichte und Chronologie von Khwārizm_, 2 parts, -Vienna, 1873 (S.B.W.A.). - -K. Shiratori: _Über den Wu-sun-stamm in Centralasien, Keleti Szemle_ III -(1902), pp. 103-140. - -F. H. Skrine and E. D. Ross: _The Heart of Asia_: A History of Russian -Turkestan, etc., from the Earliest Times. London, 1899. - -M. A. Stein: (1) _Ancient Khotan_, Oxford, 1907. - -—— (2) _Serindia_, vol. I, Oxford, 1921. - -E. Thomas: _Contributions to the Numismatic History of the Early -Mohammedan Arabs in Persia_, J.R.A.S. First Series, vol. XII (1850), pp. -253-347. - -W. Tomaschek: _Centralasiatische Studien_: I. _Soghdiana_, Vienna, 1877 -(S.B.W.A.). - -A. Vámbéry: _History of Bokhara from the Earliest Period down to the -Present_, London, 1873. - -G. van Vloten: _Recherches sur la Domination Arabe, etc., sous le -Khalifat des Omayades_, Amsterdam, 1894. - -J. Wellhausen: _Das Arabische Reich und Sein Sturz_, Berlin, 1902. - -L. Wieger, S.J.: _Tomes Historiques_, ? 1903-1905. - -Yüan Chwang: _On Yüan Chwang’s travels in India_, T. Watters, 2 vols., -London, 1904 (Oriental Translation Fund, New Series, vols. XIV and XV). - - Printed in Great Britain by FOX, JONES & CO., - Kemp Hall Press, High Street, Oxford, England. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Arab conquests in Central Asia, by -Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ARAB CONQUESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA *** - -***** This file should be named 61791-0.txt or 61791-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/6/1/7/9/61791/ - -Produced by Turgut Dincer and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, -and may not be used if you charge for the eBooks, unless you receive -specific permission. If you do not charge anything for copies of this -eBook, complying with the rules is very easy. You may use this eBook -for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, -performances and research. They may be modified and printed and given -away--you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks -not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the -trademark license, especially commercial redistribution. - -START: FULL LICENSE - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full -Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at -www.gutenberg.org/license. - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or -destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your -possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a -Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound -by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the -person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph -1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this -agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the -Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection -of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual -works in the collection are in the public domain in the United -States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the -United States and you are located in the United States, we do not -claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, -displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as -all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope -that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting -free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm -works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the -Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily -comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the -same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when -you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are -in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, -check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this -agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, -distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any -other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no -representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any -country outside the United States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other -immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear -prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work -on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, -performed, viewed, copied or distributed: - - This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and - most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no - restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it - under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this - eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the - United States, you'll have to check the laws of the country where you - are located before using this ebook. - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is -derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not -contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the -copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in -the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are -redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply -either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or -obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any -additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms -will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works -posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the -beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including -any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access -to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format -other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official -version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site -(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense -to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means -of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain -Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the -full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -provided that - -* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed - to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has - agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid - within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are - legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty - payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in - Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg - Literary Archive Foundation." - -* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all - copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue - all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm - works. - -* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of - any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of - receipt of the work. - -* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than -are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing -from both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and The -Project Gutenberg Trademark LLC, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project -Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may -contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate -or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or -other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or -cannot be read by your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium -with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you -with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in -lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person -or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second -opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If -the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing -without further opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO -OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of -damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement -violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the -agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or -limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or -unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the -remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in -accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the -production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, -including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of -the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this -or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or -additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any -Defect you cause. - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of -computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It -exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations -from people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future -generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see -Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at -www.gutenberg.org - - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by -U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is in Fairbanks, Alaska, with the -mailing address: PO Box 750175, Fairbanks, AK 99775, but its -volunteers and employees are scattered throughout numerous -locations. Its business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, Salt -Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up to -date contact information can be found at the Foundation's web site and -official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND -DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular -state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To -donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project -Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be -freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and -distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of -volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in -the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search -facility: www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - |