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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9afcaa8 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #61791 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/61791) diff --git a/old/61791-0.txt b/old/61791-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index b1e59aa..0000000 --- a/old/61791-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3900 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Arab conquests in Central Asia, by -Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Arab conquests in Central Asia - -Author: Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb - -Release Date: April 8, 2020 [EBook #61791] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ARAB CONQUESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA *** - - - - -Produced by Turgut Dincer and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive) - - - - - -Transcriber’s Note: This text makes use of an uncommon system for -transcription of Arabic. Italics, sometimes on a _s_ingle le_t_ter, -are semantically meaningful; and you’ll need a font that can display -macrons (āēīōū) and the characters for the transliterations of -Arabic letters ain (ʿ) and hamza (ʾ). - - - - - -THE ARAB CONQUESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA - - - - - JAMES G. FORLONG FUND - VOL. II. - - THE ARAB CONQUESTS - IN - CENTRAL ASIA - - H. A. R. GIBB, M.A. - (EDIN. AND LOND.) - Lecturer in Arabic, School of Oriental Studies, London. - - THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY - 74 GROSVENOR STREET, LONDON, W.1. - 1923 - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PAGE - - PREFACE vii - - I. THE OXUS BASIN - Early History—Political Divisions—The - Arabic Sources 1 - - II. THE EARLY RAIDS 15 - - III. THE CONQUESTS OF QUTAYBA 29 - - IV. THE TURKISH COUNTERSTROKE 59 - - V. THE RECONQUEST OF TRANSOXANIA 88 - - BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CHIEF WORKS CITED 100 - - - - -PREFACE - - -The first draft of this work was presented to the University of London in -December 1921, under the title of “The Arab Conquest of Transoxania”, as -a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts, and was approved by the Senate -in January 1922, for publication as such. During the year my attention -was taken up in other directions and, except for the publication of two -studies on the subject in the Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, -nothing further was done until by the generosity of the Trustees of the -Forlong Bequest Fund an opportunity of publication was offered. In its -present form the work has been largely rewritten and revised. It makes no -claim to present a complete historical account of the Arabs in Central -Asia, but is intended solely as a critical study of the authorities in -greater detail than has hitherto been made. Much is therefore omitted -because it has already been dealt with in the standard histories. In -order to keep down the cost of publication, the extensive references -which originally accompanied the text have been cut down to a few notes -at the end of each chapter. No references are given when, as in the great -majority of cases, the authority for the statements made can easily be -found in the appropriate place either in _T_abarī or Balādhurī. - -I regret that several works which are indispensable for a thorough study -of the subject have, for linguistic reasons, been inaccessible to me. -Such are van Vloten’s _Opkomst der Abbasiden_, and almost the whole range -of Russian research work. Through the kindness of Sir Denison Ross, -however, I have been able to avail myself of a draft MS. translation of -the most important and valuable of them all, Professor W. Barthold’s -_Turkestan_, as well as of his as yet unpublished London lectures on -“The Nomads of Central Asia.” My sincere thanks are due to Sir Denison -Ross also for his continued interest and material assistance ever -since he first introduced me to the subject; to Sir Thomas Arnold for -much encouragement and helpful counsel; to Professor Barthold, who has -read the MS. through and made a number of valuable suggestions; to the -Trustees of the Forlong Bequest Fund for their kindness in undertaking -the publication; and in no small measure to my wife, who has given much -time and labour to preparing the MS. for publication. - - London, April, 1923. - - - - -I. INTRODUCTION - -THE OXUS BASIN - - -_Early History._ - -The Oxus is a boundary of tradition rather than of history. Lying -midway between the old frontier of Aryan civilisation formed by the -Jaxartes and the Pamīr and the natural strategic frontier offered by the -north-eastern escarpment of the plateau of Īrān, it has never proved a -barrier to imperial armies from either side. It was not on the Oxus but -on the Jaxartes that Alexander’s strategic insight fixed the position of -Alexander Eschate, and when the outposts of Persian dominion were thrust -back by the constant pressure of the Central Asian hordes, their retreat -was stayed not on the Oxus but on the Murghāb. Thus when the tide of -conquest turned and the Arabs won back her ancient heritage for Persia, -they, like Alexander, were compelled to carry their arms ever further to -the East and all unknowing re-establish the frontiers of the Achaemenid -Empire. It was from the legends of Sāsānian times, enshrined in the pages -of the historians and the national epic of Firdawsī, that the Oxus came -to be regarded as the boundary between Īrān and Tūrān. - -Through all the centuries of invasion, however, the peoples of Sogdiana -and the Oxus basin remained Iranian at bottom, preserving an Iranian -speech and Iranian institutions. But the political conditions of the -country at the period of the Arab conquests were so complex that it is -necessary to trace briefly the course of their development. - -The second century B.C. was a period of upheaval in Central Asia: the -powerful Hiung-Nu peoples were dispossessing weaker tribes of their -pasture lands and forcing them to migrate westwards. Between 150 and -125 B.C. a succession of nomadic tribes, the last and most powerful of -which were a branch of the Yueh-Chi, were driven down into Sogdiana. It -is now generally held that these tribes were of Aryan origin, though the -question is not perhaps settled with absolute certainty. Before long, -however, a second group, the K’ang, possessed themselves of Sogdiana, -driving the Yueh Chi on into Bactria and the Afghan mountains[1]. In -these districts they found, alongside the Iranian peasantry, a settled -population of Tukhari (in Chinese, Ta-Hia), already noted in the Chinese -annals for their commercial enterprise[2], and while at first the nomad -tribes introduced complete confusion, it would seem that they rapidly -absorbed, or were absorbed by, the native elements, and thus assimilated -the Hellenistic civilisation of Bactria. From this fusion arose, about -50 A.D., the powerful Kushan Empire which spread into India on the one -side and probably maintained some form of suzerainty over the K’ang -kingdoms of Sogdiana on the other. Under the new empire, Buddhism was -acclimatised in Turkestan, and Sogdiana developed into a great _entrepôt_ -for Chinese trade with the West. Towards the close of the third century -the Kushan Empire, weakened by attacks from the new national dynasties -in India and Persia, reverted to its primitive form of small independent -principalities, which, however, retained sufficient cohesion to prevent -a Persian reconquest. It is practically certain that Sāsānian authority -never extended beyond Balkh and rarely as far. In the fourth and -fifth centuries references are made to a fresh horde of nomads in the -north-east, the Juan-Juan (Chionitae, Avars)[3], but it does not appear -that any new settlements were made in the Oxus countries. - -In the middle of the fifth century, another people, the Ephthalites -(Arabic Hay_t_al, Chinese Ye-Tha), perhaps a branch of the Hiung-nu, -not only completely overran the former Kushan territories, but by -successive defeats of the Persian armies forced the Sāsānid Kings to pay -tribute. The Ephthalites appear to have been a nomadic people organised -as a military caste of the familiar Turkish type, and the existing -institutions and principalities, in large part at least, continued side -by side with them[4]. Their rule was too transitory to produce any -lasting effects, or to inflict any serious injury on the commerce and -prosperity of Sogdiana. - -The rise of the Central Asian empire of the Turks proper (Tu-Kueh) dates -from their overthrow of the Juan-Juan in Mongolia in 552, under their -great Khan, Mokan. His brother Istämi (the Silzibul of the Byzantine -historians), the semi-independent jabghu of the ten tribes of Western -Turks, after consolidating his power in the Ili and Chu valleys, formed -an alliance with Khusrū Anūshīrwān, and in a joint attack between 563 -and 568 the two powers completely overthrew the Ephthalite kingdom and -divided their territories. For a brief moment the Oxus was the actual -boundary between Īrān and Tūrān; under pressure from the silk traders of -Sogdiana, however, the alliance was broken and the weaker successors of -Anūshīrwān could scarcely do more than maintain their outpost garrisons -on the Murghāb. From this time the Ephthalites, like the Kushans, were -gradually assimilating to the Iranian population[5], though the change -was less rapid in the Cisoxine lands of Lower _T_ukhāristān, Bādghīs, -and Herāt, where Ephthalite principalities were re-constituted, probably -with Turkish support, and continued to give Persia much trouble on her -north-eastern frontiers[6]. On the other hand the Turks of the five -western tribes (Nu-she-pi), who became independent after the break up of -the Great Khanate about 582, maintained their suzerainty over Sogdiana -and the middle Oxus basin by frequent expeditions, in one case at least -as far as Balkh. There is no trace in our records of extensive Turkish -immigration into the conquered lands; at most, small groups of Turks -wandered south with their herds, especially, it would seem, south of the -Iron Gate[7]. In general, Turkish interference in the administration -of the subject principalities was at first limited to the appointment -of military governors and the collection of tribute. Thus, in the -semi-legendary account given by An-Naysābūrī of the Turkish conquest of -Bukhārā the Bukhār Khudāh is represented as the chief dihqān under the -Turkish governor. It is possible also that the native princes maintained -guards of Turkish mercenaries. - -At this period, therefore, so far from the Oxus being a barrier, there -was considerable intercommunication between the peoples on either side, -and at least the elements of a racial and cultural unity, in spite of -political divisions. This is a factor of importance in the history of the -Arab conquests: the conquest of Transoxania is intimately linked with the -fortunes of Lower _T_ukhāristān, and only became possible when the latter -country was completely subdued. On the other hand, the Jaxartes formed -a natural racial and political frontier. “Shāsh and _S_ughd have seldom -run together” says Vámbéry, and in spite of nominal annexations on more -than one occasion Muslim rule was not effectively imposed on Shāsh and -Farghāna until some time after the final conquest of Transoxania. Their -chief importance for the history of Transoxania is that they formed the -jumping-off place for counter-invasions from the East. It is not without -significance that of the two battles which were decisive in establishing -Arab rule in Sogdiana one was fought to the west of Balkh and the other -on the Talas river, far into the Turkish lands beyond the Jaxartes (see -pp. 84 and 96). - - -_Political Divisions._ - -Researches into Chinese records have now made it possible to obtain -a more definite idea of the political conditions of these frontier -provinces in the seventh century. All the principalities acknowledged -the Khan of the Western Turks as overlord and paid tribute to him under -compulsion, though, as will appear, there is good cause for doubting -whether a Turkish army ever came in response to their appeals for support -until the rise of the Türgesh power in 716. - -Geographically the cultivated lands to the west and south-west of the -middle Jaxartes are divided by the Hissar mountains into two well-defined -areas. The northern area includes the rich valley of the Zarafshān and -the lesser streams which descend the northern slope of the watershed, -the southern comprises the broad basin formed by the Oxus and its -tributaries between the mountains of the Pamīr and the steppelands. The -former, which as a whole is called Sogdiana in distinction from the -smaller principality of _S_ughd, was at this period divided between -a number of small states, each independent of the others but forming -together a loose confederacy in a manner strikingly reminiscent of the -Hellenic city-states. The strongest bond of union was formed by their -mutual interest in the Chinese silk trade, the chief stations of which -were at Samarqand, Paykand, and Kish. The premier city was Samarqand, the -pre-eminence of which and high culture of whose population is vouched -for by Yuan Chwang. Special emphasis is laid on their enterprise and -success in trade, and a number of early embassies, doubtless commercial -missions, are recorded from Samarqand and Bukhārā to the Chinese court. -The merchant families of Paykand, according to Tomaschek’s rendering of -Narshakhī[8], were Kushans, but Iranian elements, reinforced by emigrants -from the Sāsānid dominions, formed the majority in the cities. The -agricultural population was almost if not entirely Iranian. - -A second link between the majority of the cities was formed by the ruling -house of the Shao-wu, if, as the Chinese records assert, these all -belonged to one royal family. The head of the clan governed Samarqand -and was allied by marriage to the Turkish Khan; cadet branches ruled in -Ushrūsana, Kish, Bukhārā, and the lesser principalities in the basin of -the Zarafshān. In the later lists the rulers of Shāsh and Farghāna as -well as the Khwārizm Shāh are shown as belonging to the clan also, though -with less probability[9]. Whether the family were of K’ang origin, or, -as the Chinese records state, belonged to the Yueh-Chi, they appear in -the Arabic histories with Persian territorial titles (Khudāh, Shāh, and -the general term dihqān). Some of the princes also possessed Turkish -titles, probably conferred on them as vassals of the Khan. The ruler -of Samarqand, as king of _S_ughd, is called the Ikhshīdh or Ikhshēdh, -which is easily recognised as the Persian _khshayathiya_. This title was -borne also, as is well known, by the king of Farghāna. It is certain -at least from both Chinese and Arabic accounts that these rulers were -not Turks. The Turkish names by which they are sometimes called were -given out of deference or compliment to their Turkish suzerains, just -as Arabic names begin to appear amongst them immediately after the -Arab conquests. Particularly misleading is the name _T_arkhūn which -appears more than once in the list of princes of Samarqand and has been -erroneously taken as the title Tarkhān, though it is in reality only the -Arabic transcription of a personal name spelt in the Chinese records -Tu-hoen. During the six or seven hundred years of their rule all these -princes had become fully identified with their Iranian subjects[10]. The -“kingship” moreover was not a real monarchy but rather the primacy in -an oligarchical system. Their authority was far from absolute, and the -landed aristocracy (dihqāns) and rich merchants possessed, as will be -seen later, not only a large measure of independence but also on occasion -the power to depose the ruling prince and elect his successor. As the -succession appears to have been largely hereditary it is probable that, -according to Iranian custom, eligibility was confined to a single royal -house. In some cases, it would seem, the succession was regulated during -the lifetime of the reigning prince by some such method as association in -the principate, probably combined with the appointment of the remaining -princes to other fiefs[11]. - -The “confederacy” of these states, however, was in no sense an alliance -and probably amounted to little more than a _modus vivendi_. Besides -the more important princes there existed an enormous number of petty -autocrats, some possibly Turkish, others probably descended from former -conquerors, whose authority may sometimes have scarcely extended beyond -the limits of their own villages. In lands subject to the Turks and -patrolled by nomadic tribes an effective centralised government was -hardly possible. Mutual antagonisms and wars cannot have been uncommon -though we have now no record of them, except that during the early Arab -period there was hostility between Bukhārā and Wardāna, but the latter -cannot be reckoned among the Shao-wu principalities since, according -to Narshakhī, it was founded by a Sāsānid prince about 300 A.D. Until -the profitable Chinese trade was threatened by the Arabs we find no -trustworthy record of combined resistance offered by the country to its -piecemeal reduction, and only long after the conquests of Qutayba is -there any hint of a concerted rising. At the same time, the strength of -the cities and warlike nature of their inhabitants may be gauged from the -way in which they not only preserved themselves from destruction at the -hands of their successive nomad invaders, but even gained their respect, -while this, in some respects perhaps the most highly civilised of all -the lands subdued by the Arabs[12], proved also the most difficult to -conquer, and most intractable to hold. - -The same lack of unity is apparent in the districts south of the Iron -Gate, though nominally subject to a single authority. It is important -to bear in mind that the Zarafshān and Oxus valleys were completely -independent of one another—that the difference between them was not -merely one of government, but also of language, and even, to some extent, -of blood, owing to the greater mixture of races in the southern basin. -When, occasionally, as in the “Mūsā legend”, reference is made in the -Arabic histories to common action by _S_ughd and _T_ukhāristān, it is -due to a complete misunderstanding of the state of the country prior to -the conquest, and it is worthy of notice that no such reference is to -be found in any narrative otherwise reliable. On his outward journey in -630, Yuan Chwang found the country divided into twenty-seven petty states -under separate rulers, with the chief military authority vested in the -Turkish Shād, the eldest son of the Jabghu of the Western Turks, who -had his seat near the modern Qunduz. During the period of anarchy which -befell the Western Turks in the following years, the whole district was -formed into an independent kingdom under a son of the former Shād, who -founded the dynasty of Jabghus of _T_ukhāristān. Minor Turkish chiefs -and intendants probably seized similar authority in their own districts, -and though the Jabghu was recognised as suzerain of all the lands from -the Iron Gate to Zābulistān and Kapisa and from Herāt to Khuttal[13], -his authority was little more than nominal except within his immediate -district of Upper _T_ukhāristān. The lesser princes, in Shūmān, Khuttal, -&c., many of whom were Turkish, appear to have acted quite independently -and did not hesitate to defy their Suzerain on occasion. The name -_T_ukhāristān is used very loosely in the Arabic records, with misleading -effect[14]. How relatively unimportant to the Arabs _T_ukhāristān proper -was is shown by the fact that its annexation (see below p. 38) is passed -over in silence. The brunt of the resistance offered to the early Arab -conquests was borne by the princes of _Lower_ _T_ukhāristān, _i.e._, -the riverain districts south of the Iron Gate, including Chaghāniān and -Balkh, together with the Ephthalite principalities in Jūzjān, Bādghīs, -and Herāt, and possibly the mountainous fringe of Gharjistān. This -explains why the Arabs always regarded Balkh, the old religious capital -of the Kushan Empire and site of the famous Buddhist shrine of Nawbahār, -as the capital of the “Turks”; it was in fact the centre of what we -might almost term the “amphictyony” of Lower _T_ukhāristān, combining -strategic and commercial importance with religious veneration. Long after -the Nawbahār had been destroyed by Ibn ʿĀmir this sentiment continued to -exist in the country[15]. - -A chance narrative in _T_abarī (II. 1224 f.), which, though of Bāhilite -origin, can scarcely have been invented, indicates the situation in Lower -_T_ukhāristān in 710. In the presence of Qutayba, the Shād and as-Sabal -(King of Khuttal) do homage to the Jabghu, the former excusing himself -on the ground that though he has joined Qutayba against the Jabghu, yet -he is the Jabghu’s vassal. The Ephthalite prince of Bādghīs then does -homage to the Shād, who must consequently be regarded as the chief prince -in Lower _T_ukhāristān. His identification with the Jabghu himself in -another passage (_T_ab. II. 1206. 9) is obviously impossible. Though -certainty on the point is hardly to be expected, the description best -suits the king of Chaghāniān (Chāghān Khudāh), who consistently adopted -an attitude of co-operation with the Arabs. It would seem too that the -king of Chaghāniān commanded the armies of Lower _T_ukhāristān in 652 and -again in 737. Moreover, an embassy to China on behalf of _T_ukhāristān -in 719 was actually despatched by the king of Chaghāniān, which implies -that he held a status in the kingdom consonant with the high title of -Shād. The conclusion drawn by Marquart and Chavannes that the king of -Chaghāniān and the Jabghu were identical is disproved by the Chinese -records[16]. - -Such conditions of political disunion were naturally all in favour of the -Arabs. It might have seemed also that the general insecurity, together -with the burden of maintaining armies and courts and the ever-recurring -ravages of invasion, would move the mass of the population to welcome -the prospect of a strong and united government, more especially as so -large a proportion of the Muslim armies were composed of their Persian -kin. For the Arabic records in general are misleading on two important -points. By their use of the word “Turk” for all the non-Persian peoples -of the East, they give the impression (due perhaps to the circumstances -of the time in which the chief histories were composed) that the -opponents of the Arabs in Transoxania were the historical Turks. The -truth is that until 720 the Arab invaders were resisted only by the -local princes with armies composed almost entirely of Iranians, except -perhaps on one or two special occasions when Turkish forces may have -intervened. The other error is in interpreting the conquests as primarily -wars for the Faith. Rebellion, for instance, is expressed in terms of -apostasy. It is now well established that this conception is exaggerated; -religious questions did not, in fact, enter until much later and even -then chiefly as expressions of political relationships. To the Iranian -peasantry, themselves steadfastly attached to the national cults, the -advent of another faith in this meeting-place of all the cultures and -religions of Asia at first carried little significance. Two factors in -particular combined to provoke a resistance so stubborn that it took the -Arabs a century merely to reduce the country to sullen submission. The -first of these was the proud national spirit of the Iranians which was -eventually to break down the supremacy of the Arabs and give birth to -the first Persian dynasties in Islām. The few wise governors of Khurāsān -found in this their strongest support, but, outraged again and again by -an arrogant and rapacious administration, the subject peoples became -embittered and sought all means of escape from its tyranny. The second -was the interest of the commercial relations on which the wealth and -prosperity of the country depended. This again might have disposed the -cities to accept a rule which promised not only stability, but a wide -extension of opportunity. The Arab governors, as we shall see, were -not indeed blind to this, but the exactions of the treasury, and still -more the greed of local officials, combined with the unsettlement of -constant invasion to create an attitude of distrust, which deepened later -into despair. It must not be forgotten that the commercial ties of the -Sogdians were much stronger with the East than with the West, and that -this too prompted them to cultivate relations with the Turks and Chinese -rather than with the Arabs when the necessity of making a choice was -forced upon them. - - -_The Arabic Sources._ - -The early Arabic sources are remarkably rich in material for the -reconstruction of the conquests in Khurāsān and Transoxania. For the -earlier period the narratives of Yaʿqūbī and Balādhurī are nearly as full -as those of _T_abarī, but the special value of the latter lies in his -method of compilation which renders the traditions amenable to critical -study and thus provides a control for all the others. Moreover, while -the other historians, regarding the conquests of Qutayba as definitely -completing the reduction of Transoxania, provide only meagre notices for -the later period, _T_abarī more than compensates for their silence by -the enormous wealth of detail embodied in the accounts he quotes from -Al-Madāʾinī and others of the last thirty years of Umayyad rule. As a -general rule, these three historians rely on different authorities, -though all use the earlier histories of Al-Madāʾinī and Abū ʿUbayda -to some extent. The monograph of Narshakhī (d. 959 A.D.) based on -both Arabic and local sources, with some resemblance to Balādhurī, is -unfortunately preserved only in a Persian version of two centuries -later which has obviously been edited, to what extent is unknown, but -which probably represents the original as unsatisfactorily as Balʿamī’s -Persian version of _T_abarī. Even so it preserves to us some account of -the peoples against whom the Arab invaders were matched, and thus does a -little to remedy the defects of the other historians in this respect. It -may well be doubted, however, whether some of its narratives merit the -reliance placed upon them by van Vloten[17]. The much later historian Ibn -al-Athīr introduces very little new material, but confines himself for -the most part to abridging and re-editing the narratives in _T_abarī, -with a tendency to follow the more exaggerated accounts. The geographer -Ibn Khūrdādhbih gives a list of titles and names, which is, however, too -confused to supply any reliable evidence. - -Reference has already been made to certain aspects of the conquests -in which the Arab historians are misleading. Their information on the -Turks and the principalities of Sogdiana can now, fortunately, be -supplemented and parts of their narratives controlled from Chinese -sources, chiefly through Chavannes’ valuable “Documents sur les Tou-Kiue -(Turcs) Occidentaux.” But there are two other facts which also demand -attention: one, that the Arabic authorities, as we possess them, and -even with all allowance made for their limitations, are by no means -exhaustive; _i.e._, reliance on omissions in the narratives is an unsafe -principle of criticism: the other, that by critical study it is possible -to distinguish at certain points several lines of tendentious tradition -or legend, directed to the interests of national feeling or of some -particular tribe or faction, and centred in some cases round specific -persons. These may most conveniently be summarised as follows: - - 1. A Qaysite tradition, centred on the family of Ibn Khāzim: - - 2. An Azd-Rabīʿa tradition, centred on Muhallab and hostile - to _H_ajjāj. This became the most popular tradition among the - Arabs, and is followed by Balādhurī, but opposed by Yaʿqūbī: - - 3. A Bāhilite tradition, centred on the tribal hero, Qutayba b. - Muslim. In general it found little favour but is occasionally - quoted somewhat sarcastically by _T_abarī. - - 4. A local Bukhārā tradition, followed by Yaʿqūbī, Balādhurī - and Narshakhī. It presents the early conquests under the form - of an historical romance, centred on the Queen Khātūn in the - part of a national Boadicea. Other local traditions, which are - frequently utilised by _T_abarī, seem to be much more free from - serious exaggeration: - - 5. The few notices in Dīnawarī follow an entirely divergent and - extremely garbled tradition from unknown sources, which may for - the most part be neglected: - - 6. The quotations made by Balādhurī (_e.g._ 422. 10) from Abū - ʿUbayda show the influence of a rewriting of episodes with an - anti-Arab bias, directed to the interests of the Shuʿūbīya - movement, in which Abū ʿUbayda was a prominent figure[18]. - - 7. In the later period, there appears also the fragments of a - tradition of which Nasr b. Sayyār is the hero. - -Some, if not all, of these traditions developed in some detail, and -where they are not balanced by other versions they present a distorted -narrative of events, verging in some cases on the fictitious. The most -noteworthy examples of this are the Khātūn legend (see below p. 18) and -the typical story of the exploits of Mūsā b. Khāzim in Transoxania in a -style not unworthy of Bedouin romance[19]. It is therefore most important -to disentangle these variant traditions and assign its proper value to -each. The Bāhilite accounts of Qutayba’s conquests, for instance, contain -wild exaggerations of fact, which, nevertheless, have sometimes been -utilised in all seriousness by modern historians, amongst other purposes -to establish synchronisms with the Turkish inscriptions[20]. - -With these precautions, it is possible to follow up and reconstruct, with -comparative certainty and completeness, that progress of the Arab arms -in Central Asia whose vicissitudes are outlined in the following pages. - - -NOTES - -(Full Titles in Bibliography) - -[1] Franke, Beiträge 41 ff., 67. Cordier, Chine I, 225. - -[2] If Marquart’s identification (Ērānshahr, 201 f.) is correct. - -[3] Cordier I. 229: Ērānshahr 50 ff. - -[4] Yuan Chwang I. 103. Prof. Barthold suggests that the connection -between the Ephthalites and the Huns may have been political only, not -racial. - -[5] Chavannes, Documents 155: Ērānshahr 89. - -[6] _T_ab. I. 2885. 13 and 2886. 3: Yaʿqūbī, History, II, 193: Yāqūt -(ed. Wüstenfeld) I. 492: Balādhurī 403: Ērānshahr 65 f., 77 f., and -150. Bādghīs was still a nomad pasture-ground in the XIVth century: Ibn -Ba_tt_ū_t_a, III, 67 f. - -[7] Yuan Chwang I. 105; II. 266; Chav. Doc. 161: Ērānshahr 250 ff. - -[8] Tomaschek, Soghdiana, 170. - -[9] See Marquart, Chronologie, 71: Shiratori in Keleti Szemle III (1902) -footnote to pp. 122-3. - -[10] _Cf._ Narshakhī 29. 4. On the Iranisation of nomadic elements, -Blochet, Introduction à l’Histoire des Mongols, (Leyden, 1910) p. 211 -note; Peisker, The Asiatic Background, pp. 353-6. - -[11] Chavannes, Notes 91, and _cf._ below p. 80. - -[12] _Cf._ Barthold, in Zeitschrift für Assyriologie XXVI (1911) p. 262. - -[13] Yuan Chwang I, 75 n. 2, 102 ff: II 270: Chav. Doc. 200 f. - -[14] _E.g._ _T_ab. II, 1448, 7-10: _cf._ Ērānshahr 228. - -[15] _Cf._ Yaʿqūbī, Geog. 287: _T_ab. II 1205. 12: Ērānshahr 66, 87 ff. - -[16] Chavannes, Doc. 201, Note 37. - -[17] Narshakhī’s unreliability is even more marked in his account of the -origins of the Sāmānid dynasty: _cf._ Barthold, Turkestan 215 n. 3. - -[18] See Goldziher, Muhammadanische Studien, I, 195 ff. - -[19] Prof. Barthold has drawn my attention to the fact that the story of -Mūsā also includes (twice over) an episode from the popular legend of -Zopyrus. See his article in Zapiski XVII (1906) 0141, and Wellhausen, -Arabische Reich, 257, 265. - -[20] _E.g._ Marquart, Chronologie, p. 8. - - - - -II. THE EARLY RAIDS - - -_The Conquest of Lower _T_ukhāristān._ - -Arab legend relates that the Muslim forces, pursuing Yazdigird from the -field of Nihāwand in 21/642, had already come in contact with the “Turks” -of _T_ukhāristān before the death of ʿOmar. But the final destruction -of the Sāsānid power and first imposition of Arab rule on Khurāsān only -followed ten years later, by the troops of ʿAbdullah ibn ʿĀmir, ʿOthmān’s -governor in Ba_s_ra. The Ephthalites of Herāt and Bādghīs submitted -without a blow, and the first serious check to their advance was met in -the Murghāb valley, when al-A_h_naf b. Qays with an army of 4,000 Arabs -and 1,000 Persians found himself opposed by the organised forces of -Lower _T_ukhāristān and was compelled to retire on Merv-Rūdh. A second -expedition under al-Aqraʿ b. _H_ābis, however, defeated a weaker force in -Jūzjān, and subsequently occupied Jūzjān, Fāryāb, _T_ālaqān, and Balkh. -Small divisions made plundering raids into the neighbouring territories, -_e.g._, to Siminjān (a town within the frontiers of _T_ukhāristān proper, -governed by a Turkish prince, the Ruʿb Khān), and to Khwārizm, not always -with success; on the other hand, a successful raid was made on Māyamurgh -in Sogdiana in 33/654, which is mentioned by Abū ʿUbayda alone of the -Arabic authorities[21]. A general insurrection which broke out shortly -afterwards, headed by a certain Qārin, apparently a member of the noble -Persian family bearing that name, seems to have been instrumental in -causing the Arabs to evacuate Khurāsān for a time[22], though several -raids are recorded of ʿAlī’s governors between 35 and 38 A.H. These -earliest “conquests,” in fact, were little more than plundering raids on -a large scale, the effect of that movement of expansion whose momentum -was carrying forward the Arabs irresistibly. According to the Chinese -records, which, however, require to be used with caution at this -point, the retreat of the Arabs in 655 was followed up by the army of -_T_ukhāristān who reinstated Pērōz, the son of Yazdigird, as titular king -of Persia[23]. - -When peace was restored to Islām by the recognition of Muʿāwiya in -41/661, Ibn ʿĀmir was again entrusted with the conquest of Khurāsān. The -same rough and ready methods were adopted as before; there appears to -have been no definite plan of invasion, and even the order of governors -is uncertain. Not only are traditions relating to A.H. 32 and 42 confused -by the different authorities, but a vast amount of the whole is affected -by tribal legends. Hints of fierce resistance are given from time to -time. Qays b. al-Haytham, the governor’s first legate, was faced with a -fresh revolt in Bādghīs, Herāt, and Balkh. He recaptured the latter and -in retaliation destroyed the famous shrine of Nawbahār, but left the -Ephthalites to be dealt with by his successor, ʿAbdullah ibn Khāzim. -It is clear that there was no ordered progress of the Arab arms until -Khurāsān was brought under the administration of Ziyād b. Abīhi. After -an experimental division of the province under tribal leaders, a policy -obviously dangerous and quickly abandoned, Ziyād, realising the danger of -allowing Persian nationalism a free hand in the East, backed up by the -resources of _T_ukhāristān, centralised the administration at Merv, and -organised a preventive campaign. In 47/667 his lieutenant, al-_H_akam b. -ʿAmr al-Ghifārī, opened a series of campaigns directed to the conquest of -Lower _T_ukhāristān and Gharjistān, in the course of which he crossed the -Oxus and carried his arms into Chaghāniān, and drove Pērōz back to China -in discomfiture. On his death, three years later, the conquered provinces -rose in revolt, but the new governor, Rabīʿ b. Ziyād al-_H_ārithī, the -first conqueror of Sijistān, after reducing Balkh, pursued the Ephthalite -army into Quhistān and dispersed it with great slaughter. Again an -expedition was sent across the Oxus into Chaghāniān (clearly indicating -the connection between Chaghāniān and Lower _T_ukhāristān), while another -directed down the left bank of the river secured Zamm and Āmul, the two -chief ferry points for Sogdiana. Mention is also made of a conquest of -Khwārizm. All these expeditions seem to point to a methodical plan of -conquest, arranged between Ziyād and his governors; the Arab power was -thus firmly established, for the moment at least, in the Cisoxanian -lands, and the way prepared for the invasion of Sogdiana. A further -important step was the colonisation of Khurāsān by fifty thousand -families from Ba_s_ra and Kūfa[24], settled according to Arab practice -in five garrison towns, for the double purpose of securing the conquests -already made, and providing the forces for their further extension. - - -_The First Invasion of Bukhārā and _S_ughd._ - -Although at this junction Ziyād himself died, his policy was carried on -by his sons, in particular by ʿUbaydullah. Scarcely any governor, not -even _H_ajjāj, has suffered so much at the hands of the traditionists -as the “Murderer of _H_usayn,” though his ability and devotion to the -Umayyads are beyond question. It is not surprising therefore that his -earlier military successes should be so briefly related, in spite of -their importance. Yet as he was no more than 25 years of age when -appointed by Muʿāwiya to the province of Khurāsān on probation, and only -two years later was selected to fill his father’s position in ʿIrāq, his -administration must have been markedly successful. The policy of Ziyād -had now firmly secured Khurāsān and made it feasible to use it as a base -for the extension of the conquests into the rich lands across the river. -On his arrival at Merv, therefore, in the autumn of 53/673, the new -governor began preparations for an invasion of Bukhārā. - -The Shao-wu principality of Bukhārā was at this time second in importance -only to Samarqand. It included not only the greater part of the oasis -(“al-Bukhārīya”) then much more thickly populated than now, but also -the great emporium of Paykand, which controlled the trade route across -the Oxus at Āmul. Of its early history we have two accounts, both -confused, inaccurate in detail, and often conflicting. From these it -may be gathered that the prince, who held the high Turkish title of -Shād[25], resided at Paykand, the citadel of Bukhārā being either founded -or restored by the Bukhār Khudāh Bidūn, probably in consequence of the -Arab invasions. This prince at his death left a son only a few months -old on whose behalf the regency was exercised by the Queen-Mother. This -princess, known under the title of Khātūn (a Turkish form of the Sogdian -word for “lady”) became the central figure in the local traditions, -which represent the Arab invasions as occurring precisely during the -period of her regency. This version is the one accepted by Balādhurī, -Yaʿqūbī, and Narshakhī, but though not altogether devoid of historical -value, it is certainly misplaced, and the true account of the early -conquests must, for cogent reasons, be sought in the brief and widely -divergent narratives of _T_abarī. In the first place the Khātūn-legend, -like all such legends, has grown by natural elaboration of detail, -as in the account given by Narshakhī of Khātūn’s administration of -justice and by continual accretions from other streams of tradition, as -seen, on comparing the narratives of Balādhurī and Narshakhī, in the -introduction of episodes of Ibn Khāzim and Muhallab. Critical examination -also reveals alternative traditions and chronological inconsistencies, -as, for example, the birth of _T_ughshāda after the invasion of Saʿīd -b. ʿOthmān, Khātūn’s reign of 15 years, and others mentioned below. -There is clear evidence of the late compilation of the tradition in the -frequent references to “_T_arkhūn, King of _S_ughd,” though his reign -did not begin until considerably after 696[26]. It may be noticed that -in the variant account of the conquests prefixed to the Persian edition -of Narshakhī and ascribed to An-Naysābūrī there is no reference at all -to Khātūn. Moreover there are indications that _T_abarī was aware of the -local tradition and completely rejected it; this, at least, would account -for the unusual practice of specifying Qabaj-Khātūn as “the wife of the -king” in 54 A.H. Even Balādhurī rejects the more fantastic developments -of the legend. _T_abarī’s narratives, however, require to be collated -with the additional material in Balādhurī, who has not relied entirely -on the local tradition. The germ of the native version is probably to be -found in a confusion of the Arab conquests with the later war between -Bukhārā and Wardāna[27], whose echoes are heard in Qutayba’s invasions -thirty years after. - -In the spring of 54/674 ʿUbaydullah b. Ziyād crossed the river and -marched directly on Paykand. After a partial success, he led his forces -forward towards Bukhārā and severely defeated the army of the Bukhār -Khudāh. From _T_abarī’s narrative, which relates only that two thousand -men of Bukhārā, skilful archers, were taken by ʿUbaydullah to Ba_s_ra, -where they formed his personal guard, it is left to be inferred that a -treaty was concluded under which the Bukhār Khudāh became tributary. The -local tradition magnifies the expedition by adding a siege of Bukhārā -(during the winter) and bringing in an army of Turks to assist Khātūn, -but confirms the success of the Arabs. ʿUbaydullah’s practice on this -occasion of forming a bodyguard or retinue of captives appears to have -been a common one. ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān ibn Samura had previously brought -captives from Sijistān to Ba_s_ra, where they built him a mosque, and -later governors of Khurāsān continued the practice, as will be seen. In -this may be recognised perhaps the germ of the Turkish guards recruited -by the later ʿAbbāsid Caliphs. - -ʿUbaydullah’s successor, Aslam b. Zurʿa, remained inactive, but in -56/676 Saʿīd b. ʿOthmān, who had obtained the governorship of Khurāsān -by importuning Muʿāwiya, carried the Arab arms more deeply into -Transoxania, defeated the _S_ughdians in the open field and reduced -their city. Taking fifty young nobles as hostages, he retired from -_S_ughd and subsequently occupied Tirmidh, an important fortress on the -Oxus controlling the main North and South trade route, having presumably -marched through the Iron Gate. The conquest of _S_ughd was thus -definitely co-ordinated with that of Chaghāniān. _T_abarī’s narrative is -strangely vague and abrupt; it contains no mention of Bukhārā nor any -definite reference to Samarqand, except for the statement that it was the -objective of Saʿīd’s expedition. Using this narrative alone, one would be -inclined to suspect that the city captured by Saʿīd was not Samarqand but -Kish (since it has been established by Marquart that Kish was formerly -called _S_ughd), and that the reference to Samarqand was due to a later -misunderstanding of the name[28]. On the other hand, both the local -tradition and Abū ʿUbayda speak of a siege of Samarqand by Saʿīd, though -their narratives are far from being in agreement in detail, and there -are other indications of confusion between Saʿīd and Salm b. Ziyād. All -accounts except Narshakhī’s, however, agree that the hostages who were -carried by Saʿīd to Madīna and there murdered him were _S_ughdians[29]. -Balādhurī’s tradition of Saʿīd’s expedition is as follows. On his -crossing the river, Khātūn at first renewed her allegiance, only to -withdraw it again on the approach of an army of Turks, _S_ughdians, -and men of Kish and Nasaf, 120,000 strong. Saʿīd, however, completely -defeated the enemy and after a triumphal entry into Bukhārā, marched on -Samarqand, his forces swelled by Khātūn’s army, besieged it for three -days and made it tributary. On his return he captured Tirmidh and while -there received the tribute due from Khātūn and the allegiance of Khuttal. -Narshakhī’s account is the same in essentials, adding only a number of -imaginative details. - -Saʿīd was unable to retain his position in Khurāsān, and for five -years the conquests were stayed (except for summer raids) under the -indolent Aslam b. Zurʿa and the avaricious ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān b. Ziyād. -In 61/680-681 Yazīd I appointed Salm, another son of Ziyād, to Khurāsān -and Sijistān. Eager to emulate his brother, Salm, even before leaving -Ba_s_ra, announced his intention of renewing the expeditions into -Transoxania and enlisted a picked force on the spot, including such -tried leaders as Muhallab b. Abī _S_ufra and ʿAbdullah b. Khāzim. From -a poem preserved in the _H_amāsa of Abū Tammām[30] it would appear -that somewhat unwilling levies for this expedition were raised even in -Mesopotamia. Towards the close of the winter a surprise attack was made -on Khwārizm, with some success. _T_abarī gives two versions of this -expedition, the first of which is a highly embroidered one from the -Muhallabite tradition. During the same year, Salm marched into _S_ughd -and occupied Samarqand, where he appears to have made his headquarters -over the winter. Balādhurī mentions a subsidiary raid on Khujanda under -Aʿshā Hamdān, in which, however, the Muslims were defeated, and a -_S_ughdian revolt which was crushed with the loss of its leader, here -called Bandūn. The name is almost certainly to be read as that of the -Bukhār-Khudāh, Bīdūn[31], and in view of the silence of _T_abarī raises -rather a difficult problem. It may be conjectured that what Balādhurī -intended was a revolt of the Bukhariots, combined with _S_ughdian forces. -The origin of this statement may perhaps be sought for in the Bukhārā -tradition, which Balādhurī does not follow in his general account of the -expeditions of Salm, but which he may have tried to work in with the -other. On the other hand he nowhere refers to Bīdūn as the Bukhār Khudāh. -As related by Narshakhī and Yaʿqūbī Salm’s expedition is directed solely -against Bukhārā. Khātūn, on promising her hand to _T_arkhūn, receives a -reinforcement of 120,000 men from _S_ughd, and Bīdūn (here still alive) -recruits an army in “Turkistān,” including the “Prince of Khotan.” After -severe fighting, the Muslim forces, numbering 6,000, kill Bīdūn and rout -the unbelievers, taking so much booty that the share of each horseman -amounts to 2,400 dirhems. Khātūn, thoroughly humbled by this decisive -proof of Arab invincibility, sues for peace and pays a heavy tribute. -Beyond the fantastic exaggerations and incoherencies of the legend, there -is nothing inherently improbable in a Bukhariot revolt. In support of -this view, it may be remarked that the death of Bīdūn at this point would -agree with the slender data we have for the internal wars which probably -formed the original basis of the Khātūn-legend, and would also provide -a foothold for the later developments of the tradition. Without fuller -evidence, however, we can get no further than reasonable conjecture. - -After the conquests made by Salm, which probably occupied the years 682 -and 683, it seemed as though the Arabs were on the verge of imposing -their rule on Transoxania when civil war broke out in the heart of the -Empire. Even allowing for the fact that these expeditions were little -more than raids, the comparative ease with which the Arabs held to ransom -the richest cities in the country is astonishing. The explanation can -lie only in their mutual exclusiveness. There is not a hint of united -action in the field in _T_abarī’s accounts[32]. A factor which may have -exercised some influence was that Sogdiana was completely isolated during -these years and unable to look for support from without. The power of -the Western Turks was broken by the Chinese armies between 645 and 658; -Chinese forces are said to have reached as far west as Kish, and the -Emperor Kao-Tsung had officially annexed all the territories formerly -included in the Turkish dominions. In the latter year the provinces of -Sogdiana and the Jaxartes were organized in sixteen districts, including -a “Government of Persia” under the Pērōz already mentioned, situated -apparently in Sijistān, possibly even in Eastern Khurāsān[33]. The -immediate practical effect of this change of status was of little moment, -but her nominal annexation gave China a prestige which was destined to -exercise immense influence in determining the attitude of the peoples -of Sogdiana to the Arabs. From 670 to 692, however, the new power of -Tibet held the Chinese armies in check in the Tarim basin and cut off -all possibility of Chinese intervention in the West. The Sogdian princes -were thus thrown on their own resources, and, ignorant as yet of the -danger behind the Arab raids, they seem to have bowed to the storm. It -must not be forgotten that the cities had never before met such an enemy -as the Arabs. They had been accustomed to plundering raids by Turks, who -disappeared as quickly as they came, and who, disliking to undertake -a lengthy siege, were easily appeased by a ransom. Familiar with such -nominal annexations, they would naturally adopt the same tactics against -the new invaders. Had the Arabs maintained their pressure, there was thus -every prospect that Transoxania would have been colonised with a tithe of -the expense and loss incurred in its reconquest and would have become as -integral a part of the Muslim dominions as Khurāsān. But the opportunity -was lost in the fratricidal struggles of the factions, and when the Arabs -recommenced their encroachments, the determined resistance offered to -their advance showed that the lessons of the first invasion had not been -lost on the native princes. - - -_The Withdrawal of the Arabs._ - -The tribal feuds which occupied the Arabs of Khurāsān left the princes of -Transoxania free to regain their independence. It would seem even that -Lower _T_ukhāristān was not only in part lost to the Arabs but that local -forces took the offensive and raided Khurāsān. On the gradual restoration -of order under Umayya, however, Lower _T_ukhāristān again recognised, -at least in name, the Arab suzerainty[34]. Meanwhile, a strange episode -had occurred in Chaghāniān. Mūsā, the son of ʿAbdullah ibn Khāzim, sent -by his father to secure a safe place of retreat, had captured the strong -fortress of Tirmidh, from which he continually raided the neighbouring -districts. His exploits were worked up in popular story into an epic -of adventure, in which legend has almost overlaid historical fact. The -most fantastic exaggerations were devised in order to provide a suitable -background for the incredible deeds of valour indulged in by the hero. -But in truth his actual exploits were sufficiently amazing, and all -the efforts of the forces of the local rulers (magnified in the legend -to huge armies of “Turks and Hay_t_al and Tibetans”), although aided -on one occasion by a force of Khuzāʿites, were unable to dislodge him. -For fifteen years he remained in secure possession of his stronghold, a -refuge for the disaffected from all sides, and a standing example of the -helplessness of the rulers across the river. - -In 77/696 Umayya re-opened the campaigns into Transoxania. An expedition -to Khwārizm was successful[35], another across the Oxus narrowly escaped -destruction. Balādhurī mentions, with doubtful accuracy, a successful -raid on Khuttal, which may, however, only be a variant on this. An -expedition directed against Bukhārā, which is said to have had Tirmidh -as a second objective, was hurriedly abandoned on the fresh outbreak of -revolt under Bukayr b. Wishā_h_ in Khurāsān. Though the revolt failed -in its immediate object, a most serious situation had been created. -Bukayr had endeavoured to rally the Persians to his side by promising -all converts remission of Kharāj. The opportunity was undoubtedly seized -by large numbers, and the pacification occasioned some negotiations -between Umayya and Thābit b. Qu_t_ba, an influential noble who acted as -spokesman for the mawālī of Eastern Khurāsān. Umayya’s reimposition of -Kharāj, however, caused widespread unrest[36] and made prompt action -necessary. ʿAbdul-Malik at once recalled his hapless kinsman (in 78) and -made Khurāsān a dependency of ʿIrāq under the government of _H_ajjāj. -This far-sighted governor had already dealt with a desperate situation -of the same sort in ʿIrāq and reduced it to outward tranquillity. The -same extreme measures that had been adopted there were not necessary in -Khurāsān; its troubles were due less to insurgent mawālī than to the -factions of Qays. _H_ajjāj was himself a strong Qaysite, but he was -not the man to put party before the interests of the State. The first -necessity was to appoint a governor who could be trusted to repress both -forms of anarchy and in Muhallab such a man was available. His tribe of -Azd was not yet strong enough in Khurāsān to cause the risk of opening a -new channel for factional strife, and his military reputation fitted him -for carrying out _H_ajjāj’s policy of active campaigning as an antidote -to internal dissension. It is possible that _H_ajjāj had in mind from the -first a definite conquest of Transoxania, but for a few years nothing -more than sporadic raids took place. - -Muhallab’s first care, however, was to encourage the settlement of Azd -in Khurāsān, until he was supported by a division equal in size to any -other. After securing the crossing at Zamm in 80/699 he marched into the -district of Kish and there established his headquarters for two years, -besieging the city and sending out minor expeditions under his sons -in various directions[37]. Yazīd was sent with a force into Khuttal, -nominally to co-operate with a pretender to the throne, but met with -little success; _H_abīb, sent against Rabinjān, found himself countered -by the forces of Bukhārā. Balādhurī’s account of Muhallab’s campaigns is -ludicrously exaggerated; _T_abarī quotes Muhallab himself as discouraging -any attempts at effecting a conquest. On the death of his son al-Mughīra -in Rajab 82, he came to terms with Kish and abandoned his expeditions, -but died in the following Dhuʾl-_H_ijja (Jan. 702) near Merv Rūdh, and -was succeeded by his son Yazīd. - -The Muhallabite tradition which represents the appointment as distasteful -to _H_ajjāj but popular in Khurāsān is almost certainly influenced -by the later hostility between Yazīd and _H_ajjāj. It is probable, -however, that _H_ajjāj, whose policy was to keep his governors dependent -on himself, viewed with suspicion the concentration of authority in -the hands of the leader of a powerful hostile clan, but he was content -to wait for the meantime and give Yazīd sufficient rope to hang -himself. Except for an attempted raid on Khwārizm Yazīd carried out no -expeditions, while under his government the precarious internal balance -of Khurāsān was soon upset. The quarrels of Qays had been composed by -Muhallab, but they were in no mood to bear with the leadership of the -parvenu Azd; already before the death of Muhallab, in spite of the -Tamīmite eulogy quoted by _T_abarī, there was a moment when the feud -threatened to break out. The pronounced factional leanings of Yazīd -strained the situation still further. Even more serious was the attitude -of the mawālī. _H_urayth, the brother of Thābit ibn Qu_t_ba, had been -left behind at Kish by Muhallab to collect the tribute, but on his return -was scourged for disobedience. The disgrace cut _H_urayth deeply; too -late Muhallab realised the gravity of his act, but _H_urayth spurned his -overtures and with Thābit fled to Mūsā at Tirmidh. Yazīd retaliated with -foolish severity by maltreating their families, which only inflamed the -general resentment. _H_urayth and Thābit used their influence to stir -up an insurrection to act in concert with Mūsā; the king of Chaghāniān -and his Ephthalite confederates headed by Nēzak, prince of Bādghīs, -readily responded, while Persian interest was excited by the return to -_T_ukhāristān of the son of Pērōz, the heir of the Sāsānids. It seems -probable that even some of Qays were a party to the scheme[38]. Seizing -an opportunity when Yazīd was occupied with the rebel forces of Ibn -al-Ashath on the borders of Khurāsān the revolt broke out. Yazīd was -powerless to prevent the expulsion of his residents from Chaghāniān and -Lower _T_ukhāristān, and Mūsā is said to have refrained from invading -Khurāsān only from fear that it would fall into the hands of Thābit and -_H_urayth. Even the success claimed for Yazīd in Bādghīs can have been -of little effect[39]. Fortunately for the Arabs, Mūsā’s jealousy of -Thābit and _H_urayth caused a division in the ranks of their enemies, but -though the brothers both fell in battle, the danger remained acute. The -son of Pērōz still lingered in _T_ukhāristān, and even at Damascus there -was some uneasiness about the situation in Khurāsān[40]. - -To _H_ajjāj it was obvious that the first essential was to reunite -the Arabs and that so long as Yazīd was in power that was impossible. -The only difficulty was to find a governor acceptable to Qays and to -substitute him without risking a revolt of Azd. It was solved with -admirable ingenuity. By ordering Yazīd to transfer his authority to -his weaker brother Mufa_dd_al, _H_ajjāj at one stroke removed the man -from whom he had most to fear and prevented him from uniting Azd in -opposition, although Yazīd realised that the fall of his house was -imminent. At the same time the Caliph’s permission was sought for the -nomination of Qutayba ibn Muslim as governor of Khurāsān. Belonging to -the neutral tribe of Bāhila, Qutayba was reckoned as allied to Qays, -but might be trusted to hold the scales evenly between the factions; he -had already distinguished himself in ʿIrāq and in his governorship of -Rayy, and was the more devoted to _H_ajjāj in that he was protected by -no strong party of his own. The accepted belief that _H_ajjāj took no -steps to remove the family of Muhallab until Mūsā was put out of the way -is based on a remark attributed to Muhallab in the Mūsā-legend, which is -frequently contradicted elsewhere both expressly and by implication. - -Mufa_dd_al, during his nine months of office in 85/704, seems to have -endeavoured to impress _H_ajjāj by a show of military activity against -the rebels in Bādghīs. At the same time, acting in concert with the local -princes (magnified in the legend to “_T_arkhūn and as-Sabal”), he sent -an expedition to Tirmidh under ʿOthmān b. Ma_s_ʿūd. Mūsā was cut off and -killed in a sortie and his nephew Sulaymān surrendered at discretion, -_H_ajjāj’s first exclamation on hearing the news is said to have been -one of anger at the insult to Qays, but the last hindrance to the -appointment of the new governor was now removed and towards the close of -the year Qutayba b. Muslim arrived in Merv. - - -NOTES - -[21] Bal. 408. 5: Chav., Doc. 172, n. 1. There were two localities called -Māyamurgh in _S_ughd: one near Samarqand (I_st_akhrī 321. 6), and the -other one day’s march from Nasaf on the Bukhārā road (ibid. 337. 7). -According to the Chinese records the former is the one in question here. - -[22] Yāqūt, ed. Wüstenfeld, II. 411. 21: _cf._ Caetani, “Annali” VIII. 4 -ff. On Qārin, Nöldeke, Sasaniden 127, 437: Marquart, Ērānshahr 134. - -[23] Chav., Doc. 172. - -[24] _Cf._ Lammens, “Ziād b. Abīhi” (R.S.O. 1912) p. 664. - -[25] _Cf._ with _T_ughshāda the name of the reigning prince in 658, -Chav., Doc. 137. - -[26] Chav., Doc. 136. - -[27] Narshakhī 8 and 30. - -[28] Chronologie 57: Ērānshahr 303 f. This view is supported also by the -letter from the king of Samarqand to the Emperor of China in 718 (see p. -60), which puts the first Arab conquest some 35 years before, _i.e._ in -682 or 683. - -[29] Accounts also in Kitāb al-Aghānī I. 18: Ibn Qutayba 101. - -[30] _H_amāsa, ed. Freytag, I. 363-4. - -[31] _Cf._ Barthold, “Turkestan” 103 n. 1. - -[32] The account given in _T_ab. II. 394 of the annual meeting of the -“Kings of Khurāsān” near Khwārizm for mutual counsel not only possesses -little intrinsic probability, but is obviously intended to magnify the -exploits of Muhallab. In this case, fortunately, the authorities quoted -by _T_ab. leave no doubt as to the Azdite origin of the narrative. -Madāʾinī’s version is given _ib._ ll. 19 sq. - -[33] Wieger, Textes Historiques, 1608 f: Chav., Doc. 273 ff: Marquart, -Ēran. 68. - -[34] _T_ab. II. 490, 860 ff.: Bal. 414 f.: I. Athīr, IV. 66: Anon. (ed. -Ahlwardt), 195. - -[35] Abū ʿUbayda ap. Bal. 426. 10: _cf._ Lestrange, “Lands of the Eastern -Caliphate” p. 448, note. - -[36] _T_ab. 1031: _cf._ Anon. 310 f. - -[37] _T_ab. 1040 f., 1078. 5: Yaʿqūbī, Hist. II. 330. - -[38] _Cf._ _T_ab. 1152 with 1185. 5. For the son of Pērōz, Chav., Doc. -172. - -[39] _Cf._ _T_ab. 1129 with 1144 and 1184. - -[40] Anon. 337. - - - - -III. THE CONQUESTS OF QUTAYBA - - -The achievements of the Muslim armies in Central Asia during the reign of -Walīd I were due in the first place to the complete co-operation between -the directive genius of _H_ajjāj and the military capacity of Qutayba. -Qutayba’s strategic abilities have been somewhat overrated, though the -Arabic texts are at no pains to conceal the fact that his gifts fell -something short of genius. On more than one occasion we are shown in what -constant touch the viceroy was kept with the progress of his armies, -and how large a part he took in drawing up the plan of campaign, though -the credit of carrying it through to a successful issue rightly belongs -to Qutayba. _H_ajjāj seems to have had the fullest confidence in his -lieutenant, and if he did not hesitate to utter reproof and warning -when occasion required, he was equally quick to express appreciation of -Qutayba’s success. The Arabs of all parties soon realised that behind -their general lay the authority of _H_ajjāj, the wholesome respect -inspired by whom prevented any open breach during his lifetime. The -second factor which materially assisted the conquests was that in their -prosecution Qutayba united all parties in Khurāsān, Persians and Arabs, -Qays and Yemen. It was no small matter to keep their enthusiasm unabated -in the face of campaigns so protracted and severe, nor can the enthusiasm -be explained only by the attraction of a rich booty. It is by no means -improbable that Qutayba’s success was really due more to his talent for -administration than to his generalship. He seems to have realised, as no -other Arab governor in the east had yet done, that in such a province -as Khurāsān the safety and security of the Arab government must depend -in the long run on the co-operation of the Persian populace, who formed -so great a majority in the country. The bitterness of factional strife -had shown how unsafe it was to rely on the support of the Arabs alone, -especially in the face of such a movement as Yazīd had provoked. By his -conciliatory attitude, therefore, Qutayba earned the confidence of the -Persians and repaid it with confidence; from his constant employment -of Persian agents and his growing preference for Persian governors, it -would seem even that he came to regard them as forming the “ʿAshīra” -he lacked among the Arabs. Although it earned him the ill-will of the -Arabs and played a great part in his fall, it may be that in this he was -instrumental in giving the first impulse to the recovery of a national -sentiment amongst the Persians of Khurāsān. - -The situation in Central Asia was also favourable for a renewal of the -attempt to annex to the Arab dominions the rich lands of Transoxania, -though it is doubtful how much information the Arabs possessed on this -point. In 682, while China, weakened internally by the intrigues of the -Empress Wu, had her hands tied by the wars with Tibet, the Eastern or -Northern Turks had re-asserted their independence. The new Empire never -regained its authority over all the western territories of the former -Khans, but by constant campaigns had extended its rule over the Ten -Tribes of the Ili and Chu, who, we are told, were “almost annihilated.” -In 701 the Eastern Turks invaded Sogdiana, but there is no reason to -assume, though it has frequently been suggested, that Muhallab’s forces -at Kish were affected by this raid. As the necessity of securing hostages -for the safety even of the lines of communication shows, the hostility of -the local forces is sufficient to explain all the encounters narrated. -The devastation and loss that invariably accompanied these raids must -have still further weakened the resources of the subject princes, to -whom there was small consolation in the appointment of a son of the Khan -to command the Ten Tribes. In any case the unceasing warfare which the -Eastern Turks had to wage against the Türgesh from 699 to 711 effectually -prevented them from sending assistance in response to any appeals for -support which may have reached them from Sogdiana[41]. Equally if not -more impossible was it for the Türgesh to intervene in Sogdiana during -the same period[42]. By the “Turks,” as we have seen, the Arab historians -mean as a general rule the local inhabitants, amongst whom there may -quite possibly have been included at that time Turkish elements. -Occasional references to the Khāqān (unless they may be taken to refer -to local chiefs, which is improbable) are obvious _fakhr_-developments. -The narrative of 98 A.H. on which the theory of Türgesh intervention is -mainly based, is a pure Bāhilite invention. Finally, the experience of -the Arabs in later years shows us that, if the resistance of Sogdiana had -been backed by large forces of Turks, it would have been impossible for -Qutayba to achieve so large a measure of success. - -The conquests of Qutayba fall naturally into four periods: - - 1. 86/705: The recovery of Lower _T_ukhāristān; - - 2. From 87/706 to 90/709: The conquest of Bukhārā; - - 3. From 91/710 to 93/712: Consolidation of the Arab authority - in the Oxus valley and its extension into _S_ughd; - - 4. From 94/713 to 96/715: Expeditions into the Jaxartes - provinces. - - -_The recovery of Lower _T_ukhāristān._ - -The first task before Qutayba was to crush the revolt of Lower -_T_ukhāristān. In the spring of 86/705 the army was assembled and marched -through Merv Rūdh and _T_ālaqān on Balkh. According to one of _T_abarī’s -narratives the city was surrendered without a blow. A second account, -which, though not explicitly given as Bāhilite, may be regarded as such, -since it centres on Qutayba’s brother and is intended to establish a -Bāhilite claim on the Barmakids, speaks of a revolt amongst some of the -inhabitants. This may perhaps be the more correct version, since we hear -of Balkh being in a ruinous condition four years later (_T_ab. 1206. 1). -The submission of Balkh was followed by that of Tīsh, king of Chaghāniān, -who had probably cooperated with Mufa_dd_al in the attack on Tirmidh the -year before. His action was, it seems, inspired by a feud with the king -of Shūmān and Ākharūn, in the upper valleys of the Surkhan and Penjab -rivers, against whom he hoped to use the Arab troops in return for his -assistance to them. Mufa_dd_al had actually projected an expedition -against Shūmān before his recall, and it was now carried out by Qutayba, -who was perhaps the more ready to undertake it since it assured the -safety of the southern approach to the Iron Gate. After the submission -of the King Ghīslashtān, who was of Turkish blood, according to Yuan -Chwang, Qutayba returned to Merv alone, leaving the army to follow under -his brother Sāli_h_, who carried out a number of minor raids on the way. -It is obvious that, in spite of Balādhurī’s imaginative account, these -raids must be located in the districts neighbouring on the Oxus. The -readings in _T_abarī’s narrative are, however, defective[43]. Having thus -isolated Nēzak in Bādghīs, the heart of the revolt, Qutayba spent the -winter months in negotiating with him through Sulaym “the Counsellor,” -an influential Persian whose skill in conducting the most difficult -negotiations proved more than once of the utmost value to Qutayba. Nēzak -was persuaded to surrender and was conducted to Merv, where peace was -concluded on condition that Qutayba would not enter Bādghīs in person. As -a precautionary measure however the governor arranged that Nēzak should -accompany him in all his expeditions. Thus for the moment at least, the -danger of an outbreak in Khurāsān was averted, in a manner honourable to -both parties, and the son of Pērōz took his way back to China to await a -more favourable opportunity[44]. - - -_The Conquest of Bukhārā._ - -In the following year, Qutayba, first making sure of the crossings at -Āmul and Zamm, opened his campaigns in Bukhārā with an attack on Paykand. -From the expressions of Narshakhī, on whose history of this period we -may place more reliance since his details as a rule fit in with and -supplement the other histories, it can be gathered that the principality -of Bukhārā was weakened by civil war and invasion. During the minority of -_T_ughshāda and the regency of Khātūn, the ambitious nobles had struggled -between themselves for the chief power; most of the territories, -including Bukhārā itself, had been seized by the prince of Wardāna -and the remaining districts seem to have been brought under the rule -of Khunuk Khudāh, a noble who assumed the title of Bukhār Khudāh[45]. -Paykand was thus more or less isolated and, from Narshakhī’s account, -seems to have been left to its fate. The battle with the _S_ughdians -related in _T_abarī is an obvious anticipation from the events of the -following year. After a siege of some two months the city came to terms -with Qutayba, who left it under a small garrison and, according to -_T_abarī’s version, began the return march to Merv. An émeute in Paykand, -however, brought him back at once. It seems reasonable to assume that -the citizens, imagining Qutayba’s attack to have been no more than an -isolated raid, tried to expel the garrison as soon as he retired. The -details given in Narshakhī, that on Qutayba’s advance towards Bukhārā a -certain citizen, enraged by the insulting conduct of the governor, Warqāʾ -b. Nasr al-Bāhili, attempted to murder him, are trivial and unconvincing. -Whatever the cause of the revolt may have been, however, Qutayba took a -terrible revenge. In accordance with mediaeval practice the renegade city -was sacked, its fighting men put to death, and its women and children -enslaved. The booty taken from this, the first of the great trading -cities of Central Asia to be forcibly captured by the Arabs, furnished -inexhaustible material for the exaggerated details of later tradition. -The most important part of the spoil was an arsenal of weapons and -armour, the excellence of which was such that the “forging of _S_ughd” -appears in contemporary verse alongside the traditional “forging of -David” for superlative craftsmanship[46]. With the consent of _H_ajjāj, -these weapons were not included in the division of the booty but used -to re-equip the army. The statement that there were only 350 suits of -armour in the whole army before this is, however, of Bāhilite provenance -and scarcely worthy of credence. The exemplary punishment thus meted -out by Qutayba to Paykand at the beginning of his career was a stern -warning to Nēzak and the Sogdians. Those who accepted Arab dominion would -be humanely treated, but any attempt at rebellion would be inexorably -crushed. Nevertheless the sentence on Paykand was somewhat mitigated in -the sequel, as Narshakhī adds that the captives were ransomed by the -merchants of Paykand on their return from the annual trading expedition -to China, and the city, after lying in ruins for many years, was -eventually rebuilt. - -The disaster at Paykand roused the princes and merchants of Transoxania -to the danger of neglecting the invaders. The feud between Wardāna and -Bukhārā was patched up; round Wardān Khudāh, the central figure and -organiser of the struggle for independence, gathered the forces of all -the nearer principalities. Thus when Qutayba, on renewing his expedition -in 88/707, had taken the outlying town of Tūmushkath (not Nūmushkath, -which was the earlier name of Bukhārā) and Rāmīthana (or Rāmtīn), he -found his communications cut by the troops of Wardāna, Bukhārā, and -_S_ughd. It is not, perhaps, impossible that the prince of Farghāna -should have cooperated with the _S_ughdians, as stated in Madāʾinī’s -account. On the other hand the Arabic narratives are far from explicit, -and the _S_ughdians here referred to are much more probably those of -Kish than of Samarqand, a suspicion which is confirmed by the famous -punning order of _H_ajjāj: “Crush Kish, destroy Nasaf, and drive Wardān -back.” Narshakhī and Yaʿqūbī give an account of the negotiations between -_H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, representing Qutayba, and _T_arkhūn king of -_S_ughd, which is certainly to be put, with _T_abarī, after the conquest -of Bukhārā two years later. Throughout all these campaigns there is -manifest a tendency, common to the early chronicles of all nations, -to exaggerate the numbers and composition of the opposing forces. As -usual the Bāhilite account carries this to the point of absurdity by -introducing a Türgesh force of no less than 200,000 men, an obvious -anachronism, influenced by the later Türgesh invasions. The connection -is made clear by the mention of Kūr Maghānūn, whom we find nearly thirty -years later (_T_ab. II. 1602. 2) as “one of the chiefs of the Türgesh.” -The true account would seem to be that Qutayba did not attempt to fight -a pitched battle, but by dilatory tactics wearied out the allies and -gave time for their natural inclination towards disunion to operate, -then evaded them by a rapid march through the Iron Gate and, except for -a rearguard skirmish with the enemy’s cavalry, got his army clear across -the river at Tirmidh. The appointment of ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān ibn Muslim -to command the rearguard gives us the clue, as it was to this brother -that Qutayba regularly entrusted all the most difficult commands. In -the following year Qutayba was still unable to make headway against the -united forces of Wardān Khudāh, Kish and Nasaf, and after protracted -fighting (in spite of the double victory claimed by the Bāhilites) -returned to Merv. For this weakness he was severely reprimanded by -_H_ajjāj, who, with the aid of a map, drew up a plan of attack. The -invasion of 90/709 seems to have taken Wardān Khudāh by surprise, as the -Muslim army was able to advance at once to the siege of Bukhārā. There -is some ground for the conjecture, however, that the death of Wardān -Khudāh had occurred in the interval and that Qutayba was opposed only -by the local forces[47]. This may also explain the hesitation of the -forces of Samarqand to intervene. The battle before the walls of Bukhārā -is described by _T_abarī in a long Tamīmite tradition reminiscent of -the ancient “days,” but the actual capture of the city is left to be -inferred. This siege is transferred to Wardāna by Vámbéry (_cf._ _Heart -of Asia_ p. 52) probably on the authority of the Persian _T_abarī -(Zotenberg IV. 165), but Narshakhī, _T_abarī and all other authorities -quite definitely refer to Bukhārā. Abū ʿUbayda’s tradition (Bal. 420) -of capture by treachery is at best a confusion with the capture of -Samarqand. All the details given in Narshakhī relative to Qutayba’s -organisation of Bukhārā do not refer to this year; most probably the only -immediate measures taken were the imposition of a tribute of 200,000 -dirhems and the occupation of the citadel by an Arab garrison. - -A diplomatic success followed the victory at Bukhārā. _T_arkhūn, king -of Samarqand, opened negotiations with Qutayba, who was represented by -the commander of his Persian corps, _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, and terms were -agreed upon, probably on the basis of the old treaty made by Salm ibn -Ziyād. _T_arkhūn gave hostages for the payment of tribute and Qutayba -began the march back to Merv. - - -_Consolidation and Advance._ - -If the Arabs returned in the autumn of 90/709 elated with their success, -they were soon given fresh cause for anxiety. Nēzak, finally realising -that all hope of recovering independence must be extinguished if Arab -rule was strengthened in Khurāsān, and perhaps putting down to weakness -Qutayba’s willingness to gain his ends if possible by diplomacy, -determined on a last effort to overthrow Muslim sovereignty in Lower -_T_ukhāristān, at the moment when it was least to be expected. Having -obtained permission to revisit his home, he left Qutayba at Āmul and made -for Balkh, but escaped to _T_ukhāristān in order to avoid re-arrest. From -here he corresponded with the rulers of Balkh, Merv Rūdh, _T_ālaqān, -Fāryāb, and Jūzjān, urging them to undertake a concerted rising in the -spring. The king of Chaghāniān seems to have refused to countenance the -conspiracy, but the weak Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān was induced, possibly by -force, to make common cause with Nēzak, who hoped doubtless by this means -to unite all the subject princes in defence of their suzerain. - -Qutayba’s army was already disbanded and the winter was setting in. -All that he could do was to despatch the garrison at Merv, some 12,000 -men, under ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān, with instructions to winter in Balkh, -where they could counter any immediate move by Nēzak, and advance into -_T_ukhāristān in the spring. This resolute action made Qutayba master -of the situation and so intimidated the rebels that when, in the early -spring, the Arabs marched through the disaffected districts, scarcely a -blow was struck and the princes either submitted or fled. The inhabitants -were granted a complete amnesty except at _T_alāqān, concerning which -the traditions are hopelessly confused. According to one account, a band -of robbers were there executed and crucified, but it is possible that -it was selected for special severity because there alone the revolt had -openly broken out[48]. There was probably also some reorganization of the -administration of Lower _T_ukhāristān, in the direction of conferring -fuller powers on the Arab governors installed in each district, though -the native princes continued to exercise a nominal authority. From -Balkh, Qutayba marched forward and rejoined ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān. With the -assistance of the lesser princes they pursued and captured Nēzak, who was -subsequently executed on direct orders from _H_ajjāj, in violation of -Qutayba’s promise of pardon[49]. How little this action was condemned by -the prevailing spirit of the age, however, is shown by the contemporary -poems quoted by _T_abarī, lauding the “defender of the precincts of -Islam” and comparing his action to the measures formerly adopted against -the Jewish tribes of Madīna. Yet even at this time we find traces of -the new spirit that was to make itself more felt in later years, and -hear voices raised, like Thābit Qu_t_na’s, against the “treachery that -calls itself resolution.” _T_abarī inserts at this point the narrative of -the putting to death of the hostages of Jūzjān, in retaliation for the -murder of the Arab hostage in Jūzjān, a much more excusable incident. -Balādhurī puts it at the beginning of Qutayba’s career, however, as -though it belonged to the first pacification of Lower _T_ukhāristān, so -that its position in _T_abarī may possibly be due to its superficial -similarity with the case of Nēzak. The results of this expedition were -of the greatest importance: not only was Nēzak’s scheme crushed and -Lower _T_ukhāristān henceforth incorporated in the Arab Empire, but also -for the first time Arab authority was extended over the Jabghu and his -immediate vassals in the Oxus basin. The former, exiled to Damascus, -formed a valuable hostage against any attempt to regain independence, -and it seems not improbable that the king of Chaghāniān was made regent -for the young Jabghu (see above, p. 9), ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān was appointed -governor of Balkh, in order to supervise the administration of the new -province. - -Qutayba had hardly returned to Merv before he was called to deal -with yet another revolt. The king of Shūmān, taking advantage of the -difficulties of the Arabs, or of their absence in the southern mountains, -had re-asserted his independence in spite of the conciliatory offers of -Sāli_h_ ibn Muslim. The full weight of Qutayba’s power was now employed -to crush him. His stronghold was attacked with siege artillery, the -king himself killed in a sortie and the garrison put to the sword. -From this point Shūmān and Ākharūn gradually drop out of the Arabic -narratives altogether. Qutayba then resumed his march through the Iron -Gate, reduced the districts of Kish and Nasaf, and revisited Bukhārā. -There seems to have been continual friction between the Arab garrison -and the population[50] and it was felt that a drastic re-organisation -was necessary. _T_ughshāda, though still a youth, was restored to the -position of Bukhār-Khudāh, and the leaders of the hostile party (more -probably that of Khunuk Khudāh than Wardān Khudāh) were put to death. -By this means, Qutayba no doubt hoped to secure compliance and docility -in the native administration. _T_ughshāda had been raised to the throne -by the Arabs and it might be expected that he would side with them in -consequence. A more solid guarantee for the permanence of the conquest, -however, was the establishment of a military colony in Bukhārā. Following -the precedent set in the colonization of Merv, Arabs were lodged in the -houses of the inhabitants, and it is said that the latter were encouraged -to attend the Friday prayer and behave as Muslims by the distribution -of a small gratuity. The Kushan merchants left their homes and property -rather than comply with these orders and founded a new city outside the -walls, but it is evident that the Islamization of the city was not yet so -thorough as the traditions assert[51]. The building of the Mosque and the -organization of the Friday services are dated by Narshakhī in 94 A.H., -which points to a further organization of the city after the capture of -Samarqand. The organization of the new territories proceeded, in fact, -_pari passu_ with the extension and consolidation of the conquests. -So long as the Arab authority was insecure in Cisoxania, it was out -of the question to establish either military colonies or an elaborate -administration beyond the river. Consequently, it was only now that the -failure of Nēzak’s revolt had definitely secured the Arab dominion in the -former Ephthalite lands that it was possible to take the decisive step of -settling an Arab garrison in Bukhārā. The regularity with which each step -followed the last suggests that it was done according to a prearranged -plan, or at least that some attention had been devoted to the question -of the administration of the occupied territories in the event of the -success of the military operations. - -Qutayba’s reorganization was not confined to the civil government, -however, but extended to the army as well. Hitherto the jealousy of -the Arabs for their exclusive rights as a warrior caste had strictly -limited the number of Persians in the armies, apart from the clients -and camp followers. Thus we are told (_T_ab. 1290. 20) that the armies -of Khurāsān at this period were composed as follows: from Ba_s_ra-Ahl -al-ʿĀliya, 9,000; Bakr, 7,000; Tamīm, 10,000; ʿAbd al Qays, 4,000; Azd, -10,000: from Kūfa, 7,000: and alongside these 47,000 Arabs only 7,000 -Mawālī, commanded by _H_ayyān-an-Naba_t_ī, who is called variously a -Daylamite and a native of Khurāsān. Now, however, Qutayba imposed, -first on Bukhārā, and later on each successive conquest, the obligation -of providing an auxiliary corps of local troops, amounting usually to -some ten or twenty thousand men, to serve with the Arab armies. It is -possible, if the story be true, that this was suggested by the precedent -set by Saʿīd b. ʿOthmān in the conquest of Samarqand, but more probable -that it represents an entirely new departure in the East, though it had -long been a practice in other spheres of the Arab conquests. - -We are given no hint of the motives which led to the adoption of the -new system, though it would seem that they must have been of some -force. Possibly it was no more than a desire to keep the native armies -occupied in the service of the Arabs rather than risk a revolt in their -rear. _H_ajjāj and Qutayba perhaps realised too that the Arab forces -by themselves, after taking four years to reduce Bukhārā alone, were -insufficient to ensure success in the greater task of subduing Samarqand. -Under the new system—which recalls Pan-chʿao’s famous aphorism “Use -barbarians to attack barbarians”—each conquest in turn made the next more -easy. The rapidity of Qutayba’s later conquests in contrast with the -early period is thus explained. It is just possible that in this plan -Qutayba had an ulterior motive as well: the formation of a Persian army, -trained on the same lines as the Arab forces, but more devoted to the -person of the governor and able to take his part against the Arabs. How -very nearly this plan succeeded, even in Qutayba’s own case, the sequel -was to show. - -The practice of raising native levies, once started, appears to have -become general in Khurāsān. We have no information as to when the local -forces of Khurāsān and Lower _T_ukhāristān were incorporated in the army, -nor in what proportions, but we have frequent evidence of their presence -and increasing prestige in the wars of the next forty years[52]. On the -other hand, though contingents from the towns of Sogdiana were used by -later governors if they were available, as in 106 and 112 A.H., in view -of the weaker hold of the Arabs on Transoxania Sogdian troops never -formed a regular division of the Arab forces up to the end of the Umayyad -period. This distinction between the two subject Iranian groups became, -as will be seen, of some importance when the ʿAbbāsid propaganda began to -tamper with the loyalty of the armies of Khurāsān. - -While Qutayba was occupied with the new organization of Bukhārā, a -detached force, sent under ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān from Kish to Samarqand to -exact from _T_arkhūn the tribute agreed upon in the previous year, -successfully accomplished its mission. ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān, after restoring -the hostages to _T_arkhūn, rejoined his brother at Bukhārā, whence they -returned to Merv for the winter. - -One important vassal of _T_ukhāristān, who had long been a thorn in the -side of _H_ajjāj, still remained unsubdued. This was Rutbīl or Zunbīl, -the Turkish ruler of Zābulistān[53]. In 91, the viceroy united Sijistān -to the province of Khurāsān, with instructions to Qutayba to undertake a -campaign in person against Rutbīl. In the following year, therefore, the -expeditions into Transoxania were interrupted, and the army again marched -southwards. To Qutayba’s great relief (for he disliked to undertake a -campaign against this formidable foe who had made Sijistān “an ill-omened -frontier”) Rutbīl hastened to tender his submission, and at the same -time sent an embassy to convey his homage to the Emperor of China[54]. -Recognition of Arab suzerainty over Zābulistān involved of course only -the payment of a fixed tribute, and no attempt was made at a permanent -occupation. - -Meanwhile a serious situation had arisen in _S_ughd. The merchants and -nobles of Samarqand had resented the weakness of their king and the -payment of tribute: in Qutayba’s absence the party for resistance _à -outrance_ gained the upper hand, and _T_arkhūn, deposed on the ground -of incapacity, committed suicide. The choice of the electors fell on -Ghūrak[55], a prince of whom we would gladly have known more. Under -the ever increasing difficulties with which he was confronted during -his twenty-seven years of rule, his consummate handling of the most -confused situations shows him to have been at once statesman and patriot, -and preserved his kingdom from repeated disaster. The action of the -_S_ughdian nobles, however, the Arabic account of which is confirmed by -the Chinese records, constituted a challenge to Arab pretensions which -Qutayba could not be slow in answering. These considerations clearly -disprove the partial tradition of Abū ʿUbayda (Bal. 422), to the effect -that Qutayba treacherously attacked Khwārizm and Samarqand in spite of -the treaties of Saʿīd ibn ʿOthmān, and the argument based upon it by van -Vloten in _La Domination Arabe_, must also, in consequence, be somewhat -modified. - -The winter of 93/711, therefore, was spent in preparations for an -expedition against Samarqand, but before the opening of the campaigning -season, Qutayba received a secret mission from the Khwārizm Shāh, who -offered to become tributary if the Arabs would rid him of his rebellious -brother Khurrazādh. Qutayba agreed, and after publicly announcing his -intention of invading _S_ughd, suddenly appeared at Hazārasp. The -followers of the Khwārizm Shāh were persuaded to offer no resistance -for this year, at least, and accepted the terms, which included, in -accordance with the new scheme, the provision of a corps of 10,000 -ablebodied men as well as the usual tribute. Qutayba remained at the -capital[56] until the army was collected, while ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān was -employed, according to _T_abarī, in reducing the king of Khāmjird, who -from the parallel account in Balādhurī is to be identified either with -Khurrazādh, or at least with his party. The Persian _T_abarī adds a -long and doubtless legendary narrative of his surrender. Four thousand -prisoners were taken and butchered, probably by order of the Khwārizm -Shāh. - -The later history of Khwārizm under Qutayba’s rule is an unhappy one. -His first governor Iyās b. ʿAbdullah, proved too weak for his post, -and on Qutayba’s withdrawal the Khwārizmians rose in revolt and put to -death the king who had betrayed them. Iyās was recalled in disgrace, -together with the Persian _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, who had been associated -with him, and Qutayba’s brother ʿAbdullah (in Balādhurī ʿUbaydullah) was -appointed as temporary regent until, after the capture of Samarqand, a -strong force under al-Mughīra b. ʿAbdullah could be sent to effect a -reconquest. Qutayba’s retribution on this occasion exceeded even the -terror of Paykand and Shūmān. We are told by Al-Bīrūnī that the educated -classes and more cultured elements in Khwārizm were slaughtered almost -to extinction. He refers this by implication to the second expedition of -Qutayba (though it does not appear that the governor led the expedition -in person), which is borne out by what we know of Qutayba’s methods in -similar cases, while there is no instance in his career of such an action -on a first conquest. It was in all probability the educated classes -(including no doubt the hierarchy) who led the revolt against the traitor -king and thus met with the severest punishment. The dynasty, however, was -maintained, and it is not improbable that the Arab colony of which we -hear shortly afterwards was settled in Khwārizm at the same time[57]. - -The booty from the first expedition into Khwārizm was enough to satisfy -Qutayba’s troops, who demanded to be allowed to return to their homes, -but a sudden thrust at Samarqand promised such success that Qutayba -and his leaders decided to make the attempt. The _S_ughdian army had -apparently been disbanded, and under cover of a false movement of the -advance guard, the Arabs marched directly on Samarqand. The advance guard -under ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān numbered 20,000 men, while the main body included -the new Persian contingents from Khwārizm and Bukhārā. The march occupied -only a few days and the slight resistance encountered did not prevent -the Arabs from proceeding at once to invest the city. Ghūrak conducted -the defence with vigour, however, and appealed to Shāsh and Farghāna for -assistance, reminding them that Samarqand was the bulwark of the Jaxartes -valley. A strong force was despatched from Shāsh with the intention of -making a surprise attack on the Arab camp, but was ambushed at night by a -picked troop of Arabs and almost annihilated. This reverse, together with -the continuous bombardment to which they were subjected, disheartened -the _S_ughdians, but the wall had been breached and an entrance almost -effected by the Arabs, stoutly assisted by their new Iranian divisions, -before Ghūrak sued for peace. Qutayba’s demands were unexpectedly -light—an annual tribute, stated in widely varying amounts, and a strong -corps of _S_ughdians, together with a stipulation that the city should be -cleared of its fighting men while the Arabs built a mosque and celebrated -the ritual prayers. Once within the gates, however, Qutayba refused to -restore the city to Ghūrak: a strong garrison was established in the -citadel, under the command of ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān (so Yaʿqūbī; in _T_abarī -ʿAbdullah) and drastic orders were issued excluding all unbelievers -except under strict surveillance, doubtless with the intention of -avoiding a repetition of the friction that had occurred at Bukhārā. -Ghūrak either could not or would not place himself in the humiliating -position of _T_ughshāda, and with his retinue, accompanied possibly by -the merchants, withdrew from Samarqand altogether and built a new city, -Farankath, some four farsakhs distant in the direction of Ishtīkhan[58]. -Qutayba’s double-dealing on this occasion, however, tarnished his -reputation among both Persians and Arabs, far more than his severity to -Paykand and Khwārizm, and left a rankling memory in _S_ughd. In order -to avoid the stigma of treachery attaching to their hero the Bāhilite -tradition relates this expedition in an entirely different version[59]. -Qutayba, we are told, after marching down the right bank of the Oxus -and collecting his army at Bukhārā, advanced to Rabinjān where he was -met by the _S_ughdians under Ghūrak, supported by the troops of Shāsh -and Farghāna and the Turks. The enemy retired on Samarqand but engaged -in constant rearguard actions, the city being finally entered by force -after a decisive battle in the suburbs. Though this account is at first -sight borne out to some extent by Ghūrak’s own narrative in his letter -to the Emperor of China, in which he claims an initial success against -the Arabs, but was unable to prevent their advance, both statements must -be regarded as exaggerations in opposite interests. At all events it is -quite certain that none but _S_ughdian troops were involved at first. - -A further development of the Bāhilite tradition has given rise to some -controversy. According to this, Ghūrak appealed for help not only to -Shāsh but also to the Khāqān, and the squadron sent from Shāsh appears -as a force of Turks, commanded by a son of the Khāqān. This is, of -course, an obvious exaggeration on the former narrative. In the Turkish -Orkhon inscriptions, however, an expedition under the prince Kül-tegin -into Sogdiana “to organize the Sogdian people” is mentioned, following -on a successful campaign against the Türgesh in 710/711. Marquart -endeavours to prove that this expedition occurred in 712 and is, in -fact, corroborated by the Bāhilite tradition. Professor Houtsma has -raised several objections to this view, the most important being that -the chronology of the inscriptions has to be manipulated to allow of -this date, as the natural date to assume from the context is at latest -711. These, together with the considerations mentioned above, render -Marquart’s hypothesis absolutely untenable. - -A second suggestion has been put forward by Professor Barthold, to which, -however, Professor Houtsma’s objections would apply with equal force[60]. -In the narrative of the historian Yaʿqūbī (II. 344), there is a brief -notice as follows: “Qutayba appointed his brother ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān ibn -Muslim governor of Samarqand, but the men of Samarqand treacherously -revolted against him, and Khāqān, king of the Turks, attacked him also. -He wrote to Qutayba, but Qutayba waited until the winter cleared, then -marched to join him and routed the army of the Turks.” Professor Barthold -takes the view, therefore, that this is the expedition referred to in the -inscriptions, and attributes the failure of the Turks to the disastrous -effects of a winter campaign in a devastated land, which so severely -disabled them that they could not face the formidable army that took the -field under Qutayba in the spring. It is questionable, however, how far -Yaʿqūbī’s narrative may be trusted. None of the other historians give the -slightest hint of this invasion, nor were the results such as we should -expect after a _S_ughdian revolt. There was no ruthless reconquest, no -stamping out of rebellion in blood. Neither does the general tenor of -Yaʿqūbī’s accounts of Qutayba inspire confidence. They are not only -confused in detail and chronology—the capture of Samarqand, for instance, -is dated 94 A.H.—but in some cases are taken from what we know to be the -Bāhilite tradition, and in others, such as the narrative under discussion -and the account of the conquest of Khwārizm, follow a tradition which -seems irreconcilable with our other information. While it cannot be said -definitely therefore, that Yaʿqūbī’s statements in this case contain no -truth, it is certainly preferable to regard them as a later development -of the narrative, on the lines of the Bāhilite tradition. - -If the chronological objections raised by Professor Houtsma are sound, -there remains still a third possible solution, which, however, as there -is no corroborative evidence from either the Arabic or Chinese sources, -must remain nothing but a hypothesis. It is surely quite tenable that -Kül-tegin’s “organization of the Sogdian people” had something to do -with the deposition of _T_arkhūn and appointment of Ghūrak. With Sogdian -trade playing the most important part which we know in the Turkish lands, -it would be well worth while to try to prevent the Arabs from obtaining -control over it. The very unexpectedness of the description given to this -expedition shows clearly that there was some motive for “organization” -and it is difficult to see what other motive there could have been. These -circumstances would render it quite probable that Ghūrak did, in fact, -appeal to the Khāqān for assistance against the Arabs, but it seems that -the growing power of the Türgesh barred the way into Sogdiana against the -Northern Khanate for the remainder of its short existence. - -By the conquest of Samarqand Qutayba finally established his position -in Transoxania. It must not be assumed, however, as many of the Arab -historians give the impression of assuming, that the holding of Samarqand -meant the conquest of _S_ughd. All that had been done was to settle an -Arab garrison in a country as yet unfriendly. It was the duty of the -commanders at Samarqand gradually to extend their authority over the -whole district of _S_ughd by expeditions and razzias[61]. There was -thus a radical difference between the conquest of Bukhārā and that of -Samarqand. The former was the result of a series of campaigns in which -the resources of the country had been exhausted and the province annexed -piecemeal. The whole population had become subjects of the Arabs and -were under constant surveillance: _T_ughshāda himself held his rank on -sufferance and was compelled to maintain at least an outward show of -loyalty. But Samarqand had been captured in one swift thrust; _S_ughd -as a whole was still unsubdued and only from policy acknowledged the -suzerainty of the Arabs for the time being. “Ghūrak at Ishtīkhan was -free to turn either to the Arabs or to the Turks”[58]. Nevertheless -in the years that followed there is evidence that friendly relations -were formed between the Arab garrison and many of the local leaders and -inhabitants[62]. The whole country, however, had suffered terribly in the -constant invasions and counter invasions. A contemporary poet gives a -vivid picture of its dissipated wealth, its ruined and desolate lands: - - “Daily Qutayba gathers spoil, increasing our wealth with new - wealth: A Bāhilite who has worn the crown till the hair that - was black has whitened. _S_ughd is subdued by his squadrons, - its people left sitting in nakedness.... As oft as he lights in - a land, his horse leave it furrowed and scarred.” - - -_The Expeditions into the Jaxartes Provinces._ - -It might perhaps have been expected that Qutayba’s next object after the -capture of Samarqand would be to establish Arab authority in _S_ughd as -firmly as had been done in Bukhārā. It would probably have been better -in the end had he done so, but for the moment the attractions of the -“forward policy” which had already proved so successful were too strong. -Instead of concentrating on the reduction of _S_ughd, it was decided to -push the frontiers of the Empire further into Central Asia, and leave -the former to be carried out at leisure. Qutayba therefore crossed to -Bukhārā, where 20,000 levies from Khwārizm, Bukhārā, Kish, and Nasaf -had been summoned to meet him, and marched into _S_ughd. If there was -a Turkish army wintering in the country, it offered no considerable -resistance to the advance of the Arabs. In _S_ughd Qutayba divided his -forces into two corps. The Persian levies were sent in the direction -of Shāsh, while he himself with the Arabs marched on Khujanda and -Farghāna. Our information is brief and lacking in detail. Of the northern -expedition we are told only that they captured Shāsh and burnt the -greater part of it. Qutayba’s own force had to overcome some resistance -at Khujanda, but eventually reached Kāsān, where it was rejoined by the -other. The geographers refer also to a battle fought by Qutayba at Mīnak -in Ushrūsana, but against whom is not clear[63]. _T_abarī (1440. 7) -preserves a tradition that Qutayba appointed an Arab resident, ʿI_s_ām b. -ʿAbdullah al-Bāhilī, in Farghāna. If this is true, as seems not unlikely, -the appointment was probably made during this year. The details of the -tradition are quite unacceptable, however. No Arab governor would ever -have taken up his residence in a hill-pass in the remotest district -of Farghāna, completely cut off from his fellow-countrymen. One of -Balādhurī’s authorities carries this or a similar tradition further by -crediting Qutayba with the establishment of Arab colonies as far as Shāsh -and Farghāna. Here again at most only temporary military outposts can be -in question. On the other hand, the extraordinary success achieved by the -Arabs on this expedition is apt to be overlooked, and Qutayba might well -have imagined, as he returned to Merv, that the latest conquests were as -permanently annexed to Khurāsān as Samarqand and Khwārizm. - -The helplessness of their Turkish suzerain in face of the victorious -Arabs, however, caused a revival in Transoxania of the tradition of -Chinese overlordship. Appeals to the Khāqān were of no avail, and in the -minds of the Sogdian princes, seeking for some counterpoise to the rapid -extension of the Arab conquests, the idea of appealing directly to the -Emperor was slowly maturing. Though no definite steps in this direction -had as yet been taken, some inkling of it may have reached Qutayba. The -Arabs were now familiar with China through the sea-borne trade of the -Persian Gulf and at least after, if not before, their conquest of the -cities which were already becoming the headquarters of Central Asian -commerce, must have become aware of the close commercial relations -which these cities maintained with China. Under these circumstances, -Qutayba (or possibly _H_ajjāj) decided to send a mission overland to -the Chinese court, possibly to prevent their intervention in the West, -but more probably with the intention of promoting trade relations. As -the princes of Sogdiana and _T_ukhāristān were much more alive to the -advantages of preserving their commerce and to the dangers which might -befall it under the new government than the Arabs could have been, it was -probably on their suggestion that the embassy was sent. They would, of -course, have no difficulty in persuading governors of the character of -_H_ajjāj and Qutayba that their own interests also lay in safeguarding -and encouraging the trade which brought such wealth to Transoxania. -If the intervention of the Turks had been caused by their concern for -Sogdian trade, it became doubly important for the Arabs to show their -practical interest in its welfare. Apart from the immediate gain to the -treasury which would accrue, such an action might reasonably be expected -to secure the acquiescence of the Sogdians in Arab rule. The date of the -mission is fixed as 713 by the Chinese records, which add also that in -spite of the refusal of the envoys to perform the customary kow-tow it -was favourably received by the Emperor. Both statements are confirmed by -_T_abarī’s remark that the leader was sent to Walīd on his return, which -must therefore be dated between the death of _H_ajjāj and the end of -714[64]. Unfortunately the Arab records of the mission have been confused -with the legendary exploits of Qutayba two years later, becoming so -disfigured in the process as to be almost worthless. The wisdom of this -step must have been justified by its results, though there are no effects -apparent in our histories and the relentless march of Chinese policy was -not affected. This embassy is mentioned by the Arabic historians as if it -were an isolated incident, but it was, as I have shown elsewhere[65], -only the first of many such sent by the governors of Khurāsān to maintain -friendly relations with the Chinese court. It cannot be doubted that -in the majority of cases at least the object of these missions was -commercial, particularly where joint embassies were sent with one or -other of the Sogdian principalities. - -In the following year 95/714 the raids on the Jaxartes provinces were -renewed. It would seem on comparing Balādhurī’s account with _T_abarī -that Qutayba made Shāsh his headquarters and worked northwards as far -as Isbījāb. The prince of Shāsh appealed to China for assistance, but -without effect[66]. Qutayba’s plan therefore was to follow up the -important trade-route which led from Turfan down the Ili valley, along -the northern edge of the Thian-Shan mountains, through Tokmak and Tarāz -into Shāsh and Samarqand. Though the economic importance of controlling -this trade-route may have had its part in this decision, especially in -view of their new patronage of Sogdian trade, it is probable that this -was less in the mind of the Arabs than its strategic value as the road -by which the Central Asian Turks debouched on Transoxania. Towards the -end of the summer, the expeditions were abruptly interrupted by the news -of the death of _H_ajjāj, which had occurred in Shawwāl (June). Deeply -affected by the loss of his patron and not a little uncertain of the -effect on his own fortunes, Qutayba disbanded the army, sending garrisons -to Bukhārā, Kish, and Nasaf, and returned to Merv. Walīd, however, -allayed his fears by an encouraging letter, and made his province -independent of ʿIrāq. But the death of _H_ajjāj had affected Khurāsān too -deeply for such a simple remedy. The Arabs had gained wealth in their -expeditions, they were weary of the constant campaigns and anxious to -enjoy the comforts of peace. Factional feeling was merely slumbering, -and a new element of unrest had been added by a Kūfan corps under Jahm -b. Za_h_r, which had been transferred to Khurāsān from India by _H_ajjāj -in his last year. All parties among the Arabs were alienated from -Qutayba; even Qays had been estranged by his highhanded action in the -first place with the house of Al-Ahtam and again by his feud with Wakīʿ -b. Abī Sūd, the chief of Tamīm[67]; moreover, they were suspicious of his -medizing tendencies. Amongst the Persians he was popular, but _H_ayyān -an-Naba_t_ī, though restored to his position in command of the Persian -troops, had not forgiven Qutayba for his disgrace at Khwārizm. It seems -extraordinary that the general himself should have been blind to any -internal danger and was entirely confident in the loyalty of his army. - -On re-opening the campaign in 96/715, therefore, his only precautions -consisted in the removal of his family and personal property from Merv to -Samarqand and the posting of a guard on the Oxus, in view of a possible -restoration to favour of Yazīd b. Muhallab. It is unlikely that Qutayba -could have had in mind the possibility of Walīd’s death; what he feared -was more probably a _rapprochement_ between the Caliph and his heir -Sulaymān, who was his bitter enemy. - -The object of this last campaign was probably the complete subjugation -of Farghāna. Having established his authority over the important section -of the Middle Jaxartes and its trade route, it remained now to round off -his conquests by extending it also over the central trade route between -Farghāna and Kashgaria. The account which _T_abarī intends to convey, -however, is that Qutayba marched first into Farghāna and from there led -an expedition against Kashgar, with complete success. In an article -of mine published in the _Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies_ -(II. 467 ff.), all our evidence for this expedition has been critically -discussed, and shown to be against the authenticity of the tradition. It -is unnecessary, therefore, to do more than summarise very briefly the -arguments there put forward. (1) None of the historians earlier than or -contemporary with _T_abarī contain any reference to a raid on Kashgar, -and even _T_abarī’s own statement is not borne out by the authorities -on which it professedly rests. Only one of these relates an expedition -to Kashgar, and that under the command of an unknown leader. (2) The -interval between the opening of the campaign and the death of Qutayba -in Farghāna in August or September does not allow time for such an -expedition, especially in view of the mutinous attitude of the army after -the death of the Caliph. (3) The Chinese account of Arab interference -in Farghāna cannot refer, for chronological reasons, to Qutayba’s -expedition, and in any case is silent on any attack on Kashgaria. - -That an expedition of this sort should have been attributed to Qutayba -is not surprising, in view of the tradition of the embassy to China, and -of the great renown which attached to his memory. Later tradition[68] -recounted that _H_ajjāj pledged the governorship of China to the first -to reach it of his two governors in the East, Mu_h_ammad b. Qāsim and -Qutayba. “_S_īn” was, of course, not the sharply defined country of -our days, but rather a loose term for the Far East, including even the -Turkish lands in the North-East. Qutayba had probably done little more -than make preparations for his campaign, perhaps to the extent of sending -out minor raiding expeditions, when the news of the death of Walīd -brought everything to a standstill. - -The historians give the most contradictory accounts of the events that -followed; according to Balādhurī the new Caliph Sulaymān confirmed -Qutayba in his command but gave permission to the army to disband. -_T_abarī’s narrative, with which Yaʿqūbī’s in general agrees, is fully -discussed by Wellhausen (274 ff.), together with a valuable analysis -of Qutayba’s position. The story of his highhanded negotiations with -Sulaymān is too well known to need repetition. Finding the army -disinclined to follow him, he completely lost his head and roused the -mutiny in which he was killed. The Persian levies, who were inclined to -side with him, were dissuaded by _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, and at the last -only his own family and bodyguard of Sogdian princes remained faithful. - -The death of Qutayba marked not merely the end of the Arab conquests in -Central Asia for a quarter of a century, but the beginning of a period -of retrogression. Under Wakīʿ b. Abī Sūd, his successor[69], the armies -melted away. Mukhallad, the son of Yazīd b. Muhallab and his lieutenant -in Transoxania, carried out summer raids on the villages of _S_ughd, -but an isolated attempt on the Jaxartes provinces by ʿOmar’s governor, -Al-Jarrā_h_ b. ʿAbdullah, met with ignominious failure. It is possibly -to this that the tradition, mentioned by Barthold (_Turkestan_ 160), -of the disaster met with by a Muslim army refers. On the other hand an -embassy was sent in the name of the Caliph to renew relations with the -Chinese court, and a third in concert with the kingdoms of _T_ukhāristān -and Samarqand, etc., during the reign of ʿOmar[65]. There is mention also -of an expedition into Khuttal which regained some territory. But it was -Qutayba, with _H_ajjāj at his back, who had held his conquests together, -and when he disappeared there was neither leader nor organisation to take -his place. The history of the next decade clearly shows how loose and -unstable was the authority of the Arabs. It was force that had made the -conquests, and only a settled policy of force or conciliation could hold -them. The first was absent. “Qutayba in chains at the world’s end is more -terrible to us than Yazīd as governor in our very midst” is the graphic -summary put into the mouths of the conquered, while of Rutbīl, king of -Zābulistān, we are told expressly that after the death of _H_ajjāj “he -paid not a cent of tribute to any of the governors of Sijistān on behalf -of the Umayyads nor on behalf of Abū Muslim.”[70]. - -Nor was ʿOmar’s policy a true policy of conciliation, based as it was not -on the maintenance of the Arab conquests but on the complete evacuation -of Transoxania. His orders to that effect were of course indignantly -rejected by the Arab colonists in Bukhārā and Samarqand, but together -with his appointment of the feeble and ineffective ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān b. -Nuʿaym al-Qushayrī as governor, such a policy was naturally construed -by the Sogdians as mere weakness, and an invitation to regain their -independence. In addition to the embassies to China, to be related in -the next chapter, and possibly also some negotiations with the Türgesh, -Ghūrak sought to win back his capital by playing on ʿOmar’s piety. -The Caliph sent envoys to the princes of Sogdiana calling on them to -accept Islām, and Ghūrak, outwardly professing his adherence, sent a -deputation to ʿOmar urging that as “Qutayba dealt with us treacherously -and tyrannically, but God has now caused justice and equity to reign” the -city should be restored to the _S_ughdians. The commonsense of the judge -appointed to try the case on ʿOmar’s instructions by the governor of -Samarqand, Sulaymān b. Abiʾs-Sarī (himself a mawlā), solved the problem -in an eminently practical manner, and we are told that his decision, so -far from being “malicious,” was satisfactory to both the Arabs and the -_S_ughdians, if not perhaps to Ghūrak. Beyond the remission of kharāj, it -is doubtful whether ʿOmar’s administration benefited the subject peoples -in the slightest, and the reaction which followed his brief reign only -aggravated the situation. Already before its close the _S_ughdians had -withdrawn their allegiance[71]. - -Thus within six years from the death of Qutayba, much of his work was -undone. He had laid the foundations on which the later rule of Islām -was built, and laid them well, though his own superstructure was too -flimsy to withstand the tempests of the years ahead. But the fault was -not entirely, perhaps not even chiefly, the fault of the builder. He was -snatched away before his work was done, even if in his latter years he -tended to neglect everything else for military glory. As we shall see, -there was no peace in Transoxania until other men arose, great and strong -enough to adopt and carry out the best of his plans. The ruthlessness -and ferocity of his conquests, however, have been much exaggerated. -He was always ready to use diplomacy rather than force if it offered -any hope of success, so much so that his lenience was misconstrued on -occasion by both friends and foes. Only in cases of treachery and revolt -his punishment came swift and terrible. That he did not hesitate to take -vengeance on his private enemies is to say no more than that he was an -Arab. It was not without reason that in later days the Muslims of Central -Asia added Qutayba’s name to the roll of martyrs and that his tomb in -Farghāna became a favourite place of pilgrimage[72]. - -To sum up the position in Central Asia in the years immediately following -Qutayba’s conquests:— - - (1) Lower _T_ukhāristān and Chaghāniān formed an integral part - of the Arab Empire. - - (2) _T_ukhāristān, now in the decay of its power, was held - as a vassal state, together with the Transoxine provinces of - Khuttal, Kumādh, etc., where, however, the Arab authority was - much weaker. - - (3) In Sogdiana, Bukhārā was regarded as a permanent conquest - and gradually colonized; _S_ughd was still hostile territory - held by strong outpost garrisons in Samarqand and Kish, - connected to Bukhārā by minor posts. - - (4) Khwārizm as a military power was negligible and was - permanently colonized. - - (5) The kingdoms beyond the Jaxartes remained independent, - hostile, and relatively strong, supported by the Turkish power - to the North East and also by the intervention of China. - - (6) Ushrūsana, though unsubdued, does not seem to have offered - any obstacle to the passage of Arab armies. - - (7) The existing dynastic houses were everywhere maintained, as - the representatives of the conquered peoples and vehicle of the - civil administration. The actual administrative and financial - authority in their territories, however, passed to the Wāli, - or agent of the Arab governor of Khurāsān[73]. - - -NOTES - -[41] Chav. Doc. 42, 282 f.: Marquart Chronologie 15: _T_abarī II. 1078, -1080. - -[42] As was suggested by Prof. Houtsma, Gotting. Gelehrt. Anz., 1899, -386-7. - -[43] Suggested readings in Barthold, Turkestan, p. 71 n. 5, and p. 76. - -[44] _T_ab. 1184 f., 1195: Chav. Doc. 172: Hamadhānī, Kitāb al-Buldān -(Bibl. Geog. Arab. V) 209. 7: _cf._ _T_ab. 1874. - -[45] Narshakhī 8, 15, 30, 37, 44: _T_ab. 1199. 1: Yaʿqūbī Hist. II. 342. -9. _Cf._ Marquart, Chronologie 63 and Barthold, Arab. Quellen 7. - -[46] _H_amāsa, ed. Freytag, I. 349. - -[47] Narshakhī 8. 15. - -[48] _T_ab. 1207. 16: _cf._ Yaʿqūbī loc. cit. On the Arab method of -crucifixion, Nöldeke Z.D.M.G. LVI (1902) 433; _cf._ _T_ab. 1691 and -Dīnawarī 336. 18. - -[49] Detailed accounts of this are readily accessible in “The Heart of -Asia”, and “The Caliph’s Last Heritage” by Sir Mark Sykes, the latter -in a richly imaginative vein. Very full geographical data are given by -Marquart, Ērānshahr 219 f. - -[50] Narsh. 46. 12, 50. 15. - -[51] _E.g._ Narsh. 58. 5. On the new city, Barthold Turkestan 110 f. - -[52] _E.g._ _T_ab. 1544. 9, 1600 ff. - -[53] On this dynasty see Ērānshahr 37 f., 248 ff. and de Goeje in -W.Z.K.M. XVI (1902) 192-195. - -[54] Yaʿqūbī Geog. 283: Chav. Doc. 161. - -[55] The pronunciation of this name, usually pointed Ghūzak, is fixed by -the Chinese transcription U-le-kia (Chav. Doc. 136). - -[56] On the city of Khwārizm (Fīl, Kath) see Sachau “Zur Geschichte usw. -von Khwārizm” pp. 23-25. - -[57] _T_ab. 1252 f., 1525: Bal. 421: Al-Bīrūnī, “Chronology of Ancient -Nations” (trans. Sachau, London 1879) pp. 41 f. Prof. Barthold is -inclined to regard Al-Bīrūnī’s narrative as fictitious (perhaps intended -to account for the absence of written records of Khwārizm dating from -pre-Muslim times?) _cf._ “Turkestan” p. 1. - -[58] Barthold, Arab. Quellen 21 f. - -[59] _T_ab. 1247 f., 1249. For Ghūrak’s latter, Chav. Doc. 204 f. - -[60] Marquart, Chronologie 5 ff.: Barthold, Arab. Quell. 11 f.: Houtsma -as note 2 above. - -[61] _Cf._ _T_ab. 1418: Bal. 425. - -[62] _T_ab. 1365. 8, 1518, 1542. 1. - -[63] Ibn Hawqal 383; I_st_akhrī 328. 4. The latter’s statement that -Qutayba here beleaguered the Afshīn of Ushrūsana is almost certainly due -to the omission of some words or perversion of the text. On the other -hand, there could not be, as in Ibn Hawqal’s account, any question of -Musawwida (“Black Robes”) in the ordinary sense of the term as early as -94 A.H. and above all in Ushrūsana. - -The absence of any reference to levies from _S_ughd in this expedition -would seem to favour Prof. Barthold’s theory of a _S_ughdian rising in -co-operation with the Turks. The evidence in favour of an accidental -omission is, however, very strong. At this point _T_abarī’s narratives, -in contrast to the preceding period, become extremely brief. The levies -from the four states mentioned met Qutayba at Bukhārā and marched with -him into _S_ughd. Naturally the _S_ughdian levies would have awaited his -arrival there. Had the omission been intentional it would be difficult -to explain why _T_abarī did not include some account of the reasons why -_S_ughdian troops were not summoned. In any case it is certain that -Qutayba would not have left a hostile _S_ughdian army in his rear, and -they must therefore have taken part in the march to the Jaxartes. - -[64] Cordier, Hist. gen. de la Chine, I. 460: Wieger 1642: _T_ab. 1280. 3. - -[65] Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, II. 619 ff. For another -view of these embassies see Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches (1910), -II. 247 f. - -[66] Hirth, Nachworte 81. - -[67] Bal. 425 f.: Yaʿqūbī, Hist. II. 354: Wellhausen, Arab. Reich 275. - -[68] Yaʿqūbī, Hist. II. 346. 7. - -[69] See his character-sketch in Wellhausen 277. - -[70] Bal. 401. 5: _T_ab. 1353. - -[71] _T_ab. 1364 f., 1356. 13, 1364. 13, 1421. 7, 1418. 13: Bal. 422, 426. - -[72] Narsh. 57. 4: Fa_z_āʾil Balkh, ap. Schefer, Chrest. Persane, I. 71. -2. - -[73] Sachau, Khwārizm I, 29: Barthold, Turkestan 189. - - - - -IV. THE TURKISH COUNTERSTROKE.[74] - - -The princes of Transoxania had so long been accustomed to regard the -Arabs as mere marauders that it was some time before they could realise -the loss of their independence. Though necessity forced them at first -to adopt a conciliatory spirit (as, for example, in their acceptance -of Islām under ʿOmar II), they were dismayed to find all the machinery -of permanent occupation set in motion, and their authority flouted -by tactless and greedy Arab officials. Such a state of affairs was -tolerable only in the absence of any countering force. The situation -was not stationary for long, however; even before Qutayba’s death -other and disturbing factors had begun to enter. Our best clue to the -complications in Transoxania during this period is the attitude of -Ghūrak, king of _S_ughd, of whose movements, fortunately, sufficient -indications have been preserved. In maintaining a precarious balance -between the Türgesh and the Arabs, his true statesman’s instinct seldom -misled him in judging how and when to act to advantage throughout his -troubled reign. In addition to this we have the evidence, unreliable -in detail but confirmatory in the mass, of the embassies sent by the -subject principalities to the Chinese court. Doubtless they were -despatched in the guise of commercial missions and in many cases were -truly so, but that they frequently possessed a political character -can hardly be denied. The dates of these embassies as given in the -authorities translated by Chavannes fall naturally into four periods. In -the following list all embassies have been omitted in which the Arabs -are known to have participated or whose object is known to have had no -connection with the Arab conquests, as well as those which appear to be -duplicated, and those from the minor states: - -NUMBER OF EMBASSIES FROM:— - - 1. 717-731 _S_ughd 11, _T_ukhāristān 5, Bukhārā 2, Arabs 4. - 2. 732-740 ” none ” 2 ” none ” 1 (733). - 3. 741-747 ” 4 ” 3 ” 1 ” 4 - 4. 750-755 ” 4 ” 2 ” 3 ” 6 - -These four periods, as will be seen, closely correspond to the -fluctuations of Arab authority in Transoxania. - -In the same year, 713, that Qutayba first led his army across the -Jaxartes, a new era of westward expansion opened in China with the -accession of Hiuen-Tsong. In 714 the Chinese intervened in the affairs -of the Ten Tribes and obtained their immediate submission, while in the -following year they restored the deposed king of Farghāna. In 716, on -the death of Me-chuʾo, Khan of the Northern Turks, the powerful tribes -of the Türgesh asserted their independence, and under their chief Su-Lu -established, with Chinese assistance, a new kingdom in the Ili basin. The -princes of Transoxania eagerly sought to profit by these developments -to free themselves from the Arab yoke. In 718 a joint embassy was sent -to China by _T_ughshāda, Ghūrak, Narayāna king of Kumādh, and the king -of Chaghāniān. The first three presented petitions for aid against the -Arabs, which are given in full in Chavannes’ _Documents_. _T_ughshāda -asked that the Türgesh might be ordered to attack the Arabs, Ghūrak -related the capture of Samarqand and asked for Chinese troops, Narayāna -complained of the seizure of all his treasures by the Arabs and asked -that representations might be made to induce them to remit their crushing -taxation. It is significant that the king of Chaghāniān, acting for his -suzerain, the Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān, did not compromise himself by -joining in these requests. But beyond “fair words” the son of Heaven took -no action, and no Chinese forces appeared West of the Jaxartes, in spite -of the repeated entreaties addressed by the princes to their self-elected -suzerain. - -The Türgesh, however, were not long in intervening on their own account. -Whatever opportunity the Arab government had to pacify the _S_ughdians -was lost by a succession of incompetent governors. Already in the reign -of ʿOmar II, as has been seen, they had withdrawn their allegiance from -the weak ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān b. Nuʿaym. For a moment the situation seemed -to improve at the beginning of the governorship of Saʿīd “Khudhayna” -(102/720) owing to the firm handling of Samarqand by his lieutenant -Shuʿba b. _Z_uhayr. But disturbances broke out and Shuʿba was recalled, -perhaps in a vain attempt to appease the insurgents. It would seem that -the _S_ughdians appealed to the new Turkish power in the East and Su-Lu, -unable to make headway against the growing influence of China, willingly -seized the opportunity of diverting his armies into Transoxania. A small -Türgesh force was sent under Köl-chur (called by _T_abarī Kūr_s_ūl)[75] -to make common cause with the _S_ughdian rebels in the following -spring (end of 102). Saʿīd awoke to find the whole country in arms, a -Turkish force marching on Samarqand, and the local princes, with few -exceptions, aiding the invaders. The Arab commanders could not rely on -their levies and a small garrison at Qa_s_r al-Bāhilī was evacuated only -with the utmost difficulty. The tale of their relief by a small force -of volunteers is one of the most spirited narratives of adventure in -_T_abarī. But such episodes did not affect the general success of the -Turkish forces. Kūr_s_ūl continued his advance through _S_ughd without -opposition, avoiding Samarqand, until at last Saʿīd was roused by public -reproach to march against the Turks. After a small initial success, which -he refused to follow up, he was severely defeated and confined to the -neighbourhood of Samarqand. The Turks were not strong enough to undertake -a siege of the city, as the whole operation seems to have been little -more than a reconnaissance in force combined with a raiding expedition. -As the Türgesh retired, the Arab cavalry followed them up as far as -Waraghsar, the head of the canal system of _S_ughd. Ghūrak appears to -have refrained from committing himself by openly aiding the rebels, and -doubtless recognised that the Arabs were not so easily to be dislodged. -From the fact that Saʿīd’s camp was pitched at Ishtīkhan, in close -proximity to him, it may even be conjectured that he outwardly supported -the Arabs. - -But the new governor of ʿIrāq, ʿOmar b. Hubayra, was not the man to stand -idly by in face of the danger that threatened Khurāsān. The weakness -shown by Khudhayna and the complaints of oppression from his subjects, -were sufficient reason for his recall, and Saʿīd b. ʿAmr al-_H_arashī, -a man of very different stamp, was installed in his place. The transfer -may be placed in the late autumn of 103/721. The new governor’s first -act was to summon the rebels to submit, but a large number of nobles and -merchants, with their retainers, either fearing that they could expect -no mercy, or anxious to free themselves altogether from the Arab yoke, -prepared to emigrate to Farghāna. Ghūrak did his utmost to persuade -them to remain, but without effect; their absence would no doubt affect -the revenues, and a certain emphasis is laid on the point in _T_abarī’s -account. Leaving hostages behind, the malcontents marched towards -Farghāna and opened negotiations with the king for the occupation of -ʿI_s_ām. The majority settled in the interval at Khujanda, but other -parties actually entered Farghāna, and one body at least occupied a -fortified position on the Zarafshān. Al-_H_arashī followed up his demands -by marching into _S_ughd and encamped near Dabūsia, where he was with -difficulty persuaded to stay until sufficient contingents arrived. On -advancing, he was met by a messenger from the king of Farghāna, who, -outwardly professing to assist the _S_ughdians, had secretly decided to -rid himself of them by calling in the Arabs against them. Al-_H_arashī -eagerly seized the opportunity and pressed forward, receiving the -allegiance of Ushrūsana as he passed. The emigrants, although urged by -their leader Karzanj either to take active measures or to submit, decided -to risk a siege in Khujanda, trusting to the protection of the king -of Farghāna. But when Saʿīd set about the siege in earnest, and they -realised that they had been betrayed, they surrendered on unexpectedly -easy terms. Saʿīd divided them, placing the nobles and merchants in a -camp apart from the soldiers. By the execution of Thābit, a noble from -Ishtīkhan, he provoked a revolt, under pretext of which he massacred the -nobles and the troops, sparing the merchants, who numbered four hundred, -only in order to squeeze them of their wealth. _T_abarī’s account very -thinly veils al-_H_arashī’s responsibility for this wanton act of -atrocious cruelty, which could not fail to embitter the feelings of the -whole population of Transoxania. It is curious that the Persian _T_abarī -(Zotenberg IV. 268) has an entirely different story, which is found in -none of the Arabic authorities. The refugees who escaped eventually took -refuge with the Khāqān of the Türgesh, where they formed a regiment -(no doubt continually recruited from new emigrants) which particularly -distinguished itself in the war against the Arabs[76]. - -The expedition to Khujanda may be put in the spring and summer of -722 (end of 103, beginning of 104), though the chronology here, and -indeed for all this period, is uncertain. The piecemeal reduction of -the fortresses in _S_ughd occupied the remainder of the year, a series -of operations whose difficulty is sufficient witness to the effect of -the news from Khujanda in stiffening the resistance to the Arabs. The -first fortress to be attacked was that of Abghar, in which a band of -the emigrants had settled. The attack was entrusted to Sulaymān b. -Abiʾs-Sarī, with an army composed largely of native levies from Bukhārā, -Khwārizm, and Shūmān, accompanied by their princes. Sulaymān persuaded -the dihqān to surrender, and sent him to al-_H_arashī, who at first -treated him well in order to counteract the effect of the massacre of -Khujanda, but put him to death after recapturing Kish and Rabinjān. The -most inaccessible fortress and the crowning example of Al-_H_arashī’s -perfidy were left to the last. The dihqān Subuqrī still held out in the -fortress of Khuzar, to the south of Nasaf; unable to take it by force, -Al-_H_arashī sent Musarbal b. Al-Khirrīt, a personal friend of Subuqrī, -to offer him a pardon. On his surrender, he was sent to Merv and put to -death, although the amnesty, it is said, had been confirmed by ʿOmar b. -Hubayra. - -The whole of _S_ughd was thus once more in the hands of the Arabs. The -nearer districts, Khwārizm and Bukhārā, had remained loyal and the Oxus -basin seems to have been unaffected. But to make a solitude and call it -peace did not suit the aims of the Arab government and Al-_H_arashī found -that his “policy of thorough” only provided Ibn Hubayra with an excuse -for superseding him. During the winter, therefore, he was replaced by -Muslim b. Saʿīd al-Kilābī, who, as the grandson of Aslam b. Zurʿa, came -of a house long familiar with Khurāsān. The danger of the movement of -revolt spreading to the Iranians of Khurāsān seems to have preoccupied -the Arab government during all this period. Saʿīd Khudhayna had poisoned -the too-influential _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī on suspicion of rousing the -Persians against the government and that it was felt even in Ba_s_ra -may be seen from Ibn Hubayra’s advice to his new governor, “Let your -chamberlain be one who can make peace with your mawālī.” Muslim, in fact, -favoured the Persians and did all in his power to appoint officials -acceptable to them, the Mazdean Bahrām Sīs, for example, being appointed -Marzubān of Merv[77]. But all such measures were merely palliatives -and could not materially affect the growing discontent in _S_ughd and -_T_ukhāristān. During his first year of office it is recorded (if the -narrative is not, as Wellhausen thinks, a duplicate of the raid on -Farghāna in the following year) that Muslim marched across the river -but was met and pushed back into Khurāsān by a Turkish army, narrowly -escaping disaster. It is not improbable that the local forces were again -assisted by Türgesh on this occasion. In the following year, however, -before the close of 105, a second expedition gained some success at -Afshīna, near Samarqand. Meanwhile Hishām had succeeded Yazīd II as -Caliph, and ʿOmar b. Hubayra, whose Qaysite leanings were too pronounced, -was recalled in favour of Khālid b. ʿAbdullah al-Qasrī of Bajīla. The -transfer took place most probably in March (724), though another account -places it some months later. Muslim was now preparing an expedition into -Farghāna, but the Yemenite troops at Balkh held back partly through -dislike of the campaign and doubtless expecting the governor’s recall. -Na_s_r b. Sayyār was sent with a Mu_d_arite force to use compulsion; -the mutinous Yemenites were defeated at Barūqān and unwillingly joined -the army. It is noteworthy that troops from Chaghāniān fought alongside -Na_s_r in this engagement. Before leaving Bukhārā Muslim learned that -he was to be superseded, at the same time receiving orders to continue -his expedition. Four thousand Azdites, however, took the opportunity of -withdrawing. The remainder, accompanied by _S_ughdian levies, marched -into Farghāna, crossed the Jaxartes, and besieged the capital, cutting -down the fruit trees and devastating the land. Here news was brought -that Khāqān was advancing against them, and Muslim hurriedly ordered a -retreat. The Arabic accounts graphically describe the headlong flight of -the Arabs. On the first day they retired three stages, the next day they -crossed the Wādī Sabū_h_, closely pursued by the Türgesh; a detachment, -largely composed of mawālī, which encamped separately, was attacked and -suffered heavy losses, the brother of Ghūrak being amongst the killed. -After a further eight days’ march, continually harassed by the light -Turkish horse, they were reduced to burning all the baggage, to the -value of a million dirhems. On reaching the Jaxartes the following day, -they found the way barred by the forces of Shāsh and Farghāna, together -with the _S_ughdians who had escaped from Saʿīd al-_H_arashī, but the -desperate and thirsty troops, hemmed in by the Türgesh from behind, cut -their way through. The rearguard made a stand, but lost its commander. At -length the remnants of the army reached Khujanda, where ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān -b. Nuʿaym took command on behalf of Asad b. ʿAbdullah, and made good his -retreat to Samarqand. - -This disaster, which is known as the “Day of Thirst,” marks a period in -the history of the Arab conquests. It was practically the last aggressive -expedition of the Arabs into Transoxania for fifteen years, but of -much greater importance was the blow which it struck at Arab prestige. -The rôles were reversed; from now onwards the Arabs found themselves -on the defensive and were gradually ousted from almost every district -across the Oxus. No wonder, therefore, that the memory of the “Day of -Thirst” rankled even long after it had been avenged[78]. According to -the Arab tradition, the Türgesh armies were led on this occasion not by -Su-Lu himself, but by one of his sons. Unfortunately the accounts of -Su-Lu in such Chinese works as have been translated are silent on his -Western expeditions, and the Arab historians are our only authorities. -The immediate result of the Arab defeat, not only in _S_ughd but in -_T_ukhāristān and the southern basin as well, was to stiffen the attitude -of passive resistance to the Arabs to the point at which it only needed -active support to break into a general conflagration. From this time, -if not before, the subject princes regarded the Türgesh as the agents -of their deliverance, commissioned by China in response to the urgent -entreaties they had addressed to the Emperor for aid in their struggle. -We find this actually expressed in a letter sent three years later by -the Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān, which is, in Chavannes’ words “but one long -cry of distress”[79]. “I am loaded with heavy taxation by the Arabs; -in truth, their oppression and our misery are extreme. If I do not -obtain the help of the (Chinese) Kagan ... my kingdom will certainly be -destroyed and dismembered.... I have been told that the Celestial Kagan -has given this order to the Kagan of the Türgesh: To you I delegate the -affairs of the Far West; you must at once send soldiers to drive out -the Arabs.” The point of view here expressed is of course that of the -ruling princes, whose resentment at the curtailment of their authority is -understandable. Besides making allowance for some natural exaggeration, -it would be dangerous to assume that this was as yet fully shared by the -people. In all probability, if we may judge from historical analogies, -there was also a pro-Arab party in Sogdiana, who felt that the best -interests of the country lay, not in an opposition whose final issue -could scarcely be in doubt, but in co-operation with their new masters as -far as was possible. The tragedy of the Arab administration was that by -alternately giving and refusing co-operation on its side, it drove its -supporters in the end to make common cause with its opponents. - -But though the situation was steadily deteriorating the decisive moment -had not yet come. The new governor, Asad b. ʿAbdullah, seems to have -seen something of the danger though factional feeling was running so -high that the administration was almost helpless in face of it. He -tried to continue Muslim’s policy of conciliation by appointing agents -of known probity. Tawba b. Abī Usayd, a mawlā who had been intendant -for Muslim, and who “treated the people fairly, made himself easily -accessible, dealt uprightly with the army and maintained their supplies,” -he persuaded to remain in office under him. Hāniʾ b. Hāniʾ, the financial -intendant at Samarqand, was unpopular; he was recalled and Al-_H_asan -b. Abiʾl-ʿAmarra_t_a of Kinda, who was in sympathy with the mawālī, -appointed in his place. With him was associated Thābit Qu_t_na, who had -been a leader of some repute under Saʿīd Khudhayna, “gallant warrior, -distinguished poet, confidant of Yazīd b. Muhallab, and universally -popular”[80]. Still more significant is the fact that one of Asad’s -earliest actions was to renew the practice, neglected since the days -of ʿOmar II, of sending an embassy to the Chinese court. As before, -however, the Arabs resented the favour shown to the Persians, and the -military weakness of Ibn Abiʾl-ʿAmarra_t_a roused them to open anger. -Strong Turkish forces, probably guerilla bands swollen by refugees -and malcontents from the wasted districts, spread over the country -and appeared even before Samarqand. The governor made some show of -opposition, but avoided coming to grips with them, thus intensifying his -unpopularity. - -Samarqand indeed was gradually becoming more and more isolated, but no -assistance could be given from Khurāsān. During his three years of office -Asad’s attention was wholly engaged with the situation in _T_ukhāristān -and the South. Even here his constant expeditions, to Gharjistān, -Khuttal, and elsewhere, met with no success. Worse still, in 108/726 he -found his forces in Khuttal opposed by the Khāqān with his Türgesh. The -princes of _T_ukhāristān had taken to heart the lessons of the “Day of -Thirst”, and the powerful chief who had already all but driven the Arabs -out of Sogdiana was now called in to expel them from the Oxus basin as -well. Asad visited his failure on the Mu_d_arites, whom he may have -suspected of treachery, but the indignation called out by his treatment -of such men as Na_s_r b. Sayyār, ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān b. Nuʿaym, Sawra b. -Al-_H_urr, and Al-Bakhtarī, made his recall inevitable. Nor had his -measures removed the distrust and hatred of the subject peoples. The land -was wasted and desolate[81], the crushing taxation was not lightened, and -all Persian governors were not of the stamp of Tawba; many of them were -but too ready to rival their Arab rulers in greed and cruelty. Asad may -have gained the friendship of many dihqāns[82], but that was an easier -matter than to placate the population. In such an atmosphere it was only -to be expected that Shīʿite and ʿAbbāsid propaganda, though actively -combated by the administration, found a fertile field among the Muslim -converts in Khurāsān and Lower _T_ukhāristān, and was already beginning -to undermine the whole fabric of Arab government. - -For a moment the hopes of a radical change of policy entertained by the -mawālī and the clearer-sighted Arabs were raised to the highest pitch by -the appointment (in 109) of Ashras b. ʿAbdullah as-Sulami, accompanied by -the separation of Khurāsān from Khālid al-Qasrī’s province of ʿIrāq. It -is unnecessary to recapitulate here the far-reaching concessions by which -he hoped to secure, and actually did for a time secure the allegiance of -the _S_ughdians, or the methods by which the local princes, especially -Ghūrak, succeeded in checking the movement[83]. It is generally assumed -that the hostility of Ghūrak was due to the serious fall in revenue -which would result. Though this was doubtless the plea put forward and -accepted by Ashras it can scarcely have been the true issue. Ghūrak’s -aim was not to maintain himself on good terms with the Arab governors -but to recover his independence. If once the people became “Arabs” all -hope of success must have been lost. It was a game with high stakes and -Ghūrak won. It must not be overlooked, however, that the account as we -have it is traditional and may often be mistaken on the sequence of -cause and effect. The astonishing reversal of the measures adopted by -Ashras is more probably to be explained by pressure from above, not from -below, and our tradition may really present only the popular view of -the Caliph Hishām’s reorganization of the financial administration[84]. -The Arabs resorted to brutal methods to wring the taxes from the new -converts, and with incredible blindness selected the dihqāns for -special indignities. It is not unlikely that Narshakhī’s story of the -martyrdom of native Muslims in Bukhārā is connected with this event, -though there are many other possible explanations, such as, for example, -an attempted _H_ārithite movement (see below, p. 76 f.) The reaction -swung the whole population of Transoxania, dihqāns and peasantry alike, -into open rebellion. The first small party of emigrants who quitted -Samarqand, although supported by a few Arabs, were induced to surrender -and return[85], but within a few months the dreaded Khāqān with his -Türgesh had joined forces with the rebels and swept the Arabs across the -Oxus. Even Bukhārā was lost[86] and only Samarqand with two minor posts -on the Zarafshān, Kamarja and Dabūsia, held out. Ghūrak, however, still -supported the Arabs, as Samarqand, although besieged, seems to have been -in no danger, while his son Mukhtār, doubtless to keep a footing in the -opposite camp, joined with the Türgesh. - -The pressing danger sobered the Arabs and temporarily united all parties -and factions. The army was concentrated at Āmul but for three months was -unable to cross the river in the face of the combined native and Türgesh -armies. A small body under Qa_t_an b. Qutayba which had already crossed -and fortified itself before the arrival of the Turks was beleaguered. The -Turkish cavalry even made raids on Khurāsān with an excess of boldness -which was punished by a mounted force under Thābit Qu_t_na. At length -Ashras got his forces across and, joining with Qa_t_an b. Qutayba, -advanced on Paykand. The enemy cut off the water supply, and had it not -been for the gallantry and self-sacrifice of _H_ārith b. Surayj, Thābit -Qu_t_na, and their companions, an even greater and more irretrievable -“Day of Thirst” had resulted. In spite of their weakness, Qa_t_an and the -cavalry of Qays and Tamīm charged the enemy and forced them back, so that -Ashras was able to continue his advance towards Bukhārā. In the heavy -fighting the Muslim forces were divided, Ashras and Qa_t_an gave each -other up for lost, and Ghūrak judged that the time had come to throw in -his lot with the Turks. Two days later, however, the armies were reunited -and on the retiral of the Turks encamped at Bawādara outside the walls of -Bukhārā, whence they prepared to besiege the city. Ghūrak also retrieved -his error and rejoined Ashras. The Khāqān withdrew towards Samarqand, -but sat down before Kamarja, expecting to take it by storm in a few -days at the most. The Arabic narratives of these events are confused in -several places, which has given rise to many incorrect statements, such -as that Ghūrak was beleaguered with the Arabs in Kamarja and that the -garrison consisted of Qa_t_an and his forces. Kamarja was not in the -neighbourhood of Paykand, as Wellhausen states, but a few farsakhs west -of Samarqand[87]. When the garrison would not yield to assault Khāqān -tried other methods. Accompanying his expedition was Khusrū the son of -Pērōz and grandson of Yazdigird, heir of the Sāsānid kings. This prince -was sent to parley with the garrison, but when he claimed the restoration -of his kingdom and promised them an amnesty, it is not surprising that -the Arabs indignantly refused to hear him. Nor would the appearance of a -Sāsānid prince evoke much enthusiasm amongst the Iranians of Transoxania. -As the Sāsānid house had taken refuge in China, however, the presence of -Khusrū might be taken as an indication that the rebels were receiving -encouragement from China also, though the Chinese records are silent on -this expedition. Khāqān’s second proposal, that he should hire the Arabs -as mercenaries, was rejected as derisively as the first. The siege was -then pressed with renewed vigour, both sides putting their prisoners and -hostages to death, but after fifty-eight days Khāqān, on the advice of -the son of Ghūrak and the other _S_ughdian princes, allowed the garrison -to transfer either to Samarqand or Dabūsia. On their choosing the latter, -the terms were faithfully carried out after an exchange of hostages. - -The fame of the defence of Kamarja spread far and wide, but it brought -little relief to the pressure on the Arabs in Transoxania. Even Khwārizm -was affected by the movement of revolt, but at the first symptoms of open -rebellion it was crushed by the local Muslims, probably Arabs settled -in the district, with the aid of a small force despatched by Ashras. -The reference made in _T_abarī to assistance given to the rebels by the -Turks is probably to be discounted, as is done by Ibn al-Athīr. It is of -course quite possible that the movement was instigated by the Türgesh, -though no such explanation is necessary, but if any Turks were engaged -they were probably local nomadic tribes. Ashras seems to have remained -before Bukhārā during the winter, possibly in Paykand; the Türgesh -probably withdrew towards Shāsh and Farghāna. - -In the following year, 730/111-112[88], the attacks on the army of -Ashras were renewed. The course of events can only be gathered from the -accounts given of the difficulties experienced by the new governor, -Junayd b. ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān al-Murrī, in joining the army before Bukhārā. -His guide advised him to levy a force from Zamm and the neighbouring -districts before crossing the Oxus but Junayd refused, only to find -himself after crossing put to the necessity of calling on Ashras for a -bodyguard of cavalry. This force narrowly escaped disaster on its way to -meet Junayd and fought a second severe engagement on the return journey -before reaching Paykand. The enemy are variously described as “men of -Bukhārā and _S_ughd” and “Turks and _S_ughdians”; it may therefore be -assumed that they were the same forces against whom Ashras had fought the -previous year. Wellhausen is probably correct in supposing that Ashras -was practically beleaguered, though not in Bukhārā. The recapture of this -city and the retiral of Khāqān took place shortly after Junayd’s arrival, -in circumstances which are not described[89]. The attitude of Tugshāda -during this episode is not recorded. It is practically certain, however, -that he remained in Bukhārā, and after the reconquest was able to make -his peace with the Arabs, probably on the excuse of _force majeure_. At -all events he retained his position, possibly because Junayd thought it -impolitic in the face of the situation to victimise the nobles in the -reconquered territories and thus provoke a more stubborn resistance in -the rest of the country. The Arabs seem to have followed up the Turks -towards Samarqand, probably to relieve the garrison; the two armies met -again at Zarmān, seven farsakhs from Samarqand, where the Arabs claimed -a success, one of their prisoners being a nephew of Khāqān. From _S_ughd -the army marched to Tirmidh where Junayd halted for two months in the -friendly atmosphere of Chaghāniān before returning to Merv. His intention -was no doubt to make arrangements for the pacification or reconquest of -_T_ukhāristān and Khuttal; in the following year his troops were actually -engaged in this direction when the Türgesh invasion of _S_ughd forced him -to change his plans. Balādhurī quotes Abū ʿUbayda for the statement that -Junayd reconquered certain districts in _T_ukhāristān which had revolted. - -How lightly even yet factional feeling was slumbering was shown after the -return of the army, when the Bāhilites of Balkh had a chance to retaliate -on Na_s_r b. Sayyār for their discomfiture at Barūqān. Though Junayd was -prompt to punish the offending governor, the incident throws a strong -light on one cause of the weakness of the Arabs in these campaigns. - -Early in 731/112-113, the Türgesh and _S_ughdians gathered their forces -for the investment of Samarqand. Ghūrak now openly joined the Khāqān. -Sawra b. Al-_H_urr, the governor of Samarqand, unable to face the enemy -in the field, sent an urgent message to Junayd for assistance. The -governor hastily recalled his troops, but crossed the river without -waiting for them against the advice of his generals. “No governor of -Khurāsān,” said al-Mujashshar b. Muzā_h_im, one of the ablest of the Arab -commanders, “should cross the river with less than fifty thousand men.” -Accompanied only by a small force, Junayd reached Kish, where he raised -some local levies and prepared to march on Samarqand. The enemy in the -meantime, after blocking up the water supplies on his road, interposed -their forces between Samarqand and the army of relief. Junayd thereupon -decided to follow the direct route across the Shāwdār mountains in -the hope of avoiding an engagement, but when only four farsakhs from -Samarqand was surprised in the defiles by Khāqān. The advance-guard -was driven in and the main body engaged in a furious struggle in which -both sides fought to a standstill. The Arabs, hemmed in on all sides, -were forced to entrench; stragglers, refugees, and baggage, collected -near Kish, were attacked by a detachment of Turks and severely handled. -Khāqān renewed his attacks on the camp the next day, all but overwhelming -Junayd, and settled down thereafter to beleaguer him. In this predicament -there was only one course open to Junayd. Had his force perished, -Samarqand would certainly have fallen in the end and two disasters taken -the place of one. He therefore adopted the more prudent, if unheroic, -course of ordering Sawra to leave a skeleton garrison in Samarqand and -march out to join him by way of the river: Sawra, however, took the short -cut across the mountains, and was actually within four miles of Junayd, -when the Turkish forces bore down on him. The battle lasted into the heat -of the day, when the Turks, on Ghūrak’s advice it is said, having first -set the grass on fire, drew up so as to shut Sawra off from the water. -Maddened by heat and thirst, the Arabs charged the enemy and broke their -ranks, only to perish miserably in the fire, Turks and Muslims together. -The scattered remnants were pursued by the Turkish cavalry and of twelve -thousand men scarcely a thousand escaped. While the enemy were engaged -with Sawra, Junayd freed himself from his perilous position in the -defiles, though not without severe fighting, and completed his march to -Samarqand. _T_abarī gives also a variant account of the “Battle of the -Pass,” the main difference in which is the inclusion of the Jabghu on the -side of the Turks. In view of the Arab expeditions into _T_ukhāristān, it -is improbable that the Jabghu, even if he was present personally, which -is doubtful, was accompanied by any of his troops. The Persian _T_abarī -also contains an entirely different version of the Battle of the Pass and -the fate of Sawra. The original version is amply attested by contemporary -poets, who show no mercy to Junayd. Whatever credit the Arabs gained -in this battle is reflected on Na_s_r b. Sayyār and the mawālī. Junayd -remained at Samarqand for some time, recuperating his forces, while -couriers were sent to Hishām with the news of the disaster. The Caliph -immediately ordered twenty thousand reinforcements from Ba_s_ra and Kūfa -to be sent to Khurāsān, together with a large number of weapons and a -draft on the treasury, at the same time giving Junayd a free hand in -enlistment. - -The Turks, disappointed in their attack on Samarqand, withdrew to -Bukhārā, where they laid siege to Qa_t_an b. Qutayba. Here they were also -on the natural lines of communication between Samarqand and Khurāsān. -Junayd held a council, and of three alternatives, either to remain in -Samarqand and await reinforcements, or to retire on Khurāsān _via_ Kish -and Zamm, or to attack the enemy, chose the last. But the morale of the -Arabs was sadly shaken; a garrison of eight hundred men for Samarqand -was scraped together only by granting a considerable increase in their -pay, while the troops openly regarded the decision to face Khāqān and -the Turkish hordes as equivalent to courting destruction. Junayd now -marched with the utmost circumspection, however, and easily defeated a -small body of the enemy in a skirmish near Karmīnīa. The following day -Khāqān attacked his rearguard near _T_awāwīs (on the edge of the oasis -of Bukhārā), but the attack had been foreseen and was beaten off. As it -was now well into November, the Türgesh were compelled to withdraw from -Sogdiana, while Junayd entered Bukhārā in triumph on the festival of -Mihrjān. In Chaghāniān he was joined by the reinforcements, whom he sent -on to Samarqand, the remainder of the troops returning to their winter -quarters. - -Junayd seems to have been content with saving Samarqand and Bukhārā. As -no further expeditions are recorded of his two remaining years of office -it must be assumed that the situation in _S_ughd remained unchanged and -that the Türgesh irruptions also were suspended. Though the Arabs still -held Samarqand and the territories of Bukhārā and Kish, they were in -all probability confined to these, while in the southern basin their -authority hardly extended beyond Balkh and Chaghāniān. Both sides may -have awaited the first move by the other, but were surprised by the -appearance of a new factor, which threatened the existence of Arab -sovereignty in the Far East more seriously than any external danger. It -is noteworthy that in his last year of office (115/733) Junayd resumed -relations with the Chinese court. The Turkish title of the leader of the -embassy, Mo-se-lan Tarkan, suggests that none of the ambassadors were -actually Arabs, but that the governor had commissioned some dignitaries -from the subject states to represent the Arab government. The only -embassy recorded in this year from a native state, however, came from -Khuttal. In the same year Khurāsān was visited by a severe drought -and famine, and to provide for the needs of Merv, Junayd commandeered -supplies from all the surrounding districts. This, added to the military -disasters of the last few years and the insinuations of Shīʿite -propaganda, provoked open discontent in the district which had hitherto -been outwardly faithful to Merv, namely the principalities of Lower -_T_ukhāristān. The leader of the malcontents was Al-_H_ārith b. Surayj, -who was flogged in consequence by the governor of Balkh. The discontent -flared into open revolt on the death of Junayd in Mu_h_arram 716 (Feb. -734). _H_ārith, assisted by the princes and people of Jūzjān, Fāryāb, and -_T_ālaqān, marched on Balkh and captured it from Na_s_r b. Sayyār. The -versions leave it uncertain whether _H_ārith defeated Na_s_r and then -captured the city or whether he entered the city first and beat off an -attempt at recapture by Na_s_r. (Wellhausen’s reference to the Oxus is -due to his so misunderstanding the “river of Balkh” in _T_ab. 1560. 2. -That it refers here, as frequently, to the Dehas river is clear from the -distance to the city (2 farsakhs, whereas the Oxus lay twelve farsakhs -from Balkh) as well as from the mention of the bridge of ʿA_t_ā.) From -Balkh he moved against the new governor ʿĀ_s_im b. ʿAbdullah al-Hilālī, -at Merv, capturing Merv-Rūdh on the way. ʿĀ_s_im found a large section -of the inhabitants in league with _H_ārith, but on his threatening to -evacuate Merv and to call for Syrian troops, the local forces rallied -round him. At the first reverse, the princes of Lower _T_ukhāristān -deserted _H_ārith, whose army fell from sixty thousand to three thousand. -He was thus reduced to making terms with ʿĀsim, but early in the -following year renewed his revolt. ʿĀsim, hearing that Asad b. ʿAbdullah -was on the way as his successor, began to intrigue with _H_ārith against -him. The plan miscarried, however; _H_ārith seized the governor and held -him to ransom, so that Asad on his arrival found the rebels in possession -of all Eastern Khurāsān, and Merv threatened both from the East and from -the South. Sending a force under ʿAbdur Ra_h_mān b. Nuʿaym towards Merv -Rūdh to keep _H_ārith’s main body in check, he marched himself against -the rebel forces at Āmul and Zamm. These took refuge in the citadel of -Zamm, and Asad, having thus checked the insurgents in this quarter, -continued his march on Balkh. Meanwhile _H_ārith seems to have retreated -before ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān towards Balkh and thence across the Oxus, where he -laid siege to Tirmidh. Lower _T_ukhāristān returned to its allegiance; -on the other hand _H_ārith was now supported not only by the kings of -Khuttal and Nasaf, but also, as appears from later events, by the Jabghu -of _T_ukhāristān. The government troops were unable to cross the Oxus -in the face of _H_ārith’s army; finding, however, that the garrison was -well able to defend itself, they returned to Balkh, while _H_ārith, -after falling out with the king of Khuttal, seems to have retired into -_T_ukhāristān. Here, following the example of Mūsā b. Khāzim at Tirmidh, -he made a safe retreat for himself in Badakhshān. - -The motives of _H_ārith’s rebellion have been most variously estimated. -In spite of the unctuous sentiments which he is represented as uttering -on all occasions, it is hard to find in him the “pious Muslim, ascetic -and reformer” whom van Vloten too sharply contrasts with the government -officials[90]. In spite too of the prominent position given to him in -the Arabic chronicles, it may even be questioned whether he and his -small personal following were not rather the tools than the leaders of -the elements making for the overthrow of the Umayyad administration in -Khurāsān. At all events the weakness of his hold over his temporary -followers is much more striking than his transient success. Further -evidence of this is given in a most important narrative prefaced by -_T_abarī to his account of Asad’s expedition into _S_ughd. Except for the -scantiest notices, the Arabic historians have nothing to say regarding -the effects of the war in Khurāsān on the situation in Transoxania. -Wellhausen’s conclusion (based apparently on _T_abarī 1890. 6) that -“_H_ārith first unfurled the black flag in Transoxania in the last -year of Junayd” is scarcely tenable. There is further no evidence at -all for his assumption that Samarqand had fallen into the hands of the -_H_ārithites, especially as Bukhārā remained loyal to the administration. -That Asad’s expedition was not, in fact, directed against _H_ārith -follows in the clearest possible manner from the narrative referred to -(_T_ab. 1585. 6-16). - - “Then Asad marched towards Samarqand by way of Zamm, and when - he reached Zamm, he sent to Al-Haytham ash-Shaybānī, one of - _H_ārith’s followers, who was in Bādhkar (the citadel of Zamm), - saying “That which you have disowned in your own people is only - their evil ways, but that does not extend to the women ... - _nor to the conquest by the unbelievers of such as Samarqand_. - Now I am on my way to Samarqand and I take an oath before God - that no harm shall befall you on my initiative, but you shall - have friendly and honourable treatment and pardon, you and - those with you....” So Al-Haytham came out to join him on the - condition of pardon which he had given him, and Asad pardoned - him, and Al-Haytham marched with him to Samarqand and Asad gave - them double pay.” - -The expedition therefore was obviously against unbelievers. That the -whole of _S_ughd was lost to the Arabs is clear from the fact that Asad -found it necessary to take provisions for the army with him from Bukhārā. -He was not successful in recapturing the city, however, and attempted no -more than the damming of the canal sluices at Waraghsar. - -The fate of the garrison of Samarqand has thus been passed over in -silence, unless, perhaps, it is hinted at in Asad’s reference to the -capture of Muslim women. Whether Ghūrak recaptured it with his own troops -or with the aid of the Türgesh, it can scarcely be doubted that he had -taken advantage of the dissensions in Khurāsān to realise his ambition -and at last drive the Arabs out of his capital. Of all the conquests -of Qutayba beyond the Oxus, Bukhārā, Chaghāniān, and perhaps Kish -alone remained to the Arabs. A confirmatory detail is the cessation of -_S_ughdian embassies to China between 731 and 740: now that independence -(even if under Türgesh suzerainty) had been won again, there was no need -to invoke Chinese support. Negative evidence of the same kind is afforded -by the absence of any Arab embassy during the same period. Had the Arabs -been in possession of _S_ughd, it is practically certain that Asad, -as he had done before, would have renewed relations with the Chinese -court. Against this view may be set the statement in _T_ab. 1613. 5 that -Khāqān was preparing an army to invest Samarqand at the time of his -assassination. This report is, however, from its nature untrustworthy, -and is contradicted by the presence of the king of _S_ughd with -_S_ughdian troops in the Türgesh army in 119/737 as well as by Na_s_r b. -Sayyār’s expedition to Samarqand two years later. _S_ughd thus enjoyed -once more a brief period of independence. In 737 or 738 Ghūrak died and -his kingdom was divided amongst his heirs. He was succeeded at Samarqand -by his son Tu-ho (? _T_arkhūn), formerly prince of Kabudhān. Another son -Me-chuʾo (? Mukhtār) was already king of Māyamurgh, while the king of -Ishtīkhan in 742 was a certain Ko-lo-pu-lo who may perhaps be identified -with Ghūrak’s brother Afarūn[91]. - -The year after the campaigns against _H_ārith, 118/736, was devoted by -Asad to the re-organisation of his province, including a measure which, -it seems, he had already projected in his first term of office. This was -the removal of the provincial capital from Merv to Balkh[92]. Since no -other governor of Khurāsān followed his example we must seek the motive -for the innovation either in the contemporary situation in Khurāsān -and Transoxania or in Asad’s personal views. Explanations based on the -former are not hard to find. Asad, on taking office, had been faced with -a serious situation both in Lower _T_ukhāristān and across the river. He -had obviously to establish a strong point _d’appui_. The loyalty of the -garrison at Merv was not above suspicion but the garrison at Balkh was -composed of Syrian troops, who could be trusted to the uttermost[93]. -Merv was also less convenient for reaching _T_ukhāristān, which was at -the moment the main area of operations. More important still, perhaps, -Balkh was the centre from which all disturbances spread in Eastern -Khurāsān, as in the revolt of Nēzak and the recent attempt of _H_ārith. -As the holding of Balkh had enabled Qutayba to forestall Nēzak, it is -possible that Asad felt that in Balkh he would be in a position to check -all similar movements at the beginning. Other considerations may also -have disposed him to take this view. Balkh was the traditional capital -and on it, as we have seen, was focussed the local sentiment of Eastern -Khurāsān. Merv, on the other hand, had always been the capital of the -foreigners, of the Sāsānians before the Arabs. Asad’s personal friendship -with the dihqāns may have given him some insight into the moral effect -which would follow from the transference of the administration to the -centre of the national life. Still greater would this effect be when the -rebuilding was carried out not by the Arabs themselves but by their own -people under the supervision of the Barmak, the hereditary priest-ruler -of the ancient shrine. Quite apart from this, however, the rebuilding -of Balkh was an event of the greatest significance, and once restored -it soon equalled, if it did not eclipse, its rival Merv in size and -importance. While the new city was being built, the army was employed in -expeditions into _T_ukhāristān, for the most part under the command of -Judayʿ al-Karmānī, who achieved some successes against the followers of -_H_ārith and even succeeded in capturing their fortress in Badakhshān. -Other raids were undertaken by the governor himself, but without results -of military importance. - -Asad now planned a more ambitious expedition against Khuttal, partly in -retaliation for the assistance given to _H_ārith, partly, it may be, to -wipe off an old score. The chronology presents some difficulties at this -point. _T_abarī relates two expeditions into Khuttal in the same year -119/737, both from the same source, but that which is undoubtedly the -earlier is dated towards the close of the year (Rama_d_ān = September). -Wellhausen avoids the difficulty by referring this expedition to 118, -reckoning back from the appointment of Na_s_r b. Sayyār, the data -for which are full and unimpeachable. This would seem the obvious -solution were it not that the date given in the Chinese records for -the assassination of Su-Lu, 738[94], agrees perfectly with _T_abarī’s -dating of the Battle of Kharīstān in Dec. 737. The presence of Asad -on the second expedition would then hang together with the “somewhat -legendary” narrative of the Mihrjān feast. There seems reason, therefore, -for dating this expedition in 120/738 and regarding it as having been -despatched by Asad, though not actually accompanied by him. _T_abarī -fortunately preserves also a short notice of the situation in Khuttal. -The heir of as-Sabal, whose name is to be read as Al-Hanash, from the -Chinese transcription Lo-kin-tsie[95], had fled to China, possibly on -account of factional disturbances. On his deathbed as-Sabal appointed a -regent, Ibn As-Sāʿijī, to govern the country until Al-Hanash could be -restored. The moment was certainly opportune for making an expedition and -Asad at first carried all before him. On his first appearance, however, -Ibn As-Sāʿijī had appealed for aid to Su-Lu, who was at his capital -Nawākath (on the Chu). The Khāqān, with a small mounted force including -the _S_ughdian refugees, marched from Sūyāb (near Tokmak, on the Chu) -to Khuttal in seventeen days, only to find Asad, warned of his approach -by the regent, who was endeavouring to play both sides off against each -other, in precipitate retreat. The baggage train had been despatched in -advance under Ibrāhīm b. ʿĀ_s_im with a guard of Arabs and native troops -from Chaghāniān but the main body was overtaken by the Turks as it was -crossing the river and suffered severe losses. Asad, considering himself -safe with the river between his army and the enemy, encamped and sent -orders to Ibrāhīm to halt and entrench his position. The Turks, however, -were able to effect a crossing; after an unsuccessful assault on Asad’s -camp, they hastened to overtake the richer prize while the governor’s -troops were too worn out to protect it. By sending a party under cover -to fall on the troops of Chaghāniān from the rear while he himself -attacked in front, the Khāqān forced an entrance into Ibrāhīm’s camp. -Chāghān Khudāh, faithful to the last, himself fell with the greater part -of his forces but the remainder of the garrison were saved by the timely -arrival of Asad. According to the main account, the Arabs were allowed -to withdraw to Balkh without further serious fighting. A variant account -given by _T_abarī relates an unsuccessful assault by the Türgesh on -Asad’s camp on the morning following the “Battle of the Baggage,” which -happened to be the feast of Fi_t_r (1st October 737). On the retiral of -the Arabs, the Khāqān, instead of returning to his capital with the -honours of the day, remained in _T_ukhāristān. - -Here he was joined by _H_ārith, who advised him to undertake a winter -raid into Lower _T_ukhāristān while the Arab troops were disbanded, -undoubtedly in the expectation that the local princes would again unite -with him against Asad. The governor retained his army at Balkh until -the winter had set in, and in the meantime the Khāqān summoned forces -to join him from _S_ughd and the territories subject to _T_ukhāristān. -The enumeration which _T_abarī gives of the troops accompanying the -Khāqān on this expedition shows very clearly how completely Arab rule in -Transoxania and the Oxus basin had been supplanted by that of the Turks. -We are told that besides the Khāqān’s own Turkish troops and _H_ārith -with his followers there were present the Jabghu, the king of _S_ughd, -the prince of Usrūshana, and the rulers of Shāsh and Khuttal. It is -fairly certain, of course, that the list is exaggerated in so far as the -actual presence of the princes is concerned (it is in fact partially -contradicted in other parts of the narrative), but it can scarcely be -doubted that forces from some, if not all, of these principalities -were engaged. On the evening of the 9th Dhuʾl-_H_ijja (7th Dec.) news -reached Balkh that the Türgesh with their auxiliaries, numbering some -30,000, were at Jazza. Asad ordered signal fires to be lit and with the -Syrian garrison of Balkh and what other troops he could muster from -the district marched out against them. The governor of Khulm sent in a -second report that the Khāqān, having been repulsed in an attack on the -town, had marched on towards Pērōz Nakhshēr, in the neighbourhood of -Balkh. From this point the enemy, avoiding Balkh, moved on Jūzjān and -occupied the capital[96]. Instead of continuing his advance immediately, -the Khāqān halted here and sent out raiding parties of cavalry in all -directions, an action which put it beyond doubt that the immediate object -of the expedition was not the capture of Merv but the rousing of Lower -_T_ukhāristān against the Arabs. Contrary to _H_ārith’s expectations, -however, the king of Jūzjān joined with the Arabs, who marched towards -Shubūrqān by way of Sidra and Kharīstān. From the conflicting narratives -in _T_abarī, it seems that Asad surprised the Khāqān in the neighbourhood -of Kharīstān (or Sān) at a moment when his available forces amounted only -to 4,000. A furious struggle ensued, which was decided in favour of the -Arabs by an assault on the Khāqān from the rear, on the initiative of the -king of Jūzjān. It is in connection with the battle, which he describes -as if it were a set engagement in which the whole of the opposing forces -were engaged, that _T_abarī gives his list of the combatants. But as only -4,000 out of the total of 30,000 troops with the Khāqān were involved, -the list is obviously out of place and the whole narrative shows the -marks of rehandling. The Muslims gained an overwhelming success: the -Khāqān and _H_ārith, having narrowly escaped capture in the confusion, -were closely followed by Asad as far as Jazza, when a storm of rain and -snow prevented further pursuit. They were thus able to regain the Jabghu -in _T_ukhāristān, with happier fortune than the raiding parties, whose -retreat was cut off by the vigilance of Al-Karmānī, and of whom only a -single band of _S_ughdians made good their escape. - -On this skirmish at Kharīstān, for it was little more, hung the fate of -Arab rule, not only in Transoxania, but possibly even in Khurāsān, at -least for the immediate future. Though the princes of Lower _T_ukhāristān -fought for Asad in the first place, there can be little doubt that a -victory for Su-Lu would have swung them back to the side of _H_ārith -and the Turks, who would then have been in a position to follow up -their attacks with the advantage of a base at Balkh, solidly supported -by the Oxus provinces. From such a danger the Arabs were saved only by -Asad’s resolution and fortunate selection of Balkh as his residence. The -account given of Hishām’s incredulity on hearing the report shows how -very serious the outlook had been and the extent to which the name of -the Khāqān had become an omen of disaster. Kharīstān was not only the -turning point in the fortunes of the Arabs in Central Asia, but gave the -signal for the downfall of the Türgesh power, which was bound up with the -personal prestige of Su-Lu. The princes of _T_ukhāristān and Transoxania -found it expedient to treat him with respect as he was returning to -Nawākath, but in his own country the dissensions long fomented in secret -by the Chinese broke out. Su-Lu was assassinated by the Baga Tarkhan -(Kūr_s_ūl); the kingdom fell to pieces. “The Turks split up and began to -raid one another,” and the _coup de grâce_ of the Khanate was delivered -at Sūyāb in 739 by the faction of Kūr_s_ūl, supported by the Chinese -and with the assistance of Al-Ishkand and contingents from Shāsh and -Farghāna[97][98]. With the collapse of the Türgesh kingdom disappeared -the last great Turkish confederation in Western Asia for more than two -centuries to come. The battle of Kharīstān assured the supremacy of -the Muslim civilisation in Sogdiana, but it could not have attained -the richness of its full development there unless all danger from the -steppes had been removed. That this security was attained was due not -to the Arabs, but to the Chinese diplomacy, which, by breaking down the -greatest external obstacle to the Muhammadan penetration of Central Asia, -brought itself face to face with the Arabs. This could scarcely have been -realised at once, however, by the Arab government, whose immediate task -was to restore its lost authority in Transoxania. - - -NOTES - -[74] As the history of this and the following period has been given -in considerable detail by Wellhausen (Arab. Reich 280 ff.) from the -Arab point of view, it is intended in these chapters to follow only -the situation in Transoxania and the course of the Türgesh conquests, -avoiding as far as possible a simple recapitulation of familiar matter. -Thus little reference is made to the factional strife among the Arabs, -though it naturally played a very important part in limiting their power -to deal with the insurgents. - -[75] See Chavannes, Documents 285, n. 3. - -[76] _Cf._ _T_ab. II. 1718. 3 ff. - -[77] _T_ab. 1462. 11; _cf._ 1688. 10, 1481 f. - -[78] _T_ab. 1690. 16. - -[79] Chav. Doc. 206 f., 293 f. - -[80] Van Vloten, La Domination Arabe 28. - -[81] _T_ab. 1533. 15. - -[82] _T_ab. 1501. 2. - -[83] Wellhausen 284 f.: van Vloten 22 f.: _T_ab. 1507 f.: Bal. 428 f. - -[84] See Wellhausen 218. - -[85] The variant readings in _T_ab. 1509. 11. (_cf._ Ibn al-Athīr) make -it doubtful whether the taxes were reimposed on them or not. - -[86] _T_ab. 1514. 11. - -[87] See Yāqūt s.v.: Barthold, Turkestan 127: and _cf._ _T_ab. 1523. 3. -The chief difficulty in _T_abarī’s text is the abrupt change at the last -word of l. 14 on p. 1516: thumma ta_h_awwala (ashrashu) ilā marjin yuqālu -lahu bawādaratun _faʿatāhum_ sabābatun ... wahum nuzūlun bikamarjata. -The context shows that it was not to Ashras that Sabāba came but to the -garrison of Kamarja with the news that the Khāqān was retiring past them -(mārrun bikum). - -[88] The chronological difficulties are explained by Wellhausen 285 ff. -They are of small importance however, and it seems preferable to follow -his dates for these campaigns. - -[89] _Cf._ _T_ab. 1528. 9. with 1529. 5 f. 14 f. - -[90] Van Vloten, _op. cit._ 29 ff.: Wellhausen 289 ff. (_cf._ 302 f.). -Another account of _H_ārith is given by Gardīzī ap. Barthold Turkestan, -Texts pp. 1-2. - -[91] Chav. Doc. 210, 136, 140; Barthold, Arab. Quellen 21. n. 8. - -[92] _T_ab. 1490, 1591. 18: Wellhausen 292 and 284 n.: Barthold in -Zeitschrift für Assyriologie XXVI (1911) 261. - -[93] _T_ab. 1590. 5. There does not seem to be any record of when these -Syrians were settled at Balkh. - -[94] Wieger 1643: Chav. Doc. 284 f. - -[95] Chav. Doc. 168. - -[96] As Jūzjān is distinguished from Shubūrqān in _T_ab. 1608. 17, it -is probable that this was the town Kundurm or Qurzumān mentioned in -Yaʿqūbī’s Geog. 287. - -[97] _T_ab. 1613: Chav. Doc. 83 f., 122 n. As regards the adjective -Kharlukhī applied to the Jabghu in 1612. 16, the most satisfactory -explanation is that given by Marquart, Hist. Glossen 183 f. - -[98] The frequent references in the Chinese annals to the association of -Se-kin-tʾi, king of Kish, with the Türgesh raise an interesting problem. -There can be no doubt that he is the same prince as Al-Ishkand, ruler -of Nasaf, in the Arabic records. The name is Iranian and personal, -not dynastic. (See Justi’s Iranisches Namenbuch.) Al-Ishkand is first -mentioned in the account of the Battle of the Pass, (_T_ab. 1542. 8) -where he appears in command of a cavalry force on the side of the Khāqān, -though Kish and Nasaf were both in the hands of the Arabs (1545. 1). The -forces which he commanded were therefore not the ordinary local troops. -During _H_ārith’s siege of Tirmidh he received reinforcements from -Al-Ishkand, but no statement is made on the composition of his forces. -He is mentioned again as accompanying the Khāqān and the _S_ughdians in -the attack on Asad before the “Battle of the Baggage” (1597. 17-18,) -where the reading ‘I_s_pahbadh of Nasā’ is probably an error in the -tradition. Again there can be no question here of local troops from Nasaf -or Kish. In the Chinese records Se-kin-tʾi appears as the commander of an -independent force, not merely a detachment of Turks or levies from Shāsh -or Farghāna. The most reasonable conclusion is that Al-Ishkand was the -commander of the corps of _S_ughdian refugees. This would explain the -title “King of the Warriors” by which he is sometimes mentioned in the -Chinese records (Chav. Doc. 147 n. 1 and 313). The actual term (Chākar) -from which the title was derived does not appear in the Arabic histories -in this connection, but it is perhaps possible that a variant of the name -(derived from _razm_) is to be read in _T_ab. 1614. 2 for the meaningless -“razābin al-Kissī.” In 1609. 15 a force of “Bābīya” is mentioned along -with the _S_ughdians, and the name, though unrecognisable, probably -refers to some forces connected with _S_ughd. Wellhausen’s conclusion -that the _S_ughdians and “Bābīya” formed part of the personal following -of _H_ārith b. Surayj seems to force the connection in the text too far -(_h_amala ʾl-_h_ārithu waman maʿahu min ahliʾs-sughdi wal-bābīyati). On -the other hand, since al-Ishkand appears as the ally of _H_ārith, we -may conclude that some understanding existed between the latter and the -_S_ughdians (and therefore the Turks) at the time of his revolt. It is -probable that the _S_ughdian corps assisted in the recovery of Samarqand -from the Arabs. - - - - -V. THE RECONQUEST OF TRANSOXANIA. - - -The reaction produced by the downfall of the Türgesh power was manifested -in Transoxania in the first place by an increased regard for China. The -princes had found the Türgesh yoke no less galling in the end than that -of the Arabs[99]; the country was as wasted and impoverished by their -continual raids as it had been under the latter. The profitable native -and transit trade, the source of the entire wealth of the cities, must -have shrunk to negligible proportions if it had not wholly ceased. All -classes of the people therefore were weary of war and sought only a -peace consonant with their self-respect. For the attainment of these -aims it was vain to look to China; the granting of bombastic titles -to a few princes brought neither comfort nor aid. A final opportunity -was thus offered to wise statesmanship to swing the whole country -round to the Arabs almost without a blow. For two years, however, the -situation seemed to remain much as it was, except for an expedition into -Khuttal, probably on the pretext of assisting the ruling house against -a usurper from Bamiyān. Nevertheless some progress had been made by the -administration in regaining the prestige it had lost. This was due not -merely to the effect of the victories over _H_ārith and the Türgesh, but -even more to Asad’s personal relations with the dihqāns. He had, as we -have seen, gratified the national pride of the people of _T_ukhāristān by -transferring the seat of power from Merv, the capital of the foreigners, -to Balkh, the centre of their national life. As had been the case even -in his first term of office, he was able to attract to his side many of -the more influential elements in Lower _T_ukhāristān and the Ephthalite -lands—to this, in fact, was largely due his success in the struggle with -the Turks. More striking evidence still is afforded by the conversion of -the dihqāns at this period, amongst them the minor chief Sāmān-Khudāh and -probably also the Barmak. By this means Asad laid the foundations for a -true reconciliation and Narshakhī’s work amply attests the honour which -later generations attached to his name. His work was of course incomplete -in that it was practically confined to the ruling classes and naturally -did not extend to the now independent dihqāns of _S_ughd. - -Early in 120/738 Asad died, and after a lapse of some months the -governorship was conferred by Hishām on Na_s_r b. Sayyār. For the subject -peoples no choice could have been more opportunely made. Na_s_r was -one of the few men who had come with honour and reputation through the -external and internal conflicts of the last thirty years. Belonging -to the small and almost neutral tribe of Kināna, his position bore a -strong similarity to that of Qutayba in that both were more dependent on -the support of a powerful patron than on their tribal connexions, and -therefore, though favouring Qays, less frantically partisan. In contrast -to Qutayba, however, Na_s_r, after thirty years of active leadership, -knew the situation in Khurāsān, Transoxania, and Central Asia as no -Arab governor had ever done. He had seen the futility of trying to hold -the country by mere brute force, and the equal futility of trying to -dispense with force. While he held the support of Hishām, therefore, he -set himself to restore Arab authority in Transoxania. The appointment -of Qa_t_an b. Qutayba, who had inherited much of his father’s ability, -to command the forces beyond the river gave earnest of an aggressive -policy. The appointment was not to Samarqand, as Wellhausen says, but -“over _S_ughd,” _i.e._, the garrisons in Bukhārā and probably Kish, who -were responsible in the first place for keeping the surrounding districts -in subjection. The governor himself then carried out a brief expedition, -intended apparently to punish some rebels in the neighbourhood of the -Iron Gate, possibly in Shūmān. Having thus vindicated the authority of -the administration, Na_s_r returned to Merv and delivered the famous -Khu_t_ba in which the system of taxation and conditions of amnesty were -at last laid down in a form satisfactory to the mawālī and the subject -peoples[100]. The results were as he had foreseen. The princes and people -of Transoxania submitted, as far as we can judge, without opposition when -Na_s_r with his army marched through _S_ughd to re-establish the Arab -garrison and administration in Samarqand. - -This expedition may in all probability be dated in 121/739. A year or -two later, Na_s_r collected his forces, which included levies from -Transoxania, for an attack on Shāsh. Wellhausen considers that the first -two expeditions were only stages of the third, but the expedition to -Shāsh can hardly have taken place earlier than 122/740, in view of the -fact that the armies of Shāsh and Farghāna were engaged with the Türgesh -in 739, and of Narshakhī’s statement[101], which there is no reason to -dispute, that _T_ughshāda was assassinated in the thirty-second year of -his reign. Reckoning in lunar years this gives 122 (91-122), in solar -years 123 (710-741), as the date. This is confirmed by the Chinese -record of an embassy from Shāsh in 741 complaining that “Now that the -Turks have become subject to China, it is only the Arabs that are a -curse to the Kingdoms”[102]. 123 is also the date given for the return -of the _S_ughdians[103]. It is most unlikely that the intervening year -or years passed without expeditions altogether, and the most reasonable -supposition is that they were occupied in the pacification of _S_ughd. -The expedition marched eastward through Ushrūsana, whose prince, as -usual, paid his allegiance to the victor on his passage, but on reaching -the Jaxartes Na_s_r found his crossing opposed by the army of Shāsh, -together with _H_ārith b. Surayj and some Turkish troops. It would seem -that he was unable to come to blows with the main body of the enemy, -but made a treaty with the king by which the latter agreed to accept an -Arab resident and to expel _H_ārith, who was accordingly deported to -Fārāb. As usual, later tradition magnified the exploits of the Arabs by -crediting Na_s_r with the capture and execution of Kūr_s_ūl, the Türgesh -leader who had been scarcely less redoubtable than the Khāqān himself. -If the story has any foundation it is probably a legendary development -from the capture of a Turkish chief Al-Akhram, related by _T_abarī in a -variant account. The presence of Kūr_s_ūl with a Türgesh force on this -occasion is not in itself impossible, but if his identification with -Baga Tarkhan is sound, we know that he was executed by the Chinese in -744/126[104]. The expulsion of _H_ārith was probably the object for which -the expedition had been undertaken; before returning, however, the Arabs -entered Farghāna and pursued its king as far as Qubā before bringing him -to terms. The negotiations were carried out between Sulaymān b. _S_ūl, -one of the princes of Jūrjān, and the Queen-Mother. This invasion of -Farghāna is related in three (or four) different versions, some of which -may possibly refer to a second expedition mentioned by _T_abarī later. -In the same year, on returning from the expedition to Shāsh, Na_s_r was -met at Samarqand by the Bukhār Khudāh _T_ughshāda and two of his dihqāns. -The nobles laid a complaint against the prince, but as Na_s_r seemed -indisposed to redress their grievance, they attempted to assassinate both -the Bukhār Khudāh and the Arab intendant at Bukhārā, Wā_s_il b. ʿAmr. The -former was mortally wounded, and succeeded by his son Qutayba, so named -in honour of the conqueror. The incident is related also by Narshakhī -with some additional details which profess to explain the assassination. -The two narratives present such a remarkable similarity of phrase, -however, even though they are in different languages, that it is rather -more likely that the Persian version has elaborated the story than that -_T_abarī deliberately suppressed any offensive statements, as argued by -van Vloten[105]. - -Except for a possible second expedition to Farghāna, no other campaigns -into Transoxania are recorded of Na_s_r, unless Balādhurī’s tradition -(from Abū ʿUbayda) of an unsuccessful attack on Ushrūsana refers to a -separate expedition. This is unlikely, and the account conflicts with -that given in _T_abarī. Ushrūsana, however, was never really subdued -until nearly a century later. _T_ukhāristān, if it had not already been -recovered by Asad, may have made submission of its own accord. Since the -defeat of the Türgesh and the flight of _H_ārith it had ceased to hold -any menace to the Arabs, and Na_s_r had accordingly retransferred the -capital to Merv on his appointment. - -The governor now turned his attention to restoring the prosperity of the -country and developing a policy of co-operation with the subject peoples. -Na_s_r was the first Arab ruler of Transoxania to realise that the -government depended for support in the last resort on the middle classes -and agriculturalists. Both these classes were of greater political -importance perhaps in Transoxania, with its centuries of mercantile -tradition, than any other were in the Empire. It was in the same way -that in later years the _T_āhirids and Sāmānids established their -ascendancy[106]. He was thus able not only to complete the work begun by -Asad b. ʿAbdullah, but to settle it on more stable foundations. Shortly -after his recapture of Samarqand he had sent an embassy to China. This -was followed up in 126/744 by a much more elaborate embassy, obviously -intended to regulate commercial relations in the most complete manner -possible, in which the Arabs were accompanied by ambassadors not only -from the Sogdian cities and _T_ukhāristān, but even from Zābulistān, -Shāsh, and the Türgesh. Two other Arab embassies are also recorded in -745 and 747. There can be no doubt that it was not so much the justice -of Na_s_r’s rule as his personal influence and honesty that reconciled -the peoples of Transoxania. Even the _S_ughdian refugees, stranded after -the dissolution of the Türgesh confederacy, trusted him to honour the -conditions upon which they had agreed to return, and were not deceived -although his concessions raised a storm of protest, and the Caliph -himself was brought to confirm them only for the sake of restoring peace. - -It is not surprising, however, that the princes were dissatisfied with -the success which had attended the pacification of Transoxania. The -people were “becoming Arabs” too rapidly and their own authority was -menaced in consequence. They were still hopeful of regaining their -independence, especially when Na_s_r’s position became less secure after -the death of Hishām. We hear therefore of sporadic embassies to China, -such as that sent from Ishtīkhan in 745 asking for annexation to China -“like a little circumscription.” That the governor was aware of this -undercurrent may be judged from the fact that he felt it necessary to -have _H_ārith b. Surayj pardoned, in case he should again bring in the -Turks to attack the government[107]. But the people as a whole held -for Na_s_r. The respect and even affection which he inspired held all -Transoxania true to him during the last troubled years. No tribute could -be more eloquent than the facts that not a single city in Transoxania -took advantage of the revolutionary movements in Khurāsān to withdraw -its allegiance, that Abū Muslim’s missionaries went no further than -the Arab colonies at Āmul, Bukhārā, and Khwārizm, and that the loyal -garrison of Balkh found first support and then refuge in Chaghāniān and -_T_ukhāristān. On these facts the various authorities whose narratives -are related by _T_abarī completely agree, and by their agreement -disprove the exaggerated account given by Dīnawarī (359 f.) that “Abū -Muslim sent his envoys (duʿāt) to all quarters of Khurāsān, and the -people rallied _en masse_ to Abū Muslim from Herāt, Būshanj, Merv-Rūdh, -_T_ālaqān, Merv, Nasā, Abīward, _T_ūs, Naysābūr, Sarakhs, Balkh, -Chaghāniān, _T_ukhāristān, Khuttalān, Kish, and Nasaf.” Dīnawarī himself -states a little later that Samarqand joined Abū Muslim only after the -death of Na_s_r. Abū Muslim’s main strength, in fact, was drawn from -Lower _T_ukhāristān and the neighbourhood of Merv-Rūdh, several of the -princes of which, including the ruler of Būshanj and Khālid b. Barmak, -declared for him. But even here the people were not solidly against -the administration. We are told that a camp was established at Jīranj -(south of Merv) “to cut off the reinforcements of Na_s_r b. Sayyār from -Merv-Rūdh, Balkh, and the districts of (Lower) _T_ukhāristān.” Herāt fell -to Abū Muslim by force of arms. The Syrian garrison of Balkh, together -with the Mu_d_arite party, were supported by the rulers of both Upper and -Lower _T_ukhāristān, and twice recaptured the city from their stronghold -at Tirmidh. An example of Abū Muslim’s efforts to gain over the Iranians -is afforded by an incident when, having taken 300 Khwārizmian prisoners -in an engagement, he treated them well and set them free[108]. - -The tradition of the enthusiasm of the Iranians for Abū Muslim is true -only of the period after his success. In our most authentic records there -is no trace of a mass movement such as has so often been portrayed. His -following was at first comparatively so small that had the Arabs been -more willing to support Na_s_r at the outset, it is practically certain -that it would have melted away as rapidly as the following of _H_ārith -b. Surayj at the first reverse. “Nothing succeeds like success,” and -Abū Muslim, once victorious on so imposing a scale, and that with the -aid of Iranians, became a heroic figure among the peoples of Eastern -Khurāsān. The legend penetrated but slowly into Transoxania. When by -130/748, however, the whole of Eastern Khurāsān had fallen to Abū Muslim -and Na_s_r no longer held authority, his governors in Transoxania were -replaced by the nominees of Abū Muslim without outward disturbance. But -the recrudescence of embassies to China shows that under the surface -currents were stirring. Shāsh had already thrown off its allegiance -and the Sogdian princes had by no means lost all hope of regaining -independence in spite of the tranquillity of the last few years. As it -happened, however, the first revolt was not on their part but by the Arab -garrison of Bukhārā under Sharīk b. Shaykh in 133/750-751. The rising, -which was due to their resentment at the seizure of the Caliphate by the -ʿAbbāsids and the passing over of the ʿAlid house, was suppressed with -some difficulty by Abū Muslim’s lieutenant Ziyād b. Sāli_h_ assisted by -the Bukhār Khudāh. The fact that the Bukhār-Khudāh assisted the troops -of Abū Muslim against Sharīk might be regarded as an indication that -he belonged to the party of the former. This inference is more than -doubtful, however. Of the 30,000 men, who, we are told, joined the -rebels, probably the greater part were the townsmen, or “popular party,” -of Bukhārā. The revolt thus assumed the domestic character of a movement -against the aristocratic party, who, led by the Bukhār-Khudāh, naturally -cooperated with the Government in its suppression. The events of the -following year are sufficient evidence against any other explanation. -According to Narshakhī, who gives by far the fullest account of this -revolt, Ziyād had also to suppress a similar movement in Samarqand. In -the same year an expedition was sent into Khuttal by Abū Dāwud, the -governor of Balkh. Al-_H_anash at first offered no opposition; later in -the campaign he attempted to hold out against the Arabs but was forced -to fly to the Turks and thence to China where he was given the title of -Jabghu in recompense for his resistance[109]. By this expedition Khuttal -was effectively annexed to the Arab government for the first time. - -Of much greater, and indeed decisive, importance were the results of -an expedition under Ziyād b. Sāli_h_ into the Turkish lands beyond -the Jaxartes. It is surprising to find no reference to this either in -_T_abarī or any other of the early historians. A short notice is given -by Ibn al-Athīr, drawn from some source which is now apparently lost. -The earliest reference which we find in the Arabic histories seems to -be a passing mention of Ziyād b. Sāli_h_’s expedition “into _S_īn” -in a monograph on Baghdād by Ibn _T_ayfūr (d. 250/983)[110]. For a -detailed account of the battle we are therefore dependent on the Chinese -sources[111]. In 747 and 749 the Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān had appealed -to China for aid against certain petty chiefs who were giving trouble -in the Gilghit and Chitral valleys. The governor of Kucha despatched on -this duty a Corean officer, Kao-hsien-shih, who punished the offenders -in a series of amazing campaigns over the high passes of the Karakorum. -Before returning to Kucha after the last campaign he was called in by the -King of Farghāna to assist him against the king of Shāsh. Kao-hsien-shih -at first came to terms with the king of Shāsh but when on some pretext -he broke his word and seized the city, the heir to the kingdom fled to -_S_ughd for assistance and persuaded Abū Muslim to intervene. A strong -force was accordingly despatched under Ziyād b. Sāli_h_. The Chinese, -with the army of Farghāna and the Karluks (who had succeeded the Türgesh -in the hegemony of the Western Turks), gave battle at Athlakh, near -_T_arāz, in July 751 (Dhuʾl-_h_ijja 133). During the engagement the -Karluks deserted and Kao-hsien-shih, caught between them and the Arabs, -suffered a crushing defeat. Though this battle marks the end of Chinese -power in the West, it was in consequence of internal disruption rather -than external pressure. Nothing was further at first from the minds of -the princes of _S_ughd than the passing of the long tradition of Chinese -sovereignty, indeed it blazed up more strongly than ever. For had not -a Chinese army actually visited Shāsh on their very borders; even if -the Arabs had won the first battle, would they not return to avenge the -defeat? For the last time the Shao-wu princes planned a concerted rising -in Bukhārā, Kish, _S_ughd, and Ushrūsana. But China gave neither aid -nor encouragement; the presence of Abū Muslim at Samarqand overawed the -_S_ughdians, and only at Kish did the revolt assume serious proportions. -Abū Dāwud’s army easily crushed the insurgents in a pitched battle at -Kandak, near Kish, killing the king Al-Ikhrīd and many of the other -dihqāns. Amongst the treasures of the royal palace which were sent to -Samarqand were “many articles of rare Chinese workmanship, vessels inlaid -with gold, saddles, brocades, and other objects d’art.” The Bukhār-Khudāh -Qutayba and the dihqāns of _S_ughd also paid for their complicity with -their lives[112]. - -So ended the last attempt at restoring an independent Sogdiana under -the old régime. For some years yet the princes of _S_ughd, Khwārizm, -and _T_ukhāristān continued to send appeals to China. The Emperor, -however, “preoccupied with maintaining peace, praised them all and gave -them consolation, then having warned them sent them back to assure -tranquillity in the Western lands.” Abū Muslim had also, it would seem, -realised the importance of maintaining relations with the Chinese court, -for a succession of embassies from “the Arabs with black garments” is -reported, beginning in the year following the battle of the Talas. -As many as three are mentioned in a single year. It is possible that -these embassies were in part intended to keep the government informed -on the progress of the civil wars in China, though the active interest -of the new administration in their commerce would, as before, tend to -reconcile the influential mercantile communities to ʿAbbāsid rule. The -actual deathblow to the tradition of Chinese overlordship in Western -Central Asia was given, not by any such isolated incident as the battle -of the Talas, but by the participation of Central Asian contingents in -the restoration of the Emperor to his capital in 757[113]. Men from the -distant lands to whom China had seemed an immeasurably powerful and -unconquerable Empire now saw with their own eyes the fatal weaknesses -that Chinese diplomacy had so skilfully concealed. From this blow Chinese -prestige never recovered. - -The complete shattering of the Western Turkish empires by the Chinese -policy had also put an end to all possibility of intervention from that -side. Transoxania, therefore, was unable to look for outside support, -while the reorganization of the Muslim Empire by the early ʿAbbāsid -Caliphs prevented, not indeed sporadic though sometimes serious risings, -but any repetition of the concerted efforts at national independence. -The Shao-wu princes and the more important dihqāns continued to exercise -a nominal rule until the advent of the Sāmānids, but many of them -found that the new policy of the Empire offered them an opportunity of -honourable and lucrative service in its behalf and were quick to take -advantage of it. On the other hand the frequent revolts in Eastern -Khurāsān under the guise of religious movements show that the mass of the -people remained unalterably hostile to their conquerors[114]. In none of -these, however, was the whole of Transoxania involved until the rising -organized by Rāfiʿ b. Layth three years after the fall of the Barmakids. -The extraordinary success of his movement may partly be ascribed to -resentment at their disgrace, but it perhaps counted for something that -he was the grandson of Na_s_r b. Sayyār. Though the revolt failed it led -directly to the only solution by which Transoxania could ever become -reconciled to inclusion in the Empire of the ʿAbbāsids. Whether by wise -judgment or happy chance, to Maʿmūn belongs the credit of laying the -foundations of the brilliant Muhammadan civilisation which the Iranian -peoples of Central Asia were to enjoy under the rule of a dynasty of -their own race. - - -NOTES - -[99] _Cf._ _T_abarī 1594. 14: 1613. 3: Chavannes, Documents 142. - -[100] The details of this measure are discussed by Wellhausen, Das -Arabische Reich 297 ff., and van Vloten, Domination Arabe 71 f. Note that -_T_ab. 1689. 5 expressly refers to them as “conditions of peace.” - -[101] Narshakhī 8. 19. - -[102] Chav., Doc. 142. - -[103] _T_ab. 1717 f. - -[104] Chav., Doc. 286. - -[105] Van Vloten, _op. cit._ 20. _Cf._ _e.g._ _T_ab. 1694. 1 with Narsh. -60. 3-5. - -[106] Barthold, Turkestan 219. - -[107] _T_ab. 1867. - -[108] _T_ab. 1956. 17; 1966.10; 1997 ff. (this passage is unfortunately -defective and has been supplemented by the editor from Ibn al-Athīr); -1970. 9. The popularity of Na_s_r is demonstrated also by the growth of a -tradition round his name. This appears in _T_abarī somewhat unobtrusively -in isolated passages, unfortunately without quotation of Madāʾinī’s -authorities. According to the “Fihrist” (103. 12) Madāʾinī wrote two -books on the administrations of Asad b. ʿAbdullah and Na_s_r b. Sayyār, a -fact which confirms the special importance of these two governors in the -history of Khurāsān. Probably Asad was more popular with the dihqāns and -Na_s_r with the people. - -[109] Chav., Doc. 168: _cf._ Marquart, Ērānshahr 303. - -[110] Kitāb Baghdād, Band VI ed. H. Keller, p. 8. 12. - -[111] Chav., Doc. 297 f.; Wieger, Textes Historiques 1647. - -[112] _T_ab. III. 79 f.: Narsh. 8 fin.: Chav., Doc. 140, Notes Addit. 86 -and 91. - -[113] Wieger 1684 ff.: Chav., Doc. 158 n. 4 and 298 f. _Cf._ my article -“Chinese records of the Arabs in Central Asia” in the Bulletin of the -School of Oriental Studies, II. 618 f. - -[114] A full account of these risings is given by Prof. E. G. Browne in -“Literary History of Persia” vol. I, 308 ff. - - - - -BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CHIEF WORKS CITED. - - -A. ORIENTAL AUTHORITIES. - -Al-Balādhurī: (1) (_Kitāb al-Ansāb_) _Anonyme Arabische Chronik_, Band -XI, ed. W. Ahlwardt, Greifswald, 1883. - -—— (2) _Kitāb Futū_h_ al Buldān_, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leyden, 1865. - -Ad-Dīnawarī: _Kitāb al-Akhbār a_t_-_T_iwāl_, ed. V. Guirgass, Leyden, -1888. - -_Fragmenta Historicorum Arabicorum_, vol. I, from Kitāb al-ʿUyūn, ed. M. -J. de Goeje and P. de Jong, Leyden, 1869. - -Ibn al-Athīr: _Taʿrīkh al-Kāmil_, 12 vols., Cairo 1290 A.H. - -Ibn Khalliqān, _Biographical Dictionary_, trans. by Baron MacGuckin de -Slane, 4 vols., Paris, 1842-1871. - -Ibn Khūrdādhbih: _Kitāb al-Masālik wal-Mamālik_, ed. M. J. de Goeje, -(Bibl. Geog. Arab. VI), Leyden, 1889. - -Ibn Qutayba: _Kitāb al-Maʿārif_, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Göttingen, 1850. - -Al-I_st_akhrī: _Kitāb Masālik al-Mamālik_, ed. M. J. de Goeje, (Bibl. -Geog. Arab. I), Leyden, 1870. - -An-Narshakhī: _Description Topographique et Historique de Boukhara par -Mohammed Nerchakhy_, ed. C. Schefer, Paris, 1892. - -A_t_-_T_abarī: (1) _Annales quos scripsit Abū Jaʿfar ... a_t_-_T_abarī_, -ed. M. J. de Goeje et alii, 15 vols., Leyden, 1879-1901. - -—— (2) _Chronique de Tabari traduite sur la version persane de ... -Belʿami par H. Zotenberg_, 4 vols., Paris, 1867-1874. - -Al-Yaʿqūbī: (1) _Kitāb al-Buldān_, ed. M. J. de Goeje, (Bibl. Geog. Arab. -VII), Leyden, 1892. - -—— (2) _Ibn Wadhih qui dicitur Al-Jaʿkubi Historiae_, ed. M. Th. Houtsma, -2 vols., Leyden, 1883. - -Yāqūt: _Geographisches Wörterbuch_, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, 6 vols., Leipzig, -1866-1873. - - -B. EUROPEAN WORKS. - -W. Barthold: (1) _Turkyestan v’Epokhu Mongolskavo Nashyestviya_, St. -Petersburg, 1898. - -—— (2) _Zur Geschichte des Christenthums in Mittel-Asien bis zur -Mongolischen Eroberungen_, German trans. by R. Stübe, Tubingen and -Leipzig, 1901. - -—— (3) See under Radloff. - -—— (4) Articles in _Encyclopaedia of Islām_. - -L. Caetani: _Chronographia Islamica_, Paris, 1912-(proceeding). - -Léon Cahun: _Introduction à l’Histoire de l’Asie: Turcs et Mongols des -Origines à 1450_, Paris, 1896. - -E. Chavannes: (1) _Documents sur les Tou-Kiue (Turcs) Occidentaux_, St. -Petersburg, 1903. - -—— (2) _Notes Additionnelles sur les Tou-Kiue Occidentaux, T’oung Pao_, -vol. V (1904). - -H. Cordier: _Histoire Générale de la Chine_, tome I, Paris, 1920. - -M. A. Czaplicka: _The Turks of Central Asia_, Oxford U.P., 1918 (contains -a very full bibliography). - -_Encyclopaedia Britannica_, Eleventh Edition, 1910-1911. - -_Encyclopaedia of Islām_, Leyden and London, 1913-(proceeding). - -O. Franke: _Beiträge aus Chinesischen Quellen zur Kenntnis der Türkvölker -und Skythen Zentralasiens_, Berlin, 1904. - -I. Goldziher: _Muhammandanische Studien_, Band I, Halle, 1888. - -A. von Kremer: _Culturgeschichte des Orients unter den Chalifen_, 2 -vols., Vienna, 1875-1877. - -G. Le Strange: _The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate_, Cambridge, 1905. - -J. Marquart: (1) _Die Chronologie der Alttürkischen Inschriften_, -Leipzig, 1898. - -—— (2) _Historische Glossen zu den Alttürkischen Inschriften_, W.Z.K.M., -vol. XII (1898) pp. 157-200. - -—— (3) _Ērānshahr ..._, Berlin, 1901, with notices by:— - - W. Bang, in Keleti Szemle III (1902). - - E. Chavannes in J.A. Ser. IX t. XVIII (1901). - - M. J. de Goeje, in W.Z.K.M. XVI (1902). - - Th. Nöldeke, in Z.D.M.G. LVI (1902). - -Sir W. Muir: _The Caliphate, its Rise, Decline, and Fall_: New edition, -ed. T. H. Weir, Edinburgh, 1915. - -Th. Nöldeke: _Geschichte der Perser und Araber zur Zeit der Sasaniden -..._, Leyden, 1879. - -_Pauly’s Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft, Neue -Bearbeitung_, Stuttgart, 1895-(proceeding). - -T. Peisker: “The Asiatic Background,” _Cambridge Mediaeval History_, vol. -I (1911). - -W. Radloff: (1) _Die Alttürkischen Inschriften der Mongolei, Neue Folge_, -St. Petersburg, 1897: with appendix by— - - W. Barthold: _Die Historische Bedeutung der Alttürk. Inschr._ - -—— (2) _Die Alttürkischen Inschriften der Mongolei, Zweite Folge_, St. -Petersburg, 1899: with appendices by— - - W. Barthold: _Die Alttürk. Insch. und die Arabischen Quellen_. - - Fr. Hirth: _Nachworte zur Inschrift des Tonjukuk_. - -E. Sachau: _Zur Geschichte und Chronologie von Khwārizm_, 2 parts, -Vienna, 1873 (S.B.W.A.). - -K. Shiratori: _Über den Wu-sun-stamm in Centralasien, Keleti Szemle_ III -(1902), pp. 103-140. - -F. H. Skrine and E. D. Ross: _The Heart of Asia_: A History of Russian -Turkestan, etc., from the Earliest Times. London, 1899. - -M. A. Stein: (1) _Ancient Khotan_, Oxford, 1907. - -—— (2) _Serindia_, vol. I, Oxford, 1921. - -E. Thomas: _Contributions to the Numismatic History of the Early -Mohammedan Arabs in Persia_, J.R.A.S. First Series, vol. XII (1850), pp. -253-347. - -W. Tomaschek: _Centralasiatische Studien_: I. _Soghdiana_, Vienna, 1877 -(S.B.W.A.). - -A. Vámbéry: _History of Bokhara from the Earliest Period down to the -Present_, London, 1873. - -G. van Vloten: _Recherches sur la Domination Arabe, etc., sous le -Khalifat des Omayades_, Amsterdam, 1894. - -J. Wellhausen: _Das Arabische Reich und Sein Sturz_, Berlin, 1902. - -L. Wieger, S.J.: _Tomes Historiques_, ? 1903-1905. - -Yüan Chwang: _On Yüan Chwang’s travels in India_, T. Watters, 2 vols., -London, 1904 (Oriental Translation Fund, New Series, vols. XIV and XV). - - Printed in Great Britain by FOX, JONES & CO., - Kemp Hall Press, High Street, Oxford, England. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Arab conquests in Central Asia, by -Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ARAB CONQUESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA *** - -***** This file should be named 61791-0.txt or 61791-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/6/1/7/9/61791/ - -Produced by Turgut Dincer and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Arab conquests in Central Asia - -Author: Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb - -Release Date: April 8, 2020 [EBook #61791] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ARAB CONQUESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA *** - - - - -Produced by Turgut Dincer and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="transnote"> -<p><b>Transcriber’s Note:</b> This text makes use of an uncommon system for -transcription of Arabic. Italics, sometimes on a <i class="red">s</i>ingle le<i class="red">t</i>ter (highlighted in red here, but not in the text!), -are semantically meaningful; and you’ll need a font that can display -macrons (āēīōū) and the characters for the transliterations of -Arabic letters ain (ʿ) and hamza (ʾ).</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_i" id="Page_i">[i]</a></span></p> - -<h1>THE ARAB CONQUESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA</h1> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ii" id="Page_ii">[ii]</a></span></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii">[iii]</a></span></p> - -<p class="titlepage">JAMES G. FORLONG FUND<br /> -VOL. II.</p> - -<p class="titlepage larger">THE ARAB CONQUESTS<br /> -IN<br /> -CENTRAL ASIA</p> - -<p class="titlepage">H. A. R. GIBB, M.A.<br /> -<span class="smaller">(EDIN. AND LOND.)<br /> -Lecturer in Arabic, School of Oriental Studies, London.</span></p> - -<p class="titlepage">THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY<br /> -<span class="smcap">74 Grosvenor Street, London, W.1.</span><br /> -1923</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv">[iv]</a></span></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[v]</a></span></p> - -<h2>CONTENTS</h2> - -<table summary="Contents"> - <tr> - <td class="tdr"></td> - <td></td> - <td class="tdpg smaller">PAGE</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr"></td> - <td><span class="smcap">Preface</span></td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#PREFACE">vii</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">I.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Oxus Basin</span><br /> - Early History—Political Divisions—The Arabic Sources</td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#I_INTRODUCTION">1</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">II.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Early Raids</span></td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#II_THE_EARLY_RAIDS">15</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">III.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Conquests of Qutayba</span></td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#III_THE_CONQUESTS_OF_QUTAYBA">29</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">IV.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Turkish Counterstroke</span></td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#IV_THE_TURKISH_COUNTERSTROKE">59</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">V.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Reconquest of Transoxania</span></td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#V_THE_RECONQUEST_OF_TRANSOXANIA">88</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr"></td> - <td><span class="smcap">Bibliography of Chief Works Cited</span></td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#BIBLIOGRAPHY">100</a></td> - </tr> -</table> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[vi]</a></span></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[vii]</a></span></p> - -<h2 id="PREFACE">PREFACE</h2> - -<p>The first draft of this work was presented to the -University of London in December 1921, under the title -of “The Arab Conquest of Transoxania”, as a thesis for -the degree of Master of Arts, and was approved by the -Senate in January 1922, for publication as such. During -the year my attention was taken up in other directions -and, except for the publication of two studies on the -subject in the Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, -nothing further was done until by the generosity of the -Trustees of the Forlong Bequest Fund an opportunity -of publication was offered. In its present form the work -has been largely rewritten and revised. It makes no -claim to present a complete historical account of the -Arabs in Central Asia, but is intended solely as a critical -study of the authorities in greater detail than has hitherto -been made. Much is therefore omitted because it has -already been dealt with in the standard histories. In -order to keep down the cost of publication, the extensive -references which originally accompanied the text have -been cut down to a few notes at the end of each chapter. -No references are given when, as in the great majority -of cases, the authority for the statements made can -easily be found in the appropriate place either in <i>T</i>abarī -or Balādhurī.</p> - -<p>I regret that several works which are indispensable -for a thorough study of the subject have, for linguistic -reasons, been inaccessible to me. Such are van Vloten’s -<i>Opkomst der Abbasiden</i>, and almost the whole -range of Russian research work. Through the kindness -of Sir Denison Ross, however, I have been able to avail -myself of a draft MS. translation of the most important -and valuable of them all, Professor W. Barthold’s<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[viii]</a></span> -<i>Turkestan</i>, as well as of his as yet unpublished London -lectures on “The Nomads of Central Asia.” My sincere -thanks are due to Sir Denison Ross also for his continued -interest and material assistance ever since he first introduced -me to the subject; to Sir Thomas Arnold for much -encouragement and helpful counsel; to Professor -Barthold, who has read the MS. through and made a -number of valuable suggestions; to the Trustees of the -Forlong Bequest Fund for their kindness in undertaking -the publication; and in no small measure to my wife, -who has given much time and labour to preparing the -MS. for publication.</p> - -<p class="right">London, April, 1923.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[1]</a></span></p> - -<h2 id="I_INTRODUCTION">I. INTRODUCTION<br /> -THE OXUS BASIN</h2> - -<h3 class="left"><i>Early History.</i></h3> - -<p>The Oxus is a boundary of tradition rather than of -history. Lying midway between the old frontier of -Aryan civilisation formed by the Jaxartes and the Pamīr -and the natural strategic frontier offered by the north-eastern -escarpment of the plateau of Īrān, it has never -proved a barrier to imperial armies from either side. -It was not on the Oxus but on the Jaxartes that -Alexander’s strategic insight fixed the position of -Alexander Eschate, and when the outposts of Persian -dominion were thrust back by the constant pressure of -the Central Asian hordes, their retreat was stayed not on -the Oxus but on the Murghāb. Thus when the tide of -conquest turned and the Arabs won back her ancient -heritage for Persia, they, like Alexander, were compelled -to carry their arms ever further to the East and all unknowing -re-establish the frontiers of the Achaemenid -Empire. It was from the legends of Sāsānian times, -enshrined in the pages of the historians and the national -epic of Firdawsī, that the Oxus came to be regarded as -the boundary between Īrān and Tūrān.</p> - -<p>Through all the centuries of invasion, however, the -peoples of Sogdiana and the Oxus basin remained Iranian -at bottom, preserving an Iranian speech and Iranian -institutions. But the political conditions of the country -at the period of the Arab conquests were so complex that -it is necessary to trace briefly the course of their -development.</p> - -<p>The second century <span class="smcapuc">B.C.</span> was a period of upheaval in -Central Asia: the powerful Hiung-Nu peoples were -dispossessing weaker tribes of their pasture lands and -forcing them to migrate westwards. Between 150 and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[2]</a></span> -125 <span class="smcapuc">B.C.</span> a succession of nomadic tribes, the last and -most powerful of which were a branch of the Yueh-Chi, -were driven down into Sogdiana. It is now generally -held that these tribes were of Aryan origin, though the -question is not perhaps settled with absolute certainty. -Before long, however, a second group, the K’ang, possessed -themselves of Sogdiana, driving the Yueh Chi on -into Bactria and the Afghan mountains<a name="FNanchor_1" id="FNanchor_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>. In these -districts they found, alongside the Iranian peasantry, a -settled population of Tukhari (in Chinese, Ta-Hia), already -noted in the Chinese annals for their commercial enterprise<a name="FNanchor_2" id="FNanchor_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>, -and while at first the nomad tribes introduced -complete confusion, it would seem that they rapidly -absorbed, or were absorbed by, the native elements, and -thus assimilated the Hellenistic civilisation of Bactria. -From this fusion arose, about 50 <span class="smcapuc">A.D.</span>, the powerful -Kushan Empire which spread into India on the one side -and probably maintained some form of suzerainty over -the K’ang kingdoms of Sogdiana on the other. Under -the new empire, Buddhism was acclimatised in Turkestan, -and Sogdiana developed into a great <i>entrepôt</i> for Chinese -trade with the West. Towards the close of the third -century the Kushan Empire, weakened by attacks from -the new national dynasties in India and Persia, reverted -to its primitive form of small independent principalities, -which, however, retained sufficient cohesion to prevent -a Persian reconquest. It is practically certain that -Sāsānian authority never extended beyond Balkh and -rarely as far. In the fourth and fifth centuries references -are made to a fresh horde of nomads in the north-east, -the Juan-Juan (Chionitae, Avars)<a name="FNanchor_3" id="FNanchor_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>, but it does not -appear that any new settlements were made in the -Oxus countries.</p> - -<p>In the middle of the fifth century, another people, -the Ephthalites (Arabic Hay<i>t</i>al, Chinese Ye-Tha), perhaps -a branch of the Hiung-nu, not only completely -overran the former Kushan territories, but by successive -defeats of the Persian armies forced the Sāsānid Kings<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[3]</a></span> -to pay tribute. The Ephthalites appear to have been a -nomadic people organised as a military caste of the -familiar Turkish type, and the existing institutions and -principalities, in large part at least, continued side by side -with them<a name="FNanchor_4" id="FNanchor_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>. Their rule was too transitory to produce -any lasting effects, or to inflict any serious injury on the -commerce and prosperity of Sogdiana.</p> - -<p>The rise of the Central Asian empire of the Turks -proper (Tu-Kueh) dates from their overthrow of the Juan-Juan -in Mongolia in 552, under their great Khan, Mokan. -His brother Istämi (the Silzibul of the Byzantine -historians), the semi-independent jabghu of the ten tribes -of Western Turks, after consolidating his power in the -Ili and Chu valleys, formed an alliance with Khusrū -Anūshīrwān, and in a joint attack between 563 and 568 -the two powers completely overthrew the Ephthalite -kingdom and divided their territories. For a brief -moment the Oxus was the actual boundary between -Īrān and Tūrān; under pressure from the silk traders -of Sogdiana, however, the alliance was broken and the -weaker successors of Anūshīrwān could scarcely do more -than maintain their outpost garrisons on the Murghāb. -From this time the Ephthalites, like the Kushans, were -gradually assimilating to the Iranian population<a name="FNanchor_5" id="FNanchor_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>, -though the change was less rapid in the Cisoxine lands of -Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān, Bādghīs, and Herāt, where Ephthalite -principalities were re-constituted, probably with Turkish -support, and continued to give Persia much trouble on -her north-eastern frontiers<a name="FNanchor_6" id="FNanchor_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>. On the other hand the -Turks of the five western tribes (Nu-she-pi), who became -independent after the break up of the Great Khanate -about 582, maintained their suzerainty over Sogdiana -and the middle Oxus basin by frequent expeditions, in -one case at least as far as Balkh. There is no trace in our -records of extensive Turkish immigration into the -conquered lands; at most, small groups of Turks -wandered south with their herds, especially, it would -seem, south of the Iron Gate<a name="FNanchor_7" id="FNanchor_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a>. In general, Turkish<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[4]</a></span> -interference in the administration of the subject principalities -was at first limited to the appointment of military -governors and the collection of tribute. Thus, in the -semi-legendary account given by An-Naysābūrī of the -Turkish conquest of Bukhārā the Bukhār Khudāh is -represented as the chief dihqān under the Turkish -governor. It is possible also that the native princes -maintained guards of Turkish mercenaries.</p> - -<p>At this period, therefore, so far from the Oxus -being a barrier, there was considerable intercommunication -between the peoples on either side, and at least the -elements of a racial and cultural unity, in spite of political -divisions. This is a factor of importance in the history -of the Arab conquests: the conquest of Transoxania is -intimately linked with the fortunes of Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān, -and only became possible when the latter country -was completely subdued. On the other hand, the -Jaxartes formed a natural racial and political frontier. -“Shāsh and <i>S</i>ughd have seldom run together” says -Vámbéry, and in spite of nominal annexations on more -than one occasion Muslim rule was not effectively -imposed on Shāsh and Farghāna until some time after -the final conquest of Transoxania. Their chief importance -for the history of Transoxania is that they -formed the jumping-off place for counter-invasions -from the East. It is not without significance that of the -two battles which were decisive in establishing Arab rule -in Sogdiana one was fought to the west of Balkh and the -other on the Talas river, far into the Turkish lands -beyond the Jaxartes (see pp. 84 and 96).</p> - -<h3 class="left"><i>Political Divisions.</i></h3> - -<p>Researches into Chinese records have now made it -possible to obtain a more definite idea of the political -conditions of these frontier provinces in the seventh -century. All the principalities acknowledged the Khan -of the Western Turks as overlord and paid tribute to -him under compulsion, though, as will appear, there is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[5]</a></span> -good cause for doubting whether a Turkish army ever -came in response to their appeals for support until the -rise of the Türgesh power in 716.</p> - -<p>Geographically the cultivated lands to the west and -south-west of the middle Jaxartes are divided by the -Hissar mountains into two well-defined areas. The -northern area includes the rich valley of the Zarafshān -and the lesser streams which descend the northern slope -of the watershed, the southern comprises the broad -basin formed by the Oxus and its tributaries between -the mountains of the Pamīr and the steppelands. The -former, which as a whole is called Sogdiana in distinction -from the smaller principality of <i>S</i>ughd, was at -this period divided between a number of small states, -each independent of the others but forming together a -loose confederacy in a manner strikingly reminiscent of -the Hellenic city-states. The strongest bond of union -was formed by their mutual interest in the Chinese silk -trade, the chief stations of which were at Samarqand, -Paykand, and Kish. The premier city was Samarqand, -the pre-eminence of which and high culture of whose -population is vouched for by Yuan Chwang. Special -emphasis is laid on their enterprise and success in trade, -and a number of early embassies, doubtless commercial -missions, are recorded from Samarqand and Bukhārā -to the Chinese court. The merchant families of Paykand, -according to Tomaschek’s rendering of Narshakhī<a name="FNanchor_8" id="FNanchor_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a>, -were Kushans, but Iranian elements, reinforced by -emigrants from the Sāsānid dominions, formed the -majority in the cities. The agricultural population was -almost if not entirely Iranian.</p> - -<p>A second link between the majority of the cities was -formed by the ruling house of the Shao-wu, if, as the -Chinese records assert, these all belonged to one royal -family. The head of the clan governed Samarqand and -was allied by marriage to the Turkish Khan; cadet -branches ruled in Ushrūsana, Kish, Bukhārā, and the -lesser principalities in the basin of the Zarafshān. In<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[6]</a></span> -the later lists the rulers of Shāsh and Farghāna as well as -the Khwārizm Shāh are shown as belonging to the clan -also, though with less probability<a name="FNanchor_9" id="FNanchor_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a>. Whether the -family were of K’ang origin, or, as the Chinese records -state, belonged to the Yueh-Chi, they appear in the -Arabic histories with Persian territorial titles (Khudāh, -Shāh, and the general term dihqān). Some of the princes -also possessed Turkish titles, probably conferred on them -as vassals of the Khan. The ruler of Samarqand, as -king of <i>S</i>ughd, is called the Ikhshīdh or Ikhshēdh, which -is easily recognised as the Persian <i>khshayathiya</i>. This -title was borne also, as is well known, by the king of -Farghāna. It is certain at least from both Chinese and -Arabic accounts that these rulers were not Turks. The -Turkish names by which they are sometimes called were -given out of deference or compliment to their Turkish -suzerains, just as Arabic names begin to appear amongst -them immediately after the Arab conquests. Particularly -misleading is the name <i>T</i>arkhūn which appears -more than once in the list of princes of Samarqand and -has been erroneously taken as the title Tarkhān, though -it is in reality only the Arabic transcription of a personal -name spelt in the Chinese records Tu-hoen. During -the six or seven hundred years of their rule all these -princes had become fully identified with their Iranian -subjects<a name="FNanchor_10" id="FNanchor_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a>. The “kingship” moreover was not a -real monarchy but rather the primacy in an oligarchical -system. Their authority was far from absolute, and the -landed aristocracy (dihqāns) and rich merchants possessed, -as will be seen later, not only a large measure of -independence but also on occasion the power to depose -the ruling prince and elect his successor. As the -succession appears to have been largely hereditary it is -probable that, according to Iranian custom, eligibility -was confined to a single royal house. In some cases, -it would seem, the succession was regulated during the -lifetime of the reigning prince by some such method as -association in the principate, probably combined with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[7]</a></span> -the appointment of the remaining princes to other -fiefs<a name="FNanchor_11" id="FNanchor_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a>.</p> - -<p>The “confederacy” of these states, however, was in -no sense an alliance and probably amounted to little -more than a <i>modus vivendi</i>. Besides the more important -princes there existed an enormous number of petty -autocrats, some possibly Turkish, others probably -descended from former conquerors, whose authority -may sometimes have scarcely extended beyond the -limits of their own villages. In lands subject to the Turks -and patrolled by nomadic tribes an effective centralised -government was hardly possible. Mutual antagonisms -and wars cannot have been uncommon though we have -now no record of them, except that during the early Arab -period there was hostility between Bukhārā and Wardāna, -but the latter cannot be reckoned among the Shao-wu -principalities since, according to Narshakhī, it was -founded by a Sāsānid prince about 300 <span class="smcapuc">A.D.</span> Until the -profitable Chinese trade was threatened by the Arabs -we find no trustworthy record of combined resistance -offered by the country to its piecemeal reduction, and -only long after the conquests of Qutayba is there any -hint of a concerted rising. At the same time, the -strength of the cities and warlike nature of their -inhabitants may be gauged from the way in which they -not only preserved themselves from destruction at the -hands of their successive nomad invaders, but even -gained their respect, while this, in some respects perhaps -the most highly civilised of all the lands subdued by the -Arabs<a name="FNanchor_12" id="FNanchor_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a>, proved also the most difficult to conquer, -and most intractable to hold.</p> - -<p>The same lack of unity is apparent in the districts -south of the Iron Gate, though nominally subject to a -single authority. It is important to bear in mind that -the Zarafshān and Oxus valleys were completely independent -of one another—that the difference between them -was not merely one of government, but also of language, -and even, to some extent, of blood, owing to the greater<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[8]</a></span> -mixture of races in the southern basin. When, -occasionally, as in the “Mūsā legend”, reference is made -in the Arabic histories to common action by <i>S</i>ughd and -<i>T</i>ukhāristān, it is due to a complete misunderstanding -of the state of the country prior to the conquest, and it is -worthy of notice that no such reference is to be found in -any narrative otherwise reliable. On his outward -journey in 630, Yuan Chwang found the country divided -into twenty-seven petty states under separate rulers, -with the chief military authority vested in the Turkish -Shād, the eldest son of the Jabghu of the Western Turks, -who had his seat near the modern Qunduz. During the -period of anarchy which befell the Western Turks in the -following years, the whole district was formed into an -independent kingdom under a son of the former Shād, -who founded the dynasty of Jabghus of <i>T</i>ukhāristān. -Minor Turkish chiefs and intendants probably seized -similar authority in their own districts, and though -the Jabghu was recognised as suzerain of all the lands -from the Iron Gate to Zābulistān and Kapisa and from -Herāt to Khuttal<a name="FNanchor_13" id="FNanchor_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a>, his authority was little more than -nominal except within his immediate district of Upper -<i>T</i>ukhāristān. The lesser princes, in Shūmān, Khuttal, -&c., many of whom were Turkish, appear to have acted -quite independently and did not hesitate to defy their -Suzerain on occasion. The name <i>T</i>ukhāristān is used -very loosely in the Arabic records, with misleading -effect<a name="FNanchor_14" id="FNanchor_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a>. How relatively unimportant to the Arabs -<i>T</i>ukhāristān proper was is shown by the fact that its -annexation (see below <a href="#Page_38">p. 38</a>) is passed over in silence. -The brunt of the resistance offered to the early Arab -conquests was borne by the princes of <i>Lower</i> <i>T</i>ukhāristān, -<i>i.e.</i>, the riverain districts south of the Iron Gate, -including Chaghāniān and Balkh, together with the -Ephthalite principalities in Jūzjān, Bādghīs, and Herāt, -and possibly the mountainous fringe of Gharjistān. -This explains why the Arabs always regarded Balkh, -the old religious capital of the Kushan Empire and site<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[9]</a></span> -of the famous Buddhist shrine of Nawbahār, as the -capital of the “Turks”; it was in fact the centre of what -we might almost term the “amphictyony” of Lower -<i>T</i>ukhāristān, combining strategic and commercial -importance with religious veneration. Long after the -Nawbahār had been destroyed by Ibn ʿĀmir this sentiment -continued to exist in the country<a name="FNanchor_15" id="FNanchor_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a>.</p> - -<p>A chance narrative in <i>T</i>abarī (II. 1224 f.), which, -though of Bāhilite origin, can scarcely have been invented, -indicates the situation in Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān in 710. -In the presence of Qutayba, the Shād and as-Sabal -(King of Khuttal) do homage to the Jabghu, the former -excusing himself on the ground that though he has joined -Qutayba against the Jabghu, yet he is the Jabghu’s -vassal. The Ephthalite prince of Bādghīs then does -homage to the Shād, who must consequently be regarded -as the chief prince in Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān. His identification -with the Jabghu himself in another passage -(<i>T</i>ab. II. 1206. 9) is obviously impossible. Though -certainty on the point is hardly to be expected, the -description best suits the king of Chaghāniān (Chāghān -Khudāh), who consistently adopted an attitude of co-operation -with the Arabs. It would seem too that the -king of Chaghāniān commanded the armies of Lower -<i>T</i>ukhāristān in 652 and again in 737. Moreover, an -embassy to China on behalf of <i>T</i>ukhāristān in 719 was -actually despatched by the king of Chaghāniān, which -implies that he held a status in the kingdom consonant -with the high title of Shād. The conclusion drawn by -Marquart and Chavannes that the king of Chaghāniān -and the Jabghu were identical is disproved by the -Chinese records<a name="FNanchor_16" id="FNanchor_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a>.</p> - -<p>Such conditions of political disunion were naturally -all in favour of the Arabs. It might have seemed also -that the general insecurity, together with the burden -of maintaining armies and courts and the ever-recurring -ravages of invasion, would move the mass of the population -to welcome the prospect of a strong and united<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[10]</a></span> -government, more especially as so large a proportion of -the Muslim armies were composed of their Persian kin. -For the Arabic records in general are misleading on two -important points. By their use of the word “Turk” -for all the non-Persian peoples of the East, they give the -impression (due perhaps to the circumstances of the time -in which the chief histories were composed) that the -opponents of the Arabs in Transoxania were the historical -Turks. The truth is that until 720 the Arab invaders -were resisted only by the local princes with armies -composed almost entirely of Iranians, except perhaps -on one or two special occasions when Turkish forces may -have intervened. The other error is in interpreting the -conquests as primarily wars for the Faith. Rebellion, -for instance, is expressed in terms of apostasy. It is now -well established that this conception is exaggerated; -religious questions did not, in fact, enter until much -later and even then chiefly as expressions of political -relationships. To the Iranian peasantry, themselves -steadfastly attached to the national cults, the advent of -another faith in this meeting-place of all the cultures -and religions of Asia at first carried little significance. -Two factors in particular combined to provoke a resistance -so stubborn that it took the Arabs a century -merely to reduce the country to sullen submission. The -first of these was the proud national spirit of the -Iranians which was eventually to break down the -supremacy of the Arabs and give birth to the first -Persian dynasties in Islām. The few wise governors of -Khurāsān found in this their strongest support, but, -outraged again and again by an arrogant and rapacious -administration, the subject peoples became embittered -and sought all means of escape from its tyranny. The -second was the interest of the commercial relations on -which the wealth and prosperity of the country depended. -This again might have disposed the cities to -accept a rule which promised not only stability, but a -wide extension of opportunity. The Arab governors,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[11]</a></span> -as we shall see, were not indeed blind to this, but the -exactions of the treasury, and still more the greed of local -officials, combined with the unsettlement of constant -invasion to create an attitude of distrust, which deepened -later into despair. It must not be forgotten that the -commercial ties of the Sogdians were much stronger with -the East than with the West, and that this too prompted -them to cultivate relations with the Turks and Chinese -rather than with the Arabs when the necessity of making -a choice was forced upon them.</p> - -<h3 class="left"><i>The Arabic Sources.</i></h3> - -<p>The early Arabic sources are remarkably rich in -material for the reconstruction of the conquests in -Khurāsān and Transoxania. For the earlier period the -narratives of Yaʿqūbī and Balādhurī are nearly as full -as those of <i>T</i>abarī, but the special value of the latter lies -in his method of compilation which renders the traditions -amenable to critical study and thus provides a control -for all the others. Moreover, while the other historians, -regarding the conquests of Qutayba as definitely completing -the reduction of Transoxania, provide only meagre -notices for the later period, <i>T</i>abarī more than compensates -for their silence by the enormous wealth of detail -embodied in the accounts he quotes from Al-Madāʾinī -and others of the last thirty years of Umayyad rule. -As a general rule, these three historians rely on different -authorities, though all use the earlier histories of Al-Madāʾinī -and Abū ʿUbayda to some extent. The monograph -of Narshakhī (d. 959 <span class="smcapuc">A.D.</span>) based on both Arabic -and local sources, with some resemblance to Balādhurī, -is unfortunately preserved only in a Persian version of -two centuries later which has obviously been edited, to -what extent is unknown, but which probably represents -the original as unsatisfactorily as Balʿamī’s Persian -version of <i>T</i>abarī. Even so it preserves to us some -account of the peoples against whom the Arab invaders -were matched, and thus does a little to remedy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[12]</a></span> -the defects of the other historians in this respect. It -may well be doubted, however, whether some of its -narratives merit the reliance placed upon them by van -Vloten<a name="FNanchor_17" id="FNanchor_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a>. The much later historian Ibn al-Athīr introduces -very little new material, but confines himself for -the most part to abridging and re-editing the narratives -in <i>T</i>abarī, with a tendency to follow the more exaggerated -accounts. The geographer Ibn Khūrdādhbih gives a -list of titles and names, which is, however, too confused -to supply any reliable evidence.</p> - -<p>Reference has already been made to certain aspects of -the conquests in which the Arab historians are misleading. -Their information on the Turks and the principalities of -Sogdiana can now, fortunately, be supplemented and parts -of their narratives controlled from Chinese sources, -chiefly through Chavannes’ valuable “Documents sur -les Tou-Kiue (Turcs) Occidentaux.” But there are two -other facts which also demand attention: one, that the -Arabic authorities, as we possess them, and even with all -allowance made for their limitations, are by no means -exhaustive; <i>i.e.</i>, reliance on omissions in the narratives -is an unsafe principle of criticism: the other, that by -critical study it is possible to distinguish at certain points -several lines of tendentious tradition or legend, directed -to the interests of national feeling or of some particular -tribe or faction, and centred in some cases round -specific persons. These may most conveniently be -summarised as follows:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>1. A Qaysite tradition, centred on the family of -Ibn Khāzim:</p> - -<p>2. An Azd-Rabīʿa tradition, centred on Muhallab -and hostile to <i>H</i>ajjāj. This became the most -popular tradition among the Arabs, and is -followed by Balādhurī, but opposed by Yaʿqūbī:</p> - -<p>3. A Bāhilite tradition, centred on the tribal hero, -Qutayba b. Muslim. In general it found little -favour but is occasionally quoted somewhat -sarcastically by <i>T</i>abarī.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[13]</a></span></p> - -<p>4. A local Bukhārā tradition, followed by Yaʿqūbī, -Balādhurī and Narshakhī. It presents the -early conquests under the form of an historical -romance, centred on the Queen Khātūn in the -part of a national Boadicea. Other local -traditions, which are frequently utilised by -<i>T</i>abarī, seem to be much more free from serious -exaggeration:</p> - -<p>5. The few notices in Dīnawarī follow an entirely -divergent and extremely garbled tradition from -unknown sources, which may for the most -part be neglected:</p> - -<p>6. The quotations made by Balādhurī (<i>e.g.</i> 422. 10) -from Abū ʿUbayda show the influence of a rewriting -of episodes with an anti-Arab bias, -directed to the interests of the Shuʿūbīya movement, -in which Abū ʿUbayda was a prominent -figure<a name="FNanchor_18" id="FNanchor_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a>.</p> - -<p>7. In the later period, there appears also the fragments -of a tradition of which Nasr b. Sayyār is -the hero.</p> - -</div> - -<p>Some, if not all, of these traditions developed in some -detail, and where they are not balanced by other versions -they present a distorted narrative of events, verging in -some cases on the fictitious. The most noteworthy -examples of this are the Khātūn legend (see below <a href="#Page_18">p. 18</a>) -and the typical story of the exploits of Mūsā b. Khāzim -in Transoxania in a style not unworthy of Bedouin -romance<a name="FNanchor_19" id="FNanchor_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a>. It is therefore most important to disentangle -these variant traditions and assign its proper -value to each. The Bāhilite accounts of Qutayba’s -conquests, for instance, contain wild exaggerations of -fact, which, nevertheless, have sometimes been utilised -in all seriousness by modern historians, amongst other -purposes to establish synchronisms with the Turkish -inscriptions<a name="FNanchor_20" id="FNanchor_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a>.</p> - -<p>With these precautions, it is possible to follow up and -reconstruct, with comparative certainty and completeness,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[14]</a></span> -that progress of the Arab arms in Central Asia whose -vicissitudes are outlined in the following pages.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Notes</span><br /> -(Full Titles in Bibliography)</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1" id="Footnote_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Franke, Beiträge 41 ff., 67. Cordier, Chine I, 225.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2" id="Footnote_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> If Marquart’s identification (Ērānshahr, 201 f.) is correct.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3" id="Footnote_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Cordier I. 229: Ērānshahr 50 ff.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4" id="Footnote_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Yuan Chwang I. 103. Prof. Barthold suggests that the connection between -the Ephthalites and the Huns may have been political only, not racial.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5" id="Footnote_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Chavannes, Documents 155: Ērānshahr 89.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6" id="Footnote_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. I. 2885. 13 and 2886. 3: Yaʿqūbī, History, II, 193: Yāqūt (ed. -Wüstenfeld) I. 492: Balādhurī 403: Ērānshahr 65 f., 77 f., and 150. -Bādghīs was still a nomad pasture-ground in the XIVth century: Ibn -Ba<i>tt</i>ū<i>t</i>a, III, 67 f.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7" id="Footnote_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Yuan Chwang I. 105; II. 266; Chav. Doc. 161: Ērānshahr 250 ff.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8" id="Footnote_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Tomaschek, Soghdiana, 170.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9" id="Footnote_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> See Marquart, Chronologie, 71: Shiratori in Keleti Szemle III (1902) footnote -to pp. 122-3.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10" id="Footnote_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> Narshakhī 29. 4. On the Iranisation of nomadic elements, Blochet, -Introduction à l’Histoire des Mongols, (Leyden, 1910) p. 211 note; -Peisker, The Asiatic Background, pp. 353-6.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11" id="Footnote_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Chavannes, Notes 91, and <i>cf.</i> below <a href="#Page_80">p. 80</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12" id="Footnote_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> Barthold, in Zeitschrift für Assyriologie XXVI (1911) p. 262.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13" id="Footnote_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Yuan Chwang I, 75 n. 2, 102 ff: II 270: Chav. Doc. 200 f.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14" id="Footnote_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>E.g.</i> <i>T</i>ab. II, 1448, 7-10: <i>cf.</i> Ērānshahr 228.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15" id="Footnote_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> Yaʿqūbī, Geog. 287: <i>T</i>ab. II 1205. 12: Ērānshahr 66, 87 ff.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16" id="Footnote_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Chavannes, Doc. 201, Note 37.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17" id="Footnote_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> Narshakhī’s unreliability is even more marked in his account of the origins -of the Sāmānid dynasty: <i>cf.</i> Barthold, Turkestan 215 n. 3.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18" id="Footnote_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> See Goldziher, Muhammadanische Studien, I, 195 ff.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19" id="Footnote_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> Prof. Barthold has drawn my attention to the fact that the story of Mūsā -also includes (twice over) an episode from the popular legend of Zopyrus. -See his article in Zapiski XVII (1906) 0141, and Wellhausen, Arabische -Reich, 257, 265.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20" id="Footnote_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>E.g.</i> Marquart, Chronologie, p. 8.</p> - -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[15]</a></span></p> - -<h2 id="II_THE_EARLY_RAIDS">II. THE EARLY RAIDS</h2> - -<h3 class="left"><i>The Conquest of Lower <span class="antiqua">T</span>ukhāristān.</i></h3> - -<p>Arab legend relates that the Muslim forces, pursuing -Yazdigird from the field of Nihāwand in 21/642, had -already come in contact with the “Turks” of <i>T</i>ukhāristān -before the death of ʿOmar. But the final -destruction of the Sāsānid power and first imposition of -Arab rule on Khurāsān only followed ten years later, by -the troops of ʿAbdullah ibn ʿĀmir, ʿOthmān’s governor -in Ba<i>s</i>ra. The Ephthalites of Herāt and Bādghīs submitted -without a blow, and the first serious check to -their advance was met in the Murghāb valley, when al-A<i>h</i>naf -b. Qays with an army of 4,000 Arabs and 1,000 -Persians found himself opposed by the organised forces -of Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān and was compelled to retire on -Merv-Rūdh. A second expedition under al-Aqraʿ b. -<i>H</i>ābis, however, defeated a weaker force in Jūzjān, and -subsequently occupied Jūzjān, Fāryāb, <i>T</i>ālaqān, and -Balkh. Small divisions made plundering raids into the -neighbouring territories, <i>e.g.</i>, to Siminjān (a town within -the frontiers of <i>T</i>ukhāristān proper, governed by a -Turkish prince, the Ruʿb Khān), and to Khwārizm, not -always with success; on the other hand, a successful -raid was made on Māyamurgh in Sogdiana in 33/654, -which is mentioned by Abū ʿUbayda alone of the Arabic -authorities<a name="FNanchor_21" id="FNanchor_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a>. A general insurrection which broke -out shortly afterwards, headed by a certain Qārin, -apparently a member of the noble Persian family bearing -that name, seems to have been instrumental in causing -the Arabs to evacuate Khurāsān for a time<a name="FNanchor_22" id="FNanchor_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a>, though -several raids are recorded of ʿAlī’s governors between -35 and 38 <span class="smcapuc">A.H.</span> These earliest “conquests,” in fact, were -little more than plundering raids on a large scale, the -effect of that movement of expansion whose momentum -was carrying forward the Arabs irresistibly. According<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[16]</a></span> -to the Chinese records, which, however, require to be -used with caution at this point, the retreat of the Arabs -in 655 was followed up by the army of <i>T</i>ukhāristān who -reinstated Pērōz, the son of Yazdigird, as titular king of -Persia<a name="FNanchor_23" id="FNanchor_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a>.</p> - -<p>When peace was restored to Islām by the recognition -of Muʿāwiya in 41/661, Ibn ʿĀmir was again entrusted -with the conquest of Khurāsān. The same rough and -ready methods were adopted as before; there appears -to have been no definite plan of invasion, and even the -order of governors is uncertain. Not only are traditions -relating to <span class="smcapuc">A.H.</span> 32 and 42 confused by the different -authorities, but a vast amount of the whole is affected -by tribal legends. Hints of fierce resistance are given -from time to time. Qays b. al-Haytham, the governor’s -first legate, was faced with a fresh revolt in Bādghīs, -Herāt, and Balkh. He recaptured the latter and in retaliation -destroyed the famous shrine of Nawbahār, but -left the Ephthalites to be dealt with by his successor, -ʿAbdullah ibn Khāzim. It is clear that there was no -ordered progress of the Arab arms until Khurāsān was -brought under the administration of Ziyād b. Abīhi. -After an experimental division of the province under -tribal leaders, a policy obviously dangerous and quickly -abandoned, Ziyād, realising the danger of allowing -Persian nationalism a free hand in the East, backed up -by the resources of <i>T</i>ukhāristān, centralised the administration -at Merv, and organised a preventive campaign. -In 47/667 his lieutenant, al-<i>H</i>akam b. ʿAmr al-Ghifārī, -opened a series of campaigns directed to the conquest -of Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān and Gharjistān, in the course of -which he crossed the Oxus and carried his arms into -Chaghāniān, and drove Pērōz back to China in discomfiture. -On his death, three years later, the conquered -provinces rose in revolt, but the new governor, Rabīʿ -b. Ziyād al-<i>H</i>ārithī, the first conqueror of Sijistān, -after reducing Balkh, pursued the Ephthalite army into -Quhistān and dispersed it with great slaughter. Again<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[17]</a></span> -an expedition was sent across the Oxus into Chaghāniān -(clearly indicating the connection between Chaghāniān -and Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān), while another directed down the -left bank of the river secured Zamm and Āmul, the two -chief ferry points for Sogdiana. Mention is also made of -a conquest of Khwārizm. All these expeditions seem -to point to a methodical plan of conquest, arranged -between Ziyād and his governors; the Arab power was -thus firmly established, for the moment at least, in the -Cisoxanian lands, and the way prepared for the invasion -of Sogdiana. A further important step was the colonisation -of Khurāsān by fifty thousand families from Ba<i>s</i>ra -and Kūfa<a name="FNanchor_24" id="FNanchor_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a>, settled according to Arab practice in five -garrison towns, for the double purpose of securing the -conquests already made, and providing the forces for their -further extension.</p> - -<h3 class="left"><i>The First Invasion of Bukhārā and <span class="antiqua">S</span>ughd.</i></h3> - -<p>Although at this junction Ziyād himself died, his -policy was carried on by his sons, in particular by -ʿUbaydullah. Scarcely any governor, not even <i>H</i>ajjāj, -has suffered so much at the hands of the traditionists as -the “Murderer of <i>H</i>usayn,” though his ability and -devotion to the Umayyads are beyond question. It is not -surprising therefore that his earlier military successes -should be so briefly related, in spite of their importance. -Yet as he was no more than 25 years of age when -appointed by Muʿāwiya to the province of Khurāsān on -probation, and only two years later was selected to fill -his father’s position in ʿIrāq, his administration must have -been markedly successful. The policy of Ziyād had now -firmly secured Khurāsān and made it feasible to use it as -a base for the extension of the conquests into the rich -lands across the river. On his arrival at Merv, therefore, -in the autumn of 53/673, the new governor began preparations -for an invasion of Bukhārā.</p> - -<p>The Shao-wu principality of Bukhārā was at this time -second in importance only to Samarqand. It included<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[18]</a></span> -not only the greater part of the oasis (“al-Bukhārīya”) -then much more thickly populated than now, but also the -great emporium of Paykand, which controlled the trade -route across the Oxus at Āmul. Of its early history we -have two accounts, both confused, inaccurate in detail, -and often conflicting. From these it may be gathered -that the prince, who held the high Turkish title of Shād<a name="FNanchor_25" id="FNanchor_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a>, -resided at Paykand, the citadel of Bukhārā being either -founded or restored by the Bukhār Khudāh Bidūn, probably -in consequence of the Arab invasions. This prince at his -death left a son only a few months old on whose behalf -the regency was exercised by the Queen-Mother. This -princess, known under the title of Khātūn (a Turkish -form of the Sogdian word for “lady”) became the central -figure in the local traditions, which represent the Arab -invasions as occurring precisely during the period of her -regency. This version is the one accepted by Balādhurī, -Yaʿqūbī, and Narshakhī, but though not altogether -devoid of historical value, it is certainly misplaced, and -the true account of the early conquests must, for cogent -reasons, be sought in the brief and widely divergent -narratives of <i>T</i>abarī. In the first place the Khātūn-legend, -like all such legends, has grown by natural -elaboration of detail, as in the account given by Narshakhī -of Khātūn’s administration of justice and by continual -accretions from other streams of tradition, as seen, on -comparing the narratives of Balādhurī and Narshakhī, -in the introduction of episodes of Ibn Khāzim and Muhallab. -Critical examination also reveals alternative -traditions and chronological inconsistencies, as, for -example, the birth of <i>T</i>ughshāda after the invasion of -Saʿīd b. ʿOthmān, Khātūn’s reign of 15 years, and others -mentioned below. There is clear evidence of the late -compilation of the tradition in the frequent references to -“<i>T</i>arkhūn, King of <i>S</i>ughd,” though his reign did not begin -until considerably after 696<a name="FNanchor_26" id="FNanchor_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a>. It may be noticed that -in the variant account of the conquests prefixed to the -Persian edition of Narshakhī and ascribed to An-Naysābūrī<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[19]</a></span> -there is no reference at all to Khātūn. Moreover -there are indications that <i>T</i>abarī was aware of the -local tradition and completely rejected it; this, at least, -would account for the unusual practice of specifying -Qabaj-Khātūn as “the wife of the king” in 54 <span class="smcapuc">A.H.</span> -Even Balādhurī rejects the more fantastic developments -of the legend. <i>T</i>abarī’s narratives, however, require to -be collated with the additional material in Balādhurī, -who has not relied entirely on the local tradition. The germ -of the native version is probably to be found in a confusion -of the Arab conquests with the later war between -Bukhārā and Wardāna<a name="FNanchor_27" id="FNanchor_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a>, whose echoes are heard in -Qutayba’s invasions thirty years after.</p> - -<p>In the spring of 54/674 ʿUbaydullah b. Ziyād crossed -the river and marched directly on Paykand. After a -partial success, he led his forces forward towards Bukhārā -and severely defeated the army of the Bukhār Khudāh. -From <i>T</i>abarī’s narrative, which relates only that two -thousand men of Bukhārā, skilful archers, were taken by -ʿUbaydullah to Ba<i>s</i>ra, where they formed his personal -guard, it is left to be inferred that a treaty was concluded -under which the Bukhār Khudāh became tributary. The -local tradition magnifies the expedition by adding a siege -of Bukhārā (during the winter) and bringing in an army -of Turks to assist Khātūn, but confirms the success of -the Arabs. ʿUbaydullah’s practice on this occasion of -forming a bodyguard or retinue of captives appears to -have been a common one. ʿAbdur-Ra<i>h</i>mān ibn Samura -had previously brought captives from Sijistān to Ba<i>s</i>ra, -where they built him a mosque, and later governors of -Khurāsān continued the practice, as will be seen. In -this may be recognised perhaps the germ of the Turkish -guards recruited by the later ʿAbbāsid Caliphs.</p> - -<p>ʿUbaydullah’s successor, Aslam b. Zurʿa, remained -inactive, but in 56/676 Saʿīd b. ʿOthmān, who had obtained -the governorship of Khurāsān by importuning -Muʿāwiya, carried the Arab arms more deeply into Transoxania, -defeated the <i>S</i>ughdians in the open field and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[20]</a></span> -reduced their city. Taking fifty young nobles as hostages, -he retired from <i>S</i>ughd and subsequently occupied -Tirmidh, an important fortress on the Oxus controlling -the main North and South trade route, having presumably -marched through the Iron Gate. The conquest -of <i>S</i>ughd was thus definitely co-ordinated with that of -Chaghāniān. <i>T</i>abarī’s narrative is strangely vague and -abrupt; it contains no mention of Bukhārā nor any -definite reference to Samarqand, except for the statement -that it was the objective of Saʿīd’s expedition. Using -this narrative alone, one would be inclined to suspect -that the city captured by Saʿīd was not Samarqand but -Kish (since it has been established by Marquart that -Kish was formerly called <i>S</i>ughd), and that the reference -to Samarqand was due to a later misunderstanding of -the name<a name="FNanchor_28" id="FNanchor_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a>. On the other hand, both the local -tradition and Abū ʿUbayda speak of a siege of Samarqand -by Saʿīd, though their narratives are far from being in -agreement in detail, and there are other indications of -confusion between Saʿīd and Salm b. Ziyād. All accounts -except Narshakhī’s, however, agree that the hostages -who were carried by Saʿīd to Madīna and there murdered -him were <i>S</i>ughdians<a name="FNanchor_29" id="FNanchor_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a>. Balādhurī’s tradition of Saʿīd’s -expedition is as follows. On his crossing the river, -Khātūn at first renewed her allegiance, only to withdraw -it again on the approach of an army of Turks, <i>S</i>ughdians, -and men of Kish and Nasaf, 120,000 strong. Saʿīd, -however, completely defeated the enemy and after a -triumphal entry into Bukhārā, marched on Samarqand, -his forces swelled by Khātūn’s army, besieged it for three -days and made it tributary. On his return he captured -Tirmidh and while there received the tribute due from -Khātūn and the allegiance of Khuttal. Narshakhī’s -account is the same in essentials, adding only a number of -imaginative details.</p> - -<p>Saʿīd was unable to retain his position in Khurāsān, -and for five years the conquests were stayed (except for -summer raids) under the indolent Aslam b. Zurʿa and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[21]</a></span> -avaricious ʿAbdur-Ra<i>h</i>mān b. Ziyād. In 61/680-681 -Yazīd I appointed Salm, another son of Ziyād, to -Khurāsān and Sijistān. Eager to emulate his brother, -Salm, even before leaving Ba<i>s</i>ra, announced his intention -of renewing the expeditions into Transoxania and enlisted -a picked force on the spot, including such tried leaders as -Muhallab b. Abī <i>S</i>ufra and ʿAbdullah b. Khāzim. From a -poem preserved in the <i>H</i>amāsa of Abū Tammām<a name="FNanchor_30" id="FNanchor_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> -it would appear that somewhat unwilling levies for this -expedition were raised even in Mesopotamia. Towards -the close of the winter a surprise attack was made on -Khwārizm, with some success. <i>T</i>abarī gives two versions -of this expedition, the first of which is a highly embroidered -one from the Muhallabite tradition. During the -same year, Salm marched into <i>S</i>ughd and occupied -Samarqand, where he appears to have made his headquarters -over the winter. Balādhurī mentions a subsidiary -raid on Khujanda under Aʿshā Hamdān, in which, -however, the Muslims were defeated, and a <i>S</i>ughdian -revolt which was crushed with the loss of its leader, here -called Bandūn. The name is almost certainly to be read -as that of the Bukhār-Khudāh, Bīdūn<a name="FNanchor_31" id="FNanchor_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a>, and in view -of the silence of <i>T</i>abarī raises rather a difficult problem. -It may be conjectured that what Balādhurī intended was -a revolt of the Bukhariots, combined with <i>S</i>ughdian -forces. The origin of this statement may perhaps be -sought for in the Bukhārā tradition, which Balādhurī -does not follow in his general account of the expeditions -of Salm, but which he may have tried to work in with the -other. On the other hand he nowhere refers to Bīdūn -as the Bukhār Khudāh. As related by Narshakhī and -Yaʿqūbī Salm’s expedition is directed solely against -Bukhārā. Khātūn, on promising her hand to <i>T</i>arkhūn, -receives a reinforcement of 120,000 men from <i>S</i>ughd, and -Bīdūn (here still alive) recruits an army in “Turkistān,” -including the “Prince of Khotan.” After severe fighting, -the Muslim forces, numbering 6,000, kill Bīdūn and rout -the unbelievers, taking so much booty that the share of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[22]</a></span> -each horseman amounts to 2,400 dirhems. Khātūn, -thoroughly humbled by this decisive proof of Arab -invincibility, sues for peace and pays a heavy tribute. -Beyond the fantastic exaggerations and incoherencies of -the legend, there is nothing inherently improbable in a -Bukhariot revolt. In support of this view, it may be -remarked that the death of Bīdūn at this point would -agree with the slender data we have for the internal wars -which probably formed the original basis of the Khātūn-legend, -and would also provide a foothold for the later -developments of the tradition. Without fuller evidence, -however, we can get no further than reasonable -conjecture.</p> - -<p>After the conquests made by Salm, which probably -occupied the years 682 and 683, it seemed as though the -Arabs were on the verge of imposing their rule on -Transoxania when civil war broke out in the heart of the -Empire. Even allowing for the fact that these expeditions -were little more than raids, the comparative ease -with which the Arabs held to ransom the richest cities -in the country is astonishing. The explanation can lie -only in their mutual exclusiveness. There is not a hint -of united action in the field in <i>T</i>abarī’s accounts<a name="FNanchor_32" id="FNanchor_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a>. -A factor which may have exercised some influence was -that Sogdiana was completely isolated during these years -and unable to look for support from without. The -power of the Western Turks was broken by the Chinese -armies between 645 and 658; Chinese forces are said to -have reached as far west as Kish, and the Emperor Kao-Tsung -had officially annexed all the territories formerly -included in the Turkish dominions. In the latter year -the provinces of Sogdiana and the Jaxartes were organized -in sixteen districts, including a “Government of Persia” -under the Pērōz already mentioned, situated apparently -in Sijistān, possibly even in Eastern Khurāsān<a name="FNanchor_33" id="FNanchor_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a>. -The immediate practical effect of this change of status -was of little moment, but her nominal annexation gave -China a prestige which was destined to exercise immense<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[23]</a></span> -influence in determining the attitude of the peoples of -Sogdiana to the Arabs. From 670 to 692, however, the -new power of Tibet held the Chinese armies in check in -the Tarim basin and cut off all possibility of Chinese -intervention in the West. The Sogdian princes were -thus thrown on their own resources, and, ignorant as -yet of the danger behind the Arab raids, they seem to have -bowed to the storm. It must not be forgotten that the -cities had never before met such an enemy as the Arabs. -They had been accustomed to plundering raids by Turks, -who disappeared as quickly as they came, and who, -disliking to undertake a lengthy siege, were easily -appeased by a ransom. Familiar with such nominal -annexations, they would naturally adopt the same tactics -against the new invaders. Had the Arabs maintained -their pressure, there was thus every prospect that Transoxania -would have been colonised with a tithe of the -expense and loss incurred in its reconquest and would -have become as integral a part of the Muslim dominions -as Khurāsān. But the opportunity was lost in the -fratricidal struggles of the factions, and when the Arabs -recommenced their encroachments, the determined -resistance offered to their advance showed that the lessons -of the first invasion had not been lost on the native -princes.</p> - -<h3 class="left"><i>The Withdrawal of the Arabs.</i></h3> - -<p>The tribal feuds which occupied the Arabs of Khurāsān -left the princes of Transoxania free to regain their independence. -It would seem even that Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān -was not only in part lost to the Arabs but that local -forces took the offensive and raided Khurāsān. On the -gradual restoration of order under Umayya, however, -Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān again recognised, at least in name, -the Arab suzerainty<a name="FNanchor_34" id="FNanchor_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a>. Meanwhile, a strange episode -had occurred in Chaghāniān. Mūsā, the son of ʿAbdullah -ibn Khāzim, sent by his father to secure a safe place of -retreat, had captured the strong fortress of Tirmidh,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[24]</a></span> -from which he continually raided the neighbouring -districts. His exploits were worked up in popular story -into an epic of adventure, in which legend has almost -overlaid historical fact. The most fantastic exaggerations -were devised in order to provide a suitable background -for the incredible deeds of valour indulged in -by the hero. But in truth his actual exploits were -sufficiently amazing, and all the efforts of the forces of -the local rulers (magnified in the legend to huge armies of -“Turks and Hay<i>t</i>al and Tibetans”), although aided -on one occasion by a force of Khuzāʿites, were unable to -dislodge him. For fifteen years he remained in secure -possession of his stronghold, a refuge for the disaffected -from all sides, and a standing example of the helplessness -of the rulers across the river.</p> - -<p>In 77/696 Umayya re-opened the campaigns into -Transoxania. An expedition to Khwārizm was successful<a name="FNanchor_35" id="FNanchor_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a>, -another across the Oxus narrowly escaped destruction. -Balādhurī mentions, with doubtful accuracy, a -successful raid on Khuttal, which may, however, only be a -variant on this. An expedition directed against Bukhārā, -which is said to have had Tirmidh as a second objective, -was hurriedly abandoned on the fresh outbreak of revolt -under Bukayr b. Wishā<i>h</i> in Khurāsān. Though the -revolt failed in its immediate object, a most serious -situation had been created. Bukayr had endeavoured -to rally the Persians to his side by promising all converts -remission of Kharāj. The opportunity was undoubtedly -seized by large numbers, and the pacification occasioned -some negotiations between Umayya and Thābit b. Qu<i>t</i>ba, -an influential noble who acted as spokesman for the -mawālī of Eastern Khurāsān. Umayya’s reimposition of -Kharāj, however, caused widespread unrest<a name="FNanchor_36" id="FNanchor_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> and made -prompt action necessary. ʿAbdul-Malik at once recalled -his hapless kinsman (in 78) and made Khurāsān a dependency -of ʿIrāq under the government of <i>H</i>ajjāj. This -far-sighted governor had already dealt with a desperate -situation of the same sort in ʿIrāq and reduced it to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[25]</a></span> -outward tranquillity. The same extreme measures that -had been adopted there were not necessary in Khurāsān; -its troubles were due less to insurgent mawālī than to the -factions of Qays. <i>H</i>ajjāj was himself a strong Qaysite, -but he was not the man to put party before the interests -of the State. The first necessity was to appoint a -governor who could be trusted to repress both forms of -anarchy and in Muhallab such a man was available. His -tribe of Azd was not yet strong enough in Khurāsān to -cause the risk of opening a new channel for factional -strife, and his military reputation fitted him for carrying -out <i>H</i>ajjāj’s policy of active campaigning as an antidote -to internal dissension. It is possible that <i>H</i>ajjāj had in -mind from the first a definite conquest of Transoxania, -but for a few years nothing more than sporadic raids took -place.</p> - -<p>Muhallab’s first care, however, was to encourage the -settlement of Azd in Khurāsān, until he was supported -by a division equal in size to any other. After securing -the crossing at Zamm in 80/699 he marched into the -district of Kish and there established his headquarters -for two years, besieging the city and sending out minor -expeditions under his sons in various directions<a name="FNanchor_37" id="FNanchor_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a>. -Yazīd was sent with a force into Khuttal, nominally to -co-operate with a pretender to the throne, but met with -little success; <i>H</i>abīb, sent against Rabinjān, found himself -countered by the forces of Bukhārā. Balādhurī’s -account of Muhallab’s campaigns is ludicrously exaggerated; -<i>T</i>abarī quotes Muhallab himself as discouraging -any attempts at effecting a conquest. On the death of -his son al-Mughīra in Rajab 82, he came to terms with -Kish and abandoned his expeditions, but died in the -following Dhuʾl-<i>H</i>ijja (Jan. 702) near Merv Rūdh, and -was succeeded by his son Yazīd.</p> - -<p>The Muhallabite tradition which represents the -appointment as distasteful to <i>H</i>ajjāj but popular in -Khurāsān is almost certainly influenced by the later -hostility between Yazīd and <i>H</i>ajjāj. It is probable,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[26]</a></span> -however, that <i>H</i>ajjāj, whose policy was to keep his -governors dependent on himself, viewed with suspicion -the concentration of authority in the hands of the leader -of a powerful hostile clan, but he was content to wait for -the meantime and give Yazīd sufficient rope to hang himself. -Except for an attempted raid on Khwārizm -Yazīd carried out no expeditions, while under his government -the precarious internal balance of Khurāsān was -soon upset. The quarrels of Qays had been composed by -Muhallab, but they were in no mood to bear with the -leadership of the parvenu Azd; already before the -death of Muhallab, in spite of the Tamīmite eulogy -quoted by <i>T</i>abarī, there was a moment when the feud -threatened to break out. The pronounced factional -leanings of Yazīd strained the situation still further. -Even more serious was the attitude of the mawālī. -<i>H</i>urayth, the brother of Thābit ibn Qu<i>t</i>ba, had been left -behind at Kish by Muhallab to collect the tribute, but on -his return was scourged for disobedience. The disgrace -cut <i>H</i>urayth deeply; too late Muhallab realised the -gravity of his act, but <i>H</i>urayth spurned his overtures -and with Thābit fled to Mūsā at Tirmidh. Yazīd retaliated -with foolish severity by maltreating their families, -which only inflamed the general resentment. <i>H</i>urayth -and Thābit used their influence to stir up an insurrection -to act in concert with Mūsā; the king of Chaghāniān -and his Ephthalite confederates headed by Nēzak, prince -of Bādghīs, readily responded, while Persian interest was -excited by the return to <i>T</i>ukhāristān of the son of Pērōz, -the heir of the Sāsānids. It seems probable that even some -of Qays were a party to the scheme<a name="FNanchor_38" id="FNanchor_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a>. Seizing an -opportunity when Yazīd was occupied with the rebel -forces of Ibn al-Ashath on the borders of Khurāsān the -revolt broke out. Yazīd was powerless to prevent the -expulsion of his residents from Chaghāniān and Lower -<i>T</i>ukhāristān, and Mūsā is said to have refrained from -invading Khurāsān only from fear that it would fall into -the hands of Thābit and <i>H</i>urayth. Even the success<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[27]</a></span> -claimed for Yazīd in Bādghīs can have been of little effect<a name="FNanchor_39" id="FNanchor_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a>. -Fortunately for the Arabs, Mūsā’s jealousy of -Thābit and <i>H</i>urayth caused a division in the ranks of -their enemies, but though the brothers both fell in battle, -the danger remained acute. The son of Pērōz still -lingered in <i>T</i>ukhāristān, and even at Damascus there -was some uneasiness about the situation in Khurāsān<a name="FNanchor_40" id="FNanchor_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a>.</p> - -<p>To <i>H</i>ajjāj it was obvious that the first essential was -to reunite the Arabs and that so long as Yazīd was in -power that was impossible. The only difficulty was to -find a governor acceptable to Qays and to substitute him -without risking a revolt of Azd. It was solved with -admirable ingenuity. By ordering Yazīd to transfer -his authority to his weaker brother Mufa<i>dd</i>al, <i>H</i>ajjāj -at one stroke removed the man from whom he had most -to fear and prevented him from uniting Azd in opposition, -although Yazīd realised that the fall of his house was -imminent. At the same time the Caliph’s permission -was sought for the nomination of Qutayba ibn Muslim -as governor of Khurāsān. Belonging to the neutral tribe -of Bāhila, Qutayba was reckoned as allied to Qays, -but might be trusted to hold the scales evenly between -the factions; he had already distinguished himself in -ʿIrāq and in his governorship of Rayy, and was the more -devoted to <i>H</i>ajjāj in that he was protected by no strong -party of his own. The accepted belief that <i>H</i>ajjāj took -no steps to remove the family of Muhallab until Mūsā was -put out of the way is based on a remark attributed to -Muhallab in the Mūsā-legend, which is frequently contradicted -elsewhere both expressly and by implication.</p> - -<p>Mufa<i>dd</i>al, during his nine months of office in 85/704, -seems to have endeavoured to impress <i>H</i>ajjāj by a show -of military activity against the rebels in Bādghīs. At the -same time, acting in concert with the local princes -(magnified in the legend to “<i>T</i>arkhūn and as-Sabal”), -he sent an expedition to Tirmidh under ʿOthmān b. -Ma<i>s</i>ʿūd. Mūsā was cut off and killed in a sortie and his -nephew Sulaymān surrendered at discretion, <i>H</i>ajjāj’s<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[28]</a></span> -first exclamation on hearing the news is said to have been -one of anger at the insult to Qays, but the last hindrance -to the appointment of the new governor was now removed -and towards the close of the year Qutayba b. Muslim -arrived in Merv.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Notes</span></h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21" id="Footnote_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> Bal. 408. 5: Chav., Doc. 172, n. 1. There were two localities called Māyamurgh -in <i>S</i>ughd: one near Samarqand (I<i>st</i>akhrī 321. 6), and the other one -day’s march from Nasaf on the Bukhārā road (ibid. 337. 7). According -to the Chinese records the former is the one in question here.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22" id="Footnote_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> Yāqūt, ed. Wüstenfeld, II. 411. 21: <i>cf.</i> Caetani, “Annali” VIII. 4 ff. On -Qārin, Nöldeke, Sasaniden 127, 437: Marquart, Ērānshahr 134.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23" id="Footnote_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> Chav., Doc. 172.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24" id="Footnote_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> Lammens, “Ziād b. Abīhi” (R.S.O. 1912) p. 664.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25" id="Footnote_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> with <i>T</i>ughshāda the name of the reigning prince in 658, Chav., Doc. 137.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26" id="Footnote_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> Chav., Doc. 136.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27" id="Footnote_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> Narshakhī 8 and 30.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28" id="Footnote_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> Chronologie 57: Ērānshahr 303 f. This view is supported also by the letter -from the king of Samarqand to the Emperor of China in 718 (see p. 60), -which puts the first Arab conquest some 35 years before, <i>i.e.</i> in 682 or 683.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29" id="Footnote_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> Accounts also in Kitāb al-Aghānī I. 18: Ibn Qutayba 101.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30" id="Footnote_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> <i>H</i>amāsa, ed. Freytag, I. 363-4.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31" id="Footnote_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> Barthold, “Turkestan” 103 n. 1.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32" id="Footnote_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> The account given in <i>T</i>ab. II. 394 of the annual meeting of the “Kings of -Khurāsān” near Khwārizm for mutual counsel not only possesses little -intrinsic probability, but is obviously intended to magnify the exploits -of Muhallab. In this case, fortunately, the authorities quoted by <i>T</i>ab. -leave no doubt as to the Azdite origin of the narrative. Madāʾinī’s -version is given <i>ib.</i> ll. 19 sq.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33" id="Footnote_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> Wieger, Textes Historiques, 1608 f: Chav., Doc. 273 ff: Marquart, Ēran. 68.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34" id="Footnote_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. II. 490, 860 ff.: Bal. 414 f.: I. Athīr, IV. 66: Anon. (ed. Ahlwardt), 195.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35" id="Footnote_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> Abū ʿUbayda ap. Bal. 426. 10: <i>cf.</i> Lestrange, “Lands of the Eastern Caliphate” -p. 448, note.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36" id="Footnote_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. 1031: <i>cf.</i> Anon. 310 f.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37" id="Footnote_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. 1040 f., 1078. 5: Yaʿqūbī, Hist. II. 330.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38" id="Footnote_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> <i>T</i>ab. 1152 with 1185. 5. For the son of Pērōz, Chav., Doc. 172.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39" id="Footnote_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> <i>T</i>ab. 1129 with 1144 and 1184.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40" id="Footnote_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> Anon. 337.</p> - -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[29]</a></span></p> - -<h2 id="III_THE_CONQUESTS_OF_QUTAYBA">III. THE CONQUESTS OF QUTAYBA</h2> - -<p>The achievements of the Muslim armies in Central Asia -during the reign of Walīd I were due in the first place to -the complete co-operation between the directive genius of -<i>H</i>ajjāj and the military capacity of Qutayba. Qutayba’s -strategic abilities have been somewhat overrated, though -the Arabic texts are at no pains to conceal the fact that -his gifts fell something short of genius. On more than -one occasion we are shown in what constant touch the -viceroy was kept with the progress of his armies, and how -large a part he took in drawing up the plan of campaign, -though the credit of carrying it through to a successful -issue rightly belongs to Qutayba. <i>H</i>ajjāj seems to have -had the fullest confidence in his lieutenant, and if he did -not hesitate to utter reproof and warning when occasion -required, he was equally quick to express appreciation of -Qutayba’s success. The Arabs of all parties soon realised -that behind their general lay the authority of <i>H</i>ajjāj, the -wholesome respect inspired by whom prevented any open -breach during his lifetime. The second factor which -materially assisted the conquests was that in their prosecution -Qutayba united all parties in Khurāsān, Persians -and Arabs, Qays and Yemen. It was no small matter to -keep their enthusiasm unabated in the face of campaigns -so protracted and severe, nor can the enthusiasm be -explained only by the attraction of a rich booty. It is -by no means improbable that Qutayba’s success was -really due more to his talent for administration than to his -generalship. He seems to have realised, as no other -Arab governor in the east had yet done, that in such a -province as Khurāsān the safety and security of the -Arab government must depend in the long run on the co-operation -of the Persian populace, who formed so great -a majority in the country. The bitterness of factional<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[30]</a></span> -strife had shown how unsafe it was to rely on the support -of the Arabs alone, especially in the face of such a movement -as Yazīd had provoked. By his conciliatory -attitude, therefore, Qutayba earned the confidence of the -Persians and repaid it with confidence; from his constant -employment of Persian agents and his growing preference -for Persian governors, it would seem even that he -came to regard them as forming the “ʿAshīra” he lacked -among the Arabs. Although it earned him the ill-will -of the Arabs and played a great part in his fall, it may be -that in this he was instrumental in giving the first impulse -to the recovery of a national sentiment amongst the -Persians of Khurāsān.</p> - -<p>The situation in Central Asia was also favourable for -a renewal of the attempt to annex to the Arab dominions -the rich lands of Transoxania, though it is doubtful how -much information the Arabs possessed on this point. -In 682, while China, weakened internally by the intrigues -of the Empress Wu, had her hands tied by the wars with -Tibet, the Eastern or Northern Turks had re-asserted -their independence. The new Empire never regained -its authority over all the western territories of the former -Khans, but by constant campaigns had extended its rule -over the Ten Tribes of the Ili and Chu, who, we are -told, were “almost annihilated.” In 701 the Eastern -Turks invaded Sogdiana, but there is no reason to assume, -though it has frequently been suggested, that Muhallab’s -forces at Kish were affected by this raid. As the necessity -of securing hostages for the safety even of the lines of -communication shows, the hostility of the local forces is -sufficient to explain all the encounters narrated. The -devastation and loss that invariably accompanied these -raids must have still further weakened the resources of -the subject princes, to whom there was small consolation -in the appointment of a son of the Khan to command the -Ten Tribes. In any case the unceasing warfare which -the Eastern Turks had to wage against the Türgesh -from 699 to 711 effectually prevented them from sending<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[31]</a></span> -assistance in response to any appeals for support which -may have reached them from Sogdiana<a name="FNanchor_41" id="FNanchor_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a>. Equally if -not more impossible was it for the Türgesh to intervene -in Sogdiana during the same period<a name="FNanchor_42" id="FNanchor_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a>. By the “Turks,” -as we have seen, the Arab historians mean as a general -rule the local inhabitants, amongst whom there may -quite possibly have been included at that time Turkish -elements. Occasional references to the Khāqān (unless -they may be taken to refer to local chiefs, which is -improbable) are obvious <i>fakhr</i>-developments. The -narrative of 98 <span class="smcapuc">A.H.</span> on which the theory of Türgesh -intervention is mainly based, is a pure Bāhilite invention. -Finally, the experience of the Arabs in later years shows -us that, if the resistance of Sogdiana had been backed by -large forces of Turks, it would have been impossible for -Qutayba to achieve so large a measure of success.</p> - -<p>The conquests of Qutayba fall naturally into four -periods:</p> - -<div class="blockquote hanging"> - -<p>1. 86/705: The recovery of Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān;</p> - -<p>2. From 87/706 to 90/709: The conquest of -Bukhārā;</p> - -<p>3. From 91/710 to 93/712: Consolidation of the -Arab authority in the Oxus valley and its extension -into <i>S</i>ughd;</p> - -<p>4. From 94/713 to 96/715: Expeditions into the -Jaxartes provinces.</p> - -</div> - -<h3 class="left"><i>The recovery of Lower <span class="antiqua">T</span>ukhāristān.</i></h3> - -<p>The first task before Qutayba was to crush the -revolt of Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān. In the spring of 86/705 -the army was assembled and marched through Merv -Rūdh and <i>T</i>ālaqān on Balkh. According to one of -<i>T</i>abarī’s narratives the city was surrendered without a -blow. A second account, which, though not explicitly -given as Bāhilite, may be regarded as such, since it -centres on Qutayba’s brother and is intended to -establish a Bāhilite claim on the Barmakids, speaks of a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[32]</a></span> -revolt amongst some of the inhabitants. This may -perhaps be the more correct version, since we hear of -Balkh being in a ruinous condition four years later -(<i>T</i>ab. 1206. 1). The submission of Balkh was followed -by that of Tīsh, king of Chaghāniān, who had probably -cooperated with Mufa<i>dd</i>al in the attack on Tirmidh the -year before. His action was, it seems, inspired by a feud -with the king of Shūmān and Ākharūn, in the upper -valleys of the Surkhan and Penjab rivers, against whom -he hoped to use the Arab troops in return for his assistance -to them. Mufa<i>dd</i>al had actually projected an -expedition against Shūmān before his recall, and it was -now carried out by Qutayba, who was perhaps the more -ready to undertake it since it assured the safety of the -southern approach to the Iron Gate. After the submission -of the King Ghīslashtān, who was of Turkish blood, -according to Yuan Chwang, Qutayba returned to Merv -alone, leaving the army to follow under his brother -Sāli<i>h</i>, who carried out a number of minor raids on the -way. It is obvious that, in spite of Balādhurī’s imaginative -account, these raids must be located in the districts -neighbouring on the Oxus. The readings in <i>T</i>abarī’s -narrative are, however, defective<a name="FNanchor_43" id="FNanchor_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a>. Having thus -isolated Nēzak in Bādghīs, the heart of the revolt, -Qutayba spent the winter months in negotiating with -him through Sulaym “the Counsellor,” an influential -Persian whose skill in conducting the most difficult -negotiations proved more than once of the utmost -value to Qutayba. Nēzak was persuaded to surrender -and was conducted to Merv, where peace was concluded -on condition that Qutayba would not enter Bādghīs -in person. As a precautionary measure however the -governor arranged that Nēzak should accompany him -in all his expeditions. Thus for the moment at least, the -danger of an outbreak in Khurāsān was averted, in a -manner honourable to both parties, and the son of Pērōz -took his way back to China to await a more favourable -opportunity<a name="FNanchor_44" id="FNanchor_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a>.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[33]</a></span></p> - -<h3 class="left"><i>The Conquest of Bukhārā.</i></h3> - -<p>In the following year, Qutayba, first making sure of -the crossings at Āmul and Zamm, opened his campaigns -in Bukhārā with an attack on Paykand. From the -expressions of Narshakhī, on whose history of this period -we may place more reliance since his details as a rule -fit in with and supplement the other histories, it -can be gathered that the principality of Bukhārā was -weakened by civil war and invasion. During the minority -of <i>T</i>ughshāda and the regency of Khātūn, the ambitious -nobles had struggled between themselves for the chief -power; most of the territories, including Bukhārā itself, -had been seized by the prince of Wardāna and the remaining -districts seem to have been brought under the -rule of Khunuk Khudāh, a noble who assumed the title -of Bukhār Khudāh<a name="FNanchor_45" id="FNanchor_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a>. Paykand was thus more or less -isolated and, from Narshakhī’s account, seems to have -been left to its fate. The battle with the <i>S</i>ughdians -related in <i>T</i>abarī is an obvious anticipation from the -events of the following year. After a siege of some two -months the city came to terms with Qutayba, who left -it under a small garrison and, according to <i>T</i>abarī’s -version, began the return march to Merv. An émeute in -Paykand, however, brought him back at once. It seems -reasonable to assume that the citizens, imagining -Qutayba’s attack to have been no more than an isolated -raid, tried to expel the garrison as soon as he retired. -The details given in Narshakhī, that on Qutayba’s advance -towards Bukhārā a certain citizen, enraged by -the insulting conduct of the governor, Warqāʾ b. Nasr -al-Bāhili, attempted to murder him, are trivial and -unconvincing. Whatever the cause of the revolt may -have been, however, Qutayba took a terrible revenge. -In accordance with mediaeval practice the renegade city -was sacked, its fighting men put to death, and its women -and children enslaved. The booty taken from this, the -first of the great trading cities of Central Asia to be -forcibly captured by the Arabs, furnished inexhaustible<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[34]</a></span> -material for the exaggerated details of later tradition. -The most important part of the spoil was an arsenal of -weapons and armour, the excellence of which was such -that the “forging of <i>S</i>ughd” appears in contemporary -verse alongside the traditional “forging of David” for -superlative craftsmanship<a name="FNanchor_46" id="FNanchor_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a>. With the consent of -<i>H</i>ajjāj, these weapons were not included in the division -of the booty but used to re-equip the army. The statement -that there were only 350 suits of armour in the whole -army before this is, however, of Bāhilite provenance and -scarcely worthy of credence. The exemplary punishment -thus meted out by Qutayba to Paykand at the -beginning of his career was a stern warning to Nēzak and -the Sogdians. Those who accepted Arab dominion would -be humanely treated, but any attempt at rebellion would -be inexorably crushed. Nevertheless the sentence on -Paykand was somewhat mitigated in the sequel, as -Narshakhī adds that the captives were ransomed by the -merchants of Paykand on their return from the annual -trading expedition to China, and the city, after lying in -ruins for many years, was eventually rebuilt.</p> - -<p>The disaster at Paykand roused the princes and -merchants of Transoxania to the danger of neglecting the -invaders. The feud between Wardāna and Bukhārā -was patched up; round Wardān Khudāh, the central -figure and organiser of the struggle for independence, -gathered the forces of all the nearer principalities. Thus -when Qutayba, on renewing his expedition in 88/707, -had taken the outlying town of Tūmushkath (not Nūmushkath, -which was the earlier name of Bukhārā) and -Rāmīthana (or Rāmtīn), he found his communications -cut by the troops of Wardāna, Bukhārā, and <i>S</i>ughd. -It is not, perhaps, impossible that the prince of Farghāna -should have cooperated with the <i>S</i>ughdians, as stated in -Madāʾinī’s account. On the other hand the Arabic -narratives are far from explicit, and the <i>S</i>ughdians here -referred to are much more probably those of Kish than of -Samarqand, a suspicion which is confirmed by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[35]</a></span> -famous punning order of <i>H</i>ajjāj: “Crush Kish, destroy -Nasaf, and drive Wardān back.” Narshakhī and Yaʿqūbī -give an account of the negotiations between -<i>H</i>ayyān an-Naba<i>t</i>ī, representing Qutayba, and <i>T</i>arkhūn -king of <i>S</i>ughd, which is certainly to be put, with <i>T</i>abarī, -after the conquest of Bukhārā two years later. Throughout -all these campaigns there is manifest a tendency, -common to the early chronicles of all nations, to exaggerate -the numbers and composition of the opposing forces. -As usual the Bāhilite account carries this to the point of -absurdity by introducing a Türgesh force of no less than -200,000 men, an obvious anachronism, influenced by the -later Türgesh invasions. The connection is made clear -by the mention of Kūr Maghānūn, whom we find nearly -thirty years later (<i>T</i>ab. II. 1602. 2) as “one of the chiefs -of the Türgesh.” The true account would seem to be -that Qutayba did not attempt to fight a pitched battle, -but by dilatory tactics wearied out the allies and gave -time for their natural inclination towards disunion to -operate, then evaded them by a rapid march through the -Iron Gate and, except for a rearguard skirmish with the -enemy’s cavalry, got his army clear across the river at -Tirmidh. The appointment of ʿAbdur-Ra<i>h</i>mān ibn -Muslim to command the rearguard gives us the clue, as -it was to this brother that Qutayba regularly entrusted -all the most difficult commands. In the following year -Qutayba was still unable to make headway against the -united forces of Wardān Khudāh, Kish and Nasaf, and -after protracted fighting (in spite of the double victory -claimed by the Bāhilites) returned to Merv. For this -weakness he was severely reprimanded by <i>H</i>ajjāj, who, -with the aid of a map, drew up a plan of attack. The -invasion of 90/709 seems to have taken Wardān Khudāh -by surprise, as the Muslim army was able to advance at -once to the siege of Bukhārā. There is some ground for -the conjecture, however, that the death of Wardān -Khudāh had occurred in the interval and that Qutayba -was opposed only by the local forces<a name="FNanchor_47" id="FNanchor_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a>. This may also<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[36]</a></span> -explain the hesitation of the forces of Samarqand to intervene. -The battle before the walls of Bukhārā is described -by <i>T</i>abarī in a long Tamīmite tradition reminiscent -of the ancient “days,” but the actual capture of the city -is left to be inferred. This siege is transferred to -Wardāna by Vámbéry (<i>cf.</i> <i>Heart of Asia</i> p. 52) -probably on the authority of the Persian <i>T</i>abarī (Zotenberg -IV. 165), but Narshakhī, <i>T</i>abarī and all other -authorities quite definitely refer to Bukhārā. Abū -ʿUbayda’s tradition (Bal. 420) of capture by treachery is -at best a confusion with the capture of Samarqand. All -the details given in Narshakhī relative to Qutayba’s -organisation of Bukhārā do not refer to this year; most -probably the only immediate measures taken were the -imposition of a tribute of 200,000 dirhems and the occupation -of the citadel by an Arab garrison.</p> - -<p>A diplomatic success followed the victory at Bukhārā. -<i>T</i>arkhūn, king of Samarqand, opened negotiations with -Qutayba, who was represented by the commander of his -Persian corps, <i>H</i>ayyān an-Naba<i>t</i>ī, and terms were agreed -upon, probably on the basis of the old treaty made by -Salm ibn Ziyād. <i>T</i>arkhūn gave hostages for the payment -of tribute and Qutayba began the march back to Merv.</p> - -<h3 class="left"><i>Consolidation and Advance.</i></h3> - -<p>If the Arabs returned in the autumn of 90/709 elated -with their success, they were soon given fresh cause for -anxiety. Nēzak, finally realising that all hope of recovering -independence must be extinguished if Arab rule was -strengthened in Khurāsān, and perhaps putting down to -weakness Qutayba’s willingness to gain his ends if possible -by diplomacy, determined on a last effort to overthrow -Muslim sovereignty in Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān, at the moment -when it was least to be expected. Having obtained -permission to revisit his home, he left Qutayba at Āmul -and made for Balkh, but escaped to <i>T</i>ukhāristān in order -to avoid re-arrest. From here he corresponded with the -rulers of Balkh, Merv Rūdh, <i>T</i>ālaqān, Fāryāb, and Jūzjān,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[37]</a></span> -urging them to undertake a concerted rising in the -spring. The king of Chaghāniān seems to have refused -to countenance the conspiracy, but the weak Jabghu of -<i>T</i>ukhāristān was induced, possibly by force, to make -common cause with Nēzak, who hoped doubtless by this -means to unite all the subject princes in defence of their -suzerain.</p> - -<p>Qutayba’s army was already disbanded and the -winter was setting in. All that he could do was to despatch -the garrison at Merv, some 12,000 men, under -ʿAbdur-Ra<i>h</i>mān, with instructions to winter in Balkh, -where they could counter any immediate move by -Nēzak, and advance into <i>T</i>ukhāristān in the spring. -This resolute action made Qutayba master of the situation -and so intimidated the rebels that when, in the early -spring, the Arabs marched through the disaffected -districts, scarcely a blow was struck and the princes either -submitted or fled. The inhabitants were granted a -complete amnesty except at <i>T</i>alāqān, concerning which -the traditions are hopelessly confused. According to one -account, a band of robbers were there executed and -crucified, but it is possible that it was selected for special -severity because there alone the revolt had openly broken -out<a name="FNanchor_48" id="FNanchor_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a>. There was probably also some reorganization -of the administration of Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān, in the -direction of conferring fuller powers on the Arab governors -installed in each district, though the native princes continued -to exercise a nominal authority. From Balkh, -Qutayba marched forward and rejoined ʿAbdur-Ra<i>h</i>mān. -With the assistance of the lesser princes they -pursued and captured Nēzak, who was subsequently -executed on direct orders from <i>H</i>ajjāj, in violation of -Qutayba’s promise of pardon<a name="FNanchor_49" id="FNanchor_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a>. How little this action -was condemned by the prevailing spirit of the age, however, -is shown by the contemporary poems quoted by -<i>T</i>abarī, lauding the “defender of the precincts of Islam” -and comparing his action to the measures formerly -adopted against the Jewish tribes of Madīna. Yet even<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[38]</a></span> -at this time we find traces of the new spirit that was to -make itself more felt in later years, and hear voices raised, -like Thābit Qu<i>t</i>na’s, against the “treachery that calls -itself resolution.” <i>T</i>abarī inserts at this point the -narrative of the putting to death of the hostages of -Jūzjān, in retaliation for the murder of the Arab hostage -in Jūzjān, a much more excusable incident. Balādhurī -puts it at the beginning of Qutayba’s career, however, -as though it belonged to the first pacification of Lower -<i>T</i>ukhāristān, so that its position in <i>T</i>abarī may possibly -be due to its superficial similarity with the case of Nēzak. -The results of this expedition were of the greatest importance: -not only was Nēzak’s scheme crushed and Lower -<i>T</i>ukhāristān henceforth incorporated in the Arab Empire, -but also for the first time Arab authority was extended -over the Jabghu and his immediate vassals in the Oxus -basin. The former, exiled to Damascus, formed a valuable -hostage against any attempt to regain independence, -and it seems not improbable that the king of Chaghāniān -was made regent for the young Jabghu (see above, <a href="#Page_9">p. 9</a>), -ʿAbdur-Ra<i>h</i>mān was appointed governor of Balkh, in -order to supervise the administration of the new -province.</p> - -<p>Qutayba had hardly returned to Merv before he was -called to deal with yet another revolt. The king of -Shūmān, taking advantage of the difficulties of the Arabs, -or of their absence in the southern mountains, had re-asserted -his independence in spite of the conciliatory -offers of Sāli<i>h</i> ibn Muslim. The full weight of Qutayba’s -power was now employed to crush him. His stronghold -was attacked with siege artillery, the king himself killed -in a sortie and the garrison put to the sword. From this -point Shūmān and Ākharūn gradually drop out of the -Arabic narratives altogether. Qutayba then resumed his -march through the Iron Gate, reduced the districts of -Kish and Nasaf, and revisited Bukhārā. There seems -to have been continual friction between the Arab garrison -and the population<a name="FNanchor_50" id="FNanchor_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> and it was felt that a drastic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[39]</a></span> -re-organisation was necessary. <i>T</i>ughshāda, though still -a youth, was restored to the position of Bukhār-Khudāh, -and the leaders of the hostile party (more probably that -of Khunuk Khudāh than Wardān Khudāh) were put to -death. By this means, Qutayba no doubt hoped to -secure compliance and docility in the native administration. -<i>T</i>ughshāda had been raised to the throne by the -Arabs and it might be expected that he would side with -them in consequence. A more solid guarantee for the -permanence of the conquest, however, was the establishment -of a military colony in Bukhārā. Following the -precedent set in the colonization of Merv, Arabs were -lodged in the houses of the inhabitants, and it is said that -the latter were encouraged to attend the Friday prayer -and behave as Muslims by the distribution of a small -gratuity. The Kushan merchants left their homes and -property rather than comply with these orders and -founded a new city outside the walls, but it is evident that -the Islamization of the city was not yet so thorough as -the traditions assert<a name="FNanchor_51" id="FNanchor_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a>. The building of the Mosque -and the organization of the Friday services are dated by -Narshakhī in 94 <span class="smcapuc">A.H.</span>, which points to a further organization -of the city after the capture of Samarqand. The -organization of the new territories proceeded, in fact, -<i>pari passu</i> with the extension and consolidation of the -conquests. So long as the Arab authority was insecure -in Cisoxania, it was out of the question to establish -either military colonies or an elaborate administration -beyond the river. Consequently, it was only now that -the failure of Nēzak’s revolt had definitely secured the -Arab dominion in the former Ephthalite lands that it -was possible to take the decisive step of settling an Arab -garrison in Bukhārā. The regularity with which each -step followed the last suggests that it was done according -to a prearranged plan, or at least that some attention -had been devoted to the question of the administration -of the occupied territories in the event of the success of -the military operations.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[40]</a></span></p> - -<p>Qutayba’s reorganization was not confined to the -civil government, however, but extended to the army as -well. Hitherto the jealousy of the Arabs for their -exclusive rights as a warrior caste had strictly limited -the number of Persians in the armies, apart from the -clients and camp followers. Thus we are told (<i>T</i>ab. 1290. -20) that the armies of Khurāsān at this period were -composed as follows: from Ba<i>s</i>ra-Ahl al-ʿĀliya, 9,000; -Bakr, 7,000; Tamīm, 10,000; ʿAbd al Qays, 4,000; -Azd, 10,000: from Kūfa, 7,000: and alongside these -47,000 Arabs only 7,000 Mawālī, commanded by <i>H</i>ayyān-an-Naba<i>t</i>ī, -who is called variously a Daylamite and a -native of Khurāsān. Now, however, Qutayba imposed, -first on Bukhārā, and later on each successive conquest, -the obligation of providing an auxiliary corps of local -troops, amounting usually to some ten or twenty thousand -men, to serve with the Arab armies. It is possible, if -the story be true, that this was suggested by the precedent -set by Saʿīd b. ʿOthmān in the conquest of Samarqand, -but more probable that it represents an entirely new -departure in the East, though it had long been a practice -in other spheres of the Arab conquests.</p> - -<p>We are given no hint of the motives which led to the -adoption of the new system, though it would seem that -they must have been of some force. Possibly it was no -more than a desire to keep the native armies occupied -in the service of the Arabs rather than risk a revolt in -their rear. <i>H</i>ajjāj and Qutayba perhaps realised too -that the Arab forces by themselves, after taking four -years to reduce Bukhārā alone, were insufficient to ensure -success in the greater task of subduing Samarqand. -Under the new system—which recalls Pan-chʿao’s famous -aphorism “Use barbarians to attack barbarians”—each -conquest in turn made the next more easy. The -rapidity of Qutayba’s later conquests in contrast with -the early period is thus explained. It is just possible -that in this plan Qutayba had an ulterior motive as well: -the formation of a Persian army, trained on the same<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[41]</a></span> -lines as the Arab forces, but more devoted to the person -of the governor and able to take his part against the -Arabs. How very nearly this plan succeeded, even in -Qutayba’s own case, the sequel was to show.</p> - -<p>The practice of raising native levies, once started, -appears to have become general in Khurāsān. We have -no information as to when the local forces of Khurāsān -and Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān were incorporated in the army, -nor in what proportions, but we have frequent evidence -of their presence and increasing prestige in the wars of -the next forty years<a name="FNanchor_52" id="FNanchor_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a>. On the other hand, though -contingents from the towns of Sogdiana were used by -later governors if they were available, as in 106 and 112 -<span class="smcapuc">A.H.</span>, in view of the weaker hold of the Arabs on Transoxania -Sogdian troops never formed a regular division -of the Arab forces up to the end of the Umayyad period. -This distinction between the two subject Iranian groups -became, as will be seen, of some importance when the -ʿAbbāsid propaganda began to tamper with the loyalty -of the armies of Khurāsān.</p> - -<p>While Qutayba was occupied with the new organization -of Bukhārā, a detached force, sent under ʿAbdur-Ra<i>h</i>mān -from Kish to Samarqand to exact from <i>T</i>arkhūn -the tribute agreed upon in the previous year, successfully -accomplished its mission. ʿAbdur-Ra<i>h</i>mān, after -restoring the hostages to <i>T</i>arkhūn, rejoined his brother at -Bukhārā, whence they returned to Merv for the winter.</p> - -<p>One important vassal of <i>T</i>ukhāristān, who had long -been a thorn in the side of <i>H</i>ajjāj, still remained unsubdued. -This was Rutbīl or Zunbīl, the Turkish ruler of -Zābulistān<a name="FNanchor_53" id="FNanchor_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a>. In 91, the viceroy united Sijistān to -the province of Khurāsān, with instructions to Qutayba -to undertake a campaign in person against Rutbīl. In -the following year, therefore, the expeditions into Transoxania -were interrupted, and the army again marched -southwards. To Qutayba’s great relief (for he disliked -to undertake a campaign against this formidable foe -who had made Sijistān “an ill-omened frontier”)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[42]</a></span> -Rutbīl hastened to tender his submission, and at the same -time sent an embassy to convey his homage to the -Emperor of China<a name="FNanchor_54" id="FNanchor_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a>. Recognition of Arab suzerainty -over Zābulistān involved of course only the payment of -a fixed tribute, and no attempt was made at a permanent -occupation.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile a serious situation had arisen in <i>S</i>ughd. -The merchants and nobles of Samarqand had resented -the weakness of their king and the payment of tribute: -in Qutayba’s absence the party for resistance <i>à outrance</i> -gained the upper hand, and <i>T</i>arkhūn, deposed on the -ground of incapacity, committed suicide. The choice -of the electors fell on Ghūrak<a name="FNanchor_55" id="FNanchor_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a>, a prince of whom we -would gladly have known more. Under the ever increasing -difficulties with which he was confronted during his -twenty-seven years of rule, his consummate handling -of the most confused situations shows him to have been -at once statesman and patriot, and preserved his kingdom -from repeated disaster. The action of the <i>S</i>ughdian -nobles, however, the Arabic account of which is confirmed -by the Chinese records, constituted a challenge to Arab -pretensions which Qutayba could not be slow in answering. -These considerations clearly disprove the partial -tradition of Abū ʿUbayda (Bal. 422), to the effect that -Qutayba treacherously attacked Khwārizm and Samarqand -in spite of the treaties of Saʿīd ibn ʿOthmān, and the -argument based upon it by van Vloten in <i>La Domination -Arabe</i>, must also, in consequence, be somewhat modified.</p> - -<p>The winter of 93/711, therefore, was spent in preparations -for an expedition against Samarqand, but -before the opening of the campaigning season, Qutayba -received a secret mission from the Khwārizm Shāh, -who offered to become tributary if the Arabs would rid -him of his rebellious brother Khurrazādh. Qutayba -agreed, and after publicly announcing his intention of -invading <i>S</i>ughd, suddenly appeared at Hazārasp. The -followers of the Khwārizm Shāh were persuaded to offer -no resistance for this year, at least, and accepted the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[43]</a></span> -terms, which included, in accordance with the new -scheme, the provision of a corps of 10,000 ablebodied -men as well as the usual tribute. Qutayba remained at -the capital<a name="FNanchor_56" id="FNanchor_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a> until the army was collected, while -ʿAbdur-Ra<i>h</i>mān was employed, according to <i>T</i>abarī, in -reducing the king of Khāmjird, who from the parallel -account in Balādhurī is to be identified either with -Khurrazādh, or at least with his party. The Persian -<i>T</i>abarī adds a long and doubtless legendary narrative -of his surrender. Four thousand prisoners were taken -and butchered, probably by order of the Khwārizm Shāh.</p> - -<p>The later history of Khwārizm under Qutayba’s rule -is an unhappy one. His first governor Iyās b. ʿAbdullah, -proved too weak for his post, and on Qutayba’s withdrawal -the Khwārizmians rose in revolt and put to death -the king who had betrayed them. Iyās was recalled in -disgrace, together with the Persian <i>H</i>ayyān an-Naba<i>t</i>ī, -who had been associated with him, and Qutayba’s -brother ʿAbdullah (in Balādhurī ʿUbaydullah) was -appointed as temporary regent until, after the capture -of Samarqand, a strong force under al-Mughīra b. -ʿAbdullah could be sent to effect a reconquest. Qutayba’s -retribution on this occasion exceeded even the terror of -Paykand and Shūmān. We are told by Al-Bīrūnī that -the educated classes and more cultured elements in -Khwārizm were slaughtered almost to extinction. He -refers this by implication to the second expedition of -Qutayba (though it does not appear that the governor -led the expedition in person), which is borne out by what -we know of Qutayba’s methods in similar cases, while -there is no instance in his career of such an action on a -first conquest. It was in all probability the educated -classes (including no doubt the hierarchy) who led the -revolt against the traitor king and thus met with the -severest punishment. The dynasty, however, was -maintained, and it is not improbable that the Arab colony -of which we hear shortly afterwards was settled in -Khwārizm at the same time<a name="FNanchor_57" id="FNanchor_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a>.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[44]</a></span></p> - -<p>The booty from the first expedition into Khwārizm -was enough to satisfy Qutayba’s troops, who demanded -to be allowed to return to their homes, but a -sudden thrust at Samarqand promised such success that -Qutayba and his leaders decided to make the attempt. -The <i>S</i>ughdian army had apparently been disbanded, -and under cover of a false movement of the advance -guard, the Arabs marched directly on Samarqand. The -advance guard under ʿAbdur-Ra<i>h</i>mān numbered 20,000 -men, while the main body included the new Persian -contingents from Khwārizm and Bukhārā. The march -occupied only a few days and the slight resistance encountered -did not prevent the Arabs from proceeding -at once to invest the city. Ghūrak conducted the defence -with vigour, however, and appealed to Shāsh and Farghāna -for assistance, reminding them that Samarqand was -the bulwark of the Jaxartes valley. A strong force was -despatched from Shāsh with the intention of making a -surprise attack on the Arab camp, but was ambushed at -night by a picked troop of Arabs and almost annihilated. -This reverse, together with the continuous bombardment -to which they were subjected, disheartened the <i>S</i>ughdians, -but the wall had been breached and an entrance almost -effected by the Arabs, stoutly assisted by their new -Iranian divisions, before Ghūrak sued for peace. -Qutayba’s demands were unexpectedly light—an annual -tribute, stated in widely varying amounts, and a strong -corps of <i>S</i>ughdians, together with a stipulation that the -city should be cleared of its fighting men while the Arabs -built a mosque and celebrated the ritual prayers. Once -within the gates, however, Qutayba refused to restore -the city to Ghūrak: a strong garrison was established -in the citadel, under the command of ʿAbdur-Ra<i>h</i>mān -(so Yaʿqūbī; in <i>T</i>abarī ʿAbdullah) and drastic orders -were issued excluding all unbelievers except under strict -surveillance, doubtless with the intention of avoiding -a repetition of the friction that had occurred at Bukhārā. -Ghūrak either could not or would not place himself in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[45]</a></span> -the humiliating position of <i>T</i>ughshāda, and with his -retinue, accompanied possibly by the merchants, withdrew -from Samarqand altogether and built a new city, Farankath, -some four farsakhs distant in the direction of -Ishtīkhan[58]. Qutayba’s double-dealing on this -occasion, however, tarnished his reputation among both -Persians and Arabs, far more than his severity to Paykand -and Khwārizm, and left a rankling memory in <i>S</i>ughd. -In order to avoid the stigma of treachery attaching to -their hero the Bāhilite tradition relates this expedition -in an entirely different version<a name="FNanchor_59" id="FNanchor_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a>. Qutayba, we are -told, after marching down the right bank of the Oxus -and collecting his army at Bukhārā, advanced to Rabinjān -where he was met by the <i>S</i>ughdians under Ghūrak, -supported by the troops of Shāsh and Farghāna and the -Turks. The enemy retired on Samarqand but engaged -in constant rearguard actions, the city being finally -entered by force after a decisive battle in the suburbs. -Though this account is at first sight borne out to some -extent by Ghūrak’s own narrative in his letter to the -Emperor of China, in which he claims an initial success -against the Arabs, but was unable to prevent their -advance, both statements must be regarded as exaggerations -in opposite interests. At all events it is quite -certain that none but <i>S</i>ughdian troops were involved at -first.</p> - -<p>A further development of the Bāhilite tradition has -given rise to some controversy. According to this, -Ghūrak appealed for help not only to Shāsh but also to -the Khāqān, and the squadron sent from Shāsh appears -as a force of Turks, commanded by a son of the Khāqān. -This is, of course, an obvious exaggeration on the former -narrative. In the Turkish Orkhon inscriptions, however, -an expedition under the prince Kül-tegin into Sogdiana -“to organize the Sogdian people” is mentioned, following -on a successful campaign against the Türgesh in 710/711. -Marquart endeavours to prove that this expedition -occurred in 712 and is, in fact, corroborated by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[46]</a></span> -Bāhilite tradition. Professor Houtsma has raised -several objections to this view, the most important being -that the chronology of the inscriptions has to be manipulated -to allow of this date, as the natural date to assume -from the context is at latest 711. These, together with -the considerations mentioned above, render Marquart’s -hypothesis absolutely untenable.</p> - -<p>A second suggestion has been put forward by Professor -Barthold, to which, however, Professor Houtsma’s -objections would apply with equal force<a name="FNanchor_60" id="FNanchor_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a>. In the -narrative of the historian Yaʿqūbī (II. 344), there is a -brief notice as follows: “Qutayba appointed his brother -ʿAbdur-Ra<i>h</i>mān ibn Muslim governor of Samarqand, -but the men of Samarqand treacherously revolted against -him, and Khāqān, king of the Turks, attacked him also. -He wrote to Qutayba, but Qutayba waited until the -winter cleared, then marched to join him and routed the -army of the Turks.” Professor Barthold takes the view, -therefore, that this is the expedition referred to in the -inscriptions, and attributes the failure of the Turks to -the disastrous effects of a winter campaign in a devastated -land, which so severely disabled them that they could -not face the formidable army that took the field under -Qutayba in the spring. It is questionable, however, -how far Yaʿqūbī’s narrative may be trusted. None of -the other historians give the slightest hint of this -invasion, nor were the results such as we should expect -after a <i>S</i>ughdian revolt. There was no ruthless reconquest, -no stamping out of rebellion in blood. Neither -does the general tenor of Yaʿqūbī’s accounts of Qutayba -inspire confidence. They are not only confused in detail -and chronology—the capture of Samarqand, for instance, -is dated 94 <span class="smcapuc">A.H.</span>—but in some cases are taken from what -we know to be the Bāhilite tradition, and in others, -such as the narrative under discussion and the account of -the conquest of Khwārizm, follow a tradition which -seems irreconcilable with our other information. While -it cannot be said definitely therefore, that Yaʿqūbī’s<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[47]</a></span> -statements in this case contain no truth, it is certainly -preferable to regard them as a later development of the -narrative, on the lines of the Bāhilite tradition.</p> - -<p>If the chronological objections raised by Professor -Houtsma are sound, there remains still a third possible -solution, which, however, as there is no corroborative -evidence from either the Arabic or Chinese sources, must -remain nothing but a hypothesis. It is surely quite -tenable that Kül-tegin’s “organization of the Sogdian -people” had something to do with the deposition of -<i>T</i>arkhūn and appointment of Ghūrak. With Sogdian -trade playing the most important part which we know -in the Turkish lands, it would be well worth while to try -to prevent the Arabs from obtaining control over it. -The very unexpectedness of the description given to this -expedition shows clearly that there was some motive for -“organization” and it is difficult to see what other -motive there could have been. These circumstances -would render it quite probable that Ghūrak did, in fact, -appeal to the Khāqān for assistance against the Arabs, -but it seems that the growing power of the Türgesh -barred the way into Sogdiana against the Northern -Khanate for the remainder of its short existence.</p> - -<p>By the conquest of Samarqand Qutayba finally established -his position in Transoxania. It must not be -assumed, however, as many of the Arab historians give -the impression of assuming, that the holding of Samarqand -meant the conquest of <i>S</i>ughd. All that had been done -was to settle an Arab garrison in a country as yet -unfriendly. It was the duty of the commanders at -Samarqand gradually to extend their authority over the -whole district of <i>S</i>ughd by expeditions and razzias<a name="FNanchor_61" id="FNanchor_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a>. -There was thus a radical difference between the -conquest of Bukhārā and that of Samarqand. The -former was the result of a series of campaigns in which -the resources of the country had been exhausted and the -province annexed piecemeal. The whole population had -become subjects of the Arabs and were under constant<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[48]</a></span> -surveillance: <i>T</i>ughshāda himself held his rank on sufferance -and was compelled to maintain at least an outward -show of loyalty. But Samarqand had been captured -in one swift thrust; <i>S</i>ughd as a whole was still unsubdued -and only from policy acknowledged the suzerainty of the -Arabs for the time being. “Ghūrak at Ishtīkhan was -free to turn either to the Arabs or to the Turks”<a name="FNanchor_58" id="FNanchor_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a>. -Nevertheless in the years that followed there is evidence -that friendly relations were formed between the Arab -garrison and many of the local leaders and inhabitants<a name="FNanchor_62" id="FNanchor_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a>. -The whole country, however, had suffered terribly -in the constant invasions and counter invasions. A -contemporary poet gives a vivid picture of its dissipated -wealth, its ruined and desolate lands:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Daily Qutayba gathers spoil, increasing our wealth with new -wealth: A Bāhilite who has worn the crown till the hair that was -black has whitened. <i>S</i>ughd is subdued by his squadrons, its -people left sitting in nakedness.... As oft as he lights in a land, -his horse leave it furrowed and scarred.”</p> - -</div> - -<h3 class="left"><i>The Expeditions into the Jaxartes Provinces.</i></h3> - -<p>It might perhaps have been expected that Qutayba’s -next object after the capture of Samarqand would be to -establish Arab authority in <i>S</i>ughd as firmly as had been -done in Bukhārā. It would probably have been better -in the end had he done so, but for the moment the attractions -of the “forward policy” which had already proved -so successful were too strong. Instead of concentrating -on the reduction of <i>S</i>ughd, it was decided to push the -frontiers of the Empire further into Central Asia, and -leave the former to be carried out at leisure. Qutayba -therefore crossed to Bukhārā, where 20,000 levies from -Khwārizm, Bukhārā, Kish, and Nasaf had been summoned -to meet him, and marched into <i>S</i>ughd. If there was a -Turkish army wintering in the country, it offered no -considerable resistance to the advance of the Arabs. -In <i>S</i>ughd Qutayba divided his forces into two corps. -The Persian levies were sent in the direction of Shāsh,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[49]</a></span> -while he himself with the Arabs marched on Khujanda -and Farghāna. Our information is brief and lacking in -detail. Of the northern expedition we are told only -that they captured Shāsh and burnt the greater part of it. -Qutayba’s own force had to overcome some resistance -at Khujanda, but eventually reached Kāsān, where it -was rejoined by the other. The geographers refer also to -a battle fought by Qutayba at Mīnak in Ushrūsana, but -against whom is not clear<a name="FNanchor_63" id="FNanchor_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a>. <i>T</i>abarī (1440. 7) -preserves a tradition that Qutayba appointed an Arab -resident, ʿI<i>s</i>ām b. ʿAbdullah al-Bāhilī, in Farghāna. -If this is true, as seems not unlikely, the appointment was -probably made during this year. The details of the -tradition are quite unacceptable, however. No Arab -governor would ever have taken up his residence in a hill-pass -in the remotest district of Farghāna, completely -cut off from his fellow-countrymen. One of Balādhurī’s -authorities carries this or a similar tradition further by -crediting Qutayba with the establishment of Arab -colonies as far as Shāsh and Farghāna. Here again at -most only temporary military outposts can be in question. -On the other hand, the extraordinary success achieved -by the Arabs on this expedition is apt to be overlooked, -and Qutayba might well have imagined, as he returned to -Merv, that the latest conquests were as permanently -annexed to Khurāsān as Samarqand and Khwārizm.</p> - -<p>The helplessness of their Turkish suzerain in face of -the victorious Arabs, however, caused a revival in Transoxania -of the tradition of Chinese overlordship. Appeals -to the Khāqān were of no avail, and in the minds of the -Sogdian princes, seeking for some counterpoise to the -rapid extension of the Arab conquests, the idea of appealing -directly to the Emperor was slowly maturing. Though -no definite steps in this direction had as yet been taken, -some inkling of it may have reached Qutayba. The -Arabs were now familiar with China through the sea-borne -trade of the Persian Gulf and at least after, if not -before, their conquest of the cities which were already<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[50]</a></span> -becoming the headquarters of Central Asian commerce, -must have become aware of the close commercial relations -which these cities maintained with China. Under these -circumstances, Qutayba (or possibly <i>H</i>ajjāj) decided to -send a mission overland to the Chinese court, possibly -to prevent their intervention in the West, but more probably -with the intention of promoting trade relations. -As the princes of Sogdiana and <i>T</i>ukhāristān were much -more alive to the advantages of preserving their commerce -and to the dangers which might befall it under the new -government than the Arabs could have been, it was -probably on their suggestion that the embassy was sent. -They would, of course, have no difficulty in persuading -governors of the character of <i>H</i>ajjāj and Qutayba that -their own interests also lay in safeguarding and encouraging -the trade which brought such wealth to Transoxania. -If the intervention of the Turks had been caused by their -concern for Sogdian trade, it became doubly important -for the Arabs to show their practical interest in its welfare. -Apart from the immediate gain to the treasury which -would accrue, such an action might reasonably be expected -to secure the acquiescence of the Sogdians in Arab rule. -The date of the mission is fixed as 713 by the Chinese -records, which add also that in spite of the refusal of the -envoys to perform the customary kow-tow it was favourably -received by the Emperor. Both statements are -confirmed by <i>T</i>abarī’s remark that the leader was sent -to Walīd on his return, which must therefore be dated -between the death of <i>H</i>ajjāj and the end of 714<a name="FNanchor_64" id="FNanchor_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a>. -Unfortunately the Arab records of the mission have been -confused with the legendary exploits of Qutayba two -years later, becoming so disfigured in the process as to be -almost worthless. The wisdom of this step must have -been justified by its results, though there are no effects -apparent in our histories and the relentless march of -Chinese policy was not affected. This embassy is -mentioned by the Arabic historians as if it were an isolated -incident, but it was, as I have shown elsewhere[65],<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[51]</a></span> -only the first of many such sent by the governors of -Khurāsān to maintain friendly relations with the Chinese -court. It cannot be doubted that in the majority of -cases at least the object of these missions was commercial, -particularly where joint embassies were sent with one or -other of the Sogdian principalities.</p> - -<p>In the following year 95/714 the raids on the Jaxartes -provinces were renewed. It would seem on comparing -Balādhurī’s account with <i>T</i>abarī that Qutayba made -Shāsh his headquarters and worked northwards as far as -Isbījāb. The prince of Shāsh appealed to China for -assistance, but without effect<a name="FNanchor_66" id="FNanchor_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a>. Qutayba’s plan -therefore was to follow up the important trade-route -which led from Turfan down the Ili valley, along the -northern edge of the Thian-Shan mountains, through -Tokmak and Tarāz into Shāsh and Samarqand. Though -the economic importance of controlling this trade-route -may have had its part in this decision, especially in view -of their new patronage of Sogdian trade, it is probable -that this was less in the mind of the Arabs than its -strategic value as the road by which the Central Asian -Turks debouched on Transoxania. Towards the end of -the summer, the expeditions were abruptly interrupted -by the news of the death of <i>H</i>ajjāj, which had occurred -in Shawwāl (June). Deeply affected by the loss of his -patron and not a little uncertain of the effect on his own -fortunes, Qutayba disbanded the army, sending garrisons -to Bukhārā, Kish, and Nasaf, and returned to Merv. -Walīd, however, allayed his fears by an encouraging letter, -and made his province independent of ʿIrāq. But the -death of <i>H</i>ajjāj had affected Khurāsān too deeply for -such a simple remedy. The Arabs had gained wealth in -their expeditions, they were weary of the constant -campaigns and anxious to enjoy the comforts of peace. -Factional feeling was merely slumbering, and a new element -of unrest had been added by a Kūfan corps under -Jahm b. Za<i>h</i>r, which had been transferred to Khurāsān -from India by <i>H</i>ajjāj in his last year. All parties among<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[52]</a></span> -the Arabs were alienated from Qutayba; even Qays had -been estranged by his highhanded action in the first -place with the house of Al-Ahtam and again by his feud -with Wakīʿ b. Abī Sūd, the chief of Tamīm<a name="FNanchor_67" id="FNanchor_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a>; moreover, -they were suspicious of his medizing tendencies. -Amongst the Persians he was popular, but <i>H</i>ayyān an-Naba<i>t</i>ī, -though restored to his position in command of the -Persian troops, had not forgiven Qutayba for his disgrace -at Khwārizm. It seems extraordinary that the general -himself should have been blind to any internal danger -and was entirely confident in the loyalty of his army.</p> - -<p>On re-opening the campaign in 96/715, therefore, his -only precautions consisted in the removal of his family and -personal property from Merv to Samarqand and the posting -of a guard on the Oxus, in view of a possible restoration -to favour of Yazīd b. Muhallab. It is unlikely that -Qutayba could have had in mind the possibility of -Walīd’s death; what he feared was more probably a -<i>rapprochement</i> between the Caliph and his heir Sulaymān, -who was his bitter enemy.</p> - -<p>The object of this last campaign was probably the -complete subjugation of Farghāna. Having established -his authority over the important section of the Middle -Jaxartes and its trade route, it remained now to round off -his conquests by extending it also over the central trade -route between Farghāna and Kashgaria. The account -which <i>T</i>abarī intends to convey, however, is that Qutayba -marched first into Farghāna and from there led an -expedition against Kashgar, with complete success. In -an article of mine published in the <i>Bulletin of the -School of Oriental Studies</i> (II. 467 ff.), all our evidence for -this expedition has been critically discussed, and shown to -be against the authenticity of the tradition. It is unnecessary, -therefore, to do more than summarise very -briefly the arguments there put forward. (1) None of -the historians earlier than or contemporary with <i>T</i>abarī -contain any reference to a raid on Kashgar, and even -<i>T</i>abarī’s own statement is not borne out by the authorities<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[53]</a></span> -on which it professedly rests. Only one of these -relates an expedition to Kashgar, and that under the -command of an unknown leader. (2) The interval -between the opening of the campaign and the death of -Qutayba in Farghāna in August or September does not -allow time for such an expedition, especially in view of -the mutinous attitude of the army after the death of the -Caliph. (3) The Chinese account of Arab interference in -Farghāna cannot refer, for chronological reasons, to -Qutayba’s expedition, and in any case is silent on any -attack on Kashgaria.</p> - -<p>That an expedition of this sort should have been -attributed to Qutayba is not surprising, in view of the -tradition of the embassy to China, and of the great renown -which attached to his memory. Later tradition<a name="FNanchor_68" id="FNanchor_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> -recounted that <i>H</i>ajjāj pledged the governorship of China -to the first to reach it of his two governors in the East, -Mu<i>h</i>ammad b. Qāsim and Qutayba. “<i>S</i>īn” was, of -course, not the sharply defined country of our days, but -rather a loose term for the Far East, including even the -Turkish lands in the North-East. Qutayba had probably -done little more than make preparations for his campaign, -perhaps to the extent of sending out minor raiding -expeditions, when the news of the death of Walīd brought -everything to a standstill.</p> - -<p>The historians give the most contradictory accounts -of the events that followed; according to Balādhurī -the new Caliph Sulaymān confirmed Qutayba in his command -but gave permission to the army to disband. -<i>T</i>abarī’s narrative, with which Yaʿqūbī’s in general -agrees, is fully discussed by Wellhausen (274 ff.), together -with a valuable analysis of Qutayba’s position. The -story of his highhanded negotiations with Sulaymān -is too well known to need repetition. Finding the army -disinclined to follow him, he completely lost his head and -roused the mutiny in which he was killed. The Persian -levies, who were inclined to side with him, were dissuaded -by <i>H</i>ayyān an-Naba<i>t</i>ī, and at the last only his own<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[54]</a></span> -family and bodyguard of Sogdian princes remained -faithful.</p> - -<p>The death of Qutayba marked not merely the end of -the Arab conquests in Central Asia for a quarter of a -century, but the beginning of a period of retrogression. -Under Wakīʿ b. Abī Sūd, his successor<a name="FNanchor_69" id="FNanchor_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a>, the armies -melted away. Mukhallad, the son of Yazīd b. Muhallab -and his lieutenant in Transoxania, carried out summer -raids on the villages of <i>S</i>ughd, but an isolated attempt on -the Jaxartes provinces by ʿOmar’s governor, Al-Jarrā<i>h</i> -b. ʿAbdullah, met with ignominious failure. It is possibly -to this that the tradition, mentioned by Barthold -(<i>Turkestan</i> 160), of the disaster met with by a Muslim -army refers. On the other hand an embassy was sent in -the name of the Caliph to renew relations with the -Chinese court, and a third in concert with the kingdoms of -<i>T</i>ukhāristān and Samarqand, etc., during the reign of -ʿOmar<a name="FNanchor_65" id="FNanchor_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a>. There is mention also of an expedition into -Khuttal which regained some territory. But it was -Qutayba, with <i>H</i>ajjāj at his back, who had held his -conquests together, and when he disappeared there was -neither leader nor organisation to take his place. The -history of the next decade clearly shows how loose and -unstable was the authority of the Arabs. It was force -that had made the conquests, and only a settled policy -of force or conciliation could hold them. The first was -absent. “Qutayba in chains at the world’s end is more -terrible to us than Yazīd as governor in our very midst” -is the graphic summary put into the mouths of the -conquered, while of Rutbīl, king of Zābulistān, we are -told expressly that after the death of <i>H</i>ajjāj “he paid -not a cent of tribute to any of the governors of Sijistān -on behalf of the Umayyads nor on behalf of Abū -Muslim.”<a name="FNanchor_70" id="FNanchor_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a>.</p> - -<p>Nor was ʿOmar’s policy a true policy of conciliation, -based as it was not on the maintenance of the Arab -conquests but on the complete evacuation of Transoxania. -His orders to that effect were of course indignantly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[55]</a></span> -rejected by the Arab colonists in Bukhārā and Samarqand, -but together with his appointment of the feeble and -ineffective ʿAbdur-Ra<i>h</i>mān b. Nuʿaym al-Qushayrī as -governor, such a policy was naturally construed by the -Sogdians as mere weakness, and an invitation to regain -their independence. In addition to the embassies to -China, to be related in the next chapter, and possibly also -some negotiations with the Türgesh, Ghūrak sought to -win back his capital by playing on ʿOmar’s piety. The -Caliph sent envoys to the princes of Sogdiana calling on -them to accept Islām, and Ghūrak, outwardly professing -his adherence, sent a deputation to ʿOmar urging that as -“Qutayba dealt with us treacherously and tyrannically, -but God has now caused justice and equity to reign” -the city should be restored to the <i>S</i>ughdians. The -commonsense of the judge appointed to try the case on -ʿOmar’s instructions by the governor of Samarqand, -Sulaymān b. Abiʾs-Sarī (himself a mawlā), solved the -problem in an eminently practical manner, and we are -told that his decision, so far from being “malicious,” -was satisfactory to both the Arabs and the <i>S</i>ughdians, if -not perhaps to Ghūrak. Beyond the remission of kharāj, -it is doubtful whether ʿOmar’s administration benefited -the subject peoples in the slightest, and the reaction -which followed his brief reign only aggravated the -situation. Already before its close the <i>S</i>ughdians had -withdrawn their allegiance<a name="FNanchor_71" id="FNanchor_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a>.</p> - -<p>Thus within six years from the death of Qutayba, -much of his work was undone. He had laid the foundations -on which the later rule of Islām was built, and laid -them well, though his own superstructure was too flimsy -to withstand the tempests of the years ahead. But the -fault was not entirely, perhaps not even chiefly, the fault -of the builder. He was snatched away before his work -was done, even if in his latter years he tended to neglect -everything else for military glory. As we shall see, there -was no peace in Transoxania until other men arose, great -and strong enough to adopt and carry out the best of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[56]</a></span> -his plans. The ruthlessness and ferocity of his conquests, -however, have been much exaggerated. He was always -ready to use diplomacy rather than force if it offered any -hope of success, so much so that his lenience was misconstrued -on occasion by both friends and foes. Only -in cases of treachery and revolt his punishment came swift -and terrible. That he did not hesitate to take vengeance -on his private enemies is to say no more than that he was -an Arab. It was not without reason that in later days -the Muslims of Central Asia added Qutayba’s name to -the roll of martyrs and that his tomb in Farghāna became -a favourite place of pilgrimage<a name="FNanchor_72" id="FNanchor_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a>.</p> - -<p>To sum up the position in Central Asia in the years -immediately following Qutayba’s conquests:—</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>(1) Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān and Chaghāniān formed an -integral part of the Arab Empire.</p> - -<p>(2) <i>T</i>ukhāristān, now in the decay of its power, was -held as a vassal state, together with the Transoxine -provinces of Khuttal, Kumādh, etc., where, however, the -Arab authority was much weaker.</p> - -<p>(3) In Sogdiana, Bukhārā was regarded as a permanent -conquest and gradually colonized; <i>S</i>ughd was -still hostile territory held by strong outpost garrisons in -Samarqand and Kish, connected to Bukhārā by minor -posts.</p> - -<p>(4) Khwārizm as a military power was negligible and -was permanently colonized.</p> - -<p>(5) The kingdoms beyond the Jaxartes remained -independent, hostile, and relatively strong, supported -by the Turkish power to the North East and also by the -intervention of China.</p> - -<p>(6) Ushrūsana, though unsubdued, does not seem to -have offered any obstacle to the passage of Arab armies.</p> - -<p>(7) The existing dynastic houses were everywhere -maintained, as the representatives of the conquered -peoples and vehicle of the civil administration. The -actual administrative and financial authority in their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[57]</a></span> -territories, however, passed to the Wāli, or agent of the -Arab governor of Khurāsān<a name="FNanchor_73" id="FNanchor_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Notes</span></h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41" id="Footnote_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> Chav. Doc. 42, 282 f.: Marquart Chronologie 15: <i>T</i>abarī II. 1078, 1080.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42" id="Footnote_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> As was suggested by Prof. Houtsma, Gotting. Gelehrt. Anz., 1899, 386-7.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43" id="Footnote_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> Suggested readings in Barthold, Turkestan, p. 71 n. 5, and p. 76.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44" id="Footnote_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. 1184 f., 1195: Chav. Doc. 172: Hamadhānī, Kitāb al-Buldān (Bibl. -Geog. Arab. V) 209. 7: <i>cf.</i> <i>T</i>ab. 1874.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45" id="Footnote_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> Narshakhī 8, 15, 30, 37, 44: <i>T</i>ab. 1199. 1: Yaʿqūbī Hist. II. 342. 9. <i>Cf.</i> -Marquart, Chronologie 63 and Barthold, Arab. Quellen 7.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_46" id="Footnote_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> <i>H</i>amāsa, ed. Freytag, I. 349.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_47" id="Footnote_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> Narshakhī 8. 15.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_48" id="Footnote_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. 1207. 16: <i>cf.</i> Yaʿqūbī loc. cit. On the Arab method of crucifixion, -Nöldeke Z.D.M.G. LVI (1902) 433; <i>cf.</i> <i>T</i>ab. 1691 and Dīnawarī 336. 18.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_49" id="Footnote_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> Detailed accounts of this are readily accessible in “The Heart of Asia”, and -“The Caliph’s Last Heritage” by Sir Mark Sykes, the latter in a richly -imaginative vein. Very full geographical data are given by Marquart, -Ērānshahr 219 f.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_50" id="Footnote_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> Narsh. 46. 12, 50. 15.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_51" id="Footnote_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> <i>E.g.</i> Narsh. 58. 5. On the new city, Barthold Turkestan 110 f.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_52" id="Footnote_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> <i>E.g.</i> <i>T</i>ab. 1544. 9, 1600 ff.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_53" id="Footnote_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> On this dynasty see Ērānshahr 37 f., 248 ff. and de Goeje in W.Z.K.M. XVI -(1902) 192-195.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_54" id="Footnote_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> Yaʿqūbī Geog. 283: Chav. Doc. 161.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_55" id="Footnote_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> The pronunciation of this name, usually pointed Ghūzak, is fixed by the -Chinese transcription U-le-kia (Chav. Doc. 136).</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_56" id="Footnote_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> On the city of Khwārizm (Fīl, Kath) see Sachau “Zur Geschichte usw. -von Khwārizm” pp. 23-25.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_57" id="Footnote_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. 1252 f., 1525: Bal. 421: Al-Bīrūnī, “Chronology of Ancient Nations” -(trans. Sachau, London 1879) pp. 41 f. Prof. Barthold is inclined to -regard Al-Bīrūnī’s narrative as fictitious (perhaps intended to account for -the absence of written records of Khwārizm dating from pre-Muslim -times?) <i>cf.</i> “Turkestan” p. 1.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_58" id="Footnote_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> Barthold, Arab. Quellen 21 f.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_59" id="Footnote_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. 1247 f., 1249. For Ghūrak’s latter, Chav. Doc. 204 f.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_60" id="Footnote_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> Marquart, Chronologie 5 ff.: Barthold, Arab. Quell. 11 f.: Houtsma as <a href="#Footnote_42">note -2</a> above.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_61" id="Footnote_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> <i>T</i>ab. 1418: Bal. 425.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_62" id="Footnote_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. 1365. 8, 1518, 1542. 1.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_63" id="Footnote_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> Ibn Hawqal 383; I<i>st</i>akhrī 328. 4. The latter’s statement that Qutayba -here beleaguered the Afshīn of Ushrūsana is almost certainly due to the -omission of some words or perversion of the text. On the other hand, -there could not be, as in Ibn Hawqal’s account, any question of Musawwida -(“Black Robes”) in the ordinary sense of the term as early as 94 -<span class="smcapuc">A.H.</span> and above all in Ushrūsana. -The absence of any reference to levies from <i>S</i>ughd in this expedition -would seem to favour Prof. Barthold’s theory of a <i>S</i>ughdian rising in co-operation -with the Turks. The evidence in favour of an accidental -omission is, however, very strong. At this point <i>T</i>abarī’s narratives, in -contrast to the preceding period, become extremely brief. The levies -from the four states mentioned met Qutayba at Bukhārā and marched -with him into <i>S</i>ughd. Naturally the <i>S</i>ughdian levies would have awaited -his arrival there. Had the omission been intentional it would be difficult -to explain why <i>T</i>abarī did not include some account of the reasons -why <i>S</i>ughdian troops were not summoned. In any case it is certain that -Qutayba would not have left a hostile <i>S</i>ughdian army in his rear, and they -must therefore have taken part in the march to the Jaxartes.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[58]</a></span></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_64" id="Footnote_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> Cordier, Hist. gen. de la Chine, I. 460: Wieger 1642: <i>T</i>ab. 1280. 3.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_65" id="Footnote_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, II. 619 ff. For another view of -these embassies see Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches (1910), II. 247 f.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_66" id="Footnote_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> Hirth, Nachworte 81.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_67" id="Footnote_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> Bal. 425 f.: Yaʿqūbī, Hist. II. 354: Wellhausen, Arab. Reich 275.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_68" id="Footnote_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> Yaʿqūbī, Hist. II. 346. 7.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_69" id="Footnote_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> See his character-sketch in Wellhausen 277.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_70" id="Footnote_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> Bal. 401. 5: <i>T</i>ab. 1353.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_71" id="Footnote_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. 1364 f., 1356. 13, 1364. 13, 1421. 7, 1418. 13: Bal. 422, 426.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_72" id="Footnote_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> Narsh. 57. 4: Fa<i>z</i>āʾil Balkh, ap. Schefer, Chrest. Persane, I. 71. 2.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_73" id="Footnote_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> Sachau, Khwārizm I, 29: Barthold, Turkestan 189.</p> - -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[59]</a></span></p> - -<h2 id="IV_THE_TURKISH_COUNTERSTROKE">IV. THE TURKISH COUNTERSTROKE.<a name="FNanchor_74" id="FNanchor_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a></h2> - -<p>The princes of Transoxania had so long been accustomed -to regard the Arabs as mere marauders that it was some -time before they could realise the loss of their independence. -Though necessity forced them at first to adopt a -conciliatory spirit (as, for example, in their acceptance -of Islām under ʿOmar II), they were dismayed to find all -the machinery of permanent occupation set in motion, -and their authority flouted by tactless and greedy Arab -officials. Such a state of affairs was tolerable only in the -absence of any countering force. The situation was not -stationary for long, however; even before Qutayba’s -death other and disturbing factors had begun to enter. -Our best clue to the complications in Transoxania during -this period is the attitude of Ghūrak, king of <i>S</i>ughd, of -whose movements, fortunately, sufficient indications have -been preserved. In maintaining a precarious balance -between the Türgesh and the Arabs, his true statesman’s -instinct seldom misled him in judging how and when to -act to advantage throughout his troubled reign. In -addition to this we have the evidence, unreliable in detail -but confirmatory in the mass, of the embassies sent by -the subject principalities to the Chinese court. Doubtless -they were despatched in the guise of commercial missions -and in many cases were truly so, but that they frequently -possessed a political character can hardly be denied. -The dates of these embassies as given in the authorities -translated by Chavannes fall naturally into four periods. -In the following list all embassies have been omitted in -which the Arabs are known to have participated or whose -object is known to have had no connection with the Arab -conquests, as well as those which appear to be duplicated, -and those from the minor states:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[60]</a></span></p> - -<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Number of Embassies from</span>:—</p> - -<table summary="Number of embassies from different states in different time periods"> - <tr> - <td>1.</td> - <td>717-731</td> - <td><i>S</i>ughd</td> - <td>11,</td> - <td><i>T</i>ukhāristān</td> - <td>5,</td> - <td>Bukhārā</td> - <td>2,</td> - <td>Arabs</td> - <td>4.</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>2.</td> - <td>732-740</td> - <td class="center">”</td> - <td>none</td> - <td class="center">”</td> - <td>2</td> - <td class="center">”</td> - <td>none</td> - <td class="center">”</td> - <td>1</td> - <td>(733).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>3.</td> - <td>741-747</td> - <td class="center">”</td> - <td>4</td> - <td class="center">”</td> - <td>3</td> - <td class="center">”</td> - <td>1</td> - <td class="center">”</td> - <td>4</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>4.</td> - <td>750-755</td> - <td class="center">”</td> - <td>4</td> - <td class="center">”</td> - <td>2</td> - <td class="center">”</td> - <td>3</td> - <td class="center">”</td> - <td>6</td> - <td></td> - </tr> -</table> - -<p>These four periods, as will be seen, closely correspond -to the fluctuations of Arab authority in Transoxania.</p> - -<p>In the same year, 713, that Qutayba first led his army -across the Jaxartes, a new era of westward expansion -opened in China with the accession of Hiuen-Tsong. -In 714 the Chinese intervened in the affairs of the Ten -Tribes and obtained their immediate submission, while -in the following year they restored the deposed king of -Farghāna. In 716, on the death of Me-chuʾo, Khan of -the Northern Turks, the powerful tribes of the Türgesh -asserted their independence, and under their chief Su-Lu -established, with Chinese assistance, a new kingdom in -the Ili basin. The princes of Transoxania eagerly sought -to profit by these developments to free themselves from -the Arab yoke. In 718 a joint embassy was sent to China -by <i>T</i>ughshāda, Ghūrak, Narayāna king of Kumādh, -and the king of Chaghāniān. The first three presented -petitions for aid against the Arabs, which are given in full -in Chavannes’ <i>Documents</i>. <i>T</i>ughshāda asked that the -Türgesh might be ordered to attack the Arabs, Ghūrak -related the capture of Samarqand and asked for Chinese -troops, Narayāna complained of the seizure of all his -treasures by the Arabs and asked that representations -might be made to induce them to remit their crushing -taxation. It is significant that the king of Chaghāniān, -acting for his suzerain, the Jabghu of <i>T</i>ukhāristān, did -not compromise himself by joining in these requests. -But beyond “fair words” the son of Heaven took no -action, and no Chinese forces appeared West of the Jaxartes, -in spite of the repeated entreaties addressed by the -princes to their self-elected suzerain.</p> - -<p>The Türgesh, however, were not long in intervening on -their own account. Whatever opportunity the Arab<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[61]</a></span> -government had to pacify the <i>S</i>ughdians was lost by a -succession of incompetent governors. Already in the -reign of ʿOmar II, as has been seen, they had withdrawn -their allegiance from the weak ʿAbdur-Ra<i>h</i>mān b. Nuʿaym. -For a moment the situation seemed to improve at the -beginning of the governorship of Saʿīd “Khudhayna” -(102/720) owing to the firm handling of Samarqand by -his lieutenant Shuʿba b. <i>Z</i>uhayr. But disturbances -broke out and Shuʿba was recalled, perhaps in a vain -attempt to appease the insurgents. It would seem that -the <i>S</i>ughdians appealed to the new Turkish power in -the East and Su-Lu, unable to make headway against the -growing influence of China, willingly seized the opportunity -of diverting his armies into Transoxania. A small -Türgesh force was sent under Köl-chur (called by <i>T</i>abarī -Kūr<i>s</i>ūl)<a name="FNanchor_75" id="FNanchor_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> to make common cause with the <i>S</i>ughdian -rebels in the following spring (end of 102). Saʿīd awoke -to find the whole country in arms, a Turkish force marching -on Samarqand, and the local princes, with few -exceptions, aiding the invaders. The Arab commanders -could not rely on their levies and a small garrison at -Qa<i>s</i>r al-Bāhilī was evacuated only with the utmost -difficulty. The tale of their relief by a small force of -volunteers is one of the most spirited narratives of -adventure in <i>T</i>abarī. But such episodes did not affect -the general success of the Turkish forces. Kūr<i>s</i>ūl -continued his advance through <i>S</i>ughd without opposition, -avoiding Samarqand, until at last Saʿīd was roused by -public reproach to march against the Turks. After a -small initial success, which he refused to follow up, he -was severely defeated and confined to the neighbourhood -of Samarqand. The Turks were not strong enough to -undertake a siege of the city, as the whole operation -seems to have been little more than a reconnaissance in -force combined with a raiding expedition. As the -Türgesh retired, the Arab cavalry followed them up as -far as Waraghsar, the head of the canal system of <i>S</i>ughd. -Ghūrak appears to have refrained from committing himself<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[62]</a></span> -by openly aiding the rebels, and doubtless recognised -that the Arabs were not so easily to be dislodged. From -the fact that Saʿīd’s camp was pitched at Ishtīkhan, -in close proximity to him, it may even be conjectured -that he outwardly supported the Arabs.</p> - -<p>But the new governor of ʿIrāq, ʿOmar b. Hubayra, -was not the man to stand idly by in face of the danger -that threatened Khurāsān. The weakness shown by -Khudhayna and the complaints of oppression from his -subjects, were sufficient reason for his recall, and Saʿīd -b. ʿAmr al-<i>H</i>arashī, a man of very different stamp, was -installed in his place. The transfer may be placed in -the late autumn of 103/721. The new governor’s first -act was to summon the rebels to submit, but a large -number of nobles and merchants, with their retainers, -either fearing that they could expect no mercy, or anxious -to free themselves altogether from the Arab yoke, prepared -to emigrate to Farghāna. Ghūrak did his utmost -to persuade them to remain, but without effect; their -absence would no doubt affect the revenues, and a certain -emphasis is laid on the point in <i>T</i>abarī’s account. Leaving -hostages behind, the malcontents marched towards -Farghāna and opened negotiations with the king for the -occupation of ʿI<i>s</i>ām. The majority settled in the interval -at Khujanda, but other parties actually entered Farghāna, -and one body at least occupied a fortified position on the -Zarafshān. Al-<i>H</i>arashī followed up his demands by -marching into <i>S</i>ughd and encamped near Dabūsia, -where he was with difficulty persuaded to stay until -sufficient contingents arrived. On advancing, he was -met by a messenger from the king of Farghāna, who, -outwardly professing to assist the <i>S</i>ughdians, had secretly -decided to rid himself of them by calling in the Arabs -against them. Al-<i>H</i>arashī eagerly seized the opportunity -and pressed forward, receiving the allegiance of -Ushrūsana as he passed. The emigrants, although urged -by their leader Karzanj either to take active measures or -to submit, decided to risk a siege in Khujanda, trusting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[63]</a></span> -to the protection of the king of Farghāna. But when -Saʿīd set about the siege in earnest, and they realised -that they had been betrayed, they surrendered on -unexpectedly easy terms. Saʿīd divided them, placing -the nobles and merchants in a camp apart from the -soldiers. By the execution of Thābit, a noble from -Ishtīkhan, he provoked a revolt, under pretext of which -he massacred the nobles and the troops, sparing the -merchants, who numbered four hundred, only in order to -squeeze them of their wealth. <i>T</i>abarī’s account very -thinly veils al-<i>H</i>arashī’s responsibility for this wanton -act of atrocious cruelty, which could not fail to embitter -the feelings of the whole population of Transoxania. -It is curious that the Persian <i>T</i>abarī (Zotenberg IV. 268) -has an entirely different story, which is found in none of -the Arabic authorities. The refugees who escaped -eventually took refuge with the Khāqān of the Türgesh, -where they formed a regiment (no doubt continually -recruited from new emigrants) which particularly distinguished -itself in the war against the Arabs<a name="FNanchor_76" id="FNanchor_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a>.</p> - -<p>The expedition to Khujanda may be put in the -spring and summer of 722 (end of 103, beginning of 104), -though the chronology here, and indeed for all this period, -is uncertain. The piecemeal reduction of the fortresses -in <i>S</i>ughd occupied the remainder of the year, a series -of operations whose difficulty is sufficient witness to the -effect of the news from Khujanda in stiffening the -resistance to the Arabs. The first fortress to be attacked -was that of Abghar, in which a band of the emigrants -had settled. The attack was entrusted to Sulaymān -b. Abiʾs-Sarī, with an army composed largely of native -levies from Bukhārā, Khwārizm, and Shūmān, accompanied -by their princes. Sulaymān persuaded the -dihqān to surrender, and sent him to al-<i>H</i>arashī, who at -first treated him well in order to counteract the effect of -the massacre of Khujanda, but put him to death after -recapturing Kish and Rabinjān. The most inaccessible -fortress and the crowning example of Al-<i>H</i>arashī’s<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[64]</a></span> -perfidy were left to the last. The dihqān Subuqrī -still held out in the fortress of Khuzar, to the south of -Nasaf; unable to take it by force, Al-<i>H</i>arashī sent -Musarbal b. Al-Khirrīt, a personal friend of Subuqrī, -to offer him a pardon. On his surrender, he was sent to -Merv and put to death, although the amnesty, it is said, -had been confirmed by ʿOmar b. Hubayra.</p> - -<p>The whole of <i>S</i>ughd was thus once more in the hands -of the Arabs. The nearer districts, Khwārizm and Bukhārā, -had remained loyal and the Oxus basin seems to have -been unaffected. But to make a solitude and call it -peace did not suit the aims of the Arab government -and Al-<i>H</i>arashī found that his “policy of thorough” -only provided Ibn Hubayra with an excuse for superseding -him. During the winter, therefore, he was replaced -by Muslim b. Saʿīd al-Kilābī, who, as the grandson -of Aslam b. Zurʿa, came of a house long familiar with -Khurāsān. The danger of the movement of revolt -spreading to the Iranians of Khurāsān seems to have preoccupied -the Arab government during all this period. -Saʿīd Khudhayna had poisoned the too-influential -<i>H</i>ayyān an-Naba<i>t</i>ī on suspicion of rousing the Persians -against the government and that it was felt even in Ba<i>s</i>ra -may be seen from Ibn Hubayra’s advice to his new -governor, “Let your chamberlain be one who can make -peace with your mawālī.” Muslim, in fact, favoured -the Persians and did all in his power to appoint officials -acceptable to them, the Mazdean Bahrām Sīs, for example, -being appointed Marzubān of Merv<a name="FNanchor_77" id="FNanchor_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a>. But all such -measures were merely palliatives and could not materially -affect the growing discontent in <i>S</i>ughd and <i>T</i>ukhāristān. -During his first year of office it is recorded -(if the narrative is not, as Wellhausen thinks, a duplicate -of the raid on Farghāna in the following year) that -Muslim marched across the river but was met and pushed -back into Khurāsān by a Turkish army, narrowly -escaping disaster. It is not improbable that the local -forces were again assisted by Türgesh on this occasion.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[65]</a></span> -In the following year, however, before the close of 105, -a second expedition gained some success at Afshīna, -near Samarqand. Meanwhile Hishām had succeeded -Yazīd II as Caliph, and ʿOmar b. Hubayra, whose Qaysite -leanings were too pronounced, was recalled in favour -of Khālid b. ʿAbdullah al-Qasrī of Bajīla. The transfer -took place most probably in March (724), though -another account places it some months later. Muslim -was now preparing an expedition into Farghāna, but the -Yemenite troops at Balkh held back partly through -dislike of the campaign and doubtless expecting the -governor’s recall. Na<i>s</i>r b. Sayyār was sent with a -Mu<i>d</i>arite force to use compulsion; the mutinous -Yemenites were defeated at Barūqān and unwillingly -joined the army. It is noteworthy that troops from -Chaghāniān fought alongside Na<i>s</i>r in this engagement. -Before leaving Bukhārā Muslim learned that he was to be -superseded, at the same time receiving orders to continue -his expedition. Four thousand Azdites, however, took -the opportunity of withdrawing. The remainder, -accompanied by <i>S</i>ughdian levies, marched into Farghāna, -crossed the Jaxartes, and besieged the capital, cutting -down the fruit trees and devastating the land. Here -news was brought that Khāqān was advancing against -them, and Muslim hurriedly ordered a retreat. The -Arabic accounts graphically describe the headlong flight -of the Arabs. On the first day they retired three stages, -the next day they crossed the Wādī Sabū<i>h</i>, closely pursued -by the Türgesh; a detachment, largely composed of -mawālī, which encamped separately, was attacked and -suffered heavy losses, the brother of Ghūrak being -amongst the killed. After a further eight days’ march, -continually harassed by the light Turkish horse, they -were reduced to burning all the baggage, to the value of a -million dirhems. On reaching the Jaxartes the following -day, they found the way barred by the forces of Shāsh -and Farghāna, together with the <i>S</i>ughdians who had -escaped from Saʿīd al-<i>H</i>arashī, but the desperate and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[66]</a></span> -thirsty troops, hemmed in by the Türgesh from behind, -cut their way through. The rearguard made a stand, -but lost its commander. At length the remnants of the -army reached Khujanda, where ʿAbdur-Ra<i>h</i>mān b. -Nuʿaym took command on behalf of Asad b. ʿAbdullah, -and made good his retreat to Samarqand.</p> - -<p>This disaster, which is known as the “Day of Thirst,” -marks a period in the history of the Arab conquests. It -was practically the last aggressive expedition of the Arabs -into Transoxania for fifteen years, but of much greater -importance was the blow which it struck at Arab prestige. -The rôles were reversed; from now onwards the Arabs -found themselves on the defensive and were gradually -ousted from almost every district across the Oxus. No -wonder, therefore, that the memory of the “Day of -Thirst” rankled even long after it had been avenged<a name="FNanchor_78" id="FNanchor_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a>. -According to the Arab tradition, the Türgesh armies -were led on this occasion not by Su-Lu himself, but by -one of his sons. Unfortunately the accounts of Su-Lu -in such Chinese works as have been translated are silent -on his Western expeditions, and the Arab historians -are our only authorities. The immediate result of the -Arab defeat, not only in <i>S</i>ughd but in <i>T</i>ukhāristān and -the southern basin as well, was to stiffen the attitude of -passive resistance to the Arabs to the point at which it -only needed active support to break into a general -conflagration. From this time, if not before, the subject -princes regarded the Türgesh as the agents of their -deliverance, commissioned by China in response to the -urgent entreaties they had addressed to the Emperor -for aid in their struggle. We find this actually expressed -in a letter sent three years later by the Jabghu of <i>T</i>ukhāristān, -which is, in Chavannes’ words “but one long -cry of distress”<a name="FNanchor_79" id="FNanchor_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a>. “I am loaded with heavy taxation -by the Arabs; in truth, their oppression and our misery -are extreme. If I do not obtain the help of the (Chinese) -Kagan ... my kingdom will certainly be destroyed -and dismembered.... I have been told that the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[67]</a></span> -Celestial Kagan has given this order to the Kagan of the -Türgesh: To you I delegate the affairs of the Far West; -you must at once send soldiers to drive out the Arabs.” -The point of view here expressed is of course that of the -ruling princes, whose resentment at the curtailment of -their authority is understandable. Besides making -allowance for some natural exaggeration, it would be -dangerous to assume that this was as yet fully shared by -the people. In all probability, if we may judge from -historical analogies, there was also a pro-Arab party in -Sogdiana, who felt that the best interests of the country -lay, not in an opposition whose final issue could scarcely -be in doubt, but in co-operation with their new masters -as far as was possible. The tragedy of the Arab administration -was that by alternately giving and refusing co-operation -on its side, it drove its supporters in the end to -make common cause with its opponents.</p> - -<p>But though the situation was steadily deteriorating -the decisive moment had not yet come. The new governor, -Asad b. ʿAbdullah, seems to have seen something of -the danger though factional feeling was running so high -that the administration was almost helpless in face of it. -He tried to continue Muslim’s policy of conciliation by -appointing agents of known probity. Tawba b. Abī -Usayd, a mawlā who had been intendant for Muslim, and -who “treated the people fairly, made himself easily -accessible, dealt uprightly with the army and maintained -their supplies,” he persuaded to remain in office under him. -Hāniʾ b. Hāniʾ, the financial intendant at Samarqand, -was unpopular; he was recalled and Al-<i>H</i>asan b. Abiʾl-ʿAmarra<i>t</i>a -of Kinda, who was in sympathy with the -mawālī, appointed in his place. With him was associated -Thābit Qu<i>t</i>na, who had been a leader of some repute -under Saʿīd Khudhayna, “gallant warrior, distinguished -poet, confidant of Yazīd b. Muhallab, and -universally popular”<a name="FNanchor_80" id="FNanchor_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a>. Still more significant is the -fact that one of Asad’s earliest actions was to renew the -practice, neglected since the days of ʿOmar II, of sending<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[68]</a></span> -an embassy to the Chinese court. As before, however, -the Arabs resented the favour shown to the Persians, -and the military weakness of Ibn Abiʾl-ʿAmarra<i>t</i>a roused -them to open anger. Strong Turkish forces, probably -guerilla bands swollen by refugees and malcontents from -the wasted districts, spread over the country and appeared -even before Samarqand. The governor made some show -of opposition, but avoided coming to grips with them, -thus intensifying his unpopularity.</p> - -<p>Samarqand indeed was gradually becoming more and -more isolated, but no assistance could be given from -Khurāsān. During his three years of office Asad’s -attention was wholly engaged with the situation in -<i>T</i>ukhāristān and the South. Even here his constant -expeditions, to Gharjistān, Khuttal, and elsewhere, met -with no success. Worse still, in 108/726 he found his -forces in Khuttal opposed by the Khāqān with his -Türgesh. The princes of <i>T</i>ukhāristān had taken to -heart the lessons of the “Day of Thirst”, and the powerful -chief who had already all but driven the Arabs out of -Sogdiana was now called in to expel them from the -Oxus basin as well. Asad visited his failure on the -Mu<i>d</i>arites, whom he may have suspected of treachery, -but the indignation called out by his treatment of such -men as Na<i>s</i>r b. Sayyār, ʿAbdur-Ra<i>h</i>mān b. Nuʿaym, -Sawra b. Al-<i>H</i>urr, and Al-Bakhtarī, made his recall -inevitable. Nor had his measures removed the distrust -and hatred of the subject peoples. The land was wasted -and desolate<a name="FNanchor_81" id="FNanchor_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a>, the crushing taxation was not lightened, -and all Persian governors were not of the stamp of Tawba; -many of them were but too ready to rival their Arab -rulers in greed and cruelty. Asad may have gained the -friendship of many dihqāns<a name="FNanchor_82" id="FNanchor_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a>, but that was an easier -matter than to placate the population. In such an -atmosphere it was only to be expected that Shīʿite and -ʿAbbāsid propaganda, though actively combated by the -administration, found a fertile field among the Muslim -converts in Khurāsān and Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān, and was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[69]</a></span> -already beginning to undermine the whole fabric of Arab -government.</p> - -<p>For a moment the hopes of a radical change of policy -entertained by the mawālī and the clearer-sighted Arabs -were raised to the highest pitch by the appointment (in 109) -of Ashras b. ʿAbdullah as-Sulami, accompanied by the -separation of Khurāsān from Khālid al-Qasrī’s province -of ʿIrāq. It is unnecessary to recapitulate here the far-reaching -concessions by which he hoped to secure, and -actually did for a time secure the allegiance of the -<i>S</i>ughdians, or the methods by which the local princes, -especially Ghūrak, succeeded in checking the movement<a name="FNanchor_83" id="FNanchor_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a>. -It is generally assumed that the hostility of Ghūrak -was due to the serious fall in revenue which would result. -Though this was doubtless the plea put forward and -accepted by Ashras it can scarcely have been the true -issue. Ghūrak’s aim was not to maintain himself on good -terms with the Arab governors but to recover his -independence. If once the people became “Arabs” -all hope of success must have been lost. It was a game -with high stakes and Ghūrak won. It must not be overlooked, -however, that the account as we have it is -traditional and may often be mistaken on the sequence -of cause and effect. The astonishing reversal of the -measures adopted by Ashras is more probably to be -explained by pressure from above, not from below, and -our tradition may really present only the popular view of -the Caliph Hishām’s reorganization of the financial administration<a name="FNanchor_84" id="FNanchor_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a>. -The Arabs resorted to brutal methods to -wring the taxes from the new converts, and with -incredible blindness selected the dihqāns for special -indignities. It is not unlikely that Narshakhī’s story -of the martyrdom of native Muslims in Bukhārā is connected -with this event, though there are many other -possible explanations, such as, for example, an attempted -<i>H</i>ārithite movement (see below, <a href="#Page_76">p. 76 f.</a>) The reaction -swung the whole population of Transoxania, dihqāns -and peasantry alike, into open rebellion. The first small<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[70]</a></span> -party of emigrants who quitted Samarqand, although -supported by a few Arabs, were induced to surrender and -return<a name="FNanchor_85" id="FNanchor_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a>, but within a few months the dreaded Khāqān -with his Türgesh had joined forces with the rebels and -swept the Arabs across the Oxus. Even Bukhārā was -lost<a name="FNanchor_86" id="FNanchor_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> and only Samarqand with two minor posts -on the Zarafshān, Kamarja and Dabūsia, held out. -Ghūrak, however, still supported the Arabs, as -Samarqand, although besieged, seems to have been in -no danger, while his son Mukhtār, doubtless to keep a -footing in the opposite camp, joined with the Türgesh.</p> - -<p>The pressing danger sobered the Arabs and temporarily -united all parties and factions. The army was -concentrated at Āmul but for three months was unable to -cross the river in the face of the combined native and -Türgesh armies. A small body under Qa<i>t</i>an b. Qutayba -which had already crossed and fortified itself before the -arrival of the Turks was beleaguered. The Turkish -cavalry even made raids on Khurāsān with an excess of -boldness which was punished by a mounted force under -Thābit Qu<i>t</i>na. At length Ashras got his forces across -and, joining with Qa<i>t</i>an b. Qutayba, advanced on -Paykand. The enemy cut off the water supply, and had -it not been for the gallantry and self-sacrifice of <i>H</i>ārith -b. Surayj, Thābit Qu<i>t</i>na, and their companions, an even -greater and more irretrievable “Day of Thirst” had -resulted. In spite of their weakness, Qa<i>t</i>an and the -cavalry of Qays and Tamīm charged the enemy and forced -them back, so that Ashras was able to continue his -advance towards Bukhārā. In the heavy fighting the -Muslim forces were divided, Ashras and Qa<i>t</i>an gave each -other up for lost, and Ghūrak judged that the time had -come to throw in his lot with the Turks. Two days later, -however, the armies were reunited and on the retiral of -the Turks encamped at Bawādara outside the walls of -Bukhārā, whence they prepared to besiege the city. -Ghūrak also retrieved his error and rejoined Ashras. -The Khāqān withdrew towards Samarqand, but sat down<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[71]</a></span> -before Kamarja, expecting to take it by storm in a few -days at the most. The Arabic narratives of these events -are confused in several places, which has given rise to -many incorrect statements, such as that Ghūrak was -beleaguered with the Arabs in Kamarja and that the -garrison consisted of Qa<i>t</i>an and his forces. Kamarja was -not in the neighbourhood of Paykand, as Wellhausen -states, but a few farsakhs west of Samarqand<a name="FNanchor_87" id="FNanchor_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a>. When -the garrison would not yield to assault Khāqān tried -other methods. Accompanying his expedition was -Khusrū the son of Pērōz and grandson of Yazdigird, -heir of the Sāsānid kings. This prince was sent to parley -with the garrison, but when he claimed the restoration -of his kingdom and promised them an amnesty, it is not -surprising that the Arabs indignantly refused to hear him. -Nor would the appearance of a Sāsānid prince evoke -much enthusiasm amongst the Iranians of Transoxania. -As the Sāsānid house had taken refuge in China, however, -the presence of Khusrū might be taken as an indication -that the rebels were receiving encouragement from China -also, though the Chinese records are silent on this -expedition. Khāqān’s second proposal, that he should -hire the Arabs as mercenaries, was rejected as derisively -as the first. The siege was then pressed with renewed -vigour, both sides putting their prisoners and hostages -to death, but after fifty-eight days Khāqān, on the advice -of the son of Ghūrak and the other <i>S</i>ughdian princes, -allowed the garrison to transfer either to Samarqand or -Dabūsia. On their choosing the latter, the terms were -faithfully carried out after an exchange of hostages.</p> - -<p>The fame of the defence of Kamarja spread far and -wide, but it brought little relief to the pressure on the -Arabs in Transoxania. Even Khwārizm was affected -by the movement of revolt, but at the first symptoms of -open rebellion it was crushed by the local Muslims, -probably Arabs settled in the district, with the aid of a -small force despatched by Ashras. The reference made in -<i>T</i>abarī to assistance given to the rebels by the Turks is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[72]</a></span> -probably to be discounted, as is done by Ibn al-Athīr. -It is of course quite possible that the movement was -instigated by the Türgesh, though no such explanation -is necessary, but if any Turks were engaged they were -probably local nomadic tribes. Ashras seems to have -remained before Bukhārā during the winter, possibly -in Paykand; the Türgesh probably withdrew towards -Shāsh and Farghāna.</p> - -<p>In the following year, 730/111-112<a name="FNanchor_88" id="FNanchor_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a>, the attacks on -the army of Ashras were renewed. The course of events -can only be gathered from the accounts given of the -difficulties experienced by the new governor, Junayd -b. ʿAbdur-Ra<i>h</i>mān al-Murrī, in joining the army before -Bukhārā. His guide advised him to levy a force from -Zamm and the neighbouring districts before crossing the -Oxus but Junayd refused, only to find himself after crossing -put to the necessity of calling on Ashras for a bodyguard -of cavalry. This force narrowly escaped disaster -on its way to meet Junayd and fought a second severe -engagement on the return journey before reaching -Paykand. The enemy are variously described as “men -of Bukhārā and <i>S</i>ughd” and “Turks and <i>S</i>ughdians”; -it may therefore be assumed that they were the same -forces against whom Ashras had fought the previous -year. Wellhausen is probably correct in supposing that -Ashras was practically beleaguered, though not in -Bukhārā. The recapture of this city and the retiral of -Khāqān took place shortly after Junayd’s arrival, in -circumstances which are not described<a name="FNanchor_89" id="FNanchor_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a>. The -attitude of Tugshāda during this episode is not recorded. -It is practically certain, however, that he remained in -Bukhārā, and after the reconquest was able to make his -peace with the Arabs, probably on the excuse of <i>force -majeure</i>. At all events he retained his position, possibly -because Junayd thought it impolitic in the face of the -situation to victimise the nobles in the reconquered -territories and thus provoke a more stubborn resistance -in the rest of the country. The Arabs seem to have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[73]</a></span> -followed up the Turks towards Samarqand, probably to -relieve the garrison; the two armies met again at -Zarmān, seven farsakhs from Samarqand, where the -Arabs claimed a success, one of their prisoners being a -nephew of Khāqān. From <i>S</i>ughd the army marched -to Tirmidh where Junayd halted for two months in the -friendly atmosphere of Chaghāniān before returning to -Merv. His intention was no doubt to make arrangements -for the pacification or reconquest of <i>T</i>ukhāristān and -Khuttal; in the following year his troops were actually -engaged in this direction when the Türgesh invasion of -<i>S</i>ughd forced him to change his plans. Balādhurī -quotes Abū ʿUbayda for the statement that Junayd -reconquered certain districts in <i>T</i>ukhāristān which had -revolted.</p> - -<p>How lightly even yet factional feeling was slumbering -was shown after the return of the army, when the -Bāhilites of Balkh had a chance to retaliate on Na<i>s</i>r b. -Sayyār for their discomfiture at Barūqān. Though -Junayd was prompt to punish the offending governor, -the incident throws a strong light on one cause of the -weakness of the Arabs in these campaigns.</p> - -<p>Early in 731/112-113, the Türgesh and <i>S</i>ughdians -gathered their forces for the investment of Samarqand. -Ghūrak now openly joined the Khāqān. Sawra b. -Al-<i>H</i>urr, the governor of Samarqand, unable to face the -enemy in the field, sent an urgent message to Junayd for -assistance. The governor hastily recalled his troops, -but crossed the river without waiting for them against -the advice of his generals. “No governor of Khurāsān,” -said al-Mujashshar b. Muzā<i>h</i>im, one of the ablest of the -Arab commanders, “should cross the river with less than -fifty thousand men.” Accompanied only by a small -force, Junayd reached Kish, where he raised some local -levies and prepared to march on Samarqand. The enemy -in the meantime, after blocking up the water supplies -on his road, interposed their forces between Samarqand -and the army of relief. Junayd thereupon decided to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[74]</a></span> -follow the direct route across the Shāwdār mountains -in the hope of avoiding an engagement, but when only -four farsakhs from Samarqand was surprised in the -defiles by Khāqān. The advance-guard was driven in -and the main body engaged in a furious struggle in which -both sides fought to a standstill. The Arabs, hemmed in -on all sides, were forced to entrench; stragglers, refugees, -and baggage, collected near Kish, were attacked by a -detachment of Turks and severely handled. Khāqān -renewed his attacks on the camp the next day, all but -overwhelming Junayd, and settled down thereafter to -beleaguer him. In this predicament there was only one -course open to Junayd. Had his force perished, Samarqand -would certainly have fallen in the end and two -disasters taken the place of one. He therefore adopted -the more prudent, if unheroic, course of ordering Sawra -to leave a skeleton garrison in Samarqand and march out -to join him by way of the river: Sawra, however, took -the short cut across the mountains, and was actually -within four miles of Junayd, when the Turkish forces -bore down on him. The battle lasted into the heat of -the day, when the Turks, on Ghūrak’s advice it is said, -having first set the grass on fire, drew up so as to shut -Sawra off from the water. Maddened by heat and thirst, -the Arabs charged the enemy and broke their ranks, -only to perish miserably in the fire, Turks and Muslims -together. The scattered remnants were pursued by the -Turkish cavalry and of twelve thousand men scarcely -a thousand escaped. While the enemy were engaged with -Sawra, Junayd freed himself from his perilous position -in the defiles, though not without severe fighting, and -completed his march to Samarqand. <i>T</i>abarī gives also -a variant account of the “Battle of the Pass,” the main -difference in which is the inclusion of the Jabghu on the -side of the Turks. In view of the Arab expeditions into -<i>T</i>ukhāristān, it is improbable that the Jabghu, even if -he was present personally, which is doubtful, was -accompanied by any of his troops. The Persian <i>T</i>abarī<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[75]</a></span> -also contains an entirely different version of the Battle -of the Pass and the fate of Sawra. The original version -is amply attested by contemporary poets, who show no -mercy to Junayd. Whatever credit the Arabs gained in -this battle is reflected on Na<i>s</i>r b. Sayyār and the mawālī. -Junayd remained at Samarqand for some time, recuperating -his forces, while couriers were sent to Hishām with the -news of the disaster. The Caliph immediately ordered -twenty thousand reinforcements from Ba<i>s</i>ra and Kūfa -to be sent to Khurāsān, together with a large number of -weapons and a draft on the treasury, at the same time -giving Junayd a free hand in enlistment.</p> - -<p>The Turks, disappointed in their attack on Samarqand, -withdrew to Bukhārā, where they laid siege to Qa<i>t</i>an b. -Qutayba. Here they were also on the natural lines of -communication between Samarqand and Khurāsān. -Junayd held a council, and of three alternatives, either -to remain in Samarqand and await reinforcements, or -to retire on Khurāsān <i>via</i> Kish and Zamm, or to attack -the enemy, chose the last. But the morale of the Arabs -was sadly shaken; a garrison of eight hundred men for -Samarqand was scraped together only by granting a -considerable increase in their pay, while the troops -openly regarded the decision to face Khāqān and the -Turkish hordes as equivalent to courting destruction. -Junayd now marched with the utmost circumspection, -however, and easily defeated a small body of the enemy -in a skirmish near Karmīnīa. The following day -Khāqān attacked his rearguard near <i>T</i>awāwīs (on the -edge of the oasis of Bukhārā), but the attack had been -foreseen and was beaten off. As it was now well into -November, the Türgesh were compelled to withdraw -from Sogdiana, while Junayd entered Bukhārā in -triumph on the festival of Mihrjān. In Chaghāniān he -was joined by the reinforcements, whom he sent on to -Samarqand, the remainder of the troops returning to -their winter quarters.</p> - -<p>Junayd seems to have been content with saving<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[76]</a></span> -Samarqand and Bukhārā. As no further expeditions -are recorded of his two remaining years of office it must -be assumed that the situation in <i>S</i>ughd remained unchanged -and that the Türgesh irruptions also were -suspended. Though the Arabs still held Samarqand -and the territories of Bukhārā and Kish, they were in all -probability confined to these, while in the southern basin -their authority hardly extended beyond Balkh and Chaghāniān. -Both sides may have awaited the first move -by the other, but were surprised by the appearance of a -new factor, which threatened the existence of Arab -sovereignty in the Far East more seriously than any -external danger. It is noteworthy that in his last year -of office (115/733) Junayd resumed relations with the -Chinese court. The Turkish title of the leader of the -embassy, Mo-se-lan Tarkan, suggests that none of the -ambassadors were actually Arabs, but that the governor -had commissioned some dignitaries from the subject -states to represent the Arab government. The only -embassy recorded in this year from a native state, however, -came from Khuttal. In the same year Khurāsān -was visited by a severe drought and famine, and to provide -for the needs of Merv, Junayd commandeered supplies -from all the surrounding districts. This, added to the -military disasters of the last few years and the -insinuations of Shīʿite propaganda, provoked open -discontent in the district which had hitherto been outwardly -faithful to Merv, namely the principalities of -Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān. The leader of the malcontents was -Al-<i>H</i>ārith b. Surayj, who was flogged in consequence -by the governor of Balkh. The discontent flared into -open revolt on the death of Junayd in Mu<i>h</i>arram 716 -(Feb. 734). <i>H</i>ārith, assisted by the princes and people -of Jūzjān, Fāryāb, and <i>T</i>ālaqān, marched on Balkh and -captured it from Na<i>s</i>r b. Sayyār. The versions leave -it uncertain whether <i>H</i>ārith defeated Na<i>s</i>r and -then captured the city or whether he entered the city -first and beat off an attempt at recapture by Na<i>s</i>r.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[77]</a></span> -(Wellhausen’s reference to the Oxus is due to his so misunderstanding -the “river of Balkh” in <i>T</i>ab. 1560. 2. -That it refers here, as frequently, to the Dehas river is -clear from the distance to the city (2 farsakhs, whereas -the Oxus lay twelve farsakhs from Balkh) as well as from -the mention of the bridge of ʿA<i>t</i>ā.) From Balkh he moved -against the new governor ʿĀ<i>s</i>im b. ʿAbdullah al-Hilālī, -at Merv, capturing Merv-Rūdh on the way. ʿĀ<i>s</i>im found -a large section of the inhabitants in league with <i>H</i>ārith, -but on his threatening to evacuate Merv and to call for -Syrian troops, the local forces rallied round him. At -the first reverse, the princes of Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān -deserted <i>H</i>ārith, whose army fell from sixty thousand to -three thousand. He was thus reduced to making terms -with ʿĀsim, but early in the following year renewed his -revolt. ʿĀsim, hearing that Asad b. ʿAbdullah was on -the way as his successor, began to intrigue with <i>H</i>ārith -against him. The plan miscarried, however; <i>H</i>ārith -seized the governor and held him to ransom, so that Asad -on his arrival found the rebels in possession of all Eastern -Khurāsān, and Merv threatened both from the East and -from the South. Sending a force under ʿAbdur Ra<i>h</i>mān -b. Nuʿaym towards Merv Rūdh to keep <i>H</i>ārith’s main -body in check, he marched himself against the rebel -forces at Āmul and Zamm. These took refuge in the -citadel of Zamm, and Asad, having thus checked the -insurgents in this quarter, continued his march on Balkh. -Meanwhile <i>H</i>ārith seems to have retreated before ʿAbdur-Ra<i>h</i>mān -towards Balkh and thence across the Oxus, -where he laid siege to Tirmidh. Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān -returned to its allegiance; on the other hand <i>H</i>ārith -was now supported not only by the kings of Khuttal -and Nasaf, but also, as appears from later events, by -the Jabghu of <i>T</i>ukhāristān. The government troops were -unable to cross the Oxus in the face of <i>H</i>ārith’s army; -finding, however, that the garrison was well able to defend -itself, they returned to Balkh, while <i>H</i>ārith, after falling -out with the king of Khuttal, seems to have retired into<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[78]</a></span> -<i>T</i>ukhāristān. Here, following the example of Mūsā -b. Khāzim at Tirmidh, he made a safe retreat for himself -in Badakhshān.</p> - -<p>The motives of <i>H</i>ārith’s rebellion have been most -variously estimated. In spite of the unctuous sentiments -which he is represented as uttering on all occasions, it -is hard to find in him the “pious Muslim, ascetic and -reformer” whom van Vloten too sharply contrasts with -the government officials<a name="FNanchor_90" id="FNanchor_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a>. In spite too of the -prominent position given to him in the Arabic chronicles, -it may even be questioned whether he and his small -personal following were not rather the tools than the -leaders of the elements making for the overthrow of the -Umayyad administration in Khurāsān. At all events the -weakness of his hold over his temporary followers is -much more striking than his transient success. Further -evidence of this is given in a most important narrative -prefaced by <i>T</i>abarī to his account of Asad’s expedition -into <i>S</i>ughd. Except for the scantiest notices, the Arabic -historians have nothing to say regarding the effects of -the war in Khurāsān on the situation in Transoxania. -Wellhausen’s conclusion (based apparently on <i>T</i>abarī -1890. 6) that “<i>H</i>ārith first unfurled the black flag in -Transoxania in the last year of Junayd” is scarcely -tenable. There is further no evidence at all for his -assumption that Samarqand had fallen into the hands -of the <i>H</i>ārithites, especially as Bukhārā remained loyal to -the administration. That Asad’s expedition was not, -in fact, directed against <i>H</i>ārith follows in the clearest -possible manner from the narrative referred to (<i>T</i>ab. -1585. 6-16).</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Then Asad marched towards Samarqand by way of Zamm, -and when he reached Zamm, he sent to Al-Haytham ash-Shaybānī, -one of <i>H</i>ārith’s followers, who was in Bādhkar (the citadel of Zamm), -saying “That which you have disowned in your own people is only -their evil ways, but that does not extend to the women ... <i>nor to -the conquest by the unbelievers of such as Samarqand</i>. Now I am on -my way to Samarqand and I take an oath before God that no harm -shall befall you on my initiative, but you shall have friendly and -honourable treatment and pardon, you and those with you....”<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[79]</a></span> -So Al-Haytham came out to join him on the condition of pardon -which he had given him, and Asad pardoned him, and Al-Haytham -marched with him to Samarqand and Asad gave them double pay.”</p> - -</div> - -<p>The expedition therefore was obviously against unbelievers. -That the whole of <i>S</i>ughd was lost to the Arabs -is clear from the fact that Asad found it necessary to take -provisions for the army with him from Bukhārā. He was -not successful in recapturing the city, however, and -attempted no more than the damming of the canal -sluices at Waraghsar.</p> - -<p>The fate of the garrison of Samarqand has thus been -passed over in silence, unless, perhaps, it is hinted at in -Asad’s reference to the capture of Muslim women. -Whether Ghūrak recaptured it with his own troops or -with the aid of the Türgesh, it can scarcely be doubted -that he had taken advantage of the dissensions in -Khurāsān to realise his ambition and at last drive the -Arabs out of his capital. Of all the conquests of Qutayba -beyond the Oxus, Bukhārā, Chaghāniān, and perhaps -Kish alone remained to the Arabs. A confirmatory -detail is the cessation of <i>S</i>ughdian embassies to China -between 731 and 740: now that independence (even if -under Türgesh suzerainty) had been won again, there was -no need to invoke Chinese support. Negative evidence -of the same kind is afforded by the absence of any Arab -embassy during the same period. Had the Arabs been in -possession of <i>S</i>ughd, it is practically certain that Asad, -as he had done before, would have renewed relations with -the Chinese court. Against this view may be set the -statement in <i>T</i>ab. 1613. 5 that Khāqān was preparing an -army to invest Samarqand at the time of his assassination. -This report is, however, from its nature untrustworthy, -and is contradicted by the presence of the king -of <i>S</i>ughd with <i>S</i>ughdian troops in the Türgesh army in -119/737 as well as by Na<i>s</i>r b. Sayyār’s expedition to -Samarqand two years later. <i>S</i>ughd thus enjoyed once -more a brief period of independence. In 737 or 738 -Ghūrak died and his kingdom was divided amongst his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[80]</a></span> -heirs. He was succeeded at Samarqand by his son Tu-ho -(? <i>T</i>arkhūn), formerly prince of Kabudhān. Another -son Me-chuʾo (? Mukhtār) was already king of Māyamurgh, -while the king of Ishtīkhan in 742 was a certain Ko-lo-pu-lo -who may perhaps be identified with Ghūrak’s -brother Afarūn<a name="FNanchor_91" id="FNanchor_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a>.</p> - -<p>The year after the campaigns against <i>H</i>ārith, 118/736, -was devoted by Asad to the re-organisation of his province, -including a measure which, it seems, he had already -projected in his first term of office. This was the -removal of the provincial capital from Merv to Balkh<a name="FNanchor_92" id="FNanchor_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a>. -Since no other governor of Khurāsān followed -his example we must seek the motive for the innovation -either in the contemporary situation in Khurāsān -and Transoxania or in Asad’s personal views. Explanations -based on the former are not hard to find. Asad, -on taking office, had been faced with a serious situation -both in Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān and across the river. He -had obviously to establish a strong point <i>d’appui</i>. The -loyalty of the garrison at Merv was not above suspicion -but the garrison at Balkh was composed of Syrian troops, -who could be trusted to the uttermost<a name="FNanchor_93" id="FNanchor_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a>. Merv was -also less convenient for reaching <i>T</i>ukhāristān, which was -at the moment the main area of operations. More -important still, perhaps, Balkh was the centre from which -all disturbances spread in Eastern Khurāsān, as in the -revolt of Nēzak and the recent attempt of <i>H</i>ārith. As -the holding of Balkh had enabled Qutayba to forestall -Nēzak, it is possible that Asad felt that in Balkh he would -be in a position to check all similar movements at the -beginning. Other considerations may also have disposed -him to take this view. Balkh was the traditional capital -and on it, as we have seen, was focussed the local sentiment -of Eastern Khurāsān. Merv, on the other hand, -had always been the capital of the foreigners, of the -Sāsānians before the Arabs. Asad’s personal friendship -with the dihqāns may have given him some insight into -the moral effect which would follow from the transference<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[81]</a></span> -of the administration to the centre of the national life. -Still greater would this effect be when the rebuilding was -carried out not by the Arabs themselves but by their own -people under the supervision of the Barmak, the hereditary -priest-ruler of the ancient shrine. Quite apart -from this, however, the rebuilding of Balkh was an event -of the greatest significance, and once restored it soon -equalled, if it did not eclipse, its rival Merv in size and -importance. While the new city was being built, the -army was employed in expeditions into <i>T</i>ukhāristān, -for the most part under the command of Judayʿ al-Karmānī, -who achieved some successes against the followers -of <i>H</i>ārith and even succeeded in capturing their fortress -in Badakhshān. Other raids were undertaken by the -governor himself, but without results of military -importance.</p> - -<p>Asad now planned a more ambitious expedition against -Khuttal, partly in retaliation for the assistance given to -<i>H</i>ārith, partly, it may be, to wipe off an old score. The -chronology presents some difficulties at this point. -<i>T</i>abarī relates two expeditions into Khuttal in the same -year 119/737, both from the same source, but that which is -undoubtedly the earlier is dated towards the close of the -year (Rama<i>d</i>ān = September). Wellhausen avoids the -difficulty by referring this expedition to 118, reckoning -back from the appointment of Na<i>s</i>r b. Sayyār, the data -for which are full and unimpeachable. This would seem -the obvious solution were it not that the date given in -the Chinese records for the assassination of Su-Lu, -738<a name="FNanchor_94" id="FNanchor_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a>, agrees perfectly with <i>T</i>abarī’s dating of the -Battle of Kharīstān in Dec. 737. The presence of Asad -on the second expedition would then hang together with -the “somewhat legendary” narrative of the Mihrjān -feast. There seems reason, therefore, for dating this -expedition in 120/738 and regarding it as having been -despatched by Asad, though not actually accompanied -by him. <i>T</i>abarī fortunately preserves also a short notice -of the situation in Khuttal. The heir of as-Sabal,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[82]</a></span> -whose name is to be read as Al-Hanash, from the Chinese -transcription Lo-kin-tsie<a name="FNanchor_95" id="FNanchor_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a>, had fled to China, possibly -on account of factional disturbances. On his deathbed -as-Sabal appointed a regent, Ibn As-Sāʿijī, to govern -the country until Al-Hanash could be restored. The -moment was certainly opportune for making an expedition -and Asad at first carried all before him. On his first -appearance, however, Ibn As-Sāʿijī had appealed for aid -to Su-Lu, who was at his capital Nawākath (on the Chu). -The Khāqān, with a small mounted force including the -<i>S</i>ughdian refugees, marched from Sūyāb (near Tokmak, -on the Chu) to Khuttal in seventeen days, only to find -Asad, warned of his approach by the regent, who was -endeavouring to play both sides off against each other, -in precipitate retreat. The baggage train had been -despatched in advance under Ibrāhīm b. ʿĀ<i>s</i>im with a -guard of Arabs and native troops from Chaghāniān but -the main body was overtaken by the Turks as it was -crossing the river and suffered severe losses. Asad, -considering himself safe with the river between his army -and the enemy, encamped and sent orders to Ibrāhīm -to halt and entrench his position. The Turks, however, -were able to effect a crossing; after an unsuccessful -assault on Asad’s camp, they hastened to overtake the -richer prize while the governor’s troops were too worn out -to protect it. By sending a party under cover to fall on -the troops of Chaghāniān from the rear while he himself -attacked in front, the Khāqān forced an entrance into -Ibrāhīm’s camp. Chāghān Khudāh, faithful to the last, -himself fell with the greater part of his forces but the -remainder of the garrison were saved by the timely -arrival of Asad. According to the main account, the -Arabs were allowed to withdraw to Balkh without -further serious fighting. A variant account given by -<i>T</i>abarī relates an unsuccessful assault by the Türgesh on -Asad’s camp on the morning following the “Battle of -the Baggage,” which happened to be the feast of Fi<i>t</i>r -(1st October 737). On the retiral of the Arabs, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[83]</a></span> -Khāqān, instead of returning to his capital with the -honours of the day, remained in <i>T</i>ukhāristān.</p> - -<p>Here he was joined by <i>H</i>ārith, who advised him to -undertake a winter raid into Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān while -the Arab troops were disbanded, undoubtedly in the -expectation that the local princes would again unite -with him against Asad. The governor retained his army -at Balkh until the winter had set in, and in the meantime -the Khāqān summoned forces to join him from <i>S</i>ughd -and the territories subject to <i>T</i>ukhāristān. The enumeration -which <i>T</i>abarī gives of the troops accompanying the -Khāqān on this expedition shows very clearly how completely -Arab rule in Transoxania and the Oxus basin -had been supplanted by that of the Turks. We are told -that besides the Khāqān’s own Turkish troops and -<i>H</i>ārith with his followers there were present the Jabghu, -the king of <i>S</i>ughd, the prince of Usrūshana, and the rulers -of Shāsh and Khuttal. It is fairly certain, of course, -that the list is exaggerated in so far as the actual presence -of the princes is concerned (it is in fact partially contradicted -in other parts of the narrative), but it can -scarcely be doubted that forces from some, if not all, of -these principalities were engaged. On the evening of -the 9th Dhuʾl-<i>H</i>ijja (7th Dec.) news reached Balkh that -the Türgesh with their auxiliaries, numbering some 30,000, -were at Jazza. Asad ordered signal fires to be lit and -with the Syrian garrison of Balkh and what other troops -he could muster from the district marched out against -them. The governor of Khulm sent in a second report -that the Khāqān, having been repulsed in an attack on the -town, had marched on towards Pērōz Nakhshēr, in the -neighbourhood of Balkh. From this point the enemy, -avoiding Balkh, moved on Jūzjān and occupied the -capital<a name="FNanchor_96" id="FNanchor_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a>. Instead of continuing his advance immediately, -the Khāqān halted here and sent out raiding -parties of cavalry in all directions, an action which put it -beyond doubt that the immediate object of the expedition -was not the capture of Merv but the rousing of Lower<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[84]</a></span> -<i>T</i>ukhāristān against the Arabs. Contrary to <i>H</i>ārith’s -expectations, however, the king of Jūzjān joined with the -Arabs, who marched towards Shubūrqān by way of -Sidra and Kharīstān. From the conflicting narratives -in <i>T</i>abarī, it seems that Asad surprised the Khāqān in -the neighbourhood of Kharīstān (or Sān) at a moment -when his available forces amounted only to 4,000. A -furious struggle ensued, which was decided in favour of -the Arabs by an assault on the Khāqān from the rear, -on the initiative of the king of Jūzjān. It is in connection -with the battle, which he describes as if it were a set -engagement in which the whole of the opposing forces -were engaged, that <i>T</i>abarī gives his list of the combatants. -But as only 4,000 out of the total of 30,000 troops with the -Khāqān were involved, the list is obviously out of place -and the whole narrative shows the marks of rehandling. -The Muslims gained an overwhelming success: the -Khāqān and <i>H</i>ārith, having narrowly escaped capture -in the confusion, were closely followed by Asad as far as -Jazza, when a storm of rain and snow prevented further -pursuit. They were thus able to regain the Jabghu in -<i>T</i>ukhāristān, with happier fortune than the raiding -parties, whose retreat was cut off by the vigilance of Al-Karmānī, -and of whom only a single band of <i>S</i>ughdians -made good their escape.</p> - -<p>On this skirmish at Kharīstān, for it was little more, -hung the fate of Arab rule, not only in Transoxania, but -possibly even in Khurāsān, at least for the immediate -future. Though the princes of Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān -fought for Asad in the first place, there can be little doubt -that a victory for Su-Lu would have swung them back to -the side of <i>H</i>ārith and the Turks, who would then have -been in a position to follow up their attacks with the -advantage of a base at Balkh, solidly supported by the -Oxus provinces. From such a danger the Arabs were -saved only by Asad’s resolution and fortunate selection -of Balkh as his residence. The account given of Hishām’s -incredulity on hearing the report shows how very serious<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[85]</a></span> -the outlook had been and the extent to which the name of -the Khāqān had become an omen of disaster. Kharīstān -was not only the turning point in the fortunes of the Arabs -in Central Asia, but gave the signal for the downfall of -the Türgesh power, which was bound up with the personal -prestige of Su-Lu. The princes of <i>T</i>ukhāristān and -Transoxania found it expedient to treat him with respect -as he was returning to Nawākath, but in his own country -the dissensions long fomented in secret by the Chinese -broke out. Su-Lu was assassinated by the Baga Tarkhan -(Kūr<i>s</i>ūl); the kingdom fell to pieces. “The Turks -split up and began to raid one another,” and the <i>coup de -grâce</i> of the Khanate was delivered at Sūyāb in 739 by -the faction of Kūr<i>s</i>ūl, supported by the Chinese and -with the assistance of Al-Ishkand and contingents from -Shāsh and Farghāna<a name="FNanchor_97" id="FNanchor_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a><a name="FNanchor_98" id="FNanchor_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a>. With the collapse of the -Türgesh kingdom disappeared the last great Turkish -confederation in Western Asia for more than two -centuries to come. The battle of Kharīstān assured -the supremacy of the Muslim civilisation in Sogdiana, but -it could not have attained the richness of its full development -there unless all danger from the steppes had been -removed. That this security was attained was due not -to the Arabs, but to the Chinese diplomacy, which, by -breaking down the greatest external obstacle to the -Muhammadan penetration of Central Asia, brought itself -face to face with the Arabs. This could scarcely have -been realised at once, however, by the Arab government, -whose immediate task was to restore its lost authority -in Transoxania.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Notes</span></h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_74" id="Footnote_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> As the history of this and the following period has been given in considerable -detail by Wellhausen (Arab. Reich 280 ff.) from the Arab point of view, it is -intended in these chapters to follow only the situation in Transoxania -and the course of the Türgesh conquests, avoiding as far as possible a -simple recapitulation of familiar matter. Thus little reference is made to -the factional strife among the Arabs, though it naturally played a very -important part in limiting their power to deal with the insurgents.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_75" id="Footnote_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75"><span class="label">[75]</span></a> See Chavannes, Documents 285, n. 3.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[86]</a></span></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_76" id="Footnote_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76"><span class="label">[76]</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> <i>T</i>ab. II. 1718. 3 ff.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_77" id="Footnote_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77"><span class="label">[77]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. 1462. 11; <i>cf.</i> 1688. 10, 1481 f.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_78" id="Footnote_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78"><span class="label">[78]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. 1690. 16.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_79" id="Footnote_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79"><span class="label">[79]</span></a> Chav. Doc. 206 f., 293 f.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_80" id="Footnote_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80"><span class="label">[80]</span></a> Van Vloten, La Domination Arabe 28.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_81" id="Footnote_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81"><span class="label">[81]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. 1533. 15.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_82" id="Footnote_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82"><span class="label">[82]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. 1501. 2.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_83" id="Footnote_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83"><span class="label">[83]</span></a> Wellhausen 284 f.: van Vloten 22 f.: <i>T</i>ab. 1507 f.: Bal. 428 f.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_84" id="Footnote_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_84"><span class="label">[84]</span></a> See Wellhausen 218.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_85" id="Footnote_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_85"><span class="label">[85]</span></a> The variant readings in <i>T</i>ab. 1509. 11. (<i>cf.</i> Ibn al-Athīr) make it doubtful -whether the taxes were reimposed on them or not.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_86" id="Footnote_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_86"><span class="label">[86]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. 1514. 11.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_87" id="Footnote_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_87"><span class="label">[87]</span></a> See Yāqūt s.v.: Barthold, Turkestan 127: and <i>cf.</i> <i>T</i>ab. 1523. 3. The chief -difficulty in <i>T</i>abarī’s text is the abrupt change at the last word of l. 14 on -p. 1516: thumma ta<i>h</i>awwala (ashrashu) ilā marjin yuqālu lahu bawādaratun -<i>faʿatāhum</i> sabābatun ... wahum nuzūlun bikamarjata. The -context shows that it was not to Ashras that Sabāba came but to the -garrison of Kamarja with the news that the Khāqān was retiring past -them (mārrun bikum).</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_88" id="Footnote_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88"><span class="label">[88]</span></a> The chronological difficulties are explained by Wellhausen 285 ff. They are -of small importance however, and it seems preferable to follow his dates -for these campaigns.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_89" id="Footnote_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_89"><span class="label">[89]</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> <i>T</i>ab. 1528. 9. with 1529. 5 f. 14 f.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_90" id="Footnote_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90"><span class="label">[90]</span></a> Van Vloten, <i>op. cit.</i> 29 ff.: Wellhausen 289 ff. (<i>cf.</i> 302 f.). Another account of -<i>H</i>ārith is given by Gardīzī ap. Barthold Turkestan, Texts pp. 1-2.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_91" id="Footnote_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91"><span class="label">[91]</span></a> Chav. Doc. 210, 136, 140; Barthold, Arab. Quellen 21. n. 8.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_92" id="Footnote_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92"><span class="label">[92]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. 1490, 1591. 18: Wellhausen 292 and 284 n.: Barthold in Zeitschrift -für Assyriologie XXVI (1911) 261.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_93" id="Footnote_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93"><span class="label">[93]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. 1590. 5. There does not seem to be any record of when these Syrians -were settled at Balkh.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_94" id="Footnote_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94"><span class="label">[94]</span></a> Wieger 1643: Chav. Doc. 284 f.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_95" id="Footnote_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_95"><span class="label">[95]</span></a> Chav. Doc. 168.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_96" id="Footnote_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_96"><span class="label">[96]</span></a> As Jūzjān is distinguished from Shubūrqān in <i>T</i>ab. 1608. 17, it is probable -that this was the town Kundurm or Qurzumān mentioned in Yaʿqūbī’s -Geog. 287.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_97" id="Footnote_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_97"><span class="label">[97]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. 1613: Chav. Doc. 83 f., 122 n. As regards the adjective Kharlukhī -applied to the Jabghu in 1612. 16, the most satisfactory explanation is -that given by Marquart, Hist. Glossen 183 f.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_98" id="Footnote_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_98"><span class="label">[98]</span></a> The frequent references in the Chinese annals to the association of Se-kin-tʾi, -king of Kish, with the Türgesh raise an interesting problem. There can -be no doubt that he is the same prince as Al-Ishkand, ruler of Nasaf, -in the Arabic records. The name is Iranian and personal, not dynastic. -(See Justi’s Iranisches Namenbuch.) Al-Ishkand is first mentioned in the -account of the Battle of the Pass, (<i>T</i>ab. 1542. 8) where he appears in command -of a cavalry force on the side of the Khāqān, though Kish and -Nasaf were both in the hands of the Arabs (1545. 1). The forces which -he commanded were therefore not the ordinary local troops. During -<i>H</i>ārith’s siege of Tirmidh he received reinforcements from Al-Ishkand, -but no statement is made on the composition of his forces. He is -mentioned again as accompanying the Khāqān and the <i>S</i>ughdians in the -attack on Asad before the “Battle of the Baggage” (1597. 17-18,) where -the reading ‘I<i>s</i>pahbadh of Nasā’ is probably an error in the tradition. -Again there can be no question here of local troops from Nasaf or Kish. In -the Chinese records Se-kin-tʾi appears as the commander of an independent -force, not merely a detachment of Turks or levies from Shāsh or Farghāna. -The most reasonable conclusion is that Al-Ishkand was the commander -of the corps of <i>S</i>ughdian refugees. This would explain the title “King of -the Warriors” by which he is sometimes mentioned in the Chinese records -(Chav. Doc. 147 n. 1 and 313). The actual term (Chākar) from which -the title was derived does not appear in the Arabic histories in this connection, -but it is perhaps possible that a variant of the name (derived -from <i>razm</i>) is to be read in <i>T</i>ab. 1614. 2 for the meaningless “razābin al-Kissī.” -In 1609. 15 a force of “Bābīya” is mentioned along with the -<i>S</i>ughdians, and the name, though unrecognisable, probably refers to some -forces connected with <i>S</i>ughd. Wellhausen’s conclusion that the <i>S</i>ughdians -and “Bābīya” formed part of the personal following of <i>H</i>ārith b. -Surayj seems to force the connection in the text too far (<i>h</i>amala ʾl-<i>h</i>ārithu -waman maʿahu min ahliʾs-sughdi wal-bābīyati). On the other hand, -since al-Ishkand appears as the ally of <i>H</i>ārith, we may conclude that -some understanding existed between the latter and the <i>S</i>ughdians (and -therefore the Turks) at the time of his revolt. It is probable that the -<i>S</i>ughdian corps assisted in the recovery of Samarqand from the Arabs.</p> - -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[87]</a></span></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[88]</a></span></p> - -<h2 id="V_THE_RECONQUEST_OF_TRANSOXANIA">V. THE RECONQUEST OF TRANSOXANIA.</h2> - -<p>The reaction produced by the downfall of the Türgesh -power was manifested in Transoxania in the first place -by an increased regard for China. The princes had found -the Türgesh yoke no less galling in the end than that of -the Arabs<a name="FNanchor_99" id="FNanchor_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a>; the country was as wasted and impoverished -by their continual raids as it had been under -the latter. The profitable native and transit trade, the -source of the entire wealth of the cities, must have shrunk -to negligible proportions if it had not wholly ceased. -All classes of the people therefore were weary of war and -sought only a peace consonant with their self-respect. -For the attainment of these aims it was vain to look to -China; the granting of bombastic titles to a few princes -brought neither comfort nor aid. A final opportunity -was thus offered to wise statesmanship to swing the whole -country round to the Arabs almost without a blow. -For two years, however, the situation seemed to remain -much as it was, except for an expedition into Khuttal, -probably on the pretext of assisting the ruling house -against a usurper from Bamiyān. Nevertheless some -progress had been made by the administration in regaining -the prestige it had lost. This was due not merely to the -effect of the victories over <i>H</i>ārith and the Türgesh, but -even more to Asad’s personal relations with the dihqāns. -He had, as we have seen, gratified the national pride -of the people of <i>T</i>ukhāristān by transferring the seat of -power from Merv, the capital of the foreigners, to Balkh, -the centre of their national life. As had been the case -even in his first term of office, he was able to attract to -his side many of the more influential elements in Lower -<i>T</i>ukhāristān and the Ephthalite lands—to this, in fact, -was largely due his success in the struggle with the Turks. -More striking evidence still is afforded by the conversion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[89]</a></span> -of the dihqāns at this period, amongst them the minor -chief Sāmān-Khudāh and probably also the Barmak. -By this means Asad laid the foundations for a true -reconciliation and Narshakhī’s work amply attests the -honour which later generations attached to his name. -His work was of course incomplete in that it was practically -confined to the ruling classes and naturally did not -extend to the now independent dihqāns of <i>S</i>ughd.</p> - -<p>Early in 120/738 Asad died, and after a lapse of some -months the governorship was conferred by Hishām on -Na<i>s</i>r b. Sayyār. For the subject peoples no choice -could have been more opportunely made. Na<i>s</i>r was -one of the few men who had come with honour and -reputation through the external and internal conflicts -of the last thirty years. Belonging to the small and -almost neutral tribe of Kināna, his position bore a strong -similarity to that of Qutayba in that both were more -dependent on the support of a powerful patron than on -their tribal connexions, and therefore, though favouring -Qays, less frantically partisan. In contrast to Qutayba, -however, Na<i>s</i>r, after thirty years of active leadership, -knew the situation in Khurāsān, Transoxania, -and Central Asia as no Arab governor had ever done. -He had seen the futility of trying to hold the country -by mere brute force, and the equal futility of trying to -dispense with force. While he held the support of -Hishām, therefore, he set himself to restore Arab authority -in Transoxania. The appointment of Qa<i>t</i>an b. Qutayba, -who had inherited much of his father’s ability, to -command the forces beyond the river gave earnest -of an aggressive policy. The appointment was not to -Samarqand, as Wellhausen says, but “over <i>S</i>ughd,” -<i>i.e.</i>, the garrisons in Bukhārā and probably Kish, who were -responsible in the first place for keeping the surrounding -districts in subjection. The governor himself then carried -out a brief expedition, intended apparently to punish -some rebels in the neighbourhood of the Iron Gate, -possibly in Shūmān. Having thus vindicated the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[90]</a></span> -authority of the administration, Na<i>s</i>r returned to Merv -and delivered the famous Khu<i>t</i>ba in which the system of -taxation and conditions of amnesty were at last laid down -in a form satisfactory to the mawālī and the subject -peoples<a name="FNanchor_100" id="FNanchor_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a>. The results were as he had foreseen. The -princes and people of Transoxania submitted, as far as -we can judge, without opposition when Na<i>s</i>r with his army -marched through <i>S</i>ughd to re-establish the Arab garrison -and administration in Samarqand.</p> - -<p>This expedition may in all probability be dated in -121/739. A year or two later, Na<i>s</i>r collected his forces, -which included levies from Transoxania, for an attack -on Shāsh. Wellhausen considers that the first two -expeditions were only stages of the third, but the -expedition to Shāsh can hardly have taken place earlier -than 122/740, in view of the fact that the armies of Shāsh -and Farghāna were engaged with the Türgesh in 739, -and of Narshakhī’s statement<a name="FNanchor_101" id="FNanchor_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a>, which there is no reason -to dispute, that <i>T</i>ughshāda was assassinated in the thirty-second -year of his reign. Reckoning in lunar years this -gives 122 (91-122), in solar years 123 (710-741), as the -date. This is confirmed by the Chinese record of an -embassy from Shāsh in 741 complaining that “Now -that the Turks have become subject to China, it is only -the Arabs that are a curse to the Kingdoms”<a name="FNanchor_102" id="FNanchor_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a>. 123 is -also the date given for the return of the <i>S</i>ughdians<a name="FNanchor_103" id="FNanchor_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a>. -It is most unlikely that the intervening year or years -passed without expeditions altogether, and the most -reasonable supposition is that they were occupied in the -pacification of <i>S</i>ughd. The expedition marched eastward -through Ushrūsana, whose prince, as usual, paid -his allegiance to the victor on his passage, but on reaching -the Jaxartes Na<i>s</i>r found his crossing opposed by the army -of Shāsh, together with <i>H</i>ārith b. Surayj and some -Turkish troops. It would seem that he was unable to -come to blows with the main body of the enemy, but -made a treaty with the king by which the latter agreed -to accept an Arab resident and to expel <i>H</i>ārith, who was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[91]</a></span> -accordingly deported to Fārāb. As usual, later tradition -magnified the exploits of the Arabs by crediting Na<i>s</i>r -with the capture and execution of Kūr<i>s</i>ūl, the Türgesh -leader who had been scarcely less redoubtable than the -Khāqān himself. If the story has any foundation it is -probably a legendary development from the capture -of a Turkish chief Al-Akhram, related by <i>T</i>abarī in a -variant account. The presence of Kūr<i>s</i>ūl with a Türgesh -force on this occasion is not in itself impossible, but if his -identification with Baga Tarkhan is sound, we know that -he was executed by the Chinese in 744/126<a name="FNanchor_104" id="FNanchor_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a>. The -expulsion of <i>H</i>ārith was probably the object for which the -expedition had been undertaken; before returning, -however, the Arabs entered Farghāna and pursued its -king as far as Qubā before bringing him to terms. The -negotiations were carried out between Sulaymān b. -<i>S</i>ūl, one of the princes of Jūrjān, and the Queen-Mother. -This invasion of Farghāna is related in three (or four) -different versions, some of which may possibly refer to a -second expedition mentioned by <i>T</i>abarī later. In the -same year, on returning from the expedition to Shāsh, -Na<i>s</i>r was met at Samarqand by the Bukhār Khudāh -<i>T</i>ughshāda and two of his dihqāns. The nobles laid a -complaint against the prince, but as Na<i>s</i>r seemed indisposed -to redress their grievance, they attempted to -assassinate both the Bukhār Khudāh and the Arab -intendant at Bukhārā, Wā<i>s</i>il b. ʿAmr. The former -was mortally wounded, and succeeded by his son Qutayba, -so named in honour of the conqueror. The incident is -related also by Narshakhī with some additional details -which profess to explain the assassination. The two -narratives present such a remarkable similarity of phrase, -however, even though they are in different languages, -that it is rather more likely that the Persian version has -elaborated the story than that <i>T</i>abarī deliberately -suppressed any offensive statements, as argued by van -Vloten<a name="FNanchor_105" id="FNanchor_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a>.</p> - -<p>Except for a possible second expedition to Farghāna,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[92]</a></span> -no other campaigns into Transoxania are recorded of -Na<i>s</i>r, unless Balādhurī’s tradition (from Abū ʿUbayda) -of an unsuccessful attack on Ushrūsana refers to a -separate expedition. This is unlikely, and the account -conflicts with that given in <i>T</i>abarī. Ushrūsana, however, -was never really subdued until nearly a century later. -<i>T</i>ukhāristān, if it had not already been recovered by -Asad, may have made submission of its own accord. -Since the defeat of the Türgesh and the flight of <i>H</i>ārith -it had ceased to hold any menace to the Arabs, and Na<i>s</i>r -had accordingly retransferred the capital to Merv on his -appointment.</p> - -<p>The governor now turned his attention to restoring -the prosperity of the country and developing a policy -of co-operation with the subject peoples. Na<i>s</i>r was the -first Arab ruler of Transoxania to realise that the government -depended for support in the last resort on the -middle classes and agriculturalists. Both these classes -were of greater political importance perhaps in Transoxania, -with its centuries of mercantile tradition, than -any other were in the Empire. It was in the same -way that in later years the <i>T</i>āhirids and Sāmānids -established their ascendancy<a name="FNanchor_106" id="FNanchor_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a>. He was thus able not -only to complete the work begun by Asad b. ʿAbdullah, -but to settle it on more stable foundations. Shortly -after his recapture of Samarqand he had sent an embassy -to China. This was followed up in 126/744 by a much -more elaborate embassy, obviously intended to regulate -commercial relations in the most complete manner -possible, in which the Arabs were accompanied by -ambassadors not only from the Sogdian cities and -<i>T</i>ukhāristān, but even from Zābulistān, Shāsh, and the -Türgesh. Two other Arab embassies are also recorded -in 745 and 747. There can be no doubt that it was not -so much the justice of Na<i>s</i>r’s rule as his personal influence -and honesty that reconciled the peoples of Transoxania. -Even the <i>S</i>ughdian refugees, stranded after the dissolution -of the Türgesh confederacy, trusted him to honour<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[93]</a></span> -the conditions upon which they had agreed to return, -and were not deceived although his concessions raised -a storm of protest, and the Caliph himself was brought -to confirm them only for the sake of restoring peace.</p> - -<p>It is not surprising, however, that the princes were -dissatisfied with the success which had attended the -pacification of Transoxania. The people were “becoming -Arabs” too rapidly and their own authority was -menaced in consequence. They were still hopeful of -regaining their independence, especially when Na<i>s</i>r’s -position became less secure after the death of Hishām. -We hear therefore of sporadic embassies to China, such -as that sent from Ishtīkhan in 745 asking for annexation -to China “like a little circumscription.” That the -governor was aware of this undercurrent may be judged -from the fact that he felt it necessary to have <i>H</i>ārith b. -Surayj pardoned, in case he should again bring in the -Turks to attack the government<a name="FNanchor_107" id="FNanchor_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a>. But the people as -a whole held for Na<i>s</i>r. The respect and even affection -which he inspired held all Transoxania true to him -during the last troubled years. No tribute could be more -eloquent than the facts that not a single city in Transoxania -took advantage of the revolutionary movements -in Khurāsān to withdraw its allegiance, that Abū Muslim’s -missionaries went no further than the Arab colonies at -Āmul, Bukhārā, and Khwārizm, and that the loyal -garrison of Balkh found first support and then refuge in -Chaghāniān and <i>T</i>ukhāristān. On these facts the -various authorities whose narratives are related by -<i>T</i>abarī completely agree, and by their agreement disprove -the exaggerated account given by Dīnawarī (359 f.) that -“Abū Muslim sent his envoys (duʿāt) to all quarters of -Khurāsān, and the people rallied <i>en masse</i> to Abū Muslim -from Herāt, Būshanj, Merv-Rūdh, <i>T</i>ālaqān, Merv, Nasā, -Abīward, <i>T</i>ūs, Naysābūr, Sarakhs, Balkh, Chaghāniān, -<i>T</i>ukhāristān, Khuttalān, Kish, and Nasaf.” Dīnawarī -himself states a little later that Samarqand joined Abū -Muslim only after the death of Na<i>s</i>r. Abū Muslim’s<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[94]</a></span> -main strength, in fact, was drawn from Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān -and the neighbourhood of Merv-Rūdh, several of the -princes of which, including the ruler of Būshanj and -Khālid b. Barmak, declared for him. But even here the -people were not solidly against the administration. -We are told that a camp was established at Jīranj -(south of Merv) “to cut off the reinforcements of Na<i>s</i>r -b. Sayyār from Merv-Rūdh, Balkh, and the districts of -(Lower) <i>T</i>ukhāristān.” Herāt fell to Abū Muslim -by force of arms. The Syrian garrison of Balkh, together -with the Mu<i>d</i>arite party, were supported by the rulers -of both Upper and Lower <i>T</i>ukhāristān, and twice recaptured -the city from their stronghold at Tirmidh. -An example of Abū Muslim’s efforts to gain over the -Iranians is afforded by an incident when, having taken -300 Khwārizmian prisoners in an engagement, he -treated them well and set them free<a name="FNanchor_108" id="FNanchor_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a>.</p> - -<p>The tradition of the enthusiasm of the Iranians for -Abū Muslim is true only of the period after his success. -In our most authentic records there is no trace of a mass -movement such as has so often been portrayed. His -following was at first comparatively so small that had the -Arabs been more willing to support Na<i>s</i>r at the outset, -it is practically certain that it would have melted away as -rapidly as the following of <i>H</i>ārith b. Surayj at the first -reverse. “Nothing succeeds like success,” and Abū -Muslim, once victorious on so imposing a scale, and that -with the aid of Iranians, became a heroic figure among -the peoples of Eastern Khurāsān. The legend penetrated -but slowly into Transoxania. When by 130/748, however, -the whole of Eastern Khurāsān had fallen to Abū Muslim -and Na<i>s</i>r no longer held authority, his governors in -Transoxania were replaced by the nominees of Abū -Muslim without outward disturbance. But the recrudescence -of embassies to China shows that under the -surface currents were stirring. Shāsh had already -thrown off its allegiance and the Sogdian princes had by -no means lost all hope of regaining independence in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[95]</a></span> -spite of the tranquillity of the last few years. As it -happened, however, the first revolt was not on their part -but by the Arab garrison of Bukhārā under Sharīk b. -Shaykh in 133/750-751. The rising, which was due to -their resentment at the seizure of the Caliphate by the -ʿAbbāsids and the passing over of the ʿAlid house, was -suppressed with some difficulty by Abū Muslim’s lieutenant -Ziyād b. Sāli<i>h</i> assisted by the Bukhār Khudāh. -The fact that the Bukhār-Khudāh assisted the troops of -Abū Muslim against Sharīk might be regarded as an -indication that he belonged to the party of the former. -This inference is more than doubtful, however. Of the -30,000 men, who, we are told, joined the rebels, probably -the greater part were the townsmen, or “popular party,” -of Bukhārā. The revolt thus assumed the domestic -character of a movement against the aristocratic party, -who, led by the Bukhār-Khudāh, naturally cooperated -with the Government in its suppression. The events -of the following year are sufficient evidence against any -other explanation. According to Narshakhī, who gives -by far the fullest account of this revolt, Ziyād had also -to suppress a similar movement in Samarqand. In -the same year an expedition was sent into Khuttal by -Abū Dāwud, the governor of Balkh. Al-<i>H</i>anash at -first offered no opposition; later in the campaign he -attempted to hold out against the Arabs but was forced to -fly to the Turks and thence to China where he was given -the title of Jabghu in recompense for his resistance<a name="FNanchor_109" id="FNanchor_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a>. -By this expedition Khuttal was effectively annexed to the -Arab government for the first time.</p> - -<p>Of much greater, and indeed decisive, importance were -the results of an expedition under Ziyād b. Sāli<i>h</i> into the -Turkish lands beyond the Jaxartes. It is surprising to -find no reference to this either in <i>T</i>abarī or any other -of the early historians. A short notice is given by Ibn -al-Athīr, drawn from some source which is now apparently -lost. The earliest reference which we find in the Arabic -histories seems to be a passing mention of Ziyād b.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[96]</a></span> -Sāli<i>h</i>’s expedition “into <i>S</i>īn” in a monograph on Baghdād -by Ibn <i>T</i>ayfūr (d. 250/983)<a name="FNanchor_110" id="FNanchor_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a>. For a detailed -account of the battle we are therefore dependent on the -Chinese sources<a name="FNanchor_111" id="FNanchor_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a>. In 747 and 749 the Jabghu of -<i>T</i>ukhāristān had appealed to China for aid against -certain petty chiefs who were giving trouble in the Gilghit -and Chitral valleys. The governor of Kucha despatched -on this duty a Corean officer, Kao-hsien-shih, who -punished the offenders in a series of amazing campaigns -over the high passes of the Karakorum. Before returning -to Kucha after the last campaign he was called in by the -King of Farghāna to assist him against the king of -Shāsh. Kao-hsien-shih at first came to terms with the king -of Shāsh but when on some pretext he broke his word and -seized the city, the heir to the kingdom fled to <i>S</i>ughd for -assistance and persuaded Abū Muslim to intervene. -A strong force was accordingly despatched under Ziyād -b. Sāli<i>h</i>. The Chinese, with the army of Farghāna and the -Karluks (who had succeeded the Türgesh in the hegemony -of the Western Turks), gave battle at Athlakh, -near <i>T</i>arāz, in July 751 (Dhuʾl-<i>h</i>ijja 133). During the -engagement the Karluks deserted and Kao-hsien-shih, -caught between them and the Arabs, suffered a crushing -defeat. Though this battle marks the end of Chinese -power in the West, it was in consequence of internal -disruption rather than external pressure. Nothing was -further at first from the minds of the princes of <i>S</i>ughd than -the passing of the long tradition of Chinese sovereignty, -indeed it blazed up more strongly than ever. For had -not a Chinese army actually visited Shāsh on their very -borders; even if the Arabs had won the first battle, would -they not return to avenge the defeat? For the last -time the Shao-wu princes planned a concerted rising in -Bukhārā, Kish, <i>S</i>ughd, and Ushrūsana. But China gave -neither aid nor encouragement; the presence of Abū -Muslim at Samarqand overawed the <i>S</i>ughdians, and only -at Kish did the revolt assume serious proportions. Abū -Dāwud’s army easily crushed the insurgents in a pitched<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[97]</a></span> -battle at Kandak, near Kish, killing the king Al-Ikhrīd -and many of the other dihqāns. Amongst the treasures -of the royal palace which were sent to Samarqand were -“many articles of rare Chinese workmanship, vessels -inlaid with gold, saddles, brocades, and other objects -d’art.” The Bukhār-Khudāh Qutayba and the dihqāns -of <i>S</i>ughd also paid for their complicity with their -lives<a name="FNanchor_112" id="FNanchor_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a>.</p> - -<p>So ended the last attempt at restoring an independent -Sogdiana under the old régime. For some years yet the -princes of <i>S</i>ughd, Khwārizm, and <i>T</i>ukhāristān continued -to send appeals to China. The Emperor, however, -“preoccupied with maintaining peace, praised them all -and gave them consolation, then having warned them sent -them back to assure tranquillity in the Western lands.” -Abū Muslim had also, it would seem, realised the -importance of maintaining relations with the Chinese -court, for a succession of embassies from “the Arabs -with black garments” is reported, beginning in the year -following the battle of the Talas. As many as three are -mentioned in a single year. It is possible that these -embassies were in part intended to keep the government -informed on the progress of the civil wars in China, -though the active interest of the new administration in -their commerce would, as before, tend to reconcile the -influential mercantile communities to ʿAbbāsid rule. The -actual deathblow to the tradition of Chinese overlordship -in Western Central Asia was given, not by any such -isolated incident as the battle of the Talas, but by the -participation of Central Asian contingents in the -restoration of the Emperor to his capital in 757<a name="FNanchor_113" id="FNanchor_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a>. -Men from the distant lands to whom China had seemed -an immeasurably powerful and unconquerable Empire -now saw with their own eyes the fatal weaknesses that -Chinese diplomacy had so skilfully concealed. From this -blow Chinese prestige never recovered.</p> - -<p>The complete shattering of the Western Turkish -empires by the Chinese policy had also put an end to all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[98]</a></span> -possibility of intervention from that side. Transoxania, -therefore, was unable to look for outside support, while -the reorganization of the Muslim Empire by the early -ʿAbbāsid Caliphs prevented, not indeed sporadic though -sometimes serious risings, but any repetition of the -concerted efforts at national independence. The Shao-wu -princes and the more important dihqāns continued to -exercise a nominal rule until the advent of the Sāmānids, -but many of them found that the new policy of the Empire -offered them an opportunity of honourable and lucrative -service in its behalf and were quick to take advantage of -it. On the other hand the frequent revolts in Eastern -Khurāsān under the guise of religious movements show -that the mass of the people remained unalterably hostile -to their conquerors<a name="FNanchor_114" id="FNanchor_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a>. In none of these, however, was -the whole of Transoxania involved until the rising -organized by Rāfiʿ b. Layth three years after the fall of -the Barmakids. The extraordinary success of his -movement may partly be ascribed to resentment at their -disgrace, but it perhaps counted for something that he -was the grandson of Na<i>s</i>r b. Sayyār. Though the revolt -failed it led directly to the only solution by which Transoxania -could ever become reconciled to inclusion in the -Empire of the ʿAbbāsids. Whether by wise judgment -or happy chance, to Maʿmūn belongs the credit of laying -the foundations of the brilliant Muhammadan civilisation -which the Iranian peoples of Central Asia were to -enjoy under the rule of a dynasty of their own race.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Notes</span></h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_99" id="Footnote_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_99"><span class="label">[99]</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> <i>T</i>abarī 1594. 14: 1613. 3: Chavannes, Documents 142.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_100" id="Footnote_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_100"><span class="label">[100]</span></a> The details of this measure are discussed by Wellhausen, Das Arabische -Reich 297 ff., and van Vloten, Domination Arabe 71 f. Note that <i>T</i>ab. -1689. 5 expressly refers to them as “conditions of peace.”</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_101" id="Footnote_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_101"><span class="label">[101]</span></a> Narshakhī 8. 19.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_102" id="Footnote_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_102"><span class="label">[102]</span></a> Chav., Doc. 142.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_103" id="Footnote_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_103"><span class="label">[103]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. 1717 f.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_104" id="Footnote_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_104"><span class="label">[104]</span></a> Chav., Doc. 286.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_105" id="Footnote_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_105"><span class="label">[105]</span></a> Van Vloten, <i>op. cit.</i> 20. <i>Cf.</i> <i>e.g.</i> <i>T</i>ab. 1694. 1 with Narsh. 60. 3-5.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_106" id="Footnote_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_106"><span class="label">[106]</span></a> Barthold, Turkestan 219.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[99]</a></span></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_107" id="Footnote_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_107"><span class="label">[107]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. 1867.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_108" id="Footnote_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_108"><span class="label">[108]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. 1956. 17; 1966.10; 1997 ff. (this passage is unfortunately defective and -has been supplemented by the editor from Ibn al-Athīr); 1970. 9. The -popularity of Na<i>s</i>r is demonstrated also by the growth of a tradition round -his name. This appears in <i>T</i>abarī somewhat unobtrusively in isolated -passages, unfortunately without quotation of Madāʾinī’s authorities. -According to the “Fihrist” (103. 12) Madāʾinī wrote two books on the -administrations of Asad b. ʿAbdullah and Na<i>s</i>r b. Sayyār, a fact which -confirms the special importance of these two governors in the history of -Khurāsān. Probably Asad was more popular with the dihqāns and -Na<i>s</i>r with the people.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_109" id="Footnote_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_109"><span class="label">[109]</span></a> Chav., Doc. 168: <i>cf.</i> Marquart, Ērānshahr 303.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_110" id="Footnote_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_110"><span class="label">[110]</span></a> Kitāb Baghdād, Band VI ed. H. Keller, p. 8. 12.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_111" id="Footnote_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_111"><span class="label">[111]</span></a> Chav., Doc. 297 f.; Wieger, Textes Historiques 1647.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_112" id="Footnote_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_112"><span class="label">[112]</span></a> <i>T</i>ab. III. 79 f.: Narsh. 8 fin.: Chav., Doc. 140, Notes Addit. 86 and 91.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_113" id="Footnote_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_113"><span class="label">[113]</span></a> Wieger 1684 ff.: Chav., Doc. 158 n. 4 and 298 f. <i>Cf.</i> my article “Chinese -records of the Arabs in Central Asia” in the Bulletin of the School of -Oriental Studies, II. 618 f.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_114" id="Footnote_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_114"><span class="label">[114]</span></a> A full account of these risings is given by Prof. E. G. Browne in “Literary -History of Persia” vol. I, 308 ff.</p> - -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[100]</a></span></p> - -<h2 id="BIBLIOGRAPHY">BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CHIEF WORKS CITED.</h2> - -<h3>A. <span class="smcap">Oriental Authorities.</span></h3> - -<div class="hanging"> - -<p>Al-Balādhurī: (1) (<i>Kitāb al-Ansāb</i>) <i>Anonyme Arabische Chronik</i>, Band -XI, ed. W. Ahlwardt, Greifswald, 1883.</p> - -<p>—— (2) <i>Kitāb Futū<span class="antiqua">h</span> al Buldān</i>, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leyden, 1865.</p> - -<p>Ad-Dīnawarī: <i>Kitāb al-Akhbār a<span class="antiqua">t</span>-<span class="antiqua">T</span>iwāl</i>, ed. V. Guirgass, Leyden, 1888.</p> - -<p><i>Fragmenta Historicorum Arabicorum</i>, vol. I, from Kitāb al-ʿUyūn, ed. -M. J. de Goeje and P. de Jong, Leyden, 1869.</p> - -<p>Ibn al-Athīr: <i>Taʿrīkh al-Kāmil</i>, 12 vols., Cairo 1290 <span class="smcapuc">A.H.</span></p> - -<p>Ibn Khalliqān, <i>Biographical Dictionary</i>, trans. by Baron MacGuckin -de Slane, 4 vols., Paris, 1842-1871.</p> - -<p>Ibn Khūrdādhbih: <i>Kitāb al-Masālik wal-Mamālik</i>, ed. M. J. de Goeje, -(Bibl. Geog. Arab. VI), Leyden, 1889.</p> - -<p>Ibn Qutayba: <i>Kitāb al-Maʿārif</i>, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Göttingen, 1850.</p> - -<p>Al-I<i>st</i>akhrī: <i>Kitāb Masālik al-Mamālik</i>, ed. M. J. de Goeje, (Bibl. -Geog. Arab. I), Leyden, 1870.</p> - -<p>An-Narshakhī: <i>Description Topographique et Historique de Boukhara -par Mohammed Nerchakhy</i>, ed. C. Schefer, Paris, 1892.</p> - -<p>A<i>t</i>-<i>T</i>abarī: (1) <i>Annales quos scripsit Abū Jaʿfar ... a<span class="antiqua">t</span>-<span class="antiqua">T</span>abarī</i>, ed. -M. J. de Goeje et alii, 15 vols., Leyden, 1879-1901.</p> - -<p>—— (2) <i>Chronique de Tabari traduite sur la version persane de ... -Belʿami par H. Zotenberg</i>, 4 vols., Paris, 1867-1874.</p> - -<p>Al-Yaʿqūbī: (1) <i>Kitāb al-Buldān</i>, ed. M. J. de Goeje, (Bibl. Geog. -Arab. VII), Leyden, 1892.</p> - -<p>—— (2) <i>Ibn Wadhih qui dicitur Al-Jaʿkubi Historiae</i>, ed. M. Th. -Houtsma, 2 vols., Leyden, 1883.</p> - -<p>Yāqūt: <i>Geographisches Wörterbuch</i>, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, 6 vols., Leipzig, -1866-1873.</p> - -</div> - -<h3>B. <span class="smcap">European Works.</span></h3> - -<div class="hanging"> - -<p>W. Barthold: (1) <i>Turkyestan v’Epokhu Mongolskavo Nashyestviya</i>, -St. Petersburg, 1898.</p> - -<p>—— (2) <i>Zur Geschichte des Christenthums in Mittel-Asien bis zur -Mongolischen Eroberungen</i>, German trans. by R. Stübe, Tubingen -and Leipzig, 1901.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[101]</a></span></p> - -<p>—— (3) See under Radloff.</p> - -<p>—— (4) Articles in <i>Encyclopaedia of Islām</i>.</p> - -<p>L. Caetani: <i>Chronographia Islamica</i>, Paris, 1912-(proceeding).</p> - -<p>Léon Cahun: <i>Introduction à l’Histoire de l’Asie: Turcs et Mongols -des Origines à 1450</i>, Paris, 1896.</p> - -<p>E. Chavannes: (1) <i>Documents sur les Tou-Kiue (Turcs) Occidentaux</i>, -St. Petersburg, 1903.</p> - -<p>—— (2) <i>Notes Additionnelles sur les Tou-Kiue Occidentaux, T’oung -Pao</i>, vol. V (1904).</p> - -<p>H. Cordier: <i>Histoire Générale de la Chine</i>, tome I, Paris, 1920.</p> - -<p>M. A. Czaplicka: <i>The Turks of Central Asia</i>, Oxford U.P., 1918 -(contains a very full bibliography).</p> - -<p><i>Encyclopaedia Britannica</i>, Eleventh Edition, 1910-1911.</p> - -<p><i>Encyclopaedia of Islām</i>, Leyden and London, 1913-(proceeding).</p> - -<p>O. Franke: <i>Beiträge aus Chinesischen Quellen zur Kenntnis der Türkvölker -und Skythen Zentralasiens</i>, Berlin, 1904.</p> - -<p>I. Goldziher: <i>Muhammandanische Studien</i>, Band I, Halle, 1888.</p> - -<p>A. von Kremer: <i>Culturgeschichte des Orients unter den Chalifen</i>, 2 vols., -Vienna, 1875-1877.</p> - -<p>G. Le Strange: <i>The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate</i>, Cambridge, 1905.</p> - -<p>J. Marquart: (1) <i>Die Chronologie der Alttürkischen Inschriften</i>, Leipzig, -1898.</p> - -<p>—— (2) <i>Historische Glossen zu den Alttürkischen Inschriften</i>, -W.Z.K.M., vol. XII (1898) pp. 157-200.</p> - -<p>—— (3) <i>Ērānshahr ...</i>, Berlin, 1901, with notices by:—</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>W. Bang, in Keleti Szemle III (1902).</p> - -<p>E. Chavannes in J.A. Ser. IX t. XVIII (1901).</p> - -<p>M. J. de Goeje, in W.Z.K.M. XVI (1902).</p> - -<p>Th. Nöldeke, in Z.D.M.G. LVI (1902).</p> - -</div> - -<p>Sir W. Muir: <i>The Caliphate, its Rise, Decline, and Fall</i>: New edition, -ed. T. H. Weir, Edinburgh, 1915.</p> - -<p>Th. Nöldeke: <i>Geschichte der Perser und Araber zur Zeit der Sasaniden ...</i>, -Leyden, 1879.</p> - -<p><i>Pauly’s Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft, -Neue Bearbeitung</i>, Stuttgart, 1895-(proceeding).</p> - -<p>T. Peisker: “The Asiatic Background,” <i>Cambridge Mediaeval History</i>, -vol. I (1911).</p> - -<p>W. Radloff: (1) <i>Die Alttürkischen Inschriften der Mongolei, Neue -Folge</i>, St. Petersburg, 1897: with appendix by—</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>W. Barthold: <i>Die Historische Bedeutung der Alttürk. Inschr.</i></p> - -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[102]</a></span></p> - -<p>—— (2) <i>Die Alttürkischen Inschriften der Mongolei, Zweite Folge</i>, St. -Petersburg, 1899: with appendices by—</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>W. Barthold: <i>Die Alttürk. Insch. und die Arabischen Quellen</i>.</p> - -<p>Fr. Hirth: <i>Nachworte zur Inschrift des Tonjukuk</i>.</p> - -</div> - -<p>E. Sachau: <i>Zur Geschichte und Chronologie von Khwārizm</i>, 2 parts, -Vienna, 1873 (S.B.W.A.).</p> - -<p>K. Shiratori: <i>Über den Wu-sun-stamm in Centralasien, Keleti Szemle</i> -III (1902), pp. 103-140.</p> - -<p>F. H. Skrine and E. D. Ross: <i>The Heart of Asia</i>: A History of Russian -Turkestan, etc., from the Earliest Times. London, 1899.</p> - -<p>M. A. Stein: (1) <i>Ancient Khotan</i>, Oxford, 1907.</p> - -<p>—— (2) <i>Serindia</i>, vol. I, Oxford, 1921.</p> - -<p>E. Thomas: <i>Contributions to the Numismatic History of the Early -Mohammedan Arabs in Persia</i>, J.R.A.S. First Series, vol. XII -(1850), pp. 253-347.</p> - -<p>W. Tomaschek: <i>Centralasiatische Studien</i>: I. <i>Soghdiana</i>, Vienna, 1877 -(S.B.W.A.).</p> - -<p>A. Vámbéry: <i>History of Bokhara from the Earliest Period down to the -Present</i>, London, 1873.</p> - -<p>G. van Vloten: <i>Recherches sur la Domination Arabe, etc., sous le Khalifat -des Omayades</i>, Amsterdam, 1894.</p> - -<p>J. Wellhausen: <i>Das Arabische Reich und Sein Sturz</i>, Berlin, 1902.</p> - -<p>L. Wieger, S.J.: <i>Tomes Historiques</i>, ? 1903-1905.</p> - -<p>Yüan Chwang: <i>On Yüan Chwang’s travels in India</i>, T. Watters, 2 -vols., London, 1904 (Oriental Translation Fund, New Series, vols. -XIV and XV).</p> - -</div> - -<p class="titlepage">Printed in Great Britain by <span class="smcap">Fox, Jones & Co.</span>,<br /> -Kemp Hall Press, High Street, Oxford, England.</p> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Arab conquests in Central Asia, by -Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ARAB CONQUESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA *** - -***** This file should be named 61791-h.htm or 61791-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/6/1/7/9/61791/ - -Produced by Turgut Dincer and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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