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-Project Gutenberg's History of Greece, Volume 11 (of 12), by George Grote
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
-most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
-whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
-of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
-www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll
-have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using
-this ebook.
-
-
-
-Title: History of Greece, Volume 11 (of 12)
-
-Author: George Grote
-
-Release Date: February 21, 2020 [EBook #61469]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: UTF-8
-
-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF GREECE, VOLUME 11 ***
-
-
-
-
-Produced by Henry Fower, Adrian Mastronardi, Ramon Pajares
-Box, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
-http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images
-generously made available by The Internet Archive/American
-Libraries.)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
-
-  * Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_.
-  * Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.
-  * Letter spaced Greek text is enclosed in tildes as in ~καὶ τὰ
-    λοιπά~.
-  * Footnotes have been renumbered. Each footnote is placed at the
-    end of the paragraph that includes its anchor.
-  * Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after
-    comparison with a later edition of this work. Greek text has
-    also been corrected after checking with this later edition and
-    with Perseus, when the reference was found.
-  * Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept,
-    but variant spellings were made consistent when a predominant
-    usage was found.
-  * Nevetherless, no attempt has been made at normalizing proper
-    names (i.e. Abdera and Abdêra, Alkibiades and Alkibiadês,
-    Apollokrates and Apollokratês, Athenis and Athênis, Demeter and
-    Dêmêtêr, Diokles and Dioklês, Euktemon and Euktêmon, Europe
-    and Eurôpê, Here and Hêrê, Iatrokles and Iatroklês, Isokrates
-    and Isokratês, Leptines and Leptinês, Mausolus and Mausôlus,
-    Oropus and Orôpus, Pallenê and Pallênê, Pammenes and Pammenês,
-    Philomelus and Philomêlus, Phenicians and Phœnicians, etc.). The
-    author established at the beginning of the first volume of this
-    work some rules of transcription for proper names, but neither he
-    nor his publisher follows them consistently.
-
-
-
-
-  HISTORY OF GREECE.
-
-  BY
-
-  GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.
-
-  VOL. XI.
-
-  REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.
-
-  NEW YORK:
-  HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS
-  329 AND 331 PEARL STREET.
-
-  1880.
-
-
-
-
-PREFACE TO VOL. XI.
-
-
-This History has already occupied a far larger space than I at first
-intended or anticipated.
-
-Nevertheless, to bring it to the term marked out in my original
-preface—the close of the generation contemporary with Alexander,
-on whose reign we are about to enter—one more Volume will yet be
-required.
-
-That Volume will include a review of Plato and Aristotle, so far as
-the limits of a general history permit. Plato, indeed, belonging to
-the period already described, is partially noticed in the present
-Volume; at an epoch of his life when, as counsellor of Dionysius
-II., he exercised positive action on the destinies of Syracuse. But
-I thought it more convenient to reserve the appreciation of his
-philosophical character and influence, until I could present him in
-juxtaposition with his pupil Aristotle, whose maturity falls within
-the generation now opening. These two distinguished thinkers will be
-found to throw light reciprocally upon each other, in their points
-both of contrast and similarity.
-
-  G. G.
-
-LONDON, APRIL 15, 1853.
-
-
-
-
-CONTENTS.
-
-VOL. XI.
-
-
-PART II.
-
-CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXXIII.
-
-  SICILIAN AFFAIRS (_continued_). — FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE
-  CARTHAGINIAN ARMY BY PESTILENCE BEFORE SYRACUSE, DOWN TO THE
-  DEATH OF DIONYSIUS THE ELDER. B. C. 394-367.
-
-  Frequent occurrence of pestilence among the Carthaginians, not
-  extending to the Greeks in Sicily. — Mutiny among the mercenaries
-  of Dionysius — Aristoteles their commander is sent away to
-  Sparta. — Difficulties of Dionysius arising from his mercenaries
-  — heavy burden of paying them. — Dionysius reëstablishes Messênê
-  with new inhabitants. — Conquests of Dionysius in the interior
-  of Sicily. — Alarm at Rhegium — Dionysius attacks the Sikel town
-  of Tauromenium — desperate defence of the Sikels — Dionysius
-  is repulsed and nearly slain. — Agrigentum declares against
-  Dionysius — reäppearance of the Carthaginian army under Magon. —
-  Expedition of Dionysius against Rhegium — he fails in surprising
-  the town — he concludes a truce for one year. — Magon again
-  takes the field at Agyrium — is repulsed by Dionysius — truce
-  concluded. — Dionysius again attacks Tauromenium — captures it,
-  drives out the Sikels, and plants new inhabitants. — Plans of
-  Dionysius against the Greek cities in Southern Italy — great
-  pressure upon these cities from the Samnites and Lucanians of
-  the interior. — Alliance contracted among the Italiot Greeks,
-  for defence both against the Lucanians and against Dionysius —
-  Dionysius allies himself with the Lucanians. — Dionysius attacks
-  Rhegium — the Rhegines save the Krotoniate fleet — fleet of
-  Dionysius ruined by a storm. — Defeat of the inhabitants of
-  Thurii by the Lucanians — Leptines with the fleet of Dionysius
-  off Läus — his conduct towards the survivors. — Fresh expedition
-  of Dionysius against the Italiot Greeks — his powerful armament
-  — he besieges Kaulonia. — United army of the Italiot Greeks
-  advances to relieve the place — their advanced guard is defeated,
-  and Helôris the general slain. — The whole army is defeated and
-  captured by Dionysius. — Generous lenity of Dionysius towards
-  the prisoners. — Dionysius besieges Rhegium — he grants to them
-  peace on severe terms. — He captures Kaulonia and Hipponium
-  — inhabitants transported to Syracuse — territory made over
-  to Lokri. — Artifices of Dionysius to impoverish and disarm
-  the Rhegines. — He besieges Rhegium — desperate defence of the
-  town under the general Phyton — Surrender of the place from
-  famine, after a blockade of eleven months. — Cruel treatment of
-  Phyton by Dionysius. — Strong sympathy excited by the fate of
-  Phyton. — Rhegium dismantled — all the territory of the southern
-  Calabrian peninsula united to Lokri. — Peace of Antalkidas —
-  ascendent position of Sparta and of Dionysius — Kroton conquered
-  by Dionysius — Splendid robe taken from the temple of Hêrê. —
-  Schemes of Dionysius for transmarine colonies and conquests, in
-  Epirus and Illyria. — Dionysius plunders the coast of Latium
-  and Etruria, and the rich temple of Agylla. — Immense power of
-  Dionysius — his poetical compositions. — Olympic festival of
-  384 B. C., the first after the peace of Antalkidas — Dionysius
-  sends thither a splendid legation — also chariots to run — and
-  poetical compositions to be recited. — Feelings of the crowd
-  at the festival — Dikon of Kaulonia. — Harangue of Lysias at
-  the festival against Dionysius, in reference to the political
-  state of the Grecian world, and the sufferings of the enslaved
-  Sicilians. — Hatred of the past, and fear of the future conquests
-  of Dionysius, both prevalent. — Lysias exhorts his hearers to
-  destroy the tents of the Syracusan legation at Olympia, as an
-  act of retribution against Dionysius. — Explosion of antipathy
-  against the poems of Dionysius recited at Olympia — insults
-  heaped upon his name and person. — Excessive grief, wrath, and
-  remorse, of Dionysius on hearing of this manifestation against
-  him — his suspicions and cruelties. — Marked and singular
-  character of the manifestation against Dionysius. — Plato visits
-  Syracuse — is harshly treated by Dionysius — acquires great
-  influence over Dion. — New constructions and improvements by
-  Dionysius at Syracuse. — Intention of Dionysius to renew the
-  war with Carthage. — War with Carthage — Victory of Dionysius
-  over the Carthaginian army under Magon. — Second battle with
-  the Carthaginians at Kronium, in which Dionysius is defeated
-  with terrible loss. — He concludes peace with Carthage, on terms
-  very unfavorable to himself: all the territory west of the
-  river Halykus is surrendered to Carthage: he covenants to pay
-  tribute to Carthage. — Affairs of Southern Italy: wall across the
-  Calabrian peninsula projected, but not executed. — Relations of
-  Dionysius with Central Greece. — New war undertaken by Dionysius
-  against Carthage. He is at first successful, but is ultimately
-  defeated near Lilybæum, and forced to return home. — Dionysius
-  gains the prize of tragedy at the Lenæan festival at Athens. His
-  joy at the news. He dies of fever soon afterwards. — Character of
-  Dionysius.
-                                                                  1-54
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXXIV.
-
-  SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DEATH OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS —
-  DIONYSIUS THE YOUNGER — AND DION.
-
-  Family left by Dionysius at his death. — Dion — his connection
-  with the Dionysian family. — Personal character of Dion. —
-  Plato, Dion, and the Pythagorean philosophers. — Extraordinary
-  influence of Plato upon Dion. — Dion learns to hate the Dionysian
-  despotism — he conceives large political and reformatory
-  views. — Alteration of habits in Dion — he brings Plato into
-  communication with Dionysius. — Dion maintains the good opinion
-  and confidence of Dionysius, until the death of the latter —
-  his visits to Peloponnesus. — Death of the elder Dionysius —
-  divergences of interest between the two lines of family. —
-  The younger Dionysius succeeds his father — his character. —
-  Conduct of Dion — he submits to the younger Dionysius — gives
-  him frank and wholesome advice. — Dion acquires great influence
-  and estimation from Dionysius. — Recall of Philistus from exile.
-  — Dion tries to work upon the mind of Dionysius towards a freer
-  political government and mental improvement. — His earnest
-  exhortations produced considerable effect, inspiring Dionysius
-  with a strong desire to see and converse with Plato. — Invitation
-  sent to Plato, both by Dion and by Dionysius. — Hesitation of
-  Plato — he reluctantly consents to visit Syracuse. — Plato visits
-  Syracuse — unbounded deference and admiration manifested towards
-  him at first by Dionysius — Fear and hatred felt by Philistus
-  and other courtiers. — Injudicious manner in which Plato dealt
-  with Dionysius. — Strenuous exhortations addressed by Plato
-  and Dion to Dionysius, to reform himself. — Plato damps the
-  inclination of Dionysius towards Political good. — If Plato had
-  tried to impel Dionysius towards a good practical use of his
-  power, Dionysius might at that time have obeyed him with the aid
-  of Dion. — Difficulties which they would have encountered in
-  trying to realize beneficent projects. — Intrigues by Philistus
-  and others to set Dionysius against Plato and Dion. — Relations
-  between Dionysius and Dion — natural foundation for jealousy
-  on the part of Dionysius. — Dionysius loses his inclinations
-  towards political improvements — comes to hate Dion. — Banishment
-  of Dion from Syracuse to Italy. — Dionysius retains Plato in
-  the acropolis, but treats him well, and tries to conciliate his
-  esteem. — He dismisses Plato — then recalls him — second visit
-  of Plato to Syracuse — his dissatisfaction — Dionysius refuses
-  to recall Dion. — Dionysius confiscates the property of Dion —
-  mortification of Plato, who with difficulty obtains leave to
-  depart from Syracuse. — Resolution of Dion to avenge himself on
-  Dionysius, and to force his way back to Syracuse by arms. — Plato
-  rejoins Dion in Peloponnesus — exasperation of Dion — Dionysius
-  gives his sister Aretê, the wife of Dion, in marriage to
-  Timokrates. — Means of auxiliaries of Dion — Plato — the Academy
-  — Alkimenes. Dion musters his force at Zakynthus. — Small force
-  of Dion against the prodigious power of Dionysius. Resolution of
-  Dion to conquer or perish. — Circumstances which told against
-  Dionysius — discontent at Syracuse. — Herakleides exiled from
-  Syracuse — he projects an attack upon Dionysius, at the same
-  time as Dion. — Weakness of character — dissolute and drunken
-  habits — of Dionysius himself. — Alarm of the soldiers of Dion
-  at Zakynthus, when first informed that they were going against
-  Dionysius. — Eclipse of the moon — religious disquietude of the
-  soldiers — they are reassured by the prophet Miltas — fortunate
-  voyage from Zakynthus to Sicily. — Dion lands at Herakleia —
-  he learns that Dionysius with a large fleet has just quitted
-  Syracuse for Italy. — March of Dion from Herakleia to Syracuse.
-  — Dion crosses the river Anapus, and approaches the gates of
-  Syracuse. — Mistake of Timokrates, left as governor of Syracuse
-  in the absence of Dionysius. — General rising of the Syracusans
-  to welcome and assist Dion. Timokrates is obliged to evacuate the
-  city, leaving Ortygia and Epipolæ garrisoned. — Entry of Dion
-  into Achradina — joy of the citizens — he proclaims liberty. —
-  Dion presents himself at the Pentapyla in front of Ortygia —
-  challenges the garrison of Ortygia to come out and fight — is
-  chosen general by the Syracusans, with his brother Megakles.
-  — Dion captures Epipolæ and Euryalus. He erects a cross-wall
-  from sea to sea, to block up Ortygia. — Return of Dionysius to
-  Syracuse. He tries to negotiate with Dion and the Syracusans —
-  deceives them by fallacious propositions. — Sudden sally made
-  by Dionysius to surprise the blockading wall — great bravery,
-  efforts, and danger of Dion — he at length repulses the attack
-  and recovers the wall. — Ortygia is again blocked up by land —
-  efforts of Dionysius with his fleet — arrival of Herakleides
-  from Peloponnesus with a fleet to coöperate against Dionysius.
-  — Arrival of Philistus with his fleet to the aid of Dionysius.
-  Battle in the Great Harbor between the fleet of Philistus and
-  that of the Syracusans — Philistus is defeated and slain. —
-  Intrigues of Dionysius against Dion in Syracuse. — Relationship
-  of Dion to the Dionysian dynasty — suspicions entertained
-  against him by the Syracusans — his haughty manners. Rivalry of
-  Herakleides. — Herakleides is named admiral. Dion causes him to
-  be deposed, and then moves himself for his re-appointment. —
-  Intrigues and calumnies raised against Dion in Syracuse, by the
-  management of Dionysius. — Mistrust of Dion by the Syracusans,
-  mainly in consequence of his relationship to the Dionysian
-  family. Calumnies of Sôsis. — Farther propositions of Dionysius.
-  He goes away from Ortygia to Italy, leaving his son Apollokrates
-  in command of the garrison. — Increased dissension between Dion
-  and Herakleides — Dion is deposed and his soldiers deprived of
-  the pay due to them — new generals are named. — Dion is forced
-  to retreat from Syracuse — bad conduct of the new generals and
-  of the people towards his soldiers. — Dion reaches Leontini —
-  the Leontines stand by him against the Syracusans — arrival
-  of Nypsius with a reinforcement to the Dionysian garrison in
-  Ortygia. — Advantage gained by Herakleides and the Syracusans
-  over Nypsius as he came into Ortygia — extravagant confidence in
-  Syracuse — Nypsius sallies from Ortygia, and forces his way into
-  Neapolis and Achradina. — Danger and distress of the Syracusans
-  — they send to Leontini to invoke the aid of Dion. — Assembly at
-  Leontini — pathetic address of Dion. — Reluctance of Herakleides
-  to let Dion into Syracuse — renewed assault from Nypsius —
-  unanimous prayers now sent to invite Dion. — Entrance of Dion
-  into Syracuse — he draws up his troops on Epipolæ. Frightful
-  condition of the city. — Dion drives back Nypsius and his
-  troops into Ortygia — he extinguishes the flames, and preserves
-  Syracuse. — Universal gratitude on the part of the Syracusans,
-  towards Dion. Herakleides and Theodotes throw themselves upon his
-  mercy. — Dion pardons Herakleides — his exposition of motives. —
-  Remarkable features in this act of Dion. — Dion re-establishes
-  the blockade of Ortygia, and ransoms the captives taken. — Dion
-  is named general on land, at the motion of Herakleides, who is
-  continued in his command of the fleet. — Attempt to supersede
-  Dion through Gæsylus the Spartan — good conduct of Gæsylus. —
-  Surrender of Ortygia by Apollokrates to Dion. — Entry of Dion
-  into Ortygia — restoration of his wife — speedy death of his
-  son. — Conduct of Dion in the hour of triumph. — Suspicions
-  previously entertained respecting Dion — that he was aiming at
-  the despotism for himself — confirmed by his present conduct. —
-  He retains his dictatorial power, with the fortress and garrison
-  of Ortygia — he grants no freedom to Syracuse. — Intention of
-  Dion to constitute himself king, with a Lykurgean scheme of
-  government and discipline. — Mistake of Dion as to his position.
-  — Dion takes no step to realise any measure of popular liberty.
-  — Opposition raised against Dion by Herakleides — impatience of
-  the Syracusans to see the demolition of the Dionysian strongholds
-  and funeral monument. — Dion causes Herakleides to be privately
-  slain. — Increased oppressions of Dion — hatred entertained
-  against him in Syracuse. — Disquietude and irritability of Dion
-  on account of his unpopularity. — Conspiracy of Kallippus
-  against him — artifices and perjury. — Kallippus causes Dion to
-  be assassinated. — Life, sentiments, and altered position, of
-  Dion.
-                                                                54-128
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXXV.
-
-  SICILIAN AFFAIRS DOWN TO THE CLOSE OF THE EXPEDITION OF TIMOLEON.
-  B. C. 353-336.
-
-  Position and prospects of Kallippus, after the assassination
-  of Dion. — He continues master of Syracuse more than a year.
-  His misrule. Return of Hipparinus son of Dionysius to Syracuse.
-  Expulsion of Kallippus. — Miserable condition of Syracuse
-  and Sicily, as described by Plato. — Plato’s recommendations
-  fruitless — state of Syracuse grows worse. Dionysius returns
-  to Ortygia, expelling Hipparinus. — Drunken habits of the
-  Dionysian princes. — Lokri — dependency and residence of the
-  younger Dionysius. — Sufferings of the Italiot Greeks from the
-  Lucanians and Bruttians of the interior. — Dionysius at Lokri
-  — his unpopularity and outrageous misrule — cruel retaliation
-  of the Lokrians upon his female relatives. — Distress of the
-  Syracusans — fresh danger from Carthage. They invoke the aid of
-  Hiketas — in concert with Hiketas, they send to entreat aid from
-  Corinth. Secret alliance of Hiketas with the Carthaginians — he
-  conspires to defeat the application to Corinth. — Application
-  from Syracuse favorably received by the Corinthians — vote
-  passed to grant aid. — Difficulty in finding a Corinthian leader
-  — most of the leading citizens decline — Timoleon is proposed
-  and chosen. — Antecedent life and character of Timoleon. — His
-  conduct towards his brother Timophanes, whose life he saves in
-  battle. — Timophanes makes himself despot, and commits gross
-  oppression — Timoleon with two companions puts him to death. —
-  Beneficial effects of the act upon Corinth — sentiment towards
-  Timoleon. — Bitter reproach of Timoleon by his mother. — Intense
-  mental distress of Timoleon. He shuts himself up and retires
-  from public life. — Different judgments of modern and ancient
-  minds on the act of Timoleon. Comments of Plutarch. — Timoleon
-  is appointed commander to Syracuse — he accepts the command —
-  admonition of Telekleides. — Preparations made by Timoleon —
-  his scanty means — he engages some of the Phokian mercenaries.
-  — Bad promise of the expedition — second message from Hiketas,
-  withdrawing himself from the Corinthian alliance, and desiring
-  that no troops might be sent to Sicily. — Timoleon sets out for
-  Sicily with a small squadron — favorable omens from the gods.
-  — Timoleon arrives at Rhegium — is prevented from reaching
-  Sicily by a Carthaginian fleet of superior force — insidious
-  message from Hiketas. — Stratagem of Timoleon to get across to
-  Sicily, in collusion with the Rhegines. — Public meeting in
-  Rhegium — Timoleon and the Carthaginians both present at it —
-  long speeches, during which Timoleon steals away, contriving
-  to send his fleet over to Sicily. — Timoleon at Tauromenium in
-  Sicily — formidable strength of his enemies — despots in Sicily
-  — despondency in Syracuse. — Success of Timoleon at Adranum. He
-  surprises and defeats the troops of Hiketas, superior in number.
-  — Improved position and alliances of Timoleon — he marches up to
-  the walls of Syracuse. — Position of Dionysius in Ortygia — he
-  resolves to surrender that fortress to Timoleon, stipulating for
-  safe conveyance and shelter at Corinth. — Timoleon sends troops
-  to occupy Ortygia, receiving Dionysius into his camp. — Timoleon
-  sends news of his success to Corinth, with Dionysius himself in a
-  trireme. — Great effect produced at Corinth — confidence of the
-  citizens — reinforcement sent to Timoleon. — Sight of the fallen
-  Dionysius at Corinth — impression made upon the Greeks — numerous
-  visitors to see him. Conversation with Aristoxenus. — Immense
-  advantage derived by Timoleon from the possession of Ortygia —
-  numerous stores found in it. — Large Carthaginian army under
-  Magon arrives to aid in attacking Ortygia. Defeated by Neon,
-  during the absence of Magon and Hiketas. Neon acquires Achradina,
-  and joins it by a line of wall to Ortygia. — Return of Magon and
-  Hiketas to Syracuse — increased difficulty of their proceedings,
-  since the victory of Neon. — Return of Timoleon to Syracuse —
-  fortunate march and arrival of the Corinthian reinforcement.
-  — Messênê declares in favor of Timoleon. — He establishes his
-  camp near Syracuse. — Magon distrusts Hiketas and his position
-  at Syracuse — he suddenly withdraws his army and fleet, leaving
-  Syracuse altogether. — Timoleon masters Epipolæ and the whole
-  city of Syracuse — Hiketas is obliged to escape to Leontini. —
-  Languid defence made by the troops of Hiketas. — Great effect
-  produced by the news that Timoleon was master of Syracuse. —
-  Extraordinary admiration felt towards Timoleon — especially for
-  the distinguished favor shown to him by the gods. — Timoleon
-  ascribes all his success to the gods. — Temptations of Timoleon
-  in the hour of success — easy possibility of making himself
-  despot of Syracuse. — Timoleon invited the Syracusans to demolish
-  the Dionysian stronghold in Ortygia. — He erects courts of
-  justice on the site. — Desolate condition of Syracuse and other
-  cities in Sicily. Recall of exiles. Application on the part of
-  Timoleon and the Syracusans to Corinth. — Commissioners sent from
-  Corinth to Syracuse — they revive the laws and democracy enacted
-  by Dioklês — but with various changes and additions. — Poverty at
-  Syracuse — necessity for inviting new colonists. — Large body of
-  new colonists assembled at Corinth for Sicily. — Influx of new
-  colonists into Sicily from all quarters. — Relief to the poverty
-  of Syracuse. — Successes of Timoleon against Hiketas, Leptines,
-  and other despots in Sicily — Hiketas invites the Carthaginians
-  again to invade Sicily. — The Carthaginians land in Sicily with
-  a vast army, including a large proportion of native troops. —
-  Timoleon marches from Syracuse against the Carthaginians — mutiny
-  of a portion of his mercenaries under Thrasius — Timoleon marches
-  into the Carthaginian province — omen about the parsley. — He
-  encounters the Carthaginian army while passing the Krimêsus.
-  War chariots in their front — Timoleon orders his cavalry to
-  charge. — Strenuous battle between the infantry of Timoleon and
-  the native Carthaginian infantry. Terrible storm — complete
-  victory of Timoleon. — Severe loss of the Carthaginians in the
-  battle, especially of their native troops. Booty collected by
-  the soldiers of Timoleon. — Discouragement and terror among the
-  defeated army as well as at Carthage itself. — Great increase of
-  glory to Timoleon — favor of the gods shown to him in the battle.
-  — Timoleon returns to Syracuse — he dismisses Thrasius and the
-  mercenaries who had deserted him — he sends them out of Sicily —
-  their fate. — Success of Timoleon against Hiketas and Mamerkus. —
-  Victory gained by Timoleon over Hiketas, at the river Damurias.
-  — Timoleon attacks Hiketas and Leontini. The place (with Hiketas
-  in person) is surrendered to Timoleon by the garrison. Hiketas
-  and his family are put to death. — Timoleon gains a victory over
-  Mamerkus — he concludes peace with the Carthaginians. — Timoleon
-  conquers and takes prisoners Mamerkus and Hippon. Mamerkus is
-  condemned by the Syracusan public assembly. — Timoleon puts
-  down all the despots in Sicily. — Timoleon lays down his power
-  at Syracuse. — Gratitude and reward to him by the Syracusans.
-  — Great influence of Timoleon, even after he had laid down his
-  power. — Immigration of new Greek settlers into Sicily, to
-  Gela, Agrigentum, Kamarina, etc. — Value and importance of the
-  moral ascendency enjoyed by Timoleon, in regulating these new
-  settlements. — Numerous difficulties which he would be called
-  upon to adjust. — Residence of Timoleon at Syracuse — chapel to
-  the goddess Automatia. — Arrival of the blind Timoleon in the
-  public assembly of Syracuse during matters of grave and critical
-  discussion. — Manner in which Timoleon bore contradiction in the
-  public assembly — his earnest anxiety to ensure freedom of speech
-  against himself. — Uncorrupted moderation and public spirit of
-  Timoleon. — Xenophontic ideal — command over willing free men —
-  qualities, positive as well as negative, of Timoleon. — Freedom
-  and comfort diffused throughout all Sicily for twenty-four years,
-  until the despotism of Agathokles. — Death and obsequies of
-  Timoleon. — Proclamation at his funeral — monument to his honor.
-  — Contrast of Dion and Timoleon.
-                                                               128-197
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXXVI.
-
-  CENTRAL GREECE: THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP OF MACEDON TO THE BIRTH
-  OF ALEXANDER. 359-356 B. C.
-
-  Central Greece resumed. — State of Central Greece in 360-359
-  B. C. — Degradation of Sparta. — Megalopolis — Messênê — their
-  fear of Sparta — no central action in Peloponnesus. — Corinth,
-  Sikyon, etc. — Comparatively good condition of Athens. — Power
-  of Thebes. — Extinction of the free cities of Bœotia by the
-  Thebans — repugnant to Grecian feeling. — Thessaly — despots of
-  Pheræ. — Alexander of Pheræ — his cruelties — his assassination.
-  — Tisiphonus despot of Pheræ — loss of power in the Pheræan
-  dynasty. — Macedon — reign and death of Perdikkas. — Philip as
-  a youth at Thebes — ideas there acquired — foundation laid of
-  his future military ability. — Condition of Philip at the death
-  of Perdikkas. — Embarrassments and dangers with which he had to
-  contend. — Macedonian government. — Proceedings of Philip against
-  his numerous enemies. His success — Thracians — Athenians. — He
-  evacuates Amphipolis. He defeats Argæus and the Athenians — his
-  mild treatment of Athenian prisoners. — Philip makes peace with
-  Athens — renounces his claim to Amphipolis. — Victories of Philip
-  over the Pæonians and Illyrians. — Amphipolis evacuated by Philip
-  — the Athenians neglect it. — State of Eubœa — the Thebans foment
-  revolt and attack the island — victorious efforts of Athens. —
-  Surrender of the Chersonese to Athens. — Social War — Chios, Kos,
-  Rhodes, and Byzantium revolt from Athens. — Causes of the Social
-  War — conduct of the Athenians. — Synod at Athens. — Athens
-  acts more for her own separate interests, and less for that of
-  her allies — her armaments on service — badly paid mercenaries
-  — their extortions. — The four cities declare themselves
-  independent of Athens — interference of the Karian Mausôlus. —
-  Great force of the revolters — armament despatched by Athens
-  against Chios — repulse of the Athenians, and death of Chabrias.
-  — Farther armaments of Athens — Iphikrates, Timotheus, and Chares
-  — unsuccessful operations in the Hellespont, and quarrel between
-  the generals. — Iphikrates and Timotheus are accused by Chares at
-  Athens — Iphikrates is acquitted, Timotheus is fined and retires
-  from Athens. — Arrogance and unpopularity of Timotheus, attested
-  by his friend Isokrates. — Exile of Timotheus — his death soon
-  afterwards. — Iphikrates no more employed — great loss to Athens
-  in these two generals. — Expedition of Chares — Athens makes
-  peace with her revolted allies, recognizing their full autonomy.
-  — End of the Social War — great loss of power to Athens. —
-  Renewed action of Philip. He lays siege to Amphipolis. — The
-  Amphipolitans send to ask assistance from Athens — manœuvres
-  of Philip to induce Athens not to interfere. — The Athenians
-  determine not to assist Amphipolis — their motives — importance
-  of this resolution. — Capture of Amphipolis by Philip, through
-  the treason of a party in the town. — Importance of Amphipolis
-  to Philip — disappointment of the Athenians at his breach of
-  promise. — Philip amuses the Athenians with false assurances
-  — he induces them to reject advances from the Olynthians —
-  proposed exchange of Pydna for Amphipolis. — Philip acts in a
-  hostile manner against Athens — he conquers Pydna and Potidæa —
-  gives Potidæa to the Olynthians — remissness of the Athenians. —
-  Increase of the power of Philip — he founds Philippi, opens gold
-  mines near Mount Pangæus, and derives large revenues from them. —
-  Marriage of Philip with Olympias — birth of Alexander the Great.
-                                                               197-241
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXXVII.
-
-  FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SACRED WAR TO THAT OF THE OLYNTHIAN
-  WAR.
-
-  Causes of the Sacred War — the Amphiktyonic assembly. — Political
-  complaint brought before the assembly, first by Thebes against
-  Sparta. — Next, by Thebes against the Phokians. The Phokians
-  are condemned and heavily fined. — The assembly pass a vote
-  consecrating the Phokian territory to Apollo. — Resolution of
-  the Phokians to resist — Philomelus their leader. — Question of
-  right raised as to the presidency of the temple — old right of
-  the Phokians against that of the Delphians and the Amphiktyons.
-  — Active measures taken by Philomelus. He goes to Sparta —
-  obtains aid from king Archidamus. He seizes Delphi — defeats the
-  Lokrians. — Philomelus fortifies the temple — levies numerous
-  mercenaries — tries to conciliate Grecian sentiment. The Grecian
-  world divided. — Philomelus tries to retain the prophetic agency
-  — conduct of the Pythia. — Battles of Philomelus against the
-  Lokrians — his success. — Exertions of the Thebans to raise
-  a confederacy against the Phokians. — Danger of the Phokians
-  — they take part of the treasures of the temple, in order to
-  pay a mercenary force. — Numerous mercenaries employed by the
-  Phokians — violence and ferocity of the war — defeat and death of
-  Philomelus. — Onomarchus general of the Phokians — he renews the
-  war — his power by means of the mercenaries. — Violent measures
-  of Onomarchus — he employs the treasures of the temple to scatter
-  bribes through the various cities. — Successes of Onomarchus — he
-  advances as far as Thermopylæ — he invades Bœotia — is repulsed
-  by the Thebans. — The Thebans send a force under Pammenes to
-  assist Artabazus in Asia Minor. — Conquest of Sestos by Chares
-  and the Athenians. — Intrigues of Kersobleptes against Athens —
-  he is compelled to cede to her his portion of the Chersonese
-  — Athenian settlers sent thither, as well as to Samos. —
-  Activity and constant progress of Philip — he conquers Methônê —
-  remissness of Athens. — Philip marches into Thessaly against the
-  despots of Pheræ. — Great power of Onomarchus and the Phokians —
-  plans of Athens and Sparta — the Spartans contemplate hostilities
-  against Megalopolis. — First appearance of Demosthenes as a
-  public adviser in the Athenian assembly. — Parentage and early
-  youth of Demosthenes — wealth of his father — dishonesty of
-  his guardians. — Youth of Demosthenes — sickly and feeble
-  constitution — want of physical education and bodily vigor. —
-  Training of Demosthenes for a speaker — his instructors — Isæus —
-  Plato — his devoted study of Thucydides. — Indefatigable efforts
-  of Demosthenes to surmount his natural defects as a speaker. —
-  Value set by Demosthenes upon action in oratory. His mind and
-  thoughts — how formed. — He becomes first known as a logographer
-  or composer of speeches for litigants. — Phokion — his antithesis
-  and rivalry with Demosthenes — his character and position — his
-  bravery and integrity. — Lasting hold acquired by his integrity
-  on the public of Athens. — Number of times that he was elected
-  general. — His manner of speaking — effective brevity — contempt
-  of oratory. — His frankness — his contempt of the Athenian people
-  — his imperturbability — his repulsive manners. — Phokion and
-  Eubulus the leaders of the peace-party, which represented the
-  strongly predominant sentiment at Athens. — Influence of Phokion
-  mischievous during the reign of Philip — at that time Athens
-  might have prevailed over Macedonia. — Change in the military
-  spirit of Greece since the Peloponnesian war. Decline of the
-  citizen soldiership: increased spread of mercenary troops.
-  Contrast between the Periklean and the Demosthenic citizen.
-  — Decline of military readiness also among the Peloponnesian
-  allies of Sparta. — Multiplication of mercenary soldiers — its
-  mischievous consequences — necessity of providing emigration.
-  — Deterioration of the Grecian military force occurred at the
-  same time with the great development of the Macedonian force. —
-  Rudeness and poverty of the Macedonians — excellent material for
-  soldiers — organizing genius of Philip. — First parliamentary
-  harangue of Demosthenes — on the Symmories — alarm felt about
-  Persia. — Positive recommendations in the speech — mature thought
-  and sagacity which they imply. — His proposed preparation and
-  scheme for extending the basis of the Symmories. — Spirit of
-  the Demosthenic exhortations — always impressing the necessity
-  of personal effort and sacrifice as conditions of success. —
-  Affairs of Peloponnesus — projects of Sparta against Megalopolis
-  — her attempt to obtain coöperation from Athens. — Views and
-  recommendations of Demosthenes — he advises that Athens shall
-  uphold Messênê and Megalopolis. — Philip in Thessaly — he attacks
-  Lykophron of Pheræ, who calls in Onomarchus and the Phokians —
-  Onomarchus defeats Philip. — Successes of Onomarchus in Bœotia
-  — maximum of the Phokian power. — Philip repairs his forces and
-  marches again into Thessaly — his complete victory over the
-  Phokians — Onomarchus is slain. — Philip conquers Pheræ and
-  Pagasæ — becomes master of all Thessaly — expulsion of Lykophron.
-  — Philip invades Thermopylæ — the Athenians send a force thither
-  and arrest his progress. Their alarm at this juncture, and
-  unusual rapidity of movement. — Phayllus takes the command of the
-  Phokians — third spoliation of the temple — revived strength of
-  the Phokians — malversation of the leaders. — War in Peloponnesus
-  — the Spartans attack Megalopolis — interference of Thebes. —
-  Hostilities with indecisive result — peace concluded — autonomy
-  of Megalopolis again recognized. — Ill success of the Phokians
-  in Bœotia — death of Phayllus, who is succeeded by Phalækus. —
-  The Thebans obtain money from the Persian king. — Increased
-  power and formidable attitude of Philip. Alarm which he now
-  begins to inspire throughout the Grecian world. — Philip acquires
-  a considerable navy — importance of the Gulf of Pagasæ to him
-  — his flying squadrons annoy the Athenian commerce and coast.
-  — Philip carries on war in Thrace — his intrigues among the
-  Thracian princes. — He besieges Heræon Teichos: alarm at Athens:
-  a decree is passed to send out a fleet: Philip falls sick:
-  the fleet is not sent. — Popularity of the mercenary general
-  Charidemus — vote in his favor proposed by Aristokrates — speech
-  composed by Demosthenes against it. — Languor of the Athenians
-  — the principal peace-leaders, Eubulus, Phokion, etc., propose
-  nothing energetic against Philip — Demosthenes undertakes the
-  duty. — First Philippic of Demosthenes, 352-351 B. C. — remarks
-  and recommendations of the first Philippic. Severe comments on
-  the past apathy of the people. — He insists on the necessity
-  that citizens shall serve in person, and proposes the formation
-  of an acting fleet and armament. — His financial propositions.
-  — Mischiefs of the past negligence and want of preparation —
-  harm done by the mercenary unpaid armaments, serving without
-  citizens. — Characteristics of the first Philippic — prudent
-  advice and early warnings of Demosthenes. — Advice of Demosthenes
-  not carried into effect: no serious measures adopted by Athens.
-  — Opponents of Demosthenes at Athens — speakers in the pay of
-  Philip — alarm about the Persian king still continues.
-                                                               241-319
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXXVIII.
-
-  EUBOIC AND OLYNTHIAN WARS.
-
-  Change of sentiments at Olynthus — the Olynthians afraid of
-  Philip — they make peace with Athens. — Unfriendly feelings
-  of Philip towards Olynthus — ripening into war in 350 B. C. —
-  Fugitive half-brothers of Philip obtain shelter at Olynthus.
-  — Intrigues of Philip in Olynthus — his means of corruption
-  and of fomenting intestine discord. — Conquest and destruction
-  of the Olynthian confederate towns by Philip, between 350-347
-  B. C. terrible phenomena. — Philip attacks the Olynthians and
-  Chalkidians — beginning of the Olynthian war, 350 B. C. — The
-  Olynthians conclude alliance with Athens. — The Athenians
-  contract alliance with Olynthus — earliest Olynthiac speech
-  of Demosthenes. — The Second Olynthiac is the earliest — its
-  tone and tenor. — Disposition to magnify the practical effect
-  of the speeches of Demosthenes — his true position — he is an
-  opposition speaker. — Philip continues to press the Olynthian
-  confederacy — increasing danger of Olynthus — fresh applications
-  to Athens. — Demosthenes delivers another Olynthiac oration —
-  that which stands First, in the printed order. Its tenor. — Just
-  appreciation of the situation by Demosthenes. He approaches
-  the question of the Theôric Fund. — Assistance sent by Athens
-  to Olynthus. Partial success against Philip. — Partial and
-  exaggerated confidence at Athens. The Athenians lose sight of
-  the danger of Olynthus. Third Olynthiac of Demosthenes. — Tenor
-  and substance of the third Olynthiac. — Courage of Demosthenes
-  in combating the prevalent sentiment. — Revolt of Eubœa from
-  Athens. — Intrigues of Philip in Eubœa. — Plutarch of Eretria
-  asks aid from Athens. Aid is sent to him under Phokion, though
-  Demosthenes dissuades it — Treachery of Plutarch — danger of
-  Phokion and the Athenians in Eubœa — victory of Phokion at
-  Tamynæ. — Dionysiac festival at Athens in March, 349 B. C. —
-  Insult offered to Demosthenes by Meidias. — Reproaches against
-  Demosthenes for having been absent from the battle of Tamynæ — he
-  goes over on service to Eubœa as a hoplite — he is named senator
-  for 349-348 B. C. — Hostilities in Eubœa, during 349-348 B. C. —
-  Great efforts of Athens in 349 B. C. for the support of Olynthus
-  and the maintenance of Eubœa at the same time. — Financial
-  embarrassments of Athens. Motion of Apollodorus about the Theôric
-  Fund. The assembly appropriate the surplus of revenue to military
-  purposes. — Apollodorus is indicted and fined. — The diversion
-  of the Theôric Fund proves the great anxiety of the moment at
-  Athens. — Three expeditions sent by Athens to Chalkidikê in
-  349-348 B. C. according to Philochorus. — Final success of Philip
-  — capture of the Chalkidic towns and of Olynthus. — Sale of the
-  Olynthian prisoners — ruin of the Greek cities in Chalkidikê.
-  — Cost incurred by Athens in the Olynthian war. — Theôric Fund
-  — not appropriated to war purposes until a little before the
-  battle of Chæroneia. — Views respecting the Theôric Fund. —
-  It was the general Fund of Athens for religious festivals and
-  worship — distributions were one part of it — character of the
-  ancient religious festivals. — No other branch of the Athenian
-  peace-establishment was impoverished or sacrificed to the Theôric
-  expenditure. — The annual surplus might have been accumulated as
-  a war-fund — how far Athens is blamable for not having done so. —
-  Attempt of the Athenian property-classes to get clear of direct
-  taxation by taking from the Theôric Fund. — Conflict of these two
-  feelings at Athens. Demosthenes tries to mediate between them
-  — calls for sacrifices from all, especially personal military
-  service. — Appendix.
-                                                               319-363
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXXIX.
-
-  FROM THE CAPTURE OF OLYNTHUS TO THE TERMINATION OF THE SACRED WAR
-  BY PHILIP.
-
-  Sufferings of the Olynthians and Chalkidians — triumph and
-  festival of Philip. — Effect produced at Athens by the capture of
-  Olynthus — especially by the number of Athenian captives taken in
-  it. — Energetic language of Eubulus and Æschines against Philip.
-  — Increased importance of Æschines. — Æschines as envoy of Athens
-  in Arcadia. — Increasing despondency and desire for peace at
-  Athens. — Indirect overtures for peace between Athens and Philip,
-  even before the fall of Olynthus — the Eubœans — Phrynon, etc. —
-  First proposition of Philokrates — granting permission to Philip
-  to send envoys to Athens. — Effect produced upon the minds of the
-  Athenians by their numerous captive citizens taken by Philip at
-  Olynthus. — Mission of the actor Aristodemus from the Athenians
-  to Philip on the subject of the captives. Favorable dispositions
-  reported from Philip. — Course of the Sacred War — gradual
-  decline and impoverishment of the Phokians. Dissensions among
-  themselves. — Party opposed to Phalækus in Phokis — Phalækus is
-  deposed — he continues to hold Thermopylæ with the mercenaries.
-  — The Thebans invoke the aid of Philip to put down the Phokians.
-  — Alarm among the Phokians — one of the Phokian parties invites
-  the Athenians to occupy Thermopylæ — Phalækus repels them. —
-  Increased embarrassment at Athens — uncertainty about Phalækus
-  and the pass of Thermopylæ. — The defence of Greece now turned
-  on Thermopylæ — importance of that pass both to Philip and to
-  Athens. — Motion of Philokrates in the Athenian assembly — to
-  send envoys to Philip for peace. — Ten Athenian envoys sent —
-  Demosthenes and Æschines among them. — Journey of the envoys to
-  Pella. — Statements of Æschines about the conduct of Demosthenes
-  — arrangements of the envoys for speaking before Philip. —
-  Harangue addressed by Æschines to Philip about Amphipolis.
-  Failure of Demosthenes in his speech. — Answer of Philip — return
-  of the envoys. — Review of Æschines and his conduct, as stated by
-  himself. — Philip offers peace on the terms of _uti possidetis_ —
-  report made by the Athenian envoys on their return. — Proceedings
-  in the Athenian assembly after the return of the envoys — motions
-  of Demosthenes. — Arrival of the Macedonian envoys at Athens
-  — days fixed for discussing the peace. — Resolution taken by
-  the synod of allies at Athens. — Assemblies held to discuss
-  the peace, in presence of the Macedonian envoys. — Philokrates
-  moves to conclude peace and alliance with Philip. He proposes
-  to exclude the Phokians specially. — Part taken by Æschines and
-  Demosthenes — in reference to this motion. Contradictions between
-  them. — Æschines supported the motion of Philokrates altogether
-  — Demosthenes supported it also, except as to the exclusion of
-  the Phokians — language of Eubulus. — Motion of Philokrates
-  carried in the assembly, for peace and alliance with Philip. —
-  Assembly to provide ratification and swearing of the treaty. —
-  Question, Who were to be received as allies of Athens? — about
-  the Phokians and Kersobleptes. — The envoy of Kersobleptes is
-  admitted, both by the Athenian assembly and by the Macedonian
-  envoys. — The Macedonian envoys formally refuse to admit the
-  Phokians. — Difficulty of Philokrates and Æschines. Their false
-  assurances about the secret good intentions of Philip towards the
-  Phokians. — The Phokians are tacitly excluded — the Athenians
-  and their allies swear to the peace without them. — Ruinous
-  mistake — false step of Athens in abandoning the Phokians —
-  Demosthenes did not protest against it at the time. — The oaths
-  are taken before Antipater, leaving out the Phokians. — Second
-  embassy from Athens to Philip. — Demosthenes urges the envoys
-  to go immediately to Thrace in order to administer the oath to
-  Philip — they refuse — their delay on the journey and at Pella.
-  — Philip completes his conquest of Thrace during the interval.
-  — Embassies from many Grecian states at Pella. — Consultations
-  and dissensions among the Ten Athenian envoys — views taken
-  by Æschines of the ambassadorial duties. — The envoys address
-  Philip — harangue of Æschines. — Position of Demosthenes in this
-  second embassy. — March of Philip to Thermopylæ — he masks his
-  purposes, holding out delusive hopes to the Phokians. Intrigues
-  to gain his favor. — The envoys administer the oaths to Philip
-  at Pheræ, the last thing before their departure. They return to
-  Athens. — Plans of Philip on Thermopylæ — corrupt connivance of
-  the Athenian envoys — letter from Philip which they brought back
-  to Athens. — Æschines and the envoys proclaim the Phokians to be
-  excluded from the oaths with Philip — protest of Demosthenes in
-  the Senate, on arriving at Athens, against the behavior of his
-  colleagues — vote of the Senate approving his protest. — Public
-  assembly at Athens — successful address made to it by Æschines —
-  his false assurances to the people. — The Athenian people believe
-  the promises of Philokrates and Æschines — protest of Demosthenes
-  not listened to. — Letter of Philip favorably received by the
-  assembly — motion of Philokrates carried, decreeing peace and
-  alliance with him forever. Resolution to compel the Phokians to
-  give up Delphi. — Letters of Philip to the Athenians, inviting
-  them to send forces to join him at Thermopylæ — policy of these
-  letters — the Athenians do nothing. — Phokian envoys heard
-  these debates at Athens — position of Phalækus at Thermopylæ. —
-  Dependence of the Phokians upon Athenian aid to hold Thermopylæ.
-  — News received at Thermopylæ of the determination of Athens
-  against the Phokians. — Phalækus surrenders Thermopylæ under
-  convention to Philip. He withdraws all his forces. — All the
-  towns in Phokis surrender at discretion to Philip, who declares
-  his full concurrence with the Thebans. — Third embassy sent by
-  the Athenians to Philip — the envoys return without seeing him,
-  on hearing of the Phokian convention. — Alarm and displeasure
-  at Athens — motion of Kallisthenes for putting the city in a
-  good state of defence — Æschines and other Athenian envoys
-  visit Philip in Phokis — triumphant celebration of Philip’s
-  success. — Fair professions of Philip to the Athenians, after
-  his conquest of Thermopylæ: language of his partisans at Athens.
-  — The Amphiktyonic assembly is convoked anew. Rigorous sentence
-  against the Phokians. They are excluded from the assembly, and
-  Philip is admitted in their place. — Ruin and wretchedness
-  of the Phokians. — Irresistible ascendency of Philip. He is
-  named by the Amphiktyons presiding celebrator of the Pythian
-  festival of 346 B. C. — Great change effected by this peace in
-  Grecian political relations. Demosthenes and Æschines — proof of
-  dishonesty and fraud in Æschines, even from his own admissions. —
-  This disgraceful peace was brought upon Athens by the corruption
-  of her own envoys. — Impeachment and condemnation of Philokrates.
-  — Miserable death of all concerned in the spoliation of the
-  Delphian temple.
-                                                               364-434
-
-
-  CHAPTER XC.
-
-  FROM THE PEACE OF 346 B. C. TO THE BATTLE OF CHÆRONEIA AND THE
-  DEATH OF PHILIP.
-
-  Position of Philip after the conclusion of the Sacred War.
-  — Sentiments of Demosthenes — he recommends acquiescence in
-  the peace, and recognition of the new Amphiktyonic dignity of
-  Philip. — Sentiments of Isokrates — his letter to Philip — his
-  abnegation of free Hellenism. — Position of the Persian king
-  Ochus — his measures against revolters in Phenicia and Egypt. —
-  Reconquest of Phenicia by Ochus — perfidy of the Sidonian prince
-  Tennes. — Reconquest of Egypt by the Persian force under Mentor
-  and Bagoas. — Power of Mentor as Persian viceroy of the Asiatic
-  coast — he seizes Hermeias of Atarneus. — Peace between Philip
-  and the Athenians, continued without formal renunciation from
-  346-340 B. C. — Movements and intrigues of Philip everywhere
-  throughout Greece. — Disunion of the Grecian world — no Grecian
-  city recognized as leader. — Vigilance and renewed warnings of
-  Demosthenes against Philip. — Mission of Python to Athens by
-  Philip — amendments proposed in the recent peace — fruitless
-  discussions upon them. — Dispute about Halonnesus. — The
-  Athenians refuse to accept cession of Halonnesus as a favor,
-  claiming restitution of it as their right. — Halonnesus taken and
-  retaken — reprisals between Philip and the Athenians. — Movements
-  of the philippizing factions at Megara — at Oreus — at Eretria. —
-  Philip in Thrace — disputes about the Bosphorus and Hellespont —
-  Diopeithes commander for Athens in the Chersonese. Philip takes
-  part with the Kardians against Athens. Hostile collisions and
-  complaints against Diopeithes. — Accusations against Diopeithes
-  at Athens by the philippizing orators — Demosthenes defends him
-  — speech on the Chersonese, and third Philippic. — Increased
-  influence of Demosthenes at Athens — Athenian expedition sent,
-  upon his motion, to Eubœa — Oreus and Eretria are liberated,
-  and Eubœa is detached from Philip. — Mission of Demosthenes
-  to the Chersonese and Byzantium — his important services in
-  detaching the Byzantines from Philip, and bringing them into
-  alliance with Athens. — Philip commences the siege of Perinthus
-  — he marches through the Chersonesus — declaration of war
-  by Athens against him. — Manifesto of Philip, declaring war
-  against Athens — Complaints of Philip against the Athenians —
-  his policy towards Athens — his lecture on the advantages of
-  peace. — Open war between Philip and the Athenians. — Siege of
-  Perinthus by Philip. His numerous engines for siege — great scale
-  of operations. Obstinacy of the defence. The town is relieved
-  by the Byzantines, and by Grecian mercenaries from the Persian
-  satraps. — Philip attacks Byzantium — danger of the place — it
-  is relieved by the fleets of Athens, Chios, Rhodes, etc. Success
-  of the Athenian fleet in the Propontis under Phokion. Philip
-  abandons the sieges both of Perinthus and Byzantium. — Votes
-  of thanks from Byzantium and the Chersonesus to Athens for her
-  aid — honors and compliments to Demosthenes. — Philip withdraws
-  from Byzantium, concludes peace with the Byzantines, Chians,
-  and others, and attacks the Scythians. He is defeated by the
-  Triballi, and wounded, on his return. — Important reform effected
-  by Demosthenes in the administration of the Athenian marine. —
-  Abuses which had crept into the trierarchy — unfair apportionment
-  of the burthen — undue exemption which the rich administrators
-  had acquired for themselves. — Individual hardship, and bad
-  public consequences, occasioned by these inequalities. —
-  Opposition offered by the rich citizens and by Æschines to the
-  proposed reform of Demosthenes — difficulties which he had to
-  overcome. — His new reform distributes the burthen of trierarchy
-  equitably. — Its complete success. Improved efficiency of the
-  naval armaments under it. — New Sacred War commences in Greece.
-  — Kirrha and its plain near Delphi consecrated to Apollo, in the
-  first Sacred War under Solon. — Necessity of a port at Kirrha,
-  for the convenience of visitors to Delphi. Kirrha grows up again,
-  and comes into the occupation of the Lokrians of Amphissa. —
-  Relations between the Lokrians of Amphissa and Delphi — they
-  had stood forward earnestly in the former Sacred War to defend
-  Delphi against the Phokians. — Amphiktyonic meeting at Delphi —
-  February, 339 B. C. Æschines one of the legates from Athens. —
-  Language of an Amphissian speaker among the Amphiktyons against
-  Athens — new dedication of an old Athenian donative in the
-  temple. — Speech of Æschines in the Amphiktyonic assembly. —
-  Passion and tumult excited by his speech. — Violent resolution
-  adopted by the Amphiktyons. — The Amphiktyons with the Delphian
-  multitude march down to destroy Kirrha — interference of the
-  Amphissians to rescue their property. They drive off the
-  Amphiktyons. — Farther resolution taken by the Amphiktyons to
-  hold a future special meeting and take measures for punishing the
-  Lokrians. — Unjust violence of the Amphiktyons — public mischief
-  done by Æschines. — Effect of the proceeding of Æschines at
-  Athens. Opposition of Demosthenes at first fruitless. — Change of
-  feeling at Athens — the Athenians resolve to take no part in the
-  Amphiktyonic proceedings against Amphissa. — Special meeting of
-  the Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ, held without Athens. Vote passed
-  to levy a force for punishing Amphissa. Kottyphus president. The
-  Amphiktyons invoke the intervention of Philip. — Motives which
-  dictated the vote — dependence of most of the Amphiktyonic voters
-  upon Philip — Philip accepts the command — marches southward
-  through Thermopylæ. — Philip enters Phokis. — He suddenly
-  occupies, and begins to re-fortify Elateia. — He sends an embassy
-  to Thebes, announcing his intention to attack Attica, and asking
-  either aid, or a free passage for his own army. — Unfriendly
-  relations subsisting between Athens and Thebes. Hopes of Philip
-  that Thebes would act in concert with him against Athens. —
-  Great alarm at Athens, when the news arrived that Philip was
-  fortifying Elateia. — Athenian public assembly held — general
-  anxiety and silence — no one will speak but Demosthenes. — Advice
-  of Demosthenes to despatch an embassy immediately to Thebes, and
-  to offer alliance on the most liberal terms. — The advice of
-  Demosthenes is adopted — he is despatched with other envoys to
-  Thebes. — Divided state of feeling at Thebes — influence of the
-  philippizing party — effect produced by the Macedonian envoys. —
-  Efficient and successful oratory of Demosthenes — he persuades
-  the Thebans to contract alliance with Athens against Philip.
-  — The Athenian army marches by invitation to Thebes — cordial
-  coöperation of the Thebans and Athenians. — Vigorous resolutions
-  taken at Athens — continuance of the new docks suspended — the
-  Theôric Fund is devoted to military purposes. — Disappointment of
-  Philip — he remains in Phokis, and writes to his Peloponnesian
-  allies to come and join him against Amphissa. — War of the
-  Athenians and Thebans against Philip in Phokis — they gain some
-  advantages over him — honors paid to Demosthenes at Athens. — The
-  Athenians and Thebans reconstitute the Phokians and their towns.
-  — War against Philip in Phokis — great influence of Demosthenes
-  — auxiliaries which he procured. — Increased efforts of Philip
-  in Phokis. — Successes of Philip — he defeats a large body of
-  mercenary troops — he takes Amphissa. — No eminent general on
-  the side of the Greeks — Demosthenes keeps up the spirits of
-  the allies, and holds them together. — Battle of Chæroneia —
-  complete victory of Philip. — Macedonian phalanx — its long pikes
-  — superior in front charge to the Grecian hoplites. — Excellent
-  organization of the Macedonian army by Philip — different sorts
-  of force combined. — loss at the battle of Chæroneia. — Distress
-  and alarm at Athens on the news of the defeat. — Resolutions
-  taken at Athens for energetic defence. Respect and confidence
-  shown to Demosthenes. — Effect produced upon some of the
-  islanders in the Ægean by the defeat — conduct of the Rhodians. —
-  Conduct of Philip after the victory — harshness towards Thebes —
-  greater lenity to Athens. — Conduct of Æschines — Demades is sent
-  as envoy to Philip. — Peace of Demades, concluded between Philip
-  and the Athenians. The Athenians are compelled to recognize him
-  as chief of the Hellenic world. — Remarks of Polybius on the
-  Demadean peace — means of resistance still possessed by Athens.
-  — Honorary votes passed at Athens to Philip. — Impeachment
-  brought against Demosthenes at Athens — the Athenians stand
-  by him. — Expedition of Philip into Peloponnesus. He invades
-  Laconia. — Congress held at Corinth. Philip is chosen chief of
-  the Greeks against Persia. — Mortification to Athenian feelings
-  — degraded position of Athens and of Greece. No genuine feeling
-  in Greece now, towards war against Persia. — Preparations of
-  Philip for the invasion of Persia. — Philip repudiates Olympias
-  at the instance of his recently married wife, Kleopatra —
-  resentment of Olympias and Alexander — dissension at Court. —
-  Great festival in Macedonia — celebrating the birth of a son
-  to Philip by Kleopatra, and the marriage of his daughter with
-  Alexander of Epirus. — Pausanias — outrage inflicted upon him
-  — his resentment against Philip, encouraged by the partisans of
-  Olympias and Alexander. — Assassination of Philip by Pausanias,
-  who is slain by the guards. — Accomplices of Pausanias. —
-  Alexander the great is declared king — first notice given to him
-  by the Lynkestian Alexander, one of the conspirators — Attalus
-  and queen Kleopatra, with her infant son, are put to death. —
-  Satisfaction manifested by Olympias at the death of Philip. —
-  Character of Philip.
-                                                               434-523
-
-
-
-
-HISTORY OF GREECE.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXXIII.
-
-SICILIAN AFFAIRS (_continued_). — FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE
-CARTHAGINIAN ARMY BY PESTILENCE BEFORE SYRACUSE, DOWN TO THE DEATH OF
-DIONYSIUS THE ELDER. B. C. 394-367.
-
-
-In my preceding volume, I have described the first eleven years of
-the reign of Dionysius called the Elder, as despot at Syracuse, down
-to his first great war against the Carthaginians; which war ended by
-a sudden turn of fortune in his favor, at a time when he was hard
-pressed and actually besieged. The victorious Carthaginian army
-before Syracuse was utterly ruined by a terrible pestilence, followed
-by ignominious treason on the part of its commander Imilkon.
-
-Within the space of less than thirty years, we read of four distinct
-epidemic distempers,[1] each of frightful severity, as having
-afflicted Carthage and her armies in Sicily, without touching
-either Syracuse or the Sicilian Greeks. Such epidemics were the
-most irresistible of all enemies to the Carthaginians, and the most
-effective allies to Dionysius. The second and third,—conspicuous
-among the many fortunate events of his life,—occurred at the exact
-juncture necessary for rescuing him from a tide of superiority in
-the Carthaginian arms, which seemed in a fair way to overwhelm him
-completely. Upon what physical conditions the frequent repetition of
-such a calamity depended, together with the remarkable fact that it
-was confined to Carthage and her armies,—we know partially in respect
-to the third of the four cases, but not at all in regard to the
-others.
-
-  [1] Diodor. xiii. 86-114; xiv. 70; xv. 24. Another pestilence is
-  alluded to by Diodorus in 368 B. C. (Diodor. xv. 73).
-
-  Movers notices the intense and frequent sufferings of the
-  ancient Phœnicians, in their own country, from pestilence; and
-  the fearful expiations to which these sufferings gave rise (Die
-  Phönizier, vol. ii. part ii. p. 9).
-
-The flight of Imilkon with his Carthaginians from Syracuse left
-Dionysius and the Syracusans in the full swing of triumph. The
-conquests made by Imilkon were altogether lost, and the Carthaginian
-dominion in Sicily was now cut down to that restricted space in the
-western corner of the island, which it had occupied prior to the
-invasion of Hannibal in 409 B. C. So prodigious a success probably
-enabled Dionysius to put down the opposition recently manifested
-among the Syracusans to the continuance of his rule. We are told
-that he was greatly embarrassed by his mercenaries; who, having
-been for some time without pay, manifested such angry discontent
-as to threaten his downfall. Dionysius seized the person of their
-commander, the Spartan Aristoteles: upon which the soldiers mutined
-and flocked in arms around his residence, demanding in fierce terms
-both the liberty of their commander and the payment of their arrears.
-Of these demands, Dionysius eluded the first by saying that he would
-send away Aristoteles to Sparta, to be tried and dealt with among
-his own countrymen: as to the second, he pacified the soldiers by
-assigning to them, in exchange for their pay, the town and territory
-of Leontini. Willingly accepting this rich bribe, the most fertile
-soil of the island, the mercenaries quitted Syracuse to the number
-of ten thousand, to take up their residence in the newly assigned
-town; while Dionysius hired new mercenaries in their place. To these
-(including perhaps the Iberians or Spaniards who had recently passed
-from the Carthaginian service into his) and to the slaves whom he had
-liberated, he intrusted the maintenance of his dominion.[2]
-
-  [2] Diodor. xiv. 78.
-
-These few facts, which are all that we hear, enable us to see that
-the relations between Dionysius and the mercenaries by whose means
-he ruled Syracuse, were troubled and difficult to manage. But they
-do not explain to us the full cause of such discord. We know that
-a short time before, Dionysius had rid himself of one thousand
-obnoxious mercenaries by treacherously betraying them to death in a
-battle with the Carthaginians. Moreover, he would hardly have seized
-the person of Aristoteles, and sent him away for trial, if the latter
-had done nothing more than demand pay really due to his soldiers.
-It seems probable that the discontent of the mercenaries rested
-upon deeper causes, perhaps connected with that movement in the
-Syracusan mind against Dionysius, manifested openly in the invective
-of Theodorus. We should have been glad also to know how Dionysius
-proposed to pay the new mercenaries, if he had no means of paying
-the old. The cost of maintaining his standing army, upon whomsoever
-it fell, must have been burdensome in the extreme. What became of
-the previous residents and proprietors at Leontini, who must have
-been dispossessed when this much-coveted site was transferred to
-the mercenaries? On all these points we are unfortunately left in
-ignorance.
-
-Dionysius now set forth towards the north of Sicily to reëstablish
-Messênê; while those other Sicilians, who had been expelled from
-their abodes by the Carthaginians, got together and returned. In
-reconstituting Messênê after its demolition by Imilkon, he obtained
-the means of planting there a population altogether in his interests,
-suitable to the aggressive designs which he was already contemplating
-against Rhegium and the other Italian Greeks. He established in it
-one thousand Lokrians,—four thousand persons from another city the
-name of which we cannot certainly make out,[3]—and six hundred of the
-Peloponnesian Messenians. These latter had been expelled by Sparta
-from Zakynthus and Naupaktus at the close of the Peloponnesian
-war, and had taken service in Sicily with Dionysius. Even here, the
-hatred of Sparta followed them. Her remonstrances against his project
-of establishing them in a city of consideration bearing their own
-ancient name, obliged him to withdraw them: upon which he planted
-them on a portion of the Abakene territory on the northern coast.
-They gave to their new city the name of Tyndaris, admitted many new
-residents, and conducted their affairs so prudently, as presently to
-attain a total of five thousand citizens.[4] Neither here, nor at
-Messênê, do we find any mention made of the reëstablishment of those
-inhabitants who had fled when Imilkon took Messênê, and who formed
-nearly all the previous population of the city, for very few are
-mentioned as having been slain. It seems doubtful whether Dionysius
-readmitted them, when he reconstituted Messênê. Renewing with care
-the fortifications of the city, which had been demolished by Imilkon,
-he placed in it some of his mercenaries as garrison.[5]
-
-  [3] Diodor. xiv. 78. Διονύσιος δ᾽ εἰς Μεσσήνην κατῴκισε χιλίους
-  μὲν Λοκροὺς, τετρακισχιλίους δὲ ~Μεδιμναίους~, ἑξακοσίους δὲ τῶν
-  ἐκ Πελοποννήσου Μεσσηνίων, ἔκ τε Ζακύνθου καὶ Ναυπάκτου φευγόντων.
-
-  The Medimnæans are completely unknown. Cluverius and Wesseling
-  conjecture _Medmæans_, from Medmæ or Medamæ, noticed by Strabo
-  as a town in the south of Italy. But this supposition cannot be
-  adopted as certain; especially as the total of persons named is
-  so large. The conjecture of Palmerius—Μηθυμναίους—has still less
-  to recommend it. See the note of Wesseling.
-
-  [4] Diodor. xiv. 78.
-
-  [5] Diodor. xiv. 87.
-
-Dionysius next undertook several expeditions against the Sikels in
-the interior of the island, who had joined Imilkon in his recent
-attack upon Syracuse. He conquered several of their towns, and
-established alliances with two of their most powerful princes, at
-Agyrium and Kentoripæ. Enna and Kephalœdium were also betrayed to
-him, as well as the Carthaginian dependency of Solûs. By these
-proceedings, which appear to have occupied some time, he acquired
-powerful ascendency in the central and north-east parts of the
-island, while his garrison at Messênê; ensured to him the command of
-the strait between Sicily and Italy.[6]
-
-  [6] Diodor. xiv. 78. εἰς τὴν τῶν Σικελῶν χώραν πλεονάκις
-  στρατεύσας, etc. Wesseling shows in his note, that these words,
-  and those which follow must refer to Dionysius.
-
-His acquisition of this important fortified position was well
-understood to imply ulterior designs against Rhegium and the other
-Grecian cities in the south of Italy, among whom accordingly a lively
-alarm prevailed. The numerous exiles whom he had expelled, not merely
-from Syracuse, but also from Naxus, Katana, and the other conquered
-towns, having no longer any assured shelter in Sicily, had been
-forced to cross over into Italy, where they were favorably received
-both at Kroton and at Rhegium.[7] One of these exiles, Helôris, once
-the intimate friend of Dionysius, was even appointed general of the
-forces of Rhegium; forces at that time not only powerful on land,
-but sustained by a fleet of seventy or eighty triremes.[8] Under his
-command, a Rhegine force crossed the strait for the purpose partly
-of besieging Messênê, partly of establishing the Naxian and Katanean
-exiles at Mylæ on the northern coast of the island, not far from
-Messênê. Neither scheme succeeded: Helôris was repulsed from Messênê
-with loss, while the new settlers at Mylæ were speedily expelled. The
-command of the strait was thus fully maintained to Dionysius; who,
-on the point of undertaking an aggressive expedition over to Italy,
-was delayed only by the necessity of capturing the newly established
-Sikel town on the hill of Taurus—or Tauromenium. The Sikels defended
-this position, in itself high and strong, with unexpected valor
-and obstinacy. It was the spot on which the primitive Grecian
-colonists who first came to Sicily, had originally landed, and from
-whence, therefore, the successive Hellenic encroachments upon the
-pre-established Sikel population, had taken their commencement. This
-fact, well known to both parties, rendered the capture on one side as
-much a point of honor, as the preservation on the other. Dionysius
-spent months in the siege, even throughout midwinter, while the snow
-covered this hill-top. He made reiterated assaults, which were always
-repulsed. At last, on one moonless winter night, he found means to
-scramble over some almost inaccessible crags to a portion of the town
-less defended, and to effect a lodgment in one of the two fortified
-portions into which it was divided. Having taken the first part, he
-immediately proceeded to attack the second. But the Sikels, resisting
-with desperate valor, repulsed him, and compelled the storming party
-to flee in disorder, amidst the darkness of night, and over the most
-difficult ground. Six hundred of them were slain on the spot, and
-scarcely any escaped without throwing away their arms. Even Dionysius
-himself, being overthrown by the thrust of a spear on his cuirass,
-was with difficulty picked up and carried off alive; all his arms,
-except the cuirass, being left behind. He was obliged to raise the
-siege, and was long in recovering from his wound: the rather as his
-eyes also had suffered considerably from the snow.[9]
-
-  [7] Diodor. xiv. 87-103.
-
-  [8] Diodor. xiv. 8, 87, 106
-
-  [9] Diodor. xiv. 88.
-
-So manifest a reverse, before a town comparatively insignificant,
-lowered his military reputation, and encouraged his enemies
-throughout the island. The Agrigentines and others, throwing off
-their dependence upon him, proclaimed themselves autonomous;
-banishing those leaders among them who upheld his interest.[10] Many
-of the Sikels also, elate with the success of their countrymen at
-Tauromenium, declared openly against him; joining the Carthaginian
-general Magon, who now, for the first time since the disaster before
-Syracuse, again exhibited the force of Carthage in the field.
-
-  [10] Diodor. xiv. 88. μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἀτυχίαν ταύτην, Ἀκραγαντῖνοι
-  ~καὶ Μεσσνήνιοι~ τοὺς τὰ Διονυσίου φρονοῦντας μεταστησάμενοι, τῆς
-  ἐλευθερίας ἀντείχοντο, καὶ τῆς τοῦ τυράννου συμμαχίας ἀπέστησαν.
-
-  It appears to me that the words καὶ Μεσσνήνιοι in this sentence
-  cannot be correct. The Messenians were a new population just
-  established by Dionysius, and relying upon him for protection
-  against Rhegium: moreover they will appear, during the events
-  immediately succeeding, constantly in conjunction with him, and
-  objects of attack by his enemies.
-
-  I cannot but think that Diodorus has here inadvertently placed
-  the word Μεσσνήνιοι instead of a name belonging to some other
-  community—what community, we cannot tell.
-
-Since the disaster before Syracuse, Magon had remained tranquil
-in the western or Carthaginian corner of the island, recruiting
-the strength and courage of his countrymen, and taking unusual
-pains to conciliate the attachment of the dependent native towns.
-Reinforced in part by the exiles expelled by Dionysius, he was now
-in a condition to assume the aggressive, and to espouse the cause
-of the Sikels after their successful defence of Tauromenium. He
-even ventured to overrun and ravage the Messenian territory; but
-Dionysius, being now recovered from his wound, marched against him,
-defeated him in a battle near Abakæna, and forced him again to retire
-westward, until fresh troops were sent to him from Carthage.[11]
-
-  [11] Diodor. xiv. 90-95.
-
-Without pursuing Magon, Dionysius returned to Syracuse, from whence
-he presently set forth to execute his projects against Rhegium, with
-a fleet of one hundred ships of war. So skilfully did he arrange
-or mask his movements, that he arrived at night at the gates and
-under the walls of Rhegium, without the least suspicion on the part
-of the citizens. Applying combustibles to set fire to the gate
-(as he had once done successfully at the gate of Achradina),[12]
-he at the same time planted his ladders against the walls, and
-attempted an escalade. Surprised and in small numbers, the citizens
-began their defence; but the attack was making progress, had not
-the general Helôris, instead of trying to extinguish the flames,
-bethought himself of encouraging them by heaping on dry faggots
-and other matters. The conflagration became so violent, that even
-the assailants themselves were kept off until time was given for
-the citizens to mount the walls in force; and the city was saved
-from capture by burning a portion of it. Disappointed in his
-hopes, Dionysius was obliged to content himself with ravaging the
-neighboring territory; after which, he concluded a truce of one year
-with the Rhegines, and then returned to Syracuse.[13]
-
-  [12] Diodor. xiii. 113.
-
-  [13] Diodor xiv. 90.
-
-This step was probably determined by news of the movements of Magon,
-who was in the field anew with a mercenary force reckoned at eighty
-thousand men—Libyan, Sardinian, and Italian—obtained from Carthage,
-where hope of Sicilian success was again reviving. Magon directed
-his march through the Sikel population in the centre of the island,
-receiving the adhesion of many of their various townships. Agyrium,
-however, the largest and most important of all, resisted him as an
-enemy. Agyris, the despot of the place, who had conquered much of
-the neighboring territory, and had enriched himself by the murder
-of several opulent proprietors, maintained strict alliance with
-Dionysius. The latter speedily came to his aid, with a force stated
-at twenty thousand men, Syracusans and mercenaries. Admitted into
-the city, and co-operating with Agyris, who furnished abundant
-supplies, he soon reduced the Carthaginians to great straits. Magon
-was encamped near the river Chrysas, between Agyrium and Morgantinê;
-in an enemy’s country, harassed by natives who perfectly knew the
-ground, and who cut off in detail all his parties sent out to
-obtain provisions. The Syracusans, indeed, disliking or mistrusting
-such tardy methods, impatiently demanded leave to make a vigorous
-attack; and when Dionysius refused, affirming that with a little
-patience the enemy must be speedily starved out, they left the camp
-and returned home. Alarmed at their desertion, he forthwith issued
-a requisition for a large number of slaves to supply their places.
-But at this very juncture, there arrived a proposition from the
-Carthaginians to be allowed to make peace and retire; which Dionysius
-granted, on condition that they should abandon to him the Sikels and
-their territory—especially Tauromenium. Upon these terms peace was
-accordingly concluded, and Magon again returned to Carthage.[14]
-
-  [14] Diodor. xiv. 95, 96.
-
-Relieved from these enemies, Dionysius was enabled to restore those
-slaves, whom he had levied under the recent requisition, to their
-masters. Having established his dominion fully among the Sikels, he
-again marched against Tauromenium, which on this occasion was unable
-to resist him. The Sikels, who had so valiantly defended it, were
-driven out, to make room for new inhabitants, chosen from among the
-mercenaries of Dionysius.[15]
-
-  [15] Diodor. xiv. 96.
-
-Thus master both of Messênê and Tauromenium, the two most important
-maritime posts on the Italian side of Sicily, Dionysius prepared
-to execute his ulterior schemes against the Greeks in the south
-of Italy. These still powerful, though once far more powerful,
-cities, were now suffering under a cause of decline common to all
-the Hellenic colonies on the coast of the continent. The indigenous
-population of the interior had been reinforced, or enslaved, by more
-warlike emigrants from behind, who now pressed upon the maritime
-Grecian cities with encroachment difficult to resist.
-
-It was the Samnites, a branch of the hardy Sabellian race,
-mountaineers from the central portion of the Apennine range, who had
-been recently spreading themselves abroad as formidable assailants.
-About 420 B. C., they had established themselves in Capua and the
-fertile plains of Campania, expelling or dispossessing the previous
-Tuscan proprietors. From thence, about 416 B. C., they reduced the
-neighboring city of Cumæ, the most ancient western colony of the
-Hellenic race.[16] The neighboring Grecian establishments of Neapolis
-and Dikæarchia seem also to have come, like Cumæ, under tribute
-and dominion to the Campanian Samnites, and thus became partially
-dis-hellenised.[17] These Campanians, of Samnite race, have been
-frequently mentioned in the two preceding chapters, as employed on
-mercenary service both in the armies of the Carthaginians, and in
-those of Dionysius.[18] But the great migration of this warlike
-race was farther to the south-east, down the line of the Apennines
-towards the Tarentine Gulf and the Sicilian strait. Under the name
-of Lucanians, they established a formidable power in these regions,
-subjugating the Œnotrian population there settled.[19] The Lucanian
-power seems to have begun and to have gradually increased from about
-430 B. C. At its maximum (about 380-360 B. C.), it comprehended most
-part of the inland territory, and considerable portions of the coast,
-especially the southern coast,—bounded by an imaginary line drawn
-from Metapontum on the Tarentine Gulf, across the breadth of Italy
-to Poseidonia or Pæstum, near the mouth of the river Silaris, on
-the Tyrrhenian or Lower sea. It was about 356 B. C., that the rural
-serfs, called Bruttians,[20] rebelled against the Lucanians, and
-robbed them of the southern part of this territory; establishing an
-independent dominion in the inland portion of what is now called the
-Farther Calabria—extending from a boundary line drawn across Italy
-between Thurii and Läus, down to near the Sicilian strait. About
-332 B. C., commenced the occasional intervention of the Epirotic
-kings from the one side, and the persevering efforts of Rome from
-the other, which, after long and valiant struggles, left Samnites,
-Lucanians, Bruttians, all Roman subjects.
-
-  [16] Livy, iv. 37-44; Strabo, v. p. 243-250. Diodorus (xii.
-  31-76) places the commencement of the Campanian nation in 438
-  B. C., and their conquest of Cumæ in 421 B. C. Skylax in his
-  Periplus mentions both Cumæ and Neapolis as in Campania (s. 10.)
-  Thucydides speaks of Cumæ as being ἐν Ὀπικίᾳ (vi. 4).
-
-  [17] Strabo, v. p. 246.
-
-  [18] Thucydides (vii. 53-57) does not mention _Campanians_ (he
-  mentions Tyrrhenians) as serving in the besieging Athenian
-  armament before Syracuse (414-413 B. C.) He does not introduce
-  the name _Campanians_ at all; though alluding to Iberian
-  mercenaries as men whom Athens calculated on engaging in her
-  service (vi. 90).
-
-  But Diodorus mentions, that eight hundred Campanians were engaged
-  by the Chalkidian cities in Sicily for service with the Athenians
-  under Nikias, and that they had escaped during the disasters of
-  the Athenian army (xiii. 44).
-
-  The conquest of Cumæ in 416 B. C. opened to these Campanian
-  Samnites an outlet for hired military service beyond sea.
-  Cumæ being in its Origin Chalkidic, would naturally be in
-  correspondence with the Chalkidic cities in Sicily. This forms
-  the link of connection, which explains to us how the Campanians
-  came into service in 413 B. C. under the Athenian general before
-  Syracuse, and afterwards so frequently under others in Sicily
-  (Diodor. xiii. 62-80, etc.).
-
-  [19] Strabo, vi. p. 253, 254. See a valuable section on this
-  subject in Niebuhr, Römisch. Geschichte, vol. i. p. 94-98.
-
-  It appears that the Syracusan historian Antiochus made no mention
-  either of Lucanians or of Bruttians, though he enumerated the
-  inhabitants of the exact line of territory afterwards occupied
-  by these two nations. After repeating the statement of Antiochus
-  that this territory was occupied by Italians, Œnotrians, and
-  Chonians, Strabo proceeds to say—Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἁπλουστέρως εἴρηκε
-  καὶ ἀρχαϊκῶς, οὐδὲν διορίσας περὶ τῶν Λευκανῶν καὶ τῶν Βρεττίων.
-  The German translator Grosskurd understands these words as
-  meaning, that Antiochus “did not distinguish the Lucanians from
-  the Bruttians.” But if we read the paragraph through, it will
-  appear, I think, that Strabo means to say, that Antiochus had
-  stated nothing positive respecting either Lucanians or Bruttians.
-  Niebuhr (p. 96 _ut suprà_) affirms that Antiochus represented the
-  Lucanians as having extended themselves as far as Läus; which I
-  cannot find.
-
-  The date of Antiochus seems not precisely ascertainable. His work
-  on Sicilian history was carried down from early times to 424 B.
-  C. (Diodor. xii. 71). His silence respecting the Lucanians goes
-  to confirm the belief that the date of their conquest of the
-  territory called Lucania was considerably later than that year.
-
-  Polyænus (ii. 10. 2-4) mentions war as carried on by the
-  inhabitants of Thurii, under Kleandridas the father of Gylippus,
-  against the Lucanians. From the age and circumstances of
-  Kleandridas, this can hardly be later than 420 B. C.
-
-  [20] Strabo, vi. p. 256. The Periplus of Skylax (s. 12, 13)
-  recognizes Lucania as extending down to Rhegium. The date to
-  which this Periplus refers appears to be about 370-360 B. C.:
-  see an instructive article among Niebuhr’s Kleine Schriften, p.
-  105-130. Skylax does not mention the Bruttians (Klausen, Hekatæus
-  and Skylax, p. 274. Berlin, 1831).
-
-At the period which we have now reached, these Lucanians, having
-conquered the Greek cities of Poseidonia (or Pæstum) and Läus, with
-much of the territory lying between the Gulfs of Poseidonia and
-Tarentum, severely harassed the inhabitants of Thurii, and alarmed
-all the neighboring Greek cities down to Rhegium. So serious was the
-alarm of these cities, that several of them contracted an intimate
-defensive alliance, strengthening for the occasion that feeble
-synodical band, and sense of Italiot communion,[21] the form and
-trace of which seems to have subsisted without the reality, even
-under marked enmity between particular cities. The conditions of
-the newly-contracted alliance were most stringent; not only binding
-each city to assist at the first summons any other city invaded by
-the Lucanians, but also pronouncing, that if this obligation were
-neglected, the generals of the disobedient city should be condemned
-to death.[22] However, at this time the Italiot Greeks were not less
-afraid of Dionysius and his aggressive enterprises from the south,
-than of the Lucanians from the north; and their defensive alliance
-was intended against both. To Dionysius, on the contrary, the
-invasion of the Lucanians from landward was a fortunate incident for
-the success of his own schemes. Their concurrent designs against the
-same enemies, speedily led to the formation of a distinct alliance
-between the two.[23] Among the allies of Dionysius, too, we must
-number the Epizephyrian Lokrians; who not only did not join the
-Italiot confederacy, but espoused his cause against it with ardor.
-The enmity of the Lokrians against their neighbors, the Rhegines, was
-ancient and bitter; exceeded only by that of Dionysius, who never
-forgave the refusal of the Rhegines to permit him to marry a wife out
-of their city, and was always grateful to the Lokrians for having
-granted to him the privilege which their neighbors had refused.
-
-  [21] Diodor. xiv. 91-101. Compare Polybius, ii. 39. When Nikias
-  on his way to Sicily, came near to Rhegium and invited the
-  Rhegines to coöperate against Syracuse, the Rhegines declined,
-  replying, ὅ,τι ἂν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἰταλιώταις ξυνδοκῇ, τοῦτο
-  ποιήσειν (Thucyd. vi. 44).
-
-  [22] Diodor. xiv. 101.
-
-  [23] Diodor. xiv. 100.
-
-Wishing as yet, if possible, to avoid provoking the other members of
-the Italiot confederacy, Dionysius still professed to be revenging
-himself exclusively upon Rhegium; against which he conducted a
-powerful force from Syracuse. Twenty thousand foot, one thousand
-horse, and one hundred and twenty ships of war, are mentioned as the
-total of his armament. Disembarking near Lokri, he marched across
-the lower part of the peninsula in a westerly direction, ravaged
-with fire and sword the Rhegian territory, and then encamped near
-the strait on the northern side of Rhegium. His fleet followed
-coastwise round Cape Zephyrium to the same point. While he was
-pressing the siege, the members of the Italiot synod despatched
-from Kroton a fleet of sixty sail, to assist in the defence. Their
-ships, having rounded Cape Zephyrium, were nearing Rhegium from the
-south, when Dionysius himself approached to attack them, with fifty
-ships detached from his force. Though inferior in number, his fleet
-was probably superior in respect to size and equipment; so that the
-Krotoniate captains, not daring to hazard a battle, ran their ships
-ashore. Dionysius here attacked them, and would have towed off all
-the ships (without their crews) as prizes, had not the scene of
-action lain so near to Rhegium, that the whole force of the city
-could come forth in reinforcement, while his own army was on the
-opposite side of the town. The numbers and courage of the Rhegines
-baffled his efforts, rescued the ships, and hauled them all up upon
-the shore in safety. Obliged to retire without success, Dionysius was
-farther overtaken by a terrific storm, which exposed his fleet to the
-utmost danger. Seven of his ships were driven ashore; their crews,
-fifteen hundred in number, being either drowned, or falling into the
-hands of the Rhegines. The rest, after great danger and difficulty,
-either rejoined the main fleet or got into the harbor of Messênê;
-where Dionysius himself in his quinquereme also found refuge,
-but only at midnight, and after imminent risk for several hours.
-Disheartened by this misfortune as well as by the approach of winter,
-he withdrew his forces for the present, and returned to Syracuse.[24]
-
-  [24] Diodor. xiv 100.
-
-A part of his fleet, however, under Leptines, was despatched
-northward along the south-western coast of Italy to the Gulf of Elea,
-to coöperate with the Lucanians; who from that coast and from inland
-were invading the inhabitants of Thurii on the Tarentine Gulf.
-Thurii was the successor, though with far inferior power, of the
-ancient Sybaris; whose dominion had once stretched across from sea to
-sea, comprehending the town of Läus, now a Lucanian possession.[25]
-Immediately on the appearance of the Lucanians, the Thurians had
-despatched an urgent message to their allies, who were making all
-haste to arrive, pursuant to covenant. But before such junction could
-possibly take place, the Thurians, confiding in their own native
-force of fourteen thousand foot, and one thousand horse, marched
-against the enemy single-handed. The Lucanian invaders retreated,
-pursued by the Thurians, who followed them even into that mountainous
-region of the Appenines which stretches between the two seas, and
-which presents the most formidable danger and difficulty for all
-military operations.[26] They assailed successfully a fortified
-post or village of the Lucanians, which fell into their hands with
-a rich plunder. By such partial advantage they were so elated, that
-they ventured to cross over all the mountain passes even to the
-neighborhood of the southern sea, with the intention of attacking the
-flourishing town of Läus[27]—once the dependency of their Sybaritan
-predecessors. But the Lucanians, having allured them into these
-impracticable paths, closed upon them behind with greatly increased
-numbers, forbade all retreat, and shut them up in a plain surrounded
-with high and precipitous cliffs. Attacked in this plain by numbers
-double their own, the unfortunate Thurians underwent one of the most
-bloody defeats recorded in Grecian history. Out of their fourteen
-thousand men, ten thousand were slain, under merciless order from the
-Lucanians to give no quarter. The remainder contrived to flee to a
-hill near the sea-shore, from whence they saw a fleet of ships of war
-coasting along at no great distance. Distracted with terror, they
-were led to fancy, or to hope, that these were the ships expected
-from Rhegium to their aid; though the Rhegines would naturally send
-their ships, when demanded, to Thurii, on the Tarentine Gulf, not
-to the Lower sea near Läus. Under this impression, one thousand of
-them swam off from the shore to seek protection on shipboard. But
-they found themselves, unfortunately, on board the fleet of Leptines,
-brother and admiral of Dionysius, come for the express purpose of
-aiding the Lucanians. With a generosity not less unexpected than
-honorable, this officer saved their lives, and also, as it would
-appear, the lives of all the other defenceless survivors; persuading
-or constraining the Lucanians to release them, on receiving one mina
-of silver per man.[28]
-
-  [25] Herodot. vi. 21; Strabo, vi. p. 253.
-
-  [26] See the description of this mountainous region between
-  the Tarentine Gulf and the Tyrrhenian Sea, in an interesting
-  work by a French General employed in Calabria in 1809—Calabria
-  during a military residence of Three Years, Letters, 17, 18, 19
-  (translated and published by Effingham Wilson. London, 1832).
-
-  [27] Diodor. xiv. 101. βουλόμενοι Λᾶον, πόλιν εὐδαίμονα,
-  πολιορκῆσαι. This appears the true reading: it is an acute
-  conjecture proposed by Niebuhr (Römisch. Geschicht. i. p. 96)
-  in place of the words—βουλόμενοι λαὸν καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα,
-  πολιορκῆσαι.
-
-  [28] Diodor. xiv. 102.
-
-This act of Hellenic sympathy restored three or four thousand
-citizens on ransom to Thurii, instead of leaving them to be massacred
-or sold by the barbarous Lucanians, and procured the warmest esteem
-for Leptines personally among the Thurians and other Italiot
-Greeks. But it incurred the strong displeasure of Dionysius, who
-now proclaimed openly his project of subjugating these Greeks, and
-was anxious to encourage the Lucanians as indispensable allies.
-Accordingly he dismissed Leptines, and named as admiral his other
-brother Thearides. He then proceeded to conduct a fresh expedition;
-no longer intended against Rhegium alone, but against all the Italiot
-Greeks. He departed from Syracuse with a powerful force—twenty
-thousand foot and three thousand horse, with which, he marched by
-land in five days to Messênê; his fleet under Thearides accompanying
-him—forty ships of war, and three hundred transports with provisions.
-Having first successfully surprised and captured near the Lipari
-isles a Rhegian squadron of ten ships, the crews of which he
-constituted prisoners at Messênê, he transported his army across the
-strait into Italy, and laid siege to Kaulonia—on the eastern coast
-of the peninsula, and conterminous with the northern border of his
-allies the Lokrians. He attacked this place vigorously, with the best
-siege machines which his arsenal furnished.
-
-The Italiot Greeks, on the other hand, mustered their united force
-to relieve it. Their chief centre of action was Kroton where most of
-the Syracusan exiles, the most forward of all champions in the cause,
-were now assembled. One of these exiles, Helôris (who had before been
-named general by the Rhegines), was intrusted with the command of the
-collective army; an arrangement neutralizing all local jealousies.
-Under the cordial sentiment prevailing, an army was mustered at
-Kroton, estimated at twenty-five thousand foot and two thousand
-horse; by what cities furnished, or in what proportion, we are unable
-to say.[29] At the head of these troops, Helôris marched southward
-from Kroton to the river Elleporus not far from Kaulonia; where
-Dionysius, raising the siege, met him.[30] He was about four miles
-and a half from the Krotoniate army, when he learnt from his scouts
-that Helôris with a chosen regiment of five hundred men (perhaps
-Syracusan exiles like himself), was considerably in advance of the
-main body. Moving rapidly forward in the night, Dionysius surprised
-this advanced guard at break of day, completely isolated from the
-rest. Helôris, while he despatched instant messages to accelerate
-the coming up of the main body, defended himself with his small band
-against overwhelming superiority of numbers. But the odds were too
-great. After an heroic resistance, he was slain, and his companions
-nearly all cut to pieces, before the main body, though they came up
-at full speed, could arrive.
-
-  [29] Diodor. xiv. 103.
-
-  [30] Polybius (i. 6) gives us the true name of this river:
-  Diodorus calls it the river _Helôris_.
-
-The hurried pace of the Italiot army, however, though it did not
-suffice to save the general, was of fatal efficacy in deranging
-their own soldierlike army. Confused and disheartened by finding
-that Helôris was slain, which left them without a general to direct
-the battle or restore order, the Italiots fought for some time
-against Dionysius, but were at length defeated with severe loss. They
-effected their retreat from the field of battle to a neighboring
-eminence, very difficult to attack, yet destitute of water and
-provisions. Here Dionysius blocked them up, without attempting an
-attack, but keeping the strictest guard round the hill during the
-whole remaining day and the ensuing night. The heat of the next day,
-with total want of water, so subdued their courage, that they sent
-to Dionysius a herald with propositions, entreating to be allowed
-to depart on a stipulated ransom. But the terms were peremptorily
-refused; they were ordered to lay down their arms, and surrender at
-discretion. Against this terrible requisition they stood out yet
-awhile, until the increasing pressure of physical exhaustion and
-suffering drove them to surrender, about the eighth hour of the
-day.[31]
-
-  [31] Diodor. xiv. 105. παρέδωκαν αὑτοὺς περὶ ὀγδόην ὥραν, ἤδη τὰ
-  σώματα παρείμενοι.
-
-More than ten thousand disarmed Greeks descended from the hill and
-defiled before Dionysius, who numbered the companies as they passed
-with a stick. As his savage temper was well known, they expected
-nothing short of the harshest sentence. So much the greater was
-their astonishment and delight, when they found themselves treated
-not merely with lenity, but with generosity.[32] Dionysius released
-them all without even exacting a ransom; and concluded a treaty with
-most of the cities to which they belonged, leaving their autonomy
-undisturbed. He received the warmest thanks, accompanied by votes of
-golden wreaths, from the prisoners as well as from the cities; while
-among the general public of Greece, the act was hailed as forming the
-prominent glory of his political life.[33] Such admiration was well
-deserved, looking to the laws of war then prevalent.
-
-  [32] Diodor. xiv. 105. Καὶ πάντων αὐτοῦ ὑποπτευόντων τὸ θηριῶδες,
-  τοὐναντίον ἐφάνη πάντων ἐπιεικέστατος.
-
-  [33] Diodor. xiv. 105. καὶ σχεδὸν τοῦτ᾽ ἔδοξε πράττειν ἐν τῷ ζῇν
-  κάλλιστον. Strabo, vi. p. 261.
-
-With the Krotoniates and other Italiot Greeks (except Rhegium and
-Lokri) Dionysius had had no marked previous relations and therefore
-had not contracted any strong personal sentiment either of antipathy
-or favor. With Rhegium and Lokri, the case was different. To the
-Lokrians he was strongly attached: against the Rhegines his animosity
-was bitter and implacable, manifesting itself in a more conspicuous
-manner by contrast with his recent dismissal of the Krotoniate
-prisoners; a proceeding which had been probably dictated, in great
-part, by his anxiety to have his hands free for the attack of
-isolated Rhegium. After having finished the arrangements consequent
-upon his victory, he marched against that city, and prepared to
-besiege it. The citizens, feeling themselves without hope of succor,
-and intimidated by the disaster of their Italiot allies, sent out
-heralds to beg for moderate terms, and imploring him to abstain from
-extreme or unmeasured rigor.[34] For a moment, Dionysius seemed to
-comply with their request. He granted them peace, on condition that
-they should surrender all their ships of war, seventy in number—that
-they should pay to him three hundred talents in money—and that they
-should place in his hands one hundred hostages. All these demands
-were strictly complied with; upon which Dionysius withdrew his army,
-and agreed to spare the city.[35]
-
-  [34] Diodor. xiv. 106. καὶ παρακαλέσαι μηδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν ~ὑπὲρ
-  ἄνθρωπον~ βουλεύεσθαι.
-
-  [35] Diodor. xiv. 106.
-
-His next proceeding was, to attack Kaulonia and Hipponium; two
-cities which seem between them to have occupied the whole breadth
-of the Calabrian peninsula, immediately north of Rhegium and Lokri;
-Kaulonia on the eastern coast, Hipponium on or near the western. Both
-these cities he besieged, took, and destroyed: probably neither of
-them, in the hopeless circumstances of the case, made any strenuous
-resistance. He then caused the inhabitants of both of them, such at
-least as did not make their escape, to be transported to Syracuse,
-where he domiciliated them as citizens, allowing them five years of
-exemption from taxes.[36] To be a citizen of Syracuse meant at this
-moment, to be a subject of his despotism, and nothing more: how he
-made room for these new citizens, or furnished them with lands and
-houses, we are unfortunately not informed. But the territory of both
-these towns, evacuated by its free inhabitants (though probably not
-by its slaves, or serfs), was handed over to the Lokrians and annexed
-to their city. That favored city, which had accepted his offer of
-marriage, was thus immensely enriched both in lands and in collective
-property. Here again it would have been interesting to hear what
-measures were taken to appropriate or distribute the new lands; but
-our informant is silent.
-
-  [36] Diodor. xiv. 106, 107.
-
-Dionysius had thus accumulated into Syracuse, not only all Sicily[37]
-(to use the language of Plato), but even no inconsiderable portion
-of Italy. Such wholesale changes of domicile and property must
-probably have occupied some months; during which time the army of
-Dionysius seems never to have quitted the Calabrian peninsula, though
-he himself may probably have gone for a time in person to Syracuse.
-It was soon seen that the depopulation of Hipponium and Kaulonia
-was intended only as a prelude to the ruin of Rhegium. Upon this
-Dionysius had resolved. The recent covenant into which he had entered
-with the Rhegines, was only a fraudulent device for the purpose of
-entrapping them into a surrender of their navy, in order that he
-might afterwards attack them at greater advantage. Marching his
-army to the Italian shore of the strait, near Rhegium, he affected
-to busy himself in preparations for crossing to Sicily. In the mean
-time, he sent a friendly message to the Rhegines, requesting them
-to supply him for a short time with provisions, under assurance
-that what they furnished should speedily be replaced from Syracuse.
-It was his purpose, if they refused, to resent it as an insult,
-and attack them; if they consented, to consume their provisions,
-without performing his engagement to replace the quantity consumed;
-and then to make his attack after all, when their means of holding
-out had been diminished. At first the Rhegines complied willingly,
-furnishing abundant supplies. But the consumption continued, and the
-departure of the army was deferred—first on pretence of the illness
-of Dionysius, next on other grounds—so that they at length detected
-the trick, and declined to furnish any more. Dionysius now threw off
-the mask, gave back to them their hundred hostages, and laid siege to
-the town in form.[38]
-
-  [37] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 332 D. Διονύσιος δὲ εἰς μίαν πόλιν
-  ἀθροίσας πᾶσαν Σικελίαν ὑπὸ σοφίας, etc.
-
-  [38] Diodor. xiv. 107, 108. Polyænus relates this stratagem of
-  Dionysius about the provisions, as if it had been practised at
-  the siege of Himera, and not of Rhegium (Polyæn. v. 3, 10).
-
-Regretting too late that they had suffered themselves to be defrauded
-of their means of defence, the Rhegines nevertheless prepared to hold
-out with all the energy of despair. Phyton was chosen commander,
-the whole population was armed, and all the line of wall carefully
-watched. Dionysius made vigorous assaults, employing all the
-resources of his battering machinery to effect a breach. But he was
-repelled at all points obstinately, and with much loss on both sides:
-several of his machines were also burnt or destroyed by opportune
-sallies of the besieged. In one of the assaults, Dionysius himself
-was seriously wounded by a spear thrust in the groin, from which
-he was long in recovering. He was at length obliged to convert the
-siege into a blockade, and to rely upon famine alone for subduing
-these valiant citizens. For eleven months did the Rhegines hold
-out, against the pressure of want gradually increasing, and at last
-terminating in the agony and destruction of famine. We are told that
-a medimnus of wheat came to be sold for the enormous price of five
-minæ; at the rate of about £14 sterling per bushel: every horse and
-every beast of burthen was consumed: at length hides were boiled and
-eaten, and even the grass on parts of the wall. Many perished from
-absolute hunger, while the survivors lost all strength and energy. In
-this intolerable condition, they were constrained, at the end of near
-eleven months, to surrender at discretion.
-
-So numerous were these victims of famine, that Dionysius, on entering
-Rhegium, found heaps of unburied corpses, besides six thousand
-citizens in the last stage of emaciation. All these captives were
-sent to Syracuse, where those who could provide a mina (about £3
-17s.) were allowed to ransom themselves, while the rest were sold
-as slaves. After such a period of suffering, the number of those
-who retained the means of ransom was probably very small. But the
-Rhegine general, Phyton, was detained with all his kindred, and
-reserved for a different fate. First, his son was drowned, by
-order of Dionysius: next, Phyton himself was chained to one of the
-loftiest siege-machines, as a spectacle to the whole army. While he
-was thus exhibited to scorn, a messenger was sent to apprise him,
-that Dionysius had just caused his son to be drowned. “He is more
-fortunate than his father by one day,” was the reply of Phyton.
-After a certain time, the sufferer was taken down from his pillory,
-and led round the city, with attendants scourging and insulting him
-at every step; while a herald proclaimed aloud, “Behold the man who
-persuaded the Rhegines to war, thus signally punished by Dionysius!”
-Phyton, enduring all these torments with heroic courage and dignified
-silence, was provoked to exclaim in reply to the herald, that the
-punishment was inflicted because he had refused to betray the city
-to Dionysius, who would himself soon be overtaken by the divine
-vengeance. At length the prolonged outrages, combined with the noble
-demeanor and high reputation of the victim, excited compassion even
-among the soldiers of Dionysius himself. Their murmurs became so
-pronounced, that he began to apprehend an open mutiny for the purpose
-of rescuing Phyton. Under this fear he gave orders that the torments
-should be discontinued, and that Phyton with his entire kindred
-should be drowned.[39]
-
-  [39] Diodor. xiv. 112. Ὁ δὲ Φύτων, κατὰ τὴν πολιορκίαν στρατηγὸς
-  ἀγαθὸς γεγενημένος, καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ἐπαινούμενος, οὐκ
-  ἀγεννῶς ὑπέμενε τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς τελευτῆς τιμωρίαν· ἀλλ᾽ ἀκατάπληκτον
-  τὴν ψυχὴν φυλάξας, καὶ βοῶν, ὅτι τὴν πόλιν οὐ βουληθεὶς προδοῦναι
-  Διονυσίῳ τυγχάνει τῆς τιμωρίας, ἣν αὐτῷ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐκείνῳ
-  συντόμως ἐπιστήσει· ὥστε τὴν ἀρετὴν τἀνδρὸς καὶ παρὰ τοῖς
-  στρατιώταις τοῦ Διονυσίου κατελεεῖσθαι, καί τινας ἤδη θορυβεῖν.
-  Ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος, εὐλαβηθεὶς μή τινες τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀποτολμήσωσιν
-  ἐξαρπάζειν τὸν Φύτωνα, παυσάμενος τῆς τιμωρίας, κατεπόντωσε τὸν
-  ἀτυχῆ μετὰ τῆς συγγενείας. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἀναξίως τῆς ἀρετῆς
-  ἐκνόμοις περιέπεσε τιμωρίαις, καὶ πολλοὺς ἔσχε καὶ τότε τῶν
-  Ἑλλήνων τοὺς ἀλγήσαντας τὴν συμφορὰν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ποιητὰς τοὺς
-  θρηνήσοντας τὸ τῆς περιπετείας ἐλεεινόν.
-
-The prophetic persuasion under which this unhappy man perished,
-that divine vengeance would soon overtake his destroyer, was noway
-borne out by the subsequent reality. The power and prosperity of
-Dionysius underwent abatement by his war with the Carthaginians in
-383 B. C., yet remained very considerable even to his dying day.
-And the misfortunes which fell thickly upon his son the younger
-Dionysius, more than thirty years afterwards, though they doubtless
-received a religious interpretation from contemporary critics, were
-probably ascribed to acts more recent than the barbarities inflicted
-on Phyton. But these barbarities, if not avenged, were at least laid
-to heart with profound sympathy by the contemporary world, and even
-commemorated with tenderness and pathos by poets. While Dionysius was
-composing tragedies (of which more presently) in hopes of applause in
-Greece, he was himself furnishing real matter of history, not less
-tragical than the sufferings of those legendary heroes and heroines
-to which he (in common with other poets) resorted for a subject.
-Among the many acts of cruelty, more or less aggravated, which it
-is the melancholy duty of an historian of Greece to recount, there
-are few so revolting as the death of the Rhegine general; who was
-not a subject, nor a conspirator, nor a rebel, but an enemy in open
-warfare—of whom the worst that even Dionysius himself could say, was,
-that he had persuaded his countrymen into the war. And even this
-could not be said truly; since the antipathy of the Rhegines towards
-Dionysius was of old standing, traceable to his enslavement of Naxos
-and Katana, if not to causes yet earlier—though the statement of
-Phyton may very probably be true, that Dionysius had tried to bribe
-him to betray Rhegium (as the generals of Naxos and Katana had
-been bribed to betray their respective cities), and was incensed
-beyond measure at finding the proposition repelled. The Hellenic
-war-practice was in itself sufficiently cruel. Both Athenians and
-Lacedæmonians put to death prisoners of war by wholesale, after the
-capture of Melos, after the battle of Ægospotami, and elsewhere. But
-to make death worse than death by a deliberate and protracted tissue
-of tortures and indignities, is not Hellenic; it is Carthaginian
-and Asiatic. Dionysius had shown himself better than a Greek when
-he released without ransom the Krotoniate prisoners captured at the
-battle of Kaulonia; but he became far worse than a Greek, and worse
-even than his own mercenaries, when he heaped aggravated suffering,
-beyond the simple death-warrant, on the heads of Phyton and his
-kindred.
-
-Dionysius caused the city of Rhegium to be destroyed[40] or
-dismantled. Probably he made over the lands to Lokri, like those
-of Kaulonia and Hipponium. The free Rhegine citizens had all been
-transported to Syracuse for sale; and those who were fortunate enough
-to save their liberty by providing the stipulated ransom, would not
-be allowed to come back to their native soil. If Dionysius was so
-zealous in enriching the Lokrians, as to transfer to them two other
-neighboring town-domains, against the inhabitants of which he had
-no peculiar hatred—much more would he be disposed to make the like
-transfer of the Rhegine territory, whereby he would gratify at once
-his antipathy to the one state and his partiality to the other. It
-is true that Rhegium did not permanently continue incorporated with
-Lokri; but neither did Kaulonia nor Hipponium. The maintenance of
-all the three transfers depended on the ascendency of Dionysius and
-his dynasty; but for the time immediately succeeding the capture of
-Rhegium, the Lokrians became masters of the Rhegine territory as well
-as of the two other townships, and thus possessed all the Calabrian
-peninsula south of the Gulf of Squillace. To the Italiot Greeks
-generally, these victories of Dionysius were fatally ruinous, because
-the political union formed among them, for the purpose of resisting
-the pressure of the Lucanians from the interior, was overthrown,
-leaving each city to its own weakness and isolation.[41]
-
-  [40] Strabo, vi. p. 258 ἐπιφανῆ δ᾽ οὖν πόλιν οὖσαν ... κατασκάψαι
-  Διονύσιον, etc.
-
-  [41] Polybius, ii. 39, 67.
-
-The year 387, in which Rhegium surrendered, was also distinguished
-for two other memorable events; the general peace in Central Greece
-under the dictation of Persia and Sparta, commonly called the peace
-of Antalkidas; and the capture of Rome by the Gauls.[42]
-
-  [42] Polybius, i. 6.
-
-The two great ascendant powers in the Grecian world were now, Sparta
-in Peloponnesus, and Dionysius in Sicily; each respectively fortified
-by alliance with the other. I have already in a former chapter[43]
-described the position of Sparta after the peace of Antalkidas; how
-greatly she gained by making herself the champion of that Persian
-rescript—and how she purchased, by surrendering the Asiatic Greeks
-to Artaxerxes, an empire on land equal to that which she had enjoyed
-before the defeat of Knidus, though without recovering the maritime
-empire fortified by that defeat.
-
-  [43] Chap. LXXVI. Vol. X.
-
-To this great imperial state, Dionysius in the west formed a suitable
-counterpart. His recent victories in Southern Italy had already
-raised his power to a magnitude transcending all the far-famed
-recollections of Gelon; but he now still farther extended it by
-sending an expedition against Kroton. This city, the largest in Magna
-Græcia, fell under his power; and he succeeded in capturing, by
-surprise or bribery, even its strong citadel; on a rock overhanging
-the sea.[44] He seems also to have advanced yet farther with his
-fleet to attack Thurii; which city owed its preservation solely to
-the violence of the north winds. He plundered the temple of Hêrê near
-Cape Lakinium, in the domain of Kroton. Among the ornaments of this
-temple was one of pre-eminent beauty and celebrity, which at the
-periodical festivals was exhibited to admiring spectators: a robe
-wrought with the greatest skill, and decorated in the most costly
-manner, the votive offering of a Sybarite named Alkimenes. Dionysius
-sold this robe to the Carthaginians. It long remained as one of
-the permanent religious ornaments of their city, being probably
-dedicated to the honor of those Hellenic Deities recently introduced
-for worship; whom (as I have before stated) the Carthaginians were
-about this time peculiarly anxious to propitiate, in hopes of
-averting or alleviating the frightful pestilences wherewith they
-had been so often smitten. They purchased the robe from Dionysius
-at the prodigious price of one hundred and twenty talents, or
-about £27,600 sterling.[45] Incredible as this sum may appear, we
-must recollect that the honor done to the new gods would be mainly
-estimated according to the magnitude of the sum laid out. As the
-Carthaginians would probably think no price too great to transfer
-an unrivalled vestment from the wardrobe of the Lakinian Hêrê to
-the newly-established temple and worship of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê
-in their city—so we may be sure that the loss of such an ornament,
-and the spoliation of the holy place, would deeply humiliate the
-Krotoniates, and with them the crowd of Italiot Greeks who frequented
-the Lakinian festivals.
-
-  [44] Livy has preserved the mention of this important acquisition
-  of Dionysius (xxiv. 3).
-
-  “Sed arx Crotonis, unâ parte imminens mari, alterâ vergente in
-  agrum, situ tantum naturali quondam munita, postea et muro cincta
-  est, quâ per aversas rupes ab Dionysio Siciliæ tyranno per dolum
-  fuerat capta.”
-
-  Justin also (xx. 5) mentions the attack of Dionysius upon Kroton.
-
-  We may, with tolerable certainty, refer the capture to the
-  present part of the career of Dionysius.
-
-  See also Ælian, V. H. xii. 61.
-
-  [45] Aristotel. Auscult. Mirab. s. 96; Athenæus, xii. p. 541;
-  Diodor. xiv. 77.
-
-  Polemon specified this costly robe, in his work Περὶ τῶν ἐν
-  Καρχηδόνι Πέπλων....
-
-Thus master of the important city of Kroton, with a citadel near the
-sea capable of being held by a separate garrison, Dionysius divested
-the inhabitants of their southern possession of Skylletium, which he
-made over to aggrandize yet farther the town of Lokri.[46] Whether
-he pushed his conquests farther along the Tarentine Gulf so as to
-acquire the like hold on Thurii or Metapontum, we cannot say. But
-both of them must have been overawed by the rapid extension and near
-approach of his power; especially Thurii, not yet recovered from her
-disastrous defeat by the Lucanians.
-
-  [46] Strabo, vi. p. 261.
-
-Profiting by his maritime command of the Gulf, Dionysius was
-enabled to enlarge his ambitious views even to distant ultramarine
-enterprises. To escape from his long arm, Syracusan exiles were
-obliged to flee to a greater distance, and one of their divisions
-either founded, or was admitted into, the city of Ancona, high up
-the Adriatic Gulf.[47] On the other side of that Gulf, in vicinity
-and alliance with the Illyrian tribes, Dionysius on his part sent a
-fleet, and established more than one settlement. To these schemes he
-was prompted by a dispossessed prince of the Epirotic Molossians,
-named Alketas, who, residing at Syracuse as an exile, had gained
-his confidence. He founded the town of Lissus (now Alessio) on the
-Illyrian coast, considerably north of Epidamnus; and he assisted the
-Parians in their plantation of two Grecian settlements, in sites
-still farther northward up the Adriatic Gulf—the islands of Issa
-and Pharos. His admiral at Lissus defeated the neighboring Illyrian
-coast-boats, which harassed these newly-settled Parians; but with
-the Illyrian tribes near to Lissus, he maintained an intimate
-alliance, and even furnished a large number of them with Grecian
-panoplies. It is affirmed to have been the purpose of Dionysius
-and Alketas to employ these warlike barbarians, first in invading
-Epirus and restoring Alketas to his Molossian principality; next in
-pillaging the wealthy temple of Delphi—a scheme far-reaching, yet not
-impracticable, and capable of being seconded by a Syracusan fleet,
-if circumstances favored its execution. The invasion of Epirus was
-accomplished, and the Molossians were defeated in a bloody battle,
-wherein fifteen thousand of them are said to have been slain. But the
-ulterior projects against Delphi were arrested by the intervention
-of Sparta, who sent a force to the spot and prevented all further
-march southward.[48] Alketas however seems to have remained prince of
-a portion of Epirus, in the territory nearly opposite to Korkyra;
-where we have already recognized him, in a former chapter, as having
-become the dependent of Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly.
-
-  [47] Strabo, v. p. 241. It would seem that the two maritime
-  towns, said to have been founded on the coast of Apulia on the
-  Adriatic by Dionysius the _younger_ during the first years of
-  his reign—according to Diodorus (xvi. 5)—must have been really
-  founded by the _elder_ Dionysius, near about the time to which we
-  have now reached.
-
-  [48] Diodor. xv. 13, 14.
-
-Another enterprise undertaken by Dionysius about this time was a
-maritime expedition along the coasts of Latium, Etruria, and Corsica;
-partly under color of repressing the piracies committed from their
-maritime cities; but partly also, for the purpose of pillaging the
-rich and holy temple of Leukothea, at Agylla or its seaport Pyrgi.
-In this he succeeded, stripping it of money and precious ornaments
-to the amount of one thousand talents. The Agyllæans came forth to
-defend their temple, but were completely worsted, and lost so much
-both in plunder and in prisoners, that Dionysius, after returning to
-Syracuse and selling the prisoners, obtained an additional profit of
-five hundred talents.[49]
-
-  [49] Diodor. xv. 14; Strabo, v. p. 226; Servius ad Virgil. Æneid.
-  x. 184.
-
-Such was the military celebrity now attained by Dionysius,[50] that
-the Gauls from Northern Italy, who had recently sacked Rome, sent
-to proffer their alliance and aid. He accepted the proposition;
-from whence perhaps the Gallic mercenaries whom we afterwards find
-in his service as mercenaries, may take their date. His long arms
-now reached from Lissus on one side to Agylla on the other. Master
-of most of Sicily and much of Southern Italy, as well as of the
-most powerful standing army in Greece—the unscrupulous plunderer
-of the holiest temples everywhere[51]—he inspired much terror and
-dislike throughout Central Greece. He was the more vulnerable to this
-sentiment, as he was not only a triumphant prince, but also a tragic
-poet; competitor, as such, for that applause and admiration which no
-force can extort. Since none of his tragedies have been preserved, we
-can form no judgment of our own respecting them. Yet when we learn
-that he had stood second or third, and that one of his compositions
-gained even the first prize at the Lenæan festival at Athens,[52] in
-368-367 B. C.—the favorable judgment of an Athenian audience affords
-good reason for presuming that his poetical talents were considerable.
-
-  [50] Justin, xx. 5; Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 1, 20.
-
-  [51] See Pseudo-Aristotel. Œconomic. ii. 20-41; Cicero, De Natur.
-  Deor. iii. 34, 82, 85: in which passages, however, there must be
-  several incorrect assertions as to the actual temples pillaged;
-  for Dionysius could not have been in Peloponnesus to rob the
-  temple of Zeus at _Olympia_, or of Æsculapius at _Epidaurus_.
-
-  Athenæus (xv. p. 693) recounts an anecdote that Dionysius
-  plundered the temple of Æsculapius at _Syracuse_ of a valuable
-  golden table; which is far more probable.
-
-  [52] Diodor. xv. 74. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast. Hellen. ad ann.
-  367 B. C.
-
-During the years immediately succeeding 387 B. C., however, Dionysius
-the poet was not likely to receive an impartial hearing anywhere.
-For while on the one hand his own circle would applaud every word—on
-the other hand, a large proportion of independent Greeks would be
-biassed against what they heard by their fear and hatred of the
-author. If we believed the anecdotes recounted by Diodorus, we
-should conclude not merely that the tragedies were contemptible
-compositions, but that the irritability of Dionysius in regard to
-criticism was exaggerated even to silly weakness. The dithyrambic
-poet Philoxenus, a resident or visitor at Syracuse, after hearing
-one of these tragedies privately recited, was asked his opinion. He
-gave an unfavorable opinion, for which he was sent to prison:[53] on
-the next day the intercession of friends procured his release, and
-he contrived afterwards, by delicate wit and double-meaning phrases,
-to express an inoffensive sentiment without openly compromising
-truth. At the Olympic festival of 388 B. C., Dionysius had sent some
-of his compositions to Olympia, together with the best actors and
-chorists to recite them. But so contemptible were the poems (we are
-told), that in spite of every advantage of recitation, they were
-disgracefully hissed and ridiculed; moreover the actors in coming
-back to Syracuse were shipwrecked, and the crew of the ship ascribed
-all the suffering of their voyage to the badness of the poems
-entrusted to them. The flatterers of Dionysius, however (it is said),
-still continued to extol his genius, and to assure him that his
-ultimate success as a poet, though for a time interrupted by envy,
-was infallible; which Dionysius believed, and continued to compose
-tragedies without being disheartened.[54]
-
-  [53] See a different version of the story about Philoxenus in
-  Plutarch, De Fortun. Alexand. Magni, p. 334 C.
-
-  [54] Diodor. xiv. 109; xv. 6.
-
-Amidst such malicious jests, circulated by witty men at the
-expense of the princely poet, we may trace some important matter
-of fact. Perhaps in the year 388 B. C., but certainly in the year
-384 B. C. (both of them Olympic years), Dionysius sent tragedies
-to be recited, and chariots to run, before the crowd assembled in
-festival at Olympia. The year 387 B. C. was a memorable year both
-in Central Greece and in Sicily. In the former, it was signalized
-by the momentous peace of Antalkidas, which terminated a general
-war of eight years’ standing: in the latter, it marked the close of
-the Italian campaign of Dionysius, with the defeat and humiliation
-of Kroton and the other Italiot Greeks, and subversion of three
-Grecian cities,—Hipponium, Kaulonia, and Rhegium—the fate of the
-Rhegines having been characterized by incidents most pathetic and
-impressive. The first Olympic festival which occurred after 387 B. C.
-was accordingly a distinguished epoch. The two festivals immediately
-preceding (those of 392 B. C. and 388 B. C.) having been celebrated
-in the midst of a general war, had not been visited by a large
-proportion of the Hellenic body; so that the next ensuing festival,
-the 99th Olympiad in 384 B. C., was stamped with a peculiar character
-(like the 90th Olympiad[55] in 420 B. C.) as bringing together in
-religious fraternity those who had long been separated.[56] To every
-ambitious Greek (as to Alkibiades in 420 B. C.) it was an object
-of unusual ambition to make individual figure at such a festival.
-To Dionysius, the temptation was peculiarly seductive, since he
-was triumphant over all neighboring enemies—at the pinnacle of his
-power—and disengaged from all war requiring his own personal command.
-Accordingly he sent thither his Theôre, or solemn legation for
-sacrifice, decked in the richest garments, furnished with abundant
-gold and silver plate, and provided with splendid tents to serve
-for their lodging on the sacred ground of Olympia. He farther sent
-several chariots-and-four to contend in the regular chariot races:
-and lastly, he also sent reciters and chorists, skilful as well as
-highly trained, to exhibit his own poetical compositions before
-such as were willing to hear them. We must remember that poetical
-recitation was not included in the formal programme of the festival.
-
-  [55] See Vol. VII. of this History, Ch. LV. p. 57 _seqq._
-
-  [56] See above, in this work, Vol. X. Ch. LXXVII. p. 76. I have
-  already noticed the peculiarity of this Olympic festival of 384
-  B. C., in reference to the position and sentiment of the Greeks
-  in Peloponnesus and Asia. I am now obliged to notice it again,
-  in reference to the Greeks of Sicily and Italy—especially to
-  Dionysius.
-
-All this prodigious outfit, under the superintendence of Thearides,
-brother of Dionysius, was exhibited with dazzling effect before
-the Olympic crowd. No name stood so prominently and ostentatiously
-before them as that of the despot of Syracuse. Every man, even from
-the most distant regions of Greece, was stimulated to inquire into
-his past exploits and character. There were probably many persons
-present, peculiarly forward in answering such inquiries—the numerous
-sufferers, from Italian and Sicilian Greece, whom his conquests had
-thrown into exile; and their answers would be of a nature to raise
-the strongest antipathy against Dionysius. Besides the numerous
-depopulations and mutations of inhabitants which he had occasioned
-in Sicily, we have already seen that he had, within the last three
-years, extinguished three free Grecian communities—Rhegium, Kaulonia,
-Hipponium; transporting all the inhabitants of the two latter to
-Syracuse. In the case of Kaulonia, an accidental circumstance
-occurred to impress its recent extinction vividly upon the
-spectators. The runner who gained the great prize in the stadium, in
-384 B. C., was Dikon, a native of Kaulonia. He was a man preëminently
-swift of foot, celebrated as having gained previous victories in
-the stadium, and always proclaimed (pursuant to custom) along with
-the title of his native city—“Dikon the Kauloniate.” To hear this
-well-known runner now proclaimed as “Dikon the Syracusan,”[57] gave
-painful publicity to the fact, that the free community of Kaulonia no
-longer existed,—and to the absorptions of Grecian freedom effected by
-Dionysius.
-
-  [57] Diodor. xv. 14. Παρὰ δ᾽ Ἠλείοις Ὀλυμπιὰς ἤχθη ἐννενηκοστὴ
-  ἐννάτη (B. C. 384), καθ᾽ ἣν ἐνίκα στάδιον Δίκων Συρακούσιος.
-
-  Pausanias, vi. 3, 5. Δίκων δὲ ὁ Καλλιμβρότου πέντε μὲν Πυθοῖ
-  δρόμου νίκας, τρεῖς δὲ ἀνείλετο Ἰσθμίων, τέσσαρας δὲ ἐν Νεμέᾳ,
-  καὶ Ὀλυμπιακὰς μίαν μὲν ἐν παισὶ, δύο δὲ ἄλλας ἀνδρῶν· καὶ οἱ καὶ
-  ἀνδριάντες ἴσοι ταῖς νίκαις εἰσὶν ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ· παιδὶ μὲν δὴ ὄντι
-  αὐτῷ ~Καυλωνιάτῃ, καθάπερ γε καὶ ἦν, ὑπῆρξεν ἀναγορευθῆναι~· τὸ
-  δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου ~Συρακούσιον αὑτὸν ἀνηγόρευσεν ἐπὶ χρήμασι~.
-
-  Pausanias here states, that Dikon received a bribe to permit
-  himself to be proclaimed as a Syracusan, and not as a Kauloniate.
-  Such corruption did occasionally take place (compare another case
-  of similar bribery, attempted by Syracusan envoys, Pausan. vi. 2,
-  4), prompted by the vanity of the Grecian cities to appropriate
-  to themselves the celebrity of a distinguished victor at Olympia.
-  But in this instance, the blame imputed to Dikon is more than he
-  deserves. Kaulonia had been already depopulated and incorporated
-  with Lokri; the inhabitants being taken away to Syracuse and
-  made Syracusan citizens (Diodor. xiv. 106). Dikon therefore
-  could not have been proclaimed a Kauloniate, even had he desired
-  it—when the city of Kaulonia no longer existed. The city was
-  indeed afterwards reëstablished; and this circumstance doubtless
-  contributed to mislead Pausanias, who does not seem to have been
-  aware of its temporary subversion by Dionysius.
-
-In following the history of affairs in Central Greece, I have
-already dwelt upon the strong sentiment excited among Grecian
-patriots by the peace of Antalkidas, wherein Sparta made herself the
-ostentatious champion and enforcer of a Persian rescript, purchased
-by surrendering the Asiatic Greeks to the Great King. It was natural
-that this emotion should manifest itself at the next ensuing Olympic
-festival in 384 B. C., wherein not only Spartans, Athenians, Thebans,
-and Corinthians, but also Asiatic and Sicilian Greeks, were reunited
-after a long separation. The emotion found an eloquent spokesman in
-the orator Lysias. Descended from Syracusan ancestors, and once a
-citizen of Thurii,[58] Lysias had peculiar grounds for sympathy with
-the Sicilian and Italian Greeks. He delivered a public harangue upon
-the actual state of political affairs, in which he dwelt upon the
-mournful present and upon the serious dangers of the future. “The
-Grecian world (he said) is burning away at both extremities. Our
-eastern brethren have passed into slavery under the Great King, our
-western under the despotism of Dionysius.[59] These two are the great
-potentates, both in naval force and in money, the real instruments
-of dominion:[60] if both of them combine, they will extinguish what
-remains of freedom in Greece. They have been allowed to consummate
-all this ruin unopposed, because of the past dissensions among the
-leading Grecian cities; but it is now high time that these cities
-should unite cordially to oppose farther ruin. How can Sparta, our
-legitimate president, sit still while the Hellenic world is on fire
-and consuming? The misfortunes of our ruined brethren ought to be
-to us as our own. Let us not lie idle, waiting until Artaxerxes and
-Dionysius attack us with their united force: let us check their
-insolence at once, while it is yet in our power.”[61]
-
-  [58] Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysâ, p. 452, Reisk.
-
-  [59] Lysias, Fragm. Orat. 33. ap. Dionys. Hal. p. 521. ὁρῶν οὕτως
-  αἰσχρῶς διακειμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὐτῆς ὄντα ὑπὸ τῷ
-  βαρβάρῳ, πολλὰς δὲ πόλεις ὑπὸ τυράννων ἀναστάτους γεγενημένας.
-
-  [60] Lysias, Fr. Or. 33. _l. c._ Ἐπίστασθε δὲ, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῶν
-  κρατούντων τῆς θαλάττης, τῶν δὲ χρημάτων βασιλεὺς ταμίας· τὰ δὲ
-  τῶν Ἑλλήνων σώματα τῶν δαπανᾶσθαι δυναμένων· ναῦς δὲ πολλὰς αὐτὸς
-  κέκτηται, πολλὰς δ᾽ ὁ τύραννος τῆς Σικελίας.
-
-  [61] Lysias, Orat. Frag. _l. c._ Θαυμάζω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους
-  πάντων μάλιστα, τίνι ποτε γνώμῃ χρώμενοι, καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα
-  περιορῶσιν, ἡγεμόνες ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐκ ἀδίκως, etc.
-
-  Οὐ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν ἀλλ᾽
-  οἰκείας· ~οὐδ᾽ ἀναμεῖναι, ἕως ἂν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς αἱ δυνάμεις
-  ἀμφοτέρων ἔλθωσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἕως ἔτι ἔξεστι, τὴν τούτων ὕβριν κωλῦσαι~.
-
-  I give in the text the principal points of what remains out of
-  this discourse of Lysias, without confining myself to the words.
-
-Unfortunately we possess but a scanty fragment of this emphatic
-harangue (a panegyrical harangue, in the ancient sense of the word)
-delivered at Olympia by Lysias. But we see the alarming picture
-of the time which he labored to impress: Hellas already enslaved,
-both in the east and in the west, by the two greatest potentates
-of the age,[62] Artaxerxes and Dionysius—and now threatened in her
-centre by their combined efforts. To feel the full probability of so
-gloomy an anticipation, we must recollect that only in the preceding
-year Dionysius, already master of Sicily and of a considerable
-fraction of Italian Greece, had stretched his naval force across
-to Illyria, armed a host of Illyrian barbarians, and sent them
-southward under Alketas against the Molossians, with the view of
-ultimately proceeding farther and pillaging the Delphian temple.
-The Lacedæmonians had been obliged to send a force to arrest their
-progress.[63] No wonder then that Lysias should depict the despot of
-Syracuse as meditating ulterior projects against Central Greece; and
-as an object not only of hatred for what he had done, but of terror
-for what he was about to do, in conjunction with the other great
-enemy from the east.[64]
-
-  [62] Diodor. xv. 23. οἱ μέγιστοι τῶν τότε δυναστῶν, etc.
-
-  [63] Diodor. xv. 13.
-
-  [64] Isokrates holds similar language, both about the
-  destructive conquests of Dionysius, and the past sufferings
-  and present danger of Hellas, in his Orat. IV. (Panegyric.)
-  composed about 380 B. C., and (probably enough) read at the
-  Olympic festival of that year (s. 197). ἴσως δ᾽ ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς
-  εὐηθείας πολλοὶ καταγελάσειαν, εἰ δυστυχίας ἀνδρῶν ὀδυροίμην ἐν
-  τοιούτοις καιροῖς, ἐν οἷς Ἰταλία μὲν ἀνάστατος γέγονε, Σικελία
-  δὲ καταδεδούλωται (compare s. 145), τοσαῦται δὲ πόλεις τοῖς
-  βαρβάροις ἐκδέδονται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μέρη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν τοῖς
-  μεγίστοις κινδύνοις ἐστίν.
-
-  Isokrates had addressed a letter to the elder Dionysius. He
-  alludes briefly to it in his Orat. ad Philippum (Orat. v. s. 93),
-  in terms which appear to indicate that it was bold and plain
-  spoken (θρασύτερον τῶν ἄλλων). The first letter, among the ten
-  ascribed to Isokrates, purports to be a letter to Dionysius; but
-  it seems rather (to judge by the last words) to be the preface of
-  a letter about to follow. Nothing distinct can be made out from
-  it as it now stands.
-
-Of these two enemies, one (the Persian King) was out of reach. But
-the second—Dionysius—though not present in person, stood forth by his
-envoys and appurtenances conspicuous even to ostentation, beyond any
-man on the ground. His Theôry or solemn legation outshone every other
-by the splendor of its tents and decorations: his chariots to run
-in the races were magnificent: his horses were of rare excellence,
-bred from the Venetian stock, imported out of the innermost depths
-of the Adriatic Gulf:[65] his poems, recited by the best artists in
-Greece, solicited applause—by excellent delivery and fine choric
-equipments, if not by superior intrinsic merit. Now the antipathy
-against Dionysius was not only aggravated by all this display,
-contrasted with the wretchedness of impoverished exiles whom he had
-dispossessed—but was also furnished with something to strike at and
-vent itself upon. Of such opportunity for present action against
-a visible object, Lysias did not fail to avail himself. While he
-vehemently preached a crusade to dethrone Dionysius and liberate
-Sicily, he at the same time pointed to the gold and purple tent
-before them, rich and proud above all its fellows, which lodged the
-brother of the despot with his Syracusan legation. He exhorted his
-hearers to put forth at once an avenging hand, in partial retribution
-for the sufferings of free Greece, by plundering the tent which
-insulted them by its showy decorations. He adjured them to interfere
-and prevent the envoys of this impious despot from sacrificing or
-entering their chariots in the lists, or taking any part in the holy
-Pan-hellenic festival.[66]
-
-  [65] Strabo, v. p. 212.
-
-  [66] Dionys. Hal. p. 519. Jud. de Lysiâ. Ἐστὶ δή τις αὐτῷ
-  πανηγυρικὸς λόγος, ἐν ᾧ πείθει τοὺς Ἕλληνας ... ἐκβάλλειν
-  Διονύσιον τὸν τύραννον τῆς ἀρχῆς, καὶ Σικελίαν ἐλευθερῶσαι,
-  ἄρξασθαί τε τῆς ἐχθρᾶς αὐτίκα μάλα, διαρπάσαντας τὴν τοῦ τυράννου
-  σκηνὴν χρυσῷ τε καὶ πορφύρᾳ καὶ ἄλλῳ πλούτῳ πολλῷ κεκοσμημένην,
-  etc.
-
-  Diodor. xiv. 109. Λυσίας ... προετρέπετο τὰ πλήθη μὴ προσδέχεσθαι
-  τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἀγῶσι τοὺς ἐξ ἀσεβεστάτης τυραννίδος ἀπεσταλμένους
-  θεωρούς.
-
-  Compare Plutarch Vit. x. Orator, p. 836 D.
-
-We cannot doubt that a large proportion of the spectators on the
-plain of Olympia felt with greater or less intensity the generous
-Pan-hellenic patriotism and indignation to which Lysias gave
-utterance. To what extent his hearers acted upon the unbecoming
-violence of his practical recommendations—how far they actually
-laid hands on the tents, or tried to hinder the Syracusans from
-sacrificing, or impeded the bringing out of their chariots for the
-race—we are unable to say. We are told that some ventured to plunder
-the tents:[67] how much was effected we do not hear. It is certain
-that the superintending Eleian authorities would interfere most
-strenuously to check any such attempt at desecrating the festival,
-and to protect the Syracusan envoys in their tents, their regular
-sacrifice, and their chariot-running. And it is farther certain, as
-far as our account goes, that the Syracusan chariots actually did
-run on the lists; because they were, though by various accidents,
-disgracefully unsuccessful, or overturned and broken in pieces.[68]
-
-  [67] Diodor. xiv. 109. ὥστε τινὰς τολμῆσαι διαρπάζειν τὰς σκηνάς.
-
-  [68] Diodor. xiv. 109.
-
-To any one however who reflects on the Olympic festival, with all its
-solemnity and its competition for honors of various kinds, it will
-appear that the mere manifestation of so violent an antipathy, even
-though restrained from breaking out into act, would be sufficiently
-galling to the Syracusan envoys. But the case would be far worse,
-when the poems of Dionysius came to be recited. These were volunteer
-manifestations, delivered (like the harangue of Lysias) before such
-persons as chose to come and hear; not comprised in the regular
-solemnity, nor therefore under any peculiar protection by the Eleian
-authorities. Dionysius stood forward of his own accord to put
-himself upon his trial as a poet before the auditors. Here therefore
-the antipathy against the despot might be manifested by the most
-unreserved explosions. And when we are told that the badness of the
-poems[69] caused them to be received with opprobrious ridicule, in
-spite of the excellence of the recitation, it is easy to see that
-the hatred intended for the person of Dionysius was discharged upon
-his verses. Of course the hissers and hooters would make it clearly
-understood what they really meant, and would indulge in the full
-license of heaping curses upon his name and acts. Neither the best
-reciters of Greece, nor the best poems even of Sophokles or Pindar,
-could have any chance against such predetermined antipathy. And the
-whole scene would end in the keenest disappointment and humiliation,
-inflicted upon the Syracusan envoys as well as upon the actors; being
-the only channel through which the retributive chastisement of Hellas
-could be made to reach the author.
-
-  [69] Diodor. xiv. 109.
-
-Though not present in person at Olympia, the despot felt the
-chastisement in his inmost soul. The mere narrative of what had
-passed plunged him into an agony of sorrow, which for some time
-seemed to grow worse by brooding on the scene, and at length drove
-him nearly mad. He was smitten with intolerable consciousness of
-the profound hatred borne towards him, even throughout a large
-portion of the distant and independent Hellenic world. He fancied
-that this hatred was shared by all around him, and suspected every
-one as plotting against his life. To such an excess of cruelty did
-this morbid excitement carry him, that he seized several of his best
-friends, under false accusations, or surmises, and caused them to
-be slain.[70] Even his brother Leptinês, and his ancient partisan
-Philistus, men who had devoted their lives first to his exaltation,
-and afterwards to his service, did not escape. Having given umbrage
-to him by an intermarriage between their families made without his
-privity, both were banished from Syracuse, and retired to Thurii in
-Italy, where they received that shelter and welcome which Leptinês
-had peculiarly merited by his conduct in the Lucanian war. The exile
-of Leptinês did not last longer than (apparently) about a year, after
-which Dionysius relented, recalled him, and gave him his daughter
-in marriage. But Philistus remained in banishment more than sixteen
-years; not returning to Syracuse until after the death of Dionysius
-the elder, and the accession of Dionysius the younger.[71]
-
-  [70] Diodor. xv. 7. Ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος, ἀκούσας τὴν τῶν ποιημάτων
-  καταφρόνησιν, ἐνέπεσεν εἰς ὑπερβολὴν λύπης. Ἀεὶ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ
-  πάθους ἐπίτασιν λαμβάνοντος, μανιωδὴς διάθεσις κάτεσχε τὴν ψυχὴν
-  αὐτοῦ, καὶ φθονεῖν αὐτῷ φάσκων ἅπαντας, τοὺς φίλους ὑπώπτευεν
-  ὡς ἐπιβουλεύοντας· καὶ πέρας, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο προῆλθε λύπης καὶ
-  παρακοπῆς, ὥστε τῶν φίλων πολλοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ ψευδέσιν αἰτίαις
-  ἀνελεῖν, οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ καὶ ἐφυγάδευσεν· ἐν οἷς ἦν Φίλιστος καὶ
-  Λεπτίνης ὁ ἀδελφὸς, etc.
-
-  [71] For the banishment, and the return of Philistus and
-  Leptinês, compare Diodor. xv. 7, and Plutarch, Dion. c.
-  11. Probably it was on this occasion that Polyxenus, the
-  brother-in-law of Dionysius, took flight as the only means of
-  preserving his life (Plutarch, Dion. c. 21).
-
-  Plutarch mentions the incident which offended Dionysius and
-  caused both Philistus and Leptinês to be banished. Diodorus does
-  not notice this incident; yet it is not irreconcilable with his
-  narrative. Plutarch does not mention the banishment of Leptinês,
-  but only that of Philistus.
-
-  On the other hand, he affirms (and Nepos also, Dion. c. 3) that
-  Philistus did not return until after the death of the elder
-  Dionysius, while Diodorus states his return conjointly with that
-  of Leptinês—not indicating any difference of time. Here I follow
-  Plutarch’s statement as the more probable.
-
-  There is, however, one point which is perplexing. Plutarch
-  (Timoleon, c. 15) animadverts upon a passage in the history of
-  Philistus, wherein that historian had dwelt, with a pathos which
-  Plutarch thinks childish and excessive, upon the melancholy
-  condition of the daughters of Leptinês, “who had fallen from the
-  splendor of a court into a poor and mean condition.” How is this
-  reconcilable with the fact stated by Diodorus, that Leptinês was
-  recalled from exile by Dionysius after a short time, taken into
-  favor again, and invested with command at the battle of Kronium,
-  where he was slain? It seems difficult to believe that Philistus
-  could have insisted with so much sympathy upon the privations
-  endured by the daughters of Leptinês, if the exile of the father
-  had lasted only a short time.
-
-Such was the memorable scene at the Olympic festival of 384 B. C.,
-together with its effect upon the mind of Dionysius. Diodorus, while
-noticing all the facts, has cast an air of ridicule over them by
-recognizing nothing except the vexation of Dionysius, at the ill
-success of his poem, as the cause of his mental suffering; and by
-referring to the years 388 B. C. and 386 B. C., that which properly
-belongs to 384 B. C.[72] Now it is improbable, in the first place,
-that the poem of Dionysius,—himself a man of ability and having every
-opportunity of profiting by good critics whom he had purposely
-assembled around him[73]—should have been so ridiculously bad as to
-disgust an impartial audience: next, it is still more improbable
-that a simple poetical failure, though doubtless mortifying to
-him, should work with such fearful effect as to plunge him into
-anguish and madness. To unnerve thus violently a person like
-Dionysius—deeply stained with the great crimes of unscrupulous
-ambition, but remarkably exempt from infirmities—some more powerful
-cause is required; and that cause stands out conspicuously, when we
-conceive the full circumstances of the Olympic festival of 384 B.
-C. He had accumulated for this occasion all the means of showing
-himself off, like Krœsus in his interview with Solon, as the most
-prosperous and powerful man in the Hellenic world;[74] means beyond
-the reach of any contemporary, and surpassing even Hiero or Thero
-of former days, whose praises in the odes of Pindar he probably
-had in his mind. He counted, probably with good reason, that his
-splendid legation, chariots, and outfit of acting and recitation for
-the poems, would surpass everything else seen on the holy plain;
-and he fully expected such reward as the public were always glad
-to bestow on rich men who exhausted their purses in the recognized
-vein of Hellenic pious ostentation. In this high wrought state of
-expectation, what does Dionysius hear, by his messengers returning
-from the festival? That their mission had proved a total failure, and
-even worse than a failure; that the display had called forth none of
-the usual admiration, not because there were rivals on the ground
-equal or superior, but simply because it came from _him_; that its
-very magnificence had operated to render the explosion of antipathy
-against him louder and more violent; that his tents in the sacred
-ground had been actually assailed, and that access to sacrifice,
-as well as to the matches, had been secured to him only by the
-interposition of authority. We learn indeed that his chariots failed
-in the field by unlucky accidents; but in the existing temper of the
-crowd, these very accidents would be seized as occasions for derisory
-cheering against him. To this we must add explosions of hatred, yet
-more furious, elicited by his poems, putting the reciters to utter
-shame. At the moment when Dionysius expected to hear the account
-of an unparalleled triumph, he is thus informed, not merely of
-disappointment, but of insults to himself, direct and personal, the
-most poignant ever offered by Greeks to a Greek, amidst the holiest
-and most frequented ceremony of the Hellenic world.[75] Never in any
-other case do we read of public antipathy, against an individual,
-being carried to the pitch of desecrating by violence the majesty of
-the Olympic festival.
-
-  [72] In a former chapter of this History (Vol. X. Ch. LXXVII. p.
-  75), I have already shown grounds, derived from the circumstances
-  of Central Greece and Persia, for referring the discourse of
-  Lysias, just noticed, to Olympiad 99 or 384 B. C. I here add
-  certain additional reasons, derived from what is said about
-  Dionysius, towards the same conclusion.
-
-  In xiv. 109, Diodorus describes the events of 388 B. C., the
-  year of Olympiad 98, during which Dionysius was still engaged
-  in war in Italy, besieging Rhegium. He says that Dionysius made
-  unparalleled efforts to send a great display to this festival;
-  a splendid legation, with richly decorated tents, several fine
-  chariots-and-four, and poems to be recited by the best actors.
-  He states that Lysias the orator delivered a strong invective
-  against him, exciting those who heard it to exclude the Syracusan
-  despot from sacrificing, and to plunder the rich tents. He then
-  details how the purposes of Dionysius failed miserably on every
-  point; the fine tents were assailed, the chariots all ran wrong
-  or were broken, the poems were hissed, the ships returning to
-  Syracuse were wrecked, etc. Yet in spite of this accumulation of
-  misfortunes (he tells us) Dionysius was completely soothed by
-  his flatterers (who told him that such envy always followed upon
-  greatness), and did not desist from poetical efforts.
-
-  Again, in xv. 6, 7, Diodorus describes the events of 386 B.
-  C. Here he again tells us, that Dionysius, persevering in
-  his poetical occupations, composed verses which were very
-  indifferent—that he was angry with and punished Philoxenus and
-  others who criticized them freely—that he sent some of these
-  compositions to be recited at the Olympic festival, with the best
-  actors and reciters—that the poems, in spite of these advantages,
-  were despised and derided by the Olympic audience—that Dionysius
-  was distressed by this repulse, even to anguish and madness, and
-  to the various severities and cruelties against his friends which
-  have been already mentioned in my text.
-
-  Now upon this we must remark:—
-
-  1. The year 386 B. C. is _not_ an Olympic year. Accordingly,
-  the proceedings described by Diodorus in xv. 6, 7, all done by
-  Dionysius after his hands were free from war, must be transferred
-  to the next Olympic year, 384 B. C. The year in which Dionysius
-  was so deeply stung by the events of Olympia, must therefore have
-  been 384 B. C., or Olympiad 99 (relating to 388 B. C.).
-
-  2. Compare Diodor. xiv. 109 with xv. 7. In the first passage,
-  Dionysius is represented as making the most prodigious efforts
-  to display himself at Olympia in every way, by fine tents,
-  chariots, poems, etc.—and also as having undergone the signal
-  insult from the orator Lysias, with the most disgraceful failure
-  in every way. Yet all this he is described to have borne with
-  tolerable equanimity, being soothed by his flatterers. But, in
-  xv. 7 (relating to 386 B. C., or more probably to 384 B. C.) he
-  is represented as having merely failed in respect to the effect
-  of his poems; nothing whatever being said about display of any
-  other kind, nor about an harangue from Lysias, nor insult to the
-  envoys or the tents. Yet the simple repulse of the poems is on
-  this occasion affirmed to have thrown Dionysius into a paroxysm
-  of sorrow and madness.
-
-  Now if the great and insulting treatment, which Diodorus refers
-  to 388 B. C., could be borne patiently by Dionysius—how are
-  we to believe that he was driven mad by the far less striking
-  failure in 384 B. C.? Surely it stands to reason that the violent
-  invective of Lysias and the profound humiliation of Dionysius,
-  are parts of one and the same Olympic phænomenon; the former as
-  cause, or an essential part of the cause—the latter as effect.
-  The facts will then read consistently and in proper harmony. As
-  they now appear in Diodorus, there is no rational explanation
-  of the terrible suffering of Dionysius described in xv. 7; it
-  appears like a comic exaggeration of reality.
-
-  3. Again, the prodigious efforts and outlay, which Diodorus
-  affirms Dionysius to have made in 388 B. C. for display at the
-  Olympic games—come just at the time when Dionysius, being in the
-  middle of his Italian war, could hardly have had either leisure
-  or funds to devote so much to the other purpose; whereas at the
-  next Olympic festival, or 384 B. C., he was free from war, and
-  had nothing to divert him from preparing with great efforts all
-  the means of Olympic success.
-
-  It appears to me that the facts which Diodorus has stated are
-  nearly all correct, but that he has misdated them, referring to
-  388 B. C., or Olymp. 98—what properly belongs to 384 B. C., or
-  Olymp. 99. Very possibly Dionysius may have sent one or more
-  chariots to run in the former of the two Olympiads; but his
-  signal efforts, with his insulting failure brought about partly
-  by Lysias, belong to the latter.
-
-  Dionysius of Halikarnassus, to whom we owe the citation from the
-  oration of Lysias, does not specify to which of the Olympiads it
-  belongs.
-
-  [73] Diodor. xv. 7. διὸ καὶ ποιήματα γράφειν ὑπεστήσατο μετὰ
-  πολλῆς σπουδῆς, καὶ τοὺς ἐν τούτοις δόξαν ἔχοντας μετεπέμπετο,
-  καὶ προτιμῶν αὐτοὺς συνδιέτριβε, καὶ τῶν ~ποιημάτων ἐπιστάτας καὶ
-  διορθωτὰς εἶχεν~.
-
-  The Syracusan historian Athanis (or Athenis) had noticed some
-  peculiar phrases which appeared in the verses of Dionysius: see
-  Athenæus, iii. p. 98.
-
-  [74] Thucyd. vi. 16. Οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν μείζω ἡμῶν
-  τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν, τῷ ἐμῷ διαπρεπεῖ τῆς Ὀλυμπιάζε θεωρίας
-  (speech of Alkibiadês).
-
-  [75] See a striking passage in the discourse called _Archidamus_
-  (Or. vi. s. 111, 112) of Isokrates, in which the Spartans are
-  made to feel keenly their altered position after the defeat of
-  Leuktra: especially the insupportable pain of encountering, when
-  they attended the Olympic festival, slights or disparagement from
-  the spectators, embittered by open taunts from the reëstablished
-  Messenians—instead of the honor and reverence which they had
-  become accustomed to expect.
-
-  This may help us to form some estimate of the painful sentiment
-  of Dionysius, when his envoys returned from the Olympic festival
-  of 384 B. C.
-
-Here then were the real and sufficient causes—not the mere
-ill-success of his poem—which penetrated the soul of Dionysius,
-driving him into anguish and temporary madness. Though he had
-silenced the Vox Populi at Syracuse, not all his mercenaries, ships,
-and forts in Ortygia, could save him from feeling its force, when
-thus emphatically poured forth against him by the free-spoken crowd
-at Olympia.
-
-It was apparently shortly after the peace of 387 B. C., that
-Dionysius received at Syracuse the visit of the philosopher
-Plato.[76] The latter—having come to Sicily on a voyage of inquiry
-and curiosity, especially to see Mount Ætna—was introduced by his
-friends, the philosophers of Tarentum, to Dion, then a young man,
-resident at Syracuse, and brother of Aristomachê, the wife of
-Dionysius. Of Plato and Dion I shall speak more elsewhere: here I
-notice the philosopher only as illustrating the history and character
-of Dionysius. Dion, having been profoundly impressed with the
-conversation of Plato, prevailed upon Dionysius to invite and talk
-with him also. Plato discoursed eloquently upon justice and virtue,
-enforcing his doctrine that wicked men were inevitably miserable—that
-true happiness belonged only to the virtuous—and that despots could
-not lay claim to the merit of courage.[77] This meagre abstract does
-not at all enable us to follow the philosopher’s argument. But it is
-plain that he set forth his general views on social and political
-subjects with as much freedom and dignity of speech before Dionysius
-as before any simple citizen; and we are farther told, that the
-by-standers were greatly captivated by his manner and language. Not
-so the despot himself. After one or two repetitions of the like
-discourse, he became not merely averse to the doctrine, but hostile
-to the person, of Plato. According to the statement of Diodorus, he
-caused the philosopher to be seized, taken down to the Syracusan
-slave-market, and there put up for sale as a slave at the price of
-twenty minæ; which his friends subscribed to pay, and thus released
-him. According to Plutarch, Plato himself was anxious to depart, and
-was put by Dion aboard a trireme which was about to convey home the
-Lacedæmonian envoy Pollis. But Dionysius secretly entreated Pollis
-to cause him to be slain on the voyage—or at least to sell him as a
-slave. Plato was accordingly landed at Ægina, and there sold. He was
-purchased, or repurchased, by Annikeris of Kyrênê, and sent back to
-Athens. This latter is the more probable story of the two; but it
-seems to be a certain fact that Plato was really sold, and became for
-a moment a slave.[78]
-
-  [76] There are different statements about the precise year in
-  which Plato was born: see Diogenes Laert. iii. 1-6. The accounts
-  fluctuate between 429 and 428 B. C.; and Hermodorus (ap. Diog. L.
-  iii. 6) appears to have put it in 427 B. C.: see Corsini, Fast.
-  Attic. iii. p. 230; Ast. Platon’s Leben, p. 14.
-
-  Plato (Epistol. vii. p. 324) states himself to have been about
-  (σχεδὸν) forty years of age when he visited Sicily for the first
-  time. If we accept as the date of his birth 428 B. C., he would
-  be forty years of age in 388 B. C.
-
-  It seems improbable that the conversation of Plato with Dion at
-  Syracuse (which was continued sufficiently long to exercise a
-  marked and permanent influence on the character of the latter),
-  and his interviews with Dionysius, should have taken place
-  while Dionysius was carrying on the Italian war or the siege of
-  Rhegium. I think that the date of the interview must be placed
-  after the capture of Rhegium in 387 B. C. And the expression
-  of Plato (given in a letter written more than thirty years
-  afterwards) about his own age, is not to be taken as excluding
-  the supposition that he might have been forty-one or forty-two
-  when he came to Syracuse.
-
-  Athenæus (xi. p. 507) mentions the visit of Plato.
-
-  [77] Plutarch, Dion. c. 5.
-
-  [78] Plutarch, Dion, c. 5; Diodor. xv. 7; Diogen. Laert. iii. 17;
-  Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 2.
-
-That Dionysius should listen to the discourse of Plato with
-repugnance, not less decided than that which the Emperor Napoleon
-was wont to show towards ideologists—was an event naturally to be
-expected. But that, not satisfied with dismissing the philosopher, he
-should seek to kill, maltreat, or disgrace him, illustrates forcibly
-the vindictive and irritable elements of his character, and shows how
-little he was likely to respect the lives of those who stood in his
-way as political opponents.
-
-Dionysius was at the same time occupied with new constructions,
-military, civil, and religious, at Syracuse. He enlarged the
-fortifications of the city by adding a new line of wall, extending
-along the southern cliff of Epipolæ, from Euryalus to the suburb
-called Neapolis; which suburb was now, it would appear, surrounded
-by a separate wall of its own—or perhaps may have been so surrounded
-a few years earlier, though we know that it was unfortified and open
-during the attack of Imilkon in 396 B. C.[79] At the time, probably,
-the fort at the Euryalus was enlarged and completed to the point
-of grandeur which its present remains indicate. The whole slope of
-Epipolæ became thus bordered and protected by fortifications, from
-its base at Achradina to its apex at Euryalus. And Syracuse now
-comprised five separately fortified portions,—Epipolæ, Neapolis,
-Tychê, Achradina, and Ortygia; each portion having its own
-fortification, though the four first were included within the same
-outer walls. Syracuse thus became the largest fortified city in all
-Greece; larger even than Athens in its then existing state, though
-not so large as Athens had been during the Peloponnesian war, while
-the Phaleric wall was yet standing.
-
-  [79] Diodor. xiv. 6.3. It was in the construction of these
-  extensive fortifications, seemingly, that Dionysius demolished
-  the chapel which had been erected by the Syracusans in honor of
-  Dioklês (Diodor. xiii. 635).
-
-  Serra di Falco (Antichità di Sicilia, vol. iv. p. 107) thinks
-  that Dionysius constructed only the northern wall up the cliff of
-  Epipolæ, not the southern. This latter (in his opinion) was not
-  constructed until the time of Hiero II.
-
-  I dissent from him on this point. The passage here referred to in
-  Diodorus affords to my mind sufficient evidence that the elder
-  Dionysius constructed both the southern wall of Epipolæ and the
-  fortification of Neapolis. The same conclusion moreover appears
-  to result from what we read of the proceedings of Dion and
-  Timoleon afterwards.
-
-Besides these extensive fortifications, Dionysius also enlarged the
-docks and arsenals so as to provide accommodation for two hundred men
-of war. He constructed spacious gymnasia on the banks of the river
-Anapus, without the city walls; and he further decorated the city
-with various new temples in honor of different gods.[80]
-
-  [80] Diodor. xv. 13.
-
-Such costly novelties added grandeur as well as security to Syracuse,
-and conferred imposing celebrity on the despot himself. They were
-dictated by the same aspirations as had prompted his ostentatious
-legation to Olympia in 384 B. C.; a legation of which the result had
-been so untoward and intolerable to his feelings. They were intended
-to console, and doubtless did in part console, the Syracusan people
-for the loss of their freedom. And they were further designed to
-serve as fuller preparations for the war against Carthage, which
-he was now bent upon renewing. He was obliged to look about for a
-pretext, since the Carthaginians had given him no just cause. But
-this, though an aggression, was a Pan-hellenic aggression,[81]
-calculated to win for him the sympathies of all Greeks, philosophers
-as well as the multitude. And as the war was begun in the year
-immediately succeeding the insult cast upon him at Olympia, we may
-ascribe it in part to a wish to perform exploits such as might rescue
-his name from the like opprobrium in future.
-
-  [81] See Plato, Epist. vii. p. 333, 336—also some striking lines,
-  addressed by the poet Theokritus to Hiero II. despot at Syracuse
-  in the succeeding century: Theokrit. xvi. 75-85.
-
-  Dionysius—ἐζήτει λαβεῖν πρόφασιν εὔλογον τοῦ πολέμου, etc.
-
-The sum of fifteen hundred talents, recently pillaged from the temple
-at Agylla,[82] enabled Dionysius to fit out a large army for his
-projected war. Entering into intrigues with some of the disaffected
-dependencies of Carthage in Sicily, he encouraged them to revolt,
-and received them into his alliance. The Carthaginians sent envoys
-to remonstrate, but could obtain no redress; upon which they on
-their side prepared for war, accumulated a large force of hired
-foreign mercenaries under Magon, and contracted alliance with some
-of the Italiot Greeks hostile to Dionysius. Both parties distributed
-their forces so as to act partly in Sicily, partly in the adjoining
-peninsula of Italy; but the great stress of war fell on Sicily, where
-Dionysius and Magon both commanded in person. After several combats
-partial and indecisive, a general battle was joined at a place
-called Kabala. The contest was murderous, and the bravery great on
-both sides; but at length Dionysius gained a complete victory. Magon
-himself and ten thousand men of his army were slain; five thousand
-were made prisoners; while the remainder were driven to retreat to
-a neighboring eminence, strong, but destitute of water. They were
-forced to send envoys entreating peace; which Dionysius consented
-to grant, but only on condition that every Carthaginian should be
-immediately withdrawn from all the cities in the island, and that he
-should be reimbursed for the costs of the war.[83]
-
-  [82] Diodor. xv. 15.
-
-  [83] Diodor. xv. 15.
-
-The Carthaginian generals affected to accept the terms offered, but
-stated (what was probably the truth), that they could not pledge
-themselves for the execution of such terms, without assent from the
-authorities at home. They solicited a truce of a few days, to enable
-them to send thither for instructions. Persuaded that they could not
-escape, Dionysius granted their request. Accounting the emancipation
-of Sicily from the Punic yoke to be already a fact accomplished, he
-triumphantly exalted himself on a pedestal higher even than that
-of Gelon. But this very confidence threw him off his guard and
-proved ruinous to him; as it happened frequently in Grecian military
-proceedings. The defeated Carthaginian army gradually recovered their
-spirits. In place of the slain general Magon, who was buried with
-magnificence, his son was named commander; a youth of extraordinary
-energy and ability, who so contrived to reassure and reorganize
-his troops, that when the truce expired, he was ready for a second
-battle. Probably the Syracusans were taken by surprise and not fully
-prepared. At least the fortune of Dionysius had fled. In this second
-action, fought at a spot called Kronium, he underwent a terrible and
-ruinous defeat. His brother Leptinês, who commanded on one wing,
-was slain gallantly fighting; those around him were defeated; while
-Dionysius himself, with his select troops on the other wing, had
-at first some advantage, but was at length beaten and driven back.
-The whole army fled in disorder to the camp, pursued with merciless
-vehemence by the Carthaginians, who, incensed by their previous
-defeat, neither gave quarter nor took prisoners. Fourteen thousand
-dead bodies, of the defeated Syracusan army, are said to have been
-picked up for burial; the rest were only preserved by night and by
-the shelter of their camp.[84]
-
-  [84] Diodor. xv. 16, 17.
-
-Such was the signal victory—the salvation of the army, perhaps even
-of Carthage herself—gained at Kronium by the youthful son of Magon.
-Immediately after it, he retired to Panormus. His army probably had
-been too much enfeebled by the former defeat to undertake farther
-offensive operations; moreover he himself had as yet no regular
-appointment as general. The Carthaginian authorities too had the
-prudence to seize this favorable moment for making peace, and sent
-to Dionysius envoys with full powers. But Dionysius only obtained
-peace by large concessions; giving up to Carthage Selinus with its
-territory, as well as half the Agrigentine territory—all that lay
-to the west of the river Halykus; and farther covenanting to pay to
-Carthage the sum of one thousand talents.[85] To these unfavorable
-conditions Dionysius was constrained to subscribe; after having
-but a few days before required the Carthaginians to evacuate all
-Sicily, and pay the costs of the war. As it seems doubtful whether
-Dionysius would have so large a sum ready to pay down at once, we may
-reasonably presume that he would undertake to liquidate it by annual
-instalments. And we thus find confirmation of the memorable statement
-of Plato, that Dionysius became tributary to the Carthaginians.[86]
-
-  [85] Diodor. xv. 17.
-
-  [86] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 333 A. After reciting the advice
-  which Dion and he had given to Dionysius the younger, he
-  proceeds to say—ἕτοιμον γὰρ εἶναι, τούτων γενομένων, πολὺ μᾶλλον
-  δουλώσασθαι Καρχηδονίους τῆς ἐπὶ Γέλωνος αὐτοῖς γενομένης
-  δουλείας, ~ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ, ὥσπερ νῦν τοὐναντίον, ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ φόρον
-  ἐτάξατο φέρειν τοῖς βαρβάροις~, etc.
-
-Such are the painful gaps in Grecian history as it is transmitted
-to us, that we hear scarcely anything about Dionysius for
-thirteen years after the peace of 383-382 B. C. It seems that the
-Carthaginians (in 379 B. C.) sent an armament to the southern
-portion of Italy for the purpose of reëstablishing the town of
-Hipponium and its inhabitants.[87] But their attention appears
-to have been withdrawn from this enterprise by the recurrence of
-previous misfortunes—fearful pestilence, and revolt of their Libyan
-dependencies, which seriously threatened the safety of their city.
-Again, Dionysius also, during one of these years, undertook some
-operations, of which a faint echo reaches us, in this same Italian
-peninsula (now Calabria Ultra). He projected a line of wall across
-the narrowest portion or isthmus of the peninsula, from the Gulf of
-Skylletium to that of Hipponium, so as to separate the territory of
-Lokri from the northern portion of Italy, and secure it completely
-to his own control. Professedly the wall was destined to repel the
-incursions of the Lucanians; but in reality (we are told) Dionysius
-wished to cut off the connection between Lokri and the other Greeks
-in the Tarentine Gulf. These latter are said to have interposed from
-without, and prevented the execution of the scheme; but its natural
-difficulties would be in themselves no small impediment, nor are we
-sure that the wall was even begun.[88]
-
-  [87] Diodor. xv. 24.
-
-  [88] Strabo, vi. p. 261; Pliny, H. N. iii. 10. The latter calls
-  the isthmus twenty miles broad, and says that Dionysius wished
-  (intercisam) to cut it through: Strabo says that he proposed to
-  wall it across (διατειχίζειν), which is more probable.
-
-During this interval, momentous events (recounted in my previous
-chapters) had occurred in Central Greece. In 382 B. C., the Spartans
-made themselves by fraud masters of Thebes, and placed a permanent
-garrison in the Kadmeia. In 380 B. C., they put down the Olynthian
-confederacy, thus attaining the maximum of their power. But in 379
-B. C., there occurred the revolution at Thebes achieved by the
-conspiracy of Pelopidas, who expelled the Lacedæmonians from the
-Kadmeia. Involved in a burdensome war against Thebes and Athens,
-together with other allies the Lacedæmonians gradually lost ground,
-and had become much reduced before the peace of 371 B. C., which left
-them to contend with Thebes alone. Then came the fatal battle of
-Leuktra which prostrated their military ascendency altogether. These
-incidents have been already related at large in former chapters. Two
-years before the battle of Leuktra, Dionysius sent to the aid of the
-Lacedæmonians at Korkyra a squadron of ten ships, all of which were
-captured by Iphikrates; about three years after the battle, when
-the Thebans and their allies were pressing Sparta in Peloponnesus,
-he twice sent thither a military force of Gauls and Iberians to
-reinforce her army. But his troops neither stayed long, nor rendered
-any very conspicuous service.[89]
-
-  [89] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 2, 4, 33; vii i. 20-28. Diodor. xv. 70.
-
-In this year we hear of a fresh attack by Dionysius against the
-Carthaginians. Observing that they had been lately much enfeebled
-by pestilence and by mutiny of their African subjects, he thought
-the opportunity favorable for trying to recover what the peace of
-383 B. C., had obliged him to relinquish. A false pretence being
-readily found, he invaded the Carthaginian possessions in the west of
-Sicily with a large land force of thirty thousand foot, and three
-thousand horse; together with a fleet of three hundred sail, and
-store ships in proportion. After ravaging much of the open territory
-of the Carthaginians, he succeeded in mastering Selinus, Entella, and
-Eryx—and then laid siege to Lilybæum. This town, close to the western
-cape of Sicily,[90] appears to have arisen as a substitute for the
-neighboring town of Motyê (of which we hear little more since its
-capture by Dionysius in 396 B. C.), and to have become the principal
-Carthaginian station. He began to attack it by active siege and
-battering machines. But it was so numerously garrisoned, and so well
-defended, that he was forced to raise the siege and confine himself
-to blockade. His fleet kept the harbor guarded, so as to intercept
-supplies from Africa. Not long afterwards, however, he received
-intelligence that a fire had taken place in the port of Carthage
-whereby all her ships had been burnt. Being thus led to conceive that
-there was no longer any apprehension of naval attack from Carthage,
-he withdrew his fleet from continuous watch off Lilybæum; keeping
-one hundred and thirty men-of-war near at hand, in the harbor of
-Eryx, and sending the remainder home to Syracuse. Of this incautious
-proceeding the Carthaginians took speedy advantage. The conflagration
-in their port had been much overstated. There still remained to them
-two hundred ships of war, which, after being equipped in silence,
-sailed across in the night to Eryx. Appearing suddenly in the
-harbor, they attacked the Syracusan fleet completely by surprise;
-and succeeded, without serious resistance, in capturing and towing
-off nearly all of them. After so capital an advantage, Lilybæum
-became open to reinforcement and supplies by sea, so that Dionysius
-no longer thought it worth while to prosecute the blockade. On the
-approach of winter, both parties resumed the position which they had
-occupied before the recent movement.[91]
-
-  [90] Diodor. xxii. p. 304.
-
-  [91] Diodor. xv. 73; xvi. 5.
-
-The despot had thus gained nothing by again taking up arms, nor were
-the Sicilian dependencies of the Carthaginians at all cut down below
-that which they acquired by the treaty of 383 B. C. But he received
-(about January or February 367 B. C.) news of a different species of
-success, which gave him hardly less satisfaction than a victory by
-land or sea. In the Lenæan festival of Athens, one of his tragedies
-had been rewarded with the first prize. A chorist who had been
-employed in the performance—eager to convey the first intelligence
-of this success to Syracuse and to obtain the recompense which would
-naturally await the messenger—hastened from Athens to Corinth,
-found a vessel just starting for Syracuse, and reached Syracuse by
-a straight course with the advantage of favorable winds. He was the
-first to communicate the news, and received the full reward of his
-diligence. Dionysius was overjoyed at the distinction conferred upon
-him; for though on former occasions he had obtained the second or
-third place in the Athenian competitions, he had never before been
-adjudged worthy of the first prize. Offering sacrifice to the gods
-for the good news, he invited his friends to a splendid banquet,
-wherein he indulged in an unusual measure of conviviality. But the
-joyous excitement, coupled with the effects of the wine, brought on
-an attack of fever, of which he shortly afterwards died, after a
-reign of thirty-eight years.[92]
-
-  [92] Diodor. xv. 74.
-
-Thirty-eight years, of a career so full of effort, adventure,
-and danger, as that of Dionysius, must have left a constitution
-sufficiently exhausted to give way easily before acute disease.
-Throughout this long period he had never spared himself. He was
-a man of restless energy and activity, bodily as well as mental;
-always personally at the head of his troops in war—keeping a vigilant
-eye and a decisive hand upon all the details of his government at
-home—yet employing spare time (which Philip of Macedon was surprised
-that he could find[93]) in composing tragedies of his own, to compete
-for prizes fairly adjudged. His personal bravery was conspicuous, and
-he was twice severely wounded in leading his soldiers to assault. His
-effective skill as an ambitious politician—his military resource as a
-commander—and the long-sighted care with which he provided implements
-of offence as well as of defence before undertaking war,—are
-remarkable features in his character. The Roman Scipio Africanus
-was wont to single out Dionysius and Agathokles (the history of the
-latter begins about fifty years after the death of the former), both
-of them despots of Syracuse, as the two Greeks of greatest ability
-for action known to him—men who combined, in the most memorable
-degree, daring with sagacity.[94] This criticism, coming from an
-excellent judge, is borne out by the biography of both, so far as
-it comes to our knowledge. No other Greek can be pointed out, who,
-starting from a position humble and unpromising, raised himself to so
-lofty a pinnacle of dominion at home, achieved such striking military
-exploits abroad, and preserved his grandeur unimpaired throughout
-the whole of a long life. Dionysius boasted that he bequeathed to
-his son an empire fastened by adamantine chains;[95] so powerful was
-his mercenary force—so firm his position in Ortygia—so completely
-had the Syracusans been broken into subjection. There cannot be a
-better test of vigor and ability than the unexampled success with
-which Dionysius and Agathokles played the game of the despot, and to
-a certain extent that of the conqueror. Of the two, Dionysius was
-the most favored by fortune. Both indeed profited by one auxiliary
-accident, which distinguished Syracuse from other Grecian cities; the
-local speciality of Ortygia. That islet seemed expressly made to be
-garrisoned as a separate fortress,—apart from, as well as against,
-the rest of Syracuse,—having full command of the harbor, docks,
-naval force, and naval approach. But Dionysius had, besides, several
-peculiar interventions of the gods in his favor, sometimes at the
-most critical moments: such was the interpretation put by his enemies
-(and doubtless by his friends also) upon those repeated pestilences
-which smote the Carthaginian armies with a force far more deadly
-than the spear of the Syracusan hoplite. On four or five distinct
-occasions, during the life of Dionysius, we read of this unseen foe
-as destroying the Carthaginians both in Sicily and in Africa, but
-leaving the Syracusans untouched. Twice did it arrest the progress
-of Imilkon, when in the full career of victory; once, after the
-capture of Gela and Kamarina—a second time, when, after his great
-naval victory off Katana, he had brought his numerous host under the
-walls of Syracuse, and was actually master of the open suburb of
-Achradina. On both these occasions the pestilence made a complete
-revolution in the face of the war; exalting Dionysius from impending
-ruin, to assured safety in the one, and to unmeasured triumph in the
-other. We are bound to allow for this good fortune (the like of which
-never befel Agathokles), when we contemplate the long prosperity
-of Dionysius[96], and when we adopt, as in justice we must, the
-panegyric of Scipio Africanus.
-
-  [93] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 15.
-
-  [94] Polyb. xv. 35. Διὸ καὶ Πόπλιον Σκιπίωνά φασι, τὸν πρῶτον
-  καταπολεμήσαντα Καρχηδονίους, ἐρωτηθέντα, τίνας ὑπολαμβάνει
-  πραγματικωτάτους ἄνδρας γεγονέναι καὶ σὺν νῷ τολμηροτάτους,
-  εἰπεῖν, τοὺς περὶ Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ Διονύσιον τοὺς Σικελιώτας.
-
-  [95] Plutarch, Dion, c. 7.
-
-  [96] The example of Dionysius—his long career of success and
-  quiet death—is among those cited by Cotta in Cicero (De Nat.
-  Deor. iii. 33, 81, 85) to refute the doctrine of Balbus, as to
-  the providence of the gods and their moral government over human
-  affairs.
-
-The preceding chapter has detailed the means whereby
-Dionysius attained his prize, and kept it: those employed by
-Agathokles—analogous in spirit but of still darker coloring in the
-details—will appear hereafter. That Hermokrates—who had filled with
-credit the highest offices in the state and whom men had acquired the
-habit of following—should aspire to become despot, was no unusual
-phenomenon in Grecian politics; but that Dionysius should aim at
-mounting the same ladder, seemed absurd or even insane—to use the
-phrase of Isokrates.[97] If, then, in spite of such disadvantage
-he succeeded in fastening round his countrymen, accustomed to a
-free constitution as their birth-right, those “adamantine chains”
-which they were well known to abhor—we may be sure that his plan
-of proceeding must have been dexterously chosen, and prosecuted
-with consummate perseverance and audacity; but we may be also
-sure that it was nefarious in the extreme. The machinery of fraud
-whereby the people were to be cheated into a temporary submission,
-as a prelude to the machinery of force whereby such submission was
-to be perpetuated against their consent—was the stock in trade
-of Grecian usurpers. But seldom does it appear prefaced by more
-impudent calumnies, or worked out with a larger measure of violence
-and spoliation, than in the case of Dionysius. He was indeed
-powerfully seconded at the outset by the danger of Syracuse from the
-Carthaginian arms. But his scheme of usurpation, far from diminishing
-such danger, tended materially to increase it, by disuniting the
-city at so critical a moment. Dionysius achieved nothing in his
-first enterprise for the relief of Gela and Kamarina. He was forced
-to retire with as much disgrace as those previous generals whom
-he had so bitterly vituperated; and apparently even with greater
-disgrace—since there are strong grounds for believing that he entered
-into traitorous collusion with the Carthaginians. The salvation of
-Syracuse, at that moment of peril, arose not from the energy or
-ability of Dionysius, but from the opportune epidemic which disabled
-Imilkon in the midst of a victorious career.
-
-  [97] Isokratês, Or. v. (Philipp.) s. 73. Διονύσιος ... ἐπιθυμήσας
-  μοναρχίας ~ἀλόγως καὶ μανικῶς~, καὶ τολμήσας ἅπαντα πράττειν τὰ
-  φέροντα πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην, etc.
-
-Dionysius had not only talents to organize, and boldness to make
-good, a despotism more formidable than anything known to contemporary
-Greeks, but also systematic prudence to keep it unimpaired for
-thirty-eight years. He maintained carefully those two precautions
-which Thucydides specifies as the causes of permanence to the
-Athenian Hippias, under similar circumstances—intimidation over
-the citizens, and careful organization, with liberal pay among his
-mercenaries.[98] He was temperate in indulgencies; never led by any
-of his appetites into the commission of violence.[99] This abstinence
-contributed materially to prolong his life, since many a Grecian
-despot perished through desperate feelings of individual vengeance
-provoked by his outrages. With Dionysius, all other appetites were
-merged in the love of dominion, at home and abroad; and of money as
-a means of dominion. To the service of this master-passion all his
-energies were devoted, together with those vast military resources
-which an unscrupulous ability served both to accumulate and to
-recruit. How his treasury was supplied, with the large exigencies
-continually pressing upon it, we are but little informed. We know
-however that his exactions from the Syracusans were exorbitant;[100]
-that he did not hesitate to strip the holiest temples; and that he
-left behind him a great reputation for ingenious tricks in extracting
-money from his subjects.[101] Besides the large garrison of foreign
-mercenaries by whom his orders were enforced, he maintained a regular
-body of spies, seemingly of both sexes, disseminated among the
-body of the citizens.[102] The vast quarry-prison of Syracuse was
-his work.[103] Both the vague general picture, and the fragmentary
-details which come before us, of his conduct towards the Syracusans,
-present to us nothing but an oppressive and extortionate tyrant,
-by whose fiat numberless victims perished; more than ten thousand
-according to the general language of Plutarch.[104] He enriched
-largely his younger brothers and auxiliaries; among which latter,
-Hipparinus stood prominent, thus recovering a fortune equal to or
-larger than that which his profligacy had dissipated.[105] But we
-hear also of acts of Dionysius, indicating a jealous and cruel
-temper, even towards near relatives. And it appears certain that he
-trusted no one, not even them;[106] that though in the field he
-was a perfectly brave man, yet his suspicion and timorous anxiety
-as to every one who approached his person, were carried to the most
-tormenting excess, and extended even to his wives, his brothers, his
-daughters. Afraid to admit any one with a razor near to his face,
-he is said to have singed his own beard with a burning coal. Both
-his brother and his son were searched for concealed weapons, and
-even forced to change their clothes in the presence of his guards,
-before they were permitted to see him. An officer of the guards
-named Marsyas, having dreamt that he was assassinating Dionysius,
-was put to death for this dream, as proving that his waking thoughts
-must have been dwelling upon such a project. And it has already
-been mentioned that Dionysius put to death the mother of one of his
-wives, on suspicion that she had by incantations brought about the
-barrenness of the other—as well as the sons of a Lokrian citizen
-named Aristeides, who had refused, with indignant expressions, to
-grant to him his daughter in marriage.[107]
-
-  [98] Thucyd. vi. 55. ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πρότερον ξύνηθες, τοῖς μὲν
-  πολίταις φοβερὸν, τοῖς δὲ ἐπικούροις ἀκριβὲς, πολλῷ τῷ περιόντι
-  τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς ἐκράτησε (Hippias).
-
-  On the liberality of the elder Dionysius to his mercenaries, see
-  an allusion in Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 348 A.
-
-  The extension and improvement of engines for warlike purposes,
-  under Dionysius, was noticed as a sort of epoch (Athenæus, De
-  Machinis ap. Mathemat. Veteres, ed. Paris, p. 3).
-
-  [99] Cornelius Nepos, De Regibus, c. 2. “Dionysius prior, et
-  manu fortis, et belli peritus fuit, et, id quod in tyranno non
-  facile reperitur, minime libidinosus, non luxuriosus, non avarus,
-  nullius rei denique cupidus, nisi singularis perpetuique imperii,
-  ob eamque rem crudelis. Nam dum id studuit munire, nullius
-  pepercit vitæ, quem ejus insidiatorem putaret.” To the same
-  purpose Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 20.
-
-  [100] Aristotel. Politic. v. 9, 5.
-
-  [101] Pseudo-Aristotel. Œconomic. ii. c. 21, 42; Cicero, De Nat.
-  Deorum, iii. 34, 83, 84; Valerius Maxim. i. 1.
-
-  [102] Plutarch, Dion, c. 28; Plutarch, De Curiositate, p.
-  523 A; Aristotel. Politic. v. 9, 3. The titles of these
-  spies—αἱ ποταγωγίδες καλούμεναι—as we read in Aristotle; or οἱ
-  ποταγωγεῖς—as we find in Plutarch—may perhaps both be correct.
-
-  [103] Cicero in Verrem, v. 55, 143.
-
-  [104] Plutarch, De Fortunâ Alexandr. Magni, p. 338 B. What were
-  the crimes of Dionysius which Pausanias had read and describes by
-  the general words Διονυσίου τὰ ἀνοσιώτατα—and which he accuses
-  Philistus of having intentionally omitted in his history—we
-  cannot now tell (Pausan. i. 13, 2: compare Plutarch, Dion, c.
-  36). An author named Amyntianus, contemporary with Pausanias, and
-  among those perused by Photius (Codex 131), had composed parallel
-  lives of Dionysius and the Emperor Domitian.
-
-  [105] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 332 A; Aristotel. Politic. v. 5, 6.
-
-  [106] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 332 D. Διονύσιος δὲ εἰς μίαν πόλιν
-  ἀθροίσας πᾶσαν Σικελίαν ὑπὸ σοφίας, ~πιστεύων οὐδενὶ, μόγις
-  ἐσώθη~, etc.
-
-  This brief, but significant expression of Plato, attests the
-  excessive mistrust which haunted Dionysius, as a general fact;
-  which is illustrated by the anecdotes of Cicero, Tuscul. Disput.
-  v. 20, 23; and De Officiis, ii. 7; Plutarch, Dion, c. 9; Diodor.
-  xiv. 2.
-
-  The well-known anecdote of Damoklês, and the sword which
-  Dionysius caused to be suspended over his head by a horsehair, in
-  the midst of the enjoyments of the banquet, as an illustration
-  how little was the value of grandeur in the midst of terror—is
-  recounted by Cicero.
-
-  [107] Plutarch, Dion, c. 3; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 6.
-
-Such were the conditions of existence—perpetual mistrust, danger
-even from the nearest kindred, enmity both to and from every
-dignified freeman, and reliance only on armed barbarians or liberated
-slaves—which beset almost every Grecian despot, and from which the
-greatest despot of his age enjoyed no exemption. Though philosophers
-emphatically insisted that such a man must be miserable,[108] yet
-Dionysius himself, as well as the great mass of admiring spectators,
-would probably feel that the necessities of his position were
-more than compensated by its awe-striking grandeur, and by the
-full satisfaction of ambitious dreams, subject indeed to poignant
-suffering when wounded in the tender point, and when reaping insult
-in place of admiration, at the memorable Olympic festival of 384
-B. C., above-described. But the Syracusans, over whom he ruled,
-enjoyed no such compensation for that which they suffered from his
-tax-gatherers—from his garrison of Gauls, Iberians, and Campanians,
-in Ortygia—from his spies—his prison—and his executioners.
-
-  [108] This sentiment, pronounced by Plato, Isokratês, Cicero,
-  Seneca, Plutarch, etc., is nowhere so forcibly laid out as in the
-  dialogue of Xenophon called _Hiero_—of which indeed it forms the
-  text and theme. Whoever reads this picture of the position of a
-  Grecian τύραννος, will see that it was scarcely possible for a
-  man so placed to be other than a cruel and oppressive ruler.
-
-Nor did Syracuse suffer alone. The reign of the elder Dionysius was
-desolating for the Hellenic population generally, both of Sicily and
-Italy. Syracuse became a great fortress, with vast military power
-in the hands of its governor, “whose policy[109] it was to pack all
-Sicily into it;” while the remaining free Hellenic communities were
-degraded, enslaved, and half depopulated. On this topic, the mournful
-testimonies already cited from Lysias and Isokrates, are borne out
-by the letters of the eye-witness Plato. In his advice, given to the
-son and successor of Dionysius, Plato emphatically presses upon him
-two points: first, as to the Syracusans, to transform his inherited
-oppressive despotism into the rule of a king, governing gently
-and by fixed laws; next, to reconstitute and repeople, under free
-constitutions, the other Hellenic communities in Sicily, which at
-his accession had become nearly barbarised and half deserted.[110]
-The elder Dionysius had imported into Sicily large bodies of
-mercenaries, by means of whom he had gained his conquests, and for
-whom he had provided settlements at the cost of the subdued Hellenic
-cities. In Naxos, Katana, Leontini, and Messênê, the previous
-residents had been dispossessed and others substituted, out of Gallic
-and Iberian mercenaries. Communities thus transformed, with their
-former free citizens degraded into dependence or exile, not only
-ceased to be purely Hellenic, but also became far less populous and
-flourishing. In like manner Dionysius had suppressed, and absorbed
-into Syracuse and Lokri, the once autonomous Grecian communities of
-Rhegium, Hipponium, and Kaulonia, on the Italian side of the strait.
-In the inland regions of Italy, he had allied himself with the
-barbarous Lucanians; who, even without his aid, were gaining ground
-and pressing hard upon the Italiot Greeks on the coast.
-
-  [109] See the citation from Plato, in a note immediately
-  preceding.
-
-  [110] Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 315 E. (to the younger Dionysius).
-  Φασὶ δ᾽ οὐκ ὀλίγοι λέγειν σε πρός τινας τῶν παρά σε πρεσβευόντων,
-  ὡς ἄρα σοῦ ποτὲ λέγοντος ἀκούσας ἐγὼ μέλλοντος ~τάς τε Ἑλληνίδας
-  πόλεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἰκίζειν, καὶ Συρακουσίους ἐπικουφίσαι~, τὴν
-  ἀρχὴν ἀντὶ τυραννίδος εἰς βασιλείαν μεταστήσαντα, ταῦτ᾽ ἄρα
-  σὲ μέν τοτε διεκώλυσα, σοῦ σφόδρα προθυμουμένου, νῦν δὲ Δίωνα
-  διδάσκοιμι δρᾷν αὐτὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τοῖς διανοήμασι τοῖς σοῖς τὴν σὴν
-  ἀρχὴν ἀφαιρούμεθά σε.
-
-  Ibid. p. 319 C. Μή με διάβαλλε λέγων, ὡς οὐκ εἴων σε πόλεις
-  Ἑλληνίδας ἐῤῥούσας ὑπὸ βαρβάρων οἰκίζειν, οὐδὲ Συρακουσίους
-  ἐπικουφίσαι ... ~ὡς ἐγὼ μὲν ἐκέλευον, σὺ δ᾽ οὐκ ἤθελες πράττειν
-  αὐτά~.
-
-  Again, see Epistol. vii. p. 331 F. 332 B. 334 D. 336 A.-D.—and
-  the brief notice given by Photius (Codex, 93) of the lost
-  historical works of Arrian, respecting Dion and Timoleon.
-
-  Epistol. viii. p. 357 A. (What Dion intended to do, had he not
-  been prevented by death)—Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα Σικελίαν ἂν τὴν ἄλλην
-  κατῴκισα, ~τοὺς μὲν βαρβάρους ἣν νῦν ἔχουσιν ἀφελόμενος, ὅσοι
-  μὴ ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας διεπολέμησαν πρὸς τὴν τυραννίδα,
-  τοὺς δ᾽ ἔμπροσθεν οἰκητὰς τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τόπων εἰς τὰς ἀρχαίας καὶ
-  πατρῴας οἰκήσεις κατοικίσας~. Compare Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 2.
-  αἱ δὲ πλεῖσται πόλεις ὑπὸ βαρβάρων μιγάδων καὶ στρατιωτῶν ἀμίσθων
-  κατείχοντο.
-
-  The βάρβαροι to whom Plato alludes in this last passage, are not
-  the Carthaginians (none of whom could be expected to come in and
-  fight for the purpose of putting down the despotism at Syracuse),
-  but the Campanian and other mercenaries provided for by the elder
-  Dionysius on the lands of the extruded Greeks. These men would
-  have the strongest interest in upholding the despotism, if the
-  maintenance of their own properties was connected with it. Dion
-  thought it prudent to conciliate this powerful force by promising
-  confirmation of their properties to such of them as would act
-  upon the side of freedom.
-
-If we examine the results of the warfare carried on by Dionysius
-against the Carthaginians, from the commencement to the end of
-his career, we shall observe, that he began by losing Gela and
-Kamarina, and that the peace by which he was enabled to preserve
-Syracuse itself, arose, not from any success of his own, but from the
-pestilence which ruined his enemies; to say nothing about traitorous
-collusion with them, which I have already remarked to have been the
-probable price of their guarantee to his dominion. His war against
-the Carthaginians in 397 B. C., was undertaken with much vigor,
-recovered Gela, Kamarina, Agrigentum, and Selinus, and promised the
-most decisive success. But presently again the tide of fortune turned
-against him. He sustained capital defeats, and owed the safety of
-Syracuse, a second time, to nothing but the terrific pestilence which
-destroyed the army of Imilkon. A third time, in 383 B. C., Dionysius
-gratuitously renewed the war against Carthage. After brilliant
-success at first, he was again totally defeated, and forced to cede
-to Carthage all the territory west of the river Halykus, besides
-paying a tribute. So that the exact difference between the Sicilian
-territory of Carthage—as it stood at the beginning of his command
-and at the end of his reign—amounts to this: that at the earlier
-period it reached to the river Himera—at the later period only to the
-river Halykus. The intermediate space between the two comprehends
-Agrigentum with the greater part of its territory; which represents
-therefore the extent of Hellenic soil rescued by Dionysius from
-Carthaginian dominion.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXXIV.
-
-SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DEATH OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS — DIONYSIUS
-THE YOUNGER — AND DION.
-
-
-The Elder Dionysius, at the moment of his death, boasted of having
-left his dominion “fastened by chains of adamant;” that is, sustained
-by a large body of mercenaries,[111] well trained and well paid—by
-impregnable fortifications on the islet of Ortygia—by four hundred
-ships of war—by immense magazines of arms and military stores—and
-by established intimidation over the minds of the Syracusans. These
-were really “chains of adamant”—so long as there was a man like
-Dionysius to keep them in hand. But he left no successor competent
-to the task; nor indeed an unobstructed succession. He had issue by
-two wives, whom he had married both at the same time, as has been
-already mentioned. By the Lokrian wife, Doris, he had his eldest son
-named Dionysius, and two others; by the Syracusan wife Aristomachê,
-daughter of Hipparinus, he had two sons, Hipparinus and Nysæus—and
-two daughters, Sophrosynê and Aretê.[112] Dionysius the younger can
-hardly have been less than twenty-five years old at the death of his
-father and namesake. Hipparinus, the eldest son by the other wife,
-was considerably younger. Aristomachê his mother had long remained
-childless; a fact which the elder Dionysius ascribed to incantations
-wrought by the mother of the Lokrian wife, and punished by putting to
-death the supposed sorceress.[113]
-
-  [111] Both Diodorus (xvi. 9) and Cornelius Nepos (Dion, c. 5)
-  speak of one hundred thousand foot and ten thousand horse. The
-  former speaks of four hundred ships of war; the latter of five
-  hundred.
-
-  The numbers of foot and horse appear evidently exaggerated. Both
-  authors must have copied from the same original; possibly Ephorus.
-
-  [112] Plutarch, Dion, c. 6; Theopompus, Fr. 204, ed. Didot. ap.
-  Athenæum, x. p. 435; Diodor. xvi. 6; Cornel. Nepos (Dion, c. 1).
-
-  The Scholiast on Plato’s fourth Epistle gives information
-  respecting the personal relations and marriages of the elder
-  Dionysius, not wholly agreeing with what is stated in the sixth
-  chapter of Plutarch’s Life of Dion.
-
-  [113] Plutarch, Dion, c. 3. The age of the younger Dionysius is
-  nowhere positively specified. But in the year 356 B. C.—or 355 B.
-  C., at the latest—he had a son, Apollokratês, old enough to be
-  entrusted with the command of Ortygia, when he himself evacuated
-  it for the first time (Plutarch, Dion, c. 37). We cannot suppose
-  Apollokratês to have been less than sixteen years of age at
-  the moment when he was entrusted with such a function, having
-  his mother and sisters under his charge (c. 50). Apollokratês
-  therefore must have been born at least as early as 372 B. C.;
-  perhaps even earlier. Suppose Dionysius the younger to have
-  been twenty years of age when Apollokratês was born; he would
-  thus be in his twenty-fifth year in the beginning of 367 B. C.,
-  when Dionysius the elder died. The expressions of Plato, as to
-  the youth of Dionysius the younger at that juncture, are not
-  unsuitable to such an age.
-
-The offspring of Aristomachê, though the younger brood of the two,
-derived considerable advantage from the presence and countenance of
-her brother Dion. Hipparinus, father of Dion and Aristomachê, had
-been the principal abettor of the elder Dionysius in his original
-usurpation, in order to retrieve his own fortune,[114] ruined
-by profligate expenditure. So completely had that object been
-accomplished, that his son Dion was now among the richest men in
-Syracuse,[115] possessing property estimated at above one hundred
-talents (about £23,000). Dion was, besides, son-in-law to the elder
-Dionysius, who had given his daughter Sophrosynê in marriage to
-his son (by a different mother) the younger Dionysius; and his
-daughter Aretê, first to his brother Thearides—next, on the death
-of Thearides, to Dion. As brother of Aristomachê, Dion was thus
-brother-in-law to the elder Dionysius, and uncle both to Aretê
-his own wife and to Sophrosynê the wife of the younger Dionysius;
-as husband of Aretê, he was son-in-law to the elder Dionysius,
-and brother-in-law (as well as uncle) to the wife of the younger.
-Marriages between near relatives (excluding any such connection
-between uterine brother and sister) were usual in Greek manners.
-We cannot doubt that the despot accounted the harmony likely to be
-produced by such ties between the members of his two families and
-Dion, among the “adamantine chains” which held fast his dominion.
-
-  [114] Aristotel. Polit. v. 5, 6.
-
-  [115] Plato Epistol. vii. p. 347 A. Compare the offer of Dion to
-  maintain fifty triremes at his own expense (Plutarch, Dion, c. 6.)
-
-Apart from wealth and high position, the personal character of Dion
-was in itself marked and prominent. He was of an energetic temper,
-great bravery, and very considerable mental capacities. Though his
-nature was haughty and disdainful towards individuals, yet as to
-political communion, his ambition was by no means purely self-seeking
-and egoistic, like that of the elder Dionysius. Animated with
-vehement love of power, he was at the same time penetrated with that
-sense of regulated polity, and submission of individual will to fixed
-laws, which floated in the atmosphere of Grecian talk and literature,
-and stood so high in Grecian morality. He was moreover capable of
-acting with enthusiasm, and braving every hazard in prosecution of
-his own convictions.
-
-Born about the year 408 B. C.,[116] Dion was twenty-one years of age
-in 378 B. C., when the elder Dionysius, having dismantled Rhegium
-and subdued Kroton, attained the maximum of his dominion, as master
-of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks. Standing high in the favor of
-his brother-in-law Dionysius, Dion doubtless took part in the wars
-whereby this large dominion had been acquired; as well as in the life
-of indulgence and luxury which prevailed generally among wealthy
-Greeks in Sicily and Italy, and which to the Athenian Plato appeared
-alike surprising and repulsive.[117] That great philosopher visited
-Italy and Sicily about 387 B. C., as has been already mentioned. He
-was in acquaintance and fellowship with the school of philosophers
-called Pythagoreans; the remnant of that Pythagorean brotherhood, who
-had once exercised so powerful a political influence over the cities
-of those regions—and who still enjoyed considerable reputation,
-even after complete political downfall, through individual ability
-and rank of the members, combined with habits of recluse study,
-mysticism, and attachment among themselves. With these Pythagoreans
-Dion also, a young man of open mind and ardent aspirations, was
-naturally thrown into communication by the proceedings of the elder
-Dionysius in Italy.[118] Through them he came into intercourse with
-Plato, whose conversation made an epoch in his life.
-
-  [116] Dion was fifty-five years of age at the time of his
-  death, in the fourth year after his departure from Peloponnesus
-  (Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 10).
-
-  His death took place seemingly about 354 B. C. He would thus be
-  born about 408 B. C.
-
-  [117] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 326 D. ἐλθόντα δέ με ὁ ταύτῃ
-  λεγόμενος αὖ βίος εὐδαίμων, Ἰταλιωτικῶν τε καὶ Συρακουσίων
-  τραπεζῶν πλήρης, οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς ἤρεσκε, δίς τε τῆς ἡμέρας
-  ἐμπιμπλάμενον ζῇν καὶ μηδέποτε κοιμώμενον μόνον νύκτωρ, etc.
-
-  [118] Cicero, De Finibus, v. 20; De Republic. i. 10. Jamblichus
-  (Vit. Pythagoræ, c. 199) calls Dion a member of the Pythagorean
-  brotherhood, which may be doubted; but his assertion that
-  Dion procured for Plato, though only by means of a large
-  price (one hundred minæ), the possession of a book composed
-  by the Pythagorean Philolaus, seems not improbable. The
-  ancient Pythagoreans wrote nothing. Philolaus (seemingly about
-  contemporary with Sokrates) was the first Pythagorean who left
-  any written memorial. That this book could only be obtained by
-  the intervention of an influential Syracusan—and even by him only
-  for a large price—is easy to believe.
-
-  See the instructive Dissertation of Gruppe, Ueber die Fragmente
-  des Archytas und der älteren Pythagoreer, p. 24, 26, 48, etc.
-
-The mystic turn of imagination, the sententious brevity, and the
-mathematical researches of the Pythagoreans, produced doubtless
-an imposing effect upon Dion; just as Lysis, a member of that
-brotherhood, had acquired the attachment and influenced the
-sentiments of Epaminondas at Thebes. But Plato’s power of working
-upon the minds of young men was far more impressive and irresistible.
-He possessed a large range of practical experience, a mastery of
-political and social topics, and a charm of eloquence, to which the
-Pythagoreans were strangers. The stirring effect of the Sokratic
-talk, as well as of the democratical atmosphere in which Plato
-had been brought up, had developed all the communicative aptitude
-of his mind; and great as that aptitude appears in his remaining
-dialogues, there is ground for believing that it was far greater in
-his conversation; greater perhaps in 387 B. C., when he was still
-mainly the Sokratic Plato—than it became in later days, after he had
-imbibed to a certain extent the mysticism of these Pythagoreans.[119]
-Brought up as Dion had been at the court of Dionysius—accustomed to
-see around him only slavish deference and luxurious enjoyment—unused
-to open speech or large philosophical discussion—he found in Plato a
-new man exhibited, and a new world opened before him.
-
-  [119] See a remarkable passage, Plato, Epist. vii p. 328 F.
-
-The conception of a free community—with correlative rights and duties
-belonging to every citizen, determined by laws and protected or
-enforced by power emanating from the collective entity called the
-City—stood in the foreground of ordinary Grecian morality—reigned
-spontaneously in the bosoms of every Grecian festival crowd—and had
-been partially imbibed by Dion, though not from his own personal
-experience, yet from teachers, sophists, and poets. This conception,
-essential and fundamental with philosophers as well as with the
-vulgar, was not merely set forth by Plato with commanding powers
-of speech, but also exalted with improvements and refinements into
-an ideal perfection. Above all, it was based upon a strict, even
-an abstemious and ascetic, canon, as to individual enjoyment; and
-upon a careful training both of mind and body, qualifying each man
-for the due performance of his duties as a citizen; a subject which
-Plato (as we see by his dialogues) did not simply propound with the
-direct enforcement of a preacher, but touched with the quickening
-and pungent effect, and reinforced with the copious practical
-illustrations, of Sokratic dialogue.
-
-As the stimulus from the teacher was here put forth with consummate
-efficacy, so the predisposition of the learner enabled it to take
-full effect. Dion became an altered man both in public sentiment and
-in individual behavior. He recollected that twenty years before, his
-country Syracuse had been as free as Athens. He learnt to abhor the
-iniquity of the despotism by which her liberty had been overthrown,
-and by which subsequently the liberties of so many other Greeks in
-Italy and Sicily had been trodden down also. He was made to remark,
-that Sicily had been half-barbarized through the foreign mercenaries
-imported as the despot’s instruments. He conceived the sublime idea
-or dream of rectifying all this accumulation of wrong and suffering.
-It was his wish first to cleanse Syracuse from the blot of slavery,
-and to clothe her anew in the brightness and dignity of freedom;
-yet not with the view of restoring the popular government as it
-had stood prior to the usurpation, but of establishing an improved
-constitutional policy, originated by himself, with laws which should
-not only secure individual rights, but also educate and moralize the
-citizens.[120] The function which he imagined to himself, and which
-the conversation of Plato suggested, was not that of a despot like
-Dionysius, but that of a despotic legislator like Lykurgus,[121]
-taking advantage of a momentary omnipotence, conferred upon him by
-grateful citizens in a state of public confusion, to originate a good
-system; which, when once put in motion, would keep itself alive by
-fashioning the minds of the citizens to its own intrinsic excellence.
-After having thus both liberated and reformed Syracuse, Dion promised
-to himself that he would employ Syracusan force, not in annihilating,
-but in recreating, other free Hellenic communities throughout the
-island; expelling from thence all the barbarians—both the imported
-mercenaries and the Carthaginians.
-
-  [120] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 335 F. Δίωνα γὰρ ἐγὼ σαφῶς οἶδα, ὡς
-  οἷόν τε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἄνθρωπον διϊσχυρίζεσθαι, ὅτι τὴν ἀρχὴν εἰ
-  κατέσχεν, ὡς οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐπ᾽ ἄλλο γε σχῆμα τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐτράπετο,
-  ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ—Συρακούσας μὲν πρῶτον, τὴν πατρίδα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ, ἐπεὶ
-  τὴν δουλείαν αὐτῆς ἀπήλλαξε καὶ φαιδρύνας ἐλευθερίῳ ἐν σχήματι
-  κατέστησε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἂν πάσῃ μηχάνῃ ἐκόσμησε νόμοις τοῖς
-  προσήκουσί τε καὶ ἀρίστοις τοὺς πολίτας—τό τε ἐφεξῆς τούτοις
-  προυθυμεῖτ᾽ ἂν πρᾶξαι, πᾶσαν Σικελίαν κατοικίζειν καὶ ἐλευθέραν
-  ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ποιεῖν, τοὺς μὲν ἐκβάλλων, τοὺς δὲ χειρούμενος
-  ῥᾷον Ἱέρωνος, etc.
-
-  Compare the beginning of the same epistle, p. 324 A.
-
-  [121] Plato, Epist. iv. p. 320 F. (addressed to Dion). ... ὡς οὖν
-  ὑπὸ πάντων ὁρώμενος παρασκευάζου τόν τε Λυκοῦργον ἐκεῖνον ἀρχαῖον
-  ἀποδείξων, καὶ τὸν Κῦρον καὶ εἴτις ἄλλος πώποτε ἔδοξεν ἤθει καὶ
-  πολιτείᾳ διενεγκεῖν, etc.
-
-Such were the hopes and projects which arose in the mind of the
-youthful Dion as he listened to Plato; hopes pregnant with future
-results which neither of them contemplated—and not unworthy of being
-compared with those enthusiastic aspirations which the young Spartan
-kings Agis and Kleomenes imbibed, a century afterwards, in part from
-the conversation of the philosopher Sphærus.[122] Never before had
-Plato met with a pupil who so quickly apprehended, so profoundly
-meditated, or so passionately laid to heart, his lessons.[123]
-Inflamed with his newly communicated impulse towards philosophy, as
-the supreme guide and directress of virtuous conduct, Dion altered
-his habits of life; exchanging the splendor and luxury of a Sicilian
-rich man for the simple fare and regulated application becoming a
-votary of the Academy. In this course he persisted without faltering
-throughout all his residence at the court of Dionysius, in spite
-of the unpopularity contracted among his immediate companions.
-His enthusiasm even led him to believe, that the despot himself,
-unable to resist that persuasive tongue by which he had been himself
-converted, might be gently brought round into an employment of his
-mighty force for beneficent and reformatory purposes. Accordingly
-Dion, inviting Plato to Syracuse, procured for him an interview
-with Dionysius. How miserably the speculation failed, has been
-recounted in my last chapter. Instead of acquiring a new convert, the
-philosopher was fortunate in rescuing his own person, and in making
-good his returning footsteps out of that lion’s den, into which the
-improvident enthusiasm of his young friend had inveigled him.
-
-  [122] Plutarch, Kleomenes, c. 2-11.
-
-  [123] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 327 A. Δίων μὲν γὰρ δὴ μάλ᾽
-  εὐμαθὴς ὢν πρός τε τἄλλα, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς τότε ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ λεγομένους
-  λόγους, οὕτως ὀξέως ὑπήκουσε καὶ σφόδρα, ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε ὧν ἐγὼ
-  προσέτυχον νέων, καὶ τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον ζῇν ἠθέλησε διαφερόντως
-  τῶν πολλῶν Ἰταλιωτῶν καὶ Σικελιωτῶν, ἀρετὴν περὶ πλείονος ἡδονῆς
-  τῆς τε ἄλλης τρυφῆς ποιούμενος· ὅθεν ἐπαχθέστερον τοῖς περὶ τὰ
-  τυραννικὰ νόμιμα ζῶσιν ἐβίω, μέχρι τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ περὶ Διονύσιον
-  γενομένου.
-
-  Plutarch, Dion, c. 4. ὡς πρῶτον ἐγεύσατο λόγου καὶ φιλοσοφίας
-  ἡγεμονικῆς πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἀνεφλέχθη τὴν ψυχὴν, etc.
-
-The harsh treatment of Plato by Dionysius was a painful, though
-salutary, warning to Dion. Without sacrificing either his own
-convictions, or the philosophical regularity of life which he had
-thought fit to adopt—he saw that patience was imperatively necessary,
-and he so conducted himself as to maintain unabated the favor and
-confidence of Dionysius. Such a policy would probably be recommended
-to him even by Plato, in prospect of a better future. But it would
-be strenuously urged by the Pythagoreans of Southern Italy; among
-whom was Archytas, distinguished not only as a mathematician and
-friend of Plato, but also as the chief political magistrate of
-Tarentum. To these men, who dwelt all within the reach,[124] if not
-under the dominion, of this formidable Syracusan despot, it would
-be an unspeakable advantage to have a friend like Dion near him,
-possessing his confidence, and serving as a shield to them against
-his displeasure or interference. Dion so far surmounted his own
-unbending nature as to conduct himself towards Dionysius with skill
-and prudence. He was employed by the despot in several important
-affairs, especially in embassies to Carthage, which he fulfilled
-well, especially with conspicuous credit for eloquence; and also in
-the execution of various cruel orders, which his humanity secretly
-mitigated.[125] After the death of Thearides, Dionysius gave to Dion
-in marriage the widow Aretê (his daughter), and continued until the
-last to treat him with favor, accepting from him a freedom of censure
-such as he would tolerate from no other adviser.
-
-  [124] See the story in Jamblichus (Vit. Pythagoræ, c. 189) of a
-  company of Syracusan troops under Eurymenes the brother of Dion,
-  sent to lay in ambuscade for some Pythagoreans between Tarentum
-  and Metapontum. The story has not the air of truth; but the state
-  of circumstances, which it supposes, illustrates the relation
-  between Dionysius and the cities in the Tarentine Gulf.
-
-  [125] Plutarch, Dion, c. 5, 6; Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 1, 2.
-
-During the many years which elapsed before the despot died, we
-cannot doubt that Dion found opportunities of visiting Peloponnesus
-and Athens, for the great festivals and other purposes. He would
-thus keep up his friendship and philosophical communication with
-Plato. Being as he was minister and relative, and perhaps successor
-presumptive, of the most powerful prince in Greece, he would
-enjoy everywhere great importance, which would be enhanced by his
-philosophy and eloquence. The Spartans, at that time the allies
-of Dionysius, conferred upon Dion the rare honor of a vote of
-citizenship;[126] and he received testimonies of respect from other
-cities also. Such honors tended to exalt his reputation at Syracuse;
-while the visits to Athens and the cities of Central Greece enlarged
-his knowledge both of politicians and philosophers.
-
-  [126] Plutarch, Dion, c. 17, 49. Respecting the rarity of
-  the vote of Spartan citizenship, see a remarkable passage of
-  Herodotus, ix. 33-35.
-
-  Plutarch states that the Spartans voted their citizenship to
-  Dion during his exile, while he was in Peloponnesus after the
-  year 367 B. C., at enmity with the younger Dionysius then despot
-  of Syracuse; whom (according to Plutarch) the Spartans took the
-  risk of offending, in order that they might testify their extreme
-  admiration for Dion.
-
-  I cannot but think that Plutarch is mistaken as to the time
-  of this grant. In and after 367 B. C. the Spartans were under
-  great depression, playing the losing game against Thebes. It is
-  scarcely conceivable that they should be imprudent enough to
-  alienate a valuable ally for the sake of gratuitously honoring
-  an exile whom he hated and had banished. Whereas if we suppose
-  the vote to have been passed during the lifetime of the elder
-  Dionysius, it would count as a compliment to him as well as to
-  Dion, and would thus be an act of political prudence as well as
-  of genuine respect. Plutarch speaks as if he supposed that Dion
-  was never in Peloponnesus until the time of his exile, which is,
-  in my judgment, highly improbable.
-
-At length occurred the death of the elder Dionysius, occasioned by
-an unexpected attack of fever, after a few days’ illness. He had
-made no special announcement about his succession. Accordingly, as
-soon as the physicians pronounced him to be in imminent danger, a
-competition arose between his two families: on the one hand Dionysius
-the younger, his son by the Lokrian wife Doris; on the other, his
-wife Aristomachê and her brother Dion, representing her children
-Hipparinus and Nysæus, then very young. Dion, wishing to obtain
-for these two youths either a partnership in the future power, or
-some other beneficial provision, solicited leave to approach the
-bedside of the sick man. But the physicians refused to grant his
-request without apprising the younger Dionysius; who, being resolved
-to prevent it, directed a soporific portion to be administered to
-his father, from the effects of which the latter never awoke so as
-to be able to see any one.[127] The interview with Dion being thus
-frustrated, and the father dying without giving any directions,
-Dionysius the younger succeeded as eldest son, without opposition. He
-was presented to that which was called an assembly of the Syracusan
-people,[128] and delivered some conciliatory phrases, requesting them
-to continue to him that good-will which they had so long shown to his
-father. Consent and acclamation were of course not wanting, to the
-new master of the troops, treasures, magazines, and fortifications in
-Ortygia; those “adamantine chains” which were well known to dispense
-with the necessity of any real popular good-will.
-
-  [127] Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 2; Plutarch, Dion, c. 6.
-
-  [128] Diodor. xv. 74.
-
-Dionysius II. (or the younger), then about twenty-five years of age,
-was a young man of considerable natural capacity, and of quick and
-lively impulses;[129] but weak and vain in his character, given to
-transitory caprices, and eager in his appetite for praise without
-being capable of any industrious or resolute efforts to earn it.
-As yet he was wholly unpractised in serious business of any kind.
-He had neither seen military service nor mingled in the discussion
-of political measures; having been studiously kept back from both,
-by the extreme jealousy of his father. His life had been passed in
-the palace or acropolis of Ortygia, amidst all the indulgences and
-luxuries belonging to a princely station, diversified with amateur
-carpenter’s work and turnery. However, the tastes of the father
-introduced among the guests at the palace a certain number of
-poets, reciters, musicians, etc., so that the younger Dionysius had
-contracted a relish for poetical literature, which opened his mind
-to generous sentiments, and large conceptions of excellence, more
-than any portion of his very confined experience. To philosophy,
-to instructive conversation, to the exercise of reason, he was
-a stranger.[130] But the very feebleness and indecision of his
-character presented him as impressible, perhaps improvable, by a
-strong will and influence brought to bear upon him from that quarter,
-at least as well as from any other.
-
-  [129] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 338 E. Ὁ δὲ οὔτε ἄλλως ἐστὶν ἀφυὴς
-  πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μανθάνειν δύναμιν, φιλότιμος δὲ θαυμαστῶς, etc.
-  Compare p. 330 A. p. 328 B.; also Epist. iii. p. 316 C. p. 317 E.
-
-  Plutarch, Dion, c. 7-9.
-
-  [130] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 332 E. ἐπειδὴ τὰ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς
-  αὐτῷ συνεβεβήκει οὕτως ἀνομιλήτῳ μὲν παιδείας, ἀνομιλήτῳ δὲ
-  συνουσιῶν τῶν προσηκουσῶν γεγονέναι, etc.
-
-Such was the novice who suddenly stept into the place of the most
-energetic and powerful despot of the Grecian world. Dion—being
-as he was of mature age, known service and experience, and full
-enjoyment of the confidence of the elder Dionysius,—might have
-probably raised material opposition to the younger. But he attempted
-no such thing. He acknowledged and supported the young prince with
-cordial sincerity, dropping altogether those views, whatever they
-were, on behalf of the children of Aristomachê, which had induced
-him to solicit the last interview with the sick man. While exerting
-himself to strengthen and facilitate the march of the government, he
-tried to gain influence and ascendency over the mind of the young
-Dionysius. At the first meeting of council which took place after
-the accession, Dion stood conspicuous not less for his earnest
-adhesion than for his dignified language and intelligent advice.
-The remaining councillors—accustomed, under the self-determining
-despot who had just quitted the scene, to the simple function
-of hearing, applauding, and obeying, his directions—exhausted
-themselves in phrases and compliments, waiting to catch the tone
-of the young prince before they ventured to pronounce any decided
-opinion. But Dion, to whose freedom of speech even the elder
-Dionysius had partially submitted, disdained all such tampering,
-entered at once into a full review of the actual situation, and
-suggested the positive measures proper to be adopted. We cannot
-doubt that, in the transmission of an authority which had rested so
-much on the individual spirit of the former possessor, there were
-many precautions to be taken, especially in regard to the mercenary
-troops both at Syracuse and in the outlying dependencies. All these
-necessities of the moment Dion set forth, together with suitable
-advice. But the most serious of all the difficulties arose out of
-the war with Carthage still subsisting, which it was foreseen that
-the Carthaginians were likely to press more vigorously, calculating
-on the ill-assured tenure and inexperienced management of the new
-prince. This difficulty Dion took upon himself. If the council
-should think it wise to make peace, he engaged to go to Carthage and
-negotiate peace—a task in which he had been more than once employed
-under the elder Dionysius. If, on the other hand, it were resolved
-to prosecute the war, he advised that imposing forces should be at
-once put in equipment, promising to furnish, out of his own large
-property, a sum sufficient for the outfit of fifty triremes.[131]
-
-  [131] Plutarch Dion, c. 6.
-
-The young Dionysius was not only profoundly impressed with the
-superior wisdom and suggestive resource of Dion, but also grateful
-for his generous offer of pecuniary as well as personal support.[132]
-In all probability Dion actually carried the offer into effect, for
-to a man of his disposition, money had little value except as a
-means of extending influence and acquiring reputation. The war with
-Carthage seems to have lasted at least throughout the next year,[133]
-and to have been terminated not long afterwards. But it never assumed
-those perilous proportions which had been contemplated by the council
-as probable. As a mere contingency, however, it was sufficient to
-inspire Dionysius with alarm, combined with the other exigencies of
-his new situation. At first he was painfully conscious of his own
-inexperience; anxious about hazards which he now saw for the first
-time, and not merely open to advice, but eager and thankful for
-suggestions, from any quarter where he could place confidence. Dion,
-identified by ancient connection as well as by marriage with the
-Dionysian family—trusted, more than any one else, by the old despot,
-and surrounded with that accessory dignity which ascetic strictness
-of life usually confers in excess—presented every title to such
-confidence. And when he was found not only the most trustworthy, but
-the most frank and fearless, of councillors, Dionysius gladly yielded
-both to the measures which he advised and to the impulses which he
-inspired.
-
-  [132] Plutarch, Dion, c. 7. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Διονύσιος ὑπερφυῶς τὴν
-  μεγαλοψυχίαν ἐθαύμασε καὶ τὴν προθυμίαν ἠγάπησεν.
-
-  [133] Dionysius II. was engaged at war at the time when Plato
-  first visited him at Syracuse, within the year immediately after
-  his accession (Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 317 A). We may reasonably
-  presume that this was the war with Carthage.
-
-  Compare Diodorus (xvi. 5), who mentions that the younger
-  Dionysius also carried on war for some little time, in a languid
-  manner, against the Lucanians; and that he founded two cities on
-  the coast of Apulia in the Adriatic. I think it probable that
-  these two last-mentioned foundations were acts of Dionysius I.,
-  not of Dionysius II. They were not likely to be undertaken by a
-  young prince of backward disposition, at his first accession.
-
-Such was the political atmosphere of Syracuse during the period
-immediately succeeding the new accession, while the splendid
-obsequies in honor of the departed Dionysius were being solemnized;
-coupled with a funeral pile so elaborate as to confer celebrity on
-Timæus the constructor—and commemorated by architectural monuments,
-too grand to be permanent,[134] immediately outside of Ortygia, near
-the Regal Gates leading to that citadel. Among the popular measures,
-natural at the commencement of a new reign, the historian Philistus
-was recalled from exile.[135] He had been one of the oldest and most
-attached partisans of the elder Dionysius; by whom, however, he had
-at last been banished, and never afterwards forgiven. His recall
-now seemed to promise a new and valuable assistant to the younger,
-whom it also presented as softening the rigorous proceedings of his
-father. In this respect, it would harmonize with the views of Dion,
-though Philistus afterwards became his great opponent.
-
-  [134] Tacitus, Histor. ii. 49. “Othoni sepulcrum exstructum est,
-  modicum, et mansurum.”
-
-  A person named Timæus was immortalized as the constructor of the
-  funeral pile: see Athenæus, v. p. 206. Both Göller (Timæi Fragm.
-  95) and M. Didot (Timæi Fr. 126) have referred this passage to
-  Timæus the historian, and have supposed it to relate to the
-  description given by Timæus of the funeral-pile. But the passage
-  in Athenæus seems to me to indicate Timæus as the _builder_, not
-  the _describer_, of this famous πυρά.
-
-  It is he who is meant, probably, in the passage of Cicero (De
-  Naturâ Deor. iii. 35)—(Dionysius) “in suo lectulo mortuus in
-  _Tympanidis rogum illatus est_, eamque potestatem quam ipse per
-  scelus erat nactus, quasi justam et legitimam hereditatis loco
-  filio tradidit.” This seems at least the best way of explaining a
-  passage which perplexes the editors: see the note of Davis.
-
-  [135] Plutarch (De Exilio. p. 637) and Cornelius Nepos (Dion,
-  c. 3) represent that Philistus was recalled at the persuasion
-  of the enemies of Dion, as a counterpoise and corrective to the
-  ascendency of the latter over Dionysius the younger. Though
-  Philistus afterwards actually performed this part, I doubt
-  whether such was the motive which caused him to be recalled. He
-  seems to have come back _before_ the obsequies of Dionysius the
-  elder; that is, very early after the commencement of the new
-  reign. Philistus had described, in his history, these obsequies
-  in a manner so elaborate and copious, that this passage in his
-  work excited the special notice of the ancient critics (see
-  Philisti Fragment. 42, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 34). I
-  venture to think that this proves him to have been _present_ at
-  the obsequies; which would of course be very impressive to him,
-  since they were among the first things which he saw after his
-  long exile.
-
-Dion was now both the prime minister, and the confidential monitor,
-of the young Dionysius. He upheld the march of the government with
-undiminished energy, and was of greater political importance than
-Dionysius himself. But success in this object was not the end for
-which Dion labored. He neither wished to serve a despot, nor to
-become a despot himself. The moment was favorable for resuming that
-project which he had formerly imbibed from Plato, and which, in spite
-of contemptuous disparagement by his former master, had ever since
-clung to him as the dream of his heart and life. To make Syracuse a
-free city, under a government, not of will, but of good laws, with
-himself as lawgiver in substance, if not in name—to enfranchise and
-replant the semi-barbarised Hellenic cities in Sicily—and to expel
-the Carthaginians—were schemes to which he now again devoted himself
-with unabated enthusiasm. But he did not look to any other means of
-achieving them than the consent and initiative of Dionysius himself.
-The man who had been sanguine enough to think of working upon the
-iron soul of the father, was not likely to despair of shaping anew
-the more malleable metal of which the son was composed. Accordingly,
-while lending to Dionysius his best service as minister, he also
-took up the Platonic profession, and tried to persuade him to reform
-both himself and his government. He endeavored to awaken in him
-a relish for a better and nobler private conduct than that which
-prevailed among the luxurious companions around him. He dwelt with
-enthusiasm on the scientific and soul-stirring conversation of Plato;
-specimens[136] of which he either read aloud or repeated, exalting
-the hearer not only to a higher intellectual range, but also to the
-full majesty of mind requisite for ruling others with honor and
-improvement. He pointed out the unrivalled glory which Dionysius
-would acquire in the eyes of Greece, by consenting to employ his vast
-power, not as a despot working on the fears of subjects, but as a
-king enforcing temperance and justice, by his own paternal example
-as well as by good laws. He tried to show that Dionysius, after
-having liberated Syracuse, and enrolled himself as a king limited and
-responsible amidst grateful citizens, would have far more real force
-against the barbarians than at present.[137]
-
-  [136] Plutarch, Dion, c. 11. Ταῦτα πολλάκις τοῦ Δίωνος
-  παραινοῦντος, καὶ τῶν λόγων τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἔστιν οὕστινας
-  ὑποσπείροντος, etc.
-
-  [137] Plutarch, Dion, c. 10, 11; Plato, Epist. vii. p. 327 C.
-
-Such were the new convictions which Dion tried to work into the mind
-of the young Dionysius, as a living faith and sentiment. Penetrated
-as he was with the Platonic idea—that nothing could be done for the
-improvement and happiness of mankind,[138] until philosophy and
-ruling power came together in the same hands; but everything, if the
-two did so come together—he thought that he saw before him a chance
-of realizing the conjunction, in the case of the greatest among all
-Hellenic potentates. He already beheld in fancy his native country
-and fellow citizens liberated, moralized, ennobled, and conducted
-to happiness, without murder or persecution,[139] simply by the
-well-meaning and instructed employment of power already organized. If
-accident had thrown the despotism into the hands of Dion himself, at
-this period of his life, the Grecian world would probably have seen
-an experiment tried, as memorable and generous as any event recorded
-in its history: what would have been its result, we cannot say. But
-it was enough to fire his inmost soul, to see himself separated from
-the experiment only by the necessity of persuading an impressible
-young man over whom he had much influence; and for himself he was
-quite satisfied with the humbler position of nominal minister, but
-real originator and chief, in so noble an enterprise.[140] His
-persuasive powers, strengthened as they were by intense earnestness
-as well as by his imposing station and practical capacity, actually
-wrought a great effect upon Dionysius. The young man appeared
-animated with a strong desire of self-improvement, and of qualifying
-himself for such a use of the powers of government as Dion depicted.
-He gave proof of the sincerity of his feeling by expressing eagerness
-to see and converse with Plato, to whom he sent several personal
-messages, warmly requesting him to visit Syracuse.[141]
-
-  [138] Plato, Epist. vii. p. 328 A. p. 335 E.; Plato, Republic,
-  vi. p. 499 C. D.
-
-  [139] Plato, Epist. vii. p. 327 E. ... Ὃ δὴ καὶ νῦν εἰ
-  διαπράξαιτο ἐν Διονυσίῳ ὡς ἐπεχείρησε, μεγάλας ἐλπίδας εἶχεν,
-  ἄνευ σφαγῶν καὶ θανάτων καὶ τῶν νῦν γεγονότων κακῶν, βίον ἂν
-  εὐδαίμονα καὶ ἀληθινὸν ἐν πάσῃ τῇ χώρᾳ κατασκευάσαι.
-
-  [140] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 333 B. Ταὐτὸν πρὸς Δίωνα Συρακόσιοι
-  τότε ἔπαθον, ὅπερ καὶ Διονύσιος, ὅτε αὐτὸν ἐπεχείρει παιδεύσας
-  καὶ θρέψας βασιλέα τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄξιον, οὕτω κοινωνεῖν αὐτῷ τοῦ βίου
-  παντός.
-
-  [141] Plato, Epist. vii. p. 327 E.; Plutarch. Dion, c. 11.
-  ἔσχεν ἔρως τὸν Διονύσιον ὀξὺς καὶ περιμανὴς τῶν τε λόγων καὶ
-  τῆς συνουσίας τοῦ Πλάτωνος. Εὐθὺς οὖν Ἀθήναζε πολλὰ μὲν ἐφοίτα
-  γράμματα παρὰ τοῦ Διονυσίου, πολλαὶ δ᾽ ἐπισκήψεις τοῦ Δίωνος,
-  ἄλλαι δ᾽ ἐξ Ἰταλίας παρὰ τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν, etc.
-
-This was precisely the first step which Dion had been laboring to
-bring about. He well knew, and had personally felt, the wonderful
-magic of Plato’s conversation when addressed to young men. To
-bring Plato to Syracuse, and to pour his eloquent language into
-the predisposed ears of Dionysius, appeared like realizing the
-conjunction of philosophy and power. Accordingly he sent to Athens,
-along with the invitation from Dionysius, the most pressing and
-emphatic entreaties from himself. He represented the immense prize
-to be won—nothing less than the means of directing the action of
-an organized power, extending over all the Greeks of Italy and
-Sicily—provided only the mind of Dionysius could be thoroughly gained
-over. This (he said) was already half done; not only Dionysius
-himself, but also his youthful half brothers of the other line, had
-been impressed with earnest mental aspirations, and longed to drink
-at the pure fountain of true philosophy. Everything presaged complete
-success, such as would render them hearty and active proselytes, if
-Plato would only come forthwith—before hostile influences could have
-time to corrupt them—and devote to the task his unrivalled art of
-penetrating the youthful mind. These hostile influences were indeed
-at work, and with great activity; if victorious, they would not only
-defeat the project of Dion, but might even provoke his expulsion, or
-threaten his life. Could Plato, by declining the invitation, leave
-his devoted champion and apostle to fight so great a battle, alone
-and unassisted? What could Plato say for himself afterwards, if by
-declining to come, he not only let slip the greatest prospective
-victory which had ever been opened to philosophy, but also permitted
-the corruption of Dionysius and the ruin of Dion?[142]
-
-  [142] Plato, Epist. vii. p. 328.
-
-Such appeals, in themselves emphatic and touching, reached Athens
-reinforced by solicitations, hardly less strenuous, from Archytas
-of Tarentum and the other Pythagorean philosophers in the south of
-Italy; to whose personal well-being, over and above the interests of
-philosophy, the character of the future Syracusan government was of
-capital importance. Plato was deeply agitated and embarrassed. He
-was now sixty-one years of age. He enjoyed preëminent estimation,
-in the grove of Akadêmus near Athens, amidst admiring hearers from
-all parts of Greece. The Athenian democracy, if it accorded to him
-no influence on public affairs, neither molested him nor dimmed
-his intellectual glory. The proposed voyage to Syracuse carried
-him out of his enviable position into a new field of hazard and
-speculation; brilliant indeed and flattering, beyond anything which
-had ever been approached by philosophy, if it succeeded; but fraught
-with disgrace, and even with danger to all concerned, if it failed.
-Plato had already seen the elder Dionysius surrounded by his walls
-and mercenaries in Ortygia, and had learnt by cruel experience the
-painful consequences of propounding philosophy to an intractable
-hearer, whose displeasure passed so readily into act. The sight
-of contemporary despots nearer home, such as Euphron of Sikyon
-and Alexander of Pheræ, was by no means reassuring; nor could he
-reasonably stake his person and reputation on the chance, that the
-younger Dionysius might prove a glorious exception to the general
-rule. To outweigh such scruples, he had indeed the positive and
-respectful invitation of Dionysius himself; which however would have
-passed for a transitory, though vehement caprice on the part of a
-young prince, had it not been backed by the strong assurances of a
-mature man and valued friend like Dion. To these assurances, and to
-the shame which would be incurred by leaving Dion to fight the battle
-and incur the danger alone, Plato sacrificed his own grounds for
-hesitation. He went to Syracuse, less with the hope of succeeding in
-the intended conversion of Dionysius, than from the fear of hearing
-both himself and his philosophy taunted with confessed impotence—as
-fit only for the discussions of the school, shrinking from all
-application to practice, betraying the interest of his Pythagorean
-friends, and basely deserting that devoted champion who had half
-opened the door to him for triumphant admission.[143]
-
-  [143] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 328. Ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ
-  τόλμῃ ἀπῇρα ~οἴκοθεν, οὐχ ᾗ τινὲς ἐδόξαζον, ἀλλ᾽ αἰσχυνόμενος
-  μὲν ἐμαυτὸν τὸ μέγιστον~, μὴ δόξαιμί ποτε ἐμαυτῷ παντάπασι
-  λόγος μόνον ἀτεχνῶς εἶναί τις, ἔργου δὲ οὐδενὸς ἄν ποτε ἑκὼν
-  ἀνθάψασθαι, κινδυνεύσειν δὲ προδοῦναι πρῶτον μὲν τὴν Δίωνος
-  ξενίαν ἐν κινδύνοις ὄντως γεγονότος οὐ σμικροῖς· εἴτ᾽ οὖν πάθοι
-  τι, εἴτ᾽ ἐκπεσὼν ὑπὸ Διονυσίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐχθρῶν ἔλθοι παρ᾽
-  ἡμᾶς φεύγων, καὶ ἀνέροιτο, εἰπών, etc.
-
-Such is the account which the philosopher gives of his own state
-of mind in going to Syracuse. At the same time, he intimates that
-his motives were differently interpreted by others.[144] And as
-the account which we possess was written fifteen years after the
-event—when Dion had perished, when the Syracusan enterprise had
-realized nothing like what was expected, and when Plato looked back
-upon it with the utmost grief and aversion,[145] which must have
-poisoned the last three or four years of his life—we may fairly
-suspect that he partially transfers back to 367 B. C. the feelings
-of 352 B. C.; and that at the earlier period, he went to Syracuse
-not merely because he was ashamed to decline, but because he really
-flattered himself with some hopes of success.
-
-  [144] This is contained in the words ~οὐχ ᾗ τινὲς
-  ἐδόξαζον~—before cited.
-
-  [145] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350 E. ταῦτα εἶπον μεμισηκὼς τὴν
-  περὶ Σικελίαν πλάνην καὶ ἀτυχίαν, etc.
-
-  Xenokrates seems to have accompanied Plato to Sicily (Diogen.
-  Laert. iv. 2, 1).
-
-However desponding he may have been before, he could hardly fail
-to conceive hopes from the warmth of his first reception. One of
-the royal carriages met him at his landing, and conveyed him to
-his lodging. Dionysius offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving to the
-gods for his safe arrival. The banquets at the acropolis became
-distinguished for their plainness and sobriety. Never had Dionysius
-been seen so gentle in answering suitors or transacting public
-business. He began immediately to take lessons in geometry from
-Plato. Every one around him, of course, was suddenly smitten with
-a taste for geometry;[146] so that the floors were all spread
-with sand, and nothing was to be seen except triangles and other
-figures inscribed upon it, with expositors and a listening crowd
-around them. To those who had been inmates of the acropolis, under
-the reign of the former despot, this change was surprising enough.
-But their surprise was converted into alarm, when, at a periodical
-sacrifice just then offered, Dionysius himself arrested the herald
-in pronouncing the customary prayer to the gods—“That the despotism
-might long remain unshaken.” “Stop! (said Dionysius to the herald)
-imprecate no such curse upon us!”[147] To the ears of Philistus,
-and the old politicians, these words portended nothing less than
-revolution to the dynasty, and ruin to Syracusan power. A single
-Athenian sophist (they exclaimed), with no other force than his
-tongue and his reputation, had achieved the conquest of Syracuse; an
-attempt in which thousands of his countrymen had miserably perished
-half a century before.[148] Ineffably were they disgusted to see
-Dionysius abdicate in favor of Plato, and exchange the care of his
-vast force and dominion for geometrical problems and discussions on
-the _summum bonum_.
-
-  [146] Plutarch, De Adulator, et Amici Discrimine, p. 52 C.
-
-  [147] Plutarch, Dion, c. 13. Οὐ παύσῃ καταρώμενος ἡμῖν;
-
-  [148] Plutarch, Dion, c. 14. Ἔνιοι δὲ προσεποιοῦντο δυσχεραίνειν,
-  εἰ πρότερον μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ναυτικαῖς καὶ πεζικαῖς δυνάμεσι δεῦρο
-  πλεύσαντες ἀπώλοντο καὶ διεφθάρησαν πρότερον ἢ λαβεῖν Συρακούσας,
-  νυνὶ δὲ δι᾽ ~ἑνὸς σοφιστοῦ~ καταλύουσι τὴν Διονυσίου τυραννίδα,
-  etc.
-
-  Plato is here described as a _Sophist_, in the language of those
-  who did not like him. Plato, the great authority who is always
-  quoted in disparagement of the persons called _Sophists_, is as
-  much entitled to the name as they, and is called so equally by
-  unfriendly commentators. I drew particular attention to this
-  fact in my sixty-eighth chapter (Vol. VIII.), where I endeavored
-  to show that there was no school, sect, or body of persons
-  distinguished by uniformity of doctrine or practice, properly
-  called _Sophists_, and that the name was common to all literary
-  men or teachers, when spoken of in an unfriendly spirit.
-
-For a moment Plato seemed to be despot of Syracuse; so that the
-noble objects for which Dion had labored were apparently within his
-reach, either wholly or in part. And as far as we can judge, they
-really were to a great degree within his reach—had this situation,
-so interesting and so fraught with consequences to the people of
-Sicily, been properly turned to account. With all reverence for the
-greatest philosopher of antiquity, we are forced to confess that upon
-his own showing, he not only failed to turn the situation to account,
-but contributed even to spoil it by an unseasonable rigor. To admire
-philosophy in its distinguished teachers, is one thing; to learn and
-appropriate it, is another stage, rarer and more difficult, requiring
-assiduous labor, and no common endowments; while that which Plato
-calls “the philosophical life,”[149] or practical predominance of a
-well-trained intellect and well-chosen ethical purposes, combined
-with the minimum of personal appetite—is a third stage, higher and
-rarer still. Now Dionysius had reached the first stage only. He had
-contracted a warm and profound admiration for Plato. He had imbibed
-this feeling from the exhortations of Dion; and we shall see by his
-subsequent conduct that it was really a feeling both sincere and
-durable. But he admired Plato without having either inclination or
-talent to ascend higher, and to acquire what Plato called philosophy.
-Now it was an unexpected good fortune, and highly creditable to the
-persevering enthusiasm of Dion, that Dionysius should have been wound
-up so far as to admire Plato, to invoke his presence, and to instal
-him as a sort of spiritual power by the side of the temporal. Thus
-much was more than could have been expected; but to demand more,
-and to insist that Dionysius should go to school and work through
-a course of mental regeneration—was a purpose hardly possible to
-attain, and positively mischievous if it failed. Unfortunately, it
-was exactly this error which Plato, and Dion in deference to Plato,
-seem to have committed. Instead of taking advantage of the existing
-ardor of Dionysius to instigate him at once into active political
-measures beneficial to the people of Syracuse and Sicily, with the
-full force of an authority which, at that moment, would have been
-irresistible—instead of heartening him up against groundless fears
-or difficulties of execution, and seeing that full honor was done
-to him for all the good which he really accomplished, meditated, or
-adopted—Plato postponed all these as matters for which his royal
-pupil was not yet ripe. He and Dion began to deal with Dionysius as
-a confessor treats his penitent; to probe the interior man[150]—to
-expose him to his own unworthiness—to show that his life, his
-training, his companions, had all been vicious—to insist upon
-repentance and amendment upon these points, before he could receive
-absolution, and be permitted to enter upon active political life—to
-tell him that he must reform himself, and become a rational and
-temperate man, before he was fit to enter seriously on the task of
-governing others.
-
-  [149] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 330 B. Ἐγὼ δὲ πάντα ὑπέμενον, τὴν
-  πρώτην διάνοιαν φυλάττων ᾗπερ ἀφικόμην, εἴπως εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἔλθοι
-  ~τῆς φιλοσόφου ζωῆς~ (Dionysius)—ὁ δ᾽ ἐνίκησεν ἀντιτείνων.
-
-  [150] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 332 E. Ἃ δὴ καὶ Διονυσίῳ
-  συνεβουλεύομεν ἐγὼ καὶ Δίων, ἐπειδὴ τὰ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτῷ
-  συνεβεβήκει, οὕτως ἀνομιλήτῳ μὲν παιδείας, ἀνομιλήτῳ δὲ συνουσιῶν
-  τῶν προσηκουσῶν γεγονέναι, ~πρῶτον~ ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὁρμήσαντα φίλους
-  ἄλλους αὑτῷ τῶν οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ ἡλικιωτῶν καὶ συμφώνους πρὸς
-  ἀρετὴν κτήσασθαι, ~μάλιστα δὲ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ, τούτου γὰρ αὐτὸν
-  θαυμαστῶς ἐνδεᾶ γεγονέναι· λέγοντες οὐκ ἐναργῶς οὕτως—οὐ γὰρ ἦν
-  ἀσφαλὲς~—ὡς οὕτω μὲν πᾶς ἀνὴρ αὑτόν τε καὶ ἐκείνους ὧν ἂν ἡγεμὼν
-  γένηται σώσει, μὴ ταύτῃ δὲ τραπόμενος τἀναντία πάντα ἀποτελεῖ·
-  πορευθεὶς δὲ ὡς λέγομεν, ~καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἔμφρονα καὶ σώφρονα
-  ποιησάμενος~, εἰ τὰς ἐξηρημωμένας Σικελίας πόλεις κατοικίσειε
-  νόμοις τε ξυνδήσειε καὶ πολιτείαις, etc.
-
-  Compare also p. 331 F.
-
-Such was the language which Plato and Dion held to Dionysius. They
-well knew indeed that they were treading on delicate ground—that
-while irritating a spirited horse in the sensitive part, they had
-no security against his kicks.[151] Accordingly, they resorted to
-many circumlocutory and equivocal expressions, so as to soften
-the offence given. But the effect was not the less produced, of
-disgusting Dionysius with his velleities towards political good.
-Not only did Plato decline entering upon political recommendations
-of his own, but he damped, instead of enforcing, the positive good
-resolutions which Dion had already succeeded in infusing. Dionysius
-announced freely, in the presence of Plato, his wish and intention to
-transform his despotism at Syracuse into a limited kingship, and to
-replant the dis-hellenised cities in Sicily. These were the two grand
-points to which Dion had been laboring so generously to bring him,
-and which he had invoked Plato for the express purpose of seconding.
-Yet what does Plato say when this momentous announcement is made?
-Instead of bestowing any praise or encouragement, he drily remarks to
-Dionysius,—“First go through your schooling, and then do all these
-things; otherwise leave them undone.”[152] Dionysius afterwards
-complained, and with good show of reason (when Dion was in exile,
-menacing attack upon Syracuse, under the favorable sympathies
-of Plato), that the great philosopher had actually deterred him
-(Dionysius) from executing the same capital improvements which he
-was now encouraging Dion to accomplish by an armed invasion. Plato
-was keenly sensitive to this reproach afterwards; but even his own
-exculpation proves it to have been in the main not undeserved.
-
-  [151] Horat. Satir. ii. 1, 17.
-
-                        “Haud mihi deero
-    Cum res ipsa feret. Nisi dextro tempore, Flacci
-    Verba per attentam non ibunt Cæsaris aurem.
-    Cui male si palpere, recalcitrat undique tutus.”
-
-  [152] Plato, Epist. iii. 315 E. Φάσι δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγοι λέγειν σε πρός
-  τινας τῶν παρά σε πρεσβευόντων, ὡς ἄρα σοῦ ποτὲ λέγοντος ἀκούσας
-  ἐγὼ μέλλοντος τάς τε Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἰκίζειν, καὶ
-  Συρακουσίους ἐπικουφίσαι, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀντὶ τυραννίδος εἰς βασιλείαν
-  μεταστήσαντα, ~ταῦτ᾽ ἄρα σὲ μὲν τότε, ὡς σὺ φῇς, διεκώλυσα—νῦν δὲ
-  Δίωνα διδάσκοιμι δρᾷν αὐτὰ, καὶ τοῖς διανοήμασι τοῖς σοῖς τὴν σὴν
-  ἀρχὴν~ ἀφαιρούμεθά σε....
-
-  Ibid. p. 319 B. εἶπες δὲ καὶ μάλ᾽ ἀπλάστως γελῶν, εἰ μέμνημαι, ὡς
-  ~Παιδευθέντα με ἐκέλευες ποιεῖν πάντα ταῦτα, ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν. Ἔφην
-  ἐγὼ Κάλλιστα μνημονεῦσαί σε~.
-
-  Cornelius Nepos (Dion, c. 3) gives to Plato the credit, which
-  belongs altogether to Dion, of having inspired Dionysius with
-  these ideas.
-
-Plutarch observes that Plato felt a proud consciousness of
-philosophical dignity in disdaining respect to persons, and in
-refusing to the defects of Dionysius any greater measure of
-indulgence than he would have shown to an ordinary pupil of the
-Academy.[153] If we allow him credit for a sentiment in itself
-honorable, it can only be at the expense of his fitness for dealing
-with practical life; by admitting (to quote a remarkable phrase from
-one of his own dialogues) that “he tried to deal with individual men
-without knowing those rules of art or practice which bear on human
-affairs.[154]” Dionysius was not a common pupil, nor could Plato
-reasonably expect the like unmeasured docility from one for whose
-ear so many hostile influences were competing. Nor were Plato and
-Dionysius the only parties concerned. There was, besides, in the
-first place, Dion, whose whole position was at stake—next, and of
-yet greater moment, the relief of the people of Syracuse and Sicily.
-For them, and on their behalf, Dion had been laboring with such
-zeal, that he had inspired Dionysius with readiness to execute the
-two best resolves which the situation admitted; resolves not only
-pregnant with benefit to the people, but also insuring the position
-of Dion—since if Dionysius had once entered upon this course of
-policy, Dion would have been essential to him as an auxiliary and man
-of execution.
-
-  [153] Plutarch, De Adulator, et Amici Discrimine, p. 52 E. We
-  may set against this, however, a passage in one of the other
-  treatises of Plutarch (Philosophand. cum Principibus, p. 779 _ad
-  finem_), in which he observes, that Plato, coming to Sicily with
-  the hope of converting his political doctrines into laws through
-  the agency of Dionysius, found the latter already corrupted by
-  power, unsusceptible of cure, and deaf to admonition.
-
-  [154] Plato, Phædon, c. 88. p. 89 D. Οὐκοῦν αἰσχρόν; καὶ δῆλον,
-  ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τἀνθρώπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ
-  τοῖς ἀνθρώποις;
-
-  He is expounding the causes and growth of misanthropic
-  dispositions; one of the most striking passages in his dialogues.
-
-It is by no means certain, indeed, that such schemes could have
-been successfully realized, even with full sincerity on the part of
-Dionysius, and the energy of Dion besides. With all governments, to
-do evil is easy—to effect beneficial change, difficult; and with
-a Grecian despot, this was true in a peculiar manner. Those great
-mercenary forces and other instruments, which had been strong as
-adamant for the oppressive rule of the elder Dionysius would have
-been found hardly manageable, perhaps even obstructive, if his son
-had tried to employ them for more liberal purposes. But still the
-experiment would have been tried, with a fair chance of success—if
-only Plato, during his short-lived spiritual authority at Syracuse,
-had measured more accurately the practical influence which a
-philosopher might reasonably hope to exercise over Dionysius. I make
-these remarks upon him with sincere regret; but I am much mistaken if
-he did not afterwards hear them in more poignant language from the
-banished Dion, upon whom the consequences of the mistake mainly fell.
-
-Speedily did the atmosphere at Syracuse become overclouded. The
-conservative party—friends of the old despotism, with the veteran
-Philistus at their head—played their game far better than that of the
-reformers was played by Plato, or by Dion since the arrival of Plato.
-Philistus saw that Dion, as the man of strong patriotic impulses and
-of energetic execution, was the real enemy to be aimed at. He left no
-effort untried to calumniate Dion, and to set Dionysius against him.
-Whispers and misrepresentations from a thousand different quarters
-beset the ear of Dionysius, alarming him with the idea that Dion was
-usurping to himself the real authority in Syracuse, with the view
-of ultimately handing it over to the children of Aristomachê, and
-of reigning in their name. Plato had been brought thither (it was
-said) as an agent in the conspiracy, for the purpose of winning over
-Dionysius into idle speculations, enervating his active vigor, and
-ultimately setting him aside; in order that all serious political
-agency might fall into the hands of Dion.[155] These hostile
-intrigues were no secret to Plato himself, who, even shortly after
-his arrival, began to see evidence of their poisonous activity. He
-tried sincerely to counterwork them;[156] but unfortunately the
-language which he himself addressed to Dionysius was exactly such as
-to give them the best chance of success. When Dionysius recounted to
-Philistus or other courtiers, how Plato and Dion had humiliated him
-in his own eyes, and told him that he was unworthy to govern until he
-had undergone a thorough purification—he would be exhorted to resent
-it as presumption and insult; and would be assured that it could only
-arise from a design to dispossess him of his authority, in favor of
-Dion, or perhaps of the children of Aristomachê with Dion as regent.
-
-  [155] Plutarch, Dion, c. 14, Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 333 C.
-  Ὁ δὲ (Dionysius) τοῖς διαβάλλουσι (ἐπίστευε) καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς
-  ἐπιβουλεύων τῇ τυραννίδι Δίων πράττοι πάντα ὅσα ἔπραττεν ἐν τῷ
-  τότε χρόνῳ, ἵνα ὁ μὲν (Dionysius) παιδείᾳ δὴ τὸν νοῦν κηληθεὶς
-  ἀμελοῖ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπιτρέψας ἐκείνῳ, ὁ δὲ (Dion) σφετερίσαιτο, καὶ
-  Διονύσιον ἐκβάλοι ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς δόλῳ.
-
-  [156] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 329 C. ἐλθὼν δὲ, οὐ γὰρ δεῖ
-  μηκύνειν, εὗρον στάσεως τὰ περὶ Διονύσιον μεστὰ ξύμπαντα καὶ
-  διαβολῶν πρὸς τὴν τυραννίδα Δίωνος πέρι· ἤμυνον μὲν οὖν καθ᾽ ὅσον
-  ἠδυνάμην, σμικρὰ δ᾽ οἷός τε ἦ, etc.
-
-It must not be forgotten that there was a real foundation for
-jealousy on the part of Dionysius towards Dion; who was not merely
-superior to him in age, in dignity, and in ability, but also
-personally haughty in his bearing, and rigid in his habits, while
-Dionysius relished conviviality and enjoyments. At first, this
-jealousy was prevented from breaking out—partly by the consciousness
-of Dionysius that he needed some one to lean upon—partly by what
-seems to have been great self-command on the part of Dion, and great
-care to carry with him the real mind and good will of Dionysius.
-Even from the beginning, the enemies of Dion were doubtless not
-sparing in their calumnies, to alienate Dionysius from him; and the
-wonder only is, how, in spite of such intrigues and in spite of the
-natural causes of jealousy, Dion could have implanted his political
-aspirations, and maintained his friendly influence over Dionysius
-until the arrival of Plato. After that event, the natural causes of
-antipathy tended to manifest themselves more and more powerfully,
-while the counteracting circumstances all disappeared.
-
-Three important months thus passed away, during which those precious
-public inclinations, which Plato found instilled by Dion into the
-bosom of Dionysius, and which he might have fanned into life and
-action—to liberalize the government of Syracuse, and to restore the
-other free Grecian cities—disappeared never to return. In place
-of them, Dionysius imbibed an antipathy, more and more rancorous,
-against the friend and relative with whom these sentiments had
-originated. The charges against Dion, of conspiracy and dangerous
-designs, circulated by Philistus and his cabal, became more audacious
-than ever. At length in the fourth month, Dionysius resolved to get
-rid of him.
-
-The proceedings of Dion being watched, a letter was detected which
-he had written to the Carthaginian commanders in Sicily (with whom
-the war still subsisted, though seemingly not in great activity),
-inviting them, if they sent any proposition for peace to Syracuse, to
-send it through him, as he would take care that it should be properly
-discussed. I have already stated, that even in the reign of the
-elder Dionysius, Dion had been the person to whom the negotiations
-with Carthage were habitually intrusted. Such a letter from him, as
-far as we make out from the general description, implied nothing
-like a treasonable purpose. But Dionysius, after taking counsel with
-Philistus, resolved to make use of it as a final pretext. Inviting
-Dion into the acropolis, under color of seeking to heal their growing
-differences,—and beginning to enter into an amicable conversation,—he
-conducted him unsuspectingly down to the adjacent harbor, where lay
-moored, close in shore, a boat with the rowers aboard, ready for
-starting. Dionysius then produced the intercepted letter, handed it
-to Dion, and accused him to his face of treason. The latter protested
-against the imputation, and eagerly sought to reply. But Dionysius
-stopped him from proceeding, insisted on his going aboard the boat,
-and ordered the rowers to carry him off forthwith to Italy.[157]
-
-  [157] The story is found in Plutarch (Dion, c. 14), who refers
-  to Timæus as his authority. It is confirmed in the main by
-  Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 329 D. μηνὶ δὴ σχεδὸν ἴσως τετάρτῳ Δίωνα
-  Διονύσιος, αἰτιώμενος ἐπιβουλεύειν τῇ τυραννίδι, σμικρὸν εἰς
-  πλοῖον ἐμβιβάσας, ἐξέβαλεν ἀτίμως.
-
-  Diodorus (xvi. 6) states that Dionysius sought to put Dion to
-  death, and that he only escaped by flight. But the version of
-  Plato and Plutarch is to be preferred.
-
-  Justin (xxi. 1, 2) gives an account, different from all, of the
-  reign and proceedings of the younger Dionysius. I cannot imagine
-  what authority he followed. He does not even name Dion.
-
-This abrupt and ignominious expulsion, of so great a person as Dion,
-caused as much consternation among his numerous friends, as triumph
-to Philistus and the partisans of the despotism. All consummation of
-the liberal projects conceived by Dion was now out of the question;
-not less from the incompetency of Dionysius to execute them alone,
-than from his indisposition to any such attempt. Aristomachê the
-sister, and Aretê the wife, of Dion (the latter half-sister of
-Dionysius himself), gave vent to their sorrow and indignation;
-while the political associates of Dion, and Plato beyond all
-others, trembled for their own personal safety. Among the mercenary
-soldiers, the name of Plato was particularly odious. Many persons
-instigated Dionysius to kill him, and rumors even gained footing
-that he had been killed, as the author of the whole confusion.[158]
-But the despot, having sent away the person whom he most hated
-and feared, was not disposed to do harm to any one else. While
-he calmed the anxieties of Aretê by affirming that the departure
-of her husband was not to be regarded as an exile, but only as a
-temporary separation, to allow time for abating the animosity which
-prevailed—he at the same time ordered two triremes to be fitted out,
-for sending to Dion his slaves and valuable property, and everything
-necessary to personal dignity as well as to his comfort. Towards
-Plato—who was naturally agitated in the extreme, thinking only of
-the readiest means to escape from so dangerous a situation—his
-manifestations were yet more remarkable. He soothed the philosopher’s
-apprehensions—entreated him to remain, in a manner gentle indeed but
-admitting no denial—and conveyed him at once into his own residence
-the acropolis, under color of doing him honor. From hence there
-was no possibility of escaping, and Plato remained there for some
-time. Dionysius treated him well, communicated with him freely and
-intimately, and proclaimed everywhere that they were on the best
-terms of friendship. What is yet more curious—he displayed the
-greatest anxiety to obtain the esteem and approbation of the sage,
-and to occupy a place in his mind higher than that accorded to Dion;
-shrinking nevertheless from philosophy, or the Platonic treatment and
-training, under the impression that there was a purpose to ensnare
-and paralyze him, under the auspices of Dion.[159] This is a strange
-account, given by Plato himself; but it reads like a real picture of
-a vain and weak prince, admiring the philosopher—coquetting with him,
-as it were—and anxious to captivate his approbation, so far as it
-could be done without submitting to the genuine Platonic discipline.
-
-  [158] Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 315 F.; Epist. vii. p. 329 D.; p.
-  340 A. Plutarch, Dion, c. 15.
-
-  [159] Plato, Epist. vii. p. 329, 330.
-
-During this long and irksome detention, which probably made him fully
-sensible of the comparative comforts of Athenian liberty, Plato
-obtained from Dionysius one practical benefit. He prevailed upon
-him to establish friendly and hospitable relations with Archytas
-and the Tarentines, which to these latter was a real increase of
-security and convenience.[160] But in the point which he strove
-most earnestly to accomplish, he failed. Dionysius resisted all
-entreaties for the recall of Dion. Finding himself at length occupied
-with a war (whether the war with Carthage previously mentioned,
-or some other, we do not know), he consented to let Plato depart;
-agreeing to send for him again as soon as peace and leisure should
-return, and promising to recall Dion at the same time; upon which
-covenant, Plato, on his side, agreed to come back. After a certain
-interval, peace arrived, and Dionysius re-invited Plato; yet without
-recalling Dion—whom he required still to wait another year. But
-Plato, appealing to the terms of the covenant, refused to go without
-Dion. To himself personally, in spite of the celebrity which his
-known influence with Dionysius tended to confer, the voyage was
-nothing less than repugnant, for he had had sufficient experience of
-Syracuse and its despotism. Nor would he even listen to the request
-of Dion himself; who, partly in the view of promoting his own future
-restoration, earnestly exhorted him to go. Dionysius besieged Plato
-with solicitations to come,[161] promising that all which he might
-insist upon in favor of Dion should be granted, and putting in motion
-a second time Archytas and the Tarentines to prevail upon him. These
-men, through their companion and friend Archedemus, who came to
-Athens in a Syracusan trireme, assured Plato that Dionysius was now
-ardent in the study of philosophy, and had even made considerable
-progress in it. By their earnest entreaties, coupled with those of
-Dion, Plato was at length induced to go to Syracuse. He was received,
-as before, with signal tokens of honor. He was complimented with the
-privilege, enjoyed by no one else, of approaching the despot without
-having his person searched; and was affectionately welcomed by the
-female relatives of Dion. Yet this visit, prolonged much beyond what
-he himself wished, proved nothing but a second splendid captivity, as
-the companion of Dionysius in the acropolis at Ortygia.[162]
-
-  [160] Plato, Epist. vii. p. 338 C.
-
-  [161] Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 317 B. C.
-
-  [162] Plato, Epist. vii. p. 338-346; Plutarch, Dion, c. 19.
-  Æschines, the companion of Sokrates along with Plato, is said to
-  have passed a long time at Syracuse with Dionysius, until the
-  expulsion of that despot (Diogen. Laert. ii. 63).
-
-Dionysius the philosopher obtained abundance of flatterers—as his
-father Dionysius the poet had obtained before him—and was even
-emboldened to proclaim himself as the son of Apollo.[163] It is
-possible that even an impuissant embrace of philosophy, on the part
-of so great a potentate, may have tended to exalt the reputation of
-philosophers in the contemporary world. Otherwise the dabblings of
-Dionysius would have merited no attention; though he seems to have
-been really a man of some literary talent[164]—retaining to the end
-a sincere admiration of Plato, and jealously pettish because he
-could not prevail upon Plato to admire _him_. But the second visit
-of Plato to him at Syracuse—very different from his first—presented
-no chance of benefit to the people of Syracuse, and only deserves
-notice as it bore upon the destiny of Dion. Here, unfortunately Plato
-could accomplish nothing; though his zeal on behalf of his friend was
-unwearied. Dionysius broke all his promises of kind dealing, became
-more rancorous in his hatred, impatient of the respect which Dion
-enjoyed even as an exile, and fearful of the revenge which he might
-one day be able to exact.
-
-  [163] Plutarch, De Fortunâ Alex. Magn. p. 338 B. Δωρίδος ἐκ
-  μητρὸς Φοίβου κοινώμασι βλαστών.
-
-  [164] See a passage in Plato, Epistol. ii. p. 314 E.
-
-When expelled from Syracuse, Dion had gone to Peloponnesus and
-Athens, where he had continued for some years to receive regular
-remittances of his property. But at length, even while Plato was
-residing at Syracuse, Dionysius thought fit to withhold one half of
-the property, on pretence of reserving it for Dion’s son. Presently
-he took steps yet more violent, threw off all disguise, sold the
-whole of Dion’s property, and appropriated or distributed among his
-friends the large proceeds, not less than one hundred talents.[165]
-Plato, who had the mortification to hear this intelligence while
-in the palace of Dionysius, was full of grief and displeasure. He
-implored permission to depart. But though the mind of Dionysius had
-now been thoroughly set against him by the multiplied insinuations
-of the calumniators,[166] it was not without difficulty and
-tiresome solicitations that he obtained permission; chiefly through
-the vehement remonstrances of Archytas and his companions, who
-represented to the despot that they had brought him to Syracuse, and
-that they were responsible for his safe return. The mercenaries of
-Dionysius were indeed so ill-disposed to Plato, that considerable
-precautions were required to bring him away in safety.[167]
-
-  [165] Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 318 A.; vii. p. 346, 347. Plutarch,
-  Dion, c. 15, 16.
-
-  [166] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 15—on the authority of Aristoxenus.
-
-  [167] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350 A. B.
-
-It was in the spring of 360 B. C. that the philosopher appears to
-have returned to Peloponnesus from this, his second visit to the
-younger Dionysius, and third visit to Syracuse. At the Olympic
-festival of that year, he met Dion, to whom he recounted the recent
-proceedings of Dionysius.[168] Incensed at the seizure of the
-property, and hopeless of any permission to return, Dion was now
-meditating enforcement of his restoration at the point of the sword.
-But there occurred yet another insult on the part of Dionysius,
-which infused a more deadly exasperation into the quarrel. Aretê,
-wife of Dion and half-sister of Dionysius, had continued to reside
-at Syracuse ever since the exile of her husband. She formed a
-link between the two, the continuance of which Dionysius could no
-longer tolerate, in his present hatred towards Dion. Accordingly
-he took upon him to pronounce her divorced, and to remarry her,
-in spite of her own decided repugnance, with one of his friends
-named Timokrates.[169] To this he added another cruel injury, by
-intentionally corrupting and brutalizing Dion’s eldest son, a youth
-just reaching puberty.
-
-  [168] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350 C. The return of Plato and his
-  first meeting with Dion is said to have excited considerable
-  sensation among the spectators at the festival (Diogenes Laert.
-  iii. 25).
-
-  The Olympic festival here alluded to, must be (I conceive) that
-  of 366 B. C.: the same also in Epistol. ii. p. 310 D.
-
-  [169] Plutarch, Dion, c. 21; Cornel. Nepos, Dion, c. 4.
-
-Outraged thus in all the tenderest points, Dion took up with
-passionate resolution the design of avenging himself on Dionysius,
-and of emancipating Syracuse from despotism into liberty. During
-the greater part of his exile he had resided at Athens, in the
-house of his friend Kallippus, enjoying the society of Speusippus
-and other philosophers of the Academy, and the teaching of Plato
-himself when returned from Syracuse. Well supplied with money, and
-strict as to his own personal wants, he was able largely to indulge
-his liberal spirit towards many persons, and among the rest towards
-Plato, whom he assisted towards the expense of a choric exhibition
-at Athens.[170] Dion also visited Sparta and various other cities;
-enjoying a high reputation, and doing himself credit everywhere; a
-fact not unknown to Dionysius, and aggravating his displeasure. Yet
-Dion was long not without hope that that displeasure would mitigate,
-so as to allow of his return to Syracuse on friendly terms. Nor did
-he cherish any purposes of hostility, until the last proceedings
-with respect to his property and his wife at once cut off all hope
-and awakened vindictive sentiments.[171] He began therefore to lay
-a train for attacking Dionysius and enfranchising Syracuse by arms,
-invoking the countenance of Plato; who gave his approbation, yet
-not without mournful reserves; saying that he was now seventy years
-of age—that though he admitted the just wrongs of Dion and the bad
-conduct of Dionysius, armed conflict was nevertheless repugnant to
-his feelings, and he could anticipate little good from it—that he
-had labored long in vain to reconcile the two exasperated kinsmen,
-and could not now labor for any opposite end.[172]
-
-  [170] Plutarch, Dion, c. 17; Athenæus, xi. p. 508. Plato appears
-  also to have received, when at Athens, pecuniary assistance
-  remitted by Dionysius from Syracuse, towards expenses of a
-  similar kind, as well as towards furnishing a dowry for certain
-  poor nieces. Dion and Dionysius had both aided him (Plato,
-  Epistol. xiii. p. 361).
-
-  An author named Onêtor affirmed that Dionysius had given to
-  Plato the prodigious sum of eighty talents; a story obviously
-  exaggerated (Diogenes Laert. iii. 9).
-
-  [171] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350 F.
-
-  [172] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350. This is the account which
-  Plato gives _after_ the death of Dion, when affairs had taken
-  a disastrous turn, about the extent of his own interference in
-  the enterprise. But Dionysius supposed him to have been more
-  decided in his countenance of the expedition; and Plato’s letter
-  addressed to Dion himself, after the victory of the latter at
-  Syracuse, seems to bear out that supposition.
-
-  Compare Epistol. iii. p. 315 E.; iv. p. 320 A.
-
-But though Plato was lukewarm, his friends and pupils at the
-Academy cordially sympathized with Dion. Speusippus especially, the
-intimate friend and relative, having accompanied Plato to Syracuse,
-had communicated much with the population in the city, and gave
-encouraging reports of their readiness to aid Dion, even if he came
-with ever so small a force against Dionysius. Kallippus, with Eudemus
-(the friend of Aristotle), Timonides, and Miltas—all three members
-of the society at the Academy, and the last a prophet also—lent
-him aid and embarked in his enterprise. There were a numerous body
-of exiles from Syracuse, not less than one thousand altogether;
-with most of whom Dion opened communication, inviting their
-fellowship. He at the same time hired mercenary soldiers in small
-bands, keeping his measures as secret as he could.[173] Alkimenes,
-one of the leading Achæans in Peloponnesus, was warm in the cause
-(probably from sympathy with the Achæan colony Kroton, then under
-the dependence of Dionysius), conferring upon it additional dignity
-by his name and presence. A considerable quantity of spare arms, of
-every description, was got together, in order to supply new unarmed
-partisans on reaching Sicily. With all these aids Dion found himself
-in the island of Zakynthus, a little after Midsummer 357 B. C.;
-mustering eight hundred soldiers of tried experience and bravery,
-who had been directed to come thither silently and in small parties,
-without being informed whither they were going. A little squadron was
-prepared, of no more than five merchantmen, two of them vessels of
-thirty oars, with victuals adequate to the direct passage across the
-sea from Zakynthus to Syracuse; since the ordinary passage, across
-from Korkyra and along the Tarentine Gulf was impracticable, in the
-face of the maritime power of Dionysius.[174]
-
-  [173] Plutarch, Dion, c. 22. Eudemus was afterwards slain in one
-  of the combats at Syracuse (Aristotle apud Ciceron. Tusc. Disp.
-  i. 25, 53).
-
-  [174] Plutarch, Dion, c. 23-25.
-
-Such was the contemptible force with which Dion ventured to attack
-the greatest of all Grecian potentates in his own stronghold and
-island. Dionysius had now reigned as despot at Syracuse between ten
-and eleven years. Inferior as he personally was to his father, it
-does not seem that the Syracusan power had yet materially declined
-in his hands. We know little about the political facts of his reign;
-but the veteran Philistus, his chief adviser and officer, appears
-to have kept together the larger part of the great means bequeathed
-by the elder Dionysius. The disparity of force, therefore, between
-the assailant and the party assailed, was altogether extravagant.
-To Dion, personally, indeed, such disparity was a matter of
-indifference. To a man of his enthusiastic temperament, so great was
-the heroism and sublimity of the enterprise,—combining liberation
-of his country from a despot, with revenge for gross outrages to
-himself,—that he was satisfied if he could only land in Sicily with
-no matter how small a force, accounting it honor enough to perish in
-such a cause.[175] Such was the emphatic language of Dion, reported
-to us by Aristotle; who (being then among the pupils of Plato) may
-probably have heard it with his own ears. To impartial contemporary
-spectators, like Demosthenes, the attempt seemed hopeless.[176]
-
-  [175] Aristotel. Politic. v. 8, 17.
-
-  [176] See Orat. adv. Leptinem, s. 179. p. 506: an oration
-  delivered about two years afterwards; not long after the victory
-  of Dion.
-
-  Compare Diodor. xvi. 9; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 2.
-
-But the intelligent men of the Academy who accompanied Dion, would
-not have thrown their lives away in contemplation of a glorious
-martyrdom; nor were either they or he ignorant, that there existed
-circumstances, not striking the eye of the ordinary spectator, which
-materially weakened the great apparent security of Dionysius.
-
-First, there was the pronounced and almost unanimous discontent
-of the people of Syracuse. Though prohibited from all public
-manifestations, they had been greatly agitated by the original
-project of Dion to grant liberty to the city—by the inclinations
-even of Dionysius himself towards the same end, so soon unhappily
-extinguished—by the dissembling language of Dionysius, the great
-position of Dion’s wife and sister, and the second coming of Plato,
-all of which favored the hope that Dion might be amicably recalled.
-At length such chance disappeared, when his property was confiscated
-and his wife re-married to another. But as his energetic character
-was well known, the Syracusans now both confidently expected, and
-ardently wished, that he would return by force, and help them to
-put down one who was alike his enemy and theirs. Speusippus, having
-accompanied Plato to Syracuse and mingled much with the people,
-brought back decisive testimonies of their disaffection towards
-Dionysius, and of their eager longing for relief by the hands of
-Dion. It would be sufficient (they said) if he even came alone;
-they would flock around him, and arm him at once with an adequate
-force.[177]
-
-  [177] Plutarch, Dion, c. 22. Speusippus, from Athens,
-  corresponded both with Dion and with Dionysius at Syracuse; at
-  least there was a correspondence between them, read as genuine by
-  Diogenes Laertius (iv. 1, 2, 5).
-
-There were doubtless many other messages of similar tenor sent to
-Peloponnesus; and one Syracusan exile, Herakleides, was in himself a
-considerable force. Though a friend of Dion,[178] he had continued
-high in the service of Dionysius, until the second visit of Plato. At
-that time he was disgraced, and obliged to save his life by flight,
-on account of a mutiny among the mercenary troops, or rather of the
-veteran soldiers among them, whose pay Dionysius had cut down. The
-men so curtailed rose in arms, demanding continuance of the old
-pay; and when Dionysius shut the gates of the acropolis, refusing
-attention to their requisitions, they raised the furious barbaric
-pæan or war shout, and rushed up to scale the walls.[179] Terrible
-were the voices of these Gauls, Iberians, and Campanians, in the ears
-of Plato, who knew himself to be the object of their hatred, and who
-happened to be then in the garden of the acropolis. But Dionysius,
-no less terrified than Plato, appeased the mutiny, by conceding all
-that was asked, and even more. The blame of this misadventure was
-thrown upon Herakleides, towards whom Dionysius conducted himself
-with mingled injustice and treachery—according to the judgment both
-of Plato and of all around him.[180] As an exile, he brought word
-that Dionysius could not even rely upon the mercenary troops, whom
-he treated with a parsimony the more revolting as they contrasted it
-with the munificence of his father.[181] Herakleides was eager to
-coöperate in putting down the despotism at Syracuse. But he waited
-to equip a squadron of triremes, and was not ready so soon as Dion;
-perhaps intentionally, as the jealousy between the two soon broke
-out.[182]
-
-  [178] Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 318 C.
-
-  [179] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 348 B. Οἱ δ᾽ ἐφέροντο εὐθὺς πρὸς
-  τὰ τείχη, παιῶνά τινα ἀναβοήσαντες βάρβαρον καὶ πολεμικόν· οὗ δὴ
-  περιδεὴς Διονύσιος γενόμενος, etc.
-
-  [180] Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 318; vii. p. 348, 349.
-
-  [181] Plato, Epist. vii. p. 348 A. ... ἐπεχείρησεν
-  ὀλιγομισθοτέρους ποιεῖν ~παρὰ τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἔθη~, etc.
-
-  [182] Plutarch, Dion, c. 32; Diodor. xvi. 6-16.
-
-The second source of weakness to Dionysius lay in his own character
-and habits. The commanding energy of the father, far from being
-of service to the son, had been combined with a jealousy which
-intentionally kept him down, and cramped his growth. He had always
-been weak, petty, destitute of courage or foresight, and unfit for
-a position like that which his father had acquired and maintained.
-His personal incompetency was recognized by all, and would probably
-have manifested itself even more conspicuously, had he not found a
-minister of so much ability, and so much devotion to the dynasty,
-as Philistus. But in addition to such known incompetency, he had
-contracted recently habits which inspired every one around him with
-contempt. He was perpetually intoxicated and plunged in dissipation.
-To put down such a chief, even though surrounded by walls, soldiers,
-and armed ships, appeared to Dion and his confidential companions an
-enterprise noway impracticable.[183]
-
-  [183] Aristotel. Politic. v. 8, 14; Plutarch, Dion, c. 7. These
-  habits must have probably grown upon him since the second
-  departure of Plato, who does not notice them in his letters.
-
-Nevertheless, these causes of weakness were known only to close
-observers; while the great military force of Syracuse was obvious
-to the eyes of every one. When the soldiers, mustered by Dion at
-Zakynthus, were first informed that they were destined to strike
-straight across the sea against Syracuse, they shrank from the
-proposition as an act of insanity. They complained of their leaders
-for not having before told them what was projected; just as the
-Ten Thousand Greeks in the army of Cyrus, on reaching Tarsus,
-complained of Klearchus for having kept back the fact that they were
-marching against the Great King. It required all the eloquence of
-Dion, with his advanced age,[184] his dignified presence, and the
-quantity of gold and silver plate in his possession, to remove their
-apprehensions. How widely these apprehensions were felt, is shown by
-the circumstance, that out of one thousand Syracusan exiles, only
-twenty-five or thirty dared to join him.[185]
-
-  [184] Plutarch, Dion, c. 23. ἀνὴρ παρηκμακὼς ἤδη, etc.
-
-  [185] Plutarch, Dion, c. 22; Diodor. xvi. 10.
-
-After a magnificent sacrifice to Apollo, and an ample banquet to
-the soldiers in the stadium at Zakynthus, Dion gave orders for
-embarkation in the ensuing morning. On that very night the moon was
-eclipsed. We have already seen what disastrous consequences turned
-upon the occurrence of this same phænomenon fifty-six years before,
-when Nikias was about to conduct the defeated Athenian fleet away
-from the harbor of Syracuse.[186] Under the existing apprehensions
-of Dion’s band, the eclipse might well have induced them to renounce
-the enterprise; and so it probably would, under a general like
-Nikias. But Dion had learnt astronomy; and what was of not less
-consequence, Miltas, the prophet of the expedition, besides his gift
-of prophecy, had received instruction in the Academy also. When the
-affrighted soldiers inquired what new resolution was to be adopted
-in consequence of so grave a sign from the gods, Miltas arose and
-assured them that they had mistaken the import of the sign, which
-promised them good fortune and victory. By the eclipse of the moon,
-the gods intimated that something very brilliant was about to be
-darkened over: now there was nothing in Greece so brilliant as the
-despotism of Dionysius at Syracuse; it was Dionysius who was about
-to suffer eclipse, to be brought on by the victory of Dion.[187]
-Reassured by such consoling words the soldiers got on board. They had
-good reason at first to believe that the favor of the gods waited
-upon them, for a gentle and steady Etesian breeze carried them across
-midsea without accident or suffering, in twelve days, from Zakynthus
-to Cape Pachynus, the south-eastern corner of Sicily and nearest to
-Syracuse. The pilot Protus, who had steered the course so as exactly
-to hit the cape, urgently recommended immediate disembarkation,
-without going farther along the south-western coast of the island;
-since stormy weather was commencing, which might hinder the fleet
-from keeping near the shore. But Dion was afraid of landing so near
-to the main force of the enemy. Accordingly, the squadron proceeded
-onward, but were driven by a violent wind away from Sicily towards
-the coast of Africa, narrowly escaping shipwreck. It was not without
-considerable hardship and danger that they got back to Sicily,
-after five days; touching the island at Herakleia Minoa westward
-of Agrigentum, within the Carthaginian supremacy. The Carthaginian
-governor of Minoa, Synalus (perhaps a Greek in the service of
-Carthage), was a personal acquaintance of Dion, and received him
-with all possible kindness; though knowing nothing beforehand of his
-approach, and at first resisting his landing through ignorance.
-
-  [186] Thucyd. vii. 50. See Volume VII. of this History, Chap. lx.
-  p. 314.
-
-  [187] Plutarch, Dion, c. 24.
-
-Thus was Dion, after ten years of exile, once more on Sicilian
-ground. The favorable predictions of Miltas had been completely
-realized. But even that prophet could hardly have been prepared for
-the wonderful tidings now heard, which ensured the success of the
-expedition. Dionysius had recently sailed from Syracuse to Italy,
-with a fleet of eighty triremes.[188] What induced him to commit so
-capital a mistake, we cannot make out; for Philistus was already
-with a fleet in the Gulf of Tarentum, waiting to intercept Dion,
-and supposing that the invading squadron would naturally sail along
-the coast of Italy to Syracuse, according to the practice almost
-universal in that day.[189] Philistus did not commit the same mistake
-as Nikias had made in reference to Gylippus,[190]—that of despising
-Dion because of the smallness of his force. He watched in the usual
-waters, and was only disappointed because Dion, venturing on the bold
-and unusual straight course, was greatly favored by wind and weather.
-But while Philistus watched the coast of Italy, it was natural that
-Dionysius himself should keep guard with his main force at Syracuse.
-The despot was fully aware of the disaffection which reigned in the
-town, and of the hopes excited by Dion’s project; which was generally
-well known, though no one could tell how or at what moment the
-deliverer might be expected. Suspicious now to a greater degree than
-ever, Dionysius had caused a fresh search to be made in the city for
-arms, and had taken away all that he could find.[191] We may be sure
-too that his regiment of habitual spies were more on the alert than
-ever, and that unusual rigor was the order of the day. Yet, at this
-critical juncture, he thought proper to quit Syracuse with a very
-large portion of his force, leaving the command to Timokrates, the
-husband of Dion’s late wife; and at this same critical juncture Dion
-arrived at Minoa.
-
-  [188] Plutarch, Dion, c. 26; Diodor. xvi. 10, 11.
-
-  [189] Plutarch, Dion, c. 25.
-
-  [190] Thucyd. vi. 104.
-
-  [191] Diodor. xvi. 10.
-
-Nothing could exceed the joy of the Dionian soldiers on hearing of
-the departure of Dionysius, which left Syracuse open and easy of
-access. Eager to avail themselves of the favorable instant, they
-called upon their leader to march thither without delay, repudiating
-even that measure of rest which he recommended after the fatigues of
-the voyage. Accordingly, Dion, after a short refreshment provided
-by Synalus—with whom he deposited his spare arms, to be transmitted
-to him when required—set forward on his march towards Syracuse. On
-entering the Agrigentine territory, he was joined by two hundred
-horsemen near Eknomon.[192] Farther on, while passing through Gela
-and Kamarina, many inhabitants of these towns, together with some
-neighboring Sikans and Sikels, swelled his band. Lastly, when he
-approached the Syracusan border, a considerable proportion of the
-rural population came to him also, though without arms; making the
-reinforcements which joined him altogether about five thousand
-men.[193] Having armed these volunteers in the best manner he could,
-Dion continued his progress as far as Akræ, where he made a short
-evening halt. From thence, receiving good news from Syracuse, he
-recommenced his march during the latter half of the night, hastening
-forward to the passage over the river Anapus; which he had the good
-fortune to occupy without any opposition, before daybreak.
-
-  [192] Plutarch, Dion, c. 26, 27; Diodor. xvi. 9.
-
-  [193] Plutarch, (Dion, c. 27) gives the numbers who joined him at
-  about five thousand men, which is very credible. Diodorus gives
-  the number exaggerated, at twenty thousand (xvi. 9).
-
-Dion was now within no more than a mile and a quarter of the walls
-of Syracuse. The rising sun disclosed his army to the view of the
-Syracusan population, who were doubtless impatiently watching for
-him. He was seen offering sacrifice to the river Anapus, and putting
-up a solemn prayer to the god Helios, then just showing himself
-above the horizon. He wore the wreath habitual with those who
-were thus employed; while his soldiers, animated by the confident
-encouragement of the prophets, had taken wreaths also.[194] Elate and
-enthusiastic, they passed the Anapus (seemingly at the bridge which
-formed part of the Helorine way), advanced at a running pace across
-the low plain which divided the southern cliff of Epipolæ from the
-Great Harbor, and approached the gates of the quarter of Syracuse
-called Neapolis—the Temenitid Gates, near the chapel of Apollo
-Temenites.[195] Dion was at their head, in resplendent armor, with a
-body-guard near him composed of one hundred of his Peloponnesians.
-His brother Megaklês was on one side of him, his friend the Athenian
-Kallippus on the other; all three, and a large proportion of the
-soldiers also, still crowned with their sacrificial wreaths, as
-if marching in a joyous festival procession, with victory already
-assured.[196]
-
-  [194] Plutarch, Dion, c. 27. These picturesque details about the
-  march of Dion are the more worthy of notice, as Plutarch had
-  before him the narrative of Timonides, a companion of Dion, and
-  actually engaged in the expedition. Timonides wrote an account
-  of what passed to Speusippus at Athens, doubtless for the
-  information of Plato and their friends in the Academy (Plutarch,
-  Dion, c. 31-35).
-
-  Diogenes Laertius mentions also a person named _Simonides_ who
-  wrote to Speusippus, τὰς ἱστορίας ἐν αἷς κατατετάχει τὰς πράξεις
-  Δίωνός τε καὶ Βίωνος (iv. 1, 5). Probably _Simonides_ may be a
-  misnomer for _Timonides_.
-
-  Arrian, the author of the Anabasis of Alexander, had written
-  narratives of the exploits both of Dion and Timoleon.
-  Unfortunately these have not been preserved; indeed Photius
-  himself seems never to have seen them (Photius, Codex, 92).
-
-  [195] Plutarch, Dion, c. 29. Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ εἰσῆλθεν ὁ Δίων κατὰ τὰς
-  Μενιτίδας πύλας, etc.
-
-  Most of the best critics here concur in thinking, that the
-  reading ought to be τὰς ~Τεμενιτίδας~ πύλας. The statue and
-  sacred ground of Apollo Temenites was the most remarkable feature
-  in this portion of Syracuse, and would naturally be selected to
-  furnish a name for the gates. No meaning can be assigned for the
-  phrase Μενιτίδας.
-
-  [196] Plutarch, Dion, c. 27, 28, 29. Diodorus (xvi. 10)
-  also mentions the striking fact of the wreaths worn by this
-  approaching army.
-
-As yet Dion had not met with the smallest resistance. Timokrates
-(left at Syracuse with the large mercenary force as vicegerent),
-while he sent an express to apprise Dionysius, kept his chief hold
-on the two military positions or horns of the city; the island of
-Ortygia at one extremity, and Epipolæ with Euryalus on the other. It
-has already been mentioned that Epipolæ was a triangle slope, with
-walls bordering both the northern and southern cliffs, and forming an
-angle on the western apex, where stood the strong fort of Euryalus.
-Between Ortygia and Epipolæ lay the populous quarters of Syracuse,
-wherein the great body of citizens resided. As the disaffection of
-the Syracusans was well known, Timokrates thought it unsafe to go out
-of the city, and meet Dion on the road, for fear of revolt within.
-But he perhaps might have occupied the important bridge over the
-Anapus, had not a report reached him that Dion was directing his
-attack first against Leontini. Many of the Campanian mercenaries
-under the command of Timokrates, having properties in Leontini,
-immediately quitted Epipolæ to go thither and defend them.[197] This
-rumor—false, and perhaps intentionally spread by the invaders—not
-only carried off much of the garrison elsewhere, but also misled
-Timokrates; insomuch that Dion was allowed to make his night march,
-to reach the Anapus, and to find it unoccupied.
-
-  [197] Plutarch, Dion, c. 27.
-
-It was too late for Timokrates to resist, when the rising sun had
-once exhibited the army of Dion crossing the Anapus. The effect
-produced upon the Syracusans in the populous quarters was electric.
-They rose like one man to welcome their deliverer, and to put down
-the dynasty which had hung about their necks for forty-eight years.
-Such of the mercenaries of Dionysius as were in these central
-portions of the city were forced to seek shelter in Epipolæ, while
-his police and spies were pursued and seized, to undergo the full
-terrors of a popular vengeance.[198] Far from being able to go
-forth against Dion, Timokrates could not even curb the internal
-insurrection. So thoroughly was he intimidated by the reports of his
-terrified police, and by the violent and unanimous burst of wrath
-among a people whom every Dionysian partisan had long been accustomed
-to treat as disarmed slaves—that he did not think himself safe even
-in Epipolæ. But he could not find means of getting to Ortygia, since
-the intermediate city was in the hands of his enemies, while Dion
-and his troops were crossing the low plain between Epipolæ and the
-Great Harbor. It only remained for him therefore to evacuate Syracuse
-altogether, and to escape from Epipolæ either by the northern or
-the western side. To justify his hasty flight, he spread the most
-terrific reports respecting the army of Dion, and thus contributed
-still farther to paralyze the discouraged partisans of Dionysius.[199]
-
-  [198] Plutarch, De Curiositate, p. 523 A.
-
-  [199] Plutarch, Dion. c. 28; Diodor. xvi. 10.
-
-Already had Dion reached the Temenitid gate, where the principal
-citizens, clothed in their best attire, and the multitude pouring
-forth loud and joyous acclamations, were assembled to meet him.
-Halting at the gate, he caused his trumpet to sound, and entreated
-silence; after which he formally proclaimed, that he and his brother
-Megakles were come for the purpose of putting down the Dionysian
-despotism, and of giving liberty both to the Syracusans and the other
-Sicilian Greeks. The acclamations redoubled as he and his soldiers
-entered the city, first through Neapolis, next by the ascent up to
-Achradina; the main street of which (broad, continuous, and straight,
-as was rare in a Grecian city[200]) was decorated as on a day of
-jubilee, with victims under sacrifice to the gods, tables, and bowls
-of wine ready prepared for festival. As Dion advanced at the head of
-his soldiers through a lane formed in the midst of this crowd, from
-each side wreaths were cast upon him as upon an Olympic victor, and
-grateful prayers addressed to him, as it were to a god.[201] Every
-house was a scene of clamorous joy, in which men and women, freemen
-and slaves, took part alike; the outburst of feelings long compressed
-and relieved from the past despotism with its inquisitorial police
-and garrison.
-
-  [200] Cicero in Verr. iv. 53. “Altera autem est urbs Syracusis,
-  cui nomen Acradina est: in quâ forum maximum, pulcherrimæ
-  porticus, ornatissimum prytaneum, amplissima est curia,
-  templumque egregium Jovis Olympii; cæteræque urbis partes, _unâ
-  totâ viâ perpetuâ_, multisque transversis, divisæ, privatis
-  ædificiis continentur.”
-
-  [201] Plutarch, Dion, c. 29: Diodor. xvi. 11. Compare the
-  manifestations of the inhabitants of Skionê towards Brasidas
-  (Thucyd. iv. 121).
-
-It was not yet time for Dion to yield to these pleasing but passive
-impulses. Having infused courage into his soldiers as well as into
-the citizens by his triumphant procession through Achradina, he
-descended to the level ground in front of Ortygia. That strong hold
-was still occupied by the Dionysian garrison, whom he thus challenged
-to come forth and fight. But the flight of Timokrates had left them
-without orders, while the imposing demonstration and unanimous rising
-of the people in Achradina—which they must partly have witnessed
-from their walls, and partly learnt through fugitive spies and
-partisans—struck them with discouragement and terror; so that they
-were in no disposition to quit the shelter of their fortifications.
-Their backwardness was hailed as a confession of inferiority by
-the insurgent citizens, whom Dion now addressed as an assembly of
-freemen. Hard by, in front of the acropolis with its Pentapyla or
-five gates, there stood a lofty and magnificent sun-dial, erected
-by the elder Dionysius. Mounting on the top of this edifice, with
-the muniments of the despot on the one side and the now liberated
-Achradina on the other, Dion addressed[202] an animated harangue
-to the Syracusans around, exhorting them to strenuous efforts in
-defence of their newly acquired rights and liberties, and inviting
-them to elect generals for the command, in order to accomplish the
-total expulsion of the Dionysian garrison. The Syracusans, with
-unanimous acclamations, named Dion and his brother Megakles generals
-with full powers. But both the brothers insisted that colleagues
-should be elected along with them. Accordingly twenty other persons
-were chosen besides, ten of them being from that small band of
-Syracusan exiles who had joined at Zakynthus.
-
-  [202] Plutarch, Dion, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 10, 11. The description
-  which Plutarch gives of the position of this sun-dial is
-  distinct, and the harangue which Dion delivered, while standing
-  upon it, is an impressive fact:—Ἦν δ᾽ ~ὑπὸ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν~ καὶ τὰ
-  πεντάπυλα, Διονυσίου κατασκευάσαντος, ἡλιοτρόπιον καταφανὲς καὶ
-  ὑψηλόν. Ἐπὶ τούτῳ προσβὰς ἐδημηγόρησε, καὶ παρώρμησε τοὺς πολίτας
-  ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας.
-
-  The sun-dial was thus _under_ the acropolis, that is, in the low
-  ground immediately adjoining to Ortygia; near the place where the
-  elder Dionysius is stated to have placed his large porticos and
-  market-house (Diodor. xiv. 7), and where the younger Dionysius
-  erected the funeral monument to his father (xv. 74). In order to
-  arrive at the sun-dial, Dion must have descended from the height
-  of Achradina. Now Plutarch mentions that Dion _went up_ through
-  Achradina (ἀνῄει διὰ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς). It is plain that he must
-  have come down again from Achradina, though Plutarch does not
-  specially mention it. And if he brought his men close under the
-  walls of the enemy’s garrison, this can hardly have been for any
-  other reason than that which I have assigned in the text.
-
-  Plutarch indicates the separate localities with tolerable
-  clearness, but he does not give a perspicuous description of
-  the whole march. Thus, he says that Dion, “wishing to harangue
-  the people himself, _went up_ through Achradina,” (Βουλόμενος
-  δὲ καὶ δι᾽ ἑαυτοῦ προσαγορεῦσαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἀνῄει διὰ τῆς
-  Ἀχραδινῆς), while the place from which Dion did harangue the
-  people, was _down under_ the acropolis of Ortygia.
-
-  Diodorus is still less clear about the localities, nor does
-  he say anything about the sun-dial or the exact spot from
-  whence Dion spoke, though he mentions the march of Dion through
-  Achradina.
-
-  It seems probable that what Plutarch calls τὰ πεντάπυλα are
-  the same as what Diodorus (xv. 74) indicates in the words ταῖς
-  βασιλικαῖς καλουμέναις πύλαις.
-
-Such was the entry of Dion into Syracuse, on the third day[203]
-after his landing in Sicily; and such the first public act of
-renewed Syracusan freedom; the first after that fatal vote which,
-forty-eight years before, had elected the elder Dionysius general
-plenipotentiary, and placed in his hands the sword of state, without
-foresight of the consequences. In the hands of Dion, that sword
-was vigorously employed against the common enemy. He immediately
-attacked Epipolæ; and such was the consternation of the garrison
-left in it by the fugitive Timokrates, that they allowed him to
-acquire possession of it, together with the strong fort of Euryalus,
-which a little courage and devotion might long have defended. This
-acquisition, made suddenly in the tide of success on one side and
-discouragement on the other, was of supreme importance, and went far
-to determine the ultimate contest. It not only reduced the partisans
-of Dionysius within the limits of Ortygia, but also enabled Dion to
-set free many state prisoners,[204] who became ardent partisans of
-the revolution. Following up his success, he lost no time in taking
-measures against Ortygia. To shut it up completely on the land-side,
-he commenced the erection of a wall of blockade, reaching from the
-Great Harbor at one extremity, to the sea on the eastern side of the
-Portus Lakkius, at the other.[205] He at the same time provided arms
-as well as he could for the citizens, sending for those spare arms
-which he had deposited with Synalus at Minoa. It does not appear that
-the garrison of Ortygia made any sally to impede him; so that in the
-course of seven days, he had not only received his arms from Synalus,
-but had completed, in a rough way, all or most of the blockading
-cross-wall.[206]
-
-  [203] Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 5.
-
-  [204] Plutarch, Dion, c. 29.
-
-  [205] Plutarch, Dion, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 12. Plutarch says,
-  τὴν δὲ ἀκρόπολιν ἀπετείχισε—Diodorus is more specific—Τῶν δὲ
-  Συρακοσίων κατεσκευακότων ἐκ θαλάσσης εἰς θάλασσαν διατειχίσματα,
-  etc. These are valuable words as indicating the line and the two
-  terminations of Dion’s blockading cross-wall.
-
-  [206] Plutarch, Dion, c. 29.
-
-At the end of these seven days, but not before (having been prevented
-by accident from receiving the express sent to him), Dionysius
-returned with his fleet to Ortygia.[207] Fatally indeed was his
-position changed. The islet was the only portion of the city which he
-possessed, and that too was shut up on the land-side by a blockading
-wall nearly completed. All the rest of the city was occupied by
-bitter enemies instead of by subjects. Leontini also, and probably
-many of his other dependencies out of Syracuse, had taken the
-opportunity of revolting.[208] Even with the large fleet which he
-had brought home, Dionysius did not think himself strong enough to
-face his enemies in the field, but resorted to stratagem. He first
-tried to open a private intrigue with Dion; who, however, refused to
-receive any separate propositions, and desired him to address them
-publicly to the freemen, citizens of Syracuse. Accordingly, he sent
-envoys tendering to the Syracusans what in the present day would
-be called a constitution. He demanded only moderate taxation, and
-moderate fulfilments of military service, subject to their own vote
-of consent. But the Syracusans laughed the offer to scorn, and Dion
-returned in their name the peremptory reply,—that no proposition from
-Dionysius could be received, short of total abdication; adding in
-his own name, that he would himself, on the score of kindred, procure
-for Dionysius, if he did abdicate, both security and other reasonable
-concessions. These terms Dionysius affected to approve, desiring
-that envoys might be sent to him in Ortygia to settle the details.
-Both Dion and the Syracusans eagerly caught at his offer, without
-for a moment questioning his sincerity. Some of the most eminent
-Syracusans, approved by Dion, were despatched as envoys to Dionysius.
-A general confidence prevailed, that the retirement of the despot was
-now assured; and the soldiers and citizens employed against him, full
-of joy and mutual congratulations, became negligent of their guard
-on the cross-wall of blockade; many of them even retiring to their
-houses in the city.
-
-  [207] This return of Dionysius, seven days after the coming of
-  Dion, is specified both by Plutarch and Diodorus (Plutarch, Dion,
-  c. 26-29; Diodor. xvi. 11).
-
-  [208] Diodor. xvi. 16.
-
-This was what Dionysius expected. Contriving to prolong the
-discussion, so as to detain the envoys in Ortygia all night, he
-ordered at daybreak a sudden sally of all his soldiers, whom he had
-previously stimulated both by wine and by immense promises in case
-of victory.[209] The sally was well-timed and at first completely
-successful. One half of Dion’s soldiers were encamped to guard the
-cross-wall (the other half being quartered in Achradina), together
-with a force of Syracusan citizens. But so little were they prepared
-for hostilities, that the assailants, rushing out with shouts and
-at a run, carried the wall at the first onset, slew the sentinels,
-and proceeded to demolish the wall (which was probably a rough and
-hasty structure) as well as to charge the troops on the outside of
-it. The Syracusans, surprised and terrified, fled with little or no
-resistance. Their flight partially disordered the stouter Dionian
-soldiers, who resisted bravely, but without having had time to form
-their regular array. Never was Dion more illustrious, both as an
-officer and as a soldier. He exerted himself to the utmost to form
-the troops, and to marshal them in ranks essential to the effective
-fighting of the Grecian hoplite. But his orders were unheard in the
-clamor, or disregarded in the confusion: his troops lost courage,
-the assailants gained ground, and the day seemed evidently going
-against him. Seeing that there was no other resource, he put himself
-at the head of his best and most attached soldiers, and threw
-himself, though now an elderly man, into the thickest of the fray.
-The struggle was the more violent, as it took place in a narrow
-space between the new blockading wall on one side, and the outer
-wall of Neapolis on the other. Both the armor and the person of
-Dion being conspicuous, he was known to enemies as well as friends,
-and the battle around him was among the most obstinate in Grecian
-history.[210] Darts rattled against both his shield and his helmet,
-while his shield was also pierced through by several spears which
-were kept from his body only by the breastplate. At length he was
-wounded through the right arm or hand, thrown on the ground, and in
-imminent danger of being made prisoner. But this forwardness on his
-part so stimulated the courage of his own troops, that they both
-rescued him, and made redoubled efforts against the enemy. Having
-named Timonides commander in his place, Dion with his disabled hand
-mounted on horseback, rode into Achradina, and led forth to the
-battle that portion of his troops which were there in garrison. These
-men, fresh and good soldiers, restored the battle. The Syracusans
-came back to the field, all joined in strenuous conflict, and the
-Dionysian assailants were at length again driven within the walls of
-Ortygia. The loss on both sides was severe; that of Dionysius eight
-hundred men; all of whom he caused to be picked up from the field
-(under a truce granted on his request by Dion), and buried with
-magnificent obsequies, as a means of popularizing himself with the
-survivors.[211]
-
-  [209] Plutarch, Dion, c. 30. ἐμπλήσας ἀκράτου. It is rare that we
-  read of this proceeding with soldiers in antiquity. Diodor. xvi.
-  11, 12. τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν.
-
-  [210] Diodor. xvi. 12. Ὁ δὲ Δίων ἀνελπίστως παρεσπονδημένος, μετὰ
-  τῶν ἀρίστων στρατιωτῶν ἀπήντα τοῖς πολεμίοις· καὶ συνάψας μάχην,
-  πολὺν ἐποίει φόνον ἐν σταδίῳ. Ὀλίγῳ δὴ διαστήματι, τῆς διατειχίου
-  ἔσω, μάχης οὔσης, συνέδραμε πλῆθος στρατιωτῶν εἰς στένον τόπον.
-
-  The text here is not quite clear (see Wesseling’s note); but
-  we gather from the passage information about the topography of
-  Syracuse.
-
-  [211] Plutarch, Dion, c. 30; Diodor. xvi. 12, 13.
-
-When we consider how doubtful the issue of this battle had proved,
-it seems evident that had Timokrates maintained himself in Epipolæ,
-so as to enable Dionysius to remain master of Epipolæ as well as of
-Ortygia, the success of Dion’s whole enterprise in Syracuse would
-have been seriously endangered.
-
-Great was the joy excited at Syracuse by the victory. The Syracusan
-people testified their gratitude to the Dionian soldiers by voting a
-golden wreath to the value of one hundred minæ; while these soldiers,
-charmed with the prowess of their general, voted a golden wreath
-to him. Dion immediately began the re-establishment of the damaged
-cross-wall, which he repaired, completed, and put under effective
-guard for the future.[212] Dionysius no longer tried to impede it by
-armed attack. But as he was still superior at sea, he transported
-parties across the harbor to ravage the country for provisions, and
-despatched vessels to bring in stores also by sea. His superiority
-at sea was presently lessened by the arrival of Herakleides from
-Peloponnesus,[213] with twenty triremes, three smaller vessels, and
-fifteen hundred soldiers. The Syracusans, now beginning to show
-themselves actively on shipboard, got together a tolerable naval
-force. All the docks and wharfs lay concentrated in and around
-Ortygia, within the grasp of Dionysius, who was master of the naval
-force belonging to the city. But it would seem that the crews of
-some of the ships (who were mostly native Syracusans,[214] with an
-intermixture of Athenians, doubtless of democratical sentiments) must
-have deserted from the despot to the people, carrying over their
-ships, since we presently find the Syracusans with a fleet of sixty
-triremes,[215] which they could hardly have acquired otherwise.
-
-  [212] Diodor. xvi. 13.
-
-  [213] Diodor. xvi. 16. Plutarch states that Herakleides brought
-  only seven triremes. But the force stated by Diodorus (given in
-  my text) appears more probable. It is difficult otherwise to
-  explain the number of ships which the Syracusans presently appear
-  as possessing. Moreover the great importance, which Herakleides
-  steps into, as opposed to Dion, is more easily accounted for.
-
-  [214] Plutarch, Dion, c. 35. About the Athenian seamen in
-  Ortygia, see a remarkable passage of Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350
-  A. When Plato was at Syracuse, in danger from the mercenaries,
-  the Athenian seamen, there employed, gave warning to him as their
-  countryman.
-
-  [215] Diodor. xvi. 16.
-
-Dionysius was shortly afterwards reinforced by Philistus, who brought
-to Ortygia, not only his fleet from the Tarentine Gulf, but also
-a considerable regiment of cavalry. With these latter, and some
-other troops besides, Philistus undertook an expedition against
-the revolted Leontini. But though he made his way into the town
-by night, he was presently expelled by the defenders, seconded by
-reinforcements from Syracuse.[216]
-
-  [216] Diodor. xvi. 16.
-
-To keep Ortygia provisioned, however, it was yet more indispensable
-for Philistus to maintain his superiority at sea against the growing
-naval power of the Syracusans, now commanded by Herakleides.[217]
-After several partial engagements, a final battle, desperate and
-decisive, at length took place between the two admirals. Both fleets
-were sixty triremes strong. At first Philistus, brave and forward,
-appeared likely to be victorious. But presently the fortune of
-the day turned against him. His ship was run ashore, and himself
-with most part of his fleet, overpowered by the enemy. To escape
-captivity, he stabbed himself. The wound however was not mortal;
-so that he fell alive, being now about seventy-eight years of age,
-into the hands of his enemies,—who stripped him naked, insulted him
-brutally, and at length cut off his head, after which they dragged
-his body by the leg through the streets of Syracuse.[218] Revolting
-as this treatment is, we must recollect that it was less horrible
-than that which the elder Dionysius had inflicted on the Rhegine
-general Phyton.
-
-  [217] See a Fragment of the fortieth Book of the Philippica of
-  Theopompus (Theopomp. Fragm. 212, ed. Didot), which seems to
-  refer to this point of time.
-
-  [218] Diodor. xvi. 16; Plutarch, Dion, c. 35.
-
-The last hopes of the Dionysian dynasty perished with Philistus, the
-ablest and most faithful of its servants. He had been an actor in its
-first day of usurpation—its eighteenth Brumaire: his timely, though
-miserable death, saved him from sharing in its last day of exile—its
-St. Helena.
-
-Even after the previous victory of Dion, Dionysius had lost all
-chance of overcoming the Syracusans by force. But he had now farther
-lost, through the victory of Herakleides, his superiority at sea,
-and therefore his power even of maintaining himself permanently in
-Ortygia. The triumph of Dion seemed assured, and his enemy humbled in
-the dust. But though thus disarmed, Dionysius was still formidable by
-his means of raising intrigue and dissension in Syracuse. His ancient
-antipathy against Dion became more vehement than ever. Obliged to
-forego empire himself—yet resolved at any rate that Dion should be
-ruined along with him—he set on foot a tissue of base manœuvres
-availing himself of the fears and jealousies of the Syracusans,
-the rivalry of Herakleides, the defects of Dion, and what was more
-important than all—the relationship of Dion to the Dionysian dynasty.
-
-Dion had displayed devoted courage, and merited the signal gratitude
-of the Syracusans. But he had been nursed in the despotism, of which
-his father had been one of the chief founders; he was attached by
-every tie of relationship to Dionysius, with whom his sister, his
-former wife, and his children, were still dwelling in the acropolis.
-The circumstances therefore were such as to suggest to the Syracusans
-apprehensions, noway unreasonable, that some private bargain might
-be made by Dion with the acropolis, and that the eminent services
-which he had just rendered might only be made the stepping-stone
-to a fresh despotism in his person. Such suspicions received much
-countenance from the infirmities of Dion, who combined, with a
-masculine and magnanimous character, manners so haughty as to be
-painfully felt even by his own companions. The friendly letters from
-Syracuse, written to Plato or to others at Athens (possibly those
-from Timonides to Speusippus) shortly after the victory, contained
-much complaint of the repulsive demeanor of Dion; which defect the
-philosopher exhorted his friend to amend.[219] All those, whom Dion’s
-arrogance offended, were confirmed in their suspicion of his despotic
-designs, and induced to turn for protection to his rival Herakleides.
-This latter—formerly general in the service of Dionysius, from whose
-displeasure he had only saved his life by flight—had been unable or
-unwilling to coöperate with Dion in his expedition from Zakynthus,
-but had since brought to the aid of the Syracusans a considerable
-force, including several armed ships. Though not present at the
-first entry into Syracuse, nor arriving until Ortygia had already
-been placed under blockade, Herakleides was esteemed the equal of
-Dion in abilities and in military efficiency; while with regard to
-ulterior designs, he had the prodigious advantage of being free from
-connection with the despotism and of raising no mistrust. Moreover
-his manners were not only popular, but according to Plutarch,[220]
-more than popular—smooth, insidious, and dexterous in criminatory
-speech, for the ruin of rivals and for his own exaltation.
-
-  [219] Plato, Epist. iv. p. 321 B. ... ἐνθυμοῦ δὲ καὶ ὅτι δοκεῖς
-  τισὶν ἐνδεεστέρως τοῦ προσήκοντος θεραπευτικὸς εἶναι· μὴ οὖν
-  λανθανέτω σε ὅτι διὰ τοῦ ἀρέσκειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὸ πράττειν
-  ἐστίν, ἡ δ᾽ αὐθάδεια ἐρημίᾳ ξύνοικος.
-
-  [220] Plutarch, Dion, c. 32.
-
-As the contest presently came to be carried on rather at sea than
-on land, the equipment of a fleet became indispensable; so that
-Herakleides, who had brought the greatest number of triremes,
-naturally rose in importance. Shortly after his arrival, the
-Syracusan assembly passed a vote to appoint him admiral. But Dion,
-who seems only to have heard of this vote after it had passed,
-protested against it as derogating from the full powers which
-the Syracusans had by their former vote conferred upon himself.
-Accordingly the people, though with reluctance, cancelled their vote,
-and deposed Herakleides. Having then gently rebuked Herakleides
-for raising discord at a season when the common enemy was still
-dangerous, Dion convened another assembly; wherein he proposed,
-from himself, the appointment of Herakleides as admiral, with a
-guard equal to his own.[221] The right of nomination thus assumed
-displeased the Syracusans, humiliated Herakleides, and exasperated
-his partisans as well as the fleet which he commanded. It gave him
-power—together with provocation to employ that power for the ruin
-of Dion; who thus laid himself doubly open to genuine mistrust from
-some, and to intentional calumny from others.
-
-  [221] Plutarch, Dion, c. 33. It would seem that this Herakleides
-  is the person alluded to in the fragment from the fortieth Book
-  of the Philippica of Theopompus (Theop. Fr. 212, ed. Didot):—
-
-  Προστάται δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἦσαν τῶν μὲν Συρακουσίων Ἄθηνις καὶ
-  Ἡρακλείδης, τῶν δὲ μισθοφόρων Ἀρχέλαος ὁ Δυμαῖος.
-
-  Probably also, Athênis is the same person named as _Athanis_ or
-  _Athanas_ by Diodorus and Plutarch, (Diodor. xv. 94; Plutarch,
-  Timoleon, c. 23-37). He wrote a history of Syracusan affairs
-  during the period of Dion and Timoleon, beginning from 362 B. C.,
-  and continuing the history of Philistus. See Historicorum Græc.
-  Fragm. ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 81.
-
-It is necessary to understand this situation, in order to appreciate
-the means afforded to Dionysius for personal intrigue directed
-against Dion. Though the vast majority of Syracusans were hostile
-to Dionysius, yet there were among them many individuals connected
-with those serving under him in Ortygia, and capable of being put
-in motion to promote his views. Shortly after the complete defeat
-of his sally, he renewed his solicitations for peace; to which Dion
-returned the peremptory answer, that no peace could be concluded
-until Dionysius abdicated and retired. Next, Dionysius sent out
-heralds from Ortygia with letters addressed to Dion from his female
-relatives. All these letters were full of complaints of the misery
-endured by these poor women; together with prayers that he would
-relax in his hostility. To avert suspicion, Dion caused the letters
-to be opened and read publicly before the Syracusan assembly; but
-their tenor was such, that suspicion, whether expressed or not,
-unavoidably arose, as to the effect on Dion’s sympathies. One letter
-there was, bearing on its superscription the words “Hipparinus (the
-son of Dion) to his father.” At first many persons present refused
-to take cognizance of a communication so strictly private; but Dion
-insisted, and the letter was publicly read. It proved to come, not
-from the youthful Hipparinus, but from Dionysius himself, and was
-insidiously worded for the purpose of discrediting Dion in the minds
-of the Syracusans. It began by reminding him of the long service
-which he had rendered to the despotism. It implored him not to bury
-that great power, as well as his own relatives, in one common ruin,
-for the sake of a people who would turn round and sting him, so soon
-as he had given them freedom. It offered, on the part of Dionysius
-himself, immediate retirement, provided Dion would consent to take
-his place. But it threatened, if Dion refused, the sharpest tortures
-against his female relatives and his son.[222]
-
-  [222] Plutarch, Dion, c. 31.
-
-This letter, well-turned as a composition for its own purpose, was
-met by indignant refusal and protestation on the part of Dion.
-Without doubt his refusal would be received with cheers by the
-assembly; but the letter did not the less instil its intended poison
-into their minds. Plutarch displays[223] (in my judgment) no great
-knowledge of human nature, when he complains of the Syracusans for
-suffering the letter to impress them with suspicions of Dion, instead
-of admiring his magnanimous resistance to such touching appeals. It
-was precisely the magnanimity required for the situation, which
-made them mistrustful. Who could assure them that such a feeling,
-to the requisite pitch, was to be found in the bosom of Dion? or
-who could foretel which, among painfully conflicting sentiments,
-would determine his conduct? The position of Dion forbade the
-possibility of his obtaining full confidence. Moreover his enemies,
-not content with inflaming the real causes of mistrust, fabricated
-gross falsehoods against him as well as against the mercenaries
-under his command. A Syracusan named Sôsis, brother to one of the
-guards of Dionysius, made a violent speech in the Syracusan assembly,
-warning his countrymen to beware of Dion, lest they should find
-themselves saddled with a strict and sober despot in place of one
-who was always intoxicated. On the next day Sôsis appeared in the
-Assembly with a wound on the head, which he said that some of the
-soldiers of Dion had inflicted upon him in revenge for his speech.
-Many persons present, believing the story, warmly espoused his cause;
-while Dion had great difficulty in repelling the allegation, and
-in obtaining time for the investigation of its truth. On inquiry,
-it was discovered that the wound was a superficial cut inflicted
-by Sôsis himself with a razor, and that the whole tale was an
-infamous calumny which he had been bribed to propagate.[224] In
-this particular instance, it was found practicable to convict the
-delinquent of shameless falsehood. But there were numerous other
-attacks and perversions less tangible, generated by the same hostile
-interests and tending towards the same end. Every day the suspicion
-and unfriendly sentiment of the Syracusans, towards Dion and his
-soldiers, became more imbittered.
-
-  [223] Plutarch, Dion, c. 32.
-
-  [224] Plutarch, Dion, c. 34.
-
-The naval victory gained by Herakleides and the Syracusan fleet over
-Philistus, exalting both the spirit of the Syracusans and the glory
-of the admiral, still further lowered the influence of Dion. The
-belief gained ground that even without him and his soldiers, the
-Syracusans could defend themselves, and gain possession of Ortygia.
-It was now that the defeated Dionysius sent from thence a fresh
-embassy to Dion, offering to surrender to him the place with its
-garrison, magazine of arms, and treasure equivalent to five months’
-full pay—on condition of being allowed to retire to Italy, and enjoy
-the revenues of a large and productive portion (called Gyarta) of
-the Syracusan territory. Dion again refused to reply, desiring him
-to address the Syracusan public yet advising them to accept the
-terms.[225] Under the existing mistrust towards Dion, this advice
-was interpreted as concealing an intended collusion between him and
-Dionysius. Herakleides promised, that if the war were prosecuted, he
-would keep Ortygia blocked up until it was surrendered at discretion
-with all in it as prisoners. But in spite of his promise, Dionysius
-contrived to elude his vigilance and sail off to Lokri in Italy, with
-many companions and much property, leaving Ortygia in command of his
-eldest son Apollokrates.
-
-  [225] Plutarch, Dion, c. 37; Diodor. xvi. 17.
-
-Though the blockade was immediately resumed and rendered stricter
-than before, yet this escape of the despot brought considerable
-discredit on Herakleides. Probably the Dionian partisans were not
-sparing in their reproach. To create for himself fresh popularity,
-Herakleides warmly espoused the proposition of a citizen named
-Hippo, for a fresh division of landed property; a proposition,
-which, considering the sweeping alteration of landed property
-made by the Dionysian dynasty, we may well conceive to have been
-recommended upon specious grounds of retributive justice, as well
-as upon the necessity of providing for poor citizens. Dion opposed
-the motion strenuously, but was outvoted. Other suggestions also,
-yet more repugnant to him, and even pointed directly against him,
-were adopted. Lastly, Herakleides, enlarging upon his insupportable
-arrogance, prevailed upon the people to decree that new generals
-should be appointed, and that the pay due to the Dionian soldiers,
-now forming a large arrear, should not be liquidated out of the
-public purse.[226]
-
-  [226] Plutarch, Dion, c. 37; Diodor. xvi. 17.
-
-It was towards midsummer that Dion was thus divested of his command,
-about nine months after his arrival at Syracuse.[227] Twenty-five new
-generals were named, of whom Herakleides was one.
-
-  [227] Plutarch, Dion, c. 38. θέρους μεσοῦντος, etc.
-
-The measure, scandalously ungrateful and unjust, whereby the soldiers
-were deprived of the pay due to them, was dictated by pure antipathy
-against Dion: for it does not seem to have been applied to those
-soldiers who had come with Herakleides; moreover the new generals
-sent private messages to the Dionian soldiers, inviting them to
-desert their leader and join the Syracusans, in which case the grant
-of citizenship was promised to them.[228] Had the soldiers complied,
-it is obvious, that either the pay due, or some equivalent, must
-have been assigned to satisfy them. But one and all of them scorned
-the invitation, adhering to Dion with unshaken fidelity. The purpose
-of Herakleides was, to expel him alone. This however was prevented
-by the temper of the soldiers; who, indignant at the treacherous
-ingratitude of the Syracusans, instigated Dion to take a legitimate
-revenge upon them, and demanded only to be led to the assault.
-Refusing to employ force, Dion calmed their excitement, and put
-himself at their head to conduct them out of the city; not without
-remonstrances addressed to the generals and the people of Syracuse
-upon their proceedings, imprudent as well as wicked, while the enemy
-were still masters of Ortygia. Nevertheless, the new generals, chosen
-as the most violent enemies of Dion, not only turned a deaf ear to
-his appeal, but inflamed the antipathies of the people, and spurred
-them on to attack the soldiers on their march out of Syracuse. Their
-attack, though repeated more than once, was vigorously repulsed by
-the soldiers—excellent troops, three thousand in number; while Dion,
-anxious to ensure their safety, and to avoid bloodshed on both sides,
-confined himself strictly to the defensive. He forbade all pursuit,
-giving up the prisoners without ransom as well as the bodies of the
-slain for burial.[229]
-
-  [228] Plutarch, Dion, c. 38.
-
-  [229] Plutarch, Dion, c. 39; Diodor. xvi. 17.
-
-In this guise Dion arrived at Leontini, where he found the warmest
-sympathy towards himself, with indignant disgust at the behavior
-of the Syracusans. Allied with the newly-enfranchised Syracuse
-against the Dionysian dynasty, the Leontines not only received the
-soldiers of Dion into their citizenship, and voted to them a positive
-remuneration, but sent an embassy to Syracuse insisting that justice
-should be done to them. The Syracusans, on their side, sent envoys to
-Leontini, to accuse Dion before an assembly of all the allies there
-convoked. Who these allies were, our defective information does not
-enable us to say. Their sentence went in favor of Dion and against
-the Syracusans; who nevertheless stood out obstinately, refusing all
-justice or reparation,[230] and fancying themselves competent to
-reduce Ortygia without Dion’s assistance—since the provisions therein
-were exhausted, and the garrison was already suffering from famine.
-Despairing of reinforcement, Apollokrates had already resolved to
-send envoys and propose a capitulation, when Nypsius, a Neapolitan
-officer, despatched by Dionysius from Lokri, had the good fortune to
-reach Ortygia at the head of a reinforcing fleet, convoying numerous
-transports with an abundant stock of provisions. There was now no
-farther talk of surrender. The garrison of Ortygia was reinforced
-to ten thousand mercenary troops of considerable merit, and well
-provisioned for some time.[231]
-
-  [230] Plutarch, Dion, c. 40.
-
-  [231] Plutarch, Dion, c. 41; Diodor. xvi. 18, 19.
-
-The Syracusan admirals, either from carelessness or ill-fortune,
-had not been able to prevent the entry of Nypsius. But they made
-a sudden attack upon him while his fleet were in the harbor, and
-while the crews, thinking themselves safe from an enemy, were
-interchanging salutations or aiding to disembark the stores. This
-attack was well-timed and successful. Several of the triremes of
-Nypsius were ruined—others were towed off as prizes, while the
-victory, gained by Herakleides without Dion, provoked extravagant
-joy throughout Syracuse. In the belief that Ortygia could not longer
-hold out, the citizens, the soldiers, and even the generals, gave
-loose to mad revelry and intoxication, continued into the ensuing
-night. Nypsius, an able officer, watched his opportunity, and made
-a vigorous night-sally. His troops, issuing forth in good order,
-planted their scaling-ladders, mounted the blockading wall, and slew
-the sleeping or drunken sentinels without any resistance. Master of
-this important work, Nypsius employed a part of his men to pull it
-down, while he pushed the rest forward against the city. At daybreak
-the affrighted Syracusans saw themselves vigorously attacked even
-in their own stronghold, when neither generals nor citizens were at
-all prepared to resist. The troops of Nypsius first forced their
-way into Neapolis, which lay the nearest to the wall of Ortygia;
-next into Tycha, the other fortified suburb. Over these they ranged
-victorious, vanquishing all the detached parties of Syracusans which
-could be opposed to them. The streets became a scene of bloodshed—the
-houses of plunder; for as Dionysius had now given up the idea of
-again permanently ruling at Syracuse, his troops thought of little
-else except satiating the revenge of their master and their own
-rapacity. The soldiers of Nypsius stripped the private dwellings in
-the town, taking away not only the property, but also the women and
-children, as booty into Ortygia. At last (it appears) they got also
-into Achradina, the largest and most populous portion of Syracuse.
-Here the same scene of pillage, destruction, and bloodshed, was
-continued throughout the whole day, and on a still larger scale; with
-just enough resistance to pique the fury of the victors, without
-restraining their progress.
-
-It soon became evident to Herakleides and his colleagues, as well as
-to the general body of citizens, that there was no hope of safety
-except in invoking the aid of Dion and his soldiers from Leontini.
-Yet the appeal to one whom they not only hated and feared, but had
-ignominiously maltreated, was something so intolerable, that for a
-long time no one would speak out to propose what every man had in his
-mind. At length some of the allies present, less concerned in the
-political parties of the city, ventured to broach the proposition,
-which ran from man to man, and was adopted under a press of mingled
-and opposite emotions. Accordingly two officers of the allies, and
-five Syracusan horsemen set off at full speed to Leontini, to implore
-the instant presence of Dion. Reaching the place towards evening,
-they encountered Dion himself immediately on dismounting, and
-described to him the miserable scenes now going on at Syracuse. Their
-tears and distress brought around them a crowd of hearers, Leontines
-as well as Peloponnesians; and a general assembly was speedily
-convened, before which Dion exhorted them to tell their story. They
-described, in the tone of men whose all was at stake, the actual
-sufferings and the impending total ruin of the city; entreating
-oblivion for their past misdeeds, which were already but too cruelly
-expiated.
-
-Their discourse, profoundly touching to the audience, was heard in
-silence. Every one waited for Dion to begin, and to determine the
-fate of Syracuse. He rose to speak; but for a time tears checked his
-utterance, while his soldiers around cheered him with encouraging
-sympathy. At length he found voice to say, “I have convened you,
-Peloponnesians and allies, to deliberate about your own conduct.
-For me, deliberation would be a disgrace, while Syracuse is in the
-hands of the destroyer. If I cannot save my country, I shall go and
-bury myself in its flaming ruins. For you, if, in spite of what
-has happened, you still choose to assist us, misguided and unhappy
-Syracusans, we shall owe it to you that we still continue a city.
-But if, in disdainful sense of wrong endured, you shall leave us to
-our fate, I here thank you for all your past valor and attachment
-to me, praying that the gods may reward you for it. Remember Dion,
-as one who neither deserted you when you were wronged, nor his own
-fellow-citizens when they were in misery.”
-
-This address, so replete with pathos and dignity, went home to the
-hearts of the audience, filling them with passionate emotion and
-eagerness to follow him. Universal shouts called upon him to put
-himself at their head instantly and march to Syracuse; while the
-envoys present fell upon his neck, invoking blessings both upon him
-and upon the soldiers. As soon as the excitement had subsided, Dion
-gave orders that every man should take his evening meal forthwith,
-and return in arms to the spot, prepared for a night-march to
-Syracuse.
-
-By daybreak, Dion and his band were within a few miles of the
-northern wall of Epipolæ. Messengers from Syracuse here met him,
-inducing him to slacken his march and proceed with caution.
-Herakleides and the other generals had sent a message forbidding
-his nearer approach, with notice that the gates would be closed
-against him; yet at the same time, counter-messages arrived from
-many eminent citizens, entreating him to persevere, and promising
-him both admittance and support. Nypsius, having permitted his
-troops to pillage and destroy in Syracuse throughout the preceding
-day, had thought it prudent to withdraw them back into Ortygia for
-the night. His retreat raised the courage of Herakleides and his
-colleagues; who, fancying that the attack was now over, repented
-of the invitation which they had permitted to be sent to Dion.
-Under this impression they despatched to him the second message of
-exclusion; keeping guard at the gate in the northern wall to make
-their threat good. But the events of the next morning speedily
-undeceived them. Nypsius renewed his attack with greater ferocity
-than before, completed the demolition of the wall of blockade before
-Ortygia, and let loose his soldiers with merciless hand throughout
-all the streets of Syracuse. There was on this day less of pillage,
-but more of wholesale slaughter. Men, women, and children perished
-indiscriminately, and nothing was thought of by these barbarians
-except to make Syracuse a heap of ruins and dead bodies. To
-accelerate the process, and to forestall Dion’s arrival, which they
-fully expected—they set fire to the city in several places, with
-torches and fire-bearing arrows. The miserable inhabitants knew not
-where to flee, to escape the flames within their houses, or the sword
-without. The streets were strewed with corpses, while the fire gained
-ground perpetually, threatening to spread over the greater part of
-the city. Under such terrible circumstances, neither Herakleides,
-himself wounded, nor the other generals, could hold out any longer
-against the admission of Dion; to whom even the brother and uncle of
-Herakleides were sent, with pressing entreaties to accelerate his
-march, since the smallest delay would occasion ruin to Syracuse.[232]
-
-  [232] Plutarch, Dion, c. 45.
-
-Dion was about seven miles from the gates when these last cries of
-distress reached him. Immediately hurrying forward his soldiers,
-whose ardor was not inferior to his own, at a running pace, he
-reached speedily the gates called Hexapyla, in the northern wall of
-Epipolæ. When once within these gates, he halted in an interior area
-called the Hekatompedon.[233] His light-armed were sent forward at
-once to arrest the destroying enemy, while he kept back the hoplites
-until he could form them into separate columns under proper captains,
-along with the citizens who crowded round him with demonstrations
-of great reverence. He distributed them so as to enter the interior
-portion of Syracuse, and attack the troops of Nypsius, on several
-points at once.[234] Being now within the exterior fortification
-formed by the wall of Epipolæ, there lay before him the tripartite
-interior city—Tycha, Neapolis, Achradina. Each of these parts had its
-separate fortification; between Tycha and Neapolis lay an unfortified
-space, but each of them joined on to Achradina, the western wall of
-which formed their eastern wall. It is probable that these interior
-fortifications had been partially neglected since the construction of
-the outer walls along Epipolæ, which comprised them all within, and
-formed the principal defence against a foreign enemy. Moreover the
-troops of Nypsius, having been masters of the three towns, and roving
-as destroyers around them, for several hours, had doubtless broken
-down the gates and in other ways weakened the defences. The scene was
-frightful, and the ways everywhere impeded by flame and smoke, by
-falling houses and fragments, and by the numbers who lay massacred
-around. It was amidst such horrors that Dion and his soldiers found
-themselves—while penetrating in different divisions at once into
-Neapolis, Tycha, and Achradina.
-
-  [233] Diodor. xvi. 20. διανύσας ὀξέως τὴν εἰς Συρακούσσας ὁδὸν,
-  ἧκε πρὸς τὰ Ἑξάπυλα, etc. Plutarch, Dion, c. 45. εἰσέβαλε διὰ τῶν
-  πυλῶν εἰς τὴν Ἑκατόμπεδον λεγομένην, etc.
-
-  [234] Plutarch, Dion, c. 45. ὀρθίους λόχους ποιῶν καὶ διαιρῶν τὰς
-  ἡγεμονίας, ὅπως πολλαχόθεν ἅμα προσφέροιτο φοβερώτερον.
-
-His task would probably have been difficult, had Nypsius been able
-to control the troops under his command, in themselves brave and
-good. But these troops had been for some hours dispersed throughout
-the streets, satiating their licentious and murderous passions, and
-destroying a town which Dionysius now no longer expected to retain.
-Recalling as many soldiers as he could from this brutal disorder,
-Nypsius marshalled them along the interior fortification, occupying
-the entrances and exposed points where Dion would seek to penetrate
-into the city.[235] The battle was thus not continuous, but fought
-between detached parties at separate openings, often very narrow, and
-on ground sometimes difficult to surmount, amidst the conflagration
-blazing everywhere around.[236] Disorganized by pillage, the troops
-of Nypsius could oppose no long resistance to the forward advance
-of Dion, with soldiers full of ardor and with the Syracusans around
-him stimulated by despair. Nypsius was overpowered, compelled to
-abandon his line of defence, and to retreat with his troops into
-Ortygia, which the greater number of them reached in safety. Dion
-and his victorious troops, after having forced the entrance into the
-city, did not attempt to pursue them. The first and most pressing
-necessity was to extinguish the flames; but no inconsiderable number
-of the soldiers of Nypsius were found dispersed through the streets
-and houses, and slain while actually carrying off plunder on their
-shoulders. Long after the town was cleared of enemies, however,
-all hands within it were employed in stopping the conflagration; a
-task in which they hardly succeeded, even by unremitting efforts
-throughout the day and the following night.[237]
-
-  [235] Plutarch, Dion, c. 46. παρατεταγμένων ~παρὰ τὸ τείχισμα~
-  χαλεπὴν ἔχον καὶ δυσεκβίαστον τὴν πρόσοδον.
-
-  To a person who, after penetrating into the interior of the
-  wall of Epipolæ, stood on the slope, and looked down eastward,
-  the outer wall of Tycha, Achradina, and Neapolis, might be said
-  to form one τείχισμα; not indeed in one and the same line or
-  direction, yet continuous from the northern to the southern brink
-  of Epipolæ.
-
-  [236] Plutarch, Dion, c. 46. Ὡς δὲ προσέμιξαν τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἐν
-  χερσὶ μὲν ὀλίγων πρὸς ὀλίγους ἐγένετο μάχη, διὰ τὴν στενότητα καὶ
-  τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τοῦ τόπου, etc.
-
-  [237] Plutarch, Dion, c. 45, 46; Diodor. xvi. 20.
-
-On the morrow Syracuse was another city; disfigured by the desolating
-trace of flame and of the hostile soldiery, yet still refreshed in
-the hearts of its citizens, who felt that they had escaped much
-worse; and above all, penetrated by a renewed political spirit,
-and a deep sense of repentant gratitude towards Dion. All those
-generals, who had been chosen at the last election from their
-intense opposition to him, fled forthwith; except Herakleides and
-Theodotes. These two men were his most violent and dangerous enemies;
-yet it appears that they knew his character better than their
-colleagues, and therefore did not hesitate to throw themselves upon
-his mercy. They surrendered, confessed their guilt, and implored his
-forgiveness. His magnanimity (they said) would derive a new lustre,
-if he now rose superior to his just resentment over misguided rivals,
-who stood before him humbled and ashamed of their former opposition,
-entreating him to deal with them better than they had dealt with him.
-
-If Dion had put their request to the vote, it would have been refused
-by a large majority. His soldiers, recently defrauded of their pay,
-were yet burning with indignation against the authors of such an
-injustice. His friends, reminding him of the bitter and unscrupulous
-attacks which he as well as they had experienced from Herakleides,
-exhorted him to purge the city of one who abused the popular forms
-to purposes hardly less mischievous than despotism itself. The
-life of Herakleides now hung upon a thread. Without pronouncing any
-decided opinion, Dion had only to maintain an equivocal silence, and
-suffer the popular sentiment to manifest itself in a verdict invoked
-by one party, expected even by the opposite. The more was every one
-astonished when he took upon himself the responsibility of pardoning
-Herakleides; adding, by way of explanation and satisfaction[238] to
-his disappointed friends—
-
-  [238] Plutarch, Dion, c. 47. Ὁ δὲ Δίων παραμυθούμενος αὐτοὺς
-  ἔλεγεν, etc.
-
-“Other generals have gone through most of their training with a view
-to arms and war. My long training in the Academy has been devoted to
-aid me in conquering anger, envy, and all malignant jealousies. To
-show that I have profited by such lessons, it is not enough that I do
-my duty towards my friends and towards honest men. The true test is,
-if, after being wronged, I show myself placable and gentle towards
-the wrong-doer. My wish is to prove myself superior to Herakleides
-more in goodness and justice, than in power and intelligence.
-Successes in war, even when achieved single-handed, are half owing
-to fortune. If Herakleides has been treacherous and wicked through
-envy, it is not for Dion to dishonor a virtuous life in obedience to
-angry sentiment. Nor is human wickedness, great as it often is, ever
-pushed to such an excess of stubborn brutality, as not to be amended
-by gentle and gracious treatment, from steady benefactors.”[239]
-
-  [239] Plutarch, Dion, c. 47.
-
-We may reasonably accept this as something near the genuine speech
-of Dion, reported by his companion Timonides, and thus passing into
-the biography of Plutarch. It lends a peculiar interest, as an
-exposition of motives, to the act which it accompanies. The sincerity
-of the exposition admits of no doubt, for all the ordinary motives of
-the case counselled an opposite conduct; and had Dion been in like
-manner at the feet of his rival, his life would assuredly not have
-been spared. He took pride (with a sentiment something like that of
-Kallikratidas[240] on liberating the prisoners taken at Methymna) in
-realizing by conspicuous act the lofty morality which he had imbibed
-from the Academy; the rather, as the case presented every temptation
-to depart from it Persuading himself that he could by an illustrious
-example put to shame and soften the mutual cruelties so frequent in
-Grecian party-warfare, and regarding the amnesty towards Herakleides
-as a proper sequel to the generous impulse which had led him to march
-from Leontini to Syracuse,—he probably gloried in both, more than in
-the victory itself. We shall presently have the pain of discovering
-that his anticipations were totally disappointed. And we may be sure
-that at the time, the judgment passed on his proceeding towards
-Herakleides was very different from what it now receives. Among his
-friends and soldiers, the generosity of the act would be forgotten in
-its imprudence. Among his enemies, it would excite surprise, perhaps
-admiration—yet few of them would be conciliated or converted into
-friends. In the bosom of Herakleides himself, the mere fact of owing
-his life to Dion would be a new and intolerable humiliation, which
-the Erinnys within would goad him on to avenge. Dion would be warned,
-by the criticism of his friends, as well as by the instinct of his
-soldiers, that in yielding to a magnanimous sentiment, he overlooked
-the reasonable consequences; and that Herakleides continuing at
-Syracuse would only be more dangerous both to him and them, than he
-had been before. Without taking his life, Dion might have required
-him to depart from Syracuse; which sentence, having regard to the
-practice of the time, would have been accounted generosity.
-
-  [240] See Vol. VIII. Ch. lxiv. p. 165 of this History.
-
-It was Dion’s next business to renew the wall of blockade constructed
-against Ortygia, and partially destroyed in the late sally of
-Nypsius. Every Syracusan citizen was directed to cut a stake, and
-deposit it near the spot; after which, during the ensuing night, the
-soldiers planted a stockade so as to restore the broken parts of
-the line. Protection being thus ensured to the city against Nypsius
-and his garrison, Dion proceeded to bury the numerous dead who had
-been slain in the sally, and to ransom the captives, no less than
-two thousand in number, who had been carried off into Ortygia.[241]
-A trophy, with sacrifice to the gods for the victory, was not
-forgotten.[242]
-
-  [241] Plutarch, Dion, c. 48.
-
-  [242] Diodor. xvi. 20.
-
-A public assembly was now held to elect new generals in place of
-those who had fled. Here a motion was made by Herakleides himself,
-that Dion should be chosen general with full powers both by land
-and sea. The motion was received with great favor by the principal
-citizens; but the poorer men were attached to Herakleides, especially
-the seamen; who preferred serving under his command, and loudly
-required that he should be named admiral, along with Dion as general
-on land. Forced to acquiesce in this nomination, Dion contented
-himself with insisting and obtaining, that the resolution, which had
-been previously adopted for redistributing lands and houses, should
-be rescinded.[243]
-
-  [243] Plutarch, Dion, c. 48.
-
-The position of affairs at Syracuse was now pregnant with mischief
-and quarrel. On land, Dion enjoyed a dictatorial authority;—at sea,
-Herakleides, his enemy not less than ever, was admiral, by separate
-and independent nomination. The undefined authority of Dion—exercised
-by one self-willed, though magnanimous, in spirit, and extremely
-repulsive in manner—was sure to become odious after the feelings
-arising out of the recent rescue had worn off; and abundant opening
-would thus be made for the opposition of Herakleides, often on just
-grounds. That officer indeed was little disposed to wait for just
-pretences. Conducting the Syracusan fleet to Messênê in order to
-carry on war against Dionysius at Lokri, he not only tried to raise
-the seamen in arms against Dion, by charging him with despotic
-designs, but even entered into a secret treaty with the common enemy
-Dionysius; through the intervention of the Spartan Pharax, who
-commanded the Dionysian troops. His intrigues being discovered, a
-violent opposition was raised against them by the leading Syracusan
-citizens. It would seem (as far as we can make out from the
-scanty information of Plutarch) that the military operations were
-frustrated, and that the armament was forced to return to Syracuse.
-Here again the quarrel was renewed—the seamen apparently standing
-with Herakleides, the principal citizens with Dion—and carried so
-far, that the city suffered not only from disturbance, but even
-from irregular supply of provisions.[244] Among the mortifications
-of Dion, not the least was that which he experienced from his
-own friends or soldiers, who reminded him of their warnings and
-predictions when he consented to spare Herakleides. Meanwhile
-Dionysius had sent into Sicily a body of troops under Pharax, who
-were encamped at Neapolis in the Agrigentine territory. In what
-scheme of operations this movement forms a part, we cannot make
-out; for Plutarch tells us nothing except what bears immediately
-on the quarrel between Dion and Herakleides. To attack Pharax, the
-forces of Syracuse were brought out; the fleet under Herakleides,
-the soldiers on land under Dion. The latter, though he thought
-it imprudent to fight, was constrained to hazard a battle by the
-insinuations of Herakleides and the clamor of the seamen; who accused
-him of intentionally eking out the war for the purpose of prolonging
-his own dictatorship. Dion accordingly attacked Pharax, but was
-repulsed. Yet the repulse was not a serious defeat, so that he was
-preparing to renew the attack, when he was apprised that Herakleides
-with the fleet had departed and were returning at their best speed
-to Syracuse; with the intention of seizing the city, and barring
-out Dion with his troops. Nothing but a rapid and decisive movement
-could defeat this scheme. Leaving the camp immediately with his best
-horsemen, Dion rode back to Syracuse as fast as possible; completing
-a distance of seven hundred stadia (about eighty-two miles) in a very
-short time, and forestalling the arrival of Herakleides.[245]
-
-  [244] Plutarch, Dion, c. 48. καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὴν ἀπορία καὶ σπάνις ἐν
-  ταῖς Συρακούσαις, etc.
-
-  [245] Plutarch, Dion, c. 49.
-
-Thus disappointed and exposed, Herakleides found means to direct
-another manœuvre against Dion, through the medium of a Spartan
-named Gæsylus; who had been sent by the Spartans, informed of the
-dissensions in Syracuse, to offer himself (like Gylippus) for the
-command. Herakleides eagerly took advantage of the arrival of this
-officer; pressing the Syracusans to accept a Spartan as their
-commander-in-chief. But Dion replied that there were plenty of
-native Syracusans qualified for command; moreover, if a Spartan was
-required, he was himself a Spartan, by public grant. Gæsylus, having
-ascertained the state of affairs, had the virtue and prudence not
-merely to desist from his own pretensions, but also to employ his
-best efforts in reconciling Dion and Herakleides. Sensible that the
-wrong had been on the side of the latter, Gæsylus constrained him
-to bind himself by the strongest oaths to better conduct in future.
-He engaged his own guarantee for the observance of the covenant;
-but the better to ensure such observance, the greater part of the
-Syracusan fleet (the chief instrument of Herakleides) was disbanded,
-leaving only enough to keep Ortygia under blockade.[246]
-
-  [246] Plutarch, Dion, c. 50.
-
-The capture of that islet and fortress, now more strictly watched
-than ever, was approaching. What had become of Pharax, or why
-he did not advance, after the retreat of Dion, to harass the
-Syracusans and succor Ortygia—we know not. But no succor arrived;
-provisions grew scarce; and the garrison became so discontented,
-that Apollokrates the son of Dionysius could not hold out any
-longer. Accordingly, he capitulated with Dion; handing over to him
-Ortygia with its fort, arms, magazines and everything contained in
-it—except what he could carry away in five triremes. Aboard of these
-vessels, he placed his mother, his sisters, his immediate friends,
-and his chief valuables, leaving everything else behind for Dion
-and the Syracusans, who crowded to the beach in multitudes to see
-him depart. To them the moment was one of lively joy, and mutual
-self-congratulation—promising to commence a new era of freedom.[247]
-
-  [247] Plutarch, Dion, c. 50.
-
-On entering Ortygia, Dion saw for the first time after a separation
-of about twelve years, his sister Aristomachê, his wife Aretê, and
-family. The interview was one of the tenderest emotion and tears of
-delight to all. Aretê, having been made against her own consent the
-wife of Timokratês, was at first afraid to approach Dion. But he
-received and embraced her with unabated affection.[248] He conducted
-both her and his son away from the Dionysian acropolis, in which they
-had been living since his absence, into his own house; having himself
-resolved not to dwell in the acropolis, but to leave it as a public
-fort or edifice belonging to Syracuse. However, this renewal of his
-domestic happiness was shortly afterwards imbittered by the death
-of his son; who having imbibed from Dionysius drunken and dissolute
-habits, fell from the roof of the house, in a fit of intoxication or
-frenzy, and perished.[249]
-
-  [248] Plutarch, Dion, c. 51.
-
-  [249] Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 5.
-
-Dion was now at the pinnacle of power as well as of glory. With
-means altogether disproportionate, he had achieved the expulsion of
-the greatest despot in Greece, even from an impregnable stronghold.
-He had combated danger and difficulty with conspicuous resolution,
-and had displayed almost chivalrous magnanimity. Had he “breathed
-out his soul”[250] at the instant of triumphant entry in Ortygia,
-the Academy would have been glorified by a pupil of first-rate and
-unsullied merit. But that cup of prosperity, which poisoned so many
-other eminent Greeks, had now the fatal effect of exaggerating all
-the worst of Dion’s qualities, and damping all the best.
-
-  [250] Juvenal, Satir. x. 381.
-
-      “Quid illo cive (Marius) tulisset
-    Imperium in terris, quid Roma beatius unquam,
-    Si circumducto captivorum agmine, et omni
-    Bellorum pompâ, animam exhalasset opimam,
-    Cum de Teutonico vellet descendere curru?”
-
-Plutarch indeed boasts, and we may perfectly believe, that he
-maintained the simplicity of his table, his raiment, and his habits
-of life, completely unchanged—now that he had become master of
-Syracuse, and an object of admiration to all Greece. In this respect,
-Plato and the Academy had reason to be proud of their pupil.[251]
-But the public mistakes, now to be recounted, were not the less
-mischievous to his countrymen as well as to himself.
-
-  [251] Plutarch, Dion, c. 52.
-
-From the first moment of his entry into Syracuse from Peloponnesus,
-Dion had been suspected and accused of aiming at the expulsion of
-Dionysius, only in order to transfer the despotism to himself.
-His haughty and repulsive manners, raising against him personal
-antipathies everywhere, were cited as confirming the charge. Even
-at moments when Dion was laboring for the genuine good of the
-Syracusans, this suspicion had always more or less crossed his
-path; robbing him of well-merited gratitude—and at the same time
-discrediting his opponents, and the people of Syracuse, as guilty of
-mean jealousy towards a benefactor.
-
-The time had now come when Dion was obliged to act in such a manner
-as either to confirm, or to belie, such unfavorable auguries.
-Unfortunately both his words and his deeds confirmed them in the
-strongest manner. The proud and repulsive external demeanor, for
-which he had always been notorious, was rather aggravated than
-softened. He took pride in showing, more plainly than ever, that he
-despised everything which looked like courting popularity.[252]
-
-  [252] Plutarch, Dion, c. 52. Τοῦ μέντοι περὶ τὰς ὁμιλίας ὄγκου
-  καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ἀτενοῦς ~ἐφιλονείκει μηδὲν ὑφελεῖν μηδὲ
-  χαλάσαι~, καίτοι τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῷ χάριτος ἐνδεῶν ὄντων, καὶ
-  Πλάτωνος ἐπιτιμῶντος, etc.
-
-If the words and manner of Dion were thus significant, both what
-he did, and what he left undone, was more significant still. Of
-that great boon of freedom, which he had so loudly promised to the
-Syracusans, and which he had directed his herald to proclaim on first
-entering their walls, he conferred absolutely nothing. He retained
-his dictatorial power unabated, and his military force certainly
-without reduction, if not actually reinforced; for as Apollokrates
-did not convey away with him the soldiers in Ortygia, we may
-reasonably presume that a part of them at least remained to embrace
-the service of Dion. He preserved the acropolis and fortifications
-of Ortygia just as they were, only garrisoned by troops obeying his
-command instead of that of Dionysius. His victory made itself felt
-in abundant presents to his own friends and soldiers;[253] but to
-the people of Syracuse, it produced nothing better than a change of
-masters.
-
-  [253] Plutarch, Dion, c. 52.
-
-It was not indeed the plan of Dion to constitute a permanent
-despotism. He intended to establish himself king, but to grant to
-the Syracusans what in modern times would be called a constitution.
-Having imbibed from Plato and the Academy as well as from his
-own convictions and tastes, aversion to a pure democracy, he had
-resolved to introduce a Lacedæmonian scheme of mixed government,
-combining king, aristocracy, and people, under certain provisions
-and limitations. Of this general tenor are the recommendations
-addressed both to him, and to the Syracusans after his death, by
-Plato; who however seems to contemplate, along with the political
-scheme, a Lykurgean reform of manners and practice. To aid in
-framing and realizing his scheme, Dion sent to Corinth to invite
-counsellors and auxiliaries; for Corinth was suitable to his views,
-not simply as mother city of Syracuse, but also as a city thoroughly
-oligarchical.[254]
-
-  [254] Plutarch, Dion, c. 53; Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 334, 336;
-  viii. p. 356.
-
-That these intentions on the part of Dion were sincere, we need not
-question. They had been originally conceived without any views of
-acquiring the first place for himself, during the life of the elder
-Dionysius, and were substantially the same as those which he had
-exhorted the younger Dionysius to realize, immediately after the
-death of the father. They are the same as he had intended to further
-by calling in Plato,—with what success, has been already recounted.
-But Dion made the fatal mistake of not remarking, that the state of
-things, both as to himself and as to Syracuse, was totally altered
-during the interval between 367 B. C. and 354 B. C. If at the former
-period, when the Dionysian dynasty was at the zenith of power, and
-Syracuse completely prostrated, the younger Dionysius could have
-been persuaded spontaneously and without contest or constraint to
-merge his own despotism in a more liberal system, even dictated by
-himself—it is certain that such a free, though moderate concession,
-would at first have provoked unbounded gratitude, and would have had
-a chance (though that is more doubtful) of giving long-continued
-satisfaction. But the situation was totally different in 354 B. C.,
-when Dion, after the expulsion of Apollokrates, had become master in
-Ortygia; and it was his mistake that he still insisted on applying
-the old plans when they had become not merely unsuitable, but
-mischievous. Dion was not in the position of an established despot,
-who consents to renounce, for the public good, powers which every
-one knows he can retain, if he chooses; nor were the Syracusans any
-longer passive, prostrate, and hopeless. They had received a solemn
-promise of liberty, and had been thereby inflamed into vehement
-action, by Dion himself; who had been armed by them with delegated
-powers, for the special purpose of putting down Dionysius. That
-under these circumstances Dion, instead of laying down his trust,
-should constitute himself king—even limited king—and determine how
-much liberty he would consent to allot to the Syracusans who had
-appointed him—this was a proceeding which they could not but resent
-as a flagrant usurpation, and which he could only hope to maintain by
-force.
-
-The real conduct of Dion, however, was worse even than this. He
-manifested no visible evidence of realizing even that fraction
-of popular liberty which had entered into his original scheme.
-What exact promises he made, we do not know. But he maintained his
-own power, the military force, and the despotic fortifications,
-provisionally undiminished. And who could tell how long he intended
-to maintain them? That he really had in his mind purposes such as
-Plato[255] gives him credit for, I believe to be true. But he took no
-practical step towards them. He had resolved to accomplish them, not
-through persuasion of the Syracusans, but through his own power. This
-was the excuse which he probably made to himself, and which pushed
-him down that inclined plane from whence there was afterwards no
-escape.
-
-  [255] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 335 F. p. 351 A.; Epistol. viii. p.
-  357 A.
-
-It was not likely that Dion’s conduct would pass without a protest.
-That protest came loudest from Herakleides; who, so long as Dion had
-been acting in the real service of Syracuse, had opposed him in a
-culpable and traitorous manner—and who now again found himself in
-opposition to Dion, when opposition had become the side of patriotism
-as well as of danger. Invited by Dion to attend the council, he
-declined, saying that he was now nothing more than a private citizen,
-and would attend the public assembly along with the rest; a hint
-which implied, plainly as well as reasonably, that Dion also ought
-to lay down his power, now that the common enemy was put down.[256]
-The surrender of Ortygia had produced strong excitement among the
-Syracusans. They were impatient to demolish the dangerous stronghold
-erected in that islet by the elder Dionysius; they both hoped and
-expected, moreover, to see the destruction of that splendid funeral
-monument which his son had built in his honor, and the urn with
-its ashes cast out. Now of these two measures, the first was one
-of pressing and undeniable necessity, which Dion ought to have
-consummated without a moment’s delay; the second was compliance
-with a popular antipathy at that time natural, which would have
-served as an evidence that the old despotism stood condemned. Yet
-Dion did neither. It was Herakleides who censured him, and moved
-for the demolition of the Dionysian Bastile; thus having the glory
-of attaching his name to the measure eagerly performed by Timoleon
-eleven years afterwards, the moment that he found himself master of
-Syracuse. Not only Dion did not originate the overthrow of this
-dangerous stronghold, but when Herakleides proposed it, he resisted
-him and prevented it from being done.[257] We shall find the same den
-serving for successive despots—preserved by Dion for them as well as
-for himself, and only removed by the real liberator Timoleon.
-
-  [256] Plutarch, Dion, c. 53.
-
-  [257] Plutarch, Dion. c. 53. Ἔπειτα κατηγόρει τοῦ Δίωνος ὅτι τὴν
-  ἄκραν οὐ κατέσκαψε, καὶ τῷ δήμῳ τὸν Διονυσίου τάφον ὡρμημένῳ
-  λῦσαι καὶ τὸν νεκρὸν ἐκβαλεῖν οὐκ ἐπέτρεψε, etc.
-
-  Compare Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 22.
-
-Herakleides gained extraordinary popularity among the Syracusans
-by his courageous and patriotic conduct. But Dion saw plainly
-that he could not, consistently with his own designs, permit such
-free opposition any longer. Many of his adherents, looking upon
-Herakleides as one who ought not to have been spared on the previous
-occasion, were ready to put him to death at any moment; being
-restrained only by a special prohibition which Dion now thought it
-time to remove. Accordingly, with his privity, they made their way
-into the house of Herakleides, and slew him.[258]
-
-  [258] Plutarch, Dion, c. 53; Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 6.
-
-This dark deed abolished all remaining hope of obtaining Syracusan
-freedom from the hands of Dion, and stamped him as the mere successor
-of the Dionysian despotism. It was in vain that he attended the
-obsequies of Herakleides with his full military force, excusing
-his well-known crime to the people, on the plea, that Syracuse
-could never be at peace while two such rivals were both in active
-political life. Under the circumstances of the case, the remark
-was an insulting derision; though it might have been advanced with
-pertinence as a reason for sending Herakleides away, at the moment
-when he before spared him. Dion had now conferred upon his rival the
-melancholy honor of dying as a martyr to Syracusan freedom; and in
-that light he was bitterly mourned by the people. No man after this
-murder could think himself secure. Having once employed the soldiers
-as executioners of his own political antipathies, Dion proceeded
-to lend himself more and more to their exigencies. He provided for
-them pay and largesses, great in amount, first at the cost of his
-opponents in the city, next at that of his friends, until at length
-discontent became universal. Among the general body of the citizens,
-Dion became detested as a tyrant, and the more detested because he
-had presented himself as a liberator; while the soldiers also were in
-great part disaffected to him.[259]
-
-  [259] Cornel. Nepos, Dion, c. 7.
-
-The spies and police of the Dionysian dynasty not having been yet
-reëstablished, there was ample liberty at least of speech and
-censure; so that Dion was soon furnished with full indications of the
-sentiment entertained towards him. He became disquieted and irritable
-at this change of public feeling;[260] angry with the people, yet
-at the same time ashamed of himself. The murder of Herakleides sat
-heavy on his soul. The same man whom he had spared before when in
-the wrong, he had now slain when in the right. The maxims of the
-Academy which had imparted to him so much self-satisfaction in the
-former act, could hardly fail to occasion a proportionate sickness of
-self-reproach in the latter. Dion was not a mere power-seeker, nor
-prepared for all that endless apparatus of mistrustful precaution,
-indispensable to a Grecian despot. When told that his life was in
-danger, he replied that he would rather perish at once by the hands
-of the first assassin, than live in perpetual diffidence, towards
-friends as well as enemies.[261]
-
-  [260] Cornelius Nepos, Dion. c. 7. “Insuetus male audiendi,” etc.
-
-  [261] Plutarch, Dion, c. 56. Ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν Δίων, ἐπὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὸν
-  Ἡρακλείδην ἀχθόμενος, καὶ τὸν φόνον ἐκεῖνον, ὥς τινα τοῦ βίου
-  καὶ τῶν πράξεων αὐτῷ κηλῖδα προκειμένην, δυσχεραίνων ἀεὶ καὶ
-  βαρυνόμενος εἶπεν, ὅτι πολλάκις ἤδη θνήσκειν ἕτοιμός ἐστι καὶ
-  παρέχειν τῷ βουλομένῳ σφάττειν αὐτὸν, εἰ ζῇν δεήσει μὴ μόνον τοὺς
-  ἐχθροὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φίλους φυλαττόμενον.
-
-  Compare Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 176 F.
-
-One thus too good for a despot, and yet unfit for a popular leader,
-could not remain long in the precarious position occupied by Dion.
-His intimate friend, the Athenian Kallippus, seeing that the man
-who could destroy him would become popular with the Syracusans as
-well as with a large portion of the soldiery, formed a conspiracy
-accordingly. He stood high in the confidence of Dion, had been his
-companion during his exile at Athens, had accompanied him to Sicily,
-and entered Syracuse by his side. But Plato, anxious for the credit
-of the Academy, is careful to inform us, that this inauspicious
-friendship arose, not out of fellowship in philosophy, but out
-of common hospitalities, and especially common initiation in the
-Eleusinian mysteries.[262] Brave and forward in battle, Kallippus
-enjoyed much credit with the soldiery. He was conveniently placed
-for tampering with them, and by a crafty stratagem, he even insured
-the unconscious connivance of Dion himself. Having learnt that plots
-were formed against his life, Dion talked about them to Kallippus,
-who offered himself to undertake the part of spy, and by simulated
-partnership to detect as well as to betray the conspirators. Under
-this confidence, Kallippus had full licence for carrying on his
-intrigues unimpeded, since Dion disregarded the many warnings which
-reached him.[263] Among the rumors raised out of Dion’s new position,
-and industriously circulated by Kallippus—one was, that he was about
-to call back Apollokrates, son of Dionysius, as his partner and
-successor to the despotism—as a substitute for the youthful son who
-had recently perished. By these and other reports, Dion became more
-and more discredited, while Kallippus secretly organized a wider
-circle of adherents. His plot however did not escape the penetration
-of Aristomachê and Aretê; who having, first addressed unavailing
-hints to Dion, at last took upon them to question Kallippus himself.
-The latter not only denied the charge, but even confirmed his
-denial, at their instance, by one of the most solemn and terrific
-oaths recognized in Grecian religion; going into the sacred grove of
-Demeter and Persephonê, touching the purple robe of the goddess, and
-taking in his hand a lighted torch.[264]
-
-  [262] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 333 F.: compare Plutarch. Dion. c.
-  17, 28, 54.
-
-  Athenæus, on the contrary, states that Kallippus was a pupil of
-  Plato, and fellow pupil with Dion in the school (Athenæus, xi. p.
-  508).
-
-  The statement of Plato hardly goes so far as to negative the
-  supposition that Kallippus may have frequented his school and
-  received instruction there, for a time greater or less. But it
-  refutes the idea, that the friendship of Dion and Kallippus arose
-  out of these philosophical tastes common to both; which Athenæus
-  seems to have intended to convey.
-
-  [263] Plutarch, Dion, c. 54; Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 8.
-
-  [264] Plutarch, Dion. c. 56.
-
-Inquiry being thus eluded, there came on presently the day of the
-Koreia:—the festival of these very Two goddesses in whose name and
-presence Kallippus had forsworn. This was the day which he had
-fixed for execution. The strong points of defence in Syracuse were
-confided beforehand to his principal adherents while his brother
-Philostrates[265] kept a trireme manned in the harbor ready for
-flight in case the scheme should miscarry. While Dion, taking no part
-in the festival, remained at home, Kallippus caused his house to be
-surrounded by confidential soldiers, and then sent into it a select
-company of Zakynthians, unarmed, as if for the purpose of addressing
-Dion on business. These men, young and of distinguished muscular
-strength, being admitted into the house, put aside or intimidated
-the slaves, none of whom manifested any zeal or attachment. They
-then made their way up to Dion’s apartment, and attempted to throw
-him down and strangle him. So strenuously did he resist, however,
-that they found it impossible to kill him without arms; which they
-were perplexed how to procure, being afraid to open the doors, lest
-aid might be introduced against them. At length one of their number
-descended to a back-door, and procured from a Syracusan without,
-named Lykon, a short sword; of the Laconian sort, and of peculiar
-workmanship. With this weapon they put Dion to death.[266] They
-then seized Aristomachê and Aretê, the sister and wife of Dion.
-These unfortunate women were cast into prison, where they were long
-detained, and where the latter was delivered of a posthumous son.
-
-  [265] Plato alludes to the two brothers whom Dion made his
-  friends at Athens, and who ultimately slew him; but without
-  mentioning the name of either (Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 333 F.).
-
-  The third Athenian—whose fidelity he emphatically contrasts
-  with the falsehood of these two—appears to mean, himself—Plato.
-  Compare pp. 333 and 334.
-
-  [266] Plutarch, Dion, c. 57; Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 9; Diodor.
-  xvi. 31.
-
-Thus perished Dion, having lived only about a year after his
-expulsion of the Dionysian dynasty from Syracuse—but a year too
-long for his own fame. Notwithstanding the events of those last
-months, there is no doubt that he was a man essentially differing
-from the class of Grecian despots: a man, not of aspirations
-purely personal, nor thirsting merely for multitudes of submissive
-subjects and a victorious army—but with large public-minded purposes
-attached as coördinate to his own ambitious views. He wished to
-perpetuate his name as the founder of a polity, cast in something
-of the general features of Sparta; which, while it did not shock
-Hellenic instincts, should reach farther than political institutions
-generally aim to do, so as to remodel the sentiments and habits
-of the citizens, on principles suited to philosophers like Plato.
-Brought up as Dion was from childhood at the court of the elder
-Dionysius, unused to that established legality, free speech,
-and habit of active citizenship, from whence a large portion of
-Hellenic virtue flowed—the wonder is how he acquired so much public
-conviction and true magnanimity of soul—not how he missed acquiring
-more. The influence of Plato during his youth stamped his mature
-character; but that influence (as Plato himself tells us) found a
-rare predisposition in the pupil. Still, Dion had no experience of
-the working of a free and popular government. The atmosphere in
-which his youth was passed was that of an energetic despotism; while
-the aspiration which he imbibed from Plato was, to restrain and
-regularize that despotism, and to administer to the people a certain
-dose of political liberty, yet reserving to himself the task of
-settling how much was good for them, and the power of preventing them
-from acquiring more.
-
-How this project—the natural growth of Dion’s mind, for which his
-tastes and capacities were suited—was violently thrust aside through
-the alienated feelings of the younger Dionysius—has been already
-recounted. The position of Dion was now completely altered. He became
-a banished, ill-used man, stung with contemptuous antipathy against
-Dionysius, and eager to put down his despotism over Syracuse. Here
-were new motives apparently falling in with the old project. But
-the conditions of the problem had altogether changed. Dion could
-not overthrow Dionysius without “taking the Syracusan people into
-partnership” (to use the phrase of Herodotus[267] respecting the
-Athenian Kleisthenes)—without promising them full freedom, as an
-inducement for their hearty coöperation—without giving them arms, and
-awakening in them the stirring impulses of Grecian citizenship, all
-the more violent because they had been so long trodden down.[268]
-With these new allies he knew not how to deal. He had no experience
-of a free and jealous popular mind in persuasion, he was utterly
-unpractised: his manners were haughty and displeasing. Moreover, his
-kindred with the Dionysian family exposed him to antipathy from two
-different quarters. Like the Duke of Orleans (Égalité) at the end
-of 1792, in the first French Revolution—he was hated both by the
-royalists, because, though related to the reigning dynasty, he had
-taken an active part against it—and by sincere democrats, because
-they suspected him of a design to put himself in its place. To Dion,
-such coalition of antipathies was a serious hindrance; presenting
-a strong basis of support for all his rivals, especially for the
-unscrupulous Herakleides. The bad treatment which he underwent both
-from the Syracusans and from Herakleides, during the time when
-the officers of Dionysius still remained masters in Ortygia, has
-been already related. Dion however behaved, though not always with
-prudence, yet with so much generous energy against the common enemy,
-that he put down his rival, and maintained his ascendency unshaken,
-until the surrender of Ortygia.
-
-  [267] Herodotus, v. 66. ἑσσούμενος δ᾽ ὁ Κλεισθένης τὸν δῆμον
-  προσεταιρίζεται.
-
-  [268] Cicero de Officiis, ii. 7. “Acriores morsus intermissæ
-  libertatis quam retentæ.”
-
-That surrender brought his power to a maximum. It was the
-turning-point and crisis of his life. A splendid opportunity was
-now opened, of earning for himself fame and gratitude. He might
-have attached his name to an act as sublime and impressive as any
-in Grecian history, which, in an evil hour, he left to be performed
-in after days by Timoleon—the razing of the Dionysian stronghold,
-and the erection of courts of justice on its site. He might have
-taken the lead in organizing, under the discussion and consent of
-the people, a good and free government, which, more or less exempt
-from defect as it might have been, would at least have satisfied
-them, and would have spared Syracuse those ten years of suffering
-which intervened until Timoleon came to make the possibility a fact.
-Dion might have done all that Timoleon did—and might have done it
-more easily, since he was less embarrassed both by the other towns
-in Sicily and by the Carthaginians. Unfortunately he still thought
-himself strong enough to resume his original project. In spite of
-the spirit, kindled partly by himself, among the Syracusans—in spite
-of the repugnance, already unequivocally manifested, on the mere
-suspicion of his despotic designs—he fancied himself competent to
-treat the Syracusans as a tame and passive herd; to carve out for
-them just as much liberty as he thought right, and to require them
-to be satisfied with it; nay, even worse, to defer giving them any
-liberty at all, on the plea, or pretence, of full consultation with
-advisers of his own choice.
-
-Through this deplorable mistake, alike mischievous to Syracuse and
-to himself, Dion made his government one of pure force. He placed
-himself in a groove wherein he was fatally condemned to move on from
-bad to worse, without possibility of amendment. He had already made
-a martyr of Herakleides, and he would have been compelled to make
-other martyrs besides, had his life continued. It is fortunate for
-his reputation that his career was arrested so early, before he had
-become bad enough to forfeit that sympathy and esteem with which
-the philosopher Plato still mourns his death, appeasing his own
-disappointment by throwing the blame of Dion’s failure on every one
-but Dion himself.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXXV.
-
-SICILIAN AFFAIRS DOWN TO THE CLOSE OF THE EXPEDITION OF TIMOLEON. B.
-C. 353-336.
-
-
-The assassination of Dion, as recounted in my last chapter, appears
-to have been skilfully planned and executed for the purpose of its
-contriver, the Athenian Kallippus. Succeeding at once to the command
-of the soldiers, among whom he had before been very popular,—and to
-the mastery of Ortygia,—he was practically supreme at Syracuse. We
-read in Cornelius Nepos, that after the assassination of Dion there
-was deep public sorrow, and a strong reaction in his favor, testified
-by splendid obsequies attended by the mass of the population.[269]
-But this statement is difficult to believe; not merely because
-Kallippus long remained undisturbed master, but because he also threw
-into prison the female relatives of Dion—his sister Aristomachê
-and his pregnant wife Aretê, avenging by such act of malignity the
-false oath which he had so lately been compelled to take, in order
-to satisfy their suspicions.[270] Aretê was delivered of a son in
-the prison. It would seem that these unhappy women were kept in
-confinement during all the time, more than a year, that Kallippus
-remained master. On his being deposed, they were released; when a
-Syracusan named Hiketas, a friend of the deceased Dion, affected
-to take them under his protection. After a short period of kind
-treatment, he put them on board a vessel to be sent to Peloponnesus,
-but caused them to be slain on the voyage, and their bodies to
-be sunk in the sea. To this cruel deed he is said to have been
-instigated by the enemies of Dion; and the act shows but too plainly
-how implacable those enemies were.[271]
-
-  [269] Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 10.
-
-  [270] Plutarch, Dion, c. 56, 57.
-
-  [271] Plutarch, Dion, c. 58.
-
-How Kallippus maintained himself in Syracuse—by what support, or
-violences, or promises—and against what difficulties he had to
-contend—we are not permitted to know. He seems at first to have
-made promises of restoring liberty; and we are even told, that he
-addressed a public letter to his country, the city of Athens;[272]
-wherein he doubtless laid claim to the honors of tyrannicide;
-representing himself as the liberator of Syracuse. How this was
-received by the Athenian assembly, we are not informed. But to
-Plato and the frequenters of the Academy, the news of Dion’s death
-occasioned the most profound sorrow, as may still be read in the
-philosopher’s letters.
-
-  [272] Plutarch, Dion, c. 58.
-
-Kallippus maintained himself for a year in full splendor and
-dominion. Discontents had then grown up; and the friends of Dion—or
-perhaps the enemies of Kallippus assuming that name—showed themselves
-with force in Syracuse. However, Kallippus defeated them, and forced
-them to take refuge in Leontini;[273] of which town we presently
-find Hiketas despot. Encouraged probably by this success, Kallippus
-committed many enormities, and made himself so odious,[274] that the
-expelled Dionysian family began to conceive hopes of recovering
-their dominion. He had gone forth from Syracuse on an expedition
-against Katana; of which absence Hipparinus took advantage to effect
-his entry into Syracuse, at the head of a force sufficient, combined
-with popular discontent, to shut him out of the city. Kallippus
-speedily returned, but was defeated by Hipparinus, and compelled to
-content himself with the unprofitable exchange of Katana in place of
-Syracuse.[275]
-
-  [273] Plutarch, Dion, c. 58; Diodor. xvi. 31-36.
-
-  [274] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11; Plutarch, compar. Timoleon and
-  Paul Emil, c. 2.
-
-  [275] This seems to result from Plutarch, Dion, c. 58, compared
-  with Diodor. xvi. 36.
-
-Hipparinus and Nysæus were the two sons of Dionysius the elder, by
-Aristomachê, and were therefore nephews of Dion. Though Hipparinus
-probably became master of Ortygia, the strongest portion of Syracuse,
-yet it would appear that in the other portions of Syracuse there were
-opposing parties who contested his rule; first, the partisans of
-Dionysius the younger, and of his family—next, the mass who desired
-to get rid of both the families, and to establish a free popular
-constitution. Such is the state of facts which we gather from the
-letters of Plato.[276] But we are too destitute of memorials to
-make out anything distinct respecting the condition of Syracuse
-or of Sicily between 353 B. C. and 344 B. C.—from the death of
-Dion to the invitation sent to Corinth, which brought about the
-mission of Timoleon. We are assured generally that it was a period
-of intolerable conflicts, disorders, and suffering; that even
-the temples and tombs were neglected;[277] that the people were
-everywhere trampled down by despots and foreign mercenaries; that the
-despots were frequently overthrown by violence or treachery, yet only
-to be succeeded by others as bad or worse; that the multiplication of
-foreign soldiers, seldom regularly paid, spread pillage and violence
-everywhere.[278] The philosopher Plato—in a letter written about a
-year or more after the death of Dion (seemingly after the expulsion
-of Kallippus) and addressed to the surviving relatives and friends of
-the latter—draws a lamentable picture of the state both of Syracuse
-and Sicily. He goes so far as to say, that under the distraction
-and desolation which prevailed, the Hellenic race and language were
-likely to perish in the island, and give place to the Punic or
-Oscan.[279] He adjures the contending parties at Syracuse to avert
-this miserable issue by coming to a compromise, and by constituting a
-moderate and popular government,—yet with some rights reserved to the
-ruling families, among whom he desires to see a fraternal partnership
-established, tripartite in its character; including Dionysius the
-younger (now at Lokri)—Hipparinus son of the elder Dionysius—and
-the son of Dion. On the absolute necessity of such compromise
-and concord, to preserve both people and despots from one common
-ruin, Plato delivers the most pathetic admonitions. He recommends
-a triple coördinate kingship, passing by hereditary transmission
-in the families of the three persons just named; and including the
-presidency of religious ceremonies with an ample measure of dignity
-and veneration, but very little active political power. Advising
-that impartial arbitrators, respected by all, should be invoked to
-settle terms for the compromise, he earnestly implores each of the
-combatants to acquiesce peaceably in their adjudication.[280]
-
-  [276] Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353, 355, 356.
-
-  [277] Plato, Epist. viii. 356 B. ἐλεῶν δὲ πατρίδα καὶ ἱερῶν
-  ἀθεραπευσίαν καὶ τάφους, etc.
-
-  [278] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 1.
-
-  [279] Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353 F. ... διολέσθαι δ᾽ ὑπὸ τοῦ
-  κύκλου τούτου καὶ τὸ τυραννικὸν ἅπαν καὶ τὸ δημοτικὸν γένος,
-  ~ἥξει δὲ~, ἐάν περ τῶν εἰκότων γίγνηταί τι καὶ ἀπευκτῶν, ~σχεδὸν
-  εἰς ἐρημίαν τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς φωνῆς Σικελία πᾶσα, Φοινίκων ἢ Ὀπικῶν
-  μεταβαλοῦσα εἴς τινα δυναστεῖαν καὶ κράτος~. Τούτων δὴ χρὴ πάσῃ
-  προθυμίᾳ πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας τέμνειν φάρμακον.
-
-  [280] Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 356.
-
-To Plato,—who saw before him the line double of Spartan kings, the
-only hereditary kings in Greece,—the proposition of three coördinate
-kingly families did not appear at all impracticable; nor indeed was
-it so, considering the small extent of political power allotted
-to them. But amidst the angry passions which then raged, and the
-mass of evil which had been done and suffered on all sides, it was
-not likely that any pacific arbitrator, of whatever position or
-character, would find a hearing, or would be enabled to effect any
-such salutary adjustment as had emanated from the Mantinean Dêmônax
-at Kyrênê—between the discontented Kyreneans and the dynasty of the
-Battiad princes.[281] Plato’s recommendation passed unheeded. He died
-in 348-347 B. C., without seeing any mitigation of those Sicilian
-calamities which saddened the last years of his long life. On the
-contrary, the condition of Syracuse grew worse instead of better.
-The younger Dionysius contrived to effect his return, expelling
-Hipparinus and Nysæus from Ortygia, and establishing himself there
-again as master. As he had a long train of past humiliation to
-avenge, his rule was of that oppressive character which the ancient
-proverb recognized as belonging to kings restored from exile.[282]
-
-  [281] Herodot. iv. 161.
-
-  [282] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 1.
-
-           ... Regnabis sanguine multo
-    Ad regnum quisquis venit ab exilio.
-
-Of all these princes descended from the elder Dionysius, not one
-inherited the sobriety and temperance which had contributed so
-much to his success. All of them are said to have been of drunken
-and dissolute habits[283]—Dionysius the younger, and his son
-Apollokrates, as well as Hipparinus and Nysæus. Hipparinus was
-assassinated while in a fit of intoxication; so that Nysæus became
-the representative of this family, until he was expelled from Ortygia
-by the return of the younger Dionysius.
-
-  [283] Aristotle and Theopompus, ap. Athenæum, x. p. 435, 436;
-  Theopomp. Fragm. 146, 204, 213, ed. Didot.
-
-That prince, since his first expulsion from Syracuse, had chiefly
-resided at Lokri in Italy, of which city his mother Doris was a
-native. It has already been stated that the elder Dionysius had
-augmented and nursed up Lokri by every means in his power, as an
-appurtenance of his own dominion at Syracuse. He had added to its
-territory all the southernmost peninsula of Italy (comprehended
-within a line drawn from the Gulf of Terina to that of Skylletium),
-once belonging to Rhegium, Kaulonia, and Hipponium. But though the
-power of Lokri was thus increased, it had ceased to be a free city,
-being converted into a dependency of the Dionysian family.[284] As
-such, it became the residence of the second Dionysius, when he could
-no longer maintain himself in Syracuse. We know little of what he
-did; though we are told that he revived a portion of the dismantled
-city of Rhegium under the name of Phœbia.[285] Rhegium itself
-reappears shortly afterwards as a community under its own name, and
-was probably reconstituted at the complete downfall of the second
-Dionysius.
-
-  [284] Aristotel. Politic. v. 6, 7.
-
-  [285] Strabo, vi. p. 258.
-
-The season between 356-346 B. C., was one of great pressure and
-suffering for all the Italiot Greeks, arising from the increased
-power of the inland Lucanians and Bruttians. These Bruttians, who
-occupied the southernmost Calabria, were a fraction detached from
-the general body of Lucanians and self-emancipated; having consisted
-chiefly of indigenous rural serfs in the mountain communities,
-who threw off the sway of their Lucanian masters, and formed an
-independent aggregate for themselves. These men, especially in
-the energetic effort which marked their early independence, were
-formidable enemies of the Greeks on the coast, from Tarentum to the
-Sicilian strait; and more than a match even for the Spartans and
-Epirots invited over by the Greeks as auxiliaries.
-
-It appears that the second Dionysius, when he retired to Lokri
-after the first loss of his power at Syracuse, soon found his rule
-unacceptable and his person unpopular. He maintained himself,
-seemingly from the beginning, by means of two distinct citadels in
-the town, with a standing army under the command of the Spartan
-Pharax, a man of profligacy and violence.[286] The conduct of
-Dionysius became at last so odious, that nothing short of extreme
-force could keep down the resentment of the citizens. We read that he
-was in the habit of practising the most licentious outrage towards
-the marriageable maidens of good family in Lokri. The detestation
-thus raised against him was repressed by his superior force—not,
-we may be sure, without numerous cruelties perpetrated against
-individual persons who stood on their defence—until the moment
-arrived when he and his son Apollokrates effected their second
-return to Ortygia. To ensure so important an acquisition, Dionysius
-diminished his military force at Lokri, where he at the same time
-left his wife, his two daughters, and his youthful son. But after his
-departure, the Lokrians rose in insurrection, overpowered the reduced
-garrison, and took captive these unfortunate members of his family.
-Upon their guiltless heads fell all the terrors of retaliation for
-the enormities of the despot. It was in vain that both Dionysius
-himself, and the Tarentines[287] supplicated permission to redeem
-the captives at the highest ransom. In vain was Lokri besieged, and
-its territory desolated. The Lokrians could neither be seduced by
-bribes, nor deterred by threats, from satiating the full extremity
-of vindictive fury. After multiplied cruelties and brutalities, the
-wife and family of Dionysius were at length relieved from farther
-suffering by being strangled.[288] With this revolting tragedy
-terminated the inauspicious marital connection begun between the
-elder Dionysius and the oligarchy of Lokri.
-
-  [286] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11; Compar. Timoleon and Paul. Emil.
-  c. 2; Theopompus ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 536; Plutarch, Reipub.
-  Gerend. Præcept. p. 821 D. About the two citadels in Lokri, see
-  Livy, xxix. 6.
-
-  It may have been probably a predatory fleet in the service of
-  the younger Dionysius, which Livy mentions to have been ravaging
-  about this time the coast of Latium, coöperating with the Gauls
-  against portions of the Roman territory (Livy, vii. 25, 26).
-
-  [287] It would appear that relations of amity, or amicable
-  dependence, still subsisted between Dionysius the younger and the
-  Tarentines. There was seen, in the prytaneum or government-house
-  of Tarentum, a splendid chandelier with three hundred and
-  sixty-five burners, a present from Dionysius (Euphorion, ap.
-  Athenæum, xv. p. 700).
-
-  [288] Strabo, vi. p. 259, 260; Athenæus, xii. p. 541.
-
-By the manner in which Dionysius exercised his power at Lokri, we
-may judge how he would behave at Syracuse. The Syracusans endured
-more evil than ever, without knowing where to look for help. Hiketas
-the Syracusan (once the friend of Dion, ultimately the murderer of
-the slain Dion’s widow and sister), had now established himself as
-despot at Leontini. To him they turned as an auxiliary, hoping thus
-to obtain force sufficient for the expulsion of Dionysius. Hiketas
-gladly accepted the proposition, with full purpose of reaping the
-reward of such expulsion, when achieved, for himself. Moreover,
-a formidable cloud was now gathering from the side of Carthage.
-What causes had rendered Carthage inactive for the last few years,
-while Sicily was so weak and disunited—we do not know; but she had
-now become once more aggressive, extending her alliances among the
-despots of the island, and pouring in a large force and fleet, so as
-to menace the independence both of Sicily and of Southern Italy.[289]
-The appearance of this new enemy drove the Syracusans to despair,
-and left them no hope of safety except in assistance from Corinth.
-To that city they sent a pathetic and urgent appeal, setting forth
-both the actual suffering and the approaching peril from without.
-And such indeed was the peril, that even to a calm observer, it might
-well seem as if the mournful prophecy of Plato was on the point of
-receiving fulfilment—Hellenism as well as freedom becoming extinct on
-the island.
-
-  [289] Diodor. xvi. 67.
-
-To the invocation of Corinthian aid, Hiketas was a party; yet an
-unwilling party. He had made up his mind that for his purpose, it
-was better to join the Carthaginians, with whom he had already
-opened negotiations—and to employ their forces, first in expelling
-Dionysius, next in ruling Syracuse for himself. But these were
-schemes not to be yet divulged: accordingly, Hiketas affected to
-concur in the pressing entreaty sent by the Syracusans to Corinth,
-intending from the beginning to frustrate its success.[290] He
-expected indeed that the Corinthians would themselves decline
-compliance: for the enterprise proposed to them was full of
-difficulty; they had neither injury to avenge, nor profit to expect;
-while the force of sympathy, doubtless not inconsiderable, with a
-suffering colony, would probably be neutralized by the unsettled and
-degraded condition into which all Central Greece was now rapidly
-sinking, under the ambitious strides of Philip of Macedon.
-
-  [290] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 2.
-
-The Syracusan envoys reached Corinth at a favorable moment. But
-it is melancholy to advert to the aggregate diminution of Grecian
-power, as compared with the time when (seventy years before) their
-forefathers had sent thither to solicit aid against the besieging
-armament of Athens; a time when Athens, Sparta, and Syracuse herself,
-were all in exuberant vigor as well as unimpaired freedom. However,
-the Corinthians happened at this juncture to have their hands as
-well as their minds tolerably free, so that the voice of genuine
-affliction, transmitted from the most esteemed of all their colonies,
-was heard with favor and sympathy. A decree was passed, heartily and
-unanimously, to grant the aid solicited.[291]
-
-  [291] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 3.
-
-The next step was to choose a leader. But a leader was not easily
-found. The enterprise presented little temptation, with danger and
-difficulty abundant as well as certain. The hopeless discord of
-Syracuse for years past, was well known to all the leading Corinthian
-politicians or generals. Of all or most of these, the names were
-successively put up by the archons; but all with one accord
-declined. At length, while the archons hesitated whom to fix upon,
-an unknown voice in the crowd pronounced the name of Timoleon, son
-of Timodemus. The mover seemed prompted by divine inspiration;[292]
-so little obvious was the choice, and so preëminently excellent did
-it prove. Timoleon was named—without difficulty, and without much
-intention of doing him honor—to a post which all the other leading
-men declined.
-
-  [292] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 3. ἀλλὰ θεοῦ τινος, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰς
-  νοῦν ἐμβαλόντος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, etc.
-
-Some points must be here noticed in the previous history of this
-remarkable man. He belonged to an illustrious family in Corinth,
-and was now of mature age—perhaps about fifty. He was distinguished
-no less for his courage than for the gentleness of his disposition.
-Little moved either by personal vanity or by ambition, he was
-devoted in his patriotism, and unreserved in his hatred of despots
-as well as of traitors.[293] The government of Corinth was, and
-always had been, oligarchical; but it was a regular, constitutional,
-oligarchy; while the Corinthian antipathy against despots was of old
-standing[294]—hardly less strong than that of democratical Athens.
-As a soldier in the ranks of Corinthian hoplites, the bravery of
-Timoleon, and his submission to discipline, were alike remarkable.
-
-  [293] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 3 ... φιλόπατρις δὲ καὶ πρᾶος
-  διαφερόντως, ὅσα μὴ σφόδρα μισοτύραννος εἶναι καὶ μισοπόνηρος.
-
-  [294] Herodot. v. 92.
-
-These points of his character stood out the more forcibly from
-contrast with his elder brother Timophanes; who possessed the
-soldierlike merits of bravery and energetic enterprise, but combined
-with them an unprincipled ambition, and an unscrupulous prosecution
-of selfish advancement at all cost to others. The military qualities
-of Timophanes, however, gained for him so much popularity, that he
-was placed high as an officer in the Corinthian service. Timoleon,
-animated with a full measure of brotherly attachment, not only tried
-to screen his defects as well as to set off his merits, but also
-incurred the greatest perils for the purpose of saving his life. In a
-battle against the Argeians and Kleonæans, Timophanes was commanding
-the cavalry, when his horse, being wounded, threw him on the ground,
-very near to the enemy. The remaining horsemen fled, leaving their
-commander to what seemed certain destruction; but Timoleon, who was
-serving among the hoplites, rushed singly forth from the ranks with
-his utmost speed, and covered Timophanes with his shield, when the
-enemy were just about to pierce him. He made head single-handed
-against them, warding off numerous spears and darts, and successfully
-protected his fallen brother until succor arrived; though at the cost
-of several wounds to himself.[295]
-
-  [295] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. At what time this battle took
-  place cannot be made out.
-
-This act of generous devotion raised great admiration towards
-Timoleon. But it also procured sympathy for Timophanes, who less
-deserved it. The Corinthians had recently incurred great risk of
-seeing their city fall into the hands of their Athenian allies, who
-had laid a plan to seize it, but were disappointed through timely
-notice given at Corinth.[296] To arm the people being regarded as
-dangerous to the existing oligarchy,[297] it was judged expedient
-to equip a standing force of four hundred paid foreign soldiers,
-and establish them as a permanent garrison in the strong and lofty
-citadel. The command of this garrison, with the mastery of the fort,
-was intrusted to Timophanes. A worse choice could not have been
-made. The new commander—seconded not only by his regiment and his
-strong position, but also by some violent partisans whom he took
-into his pay and armed, among the poorer citizens—speedily stood
-forth as despot, taking the whole government into his own hands. He
-seized numbers of the chief citizens, probably all the members of
-the oligarchical councils who resisted his orders, and put them to
-death without even form of trial.[298] Now, when it was too late,
-the Corinthians repented of the mistaken vote which had raised up a
-new Periander among them. But to Timoleon, the crimes of his brother
-occasioned an agony of shame and sorrow. He first went up to the
-acropolis[299] to remonstrate with him; conjuring him emphatically,
-by the most sacred motives public as well as private, to renounce
-his disastrous projects. Timophanes repudiated the appeal with
-contempt. Timoleon had now to choose between his brother and his
-country. Again he went to the acropolis, accompanied by Æschylus,
-brother of the wife of Timophanes—by the prophet Orthagoras, his
-intimate friend—perhaps also by another friend named Telekleides.
-Admitted into the presence of Timophanes, they renewed their prayers
-and supplications; urging him even yet to recede from his tyrannical
-courses. But all their pleading was without effect. Timophanes first
-laughed them to scorn; presently, he became exasperated, and would
-hear no more. Finding words unavailing, they now drew their swords
-and put him to death. Timoleon lent no hand in the deed, but stood a
-little way off, with his face hidden, and in a flood of tears.[300]
-
-  [296] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οἱ Κορίνθιοι, δεδιότες μὴ
-  πάθοιεν οἷα καὶ πρότερον ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων ἀποβαλόντες τὴν πόλιν,
-  etc.
-
-  The Corinthians were carrying on war, in conjunction with Athens
-  and Sparta, against Thebes, when (in 366 B. C.) the Athenians
-  laid their plan for seizing the city. The Corinthians, having
-  heard of it in time, took measures to frustrate it. See Xenophon,
-  Hellen. vii. 4, 4-5.
-
-  [297] Aristotel. Politic, v. 5, 9.
-
-  [298] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. συχνοὺς ἀνελὼν ἀκρίτους τῶν
-  πρώτων πολιτῶν, ἀνέδειξεν αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν τύραννον.
-
-  Diodorus (xvi. 65) coincides in the main fact—but differs in
-  several details.
-
-  [299] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. αὖθις ~ἀνέβη~ πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν,
-  etc.
-
-  [300] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4; Cornelius Nepos, Timol. c. 1;
-  Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 808 A. That Telekleides was
-  present and took part in the deed—though Plutarch directly names
-  only Æschylus and Orthagoras—seems to be implied in an indirect
-  allusion afterwards (c. 7), where Telekleides says to Timoleon
-  after his nomination to the Sicilian command, Ἂν νῦν καλῶς
-  ἀγωνίσῃς τύραννον ἀνῃρηκέναι ~δόξομεν~· ἂν δὲ φαυλῶς, ἀδελφόν.
-
-  The presence of the prophet seems to show, that they had just
-  been offering sacrifice, to ascertain the will of the gods
-  respecting what they were about to do.
-
-  Nepos says that Timoleon was not actually present at the moment
-  of his brother’s death, but stood out of the room to prevent
-  assistance from arriving.
-
-  Diodorus (xvi. 65) states that Timoleon slew his brother in the
-  market place. But the account of Plutarch appears preferable.
-
-With the life of Timophanes passed away the despotism which had
-already begun its crushing influence upon the Corinthians. The
-mercenary force was either dismissed, or placed in safe hands;
-the acropolis became again part of a free city; the Corinthian
-constitution was revived as before. In what manner this change was
-accomplished, or with what measure of violence it was accompanied,
-we are left in ignorance; for Plutarch tells us hardly anything
-except what personally concerns Timoleon. We learn however that the
-expressions of joy among the citizens, at the death of Timophanes and
-the restoration of the constitution, were vehement and universal.
-So strongly did this tide of sentiment run, as to carry along with
-it, in appearance, even those who really regretted the departed
-despotism. Afraid to say what they really felt about the deed,
-these men gave only the more abundant utterance to their hatred
-of the doer. Though it was good that Timophanes should be killed
-(they said), yet that he should be killed by his brother, and his
-brother-in-law, was a deed which tainted both the actors with
-inexpiable guilt and abomination. The majority of the Corinthian
-public, however, as well as the most distinguished citizens, took a
-view completely opposite. They expressed the warmest admiration as
-well for the doer as for the deed. They extolled the combination of
-warm family affection with devoted magnanimity and patriotism, each
-in its right place and properly balanced, which marked the conduct of
-Timoleon. He had displayed his fraternal affection by encountering
-the greatest perils in the battle, in order to preserve the life of
-Timophanes. But when that brother, instead of an innocent citizen,
-became the worst enemy of Corinth, Timoleon had then obeyed the
-imperative call of patriotism, to the disregard not less of his own
-comfort and interest than of fraternal affection.[301]
-
-  [301] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 5.
-
-Such was the decided verdict pronounced by the majority—a majority as
-well in value as in number—respecting the behavior of Timoleon. In
-his mind, however, the general strain of encomium was not sufficient
-to drown, or even to compensate, the language of reproach, in itself
-so much more pungent, which emanated from the minority. Among that
-minority too was found one person whose single voice told with
-profound impression—his mother Demaristê, mother also of the slain
-Timophanes. Demaristê not only thought of her murdered son with the
-keenest maternal sorrow, but felt intense horror and execration
-for the authors of the deed. She imprecated curses on the head of
-Timoleon, refused even to see him again, and shut her doors against
-his visits, in spite of earnest supplications.
-
-There wanted nothing more to render Timoleon thoroughly miserable,
-amidst the almost universal gratitude of Corinth. Of his strong
-fraternal affection for Timophanes, his previous conduct leaves no
-doubt. Such affection had to be overcome before he accompanied his
-tyrannicidal friends to the acropolis, and doubtless flowed back
-with extreme bitterness upon his soul, after the deed was done. But
-when to this internal source of distress, was added the sight of
-persons who shrank from contact with him as a fratricide, together
-with the sting of the maternal Erinnys—he became agonized even to
-distraction. Life was odious to him; he refused for some time all
-food, and determined to starve himself to death. Nothing but the
-pressing solicitude of friends prevented him from executing the
-resolve. But no consoling voice could impart to him spirit for the
-duties of public life. He fled the city and the haunts of men,
-buried himself in solitude amidst his fields in the country, and
-refrained from seeing or speaking to any one. For several years
-he thus hid himself like a self-condemned criminal; and even when
-time had somewhat mitigated the intensity of his anguish, he still
-shunned every prominent position, performing nothing more than his
-indispensable duties as a citizen. An interval of twenty years[302]
-had now elapsed from the death of Timophanes, to the arrival of the
-Syracusan application for aid. During all this time, Timoleon, in
-spite of the sympathy and willingness of admiring fellow-citizens,
-had never once chosen to undertake any important command or office.
-At length the _vox Dei_ is heard, unexpectedly, amidst the crowd;
-dispelling the tormenting nightmare which had so long oppressed his
-soul, and restoring him to healthy and honorable action.
-
-  [302] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 7.
-
-There is no doubt that the conduct of Timoleon and Æschylus in
-killing Timophanes was in the highest degree tutelary to Corinth. The
-despot had already imbrued his hands in the blood of his countrymen,
-and would have been condemned, by fatal necessity, to go on from
-bad to worse, multiplying the number of victims, as a condition of
-preserving his own power. To say that the deed ought not to have
-been done by near relatives, was tantamount to saying, that it ought
-not to have been done at all; for none but near relatives could
-have obtained that easy access which enabled them to effect it. And
-even Timoleon and Æschylus could not make the attempt without the
-greatest hazard to themselves. Nothing was more likely than that
-the death of Timophanes would be avenged on the spot; nor are we
-told how they escaped such vengeance from the soldiers at hand. It
-has been already stated that the contemporary sentiment towards
-Timoleon was divided between admiration of the heroic patriot, and
-abhorrence of the fratricide; yet with a large preponderance on the
-side of admiration, especially in the highest and best minds. In
-modern times the preponderance would be in the opposite scale. The
-sentiment of duty towards family covers a larger proportion of the
-field of morality, as compared with obligations towards country,
-than it did in ancient times; while that intense antipathy against
-a despot who overtops and overrides the laws, regarding him as the
-worst of criminals—which stood in the foreground of the ancient
-virtuous feeling—has now disappeared. Usurpation of the supreme
-authority is regarded generally among the European public as a crime,
-only where it displaces an established king already in possession;
-where there is no king, the successful usurper finds sympathy rather
-than censure: and few readers would have been displeased with
-Timoleon, had he even seconded his brother’s attempt. But in the
-view of Timoleon and of his age generally, even neutrality appeared
-in the light of treason to his country, when no other man but him
-could rescue her from the despot. This sentiment is strikingly
-embodied in the comments of Plutarch; who admires the fraternal
-tyrannicide, as an act of sublime patriotism, and only complains
-that the internal emotions of Timoleon were not on a level with
-the sublimity of the act; that the great mental suffering which
-he endured afterwards, argued an unworthy weakness of character;
-that the conviction of imperative patriotic duty, having been once
-deliberately adopted, ought to have steeled him against scruples,
-and preserved him from that after-shame and repentance which spoiled
-half the glory of an heroic act. The antithesis, between Plutarch
-and the modern European point of view, is here pointed; though I
-think his criticism unwarranted. There is no reason to presume
-that Timoleon ever felt ashamed and repentant for having killed
-his brother. Placed in the mournful condition of a man agitated by
-conflicting sentiments, and obeying that which he deemed to carry the
-most sacred obligation, he of necessity suffered from the violation
-of the other. Probably the reflection that he had himself saved the
-life of Timophanes, only that the latter might destroy the liberties
-of his country—contributed materially to his ultimate resolution; a
-resolution, in which Æschylus, another near relative, took even a
-larger share than he.
-
-It was in this state of mind that Timoleon was called upon to take
-the command of the auxiliaries for Syracuse. As soon as the vote
-had passed, Telekleides addressed to him a few words, emphatically
-exhorting him to strain every nerve, and to show what he was
-worth—with this remarkable point in conclusion—“If you now come off
-with success and glory, we shall pass for having slain a despot; if
-you fail, we shall be held as fratricides.”[303]
-
-  [303] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 7. Diodorus (xvi. 65) states this
-  striking antithesis as if it was put by the senate to Timoleon,
-  on conferring upon him the new command. He represents the
-  application from Syracuse as having come to Corinth shortly after
-  the death of Timophanes, and while the trial of Timoleon was
-  yet pending. He says that the senate nominated Timoleon to the
-  command, in order to escape the necessity of pronouncing sentence
-  one way or the other.
-
-  I follow the account of Plutarch, as preferable, in recognizing a
-  long interval between the death of Timophanes and the application
-  from Syracuse an interval of much mental suffering to Timoleon.
-
-He immediately commenced his preparation of ships and soldiers. But
-the Corinthians, though they had resolved on the expedition, were
-not prepared either to vote any considerable subsidy, or to serve in
-large numbers as volunteers. The means of Timoleon were so extremely
-limited, that he was unable to equip more than seven triremes, to
-which the Korkyræans (animated by common sympathy for Syracuse, as
-of old in the time of the despot Hippokrates[304]) added two more,
-and the Leukadians one. Nor could he muster more than one thousand
-soldiers, reinforced afterwards on the voyage to twelve hundred. A
-few of the principal Corinthians—Eukleides, Telemachus and Neon,
-among them—accompanied him. But the soldiers seem to have been
-chiefly miscellaneous mercenaries,—some of whom had served under the
-Phokians in the Sacred war (recently brought to a close), and had
-incurred so much odium as partners in the spoliation of the Delphian
-temple, that they were glad to take foreign service anywhere.[305]
-
-  [304] Herodot. vii. 155.
-
-  [305] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 8, 11, 12, 30; Diodor, xvi. 66;
-  Plutarch, Ser. Num. Vind. p. 552. In the Aristotelian treatise,
-  Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, s. 9, Timoleon is said to have had
-  _nine_ ships.
-
-Some enthusiasm was indeed required to determine volunteers in an
-enterprise of which the formidable difficulties, and the doubtful
-reward, were obvious from the beginning. But even before the
-preparations were completed, news came which seemed to render it all
-but hopeless. Hiketas sent a second mission, retracting all that he
-said in the first, and desiring that no expedition might be sent from
-Corinth. Not having received Corinthian aid in time (he said), he had
-been compelled to enter into alliance with the Carthaginians, who
-would not permit any Corinthian soldiers to set foot in Sicily. This
-communication, greatly exasperating the Corinthians against Hiketas,
-rendered them more hearty in votes to put him down. Yet their zeal
-for active service, far from being increased, was probably even
-abated by the aggravation of obstacles thus revealed. If Timoleon
-even reached Sicily, he would find numberless enemies, without a
-single friend of importance:—for without Hiketas, the Syracusan
-people were almost helpless. But it now seemed impossible that
-Timoleon with his small force could ever touch the Sicilian shore, in
-the face of a numerous and active Carthaginian fleet.[306]
-
-  [306] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 7.
-
-While human circumstances thus seemed hostile, the gods held out to
-Timoleon the most favorable signs and omens. Not only did he receive
-an encouraging answer at Delphi, but while he was actually in the
-temple, a fillet with intertwined wreaths and symbols of victory fell
-from one of the statues upon his head. The priestesses of Persephonê
-learnt from the goddess in a dream, that she was about to sail with
-Timoleon for Sicily, her own favorite island. Accordingly he caused
-a new special trireme to be fitted out, sacred to the Two goddesses
-(Dêmêtêr and Persephonê) who were about to accompany him. And when,
-after leaving Korkyra, the squadron struck across for a night voyage
-to the Italian coast, this sacred trireme was seen illumined by a
-blaze of light from heaven; while a burning torch on high, similar
-to that which was usually carried in the Eleusinian mysteries,
-ran along with the ship and guided the pilot to the proper landing
-place at Metapontum. Such manifestations of divine presence and
-encouragement, properly certified and commented upon by the prophets,
-rendered the voyage one of universal hopefulness to the armament.[307]
-
-  [307] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 8; Diodor. xvi. 66.
-
-These hopes, however, were sadly damped, when after disregarding
-a formal notice from a Carthaginian man-of-war, they sailed down
-the coast of Italy and at last reached Rhegium. This city, having
-been before partially revived under the name of Phœbia, by the
-younger Dionysius, appears now as reconstituted under its old name
-and with its full former autonomy, since the overthrow of his rule
-at Lokri and in Italy generally. Twenty Carthaginian triremes,
-double the force of Timoleon, were found at Rhegium awaiting his
-arrival—with envoys from Hiketas aboard. These envoys came with
-what they pretended to be good news. “Hiketas had recently gained a
-capital victory over Dionysius, whom he had expelled from most part
-of Syracuse, and was now blocking up in Ortygia; with hopes of soon
-starving him out, by the aid of a Carthaginian fleet. The common
-enemy being thus at the end of his resources, the war could not be
-prolonged. Hiketas therefore trusted that Timoleon would send back
-to Corinth his fleet and troops, now become superfluous. If Timoleon
-would do this, he (Hiketas) would be delighted to see him personally
-at Syracuse, and would gladly consult him in the resettlement of that
-unhappy city. But he could not admit the Corinthian armament into
-the island; moreover, even had he been willing, the Carthaginians
-peremptorily forbade it, and were prepared, in case of need, to repel
-it with their superior naval force now in the strait.”[308]
-
-  [308] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 9; Diodor. xvi. 68.
-
-The game which Hiketas was playing with the Carthaginians now stood
-plainly revealed, to the vehement indignation of the armament.
-Instead of being their friend, or even neutral, he was nothing less
-than a pronounced enemy, emancipating Syracuse from Dionysius only
-to divide it between himself and the Carthaginians. Yet with all
-the ardor of the armament, it was impossible to cross the strait
-in opposition to an enemy’s fleet of double force. Accordingly
-Timoleon resorted to a stratagem, in which the leaders and people
-of Rhegium, eagerly sympathizing with his projects of Sicilian
-emancipation, coöperated. In an interview with the envoys of Hiketas
-as well as with the Carthaginian commanders, he affected to accept
-the conditions prescribed by Hiketas; admitting at once that it was
-useless to stand out. But he at the same time reminded them, that
-he had been intrusted with the command of the armament for Sicilian
-purposes,—and that he should be a disgraced man, if he now conducted
-it back without touching the island; except under the pressure of
-some necessity not merely real, but demonstrable to all and attested
-by unexceptionable witnesses. He therefore desired them to appear,
-along with him, before the public assembly of Rhegium, a neutral
-city and common friend of both parties. They would then publicly
-repeat the communication which they had already made to him, and they
-would enter into formal engagement for the good treatment of the
-Syracusans, as soon as Dionysius should be expelled. Such proceeding
-would make the people of Rhegium witnesses on both points. They would
-testify on his (Timoleon’s) behalf, when he came to defend himself
-at Corinth, that he had turned his back only before invincible
-necessity, and that he had exacted everything in his power in the
-way of guarantee for Syracuse; they would testify also on behalf of
-the Syracusans, in case the guarantee now given should be hereafter
-evaded.[309]
-
-  [309] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 10.
-
-Neither the envoys of Hiketas, nor the Carthaginian commanders, had
-any motive to decline what seemed to them an unmeaning ceremony. Both
-of them accordingly attended, along with Timoleon, before the public
-assembly of Rhegium formally convened. The gates of the city were
-closed (a practice usual during the time of a public assembly): the
-Carthaginian men-of-war lay as usual near at hand, but in no state
-for immediate movement, and perhaps with many of the crews ashore;
-since all chance of hostility seemed to be past. What had been
-already communicated to Timoleon from Hiketas and the Carthaginians,
-was now repeated in formal deposition before the assembly; the envoys
-of Hiketas probably going into the case more at length, with certain
-flourishes of speech prompted by their own vanity. Timoleon stood by
-as an attentive listener; but before he could rise to reply, various
-Rhegine speakers came forward with comments or questions, which
-called up the envoys again. A long time was thus insensibly wasted,
-Timoleon often trying to get an opportunity to speak, but being
-always apparently constrained to give way to some obtrusive Rhegine.
-During this long time, however, his triremes in the harbor were not
-idle. One by one, with as little noise as possible, they quitted
-their anchorage and rowed out to sea, directing their course towards
-Sicily. The Carthaginian fleet, though seeing this proceeding,
-neither knew what it meant, nor had any directions to prevent it. At
-length the other Grecian triremes were all afloat and in progress;
-that of Timoleon alone remaining in the harbor. Intimation being
-secretly given to him as he sat in the assembly, he slipped away
-from the crowd, his friends concealing his escape—and got aboard
-immediately. His absence was not discovered at first, the debate
-continuing as if he were still present, and intentionally prolonged
-by the Rhegine speakers. At length the truth could no longer be kept
-back. The envoys and the Carthaginians found out that the assembly
-and the debate were mere stratagems, and that their real enemy had
-disappeared. But they found it out too late. Timoleon with his
-triremes was already on the voyage to Tauromenium in Sicily, where
-all arrived safe and without opposition. Overreached and humiliated,
-his enemies left the assembly in vehement wrath against the Rhegines,
-who reminded them that Carthaginians ought to be the last to complain
-of deception in others.[310]
-
-  [310] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 10, 11.
-
-The well-managed stratagem, whereby Timoleon had overcome a
-difficulty to all appearance insurmountable, exalted both his own
-fame and the spirits of his soldiers. They were now safe in Sicily,
-at Tauromenium, a recent settlement near the site of the ancient
-Naxos: receiving hearty welcome from Andromachus, the leading citizen
-of the place—whose influence was so mildly exercised, and gave such
-complete satisfaction, that it continued through and after the reform
-of Timoleon, when the citizens might certainly have swept it away
-if they had desired. Andromachus, having been forward in inviting
-Timoleon to come, now prepared to coöperate with him, and returned
-a spirited reply to the menaces sent over from Rhegium by the
-Carthaginians, after they had vainly pursued the Corinthian squadron
-to Tauromenium.
-
-But Andromachus and Tauromenium were but petty auxiliaries compared
-with the enemies against whom Timoleon had to contend; enemies
-now more formidable than ever. For Hiketas, incensed with the
-stratagem practised at Rhegium, and apprehensive of interruption
-to the blockade which he was carrying on against Ortygia, sent for
-an additional squadron of Carthaginian men-of-war to Syracuse;
-the harbor of which place was presently completely beset.[311]
-A large Carthaginian land force was also acting under Hanno in
-the western regions of the island, with considerable success
-against the Campanians of Entella and others.[312] The Sicilian
-towns had their native despots, Mamerkus at Katana—Leptines
-at Apollonia[313]—Nikodemus at Kentoripa—Apolloniades at
-Agyrium[314]—from whom Timoleon could expect no aid, except in so
-far as they might feel predominant fear of the Carthaginians. And
-the Syracusans, even when they heard of his arrival at Tauromenium,
-scarcely ventured to indulge hopes of serious relief from such a
-handful of men, against the formidable array of Hiketas and the
-Carthaginians under their walls. Moreover, what guarantee had they
-that Timoleon would turn out better than Dion, Kallippus, and others
-before him? seductive promisers of emancipation, who, if they
-succeeded, forgot the words by which they had won men’s hearts,
-and thought only of appropriating to themselves the sceptre of the
-previous despot, perhaps even aggravating all that was bad in his
-rule? Such was the question asked by many a suffering citizen of
-Syracuse, amidst that despair and sickness of heart which made the
-name of an armed liberator sound only like a new deceiver and a new
-scourge.[315]
-
-  [311] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11.
-
-  [312] Diodor. xvi. 67.
-
-  [313] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13-24; Diodor. xvi. 72.
-
-  [314] Diodor. xvi. 82.
-
-  [315] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11.
-
-It was by acts alone that Timoleon could refute such well-grounded
-suspicions. But at first, no one believed in him; nor could he
-escape the baneful effects of that mistrust which his predecessors
-had everywhere inspired. The messengers whom he sent round were so
-coldly received, that he seemed likely to find no allies beyond the
-walls of Tauromenium.
-
-At length one invitation, of great importance, reached him—from the
-town of Adranum, about forty miles inland from Tauromenium; a native
-Sikel town, seemingly in part hellenized, inconsiderable in size, but
-venerated as sacred to the god Adranus, whose worship was diffused
-throughout all Sicily. The Adranites being politically divided, at
-the same time that one party sent the invitation to Timoleon, the
-other despatched a similar message to Hiketas. Either at Syracuse or
-Leontini, Hiketas was nearer to Adranum than Timoleon at Tauromenium;
-and lost no time in marching thither, with five thousand troops, to
-occupy so important a place. He arrived there in the evening, found
-no enemy, and established his camp without the walls, believing
-himself already master of the place. Timoleon, with his inferior
-numbers, knew that he had no chance of success except in surprise.
-Accordingly, on setting out from Tauromenium, he made no great
-progress the first day, in order that no report of his approach might
-reach Adranum; but on the next morning he marched with the greatest
-possible effort, taking the shortest, yet most rugged paths. On
-arriving within about three miles of Adranum, he was informed that
-the troops from Syracuse, having just finished their march, had
-encamped near the town, not aware of any enemy near. His officers
-were anxious that the men should be refreshed after their very
-fatiguing march, before they ventured to attack an army four times
-superior in number. But Timoleon earnestly protested against any
-such delay, entreating them to follow him at once against the enemy,
-as the only chance of finding them unprepared. To encourage them,
-he at once took up his shield and marched at their head, carrying
-it on his arm (the shield of the general was habitually carried for
-him by an orderly), in spite of the fatiguing march, which he had
-himself performed on foot as well as they. The soldiers obeyed, and
-the effort was crowned by complete success. The troops of Hiketas,
-unarmed and at their suppers, were taken so completely by surprise,
-that in spite of their superior number, they fled with scarce any
-resistance. From the rapidity of their flight, three hundred of them
-only were slain, But six hundred were made prisoners, and the whole
-camp, including its appurtenances, was taken, with scarcely the loss
-of a man. Hiketas escaped with the rest to Syracuse.[316]
-
-  [316] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 12; Diodor. xvi. 68. Diodorus and
-  Plutarch agree in the numbers both of killed and of prisoners on
-  the side of Hiketas.
-
-This victory, so rapidly and skilfully won—and the acquisition of
-Adranum which followed it—produced the strongest sensation throughout
-Sicily. It counted even for more than a victory; it was a declaration
-of the gods in favor of Timoleon. The inhabitants of the holy
-town, opening their gates and approaching him with awe-stricken
-reverence, recounted the visible manifestations of the god Adranus
-in his favor. At the moment when the battle was commencing, they
-had seen the portals of their temple spontaneously burst open, and
-the god brandishing his spear, with profuse perspiration on his
-face.[317] Such facts,—verified and attested in a place of peculiar
-sanctity, and circulated from thence throughout the neighboring
-communities,—contributed hardly less than the victory to exalt the
-glory of Timoleon. He received offers of alliance from Tyndaris and
-several other towns, as well as from Mamerkus despot of Katana,
-one of the most warlike and powerful princes in the island.[318]
-So numerous were the reinforcements thus acquired, and so much was
-his confidence enhanced by recent success, that he now ventured to
-march even under the walls of Syracuse, and defy Hiketas; who did not
-think it prudent to hazard a second engagement with the victor of
-Adranum.[319]
-
-  [317] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 12.
-
-  [318] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13; Diodor. xvi. 69.
-
-  [319] Diodor. xvi. 68, 69. That Timoleon marched up to Syracuse,
-  is stated by Diodorus, though not by Plutarch. I follow Diodorus
-  so far; because it makes the subsequent proceedings in regard to
-  Dionysius more clear and intelligible.
-
-  But Diodorus adds two further matters, which cannot be correct.
-  He affirms that Timoleon pursued Hiketas at a running pace
-  (δρομαῖος) immediately from the field of battle at Adranum to
-  Syracuse; and that he then got possession of the portion of
-  Syracuse called Epipolæ.
-
-  Now it was with some difficulty that Timoleon could get his
-  troops even up to the field of battle at Adranum, without some
-  previous repose; so long and fatiguing was the march which they
-  had undergone from Tauromenium. It is therefore impossible that
-  they can have been either inclined or competent to pursue (at
-  a rapid pace) Hiketas immediately from the field of battle at
-  Adranum to Syracuse.
-
-  Next, it will appear from subsequent operations, that Timoleon
-  did not, on this occasion, get possession of any other portion of
-  Syracuse than the Islet Ortygia, surrendered to him by Dionysius.
-  He did not enter Epipolæ until afterwards.
-
-Hiketas was still master of all Syracuse—except Ortygia, against
-which he had constructed lines of blockade, in conjunction with
-the Carthaginian fleet occupying the harbor. Timoleon was in no
-condition to attack the place, and would have been obliged speedily
-to retire, as his enemies did not choose to come out. But it was soon
-seen that the manifestations of the Two goddesses, and of the god
-Adranus, in his favor, were neither barren nor delusive. A real boon
-was now thrown into his lap, such as neither skill nor valor could
-have won. Dionysius, blocked up in Ortygia with a scanty supply of
-provisions, saw from his walls the approaching army of Timoleon, and
-heard of the victory of Adranum. He had already begun to despair of
-his own position of Ortygia;[320] where indeed he might perhaps hold
-out by bold effort and steady endurance, but without any reasonable
-chance of again becoming master of Syracuse; a chance which Timoleon
-and the Corinthian intervention cut off more decidedly than ever.
-Dionysius was a man not only without the energetic character and
-personal ascendency of his father, which might have made head
-against such difficulties—but indolent and drunken in his habits,
-not relishing a sceptre when it could only be maintained by hard
-fighting, nor stubborn enough to stand out to the last merely as a
-cause of war.[321] Under these dispositions, the arrival of Timoleon
-both suggested to him the idea, and furnished him with the means, of
-making his resignation subservient to the purchase of a safe asylum
-and comfortable future maintenance: for to a Grecian despot, with
-the odium of past severities accumulated upon his head, abnegation
-of power was hardly ever possible, consistent with personal
-security.[322] But Dionysius felt assured that he might trust to the
-guarantee of Timoleon and the Corinthians for shelter and protection
-at Corinth, with as much property as he could carry away with him;
-since he had the means of purchasing such guarantee by the surrender
-of Ortygia—a treasure of inestimable worth. Accordingly he resolved
-to propose a capitulation, and sent envoys to Timoleon for the
-purpose.
-
-  [320] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13. ἀπειρηκὼς ἤδη ταῖς ἐλπίσι καὶ
-  μικρὸν ἀπολιπὼν ἐκπολιορκεῖσθαι, etc.
-
-  [321] Tacitus, Histor. iii. 70. Respecting the last days of the
-  Emperor Vitellius, “Ipse, neque jubendi neque vetandi potens, non
-  jam Imperator, sed tantum belli causa erat.”
-
-  [322] See, among other illustrations of this fact, the striking
-  remark of Solon (Plutarch, Solon, c. 14).
-
-There was little difficulty in arranging terms. Dionysius stipulated
-only for a safe transit with his movable property to Corinth, and
-for an undisturbed residence in that city; tendering in exchange
-the unconditional surrender of Ortygia with all its garrison, arms,
-and magazines. The convention was concluded forthwith, and three
-Corinthian officers—Telemachus, Eukleides and Neon—were sent in with
-four hundred men to take charge of the place. Their entrance was
-accomplished safely, though they were obliged to elude the blockade
-by stealing in at several times, and in small companies. Making over
-to them the possession of Ortygia with the command of its garrison,
-Dionysius passed, with some money and a small number of companions,
-into the camp of Timoleon; who conveyed him away, leaving at the same
-time the neighborhood of Syracuse.[323]
-
-  [323] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13; Diodor. xvi. 70. Diodorus
-  appears to me to misdate these facts; placing the capitulation of
-  Dionysius and the surrender of Ortygia to Timoleon, _after_ the
-  capture of the other portion of Syracuse by Timoleon. I follow
-  Plutarch’s chronology, which places the capitulation of Ortygia
-  first.
-
-Conceive the position and feelings of Dionysius, a prisoner in the
-camp of Timoleon, traversing that island over which his father as
-well as himself had reigned all-powerful, and knowing himself to
-be the object of either hatred or contempt to every one,—except so
-far as the immense boon which he had conferred, by surrendering
-Ortygia, purchased for him an indulgent forbearance! He was doubtless
-eager for immediate departure to Corinth, while Timoleon was no
-less anxious to send him thither, as the living evidence of triumph
-accomplished. Although not fifty days[324] had yet elapsed, since
-Timoleon’s landing in Sicily, he was enabled already to announce a
-decisive victory, a great confederacy grouped around him, and the
-possession of the inexpugnable position of Ortygia, with a garrison
-equal in number to his own army; the despatches being accompanied
-by the presence of that very despot, bearing the terrific name
-of Dionysius, against whom the expedition had been chiefly aimed!
-Timoleon sent a special trireme[325] to Corinth, carrying Dionysius,
-and communicating important events, together with the convention
-which guaranteed to the dethroned ruler an undisturbed residence in
-that city.
-
-  [324] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 16.
-
-  [325] Theopompus stated that Dionysius had gone from Sicily to
-  Corinth in a merchant ship (νηῒ στρογγύλῃ). Timæus contradicted
-  this assertion seemingly with his habitual asperity, and stated
-  that Dionysius had been sent in a ship of war (νηῒ μακρᾷ). See
-  Timæus, Fragment 133; Theopompus, Fragm. 216, ed. Didot.
-
-  Diodorus (xvi. 70) copies Theopompus.
-
-  Polybius (xii. 4 _a_) censures Timæus for cavilling at such
-  small inaccuracies, as if the difference between the two were
-  not worth noticing. Probably the language of Timæus may have
-  deserved blame as ill-mannered; but the matter of fact appears to
-  me to have been perfectly worth correcting. To send Dionysius in
-  a trireme, was treating him as prisoner in a respectful manner,
-  which Timoleon was doubtless bound to do; and which he would be
-  inclined to do on his own account—seeing that he had a strong
-  interest in making the entry of Dionysius as a captive into
-  Corinth, an impressive sight. Moreover the trireme would reach
-  Corinth more speedily than the merchantman.
-
-  That Dionysius should go in a merchant-ship, was one additional
-  evidence of fallen fortune; and this seems to have been the
-  reason why it was taken up by Theopompus—from the passion,
-  prevalent among so many Greek authors, for exaggerating contrasts.
-
-The impression produced at Corinth by the arrival of this trireme
-and its passengers was powerful beyond all parallel. Astonishment
-and admiration were universal; for the expedition of Timoleon had
-started as a desperate venture, in which scarce one among the leading
-Corinthians had been disposed to embark; nor had any man conceived
-the possibility of success so rapid as well as so complete. But the
-victorious prospect in Sicily, with service under the fortunate
-general, was now the general passion of the citizens. A reinforcement
-of two thousand hoplites and two hundred cavalry was immediately
-voted and equipped.[326]
-
-  [326] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13, 14, 15.
-
-If the triumph excited wonder and joy, the person of Dionysius
-himself appealed no less powerfully to other feelings. A fallen
-despot was a sight denied to Grecian eyes; whoever aspired to
-despotism, put his all to hazard, forfeiting his chance of retiring
-to a private station. By a remarkable concurrence of circumstances,
-the exception to this rule was presented just where it was least
-likely to take place; in the case of the most formidable and odious
-despotism which had ever overridden the Grecian world. For nearly
-half a century prior to the expedition of Dion against Syracuse,
-every one had been accustomed to pronounce the name of Dionysius
-with a mixture of fear and hatred—the sentiment of prostration
-before irresistible force. How much difficulty Dion himself found,
-in overcoming this impression in the minds of his own soldiers, has
-been already related. Though dissipated by the success of Dion, the
-antecedent alarm became again revived, when Dionysius recovered his
-possession of Ortygia, and when the Syracusans made pathetic appeal
-to Corinth for aid against him. Now, on a sudden, the representative
-of this extinct greatness, himself bearing the awful name of
-Dionysius, enters Corinth under a convention, suing only for the
-humble domicile and unpretending security of a private citizen.[327]
-The Greek mind was keenly sensitive to such contrasts, which entered
-largely into every man’s views of human affairs, and were reproduced
-in a thousand forms by writers and speakers. The affluence of
-visitors—who crowded to gaze upon and speak to Dionysius, not merely
-from Corinth, but from other cities of Greece—was immense; some in
-simple curiosity, others with compassion, a few even with insulting
-derision. The anecdotes which are recounted seem intended to convey
-a degrading impression of this last period of his career. But even
-the common offices of life—the purchase of unguents and condiments at
-the tavern[328]—the nicety of criticism displayed respecting robes
-and furniture[329]—looked degrading when performed by the ex-despot
-of Syracuse. His habit of drinking largely, already contracted, was
-not likely to become amended in these days of mortification; yet on
-the whole his conduct seems to have had more dignity than could have
-been expected. His literary tastes, manifested during the time of his
-intercourse with Plato, are implied even in the anecdotes intended to
-disparage him. Thus he is said to have opened a school for teaching
-boys to read, and to have instructed the public singers in the art
-of singing or reciting poetry.[330] His name served to subsequent
-writers, both Greek and Roman,—as those of Crœsus, Polykrates, and
-Xerxes, serve to Herodotus—for an instance to point a moral on the
-mutability of human events. Yet the anecdotes recorded about him can
-rarely be verified, nor can we distinguish real matters of fact from
-those suitable and impressive myths which so pregnant a situation was
-sure to bring forth.
-
-  [327] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 14; Diodor. xvi. 70. The remarks
-  of Tacitus upon the last hours of the Emperor Vitellius have
-  their application to the Greek feeling on this occasion (Histor.
-  iii. 68):—“Nec quisquam adeo rerum humanarum immemor, quem non
-  commoveret illa facies; Romanum principem, et generis humani
-  paulo ante dominum, relictâ fortunæ suæ sede, exire de imperio.
-  _Nihil tale viderant, nihil audierant_,” etc.
-
-  [328] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 14; Theopomp. Fragm. 217, ed.
-  Didot.; Justin xxi. 5.
-
-  [329] Timæus, ap. Polybium. xii. 24.
-
-  [330] Plutarch, Timol. c. 14; Cicero, Tuscul. Disp. iii. 12, 7.
-  His remark, that Dionysius opened the school from anxiety still
-  to have the pleasure of exercising authority, can hardly be meant
-  as serious.
-
-  We cannot suppose that Dionysius in his exile at Corinth suffered
-  under any want of a comfortable income: for it is mentioned, that
-  all his movable furniture (ἐπισκευὴ) was bought by his namesake
-  Dionysius, the fortunate despot of the Pontic Herakleia; and
-  this furniture was so magnificent, that the acquisition of it is
-  counted among the peculiar marks of ornament and dignity to the
-  Herakleotic dynasty:—see the Fragments of the historian Memnon of
-  Herakleia, ch. iv. p. 10, ed. Orell. apud Photium Cod. 224.
-
-Among those who visited him at Corinth was Aristoxenus of Tarentum:
-for the Tarentine leaders, first introduced by Plato, had maintained
-their correspondence with Dionysius even after his first expulsion
-from Syracuse to Lokri, and had vainly endeavored to preserve his
-unfortunate wife and daughters from the retributive vengeance
-of the Lokrians. During the palmy days of Dionysius, his envoy
-Polyarchus had been sent on a mission to Tarentum, where he came into
-conversation with the chief magistrate Archytas. This conversation
-Aristoxenus had recorded in writing; probably from the personal
-testimony of Archytas, whose biography he composed. Polyarchus dwelt
-upon wealth, power, and sensual enjoyments, as the sole objects worth
-living for; pronouncing those who possessed them in large masses,
-as the only beings deserving admiration. At the summit of all stood
-the Persian King, whom Polyarchus extolled as the most enviable and
-admirable of mortals. “Next to the Persian King (said he), though
-with a very long interval, comes our despot of Syracuse.”[331] What
-had become of Polyarchus, we do not know; but Aristoxenus lived to
-see the envied Dionysius under the altered phase of his life at
-Corinth, and probably to witness the ruin of the Persian Kings also.
-On being asked, what had been the cause of his displeasure against
-Plato, Dionysius replied, in language widely differing from that
-of his former envoy Polyarchus, that amidst the many evils which
-surrounded a despot, none was so mischievous as the unwillingness of
-his so-called friends to tell him the truth. Such false friends had
-poisoned the good feeling between him and Plato.[332] This anecdote
-bears greater mark of being genuine, than others which we read more
-witty and pungent. The Cynic philosopher Diogenes treated Dionysius
-with haughty scorn for submitting to live in a private station after
-having enjoyed so overruling an ascendency. Such was more or less the
-sentiment of every visitor who saw him; but the matter to be lamented
-is, that he had not been in a private station from the beginning.
-He was by nature unfit to tread, even with profit to himself, the
-perilous and thorny path of a Grecian despot.
-
-  [331] Aristoxenus, Fragm. 15, ed. Didot. ap. Athenæum, p. 545.
-  δεύτερον δὲ, φησὶ, τὸν ἡμέτερον τύραννον θείη τις ἂν, καίπερ πολὺ
-  λειπόμενον.
-
-  One sees that the word τύραννος was used even by those who
-  intended no unfriendly sense—applied by an admiring envoy to his
-  master.
-
-  [332] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 15. Aristoxenus heard from Dionysius
-  at Corinth the remarkable anecdote about the faithful attachment
-  of the two Pythagorean friends, Damon and Phintias. Dionysius
-  had been strongly impressed with the incident, and was fond of
-  relating it (~πολλάκις~ ἡμῖν διηγεῖτο, Aristoxen. Fragm. 9, ed.
-  Didot; apud Jamblichum Vit. Pythag. s. 233).
-
-The reinforcements decreed by the Corinthians, though equipped
-without delay and forwarded to Thurii in Italy, were prevented
-from proceeding farther on shipboard by the Carthaginian squadron
-at the strait, and were condemned to wait for a favorable
-opportunity.[333] But the greatest of all reinforcements to Timoleon
-was, the acquisition of Ortygia. It contained not merely a garrison
-of two thousand soldiers—who passed (probably much to their own
-satisfaction) from the declining cause of Dionysius to the victorious
-banner of Timoleon—but also every species of military stores. There
-were horses, engines for siege and battery, missiles of every sort,
-and above all, shields and spears to the amazing number of seventy
-thousand—if Plutarch’s statement is exact.[334] Having dismissed
-Dionysius, Timoleon organized a service of small craft from Katana to
-convey provisions by sea to Ortygia, eluding the Carthaginian guard
-squadron. He found means to do this with tolerable success,[335]
-availing himself of winds or bad weather, when the ships of war could
-not obstruct the entrance of the lesser harbor. Meanwhile he himself
-returned to Adranum, a post convenient for watching both Leontini and
-Syracuse. Here two assassins, bribed by Hiketas, were on the point
-of taking his life, while sacrificing at a festival; and were only
-prevented by an accident so remarkable, that every one recognized the
-visible intervention of the gods to protect him.[336]
-
-  [333] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 16.
-
-  [334] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13.
-
-  [335] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 18.
-
-  [336] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 16.
-
-Meanwhile Hiketas, being resolved to acquire possession of Ortygia,
-invoked the aid of the full Carthaginian force under Magon. The
-great harbor of Syracuse was presently occupied by an overwhelming
-fleet of one hundred and fifty Carthaginian ships of war, while a
-land force, said to consist of sixty thousand men, came also to join
-Hiketas, and were quartered by him within the walls of Syracuse.
-Never before had any Carthaginian troops got footing within those
-walls. Syracusan liberty, perhaps Syracusan Hellenism, now appeared
-extinct. Even Ortygia, in spite of the bravery of its garrison under
-the Corinthian Neon, seemed not long tenable, against repeated attack
-and battery of the walls, combined with strict blockade to keep out
-supplies by sea. Still, however, though the garrison was distressed,
-some small craft with provisions from Katana contrived to slip in; a
-fact, which induced Hiketas and Magon to form the plan of attacking
-that town, thinking themselves strong enough to accomplish this by
-a part of their force, without discontinuing the siege of Ortygia.
-Accordingly they sailed forth from the harbor, and marched from the
-city of Syracuse, with the best part of their armament, to attack
-Katana, leaving Ortygia still under blockade. But the commanders
-left behind were so negligent in their watch, that Neon soon saw
-from the walls of Ortygia the opportunity of attacking them with
-advantage. Making a sudden and vigorous sally, he fell upon the
-blockading army unawares, routed them at all points with serious
-loss, and pressed his pursuit so warmly, that he got possession of
-Achradina, expelling them from that important section of the city.
-The provisions and money, acquired herein at a critical moment,
-rendered this victory important. But what gave it the chief value
-was, the possession of Achradina which Neon immediately caused to
-be joined on to Ortygia by a new line of fortifications, and thus
-held the two in combination.[337] Ortygia had been before (as I have
-already remarked) completely distinct from Achradina. It is probable
-that the population of Achradina, delighted to be liberated from
-the Carthaginians, lent zealous aid to Neon both in the defence of
-their own walls, and in the construction of the new connecting lines
-towards Ortygia; for which the numerous intervening tombs would
-supply materials.
-
-  [337] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 18. ... Ὁ δὲ Κορίνθιος Νέων,
-  κατιδὼν ἀπὸ τῆς ἄκρας τοὺς ὑπολελειμμένους τῶν πολεμίων ἀργῶς
-  καὶ ἀμελῶς φυλάττοντας, ἐξαίφνης ἐνέπεσε διεσπαρμένοις αὐτοῖς·
-  καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀνελὼν, τοὺς δὲ τρεψάμενος, ἐκράτησε καὶ κατέσχε
-  τὴν λεγομένην Ἀχραδινὴν, ὃ κράτιστον ἐδόκει καὶ ἀθραυστότατον
-  ὑπάρχειν τῆς Συρακουσίων μέρος πόλεως, τρόπον τινα συγκειμένης
-  καὶ συνηρμοσμένης ἐκ πλειόνων πόλεων. Εὐπορήσας δὲ καὶ σίτου καὶ
-  χρημάτων οὐκ ἀφῆκε τὸν τόπον, οὐδ᾽ ἀνεχώρησε πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄκραν,
-  ἀλλὰ φραξάμενος τὸν περίβολον τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς ~καὶ συνάψας τοῖς
-  ἐρύμασι πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν~, διεφύλαττε.
-
-This gallant exploit of Neon permanently changed the position of the
-combatants at Syracuse. A horseman started instantly to convey the
-bad news to Hiketas and Magon near Katana. Both of them returned
-forthwith; but they returned only to occupy half of the city—Tycha,
-Neapolis, and Epipolæ. It became extremely difficult to prosecute a
-successful siege or blockade of Ortygia and Achradina united: besides
-that Neon had now obtained abundant supplies for the moment.
-
-Meanwhile Timoleon too was approaching, reinforced by the new
-Corinthian division; who, having been at first detained at Thurii,
-and becoming sick of delay, had made their way inland, across the
-Bruttian territory, to Rhegium. They were fortunate enough to find
-the strait unguarded; for the Carthaginian admiral Hanno—having seen
-their ships laid up at Thurii, and not anticipating their advance
-by land—had first returned with his squadron to the Strait of
-Messina, and next, hoping by a stratagem to frighten the garrison of
-Ortygia into surrender, had sailed to the harbor of Syracuse with his
-triremes decorated as if after a victory. His seamen with wreaths
-round their heads, shouted as they passed into the harbor under
-the walls of Ortygia, that the Corinthian squadron approaching the
-strait had been all captured, and exhibited as proofs of the victory
-certain Grecian shields hung up aboard. By this silly fabrication,
-Hanno probably produced a serious dismay among the garrison of
-Ortygia. But he purchased such temporary satisfaction at the cost of
-leaving the strait unguarded, and allowing the Corinthian division
-to cross unopposed from Italy into Sicily. On reaching Rhegium,
-they not only found the strait free, but also a complete and sudden
-calm, succeeding upon several days of stormy weather. Embarking
-immediately on such ferry boats and fishing craft as they could find,
-and swimming their horses alongside by the bridle, they reached the
-Sicilian coast without loss or difficulty.[338]
-
-  [338] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 19.
-
-Thus did the gods again show their favor towards Timoleon by an
-unusual combination of circumstances, and by smiting the enemy with
-blindness. So much did the tide of success run along with him, that
-the important town of Messênê declared itself among his allies,
-admitting the new Corinthian soldiers immediately on their landing.
-With little delay, they proceeded forward to join Timoleon; who
-thought himself strong enough, notwithstanding that even with this
-reinforcement he could only command four thousand men, to march up
-to the vicinity of Syracuse, and there to confront the immeasurably
-superior force of his enemies.[339] He appears to have encamped near
-the Olympieion, and the bridge over the river Anapus.
-
-  [339] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 20.
-
-Though Timoleon was sure of the coöperation of Neon and the
-Corinthian garrison in Ortygia and Achradina, yet he was separated
-from them by the numerous force of Hiketas and Magon, who occupied
-Epipolæ, Neapolis, and Tycha, together with the low ground between
-Epipolæ and the Great Harbor; while the large Carthaginian fleet
-filled the Harbor itself. On a reasonable calculation, Timoleon
-seemed to have little chance of success. But suspicion had already
-begun in the mind of Magon, sowing the seeds of disunion between
-him and Hiketas. The alliance between Carthaginians and Greeks
-was one unnatural to both parties, and liable to be crossed, at
-every mischance, by mutual distrust, growing out of antipathy
-which each party felt in itself and knew to subsist in the other.
-The unfortunate scheme of marching to Katana, with the capital
-victory gained by Neon in consequence of that absence, made Magon
-believe that Hiketas was betraying him. Such apprehensions were
-strengthened, when he saw in his front the army of Timoleon, posted
-on the river Anapus—and when he felt that he was in a Greek city
-generally disaffected to him, while Neon was at his rear in Ortygia
-and Achradina. Under such circumstances, Magon conceived the whole
-safety of his Carthaginians as depending on the zealous and faithful
-coöperation of Hiketas, in whom he had now ceased to confide.
-And his mistrust, once suggested, was aggravated by the friendly
-communication which he saw going on between the soldiers of Timoleon
-and those of Hiketas. These soldiers, all Greeks and mercenaries
-fighting for a country not their own, encountered each other, on
-the field of battle, like enemies,—but conversed in a pacific and
-amicable way, during intervals, in their respective camps. Both
-were now engaged, without disturbing each other, in catching eels
-amidst the marshy and watery ground between Epipolæ and the Anapus.
-Interchanging remarks freely, they were admiring the splendor and
-magnitude of Syracuse with its great maritime convenience,—when one
-of Timoleon’s soldiers observed to the opposite party—“And this
-magnificent city, you, Greeks as you are, are striving to barbarise,
-planting these Carthaginian cut-throats nearer to us than they now
-are; though our first anxiety ought to be, to keep them as far off as
-possible from Greece. Do you really suppose that they have brought
-up this host from the Atlantic and the pillars of Herakles, all for
-the sake of Hiketas and his rule? Why, if Hiketas took measure of
-affairs like a true ruler, he would not thus turn out his brethren,
-and bring in an enemy to his country; he would ensure to himself an
-honorable sway, by coming to an understanding with the Corinthians
-and Timoleon.” Such was the colloquy passing between the soldiers
-of Timoleon and those of Hiketas, and speedily made known to the
-Carthaginians. Having made apparently strong impression on those to
-whom it was addressed, it justified alarm in Magon; who was led to
-believe that he could no longer trust his Sicilian allies. Without
-any delay, he put all his troops aboard the fleet, and in spite
-of the most strenuous remonstrances from Hiketas sailed away to
-Africa.[340]
-
-  [340] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 20.
-
-On the next day, when Timoleon approached to the attack, he was
-amazed to find the Carthaginian army and fleet withdrawn. His
-soldiers, scarcely believing their eyes, laughed to scorn the
-cowardice of Magon. Still however Hiketas determined to defend
-Syracuse with his own troops, in spite of the severe blow inflicted
-by Magon’s desertion. That desertion had laid open both the Harbor,
-and the lower ground near the Harbor; so that Timoleon was enabled
-to come into direct communication with his garrison in Ortygia and
-Achradina, and to lay plans for a triple simultaneous onset. He
-himself undertook to attack the southern front of Epipolæ towards the
-river Anapus, where the city was strongest; the Corinthian Isias was
-instructed to make a vigorous assault from Achradina, or the eastern
-side; while Deinarchus and Demaretus, the generals who had conducted
-the recent reinforcement from Corinth, were ordered to attack the
-northern wall of Epipolæ, or the Hexapylon;[341] they were probably
-sent round from Ortygia, by sea, to land at Trogilus. Hiketas,
-holding as he did the aggregate consisting of Epipolæ, Tycha,
-and Neapolis, was assailed on three sides at once. He had a most
-defensible position, which a good commander, with brave and faithful
-troops, might have maintained against forces more numerous than those
-of Timoleon. Yet in spite of such advantages, no effective resistance
-was made, nor even attempted. Timoleon not only took the place, but
-took it without the loss of a single man, killed or wounded. Hiketas
-and his followers fled to Leontini.[342]
-
-  [341] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 21. The account given by Plutarch of
-  Timoleon’s attack is very intelligible. He states that the side
-  of Epipolæ fronting southwards or towards the river Anapus was
-  the strongest.
-
-  Saverio Cavallari (Zur Topographie von Syrakus, p. 22) confirms
-  this, by remarking that the northern side of Epipolæ, towards
-  Trogilus, is the weakest, and easiest for access or attack.
-
-  We thus see that Epipolæ was the _last_ portion of Syracuse which
-  Timoleon mastered—not the _first_ portion, as Diodorus states
-  (xvi. 69).
-
-  [342] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 21.
-
-The desertion of Magon explains of course a great deal of
-discouragement among the soldiers of Hiketas. But when we read the
-astonishing facility of the capture, it is evident that there must
-have been something more than discouragement. The soldiers on defence
-were really unwilling to use their arms for the purpose of repelling
-Timoleon, and keeping up the dominion of Hiketas in Syracuse. When we
-find this sentiment so powerfully manifested, we cannot but discern
-that the aversion of these men to serve, in what they looked upon
-as a Carthaginian cause, threw into the hands of Timoleon an easy
-victory, and that the mistrustful retreat of Magon was not so absurd
-and cowardly as Plutarch represents.[343]
-
-  [343] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 20, 21. Diodorus also implies the
-  same verdict (xvi. 69), though his account is brief as well as
-  obscure.
-
-The Grecian public, however, not minutely scrutinizing preliminary
-events, heard the easy capture as a fact, and heard it with unbounded
-enthusiasm. From Sicily and Italy the news rapidly spread to Corinth
-and other parts of Greece. Everywhere the sentiment was the same;
-astonishment and admiration, not merely at the magnitude of the
-conquest, but also at the ease and rapidity with which it had been
-achieved. The arrival of the captive Dionysius at Corinth had been in
-itself a most impressive event. But now the Corinthians learnt the
-disappearance of the large Carthaginian host and the total capture of
-Syracuse, without the loss of a man; and that too before they were
-even assured that their second reinforcement, which they knew to have
-been blocked up at Thurii, had been able to touch the Sicilian shore.
-
-Such transcendent novelties excited even in Greece, and much more
-in Sicily itself, a sentiment towards Timoleon such as hardly any
-Greek had ever yet drawn to himself. His bravery, his skilful plans,
-his quickness of movement, were indeed deservedly admired. But in
-this respect, others had equalled him before; and we may remark that
-even the Corinthian Neon, in his capture of Achradina, had rivalled
-anything performed by his superior officer. But that which stood
-without like or second in Timoleon—that which set a peculiar stamp
-upon all his meritorious qualities—was, his superhuman good fortune;
-or—what in the eyes of most Greeks was the same thing in other
-words—the unbounded favor with which the gods had cherished both his
-person and his enterprise. Though greatly praised as a brave and able
-man, Timoleon was still more affectionately hailed as an enviable
-man.[344] “Never had the gods been so manifest in their dispensations
-of kindness towards any mortal.[345]” The issue, which Telekleides
-had announced as being upon trial when Timoleon was named, now stood
-triumphantly determined. After the capture of Syracuse, we may be
-sure that no one ever denounced Timoleon as a fratricide;—every one
-extolled him as a tyrannicide. The great exploits of other eminent
-men, such as Agesilaus and Epaminondas, had been achieved at the cost
-of hardship, severe fighting, wounds and death to those concerned,
-etc., all of which counted as so many deductions from the perfect
-mental satisfaction of the spectator. Like an oration or poem
-smelling of the lamp, they bore too clearly the marks of preliminary
-toil and fatigue. But Timoleon, as the immortal gods descending to
-combat on the plain of Troy, accomplished splendid feats,—overthrew
-what seemed insuperable obstacles—by a mere first appearance, and
-without an effort. He exhibited to view a magnificent result,
-executed with all that apparent facility belonging as a privilege
-to the inspirations of first-rate genius.[346] Such a spectacle of
-virtue and good fortune combined—glorious consummation with graceful
-facility—was new to the Grecian world.
-
-  [344] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 21. Τὸ μὲν ἁλῶναι τὴν πόλιν
-  (Syracuse) κατ᾽ ἄκρας καὶ γενέσθαι ταχέως ὑποχείριον ἐκπεσόντων
-  τῶν πολεμίων, δίκαιον ἀναθεῖναι τῇ τῶν μαχομένων ἀνδραγαθίᾳ καὶ
-  τῇ δεινότητι τοῦ στρατηγοῦ· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν τινα μηδὲ τρωθῆναι
-  τῶν Κορινθίων, ἴδιον ἔργον αὑτῆς ἡ Τιμολέοντος ἐπεδείξατο
-  τύχη, καθάπερ διαμιλλωμένη πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς, ~ἵνα
-  τῶν ἐπαινουμένων αὐτοῦ τὰ μακαριζόμενα μᾶλλον οἱ πυνθανόμενοι
-  θαυμάζωσιν~.
-
-  [345] Homer, Odyss. iii. 219 (Nestor addressing Telemachus).
-
-    Εἰ γάρ σ᾽ ὣς ἔθελοι φιλέειν γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη,
-    Ὡς τότ᾽ Ὀδυσσῆος περικήδετο κυδαλίμοιο
-    Δήμῳ ἔνι Τρώων, ὅθι πάσχομεν ἄλγε᾽ Ἀχαῖοι—
-    Οὐ γάρ πω ἴδον ὧδε θεοὺς ἀναφανδὰ φιλεῦντας,
-    Ὡς κείνῳ ἀναφανδὰ παρίστατο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη.
-
-  [346] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36. μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ πολὺ τὸ ῥᾳδίως
-  ἔχουσα (ἡ Τιμολέοντος στρατηγία) φαίνεται, τοῖς εὖ καὶ δικαίως
-  λογιζομένοις, οὐ τύχης ἔργον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀρετῆς εὐτυχούσης.
-
-For all that he had done, Timoleon took little credit to himself.
-In the despatch which announced to the Corinthians his _Veni, Vidi,
-Vici_, as well as in his discourses at Syracuse, he ascribed the
-whole achievement to fortune or to the gods, whom he thanked for
-having inscribed his name as nominal mover of their decree for
-liberating Sicily.[347] We need not doubt that he firmly believed
-himself to be a favored instrument of the divine will, and that he
-was even more astonished than others at the way in which locked gates
-flew open before him. But even if he had not believed it himself,
-there was great prudence in putting this coloring on the facts; not
-simply because he thereby deadened the attacks of envy, but because,
-under the pretence of modesty, he really exalted himself much higher.
-He purchased for himself a greater hold on men’s minds towards his
-future achievements, as the beloved of the gods, than he would ever
-have possessed as only a highly endowed mortal. And though what he
-had already done was prodigious, there still remained much undone;
-new difficulties, not the same in kind, yet hardly less in magnitude,
-to be combated.
-
-  [347] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36; Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 4;
-  Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 E.
-
-It was not only new difficulties, but also new temptations, which
-Timoleon had to combat. Now began for him that moment of trial,
-fatal to so many Greeks before him. Proof was to be shown, whether
-he could swallow, without intoxication or perversion, the cup
-of success administered to him in such overflowing fulness. He
-was now complete master of Syracuse; master of it too with the
-fortifications of Ortygia yet standing,—with all the gloomy means
-of despotic compression, material and moral, yet remaining in his
-hand. In respect of personal admiration and prestige of success, he
-stood greatly above Dion, and yet more above the elder Dionysius
-in the early part of his career. To set up for himself as despot
-at Syracuse, burying in oblivion all that he had said or promised
-before, was a step natural and feasible; not indeed without peril or
-difficulty, but carrying with it chances of success equal to those of
-other nascent despotisms, and more than sufficient to tempt a leading
-Greek politician of average morality. Probably most people in Sicily
-actually expected that he would avail himself of his unparalleled
-position to stand forth as a new Dionysius. Many friends and
-partisans would strenuously recommend it. They would even deride
-him as an idiot (as Solon had been called in his time[348]) for not
-taking the boon which the gods set before him, and for not hauling up
-the net when the fish were already caught in it. There would not be
-wanting other advisers to insinuate the like recommendation under the
-pretence of patriotic disinterestedness, and regard for the people
-whom he had come to liberate. The Syracusans (it would be contended),
-unfit for a free constitution, must be supplied with liberty in small
-doses, of which Timoleon was the best judge: their best interests
-require that Timoleon should keep in his hands the anti-popular power
-with little present diminution, in order to restrain their follies,
-and ensure to them benefits which they would miss if left to their
-own free determination.
-
-  [348] Solon, Fragm. 26, ed. Schneid.; Plutarch, Solon, c. 14.
-
-    Οὐκ ἔφυ Σόλων βαθύφρων, οὐδὲ βουλήεις ἀνήρ·
-    Ἐσθλὰ γὰρ θεοῦ διδόντος, αὐτὸς οὐκ ἐδέξατο.
-    Περιβαλὼν δ᾽ ἄγραν, ἀγασθεὶς οὐκ ἀνέσπασεν μέγα
-    Δίκτυον, θυμοῦ θ᾽ ἁμαρτῇ καὶ φρενῶν ἀποσφαλείς.
-
-Considerations of this latter character had doubtless greatly
-weighed with Dion in the hour of his victory, over and above mere
-naked ambition, so as to plunge him into that fatal misjudgment and
-misconduct out of which he never recovered. But the lesson deducible
-from the last sad months of Dion’s career was not lost upon Timoleon.
-He was found proof, not merely against seductions within his own
-bosom, but against provocations or plausibilities from without.
-Neither for self-regarding purposes, nor for beneficent purposes,
-would he be persuaded to grasp and perpetuate the anti-popular
-power. The moment of trial was that in which the genuine heroism and
-rectitude of judgment united in his character, first shone forth with
-its full brightness.
-
-Master as he now was of all Syracuse, with its fivefold aggregate,
-Ortygia, Achradina, Tycha, Neapolis, and Epipolæ—he determined to
-strike down at once that great monument of servitude which the elder
-Dionysius had imposed upon his fellow citizens. Without a moment’s
-delay, he laid his hand to the work. He invited by proclamation every
-Syracusan who chose, to come with iron instruments, and coöperate
-with him in demolishing the separate stronghold, fortification, and
-residence, constructed by the elder Dionysius in Ortygia; as well as
-the splendid funeral monument erected to the memory of that despot by
-his son and successor.[349] This was the first public act executed
-in Syracuse by his order; the first manifestation of the restored
-sovereignty of the people; the first outpouring of sentiment, at
-once free, hearty, and unanimous, among men trodden down by half
-a century of servitude; the first fraternizing coöperation of
-Timoleon and his soldiers with them, for the purpose of converting
-the promise of liberation into an assured fact. That the actual
-work of demolition was executed by the hands and crowbars of the
-Syracusans themselves, rendered the whole proceeding an impressive
-compact between them and Timoleon. It cleared away all mistake, all
-possibility of suspicion, as to his future designs. It showed that
-he had not merely forsworn despotism for himself, but that he was
-bent on rendering it impossible for any one else, when he began by
-overthrowing what was not only the conspicuous memento, but also
-the most potent instrument, of the past despots. It achieved the
-inestimable good of inspiring at once confidence in his future
-proceedings, and disposing the Syracusans to listen voluntarily to
-his advice. And it was beneficial, not merely in smoothing the way to
-farther measures of pacific reconstruction, but also in discharging
-the reactionary antipathies of the Syracusans, inevitable after so
-long an oppression, upon unconscious stones; and thus leaving less of
-it to be wreaked on the heads of political rivals, compromised in the
-former proceedings.
-
-  [349] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 22. Γενόμενος δὲ τῆς ἀκρᾶς κύριος,
-  οὐκ ἔπαθε Δίωνι ταὐτὸ πάθος, οὐδ᾽ ἐφείσατο τοῦ τόπου διὰ τὸ
-  κάλλος καὶ τὴν πολυτέλειαν τῆς κατασκευῆς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκεῖνον
-  διαβαλοῦσαν, εἶτ᾽ ἀπολέσασαν ὑποψίαν φυλαξάμενος, ἐκήρυξε τῶν
-  Συρακοσίων τὸν βουλόμενον παρεῖναι μετὰ σιδήρου καὶ συνεφάπτεσθαι
-  τῶν τυραννικῶν ἐρυμάτων. Ὡς δὲ πάντες ἀνέβησαν, ἀρχὴν ἐλευθερίας
-  ποιησάμενοι βεβαιοτάτην τὸ κήρυγμα καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκείνην, οὐ
-  μόνον τὴν ἄκραν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὰ μνήματα τῶν τυράννων
-  ἀνέτρεψαν καὶ κατέσκαψαν. Εὐθὺς δὲ τὸν τόπον συνομαλύνας,
-  ἐνῳκοδόμησε τὰ δικαστήρια, χαριζόμενος τοῖς πολίταις, καὶ τῆς
-  τυραννίδος ὑπερτέραν ποιῶν τὴν δημοκρατίαν.
-
-  Compare Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 3.
-
-This important act of demolition was farther made subservient to
-a work of new construction, not less significant of the spirit in
-which Timoleon had determined to proceed. Having cleared away the
-obnoxious fortress, he erected upon the same site, and probably with
-the same materials, courts for future judicature. The most striking
-symbol and instrument of popular government thus met the eye as a
-local substitute for that of the past despotism.
-
-Deep was the gratitude of the Syracusans for these proceedings—the
-first fruits of Timoleon’s established ascendency. And if we regard
-the intrinsic importance of the act itself—the manner in which an
-emphatic meaning was made to tell as well upon the Syracusan eye as
-upon the Syracusan mind—the proof evinced not merely of disinterested
-patriotism, but also of prudence in estimating the necessities of the
-actual situation—lastly, the foundation thus laid for accomplishing
-farther good—if we take all these matters together, we shall feel
-that Timoleon’s demolition of the Dionysian Bastile, and erection in
-its place of a building for the administration of justice, was among
-the most impressive phenomena in Grecian history.
-
-The work which remained to be done was indeed such as to require the
-best spirit, energy and discretion, both on his part and on that of
-the Syracusans. Through long oppression and suffering, the city was
-so impoverished and desolate, that the market-place (if we were to
-believe what must be an exaggeration of Plutarch) served as pasture
-for horses, and as a place of soft repose for the grooms who attended
-them. Other cities of Sicily exhibited the like evidence of decay,
-desertion, and poverty. The manifestations of city life had almost
-ceased in Sicily. Men were afraid to come into the city, which
-they left to the despot and his mercenaries, retiring themselves
-to live on their fields and farms, and shrinking from all acts of
-citizenship. Even the fields were but half cultivated, so as to
-produce nothing beyond bare subsistence. It was the first anxiety
-of Timoleon to revive the once haughty spirit of Syracuse out of
-this depth of insecurity and abasement; to which revival no act
-could be more conducive than his first proceedings in Ortygia. His
-next step was to bring together, by invitations and proclamations
-everywhere circulated, those exiles who had been expelled, or forced
-to seek refuge elsewhere, during the recent oppression. Many of
-these, who had found shelter in various parts of Sicily and Italy,
-obeyed his summons with glad readiness.[350] But there were others,
-who had fled to Greece or the Ægean islands, and were out of the
-hearing of any proclamations from Timoleon. To reach persons thus
-remote, recourse was had, by him and by the Syracusans conjointly,
-to Corinthian intervention. The Syracusans felt so keenly how much
-was required to be done for the secure reorganization of their city
-as a free community, that they eagerly concurred with Timoleon in
-entreating the Corinthians to undertake, a second time, the honorable
-task of founders of Syracuse.[351]
-
-  [350] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23; Diodor. xvi. 83.
-
-  [351] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23.
-
-Two esteemed citizens, Kephalus and Dionysius, were sent from Corinth
-to coöperate with Timoleon and the Syracusans, in constituting the
-community anew, on a free and popular basis, and in preparing an
-amended legislation.[352] These commissioners adopted, for their main
-text and theme, the democratical constitution and laws as established
-by Dioklês about seventy years before, which the usurpation of
-Dionysius had subverted when they were not more than seven years
-old. Kephalus professed to do nothing more than revive the laws of
-Dioklês, with such comments, modifications, and adaptations, as the
-change of times and circumstances had rendered necessary.[353] In the
-laws respecting inheritance and property, he is said to have made no
-change at all; but unfortunately we are left without any information
-what were the laws of Dioklês, or how they were now modified. It
-is certain, however, that the political constitution of Dioklês
-was a democracy, and that the constitution as now reëstablished
-was democratical also.[354] Beyond this general fact we can assert
-nothing.
-
-  [352] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 24.
-
-  [353] Diodor. xiii. 35; xvi. 81.
-
-  [354] Diodor. xvi. 70.
-
-Though a free popular constitution, however, was absolutely
-indispensable, and a good constitution a great boon—it was not the
-only pressing necessity for Syracuse. There was required, no less an
-importation of new citizens; and not merely of poor men bringing with
-them their arms and their industry, but also of persons in affluent
-or easy circumstances, competent to purchase lands and houses.
-Besides much land ruined or gone out of cultivation, the general
-poverty of the residents was extreme; while at the same time the
-public exigencies were considerable, since it was essential, among
-other things, to provide pay for those very soldiers of Timoleon to
-whom they owed their liberation. The extent of poverty was painfully
-attested by the fact that they were constrained to sell those public
-statues which formed the ornaments of Syracuse and its temples; a
-cruel wound to the sentiments of every Grecian community. From this
-compulsory auction, however, they excepted by special vote the statue
-of Gelon, in testimony of gratitude for his capital victory at Himera
-over the Carthaginians.[355]
-
-  [355] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23; Dion Chrysostom, Orat. xxxvii.
-  p. 460.
-
-For the renovation of a community thus destitute, new funds as well
-as new men were wanted; and the Corinthians exerted themselves
-actively to procure both. Their first proclamation was indeed
-addressed specially to Syracusan exiles, whom they invited to resume
-their residence at Syracuse as free and autonomous citizens under a
-just allotment of lands. They caused such proclamation to be publicly
-made at all the Pan-hellenic and local festivals; prefaced by a
-certified assurance that the Corinthians had already overthrown both
-the despotism and the despot—a fact which the notorious presence
-of Dionysius himself at Corinth contributed to spread more widely
-than any formal announcement. They farther engaged, if the exiles
-would muster at Corinth, to provide transports, convoy, and leaders,
-to Syracuse, free of all cost. The number of exiles, who profited
-by the invitation and came to Corinth, though not inconsiderable,
-was still hardly strong enough to enter upon the proposed Sicilian
-renovation. They themselves therefore entreated the Corinthians to
-invite additional colonists from other Grecian cities. It was usually
-not difficult to find persons disposed to embark in a new settlement,
-if founded under promising circumstances, and effected under the
-positive management of a powerful presiding city.[356] There were
-many opulent persons anxious to exchange the condition of metics
-in an old city for that of full citizens in a new one. Hence the
-more general proclamation now issued by the Corinthians attracted
-numerous applicants, and a large force of colonists was presently
-assembled at Corinth; an aggregate of ten thousand persons, including
-the Syracusan exiles.[357]
-
-  [356] Compare the case of the Corinthian proclamation respecting
-  Epidamnus, Thucyd. i. 27; the Lacedæmonian foundation of
-  Herakleia, Thucyd. iii. 93; the proclamation of the Battiad
-  Arkesilaus at Samos, for a new body of settlers to Kyrênê
-  (Herodot. iv. 163).
-
-  [357] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23. Diodorus states only five
-  thousand (xvi. 82) as coming from Corinth.
-
-When conveyed to Syracuse, by the fleet and under the formal sanction
-of the Corinthian government, these colonists found a still larger
-number there assembled, partly Syracusan exiles, yet principally
-emigrants from the different cities of Sicily and Italy. The Italian
-Greeks, at this time hard pressed by the constantly augmenting force
-of the Lucanians and Bruttians, were becoming so unable to defend
-themselves without foreign aid, that several were probably disposed
-to seek other homes. The invitation of Timoleon counted even more
-than that of the Corinthians as an allurement to new comers—from
-the unbounded admiration and confidence which he now inspired; more
-especially as he was actually present at Syracuse. Accordingly, the
-total of immigrants from all quarters (restored exiles as well as
-others) to Syracuse in its renovated freedom was not less than sixty
-thousand.[358]
-
-  [358] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23. To justify his statement of this
-  large total, Plutarch here mentions (I wish he did so oftener)
-  the author from whom he copied it—Athanis, or Athanas. That
-  author was a native Syracusan, who wrote a history of Syracusan
-  affairs from the termination of the history of Philistus in 363
-  or 362 B. C., down to the death of Timoleon in 337 B. C.; thus
-  including all the proceedings of Dion and Timoleon. It is deeply
-  to be lamented that nothing remains of his work (Diodor. xv. 94;
-  Fragment. Historic. Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 81). His name
-  seems to be mentioned in Theopompus (Fr. 212, ed. Didot) as joint
-  commander of the Syracusan troops, along with Herakleides.
-
-Nothing can be more mortifying than to find ourselves without
-information as to the manner in which Timoleon and Kephalus dealt
-with this large influx. Such a state of things, as it produces many
-new embarrassments and conflicting interests, so it calls for a
-degree of resource and original judgment which furnishes good measure
-of the capacity of all persons concerned, rendering the juncture
-particularly interesting and instructive. Unfortunately we are not
-permitted to know the details. The land of Syracuse is said to have
-been distributed, and the houses to have been sold for one thousand
-talents—the large sum of 230,000_l_. A right of preëmption was
-allowed to the Syracusan exiles for repurchasing the houses formerly
-their own. As the houses were sold, and that too for a considerable
-price—so we may presume that the lands were sold also, and that
-the incoming settlers did not receive their lots gratuitously. But
-how they were sold, or how much of the territory was sold, we are
-left in ignorance. It is certain, however, that the effect of the
-new immigration was not only to renew the force and population of
-Syracuse, but also to furnish relief to the extreme poverty of the
-antecedent residents. A great deal of new money must thus have been
-brought in.[359]
-
-  [359] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23. καὶ γενομένοις αὐτοῖς
-  ἑξακισμυρίοις τὸ πλῆθος, ὡς Ἄθανις εἴρηκε, τὴν μὲν χώραν
-  διένειμε, τὰς δὲ οἰκίας ἀπέδοτο χιλίων ταλάντων, ἅμα μὲν
-  ὑπολειπόμενος τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Συρακουσίοις ἐξωνεῖσθαι τὰς αὑτῶν,
-  ἅμα δὲ χρημάτων εὐπορίαν τῷ δήμῳ μηχανώμενος οὕτως πενομένῳ καὶ
-  πρὸς τἄλλα καὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, ὥστε, etc.
-
-  Diodorus (xvi. 82) affirms that forty thousand new settlers
-  were admitted εἰς τὴν Συρακουσίαν τὴν ἀδιαίρετον, and that ten
-  thousand were settled in the fine and fertile territory of
-  Agyrium. This latter measure was taken certainly, after the
-  despot of Agyrium had been put down by Timoleon. We should
-  have been glad to have an explanation of τὴν Συρακουσίαν τὴν
-  ἀδιαίρετον: in the absence of information, conjecture as to the
-  meaning is vain.
-
-Such important changes doubtless occupied a considerable time,
-though we are not enabled to arrange them in months or years. In the
-meantime Timoleon continued to act in such a manner as to retain, and
-even to strengthen, the confidence and attachment of the Syracusans.
-He employed his forces actively in putting down and expelling the
-remaining despots throughout the island. He first attacked Hiketas,
-his old enemy, at Leontini; and compelled him to capitulate, on
-condition of demolishing the fortified citadel, abdicating his
-rule, and living as a private citizen in the town. Leptines, despot
-of Apollonia and of several other neighboring townships, was also
-constrained to submit, and to embrace the offer of a transport to
-Corinth.[360]
-
-  [360] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 24.
-
-It appears that the submission of Hiketas was merely a feint, to
-obtain time for strengthening himself by urging the Carthaginians to
-try another invasion of Sicily.[361] They were the more disposed to
-this step as Timoleon, anxious to relieve the Syracusans, sent his
-soldiers under the Corinthian Deinarchus to find pay and plunder for
-themselves in the Carthaginian possessions near the western corner
-of Sicily. This invasion, while it abundantly supplied the wants of
-the soldiers, encouraged Entella and several other towns to revolt
-from Carthage. The indignation among the Carthaginians had been
-violent, when Magon returned after suddenly abandoning the harbor of
-Syracuse to Timoleon. Unable to make his defence satisfactory, Magon
-only escaped a worse death by suicide, after which his dead body
-was crucified by public order. And the Carthaginians now resolved
-on a fresh effort, to repair their honor as well as to defend their
-territory.[362]
-
-  [361] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30. Diodor. (xvi. 72) does not
-  mention that Hiketas submitted at all. He states that Timoleon
-  was repulsed in attacking Leontini; and that Hiketas afterwards
-  attacked Syracuse, but was repulsed with loss, during the absence
-  of Timoleon in his expedition against Leptines.
-
-  [362] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 24; Diodor. xvi. 73.
-
-The effort was made on a vast scale, and with long previous
-preparations. An army said to consist of seventy thousand men, under
-Hasdrubal and Hamilkar, was disembarked at Lilybæum, on the western
-corner of the island; besides which there was a fleet of two hundred
-triremes, and one thousand attendant vessels carrying provisions,
-warlike stores, engines for sieges, war-chariots with four horses,
-etc.[363] But the most conspicuous proof of earnest effort, over and
-above numbers and expense, was furnished by the presence of no less
-than ten thousand native infantry from Carthage; men clothed with
-panoplies costly, complete, and far heavier than ordinary—carrying
-white shields and wearing elaborate breastplates besides. These men
-brought to the campaign ample private baggage; splendid goblets and
-other articles of gold and silver, such as beseemed the rich families
-of that rich city. The _élite_ of the division—twenty-five hundred
-in number, or one-fourth part—formed what was called the Sacred Band
-of Carthage.[364] It has been already stated, that in general, the
-Carthaginians caused their military service to be performed by hired
-foreigners, with few of their own citizens. Hence this army stood
-particularly distinguished, and appeared the more formidable on
-their landing; carrying panic, by the mere report, all over Sicily
-not excepting even Syracuse. The Corinthian troops ravaging the
-Carthaginian province were obliged to retreat in haste, and sent to
-Timoleon for reinforcement.
-
-  [363] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 25; Diodor. xvi. 77. They agree in
-  the main about the numerical items, and seem to have copied from
-  the same authority.
-
-  [364] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27; Diodor. xvi. 80.
-
-The miscellaneous body of immigrants recently domiciliated at
-Syracuse, employed in the cares inseparable from new settlement, had
-not come prepared to face so terrible a foe. Though Timoleon used
-every effort to stimulate their courage, and though his exhortations
-met with full apparent response, yet such was the panic prevailing,
-that comparatively few would follow him to the field. He could
-assemble no greater total than twelve thousand men; including about
-three thousand Syracusan citizens—the paid force which he had round
-him at Syracuse—that other paid force under Deinarchus, who had
-been just compelled by the invaders to evacuate the Carthaginian
-province—and finally such allies as would join.[365] His cavalry
-was about one thousand in number. Nevertheless, in spite of so
-great an inferiority, Timoleon determined to advance and meet
-the enemy in their own province, before they should have carried
-ravage over the territory of Syracuse and her allies. But when he
-approached near to the border, within the territory of Agrigentum,
-the alarm and mistrust of his army threatened to arrest his farther
-progress. An officer among his mercenaries, named Thrasius, took
-advantage of the prevailing feeling to raise a mutiny against him,
-persuading the soldiers that Timoleon was madly hurrying them on
-to certain ruin, against an enemy six times superior in number,
-and in a hostile country eight days’ march from Syracuse; so that
-there would be neither salvation for them in case of reverse, nor
-interment if they were slain. Their pay being considerably in
-arrear Thrasius urged them to return to Syracuse for the purpose of
-extorting the money, instead of following a commander, who could not
-or would not requite them, upon such desperate service. Such was the
-success and plausibility of these recommendations, under the actual
-discouragement, that they could hardly be counterworked by all the
-efforts of Timoleon. Nor was there ever any conjuncture in which his
-influence, derived as well from unbounded personal esteem as from
-belief in his favor with the gods, was so near failing. As it was,
-though he succeeded in heartening up and retaining the large body
-of his army, yet Thrasius, with one thousand of the mercenaries,
-insisted upon returning, and actually did return, to Syracuse.
-Moreover Timoleon was obliged to send an order along with them to
-the authorities at home, that these men must immediately, and at all
-cost, receive their arrears of pay. The wonder is, that he succeeded
-in his efforts to retain the rest, after insuring to the mutineers a
-lot which seemed so much safer and more enviable. Thrasius, a brave
-man, having engaged in the service of the Phokians Philomêlus and
-Onomarchus, had been concerned in the pillage of the Delphian temple,
-which drew upon him the aversion of the Grecian world.[366] How
-many of the one thousand seceding soldiers, who now followed him to
-Syracuse, had been partners in the same sacrilegious act, we cannot
-tell. But it is certain that they were men who had taken service
-with Timoleon in hopes of a period, not merely of fighting, but also
-of lucrative license, such as his generous regard for the settled
-inhabitants would not permit.
-
-  [365] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 25; Diodor. xvi. 78. Diodorus gives
-  the total of Timoleon’s force at twelve thousand men; Plutarch at
-  only six thousand. The larger total appears to me most probable,
-  under the circumstances. Plutarch seems to have taken account
-  only of the paid force who were with Timoleon at Syracuse, and
-  not to have enumerated that other division, which, having been
-  sent to ravage the Carthaginian province, had been compelled
-  to retire and rejoin Timoleon when the great Carthaginian host
-  landed.
-
-  Diodorus and Plutarch follow in the main the same authorities
-  respecting this campaign.
-
-  [366] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30.
-
-Having succeeded in keeping up the spirits of his remaining army, and
-affecting to treat the departure of so many cowards as a positive
-advantage, Timoleon marched on westward into the Carthaginian
-province, until he approached within a short distance of the river
-Krimêsus, a stream which rises in the mountainous region south of
-Panormus (Palermo), runs nearly southward, and falls into the sea
-near Selinus. Some mules, carrying loads of parsley, met him on the
-road; a fact which called forth again the half-suppressed alarm of
-the soldiers, since parsley was habitually employed for the wreaths
-deposited on tombstones. But Timoleon, taking a handful of it and
-weaving a wreath for his own head, exclaimed, “This is our Corinthian
-symbol of victory: it is the sacred herb with which we decorate our
-victors at the Isthmian festival. It comes to us here spontaneously,
-as an earnest of our approaching success.” Insisting emphatically on
-this theme, and crowning himself as well as his officers with the
-parsley, he rekindled the spirits of the army, and conducted them
-forward to the top of the eminence, immediately above the course of
-the Krimêsus.[367]
-
-  [367] The anecdote about the parsley is given both in Plutarch
-  (Timol. c. 26) and Diodorus (xvi. 79).
-
-  The upper portion of the river Krimêsus, near which this battle
-  was fought, was in the mountainous region called by Diodorus ἡ
-  Σελινουντία δυσχωρία: through which lay the road between Selinus
-  and Panormus (Diodor. xxiii. Frag. p. 333, ed. Wess.).
-
-It was just at that moment that the Carthaginian army were passing
-the river, on their march to meet him. The confused noise and
-clatter of their approach were plainly heard; though the mist of
-a May morning,[368] overhanging the valley, still concealed from
-the eye the army crossing. Presently the mist ascended from the
-lower ground to the hill tops around, leaving the river and the
-Carthaginians beneath in conspicuous view. Formidable was the aspect
-which they presented. The war-chariots-and-four,[369] which formed
-their front, had already crossed the river, and appear to have been
-halting a little way in advance. Next to them followed the native
-Carthaginians, ten thousand chosen hoplites with white shields, who
-had also in part crossed and were still crossing; while the main
-body of the host, the foreign mercenaries, were pressing behind in
-a disorderly mass to get to the bank, which appears to have been in
-part rugged. Seeing how favorable was the moment for attacking them,
-while thus disarrayed and bisected by the river, Timoleon, after
-a short exhortation, gave orders immediately to charge down the
-hill.[370] His Sicilian allies, with some mercenaries intermingled,
-were on the two wings; while he himself, with the Syracusans and the
-best of the mercenaries, occupied the centre. Demaretus with his
-cavalry was ordered to assail the Carthaginians first, before they
-could form regularly. But the chariots in their front, protecting the
-greater part of the line, left him only the power of getting at them
-partially through the vacant intervals. Timoleon, soon perceiving
-that his cavalry accomplished little, recalled them and ordered them
-to charge on the flanks, while he himself, with all the force of his
-infantry, undertook to attack in front. Accordingly, seizing his
-shield from the attendant, he marched forward in advance, calling
-aloud to the infantry around to be of good cheer and follow. Never
-had his voice been heard so predominant and heart-stirring; the
-effect of it was powerfully felt on the spirits of all around, who
-even believed that they heard a god speaking along with him.[371]
-Reëchoing his shout emphatically, they marched forward to the charge
-with the utmost alacrity—in compact order, and under the sound of
-trumpets.
-
-  [368] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27. ἱσταμένου θέρους ὥραν—λήγοντι
-  μηνὶ Θαργηλίωνι, etc.
-
-  [369] Of these war-chariots they are said to have had not less
-  than two thousand, in the unsuccessful battle which they fought
-  against Agathokles in Africa, near Carthage (Diodor. xx. 10).
-
-  After the time of Pyrrhus, they came to employ tame elephants
-  trained for war.
-
-  [370] It appears from Polybius that Timæus ascribed to Timoleon,
-  immediately before this battle, an harangue which Polybius
-  pronounces to be absurd and unsuitable (Timæus, Fr. 134, ed.
-  Didot; Polyb. xii. 26 _a_).
-
-  [371] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27. Ἀναλαβὼν τὴν ἀσπίδα καὶ βοήσας
-  ἕπεσθαι καὶ θαῤῥεῖν τοῖς πέζοις ἔδοξεν ὑπερφυεῖ φωνῇ καὶ μείζονι
-  κεχρῆσθαι τοῦ συνήθους, εἴτε τῷ πάθει παρὰ τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ τὸν
-  ἐνθουσιασμὸν οὕτω διατεινάμενος, εἴτε ~δαιμονίου τινὸς, ὡς τοῖς
-  πολλοῖς τότε παρέστη, συνεπιφθεγξαμένου~.
-
-The infantry were probably able to evade or break through the
-bulwark of interposed chariots with greater ease than the cavalry,
-though Plutarch does not tell us how this was done. Timoleon and his
-soldiers then came into close and furious contest with the chosen
-Carthaginian infantry, who resisted with a courage worthy of their
-reputation. Their vast shields, iron breastplates, and brazen helmets
-(forming altogether armor heavier than was worn usually even by
-Grecian hoplites), enabled them to repel the spear-thrusts of the
-Grecian assailants, who were compelled to take to their swords, and
-thus to procure themselves admission within the line of Carthaginian
-spears, so as to break their ranks. Such use of swords is what we
-rarely read of in a Grecian battle. Though the contest was bravely
-maintained by the Carthaginians, yet they were too much loaded with
-armor to admit of anything but fighting in a dense mass. They were
-already losing their front rank warriors, the picked men of the
-whole, and beginning to fight at a disadvantage—when the gods, yet
-farther befriending Timoleon, set the seal to their discomfiture
-by an intervention manifest and terrific.[372] A storm of the most
-violent character began. The hill-tops were shrouded in complete
-darkness; the wind blew a hurricane; rain and hail poured abundantly,
-with all the awful accompaniments of thunder and lightning. To the
-Greeks, this storm was of little inconvenience, because it came in
-their backs. But to the Carthaginians, pelting as it did directly in
-their faces, it occasioned both great suffering, and soul-subduing
-alarm. The rain and hail beat, and the lightning flashed, in their
-faces, so that they could not see to deal with hostile combatants:
-the noise of the wind, and of hail rattling against their armor,
-prevented the orders of their officers from being heard: the folds
-of their voluminous military tunics were surcharged with rain-water,
-so as to embarrass their movements: the ground presently became so
-muddy that they could not keep their footing; and when they once
-slipped, the weight of their equipment forbade all recovery. The
-Greeks, comparatively free from inconvenience, and encouraged by the
-evident disablement of their enemies, pressed them with redoubled
-energy. At length, when the four hundred front rank men of the
-Carthaginians had perished by a brave death in their places, the
-rest of the White-shields turned their backs and sought relief in
-flight. But flight, too, was all but impossible. They encountered
-their own troops in the rear advancing up, and trying to cross the
-Krimêsus; which river itself was becoming every minute fuller and
-more turbid, through the violent rain. The attempt to recross was one
-of such unspeakable confusion, that numbers perished in the torrent.
-Dispersing in total rout, the whole Carthaginian army thought only
-of escape, leaving their camp and baggage a prey to the victors, who
-pursued them across the river and over the hills on the other side,
-inflicting prodigious slaughter. In this pursuit the cavalry of
-Timoleon, not very effective during the battle, rendered excellent
-service; pressing the fugitive Carthaginians one over another in
-mass, and driving them, overloaded with their armor, into mud and
-water, from whence they could not get clear.[373]
-
-  [372] Diodor. xvi. 79. Περιεγένοντο γὰρ ἀνελπίστως τῶν πολεμίων,
-  οὐ μόνον διὰ τὰς ἰδίας ἀνδραγαθίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν θεῶν
-  συνεργίαν.
-
-  [373] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27, 28; Diodor. xvi. 79, 80.
-
-No victory in Grecian history was ever more complete than that of
-Timoleon at the Krimêsus. Ten thousand Carthaginians are said to have
-been slain, and fifteen thousand made prisoners. Upon these numbers
-no stress is to be laid; but it is certain that the total of both
-must have been very great. Of the war-chariots, many were broken
-during the action, and all that remained, two hundred in number,
-fell into the hands of the victors. But that which rendered the loss
-most serious, and most painfully felt at Carthage, was, that it fell
-chiefly upon the native Carthaginian troops, and much less upon the
-foreign mercenaries. It is even said that the Sacred Battalion of
-Carthage, comprising twenty-five hundred soldiers belonging to the
-most considerable families in Carthage, were all slain to a man;
-a statement, doubtless, exaggerated, yet implying a fearful real
-destruction. Many of these soldiers purchased safe escape by throwing
-away their ornamented shields and costly breastplates, which the
-victors picked up in great numbers—one thousand breastplates, and
-not less than ten thousand shields. Altogether, the spoil collected
-was immense—in arms, in baggage, and in gold and silver from the
-plundered camp; occupying the Greeks so long in the work of pursuit
-and capture, that they did not find time to erect their trophy until
-the third day after the battle. Timoleon left the chief part of the
-plunder,[374] as well as most part of the prisoners, in the hands of
-the individual captors, who enriched themselves amply by the day’s
-work. Yet there still remained a large total for the public Syracusan
-chest; five thousand prisoners, and a miscellaneous spoil of armor
-and precious articles, piled up in imposing magnificence around the
-general’s tent.
-
-  [374] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 80, 81.
-
-The Carthaginian fugitives did not rest until they reached Lilybæum.
-And even there, such was their discouragement—so profound their
-conviction that the wrath of the gods was upon them—that they could
-scarcely be induced to go on shipboard for the purpose of returning
-to Carthage; persuaded as they were that if once caught out at sea,
-the gods in their present displeasure would never let them reach
-land.[375] At Carthage itself also, the sorrow and depression was
-unparalleled: sorrow private as well as public, from the loss of so
-great a number of principal citizens. It was even feared that the
-victorious Timoleon would instantly cross the sea and attack Carthage
-on her own soil. Immediate efforts were however made to furnish a
-fresh army for Sicily, composed of foreign mercenaries with few or
-no native citizens. Giskon, the son of Hanno, who passed for their
-most energetic citizen, was recalled from exile, and directed to get
-together this new armament.
-
-  [375] Diodor. xvi. 81. Τοσαύτη δ᾽ αὐτοὺς κατάπληξις καὶ δέος
-  κατεῖχεν, ὥστε μὴ τολμᾷν εἰς τὰς ναῦς ἐμβαίνειν, μηδ᾽ ἀποπλεῖν
-  εἰς τὴν Λιβύην, ὡς ~διὰ τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἀλλοτριότητα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ
-  τοῦ Λιβυκοῦ πελάγους καταποθησομένους~. Compare the account of
-  the religious terror of the Carthaginians, after their defeat by
-  Agathokles (Diodor. xx. 14).
-
-  So, in the argument between Andokides and his accusers, before
-  the Dikastery at Athens—the accusers contend that Andokides
-  clearly does not believe in the gods, because, after the great
-  impiety which he has committed, he has still not been afraid
-  afterwards to make sea voyages (Lysias, cont. Andokid. s. 19).
-
-  On the other hand, Andokides himself argues triumphantly, from
-  the fact of his having passed safely through sea voyages in the
-  winter, that he is _not_ an object of displeasure to the gods.
-
-  “If the gods thought that I had wronged them, they would not
-  have omitted to punish me, when they caught me in the greatest
-  danger. For what danger can be greater than a sea voyage in
-  winter-time? The gods had then both my life and my property in
-  their power; and yet they preserved me. Was it not then open to
-  them so to manage, as that I should not even obtain interment
-  for my body?....Have the gods then preserved me from the dangers
-  of sea and pirates, merely to let me perish at Athens by the act
-  of my villanous accuser Kephisius? No, Dikasts; the dangers of
-  _accusation and trial are human_; but _the dangers encountered
-  at sea are divine_. If, therefore, we are to surmise about
-  the sentiments of the gods, I think they will be extremely
-  displeased and angry, if they see a man, whom they themselves
-  have preserved, destroyed by others.” (Andokides, De Mysteriis,
-  s. 137-139). ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἡγοῦμαι χρῆναι νομίζειν τοὺς τοιούτους
-  κινδύνους ἀνθρωπίνους, ~τοὺς δὲ κατὰ θάλασσαν θείους~. Εἴπερ οὖν
-  δεῖ τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὑπονοεῖν, πολὺ ἂν αὐτοὺς οἶμαι ἐγὼ ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ
-  ἀγανακτεῖν, εἰ τοὺς ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν σωζομένους, ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων ἀπολλυμένους
-  ὁρῷεν.
-
-  Compare Plutarch, Paul. Emil. c. 36. ~μάλιστα κατὰ πλοῦν~
-  ἐδεδίειν τὴν μεταβολὴν τοῦ δαίμονος, etc.
-
-The subduing impression of the wrath of the gods, under which the
-Carthaginians labored, arose from the fact that their defeat had
-been owing not less to the terrific storm, than to the arms of
-Timoleon. Conversely, in regard to Timoleon himself, the very same
-fact produced an impression of awe-striking wonder and envy. If
-there were any sceptics who doubted before either the reality of
-special interventions by the gods, or the marked kindness which
-determined the gods to send such interventions to the service of
-Timoleon—the victory of the Krimêsus must have convinced them.
-The storm alike violent and opportune, coming at the back of the
-Greeks and in the faces of the Carthaginians, was a manifestation
-of divine favor scarcely less conspicuous than those vouchsafed to
-Diomedes or Æneas in the Iliad.[376] And the sentiment thus raised
-towards Timoleon—or, rather previously raised, and now yet farther
-confirmed—became blended with that genuine admiration which he had
-richly earned by his rapid and well-conducted movements, as well as
-by a force of character striking enough to uphold, under the most
-critical circumstances, the courage of a desponding army. His victory
-at the Krimêsus, like his victory at Adranum, was gained mainly by
-that extreme speed in advance, which brought him upon an unprepared
-enemy at a vulnerable moment. And the news of it which he despatched
-at once to Corinth,—accompanied with a cargo of showy Carthaginian
-shields to decorate the Corinthian temples,—diffused throughout
-Central Greece both joy for the event and increased honor to his
-name, commemorated by the inscription attached—“The Corinthians and
-the general Timoleon, after liberating the Sicilian Greeks from the
-Carthaginians, have dedicated these shields as offerings of gratitude
-to the gods.”[377]
-
-  [376] Claudian, De Tertio Consulatu Honorii, v. 93.
-
-    “Te propter, gelidis Aquilo de monte procellis
-    Obruit adversas acies, revolutaque tela
-    Vertit in auctores, et turbine reppulit hastas.
-    O nimium dilecte Deo, cui fundit ab antris
-    Æolus armatas hyemes; cui militat æther,
-    Et conjurati veniunt ad classica venti.”
-
-  Compare a passage in the speech of Thrasybulus, Xenoph. Hellen.
-  ii. 4, 14.
-
-  [377] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 80.
-
-Leaving most of his paid troops to carry on war in the Carthaginian
-province, Timoleon conducted his Syracusans home. His first
-proceeding was, at once to dismiss Thrasius with the one thousand
-paid soldiers who had deserted him before the battle. He commanded
-them to quit Sicily, allowing them only twenty-four hours to depart
-from Syracuse itself. Probably under the circumstances, they were not
-less anxious to go away than he was to dismiss them. But they went
-away only to destruction; for having crossed the Strait of Messina
-and taken possession of a maritime site in Italy on the Southern
-sea, the Bruttians of the inland entrapped them by professions of
-simulated friendship, and slew them all.[378]
-
-  [378] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30; Diodor. xvi. 82.
-
-Timoleon had now to deal with two Grecian enemies—Hiketas and
-Mamerkus—the despots of Leontini and Katana. By the extraordinary
-rapidity of his movements, he had crushed the great invading host
-of Carthage, before it came into coöperation with these two allies.
-Both now wrote in terror to Carthage, soliciting a new armament, as
-indispensable for their security not less than for the Carthaginian
-interest in the island; Timoleon being the common enemy of both.
-Presently Giskon son of Hanno, having been recalled on purpose out of
-banishment, arrived from Carthage with a considerable force—seventy
-triremes, and a body of Grecian mercenaries. It was rare for the
-Carthaginians to employ Grecian mercenaries; but the battle of
-Krimêsus is said to have persuaded them that there were no soldiers
-to be compared to Greeks. The force of Giskon was apparently
-distributed partly in the Carthaginian province at the western angle
-of the island—partly in the neighborhood of Mylæ and Messênê on the
-north-east, where Mamerkus joined him with the troops of Katana.
-Messênê appears to have recently fallen under the power of a despot
-named Hippon, who acted as their ally. To both points Timoleon
-despatched a portion of his mercenary force, without going himself in
-command; on both, his troops at first experienced partial defeats;
-two divisions of them, one comprising four hundred men, being cut to
-pieces. But such partial reverses were, in the religious appreciation
-of the time, proofs more conspicuous than ever of the peculiar favor
-shown by the gods towards Timoleon. For the soldiers thus slain
-had been concerned in the pillage of the Delphian temple, and were
-therefore marked out for the divine wrath; but the gods suspended
-the sentence during the time when the soldiers were serving under
-Timoleon in person, in order that he might not be the sufferer; and
-executed it now in his absence, when execution would occasion the
-least possible inconvenience to him.[379]
-
-  [379] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30. Ἐξ ὧν καὶ μάλιστα τὴν
-  Τιμολέοντος εὐτυχίαν συνέβη γενέσθαι διώνυμον.... Τὴν μὲν οὖν
-  πρὸς Τιμολέοντα τῶν θεῶν εὐμένειαν, οὐχ ἧττον ἐν αἷς προσέκρουσε
-  πράξεσιν ἢ περὶ ἃς κατώρθου, θαυμάζεσθαι συνέβαινεν.
-
-  Compare Plutarch, De Serâ Num. Vind. p. 552 F.
-
-Mamerkus and Hiketas, however, not adopting this interpretation
-of their recent successes against Timoleon, were full of hope
-and confidence. The former dedicated the shields of the slain
-mercenaries to the gods, with an inscription of insolent triumph:
-the latter—taking advantage of the absence of Timoleon, who had made
-an expedition against a place not far off called Kalauria—undertook
-an inroad into the Syracusan territory. Not content with inflicting
-great damage and carrying off an ample booty, Hiketas, in returning
-home, insulted Timoleon and the small force along with him by passing
-immediately under the walls of Kalauria. Suffering him to pass by,
-Timoleon pursued, though his force consisted only of cavalry and
-light troops, with few or no hoplites. He found Hiketas posted
-on the farther side of the Damurias; a river with rugged banks
-and a ford of considerable difficulty. Yet notwithstanding this
-good defensive position, the troops of Timoleon were so impatient
-to attack, and each of his cavalry officers was so anxious to be
-first in the charge, that he was obliged to decide the priority by
-lot. The attack was then valiantly made, and the troops of Hiketas
-completely defeated. One thousand of them were slain in the action,
-while the remainder only escaped by flight and throwing away of their
-shields.[380]
-
-  [380] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 31.
-
-It was now the turn of Timoleon to attack Hiketas in his own domain
-of Leontini. Here his usual good fortune followed him. The soldiers
-in garrison—either discontented with the behavior of Hiketas at the
-battle of the Damurias, or awe-struck with that divine favor which
-waited on Timoleon—mutinied and surrendered the place into his
-hands; and not merely the place, but also Hiketas himself in chains,
-with his son Eupolemus, and his general Euthymus, a man of singular
-bravery as well as a victorious athlete at the games. All three
-were put to death; Hiketas and his son as despots and traitors; and
-Euthymus, chiefly in consequence of insulting sarcasms against the
-Corinthians, publicly uttered at Leontini. The wife and daughters
-of Hiketas were conveyed as prisoners to Syracuse, where they were
-condemned to death by public vote of the Syracusan assembly. This
-vote was passed in express revenge for the previous crime of Hiketas,
-in putting to death the widow, sister, and son, of Dion. Though
-Timoleon might probably have saved the unfortunate women by a strong
-exertion of influence, he did not interfere. The general feeling
-of the people accounted this cruel, but special, retaliation right
-under the circumstances; and Timoleon, as he could not have convinced
-them of the contrary, so he did not think it right to urge them to
-put their feeling aside as a simple satisfaction to him. Yet the act
-leaves a deserved stain upon a reputation such as his.[381] The women
-were treated on both sides as adjective beings, through whose lives
-revenge was to be taken against a political enemy.
-
-  [381] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 33.
-
-Next came the turn of Mamerkus, who had assembled near Katana a
-considerable force, strengthened by a body of Carthaginian allies
-under Giskon. He was attacked and defeated by Timoleon near the
-river Abolus, with a loss of two thousand men, many of them
-belonging to the Carthaginian division. We know nothing but the
-simple fact of this battle; which probably made serious impression
-upon the Carthaginians, since they speedily afterwards sent earnest
-propositions for peace, deserting their Sicilian allies. Peace was
-accordingly concluded; on terms however which left the Carthaginian
-dominion in Sicily much the same as it had been at the end of the
-reign of the elder Dionysius, as well as at the landing of Dion in
-Sicily.[382] The line of separation was fixed at the river Halykus,
-or Lykus, which flows into the southern sea near Herakleia Minoa,
-and formed the western boundary of the territory of Agrigentum.
-All westward of the Halykus was recognized as Carthaginian: but it
-was stipulated that if any Greeks within that territory desired to
-emigrate and become inmates of Syracuse, they should be allowed
-freely to come with their families and their property. It was farther
-covenanted that all the territory eastward of the Halykus should be
-considered not only as Greek, but as free Greek, distributed among
-so many free cities, and exempt from despots. And the Carthaginians
-formally covenanted that they would neither aid, nor adopt as ally,
-any Grecian despot in Sicily.[383] In the first treaty concluded by
-the elder Dionysius with the Carthaginians, it had been stipulated by
-an express article that the Syracusans should be subject to him.[384]
-Here is one of the many contrasts between Dionysius and Timoleon.
-
-  [382] Diodor. xv. 17. Minoa (Herakleia) was a Carthaginian
-  possession when Dion landed (Plutarch, Dion, c. 25).
-
-  Cornelius Nepos (Timoleon, c. 2) states erroneously, that the
-  Carthaginians were completely expelled from Sicily by Timoleon.
-
-  [383] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 34; Diodor. xvi. 82.
-
-  [384] Diodor. xiii. 114.
-
-Having thus relieved himself from his most formidable enemy, Timoleon
-put a speedy end to the war in other parts of the island. Mamerkus
-in fact despaired of farther defence without foreign aid. He crossed
-over with a squadron into Italy to ask for the introduction of a
-Lucanian army into Sicily;[385] which he might perhaps have obtained,
-since that warlike nation were now very powerful—had not his own
-seamen abandoned him, and carried back their vessels to Katana,
-surrendering both the city and themselves to Timoleon. The same
-thing, and even more, had been done a little before by the troops of
-Hiketas at Leontini, who had even delivered up Hiketas himself as
-prisoner; so powerful, seemingly, was the ascendency exercised by
-the name of Timoleon, with the prestige of his perpetual success.
-Mamerkus could now find no refuge except at Messênê, where he was
-welcomed by the despot Hippon. But Timoleon speedily came thither
-with a force ample enough to besiege Messênê by land and by sea.
-After a certain length of resistance,[386] the town was surrendered
-to him, while Hippon tried to make his escape secretly on shipboard.
-But he was captured and brought back into the midst of the Messenian
-population, who, under a sentiment of bitter hatred and vengeance,
-planted him in the midst of the crowded theatre and there put him
-to death with insult, summoning all the boys from school into the
-theatre to witness what was considered an elevating scene. Mamerkus,
-without attempting to escape, surrendered himself prisoner to
-Timoleon; only stipulating that his fate should be determined by the
-Syracusan assembly after a fair hearing, but that Timoleon himself
-should say nothing to his disfavor. He was accordingly brought to
-Syracuse, and placed on his trial before the assembled people,
-whom he addressed in an elaborate discourse; probably skilfully
-composed, since he is said to have possessed considerable talent as
-a poet.[387] But no eloquence could surmount the rooted aversion
-entertained by the Syracusans for his person and character. Being
-heard with murmurs, and seeing that he had no chance of obtaining a
-favorable verdict, he suddenly threw aside his garment and rushed
-with violent despair against one of the stone seats, head foremost,
-in hopes of giving himself a fatal blow. But not succeeding in this
-attempted suicide, he was led out of the theatre and executed like a
-robber.[388]
-
-  [385] Cornelius Nepos (Timoleon, c. 2) calls Mamerkus an Italian
-  general who had come into Sicily to aid the despots. It is
-  possible enough that he may have been an Italiot Greek; for he
-  must have been a Greek, from the manner in which Plutarch speaks
-  of his poetical compositions.
-
-  [386] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37.
-
-  [387] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 31.
-
-  [388] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 34.
-
-Timoleon had now nearly accomplished his confirmed purpose of
-extirpating every despotism in Sicily. There remained yet Nikodemus
-as despot at Kentoripa, and Apolloniades at Agyrium. Both of these
-he speedily dethroned or expelled, restoring the two cities to the
-condition of free communities. He also expelled from the town of Ætna
-those Campanian mercenaries who had been planted there by the elder
-Dionysius.[389] In this way did he proceed until there remained only
-free communities, without a single despot, in the Grecian portion of
-Sicily.
-
-  [389] Diodor. xvi. 82.
-
-Of the details of his proceedings our scanty information permits
-us to say but little. But the great purpose with which he had
-started from Corinth was now achieved. After having put down all the
-other despotisms in Sicily, there remained for him but one farther
-triumph—the noblest and rarest of all—to lay down his own. This he
-performed without any delay, immediately on returning to Syracuse
-from his military proceedings. Congratulating the Syracusans on
-the triumphant consummation already attained, he entreated them to
-dispense with his farther services as sole commander; the rather
-as his eyesight was now failing.[390] It is probable enough that
-this demand was at first refused, and that he was warmly requested
-to retain his functions; but if such was the fact, he did not the
-less persist, and the people, willing or not, acceded. We ought
-farther to note, that not only did he resign his generalship, but he
-resigned it at once and immediately, after the complete execution
-of his proclaimed purpose, to emancipate the Sicilian Greeks from
-foreign enemies as well as from despot-enemies; just as, on first
-acquiring possession of Syracuse, he had begun his authoritative
-career, without a moment’s delay, by ordering the demolition of the
-Dionysian stronghold, and the construction of a court of justice in
-its place.[391] By this instantaneous proceeding he forestalled the
-growth of that suspicion which delay would assuredly have raised,
-and for which the free communities of Greece had in general such
-ample reason. And it is not the least of his many merits, that while
-conscious of good intentions himself, he had also the good sense
-to see that others could not look into his bosom; that all their
-presumptions, except what were created by his own conduct, would be
-derived from men worse than him—and therefore unfavorable. Hence it
-was necessary for him to be prompt and forward, even to a sort of
-ostentation, in exhibiting the amplest positive proof of his real
-purposes, so as to stifle beforehand the growth of suspicion.
-
-  [390] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37. Ὡς δὲ ἐπανῆλθεν εἰς Συρακούσας,
-  εὐθὺς ἀποθέσθαι τὴν μοναρχίαν καὶ παραιτεῖσθαι τοὺς πολίτας, τῶν
-  πραγμάτων εἰς τὸ κάλλιστον ἡκόντων τέλος.
-
-  [391] Plutarch, _l. c._ ~εὐθὺς~ ἀποθέσθαι τὴν μοναρχίαν: compare
-  c. 22.
-
-He was now a private citizen of Syracuse, having neither paid
-soldiers under his command nor any other public function. As a
-reward for his splendid services, the Syracusans voted to him a
-house in the city, and a landed property among the best in the
-neighborhood. Here he fixed his residence, sending for his wife and
-family to Corinth.[392]
-
-  [392] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36.
-
-Yet though Timoleon had renounced every species of official
-authority, and all means of constraint, his influence as an adviser
-over the judgment, feelings and actions, not only of Syracusans, but
-of Sicilians generally, was as great as ever; perhaps greater—because
-the fact of his spontaneous resignation gave him one title more
-to confidence. Rarely is it allowed to mortal man, to establish
-so transcendent a claim to confidence and esteem as Timoleon now
-presented; upon so many different grounds, and with so little
-of alloy or abatement. To possess a counsellor whom every one
-reverenced, without suspicions or fears of any kind—who had not only
-given conspicuous proofs of uncommon energy combined with skilful
-management, but enjoyed besides, in a peculiar degree, the favor of
-the gods—was a benefit unspeakably precious to the Sicilians at this
-juncture. For it was now the time when not merely Syracuse, but other
-cities of Sicily also, were aiming to strengthen their reconstituted
-free communities by a fresh supply of citizens from abroad. During
-the sixty years which had elapsed since the first formidable invasion
-wherein the Carthaginian Hannibal had conquered Selinus, there had
-been a series of causes all tending to cripple and diminish, and
-none to renovate, the Grecian population of Sicily. The Carthaginian
-attacks, the successful despotism of the first Dionysius, and the
-disturbed reign of the second,—all contributed to the same result.
-About the year 352-351 B. C., Plato (as has been already mentioned)
-expresses his fear of an extinction of Hellenism in Sicily giving
-place before Phenician or Campanian force.[393] And what was a sad
-possibility, even in 352-351 B. C.—had become nearer to a probability
-in 344 B. C., before Timoleon landed, in the then miserable condition
-of the island.
-
-  [393] Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353 F.
-
-His unparalleled success and matchless personal behavior combined
-with the active countenance of Corinth without—had completely
-turned the tide. In the belief of all Greeks, Sicily was now a
-land restored to Hellenism and freedom, but requiring new colonists
-as well to partake, as to guard, these capital privileges. The
-example of colonization, under the auspices of Corinth, had been
-set at Syracuse, and was speedily followed elsewhere, especially
-at Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina. All these three cities had
-suffered cruelly during those formidable Carthaginian invasions
-which immediately preceded the despotism of Dionysius at Syracuse.
-They had had no opportunity, during the continuance of the Dionysian
-dynasty, even to make up what they had then lost; far less to acquire
-accessions from without. At the same time, all three (especially
-Agrigentum) recollected their former scale of opulence and power,
-as it had stood prior to 407 B. C. It was with eagerness therefore
-that they availed themselves of the new life and security imparted
-to Sicily by the career of Timoleon to replenish their exhausted
-numbers; by recalling those whom former suffering had driven away,
-and by inviting fresh colonists besides. Megellus and Pheristus,
-citizens of Elea on the southern coast of Italy (which was probably
-at this time distressed by the pressure of Lucanians from the
-interior), conducted a colony to Agrigentum: Gorgus, from Keos, went
-with another band to Gela: in both cases, a proportion of expatriated
-citizens returned among them. Kamarina, too, and Agyrium received
-large accessions of inhabitants. The inhabitants of Leontini are said
-to have removed their habitations to Syracuse; a statement difficult
-to understand, and probably only partially true, as the city and its
-name still continued to exist.[394]
-
-  [394] Diodor. xvi. 65, 82; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 35.
-
-Unfortunately the proceedings of Timoleon come before us (through
-Diodorus and Plutarch) in a manner so vague and confused, that we
-can rarely trace the sequence or assign the date of particular
-facts.[395] But about the general circumstances, with their character
-and bearing, there is no room either for mistake or doubt. That
-which rhetors and sophists like Lysias had preached in their
-panegyrical harangues[396]—that for which Plato sighed, in the
-epistles of his old age—commending it, after Dion’s death, to the
-surviving partisans of Dion, as having been the unexecuted purpose of
-their departed leader—the renewal of freedom and Hellenism throughout
-the island—was now made a reality under the auspices of Timoleon.
-The houses, the temples, the walls, were rescued from decay; the
-lands from comparative barrenness. For it was not merely his personal
-reputation and achievements which constituted the main allurement to
-new colonists, but also his superintending advice which regulated
-their destination when they arrived. Without the least power of
-constraint, or even official dignity, he was consulted as a sort
-of general Œkist or Patron-Founder, by the affectionate regard of
-the settlers in every part of Sicily. The distribution or sale of
-lands, the modification required in existing laws and customs, the
-new political constitutions, etc., were all submitted to his review.
-No settlement gave satisfaction, except such as he had pronounced or
-approved; none which he had approved was contested.[397]
-
-  [395] Eight years elapsed from the time when Timoleon departed
-  with his expedition from Corinth to the time of his death; from
-  345-344 B. C. to 337-336 B. C. (Diodorus, xvi. 90; Plutarch,
-  Timoleon, c. 37).
-
-  The battle of the Krimêsus is assigned by Diodorus to 340 B. C.
-  But as to the other military achievements of Timoleon in Sicily,
-  Diodorus and Plutarch are neither precise, nor in accordance with
-  each other.
-
-  [396] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37. μόνος, ἐφ᾽ ἃς οἱ σοφισταὶ διὰ
-  τῶν λόγων τῶν πανηγυρικῶν ἀεὶ παρεκάλουν πράξεις τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἐν
-  αὐταῖς ἀριστεύσας, etc.
-
-  [397] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 35. Οἷς οὐ μόνον ἀσφάλειαν ἐκ
-  πολέμου τοσούτου καὶ γαλήνην ἱδρυομένοις παρεῖχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τἄλλα
-  παρασκευάσας καὶ συμπροθυμηθεὶς ὥσπερ οἰκιστὴς ἠγαπᾶτο. Καὶ τῶν
-  ἄλλων δὲ διακειμένων ὁμοίως πρὸς αὐτὸν, οὐ πολέμου τις λύσις, οὐ
-  νόμων θέσις, οὐ χώρας κατοικισμὸς, οὐ πολιτείας διάταξις, ἐδόκει
-  καλῶς ἔχειν, ἧς ἐκεῖνος μὴ προσάψαιτο μηδὲ κατακοσμήσειεν, ὥσπερ
-  ἔργῳ συντελουμένῳ δημιουργὸς ἐπιθείς τινα χάριν θεοφιλῆ καὶ
-  πρέπουσαν.
-
-  Compare Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 3.
-
-In the situation in which Sicily was now placed, it is clear that
-numberless matters of doubt and difficulty would inevitably arise;
-that the claims and interests of pre-existing residents, returning
-exiles and new immigrants, would often be conflicting; that the
-rites and customs of different fractions composing the new whole,
-might have to be modified for the sake of mutual harmony; that the
-settlers, coming from oligarchies as well as democracies might bring
-with them different ideas as to the proper features of a political
-constitution; that the apportionment or sale of lands, and the
-adjustment of old debts, presented but too many chances of angry
-dispute; that there were, in fact, a thousand novelties in the
-situation, which could not be determined either by precedent, or by
-any peremptory rule, but must be left to the equity of a supreme
-arbitrator. Here then the advantages were unspeakable of having a man
-like Timoleon to appeal to; a man not only really without sinister
-bias, but recognized by every one as being so; a man whom every one
-loved, trusted, and was grieved to offend; a man who sought not
-to impose his own will upon free communities, but addressed them
-as freemen, building only upon their reason and sentiments, and
-carrying out in all his recommendations of detail those instincts of
-free speech, universal vote, and equal laws, which formed the germ
-of political obligation in the minds of Greeks generally. It would
-have been gratifying to know how Timoleon settled the many new and
-difficult questions which must have been submitted to him as referee.
-There is no situation in human society so valuable to study, as that
-in which routine is of necessity broken through, and the constructive
-faculties called into active exertion. Nor was there ever perhaps
-throughout Grecian history, a simultaneous colonization, and
-simultaneous recasting of political institutions, more extensive than
-that which now took place in Sicily. Unfortunately we are permitted
-to know only the general fact, without either the charm or the
-instruction which would have been presented by the details. Timoleon
-was, in Sicily, that which Epaminondas had been at the foundation of
-Messênê and Megalopolis, though with far greater power: and we have
-to deplore the like ignorance respecting the detail proceedings of
-both these great men.
-
-But though the sphere of Timoleon’s activity was coextensive with
-Sicily, his residence, his citizenship, and his peculiar interests
-and duties were at Syracuse. That city, like most of the other
-Sicilian towns, had been born anew, with a numerous body of settlers
-and altered political institutions. I have already mentioned that
-Kephalus and others, invited from Corinth by express vote of
-the Syracusans, had reëstablished the democratical institution
-of Dioklês, with suitable modifications. The new era of liberty
-was marked by the establishment of a new sacred office, that of
-Amphipolus or Attendant Priest of Zeus Olympius; an office changed
-annually, appointed by lot (doubtless under some conditions of
-qualification which are not made known to us,[398]) and intended,
-like the Archon Eponymus at Athens, as the recognized name to
-distinguish each Syracusan year. In this work of constitutional
-reform, as well as in all the labors and adjustments connected with
-the new settlers, Timoleon took a prominent part. But so soon as
-the new constitution was consummated and set at work, he declined
-undertaking any specific duties or exercising any powers under it.
-Enjoying the highest measure of public esteem, and loaded with
-honorary and grateful votes from the people, he had the wisdom
-as well as the virtue to prefer living as a private citizen; a
-resolution doubtless promoted by his increasing failure of eyesight,
-which presently became total blindness.[399] He dwelt in the
-house assigned to him by public vote of the people, which he had
-consecrated to the Holy God, and within which he had set apart a
-chapel to the goddess Automatia,—the goddess under whose auspices
-blessings and glory came as it were of themselves.[400] To this
-goddess he offered sacrifice, as the great and constant patroness
-who had accompanied him from Corinth through all his proceedings in
-Sicily.
-
-  [398] Diodor. xvi. 70; Cicero in Verrem, ii. 51.
-
-  [399] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 38.
-
-  [400] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 38. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς οἰκίας ἱερὸν
-  ἱδρυσάμενος Αὐτοματίας ἔθυσεν, αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν οἰκίαν Ἱερῷ Δαίμονι
-  καθιέρωσεν.
-
-  Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 4; Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Præcept.
-  p. 816 D.
-
-  The idea of Αὐτοματία is not the same as that of Τύχη, though the
-  word is sometimes translated as if it were. It is more nearly the
-  same as Ἀγαθὴ Τύχη—though still, as it seems to me, not exactly
-  the same.
-
-By refusing the official prominence tendered to him, and by keeping
-away from the details of public life, Timoleon escaped the jealousy
-sure to attend upon influence so prodigious as his. But in truth, for
-all great and important matters, this very modesty increased instead
-of diminishing his real ascendency. Here as elsewhere, the goddess
-Automatia worked for him, and brought to him docile listeners without
-his own seeking. Though the Syracusans transacted their ordinary
-business through others, yet when any matter of serious difficulty
-occurred, the presence of Timoleon was specially invoked in the
-discussion. During the later months of his life, when he had become
-blind, his arrival in the assembly was a solemn scene. Having been
-brought in his car drawn by mules across the market-place to the door
-of the theatre wherein the assembly was held, attendants then led
-or drew the car into the theatre amidst the assembled people, who
-testified their affection by the warmest shouts and congratulations.
-As soon as he had returned their welcome, and silence was restored,
-the discussion to which he had been invited took place, Timoleon
-sitting on his car and listening. Having heard the matter thus
-debated, he delivered his own opinion, which was usually ratified
-at once by the show of hands of the assembly. He then took leave of
-the people and retired, the attendants again leading the car out
-of the theatre, and the same cheers of attachment accompanying his
-departure; while the assembly proceeded with its other and more
-ordinary business.[401]
-
-  [401] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 38; Cornel. Nepos, Timoleon, c. 4.
-
-Such is the impressive and picturesque description given (doubtless
-by Athanis or some other eye-witness[402]) of the relations
-between the Syracusan people and the blind Timoleon, after his
-power had been abdicated, and when there remained to him nothing
-except his character and moral ascendency. It is easy to see that
-the solemnities of interposition, here recounted, must have been
-reserved for those cases in which the assembly had been disturbed
-by some unusual violence or collision of parties. For such critical
-junctures, where numbers were perhaps nearly balanced, and where
-the disappointment of an angry minority threatened to beget some
-permanent feud, the benefit was inestimable, of an umpire whom both
-parties revered, and before whom neither thought it a dishonor to
-yield. Keeping aloof from the details and embarrassments of daily
-political life, and preserving himself (like the Salaminian trireme,
-to use a phrase which Plutarch applies to Perikles at Athens) for
-occasions at once momentous and difficult, Timoleon filled up a gap
-occasionally dangerous to all free societies; but which even at
-Athens had always remained a gap, because there was no Athenian at
-once actually worthy, and known to be worthy, to fill it. We may even
-wonder how he continued worthy, when the intense popular sentiment
-in his favor tended so strongly to turn his head, and when no
-contradiction or censure against him was tolerated.
-
-  [402] It occurs in Cornelius Nepos prior to Plutarch, and was
-  probably copied by both from the same authority.
-
-Two persons, Laphystius and Demænetus, called by the obnoxious names
-of sycophants and demagogues, were bold enough to try the experiment.
-The former required him to give bail in a lawsuit; the latter, in a
-public discourse, censured various parts of his military campaigns.
-The public indignation against both these men was vehement; yet there
-can be little doubt that Laphystius applied to Timoleon a legal
-process applicable universally to every citizen: what may have been
-the pertinence of the censures of Demænetus, we are unable to say.
-However, Timoleon availed himself of the well-meant impatience of
-the people to protect him either from legal process or from censure,
-only to administer to them a serious and valuable lesson. Protesting
-against all interruption to the legal process of Laphystius, he
-proclaimed emphatically that this was the precise purpose for which
-he had so long labored, and combated—in order that every Syracusan
-citizen might be enabled to appeal to the laws and exercise freely
-his legal rights. And while he thought it unnecessary to rebut in
-detail the objections taken against his previous generalship, he
-publicly declared his gratitude to the gods, for having granted his
-prayer that he might witness all Syracusans in possession of full
-liberty of speech.[403]
-
-  [403] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37; Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 5.
-
-We obtain little from the biographers of Timoleon, except a few
-incidents, striking, impressive, and somewhat theatrical, like those
-just recounted. But what is really important is, the tone and temper
-which these incidents reveal, both in Timoleon and in the Syracusan
-people. To see him unperverted by a career of superhuman success,
-retaining the same hearty convictions with which he had started from
-Corinth; renouncing power, the most ardent of all aspirations with a
-Greek politician, and descending to a private station, in spite of
-every external inducement to the contrary; resisting the temptation
-to impose his own will upon the people, and respecting their free
-speech and public vote in a manner which made it imperatively
-necessary for every one else to follow his example; foregoing
-command, and contenting himself with advice when his opinion was
-asked—all this presents a model of genuine and intelligent public
-spirit, such as is associated with few other names except that of
-Timoleon. That the Syracusan people should have yielded to such
-conduct and obedience not merely voluntary, but heartfelt and
-almost reverential, is no matter of wonder. And we may be quite
-sure that the opinion of Timoleon, tranquilly and unostentatiously
-consulted, was the guiding star which they followed on most points
-of moment or difficulty; over and above those of exceptional cases
-of aggravated dissent where he was called in with such imposing
-ceremony as an umpire. On the value of such an oracle close at hand
-it is needless to insist; especially in a city which for the last
-half century had known nothing but the dominion of force, and amidst
-a new miscellaneous aggregate composed of Greek settlers from many
-different quarters.
-
-Timoleon now enjoyed, as he had amply earned, what Xenophon calls
-“that good, not human, but divine—command over willing men—given
-manifestly to persons of genuine and highly trained temperance of
-character.[404]” In him the condition indicated by Xenophon was found
-completely realized—temperance in the largest and most comprehensive
-sense of the word—not simply sobriety and continence (which had
-belonged to the elder Dionysius also), but an absence of that fatal
-thirst for coercive power at all price, which in Greece was the
-fruitful parent of the greater crimes and enormities.
-
-  [404] Xenoph. Œconomic. xxi. 12. Οὐ γὰρ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ὅλον τουτὶ
-  τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ θεῖον, ~τὸ ἐθελόντων ἄρχειν~·
-  σαφῶς δὲ δίδοται τοῖς ἀληθινῶς σωφροσύνῃ τετελεσμένοις. Τὸ δὲ
-  ἀκόντων τυραννεῖν διδόασιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὓς ἂν ἡγῶνται ἀξίους
-  εἶναι βιοτεύειν, ὥσπερ ὁ Τάνταλος ἐν ᾅδου λέγεται τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον
-  διατρίβειν, φοβούμενος μὴ δὶς ἀποθάνῃ.
-
-Timoleon lived to see his great work of Sicilian enfranchisement
-consummated, to carry it through all its incipient difficulties, and
-to see it prosperously moving on. Not Syracuse alone, but the other
-Grecian cities in the island also, enjoyed under their revived free
-institutions a state of security, comfort, and affluence, to which
-they had been long strangers. The lands became again industriously
-tilled; the fertile soil yielded anew abundant exports; the temples
-were restored from their previous decay, and adorned with the
-votive offerings of pious munificence.[405] The same state of
-prosperous and active freedom, which had followed on the expulsion
-of the Gelonian dynasty a hundred and twenty years before, and
-lasted about fifty years, without either despots within or invaders
-from without—was now again made prevalent throughout Sicily under
-the auspices of Timoleon. It did not indeed last so long. It was
-broken up in the year 316 B. C., twenty-four years after the battle
-of the Krimêsus, by the despot Agathokles, whose father was among
-the immigrants to Syracuse under the settlement of Timoleon. But
-the interval of security and freedom with which Sicily was blessed
-between these two epochs, she owed to the generous patriotism and
-intelligent counsel of Timoleon. There are few other names among
-the Grecian annals, with which we can connect so large an amount of
-predetermined and beneficent result.
-
-  [405] Diodor. xvi. 83.
-
-Endeared to the Syracusans as a common father and benefactor,[406]
-and exhibited as their hero to all visitors from Greece, he passed
-the remainder of his life amidst the fulness of affectionate honor.
-Unfortunately for the Syracusans, that remainder was but too short;
-for he died of an illness apparently slight, in the year 337-336 B.
-C.—three or four years after the battle of the Krimêsus. Profound
-and unfeigned was the sorrow which his death excited, universally,
-throughout Sicily. Not merely the Syracusans, but crowds from all
-other parts of the island, attended to do honor to his funeral,
-which was splendidly celebrated at the public cost. Some of the
-chosen youths of the city carried the bier whereon his body was
-deposited: a countless procession of men and women followed, in their
-festival attire, crowned with wreaths, and mingling with their tears
-admiration and envy for their departed liberator. The procession was
-made to pass over that ground which presented the most honorable
-memento of Timoleon; where the demolished Dionysian stronghold had
-once reared its head, and where the court of justice was now placed,
-at the entrance of Ortygia. At length it reached the Nekropolis,
-between Ortygia and Achradina, where a massive funeral pile had been
-prepared. As soon as the bier had been placed on this pile, and fire
-was about to be applied, the herald Demetrius, distinguished for the
-powers of his voice, proclaimed with loud announcement as follows:—
-
-  [406] Plutarch. Timoleon, c. 39. Ἐν τοιαύτῃ δὲ γηροτροφούμενος
-  τιμῇ μετ᾽ εὐνοίας, ὥσπερ πατὴρ κοινὸς, ἐκ μικρᾶς προφάσεως τῷ
-  χρόνῳ συνεφαψαμένης ἐτελεύτησεν.
-
-“The Syracusan people solemnize, at the cost of two hundred minæ, the
-funeral of this man, the Corinthian Timoleon, son of Timodemus. They
-have passed a vote to honor him for all future time with festival
-matches in music, horse and chariot race, and gymnastics,—because,
-after having put down the despots, subdued the foreign enemy, and
-re-colonized the greatest among the ruined cities, he restored to the
-Sicilian Greeks their constitution and laws.”
-
-A sepulchral monument, seemingly with this inscription recorded on
-it, was erected to the memory of Timoleon in the agora of Syracuse.
-To this monument other buildings were presently annexed; porticos,
-for the assembling of persons in business or conversation—and
-palæstræ, for the exercises of youths. The aggregate of buildings all
-taken together was called the Timoleontion.[407]
-
-  [407] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 39; Diodor, xvi. 90.
-
-When we reflect that the fatal battle of Chæroneia had taken place
-the year before Timoleon’s decease, and that his native city Corinth
-as well as all her neighbors were sinking deeper and deeper into
-the degradation of subject towns of Macedonia, we shall not regret,
-for his sake, that a timely death relieved him from so mournful
-a spectacle. It was owing to him that the Sicilian Greeks were
-rescued, for nearly one generation, from the like fate. He had the
-rare glory of maintaining to the end, and executing to the full, the
-promise of liberation with which he had gone forth from Corinth.
-His early years had been years of acute suffering—and that, too,
-incurred in the cause of freedom—arising out of the death of his
-brother; his later period, manifesting the like sense of duty under
-happier auspices, had richly repaid him, by successes overpassing
-all reasonable expectation, and by the ample flow of gratitude and
-attachment poured forth to him amidst the liberated Sicilians. His
-character appears most noble, and most instructive, if we contrast
-him with Dion. Timoleon had been brought up as the citizen of a
-free, though oligarchical community in Greece, surrounded by other
-free communities, and amidst universal hatred of despots. The
-politicians whom he had learnt to esteem were men trained in this
-school, maintaining a qualified ascendency against more or less of
-open competition from rivals, and obliged to look for the means
-of carrying their views apart from simple dictation. Moreover,
-the person whom Timoleon had selected for his peculiar model, was
-Epaminondas, the noblest model that Greece afforded.[408] It was to
-this example that Timoleon owed in part his energetic patriotism
-combined with freedom from personal ambition—his gentleness of
-political antipathy—and the perfect habits of conciliatory and
-popular dealing—which he manifested amidst so many new and trying
-scenes to the end of his career.
-
-  [408] Plutarch. Timoleon, c. 36. Ὁ μάλιστα ζηλωθεὶς ὑπὸ
-  Τιμολέοντος Ἐπαμεινώνδας, etc.
-
-  Polybius reckons Hermokrates, Timoleon, and Pyrrhus, to be the
-  most complete men of action (πραγματικωτάτους) of all those who
-  had played a conspicuous part in Sicilian affairs (Polyb. xii.
-  25. ed. Didot).
-
-Now the education of Dion (as I have recounted in the preceding
-chapter) had been something totally different. He was the member
-of a despotic family, and had learnt his experience under the
-energetic, but perfectly self-willed, march of the elder Dionysius.
-Of the temper or exigencies of a community of freemen, he had never
-learnt to take account. Plunged in this corrupting atmosphere, he
-had nevertheless imbibed generous and public-spirited aspirations:
-he had come to hold in abhorrence a government of will, and to look
-for glory in contributing to replace it by a qualified freedom and
-a government of laws. But the source from whence he drank was,
-the Academy and its illustrious teacher Plato; not from practical
-life, nor from the best practical politicians like Epaminondas.
-Accordingly, he had imbibed at the same time the idea, that though
-despotism was a bad thing, government thoroughly popular was a bad
-thing also; that, in other words, as soon as he had put down the
-despotism, it lay with him to determine how much liberty he would
-allow, or what laws he would sanction, for the community; that
-instead of a despot, he was to become a despotic lawgiver.
-
-Here then lay the main difference between the two conquerors of
-Dionysius. The mournful letters written by Plato after the death of
-Dion contrast strikingly with the enviable end of Timoleon, and with
-the grateful inscription of the Syracusans on his tomb.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXXVI.
-
-CENTRAL GREECE: THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP OF MACEDON TO THE BIRTH OF
-ALEXANDER. 359-356 B. C.
-
-
-My last preceding chapters have followed the history of the
-Sicilian Greeks through long years of despotism, suffering, and
-impoverishment, into a period of renovated freedom and comparative
-happiness, accomplished under the beneficent auspices of Timoleon,
-between 344-336 B. C. It will now be proper to resume the thread of
-events in Central Greece, at the point where they were left at the
-close of the preceding volume—the accession of Philip of Macedon in
-360-359 B. C. The death of Philip took place in 336 B. C.; and the
-closing years of his life will bring before us the last struggles of
-full Hellenic freedom; a result standing in mournful contrast with
-the achievements of the contemporary liberator Timoleon in Sicily.
-
-No such struggles could have appeared within the limits of
-possibility, even to the most far-sighted politician either of Greece
-or of Macedon—at the time when Philip mounted the throne. Among the
-hopes and fears of most Grecian cities, Macedonia then passed wholly
-unnoticed; in Athens, Olynthus, Thasus, Thessaly, and a few others,
-it formed an item not without moment, yet by no means of first-rate
-magnitude.
-
-The Hellenic world was now in a state different from anything which
-had been seen since the repulse of Xerxes in 480-479 B. C. The defeat
-and degradation of Sparta had set free the inland states from the
-only presiding city whom they had ever learned to look up to. Her
-imperial ascendency, long possessed and grievously abused, had been
-put down by the successes of Epaminondas and the Thebans. She was
-no longer the head of a numerous body of subordinate allies, sending
-deputies to her periodical synods—submitting their external politics
-to her influence—placing their military contingents under command
-of her officers (xenagi)—and even administering their internal
-government through oligarchies devoted to her purposes, with the
-reinforcement, wherever needed, of a Spartan harmost and garrison.
-She no longer found on her northern frontier a number of detached
-Arcadian villages, each separately manageable under leaders devoted
-to her, and furnishing her with hardy soldiers; nor had she the
-friendly city of Tegea, tied to her by a long-standing philo-Laconian
-oligarchy and tradition. Under the strong revolution of feeling
-which followed on the defeat of the Spartans at Leuktra, the small
-Arcadian communities, encouraged and guided by Epaminondas, had
-consolidated themselves into the great fortified city of Megalopolis,
-now the centre of a Pan-Arcadian confederacy, with a synod (called
-the Ten thousand) frequently assembled there to decide upon matters
-of interest and policy common to the various sections of the Arcadian
-name. Tegea too had undergone a political revolution; so that these
-two cities, conterminous with each other and forming together the
-northern frontier of Sparta, converted her Arcadian neighbors from
-valuable instruments into formidable enemies.
-
-But this loss of foreign auxiliary force and dignity was not the
-worst which Sparta had suffered. On her north-western frontier
-(conterminous also with Megalopolis) stood the newly-constituted city
-of Messênê, representing an amputation of nearly one-half of Spartan
-territory and substance. The western and more fertile half of Laconia
-had been severed from Sparta, and was divided between Messênê and
-various other independent cities; being tilled chiefly by those who
-had once been Periœki and Helots of Sparta.
-
-In the phase of Grecian history on which we are now about to
-enter—when the collective Hellenic world, for the first time since
-the invasion of Xerxes, was about to be thrown upon its defence
-against a foreign enemy from Macedonia—this altered position of
-Sparta was a circumstance of grave moment. Not only were the
-Peloponnesians disunited, and deprived of their common chief; but
-Megalopolis and Messênê, knowing the intense hostility of Sparta
-against them—and her great superiority of force even reduced as she
-was, to all that they could muster—lived in perpetual dread of her
-attack. Their neighbors the Argeians, standing enemies of Sparta,
-were well-disposed to protect them; but such aid was insufficient
-for their defence, without extra-Peloponnesian alliance. Accordingly
-we shall find them leaning upon the support either of Thebes or
-of Athens, whichever could be had; and ultimately even welcoming
-the arms of Philip of Macedon, as protector against the inexpiable
-hostility of Sparta. Elis—placed in the same situation with reference
-to Triphylia, as Sparta with reference to Messênê—complained that
-the Triphylians, whom she looked upon as subjects, had been admitted
-as freemen into the Arcadian federation. We shall find Sparta
-endeavoring to engage Elis in political combinations, intended
-to ensure, to both, the recovery of lost dominion.[409] Of these
-combinations more will be said hereafter; at present I merely notice
-the general fact that the degradation of Sparta, combined with
-her perpetually menaced aggression against Messênê and Arcadia,
-disorganized Peloponnesus, and destroyed its powers of Pan-hellenic
-defence against the new foreign enemy now slowly arising.
-
-  [409] Demosthenes, Orat. pro Megalopolit. p. 203, 204, s.
-  6-10; p. 206. s. 18—and indeed the whole Oration, which is an
-  instructive exposition of policy.
-
-The once powerful Peloponnesian system was in fact completely broken
-up. Corinth, Sikyon, Phlius, Trœzen, and Epidaurus, valuable as
-secondary states and as allies of Sparta, were now detached from all
-political combination, aiming only to keep clear, each for itself,
-of all share in collision between Sparta and Thebes.[410] It would
-appear also that Corinth had recently been oppressed and disturbed by
-the temporary despotism of Timophanes, described in my last chapter;
-though the date of that event cannot be precisely made out.
-
-  [410] Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 6, 10.
-
-But the grand and preponderating forces of Hellas now resided, for
-the first time in our history, without, and not within, Peloponnesus;
-at Athens and Thebes. Both these cities were in full vigor and
-efficiency. Athens had a numerous fleet, a flourishing commerce, a
-considerable body of maritime and insular allies, sending deputies
-to her synod and contributing to a common fund for the maintenance
-of the joint security. She was by far the greatest maritime power
-of Greece. I have recounted in my last preceding volume, how her
-general Timotheus had acquired for her the important island of
-Samos, together with Pydna, Methônê, and Potidæa, in the Thermaic
-Gulf; how he failed (as Iphikrates had failed before him) in more
-than one attempt upon Amphipolis; how he planted Athenian conquest
-and settlers in the Thracian Chersonese, which territory, after
-having been attacked and endangered by the Thracian prince Kotys,
-was regained by the continued efforts of Athens in the year 358 B.
-C. Athens had sustained no considerable loss, during the struggles
-which ended in the pacification after the battle of Mantinea; and her
-condition appears on the whole to have been better than it had ever
-been since her disasters at the close of the Peloponnesian war.
-
-The power of Thebes also was imposing and formidable. She had indeed
-lost many of those Peloponnesian allies who formed the overwhelming
-array of Epaminondas when he first invaded Laconia, under the fresh
-anti-Spartan impulse immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra.
-She retained only Argos, together with Tegea, Megalopolis, and
-Messênê. The last three added little to her strength, and needed
-her watchful support; a price which Epaminondas had been perfectly
-willing to pay for the establishment of a strong frontier against
-Sparta. But the body of extra Peloponnesian allies grouped round
-Thebes was still considerable:[411] the Phokians and Lokrians, the
-Malians, the Herakleots, most of the Thessalians, and most (if not
-all) of the inhabitants of Eubœa; perhaps also the Akarnanians. The
-Phokians were indeed reluctant allies, disposed to circumscribe their
-obligations within the narrowest limits of mutual defence in case
-of invasion and we shall presently find the relations between the
-two becoming positively hostile. Besides these allies, the Thebans
-possessed the valuable position of Oropus, on the north-eastern
-frontier of Attica; a town which had been wrested from Athens six
-years before, to the profound mortification of the Athenians.
-
-  [411] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 5, 23; vii 5, 4. Diodor. xv. 62.
-  The Akarnanians had been allies of Thebes at the time of the
-  first expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus; whether they
-  remained so at the time of his last expedition, is not certain.
-  But as the Theban ascendency over Thessaly was much greater at
-  the last of those two periods than at the first, we may be sure
-  that they had not lost their hold upon the Lokrians and Malians
-  who (as well as the Phokians) lay between Bœotia and Thessaly.
-
-But ever and above allies without Bœotia, Thebes had prodigiously
-increased the power of her city within Bœotia. She had appropriated
-to herself the territories of Platæa and Thespiæ on her southern
-frontier, and of Koroneia and Orchomenus near upon her northern; by
-conquest and partial expulsion of their prior inhabitants. How and
-when these acquisitions had been brought about, has been explained
-in my preceding volume:[412] here I merely recall the fact, to
-appreciate the position of Thebes in 359 B. C.—that these four
-towns, having been in 372 B. C. autonomous—joined with her only by
-the definite obligations of the Bœotian confederacy—and partly even
-in actual hostility against her—had now lost their autonomy with
-their free citizens, and had become absorbed into her property and
-sovereignty. The domain of Thebes thus extended across Bœotia from
-the frontiers of Phokis[413] on the north-west to the frontiers of
-Attica on the south.
-
-  [412] Vol. X. Ch. lxxvii. p. 161; Ch. lxxviii. p. 195; Ch. lxxx.
-  p. 312.
-
-  [413] Orchomenus was conterminous with the Phokian territory
-  (Pausanias, ix. 39, 1.)
-
-The new position thus acquired by Thebes in Bœotia, purchased at the
-cost of extinguishing three or four autonomous cities, is a fact of
-much moment in reference to the period now before us; not simply
-because it swelled the power and pride of the Thebans themselves; but
-also because it raised a strong body of unfavorable sentiment against
-them in the Hellenic mind. Just at the time when the Spartans had
-lost nearly one-half of Laconia, the Thebans had annexed to their own
-city one-third of the free Bœotian territory. The revival of free
-Messenian citizenship, after a suspended existence of more than two
-centuries, had recently been welcomed with universal satisfaction.
-How much would that same feeling be shocked when Thebes extinguished,
-for her own aggrandizement, four autonomous communities, all of her
-own Bœotian kindred—one of these communities too being Orchomenus,
-respected both for its antiquity and its traditionary legends!
-Little pains was taken to canvass the circumstances of the case,
-and to inquire whether Thebes had exceeded the measure of rigor
-warranted by the war-code of the time. In the patriotic and national
-conceptions of every Greek, Hellas consisted of an aggregate of
-autonomous, fraternal, city-communities. The extinction of any
-one of these was like the amputation of a limb from the organized
-body. Repugnance towards Thebes, arising out of these proceedings,
-affected strongly the public opinion of the time, and manifests
-itself especially in the language of Athenian orators, exaggerated by
-mortification on account of the loss of Oropus.[414]
-
-  [414] Isokrates, Or. viii. De Pace, s. 21; Demosthenes adv.
-  Leptinem, p. 490. s. 121; pro Megalopol. p. 208. s. 29; Philippic
-  ii. p. 69. s. 15.
-
-The great body of Thessalians, as well as the Magnetes and the
-Phthiot Achæans, were among those subject to the ascendency of
-Thebes. Even the powerful and cruel despot, Alexander of Pheræ, was
-numbered in this catalogue.[415] The cities of fertile Thessaly,
-possessed by powerful oligarchies with numerous dependent serfs,
-were generally a prey to intestine conflict and municipal rivalry
-with each other; disorderly as well as faithless.[416] The Aleuadæ,
-chiefs at Larissa—and the Skopadæ, at Krannon—had been once the
-ascendent families in the country. But in the hands of Lykophron and
-the energetic Jason, Pheræ had been exalted to the first rank. Under
-Jason as tagus (federal general), the whole force of Thessaly was
-united, together with a large number of circumjacent tributaries,
-Macedonian, Epirotic, Dolopian, etc., and a well-organized standing
-army of mercenaries besides. He could muster eight thousand cavalry,
-twenty thousand hoplites, and peltasts or light infantry in numbers
-far more considerable.[417] A military power of such magnitude, in
-the hands of one alike able and aspiring, raised universal alarm, and
-would doubtless have been employed in some great scheme of conquest,
-either within or without Greece, had not Jason been suddenly cut off
-by assassination in 370 B. C., in the year succeeding the battle
-of Leuktra.[418] His brothers Polyphron and Polydorus succeeded to
-his position as tagus, but not to his abilities or influence. The
-latter a brutal tyrant, put to death the former, and was in his turn
-slain, after a short interval, by a successor yet worse, his nephew
-Alexander, who lived and retained power at Pheræ, for about ten years
-(368-358 B. C.).
-
-  [415] Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 5, 4; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 35.
-  Wachsmuth states, in my judgment, erroneously, that Thebes was
-  disappointed in her attempt to establish ascendency in Thessaly
-  (Hellenisch. Alterthümer, vol. ii. x. p. 338).
-
-  [416] Plato, Kriton, p. 53 D; Xenoph. Memorab. i. 2. 24;
-  Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 23; Demosth. cont. Aristokratem,
-  p. 658. s. 133.
-
-  “Pergit ire (the Roman consul Quinctius Flamininus) in Thessaliam:
-  ubi non liberandæ modo civitates erant, sed ex omni colluvione
-  et confusione in aliquam tolerabilem formam redigendæ. Nec enim
-  temporum modo vitiis, ac violentiâ et licentiâ regiâ (_i. e._ the
-  Macedonian) turbati erant; sed inquieto etiam ingenio gentis, nec
-  comitia, nec conventum nec concilium ullum, non per seditionem
-  et tumultum, jam inde a principio ad nostram usque ætatem,
-  traducentis” (Livy, xxxiv. 51).
-
-  [417] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 19.
-
-  [418] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 32.
-
-During a portion of that time Alexander contended with success
-against the Thebans, and maintained his ascendency in Thessaly. But
-before the battle of Mantineia in 362 B. C., he had been reduced
-into the condition of a dependent ally of Thebes, and had furnished
-a contingent to the army which marched under Epaminondas into
-Peloponnesus. During the year 362-361 B. C., he even turned his
-hostilities against Athens, the enemy of Thebes; carrying on a naval
-war against her, not without partial success, and damage to her
-commerce.[419] And as the foreign ascendency of Thebes everywhere
-was probably impaired by the death of her great leader Epaminondas,
-Alexander of Pheræ recovered strength; continuing to be the greatest
-potentate in Thessaly, as well as the most sanguinary tyrant, until
-the time of his death in the beginning of 359 B. C.[420] He then
-perished, in the vigor of age and in the fulness of power. Against
-oppressed subjects or neighbors he could take security by means of
-mercenary guards; but he was slain by the contrivance of his wife
-Thêbê and the act of her brothers:—a memorable illustration of the
-general position laid down by Xenophon, that the Grecian despot could
-calculate neither on security nor on affection anywhere, and that
-his most dangerous enemies were to be found among his own household
-or kindred.[421] The brutal life of Alexander, and the cruelty of
-his proceedings, had inspired his wife with mingled hatred and fear.
-Moreover she had learnt from words dropped in a fit of intoxication,
-that he was intending to put to death her brothers Tisiphonus,
-Pytholaus, and Lykophron—and along with them herself; partly because
-she was childless, and he had formed the design of re-marrying
-with the widow of the late despot Jason, who resided at Thebes.
-Accordingly Thêbê, apprising her brothers of their peril, concerted
-with them the means of assassinating Alexander. The bed-chamber which
-she shared with him was in an upper story, accessible only by a
-removable staircase or ladder; at the foot of which there lay every
-night a fierce mastiff in chains, and a Thracian soldier tattooed
-after the fashion of his country. The whole house moreover was
-regularly occupied by a company of guards; and it is even said that
-the wardrobe and closets of Thêbê were searched every evening for
-concealed weapons. These numerous precautions of mistrust, however,
-were baffled by her artifice. She concealed her brothers during all
-the day in a safe adjacent hiding-place. At night Alexander, coming
-to bed intoxicated, soon fell fast asleep; upon which Thêbê stole
-out of the room—directed the dog to be removed from the foot of the
-stairs, under pretence that the despot wished to enjoy undisturbed
-repose—and then called her armed brothers. After spreading wool upon
-the stairs, in order that their tread might be noiseless, she went
-again up into the bed-room, and brought away the sword of Alexander,
-which always hung near him. Notwithstanding this encouragement,
-however, the three young men, still trembling at the magnitude of the
-risk, hesitated to mount the stair; nor could they be prevailed upon
-to do so, except by her distinct threat, that if they flinched, she
-would awaken Alexander and expose them. At length they mounted, and
-entered the bed-chamber, wherein a lamp was burning; while Thêbê,
-having opened the door for them, again closed it, and posted herself
-to hold the bar. The brothers then approached the bed: one seized the
-sleeping despot by the feet, another by the hair of his head, and the
-third with a sword thrust him through.[422]
-
-  [419] Demosthenes adv. Polyklem. p. 1207. s. 5, 6; Diodor. xv.
-  61-95. See my previous Volume X. Ch. lxxx. p. 370.
-
-  [420] I concur with Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. ad. ann.
-  359 B. C., and Appendix, c. 15) in thinking that this is the
-  probable date of the assassination of Alexander of Pheræ; which
-  event is mentioned by Didorus (xvi. 14) under the year 357-356 B.
-  C., yet in conjunction with a series of subsequent events, and
-  in a manner scarcely constraining us to believe that he meant to
-  affirm the assassination itself as having actually taken place in
-  that year.
-
-  To the arguments adduced by Mr. Clinton, another may be added,
-  borrowed from the expression of Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 35)
-  ὀλίγον ὕστερον. He states that the assassination of Alexander
-  occurred “a little while” after the period when the Thebans,
-  avenging the death of Pelopidas, reduced that despot to
-  submission. Now this reduction cannot be placed later than 363 B.
-  C. That interval therefore which Plutarch calls “a little while,”
-  will be three years, if we place the assassination in 359 B. C.,
-  six years, if we place it in 357-356 B. C. Three years is a more
-  suitable interpretation of the words than _six_ years.
-
-  [421] Xenoph. Hiero, i. 38; ii. 10; iii. 8.
-
-  [422] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 36, 37; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 35;
-  Conon, ap. Photium, Narr. 50. Codex, 186; Cicero, de Offic. ii.
-  7. The details of the assassination, given in these authors,
-  differ. I have principally followed Xenophon, and have admitted
-  nothing positively inconsistent with his statements.
-
-After successfully and securely consummating this deed, popular on
-account of the odious character of the slain despot, Thêbê contrived
-to win over the mercenary troops, and to insure the sceptre to
-herself and her eldest brother Tisiphonus. After this change, it
-would appear that the power of the new princes was not so great as
-that of Alexander had been, so that additional elements of weakness
-and discord were introduced into Thessaly. This is to be noted as one
-of the material circumstances paving the way for Philip of Macedon to
-acquire ascendency in Greece—as will hereafter appear.
-
-It was in the year 360-359 B. C., that Perdikkas, elder brother and
-predecessor of Philip on the throne of Macedonia, was slain, in
-the flower of his age. He perished, according to one account, in a
-bloody battle with the Illyrians, wherein four thousand Macedonians
-fell also; according to another statement, by the hands of assassins
-and the treacherous subornation of his mother Eurydikê.[423] Of the
-exploits of Perdikkas during the five years of his reign we know
-little. He had assisted the Athenian general Timotheus in war against
-the Olynthian confederacy, and in the capture of Pydna, Potidæa,
-Torônê, and other neighboring places; while on the other hand he
-had opposed the Athenians in their attempt against Amphipolis,
-securing that important place by a Macedonian garrison, both against
-them and for himself. He was engaged in serious conflicts with
-the Illyrians.[424] It appears too that he was not without some
-literary inclinations—was an admirer of intellectual men, and in
-correspondence with Plato at Athens. Distinguished philosophers or
-sophists, like Plato and Isokrates, enjoyed renown, combined with
-a certain measure of influence, throughout the whole range of the
-Grecian world. Forty years before, Archelaus king of Macedonia
-had shown favor to Plato,[425] then a young man, as well as to
-his master Sokrates. Amyntas, the father both of Perdikkas and of
-Philip, had throughout his reign cultivated the friendship of leading
-Athenians, especially Iphikrates and Timotheus; the former of whom
-he had even adopted as his son; Aristotle, afterwards so eminent
-as a philosopher (son of Nikomachus the confidential physician of
-Amyntas[426]), had been for some time studying at Athens as a pupil
-of Plato; moreover Perdikkas during his reign had resident with him a
-friend of the philosopher—Euphræus of Oreus. Perdikkas lent himself
-much to the guidance of Euphræus, who directed him in the choice of
-his associates, and permitted none to be his guests except persons
-of studious habits; thus exciting much disgust among the military
-Macedonians.[427] It is a signal testimony to the reputation of
-Plato, that we find his advice courted, at one and the same time, by
-Dionysius the younger at Syracuse, and by Perdikkas in Macedonia.
-
-  [423] Justin, vii. 5; Diodor. xvi. 2. The allusion in the speech
-  of Philotas immediately prior to his execution (Curtius, vi.
-  43. p. 591, Mützell) supports the affirmation of Justin—that
-  Perdikkas was assassinated.
-
-  [424] Antipater (the general of Philip and viceroy of his son
-  Alexander in Macedonia) is said to have left an historical work,
-  Περδίκκου πράξεις Ἰλλυρικὰς (Suidas, v. Ἀντίπατρος), which can
-  hardly refer to any other Perdikkas than the one now before us.
-
-  [425] Athenæus, xi. p. 506 E. Πλάτων, ὃν Σπεύσιππός φησι φίλτατον
-  ὄντα Ἀρχελάῳ, etc.
-
-  [426] Diogenes Laert. v. 1, 1.
-
-  [427] Athenæus, xi. p. 506 E. p. 508 E. The fourth among the
-  letters of Plato (alluded to by Diogenes Laert. iii. 62) is
-  addressed to Perdikkas partly in recommendation and praise of
-  Euphræus. There appears nothing to prove it to be spurious;
-  but whether it be spurious or genuine, the fact that Plato
-  corresponded with Perdikkas is sufficiently probable.
-
-On the suggestion of Plato, conveyed through Euphræus, Perdikkas
-was induced to bestow upon his own brother Philip a portion of
-territory or an appanage in Macedonia. In 368 B. C. (during the reign
-of Alexander elder brother of Perdikkas and Philip), Pelopidas had
-reduced Macedonia to partial submission and had taken hostages for
-its fidelity; among which hostages was the youthful Philip, then
-about fifteen years of age. In this character Philip remained about
-two or three years at Thebes.[428] How or when he left that city,
-we cannot clearly make out. He seems to have returned to Macedonia
-after the murder of Alexander by Ptolemy Alorites; probably without
-opposition from the Thebans, since his value as a hostage was
-then diminished. The fact that he was confided (together with his
-brother Perdikkas) by his mother Eurydikê to the protection of the
-Athenian general Iphikrates, then on the coast of Macedonia—has been
-recounted in a previous chapter. How Philip fared during the regency
-of Ptolemy Alorites in Macedonia, we do not know; we might ever
-suspect that he would return back to Thebes as a safer residence. But
-when his brother Perdikkas, having slain Ptolemy Alorites, became
-king, Philip resided in Macedonia, and even obtained from Perdikkas
-(as already stated), through the persuasion of Plato, a separate
-district to govern as subordinate. Here he remained until the death
-of Perdikkas in 360-359 B. C.; organizing a separate military force
-of his own (like Derdas in 382 B. C., when the Lacedæmonians made war
-upon Olynthus;[429]) and probably serving at its head in the wars
-carried on by his brother.
-
-  [428] Justin, vi. 9; vii. 5. “Philippus obses triennio Thebis
-  habitus,” etc.
-
-  Compare Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 26; Diodor. xv. 67; xvi. 2; and
-  the copious note of Wesseling upon the latter passage. The two
-  passages of Diodorus are not very consistent; in the latter, he
-  states that Philip had been deposited at Thebes by the Illyrians,
-  to whom he had been made over as a hostage by his father Amyntas.
-  This is highly improbable; as well for other reasons (assigned
-  by Wesseling), as because the Illyrians, if they ever received
-  him as a hostage, would not send him to Thebes, but keep him
-  in their own possession. The memorable interview described
-  by Æschines—between the Athenian general Iphikrates and the
-  Macedonian queen Eurydikê with her two youthful sons Perdikkas
-  and Philip—must have taken place some time before the death of
-  Ptolemy Alorites, and before the accession of Perdikkas. The
-  expressions of Æschines do not, perhaps, necessarily compel us
-  to suppose the interview to have taken place _immediately_ after
-  the death of Alexander (Æschines, Fal. Leg. p. 31, 32): yet it
-  is difficult to reconcile the statement of the orator with the
-  recognition of three years’ continuous residence at Thebes.
-  Flathe (Geschichte Makedoniens, vol. i. p. 39-47) supposes
-  Æschines to have allowed himself an oratorical misrepresentation,
-  when he states that Philip was present in Macedonia at the
-  interview with Iphikrates. This is an unsatisfactory mode of
-  escaping from the difficulty; but the chronological statements,
-  as they now stand, can hardly be all correct. It is possible that
-  Philip may have gone again back to Thebes, or may have been sent
-  back, after the interview with Iphikrates; we might thus obtain a
-  space of three years for his stay, at two several times, in that
-  city. We are not to suppose that his condition at Thebes was one
-  of durance and ill-treatment. See Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hell. App.
-  iv. p. 229.
-
-  [429] Athenæus, xi. p. 506. διατρέφων δ᾽ ἐνταῦθα δύναμιν
-  (Philippus), etc. About Derdas, see Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 38.
-
-The time passed by Philip at Thebes, however, from fifteen to
-eighteen years of age, was an event of much importance in determining
-his future character.[430] Though detained at Thebes, Philip was
-treated with courtesy and respect. He resided with Pammenes, one
-of the principal citizens; he probably enjoyed good literary and
-rhetorical teaching, since as a speaker, in after life, he possessed
-considerable talent;[431] and he may also have received some
-instruction in philosophy, though he never subsequently manifested
-any taste for it, and though the assertion of his having been
-taught by Pythagoreans merits little credence. But the lesson, most
-indelible of all, which he imbibed at Thebes, was derived from the
-society and from the living example of men like Epaminondas and
-Pelopidas. These were leading citizens, manifesting those qualities
-which insured for them the steady admiration of a free community—and
-of a Theban community, more given to action than to speech; moreover
-they were both of them distinguished military leaders—one of them the
-ablest organizer and the most scientific tactician of his day. The
-spectacle of the Theban military force, excellent both as cavalry
-and as infantry under the training of such a man as Epaminondas, was
-eminently suggestive to a young Macedonian prince; and became still
-more efficacious when combined with the personal conversation of the
-victor of Leuktra—the first man whom Philip learnt to admire, and
-whom he strove to imitate in his military career.[432] His mind was
-early stored with the most advanced strategic ideas of the day, and
-thrown into the track of reflection, comparison, and invention, on
-the art of war.
-
-  [430] It was in after times a frequent practice with the Roman
-  Senate, when imposing terms of peace on kings half-conquered, to
-  require hostages for fidelity, with a young prince of the royal
-  blood among the number; and it commonly happened that the latter,
-  after a few years’ residence at Rome, returned home an altered
-  man on many points.
-
-  See the case of Demetrius, younger son of the last Philip of
-  Macedon, and younger brother of Perseus (Livy, xxxiii. 13; xxxix.
-  53; xl. 5), of the young Parthian princes, Vonones (Tacitus,
-  Annal. ii. 1, 2), Phraates (Tacit. Annal. vi. 32), Meherdates
-  (Tacit. Ann. xii. 10, 11).
-
-  [431] Even in the opinion of very competent judges: see Æschines,
-  Fals. Leg. c. 18. p. 253.
-
-  [432] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 26. ζηλωτὴς γεγονέναι ἔδοξεν
-  Ἐπαμεινώνδου, τὸ περὶ τοὺς πολέμους καὶ τὰς στρατηγίας δραστήριον
-  ἴσως κατανοήσας, ὃ μικρὸν ἦν τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀρετῆς μόριον, etc.
-
-When transferred from Thebes to the subordinate government of a
-district in Macedonia under his elder brother Perdikkas, Philip
-organized a military force; and in so doing had the opportunity
-of applying to practice, though at first on a limited scale, the
-lessons learnt from the illustrious Thebans. He was thus at the head
-of troops belonging to and organized by himself—when the unexpected
-death of Perdikkas opened to him the prospect of succeeding to the
-throne. But it was a prospect full of doubt and hazard. Perdikkas
-had left an infant son; there existed, moreover, three princes,
-Archelaus, Aridæus, and Menelaus,[433] sons of Amyntas by another
-wife or mistress Gygæa, and therefore half-brothers of Perdikkas and
-Philip: there were also two other pretenders to the crown—Pausanias
-(who had before aspired to the throne after the death of Amyntas),
-seconded by a Thracian prince—and Argæus, aided by the Athenians. To
-these dangers was to be added, attack from the neighboring barbaric
-nations, Illyrians, Pæonians, and Thracians—always ready[434] to
-assail and plunder Macedonia at every moment of intestine weakness.
-It would appear that Perdikkas, shortly before his death, had
-sustained a severe defeat, with the loss of four thousand men, from
-the Illyrians: his death followed, either from a wound then received,
-or by the machinations of his mother Eurydikê. Perhaps both the wound
-in battle and the assassination, may be real facts.[435]
-
-  [433] Justin, vii. 4. Menelaus, the father of Amyntas and
-  grandfather of Philip, is stated to have been an illegitimate
-  son; while Amyntas himself is said to have been originally
-  an attendant or slave of Æropus (Ælian, V. H. xii. 43). Our
-  information respecting the relations of the successive kings,
-  and pretenders to the throne, in Macedonia, is obscure and
-  unsatisfactory. Justin (_l. c._) agrees with Ælian in calling the
-  father of Amyntas Menelaus; but Dexippus (ap. Syncellum, p. 263)
-  calls him Aridæus; while Diodorus (xiv. 92) calls him Tharraleus.
-
-  [434] Justin, xxix. 1.
-
-  [435] Diodor xvi. 2; Justin, vii. 5; Quint. Curt. vi. 48, 26.
-
-Philip at first assumed the government of the country as guardian of
-his young nephew Amyntas the son of Perdikkas. But the difficulties
-of the conjuncture were so formidable, that the Macedonians around
-constrained him to assume the crown.[436] Of his three half-brothers
-he put to death one, and was only prevented from killing the other
-two by their flight into exile; we shall find them hereafter at
-Olynthus. They had either found, or were thought likely to find, a
-party in Macedonia to sustain their pretensions to the crown.[437]
-
-  [436] Justin, vii. 5. Amyntas lived through the reign of Philip,
-  and was afterwards put to death by Alexander, on the charge of
-  conspiracy. See Justin, xii 6; Quintus Curtius, vi. 34, 17; with
-  the note of Mützell.
-
-  [437] Justin, viii. 3. “Post hæc Olynthios aggreditur (Philip):
-  receperant enim per misericordiam, post cædem unius, duos fratres
-  ejus, quos Philippus, ex novercâ genitos, velut participes regni,
-  interficere gestiebat.”
-
-The succession to the throne in Macedonia, though descending in a
-particular family, was open to frequent and bloody dispute between
-the individual members of that family, and usually fell to the most
-daring and unscrupulous among them. None but an energetic man,
-indeed, could well maintain himself there, especially under the
-circumstances of Philip’s accession. The Macedonian monarchy has
-been called a limited monarchy; and in a large sense of the word,
-this proposition is true. But what the limitations were, or how they
-were made operative, we do not know. That there were some ancient
-forms and customs, which the king habitually respected, we cannot
-doubt;[438] as there probably were also among the Illyrian tribes,
-the Epirots, and others of the neighboring warlike nations. A general
-assembly was occasionally convened, for the purpose of consenting
-to some important proposition, or trying some conspicuous accused
-person. But though such ceremonies were recognized and sometimes
-occurred, the occasions were rare in which they interposed any
-serious constitutional check upon the regal authority.[439] The
-facts of Macedonian history, as far as they come before us, exhibit
-the kings acting on their own feelings and carrying out their own
-schemes—consulting whom they please and when they please—subject only
-to the necessity of not offending too violently the sentiments of
-that military population whom they commanded. Philip and Alexander,
-combining regal station with personal ability and unexampled success,
-were more powerful than any of their predecessors. Each of them
-required extraordinary efforts from their soldiers, whom they were
-therefore obliged to keep in willing obedience and attachment;
-just as Jason of Pheræ had done before with his standing army of
-mercenaries.[440] During the reign of Alexander the army manifests
-itself as the only power by his side to which even he is constrained
-occasionally to bow; after his death, its power becomes for a time
-still more ascendent. But so far as the history of Macedonia is
-known to us, I perceive no evidence of coördinate political bodies,
-or standing apparatus (either aristocratical or popular) to check
-the power of the king—such as to justify in any way the comparison
-drawn by a modern historian between the Macedonian and English
-constitutions.
-
-  [438] Arrian, Exp. Alex. iv. 11. οὐ βίᾳ, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ Μακεδόνων
-  ἄρχοντες διετέλεσαν (Alexander and his ancestors before him).
-
-  [439] The trial of Philotas, who is accused by Alexander for
-  conspiracy before an assembly of the Macedonian soldiers near to
-  head-quarters, is the example most insisted on of the prevalence
-  of this custom, of public trial in criminal accusations. Quintus
-  Curtius says (vi. 32. 25), “De capitalibus rebus vetusto
-  Macedonum more inquirebat exercitus; in pace erat vulgi: et nihil
-  potestas regum valebat, nisi prius valuisset auctoritas.” Compare
-  Arrian, iii. 26; Diodor. xvii. 79, 80.
-
-  That this was an ancient Macedonian custom, in reference to
-  conspicuous persons accused of treason, we may readily believe;
-  and that an officer of the great rank and military reputation
-  of Philotas, if suspected of treason, could hardly be dealt
-  with in any other way. If he was condemned, all his relatives
-  and kinsmen, whether implicated or not, became involved in the
-  same condemnation. Several among the kinsmen of Philotas either
-  fled or killed themselves; and Alexander then issued an edict
-  pardoning them all, except Parmenio; who was in Media, and whom
-  he sent secret orders instantly to despatch. If the proceedings
-  against Philotas, as described by Curtius, are to be taken
-  as correct, it is rather an appeal made by Alexander to the
-  soldiery, for their consent to his killing a dangerous enemy,
-  than an investigation of guilt or innocence.
-
-  Olympias, during the intestine contests which followed after
-  the death of Alexander, seems to have put to death as many
-  illustrious Macedonians as she chose, without any form of trial.
-  But when her enemy Kassander got the upper hand, subdued and
-  captured her, he did not venture to put her to death without
-  obtaining the consent of a Macedonian assembly (Diodor. xix.
-  11, 51; Justin, xiv. 6; Pausanias, i. 11, 2). These Macedonian
-  assemblies, insofar as we read of them, appear to be summoned
-  chiefly as mere instruments to sanction some predetermined
-  purpose of the king or the military leader predominant at the
-  time. Flathe (Geschicht. Makedon. p. 43-45) greatly overrates,
-  in my judgment, the rights and powers enjoyed by the Macedonian
-  people.
-
-  [440] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 6, 16.
-
-The first proceeding of Philip, in dealing with his numerous enemies,
-was to buy off the Thracians by seasonable presents and promises; so
-that the competition of Pausanias for the throne became no longer
-dangerous. There remained as assailants the Athenians with Argæus
-from seaward, and the Illyrians from landward.
-
-But Philip showed dexterity and energy sufficient to make head
-against all. While he hastened to reorganize the force of the
-country, to extend the application of those improved military
-arrangements which he had already been attempting in his own
-province, and to encourage his friends and soldiers by collective
-harangues,[441] in a style and spirit such as the Macedonians had
-never before heard from regal lips—he contrived to fence off the
-attack of the Athenians until a more convenient moment.
-
-  [441] Diodor. xvi. 2, 3.
-
-He knew that the possession of Amphipolis was the great purpose for
-which they had been carrying on war against Macedonia for some years,
-and for which they now espoused the cause of Argæus. Accordingly he
-professed his readiness at once to give up to them this important
-place, withdrawing the Macedonian garrison whereby Perdikkas had held
-it against them, and leaving the town to its own citizens. This act
-was probably construed by the Athenians as tantamount to an actual
-cession; for even if Amphipolis should still hold out against them,
-they doubted not of their power to reduce it when unaided. Philip
-farther despatched letters to Athens, expressing an anxious desire
-to be received into her alliance, on the same friendly terms as his
-father Amyntas before him.[442] These proceedings seem to have had
-the effect of making the Athenians lukewarm in the cause of Argæus.
-For Mantias the Athenian admiral, though he conveyed that prince
-by sea to Methônê, yet stayed in the seaport himself, while Argæus
-marched inland—with some returning exiles, a body of mercenaries,
-and a few Athenian volunteers—to Ægæ or Edessa;[443] hoping to
-procure admission into that ancient capital of the Macedonian kings.
-But the inhabitants refused to receive him; and in his march back,
-to Methônê, he was attacked and completely defeated by Philip. His
-fugitive troops found shelter on a neighboring eminence, but were
-speedily obliged to surrender. Philip suffered the greater part
-of them to depart on terms, requiring only that Argæus and the
-Macedonian exiles should be delivered up to him. He treated the
-Athenian citizens with especial courtesy, preserved to them all their
-property, and sent them home full of gratitude, with conciliatory
-messages to the people of Athens. The exiles, Argæus among them,
-having become his prisoners, were probably put to death.[444]
-
-  [442] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660. s. 144.
-
-  [443] Diodor. xvi. 3; Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 660 _ut
-  sup._ τῶν ἡμετέρων τινὰς πολιτῶν, etc. Justin, vii 6.
-
-  [444] Diodor. xvi. 3.
-
-The prudent lenity exhibited by Philip towards the Athenian
-prisoners, combined with his evacuation of Amphipolis, produced the
-most favorable effect upon the temper of the Athenian public, and
-disposed them to accept his pacific offers. Peace was accordingly
-concluded. Philip renounced all claim to Amphipolis, acknowledging
-that town as a possession rightfully belonging to Athens.[445] By
-such renunciation he really abandoned no rightful possession; for
-Amphipolis had never belonged to the Macedonian kings; nor had
-any Macedonian soldiers ever entered it until three or four years
-before, when the citizens had invoked aid from Perdikkas to share
-in the defence against Athens. But the Athenians appeared to have
-gained the chief prize for which they had been so long struggling.
-They congratulated themselves in the hope, probably set forth
-with confidence by the speakers who supported the peace, that the
-Amphipolitans alone would never think of resisting the acknowledged
-claims of Athens.
-
-  [445] Diodor. xvi. 4.
-
-Philip was thus relieved from enemies on the coast, and had his hands
-free to deal with the Illyrians and Pæonians of the interior. He
-marched into the territory of the Pæonians (seemingly along the upper
-course of the river Axius), whom he found weakened by the recent
-death of their king Agis. He defeated their troops, and reduced
-them to submit to Macedonian supremacy. From thence he proceeded to
-attack the Illyrians—a more serious and formidable undertaking. The
-names _Illyrians_, _Pæonians_, _Thracians_, etc., did not designate
-any united national masses, but were applied to a great number of
-kindred tribes or clans, each distinct, separately governed, and
-having its particular name and customs. The Illyrian and Pæonian
-tribes occupied a wide space of territory to the north and north-west
-of Macedonia, over the modern Bosnia nearly to the Julian Alps and
-the river Save. But during the middle of the fourth century before
-Christ, it seems that a large immigration of Gallic tribes from
-the westward was taking place, invading the territory of the more
-northerly Illyrians and Pæonians, circumscribing their occupancy and
-security, and driving them farther southward; sometimes impelling
-them to find subsistence and plunder by invasions of Macedonia or by
-maritime piracies against Grecian commerce in the Adriatic.[446] The
-Illyrians had become more dangerous neighbors to Macedonia than they
-were in the time of Thucydides; and it seems that a recent coalition
-of their warriors, for purposes of invasion and plunder, was now
-in the zenith of its force. It was under a chief named Bardylis,
-who had raised himself to command from the humble occupation of
-a charcoal burner; a man renowned for his bravery, but yet more
-renowned for dealings rigidly just towards his soldiers, especially
-in the distribution of plunder.[447] Bardylis and his Illyrians had
-possessed themselves of a considerable portion of Western Macedonia
-(west of Mount Bermius), occupying for the most part the towns,
-villages, and plains,[448] and restricting the native Macedonians
-to the defensible, yet barren hills. Philip marched to attack them,
-at the head of a force which he had now contrived to increase to
-the number of ten thousand foot and six hundred horse. The numbers
-of Bardylis were about equal; yet on hearing of Philip’s approach,
-he sent a proposition tendering peace, on the condition that each
-party should retain what it actually possessed. His proposition being
-rejected, the two armies speedily met. Philip had collected around
-him on the right wing his chosen Macedonian troops, with whom he made
-his most vigorous onset: manœuvring at the same time with a body of
-cavalry so as to attack the left flank of the Illyrians. The battle,
-contested with the utmost obstinacy on both sides, was for some time
-undecided; nor could the king of Macedon break the oblong square into
-which his enemies had formed themselves. But at length his cavalry
-were enabled to charge them so effectively in flank and rear, that
-victory declared in his favor. The Illyrians fled, were vigorously
-pursued with the loss of seven thousand men, and never again rallied.
-Bardylis presently sued for peace, and consented to purchase it by
-renouncing all his conquests in Macedonia; while Philip pushed his
-victory so strenuously, as to reduce to subjection all the tribes
-eastward of Lake Lychnidus.[449]
-
-  [446] See the remarks of Niebuhr, on these migrations of Gallic
-  tribes from the west, and their effect upon the prior population
-  established between the Danube and the Ægean Sea (Niehbuhr,
-  Vorträge über alte Geschichte, vol. iii. p. 225, 281; also the
-  earlier work of the same author—Kleine Schriften, Untersuchungen
-  über die Geschichte der Skythen, p. 375).
-
-  [447] Theopompus, Fragm. 35, ed. Didot; Cicero de Officiis, ii.
-  11; Diodor. xvi. 4.
-
-  [448] Arrian, vii. 9, 2, 3.
-
-  [449] Diodor. xvi. 4-8. Frontinus (Strategem. ii. 3, 2) mentions
-  a battle gained by Philip against the Illyrians; wherein,
-  observing that their chosen troops were in the centre, he placed
-  his own greatest strength in his right wing, attacked and beat
-  their left wing; then came upon their centre in flank and
-  defeated their whole army. Whether this be the battle alluded
-  to, we cannot say. The tactics employed are the same as those
-  of Epaminondas at Leuktra and Mantinea; strengthening one wing
-  peculiarly for the offensive, and keeping back the rest of the
-  army upon the defensive.
-
-These operations against the inland neighbors of Macedonia must have
-occupied a year or two. During that interval, Philip left Amphipolis
-to itself, having withdrawn from it the Macedonian garrison as a
-means of conciliating the Athenians. We might have expected that
-they would forthwith have availed themselves of the opening and
-taken active measures for regaining Amphipolis. They knew the value
-of that city: they considered it as of right theirs; they had long
-been anxious for its repossession, and had even besieged it five
-years before, though seemingly only with a mercenary force, which
-was repelled mainly by the aid of Philip’s predecessor Perdikkas.
-Amphipolis was not likely to surrender to them voluntarily; but when
-thrown upon its own resources, it might perhaps have been assailed
-with success. Yet they remained without making any attempt on the
-region at the mouth of the river Strymon. We must recollect (as has
-been narrated in my last preceding volume[450]), that during 359 B.
-C., and the first part of 358 B. C., they were carrying on operations
-in the Thracian Chersonese, against Charidemus and Kersobleptes,
-with small success and disgraceful embarrassment. These vexatious
-operations in the Chersonese—in which peninsula many Athenians were
-interested as private proprietors, besides the public claims of the
-city—may perhaps have absorbed wholly the attention of Athens, so
-as to induce her to postpone the acquisition of Amphipolis until
-they were concluded; a conclusion which did not arrive (as we shall
-presently see) until immediately before she became plunged in the
-dangerous crisis of the Social War. I know no better explanation
-of the singular circumstance, that Athens, though so anxious, both
-before and after, for the possession of Amphipolis, made no attempt
-to acquire it during more than a year after its evacuation by Philip;
-unless indeed we are to rank this opportunity among the many which
-she lost (according to Demosthenes[451]) from pure negligence; little
-suspecting how speedily such opportunity would disappear.
-
-  [450] See Vol. X. Ch. lxxx. p. 379 _seqq._
-
-  [451] Demosthenes, Orat. de Chersonese, p. 98, s. 34. φέρε γὰρ,
-  πρὸς Διὸς, εἰ λόγον ὑμᾶς ἀπαιτήσειαν οἱ Ἕλληνες ὧν νυνὶ παρείκατε
-  καιρῶν διὰ ῥᾳθυμίαν, etc.
-
-In 358 B. C., an opening was afforded to the Athenians for
-regaining their influence in Eubœa; and for this island, so near
-their own shores, they struck a more vigorous blow than for the
-distant possessions of Amphipolis. At the revival of the maritime
-confederacy under Athens (immediately after 378 B. C.), most of
-the cities in Eubœa had joined it voluntarily; but after the
-battle of Leuktra (in 371 B. C.), the island passed under Theban
-supremacy. Accordingly Eubœans from all the cities served in the
-army of Epaminondas, both in his first and his last expedition into
-Peloponnesus (369-362 B. C.).[452] Moreover, Orôpus, the frontier
-town of Attica and Bœotia—immediately opposite to Eubœa, having been
-wrested from Athens[453] in 366 B. C. by a body of exiles crossing
-the strait from Eretria, through the management of the Eretrian
-despot Themison—had been placed in the keeping of the Thebans,
-with whom it still remained. But in the year 358 B. C., discontent
-began in the Eubœan cities, from what cause we know not, against
-the supremacy of Thebes; whereupon a powerful Theban force was sent
-into the island to keep them down. A severe contest ensued, in which
-if Thebes had succeeded, Chalkis and Eretria might possibly have
-shared the fate of Orchomenus.[454] These cities sent urgent messages
-entreating aid from the Athenians, who were powerfully moved by the
-apprehension of seeing their hated neighbor Thebes reinforced by so
-large an acquisition close to their borders. The public assembly,
-already disposed to sympathize with the petitioners, was kindled
-into enthusiasm by the abrupt and emphatic appeal of Timotheus son
-of Konon.[455] “How! Athenians (said he), when you have the Thebans
-actually in the island, are you still here debating what is to be
-done, or how you shall deal with the case? Will you not fill the
-sea with triremes? Will you not start up at once, hasten down to
-Peiræus, and haul the triremes down to the water?” This animated
-apostrophe, reported and doubtless heard by Demosthenes himself,
-was cordially responded to by the people. The force of Athens,
-military as well as naval, was equipped with an eagerness, and sent
-forth with a celerity, seldom paralleled. Such was the general
-enthusiasm, that the costly office of trierarchy was for the first
-time undertaken by volunteers, instead of awaiting the more tardy
-process of singling out those rich men whose turn it was to serve,
-with the chance of still farther delay from the legal process called
-Antidosis or Exchange of property,[456] instituted by any one of
-the persons so chosen who might think himself hardly used by the
-requisition. Demosthenes himself was among the volunteer trierarchs;
-he and a person named Philinus being co-trierarchs of the same
-ship. We are told that in three or in five days the Athenian fleet
-and army, under the command of Timotheus,[457] were landed in full
-force on Eubœa; and that in the course of thirty days the Thebans
-were so completely worsted, as to be forced to evacuate it under
-capitulation. A body of mercenaries under Chares contributed to the
-Athenian success. Yet it seems not clear that the success was so easy
-and rapid as the orators are fond of asserting.[458] However, their
-boast, often afterwards repeated, is so far well-founded, that Athens
-fully accomplished her object, rescued the Eubœans from Thebes, and
-received the testimonial of their gratitude in the form of a golden
-wreath dedicated in the Athenian acropolis.[459] The Eubœan cities,
-while acknowledged as autonomous, continued at the same time to be
-enrolled as members of the Athenian confederacy, sending deputies
-to the synod at Athens; towards the general purposes of which they
-paid an annual tribute, assessed at five talents each for Oreus (or
-Histiæa) and Eretria.[460]
-
-  [452] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 5, 23. Εὐβοεῖς ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων:
-  also vii. 5, 4. Βοιωτοὺς ἔχων πάντας καὶ Εὐβοέας (Epaminondas),
-  etc.
-
-  Winiewski, in his instructive commentary upon the historical
-  facts of the Oration of Demosthenes de Coronâ, states erroneously
-  that Eubœa continued in the dependence of Athens without
-  interruption from 377 to 358 B. C. (Winiewski, Commentarii
-  Historici et Chronologici in Demosthenis Orationem de Coronâ, p.
-  30).
-
-  [453] Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 4, 1; Diodor. xv. 76; Demosthen. de
-  Coronâ, p. 259. s. 123.
-
-  [454] Demosthenes, Orat. de Chersones. p. 108. s. 80. τοὺς
-  Εὐβοέας σώζειν, ὅτε Θηβαῖοι κατεδουλοῦντ᾽ αὐτοὺς, etc.: compare
-  Demosthen. de Coronâ, p. 259. s. 123. Θηβαίων σφετεριζομένων τὴν
-  Εὔβοιαν, etc.; and Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 397. c. 31.
-  ἐπειδὴ διέβησαν εἰς Εὔβοιαν Θηβαῖοι, καταδουλώσασθαι τὰς πόλεις
-  πειρώμενοι, etc.
-
-  [455] Demosthen. Orat. de Chersones. p. 108. s. 80. Εἶπέ μοι,
-  βουλεύεσθε, ἔφη (Timotheus), Θηβαίους ἔχοντες ἐν νήσῳ, τί
-  χρήσεσθε, καὶ τί δεῖ ποιεῖν; Οὐκ ἐμπλήσετε τὴν θάλασσαν, ὦ ἄνδρες
-  Ἀθηναῖοι, τριηρῶν; Οὐκ ἀναστάντες ἤδη πορεύσεσθε εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ;
-  Οὐ καθέλξετε τὰς ναῦς;
-
-  [456] See, in illustration of these delays, Demosthenes,
-  Philippic i. p. 50 s. 42.
-
-  Any citizen who thought that he had been called upon out of his
-  fair turn to serve a trierarchy or other expensive duty, and
-  that another citizen had been unduly spared, might tender to
-  this latter an exchange of properties, offering to undertake
-  the duty if the other’s property were made over to him. The
-  person, to whom tender was made, was compelled to do one of
-  three things; either, 1. to show, at legal process, that it was
-  not his turn, and that he was not liable; 2. or to relieve the
-  citizen tendering from the trierarchy just imposed upon him; 3.
-  or to accept the exchange, receiving the other’s property, and
-  making over his own property in return; in which case the citizen
-  tendering undertook the trierarchy.
-
-  This obligatory exchange of properties, with the legal process
-  attached to it, was called Antidosis.
-
-  [457] That Timotheus was commander, is not distinctly stated by
-  Demosthenes, but may be inferred from Plutarch, De Gloriâ Athen.
-  p. 350 F. ἐν ᾧ Τιμόθεος Εὔβοιαν ἠλευθέρου, which, in the case of
-  a military man like Timotheus, can hardly allude merely to the
-  speech which he made in the assembly. Diokles is mentioned by
-  Demosthenes as having concluded the convention with the Thebans;
-  but this does not necessarily imply that he was commander: see
-  Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p. 570 s. 219.
-
-  About Philinus as colleague of Demosthenes in the trierarchy, see
-  Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 566. s. 204.
-
-  [458] Diodorus (xvi. 7) states that the contest in Eubœa lasted
-  for some considerable time.
-
-  Demosthenes talks of the expedition as having reached its
-  destination in three days, Æschines in five days; the latter
-  states also that within thirty days the Thebans were vanquished
-  and expelled (Demosthenes cont. Androtion. p. 597. s. 17;
-  Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 397. c. 31).
-
-  About Chares and the mercenaries, see Demosthenes cont.
-  Aristokrat. p. 678. s. 206.
-
-  [459] Demosthenes cont. Androtion. p. 616. s. 89; cont. Timokrat.
-  p. 756. s. 205.
-
-  [460] Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 401, 403, 404. c. 32. 33;
-  Demosthenes pro Megalopolitan. p. 204. s. 16.
-
-On the conclusion of this Eubœan enterprise, Chares with his
-mercenaries was sent forward to the Chersonese, where he at length
-extorted from Charidemus and Kersobleptes the evacuation of that
-peninsula and its cession to Athens, after a long train of dilatory
-manœuvres and bad faith on their part. I have in my last preceding
-volume, described these events, remarking at the same time that
-Athens attained at this moment the maximum of her renewed foreign
-power and second confederacy, which had begun in 378 B. C.[461] But
-this period of exaltation was very short. It was speedily overthrown
-by two important events—the Social war and the conquests of Philip in
-Thrace.
-
-  [461] See Vol. X. Ch. lxxx. p. 381, 382.
-
-The Athenian confederacy, recently strengthened by the rescue of
-Eubœa, numbered among its members a large proportion of the islands
-in the Ægean as well as the Grecian seaports in Thrace. The list
-included the islands Lesbos, Chios, Samos (this last now partially
-occupied by a body of Athenian Kleruchs or settlers), Kos and Rhodes;
-together with the important city of Byzantium. It was shortly after
-the recent success in Eubœa, that Chios, Kos, Rhodes, and Byzantium
-revolted from Athens by concert, raising a serious war against her,
-known by the name of the Social War.
-
-Respecting the proximate causes of this outbreak, we find,
-unfortunately, little information. There was now, and had always been
-since 378 B. C., a synod of deputies from all the confederate cities
-habitually assembling at Athens; such as had not subsisted under the
-first Athenian empire in its full maturity. How far the Synod worked
-efficiently, we do not know. At least it must have afforded to the
-allies, if aggrieved, a full opportunity of making their complaints
-heard; and of criticising the application of the common fund, to
-which each of them contributed. But I have remarked in the preceding
-volume, that the Athenian confederacy, which had begun (378 B. C.)
-in a generous and equal spirit of common maritime defence,[462] had
-gradually become perverted, since the humiliation of the great enemy
-Sparta at Leuktra, towards purposes and interests more exclusively
-Athenian. Athens had been conquering the island of Samos—Pydna,
-Potidæa, and Methônê, on the coast of Macedonia and Thrace—and the
-Thracian Chersonese; all of them acquisitions made for herself alone,
-without any advantage to the confederate synod—and made, too, in
-great part, to become the private property of her own citizens as
-kleruchs, in direct breach of her public resolution, passed in 378 B.
-C., not to permit any appropriation of lands by Athenian citizens out
-of Attica.
-
-  [462] Demosthenes, De Rhodior. Libertat. p. 194. s. 17. παρὸν
-  αὐτοῖς (the Rhodians) Ἕλλησι καὶ ~βελτίοσιν αὐτῶν ὑμῖν ἐξ ἴσου
-  συμμαχεῖν~, etc.
-
-In proportion as Athens came to act more for her own separate
-aggrandizement, and less for interests common to the whole
-confederacy, the adherence of the larger confederate states
-grew more and more reluctant. But what contributed yet farther
-to detach them from Athens, was, the behavior of her armaments
-on service, consisting in great proportion of mercenaries,
-scantily and irregularly paid; whose disorderly and rapacious
-exaction, especially at the cost of the confederates of Athens,
-are characterized in strong terms by all the contemporary
-orators—Demosthenes, Æschines, Isokrates, etc. The commander, having
-no means of paying his soldiers, was often compelled to obey their
-predatory impulses, and conduct them to the easiest place from whence
-money could be obtained; indeed, some of the commanders, especially
-Chares, were themselves not less ready than their soldiers to profit
-by such depredations.[463] Hence the armaments sent out by Athens
-sometimes saw little of the enemy whom they were sent to combat,
-preferring the easier and more lucrative proceeding of levying
-contributions from friends, and of plundering the trading-vessels
-met with at sea. Nor was it practicable for Athens to prevent such
-misconduct, when her own citizens refused to serve personally,
-and when she employed foreigners, hired for the occasion, but
-seldom regularly paid.[464] The suffering, alarm, and alienation
-arising from hence among the confederates, was not less mischievous
-than discreditable to Athens. We cannot doubt that complaints in
-abundance were raised in the confederate synod; but they must have
-been unavailing, since the abuse continued until the period shortly
-preceding the battle of Chæroneia.
-
-  [463] Diodor. xv. 95.
-
-  [464] Demosthenes, Philip, i. 46. s. 28. ἐξ οὗ δ᾽ αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ
-  τὰ ξενικὰ ὑμῖν στρατεύεται, τοὺς φίλους νικᾷ καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους,
-  οἱ δ᾽ ἐχθροὶ μείζους τοῦ δέοντος γεγόνασιν. Καὶ παρακύψαντα ἐπὶ
-  τὸν τῆς πόλεως πόλεμον, πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον ἢ πανταχοῦ μᾶλλον οἴχεται
-  πλέοντα· ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς ἀκολουθεῖ· εἰκότως· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄρχειν
-  μὴ διδόντα μισθόν.
-
-  Ibid. p. 53. s. 51. Ὅποι δ᾽ ἂν στρατηγὸν καὶ ψήφισμα κενὸν καὶ
-  τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος ἐλπίδας ἐκπέμψητε, οὐδὲν ὑμῖν τῶν δεόντων
-  γίγνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ~οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ καταγελῶσιν, οἱ δὲ σύμμαχοι τεθνᾶσι
-  τῷ δέει τοὺς τοιούτους ἀποστόλους~.
-
-  Ibid. p. 53. s. 53. Νῦν δ᾽ εἰς τοῦθ᾽ ἥκει τὰ πράγματα αἰσχύνης,
-  ὥστε τῶν στρατηγῶν ἕκαστος δὶς καὶ τρὶς κρίνεται παρ᾽ ὑμῖν περὶ
-  θανάτου, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς οὐδεὶς οὐδ᾽ ἅπαξ αὐτῶν ἀγωνίσασθαι
-  περὶ θανάτου τολμᾷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν ἀνδραποδιστῶν καὶ λωποδυτῶν
-  θάνατον μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται τοῦ προσήκοντος.
-
-  Compare Olynthiac ii. p. 26. s. 28; De Chersoneso, p. 95. s.
-  24-27, cont. Aristokrat. p. 639. s. 69; De Republ. Ordinand. περὶ
-  Συντάξεως, p. 167. s. 7. Also Æschines de Fals. Legat. p. 264. c.
-  24; Isokrates, De Pace, s. 57. 160.
-
-Amidst such apparent dispositions on the part of Athens to
-neglect the interests of the confederacy for purposes of her own
-and to tolerate or encourage the continued positive depredations
-of unpaid armaments—discontent naturally grew up, manifesting
-itself most powerfully among some of the larger dependencies
-near the Asiatic coast. The islands of Chios, Kos, and Rhodes,
-together with the important city of Byzantium on the Thracian
-Bosphorus, took counsel together, and declared themselves detached
-from Athens and her confederacy. According to the spirit of the
-convention, sworn at Sparta, immediately before the battle of
-Leuktra, and of the subsequent alliance, sworn at Athens, a few
-months afterwards[465]—obligatory and indefeasible confederacies
-stood generally condemned among the Greeks, so that these islands
-were justified in simply seceding when they thought fit. But their
-secession, which probably Athens would, under all circumstances,
-have resisted, was proclaimed in a hostile manner, accompanied with
-accusations of treacherous purposes on her part against them. It was
-moreover fomented by the intrigues, as well as aided by the arms,
-of the Karian prince Mausôlus.[466] Since the peace of Antalkidas,
-the whole Asiatic coast had been under the unresisted dominion
-either of satraps or subordinate princes dependent upon Persia,
-who were watching for opportunities of extending their conquests
-in the neighboring islands. Mausôlus appears to have occupied both
-Rhodes and Kos; provoking in the former island a revolution which
-placed it under an oligarchy, not only devoted to him, but farther
-sustained by the presence of a considerable force of his mercenary
-troops.[467] The government of Chios appears to have been always
-oligarchical; which fact was one ground for want of sympathy between
-the Chians and Athens. Lastly, the Byzantines had also a special
-ground for discontent; since they assumed the privilege of detaining
-and taxing the corn-ships from the Euxine in their passage through
-the Bosphorus[468]—while Athens, as chief of the insular confederacy,
-claimed that right for herself, and at any rate protested against the
-use of such power by any other city for its own separate profit.
-
-  [465] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 3, 18; vi. 5, 2.
-
-  [466] Demosthenes, De Rhodior. Libertat. p. 191. s. 3. ᾐτιάσαντο
-  γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἐπιβουλεύειν αὑτοῖς Χῖοι καὶ Βυζάντιοι καὶ Ῥόδιοι, καὶ
-  διὰ ταῦτα συνέστησαν ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς τὸν τελευταῖον τουτονὶ πόλεμον·
-  φανήσεται δ᾽ ὁ μὲν πρυτανεύσας ταῦτα καὶ πείσας Μαύσωλος, φίλος
-  εἶναι φάσκων Ῥοδίων, τὴν ἐλευθερίαν αὐτῶν ἀφῃρημένος.
-
-  [467] Demosthen. de Rhodior. Libert. p. 195. s. 17. p. 198 s. 34;
-  de Pace, p. 63. s. 25; Diodor. xvi. 7.
-
-  [468] Demosthen. de Pace, p. 63. s. 25. (ἐῶμεν) τὸν Κᾶρα τὰς
-  νήσους καταλαμβάνειν, Χίον καὶ Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον, καὶ ~Βυζαντίους
-  κατάγειν τὰ πλοῖα~, etc.
-
-  Compare Demosthenes adv. Polykl. p. 1207 s. 6. p. 1211. s. 22;
-  adv. Leptinem, p. 475. s. 68.
-
-This revolt, the beginning of what is termed the Social War, was a
-formidable shock to the foreign ascendency of Athens. Among all her
-confederates, Chios was the largest and most powerful, the entire
-island being under one single government. Old men, like Plato and
-Isokrates, might perhaps recollect the affright occasioned at Athens
-fifty-four years before (B. C. 412) by the news of the former revolt
-of Chios,[469] shortly after the great disaster before Syracuse. And
-probably the alarm was not much less, when the Athenians were now
-apprised of the quadruple defection among their confederates near the
-Asiatic coast. The joint armament of all four was mustered at Chios,
-whither Mausôlus also sent a reinforcement. The Athenians equipped a
-fleet with land-forces on board, to attack the island; and on this
-critical occasion we may presume that their citizens would overcome
-the reluctance to serve in person. Chabrias was placed in command of
-the fleet, Chares of the land-force; the latter was disembarked on
-the island, and a joint attack upon the town of Chios, by sea and
-land at the same moment, was concerted. When Chares marched up to
-the walls, the Chians and their allies felt strong enough to come
-forth and hazard a battle, with no decisive result; while Chabrias
-at the same time attempted with the fleet to force his way into the
-harbor. But the precautions for defence had been effectively taken,
-and the Chian seamen were resolute. Chabrias, leading the attack with
-his characteristic impetuosity, became entangled among the enemy’s
-vessels, was attacked on all sides, and fell gallantly fighting. The
-other Athenian ships either were not forward in following him, or
-could make no impression. Their attack completely failed, and the
-fleet was obliged to retire, with little loss apparently, except that
-of the brave admiral. Chares with his land-force having been again
-taken aboard, the Athenians forthwith sailed away from Chios.[470]
-
-  [469] Thucyd. viii. 15.
-
-  [470] The account of this event comes to us in a meagre and
-  defective manner, Diodorus xvi. 7; Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c.
-  4; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 6.
-
-  Demosthenes, in an harangue delivered three years afterwards,
-  mentions the death of Chabrias, and eulogizes his conduct at
-  Chios among his other glorious deeds; but gives no particulars
-  (Demosth. cont. Leptin. p. 481, 482).
-
-  Cornelius Nepos says that Chabrias was not commander, but
-  only serving as a private soldier on shipboard. I think this
-  less probable than the statement of Diodorus, that he was
-  joint-commander with Chares.
-
-This repulse at Chios was a serious misfortune to Athens. Such
-was the dearth of military men and the decline of the military
-spirit, in that city, that the loss of a warlike citizen, daring
-as a soldier and tried as a commander, like Chabrias, was never
-afterwards repaired. To the Chians and their allies, on the other
-hand, the event was highly encouraging. They were enabled, not merely
-to maintain their revolt, but even to obtain fresh support, and to
-draw into the like defection other allies of Athens,—among them,
-seemingly, Sestos, and other cities on the Hellespont. For some
-months they appear to have remained masters of the sea, with a fleet
-of one hundred triremes, disembarking and inflicting devastation on
-the Athenian islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samos, and elsewhere, so
-as to collect a sum for defraying their expenses. They were even
-strong enough to press the town of Samos, by close siege, until at
-length the Athenians, not without delay and difficulty, got together
-a fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes, under the joint command
-of Chares, Iphikrates with his son Menestheus, and Timotheus.
-Notwithstanding that Samos was under siege, the Athenian admirals
-thought it prudent to direct their first efforts to the reduction of
-Byzantium; probably from the paramount importance of keeping open
-the two straits between the Euxine and the Ægean, in order that the
-corn-ships, out of the former, might come through in safety.[471]
-To protect Byzantium, the Chians and their allies raised the siege
-of Samos, and sailed forthwith to the Hellespont, in which narrow
-strait both fleets were collected,—as the Athenians and Lacedæmonians
-had been during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war. A plan
-of naval action had been concerted by the three Athenian commanders,
-and was on the point of taking place, when there supervened a sudden
-storm, which in the judgment both of Iphikrates and Timotheus,
-rendered it rash and perilous to persist in the execution. They
-therefore held off, while Chares, judging differently, called upon
-the trierachs and seamen to follow him, and rushed into the fight
-without his colleagues. He was defeated, or at least was obliged to
-retire without accomplishing anything. But so incensed was he against
-his two colleagues, that he wrote a despatch to Athens accusing them
-of corruption and culpable backwardness against the enemy.[472]
-
-  [471] It appears that there was a great and general scarcity of
-  corn during this year 357 B. C. Demosthenes adv. Leptinem, p.
-  467. s. 38. ~προπέρυσι~ σιτοδείας παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις γενομένης,
-  etc. That oration was delivered in 355 B. C.
-
-  [472] I follow chiefly the account given of these transactions
-  by Diodorus, meagre and unsatisfactory as it is (xvi. 21). Nepos
-  (Timotheus, c. 3) differs from Diodorus on several points. He
-  states that both Samos and the Hellespont had revolted from
-  Athens; and that the locality in which Chares made his attack,
-  contrary to the judgment of his two colleagues, was near
-  Samos—not in the Hellespont. He affirms farther that Menestheus,
-  son of Iphikrates, was named as colleague of Chares; and that
-  Iphikrates and Timotheus were appointed as advisers of Menestheus.
-
-  As to the last assertion—that Timotheus only served as adviser to
-  his junior relative and not as a general formally named—this is
-  not probable in itself; nor seemingly consistent with Isokrates
-  (Or. xv. De Permutat. s. 137), who represents Timotheus as
-  afterwards passing through the usual trial of accountability.
-  Nor can Nepos be correct in saying that Samos had now revolted:
-  for we find it still in possession of Athens after the Social
-  War, and we know that a fresh batch of Athenian Kleruchs were
-  afterwards sent there.
-
-  On the other hand, I think Nepos is probably right in his
-  assertion, that the Hellespont now revolted (“descierat
-  Hellespontus”). This is a fact in itself noway improbable, and
-  helping us to understand how it happened that Chares conquered
-  Sestos afterwards in 353 B. C. (Diodor. xvi. 34), and that the
-  Athenians are said to have _then_ recovered the Chersonesus from
-  Kersobleptes.
-
-  Polyænus (iii. 9, 29) has a story representing the reluctance of
-  Iphikrates to fight, as having been manifested near Embata; a
-  locality not agreeing either with Nepos or with Diodorus. Embata
-  was on the continent of Asia, in the territory of Erythræ.
-
-  See respecting the relations of Athens with Sestos, my last
-  preceding volume, Vol. X. Ch. lxxx. p. 380 note.
-
-  Our evidence respecting this period is so very defective, that
-  nothing like certainty is attainable.
-
-The three joint admirals were thus placed not merely in opposition,
-but in bitter conflict, among themselves. At the trial of
-accountability, undergone by all of them not long afterwards at
-Athens, Chares stood forward as the formal accuser of his two
-colleagues, who in their turn also accused him. He was seconded
-in his attack by Aristophon, one of the most practised orators of
-the day. Both of them charged Iphikrates and Timotheus with having
-received bribes from the Chians and Rhodians,[473] and betrayed their
-trust; by deserting Chares at the critical moment when it had been
-determined beforehand to fight, and when an important success might
-have been gained.
-
-  [473] Deinarchus cont. Philokl. s. 17. ἕκατον ταλάντων τιμήσαντες
-  (Τιμόθεον), ὅτι χρήματ᾽ αὐτὸν Ἀριστοφῶν ἔφη παρὰ Χίων εἰληφέναι
-  καὶ Ῥοδίων: compare Deinarch. cont. Demosthen. s. 15, where the
-  same charge of bribery is alluded to, though αὐτὸς ἔφη is put
-  in place of αὐτὸν Ἀριστοφῶν ἔφη, seemingly by mistake of the
-  transcriber.
-
-How the justice of the case stood, we cannot decide. The characters
-of Iphikrates and Timotheus raise strong presumption that they
-were in the right and their accuser in the wrong. Yet it must be
-recollected that the Athenian public, (and probably every other
-public,—ancient or modern,—Roman, English, or French), would
-naturally sympathize with the forward and daring admiral, who led the
-way into action, fearing neither the storm nor the enemy, and calling
-upon his colleagues to follow. Iphikrates and Timotheus doubtless
-insisted upon the rashness of his proceedings, and set forth the
-violence of the gale. But this again would be denied by Chares, and
-would stand as a point where the evidence was contradictory; captains
-and seamen being produced as witnesses on both sides, and the fleet
-being probably divided into two opposing parties. The feelings of the
-Athenian Dikasts might naturally be, that Iphikrates and Timotheus
-ought never to have let their colleague go into action unassisted,
-even though they disapproved of the proceeding. Iphikrates defended
-himself partly by impeaching the behavior of Chares, partly by bitter
-retort upon his other accuser Aristophon. “Would _you_ (he asked),
-betray the fleet for money?” “No,” was the reply. “Well, then,
-_you_, Aristophon, would not betray the fleet; shall _I_, Iphikrates
-do so?”[474]
-
-  [474] See Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii. 24; iii. 10. Quintilian, Inst.
-  Or. v. 12, 10.
-
-The issue of this important cause was, that Iphikrates was acquitted,
-while Timotheus was found guilty and condemned to the large fine of
-one hundred talents. Upon what causes such difference of sentence
-turned, we make out imperfectly. And it appears that Iphikrates, far
-from exonerating himself by throwing blame on Timotheus, emphatically
-assumed the responsibility of the whole proceeding; while his son,
-Menestheus tendered an accurate account within his own knowledge, of
-all the funds received and disbursed by the army.[475]
-
-  [475] Isokrates, Or. xv. (Permutat.) s. 137. εἰ τοσαύτας μὲν
-  πόλεις ἑλόντα, μηδεμίαν δ᾽ ἀπολέσαντα, περὶ προδοσίας ἔκρινε (ἡ
-  πόλις Τιμόθεον), καὶ πάλιν εἰ διδόντος εὐθύνας αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰς μὲν
-  πράξεις Ἰφικράτους ἀναδεχομένου, τὸν δ᾽ ὑπὲρ τῶν χρημάτων λόγον
-  Μενεσθέως, τούτους μὲν ἀπέλυσε, Τιμόθεον δὲ τοσούτοις ἐζημίωσε
-  χρήμασιν, ὅσοις οὐδένα πώποτε τῶν προγεγενημένων.
-
-The cause assigned by Isokrates, the personal friend of Timotheus,
-is, the extreme unpopularity of the latter in the city. Though
-as a general and on foreign service, Timotheus conducted himself
-not only with scrupulous justice to every one, but with rare
-forbearance towards the maritime allies whom other generals vexed
-and plundered,—yet at home his demeanor was intolerably arrogant
-and offensive, especially towards the leading speakers who took
-part in public affairs. While recognized as a man of ability and as
-a general who had rendered valuable service, he had thus incurred
-personal unpopularity and made numerous enemies; chiefly among those
-most able to do him harm. Isokrates tells us that he had himself
-frequently remonstrated with Timotheus (as Plato admonished Dion),
-on this serious fault, which overclouded his real ability, caused
-him to be totally misunderstood, and laid up against him a fund of
-popular dislike sure to take melancholy effect on some suitable
-occasion. Timotheus (according to Isokrates), though admitting
-the justice of the reproof, was unable to conquer his own natural
-disposition.[476] If such was the bearing of this eminent man, as
-described by his intimate friend, we may judge how it would incense
-unfriendly politicians and even indifferent persons who knew him only
-from his obvious exterior. Iphikrates, though by nature a proud man,
-was more discreet and conciliatory in his demeanor, and more alive
-to the mischief of political odium.[477] Moreover, he seems to have
-been an effective speaker[478] in public, and his popularity among
-the military men in Athens was so marked, that on this very trial
-many of them manifested their sympathy by appearing in arms near the
-Dikastery.[479] Under these circumstances, we may easily understand
-that Chares and Aristophon might find it convenient to press their
-charge more pointedly against Timotheus than against Iphikrates; and
-that the Dikastery, while condemning the former, may have been less
-convinced of the guilt of the latter, and better satisfied in every
-way to acquit him.[480]
-
-  [476] Isokrates, Or. xv. (Permutat.) s. 146. Ταῦτα δ᾽ ἀκούων
-  ὀρθῶς μὲν ἔφασκέ με λέγειν, οὐ μὴν οἷός τ᾽ ἦν τὴν φύσιν
-  μεταβαλεῖν, etc.
-
-  Isokrates goes at some length into the subject from s. 137 to s.
-  147. The discourse was composed seemingly in 353 B. C., about one
-  year after the death of Timotheus, and four years after the trial
-  here described.
-
-  [477] Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 534, 535; Xenoph. Hellen. vi.
-  2. 39.
-
-  [478] Dionysius Halikarnass., Judicium de Lysiâ, p. 481; Justin,
-  vi. 5. Aristotle in his Rhetorica borrows several illustrations
-  on rhetorical points from the speeches of Iphikrates; but none
-  from any speeches of Timotheus.
-
-  [479] Polyænus, iii. 9, 29. That this may have been done with
-  the privity and even by the contrivance of Iphikrates, is
-  probable enough. But it seems to me that any obvious purpose of
-  intimidating the Dikastery would have been likely to do him more
-  harm than good.
-
-  [480] Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p. 224
-  _seqq._), while collecting and discussing instructively all the
-  facts respecting these two commanders, places the date of this
-  memorable trial in the year 354 B. C.; three years after the
-  events to which it relates, and two years after the peace which
-  concluded the Social War. Mr. Clinton (Fast. Hellenici, B. C.
-  354) gives the same statement. I dissent from their opinion on
-  the date and think that the trial must have occurred very soon
-  after the abortive battle in the Hellespont—that is in 357 B. C.
-  (or 356 B. C.), while the Social War was still going on.
-
-  Rehdantz and Mr. Clinton rely on the statement of Dionysius
-  Halikarnass. (De Dinarcho Judicium, p. 667). Speaking of an
-  oration falsely ascribed to Deinarchus, Dionysius says, that
-  it was spoken before the maturity of that orator—εἴρηται γὰρ
-  ἐπὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ Τιμοθέου ζῶντος, κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς μετὰ
-  Μενεσθέως στρατηγίας, ἐφ᾽ ᾗ τὰς εὐθύνας ὑποσχὼν, ἑάλω. Τιμόθεος
-  δὲ τὰς εὐθύνας ὑπέσχηκεν ἐπὶ Διοτίμου, τοῦ μετὰ Καλλίστρατον, ὅτε
-  καὶ.... These are the last words in the MS., so that the sentence
-  stands defective; Mr. Clinton supplies ἐτελεύτησεν, which is very
-  probable.
-
-  The archonship of Diotimus is in 354-353 B. C.; so that Dionysius
-  here states the trial to have taken place in 354 B. C. But on
-  the other hand, the same Dionysius, in another passage, states
-  the same trial to have taken place while the Social War was yet
-  going on; that is, some time between 358 and 355 B. C. De Lysiâ
-  Judicium, p. 480. ἐν γὰρ τῷ συμμαχικῷ πολέμῳ τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν
-  Ἰφικράτης ἠγώνισται, καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας ὑπέσχηκε τῆς στρατηγίας,
-  ~ὡς ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου γίγνεται καταφανές~· οὗτος δὲ ὁ πόλεμος
-  πίπτει κατὰ Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ Ἐλπίνην ἄρχοντας. The archonships of
-  Agathokles and Elpines cover the interval between Midsummer 357
-  B. C. and Midsummer 355 B. C.
-
-  It is plain that these two passages of Dionysius contradict
-  each other. Rehdantz and Mr. Clinton notice the contradiction,
-  but treat the passage first cited as containing the truth, and
-  the other as erroneous. I cannot but think that the passage
-  last cited is entitled to most credit, and that the true date
-  of the trial was 357-356 B. C., not 354 B. C. When Dionysius
-  asserts that the trial took place while the Social War was yet
-  going on, he adds, “as is evident from the speech itself—ὡς ἐξ
-  αὐτοῦ γίγνεται τοῦ λόγου καταφανές.” Here therefore there was no
-  possibility of being misled by erroneous tables; the evidence
-  is direct and complete; whereas he does not tell us on what
-  authority he made the other assertion, about the archonship of
-  Diotimus. Next, it is surely improbable that the abortive combat
-  in the Hellespont, and the fierce quarrel between Chares and
-  his colleagues, probably accompanied with great excitement in
-  the fleet, could have remained without judicial settlement for
-  three years. Lastly, assuming the statement about the archonship
-  of Diotimus to be a mistake, we can easily see how the mistake
-  arose. Dionysius has confounded the year in which Timotheus died,
-  with the year of his trial. He seems to have died in 354 B. C. I
-  will add that the text in this passage is not beyond suspicion.
-
-A fine of one hundred talents is said to have been imposed upon
-Timotheus, the largest fine (according to Isokrates), ever imposed
-at Athens. Upon his condemnation he retired to Chalkis, where he
-died three years afterwards, in 354 B. C. In the year succeeding his
-death, his memory was still very unpopular; yet it appears that the
-fine was remitted to his family, and that his son Konon was allowed
-to compromise the demand by a disbursement of the smaller sum of ten
-talents for the repairs of the city walls. It seems evident that
-Timotheus by his retirement evaded payment of the full fine; so that
-his son Konon appears after him as one of the richest citizens in
-Athens.[481]
-
-  [481] Cornelius Nepos, Timoth. c. 4; Rehdantz, Vit. Iph., Ch. et
-  Timoth. p. 235; Isokrates, Or. xv. (Permutat.) s. 108, 110. 137.
-
-The loss of such a citizen as Timotheus was a fresh misfortune to
-her. He had conducted her armies with signal success, maintained
-the honor of her name throughout the eastern and western seas, and
-greatly extended the list of her foreign allies. She had recently
-lost Chabrias in battle; a second general, Timotheus, was now
-taken from her; and the third, Iphikrates, though acquitted at the
-last trial, seems, as far as we can make out, never to have been
-subsequently employed on military command. These three were the
-last eminent military citizens at Athens; for Phokion, though brave
-and deserving, was not to be compared with either of them. On the
-other hand, Chares, a man of great personal courage, but of no other
-merit, was now in the full swing of reputation. The recent judicial
-feud between the three Athenian admirals had been doubly injurious
-to Athens, first as discrediting Iphikrates and Timotheus, next as
-exalting Chares, to whom the sole command was now confided.
-
-In the succeeding year, 356 B. C., Chares conducted another powerful
-fleet to attack the revolted allies. Being however not furnished
-with adequate funds from home to pay his troops, chiefly foreign
-mercenaries, he thought it expedient, on his own responsibility,
-to accept an offer from Artabazus (satrap of Daskylium and the
-region south of the Propontis), then in revolt against the Persian
-king.[482] Chares joined Artabazus with his own army, reinforced by
-additional bodies of mercenaries recently disbanded by the Persian
-satraps. With this entire force he gave battle to the king’s troops
-under the command of Tithraustes, and gained a splendid victory;
-upon which Artabazus remunerated him so liberally, as to place the
-whole Athenian army in temporary affluence. The Athenians at home
-were at first much displeased with their general, for violating
-his instructions, and withdrawing his army from its prescribed
-and legitimate task. The news of his victory, however, and of the
-lucrative recompense following it, somewhat mollified them. But
-presently they learned that the Persian king, indignant at such a
-gratuitous aggression on their part, was equipping a large fleet to
-second the operations of their enemies. Intimidated by the prospect
-of Persian attack, they became anxious to conclude a peace with
-the revolted allies; who, on their part, were not less anxious to
-terminate the war. Embassies being exchanged, and negotiations
-opened, in the ensuing year (355 B. C., the third of the war), a
-peace was sworn, whereby the Athenians recognized the complete
-autonomy, and severance from their confederacy, of the revolted
-cities, Chios, Rhodes, Kos, and Byzantium.[483]
-
-  [482] Diodor. xvi. 22. Demosthenes (Philippic. i. p. 46. s. 28)
-  has an emphatic passage, alluding to this proceeding on the part
-  of Chares; which he represents as a necessary result of the
-  remissness of the Athenians, who would neither serve personally
-  themselves, nor supply their general with money to pay his
-  foreign troops—and as a measure which the general could not avoid.
-
-  ... ἐξ οὗ δ᾽ αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ τὰ ξενικὰ ὑμῖν στρατεύεται, τοὺς
-  φίλους νικᾷ καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους, οἱ δ᾽ ἐχθροὶ μείζους τοῦ δέοντος
-  γεγόνασιν, καὶ παρακύψαντα ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς πόλεως πόλεμον, ~πρὸς
-  Ἀρτάβαζον καὶ πανταχοῦ μᾶλλον~ οἴχεται πλέοντα· ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς
-  ἀκολουθεῖ· εἰκότως—οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄρχειν, μὴ διδόντα μισθόν.
-  Compare the Scholia on the same oration, a passage which occurs
-  somewhat earlier, p. 44. s. 22.
-
-  It seems evident, from this passage, that the Athenians were at
-  first displeased with such diversion from the regular purpose of
-  the war, though the payment from Artabazus afterwards partially
-  reconciled them to it; which is somewhat different from the
-  statement of Diodorus.
-
-  From an inscription (cited in Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ,
-  etc., p. 158) we make out that Chares, Charidemus, and Phokion,
-  were about this time in joint-command of the Athenian fleet near
-  Lesbos, and that they were in some negotiation as to pecuniary
-  supplies with the Persian Orontes on the mainland. But the
-  inscription is so mutilated, that no distinct matter of fact can
-  be ascertained.
-
-  [483] Diodor. xvi. 22. I place little reliance on the Argument
-  prefixed to the Oration of Isokrates De Pace. As far as I am
-  able to understand the facts of this obscure period, it appears
-  to me that the author of that Argument has joined them together
-  erroneously, and misconceived the situation.
-
-  The assertion of Demosthenes, in the Oration against Leptines (p.
-  481. s. 90), respecting the behavior of the Chians towards the
-  memory of Chabrias, seems rather to imply that the peace with
-  Chios had been concluded before that oration was delivered. It
-  was delivered in the very year of the peace 355 B. C.
-
-Such was the termination of the Social War, which fatally impaired
-the power, and lowered the dignity, of Athens. Imperfectly as
-we know the events, it seems clear that her efforts to meet this
-formidable revolt were feeble and inadequate; evincing a sad downfall
-of energy since the year 412 B. C., when she had contended with
-transcendent vigor against similar and even greater calamities, only
-a year after her irreparable disaster before Syracuse. Inglorious as
-the result of the Social War was, it had nevertheless been costly,
-and left Athens poor. The annual revenues of her confederacy were
-greatly lessened by the secession of so many important cities,
-and her public treasury was exhausted. It is just at this time
-that the activity of Demosthenes as a public adviser begins. In a
-speech delivered this year (355 B. C.), he notes the poverty of the
-treasury; and refers back to it in discourses of after time as a fact
-but too notorious.[484]
-
-  [484] Demosthenes adv. Leptinem, p. 464. s. 26, 27; and De
-  Coronâ, p. 305 s. 293.
-
-But the misfortunes arising to Athens from the Social War did not
-come alone. It had the farther effect of rendering her less competent
-for defence against the early aggressions of Philip of Macedon.
-
-That prince, during the first year of his accession (359 B. C.), had
-sought to conciliate Athens by various measures, but especially by
-withdrawing his garrison from Amphipolis, while he was establishing
-his military strength in the interior against the Illyrians and
-Pæonians. He had employed in this manner a period apparently somewhat
-less than two years; and employed it with such success, as to humble
-his enemies in the interior, and get together a force competent for
-aggressive operations against the cities on the coast. During this
-interval, Amphipolis remained a free and independent city; formally
-renounced by Philip, and not assailed by the Athenians. Why they
-let slip this favorable opportunity of again enforcing by arms
-pretensions on which they laid so much stress—I have before partially
-(though not very satisfactorily) explained. Philip was not the man to
-let them enjoy the opportunity longer than he could help, or to defer
-the moment of active operations as they did. Towards the close of
-358 B. C., finding his hands free from impediments in the interior,
-he forthwith commenced the siege of Amphipolis. The inhabitants are
-said to have been unfavorably disposed towards him, and to have
-given him many causes for war.[485] It is not easy to understand what
-these causes could have been, seeing that so short a time before, the
-town had been garrisoned by Macedonians invoked as protectors against
-Athens; nor were the inhabitants in any condition to act aggressively
-against Philip.
-
-  [485] Diodor. xvi. 8.
-
-Having in vain summoned Amphipolis to surrender, Philip commenced a
-strenuous siege, assailing the walls with battering-rams and other
-military engines. The weak points of the fortification must have been
-well known to him, from his own soldiers who had been recently in
-garrison. The inhabitants defended themselves with vigor; but such
-was now the change of circumstances, that they were forced to solicit
-their ancient enemy Athens for aid against the Macedonian prince.
-Their envoys Hierax and Stratokles, reaching Athens shortly after
-the successful close of the Athenian expedition to Eubœa, presented
-themselves before the public assembly, urgently inviting the
-Athenians to come forthwith and occupy Amphipolis, as the only chance
-of rescue from Macedonian dominion.[486] We are not certain whether
-the Social War had yet broken out; if it had, Athens would be too
-much pressed with anxieties arising out of so formidable a revolt, to
-have means disposable even for the tempting recovery of the long-lost
-Amphipolis. But at any rate Philip had foreseen and counterworked
-the prayers of the Amphipolitans. He sent a courteous letter to
-the Athenians, acquainting them that he was besieging the town,
-yet recognizing it as belonging of right to them, and promising to
-restore it to them when he should have succeeded in the capture.[487]
-
-  [486] Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 11. s. 8 ... εἰ γὰρ, ὅθ᾽
-  ἥκομεν Εὐβοεῦσι βεβοηθηκότες καὶ παρῆσαν Ἀμφιπολιτῶν Ἱέραξ
-  καὶ Στρατοκλῆς ἐπὶ τουτὶ τὸ βῆμα, κελεύοντες ἡμᾶς πλεῖν καὶ
-  παραλαμβάνειν τὴν πόλιν, τὴν αὐτὴν παρειχόμεθ᾽ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν
-  προθυμίαν ἥνπερ ὑπὲρ τῆς Εὐβοέων σωτηρίας, εἴχετ᾽ ἂν Ἀμφίπολιν
-  τότε καὶ πάντων τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα ἂν ἦτε ἀπαλλαγμένοι πραγμάτων.
-
-  [487] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 659. s. 138. ... κἀκεῖνο
-  εἰδότες, ὅτι Φίλιππος, ὅτε μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν ἐπολιόρκει, ἵν᾽
-  ὑμῖν παραδῷ, πολιορκεῖν ἔφη· ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἔλαβε, καὶ Ποτείδαιαν
-  προσαφείλετο.
-
-  Also the Oration De Halonneso, p. 83. s. 28. ... τῆς δ᾽
-  ἐπιστολῆς, ἣν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔπεμψεν (Philip) ὅτ᾽ Ἀμφίπολιν
-  ἐπολιόρκει, ἐπιλέλησται, ἐν ᾗ ὡμολόγει τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν ὑμετέραν
-  εἶναι· ἔφη γὰρ ἐκπολιορκήσας ὑμῖν ἀποδώσειν ὡς οὖσαν ὑμετέραν,
-  ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τῶν ἐχόντων.
-
-Much of the future history of Greece turned upon the manner in which
-Athens dealt with these two conflicting messages. The situation of
-Amphipolis, commanding the passage over the Strymon, was not only
-all-important—as shutting up Macedonia to the eastward and as opening
-the gold regions around Mount Pangæus—but was also easily defensible
-by the Athenians from seaward, if once acquired. Had they been
-clear-sighted in the appreciation of chances, and vigilant in respect
-to future defence, they might now have acquired this important place,
-and might have held it against the utmost efforts of Philip. But that
-fatal inaction which had become their general besetting sin, was on
-the present occasion encouraged by some plausible, yet delusive,
-pleas. The news of the danger of the Amphipolitans would be not
-unwelcome at Athens—where strong aversion was entertained towards
-them, as refractory occupants of a territory not their own, and as
-having occasioned repeated loss and humiliation to the Athenian arms.
-Nor could the Athenians at once shift their point of view, so as
-to contemplate the question on the ground of policy alone, and to
-recognize these old enemies as persons whose interests had now come
-into harmony with their own. On the other hand, the present temper of
-the Athenians towards Philip was highly favorable. Not only had they
-made peace with him during the preceding year, but they also felt
-that he had treated them well both in evacuating Amphipolis and in
-dismissing honorably their citizens who had been taken prisoners in
-the army of his competitor Argæus.[488] Hence they were predisposed
-to credit his positive assurance, that he only wished to take the
-place in order to expel a troublesome population who had wronged and
-annoyed him, and that he would readily hand it over to its rightful
-owners the Athenians. To grant the application of the Amphipolitans
-for aid, would thus appear, at Athens, to be courting a new war and
-breaking with a valuable friend, in order to protect an odious enemy,
-and to secure an acquisition which would at all events come to them,
-even if they remained still, through the cession of Philip. It is
-necessary to dwell upon the motives which determined Athens on this
-occasion to refrain from interference; since there were probably few
-of her resolutions which she afterwards more bitterly regretted. The
-letter of assurance from Philip was received and trusted; the envoys
-from Amphipolis were dismissed with a refusal.
-
-  [488] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660. s. 144.
-
-Deprived of all hope of aid from Athens, the Amphipolitans still
-held out as long as they could. But a party in the town entered
-into correspondence with Philip to betray it, and the defence thus
-gradually became feebler. At length he made a breach in the walls,
-sufficient, with the aid of partisans within, to carry the city by
-assault, not without a brave resistance from those who still remained
-faithful. All the citizens unfriendly to him were expelled or fled,
-the rest were treated with lenity; but we are told that little favor
-was shown by Philip towards those who had helped in the betrayal.[489]
-
-  [489] Diodor. xvi. 8, with the passage from Libanius cited in
-  Wesseling’s note. Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 10. s. 5.
-
-  Hierax and Stratokles were the Amphipolitan envoys despatched to
-  Athens to ask for aid against Philip. An Inscription yet remains,
-  recording the sentence of perpetual banishment of Philo and
-  Stratokles. See Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. No. 2008.
-
-Amphipolis was to Philip an acquisition of unspeakable importance,
-not less for defence than for offence. It was not only the most
-convenient maritime station in Thrace, but it also threw open to
-him all the country east of the Strymon, and especially the gold
-region near Mount Pangæus. He established himself firmly in his new
-position, which continued from henceforward one of the bulwarks of
-Macedonia, until the conquest of that kingdom by the Romans. He took
-no steps to fulfil his promise of handing over the place to the
-Athenians, who doubtless sent embassies to demand it. The Social
-War, indeed, which just now broke out, absorbed all their care and
-all their forces, so that they were unable, amidst their disastrous
-reverses at Chios and elsewhere, to take energetic measures in
-reference to Philip and Amphipolis. Nevertheless he still did not
-peremptorily refuse the surrender, but continued to amuse the
-Athenians with delusive hopes, suggested through his partisans, paid
-or voluntary, in the public assembly.
-
-It was the more necessary for him to postpone any open breach with
-Athens, because the Olynthians had conceived serious alarm from
-his conquest of Amphipolis, and had sent to negotiate a treaty of
-amity and alliance with the Athenians. Such an alliance, had it
-been concluded, would have impeded the farther schemes of Philip.
-But his partisans at Athens procured the dismissal of the Olynthian
-envoys, by renewed assurances that the Macedonian prince was still
-the friend of Athens, and still disposed to cede Amphipolis as her
-legitimate possession. They represented, however, that he had good
-ground for complaining that Athens continued to retain Pydna, an
-ancient Macedonian seaport.[490] Accordingly they proposed to open
-negotiations with him for the exchange of Pydna against Amphipolis.
-But as the Pydnæans were known to be adverse to the transfer, secrecy
-was indispensable in the preliminary proceedings, so that Antiphon
-and Charidemus, the two envoys named, took their instructions from
-the Senate and made their reports only to the Senate. The public
-assembly being informed that negotiations, unavoidably secret, were
-proceeding, to ensure the acquisition of Amphipolis—was persuaded to
-repel the advances of Olynthus, as well as to look upon Philip still
-as a friend.[491]
-
-  [490] Thucyd. i. 61, 137; Diodor. xiii. 49. Pydna had been
-  acquired to Athens by Timotheus.
-
-  [491] This secret negotiation, about the exchange of Pydna for
-  Amphipolis, is alluded to briefly by Demosthenes, and appears to
-  have been fully noticed by Theopompus (Demosthenes, Olynth. ii.
-  p. 19. s. 6. with the comments of Ulpian; Theopompus, Fr. 189,
-  ed. Didot).
-
-The proffered alliance of the Olynthians was thus rejected, as the
-entreaty of the Amphipolitans for aid had previously been. Athens had
-good reason to repent of both. The secret negotiation brought her
-no nearer to the possession of Amphipolis. It ended in nothing, or
-in worse than nothing, as it amused her with delusive expectations,
-while Philip opened a treaty with the Olynthians, irritated, of
-course, by their recent repulse at Athens. As yet he had maintained
-pacific relations with the Athenians, even while holding Amphipolis
-contrary to his engagement. But he now altered his policy, and
-contracted alliance with the Olynthians; whose friendship he
-purchased not only by ceding to them the district of Anthemus (lying
-between Olynthus and Therma, and disputed by the Olynthians with
-former Macedonian kings), but also by conquering and handing over to
-them the important Athenian possession of Potidæa.[492] We know no
-particulars of these important transactions. Our scanty authorities
-merely inform us, that during the first two years (358-356 B. C.),
-while Athens was absorbed by her disastrous Social War, Philip began
-to act as her avowed enemy. He conquered from her not only Pydna and
-other places for himself, but also Potidæa for the Olynthians. We are
-told that Pydna was betrayed to Philip by a party of traitors in the
-town;[493] and he probably availed himself of the secret propositions
-made by Athens respecting the exchange of Pydna for Amphipolis, to
-exasperate the Pydnæans against her bad faith; since they would have
-good ground for resenting the project of transferring them underhand,
-contrary to their own inclination. Pydna was the first place besieged
-and captured. Several of its inhabitants, on the ground of prior
-offence towards Macedonia,[494] are said to have been slain, while
-even those who had betrayed the town were contemptuously treated. The
-siege lasted long enough to transmit news to Athens, and to receive
-aid, had the Athenians acted with proper celerity in despatching
-forces. But either the pressure of the Social War—or the impatience
-of personal service as well as of pecuniary payment—or both causes
-operating together—made them behindhand with the exigency. Several
-Athenian citizens were taken in Pydna and sold into slavery, some
-being ransomed by Demosthenes out of his own funds; yet we cannot
-make out clearly that any relief at all was sent from Athens.[495] If
-any was sent, it came too late.
-
-  [492] Demosthenes, Philipp. ii. p. 71. s. 22.
-
-  [493] Demosthen. adv. Leptinem, p. 476. s. 71. ... φέρε δὴ
-  κἀκεῖνο ἐξετάσωμεν, οἱ προδόντες τὴν Πύδναν καὶ τἄλλα χωρία τῷ
-  Φιλίππῳ τῷ ποτ᾽ ἐπαρθέντες ὑμᾶς ἠδίκουν; ἢ πᾶσι πρόδηλον τοῦτο,
-  ὅτι ταῖς παρ᾽ ἐκείνου δωρειαῖς, ἃς διὰ ταῦτα ἔσεσθαι σφίσιν
-  ἡγοῦντο;
-
-  Compare Olynthiac i. p. 10. s. 5.
-
-  This discourse was pronounced in 355 B. C., thus affording
-  confirmatory evidence of the date assigned to the surrender of
-  Pydna and Potidæa.
-
-  What the “other places” here alluded to by Demosthenes are
-  (besides Pydna and Potidæa), we do not know. It appears by
-  Diodorus (xvi. 31) that Methônê was not taken till 354-353 B. C.
-
-  [494] The conquests of Philip are always enumerated by
-  Demosthenes in this order, Amphipolis, Pydna, Potidæa, Methônê,
-  etc., Olynthiac i. p. 11. s. 9. p. 12. s. 13; Philippic i. p. 41.
-  s. 6; De Coronâ, p. 248. s. 85.
-
-  See Ulpian ad Demosthenem, Olynth. i. p. 10. s. 5; also Diodor.
-  xvi. 8 and Wesseling’s note.
-
-  [495] In the public vote of gratitude passed many years
-  afterwards by the Athenian assembly towards Demosthenes, his
-  merits are recited; and among them we find this contribution
-  towards the relief of captives at Pydna, Methônê, and Olynthus
-  (Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator, p. 851).
-
-Equal tardiness was shown in the relief sent to Potidæa[496]—though
-the siege, carried on jointly by Philip and the Olynthians, was
-both long and costly[497]—and though there were a body of Athenian
-settlers (Kleruchs) resident there, whom the capture of the place
-expelled from their houses and properties.[498] Even for the rescue
-of these fellow-citizens, it does not appear that any native
-Athenians would undertake the burden of personal service; the
-relieving force despatched seems to have consisted of a general
-with mercenary foreigners; who, as no pay was provided for them,
-postponed the enterprise on which they were sent to the temptation
-of plundering elsewhere for their own profit.[499] It was thus that
-Philip, without any express declaration of war, commenced a series of
-hostile measures against Athens, and deprived her of several valuable
-maritime possessions on the coast of Macedonia and Thrace, besides
-his breach of faith respecting the cession of Amphipolis.[500]
-After her losses from the Social War, and her disappointment about
-Amphipolis, she was yet farther mortified by seeing Pydna pass
-into his hands, and Potidæa (the most important possession in
-Thrace next to Amphipolis) into those of Olynthus. Her impoverished
-settlers returned home, doubtless with bitter complaint against the
-aggression, but also with just vexation against the tardiness of
-their countrymen in sending relief.
-
-  [496] Compare Demosthenes, Olynthiac i. p. 11. s. 9; Philippic
-  i. p. 50. s. 40 (where he mentions the expedition to Potidæa as
-  having come too late, but does not mention any expedition for
-  relief of Pydna.)
-
-  [497] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 656. s. 128. πρὸς ὑμᾶς
-  πολεμῶν, χρήματα πολλὰ ἀναλώσας (Philip, in the siege of
-  Potidæa). In this oration (delivered B. C. 352) Demosthenes
-  treats the capture of Potidæa as mainly the work of Philip; in
-  the second Olynthiac, he speaks as if Philip had been a secondary
-  agent, a useful adjunct to the Olynthians in the siege, πάλιν αὖ
-  πρὸς Ποτίδαιαν Ὀλυνθίοις ἐφάνη τι τοῦτο συναμφότερον—_i. e._
-  the Macedonian power was προσθήκη τις οὐ σμικρά.... The first
-  representation, delivered two or three years before the second,
-  is doubtless the more correct.
-
-  [498] Demosthenes, Philipp. ii. p. 71. s. 22. Ποτίδαιαν δ᾽
-  ἐδίδου, τοὺς Ἀθηναίων ἀποίκους ἐκβάλλων (Philip gave it to the
-  Olynthians), καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐχθρὰν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτὸς ἀνῄρητο, τὴν
-  χώραν δ᾽ ἐκείνοις ἐδεδώκει καρποῦσθαι. The passage in the Oratio
-  de Halonneso (p. 79. s. 10) alludes to this same extrusion and
-  expropriation of the Athenian Kleruchs, though Vœmel and Franke
-  (erroneously, I think) suppose it to allude to the treatment of
-  these Kleruchs by Philip some years afterwards, when he took
-  Potidæa for himself. We may be sure that no Athenian Kleruchs
-  were permitted to stay at Potidæa even after the first capture.
-
-  [499] The general description given in the first Philippic of
-  Demosthenes of the ἀπόστολοι from Athens, may doubtless be
-  applied to the expedition for the relief of Potidæa—Demosthenes,
-  Philippic i. p. 46. s. 28. p. 53, s. 52. and the general tenor of
-  the harangue.
-
-  [500] Diodorus (xvi. 8), in mentioning the capture of Potidæa,
-  considers it an evidence of the kind disposition of Philip, and
-  of his great respect for the dignity of Athens (φιλανθρώπως
-  προσενεγκάμενος) that he spared the persons of these Athenians
-  in the place, and permitted them to depart. But it was a great
-  wrong, under the circumstances, that he should expel and
-  expropriate them, when no offence had been given to him, and when
-  there was no formal war (Demosth. Or. de Halonneso, p. 79. s. 10).
-
-  Diodorus states also that Philip gave Pydna, as well as Potidæa,
-  to the Olynthians; which is not correct.
-
-These two years had been so employed by Philip as to advance
-prodigiously his power and ascendency. He had deprived Athens of her
-hold upon the Thermaic gulf, in which she now seems only to have
-retained the town of Methônê, instead of the series of ports round
-the gulf acquired for her by Timotheus.[501] He had conciliated the
-good-will of the Olynthians by his cession of Anthemus and Potidæa;
-the latter place, from its commanding situation on the isthmus of
-Pallenê, giving them the mastery of that peninsula,[502] and ensuring
-(what to Philip was of great importance) their enmity with Athens.
-He not only improved the maritime conveniences of Amphipolis, but
-also extended his acquisitions into the auriferous regions of Mount
-Pangæus eastward of the Strymon. He possessed himself of that
-productive country immediately facing the island of Thasos; where
-both Thasians and Athenians had once contended for the rights of
-mining, and from whence, apparently, both had extracted valuable
-produce. In the interior of this region he founded a new city called
-Philippi, enlarged from a previous town called Krenides, recently
-founded by the Thasians; and he took such effective measures for
-increasing the metallic works in the neighborhood, that they
-presently yielded to him a large revenue; according to Diodorus,
-not less than one thousand talents per annum.[503] He caused a new
-gold coin to be struck, bearing a name derived from his own. The
-fresh source of wealth thus opened was of the greatest moment to
-him, as furnishing means to meet the constantly increasing expense
-of his military force. He had full employment to keep his soldiers
-in training: for the nations of the interior—Illyrians, Pæonians,
-and Thracians—humbled but not subdued, rose again in arms, and tried
-again jointly to reclaim their independence. The army of Philip—under
-his general Parmenio, of whom we now hear for the first time—defeated
-them, and again reduced them to submission.[504]
-
-  [501] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 41. s. 6 ... εἴχομέν ποτε
-  ἡμεῖς Πύδναν καὶ Ποτίδαιαν καὶ Μεθώνην, καὶ ~πάντα τὸν τόπον
-  τοῦτον οἰκεῖον κύκλῳ~, etc.
-
-  [502] Demosthenes, Philipp. ii. p. 70. s. 22.
-
-  [503] Diodor. xvi. 4-8; Harpokration v. Δάτον. Herodot. ix. 74.
-
-  [504] Diodor. xvi. 22; Plutarch, Alexand. c. 3.
-
-It was during this interval too that Philip married Olympias,
-daughter of Neoptolemus prince of the Molossi,[505] and descended
-from the ancient Molossian kings, who boasted of an heroic Æakid
-genealogy. Philip had seen her at the religious mysteries in the
-island of Samothrace, where both were initiated at the same time. In
-violence of temper—in jealous, cruel, and vindictive disposition—she
-forms almost a parallel to the Persian queens Amestris and Parysatis.
-The Epirotic women, as well as the Thracian, were much given to the
-Bacchanalian religious rites, celebrated with fierce ecstasy amid
-the mountain solitudes in honor of Dionysius.[506] To this species
-of religious excitement Olympias was peculiarly susceptible. She is
-said to have been fond of tame snakes playing around her, and to have
-indulged in ceremonies of magic and incantation.[507] Her temper and
-character became, after no long time, repulsive and even alarming to
-Philip. But in the year 356 B. C. she bore to him a son, afterwards
-renowned as Alexander the Great. It was in the summer of this year,
-not long after the taking of Potidæa, that Philip received nearly at
-the same time, three messages with good news—the birth of his son;
-the defeat of the Illyrians by Parmenio; and the success of one of
-his running horses at the Olympic games.[508]
-
-  [505] Justin, vii. 6.
-
-  [506] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 2. 3. The Bacchæ of Euripides
-  contains a powerful description of these exciting ceremonies.
-
-  [507] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 2. ἡ δὲ Ὀλυμπιὰς μᾶλλον ἑτέρων
-  ζηλώσασα τὰς κατοχὰς, καὶ τοὺς ἐνθουσιασμοὺς ἐξάγουσα
-  βαρβαρικώτερον, ὄφεις μεγάλους χειροήθεις ἐφείλκετο τοῖς θιάσοις,
-  etc.
-
-  Compare Duris apud Athenæum, xiii. p. 560.
-
-  [508] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 3; Justin, xii. 19.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXXVII.
-
-FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SACRED WAR TO THAT OF THE OLYNTHIAN WAR.
-
-
-It has been recounted in the preceding chapter, how Philip,
-during the continuance of the Social War, aggrandized himself in
-Macedonia and Thrace at the expense of Athens, by the acquisition
-of Amphipolis, Pydna, and Potidæa—the two last actually taken from
-her, the first captured only under false assurances held out to her
-while he was besieging it: how he had farther strengthened himself by
-enlisting Olynthus both as an ally of his own, and as an enemy of the
-Athenians. He had thus begun the war against Athens, usually spoken
-of as the war about Amphipolis, which lasted without any formal
-peace for twelve years. The resistance opposed by Athens to these
-his first aggressions had been faint and ineffective—partly owing to
-embarrassments. But the Social War had not yet terminated, when new
-embarrassments and complications, of a far more formidable nature,
-sprang up elsewhere—known by the name of the Sacred War, rending
-the very entrails of the Hellenic world, and profitable only to the
-indefatigable aggressor in Macedonia.
-
-The Amphiktyonic assembly, which we shall now find exalted into an
-inauspicious notoriety, was an Hellenic institution ancient and
-venerable, but rarely invested with practical efficiency. Though
-political by occasion, it was religious in its main purpose,
-associated with the worship of Apollo at Delphi and of Dêmêtêr at
-Thermopylæ. Its assemblies were held twice annually—in spring at
-Delphi, in autumn at Thermopylæ; while in every fourth year it
-presided at the celebration of the great Pythian festival near
-Delphi, or appointed persons to preside in its name. It consisted
-of deputies called Hieromnemones and Pylagoræ, sent by the twelve
-ancient nations or fractions of the Hellenic name, who were
-recognized as its constituent body: Thessalians, Bœotians, Dorians,
-Ionians, Perrhæbians, Magnêtes, Lokrians, Œtæans or Ænianes, Achæans,
-Malians, Phokians, Dolopes. These were the twelve nations, sole
-partners in the Amphiktyonic sacred rites and meetings: each nation,
-small and great alike, having two votes in the decision and no more;
-and each city, small and great alike, contributing equally to make
-up the two votes of that nation to which it belonged. Thus Sparta
-counted only as one of the various communities forming the Dorian
-nation: Athens, in like manner in the Ionian, not superior in rank to
-Erythræ or Priênê.[509]
-
-  [509] Æschines, De Fals. Legat. p. 280. c. 36. For particulars
-  respecting the Amphiktyonic assembly see the treatise of Tittman,
-  Ueber den Amphiktyonischen Bund, p. 37, 45, _seqq._
-
-That during the preceding century, the Amphiktyonic assembly had
-meddled rarely, and had never meddled to any important purpose,
-in the political affairs of Greece—is proved by the fact that it
-is not once mentioned either in the history of Thucydides, or in
-the Hellenica of Xenophon. But after the humiliation of Sparta at
-Leuktra, this great religious convocation of the Hellenic world,
-after long torpor, began to meet for the despatch of business.
-Unfortunately its manifestations of activity were for the most
-part abusive and mischievous. Probably not long after the battle
-of Leuktra, though we do not know the precise year—the Thebans
-exhibited before the Amphiktyons an accusation against Sparta, for
-having treacherously seized the Kadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) in
-a period of profound peace. Sentence of condemnation was pronounced
-against her,[510] together with a fine of five hundred talents,
-doubled after a certain interval of non-payment. The act here put in
-accusation was indisputably a gross political wrong; and a pretence,
-though a very slight pretence, for bringing political wrong under
-cognizance of the Amphiktyons, might be found in the tenor of the old
-oath taken by each included city.[511] Still, every one knew that
-for generations past, the assembly had taken no actual cognizance
-of political wrong; so that both trial and sentence were alike
-glaring departures from understood Grecian custom—proving only the
-humiliation of Sparta and the insolence of Thebes. The Spartans of
-course did not submit to pay, nor were there any means of enforcement
-against them. No practical effect followed therefore, except
-(probably) the exclusion of Sparta from the Amphiktyonic assembly—as
-well as from the Delphian temple and the Pythian games. Indirectly,
-however, the example was most pernicious, as demonstrating that the
-authority of a Pan-hellenic convocation, venerable from its religious
-antiquity; could be abused to satisfy the political antipathies of a
-single leading state.
-
-  [510] Diodor. xvi. 23-29; Justin, viii. 1.
-
-  [511] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. p. 279. c. 35.
-
-In the year 357 B. C., a second attempt was made by Thebes to employ
-the authority of the Amphiktyonic assembly as a means of crushing
-her neighbors the Phokians. The latter had been, from old time,
-border-enemies of the Thebans, Lokrians, and Thessalians. Until
-the battle of Leuktra, they had fought as allies of Sparta against
-Thebes, but had submitted to Thebes after that battle, and had
-continued to be her allies, though less and less cordial, until the
-battle of Mantinea and the death of Epaminondas.[512] Since that
-time, the old antipathy appears to have been rekindled, especially
-on the part of Thebes. Irritated against the Phokians probably as
-having broken off from a sworn alliance, she determined to raise
-against them an accusation in the Amphiktyonic assembly. As to the
-substantive ground of accusation, we find different statements.
-According to one witness, they were accused of having cultivated
-some portion of the Kirrhæan plain, consecrated from of old to
-Apollo; according to another, they were charged with an aggressive
-invasion of Bœotia; while, according to a third, the war was caused
-by their having carried off Theano, a married Theban woman. Pausanias
-confesses that he cannot distinctly make out what was the allegation
-against them.[513] Assisted by the antipathy of the Thessalians and
-Lokrians, not less vehement than her own, Thebes had no difficulty in
-obtaining sentence of condemnation against the Phokians. A fine was
-imposed upon them; of what amount we are not told, but so heavy as to
-be far beyond their means of payment.
-
-  [512] Compare Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 5, 23, and vii. 5, 4. About
-  the feud of the Thessalians and Phokians, see Herodot. vii. 176,
-  viii. 27; Æschines, De Fals. Leg. p. 289. c. 43—of the Lokrians
-  and Phokians, Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 5, 3; Pausanias, iii. 9, 4.
-
-  [513] Diodor. xvi. 23; Justin, viii. 1; Pausanias, x. 2, 1; Duris
-  ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 560. Justin says, “Causa et origo hujus
-  mali, Thebani fuere; qui cum rerum potirentur, secundam fortunam
-  imbecillo animo ferentes, victos armis Lacedæmonios et Phocenses,
-  quasi parva supplicia cædibus et rapinis luissent, apud commune
-  Græciæ concilium superbe accusaverunt Lacedæmoniis crimini datum,
-  quod arcem Thebanam induciarum tempore occupassent; Phocensibus,
-  quod Bœotiam depopulati essent; prorsus quasi post arma et bellum
-  locum legibus reliquissent.”
-
-It was thus that the Thebans, who had never been able to attach
-to themselves a powerful confederacy such as that which formerly
-held its meetings at Sparta, supplied the deficiency by abusing
-their ascendency in the Amphiktyonic assembly to procure vengeance
-upon political enemies. A certain time was allowed for liquidating
-the fine, which the Phokians had neither means nor inclination
-to do. Complaint of the fact was then made at the next meeting
-of the Amphiktyons, when a decisive resolution was adopted, and
-engraven along with the rest on a column in the Delphian temple, to
-expropriate the recusant Phokians, and consecrate all their territory
-to Apollo—as Kirrha with its fertile plain had been treated two
-centuries before. It became necessary, at the same time, for the
-maintenance of consistency and equal dealing, to revive the mention
-of the previous fine still remaining unpaid by the Lacedæmonians;
-against whom it was proposed to pass a vote of something like
-excommunication.
-
-Such impending dangers, likely to be soon realized under the
-instigation of Thebes, excited a resolute spirit of resistance among
-the Phokians. A wealthy and leading citizen of the Phokian town
-Ledon, named Philomelus son of Theotimus, stood forward as the head
-of this sentiment, setting himself energetically to organize means
-for the preservation of Phokian liberty as well as property. Among
-his assembled countrymen, he protested against the gross injustice
-of the recent sentence, amercing them in an enormous sum exceeding
-their means; when the strip of land, where they were alleged to
-have trespassed on the property of the god, was at best narrow and
-insignificant. Nothing was left, now, to avert from them utter
-ruin, except a bold front and an obstinate resistance, which he
-(Philomelus) would pledge himself to conduct with success, if they
-would intrust him with full powers. The Phokians (he contended) were
-the original and legitimate administrators of the Delphian temple—a
-privilege of which they had been wrongfully dispossessed by the
-Amphiktyonic assembly and the Delphians. “Let us reply to our enemies
-(he urged) by re-asserting our lost rights and seizing the temple; we
-shall obtain support and countenance from many Grecian states, whose
-interest is the same as our own, to resist the unjust decrees of the
-Amphiktyons.[514] Our enemies the Thebans (he added) are plotting the
-seizure of the temple for themselves, through the corrupt connivance
-of an Amphiktyonic majority: let us anticipate and prevent their
-injustice.”[515]
-
-  [514] Diodor. xvi. 23, 24; Pausanias, x. 2, 1.
-
-  [515] That this design, imputed to the Thebans, was a part of
-  the case made out by the Phokians for themselves, we may feel
-  assured from the passage in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 347. s.
-  22. Demosthenes charges Æschines with having made false promises
-  and statements to the Athenian assembly, on returning from his
-  embassy in 346 B. C. Æschines told the Athenians (so Demosthenes
-  affirms) that he had persuaded Philip to act altogether in the
-  interest and policy of Athens; that the Athenians would very
-  presently see Thebes besieged by Philip, and the Bœotian towns
-  restored; and furthermore, τῷ θεῷ δὲ τὰ χρήματα εἰσπραττόμενα, οὐ
-  παρὰ Φωκέων, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ~Θηβαίων τῶν βουλευσάντων τὴν κατάληψιν
-  τοῦ ἱεροῦ~ διδάσκειν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἔφη τὸν Φίλιππον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἧττον
-  ~ἠσεβήκασιν οἱ βεβουλευκότες τῶν ταῖς χερσὶ πραξάντων~, καὶ διὰ
-  ταῦτα χρήμαθ᾽ ἑαυτῷ τοὺς Θηβαίους ἐπικεκηρυχέναι.
-
-  How far Æschines really promised to the Athenians that which
-  Demosthenes here alleges him to have promised—is a matter to
-  be investigated when we arrive at the transactions of the year
-  346 B. C. But it seems to me clear that the imputation (true
-  or false) against the Thebans, of having been themselves in
-  conspiracy to seize the temple, must have emanated first from the
-  Phokians, as part of the justification of their own proceedings.
-  If the Thebans ever conceived such an idea, it must have been
-  _before_ the actual occupation of the temple by the Phokians, if
-  they were falsely charged with conceiving it, the false charge
-  would also be preferred at the time. Demosthenes would hardly
-  invent it twelve years after the Phokian occupation.
-
-Here a new question was raised, respecting the right of presidency
-over the most venerated sanctuary in Greece; a question fraught
-with ruin to the peace of the Hellenic world. The claim of the
-Phokians was not a mere fiction, but founded on an ancient reality,
-and doubtless believed by themselves to be just. Delphi and its
-inhabitants were originally a portion of the Phokian name. In the
-Homeric Catalogue, which Philomelus emphatically cited, it stands
-enumerated among the Phokians commanded by Schedius and Epistrophus,
-under the name of the “rocky Pytho,”—a name still applied to it by
-Herodotus.[516] The Delphians had acquired sufficient force to sever
-themselves from their Phokian brethren—to stand out as a community
-by themselves—and to assume the lucrative privilege of administering
-the temple as their own peculiar. Their severance had been first
-brought about, and their pretensions as administrators espoused by
-Sparta,[517] upon whose powerful interest they mainly depended. But
-the Phokians had never ceased to press their claim, and so far was
-the dispute from being settled against them, even in 450 B. C.,
-that they then had in their hands the actual administration. The
-Spartans despatched an army for the express purpose of taking it away
-from them and transferring it to the Delphians; but very shortly
-afterwards, when the Spartan forces had retired, the Athenians
-marched thither, and dispossessed the Delphians,[518] restoring
-the temple to the Phokians. This contest went by the name of the
-Sacred War. At that time the Athenians were masters of most parts of
-Bœotia, as well as of Megara and Pegæ; and had they continued so, the
-Phokians would probably have been sustained in their administration
-of the holy place; the rights of the Delphians on one side, against
-those of the Phokians on the other, being then obviously dependent
-on the comparative strength of Athens and Sparta. But presently evil
-days came upon Athens, so that she lost all her inland possessions
-north of Attica, and could no longer uphold her allies in Phokis. The
-Phokians now in fact passed into allies of Sparta, and were forced
-to relinquish their temple-management to the Delphians; who were
-confirmed in it by a formal article of the peace of Nikias in 421
-B. C.,[519] and retained it without question, under the recognized
-Hellenic supremacy of Sparta, down to the battle of Leuktra. Even
-then, too, it continued undisturbed; since Thebes was nowise
-inclined to favor the claim of her enemies the Phokians, but was on
-the contrary glad to be assisted in crushing them by their rivals
-the Delphians, who, as managers of the temple, could materially
-contribute to a severe sentence of the Amphiktyonic assembly.
-
-  [516] Herodot. i. 54.
-
-  [517] Strabo, ix. p. 423.
-
-  [518] Thucyd. i. 12.
-
-  [519] Thucyd. v. 18.
-
-We see thus that the claim now advanced by Philomelus was not
-fictitious, but genuine, and felt by himself as well as by other
-Phokians to be the recovery of an ancient privilege, lost only
-through superior force.[520] His views being heartily embraced by
-his countrymen, he was nominated general with full powers. It was
-his first measure to go to Sparta, upon whose aid he counted, in
-consequence of the heavy fine which still stood imposed upon her
-by the Amphiktyonic sentence. He explained his views privately to
-king Archidamus, engaging, if the Phokians should become masters
-of the temple, to erase the sentence and fine from the column of
-record. Archidamus did not dare to promise him public countenance or
-support; the rather, as Sparta had always been the chief supporter
-of the Delphian presidency (as against the Phokian) over the temple.
-But in secret he warmly encouraged the scheme; furnishing a sum
-of fifteen talents, besides a few mercenary soldiers, towards its
-execution. With this aid Philomelus returned home, provided an equal
-sum of fifteen talents from his own purse, and collected a body of
-peltasts, Phokians as well as strangers. He then executed his design
-against Delphi, attacking suddenly both the town and the temple,
-and capturing them, as it would appear, with little opposition. To
-the alarmed Delphians, generally, he promised security and good
-treatment; but he put to death the members of the Gens (or Clan)
-called Thrakidæ, and seized their property: these men constituted one
-among several holy Gentes, leading conductors of the political and
-religious agency of the place.[521] It is probable, that when thus
-suddenly assailed, they had sent to solicit aid from their neighbors,
-the Lokrians of Amphissa; for Philomelus was scarcely in possession
-of Delphi, when these latter marched up to the rescue. He defeated
-them however with serious loss, and compelled them to return home.
-
-  [520] Justin (viii. 1) takes no notice of this first position of
-  the Phokians in regard to the temple of Delphi. He treats them as
-  if they had been despoilers of the temple even at first; “velut
-  deo irascentes.”
-
-  [521] Diodor. xvi. 24. Hesychius (v. Λαφριάδαι) mentions another
-  phratry or gens at Delphi, called Laphriadæ. See Wilhelm Götte,
-  Das Delphische Orakel, p. 83. Leipsic, 1839.
-
-  It is stated by Pausanias, that the Phokians were bent upon
-  dealing with Delphi and its inhabitants in the harshest manner;
-  intending to kill all the men of military age, to sell the
-  remaining population as slaves, and to raze the whole town to
-  the ground. Archidamus, king of Sparta, (according to Pausanias)
-  induced the Phokians to abandon this resolution (Pausan. iii. 10,
-  4).
-
-  At what moment the Phokians ever determined on this step—or,
-  indeed, whether they ever really determined on it—we cannot feel
-  any certainty. Nor can we decide confidently, whether Pausanias
-  borrowed the statement from Theopompus, whom he quotes a little
-  before.
-
-Thus completely successful in his first attempt, Philomelus lost
-no time in announcing solemnly and formally his real purpose. He
-proclaimed that he had come only to resume for the Phokians their
-ancient rights as administrators; that the treasures of the temple
-should be safe and respected as before; that no impiety or illegality
-of any kind should be tolerated; and that the temple and its oracle
-would be opened, as heretofore, for visitors, sacrificers, and
-inquirers. At the same time, well aware that his Lokrian enemies at
-Amphissa were very near, he erected a wall to protect the town and
-temple, which appears to have been hitherto undefended,—especially
-its western side. He further increased his levies of troops. While
-the Phokians, inspirited with this first advantage, obeyed his
-call in considerable numbers, he also attracted new mercenaries
-from abroad by the offer of higher pay. He was presently at the
-head of five thousand men, strong enough to hold a difficult post
-like Delphi against all immediate attack. But being still anxious
-to appease Grecian sentiment and avert hostility, he despatched
-envoys to all the principal states,—not merely to Sparta and Athens,
-but also to his enemy Thebes. His envoys were instructed to offer
-solemn assurances, that the Phokians had taken Delphi simply to
-reclaim their paternal right of presidency, against past wrongful
-usurpation; that they were prepared to give any security required by
-the Hellenic body, for strict preservation of the valuables in the
-temple, and to exhibit and verify all, by weight and number, before
-examiners; that conscious of their own rectitude of purpose, they
-did not hesitate to entreat positive support against their enemies,
-or at any rate, neutrality.[522] The answers sent to Philomelus were
-not all of the same tenor. On this memorable event, the sentiments
-of the Grecian world were painfully divided. While Athens, Sparta,
-the Peloponnesian Achæans and some other states in Peloponnesus,
-recognized the possession of the Phokians, and agreed to assist them
-in retaining it,—the Thebans and Thessalians declared strenuously
-against them, supported by all the states north of Bœotia,
-Lokrians, Dorians, Ænianes, Phthiot-Achæans, Magnêtes, Perrhæbians,
-Athamânes, and Dolopes. Several of these last were dependents of
-the Thessalians, and followed their example; many of them moreover
-belonging to the Amphiktyonic constituency, must have taken part in
-the votes of condemnation just rescinded by the Phokians.
-
-  [522] Didorus xvi. 27. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας τὰς
-  ἐπισημοτάτας τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πόλεων ἀπέστειλεν,
-  ἀπολογούμενος, ὅτι κατείληπται τοὺς Δελφοὺς, οὐ τοῖς ἱεροῖς
-  χρήμασιν ἐπιβουλεύων, ἀλλὰ τῆς τοῦ ἱεροῦ προστασίας ἀμφισβητῶν·
-  εἶναι γὰρ Φωκέων αὐτὴν ἰδίαν ἐν τοῖς παλαιοῖς χρόνοις
-  ἀποδεδειγμένην. Τῶν δὲ χρημάτων τὸν λόγον ἔφη πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν
-  ἀποδώσειν, καὶ τόν τε σταθμὸν καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀναθημάτων
-  ἕτοιμος εἶναι παραδιδόναι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐξετάζειν. Ἠξίου δὲ,
-  ἄν τις δι᾽ ἐχθρὰν ἢ φθόνον πολέμῃ Φωκεῦσι, μάλιστα μὲν ξυμμαχεῖν,
-  εἰ δὲ μή γε, τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν.
-
-  In reference to the engagement taken by Philomelus, that he
-  would exhibit and verify, before any general Hellenic examiners,
-  all the valuable property in the Delphian temple, by weight
-  and number of articles—the reader will find interesting matter
-  of comparison in the Attic Inscriptions. No. 137-142, vol. i.
-  of Boeckh’s Corpus Inscriptt. Græcarum—with Boeckh’s valuable
-  commentary. These are the records of the numerous gold and
-  silver donatives, preserved in the Parthenon, handed over by the
-  treasurers of the goddess annually appointed, to their successors
-  at the end of the year, from one Panathenaic festival to the
-  next. The weight of each article is formally recorded, and the
-  new articles received each year (ἐπέτεια) are specified. Where an
-  article is transferred without being weighed (ἄσταθμον), the fact
-  is noticed. That the precious donatives in the Delphian temple
-  also, were carefully weighed, we may judge by the statement of
-  Herodotus, that the golden lion dedicated by Krœsus had lost
-  a fraction of its weight in the conflagration of the building
-  (Herodot. i. 50).
-
-  Pausanias (x. 2, 1) does not advert to the difference between
-  the first and the second part of the proceedings of Philomelus;
-  first, the seizure of the temple, without any spoliation of the
-  treasure, but simply upon the plea that the Phokians had the
-  best right to administer its affairs; next, the seizure of the
-  treasure and donatives of the temple—which he came to afterwards,
-  when he found it necessary for defence.
-
-We may clearly see that it was not at first the intention of
-Philomelus or his Phokian comrades to lay hands on the property
-of the Delphian temple; and Philomelus, while taking pains to set
-himself right in the eyes of Greece, tried to keep the prophetic
-agency of the temple in its ordinary working, so as to meet the
-exigencies of sacrificers and inquirers as before. He required
-the Pythian priestess to mount the tripod, submit herself to the
-prophetic inspiration, and pronounce the word thus put into her
-mouth, as usual. But the priestess,—chosen by the Delphians,
-and probably herself a member of one among the sacred Delphian
-Gentes,—obstinately refused to obey him; especially as the first
-question which he addressed concerned his own usurpation, and his
-chances of success against enemies. On his injunctions, that she
-should prophesy according to the traditional rites,—she replied
-that these rites were precisely what he had just overthrown; upon
-which he laid hold of her, and attempted to place her on the tripod
-by force. Subdued and frightened for her own personal safety, the
-priestess exclaimed involuntarily, that he might do what he chose.
-Philomelus gladly took this as an answer, favorable to his purpose.
-He caused it to be put in writing and proclaimed, as an oracle from
-the god, sanctioning and licensing his designs. He convened a special
-meeting of his partisans and the Delphians generally, wherein appeal
-was made to this encouraging answer, as warranting full confidence
-with reference to the impending war. So it was construed by all
-around, and confirmatory evidence was derived from farther signs and
-omens occurring at the moment.[523] It is probable, however, that
-Philomelus took care for the future to name a new priestess, more
-favorable to his interest, and disposed to deliver oracular answers
-under the new administrators in the same manner as under the old.
-
-  [523] Diodor. xvi. 25, 26, 27.
-
-Though so large a portion of the Grecian name had thus declared war
-against the Phokians, yet none at first appear to have made hostile
-movements, except the Lokrians, with whom Philomelus was fully
-competent to deal. He found himself strong enough to overrun and
-plunder their territory, engaging in some indecisive skirmishes.
-At first the Lokrians would not even give up the bodies of his
-slain soldiers for burial, alleging that sacrilegious men were
-condemned by the general custom of Greece to be cast out without
-sepulture. Nor did they desist from their refusal until he threatened
-retaliation towards the bodies of their own slain.[524] So bitter
-was the exasperation arising out of this deplorable war throughout
-the Hellenic world! Even against the Lokrians alone, however,
-Philomelus soon found himself in want of money, for the payment
-of his soldiers,—native Phokians as well as mercenary strangers.
-Accordingly, while he still adhered to his pledge to respect the
-temple property, he did not think himself precluded from levying a
-forced contribution on the properties of his enemies, the wealthy
-Delphian citizens; and his arms were soon crowned with a brilliant
-success against the Lokrians, in a battle fought near the Rocks
-called Phædriades; a craggy and difficult locality so close to
-Delphi, that the Lokrians must evidently have been the aggressors,
-marching up with a view to relieve the town. They were defeated with
-great loss, both in slain and in prisoners; several of them only
-escaping the spear of the enemy by casting themselves to certain
-death down the precipitous cliffs.[525]
-
-  [524] Diodor. xvi. 25.
-
-  [525] Diodor. xvi. 28.
-
-This victory, while imparting courage to the Phokians, proved the
-signal for fresh exertions among their numerous enemies. The loud
-complaints of the defeated Lokrians raised universal sympathy; and
-the Thebans, now pressed by fear, as well as animated by hatred, of
-the Phokians, put themselves at the head of the movement. Sending
-round envoys to the Thessalians and the other Amphiktyonic states,
-they invoked aid and urged the necessity of mustering a common
-force,—“to assist the god,”—to vindicate the judicial dignity
-of the Amphiktyonic assembly,—and to put down the sacrilegious
-Phokians.[526] It appears that a special meeting of the assembly
-itself was convened; probably at Thermopylæ, since Delphi was in
-possession of the enemy. Decided resolutions were here taken to form
-an Amphiktyonic army of execution; accompanied by severe sentences
-of fine and other punishments, against the Phokian leaders, by name
-Philomelus and Onomarchus,—perhaps brothers, but at least joint
-commanders, together with others.[527]
-
-  [526] Diodor. xvi. 28. ψηφισαμένων δὲ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων τὸν πρὸς
-  Φωκεῖς πόλεμον, πολλὴ ταραχὴ καὶ διάστασις ἦν καθ᾽ ὅλην τὴν
-  Ἑλλάδα. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔκριναν βοηθεῖν τῷ θεῷ, καὶ τοὺς Φωκεῖς,
-  ὡς ἱεροσύλους, κολάζειν· οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Φωκέων βοήθειαν
-  ἀπέκλιναν.
-
-  [527] Diodor. xvi. 32. about Onomarchus—πολλαῖς γὰρ καὶ μεγάλαις
-  δίκαις ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων ἦν καταδεδικασμένος ὁμοίως τοῖς
-  ἄλλοις, etc.
-
-  Onomarchus is denominated the colleague of Philomelus, cap. 31,
-  and his brother, cap. 61.
-
-The perils of the Phokians now became imminent. Their own unaided
-strength was nowise sufficient to resist the confederacy about to
-arm in defence of the Amphiktyonic assembly;[528] nor does it appear
-that either Athens or Sparta had as yet given them anything more
-than promises and encouragement. Their only chance of effective
-resistance lay in the levy of a large mercenary force; for which
-purpose neither their own funds, nor any farther aid derivable from
-private confiscation, could be made adequate. There remained no other
-resource except to employ the treasures and valuables in the Delphian
-temple, upon which accordingly Philomelus now laid hands. He did so,
-however, as his previous conduct evinced, with sincere reluctance,
-probably with various professions at first of borrowing only a given
-sum, destined to meet the actual emergency, and intended to be repaid
-as soon as safety should be provided for.[529] But whatever may have
-been his intentions at the outset, all such reserves or limits, or
-obligations to repay, were speedily forgotten in practice. When the
-feeling which protected the fund was broken through, it was as easy
-to take much as little, and the claimants became more numerous and
-importunate; besides which the exigencies of the war never ceased,
-and the implacable repugnance raised by the spoliation amidst half of
-the Grecian world, left to the Phokians no security except under the
-protection of a continued mercenary force.[530] Nor were Philomelus
-and his successors satisfied without also enriching their friends and
-adorning their wives or favorites.
-
-  [528] Even in 374 B. C., three years before the battle of
-  Leuktra, the Phokians had been unable to defend themselves
-  against Thebes without aid from Sparta (Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 1).
-
-  [529] Diodor. xvi. 30. ἠναγκάζετο (Philomelus) τοῖς ἱεροῖς
-  ἀναθήμασιν ἐπιβαλεῖν τὰς χεῖρας καὶ συλᾷν τὸ μαντεῖον. A similar
-  proposition had been started by the Corinthian envoys in the
-  congress at Sparta, shortly before the Peloponnesian war; they
-  suggested as one of their ways and means the borrowing from
-  the treasures of Delphi and Olympia, to be afterwards repaid
-  (Thucyd. i. 121). Perikles made the like proposition in the
-  Athenian assembly; “for purposes of security,” the property
-  of the temples might be employed to defray the cost of war,
-  subject to the obligation of replacing the whole afterwards
-  (χρησαμένους τε ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ ἔφη χρῆναι μὴ ἐλάσσω ἀντικαταστῆσαι
-  πάλιν, Thucyd. ii. 13). After the disaster before Syracuse,
-  and during the years of struggle intervening before the close
-  of the war, the Athenians were driven by financial distress to
-  appropriate to public purposes many of the rich donatives in the
-  Parthenon, which they were never afterwards able to replace. Of
-  this abstraction, proof is found in the Inscriptions published by
-  Boeckh, Corp. Inscript. No. 137-142, which contain the official
-  records of the successive Boards of Treasurers of Athênê. It is
-  stated in an instructive recent Dissertation, by J. L. Ussing
-  (De Parthenone ejusque partibus Disputatio, p. 3. Copenhagen,
-  1849), “Multæ in arce Athenarum inventæ sunt tabulæ Quæstorum
-  Minervæ, in quibus quotannis inscribebant, quænam vasa aurea
-  aliæque res pretiosæ in æde Minervæ dedicata extarent. Harum
-  longe maxima pars ante Euclidem archontem scripta est...: Nec
-  tamen una tabula templi dona continebat universa, sed separatim
-  quæ in Pronao, quæ in Hecatompedo, quæ in Parthenone (the part
-  of the temple specially so called), servabantur, separatim suis
-  quæque lapidibus consignata erant. Singulari quadam fortuna
-  contigit, ut inde ab anno 434 B. C., ad 407 B. C., tam multa
-  fragmenta tabularum servata sint, ut hos donorum catalogos
-  aliquatenus restituere possimus. In quo etiam ad historiam
-  illius temporis pertinet, quod florentibus Athenarum rebus opes
-  Deæ semper augeri, fractis autem bello Siculo, inde ab anno 412
-  B. C., eas paulatim deminui videmus.... Urgente pecuniæ inopia
-  Athenienses ad Deam confugiebant, et jam ante annum 406 B. C.,
-  pleraque Pronai dona ablata esse videmus. Proximis annis sine
-  dubio nec Hecatompedo nec Parthenoni pepercerunt; nec mirum est,
-  post bellum Peloponnesiacum ex antiquis illis donis fere nulla
-  comparere.”
-
-  [530] Theopompus, Frag. 182, ed. Didot; Athenæ. xiii. p. 605, vi.
-  p. 232; Ephorus, Frag. 155, ed. Didot; Diodor. xvi. 64.
-
-Availing himself of the large resources of the temple, Philomelus
-raised the pay of his troops to a sum half as large again as before,
-and issued proclamations inviting new levies at the same rate.
-Through such tempting offers he was speedily enabled to muster a
-force, horse and foot together, said to amount to 10,000 men;
-chiefly, as we are told, men of peculiarly wicked and reckless
-character, since no pious Greek would enlist in such a service.
-With these he attacked the Lokrians, who were however now assisted
-by the Thebans from one side, and by the Thessalians with their
-circumjacent allies from the other. Philomelus gained successive
-advantages against both of them, and conceived increased hopes from a
-reinforcement of 1500 Achæans who came to him from Peloponnesus. The
-war assumed a peculiarly ferocious character; for the Thebans,[531]
-confident in their superior force and chance of success, even
-though the Delphian treasure was employed against them, began by
-putting to death all their prisoners, as sacrilegious men standing
-condemned by the Amphiktyonic assembly. This so exasperated the
-troops of Philomelus, that they constrained him to retaliate upon
-the Bœotian prisoners. For some time such rigorous inflictions were
-continued on both sides, until at length the Thebans felt compelled
-to desist, and Philomelus followed their example. The war lasted a
-while with indecisive results, the Thebans and their allies being
-greatly superior in number. But presently Philomelus incautiously
-exposed himself to attack in an unfavorable position, near the town
-of Neon, amidst embarrassing woods and rocks. He was here defeated
-with severe loss, and his army dispersed; himself receiving several
-wounds, and fighting with desperate bravery, until farther resistance
-became impossible. He then tried to escape, but found himself driven
-to the brink of a precipice, where he could only avoid the tortures
-of captivity by leaping down and perishing. The remnant of his
-vanquished army was rallied at some distance by Onomarchus.[532]
-
-  [531] Isokrates, Orat. v. (ad Philippum) s. 60. τελευτῶντες δὲ
-  πρὸς Φωκέας πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν (the Thebans), ὡς τῶν τε πόλεων
-  ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ κρατήσοντες, τόν τε τόπον ἅπαντα τὸν περιέχοντα
-  κατασχήσοντες, τῶν τε χρημάτων τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς περιγενησόμενοι
-  ταῖς ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων δαπάναις.
-
-  [532] Diodor. xvi. 31; Pausan. x. 2, 1. The dates and duration
-  of these events are only known to us in a loose and superficial
-  manner from the narrative of Diodorus.
-
-The Thebans and their allies, instead of pressing the important
-victory recently gained over Philomelus, seem to have supposed that
-the Phokians would now disperse or submit of their own accord, and
-accordingly returned home. Their remissness gave time to Onomarchus
-to reorganize his dispirited countrymen. Convening at Delphi a
-general assembly of Phokians and allies, he strenuously exhorted them
-to persevere in the projects, and avenge the death, of their late
-general. He found, however, no inconsiderable amount of opposition;
-for many of the Phokians—noway prepared for the struggle in which
-they now found themselves embarked, and themselves ashamed of the
-spoliation of the temple—were anxious by some accommodation to put
-themselves again within the pale of Hellenic religious sentiment.
-Onomarchus doubtless replied, and with too good reason, that peace
-was unattainable upon any terms short of absolute ruin; and that
-there was no course open except to maintain their ground as they
-stood, by renewed efforts of force. But even if the necessities
-of the case had been less imperative, he would have been able to
-overbear all opposition of his own countrymen through the numerous
-mercenary strangers, now in Phokis and present at the assembly
-under the name of allies.[533] In fact, so irresistible was his
-ascendency by means of this large paid force under his command,
-that both Demosthenes and Æschines[534] denominate him (as well as
-his predecessor and his successor) not general, but despot, of the
-Phokians. The soldiers were not less anxious than Onomarchus to
-prosecute the war, and to employ the yet unexhausted wealth of the
-temple in every way conducive to ultimate success. In this sense the
-assembly decreed, naming Onomarchus general with full powers for
-carrying the decree into effect.
-
-  [533] Diodor. xvi. 32. Οἱ δὲ Φωκεῖς—ἐπανῆλθον εἰς Δελφοὺς καὶ
-  συνελθόντες ~μετὰ τῶν συμμάχων~ εἰς κοινὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐβουλεύοντο
-  περὶ τοῦ πολέμου.
-
-  [534] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 286. c. 41. τῶν ἐν Φωκεῦσι
-  τυράννων, etc. Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 661. s. 147.
-  Φαύλλος ὁ Φωκεὺς ἤ τις ἄλλος δυναστὴς, etc.
-
-His energetic measures presently retrieved the Phokian cause.
-Employing the temple-funds still more profusely than Philomelus, he
-invited fresh soldiers from all quarters, and found himself, after
-some time, at the head of a larger army than before. The temple
-exhibited many donatives, not only of gold and silver, but also of
-brass and iron. While Onomarchus melted the precious metals and
-coined them into money, he at the same time turned the brass and
-iron into arms;[535] so that he was enabled to equip both his own
-soldiers disarmed in the recent defeat, and a class of volunteers
-poorer than the ordinary self-armed mercenaries. Besides paying
-soldiers, he scattered everywhere presents or bribes to gain
-influential partisans in the cities favorable to his cause; probably
-Athens and Sparta first of all. We are told that the Spartan king
-Archidamus, with his wife Deïnicha, were among the recipients;
-indeed the same corrupt participation was imputed, by the statement
-of the hostile-minded Messenians,[536] to the Spartan ephors and
-senate. Even among enemies, Onomarchus employed his gold with effect,
-contriving thus to gain or neutralize a portion of the Thessalians;
-among them the powerful despots of Pheræ, whom we afterwards find
-allied to him. Thus was the great Delphian treasure turned to account
-in every way; and the unscrupulous Phokian despot strengthened his
-hands yet farther, by seizing such of his fellow-countrymen as had
-been prominent in opposition to his views, putting them to death, and
-confiscating their property.[537]
-
-  [535] Diodor. xvi. 33. The numerous iron spits, dedicated by the
-  courtezan Rhodôpis at Delphi, may probably have been applied to
-  this military purpose. Herodotus (ii. 135) saw them at Delphi;
-  in the time of Plutarch, the guide of the Temple only showed the
-  place in which they had once stood (Plutarch, De Pythiæ Oraculis,
-  p. 400).
-
-  [536] Theopompus, Frag. 255, ed. Didot; Pausanias, iii. 10, 2;
-  iv. 5, 1. As Archidamus is said to have furnished fifteen talents
-  privately to Philomelus (Diodor. xvi. 24), he may, perhaps, have
-  received now repayment out of the temple property.
-
-  [537] Diodor. xvi. 33.
-
-Through such combination of profuse allurement, corruption, and
-violence, the tide began to turn again in favor of the Phokians.
-Onomarchus found himself shortly at the head of a formidable army,
-which he marched forth from Delphi, and subdued successively the
-Lokrians of Amphissa, the Epiknemidian Lokrians, and the neighboring
-territory of Doris. He carried his conquests even as far as the
-vicinity of Thermopylæ; capturing Thronium, one of the towns which
-commanded that important pass, and reducing its inhabitants to
-slavery. It is probable that he also took Nikæa and Alpônus—two other
-valuable positions near Thermopylæ, which we know to have been in
-the power of the Phokians until the moment immediately preceding
-their ruin—since we find him henceforward master of Thermopylæ, and
-speedily opening his communications with Thessaly.[538] Besides this
-extension of dominion to the north and east of Phokis, Onomarchus
-also invaded Bœotia. The Thebans, now deprived of their northern
-allies, did not at first meet him in the field, so that he was
-enabled to capture Orchomenus. But when he proceeded to attack
-Chæroneia, they made an effective effort to relieve the place. They
-brought out their forces, and defeated him, in an action not very
-decisive, yet sufficient to constrain him to retire into Phokis.
-
-  [538] Diodor. xvi. 33. His account of the operations of
-  Onomarchus is, as usual, very meagre—εἰς δὲ τὴν πολεμίαν
-  ἐμβαλὼν, Θρόνιον μὲν ἐκπολιορκήσας ἐξηνδραποδίσατο, Ἀμφισσεῖς δὲ
-  καταπληξάμενος, τὰς δ᾽ ἐν Δωριεῦσι πόλεις πορθήσας, τὴν χώραν
-  αὐτῶν ἐδῄωσεν.
-
-  That Thronium, with Alpônus and Nikæa, were the three places
-  which commanded the pass of Thermopylæ—and that all the three
-  were in possession of the Phokians immediately before they
-  were conquered by Philip of Macedon in 346 B. C.—we know from
-  Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 286. c. 41.
-
-  ... πρέσβεις πρὸς ὑμᾶς (the Athenians) ἦλθον ἐκ Φωκέων, βοηθεῖν
-  αὑτοῖς κελεύοντες, καὶ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι παραδώσειν Ἀλπωνὸν καὶ
-  Θρόνιον καὶ Νίκαιαν, τὰ τῶν παρόδων τῶν εἰς Πύλας χωρία κύρια.
-
-  In order to conquer Thronium, Onomarchus must have marched
-  through and mastered the Epiknemidian Lokrians; and though no
-  place except Thronium is specified by Diodorus, it seems plain
-  that Onomarchus can not have conquered Thronium alone.
-
-Probably the Thebans were at this time much pressed, and prevented
-from acting effectively against the Phokians, by want of money. We
-know at least that in the midst of the Phokian war they hired out
-a force of 5000 hoplites commanded by Pammenes, to Artabazus the
-revolted Phrygian satrap. Here Pammenes with his soldiers acquired
-some renown, gaining two important victories over the Persians.[539]
-The Thebans, it would seem, having no fleet and no maritime
-dependencies, were less afraid of giving offence to the Great King
-than Athens had been, when she interdicted Chares from aiding
-Artabazus, and acquiesced in the unfavorable pacification which
-terminated the Social War. How long Pammenes and the Thebans remained
-in Asia, we are not informed. But in spite of the victories gained
-by them, Artabazus was not long able to maintain himself against
-the Persian arms. Three years afterwards, we hear of him and his
-brother-in-law Memnon as expelled from Asia, and as exiles residing
-with Philip of Macedon.[540]
-
-  [539] Diodor. xvi. 34.
-
-  [540] Diodor. xvi. 52.
-
-While Pammenes was serving under Artabazus, the Athenian general
-Chares recaptured Sestos in the Hellespont, which appears to have
-revolted from Athens during the Social War. He treated the captive
-Sestians with rigor; putting to death the men of military age,
-and selling the remainder as slaves.[541] This was an important
-acquisition for Athens, as a condition of security in the Chersonese
-as well as of preponderance in the Hellespont.
-
-  [541] Diodor. xvi. 34.
-
-Alarmed at the successes of Chares in the Hellespont, the Thracian
-prince Kersobleptes now entered on an intrigue with Pammenes in Asia,
-and with Philip of Macedon (who was on the coast of Thrace, attacking
-Abdêra and Maroneia), for the purpose of checking the progress of the
-Athenian arms. Philip appears to have made a forward movement, and
-to have menaced the possessions of Athens in the Chersonese; but his
-access thither was forbidden by Amadokus, another prince of Thrace,
-master of the intermediate territory, as well as by the presence of
-Chares with his fleet off the Thracian coast.[542] Apollonides of
-Kardia was the agent of Kersobleptes; who however finding his schemes
-abortive, and intimidated by the presence of Chares, came to terms
-with Athens, and surrendered to her the portion of the Chersonese
-which still remained to him, with the exception of Kardia. The
-Athenians sent to the Chersonese a farther detachment of Kleruchs
-or out-settlers, for whom considerable room must have been made as
-well by the depopulation of Sestos, as by the recent cession from
-Kersobleptes.[543] It was in the ensuing year (352 B. C.) that the
-Athenians also despatched a fresh batch of 2000 citizens as settlers
-to Samos, in addition to those who had been sent thither thirteen
-years before.[544]
-
-  [542] Polyænus, iv. 2, 22, seems to belong to this juncture.
-
-  [543] We derive what is here stated from the comparison of two
-  passages, put together as well as the uncertainty of their tenor
-  admits, Diodor. xvi. 34, with Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p.
-  681. s. 219 (s. 183, in Weber’s edition, whose note ought to be
-  consulted). Demosthenes says, Φιλίππου γὰρ εἰς Μαρώνειαν ἐλθόντος
-  ἔπεμψε (Kersobleptes) πρὸς αὐτὸν Ἀπολλωνίδην, πίστεις δοὺς ἐκείνῳ
-  καὶ Παμμένει· καὶ εἰ μὴ κρατῶν τῆς χώρας Ἀμάδοκος ἀπεῖπε Φιλίππῳ
-  μὴ ἐπιβαίνειν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ἐν μέσῳ πολεμεῖν ἡμᾶς πρὸς Καρδιανοὺς
-  ἤδη καὶ Κερσοβλέπτην. Καὶ ὅτι ταῦτ᾽ ἀληθῆ λέγω, λαβὲ τὴν Χάρητος
-  ἐπιστολήν.
-
-  The mention of Pammenes, as being within reach of communication
-  with Kersobleptes—the mention of Chares as being at the
-  Chersonese, and sending home despatches—and the notice of Philip
-  as being at Maroneia—all conspire to connect this passage with
-  the year 353-352 B. C., and with the facts referred to that
-  year by Diodorus, xvi. 34. There is an interval of five years
-  between the presence of Chares here alluded to, and the presence
-  of Chares noticed before in the same oration, p. 678. s. 206,
-  immediately after the successful expedition to Eubœa in 358 B.
-  C. During these five years, Kersobleptes had acted in a hostile
-  manner towards Athens in the neighborhood of the Chersonese (p.
-  680. s. 214), and also towards the two rival Thracian princes,
-  friends of Athens. At the same time Sestos had again revolted;
-  the forces of Athens being engaged in the Social War, from 358
-  to 355 B. C. In 353 B. C. Chares is at the Hellespont, recovers
-  Sestos, and again defeats the intrigues of Kersobleptes, who
-  makes cession to Athens of a portion of territory which he
-  still held in the Chersonese. Diodorus ascribes this cession
-  of Kersobleptes to the motive of aversion towards Philip and
-  good-will towards the Athenians. Possibly these may have been
-  the motives pretended by Kersobleptes, to whom a certain party
-  at Athens gave credit for more favorable dispositions than the
-  Demosthenic oration against Aristokrates recognizes—as we may see
-  from that oration itself. But I rather apprehend that Diodorus,
-  in describing Kersobleptes as hostile to Philip, and friendly to
-  Athens, has applied to the year 353 B. C. a state of relations
-  which did not become true until a later date, nearer to the time
-  when peace was made between Philip and the Athenians in 346 B. C.
-
-  [544] Dionysius, Hal. Judic. de Dinarcho, p. 664; Strabo. xiv. p.
-  638.
-
-The mention of Philip as attacking Maroneia and menacing the
-Thracian Chersonese, shows the indefatigable activity of that
-prince and the steady enlargement of his power. In 358 B. C., he
-had taken Amphipolis; before 355 B. C., he had captured Pydna and
-Potidæa, founded the new town of Philippi, and opened for himself
-the resource of the adjoining auriferous region; he had established
-relations with Thessaly, assisting the great family of the Aleuadæ
-at Larissa in their struggle against Lykophron and Peitholaus, the
-despots of Pheræ:[545] he had farther again chastised the interior
-tribes bordering on Macedonia, Thracians. Pæonians, and Illyrians,
-who were never long at rest, and who had combined to regain their
-independence.[546] It appears to have been in 354-353 B. C., that
-he attacked Methônê, the last remaining possession of Athens on
-the Macedonian coast. Situated on the Thermaic Gulf, Methônê was
-doubtless a convenient station for Athenian privateers to intercept
-trading vessels, not merely to and from Macedonian ports, but also
-from Olynthus and Potidæa; so that the Olynthians, then in alliance
-with Philip against Athens, would be glad to see it pass into his
-power, and may perhaps have lent him their aid. He pressed the siege
-of the place with his usual vigor, employing all the engines and
-means of assault then known; while the besieged on their side were
-not less resolute in the defence. They repelled his attacks for so
-long a time, that news of the danger of the place reached Athens, and
-ample time was afforded for sending relief, had the Athenians been
-ready and vigorous in their movement. But unfortunately they had not
-even now learnt experience from the loss of Pydna and Potidæa. Either
-the Etesian winds usual in summer, or the storms of winter, both
-which circumstances were taken into account by Philip in adjusting
-the season of his enterprises[547]—or (which is more probable) the
-aversion of the Athenian respectable citizens to personal service
-on shipboard, and their slackness even in pecuniary payment—caused
-so much delay in preparations, that the expedition sent out did not
-reach Methônê until too late.[548] The Methonæans, having gallantly
-held out until all their means were exhausted, were at length
-compelled to surrender. Diodorus tells us that Philip granted terms
-so far lenient as to allow them to depart with the clothes on their
-backs.[549] But this can hardly be accurate, since we know that
-there were Athenian citizens among them sold as slaves, some of whom
-were ransomed by Demosthenes with his own money.[550]
-
-  [545] Diodor. xvi, 14. This passage relates to the year 357-356
-  B. C., and possibly Philip may have begun to meddle in the
-  Thessalian party-disputes even as early as that year; but his
-  effective interference comes two or three years later. See the
-  general order of Philip’s aggressions indicated by Demosthenes,
-  Olynth. i. p. 12. s. 13.
-
-  [546] Diodor. xvi. 22.
-
-  [547] See a striking passage in Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p.
-  48. s. 35. There was another place called Methônê—the Thracian
-  Methônê—situated in the Chalkidic or Thracian peninsula, near
-  Olynthus and Apollonia—of which we shall hear presently.
-
-  [548] Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 50. s. 40; Olynth. i. p. 11. s.
-  9.
-
-  [549] Diodorus (xvi. 31-34) mentions the capture of Methônê by
-  Philip twice, in two successive years: first, in 354-353 B. C.;
-  again, more copiously, in 353-352 B. C. In my judgment, the
-  earlier of the two dates is the more probable. In 353-352 B. C.,
-  Philip carried on his war in Thrace, near Abdera and Maroneia—and
-  also his war against Onomarchus in Thessaly; which transactions
-  seem enough to fill up the time. From the language of Demosthenes
-  (Olynth. i. p. 12. s. 13), we see that Philip did not attack
-  Thessaly until after the capture of Methônê. Diodorus as well as
-  Strabo (vii. p. 330), and Justin (vii. 6) state that Philip was
-  wounded and lost the sight of one eye in this siege. But this
-  seems to have happened afterwards, near the Thracian Methônê.
-
-  Compare Justin, vii. 6; Polyænus, iv. 2. 15. Under the year
-  354-353 B. C., Diodorus mentions not only the capture of Methônê
-  by Philip, but also the capture of _Pagæ_. Παγὰς δὲ χειρωσάμενος,
-  ἠνάγκασεν ὑποταγῆναι. _Pagæ_ is unknown, anywhere near Macedonia
-  and Thessaly. Wesseling and Mr. Clinton suppose _Pagasæ_ in
-  Thessaly to be meant. But it seems to me impossible that Philip,
-  who had no considerable power at sea, can have taken Pagasæ,
-  before his wars in Thessaly, and before he had become master of
-  Pheræ, which events did not occur until one year or two years
-  afterwards. Pagasæ is the port of Pheræ, and Lykophron the despot
-  of Pheræ was still powerful and unconquered. If, therefore, the
-  word intended by Diodorus be Παγασὰς instead of Παγὰς, I think
-  the matter of fact asserted cannot be correct.
-
-  [550] This fact is mentioned in the public vote of gratitude
-  passed by the Athenian people to Demosthenes (Plutarch, Vitæ X.
-  Orat. p. 851).
-
-Being now master of the last port possessed by Athens in the Thermaic
-Gulf—an acquisition of great importance, which had never before[551]
-belonged to the Macedonian kings—Philip was enabled to extend his
-military operations to the neighborhood of the Thracian Chersonese
-on the one side, and to that of Thermopylæ on the other. How he
-threatened the Chersonese, has been already related; and his campaign
-in Thessaly was yet more important. That country was, as usual, torn
-by intestine disputes. Lykophron the despot of Pheræ possessed the
-greatest sway; while the Aleuadæ of Larissa, too weak to contend
-against him with their own forces, invited assistance from Philip;
-who entered Thessaly with a powerful army. Such a reinforcement so
-completely altered the balance of Thessalian power, that Lykophron
-in his turn was compelled to entreat aid from Onomarchus and the
-Phokians.
-
-  [551] Thucyd. vi. 7. Μεθώνην τὴν ὅμορον Μακεδονίᾳ, etc.
-
-So strong were the Phokians now, that they were more than a match
-for the Thebans with their other hostile neighbors, and had means to
-spare for combating Philip in Thessaly. As their force consisted
-of a large body of mercenaries, whom they were constrained for
-security to retain in pay—to keep them employed beyond the border
-was a point not undesirable. Hence they readily entered upon the
-Thessalian campaign. At this moment they counted, in the comparative
-assessment of Hellenic forces, as an item of first-rate magnitude.
-They were hailed both by Athenians and Spartans as the natural
-enemy and counterpoise of Thebes, alike odious to both. While the
-Phokians maintained their actual power, Athens could manage her
-foreign policy abroad, and Sparta her designs in Peloponnesus,
-with diminished apprehensions of being counterworked by Thebes.
-Both Athens and Sparta had at first supported the Phokians against
-unjust persecution by Thebes and abuse of Amphiktyonic jurisdiction,
-before the spoliation of the Delphian temple was consummated or even
-anticipated. And though, when that spoliation actually occurred, it
-was doubtless viewed with reprobation among Athenians, accustomed
-to unlimited freedom of public discussion—as well as at Sparta, in
-so far as it became known amidst the habitual secrecy of public
-affairs—nevertheless political interests so far prevailed, that the
-Phokians (perhaps in part by aid of bribery) were still countenanced,
-though not much assisted, as useful rivals to Thebes.[552] To
-restrain “the Leuktric insolence of the Thebans,”[553] and to see
-the Bœotian towns Orchomenus, Thespiæ, Platæa, restored to their
-pristine autonomy, was an object of paramount desire with each of
-the two ancient heads of Greece. So far both Athens and Sparta felt
-in unison. But Sparta cherished a farther hope—in which Athens
-by no means concurred—to avail herself of the embarrassments of
-Thebes for the purpose of breaking up Megalopolis and Messênê,
-and recovering her former Peloponnesian dominion. These two new
-Peloponnesian cities, erected by Epaminondas on the frontier of
-Laconia, had been hitherto upheld against Sparta by the certainty of
-Theban interference if they were menaced. But so little did Thebes
-seem in a condition to interfere, while Onomarchus and the Phokians
-were triumphant in 353-352 B. C., that the Megalopolitans despatched
-envoys to Athens to entreat protection and alliance, while the
-Spartans on their side sent to oppose the petition.
-
-  [552] Such is the description of Athenian feeling, as it then
-  stood, given by Demosthenes twenty-four years afterwards in the
-  Oration De Coronâ, p. 230. s. 21.
-
-  Τοῦ γὰρ Φωκικοῦ συστάντος πολέμου, πρῶτον μὲν ὑμεῖς οὕτω
-  διέκεισθε, ὥστε Φωκέας μὲν βούλεσθαι σωθῆναι, καίπερ οὐ δίκαια
-  ποιοῦντας ὁρῶντες, Θηβαίοις δ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ἂν ἐφησθῆναι παθοῦσιν, οὐκ
-  ἀλόγως οὐδ᾽ ἀδίκως αὐτοῖς ὀργιζόμενοι, etc.
-
-  [553] Diodor. xvi. 58. Βουλόμενος τὰ Λευκτρικὰ φρονήματα
-  συστεῖλαι τῶν Βοιωτῶν, etc., an expression used in reference to
-  Philip a few years afterwards, but more animated and emphatic
-  than we usually find in Diodorus, who, perhaps, borrowed it from
-  Theopompus.
-
-It is on occasion of the political debates in Athens during the
-years 354 and 353 B. C., that we first have before us the Athenian
-Demosthenes, as adviser of his countrymen in the public assembly. His
-first discourse of public advice was delivered in 354-353 B. C., on
-an alarm of approaching war with Persia; his second, in 353-352 B.
-C., was intended to point out the policy proper for Athens in dealing
-with the Spartan and Megalopolitan envoys.
-
-A few words must here be said about this eminent man, who forms the
-principal ornament of the declining Hellenic world. He was about
-twenty-seven years old; being born, according to what seems the
-most probable among contradictory accounts, in 382-381 B. C.[554]
-His father, named also Demosthenes, was a citizen of considerable
-property, and of a character so unimpeachable that even Æschines
-says nothing against him; his mother Kleobulê was one of the
-two daughters and coheiresses of a citizen named Gylon,[555] an
-Athenian exile, who, having become rich as a proprietor of land and
-exporter of corn in Bosphorus, sent his two daughters to Athens;
-where, possessing handsome dowries, they married two Athenian
-citizens—Demochares and the elder Demosthenes. The latter was a man
-of considerable wealth, and carried on two distinct manufactories;
-one of swords or knives, employing thirty-two slaves—the other, of
-couches or beds, employing twenty. In the new schedule of citizens
-and of taxable property, introduced in the archonship of Nausinikus
-(378 B. C.), the elder Demosthenes was enrolled among the richest
-class, the leaders of Symmories. But he died about 375 B. C., leaving
-his son Demosthenes seven years old, with a younger daughter about
-five years of age. The boy and his large paternal property were
-confided to the care of three guardians named under his father’s
-will. These guardians—though the father, in hopes of ensuring
-their fidelity, had bequeathed to them considerable legacies, away
-from his own son, and though all of them were rich men as well as
-family connections and friends—administered the property with such
-negligence and dishonesty, that only a sum comparatively small was
-left, when they came to render account to their ward. At the age of
-sixteen years complete, Demosthenes attained his civil majority, and
-became entitled by the Athenian law to the administration of his own
-property. During his minority, his guardians had continued to enrol
-him among the wealthiest class (as his father had ranked before), and
-to pay the increased rate of direct taxation chargeable upon that
-class; but the real sum handed over to him by his guardians was too
-small to justify such a position. Though his father had died worth
-fourteen talents,—which would be diminished by the sums bequeathed
-as legacies, but ought to have been increased in greater proportion
-by the interest on the property for the ten years of minority, had
-it been properly administered—the sum paid to young Demosthenes on
-his majority was less than two talents, while the guardians not only
-gave in dishonest accounts, but professed not to be able to produce
-the father’s will. After repeated complaints and remonstrances,
-he brought a judicial action against one of them—Aphobus, and
-obtained a verdict carrying damages to the amount of ten talents.
-Payment however was still evaded by the debtor. Five speeches remain
-delivered by Demosthenes, three against Aphobus, two against Onêtor,
-brother-in-law of Aphobus. At the date of the latest oration,
-Demosthenes had still received nothing; nor do we know how much he
-ultimately realized, though it would seem that the difficulties
-thrown in his way were such as to compel him to forego the greater
-part of the claim. Nor is it certain whether he ever brought the
-actions, of which he speaks as intended, against the other two
-guardians Demophon and Therippides.[556]
-
-  [554] The birth-year of Demosthenes is matter of notorious
-  controversy. No one of the statements respecting it rests upon
-  evidence thoroughly convincing.
-
-  The question has been examined with much care and ability both
-  by Mr. Clinton (Fasti Hellen. Appen. xx.) and by Dr. Thirlwall
-  (Histor. G. vol. v. Appen. i. p. 485 seq.); by Böhnecke
-  (Forschungen, p. 1-94) more copiously than cautiously, but still
-  with much instruction; also by K. F. Hermann (De Anno Natali
-  Demosthenis), and many other critics.
-
-  In adopting the year Olymp. 99. 3 (the archonship of Evander,
-  382-381 B. C.), I agree with the conclusion of Mr. Clinton and
-  of K. F. Hermann; differing from Dr. Thirlwall, who prefers the
-  previous year (Olymp. 99. 2)—and from Böhnecke, who vindicates
-  the year affirmed by Dionysius (Olymp. 99. 4).
-
-  Mr. Clinton fixes the _first month_ of Olymp. 99. 3, as the
-  month in which Demosthenes was born. This appears to me greater
-  precision than the evidence warrants.
-
-  [555] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 4; Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 78.
-  c. 57; Demosth. cont. Aphob. B. p. 835. According to Æschines,
-  Gylon was put on his trial for having betrayed Nymphæum to the
-  enemy; but not appearing, was sentenced to death in his absence,
-  and became an exile. He then went to Bosphorus (Pantikapæum),
-  obtained the favor of the king (probably Satyrus—see Mr.
-  Clinton’s Appendix on the kings of Bosphorus—Fasti Hellenic.
-  Append. xiii, p. 282), together with the grant of a district
-  called Kepi, and married the daughter of a rich man there; by
-  whom he had two daughters. In after-days, he sent these two
-  daughters to Athens, where one of them, Kleobulê, was married
-  to the elder Demosthenes. Æschines has probably exaggerated the
-  gravity of the sentence against Gylon, who seems only to have
-  been fined. The guardians of Demosthenes assert no more than that
-  Gylon was fined, and died with the fine unpaid, while Demosthenes
-  asserts that the fine _was_ paid.
-
-  Upon the facts here stated by Æschines, a few explanatory remarks
-  will be useful. Demosthenes being born 382-381 B. C., this would
-  probably throw the birth of his mother Kleobulê to some period
-  near the close of the Peloponnesian war, 405-404 B. C. We see,
-  therefore, that the establishment of Gylon in the kingdom of
-  Bosphorus, and his nuptial connection there formed, must have
-  taken place during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war;
-  between 412 B. C. (the year after the Athenian catastrophe at
-  Syracuse) and 405 B. C.
-
-  These were years of great misfortune to Athens. After the
-  disaster at Syracuse, she could no longer maintain ascendency
-  over, or grant protection to, a distant tributary like Nymphæum
-  in the Tauric Chersonese. It was therefore natural that the
-  Athenian citizens there settled, engaged probably in the export
-  trade of corn to Athens, should seek security by making the best
-  bargain they could with the neighboring kings of Bosphorus. In
-  this transaction Gylon seems to have stood conspicuously forward,
-  gaining both favor and profit to himself. And when, after the
-  close of the war, the corn-trade again became comparatively
-  unimpeded, he was in a situation to carry it on upon a large and
-  lucrative scale. Another example of Greeks who gained favor,
-  held office, and made fortunes, under Satyrus in the Bosphorus,
-  is given in the Oratio (xvii.) Trapezitica of Isokrates, s. 3,
-  14. Compare also the case of Mantitheus the Athenian (Lysias pro
-  Mantitheo, Or. xvi. s. 4), who was sent by his father to reside
-  with Satyrus for some time, before the close of the Peloponnesian
-  war; which shows that Satyrus was at that time, when Nymphæum was
-  probably placed under his protection, in friendly relations with
-  Athens.
-
-  I may remark that the woman whom Gylon married, though Æschines
-  calls her a Scythian woman, may be supposed more probably to have
-  been the daughter of some Greek (not an Athenian) resident in
-  Bosphorus.
-
-  [556] Demosth. cont. Onetor. ii. p. 880. κεκομισμένον μηδ᾽
-  ὁτιοῦν, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐθέλοντα ποιεῖν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς, εἴτι τῶν δεόντων
-  ἐβούλεσθε πράττειν.
-
-  That he ultimately got much less than he was entitled to, appears
-  from his own statement in the oration against Meidias, p. 540.
-
-  See Westermann, De Litibus quas Demosthenes oravit ipse, cap. i.
-  p. 15, 16.
-
-  Plutarch (Vit. X Oratt. p. 844) says that he voluntarily
-  refrained from enforcing the judgment obtained. I do not clearly
-  understand what is meant by Æschines (cont. Ktesiph. p. 78), when
-  he designates Demosthenes as τὰ πατρῷα καταγελάστως προέμενος.
-
-Demosthenes received during his youth the ordinary grammatical and
-rhetorical education of a wealthy Athenian. Even as a boy, he is said
-to have manifested extraordinary appetite and interest for rhetorical
-exercise. By earnest entreaty, he prevailed on his tutors to conduct
-him to hear Kallistratus, one of the ablest speakers in Athens,
-delivering an harangue in the Dikastery on the matter of Oropus.[557]
-This harangue, producing a profound impression upon Demosthenes,
-stimulated his fondness for rhetorical studies. Still more was the
-passion excited, when on attaining his majority, he found himself
-cheated of most of his paternal property, and constrained to claim
-his rights by a suit at law against his guardians. Being obliged,
-according to Athenian practice, to plead his own cause personally,
-he was made to feel keenly the helpless condition of an incompetent
-speaker, and the necessity of acquiring oratorical power, not simply
-as an instrument of ambition, but even as a means of individual
-defence and safety.[558] It appears also that he was, from childhood,
-of sickly constitution and feeble muscular frame; so that partly from
-his own disinclination, partly from the solicitude of his mother,
-he took little part either as boy or youth in the exercises of the
-palæstra. His delicate clothing, and somewhat effeminate habits,
-procured for him as a boy the nickname of Batalus, which remained
-attached to him most part of his life, and which his enemies tried
-to connect with degrading imputations.[559] Such comparative bodily
-disability probably contributed to incite his thirst for mental and
-rhetorical acquisitions, as the only road to celebrity open. But
-it at the same time disqualified him from appropriating to himself
-the full range of a comprehensive Grecian education, as conceived
-by Plato, Isokrates, and Aristotle; an education applying alike to
-thought, word, and action—combining bodily strength, endurance, and
-fearlessness, with an enlarged mental capacity and a power of making
-it felt by speech. The disproportion between the physical energy,
-and the mental force, of Demosthenes, beginning in childhood, is
-recorded and lamented in the inscription placed on his statue after
-his death.[560]
-
-  [557] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 5; Vit. X Orator. p. 844; Hermippus
-  ap. Aul. Gell. iii. 13. Nothing positive can be made out
-  respecting this famous trial; neither the date, nor the exact
-  point in question, nor the manner in which Kallistratus was
-  concerned in it—nor who were his opponents. Many conjectures have
-  been proposed, differing materially one from the other, and all
-  uncertain.
-
-  These conjectures are brought together and examined in Rehdantz,
-  Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p. 111-114.
-
-  In the month of November, 361 B. C., Kallistratus was in exile
-  at Methônê in the Thermaic Gulf. He had been twice condemned to
-  death by the Athenians (Demosth. cont. Polykl. p. 1221). But when
-  these condemnations took place, we do not know.
-
-  [558] Plutarch. Demosth. c. 4. Such a view of the necessity of
-  a power of public speaking, is put forward by Kallikles in the
-  Gorgias of Plato, p. 486, 511. c. 90, 142. τὴν ῥητορικὴν τὴν ἐν
-  τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ~διασώζουσαν~, etc. Compare Aristot. Rhetoric,
-  i. 1, 3. Ἄτοπον, εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι ~βοηθεῖν
-  ἑαυτῷ~, λόγῳ δὲ, οὐκ αἰσχρόν· ὃ μᾶλλον ἴδιόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου τῆς
-  τοῦ σώματος χρείας.
-
-  The comparison of Aristotle is instructive as to the point of
-  view of a free Greek. “If it be disgraceful not to be able to
-  protect yourself by your bodily force, it is equally so not to be
-  able to protect yourself by your powers of speaking; which is in
-  a more peculiar manner the privilege of man.” See also Tacitus,
-  Dialog. de Orator. c. 5.
-
-  [559] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 4; Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 17, 18.
-  c. 27, with Scholia, De Fal. Leg. p. 41. c. 31. εἰ γάρ τις σοῦ τὰ
-  κομψὰ ταῦτα χλανίσκια περικλώμενος καὶ τοὺς μαλακοὺς χιτωνίσκους,
-  ἐν οἷς τοὺς κατὰ τῶν φίλων λόγους γράφεις, περιενέγκας, δοίη εἰς
-  τὰς χεῖρας τῶν δικαστῶν, οἶμαι ἂν αὐτοὺς εἴτις μὴ προειπὼν ταῦτα
-  ποιήσειεν, ἀπορήσειν εἴτε γυναικὸς εἴτε ἀνδρὸς εἰλήφασιν ἐσθῆτα.
-  Compare Æsch. Fal. Leg. p. 45.
-
-  The foundation of the nickname _Batalus_ is not clear, and
-  was differently understood by different persons; compare also
-  Libanius, Vita Demosth. p. 294, ap Westermann, Scriptores
-  Biographici. But it can hardly have been a very discreditable
-  foundation, since Demosthenes takes the name to himself, De
-  Coronâ, p. 289.
-
-  [560] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 30.
-
-    Εἴπερ ἴσην ῥώμην γνώμῃ, Δημόσθενες, εἶχες,
-    Οὔποτ᾽ ἂν Ἑλλήνων ἦρξεν Ἄρης Μακεδών.
-
-As a youth of eighteen years of age, Demosthenes found himself
-with a known and good family position at Athens, being ranked in
-the class of richest citizens and liable to the performance of
-liturgies and trierarchy as his father had been before him;[561]
-yet with a real fortune very inadequate to the outlay expected from
-him—embarrassed by a legal proceeding against guardians wealthy as
-well as unscrupulous—and an object of dislike and annoyance from
-other wealthy men, such as Meidias and his brother Thrasylochus,[562]
-friends of those guardians. His family position gave him a good
-introduction to public affairs, for which he proceeded to train
-himself carefully; first as a writer of speeches for others, next as
-a speaker in his own person. Plato and Isokrates were both at this
-moment in full celebrity, visited at Athens by pupils from every
-part of Greece; Isæus also, who had studied under Isokrates, was in
-great reputation as a composer of judicial harangues for plaintiffs
-or defendants in civil causes. Demosthenes put himself under the
-teaching of Isæus (who is said to have assisted him in composing the
-speeches against his guardians), and also profited largely by the
-discourse of Plato, of Isokrates, and others. As an ardent aspirant
-he would seek instruction from most of the best sources, theoretical
-as well as practical—writers as well as lecturers.[563] But besides
-living teachers, there was one of the past generation who contributed
-largely to his improvement. He studied Thucydides with indefatigable
-labor and attention; according to one account, he copied the whole
-history eight times over with his own hand; according to another,
-he learnt it all by heart, so as to be able to rewrite it from
-memory when the manuscript was accidentally destroyed. Without
-minutely criticising these details, we ascertain at least that
-Thucydides was the object of his peculiar study and imitation. How
-much the composition of Demosthenes was fashioned by the reading
-of Thucydides—reproducing the daring, majestic and impressive
-phraseology, yet without the overstrained brevity and involutions of
-that great historian—and contriving to blend with it a perspicuity
-and grace not inferior to Lysias—may be seen illustrated in the
-elaborate criticism of the rhetor Dionysius.[564]
-
-  [561] Position of Demosthenes, πατὴρ τριηραρχικὸς—χρυσέα κρηπὶς,
-  κατὰ Πίνδαρον, etc. (Lucian, Encomium Demosth. vol. iii. p. 499,
-  ed. Reitz.)
-
-  [562] See the account given by Demosthenes (cont. Meidiam, p.
-  539, 540) of the manner in which Meidias and Thrasylochus first
-  began their persecution of him, while the suit against his
-  guardians was still going on. These guardians attempted to get
-  rid of the suit by inducing Thrasylochus to force upon him an
-  exchange of properties (Antidosis), tendered by Thrasylochus, who
-  had just been put down for a trierarchy. If the exchange had been
-  effected, Thrasylochus would have given the guardians a release.
-  Demosthenes could only avoid it by consenting to incur the cost
-  of the trierarchy—20 minæ.
-
-  [563] Demosthenes both studied attentively the dialogues, and
-  heard the discourse, of Plato (Cicero, Brutus, 31, 121; Orator.
-  4, 15; Plutarch, Vit. X Orator. p. 844). Tacitus, Dialog. de
-  Orator. c. 32.
-
-  [564] Dionys. Hal. De Thucydide Judicium, p. 944; De Admirab. Vi.
-  Dicend. Demosthen. p. 982, 983.
-
-While thus striking out for himself a bold and original style,
-Demosthenes had still greater difficulties to overcome in regard to
-the external requisites of an orator. He was not endowed by nature,
-like Æschines, with a magnificent voice; nor, like Demades, with
-a ready flow of vehement improvisation. His thoughts required to
-be put together by careful preparation; his voice was bad and even
-lisping—his breath short—his gesticulation ungraceful; moreover he
-was overawed and embarrassed by the manifestations of the multitude.
-Such an accumulation of natural impediments were at least equal to
-those of which Isokrates complains, as having debarred him all his
-life from addressing the public assembly, and restrained him to a
-select audience of friends or pupils. The energy and success with
-which Demosthenes overcame his defects, in such manner as to satisfy
-a critical assembly like the Athenian, is one of the most memorable
-circumstances in the general history of self-education. Repeated
-humiliation and repulse only spurred him on to fresh solitary
-efforts for improvement. He corrected his defective elocution
-by speaking with pebbles in his mouth; he prepared himself to
-overcome the noise of the assembly by declaiming in stormy weather
-on the sea-shore of Phalerum; he opened his lungs by running, and
-extended his powers of holding breath by pronouncing sentences in
-marching up-hill; he sometimes passed two or three months without
-interruption in a subterranean chamber, practising night and day
-either in composition or declamation, and shaving one half of his
-head in order to disqualify himself from going abroad. After several
-trials without success before the assembly, his courage was on the
-point of giving way, when Eunomus and other old citizens reassured
-him by comparing the matter of his speeches to those of Perikles,
-and exhorting him to persevere a little longer in the correction
-of his external defects. On another occasion, he was pouring forth
-his disappointment to Satyrus the actor, who undertook to explain
-to him the cause, desiring him to repeat in his own way a speech
-out of Sophokles, which he (Satyrus) proceeded to repeat after him,
-with suitable accent and delivery. Demosthenes, profoundly struck
-with the difference, began anew the task of self-improvement;
-probably taking constant lessons from good models. In his unremitting
-private practice, he devoted himself especially to acquiring a
-graceful action, keeping watch on all his movements while declaiming
-before a tall looking-glass.[565] After pertinacious efforts for
-several years, he was rewarded at length with complete success.
-His delivery became full of decision and vehemence, highly popular
-with the general body of the assembly; though some critics censured
-his modulation as artificial and out of nature, and savoring of
-low stage-effect; while others, in the same spirit, condemned his
-speeches as over-labored and smelling of the lamp.[566]
-
-  [565] These and other details are given in Plutarch’s Life of
-  Demosthenes, c. 4, 9. They depend upon good evidence; for he
-  cites Demetrius the Phalerean, who heard them himself from
-  Demosthenes in the latter years of his life. The subterranean
-  chamber where Demosthenes practised, was shown at Athens even in
-  the time of Plutarch.
-
-  Cicero (who also refers to Demetrius Phalereus), De Divinat. ii.
-  46, 96. Libanius, Zosimus, and Photius, give generally the same
-  statements, with some variations.
-
-  [566] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 9. Ἐπεὶ τόλμαν γε καὶ θάρσος οἱ
-  λεχθέντες ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ λόγοι τῶν γραφέντων μᾶλλον εἶχον· εἴ τι δεῖ
-  πιστεύειν Ἐρατοσθένει καὶ Δημητρίῳ τῷ Φαληρεῖ καὶ τοῖς κωμικοῖς.
-  Ὧν Ἐρατοσθένης μέν φησιν αὑτὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ~πολλαχοῦ γεγονέναι
-  παράβακχον~, ὁ δὲ Φαληρεὺς τὸν ἔμμετρον ἐκεῖνον ὅρκον ὀμόσαι
-  ποτε πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ~ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιῶντα~. Again, c. 11. Τοῖς μὲν
-  οὖν πολλοῖς ὑποκρινόμενος ἤρεσκε θαυμαστῶς, οἱ δὲ χαριέντες
-  ~ταπεινὸν~ ἡγοῦντο καὶ ~ἀγεννὲς αὐτοῦ τὸ πλάσμα καὶ μαλακὸν~, ὧν
-  καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεύς ἐστιν.
-
-  This sentence is illustrated by a passage in Quintilian, i. 8.
-  2. “Sit autem in primis lectio virilis, et cum suavitate quadam
-  gravis: et non quidem prosæ similis—quia carmen est, et se poetæ
-  canere testantur—non tamen in canticum dissoluta, nec _plasmate_
-  (ut nunc a plerisque fit) effeminata.”
-
-  The meaning of _plasma_, in the technical language of
-  rhetoricians contemporary with Quintilian, seems different from
-  that which it bears in Dionysius, p. 1060-1061. But whether
-  Plutarch has exactly rendered to us what Demetrius Phalereus
-  said of Demosthenes—whether Demetrius spoke of the modulation
-  of Demosthenes as being _low_ and _vulgar_—I cannot but doubt.
-  Æschines urges very different reproaches against him—overmuch
-  labor and affectation, but combined with bitterness and malignity
-  (adv. Ktesiph. p. 78-86). He denounces the _character_ of
-  Demosthenes as low and vulgar—but not his oratorical delivery.
-  The expression ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιῶν, which Plutarch cites from
-  Demetrius Phalereus, hardly suits well with ταπεινὸν καὶ ἀγεννές.
-
-So great was the importance assigned by Demosthenes himself to
-these external means of effect, that he is said to have pronounced
-“Action” to be the first, second, and third requisite for an orator.
-If we grant this estimate to be correct, with reference to actual
-hearers, we must recollect that his speeches are, (not less truly
-than the history of Thucydides), “an everlasting possession rather
-than a display for momentary effect.” Even among his contemporaries,
-the effect of the speeches, when read apart from the speaker,
-was very powerful. There were some who thought that their full
-excellence could only be thus appreciated;[567] while to the
-after-world, who know them only by reading, they have been and still
-are the objects of an admiration reaching its highest pitch in the
-enthusiastic sentiment of the fastidious rhetor Dionysius.[568] The
-action of Demosthenes,—consummate as it doubtless was, and highly
-as he may himself have prized an accomplishment so laboriously
-earned,—produced its effect only in conjunction with the matter of
-Demosthenes; his thoughts, sentiments, words, and above all, his
-sagacity in appreciating and advising on the actual situation. His
-political wisdom, and his lofty patriotic _idéal_, are in truth quite
-as remarkable as his oratory. By what training he attained either
-the one or the other of these qualities, we are unfortunately not
-permitted to know. Our informants have little interest in him except
-as a speaker; they tell us neither what he learned, nor from whom,
-nor by what companions, or party-associates, his political point
-of view was formed. But we shall hardly err in supposing that his
-attentive meditation of Thucydides supplied him, not merely with
-force and majesty of expression, but also with that conception of
-Athens in her foretime which he is perpetually impressing on his
-countrymen,—Athens at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war,
-in days of exuberant energy, and under the advice of her noblest
-statesman.
-
-  [567] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 11. Αἰσίωνα δέ φησιν Ἕρμιππος,
-  ἐρωτηθέντα περὶ τῶν πάλαι ῥητόρων καὶ τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὸν, εἰπεῖν, ὡς
-  ἀκούων μὲν ἄν τις ἐθαύμασεν ἐκείνους εὐκόσμως καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς
-  τῷ δήμῳ διαλεγομένους, ~ἀναγινωσκόμενοι δὲ οἱ Δημοσθένους λόγοι~
-  πολὺ τῇ κατασκευῇ καὶ δυνάμει διαφέρουσιν.
-
-  [568] Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dicend. Demosth. p. 1022, a very
-  remarkable passage.
-
-In other respects, we are left in ignorance as to the mental history
-of Demosthenes. Before he acquired reputation as a public adviser, he
-was already known as a logographer, or composer of discourses to be
-delivered either by speakers in the public assembly or by litigants
-in the Dikastery; for which compositions he was paid, according to
-usual practice at Athens. He had also pleaded in person before the
-Dikastery; in support of an accusation preferred by others against a
-law, proposed by Leptines, for abrogating votes of immunity passed
-by the city in favor of individuals, and restraining such grants
-in future. Nothing can be more remarkable, in this speech against
-Leptines, than the intensity with which the young speaker enforces
-the necessity of strict and faithful adherence to engagements on the
-part of the people, in spite of great occasional inconvenience in so
-doing. It would appear that he was in habitual association with some
-wealthy youths,—among others, with Apollodorus son of the wealthy
-banker, Pasion, whom he undertook to instruct in the art of speaking.
-This we learn from the denunciations of his rival, Æschines;[569]
-who accuses him of having thus made his way into various wealthy
-families,—especially where there was an orphan youth and a widowed
-mother,—using unworthy artifices to defraud and ruin them. How
-much truth there may be in such imputations, we cannot tell. But
-Æschines was not unwarranted in applying to his rival the obnoxious
-appellations of logographer and sophist; appellations all the more
-disparaging, because Demosthenes belonged to a trierarchic family, of
-the highest class in point of wealth.[570]
-
-  [569] Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 16, 24.
-
-  [570] Æschines cont. Timarchum, p. 13, 17, 25, cont. Ktesiphont.
-  p. 78. Περὶ δὲ τὴν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν δίαιταν τίς ἐστιν; Ἐκ τριηράρχου
-  λογογράφος ἀνεφάνη, τὰ πατρῷα καταγελάστως προέμενος, etc.
-
-  See also Demosthenes, De Fals. Legat. p. 417-420.
-
-  Compare the shame of the rich youth Hippokrates, in the Platonic
-  dialogue called Protagoras, when the idea is broached that he is
-  about to visit Protagoras for the purpose of becoming himself a
-  sophist (Plato, Protagor. p. 154 F, 163 A, cap. 8-19).
-
-It will be proper here to notice another contemporary adviser, who
-stands in marked antithesis and rivalry to Demosthenes. Phokion was
-a citizen of small means, son of a pestle-maker. Born about the year
-402 B. C., he was about twenty years older than Demosthenes. At what
-precise time his political importance commenced, we do not know; but
-he lived to the great age of eighty-four, and was a conspicuous man
-throughout the last half-century of his life. He becomes known first
-as a military officer, having served in subordinate command under
-Chabrias, to whom he was greatly attached, at the battle of Naxos in
-376 B. C. He was a man of thorough personal bravery, and considerable
-talents for command; of hardy and enduring temperament, insensible
-to cold or fatigue; strictly simple in his habits, and above all,
-superior to every kind of personal corruption. His abstinence
-from plunder and peculation, when on naval expeditions, formed an
-honorable contrast with other Athenian admirals, and procured for him
-much esteem on the part of the maritime allies. Hence, probably, his
-surname of Phokion the Good.[571]
-
-  [571] Ælian, V. H. iii. 47; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 10; Cornelius
-  Nepos, Phokion, c. 1.
-
-I have already remarked how deep and strong was the hold acquired
-on the Athenian people, by any public man who once established
-for himself a character above suspicion on the score of personal
-corruption. Among Athenian politicians, but too many were not
-innocent on this point; moreover, even when a man was really
-innocent, there were often circumstances in his life which rendered
-more or less of doubt admissible against him; thus Demosthenes,—being
-known not only as a person of somewhat costly habits, but also
-as frequenting wealthy houses, and receiving money for speeches
-composed or rhetoric communicated,—was sure to be accused, justly or
-unjustly, by his enemies, of having cheated rich clients, and would
-never obtain unquestioned credit for a high pecuniary independence,
-even in regard to the public affairs; although he certainly was not
-corrupt, nor generally believed to be corrupt,—at least during the
-period which this volume embraces, down to the death of Philip.[572]
-But Phokion would receive neither money nor gifts from any one,—was
-notoriously and obviously poor,—went barefoot and without an upper
-garment even in very cold weather,—had only one female slave to
-attend on his wife; while he had enjoyed commands sufficient to
-enrich him if he had chosen. His personal incorruptibility thus
-stood forth prominently to the public eye; and combined as it was
-with bravery and fair generalship, procured for him testimonies
-of confidence greater than those accorded even to Perikles. He
-was elected no less than forty-five times to the annual office of
-Stratêgus or General of the city,—that is, one of the Board of Ten so
-denominated, the greatest executive function at Athens,—and elected
-too, without having ever on any occasion solicited the office, or
-even been present at the choice.[573] In all Athenian history, we
-read of no similar multiplication of distinct appointments and honors
-to the same individual.
-
-  [572] I introduce here this reservation as to time, not as
-  meaning to affirm the contrary with regard to the period after
-  Philip’s death, but as wishing to postpone for the present the
-  consideration of the later charges against Demosthenes—the
-  receipt of money from Persia, and the abstraction from the
-  treasures of Harpalus. I shall examine these points at the proper
-  time.
-
-  [573] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 8. Ὁμολογεῖται γὰρ, ὅτι πέντε καὶ
-  τεσσαράκοντα στρατηγίας ἔλαβεν οὐδ᾽ ἅπαξ ἀρχαιρεσίοις παρατυχὼν,
-  ἀλλ᾽ ἀπόντα μεταπεμπομένων αὐτὸν ἀεὶ καὶ χειροτονούντων,
-  ὥστε θαυμάζειν τοὺς οὐκ εὖ φρονοῦντας τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι πλεῖστα
-  τοῦ Φωκίωνος ἀντικρούοντος αὐτῷ καὶ μηδὲν εἰπόντος πώποτε
-  μηδὲ πράξαντος πρὸς χάριν, ὥσπερ ἀξιοῦσι τοὺς βασιλεῖς τοῖς
-  κόλαξι χρῆσθαι μετὰ τὸ κατὰ χειρὸς ὕδωρ, έχρῆτο οὗτος τοῖς μὲν
-  κομψοτέροις καὶ ἱλαροῖς ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει δημαγωγοῖς, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς
-  ἀρχὰς ἀεὶ νήφων καὶ σπουδάζων τὸν αὐστηρότατον καὶ φρονιμώτατον
-  ἐκάλει τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ μόνον ἢ μᾶλλον ταῖς βουλήσεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ
-  ὁρμαῖς ἀντιτασσόμενον.
-
-According to the picture of Athens and her democracy, as usually
-presented by historians, we are taught to believe that the only road
-open to honors or political influence, was, by a seductive address,
-and by courting the people with fine speeches, unworthy flattery,
-or unmeasured promises. Those who take this view of the Athenian
-character, will find it difficult to explain the career of Phokion.
-He was no orator,—from disdain rather than incompetence.[574] Besides
-receiving a good education, he had profited by the conversation of
-Plato, as well as of Xenokrates, in the Academy;[575] and we are
-not surprised that in their school he contracted a contempt for
-popular oratory, as well as a love for brief, concentrated, pungent
-reply. Once, when about to speak in public, he was observed to be
-particularly absorbed in thought. “You seem meditative, Phokion,”
-said a friend. “Ay, by Zeus,” was the reply; “I am meditating whether
-I cannot in some way abridge the speech which I am just about to
-address to the Athenians.” He knew so well, however, on what points
-to strike, that his telling brevity, strengthened by the weight of
-character and position, cut through the fine oratory of Demosthenes
-more effectively than any counter-oratory from men like Æschines.
-Demosthenes himself greatly feared Phokion as an opponent, and was
-heard to observe, on seeing him rise to speak, “Here comes the
-cleaver of my harangues.”[576] Polyeuktus,—himself an orator and a
-friend of Demosthenes,—drew a distinction highly complimentary to
-Phokion, by saying, that “Demosthenes was the finest orator, but
-Phokion the most formidable in speech.”[577] In public policy, in
-means of political effect, and in personal character,—Phokion was the
-direct antithesis of Demosthenes; whose warlike eloquence, unwarlike
-disposition, paid speech-writing, and delicate habits of life, he
-doubtless alike despised.
-
-  [574] Tacit. Dialog. de Clar. Orator. c. 2. “Aper, communi
-  eruditione imbutus, contemnebat potius literas quam nesciebat.”
-
-  [575] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 4, 14.
-
-  [576] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 5. ἡ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων κοπὶς πάρεστιν.
-
-  [577] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 5. εἰπεῖν—ὅτι ῥήτωρ μὲν ἄριστος εἴη
-  Δημοσθένης, εἰπεῖν δὲ δεινότατος ὁ Φωκίων.
-
-As Phokion had in his nature little of the professed orator, so
-he had still less of the flatterer. He affected and sustained the
-character of a blunt soldier, who speaks out his full mind without
-suppression or ornament, careless whether it be acceptable to
-hearers or not.[578] His estimate of his countrymen was thoroughly
-and undisguisedly contemptuous. This is manifest in his whole
-proceedings; and appears especially in the memorable remark ascribed
-to him, on an occasion when something that he had said in the public
-assembly met with peculiar applause. Turning round to a friend, he
-asked, “Have I not, unconsciously, said something bad?” His manners,
-moreover, were surly and repulsive, though his disposition is said
-to have been kind. He had learnt, in the Academy, a sort of Spartan
-self-suppression and rigor of life.[579] No one ever saw him either
-laughing, or weeping, or bathing in the public baths.
-
-  [578] So Tacitus, after reporting the exact reply of the tribune
-  Subrias Flavius, when examined as an accomplice in the conspiracy
-  against Nero—“Ipsa retuli verba: quia non, ut Senecæ, vulgata
-  erant; nec minus nosci decebat sensus militaris viri incomptos
-  sed validos.”
-
-  [579] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 4, 5.
-
-If, then, Phokion attained the unparalleled honor of being chosen
-forty-five times general, we may be sure that there were other
-means of reaching it besides the arts of oratory and demagogy. We
-may indeed ask with surprise, how it was possible for him to attain
-it, in the face of so many repulsive circumstances, by the mere
-force of bravery and honesty; especially as he never performed any
-supereminent service,[580] though on various occasions he conducted
-himself with credit and ability. The answer to this question may be
-found in the fact that Phokion, though not a flatterer of the people,
-went decidedly along with the capital weakness of the people. While
-despising their judgment, he manifested no greater foresight, as
-to the public interests and security of Athens, than they did. The
-Athenian people had doubtless many infirmities and committed many
-errors; but the worst error of all, during the interval between
-360-336 B. C., was their unconquerable repugnance to the efforts,
-personal and pecuniary, required for prosecuting a hearty war against
-Philip. Of this aversion to a strenuous foreign policy, Phokion made
-himself the champion;[581] addressing, in his own vein, sarcastic
-taunts against those who called for action against Philip, as if
-they were mere brawlers and cowards, watching for opportunities to
-enrich themselves at the public expense. Eubulus the orator was among
-the leading statesmen who formed what may be called the peace-party
-at Athens, and who continually resisted or discouraged energetic
-warlike efforts, striving to keep out of sight the idea of Philip
-as a dangerous enemy. Of this peace-party, there were doubtless
-some who acted corruptly, in the direct pay of Philip. But many
-others of them, without any taint of personal corruption, espoused
-the same policy merely because they found it easier, for the time,
-to administer the city under peace than under war—because war was
-burdensome and disagreeable, to themselves as well as to their
-fellow-citizens—and because they either did not, or would not, look
-forward to the consequences of inaction. Now it was a great advantage
-to this peace-party, who wanted a military leader as partner to their
-civil and rhetorical leaders, to strengthen themselves by a colleague
-like Phokion; a man not only of unsuspected probity, but peculiarly
-disinterested in advising peace, since his importance would have
-been exalted by war.[582] Moreover most of the eminent military
-leaders had now come to love only the license of war, and to disdain
-the details of the war-office at home; while Phokion,[583] and he
-almost alone among them, was content to stay at Athens, and keep up
-that combination of civil with military efficiency which had been,
-formerly, habitual. Hence he was sustained, by the peace-party and by
-the aversion to warlike effort prevalent among the public, in a sort
-of perpetuity of the strategic functions, without any solicitation or
-care for personal popularity on his own part.
-
-  [580] Cornelius Nepos (Phocion, c. 1) found in his authors no
-  account of the military exploits of Phokion but much about his
-  personal integrity.
-
-  [581] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 8. Οὕτω δὲ συντάξας ἑαυτὸν
-  ἐπολιτεύετο μὲν ἀεὶ πρὸς εἰρήνην καὶ ἡσυχίαν, etc.
-
-  [582] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16. See the first repartee there
-  ascribed to Phokion.
-
-  [583] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7.
-
-The influence of Phokion as a public adviser, during the period
-embraced in this volume, down to the battle of Chæroneia, was
-eminently mischievous to Athens: all the more mischievous, partly
-(like that of Nikias) from the respectability of his personal
-qualities—partly because he espoused and sanctioned the most
-dangerous infirmity of the Athenian mind. His biographers mislead our
-judgment by pointing our attention chiefly to the last twenty years
-of his long life, after the battle of Chæroneia. At that time, when
-the victorious military force of Macedonia had been fully organized,
-and that of Greece comparatively prostrated, it might be argued
-plausibly (I do not say decisively, even then) that submission to
-Macedonia had become a fatal necessity; and that attempts to resist
-could only end by converting bad into worse. But the peace-policy
-of Phokion—which might be called prudence after the accession of
-Alexander—was ruinously imprudent as well as dishonorable during
-the reign of Philip. The odds were all against Philip in his early
-years; they shifted and became more and more in his favor, only
-because his game was played well, and that of his opponents badly.
-The superiority of force was at first so much on the side of Athens,
-that if she had been willing to employ it, she might have made sure
-of keeping Philip at least within the limits of Macedonia. All
-depended upon her will; upon the question, whether her citizens were
-prepared in their own minds to incur the expense and fatigue of a
-vigorous foreign policy—whether they would handle their pikes, open
-their purses, and forego the comforts of home, for the maintenance
-of Grecian and Athenian liberty against a growing, but not as yet
-irresistible destroyer. To such a sacrifice the Athenians could not
-bring themselves to submit; and in consequence of that reluctance,
-they were driven in the end to a much graver and more irreparable
-sacrifice—the loss of liberty, dignity, and security. Now it was
-precisely at such a moment, and when such a question was pending,
-that the influence of the peace-loving Phokion was most ruinous.
-His anxiety that the citizens should be buried at home in their own
-sepulchres—his despair, mingled with contempt, of his countrymen
-and their refined habits—his hatred of the orators who might profit
-by an increased war-expenditure[584]—all contributed to make him
-discourage public effort, and await passively the preponderance of
-the Macedonian arms; thus playing the game of Philip, and siding,
-though himself incorruptible, with the orators in Philip’s pay.
-
-  [584] See the replies of Phokion in Plutarch, Phokion, c. 23.
-
-The love of peace, either in a community or in an individual, usually
-commands sympathy without farther inquiry, though there are times of
-growing danger from without, in which the adviser of peace is the
-worst guide that can be followed. Since the Peloponnesian war, a
-revolution had been silently going on in Greece, whereby the duties
-of soldiership had passed to a great degree from citizen militia
-into the hands of paid mercenaries. The resident citizens generally
-had become averse to the burden of military service; while on the
-other hand the miscellaneous aggregate of Greeks willing to carry
-arms anywhere and looking merely for pay, had greatly augmented.
-Very differently had the case once stood. The Athenian citizen of
-432 B. C.—by concurrent testimony of the eulogist Perikles and of
-the unfriendly Corinthians—was ever ready to brave the danger,
-fatigue, and privation, of foreign expeditions, for the glory of
-Athens. “He accounted it holidaywork to do duty in her service (it
-is an enemy who speaks[585]); he wasted his body for her as though
-it had been the body of another.” Embracing with passion the idea
-of imperial Athens, he knew that she could only be upheld by the
-energetic efforts of her individual citizens, and that the talk in
-her public assemblies, though useful as a preliminary to action,
-was mischievous if allowed as a substitute for action.[586] Such
-was the Periklean Athenian of 431 B. C. But this energy had been
-crushed in the disasters closing the Peloponnesian war, and had
-never again revived. The Demosthenic Athenian of 360 B. C. had as it
-were grown old. Pugnacity, Pan-hellenic championship, and the love
-of enterprise, had died within him. He was a quiet, home-keeping,
-refined citizen, attached to the democratic constitution, and
-executing with cheerful pride his ordinary city-duties under it;
-but immersed in industrial or professional pursuits, in domestic
-comforts, in the impressive manifestations of the public religion,
-in the atmosphere of discussion and thought, intellectual as well as
-political. To renounce all this for foreign and continued military
-service, he considered as a hardship not to be endured, except under
-the pressure of danger near and immediate. Precautionary exigencies
-against distant perils, however real, could not be brought home to
-his feelings; even to pay others for serving in his place, was a duty
-which he could scarcely be induced to perform.
-
-  [585] I have more than once referred to the memorable picture of
-  the Athenian character, in contrast with the Spartan, drawn by
-  the Corinthian envoy at Sparta in 432 B. C. (Thucyd. i. 70, 71).
-  Among the many attributes, indicative of exuberant energy and
-  activity, I select those which were most required, and most found
-  wanting, as the means of keeping back Philip.
-
-  1. Παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ, καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ, καὶ ἐν
-  τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες.
-
-  2. Ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μελλητὰς καὶ ~ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους~
-  (in opposition to _you_, Spartans).
-
-  3. ~Τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτοις ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως χρῶνται~, τῇ
-  γνώμῃ δὲ οἰκειοτάτῃ ἐς τὸ πράσσειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς, etc.
-
-  4. ~Καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι᾽ ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος
-  μοχθοῦσι~, καὶ ~ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων~, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ
-  κτᾶσθαι καὶ μήτε ~ἑορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι~,
-  ξυμφοράν τε οὐχ ἧσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον, etc.
-
-  To the same purpose Perikles expresses himself in his funeral
-  oration of the ensuing year; extolling the vigor and courage
-  of his countrymen, as alike forward and indefatigable—yet as
-  combined also with a love of public discussion, and a taste for
-  all the refinements of peaceful and intellectual life (Thucyd.
-  ii. 40, 41).
-
-  [586] Thucyd. ii. 40, 41, 43. τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἔργῳ
-  θεωμένους καὶ ἐραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅταν ὑμῖν μεγάλη
-  δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ
-  δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, etc.
-
-  Compare ii. 63—the last speech of Perikles.
-
-Not merely in Athens, but also among the Peloponnesian allies of
-Sparta, the resident citizens had contracted the like indisposition
-to military service. In the year 431 B. C., these Peloponnesians
-(here too we have the concurrent testimony of Perikles and
-Archidamus[587]) had been forward for service with their persons, and
-only backward when asked for money. In 383 B. C., Sparta found them
-so reluctant to join her standard, especially for operations beyond
-sea, that she was forced to admit into her confederacy the principle
-of pecuniary commutation;[588] just as Athens had done (about 460-450
-B. C.) with the unwarlike islanders enrolled in her confederacy of
-Delos.[589]
-
-  [587] Thucyd. i. 80, 81, 141.
-
-  [588] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 21. The allied cities furnished money
-  instead of men in the expedition of Mnasippus to Korkyra (Xenoph.
-  Hellen. vi. 2, 16).
-
-  [589] Thucyd. i. 99.
-
-Amidst this increasing indisposition to citizen military service,
-the floating, miscellaneous bands who made soldiership a livelihood
-under any one who would pay them, increased in number from year to
-year. In 402-401 B. C., when the Cyreian army (the Ten Thousand
-Greeks) were levied, it had been found difficult to bring so many
-together; large premiums were given to the chiefs or enlisting
-agents; the recruits consisted, in great part, of settled men tempted
-by lucrative promises away from their homes.[590] But active men
-ready for paid foreign service were perpetually multiplying, from
-poverty, exile, or love of enterprise[591]; they were put under
-constant training and greatly improved, by Iphikrates and others,
-as peltasts or light infantry to serve in conjunction with the
-citizen force of hoplites. Jason of Pheræ brought together a greater
-and better trained mercenary force than had ever been seen since
-the Cyreians in their upward march[592]; the Phokians also in the
-Sacred War, having command over the Delphian treasures, surrounded
-themselves with a formidable array of mercenary soldiers. There arose
-(as in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in modern Europe)
-Condottieri like Charidemus and others—generals having mercenary
-bands under their command, and hiring themselves out to any prince or
-potentate who would employ and pay them. Of these armed rovers—poor,
-brave, desperate, and held by no civic ties—Isokrates makes repeated
-complaint, as one of the most serious misfortunes of Greece.[593]
-Such wanderers, indeed, usually formed the natural emigrants in new
-colonial enterprises. But it so happened that few Hellenic colonies
-were formed during the interval between 400-350 B. C.; in fact, the
-space open to Hellenic colonization was becoming more circumscribed
-by the peace of Antalkidas—by the despotism of Dionysius—and by the
-increase of Lucanians, Bruttians, and the inland powers generally.
-Isokrates, while extolling the great service formerly rendered to the
-Hellenic world by Athens, in setting on foot the Ionic emigration,
-and thus providing new homes for so many unsettled Greeks—insists on
-the absolute necessity of similar means of emigration in his own day.
-He urges on Philip to put himself at the head of an Hellenic conquest
-of Asia Minor, and thus to acquire territory which might furnish
-settlement to the multitudes of homeless, roving, exiles, who lived
-by the sword, and disturbed the peace of Greece.[594]
-
-  [590] Isokrates, Orat. v. (Philipp.) s. 112. ... ἐν ἐκείνοις δὲ
-  τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἦν ξενικὸν οὐδὲν, ὥστ᾽ ἀναγκαζόμενοι ξενολογεῖν
-  ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, πλέον ἀνήλισκον εἰς τὰς διδομένας τοῖς συλλέγουσι
-  δωρεὰς, ἢ τὴν εἰς τοὺς στρατιώτας μισθοφοράν.
-
-  About the liberal rewards of Cyrus to the generals Klearchus,
-  Proxenus, and others, for getting together the army, and to the
-  soldiers themselves also, see Xenoph. Anabas. i. 1, 9; i. 3, 4;
-  iii. 1, 4; vi. 8, 48.
-
-  [591] See the mention of the mercenary Greeks in the service of
-  the satrapess Mania in Æolis—of the satraps, Tissaphernes and
-  Pharnabazus, and of the Spartan Agesilaus—Iphikrates and others,
-  Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 1, 13; iii. 3, 15; iv. 2, 5; iv. 3, 15; iv.
-  4, 14; iv. 8, 35; vii. 5, 10.
-
-  Compare Harpokration—Ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ—and Demosthenes, Philipp.
-  i. p. 46.
-
-  [592] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 5.
-
-  [593] Isokrates pours forth this complaint in many places: in
-  the fourth or Panegyrical Oration (B. C. 380); in the eighth or
-  Oratio de Pace (356 B. C.); in the fifth or Oratio ad Philippum
-  (346 B. C.). The latest of these discourses is delivered in the
-  strongest language. See Orat. Panegyr. s. 195 τοὺς δ᾽ ἐπὶ ξένης
-  μετὰ παιδῶν καὶ γυναικῶν ἀλᾶσθαι, πολλοὺς δὲ δι᾽ ἔνδειαν τῶν
-  καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἐπικουρεῖν (_i. e._ to become an ἐπικοῦρος, or paid
-  soldier in foreign service) ἀναγκαζομένους ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τοῖς
-  φίλοις μαχομένους ἀποθνήσκειν. See also Orat. De Pace (viii.) s.
-  53, 56, 58; Orat. ad. Philipp. (v.) s. 112. οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει τὰ τῆς
-  Ἑλλάδος, ὥστε ῥᾷον εἶναι συστῆσαι στρατόπεδον μεῖζον καὶ κρεῖττον
-  ἐκ τῶν πλανωμένων ἢ τῶν πολιτευομένων, etc.... also s. 142,
-  149; Orat. de Permutat. (xv.) s. 122. ἐν τοῖς στρατοπέδοις τοῖς
-  πλανωμένοις κατατετριμμένος, etc. A melancholy picture of the
-  like evils is also presented in the ninth Epistle of Isokrates,
-  to Archidamus, s. 9, 12. Compare Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p.
-  665. s. 162.
-
-  For an example of a disappointed lover who seeks distraction by
-  taking foreign military service, see Theokritus, xiv. 58.
-
-  [594] Isokrates ad Philipp. (v.) s. 142-144. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
-  κτίσαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ, καὶ κατοικίσαι τοὺς νῦν μὲν
-  πλανωμένους δι᾽ ἔνδειαν τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν καὶ λυμαινομένους οἷς ἂν
-  ἐντύχωσιν. Οὓς εἰ μὴ παύσομεν ἀθροιζομένους, βίον αὐτοῖς ἱκανὸν
-  πορίσαντες, λήσουσιν ἡμᾶς τοσοῦτοι γενόμενοι τὸ πλῆθος, ὥστε
-  μηδὲν ἧττον αὐτοὺς εἶναι φοβεροὺς τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἢ τοῖς βαρβάροις,
-  etc.
-
-This decline of the citizen militia, and growing aversion to personal
-service, or military exercises—together with the contemporaneous
-increase of the professional soldiery unmoved by civic obligations—is
-one of the capital facts of the Demosthenic age. Though not peculiar
-to Athens, it strikes us more forcibly at Athens, where the spirit
-of self-imposed individual effort had once been so high wrought—but
-where also the charm and stimulus[595] of peaceful existence was
-most diversified, and the activity of industrial pursuit most
-continuous. It was a fatal severance of the active force of society
-from political freedom and intelligence breaking up that many-sided
-combination, of cultivated thought with vigorous deed, which formed
-the Hellenic _idéal_—and throwing the defence of Greece upon armed
-men looking up only to their general or their paymaster. But what
-made it irreparably fatal, was that just at this moment the Grecian
-world was thrown upon its defence against Macedonia led by a young
-prince of indefatigable enterprise; who had imbibed, and was capable
-even of improving, the best ideas of military organization[596]
-started by Epaminondas and Iphikrates. Philip (as described by his
-enemy Demosthenes) possessed all that forward and unconquerable love
-of action which the Athenians had manifested in 431 B. C., as we know
-from enemies as well as from friends; while the Macedonian population
-also retained, amidst rudeness and poverty, that military aptitude
-and readiness which had dwindled away within the walls of the Grecian
-cities.
-
-  [595] Thucyd. ii. 41 (the funeral harangue of Perikles)—ξυνελών
-  τε λέγω τήν τε πόλιν πᾶσαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν εἶναι, καὶ καθ᾽
-  ἕκαστον δοκεῖν ἄν μοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα παρ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν
-  εἴδη καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὔταρκες
-  παρέχεσθαι.
-
-  [596] The remarkable organization of the Macedonian army, with
-  its systematic combination of different arms and sorts of
-  troops—was the work of Philip. Alexander found it ready made
-  to his hands, in the very first months of his reign. It must
-  doubtless have been gradually formed; year after year improved
-  by Philip; and we should be glad to be enabled to trace the
-  steps of his progress. But unfortunately we are left without any
-  information about the military measures of Philip, beyond bare
-  facts and results. Accordingly I am compelled to postpone what
-  is to be said about the Macedonian military organization until
-  the reign of Alexander, about whose operations we have valuable
-  details.
-
-Though as yet neither disciplined nor formidable, they were an
-excellent raw material for soldiers, in the hands of an organizing
-genius like Philip. They were still (as their predecessors had
-been in the time of the first Perdikkas,[597] when the king’s wife
-baked cakes with her own hand on the hearth), mountain shepherds
-ill-clothed and ill-housed—eating and drinking from wooden platters
-and cups—destitute to a great degree, not merely of cities, but
-of fixed residences.[598] The men of substance were armed with
-breastplates and made good cavalry; but the infantry were a rabble
-destitute of order,[599] armed with wicker shields and rusty swords,
-and contending at disadvantage, though constantly kept on the alert,
-to repel the inroads of their Illyrian or Thracian neighbors. Among
-some Macedonian tribes, the man who had never slain an enemy was
-marked by a degrading badge.[600] These were the men whom Philip on
-becoming king found under his rule; not good soldiers, but excellent
-recruits to be formed into soldiers. Poverty, endurance, and bodies
-inured to toil, were the natural attributes, well appreciated by
-ancient politicians, of a military population destined to make
-conquests. Such had been the native Persians, at their first outburst
-under Cyrus the Great; such were even the Greeks at the invasion of
-Xerxes, when the Spartan King Demaratus reckoned poverty both as an
-inmate of Greece, and as a guarantee of Grecian courage.[601]
-
-  [597] Herodot. viii. 137.
-
-  [598] This poor condition of the Macedonian population at the
-  accession of Philip, is set forth in the striking speech made
-  thirty-six years afterwards by Alexander the Great (in 323 B.
-  C., a few months before his death) to his soldiers, satiated
-  with conquest and plunder, but discontented with his increasing
-  insolence and Orientalism.
-
-  Arrian, Exp. Alex. vii. 9. Φίλιππος γὰρ παραλαβὼν ὑμᾶς πλανήτας
-  καὶ ἀπόρους, ἐν διφθέραις τοὺς πολλοὺς νέμοντας ἀνὰ τὰ ὄρη
-  πρόβατα κατὰ ὀλίγα, καὶ περὶ τούτων κακῶς μαχομένους Ἰλλυρίοις
-  καὶ Τριβαλλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὁμόροις Θρᾳξὶ, χλαμύδας μὲν ὑμῖν ἀντὶ τῶν
-  διφθερῶν φορεῖν ἔδωκε, κατήγαγε δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὀρῶν ἐς τὰ πεδία, etc.
-
-  Other points are added in the version given by Quintus Curtius
-  of the same speech (x. 10)—“En tandem! Illyriorum paulo ante et
-  Persarum tributariis, Asia et tot gentium spolia fastidio sunt.
-  Modo sub Philippo seminudis, amicula ex purpura sordent: aurum et
-  argentum oculi ferre non possunt; lignea enim vasa desiderant, et
-  ex cratibus scuta et rubiginem gladiorum.”
-
-  [599] Thucydides (ii. 100) recognizes the goodness of the
-  Macedonian cavalry: so also Xenophon, in the Spartan expedition
-  against Olynthus (Hellen. v. 2, 40).
-
-  That the infantry were of little military efficiency, we see from
-  the judgment of Brasidas—Thucyd. iv. 26. compare also ii. 100.
-
-  See O. Müller’s short tract on the Macedonians, annexed to his
-  History of the Dorians, s. 33.
-
-  [600] Aristot. Polit. vii. 2, 6.
-
-  [601] Herodot. vii. 102. τῇ Ἑλλάδι πενίη μὲν αἰεί κοτε σύντροφός
-  ἐστι, etc.
-
-  About the Persians, Herodot. i. 71; Arrian, v. 4, 13.
-
-Now it was against these rude Macedonians, to whom camp-life
-presented chances of plunder without any sacrifice, that the
-industrious and refined Athenian citizen had to go forth and fight,
-renouncing his trade, family, and festivals; a task the more severe,
-as the perpetual aggressions and systematized warfare of his new
-enemies could only be countervailed by an equal continuity of effort
-on his part. For such personal devotion, combined with the anxieties
-of preventive vigilance, the Athenians of the Periklean age would
-have been prepared, but those of the Demosthenic age were not; though
-their whole freedom and security were in the end found to be at stake.
-
-Without this brief sketch of the great military change in Greece
-since the Peloponnesian war—the decline of the citizen force and the
-increase of mercenaries—the reader would scarcely understand either
-the proceedings of Athens in reference to Philip, or the career of
-Demosthenes on which we are now about to enter.
-
-Having by assiduous labor acquired for himself these high powers both
-of speech and of composition, Demosthenes stood forward in 354 B. C.
-to devote them to the service of the public. His first address to the
-assembly is not less interesting, objectively, as a memorial of the
-actual Hellenic political world in that year—than subjectively, as
-an evidence of his own manner of appreciating its exigencies.[602]
-At that moment, the predominant apprehension at Athens arose from
-reports respecting the Great King, who was said to be contemplating
-measures of hostility against Greece, and against Athens in
-particular, in consequence of the aid recently lent by the Athenian
-general Chares to the revolted Persian satrap Artabazus. By this
-apprehension—which had already, in part, determined the Athenians
-(a year before) to make peace with their revolted insular allies,
-and close the Social War—the public mind still continued agitated. A
-Persian armament of three hundred sail, with a large force of Grecian
-mercenaries—and an invasion of Greece—was talked of as probable.[603]
-It appears that Mausôlus, prince or satrap of Karia, who had been
-the principal agent in inflaming the Social War, still prosecuted
-hostilities against the islands even after the peace, announcing that
-he acted in execution of the king’s designs; so that the Athenians
-sent envoys to remonstrate with him.[604] The Persians seem also to
-have been collecting inland forces, which were employed some years
-afterwards in reconquering Egypt, but of which the destination was
-not at this moment declared. Hence the alarm now prevalent at Athens.
-It is material to note—as a mark in the tide of events—that few
-persons as yet entertained apprehensions about Philip of Macedon,
-though that prince was augmenting steadily his military force as well
-as his conquests. Nay, Philip afterwards asserted that during this
-alarm of Persian invasion, he was himself one of the parties invited
-to assist in the defence of Greece.[605]
-
-  [602] The oration De Symmoriis is placed by Dionysius of
-  Halikarnassus in the archonship of Diotimus, 354-353 B. C.
-  (Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum. p. 724). And it is plainly composed
-  prior to the expedition sent by the Thebans under Pammenês to
-  assist the revolted Artabazus against the Great King; which
-  expedition is placed by Diodorus (xvi. 34) in the ensuing year
-  353-352 B. C. Whoever will examine the way in which Demosthenes
-  argues, in the Oration De Symmoriis (p. 187. s. 40-42), as to the
-  relations of the Thebans with Persia—will see that he cannot have
-  known anything about assistance given by the Thebans to Artabazus
-  against Persia.
-
-  [603] Diodor. xvi. 21.
-
-  [604] Demosthenes cont. Timokratem, s. 15; see also the second
-  Argument prefixed to that Oration.
-
-  [605] See Epistola Philipp. ap. Demosthen. p. 160. s. 6.
-
-Though the Macedonian power had not yet become obviously formidable,
-we trace in the present speech of Demosthenes that same Pan-hellenic
-patriotism which afterwards rendered him so strenuous in blowing the
-trumpet against Philip. The obligation incumbent upon all Greeks, but
-upon Athens especially, on account of her traditions and her station,
-to uphold Hellenic liberty against the foreigner at all cost, is
-insisted on with an emphasis and dignity worthy of Perikles.[606]
-But while Demosthenes thus impresses upon his countrymen noble
-and Pan-hellenic purposes, he does not rest content with eloquent
-declamation, or negative criticism on the past. His recommendations
-as to means are positive and explicit; implying an attentive survey
-and a sagacious appreciation of the surrounding circumstances. While
-keeping before his countrymen a favorable view of their position,
-he never promises them success except on condition of earnest and
-persevering individual efforts, with arms and with money: and he
-exhausts all his invention in the unpopular task of shaming them,
-by direct reproach as well as by oblique insinuation, out of that
-aversion to personal military service, which, for the misfortune of
-Athens, had become a confirmed habit. Such positive and practical
-character as to means, always contemplating the full exigencies of
-a given situation—combined with the constant presentation of Athens
-as the pledged champion of Grecian freedom, and with appeals to
-Athenian foretime, not as a patrimony to rest upon, but as an example
-to imitate—constitute the imperishable charm of these harangues of
-Demosthenes, not less memorable than their excellence as rhetorical
-compositions. In the latter merit, indeed, his rival Æschines is less
-inferior to him than in the former.
-
-  [606] Demosthenes, De Symmoriis, p. 179. s. 7. Οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ᾽ ἀπ᾽
-  ἴσης ὁρῶ τοῖς τ᾽ ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι καὶ ὑμῖν περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα
-  τὴν βουλὴν οὖσαν—ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνων μὲν πολλοῖς ἐνδέχεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ
-  τῶν ἰδίᾳ τι συμφερόντων διοικουμένοις τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἀμελῆσαι,
-  ὑμῖν δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἀδικουμένοις παρὰ τῶν ἀδικούντων καλόν ἐστι λαβεῖν
-  ταύτην τὴν δίκην, ἐᾶσαί τινας αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ γενέσθαι.
-
-In no one of the speeches of Demosthenes is the spirit of practical
-wisdom more predominant than in this his earliest known discourse
-to the public assembly—on the Symmories—delivered by a young man of
-twenty-seven years of age, who could have had little other teaching
-except from the decried classes of sophists, rhetors, and actors.
-While proclaiming the king of Persia as the common and dangerous
-enemy of the Grecian name, he contends that no evidence of impending
-Persian attack had yet transpired, sufficiently obvious and glaring
-to warrant Athens in sending round[607] to invoke a general league
-of Greeks, as previous speakers had suggested. He deprecates on the
-one hand any step calculated to provoke the Persian king or bring on
-a war—and on the other hand, any premature appeal to the Greeks for
-combination, before they themselves were impressed with a feeling of
-common danger. Nothing but such common terror could bring about union
-among the different Hellenic cities; nothing else could silence those
-standing jealousies and antipathies, which rendered intestine war so
-frequent, and would probably enable the Persian king to purchase
-several Greeks for his own allies against the rest.
-
-  [607] Demosthen. De Symmor. p. 181. s. 14.
-
-“Let us neither be immoderately afraid of the Great King, nor on
-the other hand be ourselves the first to begin the war and wrong
-him—as well on our own account as from the bad feeling and mistrust
-prevalent among the Greeks around us. If indeed we, with the full
-and unanimous force of Greece, could attack him unassisted, I should
-have held that even wrong, done towards him, was no wrong at all. But
-since this is impossible, I contend that we must take care not to
-give the king a pretence for enforcing claims of right on behalf of
-the other Greeks. While we remain quiet, he cannot do any such thing
-without being mistrusted; but if we have been the first to begin war,
-he will naturally seem to mean sincere friendship to the others, on
-account of their aversion to us. Do not, therefore, expose to light
-the sad distempers of the Hellenic world, by calling together its
-members when you will not persuade them, and by going to war when
-you will have no adequate force; but keep the peace, confiding in
-yourselves, and making full preparation.”[608]
-
-  [608] Demosthen. De Symmor. p. 188. s. 42-46. ... Ὥστ᾽ οὔτε
-  φοβεῖσθαί φημι δεῖν πέρα τοῦ μετρίου, οὔθ᾽ ὑπαχθῆναι προτέρους
-  ἐκφέρειν τὸν πόλεμον....
-
-  ... Τοῦτον ἡμεῖς φοβώμεθα; μηδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ μηδ᾽ ἀδικῶμεν, ~αὐτῶν
-  ἡμῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπιστίας~· ἐπεὶ
-  εἴ γ᾽ ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἦν μετὰ πάντων ἐπιθέσθαι μόνῳ, οὐδ᾽ ἀδικεῖν
-  ἡμᾶς ἐκεῖνον ἀδίκημ᾽ ἂν ἔθηκα. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει,
-  φυλάττεσθαί φημι δεῖν μὴ πρόφασιν δῶμεν βασιλεῖ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια
-  ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ζητεῖν· ἡσυχίαν μὲν γὰρ ἐχόντων ὑμῶν,
-  ὕποπτος ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτό τι πράττων—πόλεμον δὲ ποιησαμένων προτέρων
-  ~εἰκότως ἂν δοκοίη διὰ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐχθρὰν τοῖς ἄλλοις φίλος~
-  εἶναι βούλεσθαι. ~Μὴ οὖν ἐξελέγξητε ὡς κακῶς ἔχει τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ,
-  συγκαλοῦντες ὅτ᾽ οὐ πείσετε, καὶ πολεμοῦντες ὅτ᾽ οὐ δυνήσεσθε·
-  ἀλλ᾽ ἔχετε ἡσυχίαν θαῤῥοῦντες καὶ παρασκευαζόμενοι~.
-
-It is this necessity of making preparation, which constitutes the
-special purpose of Demosthenes in his harangue. He produces an
-elaborate plan, matured by careful reflection,[609] for improving
-and extending the classification by Symmories; proposing a more
-convenient and systematic distribution of the leading citizens as
-well as of the total financial and nautical means—such as to ensure
-both the ready equipment of armed force whenever required, and a fair
-apportionment both of effort and of expense among the citizens. Into
-the details of this plan of economical reform, which are explained
-with the precision of an administrator and not with the vagueness
-of a rhetor, I do not here enter; especially as we do not know that
-it was actually adopted. But the spirit in which it was proposed
-deserves all attention, as proclaiming, even at this early day,
-the home-truth which the orator reiterates in so many subsequent
-harangues. “In the preparation which I propose to you, Athenians
-(he says), the first and most important point is, that your minds
-shall be so set, as that each man individually will be willing and
-forward in doing his duty. For you see plainly, that of all those
-matters on which you have determined collectively, and on which each
-man individually has looked upon the duty of execution as devolving
-upon himself—not one has ever slipped through your hands; while,
-on the contrary, whenever, after determination has been taken, you
-have stood looking at one another, no man intending to do anything
-himself, but every one throwing the burthen of action upon his
-neighbor—nothing has ever succeeded. Assuming you, therefore, to be
-thus disposed and wound up to the proper pitch, I recommend,”[610]
-etc.
-
-  [609] Demosthen. De Symmor. p. 181. s. 17. Τὴν μὲν παρασκευὴν,
-  ὅπως ὡς ἄριστα καὶ τάχιστα γενήσεται, πάνυ πολλὰ πράγματα ἔσχον
-  σκοπῶν.
-
-  [610] Demosthenes, De Symmoriis, p. 182. s. 18. Ἔστι τοίνυν
-  πρῶτον μὲν τῆς παρασκευῆς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ μέγιστον, οὕτω
-  διακεῖσθαι τὰς γνώμας ὑμᾶς, ὡς ἕκαστον ἕκοντα προθύμως ὅ,τι
-  ἂν δέῃ ποιήσοντα. Ὁρᾶτε γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ~ὅτι, ὅσα μὲν
-  πώποθ᾽ ἅπαντες ὑμεῖς ἠβουλήθητε, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸ πράττειν αὐτὸς
-  ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ προσήκειν ἡγήσατο, οὐδὲν πώποθ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἐξέφυγεν~·
-  ὅσα δ᾽ ἠβουλήθητε μὲν, μετὰ ~ταῦτα δ᾽ ἀπεβλέψατε πρὸς ἀλλήλους
-  ὡς αὐτὸς μὲν ἕκαστος οὐ ποιήσων, τὸν δὲ πλησίον πράξοντα~, οὐδὲν
-  πώποθ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐγένετο. Ἐχόντων δ᾽ ~ὑμῶν οὕτω καὶ αρωξυμμένων~, etc.
-
-This is the true Demosthenic vein of exhortation, running with
-unabated force through the Philippics and Olynthiacs, and striving
-to revive that conjunction—of which Perikles had boasted as an
-established fact in the Athenian character[611]—energetic individual
-action following upon full public debate and collective resolution.
-How often here, and elsewhere, does the orator denounce the
-uselessness of voters in the public assembly, even after such
-votes had been passed—if the citizens individually hung back, and
-shrunk from the fatigue or the pecuniary burthen indispensable
-for execution! Demus in the Pnyx (to use, in an altered sense,
-an Aristophanic comparison)[612] still remained Pan-hellenic and
-patriotic, when Demus at home had come to think that the city would
-march safely by itself without any sacrifice on his part, and that
-he was at liberty to become absorbed in his property, family,
-religion, and recreations. And so Athens might really have proceeded,
-in her enjoyment of liberty, wealth, refinement, and individual
-security—could the Grecian world have been guaranteed against the
-formidable Macedonian enemy from without.
-
-  [611] Thucyd. ii. 39, 40.
-
-  [612] Aristophanes, Equit. 750.
-
-It was in the ensuing year, when the alarm respecting Persia had worn
-off, that the Athenians were called on to discuss the conflicting
-applications of Sparta and of Megalopolis. The success of the
-Phokians appeared to be such as to prevent Thebes, especially while
-her troops, under Pammenes, were absent in Asia, from interfering
-in Peloponnesus for the protection of Megalopolis. There were even
-at Athens politicians who confidently predicted the approaching
-humiliation of Thebes,[613] together with the emancipation and
-reconstitution of those Bœotian towns which she now held in
-dependence—Orchomenus, Thespiæ, and Platæa; predictions cordially
-welcomed by the Miso-Theban sentiment at Athens. To the Spartans, the
-moment appeared favorable for breaking up Megalopolis and recovering
-Messênê; in which scheme they hoped to interest not only Athens, but
-also Elis, Phlius, and some other Peloponnesian states. To Athens
-they offered aid for the recovery of Orôpus, now and for about
-twelve years past in the hands of the Thebans; to Elis and Phlius
-they also tendered assistance for regaining respectively Triphylia
-and the Trikaranum, from the Arcadians and Argeians.[614] This
-political combination was warmly espoused by a considerable party
-at Athens; being recommended not less by aversion to Thebes than by
-the anxious desire for repossessing the border town of Orôpus. But
-it was combated by others, and by Demosthenes among the number, who
-could not be tempted by any bait to acquiesce in the reconstitution
-of Lacedæmonian power as it had stood before the battle of Leuktra.
-In the Athenian assembly, the discussion was animated and even angry;
-the envoys from Megalopolis, as well as those from Sparta on the
-other side, finding strenuous partisans.[615]
-
-  [613] Demosthenes, Orat. pro Megalopolitanis, p. 203. s. 5. p.
-  210. s. 36. Ἔστι τοίνυν ἔν τινι τοιούτῳ καιρῷ τὰ πράγματα νῦν,
-  εἴ τι δεῖ τοῖς εἰρημένοις πολλάκις παρ᾽ ὑμῖν λόγοις τεκμήρασθαι,
-  ὥστε Θηβαίους μὲν Ὀρχομενοῦ καὶ Θεσπιῶν καὶ Πλαταιῶν οἰκισθεισῶν
-  ἀσθενεῖς γενέσθαι, etc. Ἂν μὲν τοίνυν καταπολεμηθῶσιν οἱ Θηβαῖοι,
-  ὥσπερ αὐτοὺς δεῖ, etc.
-
-  Compare Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 654. s. 120.
-
-  [614] Demosthenes pro Megalopol. p. 206. s. 18; compare Xenoph.
-  Hellen. vii. 2, 1-5.
-
-  [615] Demosthenes pro Megalopolit. p. 202. s. 1.
-
-Demosthenes strikes a course professedly middle between the two, yet
-really in favor of defending Megalopolis against Spartan reconquest.
-We remark in this oration (as in the oration De Symmoriis, a year
-before) that there is no allusion to Philip; a point to be noticed
-as evidence of the gradual changes in the Demosthenic point of view.
-All the arguments urged turn upon Hellenic and Athenian interests,
-without reference to the likelihood of hostilities from without.
-In fact, Demosthenes lays down as a position not to be disputed by
-any one, that for the interest of Athens, both Sparta and Thebes
-ought to be weak; neither of them in condition to disturb her
-security;[616]—a position, unfortunately, but too well recognized
-among all the leading Grecian states in their reciprocal dealings
-with each other, rendering the Pan-hellenic aggregate comparatively
-defenceless against Philip or any skilful aggressor from without.
-While, however, affirming a general maxim, in itself questionable
-and perilous, Demosthenes deduces from it nothing but judicious
-consequences. In regard to Sparta, he insists only on keeping her _in
-statu quo_, and maintaining inviolate against her the independence of
-Megalopolis and Messênê. He will not be prevailed upon to surrender
-to her these two cities, even by the seductive prospect of assistance
-to Athens in recovering Orôpus, and in reviving the autonomy of the
-Bœotian cities. At that moment the prevalent disposition among the
-Athenian public was antipathy against Thebes, combined with a certain
-sympathy in favor of Sparta, whom they had aided at the battle of
-Mantineia against the Megalopolitans.[617] Though himself sharing
-this sentiment,[618] Demosthenes will not suffer his countrymen to
-be misled by it. He recommends that Athens shall herself take up
-the Theban policy in regard to Megalopolis and Messênê, so as to
-protect these two cities against Sparta; the rather, as by such a
-proceeding the Thebans will be excluded from Peloponnesus, and their
-general influence narrowed. He even goes so far as to say, that if
-Sparta should succeed in reconquering Megalopolis and Messênê, Athens
-must again become the ally of the Thebans to restrain her farther
-aggrandizement.[619]
-
-  [616] Demosthen. pro Megalop. p. 203. s. 5, 6. Compare a similar
-  sentiment, Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 654. s. 120.
-
-  [617] Demosthen. pro Megalop. p. 203. s. 7, 9. p. 207. s. 22.
-
-  [618] See Demosthen. cont. Leptinem, p. 489. s. 172 (delivered
-  355 B. C.) and Olynthiac i. p. 16. s. 27.
-
-  [619] Demosthenes pro Megalopol. p. 207. s. 24.
-
-As far as we make out from imperfect information, it seems that the
-views of Demosthenes did not prevail, and that the Athenians declined
-to undertake the protection of Megalopolis against Sparta; since we
-presently find the Thebans continuing to afford that protection, as
-they had done before. The aggressive schemes of Sparta appear to
-have been broached at the moment when the Phokians under Onomarchus
-were so decidedly superior to Thebes as to place that city in some
-embarrassment. But the superiority of the Phokians was soon lessened
-by their collision with a more formidable enemy—Philip of Macedon.
-
-That prince had been already partially interfering in Thessalian
-affairs,[620] at the instigation of Eudikus and Simus, chiefs of the
-Aleuadæ of Larissa, against Lykophron the despot of Pheræ. But his
-recent acquisition of Methônê left him more at liberty to extend
-his conquests southward, and to bring a larger force to bear on the
-dissensions of Thessaly. In that country, the great cities were,[621]
-as usual, contending for supremacy, and holding in subjection the
-smaller by means of garrisons; while Lykophron of Pheræ was exerting
-himself to regain that ascendency over the whole, which had once
-been possessed by Jason and Alexander. Philip now marched into
-the country and attacked him so vigorously as to constrain him to
-invoke aid from the Phokians. Onomarchus, at that time victorious
-over the Thebans and master as far as Thermopylæ, was interested in
-checking the farther progress of Philip southward and extending his
-own ascendency. He sent into Thessaly a force of seven thousand men,
-under his brother Phayllus, to sustain Lykophron. But Phayllus failed
-altogether; being defeated and driven out of Thessaly by Philip, so
-that Lykophron of Pheræ was in greater danger than ever. Upon this,
-Onomarchus went himself thither with the full force of Phokians and
-foreign mercenaries. An obstinate, and seemingly a protracted contest
-now took place, in the course of which he was at first decidedly
-victorious. He defeated Philip in two battles, with such severe loss
-that the Macedonian army was withdrawn from Thessaly, while Lykophron
-with his Phokian allies remained masters of the country.[622]
-
-  [620] Diodor. xvi. 14; Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 241. s. 60.
-  Harpokration v. Σίμος.
-
-  [621] Isokrates, Orat. viii. (De Pace) s. 143, 144.
-
-  [622] Diodor. xvi. 35.
-
-This great success of the Phokian arms was followed up by farther
-victory in Bœotia. Onomarchus renewed his invasion of that territory,
-defeated the Thebans in battle, and made himself master of Koroneia,
-in addition to Orchomenus, which he held before.[623] It would seem
-that the Thebans were at this time deprived of much of their force,
-which was serving in Asia under Artabazus, and which, perhaps from
-these very reverses, they presently recalled. The Phokians, on the
-other hand, were at the height of their power. At this juncture
-falls, probably, the aggressive combination of the Spartans against
-Megalopolis, and the debate, before noticed, in the Athenian assembly.
-
-  [623] Diodor. xvi. 35.
-
-Philip was for some time in embarrassment from his defeats in
-Thessaly. His soldiers, discouraged and even mutinous, would hardly
-consent to remain under his standard. By great pains, and animated
-exhortation, he at last succeeded in reanimating them. After a
-certain interval for restoration and reinforcement, he advanced
-with a fresh army into Thessaly, and resumed his operations against
-Lykophron; who was obliged again to solicit aid from Onomarchus, and
-to promise that all Thessaly should henceforward be held under his
-dependence. Onomarchus accordingly joined him in Thessaly with a
-large army, said to consist of twenty thousand foot and five hundred
-cavalry. But he found on this occasion, within the country, more
-obstinate resistance than before; for the cruel dynasty of Pheræ had
-probably abused their previous victory by aggravated violence and
-rapacity, so as to throw into the arms of their enemy a multitude
-of exiles. On Philip’s coming into Thessaly with a new army, the
-Thessalians embraced his cause so warmly, that he soon found himself
-at the head of an army of twenty thousand foot and three thousand
-horse. Onomarchus met him in the field, somewhere near the southern
-coast of Thessaly; not diffident of success, as well from his
-recent victories, as from the neighborhood of an Athenian fleet
-under Chares, coöperating with him. Here a battle was joined, and
-obstinately contested between the two armies, nearly equal in numbers
-of infantry. Philip exalted the courage of his soldiers by decorating
-them with laurel wreaths,[624] as crusaders in the service of the god
-against the despoilers of the Delphian temple; while the Thessalians
-also, forming the best cavalry in Greece and fighting with earnest
-valor, gave decisive advantage to his cause. The defeat of the forces
-of Onomarchus and Lykophron was complete. Six thousand of them are
-said to have been slain, and three thousand to have been taken
-prisoners; the remainder escaped either by flight, or by throwing
-away their arms, and swimming off to the Athenian ships. Onomarchus
-himself perished. According to one account, he was slain by his
-own mercenaries, provoked by his cowardice: according to another
-account, he was drowned—being carried into the sea by an unruly
-horse, and trying to escape to the ships. Philip caused his dead
-body to be crucified, and drowned all the prisoners as men guilty of
-sacrilege.[625]
-
-  [624] This fact is mentioned by Justin (vii. 2), and seems
-  likely to be true, from the severity with which Philip, after
-  his victory, treated the Phokian prisoners. But the farther
-  statement of Justin is not likely to be true—that the Phokians,
-  on beholding the insignia of the god, threw away their arms and
-  fled without resistance.
-
-  [625] Diodor. xvi. 55; Pausan. x. 2, 3; Philo Judæus apud
-  Eusebium Præp. Evang. viii. p. 392. Diodorus states that Chares
-  with the Athenian fleet was sailing by, _accidentally_. But this
-  seems highly improbable. It cannot but be supposed that he was
-  destined to coöperate with the Phokians.
-
-This victory procured for Philip great renown as the avenger of
-the Delphian god—and became an important step in his career of
-aggrandizement. It not only terminated the power of the Phokians
-north of Thermopylæ, but also finally crushed the powerful dynasty
-of Pheræ in Thessaly. Philip laid siege to that city, upon which
-Lykophron and Peitholaus, surrounded by an adverse population and
-unable to make any long defence, capitulated, and surrendered it to
-him; retiring with their mercenaries, two thousand in number, into
-Phokis.[626] Having obtained possession of Pheræ and proclaimed it
-a free city, Philip proceeded to besiege the neighboring town of
-Pagasæ, the most valuable maritime station in Thessaly. How long
-Pagasæ resisted, we do not know; but long enough to send intimation
-to Athens, with entreaties for succor. The Athenians, alarmed at
-the successive conquests of Philip, were well-disposed to keep this
-important post out of his hands, which their naval power fully
-enabled them to do. But here again (as in the previous examples of
-Pydna, Potidæa, and Methônê), the aversion to personal service among
-the citizens individually—and the impediments as to apportionment of
-duty or cost, whenever actual outgoing was called for—produced the
-untoward result, that though an expedition was voted and despatched,
-it did not arrive in time.[627] Pagasæ surrendered and came into the
-power of Philip; who fortified and garrisoned it for himself, thus
-becoming master of the Pagasæan gulf, the great maritime inlet of
-Thessaly.
-
-  [626] Diodor. xvi. 37.
-
-  [627] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 50. s. 40. Καίτοι, τί δήποτε
-  νομίζετε ... τοὺς ἀποστόλους πάντας ὑμῖν ὑστερίζειν τῶν καιρῶν,
-  τὸν εἰς Μεθώνην, ~τὸν εἰς Παγασὰς~, τὸν εἰς Ποτίδαιαν, etc.
-
-  Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 11. s. 9. Καὶ πάλιν ἥνικα Πύδνα,
-  Ποτίδαια, Μεθώνη, ~Παγασαί—πολιορκούμενα ἀπηγγέλλετο~, εἰ τότε
-  τούτων ἑνὶ τῷ πρώτῳ προθύμως καὶ ὡς προσῆκεν ἐβοηθήσαμεν αὐτοὶ,
-  etc.
-
-  The first Philippic was delivered in 352-351 B. C., which proves
-  that Philip’s capture of Pagasæ cannot have been later than that
-  year. Nor can it have been earlier than his capture of Pheræ—as
-  I have before remarked in reference to the passage of Diodorus
-  (xvi. 31), where it seems to be placed in 354-353 B. C.; if Παγὰς
-  is to be taken for Παγασάς.
-
-  I apprehend that the first campaign of Philip in Thessaly against
-  the Phokians, wherein he was beaten and driven out by Onomarchus,
-  may be placed in the summer of 353 B. C. The second entrance
-  into Thessaly, with the defeat and death of Onomarchus, belongs
-  to the early spring of 352 B. C. The capture of Pheræ and Pagasæ
-  comes immediately afterwards; then the expedition of Philip to
-  Thermopylæ, where his progress was arrested by the Athenians
-  comes about Midsummer 352 B. C.
-
-Philip was probably occupied for a certain time in making good his
-dominion over Thessaly. But as soon as sufficient precautions had
-been taken for this purpose, he sought to push his advantage over
-the Phokians by invading them in their own territory. He marched
-to Thermopylæ, still proclaiming as his aim the liberation of the
-Delphian temple and the punishment of its sacrilegious robbers; while
-he at the same time conciliated the favor of the Thessalians by
-promising to restore to them the Pylæa, or half-yearly Amphiktyonic
-festival at Thermopylæ, which the Phokians had discontinued.[628] The
-Phokians, though masters of this almost inexpugnable pass, seemed
-to have been so much disheartened by their recent defeat, and the
-death of Onomarchus, that they felt unable to maintain it long. The
-news of such a danger, transmitted to Athens, excited extraordinary
-agitation. The importance of defending Thermopylæ—and of prohibiting
-the victorious king of Macedon from coming to coöperate with the
-Thebans on the southern side of it,[629] not merely against the
-Phokians, but probably also against Attica—were so powerfully felt,
-that the usual hesitations and delay of the Athenians in respect
-to military expeditions were overcome. Chiefly from this cause—but
-partly also, we may suppose, from the vexatious disappointment
-recently incurred in the attempt to relieve Pagasæ—an Athenian
-armament under Nausikles (not less than five thousand foot and four
-hundred horse, according to Diodorus[630]) was fitted out with not
-less vigor and celerity than had been displayed against the Thebans
-in Eubœa, seven years before. Athenian citizens shook off their
-lethargy, and promptly volunteered. They reached Thermopylæ in good
-time, placing the pass in such a condition of defence that Philip
-did not attack it at all. Often afterwards does Demosthenes,[631]
-in combating the general remissness of his countrymen when military
-exigencies arose, remind them of this unwonted act of energetic
-movement, crowned with complete effect. With little or no loss, the
-Athenians succeeded in guarding both themselves and their allies
-against a very menacing contingency, simply by the promptitude of
-their action. The cost of the armament altogether was more than two
-hundred talents; and from the stress which Demosthenes lays on that
-portion of the expense which was defrayed by the soldiers privately
-and individually,[632] we may gather that these soldiers (as in
-the Sicilian expedition under Nikias[633]) were in considerable
-proportion opulent citizens. Among a portion of the Grecian public,
-however, the Athenians incurred obloquy as accomplices in the Phokian
-sacrilege, and enemies of the Delphian god.[634]
-
-  [628] Demosthenes, De Pace, p. 62. s. 23; Philippic ii. p. 71. s.
-  24; De Fals. Legat. p. 443. s. 365.
-
-  [629] Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. p. 367. s. 94. p. 446. s. 375.
-  Τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὑμῶν ὅτι τῷ Φωκέων πολέμῳ καὶ τῷ κυρίους
-  εἶναι Πυλῶν Φωκέας, ἥ τε ἀπὸ Θηβαίων ἄδεια ὑπῆρχεν ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ
-  μηδέποτ᾽ ἐλθεῖν ἂν εἰς Πελοπόννησον μηδ᾽ εἰς Εὔβοιαν Φίλιππον
-  μηδὲ Θηβαίους;
-
-  [630] Diodor. xvi. 37, 38.
-
-  [631] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 44. s. 20; De Coronâ, p. 236.
-  s. 40; De Fals. Leg. p. 444. s. 366.
-
-  [632] Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. p. 367. s. 95.
-
-  [633] Thucyd. vi. 31.
-
-  [634] Justin, vii. 2. His rhetorical exaggerations ought not to
-  make us reject the expression of this opinion against Athens, as
-  a real fact.
-
-But though Philip was thus kept out of Southern Greece, and the
-Phokians enabled to reorganize themselves against Thebes, yet in
-Thessaly and without the straits of Thermopylæ, Macedonian ascendency
-was henceforward an uncontested fact. Before we follow his subsequent
-proceedings, however, it will be convenient to turn to events both in
-Phokis and in Peloponnesus.
-
-In the depressed condition of the Phokians after the defeat of
-Onomarchus, they obtained reinforcement not only from Athens, but
-also from Sparta (one thousand men), and from the Peloponnesian
-Achæans (two thousand men[635]). Phayllus, the successor (by some
-called brother) of Onomarchus, put himself again in a condition
-of defence. He had recourse a third time to that yet unexhausted
-store—the Delphian treasures and valuables. He despoiled the temple
-to a greater extent than Philomelus, and not less than Onomarchus;
-incurring aggravated odium from the fact, that he could not now
-supply himself without laying hands on offerings of conspicuous
-magnificence and antiquity, which his two predecessors had spared.
-It was thus that the splendid golden donatives of the Lydian king
-Krœsus were now melted down and turned into money; one hundred and
-seventeen bricks or ingots of gold, most of them weighing two talents
-each; three hundred and sixty golden goblets, together with a female
-statue three cubits high, and a lion, of the same metal—said to have
-weighed in the aggregate thirty talents.[636] The abstraction of
-such ornaments, striking and venerable in the eyes of the numerous
-visitors of the temple, was doubtless deeply felt among the Grecian
-public. And the indignation was aggravated by the fact that beautiful
-youths or women, favorites of Onomarchus or Phayllus, received some
-of the most precious gifts, and wore the most noted ornaments, which
-had decorated the temple—even the necklaces of Helen and Eriphylê.
-One woman, a flute-player named Bromias, not only received from
-Phayllus a silver cup and a golden wreath (the former dedicated in
-the temple by the Phokæans, the latter by the Peparethians), but was
-also introduced by him, in his capacity of superintendent of the
-Pythian festival, to contend for the prize in playing the sacred
-Hymn. As the competitors for such prize had always been men, the
-assembled crowd so loudly resented the novelty, that Bromias was
-obliged to withdraw.[637] Moreover profuse largesses, and flagrant
-malversation, became more notorious than ever.[638] The Phokian
-leaders displayed with ostentation their newly-acquired wealth, and
-either imported for the first time bought slaves, or at least greatly
-multiplied the pre-existing number. It had before been the practice
-in Phokis, we are told, for the wealthy men to be served by the poor
-youthful freemen of the country; and complaints arose among the
-latter class that their daily bread was thus taken away.[639]
-
-  [635] Demosthenes (Fals. Leg. p. 443) affirms that no one else
-  except Athens assisted or rescued the Phokians in this emergency.
-  But Diodorus (xvi. 37) mentions succors from the other allies
-  also; and there seems no ground for disbelieving him. The boast
-  of Demosthenes, however, that Athens single-handed saved the
-  Phokians, is not incorrect as to the main fact, though overstated
-  in the expression. For the Athenians, commanding a naval force,
-  and on this rare occasion rapid in their movements, reached
-  Thermopylæ in time to arrest the progress of Philip, and before
-  the Peloponnesian troops could arrive. The Athenian expedition to
-  Thermopylæ seems to have occurred about May 352 B. C.—as far as
-  we can make out the chronology of the time.
-
-  [636] Diodor. xvi. 56. The account of these donatives of Krœsus
-  may be read in Herodotus (i. 50, 51), who saw them at Delphi. As
-  to the exact weight and number, there is some discrepancy between
-  him and Diodorus; moreover the text of Herodotus himself is not
-  free from obscurity.
-
-  [637] Theopomp. Fragm. 182, 183; Phylarchus, Frag. 60, ed. Didot;
-  Anaximenes and Ephorus ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 231, 232. The Pythian
-  games here alluded to must have been those celebrated in August
-  or September 350 B. C. It would seem therefore that Phayllus
-  survived over that period.
-
-  [638] Diodor. xvi. 56, 57. The story annexed about Iphikrates
-  and the ships of Dionysius of Syracuse—a story which, at all
-  events, comes quite out of its chronological place—appears to me
-  not worthy of credit, in the manner in which Diodorus here gives
-  it. The squadron of Dionysius, which Iphikrates captured on the
-  coast of Korkyra, was coming to the aid and at the request of
-  the Lacedæmonians, then at war with Athens (Xenoph. Hellen. vi.
-  2, 33). It was therefore a fair capture for an Athenian general,
-  together with all on board. If, amidst the cargo, there happened
-  to be presents intended for Olympia and Delphi, these, as being
-  on board of ships of war, would follow the fate of the other
-  persons and things along with them. They would not be considered
-  as the property of the god until they had been actually dedicated
-  in his temple. Nor would the person sending them be entitled to
-  invoke the privilege of a consecrated cargo unless he divested
-  it of hostile accompaniment. The letter of complaint to the
-  Athenians, which Diodorus gives as having been sent by Dionysius,
-  seems to me neither genuine nor even plausible.
-
-  [639] Timæus, Fragm. 67, ed. Didot; ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 264-272.
-
-Notwithstanding the indignation excited by these proceedings not
-only throughout Greece, but even in Phokis itself,—Phayllus carried
-his point of levying a fresh army of mercenaries, and of purchasing
-new alliances among the smaller cities. Both Athens and Sparta
-profited more or less by the distribution; though the cost of the
-Athenian expedition to Thermopylæ, which rescued the Phokians from
-destruction, seems clearly to have been paid by the Athenians
-themselves.[640] Phayllus carried on war for some time against both
-the Bœotians and Lokrians. He is represented by Diodorus to have lost
-several battles. But it is certain that the general result was not
-unfavorable to him; that he kept possession of Orchomenus in Bœotia;
-and that his power remained without substantial diminution.[641]
-
-  [640] Diodor. xvi. 57: compare Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 367.
-
-  [641] Diodor. xvi. 37, 38.
-
-The stress of war seems, for the time, to have been transferred
-to Peloponnesus, whither a portion both of the Phokian and Theban
-troops went to coöperate. The Lacedæmonians had at length opened
-their campaign against Megalopolis, of which I have already spoken
-as having been debated before the Athenian public assembly. Their
-plan seems to have been formed some months before, when Onomarchus
-was at the maximum of his power, and when Thebes was supposed to be
-in danger; but it was not executed until after his defeat and death,
-when the Phokians, depressed for the time, were rescued only by the
-prompt interference of Athens,—and when the Thebans had their hands
-comparatively free. Moreover, the Theban division which had been sent
-into Asia under Pammenes a year or two before, to assist Artabazus,
-may now be presumed to have returned; especially as we know that no
-very long time afterwards, Artabazus appears as completely defeated
-by the Persian troops,—expelled from Asia, and constrained to take
-refuge, together with his brother-in-law Memnon, under the protection
-of Philip.[642] The Megalopolitans had sent envoys to entreat aid
-from Athens, under the apprehension that Thebes would not be in a
-condition to assist them. It may be doubted whether Athens would have
-granted their prayer, in spite of the advice of Demosthenes,—but the
-Thebans had now again become strong enough to uphold with their own
-force their natural allies in Peloponnesus.
-
-  [642] Diodor. xvi. 52.
-
-Accordingly, when the Lacedæmonian army under king Archidamus invaded
-the Megalopolitan territory, a competent force was soon brought
-together to oppose them; furnished partly by the Argeians,—who had
-been engaged during the preceding year in a border warfare with
-Sparta, and had experienced a partial defeat at Orneæ,[643]—partly by
-the Sikyonians and Messenians, who came in full muster. Besides this,
-the forces on both sides from Bœotia and Phokis were transferred to
-Peloponnesus. The Thebans sent four thousand foot, and five hundred
-horse, under Kephision, to the aid of Megalopolis; while the Spartans
-not only recalled their own troops from Phokis, but also procured
-three thousand of the mercenaries in the service of Phayllus, and
-one hundred and fifty Thessalian horse from Likophron, the expelled
-despot of Pheræ. Archidamus received his reinforcements, and got
-together his aggregate forces earlier than the enemy. He advanced
-first into Arcadia, where he posted himself near Mantinea, thus
-cutting off the Argeians from Megalopolis; he next invaded the
-territory of Argos, attacked Orneæ, and defeated the Argeians in
-a partial action. Presently the Thebans arrived, and effected a
-junction with their Argeian and Arcadian allies. The united force was
-greatly superior in number to the Lacedæmonians; but such superiority
-was counterbalanced by the bad discipline of the Thebans, who had
-sadly declined on this point during the interval of ten years since
-the death of Epaminondas. A battle ensued, partially advantageous to
-the Lacedæmonians; while the Argeians and Arcadians chose to go home
-to their neighboring cities. The Lacedæmonians also, having ravaged
-a portion of Arcadia, and stormed the Arcadian town of Helissus,
-presently recrossed their own frontier and returned to Sparta. They
-left, however, a division in Arcadia under Anaxander, who, engaging
-with the Thebans near Telphusa, was worsted with great loss and made
-prisoner. In two other battles, also, the Thebans were successively
-victorious; in a third, they were vanquished by the Lacedæmonians.
-With such balanced and undecided success was the war carried on
-until, at length, the Lacedæmonians proposed and concluded peace
-with Megalopolis. Either formally, or by implication, they were
-forced to recognize the autonomy of that city; thus abandoning, for
-the time at least, their aggressive purposes, which Demosthenes had
-combated and sought to frustrate before the Athenian assembly. The
-Thebans on their side returned home, having accomplished their object
-of protecting Megalopolis and Messênê; and we may presume that the
-Phokian allies of Sparta were sent home also.[644]
-
-  [643] Diodor. xvi. 34.
-
-  [644] Diodor. xvi. 39.
-
-The war between the Bœotians and Phokians had doubtless slackened
-during this episode in Peloponnesus; but it still went on in a series
-of partial actions, on the river Kephissus, at Koroneia, at Abæ
-in Phokis, and near the Lokrian town of Naryx. For the most part,
-the Phokians are said to have been worsted; and their commander,
-Phayllus, presently died of a painful disease,—the suitable
-punishment (in the point of view of a Grecian historian[645]) for
-his sacrilegious deeds. He left as his successor Phalækus, a young
-man, son of Onomarchus, under the guardianship and advice of an
-experienced friend named Mnaseas. But Mnaseas was soon surprised at
-night, defeated, and slain, by the Thebans while Phalækus, left to
-his own resources, was defeated in two battles near Chæroneia, and
-was unable to hinder his enemies from ravaging a large part of the
-Phokian territory.[646]
-
-  [645] Diodor. xvi. 38.
-
-  [646] Diodor. xvi. 38, 39.
-
-We know the successive incidents of this ten years’ Sacred War
-only from the meagre annals of Diodorus,—whose warm sympathy in
-favor of the religious side of the question seems to betray him
-into exaggeration of the victories of the Thebans, or at least
-into some omission of counterbalancing reverses. For in spite of
-these successive victories, the Phokians were noway put down, but
-remained in possession of the Bœotian town of Orchomenus; moreover,
-the Thebans became so tired out and impoverished by the war, that
-they confined themselves presently to desultory incursions and
-skirmishes.[647] Their losses fell wholly upon their own citizens and
-their own funds; while the Phokians fought with foreign mercenaries
-and with the treasures of the temple.[648] The increasing poverty of
-the Thebans even induced them to send an embassy to the Persian king,
-entreating pecuniary aid; which drew from him a present of three
-hundred talents. As he was at this time organizing a fresh expedition
-on an immense scale, for the reconquest of Phenicia and Egypt, after
-more than one preceding failure, he required Grecian soldiers as much
-as the Greeks required his money. Hence we shall see presently that
-the Thebans were able to send him an equivalent.
-
-  [647] Diodor. xvi. 40. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων, Θηβαῖοι κάμνοντες τῷ πρὸς
-  Φωκεῖς πολέμῳ, καὶ χρημάτων ἀπορούμενοι, πρέσβεις ἐξέπεμψαν πρὸς
-  τὸν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλέα.... Τοῖς δὲ Βοιωτοῖς καὶ τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν
-  ἀκροβολισμοὶ μὲν καὶ χώρας καταδρομαὶ συνέστησαν, πράξεις δὲ κατὰ
-  τοῦτον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν (351-350 B. C.—according to the chronology of
-  Diodorus) οὐ συνετελέσθησαν.
-
-  [648] Isokrates, Orat. v. (ad Philipp.) s. 61.
-
-In the war just recounted on the Laconian and Arcadian frontier,
-the Athenians had taken no part. Their struggle with Philip had
-been becoming from month to month more serious and embarrassing. By
-occupying in time the defensible pass of Thermopylæ, they had indeed
-prevented him both from crushing the Phokians and from meddling with
-the Southern states of Greece. But the final battle wherein he had
-defeated Onomarchus, had materially increased both his power and his
-military reputation. The numbers on both sides were very great; the
-result was decisive, and ruinous to the vanquished; moreover, we
-cannot doubt that the Macedonian phalanx, with the other military
-improvements and manœuvres which Philip had been gradually organizing
-since his accession, was now exhibited in formidable efficiency.
-The King of Macedon had become the ascendent soldier and potentate,
-hanging on the skirts of the Grecian world, exciting fears or hopes,
-or both at once, in every city throughout its limits. In the first
-Philippic of Demosthenes, and in his oration against Aristokrates,
-(delivered between midsummer 352 B. C. and midsummer 351 B. C.),
-we discern evident marks of the terrors which Philip had come
-to inspire, within a year after his repulse from Thermopylæ, to
-reflecting Grecian politicians. “It is impossible for Athens (says
-the orator[649]) to provide any land-force competent to contend in
-the field against that of Philip.”
-
-  [649] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 46. s. 26. (352-351 B. C.)
-
-  Compare Philippic iii. p. 124. s. 63.
-
-The reputation of his generalship and his indefatigable activity
-was already everywhere felt; as well as that of the officers and
-soldiers, partly native Macedonians, partly chosen Greeks, whom he
-had assembled round him,[650]—especially the lochages or front-rank
-men of the phalanx and the hypaspistæ. Moreover, the excellent
-cavalry of Thessaly became embodied from henceforward as an element
-in the Macedonian army; since Philip had acquired unbounded
-ascendency in that country, from his expulsion of the Pheræan despots
-and their auxiliaries the Phokians. The philo-Macedonian party in
-the Thessalian cities had constituted him federal chief (or in some
-sort Tagus) of the country, not only enrolling their cavalry in his
-armies, but also placing at his disposal the customs and market-dues,
-which formed a standing common fund for supporting the Thessalian
-collective administration.[651] The financial means of Philip, for
-payment of his foreign troops, and prosecution of his military
-enterprises, were thus materially increased.
-
-  [650] Demosthenes, Olynth. ii. p. 23. s. 17. (delivered in 350 B.
-  C.) ... Οἱ δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὸν ὄντες ξένοι καὶ πεζέταιροι δόξαν μὲν
-  καὶ ἔχουσιν ὡς εἰσὶ θαυμαστοὶ καὶ συγκεκροτημένοι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου,
-  etc.
-
-  [651] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s. 133 (352-351
-  B. C.); also Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 23. (349 B. C.)
-  ἤκουον δ᾽ ἔγωγέ τινων ὡς ~οὐδὲ~ τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς
-  ~ἔτι δώσοιεν~ αὐτῷ καρποῦσθαι· τὰ γὰρ κοινὰ τὰ Θετταλῶν ἀπὸ
-  τούτων δέοι διοικεῖν, οὐ Φίλιππον λαμβάνειν· εἰ δὲ τούτων
-  ἀποστερηθήσεται τῶν χρημάτων, εἰς στενὸν κομιδῇ τὰ τῆς τροφῆς
-  τοῖς ξένοις αὐτῷ καταστήσεται.
-
-But besides his irresistible land-force, Philip had now become master
-of no inconsiderable naval power also. During the early years of
-the war, though he had taken not only Amphipolis, but also all the
-Athenian possessions on the Macedonian coast, yet the exports from
-his territory had been interrupted by the naval force of Athens, so
-as to lessen seriously the produce of his export duties.[652] But
-he had now contrived to get together a sufficient number of armed
-ships and privateers, if not to ward off such damage from himself,
-at least to retaliate it upon Athens. Her navy, indeed, was still
-incomparably superior, but the languor and remissness of her citizens
-refused to bring it out with efficiency; while Philip had opened for
-himself a new avenue to maritime power by his acquisition of Pheræ
-and Pagasæ, and by establishing his ascendency over the Magnêtes
-and their territory, round the eastern border of the Pagasæan Gulf.
-That gulf (now known by the name of Volo), is still the great inlet
-and outlet for Thessalian trade; the eastern coast of Thessaly,
-along the line of Mount Pelion, being craggy and harborless.[653]
-The naval force belonging to Pheræ and its seaport Pagasæ, was very
-considerable, and had been so even from the times of the despots,
-Jason and Alexander;[654] at one moment painfully felt even by
-Athens. All these ships now passed into the service of Philip,
-together with the dues on export and import levied round the Pagasæan
-Gulf; the command of which he farther secured by erecting suitable
-fortifications on the Magnesian shore, and by placing a garrison in
-Pagasæ.[655] Such additional naval means, combined with what he
-already possessed at Amphipolis and elsewhere, made him speedily
-annoying, if not formidable, to Athens, even at sea. His triremes
-showed themselves everywhere, probably in small and rapidly moving
-squadrons. He levied large contributions on the insular allies of
-Athens, and paid the costs of war greatly out of the capture of
-merchant vessels in the Ægean. His squadrons made incursions on the
-Athenian islands of Lemnos and Imbros, carrying off several Athenian
-citizens as prisoners. They even stretched southward as far as
-Geræstus, the southern promontory of Eubœa, where they not only fell
-in with and captured a lucrative squadron of corn-ships, but also
-insulted the coast of Attica itself in the opposite bay of Marathon,
-towing off as a prize one of the sacred triremes.[656] Such was the
-mischief successfully inflicted by the flying squadrons of Philip,
-though Athens had probably a considerable number of cruisers at sea,
-and certainly a far superior number of ships at home in Peiræus. Her
-commerce, and even her coasts, were disturbed and endangered; her
-insular allies suffered yet more. Eubœa especially, the nearest and
-most important of all her allies, separated only by a narrow strait
-from the Pagasæan Gulf and the southern coast of Phthiotis, was now
-within the immediate reach not only of Philip’s marauding vessels,
-but also of his political intrigues.
-
-  [652] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s. 131-133 (352-351
-  B. C.); compare Isokrates, Orat. v. (ad Philipp. s. 5.)
-
-  [653] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 4, 56; Hermippus ap. Athenæum, i. p.
-  27. About the lucrative commerce in the Gulf, in reference to
-  Demetrias and Thebæ Phthiotides, see Livy, xxxix. 25.
-
-  [654] Demosthenes cont. Polykl. p. 1207; De Coronâ Trierarchicâ,
-  p. 1230; Diodor. xv. 95; Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 11.
-
-  [655] Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 23. Καὶ γὰρ Παγασὰς
-  ἀπαιτεῖν αὐτόν εἰσιν ἐψηφισμένοι (the Thessalians re-demand
-  the place from Philip), καὶ Μαγνησίαν κεκωλύκασι τειχίζειν. In
-  Olynth. ii. p. 21. s. 11. it stands—καὶ γὰρ νῦν εἰσὶν ἐψηφισμένοι
-  Παγασὰς ἀπαιτεῖν, καὶ περὶ Μαγνησίας λόγους ποιεῖσθαι. I take the
-  latter expression to state the fact with more strict precision;
-  the Thessalians passed a vote to _remonstrate_ with Philip; it
-  is not probable that they _actually hindered him_. And if he
-  afterwards “gave to them Magnesia,” as we are told in a later
-  oration delivered 344 B. C. (Philippic ii. p. 71. s. 24), he
-  probably gave it with reserve of the fortified posts to himself;
-  since we know that his ascendency over Thessaly was not only not
-  relaxed, but became more violent and compressive.
-
-  The value which the Macedonian kings always continued to
-  set, from this time forward, upon Magnesia and the recess of
-  the Pagasæan Gulf, is shown in the foundation of the city of
-  Demetrias in that important position, by Demetrius Poliorketes,
-  about sixty years afterwards. Demetrias, Chalkis, and Corinth
-  came to be considered the most commanding positions in Greece.
-
-  This fine bay, with the fertile territory lying on its shores
-  under Mount Pelion, are well described by colonel Leake, Travels
-  in Northern Greece, vol. iv. ch. 41. p. 373 _seqq._ I doubt
-  whether either Ulpian (ad Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 24) or colonel
-  Leake (p. 381) are borne out in supposing that there was any
-  _town_ called _Magnesia_ on the shores of the Gulf. None such is
-  mentioned either by Strabo or by Skylax; and I apprehend that the
-  passages above cited from Demosthenes mean _Magnesia the region_
-  inhabited by the Magnetes; as in Demosthenes cont. Neæram. p.
-  1382. s. 141.
-
-  [656] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 46. s. 25. δεῖ γὰρ, ἔχοντος
-  ἐκείνου ναυτικὸν, καὶ ταχειῶν τριηρῶν ἡμῖν, ὅπως ἀσφαλῶς ἡ
-  δύναμις πλέῃ.—p. 49. s. 38. Πρῶτον μὲν, τὸν μέγιστον τῶν ἐκείνου
-  πόρων ἀφαιρήσεσθε· ἔστι δ᾽ οὗτος τίς; ἀπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὑμῖν
-  πολεμεῖ συμμάχων, ἄγων καὶ φέρων τοὺς πλέοντας τὴν θάλασσαν.
-  Ἔπειτα, τί πρὸς τούτῳ; τοῦ πάσχειν αὐτοὶ κακῶς ἔξω γενήσεσθε,
-  οὐχ ὥσπερ τὸν παρελθόντα χρόνον εἰς Λῆμνον καὶ Ἴμβρον ἐμβαλὼν
-  αἰχμαλώτους πολίτας ὑμετέρους ᾤχετ᾽ ἄγων, πρὸς τῷ Γεραιστῷ τὰ
-  πλοῖα συλλαβὼν ἀμύθητα χρήματ᾽ ἐξέλεξε, τὰ τελευταῖα εἰς Μαραθῶνα
-  ἀπέβη, καὶ τὴν ἱερὰν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας ᾤχετ᾽ ἔχων τριήρη, etc.
-
-  We can hardly be certain that the Sacred Trireme thus taken was
-  either the Paralus or the Salaminia; there may have been other
-  sacred triremes besides these two.
-
-It was thus that the war against Philip turned more and more to the
-disgrace and disadvantage of the Athenians. Though they had begun
-it in the hope of punishing him for his duplicity in appropriating
-Amphipolis, they had been themselves the losers by the capture
-of Pydna, Potidæa, Methônê, etc.; and they were now thrown upon
-the defensive, without security for their maritime allies, their
-commerce, or their coasts.[657] The intelligence of these various
-losses and insults endured at sea, in spite of indisputable maritime
-preponderance, called forth at Athens acrimonious complaints
-against the generals of the state, and exaggerated outbursts of
-enmity against Philip.[658] That prince, having spent a few months,
-after his repulse from Thermopylæ, in Thessaly, and having so
-far established his ascendency over that country that he could
-leave the completion of the task to his officers, pushed with his
-characteristic activity into Thrace. He there took part in the
-disputes between various native princes, expelling some, confirming
-or installing others, and extending his own dominion at the cost
-of all.[659] Among these princes were probably Kersobleptes, and
-Amadokus; for Philip carried his aggressions to the immediate
-neighborhood of the Thracian Chersonese.
-
-  [657] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 52. s. 49. ὁρῶν τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν
-  τοῦ πολέμου γεγενημένην ὑπὲρ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι Φίλιππον, τὴν
-  δὲ τελευτὴν οὖσαν ἤδη ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν κακῶς ὑπὸ Φιλίππου.
-  (Between Midsummer 352 and Midsummer 351 B. C.)
-
-  [658] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660. s. 144. p. 656. s.
-  130. Ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μάλιστα δοκῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ἐχθρὸς εἶναι Φίλιππος οὑτοσί,
-  etc. (this harangue also between Midsummer 352 and Midsummer 351
-  B. C.)
-
-  [659] Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13.
-
-In November, 352 B. C., intelligence reached Athens, that he
-was in Thrace besieging Heræon Teichos; a place so near to the
-Chersonese,[660] that the Athenian possessions and colonists in
-that peninsula were threatened with considerable danger. So great
-was the alarm and excitement caused by this news, that a vote was
-immediately passed in the public assembly to equip a fleet of forty
-triremes,—to man it with Athenian citizens, all persons up to the age
-of forty-five being made liable to serve on the expedition,—and to
-raise sixty talents by a direct property tax. At first active steps
-were taken to accelerate the armament. But before the difficulties
-of detail could be surmounted,—before it could be determined,
-amidst the general aversion to personal service, what citizens
-should go abroad, and how the burthen of trierarchy should be
-distributed,—fresh messengers arrived from the Chersonese, reporting
-first that Philip had fallen sick, next that he was actually
-dead.[661] The last-mentioned report proved false; but the sickness
-of Philip was an actual fact, and seems to have been severe enough
-to cause a temporary suspension of his military operations. Though
-the opportunity became thus only the more favorable for attacking
-Philip, yet the Athenians, no longer spurred on by the fear of
-farther immediate danger, relapsed into their former languor, and
-renounced or postponed their intended armament. After passing the
-whole ensuing summer in inaction, they could only be prevailed upon,
-in the month of September 351, to despatch to Thrace a feeble force
-under the mercenary chief Charidemus; ten triremes, without any
-soldiers aboard, and with no more than five talents in money.[662]
-
-  [660] Demosthenes, Olynth. iii. p. 29. s. 5 (delivered in the
-  latter half of 350 B. C.)
-
-  ... ἀπηγγέλθη Φίλιππος ὑμῖν ἐν Θρᾴκῃ, τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον
-  ἔτος τουτὶ, Ἡραῖον τεῖχος πολιορκῶν, τότε τοίνυν μὴν μὲν ἦν
-  Μαιμακτηριὼν, etc.
-
-  This Thracian expedition of Philip (alluded to also in
-  Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13) stands fixed to the date of
-  November 352 B. C., on reasonably good grounds.
-
-  That the town or fortress called Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος was near to the
-  Chersonese, cannot be doubted. The commentators identify it with
-  Ἡραῖον, mentioned by Herodotus (iv. 90) as being near Perinthus.
-  But this hypothesis is open to much doubt. Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος is not
-  quite the same as Ἡραῖον; nor was the latter place very near to
-  the Chersonese; nor would Philip be yet in a condition to provoke
-  or menace so powerful a city as Perinthus—though he did so ten
-  years afterwards. (Diodor. xvi. 74).
-
-  I cannot think that we know where Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος was situated;
-  except that it was in Thrace, and near the Chersonese.
-
-  [661] Demosthenes, Olynth. iii. p. 29, 30. ὡς γὰρ ἠγγέλθη
-  Φίλιππος ἀσθενῶν ἢ τεθνεὼς (ἦλθε γὰρ ἀμφότερα), etc. These
-  reports of the sickness and death of Philip in Thrace are alluded
-  to in the first Philippic, p. 43. s. 14. The expedition of Philip
-  threatening the Chersonese, and the vote passed by the Athenians
-  when they first heard of this expedition, are also alluded to in
-  the first Philippic, p. 44. s. 20. p. 51. s. 46. καὶ ὑμεῖς, ἂν
-  ἐν Χεῤῥονήσῳ πύθησθε Φίλιππον, ἐκεῖσε βοηθεῖν ψηφίζεσθε, etc.
-  When Philip was besieging Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος, he was said to be ἐν
-  Χεῤῥονήσῳ.
-
-  [662] Demosthenes, Olynth. iii. p. 30. s. 6.
-
-At this time Charidemus was at the height of his popularity. It was
-supposed that he could raise and maintain a mercenary band by his
-own ingenuity and valor. His friends confidently averred, before
-the Athenian assembly, that he was the only man capable of putting
-down Philip, and conquering Amphipolis.[663] One of these partisans,
-Aristokrates, even went so far as to propose that a vote should be
-passed ensuring inviolability to his person, and enacting that any
-one who killed him should be seized wherever found in the territory
-of Athens or her allies. This proposition was attacked judicially by
-an accuser named Euthykles, who borrowed a memorable discourse from
-the pen of Demosthenes.
-
-  [663] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 625. s. 14. p. 682, 683.
-  This oration, delivered between Midsummer 352 and Midsummer 351
-  B. C., seems to have been prior to November 352 B. C., when the
-  news reached Athens that Philip was besieging Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος.
-
-It was thus that the real sickness, and reported death, of Philip
-which ought to have operated as a stimulus to the Athenians by
-exposing to them their enemy during a moment of peculiar weakness,
-proved rather an opiate exaggerating their chronic lethargy, and
-cheating them into a belief that no farther efforts were needed. That
-belief appears to have been proclaimed by the leading, best-known,
-and senior speakers, those who gave the tone to the public assembly,
-and who were principally relied upon for advice. These men,—probably
-Eubulus at their head, and Phokion, so constantly named as general,
-along with him,—either did not feel, or could not bring themselves
-to proclaim, the painful necessity of personal military service and
-increased taxation. Though repeated debates took place on the insults
-offered to Athens in her maritime dignity, and on the sufferings of
-those allies to whom she owed protection,—combined with accusations
-against the generals, and complaints of the inefficiency of such
-mercenary foreigners as Athens took into commission but never
-paid,—still, the recognized public advisers shrank from appeal
-to the dormant patriotism or personal endurance of the citizens.
-The serious, but indispensable, duty which they thus omitted, was
-performed for them by a younger competitor, far beneath them in
-established footing and influence,—Demosthenes, now about thirty
-years old,—in an harangue, known as the first Philippic.
-
-We have already had before us this aspiring man, as a public adviser
-in the assembly. In his first parliamentary harangue two years
-before,[664] he had begun to inculcate on his countrymen the general
-lesson of energy and self-reliance, and to remind them of that
-which the comfort, activity, and peaceful refinement of Athenian
-life, had a constant tendency to put out of sight:—That the City,
-as a whole, could not maintain her security and dignity against
-enemies, unless each citizen individually, besides his home-duties,
-were prepared to take his fair share, readily and without evasion,
-of the hardship and cost of personal service abroad.[665] But he
-had then been called upon to deal (in his discourse De Symmoriis)
-only with the contingency of Persian hostilities—possible indeed,
-yet neither near nor declared; he now renews the same exhortation
-under more pressing exigencies. He has to protect interests already
-suffering, and to repel dishonorable insults, becoming from month
-to month more frequent, from an indefatigable enemy. Successive
-assemblies have been occupied with complaints from sufferers, amidst
-a sentiment of unwonted chagrin and helplessness among the public—yet
-with no material comfort from the leading and established speakers;
-who content themselves with inveighing against the negligence of
-the mercenaries—taken into service by Athens but never paid—and
-with threatening to impeach the generals. The assembly, wearied by
-repetition of topics promising no improvement for the future, is
-convoked, probably to hear some farther instance of damage committed
-by the Macedonian cruisers, when Demosthenes, breaking through the
-common formalities of precedence, rises first to address them.
-
-  [664] I adopt the date accepted by most critics, on the authority
-  of Dionysius of Halikarnassus, to the first Philippic; the
-  archonship of Aristodemus 352-351 B. C. It belongs, I think, to
-  the latter half of that year.
-
-  The statements of Dionysius bearing on this oration have been
-  much called in question; to a certain extent, with good reason,
-  in what he states about the _sixth Philippic_ (ad Ammæum, p.
-  736). What he calls the _sixth_, is in reality the _fifth_ in his
-  own enumeration, coming next after the first Philippic and the
-  three Olynthiacs. To the Oratio De Pace, which is properly the
-  sixth in his enumeration, he assigns no ordinal number whatever.
-  What is still more perplexing—he gives as the initial words of
-  what he calls the _sixth_ Philippic, certain words which occur
-  in the middle of the first Philippic, immediately after the
-  financial scheme read by Demosthenes to the people, the words,
-  Ἃ μὲν ἡμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δεδυνήμεθα εὑρεῖν ταῦτ᾽ ἐστίν
-  (Philipp. i. p. 48). If this were correct, we should have to
-  divide the first Philippic into two parts, and recognize the
-  latter part (after the words ἃ μὲν ἡμεῖς) as a separate and later
-  oration. Some critics, among them Dr. Thirlwall, agree so far
-  with Dionysius as to separate the latter part from the former,
-  and to view it as a portion of some later oration. I follow the
-  more common opinion, accepting the oration as one. There is a
-  confusion, either in the text or the affirmations, of Dionysius,
-  which has never yet been, perhaps cannot be, satisfactorily
-  cleared up.
-
-  Böhnecke (in his Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Attischen
-  Redner, p. 222 seq.) has gone into a full and elaborate
-  examination of the first Philippic and all the controversy
-  respecting it. He rejects the statement of Dionysius altogether.
-  He considers that the oration as it stands now is one whole,
-  but delivered three years later than Dionysius asserts: not
-  in 351 B. C., but in the Spring of 348 B. C., after the three
-  Olynthiacs, and a little before the fall of Olynthus. He notices
-  various chronological points (in my judgment none of them proving
-  his point) tending to show that the harangue cannot have been
-  delivered so early as 351 B. C. But I think the difficulty of
-  supposing that the oration was spoken at so late a period of the
-  Olynthian war, and yet that nothing is said in it about that war,
-  and next to nothing about Olynthus itself—is greater than any of
-  those difficulties which Böhnecke tries to make good against the
-  earlier date.
-
-  [665] Demosthenes, De Symmor. p. 182. s. 18.
-
-It had once been the practice at Athens, that the herald formally
-proclaimed, when a public assembly was opened—“Who among the citizens
-above fifty years old wishes to speak? and after them, which of
-the other citizens in his turn?”[666] Though this old proclamation
-had fallen into disuse, the habit still remained, that speakers of
-advanced age and experience rose first after the debate had been
-opened by the presiding magistrates. But the relations of Athens with
-Philip had been so often discussed, that all these men had already
-delivered their sentiments and exhausted their recommendations. “Had
-their recommendations been good, you need not have been now debating
-the same topic over again”[667]—says Demosthenes, as an apology for
-standing forward out of his turn to produce his own views.
-
-  [666] Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 366.
-
-  [667] Demosthen. Philipp. i. init. ... Εἰ μὲν περὶ καινοῦ τινὸς
-  πράγματος προὐτίθετο λέγειν, ἐπισχὼν ἂν ἕως ~οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν
-  εἰωθότων~ γνώμην ἀπεφῄναντο ... ἐπειδὴ δὲ περὶ ὧν πολλάκις
-  εἰρήκασιν οὗτοι πρότερον συμβαίνει καὶ νυνὶ σκοπεῖν, ~ἡγοῦμαι καὶ
-  πρῶτος ἀναστὰς~ εἰκότως ἂν συγγνώμης τυγχάνειν· εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ
-  παρεληλυθότος χρόνου τὰ δέοντα οὗτοι συνεβούλευσαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ὑμᾶς
-  νῦν ἔδει βουλεύεσθαι.
-
-His views indeed were so new, so independent of party-sympathies
-or antipathies, and so plain-spoken in comments on the past as
-well as in demands for the future—that they would hardly have been
-proposed except by a speaker instinct with the ideal of the Periklean
-foretime, familiar to him from his study of Thucydides. In explicit
-language, Demosthenes throws the blame of the public misfortunes,
-not simply on the past advisers and generals of the people, but
-also on the people themselves.[668] It is from this proclaimed fact
-that he starts, as his main ground of hope for future improvement.
-Athens contended formerly with honor against the Lacedæmonians; and
-now also, she will exchange disgrace for victory in her war against
-Philip, if her citizens individually will shake off their past
-inertness and negligence, each of them henceforward becoming ready
-to undertake his full share of personal duty in the common cause.
-Athens had undergone enough humiliation, and more than enough, to
-teach her this lesson. She might learn it farther from her enemy
-Philip himself, who had raised himself from small beginnings, and
-heaped losses as well as shame upon her, mainly by his own personal
-energy, perseverance, and ability; while the Athenian citizens had
-been hitherto so backward as individuals, and so unprepared as a
-public, that even if a lucky turn of fortune were to hand over to
-them Amphipolis, they would be in no condition to seize it.[669]
-Should the rumor prove true, that this Philip were dead, they would
-soon make for themselves another Philip equally troublesome.
-
-  [668] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 40, 41. Ὅτι ~οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων
-  ποιούντων~ ὑμῶν κακῶς τὰ πράγματα ἔχει· ἐπεί τοι, εἰ πάνθ᾽ ἃ
-  προσῆκε πραττόντων οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐλπὶς ἦν αὐτὰ βελτίω
-  γενέσθαι, etc. Again, p. 42. Ἂν τοίνυν καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ τῆς τοιαύτης
-  ἐθελήσητε γενέσθαι γνώμης νῦν, ~ἐπειδήπερ οὐ πρότερον~, ... καὶ
-  παύσησθε αὐτὸς μὲν οὐδὲν ἕκαστος ποιήσειν ἐλπίζων, τὸν δὲ πλησίον
-  πάνθ᾽ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ πράξειν, etc.
-
-  Compare the previous harangue, De Symmoriis, p. 182. s. 18.
-
-  [669] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 43. s. 15. ὡς δὲ νῦν ἔχετε,
-  οὐδὲ διδόντων τῶν καιρῶν Ἀμφίπολιν δέξασθαι δύναισθ᾽ ἄν,
-  ἀπηρτημένοι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς καὶ ταῖς γνώμαις.
-
-After thus severely commenting on the past apathy of the citizens,
-and insisting upon a change of disposition as indispensable,
-Demosthenes proceeds to specify the particular acts whereby such
-change ought to be manifested. He entreats them not to be startled by
-the novelty of his plan, but to hear him patiently to the end. It is
-the result of his own meditations; other citizens may have better to
-propose; if they have, he shall not be found to stand in their way.
-What is past, cannot be helped; nor is extemporaneous speech the best
-way of providing remedies for a difficult future.[670]
-
-  [670] Demosthenes, Philip. i. p. 44. ... ἐπειδὰν ἅπαντα ἀκούσητε,
-  κρίνατε—μὴ πρότερον προλαμβάνετε· μηδ᾽ ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ~δοκῶ τινὶ
-  καινὴν παρασκευὴν~ λέγειν, ἀναβάλλειν με τὰ πράγματα ἡγείσθω· οὐ
-  γὰρ οἱ ταχὺ καὶ τήμερον εἰπόντες μάλιστα εἰς δέον λέγουσιν, etc.
-
-  ... Οἶμαι τοίνυν ἐγὼ ταῦτα λέγειν ἔχειν, μὴ κωλύων εἴ τις ἄλλος
-  ἐπαγγέλλεταί τι.
-
-  This deprecatory tone deserves notice, and the difficulty which
-  the speaker anticipates in obtaining a hearing.
-
-He advises first, that a fleet of fifty triremes shall be immediately
-put in readiness; that the citizens shall firmly resolve to serve in
-person on board, whenever the occasion may require, and that triremes
-and other vessels shall be specially fitted out for half of the
-horsemen of the city, who shall serve personally also. This force is
-to be kept ready to sail at a moment’s notice, and to meet Philip
-in any of his sudden out-marches—to Chersonesus, to Thermopylæ, to
-Olynthus, etc.[671]
-
-  [671] Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 44, 45.
-
-Secondly, that a farther permanent force shall be set on foot
-immediately, to take the aggressive, and carry on active continuous
-warfare against Philip, by harassing him in various points of his
-own country. Two thousand infantry, and two hundred horse, will be
-sufficient; but it is essential that one-fourth part—five hundred
-of the former and fifty of the latter—shall be citizens of Athens.
-The remainder are to be foreign mercenaries; ten swift sailing war
-triremes are also to be provided to protect the transports against
-the naval force of Philip. The citizens are to serve by relays,
-relieving each other; every one for a time fixed beforehand, yet none
-for a very long time.[672] The orator then proceeds to calculate
-the cost of such a standing force for one year. He assigns to each
-seaman, and to each foot soldier, ten drachmæ per month, or two
-oboli per day; to each horseman, thirty drachmæ per month, or one
-drachma (six oboli) per day. No difference is made between the
-Athenian citizen and the foreigner. The sum here assigned is not
-full pay, but simply the cost of each man’s maintenance. At the same
-time, Demosthenes pledges himself, that if thus much be furnished
-by the state, the remainder of a full pay (or as much again) will
-be made up by what the soldiers will themselves acquire in the war;
-and that too, without wrong done to allies or neutral Greeks. The
-total annual cost thus incurred will be ninety-two talents (= about
-£22,000.) He does not give any estimate of the probable cost of his
-other armament, of fifty triremes; which are to be equipped and ready
-at a moment’s notice for emergencies, but not sent out on permanent
-service.
-
-  [672] Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 45, 46.
-
-His next task is, to provide ways and means for meeting such
-additional cost of ninety-two talents. Here he produces and reads
-to the assembly, a special financial scheme, drawn up in writing.
-Not being actually embodied in the speech, the scheme has been
-unfortunately lost; though its contents would help us materially to
-appreciate the views of Demosthenes.[673] It must have been more or
-less complicated in its details; not a simple proposition for an
-_eisphora_ or property-tax, which would have been announced in a
-sentence of the orator’s speech.
-
-  [673] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 48, 49. Ἃ δ᾽ ὑπάρξαι δεῖ παρ᾽
-  ὑμῶν, ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἁγὼ γέγραφα.
-
-Assuming the money, the ships, and the armament for permanent
-service, to be provided, Demosthenes proposes that a formal law be
-passed, making such permanent service peremptory; the general in
-command being held responsible for the efficient employment of the
-force.[674] The islands, the maritime allies, and the commerce of the
-Ægean would then become secure; while the profits of Philip from his
-captures at sea would be arrested.[675] The quarters of the armament
-might be established, during winter or bad weather, in Skiathos,
-Thasos, Lemnos, or other adjoining islands, from whence they could
-act at all times against Philip on his own coast; while from Athens
-it was difficult to arrive thither either during the prevalence of
-the Etesian winds or during winter—the seasons usually selected by
-Philip for his aggressions.[676]
-
-  [674] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 49. s. 37.
-
-  [675] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 49. s. 38, 39.
-
-  [676] Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 48, 49. “The obstinacy and
-  violence of the Etesian winds, in July and August, are well known
-  to those who have had to struggle with them in the Ægean during
-  that season” (Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iv.
-  ch. 42. p. 426).
-
-  The Etesian winds, blowing from the north, made it difficult to
-  reach Macedonia from Athens.
-
-  Compare Demosthenes, De Rebus Chersonesi, p. 93. s. 14.
-
-The aggregate means of Athens (Demosthenes affirmed) in men,
-money, ships, hoplites, horsemen, were greater than could be found
-anywhere else. But hitherto they had never been properly employed.
-The Athenians, like awkward pugilists, waited for Philip to strike,
-and then put up their hand to follow his blow. They never sought to
-look him in the face—nor to be ready with a good defensive system
-beforehand—nor to anticipate him in offensive operations.[677] While
-their religious festivals, the Panathenaic, Dionysiac, and others,
-were not only celebrated with costly splendor, but prearranged with
-the most careful pains, so that nothing was ever wanting in detail
-at the moment of execution—their military force was left without
-organization or predetermined system. Whenever any new encroachment
-of Philip was made known, nothing was found ready to meet it; fresh
-decrees were to be voted, modified, and put in execution, for each
-special occasion; the time for action was wasted in preparation,
-and before a force could be placed on shipboard, the moment for
-execution had passed.[678] This practice of waiting for Philip to
-act offensively, and then sending aid to the point attacked, was
-ruinous; the war must be carried on by a standing force put in motion
-beforehand.[679]
-
-  [677] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 51. s. 46. ... ὑμεῖς δὲ, πλείστην
-  δύναμιν ἁπάντων ἔχοντες, τριηρεῖς, ὁπλίτας, ἱππέας, χρημάτων
-  πρόσοδον, τούτων μὲν μέχρι τῆς τήμερον ἡμέρας οὐδενὶ πώποτε εἰς
-  δέον τι κέχρησθε.
-
-  [678] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 50. ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τοῦ πολέμου
-  ἄτακτα, ἀδιόρθωτα, ἀόριστα, ἅπαντα. Τοιγαροῦν ἅμα ἀκηκόαμέν τι
-  καὶ τριηράρχους καθίσταμεν, καὶ τούτοις ἀντιδόσεις ποιούμεθα καὶ
-  περὶ χρημάτων πόρου σκοποῦμεν, etc.
-
-  [679] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 48, 49. δεῖ—μὴ βοηθείαις πολεμεῖν
-  (ὑστεριοῦμεν γὰρ ἁπάντων) ἀλλὰ παρασκευῇ συνεχεῖ καὶ δυνάμει.
-
-  Compare his Oration De Rebus Chersonesi, p. 92. s. 11.
-
-To provide and pay such a standing force, is one of the main points
-in the project of Demosthenes. The absolute necessity that it shall
-consist, in large proportion at least, of citizens, is another. To
-this latter point he reverts again and again, insisting that the
-foreign mercenaries—sent out to make their pay where or how they
-could, and unaccompanied by Athenian citizens—were at best useless
-and untrustworthy. They did more mischief to friends and allies,
-who were terrified at the very tidings of their approach—than to
-the enemy.[680] The general, unprovided with funds to pay them, was
-compelled to follow them wheresoever they chose to go, disregarding
-his orders received from the city. To try him afterwards for that
-which he could not help, was unprofitable disgrace. But if the
-troops were regularly paid; if, besides, a considerable proportion
-of them were Athenian citizens, themselves interested in success,
-and inspectors of all that was done; then the general would be
-found willing and able to attack the enemy with vigor—and might be
-held to a rigorous accountability, if he did not. Such was the only
-way in which the formidable and ever-growing force of their enemy
-Philip could be successfully combated. As matters now stood, the
-inefficiency of Athenian operations was so ridiculous, that men might
-be tempted to doubt whether Athens was really in earnest. Her chief
-military officers—her ten generals, ten taxiarchs, ten phylarchs,
-and two hipparchs, annually chosen—were busied only in the affairs
-of the city and in the showy religious processions. They left the
-real business of war to a foreign general named Menelaus.[681] Such a
-system was disgraceful. The honor of Athens ought to be maintained by
-her own citizens, both as generals and as soldiers.
-
-  [680] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 46. s. 28. ἐξ οὗ δ᾽ αὐτὰ
-  καθ᾽ αὑτὰ τὰ ξενικὰ ὑμῖν στρατεύεται, τοὺς φίλους νικᾷ καὶ
-  τοὺς συμμάχους, οἱ δ᾽ ἐχθροὶ μείζους τοῦ δέοντος γεγόνασι· καὶ
-  παρακύψαντα ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς πόλεως πόλεμον, πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον καὶ
-  πανταχοῖ μᾶλλον οἴχεται πλέοντα, ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς ἀκολουθεῖ,
-  εἰκότως· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄρχειν μὴ διδόντα μισθόν. Τί οὖν κελεύω;
-  τὰς προφάσεις ἀφελεῖν καὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν,
-  μισθὸν πορίσαντας καὶ στρατιώτας οἰκείους ὥσπερ ἐπόπτας τῶν
-  στρατηγουμένων παρακαταστήσαντας, etc.
-
-  ... p 53. s. 51. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ καταγελῶσιν, οἱ δὲ σύμμαχοι
-  τεθνᾶσι τῷ δέει τοὺς τοιούτους ἀποστόλους, etc.
-
-  [681] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 47. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε γέλως ἔσθ᾽ ὡς
-  χρώμεθα τοῖς πράγμασι.
-
-Such are the principal features in the discourse called the First
-Philippic; the earliest public harangue delivered by Demosthenes
-to the Athenian assembly, in reference to the war with Philip. It
-is not merely a splendid piece of oratory, emphatic and forcible
-in its appeal to the emotions; bringing the audience by many
-different roads, to the main conviction which the orator seeks to
-impress; profoundly animated with genuine Pan-hellenic patriotism,
-and with the dignity of that free Grecian world now threatened
-by a monarch from without. It has other merits besides, not less
-important in themselves, and lying more immediately within the
-scope of the historian. We find Demosthenes, yet only thirty years
-old—young in political life—and thirteen years before the battle
-of Chæroneia—taking accurate measure of the political relations
-between Athens and Philip; examining those relations during the
-past, pointing out how they had become every year more unfavorable,
-and foretelling the dangerous contingencies of the future, unless
-better precautions were taken; exposing with courageous frankness
-not only the past mismanagement of public men, but also those
-defective dispositions of the people themselves wherein such
-management had its root; lastly, after fault found, adventuring on
-his own responsibility to propose specific measures of correction,
-and urging upon reluctant citizens a painful imposition of personal
-hardship as well as of taxation. We shall find him insisting on the
-same obligation, irksome alike to the leading politicians and to
-the people,[682] throughout all the Olynthiacs and Philippics. We
-note his warnings given at this early day, when timely prevention
-would have been easily practicable; and his superiority to elder
-politicians like Eubulus and Phokion, in prudent appreciation,
-in foresight, and in courage of speaking out unpalatable truths.
-More than twenty years after this period, when Athens had lost
-the game and was in her phase of humiliation, Demosthenes (in
-repelling the charges of those who imputed her misfortune to his
-bad advice) measures the real extent to which a political statesman
-is properly responsible. The first of all things is—“To see events
-in their beginnings—to discern tendencies beforehand, and proclaim
-them beforehand to others—to abridge as much as possible the
-rubs, impediments, jealousies, and tardy movements, inseparable
-from the march of a free city—and to infuse among the citizens
-harmony, friendly feelings, and zeal for the performance of their
-duties.”[683] The first Philippic is alone sufficient to prove, how
-justly Demosthenes lays claim to the merit of having “seen events
-in their beginnings” and given timely warning to his countrymen. It
-will also go to show, along with other proofs hereafter to be seen,
-that he was not less honest and judicious in his attempts to fulfil
-the remaining portion of the statesman’s duty—that of working up
-his countrymen to unanimous and resolute enterprise; to the pitch
-requisite not merely for speaking and voting, but for acting and
-suffering, against the public enemy.
-
-  [682] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 54 s. 58. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν
-  οὔτ᾽ ἄλλοτε πώποτε πρὸς χάριν εἱλόμην λέγειν, ὅ,τι ἂν μὴ καὶ
-  συνοίσειν πεπεισμένος ὦ, νῦν τε ἃ γιγνώσκω πάνθ᾽ ἁπλῶς, οὐδὲν
-  ὑποστειλάμενος, πεπαῤῥησίασμαι. Ἐβουλόμην δ᾽ ἄν, ὥσπερ ὅτι ὑμῖν
-  συμφέρει τὰ βέλτιστα ἀκούειν οἶδα, οὕτως εἰδέναι συνοῖσον καὶ τῷ
-  τὰ βέλτιστα εἰπόντι· πολλῷ γὰρ ἂν ἥδιον εἶπον. Νῦν δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀδήλοις
-  οὖσι τοῖς ἀπὸ τούτων ἐμαυτῷ γενησομένοις, ὅμως ἐπὶ τῷ συνοίσειν
-  ὑμῖν, ἂν πράξητε, ταῦτα πεπεῖσθαι λέγειν αἱροῦμαι.
-
-  [683] Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 308. s. 306. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧν γ᾽ ἂν ὁ
-  ῥήτωρ ὑπεύθυνος εἴη, πᾶσαν ἐξέτασιν λάμβανε· οὐ παραιτοῦμαι. Τίνα
-  οὖν ἐστὶ ταῦτα; Ἰδεῖν τὰ πράγματα ἀρχόμενα, καὶ προαισθέσθαι καὶ
-  προειπεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις. Ταῦτα πέπρακταί μοι. Καὶ ἔτι τὰς ἑκασταχοῦ
-  βραδυτῆτας, ὄκνους, ἀγνοίας, φιλονεικίας, ἃ πολιτικὰ ταῖς πόλεσι
-  πρόσεστιν ἁπάσαις καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἁμαρτήματα, ταῦθ᾽ ὡς εἰς ἐλάχιστα
-  συστεῖλαι, καὶ τοὐνάντιον εἰς ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ τοῦ τὰ δέοντα
-  ποιεῖν ὁρμὴν προτρέψαι.
-
-We know neither the actual course, nor the concluding vote, of this
-debate, wherein Demosthenes took a part so unexpectedly prominent.
-But we know that neither of the two positive measures which he
-recommends was carried into effect. The working armament was not
-sent out, nor was the home-force, destined to be held in reserve for
-instant movement in case of emergency, ever got ready. It was not
-until the following month of September (the oration being delivered
-some time in the first half of 351 B. C.), that any actual force
-was sent against Philip; and even then nothing more was done than
-to send the mercenary chief Charidemus to the Chersonese, with ten
-triremes, and five talents in money, but no soldiers.[684] Nor is
-there any probability that Demosthenes even obtained a favorable vote
-of the assembly; though strong votes against Philip were often passed
-without being ever put in execution afterwards.[685]
-
-  [684] Demosthenes, Olynth. iii. p. 29. s. 5.
-
-  [685] Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 48. s. 34; Olynth. ii. p. 21.
-  s. 12; Olynth. iii. p. 29. s. 5. p. 32. s. 16; De Rhodiorum
-  Libertate, p. 190. s. 1. And not merely votes against Philip, but
-  against others also, remained either unexecuted or inadequately
-  executed (Demosthenes, De Republicâ Ordinandâ, p. 175, 176).
-
-Demosthenes was doubtless opposed by those senior statesmen whose
-duty it would have been to come forward themselves with the same
-propositions assuming the necessity to be undeniable. But what
-ground was taken in opposing him, we do not know. There existed
-at that time in Athens a certain party or section who undervalued
-Philip as an enemy not really formidable—far less formidable than
-the Persian king.[686] The reports of Persian force and preparation,
-prevalent two years before when Demosthenes delivered his harangue
-on the Symmories, seem still to have continued, and may partly
-explain the inaction again Philip. Such reports would be magnified,
-or fabricated, by another Athenian party much more dangerous;
-in communication with, and probably paid by, Philip himself. To
-this party Demosthenes makes his earliest allusion in the first
-Philippic,[687] and reverts to them on many occasions afterwards.
-We may be very certain that there were Athenian citizens serving
-as Philip’s secret agents, though we cannot assign their names. It
-would be not less his interest to purchase such auxiliaries, than to
-employ paid spies in his operations of war:[688] while the prevalent
-political antipathies at Athens, coupled with the laxity of public
-morality in individuals, would render it perfectly practicable to
-obtain suitable instruments. That not only at Athens, but also at
-Amphipolis, Potidæa, Olynthus and elsewhere, Philip achieved his
-successes, partly by purchasing corrupt partisans among the leaders
-of his enemies—is an assertion so intrinsically probable, that we may
-readily believe it, though advanced chiefly by unfriendly witnesses.
-Such corruption alone, indeed, would not have availed him, but it was
-eminently useful when combined with well-employed force and military
-genius.
-
-  [686] Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libertat. p. 197. s. 31. ὁρῶ
-  δ᾽ ~ὑμῶν ἐνίους~ Φιλίππου μὲν ὡς ἄρ᾽ οὐδενὸς ἀξίου πολλάκις
-  ὀλιγωροῦντας, βασιλέα δ᾽ ὡς ἰσχυρὸν ἐχθρὸν οἷς ἂν προέληται
-  φοβουμένους. Εἰ δὲ ~τὸν μὲν ὡς φαῦλον οὐκ ἀμυνούμεθα~, τῷ δὲ ὡς
-  φοβερῷ πάνθ᾽ ὑπείξομεν, πρὸς τίνας παραταξόμεθα;
-
-  This oration was delivered in 351-350 B. C.; a few months after
-  the first Philippic.
-
-  [687] Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 45. s. 21; Olynthiac ii. p. 19.
-  s. 4.
-
-  [688] Compare the advice of the Thebans to Mardonius in 479 B.
-  C.—during the Persian invasion of Greece (Herodot. ix. 2).
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXXVIII.
-
-EUBOIC AND OLYNTHIAN WARS.
-
-
-If even in Athens, at the date of the first Philippic of Demosthenes,
-the uneasiness about Philip was considerable, much more serious had
-it become among his neighbors the Olynthians. He had gained them
-over, four years before, by transferring to them the territory of
-Anthemus—and the still more important town of Potidæa, captured by
-his own arms from Athens. Grateful for these cessions, they had
-become his allies in his war with Athens, whom they hated on every
-ground. But a material change had since taken place. Since the loss
-of Methônê, Athens, expelled from the coast of Thrace and Macedonia,
-had ceased to be a hostile neighbor, or to inspire alarm to the
-Olynthians; while the immense increase in the power of Philip,
-combined with his ability and ambition alike manifest, had overlaid
-their gratitude for the past by a sentiment of fear for the future.
-It was but too clear that a prince who stretched his encroaching
-arms in all directions—to Thermopylæ, to Illyria, and to Thrace—would
-not long suffer the fertile peninsula between the Thermaic and
-Strymonic gulfs to remain occupied by free Grecian communities.
-Accordingly, it seems that after the great victory of Philip in
-Thessaly over the Phokians (in the first half of 352 B. C.), the
-Olynthians manifested their uneasiness by seceding from alliance
-with him against Athens. They concluded peace with that city, and
-manifested such friendly sentiments that an alliance began to be
-thought possible. This peace seems to have been concluded before
-November 352 B. C.[689]
-
-  [689] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 656. s. 129. ἐκεῖνοι
-  (Olynthians) ἕως μὲν ἑώρων αὐτὸν (Philip) τηλικοῦτον ἡλίκος ὢν
-  πιστὸς ὑπῆρχε, σύμμαχοί τε ἦσαν, καὶ δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον ἡμῖν ἐπολέμουν·
-  ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἶδον μείζω τῆς πρὸς αὑτοὺς πίστεως γιγνόμενον ...
-  ὑμᾶς, οὓς ἴσασιν ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἥδιστ᾽ ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνου
-  φίλους καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον ἀποκτείναντας, φίλους πεποίηνται,
-  φασὶ δὲ καὶ συμμάχους ποιήσεσθαι.
-
-  We know from Dionysius that this oration was delivered between
-  Midsummer 352 B. C. and Midsummer 351 B. C. I have already
-  remarked that it must have been delivered, in my judgment, before
-  the month Mæmakterion (November) 352 B. C.
-
-Here was an important change of policy on the part of the Olynthians.
-Though they probably intended it, not as a measure of hostility
-against Philip, but simply as a precaution to ensure to themselves
-recourse elsewhere in case of becoming exposed to his attack, it
-was not likely that he would either draw or recognize any such
-distinction. He would probably consider that by the cession of
-Potidæa, he had purchased their coöperation against Athens, and would
-treat their secession as at least making an end to all amicable
-relations.
-
-A few months afterwards (at the date of the first Philippic[690])
-we find that he, or his soldiers, had attacked, and made sudden
-excursions into their territory, close adjoining to his own.
-
-  [690] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 44. s. 20. ... ἐπὶ τὰς
-  ἐξαίφνης ταύτας ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας χώρας αὐτοῦ στρατείας, εἰς Πύλας
-  καὶ Χεῤῥόνησον καὶ Ὄλυνθον καὶ ὅποι βούλεται.
-
-In this state of partial hostility, yet without proclaimed or
-vigorous war, matters seem to have remained throughout the year 351
-B. C. Philip was engaged during that year in his Thracian expedition,
-where he fell sick, so that aggressive enterprise was for the time
-suspended. Meanwhile the Athenians seem to have proposed to Olynthus
-a scheme of decided alliance against Philip.[691] But the Olynthians
-had too much to fear from him, to become themselves the aggressors.
-They still probably hoped that he might find sufficient enemies
-and occupation elsewhere, among Thracians, Illyrians, Pæonians,
-Arymbas and the Epirots, and Athenians;[692] at any rate, they would
-not be the first to provoke a contest. This state of reciprocal
-mistrust[693] continued for several months, until at length Philip
-began serious operations against them; not very long after his
-recovery from the sickness in Thrace, and seemingly towards the
-middle of 350 B. C.;[694] a little before the beginning of Olympiad
-107, 3.
-
-  [691] Demosthenes, Olynthiac i. p. 11. s. 7. ... νυνὶ γὰρ, ~ὃ
-  πάντες ἐθρύλλουν τέως, Ὀλυνθίους ἐκπολεμῆσαι δεῖν~ Φιλίππῳ,
-  γέγονεν αὐτόματον, καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὡς ἂν ὑμῖν μάλιστα συμφέροι. Εἰ μὲν
-  γὰρ ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν πεισθέντες ἀνείλοντο τὸν πόλεμον, σφαλεροὶ σύμμαχοι
-  καὶ μέχρι του ταῦτ᾽ ἂν ἐγνωκότες ἦσαν ἴσως, etc.
-
-  Compare Olynth. iii. p. 30. s. 9. and p. 32. s. 18. οὐχ οὓς, εἰ
-  πολεμήσαιεν, ἑτοίμως σώσειν ὑπισχνούμεθα, οὗτοι νῦν πολεμοῦνται;
-
-  [692] Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13.
-
-  [693] Demosthen. Olynth. iii. p. 30. s. 8. οὔτε Φίλιππος ἐθάῤῥει
-  τούτους, οὔθ᾽ οὗτοι Φίλιππον, etc.
-
-  [694] Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13. ... ἠσθένησε· πάλιν
-  ῥαΐσας οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ῥᾳθυμεῖν ἀπέκλινεν, ἀλλ᾽ ~εὐθὺς Ὀλυνθίοις
-  ἐπεχείρησεν~.
-
-  What length of time is denoted by the adverb εὐθὺς, must of
-  course be matter of conjecture. If the expression had been found
-  in the Oration De Coronâ, delivered twenty years afterwards, we
-  might have construed εὐθὺς very loosely. But it occurs here in an
-  oration delivered probably in the latter half of 350 B. C., but
-  certainly not later than the first half of 348 B. C. Accordingly,
-  it is hardly reasonable to assign to the interval here designated
-  by εὐθὺς (that between Philip’s recovery and his serious attack
-  upon the Olynthians) a longer time than six months. We should
-  then suppose this attack to have been commenced about the
-  last quartet of Olymp. 107, 2; or in the first half of 350 B.
-  C. This is the view of Böhnecke, and, I think, very probable
-  (Forschungen, p. 211).
-
-It was probably during the continuance of such semi-hostile relations
-that two half-brothers of Philip, sons of his father Amyntas by
-another mother, sought and obtained shelter at Olynthus. They came as
-his enemies; for he had put to death already one of their brothers,
-and they themselves only escaped the same fate by flight. Whether
-they had committed any positive act to provoke his wrath, we are not
-informed; but such tragedies were not unfrequent in the Macedonian
-regal family. While Olynthus was friendly and grateful to Philip,
-these exiles would not have resorted thither; but they were now
-favorably received, and may perhaps have held out hopes that in case
-of war they could raise a Macedonian party against Philip. To that
-prince, the reception of his fugitive enemies served as a plausible
-pretence for war—which he doubtless would under all circumstances
-have prosecuted—against Olynthus; and it seems to have been so put
-forward in his public declarations.[695]
-
-  [695] Justin, viii. 3; Orosius, iii. 12. Justin states this as
-  the _cause_ of the attack made by Philip on Olynthus—which I do
-  not believe. But I see no ground for doubting the fact itself—or
-  for doubting that Philip laid hold of it as a _pretext_. He found
-  the half-brothers in Olynthus when the city was taken, and put
-  both of them to death.
-
-But Philip, in accomplishing his conquests, knew well how to blend
-the influences of deceit and seduction with those of arms, and to
-divide or corrupt those whom he intended to subdue. To such insidious
-approaches Olynthus was in many ways open. The power of that city
-consisted, in great part, in her position as chief of a numerous
-confederacy, including a large proportion, though probably not all,
-of the Grecian cities in the peninsula of Chalkidikê. Among the
-different members of such a confederacy, there was more or less of
-dissentient interest or sentiment, which accidental circumstances
-might inflame so as to induce a wish for separation. In each city
-moreover, and in Olynthus itself, there were ambitious citizens
-competing for power, and not scrupulous as to the means whereby it
-was to be acquired or retained. In each of them, Philip could open
-intrigues, and enlist partisans; in some, he would probably receive
-invitations to do so; for the greatness of his exploits, while it
-inspired alarm in some quarters, raised hopes among disappointed and
-jealous minorities. If, through such predisposing circumstances, he
-either made or found partisans and traitors in the distant cities
-of Peloponnesus, much more was this practicable for him in the
-neighboring peninsula of Chalkidikê. Olynthus and the other cities
-were nearly all conterminous with the Macedonian territory, some
-probably with boundaries not clearly settled. Perdikkas II. had
-given to the Olynthians (at the beginning of the Peloponnesian
-war[696]) a portion of his territory near the Lake Bolbê: Philip
-himself had given to them the district of Anthemus. Possessed of so
-much neighboring land, he had the means, with little loss to himself,
-of materially favoring or enriching such individual citizens, of
-Olynthus or other cities, as chose to promote his designs. Besides
-direct bribes, where that mode of proceeding was most effective, he
-could grant the right of gratuitous pasture to the flocks and herds
-of one, and furnish abundant supplies of timber to another. Master as
-he now was of Amphipolis and Philippi, he could at pleasure open or
-close to them the speculations of the gold mines of Mount Pangæus,
-for which they had always hankered.[697] If his privateers harassed
-even the powerful Athens, and the islands under her protection,
-much more vexatious would they be to his neighbors in the Chalkidic
-peninsula, which they as it were encircled, from the Thermaic Gulf on
-one side to the Strymonic Gulf on the other. Lastly, we cannot doubt
-that some individuals in these cities had found it profitable to take
-service, civil or military, under Philip, which would supply him with
-correspondents and adherents among their friends and relatives.
-
-  [696] Thucyd. i. 58.
-
-  [697] Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 425, 426; Xenophon, Hellen. v.
-  2. 17.
-
-It will thus be easily seen, that with reference to Olynthus and
-her confederate cities, Philip had at his command means of private
-benefit and annoyance to such an extent, as would ensure to him the
-coöperation of a venal and traitorous minority in each; such minority
-of course blending its proceedings, and concealing its purposes,
-among the standing political feuds of the place. These means however
-were only preliminary to the direct use of the sword. His seductions
-and presents commenced the work, but his excellent generalship
-and soldiers—the phalanx, the hypaspistæ, and the cavalry, all
-now brought into admirable training during the ten years of his
-reign—completed it.
-
-Though Demosthenes in one passage goes so far as to say that Philip
-rated his established influence so high as to expect to incorporate
-the Chalkidic confederacy in his empire without serious difficulty
-and without even real war[698]—there is ground for believing that he
-encountered strenuous resistance, avenged by unmeasured rigors after
-the victory. The two years and a half between Midsummer 350 B. C.,
-and the commencement of 347 B. C. (the two last years of Olympiad
-107 and the nine first months of Olympiad 108), were productive of
-phænomena more terror-striking than anything in the recent annals of
-Greece. No less than thirty-two free Grecian cities in Chalkidikê
-were taken and destroyed, the inhabitants being reduced to slavery,
-by Philip. Among them was Olynthus, one of the most powerful,
-flourishing, and energetic members of the Hellenic brotherhood;
-Apollonia, whose inhabitants would now repent the untoward obstinacy
-of their fathers (thirty-two years before) in repudiating a generous
-and equal confederacy with Olynthus, and invoking Spartan aid to
-revive the falling power of Philip’s father, Amyntas; and Stageira,
-the birth-place of Aristotle. The destruction of thirty-two free
-Hellenic communities in two years by a foreign prince, was a calamity
-the like of which had never occurred since the suppression of the
-Ionic revolt and the invasion of Xerxes. I have already recounted in
-a previous chapter[699] the manifestation of wrath at the festival
-of the ninety-ninth Olympiad (394 B. C.) against the envoys of the
-elder Dionysius of Syracuse, who had captured and subverted five or
-six free Hellenic communities in Italy and Sicily. Far more vehement
-would be the sentiment of awe and terror, after the Olynthian war,
-against the Macedonian destroyer of thirty-two Chalkidic cities.
-We shall find this plainly indicated in the phænomena immediately
-succeeding. We shall see Athens terrified into a peace alike
-dishonorable and improvident, which even Demosthenes does not venture
-to oppose; we shall see Æschines passing out of a free spoken
-Athenian citizen into a servile worshipper, if not a paid agent, of
-Philip: we shall observe Isokrates, once the champion of Pan-hellenic
-freedom and integrity, ostentatiously proclaiming Philip as the
-master and arbiter of Greece, while persuading him at the same time
-to use his power well for the purpose of conquering Persia. These
-were terrible times; suitably illustrated in their cruel details by
-the gangs of enslaved Chalkidic Greeks of both sexes, seen passing
-even into Peloponnesus[700] as the property of new grantees who
-extolled the munificence of the donor Philip; and suitably ushered in
-by awful celestial signs, showers of fire and blood falling from the
-heavens to the earth, in testimony of the wrath of the gods.[701]
-
-  [698] Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 22. οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐξήνεγκε τὸν
-  πόλεμόν ποτε τοῦτον ἐκεῖνος, εἰ πολεμεῖν ᾠήθη δεήσειν αὐτὸν,
-  ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπιὼν ἅπαντα τότε ἤλπιζε τὰ πράγματα ἀναιρήσεσθαι, κᾆτα
-  διέψευσται. Τοῦτο δὴ πρῶτον αὐτὸν ταράττει παρὰ γνώμην γεγονὸς,
-  etc.
-
-  [699] See ch. lxxxiii. p. 35 of this Volume.
-
-  [700] Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 439. Æschines himself met a
-  person named Atrestidas followed by one of these sorrowful
-  troops. We may be sure that this case was only one among many.
-
-  [701] Pliny, H. N. ii. 27. “Fit et cœli ipsius hiatus, quod
-  vocant chasma. Fit et sanguineâ specie (quo nihil terribilius
-  mortalium timori est) incendium ad terras cadens inde; _sicut
-  Olympiadis centesimæ septimæ anno tertio, cum rex Philippus
-  Græciam quateret_. Atque ego hæc statis temporibus naturæ, ut
-  cetera, arbitror existere; non (ut plerique) variis de causis,
-  quas ingeniorum acumen excogitat. _Quippe ingentium malorum fuere
-  prænuntia_; sed ea accidisse non quia hæc facta sunt arbitror,
-  verum hæc ideo facta, quia incasura erant illa: raritate autem
-  occultam eorum esse rationem, ideoque non sicut exortus supra
-  dictos defectusque et multa alia nosci.”
-
-  The precision of this chronological note makes it valuable.
-  Olymp. 107, 3—corresponds to the year between Midsummer 350 and
-  Midsummer 349 B. C.
-
-  Taylor, who cites this passage in his Prolegomena ad Demosthenem
-  (ap. Reiske Oratt. Gr. vol. viii. p. 756), takes the liberty,
-  without any manuscript authority, of altering _tertio_ into
-  _quarto_; which Böhnecke justly pronounces to be unreasonable
-  (Forschungen, p. 212). The passage as it stands is an evidence,
-  not merely to authenticate the terrific character of the time,
-  but also to prove, among other evidences, that the attack of
-  Philip on the Olynthians and Chalkidians began in 350-349 B.
-  C.—not in the following Olympic year, or in the time after
-  Midsummer 349 B. C.
-
-  Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 201-221) has gone into an examination
-  of the dates and events of this Olynthian war, and has arranged
-  them in a manner different from any preceding critic. His
-  examination is acute and instructive, including however some
-  reasonings of little force or pertinence. I follow him generally,
-  in placing the beginning of the Olynthian war, and the Olynthiacs
-  of Demosthenes, before Olymp. 107, 4. This is the best opinion
-  which I can form, on matters lamentably unattested and uncertain.
-
-While, however, we make out with tolerable clearness the general
-result of Philip’s Olynthian war, and the terror which it struck into
-the Grecian mind—we are not only left without information as to its
-details, but are even perplexed by its chronology. I have already
-remarked, that though the Olynthians had contracted such suspicions
-of Philip, even before the beginning of 351 B. C., as to induce them
-to make peace with his enemy Athens—they had nevertheless, declined
-the overtures of Athens for a closer alliance, not wishing to bring
-upon themselves decided hostility from so powerful a neighbor, until
-his aggressions should become such as to leave them no choice. We
-have no precise information as to Philip’s movements after his
-operations in Thrace and his sickness in 351 B. C. But we know that
-it was not in his nature to remain inactive; that he was incessantly
-pushing his conquests; and that no conquest could be so important to
-him as that of Olynthus and the Chalkidic peninsula. Accordingly,
-we are not surprised to find, that the Olynthian and Chalkidian
-confederates became the object of his direct hostility in 350 B.
-C. He raised pretences for attack against one or other of these
-cities separately; avoiding to deal with the confederacy as a whole,
-and disclaiming, by special envoys,[702] all purposes injurious to
-Olynthus.
-
-  [702] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113. That Philip not only
-  attacked, but even subdued, the thirty-two Chalkidic cities,
-  before he marched directly and finally to assail Olynthus—is
-  stated in the Fragment of Kallisthenes ap. Stobæum, Eclog. Tit.
-  vii. p. 92.
-
-  Kallisthenes, whose history is lost, was a native of Olynthus,
-  born a few years before the capture of the city.
-
-Probably the philippizing party in that city may have dwelt upon
-this disclaimer as satisfactory, and given as many false assurances
-about the purposes of Philip, as we shall find Æschines hereafter
-uttering at Athens. But the general body of citizens were not so
-deceived. Feeling that the time had come when it was prudent to close
-with the previous Athenian overtures, they sent envoys to Athens to
-propose alliance and invite coöperation against Philip. Their first
-propositions were doubtless not couched in the language of urgency
-and distress. They were not as yet in any actual danger; their
-power was great in reality, and estimated at its full value abroad;
-moreover, as prudent diplomatists, they would naturally overstate
-their own dignity and the magnitude of what they were offering. Of
-course they would ask for Athenian aid to be sent to Chalkidikê—since
-it was there that the war was being carried on; but they would ask
-for aid in order to act energetically against the common enemy,
-and repress the growth of his power—not to avert immediate danger
-menacing Olynthus.
-
-There needed no discussion to induce the Athenians to accept this
-alliance. It was what they had long been seeking, and they willingly
-closed with the proposition. Of course they also promised—what indeed
-was almost involved in the acceptance—to send a force to coöperate
-against Philip in Chalkidikê. On this first recognition of Olynthus
-as an ally—or perhaps shortly afterwards, but before circumstances
-had at all changed—Demosthenes delivered his earliest Olynthiac
-harangue. Of the three memorable compositions so denominated, the
-earliest is, in my judgment, that which stands _second_ in the edited
-order. Their true chronological order has long been, and still is,
-matter of controversy; the best conclusion which I can form, is that
-the first and the second are erroneously placed, but that the third
-is really the latest;[703] all of them being delivered during the six
-or seven last months of 350 B. C.
-
-  [703] Some remarks will be found on the order of the Olynthiacs,
-  in an Appendix to the present chapter.
-
-  It must be understood that I always speak of the Olynthiacs as
-  _first_, _second_, and _third_, according to the common and
-  edited order; though I cannot adopt that order as correct.
-
-In this his earliest advocacy (the speech which stands printed as
-the second Olynthiac), Demosthenes insists upon the advantageous
-contingency which has just turned up for Athens, through the blessing
-of the gods, in the spontaneous tender of so valuable an ally. He
-recommends that aid be despatched to the new ally; the most prompt
-and effective aid will please him the best. But this recommendation
-is contained in a single sentence, in the middle of the speech; it
-is neither repeated a second time, nor emphatically insisted upon,
-nor enlarged by specification of quantity or quality of aid to be
-sent. No allusion is made to necessities or danger of Olynthus, nor
-to the chance that Philip might conquer the town; still less to
-ulterior contingencies, that Philip, if he did conquer it, might
-carry the seat of war from his own coasts to those of Attica. On
-the contrary, Demosthenes adverts to the power of the Olynthians—to
-the situation of their territory, close on Philip’s flanks—to their
-fixed resolution that they will never again enter into amity or
-compromise with him—as evidences how valuable their alliance will
-prove to Athens; enabling her to prosecute with improved success the
-war against Philip, and to retrieve the disgraceful losses brought
-upon her by previous remissness. The main purpose of the orator is
-to inflame his countrymen into more hearty and vigorous efforts for
-the prosecution of this general war; while to furnish aid to the
-Olynthians, is only a secondary purpose, and a part of the larger
-scheme. “I shall not (says the orator) expatiate on the formidable
-power of Philip as an argument to urge you to the performance of
-your public duty. That would be too much both of compliment to him
-and of disparagement to you. I should, indeed, myself have thought
-him truly formidable, if he had achieved his present eminence by
-means consistent with justice. But he has aggrandized himself, partly
-through your negligence and improvidence, partly by treacherous
-means—by taking into pay corrupt partisans at Athens, and by cheating
-successively Olynthians, Thessalians, and all his other allies.
-These allies, having now detected his treachery, are deserting him;
-without them, his power will crumble away. Moreover, the Macedonians
-themselves have no sympathy with his personal ambition; they are
-fatigued with the labor imposed upon them by his endless military
-movements, and impoverished by the closing of their ports through
-the war. His vaunted officers are men of worthless and dissolute
-habits; his personal companions are thieves, vile ministers of
-amusement, outcasts from our cities. His past good fortune imparts to
-all this real weakness a fallacious air of strength; and doubtless
-his good fortune has been very great. But the fortune of Athens,
-and her title to the benevolent aid of the gods is still greater—if
-only you, Athenians, will do your duty. Yet here you are, sitting
-still, doing nothing. The sluggard cannot even command his friends
-to work for him—much less the gods. I do not wonder, that Philip,
-always in the field, always in movement, doing everything for
-himself, never letting slip an opportunity—prevails over you who
-merely talk, inquire, and vote, without action. Nay—the contrary
-would be wonderful—if under such circumstances, he had _not_ been
-the conqueror. But what I do wonder at is, that you Athenians—who
-in former days contended for Pan-hellenic freedom against the
-Lacedæmonians—who, scorning unjust aggrandizement for yourselves,
-fought in person and lavished your substance to protect the rights
-of other Greeks—that _you_ now shrink from personal service and
-payment of money for the defence of your own possessions. You, who
-have so often rescued others, can now sit still after having lost so
-much of your own! I wonder you do not look back to that conduct of
-yours which has brought your affairs into this state of ruin, and
-ask yourselves how they can ever mend, while such conduct remains
-unchanged. It was much easier at first to preserve what we once had,
-than to recover it now that it is lost; we have nothing now left to
-lose—we have everything to recover. This must be done by ourselves,
-and at once; we must furnish money, we must serve in person by turns;
-we must give our generals means to do their work well, and then exact
-from them a severe account afterwards—which we cannot do so long
-as we ourselves will neither pay nor serve. We must correct that
-abuse which has grown up, whereby particular symmories in the state
-combine to exempt themselves from burdensome duties, and to cast them
-all unjustly upon others. We must not only come forward vigorously
-and heartily, with person and with money, but each man must embrace
-faithfully his fair share of patriotic obligation.”
-
-Such are the main points of the earliest discourse delivered by
-Demosthenes on the subject of Olynthus. In the mind of modern
-readers, as in that of the rhetor Dionysius,[704] there is an
-unconscious tendency to imagine that these memorable pleadings must
-have worked persuasion, and to magnify the efficiency of their author
-as an historical and directing person. But there are no facts to
-bear out such an impression. Demosthenes was still comparatively a
-young man—thirty-one years of age; admired indeed for his speeches
-and his compositions written to be spoken by others;[705] but as yet
-not enjoying much practical influence. It is moreover certain—to
-his honor—that he described and measured foreign dangers before they
-were recognized by ordinary politicians; that he advised a course,
-energetic and salutary indeed, but painful for the people to act
-upon, and disagreeable for recognized leaders to propose; that these
-leaders, such as Eubulus and others, were accordingly adverse to him.
-The tone of Demosthenes in these speeches is that of one who feels
-that he is contending against heavy odds—combating an habitual and
-deep-seated reluctance. He is an earnest remonstrant—an opposition
-speaker—contributing to raise up gradually a body of public sentiment
-and conviction which ultimately may pass into act. His rival Eubulus
-is the ministerial spokesman, whom the majority, both rich and
-poor, followed; a man not at all corrupt (so far as we know), but
-of simple conservative routine, evading all painful necessities and
-extraordinary precautions; conciliating the rich by resisting a
-property-tax, and the general body of citizens by refusing to meddle
-with the Theôric expenditure.
-
-  [704] Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæ. p. 736. μετὰ γὰρ ἄρχοντα Καλλίμαχον,
-  ἐφ᾽ οὗ τὰς εἰς Ὄλυνθον βοηθείας ἀπέστειλαν Ἀθηναῖοι, ~πεισθέντες
-  ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους~, etc.
-
-  He connects the three Olynthiacs of Demosthenes, with the three
-  Athenian armaments sent to Olynthus in the year following
-  Midsummer 349 B. C.; for which armaments he had just before cited
-  Philochorus.
-
-  [705] This is evident from the sneers of Meidias: see the oration
-  of Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 575, 576. (spoken in the year
-  following—349-348 B. C.)
-
-  I observe, not without regret, that Demosthenes himself is
-  not ashamed to put the like sneers into the mouth of a client
-  speaking before the Dikastery—against Lakritus—“this very clever
-  man, who has paid ten minæ to Isokrates for a course of rhetoric,
-  and thinks himself able to talk you over as he pleases,” etc.
-  (Demosth. adv. Lakrit. p. 938).
-
-The Athenians did not follow the counsel of Demosthenes. They
-accepted the Olynthian alliance, but took no active step to coöperate
-with Olynthus in the war against Philip.[706] Such unhappily was
-their usual habit. The habit of Philip was the opposite. We need no
-witness to satisfy us, that he would not slacken in his attack—and
-that in the course of a month or two, he would master more than one
-of the Chalkidic cities, perhaps defeating the Olynthian forces
-also. The Olynthians would discover that they had gained nothing by
-their new allies; while the philippizing party among themselves
-would take advantage of the remissness of Athens to depreciate her
-promises as worthless or insincere, and to press for accommodation
-with the enemy.[707] Complaints would presently reach Athens, brought
-by fresh envoys from the Olynthians, and probably also from the
-Chalkidians, who were the greatest sufferers by Philip’s arms. They
-would naturally justify this renewed application by expatiating
-on the victorious progress of Philip; they would now call for aid
-more urgently, and might even glance at the possibility of Philip’s
-conquest of Chalkidikê. It was in this advanced stage of the
-proceedings that Demosthenes again exerted himself in the cause,
-delivering that speech which stands first in the printed order of the
-Olynthiacs.
-
-  [706] An orator of the next generation (Deinarchus cont.
-  Demosthen. p. 102, s. 99) taunts Demosthenes as a mere
-  opposition-talker, in contrast with the excellent administration
-  of the finances and marine under Eubulus—ποῖαι γὰρ τριήρεις εἰσὶ
-  κατεσκευασμέναι διὰ τοῦτον (Demosthenes) ὥσπερ επὶ Εὐβούλου,
-  τῇ πόλει; ἢ ποῖοι νεώσοικοι τούτου πολιτευομένου γεγόνασι;
-  The administration of Eubulus must have left a creditable
-  remembrance, to be thus cited afterwards.
-
-  See Theopompus ap. Harpokr. v. Εὔβουλος; Plutarch, Reipubl.
-  Gerend. Præcept. p. 812. Compare also Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 435;
-  and Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 57. c. 11.
-
-  [707] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9. ὡς ἔστι μάλιστα τοῦτο δέος, μὴ
-  πανοῦργος ὢν καὶ δεινὸς ἅνθρωπος (Philip) πράγμασι χρῆσθαι τὰ
-  μὲν εἴκων ἡνίκ᾽ ἂν τύχῃ, τὰ δ᾽ ἀπειλῶν, τὰ δ᾽ ἡμᾶς διαβάλλων καὶ
-  ~τὴν ἀπουσίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν~ τρέψῃ τε καὶ παρασπάσηταί τι τῶν ὅλων
-  πραγμάτων.
-
-  This occurs in the next subsequent speech of Demosthenes,
-  intimating what Philip and his partisans had already deduced as
-  inference from the past neglect of the Athenians to send any aid
-  to Olynthus. Of course, no such inference could be started until
-  some time had been allowed for expectation and disappointment;
-  which is one among many reasons for believing the first Olynthiac
-  to be posterior in time to the second.
-
-Here we have, not a Philippic, but a true Olynthiac. Olynthus is no
-longer part and parcel of a larger theme, upon the whole of which
-Demosthenes intends to discourse; but stands out as the prominent
-feature and specialty of his pleading. It is now pronounced to be in
-danger and in pressing need of succor; moreover its preservation is
-strenuously pressed upon the Athenians, as essential to their own
-safety. While it stands with its confederacy around it, the Athenians
-can fight Philip on his own coast; if it falls, there is nothing to
-prevent him from transferring the war into Attica, and assailing them
-on their own soil.[708] Demosthenes is wound up to a higher pitch
-of emphasis, complaining of the lukewarmness of his countrymen on
-a crisis which calls aloud for instant action.[709] He again urges
-that a vote be at once passed to assist Olynthus, and two armaments
-despatched as quickly as possible; one to preserve to Olynthus her
-confederate cities—the other, to make a diversion by simultaneous
-attack on Philip at home. Without such two-fold aid (he says) the
-cities cannot be preserved.[710] Advice of aid generally he had
-already given, though less emphatically, in his previous harangue;
-but he now superadds a new suggestion—that Athenian envoys shall
-be sent thither, not merely to announce the coming of the force,
-but also to remain at Olynthus and watch over the course of events.
-For he is afraid, that unless such immediate encouragement be sent,
-Philip may, even without the tedious process of a siege, frighten or
-cajole the Olynthian confederacy into submission; partly by reminding
-them that Athens had done nothing for them, and by denouncing her
-as a treacherous and worthless ally.[711] Philip would be glad to
-entrap them into some plausible capitulation; and though they knew
-that they could have no security for his keeping the terms of it
-afterwards, still he might succeed, if Athens remained idle. Now,
-if ever, was the time for Athenians to come forward and do their
-duty without default; to serve in person and submit to the necessary
-amount of direct taxation. They had no longer the smallest pretence
-for continued inaction; the very conjuncture which they had so long
-desired, had turned up of itself—war between Olynthus and Philip,
-and that too upon grounds special to Olynthus—not at the instigation
-of Athens.[712] The Olynthian alliance had been thrown in the way of
-Athens by the peculiar goodness of the gods, to enable her to repair
-her numerous past errors and short-comings. She ought to look well
-and deal rightly with these last remaining opportunities, in order
-to wipe off the shame of the past; but if she now let slip Olynthus
-and suffer Philip to conquer it, there was nothing else to hinder him
-from marching whithersoever he chose. His ambition was so insatiable,
-his activity so incessant, that, assuming Athens to persist in her
-careless inaction, he would carry the war forward from Thrace into
-Attica—of which the ruinous consequences were but too clear.[713]
-
-  [708] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 12, 13.
-
-  [709] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9.
-
-  [710] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 14. Φημὶ δὴ διχῆ βοηθητέον εἶναι
-  τοῖς πράγμασιν ὑμῖν· ~τῷ τε τὰς πόλεις τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις σῴζειν~,
-  καὶ τοὺς τοῦτο ποιήσοντας στρατιώτας ἐκπέμπειν—καὶ τῷ τὴν ἐκείνου
-  χώραν κακῶς ποιεῖν καὶ τριήρεσι καὶ στρατιώταις ἑτέροις· εἰ δὲ
-  θατέρου τούτων ὀλιγωρήσετε, ὀκνῶ μὴ μάταιος ὑμῶν ἡ στρατεία
-  γένηται.
-
-  [711] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9, 10.
-
-  [712] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 11.
-
-  [713] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 12, 13, 16. ... εἰ δὲ προησόμεθα
-  καὶ τούτους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, εἶτ᾽ Ὄλυνθον ἐκεῖνος καταστρέψεται,
-  φρασάτω τις ἐμοὶ, τί τὸ κωλῦον ἔτ᾽ αὐτὸν ἔσται βαδίζειν ὅποι
-  βούλεται.
-
-  ... τίς οὕτως εὐήθης ἐστὶν ὑμῶν ὅστις ἀγνοεῖ τὸν ἐκεῖθεν πόλεμον
-  δεῦρο ἥξοντα, ἂν ἀμελήσωμεν;
-
-“I maintain (continued the orator) that you ought to lend aid at the
-present crisis in two ways; by preserving for the Olynthians their
-confederated cities, through a body of troops sent out for that
-express purpose—and by employing at the same time other troops and
-other triremes to act aggressively against Philip’s own coast. If you
-neglect either of these measures, I fear that the expedition will
-fail. As to the pecuniary provision, you have already more money than
-any other city, available for purposes of war; if you will pay that
-money to soldiers on service, no need exists for farther provision—if
-not, then need exists; but above all things, money _must_ be found.
-What then! I shall be asked—are you moving that the Theôric fund
-shall be devoted to war purposes? Not I, by Zeus. I merely express
-my conviction, that soldiers _must_ be equipped, and that receipt of
-public money, and performance of public service, ought to go hand in
-hand; but your practice is to take the public money, without any such
-condition, for the festivals. Accordingly, nothing remains except
-that all should directly contribute; much, if much is wanted—little,
-if little will suffice. Money must be had; without it, not a single
-essential step can be taken. There are moreover different ways
-and means suggested by others. Choose any one of these which you
-think advantageous; and lay a vigorous grasp on events while the
-opportunity still lasts.”[714]
-
-  [714] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 15.
-
-It was thus that Demosthenes addressed his countrymen some time after
-the Olynthians had been received as allies, but before any auxiliary
-force had been either sent to them or even positively decreed—yet
-when such postponement of action had inspired them with mistrust,
-threatening to throw them, even without resistance, into the hands of
-Philip and their own philippizing party. We observe in Demosthenes
-the same sagacious appreciation, both of the present and the future,
-as we have already remarked in the first Philippic—foresight of the
-terrible consequences of this Olynthian war, while as yet distant and
-unobserved by others. We perceive the same good sense and courage
-in invoking the right remedies; though his propositions of personal
-military service, direct taxation, or the diversion of the Theôric
-fund—were all of them the most unpopular which could be made. The
-last of the three, indeed, he does not embody in a substantive
-motion; nor could he move it without positive illegality, which would
-have rendered him liable to the indictment called Graphê Paranomon.
-But he approaches it near enough to raise in the public mind the
-question as it really stood—that money must be had; that there were
-only two ways of getting it—direct taxation, and appropriation of
-the festival fund; and that the latter of these ought to be restored
-as well as the former. We shall find this question about the Theôric
-Fund coming forward again more than once, and shall have presently to
-notice it more at large.
-
-At some time after this new harangue of Demosthenes—how long after
-it, or how far in consequence of it, we cannot say—the Athenians
-commissioned and sent a body of foreign mercenaries to the aid of
-the Olynthians and Chalkidians. The outfit and transport of these
-troops was in part defrayed by voluntary subscriptions from rich
-Athenian citizens. But no Athenian citizen-soldiers were sent; nor
-was any money assigned for the pay of the mercenaries. The expedition
-appears to have been sent towards the autumn of 350 B. C., as far as
-we can pretend to affirm anything respecting the obscure chronology
-of this period.[715] It presently gained some victory over Philip
-or Philip’s generals, and was enabled to transmit good news to
-Athens, which excited much exultation there, and led the people to
-fancy that they were in a fair way of taking revenge on Philip for
-past miscarriages. According to some speakers, not only were the
-Olynthians beyond all reach of danger, but Philip was in a fair
-way of being punished and humbled. It is indeed possible that the
-success may really have been something considerable, such as to check
-Philip’s progress for the time. Though victorious on the whole, he
-must have experienced partial and temporary reverses, otherwise he
-would have concluded the war before the early spring of 347 B. C.
-Whether this success coincided with that of the Athenian general
-Chares over Philip’s general Adæus,[716] we cannot say.
-
-  [715] In my view, it is necessary to separate entirely the
-  proceedings alluded to in the Demosthenic Olynthiacs, from the
-  three expeditions to Olynthus mentioned by Philochorus during
-  the following year—349-348 B. C., the archonship of Kallimachus.
-  I see no reason to controvert the statement of Philochorus,
-  that there were three expeditions during that year, such as he
-  describes. But he must be mistaken (or Dionysius must have copied
-  him erroneously) in setting forth those three expeditions _as the
-  whole Olynthian war_, and the first of the three as being the
-  beginning of the war. The Olynthian war began in 350 B. C., and
-  the three Olynthiacs of Demosthenes refer, in my judgment, to the
-  first months of the war. But it lasted until the early spring of
-  347 B. C., so that the armaments mentioned by Philochorus may
-  have occurred during the last half of the war. I cannot but think
-  that Dionysius, being satisfied with finding _three_ expeditions
-  to Olynthus which might be attached as results to the _three_
-  orations of Demosthenes, was too hastily copied out the three
-  from Philochorus, and has assigned the date of 349-348 B. C. to
-  the three _orations_, simply because he found that date given to
-  the three _expeditions_ by Philochorus.
-
-  The revolt in Eubœa, the expedition of Phokion with the battle of
-  Tamynæ and the prolonged war in that island, began about January
-  or February 349 B. C., and continued throughout that year and the
-  next. Mr. Clinton even places these events a year earlier; in
-  which I do not concur, but which, if adopted, would throw back
-  the beginning of the Olynthian war one year farther still. It is
-  certain that there was one Athenian expedition at least sent to
-  Olynthus _before the Eubœan war_, (Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p.
-  566-578)—an expedition so considerable that voluntary donations
-  from the rich citizens were obtained towards the cost. Here is
-  good proof (better than Philochorus, if indeed it be inconsistent
-  with what he really said) that the Athenians not only contracted
-  the alliance of Olynthus, but actually assisted Olynthus, during
-  the year 350 B. C. Now the Olynthiacs of Demosthenes present to
-  my mind strong evidence of belonging to the earliest months of
-  the Olynthian war. I think it reasonable, therefore, to suppose
-  that the expedition of foreign mercenaries to Olynthus, which the
-  third Olynthiac implies as having been sent, is the same as that
-  for which the ἐπιδόσεις mentioned in the Meidiana were required.
-  See Böhnecke, Forschungen, p. 202; and K. F. Hermann, De Anno
-  Natali Demosthenis, p. 9.
-
-  [716] Theopompus ap. Athenæ;, xii. p. 532. This victory would
-  seem to belong more naturally (as Dr. Thirlwall remarks) to the
-  operations of Chares and Onomarchus against Philip in Thessaly,
-  in 353-352 B. C. But the point cannot be determined.
-
-But Demosthenes had sagacity enough to perceive, and frankness to
-proclaim, that it was a success noway decisive of the war generally;
-worse than nothing, if it induced the Athenians to fancy that they
-had carried their point.
-
-To correct the delusive fancy, that enough had been done—to combat
-that chronic malady under which the Athenians so readily found
-encouragement and excuses for inaction—to revive in them the
-conviction, that they had contracted a debt, yet unpaid, towards
-their Olynthian allies and towards their own ultimate security—is the
-scope of Demosthenes in his third Olynthiac harangue; third in the
-printed order, and third also, according to my judgment, in order
-of time; delivered towards the close of the year 350 B. C.[717]
-Like Perikles, he was not less watchful to abate extravagant and
-unseasonable illusions of triumph in his countrymen, than to raise
-their spirits in moments of undue alarm and despondency.[718]
-
-  [717] Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 29. μέμνησθε, ὅτ᾽ ἀπηγγέλθη
-  Φίλιππος ὑμῖν ἐν Θρᾴκῃ τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἔτος τουτὶ, Ἡραῖον
-  τεῖχος πολιορκῶν· τότε τοίνυν μὴν μὲν ἦν Μαιμακτηριὼν, etc. This
-  was the month Mæmakterion or November 352 B. C. Calculating
-  forward from that date, τρίτον ἔτος means _the next year but
-  one_; that is the Attic year Olymp. 107. 3, or the year between
-  Midsummer 350 and Midsummer 349 B. C. Dionysius of Halikarnassus
-  says (p. 726)—Καλλιμάχου τοῦ τρίτου μετὰ Θέσσαλον ἄρξαντος—though
-  there was only one archon between Thessalus and Kallimachus. When
-  Demosthenes says τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἔτος—it is clear that both
-  cannot be accurate; we must choose one or the other; and τρίτον
-  ἔτος brings us to the year 350-349 B. C.
-
-  To show that the oration was probably spoken during the first
-  half of that year, or before February 349 B. C., another point of
-  evidence may be noticed.
-
-  At the time when the third Olynthiac was spoken, _no_ expedition
-  of Athenian _citizens_ had yet been sent to the help of Olynthus.
-  But we shall see, presently, that Athenian citizens _were_ sent
-  thither during the first half of 349 B. C.
-
-  Indeed, it would be singular, if the Olynthiacs had been spoken
-  _after_ the expedition to Eubœa, that Demosthenes should make no
-  allusion in any one of them to that expedition, an affair of so
-  much moment and interest, which kept Athens in serious agitation
-  during much of the year, and was followed by prolonged war in
-  that neighboring island. In the third Olynthiac, Demosthenes
-  alludes to taking arms against Corinth and Megara (p. 34). Would
-  he be likely to leave the far more important proceedings in
-  Eubœa unnoticed? Would he say nothing about the grave crisis in
-  which the decree of Apollodorus was proposed? This difficulty
-  disappears when we recognize the Olynthiacs as anterior to the
-  Euboic war.
-
-  [718] Thucyd. ii. 65. Ὅποτε γοῦν αἴσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν
-  ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησσεν (Perikles) εἰς τὸ φοβεῖσθαι·
-  καὶ δεδιότας αὖ ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν.
-
-  Compare the Argument of the third Olynthiac by Libanius.
-
-“The talk which I hear about punishing Philip (says Demosthenes, in
-substance) is founded on a false basis. The real facts of the case
-teach us a very different lesson.[719] They bid us look well to our
-own security, that we be not ourselves the sufferers, and that we
-preserve our allies. There _was_ indeed a time—and that too within
-my remembrance not long ago—when we might have held our own and
-punished Philip besides; but now, our first care must be to preserve
-our own allies. After we have made this sure, then it will be time
-to think of punishing others. The present juncture calls for anxious
-deliberation. Do not again commit the same error as you committed
-three years ago. When Philip was besieging Heræum in Thrace, you
-passed an energetic decree to send an expedition against him:
-presently came reports that he was sick, and that he was dead: this
-good news made you fancy that the expedition was unnecessary, and you
-let it drop. If you had executed promptly what you resolved, Philip
-would have been put down _then_, and would have given you no further
-trouble.[720]
-
-  [719] Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 28, 29. Τοὺς μὲν γὰρ λόγους περὶ
-  τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι Φίλιππον ὁρῶ γιγνομένους, τὰ δὲ πράγματα εἰς
-  τοῦτο προήκοντα, ὥστε ὅπως μὴ πεισόμεθα αὐτοὶ πρότερον κακῶς
-  σκέψασθαι δέον.
-
-  ... τοῦθ᾽ ἱκανὸν προλαβεῖν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην, ὅπως τοὺς
-  συμμάχους σώσομεν.
-
-  [720] Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 30.
-
-“Those matters indeed are past, and cannot be mended. But I advert
-to them now, because the present war-crisis is very similar, and I
-trust you will not make the like mistake again. If you do not send
-aid to Olynthus with all your force and means, you will play Philip’s
-game for him now, exactly as you did then. You have been long anxious
-and working to get the Olynthians into war with Philip. This has
-now happened: what choice remains, except to aid them heartily and
-vigorously? You will be covered with shame, if you do not. But this
-is not all. Your own security at home requires it of you also; for
-there is nothing to hinder Philip, if he conquers Olynthus, from
-invading Attica. The Phokians are exhausted in funds—and the Thebans
-are your enemies.
-
-“All this is superfluous, I shall be told. We have already resolved
-unanimously to succor Olynthus, and we will succor it. We only
-want you to tell us how. You will be surprised, perhaps, at my
-answer. Appoint Nomothetæ at once.[721] Do not submit to them any
-propositions for new laws, for you have laws enough already—but
-only repeal such of the existing laws as are hurtful at the present
-juncture—I mean, those which regard the Theôric fund (I speak out
-thus plainly), and some which bear on the citizens in military
-service. By the former, you hand over money, which ought to go
-to soldiers on service, in Theôric distribution among those who
-stay at home. By the latter, you let off without penalty those who
-evade service, and discourage those who wish to do their duty. When
-you have repealed these mischievous laws, and rendered it safe to
-proclaim salutary truths, then expect some one to come forward with
-a formal motion such as you all know to be required. But until you
-do this, expect not that any one will make these indispensable
-propositions on your behalf, with the certainty of ruin at your
-hands. You will find no such man; especially as he would only incur
-unjust punishment for himself, without any benefit to the city—while
-his punishment would make it yet more formidable to speak out upon
-that subject in future, than it is even now. Moreover, the same men
-who proposed these laws should also take upon them to propose the
-repeal; for it is not right that these men should continue to enjoy
-a popularity which is working mischief to the whole city, while the
-unpopularity of a reform beneficial to us all, falls on the head of
-the reforming mover. But while you retain this prohibition, you can
-neither tolerate that any one among you shall be powerful enough to
-infringe a law with impunity—nor expect that any one will be fool
-enough to run with his eyes open into punishment.”
-
-  [721] Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 31, 32.
-
-I lament that my space confines me to this brief and meagre abstract
-of one of the most splendid harangues ever delivered—the third
-Olynthiac of Demosthenes. The partial advantage gained over Philip
-being prodigiously over-rated, the Athenians seemed to fancy that
-they had done enough, and were receding from their resolution to
-assist Olynthus energetically. As on so many other occasions, so on
-this—Demosthenes undertook to combat a prevalent sentiment which he
-deemed unfounded and unseasonable. With what courage, wisdom, and
-dexterity—so superior to the insulting sarcasms of Phokion—does he
-execute this self-imposed duty, well knowing its unpopularity!
-
-Whether any movement was made by the Athenians in consequence of
-the third Olynthiac of Demosthenes, we cannot determine. We have no
-ground for believing the affirmative; while we are certain that the
-specific measure which he recommended—the sending of an armament of
-citizens personally serving—was not at that time (before the end of
-350 B. C.) carried into effect. At or before the commencement of
-349 B. C., the foreign relations of Athens began to be disturbed by
-another supervening embarrassment—the revolt of Eubœa.
-
-After the successful expedition of 358 B. C., whereby the Athenians
-had expelled the Thebans from Eubœa, that island remained for some
-years in undisturbed connection with Athens. Chalkis, Eretria, and
-Oreus, its three principal cities, sent each a member to the synod
-of allies holding session at Athens, and paid their annual quota
-(seemingly five talents each) to the confederate fund.[722] During
-the third quarter of 352 B. C., Menestratus the despot or principal
-citizen of Eretria is cited as a particularly devoted friend of
-Athens.[723] But this state of things changed shortly after Philip
-conquered Thessaly and made himself master of the Pagasæan Gulf (in
-353 and the first half of 352 B. C.). His power was then established
-immediately over against Oreus and the northern coast of Eubœa, with
-which island his means of communication became easy and frequent.
-Before the date of the first Philippic of Demosthenes (seemingly
-towards the summer of 351 B. C.) Philip had opened correspondences
-in Eubœa, and had despatched thither various letters, some of which
-the orator reads in the course of that speech to the Athenian
-assembly. The actual words of the letters are not given; but from the
-criticism of the orator himself, we discern that they were highly
-offensive to Athenian feelings; instigating the Eubœans probably
-to sever themselves from Athens, with offers of Macedonian aid
-towards that object.[724] Philip’s naval warfare also brought his
-cruisers to Geræstus in Eubœa, where they captured several Athenian
-corn-ships;[725] insulting even the opposite coast of Attica at
-Marathon, so as to lower the reputation of Athens among her allies.
-Accordingly, in each of the Eubœan cities, parties were soon formed
-aiming at the acquisition of dominion through the support of Philip;
-while for the same purpose detachments of mercenaries could also be
-procured across the western Eubœan strait, out of the large numbers
-now under arms in Phokis.
-
-  [722] Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 67, 68.
-
-  [723] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 661. φέρ᾽, ἐὰν δὲ δὴ καὶ
-  Μενέστρατος ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἐρετριεὺς ἀξιοῖ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ αὑτῷ ψηφίσασθαι, ἢ
-  Φάϋλλος ὁ Φωκεὺς, etc.
-
-  [724] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 51.
-
-  [725] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 49.
-
-About the beginning of 349 B. C.—while the war of Philip, unknown
-to us in its details, against the Olynthians and Chalkidians, was
-still going on, with more or less of help from mercenaries sent by
-Athens—hostilities, probably raised by the intrigues of Philip, broke
-out at Eretria in Eubœa. An Eretrian named Plutarch (we do not know
-what had become of Menestratus), with a certain number of soldiers at
-his disposal, but opposed by enemies yet more powerful, professed to
-represent Athenian interests in his city, and sent to Athens to ask
-for aid. Demosthenes, suspecting this man to be a traitor, dissuaded
-compliance with the application.[726] But Plutarch had powerful
-friends at Athens, seemingly among the party of Eubulus; one of whom,
-Meidias, a violent personal enemy of Demosthenes, while advocating
-the grant of aid, tried even to get up a charge against Demosthenes,
-of having himself fomented these troubles in Eubœa against the
-reputed philo-Athenian Plutarch.[727] The Athenian assembly
-determined to despatch a force under Phokion; who accordingly crossed
-into the island, somewhat before the time of the festival Anthesteria
-(February) with a body of hoplites.[728] The cost of fitting out
-triremes for this transport, was in part defrayed by voluntary
-contributions from rich Athenians; several of whom, Nikêratus,
-Euktêmon, Euthydemus, contributed each the outfit of one vessel.[729]
-A certain proportion of the horsemen of the city were sent also; yet
-the entire force was not very large, as it was supposed that the
-partisans there to be found would make up the deficiency.
-
-  [726] Demosthenes, De Pace, p. 58.
-
-  [727] Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 550. ... καὶ τῶν ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ
-  πραγμάτων, ἃ Πλούταρχος ὁ τούτου ξένος καὶ φίλος διεπράξατο, ὡς
-  ἐγὼ αἴτιός εἰμι κατεσκεύαζε, πρὸ τοῦ τὸ πρᾶγμα γενέσθαι φανερὸν
-  διὰ Πλουτάρχου γεγονός.
-
-  [728] Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p. 558; cont. Bœotum de Nomine, p.
-  999. The mention of the χόες in the latter passage, being the
-  second day of the festival called Anthesteria, identifies the
-  month.
-
-  [729] Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 566, 567.
-
-This hope however turned out fallacious. After an apparently friendly
-reception and a certain stay at or near Eretria, Phokion found
-himself betrayed. Kallias, an ambitious leader of Chalkis, collected
-as much Eubœan force as he could, declared openly against Athens,
-and called in Macedonian aid (probably from Philip’s commanders in
-the neighboring Pagasæan Gulf); while his brother Taurosthenes hired
-a detachment of mercenaries out of Phokis.[730] The anti-Athenian
-force thus became more formidable than Phokion could fairly cope
-with; while the support yielded to him in the island was less
-than he expected. Crossing the eminence named Kotylæum, he took a
-position near the town and hippodrome of Tamynæ, on high ground
-bordered by a ravine; Plutarch still professing friendship, and
-encamping with his mercenaries along with him. Phokion’s position
-was strong; yet the Athenians were outnumbered and beleaguered so
-as to occasion great alarm.[731] Many of the slack and disorderly
-soldiers deserted; a loss which Phokion affected to despise—though he
-at the same time sent to Athens to make known his difficulties and
-press for reinforcement. Meanwhile he kept on the defensive in his
-camp, which the enemy marched up to attack. Disregarding his order,
-and acting with a deliberate treason which was accounted at Athens
-unparalleled—Plutarch advanced forward out of the camp to meet them;
-but presently fled, drawing along with his flight the Athenian horse,
-who had also advanced in some disorder. Phokion with the infantry was
-now in the greatest danger. The enemy, attacking vigorously, were
-plucking up the palisade, and on the point of forcing his camp. But
-his measures were so well taken, and his hoplites behaved with so
-much intrepidity and steadiness in this trying emergency, that he
-repelled the assailants with loss, and gained a complete victory.
-Thallus and Kineas distinguished themselves by his side; Kleophanes
-also was conspicuous in partially rallying the broken horsemen; while
-Æschines the orator, serving among the hoplites, was complimented
-for his bravery, and sent to Athens to carry the first news of
-the victory.[732] Phokion pursued his success, expelled Plutarch
-from Eretria, and captured a strong fort called Zaretra, near the
-narrowest part of the island. He released all his Greek captives,
-fearing that the Athenians, incensed at the recent treachery, should
-resolve upon treating them with extreme harshness.[733] Kallias seems
-to have left the island and found shelter with Philip.[734]
-
-  [730] Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 399. ... Ταυροσθένης, τοὺς
-  Φωκικοὺς ξένους διαβιβάσας, etc. There is no ground for inferring
-  from this passage (with Böhnecke, p. 20, and others), that the
-  Phokians themselves seconded Philip in organizing Eubœan parties
-  against Athens. The Phokians were then in alliance with Athens,
-  and would not be likely to concur in a step alike injurious and
-  offensive to her, without any good to themselves. But some of
-  the mercenaries on service in Phokis might easily be tempted to
-  change their service and cross to Eubœa, by the promise of a
-  handsome gratuity.
-
-  [731] Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p. 567. ἐπειδὴ δὲ πολιορκεῖσθαι
-  τοὺς ἐν Ταμύναις στρατιώτας ἐξηγγέλλετο, etc.
-
-  [732] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 300. c. 53; cont. Ktesiphont. p.
-  399. c. 32. Plutarch, Phokion, c. 13. Plutarch has no clear idea
-  of the different contests carried on in the island of Eubœa. He
-  passes on, without a note of transition, from this war in the
-  island (in 349-348 B. C.) to the subsequent war in 341 B. C.
-
-  Nothing indeed can be more obscure and difficult to disentangle
-  than the sequence of Eubœan transactions.
-
-  It is to be observed that Æschines lays the blame of the
-  treachery, whereby the Athenian army was entrapped and
-  endangered, on Kallias of Chalkis; while Demosthenes throws it on
-  Plutarch of Eretria. Probably both Plutarch and Kallias deserved
-  the stigma. But Demosthenes is on this occasion more worthy of
-  credit than Æschines, since the harangue against Meidias, in
-  which the assertion occurs, was delivered only a few months
-  after the battle of Tamynæ; while the allegation of Æschines is
-  contained in his harangue against Ktesiphon, which was not spoken
-  till many years afterwards.
-
-  [733] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 13.
-
-  [734] Æschines indeed says, that Kallias, having been forgiven by
-  Athens on this occasion, afterwards, gratuitously and from pure
-  hostility and ingratitude to Athens, went to Philip. But I think
-  this is probably an exaggeration. The orator is making a strong
-  point against Kallias, who afterwards became connected with
-  Demosthenes, and rendered considerable service to Athens in Eubœa.
-
-  The treason of Kallias and Taurosthenes is alluded to by
-  Deinarchus in his harangue against Demosthenes, s. 45.
-
-The news brought by Æschines (before the Dionysiac festival) of
-the victory of Tamynæ, relieved the Athenians from great anxiety.
-On the former despatch from Phokion, the Senate had resolved to
-send to Eubœa another armament, including the remaining half of
-the cavalry, a reinforcement of hoplites, and a fresh squadron of
-triremes. But the victory enabled them to dispense[735] with any
-immediate reinforcement, and to celebrate the Dionysiac festival
-with cheerfulness. The festival was on this year of more than usual
-notoriety. Demosthenes, serving in it as chorêgus for his tribe
-the Pandionis, was brutally insulted, in the theatre and amid the
-full pomp of the ceremony, by his enemy the wealthy Meidias; who,
-besides other outrages, struck him several times with his fist on
-the head. The insult was the more poignant, because Meidias at this
-time held the high office of Hipparch, or one of the commanders
-of the horse. It was the practice at Athens to convene a public
-assembly immediately after the Dionysiac festival, for the special
-purpose of receiving notifications and hearing complaints about
-matters which had occurred at the festival itself. At this special
-assembly Demosthenes preferred a complaint against Meidias for the
-unwarrantable outrage offered, and found warm sympathy among the
-people, who passed a unanimous vote of censure. This procedure
-(called Probolê), did not by itself carry any punishment, but served
-as a sort of _præjudicium_, or finding of a true bill; enabling
-Demosthenes to quote the public as a witness to the main fact of
-insult, and encouraging him to pursue Meidias before the regular
-tribunals; which he did a few months afterwards, but was induced to
-accept from Meidias the self-imposed fine of thirty minæ before the
-final passing of sentence by the Dikasts.[736]
-
-  [735] Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 567.
-
-  [736] Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 61; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 12.
-  Westermann and many other critics (De Litibus quas Demosthenes
-  oravit ipse, p. 25-28) maintain that the discourse against
-  Meidias can never have been really spoken by Demosthenes to the
-  Dikastery, since if it had been spoken, he could not afterwards
-  have entered into the compromise. But it is surely possible,
-  that he may have delivered the discourse and obtained judgment
-  in his favor; and then afterwards—when the second vote of the
-  Dikasts was about to come on, for estimation of the penalty—may
-  have accepted the offer of the defendant to pay a moderate fine
-  (compare Demosth. cont. Neæram, p. 1348) in fear of exasperating
-  too far the powerful friends around Meidias. The action of
-  Demosthenes against Meidias was certainly an ἀγὼν τιμητός. About
-  προβολὴ, see Meier and Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, p. 271.
-
-From the despatches of Phokion, the treason of Plutarch of Eretria
-had become manifest; so that Demosthenes gained credit for his
-previous remarks on the impolicy of granting the armament; while
-the friends of Plutarch—Hegesilaus and others of the party of
-Eubulus—incurred displeasure; and some, as it appears, were
-afterwards tried.[737] But he was reproached by his enemies for
-having been absent from the battle of Tamynæ; and a citizen named
-Euktêmon, at the instigation of Meidias, threatened an indictment
-against him for desertion of his post. Whether Demosthenes had
-actually gone over to Eubœa as a hoplite in the army of Phokion, and
-obtained leave of absence to come back for the Dionysia—or whether
-he did not go at all—we are unable to say. In either case, his
-duties as chorêgus for this year furnished a conclusive excuse; so
-that Euktêmon, though he formally hung up before the statues of the
-Eponymous Heroes public proclamation of his intended indictment,
-never thought fit to take even the first step for bringing it to
-actual trial, and incurred legal disgrace for such non-performance
-of his engagement.[738] Nevertheless the opprobrious and undeserved
-epithet of deserter was ever afterwards applied to Demosthenes by
-Æschines and his other enemies; and Meidias even heaped the like
-vituperation upon most of those who took part in that assembly[739]
-wherein the Probolê or vote of censure against him had been passed.
-Not long after the Dionysiac festival, however, it was found
-necessary to send fresh troops, both horsemen and hoplites, to Eubœa;
-probably to relieve either some or all of those already serving
-there. Demosthenes on this occasion put on his armor and served
-as a hoplite in the island. Meidias also went to Argura in Eubœa,
-as commander of the horsemen: yet, when the horsemen were summoned
-to join the Athenian army, he did not join along with them, but
-remained as trierarch of a trireme the outfit of which he had himself
-defrayed.[740] How long the army stayed in Eubœa, we do not know.
-It appears that Demosthenes had returned to Athens by the time when
-the annual Senate was chosen in the last month of the Attic year
-(Skirrophorion—June); having probably by that time been relieved. He
-was named (by the lot) among the Five Hundred Senators for the coming
-Attic year (beginning Midsummer 349 B. C. = Olymp. 107, 4);[741] his
-old enemy Meidias in vain impugning his qualification as he passed
-through the Dokimasy or preliminary examination previous to entering
-office.
-
-  [737] Demosthenes, De Pace, p. 58; De Fals. Leg. p. 434—with the
-  Scholion.
-
-  [738] Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 548. ... ἐφ᾽ ᾗ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος
-  (Euktemon) ἠτίμωκεν αὑτὸν οὐκ ἐπεξελθὼν, οὐδεμιᾶς ἔγωγ᾽ ἔτι
-  προσδέομαι δίκης, ἀλλ᾽ ἱκανὴν ἔχω.
-
-  Æschines says that Nikodemus entered an indictment against
-  Demosthenes for deserting his place in the ranks; but that he was
-  bought off by Demosthenes, and refrained from bringing it before
-  the Dikastery (Æsch. Fals. Leg. p. 292).
-
-  [739] Demosth. cont. Meid. p. 577.
-
-  [740] Demosth. cont. Meid. p. 558-567.
-
-  [741] Demosth. cont. Meid. p. 551.
-
-What the Athenian army did farther in Eubœa, we cannot make
-out. Phokion was recalled—we do not know when—and replaced by a
-general named Molossus; who is said to have managed the war very
-unsuccessfully, and even to have been made prisoner himself by the
-enemy.[742] The hostile parties in the island, sided by Philip, were
-not subdued, nor was it until the summer of 348 B. C. that they
-applied for peace. Even then, it appears, none was concluded, so that
-the Eubœans remained unfriendly to Athens until the peace with Philip
-in 346 B. C.
-
-  [742] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 14; Pausanias, i. 36, 3.
-
-But while the Athenians were thus tasked for the maintenance of
-Eubœa, they found it necessary to undertake more effective measures
-for the relief of Olynthus, and they thus had upon their hands at
-the same time the burthen of two wars. We know that they had to
-provide force for both Eubœa and Olynthus at once;[743] and that
-the occasion which called for these simultaneous efforts was one
-of stringent urgency. The Olynthian requisition and communications
-made themselves so strongly felt, as to induce Athens to do, what
-Demosthenes in his three Olynthiacs had vainly insisted on during
-the preceding summer and autumn—to send thither a force of native
-Athenians, in the first half of 349 B. C. Of the horsemen who had
-gone from Athens to Eubœa, under Meidias, to serve under Phokion,
-either all, or a part, crossed by sea from Eubœa to Olynthus, during
-that half-year.[744] Meidias did not cross with them, but came back
-as trierarch in his trireme to Athens. Now the Athenian horsemen were
-not merely citizens, but citizens of wealth and consequence; moreover
-the transport of them by sea was troublesome as well as costly.
-The sending of such troops implies a strenuous effort and sense of
-urgency on the part of Athens. We may farther conclude that a more
-numerous body of hoplites were sent along with the horsemen at the
-same time; for horsemen would hardly under any circumstances be sent
-across sea alone; moreover Olynthus stood most in need of auxiliary
-hoplites, since her native force consisted chiefly of horsemen and
-peltasts.[745]
-
-  [743] Demosthen. cont. Neæram, p. 1346. ... συμβάντος τῇ
-  πόλει καιροῦ τοιούτου καὶ πολέμου, ἐν ᾧ ἦν ἢ κρατήσασιν ὑμῖν
-  μεγίστοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἶναι, καὶ ἀναμφισβητήτως τά τε ὑμέτερα
-  αὐτῶν κεκομίσθαι καὶ ~καταπεπολεμηκέναι Φίλιππον—ἢ ὑστερήσασι
-  τῇ βοηθείᾳ καὶ προεμένοις τοὺς συμμάχους~, δι᾽ ἀπορίαν χρημάτων
-  καταλυθέντος τοῦ στρατοπέδου, τούτους τ᾽ ἀπολέσαι καὶ τοῖς
-  ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν ἀπίστους εἶναι δοκεῖν, καὶ κινδυνεύειν περὶ
-  τῶν ὑπολοίπων, περί τε Λήμνου καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου καὶ
-  Χεῤῥονήσου—καὶ ~μελλόντων στρατεύεσθαι ὑμῶν πανδημεὶ εἴς τε
-  Εὔβοιαν καὶ Ὄλυνθον~—ἔγραψε ψήφισμα ἐν τῇ βουλῇ Ἀπολλόδωρος
-  βουλεύων, etc.
-
-  This speech was delivered before the Dikastery by a person named
-  Theomnestus, in support of an indictment against Neæra—perhaps
-  six or eight years after 349 B. C. Whether Demosthenes was the
-  author of the speech or not, its value as evidence will not be
-  materially altered.
-
-  [744] Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 578. ... οὗτος τῶν μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ
-  στρατευσαμένων ἱππέων, ~ὅτε εἰς Ὄλυνθον διέβησαν, ἐλθὼν~ πρὸς
-  ὑμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κατηγόρει. Compare the same oration, p.
-  558—περὶ δὲ τῶν συστρατευσαμένων εἰς Ἄργουραν (in Eubœa) ἴστε
-  δήπου πάντες οἷα ἐδημηγόρησε παρ᾽ ὑμῖν, ~ὅτ᾽ ἧκεν ἐκ Χαλκίδος~,
-  κατηγορῶν καὶ φάσκων ὄνειδος ἐξελθεῖν τὴν στρατιὰν ταύτην τῇ
-  πόλει.
-
-  This transit of the Athenian horsemen to Olynthus, which took
-  place after the battle of Tamynæ, is a distinct occurrence from
-  the voluntary contributions at Athens towards an Olynthian
-  expedition (ἐπιδόσεις εἰς Ὄλυνθον—Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p.
-  566); which contributions took place before the battle of Tamynæ,
-  and before the expedition to Eubœa of which that battle made part.
-
-  These horsemen went from Eubœa to Olynthus _before Meidias
-  returned to Athens_. But we know that he returned to Athens
-  before the beginning of the new Attic or Olympic year (Olymp.
-  107, 4, 349-348 B. C.); that is, speaking approximatively, before
-  the 1st of July 349 B. C. For he was present at Athens and
-  accused Demosthenes in the senatorial Dokimasy, or preliminary
-  examination, which all senators underwent before they took their
-  seats with the beginning of the new year (Demosth. cont. Meid. p.
-  551).
-
-  It seems, therefore, clear that the Athenian expedition—certainly
-  horsemen, and probably hoplites also—went to Olynthus before July
-  1, 349 B. C. I alluded to this expedition of Athenian citizens
-  to Olynthus in a previous note—as connected with the date of the
-  third Olynthiac of Demosthenes.
-
-  [745] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 41; v. 3, 3-6.
-
-The evidence derived from the speech against Neæra being thus
-corroborated by the still better evidence of the speech against
-Meidias, we are made certain of the important fact, that the first
-half of the year 349 B. C. was one in which Athens was driven to
-great public exertions—even to armaments of native citizens—for
-the support of Olynthus as well as for the maintenance of Eubœa.
-What the Athenians achieved, indeed, or helped to achieve, by these
-expeditions to Olynthus—or how long they stayed there—we have no
-information. But we may reasonably presume—though Philip during this
-year 349 B. C., probably conquered a certain number of the thirty-two
-Chalkidic towns—that the allied forces, Olynthian, Chalkidic and
-Athenian, contended against him with no inconsiderable effect, and
-threw back his conquest of Chalkidikê into the following year. After
-a summer’s campaign in that peninsula, the Athenian citizens would
-probably come home. We learn that the Olynthians made prisoner a
-Macedonian of rank named Derdas, with other Macedonians attached to
-him.[746]
-
-  [746] Theopompus, Fragm. 155; ap. Athenæum, x. p. 436; Ælian, V.
-  H. ii. 41.
-
-So extraordinary a military effort, however, made by the Athenians
-in the first half of 349 B. C.—to recover Eubœa and to protect
-Olynthus at once—naturally placed them in a state of financial
-embarrassment. Of this, one proof is to be found in the fact, that
-for some time there was not sufficient money to pay the Dikasteries,
-which accordingly sat little; so that few causes were tried for some
-time—for how long we do not know.[747]
-
-  [747] See Demosthenes adv. Bœotum De Nomine, p. 999. ... καὶ εἰ
-  μισθὸς ἐπορίσθη τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, εἰσῆγον ἂν δῆλον ὅτι. This
-  oration was spoken shortly after the battle of Tamynæ, p. 999.
-
-To meet in part the pecuniary wants of the moment, a courageous
-effort was made by the senator Apollodorus. He moved a decree in
-the Senate, that it should be submitted to the vote of the public
-assembly, whether the surplus of revenue, over and above the ordinary
-and permanent peace establishment of the city, should be paid to
-the Theôric Fund for the various religious festivals—or should be
-devoted to the pay, outfit, and transport of soldiers for the actual
-war. The Senate approved the motion of Apollodorus, and adopted a
-(probouleuma) preliminary resolution authorizing him to submit it
-to the public assembly. Under such authority, Apollodorus made the
-motion in the assembly, where also he was fully successful. The
-assembly (without a single dissentient voice, we are told) passed a
-decree enjoining that the surplus of revenue should under the actual
-pressure of war be devoted to the pay and other wants of soldiers.
-Notwithstanding such unanimity, however, a citizen named Stephanus
-impeached both the decree and its mover on the score of illegality,
-under the Graphê Paranomon. Apollodorus was brought before the
-Dikastery, and there found guilty; mainly (according to his friend
-and relative the prosecutor of Neæra) through suborned witnesses
-and false allegations foreign to the substance of the impeachment.
-When the verdict of guilty had been pronounced, Stephanus as accuser
-assessed the measure of punishment at the large fine of fifteen
-talents, refusing to listen to any supplications from the friends of
-Apollodorus, when they entreated him to name a lower sum. The Dikasts
-however, more lenient than Stephanus, were satisfied to adopt the
-measure of fine assessed by Apollodorus upon himself—one talent—which
-he actually paid.[748]
-
-  [748] Demosthen. cont. Neær. p. 1346, 1347.
-
-There can hardly be a stronger evidence both of the urgency and
-poverty of the moment, than the fact, that both Senate and people
-passed this decree of Apollodorus. That fact there is no room for
-doubting. But the additional statement—that there was not a single
-dissentient, and that every one, both at the time and afterwards,
-always pronounced the motion to have been an excellent one[749]—is
-probably an exaggeration. For it is not to be imagined that the
-powerful party, who habitually resisted the diversion of money from
-the Theôric Fund to war purposes, should have been wholly silent
-or actually concurrent on this occasion, though they may have been
-outvoted. The motion of Apollodorus was one which could not be made
-without distinctly breaking the law, and rendering the mover liable
-to those penal consequences which afterwards actually fell upon him.
-Now, that even a majority, both of senate and assembly, should have
-overleaped this illegality, is a proof sufficiently remarkable how
-strongly the crisis pressed upon their minds.
-
-  [749] Demosthen. cont. Neær. p. 1346. ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν ἔτι, ἄν που
-  λόγος γέγνηται, ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ πάντων, ὡς τὰ βέλτιστα εἴπας
-  ἄδικα πάθοι.
-
-The expedition of Athenian citizens, sent to Olynthus before
-Midsummer 349 B. C., would probably return after a campaign of two
-or three months, and after having rendered some service against
-the Macedonian army. The warlike operations of Philip against
-the Chalkidians and Olynthians were noway relaxed. He pressed
-the Chalkidians more and more closely throughout all the ensuing
-eighteen months (from Midsummer 349 B. C. to the early spring of
-347 B. C.). During the year Olymp. 407, 4, if the citation from
-Philochorus[750] is to be trusted, the Athenians despatched to
-their aid three expeditions; one, at the request of the Olynthians,
-who sent envoys to pray for it—consisting of two thousand peltasts
-under Chares, in thirty ships partly manned by Athenian seamen. A
-second under Charidemus, at the earnest entreaty of the suffering
-Chalkidians; consisting of eighteen triremes, four thousand peltasts
-and one hundred and fifty horsemen. Charidemus, in conjunction
-with the Olynthians, marched over Bottiæa and the peninsula of
-Pallênê, laying waste the country; whether he achieved any important
-success, we do not know. Respecting both Chares and Charidemus,
-the anecdotes descending to us are of insolence, extortion, and
-amorous indulgences, rather than of military exploits.[751] It is
-clear that neither the one nor the other achieved anything effectual
-against Philip, whose arms and corruption made terrible progress
-in Chalkidikê. So grievously did the strength of the Olynthians
-fail, that they transmitted a last and most urgent appeal to Athens;
-imploring the Athenians not to abandon them to ruin, but to send them
-a force of citizens in addition to the mercenaries already there.
-The Athenians complied, despatching thither seventeen triremes, two
-thousand hoplites, and three hundred horsemen, all under the command
-of Chares.
-
-  [750] Philochorus ap. Dionys. Hal. ad Amm. p. 734, 735.
-  Philochorus tells us that the Athenians _now_ contracted the
-  alliance with Olynthus; which certainly is not accurate. The
-  alliance had been contracted in the preceding year.
-
-  [751] Theopomp. Fragm. 183-238; Athenæus, xii. p. 532.
-
-To make out anything of the successive steps of this important war
-is impossible; but we discern that during this latter portion of
-the Olynthian war, the efforts made by Athens were considerable.
-Demosthenes (in a speech six years afterwards) affirms that the
-Athenians had sent to the aid of Olynthus four thousand citizens,
-ten thousand mercenaries, and fifty triremes.[752] He represents
-the Chalkidic cities as having been betrayed successively to
-Philip by corrupt and traitorous citizens. That the conquest was
-achieved greatly by the aid of corruption, we cannot doubt; but
-the orator’s language carries no accurate information. Mekyberna
-and Torônê are said to have been among the towns betrayed without
-resistance.[753] After Philip had captured the thirty-two Chalkidic
-cities, he marched against Olynthus itself, with its confederate
-neighbors,—the Thracian Methônê and Apollonia. In forcing the passage
-of the river Sardon, he encountered such resistance that his troops
-were at first repulsed; and he was himself obliged to seek safety
-by swimming back across the river. He was moreover wounded in the
-eye by an Olynthian archer, named Aster, and lost the sight of that
-eye completely, notwithstanding the skill of his Greek surgeon,
-Kritobulus.[754] On arriving within forty furlongs of Olynthus,
-he sent to the inhabitants a peremptory summons, intimating that
-either they must evacuate the city, or he must leave Macedonia.[755]
-Rejecting this notice, they determined to defend their town to the
-last. A considerable portion of the last Athenian citizen-armament
-was still in the town to aid in the defence;[756] so that the
-Olynthians might reasonably calculate that Athens would strain every
-nerve to guard her own citizens against captivity. But their hopes
-were disappointed. How long the siege lasted,—or whether there was
-time for Athens to send farther reinforcement, we cannot say. The
-Olynthians are said to have repulsed several assaults of Philip with
-loss; but according to Demosthenes, the philippizing party, headed
-by the venal Euthykrates and Lasthenes, brought about the banishment
-of their chief opponent Apollonides, nullified all measures for
-energetic defence, and treasonably surrendered the city. Two defeats
-were sustained near its walls, and one of the generals of this
-party, having five hundred cavalry under his command, betrayed them
-designedly into the hands of the invader.[757] Olynthus, with all its
-inhabitants and property, at length fell into the hands of Philip.
-His mastery of the Chalkidic peninsula thus became complete towards
-the end of winter, 348-347 B. C.
-
-  [752] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 426.
-
-  [753] Diodor. xvi. 52.
-
-  [754] Kallisthenes ap. Stobæum, t. vii. p. 92; Plutarch,
-  Parallel. c. 8; Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 117. Kritobulus could
-  not save the sight of the eye, but he is said to have prevented
-  any visible disfigurement. “Magna et Critobulo fama est, extracta
-  Philippi regis oculo sagitta et citra deformitatem oris curata,
-  orbitate luminis” (Pliny, H. N. vii. 37).
-
-  [755] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113.
-
-  [756] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30.
-
-  [757] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 125-128; Fals. Leg. p. 426;
-  Diodor. xvi. 53.
-
-Miserable was the ruin which fell upon this flourishing peninsula.
-The persons of the Olynthians,—men, women and children,—were sold
-into slavery. The wealth of the city gave to Philip the means of
-recompensing his soldiers for the toils of the war; the city itself
-he is said to have destroyed, together with Apollonia, Methônê,
-Stageira, etc.,—in all, thirty-two Chalkidic cities. Demosthenes,
-speaking about five years afterwards, says that they were so
-thoroughly and cruelly ruined as to leave their very sites scarcely
-discernible.[758] Making every allowance for exaggeration, we may
-fairly believe that they were dismantled, and bereft of all citizen
-proprietors; that the buildings and visible marks of Hellenic
-city-life were broken up or left to decay; that the remaining
-houses, as well as the villages around, were tenanted by dependent
-cultivators or slaves,—now working for the benefit of new Macedonian
-proprietors, in great part nonresident, and probably of favored
-Grecian grantees also.[759] Though various Greeks thus received
-their recompense for services rendered to Philip, yet Demosthenes
-affirms that Euthykrates and Lasthenes, the traitors who had sold
-Olynthus, were not among the number; or at least that, not long
-afterwards, they were dismissed with dishonor and contempt.[760]
-
-  [758] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 117; Justin, viii. 3.
-
-  [759] Demosthenes, (Fals. Leg. p. 386) says, that both
-  Philokrates and Æschines received from Philip, not only presents
-  of timber and corn, but also grants of productive and valuable
-  farms in the Olynthian territory. He calls some Olynthian
-  witnesses to prove his assertion; but their testimony is not
-  given at length.
-
-  [760] Demosth. De Chersones. p. 99. The existence of these
-  Olynthian traitors, sold to Philip, proves that he could not
-  have needed the aid of the Stageirite philosopher Aristotle to
-  indicate to him who were the richest Olynthian citizens, at
-  the time when the prisoners were put up for sale as slaves.
-  The Athenian Demochares, about thirty years afterwards, in his
-  virulent speech against the philosophers, alleged that Aristotle
-  had rendered this disgraceful service to Philip (Aristokles
-  ap. Eusebium, Præp. Ev. p. 792) Wesseling (ad Diodor. xvi.
-  53) refutes the charge by saying that Aristotle was at that
-  time, along with Hermeias, at Atarneus; a refutation not very
-  conclusive, which I am glad to be able to strengthen.
-
-In this Olynthian war,—ruinous to the Chalkidic Greeks, terrific to
-all other Greeks, and doubling the power of Philip,—Athens too must
-have incurred a serious amount of expense. We find it stated loosely,
-that in her entire war against Philip,—from the time of his capture
-of Amphipolis in 358-357 B. C. down to the peace of 346 B. C. or
-shortly afterwards,—she had expended not less than fifteen hundred
-talents.[761] On these computations no great stress is to be laid;
-but we may well believe that her outlay was considerable. In spite
-of all reluctance, she was obliged to do something; what she did was
-both too little, and too intermittent,—done behind time so as to
-produce no satisfactory result; but nevertheless, the aggregate cost,
-in a series of years, was a large one. During the latter portion of
-the Olynthian war, as far as we can judge, she really seems to have
-made efforts, though she had done little in the beginning. We may
-presume that the cost must have been defrayed, in part at least, by a
-direct property-tax; for the condemnation of Apollodorus put an end
-to the proposition of taking from the Theôric Fund.[762] Means may
-also have been found of economizing from the other expenses of the
-state.
-
-  [761] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 37. c. 24. Demosthenes (Olynth.
-  iii. p. 36) mentions the same amount of public money as having
-  been wasted εἰς οὐδὲν δέον—even in the early part of the
-  Olynthiac war and before the Eubœan war. As evidences of actual
-  amount, such statements are of no value.
-
-  [762] Ulpian, in his Commentary on the first Olynthiac, tells us
-  that after the fine imposed upon Apollodorus, Eubulus moved and
-  carried a law, enacting that any future motion to encroach on the
-  Theôric Fund should be punished with death.
-
-  The authority of Ulpian is not sufficient to accredit this
-  statement. The fine inflicted by the Dikastery upon Apollodorus
-  was lenient; we may therefore reasonably doubt whether the
-  popular sentiment would go along with the speaker in making the
-  like offence capital in future.
-
-Though the appropriation of the Theôric Fund to other purposes
-continued to be thus interdicted to any formal motion, yet, in the
-way of suggestion and insinuation it was from time to time glanced
-at by Demosthenes, and others;—and whenever money was wanted for
-war, the question whether it should be taken from this source or
-from direct property-tax, was indirectly revived. The appropriation
-of the Theôric Fund, however, remained unchanged until the very eve
-of the battle of Chæroneia. Just before that Dies Iræ, when Philip
-was actually fortifying Elateia, the fund was made applicable to
-war-purposes; the views of Demosthenes were realized,—twelve years
-after he had begun to enforce them.
-
-This question about the Theôric expenditure is rarely presented by
-modern authors in the real way that it affected the Athenian mind. It
-has been sometimes treated as a sort of almsgiving to the poor,—and
-sometimes as an expenditure by the Athenians upon their pleasures.
-Neither the one nor the other gives a full or correct view of the
-case; each only brings out a part of the truth.
-
-Doubtless, the Athenian democracy cared much for the pleasures of
-the citizens. It provided for them the largest amount of refined and
-imaginative pleasures ever tasted by any community known to history;
-pleasures essentially social and multitudinous, attaching the
-citizens to each other, rich and poor, by the strong tie of community
-of enjoyment.
-
-But pleasure, though an usual accessory, was not the primary idea or
-predominant purpose of the Theôric expenditure. That expenditure was
-essentially religious in its character, incurred only for various
-festivals, and devoted exclusively to the honor of the gods. The
-ancient religion, not simply at Athens, but throughout Greece and
-the contemporary world,—very different in this respect from the
-modern,—included within itself and its manifestations nearly the
-whole range of social pleasures.[763] Now the Theôric Fund was
-essentially the Church-Fund at Athens; that upon which were charged
-all the expenses incurred by the state in the festivals and the
-worship of the gods. The Diobely, or distribution of two oboli to
-each present citizen, was one part of this expenditure; given in
-order to ensure that every citizen should have the opportunity of
-attending the festival, and doing honor to the god; never given
-to any one who was out of Attica because, of course, he could not
-attend;[764] but given to all alike within the country, rich or
-poor.[765] It was essential to that universal communion which formed
-a prominent feature of the festival, not less in regard to the
-god, than in regard to the city;[766] but it was only one portion
-of the total disbursements covered by the Theôric Fund. To this
-general religious fund it was provided by law that the surplus of
-ordinary revenue should be paid over, after all the cost of the
-peace establishment had been defrayed. There was no appropriation
-more thoroughly coming home to the common sentiment, more conducive
-as a binding force to the unity of the city, or more productive of
-satisfaction to each individual citizen.
-
-  [763] Among the many passages which illustrate this association
-  in the Greek mind, between the idea of a religious festival, and
-  that of enjoyment—we may take the expressions of Herodotus about
-  the great festival at Sparta called Hyakinthia. In the summer
-  of 479 B. C., the Spartans were tardy in bringing out their
-  military force for the defence of Attica—being engaged in that
-  festival. Οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὅρταζόν τε τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον, καί
-  σφι ἦν Ὑακίνθια· ~περὶ πλείστου δ᾽ ἦγον τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πορσύνειν~
-  (Herod. ix. 7). Presently the Athenian envoys come to Sparta
-  to complain of the delay in the following language: Ὑμεῖς μὲν,
-  ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, αὐτοῦ τῇδε μένοντες, ~Ὑακίνθιά τε ἄγετε καὶ
-  παίζετε~, καταπροδόντες τοὺς συμμάχους.
-
-  Here the expressions “to fulfil the requirements of the god,”
-  and “to amuse themselves,” are used in description of the same
-  festival, and almost as equivalents.
-
-  [764] Harpokration, v. Θεωρικά ... διένειμεν Εὔβουλος εἰς τὴν
-  θυσίαν, ἵνα πάντες ἑορτάζωσι, καὶ μηδεὶς τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπολίπηται
-  δἰ᾽ ἀσθένειαν τῶν ἰδίων.... Ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἐξῆν τοῖς ἀποδημοῦσι
-  θεωρικὸν λαμβάνειν, Ὑπερίδης δεδήλωκεν ἐν τῷ κατ᾽ Ἀρχεστρατίδου.
-
-  [765] See Demosth. adv. Leocharem, p. 1091, 1092; Philipp. iv. p.
-  141. Compare also Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Att. s. 69.
-
-  [766] See the directions of the old oracles quoted by Demosthenes
-  cont. Meidiam, p. 531. ἱστάναι ὡραίων Βρομίῳ χάριν ~ἄμμιγα
-  πάντας~, etc. στεφανηφορεῖν ἐλευθέρους καὶ δούλους, etc.
-
-We neither know the amount of the Theôric Fund, nor of the
-distributions connected with it. We cannot, therefore, say what
-proportion it formed of the whole peace-expenditure,—itself
-unknown also. But we cannot doubt that it was large. To be sparing
-of expenditure in manifestations for the honor of the gods, was
-accounted the reverse of virtue by Greeks generally; and the
-Athenians especially, whose eyes were every day contemplating the
-glories of their acropolis, would learn a different lesson,—moreover,
-magnificent religious display was believed to conciliate the
-protection and favor of the gods.[767] We may affirm, however,
-upon the strongest presumptions, that this religious expenditure
-did not absorb any funds required for the other branches of a
-peace-establishment. Neither naval, nor military, nor administrative
-exigencies, were starved in order to augment the Theôric surplus.
-Eubulus was distinguished for his excellent keeping of the docks and
-arsenals, and for his care in replacing the decayed triremes by new
-ones. And after all the wants of a well-mounted peace-establishment
-were satisfied, no Athenian had scruple in appropriating what
-remained under the conspiring impulses of piety, pleasure and social
-brotherhood.
-
-  [767] See the boast of Isokrates, Orat. iv. (Panegyr.) s. 40;
-  Plato, Alkibiad. ii. p. 148. Xenophon (Vectigal. vi. 1.), in
-  proposing some schemes for the improvement of the Athenian
-  revenue, sets forth as one of the advantages, that “the religious
-  festivals will be celebrated then with still greater magnificence
-  than they are now.”
-
-It is true that the Athenians might have laid up that surplus
-annually in the acropolis, to form an accumulating war-fund. Such
-provision had been made half a century before, under the full energy
-and imperial power of Athens, when she had a larger revenue, with
-numerous tribute-paying allies, and when Perikles presided over
-her councils. It might have been better if she had done something
-of the same kind in the age after the Peloponnesian war. Perhaps,
-if men like Perikles, or even like Demosthenes, had enjoyed marked
-ascendency, she would have been advised and prevailed on to
-continue such a precaution. But before we can measure the extent
-of improvidence with which Athens is here fairly chargeable, we
-ought to know what was the sum thus expended on the festivals.
-What amount of money could have been stored up for the contingency
-of war, even if all the festivals and all the distributions had
-been suppressed? How far would it have been possible, in any other
-case than that of obvious present necessity, to carry economy into
-the festival-expenditure,—truly denominated by Demades the cement
-of the political system,[768]—without impairing in the bosom of
-each individual that sentiment of communion, religious, social
-and patriotic, which made the Athenians a City, and not a simple
-multiplication of units? These are points on which we ought to have
-information, before we can fairly graduate our censure upon Athens
-for not converting her Theôric Fund into an accumulated capital to
-meet the contingency of war. We ought also to ask, as matter for
-impartial comparison, how many governments, ancient or modern, have
-ever thought it requisite to lay up during peace a stock of money
-available for war?
-
-  [768] Plutarch, Quæstion. Platonic. p. 1011. ὡς ἔλεγε Δημάδης,
-  κόλλαν ὀνομάζων τὰ θεωρικὰ τοῦ πολιτεύματος (erroneously written
-  θεωρητικὰ).
-
-The Athenian peace-establishment maintained more ships of war, larger
-docks, and better-stored arsenals, than any city in Greece, besides
-expending forty talents annually upon the Horsemen of the state, and
-doubtless something farther (though we know not how much) upon the
-other descriptions of military force. All this, let it be observed,
-and the Theôric expenditure besides, was defrayed without direct
-taxation, which was reserved for the extraordinary cost incident to a
-state of war, and was held to be sufficient to meet it, without any
-accumulated war-fund. When the war against Philip became serious,
-the proprietary classes at Athens, those included in the schedule of
-assessment, were called upon to defray the expense by a direct tax,
-from which they had been quite free in time of peace. They tried to
-evade this burthen by requiring that the festival-fund should be
-appropriated instead;[769] thus menacing what was dearest to the
-feelings of the majority of the citizens. The ground which they took
-was the same in principle, as if the proprietors in France or Belgium
-claimed to exempt themselves from direct taxation for the cost of a
-war, by first taking either all or half of the annual sum voted out
-of the budget for the maintenance of religion.[770] We may judge how
-strong a feeling would be raised among the Athenian public generally,
-by the proposal of impoverishing the festival expenditure in order
-to save a property-tax. Doubtless, after the proprietary class had
-borne a certain burthen of direct taxation, their complaints would
-become legitimate. The cost of the festivals could not be kept up
-undiminished, under severe and continued pressure of war. As a second
-and subsidiary resource, it would become essential to apply the whole
-or a part of the fund in alleviation of the burthens of the war. But
-even if all had been so applied, the fund could not have been large
-enough to dispense with the necessity of a property-tax besides.
-
-  [769] According to the author of the oration against Neæra,
-  the law did actually provide, that in time of war, the surplus
-  revenue should be devoted to warlike purposes—κελευόντων τῶν
-  νόμων, ὅταν πόλεμος ᾖ, τὰ περιόντα χρήματα τῆς διοικήσεως
-  στρατιωτικὰ εἶναι (p. 1346). But it seems to me that this must be
-  a misstatement, got up to suit the speaker’s case. If the law had
-  been so, Apollodorus would have committed no illegality in his
-  motion; moreover, all the fencing and manœuvring of Demosthenes
-  in his first and third Olynthiacs would have been to no purpose.
-
-  [770] The case here put, though analogous in principle, makes
-  against the Athenian proprietors, in degree; for, even in time
-  of peace, one half of the French revenue is raised by direct
-  taxation.
-
-We see this conflict of interests,—between direct taxation on one
-side, and the festival-fund on the other as a means of paying for
-war,—running through the Demosthenic orations, and especially marked
-in the fourth Philippic.[771] Unhappily, the conflict served as an
-excuse to both parties for throwing the blame on each other, and
-starving the war; as well as for giving effect to the repugnance,
-shared by both rich and poor, against personal military service
-abroad. Demosthenes sides with neither, tries to mediate between
-them, and calls for patriotic sacrifice from both alike. Having
-before him an active and living enemy, with the liberties of Greece
-as well as of Athens at stake,—he urges every species of sacrifice
-at once—personal service, direct-tax payments, abnegation of the
-festivals. Sometimes the one demand stands most prominent, sometimes
-the other; but oftenest of all, comes his appeal for personal
-service. Under such military necessities, in fact the Theôric
-expenditure became mischievous, not merely because it absorbed the
-public money, but also because it chained the citizens to their home
-and disinclined them to active service abroad. The great charm and
-body of sentiment connected with the festival, essentially connected
-as it was with presence in Attica, operated as a bane; at an exigency
-when one-third or one-fourth of the citizens ought to have been
-doing hard duty as soldiers on the coasts of Macedonia or Thrace,
-against an enemy who never slept. Unfortunately for the Athenians,
-they could not be convinced, by all the patriotic eloquence of
-Demosthenes, that the festivals which fed their piety and brightened
-their home-existence during peace, were unmaintainable during such a
-war, and must be renounced for a time, if the liberty and security
-of Athens were to be preserved. The same want of energy which made
-them shrink from the hardship of personal service, also rendered
-them indisposed to so great a sacrifice as that of their festivals;
-nor indeed would it have availed them to spare all the cost of their
-festivals, had their remissness as soldiers still continued. Nothing
-less could have saved them, than simultaneous compliance with all
-the three requisitions urged by Demosthenes in 350 B. C.; which
-compliance ultimately came, but came too late, in 339-338 B. C.
-
-  [771] Demosth. Philipp. iv. p. 141-143; De Republicâ Ordinandâ,
-  p. 167. Whether these two orations were actually delivered in
-  their present form may perhaps be doubted. But I allude to them
-  with confidence as Demosthenic compositions; put together out of
-  Demosthenic fragments and thoughts.
-
-
-
-
-APPENDIX TO CHAPTER LXXXVIII
-
-ON THE ORDER OF THE OLYNTHIAC ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
-
-
-Respecting the true chronological order of these three harangues,
-dissentient opinions have been transmitted from ancient times, and
-still continue among modern critics.
-
-Dionysius of Halikarnassus cites the three speeches by their initial
-words, but places them in a different chronological order from that
-in which they stand edited. He gives the second as being first in the
-series; the third, as second; and the first, as third.
-
-It will be understood that I always speak of and describe these
-speeches by the order in which they stand edited; though, as far as I
-can judge, that order is not the true one.
-
-  Edited Order            I.       II.       III.
-  Order of Dionysius      II.      III.      I.
-
-The greater number of modern critics defend the edited order; the
-main arguments for which have been ably stated in a dissertation
-published by Petrenz in 1833. Dindorf, in his edition of Demosthenes,
-places this Dissertation in front of his notes to the Olynthiacs;
-affirming that it is conclusive, and sets the question at rest.
-Böhnecke also, (Forschungen, p. 151), treats the question as no
-longer open to doubt.
-
-On the other hand, Flathe (Geschichte Makedoniens, p. 183-187)
-expresses himself with equal confidence in favor of the order stated
-by Dionysius. A much higher authority, Dr. Thirlwall, agrees in
-the same opinion; though with less confidence, and with a juster
-appreciation of our inadequate means for settling the question. See
-the Appendix iii. to the 5th volume of his History of Greece, p. 512.
-
-Though I have not come to the same conclusion as Dr. Thirlwall, I
-agree with him, that unqualified confidence, in any conclusion as
-to the order of these harangues, is unsuitable and not warranted by
-the amount of evidence. We have nothing to proceed upon except the
-internal evidence of the speeches, taken in conjunction with the
-contemporaneous history; of which we know little or nothing from
-information in detail.
-
-On the best judgment that I can form, I cannot adopt wholly either
-the edited order or that of Dionysius, though agreeing in part with
-both. I concur with Dionysius and Dr. Thirlwall in placing the second
-Olynthiac _first_ of the three. I concur with the edited order in
-placing the third _last_. I observe, in Dr. Thirlwall’s Appendix,
-that this arrangement has been vindicated in a Dissertation by
-Stueve. I have not seen this Dissertation; and my own conclusion
-was deduced (even before I knew that it had ever been advocated
-elsewhere) only from an attentive study of the speeches.
-
-  Edited Order                              I.       II.       III.
-  Order of Dionysius                        II.      III.      I.
-  Order of Stueve                     }
-    (which I think the most probable) }     II.      I.        III.
-
-To consider, first, the proper place of the _second_ Olynthiac (I
-mean that which stands second in the edited order).
-
-The most remarkable characteristic of this oration is, that scarcely
-anything is said in it about Olynthus. It is, in fact, a Philippic
-rather than an Olynthiac. This characteristic is not merely admitted,
-but strongly put forward, by Petrenz, p. 11:—“Quid! quod ipsorum
-Olynthiorum hac quidem in causâ tantum uno loco facta mentio est—ut
-uno illo versiculo sublato, vix ex ipsâ oratione, quâ in causâ esset
-habita, certis rationibus evinci posset.” How are we to explain the
-absence of all reference to Olynthus? According to Petrenz, it is
-because the orator had already, in his former harangue, said all
-that could be necessary in respect to the wants of Olynthus, and
-the necessity of upholding that city even for the safety of Athens;
-he might now therefore calculate that his first discourse remained
-impressed on his countrymen, and that all that was required was, to
-combat the extraordinary fear of Philip which hindered them from
-giving effect to a resolution already taken to assist the Olynthians.
-
-In this hypothesis I am unable to acquiesce. It may appear natural
-to a reader of Demosthenes, who passes from the first printed
-discourse to the second without any intervening time to forget what
-he has just read. But it will hardly fit the case of a real speaker
-in busy Athens. Neither Demosthenes in the fluctuating Athenian
-assembly—nor even any orator in the more fixed English Parliament or
-American Congress—could be rash enough to calculate that a discourse
-delivered some time before had remained engraven on the minds of
-his audience. If Demosthenes had previously addressed the Athenians
-with so strong a conviction of the distress of Olynthus, and of the
-motives for Athens to assist Olynthus, as is embodied in the first
-discourse—if his speech, however well received, was not acted upon,
-so that in the course of a certain time he had to address them
-again for the same purpose—I cannot believe that he would allude
-to Olynthus only once by the by, and that he would merely dilate
-upon the general chances and conditions of the war between Athens
-and Philip. However well calculated the second Olynthiac may be “ad
-concitandos exacerbandosque civium animos” (to use the words of
-Petrenz), it is not peculiarly calculated to procure aid to Olynthus.
-If the orator had failed to procure such aid by a discourse like the
-first Olynthiac, he would never resort to a discourse like the second
-Olynthiac to make good the deficiency; would repeat anew, and more
-impressively than before, the danger of Olynthus, and the danger to
-Athens herself if she suffered Olynthus to fall. This would be the
-way to accomplish his object, and at the same time to combat the fear
-of Philip in the minds of the Athenians.
-
-According to my view of the subject, the omission (or mere single
-passing notice) of Olynthus clearly shows that the wants of that
-city, and the urgency of assisting it, were _not_ the main drift of
-Demosthenes in the second Olynthiac. His main drift is, to encourage
-and stimulate his countrymen in their general war against Philip;
-taking in, thankfully, the new ally Olynthus, whom they have just
-acquired—but taking her only as a valuable auxiliary (ἐν προσθήκης
-μέρει), to coöperate with Athens against Philip as well as to receive
-aid from Athens—not presenting her either as peculiarly needing
-succor, or as likely, if allowed to perish, to expose the vitals of
-Athens.
-
-Now a speech of this character is what I cannot satisfactorily
-explain, as following after the totally different spirit of the first
-Olynthiac; but it is natural and explicable, if we suppose it to
-precede the first Olynthiac. Olynthus does not approach Athens at
-first in _formâ pauperis_, as if she were in danger and requiring
-aid against an overwhelming enemy. She presents herself as an equal,
-offering to coöperate against a common enemy, and tendering an
-alliance which the Athenians had hitherto sought in vain. She will,
-of course, want aid,—but she can give coöperation of equal value.
-Demosthenes advises to assist her; this comes of course, when her
-alliance is accepted:—but he dwells more forcibly upon the value of
-what she will _give_ to the Athenians, in the way of coöperation
-against Philip. Nay, it is remarkable that the territorial vicinity
-of Olynthus to Philip is exhibited, not as a peril to _her_ which the
-Athenians must assist her in averting, but as a godsend to enable
-them the better to attack Philip in conjunction with her. Moreover
-Olynthus is represented, not as apprehending any danger from Philip’s
-arms, but as having recently discovered how dangerous it is to be
-in alliance with him. Let us thank the gods (says Demosthenes at
-the opening of the second Olynthiac)—τὸ τοὺς πολεμήσοντας Φιλίππῳ
-γεγενῆσθαι καὶ ~χώραν ὅμορον~ καὶ δύναμίν τινα κεκτημένους, καὶ τὸ
-μέγιστον ἁπάντων, τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολέμου γνώμην τοιαύτην ἔχοντας, ὥστε
-τὰς πρὸς ἐκεῖνον διαλλαγὰς, πρῶτον μὲν ἀπίστους, εἶτα τῆς ἑαυτῶν
-πατρίδος νομίζειν ἀνάστασιν εἶναι, δαιμονίᾳ τινι καὶ θείᾳ παντάπασιν
-ἔοικεν εὐεργεσίᾳ (p. 18).
-
-The general tenor of the second Olynthiac is in harmony with this
-opening. Demosthenes looks forward to a vigorous aggressive war
-carried on by Athens and Olynthus jointly against Philip, and he
-enters at large into the general chances of such war, noticing the
-vulnerable as well as odious points of Philip, and striving (as
-Petrenz justly remarks) to “excite and exasperate the minds of the
-citizens.”
-
-Such is the first bright promise of the Olynthian alliance with
-Athens. But Athens, as usual, makes no exertions; leaving the
-Olynthians and Chalkidians to contend against Philip by themselves.
-It is presently found that he gains advantages over them; bad news
-comes from Thrace, and probably complaining envoys to announce
-them. It is then that Demosthenes delivers his first Olynthiac, so
-much more urgent in its tone respecting Olynthus. The main topic is
-now—“Protect the Olynthians; save their confederate cities; think
-what will happen if they are ruined; there is nothing to hinder
-Philip, in that case, from marching into Attica.” The views of
-Demosthenes have changed from the offensive to the defensive.
-
-I cannot but think, therefore, that all the internal evidence of
-the Olynthiacs indicates the second as prior in point of time both
-to the first and to the third. Stueve (as cited by Dr. Thirlwall)
-mentions another reason tending to the same conclusion. Nothing
-is said in the second Olynthiac about meddling with the Theôric
-Fund; whereas in the first, that subject is distinctly adverted
-to—and in the third, forcibly and repeatedly pressed, though with
-sufficient artifice to save the illegality. This is difficult to
-explain, assuming the second to be posterior to the first; but noway
-difficult, if we suppose the second to be the earliest of the three,
-and to be delivered with the purpose which I have pointed out.
-
-On the other hand, this manner of handling the Theôric Fund in the
-third oration, as compared with the first, is one strong reason for
-believing (as Petrenz justly contends) that the third is posterior to
-the first—and not prior, as Dionysius places it.
-
-As to the third Olynthiac, its drift and purpose appear to me
-correctly stated in the argument prefixed by Libanius. It was
-delivered after Athens had sent some succor to Olynthus; whereas,
-both the first and the second were spoken before anything at all had
-yet been done. I think there is good ground for following Libanius
-(as Petrenz and others do) in his statement that the third oration
-recognizes Athens as having done _something_, which the two first do
-not; though Dr. Thirlwall (p. 509) agrees with Jacobs in doubting
-such a distinction. The successes of mercenaries, reported at Athens
-(p. 38), must surely have been successes of mercenaries commissioned
-by her; and the triumphant hopes, noticed by Demosthenes as actually
-prevalent, are most naturally explained by supposing such news
-to have arrived. Demosthenes says no more than he can help about
-the success actually gained, because he thinks it of no serious
-importance. He wishes to set before the people, as a corrective to
-the undue confidence prevalent, that all the real danger yet remained
-to be dealt with.
-
-Though Athens had done something, she had done little—sent no
-citizens—provided no pay. This Demosthenes urges her to do without
-delay, and dwells upon the Theôric Fund as one means of obtaining
-money along with personal service. Dr. Thirlwall indeed argues that
-the first Olynthiac is more urgent than the third, in setting forth
-the crisis; from whence he infers that it is posterior in time.
-His argument is partly founded upon a sentence near the beginning
-of the first Olynthiac, wherein the safety of _Athens herself_ is
-mentioned as involved—τῶν πραγμάτων ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἀντιληπτέον ἐστὶν,
-εἴπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας ~αὑτῶν~ φροντίζετε: upon which I may remark, that
-the reading ~αὑτῶν~ is not universally admitted. Dindorf, in his
-edition, reads ~αὐτῶν~, referring it to πραγμάτων: and stating in
-his note that ~αὐτῶν~ is the reading of the vulgate, first changed
-by Reiske into ~αὑτῶν~ on the authority of the Codex Bavaricus. But
-even if we grant that the first Olynthiac depicts the crisis as more
-dangerous and urgent than the third, we cannot infer that the first
-is posterior to the third. The third was delivered immediately after
-news received of success near Olynthus; Olynthian affairs did really
-prosper for the moment and to a certain extent—though the amount of
-prosperity was greatly exaggerated by the public. Demosthenes sets
-himself to combat this exaggeration; he passes as lightly as he can
-over the recent good news, but he cannot avoid allowing something for
-them, and throwing the danger of Olynthus a little back into more
-distant contingency. At the same time he states it in the strongest
-manner, both section 2 and sections 9, 10.
-
-Without being insensible, therefore, to the fallibility of all
-opinions founded upon such imperfect evidence, I think that the true
-chronological order of the Olynthiacs is that proposed by Stueve, II.
-I. III. With Dionysius I agree so far as to put the second first; and
-with the common order, in putting the third last.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXXIX.
-
-FROM THE CAPTURE OF OLYNTHUS TO THE TERMINATION OF THE SACRED WAR BY
-PHILIP.
-
-
-It was during the early spring of 347 B. C., as far as we can make
-out, that Olynthus, after having previously seen the thirty Chalkidic
-cities conquered, underwent herself the like fate from the arms of
-Philip. Exile and poverty became the lot of such Olynthians and
-Chalkidians as could make their escape; while the greater number
-of both sexes were sold into slavery. A few painful traces present
-themselves of the diversities of suffering which befel these unhappy
-victims. Atrestidas, an Arcadian who had probably served in the
-Macedonian army, received from Philip a grant of thirty Olynthian
-slaves, chiefly women and children, who were seen following him
-in a string as he travelled homeward through the Grecian cities.
-Many young Olynthian women were bought for the purpose of having
-their persons turned to account by their new proprietors. Of these
-purchasers, one, an Athenian citizen who had exposed his new purchase
-at Athens, was tried and condemned for the proceeding by the
-Dikastery.[772] Other anecdotes come before us, inaccurate probably
-as to names and details,[773] yet illustrating the general hardships
-brought upon this once free Chalkidic population. Meanwhile the
-victor Philip was at the maximum of his glory. In commemoration of
-his conquests, he celebrated a splendid festival to the Olympian
-Zeus in Macedonia, with unbounded hospitality, and prizes of every
-sort, for matches and exhibitions, both gymnastic and poetical. His
-donations were munificent, as well to the Grecian and Macedonian
-officers who had served him, as to the eminent poets or actors who
-pleased his taste. Satyrus the comic actor, refusing all presents for
-himself, asked and obtained from him the release of two young women
-taken in Olynthus, daughters of his friend the Pydnæan Apollophanes,
-who had been one of the persons concerned in the death of Philip’s
-elder brother Alexander. Satyrus announced his intention not only
-of ensuring freedom to these young women, but likewise of providing
-portions for them and giving them out in marriage.[774] Philip also
-found at Olynthus his two exile half-brothers, who had served as
-pretexts for the war—and put both of them to death.[775]
-
-  [772] Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 93; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p.
-  439, 440. Demosthenes asserts also that Olynthian women were
-  given, as a present, by Philip to Philokrates (p. 386-440). The
-  outrage which he imputes (p. 401) to Æschines and Phrynon in
-  Macedonia, against the Olynthian woman—is not to be received as
-  a fact, since it is indignantly denied by Æschines (Fals. Leg.
-  init. and p. 48). Yet it is probably but too faithful a picture
-  of real deeds, committed by others, if not by Æschines.
-
-  [773] The story of the old man of Olynthus (Seneca, Controv. v.
-  10) bought by Parrhasius the painter and tortured in order to
-  form a subject for a painting of the suffering Prometheus—is more
-  than doubtful: since Parrhasius, already in high repute as a
-  painter before 400 B. C. (see Xenoph. Mem. iii. 10), can hardly
-  have been still flourishing in 347 B. C. It discloses, however,
-  at least, one of the many forms of slave-suffering occasionally
-  realized.
-
-  [774] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 384-401; Diodor. xvi. 55.
-
-  [775] Justin, viii. 3.
-
-It has already been stated that Athens had sent to Olynthus more than
-one considerable reinforcement, especially during the last year of
-the war. Though we are ignorant what these expeditions achieved, or
-even how much was their exact force, we find reason to suspect that
-they were employed by Chares and other generals to no good purpose.
-The opponents of Chares accused him, as well as Deiares and other
-mercenary chiefs, of having wasted the naval and military strength of
-the city in idle enterprises or rapacious extortions upon the traders
-of the Ægean. They summed up 1500 talents and 150 triremes thus lost
-to Athens, besides wide-spread odium incurred among the islanders by
-the unjust contributions levied upon them to enrich the general.[776]
-In addition to this disgraceful ill-success, came now the fearful
-ruin in Olynthus and Chalkidikê, and the great aggrandizement
-of their enemy Philip. The loss of Olynthus, with the miserable
-captivity of its population, would have been sufficient of themselves
-to excite powerful sentiment among the Athenians. But there was a
-farther circumstance which came yet more home to their feelings.
-Many of their own citizens were serving in Olynthus as an auxiliary
-garrison, and had now become captives along with the rest.[777] No
-such calamity as this had befallen Athens for a century past, since
-the defeat of Tolmides at Koroneia in Bœotia. The whole Athenian
-people, and especially the relations of the captives, were full
-of agitation and anxiety, increased by alarming news from other
-quarters. The conquest threatened the security of all the Athenian
-possessions in Lemnos, Imbros, and the Chersonese. This last
-peninsula, especially, was altogether unprotected against Philip,
-who was even reported to be on his march thither; insomuch that the
-Athenian settlers within it began to forsake their properties and
-transfer their families to Athens. Amidst the grief and apprehension
-which disturbed the Athenian mind, many special assemblies were held
-to discuss suitable remedies. What was done, we are not exactly
-informed. But it seems that no one knew where the general Chares,
-with his armament, was; so that it became necessary even for his
-friends in the assembly to echo the strong expressions of displeasure
-among the people, and to send a light vessel immediately in search of
-him.[778]
-
-  [776] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 37. c. 24.
-
-  [777] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30.
-
-  [778] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 37.
-
-The gravity of the crisis forced even Eubulus and others among the
-statesmen hitherto languid in the war, to hold a more energetic
-language than before against Philip. Denouncing him now as the common
-enemy of Greece,[779] they proposed missions into Peloponnesus and
-elsewhere for the purpose of animating the Grecian states into
-confederacy against him. Æschines assisted strenuously in procuring
-the adoption of this proposition, and was himself named as one of the
-envoys into Peloponnesus.[780]
-
-  [779] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 434. καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ δήμῳ κατηρῶ (you,
-  Eubulus) Φιλίππῳ, καὶ κατὰ τῶν παίδων ὤμνυες ἦ μὴν ἀπολωλέναι
-  Φίλιππον ἂν βούλεσθαι, etc.
-
-  [780] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 438, 439.
-
-This able orator, immortalized as the rival of Demosthenes, has
-come before us hitherto only as a soldier in various Athenian
-expeditions—to Phlius in Peloponnesus (368)—to the battle of
-Mantineia (362)—and to Eubœa under Phokion (349 B. C.); in which
-last he had earned the favorable notice of the general, and had been
-sent to Athens with the news of the victory at Tamynæ. Æschines was
-about six years older than Demosthenes, but born in a much humbler
-and poorer station. His father Atromêtus taught to boys the elements
-of letters; his mother Glaukothea made a living by presiding over
-certain religious assemblies and rites of initiation, intended
-chiefly for poor communicants; the boy Æschines assisting both one
-and the other in a mental capacity. Such at least is the statement
-which comes to us, enriched with various degrading details, on the
-doubtful authority of his rival Demosthenes;[781] who also affirms,
-what we may accept as generally true, that Æschines had passed his
-early manhood partly as an actor, partly as a scribe or reader to
-the official boards. For both functions he possessed some natural
-advantages—an athletic frame, a powerful voice, a ready flow of
-unpremeditated speech. After some years passed as scribe, in which
-he made himself useful to Eubulus and others, he was chosen public
-scribe to the assembly—acquired familiarity with the administrative
-and parliamentary business of the city—and thus elevated himself by
-degrees to influence as a speaker. In rhetorical power, he seems to
-have been surpassed only by Demosthenes.[782]
-
-  [781] Demosthenes affirms this at two distinct times—Fals. Leg.
-  p. 415-431; De Coronâ, p. 313.
-
-  Stechow (Vita Æschinis, p. 1-10) brings together the little which
-  can be made out respecting Æschines.
-
-  [782] Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dicend. Demosth. p. 1063; Cicero,
-  Orator, c. 9, 29.
-
-As envoy of Athens despatched under the motion of Eubulus, Æschines
-proceeded into Peloponnesus in the spring of 347; others being
-sent at the same time to other Grecian cities. Among other places,
-he visited Megalopolis, where he was heard before the Arcadian
-collective assembly called the Ten Thousand. He addressed them
-in a strain of animated exhortation, adjuring them to combine
-with Athens for the defence of the liberties of Greece against
-Philip, and inveighing strenuously against those traitors who, in
-Arcadia as well as in other parts of Greece, sold themselves to
-the aggressor and paralyzed all resistance. He encountered however
-much opposition from a speaker named Hieronymus, who espoused the
-interest of Philip in the assembly: and though he professed to
-bring back some flattering hopes, it is certain that neither in
-Arcadia, nor elsewhere in Peloponnesus, was his influence of any real
-efficacy.[783] The strongest feeling among the Arcadians was fear
-and dislike of Sparta, which rendered them in the main indifferent,
-if not favorable, to the Macedonian successes. In returning from
-Arcadia to Athens, Æschines met the Arcadian Atrestidas, with the
-unhappy troop of Olynthian slaves following; a sight which so deeply
-affected the Athenian orator, that he dwelt upon it afterwards in his
-speech before the assembly, with indignant sympathy; deploring the
-sad effects of Grecian dissension, and the ruin produced by Philip’s
-combined employment of arms and corruption.
-
-  [783] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 344-438; Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 38.
-  The conduct of Æschines at this juncture is much the same, as
-  described by his rival, and as admitted by himself. It was, in
-  truth, among the most honorable epochs of his life.
-
-Æschines returned probably about the middle of the summer of 347 B.
-C. Other envoys, sent to more distant cities, remained out longer;
-some indeed even until the ensuing winter. Though it appears that
-some envoys from other cities were induced in return to visit Athens,
-yet no sincere or hearty coöperation against Philip could be obtained
-in any part of Greece. While Philip, in the fulness of triumph,
-was celebrating his magnificent Olympic festival in Macedonia, the
-Athenians were disheartened by finding that they could expect little
-support from independent Greeks, and were left to act only with
-their own narrow synod of allies. Hence Eubulus and Æschines became
-earnest partisans of peace, and Demosthenes also seems to have been
-driven by the general despondency into a willingness to negotiate.
-The two orators, though they afterwards became bitter rivals, were
-at this juncture not very discordant in sentiment. On the other
-hand, the philippizing speakers at Athens held a bolder tone than
-ever. As Philip found his ports greatly blocked up by the Athenian
-cruisers, he was likely to profit by his existing ascendency for the
-purpose of strengthening his naval equipments. Now there was no place
-so abundantly supplied as Athens, with marine stores and muniments
-for armed ships. Probably there were agents or speculators taking
-measures to supply Philip with these articles, and it was against
-them that a decree of the assembly was now directed, adopted on the
-motion of a senator named Timarchus—to punish with death all who
-should export from Athens to Philip either arms or stores for ships
-of war.[784] This severe decree, however, was passed at the same
-time that the disposition towards peace, if peace were attainable,
-was on the increase at Athens.
-
-  [784] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 433. This decree must have been
-  proposed by Timarchus either towards the close of Olymp. 108,
-  1—or towards the beginning of the following year, Olymp. 108, 2;
-  that is, not long before, or not long after, Midsummer 347 B.
-  C. But which of these two dates is to be preferred, is matter
-  of controversy. Franke (Prolegom. ad Æschin. cont. Timarchum,
-  p. xxxviii.—xli.) thinks that Timarchus was senator in Olymp.
-  108, 1—and proposed the decree then; he supposes the oration of
-  Æschines to have been delivered in the beginning of Olymp. 108,
-  3—and that the expression (p. 11) announcing Timarchus as having
-  been senator “the year before” (πέρυσιν), is to be construed
-  loosely as signifying “the year but one before.”
-
-  Mr. Clinton, Boeckh, and Westermann, suppose the oration of
-  Æschines against Timarchus to have been delivered in Olymp.
-  108, 4—not in Olymp. 108, 3. On that supposition, if we take
-  the word πέρυσιν in its usual sense, Timarchus was senator in
-  108, 3. Now it is certain that he did not propose the decree
-  forbidding the export of naval stores to Philip, at a date so
-  late as 108, 3; because the peace with Philip was concluded
-  in Elaphebolion Olymp. 108, 2. (March, 346 B. C.) But the
-  supposition might be admissible, that Timarchus was senator in
-  two different years,—both in Olymp. 108, 1 and in Olymp. 108, 3
-  (not in two consecutive years). In that case, the senatorial year
-  of Timarchus, to which Æschines alludes (cont. Timarch. p. 11),
-  would be Olymp. 108, 3, while the other senatorial year, in which
-  Timarchus moved the decree prohibiting export, would be Olymp.
-  108, 1.
-
-  Nevertheless, I agree with the views of Böhnecke (Forschungen,
-  p. 294) who thinks that the oration was delivered Olymp. 108,
-  3—and that Timarchus had been senator and had proposed the
-  decree prohibiting export of stores to Philip, in the year
-  preceding,—that is, Olymp. 108, 2; at the beginning of the
-  year,—Midsummer 347 B. C.
-
-Some months before the capture of Olynthus, ideas of peace had
-already been started, partly through the indirect overtures of Philip
-himself. During the summer of 348 B. C., the Eubœans had tried to
-negotiate an accommodation with Athens; the contest in Eubœa, though
-we know no particulars of it, having never wholly ceased for the
-last year and a half. Nor does it appear that any peace was even
-now concluded; for Eubœa is spoken of as under the dependence of
-Philip during the ensuing year.[785] The Eubœan envoys, however,
-intimated that Philip had desired them to communicate from him a
-wish to finish the war and conclude peace with Athens.[786] Though
-Philip had at this time conquered the larger portion of Chalkidikê,
-and was proceeding successfully against the remainder, it was still
-his interest to detach Athens from the war, if he could. Her manner
-of carrying on war was indeed faint and slack; yet she did him much
-harm at sea, and she was the only city competent to organize an
-extensive Grecian confederacy against him; which, though it had not
-yet been brought about, was at least a possible contingency under her
-presidency.
-
-  [785] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 348-445.
-
-  [786] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 29.
-
-An Athenian of influence named Phrynon had been captured by Philip’s
-cruisers, during the truce of the Olympic festival in 348 B. C.:
-after a certain detention, he procured from home the required ransom
-and obtained his release. On returning to Athens, he had sufficient
-credit to prevail on the public assembly to send another citizen
-along with him, as public envoy from the city to Philip; in order to
-aid him in getting back his ransom, which he alleged to have been
-wrongfully demanded from one captured during the holy truce. Though
-this seems a strange proceeding during mid-war,[787] yet the Athenian
-people took up the case with sympathy; Ktesiphon was named envoy, and
-went with Phrynon to Philip, whom they must have found engaged in the
-war against Olynthus. Being received in the most courteous manner,
-they not only obtained restitution of the ransom, but were completely
-won over by Philip. With his usual good policy, he had seized the
-opportunity of gaining (we may properly say, of bribing, since
-the restoration of ransom was substantially a bribe) two powerful
-Athenian citizens, whom he now sent back to Athens as his pronounced
-partisans.
-
-  [787] There is more than one singularity in the narrative given
-  by Æschines about Phrynon. The complaint of Phrynon implies an
-  assumption, that the Olympic truce suspended the operations of
-  war everywhere throughout Greece between belligerent Greeks. But
-  such was not the maxim recognized or acted on; so far as we know
-  the operations of warfare. Vœmel (Proleg. ad Demosth. De Pace, p.
-  246) feeling this difficulty, understands the Olympic truce, here
-  mentioned, to refer to the Olympic festival celebrated by Philip
-  himself in Macedonia, in the spring or summer of 347 B. C. This
-  would remove the difficulty about the effect of the truce; for
-  Philip of course would respect his own proclaimed truce. But it
-  is liable to another objection: that Æschines plainly indicates
-  the capture of Phrynon to have been _anterior_ to the fall of
-  Olynthus. Besides, Æschines would hardly use the words ἐν ταῖς
-  Ὀλυμπικαῖς σπονδαῖς, without any special addition, to signify the
-  Macedonian games.
-
-Phrynon and Ktesiphon, on their return, expatiated warmly on the
-generosity of Philip, and reported much about his flattering
-expressions towards Athens, and his reluctance to continue the war
-against her. The public assembly being favorably disposed, a citizen
-named Philokrates, who now comes before us for the first time,
-proposed a decree, granting to Philip leave to send a herald and
-envoys, if he chose, to treat for peace; which was what Philip was
-anxious to do, according to the allegation of Ktesiphon. The decree
-was passed unanimously in the assembly, but the mover Philokrates
-was impeached some time afterwards before the Dikastery, as for an
-illegal proposition, by a citizen named Lykinus. On the cause coming
-to trial, the Dikastery pronounced an acquittal so triumphant,
-that Lykinus did not even obtain the fifth part of the suffrages.
-Philokrates being so sick as to be unable to do justice to his own
-case, Demosthenes stood forward as his supporter, and made a long
-speech in his favor.[788]
-
-  [788] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 7; cont. Ktesiph. p. 63.
-  Our knowledge of these events is derived almost wholly from one,
-  or other, or both, of the two rival orators, in their speeches
-  delivered four or five years afterwards, on the trial De Falsâ
-  Legatione. Demosthenes seeks to prove that before the embassy
-  to Macedonia, in which he and Æschines were jointly concerned,
-  Æschines was eager for continued war against Philip, and only
-  became the partisan of Philip during and after the embassy.
-  Æschines does not deny that he made efforts at that juncture to
-  get up more effective war against Philip; nor is the fact at
-  all dishonorable to him. On the other hand, he seeks to prove
-  against Demosthenes, that he (Demosthenes) was at that time both
-  a partisan of peace with Philip, and a friend of Philokrates to
-  whom he afterwards became so bitterly opposed. For this purpose
-  Æschines adverts to the motion of Philokrates about permitting
-  Philip to send envoys to Athens—and the speech of Demosthenes in
-  the Dikastery in favor of Philokrates.
-
-  It would prove nothing discreditable to Demosthenes if both these
-  allegations were held to be correct. The motion of Philokrates
-  was altogether indefinite, pledging Athens to nothing; and
-  Demosthenes might well think it unreasonable to impeach a
-  statesman for such a motion.
-
-The motion of Philokrates determined nothing positive, and only made
-an opening; of which, however, it did not suit Philip’s purpose
-to avail himself. But we see that ideas of peace had been thrown
-out by some persons at Athens, even during the last months of the
-Olynthian war, and while a body of Athenian citizens were actually
-assisting Olynthus against the besieging force of Philip. Presently
-arrived the terrible news of the fall of Olynthus, and of the
-captivity of the Athenian citizens in garrison there. While this
-great alarm (as has been already stated) gave birth to new missions
-for anti-Macedonian alliances, it enlisted on the side of peace
-all the friends of those captives whose lives were now in Philip’s
-hands. The sorrow thus directly inflicted on many private families,
-together with the force of individual sympathy widely diffused among
-the citizens, operated powerfully upon the decisions of the public
-assembly. A century before, the Athenians had relinquished all their
-acquisitions in Bœotia, in order to recover their captives taken in
-the defeat of Tolmides at Koroneia; and during the Peloponnesian
-war, the policy of the Spartans had been chiefly guided for three or
-four years by the anxiety to ensure the restoration of the captives
-of Sphakteria. Moreover, several Athenians of personal consequence
-were taken at Olynthus; among them, Eukratus and Iatrokles. Shortly
-after the news arrived, the relatives of these two men, presenting
-themselves before the assembly in the solemn guise of suppliants,
-deposited an olive branch on the altar hard by, and entreated that
-care might be had for the safety of their captive kinsmen.[789]
-This appeal, echoed as it would be by the cries of so many other
-citizens in the like distress, called forth unanimous sympathy in
-the assembly. Both Philokrates and Demosthenes spoke in favor of it;
-Demosthenes probably, as having been a strenuous advocate of the war,
-was the more anxious to shew that he was keenly alive to so much
-individual suffering. It was resolved to open indirect negotiations
-with Philip for the release of the captives, through some of the
-great tragic and comic actors; who, travelling in the exercise of
-their profession to every city in Greece, were everywhere regarded
-in some sort as privileged persons. One of these, Neoptolemus,[790]
-had already availed himself of his favored profession and liberty
-of transit to assist in Philip’s intrigues and correspondences
-at Athens; another, Aristodemus, was also in good esteem with
-Philip; both were probably going to Macedonia to take part in the
-splendid Olympic festival there preparing. They were charged to make
-application, and take the best steps in their power, for the safety
-or release of the captives.[791]
-
-  [789] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 8. Ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς
-  χρόνους Ὄλυνθος ἥλω, καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἐγκατελήφθησαν
-  πολιτῶν, ὧν ἦν Ἰατροκλῆς καὶ Εὔκρατος. Ὑπὲρ δὴ τούτων ἱκετηρίαν
-  θέντες οἱ οἰκεῖοι, ἐδέοντο ὑμῶν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιήσασθαι·
-  παρελθόντες δ᾽ αὐτοῖς συνηγόρουν Φιλοκράτης καὶ Δημοσθένης, ἀλλ᾽
-  οὐκ Αἰσχίνης.
-
-  To illustrate the effect of this impressive ceremony upon the
-  Athenian assembly, we may recall the memorable scene mentioned
-  by Xenophon and Diodorus (Xen. Hell. i. 7, 8; Diodor. xiii. 101)
-  after the battle of Arginusæ, when the relatives of the warriors
-  who had perished on board of the foundered ships, presented
-  themselves before the assembly with shaven heads and in mourning
-  garb. Compare also, about presentments of solemn supplication to
-  the assembly, Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 262—with the note of
-  Dissen, and Æschines contra Timarchum p. 9. c. 13.
-
-  [790] Demosth. De Pace, p. 58.
-
-  [791] Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 8) mentions only
-  Aristodemus. But from various passages in the oration of
-  Demosthenes (De Fals. Leg. p. 344, 346, 371, 443), we gather
-  that the actor Neoptolemus must have been conjoined with him;
-  perhaps also the Athenian Ktesiphon, though this is less certain.
-  Demosthenes mentions Aristodemus again, in the speech De Coronâ
-  (p. 232) as the first originator of the peace.
-
-  Demosthenes (De Pace, p. 58) had, even before this, denounced
-  Neoptolemus as playing a corrupt game, for the purposes of
-  Philip, at Athens. Soon after the peace, Neoptolemus sold up all
-  his property at Athens, and went to reside in Macedonia.
-
-It would appear that these actors were by no means expeditious in
-the performance of their mission. They probably spent some time in
-their professional avocations in Macedonia; and Aristodemus, not
-being a responsible envoy, delayed some time even after his return,
-before he made any report. That his mission had not been wholly
-fruitless, however, became presently evident from the arrival of
-the captive Iatrokles, whom Philip had released without ransom. The
-Senate then summoned Aristodemus before them, inviting him to make
-a general report of his proceedings, which he did; first before the
-Senate,—next, before the public assembly. He affirmed that Philip
-had entertained his propositions kindly, and that he was in the
-best dispositions towards Athens; desirous not only to be at peace
-with her, but even to be admitted as her ally. Demosthenes, then a
-senator, moved a vote of thanks and a wreath to Aristodemus.[792]
-
-  [792] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 8.
-
-This report, as far as we can make out, appears to have been made
-about September or October 347 B. C.; Æschines, and the other
-roving commissioners sent out by Athens to raise up anti-Macedonian
-combinations, had returned with nothing but disheartening
-announcement of refusal or lukewarmness. And there occurred also
-about the same time in Phokis and Thermopylæ, other events of grave
-augury to Athens, showing that the Sacred War and the contest between
-the Phokians and Thebans was turning,—as all events had turned for
-the last ten years,—to the farther aggrandizement of Philip.
-
-During the preceding two years, the Phokians, now under the
-command of Phalækus, in place of Phayllus, had maintained their
-position against Thebes; had kept possession of the Bœotian towns,
-Orchomenus, Koroneia, and Korsia, and were still masters of
-Alpônus, Thronium, and Nikæa, as well as of the important pass of
-Thermopylæ adjoining.[793] But though on the whole successful in
-regard to Thebes, they had fallen into dissension among themselves.
-The mercenary force, necessary to their defence, could only be
-maintained by continued appropriation of the Delphian treasures; an
-appropriation becoming from year to year both less lucrative and
-more odious. By successive spoliation of gold and silver ornaments,
-the temple is said to have been stripped of ten thousand talents
-(about two million three hundred thousand pounds), all its available
-wealth; so that the Phokian leaders were now reduced to dig for an
-unauthenticated treasure, supposed (on the faith of a verse in the
-Iliad, as well as on other grounds of surmise), to lie concealed
-beneath its stone floor. Their search, however, was not only
-unsuccessful, but arrested, as we are told, by violent earthquakes,
-significant of the anger of Apollo.[794]
-
-  [793] Diodor. xvi. 58; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 385-387; Æschines,
-  Fals. Leg. p. 45. c. 41.
-
-  [794] Diodor. xvi. 56.
-
-As the Delphian treasure became less and less, so the means of
-Phalækus to pay troops and maintain ascendency declined. While
-the foreign mercenaries relaxed in their obedience, his opponents
-in Phokis manifested increased animosity against his continued
-sacrilege. So greatly did these opponents increase in power, that
-they deposed Phalækus, elected Deinokrates with two others in
-his place, and instituted a strict inquiry into the antecedent
-appropriation of the Delphian treasure. Gross peculation was
-found to have been committed for the profit of individual leaders,
-especially one named Philon; who, on being seized and put to the
-torture, disclosed the names of several accomplices. These men
-were tried, compelled to refund, and ultimately put to death.[795]
-Phalækus however still retained his ascendency over the mercenaries,
-about eight thousand in number, so as to hold Thermopylæ and the
-places adjacent, and even presently to be re-appointed general.[796]
-
-  [795] Diodor. xvi. 56, 57.
-
-  [796] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 62. c. 41; Diodor. xvi. 59. Φάλαικον,
-  πάλιν τῆς στρατηγίας ἠξιωμένον, etc.
-
-Such intestine dispute, combined with the gradual exhaustion of
-the temple-funds, sensibly diminished the power of the Phokians.
-Yet they still remained too strong for their enemies the Thebans;
-who, deprived of Orchomenus and Koroneia, impoverished by military
-efforts of nine years, and unable to terminate the contest by their
-own force, resolved to invoke foreign aid. An opportunity might
-perhaps have been obtained for closing the war by some compromise,
-if it had been possible now to bring about an accommodation
-between Thebes and Athens; which some of the philo-Theban orators,
-(Demosthenes seemingly among them), attempted, under the prevalent
-uneasiness about Philip.[797] But the adverse sentiments in both
-cities, especially in Thebes, were found invincible; and the Thebans,
-little anticipating consequences, determined to invoke the ruinous
-intervention of the conqueror of Olynthus. The Thessalians, already
-valuable allies of Philip, joined them in soliciting him to crush
-the Phokians, and to restore the ancient Thessalian privilege of the
-Pylæa, (or regular yearly Amphiktyonic meeting at Thermopylæ), which
-the Phokians had suppressed during the last ten years. This joint
-prayer for intervention was preferred in the name of the Delphian
-god, investing Philip with the august character of champion of
-the Amphiktyonic assembly, to rescue the Delphian temple from its
-sacrilegious plunderers.
-
-  [797] Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 73. c. 44; Demosth. De Coronâ,
-  p. 231. Demosthenes, in his oration De Coronâ, spoken many years
-  after the facts, affirms the contingency of alliance between
-  Athens and Thebes at this juncture, as having been much more
-  probable than he ventures to state it in the earlier speech De
-  Falsâ Legatione.
-
-The King of Macedon, with his past conquests and his well-known
-spirit of aggressive enterprise, was now a sort of present deity,
-ready to lend force to all the selfish ambition, or blind fear and
-antipathy, prevalent among the discontented fractions of the Hellenic
-world. While his intrigues had procured numerous partisans even in
-the centre of Peloponnesus,—as Æschines, on return from his mission,
-had denounced, not having yet himself enlisted in the number,—he was
-now furnished with a pious pretence, and invited by powerful cities,
-to penetrate into the heart of Greece, within its last line of common
-defence, Thermopylæ.
-
-The application of the Thebans to Philip excited much alarm in
-Phokis. A Macedonian army under Parmenio did actually enter
-Thessaly,—where we find them, three months later, besieging
-Halus.[798] Reports seem to have been spread, about September 347
-B. C., that the Macedonians were about to march to Thermopylæ; upon
-which the Phokians took alarm, and sent envoys to Athens as well
-as to Sparta, entreating aid to enable them to hold the pass, and
-offering to deliver up the three important towns near it,—Alpônus,
-Thronium, and Nikæa. So much were the Athenians alarmed by the
-message, that they not only ordered Proxenus, their general at Oreus,
-to take immediate possession of the pass, but also passed a decree
-to equip fifty triremes, and to send forth their military citizens
-under thirty years of age, with an energy like that displayed when
-they checked Philip before at the same place. But it appears that the
-application had been made by the party in Phokis opposed to Phalækus.
-So vehemently did that chief resent the proceeding, that he threw
-the Phokian envoys into prison on their return; refusing to admit
-either Proxenus or Archidamus into possession of Thermopylæ, and even
-dismissing without recognition the Athenian heralds, who came in
-their regular rounds to proclaim the solemn truce of the Eleusinian
-mysteries.[799] This proceeding on the part of Phalækus was dictated
-seemingly by jealousy of Athens and Sparta, and by fear that they
-would support the party opposed to him in Phokis. It could not have
-originated (as Æschines alleges) in superior confidence and liking
-towards Philip; for if Phalækus had entertained such sentiments,
-he might have admitted the Macedonian troops at once; which he
-did not do until ten months later, under the greatest pressure of
-circumstances.
-
-  [798] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 392.
-
-  [799] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 41. It is this notice of
-  the μυστηριωτίδες σπονδαὶ which serves as indication of time for
-  the event. The Eleusinian mysteries were celebrated in the month
-  Boëdromion (September). These events took place in September, 347
-  B. C., Olymp. 108, 2—the archonship of Themistokles at Athens.
-  There is also a farther indication of time given by Æschines:
-  that the event happened before he was nominated envoy,—πρὶν
-  ἐμὲ χειροτονηθῆναι πρεσβευτήν (p. 46. c. 41). This refutes the
-  supposition of Vœmel (Proleg. ad Demosth. de Pace, p. 255),
-  who refers the proceeding to the following month Elaphebolion
-  (March), on the ground of some other words of Æschines,
-  intimating “that the news reached Athens while the Athenians were
-  deliberating about the peace.” Böhnecke, too, supposes that the
-  mysteries here alluded to are the lesser mysteries, celebrated
-  in Anthesterion; not the greater, which belong to Boëdromion.
-  This supposition appears to me improbable and unnecessary. We may
-  reasonably believe that there were many discussions on the peace
-  at Athens, before the envoys were actually nominated. Some of
-  these debates may well have taken place in the month Boëdromion.
-
-Such insulting repudiation of the aid tendered by Proxenus at
-Thermopylæ, combined with the distracted state of parties in Phokis,
-menaced Athens with a new embarrassment. Though Phalækus still held
-the pass, his conduct had been such as to raise doubts whether he
-might not treat separately with Philip. Here was another circumstance
-operating on Athens,—besides the refusal of coöperation from other
-Greeks and the danger of her captives at Olynthus,—to dishearten her
-in the prosecution of the war, and to strengthen the case of those
-who advocated peace. It was a circumstance the more weighty, because
-it really involved the question of safety or exposure to her own
-territory, through the opening of the pass of Thermopylæ. It was
-here that she was now under the necessity of keeping watch; being
-thrown on the defensive for her own security at home,—not, as before,
-stretching out a long arm for the protection of distant possessions
-such as the Chersonese, or distant allies such as the Olynthians.
-So speedily had the predictions of Demosthenes been realized, that
-if the Athenians refused to carry on strenuous war against Philip
-on _his_ coast, they would bring upon themselves the graver evil of
-having to resist him on or near their own frontier.
-
-The maintenance of freedom in the Hellenic world against the
-extra-Hellenic invader, now turned once more upon the pass of
-Thermopylæ; as it had turned one hundred and thirty-three years
-before, during the onward march of the Persian Xerxes.
-
-To Philip, that pass was of incalculable importance. It was his only
-road into Greece; it could not be forced by any land-army; while at
-sea the Athenian fleet was stronger than his. In spite of the general
-remissness of Athens in warlike undertakings, she had now twice
-manifested her readiness for a vigorous effort to maintain Thermopylæ
-against him. To become master of the position, it was necessary that
-he should disarm Athens by concluding peace,—keep her in ignorance
-or delusion as to his real purposes,—prevent her from conceiving
-alarm or sending aid to Thermopylæ,—and then overawe or buy off the
-isolated Phokians. How ably and cunningly his diplomacy was managed
-for this purpose, will presently appear.[800]
-
-  [800] It is at this juncture, in trying to make out the
-  diplomatic transactions between Athens and Philip, from the
-  summer of 347 to that of 346 B. C., that we find ourselves
-  plunged amidst the contradictory assertions of the two rival
-  orators,—Demosthenes and Æschines; with very little of genuine
-  historical authority to control them. In 343-342 B. C.,
-  Demosthenes impeached Æschines for corrupt betrayal of the
-  interest of Athens in the second of his three embassies to
-  Philip (in 346 B. C.). The long harangue (De Falsâ Legatione),
-  still remaining, wherein his charge stands embodied, enters
-  into copious details respecting the peace with its immediate
-  antecedents and consequents. We possess also the speech delivered
-  by Æschines in his own defence, and in counter-accusation of
-  Demosthenes; a speech going over the same ground, suitably to his
-  own purpose and point of view. Lastly, we have the two speeches,
-  delivered several years later (in 330 B. C.), of Æschines in
-  prosecuting Ktesiphon, and of Demosthenes in defending him;
-  wherein the conduct of Demosthenes as to the peace of 346 B. C.
-  again becomes matter of controversy. All these harangues are
-  interesting, not merely as eloquent compositions, but also from
-  the striking conception which they impart of the living sentiment
-  and controversy of the time. But when we try to extract from
-  them real and authentic matter of history, they become painfully
-  embarrassing; so glaring are the contradictions not only between
-  the two rivals, but also between the earlier and later discourses
-  of the same orator himself, especially Æschines; so evident is
-  the spirit of perversion, so unscrupulous are the manifestations
-  of hostile feeling, on both sides. We can place little faith
-  in the allegations of either orator against the other, except
-  where some collateral grounds of fact or probability can be
-  adduced in confirmation. But the allegations of each as to
-  matters which do not make against the other, are valuable; even
-  the misrepresentations, since we have them on both sides, will
-  sometimes afford mutual correction: and we shall often find it
-  practicable to detect a basis of real matter of fact which one or
-  both may seek to pervert, but which neither can venture to set
-  aside, or can keep wholly out of sight. It is indeed deeply to be
-  lamented that we know little of the history except so much as it
-  suits the one or the other of these rival orators, each animated
-  by purposes totally at variance with that of the historian, to
-  make known either by direct notice or oblique allusion.
-
-On the other hand, to Athens, to Sparta, and to the general cause
-of Pan-hellenic independence, it was of capital moment that Philip
-should be kept on the outside of Thermopylæ. And here Athens had
-more at stake than the rest; since not merely her influence abroad,
-but the safety of her own city and territory against invasion,
-was involved in the question. The Thebans had already invited the
-presence of Philip, himself always ready even without invitation,
-to come within the pass; it was the first interest, as well as the
-first duty, of Athens, to counterwork them, and to keep him out.
-With tolerable prudence, her guarantee of the past might have been
-made effective; but we shall find her measures ending only in shame
-and disappointment, through the flagrant improvidence, and apparent
-corruption, of her own negotiators.
-
-The increasing discouragement as to war, and yearning for peace,
-which prevailed at Athens during the summer and autumn of 347 B.
-C., has been already described. We may be sure that the friends of
-the captives taken at Olynthus would be importunate in demanding
-peace, because there was no other way of procuring their release;
-since Philip did not choose to exchange them for money, reserving
-them as an item in political negotiation. At length, about the month
-of November, the public assembly decreed that envoys should be sent
-to Philip to ascertain on what conditions peace could be made; ten
-Athenian envoys, and one from the synod of confederate allies,
-sitting at Athens. The mover of the decree was Philokrates, the same
-who had moved the previous decree permitting Philip to send envoys if
-he chose. Of this permission Philip had not availed himself, in spite
-of all that the philippizers at Athens had alleged about his anxiety
-for peace and alliance with the city. It suited his purpose to have
-the negotiations carried on in Macedonia, where he could act better
-upon the individual negotiators of Athens.
-
-The decree having been passed in the assembly, ten envoys were
-chosen: Philokrates, Demosthenes, Æschines, Ktesiphon, Phrynon,
-Iatroklês, Derkyllus, Kimon, Nausiklês, and Aristodemus the
-actor. Aglaokreon of Tenedos was selected to accompany them, as
-representative of the allied synod. Of these envoys, Ktesiphon,
-Phrynon, and Iatroklês, had already been gained over as partisans
-by Philip while in Macedonia; moreover, Aristodemus was a person
-to whom, in his histrionic profession, the favor of Philip was
-more valuable than the interests of Athens. Æschines was proposed
-by Nausiklês; Demosthenes, by Philokrates the mover.[801] Though
-Demosthenes had been before so earnest in advocating vigorous
-prosecution of the war, it does not appear that he was now adverse to
-the opening of negotiations. Had he been ever so adverse, he would
-probably have failed in obtaining even a hearing, in the existing
-temper of the public mind. He thought indeed that Athens inflicted so
-much damage on her enemy by ruining the Macedonian maritime commerce,
-that she was not under the necessity of submitting to peace on bad or
-humiliating terms.[802] But still he did not oppose the overtures,
-nor did his opposition begin until afterwards, when he saw the turn
-which the negotiations were taking. Nor, on the other hand, was
-Æschines as yet suspected of a leaning towards Philip. Both he and
-Demosthenes obeyed, at this moment, the impulse of opinion generally
-prevalent at Athens. Their subsequent discordant views and bitter
-rivalry grew out of the embassy itself; out of its result and the
-behavior of Æschines.
-
-  [801] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30. s. 9. p. 31. c. 10. p. 34. c.
-  20; Argumentum ii ad Demosth. Fals. Leg.
-
-  [802] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p 442. Compare p. 369, 387, 391.
-
-The eleven envoys were appointed to visit Philip, not with any power
-of concluding peace, but simply to discuss with him and ascertain on
-what terms peace could be had. So much is certain; though we do not
-possess the original decree under which they were nominated. Having
-sent before them a herald to obtain a safe-conduct from Philip, they
-left Athens about December 347 B. C., and proceeded by sea to Oreus,
-on the northern coast of Eubœa, where they expected to meet the
-returning herald. Finding that he had not yet come back, they crossed
-the strait at once, without waiting for him, into the Pagasæan Gulf,
-where Parmenio with a Macedonian army was then besieging Halus.
-To him they notified their arrival, and received permission to
-pass on, first to Pagasæ, next to Larissa. Here they met their own
-returning herald, under whose safeguard they pursued their journey to
-Pella.[803]
-
-  [803] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 392.
-
-Our information respecting this (first) embassy proceeds almost
-wholly from Æschines. He tells us that Demosthenes was, from the
-very day of setting out, intolerably troublesome both to him and
-to his brother envoys; malignant, faithless, and watching for such
-matters as might be turned against them in the way of accusation
-afterwards; lastly, boastful even to absurd excess, of his own
-powers of eloquence. In Greece, it was the usual habit to transact
-diplomatic business, like other political matters, publicly before
-the governing number—the council, if the constitution happened to
-be oligarchical—the general assembly, if democratical. Pursuant to
-this habit, the envoys were called upon to appear before Philip in
-his full pomp and state, and there address to him formal harangues
-(either by one or more of their number as they chose), setting forth
-the case of Athens; after which Philip would deliver his reply in
-the like publicity, either with his own lips or by those of a chosen
-minister. The Athenian envoys resolved among themselves, that when
-introduced, each of them should address Philip, in the order of
-seniority; Demosthenes being the youngest of the Ten, and Æschines
-next above him. Accordingly, when summoned before Philip, Ktesiphon,
-the oldest envoy, began with a short address; the other seven
-followed with equal brevity, while the stress of the business was
-left to Æschines and Demosthenes.[804]
-
-  [804] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 31. c. 10, 11.
-
-Æschines recounts in abridgment to the Athenians, with much
-satisfaction, his own elaborate harangue, establishing the right
-of Athens to Amphipolis, the wrong done by Philip in taking it
-and holding it against her, and his paramount obligation to make
-restitution—but touching upon no other subject whatever.[805] He
-then proceeds to state—probably with yet greater satisfaction—that
-Demosthenes, who followed next, becoming terrified and confused,
-utterly broke down, forgot his prepared speech, and was obliged to
-stop short, in spite of courteous encouragements from Philip.[806]
-Gross failure, after full preparation, on the part of the greatest
-orator of ancient or modern times, appears at first hearing so
-incredible, that we are disposed to treat it as a pure fabrication
-of his opponent. Yet I incline to believe that the fact was
-substantially as Æschines states it; and that Demosthenes was
-partially divested of his oratorical powers by finding himself not
-only speaking before the enemy whom he had so bitterly denounced, but
-surrounded by all the evidences of Macedonian power, and doubtless
-exposed to unequivocal marks of well-earned hatred, from those
-Macedonians who took less pains than Philip to disguise their real
-feelings.[807]
-
-  [805] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 31. c. 11.
-
-  [806] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 32. c. 13, 14.
-
-  [807] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 32, 33. c. 15. Demosthenes himself
-  says little or nothing about this first embassy, and nothing at
-  all either about his own speech or that of Æschines.
-
-Having dismissed the envoys after their harangues, and taken a short
-time for consideration, Philip recalled them into his presence. He
-then delivered his reply with his own lips, combating especially
-the arguments of Æschines, and according to that orator, with such
-pertinence and presence of mind, as to excite the admiration of
-all the envoys, Demosthenes among the rest. What Philip said, we
-do not learn from Æschines; who expatiates only on the shuffling,
-artifice, and false pretences of Demosthenes, to conceal his failure
-as an orator, and to put himself on a point of advantage above his
-colleagues. Of these personalities it is impossible to say how much
-is true; and even were they true, they are scarcely matter of general
-history.
-
-It was about the beginning of March when the envoys returned to
-Athens. Some were completely fascinated by the hospitable treatment
-and engaging manners of Philip,[808] especially when entertaining
-them at the banquet: with others, he had come to an understanding at
-once more intimate and more corrupt. They brought back a letter from
-Philip, which was read both in the Senate and the assembly; while
-Demosthenes, senator of that year, not only praised them all in the
-Senate, but also became himself the mover of a resolution that they
-should be crowned with a wreath of honor, and invited to dine next
-day in the prytaneium.[809]
-
-  [808] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 33. c. 17, 18. The effect of the
-  manner and behavior of Philip upon Ktesiphon the envoy, is
-  forcibly stated here by Æschines.
-
-  [809] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 34. c. 19; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p.
-  414. This vote of thanks, and invitation to dinner, appears to
-  have been so uniform a custom, that Demosthenes (Fals. Leg. p.
-  350) comments upon the withholding of the compliment, when the
-  second embassy returned, as a disgrace without parallel. That
-  Demosthenes should have proposed a motion of such customary
-  formality, is a fact of little moment any way. It rather proves
-  that the relations of Demosthenes with his colleagues during
-  the embassy, cannot have been so ill-tempered as Æschines had
-  affirmed. Demosthenes himself admits that he did not begin to
-  suspect his colleagues until the debates at Athens after the
-  return of this first embassy.
-
-We have hardly any means of appreciating the real proceedings of
-this embassy, or the matters treated in discussion with Philip.
-Æschines tells us nothing, except the formalities of the interview,
-and the speeches about Amphipolis. But we shall at any rate do him no
-injustice, if we judge him upon his own account; which, if it does
-not represent what he actually did, represents what he wished to
-be thought to have done. His own account certainly shows a strange
-misconception of the actual situation of affairs. In order to justify
-himself for being desirous of peace, he lays considerable stress on
-the losing game which Athens had been playing during the war, and on
-the probability of yet farther loss if she persisted. He completes
-the cheerless picture by adding—what was doubtless but too familiar
-to his Athenian audience—that Philip on his side, marching from one
-success to another, had raised the Macedonian kingdom to an elevation
-truly formidable, by the recent extinction of Olynthus. Yet under
-this state of comparative force between the two contending parties,
-Æschines presents himself before Philip with a demand of exorbitant
-magnitude,—for the cession of Amphipolis. He says not a word about
-anything else. He delivers an eloquent harangue to convince Philip
-of the incontestible right of Athens to Amphipolis, and to prove to
-him that he was in the wrong for taking and keeping it. He affects
-to think, that by this process he should induce Philip to part
-with a town, the most capital and unparalleled position in all his
-dominions; which he had now possessed for twelve years, and which
-placed him in communication with his new foundation Philippi and
-the auriferous region around it. The arguments of Æschines would
-have been much to the purpose, in an action tried between two
-litigants before an impartial Dikastery at Athens. But here were two
-belligerent parties, in a given ratio of strength and position as to
-the future, debating terms of peace. That an envoy on the part of
-Athens, the losing party, should now stand forward to demand from
-a victorious enemy the very place which formed the original cause
-of the war, and which had become far more valuable to Philip than
-when he first took it—was a pretension altogether preposterous. When
-Æschines reproduces his eloquent speech reclaiming Amphipolis, as
-having been the principal necessity and most honorable achievement
-of his diplomatic mission, he only shows how little qualified he was
-to render real service to Athens in that capacity—to say nothing
-as yet about corruption. The Athenian people, extremely retentive
-of past convictions, had it deeply impressed on their minds that
-Amphipolis was theirs by right; and probably the first envoys to
-Macedonia,—Aristodemus, Neoptolemus, Ktesiphon, Phrynon,[810]
-etc.—had been so cajoled by the courteous phrases, deceptions, and
-presents of Philip, that they represented him on their return as
-not unwilling to purchase friendship with Athens by the restoration
-of Amphipolis. To this delusive expectation in the Athenian mind
-Æschines addressed himself, when he took credit for his earnest
-pleading before Philip on behalf of Athenian right to the place,
-as if it were the sole purpose of his mission.[811] We shall see
-him throughout, in his character of envoy, not only fostering the
-actual delusions of the public at Athens, but even circulating gross
-fictions and impostures of his own, respecting the proceedings and
-purposes of Philip.
-
-  [810] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 344. Compare p. 371. τοὺς περὶ τῆς
-  εἰρήνης πρέσβεις πέμπειν ὡς Φίλιππον ἐπείσθητε ὑπ᾽ Ἀριστοδήμου
-  καὶ Νεοπτολέμου καὶ Κτησιφῶντος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐκεῖθεν
-  ἀπαγγελλόντων οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ὑγιὲς, etc.
-
-  [811] There is great contradiction between the two orators,
-  Æschines and Demosthenes, as to this speech of Æschines before
-  Philip respecting Amphipolis. Demosthenes represents Æschines
-  as having said in this report to the people on his return, “I
-  (Æschines) said nothing about Amphipolis, in order that I might
-  leave that subject fresh for Demosthenes,” etc.
-
-  Compare Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 421; Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 33,
-  34. c. 18, 19, 21.
-
-  As to this particular matter of fact, I incline to believe
-  Æschines rather than his rival. He probably did make an eloquent
-  speech about Amphipolis before Philip.
-
-It was on or about the first day of the month Elaphebolion[812]
-(March) when the envoys reached Athens on returning from the court of
-Philip. They brought a letter from him couched in the most friendly
-terms; expressing great anxiety not only to be at peace with Athens,
-but also to become her ally; stating moreover that he was prepared to
-render her valuable service, and that he would have specified more
-particularly what the service would be, if he could have felt certain
-that he should be received as her ally.[813] But in spite of such
-amenities of language, affording an occasion for his partisans in the
-assembly, Æschines, Philokrates, Ktesiphon, Phrynon, Iatroklês and
-others, to expatiate upon his excellent dispositions, Philip would
-grant no better terms of peace than that each party should retain
-what they already possessed. Pursuant to this general principle, the
-Chersonesus was assured to Athens, of which Æschines appears to have
-made some boast.[814] Moreover, at the moment when the envoys were
-quitting Pella to return home, Philip was also leaving it at the
-head of his army on an expedition against Kersobleptes in Thrace.
-He gave a special pledge to the envoys that he would not attack the
-Chersonese, until the Athenians should have had an opportunity of
-debating,—accepting or rejecting the propositions of peace. His
-envoys, Antipater and Parmenio, received orders to visit Athens with
-little delay; and a Macedonian herald accompanied the Athenian envoys
-on their return.[815]
-
-  [812] The eighth day of Elaphebolion fell some little time after
-  their arrival, so that possibly they may have even reached
-  Athens on the last days of the month Anthesterion (Æschines
-  adv. Ktesiph. p. 63. c. 24). The reader will understand that
-  the Grecian lunar months do not correspond precisely, but only
-  approximatively, with ours.
-
-  [813] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 353, 354. ... ὁ γὰρ εἰς τὴν
-  ~προτέραν~ γράψας ~ἐπιστολὴν, ἣν ἠνέγκαμεν ἡμεῖς~, ὅτι “ἔγραφόν
-  τ᾽ ἂν καὶ διαῤῥήδην, ἥλικα ὑμᾶς εὖ ποιήσω, εἰ εὖ ᾔδειν καὶ τὴν
-  συμμαχίαν μοι γενησομένην,” etc. Compare Pseudo-Demosth. De
-  Halonneso, p. 85. Æschines alludes to this letter, Fals. Leg. p.
-  34. c. 21.
-
-  [814] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p 365.
-
-  [815] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 26; Æschines cont.
-  Ktesiphont. p. 63. c. 23. παρηγγέλλετο δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν
-  (Kersobleptes) ἤδη στρατεία, etc.
-
-Having ascertained on what terms peace could be had, the envoys
-were competent to advise the Athenian people, and prepare them for
-a definite conclusion, as soon as this Macedonian mission should
-arrive. They first gave an account of their proceedings to the
-public assembly. Ktesiphon, the oldest, who spake first, expatiated
-on the graceful presence and manners of Philip, as well as upon the
-charm of his company in wine-drinking.[816] Æschines dwelt upon
-his powerful and pertinent oratory; after which he recounted the
-principal occurrences of the journey, and the debate with Philip,
-intimating that in the previous understanding of the envoys among
-themselves, the duty of speaking about Amphipolis had been confided
-to Demosthenes, in case any point should have been omitted by the
-previous speakers. Demosthenes then made his own statement, in
-language (according to Æschines) censorious and even insulting
-towards his colleagues; especially affirming that Æschines, in his
-vanity, chose to preoccupy all the best points in his own speech,
-leaving none open for any one else.[817] Demosthenes next proceeded
-to move various decrees; one, to greet by libation the herald who
-had accompanied them from Philip,—and the Macedonian envoys who
-were expected; another, providing that the prytanes should convene
-a special assembly on the eighth day of Elaphebolion, (a day sacred
-to Æsculapius, on which generally no public business was ever
-transacted), in order that if the envoys from Macedonia had then
-arrived, the people might discuss without delay their political
-relations with Philip; a third, to commend the behavior of the
-Athenian envoys (his colleagues and himself), and to invite them to
-dinner in the prytaneium. Demosthenes farther moved in the Senate,
-that when Philip’s envoys came, they should be accommodated with
-seats of honor at the Dionysiac festival.[818]
-
-  [816] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 34. c. 20. τῆς ἐν τοῖς πότοις
-  ἐπιδεξιότητος—συμπιεῖν δεινὸς ἦν (c. 21).
-
-  [817] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 34, 35. c. 21; Dem. Fals. Leg. p.
-  421. Yet Æschines, when describing the same facts in his oration
-  against Ktesiphon (p. 62. c. 23), simply says that Demosthenes
-  gave to the assembly an account of the proceedings of the first
-  embassy, similar to that given by the other envoys—ταὐτὰ τοῖς
-  ἄλλοις πρέσβεσιν ἀπήγγειλε, etc.
-
-  The point noticed in the text (that Demosthenes charged Æschines
-  with reluctance to let any one else have anything to say) is one
-  which appears both in Æschines and Demosthenes, De Fals. Legat.,
-  and may therefore in the main be regarded as having really
-  occurred. But probably the statement made by Demosthenes to the
-  people as to the proceedings of the embassy, _was_ substantially
-  the same as that of his colleagues. For though the later oration
-  of Æschines is, in itself, less trustworthy evidence than the
-  earlier—yet when we find two different statements of Æschines
-  respecting Demosthenes, we may reasonably presume that the one
-  which is _least unfavorable_ is the _most credible_ of the two.
-
-  [818] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 34, 35, 42. c 20, 21, 34; Æschines
-  adv. Ktesiphont. p. 62, 63. c. 23, 24. In the first of the two
-  speeches, Æschines makes no mention of the decree proposed
-  by Demosthenes relative to the assembly on the eighth of
-  Elaphebolion. He mentions it in the speech against Ktesiphon,
-  with considerable specification.
-
-Presently, these Macedonian envoys, Antipater, Parmenio and
-Eurylochus, arrived; yet not early enough to allow the full debate
-to take place on the assembly of the eighth of Elaphebolion.
-Accordingly (as it would seem, in that very assembly), Demosthenes
-proposed and carried a fresh decree, fixing two later days for the
-special assemblies to discuss peace and alliance with Macedonia. The
-days named were the eighteenth and nineteenth days of the current
-month Elaphebolion (March); immediately after the Dionysiac festival,
-and the assembly in the temple of Dionysius which followed upon
-it.[819] At the same time Demosthenes showed great personal civility
-to the Macedonian envoys, inviting them to a splendid entertainment,
-and not only conducting them to their place of honor at the Dionysiac
-festival, but also providing for them comfortable seats and
-cushions.[820]
-
-  [819] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 36. c. 22. ἕτερον ψήφισμα, Æsch.
-  adv. Ktesiph. p. 63. c. 24. This last decree, fixing the two
-  special days of the month, could scarcely have been proposed
-  until after Philip’s envoys had actually reached Athens.
-
-  [820] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 42. c. 34; adv. Ktesiphont. p.
-  62. c. 22; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 414; De Coronâ, p. 234. This
-  courtesy and politeness towards the Macedonian envoys is admitted
-  by Demosthenes himself. It was not a circumstance of which he had
-  any reason to be ashamed.
-
-Besides the public assembly held by the Athenians themselves, to
-receive report from their ten envoys returned out of Macedonia, the
-synod of Athenian confederates was also assembled to hear the report
-of Aglaokreon, who had gone as their representative along with the
-Ten. This synod agreed to a resolution, important in reference to
-the approaching debate in the Athenian assembly, yet unfortunately
-nowhere given to us entire, but only in partial and indirect notice
-from the two rival orators. It has been already mentioned that
-since the capture of Olynthus, the Athenians had sent forth envoys
-throughout a large portion of Greece, urging the various cities
-to unite with them either in conjoint war against Philip, or in
-conjoint peace to obtain some mutual guarantee against his farther
-encroachments. Of these missions, the greater number had altogether
-failed, demonstrating the hopelessness of the Athenian project.
-But some had been so far successful, that deputies, more or fewer,
-were actually present in Athens, pursuant to the invitation; while
-a certain number were still absent and expected to return,—the same
-individuals having perhaps been sent to different places at some
-distance from each other. The resolution of the synod (noway binding
-upon the Athenian people, but merely recommendatory), was adapted to
-this state of affairs, and to the dispositions recently manifested
-at Athens towards conjoint action with other Greeks against Philip.
-The synod advised, that immediately on the return of the envoys still
-absent on mission (when probably all such Greeks, as were willing
-even to talk over the proposition, would send their deputies also),
-the Athenian prytanes should convene two public assemblies, according
-to the laws, for the purpose of debating and deciding the question
-of peace. Whatever decision might be here taken, the synod adopted
-it beforehand as their own. They farther recommended that an article
-should be annexed, reserving an interval of three months for any
-Grecian city not a party to the peace, to declare its adhesion, to
-inscribe its name on the column of record, and to be included under
-the same conditions as the rest. Apparently this resolution of the
-synod was adopted before the arrival of the Macedonian deputies in
-Athens, and before the last-mentioned decree proposed by Demosthenes
-in the public assembly; which decree, fixing two days, (the 18th and
-19th of Elaphebolion), for decision of the question of peace and
-alliance with Philip, coincided in part with the resolution of the
-synod.[821]
-
-  [821] I insert in the text what appears to me the probable
-  truth about this resolution of the confederate synod. The
-  point is obscure, and has been differently viewed by different
-  commentators.
-
-  Demosthenes affirms, in his earlier speech (De Fals. Leg. p.
-  346), that Æschines held disgraceful language in his speech
-  before the public assembly on the 19th Elaphebolion (to the
-  effect that Athens ought to act for herself alone, and to take no
-  thought for any other Greeks except such as had assisted her);
-  and that, too, in the presence and hearing of those envoys from
-  other Grecian cities, whom the Athenians had sent for at the
-  instigation of Æschines himself. The presence of these envoys
-  in the assembly, here implied, is not the main charge, but a
-  collateral aggravation; nevertheless, Æschines (as is often the
-  case throughout his defence) bestows nearly all his care upon
-  the aggravation, taking comparatively little notice of the main
-  charge. He asserts with great emphasis (Fals. Leg. p. 35), that
-  the envoys sent out from Athens on mission had _not returned_,
-  and that there were _no envoys present_ from any Grecian cities.
-
-  It seems to me reasonable here to believe the assertion of
-  Demosthenes, that there _were_ envoys from other Grecian cities
-  present; although he himself in his later oration (De Coronâ,
-  p. 232, 233) speaks as if such were not the fact, as if all
-  the Greeks had been long found out as recreants in the cause
-  of liberty, and as if no envoys from Athens were then absent
-  on mission. I accept the _positive_ assertion of Æschines as
-  true—that there were Athenian envoys then absent on mission, who
-  might possibly, on their return, bring in with them deputies from
-  other Greeks; but I do not admit his _negative_ assertion—that
-  no Athenian envoys had returned from their mission, and that no
-  deputies had come in from other Greeks. That among many Athenian
-  envoys sent out, _all_ should fail—appears to me very improbable.
-
-  If we follow the argument of Æschines (in the speech De Fals.
-  Leg.), we shall see that it is quite enough if we suppose _some_
-  of the envoys sent out on mission, and not _all_ of them, to be
-  absent. To prove this fact, he adduces (p. 35, 36) the resolution
-  of the confederate synod, alluding to the absent envoys, and
-  recommending a certain course to be taken after their return.
-  This does not necessarily imply that _all_ were absent. Stechow
-  remarks justly, that some of the envoys would necessarily be out
-  a long time, having to visit more than one city, and perhaps
-  cities distant from each other (Vita Æschinis, p. 41).
-
-  I also accept what Æschines says about the resolution of the
-  confederate synod, as being substantially true. About the actual
-  import of this resolution, he is consistent with himself, both
-  in the earlier and in the later oration. Winiewski (Comment.
-  Historic. in Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 74-77) and Westermann (De
-  Litibus quas Demosthenes oravit ipse, p. 38-42) affirm, I think
-  without reason, that the import of this resolution is differently
-  represented by Æschines in the earlier and in the later orations.
-  What is really different in the two orations, is the way in which
-  Æschines perverts the import of the resolution to inculpate
-  Demosthenes; affirming in the later oration, that if Athens had
-  waited for the return of her envoys on mission, she might have
-  made peace with Philip jointly with a large body of Grecian
-  allies; and that it was Demosthenes who hindered her from doing
-  this, by hurrying on the discussions about the peace (Æsch. adv.
-  Ktesiph. p. 61-63), etc. Westermann thinks that the synod would
-  not take upon them to prescribe how many assemblies the Athenians
-  should convene for the purpose of debating about peace. But it
-  seems to have been a common practice with the Athenians, about
-  peace or other special and important matters, to convene two
-  assemblies on two days immediately succeeding: all that the synod
-  here recommended was, that the Athenians should follow the usual
-  custom—προγράψαι τοὺς πρυτάνεις ἐκκλησίας δύο κατὰ τοὺς νόμους,
-  etc. That two assemblies, neither less nor more, should be
-  convened for the purpose, was a point of no material importance;
-  except that it indicated a determination to decide the question
-  at once—_sans désemparer_.
-
-Accordingly, after the great Dionysiac festival, these two prescribed
-assemblies were held,—on the 18th and 19th of Elaphebolion. The
-three ambassadors from Philip, Parmenio, Antipater, and Eurylochus
-were present, both at the festival and the assemblies.[822] The
-general question of the relations between Athens and Philip being
-here submitted for discussion, the resolution of the confederate
-synod was at the same time communicated. Of this resolution the
-most significant article was, that the synod accepted beforehand
-the decree of the Athenian assembly, whatever that might be; the
-other articles were recommendations, doubtless heard with respect,
-and constituting a theme for speakers to insist on, yet carrying no
-positive authority. But in the pleadings of the two rival orators
-some years afterwards, (from which alone we know the facts), the
-entire resolution of the synod appears invested with a factitious
-importance; because each of them had an interest in professing to
-have supported it,—each accuses the other of having opposed it; both
-wished to disconnect themselves from Philokrates, then a disgraced
-exile, and from the peace moved by him, which had become discredited.
-It was Philokrates who stood forward in the assembly as the prominent
-mover of peace and alliance with Philip. His motion did not embrace
-either of the recommendations of the synod, respecting absent
-envoys, and interval to be left for adhesions from other Greeks; nor
-did he confine himself, as the synod had done, to the proposition of
-peace with Philip. He proposed that not only peace, but alliance,
-should be concluded between the Athenians and Philip; who had
-expressed by letter his great anxiety both for one and for the other.
-He included in his proposition, Philip with all his allies, on one
-side,—and Athens, with all her allies, on the other; making special
-exception, however, of two among the allies of Athens, the Phokians,
-and the town of Halus near the Pagasæan Gulf, recently under siege by
-Parmenio.[823]
-
-  [822] Æschines, adv. Ktesiph. p. 64.
-
-  [823] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 391. τήν τε γὰρ εἰρήνην οὐχὶ
-  δυνηθέντων ὡς ἐπεχείρησαν οὗτοι, “πλὴν Ἁλέων καὶ Φωκέων,”
-  γράψαι—ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκασθέντος ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν τοῦ Φιλοκράτους ταῦτα μὲν
-  ἀπαλείψαι, γράψαι δ᾽ ἀντικρὺς “~Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίων
-  συμμάχους~,” etc.
-
-What part Æschines and Demosthenes took in reference to this motion,
-it is not easy to determine. In their speeches, delivered three
-years afterwards, both denounce Philokrates; each accuses the other
-of having supported him; each affirms himself to have advocated
-the recommendations of the synod. The contradictions between the
-two, and between Æschines in his earlier and Æschines in his later
-speech, are here very glaring. Thus, Demosthenes accuses his rival
-of having, on the 18th of the month or on the first of the two
-assemblies, delivered a speech strongly opposed to Philokrates;[824]
-but of having changed his politics during the night and spoken on the
-19th in support of the latter, so warmly as to convert the hearers
-when they were predisposed the other way. Æschines altogether denies
-such sudden change of opinion; alleging that he made but one speech,
-and that in favor of the recommendation of the synod; and averring
-moreover that to speak on the second assembly-day was impossible,
-since that day was exclusively consecrated to putting questions and
-voting, so that no oratory was allowed.[825] Yet Æschines, though in
-his earlier harangue (De Fals. Leg.) he insists so strenuously on
-this impossibility of speaking on the 19th,—in his later harangue
-(against Ktesiphon) accuses Demosthenes of having spoken at great
-length on that very day, the 19th, and of having thereby altered the
-temper of the assembly.[826]
-
-In spite, however, of the discredit thus thrown by Æschines upon
-his own denial, I do not believe the sudden change of speech in the
-assembly, ascribed to him by Demosthenes. It is too unexplained, and
-in itself too improbable, to be credited on the mere assertion of
-a rival. But I think it certain that neither he, nor Demosthenes,
-can have advocated the recommendations of the synod, though both
-profess to have done so,—if we are to believe the statement of
-Æschines (we have no statement from Demosthenes), as to the tenor
-of those recommendations. For the synod (according to Æschines) had
-recommended to await the return of the absent envoys before the
-question of peace was debated. Now this proposition was impracticable
-under the circumstances; since it amounted to nothing less than an
-indefinite postponement of the question. But the Macedonian envoys,
-Antipater and Parmenio, were now in Athens, and actually present in
-the assembly; having come, by special invitation, for the purpose
-either of concluding peace or of breaking off the negotiation; and
-Philip had agreed (as Æschines[827] himself states), to refrain from
-all attack on the Chersonese, while the Athenians were debating
-about peace. Under these conditions, it was imperatively necessary
-to give some decisive and immediate answer to the Macedonian envoys.
-To tell them—“We can say nothing positive at present; you must wait
-until our absent envoys return, and until we ascertain how many
-Greeks we can get into our alliance,” would have been not only in
-itself preposterous, but would have been construed by able men like
-Antipater and Parmenio as a mere dilatory manœuvre for breaking off
-the peace altogether. Neither Demosthenes nor Æschines can have
-really supported such a proposition, whatever both may pretend
-three years afterwards. For at that time of the actual discussion,
-not only Æschines himself, but the general public of Athens were
-strongly anxious for peace; while Demosthenes, though less anxious,
-was favorable to it.[828] Neither of them were at all disposed to
-frustrate the negotiations by insidious delay; nor, if they had been
-so disposed, would the Athenian public have tolerated the attempt.
-
-  [824] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 345, 346.
-
-  [825] Æschines. Fals. Leg. p. 36.
-
-  [826] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 63, 64.
-
-  [827] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39.
-
-  [828] From the considerations here stated, we can appreciate the
-  charges of Æschines against Demosthenes, even on his own showing;
-  though the precise course of either is not very clear.
-
-  He accuses Demosthenes of having sold himself to Philip (adv.
-  Ktes. p. 63, 64); a charge utterly futile and incredible,
-  refuted by the whole conduct of Demosthenes, both before and
-  after. Whether Demosthenes received bribes from Harpalus—or from
-  the Persian court—will be matter of future inquiry. But the
-  allegation that he had been bribed by Philip is absurd. Æschines
-  himself confesses that it was quite at variance with the received
-  opinion at Athens (adv. Ktes. p. 62. c. 22).
-
-  He accuses Demosthenes of having, under the influence of these
-  bribes, opposed and frustrated the recommendation of the
-  confederate synod—of having hurried on the debate about peace at
-  once—and of having thus prevented Athens from waiting for the
-  return of her absent envoys, which would have enabled her to make
-  peace in conjunction with a powerful body of coöperating Greeks.
-  This charge is advanced by Æschines, first in the speech De Fals.
-  Leg. p. 36—next, with greater length and emphasis, in the later
-  speech, adv. Ktesiph. p. 63, 64. From what has been said in the
-  text, it will be seen that such indefinite postponement, when
-  Antipater and Parmenio were present in Athens by invitation, was
-  altogether impossible, without breaking off the negotiation.
-  Not to mention, that Æschines himself affirms, in the strongest
-  language, the ascertained impossibility of prevailing upon any
-  other Greeks to join Athens, and complains bitterly of their
-  backward dispositions (Fals. Leg. p. 38. c. 25). In this point
-  Demosthenes perfectly concurs with him (De Coronâ, p. 231, 232).
-  So that even if postponement could have been had, it would have
-  been productive of no benefit, nor of any increase of force, to
-  Athens, since the Greeks were not inclined to coöperate with her.
-
-  The charge of Æschines against Demosthenes is thus untenable, and
-  suggests its own refutation, even from the mouth of the accuser
-  himself. Demosthenes indeed replies to it in a different manner.
-  When Æschines says—“You hurried on the discussion about peace,
-  without allowing Athens to await the return of her envoys, then
-  absent on mission”—Demosthenes answers—“There were _no_ Athenian
-  envoys then absent on mission. All the Greeks had been long ago
-  detected as incurably apathetic.” (De Coronâ, p. 233). This is a
-  slashing and decisive reply, which it might perhaps be safe for
-  Demosthenes to hazard, at an interval of thirteen years after the
-  events. But it is fortunate that another answer can be provided;
-  for I conceive the assertion to be neither correct in point of
-  fact, nor consistent with the statements of Demosthenes himself
-  in the speech De Falsâ Legatione.
-
-On the best conclusion which I can form, Demosthenes supported the
-motion of Philokrates (enacting both peace and alliance with Philip),
-except only that special clause which excluded both the Phokians
-and the town of Halus, and which was ultimately negatived by the
-assembly.[829] That Æschines supported the same motion entire, and
-in a still more unqualified manner, we may infer from his remarkable
-admission in the oration against Timarchus[830] (delivered in the
-year after the peace, and three years before his own trial), wherein
-he acknowledges himself as joint author of the peace along with
-Philokrates, and avows his hearty approbation of the conduct and
-language of Philip, even after the ruin of the Phokians. Eubulus,
-the friend and partisan of Æschines, told the Athenians[831] the
-plain alternative: “You must either march forthwith to Peiræus,
-serve on shipboard, pay direct taxes, and convert the Theôric Fund
-to military purposes,—or else you must vote the terms of peace moved
-by Philokrates.” Our inference respecting the conduct of Æschines is
-strengthened by what is here affirmed respecting Eubulus. Demosthenes
-had been vainly urging upon his countrymen, for the last five years,
-at a time when Philip was less formidable, the real adoption of these
-energetic measures; Eubulus, his opponent, now holds them out _in
-terrorem_, as an irksome and intolerable necessity, constraining the
-people to vote for the terms of peace proposed. And however painful
-it might be to acquiesce in the _statu quo_, which recognized
-Philip as master of Amphipolis and of so many other possessions
-once belonging to Athens,—I do not believe that even Demosthenes,
-at the time when the peace was actually under debate, would put
-the conclusion of it to hazard, by denouncing the shame of such
-unavoidable cession, though he professes three years afterwards to
-have vehemently opposed it.[832]
-
-  [829] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 391-430. Æschines affirms strongly,
-  in his later oration against Ktesiphon (p. 63), that Demosthenes
-  warmly advocated the motion of Philokrates for alliance as well
-  as peace with Philip. He professes to give the precise phrase
-  used by Demosthenes—which he censures as an inelegant phrase—οὐ
-  δεῖν ἀποῤῥῆξαι τῆς εἰρήνης τὴν συμμαχίαν, etc. He adds that
-  Demosthenes called up the Macedonian ambassador Antipater to the
-  rostrum, put a question to him, and obtained an answer concerted
-  beforehand. How much of this is true, I cannot say. The version
-  given by Æschines in his later speech, is, as usual, different
-  from that in his earlier.
-
-  The accusation against Demosthenes, of corrupt collusion with
-  Antipater, is incredible and absurd.
-
-  [830] Æschines, adv. Timarch. p. 24, 25. c. 34. παρεμβάλλων
-  (Demosthenes) τὰς ἐμὰς δημηγορίας, καὶ ~ψέγων τὴν εἰρήνην τὴν
-  δι᾽ ἐμοῦ καὶ Φιλοκράτους γεγενημένην~, ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀπαντήσεσθαί με
-  ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον ἀπολογησόμενον, ὅταν τὰς τῆς πρεσβείας εὐθύνας
-  διδῶ, etc. ... Φίλιππον δὲ νῦν μὲν διὰ τὴν τῶν λόγων εὐφημίαν
-  ἐπαινῶ, etc.
-
-  [831] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 434. φήσας (Eubulus) καταβαίνειν εἰς
-  Πειραιᾶ δεῖν ἤδη καὶ χρήματ᾽ εἰσφέρειν καὶ τὰ θεωρικὰ στρατιωτικὰ
-  ποιεῖν—ἢ χειροτονεῖν ἃ συνεῖπε μὲν οὗτος (Æschines) ἔγραψε δ᾽ ὁ
-  βδελυρὸς Φιλοκράτης.
-
-  [832] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 385.
-
-I suspect therefore that the terms of peace proposed by Philokrates
-met with unqualified support from one of our two rival orators,
-and with only partial opposition, to one special clause, from
-the other. However this may be, the proposition passed, with no
-other modification (so far as we know) except the omission of that
-clause which specially excepted Halus and the Phokians. Philokrates
-provided, that all the possessions actually in the hands of each of
-the belligerent parties, should remain to each, without disturbance
-from the other;[833] that on these principles, there should be both
-peace and alliance between Athens with all her allies on the one
-side, and Philip with all his allies on the other. These were the
-only parties included in the treaty. Nothing was said about other
-Greeks, not allies either of Philip or of Athens.[834] Nor was any
-special mention made about Kersobleptes.[835]
-
-  [833] Pseudo-Demosthen. De Halonneso, p. 81-83. Demosthenes, in
-  one passage (Fals. Leg. p. 385), speaks as if it were a part of
-  the Athenian oath—that they would oppose and treat as enemies
-  all who should try to save from Philip and to restore to Athens
-  the places now recognized as Philip’s possession for the future.
-  Though Vœmel (Proleg. ad Demosth. De Pace, p. 265) and Böhnecke
-  (p. 303) insert these words as a part of the actual formula,
-  I doubt whether they are anything more than a constructive
-  expansion, given by Demosthenes himself, of the import of the
-  formula.
-
-  [834] This fact we learn from the subsequent discussions about
-  _amending_ the peace, mentioned in Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso,
-  p. 84.
-
-  [835] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 33. c. 26.
-
-Such was the decree of peace and alliance, enacted on the second of
-the two assembly-days,—the nineteenth of the month Elaphebolion. Of
-course, without the fault of any one, it was all to the advantage
-of Philip. He was in the superior position; and it sanctioned his
-retention of all his conquests. For Athens, the inferior party, the
-benefit to be expected was, that she would prevent these conquests
-from being yet farther multiplied, and protect herself against being
-driven from bad to worse.
-
-But it presently appeared that even thus much was not realized. On
-the twenty-fifth day of the same month[836] (six days after the
-previous assembly), a fresh assembly was held, for the purpose of
-providing ratification by solemn oath for the treaty which had
-been just decreed. It was now moved and enacted, that the same ten
-citizens, who had been before accredited to Philip, should again be
-sent to Macedonia for the purpose of receiving the oaths from him
-and from his allies.[837] Next, it was resolved that the Athenians,
-together with the deputies of their allies then present in Athens,
-should take the oath forthwith, in the presence of Philip’s envoys.
-
-  [836] This date is preserved by Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 64.
-  c. 27. ἕκτῃ φθίνοντος τοῦ Ἐλαφηβολιῶνος μηνὸς, etc. In the
-  earlier oration (De Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 29) Æschines states
-  that Demosthenes was among the Proedri or presiding senators of
-  a public assembly held ἑβδόμῃ φθίνοντος—the day before. It is
-  possible that there might have been two public assemblies held,
-  on two successive days (the 23d and 24th, or the 24th and 25th,
-  according as the month Elaphebolion happened in that year to have
-  30 days or 29 days), and that Demosthenes may have been among the
-  Proedri in both. But the transaction described (in the oration
-  against Ktesiphon) as having happened on the latter of the two
-  days—must have preceded that which is mentioned (in the Oration
-  De Fals. Leg.) as having happened on the earlier of the two days;
-  or at least cannot have followed it; so that there seems to be
-  an inaccuracy in one or in the other. If the word ἕκτῃ, in the
-  oration against Ktesiphon, and ἑβδόμῃ in the speech on the False
-  Legation, are both correct, the transactions mentioned in the
-  one cannot be reconciled chronologically with those narrated in
-  the other. Various conjectural alterations have bean proposed.
-  See Vœmel, Prolegg. ad Demosth. Orat. De Pace, p. 257; Böhnecke,
-  Forschungen, p. 399.
-
-  [837] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. ἤδη δὲ ἡμῶν κεχειροτονημένων
-  εἰς τοὺς ὅρκους, οὔπω δὲ ἀπῃρκότων ἐπὶ τὴν ὑστέραν πρεσβείαν,
-  ἐκκλησία γίνεται, etc.
-
-  This ἐκκλησία seems to be the same as that which is named by
-  Æschines in the speech against Ktesiphon, as having been held on
-  the 25th Elaphebolion.
-
-But now arose the critical question, Who were to be included as
-allies of Athens? Were the Phokians and Kersobleptes to be included?
-The one and the other represented those two capital positions,[838]
-Thermopylæ and the Hellespont, which Philip was sure to covet, and
-which it most behooved Athens to ensure against him. The assembly, by
-its recent vote, had struck out the special exclusion of the Phokians
-proposed by Philokrates, thus by implication admitting them as allies
-along with the rest. They were in truth allies of old standing and
-valuable; they had probably envoys present in Athens, but no deputies
-sitting in the synod. Nor had Kersobleptes any such deputy in that
-body; but a citizen of Lampsakus, named Kritobulus, claimed on this
-occasion to act for him, and to take the oaths in his name.
-
-  [838] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 397. καίτοι δύο χρησιμωτέρους
-  τόπους τῆς οἰκουμένης οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς ἐπιδείξαι τῇ πόλει, κατὰ μὲν
-  γῆν, Πυλῶν—ἐκ θαλάττης δὲ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου· ἃ συναμφότερα οὗτοι
-  πεπράκασιν αἰσχρῶς καὶ καθ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐγκεχειρίκασι Φιλίππῳ.
-
-As to the manner of dealing with Kersobleptes, Æschines tells us
-two stories (one in the earlier oration, the other in the later)
-quite different from each other; and agreeing only in this—that in
-both Demosthenes is described as one of the presiding magistrates
-of the public assembly, as having done all that he could to prevent
-the envoy of Kersobleptes from being admitted to take the oaths as
-an ally of Athens. Amidst such discrepancies, to state in detail
-what passed is impossible. But it seems clear,—both from Æschines
-(in his earliest speech) and Demosthenes,—first, that the envoy
-from Kersobleptes, not having a seat in the confederate synod, but
-presenting himself and claiming to be sworn as an ally of Athens,
-found his claim disputed; secondly, that upon this dispute arising,
-the question was submitted to the vote of the public assembly, who
-decided that Kersobleptes was an ally, and should be admitted to take
-the oath as such.[839]
-
-  [839] Compare Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 26, with Æschines
-  cont. Ktesiphont. p. 64. c. 27.
-
-  Franke (Proleg. ad Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 30, 31) has some severe
-  comments on the discrepancy between the two statements.
-
-  That the question was put, and affirmed by vote, to admit
-  Kersobleptes appears from the statement of Æschines in the speech
-  De Fals. Leg.—τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπεψηφίσθη—ἐψηφισμένου δὲ τοῦ δήμου.
-  Compare Demosth. De Fals. Leg. p. 398, and Demosthen. Philipp.
-  iv. p. 133.
-
-  Philip, in his letter some years afterwards to the Athenians,
-  affirmed that Kersobleptes wished to be admitted to take the
-  oaths, but was excluded by the Athenian generals, who declared
-  him to be an enemy of Athens (Epist. Phil. ap. Demosth. p. 160).
-  If it be true that the generals tried to exclude him, their
-  exclusion must have been overruled by the vote of the assembly.
-
-Antipater and Parmenio, on the part of Philip, did not refuse to
-recognize Kersobleptes as an ally of Athens, and to receive his
-oath. But in regard to the Phokians, they announced a determination
-distinctly opposite. They gave notice, at or after the assembly of
-the 25th Elaphebolion, that Philip positively refused to admit the
-Phokians as parties to the convention.
-
-This determination, formally announced by Antipater at Athens, must
-probably have been made known by Philip himself to Philokrates and
-Æschines, when on mission in Macedonia. Hence Philokrates, in his
-motion about the terms of peace, had proposed that the Phokians and
-Halus should be specially excluded (as I have already related).
-Now, however, when the Athenian assembly, by expressly repudiating
-such exclusion, had determined that the Phokians should be received
-as parties, while the envoys of Philip were not less express in
-rejecting them,—the leaders of the peace, Æschines and Philokrates,
-were in great embarrassment. They had no other way of surmounting
-the difficulty, except by holding out mendacious promises, and
-unauthorized assurances of future intention in the name of Philip.
-Accordingly, they confidently announced that the King of Macedon,
-though precluded by his relations with the Thebans and Thessalians
-(necessary to him while he remained at war with Athens), from openly
-receiving the Phokians as allies, was nevertheless in his heart
-decidedly adverse to the Thebans; and that, if his hands were once
-set free by concluding peace with Athens, he would interfere in the
-quarrel just in the manner that the Athenians would desire; that
-he would uphold the Phokians, put down the insolence of Thebes,
-and even break up the integrity of the city; restoring also the
-autonomy of Thespiæ, Platæa and the other Bœotian towns, now in
-Theban dependence. The general assurances,—previously circulated
-by Aristodemus, Ktesiphon, and others,—of Philip’s anxiety to win
-favorable opinions from the Athenians, were now still farther
-magnified into a supposed community of antipathy against Thebes;
-and even into a disposition to compensate Athens for the loss of
-Amphipolis, by making her complete mistress of Eubœa as well as by
-recovering for her Orôpus.
-
-By such glowing fabrications and falsehoods, confidently asseverated,
-Philokrates, Æschines, and the other partisans of Philip present,
-completely deluded the assembly; and induced them, not indeed to
-decree the special exclusion of the Phokians, as Philokrates had
-at first proposed,—but to swear the convention with Antipater and
-Parmenio without the Phokians.[840] These latter were thus shut
-out in fact, though by the general words of the peace, Athens had
-recognized their right to be included. Their deputies were probably
-present, claimed to be admitted, and were refused by Antipater,
-without any peremptory protest on the part of Athens.
-
-  [840] Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 444. ἐντεῦθεν ~οἱ μὲν παρ᾽
-  ἐκείνου πρέσβεις προὔλεγον ὑμῖν ὅτι Φωκέας οὐ προσδέχεται
-  Φίλιππος συμμάχους, οὗτοι δ᾽ ἐκδεχόμενοι τοιαῦτ᾽ ἐδημηγόρουν, ὡς
-  φανερῶς μὲν οὐχὶ καλῶς ἔχει τῷ Φιλίππῳ προσδέξασθαι τοὺς Φωκέας~
-  συμμάχους, διὰ τοὺς Θηβαίους καὶ τοὺς Θετταλοὺς, ἂν δὲ γένηται
-  τῶν πραγμάτων κύριος ~καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης τύχῃ~, ἅπερ ἂν συνθέσθαι
-  νῦν ἀξιώσαιμεν αὐτὸν, ταῦτα ποιήσει τότε. ~Τὴν μὲν τοίνυν εἰρήνην
-  ταύταις ταῖς ἐλπίσι καὶ ταῖς ἐπαγωγαῖς εὕροντο παρ᾽ ὑμῶν ἄνευ
-  Φωκέων~.
-
-  Ibid. p. 409. Εἰ δὲ πάντα τἀναντία τούτων καὶ πολλὰ καὶ
-  φιλάνθρωπα εἰπόντες Φίλιππον, φιλεῖν τὴν πόλιν, Φωκέας σώσειν,
-  Θηβαίους παύσειν τῆς ὕβρεως, ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ~μείζονα ἢ κατ᾽
-  Ἀμφίπολιν εὖ ποιήσειν ὑμᾶς, ἐὰν τύχῃ τῆς εἰρήνης, Εὔβοιαν,
-  Ὠρωπὸν~ ἀποδώσειν—εἰ ταῦτ᾽ εἰπόντες καὶ ὑποσχόμενοι πάντ᾽
-  ἐξηπατήκασι καὶ πεφενακίκασι, etc.
-
-  Compare also, p. 346, 388, 391, about the false promises under
-  which the Athenians were induced to consent to the peace—τῶν
-  ὑποσχέσεων, ἐφ᾽ αἷς εὑρίσκετο (Philip) τὴν εἰρήνην. The same
-  false promises put forward _before_ the peace and determining the
-  Athenians to conclude it, are also noticed by Demosthenes in the
-  second Philippic (p. 69), τὰς ὑποσχέσεις, ἐφ᾽ αἷς τῆς εἰρήνης
-  ἔτυχεν (Philip)—p. 72. τοὺς ἐνεγκόντας τὰς ὑποσχέσεις, ἐφ᾽ αἷς
-  ἐπείσθητε ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰρήνην. This second Philippic is one
-  year earlier in date than the oration de Falsâ Legatione, and is
-  better authority than that oration, not merely on account of its
-  earlier date, but because it is a parliamentary harangue, not
-  tainted with an accusatory purpose nor mentioning Æschines by
-  name.
-
-This tissue, not of mere exaggerations, but of impudent and
-monstrous falsehood, respecting the purposes of Philip,—will be seen
-to continue until he had carried his point of penetrating within
-the pass of Thermopylæ, and even afterwards. We can hardly wonder
-that the people believed it, when proclaimed and guaranteed to
-them by Philokrates, Æschines, and the other envoys, who had been
-sent into Macedonia for the express purpose of examining on the
-spot and reporting, and whose assurance was the natural authority
-for the people to rely upon. In this case, the deceptions found
-easier credence and welcome because they were in complete harmony
-with the wishes and hopes of Athens, and with the prevalent thirst
-for peace. To betray allies like the Phokians appeared of little
-consequence, when once it became a settled conviction that the
-Phokians themselves would be no losers by it. But this plea, though
-sufficient as a tolerable excuse for the Athenian people, will not
-serve for a statesman like Demosthenes; who, on this occasion (as
-far as we can make out even from his own language), did not enter
-any emphatic protest against the tacit omission of the Phokians,
-though he had opposed the clause (in the motion of Philokrates)
-which formally omitted them by name. Three months afterwards, when
-the ruin of the isolated Phokians was about to be consummated as a
-fact, we shall find Demosthenes earnest in warning and denunciation;
-but there is reason to presume that his opposition[841] was at
-best only faint, when the positive refusal of Antipater was first
-proclaimed against that acquiescence on the part of Athens, whereby
-the Phokians were really surrendered to Philip. Yet in truth this was
-the great diplomatic turning-point, from whence the sin of Athens,
-against duty to allies as well as against her own security, took
-its rise. It was a false step of serious magnitude, difficult, if
-not impossible, to retrieve afterwards. Probably the temper of the
-Athenians, then eager for peace, trembling for the lives of their
-captives, and prepossessed with the positive assurances of Æschines
-and Philokrates,—would have heard with repugnance any strong protest
-against abandoning the Phokians, which threatened to send Antipater
-home in disgust and intercept the coming peace,—the more so as
-Demosthenes, if he called in question the assurances of Æschines as
-to the projects of Philip, would have no positive facts to produce
-in refuting them, and would be constrained to take the ground of
-mere scepticism and negation;[842] of which a public, charmed with
-hopeful auguries and already disarmed through the mere comfortable
-anticipations of peace, would be very impatient. Nevertheless, we
-might have expected from a statesman like Demosthenes, that he would
-have begun his energetic opposition to the disastrous treaty of
-346 B. C., at that moment when the most disastrous and disgraceful
-portion of it,—the abandonment of the Phokians,—was first shuffled in.
-
-  [841] Demosthenes speaks of the omission of the Phokians, in
-  taking the oaths at Athens, as if it were a matter of small
-  importance (Fals. Leg. p. 387, 388; compare p. 372); that is, on
-  the supposition that the promises made by Æschines turned out to
-  be realized.
-
-  In his speech De Pace (p. 59), he takes credit for his protests
-  on behalf of the Phokians; but only for protests made _after
-  his_ return from the second embassy—not for protests made when
-  Antipater refused to admit the Phokians to the oaths.
-
-  Westermann (De Litibus quas Demosthenes oravit ipse, p. 48)
-  suspects that Demosthenes did not see through the deception of
-  Æschines until the Phokians were utterly ruined. This, perhaps,
-  goes beyond the truth; but at the time when the oaths were
-  exchanged at Athens, he either had not clearly detected the
-  consequences of that miserable shuffle into which Athens was
-  tricked by Philokrates, etc.—or he was afraid to proclaim them
-  emphatically.
-
-  [842] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 355. τραχέως ~δ᾽ ὑμῶν τῷ “μηδὲ
-  προσδοκᾷν” σχόντων~, etc. (the Athenian public were displeased
-  with Demosthenes when he told them that he did not expect the
-  promises of Æschines to be realized; this was after the second
-  embassy, but it illustrates the temper of the assembly even
-  before the second embassy)—ibid. p. 349. τίς γὰρ ἂν ἠνέσχετο,
-  τηλικαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα ἔσεσθαι προσδοκῶν ἀγαθὰ, ἢ ~ταῦθ᾽ ὡς οὐκ
-  ἔσται λέγοντός τινος~, ἢ κατηγοροῦντος τῶν πεπραγμένων τούτοις;
-
-  How unpopular it was to set up mere negative mistrust against
-  glowing promises of benefits to come, is here strongly urged by
-  Demosthenes.
-
-  Respecting the premature disarming of the Athenians, see Demosth.
-  De Coronâ, p. 234.
-
-After the assembly of the 25th Elaphebolion, Antipater administered
-the oaths of peace and alliance to Athens and to all her other allies
-(seemingly including the envoy of Kersobleptes) in the Board-room of
-the Generals.[843] It now became the duty of the ten Athenian envoys,
-with one more from the confederate synod,—the same persons who had
-been employed in the first embassy,—to go and receive the oaths from
-Philip. Let us see how this duty was performed.
-
-  [843] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 27.
-
-The decree of the assembly, under which these envoys held their
-trust, was large and comprehensive. They were to receive an oath, of
-amity and alliance with Athens and her allies, from Philip as well
-as from the chief magistrate in each city allied with him. They were
-forbidden (by a curious restriction) to hold any intercourse singly
-and individually with Philip;[844] but they were farther enjoined,
-by a comprehensive general clause, “to do anything else which might
-be within their power for the advantage of Athens.”—“It was our duty
-as prudent envoys (says Æschines to the Athenian people) to take
-a right measure of the whole state of affairs, as they concerned
-either you or Philip.”[845] Upon these rational views of the duties
-of the envoys, however, Æschines unfortunately did not act. It was
-Demosthenes who acted upon them, and who insisted, immediately after
-the departure of Antipater and Parmenio, on going straight to the
-place where Philip actually was; in order that they might administer
-the oath to him with as little delay as possible. It was not only
-certain that the King of Macedon, the most active of living men,
-would push his conquests up to the last moment; but it was farther
-known to Æschines and the envoys, that he had left Pella to make war
-against Kersobleptes in Thrace, at the time when they returned from
-their first embassy.[846] Moreover, on the day of, or the day after,
-the public assembly last described (that is, on the 25th or 26th of
-the month Elaphebolion), a despatch had reached Athens from Chares,
-the Athenian commander at the Hellespont, intimating that Philip
-had gained important advantages in Thrace, had taken the important
-place called the Sacred Mountain, and deprived Kersobleptes of great
-part of his kingdom.[847] Such successive conquests on the part of
-Philip strengthened the reasons for despatch on the part of the
-envoys, and for going straight to Thrace to arrest his progress. As
-the peace concluded was based on the _uti possidetis_, dating from
-the day on which the Macedonian envoys had administered the oaths at
-Athens,—Philip was bound to restore all conquests made after that
-day. But it did not escape Demosthenes, that this was an obligation
-which Philip was likely to evade; and which the Athenian people, bent
-as they were on peace, were very unlikely to enforce.[848] The more
-quickly the envoys reached him, the fewer would be the places in
-dispute, the sooner would he be reduced to inaction,—or at least, if
-he still continued to act, the more speedily would his insincerity be
-exposed.
-
-  [844] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 430. οὐ τὸ μὲν ψήφισμα “οὐδαμοῦ
-  μόνους ἐντυγχάνειν Φιλίππῳ,” οὗτοι δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἐπαύσαντο ἰδίᾳ
-  χρηματίζοντες;
-
-  [845] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 41. c. 32. Τὸ δὲ ~ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων
-  ὀρθῶς βουλεύσασθαι~, ὅσα καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ~ἐστιν~ ἢ Φίλιππον, τοῦτο ἤδη
-  ἔργον ἐστὶ πρεσβέων φρονίμων.... Ἀφίγμεθα δ᾽ ἡμεῖς ἔχοντες τοῦ
-  δήμου ψήφισμα, ἐν ᾧ γέγραπται, ~Πράττειν δὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις, καὶ
-  ἄλλ᾽ ὅ,τι ἂν δύνωνται ἀγαθόν~.
-
-  [846] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 26.
-
-  [847] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 29. ὅτι Κερσοβλέπτης
-  ἀπολώλεκε τὴν ἀρχὴν, καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν ὄρος κατείληφε Φίλιππος.
-
-  There is no fair ground for supposing that the words ἀπολώλεκε
-  τὴν ἀρχὴν are the actual words used by Chares, or that
-  Kersobleptes was affirmed by Chares to have lost everything that
-  he had. It suited the argument of Æschines to give the statement
-  in a sweeping and exaggerated form.
-
-  [848] See the just and prudent reasoning of Demosthenes, Fals.
-  Leg. p. 388, and De Coronâ, p. 234.
-
-  Compare also Pseudo-Demosthenes, De Halonneso, p. 85, 86.
-
-Impressed with this necessity for an immediate interview with
-Philip, Demosthenes urged his colleagues to set out at once. But
-they resisted his remonstrances, and chose to remain at Athens;
-which, we may remark, was probably in a state of rejoicing and
-festivity in consequence of the recent peace. So reckless was their
-procrastination and reluctance to depart, that on the 3d of the
-month Munychion (April—nine days after the solemnity of oath-taking
-before Antipater and Parmenio) Demosthenes made complaint and moved a
-resolution in the Senate, peremptorily ordering them to begin their
-journey forthwith, and enjoining Proxenus the Athenian commander at
-Oreus in Eubœa, to transport them without delay to the place where
-Philip was, wherever that might be.[849] But though the envoys were
-forced to leave Athens and repair to Oreus, nothing was gained in
-respect to the main object; for they, as well as Proxenus, took upon
-them to disobey the express order of the Senate, and never went to
-find Philip. After a certain stay at Oreus, they moved forward by
-leisurely journeys to Macedonia; where they remained inactive at
-Pella until the return of Philip from Thrace, fifty days after they
-had left Athens.[850]
-
-  [849] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 389; De Coronâ, p. 234. Æschines
-  (Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 29, 30) recognizes the fact that this
-  decree was passed by the Senate on the 3d of Munychion, and that
-  the envoys left Athens in consequence of it. He does not mention
-  that it was proposed by Demosthenes. Æschines here confirms, in
-  a very important manner, the fact of the delay, as alleged by
-  Demosthenes, while the explanation which he gives, why the envoys
-  did not go to Thrace, is altogether without value.
-
-  A document, purporting to be this decree, is given in Demosth. De
-  Coronâ, p. 234, but the authenticity is too doubtful to admit of
-  citing it.
-
-  [850] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 390.
-
-Had the envoys done their duty as Demosthenes recommended, they
-might have reached the camp of Philip in Thrace within five or six
-days after the conclusion of the peace at Athens; had they been
-even content to obey the express orders of the Senate, they might
-have reached it within the same interval after the 3d of Munychion;
-so that from pure neglect, or deliberate collusion, on their part,
-Philip was allowed more than a month to prosecute his conquests in
-Thrace, after the Athenians on their side had sworn to peace. During
-this interval, he captured Doriskus with several other Thracian
-towns; some of them garrisoned by Athenian soldiers; and completely
-reduced Kersobleptes, whose son he brought back as prisoner and
-hostage.[851] The manner in which these envoys, employed in an
-important mission at the public expense, wasted six weeks of a
-critical juncture in doing nothing—and that too in defiance of an
-express order from the Senate—confirms the supposition before stated,
-and would even of itself raise a strong presumption, that the leaders
-among them were lending themselves corruptly to the schemes of Philip.
-
-  [851] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 38. c. 26; Demosth. De Halonneso,
-  p. 85; Fals. Leg. p. 390-448: compare Philippic iii. p. 114.
-  Among the Thracian places captured by Philip during this
-  interval, Demosthenes enumerates the Sacred Mountain. But this
-  is said to have been captured before the end of Elaphebolion, if
-  Æschines quotes correctly from the letter of Chares, Fals. Leg.
-  p. 40. c. 29.
-
-The protests and remonstrances addressed by Demosthenes to his
-colleagues, became warmer and more unmeasured as the delay was
-prolonged.[852] His colleagues doubtless grew angry on their side, so
-that the harmony of the embassy was overthrown. Æschines affirms that
-none of the other envoys would associate with Demosthenes, either in
-the road or at the resting-places.[853]
-
-  [852] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 390.
-
-  [853] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 41. c. 30. Demosthenes (and
-  doubtless the other envoys also) walked on the journey, with two
-  slaves to carry his clothes and bedding. In the pack carried by
-  one slave, was a talent in money, destined to aid some of the
-  poor prisoners towards their ransom.
-
-Pella was now the centre of hope, fear, and intrigue, for the entire
-Grecian world. Ambassadors were already there from Thebes, Sparta,
-Eubœa, and Phokis; moreover a large Macedonian army was assembled
-around, ready for immediate action.
-
-At length the Athenian envoys, after so long a delay of their own
-making, found themselves in the presence of Philip. And we should
-have expected that they would forthwith perform their special
-commission by administering the oaths. But they still went on
-postponing this ceremony, and saying nothing about the obligation
-incumbent on him, to restore all the places captured since the day
-of taking the oaths to Antipater at Athens;[854] places, which had
-now indeed become so numerous, through waste of time on the part
-of the envoys themselves, that Philip was not likely to yield the
-point even if demanded. In a conference held with his colleagues,
-Æschines—assuming credit to himself for a view larger than that taken
-by them, of the ambassadorial duties—treated the administration
-of the oath as merely secondary; he insisted on the propriety of
-addressing Philip on the subject of the intended expedition to
-Thermopylæ (which he was on the point of undertaking, as was plain
-from the large force mustered near Pella), and exhorting him to
-employ it so as to humble Thebes and reconstitute the Bœotian cities.
-The envoys (he said) ought not to be afraid of braving any ill-will
-that might be manifested by the Thebans. Demosthenes (according to
-the statement of Æschines) opposed this recommendation—insisting
-that the envoys ought not to mingle in disputes belonging to
-other parts of Greece, but to confine themselves to their special
-mission—and declared that he should take no notice of Philip’s march
-to Thermopylæ.[855] At length, after much discussion, it was agreed
-among the envoys, that each of them, when called before Philip,
-should say what he thought fit, and that the youngest should speak
-first.
-
-  [854] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 388. ἢ γὰρ παρόντων (we the envoys)
-  καὶ κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα αὐτὸν (Philip) ἐξορκωσάντων, ἃ μὲν εἰλήφει
-  τῆς πόλεως, ἀποδώσειν, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀφέξεσθαι—ἢ μὴ ποιοῦντος
-  ταῦτα ἀπαγγελεῖν ἡμᾶς εὐθέως δεῦρο, etc.
-
-  [855] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 42. c. 33. πορεύεται Φίλιππος εἰς
-  Πύλας· ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἐγκαλύπτομαι, etc. This is the language which
-  Æschines affirms to have been held by Demosthenes during the
-  embassy. It is totally at variance with all that Demosthenes
-  affirms, over and over again, respecting his own proceedings; and
-  (in my judgment) with all the probabilities of the case.
-
-According to this rule, Demosthenes was first heard, and delivered
-a speech (if we are to believe Æschines) not only leaving out all
-useful comment upon the actual situation, but so spiteful towards
-his colleagues, and so full of extravagant flattery to Philip, as
-to put the hearers to shame.[856] The turn now came to Æschines,
-who repeats in abridgment his own long oration delivered to Philip.
-We can reason upon it with some confidence, in our estimate of
-Æschines, though we cannot trust his reports about Demosthenes.
-Æschines addressed himself exclusively to the subject of Philip’s
-intended expedition to Thermopylæ. He exhorted Philip to settle
-the controversy, pending with respect to the Amphiktyons and the
-Delphian temple, by peaceful arbitration and not by arms. But if
-armed interference was inevitable, Philip ought carefully to inform
-himself of the ancient and holy bond whereby the Amphiktyonic synod
-was held together. That synod consisted of twelve different nations
-or sections of the Hellenic name, each including many cities small
-as well as great; each holding two votes and no more; each binding
-itself by an impressive oath, to uphold and protect every other
-Amphiktyonic city. Under this venerable sanction, the Bœotian cities,
-being Amphiktyonic like the rest, were entitled to protection against
-the Thebans their destroyers. The purpose of Philip’s expedition, to
-restore the Amphiktyonic council, was (Æschines admitted) holy and
-just.[857] He ought to carry it through in the same spirit; punishing
-the individuals originally concerned in the seizure of the Delphian
-temple, but not the cities to which they belonged, provided those
-cities were willing to give up the wrong-doers. But if Philip should
-go beyond this point, and confirm the unjust dominion of Thebes over
-the other Bœotian towns, he would do wrong on his own side, add to
-the number of his enemies, and reap no gratitude from those whom he
-favored.[858]
-
-  [856] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 42. c. 34.
-
-  [857] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 36. Τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴν τῆς
-  στρατείας ταύτης ὁσίαν καὶ δικαίαν ἀπεφηνάμην εἶναι, etc.
-
-  ... Ἀπεφηνάμην ὅτι ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, μὴ περιορᾷν
-  κατεσκαμμένας τὰς ἐν Βοιωτοῖς πόλεις, ὅτι δὴ ἦσαν Ἀμφικτυονίδες
-  καὶ ἔνορκοι.
-
-  [858] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 37; compare Demosth. Fals.
-  Leg. p. 347.
-
-Demosthenes, in his comments upon this second embassy, touches
-little on what either Æschines or himself said to Philip. He
-professes to have gone on the second embassy with much reluctance,
-having detected the treacherous purposes of Æschines and Philokrates.
-Nay, he would have positively refused to go (he tells us) had he not
-bound himself by a promise made during the first embassy, to some of
-the poor Athenian prisoners in Macedonia, to provide for them the
-means of release. He dwells much upon his disbursements for their
-ransom during the second embassy, and his efforts to obtain the
-consent of Philip.[859] This (he says) was all that lay in his power
-to do, as an individual; in regard to the collective proceedings of
-the embassy, he was constantly outvoted. He affirms that he detected
-the foul play of Æschines and the rest with Philip; that he had
-written a despatch to send home for the purpose of exposing it; that
-his colleagues not only prevented him from forwarding it, but sent
-another despatch of their own with false information.[860] Then, he
-had resolved to come home personally, for the same purpose, sooner
-than his colleagues, and had actually hired a merchant-vessel—but was
-hindered by Philip from sailing out of Macedonia.[861]
-
-  [859] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 393, 394, 395.
-
-  [860] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 396. καὶ τὴν μὲν γραφεῖσαν ἐπιστολὴν
-  ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπεψηφίσαντο μὴ πέμπειν, αὐτοὶ δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν
-  ὑγιὲς γράψαντες ἔπεμψαν. Compare p. 419.
-
-  [861] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 445. ἐγὼ δ᾽, ὥσπερ ἀκηκόατ᾽ ἤδη
-  πολλάκις, οὐχὶ δυνηθεὶς προαπελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ ~καὶ μισθωσάμενος
-  πλοῖον κατακωλυθεὶς ἐκπλεῦσαι~. Compare p. 357.—οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐμὲ,
-  ἡνίκα δεῦρο ἀποπλεῖν ἐβουλόμην, κατεκώλυεν (Philip), etc.
-
-The general description here given by Demosthenes, of his own conduct
-during the second embassy, is probably true. Indeed, it coincided
-substantially with the statement of Æschines, who complains of him as
-in a state of constant and vexatious opposition to his colleagues.
-We must recollect that Demosthenes had no means of knowing what the
-particular projects of Philip really were. This was a secret to every
-one except Philip himself, with his confidential agents or partisans.
-Whatever Demosthenes might suspect, he had no public evidence by
-which to impress his suspicions upon others, or to countervail
-confident assertions on the favorable side transmitted home by his
-colleagues.
-
-The army of Philip was now ready, and he was on the point of
-marching southward towards Thessaly and Thermopylæ. That pass
-was still held by the Phokians, with a body of Lacedæmonian
-auxiliaries;[862] a force quite sufficient to maintain it against
-Philip’s open attack, and likely to be strengthened by Athens from
-seaward, if the Athenians came to penetrate his real purposes. It
-was therefore essential to Philip to keep alive a certain belief in
-the minds of others, that he was marching southward with intentions
-favorable to the Phokians,—though not to proclaim it in any such
-authentic manner as to alienate his actual allies the Thebans and
-Thessalians. And the Athenian envoys were his most useful agents in
-circulating the imposture.
-
-  [862] The Lacedæmonian troops remained at Thermopylæ until a
-  little time before Philip reached it (Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 365).
-
-Some of the Macedonian officers round Philip gave explicit assurance,
-that the purpose of his march was to conquer Thebes, and reconstitute
-the Bœotian cities. So far, indeed, was this deception carried, that
-(according to Æschines) the Theban envoys in Macedonia, and the
-Thebans themselves, became seriously alarmed.[863] The movements
-of Philip were now the pivot on which Grecian affairs turned, and
-Pella the scene wherein the greatest cities in Greece were bidding
-for his favor. While the Thebans and Thessalians were calling upon
-him to proclaim himself openly Amphiktyonic champion against the
-Phokians,—the Phokian envoys,[864] together with those from Sparta
-and Athens, were endeavoring to enlist him in their cause against
-Thebes. Wishing to isolate the Phokians from such support, Philip
-made many tempting promises to the Lacedæmonian envoys; who, on
-their side, came to open quarrel, and indulged in open menace,
-against those of Thebes.[865] Such was the disgraceful auction,
-wherein these once great states, in prosecution of their mutual
-antipathies, bartered away to a foreign prince the dignity of the
-Hellenic name and the independence of the Hellenic world;[866]
-following the example set by Sparta in her applications to the Great
-King, during the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, and at the
-peace of Antalkidas. Amidst such a crowd of humble petitioners
-and expectants, all trembling to offend him,—with the aid too of
-Æschines, Philokrates, and the other Athenian envoys who consented
-to play his game,—Philip had little difficulty in keeping alive the
-hopes of all, and preventing the formation of any common force or
-decisive resolution to resist him.[867]
-
-  [863] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41. ~αὐτοὶ δὲ οὐκ ἠπόρουν
-  καὶ ἐφοβοῦντο οἱ τῶν Θηβαίων πρέσβεις; ... τῶν δ᾽ ἑταίρων τινες
-  τῶν Φιλίππου οὐ διαῤῥήδην πρός τινας ἡμῶν ἔλεγον, ὅτι τὰς ἐν
-  Βοιωτίᾳ πόλεις κατοικιεῖ Φίλιππος;~ Θηβαῖοι δ᾽ οὐκ ἐξεληλύθεσαν
-  πανδημεὶ, ἀπιστοῦντες τοῖς πράγμασιν;
-
-  Demosthenes greatly eulogizes the incorruptibility and hearty
-  efforts of the Theban envoys (Fals. Leg. p. 384); which assertion
-  is probably nothing better at bottom, than a rhetorical contrast,
-  to discredit Æschines—fit to be inserted in the numerous list of
-  oratorical exaggerations and perversions of history, collected
-  in the interesting Treatise of Weiske, De Hyperbolê, errorum in
-  Historiâ Philippi commissorum genitrice (Meissen, 1819).
-
-  [864] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113; Justin, viii. 4. “Contra
-  Phocensium legati, adhibitis Lacedæmoniis et Atheniensibus,
-  bellum deprecabantur, cujus ab eo dilationem ter jam emerant.” I
-  do not understand to what facts Justin refers, when he states,
-  that the Phokians “had already purchased thrice from Philip a
-  postponement of war.”
-
-  [865] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 365. τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους
-  μετεπέμπετο, πάντα τὰ πράγματα ὑποσχόμενος πράξειν ἐκείνοις, etc.
-
-  Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41. Λακεδαιμονίοι δὲ οὐ μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν
-  τἀναντία Θηβαίοις ἐπρέσβευον, καὶ τελευτῶντες προσέκρουον φανερῶς
-  ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, καὶ διηπείλουν τοῖς τῶν Θηβαίων πρέσβεισιν;
-
-  [866] This thought is strikingly presented by Justin (viii.
-  4), probably from Theopompus—“Fœdum prorsus miserandumque
-  spectaculum, Græciam, etiam nunc et viribus et dignitate orbis
-  terrarum principem, regum certo gentiumque semper victricem
-  et multarum adhuc urbium dominam, alienis excubare sedibus,
-  aut rogantem bellum aut deprecantem: in alterius ope omnem
-  spem posuisse orbis terrarum vindices; eoque discordia sua
-  civilibusque bellis redactos, ut adulentur ultro sordidam paulo
-  ante clientelæ suæ partem: et hæc potissimum facere Thebanos
-  Lacedæmoniosque, antea inter se imperii, nunc gratiæ imperantis,
-  æmulos.”
-
-  [867] Justin, viii. 4.
-
-After completing his march southward through Thessaly, he reached
-Pheræ near the Pagasæan Gulf, at the head of a powerful army of
-Macedonians and allies. The Phokian envoys accompanied his march, and
-were treated, if not as friends, at least in such manner as to make
-it appear doubtful whether Philip was going to attack the Phokians or
-the Thebans.[868] It was at Pheræ that the Athenian envoys at length
-administered the oath both to Philip and to his allies.[869] This was
-done the last thing before they returned to Athens; which city they
-reached on the 13th of the month Skirrophorion;[870] after an absence
-of seventy days, comprising all the intervening month Thargelion,
-and the remnant (from the third day) of the month Munychion. They
-accepted, as representatives of the allied cities, all whom Philip
-sent to them; though Demosthenes remarks that their instructions
-directed them to administer the oath to the chief magistrate in each
-city respectively.[871] And among the cities whom they admitted
-to take the oath as Philip’s allies, was comprised Kardia, on the
-borders of the Thracian Chersonese. The Athenians considered Kardia
-as within the limits of the Chersonese, and therefore as belonging to
-them.[872]
-
-  [868] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113. τοῦτο δ᾽ εἰς Φωκέας ὡς πρὸς
-  συμμάχους ἐπορεύετο, καὶ πρέσβεις Φωκέων ἦσαν οἳ παρηκολούθουν
-  αὐτῷ πορευομένῳ· καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἤριζον πολλοὶ, Θηβαίοις οὐ
-  λυσιτελήσειν τὴν ἐκείνου πάροδον. The words παρ᾽ ἡμῖν denote the
-  Athenian envoys (of whom Demosthenes was one) and the persons
-  around them, marching along with Philip; the oaths not having
-  been yet taken.
-
-  [869] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 390. The oath was administered in
-  the inn in front of the chapel of the Dioskuri, near Pheræ.
-
-  [870] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359. In more than one passage,
-  he states their absence from Athens to have lasted three
-  entire months (p. 390; also De Coronâ, p. 235). But this is
-  an exaggeration of the time. The decree of the Senate, which
-  constrained them to depart, was passed on the third of Munychion.
-  Assuming that they set out on that very day (though it is more
-  probable that they did not set out until the ensuing day), their
-  absence would only have lasted seventy days.
-
-  [871] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 430. The Magnesian and Achæan cities
-  round the Pagasæan Gulf, all except Halus, were included in the
-  oath as allies of Philip (Epistola Philippi ap. Demosthen. p.
-  159).
-
-  [872] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 395. Compare Pseudo-Demosth. De
-  Halonneso, p. 87.
-
-It was thus that the envoys postponed both the execution of their
-special mission, and their return, until the last moment, when Philip
-was within three days’ march of Thermopylæ. That they so postponed
-it, in corrupt connivance with him, is the allegation of Demosthenes,
-sustained by all the probabilities of the case. Philip was anxious
-to come upon Thermopylæ by surprise,[873] and to leave as little
-time as possible either to the Phokians or to Athens for organizing
-defence. The oath, which ought to have been administered in
-Thrace,—but at any rate at Pella—was not taken until Philip had got
-as near as possible to the important pass; nor had the envoys visited
-one single city among his allies in execution of their mandate.
-And as Æschines was well aware that this would provoke inquiry, he
-took the precaution of bringing with him a letter from Philip to
-the Athenian people, couched in the most friendly terms; wherein
-Philip took upon himself any blame which might fall upon the envoys,
-affirming that they themselves had been anxious to go and visit the
-allied cities, but that he had detained them in order that they might
-assist him in accommodating the difference between the cities of
-Halus and Pharsalus. This letter, affording farther presumption of
-the connivance between the envoys and Philip, was besides founded on
-a false pretence; for Halus was (either at that very time or shortly
-afterwards) conquered by his arms, given up to the Pharsalians, and
-its population sold or expelled.[874]
-
-  [873] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 351. ἦν γὰρ τοῦτο πρῶτον ἁπάντων τῶν
-  ἀδικημάτων, τὸ τὸν Φίλιππον ἐπιστῆσαι τοῖς πράγμασι τούτοις, καὶ
-  δέον ὑμᾶς ἀκοῦσαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, εἶτα βουλεύσασθαι, μετὰ
-  ταῦτα δὲ πράττειν ὅ,τι δόξαι, ἅμα ἀκούειν κἀκεῖνον παρεῖναι,
-  καὶ μηδ᾽ ὅ,τι χρὴ ποιεῖν ῥᾴδιον εἰπεῖν εἶναι. Compare Demosth.
-  De Coronâ, p. 236. πάλιν ὠνεῖται παρ᾽ αὐτῶν ὅπως μὴ ἄπίωμεν ἐκ
-  Μακεδονίας ἕως τὰ τῆς στρατείας τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς Φωκέας εὐτρεπῆ
-  ποιήσαιτο, etc.
-
-  [874] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 352, 353; ad Philipp. Epistol. p.
-  152. Demosthenes affirms farther that Æschines himself _wrote_
-  the letter in Philip’s name. Æschines denies that he wrote it,
-  and sustains his denial upon sufficient grounds. But he does not
-  deny that he brought it (Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 44. c. 40, 41).
-
-  The inhabitants of Pharsalus were attached to Philip; while those
-  of Pheræ were opposed to him as much as they dared, and even
-  refused (according to Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 444) to join his
-  army on this expedition. The old rivalry between the two cities
-  here again appears.
-
-In administering the oaths at Pheræ to Philip and his allies,
-Æschines and the majority of the Athenian envoys had formally and
-publicly pronounced the Phokians to be excluded and out of the
-treaty, and had said nothing about Kersobleptes. This was, if not
-a departure from their mandate, at least a step beyond it; for the
-Athenian people had expressly rejected the same exclusion when
-proposed by Philokrates at Athens; though when the Macedonian envoy
-declared that he could not admit the Phokians, the Athenians had
-consented to swear the treaty without them. Probably Philip and
-his allies would not consent to take the oath, to Athens and her
-allies, without an express declaration that the Phokians were out
-of the pale.[875] But though Philokrates and Æschines thus openly
-repudiated the Phokians, they still persisted in affirming that the
-intentions of Philip towards that people were highly favorable. They
-affirmed this probably to the Phokians themselves, as an excuse for
-having pronounced the special exclusion; they repeated it loudly and
-emphatically at Athens, immediately on their return. It was then that
-Demosthenes also, after having been outvoted and silenced during
-the mission, obtained an opportunity for making his own protest
-public. Being among the senators of that year, he made his report
-to the Senate forthwith, seemingly on the day, or the day next but
-one, after his arrival, before a large audience of private citizens
-standing by to witness so important a proceeding. He recounted all
-the proceedings of the embassy,—recalling the hopes and promises
-under which Æschines and others had persuaded the Athenians to agree
-to the peace,—arraigning these envoys as fabricators, in collusion
-with Philip, of falsehoods and delusive assurances,—and accusing them
-of having already by their unwarrantable delays betrayed Kersobleptes
-to ruin. Demosthenes at the same time made known to the Senate the
-near approach and rapid march of Philip; entreating them to interpose
-even now at the eleventh hour, for the purpose of preventing what
-yet remained, the Phokians and Thermopylæ, from being given up under
-the like treacherous fallacies.[876] A fleet of fifty triremes had
-been voted, and were ready at a moment’s notice to be employed on
-sudden occasion.[877] The majority of the Senate went decidedly along
-with Demosthenes, and passed a resolution[878] in that sense to be
-submitted to the public assembly. So adverse was this resolution to
-the envoys, that it neither commended them nor invited them to dinner
-in the prytaneium; an insult (according to Demosthenes) without any
-former precedent.
-
-  [875] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 355. ἐκ τοῦ, ὅτε τοὺς ὅρκους
-  ἤμελλε Φίλιππος ὀμνύναι τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, ~ἐκσπόνδους
-  ἀποφανθῆναι τοὺς Φωκέας~ ὑπὸ τούτων, ὃ σιωπᾷν καὶ ἐᾷν εἰκὸς ἦν,
-  εἴπερ ἤμελλον σώζεσθαι. Compare p. 395. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ~Φωκεῖς
-  ἐκσπόνδους καὶ Ἁλεῖς ἀπέφηναν~ καὶ Κερσοβλέπτην, παρὰ τὸ ψήφισμα
-  καὶ τὰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρημένα, etc.; also p. 430.
-
-  [876] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 346.
-
-  [877] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 444. ἐφ᾽ ἣν αἱ πεντήκοντα τριήρεις
-  ὅμως ἐφώρμουν, etc. Compare Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 33.
-
-  [878] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 350, 351. Demosthenes causes this
-  resolution of the Senate (προβούλευμα) to be read to the Dikasts,
-  together with the testimony of the senator who moved it. The
-  document is not found _verbatim_, but Demosthenes comments upon
-  it before the Dikasts after it has been read, and especially
-  points out that it contains neither praise nor invitation, which
-  the Senate was always in the habit of voting to returning envoys.
-  This is sufficient to refute the allegation of Æschines (Fals.
-  Leg. p. 44. c. 38), that Demosthenes himself moved a resolution
-  to praise the envoys and invite them to a banquet in the
-  Prytaneium. Æschines does not produce such resolution, nor cause
-  it to be read before the Dikasts.
-
-On the 16th of the month Skirrophorion, three days after the return
-of the envoys, the first public assembly was held: where, according
-to usual form, the resolution just passed by the Senate ought to
-have been discussed. But it was not even read to the assembly; for
-immediately on the opening of business (so Demosthenes tells us),
-Æschines rose and proceeded to address the people, who were naturally
-impatient to hear him before any one else, speaking as he did in
-the name of his colleagues generally.[879] He said nothing either
-about the recent statements of Demosthenes before the Senate, or the
-senatorial resolution following, or even the past history of the
-embassy—but passed at once to the actual state of affairs, and the
-coming future. He acquainted the people that Philip, having sworn
-the oaths at Pheræ, had by this time reached Thermopylæ with his
-army. “But he comes there (said Æschines) as the friend and ally of
-Athens, the protector of the Phokians, the restorer of the enslaved
-Bœotian cities, and the enemy of Thebes alone. We your envoys have
-satisfied him that the Thebans are the real wrong-doers, not only in
-their oppression towards the Bœotian cities, but also in regard to
-the spoliation of the temple, which they had conspired to perpetrate
-earlier than the Phokians. I (Æschines) exposed in an emphatic speech
-before Philip the iniquities of the Thebans, for which proceeding
-they have set a price on my life. You Athenians will hear, in two
-or three days, without any trouble of your own, that Philip is
-vigorously prosecuting the siege of Thebes. You will find that he
-will capture and break up that city—that he will exact from the
-Thebans compensation for the treasure ravished from Delphi—and that
-he will restore the subjugated communities of Platæa and Thespiæ.
-Nay more—you will hear of benefits still more direct, which we have
-determined Philip to confer upon you, but which it would not be
-prudent as yet to particularize. Eubœa will be restored to you as
-a compensation for Amphipolis: the Eubœans have already expressed
-the greatest alarm at the confidential relations between Athens
-and Philip, and the probability of his ceding to you their island.
-There are other matters too, on which I do not wish to speak out
-fully, because I have false friends even among my own colleagues.”
-These last ambiguous allusions were generally understood, and
-proclaimed by the persons round the orator, to refer to Oropus,
-the ancient possession of Athens, now in the hands of Thebes.[880]
-Such glowing promises, of benefits to come, were probably crowned
-by the announcement, more worthy of credit, that Philip had engaged
-to send back all the Athenian prisoners by the coming Panathenaic
-festival,[881] which fell during the next month Hekatombæon.
-
-  [879] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 347, 351, 352. τοῦτο μὲν οὐδεὶς
-  ἀνέγνω τῷ δήμῳ τὸ προβούλευμα, οὐδ᾽ ἤκουσεν ὁ δῆμος, ἀναστὰς
-  δ᾽ οὗτος ἐδημηγόρει. The date of the 16th Skirrophorion is
-  specified, p. 359.
-
-  [880] I have here condensed the substance of what is stated by
-  Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 347, 348, 351, 352, 364, 411, etc.
-  Another statement, to the same effect, made by Demosthenes in the
-  Oration De Pace (delivered only a few months after the assembly
-  here described, and not a judicial accusation against Æschines,
-  but a deliberative harangue before the public assembly), is
-  even better evidence than the accusatory speech De Falsâ
-  Legatione—ἡνίκα τοὺς ὅρκους τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ἀπειληφότες
-  ἥκομεν οἱ πρέσβεις, τότε Θεσπιάς τινων καὶ Πλαταιὰς ὑπισχνουμένων
-  οἰκισθήσεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν Φωκέας τὸν Φίλιππον, ἂν γένηται
-  κύριος, σώσειν, τὴν δὲ Θηβαίων πόλιν διοικιεῖν, καὶ τὸν Ὠρωπὸν
-  ὑμῖν ὑπάρξειν, καὶ τὴν Εὔβοιαν ἀντ᾽ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀποδοθήσεσθαι,
-  καὶ τοιαύτας ἐλπίδας καὶ φενακισμοὺς, οἷς ἐπαχθέντες ὑμεῖς οὔτε
-  συμφόρως οὔτ᾽ ἴσως οὔτε καλῶς προεῖσθε Φωκέας ... οὐδὲν τούτων
-  οὔτ᾽ ἐξαπατήσας οὔτε σιγήσας ἐγὼ φανήσομαι, ἀλλὰ προειπὼν ὑμῖν,
-  ὡς οἶδ᾽ ὅτι μνημονεύετε, ὅτι ταῦτα οὔτε οἶδα οὔτε προσδοκῶ,
-  νομίζω δὲ τὸν λέγοντα ληρεῖν (De Pace, p. 59).
-
-  Compare also Philippic ii. p. 72, 73, where Demosthenes repeats
-  the like assertion; also De Chersoneso, p. 105; De Coronâ, p.
-  236, 237.
-
-  [881] Demosthenes states (Fals. Leg. p. 394. εἰς τὰ Παναθήναια
-  φήσας ἀποπέμψειν) that _he_ received this assurance from Philip,
-  while he was busying himself during the mission in efforts to
-  procure the ransom or liberation of the prisoners. But we may be
-  sure that Æschines, so much more in the favor of Philip, must
-  have received it also, since it would form so admirable a point
-  for his first speech at Athens, in this critical juncture.
-
-The first impression of the Athenians, on hearing Æschines, was
-that of surprise, alarm, and displeasure, at the unforeseen
-vicinity of Philip;[882] which left no time for deliberation, and
-scarcely the minimum of time for instant precautionary occupation
-of Thermopylæ, if such a step were deemed necessary. But the sequel
-of the speech—proclaiming to them the speedy accomplishment of
-such favorable results, together with the gratification of their
-antipathy against Thebes—effaced this sentiment, and filled them
-with agreeable prospects. It was in vain that Demosthenes rose
-to reply, arraigned the assurances as fallacious, and tried to
-bring forward the same statement as had already prevailed with the
-Senate. The people refused to hear him; Philokrates with the other
-friends of Æschines hooted him off; and the majority were so full
-of the satisfactory prospect opened to them, that all mistrust or
-impeachment of its truth appeared spiteful and vexatious.[883] It is
-to be remembered that these were the same promises previously made
-to them by Philokrates and others, nearly three months before, when
-the peace with Philip was first voted. The immediate accomplishment
-of them was now again promised on the same authority—by envoys who
-had communicated a second time with Philip, and thus had farther
-means of information—so that the comfortable anticipation previously
-raised was confirmed and strengthened. No one thought of the danger
-of admitting Philip within Thermopylæ, when the purpose of his
-coming was understood to be, the protection of the Phokians, and the
-punishment of the hated Thebans. Demosthenes was scarcely allowed
-even to make a protest, or to disclaim responsibility as to the
-result. Æschines triumphantly assumed the responsibility to himself;
-while Philokrates amused the people by saying: “No wonder, Athenians,
-that Demosthenes and I should not think alike; he is an ungenial
-water-drinker; I am fond of wine.”[884]
-
-  [882] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 352. ὥσθ᾽ ὑμᾶς, ἐκπεπληγμένους
-  τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ Φιλίππου, καὶ τούτοις ὀργιζομένους ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ
-  προηγγελκέναι, πρᾳοτέρους γενέσθαι τινὸς, πάνθ᾽ ὅσ᾽ ἐβούλεσθ᾽
-  ὑμῖν ἔσεσθαι προσδοκήσαντας, etc.
-
-  [883] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 348, 349, 352. οἱ δ᾽ ~ἀντιλέγοντες
-  ὄχλος ἄλλως καὶ βασκανία κατεφαίνετο~, etc.
-
-  [884] Dem. Fals. Leg. p. 355; Phil. ii. p. 73.
-
-It was during this temper of the assembly that the letter of
-Philip, brought by the envoys, was produced and read. His abundant
-expressions of regard, and promises of future benefit, to Athens,
-were warmly applauded; while, prepossessed as the hearers were,
-none of them discerned, nor was any speaker permitted to point
-out, that these expressions were thoroughly vague and general, and
-that not a word was said about the Thebans or the Phokians.[885]
-Philokrates next proposed a decree, extolling Philip for his just
-and beneficent promises—providing that the peace and alliance with
-him should be extended, not merely to the existing Athenians, but
-also to their posterity—and enacting that if the Phokians should
-still refuse to yield possession of the Delphian temple to the
-Amphiktyons, the people of Athens would compel them to do so by armed
-intervention.[886]
-
-  [885] Dem. Fals. Leg. p. 353.
-
-  [886] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 356. Οὗτος (Æschines) ἦν ὁ λέγων
-  ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπισχνούμενος· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς παρὰ τούτου λόγους
-  ὡρμηκότας λαβὼν ὑμᾶς ὁ Φιλοκράτης, ἐγγράφει τοῦτ᾽ εἰς τὸ ψήφισμα,
-  ἐὰν μὴ ποιῶσι Φωκεῖς ἃ δεῖ, καὶ παραδίδωσι τοῖς Ἀμφικτύοσι τὸ
-  ἱερὸν, ὅτι βοηθήσει ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τοὺς διακωλύοντας
-  ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι.
-
-  The fact, that by this motion of Philokrates the peace was
-  extended to “the posterity” of the Athenians—is dwelt upon by
-  Demosthenes as “the greatest disgrace of all;” with an intensity
-  of emphasis which it is difficult to enter into (Philippic ii. p.
-  73).
-
-During the few days immediately succeeding the return of the
-envoys to Athens (on the 13th of Skirrophorion), Philip wrote
-two successive letters, inviting the Athenian troops to join him
-forthwith at Thermopylæ.[887] Probably these were sent at the
-moment when Phalækus, the Phokian leader at that pass, answered
-his first summons by a negative reply.[888] The two letters must
-have been despatched one immediately after the other, betraying
-considerable anxiety on the part of Philip; which it is not difficult
-to understand. He could not be at first certain what effect would
-be produced by his unforeseen arrival at Thermopylæ on the public
-mind at Athens. In spite of all the persuasions of Æschines and
-Philokrates, the Athenians might conceive so much alarm as to
-obstruct his admission within that important barrier; while Phalækus
-and the Phokians—having a powerful mercenary force, competent,
-even unaided, to a resistance of some length—were sure to attempt
-resistance, if any hope of aid were held out to them from Athens.
-Moreover it would be difficult for Philip to carry on prolonged
-military operations in the neighborhood, from the want of provisions;
-the lands having been unsown through the continued antecedent war,
-and the Athenian triremes being at hand to intercept his supplies
-by sea.[889] Hence it was important to him to keep the Athenians
-in illusion and quiescence for the moment; to which purpose his
-letters were well adapted, in whichever way they were taken. If the
-Athenians came to Thermopylæ, they would come as his allies—not as
-allies of the Phokians. Not only would they be in the midst of his
-superior force and therefore as it were hostages;[890] but they
-would be removed from contact with the Phokians, and would bring
-to bear upon the latter an additional force of intimidation. If,
-on the contrary, the Athenians determined not to come, they would
-at any rate interpret his desire for their presence as a proof
-that he contemplated no purposes at variance with their wishes and
-interests; and would trust the assurances, given by Æschines and his
-other partisans at Athens, that he secretly meant well towards the
-Phokians. This last alternative was what Philip both desired and
-anticipated. He wished only to deprive the Phokians of all chance
-of aid from Athens, and to be left to deal with them himself. His
-letters served to blind the Athenian public, but his partisans took
-care not to move the assembly[891] to a direct compliance with their
-invitation. Indeed the proposal of such an expedition (besides the
-standing dislike of the citizens towards military service) would have
-been singularly repulsive, seeing that the Athenians would have had
-to appear, ostensibly at least, in arms against their Phokian allies.
-The conditional menace of the Athenian assembly against the Phokians
-(in case of refusal to surrender the temple to the Amphiktyons),
-decreed on the motion of Philokrates, was in itself sufficiently
-harsh, against allies of ten years’ standing; and was tantamount
-at least to a declaration that Athens would not interfere on their
-behalf—which was all that Philip wanted.
-
-  [887] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 357. Demosthenes causes the two
-  letters to be read, and proceeds—Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἐπιστολαὶ καλοῦσιν
-  αὗται, καὶ νὴ ~Δία ἤδη γε~.
-
-  So also Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 4. ὑμῖν δὲ ταῦθ᾽ ὁρῶν οὐκ
-  ἔγραψεν ἐπιστολὴν ὁ Φίλιππος, ἐξιέναι πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει βοηθήσοντας
-  τοῖς δικαίοις; Æschines only notices one of the two letters.
-  Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 412) conceives the letters as having
-  been written and sent between the 16th and 23d of the month
-  Skirrophorion.
-
-  [888] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359.
-
-  [889] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 379.
-
-  [890] This was among the grounds of objection, taken by
-  Demosthenes and his friends, against the despatch of forces to
-  Thermopylæ in compliance with the letter of Philip—according to
-  the assertion of Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41); who treats
-  the objection with contempt, though it seems well-grounded and
-  reasonable.
-
-  [891] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 356, 357.
-
-Among the hearers of these debates at Athens, were deputies from
-these very Phokians, whose fate now hung in suspense. It has
-already been stated that during the preceding September, while the
-Phokians were torn by intestine dissensions, Phalækus, the chief
-of the mercenaries, had repudiated aid (invited by his Phokian
-opponents), both from Athens and Sparta;[892] feeling strong enough
-to hold Thermopylæ by his own force. During the intervening months,
-however, both his strength and his pride had declined. Though he
-still occupied Thermopylæ with eight thousand or ten thousand
-mercenaries, and still retained superiority over Thebes, with
-possession of Orchomenus, Koroneia, and other places taken from the
-Thebans,[893]—yet his financial resources had become so insufficient
-for a numerous force, and the soldiers had grown so disorderly from
-want of regular pay,[894] that he thought it prudent to invite
-aid from Sparta during the spring,—while Athens was deserting the
-Phokians to make terms with Philip. Archidamus accordingly came to
-Thermopylæ with one thousand Lacedæmonian auxiliaries.[895] The
-defensive force thus assembled was amply sufficient against Philip
-by land; but that important pass could not be held without the
-coöperation of a superior fleet at sea.[896] Now the Phokians had
-powerful enemies even within the pass—the Thebans; and there was no
-obstacle, except the Athenian fleet under Proxenus at Oreus,[897] to
-prevent Philip from landing troops in the rear of Thermopylæ, joining
-the Thebans, and making himself master of Phokis from the side
-towards Bœotia.
-
-  [892] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41.
-
-  [893] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 387.
-
-  [894] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41. This statement of
-  Æschines—about the declining strength of the Phokians and the
-  causes thereof—has every appearance of being correct in point of
-  fact; though it will not sustain the conclusions which he builds
-  upon it.
-
-  Compare Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 30 (delivered four years
-  earlier) ἀπειρηκότων δὲ χρήμασι Φωκέων, etc.
-
-  [895] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 365; Diodor. xvi. 59.
-
-  [896] For the defence of Thermopylæ, at the period of the
-  invasion of Xerxes, the Grecian fleet at Artemisium was not less
-  essential than the land force of Leonidas encamped in the pass
-  itself.
-
-  [897] That the Phokians could not maintain Thermopylæ without
-  the aid of Athens—and that Philip could march to the frontier
-  of Attica, without any intermediate obstacle to prevent him,
-  if Olynthus were suffered to fall into his hand—is laid down
-  emphatically by Demosthenes in the first Olynthiac, nearly four
-  years before the month of Skirrophorion, 346 B. C.
-
-  Ἂν δ᾽ ἐκεῖνα Φίλιππος λάβῃ, τίς αὐτὸν κωλύσει δεῦρο βαδίζειν;
-  Θηβαῖοι; οἳ, εἰ μὴ λίαν πικρὸν εἰπεῖν, καὶ συνεισβαλοῦσιν
-  ἑτοίμως. Ἀλλὰ Φωκεῖς; οἱ τὴν οἰκείαν οὐχ οἷοί τε ὄντες φυλάττειν,
-  ἐὰν μὴ βοηθήσεθ᾽ ὑμεῖς (Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 16).
-
-To the safety of the Phokians, therefore, the continued maritime
-protection of Athens was indispensable; and they doubtless watched
-with trembling anxiety the deceitful phases of Athenian diplomacy
-during the winter and spring of 347-346 B. C. Their deputies must
-have been present at Athens when the treaty was concluded and sworn
-in March 346 B. C. Though compelled to endure not only the refusal
-of Antipater excluding them from the oath, but also the consent of
-their Athenian allies, tacitly acted upon without being formally
-announced, to take the oath without them,—they nevertheless heard the
-assurances, confidently addressed by Philokrates and Æschines to the
-people, that this refusal was a mere feint to deceive the Thessalians
-and Thebans,—that Philip would stand forward as the protector of
-the Phokians, and that all his real hostile purposes were directed
-against Thebes. How the Phokians interpreted such tortuous and
-contradictory policy, we are not told. But their fate hung upon the
-determination of Athens; and during the time when the Ten Athenian
-envoys were negotiating or intriguing with Philip at Pella, Phokian
-envoys were there also, trying to establish some understanding with
-Philip, through Lacedæmonian and Athenian support. Both Philip and
-Æschines probably amused them with favorable promises. And though,
-when the oaths were at last administered to Philip at Pheræ, the
-Phokians were formally pronounced to be excluded,—still the fair
-words of Æschines, and his assurances of Philip’s good intentions
-towards them, were not discontinued.
-
-While Philip marched straight from Pheræ to Thermopylæ,—and while
-the Athenian envoys returned to Athens,—Phokian deputies visited
-Athens also, to learn the last determination of the Athenian people,
-upon which their own destiny turned. Though Philip, on reaching the
-neighborhood of Thermopylæ, summoned the Phokian leader, Phalækus to
-surrender the pass, and offered him terms,—Phalækus would make no
-reply until his deputies returned to Athens.[898] These deputies,
-present at the public assembly of the 16th Skirrophorion, heard the
-same fallacious assurances as before respecting Philip’s designs,
-repeated by Philokrates and Æschines with unabated impudence, and
-still accepted by the people. But they also heard, in the very
-same assembly, the decree proposed by Philokrates and adopted,
-that unless the Phokians restored the Delphian temple forthwith to
-the Amphiktyons, the Athenian people would compel them to do so by
-armed force. If the Phokians still cherished hopes, this conditional
-declaration of war, from a city which still continued by name to be
-their ally, opened their eyes, and satisfied them that no hope was
-left except to make the best terms they could with Philip.[899] To
-defend Thermopylæ successfully without Athens, much more against
-Athens, was impracticable.
-
-  [898] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359. ἥκομεν δὲ δεῦρο ἀπὸ τῆς
-  πρεσβείας τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς ὅρκους τρίτῃ ἐπὶ δέκα τοῦ Σκιῤῥοφοριῶνος
-  μηνὸς, καὶ παρῆν ὁ Φίλιππος ἐν Πύλαις ἤδη καὶ τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν
-  ἐπηγγέλλετο ὧν οὐδὲν ἐπίστευον ἐκεῖνοι. Σημεῖον δὲ—οὐ γὰρ ἂν
-  δεῦρ᾽ ἧκον ὡς ὑμᾶς ... παρῆσαν γὰρ οἱ τῶν Φωκέων πρέσβεις ἐνθάδε,
-  καὶ ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ τί ἀπαγγελοῦσιν οὗτοι (Æschines, Philokrates,
-  etc.) καὶ τί ψηφιεῖσθε ὑμεῖς, ἐπιμελὲς εἰδέναι.
-
-  [899] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 357. οἱ μὲν τοίνυν Φωκεῖς, ὡς τὰ
-  παρ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐπύθοντο ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ τό τε ψήφισμα τοῦτ᾽
-  ἔλαβον τὸ τοῦ Φιλοκράτους, καὶ τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν ἐπύθοντο τὴν τούτου
-  καὶ τὰς ὑποσχέσεις—κατὰ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους ἀπώλοντο.
-
-  Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 45. c. 41) touches upon the statements
-  made by Demosthenes respecting the envoys of Phalækus at Athens,
-  and the effect of the news which they carried back in determining
-  the capitulation. He complains of them generally as being “got
-  up against him” (ὁ κατήγορος μεμηχάνηται), but he does not
-  contradict them upon any specific point. Nor does he at all
-  succeed in repelling the main argument, brought home with great
-  precision of date by Demosthenes.
-
-Leaving Athens after the assembly of the 16th Skirrophorion, the
-Phokian deputies carried back the tidings of what had passed to
-Phalækus, whom they reached at Nikæa, near Thermopylæ, about the 20th
-of the same month.[900] Three days afterwards, Phalækus, with his
-powerful army of eight thousand or ten thousand mercenary infantry
-and one thousand cavalry, had concluded a convention with Philip.
-The Lacedæmonian auxiliaries, perceiving the insincere policy of
-Athens, and the certain ruin of the Phokians, had gone away a little
-before.[901] It was stipulated in the convention that Phalækus should
-evacuate the territory, and retire wherever else he pleased, with
-his entire mercenary force and with all such Phokians as chose to
-accompany him. The remaining natives threw themselves upon the mercy
-of the conqueror.
-
-  [900] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359: compare Diodor. xvi. 59. In
-  this passage, Demosthenes reckons up _seven_ days between the
-  final assembly at Athens, and the capitulation concluded by the
-  Phokians. In another passage, he states the same interval at only
-  _five_ days (p. 365); which is doubtless inaccurate. In a third
-  passage, the same interval, seemingly, stands at five or six
-  days, p. 379.
-
-  [901] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 356-365. ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἧκεν (Philip) εἰς
-  Πύλας, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δ᾽ αἰσθόμενοι τὴν ἐνέδραν ὑπεχώρησαν, etc.
-
-All the towns in Phokis, twenty-two in number, together with the pass
-of Thermopylæ, were placed in the hands of Philip; all surrendering
-at discretion; all without resistance. The moment Philip was thus
-master of the country, he joined his forces with those of the
-Thebans, and proclaimed his purpose of acting thoroughly upon their
-policy; of transferring to them a considerable portion of Phokis; of
-restoring to them Orchomenus, Korsiæ, and Koroneia, Bœotian towns
-which the Phokians had taken from them; and of keeping the rest of
-Bœotia in their dependence, just as he found it.[902]
-
-  [902] Demosth. Fals. Leg p. 359, 360, 365, 379, 413. ὁ δὲ
-  (Æschines) τοσοῦτον δεῖ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τινα αἰχμάλωτον σῶσαι,
-  ὥσθ᾽ ὅλον τόπον καὶ πλεῖν ἢ μυρίους μὲν ὁπλίτας, ὁμοῦ δὲ χιλίους
-  ἱππέας τῶν ὑπαρχόντων συμμάχων, ὅπως αἰχμάλωτοι γένωνται Φιλίππῳ
-  συμπαρεσκεύασεν.
-
-  Diodorus (xvi. 59) states the mercenaries of Phalækus at eight
-  thousand men.
-
-  Because the Phokians capitulated to Philip and not to the
-  Thebans (p. 360)—because not one of their towns made any
-  resistance—Demosthenes argues that this proves their confidence
-  in the favorable dispositions of Philip, as testified by
-  Æschines. But he overstrains this argument against Æschines. The
-  Phokians had no choice but to surrender, as soon as all chance
-  of Athenian aid was manifestly shut out. The belief of favorable
-  dispositions on the part of Philip, was doubtless an auxiliary
-  motive, but not the primary or predominant.
-
-In the meantime, the Athenians, after having passed the decree above
-mentioned, re-appointed (in the very same assembly of the 16th
-Skirrophorion, June), the same ten envoys to carry intelligence
-of it to Philip, and to be witnesses of the accomplishment of the
-splendid promises made in his name. But Demosthenes immediately swore
-off, and refused to serve; while Æschines, though he did not swear
-off, was nevertheless so much indisposed, as to be unable to go.
-This at least is his own statement; though Demosthenes affirms that
-the illness was a mere concerted pretence, in order that Æschines
-might remain at home to counterwork any reaction of public feeling
-at Athens, likely to arise on the arrival of the bad news, which
-Æschines knew to be at hand, from Phokis.[903] Others having been
-chosen in place of Æschines and Demosthenes,[904] the ten envoys set
-out, and proceeded as far as Chalkis in Eubœa. It was there that they
-learned the fatal intelligence from the main land on the other side
-of the Eubœan strait. On the 23d of Skirrophorion, Phalækus and all
-the Phokian towns had surrendered; Philip was master of Thermopylæ,
-had joined his forces with the Thebans, and proclaimed an unqualified
-philo-Theban policy; on the 27th of Skirrophorion, Derkyllus, one of
-the envoys, arrived in haste back at Athens, having stopped short in
-his mission on hearing the facts.
-
-  [903] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 378; Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 40.
-  c. 30. It appears that the ten envoys were not all the same—τῶν
-  ἄλλων ~τοῦς πλείστους~ τοὺς αὐτοὺς, etc.
-
-  [904] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 380. οὔθ᾽ ὅτι πρεσβευτὴς ἄλλος
-  ᾕρητο ἀνθ᾽ αὑτοῦ, etc.
-
-  Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 43) does not seem to deny this
-  distinctly.
-
-At the moment when he arrived, the people were holding an assembly
-in the Peiræus, on matters connected with the docks and arsenal; and
-to this assembly, actually sitting, Derkyllus made his unexpected
-report.[905] The shock to the public of Athens was prodigious. Not
-only were all their splendid anticipations of anti-Theban policy from
-Philip (hitherto believed and welcomed by the people on the positive
-assurances of Philokrates and Æschines) now dashed to the ground—not
-only were the Athenians smitten with the consciousness that they had
-been overreached by Philip, that they had played into the hands of
-their enemies the Thebans, and that they had betrayed their allies
-the Phokians to ruin—but they felt also that they had yielded up
-Thermopylæ, the defence at once of Attica and of Greece, and that
-the road to Athens lay open to their worst enemies the Thebans, now
-aided by Macedonian force. Under this pressure of surprise, sorrow,
-and terror, the Athenians, on the motion of Kallisthenes, passed
-these votes:—To put the Peiræus, as well as the fortresses throughout
-Attica, in immediate defence—To bring within these walls, for safety,
-all the women and children, and all the movable property, now spread
-abroad in Attica—To celebrate the approaching festival of the
-Herakleia, not in the country, as was usual, but in the interior of
-Athens.[906]
-
-  [905] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 359, 360, 365, 379.
-
-  [906] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 368-379. Æschines also
-  acknowledges the passing of this vote, for bringing in the
-  movable property of Athens into a place of safety; though he
-  naturally says very little about it (Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 42).
-
-  In the oration of Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 238, this decree,
-  moved by Kallisthenes, is not only alluded to, but purports to
-  be given _verbatim_. The date as we there read it—the 21st of
-  the month Mæmakterion—is unquestionably wrong; for the real
-  decree must have been passed in the concluding days of the month
-  Skirrophorion, immediately after hearing the report of Derkyllus.
-  This manifest error of date will not permit us to believe in
-  the authenticity of the document. Of these supposed original
-  documents, inserted in the oration De Coronâ, Droysen and other
-  critics have shown some to be decidedly spurious; and all are so
-  doubtful that I forbear to cite them as authority.
-
-Such were the significant votes, the like of which had not been
-passed at Athens since the Peloponnesian war, attesting the terrible
-reaction of feeling occasioned at Athens by the disastrous news
-from Phokis. Æschines had now recovered from his indisposition;
-or (if we are to believe Demosthenes) found it convenient to lay
-aside the pretence. He set out as self-appointed envoy, without any
-new nomination by the people—probably with such of the Ten as were
-favorable to his views—to Philip and to the joint Macedonian and
-Theban army in Phokis. And what is yet more remarkable, he took his
-journey thither through Thebes itself;[907] though his speeches and
-his policy had been for months past (according to his own statement)
-violently anti-Theban;[908] and though he had affirmed (this,
-however, rests upon the testimony of his rival) that the Thebans
-had set a price upon his head. Having joined Philip, Æschines took
-part in the festive sacrifices and solemn pæans celebrated by the
-Macedonians, Thebans and Thessalians,[909] in commemoration and
-thanksgiving for their easy, though long-deferred, triumph over the
-Phokians, and for the conclusion of the Ten-Years Sacred War.
-
-  [907] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 380.
-
-  [908] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 41. c. 32. p. 43. c. 36. Æschines
-  accuses Demosthenes of traitorous partiality for Thebes.
-
-  [909] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 380; De Coronâ, p. 321. Æschines
-  (Fals. Leg. p. 49, 50) admits, and tries to justify, the
-  proceeding.
-
-Shortly after Philip had become master of Thermopylæ and Phokis, he
-communicated his success in a letter to the Athenians. His letter
-betokened a full consciousness of the fear and repugnance which his
-recent unexpected proceedings had excited at Athens:[910] but in
-other respects, it was conciliatory and even seductive; expressing
-great regard for them as his sworn allies, and promising again
-that they should reap solid fruits from the alliance. It allayed
-that keen apprehension of Macedonian and Theban attack, which had
-induced the Athenians recently to sanction the precautionary measures
-proposed by Kallisthenes. In his subsequent communications also with
-Athens, Philip found his advantage in continuing to profess the
-same friendship and to intersperse similar promises;[911] which,
-when enlarged upon by his partisans in the assembly, contributed to
-please the Athenians and to lull them into repose, thus enabling
-him to carry on without opposition real measures of an insidious or
-hostile character. Even shortly after Philip’s passage of Thermopylæ,
-when he was in full coöperation with the Thebans and Thessalians,
-Æschines boldly justified him by the assertion, that these Thebans
-and Thessalians had been too strong for him, and had constrained him
-against his will to act on their policy, both to the ruin of the
-Phokians and to the offence of Athens.[912] And we cannot doubt that
-the restoration of the prisoners taken at Olynthus, which must soon
-have occurred, diffused a lively satisfaction at Athens, and tended
-for the time to countervail the mortifying public results of her
-recent policy.
-
-  [910] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 237, 238, 239. It is evident that
-  Demosthenes found little in the letter which could be turned
-  against Philip. Its tone must have been plausible and winning.
-
-  A letter is inserted _verbatim_ in this oration, professing to
-  be the letter of Philip to the Athenians. I agree with those
-  critics who doubt or disbelieve the genuineness of this letter,
-  and therefore I do not cite it. If Demosthenes had had before him
-  a letter so peremptory and insolent in its tone, he would have
-  animadverted upon it much more severely.
-
-  [911] Æschines went on boasting about the excellent dispositions
-  of Philip towards Athens, and the great benefits which Philip
-  promised to confer upon her, for at least several months after
-  this capture of Thermopylæ Æschines, cont. Timarch. p. 24. c. 33.
-  Φίλιππον δὲ νῦν μὲν διὰ τὴν τῶν λόγων εὐφημίαν ἐπαινῶ· ἐὰν δ᾽
-  αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔργοις γένηται, οἷος νῦν ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς
-  ὑποσχέσεσιν, ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ῥᾴδιον τὸν καθ᾽ αὑτοῦ ποιήσεται ἔπαινον.
-
-  This oration was delivered apparently about the middle of Olymp.
-  108, 3; some months after the conquest of Thermopylæ by Philip.
-
-  [912] Demosth. De Pace, p. 62, Philippic ii. p. 69.
-
-Master as he now was of Phokis, at the head of an irresistible force
-of Macedonians and Thebans, Philip restored the Delphian temple
-to its inhabitants, and convoked anew the Amphiktyonic assembly,
-which had not met since the seizure of the temple by Philomelus.
-The Amphiktyons reassembled under feelings of vindictive antipathy
-against the Phokians, and of unqualified devotion to Philip. Their
-first vote was to dispossess the Phokians of their place in the
-assembly as one of the twelve ancient Amphiktyonic races, and to
-confer upon Philip the place and two votes (each of the twelve
-races had two votes) thus left vacant. All the rights to which the
-Phokians laid claim over the Delphian temple were formally cancelled.
-All the towns in Phokis, twenty-two in number, were dismantled and
-broken up into villages. Abæ alone was spared; being preserved by
-its ancient and oracular temple of Apollo, and by the fact that
-its inhabitants had taken no part in the spoliation of Delphi.[913]
-No village was allowed to contain more than fifty houses, nor to
-be nearer to another than a minimum distance of one furlong. Under
-such restriction, the Phokians were still allowed to possess and
-cultivate their territory, with the exception of a certain portion
-of the frontier transferred to the Thebans;[914] but they were
-required to pay to the Delphian temple an annual tribute of fifty
-talents, until the wealth taken away should have been made good. The
-horses of the Phokians were directed to be sold; their arms were to
-be cast down the precipices of Parnassus, or burnt. Such Phokians
-as had participated individually in the spoliation, were proclaimed
-accursed, and rendered liable to arrest wherever they were found.[915]
-
-  [913] Pausanias, x. 3, 2.
-
-  [914] This transfer to the Thebans is not mentioned by Diodorus,
-  but seems contained in the words of Demosthenes (Fals. Leg. p.
-  385)—τῆς τῶν Φωκέων χώρας ὁπόσην βούλονται: compare p. 380.
-
-  [915] Diodor. xvi. 60; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 385. ὅλων τῶν
-  τειχῶν καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἀναιρέσεις. Demosthenes causes this severe
-  sentence of the Amphiktyonic council to be read to the Dikastery
-  (Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 361.) Unfortunately it has not been
-  preserved.
-
-By the same Amphiktyonic assembly, farther, the Lacedæmonians, as
-having been allies of the Phokians, were dispossessed of their
-franchise, that is, of their right to concur in the Amphiktyonic
-suffrage of the Dorian nation. This vote probably emanated from the
-political antipathies of the Argeians and Messenians.[916]
-
-  [916] Pausanias, x. 8, 2.
-
-The sentence, rigorous as it is, pronounced by the Amphiktyons
-against the Phokians, was merciful as compared with some of the
-propositions made in the assembly. The Œtæans went so far as to
-propose, that all the Phokians of military age should be cast
-down the precipice; and Æschines takes credit to himself for
-having induced the assembly to hear their defence, and thereby
-preserved their lives.[917] But though the terms of the sentence
-may have been thus softened, we may be sure that the execution of
-it by Thebans, Thessalians, and other foreigners quartered on the
-country,—all bitter enemies of the Phokian name, and giving vent
-to their antipathies under the mask of pious indignation against
-sacrilege,—went far beyond the literal terms in active cruelty.
-That the Phokians were stripped and slain[918]—that children were
-torn from their parents, wives from their husbands, and the images
-of the gods from their temples,—that Philip took for himself the
-lion’s share of the plunder and movable property,—all these are facts
-naturally to be expected, as incidental to the violent measure of
-breaking up the cities and scattering the inhabitants. Of those,
-however, who had taken known part in the spoliation of the temple,
-the greater number went into exile with Phalækus; and not they alone,
-but even all such of the moderate and meritorious citizens as could
-find means to emigrate.[919] Many of them obtained shelter at Athens.
-The poorer Phokians remained at home by necessity. But such was the
-destruction inflicted by the conquerors, that even two or three years
-afterwards, when Demosthenes and other Athenian envoys passed through
-the country in their way to the Amphiktyonic meeting at Delphi,
-they saw nothing but evidences of misery; old men, women and little
-children, without adults,—ruined houses, impoverished villages,
-half-cultivated fields.[920] Well might Demosthenes say that events
-more terrific and momentous had never occurred in the Grecian world,
-either in his own time or in that of his predecessors.[921]
-
-  [917] Æschines, Fals. Leg p. 47. c. 44.
-
-  [918] Justin, viii. 5. “Victi igitur necessitate, pactâ salute
-  se dediderunt. Sed pactio ejus fidei fuit, cujus antea fuerat
-  deprecati belli promissio. Igitur cæduntur passim rapiunturque:
-  non liberi parentibus, non conjuges maritis, non deorum simulacra
-  templis suis relinquuntur. Unum tantum miseris solatium fuit,
-  quod cum Philippus portione prædæ socios fraudasset, nihil rerum
-  suarum apud inimicos viderunt.”
-
-  Compare Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 366.
-
-  [919] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 47. c. 44; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p.
-  366; Demosthen. De Pace, p. 61. ὅτι τοὺς Φωκέων φυγάδας σώζομεν,
-  etc.
-
-  [920] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 361. θέαμα δεινὸν καὶ ἐλεεινόν·
-  ὅτε γὰρ ~νῦν ἐπορευόμεθα εἰς Δελφοὺς~ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἦν ὁρᾷν ἡμῖν
-  πάντα ταῦτα, οἰκίας κατεσκαμμένας, τείχη περιῃρημένα, χώραν
-  ἔρημον τῶν ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, γύναια δὲ καὶ παιδάρια ὀλίγα καὶ
-  πρεσβύτας ἀνθρώπους οἰκτροὺς, οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς δύναιτ᾽ ἐφικέσθαι τῷ
-  λόγῳ ~τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν νῦν ὄντων~.
-
-  As this oration was delivered in 343-342 B. C., the adverb of
-  time νῦν may be reasonably referred to the early part of that
-  year, and the journey to Delphi was perhaps undertaken for the
-  spring meeting of the Amphiktyonic council of that year; between
-  two and three years after the destruction of the Phokians by
-  Philip.
-
-  [921] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 361.
-
-It was but two years since the conquest and ruin of Olynthus, and
-of thirty-two Chalkidic Grecian cities besides, had spread abroad
-everywhere the terror and majesty of Philip’s name. But he was
-now exalted to a still higher pinnacle by the destruction of the
-Phokians, the capture of Thermopylæ, and the sight of a permanent
-Macedonian garrison, occupying from henceforward Nikæa and other
-places commanding the pass.[922] He was extolled as restorer of the
-Amphiktyonic assembly, and as avenging champion of the Delphian god,
-against the sacrilegious Phokians. That he should have acquired
-possession of an unassailable pass, dismissed the formidable
-force of Phalækus, and become master of twenty-two Phokian cites,
-all without striking a blow,—was accounted the most wonderful of
-all his exploits. It strengthened more than ever the prestige of
-his constant good fortune. Having been now, by the vote of the
-Amphiktyons, invested with the right of Amphiktyonic suffrage
-previously exercised by the Phokians, he acquired a new Hellenic
-rank, with increased facilities for encroachment and predominance
-in Hellenic affairs. Moreover, in the month of August 346 B. C.,
-about two months after the surrender of Phokis to Philip, the season
-recurring for celebrating the great Pythian festival, after the
-usual interval of four years, the Amphiktyons conferred upon Philip
-the signal honor of nominating him president to celebrate this
-festival, in conjunction with the Thebans and Thessalians;[923] an
-honorary preëminence, which ranked among the loftiest aspirations of
-ambitious Grecian despots, and which Jason, of Pheræ, had prepared
-to appropriate for himself twenty-four years before, at the moment
-when he was assassinated.[924] It was in vain that the Athenians,
-mortified and indignant at the unexpected prostration of their
-hopes and the utter ruin of their allies, refused to send deputies
-to the Amphiktyons,—affected even to disregard the assembly as
-irregular,—and refrained from despatching their sacred legation as
-usual, to sacrifice at the Pythian festival.[925] The Amphiktyonic
-vote did not the less pass; without the concurrence, indeed, either
-of Athens or of Sparta, yet with the hearty support not only of
-Thebans and Thessalians, but also of Argeians, Messenians, Arcadians,
-and all those who counted upon Philip as a probable auxiliary against
-their dangerous Spartan neighbor.[926] And when envoys from Philip
-and from the Thessalians arrived at Athens, notifying that he had
-been invested with the Amphiktyonic suffrage, and inviting the
-concurrence of Athens in his reception,—prudential considerations
-obliged the Athenians, though against their feelings, to pass a
-vote of concurrence. Even Demosthenes was afraid to break the
-recent peace, however inglorious,—and to draw upon Athens a general
-Amphiktyonic war, headed by the King of Macedon.[927]
-
-  [922] Demosth. ad Philipp. Epistolam, p. 153. Νικαίαν μὲν φρουρᾷ
-  κατέχων, etc.
-
-  [923] Diodor. xvi. 60. τιθέναι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τῶν Πυθίων
-  Φίλιππον μετὰ Βοιωτῶν καὶ Θετταλῶν, διὰ τὸ ~Κορινθίους~
-  μετεσχηκέναι τοῖς Φωκεῦσι τῆς εἰς τὸ θεῖον παρανομίας.
-
-  The reason here assigned by Diodorus, why the Amphiktyons placed
-  the celebration of the Pythian festival in the hands of Philip,
-  cannot be understood. It may be true, as matter of fact, that the
-  Corinthians had allied themselves with the Phokians during the
-  Sacred War—though there is no other evidence of the fact except
-  this passage. But the Corinthians were never invested with any
-  authoritative character in reference to the _Pythian_ festival.
-  They were the recognized presidents of the _Isthmian_ festival. I
-  cannot but think that Diodorus has been misled by a confusion of
-  these two festivals one with the other.
-
-  [924] Xenoph. Hellen. vi.
-
-  [925] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 380-398. οὕτω δεινὰ καὶ σχέτλια
-  ἡγουμένων τοὺς ταλαιπώρους πάσχειν Φωκέας, ὥστε μήτε τοὺς ἐκ τῆς
-  βουλῆς θεωροὺς μήτε τοὺς θεσμοθέτας εἰς τὰ Πύθια πέμψαι, ἀλλ᾽
-  ἀποστῆναι τῆς πατρίου θεωρίας, etc. Demosth. De Pace, p. 60.
-  ~τοὺς συνεληλυθότας τούτους καὶ φάσκοντας Ἀμφικτύονας εἶναι~, etc.
-
-  [926] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 61; Philippic ii. p. 68, 69.
-
-  [927] Demosth. De Pace, p. 60-63; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 375.
-  In the latter passage, p. 375, Demosthenes accuses Æschines of
-  having been the only orator in the city who spoke in favor of the
-  proposition, there being a strong feeling in the assembly and in
-  the people against it. Demosthenes must have forgotten, or did
-  not wish to remember, his own harangue De Pace, delivered three
-  years before. In spite of the repugnance of the people, very
-  easy to understand, I conclude that the decree must have passed;
-  since, if it had been rejected, consequences must have arisen
-  which would have come to our knowledge.
-
-Here then was a momentous political change doubly fatal to the
-Hellenic world; first, in the new position of Philip both as master
-of the keys of Greece and as recognized Amphiktyonic leader, with
-means of direct access and influence even on the inmost cities of
-Peloponnesus; next, in the lowered banner, and uncovered frontier, of
-Athens, disgraced by the betrayal both of her Phokian allies and of
-the general safety of Greece,—and recompensed only in so far as she
-regained her captives.
-
-How came the Athenians to sanction a peace at once dishonorable and
-ruinous, yielding to Philip that important pass, the common rampart
-of Attica and of Southern Greece, which he could never have carried
-in war at the point of the sword? Doubtless, the explanation of
-this proceeding is to be found, partly in the general state of the
-Athenian mind; repugnance to military cost and effort,—sickness
-and shame at their past war with Philip,—alarm from the prodigious
-success of his arms,—and pressing anxiety to recover the captives
-taken at Olynthus. But the feelings here noticed, powerful as they
-were, would not have ended in such a peace, had they not been
-seconded by the deliberate dishonesty of Æschines and a majority
-of his colleagues; who deceived their countrymen with a tissue of
-false assurances as to the purposes of Philip, and delayed their
-proceedings on the second embassy in such a manner that he was
-actually at Thermopylæ before the real danger of the pass was known
-at Athens.
-
-Making all just allowance for mistrust of Demosthenes as a witness,
-there appears in the admissions of Æschines himself sufficient
-evidence of corruption. His reply to Demosthenes, though successfully
-meeting some collateral aggravations, seldom touches, and never
-repels, the main articles of impeachment against himself. The
-dilatory measures of the second embassy,—the postponement of
-the oath-taking until Philip was within three days’ march of
-Thermopylæ,—the keeping back of information about the danger of that
-pass, until the Athenians were left without leisure for deliberating
-on the conjuncture,—all these grave charges remain without denial
-or justification. The refusal to depart at once on the second
-embassy, and to go straight to Philip in Thrace for the protection
-of Kersobleptes, is indeed explained, but in a manner which makes
-the case rather worse than better. And the gravest matter of all—the
-false assurances given to the Athenian public respecting Philip’s
-purposes,—are plainly admitted by Æschines.[928]
-
-  [928] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 37. Τοῦτο οὐκ ἀπαγγεῖλαι, ἀλλ᾽
-  ὑποσχέσθαι μέ φησίν.
-
-  Compare p. 43. c. 36. p. 46. c. 41. p. 52. c. 54—also p.
-  31-41—also the speech against Ktesiphon, p. 65. c. 30. ὡς τάχιστα
-  εἴσω Πυλῶν Φίλιππος παρῆλθε καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Φωκεῦσι πόλεις
-  ~παραδόξως~ ἀναστάτους ἐποίησε, etc.
-
-In regard to these public assurances given by Æschines about Philip’s
-intentions, corrupt mendacity appears to me the only supposition
-admissible. There is nothing, even in his own account, to explain
-how he came to be beguiled into such flagrant misjudgment; while
-the hypothesis of honest error is yet farther refuted by his own
-subsequent conduct. “If (argues Demosthenes), Æschines had been
-sincerely misled by Philip, so as to pledge his own veracity and
-character to the truth of positive assurances given publicly before
-his countrymen, respecting Philip’s designs,—then on finding that
-the result belied him, and that he had fatally misled those whom he
-undertook to guide, he would be smitten with compunction, and would
-in particular abominate the name of Philip as one who had disgraced
-him and made him an unconscious instrument of treachery. But the fact
-has been totally otherwise; immediately after the peace, Æschines
-visited Philip to share his triumph, and has been ever since his
-avowed partisan and advocate.”[929] Such conduct is inconsistent
-with the supposition of honest mistake, and goes to prove,—what the
-proceedings of the second embassy all bear out,—that Æschines was
-the hired agent of Philip for deliberately deceiving his countrymen
-with gross falsehood. Even as reported by himself, the language of
-Æschines betokens his ready surrender of Grecian freedom, and his
-recognition of Philip as a master; for he gives not only his consent,
-but his approbation, to the entry of Philip within Thermopylæ,[930]
-only exhorting him, when he comes there, to act against Thebes and
-in defence of the Bœotian cities. This, in an Athenian envoy, argues
-a blindness little short of treason. The irreparable misfortune, both
-for Athens and for free Greece generally, was to bring Philip within
-Thermopylæ, with power sufficient to put down Thebes and reconstitute
-Bœotia,—even if it could have been made sure that such would be the
-first employment of his power. The same negotiator, who had begun
-his mission by the preposterous flourish of calling upon Philip to
-give up Amphipolis, ended by treacherously handing over to him a new
-conquest which he could not otherwise have acquired. Thermopylæ,
-betrayed once before by Ephialtes the Malian to Xerxes, was now
-betrayed a second time by the Athenian envoys to an extra-Hellenic
-power yet more formidable.
-
-  [929] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 373, 374. I translate the substance
-  of the argument, not the words.
-
-  [930] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 36. In rebutting the charge
-  against him of having betrayed the Phokians to Philip, Æschines
-  (Fals. Leg. p. 46, 47) dwells upon the circumstance, that none of
-  the Phokian exiles appeared to assist in the accusation, and that
-  some three or four Phokians and Bœotians (whom he calls by name)
-  were ready to appear as witnesses in his favor.
-
-  The reason, why none of them appeared against him, appears to
-  me sufficiently explained by Demosthenes. The Phokians were
-  in a state far too prostrate and terror-stricken to incur new
-  enmities, or to come forward as accusers of one of the Athenian
-  partisans of Philip, whose soldiers were in possession of their
-  country.
-
-  The reason why some of them appeared in his favor is also
-  explained by Æschines himself, when he states that he had pleaded
-  for them before the Amphiktyonic assembly, and had obtained
-  for them a mitigation of that extreme penalty which their most
-  violent enemies urged against them. To captives at the mercy of
-  their opponents, such an interference might well appear deserving
-  of gratitude; quite apart from the question, how far Æschines as
-  envoy, by his previous communications to the Athenian people, had
-  contributed to betray Thermopylæ and the Phokians to Philip.
-
-The ruinous peace of 346 B. C. was thus brought upon Athens not
-simply by mistaken impulses of her own, but also by the corruption of
-Æschines and the major part of her envoys. Demosthenes had certainly
-no hand in the result. He stood in decided opposition to the majority
-of the envoys; a fact manifest as well from his own assurances, as
-from the complaints vented against him, as a colleague insupportably
-troublesome, by Æschines. Demosthenes affirms, too, that after
-fruitless opposition to the policy of the majority, he tried to make
-known their misconduct to his countrymen at home both by personal
-return, and by letter; and that in both cases his attempts were
-frustrated. Whether he did all that he could towards this object,
-cannot be determined; but we find no proof of any short-coming. The
-only point upon which Demosthenes appears open to censure, is, on
-his omission to protest emphatically during the debates of the month
-Elaphebolion at Athens, when the Phokians were first practically
-excluded from the treaty. I discover no other fault established on
-probable grounds against him, amidst the multifarious accusations,
-chiefly personal and foreign to the main issue, preferred by his
-opponent.
-
-Respecting Philokrates—the actual mover, in the Athenian assembly, of
-all the important resolutions tending to bring about this peace—we
-learn that being impeached by Hyperides[931] not long afterwards,
-he retired from Athens without standing trial, and was condemned
-in his absence. Both he and Æschines (so Demosthenes asserts) had
-received from Philip bribes and grants out of the spoils of Olynthus;
-and Philokrates, especially, displayed his newly-acquired wealth
-at Athens with impudent ostentation.[932] These are allegations in
-themselves probable, though coming from a political rival. The peace,
-having disappointed every one’s hopes, came speedily to be regarded
-with shame and regret, of which Philokrates bore the brunt as its
-chief author. Both Æschines and Demosthenes sought to cast upon each
-other the imputation of confederacy with Philokrates.
-
-  [931] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 376.
-
-  [932] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 375, 376, 377, 386
-
-  The pious feeling of Diodorus leads him to describe, with
-  peculiar seriousness, the divine judgments which fell on all
-  those concerned in despoiling the Delphian temple. Phalækus, with
-  his mercenaries out of Phokis, retired first into Peloponnesus;
-  from thence seeking to cross to Tarentum, he was forced back when
-  actually on shipboard by a mutiny of his soldiers, and passed
-  into Krete. Here he took service with the inhabitants of Knossus
-  against those of Lyktus. Over the latter he gained a victory,
-  and their city was only rescued from him by the unexpected
-  arrival of the Spartan king Archidamus. That prince, recently the
-  auxiliary of Phalækus in Phokis, was now on his way across the
-  sea towards Tarentum; near which city he was slain a few years
-  afterwards. Phalækus, repulsed from Lyktus, next laid siege to
-  Kydonia, and was bringing up engines to batter the walls, when
-  a storm of thunder and lightning arose, so violent, that his
-  engines “were burnt by the divine fire,”[933] and he himself with
-  several soldiers perished in trying to extinguish the flames.
-  His remaining army passed into Peloponnesus, where they embraced
-  the cause of some Eleian exiles against the government of Elis;
-  but were vanquished, compelled to surrender, and either sold
-  into slavery or put to death.[934] Even the wives of the Phokian
-  leaders, who had adorned themselves with some of the sacred
-  donatives out of the Delphian Temple, were visited with the like
-  extremity of suffering. And while the gods dealt thus rigorously
-  with the authors of the sacrilege, they exhibited favor no less
-  manifest towards their champion Philip, whom they exalted more
-  and more towards the pinnacle of honor and dominion.[935]
-
-  [933] Diodor. xvi. 63. ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου πυρὸς κατεφλέχθησαν, etc.
-
-  [934] Diodor. xvi. 61, 62, 63.
-
-  [935] Diodor. xvi. 64; Justin, viii. 2. “Dignum itaque qui a Diis
-  proximus habeatur, per quem Deorum majestas vindicata sit.”
-
-  Some of these mercenaries, however, who had been employed in
-  Phokis perished in Sicily in the service of Timoleon—as has been
-  already related.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XC.
-
-FROM THE PEACE OF 346 B. C., TO THE BATTLE OF CHÆRONEIA AND THE DEATH
-OF PHILIP.
-
-
-I have described in my last chapter the conclusion of the Sacred
-War, and the reëstablishment of the Amphiktyonic assembly by Philip;
-together with the dishonorable peace of 346 B. C., whereby Athens,
-after a war, feeble in management and inglorious in result, was
-betrayed by the treachery of her own envoys into the abandonment
-of the pass of Thermopylæ;—a new sacrifice, not required by her
-actual position, and more fatal to her future security than any
-of the previous losses. This important pass, the key of Greece,
-had now come into possession of Philip, who occupied it, together
-with the Phokian territory, by a permanent garrison of his own
-troops.[936] The Amphiktyonic assembly had become an instrument for
-his exaltation. Both Thebans and Thessalians were devoted to his
-interest; rejoicing in the ruin of their common enemies the Phokians,
-without reflecting on the more formidable power now established on
-their frontiers. Though the power of Thebes had been positively
-increased by regaining Orchomenus and Koroneia, yet, comparatively
-speaking, the new position of Philip brought upon her, as well as
-upon Athens and the rest of Greece, a degradation and extraneous
-mastery such as had never before been endured.[937]
-
-  [936] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 119.
-
-  [937] Demosth. De Pace, p. 62. νυνὶ δὲ Θηβαίοις πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὴν
-  χώραν κεκομίσθαι, κάλλιστα πέπρακται, πρὸς δὲ τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν,
-  αἴσχιστα, etc.
-
-This new position of Philip, as champion of the Amphiktyonic
-assembly, and within the line of common Grecian defence, was
-profoundly felt by Demosthenes. A short time after the surrender of
-Thermopylæ, when the Thessalian and Macedonian envoys had arrived
-at Athens, announcing the recent determination of the Amphiktyons
-to confer upon Philip the place in that assembly from whence the
-Phokians had been just expelled, concurrence of Athens in this
-vote was invited; but the Athenians, mortified and exasperated
-at the recent turn of events, were hardly disposed to acquiesce.
-Here we find Demosthenes taking the cautious side, and strongly
-advising compliance. He insists upon the necessity of refraining
-from any measure calculated to break the existing peace, however
-deplorable may have been its conditions; and of giving no pretence
-to the Amphiktyons for voting conjoint war against Athens, to be
-executed by Philip.[938] These recommendations, prudent under the
-circumstances, prove that Demosthenes, though dissatisfied with the
-peace, was anxious to keep it now that it was made; and that if he
-afterwards came to renew his exhortations to war, this was owing to
-new encroachments and more menacing attitude on the part of Philip.
-
-  [938] Demosth. De Pace, p. 60, 61.
-
-We have other evidences, besides the Demosthenic speech just cited,
-to attest the effect of Philip’s new position on the Grecian mind.
-Shortly after the peace, and before the breaking up of the Phokian
-towns into villages had been fully carried into detail—Isokrates
-published his letter addressed to Philip—the Oratio ad Philippum.
-The purpose of this letter is, to invite Philip to reconcile the
-four great cities of Greece—Sparta, Athens, Thebes, and Argos; to
-put himself at the head of their united force, as well as of Greece
-generally; and to invade Asia, for the purpose of overthrowing
-the Persian empire, of liberating the Asiatic Greeks, and of
-providing new homes for the unsettled wanderers in Greece. The
-remarkable point here is, that Isokrates puts the Hellenic world
-under subordination and pupilage to Philip, renouncing all idea
-of it as a self-sustaining and self-regulating system. He extols
-Philip’s exploits, good fortune, and power, above all historical
-parallels—treats him unequivocally as the chief of Greece—and only
-exhorts him to make as good use of his power, as his ancestor
-Herakles had made in early times.[939] He recommends him, by
-impartial and conciliatory behavior towards all, to acquire for
-himself the same devoted esteem among the Greeks as that which
-now prevailed among his own Macedonian officers—or as that which
-existed among the Lacedæmonians towards the Spartan kings.[940]
-Great and melancholy indeed is the change which had come over the
-old age of Isokrates, since he published the Panegyrical Oration
-(380 B. C.—thirty-four years before) wherein he invokes a united
-Pan-hellenic expedition against Asia, under the joint guidance of the
-two Hellenic chiefs by land and sea—Sparta and Athens; and wherein he
-indignantly denounces Sparta for having, at the peace of Antalkidas,
-introduced for her own purposes a Persian rescript to impose laws on
-the Grecian world. The prostration of Grecian dignity, serious as it
-was, involved in the peace of Antalkidas, was far less disgraceful
-than that recommended by Isokrates towards Philip—himself indeed
-personally of Hellenic parentage, but a Macedonian or barbarian (as
-Demosthenes[941] terms him) by power and position. As Æschines,
-when employed in embassy from Athens to Philip, thought that his
-principal duty consisted in trying to persuade him by eloquence
-to restore Amphipolis to Athens, and put down Thebes—so Isokrates
-relies upon his skilful pen to dispose the new chief to a good use
-of imperial power—to make him protector of Greece, and conquerer of
-Asia. If copious and elegant flattery could work such a miracle,
-Isokrates might hope for success. But it is painful to note the
-increasing subservience, on the part of estimable Athenian freemen
-like Isokrates, to a foreign potentate; and the declining sentiment
-of Hellenic independence and dignity, conspicuous after the peace of
-346 B. C. in reference to Philip.
-
-  [939] Isokrates. Or. v. ad Philipp. s. 128-135.
-
-  [940] Isokrat. Or. v. ad Philipp. s. 91. ὅταν οὕτω διαθῆς τοὺς
-  Ἕλληνας, ὥσπερ ὁρᾷς Λακεδαιμονίους τε πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν βασιλέας
-  ἔχοντας, τοὺς δ᾽ ἑταίρους τοὺς σοὺς πρὸς σὲ διακειμένους. Ἔστι δ᾽
-  οὐ χαλεπὸν τυχεῖν τούτων, ἢν ἐθελήσῃς κοινὸς ἅπασι γενέσθαι, etc.
-
-  [941] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 118.
-
-From Isokrates as well as from Demosthenes, we thus obtain evidence
-of the imposing and intimidating effect of Philip’s name in
-Greece after the peace of 346 B. C. Ochus, the Persian king, was
-at this time embarrassed by unsubdued revolt among his subjects;
-which Isokrates urges as one motive for Philip to attack him. Not
-only Egypt, but also Phenicia and Cyprus, were in revolt against
-the Persian king. One expedition (if not two) on a large scale,
-undertaken by him for the purpose of reconquering Egypt, had been
-disgracefully repulsed, in consequence of the ability of the
-generals (Diophantus an Athenian and Lamius a Spartan) who commanded
-the Grecian mercenaries in the service of the Egyptian prince
-Nektanebus.[942] About the time of the peace of 346 B. C. in Greece,
-however, Ochus appears to have renewed with better success his
-attack on Cyprus, Phenicia, and Egypt. To reconquer Cyprus, he put
-in requisition the force of the Karian prince Idrieus (brother and
-successor of Mausolus and Artemisia), at this time not only the most
-powerful prince in Asia Minor, but also master of the Grecian islands
-Chios, Kos, and Rhodes, probably by means of an internal oligarchy
-in each, who ruled in his interest and through his soldiers.[943]
-Idrieus sent to Cyprus a force of forty triremes and eight thousand
-mercenary troops, under the command of the Athenian Phokion and of
-Evagoras, an exiled member of the dynasty reigning at Salamis in the
-island. After a long siege of Salamis itself, which was held against
-the Persian king by Protagoras, probably another member of the same
-dynasty—and after extensive operations throughout the rest of this
-rich island, affording copious plunder to the soldiers, so as to
-attract numerous volunteers from the mainland—all Cyprus was again
-brought under the Persian authority.[944]
-
-  [942] Isokrates, Or. v. Philipp. s. 118; Diodor. xv. 40, 44, 48.
-  Diodorus alludes three several times to this repulse of Ochus
-  from Egypt. Compare Demosth. De Rhod. Libert. p. 193.
-
-  Trogus mentioned three different expeditions of Ochus against
-  Egypt (Argument. ad Justin. lib. x).
-
-  [943] Isokrates, Or. v. Philipp. s. 102. Ἰδριέα γε τὸν
-  εὐπορώτατον ~τῶν νῦν~ περὶ τὴν ἤπειρον, etc.
-
-  Demosth. De Pace, p. 63. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐῶμεν—καὶ τὸν Κᾶρα τὰς ~νήσους~
-  καταλαμβάνειν, Χίον καὶ Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον, etc. An oration delivered
-  in the latter half of 346 B. C. after the peace.
-
-  Compare Demosth. De Rhod. Libertat. p. 121, an oration four years
-  earlier.
-
-  [944] Diodor. xvi. 42-46. In the Inscription No. 87. of Boeckh’s
-  Corpus Inscriptt., we find a decree passed by the Athenians
-  recognizing friendship and hospitality with the Sidonian prince
-  Strato—from whom they seem to have received a donation of ten
-  talents. The note of date in this decree is not preserved; but M.
-  Boeckh conceives it to date between Olympiad 101-104.
-
-The Phenicians had revolted from Ochus at the same time as the
-Cypriots, and in concert with Nektanebus prince of Egypt, from whom
-they received a reinforcement of four thousand Greek mercenaries
-under Mentor the Rhodian. Of the three great Phenician cities,
-Sidon, Tyre, and Aradus—each a separate political community, but
-administering their common affairs at a joint town called Tripolis,
-composed of three separate walled circuits, a furlong apart from each
-other—Sidon was at once the oldest, the richest, and the greatest
-sufferer from Persian oppression. Hence the Sidonian population,
-with their prince Tennes, stood foremost in the revolt against
-Ochus, employing their great wealth in hiring soldiers, preparing
-arms, and accumulating every means of defence. In the first outbreak
-they expelled the Persian garrison, seized and punished some of
-the principal officers, and destroyed the adjoining palace and
-park reserved for the satrap or king. Having farther defeated the
-neighboring satraps of Kilikia and Syria, they strengthened the
-defences of the city by triple ditches, heightened walls, and a
-fleet of one hundred triremes and quinqueremes. Incensed at these
-proceedings, Ochus marched with an immense force from Babylon.
-But his means of corruption served him better than his arms. The
-Sidonian prince Tennes, in combination with Mentor, entered into
-private bargain with him, betrayed to him first one hundred of the
-principal citizens, and next placed the Persian army in possession of
-the city-walls. Ochus, having slain the hundred citizens surrendered
-to him, together with five hundred more who came to him with boughs
-of supplication, intimated his purpose of taking signal revenge on
-the Sidonians generally; who took the desperate resolution, first
-of burning their fleet that no one might escape—next, of shutting
-themselves up with their families, and setting fire each man to his
-own house. In this deplorable conflagration forty thousand persons
-are said to have perished; and such was the wealth destroyed, that
-the privilege of searching the ruins was purchased for a large sum of
-money. Instead of rewarding the traitor Tennes, Ochus concluded the
-tragedy by putting him to death.[945]
-
-  [945] Diodor. xvi. 42, 43, 45. “Occisis optimatibus Sidona cepit
-  Ochus” (Trogus, Argum. ad Justin. lib x).
-
-Flushed with this unexpected success, Ochus marched with an immense
-force against Egypt. He had in his army ten thousand Greeks; six
-thousand by requisition from the Greek cities in Asia Minor; three
-thousand by request from Argos; and one thousand from Thebes.[946] To
-Athens and Sparta, he had sent a like request, but had received from
-both a courteous refusal. His army, Greek and Asiatic, the largest
-which Persia had sent forth for many years, was distributed into
-three divisions, each commanded by one Greek and one Persian general;
-one of the three divisions was confided to Mentor and the eunuch
-Bagoas, the two ablest servants of the Persian king. The Egyptian
-prince Nektanebus, having been long aware of the impending attack,
-had also assembled a numerous force: no less than twenty thousand
-mercenary Greeks, with a far larger body of Egyptians and Libyans.
-He had also taken special care to put the eastern branch of the
-Nile, with the fortress of Pelusium at its mouth, in a full state of
-defence. But these ample means of defence were rendered unavailing,
-partly by his own unskilfulness and incompetence, partly by the
-ability and cunning of Mentor and Bagoas. Nektanebus was obliged
-to retire into Ethiopia; all Egypt fell, with little resistance,
-into the hands of the Persians; the fortified places capitulated—the
-temples were pillaged, with an immense booty to the victors—and
-even the sacred archives of the temples were carried off, to be
-afterwards resold to the priests for an additional sum of money. The
-wealthy territory of Egypt again became a Persian province, under the
-satrap Pherendates; while Ochus returned to Babylon, with a large
-increase both of dominion and of reputation. The Greek mercenaries
-were dismissed to return home, with an ample harvest both of pay
-and plunder.[947] They constituted in fact the principal element of
-force on both sides; some Greeks enabled the Persian king to subdue
-revolters,[948] while others lent their strength to the revolters
-against him.
-
-  [946] Diodor. xvi. 47; Isokrates, Or. xii. Panathenaic. s. 171.
-
-  [947] Diodor. xvi. 47-51. Ley, Fata et Conditio, Ægypti sub Regno
-  Persarum, p. 25, 26.
-
-  [948] Isokrates, Or. iv. Philipp. s. 149. καὶ τοὺς ἀφισταμένους
-  τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς βασιλέως συγκαταστρεφόμεθα, etc.
-
-By this reconquest of Phenicia and Egypt, Ochus relieved himself
-from that contempt into which he had fallen through the failure of
-his former expedition,[949] and even exalted the Persian empire in
-force and credit to a point nearly as high as it had ever occupied
-before. The Rhodian Mentor, and the Persian Bagoas, both of whom had
-distinguished themselves in the Egyptian campaign, became from this
-time among his most effective officers. Bagoas accompanied Ochus
-into the interior provinces, retaining his full confidence; while
-Mentor, rewarded with a sum of 100 talents, and loaded with Egyptian
-plunder, was invested with the satrapy of the Asiatic seaboard.[950]
-He here got together a considerable body of Greek mercenaries, with
-whom he rendered signal service to the Persian king. Though the whole
-coast was understood to belong to the Persian empire, yet there were
-many separate strong towns and positions, held by chiefs who had
-their own military force; neither paying tribute nor obeying orders.
-Among these chiefs, one of the most conspicuous was Hermeias, who
-resided in the stronghold of Atarneus (on the mainland opposite
-to Lesbos), but had in pay many troops and kept garrisons in many
-neighboring places. Though partially disabled by accidental injury in
-childhood,[951] Hermeias was a man of singular energy and ability,
-and had conquered for himself this dominion. But what has contributed
-most to his celebrity, is, that he was the attached friend and
-admirer of Aristotle; who passed three years with him at Atarneus,
-after the death of Plato in 348-347 B. C.—and who has commemorated
-his merits in a noble ode. By treachery and false promises, Mentor
-seduced Hermeias into an interview, seized his person, and employed
-his signet-ring to send counterfeit orders whereby he became master
-of Atarneus and all the remaining places held by Hermeias. Thus,
-by successful perfidy, Mentor reduced the most vigorous of the
-independent chiefs on the Asiatic coast; after which, by successive
-conquests of the same kind, he at length brought the whole coast
-effectively under Persian dominion.[952]
-
-  [949] Isokrates, Or. iv. Philipp. s. 117, 121, 160. Diodorus
-  places the successful expeditions of Ochus against Phenicia and
-  Egypt during the three years between 351-348 B. C. (Diodor. xvi.
-  40-52). In my judgment, they were not executed until after the
-  conclusion of the peace between Philip and Athens in March 346
-  B. C.; they were probably brought to a close in the two summers
-  of 346-345 B. C. The Discourse or Letter of Isokrates to Philip
-  appears better evidence on this point of chronology, than the
-  assertion of Diodorus. The Discourse of Isokrates was published
-  shortly after the peace of March 346 B. C., and addressed to a
-  prince perfectly well informed of all the public events of his
-  time. One of the main arguments used by Isokrates to induce
-  Philip to attack the Persian empire, is the weakness of Ochus
-  in consequence of Egypt and Phenicia being still in revolt and
-  unsubdued—and the contempt into which Ochus had fallen from
-  having tried to reconquer Egypt and having been ignominiously
-  repulsed—ἀπῆλθεν ἐκεῖθεν (Ochus) οὐ μόνον ἡττηθεὶς ἀλλὰ καὶ
-  καταγελασθεὶς, καὶ δόξας οὔτε βασιλεύειν οὔτε στρατηγεῖν ἄξιος
-  εἶναι (s. 188) ... οὕτω σφόδρα μεμισημένος καὶ καταπεφρονημένος
-  ὑφ᾽ ἁπάντων ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε τῶν βασιλευσάντων (s. 160).
-
-  The reconquest of Egypt by Ochus, with an immense army and a
-  large number of Greeks engaged on both sides, must have been one
-  of the most impressive events of the age. Diodorus may perhaps
-  have confounded the date of the _first_ expedition, wherein Ochus
-  failed, with that of the _second_, wherein he succeeded.
-
-  [950] Diodor. xvi. 50-52.
-
-  [951] Strabo, xvi. p. 610. Suidas v. Aristotelis—θλιβίας ἐκ
-  παιδός.
-
-  [952] Diodorus places the appointment of Mentor to the satrapy of
-  the Asiatic coast, and his seizure of Hermeias, in Olymp. 107,
-  4 (349-348 B. C.), immediately after the successful invasion of
-  Egypt.
-
-  But this date cannot be correct, since Aristotle visited Hermeias
-  at Atarneus after the death of Plato, and passed three years
-  with him—from the archonship of Theophilus (348-347 B. C. Olymp.
-  108, 1), in which year Plato died—to the archonship of Eubulus
-  (345-344 B. C. Olymp. 108, 4) (Vita Aristotelis ap. Dionys.
-  Hal. Epist. ad Ammæum, c. 5; Scriptt. Biographici, p. 397, ed.
-  Westermann); Diogen. Laert. v. 7.
-
-  Here is another reason confirming the remark made in my former
-  note, that Diodorus has placed the conquest of Egypt by Ochus
-  three or four years too early; since the appointment of Mentor
-  to the satrapy of the Asiatic coast follows naturally and
-  immediately after the distinguished part which he had taken in
-  the conquest of Egypt.
-
-  The seizure of Hermeias by Mentor must probably have taken place
-  about 343 B. C. The stay of Aristotle with Hermeias will probably
-  have occupied the three years between 347 and 344 B. C.
-
-  Respecting the chronology of these events, Mr. Clinton follows
-  Diodorus; Böhnecke dissents from him—rightly, in my judgment
-  (Forschungen, p. 460-734, note). Böhnecke seems to think that
-  the person mentioned in Demosth. Philipp. iv. (p. 139, 140) as
-  having been seized and carried up prisoner to the king of Persia,
-  accused of plotting with Philip measures of hostility against the
-  latter—is Hermeias. This is not in itself improbable, but the
-  authority of the commentator Ulpian seems hardly sufficient to
-  warrant us in positively asserting the identity.
-
-  It is remarkable that Diodorus makes no mention of the peace of
-  346 B. C. between Philip and the Athenians.
-
-The peace between Philip and the Athenians lasted without any formal
-renunciation on either side for more than six years; from March
-346 B. C. to beyond Midsummer 340 B. C. But though never formally
-renounced during that interval, it became gradually more and more
-violated in practice by both parties. To furnish a consecutive
-history of the events of these few years, is beyond our power. We
-have nothing to guide us but a few orations of Demosthenes;[953]
-which, while conveying a lively idea of the feeling of the time,
-touch, by way of allusion, and as materials for reasoning, upon some
-few facts; yet hardly enabling us to string together those facts into
-an historical series. A brief sketch of the general tendencies of
-this period is all that we can venture upon.
-
-  [953]
-                                           Delivered in
-  Demosthenes, Philippic ii.               B. C. 344-343
-      ——       De Halonneso, not genuine   B. C. 343-342
-      ——       De Falsâ Legatione              _ib._
-  Æschines,    De Falsâ Legatione              _ib._
-  Demosthenes, De Chersoneso               B. C. 342-341
-      ——       Philipp. iii.                   _ib._
-      ——       Philipp. iv.                B. C. 341-340
-      ——       ad Philipp. Epist.          B. C. 340-339
-
-Philip was the great aggressor of the age. The movement everywhere,
-in or near Greece, began with him, and with those parties in the
-various cities, who acted on his instigation and looked up to him for
-support. We hear of his direct intervention, or of the effects of
-his exciting suggestions, everywhere; in Peloponnesus, at Ambrakia
-and Leukas, in Eubœa, and in Thrace. The inhabitants of Megalopolis,
-Messênê, and Argos, were soliciting his presence in Peloponnesus, and
-his active coöperation against Sparta. Philip intimated a purpose
-of going there himself, and sent in the mean time soldiers and
-money, with a formal injunction to Sparta that she must renounce all
-pretension to Messênê.[954] He established a footing in Elis,[955]
-by furnishing troops to an oligarchical faction, and enabling them
-to become masters of the government, after a violent revolution.
-Connected probably with this intervention in Elis, was his capture
-of the three Eleian colonies, Pandosia, Bucheta, and Elateia, on
-the coast of the Epirotic Kassopia, near the Gulf of Ambrakia. He
-made over these three towns to his brother-in-law Alexander, whom
-he exalted to be prince of the Epirotic Molossians[956]—deposing
-the reigning prince Arrhybas. He farther attacked the two principal
-Grecian cities in that region, Ambrakia and Leukas; but here he
-appears to have failed.[957] Detachments of his troops showed
-themselves near Megara and Eretria, to the aid of philippizing
-parties in these cities and to the serious alarm of the Athenians.
-Philip established more firmly his dominion over Thessaly,
-distributing the country into four divisions, and planting a garrison
-in Pheræ, the city most disaffected to him.[958] We also read,
-that he again overran and subdued the Illyrian, Dardanian, and
-Pæonian tribes on his northern and western boundary; capturing many
-of their towns, and bringing back much spoil; and that he defeated
-the Thracian prince Kersobleptes, to the great satisfaction of the
-Greek cities on and near the Hellespont.[959] He is said farther
-to have redistributed the population of Macedonia, transferring
-inhabitants from one town to another according as he desired to favor
-or discourage residence—to the great misery and suffering of the
-families so removed.[960]
-
-  [954] Demosth. De Pace, p. 61; Philippic ii. p. 69.
-
-  [955] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 424; Pausan. iv. 28, 3.
-
-  [956] Justin, viii. 6. Diodorus states that Alexander did not
-  become prince until after the death of Arrhybas (xvi. 72).
-
-  [957] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 84; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p.
-  424-435; Philippic iii. p. 117-120; Philippic iv. p. 133.
-
-  As these enterprises of Philip against Ambrakia and Leukas are
-  not noticed in the second Philippic, but only in orations of
-  later date, we may perhaps presume that they did not take place
-  till after Olymp. 109, 1 = B. C. 344-343. But this is not a very
-  certain inference.
-
-  [958] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 368, 424, 436; Philipp. iii. 117,
-  118. iv. p. 133; De Coronâ, p. 324; Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso,
-  p. 84.
-
-  Compare Harpokration v. Δεκαδαρχία.
-
-  [959] Diodor. xvi. 69, 71.
-
-  [960] Justin, viii. 5, 6. “Reversus in regnum, ut pecora pastores
-  nunc in hybernos, nunc in æstivos saltus trajiciunt—sic ille
-  populos et urbes, ut illi vel replenda vel derelinquenda quæquæ
-  loca videbantur, ad libidinem suam transfert. Miseranda ubique
-  facies et similis excidio erat,” etc. Compare Livy, xl. 3, where
-  similar proceedings of Philip son of Demetrius (B. C. 182) are
-  described.
-
-Such was the exuberant activity of Philip, felt everywhere from the
-coasts of the Propontis to those of the Ionian sea and the Corinthian
-Gulf. Every year his power increased; while the cities of the Grecian
-world remained passive, uncombined, and without recognizing any
-one of their own number as leader. The philippizing factions were
-everywhere rising in arms or conspiring to seize the governments for
-their own account under Philip’s auspices; while those who clung
-to free and popular Hellenism were discouraged and thrown on the
-defensive.[961]
-
-  [961] See a striking passage in the fourth Philippic of
-  Demosthenes, p. 132.
-
-It was Philip’s policy to avoid or postpone any breach of peace with
-Athens; the only power under whom Grecian combination against him was
-practicable. But a politician like Demosthenes foresaw clearly enough
-the coming absorption of the Grecian world, Athens included, into the
-dominion of Macedonia, unless some means could be found of reviving
-among its members a spirit of vigorous and united defence. In or
-before the year 344 B. C., we find this orator again coming forward
-in the Athenian assembly, persuading his countrymen to send a mission
-into Peloponnesus, and going himself among the envoys.[962] He
-addressed both to the Messenians and Argeians emphatic remonstrances
-on their devotion to Philip; reminding them that from excessive fear
-and antipathy towards Sparta, they were betraying to him their own
-freedom, as well as that of all their Hellenic brethren.[963] Though
-heard with approbation, he does not flatter himself with having
-worked any practical change in their views.[964] But it appears
-that envoys reached Athens (in 344-343 B. C.), to whom some answer
-was required, and it is in suggesting that answer that Demosthenes
-delivers his second Philippic. He denounces Philip anew, as an
-aggressor stretching his power on every side, violating the peace
-with Athens, and preparing ruin for the Grecian world.[965] Without
-advising immediate war, he calls on the Athenians to keep watch and
-ward, and to organize defensive alliance among the Greeks generally.
-
-  [962] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 252.
-
-  [963] Demosth. Philipp. ii. p. 71, 72. Demosthenes himself
-  reports to the Athenian assembly (in 344-343 B. C.) what he had
-  said to the Messenians and Argeians.
-
-  [964] Demosth. Philipp. ii. p. 72.
-
-  [965] Demosth. Philipp. ii. p. 66-72. Who these envoys were, or
-  from whence they came, does not appear from the oration. Libanius
-  in his Argument says that they had come jointly from Philip, from
-  the Argeians, and from the Messenians. Dionysius Hal. (ad Ammæum,
-  p. 737) states that they came out of Peloponnesus.
-
-  I cannot bring myself to believe, on the authority of Libanius,
-  that there were any envoys present from Philip. The tenor of the
-  discourse appears to contradict that supposition.
-
-The activity of Athens, unfortunately, was shown in nothing but
-words; to set off against the vigorous deeds of Philip. But they
-were words of Demosthenes, the force of which was felt by Philip’s
-partisans in Greece, and occasioned such annoyance to Philip
-himself that he sent to Athens more than once envoys and letters of
-remonstrance. His envoy, an eloquent Byzantine named Python,[966]
-addressed the Athenian assembly with much success, complaining of
-the calumnies of the orators against Philip—asserting emphatically
-that Philip was animated with the best sentiments towards Athens,
-and desired only to have an opportunity of rendering service to
-her—and offering to review and amend the terms of the late peace.
-Such general assurances of friendship, given with eloquence and
-emphasis, produced considerable effect in the Athenian assembly, as
-they had done from the mouth of Æschines during the discussions on
-the peace. The proposal of Python was taken up by the Athenians, and
-two amendments were proposed. 1. Instead of the existing words of the
-peace—“that each party should have what they actually had”—it was
-moved to substitute this phrase—“That each party should have their
-own.”[967] 2. That not merely the allies of Athens and of Philip,
-but also all the other Greeks, should be included in the peace; That
-all of them should remain free and autonomous; That if any of them
-were attacked, the parties to the treaty on both sides would lend
-them armed assistance forthwith. 3. That Philip should be required to
-make restitution of those places, Doriskus, Serreium, etc., which he
-had captured from Kersobleptes after the day when peace was sworn at
-Athens.
-
-  [966] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81, 82. Winiewski (Comment
-  Histor. in Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 140) thinks that the embassy
-  of Python to Athens is the very embassy to which the second
-  Philippic of Demosthenes provides or introduces a reply. I agree
-  with Böhnecke in regarding this supposition as improbable.
-
-  [967] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81. Περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰρήνης,
-  ἢν ~ἔδοσαν ἡμῖν οἱ πρέσβεις οἱ παρ᾽ ἐκείνου πεμφθέντες
-  ἐπανορθώσασθαι, ὅτι ἐπηνωρθωσάμεθα~, ὃ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις
-  ὁμολογεῖται δίκαιον εἶναι, ~ἑκατέρους ἔχειν τὰ ἑαυτῶν~,
-  ἀμφισβητεῖ (Philip) μὴ δεδωκέναι, μηδὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις ταῦτ᾽
-  εἰρηκέναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, etc.
-
-  Compare Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 398.
-
-The first amendment appears to have been moved by a citizen named
-Hegesippus, a strenuous anti-philippizing politician, supporting
-the same views as Demosthenes. Python, with the other envoys of
-Philip, present in the assembly, either accepted these amendments,
-or at least did not protest against them. He partook of the
-public hospitality of the city as upon an understanding mutually
-settled.[968] Hegesippus with other Athenians was sent to Macedonia
-to procure the ratification of Philip; who admitted the justice of
-the second amendment, offered arbitration respecting the third, but
-refused to ratify the first—disavowing both the general proposition,
-and the subsequent acceptance of his envoys at Athens.[969] Moreover
-he displayed great harshness in the reception of Hegesippus and his
-colleagues; banishing from Macedonia the Athenian poet Xenokleides,
-for having shown hospitality towards them.[970] The original treaty,
-therefore, remained unaltered.
-
-  [968] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81. See Ulpian ad Demosth.
-  Fals. Leg. p. 364.
-
-  [969] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81, 84, 85. ἀμφισβητεῖ μὴ
-  δεδωκέναι (Philip contends that he never tendered the terms of
-  peace for amendment) μηδὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις ταῦτ᾽ εἰρηκέναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς
-  ... Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα (the second amendment) ὁμολογῶν ἐν τῇ
-  ἐπιστολῇ, ὡς ἀκούετε, δίκαιόν τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ δέχεσθαι, etc.
-
-  [970] Hegesippus was much denounced by the philippizing orators
-  at Athens (Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 364). His embassy to Philip
-  has been treated by some authors as enforcing a “grossly
-  sophistical construction of an article in the peace,” which
-  Philip justly resented. But in my judgment it was no construction
-  of the original treaty, nor was there any sophistry on the part
-  of Athens. It was an amended clause, presented by the Athenians
-  in place of the original. They never affirmed that the amended
-  clause meant the same thing as the clause prior to amendment. On
-  the contrary, they imply that the meaning is _not_ the same—and
-  it is on that ground that they submit the amended form of words.
-
-Hegesippus and his colleagues had gone to Macedonia, not simply to
-present for Philip’s acceptance the two amendments just indicated,
-but also to demand from him the restoration of the little island
-of Halonnesus (near Skiathos), which he had taken since the peace.
-Philip denied that the island belonged to the Athenians, or that they
-had any right to make such a demand; affirming that he had taken it,
-not from them, but from a pirate named Sostratus, who was endangering
-the navigation of the neighboring sea—and that it now belonged
-to him. If the Athenians disputed this, he offered to submit the
-question to arbitration; to _restore_ the island to Athens, should
-the arbitrators decide against him—or to _give_ it to her, even
-should they decide in his favor.[971]
-
-  [971] Compare Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 77, and the
-  Epistola Philippi, p. 162. The former says, ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ πρὸς
-  ἡμᾶς τοιούτους λόγους, ~ὅτε πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπρεσβεύσαμεν~, ὡς λῃστὰς
-  ἀφελόμενος ταύτην τὴν νῆσον κτήσαιτο, καὶ προσήκειν αὐτὴν ἑαυτοῦ
-  εἶναι.
-
-  Philip’s letter agrees as to the main facts.
-
-Since we know that Philip treated Hegesippus and the other envoys
-with peculiar harshness, it is probable that the diplomatic argument
-between them, about Halonnesus as well as about other matters, was
-conducted with angry feeling on both sides. Hence an island, in
-itself small and insignificant, became the subject of prolonged
-altercation for two or three years. When Hegesippus and Demosthenes
-maintained that Philip had wronged the Athenians about Halonnesus,
-and that it could only be received from him in restitution of
-rightful Athenian ownership, not as a gift _proprio motu_—Æschines
-and others treated the question with derision, as a controversy about
-syllables.[972] “Philip (they said) offers to give us Halonnesus. Let
-us take it, and set the question at rest. What need to care whether
-he _gives it_ to us, or _gives it back_ to us?” The comic writers
-made various jests on the same verbal distinction, as though it
-were a mere silly subtlety. But though party-orators and wits might
-here find a point to turn or a sarcasm to place, it is certain that
-well-conducted diplomacy, modern as well as ancient, has been always
-careful to note the distinction as important. The question here had
-no reference to capture during war, but during peace. No modern
-diplomatist will accept restitution of what has been unlawfully
-taken, if he is called upon to recognize it as gratuitous cession
-from the captor. The plea of Philip—that he had taken the island, not
-from Athens, but from the pirate Sostratus—was not a valid excuse,
-assuming that the island really belonged to Athens. If Sostratus had
-committed piratical damage, Philip ought to have applied to Athens
-for redress, which he evidently did not do. It was only in case of
-redress being refused, that he could be entitled to right himself by
-force; and even then, it may be doubted whether his taking of the
-island could give him any right to it against Athens. The Athenians
-refused his proposition of arbitration; partly because they were
-satisfied of their own right to the island—partly because they were
-jealous of admitting Philip to any recognized right of interference
-with their insular ascendency.[973]
-
-  [972] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 65. c. 30. περὶ συλλαβῶν
-  διαφερόμενος, etc.
-
-  [973] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 78-80.
-
-Halonnesus remained under garrison by Philip, forming one among many
-topics of angry communication by letters and by envoys, between
-him and Athens—until at length (seemingly about 341 B. C.) the
-inhabitants of the neighboring island of Peparêthus retook it and
-carried off his garrison. Upon this proceeding, Philip addressed
-several remonstrances, both to the Peparethians and to the Athenians.
-Obtaining no redress, he attacked Peparêthus and took severe revenge
-upon the inhabitants. The Athenians then ordered their admiral to
-make reprisals upon him, so that the war, though not yet actually
-declared, was approaching nearer and nearer towards renewal.[974]
-
-  [974] Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 162. The oration of
-  Pseudo-Demosthenes De Halonneso is a discourse addressed to the
-  people on one of these epistolary communications of Philip,
-  brought by some envoys who had also addressed the people _vivâ
-  voce_. The letter of Philip adverted to several other topics
-  besides, but that of Halonnesus came first.
-
-But it was not only in Halonnesus that Athens found herself beset by
-Philip and the philippizing factions. Even her own frontier on the
-side towards Bœotia now required constant watching, since the Thebans
-had been relieved from their Phokian enemies; so that she was obliged
-to keep garrisons of hoplites at Drymus and Panaktum.[975] In Megara
-an insurgent party under Perilaus had laid plans for seizing the city
-through the aid of a body of Philip’s troops, which could easily be
-sent from the Macedonian army now occupying Phokis, by sea to Pegæ,
-the Megarian post on the Krissæan Gulf. Apprized of this conspiracy,
-the Megarian government solicited aid from Athens. Phokion,
-conducting the Athenian hoplites to Megara with the utmost celerity,
-assured the safety of the city, and at the same time reëstablished
-the Long Walls to Nisæa, so as to render it always accessible to
-Athenians by sea.[976] In Eubœa, the cities of Oreus and Eretria
-fell into the hands of the philippizing leaders, and became hostile
-to Athens. In Oreus, the greater part of the citizens were persuaded
-to second the views of Philip’s chief adherent, Philistides; who
-prevailed on them to silence the remonstrances, and imprison the
-person, of the opposing leader Euphræus, as a disturber of the
-public peace. Philistides then, watching his opportunity, procured
-the introduction of a body of Macedonian troops, by means of whom
-he assured to himself the rule of the city as Philip’s instrument;
-while Euphræus, agonized with grief and alarm, slew himself in
-prison. At Eretria, Kleitarchus with others carried on the like
-conspiracy. Having expelled their principal opponents, and refused
-admission to Athenian envoys, they procured a thousand Macedonian
-troops under Hipponikus; they thus mastered Eretria itself, and
-destroyed the fortified seaport called Porthmus, in order to break
-the easy communication with Athens. Oreus and Eretria are represented
-by Demosthenes as suffering miserable oppression under these two
-despots, Philistides and Kleitarchus.[977] On the other hand,
-Chalkis, the chief city in Eubœa, appears to have been still free,
-and leaning to Athens rather than to Philip, under the predominant
-influence of a leading citizen named Kallias.
-
-  [975] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 446. I take these words to denote,
-  not any one particular outmarch to these places, but a standing
-  guard kept there, since the exposure of the northern frontier of
-  Attica after the peace. For the great importance of Panaktum, as
-  a frontier position between Athens and Thebes, see Thucydides, v.
-  35, 36, 39.
-
-  [976] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 368, 435, 446, 448; Philippic iv. p.
-  133; De Coronâ, p. 324; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.
-
-  [977] The general state of things, as here given, at Oreus and
-  Eretria, existed at the time when Demosthenes delivered his two
-  orations—the third Philippic and the oration on the Chersonese;
-  in the late spring and summer of 341 B. C.—De Chersoneso, p. 98,
-  99, 104; Philipp. iii. p. 112, 115, 125, 126.
-
-  ... δουλεύουσί γε μαστιγούμενοι καὶ στρεβλούμενοι (the people of
-  Eretria under Kleitarchus, p. 128).
-
-At this time, it appears, Philip was personally occupied with
-operations in Thrace; where he passed at least eleven months and
-probably more,[978] leaving the management of affairs in Eubœa to his
-commanders in Phokis and Thessaly. He was now seemingly preparing
-his schemes for mastering the important outlets from the Euxine into
-the Ægean—the Bosphorus and Hellespont—and the Greek cities on those
-coasts. Upon these straits depended the main supply of imported corn
-for Athens and a large part of the Grecian world; and hence the great
-value of the Athenian possession of the Chersonese.
-
-  [978] Demosth. De Chersoneso, p. 99.
-
-Respecting this peninsula, angry disputes now arose. To protect
-her settlers there established, Athens had sent Diopeithes with a
-body of mercenaries—unprovided with pay, however, and left to levy
-contributions where they could; while Philip had taken under his
-protection and garrisoned Kardia—a city situated within the peninsula
-near its isthmus, but ill-disposed to Athens, asserting independence,
-and admitted at the peace of 346 B. C., by Æschines and the Athenian
-envoys, as an ally of Philip to take part in the peace-oaths.[979]
-In conjunction with the Kardians, Philip had appropriated and
-distributed lands which the Athenian settlers affirmed to be theirs;
-and when they complained, he insisted that they should deal with
-Kardia as an independent city, by reference to arbitration.[980] This
-they refused, though their envoy Æschines had recognized Kardia as an
-independent ally of Philip when the peace was sworn.
-
-  [979] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p 677. De Fals. Leg. p. 396; De
-  Chersoneso, p. 104, 105.
-
-  [980] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 87.
-
-Here was a state of conflicting pretensions, out of which hostilities
-were sure to grow. The Macedonian troops overran the Chersonese,
-while Diopeithes on his side made excursions out of the peninsula,
-invading portions of Thrace subject to Philip; who sent letters of
-remonstrance to Athens.[981] While thus complaining at Athens, Philip
-was at the same time pushing his conquests in Thrace against the
-Thracian princes Kersobleptes, Teres, and Sitalkes,[982] upon whom
-the honorary grant of Athenian citizenship had been conferred.
-
-  [981] Demosth. De Chersoneso, p. 93; Pseudo-Demosth. De
-  Halonneso, p. 87; Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 161.
-
-  [982] Epistol. Philipp. _l. c._
-
-The complaints of Philip, and the speeches of his partisans at
-Athens, raised a strong feeling against Diopeithes at Athens, so that
-the people seemed disposed to recall and punish him. It is against
-this step that Demosthenes protests in his speech on the Chersonese.
-Both that speech, and his third Philippic were delivered in 341-340
-B. C.; seemingly in the last half of 341 B. C. In both, he resumes
-that energetic and uncompromising tone of hostility towards Philip,
-which had characterized the first Philippic and the Olynthiacs.
-He calls upon his countrymen not only to sustain Diopeithes, but
-also to renew the war vigorously against Philip in every other way.
-Philip (he says), while pretending in words to keep the peace, had
-long ago broken it by his acts, and by aggressions in numberless
-quarters. If Athens chose to imitate him by keeping the peace in
-name, let her do so; but at any rate, let her imitate him also by
-prosecuting a strenuous war in reality.[983] Chersonesus, the ancient
-possession of Athens, could be protected only by encouraging and
-reinforcing Diopeithes; Byzantium also was sure to become the next
-object of Philip’s attack, and ought to be preserved, as essential
-to the interests of Athens, though hitherto the Byzantines had been
-disaffected towards her. But even these interests, important as
-they were, must be viewed only as parts of a still more important
-whole. The Hellenic world altogether was in imminent danger;[984]
-overridden by Philip’s prodigious military force; torn in pieces
-by local factions leaning upon his support; and sinking every day
-into degradation more irrecoverable. There was no hope of rescue
-for the Hellenic name except from the energetic and well-directed
-military action of Athens. She must stand forth in all her might
-and resolution; her citizens must serve in person, pay direct taxes
-readily, and forego for the time their festival-fund; when they had
-thus shown themselves ready to bear the real pinch and hardship of
-the contest, then let them send round envoys to invoke the aid of
-other Greeks against the common enemy.[985]
-
-  [983] Philippic iii. p. 112.
-
-  [984] Philippic iii. p. 118, 119.
-
-  [985] Philippic iii. p. 129, 130.
-
-Such, in its general tone, is the striking harangue known as the
-third Philippic. It appears that the Athenians were now coming round
-more into harmony with Demosthenes than they had ever been before.
-They perceived,—what the orator had long ago pointed out,—that
-Philip went on pushing from one acquisition to another, and became
-only the more dangerous in proportion as others were quiescent. They
-were really alarmed for the safety of the two important positions
-of the Hellespont and Bosphorus. From this time to the battle of
-Chæroneia, the positive influence of Demosthenes in determining
-the proceedings of his countrymen, becomes very considerable. He
-had already been employed several times as envoy,—to Peloponnesus
-(344-343 B. C.), to Ambrakia, Leukas, Korkyra, the Illyrians,
-and Thessaly. He now moved, first a mission of envoys to Eubœa,
-where a plan of operations was probably concerted with Kallias
-and the Chalkidians,—and subsequently, the despatch of a military
-force to the same island, against Oreus and Eretria.[986] This
-expedition, commanded by Phokion, was successful. Oreus and Eretria
-were liberated; Kleitarchus and Philistides, with the Macedonian
-troops, were expelled from the island, though both in vain tried to
-propitiate Athens.[987] Kallias, also, with the Chalkidians of Eubœa,
-and the Megarians, contributed as auxiliaries to this success.[988]
-On his proposition, supported by Demosthenes, the attendance and
-tribute from deputies of the Euboic cities to the synod at Athens,
-were renounced; and in place of it was constituted an Euboic synod,
-sitting at Chalkis; independent of, yet allied with, Athens.[989]
-In this Euboic synod Kallias was the leading man; forward both
-as a partisan of Athens and as an enemy of Philip. He pushed his
-attack beyond the limits of Eubœa to the Gulf of Pagasæ, from whence
-probably came the Macedonian troops who had formed the garrison
-of Oreus under Philistides. He here captured several of the towns
-allied with or garrisoned by Philip; together with various Macedonian
-vessels, the crews of which he sold as slaves. For these successes
-the Athenians awarded to him a public vote of thanks.[990] He also
-employed himself (during the autumn and winter of 341-340 B. C.)
-in travelling as missionary throughout Peloponnesus, to organize a
-confederacy against Philip. In that mission he strenuously urged the
-cities to send deputies to a congress at Athens, in the ensuing month
-Anthesterion (February), 340 B. C. But though he made flattering
-announcement at Athens of concurrence and support promised to him,
-the projected congress came to nothing.[991]
-
-  [986] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 252.
-
-  [987] Diodor. xvi. 74.
-
-  [988] Stephanus Byz. v. Ὠρεός.
-
-  [989] Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 67, 68. Æschines greatly
-  stigmatizes Demosthenes for having deprived the Athenian synod of
-  these important members. But the Eubœan members certainly had not
-  been productive of any good to Athens by their attendance, real
-  or nominal, at her synod, for some years past. The formation of a
-  free Euboic synod probably afforded the best chance of ensuring
-  real harmony between the island and Athens.
-
-  Æschines gives here a long detail of allegations, about the
-  corrupt intrigues between Demosthenes and Kallias at Athens. Many
-  of these allegations are impossible to reconcile with what we
-  know of the course of history at the time. We must recollect that
-  Æschines makes the statement eleven years after the events.
-
-  [990] Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 159.
-
-  [991] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. _l. c._ Æschines here specifies the
-  month, but not the year. It appears to me that Anthesterion, 340
-  B. C. (Olymp. 109, 4) is the most likely date; though Böhnecke
-  and others place it a year earlier.
-
-While the important success in Eubœa relieved Athens from anxiety
-on that side, Demosthenes was sent as envoy to the Chersonese and
-to Byzantium. He would doubtless encourage Diopeithes, and may
-perhaps have carried to him some reinforcements. But his services
-were principally useful at Byzantium. That city had long been badly
-disposed towards Athens,—from recollections of the Social War, and
-from jealousy about the dues on corn-ships passing the Bosphorus;
-moreover, it had been for some time in alliance with Philip; who was
-now exerting all his efforts to prevail on the Byzantines to join
-him in active warfare against Athens. So effectively did Demosthenes
-employ his eloquence, at Byzantium, that he frustrated this purpose,
-overcame the unfriendly sentiment of the citizens, and brought them
-to see how much it concerned both their interest and their safety
-to combine with Athens in resisting the farther preponderance of
-Philip. The Byzantines, together with their allies and neighbors
-the Perinthians, contracted alliance with Athens. Demosthenes takes
-just pride in having achieved for his countrymen this success as
-a statesman and diplomatist, in spite of adverse probabilities.
-Had Philip been able to obtain the active coöperation of Byzantium
-and Perinthus, he would have become master of the corn-supply, and
-probably of the Hellespont also, so that war in those regions would
-have become almost impracticable for Athens.[992]
-
-  [992] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 254, 304, 308. βουλόμενος τῆς
-  σιτοπομπίας κύριος γενέσθαι (Philip), παρελθὼν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης
-  Βυζαντίους συμμάχους ὄντας αὑτῷ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠξίου συμπολεμεῖν
-  τὸν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πόλεμον, etc.
-
-  ἡ μὲν ἐμὴ πολίτεια ... ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἔχειν
-  Φίλιππον, λαβόντα Βυζάντιον, συμπολεμεῖν τοὺς Βυζαντίους μεθ᾽
-  ἡμῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν (ἐποίησεν) ... Τίς ὁ κωλύσας τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον
-  ἀλλοτριωθῆναι κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους; (p. 255.)
-
-  Compare Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 90.
-
-  That Demosthenes foresaw, several months earlier, the plans
-  of Philip upon Byzantium, is evident from the orations De
-  Chersoneso, p. 93-106, and Philippic iii. p. 115.
-
-As this unexpected revolution in the policy of Byzantium was
-eminently advantageous to Athens, so it was proportionally mortifying
-to Philip; who resented it so much, that he shortly afterwards
-commenced the siege of Perinthus by land and sea,[993] a little
-before midsummer 340 B. C. He brought up his fleet through the
-Hellespont into the Propontis, and protected it in its passage,
-against the attack of the Athenians in the Chersonese,[994] by
-causing his land-force to traverse and lay waste that peninsula.
-This was a violation of Athenian territory, adding one more to the
-already accumulated causes of war. At the same time, it appears
-that he now let loose his cruisers against the Athenian merchantmen,
-many of which he captured and appropriated. These captures, together
-with the incursions on the Chersonese, served as last additional
-provocations, working up the minds of the Athenians to a positive
-declaration of war.[995] Shortly after midsummer 340 B. C., at the
-beginning of the archonship of Theophrastus, they passed a formal
-decree[996] to remove the column on which the peace of 346 B. C.
-stood recorded, and to renew the war openly and explicitly against
-Philip. It seems probable that this was done while Demosthenes
-was still absent on his mission at the Hellespont and Bosphorus;
-for he expressly states that none of the decrees immediately
-bringing on hostilities were moved by him, but all of them by other
-citizens;[997] a statement which we may reasonably believe, since he
-would be rather proud than ashamed of such an initiative.
-
-  [993] Diodor. xvi. 74.
-
-  [994] Epistola Philippi ap. Demosth. p. 163.
-
-  [995] That these were the two last causes which immediately
-  preceded and determined the declaration of war, we may see by
-  Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 249—Καὶ μὴν τὴν εἰρήνην γ᾽ ἐκεῖνος
-  ἔλυσε τὰ πλοῖα λαβὼν, οὐχ ἡ πόλις, etc.
-
-  Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ φανερῶς ἤδη τὰ πλοῖα ἐσεσύλητο, Χεῤῥόνησος ἐπορθεῖτο,
-  ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐπορεύεθ᾽ ἄνθρωπος, οὐκέτ᾽ ἐν ἀμφισβητησίμῳ τὰ
-  πράγματα ἦν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνειστήκει πόλεμος, etc. (p. 274.)
-
-  [996] Philochorus, Frag. 135. ed. Didot; Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum,
-  p. 738-741; Diodorus, xvi. 77. The citation given by Dionysius
-  out of Philochorus is on one point not quite accurate. It states
-  that Demosthenes moved the decisive resolution for declaring war;
-  whereas Demosthenes himself tells us that none of the motions at
-  this juncture were made by him (De Coronâ, p. 250).
-
-  [997] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 250. It will be seen that I take
-  no notice of the two decrees of the Athenians, and the letter
-  of Philip, embodied in the oration De Coronâ, p. 249, 250,
-  251. I have already stated that all the documents which we
-  read as attached to this oration are so tainted either with
-  manifest error or with causes of doubt, that I cannot cite them
-  as authorities in this history, wherever they stand alone.
-  Accordingly, I take no account either of the supposed siege of
-  Selymbria, mentioned in Philip’s pretended letter, but mentioned
-  nowhere else—nor of the twenty Athenian ships captured by the
-  Macedonian admiral Amyntas, and afterwards restored by Philip on
-  the remonstrance of the Athenians, mentioned in the pretended
-  Athenian decree moved by Eubulus. Neither Demosthenes, nor
-  Philochorus, nor Diodorus, nor Justin, says anything about the
-  siege of Selymbria, though all of them allude to the attacks
-  on Byzantium and Perinthus. I do not believe that the siege of
-  Selymbria ever occurred. Moreover, Athenian vessels captured, but
-  afterwards restored by Philip on remonstrance from the Athenians,
-  can hardly have been the actual cause of war.
-
-  The pretended decrees and letter do not fit the passage of
-  Demosthenes to which they are attached.
-
-About the same time, as it would appear, Philip on his side,
-addressed a manifesto and declaration of war to the Athenians.
-In this paper he enumerated many wrongs done by them to him, and
-still remaining unredressed in spite of formal remonstrance; for
-which wrongs he announced his intention of taking a just revenge by
-open hostilities.[998] He adverted to the seizure, on Macedonian
-soil, of Nikias his herald carrying despatches; the Athenians (he
-alleged) had detained this herald as prisoner for ten months and
-had read the despatches publicly in their assembly. He complained
-that Athens had encouraged the inhabitants of Thasos, in harboring
-triremes from Byzantium and privateers from other quarters, to
-the annoyance of Macedonian commerce. He dwelt on the aggressive
-proceedings of Diopeithes in Thrace, and of Kallias in the Gulf of
-Pagasæ. He denounced the application made by Athens to the Persians
-for aid against him, as a departure from Hellenic patriotism, and
-from the Athenian maxims of aforetime. He alluded to the unbecoming
-intervention of Athens in defence of the Thracian princes Teres
-and Kersobleptes, neither of them among the sworn partners in the
-peace, against him; to the protection conferred by Athens on the
-inhabitants of Peparethus, whom he had punished for hostilities
-against his garrison in Halonnesus; to the danger incurred by his
-fleet in sailing up the Hellespont, from the hostilities of the
-Athenian settlers in the Chersonese, who had coöperated with his
-enemies the Byzantines, and had rendered it necessary for him to
-guard the ships by marching a land-force through the Chersonese. He
-vindicated his own proceedings in aiding his allies the inhabitants
-of Kardia, complaining that the Athenians had refused to submit their
-differences with that city to an equitable arbitration. He repelled
-the Athenian pretensions of right to Amphipolis, asserting his own
-better right to the place, on all grounds. He insisted especially
-on the offensive behavior of the Athenians, in refusing, when he
-had sent envoys conjointly with all his allies, to “conclude a just
-convention on behalf of the Greeks generally”—“Had you acceded to
-this proposition (he said), you might have placed out of danger all
-those who really suspected my purposes, or you might have exposed
-me publicly as the most worthless of men. It was to the interest of
-your people to accede, but not to the interest of your orators. To
-them—as those affirm who know your government best—peace is war,
-and war, peace; for they always make money at the expense of your
-generals, either as accusers or as defenders; moreover by reviling in
-the public assembly your leading citizens at home, and other men of
-eminence abroad, they acquire with the multitude credit for popular
-dispositions. It would be easy for me, by the most trifling presents,
-to silence their invectives and make them trumpet my praises. But
-I should be ashamed of appearing to purchase your good-will from
-_them_.[999]”
-
-  [998] Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 165. This Epistle of
-  Philip to the Athenians appears here inserted among the orations
-  of Demosthenes. Some critics reject it as spurious; but I
-  see no sufficient ground for such an opinion. Whether it be
-  the composition of Philip himself, or of some Greek employed
-  in Philip’s cabinet, is a point which we have no means of
-  determining.
-
-  The oration of Demosthenes which is said to be delivered in reply
-  to this letter of Philip (Orat. xi), is, in my judgment, wrongly
-  described. Not only it has no peculiar bearing on the points
-  contained in the letter—but it must also be two or three months
-  later in date, since it mentions the aid sent by the Persian
-  satraps to Perinthus, and the raising of the siege of that city
-  by Philip (p. 153).
-
-  [999] Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 159, 164; compare
-  Isokrates. Or. v. (Philip.) s. 82.
-
-It is of little moment to verify or appreciate the particular
-complaints here set forth, even if we had adequate information for
-the purpose. Under the feeling which had prevailed during the last
-two years between the Athenians and Philip, we cannot doubt that many
-detached acts of a hostile character had been committed on their
-side as well as on his. Philip’s allegation—that he had repeatedly
-proposed to them amicable adjustment of differences—whether true or
-not, is little to the purpose. It was greatly to his interest to keep
-Athens at peace and tranquil, while he established his ascendency
-everywhere else, and accumulated a power for ultimate employment
-such as she would be unable to resist. The Athenians had at length
-been made to feel, that farther acquiescence in these proceedings
-would only ensure to them the amount of favor tendered by Polyphemus
-to Odysseus—that they should be devoured last. But the lecture
-which he thinks fit to administer both to them and to their popular
-orators, is little better than insulting derision. It is strange to
-read encomiums on peace—as if it were indisputably advantageous to
-the Athenian public, and as if recommendations of war originated only
-with venal and calumnious orators for their own profit—pronounced by
-the greatest aggressor and conqueror of his age, whose whole life was
-passed in war and in the elaborate organization of great military
-force; and addressed to a people whose leading infirmity then was,
-an aversion almost unconquerable to the personal hardships and
-pecuniary sacrifices of effective war. This passage of the manifesto
-may probably be intended as a theme for Æschines and the other
-philippizing partisans in the Athenian assembly.
-
-War was now an avowed fact on both sides. At the instigation of
-Demosthenes and others, the Athenians decreed to equip a naval force,
-which was sent under Chares to the Hellespont and Propontis.
-
-Meanwhile Philip brought up to the siege of Perinthus an army of
-thirty thousand men, and a stock of engines and projectiles such
-as had never before been seen.[1000] His attack on this place was
-remarkable not only for great bravery and perseverance on both sides,
-but also for the extended scale of the military operations.[1001]
-Perinthus was strong and defensible; situated on a promontory
-terminating in abrupt cliffs southward towards the Propontis,
-unassailable from seaward, but sloping, though with a steep declivity
-towards the land, with which it was joined by an isthmus of not more
-than a furlong in breadth. Across this isthmus stretched the outer
-wall, behind which were seen the houses of the town, lofty, strongly
-built, and rising one above the other in terraces up the ascent of
-the promontory. Philip pressed the place with repeated assaults on
-the outer wall; battering it with rams, undermining it by sap, and
-rolling up movable towers said to be one hundred and twenty feet in
-height (higher even than the towers of the Perinthian wall), so as to
-chase away the defenders by missiles, and to attempt an assault by
-boarding-planks hand to hand. The Perinthians, defending themselves
-with energetic valor, repelled him for a long time from the outer
-wall. At length the besieging engines, with the reiterated attacks of
-Macedonian soldiers animated by Philip’s promises, overpowered this
-wall, and drove them back into the town. It was found, however, that
-the town itself supplied a new defensible position to its citizens.
-The lower range of houses, united by strong barricades across the
-streets, enabled the Perinthians still to hold out. In spite of
-all their efforts, however, the town would have shared the fate of
-Olynthus, had they not been sustained by effective foreign aid. Not
-only did their Byzantine kinsmen exhaust themselves to furnish every
-sort of assistance by sea, but also the Athenian fleet, and Persian
-satraps on the Asiatic side of the Propontis, coöperated. A body of
-Grecian mercenaries under Apollodorus, sent across from Asia by the
-Phrygian satrap Arsites, together with ample supplies of stores by
-sea, placed Perinthus in condition to defy the besiegers.[1002]
-
-  [1000] How much improvement Philip had made in engines for siege,
-  as a part of his general military organization—is attested in
-  a curious passage of a later author on mechanics. Athenæus, De
-  Machinis ap. Auctor. Mathem. Veter. p. 3, ed. Paris.—ἐπίδοσιν δὲ
-  ἔλαβεν ἡ τοαιύτη μηχανοποιΐα ἅπασα κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Διονυσίου τοῦ
-  Σικελιώτου τυραννίδα, κατά τε τὴν Φιλίππου τοῦ Ἀμύντου βασίλειαν,
-  ὅτε ἐπολιόρκει Βυζαντίους Φίλιππος. Εὐημέρει δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ τέχνῃ
-  Πολύειδος ὁ Θεσσαλὸς, οὗ οἱ μαθηταὶ συνεστρατεύοντο Ἀλεξάνδρῷ.
-
-  Respecting the engines employed by Dionysius of Syracuse, see
-  Diodor. xiv. 42, 48, 50.
-
-  [1001] Diodor. xvi. 74-76; Plutarch, Vit. Alexandri, c. 70; also
-  Laconic. Apophthegm. p. 215, and De Fortunâ Alexan. p. 339.
-
-  [1002] Demosth. ad Philip. Epistol. p. 153; Diodor. xvi. 75;
-  Pausanias, i. 29, 7.
-
-After a siege which can hardly have lasted less than three months,
-Philip found all his efforts against Perinthus baffled. He then
-changed his plan, withdrew a portion of his forces, and suddenly
-appeared before Byzantium. The walls were strong, but inadequately
-manned and prepared; much of the Byzantine force being in service
-at Perinthus. Among several vigorous attacks, Philip contrived to
-effect a surprise on a dark and stormy night, which was very near
-succeeding. The Byzantines defended themselves bravely, and even
-defeated his fleet; but they too were rescued chiefly by foreign aid.
-The Athenians—now acting under the inspirations of Demosthenes, who
-exhorted them to bury in a generous oblivion all their past grounds
-of offence against Byzantium—sent a still more powerful fleet to the
-rescue, under the vigorous guidance of Phokion[1003] instead of the
-loose and rapacious Chares. Moreover the danger of Byzantium called
-forth strenuous efforts from the chief islanders of the Ægean—Chians,
-Rhodians, Koans, etc., to whom it was highly important that Philip
-should not become master of the great passage for imported corn into
-the Grecian seas. The large combined fleet thus assembled was fully
-sufficient to protect Byzantium.[1004] Compelled to abandon the siege
-of that city as well as of Perinthus, Philip was farther baffled in
-an attack on the Chersonese. Phokion not only maintained against him
-the full security of the Propontis and its adjoining straits, but
-also gained various advantages over him both by land and sea.[1005]
-
-  [1003] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 14; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p.
-  848-851. To this fleet of Phokion, Demosthenes contributed the
-  outfit of a trireme, while the orator Hyperides sailed with
-  the fleet as trierarch. See Boeckh, Urkunden über das Attische
-  Seewesen, p. 441, 442, 498. From that source the obscure
-  chronology of the period now before us derives some light;
-  since it becomes certain that the expedition of Chares began
-  during the archonship of Nichomaclides; that is, in the year
-  _before_ Midsummer 340 B. C.; while the expedition of Phokion and
-  Kephisophon began in the year following—_after_ Midsummer 340 B. C.
-
-  See some anecdotes respecting this siege of Byzantium by Philip,
-  collected from later authors (Dionysius Byzantinus, Hesychius
-  Milesius, and others) by the diligence of Böhnecke—Forschungen,
-  p. 470 _seqq._
-
-  [1004] Diodor. xvi. 77: Plutarch, Demosthen. c. 17.
-
-  [1005] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 14.
-
-These operations probably occupied the last six months of 340 B. C.
-They constituted the most important success gained by Athens, and the
-most serious reverse experienced by Philip, since the commencement of
-war between them. Coming as they did immediately after the liberation
-of Eubœa in the previous year, they materially improved the position
-of Athens against Philip. Phokion and his fleet not only saved the
-citizens of Byzantium from all the misery of a capture by Macedonian
-soldiers, but checked privateering, and protected the trade-ships
-so efficaciously, that corn became unusually abundant and cheap both
-at Athens and throughout Greece:[1006] and Demosthenes, as statesman
-and diplomatist, enjoyed the credit of having converted Eubœa into
-a friendly and covering neighbor for Athens, instead of being a
-shelter for Philip’s marauding cruisers—as well as of bringing round
-Byzantium from the Macedonian alliance to that of Athens, and thus
-preventing both the Hellespont and the corn-trade from passing into
-Philip’s hands.[1007] The warmest votes of thanks, together with
-wreaths in token of gratitude, were decreed to Athens by the public
-assemblies of Byzantium, Perinthus, and the various towns of the
-Chersonese;[1008] while the Athenian public assembly also decreed
-and publicly proclaimed a similar vote of thanks and admiration to
-Demosthenes. The decree, moved by Aristonikus, was so unanimously
-popular at the time, that neither Æschines nor any of the other
-enemies of Demosthenes thought it safe to impeach the mover.[1009]
-
-  [1006] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 255; Plutarch, De Glor. Athen. p.
-  350.
-
-  [1007] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 305, 306, 307: comp. p. 253. μετὰ
-  ταῦτα δὲ τοὺς ἀποστόλους πάντας ἀπέστειλα, καθ᾽ οὓς Χεῤῥόνησος
-  ἐσώθη, καὶ Βυζάντιον καὶ πάντες οἱ σύμμαχοι, etc.
-
-  [1008] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 255, 257. That these votes of
-  thanks were passed, is authenticated by the words of the oration
-  itself. Documents are inserted in the oration, purporting to be
-  the decree of the Byzantines and Perinthians, and that of the
-  Chersonesite cities. I do not venture to cite these as genuine,
-  considering how many of the other documents annexed to this
-  oration are decidedly spurious.
-
-  [1009] Demosth. p. 253. Aristonikus is again mentioned, p.
-  302. A document appears, p. 253, purporting to be the vote
-  of the Athenians to thank and crown Demosthenes, proposed by
-  Aristonikus. The name of the Athenian archon is wrong, as in all
-  the other documents embodied in this oration, where the name of
-  an Athenian archon appears.
-
-In the recent military operations, on so large a scale, against
-Byzantium and Perinthus, Philip had found himself in conflict not
-merely with Athens, but also with Chians, Rhodians and others; an
-unusually large muster of confederate Greeks. To break up this
-confederacy, he found it convenient to propose peace, and to abandon
-his designs against Byzantium and Perinthus—the point on which
-the alarm of the confederates chiefly turned. By withdrawing his
-forces from the Propontis, he was enabled to conclude peace with
-the Byzantines and most of the maritime Greeks who had joined in
-relieving them. The combination against him was thus dissolved,
-though with Athens[1010] and her more intimate allies his naval war
-still continued. While he multiplied cruisers and privateers to make
-up by prizes his heavy outlay during the late sieges, he undertook
-with his land-force an enterprize, during the spring of 339 B. C.,
-against the Scythian king Atheas; whose country, between Mount Hæmus
-and the Danube, he invaded with success, bringing away as spoil a
-multitude of youthful slaves of both sexes, as well as cattle. On
-his return however across Mount Hæmus, he was attacked on a sudden
-by the Thracian tribe Triballi, and sustained a defeat; losing all
-his accompanying captives, and being badly wounded through the
-thigh.[1011] This expedition and its consequences occupied Philip
-during the spring and summer of 339 B. C.
-
-  [1010] Diodorus (xvi. 77) mentions this peace; stating that
-  Philip raised the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus, and made
-  peace πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους.
-
-  Wesseling (ad loc.) and Weiske (De Hyperbolê, ii. p. 41) both
-  doubt the reality of this peace. Neither Böhnecke nor Winiewski
-  recognize it. Mr. Clinton admits it in a note to his Appendix 16.
-  p. 292; though he does not insert it in his column of events in
-  the tables.
-
-  I perfectly concur with these authors in dissenting from
-  Diodorus, so far as _Athens_ is concerned. The supposition that
-  peace was concluded between Philip and Athens at this time is
-  distinctly negatived by the language of Demosthenes (De Coronâ,
-  p. 275, 276); indirectly also by Æschines. Both from Demosthenes
-  and from Philochorus it appeals sufficiently clear, in my
-  judgment, that the war between Philip and the Athenians went on
-  without interruption from the summer of 340 B. C., to the battle
-  of Chæroneia, in August 338.
-
-  But I see no reason for disbelieving Diodorus, in so far as he
-  states that Philip made peace with the other Greeks—Byzantines,
-  Perinthians, Chians, Rhodians, etc.
-
-  [1011] Justin, ix. 2, 3. Æschines alludes to this expedition
-  against the Scythians during the spring of the archon
-  Theophrastus, or 339 B. C. (Æschin. cont. Ktesiph. p. 71).
-
-Meanwhile the naval war of Athens against Philip was more effectively
-carried on, and her marine better organized, than ever it had been
-before. This was chiefly owing to an important reform proposed and
-carried by Demosthenes, immediately on the declaration of war against
-Philip in the summer of 340 B. C. Enjoying as he did, now after long
-public experience, the increased confidence of his fellow-citizens,
-and being named superintendent of the navy,[1012] he employed his
-influence not only in procuring energetic interference both as to
-Eubœa and Byzantium, but also in correcting deep-seated abuses which
-nullified the efficiency of the Athenian marine department.
-
-  [1012] Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 85. c. 80. ἐπιστάτης τοῦ
-  ναυτικοῦ.
-
-The law of Periander (adopted in 357 B. C.) had distributed the
-burthen of the trierarchy among the twelve hundred richest citizens
-on the taxable property-schedule, arranged in twenty fractions called
-Symmories, of sixty persons each. Among these men, the three hundred
-richest, standing distinguished, as leaders of the Symmories, were
-invested with the direction and enforcement of all that concerned
-their collective agency and duties. The purpose of this law had
-been to transfer the cost of trierarchy—a sum of about forty, fifty
-or sixty minæ for each trireme, defraying more or less of the
-outfit—which had originally been borne by a single rich man as his
-turn came round, and afterwards by two rich men in conjunction—to
-a partnership more or less numerous, consisting of five, six, or
-even fifteen or sixteen members of the same symmory. The number of
-such partners varied according to the number of triremes required
-by the state to be fitted out in any one year. If only few triremes
-were required, sixteen contributors might be allotted to defray
-collectively the trierarchic cost of each: if on the other hand many
-triremes were needed, a less number of partners, perhaps no more
-than five or six, could be allotted to each—since the total number
-of citizens whose turn it was to be assessed in that particular year
-was fixed. The assessment upon each partner was of course heavier,
-in proportion as the number of partners assigned to a trireme was
-smaller. Each member of the partnership, whether it consisted of
-five, of six, or of sixteen, contributed in equal proportion towards
-the cost.[1013] The richer members of the partnership thus paid no
-greater sum than the poorer; and sometimes even evaded any payment
-of their own, by contracting with some one to discharge the duties
-of the post, on condition of a total sum not greater than that which
-they had themselves collected from these poorer members.
-
-  [1013] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 260-262. ἦν γὰρ αὐτοῖς (τοῖς
-  ἡγεμόσι τῶν συμμοριῶν) ἐκ μὲν τῶν προτέρων νόμων συνεκκαίδεκα
-  λειτουργεῖν—αὐτοῖς μὲν μικρὰ καὶ οὐδὲν ἀναλίσκουσιν, τοὺς δ᾽
-  ἀπόρους τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπιτρίβουσιν ... ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ νόμου τὸ
-  γιγνόμενον κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἕκαστον τιθέναι· καὶ δυοῖν ἐφάνη
-  τριήραρχος ὁ τῆς μιᾶς ἕκτος καὶ δέκατος πρότερον συντελής· οὐδὲ
-  γὰρ τριηράρχους ἔτι ὠνόμαζον ἑαυτοὺς, ἀλλὰ συντελεῖς.
-
-  The trierarchy, and the trierarchic symmories, at Athens, are
-  subjects not perfectly known; the best expositions respecting
-  them are to be found in Boeckh’s Public Economy of Athens (b. iv.
-  ch. 11-13), and in his other work, Urkunden über das Attische
-  Seewesen (ch. xi. xii. xiii.); besides Parreidt, De Symmoriis,
-  part ii. p. 22, seq.
-
-  The fragment of Hyperides (cited by Harpokration v. Συμμορία)
-  alluding to the trierarchic reform of Demosthenes, though briefly
-  and obscurely, is an interesting confirmation of the oration De
-  Coronâ.
-
-According to Demosthenes, the poorer members of these trierarchic
-symmories were sometimes pressed down almost to ruin by the sums
-demanded; so that they complained bitterly, and even planted
-themselves in the characteristic attitude of suppliants at Munychia
-or elsewhere in the city. When their liabilities to the state were
-not furnished in time, they became subject to imprisonment by the
-officers superintending the outfit of the armament In addition to
-such private hardship, there arose great public mischief from the
-money not being at once forthcoming; the armament being delayed in
-its departure, and forced to leave Peiræus either in bad condition or
-without its full numbers. Hence arose in great part, the ill-success
-of Athens in her maritime enterprises against Philip, before the
-peace of 346 B. C.[1014]
-
-  [1014] There is a point in the earlier oration of Demosthenes
-  De Symmoriis, illustrating the grievance which he now reformed.
-  That grievance consisted, for one main portion, in the fact,
-  that the richest citizen in a trierarchic partnership paid a
-  sum no greater (sometimes even less) than the poorest. Now it
-  is remarkable that this unfair apportionment of charge might
-  have occurred, and is noway guarded against, in the symmories as
-  proposed by Demosthenes himself. His symmories, each comprising
-  sixty persons or one-twentieth of the total active twelve
-  hundred, are directed to divide themselves into five fractions
-  of twelve persons each, or a hundredth of the twelve hundred.
-  Each group of twelve is to comprise the richest alongside of
-  the poorest members of the sixty (ἀνταναπληροῦντας πρὸς τὸν
-  εὐπορώτατον ἀεὶ τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους, p. 182), so that each group
-  would contain individuals very unequal in wealth, though the
-  aggregate wealth of one group would be nearly equal to that of
-  another. These twelve persons were to defray collectively the
-  cost of trierarchy for one ship, two ships, or three ships,
-  according to the number of ships which the state might require
-  (p. 183). But Demosthenes nowhere points out in what proportions
-  they were to share the expense among them; whether the richest
-  citizens among the twelve were to pay only an equal sum with
-  the poorest, or a sum greater in proportion to their wealth.
-  There is nothing in his project to prevent the richer members
-  from insisting that all should pay equally. This is the very
-  abuse that he denounced afterwards (in 340 B. C.), as actually
-  realized—and corrected by a new law. The oration of Demosthenes
-  De Symmoriis, omitting as it does all positive determination as
-  to proportions of payment, helps us to understand how the abuse
-  grew up.
-
-The same influences, which had led originally to the introduction of
-such abuses, stood opposed to the orator in his attempted amendment.
-The body of Three Hundred, the richest men in the state—the leader
-or richest individual in each symmory, with those who stood second
-or third in order of wealth—employed every effort to throw out
-the proposition, and tendered large bribes to Demosthenes (if we
-may credit his assertion) as inducements for dropping it. He was
-impeached moreover under the Graphê Paranomon, as mover of an
-unconstitutional or illegal decree. It required no small share of
-firmness and public spirit, combined with approved eloquence and an
-established name, to enable Demosthenes to contend against these
-mighty enemies.
-
-His new law caused the charge of trierarchy to be levied upon all
-the members of the symmories, or upon all above a certain minimum of
-property, in proportion to their rated property; but it seems, if we
-rightly make out, to have somewhat heightened the minimum, so that
-the aggregate number of persons chargeable was diminished.[1015]
-Every citizen rated at ten talents was assessed singly for the
-charge of trierarchy belonging to one trireme; if rated at twenty
-talents, for the trierarchy of two; at thirty talents, for the
-trierarchy of three; if above thirty talents, for that of three
-triremes and a service boat—which was held to be the maximum
-payable by any single individual. Citizens rated at less than ten
-talents, were grouped together into ratings of ten talents in the
-aggregate, in order to bear collectively the trierarchy of one of a
-trireme; the contributions furnished by each person in the group
-being proportional to the sum for which he stood rated. This new
-proposition, while materially relieving the poorer citizens, made
-large addition to the assessments of the rich. A man rated at twenty
-talents, who had before been chargeable for only the sixteenth part
-of the expense of one trierarchy, along with partners much poorer
-than himself but equally assessed—now became chargeable with the
-entire expense of two trierarchies. All persons liable were assessed
-in fair proportion to the sum for which they stood rated in the
-schedule. When the impeachment against Demosthenes came to be tried
-before the Dikastery, he was acquitted by more than four-fifths
-of the Dikasts; so that the accuser was compelled to pay the
-established fine. And so animated was the temper of the public at
-that moment, in favor of vigorous measures for prosecuting the war
-just declared, that they went heartily along with him, and adopted
-the main features of his trierarchic reform. The resistance from
-the rich, however, though insufficient to throw out the measure,
-constrained him to modify it more than once, during the progress of
-the discussion;[1016] partly in consequence of the opposition of
-Æschines, whom he accuses of having been hired by the rich for the
-purpose.[1017] It is deeply to be regretted that the speeches of
-both of them—especially those of Demosthenes, which must have been
-numerous—have not been preserved.
-
-  [1015] Æschines (adv. Ktesiph. p. 86) charges Demosthenes with
-  “having stolen away from the city the trierarchs of sixty-five
-  swift sailing vessels.” This implies, I imagine, that the new law
-  diminished the total number of persons chargeable with trierarchy.
-
-  [1016] Deinarchus adv. Demosthen. p. 95. s. 43. Εἰσί τινες ἐν
-  τῷ δικαστηρίῳ τῶν ἐν τοῖς τριακοσίοις γεγενημένων, ὅθ᾽ οὗτος
-  (Demosthenes) ἐτίθει τὸν περὶ τῶν τριηράρχων νόμον. Οὐ φράσετε
-  τοῖς πλησίον ὅτι τρία τάλαντα λαβὼν μετέγραφε καὶ μετεσκεύαζε τὸν
-  νόμον καθ᾽ ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίαν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπώλει ὦν εἰλήφει τὴν
-  τιμὴν, τὰ δ᾽ ἀποδόμενος οὐκ ἐβεβαίου;
-
-  Without accepting this assertion of a hostile speaker, so far
-  as it goes to accuse Demosthenes of having accepted bribes—we
-  may safely accept it, so far as it affirms that he made several
-  changes and modifications in the law before it finally passed; a
-  fact not at all surprising, considering the intense opposition
-  which it called forth.
-
-  Some of the Dikasts, before whom Deinarchus was pleading, had
-  been included among the Three Hundred (that is, the richest
-  citizens in the State) when Demosthenes proposed his trierarchic
-  reform. This will show, among various other proofs which might
-  be produced, that the Athenian Dikasts did not always belong to
-  the poorest class of citizens, as the jests of Aristophanes would
-  lead us to believe.
-
-  [1017] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 329. Boeckh (Attisch. Seewesen,
-  p. 183, and Publ. Econ. Ath. iv. 14) thinks that this
-  passage—διτάλαντον δ᾽ εἶχες ἔρανον δωρεὰν παρὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων
-  τῶν συμμοριῶν, ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἐλυμῄνω τὸν τριηραρχικὸν νόμον—must
-  allude to injury done by Æschines to the law in later years,
-  after it became a law. But I am unable to see the reason for so
-  restricting its meaning. The rich men would surely bribe most
-  highly, and raise most opposition, against the first passing of
-  the law, as they were then most likely to be successful; and
-  Æschines, whether bribed or not bribed, would most naturally as
-  well as most effectively stand out against the novelty introduced
-  by his rival, without waiting to see it actually become a part of
-  the laws of the State.
-
-Thus were the trierarchic symmories distributed and assessed anew
-upon each man in the ratio of his wealth, and therefore most largely
-upon the Three Hundred richest.[1018] How long the law remained
-unchanged, we do not know. But it was found to work admirably well;
-and Demosthenes boasts that during the entire war (that is, from
-the renewal of the war about August 340 B. C., to the battle of
-Chæroneia in August 338 B. C.) all the trierarchs named under the law
-were ready in time without complaint or suffering; while the ships,
-well-equipped and exempt from the previous causes of delay, were
-found prompt and effective for all exigencies. Not one was either
-left behind, or lost at sea, throughout these two years.[1019]
-
-  [1018] See the citation from Hyperides in Harpokrat. v. Συμμορία.
-  The Symmories are mentioned in Inscription xiv. of Boeckh’s
-  Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen (p. 465), which Inscription
-  bears the date of 325 B. C. Many of these Inscriptions name
-  individual citizens, in different numbers three, five, or six, as
-  joint trierarchs of the same vessel.
-
-  [1019] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 262.
-
-Probably the first fruits of the Demosthenic reform in Athenian naval
-administration, was, the fleet equipped under Phokion, which acted
-so successfully at and near Byzantium. The operations of Athenians
-at sea, though not known in detail, appear to have been better
-conducted and more prosperous in their general effect than they had
-ever been since the Social War. But there arose now a grave and
-melancholy dispute in the interior of Greece, which threw her upon
-her defence by land. This new disturbing cause was nothing less than
-another Sacred War, declared by the Amphiktyonic assembly against
-the Lokrians of Amphissa. Kindled chiefly by the Athenian Æschines,
-it more than compensated Philip for his repulse at Byzantium and
-his defeat by the Triballi; bringing, like the former Sacred War,
-aggrandizement to him alone, and ruin to Grecian liberty.
-
-I have recounted, in the fourth volume of this work,[1020] the first
-Sacred War recorded in Grecian history (590-580 B. C.), about two
-centuries before the birth of Æschines and Demosthenes. That war
-had been undertaken by the Amphiktyonic Greeks to punish, and ended
-by destroying, the flourishing seaport of Kirrha, situated near
-the mouth of the river Pleistus, on the coast of the fertile plain
-stretching from the southern declivity of Delphi to the sea. Kirrha
-was originally the port of Delphi; and of the ancient Phokian town
-of Krissa, to which Delphi was once an annexed sanctuary.[1021] But
-in process of time Kirrha increased at the expense of both; through
-profits accumulated from the innumerable visitors by sea who landed
-there as the nearest access to the temple. The prosperous Kirrhæans,
-inspiring jealousy at Delphi and Krissa, were accused of extortion
-in the tolls levied from visitors, as well as of other guilty or
-offensive proceedings. An Amphiktyonic war, wherein the Athenian
-Solon stood prominently forward, being declared against them,
-Kirrha was taken and destroyed. Its fertile plain was consecrated
-to the Delphian god, under an oath taken by all the Amphiktyonic
-members, with solemn pledges and formidable imprecations against
-all disturbers. The entire space between the temple and the sea now
-became, as the oracle had required, sacred property of the god; that
-is, incapable of being tilled, planted, or occupied in any permanent
-way, by man, and devoted only to spontaneous herbage with pasturing
-animals.
-
-  [1020] Chap. xxviii. p. 62 _seqq._
-
-  [1021] For the topography of the country round Delphi, see
-  the instructive work of Ulrichs, Reisen und Forschungen in
-  Griechenland (Bremen, 1840) chapters i. and ii. about Kirrha and
-  Krissa.
-
-But though the Delphians thus procured the extirpation of their
-troublesome neighbors at Kirrha, it was indispensable that on or
-near the same spot there should exist a town and port, for the
-accommodation of the guests who came from all quarters to Delphi;
-the more so, as such persons, not merely visitors, but also traders
-with goods to sell, now came in greater multitudes than ever, from
-the increased attractions imparted out of the rich spoils of Kirrha
-itself, to the Pythian festival. How this want was at first supplied,
-while the remembrance of the oath was yet fresh, we are not informed.
-But in process of time Kirrha became reoccupied and refortified by
-the western neighbors of Delphi—the Lokrians of Amphissa—on whose
-borders it stood, and for whom probably it served as a port not less
-than for Delphi. These new occupants received the guests coming to
-the temple, enriched themselves by the accompanying profit and took
-into cultivation a certain portion of the plain around the town.[1022]
-
-  [1022] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69; compare Livy, xlii. 5;
-  Pausanias, x. 37, 4. The distance from Delphi to Kirrha is given
-  by Pausanias at sixty stadia, or about seven English miles: by
-  Strabo at eighty stadia.
-
-At what period the occupation by the Lokrians had its origin, we
-are unable to say. So much however we make out—not merely from
-Demosthenes, but even from Æschines—that in their time it was an
-ancient and established occupation—not a recent intrusion or novelty.
-The town was fortified; the space immediately adjacent being tilled
-and claimed by the Lokrians as their own.[1023] This indeed was
-a departure from the oath, sworn by Solon with his Amphiktyonic
-contemporaries, to consecrate Kirrha and its lands to the Delphian
-god. But if that oath had been literally carried out, the god
-himself, and the Delphians among whom he dwelt, would have been the
-principal losers; because the want of a convenient port would have
-been a serious discouragement, if not a positive barrier, against
-the arrival of visitors, most of whom came by sea. Accordingly the
-renovation of the town and port of Kirrha, doubtless on a modest
-scale, together with a space of adjacent land for tillage, was at
-least tolerated, if not encouraged. Much of the plain, indeed, still
-remained unfilled and unplanted, as the property of Apollo; the
-boundaries being perhaps not accurately drawn.
-
-  [1023] Æschines, _l. c._; Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 277. τὴν
-  χώραν ἣν οἱ μὲν Ἀμφισσεῖς σφῶν αὐτῶν γεωργεῖν ἔφασαν, οὗτος δὲ
-  (Æschines) τῆς ἱερᾶς χώρας ᾐτιᾶτο εἶναι, etc.
-
-While the Lokrians had thus been serviceable to the Delphian
-temple by occupying Kirrha, they had been still more valuable as
-its foremost auxiliaries and protectors against the Phokians,
-their enemies of long standing.[1024] One of the first objects of
-Philomelus the Phokian, after defeating the Lokrian armed force, was
-to fortify the sacred precinct of Delphi on its western side, against
-their attacks;[1025] and we cannot doubt that their position in close
-neighborhood to Delphi must have been one of positive suffering as
-well as of danger, during the years when the Phokian leaders, with
-their numerous mercenary bands, remained in victorious occupation of
-the temple, and probably of the harbor of Kirrha also. The subsequent
-turn of fortune,—when Philip crushed the Phokians and when the
-Amphiktyonic assembly was reorganized, with him as its chief,—must
-have found the Amphissian Lokrians among the warmest allies and
-sympathizers. Resuming possession of Kirrha, they may perhaps have
-been emboldened, in such a moment of triumphant reaction, to enlarge
-their occupancy round the walls to a greater extent than they had
-done before. Moreover they were animated with feelings attached to
-Thebes; and were hostile to Athens, as the ally and upholder of their
-enemies the Phokians.
-
-  [1024] Diodor. xvi. 24; Thucyd. iii. 101.
-
-  [1025] Diodor. xvi. 25.
-
-Matters were in this condition when the spring meeting of the
-Amphiktyonic assembly (February or March 339 B. C.) was held at
-Delphi. Diognetus was named by the Athenians to attend it as
-Hieromnemon, or chief legate; with three Pylagoræ or vice-legates,
-Æschines, Meidias, and Thrasykles.[1026] We need hardly believe
-Demosthenes, when he states that the name of Æschines was put up
-without foreknowledge on the part of any one; and that though it
-passed, yet not more than two or three hands were held up in his
-favor.[1027] Soon after they reached Delphi, Diognetus was seized
-with a fever, so that the task of speaking in the Amphiktyonic
-assembly was confided to Æschines.
-
-  [1026] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69.
-
-  [1027] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277.
-
-There stood in the Delphian temple some golden or gilt shields
-dedicated as an offering out of the spoils taken at the battle of
-Platæa, a century and a half before,—with an inscription to this
-effect,—“Dedicated by the Athenians, out of the spoils of Persians
-and Thebans engaged in joint battle against the Greeks.” It appears
-that these shields had recently been set up afresh (having been
-perhaps stript of their gilding by the Phokian plunderers), in a
-new cell or chapel, without the full customary forms of prayer or
-solemnities;[1028] which perhaps might be supposed unnecessary,
-as the offering was not now dedicated for the first time. The
-inscription, little noticed and perhaps obscured by the lapse of
-time on the original shields, would now stand forth brightly and
-conspicuously on the new gilding; reviving historical recollections
-highly offensive to the Thebans,[1029] and to the Amphissian Lokrians
-as friends of Thebes. These latter not only remonstrated against it
-in the Amphiktyonic assembly, but were even preparing (if we are
-to believe Æschines), to accuse Athens of impiety; and to invoke
-against her a fine of fifty talents, for omission of the religious
-solemnities.[1030] But this is denied by Demosthenes;[1031] who
-states that the Lokrians could not bring any such accusation against
-Athens without sending a formal summons,—which they had never sent.
-Demosthenes would be doubtless right as to the regular form, probably
-also as to the actual fact; though Æschines accuses him of having
-received bribes[1032] to defend the iniquities of the Lokrians.
-Whether the Lokrians went so far as to invoke a penalty, or not,—at
-any rate they spoke in terms of complaint against the proceeding.
-Such complaint was not without real foundation; since it was better
-for the common safety of Hellenic liberty against the Macedonian
-aggressor, that the treason of Thebes at the battle of Platæa should
-stand as a matter of past antiquity, rather than be republished in a
-new edition. But this was not the ground taken by the complainants,
-nor could they directly impeach the right of Athens to burnish up her
-old donatives. Accordingly they assailed the act on the allegation
-of impiety, as not having been preceded by the proper religious
-solemnities; whereby they obtained the opportunity of inveighing
-against Athens, as ally of the Phokians in their recent sacrilege,
-and enemy of Thebes the steadfast champion of the god.
-
-  [1028] This must have been an ἀποκατάστασις τῶν ἀναθημάτων
-  (compare Plutarch, Demetrius, c. 13), requiring to be preceded by
-  solemn ceremonies, sometimes specially directed by the oracle.
-
-  [1029] How painfully the Thebans of the Demosthenic age felt the
-  recollection of the alliance of their ancestors with the Persians
-  at Platæa, we may read in Demosthenes, De Symmoriis, p. 187.
-
-  It appears that the Thebans also had erected a new chapel at
-  Delphi (after 346 B. C.) out of the spoils acquired from the
-  conquered Phokians—ὁ ἀπὸ Φωκέων ναὸς, ὃν ἱδρύσαντο Θηβαῖοι
-  (Diodor. xvii. 10).
-
-  [1030] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 70. The words of his speech
-  do not however give either a full or a clear account of the
-  transaction; which I have endeavored, as well as I can, to supply
-  in the text.
-
-  [1031] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277.
-
-  [1032] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69.
-
-“The Amphiktyons being assembled (I here give the main recital,
-though not the exact words, of Æschines), a friendly person came to
-acquaint us that the Amphissians were bringing on their accusation
-against Athens. My sick colleagues requested me immediately to enter
-the assembly and undertake her defence. I made haste to comply, and
-was just beginning to speak, when an Amphissian,—of extreme rudeness
-and brutality,—perhaps even under the influence of some misguiding
-divine impulse,—interrupted me and exclaimed,—‘Do not hear him,
-men of Hellas! Do not permit the name of the Athenian people to be
-pronounced among you at this holy season! Turn them out of the sacred
-ground, like men under a curse.’ With that he denounced us for our
-alliance with the Phokians, and poured out many other outrageous
-invectives against the city.
-
-“To me (continues Æschines) all this was intolerable to hear; I
-cannot even now think on it with calmness—and at the moment, I was
-provoked to anger such as I had never felt in my life before. The
-thought crossed me that I would retort upon the Amphissians for their
-impious invasion of the Kirrhæan land. That plain, lying immediately
-below the sacred precinct in which we were assembled, was visible
-throughout. ‘You see, Amphiktyons (said I), that plain cultivated
-by the Amphissians, with buildings erected in it for farming and
-pottery! You have before your eyes the harbor, consecrated by the
-oath of your forefathers, now occupied and fortified. You know
-of yourselves, without needing witnesses to tell you, that these
-Amphissians have levied tolls and are taking profit out of the
-sacred harbor!’ I then caused to be read publicly the ancient
-oracle, the oath, and the imprecations (pronounced after the first
-Sacred War, wherein Kirrha was destroyed). Then continuing, I
-said—‘Here am I, ready to defend the god and the sacred property,
-according to the oath of our forefathers, with hand, foot, voice,
-and all the powers that I possess. I stand prepared to clear my own
-city of her obligations to the gods do you take counsel forthwith
-for yourselves. You are here about to offer sacrifice and pray
-to the gods for good things, publicly and individually. Look well
-then,—where will you find voice, or soul, or eyes, or courage,
-to pronounce such supplications, if you permit these accursed
-Amphissians to remain unpunished, when they have come under the
-imprecations of the recorded oath? Recollect that the oath distinctly
-proclaims the sufferings awaiting all impious transgressors, and even
-menaces those who tolerate their proceedings, by declaring,—They who
-do not stand forward to vindicate Apollo, Artemis, Latona, and Athênê
-Pronæa, may not sacrifice undefiled or with favorable acceptance.’”
-
-Such is the graphic and impressive description,[1033] given by
-Æschines himself some years afterwards to the Athenian assembly,
-of his own address to the Amphiktyonic meeting in spring 339 B.
-C.; on the lofty sight of the Delphian Pylæa, with Kirrha and its
-plain spread out before his eyes, and with the ancient oath and
-all its fearful imprecations recorded on the brass plate hard by,
-readable by every one. His speech, received with loud shouts, roused
-violent passion in the bosoms of the Amphiktyons, as well as of the
-hearers assembled round. The audience at Delphi was not like that
-of Athens. Athenian citizens were accustomed to excellent oratory,
-and to the task of balancing opposite arguments: though susceptible
-of high-wrought intellectual excitement—admiration or repugnance
-as the case might be—they discharged it all in the final vote, and
-then went home to their private affairs. But to the comparatively
-rude men at Delphi, the speech of a first-rate Athenian orator was
-a rarity. When Æschines, with great rhetorical force, unexpectedly
-revived in their imaginations the ancient and terrific history of the
-curse of Kirrha[1034]—assisted by all the force of visible and local
-association—they were worked up to madness; while in such minds as
-theirs, the emotion raised would not pass off by simple voting, but
-required to be discharged by instant action.
-
-  [1033] Æschines adv. Ktesiph, p. 70.
-
-  [1034] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 277. ὡς δὲ τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀξίωμα
-  λαβὼν (Æschines) ἀφίκετο εἰς τοὺς Ἀμφικτύονας, πάντα τἄλλ᾽ ἀφεὶς
-  καὶ παριδὼν ἐπέραινεν ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἐμισθώθη, καὶ λόγους εὐπροσώπους
-  καὶ μύθους, ὅθεν ἡ Κιῤῥαία χώρα καθιερώθη, συνθεὶς καὶ διεξελθὼν,
-  ~ἀνθρώπους ἀπείρους λόγων~ καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐ προορωμένους, τοὺς
-  Ἀμφικτύονας, πείθει ψηφίσασθαι, etc.
-
-How intense and ungovernable that emotion became, is shown by
-the monstrous proceedings which followed. The original charge of
-impiety brought against Athens, set forth by the Amphissian speaker
-coarsely and ineffectively, and indeed noway lending itself to
-exaggeration—was now altogether forgotten in the more heinous impiety
-of which Æschines had accused the Amphissians themselves. About
-the necessity of punishing them, there was but one language. The
-Amphissian speakers appear to have fled—since even their persons
-would hardly have been safe amidst such an excitement. And if the day
-had not been already far advanced, the multitude would have rushed
-at once down from the scene of debate to Kirrha.[1035] On account of
-the lateness of the hour, a resolution was passed which the herald
-formally proclaimed,—That on the morrow at daybreak, the whole
-Delphian population, of sixteen years and upwards, freemen as well as
-slaves, should muster at the sacrificing place, provided with spades
-and pickaxes: That the assembly of Amphiktyonic legates would there
-meet them, to act in defence of the god and the sacred property: That
-if there were any city whose deputies did not appear, it should be
-excluded from the temple, and proclaimed unholy and accursed.[1036]
-
-  [1035] Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. p. 70. κραυγὴ πολλὴ καὶ θόρυβος ἦν
-  τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων, καὶ λόγος ἦν οὐκέτι περὶ τῶν ἀσπίδων ἃς ἡμεῖς
-  ἀνέθεμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀμφισσέων τιμωρίας. Ἤδη δὲ πόῤῥω
-  τῆς ἡμέρας οὔσης, προελθὼν ὁ κῆρυξ, etc.
-
-  [1036] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 71.
-
-At daybreak, accordingly, the muster took place. The Delphian
-multitude came with their implements for demolition:—the Amphiktyons
-with Æschines placed themselves at the head:—and all marched down
-to the port of Kirrha. Those there resident—probably astounded and
-terrified at so furious an inroad from an entire population with
-whom, a few hours before, they had been on friendly terms—abandoned
-the place without resistance, and ran to acquaint their
-fellow-citizens at Amphissa. The Amphiktyons with their followers
-then entered Kirrha, demolished all the harbor-conveniences, and
-even set fire to the houses in the town. This Æschines himself tells
-us; and we may be very sure (though he does not tell us) that the
-multitude thus set on were not contented with simply demolishing,
-but plundered and carried away whatever they could lay hands on.
-Presently, however, the Amphissians, whose town was on the high
-ground about seven or eight miles west of Delphi, apprised of the
-destruction of their property and seeing their houses in flames,
-arrived in haste to the rescue, with their full-armed force. The
-Amphiktyons and the Delphian multitude were obliged in their turn to
-evacuate Kirrha, and hurry back to Delphi at their best speed. They
-were in the greatest personal danger. According to Demosthenes, some
-were actually seized; but they must have been set at liberty almost
-immediately.[1037] None were put to death; an escape which they
-probably owed to the respect borne by the Amphissians, even under
-such exasperating circumstances, to the Amphiktyonic function.
-
-  [1037] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277. According to the second
-  decree of the Amphiktyons cited in this oration (p. 278), some of
-  the Amphiktyons were wounded. But I concur with Droysen, Franke,
-  and others, in disputing the genuineness of these decrees; and
-  the assertion, that some of the Amphiktyons were wounded, is one
-  among the grounds for disputing it: for if such had been the
-  fact, Æschines could hardly have failed to mention it; since it
-  would have suited exactly the drift and purpose of his speech.
-
-  Æschines is by far the best witness for the proceedings at this
-  spring meeting of the Amphiktyons. He was not only present, but
-  the leading person concerned; if he makes a wrong statement,
-  it must be by design. But if the facts as stated by Æschines
-  are at all near the truth, it is hardly possible that the two
-  decrees cited in Demosthenes can have been the real decrees
-  passed by the Amphiktyons. The substance of what was resolved,
-  as given by Æschines, pp. 70, 71, is materially different from
-  the first decree quoted in the oration of Demosthenes, p. 278.
-  There is no mention, in the letter, of those vivid and prominent
-  circumstances—the summoning of all the Delphians, freemen and
-  slaves above sixteen years of age, with spades and mattocks—the
-  exclusion from the temple, and the cursing, of any city which did
-  not appear to take part.
-
-  The compiler of those decrees appears to have had only
-  Demosthenes before him, and to have known nothing of Æschines.
-  Of the violent proceedings of the Amphiktyons, both provoked and
-  described by Æschines, Demosthenes says nothing.
-
-On the morning after this narrow escape, the president, a Thessalian
-of Pharsalus, named Kottyphus, convoked a full Amphiktyonic Ekklesia;
-that is, not merely the Amphiktyons proper, or the legates and
-co-legates deputed from the various cities,—but also, along with
-them, the promiscuous multitude present for purpose of sacrifice and
-consultation of the oracle. Loud and indignant were the denunciations
-pronounced in this meeting against the Amphissians; while Athens
-was eulogized as having taken the lead in vindicating the rights
-of Apollo. It was finally resolved that the Amphissians should be
-punished as sinners against the god and the sacred domain, as well
-as against the Amphiktyons personally; that the legates should now
-go home, to consult each his respective city; and that as soon as
-some positive resolution for executory measures could be obtained,
-each should come to a special meeting, appointed at Thermopylæ for
-a future day,—seemingly not far distant, and certainly prior to the
-regular season of autumnal convocation.
-
-Thus was the spark applied, and the flame kindled, of a second
-Amphiktyonic war, between six and seven years after the conclusion
-of the former in 346 B. C. What has been just recounted comes to us
-from Æschines, himself the witness as well as the incendiary. We here
-judge him, not from accusations preferred by his rival Demosthenes,
-but from his own depositions; and from facts which he details not
-simply without regret, but with a strong feeling of pride. It is
-impossible to read them without becoming sensible of the profound
-misfortune which had come over the Grecian world; since the unanimity
-or dissidence of its component portions were now determined, not
-by political congresses at Athens or Sparta, but by debates in the
-religious convocation at Delphi and Thermopylæ. Here we have the
-political sentiment of the Amphissian Lokrians,—their sympathy for
-Thebes, and dislike to Athens,—dictating complaint and invective
-against the Athenians on the allegation of impiety. Against every
-one, it was commonly easy to find matter for such an allegation, if
-parties were on the look-out for it; while defence was difficult,
-and the fuel for kindling religious antipathy all at the command
-of the accuser. Accordingly Æschines troubles himself little with
-the defence, but plants himself at once on the vantage-ground of
-the accuser, and retorts the like charge of impiety against the
-Amphissians, on totally different allegations. By superior oratory,
-as well as by the appeal to an ancient historical fact of a character
-peculiarly terror-striking, he exasperates the Amphiktyons to a
-pitch of religious ardor, in vindication of the god, such as to make
-them disdain alike the suggestions either of social justice or of
-political prudence. Demosthenes—giving credit to the Amphiktyons
-for something like the equity of procedure, familiar to Athenian
-ideas and practice—affirmed that no charge against Athens could have
-been made before them by the Lokrians, because no charge would be
-entertained without previous notice given to Athens. But Æschines,
-when accusing the Lokrians,—on a matter of which he had given no
-notice, and which it first crossed his mind to mention at the moment
-when he made his speech[1038]—found these Amphiktyons so inflammable
-in their religious antipathies, that they forthwith call out and head
-the Delphian mob armed with pickaxes for demolition. To evoke, from a
-far-gone and half-forgotten past, the memory of that fierce religious
-feud, for the purpose of extruding established proprietors, friends
-and defenders of the temple, from an occupancy wherein they rendered
-essential service to the numerous visitors of Delphi—to execute this
-purpose with brutal violence, creating the maximum of exasperation
-in the sufferers, endangering the lives of the Amphiktyonic legates,
-and raising another Sacred War pregnant with calamitous results—this
-was an amount of mischief such as the bitterest enemy of Greece could
-hardly have surpassed. The prior imputations of irreligion, thrown
-out by the Lokrian orator against Athens, may have been futile and
-malicious; but the retort of Æschines was far worse, extending as
-well as embittering the poison of pious discord, and plunging the
-Amphiktyonic assembly in a contest from which there was no exit
-except by the sword of Philip.
-
-  [1038] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 70. ~ἐπῆλθε δ᾽ οὖν μοι ἐπὶ
-  τὴν γνώμην~ μνησθῆναι τῆς τῶν Ἀμφισσέων περὶ τὴν γῆν τὴν ἱερὰν
-  ἀσεβείας, etc.
-
-Some comments on this proceeding appeared requisite, partly because
-it is the only distinct matter known to us, from an actual witness,
-respecting the Amphiktyonic council—partly from its ruinous
-consequences, which will presently appear. At first, indeed, these
-consequences did not manifest themselves; and when Æschines returned
-to Athens, he told his story to the satisfaction of the people. We
-may presume that he reported the proceedings at the time in the same
-manner as he stated them afterwards, in the oration now preserved.
-The Athenians, indignant at the accusation brought by the Lokrians
-against Athens, were disposed to take part in that movement of pious
-enthusiasm which Æschines had kindled on the subject of Kirrha,
-pursuant to the ancient oath sworn by their forefathers.[1039] So
-forcibly was the religious point of view of this question thrust
-upon the public mind, that the opposition of Demosthenes was hardly
-listened to. He laid open at once the consequences of what had
-happened, saying—“Æschines, you are bringing war into Attica—an
-Amphiktyonic war.” But his predictions were cried down as allusions
-or mere manifestations of party feeling against a rival.[1040]
-Æschines denounced him openly as the hired agent of the impious
-Lokrians;[1041] a charge sufficiently refuted by the conduct of these
-Lokrians themselves, who are described by Æschines as gratuitously
-insulting Athens.
-
-  [1039] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 71. καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἡμῶν
-  ἀποδεξαμένου τοῦ δήμου, καὶ τῆς πόλεως πάσης προαιρουμένης
-  εὐσεβεῖν, etc. Οὐκ ἐᾷ (Demosthenes) μεμνῆσθαι τῶν ὅρκων, οὓς οἱ
-  πρόγονοι ὤμοσαν, οὐδὲ τῆς ἀρᾶς οὐδὲ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ μαντείας.
-
-  [1040] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 275.
-
-  [1041] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69-71.
-
-But though the general feeling at Athens, immediately after the
-return of Æschines, was favorable to his proceedings at Delphi, it
-did not long continue so. Nor is the change difficult to understand.
-The first mention of the old oath, and the original devastation
-of Kirrha, sanctioned by the name and authority of Solon, would
-naturally turn the Athenian mind into a strong feeling of pious
-sentiment against the tenants of that accursed spot. But farther
-information would tend to prove that the Lokrians were more sinned
-against than sinning; that the occupation of Kirrha as a harbor
-was a convenience to all Greeks, and most of all to the temple
-itself; lastly, that the imputations said to have been cast by the
-Lokrians upon Athens had either never been made at all (so we find
-Demosthenes affirming), or were nothing worse than an unauthorized
-burst of ill-temper from some rude individual.—Though Æschines had
-obtained at first a vote of approbation for his proceedings, yet
-when his proposition came to be made—that Athens should take part
-in the special Amphiktyonic meeting convened for punishing the
-Amphissians—the opposition of Demosthenes was found more effective.
-Both the Senate, and the public assembly passed a resolution
-peremptorily forbidding all interference on the part of Athens at
-that special meeting. “The Hieromnemon and the Pylagoræ of Athens (so
-the decree prescribed) shall take no part either in word or deed or
-resolution, with the persons assembled at that special meeting. They
-shall visit Delphi and Thermopylæ at the regular times fixed by our
-forefathers.” This important decree marks the change of opinion at
-Athens. Æschines indeed tells us, that it was only procured by crafty
-manœuvre on the part of Demosthenes; being hurried through in a thin
-assembly, at the close of business, when most citizens (and Æschines
-among them) had gone away. But there is nothing to confirm such
-insinuations; moreover Æschines, if he had still retained the public
-sentiment in his favor, could easily have baffled the tricks of his
-rival.[1042]
-
-  [1042] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 71.
-
-The special meeting of Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ accordingly took
-place, at some time between the two regular periods of spring and
-autumn. No legates attended from Athens—nor any from Thebes; a
-fact made known to us by Æschines, and remarkable as evincing an
-incipient tendency towards concurrence, such as had never existed
-before, between these two important cities. The remaining legates
-met, determined to levy a joint force for the purpose of punishing
-the Amphissians, and chose the president Kottyphus general. According
-to Æschines, this force was brought together, marched against the
-Lokrians, and reduced them to submission, but granted to them
-indulgent terms; requiring from them a fine to the Delphian god,
-payable at stated intervals—sentencing some of the Lokrian leaders
-to banishment as having instigated the encroachment on the sacred
-domain—and recalling others who had opposed it. But the Lokrians (he
-says), after the force had retired, broke faith, paid nothing, and
-brought back all the guilty leaders. Demosthenes, on the contrary,
-states, that Kottyphus summoned contingents from the various
-Amphiktyonic states; but some never came at all, while those that did
-come were lukewarm and inefficient; so that the purpose altogether
-miscarried.[1043] The account of Demosthenes is the more probable of
-the two: for we know from Æschines himself that neither Athens nor
-Thebes took part in the proceeding, while Sparta had been excluded
-from the Amphiktyonic council in 346 B. C. There remained therefore
-only the secondary and smaller states. Of these, the Peloponnesians,
-even if inclined, could not easily come, since they could neither
-march by land through Bœotia, nor come with ease by sea while the
-Amphissians were masters of the port of Kirrha; and the Thessalians
-and their neighbors were not likely to take so intense an interest in
-the enterprize as to carry it through without the rest. Moreover, the
-party who were only waiting for a pretext to invite the interference
-of Philip, would rather prefer to do nothing, in order to show how
-impossible it was to act without him. Hence we may fairly assume
-that what Æschines represents as indulgent terms granted to the
-Lokrians and afterwards violated by them, was at best nothing more
-than a temporary accommodation; concluded because Kottyphus could
-not do anything—probably did not wish to do anything—without the
-intervention of Philip.
-
-  [1043] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277; Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 72.
-
-The next Pylæa, or the autumnal meeting of the Amphiktyons at
-Thermopylæ, now arrived; yet the Lokrians were still unsubdued.
-Kottyphus and his party now made the formal proposition to
-invoke the aid of Philip. “If you do not consent (they told the
-Amphiktyons[1044]), you must come forward personally in force,
-subscribe ample funds, and fine all defaulters. Choose which you
-prefer.” The determination of the Amphiktyons was taken to invoke
-the interference of Philip; appointing him commander of the combined
-force, and champion of the god, in the new Sacred War, as he had been
-in the former.
-
-  [1044] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 277, 278.
-
-At the autumnal meeting[1045] where this fatal measure of calling
-in Philip was adopted, legates from Athens were doubtless present
-(Æschines among them), according to usual custom; for the decree of
-Demosthenes had enacted that the usual custom should be followed,
-though it had forbidden the presence of legates at the special or
-extraordinary meeting. Æschines[1046] was not backward in advocating
-the application to Philip; nor indeed could he take any other course,
-consistently with what he had done at the preceding spring meeting.
-He himself only laments that Athens suffered herself to be deterred,
-by the corrupt suggestions of Demosthenes, from heading the crusade
-against Amphissa, when the gods themselves had singled her out for
-that pious duty.[1047] What part Thebes took in the nomination of
-Philip, or whether her legates attended at the autumnal Amphiktyonic
-meeting, we do not know. But it is to be remembered that one of the
-twelve Amphiktyonic double suffrages now belonged to the Macedonians
-themselves; while many of the remaining members had become dependent
-on Macedonia—the Thessalians, Phthiot Achæans, Perrhæbians,
-Dolopians, Magnetes, etc.[1048] It was probably not very difficult
-for Kottyphus and Æschines to procure a vote investing Philip with
-the command. Even those who were not favorable might dread the charge
-of impiety if they opposed it.
-
-  [1045] The chronology of the events here recounted has been
-  differently conceived by different authors. According to my
-  view, the first motion raised by Æschines against the Amphissian
-  Lokrians, occurred in the spring meeting of the Amphiktyons at
-  Delphi in 339 B. C. (the year of the archon Theophrastus at
-  Athens); next, there was held a special or extraordinary meeting
-  of Amphiktyons, and a warlike manifestation against the Lokrians;
-  after which came the regular autumnal meeting at Thermopylæ (B.
-  C. 339—September—the year of the archon Lysimachides at Athens),
-  where the vote was passed to call in the military interference of
-  Philip.
-
-  This chronology does not, indeed, agree with the two so-called
-  decrees of the Amphiktyons, and with the documentary
-  statement—Ἄρχων Μνησιθείδης, Ἀνθεστηριῶνος ἕκτῃ ἐπὶ δέκα—which we
-  read as incorporated in the oration De Coronâ, p. 279. But I have
-  already stated that I think these documents spurious.
-
-  The archon Mnesitheides (like all the other archons named in
-  the documents recited in the oration De Coronâ) is a wrong
-  name, and cannot have been quoted from any genuine document.
-  Next, the first decree of the Amphiktyons is not in harmony
-  with the statement of Æschines, himself the great mover, of
-  what the Amphiktyons really did. Lastly, the second decree
-  plainly intimates that the person who composed the two decrees
-  conceived the nomination of Philip to have taken place in the
-  very same Amphiktyonic assembly as the first movement against
-  the Lokrians. The same words, ἐπὶ ἱερέως Κλειναγόρου, ἐαρινῆς
-  πυλαίας—prefixed to both decrees, must be understood to indicate
-  the same assembly. Mr. Clinton’s supposition that the first
-  decree was passed at the spring meeting of 339 B. C.—and the
-  second at the spring meeting of 338 B. C.—Kleinagoras being the
-  eponymus in both years—appears to me nowise probable. The special
-  purpose and value of an eponymus would disappear, if the same
-  person served in that capacity for two successive years. Boeckh
-  adopts the conjecture of Reiske, altering ἐαρινῆς πυλαίας in the
-  second decree into ὀπωρινῆς πυλαίας. This would bring the second
-  decree into better harmony with chronology; but there is nothing
-  in the state of the text to justify such an innovation. Böhnecke
-  (Forsch. p. 498-508) adopts a supposition yet more improbable.
-  He supposes that Æschines was chosen Pylagoras at the beginning
-  of the Attic year 340-339 B. C., and that he attended first at
-  Delphi at the _autumnal_ meeting of the Amphiktyons 340 B. C.;
-  that he there raised the violent storm which he himself describes
-  in his speech; and that he afterwards, at the subsequent spring
-  meeting, came both the two decrees which we now read in the
-  oration De Coronâ. But the first of these two decrees can
-  never have come _after_ the outrageous proceeding described by
-  Æschines. I will add, that in the form of decree, the president
-  Kottyphus is called an Arcadian; whereas Æschines designates him
-  as a _Pharsalian_.
-
-  [1046] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 278.
-
-  [1047] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 72 ... τῶν μὲν θεῶν τὴν
-  ἡγεμονίαν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἡμῖν παραδεδωκότων, τῆς δὲ Δημοσθένους
-  δωροδοκίας ἐμποδὼν γεγενημένης.
-
-  [1048] See Isokrates, Orat. V. (Philipp.) s. 22. 23.
-
-During the spring and summer of this year 339 B. C. (the interval
-between the two Amphiktyonic meetings), Philip had been engaged
-in his expedition against the Scythians, and in his battle, while
-returning, against the Triballi, wherein he received the severe wound
-already mentioned. His recovery from this wound was completed, when
-the Amphiktyonic vote, conferring upon him the command, was passed.
-He readily accepted a mission which his partisans, and probably
-his bribes, had been mainly concerned in procuring. Immediately
-collecting his forces, he marched southward through Thessaly and
-Thermopylæ, proclaiming his purpose of avenging the Delphian god
-upon the unholy Lokrians of Amphissa. The Amphiktyonic deputies,
-and the Amphiktyonic contingents in greater or less numbers,
-accompanied his march. In passing through Thermopylæ, he took Nikæa
-(one of the towns most essential to the security of the pass) from
-the Thebans, in whose hands it had remained since his conquest of
-Phokis in 346 B. C., though with a Macedonian garrison sharing in
-the occupation.[1049] Not being yet assured of the concurrence of
-the Thebans in his farther projects, he thought it safer to consign
-this important town to the Thessalians, who were thoroughly in his
-dependence.
-
-  [1049] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 73. ἐπειδὴ Φίλιππος αὐτῶν
-  ἀφελόμενος Νίκαιαν Θετταλοῖς παρέδωκε, etc.
-
-  Compare Demosthen. ad Philipp. Epistol. p. 153. ὑποπτεύεται δὲ
-  ὑπὸ Θηβαίων Νίκαιαν μὲν φρουρᾷ κατέχων, etc.
-
-His march from Thermopylæ whether to Delphi and Amphissa, or into
-Bœotia, lay through Phokis. That unfortunate territory still
-continued in the defenceless condition to which it had been condemned
-by the Amphiktyonic sentence of 346 B. C., without a single fortified
-town, occupied merely by small dispersed villages and by a population
-scanty as well as poor. On reaching Elateia, once the principal
-Phokian town, but now dismantled, Philip halted his army, and began
-forthwith to reëstablish the walls, converting it into a strong place
-for permanent military occupation. He at the same time occupied
-Kytinium,[1050] the principal town in the little territory of Doris,
-in the upper portion of the valley of the river Kephissus, situated
-in the short mountain road from Thermopylæ to Amphissa.
-
-  [1050] Philochorus ap. Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 742.
-
-The seizure of Elateia by Philip, coupled with his operations for
-reconstituting it as a permanent military post, was an event of the
-gravest moment, exciting surprise and uneasiness throughout a large
-portion of the Grecian world. Hitherto he had proclaimed himself as
-general acting under the Amphiktyonic vote of nomination, and as on
-his march simply to vindicate the Delphian god against sacrilegious
-Lokrians. Had such been his real purpose, however, he would have had
-no occasion to halt at Elateia, much less to re-fortify and garrison
-it. Accordingly it now became evident that he meant something
-different—or at least something ulterior. He himself indeed no longer
-affected to conceal his real purposes. Sending envoys to Thebes, he
-announced that he had come to attack the Athenians, and earnestly
-invited her coöperation as his ally, against enemies odious to her
-as well as to himself. But if the Thebans, in spite of an excellent
-opportunity to crush an ancient foe, should still determine to stand
-aloof—he claimed of them at least a free passage through Bœotia, that
-he might invade Attica with his own forces.[1051]
-
-  [1051] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 293-299. Justin, ix. 3, “diu
-  dissimulatum bellum Atheniensibus infert.” This expression is
-  correct in the sense, that Philip, who had hitherto pretended
-  to be on his march against Amphissa, disclosed his real purpose
-  to be against Athens at the moment when he seized Elateia.
-  Otherwise, he had been at open war with Athens, ever since the
-  sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus in the preceding year.
-
-The relations between Athens and Thebes at this moment were
-altogether unfriendly. There had indeed been no actual armed
-conflict between them since the conclusion of the Sacred War in
-346 B. C. Yet the old sentiment of enmity and jealousy, dating
-from earlier days and aggravated during that war, still continued
-unabated. To soften this reciprocal dislike, and to bring about
-coöperation with Thebes, had always been the aim of some Athenian
-politicians—Eubulus—Aristophon—and Demosthenes himself, whom Æschines
-tries to discredit as having been complimented and corrupted by
-the Thebans.[1052] Nevertheless, in spite of various visits and
-embassies to Thebes, where a philo-Athenian minority also subsisted,
-nothing had ever been accomplished.[1053] The enmity still remained,
-and had been even artificially aggravated (if we are to believe
-Demosthenes[1054]) during the six months which elapsed since the
-breaking out of the Amphissian quarrel, by Æschines and the partisans
-of Philip in both cities.
-
-  [1052] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46, 47.
-
-  [1053] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 73; Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 281.
-
-  [1054] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 276, 281, 284. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖσε
-  ἐπάνειμι, ὅτι τὸν ἐν Ἀμφίσσῃ πόλεμον τούτου (Æschines) μὲν
-  ποιήσαντος, συμπεραναμένων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συνέργων αὐτοῦ τὴν
-  πρὸς Θηβαίους ἐχθρὰν, συνέβη τὸν Φίλιππον ἐλθεῖν ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς,
-  οὗπερ ἕνεκα τὰς πόλεις οὗτοι συνέκρουον, etc. Οὕτω μέχρι πόῤῥω
-  προήγαγον οὗτοι τὴν ἐχθράν.
-
-The ill-will subsisting between Athens and Thebes at the moment when
-Philip took possession of Elateia, was so acknowledged, that he had
-good reason for looking upon confederacy of the two against him as
-impossible.[1055] To enforce the request, that Thebes, already his
-ally, would continue to act as such at this critical juncture, he
-despatched thither envoys not merely Macedonian, but also Thessalian,
-Dolopian, Phthiot Achæan, Ætolian, and Ænianes—the Amphiktyonic
-allies who were now accompanying his march.[1056]
-
-  [1055] Demosth. De Coronâ—ἧκεν ἔχων (Philip) τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν
-  Ἐλάτειαν κατέλαβεν, ὡς οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἴ τι γένοιτο ἔτι συμπνευσάντων ἂν
-  ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων.
-
-  [1056] Philochorus ap. Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 742.
-
-If such were the hopes, and the reasonable hopes, of Philip, we may
-easily understand how intense was the alarm among the Athenians,
-when they first heard of the occupation of Elateia. Should the
-Thebans comply, Philip would be in three days on the frontier of
-Attica; and from the sentiment understood as well as felt to be
-prevalent, the Athenians could not but anticipate, that free passage,
-and a Theban reinforcement besides, would be readily granted. Ten
-years before, Demosthenes himself (in his first Olynthiac) had
-asserted that the Thebans would gladly join Philip in an attack on
-Attica.[1057] If such was then the alienation, it had been increasing
-rather than diminishing ever since. As the march of Philip had
-hitherto been not merely rapid, but also understood as directed
-towards Delphi and Amphissa, the Athenians had made no preparations
-for the defence of their frontier. Neither their families nor their
-movable property had yet been carried within walls. Nevertheless
-they had now to expect, within little more than forty-eight hours,
-an invading army as formidable and desolating as any of those during
-the Peloponnesian war, under a commander far abler than Archidamus or
-Agis.[1058]
-
-  [1057] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 16. Ἂν δ᾽ ἐκεῖνα Φίλιππος λάβῃ,
-  τίς αὐτὸν κωλύσει δεῦρο βαδίζειν; Θηβαῖοι; οἳ, εἰ μὴ λίαν πικρὸν
-  εἰπεῖν, καὶ συνεισβαλοῦσιν ἑτοίμως.
-
-  [1058] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 304. ἡ γὰρ ἐμὴ πολιτεία, ἧς οὗτος
-  (Æschines) κατηγορεῖ, ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ Θηβαίους μετὰ Φιλίππου
-  συνεμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν χώραν, ~ὃ πάντες ᾤοντο~, μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν
-  παραταξαμένους ἐκεῖνον κωλύειν ἐποίησεν, etc.
-
-Though the general history of this important period can be made out
-only in outline, we are fortunate enough to obtain from Demosthenes
-a striking narrative, in some detail, of the proceedings at Athens
-immediately after the news of the capture of Elateia by Philip. It
-was evening when the messenger arrived, just at the time when the
-prytanes (or senators of the presiding tribe) were at supper in their
-official residence. Immediately breaking up their meal, some ran to
-call the generals whose duty it was to convoke the public assembly,
-with the trumpeter who gave public notice thereof; so that the Senate
-and assembly were convoked for the next morning at daybreak. Others
-bestirred themselves in clearing out the market-place, which was full
-of booths and stands, for traders selling merchandize. They even
-set fire to these booths, in their hurry to get the space clear.
-Such was the excitement and terror throughout the city, that the
-public assembly was crowded at the earliest dawn, even before the
-Senate could go through their forms and present themselves for the
-opening ceremonies. At length the Senate joined the assembly, and the
-prytanes came forward to announce the news, producing the messenger
-with his public deposition. The herald then proclaimed the usual
-words—“Who wishes to speak?” Not a man came forward. He proclaimed it
-again and again; yet still no one rose.
-
-At length, after a considerable interval of silence, Demosthenes rose
-to speak. He addressed himself to that alarming conviction which
-beset the minds of all, though no one had yet given it utterance—that
-the Thebans were in hearty sympathy with Philip. “Suffer not
-yourselves (he said) to believe any such thing. If the fact had been
-so, Philip would have been already on your frontier, without halting
-at Elateia. He has a large body of partisans at Thebes, procured by
-fraud and corruption; but he has not the whole city. There is yet
-a considerable Theban party, adverse to him and favorable to you.
-It is for the purpose of emboldening his own partisans in Thebes,
-overawing his opponents, and thus extorting a positive declaration
-from the city in his favor—that he is making display of his force at
-Elateia. And in this he will succeed, unless you, Athenians, shall
-exert yourselves vigorously and prudently in counteraction. If you,
-acting on your old aversion towards Thebes, shall now hold aloof,
-Philip’s partisans in the city will become all-powerful, so that the
-whole Theban force will march along with him against Attica. For
-your own security, you must shake off these old feelings, however
-well-grounded—and stand forward for the protection of Thebes, as
-being in greater danger than yourselves. March forth your entire
-military strength to the frontier, and thus embolden your partisans
-in Thebes, to speak out openly against their philippizing opponents
-who rely upon the army at Elateia. Next, send ten envoys to Thebes;
-giving them full powers, in conjunction with the generals, to call
-in your military force whenever they think fit. Let your envoys
-demand neither concessions nor conditions from the Thebans; let them
-simply tender the full force of Athens to assist the Thebans in their
-present straits. If the offer be accepted, you will have secured an
-ally inestimable for your own safety, while acting with a generosity
-worthy of Athens; if it be refused, the Thebans will have themselves
-to blame, and you will at least stand unimpeached on the score of
-honor as well as of policy.”[1059]
-
-  [1059] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 286, 287; Diodor. xvi. 84. I have
-  given the substance, in brief, of what Demosthenes represents
-  himself to have said.
-
-The recommendation of Demosthenes, alike wise and generous,
-was embodied in a decree and adopted by the Athenians without
-opposition.[1060] Neither Æschines, nor any one else, said a word
-against it. Demosthenes himself, being named chief of the ten envoys,
-proceeded forthwith to Thebes; while the military force of Attica was
-at the same time marched to the frontier.
-
-  [1060] This decree, or a document claiming to be such, is
-  given _verbatim_ in Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 289, 290. It
-  bears date on the 16th of the month Skirrophorion (June),
-  under the archonship of Nausikles. This archon is a wrong or
-  pseud-eponymous archon: and the document, to say nothing of its
-  verbosity, implies that Athens was now about to pass out of
-  pacific relations with Philip, and to begin war against him—which
-  is contrary to the real fact.
-
-  There also appear inserted, a few pages before, in the same
-  speech (p. 282), four other documents, purporting to relate to
-  the time immediately preceding the capture of Elateia by Philip.
-  1. A decree of the Athenians, dated in the month Elaphebolion
-  of the archon _Heropythus_. 2. Another decree, in the month
-  Munychion of the same _archon_. 3. An answer addressed by Philip
-  to the Athenians. 4. An answer addressed by Philip to the Thebans.
-
-  Here again, the archon called _Heropythus_ is a wrong and unknown
-  archon. Such manifest error of date would alone be enough to
-  preclude me from trusting the document as genuine. Droysen is
-  right, in my judgment, in rejecting all these five documents as
-  spurious. The answer of Philip to the Athenians is adapted to the
-  two decrees of the Athenians, and cannot be genuine if they are
-  spurious.
-
-  These decrees, too, like that dated in Skirrophorion, are not
-  consistent with the true relations between Athens and Philip.
-  They imply that she was at peace with him, and that hostilities
-  were first undertaken against him by her after his occupation of
-  Elateia; whereas open war had been prevailing between them for
-  more than a year, ever since the summer of 340 B. C., and the
-  maritime operations against him in the Propontis. That the war
-  was going on without interruption during all this period—that
-  Philip could not get near to Athens to strike a blow at her and
-  close the war, except by bringing the Thebans and Thessalians
-  into coöperation with him—and that for the attainment of this
-  last purpose, he caused the Amphissian war to be kindled, through
-  the corrupt agency of Æschines—is the express statement of
-  Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 275, 276. Hence I find it impossible
-  to believe in the authenticity either of the four documents here
-  quoted, or of this supposed very long decree of the Athenians, on
-  forming their alliance with Thebes, bearing date on the 16th of
-  the month Skirrophorion, and cited De Coronâ, p. 289. I will add,
-  that the two decrees which we read in p. 282, profess themselves
-  as having been passed in the months Elaphebolion and Munychion,
-  and bear the name of the archon _Heropythus_; while the decree
-  cited, p. 289, bears date the 16th of Skirrophorion, and the
-  name of a different archon, _Nausikles_. Now if the decrees
-  were genuine, the events which are described in both must have
-  happened under the same archon, at an interval of about six weeks
-  between the last day of Munychion and the 16th of Skirrophorion.
-  It is impossible to suppose an interval of one year and six weeks
-  between them.
-
-  It appears to me, on reading attentively the words of Demosthenes
-  himself, that the _falsarius_ or person who composed these four
-  first documents, has not properly conceived what it was that
-  Demosthenes caused to be read by the public secretary. The point
-  which Demosthenes is here making, is to show how ably he had
-  managed, and how well he had deserved of his country, by bringing
-  the Thebans into alliance with Athens immediately after Philip’s
-  capture of Elateia. For this purpose he dwells upon the bad state
-  of feeling between Athens and Thebes before that event, brought
-  about by the secret instigations of Philip through corrupt
-  partisans in both places. Now it is to illustrate this hostile
-  feeling _between Athens and Thebes_, that he causes the secretary
-  to read certain decrees and answers—ἐν οἷς δ᾽ ἦτη ἤδη ~τὰ πρὸς
-  ἀλλήλους~, τουτωνὶ τῶν ψηφισμάτων ἀκούσαντες καὶ τῶν ἀποκρίσεων
-  εἴσεσθε. Καί μοι λέγε ταῦτα λαβών.... (p. 282). The documents
-  here announced to be read do not bear upon the relations between
-  _Athens and Philip_ (which were those of active warfare, needing
-  no illustration)—but to the relation between _Athens and Thebes_.
-  There had plainly been interchanges of bickering and ungracious
-  feeling between the two cities, manifested in public decrees or
-  public answers to complaints or remonstrances. Instead of which,
-  the two Athenian decrees, which we now read as following, are
-  addressed, not to the Thebans, but to Philip; the first of them
-  does not mention Thebes at all; the second mentions Thebes only
-  to recite as a ground of complaint against Philip, that he was
-  trying to put the two cities at variance; and this too, among
-  other grounds of complaint, much more grave and imputing more
-  hostile purposes. Then follow two answers—which are not answers
-  between Athens and Thebes, as they ought to be—but answers from
-  Philip, the first to the Athenians, the second to the Thebans.
-  Neither the decrees, nor the answers, as they here stand, go
-  to illustrate the point at which Demosthenes is aiming—the bad
-  feeling and mutual provocations which had been exchanged a little
-  before between Athens and Thebes. Neither the one nor the other
-  justify the words of the orator immediately after the documents
-  have been read—Οὕτω διαθεὶς ὁ Φίλιππος τὰς πόλεις ~πρὸς ἀλλήλας
-  διὰ τούτων~ (through Æschines and his supporters), καὶ τούτοις
-  ἐπαρθεὶς τοῖς ψηφίσμασι καὶ ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν, ἧκεν ἔχων τὴν
-  δύναμιν καὶ τὴν Ἐλάτειαν κατέλαβεν, ὡς οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἴ τι γένοιτο ἔτι
-  συμπνευσάντων ἂν ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων.
-
-  Demosthenes describes Philip as acting upon Thebes and Athens
-  through the agency of corrupt citizens in each; the author of
-  these documents conceives Philip as acting by his own despatches.
-
-  The decree of the 16th Skirrophorion enacts, not only that
-  there shall be alliance with Thebes, but also that the right of
-  _intermarriage_ between the two cities shall be established. Now
-  at the moment when the decree was passed, the Thebans both had
-  been, and still were, on bad terms with Athens, so that it was
-  doubtful whether they would entertain or reject the proposition;
-  nay, the chances even were, that they would reject it and join
-  Philip. We can hardly believe it possible, that under such a
-  state of probabilities, the Athenians would go so far as to
-  pronounce for the establishment of _intermarriage_ between the
-  two cities.
-
-At Thebes they found the envoys of Philip and his allies, and the
-philippizing Thebans full of triumph; while the friends of Athens
-were so dispirited, that the first letters of Demosthenes, sent
-home immediately on reaching Thebes, were of a gloomy cast.[1061]
-According to Grecian custom, the two opposing legations were heard
-in turn before the Theban assembly. Amyntas and Klearchus were the
-Macedonian envoys, together with the eloquent Byzantine Python, as
-chief spokesman, and the Thessalians Daochus and Thrasylaus.[1062]
-Having the first word, as established allies of Thebes, these orators
-found it an easy theme to denounce Athens, and to support their case
-by the general tenor of past history since the battle of Leuktra.
-The Macedonian orator contrasted the perpetual hostility of Athens
-with the valuable aid furnished to Thebes by Philip, when he rescued
-her from the Phokians, and confirmed her ascendency over Bœotia.
-“If (said the orator) Philip had stipulated, before he assisted
-you against the Phokians, that you should grant him in return a
-free passage against Attica, you would have gladly acceded. Will
-you refuse it now, when he has rendered to you the service without
-stipulation? Either let us pass through to Attica—or join our march;
-whereby you will enrich yourself with the plunder of that country,
-instead of being impoverished by having Bœotia as the seat of
-war.”[1063]
-
-  [1061] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 298.
-
-  [1062] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 18. Daochus and Thrasylaus are named
-  by Demosthenes as Thessalian partisans of Philip (Demosth. De
-  Coronâ, p. 324).
-
-  [1063] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 298, 299. Aristot. Rhetoric. ii.
-  23; Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 744; Diodor. xvi. 85.
-
-All these topics were so thoroughly in harmony with the previous
-sentiments of the Thebans, that they must have made a lively
-impression. How Demosthenes replied to them, we are not permitted to
-know. His powers of oratory must have been severely tasked; for the
-preëstablished feeling was all adverse, and he had nothing to work
-upon, except fear, on the part of Thebes, of too near contact with
-the Macedonian arms—combined with her gratitude for the spontaneous
-and unconditional tender of Athens. And even as to fears, the Thebans
-had only to choose between admitting the Athenian army or that
-of Philip; a choice in which all presumption was in favor of the
-latter, as present ally and recent benefactor—against the former,
-as standing rival and enemy. Such was the result anticipated by the
-hopes of Philip as well as by the fears of Athens. Yet with all the
-chances thus against him, Demosthenes carried his point in the Theban
-assembly; determining them to accept the offered alliance of Athens
-and to brave the hostility of Philip. He boasts with good reason, of
-such a diplomatic and oratorical triumph;[1064] by which he not only
-obtained a powerful ally against Philip, but also—a benefit yet more
-important—rescued Attica from being overrun by a united Macedonian
-and Theban army. Justly does the contemporary historian Theopompus
-extol the unrivalled eloquence whereby Demosthenes kindled in the
-bosoms of the Thebans a generous flame of Pan-hellenic patriotism.
-But it was not simply by superior eloquence[1065]—though that
-doubtless was an essential condition—that his triumph at Thebes was
-achieved. It was still more owing to the wise and generous offer
-which he carried with him, and which he had himself prevailed on the
-Athenians to make—of unconditional alliance without any references
-to the jealousies and animosities of the past, and on terms even
-favorable to Thebes, as being mere exposed than Athens in the war
-against Philip.[1066]
-
-  [1064] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 304-307. εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ~μετέγνωσαν~
-  εὐθέως, ὡς ταῦτ᾽ εἶδον, οἱ Θηβαῖοι, καὶ μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐγένοντο, etc.
-
-  [1065] Theopompus, Frag. 239, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 18.
-
-  [1066] We may here trust the more fully the boasts made by
-  Demosthenes of his own statesmanship and oratory, since we
-  possess the comments of Æschines, and therefore know the worst
-  that can be said by an unfriendly critic. Æschines (adv. Ktesiph.
-  p. 73, 74) says that the Thebans were induced to join Athens, not
-  by the oratory of Demosthenes, but by the fear of Philip’s near
-  approach, and by their displeasure in consequence of having Nikæa
-  taken from them. Demosthenes says in fact the same. Doubtless
-  the ablest orator must be furnished with some suitable points to
-  work up in his pleadings. But the orators on the other side would
-  find in the history of the past a far more copious collection
-  of matters, capable of being appealed to as causes of antipathy
-  against Athens, and of favour to Philip; and against this
-  superior case Demosthenes had to contend.
-
-The answer brought back by Demosthenes was cheering. The important
-alliance, combining Athens and Thebes in defensive war against
-Philip, had been successfully brought about. The Athenian army,
-already mustered in Attica, was invited into Bœotia, and marched to
-Thebes without delay. While a portion of them joined the Theban force
-at the northern frontier of Bœotia to resist the approach of Philip,
-the rest were left in quarters at Thebes. And Demosthenes extols not
-only the kindness with which they were received in private houses,
-but also their correct and orderly behavior amidst the families and
-properties of the Thebans; not a single complaint being preferred
-against them.[1067] The antipathy and jealousy between the two cities
-seemed effaced in cordial coöperation against the common enemy. Of
-the cost of the joint operations, on land and sea, two-thirds were
-undertaken by Athens. The command was shared equally between the
-allies; and the centre of operations was constituted at Thebes.[1068]
-
-  [1067] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 299, 300.
-
-  [1068] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 74.
-
-In this as well as in other ways, the dangerous vicinity of Philip,
-giving increased ascendency to Demosthenes, impressed upon the
-counsels of Athens a vigor long unknown. The orator prevailed
-upon his countrymen to suspend the expenditure going on upon the
-improvement of their docks and the construction of a new arsenal,
-in order that more money might be devoted to military operations.
-He also carried a farther point which he had long aimed at
-accomplishing by indirect means, but always in vain; the conversion
-of the Theoric Fund to military purposes.[1069] So preponderant was
-the impression of danger at Athens, that Demosthenes was now able to
-propose this motion directly, and with success. Of course, he must
-first have moved to suspend the standing enactment, whereby it was
-made penal even to submit the motion.
-
-  [1069] Philochorus Frag. 135, ed. Didot; Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum,
-  p. 742.
-
-To Philip, meanwhile, the new alliance was a severe disappointment
-and a serious obstacle. Having calculated on the continued adhesion
-of Thebes, to which he conceived himself entitled as a return
-for benefits conferred—and having been doubtless assured by his
-partisans in the city that they could promise him Theban coöperation
-against Athens, as soon as he should appear on the frontier with
-an overawing army—he was disconcerted at the sudden junction of
-these two powerful cities, unexpected alike by friends and enemies.
-Henceforward we shall find him hating Thebes, as guilty of desertion
-and ingratitude, worse than Athens, his manifest enemy.[1070] But
-having failed in inducing the Thebans to follow his lead against
-Athens, he thought it expedient again to resume his profession of
-acting on behalf of the Delphian god against Amphissa,—and to write
-to his allies in Peloponnesus to come and join him, for this specific
-purpose. His letters were pressing, often repeated, and implying
-much embarrassment, according to Demosthenes.[1071] As far as we can
-judge they do not seem to have produced much effect; nor was it easy
-for the Peloponnesians to join Philip—either by land, while Bœotia
-was hostile—or by sea while the Amphissians held Kirrha, and the
-Athenians had a superior navy.
-
-  [1070] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 73. Æschines remarks the
-  fact—but perverts the inferences deducible from it.
-
-  [1071] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 279. Δὸς δή μοι τὴν ἐπιστολὴν,
-  ἥν, ὡς οὐχ ὑπήκουον οἱ Θηβαῖοι, πέμπει πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ
-  συμμάχους ὁ Φίλιππος, ἵν᾽ εἴδητε καὶ ἐκ ταύτης σαφῶς ὅτι τὴν
-  μὲν ἀληθῆ πρόφασιν τῶν πραγμάτων, τὸ ταῦτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ
-  τοὺς Θηβαίους καὶ ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ἀπεκρύπτετο, κοινὰ δὲ καὶ τοῖς
-  Ἀμφικτύοσι δόξαντα ποιεῖν προσεποιεῖτο, etc.
-
-  Then follows a letter, purporting to be written by Philip to
-  the Peloponnesians. I concur with Droysen in mistrusting its
-  authenticity. I do not rest any statements on its evidence.
-  The Macedonian month Löus does not appear to coincide with the
-  Attic Boëdromion; nor is it probable that Philip in writing to
-  Peloponnesians, would allude at all to Attic months. Various
-  subsequent letters written by Philip to the Peloponnesians, and
-  intimating much embarrassment, are alluded to by Demosthenes
-  further on—Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵας τότ᾽ ἠφίει φωνὰς ὁ Φίλιππος καὶ ἐν οἵαις
-  ἦν ταραχαῖς ἐπὶ τούτοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν ἐκείνου μαθήσεσθε ὧν
-  εἰς Πελοπόννησον ἔπεμπεν (p. 301, 302). Demosthenes causes the
-  letters to be read publicly, but no letters appear _verbatim_.
-
-War was now carried on, in Phokis and on the frontiers of Bœotia,
-during the autumn and winter of 339-338 B. C. The Athenians and
-Thebans not only maintained their ground against Philip, but even
-gained some advantages over him; especially in two engagements—called
-the battle on the river, and the winter-battle—of which Demosthenes
-finds room to boast, and which called forth manifestations of
-rejoicing and sacrifice, when made known at Athens.[1072] To
-Demosthenes himself, as the chief adviser of the Theban alliance, a
-wreath of gold was proposed by Demomeles and Hyperides, and decreed
-by the people; and though a citizen named Diondas impeached the mover
-for an illegal decree, yet he did not even obtain the fifth part of
-the suffrages of the Dikastery, and therefore became liable to the
-fine of one thousand drachms.[1073] Demosthenes was crowned with
-public proclamation at the Dionysiac festival of March 338 B. C.[1074]
-
-  [1072] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 300.
-
-  [1073] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 302; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator., p.
-  848.
-
-  [1074] That Demosthenes was crowned at the Dionysiac festival
-  (March 338 B. C.) is contended by Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 534,
-  535); upon grounds which seem sufficient, against the opinion of
-  Boeckh and Winiewski (Comment. ad Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 250),
-  who think that he was not crowned until the Panathenaic festival,
-  in the ensuing July.
-
-But the most memorable step taken by the Athenians and Thebans,
-in this joint war against Philip, was that of reconstituting the
-Phokians as an independent and self-defending section of the Hellenic
-name. On the part of the Thebans, hitherto the bitterest enemies
-of the Phokians, this proceeding evinced adoption of an improved
-and generous policy, worthy of the Pan-hellenic cause in which they
-had now embarked. In 346 B. C., the Phokians had been conquered
-and ruined by the arms of Philip, under condemnation pronounced by
-the Amphiktyons. Their cities had all been dismantled, and their
-population distributed in villages, impoverished, or driven into
-exile. These exiles, many of whom were at Athens, now returned, and
-the Phokian population were aided by the Athenians and Thebans in
-reoccupying and securing their towns.[1075] Some indeed of these
-towns were so small, such as Parapotamii[1076] and others, that
-it was thought inexpedient to reconstitute them. Their population
-was transferred to the others, as a means of increased strength.
-Ambrysus, in the south-western portion of Phokis, was refortified
-by the Athenians and Thebans with peculiar care and solidity. It
-was surrounded with a double circle of wall of the black stone of
-the country; each wall being fifteen feet high and nearly six feet
-in thickness, with an interval of six feet between the two.[1077]
-These walls were seen, five centuries afterwards, by the traveller
-Pausanias, who numbers them among the most solid defensive structures
-in the ancient world.[1078] Ambrysus was valuable to the Athenians
-and Thebans as a military position for the defence of Bœotia,
-inasmuch as it lay on that rough southerly road near the sea, which
-the Lacedæmonian king Kleombrotus[1079] had forced when he marched
-from Phokis to the position of Leuktra; eluding Epaminondas and
-the main Theban force, who were posted to resist him on the more
-frequented road by Koroneia. Moreover, by occupying the south-western
-parts of Phokis on the Corinthian Gulf, they prevented the arrival of
-reinforcements to Philip by sea out of Peloponnesus.
-
-  [1075] Pausanias, x. 3, 2.
-
-  [1076] Pausanias, x. 33, 4.
-
-  [1077] Pausanias, x. 36, 2.
-
-  [1078] Pausanias, iv. 31, 5. He places the fortifications of
-  Ambrysus in a class with those of Byzantium and Rhodes.
-
-  [1079] Pausan. ix. 13, 2; Diodor. xv. 53; Xenoph. Hell. vi. 4, 3.
-
-The war in Phokis, prosecuted seemingly upon a large scale and with
-much activity, between Philip and his allies on one side, and the
-Athenians and Thebans with their allies on the other—ended with
-the fatal battle of Chæroneia, fought in August 338 B. C.; having
-continued about ten months from the time when Philip, after being
-named general at the Amphiktyonic assembly (about the autumnal
-equinox), marched southward and occupied Elateia.[1080] But
-respecting the intermediate events, we are unfortunately without
-distinct information. We pick up only a few hints and allusions which
-do not enable us to understand what passed. We cannot make out either
-the auxiliaries engaged, or the total numbers in the field, on either
-side. Demosthenes boasts of having procured for Athens as allies,
-the Eubœans, Achæans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leukadians,
-and Korkyræans—arraying along with the Athenian soldiers not less
-than fifteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry;[1081] and
-pecuniary contributions besides, to no inconsiderable amount, for the
-payment of mercenary troops. Whether all these troops fought either
-in Phokis or at Chæroneia, we cannot determine; we verify the Achæans
-and the Corinthians.[1082] As far as we can trust Demosthenes, the
-autumn and winter of 339-338 B. C. was a season of advantages gained
-by the Athenians and Thebans over Philip, and of rejoicing in their
-two cities; not without much embarrassment to Philip, testified by
-his urgent requisitions of aid from his Peloponnesian allies, with
-which they did not comply. Demosthenes was the war-minister of the
-day, exercising greater influence than the generals—deliberating
-at Thebes in concert with the Bœotarchs—advising and swaying the
-Theban public assembly as well as the Athenian—and probably in
-mission to other cities also, for the purpose of pressing military
-efforts.[1083] The crown bestowed upon him at the Dionysiac festival
-(March 338 B. C.) marks the pinnacle of his glory and the meridian of
-his hopes, when there seemed a fair chance of successfully resisting
-the Macedonian invasion.
-
-  [1080] The chronology of this period has caused much perplexity,
-  and has been differently arranged by different authors. But
-  it will be found that all the difficulties and controversies
-  regarding it have arisen from resting on the spurious decrees
-  embodied in the speech of Demosthenes De Coronâ, as if they were
-  so much genuine history. Mr. Clinton, in his Fasti Hellenici,
-  cites these decrees as if they were parts of Demosthenes himself.
-  When we once put aside these documents, the general statements
-  both of Demosthenes and Æschines, though they are not precise or
-  specific, will appear perfectly clear and consistent respecting
-  the chronology of the period.
-
-  That the battle of Chæroneia took place on the 7th of the Attic
-  month Metageitnion (August) B. C. 338 (the second month of the
-  archon Chærondas at Athens)—is affirmed by Plutarch (Camill. c.
-  19) and generally admitted.
-
-  The time when Philip first occupied Elateia has been stated
-  by Mr. Clinton and most authors as the preceding month of
-  Skirrophorion, fifty days or thereabouts earlier. But this
-  rests exclusively on the evidence of the pretended decree, for
-  alliance between Athens and Thebes, which appears in Demosthenes
-  De Coronâ, p. 289. Even those who defend the authenticity of the
-  decree, can hardly confide in the truth of the month-date, when
-  the name of the archon Nausikles is confessedly wrong. To me
-  neither this document, nor the other so-called Athenian decrees
-  professing to bear date in Munychion and Elaphebolion (p. 282),
-  carry any evidence whatever.
-
-  The general statements both of Demosthenes and Æschines, indicate
-  the appointment of Philip as Amphiktyonic general to have been
-  made in the autumnal convocation of Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ.
-  Shortly after this appointment, Philip marched his army into
-  Greece with the professed purpose of acting upon it. In this
-  march he came upon Elateia and began to fortify it; probably
-  about the month of October 339 B. C. The Athenians, Thebans,
-  and other Greeks, carried on the war against him in Phokis for
-  about ten months, until the battle of Chæroneia. That this war
-  must have lasted as long as ten months, we may see by the facts
-  mentioned in my last page—the reëstablishment of the Phokians
-  and their towns, and especially the elaborate fortification
-  of Ambrysus. Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 533) points out justly
-  (though I do not agree with his general arrangement of the events
-  of the war) that this restoration of the Phokian towns implies
-  a considerable interval between the occupation of Elateia and
-  the battle of Chæroneia. We have also two battles gained against
-  Philip, one of them a μάχη χειμερινὴ, which perfectly suits with
-  this arrangement.
-
-  [1081] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 306; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 17. In
-  the decree of the Athenian people (Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p.
-  850) passed after the death of Demosthenes, granting various
-  honors and a statue to his memory—it is recorded that he brought
-  in by his persuasions not only the allies enumerated in the text,
-  but also the Lokrians and the Messenians; and that he procured
-  from the allies a total contribution of above five hundred
-  talents. The Messenians, however, certainly did not fight at
-  Chæroneia; nor is it correct to say that Demosthenes induced the
-  Amphissian Lokrians to become allies of Athens.
-
-  [1082] Strabo, ix. p. 414; Pausanias, vii. 6, 3.
-
-  [1083] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 48. Æschines (adv. Ktesiph. p.
-  74) puts these same facts—the great personal ascendency of
-  Demosthenes at this period—in an invidious point of view.
-
-Philip had calculated on the positive aid of Thebes; at the very
-worst, upon her neutrality between him and Athens. That she would
-cordially join Athens, neither he nor any one else imagined; nor
-could so improbable a result have been brought about, had not the
-game of Athens been played with unusual decision and judgment by
-Demosthenes. Accordingly, when opposed by the unexpected junction
-of the Theban and Athenian force, it is not wonderful that Philip
-should have been at first repulsed. Such disadvantages would hardly
-indeed drive him to send instant propositions of peace;[1084] but
-they would admonish him to bring up fresh forces, and to renew his
-invasion during the ensuing spring and summer with means adequate to
-the known resistance. It seems probable that the full strength of the
-Macedonian army, now brought to a high excellence of organization
-after the continued improvements of his twenty years’ reign—would
-be marched into Phokis during the summer of 338 B. C., to put down
-the most formidable combination of enemies that Philip had ever
-encountered. His youthful son Alexander, now eighteen years of age,
-came along with them.
-
-  [1084] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 18. ὥστε εὐθὺς ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι
-  δεόμενον εἰρήνης, etc.
-
-  It is possible that Philip may have tried to disunite the enemies
-  assembled against him, by separate propositions addressed to some
-  of them.
-
-It is among the accusations urged by Æschines against Demosthenes,
-that in levying mercenary troops, he wrongfully took the public money
-to pay men who never appeared; and farther, that he placed at the
-disposal of the Amphissians a large body of ten thousand mercenary
-troops, thus withdrawing them from the main Athenian and Bœotian
-army; whereby Philip was enabled to cut to pieces the mercenaries
-separately, while the entire force, if kept together, could never
-have been defeated. Æschines affirms that he himself strenuously
-opposed this separation of forces, the consequences of which were
-disastrous and discouraging to the whole cause.[1085] It would
-appear that Philip attacked and took Amphissa. We read of his having
-deceived the Athenians and Thebans by a false despatch intended to be
-intercepted; so as to induce them to abandon their guard of the road
-which led to that place.[1086] The sacred domain was restored, and
-the Amphissians, or at least such of them as had taken a leading part
-against Delphi, were banished.[1087]
-
-  [1085] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 74. Deinarchus mentions a Theban
-  named Proxenus, whom he calls a traitor, as having commanded
-  these mercenary troops at Amphissa (Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p.
-  99).
-
-  [1086] Polyænus, iv. 2, 8.
-
-  [1087] We gather this from the edict issued by Polysperchon some
-  years afterwards (Diodor. xviii. 56).
-
-It was on the seventh day of the month Metageitnion (the second month
-of the Attic year, corresponding nearly to August) that the allied
-Grecian army met Philip near Chæroneia; the last Bœotian town on
-the frontiers of Phokis. He seems to have been now strong enough to
-attempt to force his way into Bœotia, and is said to have drawn down
-the allies from a strong position into the plain, by laying waste
-the neighboring fields.[1088] His numbers are stated by Diodorus at
-thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse; he doubtless had with
-him Thessalians and other allies from Northern Greece; but not a
-single ally from Peloponnesus. Of the united Greeks opposed to him,
-the total is not known.[1089] We can therefore make no comparison
-as to numbers, though the superiority of the Macedonian army in
-organization is incontestable. The largest Grecian contingents
-were those of Athens, under Lysikles and Chares—and of Thebes,
-commanded by Theagenes; there were, besides, Phokians, Achæans, and
-Corinthians—probably also Eubœans and Megarians. The Lacedæmonians,
-Messenians, Arcadians, Eleians, and Argeians, took no part in the
-war.[1090] All of them had doubtless been solicited on both sides;
-by Demosthenes as well as by the partisans of Philip. But jealousy
-and fear of Sparta led the last four states rather to look towards
-Philip as a protector against her—though on this occasion they took
-no positive part.
-
-  [1088] Polyænus, iv. 2, 14.
-
-  [1089] Diodorus affirms that Philip’s army was superior in
-  number; Justin states the reverse (Diodor. xvi. 85; Justin, ix.
-  3).
-
-  [1090] Pausanias, iv. 2, 82; v. 4, 5; viii. 6, 1.
-
-The command of the army was shared between the Athenians and
-Thebans, and its movements determined by the joint decision of
-their statesmen and generals. As to statesmen, the presence of
-Demosthenes at least ensured to them sound and patriotic counsel
-powerfully set forth; as to generals, not one of the three was fit
-for an emergency so grave and terrible. It was the sad fortune
-of Greece, that at this crisis of her liberty, when everything
-was staked on the issue of the campaign, neither an Epaminondas
-nor an Iphikrates was at hand. Phokion was absent as commander of
-the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont or the Ægean.[1091] Portents
-were said to have occurred—oracles, and prophecies, were in
-circulation—calculated to discourage the Greeks; but Demosthenes,
-animated by the sight of so numerous an army hearty and combined in
-defence of Grecian independence, treated all such stories with the
-same indifference[1092] as Epaminondas had shown before the battle
-of Leuktra, and accused the Delphian priestess of philippizing.
-Nay, so confident was he in the result (according to the statement
-of Æschines), that when Philip, himself apprehensive, was prepared
-to offer terms of peace, and the Bœotarchs inclined to accept
-them—Demosthenes alone stood out, denouncing as a traitor any one
-who should broach the proposition of peace,[1093] and boasting that
-if the Thebans were afraid, his countrymen the Athenians desired
-nothing better than a free passage through Bœotia to attack Philip
-single-handed. This is advanced as an accusation by Æschines;
-who however himself furnishes the justification of his rival, by
-intimating that the Bœotarchs were so eager for peace, that they
-proposed, even before the negotiations had begun, to send home the
-Athenian soldiers into Attica, in order that deliberations might
-be taken concerning the peace. We can hardly be surprised that
-Demosthenes “became out of his mind”[1094] (such is the expression of
-Æschines) on hearing a proposition so fraught with imprudence. Philip
-would have gained his point even without a battle, if, by holding
-out the lure of negotiation for peace, he could have prevailed upon
-the allied army to disperse. To have united the full force of Athens
-and Thebes, with other subordinate states, in the same ranks and
-for the same purpose, was a rare good fortune, not likely to be
-reproduced, should it once slip away. And if Demosthenes, by warm or
-even passionate remonstrance, prevented such premature dispersion, he
-rendered the valuable service of ensuring to Grecian liberty a full
-trial of strength under circumstances not unpromising; and at the
-very worst, a catastrophe worthy and honorable.
-
-  [1091] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.
-
-  [1092] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 19, 20; Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. p. 72.
-
-  [1093] Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. p. 74, 75.
-
-  [1094] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 75. Ὡς δ᾽ οὐ προσεῖχον αὐτῷ
-  (Δημοσθένει) οἱ ἄρχοντες οἱ ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς
-  στρατιώτας τοὺς ὑμετέρους πάλιν ἀνέστρεψαν ἐξεληλυθότας, ἵνα
-  βουλεύσαισθε περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, ἐνταῦθα παντάπασιν ἔκφρων ἐγένετο,
-  etc.
-
-  It is, seemingly, this disposition on the part of Philip to open
-  negotiations which is alluded to by Plutarch as having been
-  (Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16) favorably received by Phokion.
-
-In the field of battle near Chæroneia, Philip himself commanded a
-chosen body of troops on the wing opposed to the Athenians, while his
-youthful son, Alexander, aided by experienced officers, commanded
-against the Thebans on the other wing. Respecting the course of the
-battle, we are scarcely permitted to know anything. It is said to
-have been so obstinately contested, that for some time the result
-was doubtful. The Sacred Band of Thebes, who charged in one portion
-of the Theban phalanx, exhausted all their strength and energy in an
-unavailing attempt to bear down the stronger phalanx and multiplied
-pikes opposed to them. The youthful Alexander[1095] here first
-displayed his great military energy and ability. After a long and
-murderous struggle, the Theban Sacred Band were all overpowered and
-perished in their ranks,[1096] while the Theban phalanx was broken
-and pushed back. Philip on his side was still engaged in undecided
-conflict with the Athenians, whose first onset is said to have been
-so impetuous, as to put to flight some of the troops in his army;
-insomuch that the Athenian general exclaimed in triumph, “Let us
-pursue them even to Macedonia.”[1097] It is farther said that Philip
-on his side simulated a retreat, for the purpose of inducing them
-to pursue and to break their order. We read another statement, more
-likely to be true—that the Athenian hoplites, though full of energy
-at the first shock, could not endure fatigue and prolonged struggle
-like the trained veterans in the opposite ranks.[1098] Having
-steadily repelled them for a considerable time, Philip became emulous
-on witnessing the success of his son, and redoubled his efforts; so
-as to break and disperse them. The whole Grecian army was thus put to
-flight with severe loss.[1099]
-
-  [1095] Diodor. xvi. 85. Alexander himself, after his vast
-  conquests in Asia and shortly before his death, alludes briefly
-  to his own presence at Chæroneia, in a speech delivered to his
-  army (Arrian, vii. 9, 5).
-
-  [1096] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18.
-
-  [1097] Polyænus, iv. 2, 2. He mentions Stratokles as the Athenian
-  general from whom this exclamation came. We know from Æschines
-  (adv. Ktesiph. p. 74) that Stratokles was general of the Athenian
-  troops at or near Thebes shortly after the alliance with the
-  Thebans was formed. But it seems that Chares and Lysikles
-  commanded at Chæroneia. It is possible, therefore, that the
-  anecdote reported by Polyænus may refer to one of the earlier
-  battles fought, before that of Chæroneia.
-
-  [1098] Polyænus, iv. 2, 7; Frontinus.
-
-  [1099] Diodor. xvi. 85, 86.
-
-The Macedonian phalanx, as armed and organized by Philip, was sixteen
-deep; less deep than that of the Thebans either at Delium or at
-Leuktra. It had veteran soldiers of great strength and complete
-training, in its front ranks; yet probably soldiers hardly superior
-to the Sacred Band, who formed the Theban front rank. But its great
-superiority was in the length of the Macedonian pike or sarissa—in
-the number of these weapons which projected in front of the foremost
-soldiers—and the long practice of the men to manage this impenetrable
-array of pikes in an efficient manner. The value of Philip’s improved
-phalanx was attested by his victory at Chæroneia.
-
-But the victory was not gained by the phalanx alone. The military
-organization of Philip comprised an aggregate of many sorts of troops
-besides the phalanx; the body-guards, horse as well as foot—the
-hypaspistæ, or light hoplites—the light cavalry, bowmen, slingers,
-etc. When we read the military operations of Alexander, three years
-afterwards, in the very first year of his reign, before he could have
-made any addition of his own to the force inherited from Philip;
-and when we see with what efficiency all these various descriptions
-of troops are employed in the field;[1100] we may feel assured that
-Philip both had them near him and employed them at the battle of
-Chæroneia.
-
-  [1100] Arrian, Exp. Alex. i. 2, 3, 10.
-
-One thousand Athenian citizens perished in this disastrous field;
-two thousand more fell into the hands of Philip as prisoners.[1101]
-The Theban loss is said also to have been terrible, as well as
-the Achæan.[1102] But we do not know the numbers; nor have we any
-statement of the Macedonian loss. Demosthenes, himself present in
-the ranks of the hoplites, shared in the flight of his defeated
-countrymen. He is accused by his political enemies of having behaved
-with extreme and disgraceful cowardice; but we see plainly from the
-continued confidence and respect shown to him by the general body
-of his countrymen, that they cannot have credited the imputation.
-The two Athenian generals Chares and Lysikles, both escaped from the
-field. The latter was afterwards publicly accused at Athens by the
-orator Lykurgus—a citizen highly respected for his integrity and
-diligence in the management of the finances, and severe in arraigning
-political delinquents. Lysikles was condemned to death by the
-Dikastery.[1103] What there was to distinguish his conduct from that
-of his colleague Chares—who certainly was not condemned, and is not
-even stated to have been accused—we do not know. The memory of the
-Theban general Theagenes[1104] also, though he fell in the battle,
-was assailed by charges of treason.
-
-  [1101] This is the statement of the contemporary orators
-  (Demades, Frag. p. 179) Lykurgus (ap. Diodor. xvi. 85; adv.
-  Leokratem, p. 236. c. 36) and Demosthenes (De Coronâ, p. 314).
-  The latter does not specify the number of prisoners, though he
-  states the slain at one thousand. Compare Pausanias, vii. 10, 2.
-
-  [1102] Pausanias, vii. 6, 3.
-
-  [1103] Diodor. xvi. 88.
-
-  [1104] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 12; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p. 99.
-  Compare the Pseudo-Demosthenic Oratio Funebr. p. 1395.
-
-Unspeakable was the agony at Athens, on the report of this disaster,
-with a multitude of citizens as yet unknown left on the field
-or prisoners, and a victorious enemy within three or four days’
-march of the city. The whole population, even old men, women, and
-children, were spread about the streets in all the violence of
-grief and terror, interchanging effusions of distress and sympathy,
-and questioning every fugitive as he arrived about the safety of
-their relatives in the battle.[1105] The flower of the citizens of
-military age had been engaged; and before the extent of loss had been
-ascertained, it was feared that none except the elders would be left
-to defend the city. At length the definite loss became known: severe
-indeed and terrible—yet not a total shipwreck, like that of the army
-of Nikias in Sicily.
-
-  [1105] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 164, 166. c. 11; Deinarchus
-  cont. Demosth. p. 99.
-
-As on that trying occasion, so now: amidst all the distress and
-alarm, it was not in the Athenian character to despair. The mass of
-citizens hastened unbidden to form a public assembly,[1106] wherein
-the most energetic resolutions were taken for defence. Decrees were
-passed enjoining every one to carry his family and property out of
-the open country of Attica into the various strongholds; directing
-the body of the senators, who by general rule were exempt from
-military service, to march down in arms to Peiræus, and put that
-harbor in condition to stand a siege; placing every man without
-exception at the disposal of the generals, as a soldier for defence,
-and imposing the penalties of treason on every one who fled;[1107]
-enfranchising all slaves fit for bearing arms, granting the
-citizenship to metics under the same circumstances, and restoring
-to the full privilege of citizens those who had been disfranchised
-by judicial sentence.[1108] This last-mentioned decree was proposed
-by Hyperides; but several others were moved by Demosthenes, who,
-notwithstanding the late misfortune of the Athenian arms, was
-listened to with undiminished respect and confidence. The general
-measures requisite for strengthening the walls, opening ditches,
-distributing military posts and constructing earthwork, were decreed
-on his motion; and he seems to have been named member of a special
-Board for superintending the fortifications.[1109] Not only he, but
-also most of the conspicuous citizens and habitual speakers in the
-assembly, came forward with large private contributions to meet the
-pressing wants of the moment.[1110] Every man in the city lent a hand
-to make good the defective points in the fortification. Materials
-were obtained by felling the trees near the city, and even by taking
-stones from the adjacent sepulchres[1111]—as had been done after
-the Persian war when the walls were built under the contrivance of
-Themistokles.[1112] The temples were stripped of the arms suspended
-within them, for the purpose of equipping unarmed citizens.[1113] By
-such earnest and unanimous efforts, the defences of the city and of
-Peiræus were soon materially improved. At sea Athens had nothing to
-fear. Her powerful naval force was untouched, and her superiority to
-Philip on that element incontestable. Envoys were sent to Trœzen,
-Epidaurus, Andros, Keos, and other places, to solicit aid, and
-collect money; in one or other of which embassies Demosthenes served,
-after he had provided for the immediate exigencies of defence.[1114]
-
-  [1106] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 146. Γεγενημένης γὰρ τῆς ἐν
-  Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχης, καὶ συνδραμόντων ἁπάντων ὑμῶν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν,
-  ἐψηφίσατο ὁ δῆμος, παῖδας μὲν καὶ γυναῖκας ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν εἰς τὰ
-  τείχη κατακομίζειν, etc.
-
-  [1107] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 177. c. 13.
-
-  [1108] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 170. c. 11. ἥνιχ᾽ ὁρᾷν ἦν
-  τὸν δῆμον ψηφισάμενον τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐλευθέρους, τοὺς δὲ
-  ξένους Ἀθηναίους, τοὺς δὲ ἀτίμους ἐντίμους. The orator causes
-  this decree, proposed by Hyperides, to be read publicly by the
-  secretary, in court.
-
-  Compare Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 849. and Demosth. cont.
-  Aristog. p. 803.
-
-  [1109] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 309; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p.
-  100.
-
-  [1110] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 329; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p.
-  100; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 851.
-
-  [1111] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 172. c. 11; Æschines adv.
-  Ktesiph. p. 87.
-
-  [1112] Thucyd. i. 93.
-
-  [1113] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. _l. c._
-
-  [1114] Lykurgus (adv. Leokrat. p. 171 c. 11) mentions these
-  embassies; Deinarchus (adv. Demosth. p. 100) affirms that
-  Demosthenes provided for himself an escape from the city as an
-  envoy—αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν πρεσβευτὴν κατασκεύασας, ἵν᾽ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως
-  ἀποδραίη, etc. Compare Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 76.
-
-  The two hostile orators treat such temporary absence of
-  Demosthenes on the embassy to obtain aid, as if it were a
-  cowardly desertion of his post. This is a construction altogether
-  unjust.
-
-What was the immediate result of these applications to other cities,
-we do not know. But the effect produced upon some of these Ægean
-islands by the reported prostration of Athens, is remarkable. An
-Athenian citizen named Leokrates, instead of staying at Athens to
-join in the defence, listened only to a disgraceful timidity,[1115]
-and fled forthwith from Peiræus with his family and property. He
-hastened to Rhodes, where he circulated the false news that Athens
-was already taken and the Peiræus under siege. Immediately on hearing
-this intelligence, and believing it to be true, the Rhodians with
-their triremes began a cruise to seize the merchant-vessels at
-sea.[1116] Hence we learn, indirectly, that the Athenian naval power
-constituted the standing protection for these merchant vessels;
-insomuch that so soon as that protection was removed, armed cruisers
-began to prey upon them from various islands in the Ægean.
-
-  [1115] Leokrates was not the only Athenian who fled, or tried to
-  flee. Another was seized in the attempt (according to Æschines)
-  and condemned to death by the Council of Areopagus (Æschines
-  adv. Ktesiph. p. 89). A member of the Areopagus itself, named
-  Autolykus (the same probably who is mentioned with peculiar
-  respect by Æschines cont. Timarchum, p. 12), sent away his family
-  for safety; Lykurgus afterwards impeached him for it, and he was
-  condemned by the Dikastery (Harpokration v. Αὐτόλυκος).
-
-  [1116] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 149. Οὕτω δὲ σφόδρα ταῦτ᾽
-  ἐπίστευσαν οἱ Ῥόδιοι, ὥστε τριήρεις πληρώσαντες τὰ πλοῖα κατῆγον,
-  etc.
-
-Such were the precautions taken at Athens after this fatal day. But
-Athens lay at a distance of three or four days’ march from the field
-of Chæroneia; while Thebes, being much nearer, bore the first attack
-of Philip. Of the behavior of that prince after his victory, we have
-contradictory statements. According to one account, he indulged in
-the most insulting and licentious exultation on the field of battle,
-jesting especially on the oratory and motions of Demosthenes; a
-temper, from which he was brought round by the courageous reproof of
-Demades, then his prisoner as one of the Athenian hoplites.[1117] At
-first he even refused to grant permission to inter the slain, when
-the herald came from Lebadeia to make the customary demand.[1118]
-According to another account, the demeanor of Philip towards the
-defeated Athenians was gentle and forbearing.[1119] However the fact
-may have stood as to his first manifestations, it is certain that
-his positive measures were harsh towards Thebes and lenient towards
-Athens. He sold the Theban captives into slavery; he is said also
-to have exacted a price for the liberty granted to bury the Theban
-slain—which liberty, according to Grecian custom, was never refused
-and certainly never sold, by the victor. Whether Thebes made any
-farther resistance, or stood a siege, we do not know. But presently
-the city fell into Philip’s power, who put to death several of the
-leading citizens, banished others, and confiscated the property of
-both. A council of Three Hundred—composed of philippizing Thebans,
-for the most part just recalled from exile—was invested with the
-government of the city, and with powers of life and death over every
-one.[1120] The state of Thebes became much the same as it had been
-when the Spartan Phœbidas, in concert with the Theban party headed
-by Leontiades, surprised the Kadmeia. A Macedonian garrison was
-now placed in the Kadmeia, as a Spartan garrison had been placed
-then. Supported by this garrison, the philippizing Thebans were
-uncontrolled masters of the city; with full power, and no reluctance,
-to gratify their political antipathies. At the same time, Philip
-restored the minor Bœotian towns—Orchomenus, and Platæa, probably
-also Thespiæ and Koroneia—to the condition of free communities
-instead of subjection to Thebes.[1121]
-
-  [1117] Diodor. xvi. 87. The story respecting Demades is told
-  somewhat differently in Sextus Empiricus adv. Grammaticos, p. 281.
-
-  [1118] Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator, p. 849.
-
-  [1119] Justin, ix. 4; Polybius, v. 10; Theopomp. Frag. 262. See
-  the note of Wichers ad Theopompi Fragmenta, p. 259.
-
-  [1120] Justin, ix. 4. Dienarch. cont. Demosth. s. 20. p. 92.
-
-  [1121] Pausanias, iv. 25, 5; ix. 1, 3.
-
-At Athens also, the philippizing orators raised their voices
-loudly and confidently, denouncing Demosthenes and his policy.
-New speakers,[1122] who would hardly have come forward before,
-were now put up against him. The accusations however altogether
-failed; the people continued to trust him, omitting no measure of
-defence which he suggested. Æschines, who had before disclaimed all
-connection with Philip, now altered his tone, and made boast of the
-ties of friendship and hospitality subsisting between that prince
-and himself.[1123] He tendered his services to go as envoy to the
-Macedonian camp; whither he appears to have been sent, doubtless with
-others, perhaps with Xenokrates and Phokion.[1124] Among them was
-Demades also, having been just released from his captivity. Either by
-the persuasions of Demades, or by a change in his own dispositions,
-Philip had now become inclined to treat with Athens on favorable
-terms. The bodies of the slain Athenians were burned by the victors,
-and their ashes collected to be carried to Athens; though the formal
-application of the herald to the same effect, had been previously
-refused.[1125] Æschines (according to the assertion of Demosthenes)
-took part as a sympathizing guest in the banquet and festivities
-whereby Philip celebrated his triumph over Grecian liberty.[1126] At
-length Demades with the other envoys returned to Athens, reporting
-the consent of Philip to conclude peace, to give back the numerous
-prisoners in his hands, and also to transfer Oropus from the Thebans
-to Athens.
-
-  [1122] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 310. οὐ δι᾽ ἑαυτῶν τό γε πρῶτον,
-  ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ὧν μάλισθ᾽ ὑπελάμβανον ἀγνοήσεσθαι, etc.
-
-  So the enemies of Alkibiades put up against him in the assembly
-  speakers of affected candor and impartiality—ἄλλους ῥήτορας
-  ἐνιέντες, etc. Thucyd. vi. 29.
-
-  [1123] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 319, 320.
-
-  [1124] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 319. ὃς εὐθέως μετὰ τὴν μάχην
-  πρεσβευτὴς ἐπορεύου πρὸς Φίλιππον, etc. Compare Plutarch,
-  Phokion, c. 16. Diogen. Laert. iv. 5. in his Life of the
-  Philosopher Xenokrates.
-
-  [1125] Demades, Fragment. Orat. p. 179. χιλίων ταφὴ Ἀθηναίων
-  μαρτυρεῖ μοι, κηδευθεῖσα ταῖς τῶν ἐναντίων χερσὶν, ἃς ἀντὶ
-  πολεμίων φιλίας ἐποίησα τοῖς ἀποθανοῦσιν. Ἐνταῦθα ἐπιστὰς τοῖς
-  πράγμασιν ἔγραψα τὴν εἰρήνην· ὁμολογῶ. Ἔγραψα καὶ Φιλίππῳ τιμάς·
-  οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι· δισχιλίους γὰρ αἰχμαλώτους ἄνευ λύτρων καὶ χίλια
-  πολιτῶν σώματα χωρὶς κήρυκος, καὶ τὸν Ὠρωπὸν ἄνευ πρεσβείας λαβὼν
-  ὑμῖν, ταῦτ᾽ ἔγραψα. See also Suidas v. Δημάδης.
-
-  [1126] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 321.
-
-Demades proposed the conclusion of peace to the Athenian assembly,
-by whom it was readily decreed. To escape invasion and siege by
-the Macedonian army, was doubtless an unspeakable relief; while
-the recovery of the two thousand prisoners without ransom, was an
-acquisition of great importance, not merely to the city collectively,
-but to the sympathies of numerous relatives. Lastly, to regain
-Oropus—a possession which they had once enjoyed, and for which
-they had long wrangled with the Thebans—was a farther cause of
-satisfaction. Such conditions were doubtless acceptable at Athens.
-But there was a submission to be made on the other side, which to the
-contemporaries of Perikles would have seemed intolerable, even as
-the price of averted invasion or recovered captives. The Athenians
-were required to acknowledge the exaltation of Philip to the headship
-of the Grecian world, and to promote the like acknowledgment by all
-other Greeks, in a congress to be speedily convened. They were to
-renounce all pretensions of headship, not only for themselves, but
-for every other Grecian state; to recognize not Sparta or Thebes,
-but the king of Macedon, as Pan-hellenic chief; to acquiesce in the
-transition of Greece from the position of a free, self-determining,
-political aggregate, into a provincial dependency of the kings of
-Pella and Ægæ. It is not easy to conceive a more terrible shock
-to that traditional sentiment of pride and patriotism, inherited
-from forefathers, who, after repelling and worsting the Persians,
-had first organized the maritime Greeks into a confederacy running
-parallel with and supplementary to the non-maritime Greeks allied
-with Sparta; thus keeping out foreign dominion and casting the
-Grecian world into a system founded on native sympathies and free
-government. Such traditional sentiment, though it no longer governed
-the character of the Athenians or impressed upon them motives of
-action, had still a strong hold upon their imagination and memory,
-where it had been constantly kept alive by the eloquence of
-Demosthenes and others. The peace of Demades, recognizing Philip as
-chief of Greece, was a renunciation of all this proud historical
-past, and the acceptance of a new and degraded position, for Athens
-as well as for Greece generally.
-
-Polybius praises the generosity of Philip in granting such favorable
-terms, and even affirms, not very accurately, that he secured thereby
-the steady gratitude and attachment of the Athenians.[1127] But
-Philip would have gained nothing by killing his prisoners; not to
-mention that he would have provoked an implacable spirit of revenge
-among the Athenians. By selling his prisoners for slaves he would
-have gained something, but by the use actually made of them he
-gained more. The recognition of his Hellenic supremacy by Athens
-was the capital step for the prosecution of his objects. It ensured
-him against dissentients among the remaining Grecian states, whose
-adhesion had not yet been made certain, and who might possibly have
-stood out against a proposition so novel and so anti-Hellenic, had
-Athens set them the example. Moreover, if Philip had not purchased
-the recognition of Athens in this way, he might have failed in trying
-to extort it by force. For though, being master of the field, he
-could lay waste Attica with impunity, and even establish a permanent
-fortress in it like Dekeleia—yet the fleet of Athens was as strong
-as ever, and her preponderance at sea irresistible. Under these
-circumstances, Athens and Peiræus might have been defended against
-him, as Byzantium and Perinthus had been, two years before; the
-Athenian fleet might have obstructed his operations in many ways;
-and the siege of Athens might have called forth a burst of Hellenic
-sympathy, such as to embarrass his farther progress. Thebes—an inland
-city, hated by the other Bœotian cities—was prostrated by the battle
-of Chæroneia, and left without any means of successful defence. But
-the same blow was not absolutely mortal to Athens, united in her
-population throughout all the area of Attica, and superior at sea.
-We may see therefore, that—with such difficulties before him if he
-pushed the Athenians to despair—Philip acted wisely in employing
-his victory and his prisoners to procure her recognition of his
-headship. His political game was well-played, now as always; but to
-the praise of generosity bestowed by Polybius, he has little claim.
-
-  [1127] Polybius, v. 10; xvii. 14; Diodor. Fragm. lib. xxxii.
-
-Besides the recognition of Philip as chief of Greece, the Athenians,
-on the motion of Demades, passed various honorary and complimentary
-votes in his favor; of what precise nature we do not know.[1128]
-Immediate relief from danger, with the restoration of two thousand
-captive citizens, were sufficient to render the peace popular at
-the first moment; moreover, the Athenians, as if conscious of
-failing resolution and strength, were now entering upon that career
-of flattery to powerful kings, which we shall hereafter find them
-pushing to disgraceful extravagance. It was probably during the
-prevalence of this sentiment, which did not long continue, that the
-youthful Alexander of Macedon, accompanied by Antipater, paid a visit
-to Athens.[1129]
-
-  [1128] Demades, Frag. p. 179. ἔγραψα καὶ Φιλίππῳ τιμὰς, οὐκ
-  ἀρνοῦμαι, etc. Compare Arrian, Exp. Alex. i. 2, 3—καὶ πλείονα ἔτι
-  τῶν Φιλίππῳ δοθέντων Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐς τιμὴν ξυγχωρῆσαι, etc., and
-  Clemens Alex. Admonit. ad Gent. p. 36 B. τὸν Μακεδόνα Φίλιππον ἐν
-  Κυνοσάργει νομοθετοῦντες προσκυνεῖν, etc.
-
-  [1129] Justin, ix. 4.
-
-Meanwhile the respect enjoyed by Demosthenes among his countrymen was
-noway lessened. Though his political opponents thought the season
-favorable for bringing many impeachments against him, none of them
-proved successful: and when the time came for electing a public
-orator to deliver the funeral discourse at the obsequies celebrated
-for the slain at Chæroneia—he was invested with that solemn duty,
-not only in preference to Æschines, who was put up in competition,
-but also to Demades the recent mover of the peace[1130]—and honored
-with strong marks of esteem and sympathy from the surviving
-relatives of these gallant citizens. Moreover it farther appears
-that Demosthenes was continued in an important financial post as one
-of the joint managers of the Theôric Fund, and as member of a Board
-for purchasing corn; he was also continued, or shortly afterwards
-re-appointed, superintendent of the walls and defences of the city.
-The orator Hyperides, the political coadjutor of Demosthenes, was
-impeached by Aristogeiton under the Graphê Paranomon, for his illegal
-and unconstitutional decree (proposed under the immediate terror
-of the defeat at Chæroneia), to grant manumission to the slaves,
-citizenship to metics, and restoration of citizenship to those
-who had been disfranchised by judicial sentence. The occurrence
-of peace had removed all necessity for acting upon this decree;
-nevertheless an impeachment was entered and brought against its
-mover. Hyperides, unable to deny its illegality, placed his defence
-on the true and obvious ground—“The Macedonian arms (he said)
-darkened my vision. It was not I who moved the decree; it was the
-battle of Chæroneia.”[1131] The substantive defence was admitted by
-the Dikastery; while the bold oratorical turn attracted notice from
-rhetorical critics.
-
-  [1130] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 310-320.
-
-  [1131] Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 849.
-
-Having thus subjugated and garrisoned Thebes—having reconstituted the
-anti-Theban cities in Bœotia—having constrained Athens to submission
-and dependent alliance—and having established a garrison in Ambrakia,
-at the same time mastering Akarnania, and banishing the leading
-Akarnanians who were opposed to him—Philip next proceeded to carry
-his arms into Peloponnesus. He found little positive resistance
-anywhere, except in the territory of Sparta. The Corinthians,
-Argeians, Messenians, Eleians, and many Arcadians, all submitted to
-his dominion; some even courted his alliance, from fear and antipathy
-against Sparta. Philip invaded Laconia with an army too powerful for
-the Spartans to resist in the field. He laid waste the country, and
-took some detached posts; but he did not take, nor do we know that
-he even attacked, Sparta itself. The Spartans could not resist; yet
-would they neither submit, nor ask for peace. It appears that Philip
-cut down their territory and narrowed their boundaries on all the
-three sides; towards Argos, Messênê, and Megalopolis.[1132] We have
-no precise account of the details of his proceedings; but it is clear
-that he did just what seemed to him good, and that the governments of
-all the Peloponnesian cities came into the hands of his partisans.
-Sparta was the only city which stood out against him; maintaining her
-ancient freedom and dignity, under circumstances of feebleness and
-humiliation, with more unshaken resolution than Athens.
-
-  [1132] Polybius, ix. 28, 33, xvii. 14; Tacitus, Annal. iv. 43;
-  Strabo, viii. p. 361; Pausanias, ii. 20, 1. viii. 7, 4. viii. 27,
-  8. From Diodorus xvii. 3, we see how much this adhesion to Philip
-  was obtained under the pressure of necessity.
-
-Philip next proceeded to convene a congress of Grecian cities at
-Corinth. He here announced himself as resolved on an expedition
-against the Persian king, for the purpose both of liberating the
-Asiatic Greeks, and avenging the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. The
-general vote of the congress nominated him leader of the united
-Greeks for this purpose, and decreed a Grecian force to join him,
-to be formed of contingents furnished by the various cities. The
-total of the force promised is stated only by Justin, who gives it
-at two hundred thousand foot, and fifteen thousand horse; an army
-which Greece certainly could not have furnished, and which we can
-hardly believe to have been even promised.[1133] The Spartans stood
-aloof from the congress, continuing to refuse all recognition of
-the headship of Philip. The Athenians attended and concurred in the
-vote; which was in fact the next step to carry out the peace made
-by Demades. They were required to furnish a well-equipped fleet
-to serve under Philip; and they were at the same time divested of
-their dignity of chiefs of a maritime confederacy, the islands being
-enrolled as maritime dependencies of Philip, instead of continuing
-to send deputies to a synod meeting at Athens.[1134] It appears that
-Samos was still recognized as belonging to them[1135]—or at least
-such portion of the island as was occupied by the numerous Athenian
-kleruchs or out-settlers, first established in the island after the
-conquest by Timotheus in 365 B. C., and afterwards reinforced. For
-several years afterwards, the naval force in the dockyards of Athens
-still continued large and powerful; but her maritime ascendency
-henceforward disappears.
-
-  [1133] Justin, ix. 5.
-
-  [1134] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16; Pausanias, i. 25, 3. Τὸ γὰρ
-  ἀτύχημα τὸ ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ ἅπασι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἦρξε κακοῦ, καὶ οὐχ
-  ἥκιστα δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς ὑπεριδόντας, καὶ ὅσοι μετὰ Μακεδόνων
-  ἐτάχθησαν. Τὰς μὲν δὴ πολλὰς Φίλιππος τῶν πόλεων εἷλεν. Ἀθηναίοις
-  δὲ λόγῳ συνθέμενος, ἔργῳ σφᾶς μάλιστα ἐκάκωσε, νήσους τε
-  ἀφελόμενος καὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ ναυτικὰ παύσας ἀρχῆς.
-
-  [1135] Diodor. xviii. 56. Σάμον δὲ δίδομεν Ἀθηναίοις, ἐπειδὴ καὶ
-  Φίλιππος ἔδωκεν ὁ πατήρ. Compare Plutarch, Alexand. c. 28.
-
-The Athenians, deeply mortified by such humiliation, were reminded
-by Phokion that it was a necessary result of the peace which they
-had accepted on the motion of Demades, and that it was now too late
-to murmur.[1136] We cannot wonder at their feelings. Together with
-the other free cities of Greece, they were enrolled as contributory
-appendages of the king of Macedon; a revolution, to them more galling
-than to the rest, since they passed at once, not merely from simple
-autonomy, but from a condition of superior dignity, into the common
-dependence. Athens had only to sanction the scheme dictated by
-Philip and to furnish her quota towards the execution. Moreover,
-this scheme—the invasion of Persia—had ceased to be an object of
-genuine aspiration throughout the Grecian world. The Great King,
-no longer inspiring terror to Greece collectively, might now be
-regarded as likely to lend protection against Macedonian oppression.
-To emancipate the Asiatic Greeks from Persian dominion would be
-in itself an enterprise grateful to Grecian feeling, though all
-such wishes must have been gradually dying out since the peace of
-Antalkidas. But emancipation, accomplished by Philip, would be only
-a transfer of the Asiatic Greeks from Persian dominion to his. The
-synod of Corinth served no purpose except to harness the Greeks to
-his car, for a distant enterprise lucrative to his soldiers and
-suited to his insatiable ambition.
-
-  [1136] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.
-
-It was in 337 B. C. that this Persian expedition was concerted and
-resolved. During that year preparations were made of sufficient
-magnitude to exhaust the finances of Philip;[1137] who was at the
-same time engaged in military operations, and fought a severe battle
-against the Illyrian king Pleurias.[1138] In the spring of 336 B.
-C., a portion of the Macedonian army under Parmenio and Attalus, was
-sent across to Asia to commence military operations; Philip himself
-intending speedily to follow.[1139]
-
-  [1137] Arrian, vii. 9, 5.
-
-  [1138] Diodor. xvi. 93.
-
-  [1139] Justin, ix. 5; Diodor. xvi. 91.
-
-Such however was not the fate reserved for him. Not long before,
-he had taken the resolution of repudiating, on the allegation of
-infidelity, his wife Olympias; who is said to have become repugnant
-to him, from the furious and savage impulses of her character.
-He had successively married several wives, the last of whom was
-Kleopatra, niece of the Macedonian Attalus. It was at her instance
-that he is said to have repudiated Olympias; who retired to her
-brother Alexander of Epirus.[1140] This step provoked violent
-dissensions among the partisans of the two queens, and even between
-Philip and his son Alexander, who expressed a strong resentment
-at the repudiation of his mother. Amidst the intoxication of the
-marriage banquet, Attalus proposed a toast and prayer, that there
-might speedily appear a legitimate son, from Philip and Kleopatra,
-to succeed to the Macedonian throne. Upon which Alexander exclaimed
-in wrath—“Do you then proclaim _me_ as a bastard?”—at the same time
-hurling a goblet at him. Incensed at this proceeding, Philip started
-up, drew his sword, and made furiously at his son; but fell to the
-ground from passion and intoxication. This accident alone preserved
-the life of Alexander; who retorted—“Here is a man, preparing to
-cross from Europe into Asia—who yet cannot step surely from one
-couch to another.[1141]” After this violent quarrel the father and
-son separated. Alexander conducted his mother into Epirus, and then
-went himself to the Illyrian king. Some months afterwards, at the
-instance of the Corinthian Demaratus, Philip sent for him back, and
-became reconciled to him; but another cause of displeasure soon
-arose, because Alexander had opened a negotiation for marriage with
-the daughter of the satrap of Karia. Rejecting such an alliance
-as unworthy, Philip sharply reproved his son, and banished from
-Macedonia several courtiers whom he suspected as intimate with
-Alexander;[1142] while the friends of Attalus stood high in favor.
-
-  [1140] Athenæus, xiii. p. 557; Justin, ix. 7.
-
-  [1141] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 9; Justin, ix. 7; Diodor. xvi. 91-93.
-
-  [1142] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 10; Arrian, iii. 6, 5.
-
-Such were the animosities distracting the court and family of Philip.
-A son had just been born to him from his new wife Kleopatra.[1143]
-His expedition against Persia, resolved and prepared during the
-preceding year, had been actually commenced; Parmenio and Attalus
-having been sent across to Asia with the first division, to be
-followed presently by himself with the remaining army. But Philip
-foresaw that during his absence danger might arise from the furious
-Olympias, bitterly exasperated by the recent events, and instigating
-her brother Alexander king of Epirus, with whom she was now residing.
-Philip indeed held a Macedonian garrison in Ambrakia,[1144] the chief
-Grecian city on the Epirotic border; and he had also contributed much
-to establish Alexander as prince. But he now deemed it essential to
-conciliate him still farther, by a special tie of alliance; giving to
-him in marriage Kleopatra, his daughter by Olympias.[1145] For this
-marriage, celebrated at Ægæ in Macedonia in August 336 B. C., Philip
-provided festivals of the utmost cost and splendor, commemorating
-at the same time the recent birth of his son by Kleopatra.[1146]
-Banquets, munificent presents, gymnastic and musical matches, tragic
-exhibitions,[1147] among which Neoptolemus the actor performed in
-the tragedy of Kinyras, etc. with every species of attraction known
-to the age—were accumulated, in order to reconcile the dissentient
-parties in Macedonia, and to render the effect imposing on the
-minds of the Greeks; who, from every city, sent deputies for
-congratulation. Statues of the twelve great gods, admirably executed,
-were carried in solemn procession into the theatre; immediately after
-them, the statue of Philip himself as a thirteenth god.[1148]
-
-  [1143] Pausanias (viii. 7, 5) mentions a son born to Philip by
-  Kleopatra; Diodorus (xvii. 2) also notices a son. Justin in one
-  place (ix. 7) mentions a daughter, and in another place (xi. 2)
-  a son named Caranus. Satyrus (ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 557) states
-  that a daughter named Eurôpê was born to him by Kleopatra.
-
-  It appears that the son was born only a short time before the
-  last festival and the assassination of Philip, But I incline to
-  think that the marriage with Kleopatra may well have taken place
-  two years or more before that event, and that there may have been
-  a daughter born before the son. Certainly Justin distinguishes
-  the two, stating that the daughter was killed by order of
-  Olympias, and the son by that of Alexander (ix. 7; xi. 2).
-
-  Arrian (iii. 6, 5) seems to mean _Kleopatra_ the wife of Philip,
-  though he speaks of Eurydikê.
-
-  [1144] Diodor. xvii. 3.
-
-  [1145] This Kleopatra—daughter of Philip, sister of Alexander the
-  Great, and bearing the same name as Philip’s last wife—was thus
-  niece of the Epirotic Alexander, her husband. Alliances of that
-  degree of kindred were then neither disreputable nor unfrequent.
-
-  [1146] Diodor. xvii. 2.
-
-  [1147] Josephus, Antiq. xix. 1, 13; Suetonius, Caligula, c. 57.
-  See Mr. Clinton’s Appendix (4) on the Kings of Macedonia. Fast.
-  Hellen. p. 230, note.
-
-  [1148] Diodor. xvi. 92.
-
-Amidst this festive multitude, however, there were not wanting
-discontented partisans of Olympias and Alexander, to both of whom the
-young queen with her new-born child threatened a formidable rivalry.
-There was also a malcontent yet more dangerous—Pausanias, one of the
-royal body-guards, a noble youth born in the district called Orestis
-in Upper Macedonia; who, from causes of offence peculiar to himself,
-nourished a deadly hatred against Philip. The provocation which he
-had received is one which we can neither conveniently transcribe,
-nor indeed accurately make out, amidst discrepancies of statement.
-It was Attalus, the uncle of the new queen Kleopatra, who had given
-the provocation, by inflicting upon Pausanias an outrage of the
-most brutal and revolting character. Even for so monstrous an act,
-no regular justice could be had in Macedonia, against a powerful
-man. Pausanias complained to Philip in person. According to one
-account, Philip put aside the complaint with evasions, and even
-treated it with ridicule; according to another account, he expressed
-his displeasure at the act, and tried to console Pausanias by
-pecuniary presents. But he granted neither redress nor satisfaction
-to the sentiment of an outraged man.[1149] Accordingly Pausanias
-determined to take revenge for himself. Instead of revenging himself
-on Attalus—who indeed was out of his reach, being at the head of the
-Macedonian troops in Asia—his wrath fixed upon Philip himself, by
-whom the demand for redress had been refused. It appears that this
-turn of sentiment, diverting the appetite for revenge away from the
-real criminal, was not wholly spontaneous on the part of Pausanias,
-but was artfully instigated by various party conspirators who wished
-to destroy Philip. The enemies of Attalus and queen Kleopatra (who
-herself is said to have treated Pausanias with insult[1150])—being of
-course also partisans of Olympias and Alexander—were well disposed
-to make use of the maddened Pausanias as an instrument, and to
-direct his exasperation against the king. He had poured forth his
-complaints both to Olympias and to Alexander; the former is said to
-have worked him up vehemently against her late husband—and even the
-latter repeated to him a verse out of Euripides, wherein the fierce
-Medea, deserted by her husband Jason who had married the daughter of
-the Corinthian king Kreon, vows to include in her revenge the king
-himself, together with her husband and his new wife.[1151] That the
-vindictive Olympias would positively spur on Pausanias to assassinate
-Philip, is highly probable. Respecting Alexander, though he also
-was accused, there is no sufficient evidence to warrant a similar
-assertion; but that some among his partisans—men eager to consult
-his feelings and to ensure his succession—lent their encouragements,
-appears tolerably well established. A Greek sophist named Hermokrates
-is also said to have contributed to the deed, though seemingly
-without intention, by his conversation; and the Persian king (an
-improbable report) by his gold.[1152]
-
-  [1149] Aristot. Polit. v. 8. 10. Ἡ Φιλίππου (ἐπίθεσις) ὑπὸ
-  Παυσανίου, διὰ τὸ ἐᾶσαι ὑβρισθῆναι αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ Ἄτταλον, etc.
-  Justin, ix. 6; Diodor. xvi. 93.
-
-  [1150] Plutarch, Alex. c. 10.
-
-  [1151] Plutarch, Alex. c. 10.
-
-  [1152] Arrian, Exp. Alex. ii. 14, 10.
-
-Unconscious of the plot, Philip was about to enter the theatre,
-already crowded with spectators. As he approached the door, clothed
-in a white robe, he felt so exalted with impressions of his own
-dignity, and so confident in the admiring sympathy of the surrounding
-multitude, that he advanced both unarmed and unprotected, directing
-his guards to hold back. At this moment Pausanias, standing near with
-a Gallic sword concealed under his garment, rushed upon him, thrust
-the weapon through his body, and killed him. Having accomplished
-his purpose, the assassin immediately ran off, and tried to reach
-the gates, where he had previously caused horses to be stationed.
-Being strong and active, he might have succeeded in effecting
-his escape—like most of the assassins of Jason of Pheræ[1153]
-under circumstances very similar—had not his foot stumbled amidst
-some vine-stocks. The guards and friends of Philip were at first
-paralyzed with astonishment and consternation. At length however some
-hastened to assist the dying king; while others rushed in pursuit
-of Pausanias. Leonnatus and Perdikkas overtook him and slew him
-immediately.[1154]
-
-  [1153] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 32.
-
-  [1154] Diodor. xvi. 94; Justin, ix. 7; Plutarch, Alex. c. 10.
-
-In what way, or to what extent, the accomplices of Pausanias lent
-him aid, we are not permitted to know. It is possible that they
-may have posted themselves artfully so as to obstruct pursuit,
-and favor his chance of escape; which would appear extremely
-small, after a deed of such unmeasured audacity. Three only of the
-reputed accomplices are known to us by name—three brothers from
-the Lynkestian district of Upper Macedonia—Alexander, Heromenes,
-and Arrhibæus, sons of Æropus;[1155] but it seems that there were
-others besides. The Lynkestian Alexander—whose father-in-law
-Antipater was one of the most conspicuous and confidential officers
-in the service of Philip—belonged to a good family in Macedonia,
-perhaps even descendants from the ancient family of the princes of
-Lynkestis.[1156] It was he, who, immediately after Pausanias had
-assassinated Philip, hastened to salute the prince Alexander as king,
-helped him to put on his armor, and marched as one of his guards to
-take possession of the regal palace.[1157]
-
-  [1155] Arrian, Exp. Alex. i. 25, 1.
-
-  [1156] Justin, xii. 14; Quintus Curtius, vii. 1, 5, with the note
-  of Mützell.
-
-  [1157] Arrian, i. 25, 2; Justin, xi. 2. “Soli Alexandro
-  Lyncistarum fratri pepercit, servans in eo auspicium dignitatis
-  suæ; nam regem eum primus salutaverat.”
-
-This “prima vox”[1158] was not simply an omen or presage to Alexander
-of empire to come, but essentially serviceable to him as a real
-determining cause or condition. The succession to the Macedonian
-throne was often disturbed by feud or bloodshed among the members
-of the regal family; and under the latter circumstances of Philip’s
-reign, such disturbance was peculiarly probable. He had been on
-bad terms with Alexander, and on still worse terms with Olympias.
-While banishing persons attached to Alexander, he had lent his ear
-to Attalus with the partisans of the new queen Kleopatra. Had these
-latter got the first start after the assassination, they would have
-organized an opposition to Alexander in favor of the infant prince;
-which opposition might have had some chances of success, since they
-had been in favor with the deceased king, and were therefore in
-possession of many important posts. But the deed of Pausanias took
-them unprepared, and for the moment paralyzed them; while, before
-they could recover or take concert, one of the accomplices of the
-assassin ran to put Alexander in motion without delay. A decisive
-initiatory movement from him and his friends, at this critical
-juncture, determined waverers and forestalled opposition. We need not
-wonder therefore that Alexander, when king, testified extraordinary
-gratitude and esteem for his Lynkestian namesake; not simply
-exempting him from the punishment of death inflicted on the other
-accomplices, but also promoting him to great honors and important
-military commands. Neither Alexander and Olympias on the one side,
-nor Attalus and Kleopatra on the other, were personally safe, except
-by acquiring the succession. It was one of the earliest proceedings
-of Alexander to send over a special officer to Asia, for the purpose
-of bringing home Attalus prisoner, or of putting him to death; the
-last of which was done, seemingly through the coöperation of Parmenio
-(who was in joint command with Attalus) and his son Philotas.[1159]
-The unfortunate Kleopatra and her child were both put to death
-shortly afterwards.[1160] Other persons also were slain, of whom I
-shall speak farther in describing the reign of Alexander.
-
-  [1158] Tacitus, Hist. ii. 80. “Dum quæritur tempus locusque,
-  quodque in re tali difficillimum est, _prima vox_; dum animo
-  spes, timor, ratio, casus observantur; egressum cubiculo
-  Vespasianum, pauci milites solito adsistentes ordine,
-  _Imperatorem_ salutavere. Tum cæteri accurrere, _Cæsarem_, et
-  _Augustum_, et omnia principatus vocabula cumulare: mens a metu
-  ad fortunam transierat.”
-
-  [1159] Quintus Curtius, vii. 1, 3; Diodorus, xvii. 2, 5. Compare
-  Justin, xi. 5.
-
-  [1160] Justin, ix. 7; xi. 2. Pausanias, viii. 7, 5; Plutarch,
-  Alex. c. 10.
-
-  According to Pausanias, Olympias caused Kleopatra and her infant
-  boy to perish by a horrible death; being roasted or baked on a
-  brazen vessel surrounded by fire. According to Justin, Olympias
-  first slew the daughter of Kleopatra on her mother’s bosom, and
-  then caused Kleopatra herself to be hanged; while Alexander
-  put to death Caranus, the infant son of Kleopatra. Plutarch
-  says nothing about this; but states that the cruel treatment of
-  Kleopatra was inflicted by order of Olympias during the absence
-  of Alexander, and that he was much displeased at it. The main
-  fact, that Kleopatra and her infant child were despatched by
-  violence, seems not open to reasonable doubt; though we cannot
-  verify the details.
-
-We could have wished to learn from some person actually present,
-the immediate effect produced upon the great miscellaneous crowd in
-the theatre, when the sudden murder of Philip first became known.
-Among the Greeks present, there were doubtless many who welcomed it
-with silent satisfaction, as seeming to reopen for them the door of
-freedom. One person alone dared to manifest satisfaction; and that
-one was Olympias.[1161]
-
-  [1161] After the solemn funeral of Philip, Olympias took down
-  and burned the body of Pausanias (which had been crucified),
-  providing for him a sepulchral monument and an annual ceremony of
-  commemoration. Justin, ix. 7.
-
-Thus perished the destroyer of freedom and independence in the
-Hellenic world, at the age of forty-six or forty-seven, after a reign
-of twenty-three years.[1162] Our information about him is signally
-defective. Neither his means, nor his plans, nor the difficulties
-which he overcame, nor his interior government, are known to us with
-exactness or upon contemporary historical authority. But the great
-results of his reign, and the main lines of his character, stand
-out incontestably. At his accession, the Macedonian kingdom was a
-narrow territory round Pella, excluded partially, by independent and
-powerful Grecian cities, even from the neighboring sea-coast. At his
-death, Macedonian ascendency was established from the coasts of the
-Propontis to those of the Ionian Sea, and the Ambrakian, Messenian,
-and Saronic Gulfs. Within these boundaries, all the cities recognized
-the supremacy of Philip; except only Sparta, and mountaineers like
-the Ætolians and others, defended by a rugged home. Good fortune had
-waited on Philip’s steps, with a few rare interruptions;[1163] but
-it was good fortune crowning the efforts of a rare talent, political
-and military. Indeed the restless ambition, the indefatigable
-personal activity and endurance, and the adventurous courage, of
-Philip, were such as, in a king, suffice almost of themselves to
-guarantee success, even with abilities much inferior to his. That
-among the causes of Philip’s conquests, one was corruption, employed
-abundantly to foment discord and purchase partisans among neighbors
-and enemies—that with winning and agreeable manners, he combined
-recklessness in false promises, deceit and extortion even towards
-allies, and unscrupulous perjury when it suited his purpose—this
-we find affirmed, and there is no reason for disbelieving it.[1164]
-Such dissolving forces smoothed the way for an efficient and
-admirable army, organized, and usually commanded, by himself. Its
-organization adopted and enlarged the best processes of scientific
-warfare employed by Epaminondas and Iphikrates.[1165] Begun as well
-as completed by Philip, and bequeathed as an engine ready-made for
-the conquests of Alexander, it constitutes an epoch in military
-history. But the more we extol the genius of Philip as a conqueror,
-formed for successful encroachment and aggrandizement at the expense
-of all his neighbors—the less can we find room for that mildness and
-moderation which some authors discover in his character. If, on some
-occasions of his life, such attributes may fairly be recognized, we
-have to set against them the destruction of the thirty-two Greek
-cities in Chalkidikê and the wholesale transportation of reluctant
-and miserable families from one inhabitancy to another.
-
-  [1162] Justin (ix. 3) calls Philip forty-seven years of age;
-  Pausanias (viii. 7, 4) speaks of him as forty-six. See Mr.
-  Clinton’s Fast. Hellen. Appen. 4. p. 227.
-
-  [1163] Theopompus, Frag. 265. ap. Athenæ. iii. p. 77. καὶ
-  εὐτυχῆσαι πάντα Φίλιππον. Compare Demosth. Olynth. ii. p. 24.
-
-  [1164] Theopomp. Frag. 249; Theopompus ap. Polybium, viii. 11.
-  ἀδικώτατον δὲ καὶ κακοπραγμονέστατον περὶ τὰς τῶν φίλων καὶ
-  συμμάχων κατασκευὰς, πλείστας δὲ πόλεις ἐξηνδραποδισμένον καὶ
-  πεπραξικοπηκότα μετὰ δόλου καὶ βίας, etc.
-
-  Justin, ix. 8. Pausanias, vii. 7, 3; vii. 10, 4; viii. 7, 4.
-  Diodor. xvi. 54.
-
-  The language of Pausanias about Philip, after doing justice to
-  his great conquests and exploits, is very strong—ὅς γε καὶ ὅρκους
-  θεῶν κατεπάτησεν ἀεὶ, καὶ σπονδὰς ἐπὶ πάντι ἐψεύσατο, πίστιν τε
-  ἠτίμασε μάλιστα ἀνθρώπων, etc. By such conduct, according to
-  Pausanias, Philip brought the divine wrath both upon himself and
-  upon his race, which became extinct with the next generation.
-
-  [1165] A striking passage occurs, too long to cite, in the third
-  Philippic of Demosthenes (p. 123-124) attesting the marvellous
-  stride made by Philip in the art and means of effective warfare.
-
-Besides his skill as a general and a politician, Philip was no mean
-proficient in the Grecian accomplishments of rhetoric and letters.
-The testimony of Æschines as to his effective powers of speaking,
-though requiring some allowance, is not to be rejected. Isokrates
-addresses him as a friend of letters and philosophy; a reputation
-which his choice of Aristotle as instructor of his son Alexander,
-tends to bear out. Yet in Philip, as in the two Dionysii of Syracuse
-and other despots, these tastes were not found inconsistent either
-with the crimes of ambition, or the licenses of inordinate appetite.
-The contemporary historian Theopompus, a warm admirer of Philip’s
-genius, stigmatizes not only the perfidy, of his public dealings, but
-also the drunkenness, gambling, and excesses of all kinds in which
-he indulged—encouraging the like in those around him. His Macedonian
-and Grecian body-guard, eight hundred in number, was a troop in which
-no decent man could live; distinguished indeed for military bravery
-and aptitude, but sated with plunder, and stained with such shameless
-treachery, sanguinary rapacity, and unbridled lust, as befitted only
-Centaurs and Læstrygons.[1166] The number of Philip’s mistresses and
-wives was almost on an Oriental scale;[1167] and the dissensions thus
-introduced into his court through his offspring by different mothers,
-were fraught with mischievous consequences.
-
-  [1166] Theopomp. Frag. 249. Ἁπλῶς δ᾽ εἰπεῖν ... ἡγοῦμαι τοιαῦτα
-  θηρία γεγονέναι, καὶ τοιοῦτον τοὺς φίλους καὶ τους ἑταίρους
-  Φιλίππου προσαγορευθέντας, οἵους οὔτε τοὺς Κενταύρους τοὺς τὸ
-  Πήλιον κατασχόντας, οὔτε τοὺς Λαιστρυγόνας τοὺς Λεοντῖνον πεδίον
-  οἰκήσαντας, οὔτ’ ἄλλους οὐδ᾽ ὁποίους.
-
-  Compare Athenæ. iv. p. 166, 167; vi. p. 260, 261. Demosthen.
-  Olynth. ii. p. 23.
-
-  Polybius (viii. 11) censures Theopompus for self-contradiction,
-  in ascribing to Philip both unprincipled means and intemperate
-  habits, and yet extolling his ability and energy as a king. But
-  I see no contradiction between the two. The love of enjoyment
-  was not suffered to stand in the way of Philip’s military and
-  political schemes, either in himself or his officers. The
-  master-passion overpowered all appetites; but when that passion
-  did not require effort, intemperance was the habitual relaxation.
-  Polybius neither produces any sufficient facts, nor cites any
-  contemporary authority, to refute Theopompus.
-
-  It is to be observed that the statements of Theopompus,
-  respecting both the public and private conduct of Philip, are as
-  disparaging as anything in Demosthenes.
-
-  [1167] Satyrus ap. Athenæ. xiii. p. 557. Ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ἀεὶ κατὰ
-  πόλεμον ἐγάμει, etc.
-
-In appreciating the genius of Philip, we have to appreciate also
-the parties to whom he stood opposed. His good fortune was nowhere
-more conspicuous than in the fact, that he fell upon those days of
-disunion and backwardness in Greece (indicated in the last sentence
-of Xenophon’s Hellenica) when there was neither leading city
-prepared to keep watch, nor leading general to take command, nor
-citizen-soldiers willing and ready to endure the hardships of steady
-service. Philip combated no opponents like Epaminondas, or Agesilaus,
-or Iphikrates. How different might have been his career, had
-Epaminondas survived the victory of Mantineia, gained only two years
-before Philip’s accession! To oppose Philip, there needed a man like
-himself, competent not only to advise and project, but to command in
-person, to stimulate the zeal of citizen-soldiers, and to set the
-example of braving danger and fatigue. Unfortunately for Greece, no
-such leader stood forward. In counsel and speech Demosthenes sufficed
-for the emergency. Twice before the battle of Chæroneia—at Byzantium
-and at Thebes—did he signally frustrate Philip’s combinations. But he
-was not formed to take the lead in action, nor was there any one near
-him to supply the defect. In the field, Philip encountered only that
-“public inefficiency,” at Athens and elsewhere in Greece, of which
-even Æschines complains;[1168] and to this decay of Grecian energy,
-not less than to his own distinguished attributes, the unparalleled
-success of his reign was owing. We shall find during the reign of
-his son Alexander (to be described in our next volume) the like
-genius and vigor exhibited on a still larger scale, and achieving
-still more wonderful results; while the once stirring politics of
-Greece, after one feeble effort, sink yet lower, into the nullity of
-a subject-province.
-
-  [1168] Æschines cont. Timarchum, p. 26. εἶτα τί θαυμάζομεν ~τὴν
-  κοινὴν~ ἀπραξίαν, τοιούτων ῥητόρων ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ δήμου γνώμας
-  ἐπιγραφομένων;
-
-  Æschines would ascribe this public inefficiency—which many
-  admitted and deplored, though few except Demosthenes persevered
-  in contending against it—to the fact that men of scandalous
-  private lives (like Timarchus) were permitted, against the law,
-  to move decrees in the public assembly. Compare Æschines, Fals.
-  Leg. p. 37.
-
-
-
-
-
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