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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 58417 ***
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+The Daily Telegraph
+WAR BOOKS
+
+THE BATTLE OF THE RIVERS
+
+
+
+
+The Daily Telegraph
+WAR BOOKS
+
+Cloth 1/- net each
+
+Post free 1/3 each
+
+
++HOW THE WAR BEGAN.+ By W. L. COURTNEY, LL.D., and J. M. KENNEDY.
+
++THE FLEETS AT WAR.+ By ARCHIBALD HURD.
+
++THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN.+ By GEORGE HOOPER.
+
++THE CAMPAIGN ROUND LIÈGE.+ By J. M. KENNEDY.
+
++IN THE FIRING LINE.+ Battle Stories told by British Soldiers at the
+Front. By A. ST. JOHN ADCOCK.
+
++GREAT BATTLES OF THE WORLD.+ By STEPHEN CRANE, Author of "The Red Badge
+of Courage."
+
++BRITISH REGIMENTS AT THE FRONT.+ The glorious story of their Battle
+Honours.
+
++THE RED CROSS IN WAR.+ By M. F. BILLINGTON.
+
++FORTY YEARS AFTER.+ The Story of the Franco-German War. By H. C. BAILEY.
+With an introduction by W. L. COURTNEY, LL.D.
+
++A SCRAP OF PAPER.+ The Inner History of German Diplomacy. By E. J.
+DILLON.
+
++HOW THE NATIONS WAGED WAR.+ A companion volume to "How the War Began,"
+telling how the world faced Armageddon and how the British Army answered
+the call to arms. By J. M. KENNEDY.
+
++AIR-CRAFT IN WAR+. By ERIC STUART BRUCE.
+
++HACKING THROUGH BELGIUM.+ By EDMUND DANE.
+
++FAMOUS FIGHTS OF INDIAN NATIVE REGIMENTS.+ By REGINALD HODDER.
+
++THE RETREAT TO PARIS.+ By ROGER INGPEN.
+
++THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE.+ By MARR MURRAY.
+
++THE SUBMARINE IN WAR.+ By C. W. DOMVILLE FIFE.
+
++MOTOR TRANSPORTS IN WAR.+ By HORACE WYATT.
+
++THE SLAV NATIONS.+
+
++FROM HELIGOLAND TO KEELING ISLAND.+ By ARCHIBALD HURD.
+
++WITH THE FRENCH EASTERN ARMY.+ By W. E. GREY.
+
++WITH THE ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORP.+ By E. C. VIVIAN.
+
++WITH THE SCOTTISH REGIMENTS AT THE FRONT.+ By E. C. VIVIAN.
+
++THE FIRST CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIAN POLAND.+ By P. C. STANDING.
+
++THE BATTLE OF THE RIVERS.+ By EDMUND DANE.
+
+HODDER AND STOUGHTON
+
+
+
+
+THE BATTLE OF THE RIVERS
+
+BY
+EDMUND DANE
+
+HODDER AND STOUGHTON
+LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
+MCMXIV
+
+
+
+
+PREFATORY NOTE
+
+
+On a scale before unknown in Western Europe, and save for the coincident
+operations in the Eastern theatre of war, unexampled in history, the
+succession of events named the "Battle of the Rivers" presents
+illustrations of strategy and tactics of absorbing interest. Apart even
+from the spectacular aspects of this lurid and grandiose drama, full as
+it is of strange and daring episodes, the problems it affords in the
+science of war must appeal to every intelligent mind.
+
+An endeavour is here made to state these problems in outline. In the
+light they throw, events and episodes, which might otherwise appear
+confused, will be found to fit into a clear sequence of causes and
+consequences. The events and episodes themselves gain in grandeur as
+their import and relationship are unfolded.
+
+Since the story of the retreat from Mons has been told in another volume
+of this series, it is only in the following pages dealt with so far as
+its military bearings elucidate succeeding phases of the campaign.
+
+
+
+
+The Battle of the Rivers
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+THE GERMAN PLANS
+
+
+"About September 3," wrote Field Marshal Sir John French in his despatch
+dated a fortnight later,[1] "the enemy appears to have changed his
+plans, and to have determined to stop his advance south direct upon
+Paris, for on September 4 air reconnaissances showed that his main
+columns were moving in a south-easterly direction generally, east of a
+line drawn through Nanteuil and Lizy on the Ourcq."
+
+In that passage the British commander summarises an event which changed
+the whole military aspect of the Great War and changed it not only in
+the Western, but in the Eastern theatre of hostilities.
+
+What were the German plans and why were they changed?
+
+In part the plans were military, and in part political. These two
+aspects, however, are so interwoven that it is necessary, in the first
+place, briefly to sketch the political aspect in order that the military
+aspect, which depended on the political, may be the better understood.
+
+The political object was to reduce France to such powerlessness that she
+must not only agree to any terms imposed, but remain for the future in a
+state of vassalage to Germany. Further, the object was to extract from
+France a war fine so colossal[2] that, if paid, it would furnish Germany
+with the means of carrying on the war against Great Britain and Russia,
+and, if not paid, or paid only in part, would offer a pretext for an
+occupation of a large part of France by German troops, indefinite in
+point of time, and, formalities apart, indistinguishable from
+annexation. By means of that occupation great resources for carrying on
+the war might, in any event, be drawn in kind from the French population
+and from their territory, or drawn in cash in the form of local war
+levies.
+
+In a passage quoted by M. Edouard Simon,[3] the late Prince von Bismarck
+once spoke of the difficulty he met with at the end of the war with
+France in 1871, in restraining the cupidity of the then King of Prussia
+and in "mixing the water of reflection with the wine of victory." There
+was at the time, in Germany, much discussion as to the amount of the War
+Fine. The staggering total of 15,000 millions of francs (600 million
+pounds sterling) was freely asserted to be none too high. Fear of
+possible war with Great Britain mainly kept within bounds this desire of
+plunder, and led the Emperor William to accept, reluctantly, the 5,000
+million francs afterwards paid.
+
+There can be no doubt, however, that it became a settled opinion with
+the Government, and also, even if to a less extent, a conviction with
+the public of Germany that, enormous as it was, the levy upon France in
+1871 was insufficient. That opinion was sharpened by the promptitude,
+almost contemptuous, with which the French people discharged the demand,
+and brought the German military occupation to an end.
+
+The opinion that the War Fine of 1871 had been too small inspired the
+political crisis of 1875, caused by a threatened renewal of the German
+attack. The pretext then was that France was forming, with Austria and
+Italy, a league designed to destroy the new German Empire. The true
+cause of hostility was that France had begun to reorganise her army.
+Intervention by the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg averted the
+peril. The German Government found itself obliged to put off a further
+draft upon "opulent France"[4] until a more convenient season.
+
+This discovery that neither Great Britain nor Russia was willing to see
+France become the milch cow of Germany dictated the policy which led
+later to the Triple Alliance. Consistently from this time to the end of
+his life the Emperor William I. assumed the part of guardian of the
+peace of Europe. The Triple Alliance was _outwardly_ promoted by Germany
+with that object.[5]
+
+Meanwhile, every opportunity was taken to strengthen the German military
+organisation. Only by possession of an invincible army could the German
+Empire, it was contended, fulfil its peace-keeping mission.
+
+This growth of military armaments imposed on Germany a heavy burden. Was
+the burden borne merely for the sake of peace, or for the sake of the
+original inspiration and policy?
+
+Few acquainted with the character of the Germans will credit them with a
+tendency to spend money out of sentiment. The answer, besides, has been
+given by General von Bernhardi.[6] He has not hesitated to declare that
+the object of these preparations was to ensure victory in the offensive
+war made necessary by the growth of the German population, a growth
+calling for a proportionate "political expansion."
+
+Outside Germany the so-called revelations of General von Bernhardi took
+many by surprise. That, however, was because, outside Germany, not many
+know much of German history, and fewer still the history of modern
+Prussia.
+
+It was realised, when General von Bernhardi published his book, that the
+original inspiration and policy had never been changed. On the contrary,
+all the efforts and organisation of Prussia had been directed to the
+realisation of that policy, and the only alteration was that, as
+confidence in Prussia's offensive organisation grew, the policy had been
+enlarged by sundry added ambitions until at length it became that
+grotesque and Gothic political fabric known as Pan-Germanism.
+
+"The military origin of the new German Empire," says M. Simon, "is of
+vast importance; it gives that Empire its fundamental character; it
+establishes its basis and its principle of existence. Empires derive
+their vitality from the principle to which they owe their birth."
+
+The fact is of vast importance because, just as the British Empire had
+its origin in, and owes its character to, the embodiment of moral force
+in self-government, so the German Empire had its origin in, and owes its
+character to, the embodiment of material forces in armies, and existed,
+as General von Bernhardi says, for the employment of that force as and
+whenever favourable opportunity should present itself.
+
+The political inspiration and purpose being clear, how was that purpose,
+as regards France, most readily and with fewest risks to be realised?
+
+It was most readily to be realised by seizing Paris. As everybody is
+aware, the Government of France is more centralised than that of any
+other great State. Paris is the hub of the French roads and railways;
+Paris is also the hub of French finance; Paris is at once the brain and
+the heart of the country; the place to which all national taxes flow;
+the seat from which all national direction and control proceed. It was
+believed, therefore, that, Paris occupied, France would be stricken with
+political paralysis. Resistance might be offered by the provinces, for
+the area of France is roughly equal to the area of Germany, but the
+resistance could never be more than ineffectual.
+
+Such was the plan on its political side. What were its military
+features?
+
+A political plan of that character plainly called for a swift and, if
+possible, crushing military offensive. Rapidity was one of the first
+essentials. That affected materially the whole military side of the
+scheme. It meant that to facilitate mobility and transport, the
+equipment of the troops must be made as light as possible. Hence all the
+usual apparatus of field hospitals and impedimenta for encampment must
+be dispensed with. It meant that the force to be dispatched must be
+powerful enough to bear down the _maximum_ of estimated opposition, and
+ensure the seizure of Paris, without delay. It meant again that the
+force must move by the shortest and most direct route.
+
+If we bear in mind these three features--equipment cut down to give
+mobility, strength to ensure an uninterrupted sweep, shortest route--we
+shall find it the easier to grasp the nature of the operations which
+have since taken place. The point to be kept in mind is that what the
+military expedition contemplated was not only on an unusual scale, but
+was of an altogether unusual, and in many respects novel, character.
+
+The most serious military problem in front of the German Government was
+the problem of route. The forces supposed to be strong enough Germany
+had at her disposal. Within her power, too, was it to make them, so far
+as meticulous preparation could do it, mobile. But command of the
+shortest and most direct route she did not possess.
+
+That route we know passes in part through the plain of northern Belgium,
+and in part through the parallel valley of the Meuse to the points
+where, on the Belgium frontier, there begin the great international
+roads converging on Paris. All the way from Liége to Paris there are not
+only these great paved highways, but lines of main trans-continental
+railroads. The route, in short, presented every natural and artificial
+facility needed to keep a vast army fully supplied.
+
+Here it should be recalled that two things govern the movements of
+armies. Hostile opposition is one; supplies are the other. In this
+instance, the possible hostile opposition was estimated for. It remained
+to ensure that neither the march of the great host, as a whole, nor the
+advance of any part of it should at any time be held up by waiting for
+the arrival of either foodstuffs, munitions, or reinforcements, but that
+the thousand and one necessaries for such an army, still a complex list
+even when everything omissible had been weeded out, should arrive, as,
+when, and where wanted.
+
+Little imagination need be exercised to perceive that to work out a
+scheme like that on such a scale involves enormous labour. On the one
+side were the arrangements for gathering these necessaries and placing
+them in depots; on the other were the arrangements for issuing them,
+sending them forward, and distributing them. Nothing short of years of
+effort could connect such a mass of detail. If hopeless confusion was
+not almost from the outset to ensue, the greatest care was called for to
+make it certain that the mighty machination would move successfully.
+
+A scheme of that kind suited the methodical genius of Germany, and there
+can be no doubt that the years spent upon it had brought it to
+perfection. It had been worked out to time table. Concurrently,
+arrangements for the mobilisation of reserve troops had become almost
+automatic. Every reservist in the German Army held instructions setting
+out minutely what to do and where and when to report himself as soon as
+the call came.
+
+Now this elaborate plan had been drawn up on the assumption of an
+invasion of France by the route through Belgium. That assumption formed
+its basis. Not only so, but the extent to which the resources of Belgium
+and North-east France might, by requisitioning, be drawn upon to relieve
+transport and so promote rapidity, had been exactly estimated.
+
+It is evident, therefore, that the adoption of any other route must have
+upset the whole proposal. In any other country the fact of the
+Government devoting its energies over a long period of time to such a
+scheme on such a footing would appear extraordinary, and the more
+extraordinary since this, after all, was only part of a still larger
+plan, worked out with the same minuteness, for waging a war on both
+frontiers.
+
+The fact, however, ceases to be extraordinary if we bear in mind that
+the modern German Empire is essentially military and aggressive.
+
+Obviously, the weak point of plans so elaborate is that they cannot
+readily be changed. Neither even can they, save with difficulty, be
+modified. Even in face, therefore, of a declaration of war by Great
+Britain, the plan had to be adhered to. Unless it could be adhered to,
+the invasion of France must be given up.
+
+Bearing in mind the labour and cost of preparation, the hopes built upon
+the success of the invasion, and the firm belief that the opposition to
+be expected by Belgium could at most be but trifling, it ceases to be
+surprising that, though there was every desire to put off that
+complication, a war with Great Britain proved no deterrent.
+
+Further, the construction by the French just within their Eastern
+frontier of a chain of fortifications extremely difficult to force by
+means of a frontal attack, and quite impossible to break if defended by
+efficient field forces, manifestly suggested the plea of adopting the
+shorter and more advantageous route on the ground of necessity. In
+dealing with that plea it should not be forgotten that the State which
+elects to take the offensive in war needs resources superior to those of
+the State which elects to stand, to begin with, upon a policy of
+defence. Those superior resources, save in total population, Germany, as
+compared with France, did not possess. In adopting the offensive,
+therefore, on account of its initial military advantages, Germany was
+risking in this attack means needed for a prolonged struggle. It was
+necessary in consequence for the attack to be so designed that it could
+not only not fail, but should succeed rapidly enough to enable the
+attacking State to recoup itself--and, possibly, with a profit.
+
+The conditions of first rapidity, and second certainty, formed the
+_political_ aspects of the plan, and they affected its military aspects
+in regard to first numbers, secondly equipment, thirdly route.
+
+But there were, if success was to be assured, still other conditions to
+be fulfilled, and these conditions were _purely_ military. They were:--
+
+
+     (1) That in advancing the line of the invading armies must not
+     expose a flank, and by so doing risk delay through local or partial
+     defeat.
+
+     (2) That the invading armies must not lay bare their
+     communications. Risk to their communications would also involve
+     delay.
+
+     (3) That they must at no point incur the hazard of attacking a
+     defended position save in superior force. To do so would again risk
+     repulse and delay.
+
+
+Did the plan drawn up by the German General Staff fulfil apparently all
+the conditions, both political and military, and did it promise swift
+success? It did.
+
+The plan, in the first instance, covered the operations of eight
+armies, acting in combination. These were the armies of General von
+Emmich; General von Kluck; General von Bülow; General von Hausen;
+Albert, Duke of Wurtemberg; the Crown Prince of Germany; the Crown
+Prince of Bavaria; and General von Heeringen. Embodying first reserves,
+they comprised twenty-eight army corps out of the forty-six which
+Germany, on a war footing, could put immediately into the field.[7]
+
+Having reached the French frontier from near the Belgian coast to
+Belfort, the eight armies were to have advanced across France in
+echelon. If you take a row of squares running across a chessboard from
+corner to corner you have such squares for what is known in military
+phraseology as echelon formation.
+
+Almost invariably in a military scheme of that character the first body,
+or "formation" as it is called, of the echelon is reinforced and made
+stronger than the others, because, while such a line of formations is
+both supple and strong, it becomes liable to be badly disorganised if
+the leading body be broken. On the leading body is thrown the main work
+of initiating the thrust. That leading body, too, must be powerful
+enough to resist an attack in flank as well as in front.[8]
+
+Advancing on this plan, these armies would present a line exposing, save
+as regarded the first of them, no flank open to attack. Indeed, the
+first object of the echelon is to render both a frontal and a flank
+attack upon it difficult.
+
+Had the plan succeeded as designed, we should have had this position of
+affairs: the eight armies would have extended across France from Paris
+to Verdun by the valley of the Marne, the great natural highway running
+across France due east to the German frontier, and one having both
+first-rate road and railway facilities. It was hoped that by the time
+the first and strongest formation of this chain of armies had reached
+Paris and had fastened round it, the sixth, seventh, and eighth armies
+would, partly by attacking the fortified French frontier on the east,
+but chiefly by enveloping it on the west, have gained possession of the
+frontier defence works.
+
+The main French army must then have been driven westward from the valley
+of the Marne, across the Aube, brought to a decisive battle in the
+valley of the Seine, defeated, and, enclosed in a great arc by the
+German armies extending round from the north and by the east to the
+south of Paris, have been forced into surrender.
+
+There is a common assumption that the German plan was designed to repeat
+the manoeuvres which in the preceding war led to Sedan, and almost with
+the same detail. That is rating the intelligence of the German General
+Staff far too low. They could not but know that the details of one
+campaign cannot be repeated in another against an opponent, who, aware
+of the repetition, would be ready in advance against every move.
+
+Naturally, they fostered the notion of an intended repetition. That
+promoted their real design. The design itself, however, was based not
+merely on the war of 1870-1, but on the invasion of 1814, which led to
+the abdication of Napoleon, and the primary idea of it was to have _only
+one main line of advance_.
+
+The reason was that if an assailant takes two main lines of advance
+simultaneously and has to advance along the valleys of rivers
+converging to a point, as the Oise, the Marne, and the Seine converge
+towards Paris, his advance may be effectively disputed by a much smaller
+defending force than if he adopts only one line of advance, provided
+always, of course, that he can safeguard his flanks and his
+communications.
+
+Bear in mind the calculation that the main French army would never in
+any event be strong enough successfully to resist an invasion so
+planned. Bear in mind, too, that an echelon formation is not only supple
+and difficult to attack along its length on either side, but that it can
+be stretched out or closed up like a concertina. To maintain a formation
+of that kind with smaller bodies of troops is fairly easy. To maintain
+it with the enormous masses forming the German armies would be
+difficult. But the Germans were so confident of being able to compel the
+French to conform to all the German movements, to stand, that is to say,
+as the weaker side, always on the defensive, leaving the invaders a
+practically unchallenged initiative, that they believed they could
+co-ordinate all their movements with exactitude. This was taking a risk,
+but they took it.
+
+It is a mistake to suppose that they entered on the campaign with every
+movement mapped out from start to finish. No plan of any campaign was
+ever laid down on such lines, and none ever will be. The plan of a
+campaign has to be built on broad ideas. Those ideas, by taking all the
+essentials into consideration, the strategist seeks to convert into
+realised events. In this instance, there can be very little doubt that
+certain assumptions were treated as so probable as almost to be
+certainties. The first was that such forces as France could mobilise in
+the time would be mainly drafted to defend the fortified frontier. The
+next was that such forces as could be massed in time along the boundary
+of Belgium would be too weak seriously to impede the invasion. The third
+was that in any subsequent attempt to transfer forces from the fortified
+frontier to the Belgian boundary the French would be met and defeated by
+the advancing echelon of German masses. The fourth was that such an
+attempted transfer, followed by its defeat, would leave the fortified
+frontier so readily seizable, that German armies advancing swiftly into
+the valley of the Marne would fall upon these defeated French forces on
+the flank and rear. Besides, that attempted transfer would be the very
+thing that would promote the German design of envelopment.
+
+If Paris could be reached by the strongest of the chain of armies in
+eight days, then the mobilisation of the French reserves would still be
+incomplete. Under the most favourable conditions, and even without the
+disturbance of invasion, that mobilisation takes a fortnight. Given a
+sudden and successful invasion with the resultant upset of
+communications and the mobilisation could never be completed. All,
+therefore, that the 1,680,000 men forming the invading hosts[9] would
+have to encounter would be the effectives of the French regular forces,
+less than half the number of the invaders.
+
+When we speak of twenty-eight army corps moving in echelon,
+approximately like so many squares placed diagonally corner to corner,
+it is as well not to forget that such a chain of masses may assume quite
+sinuous and snake-like variations and yet remain perfectly intact and
+strong. For example, the head of the chain might be wound round and
+pivot upon Paris, and the rest of the chain extended across France in
+curves. This gigantic military boa-constrictor might therefore crush the
+heart out of France, while the defenders of the country remained
+helpless in its toils.
+
+Such in brief was the daring and ambitious scheme conceived and worked
+out by the German General Headquarters Staff, and worked out in the most
+minute detail.
+
+It will be seen from this summary that so far as its broad military
+features are concerned, the plan promised an almost certainly successful
+enterprise. There were concealed in its calculations, nevertheless,
+fatal flaws. What they were will appear in the course of the present
+narrative. Meanwhile it is necessary to add that possible opposition
+from Belgium had not been overlooked; nor the possibility, consequent
+upon that opposition, of intervention by Great Britain. From the
+military standpoint, however, it was never calculated that any British
+military force would be able to land either in France or in Belgium
+promptly enough to save the French army from disaster. In any event,
+such a force would be, from its limited numbers, comparatively
+unimportant.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[1] Despatch from Sir John French to Earl Kitchener of September 17th,
+1914. For the text of this see Appendix.
+
+[2] The contemplated fine has been alleged to be 4,000 millions
+sterling, coupled with the formal cession of all North Eastern France.
+This statement was circulated by Reuter's correspondent at Paris on what
+was asserted to be high diplomatic authority. Such a sum sounds
+incredible, though as a _pretext_ it might possibly have been put
+forward.
+
+[3] Simon: _The Emperor William and his Reign._
+
+[4] This phrase is that of General F. von Bernhardi.
+
+[5] After the Berlin Congress in 1878, Prince Gortschakov mooted the
+idea of an alliance between Russia and France. In 1879 Bismarck, in view
+of such a development, concluded the alliance between Germany and
+Austria. Italy joined this alliance in 1883, but on a purely defensive
+footing. The account given of the Triple Alliance by Prince Bernhard von
+Bülow, ex-Imperial Chancellor, is that it was designed to safeguard the
+Continental interests of the three Powers, leaving each free to pursue
+its extra-Continental interests. From 1815 to 1878 the three absolutist
+Powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, had aimed at dominating the
+politics of the Continent by their entente. For many years, however,
+German influence in Russia has been giving way before French influence.
+This is one of the most important facts of modern European history. The
+Triple Alliance was undoubtedly designed to counteract its effect.
+Germany, with ambitions in Asia Minor, backed up Austria, with ambitions
+in the Balkans. Both sets of ambitions were opposed to the interests of
+Russia. Russia's desertion of the absolutist entente for the existing
+entente with the liberal Powers of the West has been due nevertheless as
+much to the growth of constitutionalism as to diplomacy. The entente
+with Great Britain and France is popular. On the other hand, the entente
+with Germany and Austria was unpopular. The view here taken that one of
+the real aims of the Triple Alliance was the furtherance of Prussia's
+designs against France is the view consistent with the course of
+Prussian policy. For Prince von Bülow's explanations, see his _Imperial
+Germany_.
+
+[6] F. von Bernhardi: _The Next War:_ see Introduction.
+
+[7] Of the remaining corps, five were posted along the frontier of East
+Prussia to watch the Russians. The rest were held chiefly at Mainz,
+Coblentz, and Breslau as an initial reserve.
+
+The now definitely ascertained facts regarding the military strength of
+Germany appear to be these:--
+
+
+     25 corps and one division of the
+       active army mustering           1,530,000 men
+     21 corps of Landwehr mustering    1,260,000 men
+                                       ---------
+     Total                             2,790,000 men
+
+
+In addition, there were raised 12 corps of Ersatz Reserve, and there
+were also the Landsturm and the Volunteers, whose numerical strength is
+uncertain. These troops, however, were not embodied until later in the
+campaign.
+
+[8] The leading army, that of General von Kluck, consisted of 6 corps;
+and the second army, that of General von Bülow, of 4 corps. The others
+were formed each of 3 corps, making an original total of 28 corps.
+
+Following the disaster at Liége, however, the army of General von Emmich
+was divided up, and the view here taken, which appears to be most
+consistent with the known facts, is that it was, after being re-formed,
+employed to reinforce the armies of Generals von Kluck and von Bülow.
+That would make the strength of the German force, which marched through
+northern Belgium, 780,000 men.
+
+[9] A German army corps is made up, with first reserves, embodied on
+mobilisation, to 60,000 men. Twenty-eight army corps, therefore,
+represent a total of 1,680,000 of all arms.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+WHY THE PLANS WERE CHANGED
+
+
+Let us now pass from designs to events, and, reviewing in their military
+bearing the operations between August 3, when the German troops crossed
+the Belgian frontier, to the day, exactly one month later, when the
+German plans were apparently changed, deal with the question: Why were
+the plans changed?
+
+The Germans entered Liége on August 10. They had hoped by that time to
+be, if not at, at any rate close to, Paris. In part they were unable to
+begin their advance through Belgium until August 17 or August 18,
+because they had not, until that date, destroyed all the forts at Liége,
+but in part, also, these delays had played havoc with the details of
+their scheme.
+
+Consider how the shock of such a delay would make itself felt. The
+mighty movement by this time going on throughout the length and breadth
+of Germany found itself suddenly jerked into stoppage. All its couplings
+clashed. Excellently designed as are the strategic railways of Germany
+they are no more than sufficient for the transport of troops, guns,
+munitions, foodstuffs, and other things necessary in such a case. If,
+owing to delays, troop trains got into the way of food trains, and _vice
+versa_, the resultant difficulties are readily conceivable. All this war
+transport is run on a military time table. The time table was there, and
+it was complete in every particular. But it had become unworkable.
+Gradually the tangle was straightened out, but the muddle, while it
+lasted, was gigantic, and we can well believe that masses of men,
+arriving from all parts of Germany at Aix-la-Chapelle, found no
+sufficient supplies awaiting them, and that sheer desperation drove the
+German Government to collect supplies by plundering all the districts of
+Belgium within reach. As the Belgians were held to be wilfully
+responsible for the mess, the cruelty and ferocity shown in these raids
+ceases to be in any sense unbelievable.
+
+Dislocation of the plan, however, was not all. In the attempts to carry
+the fortress of Liége by storm the Germans lost, out of the three corps
+forming the army of General von Emmich, 48,700 men killed and
+wounded.[10] These corps, troops from Hanover, Pomerania, and
+Brandenburg, formed the flower of the army. The work had to be carried
+out of burying the dead and evacuating the wounded. The shattered corps
+had to be reformed from reserves. All this of necessity meant additional
+complications.
+
+Then there was the further fighting with the Belgians. What were the
+losses sustained by the Germans between the assaults on Liége and the
+occupation of Brussels is, outside of Germany, not known, nor is it
+known in Germany save to the Government. To put that loss as at least
+equal to the losses at Liége is, however, a very conservative estimate.
+
+Meanwhile, the French had advanced into Belgium along both banks of the
+Meuse and that further contributed to upset the great preparation.
+
+We have, therefore, down to August 21, losses, including those in the
+fighting on the Meuse and in Belgian Luxemburg, probably equal to the
+destruction of two reinforced army corps.
+
+Now we come to the Battle of Mons and Charleroi, when to the surprise of
+all non-German tacticians, the attacks in mass formation witnessed at
+Liége were repeated.
+
+To describe that battle is beyond the scope of this narrative. But it is
+certain that the estimates so far formed of German losses are below, if
+not a long way below, the truth.
+
+There is, however, a reliable comparative basis on which to arrive at a
+computation, and this has a most essential bearing on later events.
+
+At Liége there were three heavy mass attacks against trenches defended
+by a total force of 20,000 Belgian riflemen with machine guns.[11] We
+have seen what the losses were. At Mons, against the British forces,
+there were mass attacks against lines held by five divisions of British
+infantry, a total roughly of 65,000 riflemen, with machine guns, and
+backed by over sixty batteries of artillery.
+
+Now, taking them altogether, the British infantry reach, as marksmen, a
+level quite unknown in the armies of the Continent. Further, these mass
+attacks were made by the Germans with far greater numbers than at Liége,
+and there were far more of them. Indeed, they were pressed at frequent
+intervals during two days and part of the intervening night. The
+evidence as to the dense formations adopted in these attacks is
+conclusive.
+
+What, from facts such as these, is the inference to be drawn as to
+losses incurred? The inference, and it is supported by the failure of
+any of these attacks to get home, is, and can only be, that the losses
+must have been proportionally on the same scale as those at Liége, for
+the attacks were, for the most part, as at Liége, launched frontally
+against entrenched positions. Though at first sight such figures may
+appear fantastic, to put the losses at three times the total of the
+losses at Liége is probably but a very slight exaggeration, even if it
+be any exaggeration at all.
+
+There is, however, still another ground for such a conclusion. While
+the British front from Condé past and behind Mons to Binche allowed of
+the full and effective employment of the whole British force, even when
+holding in hand necessary reserves, it was obviously not a front wide
+enough to allow of the full and effective employment on the German side
+of a force four times as numerous. It must not be forgotten that troops
+cannot fight at their best without sufficient space to fight in.
+
+But to employ in the same space a force no greater than the British,
+considering the advantage of position given with modern arms to an army
+acting on the defensive on well-chosen ground, would have meant the
+annihilation of the German army section by section.
+
+That in effect, apart from the turning movement undertaken through
+Tournai, and the attempt at Binche to enfilade the British position by
+an oblique line of attack, was the problem which General von Kluck had
+to face. His solution of it, in the belief that his artillery must have
+completely shaken the British resistance, was to follow up the
+bombardment by a succession of infantry attacks in close formation, one
+following immediately the other, so that each attack would, it was
+thought, start from a point nearer to the British trenches than that
+preceding it, until finally the rush could not possibly be stopped. In
+that way the whole weight of the German infantry might, despite the
+narrow front, be thrown against the British positions, and though the
+losses incurred must of necessity be severe, nevertheless, the British
+line would be entirely swept away, and the losses more than amply
+revenged in the rout that must ensue. Not only so, but the outcome
+should be the destruction of the British force.
+
+That this is as near the truth as any explanation which can be offered
+is hardly doubtful. The conclusion is consonant, besides, with what have
+been considered the newest German views on offensive tactics. To suppose
+that General von Kluck, or any other commander, would throw away the
+lives of his officers and men without some seemingly sufficient object
+is not reasonable.
+
+Here we touch one of the hidden but fatal flaws in the German plan--the
+assumption that German troops, if not superior, must at any rate be
+equal in skill to any others. The German troops at Mons, admittedly,
+fought with great daring, but that they fought or were led with skill is
+disproved by all the testimony available. It is as clear as anything can
+be that not merely the coolness and the marksmanship of the British
+force was a surprise to the enemy, but the uniformity of its quality. Of
+the elements that go to make up military strength, uniformity of quality
+is among the most important. The cohesion of an army with no weak links
+is unbreakable. It is not only more supple than an army made up of
+troops of varying quality and skill, but it is more tenacious. Like a
+well-tempered sword, it is at once more flexible yet more unbreakable
+than an inferior weapon.
+
+Against an inferior army the tactics of General von Kluck must
+infallibly have succeeded. Against such a military weapon as the British
+force at Mons they were foredoomed to failure. Assuming the British army
+to be inferior, General von Kluck threw the full weight of his troops
+upon it before he had tried its temper.
+
+Studying their bearing, the importance of these considerations becomes
+plain. Powerful as it was, the driving head of the great German chain
+had yet not proved powerful enough inevitably to sweep away resistance.
+That again disclosed a miscalculation. It is true that the British force
+had to retire, and it is equally true that that retirement exposed them
+to great danger, for the enemy, inflamed by his losses, was still in
+numbers far superior, and what, for troops obliged to adopt marching
+formations, was even more serious, he was times over superior in guns.
+Few armies in face of such superiority could have escaped annihilation;
+fewer still would not have fallen into complete demoralisation.
+
+The British force, however, not only escaped annihilation, but came out
+both with losses _relatively_ light, and wholly undemoralised. This was
+no mere accident. Why, can be briefly told. Remember that quality of
+uniformity, remember the value of it in giving cohesion to the organic
+masses of the army. Remember further the hitting power of an army in
+which both gunners and riflemen are on the whole first-rate shots, and
+with a cavalry which the hostile horse had shown itself unable to
+contend against. On the other hand, bear in mind that the greater
+masses of the enemy were of necessity slower in movement, and that the
+larger an army is, the slower it _must_ move.
+
+Naturally the enemy used every effort to throw as large forces as he
+could upon the flanks of the retiring British divisions. He especially
+employed his weight of guns for that purpose. On the other hand, the
+British obviously and purposely occupied all the roads over as broad an
+extent of country as was advisable. They did so in order to impose wide
+detours on outflanking movements. While those forces were going round,
+the British were moving forward and so escaping them.
+
+The difficulties the Germans had to contend against were first the
+difficulty of getting close in enough with bodies of troops large
+enough, and secondly that, in flowing up, their mass, while greater in
+depth from van to rear than the British, could not be much, if anything,
+greater in breadth. The numerical superiority, therefore, could not be
+made fully available.
+
+Broadly, those were the conditions of this retirement; and when we come
+to examine them, comparing the effective force of the opponents, the
+_relatively_ light losses of the British cease to be surprising. The
+retirement, of course, was full of exciting episodes. Sir John French
+began his movement with a vigorous counter-attack.[12] This wise tactic
+both misled the enemy and taught him caution.
+
+It was by such tactics that the British General so far outpaced the
+enemy as to be able to form front for battle at Cambrai. Here again some
+brief notes are necessary in order to estimate the effect on later
+events.
+
+On the right of the British position from Cambrai to Le Cateau, and
+somewhat in advance of it, the village of Landrecies was held by the 4th
+Brigade of Guards. Just to the north of Landrecies is the forest of
+Mormal. The forest is shaped like a triangle. Landrecies stands at the
+apex pointing south. Round the skirts of the forest both to the east and
+to the west are roads meeting at Landrecies. Along these roads the
+Germans were obliged to advance, although to obtain cover from the
+British guns enfilading these roads large bodies of them came through
+the forest.
+
+The British right, the corps of General Sir Douglas Haig, held
+Marailles, and commanded the road to the west of the forest.
+
+Towards the British centre a second slightly advanced position like that
+of Landrecies was held to the south of Solesmes by the 4th Division,
+commanded by General Snow.
+
+The British left, formed of the corps of General Sir Horace
+Smith-Dorrien, was "refused" or drawn back, because in this quarter an
+attempted turning movement on the part of the enemy was looked for. In
+the position taken up, the front here was covered by a small river
+continued by a canal.
+
+On the British left also, to the south of Cambrai, were posted the
+cavalry under General Allenby.
+
+These dispositions commanded the roads and approaches along which the
+enemy must advance in order to obtain touch with the main body, and they
+were calculated both to break up the unity of his onset and to lay him
+open to effective attack while deploying for battle. They were, in fact,
+the same tactics which, in resisting the onset of a superior force,
+Wellington employed at Waterloo by holding in advance of his main line
+Hugomont and La Haye Sainte for a like purpose.
+
+Sir John French had foreseen that, taught at Mons the cost of a frontal
+assault against British troops, General von Kluck would now seek to
+employ his greater numerical strength and weight of guns by throwing
+that strength as far as he could against the flanks of the British,
+hoping to crush the British line together and so destroy it.
+
+That, in fact, was what General von Kluck did try to do. In this attack
+five German army corps were engaged. The German General concentrated the
+main weight of his artillery, comprising some 112 batteries of field
+guns and howitzers, against the British left. The terrific bombardment
+was followed up by infantry attacks, in which mass formations were once
+more resorted to. Evidently it was thought that against such a strength
+in guns the British could not possibly hold their lines, and that the
+infantry, completely demoralised, must be so shaken as to fire wildly,
+rendering an onslaught by superior forces of the German infantry an
+assured and sweeping victory.
+
+For a second time these calculations miscarried. As they rushed forward,
+expecting but feeble opposition, the hostile infantry masses were shot
+down by thousands. The spectacle of such masses was certainly designed
+to terrify. It failed to terrify. In this connection it is apposite to
+recall that the destruction of Baker Pasha's army at Suakim by a massed
+rush of Arab spearmen long formed with the newer school of German
+tacticians a classic example of the effect of such charges on _British_
+troops. No distinction seems to have been made between the half-trained
+Egyptian levies led by Baker Pasha and fully trained British infantry.
+The two are, in a military sense, worlds apart. Yet German theorists,
+their judgment influenced by natural bias, ignored the difference.
+
+Nor was the fortune of the attacks upon the British right any better.
+The defence of Landrecies by the Guards Brigade forms one of the most
+heroic episodes of the war. Before it was evacuated the village had
+become a German charnel-house. Hard pressed as they were at both
+extremities of their line, the British during these two days fought to
+a standstill an army still nearly three times as large as their own.
+
+That simply upset all accepted computations. As Sir John French stated
+in his despatch of September 7, the fighting from the beginning of the
+action at Mons to the further British retirement from Cambrai formed in
+effect one continuous battle. The British withdrawal was materially
+helped by a timely attack upon the right flank of the German forces
+delivered by two French divisions which had advanced from Arras under
+the command of General d'Amade, and by the French cavalry under General
+Sordêt.
+
+Now consider the effect upon the German plans. There is, to begin with,
+the losses. That those at Cambrai must have been extremely heavy is
+certain. The failure of such an attack pushed with such determination
+proves it.[13] We are fully justified in concluding that the attack did
+not cease until the power to continue it had come to an end. Losses on
+that scale meant, first, the collection of the wounded and the burial of
+the dead; and, secondly, the reforming of broken battalions from
+reserves. The latter had to be brought from the rear, and that, as well
+as their incorporation in the various corps, involved delay. Again, the
+vast expenditure of artillery munitions meant waiting for
+replenishment; and though we may assume that arrangements for
+replenishment were as complete as possible, yet it would take time. For
+all these reasons the inability of General von Kluck to follow up
+becomes readily explicable.
+
+Bear in mind that the whole German scheme of invasion hung for its
+success on his ability to follow up and on the continued power and
+solidity of his forces. It must not be supposed that that had not been
+fully foreseen and, as far as was thought necessary, provided for. There
+is ample evidence that, in view alike of the fighting in Belgium and of
+the landing of the British Expeditionary Force on August 17, this
+leading and largest formation of the German chain of armies had been
+made still larger than the original scheme had designed. Apparently at
+Mons it comprised eight instead of the originally proposed six army
+corps. After Cambrai, as later events will show, the force of General
+von Kluck included only five army corps of first line troops.
+
+To account for that decrease, the suggestion has been made that at this
+time, consequent upon the defeat met with by the Germans at Gunbinnen in
+East Prussia and the advance of the Russians towards Königsberg, there
+was a heavy transfer of troops from the west front to the east. Not only
+would such a transfer have been in the circumstances the most manifest
+of military blunders, but no one acquainted with the methods of the
+German Government and of the German General Staff can accept the
+explanation. Whatever may be the shortcomings of the German Government,
+vacillation is not one of them. What evidently did take place was the
+transfer of the _débris_ of army corps preparatory to their re-formation
+for service on the east front and their replacement by fresh reserves.
+
+But though the mass was thus made up again, there is a wide difference
+between a great army consisting wholly of first line troops and an army,
+even of equal numbers, formed of troops of varying values. The driving
+head was no longer solid.
+
+In the battle on the Somme when the British occupied positions from Ham
+to Peronne, and the French army delivered a flank attack on the Germans
+along the line from St. Quentin to Guise, the invaders were again
+checked.
+
+From St. Quentin to Peronne the course of the Somme, a deep and
+dangerous river, describes an irregular half-circle, sweeping first to
+the west, and then round to the north. General von Kluck had here to
+face the far from easy tactical problem of fighting on the inner line of
+that half-circle. He addressed himself to it with vigour. One part of
+his plan was a wide outflanking movement through Amiens; another was to
+throw a heavy force against St. Quentin; a third was to force the
+passage of the Somme both east and west of Ham.
+
+These operations were undertaken, of course, in conjunction with the
+army of General von Bülow. Part of the troops of von Bülow, the 10th,
+and the Reserve Corps of the Prussian Guard were heavily defeated by the
+French at Guise. But while it was the object of the French and British
+to make the German operations as costly as possible, it formed, for
+reasons which will presently appear, no part of their strategy to follow
+up local advantages.
+
+Why it formed no part of their strategy will become evident if at this
+point a glance is cast over the fortunes of the other German armies.
+
+The army of General von Bülow had been engaged against the French in the
+battle at Charleroi and along the Sambre, and again in the battle at St.
+Quentin and Guise, and admittedly had in both encounters lost heavily.
+
+The army of General von Hausen had been compelled to fight its way
+across the Meuse in the face of fierce opposition. At Charleville, the
+centre of this great combat, its losses, too, were severe. Again, at
+Rethel, on the line of the Aisne, there was a furious six days' battle.
+
+The army of Duke Albert of Wurtemberg had twice been driven back over
+the Meuse into Belgian Luxemburg.
+
+The army of the Crown Prince of Germany, notwithstanding its initial
+success at Château Malins, had been defeated at Spincourt.
+
+The army of the Crown Prince of Bavaria had been defeated with heavy
+loss at Luneville.
+
+Divisions of the German army operating in Alsace had been worsted, first
+at Altkirch, and again at Mulhausen.
+
+Taking these events together, the fact stands out that the first aim in
+the strategy of General Joffre was, as far as possible, to defeat the
+German armies in detail, and thus to hinder and delay their
+co-operation. He was enabled to carry out that object because the French
+mobilisation had been completed without disturbance.
+
+These two facts--completion of the French mobilisation and the throwing
+back of the German plan by the defeat of the several armies in
+detail--are facts of the first importance.
+
+The aggregate losses sustained by the Germans were already huge. If, up
+to September 3, we put the total wastage of war from the outset at
+500,000, remembering that the fatigues of a campaign conducted in a
+hurry mean a wastage from exhaustion equal at least to the losses in
+action, we shall, great as such a total may appear, still be within the
+truth.
+
+But more serious even than the losses was the dislocation of the plan.
+The army of the Crown Prince of Germany, which was to have advanced by
+rapid marches through the defiles of the Argonne, to have invested
+Verdun, and to have taken the fortified frontier in the rear, found
+itself unable to effect that object. It was held up in the hills. That
+meant that the armies of the Crown Prince of Bavaria and the army of
+General von Heeringen were kept out of the main scheme of operations.
+
+Consider what this meant. It meant that the freedom of movement of the
+whole chain of armies was for the time being gone. It meant further
+that, so long as that state of things continued, the primary condition
+on which the whole German scheme depended--a superiority of military
+strength--could not be realised. Not only were the German armies no
+longer, in a military sense, homogeneous, but a considerable part of the
+force, being on the wrong side of the fortified frontier, could not be
+brought to bear, and another considerable part of the force, the army of
+the Crown Prince of Germany, had fallen into an entanglement. Were the
+armies of von Kluck, von Bülow, von Hausen, and Duke Albert, the latter
+already badly mauled, sufficient to carry out the scheme laid down?
+Quite obviously not.
+
+Obviously not, because on the one hand there was the completion of the
+French mobilisation, and the presence of a British army; and on the
+other hand there were the losses met with, and the reductions in the
+_applicable_ force.
+
+Something must be done to pull affairs round. The something was to begin
+with the extraction of the Crown Prince of Germany from his predicament.
+If that could be effected and the fortified frontier turned, then the
+armies of the Crown Prince of Bavaria and of General von Heeringen could
+make their entry into the main arena; and the primary condition of
+superiority in strength restored.
+
+Thus it is evident that the events preceding September 3, dictated the
+movement which, on September 3, changed for good the aspect of the
+campaign.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[10] These figures are given on the authority of M. de Broqueville,
+Belgian Prime Minister and Minister of War, who has stated that the
+total here quoted was officially admitted by the German Government.
+
+[11] There are usually two machine guns to each section of infantry.
+
+[12] "At daybreak on the 24th (Aug.) the Second Division from the
+neighbourhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration as if to
+retake Binche. This was supported by the artillery of the first and
+second divisions, while the First Division took up a supporting position
+in the neighbourhood of Peissant. Under cover of this demonstration the
+Second (Army) Corps retired on the line
+Dour--Quarouble--Frameries."--_Despatch of Sir John French of September
+7_.
+
+[13] The reported extraordinary Army Order issued by the German Emperor
+commanding "extermination" of the British force has since been
+officially disavowed as a fiction.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+GENERAL JOFFRE AS A STRATEGIST
+
+
+From the strategy on the German side let us now turn to that on the side
+of the French. Between them a fundamental distinction at once appears.
+
+Of both the aim was similar--to compel the other side to fight under a
+disadvantage. In that way strategy helps to ensure victory, or to lessen
+the consequences of defeat.
+
+The strategy of the German General Staff, however, was from the outset
+obvious. The strategy of General Joffre was at the outset a mystery.
+Only as the campaign went on did the French scheme of operations become
+apparent. Even then the part of the scheme still to come remained
+unfathomable.
+
+It has been assumed that with the employment of armies formed of
+millions of men the element of surprise must be banished. That was a
+German theory. The theory is unsound. Now, as ever, intellect is the
+ultimate commanding quality in war.
+
+In truth, the factor of intellect was never more commanding than under
+conditions of war carried on with mass armies.
+
+Reflect upon the difference between an opponent who, under such
+conditions, is able to fathom and to provide against hostile moves, and
+the opponent who has to take his measures in the dark as to hostile
+intentions.
+
+The former can issue his orders with the reasonable certainty that they
+are what the situation will call for. Never were orders and instructions
+more complex than with modern armies numbering millions; never were
+there more contingencies to provide against and to foresee. To move and
+to manipulate these vast masses with effect, accurate _anticipation_ is
+essential. Such complicated machines cannot be pushed about on the spur
+of the moment when a general suddenly wakes up to a discovery.
+
+It follows that to conduct a campaign with mass armies there must either
+be a plan which you judge yourself strong enough in any event to realise
+or a plan which, because your opponent cannot fathom it, must throw him
+into complete confusion. The former was the German way; the latter the
+French.
+
+That General Joffre would _try_ in the first place to defeat the German
+armies in detail was not, of course, one of the surprises, because it is
+elementary, but that he should have so largely _succeeded_ in defeating
+them was a surprise.
+
+In these encounters, as during later battles of the campaign, the French
+troops discovered a cohesion and steadiness and a military habit of
+discipline assumed to be foreign to their temperament. But their units
+had been trained to act together in masses on practical lines. Of the
+value of that training General Joffre was well aware.
+
+He knew also that success in the earlier encounters, which that training
+would go far to ensure, must give his troops an invaluable confidence in
+their own quality.
+
+There were, however, two surprises even more marked. One of these was
+the quite unexpected use made of the fortified frontier; the other,
+associated with it, was that of allowing the Germans to advance upon
+Paris with an insufficient force, in the belief that French movements
+were being conformed to their own.
+
+Undoubtedly as regards the fortified frontier the belief prevailed that
+the chief difficulty would be that of destroying its works with heavy
+guns. It had never been anticipated that the Germans might be prevented
+from getting near enough for the purpose. But in the French strategy
+Verdun, Toul, and Belfort were not employed as obstacles. They were
+employed as the fortified bases of armies. Being fortified, these bases
+were safe even if close to the scene of operations. Consequently the
+lines of communication could be correspondingly shortened, and the power
+and activity of the armies dependent on them correspondingly increased.
+So long as these armies remained afoot, the fortresses were
+unattackable. Used in that way, a fortress reaches its highest military
+value.
+
+The strategy adopted by General Joffre in association with the German
+advance upon Paris is one of the most interesting phases of the war. His
+_tactics_ were to delay and weaken the first and driving formation of
+the German chain of armies; his _strategy_ was, while holding the tail
+of that chain of armies fast upon the fortified frontier, to attract the
+head of it south-west. In that way he at once weakened the chain and
+lengthened out the German communications. Not merely was the position of
+the first German army the worse, and its effective strength the less,
+the further it advanced, thus ensuring its eventual defeat, but in the
+event of defeat retirement became proportionally more difficult. The
+means employed were the illusion that this army was driving before it,
+not a wing of the Allied forces engaged merely in operations of delay,
+but forces which, through defeat, were unable to withstand its march
+onward.
+
+It cannot now be doubted that the Germans had believed themselves strong
+enough to undertake the investment of Paris concurrently with successful
+hostilities against the French forces in the field. But by the time
+General von Kluck's army arrived at Creil, the fact had become manifest
+that those two objectives could not be attempted concurrently. The
+necessity had therefore arisen of attempting them _successively_.
+
+In face of that necessity the choice as to which of the two should be
+attempted first was not a choice which admitted of debate. Defeat of
+the French forces in the field must be first. Without it, the
+investment of Paris had clearly become an impossibility. How far it had
+become an impossibility will be realised by looking at the position of
+the German armies.
+
+Five of them were echeloned across France from Creil, north-east of
+Paris, to near the southern point of the Argonne.
+
+The army of von Kluck was between Creil and Soissons, with advanced
+posts extended to Meaux on the Marne.
+
+The army of von Bülow was between Soissons and Rheims, with advanced
+posts pushed to Château-Thierry, also on the Marne.
+
+The army of von Hausen held Rheims and the country between Rheims and
+Chalons, with advanced posts at Epernay.
+
+The army of Duke Albert, with headquarters at Chalons, occupied the
+valley of the Marne as far as the Argonne.
+
+The army of the Crown Prince of Prussia, with headquarters at St.
+Menehould, held the Argonne north of that place, with communications
+passing round Verdun to Metz.
+
+If the line formed by these armies be traced on the map, it will be
+found to present from Creil to the southern part of the Argonne a great
+but somewhat flattened arc, its curvature northwards. Then from the
+southern part of the Argonne the line will present a sharp bend to the
+north-east.
+
+Now these five armies, refortified by reserves, comprised nineteen army
+corps, plus divisions of cavalry--a vast force aggregating well over
+one million men, with more than 3,000 guns. Powerful as it appeared,
+however, this chain of armies was hampered by that capital disadvantage
+of being held fast by the tail. Held as it was, the chain could not be
+stretched to attempt an investment of Paris without peril of being
+broken, and the great project of defeating and enveloping the Allied
+forces was impossible.
+
+No question was during the first weeks of the war more repeatedly asked
+than why, instead of drafting larger forces to the frontier of Belgium,
+General Joffre should have made what seemed to be a purposeless
+diversion into Upper Alsace, the Vosges, and Lorraine.
+
+The operations of the French in those parts of the theatre of war were
+neither purposeless nor a diversion.
+
+On the contrary, those operations formed the crux of the French
+General's counter-scheme.
+
+Their object was, as shown, to prevent the Germans from making an
+effective attack on the fortified frontier. General Joffre well knew
+that in the absence of that effective attack, and so long as the German
+echelon of armies was pinned upon the frontier, Paris could not be
+invested. In short, the effect of General Joffre's strategy was to _rob
+the Germans of the advantages arising from their main body having taken
+the Belgian route_.
+
+On September 3, then, the scale of advantage had begun to dip on the
+side of the defence. It remained to make that advantage decisive. The
+opportunity speedily offered. Since the opportunity had been looked for,
+General Joffre had made his dispositions accordingly, and was ready to
+seize it.
+
+Let it be recalled that the most vulnerable and at the same time the
+most vital point of the German echelon was the outside or right flank of
+the leading formation, the force led by General von Kluck. Obviously
+that was the point against which the weight of the French and British
+attack was primarily directed.
+
+To grasp clearly the operations which followed, it is necessary here to
+outline the natural features of the terrain and its roads and railways.
+For that purpose it will probably be best to start from the Vosges and
+take the country westward as far as Paris.
+
+On their western side the Vosges are buttressed by a succession of
+wooded spurs divided by upland valleys, often narrowing into mere clefts
+called "rupts." These valleys, as we move away from the Vosges, widen
+out and fall in level until they merge with the upper valley of the
+Moselle. If we think of this part of the valley of the Moselle as a main
+street, and these side valleys and "rupts" as _culs-de-sac_ opening off
+it, we form a fairly accurate notion of the region.
+
+From the valley of the upper Moselle the valley of the upper Meuse,
+roughly parallel to it farther west, is divided by a ridge of wooded
+country. Though not high, this ridge is continuous.
+
+On the points of greatest natural strength commanding the roads and
+railways running across the ridge, and mostly on the east side of the
+valley of the Meuse, had been built the defence works of the fortified
+frontier.
+
+Crossing the valley of the Meuse we come into a similar region of hills
+and woods, but this region is, on the whole, much wilder, the hills
+higher, and the forests more extensive and dense. The hills here, too,
+form a nearly continuous ridge, running north-north-west. The highlands
+east of the Meuse sink, as we go north, into the undulating country of
+Lorraine, but the ridge on the west side of the Meuse extends a good
+many miles farther. This ridge, with the Meuse flowing along the east
+side of it and the river Aire flowing along its west side, is the
+Argonne. It is divided by two main clefts. Through the more northerly
+runs the main road from Verdun to Chalons; through the more southerly
+the main road from St. Mihiel on the Meuse to Bar-le-Duc, on the Marne.
+
+Thus from the Vosges to the Aire we have three nearly parallel rivers
+divided by two hilly ridges.
+
+North of Verdun the undulating Lorraine country east of the Meuse again
+rises into a stretch of upland forest. This is the Woevre.
+
+Now, westward of the Argonne and across the Aire there is a region in
+character very like the South Downs in England. It extends all the way
+from the upper reaches of the Marne north-west beyond the Aisne and the
+Oise to St. Quentin. In this open country, where the principal
+occupation is sheep grazing, the lonely main roads run across the downs
+for mile after mile straight as an arrow. Villages are far between. The
+few towns lie along the intersecting valleys.
+
+But descending from the downs into the wide valley of the Marne we come
+into the region which has been not unaptly called the orchard of France,
+the land of vineyards and plantations, and flourishing, picturesque
+towns; in short, one of the most beautiful spots in Europe. The change
+from the wide horizons of the solitary downs to the populous and
+highly-cultivated lowlands is like coming into another world.
+
+From the military point of view, however, the important features of all
+this part of France are its roads and rivers, and most of all its
+rivers.
+
+The three main waterways, the Oise, the Marne, and the Seine, converge
+as they approach Paris. Between the Oise and the Marne flows the main
+tributary of the Oise, the Aisne. Also north of the Marne is its
+tributary, the Ourcq; south of the Marne flows its tributaries, the
+Petit Morin and the Grand Morin. All join the Marne in the lower part of
+the valley not far from Paris. Between the Marne and the Seine flows the
+Aube, a tributary of the Seine. The country between the Marne and the
+Seine forms a wide swell of land. It was along the plateaux forming the
+backbone of this broad ridge that the Battle of the Marne was, for the
+most part, fought.
+
+That brings us to the question of the roads.
+
+Eastward from Paris, along the valley of the Marne, run three great
+highways. The most northerly, passing through Meaux, La
+Ferté-sous-Jouarre, Château Thierry, and Epernay to Chalons, follows
+nearly the same course as the river, crossing it at several points to
+avoid bends. The next branches off at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and also
+runs to Chalons by way of Montmirail. The third, passing through La
+Ferté-Gaucher, Sezanne, Fère Champenoise, and Sommesons to
+Vitry-le-François, follows the backbone of country already alluded to.
+All these great roads lead farther east into Germany, the northerly and
+the middle roads to Metz and the valley of the Moselle, the third road
+to Nancy and Strasburg.
+
+Now, it must be manifest to anybody that command of these routes, with
+command of the railways corresponding with them, meant mastery of the
+communications between Paris and the French forces holding the fortified
+frontier all the way from Toul to Verdun.
+
+If, consequently, the invading forces could seize and hold these routes
+and railways, and, as a result, which would to all intents follow, could
+seize and hold the great main routes and the railways running eastward
+through the valley of the Seine from Paris to Belfort, the fortified
+frontier--the key to the whole situation--would in military phrase, be
+completely "turned." Its defence consequently would have to be
+abandoned.
+
+Not only must its defence have been abandoned, with the effect of
+giving freedom of movement to the German echelon, but, that barrier
+removed, the German armies would no longer be dependent for munitions
+and supplies on the route through Belgium. They could receive them just
+as conveniently by the route through Metz. Their facilities of supply
+would be doubled.
+
+It will be seen, therefore, to what an extent the whole course of the
+war hung upon this great clash of arms on the Marne. German success must
+have affected the future of operations alike in the western theatre and
+in the eastern.
+
+But there is another feature of the roads in the valley of the Marne
+which is of consequence. Great roads converge into it from the north.
+Sezanne has already been mentioned. It is half-way along the broad
+backbone dividing the valley of the Marne from the valley of the Seine.
+Five great roads meet there from La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, Soissons,
+Rheims, Chalons, Verdun, and Nancy. Hence the facility for massing at
+that place a huge body of troops.
+
+It will be seen, therefore, that in making Sezanne the point at which
+they aimed their main blow at the whole French scheme of defence, the
+Germans had selected the spot where the blow would, in all probability,
+be at once decisive and possibly fatal. Clearly they had now grasped, at
+all events in its main intention, the strategy of the French general.
+_They saw that he was using the fortified frontier to checkmate their
+Belgian plan._
+
+Summing up the consequences, had success attended the stroke we find
+that it would have:
+
+Opened to the invaders the valley of the Seine.
+
+Turned the defence of the fortified frontier.
+
+Released the whole of the German armies.
+
+Given them additional, as well as safer, lines of supply from Germany.
+
+Enabled the German armies to sweep westward along the valley of the
+Seine, enveloping or threatening to envelop the greater part of the
+French forces in the field.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
+
+
+Why, then, if it was so necessary and the object of it so important, was
+the move begun by General von Kluck on September 3 a false move?
+
+It was a false move because he ought to have stood against the forces
+opposed to him. The defeat of those forces was necessary before the
+attack against Sezanne could be successful. Conversely, his own defeat
+involved failure of the great enterprise.
+
+Instead, however, of facing and continuing his offensive against the
+forces opposed to him, he turned towards Sezanne. By doing that he
+exposed his flank to the Allied counter-stroke.
+
+This blunder can only be attributed to the combined influences of,
+firstly, hurry; secondly, bad information as to the strength and
+positions of the Allied forces; thirdly, the false impression formed
+from reports of victories unaccompanied by exact statements as to
+losses; and fourthly, and perhaps of most consequence, the failure of
+the Crown Prince of Germany in the Argonne.
+
+General von Kluck doubtless acted upon imperative orders. His
+incomplete information and the false impression his advance had created
+probably also led him to accept those orders without protest. But it
+should not be forgotten that the Commander primarily responsible for the
+blunder, and for the disasters it involved, was the Crown Prince of
+Germany.
+
+Primarily the Crown Prince of Germany was responsible, but not wholly.
+In the responsibility General von Kluck had no small share. He was
+misled. When the British force arrived at Creil General Joffre resolved
+upon and carried out a masterly and remarkable piece of strategy. The
+British army was withdrawn from the extreme left of the Allied line on
+the north-east of Paris, and transferred to the south-east, and its
+former place taken by the 6th French army. This move, carried out with
+both secrecy and rapidity, was designed to give General von Kluck the
+impression that the British troops had been withdrawn from the front.
+That the ruse succeeded is now clear. So far from being withdrawn, the
+British army was brought up by reinforcements to the strength of three
+army corps. Leaving out of account a force of that strength, the
+calculations of the German Commander were fatally wrong.
+
+Let us now see what generally were the movements of the German and of
+the Allied forces between September 3 and September 6 when the Battle of
+the Marne began.
+
+Leaving two army corps, the 2nd and the 4th Reserve corps, on the Ourcq
+to cover his flank and rear, General von Kluck struck south-east across
+the Marne with the 3rd, 4th, and 7th corps. The main body crossed the
+river at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and took the main route to Sezanne.
+Others crossed higher up between La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and
+Château-Thierry. For this purpose they threw bridges across the river.
+The Marne is deep and for 120 miles of its course navigable.
+
+These movements were covered and screened by the 2nd division of
+cavalry, which advanced towards Coulommiers, and the 9th division, which
+pushed on to the west of Crecy. Both places are south of the Marne and
+east of Paris.
+
+Writing of these events at the time, Mr. W. T. Massey, special
+correspondent of the _Daily Telegraph_, observed that:--
+
+
+     The beginning of the alteration of German plans was noticeable at
+     Creil. Hidden by a thick screen of troops from the army in the
+     field, but observed by aerial squadrons, the enemy were seen to be
+     on the move. Ground won at Senlis was given up, and the German
+     troops, which at that point were nearer Paris than any other men of
+     the Kaiser's army, were marched to the rear. Only the commandants
+     in the field can say whether the movement was expected, but it is
+     the fact that immediately the enemy began their strategic movement
+     British and French dispositions were changed.
+
+
+The movement _was_ expected. Indeed, as we have seen, the whole strategy
+of the campaign on the French side had been designed to bring it about.
+
+
+     The Germans must have observed that their new intentions had been
+     noticed, but they steadily pursued their policy. Their right was
+     withdrawn from before Beauvais, and that pretty cathedral town has
+     now been relieved of the danger of Teuton invasion. The shuttered
+     houses are safe, temporarily at any rate.
+
+     The ponderous machine did not turn at right angles with any
+     rapidity. Its movements were slow, but they were not uncertain, and
+     the change was made just where it was anticipated the driving wedge
+     would meet with least resistance.
+
+     In the main the German right is a tired army. It is a great
+     fighting force still. The advance has been rapid, and some big
+     tasks have been accomplished. But the men have learnt many things
+     which have surprised them. They thought they were invincible, that
+     they could sweep away opposition like a tidal wave. Instead of a
+     progress as easy as modern warfare would allow, their way has had
+     to be fought step by step at a staggering sacrifice, and in place
+     of an army which took the field full of confidence in the speedy
+     ending of the war and taught that nothing could prevent a triumph
+     for German arms, you have an army thoroughly disillusioned.
+
+
+In this connection the service of the British Flying Corps proved
+invaluable. Covering though they did a vast area, and carefully as they
+were screened by ordinary military precautions, the movements of the
+Germans were watched and notified in detail. Upon this, as far as the
+dispositions of the Allied forces were concerned, everything depended,
+and no one knew that better than General Joffre. On September 9 he
+acknowledged it in a message to the British headquarters:--
+
+
+     Please express most particularly to Marshal French my thanks for
+     services rendered on every day by the English Flying Corps. The
+     precision, exactitude, and regularity of the news brought in by its
+     members are evidence of their perfect organisation, and also of the
+     perfect training of pilots and observers.
+
+
+Farther east the army of General von Bülow (the 9th, 10th, 10th Reserve
+corps, and the Army corps of the Prussian Guard), advancing from
+Soissons through Château-Thierry, and crossing the Marne at that place
+as well as at points higher up towards Epernay, was following the main
+road to Montmirail on the Petit Morin.
+
+The army of General von Hausen (the 11th, 12th, and 19th corps),
+advancing from Rheims, had crossed the Marne at Epernay and at other
+points towards Chalons, and was following the road towards Sezanne by
+way of Champaubert.
+
+The army of Duke Albert, having passed the Marne above Chalons, was
+moving along the roads to Sommesous.
+
+The army of the Crown Prince of Germany was endeavouring to move from
+St. Menehould to Vitry-le-François, also on the Marne.
+
+On the side of the Allies,
+
+General Maunoury, with the 6th French army, advanced from Paris upon the
+Ourcq. The right of this army rested on Meaux on the Marne.
+
+General French with the British army, pivoting on its left, formed a
+new front extending south-east to north-west from Jouey, through Le
+Chatel and Faremoutiers, to Villeneuve-le-Comte.
+
+General Conneau with the French cavalry was on the British right,
+between Coulommiers and La Ferté Gaucher.
+
+General Desperey with the 5th French army held the line from Courtagon
+to Esternay, barring the roads from La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and Montmirail
+to Sezanne.
+
+General Foch, with headquarters at La Fère Champenoise, barred with his
+army the roads from Epernay and Chalons.
+
+General de Langle, holding Vitry-le-François, barred the approaches to
+that place and to Sommesous.
+
+General Serrail, with the French army operating in the Argonne, held
+Revigny. His line extended north-east across the Argonne to Verdun, and
+was linked up with the positions held by the French army base on that
+fortress.
+
+General Pau held the line on the east of the fortified frontier.
+
+Some observations on these dispositions of the Allies will elucidate
+their tactical intention.
+
+The position of the Allied armies formed a great bow, with the western
+end of it bent sharply inwards.
+
+The _weight_ of the Allied forces was massed round that western bend
+against the now exposed flank of von Kluck's army. Here lay the most
+vulnerable point of the German line.
+
+The tactical scheme of the Allied Commander-in-Chief was simple--a great
+military merit. He aimed first at defeating the German right led by
+Generals von Kluck and von Bülow. Having by that uncovered the flank of
+General von Hausen's army, his intention was to attack it also in both
+front and flank and defeat it. The same tactic was to be repeated with
+each of the other German armies in succession.
+
+For that purpose the allied armies were not posted directly on the front
+of the German armies, but between them. Consequently the left of one
+German army and the right of another was attacked by the same French
+army. In that way two German Generals would have to resist an attack
+directed by one French General, and every German General would have to
+resist two independent French attacks. Hence, too, if a German army was
+forced back the French could at once double round the flank of the
+German army next in the line if that army was still standing its ground.
+
+Choice of the battle ground and command of the roads leading to it
+ensured that this would happen. As a fact, it did.
+
+Finally, all the way behind the French line ran the great road leading
+across the plateaux from Paris to the fortified frontier. This, with
+railway communication, gave the needed facilities for the movement of
+reserves and the transport of munitions and food supplies.
+
+Now let us glance at the tactical scheme on the German side.
+
+The fact that General von Kluck had left two out of the five corps
+forming his army on the Ourcq, and was covering his movement to the
+south of the Marne with his cavalry, proves that he did not, as was
+supposed, intend to lose contact with Paris. His scheme was to establish
+an echelon of troops from the Ourcq to La Ferté Gaucher on the great
+eastern road, believing that to be meanwhile a quite sufficient defence.
+
+With the rest of his force he was to join with von Bülow and von Hausen
+in smashing through the French position at Sezanne. Against that
+position there was to be the overwhelming concentration of ten army
+corps.
+
+To assist the stroke against Sezanne there was a concurrent intention to
+break the French line at Vitry-le-François. The French line between
+Sezanne and Vitry-le-François would then be swept away.
+
+Assuming the success of these operations, the German forces would be
+echeloned south-east from the Ourcq across the valley of the Marne and
+the plateau south of it to Troyes on the Aube. The Germans would then be
+in a position to attack in flank the French retreating from the
+frontier, and ready, when these French troops fell back, pursued by the
+armies of the Crown Princes of Germany and Bavaria and by von
+Heeringen's army of the Vosges, to join in the great sweep along the
+valley of the Seine and round to the south of Paris. By this time,
+remember, the long lines of communication through Belgium would have
+ceased to be vital.
+
+It was a bold scheme.
+
+There are, however, other factors to be taken into account besides
+tactical plans.
+
+Not less a surprise than the apparently sudden change in the German
+movements had been, during the preceding week or more, the seemingly
+hardly less precipitate falling back of the French upon the Marne. All
+the world believed that the French were "on the run," and all the world
+thought they would keep on running. Day by day during that exciting time
+the inhabitants of the valley of the Marne witnessed column after column
+of their defenders apparently in full retreat. The marching qualities of
+the French are, as everybody knows, remarkable. They showed the enemy a
+clean pair of heels. Few could understand it.
+
+Then came the Germans, hot on the scent, confident that the French could
+never withstand them. From over the highlands by every road they poured
+into the peaceful Marne valley like a destroying flood. In front of them
+swept a multitude of fugitives.
+
+"Champagne," wrote a special correspondent of the _Daily Telegraph_, "is
+now overrun with fugitive villagers from the neighbourhood of Rethel,
+Laon, and Soissons. It is painful to see these unfortunate people
+hurrying away with a few household goods on carts, or with bundles, and
+walking along the country roads in regular ragged processions, not
+knowing whither they are going. Château-Thierry and all the beautiful
+country of the Marne is by this time in the hands of the Germans. When I
+last drove through the place a few weeks ago, and lunched with a few
+amiable French officers at the best hotel in the place, "L'Eléphant,"
+Château-Thierry was teeming with cattle and army horses requisitioned
+for the campaign. Four times I passed through it, and each time the
+great assemblage of horses, trucks, and army material had increased,
+although the horses and cattle were driven away each day, and fresh ones
+were led in from the great pastoral country round about. Little did I
+think then that the Germans would now be bivouacking on the great market
+place and stacking their rifles on the banks of the Marne."
+
+It was by just this over-confidence in themselves that General Joffre
+had intended the enemy should be misled. He had foreseen that the
+Germans would come on in a hurry. On the other hand, the French retreat
+had apparently been precipitous because it was essential to make ready
+for the rebound. The retreat had rendered the French troops, still
+unbeaten, only the more dangerous. Describing the effect from his own
+observation, Mr. Massey wrote:--
+
+
+     The French eastern army has been on the move for days, and if the
+     Germans were not in such strong force they would be in grave
+     danger. The French have made such a strenuous effort to cope with
+     the new condition of things that one of their infantry brigades
+     marched continuously for three days, the men never resting for more
+     than an hour at a time.
+
+     One who has seen only the Allied armies may be a bad judge, and
+     less able to form an opinion than an armchair critic, who sums up
+     the possibilities with the aid of maps and the knowledge of past
+     achievements of German forces. But there is one guide which the
+     stay-at-home strategist cannot possibly have, and that is the
+     spirit of the Allied soldiery. I have seen far more of the French
+     than of the English troops in this campaign, but anyone who has
+     talked to the soldier must be infected with his cheery optimism.
+
+     His faith in his country and in the power of the army is
+     stupendous, his patriotism is unquestionable, his confidence grows
+     as the enemy approaches. With a smile he accepts the news of the
+     German march southwards, and tells you nothing could be better; the
+     further the line penetrates the more remote is the chance that it
+     will continue unbroken. He will not believe that the German advance
+     would have got so far if it had not been the plan of General Joffre
+     to lure the enemy forwards, and so to weaken his line. The French
+     soldier to-day is more confident of victory than ever.
+
+     These things, which a soldier can appreciate at their proper value,
+     explain why the dash of the French troops has rivalled their
+     attitude in the previous part of the campaign. Reinforced by great
+     battalions, stiffened by reserves composed mainly of men with a
+     stake in the country, and fighting for all they hold most dear--for
+     France, for hearth, and home--they have offered a magnificent,
+     resolute front to the machine-like advance.
+
+
+General Joffre, therefore, had handled his machine with skill. He had
+used it for his design without impairing its spirit. On the contrary, he
+had stiffened its "form." And on the eve of the great encounter on which
+the fortunes of the campaign, and the future of France alike hung, he
+issued to the troops his now famous Order:--
+
+
+     At the moment, when a battle on which the welfare of the country
+     depends is about to begin, I feel it incumbent upon me to remind
+     you all that this is no longer the time to look behind. All our
+     efforts must be directed towards attacking and driving back the
+     enemy. An army which can no longer advance must at all costs keep
+     the ground it has won and allow itself to be killed on the spot
+     rather than give way. In the present circumstances no faltering can
+     be tolerated.
+
+
+That the Germans on their side equally realised how momentous was the
+impending battle is shown by their Army Order. A copy of it was, after
+the battle, found in a house at Vitry-le-François, which for a time had
+been used as a headquarters of the 8th German army corps. In the haste
+of flight the document was left behind. Signed by Lieut.-General Tulff
+von Tscheppe und Wendenbach, commandant of the 8th corps, and dated
+September 7, it ran:--
+
+
+     The object of our long and arduous marches has been achieved. The
+     principal French troops have been forced to accept battle after
+     having been continually forced back. The great decision is
+     undoubtedly at hand.
+
+     To-morrow, therefore, the whole strength of the German army, as
+     well as of all that of our army corps, is bound to be engaged all
+     along the line from Paris to Verdun.
+
+     To save the welfare and honour of Germany I expect every officer
+     and man, notwithstanding the hard and heroic fights of the last few
+     days, to do his duty unswervingly, and to the last breath.
+
+     Everything depends on the result of to-morrow.
+
+
+This, then, was the spirit in which, on both sides, the mightiest clash
+of arms until then known to history was entered upon. Across France the
+battle front stretched for 150 miles. The fight raged, too, for another
+forty miles along the frontier, for coincidently with the main conflict
+from Paris to Verdun, the Germans made yet another great effort to break
+upon the frontier from the east. Fourteen great armies took part in the
+battle. They numbered altogether more than two millions of men. Taking
+the two great hosts each as a whole, the numbers were not very unequal.
+True, the Germans had but six armies as against the eight on the side of
+the Allies. The German armies, however, were larger. Their strength
+ranged from 160,000 to 180,000 men as against, on the side of the
+Allies, an average strength of 120,000.[14]
+
+During nearly six days there was, along that far extended battle line,
+the flash and thunder of more than 7,000 guns. Shells rose and burst
+like flights of warring meteorites. Masses of infantry moved to the
+attack. Incessant rifle fire accompanied the bolder bass of the
+artillery. In and through woods, across fields, in and round blazing
+villages and burning farms and chateaux they fought; an incessant
+movement to and fro, amid an unceasing roar--the rage of nations locked
+in deadly embrace. There were bayonet fights on a vast scale; there were
+charges by clouds of horsemen; there were furious and murderous combats
+for points of vantage; there was the capture and recapture of towns; the
+rush of fire-spitting automobiles below, and the flight of bomb-dropping
+aeroplanes above. There was the hurried movement of troops and the wild
+gallop of batteries of guns along the roads. There was, too, the
+ever-changing kaleidoscope of the masses of transport. Along the great
+road from Paris to Germany a spectator might have travelled from sunrise
+to sunset during the whole week of battle, and yet still have found
+himself in the midst of this seemingly unbounded fury of a world at war.
+
+FOOTNOTE:
+
+[14] The following may be taken as the _approximate_ strength of the
+armies engaged, allowing on the one hand for war wastage, and on the
+other for a filling up from reserves, which on the part of the Allies
+had been completed:--
+
+
+GERMANS.
+
+     General von Kluck's Army (5 corps,
+     Prussians)                              245,000
+
+     2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions            23,000
+
+     General von Bülow's Army (4 corps,
+     Prussians)                              180,000
+
+     Cavalry of the Prussian Guard             6,000
+
+     General von Hausen's Army (3 corps,
+     Saxons)                                 165,000
+
+     Duke Albert's Army (3 corps,
+     Wurtembergers)                          150,000
+
+     Crown Prince of Germany's Army (3
+     corps, Prussians)                       175,000
+
+     Crown Prince of Bavaria's Army (3
+     corps, Bavarians)                       160,000
+                                           ---------
+     Approximate total                     1,104,000
+
+
+ALLIES.
+
+     General Maunoury's Army (3 corps
+     and reserves)                           140,000
+
+     General French's Army (3 corps)         110,000
+
+     British Cavalry Divisions                 8,000
+
+     General Conneau's Cavalry                23,000
+
+     General Desperey's Army (3 corps
+     and reserves)                           150,000
+
+     General Foch's Army (3 corps)           120,000
+
+     General de Langle's Army (3 corps
+     and reserves)                           150,000
+
+     General Serrail's Army (3 corps)        120,000
+
+     General Pau's Army (3 corps and
+     reserves)                               140,000
+                                           ---------
+     Approximate total                       961,000
+
+     Grand approximate total of combatants 2,065,000
+
+
+     Approximate guns and mortars, Germans  3,610
+     Approximate guns and mortars, Allies   3,680
+
+     Total                                  7,290
+
+
+The Allies were superior in field-guns, but had fewer howitzers,
+especially of the heavy type, and the aggregate _weight_ of the German
+artillery was on the whole greater. The estimate given of the number of
+combatants is rather below than above the actual.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+THE GERMAN OVERTHROW
+
+
+Such were the spectacular aspects of the battle. It remains to sketch
+its phases as, first sullenly, then swiftly, the tide of conflict rolled
+backward across the miles of country between Sezanne and Rheims.
+
+These developments can best be followed day by day.
+
+_September 5._--General movement of the German armies across the Marne.
+The troops of von Kluck crossed at Trilport, Sommery, and La
+Ferté-sous-Jouarre; those of von Bülow at Château-Thierry; those of von
+Hausen at Epernay, and Duke Albert's at Chalons. Simultaneously columns
+of von Kluck's 2nd and 4th Reserve corps began to cross the Ourcq.
+
+From the Marne the Germans pushed on without delay to the south. The
+3rd, 4th, and 7th corps of von Kluck's army were on the march diagonally
+across the British near Coulommiers. They were making for La Ferté
+Gaucher. In face of this advance the 5th French army fell back on the
+latter place. This move lengthened the German flank and laid it more
+completely open to a British attack.
+
+_September 6._--General Joffre gave orders for a general advance. Before
+daybreak the 6th French, British, and 5th French armies began a combined
+offensive. While the 6th French army advanced eastward towards the line
+of the Ourcq, the British advanced north-east to the line of the Grand
+Morin, and the 5th French army north from east of La Ferté Gaucher upon
+Montmirail.
+
+The 6th French army, driving in the German advance posts, reached
+Nanteuil.
+
+The British fell upon the flank of the divisions of von Kluck's army
+still crossing the Grand Morin, and drove them back upon the Petit
+Morin.
+
+By this unexpected and swiftly delivered blow von Kluck's army,
+extending from the Marne to La Ferté Gaucher, was cut into two parts.
+
+Coincidently with the British advance the 5th French army had, in a
+night attack and at the point of the bayonet, driven the leading German
+divisions out of three villages near La Ferté Gaucher, where they had
+bivouacked.
+
+In view of these attacks General von Kluck had no alternative save to
+retreat. To escape the British he fell back on the Petit Morin in the
+direction of Montmirail.
+
+His retreat was assisted by the right of von Bülow's army, and covered
+by his divisions of cavalry, reinforced by von Bülow's cavalry of the
+Prussian Guard. The German cavalry, attacked by the French and British,
+was cut up with heavy loss. More than 60,000 horsemen were engaged in
+this gigantic combat.
+
+_September 7._--To assist the retreat, the centre divisions of von
+Kluck's army opposing the British made a stand upon the Petit Morin, and
+the army of von Bülow a stand from Montmirail to Le Petit Sompius. Along
+that line the 5th French army was all day heavily engaged against the
+left wing of von Kluck's army and the right of von Bülow's.
+
+On the Ourcq the Germans launched a general assault against the 6th
+French army.
+
+On the Petit Morin they occupied a strong position on the high north
+bank. This river flows during part of its course through marshes. A
+frontal attack on the position was out of the question, but the 1st
+British army corps and the British cavalry found "a way round" higher up
+stream. Simultaneously the 3rd British corps crossed lower down.
+Threatened on both flanks, the Germans fled precipitately towards the
+Marne. Though they covered their retreat by a counter-attack, they lost
+many prisoners and some guns.
+
+The armies of von Hausen and Duke Albert and the Crown Prince of Germany
+were now engaged against the armies of General Foch, General Langle, and
+General Serrail from the north of Sezanne to Sermaise-les-Bains in the
+south of the Argonne. The fighting north of Sezanne was obstinate, but
+the Wurtembergers at Vitry-le-François met with a repulse.
+
+On this day the battle extended for more than 120 miles, from the line
+of the Ourcq across the country to Montmirail, from that place to
+Sezanne, and then along the plateaux into the Argonne. There was also a
+German attack upon Luneville designed to aid their operations west of
+the fortified frontier.
+
+_September 8._--Heavy fighting between the 6th French army and the
+Germans on the Ourcq.
+
+The British attacked the passages of the Marne. At La Ferté Gaucher,
+where the bridge had been destroyed, the Germans, supported by machine
+guns, obstinately disputed the passage against the British 3rd corps.
+The 1st and 2nd corps, however, succeeded in bridging the river higher
+up, and dislodged them. In their retreat the Germans again met with
+heavy losses.
+
+At Montmirail the battle was continued with great severity. The French
+carried several of the German positions at the point of the bayonet. Von
+Bülow's troops began a general retirement, and were driven over the
+river.
+
+Taking the offensive, General Foch's army attacked the troops of von
+Hausen in flank. The left of von Hausen's army north of Sezanne was
+forced back, but his right at Le Fère Champenoise made an obstinate
+stand.
+
+To meet this, General Langle also began a general advance, and drove the
+Germans from Vitry-le-François.
+
+A heavy German attack was directed against Clermont-en-Argonne. Beyond
+the fortified frontier there was a renewed effort to capture Nancy said
+to have been watched by the Kaiser.
+
+_September 9._--Reinforced, the Germans on the Ourcq made a great
+effort to break through the 6th French army.
+
+The British, having crossed the Marne, fell upon the Germans fighting on
+the Ourcq, and drove them northwards. Many guns, caissons, and large
+quantities of transport were captured.
+
+The 5th French army pursued the defeated troops of von Bülow from
+Montmirail to Château-Thierry. At that place the Germans are thrown
+across the Marne in disorder and with huge losses.
+
+The German line had now been completely broken. Between the wreck of von
+Bülow's troops, north of the Marne, and von Hausen's positions, north of
+Sezanne, there was a gap of some fifteen miles.
+
+From Sezanne eastward the battle from this time continued with more
+marked advantage to the Allies.
+
+_September 10._--The 6th French army and the British continued the
+pursuit. On this day the British captured, besides further quantities of
+transport abandoned in the flight or surrounded, 13 guns, 19 machine
+guns, and 2,000 prisoners. German infantry, left behind in the hurried
+march of their army, were found hiding in the woods. There were
+evidences of general looting by the enemy and of his demoralisation.
+
+In the pursuit of von Bülow's troops by the 5th French army, the
+Prussian Guard were driven into the marshes of St. Gond.
+
+Covered with tall reeds and rank grass, these marshes, drained by the
+Petit Morin, are a stretch of low-lying land lying between the Marne and
+a range of hills. They are probably the bed of an ancient lake. Safe in
+the dry season, they become in wet weather a dangerous swamp. They were
+at this time saturated with heavy rains. The Prussian Guards, who had
+borne the brunt of the recent fighting, had already suffered heavily.
+They now lost the greater part of their artillery, and a heavy
+proportion of the surviving force either perished in the quagmires or
+were killed by the French shells.
+
+An effort nevertheless was made to retrieve the general disaster by a
+violent German attack from Sezanne to Vitry-le-François, accompanied by
+an energetic offensive in the Argonne, and by a renewed attempt against
+Nancy.
+
+In the Argonne the Germans captured Revigny and Brabant-le-Roi, but west
+of Vitry were forced into retreat. The attack on Nancy was again
+unsuccessful.
+
+_September 11._--The 5th and 6th French armies and the British pursued
+the troops of von Kluck and von Bülow to the Aisne.
+
+The armies of von Hausen and Duke Albert were now in full flight at
+Epernay and Chalons. Both incurred very heavy losses. The French
+captured 6,000 prisoners and 175 guns.
+
+The Germans were driven by General Serrail's troops out of Revigny and
+Brabant-le-Roi. East of the frontier there was also a general falling
+back, notably from St. Die and round Luneville. The French seized
+Pont-a-Mousson, commanding one of the main passes across the Vosges.
+
+Of the decisive character of the overthrow there could now be no doubt.
+On September 11, in an Order to the French armies, General Joffre,
+summing up the situation with soldierly brevity, said:--
+
+
+     The battle which has been taking place for five days is finishing
+     in an incontestable victory.
+
+     The retreat of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd German armies is being
+     accentuated before our left and our centre.
+
+     The enemy's 4th army, in its turn, is beginning to fall back to the
+     north of Vitry and Sermaize.
+
+     Everywhere the enemy is leaving on the field numbers of wounded and
+     quantities of munitions. On all hands prisoners are being taken.
+
+     Our troops, as they gain ground, are finding proofs of the
+     intensity of the struggle and of the extent of the means employed
+     by the Germans in attempting to resist our _élan_.
+
+     The vigorous resumption of the offensive has brought about success.
+     Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men! you have all of you
+     responded to my appeal, and all of you have deserved well of your
+     country.--JOFFRE.
+
+
+It had been no easy victory. The huge forces of Generals von Kluck, von
+Bülow, and von Hausen, comprising the flower of the German first line
+army, fought with stubborn and even reckless courage. During the opening
+days of the battle they contested the ground foot by foot. The character
+of the fighting in which the British troops were engaged, gathered from
+men who had taken part in it, was disclosed by the Paris correspondent
+of the _Daily Telegraph_:--
+
+
+     "The more we killed the more they seemed to become," said an
+     officer who described to me some of the earlier phases. "They
+     swarmed like ants, coming on in masses, though rarely seeking close
+     contact, for they have learned to respect our rifles and our
+     bayonets."
+
+     On this point there is unprejudiced testimony. A non-commissioned
+     officer of Hussars asked me to translate a letter found on a German
+     officer killed while defending his battery. In the letter are these
+     sentences:--
+
+
+     "German infantry and cavalry will not attack English infantry and
+     cavalry at close quarters. Their fire is murderous. The only way to
+     attack them is with artillery."
+
+
+     Upon this advice the enemy seem to act. They make the best use of
+     their guns, and keep up an incessant fire, which is often well
+     directed, though the effect is not nearly so deadly as they imagine.
+     Their machine guns--of which they have great numbers--are also
+     handled with skill, and make many gaps in our ranks. But the enemy
+     rarely charge with the bayonet. Under cover of artillery they
+     advance _en masse_, pour out volleys without taking aim, and retire
+     when threatened. This is the general method of attack, and it is one
+     in which numbers undoubtedly count. But numbers are not everything;
+     spirit and dash count for more in the end, and these qualities our
+     soldiers have beyond all others in this war. Every officer with whom
+     I have spoken says the same thing. Nothing could be finer than the
+     steadiness and the enterprise of our troops. They remember and obey
+     the order given by Wellington at Waterloo--they stand fast--to the
+     death. Before this insistent and vigorous offensive the enemy have
+     fallen back every day, pressed hard on front and on flank.
+
+
+Realising that the whole future of the campaign, if not of the war, hung
+upon the issue, the army of General von Hausen stood to the last. There
+was a hope that the German right might yet rally against the staggering
+attack thrown upon it. Mr. Massey wrote:--
+
+
+     The fighting on the line of the French centre has, from all
+     accounts, been of a most terrific description. Neither side would
+     give ground except under the heaviest pressure. Long-continued
+     artillery duels paved the way for infantry attacks, and positions
+     had to be carried at the point of the bayonet. Often when bayonet
+     charges had cleared trenches the men driven out were rallied and
+     reinforced, and retook the positions. Here was the most strenuous
+     fighting of the campaign, and as the enemy's casualties are certain
+     to have exceeded those of the French, the total of German killed,
+     wounded, and prisoners must reach an enormous figure. The French
+     losses were very heavy.
+
+     An infantryman wounded within sight of Vitry-le-François told me
+     that the French bayonet fighting was performed with an irresistible
+     dash. The men were always eager--sometimes too eager--to get to
+     close quarters. The weary waiting in trenches too hastily dug to
+     give more than poor shelter from artillery fire caused many a
+     murmur, and there was no attempt to move forward stealthily when
+     the word to advance was given. Often a rushing line was severely
+     torn by mitrailleuse fire, but the heart's desire to settle
+     matters with cold steel could not be checked merely because
+     comrades to the right and left were put out of action. The bayonet
+     work of French infantry gave the enemy a terrible time.
+
+
+Of the struggle on the left of von Hausen's army against the troops of
+General Langle, a graphic picture is given in the diary of a Saxon
+officer of infantry found later among the German dead. The army of von
+Hausen had arrived by forced marches, the left from Rethel, the right
+from Rheims:--
+
+
+     _Sept. 1._--We marched to Rethel. Our battalion stayed there as
+     escort to headquarters.
+
+     _Sept. 2._--The French burnt half the town, probably to cut our
+     lines of communications. It can't hurt us for long, of course, but
+     it's a nuisance, as our field artillery is short of ammunition.
+
+     However, our division advanced. The burning of Rethel was dreadful.
+     All the little houses with wooden beams in their roofs, and their
+     stacks of furniture, fed the flames to the full. The Aisne was only
+     a feeble protection; the sparks were soon carried over to the other
+     side. Next day the town was nothing but a heap of ashes.
+
+     _Sept. 3._--Still at Rethel, on guard over prisoners. The houses
+     are charming inside. The middle-class in France has magnificent
+     furniture. We found stylish pieces everywhere, and beautiful silk,
+     but in what a state!... Good God!... Every bit of furniture broken,
+     mirrors smashed. The vandals themselves could not have done more
+     damage.
+
+     This place is a disgrace to our army. The inhabitants who fled
+     could not have expected, of course, that all their goods would have
+     been left in full after so many troops had passed. But the column
+     commanders are responsible for the greater part of the damage, as
+     they could have prevented the looting and destruction. The damage
+     amounts to millions of marks; even the safes have been attacked.
+
+     In a solicitor's house, in which, as luck would have it, everything
+     was in excellent taste, including a collection of old lace, and
+     Eastern works of art, everything was smashed to bits.
+
+     I couldn't resist taking a little memento myself here and there....
+     One house was particularly elegant, everything in the best taste.
+     The hall was of light oak; near the staircase I found a splendid
+     aquascutum and a camera by Felix.
+
+     The sappers have been ordered to march with the divisional bridging
+     train. We shall start to-morrow. Yesterday at Chalons-sur-Marne a
+     French aviator (officer) was taken prisoner. He imagined the
+     village was held by French troops and so landed there. He was
+     awfully disgusted at being taken prisoner.
+
+     _Sept. 4._--To Tuniville, Pont-Fauerger, where we billeted.
+
+     _Sept. 5._--Les Petites Loges, Tours-sur-Marne. I never want to
+     make such marches again; simply tests of endurance. We crossed the
+     Marne canal on Sept. 6. On our left the 19th corps marched straight
+     on Chalons. On our right front the Guard corps was hotly engaged.
+     When we reached Villeneuve we heard that the Guard corps had thrown
+     the enemy back and that our division was to take up the pursuit. We
+     were in a wood, which the enemy searched with shell fire.
+
+     Left and right it simply rained bullets, but the one I'm fated to
+     stop was not among them. We could not advance any further, the
+     enemy was too strong for us. On our left the 19th corps came up in
+     time to give us a little breathing space. An infernal shell fire.
+     We had a dreadful thirst, a glass of Pilsener would have been a
+     godsend.... A shell suddenly fell in the wood and killed six of my
+     section; a second fell right in the middle of us; we couldn't hang
+     on any longer, so we retired.
+
+     We made several attempts to reach the village of Lenharree, but the
+     enemy's artillery swept the whole wood, so that we could not make
+     any headway. And we never got a sight of the enemy's guns. We soon
+     had the answer to the riddle as to why the enemy's shooting was so
+     wonderfully accurate. We were actually on the enemy's practice
+     range. Lenharree was the chief point _d'appui_ on the right wing.
+
+     The situation was as follows: The Guard corps was on a ground which
+     the enemy knew like the back of his hand, and so was in an
+     extremely critical position. It was just like St. Privat, except
+     that we were all in woods under a terrible shell fire. Our
+     artillery could do nothing, as there was nothing to be seen.
+
+     We found an order from General Joffre to the commander of the 2nd
+     French corps, telling him to hold the position at all costs, and
+     saying that it was the last card. It was probably the best one,
+     too. As we knew later, the artillery opposed to us had an immense
+     reserve of ammunition.... Absolutely exhausted, we waited for the
+     night. In front of us all was still.
+
+     _Sept. 8._--We went forward again to the attack against an enemy
+     perfectly entrenched. In spite of his artillery fire, which nothing
+     could silence, we passed through the wood again. As soon as we
+     reached the northern edge, a perfectly insane fire opened on us,
+     infantry and shell fire with redoubled intensity.
+
+     A magnificent spectacle lay before us; in the far background
+     Lenharree was in flames, and we saw the enemy retreating, beaten at
+     last. The enemy withdrew from one wood to another, but shelled us
+     furiously and scattered us with his machine guns. We got to the
+     village at last, but were driven out of it again with heavy loss.
+     Our losses were enormous. The 178th Regiment alone had 1,700 men
+     wounded, besides those killed. It was hell itself. There were
+     practically no officers left.
+
+     One word more about this artillery range; there were telephone
+     wires everywhere. It is thought that French officers hidden in
+     trees were telephoning our exact situation in the woods.
+
+     _Sept. 9._--We marched to Oeuvry. The enemy was apparently two
+     kilometres in front of us. Where was our intelligence branch? Our
+     artillery arrived half an hour too late, unfortunately. The French
+     are indefatigable in digging trenches. We passed through a wood and
+     lost touch altogether. We saw companies retiring, and we ourselves
+     received the order to withdraw.
+
+     We passed through Lenharree once more, where we found piles of
+     bodies, and we billeted at Germinon. There was a rumour that the
+     1st army had had some disastrous fighting. Our sappers prepared the
+     bridges for demolition. We passed through Chalons-sur-Marne. I am
+     terribly depressed. Everybody thinks the situation is critical. The
+     uncertainty is worst of all.
+
+     I think we advanced too quickly and were worn out by marching too
+     rapidly and fighting incessantly. So we must wait for the other
+     armies. We went on to Mourmelon-le-Petit, where we dug ourselves in
+     thoroughly. Four of our aviators are said to have been brought
+     down by the enemy.
+
+
+Finally, when forced back to the Marne, after three days of incessant
+fighting--pounded by the French guns, broken by the fury of the French
+infantry, ripped by slashing onslaughts of the French horse--the Germans
+still made effort after effort to recover and to re-form. Of the
+struggle on the Marne, Mr. William Maxwell says:--
+
+
+     I was fortunate enough to meet a non-commissioned officer who
+     watched from an eminence the critical phase of the battle which
+     routed the German centre. This is the substance of his story, which
+     has since been corroborated by officers of my acquaintance. The
+     enemy had been driven back fighting for three days, until they came
+     to the river. There they made a desperate stand. Masses of them
+     appeared on the flat and in the undulations of the ground--they
+     seemed like the sands on the sea shore for numbers. They came on in
+     masses and kept up a terrible fire from rifle and machine-gun. But
+     our infantry were not to be denied; they advanced in short rushes
+     and in open order, while shells rained down upon the enemy, and
+     rifles opened great gaps in their ranks.
+
+     "I began," said the sergeant, "to count the dead, but I soon found
+     that impossible. Suddenly I heard a great shout, and turning to my
+     left I saw a sight that made my heart stand still. Our cavalry were
+     charging down on the enemy's cavalry."
+
+     In the bright sunshine their lances and sabres looked like a shower
+     of falling stars. There was an avalanche of men and horses and
+     cold steel. Huge gaps were torn in the enemy's ranks--and the whole
+     thing was over in a few minutes. The German horsemen seemed to
+     vanish into the earth.
+
+
+Stubborn courage, however, was of no avail. In a brief six days that
+mighty host had been reduced to a military ruin. They had advanced in
+the confidence that they were irresistible. Down the valley of the Oise,
+over the highlands of Champagne they had streamed, in endless columns of
+men and guns. The earth had shaken beneath the rumble of their artillery
+and trembled under the hoofs of their horsemen; every road had re-echoed
+the united tread of their battalions; every horizon had bristled with
+the flash of their bayonets and sabres; every town and village had felt
+their arrogance as they "requisitioned" its foodstuffs, consumed its
+wines, slept in its beds, laid hands on whatever they fancied, and
+summoned mayors and officials before them to learn their will, and
+collect their "fines." On the substance of this country of the Marne
+they had revelled, imagining that the world was theirs.
+
+And now they were a battered mass of fugitives, hiding in woods and
+orchards; littering the roads with the wrecks of their equipment; fagged
+and footsore; driven by hunger to tear up the crops from the fields, and
+devour roots and vegetables raw; their discipline replaced by brutal
+savagery. Not even the liveliest imagination can adequately picture the
+state of an army in flight after a heavy defeat. The bigger the army
+the worse that state becomes. The organisation of food supply is thrown
+out of gear. No man knows where the supplies may be, or whether they may
+not be lost. Guns become separated from their ammunition columns. Wagons
+break down or are disabled and have to be left behind. The horses drop
+from famine and overwork. Men grow sullen and intractable. The boom of
+guns bespeaking the pursuit alone gives the stimulus to cover the
+lengthening miles of weary road.
+
+Without time to bury their dead, yet anxious to hide their losses from
+the enemy, the Germans, where they could, formed large pyres of timber,
+which they soaked with oil. On to these they threw the bodies of the
+slain. Across the country the smoke from such pyramids by day and the
+glare of flames by night added to the strangeness and tragedy of a scene
+removed even from what had been thought civilised war.
+
+The sufferings of the beaten host were severe. Starving and depressed,
+or at the last point of exhaustion, men fell out or hid themselves in
+the thick woods which clothe the long undulating slopes on the northern
+side of the Marne valley.[15] Here they were found by the pursuing
+French and British. Most, when discovered, had been without food for
+two days. Partly to satisfy the pangs of hunger, partly out of mere
+senseless revenge, general and indiscriminate pillage was resorted to.
+Chateaux, country houses, and villages were ransacked, and pictures or
+pieces of furniture which could not be carried off destroyed. Though
+their military spirit had been broken, the ruthlessness of the invaders
+remained. They traversed the country like a horde of bandits.
+
+Loss of horses forced them to leave behind whole batteries of heavy
+howitzers and trains of ammunition wagons, for these days of the retreat
+were days of heavy rain. To shorten the length of their columns, as well
+as to gain time, the hurrying troops plunged into by-roads. These, cut
+up by the weight of the guns, speedily became impassable. How hasty was
+the retreat is proved by the headquarters staff of the 2nd army leaving
+behind them at Montmirail maps, documents, and personal papers, as well
+as letters and parcels received by or waiting for the military post.
+
+Following the track of General von Kluck's army, Mr. Gerald Morgan,
+another special correspondent of the _Daily Telegraph_, wrote:--
+
+
+     At Vareddes horses and men littered the ground. Semi-permanent
+     entrenchments had been suddenly abandoned. Alongside the German
+     artillery positions I saw piles of unexploded shells which the
+     Germans had abandoned in their hurry. These shells were in wicker
+     baskets, three to a basket. The Germans had had there many
+     batteries of field guns, both three-inch and five-inch, and had
+     meant evidently to make a determined resistance. But their
+     artillery positions were plainly so badly placed that the French
+     were able to blow them, literally to drench them, out. An avenue of
+     large trees along the roadside, trees which the Germans hoped to
+     use as a shelter, had been torn to pieces and flung to the ground
+     by the French artillery as by strokes of lightning. The German dead
+     had almost all been hit by shells or by shrapnel. A German
+     aeroplane, brought down during the engagement, lay in the fields
+     like a big dead bird.
+
+     I followed the line of the German retreat as far as a village
+     called May. From the number of accoutrements thrown away along the
+     road I judged the retreat was in bad order and greatly hurried.
+
+     The scene on the battlefield was rather terrible. There was no one
+     to bury the dead, for the French army had gone on in pursuit, and
+     the villagers had almost all left the country some days before.
+
+     The German infantry position was in a valley. The entrenchments had
+     undoubtedly been dug with a view to maintaining them permanently,
+     but the fault lay in the artillery position. The German
+     guns--evidently a large number--had been placed on a ridge behind
+     the infantry position. This ridge was exposed to a fire from the
+     French artillery on a ridge opposite, a fire which completely
+     silenced the German guns, and left the German infantry to its fate.
+     Few of the infantry escaped.
+
+
+On the day after the Germans had been driven across the Marne, Mr. Wm.
+Maxwell, driving into the, at ordinary times, pleasant little town of
+Meaux, found it deserted:--
+
+
+     Its houses are standing; its churches and public buildings are
+     untouched, yet its streets are silent, its windows shuttered, and
+     its doors closed. It might be a plague-stricken city, forsaken by
+     all except a few Red Cross nurses, who wait for the ambulances
+     bringing the wounded from the battlefield.
+
+     Leaving the town with a feeling akin to awe, I came upon a new
+     surprise. Walking calmly along the public road in broad day were
+     men in Prussian uniform, and--more amazing still--women in the dark
+     _gellab_ or cloak of the Moors. This was certainly startling, but
+     the explanation was waiting on the road to the east, and it was
+     written in gruesome signs--dead men lying in the ditches--Zouaves
+     in their Oriental dress, Moors in their cloaks, French soldiers in
+     their long blue coats, and Germans in their grey. Every hundred
+     yards or so lay a disembowelled horse with a bloody saddle. This
+     was the ragged edge of the battlefield of the Marne, and the men
+     and women in Prussian and Moorish dress were harmless civilians who
+     had gone to bury the dead and to succour the wounded. It was
+     raining torrents; the wind was bitterly cold, and they had covered
+     themselves with the garments of the dead.
+
+     Passing along this road I came to a wood, where one of these
+     civilian burial parties had dug a pit in which they laid the friend
+     and foe side by side. Fresh mounds of earth that told their own
+     story guided me to a path, where the battle had blazed, a trail of
+     splintered shells, broken rifles, bullet-riddled helmets,
+     blood-stained rags, with which the dying had stopped their wounds,
+     tiny bags in which the German soldier had hoarded his crumbs of
+     biscuit, letters with the crimson imprint of fingers, showing how
+     in the hour of agony and death men's thoughts turn to the beloved
+     ones they are leaving for ever.
+
+     Four miles east of Meaux the hills rise sharply to the north, and
+     are covered with trees. Beyond this wood a broad undulating plain
+     stretches northward over cultivated fields dotted with farmsteads.
+     A hundred paces in front, on a gentle slope, the earth has been
+     levelled in several places that are sown with brass cylinders,
+     whose charge sent the shells on their deadly flight.
+
+     In these emplacements lie some gunners; their heads have been
+     shattered by shells. Under an apple-tree, laden with green fruit,
+     two livid faces turn to the pitiless sky; one man grasps a letter
+     in his hand--it is a woman's writing. Dark huddled patches among
+     the cabbages and the trampled wheat, brown stains on the path,
+     fragments of blood-stained lint, broken rifles and bayonets,
+     bullet-pierced helmets and rent cloaks--all the _débris_ of battle
+     show where the fight was fiercest.
+
+     On the crest of the rise are the trenches; they extend for nearly a
+     mile parallel with the edge of the wood, and are thrown back on the
+     west. They are deep trenches, protected with mounds of earth, and
+     were not made hurriedly. About them lie the dead.
+
+     The position of the trenches and gun emplacements shows that here
+     the enemy met a flanking attack from the west and north, and
+     covered the retreat of their centre. It is not difficult to picture
+     what happened.
+
+
+Scenes like these, the aftermath of the storm of war, were repeated up
+the valley of the Marne from Meaux to beyond Chalons. Terrific in its
+intensity the whirlwind had passed as swiftly as it had come.
+
+No estimate has been formed of the loss of life in this vast encounter.
+It is certain, however, that all the suppositions hitherto advanced have
+been far below reality. Equally is it certain that this was one of the
+most destructive battles even in a war of destructive battles. Since the
+losses on the side of the victorious troops in killed and wounded
+exceeded 80,000 men, the losses on the side of the vanquished must have
+been more than three times as great.
+
+That at first sight may appear exaggerated. There exist, nevertheless,
+good grounds for concluding that such a figure is within the truth. The
+Germans made a series of grave tactical mistakes. When he discovered the
+error into which he had fallen, General von Kluck properly decided to
+withdraw. Had the rest of the German line in conformity with his
+movement fallen back upon the north bank of the Marne, their repulse,
+though serious, would not have been a disaster. But it is now manifest
+that, from a quarter in which the situation was not understood,
+imperative orders were received to press on.
+
+These orders evidently led von Bülow to attempt a stand upon the Petit
+Morin. General von Kluck, in face of the attack by the British and by
+the 6th French army on the Ourcq, realised that retirement on his part
+could not be delayed. But the retreat of his left from the Petit Morin
+exposed the army of von Bülow to an attack in flank. By that attack in
+flank, as well as in front, von Bülow's troops were forced at
+Château-Thierry to cross the Marne in full flight. Passing a deep and
+navigable river in such circumstances is, of all military operations,
+perhaps, the most destructive and dangerous, and this, from the German
+standpoint, formed one of the worst episodes of the battle.
+
+Again, probably in obedience to the same imperative orders, the army of
+von Hausen remained before Sezanne until its decisive defeat was
+foregone, and its escape to the last degree jeopardised. In the retreat,
+consequently, the losses were terribly heavy. But even these were less
+than the losses which fell upon the army of Duke Albert. With almost
+inconceivable obstinacy and ill-judgment that army clung to its
+positions at Vitry until pressed by the French forces on both flanks.
+All the way across the valley of the Marne and over the highlands it had
+consequently to run a gauntlet of incessant attacks.
+
+In the face of these facts, it is no exaggeration to say that the German
+losses must have been at least 250,000. To that has to be added nearly
+70,000 prisoners. They lost also by capture or by abandonment about a
+tenth part of their artillery, besides masses of ammunition and
+transport.
+
+FOOTNOTE:
+
+[15] From the Oise to the Seine the general aspect of this part of
+France is a succession of broad ridges separated by valleys, some of
+them narrow and deep. One-fifth of the whole surface is covered by woods
+and forests of oak, beech and chestnut. Many of the forests are of great
+extent. The main ridge was the site of the battle in its first phases.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+HOW GENERAL VON KLUCK AVERTED RUIN
+
+
+The German defeat had indeed been decisive. On the other hand, the
+defeat did not, in the immediate sequel, yield for the Allies all the
+results which might have been looked for. There have been misimpressions
+on both points.
+
+Take the first misimpression. A victorious general, it has been well
+said, rarely knows the full damage he inflicts. Over the wide area
+covered by the Battle of the Marne and by the pursuit, it was not
+humanely possible to collect and to collate precise information without
+some delay. All the same, the French General Staff and the French War
+Ministry had by September 12 gathered facts enough to form a fairly
+accurate estimate of advantages won. Beyond vague indications of their
+nature, however, these facts were not made public. There was at the time
+a good reason. Situated as the German armies were, and with their
+intercommunication disorganised, they would take two or three days
+longer at least to discover on their part the full measure of their
+losses, and to judge of the effect. To the Allies, that difference in
+time was of the utmost moment. Certainly it would have been against
+their interest by publication of details to tell the German General
+Staff in effect what reinforcements they ought to send, and where they
+ought to send them. Why the difference in time was of moment will
+presently appear.
+
+Again it has been repeatedly stated that the foremost effect of the
+Battle of the Marne was to confirm to the Allies the initiative which
+the strategy of General Joffre had so skilfully gained. That was one
+effect assuredly, and a vitally important effect. Another effect,
+however, hardly less important, was that, in point of military value and
+for effective operations, the German force in France was no longer the
+same. The blow had been too severe. Never again could that force be
+levelled up to those armies which had crossed the Marne in the
+confidence of prospective victory.
+
+The effect was not moral merely, though _moral_ had not a little to do
+with it. The effect was in the main material. War wastage arising from
+fatigue and privation must have reduced the effective strength of the
+German armies in nearly as great a degree as losses in killed and
+wounded. If _on September 12_ we put the armies which turned to hold the
+new line from Compiègne to Verdun at 600,000 men still fit for duty, we
+shall be adopting probably an outside figure.
+
+Had this force, so reduced, not been able to make a stand along that
+new line, it must have been destroyed largely through exhaustion and
+famine. It was saved not, as imagined, chiefly by the defence works
+thrown up north of the Aisne and across the highlands to the Argonne. It
+was saved mainly by the tactics and by the energy of General von Kluck.
+
+Rightly described by the British Official Bureau, doubtless on the
+authority of Sir John French himself, as "bold and skilful," those
+tactics form one of the outstanding features of the campaign, and they
+ought justly to be considered among the greatest feats in modern war.
+They are on the same plane indeed as the strategy and tactics of General
+Joffre, and these, beyond doubt, rank in point of mastery with the
+campaign of Napoleon in 1814. In this very area of Champagne on the eve
+of his fall the military genius of Napoleon was, like lightning in the
+gloom of tempest, displayed in its greatest splendour. For a thousand
+years this region of plateaux and rivers has been the arena of events
+which have shaped the history of Europe.[16] The features it offers for
+military defence are remarkable. Versed in the campaigns of Napoleon,
+aware of what have proved to be his mistakes, knowing the country in its
+every detail, knowing and judging rightly the qualities and
+capabilities of his troops, General Joffre drew the Germans on step by
+step to overthrow. The great feature of his plans was that this was
+meant to be an overthrow which would govern the fortune of the war. In
+great fact that aim was achieved, but in part also its fulfilment was
+postponed.
+
+On the retreat of the German armies from the Marne there were, in order
+to bring about the destruction of those armies as a fighting force,
+three things which the Allies had to accomplish, and accomplish, if
+possible, concurrently. The first was to cut the German communications
+with Luxemburg and Metz by barring the roads and railways across the
+eastern frontier; the second was to push forward and seize Rheims, and
+the outlet through the hills north of the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac; the
+third was to force the troops of von Kluck eastward off their lines of
+communication along the valley of the Oise, and to do that, if it could
+be done, south of the Aisne.
+
+All three objectives were of great consequence. The third, however, was
+the most important of the three.
+
+Of the three, the first, the closing of the eastern frontier, was
+accomplished in part; the second was so far successful that the French
+were able to seize Rheims without opposition; the third was not
+accomplished. Had it been the armies of von Kluck and von Bülow forming
+the German right must both have been severed from the German line to the
+east of Rheims, and, with their supplies of food and of munitions cut
+off, must have been compelled to surrender.
+
+Appreciating the peril, and fully aware that the fate of the _whole_
+German force hung upon averting it, General von Kluck acted with
+resource and energy. Probably no commander ever extricated himself out
+of a more deadly predicament, and the achievement is all the more
+notable since he was opposed to skilful generals in command of skilful
+troops, directed by the greatest strategist of the age. The predicament
+in which General von Kluck found himself was this. If he opposed a front
+to the army of General Desperey, formed of the pick of the French
+regulars, he had on his flank both the British and the troops of General
+Maunoury. In that case, overwhelming defeat was certain. If on the other
+hand he formed a front against the troops of General French and General
+Maunoury, he presented a flank to the 5th French army. Not only in such
+circumstances was a bad defeat almost equally foregone, but, forming
+front to a flank and fighting along the lines of his communications, he
+must, in the event of defeat, retire eastward, abandoning his lines of
+communication and obstructing the retreat of von Bülow.
+
+As events prove, the measures he adopted were these. He recalled from
+Amiens the army corps sent to that place to undertake an outflanking
+movement against the Allied left, and to cut off communication between
+Paris and Boulogne and Calais. With all haste these troops fell back
+upon the Oise to secure the German right rear. Coincidently, his two
+army corps on the Ourcq were ordered to undertake against General
+Maunoury a vigorous offensive to the west of that river. With the
+remaining three army corps, which had crossed the Marne, General von
+Kluck fell back, presenting to the British and to the 5th French army a
+line protected first by the Grand Morin, and then by the Petit Morin and
+the Marne. In order to carry out that movement he did not hesitate to
+sacrifice a considerable part of his cavalry.
+
+The danger-point of this disposition was La Ferté-sous-Jouarre. Into
+that place, consequently, he threw a strong force with orders to hold it
+to the last moment. With the rest of his three corps he formed front
+partly against the British, partly against the left of the army of
+General Desperey. In these actions, as Mr. Maxwell has pointed out, his
+troops were swept by the flank attack of part of the 6th French army.
+There is no doubt they fought, despite cruel losses, with the most
+stubborn courage. As the 6th French army, who displayed equally
+unshakable resolution, strove, following the course of the Ourcq, to
+work round against the German line of retreat, and as their attacks had
+to be met as well as the attacks of the British, the expedient which the
+German general resorted to was, as he retired, to hurry divisions of
+troops successively from the south to the north of his flank defence,
+and, as the 6th French army moved, to move his flank defence with it.
+Not only was the object to do that, but there was, at the same time, an
+effort to press the 6th French army towards the north-west. This, in
+fact, General von Kluck managed to do. He did it by extending his flank
+beyond the left of the French army, and making a feint of envelopment.
+Imagine a row of coins, each coin a division, and a movement of the row
+by constantly shifting a coin from one end of the row to the other. That
+will give roughly an idea of what, on the events, appears to have been
+the expedient.
+
+The success of such a series of movements depended, of course, on their
+rapidity, and, considering the severe and insistent pressure from the
+British on the rear of the line, forming an angle with the flank, the
+movements were carried out with surprising rapidity. The Ourcq, though
+not a long river, is, like the Marne, deep, and over more than half its
+length navigable. It flows between plateaux through a narrow valley with
+steep sides. The crossing of such a stream is no easy feat.
+
+But General von Kluck did not mind the losses he incurred so long as he
+achieved his purpose. This was clearly his best policy. In the intervals
+of desperate fighting his men had to undertake long marches at a
+breakneck pace. For several days together they were without rest or
+sleep. To some extent they were aided by the entrenchments already dug
+to guard against an attack from the west. These positions, prepared to
+protect the head of the German chain of armies remaining in contact with
+Paris, now proved useful in covering the retirement. Nevertheless, the
+efforts of the Germans must have been exhausting to the last degree.[17]
+
+Despite that, they were successful in reaching the Aisne in advance of
+the 6th French army. The latter, it ought, however, to be said, had to
+operate through a difficult area. From the Ourcq to the Aisne there is a
+succession of forests. Of these the great forest of Villers-Cotterets
+extends northwards from the Ourcq to within six miles of Soissons. East
+of the stretch of forests the country is more open. Given these facts of
+topography, it is evident that on following the line of the Ourcq, with
+the object of barring its passage to the enemy, the French had in the
+forest belt a formidable obstacle. Perceiving that in this lay his
+chance, General von Kluck hurried as large a part of his force as
+possible across the Ourcq in order to bar the advance of the French by
+the forest roads through Villers, and by the comparatively narrow break
+in the forest belt between Crepy and Pierrefond. He was thus able,
+notwithstanding that the British were hanging on to and harrying his
+rear, to hold the outlets against the troops of General Maunoury until
+he slipped past them.[18]
+
+
+And once on the Aisne and in touch with his Amiens rearguard, now on the
+Oise above Compiègne, he was in a position to initiate a complete change
+in tactics, and, his force being comparatively secure, the other German
+armies could again fall into line.
+
+Before dealing with those new German tactics, it is advisable briefly to
+sketch the defence works thrown up by the Germans along their line,
+because both these defence works and the character of the country are
+intimately related to the tactics.
+
+As already stated, the highlands of Champagne extend north-west nearly
+as far as Peronne. They are chalk hills and uplands cut by deep valleys.
+The most northerly of the valleys is that out of which flows the Somme.
+Then comes the much wider valley of the Oise. Still farther south is the
+valley of the Aisne. Between the Oise and the Aisne is a roughly
+triangular tract of country, its apex at the point where the Oise and
+the Aisne join. Across the broad end or base of this triangle run the
+open downs. Towards the narrower end of the area the country becomes
+broken and hilly, and is covered with great patches of wood and forest.
+
+There is along the north of the Aisne a long wooded ridge, which on its
+northern edge slopes steeply. But the top of the ridge forms a gentle
+undulating slope to the south. It is not unlike the top of a rough,
+slightly tilted table. To a bird's-eye view this top would appear shaped
+rather like a very coarse-toothed comb, with the teeth jagged and
+broken. The top, that is to say, runs out on its south side into a
+succession of promontories, each ending in a round-ended bluff
+overlooking the Aisne valley. Some of these bluffs jut out close above
+the river. Others are much farther back. Between them are clefts and
+side valleys, in which the land slopes up from the bottom of the main
+valley to the top of the plateau. In the longer clefts, of course, the
+general gradient is much less stiff than in the shorter ones. Both the
+tops of the bluffs and most of the clefts are thickly wooded. The bluffs
+are on an average above 400 feet in height, that in fact being the
+general elevation of the plateau.
+
+The aspect of the edge of the corresponding plateau on the south side of
+the valley of the Aisne is exactly similar. Since the bluffs on the
+opposite sides approach each other in some places and are farther apart
+in others, the valley varies in breadth from half a mile to two miles.
+The bottom of the valley is practically flat, and through this flat
+tract of meadow land the river winds, now near one side of the valley,
+now near the other. The stream is between fifty and sixty yards wide,
+but, like all the rivers in this part of France, deep. Where the valley
+opens out there are villages and small towns. The largest place is the
+picturesque old city of Soissons.
+
+Now the ridge north of the Aisne extends west to east for some
+thirty-four miles. At Craonne, its eastern end, it rises to a summit
+about 500 feet high, and then falls abruptly. There is here, going from
+the Aisne northwards, a fairly level open gap some three miles wide.
+South of the Aisne, the same gap extends for about ten miles to Rheims.
+On each side of the gap rise hillsides clothed with woods. At the
+crossing of the Aisne is situated the village of Berry-au-Bac. This gap,
+it will be seen, forms an important feature in the Aisne battle.
+
+Above and behind the hills to the east of the gap, and across the downs,
+the German entrenchments extended eastward for mile after mile right
+away to the Argonne. It is apposite here to note that near Rheims the
+traverse gap widens out and passes right and left round an isolated,
+hilly mass, lying like an island in a stream. Up the sides of this hilly
+mass climb the villages of Berru and Nogent-l'Abbesse.
+
+Undoubtedly, one of the surprises of the war was the discovery that the
+Germans had prepared the positions just described. The preparation must
+have involved great labour. But it should not be forgotten that from
+time out of mind one of the chief industries in this part of France is
+represented by the chalk quarries, out of which is dug the material,
+known in its prepared state as plaster of Paris. All through Champagne
+there was, before the war, a considerable German population. Not a few
+of the plaster quarries had passed into the hands of Germans. The
+principal quarries are on the steep north slope of the ridge along the
+Aisne. Cut into the hillsides, these chalk pits present a labyrinth of
+galleries and chambers, where the quarrymen were accustomed to take
+their meals and even to sleep. These quarries, numbered by scores, might
+well form the refuge and stronghold of an army. The region is
+remarkable, also, for its many natural caves.
+
+Even more important, however, from a military standpoint, is the
+southern side of this plateau. The only means of approaching the plateau
+from that side is either up the clefts or side valleys, or from the
+western end where the level gradually falls. But an attack made up one
+of the side valleys could be assailed from both sides. In possession of
+the plateau above, the defence, while keeping its force undivided, could
+move that force to any point where attack was threatened, having itself
+no clefts or fissures to deal with. It will be seen, therefore, that the
+ridge formed a sort of vast ready-made castle, big enough to stretch
+from London to beyond Oxford, or from Liverpool to Manchester, and that
+the quarries and galleries made it habitable, at all events on the
+banditti level of existence.
+
+As Sir John French has pointed out,[19] owing to the patches of wood on
+the upper slopes and tops of the bluffs, only small areas of the plateau
+were open to view from the tops of bluffs on the south side of the
+river. Hence the movements of the defenders were, looked at from across
+the river, to no small extent concealed.
+
+Two further _military_ features of the ridge should be noted. One is the
+fact that its steep northern slope forms one side of the valley of the
+Lette, and that, therefore, it is bounded by a river on both sides; the
+other is, that some eight miles from its eastern end at Craonne the
+plateau narrows to a mere neck less than a mile wide, and that across
+this neck is carried the Oise and Aisne canal.
+
+Not relying, however, merely on the natural features of the place, the
+Germans dug along the plateau lines of entrenchments connected by
+galleries with other trenches in the rear where reserves, not in the
+firing line, were held. These back trenches formed living places. The
+mass of men was too large, for any save the smaller proportion, to find
+shelter in the quarries.
+
+It will be seen, therefore, that the business of turning the Germans out
+of such a fastness could be no easy matter.
+
+On the choice of this position two questions suggest themselves. How was
+it that the Germans came to pitch upon this place--for there can be no
+doubt the choice was deliberate[20]--and what operations did they intend
+to undertake on the strength of its possession?
+
+The answers to these questions are in no sense speculations in the
+secrets of War Offices. Those secrets it would be idle to profess to
+know. Like the observations made in preceding pages, the answers are
+deductions from admitted facts and events, perfectly plain to anyone who
+has knowledge enough of military operations to draw them. Only ignorance
+can assume that no true commentary can be written concerning a campaign
+save upon official confidences.
+
+As to the German choice of this position, it should not be forgotten
+that the present war represents the fourth campaign which the Prussians
+have fought in this area of France. In forming their plans they had, we
+ought to presume, considered--bearing in mind the difference in military
+conditions--not only the war of 1870-1, but the campaign of Frederick
+William II., and the campaign of Blucher in 1814. A little earlier it
+was said that this arena offers great facilities for defence. The reason
+is that, since there is here a system of rivers flowing to a conjunction
+near Paris, it is always open to the defence to attack in superior force
+between any two of the rivers, while the assailant must, in advancing
+from east to west, have his forces divided by one or more of the
+streams. The whole German plan was intended to obviate and to overcome
+that difficulty, and yet the plan came to grief because, at the moment
+when their forces were divided by the Marne and by the Grand Morin, the
+defence were able to attack them in superior force on their extreme
+right--the vital point--and when the crossing of the rivers made it
+difficult to meet that attack.[21]
+
+Foreseeing, however, the _possibility_, though not accepting the
+probability, of having to stand for a time on the defensive, the German
+General Staff, we cannot now doubt, had formed the subsidiary and
+provisional plan of concentrating, as far as possible and in case of
+necessity, between two of the rivers--the Oise and the Aisne--in
+positions which could be held with a minimum of numbers.
+
+But this concentration was only preliminary. It was intended to aid the
+massing on their own right flank of an echelon of reserve formations to
+be thrown against the left of the Allied forces.
+
+Concentration between two of the rivers was, as a defensive, beyond
+question the best measure in the situation. A mere defensive, however,
+would be tantamount to a confession that the whole expedition against
+France had proved a failure. Undoubtedly, therefore, as the later events
+show, the design was, at the earliest moment, to resume the offensive by
+means of masses of reserves. These, pivoting upon Noyon, at the western
+end of the fortified line, might sweep round and, by threatening to
+envelop the Allied armies compel their retirement.
+
+Conversely, the Allied tactic was plainly to envelop the Germans and to
+threaten their main communications through Belgium. The question now
+was: Which side could carry out its manoeuvre first?
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[16] The Italian historian, Signor Guglielmo Ferrero, has expressed the
+opinion that the Battle of the Marne has altered the face of European
+history. There is little doubt that time will prove this view to be
+fully justified.
+
+[17] An official British note on this retreat stated: "Many isolated
+parties of Germans have been discovered hiding in the numerous woods a
+long way behind our line. As a rule they seem glad to surrender.
+
+"An officer, who was proceeding along the road in charge of a number of
+led horses, received information that there were some of the enemy in
+the neighbourhood. Upon seeing them he gave the order to charge,
+whereupon three German officers and 106 men surrendered."
+
+[18] An interesting sidelight on the German movements is afforded by
+these particulars given on official authority:--
+
+"At Villers-Cotterets, though supplies far in excess of the capabilities
+of the place were demanded, the town was not seriously damaged. The
+Germans evacuated the place on September 11th in such haste that they
+left behind a large amount of the bread requisitioned. It was stated by
+the inhabitants that the enemy destroyed and abandoned fifteen
+motor-lorries, seven guns, and ammunition wagons.
+
+"At Crepy, on Sept. 3, various articles were requisitioned under threat
+of a fine of 100,000f. for every day's delay in the delivery of the
+goods. The following list shows the amounts and natures of the supplies
+demanded, and also the actual quantities furnished:
+
+
+                          REQUISITIONED.          SUPPLIED.
+     Flour               20,000 kilos.           20,000 kilos.
+     Dried vegetables     5,000   "                 800   "
+     Coffee               1,000   "                 809   "
+     Salt                 1,000   "                2,000  "
+     Oats               100,000   "               55,000  "
+     Red wine             2,500 litres.            2,500 litres.
+
+     All smoked meats, ham, cloth,    }
+     new boots, tobacco, biscuits,    } 61 prs. of boots.
+     handkerchiefs, shirts, braces,   } 91 bicycles.
+     stockings, horse shoes, bicycles,} 15 motor tyres.
+     motor-cars, petrol.              }  6 inner tubes.
+
+
+[19] See Appendix, Despatch of Sir John French, Oct. 8, 1914.
+
+[20] The opinion on this point of the officers who took part in the
+Battle of the Aisne is embodied in the following official note published
+by the British Press Bureau:--
+
+"There is no doubt that the position on the Aisne was not hastily
+selected by the German Staff after the retreat had begun. From the
+choice of ground and the care with which the fields of fire have been
+arranged to cover all possible avenues of approach, and from the amount
+of work already carried out, it is clear that the contingency of having
+to act on the defensive was not overlooked when the details of the
+strategically offensive campaign were arranged."
+
+[21] The late General Hamley, describing what he considered the most
+effective lines for an invasion of France from Germany in opposition to
+the defensive adopted by Napoleon, points out that if the left of the
+defence threatens the invaders' communications, the invaders, leaving
+their right on the Ourcq and Marne, march through Sezanne to fight on
+the right bank of the Seine. Pushing the French right and centre to the
+Yères with their own centre and left, they fight then the decisive
+battle. It should be decisive, for the [Germans] on the two rivers,
+approaching each other in the narrowing angle can combine in a movement
+on Paris, holding the passages at Melun and Montereau on the one side,
+and at Meaux on the other.
+
+"In executing such a plan the weapons of the defender would be in some
+measure turned against himself.... But the assailants in taking these
+forward steps do so at the disadvantage of attacking a strongly posted
+enemy and under penalty of exposing a flank to him. This course demands
+a superiority in numbers of not less than 4 to 3, and probably greater
+than that."
+
+The Germans had adopted this very plan, but they had not the superiority
+they imagined.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+THE OPERATIONS ON THE AISNE
+
+
+The battle of the Aisne, destined to develop into the longest conflict
+on record--it extended over two whole months--began on the afternoon of
+Sunday, September 13. To follow its complexities it is necessary clearly
+to grasp, not only the military purposes or objectives the two sides had
+immediately in view, but the respective situations of the opposing
+masses as regards fighting efficiency. When operations are on this
+gigantic scale a certain amount of imagination must be exercised to
+realise even the barest facts.
+
+From Compiègne eastward to Rheims the Allied line was formed by the 6th
+French, the British, and the 5th French armies. To the first for the
+moment was assigned the duty of forcing the passages of the Aisne from
+below Soissons, clearing the enemy off the western end of the ridge, and
+pushing him up to Noyon on the Oise.
+
+The business which fell to the British army was that of delivering a
+frontal attack on this natural hill fortress from Soissons as far as
+Craonne.
+
+The 6th French army, which by a vigorous forward thrust had driven the
+enemy out of Rheims, was to push up through the transverse gap to
+Berry-au-Bac, and assault the hostile positions on the hillsides along
+the east side of the gap. Along these hills the Germans had settled
+themselves in force. Here, too, there were many chalk quarries and
+caves, which the Germans were using as shelters and stores.
+
+At first sight it might well seem that the frontal attack undertaken by
+the British was not strictly a necessary operation. Clearly, the
+feasible way of driving the Germans out of their fastness was to turn
+the flanks of the position on the west through Lassigny and Noyon, and
+on the east through Berry-au-Bac. The main operation was, of course,
+that of turning the position from the west, for the right of the German
+position remained its vulnerable point. It was essential, however, to
+the success of that operation that General von Kluck should not be able
+to meet it in force until, at all events, the Allied troops had taken a
+firm grip.
+
+Now, if the British army had assumed a merely watching attitude on the
+south side of the Aisne, and had in consequence been able to extend
+their line from the south of Craonne down the river to, say, Attichy,
+some ten miles below Soissons, that, while leaving nearly the whole
+strength of the 6th French army free to undertake the turning movement,
+would at the same time have left General von Kluck also free to throw
+his main strength against it.
+
+A vigorous and pressing attack along his front was consequently
+essential, in order to keep his main force employed. Not only was the
+attack essential, but it had to be launched against him without delay,
+and before he could recover from the effects of his retreat.
+
+Including the troops recalled from Amiens, Generals von Kluck and von
+Bülow had under their command, nominally at any rate, ten army corps.
+If, deducting losses and war wastages, we put their strength in
+effectives at not more than the equivalent of six corps--it could have
+been very little more--yet six corps was, _in the positions they held_,
+a force fully able to cope with the nine corps making up the three
+Allied armies pitted then against them. Bearing in mind, indeed, the
+natural defensive advantages of the ridges on which the Germans had
+established themselves, and their facility for moving troops either for
+the purposes of defence or of counter-attack, their strongholds could
+have been held by three corps, leaving the remainder to be used on the
+flank for active operations.
+
+Intended to frustrate that manoeuvre, the British attack compelled the
+German commanders to await, before they could make any such attempt, the
+arrival of reinforcements. On both sides there was now a race against
+time. French reinforcements and reserves had to be brought up and massed
+against the flank of the German position. Many of those troops had,
+however, to cover long distances afoot. The movements of mass armies are
+comparatively slow. After all, the roads and railways traversing a
+country have a capacity which is limited. Some idea of what such
+movement involves may be formed from the traffic on a popular bank
+holiday. In the case of armies there is, in addition to human numbers,
+the artillery, the munitions, the camp equipment, the foodstuffs, and
+all the rest of the transport. No one, therefore, can be surprised that
+by the time these masses could be concentrated on the German flank,
+there were German masses who, under the same conditions, had been
+hurried forward to meet them. From the very necessities of time and
+space the race resulted to a great extent in a draw.
+
+The Battle of the Aisne is in every respect unique. A battle in the
+ordinary sense of field operations it was not. It was a siege. Nothing
+at all like it had ever occurred before in war. There have been many
+sieges of banditti in mountain retreats. There have been sieges in old
+times of fortified camps. There had never been the siege under such
+conditions of a great army.
+
+The operations in this amazing and gigantic conflict, though
+inter-related, must for the purposes of clear narration be dealt with in
+sections. The story divides itself into:--
+
+The attack upon the German positions north of the Aisne.
+
+The struggle for and around Rheims.
+
+The operations on and against the German right flank.
+
+In this chapter it is proposed to deal with the attack upon the German
+positions north of the Aisne. The manner in which the British troops
+forced the passage of that river and secured a footing on the ridge, and
+held on to it, forms a particularly brilliant feat of arms.
+
+As stated in the official account:--
+
+
+     The country across which the army has had to force its way is
+     undulating and covered with patches of thick wood.
+
+     Within the area which faced the British before the advance
+     commenced, right up to Laon, the chief feature of tactical
+     importance is the fact that there are six rivers running right
+     across the direction of advance, at all of which it was possible
+     that the Germans might make a resistance.
+
+     These are, in order from the south, the Marne, the Ourcq, the
+     Vesle, the Aisne, the Lette, and the Oise.
+
+
+The Lette, it may here be stated, is a tributary of the Oise. Rising
+just to the north of Craonne and flowing westward through an upland
+valley, it is used in the lower part of its course as a section of the
+Oise and Aisne Canal.
+
+
+     On Friday, the 11th, the official account goes on to say, but
+     little opposition was met with by us along any part of our front,
+     and the direction of advance was, for the purpose of co-operating
+     with our Allies, turned slightly to the north-east. The day was
+     spent in pushing forward and in gathering in various hostile
+     detachments, and by nightfall our forces had reached a line to the
+     north of the Ourcq, extending from Oulchy Le Château to Long Pont.
+
+     On this day there was also a general advance on the part of the
+     French along their whole line, which ended in substantial success,
+     in one portion of the field Duke Albrecht of Würtemberg's fourth
+     army being driven back across the Saulx; and elsewhere the whole of
+     the corps artillery of a German corps being captured. Several
+     German colours also were taken.
+
+     It was only on this day that the full extent of the victory gained
+     by the Allies was appreciated by them. The moral effect of this
+     success has been enormous.
+
+
+When the British pushed forward on September 12 to the Aisne, they found
+that the Germans still held the heights to the south of the river above
+Soissons. German outposts also held the strip of hilly country between
+the Aisne and its tributary the Vesle.
+
+The first step was to drive the Germans across the Aisne at Soissons.
+This was undertaken by the 3rd army corps. Pushing forward to Buzancy,
+south-east of Soissons, the troops won the heights overlooking the old
+city and the Aisne valley, which here opens to its greatest width. It
+was a stiff fight. Despite, however, a heavy bombardment from across the
+valley, the British, side by side with troops of General Maunoury, swept
+the Germans down into and through Soissons, and as the enemy crowded
+over the two bridges the artillery of the 3rd corps poured upon them a
+rain of shells. Immediately the Germans had crossed, the bridges, which
+had been mined, went up in two terrific explosions.
+
+While this action was in progress, Sir John French had thrown the 1st
+army corps across the Vesle at Fismes. They advanced to Vaucere with but
+little opposition.
+
+At Braisne on the Vesle, however, the Germans for a time made a resolute
+stand. They held the town in force, and covered the bridge with machine
+guns. They were strongly supported by artillery. Notwithstanding this,
+they were ousted out of the place by the 1st British Cavalry Division
+under General Allenby. While a brigade of British infantry cleared the
+enemy out of the town, which lies mainly on the south bank, the cavalry
+rushed the passage of the river under a galling fire and turned the
+hostile position. So rapidly did the Germans take to flight that they
+had to throw a large amount of their artillery ammunition into the
+river. There was no time to reload it into the caissons.[22] This feat
+of the British horse ranks among the finest bits of "derring do" in the
+campaign. The Queen's Bays have been mentioned in despatches as
+rendering distinguished service. Conspicuous gallantry was shown by the
+whole division. As a result of these operations from Braisne and
+Fismes, the British secured the country up to the Aisne.
+
+Left and right, therefore, the advance had been completely successful.
+In the centre, however, the 2nd army corps had an exceptionally tough
+piece to negotiate. They advanced up to the Aisne between Soissons and
+Missy. The latter place lies on the north bank, just below the junction
+of the Aisne and the Vesle. Here there is a broad stretch of meadow
+flats, commanded north, east, and south by bluffs. On the south is the
+Sermoise bluff or spur; across the flats, directly opposite to the
+north, stands out the Chivre spur. The summit of the latter is crowned
+by an old defence work, the Fort de Condé. This the Germans held, and
+they made use of the spur, like a miniature Gibraltar, to sweep the
+flats of the valley with their guns. On this 12th September the 5th
+division found themselves unable to make headway. They advanced to the
+Aisne, which just here sweeps close under the Chivres spur, leaving
+between the cliff and the bank a narrow strip, occupied by the village
+of Condé-sur-Aisne. Across the river at Condé there was a road bridge,
+and the enemy had left the bridge intact, both because they held the
+houses of the village, which they had loop-holed, and because their guns
+above commanded the approach road. It may be stated that they held on to
+the Chivre spur and on to Condé all through the battle.
+
+On the night of September 12 the British had possession of all the south
+bank of the Aisne from Soissons up to Maizy, immediately to the south
+of Craonne.
+
+At daybreak on Sunday, September 13, Sir John French ordered a general
+advance across the river. Opposite the places where the waterway could
+most readily be crossed, the enemy had posted strong bodies of infantry
+with machine guns. Along the bluffs, and behind the side valleys above,
+they had disposed their artillery in a range of batteries upwards of
+fifteen miles in length.
+
+The battle began with one of the most tremendous and concentrated
+artillery duels that has ever taken place, for the line was prolonged
+both east and west by the French artillery, until it stretched out to
+more than twice the length of the British front.
+
+Of the nine bridges over this section of the Aisne, all save that at
+Condé had been blown up. Near a little place called Bourg on the north
+bank, some three miles below Maizy, the valley is crossed by an aqueduct
+carrying the Oise and Aisne canal. This canal passes in a series of
+locks over the ridge north-west. The canal is much used in connection
+with the chalk quarries.
+
+Troops of the 1st British division, defying a fierce bombardment,
+advanced in rushes along the towing path, or crept along the parapets of
+the aqueduct. Every man deliberately took his life in his hands. Others
+crept breast high in the water along the canal sides. The German guns
+stormed at them, and many fell, but foot by foot and yard by yard they
+crawled on, while supporting riflemen from the ridges behind them
+picked off the Germans who strove to oppose their passage. The
+resistance was furious. They won, however, a footing on the north bank.
+Once there, no counter-assaults could dislodge them.
+
+This bridgehead formed at the opposite end of the aqueduct, more troops
+rushed across, covered by a concentration of the British artillery. In
+this way, at length, the whole division got over, including the cavalry.
+Forthwith they advanced up the road leading across the ridge from Bourg,
+along the side valley, towards Chamouille.
+
+While these events were taking place, troops of the 2nd division were,
+five miles farther down the river, near Vailly, carrying out a feat of
+equal daring. Just about Vailly, the Aisne is crossed obliquely by the
+railway line from Soissons. The railway bridge, a structure of iron, now
+lay in the stream. Most of the confusion of massive ribs and girders was
+under water, and the deep and smoothly sweeping current, swollen by
+recent rains, foamed and chafed against the obstacle. One of the long
+girders, however, still showed an edge above the flood. It was possible
+for men to cross upon this girder, but only in single file. Not more
+than two feet in breadth at the outside, not less than 250 feet in
+length, this path of iron resembled, if anything could, that bridge,
+narrow as the edge of a scimitar, over which the faithful Mussulman is
+fabled to pass into Paradise. It was swept by shot and shell. From the
+heights across the valley belched without ceasing the hail of death.
+Wounded or unnerved a man saw his end as surely in the grey-green swirl
+of waters. But the soldiers who undertook this service did not hesitate.
+It may be doubted if there has ever been anything in ancient or in
+modern war more coolly heroic. Here was the spirit which has made
+Britain the mother of mighty nations. Not a few of these heroes fell,
+inevitably, but the spirit was in all, and if some fell, others won
+their way over, and having won it kept their footing against heavy odds.
+
+In sight of this struggle, amid the unceasing roar of the batteries on
+either side, the 4th Guards Brigade were, a mile away at Chavonne,
+ferrying themselves over in boats. Notwithstanding the furious efforts
+to annihilate them, both as they crossed and as they sprang ashore, a
+whole battalion in this way got across and made good their foothold.
+
+Half-way between Condé and Soissons, at the village of Venizel, at the
+same time, the 14th brigade were rafting themselves over on tree-trunks
+crossed with planks, derelict doors, and stairways.
+
+These footholds won, the troops, like the 1st division, lost no time in
+pushing forward to seize points of vantage before the enemy could rally
+from his astonishment. The 2nd division advanced along the road from
+Vailly towards Courteçon; the 12th brigade made an attack in the
+direction of Chivres, situated in a small side valley to the west of
+the Chivres bluff. Slightly higher up this side valley, and on its
+opposite slope, the Germans held the hillside village of Vregny in
+force. The cleft at once became the scene of a furious combat.
+
+Coincidently the work went on of throwing pontoon bridges across the
+river. Under persistent bombardment the Royal Engineers stuck to this
+business with grim resolve. The battle had gone on without a pause from
+daybreak. At half-past five in the evening, opposite Bucy-le-Long, three
+miles above Soissons, the first pontoon bridge had been completed, and
+the 10th brigade crossing by it drove the enemy out of Bucy. Working
+right through the night the Engineers completed eight pontoon bridges
+and one footbridge. On the following day they temporarily repaired the
+road bridges at Venizel, Missy, and Vailly, and the bridge at Villers.
+The army had thus twelve bridges connecting with the south bank, and was
+able to move across in force with a large part of his artillery.
+
+Crossing the Aisne at Soissons, the main road running for about a mile
+and a half north-east to the little village of Crouy, there divides. On
+the right is a lower road eastward up the valley of the Aisne, past and
+under the bluffs on the north side to Berry-au-Bac. On the left is a
+road which climbs up hill, carried in some places through cuttings and
+tunnels, at others over short viaducts, until it reaches the summit of
+the ridge. There, parallel in direction with the lower road three miles
+away, it continues for some twelve miles to Craonne. From this summit
+road there is, between the patches of woods, a wide view of the
+country--to the north the valley of the Lette, and beyond it the height
+round which lies the town and fortress of Laon, to the south the rich
+woodland glimpses of the Aisne valley. This panoramic highway is the
+famous Chemins des Dames.
+
+It is evident that command of the higher and of the lower roads meant
+command of all the part of the ridge between Soissons and Berry, and the
+operations were an effort on the one side to obtain, and on the other to
+retain, that command.
+
+Already, with the exception of the break at Condé, the lower road, and
+the villages and the town of Vailly lying along its length, were, as the
+result of the fighting on September 13, in the hands of the British. The
+higher road remained in the possession of the Germans. Up the clefts and
+side valleys are a number of small villages and hamlets, inhabited for
+the most part by quarrymen and lime-burners, but with, here and there, a
+small factory. A sprinkling of these civilians were Germans. Most were
+known to the enemy, and were active spies, and one of the first measures
+taken by the Germans was to establish at various points secret
+telephones, forming an exchange of intercommunication with and along
+their positions. Where telephones could not be employed they arranged a
+system of ruses and signals. Among these devices was that of smoke from
+cottage chimneys.
+
+On the morning of September 14, the 13th, 14th, and 15th Brigades,
+defeating a heavy counter-attack, seized the roads between Condé and
+Soissons. The object was to cut into the centre of the German defence.
+
+During this day further bodies of British troops crossed the river. The
+forces already on the north side were heavily engaged. Towards nightfall
+the Germans attempted a counter-attack. It was beaten off after severe
+fighting. Three hours later, about ten o'clock at night, they again
+descended in force against the positions and villages held by the
+British troops. While the clefts and side valleys blazed with flashing
+fire of infantry, the valley of the Aisne was lit up for miles with the
+fluctuating and lurid flare from the heavy guns. Masses of German
+infantry tried to drive the British troops out of the villages they had
+seized. It was evidently hoped to prevail by weight of numbers. The
+onset fell back crippled by the losses sustained.
+
+By this time the fact was becoming plain that the battle was no mere
+rearguard action. The enemy had manifestly resolved to make a stand. To
+ascertain the character and strength of his disposition, Sir John French
+ordered a general advance. It was timed to begin at daybreak.
+
+The dawn broke amid rain and heavy mists, but this, if a disadvantage to
+the attack, was equally a disadvantage to the defence. One of the
+leading features of this offensive was what Sir John French has justly
+called the bold and decisive action of the 1st army corps, commanded by
+Sir Douglas Haig.
+
+From Bourg, the scene of the crossing on the aqueduct, there runs
+northward climbing to the summit of the ridge a road to the village of
+Cerny, about half-way along the Chemin des Dames. The distance from
+Bourg to Cerny is rather more than three miles. It is, however, a stiff
+climb. Two-thirds of the way up, where the road bends sharply to the
+left round a spur, is the village of Vendresse-et-Troyon. The capture of
+this place was one of the immediate objectives, and the troops told off
+to accomplish it were the 1st infantry brigade and the 25th artillery
+brigade, under General Bulfin.[23] At Cerny there is a slight dip on the
+level of the ridge.
+
+Vendresse is on the west slope of this side valley, and Troyon on the
+east slope just behind the spur. The Germans held in strong force both
+the spur and the houses on each slope. At Troyon they had fortified
+themselves in a factory.
+
+Few operations could be more ticklish than the seizure of such a place.
+From the spur the Germans came down in a counter-attack like a human
+avalanche. After stemming this rush by a withering fire the Northamptons
+were ordered to carry the spur at the point of the bayonet. They did it.
+As they were chasing the survivors of the counter-attack up the slope
+there suddenly appeared on the skyline a second mass of German infantry,
+the reserves supporting the counter-attacking column. In a matter of
+seconds, however, the fugitives and the Northamptons were on them.
+Their ranks broken, they also turned and fled in rout across the
+plateau.
+
+In the meantime the North Lancashires had stormed the factory and
+cleared the enemy out of Vendresse at the point of the bayonet. Other
+troops of the 1st army corps pushed on to Meulins, a mile to the
+south-east, and seized positions along the east end of the ridge. During
+the fighting the Germans lost 12 field guns and 600 prisoners. Many of
+the latter were found to belong to the Landwehr, proving that the enemy
+had already been compelled to fill up his formations from second
+reserves.
+
+The fury of this fighting was intense. There could be no better evidence
+of its character than an unposted letter found later on an officer of
+the 7th German army reserve corps. The letter runs:--
+
+
+     CERNY, S. OF LAON, _Sept. 17, 1914_.
+
+     MY DEAR PARENTS,--Our corps has the task of holding the heights
+     south of Cerny in all circumstances till the 15th corps on our left
+     flank can grip the enemy's flank. On our right are other corps. We
+     are fighting with the English Guards, Highlanders, and Zouaves.[24]
+     The losses on both sides have been enormous. For the most part this
+     is due to the too brilliant French artillery. The English are
+     marvellously trained in making use of the ground. One never sees
+     them, and one is constantly under fire.
+
+     Three days ago our division took possession of these heights, dug
+     itself in, &c. Two days ago, early in the morning, we were attacked
+     by immensely superior English forces (one brigade and two
+     battalions), and were turned out of our positions; the fellows took
+     five guns from us. It was a tremendous hand-to-hand fight. How I
+     escaped myself I am not clear. I then had to bring up supports on
+     foot (my horse was wounded and the others were too far in rear).
+     Then came up the Guard Jager Battalion, 4th Jager, 65th Regiment,
+     Reserve Regiment 13, Landwehr Regiments 13 and 16, and with the
+     help of the artillery drove back the fellows out of the position
+     again.
+
+     ... During the first two days of the battle[25] I had only one
+     piece of bread and no water, spent the night in the rain without my
+     great coat. The rest of my kit was on the horses which have been
+     left miles behind with the baggage, which cannot come up into the
+     battle because as soon as you put your nose out from behind cover
+     the bullets whistle.
+
+     Yesterday evening about six p.m., in the valley in which our
+     reserves stood, there was such a terrible cannonade that we saw
+     nothing of the sky but a cloud of smoke. We had few casualties.
+
+
+Just to the west of Vendresse the 5th infantry brigade advanced against
+the part of the ridge where is situated the village of Courteçon.
+Simultaneously the 4th Guards Brigade, with the 36th brigade of
+artillery, debouched from Bourg along the Aisne and Oise canal, with the
+object of seizing Ostel. They had to fight their way, opposed foot by
+foot, through dense woods. The 6th brigade pressed up farther along the
+canal to Braye-en-Laonnois. It is immediately to the north of that
+place that the plateau is at the narrowest. Evidently to obtain
+possession of that neck would be a great advantage. The enemy held on to
+Braye at all costs.
+
+Further west, again, the British advanced from Vailly to Aizy along
+another of the approaches to the plateau. The object was to hem in the
+Germans holding the Chivres bluff and Condé. On the farther side of the
+bluff from Aizy the division of Sir Charles Fergusson held on to Chivres
+village in the face of a succession of determined onslaughts.
+
+As the outcome of this day's fighting, which had been very severe, the
+1st army corps had won close up to the ridge by Craonne, and held
+positions extending along the plateau across the canal to Soupir, a
+distance of nearly nine miles. Concurrently the 2nd and 3rd corps had
+gained the plateau from Chavonne westward to Croucy, and with the
+exception of the Chivres bluff all the outer or southern edge of the
+plateau, as well as the intervening side valleys, were in the British
+hands, from Soissons to Craonne.
+
+As soon as they had gained these positions the British troops set about
+digging themselves in, and although the rain fell all night in torrents,
+and the men had been through a long and fierce struggle since daybreak,
+they worked magnificently.
+
+Next day (September 15) heavy rain blurred the view. Neither force could
+see the movements of the other, but when the mists lifted somewhat the
+Germans must have been surprised to discover that the foe were already
+in their stronghold.
+
+On their side they had not been idle. They had brought along from
+Maubeuge the batteries of heavy howitzers used to destroy the forts at
+that place, and were putting them into well-concealed positions. Besides
+this they worked with energy to strengthen their entrenchments. These
+lines of trenches among and along the edges of the woods crowning the
+slopes of the ridge were elaborately made, and in general cleverly
+hidden.
+
+They were so placed as to sweep with rifle and machine gun fire the
+approaches to the plateau up the various clefts. Lengths of barbed-wire
+entanglements and rabbit fencing further defended the approaches, both
+in the woods and across open ground. Where behind or between the lines
+of trenches the land rose--the top of the plateau had been worn by ages
+of weather into sweeping undulations--there were batteries of field
+guns, so arranged that they laid approaches under a cross fire. Round
+and in front of these knobs of land the trenches swept like ditches
+round bastions. Everything, in fact, that resource could suggest had
+been done to make the positions impregnable.[26]
+
+In addition to trenches, hamlets and villages were held by the two
+armies as advanced posts, and had been turned roughly into groups of
+block houses.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[22] A buried store of the enemy's munitions of war was also found not
+far from the Aisne, ten wagon-loads of live shell and two wagons of
+cable being dug up; and traces were discovered of large quantities of
+stores having been burnt, all tending to show that so far back as the
+Aisne the German retirement was hurried.
+
+[23] This able and distinguished officer has since been promoted for his
+services.
+
+[24] Part of the 5th French Army, which was operating on the right of
+the British from Rheims and Berry-au-Bac.
+
+[25] The reference is evidently to the fighting on Sept. 13 and 14.
+
+[26] The following descriptive notes on the German positions were made
+by the official "Eye-witness" with the British forces:--"Owing to the
+concealment afforded to the Germans' fire trenches and gun emplacements
+by the woods and to the fact that nearly all the bridges and roads
+leading to them, as well as a great part of the southern slopes, are
+open to their fire, the position held by them is a very strong one.
+Except for these patches of wood, the terrain generally is not enclosed.
+No boundaries between the fields exist as in England. There are ditches
+here and there, but no hedges, wire fences, or walls, except round the
+enclosures in the villages. A large proportion of the woods, however,
+are enclosed by high rabbit netting, which is in some places supported
+by iron stanchions. The top of the plateau on the south of the river to
+some extent resembles Salisbury Plain, except that the latter is
+downland while the former is cultivated, being sown with lucerne, wheat,
+and beetroot.
+
+"A feature of this part of the country, and one which is not confined to
+the neighbourhood of the Aisne, is the large number of caves, both
+natural and artificial, and of quarries. These are of great service to
+the forces on both sides, since they can often be used as sheltered
+accommodation for the troops in the second line. Other points worthy of
+note are the excellence of the metalled roads, though the metalled
+portion is very narrow, and the comparative ease with which one can find
+one's way about, even without a map. This is due partly to the
+prevailing straightness of the roads and partly to the absence of
+hedges. There are signposts at all cross-roads, whilst the name of each
+village is posted in a conspicuous place at the entry and exit of the
+main highway passing through it.
+
+"In addition to the absence of hedges, the tall, white ferro-concrete
+telegraph posts lining many of the main roads give a somewhat strange
+note to the landscape."
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+WARFARE BY DAY AND BY NIGHT
+
+
+In three days the British had not only gained the passages over the
+Aisne, but had won their way to the plateau. Both sides had fought with
+determination. The German commander knew that if he could not hold this
+position the whole contemplated strategy of throwing masses of
+reinforcements against the left flank of the Allied forces must
+collapse. He was well aware that if he failed, not only must his own
+force in all probability be destroyed, but the whole German line as far
+as Verdun must in all probability be crumpled up.
+
+Not less was Sir John French aware that the future success of the Allied
+campaign hung upon obtaining a purchase on the German position which
+would force General von Kluck to employ his whole strength in holding
+on. It is easy, therefore, to infer how fierce had been this three days'
+struggle.
+
+The Germans had put forth the greatest effort of which they were
+capable. But despite the natural advantage given them, first by the
+river front, and next by the rugged and broken ground in the many side
+valleys, they had been beaten. Henceforward the struggle was on less
+uneven terms. The fact had become manifest that without a strenuous
+counter-offensive the Germans could not hope to hold on.
+
+This counter-offensive was attempted without delay.
+
+Since the top of the plateau sloped from north to south, the positions
+held by the British were in general on lower ground than the trenches
+cut by the Germans, and it must have been something of a disagreeable
+surprise to the latter when on the morning of September 15, the heavy
+mists having lifted, they saw miles of earthworks, which had literally
+sprung up in the night. The rain and mist during the hours of darkness
+had made a night attack impossible, even if, after the eighteen hours'
+furious battle in the mists on the preceding day, they had had the
+stomach for it.
+
+They had their surprise ready, however, as well. From well-hidden
+positions behind the woods on the top of the plateau they opened a
+violent bombardment of the British lines with their huge 8-inch and
+11-inch howitzers, throwing the enormous shells, which fell with such
+terrific force as to bury themselves in the ground. Giving off in
+exploding dense clouds of black smoke, these shells blew away the earth
+on all sides of them in a rain of fragments of rock, masses of soil and
+stones, leaving the surface filled with holes wide and deep enough to be
+the burial place of several horses. This heavy ordnance was kept well
+beyond the range of the British guns, and employed for high-angle fire.
+So far as life was concerned, the shells caused relatively little loss.
+Their flight being visible--they looked not unlike tree-trunks hurled
+from across the hills--they could be dodged. On realising how little
+they were to be feared, the British troops nicknamed them "Black
+Marias," "Coalboxes," and "Jack Johnsons," and shouted jocular warnings.
+The idea of using these shells was to knock the British defence works to
+pieces. Some of these works, hastily thrown up, proved to be too slight,
+and had to be replaced by diggings, which became regular underground
+barracks.
+
+At this time the British lines were in general more than a mile distant,
+on the average, from those of the enemy. They followed no symmetrical
+plan, but, adapted to the defensive features of the ground, were cut
+where there were at once the best shelters from attack and the best
+jumping-off places for offence. Describing them, the British military
+correspondent wrote:--
+
+
+     A striking feature of our line--to use the conventional term which
+     so seldom expresses accurately the position taken up by an army--is
+     that it consists really of a series of trenches not all placed
+     alongside each other, but some more advanced than others, and many
+     facing in different directions. At one place they run east and
+     west, along one side of a valley; another, almost north and south,
+     up some subsidiary valley; here they line the edge of wood, and
+     there they are on the reverse slope of a hill, or possibly along a
+     sunken road. And at different points both the German and British
+     trenches jut out like promontories into what might be regarded as
+     the opponent's territory.
+
+
+While the British infantry had been entrenching, the artillery, with an
+equal energy, had hauled their guns up the steep roads, and in many
+cases up still steeper hillsides, and by the morning of September
+15--another disagreeable surprise for the enemy--nearly 500 field pieces
+bristled from positions of vantage along the front. The reply to the
+German bombardment was a bombardment of the hostile trenches. The latter
+were crowded with men. If the German shells did a lot of injury to the
+landscape, the British shrapnel inflicted far heavier injury on the
+enemy's force. It swept the German trenches and field batteries with a
+regular hail of lead. Well-concealed though they to a great extent were,
+the German positions were not so well-concealed as the British
+positions. Both armies did their best to make themselves appear scarce,
+and beyond the deafening uproar of the guns belching from behind woods
+and undulations, there seemed at a distance few signs of life on either
+side. But, looked at from behind and within, the lines were very
+anthills of activity.
+
+The bombardment went on until midnight. Then came a night battle of
+almost unexampled fury.
+
+From the outline already given of the fighting on September 14 it will
+have been gathered that one of the most substantial advantages won had
+been the position seized by the 4th Guards Brigade along the Aisne and
+Oise Canal from Astel to Braye-en-Laonnois. At Braye and eastwards over
+the intervening spur of plateau to Vendresse the British positions were
+dangerously close to the narrow neck of the ridge. Across that neck,
+too, following the canal to its juncture with the Lette, and then up the
+short valley of the Ardon, was the easiest route to Laon, the main base
+of the 1st German army. Obviously the British must, if possible, be
+ousted out of these villages.
+
+Bombardment had failed to do it. Soon after midnight, therefore, a huge
+mass of German infantry moved down against the Guards' entrenchments by
+Braye. It was a murderous combat. Six times in succession the Germans
+were beaten off. But for every column of the enemy that went back,
+broken, decimated, and exhausted, there was another ready instantly to
+take its place. Advancing over the dying and the dead, the Germans faced
+the appalling and rapid volleys of the Guards with unflinching courage.
+They fell in hundreds, but still they rushed on. Machine guns on both
+sides spat sheets of bullets. At close grips, finally, men stabbed like
+demons. In and round houses, many set on fire, and throwing the scene of
+slaughter into lurid and Dantesque relief, there were fights to the
+death. No quarter was given or taken. The canal became choked with
+corpses. On the roads and hillsides dead and wounded lay in every
+posture of pain. Beyond the outer ring of the struggle, where shouts of
+fury mingled with cries of agony, the roaring choruses of the guns bayed
+across the valley with redoubled rage.
+
+Great as it was, the effort proved vain. If the attack was heroic, the
+defence was super-heroic. When, for the last time, the lines of the
+Guards swept forward, withering the retreating and now disordered foe
+with their volleys, charging into them in what seemed a lightning-like
+energy, terrible alike in their forgetfulness of danger and in the
+irresistible impetus of victory, the Germans must have realised that
+their hopes of conquest were shattered.
+
+This was but one out of similar scenes in that fierce night.[27] After
+it the cold, grey morning broke in strange silence. For a space the
+artillery had ceased to speak. Many and many a hero, unknown to fame,
+but faithful unto death, lay with face upturned on those hillsides.
+Never had duty been more valiantly done.
+
+Sir John French realised the qualities of his soldiers. He had been
+compelled to demand from them a herculean energy. They had not failed
+him in any place nor in any particular. They had been in truth
+magnificent, and he could not but embody his admiration in a Special
+Order of the Day. That historic document ran:--
+
+
+     Once more I have to express my deep appreciation of the splendid
+     behaviour of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the
+     army under my command throughout the great battle of the Aisne,
+     which has been in progress since the evening of the 12th inst. The
+     battle of the Marne, which lasted from the morning of the 6th to
+     the evening of the 10th, had hardly ended in the precipitate flight
+     of the enemy when we were brought face to face with a position of
+     extraordinary strength, carefully entrenched and prepared for
+     defence by an army and a staff which are thorough adepts in such
+     work.
+
+     Throughout the 13th and 14th that position was most gallantly
+     attacked by the British forces, and the passage of the Aisne
+     effected. This is the third day the troops have been gallantly
+     holding the position they have gained against the most desperate
+     counter-attacks and a hail of heavy artillery.
+
+     I am unable to find adequate words in which to express the
+     admiration I feel for their magnificent conduct.
+
+     The self-sacrificing devotion and splendid spirit of the British
+     Army in France will carry all before it.
+
+
+     (Signed) J. D. P. FRENCH, Field Marshal,
+     _Commanding-in-Chief the British Army
+     in the Field_.
+
+
+The enemy had been shaken. Of that there could be no doubt. Following
+his experiences in the battle of the Marne this fighting was beginning
+to prove too much for him.
+
+
+A considerable amount of information about the, enemy has now been
+gleaned from prisoners (says the official record). It has been gathered
+that our bombardment on the 15th produced a great impression. The
+opinion is also recorded that our infantry make such good use of the
+ground that the German companies are decimated by our rifle fire before
+a British soldier can be seen.
+
+From an official diary captured by the First Army Corps it appears that
+one of the German corps contains an extraordinary mixture of units. If
+the composition of the other corps is at all similar, it may be assumed
+that the present efficiency of the enemy's forces is in no way
+comparable with what it was when war commenced. The losses in officers
+are noted as having been especially severe. A brigade is stated to be
+commanded by a major, and some companies of the Foot Guards to be
+commanded by one-year volunteers, while after the battle of Montmirail
+one regiment lost fifty-five out of sixty officers.
+
+The prisoners recently captured appreciate the fact that the march on
+Paris has failed, and that their forces are retreating, but state that
+the object of this movement is explained by the officers as being to
+withdraw into closer touch with supports which have stayed too far in
+rear. The officers are also endeavouring to encourage the troops by
+telling them that they will be at home by Christmas. A large number of
+the men, however, believe that they are beaten. The following is an
+extract from one document:--
+
+
+     With the English troops we have great difficulties. They have a
+     queer way of causing losses to the enemy. They make good trenches,
+     in which they wait patiently. They carefully measure the ranges for
+     their rifle fire, and they then open a truly hellish fire. This was
+     the reason that we had such heavy losses....
+
+
+From another source:--
+
+
+     The English are very brave, and fight to the last man.... One of
+     our companies has lost 130 men out of 240.
+
+
+From this time the battle took on more and more the features of a
+regular siege. On the side of the Germans the operations resolved
+themselves into persistent bombardments by day alternated with infantry
+attacks by night. Infantry attacks in daylight they now knew to be
+foredoomed. It is questionable, indeed, if, with the lowered _moral_ of
+their troops, such attacks were any longer possible. To assist their
+night attacks they rigged up searchlights, and when their infantry
+advanced played the beams upon the British lines in the hope of dazzling
+the defence and spoiling the rifle-fire they had learned to dread. These
+lights, however, served also as a warning. When that was found out the
+enemy went back to attacks in the darkness, but with no better results.
+
+Sunday, September 20, was the date of another general night onslaught.
+Just before the attack developed military bands were heard playing in
+the German lines. After the manner of the natives of West Africa they
+were working themselves up to the fury pitch. It was to be a do-or-die
+business evidently. The enterprise, however, again failed to prosper.
+Against some of the British positions the attack was pushed with dogged
+bravery; and the scenes of five nights before were enacted again and
+again with the like results. Against one part of the line the onset
+wound up with an extraordinary disaster. Two German columns mistook each
+other in the darkness for British troops. They had apparently set out
+from different points to converge upon the same British position. In
+front of that position they fought a furious combat, and while no
+bullets reached the British trenches the men in them were afforded the
+unwonted spectacle of the enemy wiping themselves out.[28]
+
+
+Between the two armies the country had now become a "no-man's land,"
+deserted by both sides because, in the expressive phrase of the British
+soldier, it had turned "unhealthy." Over this tract the still unburied
+bodies of German infantry lay where they had fallen. Outside the village
+of Paissy, held by the British and near a ridge where there had been
+some of the severest fighting, the German dead lay in heaps. Lines of
+German trenches held at the beginning of the battle were by this time
+deserted.
+
+Reconnoitring parties, says the authorised story, sent out during the
+night of the 21st-22nd, discovered some deserted trenches, and in them,
+or near them in the woods, over a hundred dead and wounded were picked
+up. A number of rifles, ammunition, and equipment were also found. There
+were various other signs that portions of the enemy's forces had
+withdrawn for some distance.
+
+Unable to prevail in open fight, the Germans resorted to almost every
+variety of ruse. In the words of the official story:--
+
+
+     The Germans, well trained, long-prepared, and brave, are carrying
+     on the contest with skill and valour. Nevertheless, they are
+     fighting to win anyhow, regardless of all the rules of fair play,
+     and there is evidence that they do not hesitate at anything in
+     order to gain victory.
+
+     During a counter-attack by the German 53rd Regiment on portions of
+     the Northampton and Queen's Regiments on Thursday, the 17th, a
+     force of some 400 of the enemy were allowed to approach right up to
+     the trench occupied by a platoon of the former regiment, owing to
+     the fact that they had held up their hands and made gestures that
+     were interpreted as signs that they wished to surrender. When they
+     were actually on the parapet of the trench held by the Northamptons
+     they opened fire on our men at point-blank range.
+
+     Unluckily for the enemy, however, flanking them and only some 400
+     yards away, there happened to be a machine gun manned by a
+     detachment of the "Queen's." This at once opened fire, cutting a
+     lane through their mass, and they fell back to their own trench
+     with great loss. Shortly afterwards they were driven further back
+     with additional loss by a battalion of the Guards, which came up in
+     support.
+
+     During the fighting, also, some German ambulance wagons advanced
+     in order to collect the wounded. An order to cease fire was
+     consequently given to our guns, which were firing on this
+     particular section of ground. The German battery commanders at once
+     took advantage of the lull in the action to climb up their
+     observation ladders and on to haystacks to locate our guns, which
+     soon afterwards came under a far more accurate fire than any to
+     which they had been subjected up to that time.
+
+     A British officer who was captured by the Germans, and has since
+     escaped, reports that while a prisoner he saw men who had been
+     fighting subsequently put on Red Cross brassards. That the
+     irregular use of the protection afforded by the Geneva Convention
+     is not uncommon is confirmed by the fact that on one occasion men
+     in the uniform of combatant units have been captured wearing the
+     Red Cross brassard hastily slipped over the arm. The excuse given
+     has been that they had been detailed after a fight to look after
+     the wounded.
+
+     It is reported by a cavalry officer that the driver of a motor-car
+     with a machine gun mounted on it, which he captured, was wearing
+     the Red Cross.
+
+
+A curious feature of this strange siege-battle was that villages and
+hamlets between the fighting lines still continued, where not destroyed,
+to be in part, at any rate, inhabited, and at intervals peasants worked
+in the intervening fields. The Germans took advantage of this to push
+their spy system.
+
+The suspicions of some French troops (of the 5th army) were aroused by
+coming across a farm from which the horses had not been removed. After
+some search they discovered a telephone which was connected by an
+underground cable with the German lines, and the owner of the farm paid
+the penalty usual in war for his treachery.
+
+Some of the methods being employed for the collection or conveyance of
+intelligence were:--
+
+
+     Men in plain clothes who signalled to the German lines from points
+     in the hands of the enemy by means of coloured lights at night and
+     puffs of smoke from chimneys by day.
+
+     Pseudo-labourers working in the fields between the armies who
+     conveyed information, and persons in plain clothes acting as
+     advanced scouts.
+
+     German officers and soldiers in plain clothes or in French or
+     British uniforms remained in localities evacuated by the Germans in
+     order to furnish them with intelligence.
+
+
+One spy of this kind was found by the British troops hidden in a church
+tower. His presence was only discovered through the erratic movements of
+the hands of the church clock, which he was using to signal to his
+friends by means of an improvised semaphore code.
+
+Women spies were also caught, and secret agents found observing
+entrainments and detrainments.
+
+Amongst the precautions taken by the British to guard against spying was
+the publication of the following notice:--
+
+
+     (1) Motor cars and bicycles other than those carrying soldiers in
+     uniform may not circulate on the roads.
+
+     (2) Inhabitants may not leave the localities in which they reside
+     between six p.m. and six a.m.
+
+     (3) Inhabitants may not quit their homes after eight p.m.
+
+     (4) No person may on any pretext pass through the British lines
+     without an authorisation countersigned by a British officer.
+
+
+On October 23rd six batteries of heavy howitzers asked for by Sir John
+French reached the front, and were at once put into action. No effort
+was spared by the Germans to drive the British army back across the
+Aisne. The quantity of heavy shells they fired was enormous, and they
+were probably under the impression that the effect was devastating.
+
+
+The object of the great proportion of artillery the Germans employ
+(observes the official record on this point) is to beat down the
+resistance of their enemy by a concentrated and prolonged fire, and to
+shatter their nerve with high explosives before the infantry attack is
+launched. They seem to have relied on doing this with us; but they have
+not done so, though it has taken them several costly experiments to
+discover this fact. From the statements of prisoners, indeed, it appears
+that they have been greatly disappointed by the moral effect produced by
+their heavy guns, which, despite the actual losses inflicted, has not
+been at all commensurate with the colossal expenditure of ammunition,
+which has really been wasted.
+
+By this it is not implied that their artillery fire is not good. It is
+more than good; it is excellent. But the British soldier is a difficult
+person to impress or depress, even by immense shells filled with high
+explosive which detonate with terrific violence and form craters large
+enough to act as graves for five horses.
+
+How far the colossal expenditure of ammunition was thrown away is
+illustrated by this description of the effect in a given instance:--
+
+
+     At a certain point in our front our advanced trenches on the north
+     of the Aisne are not far from a village on the hillside, and also
+     within a short distance of the German works, being on the slope of
+     a spur formed by a subsidiary valley running north and the main
+     valley of the river. It was a calm, sunny afternoon, but hazy; and
+     from a point of vantage south of the river it was difficult exactly
+     to locate on the far bank the well-concealed trenches of either
+     side. From far and near the sullen boom of guns echoed along the
+     valley and at intervals, in different directions, the sky was
+     flecked with the almost motionless smoke of anti-aircraft shrapnel.
+     Suddenly, without any warning, for the reports of the distant
+     howitzers from which they were fired could not be distinguished
+     from other distant reports, three or four heavy shells fell into
+     the village, sending up huge clouds of smoke and dust, which slowly
+     ascended in a brownish-grey column. To this no reply was made by
+     our side.
+
+     Shortly afterwards there was a quick succession of reports from a
+     point some distance up the subsidiary valley on the side opposite
+     our trenches, and therefore rather on their flank. It was not
+     possible either by ear or by eye to locate the guns from which
+     these sounds proceeded. Almost simultaneously, as it seemed, there
+     was a corresponding succession of flashes and sharp detonations in
+     a line on the hill side, along what appeared to be our trenches.
+     There was then a pause, and several clouds of smoke rose slowly
+     and remained stationary, spaced as regularly as a line of poplars.
+     Again there was a succession of reports from the German
+     quick-firers on the far side of the misty valley and--like
+     echoes--the detonations of high explosive; and the row of expanding
+     smoke clouds was prolonged by several new ones.
+
+     Another pause, and silence, except for the noise in the distance.
+     After a few minutes there was a roar from our side of the main
+     valley as our field guns opened one after another in a more
+     deliberate fire upon the position of the German guns. After six
+     reports there was again silence, save for the whirr of the shells
+     as they sang up the small valley, and then followed the flashes and
+     balls of smoke--one, two, three, four, five, six, as the shrapnel
+     burst nicely over what in the haze looked like some ruined
+     buildings at the edge of a wood.
+
+     Again, after a short interval, the enemy's gunners reopened with a
+     burst, still further prolonging the smoke, which was by now merged
+     into one solid screen above a considerable length of trench, and
+     again did our guns reply. And so the duel went on for some time.
+     Ignoring our guns, the German artillerymen, probably relying on
+     concealment for immunity, were concentrating all their efforts in a
+     particularly forceful effort to enfilade our trenches. For them it
+     must have appeared to be the chance of a lifetime, and with their
+     customary prodigality of ammunition they continued to pour bouquet
+     after bouquet of high-explosive _Einheitsgeschoss_, or combined
+     shrapnel and common shell, on to our works. Occasionally, with a
+     roar, a high-angle projectile would sail over the hill and blast a
+     gap in the village.
+
+     In the hazy valleys bathed in sunlight not a man, not a horse, not
+     a gun, nor even a trench was to be seen. There were only flashes,
+     smoke, and noise. Above, against the blue sky, were several round
+     white clouds hanging in the track of the only two visible human
+     souls--represented by a glistening speck in the air. On high also
+     were to be heard the more or less gentle reports of the bursts of
+     the anti-aircraft projectiles.
+
+     Upon inquiry as to the losses sustained it was found that our men
+     had dug themselves well in. In that collection of trenches were
+     portions of four battalions of British soldiers--the Dorsets, the
+     West Kents, the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, and the King's
+     Own Scottish Borderers. Over 300 projectiles were fired against
+     them. The result was nine men wounded.
+
+     On the following day 109 shells were fired at the trenches occupied
+     by the West Kent Regiment alone. Four officers were buried, but dug
+     out unhurt. One man was scratched.
+
+
+All through the second week of the battle, from September 20 to
+September 28, there was a succession of night attacks. Those delivered
+on the nights of September 21 and September 23 were especially violent.
+In the fierce bayonet fights--sometimes on the line of the trenches--the
+British infantry never failed to prove their superiority. The losses of
+the enemy were punishingly heavy, not merely in the fire-fights, but in
+the pursuit when the survivors turned to fly. The object of these
+tactics of bombardment throughout the day, and of infantry assaults at
+night, kept up without intermission, was plainly so to wear the British
+force down that in the end it must give way and be swept back to the
+Aisne in rout.
+
+For such a victory the Germans were ready to pay a very high price. They
+paid it--but for defeat. What may be considered the culminating effort
+was launched against the trenches held by the 1st division on the
+extreme British right. The division's advanced position close under the
+ridge near Craonne had all through been a thorn. On the night of
+September 27 an apparently overwhelming force was flung upon it. Aided
+by the play of searchlights the German masses strove with might and
+main. The fight lasted for hours. To say that it was repulsed is
+evidence enough. The next night the attack was repeated with, if
+anything, greater violence. It was the fight of the Guards Brigade over
+again, but on a greater scale. Imagine such a struggle with 50,000 men
+involved; a fighting mass nearly three miles in extent; the fire of
+rifles and machine guns and artillery; the gleam of clashing bayonets;
+the searchlights throwing momentarily into view the fury of a _mêlée_
+and then shutting it off to light up another scene of struggle.
+Fortunately for the British, the columns of attack were ripped up before
+the trenches could be reached. Men fell in rows, held up by the wire
+entanglements and shot wholesale. This was the enemy's last great
+stroke.
+
+From that time the British won forward until they gained the ridge,
+seized Craonne and all the hostile positions along the Chemin des Dames.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[27] The troops of the 5th Division under Sir Charles Fergusson repulsed
+with equal gallantry a furious attack against their position at Missy,
+on the west side of the Chivres bluff.
+
+[28] In the official account this singular episode is thus
+recorded:--"Since the last letter left General Headquarters evidence has
+been received which points to the fact that during the counter-attacks
+on the night of Sunday, the 20th, the German infantry fired into each
+other--the result of an attempt to carry out the dangerous expedient of
+a converging advance in the dark. Opposite one portion of our position a
+considerable massing of the hostile forces was observed before dark.
+Some hours later a furious fusillade was heard in front of our line,
+though no bullets came over our trenches."
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+THE STRUGGLE ROUND RHEIMS
+
+
+It will have been gathered from the preceding pages that the tactics
+adopted by the Germans north of the Aisne were tactics designed to wear
+down the British force. No troops, it was supposed, could, even if they
+survived, withstand such an experience as that of the eight days from
+September 20 to September 28. Their lines pounded during all the hours
+of daylight by heavy shells, and assaulted during the hours of darkness
+by masses of infantry, the British force ought, upon every German
+hypothesis of modern warfare, to have been either driven back, or broken
+to pieces. The theory had proved unsound. To say nothing of the enormous
+monetary cost of the ammunition used, the attacks had turned out
+appallingly wasteful of life. The best troops of the Prussian army had
+been engulfed. In this savage struggle, between 13,000 and 14,000
+British soldiers had been killed or wounded. What the losses were on the
+side of the Germans we do not know, for their casualties in any
+particular operations have not been disclosed.
+
+If, however, their losses were on anything like the same scale as those
+at Mons and at Cambrai, the casualties must have been severe in the
+extreme. That they were severe is certain. The tactics adopted on the
+Aisne were not yet substantially different from the tactics followed in
+the earlier battles. At this stage of the campaign, the Germans still
+held to the principle that for victory hardly any price was too high.
+
+Remembering at the same time that neither lives nor money are sacrificed
+by Germany without what is considered good cause, it becomes necessary
+when there are heavy sacrifices to search for the most adequate and
+assignable reason. In this instance, the search need not go far. After
+the first week of the battle, the enemy were not merely defending their
+stronghold, they were attempting to carry out an offensive, and that
+offensive had two objects. One was the scheme of operations against the
+left of the Allied line. The other was the recapture of Rheims.
+
+Consider how a defeat of the British force must have affected the
+situation. On the one hand, it would have enabled the Germans to push
+back the 6th French army upon Paris; on the other, it would have
+compelled the French to evacuate Rheims.
+
+Now Rheims was clearly at this time the key of the Allied position. The
+roads and railways converging upon the city made it an advanced base of
+the first importance. Driven out of Rheims, the Allies would have found
+their communications between Noyon and Verdun hopelessly confused.
+Neither reinforcements, nor munitions, nor supplies could have been
+brought up save by difficult and circuitous routes. A general retreat
+must have become imperative, and all the advantages arising from the
+recent victory on the Marne have been lost.
+
+Why, then, it may be asked, did the Germans not keep Rheims when they
+had it? To that question there is but one answer. The Germans evacuated
+Rheims because they had no choice. Possession of Rheims means command of
+all the country between the Aisne and the Marne, because that possession
+also means command of the communications. From Roman times the military
+importance of the city has been recognised. Eight great roads converge
+into it from as many points of the compass. These are military roads,
+made originally by the Romans, and mostly straight as arrows. They are
+now supplemented, but in time of war not superseded, by the railways.
+
+The occupation of Rheims by the Germans, and their forced evacuation of
+the place twelve days later, are two of the most notable episodes of the
+campaign. If there was one position where it might have been expected
+the French would make a stand between Belgium and Paris, it was
+assuredly here. The Germans looked for that opposition. The city was
+plainly too valuable a prize, and too important a military possession
+to be yielded without a struggle. Yet when the invaders came within
+sight of it, there were no signs of resistance. As they debouched from
+the highlands the splendid picture which spread before their eyes to the
+south-west was touched with a strange peace. Framed in its theatre of
+wooded hills, and dominated by the twin towers of its peerless
+cathedral, the lordly city, a seat of civilisation and the arts when
+ancient Germany was still a wilderness, seemed far removed from the
+scene of war. No cannon boomed from any of its surrounding forts; no
+trenches were anywhere visible; no troops could be seen along the
+distant roads. German officers swept the landscape with their field
+glasses. They found a military blank. Naturally, they suspected a ruse.
+Volunteers were called for, and a band of eighteen valiants enrolled
+themselves. The eighteen rode into the city. They were not molested. At
+the same time, another band crept cautiously up to the nearest of the
+outlying forts. They entered it without challenge. It was empty. Both
+bands came back to headquarters with the same surprising report. The
+French troops had fled to the last man. What better proof could there be
+of total demoralisation?
+
+Now, there was a ruse, and if anything could illustrate the combined
+boldness and depth of the French strategy it was this. Let us see what
+the ruse was. To begin with, Rheims was supposed to be a fortress, but
+the forts, situated on the surrounding hills, and constructed after the
+war of 1870-71, were mere earthworks. They were not adapted to withstand
+modern artillery. It was part of the French plan that they should not be
+adapted. On the contrary, just before the German advance, the forts had
+been dismantled and abandoned. That measure had been postponed to the
+last moment, and though the invaders had their spies at Rheims, as
+elsewhere, they remained unaware of it.
+
+Clearly the effect of the abandonment was a belief that the French were
+already, to all intents, beaten. In the Berlin papers there appeared
+glowing accounts of the triumph. Conversely, at all events in England
+among those who did not know, the French evacuation came as a shock.
+This was all part of the foreseen result. It not only heightened the
+confidence of the German armies, but it had no small influence on that
+fatal change of plan on their part which we may now say was decided upon
+at this very time. General Joffre purposely misled the enemy, both as to
+the power at his command, and as to his disposition of that power.
+
+Thus it was that the Germans, unopposed, made their triumphal entry.
+They swept through the famous Gate of Mars, the triumphal arch built by
+the then townsmen of Rheims in honour of Julius Cæsar and Augustus and
+to mark the completion of the scheme of military roads by Agrippa. They
+parked their cannon along the noble Public Promenade which stretches
+beyond this great monument. In the square before the Cathedral, about
+which at that time German war correspondents went into ecstasies of
+admiration, the statue of Joan of Arc was ringed by stacks of German
+lances. Ranks of men in _pickelhauben_, headed by bands playing
+"Deutschland über Alles," were in movement along the great Boulevard
+Victor Hugo. The very name now seemed a mockery. Rheims appeared
+helpless. Taking possession of the town hall, the invaders seized the
+Mayor, Dr. Langlet, and compelled him to remain up all through the
+succeeding night issuing the orders which they dictated at the muzzle of
+a revolver.[29] Nearly one hundred of the leading citizens found
+themselves placed under arrest as hostages. This was alleged to be a
+guarantee for the preservation of order. As a fact, it was intended to
+assist collection, both of the heavy "fine" imposed on the city, and of
+the extortionate requisitions demanded in kind. With the stocks of
+champagne contained in the labyrinth of vast cellars hollowed out
+beneath Rheims in the chalk rock, the German officers made themselves
+unrestrainedly free. The occupation degenerated into an orgie. Much wine
+that could not be consumed was, on the advance being resumed, taken to
+the front, loaded on ambulance wagons.[30] It is alleged that nearly
+2,000,000 bottles of wine were either consumed, plundered, or wasted.
+
+Every house, too, had its complement of soldiers billeted on the
+occupants. When they marched south to the Marne, the Germans had been
+refreshed with unwonted good cheer and by rest in comfortable beds.
+
+But three days later there began to come in, both by road and by
+railway, convoys of wounded, and these swelled in number day by day,
+until every hotel and many houses had been filled with human wrecks of
+battle. The Cathedral, its floor strewn with straw, was turned into a
+great hospital. All this, however, was but a presage. Rarely has there
+been in so brief a time a contrast more startling than that between the
+outward march of the German troops and their return.
+
+Just ten days had gone by when Rheims witnessed the influx of haggard,
+hungry, and dog-tired men; many bare-headed or bootless; not a few
+wearing uniforms which were in rags; numbers injured. The bands had
+ceased to play. Instead of the steady march and the imperious word of
+command, there was the tramp of a sullen, beaten, and battered army; a
+tramp mingled with shouts and curses of exasperation; and the rumble of
+guns dragged by exhausted horses, mercilessly lashed in order to get the
+last ounce of pace out of them. All day, on September 12, the tide of
+defeat rolled into Rheims from the south, and surged out of it by the
+north; but above the clash and confusion was borne the boom of cannon,
+growing steadily louder and nearer.
+
+Knowing that the population of Rheims had been driven to exasperation,
+the Germans feared they might be entrapped in the city by street
+fighting. An evidence of their panic is found in the proclamation which,
+on the morning of September 12, they compelled the Mayor to issue. The
+document speaks for itself. It ran:--
+
+
+     In the event of an action being fought either to-day or in the
+     immediate future in the neighbourhood of Rheims, or in the city
+     itself, the inhabitants are warned that they must remain absolutely
+     calm and must in no way try to take part in the fighting. They must
+     not attempt to attack either isolated soldiers or detachments of
+     the German army. The erection of barricades, the taking up of
+     paving stones in the streets in a way to hinder the movements of
+     troops, or, in a word, any action that may embarrass the German
+     army, is formally forbidden.
+
+     With a view to securing adequately the safety of the troops and to
+     instil calm into the population of Rheims, the persons named below
+     have been seized as hostages by the Commander-in-Chief of the
+     German Army. These hostages will be hanged at the slightest attempt
+     at disorder. Also, the city will be totally or partly burnt and
+     the inhabitants will be hanged for any infraction of the above.
+
+     By order of the German Authorities.
+
+     THE MAYOR (Dr. Langlet).
+
+     Rheims, Sept. 12, 1914.
+
+
+Then followed the names of 81 of the principal inhabitants, with their
+addresses, including four priests, the list ending with the words, "and
+some others."
+
+There was good reason for this German panic. These troops of the army of
+von Bülow had been completely defeated. Of that no better evidence can
+be offered than a letter found on a soldier of the 74th German Regiment
+of infantry, part of the 10th army corps. The letter is of vivid human
+interest.
+
+
+     MY DEAR WIFE,--I have just been living through days that defy
+     imagination. I should never have thought that men could stand it.
+     Not a second has passed but my life has been in danger, and yet not
+     a hair of my head has been hurt. It was horrible, it was ghastly.
+     But I have been saved for you and for our happiness, and I take
+     heart again, although I am still terribly unnerved. God grant that
+     I may see you again soon, and that this horror may soon be over.
+     None of us can do any more; human strength is at an end.
+
+     I will try to tell you about it.
+
+     On Sept. 5 the enemy were reported to be taking up a position near
+     St. Prix (north-east of Paris). The 10th corps, which had made an
+     astonishingly rapid advance, of course attacked on the Sunday.
+
+     Steep slopes led up to heights which were held in considerable
+     force. With our weak detachments of the 74th and 91st Regiments we
+     reached the crest and came under a terrible artillery fire that
+     mowed us down. However, we entered St. Prix. Hardly had we done so
+     than we were met with shell fire and a violent fusillade from the
+     enemy's infantry. Our colonel was badly wounded--he is the third we
+     have had. Fourteen men were killed round me.... We got away in a
+     lull without being hit.
+
+     The 7th, 8th, and 9th of Sept, we were constantly under shell and
+     shrapnel fire, and suffered terrible losses. I was in a house which
+     was hit several times. The fear of a death of agony which is in
+     every man's heart, and naturally so, is a terrible feeling.
+
+     How often I thought of you, my darling, and what I suffered in that
+     terrifying battle, which extended along a front of many miles near
+     Montmirail, you cannot possibly imagine. Our heavy artillery was
+     being used for the siege of Maubeuge; we wanted it badly, as the
+     enemy had theirs in force, and kept up a furious bombardment. For
+     four days I was under artillery fire; it is like hell, but a
+     thousand times worse.
+
+     On the night of the 9th the order was given to retreat, as it would
+     have been madness to attempt to hold our position with our few men,
+     and we should have risked a terrible defeat the next day. The first
+     and third armies had not been able to attack with us, as we had
+     advanced too rapidly. Our _moral_ was absolutely broken.
+
+     In spite of unheard-of sacrifices we had achieved nothing. I cannot
+     understand how our army, after fighting three great battles and
+     being terribly weakened, was sent against a position which the
+     enemy had prepared for three weeks, but naturally I know nothing
+     of the intentions of our chiefs.... They say nothing has been lost.
+     In a word, we retired towards Cormontreuil and Rheims by forced
+     marches by day and night.
+
+     We hear that three armies are going to get into line, entrench,
+     rest, and then start afresh our victorious march on Paris. It was
+     not a defeat, but only a strategic retreat. I have confidence in
+     our chiefs that everything will be successful. Our first battalion,
+     which has fought with unparalleled bravery, is reduced from 1,200
+     to 194 men. These numbers speak for themselves....
+
+
+If the defeat had been complete, the pursuit had been relentless. The
+5th French army had excelled itself. It comprised the Algerian army
+corps, and had been reinforced by the Moroccan and Senegalese regiments.
+Not only along the main roads, but along all the by-roads, and in and
+among the vineyards and woods, there had been ceaseless fighting. If one
+side is reflected by the letter of the dead German soldier, that
+revelation is completed by the Order issued to his troops by General
+Desperey when they had broken the enemy at Montmirail on September 9.
+
+
+     Soldiers,--Upon the memorable fields of Montmirail, of Vauchamps,
+     and of Champaubert, which a century ago witnessed the victories of
+     our ancestors over Blücher's Prussians, your vigorous offensive has
+     triumphed over the resistance of the Germans.
+
+     Held on his flanks, his centre broken, the enemy is now retreating
+     towards east and north by forced marches. The most renowned army
+     corps of Old Prussia, the contingents of Westphalia, of Hanover, of
+     Brandenburg, have retired in haste before you.
+
+     This first success is no more than a prelude. The enemy is shaken,
+     but not yet decisively beaten.
+
+     You have still to undergo severe hardships, to make long marches,
+     to fight hard battles.
+
+     May the image of our country, soiled by barbarians, always remain
+     before your eyes. Never was it more necessary to sacrifice all for
+     her.
+
+     Saluting the heroes who have fallen in the fighting of the last few
+     days, my thoughts turn towards you--the victors in the next battle.
+
+     Forward, soldiers, for France!
+
+
+Forward for France they had gone. Thus it was that, shut in their houses
+throughout the night of September 12, the people of Rheims heard above
+the uproar of the German retreat the always swelling thunder of the
+French guns. When morning broke the only German military still left in
+Rheims were the abandoned wounded, and the main streets echoed to the
+welcome tread of the war-worn but triumphant defenders of the
+fatherland.
+
+Through the transverse gap from Rheims to Berry-au-Bac on the Aisne
+there is one of those wonderful old Roman roads, now a great modern
+highway. The road runs nearly straight as a ruler north-west to Laon.
+The first step taken by General Desperey was to secure this road, as
+well as the railway which on the western side of the gap winds curiously
+in and out along the foot of the hills. From Berry-au-Bac north of the
+Aisne the French lent most material aid to the British attack upon
+Craonne. South-east of Rheims they were occupied in securing the railway
+to Chalons, which for some twenty miles runs through the valley of the
+Vesle. Above Rheims this valley, in character not unlike the valley of
+the Aisne, but wilder, may be compared to a great crack in the plateau
+of the highlands. On each side are chalk cliffs, and side valleys of
+gravel soil covered with woods. Between the cliffs the river winds
+through flat meadows. Towards Rheims the valley opens out into that
+theatre of wooded hills in the midst of which the city is situated.
+
+The operations of this part of the great battle resolved themselves
+partly into a struggle for the transverse gap; next into a gigantic
+combat waged from opposite sides of the theatre of hills; and lastly,
+into a fight for command of the upper valley of the Vesle.
+
+Sheltered among the caves and quarries on the north-east side of the gap
+and of the theatre of hills, the Germans had contrived a scheme of
+defence works not less elaborate than those along the ridge north of the
+Aisne, and these defence works extended round the theatre of hills to
+the outlet from the narrow part of the Vesle valley, blockading both the
+main military road from Rheims to Chalons, and also the railway.
+
+At the outset their reduced strength limited them to merely defensive
+tactics, and, as on the north of the Aisne, they steadily, and day by
+day, lost ground. But they then began steadily and day by day to receive
+reinforcements, both of men and of heavy artillery. The reinforcements
+of men included a reconstitution of the Prussian Guard drawn from its
+reserves at Berlin.
+
+Before the end of September an immense body of additional troops had
+arrived at this part of the front. On the side of the French, also,
+strong reserves were hurried forward.
+
+It will assist to understand the description of the operations to state
+first their plan and purpose both on the one side and the other, since
+this formed strategically the critical section of the battle.
+
+At Condé-sur-Aisne, it will be recalled, the Germans held a position
+right on the river, and that position formed a wedge or salient jutting
+into the British lines east and west of it.
+
+The fact is recalled here because it illustrates what in this campaign
+has proved a well-marked feature of German strategy. It has been proved,
+that is to say, that whenever the Germans found it necessary to resist
+very heavy pressure they seized some point capable of obstinate defence,
+and, even if pushed back to right and left, kept their grip as long as
+possible, using the position as a general hold-up along that section of
+the front.
+
+Thus their grip on Condé and the Chivres bluff was essential to their
+retention of the Aisne ridge.
+
+They had a similar position at Prunay on the railway between Rheims and
+Chalons. The village of Prunay is at the point where the theatre of
+hills narrows into the upper valley of the Vesle. The position jutted
+out like an angle from the German line, and it commanded the valley.
+
+Figuratively taking these positions of Condé-sur-Aisne on the one side
+and Prunay on the other, we may imagine the German army like a man
+clinging to a couple of posts or railings and so defying the effort to
+move him.
+
+That is the aspect of the matter so far as defensive tactics go. For
+offensive tactics grip on such positions is obviously a great aid to
+pressure on a hostile line lying between them. A military salient serves
+exactly the same purpose as a wedge. It is a device for splitting the
+opposition. Here, then, were two wedges in the Allied front, and the
+object was manifestly to break off the part of the front intervening. On
+that part of the front with Rheims as its main advanced base the Allied
+line, all the way round from beyond Noyon to Verdun, structurally
+depended.
+
+Such was the German scheme. But the Allies on their part had a wedge or
+salient driven into the German front at Craonne, and as they were there
+two-thirds of the way along the road from Rheims to Laon, the main
+advanced base and communication centre of the German line, that salient
+was extremely awkward. They were intent, on their part, in hammering in
+their wedge, because it meant a collapse of the whole German right
+flank from the Aisne ridge to the Belgian frontier.
+
+It is not difficult, therefore, to understand the fury of the resulting
+struggle. The best troops on both sides were engaged. In point of
+magnitude the fighting round Rheims was hardly less than the fighting
+which occurred later round Ypres.
+
+The struggle in its acute phase lasted for fifteen days and nights
+without the slightest pause or intermission. In the tracks of the German
+retreat from the Marne great gaps among the vineyards, where rose mounds
+of earth, marked the common graves of the slain. Along the boundaries of
+woods appeared the blackened sites of the hecatombs. Nevertheless, many
+of the fallen still lay in the woods or among the vines, unburied and
+infecting the air. Through this country and these scenes marched the
+reinforcements of the 5th French army. In the opposite direction flowed
+a ceaseless stream of civilian fugitives--poor people carrying their few
+personal belongings strapped on their backs, or pushing them along in
+wheelbarrows; women carrying children in their arms, and with other
+children trailing at their skirts; a procession on foot and in vehicles
+of every sort.
+
+Against Rheims the Germans employed much of the artillery and material
+and apparatus they had intended for the siege of Paris. On the eastern
+side of the theatre of hills behind the advanced island mass where stand
+the villages of Berru and Nogent l'Abbesse, they had mounted their huge
+mortars. From these positions and from others to the north-east they
+threw into Rheims an incessant crash of monster shells. Viewed from any
+of the villages of its circumference, this theatre of hills ten miles
+across presented during these days a spectacle at once grandiose and
+awful. The battle spread out round and below like a panorama of fire.
+Out of advanced positions among the woods on the south-west, across by
+Rheims, and to the north, hundreds of the French field guns searched the
+German positions with their terrible high explosive shells. At brief
+regular intervals amid the angry roar arose a deep resounding boom--the
+note of the enemy's great howitzers. The earth shook beneath the
+salvoes, for the French had also massed here their heaviest artillery.
+Amid the flash of bursting shells appeared here a village, there a mill
+a mass of flames, with the smoke drifting above it in a dense cloud. The
+roar was that of hurricane and earthquake rolled into one. And the
+uproar went on without ceasing through all the hours of daylight, and
+far into the night.
+
+Furious and destructive as it was, however, the artillery duel was not
+the deadliest part. The great slaughter occurred when the armies came to
+grips. The Germans launched an attack upon Rheims from the north and an
+attack at the same time from the south-east. Of the first attack the
+immediate objective was the suburb of La Neuvillette. That place is on
+the great road from Rheims to Berry-au-Bac, and if it could be seized
+the French positions along the transverse gap would be endangered, and
+their position at Craonne made untenable. The immediate objective of the
+second attack was the fort of La Pompelle, commanding the great road to
+Chalons. To the French both communications were vital.
+
+In the attack upon La Neuvillette the troops employed were the re-formed
+Prussian Guard. Over 40,000 strong, men for the most part in the prime
+of life, and men who, though reservists, had received the highest
+military training, they formed probably as formidable a body of troops
+as any in Europe. Against them were pitted the finest of French regular
+infantry, including a division 20,000 strong of the Zouaves. Both sides
+fought with the fury of mutual hate. It was a contest in which race
+passion had been stirred to its depths. The Guard advanced south along
+the great road from Neuchatel; descended into the transverse gap; and
+crossed the Aisne and Marne canal at Loivre. They braved the deadly hail
+of the French 75-millimetre guns, than which there is nothing more
+deadly; they fought through the gap against charges of the Zouaves in
+which there was no quarter; they reached St. Thierry; they reached,
+after fourteen hours' continuous fighting, La Neuvillette itself--that
+is to say, a remnant reached it. It was a splendid feat of courage; for
+more than half the force had fallen. At Neuvillette, however, they were
+overpowered. The French troops who held that place could not be
+dislodged. The scenes in the streets were terrible. Meanwhile, the
+French had shattered the succeeding and supporting German columns, and
+had closed in on the rear. The Guards, finding themselves entrapped, had
+to cut their way out. How many again reached the German lines we do not
+know. It must have been very few.
+
+At Fort La Pompelle the garrison heroically held out against a vastly
+superior force. The fort was stormed. Then it was retaken by the French.
+The order to the officer commanding was, "Fight to the last man." He
+fought. When the position became desperate he appealed for
+reinforcements. As he was sending off the message he was killed by a
+shell. The command devolved upon a sergeant. Relief came while the
+survivors of the garrison were still resisting.
+
+To throw the relief into La Pompelle it was necessary to attack the
+tiers of trenches cut by the Germans along the hills as far as Prunay.
+The French had to cross the Aisne and Oise canal, which after passing
+through Rheims is joined up with the Vesle. This, in face of the German
+infantry fire and in face of well-concealed batteries of guns, was a
+desperate business. It was done not only through the dauntless courage
+of the French foot, but by the terrible effect of their artillery. The
+Germans, notwithstanding, advanced from their trenches to dispute the
+passage. There was a hand-to-hand battle in the canal itself--a battle
+to the death. The French won over; they carried the first line of German
+trenches; supports, regiment after regiment, were thrown across; they
+carried the second line; then the third; at each it was bayonet work,
+thrust and parry.
+
+But the Germans still clung to Prunay. That place was the real centre of
+this part of the struggle. The village lies between the Rheims-Chalons
+railway line and the Vesle. Out of the place the enemy had to be
+cleared, cost what it might. It was one of those episodes in which an
+army puts forth its whole strength of nerve. From the wooded heights
+above the valley a massing of German batteries sought to wither the
+attack. A massing of French batteries on the nearer side strove to put
+the German guns out of action. The duel was gigantic. Reports of the
+guns became no longer distinguishable. They were merged into what seemed
+one continued solid and unbroken explosion. The French infantry advanced
+to the assault. Their losses were heavy. Prunay was set alight by
+shells. Still the attack was pressed. Then the ring of fire round the
+distant woods which marked the line of German batteries became ragged,
+and died down. The French guns had proved their superiority. At the
+point of the bayonet the Germans were driven out of Prunay and across
+the railway. Here they made a last stand. It was in vain. French gunners
+were now racing their pieces forward and opening in new positions;
+German batteries, on the other hand, were seen limbering up and in
+flight. At last, as night fell, the Germans broke in rout along the road
+to Beine. Prunay they had lost for good.
+
+These were leading but only typical episodes of those fifteen days. The
+fighting went on, too, through the night. As daylight faded, masses of
+Algerian and Moroccan troops, held in reserve, crept forward, and
+gathered stealthily in chalk-pits or among the woods. They moved with an
+almost catlike tread. In these secret rendezvous they waited until the
+dead of night. Then in file after file, thousands of them, they stole
+up, invisible, to the German trenches; and in the first faint shimmer of
+dawn launched themselves with a savage yell upon the foe. There was
+terrible work among those hills.
+
+Do these episodes throw no light on the damage done to Rheims Cathedral?
+Here round Rheims and north of the Aisne had been the mightiest effort
+the German armies had yet made. Here was concentrated the full force of
+their most disciplined and most valiant troops. Those troops had been
+sacrificed and with no result. Many storms of war had passed by the
+cathedral at Rheims since it was completed in 1231, and from the time
+when nearly a hundred more years of patient labour had put the last
+touches on its marvellous sculptures, and it had stood forth a thing of
+wonder and of beauty, no hand of violence had been laid on its
+consecrated stones. At the news that Prussian cannon had been turned
+upon it to destroy it, and had reduced it to a burned-out skeleton, from
+which Prussian wounded had to be carried out lest they should be roasted
+alive, the whole civilised world gasped.
+
+Mr. E. Ashmead-Bartlett, who visited the cathedral while the
+bombardment was going on, sent to the _Daily Telegraph_ a remarkable
+account of his experiences.
+
+"Round the cathedral," he wrote, "hardly a house had escaped damage, and
+even before we reached the open square in which it stands it became
+evident that the Germans had concentrated their fire on the building.
+The pavement of the square had been torn up by the bursting of these
+6-in. shells and was covered with fragments of steel, cracked masonry,
+glass, and loose stones. In front of the façade of the cathedral stands
+the well-known statue of Jeanne d'Arc. Someone had placed a Tricolour in
+her outstretched arm. The great shells had burst all round her, leaving
+the Maid of Orleans and her flag unscathed, but her horse's belly and
+legs were chipped and seared with fragments of flying steel.
+
+"At the first view the exterior of the cathedral did not appear to have
+suffered much damage, although the masonry was chipped and scarred white
+by countless shrapnel bullets or pieces of steel, and many of the carved
+figures and gargoyles on the western façade were broken and chipped.
+
+"We found no one in the square; in fact, this part of the town appeared
+to be deserted, but as we approached the main entrance to try to obtain
+admittance a curious sight met our eyes. We saw the recumbent figure of
+a man lying against the door. He had long since lost both his legs,
+which had been replaced by wooden stumps. He lay covered with dust,
+small stones, and broken glass, which had been thrown over him by
+bursting shells, but by some chance his remaining limbs had escaped all
+injury. This old veteran of the war of 1870, as he described himself,
+has accosted all and sundry at the gate of the cathedral for generations
+past, and even in the midst of the bombardment he had crawled once more
+to his accustomed post. As we knocked on the great wooden door, from
+this shapeless and filthy wreck of what had once been a man there came
+the feeble cry: '_Monsieur, un petit sou. Monsieur, un petit sou._'
+
+"Our knock was answered by a priest, who, on seeing that we were
+English, at once allowed us to enter. The father then told us, in
+language that was not altogether priestly, when speaking of the vandals
+whose guns were still thundering outside, of how the Germans had
+bombarded the cathedral for two hours that morning, landing over fifty
+shells in its immediate neighbourhood, but, luckily, the range being
+very great, over eight kilometres, the solid stonework of the building
+had resisted the successive shocks of these six-inch howitzers, and how
+it was that ancient and priceless glass which had suffered the most.[31]
+
+"'Monsieur, they respect nothing. We placed 125 of them inside and
+hoisted the red cross on the spire in order to protect the cathedral,
+and yet they fire at it all the same, and have killed their own
+soldiers. Pray, monsieur, make these facts known all over Europe and
+America.'
+
+"With these words he unlocked a wicket and conducted us toward the
+altar, close to which stands a small painted statue of Jeanne d'Arc. The
+east end of Notre Dame had up to this period suffered but little, and
+although some of the windows were damaged they were not lost beyond
+repair. The light still shone through in rays of dark blue and red,
+broken here and there by streaks of pure light.
+
+"Then our guide conducted us to the great cold stone body of the
+cathedral, where the Gothic pillars rise in sombre majesty, relieved by
+no ornamentation[32] until they hold aloft the blue masterpieces of the
+unknown artist. Here one of the strangest of spectacles met the eye. The
+whole of this vast vault was covered with dust half an inch thick, with
+chipped-off masonry, pieces of lead piping from the shattered windows,
+and with countless fragments of varied coloured glass. In the centre lay
+an ancient candelabrum which had hung for centuries from the roof
+suspended by a steel chain. That morning a fragment of shell had cut the
+chain in half and dropped its ancient burden to the hard stone floor
+beneath, where it lay bent and crumpled.
+
+"A great wave of sunshine lit up a sombre picture of carnage and
+suffering at the western end near the main entrance. Here on piles of
+straw lay the wounded Germans in all stages of suffering--their round
+shaven heads, thin cheeks, and bluish-grey uniforms contrasting
+strangely with the sombre black of the silent priests attending them,
+while in the background the red trousers of the French soldiers were
+just visible on the steps outside. Most of the wounded had dragged their
+straw behind the great Gothic pillars as if seeking shelter from their
+own shells. The priest conducted us to one of the aisles beneath the
+window where the shell had entered that morning. A great pool of blood
+lay there, staining the column just as the blood of Thomas à Becket must
+have stained the altar of Canterbury seven centuries before.
+
+"'That, Monsieur, is the blood of the French gendarme who was killed at
+eleven this morning, but he did not go alone.' The priest pointed to two
+more recumbent figures clad in the bluish-grey of the Kaiser's legions.
+There they lay stiff and cold as the effigies around them. All three had
+perished by the same shell. Civilian doctors of Rheims moved amongst the
+wounded, who for the most part maintained an attitude of stoical
+indifference to everything around them. We moved around collecting
+fragments of the precious glass which the Kaiser had so unexpectedly
+thrown within our reach. We were brought back to realities by hearing
+the unmistakable whistle of an approaching shell, followed by a
+deafening explosion, and more fragments of glass came tumbling from
+aloft. The weary war-worn Teutons instinctively huddled closer to the
+Gothic arches. A dying officer, his eyes already fixed in a glassy stare
+on the sunlight above, gave an involuntary groan. We heard outside the
+crash of falling masonry. The shell was followed by another, and more
+breaking glass. Our chauffeur came hastening in with the Virgin's broken
+arm in his hands. A fragment of shell had broken it off outside. We
+lingered long gazing at this strange scene.
+
+"Outside the guns were thundering all round Rheims."
+
+It was after this that the cathedral was set on fire by the shells.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[29] This incident was narrated by the special correspondent of the
+_Berliner Tageblatt_.
+
+[30] Letters from the front published in the Berlin newspapers leave no
+doubt on this point. One such account described how a French shell in
+the Battle of the Marne wrecked an ambulance wagon loaded with bottles
+of wine--an instance of French contempt for civilised warfare!
+
+In 1870-71 the Germans impoverished Rheims by heavy requisitions.
+
+[31] The windows of Rheims Cathedral were filled with stained Venetian
+glass dating from the 12th century and impossible to replace.
+
+[32] The interior of Rheims Cathedral was furnished with sixty-six large
+pieces of priceless old tapestry, representing scenes in the life of
+Christ, the story of the Virgin, and scenes from the life of St. Paul,
+the latter after designs by Raphael. These tapestries had been removed
+to a place of safety.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+REVIEW OF RESULTS
+
+
+Had the fighting round Rheims and the fighting north of the Aisne no
+result? Were these combats, vast as they were, merely drawn combats? By
+no means. North of the Aisne the British gained the eastern end of the
+ridge; round Rheims the French won all the eastern side of the theatre
+of hills, with the exception of Nogent l'Abbesse, and also the eastern
+side of the transverse gap. Those results were both decisive and
+important.
+
+They were decisive and important because they achieved strategical
+purposes vital to the Allied campaign. Let us try to make that clear.
+
+When after the defeat on the Marne the Germans took up their new line
+from the north of the Aisne to the Argonne, their utmost energy and
+resource were put forth to send into the fighting line from Germany
+fresh reserve formations which would give their forces not only a
+numerical but a military superiority.
+
+But the effect and value of those fresh masses clearly depended on
+their being employed at the decisive points. Where were those decisive
+points?
+
+The decisive points were first the extreme left of the Allied line,
+where it turned round from the north of the Aisne to the Oise, and
+secondly Verdun and along the eastern frontier.
+
+Consider the effect had the Germans been able promptly to throw
+_decisively_ superior forces against the Allies at those points. They
+would have turned both flanks of the Allied line, they would have forced
+a general retreat, and they would have been able once more to resume the
+offensive, but this time probably with the fortified frontier in their
+hands.
+
+There can be no doubt that, broadly, that was their intention; and it
+was plainly seen by General Joffre to be their intention, because
+eastward from Rheims to the Argonne in their fortified line across the
+highlands _the Germans remained from first to last upon the defensive_.
+
+This, however, was the situation the Germans had to meet: between the
+Aisne and the Oise a new and powerful French army under the command of
+General de Castlenau; on the Aisne and round Rheims, a tremendous and
+sustained onset by the 6th French, the British, and the 5th French army;
+between Rheims and the Argonne, an offensive which pushed them
+successively out of Suippes, and Souain, and therefore off the great
+cross-roads; in the Argonne, an offensive which forced them back from
+St. Menehould and beyond Varennes, and closed the defiles; round
+Verdun, and in the Woeuvre, an onset which threatened to cut
+communications with Metz.
+
+Now the effect of these operations was, among other things, to restrict
+the German means of movement and supply; and it was a consequence of
+that restriction that even though there might be two or more millions of
+men then ready in Germany to be sent forward, there were neither roads
+nor railways enough to send them forward save after delay, nor roads or
+railways enough to keep them supplied when they had been sent.
+
+With the means at their disposal--those means were still great, though
+not great enough--the German Government had to choose between various
+alternatives. As to the choice they made, later events leave no doubt.
+They sent forward troops enough to _defend_ their flank between the
+Aisne and the Oise--it was all at the moment they could do; and they
+employed the best and heaviest of their masses of reserves partly to
+resist the British attack, but mainly to resist the 5th French army. At
+this time they had to let the position in the Argonne, round Verdun, and
+on the eastern frontier go; that is to say, they had there to remain for
+the time being on the defensive.
+
+The fighting north of the Aisne and round Rheims therefore crippled
+their operations at what were, in truth, the decisive points--the Allied
+flanks; and that was unavoidable, because unless the centre of their
+line remained secure, operations on the flanks would be impracticable.
+
+But these operations in the centre _used up their best troops_.
+
+Conversely, of course, the same operations left General Joffre the more
+free both to pursue his envelopment of the Germans on their flank
+northwards from the Aisne towards the Belgian frontier, and to go on
+with his seizures of positions round Verdun and on the eastern frontier,
+seizures which pressed upon and embarrassed the German communications,
+and consequently limited the total strength they could put into the
+field.
+
+It will be seen, therefore, that the fighting north of the Aisne and
+round Rheims _was_ important and _was_ decisive.
+
+The fact must not be lost sight of that the aim of the Germans was at
+this time, if they could, to re-seize the initiative. Again the fact
+ought to be kept in mind that the aim of the Allied strategy was not to
+drive the German armies from France, but both to prevent them from
+getting out of France and to destroy them as a military force. If we
+know the governing motive on each side, we hold the key to the strategy
+adopted. Here the governing motive of neither was a secret.
+
+To show the effect of governing motive, let us in the first instance
+follow the course of German strategy. We shall find that from the middle
+of September, during the succeeding nine weeks--that is, until about
+November 20--they made six great efforts, any one of which, had it
+succeeded, would once more have given them the initiative in this
+western campaign. The first was the effort to break the Allied line at
+Rheims.
+
+Foiled in their outflanking scheme by the inherent difficulties of the
+situation, but not less by the powerful Allied attack north of the Aisne
+and round Rheims, there can be no question that the German Headquarters
+Staff decided that their best, most direct, and most decisive stroke
+would be a counter-offensive made against Rheims with their utmost
+force, and as the situation stood at the end of September, there can be
+no question that they were right.
+
+Had the effort succeeded both parts of the Allies' line must have been
+forced into retreat and their communications severed. This success must
+have changed the entire aspect of the western operations. For the Allies
+it would have been a disaster of the first magnitude. If in this effort
+the Germans sacrificed their best troops, it affords only another
+illustration of the statement that they do not make such sacrifices
+without what they consider good cause.
+
+But the effort failed, and the German Headquarters Staff, at any rate,
+must have realised that the failure and the cost of it had imperilled
+the whole position of their armies in France. Matters of this kind have
+not to be judged only by ground lost or won. The success or failure to
+achieve objectives is the true test.
+
+Meanwhile heavy forces of the Allies had been massed against the German
+right flank. The next effort of the Germans consequently was to push
+back those forces. They met the outflanking movement in the way such
+movements can best be met--by trying to outflank the outflankers.
+
+At this time the Allied forces on the flank extended from near Noyon on
+the Oise northward to the Somme. The Germans promptly pushed westward in
+force north of the Somme and across the outside edge of the Allied line
+to the town of Albert and the heights commanding it.
+
+With notable promptitude, however, the Allied line was extended across
+the Somme to the north, and by the west of Arras, and the German
+movement was held. Gradually, after days of obstinate fighting, the
+enemy were battled out of Albert and then out of Arras; and the Allied
+outflanking line was stretched up to Bethune and La Bassée.
+
+Night and day, day and night, by railway, by motor-omnibus, on
+motor-cars,[33] French troops during three whole weeks were rushed up
+from the south and west of France. This movement towards the fighting
+line had begun with the pursuit after the Battle of the Marne. It never
+ceased. First the army of General de Castlenau appeared on the front.
+Next came the army of General de Maudhuy. Territorials and marines from
+the fleet were hurried into the service; divisions of cavalry spaced out
+the line, and defended communications. In Germany as in France no
+effort was spared. The issue was momentous. During these first weeks of
+October the German Government put forth its supreme effort to stem and
+to turn the adverse tide of war. Hitherto they had found their measures
+baffled. Two new and powerful French armies had fastened on to the flank
+of their position. Their own forces had come up just too late. The peril
+was menacing and it was growing. They redoubled their energies.
+
+Their decision was another supreme effort to outflank the outflankers.
+With fresh masses of Reservists, sent westward at all possible speed,
+they pushed behind a heavy screen of cavalry across the Aa and across
+the Lys at Estaires and threatened the rear of the French troops holding
+Bethune.
+
+It is probably not realised that this was strategically the most
+important offensive movement the Germans had made in the western theatre
+of war since their advance upon Paris.
+
+Yet that undoubtedly was the fact. Had the movement succeeded it must
+not only have given them control of the north-east coast of France as
+far probably as Havre, but it must have rolled up the Allied line as far
+as Noyon. The whole original scheme of turning the Allies' left flank
+would have been within realisation.
+
+The movement did not succeed. It was met by a counter-move probably as
+unexpected by the Germans as it was bold. The counter-move was the
+transfer of the British army from the Aisne.
+
+Recognising the decisive character of these operations, General Joffre
+had entrusted the control of affairs on this part of the front to
+General Foch, not only one of the ablest among the able soldiers whom
+this war has shown the French Army to possess, but one of the most
+brilliant authorities on the science of modern military tactics. As he
+had met the situation magnificently at Sezanne, so now he met it with
+equal resource under circumstances hardly less critical.
+
+There were now three French armies on the German flank, and they fought
+as they were led with a skill equal to their valour. Yet the necessity
+remained for a great counter-stroke. In view of that necessity the idea
+occurred to Sir John French to transfer the British army, a proposal to
+which General Joffre at once agreed.
+
+It is beyond the scope of this volume to enter into details of the new
+great battle which, beginning with the arrival of the British troops,
+culminated in the heroic defence of Ypres. Justice could not be done to
+that great and memorable feat of arms in a brief summary.
+
+Suffice it to say that here, on the great coalfield of northern France,
+in a labyrinth of railway sidings and canals, villages and lanes, pit
+heaps, and factories, the British troops, helped by the French cavalry,
+after furious fighting, drove back the Germans from the Aa and the Lys
+and took up a line continuing the outflanking positions from La Bassée
+to Ypres in Belgium.
+
+A third effort of the Germans to outflank the outflanking line was
+directed across the Yser. This was the last attempt of the kind that
+could be made. Its success was consequently vital, and its failure
+equally disastrous. Again it illustrates the fact that the Germans
+sacrifice neither money nor lives without good cause. The fighting on
+the Yser was as deadly for the enemy as the fighting round Rheims.
+
+Coincidently, however, with these movements were others of a different
+kind. The official _communiqués_, covering the two kinds of movements as
+the evidences of them appeared day by day, have naturally led to a
+certain amount of mystification--not intentional, but inevitable from
+the brevity and caution of these statements and the fact that they cover
+separately only the operations of a few hours.
+
+The movements of a different kind were those designed at one point or
+another to drive a wedge or salient into the Allied front.
+
+In the operations on the German flank between the Aisne and the Belgian
+coast there have been two main efforts of that character. The first was
+the attempt to split the Allied front at Roye and at Arras, and to break
+up the line between those places; the second was the effort on an even
+larger scale, and pursued with still greater determination, to split the
+front at La Bassée and at Ypres, and to break up the line intervening.
+
+It is no mere accident that this latter attempt followed immediately on
+the failure to cross the Yser. _The attempt arose out of the necessity
+of the situation._
+
+On the Upper Meuse, by another great effort, the Germans had driven a
+wedge into the French fortified frontier at St. Mihiel, and that wedge
+appeared to some the prelude of a mysterious scheme. In fact, the
+intention and the effect of it was to hold off the French advance along
+the frontier of Lorraine and across the Vosges. Again it is the case of
+a desperate man clinging to a railing.
+
+We have, therefore, three great efforts to break the Allied front by
+their wedge tactics, and three to outflank the Allied outflanking
+development. None of these efforts succeeded.
+
+What was the consequence? The consequence was that the German armies in
+France and Belgium could neither advance nor retreat. They could not
+advance because they are not strong enough. They could not retreat,
+because retreat would mean their destruction.
+
+The retreat of any army--and most of all the retreat of a huge mass
+army--is not a simple matter. On the contrary, it is a most difficult
+and complex operation in the most favourable circumstances. Here,
+however, was not one mass army, but a line of mass armies, occupying a
+front forming a right angle, and opposed on each arm of that right angle
+by forces which had proved stronger than they. So situated, they could
+only retreat with any chance of safety by falling directly back; but
+either arm of the angle if it fell directly back must obstruct the
+retreat of the other; and if they fell directly back each at the same
+time, their movements must become exactly like those of the blades of a
+pair of scissors as they are being closed. _A retreat under such
+conditions is a military impossibility._
+
+Not a few fantastic motives have been attributed to the Germans, more
+particularly as regards the terrible struggle in West Flanders, but the
+plain truth of the matter is that here stated.
+
+Now if we turn to the strategy of the Allies, bearing their governing
+motive in mind, we shall find that it rested primarily on the attack
+launched against the German positions north of the Aisne and round
+Rheims.
+
+That attack wrecked the German scheme for resuming the offensive, and
+was the most effective means of assuring that end. It is impossible
+indeed not to recognise that the feat which reduced a force like the
+German armies to immobility is a masterpiece of strategy wholly without
+parallel in the annals of war. Whether we look at the breadth and
+boldness of its conception, at the patience and command of organisation
+with which it was carried out, at the grasp it displayed of the real
+conditions governing the operations of modern mass armies, or at the
+clear purpose and unswerving resolution with which it was followed, the
+plan equally calls forth surprise and admiration.
+
+From the military standpoint, victory or defeat is the answer to the
+question: Which side has accomplished the purpose it had in view?
+
+The German purpose of re-seizing the initiative was not accomplished.
+The German scheme of turning either one or both flanks of the Allied
+line was not accomplished. That is military failure.
+
+From the beginning of October, when the struggle round Rheims was at its
+height, the feature of the campaign broadly was that the weight of the
+fighting passed progressively from the centre of the fighting front to
+the wings--to West Flanders on the one side, and to the Argonne and the
+Upper Meuse on the other. Progressively the Allied forces were placed
+where it was intended they should be placed. They accomplished the
+purpose which it was intended they should accomplish--that of keeping
+the main military strength of Germany helpless while they wasted that
+strength. That is military success.
+
+To sum up. The Germans entered France with a force of more than a
+million and a half of men. The like of such a military expedition the
+world till then had never seen. The plan of it had been studied and
+worked out in detail for years. On the preparations for it had been
+bestowed a colossal labour. It appeared certain of success. It was
+defeated by an exercise of military skill and resource which, however
+regarded, must stand as one of the greatest records of mastery in the
+art of war.
+
+FOOTNOTE:
+
+[33] Some 70,000 motor-cars and motor-omnibuses are said to have been
+employed.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX
+
+
+Despatches of Field-Marshal Sir John French on the Battles of the Marne
+and the Aisne, addressed to Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War.
+
+
+I.
+
+Sept. 17, 1914.
+
+MY LORD--
+
+In continuation of my despatch of Sept. 7, I have the honour to report
+the further progress of the operations of the forces under my command
+from Aug. 28.
+
+On that evening the retirement of the force was followed closely by two
+of the enemy's cavalry columns, moving south-east from St. Quentin.
+
+The retreat in this part of the field was being covered by the 3rd and
+5th Cavalry Brigades. South of the Somme General Gough, with the 3rd
+Cavalry Brigade, threw back the Uhlans of the Guard with considerable
+loss.
+
+General Chetwode, with the 5th Cavalry Brigade, encountered the eastern
+column near Cérizy, moving south. The Brigade attacked and routed the
+column, the leading German regiment suffering very severe casualties and
+being almost broken up.
+
+The 7th French Army Corps was now in course of being railed up from the
+south to the east of Amiens. On the 29th it nearly completed its
+detrainment, and the French 6th Army got into position on my left, its
+right resting on Roye.
+
+The 5th French Army was behind the line of the Oise between La Fère and
+Guise.
+
+The pursuit of the enemy was very vigorous; some five or six German
+corps were on the Somme, facing the 5th Army on the Oise. At least two
+corps were advancing towards my front, and were crossing the Somme east
+and west of Ham. Three or four more German corps were opposing the 6th
+French Army on my left.
+
+This was the situation at one o'clock on the 29th, when I received a
+visit from General Joffre at my headquarters.
+
+I strongly represented my position to the French Commander-in-Chief, who
+was most kind, cordial, and sympathetic, as he has always been. He told
+me that he had directed the 5th French Army on the Oise to move forward
+and attack the Germans on the Somme, with a view to checking pursuit. He
+also told me of the formation of the 6th French Army on my left flank,
+composed of the 7th Army Corps, four reserve divisions, and Sordêt's
+corps of cavalry.
+
+I finally arranged with General Joffre to effect a further short
+retirement towards the line Compiègne-Soissons, promising him, however,
+to do my utmost to keep always within a day's march of him.
+
+In pursuance of this arrangement the British forces retired to a
+position a few miles north of the line Compiègne-Soissons on the 29th.
+
+The right flank of the German army was now reaching a point which
+appeared seriously to endanger my line of communications with Havre. I
+had already evacuated Amiens, into which place a German reserve division
+was reported to have moved.
+
+Orders were given to change the base to St. Nazaire, and establish an
+advance base at Le Mans. This operation was well carried out by the
+Inspector-General of Communications.
+
+In spite of a severe defeat inflicted upon the Guard 10th and Guard
+Reserve Corps of the German army by the 1st and 3rd French Corps on the
+right of the 5th Army, it was not part of General Joffre's plan to
+pursue this advantage, and a general retirement on to the line of the
+Marne was ordered, to which the French forces in the more eastern
+theatre were directed to conform.
+
+A new army (the 9th) has been formed from three corps in the south by
+General Joffre, and moved into the space between the right of the 5th
+and left of the 4th Armies.
+
+Whilst closely adhering to his strategic conception to draw the enemy on
+at all points until a favourable situation was created from which to
+assume the offensive, General Joffre found it necessary to modify from
+day to day the methods by which he sought to attain this object, owing
+to the development of the enemy's plans and changes in the general
+situation.
+
+In conformity with the movements of the French forces, my retirement
+continued practically from day to day. Although we were not severely
+pressed by the enemy, rearguard actions took place continually.
+
+On Sept. 1, when retiring from the thickly-wooded country to the south
+of Compiègne, the 1st Cavalry Brigade was overtaken by some German
+cavalry. They momentarily lost a horse artillery battery, and several
+officers and men were killed and wounded. With the help, however, of
+some detachments from the 3rd Corps operating on their left, they not
+only recovered their own guns, but succeeded in capturing twelve of the
+enemy's.
+
+Similarly, to the eastward, the 1st Corps, retiring south, also got into
+some very difficult forest country, and a somewhat severe rearguard
+action ensued at Villers-Cotterets, in which the 4th Guards Brigade
+suffered considerably.
+
+On Sept. 3 the British forces were in position south of the Marne
+between Lagny and Signy-Signets. Up to this time I had been requested by
+General Joffre to defend the passages of the river as long as possible,
+and to blow up the bridges in my front. After I had made the necessary
+dispositions, and the destruction of the bridges had been effected, I
+was asked by the French Commander-in-Chief to continue my retirement to
+a point some twelve miles in rear of the position I then occupied, with
+a view to taking up a second position behind the Seine. This retirement
+was duly carried out. In the meantime the enemy had thrown bridges and
+crossed the Marne in considerable force, and was threatening the Allies
+all along the line of the British forces and the 5th and 9th French
+armies. Consequently several small outpost actions took place.
+
+On Saturday, Sept. 5, I met the French Commander-in-Chief at his
+request, and he informed me of his intention to take the offensive
+forthwith, as he considered conditions were very favourable to success.
+
+General Joffre announced to me his intention of wheeling up the left
+flank of the 6th Army, pivoting on the Marne, and directing it to move
+on the Ourcq; cross and attack the flank of the 1st German Army, which
+was then moving in a south-easterly direction east of that river.
+
+He requested me to effect a change of front to my right--my left resting
+on the Marne and my right on the 5th Army--to fill the gap between that
+army and the 6th. I was then to advance against the enemy in my front
+and join in the general offensive movement.
+
+These combined movements practically commenced on Sunday, Sept. 6, at
+sunrise; and on that day it may be said that a great battle opened on a
+front extending from Ermenonville, which was just in front of the left
+flank of the 6th French Army, through Lizy on the Marne, Mauperthuis,
+which was about the British centre, Courteçon, which was the left of the
+5th French Army, to Esternay and Charleville, the left of the 9th Army
+under General Foch, and so along the front of the 9th, 4th, and 3rd
+French Armies to a point north of the fortress of Verdun.
+
+This battle, in so far as the 6th French Army, the British Army, the 5th
+French Army, and the 9th French Army were concerned, may be said to have
+concluded on the evening of Sept. 10, by which time the Germans had been
+driven back to the line Soissons-Rheims, with a loss of thousands of
+prisoners, many guns, and enormous masses of transport.
+
+About Sept. 3 the enemy appears to have changed his plans and to have
+determined to stop his advance south direct upon Paris, for on Sept. 4
+air reconnaissances showed that his main columns were moving in a
+south-easterly direction generally east of a line drawn through Nanteuil
+and Lizy on the Ourcq.
+
+On Sept. 5 several of these columns were observed to have crossed the
+Marne; whilst German troops, which were observed moving south-east up
+the left bank of the Ourcq on the 4th, were now reported to be halted
+and facing that river. Heads of the enemy's columns were seen crossing
+at Changis, La Ferté, Nogent, Château-Thierry, and Mezy.
+
+Considerable German columns of all arms were seen to be converging on
+Montmirail, whilst before sunset large bivouacs of the enemy were
+located in the neighbourhood of Coulommiers, south of Rebais, La
+Ferté-Gaucher and Dagny.
+
+I should conceive it to have been about noon on Sept. 6, after the
+British forces had changed their front to the right and occupied the
+line Jouy-Le Chatel-Faremoutiers-Villeneuve Le Comte, and the advance of
+the 6th French Army north of the Marne towards the Ourcq became
+apparent, that the enemy realised the powerful threat that was being
+made against the flank of his columns moving south-east, and began the
+great retreat which opened the battle above referred to.
+
+On the evening of Sept. 6, therefore, the fronts and positions of the
+opposing armies were, roughly, as follows:
+
+ALLIES.
+
+6th French Army.--Right on the Marne at Meux, left towards Betz.
+
+British Forces.--On the line Dagny-Coulommiers-Maison.
+
+5th French Army.--At Courtagon, right on Esternay.
+
+Conneau's Cavalry Corps.--Between the right of the British and the left
+of the French 5th Army.
+
+GERMANS.
+
+4th Reserve and 2nd Corps.--East of the Ourcq and facing that river.
+
+9th Cavalry Division.--West of Crecy.
+
+2nd Cavalry Division. North of Coulommiers.
+
+4th Corps.--Rebais.
+
+3rd and 7th Corps.--South-west of Montmirail.
+
+All these troops constituted the 1st German Army, which was directed
+against the French 6th Army on the Ourcq, and the British forces, and
+the left of the 5th French Army south of the Marne.
+
+The 2nd German Army (IX., X., X.R. and Guard) was moving against the
+centre and right of the 5th French Army and the 9th French Army.
+
+On Sept. 7 both the 5th and 6th French Armies were heavily engaged on
+our flank. The 2nd and 4th Reserve German Corps on the Ourcq vigorously
+opposed the advance of the French towards that river, but did not
+prevent the 6th Army from gaining some headway, the Germans themselves
+suffering serious losses. The French 5th Army threw the enemy back to
+the line of the Petit Morin River, after inflicting severe losses upon
+them, especially about Montceaux, which was carried at the point of the
+bayonet.
+
+The enemy retreated before our advance, covered by his 2nd and 9th and
+Guard Cavalry Divisions, which suffered severely.
+
+Our cavalry acted with great vigour, especially General De Lisle's
+Brigade, with the 9th Lancers and 18th Hussars.
+
+On Sept. 8 the enemy continued his retreat northward, and our army was
+successfully engaged during the day with strong rearguards of all arms
+on the Petit Morin River, thereby materially assisting the progress of
+the French armies on our right and left, against whom the enemy was
+making his greatest efforts. On both sides the enemy was thrown back
+with very heavy loss. The First Army Corps encountered stubborn
+resistance at La Trétoire (north of Rebais). The enemy occupied a
+strong position with infantry and guns on the northern bank of the Petit
+Morin River; they were dislodged with considerable loss. Several machine
+guns and many prisoners were captured, and upwards of 200 German dead
+were left on the ground.
+
+The forcing of the Petit Morin at this point was much assisted by the
+cavalry and the 1st Division, which crossed higher up the stream.
+
+Later in the day a counter attack by the enemy was well repulsed by the
+First Army Corps, a great many prisoners and some guns again falling
+into our hands.
+
+On this day (Sept. 8) the Second Army Corps encountered considerable
+opposition, but drove back the enemy at all points with great loss,
+making considerable captures.
+
+The Third Army Corps also drove back considerable bodies of the enemy's
+infantry and made some captures.
+
+On Sept. 9 the First and Second Army Corps forced the passage of the
+Marne and advanced some miles to the north of it. The Third Corps
+encountered considerable opposition, as the bridge at La Ferté was
+destroyed and the enemy held the town on the opposite bank in some
+strength, and thence persistently obstructed the construction of a
+bridge; so the passage was not effected until after nightfall.
+
+During the day's pursuit the enemy suffered heavy loss in killed and
+wounded, some hundreds of prisoners fell into our hands, and a battery
+of eight machine guns was captured by the 2nd Division.
+
+On this day the 6th French Army was heavily engaged west of the River
+Ourc. The enemy had largely increased his force opposing them, and very
+heavy fighting ensued, in which the French were successful throughout.
+
+The left of the 5th French Army reached the neighbourhood of
+Château-Thierry after the most severe fighting, having driven the enemy
+completely north of the river with great loss.
+
+The fighting of this army in the neighbourhood of Montmirail was very
+severe.
+
+The advance was resumed at daybreak on the 10th up to the line of the
+Ourcq, opposed by strong rearguards of all arms. The 1st and 2nd Corps,
+assisted by the Cavalry Division on the right, the 3rd and 5th Cavalry
+Brigades on the left, drove the enemy northwards. Thirteen guns, seven
+machine guns, about 2,000 prisoners, and quantities of transport fell
+into our hands. The enemy left many dead on the field. On this day the
+French 5th and 6th Armies had little opposition.
+
+As the 1st and 2nd German Armies were now in full retreat, this evening
+marks the end of the battle which practically commenced on the morning
+of the 6th instant, and it is at this point in the operations that I am
+concluding the present despatch.
+
+Although I deeply regret to have had to report heavy losses in killed
+and wounded throughout these operations, I do not think they have been
+excessive in view of the magnitude of the great fight, the outlines of
+which I have only been able very briefly to describe, and the
+demoralisation and loss in killed and wounded which are known to have
+been caused to the enemy by the vigour and severity of the pursuit.
+
+In concluding this despatch I must call your lordship's special
+attention to the fact that from Sunday, Aug. 23, up to the present date
+(Sept. 17), from Mons back almost to the Seine, and from the Seine to
+the Aisne, the Army under my command has been ceaselessly engaged
+without one single day's halt or rest of any kind.
+
+Since the date to which in this dispatch I have limited my report of the
+operations, a great battle on the Aisne has been proceeding. A full
+report of this battle will be made in an early further despatch.
+
+It will, however, be of interest to say here that, in spite of a very
+determined resistance on the part of the enemy, who is holding in
+strength and great tenacity a position peculiarly favourable to defence,
+the battle which commenced on the evening of the 12th inst. has, so far,
+forced the enemy back from his first position, secured the passage of
+the river, and inflicted great loss upon him, including the capture of
+over 2,000 prisoners and several guns.--I have the honour to be, your
+lordship's most obedient servant,
+
+
+(Signed) J. D. P. FRENCH, Field-Marshal,
+Commanding-in-Chief, the
+British Forces in the Field.
+
+
+II.
+
+Oct. 8, 1914.
+
+MY LORD--
+
+I have the honour to report the operations in which the British forces
+in France have been engaged since the evening of Sept. 10.
+
+1. In the early morning of the 11th the further pursuit of the enemy was
+commenced, and the three corps crossed the Ourcq practically unopposed,
+the cavalry reaching the line of the Aisne River; the 3rd and 5th
+Brigades south of Soissons, the 1st, 2nd, and 4th on the high ground at
+Couvrelles and Cerseuil.
+
+On the afternoon of the 12th from the opposition encountered by the 6th
+French Army to the west of Soissons, by the 3rd Corps south-east of that
+place, by the 2nd Corps south of Missy and Vailly, and certain
+indications all along the line, I formed the opinion that the enemy had,
+for the moment at any rate, arrested his retreat, and was preparing to
+dispute the passage of the Aisne with some vigour.
+
+South of Soissons the Germans were holding Mont de Paris against the
+attack of the right of the French 6th Army when the 3rd Corps reached
+the neighbourhood of Buzancy, south-east of that place. With the
+assistance of the artillery of the 3rd Corps the French drove them back
+across the river at Soissons, where they destroyed the bridges.
+
+The heavy artillery fire which was visible for several miles in a
+westerly direction in the valley of the Aisne showed that the 6th French
+Army was meeting with strong opposition all along the line.
+
+On this day the cavalry under General Allenby reached the neighbourhood
+of Braine, and did good work in clearing the town and the high ground
+beyond it of strong hostile detachments. The Queen's Bays are
+particularly mentioned by the General as having assisted greatly in the
+success of this operation. They were well supported by the 3rd Division,
+which on this night bivouacked at Brenelle, south of the river.
+
+The 5th Division approached Missy, but were unable to make headway.
+
+The 1st Army Corps reached the neighbourhood of Vauxcéré without much
+opposition.
+
+In this manner the Battle of the Aisne commenced.
+
+2. The Aisne Valley runs generally east and west, and consists of a
+flat-bottomed depression of width varying from half a mile to two miles,
+down which the river follows a winding course to the west at some points
+near the southern slopes of the valley and at others near the northern.
+The high ground both on the north and south of the river is
+approximately 400 ft. above the bottom of the valley, and is very
+similar in character, as are both slopes of the valley itself, which are
+broken into numerous rounded spurs and re-entrants. The most prominent
+of the former are the Chivre spur on the right bank and Sermoise spur on
+the left. Near the latter place the general plateau on the south is
+divided by a subsidiary valley of much the same character, down which
+the small River Vesle flows to the main stream near Sermoise. The slopes
+of the plateau overlooking the Aisne on the north and south are of
+varying steepness, and are covered with numerous patches of wood, which
+also stretch upwards and backwards over the edge on to the top of the
+high ground. There are several villages and small towns dotted about in
+the valley itself and along its sides, the chief of which is the town of
+Soissons.
+
+The Aisne is a sluggish stream of some 170 ft. in breadth, but, being 15
+ft. deep in the centre, it is unfordable. Between Soissons on the west
+and Villers on the east (the part of the river attacked and secured by
+the British forces) there are eleven road bridges across it. On the
+north bank a narrow-gauge railway runs from Soissons to Vailly, where it
+crosses the river and continues eastward along the south bank. From
+Soissons to Sermoise a double line of railway runs along the south bank,
+turning at the latter place up the Vesle Valley towards Bazoches.
+
+The position held by the enemy is a very strong one, either for a
+delaying action or for a defensive battle. One of its chief military
+characteristics is that from the high ground on neither side can the top
+of the plateau on the other side be seen except for small stretches.
+This is chiefly due to the woods on the edges of the slopes. Another
+important point is that all the bridges are under either direct or
+high-angle artillery fire.
+
+The tract of country above described, which lies north of the Aisne, is
+well adapted to concealment, and was so skilfully turned to account by
+the enemy as to render it impossible to judge the real nature of his
+opposition to our passage of the river, or to accurately gauge his
+strength; but I have every reason to conclude that strong rearguards of
+at least three army corps were holding the passages on the early morning
+of the 13th.
+
+3. On that morning I ordered the British Forces to advance and make good
+the Aisne.
+
+The 1st Corps and the cavalry advanced on the river. The First Division
+was directed on Chanouille, viâ the canal bridge at Bourg, and the
+Second Division on Courteçon and Presles, _viâ_ Pont-Arcy and on the
+canal to the north of Braye, _viâ_ Chavonne. On the right the cavalry
+and First Division met with slight opposition, and found a passage by
+means of the canal which crosses the river by an aqueduct. The Division
+was, therefore, able to press on, supported by the Cavalry Division on
+its outer flank, driving back the enemy in front of it.
+
+On the left the leading troops of the Second Division reached the river
+by nine o'clock. The Fifth Infantry Brigade were only enabled to cross,
+in single file and under considerable shell fire, by means of the broken
+girder of the bridge which was not entirely submerged in the river. The
+construction of a pontoon bridge was at once undertaken, and was
+completed by five o'clock in the afternoon.
+
+On the extreme left the 4th Guards Brigade met with severe opposition at
+Chavonne, and it was only late in the afternoon that it was able to
+establish a foothold on the northern bank of the river by ferrying one
+battalion across in boats.
+
+By nightfall the First Division occupied the area Moulins-Paissy-Geny,
+with posts in the village of Vendresse.
+
+The Second Division bivouacked as a whole on the southern bank of the
+river, leaving only the Fifth Brigade on the north bank to establish a
+bridge head.
+
+The Second Corps found all the bridges in front of them destroyed,
+except that of Condé, which was in possession of the enemy, and remained
+so until the end of the battle.
+
+In the approach to Missy, where the 5th Division eventually crossed,
+there is some open ground which was swept by heavy fire from the
+opposite bank. The 13th Brigade was, therefore, unable to advance; but
+the 14th, which was directed to the east of Venizel at a less exposed
+point, was rafted across, and by night established itself with its left
+at St. Marguérite. They were followed by the 15th Brigade, and later on
+both the 14th and 15th supported the 4th Division on their left in
+repelling a heavy counter-attack on the Third Corps.
+
+On the morning of the 13th the Third Corps found the enemy had
+established himself in strength on the Vregny Plateau. The road bridge
+at Venizel was repaired during the morning, and a reconnaissance was
+made with a view to throwing a pontoon bridge at Soissons.
+
+The 12th Infantry Brigade crossed at Venizel, and was assembled at Bucy
+Le Long by one p.m., but the bridge was so far damaged that artillery
+could only be manhandled across it. Meanwhile the construction of a
+bridge was commenced close to the road bridge at Venizel.
+
+At two p.m. the 12th Infantry Brigade attacked in the direction of
+Chivres and Vregny with the object of securing the high ground east of
+Chivres, as a necessary preliminary to a further advance northwards.
+This attack made good progress, but at 5.30 p.m. the enemy's artillery
+and machine-gun fire from the direction of Vregny became so severe that
+no further advance could be made. The positions reached were held till
+dark.
+
+The pontoon bridge at Venizel was completed at 5.30 p.m., when the 10th
+Infantry Brigade crossed the river and moved to Bucy Le Long.
+
+The 19th Infantry Brigade moved to Billy-sur-Aisne, and before dark all
+the artillery of the division had crossed the river, with the exception
+of the heavy battery and one brigade of field artillery.
+
+During the night the positions gained by the 12th Infantry Brigade to
+the east of the stream running through Chivres were handed over to the
+5th Division.
+
+The section of the bridging train allotted to the Third Corps began to
+arrive in the neighbourhood of Soissons late in the afternoon, when an
+attempt to throw a heavy pontoon bridge at Soissons had to be abandoned,
+owing to the fire of the enemy's heavy howitzers.
+
+In the evening the enemy retired at all points and entrenched himself on
+the high ground about two miles north of the river, along which runs the
+Chemin-des-Dames. Detachments of infantry, however, strongly entrenched
+in commanding points down slopes of the various spurs, were left in
+front of all three corps, with powerful artillery in support of them.
+
+During the night of the 13th and on the 14th and following days the
+field companies were incessantly at work night and day. Eight pontoon
+bridges and one foot bridge were thrown across the river under generally
+very heavy artillery fire, which was incessantly kept up on to most of
+the crossings after completion. Three of the road bridges, _i.e._,
+Venizel, Missy, and Vailly, and the railway bridge east of Vailly were
+temporarily repaired so as to take foot traffic, and the Villers Bridge
+made fit to carry weights up to six tons.
+
+Preparations were also made for the repair of the Missy, Vailly, and
+Bourg Bridges, so as to take mechanical transport.
+
+The weather was very wet and added to the difficulties by cutting up the
+already indifferent approaches, entailing a large amount of work to
+repair and improve.
+
+The operations of the field companies during this most trying time are
+worthy of the best traditions of the Royal Engineers.
+
+4. On the evening of the 14th it was still impossible to decide whether
+the enemy was only making a temporary halt, covered by rearguards, or
+whether he intended to stand and defend the position.
+
+With a view to clearing up the situation, I ordered a general advance.
+
+The action of the 1st Corps on this day under the direction and command
+of Sir Douglas Haig was of so skilful, bold, and decisive a character
+that he gained positions which alone have enabled me to maintain my
+position for more than three weeks of very severe fighting on the north
+bank of the river.
+
+The corps was directed to cross the line Moulins-Moussy by seven a.m.
+
+On the right the General Officer Commanding the 1st Division directed
+the 2nd Infantry Brigade (which was in billets and bivouacked about
+Moulins), and the 25th Artillery Brigade (less one battery), under
+General Bulfin, to move forward before daybreak, in order to protect the
+advance of the division sent up the valley to Vendresse. An officers'
+patrol sent out by this brigade reported a considerable force of the
+enemy near the factory north of Troyon, and the Brigadier accordingly
+directed two regiments (the King's Royal Rifles and the Royal Sussex
+Regiment) to move at three a.m. The Northamptonshire Regiment was
+ordered to move at four a.m. to occupy the spur east of Troyon. The
+remaining regiment of the brigade (the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment)
+moved at 5.30 a.m. to the village of Vendresse. The factory was found to
+be held in considerable strength by the enemy, and the brigadier ordered
+the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment to support the King's Royal Rifles
+and the Sussex Regiment. Even with this support the force was unable to
+make headway, and on the arrival of the 1st Brigade the Coldstream
+Guards were moved up to support the right of the leading brigade (the
+2nd), while the remainder of the 1st Brigade supported its left.
+
+About noon the situation was, roughly, that the whole of these two
+brigades were extended along a line running east and west, north of the
+line Troyon and south of the Chemin-des-Dames. A party of the Loyal
+North Lancashire Regiment had seized and were holding the factory. The
+enemy held a line of entrenchments north and east of the factory in
+considerable strength, and every effort to advance against this line was
+driven back by heavy shell and machine-gun fire. The morning was wet,
+and a heavy mist hung over the hills, so that the 25th Artillery Brigade
+and the Divisional Artillery were unable to render effective support to
+the advanced troops until about nine o'clock.
+
+By ten o'clock the 3rd Infantry Brigade had reached a point one mile
+south of Vendresse, and from there it was ordered to continue the line
+of the 1st Brigade and to connect with and help the right of the 2nd
+Division. A strong hostile column was found to be advancing, and by a
+vigorous counter-stroke with two of his battalions the Brigadier checked
+the advance of this column and relieved the pressure on the 2nd
+Division. From this period until late in the afternoon the fighting
+consisted of a series of attacks and counter-attacks. The
+counter-strokes by the enemy were delivered at first with great vigour,
+but later on they decreased in strength, and all were driven off with
+heavy loss.
+
+On the left the 6th Infantry Brigade had been ordered to cross the river
+and to pass through the line held during the preceding night by the 5th
+Infantry Brigade and occupy the Courteçon Ridge, whilst a detached
+force, consisting of the 4th Guards Brigade and the 36th Brigade, Royal
+Field Artillery, under Brigadier-General Perceval, were ordered to
+proceed to a point east of the village of Ostel.
+
+The 6th Infantry Brigade crossed the river at Pont-Arcy, moved up the
+valley towards Braye, and at nine a.m. had reached the line Tilleul--La
+Buvelle. On this line they came under heavy artillery and rifle fire,
+and were unable to advance until supported by the 34th Brigade, Royal
+Field Artillery, and the 44th Howitzer Brigade and the Heavy Artillery.
+
+The 4th Guards Brigade crossed the river at ten a.m., and met with very
+heavy opposition. It had to pass through dense woods; field artillery
+support was difficult to obtain; but one section of the field battery
+pushed up to and within the firing line. At one p.m. the left of the
+brigade was south of the Ostel Ridge.
+
+At this period of the action the enemy obtained a footing between the
+First and Second Corps, and threatened to cut the communications of the
+latter.
+
+Sir Douglas Haig was very hardly pressed, and had no reserve in hand. I
+placed the cavalry division at his disposal, part of which he skilfully
+used to prolong and secure the left flank of the Guards Brigade. Some
+heavy fighting ensued, which resulted in the enemy being driven back
+with heavy loss.
+
+About four o'clock the weakening of the counter-attacks by the enemy and
+other indications tended to show that his resistance was decreasing, and
+a general advance was ordered by the Army Corps Commander. Although
+meeting with considerable opposition, and coming under very heavy
+artillery and rifle fire, the position of the corps at the end of the
+day's operations extended from the Chemin-des-Dames on the right,
+through Chivy, to Le Cour de Soupir, with the 1st Cavalry Brigade
+extending to the Chavonne--Soissons road.
+
+On the right the corps was in close touch with the French Moroccan
+troops of the 18th Corps, which were entrenched in echelon to its right
+rear. During the night they entrenched this position.
+
+Throughout the battle of the Aisne this advanced and commanding position
+was maintained, and I cannot speak too highly of the valuable services
+rendered by Sir Douglas Haig and the army corps under his command. Day
+after day and night after night the enemy's infantry has been hurled
+against him in violent counter-attack, which has never on any one
+occasion succeeded, whilst the trenches all over his position have been
+under continuous heavy artillery fire.
+
+The operations of the First Corps on this day resulted in the capture of
+several hundred prisoners, some field pieces, and machine guns.
+
+The casualties were very severe, one brigade alone losing three of its
+four colonels.
+
+The 3rd Division commenced a further advance, and had nearly reached the
+plateau of Aizy when they were driven back by a powerful counter-attack
+supported by heavy artillery. The division, however, fell back in the
+best order, and finally entrenched itself about a mile north of Vailly
+Bridge, effectively covering the passage.
+
+The 4th and 5th Divisions were unable to do more than maintain their
+ground.
+
+5. On the morning of the 15th, after close examination of the position,
+it became clear to me that the enemy was making a determined stand, and
+this view was confirmed by reports which reached me from the French
+armies fighting on my right and left, which clearly showed that a
+strongly entrenched line of defence was being taken up from the north of
+Compiègne, eastward and south-eastward, along the whole valley of the
+Aisne up to and beyond Rheims.
+
+A few days previously the fortress of Maubeuge fell, and a considerable
+quantity of siege artillery was brought down from that place to
+strengthen the enemy's position in front of us.
+
+During the 15th shells fell in our position which have been judged by
+experts to be thrown by eight-inch siege guns with a range of 10,000
+yards. Throughout the whole course of the battle our troops have
+suffered very heavily from this fire, although its effect latterly was
+largely mitigated by more efficient and thorough entrenching, the
+necessity for which I impressed strongly upon army corps commanders. In
+order to assist them in this work all villages within the area of our
+occupation were searched for heavy entrenching tools, a large number of
+which were collected.
+
+In view of the peculiar formation of the ground on the north side of the
+river between Missy and Soissons, and its extraordinary adaptability to
+a force on the defensive, the 5th Division found it impossible to
+maintain its position on the southern edge of the Chivres Plateau, as
+the enemy in possession of the village of Vregny to the west was able to
+bring a flank fire to bear upon it. The division had, therefore, to
+retire to a line the left of which was at the village of Marguérite, and
+thence ran by the north edge of Missy back to the river to the east of
+that place.
+
+With great skill and tenacity Sir Charles Fergusson maintained this
+position throughout the whole battle, although his trenches were
+necessarily on lower ground than that occupied by the enemy on the
+southern edge of the plateau, which was only 400 yards away.
+
+General Hamilton with the 3rd Division vigorously attacked to the north,
+and regained all the ground he had lost on the 15th, which throughout
+the battle had formed a most powerful and effective bridge head.
+
+6. On the 16th the 6th Division came up into line.
+
+It had been my intention to direct the First Corps to attack and seize
+the enemy's position on the Chemin-des-Dames, supporting it with this
+new reinforcement. I hoped from the position thus gained to bring
+effective fire to bear across the front of the 3rd Division which, by
+securing the advance of the latter, would also take the pressure off the
+5th Division and the Third Corps.
+
+But any further advance of the First Corps would have dangerously
+exposed my right flank. And, further, I learned from the French
+Commander-in-Chief that he was strongly reinforcing the 6th French Army
+on my left, with the intention of bringing up the Allied left to attack
+the enemy's flank, and thus compel his retirement. I therefore sent the
+6th Division to join the Third Corps, with orders to keep it on the
+south side of the river, as it might be available in general reserve.
+
+On the 17th, 18th, and 19th the whole of our line was heavily
+bombarded, and the First Corps was constantly and heavily engaged. On
+the afternoon of the 17th the right flank of the 1st Division was
+seriously threatened. A counter-attack was made by the Northamptonshire
+Regiment in combination with the Queen's, and one battalion of the
+Divisional Reserve was moved up in support. The Northamptonshire
+Regiment, under cover of mist, crept up to within a hundred yards of the
+enemy's trenches and charged with the bayonet, driving them out of the
+trenches and up the hill. A very strong force of hostile infantry was
+then disclosed on the crest line. This new line was enfiladed by part of
+the Queen's and the King's Royal Rifles, which wheeled to their left on
+the extreme right of our infantry line, and were supported by a squadron
+of cavalry on their outer flank. The enemy's attack was ultimately
+driven back with heavy loss.
+
+On the 18th, during the night, the Gloucestershire Regiment advanced
+from their position near Chivy, filled in the enemy's trenches and
+captured two Maxim guns.
+
+On the extreme right the Queen's were heavily attacked, but the enemy
+was repulsed with great loss. About midnight the attack was renewed on
+the 1st Division, supported by artillery fire, but was again repulsed.
+
+Shortly after midnight an attack was made on the left of the 2nd
+Division with considerable force, which was also thrown back.
+
+At about one p.m. on the 19th the 2nd Division drove back a heavy
+infantry attack strongly supported by artillery fire. At dusk the attack
+was renewed and again repulsed.
+
+On the 18th I discussed with the General Officer Commanding the 2nd Army
+Corps and his Divisional Commanders the possibility of driving the enemy
+out of Condé, which lay between his two divisions, and seizing the
+bridge which has remained throughout in his possession.
+
+As, however, I found that the bridge was closely commanded from all
+points on the south side and that satisfactory arrangements were made
+to prevent any issue from it by the enemy by day or night, I decided
+that it was not necessary to incur the losses which an attack would
+entail, as, in view of the position of the 2nd and 3rd Corps, the enemy
+could make no use of Condé, and would be automatically forced out of it
+by any advance which might become possible for us.
+
+7. On this day information reached me from General Joffre that he had
+found it necessary to make a new plan, and to attack and envelop the
+German right flank.
+
+It was now evident to me that the battle in which we had been engaged
+since the 12th instant must last some days longer, until the effect of
+this new flank movement could be felt, and a way opened to drive the
+enemy from his positions.
+
+It thus became essential to establish some system of regular relief in
+the trenches, and I have used the infantry of the 6th Division for this
+purpose with good results. The relieved brigades were brought back
+alternately south of the river, and, with the artillery of the 6th
+Division, formed a general reserve on which I could rely in case of
+necessity.
+
+The cavalry has rendered most efficient and ready help in the trenches,
+and have done all they possibly could to lighten the arduous and trying
+task which has of necessity fallen to the lot of the infantry.
+
+On the evening of the 19th, and throughout the 20th, the enemy again
+commenced to show considerable activity. On the former night a severe
+counter-attack on the 3rd Division was repulsed with considerable loss,
+and from early on Sunday morning various hostile attempts were made on
+the trenches of the 1st Division. During the day the enemy suffered
+another severe repulse in front of the 2nd Division, losing heavily in
+the attempt. In the course of the afternoon the enemy made desperate
+attempts against the trenches all along the front of the First Corps,
+but with similar results.
+
+After dark the enemy again attacked the 2nd Division, only to be again
+driven back.
+
+Our losses on these two days were considerable, but the number, as
+obtained, of the enemy's killed and wounded vastly exceeded them.
+
+As the troops of the First Army Corps were much exhausted by this
+continual fighting, I reinforced Sir Douglas Haig with a brigade from
+the reserve, and called upon the 1st Cavalry Division to assist them.
+
+On the night of the 21st another violent counter-attack was repulsed by
+the 3rd Division, the enemy losing heavily.
+
+On the 23rd the four six-inch howitzer batteries, which I had asked to
+be sent from home, arrived. Two batteries were handed over to the Second
+Corps and two to the First Corps. They were brought into action on the
+24th with very good results.
+
+Our experiences in this campaign seem to point to the employment of more
+heavy guns of a larger calibre in great battles which last for several
+days, during which time powerful entrenching work on both sides can be
+carried out.
+
+These batteries were used with considerable effect on the 24th and the
+following days.
+
+8. On the 23rd the action of General de Castelnau's army on the Allied
+left developed considerably, and apparently withdrew considerable forces
+of the enemy away from the centre and east. I am not aware whether it
+was due to this cause or not, but until the 26th it appeared as though
+the enemy's opposition in our front was weakening. On that day, however,
+a very marked renewal of activity commenced. A constant and vigorous
+artillery bombardment was maintained all day, and the Germans in front
+of the 1st Division were observed to be "sapping" up to our lines and
+trying to establish new trenches. Renewed counter-attacks were delivered
+and beaten off during the course of the day, and in the afternoon a
+well-timed attack by the 1st Division stopped the enemy's entrenching
+work.
+
+During the night of 27th-28th the enemy again made the most determined
+attempts to capture the trenches of the 1st Division, but without the
+slightest success.
+
+Similar attacks were reported during these three days all along the
+line of the Allied front, and it is certain that the enemy then made one
+last great effort to establish ascendancy. He was, however, unsuccessful
+everywhere, and is reported to have suffered heavy losses. The same
+futile attempts were made all along our front up to the evening of the
+28th, when they died away, and have not since been renewed.
+
+On former occasions I have brought to your lordship's notice the
+valuable services performed during this campaign by the Royal Artillery.
+
+Throughout the Battle of the Aisne they have displayed the same skill,
+endurance, and tenacity, and I deeply appreciate the work they have
+done.
+
+Sir David Henderson and the Royal Flying Corps under his command have
+again proved their incalculable value. Great strides have been made in
+the development of the use of aircraft in the tactical sphere by
+establishing effective communication between aircraft and units in
+action.
+
+It is difficult to describe adequately and accurately the great strain
+to which officers and men were subjected almost every hour of the day
+and night throughout this battle.
+
+I have described above the severe character of the artillery fire which
+was directed from morning till night, not only upon the trenches, but
+over the whole surface of the ground occupied by our forces. It was not
+until a few days before the position was evacuated that the heavy guns
+were removed and the fire slackened. Attack and counter-attack occurred
+at all hours of the night and day throughout the whole position,
+demanding extreme vigilance, and permitting only a minimum of rest.
+
+The fact that between Sept. 12 to the date of this despatch the total
+numbers of killed, wounded, and missing reached the figures amounting to
+561 officers, 12,980 men, proves the severity of the struggle.
+
+The tax on the endurance of the troops was further increased by the
+heavy rain and cold which prevailed for some ten or twelve days of this
+trying time.
+
+The battle of the Aisne has once more demonstrated the splendid spirit,
+gallantry, and devotion which animates the officers and men of his
+Majesty's Forces.
+
+With reference to the last paragraph of my despatch of Sept. 7, I append
+the names of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men brought
+forward for special mention by Army Corps commanders and heads of
+departments for services rendered from the commencement of the campaign
+up to the present date.
+
+I entirely agree with these recommendations and beg to submit them for
+your lordship's consideration.
+
+I further wish to bring forward the names of the following officers who
+have rendered valuable service: General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and
+Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Haig (commanding First and Second Corps
+respectively) I have already mentioned in the present and former
+despatches for particularly marked and distinguished service in critical
+situations.
+
+Since the commencement of the campaign they have carried out all my
+orders and instructions with the utmost ability.
+
+Lieutenant-General W. P. Pulteney took over the command of the Third
+Corps just before the commencement of the battle of the Marne.
+Throughout the subsequent operations he showed himself to be a most
+capable commander in the field, and has rendered very valuable services.
+
+Major-General E. H. H. Allenby and Major-General H. de la P. Gough have
+proved themselves to be cavalry leaders of a high order, and I am deeply
+indebted to them. The undoubted moral superiority which our cavalry has
+obtained over that of the enemy has been due to the skill with which
+they have turned to the best account the qualities inherent in the
+splendid troops they command.
+
+In my despatch of Sept. 7 I mentioned the name of Brigadier-General Sir
+David Henderson and his valuable work in command of the Royal Flying
+Corps, and I have once more to express my deep appreciation of the help
+he has since rendered me.
+
+Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray has continued to render me
+invaluable help as Chief of the Staff, and in his arduous and
+responsible duties he has been ably assisted by Major-General Henry
+Wilson, Sub-Chief.
+
+Lieutenant-General Sir Nevil Macready and Lieutenant-General Sir William
+Robertson have continued to perform excellent service as
+Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General respectively.
+
+The Director of Army Signals, Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Fowler, has
+materially assisted the operations by the skill and energy which he has
+displayed in the working of the important department over which he
+presides.
+
+My Military Secretary, Brigadier-General the Hon. W. Lambton, has
+performed his arduous and difficult duties with much zeal and great
+efficiency.
+
+I am anxious also to bring to your lordship's notice the following names
+of officers of my Personal Staff, who throughout these arduous
+operations have shown untiring zeal and energy in the performance of
+their duties:--
+
+
+AIDES-DE-CAMP.
+
+Lieut.-Colonel Stanley Barry.
+Lieut.-Colonel Lord Brooke.
+Major Fitzgerald Watt.
+
+
+EXTRA AIDE-DE-CAMP.
+
+Captain the Hon. F. E. Guest.
+
+
+PRIVATE SECRETARY.
+
+Lieut.-Colonel Brindsley Fitzgerald.
+
+
+Major his Royal Highness Prince Arthur of Connaught, K.G., joined my
+staff as Aide-de-Camp on Sept. 14.
+
+His Royal Highness's intimate knowledge of languages enabled me to
+employ him with great advantage on confidential missions of some
+importance, and his services have proved of considerable value.
+
+I cannot close this despatch without informing your lordship of the
+valuable services rendered by the chief of the French Military Mission
+at my headquarters, Colonel Victor Huguet, of the French Artillery. He
+has displayed tact and judgment of a high order in many difficult
+situations, and has rendered conspicuous service to the Allied cause.--I
+have the honour to be, your lordship's most obedient servant,
+
+
+(Signed) J. D. P. FRENCH, Field-Marshal,
+Commanding-in-Chief, the British
+Army in the Field.
+
+
+PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY R. CLAY AND SONS, LTD.,
+BRUNSWICK STREET, STAMFORD STREET, S.E., AND BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Battle of the Rivers, by Edmund Dane
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 58417 ***