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+Project Gutenberg's The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, by Immanuel Kant
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license
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+
+Title: The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics
+
+Author: Immanuel Kant
+
+Posting Date: August 4, 2013 [EBook #5684]
+Release Date: May, 2004
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Matthew Stapleton.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+				 1780
+
+		 THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS
+
+			   by Immanuel Kant
+
+		translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+If there exists on any subject a philosophy (that is, a system of
+rational knowledge based on concepts), then there must also be for
+this philosophy a system of pure rational concepts, independent of any
+condition of intuition, in other words, a metaphysic. It may be
+asked whether metaphysical elements are required also for every
+practical philosophy, which is the doctrine of duties, and therefore
+also for Ethics, in order to be able to present it as a true science
+(systematically), not merely as an aggregate of separate doctrines
+(fragmentarily). As regards pure jurisprudence, no one will question
+this requirement; for it concerns only what is formal in the
+elective will, which has to be limited in its external relations
+according to laws of freedom; without regarding any end which is the
+matter of this will. Here, therefore, deontology is a mere
+scientific doctrine (doctrina scientiae). *
+
+
+
+* One who is acquainted with practical philosophy is not,
+therefore, a practical philosopher. The latter is he who makes the
+rational end the principle of his actions, while at the same time he
+joins with this the necessary knowledge which, as it aims at action,
+must not be spun out into the most subtile threads of metaphysic,
+unless a legal duty is in question; in which case meum and tuum must
+be accurately determined in the balance of justice, on the principle
+of equality of action and action, which requires something like
+mathematical proportion, but not in the case of a mere ethical duty.
+For in this case the question is not only to know what it is a duty to
+do (a thing which on account of the ends that all men naturally have
+can be easily decided), but the chief point is the inner principle
+of the will namely that the consciousness of this duty be also the
+spring of action, in order that we may be able to say of the man who
+joins to his knowledge this principle of wisdom that he is a practical
+philosopher.
+
+
+
+Now in this philosophy (of ethics) it seems contrary to the idea
+of it that we should go back to metaphysical elements in order to make
+the notion of duty purified from everything empirical (from every
+feeling) a motive of action. For what sort of notion can we form of
+the mighty power and herculean strength which would be sufficient to
+overcome the vice-breeding inclinations, if Virtue is to borrow her
+"arms from the armoury of metaphysics," which is a matter of
+speculation that only few men can handle? Hence all ethical teaching
+in lecture rooms, pulpits, and popular books, when it is decked out
+with fragments of metaphysics, becomes ridiculous. But it is not,
+therefore, useless, much less ridiculous, to trace in metaphysics
+the first principles of ethics; for it is only as a philosopher that
+anyone can reach the first principles of this conception of duty,
+otherwise we could not look for either certainty or purity in the
+ethical teaching. To rely for this reason on a certain feeling
+which, on account of the effect expected from it, is called moral,
+may, perhaps, even satisfy the popular teacher, provided he desires as
+the criterion of a moral duty to consider the problem: "If everyone in
+every case made your maxim the universal law, how could this law be
+consistent with itself?" But if it were merely feeling that made it
+our duty to take this principle as a criterion, then this would not be
+dictated by reason, but only adopted instinctively and therefore
+blindly.
+
+                                                    {PREFACE ^paragraph 5}
+
+But in fact, whatever men imagine, no moral principle is based on
+any feeling, but such a principle is really nothing else than an
+obscurely conceived metaphysic which inheres in every man's
+reasoning faculty; as the teacher will easily find who tries to
+catechize his pupils in the Socratic method about the imperative of
+duty and its application to the moral judgement of his actions. The
+mode of stating it need not be always metaphysical, and the language
+need not necessarily be scholastic, unless the pupil is to be
+trained to be a philosopher. But the thought must go back to the
+elements of metaphysics, without which we cannot expect any
+certainty or purity, or even motive power in ethics.
+
+If we deviate from this principle and begin from pathological, or
+purely sensitive, or even moral feeling (from what is subjectively
+practical instead of what is objective), that is, from the matter of
+the will, the end, not from its form that is the law, in order from
+thence to determine duties; then, certainly, there are no metaphysical
+elements of ethics, for feeling by whatever it may be excited is
+always physical. But then ethical teaching, whether in schools, or
+lecture-rooms, etc., is corrupted in its source. For it is not a
+matter of indifference by what motives or means one is led to a good
+purpose (the obedience to duty). However disgusting, then, metaphysics
+may appear to those pretended philosophers who dogmatize oracularly,
+or even brilliantly, about the doctrine of duty, it is,
+nevertheless, an indispensable duty for those who oppose it to go back
+to its principles even in ethics, and to begin by going to school on
+its benches.
+
+
+
+We may fairly wonder how, after all previous explanations of the
+principles of duty, so far as it is derived from pure reason, it was
+still possible to reduce it again to a doctrine of happiness; in
+such a way, however, that a certain moral happiness not resting on
+empirical causes was ultimately arrived at, a self-contradictory
+nonentity. In fact, when the thinking man has conquered the
+temptations to vice, and is conscious of having done his (often
+hard) duty, he finds himself in a state of peace and satisfaction
+which may well be called happiness, in which virtue is her own reward.
+Now, says the eudaemonist, this delight, this happiness, is the real
+motive of his acting virtuously. The notion of duty, says be, does not
+immediately determine his will; it is only by means of the happiness
+in prospect that he is moved to his duty. Now, on the other hand,
+since he can promise himself this reward of virtue only from the
+consciousness of having done his duty, it is clear that the latter
+must have preceded: that is, he must feel himself bound to do his duty
+before he thinks, and without thinking, that happiness will be the
+consequence of obedience to duty. He is thus involved in a circle in
+his assignment of cause and effect. He can only hope to be happy if he
+is conscious of his obedience to duty: and he can only be moved to
+obedience to duty if be foresees that he will thereby become happy.
+But in this reasoning there is also a contradiction. For, on the one
+side, he must obey his duty, without asking what effect this will have
+on his happiness, consequently, from a moral principle; on the other
+side, he can only recognize something as his duty when he can reckon
+on happiness which will accrue to him thereby, and consequently on a
+pathological principle, which is the direct opposite of the former.
+
+I have in another place (the Berlin Monatsschrift), reduced, as I
+believe, to the simplest expressions the distinction between
+pathological and moral pleasure. The pleasure, namely, which must
+precede the obedience to the law in order that one may act according
+to the law is pathological, and the process follows the physical order
+of nature; that which must be preceded by the law in order that it may
+be felt is in the moral order. If this distinction is not observed; if
+eudaemonism (the principle of happiness) is adopted as the principle
+instead of eleutheronomy (the principle of freedom of the inner
+legislation), the consequence is the euthanasia (quiet death) of all
+morality.
+
+                                                   {PREFACE ^paragraph 10}
+
+The cause of these mistakes is no other than the following: Those
+who are accustomed only to physiological explanations will not admit
+into their heads the categorical imperative from which these laws
+dictatorially proceed, notwithstanding that they feel themselves
+irresistibly forced by it. Dissatisfied at not being able to explain
+what lies wholly beyond that sphere, namely, freedom of the elective
+will, elevating as is this privilege, that man has of being capable of
+such an idea, they are stirred up by the proud claims of speculative
+reason, which feels its power so strongly in the fields, just as if
+they were allies leagued in defence of the omnipotence of
+theoretical reason and roused by a general call to arms to resist that
+idea; and thus they are at present, and perhaps for a long time to
+come, though ultimately in vain, to attack the moral concept of
+freedom and if possible render it doubtful.
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+    INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS
+
+
+
+Ethics in ancient times signified moral philosophy (philosophia
+moralis) generally, which was also called the doctrine of duties.
+Subsequently it was found advisable to confine this name to a part
+of moral philosophy, namely, to the doctrine of duties which are not
+subject to external laws (for which in German the name Tugendlehre was
+found suitable). Thus the system of general deontology is divided into
+that of jurisprudence (jurisprudentia), which is capable of external
+laws, and of ethics, which is not thus capable, and we may let this
+division stand.
+
+
+
+
+
+I. Exposition of the Conception of Ethics
+
+
+
+The notion of duty is in itself already the notion of a constraint
+of the free elective will by the law; whether this constraint be an
+external one or be self-constraint. The moral imperative, by its
+categorical (the unconditional ought) announces this constraint, which
+therefore does not apply to all rational beings (for there may also be
+holy beings), but applies to men as rational physical beings who are
+unholy enough to be seduced by pleasure to the transgression of the
+moral law, although they themselves recognize its authority; and
+when they do obey it, to obey it unwillingly (with resistance of their
+inclination); and it is in this that the constraint properly
+consists. * Now, as man is a free (moral) being, the notion of duty
+can contain only self-constraint (by the idea of the law itself), when
+we look to the internal determination of the will (the spring), for
+thus only is it possible to combine that constraint (even if it were
+external) with the freedom of the elective will. The notion of duty
+then must be an ethical one.
+
+                                               {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 5}
+
+
+
+* Man, however, as at the same time a moral being, when he
+considers himself objectively, which he is qualified to do by his pure
+practical reason, (i.e. according to humanity in his own person),
+finds himself holy enough to transgress the law only unwillingly;
+for there is no man so depraved who in this transgression would not
+feel a resistance and an abhorrence of himself, so that he must put
+a force on himself. It is impossible to explain the phenomenon that at
+this parting of the ways (where the beautiful fable places Hercules
+between virtue and sensuality) man shows more propensity to obey
+inclination than the law. For, we can only explain what happens by
+tracing it to a cause according to physical laws; but then we should
+not be able to conceive the elective will as free. Now this mutually
+opposed self-constraint and the inevitability of it makes us recognize
+the incomprehensible property of freedom.
+
+
+
+The impulses of nature, then, contain hindrances to the fulfilment
+of duty in the mind of man, and resisting forces, some of them
+powerful; and he must judge himself able to combat these and to
+conquer them by means of reason, not in the future, but in the
+present, simultaneously with the thought; he must judge that he can do
+what the law unconditionally commands that he ought.
+
+Now the power and resolved purpose to resist a strong but unjust
+opponent is called fortitude (fortitudo), and when concerned with
+the opponent of the moral character within us, it is virtue (virtus,
+fortitudo moralis). Accordingly, general deontology, in that part
+which brings not external, but internal, freedom under laws is the
+doctrine of virtue.
+
+                                              {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 10}
+
+Jurisprudence had to do only with the formal condition of external
+freedom (the condition of consistency with itself, if its maxim became
+a universal law), that is, with law. Ethics, on the contrary, supplies
+us with a matter (an object of the free elective will), an end of pure
+reason which is at the same time conceived as an objectively necessary
+end, i.e., as duty for all men. For, as the sensible inclinations
+mislead us to ends (which are the matter of the elective will) that
+may contradict duty, the legislating reason cannot otherwise guard
+against their influence than by an opposite moral end, which therefore
+must be given a priori independently on inclination.
+
+An end is an object of the elective will (of a rational being) by
+the idea of which this will is determined to an action for the
+production of this object. Now I may be forced by others to actions
+which are directed to an end as means, but I cannot be forced to
+have an end; I can only make something an end to myself. If,
+however, I am also bound to make something which lies in the notions
+of practical reason an end to myself, and therefore besides the formal
+determining principle of the elective will (as contained in law) to
+have also a material principle, an end which can be opposed to the end
+derived from sensible impulses; then this gives the notion of an end
+which is in itself a duty. The doctrine of this cannot belong to
+jurisprudence, but to ethics, since this alone includes in its
+conception self-constraint according to moral laws.
+
+For this reason, ethics may also be defined as the system of the
+ends of the pure practical reason. The two parts of moral philosophy
+are distinguished as treating respectively of ends and of duties of
+constraint. That ethics contains duties to the observance of which one
+cannot be (physically) forced by others, is merely the consequence
+of this, that it is a doctrine of ends, since to be forced to have
+ends or to set them before one's self is a contradiction.
+
+Now that ethics is a doctrine of virtue (doctrina officiorum
+virtutis) follows from the definition of virtue given above compared
+with the obligation, the peculiarity of which has just been shown.
+There is in fact no other determination of the elective will, except
+that to an end, which in the very notion of it implies that I cannot
+even physically be forced to it by the elective will of others.
+Another may indeed force me to do something which is not my end (but
+only means to the end of another), but he cannot force me to make it
+my own end, and yet I can have no end except of my own making. The
+latter supposition would be a contradiction- an act of freedom which
+yet at the same time would not be free. But there is no
+contradiction in setting before one's self an end which is also a
+duty: for in this case I constrain myself, and this is quite
+consistent with freedom. * But how is such an end possible? That is
+now the question. For the possibility of the notion of the thing
+(viz., that it is not self-contradictory) is not enough to prove the
+possibility of the thing itself (the objective reality of the notion).
+
+
+
+                                              {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 15}
+
+* The less a man can be physically forced, and the more he can be
+morally forced (by the mere idea of duty), so much the freer he is.
+The man, for example, who is of sufficiently firm resolution and
+strong mind not to give up an enjoyment which he has resolved on,
+however much loss is shown as resulting therefrom, and who yet desists
+from his purpose unhesitatingly, though very reluctantly, when he
+finds that it would cause him to neglect an official duty or a sick
+father; this man proves his freedom in the highest degree by this very
+thing, that he cannot resist the voice of duty.
+
+
+
+
+
+II. Exposition of the Notion of an End which is also a Duty
+
+
+
+We can conceive the relation of end to duty in two ways; either
+starting from the end to find the maxim of the dutiful actions; or
+conversely, setting out from this to find the end which is also
+duty. Jurisprudence proceeds in the former way. It is left to
+everyone's free elective will what end he will choose for his
+action. But its maxim is determined a priori; namely, that the freedom
+of the agent must be consistent with the freedom of every other
+according to a universal law.
+
+                                              {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 20}
+
+Ethics, however, proceeds in the opposite way. It cannot start
+from the ends which the man may propose to himself, and hence give
+directions as to the maxims he should adopt, that is, as to his
+duty; for that would be to take empirical principles of maxims, and
+these could not give any notion of duty; since this, the categorical
+ought, has its root in pure reason alone. Indeed, if the maxims were
+to be adopted in accordance with those ends (which are all selfish),
+we could not properly speak of the notion of duty at all. Hence in
+ethics the notion of duty must lead to ends, and must on moral
+principles give the foundation of maxims with respect to the ends
+which we ought to propose to ourselves.
+
+Setting aside the question what sort of end that is which is in
+itself a duty, and how such an end is possible, it is here only
+necessary to show that a duty of this kind is called a duty of virtue,
+and why it is so called.
+
+To every duty corresponds a right of action (facultas moralis
+generatim), but all duties do not imply a corresponding right
+(facultas juridica) of another to compel anyone, but only the
+duties called legal duties. Similarly to all ethical obligation
+corresponds the notion of virtue, but it does not follow that all
+ethical duties are duties of virtue. Those, in fact, are not so
+which do not concern so much a certain end (matter, object of the
+elective will), but merely that which is formal in the moral
+determination of the will (e.g., that the dutiful action must also
+be done from duty). It is only an end which is also duty that can be
+called a duty of virtue. Hence there are several of the latter kind
+(and thus there are distinct virtues); on the contrary, there is
+only one duty of the former kind, but it is one which is valid for all
+actions (only one virtuous disposition).
+
+The duty of virtue is essentially distinguished from the duty of
+justice in this respect; that it is morally possible to be
+externally compelled to the latter, whereas the former rests on free
+self-constraint only. For finite holy beings (which cannot even be
+tempted to the violation of duty) there is no doctrine of virtue,
+but only moral philosophy, the latter being an autonomy of practical
+reason, whereas the former is also an autocracy of it. That is, it
+includes a consciousness- not indeed immediately perceived, but
+rightly concluded, from the moral categorical imperative- of the power
+to become master of one's inclinations which resist the law; so that
+human morality in its highest stage can yet be nothing more than
+virtue; even if it were quite pure (perfectly free from the
+influence of a spring foreign to duty), a state which is poetically
+personified under the name of the wise man (as an ideal to which one
+should continually approximate).
+
+Virtue, however, is not to be defined and esteemed merely as
+habit, and (as it is expressed in the prize essay of Cochius) as a
+long custom acquired by practice of morally good actions. For, if this
+is not an effect of well-resolved and firm principles ever more and
+more purified, then, like any other mechanical arrangement brought
+about by technical practical reason, it is neither armed for all
+circumstances nor adequately secured against the change that may be
+wrought by new allurements.
+
+                                              {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 25}
+
+
+
+                       REMARK
+
+
+
+To virtue = + a is opposed as its logical contradictory
+(contradictorie oppositum) the negative lack of virtue (moral
+weakness) = 0; but vice =  - a is its contrary (contrarie s. realiter
+oppositum); and it is not merely a needless question but an
+offensive one to ask whether great crimes do not perhaps demand more
+strength of mind than great virtues. For by strength of mind we
+understand the strength of purpose of a man, as a being endowed with
+freedom, and consequently so far as he is master of himself (in his
+senses) and therefore in a healthy condition of mind. But great crimes
+are paroxysms, the very sight of which makes the man of healthy mind
+shudder. The question would therefore be something like this:
+whether a man in a fit of madness can have more physical strength than
+if he is in his senses; and we may admit this without on that
+account ascribing to him more strength of mind, if by mind we
+understand the vital principle of man in the free use of his powers.
+For since those crimes have their ground merely in the power of the
+inclinations that weaken reason, which does not prove strength of
+mind, this question would be nearly the same as the question whether a
+man in a fit of illness can show more strength than in a healthy
+condition; and this may be directly denied, since the want of
+health, which consists in the proper balance of all the bodily
+forces of the man, is a weakness in the system of these forces, by
+which system alone we can estimate absolute health.
+
+
+
+
+
+                                              {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 30}
+
+III. Of the Reason for conceiving an End which is also a Duty
+
+
+
+An end is an object of the free elective will, the idea of which
+determines this will to an action by which the object is produced.
+Accordingly every action has its end, and as no one can have an end
+without himself making the object of his elective will his end,
+hence to have some end of actions is an act of the freedom of the
+agent, not an affect of physical nature. Now, since this act which
+determines an end is a practical principle which commands not the
+means (therefore not conditionally) but the end itself (therefore
+unconditionally), hence it is a categorical imperative of pure
+practical reason and one, therefore, which combines a concept of
+duty with that of an end in general.
+
+Now there must be such an end and a categorical imperative
+corresponding to it. For since there are free actions, there must also
+be ends to which as an object those actions are directed. Amongst
+these ends there must also be some which are at the same time (that
+is, by their very notion) duties. For if there were none such, then
+since no actions can be without an end, all ends which practical
+reason might have would be valid only as means to other ends, and a
+categorical imperative would be impossible; a supposition which
+destroys all moral philosophy.
+
+Here, therefore, we treat not of ends which man actually makes to
+himself in accordance with the sensible impulses of his nature, but of
+objects of the free elective will under its own laws- objects which he
+ought to make his end. We may call the former technical
+(subjective), properly pragmatical, including the rules of prudence in
+the choice of its ends; but the latter we must call the moral
+(objective) doctrine of ends. This distinction is, however,
+superfluous here, since moral philosophy already by its very notion is
+clearly separated from the doctrine of physical nature (in the present
+instance, anthropology). The latter resting on empirical principles,
+whereas the moral doctrine of ends which treats of duties rests on
+principles given a priori in pure practical reason.
+
+                                              {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 35}
+
+
+
+
+
+IV. What are the Ends which are also Duties?
+
+
+
+They are: A. OUR OWN PERFECTION, B. HAPPINESS OF OTHERS.
+
+We cannot invert these and make on one side our own happiness, and
+on the other the perfection of others, ends which should be in
+themselves duties for the same person.
+
+                                              {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 40}
+
+For one's own happiness is, no doubt, an end that all men have (by
+virtue of the impulse of their nature), but this end cannot without
+contradiction be regarded as a duty. What a man of himself
+inevitably wills does not come under the notion of duty, for this is a
+constraint to an end reluctantly adopted. It is, therefore, a
+contradiction to say that a man is in duty bound to advance his own
+happiness with all his power.
+
+It is likewise a contradiction to make the perfection of another
+my end, and to regard myself as in duty bound to promote it. For it is
+just in this that the perfection of another man as a person
+consists, namely, that he is able of himself to set before him his own
+end according to his own notions of duty; and it is a contradiction to
+require (to make it a duty for me) that I should do something which no
+other but himself can do.
+
+
+
+
+
+V. Explanation of these two Notions
+
+
+
+                                              {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 45}
+
+                A. OUR OWN PERFECTION
+
+
+
+The word perfection is liable to many misconceptions. It is
+sometimes understood as a notion belonging to transcendental
+philosophy; viz., the notion of the totality of the manifold which
+taken together constitutes a thing; sometimes, again, it is understood
+as belonging to teleology, so that it signifies the correspondence
+of the properties of a thing to an end. Perfection in the former sense
+might be called quantitative (material), in the latter qualitative
+(formal) perfection. The former can be one only, for the whole of what
+belongs to the one thing is one. But of the latter there may be
+several in one thing; and it is of the latter property that we here
+treat.
+
+When it is said of the perfection that belongs to man generally
+(properly speaking, to humanity), that it is in itself a duty to
+make this our end, it must be placed in that which may be the effect
+of one's deed, not in that which is merely an endowment for which we
+have to thank nature; for otherwise it would not be duty.
+Consequently, it can be nothing else than the cultivation of one's
+power (or natural capacity) and also of one's will (moral disposition)
+to satisfy the requirement of duty in general. The supreme element
+in the former (the power) is the understanding, it being the faculty
+of concepts, and, therefore, also of those concepts which refer to
+duty. First it is his duty to labour to raise himself out of the
+rudeness of his nature, out of his animal nature more and more to
+humanity, by which alone he is capable of setting before him ends to
+supply the defects of his ignorance by instruction, and to correct his
+errors; he is not merely counselled to do this by reason as
+technically practical, with a view to his purposes of other kinds
+(as art), but reason, as morally practical, absolutely commands him to
+do it, and makes this end his duty, in order that he may be worthy
+of the humanity that dwells in him. Secondly, to carry the cultivation
+of his will up to the purest virtuous disposition, that, namely, in
+which the law is also the spring of his dutiful actions, and to obey
+it from duty, for this is internal morally practical perfection.
+This is called the moral sense (as it were a special sense, sensus
+moralis), because it is a feeling of the effect which the
+legislative will within himself exercises on the faculty of acting
+accordingly. This is, indeed, often misused fanatically, as though
+(like the genius of Socrates) it preceded reason, or even could
+dispense with judgement of reason; but still it is a moral perfection,
+making every special end, which is also a duty, one's own end.
+
+
+
+                                              {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 50}
+
+               B. HAPPINESS OF OTHERS
+
+
+
+It is inevitable for human nature that man a should wish and seek for
+happiness, that is, satisfaction with his condition, with certainty of
+the continuance of this satisfaction. But for this very reason it is
+not an end that is also a duty. Some writers still make a
+distinction between moral and physical happiness (the former
+consisting in satisfaction with one's person and moral behaviour, that
+is, with what one does; the other in satisfaction with that which
+nature confers, consequently with what one enjoys as a foreign
+gift). Without at present censuring the misuse of the word (which even
+involves a contradiction), it must be observed that the feeling of the
+former belongs solely to the preceding head, namely, perfection. For
+he who is to feel himself happy in the mere consciousness of his
+uprightness already possesses that perfection which in the previous
+section was defined as that end which is also duty.
+
+If happiness, then, is in question, which it is to be my duty to
+promote as my end, it must be the happiness of other men whose
+(permitted) end I hereby make also mine. It still remains left to
+themselves to decide what they shall reckon as belonging to their
+happiness; only that it is in my power to decline many things which
+they so reckon, but which I do not so regard, supposing that they have
+no right to demand it from me as their own. A plausible objection
+often advanced against the division of duties above adopted consists
+in setting over against that end a supposed obligation to study my own
+(physical) happiness, and thus making this, which is my natural and
+merely subjective end, my duty (and objective end). This requires to
+be cleared up.
+
+Adversity, pain, and want are great temptations to transgression
+of one's duty; accordingly it would seem that strength, health, a
+competence, and welfare generally, which are opposed to that
+influence, may also be regarded as ends that are also duties; that is,
+that it is a duty to promote our own happiness not merely to make that
+of others our end. But in that case the end is not happiness but the
+morality of the agent; and happiness is only the means of removing the
+hindrances to morality; permitted means, since no one has a right to
+demand from me the sacrifice of my not immoral ends. It is not
+directly a duty to seek a competence for one's self; but indirectly it
+may be so; namely, in order to guard against poverty which is a
+great temptation to vice. But then it is not my happiness but my
+morality, to maintain which in its integrity is at once my end and
+my duty.
+
+                                              {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 55}
+
+
+
+
+
+VI. Ethics does not supply Laws for Actions (which is done by
+
+    Jurisprudence), but only for the Maxims of Action
+
+
+
+The notion of duty stands in immediate relation to a law (even
+though I abstract from every end which is the matter of the law); as
+is shown by the formal principle of duty in the categorical
+imperative: "Act so that the maxims of thy action might become a
+universal law." But in ethics this is conceived as the law of thy
+own will, not of will in general, which might be that of others; for
+in the latter case it would give rise to a judicial duty which does
+not belong to the domain of ethics. In ethics, maxims are regarded
+as those subjective laws which merely have the specific character of
+universal legislation, which is only a negative principle (not to
+contradict a law in general). How, then, can there be further a law
+for the maxims of actions?
+
+                                              {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 60}
+
+It is the notion of an end which is also a duty, a notion peculiar
+to ethics, that alone is the foundation of a law for the maxims of
+actions; by making the subjective end (that which every one has)
+subordinate to the objective end (that which every one ought to make
+his own). The imperative: "Thou shalt make this or that thy end (e.
+g., the happiness of others)" applies to the matter of the elective
+will (an object). Now since no free action is possible, without the
+agent having in view in it some end (as matter of his elective
+will), it follows that, if there is an end which is also a duty, the
+maxims of actions which are means to ends must contain only the
+condition of fitness for a possible universal legislation: on the
+other hand, the end which is also a duty can make it a law that we
+should have such a maxim, whilst for the maxim itself the
+possibility of agreeing with a universal legislation is sufficient.
+
+For maxims of actions may be arbitrary, and are only limited by
+the condition of fitness for a universal legislation, which is the
+formal principle of actions. But a law abolishes the arbitrary
+character of actions, and is by this distinguished from recommendation
+(in which one only desires to know the best means to an end).
+
+
+
+
+
+VII. Ethical Duties are of indeterminate, Juridical Duties of
+
+                  strict, Obligation
+
+                                              {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 65}
+
+
+
+This proposition is a consequence of the foregoing; for if the law
+can only command the maxim of the actions, not the actions themselves,
+this is a sign that it leaves in the observance of it a latitude
+(latitudo) for the elective will; that is, it cannot definitely assign
+how and how much we should do by the action towards the end which is
+also duty. But by an indeterminate duty is not meant a permission to
+make exceptions from the maxim of the actions, but only the permission
+to limit one maxim of duty by another (e. g., the general love of
+our neighbour by the love of parents); and this in fact enlarges the
+field for the practice of virtue. The more indeterminate the duty, and
+the more imperfect accordingly the obligation of the man to the
+action, and the closer he nevertheless brings this maxim of
+obedience thereto (in his own mind) to the strict duty (of justice),
+so much the more perfect is his virtuous action.
+
+Hence it is only imperfect duties that are duties of virtue. The
+fulfilment of them is merit (meritum) = + a; but their transgression
+is not necessarily demerit (demeritum) = - a, but only moral unworth
+= o, unless the agent made it a principle not to conform to those
+duties. The strength of purpose in the former case is alone properly
+called virtue [Tugend] (virtus); the weakness in the latter case is
+not vice (vitium), but rather only lack of virtue [Untugend], a want
+of moral strength (defectus moralis). (As the word Tugend is derived
+from taugen [to be good for something], Untugend by its etymology
+signifies good for nothing.) Every action contrary to duty is called
+transgression (peccatum). Deliberate transgression which has become
+a principle is what properly constitutes what is called vice (vitium).
+
+Although the conformity of actions to justice (i.e., to be an
+upright man) is nothing meritorious, yet the conformity of the maxim
+of such actions regarded as duties, that is, reverence for justice
+is meritorious. For by this the man makes the right of humanity or
+of men his own end, and thereby enlarges his notion of duty beyond
+that of indebtedness (officium debiti), since although another man
+by virtue of his rights can demand that my actions shall conform to
+the law, he cannot demand that the law shall also contain the spring
+of these actions. The same thing is true of the general ethical
+command, "Act dutifully from a sense of duty." To fix this disposition
+firmly in one's mind and to quicken it is, as in the former case,
+meritorious, because it goes beyond the law of duty in actions and
+makes the law in itself the spring.
+
+But just for or reason, those duties also must be reckoned as of
+indeterminate obligation, in respect of which there exists a
+subjective principle which ethically rewards them; or to bring them as
+near as possible to the notion of a strict obligation, a principle
+of susceptibility of this reward according to the law of virtue;
+namely, a moral pleasure which goes beyond mere satisfaction with
+oneself (which may be merely negative), and of which it is proudly
+said that in this consciousness virtue is its own reward.
+
+                                              {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 70}
+
+When this merit is a merit of the man in respect of other men of
+promoting their natural ends, which are recognized as such by all
+men (making their happiness his own), we might call it the sweet
+merit, the consciousness of which creates a moral enjoyment in which
+men are by sympathy inclined to revel; whereas the bitter merit of
+promoting the true welfare of other men, even though they should not
+recognize it as such (in the case of the unthankful and ungrateful),
+has commonly no such reaction, but only produces a satisfaction with
+one's self, although in the latter case this would be even greater.
+
+
+
+
+
+VIII. Exposition of the Duties of Virtue as Intermediate Duties
+
+
+
+(1) OUR OWN PERFECTION as an end which is also a duty
+
+                                              {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 75}
+
+(a) Physical perfection; that is, cultivation of all our faculties
+generally for the promotion of the ends set before us by reason.
+That this is a duty, and therefore an end in itself, and that the
+effort to effect this even without regard to the advantage that it
+secures us, is based, not on a conditional (pragmatic), but an
+unconditional (moral) imperative, may be seen from the following
+consideration. The power of proposing to ourselves an end is the
+characteristic of humanity (as distinguished from the brutes). With
+the end of humanity in our own person is therefore combined the
+rational will, and consequently the duty of deserving well of humanity
+by culture generally, by acquiring or advancing the power to carry out
+all sorts of possible ends, so far as this power is to be found in
+man; that is, it is a duty to cultivate the crude capacities of our
+nature, since it is by that cultivation that the animal is raised to
+man, therefore it is a duty in itself.
+
+This duty, however, is merely ethical, that is, of indeterminate
+obligation. No principle of reason prescribes how far one must go in
+this effort (in enlarging or correcting his faculty of
+understanding, that is, in acquisition of knowledge or technical
+capacity); and besides the difference in the circumstances into
+which men may come makes the choice of the kind of employment for
+which he should cultivate his talent very arbitrary. Here,
+therefore, there is no law of reason for actions, but only for the
+maxim of actions, viz.: "Cultivate thy faculties of mind and body so
+as to be effective for all ends that may come in thy way, uncertain
+which of them may become thy own."
+
+(b) Cultivation of Morality in ourselves. The greatest moral
+perfection of man is to do his duty, and that from duty (that the
+law be not only the rule but also the spring of his actions). Now at
+first sight this seems to be a strict obligation, and as if the
+principle of duty commanded not merely the legality of every action,
+but also the morality, i.e., the mental disposition, with the
+exactness and strictness of a law; but in fact the law commands even
+here only the maxim of the action, namely, that we should seek the
+ground of obligation, not in the sensible impulses (advantage or
+disadvantage), but wholly in the law; so that the action itself is not
+commanded. For it is not possible to man to see so far into the
+depth of his own heart that he could ever be thoroughly certain of the
+purity of his moral purpose and the sincerity of his mind even in
+one single action, although he has no doubt about the legality of
+it. Nay, often the weakness which deters a man from the risk of a
+crime is regarded by him as virtue (which gives the notion of
+strength). And how many there are who may have led a long blameless
+life, who are only fortunate in having escaped so many temptations.
+How much of the element of pure morality in their mental disposition
+may have belonged to each deed remains hidden even from themselves.
+
+Accordingly, this duty to estimate the worth of one's actions not
+merely by their legality, but also by their morality (mental
+disposition), is only of indeterminate obligation; the law does not
+command this internal action in the human mind itself, but only the
+maxim of the action, namely, that we should strive with all our
+power that for all dutiful actions the thought of duty should be of
+itself an adequate spring.
+
+(2) HAPPINESS OF OTHERS as an end which is also a duty
+
+                                              {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 80}
+
+(a) Physical Welfare. Benevolent wishes may be unlimited, for they
+do not imply doing anything. But the case is more difficult with
+benevolent action, especially when this is to be done, not from
+friendly inclination (love) to others, but from duty, at the expense
+of the sacrifice and mortification of many of our appetites. That this
+beneficence is a duty results from this: that since our self-love
+cannot be separated from the need to be loved by others (to obtain
+help from them in case of necessity), we therefore make ourselves an
+end for others; and this maxim can never be obligatory except by
+having the specific character of a universal law, and consequently
+by means of a will that we should also make others our ends. Hence the
+happiness of others is an end that is also a duty.
+
+I am only bound then to sacrifice to others a part of my welfare
+without hope of recompense: because it is my duty, and it is
+impossible to assign definite limits how far that may go. Much depends
+on what would be the true want of each according to his own
+feelings, and it must be left to each to determine this for himself.
+For that one should sacrifice his own happiness, his true wants, in
+order to promote that of others, would be a self-contradictory maxim
+if made a universal law. This duty, therefore, is only
+indeterminate; it has a certain latitude within which one may do
+more or less without our being able to assign its limits definitely.
+The law holds only for the maxims, not for definite actions.
+
+(b) Moral well-being of others (salus moralis) also belongs to
+the happiness of others, which it is our duty to promote, but only a
+negative duty. The pain that a man feels from remorse of conscience,
+although its origin is moral, is yet in its operation physical, like
+grief, fear, and every other diseased condition. To take care that
+he should not be deservedly smitten by this inward reproach is not
+indeed my duty but his business; nevertheless, it is my duty to do
+nothing which by the nature of man might seduce him to that for
+which his conscience may hereafter torment him, that is, it is my duty
+not to give him occasion of stumbling. But there are no definite
+limits within which this care for the moral satisfaction of others
+must be kept; therefore it involves only an indeterminate obligation.
+
+
+
+
+
+IX. What is a Duty of Virtue?
+
+                                              {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 85}
+
+
+
+Virtue is the strength of the man's maxim in his obedience to
+duty. All strength is known only by the obstacles that it can
+overcome; and in the case of virtue the obstacles are the natural
+inclinations which may come into conflict with the moral purpose;
+and as it is the man who himself puts these obstacles in the way of
+his maxims, hence virtue is not merely a self-constraint (for that
+might be an effort of one inclination to constrain another), but is
+also a constraint according to a principle of inward freedom, and
+therefore by the mere idea of duty, according to its formal law.
+
+All duties involve a notion of necessitation by the law, and ethical
+duties involve a necessitation for which only an internal
+legislation is possible; juridical duties, on the other hand, one
+for which external legislation also is possible. Both, therefore,
+include the notion of constraint, either self-constraint or constraint
+by others. The moral power of the former is virtue, and the action
+springing from such a disposition (from reverence for the law) may
+be called a virtuous action (ethical), although the law expresses a
+juridical duty. For it is the doctrine of virtue that commands us to
+regard the rights of men as holy.
+
+But it does not follow that everything the doing of which is virtue,
+is, properly speaking, a duty of virtue. The former may concern merely
+the form of the maxims; the latter applies to the matter of them,
+namely, to an end which is also conceived as duty. Now, as the ethical
+obligation to ends, of which there may be many, is only indeterminate,
+because it contains only a law for the maxim of actions, and the end
+is the matter (object) of elective will; hence there are many
+duties, differing according to the difference of lawful ends, which
+may be called duties of virtue (officia honestatis), just because they
+are subject only to free self-constraint, not to the constraint of
+other men, and determine the end which is also a duty.
+
+Virtue, being a coincidence of the rational will, with every duty
+firmly settled in the character, is, like everything formal, only
+one and the same. But, as regards the end of actions, which is also
+duty, that is, as regards the matter which one ought to make an end,
+there may be several virtues; and as the obligation to its maxim is
+called a duty of virtue, it follows that there are also several duties
+of virtue.
+
+                                              {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 90}
+
+The supreme principle of ethics (the doctrine of virtue) is: "Act on
+a maxim, the ends of which are such as it might be a universal law for
+everyone to have." On this principle a man is an end to himself as
+well as others, and it is not enough that he is not permitted to use
+either himself or others merely as means (which would imply that be
+might be indifferent to them), but it is in itself a duty of every man
+to make mankind in general his end.
+
+The principle of ethics being a categorical imperative does not
+admit of proof, but it admits of a justification from principles of
+pure practical reason. Whatever in relation to mankind, to oneself,
+and others, can be an end, that is an end for pure practical reason:
+for this is a faculty of assigning ends in general; and to be
+indifferent to them, that is, to take no interest in them, is a
+contradiction; since in that case it would not determine the maxims of
+actions (which always involve an end), and consequently would cease to
+be practical reasons. Pure reason, however, cannot command any ends
+a priori, except so far as it declares the same to be also a duty,
+which duty is then called a duty of virtue.
+
+
+
+
+
+X. The Supreme Principle of Jurisprudence was Analytical; that of
+
+                   Ethics is Synthetical
+
+                                              {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 95}
+
+
+
+That external constraint, so far as it withstands that which hinders
+the external freedom that agrees with general laws (as an obstacle
+of the obstacle thereto), can be consistent with ends generally, is
+clear on the principle of contradiction, and I need not go beyond
+the notion of freedom in order to see it, let the end which each may
+be what he will. Accordingly, the supreme principle of jurisprudence
+is an analytical principle. On the contrary the principle of ethics
+goes beyond the notion of external freedom and, by general laws,
+connects further with it an end which it makes a duty. This principle,
+therefore, is synthetic. The possibility of it is contained in the
+Deduction (Sec. ix.).
+
+This enlargement of the notion of duty beyond that of external
+freedom and of its limitation by the merely formal condition of its
+constant harmony; this, I say, in which, instead of constraint from
+without, there is set up freedom within, the power of self-constraint,
+and that not by the help of other inclinations, but by pure
+practical reason (which scorns all such help), consists in this
+fact, which raises it above juridical duty; that by it ends are
+proposed from which jurisprudence altogether abstracts. In the case of
+the moral imperative, and the supposition of freedom which it
+necessarily involves, the law, the power (to fulfil it) and the
+rational will that determines the maxim, constitute all the elements
+that form the notion of juridical duty. But in the imperative, which
+commands the duty of virtue, there is added, besides the notion of
+self-constraint, that of an end; not one that we have, but that we
+ought to have, which, therefore, pure practical reason has in
+itself, whose highest, unconditional end (which, however, continues to
+be duty) consists in this: that virtue is its own end and, by
+deserving well of men, is also its own reward. Herein it shines so
+brightly as an ideal to human perceptions, it seems to cast in the
+shade even holiness itself, which is never tempted to
+transgression. * This, however, is an illusion arising from the fact
+that as we have no measure for the degree of strength, except the
+greatness of the obstacles which might have been overcome (which in
+our case are the inclinations), we are led to mistake the subjective
+conditions of estimation of a magnitude for the objective conditions
+of the magnitude itself. But when compared with human ends, all of
+which have their obstacles to be overcome, it is true that the worth
+of virtue itself, which is its own end, far outweighs the worth of all
+the utility and all the empirical ends and advantages which it may
+have as consequences.
+
+
+
+* So that one might vary two well-known lines of Haller thus:
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 100}
+
+  With all his failings, man is still
+
+  Better than angels void of will.
+
+
+
+We may, indeed, say that man is obliged to virtue (as a moral
+strength). For although the power (facultas) to overcome all
+imposing sensible impulses by virtue of his freedom can and must be
+presupposed, yet this power regarded as strength (robur) is
+something that must be acquired by the moral spring (the idea of the
+law) being elevated by contemplation of the dignity of the pure law of
+reason in us, and at the same time also by exercise.
+
+
+
+
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 105}
+
+XI. According to the preceding Principles, the Scheme of Duties of
+
+                Virtue may be thus exhibited
+
+
+
+     The Material Element of the Duty of Virtue
+
+
+
+
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 110}
+
+             1                              2
+
+  Internal Duty of Virtue       External Virtue of Duty
+
+
+
+      My Own End,                  The End of Others,
+
+      which is also my             the promotion of
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 115}
+
+      Duty                         which is also my
+
+                                   Duty
+
+
+
+      (My own                      (The Happiness
+
+      Perfection)                  of Others)
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 120}
+
+
+
+             3                              4
+
+      The Law which is             The End which is
+
+      also Spring                  also Spring
+
+
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 125}
+
+      On which the                 On which the
+
+      Morality                     Legality
+
+
+
+       of every free determination of will rests
+
+
+
+
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 130}
+
+  The Formal Element of the Duty of Virtue.
+
+
+
+
+
+XII. Preliminary Notions of the Susceptibility of the Mind for
+
+               Notions of Duty generally
+
+
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 135}
+
+These are such moral qualities as, when a man does not possess them,
+he is not bound to acquire them. They are: the moral feeling,
+conscience, love of one's neighbour, and respect for ourselves
+(self-esteem). There is no obligation to have these, since they are
+subjective conditions of susceptibility for the notion of duty, not
+objective conditions of morality. They are all sensitive and
+antecedent, but natural capacities of mind (praedispositio) to be
+affected by notions of duty; capacities which it cannot be regarded as
+a duty to have, but which every man has, and by virtue of which he can
+be brought under obligation. The consciousness of them is not of
+empirical origin, but can only follow on that of a moral law, as an
+effect of the same on the mind.
+
+
+
+                  A. THE MORAL FEELING
+
+
+
+This is the susceptibility for pleasure or displeasure, merely
+from the consciousness of the agreement or disagreement of our
+action with the law of duty. Now, every determination of the
+elective will proceeds from the idea of the possible action through
+the feeling of pleasure or displeasure in taking an interest in it
+or its effect to the deed; and here the sensitive state (the affection
+of the internal sense) is either a pathological or a moral feeling.
+The former is the feeling that precedes the idea of the law, the
+latter that which may follow it.
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 140}
+
+Now it cannot be a duty to have a moral feeling, or to acquire it;
+for all consciousness of obligation supposes this feeling in order
+that one may become conscious of the necessitation that lies in the
+notion of duty; but every man (as a moral being) has it originally
+in himself; the obligation, then, can only extend to the cultivation
+of it and the strengthening of it even by admiration of its
+inscrutable origin; and this is effected by showing how it is just, by
+the mere conception of reason, that it is excited most strongly, in
+its own purity and apart from every pathological stimulus; and it is
+improper to call this feeling a moral sense; for the word sense
+generally means a theoretical power of perception directed to an
+object; whereas the moral feeling (like pleasure and displeasure in
+general) is something merely subjective, which supplies no
+knowledge. No man is wholly destitute of moral feeling, for if he were
+totally unsusceptible of this sensation he would be morally dead; and,
+to speak in the language of physicians, if the moral vital force could
+no longer produce any effect on this feeling, then his humanity
+would be dissolved (as it were by chemical laws) into mere animality
+and be irrevocably confounded with the mass of other physical
+beings. But we have no special sense for (moral) good and evil any
+more than for truth, although such expressions are often used; but
+we have a susceptibility of the free elective will for being moved
+by pure practical reason and its law; and it is this that we call
+the moral feeling.
+
+
+
+                  B. OF CONSCIENCE
+
+
+
+Similarly, conscience is not a thing to be acquired, and it is not a
+duty to acquire it; but every man, as a moral being, has it originally
+within him. To be bound to have a conscience would be as much as to
+say to be under a duty to recognize duties. For conscience is
+practical reason which, in every case of law, holds before a man his
+duty for acquittal or condemnation; consequently it does not refer
+to an object, but only to the subject (affecting the moral feeling
+by its own act); so that it is an inevitable fact, not an obligation
+and duty. When, therefore, it is said, "This man has no conscience,"
+what is meant is that he pays no heed to its dictates. For if he
+really had none, he would not take credit to himself for anything done
+according to duty, nor reproach himself with violation of duty, and
+therefore he would be unable even to conceive the duty of having a
+conscience.
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 145}
+
+I pass by the manifold subdivisions of conscience, and only
+observe what follows from what has just been said, namely, that
+there is no such thing as an erring conscience. No doubt it is
+possible sometimes to err in the objective judgement whether something
+is a duty or not; but I cannot err in the subjective whether I have
+compared it with my practical (here judicially acting) reason for
+the purpose of that judgement: for if I erred I would not have
+exercised practical judgement at all, and in that case there is
+neither truth nor error. Unconscientiousness is not want of
+conscience, but the propensity not to heed its judgement. But when a
+man is conscious of having acted according to his conscience, then, as
+far as regards guilt or innocence, nothing more can be required of
+him, only he is bound to enlighten his understanding as to what is
+duty or not; but when it comes or has come to action, then
+conscience speaks involuntarily and inevitably. To act conscientiously
+can, therefore, not be a duty, since otherwise it would be necessary
+to have a second conscience, in order to be conscious of the act of
+the first.
+
+The duty here is only to cultivate our conscience, to quicken
+our attention to the voice of the internal judge, and to use all means
+to secure obedience to it, and is thus our indirect duty.
+
+
+
+                  C. OF LOVE TO MEN
+
+
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 150}
+
+Love is a matter of feeling, not of will or volition, and I cannot
+love because I will to do so, still less because I ought (I cannot
+be necessitated to love); hence there is no such thing as a duty to
+love. Benevolence, however (amor benevolentiae), as a mode of
+action, may be subject to a law of duty. Disinterested benevolence
+is often called (though very improperly) love; even where the
+happiness of the other is not concerned, but the complete and free
+surrender of all one's own ends to the ends of another (even a
+superhuman) being, love is spoken of as being also our duty. But all
+duty is necessitation or constraint, although it may be
+self-constraint according to a law. But what is done from constraint
+is not done from love.
+
+It is a duty to do good to other men according to our power, whether
+we love them or not, and this duty loses nothing of its weight,
+although we must make the sad remark that our species, alas! is not
+such as to be found particularly worthy of love when we know it more
+closely. Hatred of men, however, is always hateful: even though
+without any active hostility it consists only in complete aversion
+from mankind (the solitary misanthropy). For benevolence still remains
+a duty even towards the manhater, whom one cannot love, but to whom we
+can show kindness.
+
+To hate vice in men is neither duty nor against duty, but a mere
+feeling of horror of vice, the will having no influence on the feeling
+nor the feeling on the will. Beneficence is a duty. He who often
+practises this, and sees his beneficent purpose succeed, comes at last
+really to love him whom he has benefited. When, therefore, it is said:
+"Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," this does not mean,
+"Thou shalt first of all love, and by means of this love (in the
+next place) do him good"; but: "Do good to thy neighbour, and this
+beneficence will produce in thee the love of men (as a settled habit
+of inclination to beneficence)."
+
+The love of complacency (amor complacentiae,) would therefore
+alone be direct. This is a pleasure immediately connected with the
+idea of the existence of an object, and to have a duty to this, that
+is, to be necessitated to find pleasure in a thing, is a
+contradiction.
+
+
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 155}
+
+                   D. OF RESPECT
+
+
+
+Respect (reverentia) is likewise something merely subjective; a
+feeling of a peculiar kind not a judgement about an object which it
+would be a duty to effect or to advance. For if considered as duty
+it could only be conceived as such by means of the respect which we
+have for it. To have a duty to this, therefore, would be as much as to
+say to be bound in duty to have a duty. When, therefore, it is said:
+"Man has a duty of self-esteem," this is improperly stated, and we
+ought rather to say: "The law within him inevitably forces from him
+respect for his own being, and this feeling (which is of a peculiar
+kind) is a basis of certain duties, that is, of certain actions
+which may be consistent with his duty to himself." But we cannot say
+that he has a duty of respect for himself; for he must have respect
+for the law within himself, in order to be able to conceive duty at
+all.
+
+
+
+
+
+XIII. General Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in the
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 160}
+
+             treatment of Pure Ethics
+
+
+
+First. A duty can have only a single ground of obligation; and if
+two or more proof of it are adduced, this is a certain mark that
+either no valid proof has yet been given, or that there are several
+distinct duties which have been regarded as one.
+
+For all moral proofs, being philosophical, can only be drawn by
+means of rational knowledge from concepts, not like mathematics,
+through the construction of concepts. The latter science admits a
+variety of proofs of one and the same theorem; because in intuition
+a priori there may be several properties of an object, all of which
+lead back to the very same principle. If, for instance, to prove the
+duty of veracity, an argument is drawn first from the harm that a
+lie causes to other men; another from the worthlessness of a liar
+and the violation of his own self-respect, what is proved in the
+former argument is a duty of benevolence, not of veracity, that is
+to say, not the duty which required to be proved, but a different one.
+Now, if, in giving a variety of proof for one and the same theorem, we
+flatter ourselves that the multitude of reasons will compensate the
+lack of weight in each taken separately, this is a very
+unphilosophical resource, since it betrays trickery and dishonesty;
+for several insufficient proofs placed beside one another do not
+produce certainty, nor even probability. They should advance as reason
+and consequence in a series, up to the sufficient reason, and it is
+only in this way that they can have the force of proof. Yet the former
+is the usual device of the rhetorician.
+
+Secondly. The difference between virtue and vice cannot be sought in
+the degree in which certain maxims are followed, but only in the
+specific quality of the maxims (their relation to the law). In other
+words, the vaunted principle of Aristotle, that virtue is the mean
+between two vices, is false. * For instance, suppose that good
+management is given as the mean between two vices, prodigality and
+avarice; then its origin as a virtue can neither be defined as the
+gradual diminution of the former vice (by saving), nor as the increase
+of the expenses of the miserly. These vices, in fact, cannot be viewed
+as if they, proceeding as it were in opposite directions, met together
+in good management; but each of them has its own maxim, which
+necessarily contradicts that of the other.
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 165}
+
+
+
+* The common classical formulae of ethics- medio tutissimus ibis;
+omne mimium vertitur in vitium; est modus in rebus, etc., medium
+tenuere beati; virtus est medium vitiorum et utrinque reductum-
+["You will go most safely in the middle" (Virgil); "Every excess
+develops into a vice"; "There is a mean in all things, etc." (Horace);
+"Happy they who steadily pursue a middle course"; "Virtue is the
+mean between two vices and equally removed from either" (Horace).]-
+contain a poor sort of wisdom, which has no definite principles; for
+this mean between two extremes, who will assign it for me? Avarice (as
+a vice) is not distinguished from frugality (as a virtue) by merely
+being the latter pushed too far; but has a quite different principle
+(maxim), namely placing the end of economy not in the enjoyment of
+one's means, but in the mere possession of them, renouncing enjoyment;
+just as the vice of prodigality is not to be sought in the excessive
+enjoyment of one's means, but in the bad maxim which makes the use
+of them, without regard to their maintenance, the sole end.
+
+
+
+For the same reason, no vice can be defined as an excess in the
+practice of certain actions beyond what is proper (e.g.,
+Prodigalitas est excessus in consumendis opibus); or, as a less
+exercise of them than is fitting (Avaritia est defectus, etc.). For
+since in this way the degree is left quite undefined, and the question
+whether conduct accords with duty or not, turns wholly on this, such
+an account is of no use as a definition.
+
+Thirdly. Ethical virtue must not be estimated by the power we
+attribute to man of fulfilling the law; but, conversely, the moral
+power must be estimated by the law, which commands categorically; not,
+therefore, by the empirical knowledge that we have of men as they are,
+but by the rational knowledge how, according to the ideas of humanity,
+they ought to be. These three maxims of the scientific treatment of
+ethics are opposed to the older apophthegms:
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 170}
+
+1. There is only one virtue and only one vice.
+
+2. Virtue is the observance of the mean path between two opposite
+vices.
+
+3. Virtue (like prudence) must be learned from experience.
+
+
+
+
+
+XIV. Of Virtue in General
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 175}
+
+
+
+Virtue signifies a moral strength of will. But this does not exhaust
+the notion; for such strength might also belong to a holy (superhuman)
+being, in whom no opposing impulse counteracts the law of his rational
+will; who therefore willingly does everything in accordance with the
+law. Virtue then is the moral strength of a man's will in his
+obedience to duty; and this is a moral necessitation by his own law
+giving reason, inasmuch as this constitutes itself a power executing
+the law. It is not itself a duty, nor is it a duty to possess it
+(otherwise we should be in duty bound to have a duty), but it
+commands, and accompanies its command with a moral constraint (one
+possible by laws of internal freedom). But since this should be
+irresistible, strength is requisite, and the degree of this strength
+can be estimated only by the magnitude of the hindrances which man
+creates for himself, by his inclinations. Vices, the brood of unlawful
+dispositions, are the monsters that he has to combat; wherefore this
+moral strength as fortitude (fortitudo moralis) constitutes the
+greatest and only true martial glory of man; it is also called the
+true wisdom, namely, the practical, because it makes the ultimate
+end of the existence of man on earth its own end. Its possession alone
+makes man free, healthy, rich, a king, etc., nor either chance or fate
+deprive him of this, since he possesses himself, and the virtuous
+cannot lose his virtue.
+
+All the encomiums bestowed on the ideal of humanity in its moral
+perfection can lose nothing of their practical reality by the examples
+of what men now are, have been, or will probably be hereafter;
+anthropology which proceeds from mere empirical knowledge cannot
+impair anthroponomy which is erected by the unconditionally
+legislating reason; and although virtue may now and then be called
+meritorious (in relation to men, not to the law), and be worthy of
+reward, yet in itself, as it is its own end, so also it must be
+regarded as its own reward.
+
+Virtue considered in its complete perfection is, therefore, regarded
+not as if man possessed virtue, but as if virtue possessed the man,
+since in the former case it would appear as though he had still had
+the choice (for which he would then require another virtue, in order
+to select virtue from all other wares offered to him). To conceive a
+plurality of virtues (as we unavoidably must) is nothing else but to
+conceive various moral objects to which the (rational) will is led
+by the single principle of virtue; and it is the same with the
+opposite vices. The expression which personifies both is a contrivance
+for affecting the sensibility, pointing, however, to a moral sense.
+Hence it follows that an aesthetic of morals is not a part, but a
+subjective exposition of the Metaphysic of Morals; in which the
+emotions that accompany the force of the moral law make the that force
+to be felt; for example: disgust, horror, etc., which gives a sensible
+moral aversion in order to gain the precedence from the merely
+sensible incitement.
+
+
+
+
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 180}
+
+XV. Of the Principle on which Ethics is separated from
+
+                   Jurisprudence
+
+
+
+This separation on which the subdivision of moral philosophy in
+general rests, is founded on this: that the notion of freedom, which
+is common to both, makes it necessary to divide duties into those of
+external and those of internal freedom; the latter of which alone
+are ethical. Hence this internal freedom which is the condition of all
+ethical duty must be discussed as a preliminary (discursus
+praeliminaris), just as above the doctrine of conscience was discussed
+as the condition of all duty.
+
+
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 185}
+
+                       REMARKS
+
+
+
+Of the Doctrine of Virtue on the Principle Of Internal Freedom.
+
+
+
+Habit (habitus) is a facility of action and a subjective
+perfection of the elective will. But not every such facility is a free
+habit (habitus libertatis); for if it is custom (assuetudo), that
+is, a uniformity of action which, by frequent repetition, has become a
+necessity, then it is not a habit proceeding from freedom, and
+therefore not a moral habit. Virtue therefore cannot be defined as a
+habit of free law-abiding actions, unless indeed we add "determining
+itself in its action by the idea of the law"; and then this habit is
+not a property of the elective will, but of the rational will, which
+is a faculty that in adopting a rule also declares it to be a
+universal law, and it is only such a habit that can be reckoned as
+virtue. Two things are required for internal freedom: to be master
+of oneself in a given case (animus sui compos) and to have command
+over oneself (imperium in semetipsum), that is to subdue his
+emotions and to govern his passions. With these conditions, the
+character (indoles) is noble (erecta); in the opposite case, it is
+ignoble (indoles abjecta serva).
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 190}
+
+
+
+
+
+XVI. Virtue requires, first of all, Command over Oneself
+
+
+
+Emotions and passions are essentially distinct; the former belong to
+feeling in so far as this coming before reflection makes it more
+difficult or even impossible. Hence emotion is called hasty (animus
+praeceps). And reason declares through the notion of virtue that a man
+should collect himself; but this weakness in the life of one's
+understanding, joined with the strength of a mental excitement, is
+only a lack of virtue (Untugend), and as it were a weak and childish
+thing, which may very well consist with the best will, and has further
+this one good thing in it, that this storm soon subsides. A propensity
+to emotion (e.g., resentment) is therefore not so closely related to
+vice as passion is. Passion, on the other hand, is the sensible
+appetite grown into a permanent inclination (e. g., hatred in contrast
+to resentment). The calmness with which one indulges it leaves room
+for reflection and allows the mind to frame principles thereon for
+itself; and thus when the inclination falls upon what contradicts
+the law, to brood on it, to allow it to root itself deeply, and
+thereby to take up evil (as of set purpose) into one's maxim; and this
+is then specifically evil, that is, it is a true vice.
+
+Virtue, therefore, in so far as it is based on internal freedom,
+contains a positive command for man, namely, that he should bring
+all his powers and inclinations under his rule (that of reason); and
+this is a positive precept of command over himself which is additional
+to the prohibition, namely, that he should not allow himself to be
+governed by his feelings and inclinations (the duty of apathy); since,
+unless reason takes the reins of government into its own hands, the
+feelings and inclinations play the master over the man.
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 195}
+
+
+
+
+
+XVII. Virtue necessarily presupposes Apathy (considered as
+
+                        Strength)
+
+
+
+This word (apathy) has come into bad repute, just as if it meant
+want of feeling, and therefore subjective indifference with respect to
+the objects of the elective will; it is supposed to be a weakness.
+This misconception may be avoided by giving the name moral apathy to
+that want of emotion which is to be distinguished from indifference.
+In the former, the feelings arising from sensible impressions lose
+their influence on the moral feeling only because the respect for
+the law is more powerful than all of them together. It is only the
+apparent strength of a fever patient that makes even the lively
+sympathy with good rise to an emotion, or rather degenerate into it.
+Such an emotion is called enthusiasm, and it is with reference to this
+that we are to explain the moderation which is usually recommended
+in virtuous practices:
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 200}
+
+
+
+        Insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus uniqui
+
+        Ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam. *
+
+
+
+* Horace. ["Let the wise man bear the name of fool, and the just of
+unjust, if he pursue virtue herself beyond the proper bounds."]
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 205}
+
+
+
+For otherwise it is absurd to imagine that one could be too wise
+or too virtuous. The emotion always belongs to the sensibility, no
+matter by what sort of object it may be excited. The true strength
+of virtue is the mind at rest, with a firm, deliberate resolution to
+bring its law into practice. That is the state of health in the
+moral life; on the contrary, the emotion, even when it is excited by
+the idea of the good, is a momentary glitter which leaves exhaustion
+after it. We may apply the term fantastically virtuous to the man
+who will admit nothing to be indifferent in respect of morality
+(adiaphora), and who strews all his steps with duties, as with
+traps, and will not allow it to be indifferent whether a man eats fish
+or flesh, drink beer or wine, when both agree with him; a micrology
+which, if adopted into the doctrine of virtue, would make its rule a
+tyranny.
+
+
+
+                       REMARK
+
+
+
+                                             {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 210}
+
+Virtue is always in progress, and yet always begins from the
+beginning. The former follows from the fact that, objectively
+considered, it is an ideal and unattainable, and yet it is a duty
+constantly to approximate to it. The second is founded subjectively on
+the nature of man which is affected by inclinations, under the
+influence of which virtue, with its maxims adopted once for all, can
+never settle in a position of rest; but, if it is not rising,
+inevitably falls; because moral maxims cannot, like technical, be
+based on custom (for this belongs to the physical character of the
+determination of will); but even if the practice of them become a
+custom, the agent would thereby lose the freedom in the choice of
+his maxims, which freedom is the character of an action done from
+duty.
+
+ON_CONSCIENCE
+
+                   ON CONSCIENCE
+
+
+
+The consciousness of an internal tribunal in man (before which
+"his thoughts accuse or excuse one another") is CONSCIENCE.
+
+Every man has a conscience, and finds himself observed by an
+inward judge which threatens and keeps him in awe (reverence
+combined with fear); and this power which watches over the laws within
+him is not something which he himself (arbitrarily) makes, but it is
+incorporated in his being. It follows him like his shadow, when he
+thinks to escape. He may indeed stupefy himself with pleasures and
+distractions, but cannot avoid now and then coming to himself or
+awaking, and then he at once perceives its awful voice. In his
+utmost depravity, he may, indeed, pay no attention to it, but he
+cannot avoid hearing it.
+
+Now this original intellectual and (as a conception of duty) moral
+capacity, called conscience, has this peculiarity in it, that although
+its business is a business of man with himself, yet he finds himself
+compelled by his reason to transact it as if at the command of another
+person. For the transaction here is the conduct of a trial (causa)
+before a tribunal. But that he who is accused by his conscience should
+be conceived as one and the same person with the judge is an absurd
+conception of a judicial court; for then the complainant would
+always lose his case. Therefore, in all duties the conscience of the
+man must regard another than himself as the judge of his actions, if
+it is to avoid self-contradiction. Now this other may be an actual
+or a merely ideal person which reason frames to itself. Such an
+idealized person (the authorized judge of conscience) must be one
+who knows the heart; for the tribunal is set up in the inward part
+of man; at the same time he must also be all-obliging, that is, must
+be or be conceived as a person in respect of whom all duties are to be
+regarded as his commands; since conscience is the inward judge of
+all free actions. Now, since such a moral being must at the same
+time possess all power (in heaven and earth), since otherwise he could
+not give his commands their proper effect (which the office of judge
+necessarily requires), and since such a moral being possessing power
+over all is called GOD, hence conscience must be conceived as the
+subjective principle of a responsibility for one's deeds before God;
+nay, this latter concept is contained (though it be only obscurely) in
+every moral self-consciousness.
+
+
+                             THE END
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
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+Immanuel Kant
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