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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/5684-h.zip b/5684-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..9d1f5a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/5684-h.zip diff --git a/5684-h/5684-h.htm b/5684-h/5684-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a774cf --- /dev/null +++ b/5684-h/5684-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,2379 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="us-ascii"?> + +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd" > + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <meta content="pg2html (binary v0.17)" name="linkgenerator" /> + <title> + The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, by Immanuel Kant + </title> + + <style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + body { margin:5%; background:#faebd0; text-align:justify} + P { text-indent: 1em; margin-top: .75em; margin-bottom: .75em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; } + hr { width: 50%; text-align: center;} + .foot { margin-left: 5%; margin-right: 5%; text-align: justify; font-size: 80%; font-style: italic;} + blockquote {font-size: 97%; font-style: italic; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .mynote {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;} + .toc { margin-left: 10%; margin-bottom: .75em;} + .toc2 { margin-left: 20%;} + .xx-small {font-size: 60%;} + .x-small {font-size: 75%;} + .small {font-size: 85%;} + .large {font-size: 115%;} + .x-large {font-size: 130%;} + .indent5 { margin-left: 5%;} + .indent10 { margin-left: 10%;} + .indent15 { margin-left: 15%;} + .indent20 { margin-left: 20%;} + .indent25 { margin-left: 25%;} + .indent30 { margin-left: 30%;} + .indent35 { margin-left: 35%;} + .indent40 { margin-left: 40%;} + div.fig { display:block; margin:0 auto; text-align:center; } + div.middle { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; } + .figleft {float: left; margin-left: 0%; margin-right: 1%;} + .figright {float: right; margin-right: 0%; margin-left: 1%;} + .pagenum {position: absolute; right: 1%; font-size: 0.6em; + font-variant: normal; font-style: normal; + text-align: right; background-color: #FFFACD; + border: 1px solid; padding: 0.3em;text-indent: 0em;} + .side { float: left; font-size: 75%; width: 25%; padding-left: 0.8em; + border-left: dashed thin; text-align: left; + text-indent: 0; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; + font-weight: bold; color: black; background: #eeeeee; border: solid 1px;} + .head { float: left; font-size: 90%; width: 98%; padding-left: 0.8em; + border-left: dashed thin; text-align: center; + text-indent: 0; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; + font-weight: bold; color: black; background: #eeeeee; border: solid 1px;} + p.pfirst, p.noindent {text-indent: 0} + span.dropcap { float: left; margin: 0 0.1em 0 0; line-height: 0.8 } + pre { font-style: italic; font-size: 100%; margin-left: 10%;} +</style> + </head> + <body> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> +Project Gutenberg's The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, by Immanuel Kant + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license + + +Title: The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics + +Author: Immanuel Kant + +Posting Date: August 4, 2013 [EBook #5684] +Release Date: May, 2004 +Last Updated: December 10, 2018 + + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS *** + + + + +Etext produced by Matthew Stapleton. + +HTML file produced by David Widger + + + + + +</pre> + <div style="height: 8em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h1> + THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS + </h1> + <h2> + By Immanuel Kant + </h2> + <h3> + 1780 + </h3> + <h4> + Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott + </h4> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <p> + <b>CONTENTS</b> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_PREF"> PREFACE </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_INTR"> <b>INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF + ETHICS</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0003"> I. Exposition of the Conception of Ethics </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0004"> II. Exposition of the Notion of an End which is + also a Duty </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0005"> REMARK </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0007"> III. Of the Reason for conceiving an End which + is also a Duty </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0008"> IV. What are the Ends which are also Duties? + </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0009"> V. Explanation of these two Notions </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0010"> A. OUR OWN PERFECTION </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0011"> B. HAPPINESS OF OTHERS </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0012"> VI. Ethics does not supply Laws for Actions + (which is done by Jurisprudence), but only for the Maxims of Action </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0013"> VII. Ethical Duties are of indeterminate, + Juridical Duties of strict, Obligation </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0014"> VIII. Exposition of the Duties of Virtue as + Intermediate Duties </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0015"> (1) OUR OWN PERFECTION as an end which is also a + duty </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0016"> (2) HAPPINESS OF OTHERS as an end which is also + a duty </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0017"> IX. What is a Duty of Virtue? </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0018"> X. The Supreme Principle of Jurisprudence was + Analytical; that of Ethics is Synthetical </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0019"> XI. According to the preceding Principles, the + Scheme of Duties of Virtue may be thus exhibited </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0020"> XII. Preliminary Notions of the Susceptibility + of the Mind for Notions of Duty generally </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0021"> A. THE MORAL FEELING </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0022"> B. OF CONSCIENCE </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0023"> C. OF LOVE TO MEN </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0024"> XIII. General Principles of the Metaphysics of + Morals in the treatment of Pure Ethics </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0025"> XIV. Of Virtue in General </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0026"> XV. Of the Principle on which Ethics is + separated from Jurisprudence </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0027"> REMARKS </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0028"> Of the Doctrine of Virtue on the Principle Of + Internal Freedom. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0029"> XVI. Virtue requires, first of all, Command over + Oneself </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0030"> XVII. Virtue necessarily presupposes Apathy + (considered as Strength) </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0031"> REMARK </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0032"> <b>ON CONSCIENCE</b> </a> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_PREF" id="link2H_PREF"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + PREFACE + </h2> + <p> + If there exists on any subject a philosophy (that is, a system of rational + knowledge based on concepts), then there must also be for this philosophy + a system of pure rational concepts, independent of any condition of + intuition, in other words, a metaphysic. It may be asked whether + metaphysical elements are required also for every practical philosophy, + which is the doctrine of duties, and therefore also for Ethics, in order + to be able to present it as a true science (systematically), not merely as + an aggregate of separate doctrines (fragmentarily). As regards pure + jurisprudence, no one will question this requirement; for it concerns only + what is formal in the elective will, which has to be limited in its + external relations according to laws of freedom; without regarding any end + which is the matter of this will. Here, therefore, deontology is a mere + scientific doctrine (doctrina scientiae). * + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * One who is acquainted with practical philosophy is not, + therefore, a practical philosopher. The latter is he who + makes the rational end the principle of his actions, while + at the same time he joins with this the necessary knowledge + which, as it aims at action, must not be spun out into the + most subtile threads of metaphysic, unless a legal duty is + in question; in which case meum and tuum must be accurately + determined in the balance of justice, on the principle of + equality of action and action, which requires something like + mathematical proportion, but not in the case of a mere + ethical duty. For in this case the question is not only to + know what it is a duty to do (a thing which on account of + the ends that all men naturally have can be easily decided), + but the chief point is the inner principle of the will + namely that the consciousness of this duty be also the + spring of action, in order that we may be able to say of the + man who joins to his knowledge this principle of wisdom that + he is a practical philosopher. +</pre> + <p> + Now in this philosophy (of ethics) it seems contrary to the idea of it + that we should go back to metaphysical elements in order to make the + notion of duty purified from everything empirical (from every feeling) a + motive of action. For what sort of notion can we form of the mighty power + and herculean strength which would be sufficient to overcome the + vice-breeding inclinations, if Virtue is to borrow her "arms from the + armoury of metaphysics," which is a matter of speculation that only few + men can handle? Hence all ethical teaching in lecture rooms, pulpits, and + popular books, when it is decked out with fragments of metaphysics, + becomes ridiculous. But it is not, therefore, useless, much less + ridiculous, to trace in metaphysics the first principles of ethics; for it + is only as a philosopher that anyone can reach the first principles of + this conception of duty, otherwise we could not look for either certainty + or purity in the ethical teaching. To rely for this reason on a certain + feeling which, on account of the effect expected from it, is called moral, + may, perhaps, even satisfy the popular teacher, provided he desires as the + criterion of a moral duty to consider the problem: "If everyone in every + case made your maxim the universal law, how could this law be consistent + with itself?" But if it were merely feeling that made it our duty to take + this principle as a criterion, then this would not be dictated by reason, + but only adopted instinctively and therefore blindly. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 5</span> + </p> + <p> + But in fact, whatever men imagine, no moral principle is based on any + feeling, but such a principle is really nothing else than an obscurely + conceived metaphysic which inheres in every man's reasoning faculty; as + the teacher will easily find who tries to catechize his pupils in the + Socratic method about the imperative of duty and its application to the + moral judgement of his actions. The mode of stating it need not be always + metaphysical, and the language need not necessarily be scholastic, unless + the pupil is to be trained to be a philosopher. But the thought must go + back to the elements of metaphysics, without which we cannot expect any + certainty or purity, or even motive power in ethics. + </p> + <p> + If we deviate from this principle and begin from pathological, or purely + sensitive, or even moral feeling (from what is subjectively practical + instead of what is objective), that is, from the matter of the will, the + end, not from its form that is the law, in order from thence to determine + duties; then, certainly, there are no metaphysical elements of ethics, for + feeling by whatever it may be excited is always physical. But then ethical + teaching, whether in schools, or lecture-rooms, etc., is corrupted in its + source. For it is not a matter of indifference by what motives or means + one is led to a good purpose (the obedience to duty). However disgusting, + then, metaphysics may appear to those pretended philosophers who dogmatize + oracularly, or even brilliantly, about the doctrine of duty, it is, + nevertheless, an indispensable duty for those who oppose it to go back to + its principles even in ethics, and to begin by going to school on its + benches. + </p> + <p> + We may fairly wonder how, after all previous explanations of the + principles of duty, so far as it is derived from pure reason, it was still + possible to reduce it again to a doctrine of happiness; in such a way, + however, that a certain moral happiness not resting on empirical causes + was ultimately arrived at, a self-contradictory nonentity. In fact, when + the thinking man has conquered the temptations to vice, and is conscious + of having done his (often hard) duty, he finds himself in a state of peace + and satisfaction which may well be called happiness, in which virtue is + her own reward. Now, says the eudaemonist, this delight, this happiness, + is the real motive of his acting virtuously. The notion of duty, says be, + does not immediately determine his will; it is only by means of the + happiness in prospect that he is moved to his duty. Now, on the other + hand, since he can promise himself this reward of virtue only from the + consciousness of having done his duty, it is clear that the latter must + have preceded: that is, he must feel himself bound to do his duty before + he thinks, and without thinking, that happiness will be the consequence of + obedience to duty. He is thus involved in a circle in his assignment of + cause and effect. He can only hope to be happy if he is conscious of his + obedience to duty: and he can only be moved to obedience to duty if be + foresees that he will thereby become happy. But in this reasoning there is + also a contradiction. For, on the one side, he must obey his duty, without + asking what effect this will have on his happiness, consequently, from a + moral principle; on the other side, he can only recognize something as his + duty when he can reckon on happiness which will accrue to him thereby, and + consequently on a pathological principle, which is the direct opposite of + the former. + </p> + <p> + I have in another place (the Berlin Monatsschrift), reduced, as I believe, + to the simplest expressions the distinction between pathological and moral + pleasure. The pleasure, namely, which must precede the obedience to the + law in order that one may act according to the law is pathological, and + the process follows the physical order of nature; that which must be + preceded by the law in order that it may be felt is in the moral order. If + this distinction is not observed; if eudaemonism (the principle of + happiness) is adopted as the principle instead of eleutheronomy (the + principle of freedom of the inner legislation), the consequence is the + euthanasia (quiet death) of all morality. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 10</span> + </p> + <p> + The cause of these mistakes is no other than the following: Those who are + accustomed only to physiological explanations will not admit into their + heads the categorical imperative from which these laws dictatorially + proceed, notwithstanding that they feel themselves irresistibly forced by + it. Dissatisfied at not being able to explain what lies wholly beyond that + sphere, namely, freedom of the elective will, elevating as is this + privilege, that man has of being capable of such an idea, they are stirred + up by the proud claims of speculative reason, which feels its power so + strongly in the fields, just as if they were allies leagued in defence of + the omnipotence of theoretical reason and roused by a general call to arms + to resist that idea; and thus they are at present, and perhaps for a long + time to come, though ultimately in vain, to attack the moral concept of + freedom and if possible render it doubtful. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_INTR" id="link2H_INTR"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS + </h2> + <p> + Ethics in ancient times signified moral philosophy (philosophia moralis) + generally, which was also called the doctrine of duties. Subsequently it + was found advisable to confine this name to a part of moral philosophy, + namely, to the doctrine of duties which are not subject to external laws + (for which in German the name Tugendlehre was found suitable). Thus the + system of general deontology is divided into that of jurisprudence + (jurisprudentia), which is capable of external laws, and of ethics, which + is not thus capable, and we may let this division stand. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0003" id="link2H_4_0003"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + I. Exposition of the Conception of Ethics + </h2> + <p> + The notion of duty is in itself already the notion of a constraint of the + free elective will by the law; whether this constraint be an external one + or be self-constraint. The moral imperative, by its categorical (the + unconditional ought) announces this constraint, which therefore does not + apply to all rational beings (for there may also be holy beings), but + applies to men as rational physical beings who are unholy enough to be + seduced by pleasure to the transgression of the moral law, although they + themselves recognize its authority; and when they do obey it, to obey it + unwillingly (with resistance of their inclination); and it is in this that + the constraint properly consists. * Now, as man is a free (moral) being, + the notion of duty can contain only self-constraint (by the idea of the + law itself), when we look to the internal determination of the will (the + spring), for thus only is it possible to combine that constraint (even if + it were external) with the freedom of the elective will. The notion of + duty then must be an ethical one. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 5</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Man, however, as at the same time a moral being, when he + considers himself objectively, which he is qualified to do + by his pure practical reason, (i.e. according to humanity in + his own person), finds himself holy enough to transgress the + law only unwillingly; for there is no man so depraved who in + this transgression would not feel a resistance and an + abhorrence of himself, so that he must put a force on + himself. It is impossible to explain the phenomenon that at + this parting of the ways (where the beautiful fable places + Hercules between virtue and sensuality) man shows more + propensity to obey inclination than the law. For, we can + only explain what happens by tracing it to a cause according + to physical laws; but then we should not be able to conceive + the elective will as free. Now this mutually opposed self- + constraint and the inevitability of it makes us recognize + the incomprehensible property of freedom. +</pre> + <p> + The impulses of nature, then, contain hindrances to the fulfilment of duty + in the mind of man, and resisting forces, some of them powerful; and he + must judge himself able to combat these and to conquer them by means of + reason, not in the future, but in the present, simultaneously with the + thought; he must judge that he can do what the law unconditionally + commands that he ought. + </p> + <p> + Now the power and resolved purpose to resist a strong but unjust opponent + is called fortitude (fortitudo), and when concerned with the opponent of + the moral character within us, it is virtue (virtus, fortitudo moralis). + Accordingly, general deontology, in that part which brings not external, + but internal, freedom under laws is the doctrine of virtue. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 10</span> + </p> + <p> + Jurisprudence had to do only with the formal condition of external freedom + (the condition of consistency with itself, if its maxim became a universal + law), that is, with law. Ethics, on the contrary, supplies us with a + matter (an object of the free elective will), an end of pure reason which + is at the same time conceived as an objectively necessary end, i.e., as + duty for all men. For, as the sensible inclinations mislead us to ends + (which are the matter of the elective will) that may contradict duty, the + legislating reason cannot otherwise guard against their influence than by + an opposite moral end, which therefore must be given a priori + independently on inclination. + </p> + <p> + An end is an object of the elective will (of a rational being) by the idea + of which this will is determined to an action for the production of this + object. Now I may be forced by others to actions which are directed to an + end as means, but I cannot be forced to have an end; I can only make + something an end to myself. If, however, I am also bound to make something + which lies in the notions of practical reason an end to myself, and + therefore besides the formal determining principle of the elective will + (as contained in law) to have also a material principle, an end which can + be opposed to the end derived from sensible impulses; then this gives the + notion of an end which is in itself a duty. The doctrine of this cannot + belong to jurisprudence, but to ethics, since this alone includes in its + conception self-constraint according to moral laws. + </p> + <p> + For this reason, ethics may also be defined as the system of the ends of + the pure practical reason. The two parts of moral philosophy are + distinguished as treating respectively of ends and of duties of + constraint. That ethics contains duties to the observance of which one + cannot be (physically) forced by others, is merely the consequence of + this, that it is a doctrine of ends, since to be forced to have ends or to + set them before one's self is a contradiction. + </p> + <p> + Now that ethics is a doctrine of virtue (doctrina officiorum virtutis) + follows from the definition of virtue given above compared with the + obligation, the peculiarity of which has just been shown. There is in fact + no other determination of the elective will, except that to an end, which + in the very notion of it implies that I cannot even physically be forced + to it by the elective will of others. Another may indeed force me to do + something which is not my end (but only means to the end of another), but + he cannot force me to make it my own end, and yet I can have no end except + of my own making. The latter supposition would be a contradiction- an act + of freedom which yet at the same time would not be free. But there is no + contradiction in setting before one's self an end which is also a duty: + for in this case I constrain myself, and this is quite consistent with + freedom. * But how is such an end possible? That is now the question. For + the possibility of the notion of the thing (viz., that it is not + self-contradictory) is not enough to prove the possibility of the thing + itself (the objective reality of the notion). + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 15</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * The less a man can be physically forced, and the more he + can be morally forced (by the mere idea of duty), so much + the freer he is. The man, for example, who is of + sufficiently firm resolution and strong mind not to give up + an enjoyment which he has resolved on, however much loss is + shown as resulting therefrom, and who yet desists from his + purpose unhesitatingly, though very reluctantly, when he + finds that it would cause him to neglect an official duty or + a sick father; this man proves his freedom in the highest + degree by this very thing, that he cannot resist the voice + of duty. +</pre> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0004" id="link2H_4_0004"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + II. Exposition of the Notion of an End which is also a Duty + </h2> + <p> + We can conceive the relation of end to duty in two ways; either starting + from the end to find the maxim of the dutiful actions; or conversely, + setting out from this to find the end which is also duty. Jurisprudence + proceeds in the former way. It is left to everyone's free elective will + what end he will choose for his action. But its maxim is determined a + priori; namely, that the freedom of the agent must be consistent with the + freedom of every other according to a universal law. <span class="side">INTRODUCTION + ^paragraph 20</span> + </p> + <p> + Ethics, however, proceeds in the opposite way. It cannot start from the + ends which the man may propose to himself, and hence give directions as to + the maxims he should adopt, that is, as to his duty; for that would be to + take empirical principles of maxims, and these could not give any notion + of duty; since this, the categorical ought, has its root in pure reason + alone. Indeed, if the maxims were to be adopted in accordance with those + ends (which are all selfish), we could not properly speak of the notion of + duty at all. Hence in ethics the notion of duty must lead to ends, and + must on moral principles give the foundation of maxims with respect to the + ends which we ought to propose to ourselves. + </p> + <p> + Setting aside the question what sort of end that is which is in itself a + duty, and how such an end is possible, it is here only necessary to show + that a duty of this kind is called a duty of virtue, and why it is so + called. + </p> + <p> + To every duty corresponds a right of action (facultas moralis generatim), + but all duties do not imply a corresponding right (facultas juridica) of + another to compel anyone, but only the duties called legal duties. + Similarly to all ethical obligation corresponds the notion of virtue, but + it does not follow that all ethical duties are duties of virtue. Those, in + fact, are not so which do not concern so much a certain end (matter, + object of the elective will), but merely that which is formal in the moral + determination of the will (e.g., that the dutiful action must also be done + from duty). It is only an end which is also duty that can be called a duty + of virtue. Hence there are several of the latter kind (and thus there are + distinct virtues); on the contrary, there is only one duty of the former + kind, but it is one which is valid for all actions (only one virtuous + disposition). + </p> + <p> + The duty of virtue is essentially distinguished from the duty of justice + in this respect; that it is morally possible to be externally compelled to + the latter, whereas the former rests on free self-constraint only. For + finite holy beings (which cannot even be tempted to the violation of duty) + there is no doctrine of virtue, but only moral philosophy, the latter + being an autonomy of practical reason, whereas the former is also an + autocracy of it. That is, it includes a consciousness- not indeed + immediately perceived, but rightly concluded, from the moral categorical + imperative- of the power to become master of one's inclinations which + resist the law; so that human morality in its highest stage can yet be + nothing more than virtue; even if it were quite pure (perfectly free from + the influence of a spring foreign to duty), a state which is poetically + personified under the name of the wise man (as an ideal to which one + should continually approximate). + </p> + <p> + Virtue, however, is not to be defined and esteemed merely as habit, and + (as it is expressed in the prize essay of Cochius) as a long custom + acquired by practice of morally good actions. For, if this is not an + effect of well-resolved and firm principles ever more and more purified, + then, like any other mechanical arrangement brought about by technical + practical reason, it is neither armed for all circumstances nor adequately + secured against the change that may be wrought by new allurements. <span + class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 25</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0005" id="link2H_4_0005"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK + </h2> + <p> + To virtue = + a is opposed as its logical contradictory (contradictorie + oppositum) the negative lack of virtue (moral weakness) = 0; but vice = - + a is its contrary (contrarie s. realiter oppositum); and it is not merely + a needless question but an offensive one to ask whether great crimes do + not perhaps demand more strength of mind than great virtues. For by + strength of mind we understand the strength of purpose of a man, as a + being endowed with freedom, and consequently so far as he is master of + himself (in his senses) and therefore in a healthy condition of mind. But + great crimes are paroxysms, the very sight of which makes the man of + healthy mind shudder. The question would therefore be something like this: + whether a man in a fit of madness can have more physical strength than if + he is in his senses; and we may admit this without on that account + ascribing to him more strength of mind, if by mind we understand the vital + principle of man in the free use of his powers. For since those crimes + have their ground merely in the power of the inclinations that weaken + reason, which does not prove strength of mind, this question would be + nearly the same as the question whether a man in a fit of illness can show + more strength than in a healthy condition; and this may be directly + denied, since the want of health, which consists in the proper balance of + all the bodily forces of the man, is a weakness in the system of these + forces, by which system alone we can estimate absolute health. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0007" id="link2H_4_0007"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + III. Of the Reason for conceiving an End which is also a Duty + </h2> + <p> + An end is an object of the free elective will, the idea of which + determines this will to an action by which the object is produced. + Accordingly every action has its end, and as no one can have an end + without himself making the object of his elective will his end, hence to + have some end of actions is an act of the freedom of the agent, not an + affect of physical nature. Now, since this act which determines an end is + a practical principle which commands not the means (therefore not + conditionally) but the end itself (therefore unconditionally), hence it is + a categorical imperative of pure practical reason and one, therefore, + which combines a concept of duty with that of an end in general. + </p> + <p> + Now there must be such an end and a categorical imperative corresponding + to it. For since there are free actions, there must also be ends to which + as an object those actions are directed. Amongst these ends there must + also be some which are at the same time (that is, by their very notion) + duties. For if there were none such, then since no actions can be without + an end, all ends which practical reason might have would be valid only as + means to other ends, and a categorical imperative would be impossible; a + supposition which destroys all moral philosophy. + </p> + <p> + Here, therefore, we treat not of ends which man actually makes to himself + in accordance with the sensible impulses of his nature, but of objects of + the free elective will under its own laws- objects which he ought to make + his end. We may call the former technical (subjective), properly + pragmatical, including the rules of prudence in the choice of its ends; + but the latter we must call the moral (objective) doctrine of ends. This + distinction is, however, superfluous here, since moral philosophy already + by its very notion is clearly separated from the doctrine of physical + nature (in the present instance, anthropology). The latter resting on + empirical principles, whereas the moral doctrine of ends which treats of + duties rests on principles given a priori in pure practical reason. <span + class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 35</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0008" id="link2H_4_0008"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + IV. What are the Ends which are also Duties? + </h2> + <p> + They are: A. OUR OWN PERFECTION, B. HAPPINESS OF OTHERS. + </p> + <p> + We cannot invert these and make on one side our own happiness, and on the + other the perfection of others, ends which should be in themselves duties + for the same person. <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 40</span> + </p> + <p> + For one's own happiness is, no doubt, an end that all men have (by virtue + of the impulse of their nature), but this end cannot without contradiction + be regarded as a duty. What a man of himself inevitably wills does not + come under the notion of duty, for this is a constraint to an end + reluctantly adopted. It is, therefore, a contradiction to say that a man + is in duty bound to advance his own happiness with all his power. + </p> + <p> + It is likewise a contradiction to make the perfection of another my end, + and to regard myself as in duty bound to promote it. For it is just in + this that the perfection of another man as a person consists, namely, that + he is able of himself to set before him his own end according to his own + notions of duty; and it is a contradiction to require (to make it a duty + for me) that I should do something which no other but himself can do. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0009" id="link2H_4_0009"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + V. Explanation of these two Notions + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 45</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0010" id="link2H_4_0010"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + A. OUR OWN PERFECTION + </h2> + <p> + The word perfection is liable to many misconceptions. It is sometimes + understood as a notion belonging to transcendental philosophy; viz., the + notion of the totality of the manifold which taken together constitutes a + thing; sometimes, again, it is understood as belonging to teleology, so + that it signifies the correspondence of the properties of a thing to an + end. Perfection in the former sense might be called quantitative + (material), in the latter qualitative (formal) perfection. The former can + be one only, for the whole of what belongs to the one thing is one. But of + the latter there may be several in one thing; and it is of the latter + property that we here treat. + </p> + <p> + When it is said of the perfection that belongs to man generally (properly + speaking, to humanity), that it is in itself a duty to make this our end, + it must be placed in that which may be the effect of one's deed, not in + that which is merely an endowment for which we have to thank nature; for + otherwise it would not be duty. Consequently, it can be nothing else than + the cultivation of one's power (or natural capacity) and also of one's + will (moral disposition) to satisfy the requirement of duty in general. + The supreme element in the former (the power) is the understanding, it + being the faculty of concepts, and, therefore, also of those concepts + which refer to duty. First it is his duty to labour to raise himself out + of the rudeness of his nature, out of his animal nature more and more to + humanity, by which alone he is capable of setting before him ends to + supply the defects of his ignorance by instruction, and to correct his + errors; he is not merely counselled to do this by reason as technically + practical, with a view to his purposes of other kinds (as art), but + reason, as morally practical, absolutely commands him to do it, and makes + this end his duty, in order that he may be worthy of the humanity that + dwells in him. Secondly, to carry the cultivation of his will up to the + purest virtuous disposition, that, namely, in which the law is also the + spring of his dutiful actions, and to obey it from duty, for this is + internal morally practical perfection. This is called the moral sense (as + it were a special sense, sensus moralis), because it is a feeling of the + effect which the legislative will within himself exercises on the faculty + of acting accordingly. This is, indeed, often misused fanatically, as + though (like the genius of Socrates) it preceded reason, or even could + dispense with judgement of reason; but still it is a moral perfection, + making every special end, which is also a duty, one's own end. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 50</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0011" id="link2H_4_0011"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + B. HAPPINESS OF OTHERS + </h2> + <p> + It is inevitable for human nature that man a should wish and seek for + happiness, that is, satisfaction with his condition, with certainty of the + continuance of this satisfaction. But for this very reason it is not an + end that is also a duty. Some writers still make a distinction between + moral and physical happiness (the former consisting in satisfaction with + one's person and moral behaviour, that is, with what one does; the other + in satisfaction with that which nature confers, consequently with what one + enjoys as a foreign gift). Without at present censuring the misuse of the + word (which even involves a contradiction), it must be observed that the + feeling of the former belongs solely to the preceding head, namely, + perfection. For he who is to feel himself happy in the mere consciousness + of his uprightness already possesses that perfection which in the previous + section was defined as that end which is also duty. + </p> + <p> + If happiness, then, is in question, which it is to be my duty to promote + as my end, it must be the happiness of other men whose (permitted) end I + hereby make also mine. It still remains left to themselves to decide what + they shall reckon as belonging to their happiness; only that it is in my + power to decline many things which they so reckon, but which I do not so + regard, supposing that they have no right to demand it from me as their + own. A plausible objection often advanced against the division of duties + above adopted consists in setting over against that end a supposed + obligation to study my own (physical) happiness, and thus making this, + which is my natural and merely subjective end, my duty (and objective + end). This requires to be cleared up. + </p> + <p> + Adversity, pain, and want are great temptations to transgression of one's + duty; accordingly it would seem that strength, health, a competence, and + welfare generally, which are opposed to that influence, may also be + regarded as ends that are also duties; that is, that it is a duty to + promote our own happiness not merely to make that of others our end. But + in that case the end is not happiness but the morality of the agent; and + happiness is only the means of removing the hindrances to morality; + permitted means, since no one has a right to demand from me the sacrifice + of my not immoral ends. It is not directly a duty to seek a competence for + one's self; but indirectly it may be so; namely, in order to guard against + poverty which is a great temptation to vice. But then it is not my + happiness but my morality, to maintain which in its integrity is at once + my end and my duty. <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 55</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0012" id="link2H_4_0012"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VI. Ethics does not supply Laws for Actions (which is done by + Jurisprudence), but only for the Maxims of Action + </h2> + <p> + The notion of duty stands in immediate relation to a law (even though I + abstract from every end which is the matter of the law); as is shown by + the formal principle of duty in the categorical imperative: "Act so that + the maxims of thy action might become a universal law." But in ethics this + is conceived as the law of thy own will, not of will in general, which + might be that of others; for in the latter case it would give rise to a + judicial duty which does not belong to the domain of ethics. In ethics, + maxims are regarded as those subjective laws which merely have the + specific character of universal legislation, which is only a negative + principle (not to contradict a law in general). How, then, can there be + further a law for the maxims of actions? <span class="side">INTRODUCTION + ^paragraph 60</span> + </p> + <p> + It is the notion of an end which is also a duty, a notion peculiar to + ethics, that alone is the foundation of a law for the maxims of actions; + by making the subjective end (that which every one has) subordinate to the + objective end (that which every one ought to make his own). The + imperative: "Thou shalt make this or that thy end (e. g., the happiness of + others)" applies to the matter of the elective will (an object). Now since + no free action is possible, without the agent having in view in it some + end (as matter of his elective will), it follows that, if there is an end + which is also a duty, the maxims of actions which are means to ends must + contain only the condition of fitness for a possible universal + legislation: on the other hand, the end which is also a duty can make it a + law that we should have such a maxim, whilst for the maxim itself the + possibility of agreeing with a universal legislation is sufficient. + </p> + <p> + For maxims of actions may be arbitrary, and are only limited by the + condition of fitness for a universal legislation, which is the formal + principle of actions. But a law abolishes the arbitrary character of + actions, and is by this distinguished from recommendation (in which one + only desires to know the best means to an end). + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0013" id="link2H_4_0013"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VII. Ethical Duties are of indeterminate, Juridical Duties of strict, + Obligation + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 65</span> + </p> + <p> + This proposition is a consequence of the foregoing; for if the law can + only command the maxim of the actions, not the actions themselves, this is + a sign that it leaves in the observance of it a latitude (latitudo) for + the elective will; that is, it cannot definitely assign how and how much + we should do by the action towards the end which is also duty. But by an + indeterminate duty is not meant a permission to make exceptions from the + maxim of the actions, but only the permission to limit one maxim of duty + by another (e. g., the general love of our neighbour by the love of + parents); and this in fact enlarges the field for the practice of virtue. + The more indeterminate the duty, and the more imperfect accordingly the + obligation of the man to the action, and the closer he nevertheless brings + this maxim of obedience thereto (in his own mind) to the strict duty (of + justice), so much the more perfect is his virtuous action. + </p> + <p> + Hence it is only imperfect duties that are duties of virtue. The + fulfilment of them is merit (meritum) = + a; but their transgression is + not necessarily demerit (demeritum) = - a, but only moral unworth = o, + unless the agent made it a principle not to conform to those duties. The + strength of purpose in the former case is alone properly called virtue + [Tugend] (virtus); the weakness in the latter case is not vice (vitium), + but rather only lack of virtue [Untugend], a want of moral strength + (defectus moralis). (As the word Tugend is derived from taugen [to be good + for something], Untugend by its etymology signifies good for nothing.) + Every action contrary to duty is called transgression (peccatum). + Deliberate transgression which has become a principle is what properly + constitutes what is called vice (vitium). + </p> + <p> + Although the conformity of actions to justice (i.e., to be an upright man) + is nothing meritorious, yet the conformity of the maxim of such actions + regarded as duties, that is, reverence for justice is meritorious. For by + this the man makes the right of humanity or of men his own end, and + thereby enlarges his notion of duty beyond that of indebtedness (officium + debiti), since although another man by virtue of his rights can demand + that my actions shall conform to the law, he cannot demand that the law + shall also contain the spring of these actions. The same thing is true of + the general ethical command, "Act dutifully from a sense of duty." To fix + this disposition firmly in one's mind and to quicken it is, as in the + former case, meritorious, because it goes beyond the law of duty in + actions and makes the law in itself the spring. + </p> + <p> + But just for or reason, those duties also must be reckoned as of + indeterminate obligation, in respect of which there exists a subjective + principle which ethically rewards them; or to bring them as near as + possible to the notion of a strict obligation, a principle of + susceptibility of this reward according to the law of virtue; namely, a + moral pleasure which goes beyond mere satisfaction with oneself (which may + be merely negative), and of which it is proudly said that in this + consciousness virtue is its own reward. <span class="side">INTRODUCTION + ^paragraph 70</span> + </p> + <p> + When this merit is a merit of the man in respect of other men of promoting + their natural ends, which are recognized as such by all men (making their + happiness his own), we might call it the sweet merit, the consciousness of + which creates a moral enjoyment in which men are by sympathy inclined to + revel; whereas the bitter merit of promoting the true welfare of other + men, even though they should not recognize it as such (in the case of the + unthankful and ungrateful), has commonly no such reaction, but only + produces a satisfaction with one's self, although in the latter case this + would be even greater. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0014" id="link2H_4_0014"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VIII. Exposition of the Duties of Virtue as Intermediate Duties + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0015" id="link2H_4_0015"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + (1) OUR OWN PERFECTION as an end which is also a duty + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 75</span> + </p> + <p> + (a) Physical perfection; that is, cultivation of all our faculties + generally for the promotion of the ends set before us by reason. That this + is a duty, and therefore an end in itself, and that the effort to effect + this even without regard to the advantage that it secures us, is based, + not on a conditional (pragmatic), but an unconditional (moral) imperative, + may be seen from the following consideration. The power of proposing to + ourselves an end is the characteristic of humanity (as distinguished from + the brutes). With the end of humanity in our own person is therefore + combined the rational will, and consequently the duty of deserving well of + humanity by culture generally, by acquiring or advancing the power to + carry out all sorts of possible ends, so far as this power is to be found + in man; that is, it is a duty to cultivate the crude capacities of our + nature, since it is by that cultivation that the animal is raised to man, + therefore it is a duty in itself. + </p> + <p> + This duty, however, is merely ethical, that is, of indeterminate + obligation. No principle of reason prescribes how far one must go in this + effort (in enlarging or correcting his faculty of understanding, that is, + in acquisition of knowledge or technical capacity); and besides the + difference in the circumstances into which men may come makes the choice + of the kind of employment for which he should cultivate his talent very + arbitrary. Here, therefore, there is no law of reason for actions, but + only for the maxim of actions, viz.: "Cultivate thy faculties of mind and + body so as to be effective for all ends that may come in thy way, + uncertain which of them may become thy own." + </p> + <p> + (b) Cultivation of Morality in ourselves. The greatest moral perfection of + man is to do his duty, and that from duty (that the law be not only the + rule but also the spring of his actions). Now at first sight this seems to + be a strict obligation, and as if the principle of duty commanded not + merely the legality of every action, but also the morality, i.e., the + mental disposition, with the exactness and strictness of a law; but in + fact the law commands even here only the maxim of the action, namely, that + we should seek the ground of obligation, not in the sensible impulses + (advantage or disadvantage), but wholly in the law; so that the action + itself is not commanded. For it is not possible to man to see so far into + the depth of his own heart that he could ever be thoroughly certain of the + purity of his moral purpose and the sincerity of his mind even in one + single action, although he has no doubt about the legality of it. Nay, + often the weakness which deters a man from the risk of a crime is regarded + by him as virtue (which gives the notion of strength). And how many there + are who may have led a long blameless life, who are only fortunate in + having escaped so many temptations. How much of the element of pure + morality in their mental disposition may have belonged to each deed + remains hidden even from themselves. + </p> + <p> + Accordingly, this duty to estimate the worth of one's actions not merely + by their legality, but also by their morality (mental disposition), is + only of indeterminate obligation; the law does not command this internal + action in the human mind itself, but only the maxim of the action, namely, + that we should strive with all our power that for all dutiful actions the + thought of duty should be of itself an adequate spring. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0016" id="link2H_4_0016"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + (2) HAPPINESS OF OTHERS as an end which is also a duty + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 80</span> + </p> + <p> + (a) Physical Welfare. Benevolent wishes may be unlimited, for they do not + imply doing anything. But the case is more difficult with benevolent + action, especially when this is to be done, not from friendly inclination + (love) to others, but from duty, at the expense of the sacrifice and + mortification of many of our appetites. That this beneficence is a duty + results from this: that since our self-love cannot be separated from the + need to be loved by others (to obtain help from them in case of + necessity), we therefore make ourselves an end for others; and this maxim + can never be obligatory except by having the specific character of a + universal law, and consequently by means of a will that we should also + make others our ends. Hence the happiness of others is an end that is also + a duty. + </p> + <p> + I am only bound then to sacrifice to others a part of my welfare without + hope of recompense: because it is my duty, and it is impossible to assign + definite limits how far that may go. Much depends on what would be the + true want of each according to his own feelings, and it must be left to + each to determine this for himself. For that one should sacrifice his own + happiness, his true wants, in order to promote that of others, would be a + self-contradictory maxim if made a universal law. This duty, therefore, is + only indeterminate; it has a certain latitude within which one may do more + or less without our being able to assign its limits definitely. The law + holds only for the maxims, not for definite actions. + </p> + <p> + (b) Moral well-being of others (salus moralis) also belongs to the + happiness of others, which it is our duty to promote, but only a negative + duty. The pain that a man feels from remorse of conscience, although its + origin is moral, is yet in its operation physical, like grief, fear, and + every other diseased condition. To take care that he should not be + deservedly smitten by this inward reproach is not indeed my duty but his + business; nevertheless, it is my duty to do nothing which by the nature of + man might seduce him to that for which his conscience may hereafter + torment him, that is, it is my duty not to give him occasion of stumbling. + But there are no definite limits within which this care for the moral + satisfaction of others must be kept; therefore it involves only an + indeterminate obligation. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0017" id="link2H_4_0017"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + IX. What is a Duty of Virtue? + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 85</span> + </p> + <p> + Virtue is the strength of the man's maxim in his obedience to duty. All + strength is known only by the obstacles that it can overcome; and in the + case of virtue the obstacles are the natural inclinations which may come + into conflict with the moral purpose; and as it is the man who himself + puts these obstacles in the way of his maxims, hence virtue is not merely + a self-constraint (for that might be an effort of one inclination to + constrain another), but is also a constraint according to a principle of + inward freedom, and therefore by the mere idea of duty, according to its + formal law. + </p> + <p> + All duties involve a notion of necessitation by the law, and ethical + duties involve a necessitation for which only an internal legislation is + possible; juridical duties, on the other hand, one for which external + legislation also is possible. Both, therefore, include the notion of + constraint, either self-constraint or constraint by others. The moral + power of the former is virtue, and the action springing from such a + disposition (from reverence for the law) may be called a virtuous action + (ethical), although the law expresses a juridical duty. For it is the + doctrine of virtue that commands us to regard the rights of men as holy. + </p> + <p> + But it does not follow that everything the doing of which is virtue, is, + properly speaking, a duty of virtue. The former may concern merely the + form of the maxims; the latter applies to the matter of them, namely, to + an end which is also conceived as duty. Now, as the ethical obligation to + ends, of which there may be many, is only indeterminate, because it + contains only a law for the maxim of actions, and the end is the matter + (object) of elective will; hence there are many duties, differing + according to the difference of lawful ends, which may be called duties of + virtue (officia honestatis), just because they are subject only to free + self-constraint, not to the constraint of other men, and determine the end + which is also a duty. + </p> + <p> + Virtue, being a coincidence of the rational will, with every duty firmly + settled in the character, is, like everything formal, only one and the + same. But, as regards the end of actions, which is also duty, that is, as + regards the matter which one ought to make an end, there may be several + virtues; and as the obligation to its maxim is called a duty of virtue, it + follows that there are also several duties of virtue. <span class="side">INTRODUCTION + ^paragraph 90</span> + </p> + <p> + The supreme principle of ethics (the doctrine of virtue) is: "Act on a + maxim, the ends of which are such as it might be a universal law for + everyone to have." On this principle a man is an end to himself as well as + others, and it is not enough that he is not permitted to use either + himself or others merely as means (which would imply that be might be + indifferent to them), but it is in itself a duty of every man to make + mankind in general his end. + </p> + <p> + The principle of ethics being a categorical imperative does not admit of + proof, but it admits of a justification from principles of pure practical + reason. Whatever in relation to mankind, to oneself, and others, can be an + end, that is an end for pure practical reason: for this is a faculty of + assigning ends in general; and to be indifferent to them, that is, to take + no interest in them, is a contradiction; since in that case it would not + determine the maxims of actions (which always involve an end), and + consequently would cease to be practical reasons. Pure reason, however, + cannot command any ends a priori, except so far as it declares the same to + be also a duty, which duty is then called a duty of virtue. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0018" id="link2H_4_0018"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + X. The Supreme Principle of Jurisprudence was Analytical; that of Ethics + is Synthetical + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 95</span> + </p> + <p> + That external constraint, so far as it withstands that which hinders the + external freedom that agrees with general laws (as an obstacle of the + obstacle thereto), can be consistent with ends generally, is clear on the + principle of contradiction, and I need not go beyond the notion of freedom + in order to see it, let the end which each may be what he will. + Accordingly, the supreme principle of jurisprudence is an analytical + principle. On the contrary the principle of ethics goes beyond the notion + of external freedom and, by general laws, connects further with it an end + which it makes a duty. This principle, therefore, is synthetic. The + possibility of it is contained in the Deduction (Sec. ix.). + </p> + <p> + This enlargement of the notion of duty beyond that of external freedom and + of its limitation by the merely formal condition of its constant harmony; + this, I say, in which, instead of constraint from without, there is set up + freedom within, the power of self-constraint, and that not by the help of + other inclinations, but by pure practical reason (which scorns all such + help), consists in this fact, which raises it above juridical duty; that + by it ends are proposed from which jurisprudence altogether abstracts. In + the case of the moral imperative, and the supposition of freedom which it + necessarily involves, the law, the power (to fulfil it) and the rational + will that determines the maxim, constitute all the elements that form the + notion of juridical duty. But in the imperative, which commands the duty + of virtue, there is added, besides the notion of self-constraint, that of + an end; not one that we have, but that we ought to have, which, therefore, + pure practical reason has in itself, whose highest, unconditional end + (which, however, continues to be duty) consists in this: that virtue is + its own end and, by deserving well of men, is also its own reward. Herein + it shines so brightly as an ideal to human perceptions, it seems to cast + in the shade even holiness itself, which is never tempted to + transgression. * This, however, is an illusion arising from the fact that + as we have no measure for the degree of strength, except the greatness of + the obstacles which might have been overcome (which in our case are the + inclinations), we are led to mistake the subjective conditions of + estimation of a magnitude for the objective conditions of the magnitude + itself. But when compared with human ends, all of which have their + obstacles to be overcome, it is true that the worth of virtue itself, + which is its own end, far outweighs the worth of all the utility and all + the empirical ends and advantages which it may have as consequences. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * So that one might vary two well-known lines of Haller + thus: +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 100</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + With all his failings, man is still + + Better than angels void of will. +</pre> + <p> + We may, indeed, say that man is obliged to virtue (as a moral strength). + For although the power (facultas) to overcome all imposing sensible + impulses by virtue of his freedom can and must be presupposed, yet this + power regarded as strength (robur) is something that must be acquired by + the moral spring (the idea of the law) being elevated by contemplation of + the dignity of the pure law of reason in us, and at the same time also by + exercise. <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 105</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0019" id="link2H_4_0019"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XI. According to the preceding Principles, the Scheme of Duties of Virtue + may be thus exhibited + </h2> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + The Material Element of the Duty of Virtue +<span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 110</span> + + 1 2 + + Internal Duty of Virtue External Virtue of Duty +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + My Own End, The End of Others, + + which is also my the promotion of +<span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 115</span> + + Duty which is also my + + Duty +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + (My own (The Happiness + + Perfection) of Others) +<span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 120</span> +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + 3 4 + + The Law which is The End which is + + also Spring also Spring +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 125</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + On which the On which the + + Morality Legality +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + of every free determination of will rests +<span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 130</span> + + The Formal Element of the Duty of Virtue. +</pre> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0020" id="link2H_4_0020"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XII. Preliminary Notions of the Susceptibility of the Mind for Notions of + Duty generally + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 135</span> + </p> + <p> + These are such moral qualities as, when a man does not possess them, he is + not bound to acquire them. They are: the moral feeling, conscience, love + of one's neighbour, and respect for ourselves (self-esteem). There is no + obligation to have these, since they are subjective conditions of + susceptibility for the notion of duty, not objective conditions of + morality. They are all sensitive and antecedent, but natural capacities of + mind (praedispositio) to be affected by notions of duty; capacities which + it cannot be regarded as a duty to have, but which every man has, and by + virtue of which he can be brought under obligation. The consciousness of + them is not of empirical origin, but can only follow on that of a moral + law, as an effect of the same on the mind. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0021" id="link2H_4_0021"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + A. THE MORAL FEELING + </h2> + <p> + This is the susceptibility for pleasure or displeasure, merely from the + consciousness of the agreement or disagreement of our action with the law + of duty. Now, every determination of the elective will proceeds from the + idea of the possible action through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure + in taking an interest in it or its effect to the deed; and here the + sensitive state (the affection of the internal sense) is either a + pathological or a moral feeling. The former is the feeling that precedes + the idea of the law, the latter that which may follow it. <span + class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 140</span> + </p> + <p> + Now it cannot be a duty to have a moral feeling, or to acquire it; for all + consciousness of obligation supposes this feeling in order that one may + become conscious of the necessitation that lies in the notion of duty; but + every man (as a moral being) has it originally in himself; the obligation, + then, can only extend to the cultivation of it and the strengthening of it + even by admiration of its inscrutable origin; and this is effected by + showing how it is just, by the mere conception of reason, that it is + excited most strongly, in its own purity and apart from every pathological + stimulus; and it is improper to call this feeling a moral sense; for the + word sense generally means a theoretical power of perception directed to + an object; whereas the moral feeling (like pleasure and displeasure in + general) is something merely subjective, which supplies no knowledge. No + man is wholly destitute of moral feeling, for if he were totally + unsusceptible of this sensation he would be morally dead; and, to speak in + the language of physicians, if the moral vital force could no longer + produce any effect on this feeling, then his humanity would be dissolved + (as it were by chemical laws) into mere animality and be irrevocably + confounded with the mass of other physical beings. But we have no special + sense for (moral) good and evil any more than for truth, although such + expressions are often used; but we have a susceptibility of the free + elective will for being moved by pure practical reason and its law; and it + is this that we call the moral feeling. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0022" id="link2H_4_0022"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + B. OF CONSCIENCE + </h2> + <p> + Similarly, conscience is not a thing to be acquired, and it is not a duty + to acquire it; but every man, as a moral being, has it originally within + him. To be bound to have a conscience would be as much as to say to be + under a duty to recognize duties. For conscience is practical reason + which, in every case of law, holds before a man his duty for acquittal or + condemnation; consequently it does not refer to an object, but only to the + subject (affecting the moral feeling by its own act); so that it is an + inevitable fact, not an obligation and duty. When, therefore, it is said, + "This man has no conscience," what is meant is that he pays no heed to its + dictates. For if he really had none, he would not take credit to himself + for anything done according to duty, nor reproach himself with violation + of duty, and therefore he would be unable even to conceive the duty of + having a conscience. <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 145</span> + </p> + <p> + I pass by the manifold subdivisions of conscience, and only observe what + follows from what has just been said, namely, that there is no such thing + as an erring conscience. No doubt it is possible sometimes to err in the + objective judgement whether something is a duty or not; but I cannot err + in the subjective whether I have compared it with my practical (here + judicially acting) reason for the purpose of that judgement: for if I + erred I would not have exercised practical judgement at all, and in that + case there is neither truth nor error. Unconscientiousness is not want of + conscience, but the propensity not to heed its judgement. But when a man + is conscious of having acted according to his conscience, then, as far as + regards guilt or innocence, nothing more can be required of him, only he + is bound to enlighten his understanding as to what is duty or not; but + when it comes or has come to action, then conscience speaks involuntarily + and inevitably. To act conscientiously can, therefore, not be a duty, + since otherwise it would be necessary to have a second conscience, in + order to be conscious of the act of the first. + </p> + <p> + The duty here is only to cultivate our conscience, to quicken our + attention to the voice of the internal judge, and to use all means to + secure obedience to it, and is thus our indirect duty. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0023" id="link2H_4_0023"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + C. OF LOVE TO MEN + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 150</span> + </p> + <p> + Love is a matter of feeling, not of will or volition, and I cannot love + because I will to do so, still less because I ought (I cannot be + necessitated to love); hence there is no such thing as a duty to love. + Benevolence, however (amor benevolentiae), as a mode of action, may be + subject to a law of duty. Disinterested benevolence is often called + (though very improperly) love; even where the happiness of the other is + not concerned, but the complete and free surrender of all one's own ends + to the ends of another (even a superhuman) being, love is spoken of as + being also our duty. But all duty is necessitation or constraint, although + it may be self-constraint according to a law. But what is done from + constraint is not done from love. + </p> + <p> + It is a duty to do good to other men according to our power, whether we + love them or not, and this duty loses nothing of its weight, although we + must make the sad remark that our species, alas! is not such as to be + found particularly worthy of love when we know it more closely. Hatred of + men, however, is always hateful: even though without any active hostility + it consists only in complete aversion from mankind (the solitary + misanthropy). For benevolence still remains a duty even towards the + manhater, whom one cannot love, but to whom we can show kindness. + </p> + <p> + To hate vice in men is neither duty nor against duty, but a mere feeling + of horror of vice, the will having no influence on the feeling nor the + feeling on the will. Beneficence is a duty. He who often practises this, + and sees his beneficent purpose succeed, comes at last really to love him + whom he has benefited. When, therefore, it is said: "Thou shalt love thy + neighbour as thyself," this does not mean, "Thou shalt first of all love, + and by means of this love (in the next place) do him good"; but: "Do good + to thy neighbour, and this beneficence will produce in thee the love of + men (as a settled habit of inclination to beneficence)." + </p> + <p> + The love of complacency (amor complacentiae,) would therefore alone be + direct. This is a pleasure immediately connected with the idea of the + existence of an object, and to have a duty to this, that is, to be + necessitated to find pleasure in a thing, is a contradiction. <span + class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 155</span> + </p> + <h3> + D. OF RESPECT + </h3> + <p> + Respect (reverentia) is likewise something merely subjective; a feeling of + a peculiar kind not a judgement about an object which it would be a duty + to effect or to advance. For if considered as duty it could only be + conceived as such by means of the respect which we have for it. To have a + duty to this, therefore, would be as much as to say to be bound in duty to + have a duty. When, therefore, it is said: "Man has a duty of self-esteem," + this is improperly stated, and we ought rather to say: "The law within him + inevitably forces from him respect for his own being, and this feeling + (which is of a peculiar kind) is a basis of certain duties, that is, of + certain actions which may be consistent with his duty to himself." But we + cannot say that he has a duty of respect for himself; for he must have + respect for the law within himself, in order to be able to conceive duty + at all. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0024" id="link2H_4_0024"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XIII. General Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in the treatment of + Pure Ethics + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 160</span> + </p> + <p> + First. A duty can have only a single ground of obligation; and if two or + more proof of it are adduced, this is a certain mark that either no valid + proof has yet been given, or that there are several distinct duties which + have been regarded as one. + </p> + <p> + For all moral proofs, being philosophical, can only be drawn by means of + rational knowledge from concepts, not like mathematics, through the + construction of concepts. The latter science admits a variety of proofs of + one and the same theorem; because in intuition a priori there may be + several properties of an object, all of which lead back to the very same + principle. If, for instance, to prove the duty of veracity, an argument is + drawn first from the harm that a lie causes to other men; another from the + worthlessness of a liar and the violation of his own self-respect, what is + proved in the former argument is a duty of benevolence, not of veracity, + that is to say, not the duty which required to be proved, but a different + one. Now, if, in giving a variety of proof for one and the same theorem, + we flatter ourselves that the multitude of reasons will compensate the + lack of weight in each taken separately, this is a very unphilosophical + resource, since it betrays trickery and dishonesty; for several + insufficient proofs placed beside one another do not produce certainty, + nor even probability. They should advance as reason and consequence in a + series, up to the sufficient reason, and it is only in this way that they + can have the force of proof. Yet the former is the usual device of the + rhetorician. + </p> + <p> + Secondly. The difference between virtue and vice cannot be sought in the + degree in which certain maxims are followed, but only in the specific + quality of the maxims (their relation to the law). In other words, the + vaunted principle of Aristotle, that virtue is the mean between two vices, + is false. * For instance, suppose that good management is given as the + mean between two vices, prodigality and avarice; then its origin as a + virtue can neither be defined as the gradual diminution of the former vice + (by saving), nor as the increase of the expenses of the miserly. These + vices, in fact, cannot be viewed as if they, proceeding as it were in + opposite directions, met together in good management; but each of them has + its own maxim, which necessarily contradicts that of the other. <span + class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 165</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * The common classical formulae of ethics- medio tutissimus + ibis; omne mimium vertitur in vitium; est modus in rebus, + etc., medium tenuere beati; virtus est medium vitiorum et + utrinque reductum-["You will go most safely in the middle" + (Virgil); "Every excess develops into a vice"; "There is a + mean in all things, etc." (Horace); "Happy they who steadily + pursue a middle course"; "Virtue is the mean between two + vices and equally removed from either" (Horace).]-contain a + poor sort of wisdom, which has no definite principles; for + this mean between two extremes, who will assign it for me? + Avarice (as a vice) is not distinguished from frugality (as + a virtue) by merely being the latter pushed too far; but has + a quite different principle (maxim), namely placing the end + of economy not in the enjoyment of one's means, but in the + mere possession of them, renouncing enjoyment; just as the + vice of prodigality is not to be sought in the excessive + enjoyment of one's means, but in the bad maxim which makes + the use of them, without regard to their maintenance, the + sole end. +</pre> + <p> + For the same reason, no vice can be defined as an excess in the practice + of certain actions beyond what is proper (e.g., Prodigalitas est excessus + in consumendis opibus); or, as a less exercise of them than is fitting + (Avaritia est defectus, etc.). For since in this way the degree is left + quite undefined, and the question whether conduct accords with duty or + not, turns wholly on this, such an account is of no use as a definition. + </p> + <p> + Thirdly. Ethical virtue must not be estimated by the power we attribute to + man of fulfilling the law; but, conversely, the moral power must be + estimated by the law, which commands categorically; not, therefore, by the + empirical knowledge that we have of men as they are, but by the rational + knowledge how, according to the ideas of humanity, they ought to be. These + three maxims of the scientific treatment of ethics are opposed to the + older apophthegms: <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 170</span> + </p> + <p> + 1. There is only one virtue and only one vice. + </p> + <p> + 2. Virtue is the observance of the mean path between two opposite vices. + </p> + <p> + 3. Virtue (like prudence) must be learned from experience. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0025" id="link2H_4_0025"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XIV. Of Virtue in General + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 175</span> + </p> + <p> + Virtue signifies a moral strength of will. But this does not exhaust the + notion; for such strength might also belong to a holy (superhuman) being, + in whom no opposing impulse counteracts the law of his rational will; who + therefore willingly does everything in accordance with the law. Virtue + then is the moral strength of a man's will in his obedience to duty; and + this is a moral necessitation by his own law giving reason, inasmuch as + this constitutes itself a power executing the law. It is not itself a + duty, nor is it a duty to possess it (otherwise we should be in duty bound + to have a duty), but it commands, and accompanies its command with a moral + constraint (one possible by laws of internal freedom). But since this + should be irresistible, strength is requisite, and the degree of this + strength can be estimated only by the magnitude of the hindrances which + man creates for himself, by his inclinations. Vices, the brood of unlawful + dispositions, are the monsters that he has to combat; wherefore this moral + strength as fortitude (fortitudo moralis) constitutes the greatest and + only true martial glory of man; it is also called the true wisdom, namely, + the practical, because it makes the ultimate end of the existence of man + on earth its own end. Its possession alone makes man free, healthy, rich, + a king, etc., nor either chance or fate deprive him of this, since he + possesses himself, and the virtuous cannot lose his virtue. + </p> + <p> + All the encomiums bestowed on the ideal of humanity in its moral + perfection can lose nothing of their practical reality by the examples of + what men now are, have been, or will probably be hereafter; anthropology + which proceeds from mere empirical knowledge cannot impair anthroponomy + which is erected by the unconditionally legislating reason; and although + virtue may now and then be called meritorious (in relation to men, not to + the law), and be worthy of reward, yet in itself, as it is its own end, so + also it must be regarded as its own reward. + </p> + <p> + Virtue considered in its complete perfection is, therefore, regarded not + as if man possessed virtue, but as if virtue possessed the man, since in + the former case it would appear as though he had still had the choice (for + which he would then require another virtue, in order to select virtue from + all other wares offered to him). To conceive a plurality of virtues (as we + unavoidably must) is nothing else but to conceive various moral objects to + which the (rational) will is led by the single principle of virtue; and it + is the same with the opposite vices. The expression which personifies both + is a contrivance for affecting the sensibility, pointing, however, to a + moral sense. Hence it follows that an aesthetic of morals is not a part, + but a subjective exposition of the Metaphysic of Morals; in which the + emotions that accompany the force of the moral law make the that force to + be felt; for example: disgust, horror, etc., which gives a sensible moral + aversion in order to gain the precedence from the merely sensible + incitement. <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 180</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0026" id="link2H_4_0026"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XV. Of the Principle on which Ethics is separated from Jurisprudence + </h2> + <p> + This separation on which the subdivision of moral philosophy in general + rests, is founded on this: that the notion of freedom, which is common to + both, makes it necessary to divide duties into those of external and those + of internal freedom; the latter of which alone are ethical. Hence this + internal freedom which is the condition of all ethical duty must be + discussed as a preliminary (discursus praeliminaris), just as above the + doctrine of conscience was discussed as the condition of all duty. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 185</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0027" id="link2H_4_0027"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARKS + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0028" id="link2H_4_0028"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + Of the Doctrine of Virtue on the Principle Of Internal Freedom. + </h2> + <p> + Habit (habitus) is a facility of action and a subjective perfection of the + elective will. But not every such facility is a free habit (habitus + libertatis); for if it is custom (assuetudo), that is, a uniformity of + action which, by frequent repetition, has become a necessity, then it is + not a habit proceeding from freedom, and therefore not a moral habit. + Virtue therefore cannot be defined as a habit of free law-abiding actions, + unless indeed we add "determining itself in its action by the idea of the + law"; and then this habit is not a property of the elective will, but of + the rational will, which is a faculty that in adopting a rule also + declares it to be a universal law, and it is only such a habit that can be + reckoned as virtue. Two things are required for internal freedom: to be + master of oneself in a given case (animus sui compos) and to have command + over oneself (imperium in semetipsum), that is to subdue his emotions and + to govern his passions. With these conditions, the character (indoles) is + noble (erecta); in the opposite case, it is ignoble (indoles abjecta + serva). <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 190</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0029" id="link2H_4_0029"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XVI. Virtue requires, first of all, Command over Oneself + </h2> + <p> + Emotions and passions are essentially distinct; the former belong to + feeling in so far as this coming before reflection makes it more difficult + or even impossible. Hence emotion is called hasty (animus praeceps). And + reason declares through the notion of virtue that a man should collect + himself; but this weakness in the life of one's understanding, joined with + the strength of a mental excitement, is only a lack of virtue (Untugend), + and as it were a weak and childish thing, which may very well consist with + the best will, and has further this one good thing in it, that this storm + soon subsides. A propensity to emotion (e.g., resentment) is therefore not + so closely related to vice as passion is. Passion, on the other hand, is + the sensible appetite grown into a permanent inclination (e. g., hatred in + contrast to resentment). The calmness with which one indulges it leaves + room for reflection and allows the mind to frame principles thereon for + itself; and thus when the inclination falls upon what contradicts the law, + to brood on it, to allow it to root itself deeply, and thereby to take up + evil (as of set purpose) into one's maxim; and this is then specifically + evil, that is, it is a true vice. + </p> + <p> + Virtue, therefore, in so far as it is based on internal freedom, contains + a positive command for man, namely, that he should bring all his powers + and inclinations under his rule (that of reason); and this is a positive + precept of command over himself which is additional to the prohibition, + namely, that he should not allow himself to be governed by his feelings + and inclinations (the duty of apathy); since, unless reason takes the + reins of government into its own hands, the feelings and inclinations play + the master over the man. <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 195</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0030" id="link2H_4_0030"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XVII. Virtue necessarily presupposes Apathy (considered as Strength) + </h2> + <p> + This word (apathy) has come into bad repute, just as if it meant want of + feeling, and therefore subjective indifference with respect to the objects + of the elective will; it is supposed to be a weakness. This misconception + may be avoided by giving the name moral apathy to that want of emotion + which is to be distinguished from indifference. In the former, the + feelings arising from sensible impressions lose their influence on the + moral feeling only because the respect for the law is more powerful than + all of them together. It is only the apparent strength of a fever patient + that makes even the lively sympathy with good rise to an emotion, or + rather degenerate into it. Such an emotion is called enthusiasm, and it is + with reference to this that we are to explain the moderation which is + usually recommended in virtuous practices: <span class="side">INTRODUCTION + ^paragraph 200</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus uniqui + + Ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam. * +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Horace. ["Let the wise man bear the name of fool, and the + just of unjust, if he pursue virtue herself beyond the + proper bounds."] +<span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 205</span> +</pre> + <p> + For otherwise it is absurd to imagine that one could be too wise or too + virtuous. The emotion always belongs to the sensibility, no matter by what + sort of object it may be excited. The true strength of virtue is the mind + at rest, with a firm, deliberate resolution to bring its law into + practice. That is the state of health in the moral life; on the contrary, + the emotion, even when it is excited by the idea of the good, is a + momentary glitter which leaves exhaustion after it. We may apply the term + fantastically virtuous to the man who will admit nothing to be indifferent + in respect of morality (adiaphora), and who strews all his steps with + duties, as with traps, and will not allow it to be indifferent whether a + man eats fish or flesh, drink beer or wine, when both agree with him; a + micrology which, if adopted into the doctrine of virtue, would make its + rule a tyranny. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0031" id="link2H_4_0031"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 210</span> + </p> + <p> + Virtue is always in progress, and yet always begins from the beginning. + The former follows from the fact that, objectively considered, it is an + ideal and unattainable, and yet it is a duty constantly to approximate to + it. The second is founded subjectively on the nature of man which is + affected by inclinations, under the influence of which virtue, with its + maxims adopted once for all, can never settle in a position of rest; but, + if it is not rising, inevitably falls; because moral maxims cannot, like + technical, be based on custom (for this belongs to the physical character + of the determination of will); but even if the practice of them become a + custom, the agent would thereby lose the freedom in the choice of his + maxims, which freedom is the character of an action done from duty. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0032" id="link2H_4_0032"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + ON CONSCIENCE + </h2> + <p> + The consciousness of an internal tribunal in man (before which "his + thoughts accuse or excuse one another") is CONSCIENCE. + </p> + <p> + Every man has a conscience, and finds himself observed by an inward judge + which threatens and keeps him in awe (reverence combined with fear); and + this power which watches over the laws within him is not something which + he himself (arbitrarily) makes, but it is incorporated in his being. It + follows him like his shadow, when he thinks to escape. He may indeed + stupefy himself with pleasures and distractions, but cannot avoid now and + then coming to himself or awaking, and then he at once perceives its awful + voice. In his utmost depravity, he may, indeed, pay no attention to it, + but he cannot avoid hearing it. + </p> + <p> + Now this original intellectual and (as a conception of duty) moral + capacity, called conscience, has this peculiarity in it, that although its + business is a business of man with himself, yet he finds himself compelled + by his reason to transact it as if at the command of another person. For + the transaction here is the conduct of a trial (causa) before a tribunal. + But that he who is accused by his conscience should be conceived as one + and the same person with the judge is an absurd conception of a judicial + court; for then the complainant would always lose his case. Therefore, in + all duties the conscience of the man must regard another than himself as + the judge of his actions, if it is to avoid self-contradiction. Now this + other may be an actual or a merely ideal person which reason frames to + itself. Such an idealized person (the authorized judge of conscience) must + be one who knows the heart; for the tribunal is set up in the inward part + of man; at the same time he must also be all-obliging, that is, must be or + be conceived as a person in respect of whom all duties are to be regarded + as his commands; since conscience is the inward judge of all free actions. + Now, since such a moral being must at the same time possess all power (in + heaven and earth), since otherwise he could not give his commands their + proper effect (which the office of judge necessarily requires), and since + such a moral being possessing power over all is called GOD, hence + conscience must be conceived as the subjective principle of a + responsibility for one's deeds before God; nay, this latter concept is + contained (though it be only obscurely) in every moral self-consciousness. + </p> + <h3> + THE END + </h3> + <div style="height: 6em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, by +Immanuel Kant + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS *** + +***** This file should be named 5684-h.htm or 5684-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/5/6/8/5684/ + +Etext produced by Matthew Stapleton. + +HTML file produced by David Widger + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license + + +Title: The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics + +Author: Immanuel Kant + +Posting Date: August 4, 2013 [EBook #5684] +Release Date: May, 2004 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS *** + + + + +Produced by Matthew Stapleton. + + + + + + + + + 1780 + + THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS + + by Immanuel Kant + + translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott + + +PREFACE + +If there exists on any subject a philosophy (that is, a system of +rational knowledge based on concepts), then there must also be for +this philosophy a system of pure rational concepts, independent of any +condition of intuition, in other words, a metaphysic. It may be +asked whether metaphysical elements are required also for every +practical philosophy, which is the doctrine of duties, and therefore +also for Ethics, in order to be able to present it as a true science +(systematically), not merely as an aggregate of separate doctrines +(fragmentarily). As regards pure jurisprudence, no one will question +this requirement; for it concerns only what is formal in the +elective will, which has to be limited in its external relations +according to laws of freedom; without regarding any end which is the +matter of this will. Here, therefore, deontology is a mere +scientific doctrine (doctrina scientiae). * + + + +* One who is acquainted with practical philosophy is not, +therefore, a practical philosopher. The latter is he who makes the +rational end the principle of his actions, while at the same time he +joins with this the necessary knowledge which, as it aims at action, +must not be spun out into the most subtile threads of metaphysic, +unless a legal duty is in question; in which case meum and tuum must +be accurately determined in the balance of justice, on the principle +of equality of action and action, which requires something like +mathematical proportion, but not in the case of a mere ethical duty. +For in this case the question is not only to know what it is a duty to +do (a thing which on account of the ends that all men naturally have +can be easily decided), but the chief point is the inner principle +of the will namely that the consciousness of this duty be also the +spring of action, in order that we may be able to say of the man who +joins to his knowledge this principle of wisdom that he is a practical +philosopher. + + + +Now in this philosophy (of ethics) it seems contrary to the idea +of it that we should go back to metaphysical elements in order to make +the notion of duty purified from everything empirical (from every +feeling) a motive of action. For what sort of notion can we form of +the mighty power and herculean strength which would be sufficient to +overcome the vice-breeding inclinations, if Virtue is to borrow her +"arms from the armoury of metaphysics," which is a matter of +speculation that only few men can handle? Hence all ethical teaching +in lecture rooms, pulpits, and popular books, when it is decked out +with fragments of metaphysics, becomes ridiculous. But it is not, +therefore, useless, much less ridiculous, to trace in metaphysics +the first principles of ethics; for it is only as a philosopher that +anyone can reach the first principles of this conception of duty, +otherwise we could not look for either certainty or purity in the +ethical teaching. To rely for this reason on a certain feeling +which, on account of the effect expected from it, is called moral, +may, perhaps, even satisfy the popular teacher, provided he desires as +the criterion of a moral duty to consider the problem: "If everyone in +every case made your maxim the universal law, how could this law be +consistent with itself?" But if it were merely feeling that made it +our duty to take this principle as a criterion, then this would not be +dictated by reason, but only adopted instinctively and therefore +blindly. + + {PREFACE ^paragraph 5} + +But in fact, whatever men imagine, no moral principle is based on +any feeling, but such a principle is really nothing else than an +obscurely conceived metaphysic which inheres in every man's +reasoning faculty; as the teacher will easily find who tries to +catechize his pupils in the Socratic method about the imperative of +duty and its application to the moral judgement of his actions. The +mode of stating it need not be always metaphysical, and the language +need not necessarily be scholastic, unless the pupil is to be +trained to be a philosopher. But the thought must go back to the +elements of metaphysics, without which we cannot expect any +certainty or purity, or even motive power in ethics. + +If we deviate from this principle and begin from pathological, or +purely sensitive, or even moral feeling (from what is subjectively +practical instead of what is objective), that is, from the matter of +the will, the end, not from its form that is the law, in order from +thence to determine duties; then, certainly, there are no metaphysical +elements of ethics, for feeling by whatever it may be excited is +always physical. But then ethical teaching, whether in schools, or +lecture-rooms, etc., is corrupted in its source. For it is not a +matter of indifference by what motives or means one is led to a good +purpose (the obedience to duty). However disgusting, then, metaphysics +may appear to those pretended philosophers who dogmatize oracularly, +or even brilliantly, about the doctrine of duty, it is, +nevertheless, an indispensable duty for those who oppose it to go back +to its principles even in ethics, and to begin by going to school on +its benches. + + + +We may fairly wonder how, after all previous explanations of the +principles of duty, so far as it is derived from pure reason, it was +still possible to reduce it again to a doctrine of happiness; in +such a way, however, that a certain moral happiness not resting on +empirical causes was ultimately arrived at, a self-contradictory +nonentity. In fact, when the thinking man has conquered the +temptations to vice, and is conscious of having done his (often +hard) duty, he finds himself in a state of peace and satisfaction +which may well be called happiness, in which virtue is her own reward. +Now, says the eudaemonist, this delight, this happiness, is the real +motive of his acting virtuously. The notion of duty, says be, does not +immediately determine his will; it is only by means of the happiness +in prospect that he is moved to his duty. Now, on the other hand, +since he can promise himself this reward of virtue only from the +consciousness of having done his duty, it is clear that the latter +must have preceded: that is, he must feel himself bound to do his duty +before he thinks, and without thinking, that happiness will be the +consequence of obedience to duty. He is thus involved in a circle in +his assignment of cause and effect. He can only hope to be happy if he +is conscious of his obedience to duty: and he can only be moved to +obedience to duty if be foresees that he will thereby become happy. +But in this reasoning there is also a contradiction. For, on the one +side, he must obey his duty, without asking what effect this will have +on his happiness, consequently, from a moral principle; on the other +side, he can only recognize something as his duty when he can reckon +on happiness which will accrue to him thereby, and consequently on a +pathological principle, which is the direct opposite of the former. + +I have in another place (the Berlin Monatsschrift), reduced, as I +believe, to the simplest expressions the distinction between +pathological and moral pleasure. The pleasure, namely, which must +precede the obedience to the law in order that one may act according +to the law is pathological, and the process follows the physical order +of nature; that which must be preceded by the law in order that it may +be felt is in the moral order. If this distinction is not observed; if +eudaemonism (the principle of happiness) is adopted as the principle +instead of eleutheronomy (the principle of freedom of the inner +legislation), the consequence is the euthanasia (quiet death) of all +morality. + + {PREFACE ^paragraph 10} + +The cause of these mistakes is no other than the following: Those +who are accustomed only to physiological explanations will not admit +into their heads the categorical imperative from which these laws +dictatorially proceed, notwithstanding that they feel themselves +irresistibly forced by it. Dissatisfied at not being able to explain +what lies wholly beyond that sphere, namely, freedom of the elective +will, elevating as is this privilege, that man has of being capable of +such an idea, they are stirred up by the proud claims of speculative +reason, which feels its power so strongly in the fields, just as if +they were allies leagued in defence of the omnipotence of +theoretical reason and roused by a general call to arms to resist that +idea; and thus they are at present, and perhaps for a long time to +come, though ultimately in vain, to attack the moral concept of +freedom and if possible render it doubtful. + +INTRODUCTION + + INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS + + + +Ethics in ancient times signified moral philosophy (philosophia +moralis) generally, which was also called the doctrine of duties. +Subsequently it was found advisable to confine this name to a part +of moral philosophy, namely, to the doctrine of duties which are not +subject to external laws (for which in German the name Tugendlehre was +found suitable). Thus the system of general deontology is divided into +that of jurisprudence (jurisprudentia), which is capable of external +laws, and of ethics, which is not thus capable, and we may let this +division stand. + + + + + +I. Exposition of the Conception of Ethics + + + +The notion of duty is in itself already the notion of a constraint +of the free elective will by the law; whether this constraint be an +external one or be self-constraint. The moral imperative, by its +categorical (the unconditional ought) announces this constraint, which +therefore does not apply to all rational beings (for there may also be +holy beings), but applies to men as rational physical beings who are +unholy enough to be seduced by pleasure to the transgression of the +moral law, although they themselves recognize its authority; and +when they do obey it, to obey it unwillingly (with resistance of their +inclination); and it is in this that the constraint properly +consists. * Now, as man is a free (moral) being, the notion of duty +can contain only self-constraint (by the idea of the law itself), when +we look to the internal determination of the will (the spring), for +thus only is it possible to combine that constraint (even if it were +external) with the freedom of the elective will. The notion of duty +then must be an ethical one. + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 5} + + + +* Man, however, as at the same time a moral being, when he +considers himself objectively, which he is qualified to do by his pure +practical reason, (i.e. according to humanity in his own person), +finds himself holy enough to transgress the law only unwillingly; +for there is no man so depraved who in this transgression would not +feel a resistance and an abhorrence of himself, so that he must put +a force on himself. It is impossible to explain the phenomenon that at +this parting of the ways (where the beautiful fable places Hercules +between virtue and sensuality) man shows more propensity to obey +inclination than the law. For, we can only explain what happens by +tracing it to a cause according to physical laws; but then we should +not be able to conceive the elective will as free. Now this mutually +opposed self-constraint and the inevitability of it makes us recognize +the incomprehensible property of freedom. + + + +The impulses of nature, then, contain hindrances to the fulfilment +of duty in the mind of man, and resisting forces, some of them +powerful; and he must judge himself able to combat these and to +conquer them by means of reason, not in the future, but in the +present, simultaneously with the thought; he must judge that he can do +what the law unconditionally commands that he ought. + +Now the power and resolved purpose to resist a strong but unjust +opponent is called fortitude (fortitudo), and when concerned with +the opponent of the moral character within us, it is virtue (virtus, +fortitudo moralis). Accordingly, general deontology, in that part +which brings not external, but internal, freedom under laws is the +doctrine of virtue. + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 10} + +Jurisprudence had to do only with the formal condition of external +freedom (the condition of consistency with itself, if its maxim became +a universal law), that is, with law. Ethics, on the contrary, supplies +us with a matter (an object of the free elective will), an end of pure +reason which is at the same time conceived as an objectively necessary +end, i.e., as duty for all men. For, as the sensible inclinations +mislead us to ends (which are the matter of the elective will) that +may contradict duty, the legislating reason cannot otherwise guard +against their influence than by an opposite moral end, which therefore +must be given a priori independently on inclination. + +An end is an object of the elective will (of a rational being) by +the idea of which this will is determined to an action for the +production of this object. Now I may be forced by others to actions +which are directed to an end as means, but I cannot be forced to +have an end; I can only make something an end to myself. If, +however, I am also bound to make something which lies in the notions +of practical reason an end to myself, and therefore besides the formal +determining principle of the elective will (as contained in law) to +have also a material principle, an end which can be opposed to the end +derived from sensible impulses; then this gives the notion of an end +which is in itself a duty. The doctrine of this cannot belong to +jurisprudence, but to ethics, since this alone includes in its +conception self-constraint according to moral laws. + +For this reason, ethics may also be defined as the system of the +ends of the pure practical reason. The two parts of moral philosophy +are distinguished as treating respectively of ends and of duties of +constraint. That ethics contains duties to the observance of which one +cannot be (physically) forced by others, is merely the consequence +of this, that it is a doctrine of ends, since to be forced to have +ends or to set them before one's self is a contradiction. + +Now that ethics is a doctrine of virtue (doctrina officiorum +virtutis) follows from the definition of virtue given above compared +with the obligation, the peculiarity of which has just been shown. +There is in fact no other determination of the elective will, except +that to an end, which in the very notion of it implies that I cannot +even physically be forced to it by the elective will of others. +Another may indeed force me to do something which is not my end (but +only means to the end of another), but he cannot force me to make it +my own end, and yet I can have no end except of my own making. The +latter supposition would be a contradiction- an act of freedom which +yet at the same time would not be free. But there is no +contradiction in setting before one's self an end which is also a +duty: for in this case I constrain myself, and this is quite +consistent with freedom. * But how is such an end possible? That is +now the question. For the possibility of the notion of the thing +(viz., that it is not self-contradictory) is not enough to prove the +possibility of the thing itself (the objective reality of the notion). + + + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 15} + +* The less a man can be physically forced, and the more he can be +morally forced (by the mere idea of duty), so much the freer he is. +The man, for example, who is of sufficiently firm resolution and +strong mind not to give up an enjoyment which he has resolved on, +however much loss is shown as resulting therefrom, and who yet desists +from his purpose unhesitatingly, though very reluctantly, when he +finds that it would cause him to neglect an official duty or a sick +father; this man proves his freedom in the highest degree by this very +thing, that he cannot resist the voice of duty. + + + + + +II. Exposition of the Notion of an End which is also a Duty + + + +We can conceive the relation of end to duty in two ways; either +starting from the end to find the maxim of the dutiful actions; or +conversely, setting out from this to find the end which is also +duty. Jurisprudence proceeds in the former way. It is left to +everyone's free elective will what end he will choose for his +action. But its maxim is determined a priori; namely, that the freedom +of the agent must be consistent with the freedom of every other +according to a universal law. + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 20} + +Ethics, however, proceeds in the opposite way. It cannot start +from the ends which the man may propose to himself, and hence give +directions as to the maxims he should adopt, that is, as to his +duty; for that would be to take empirical principles of maxims, and +these could not give any notion of duty; since this, the categorical +ought, has its root in pure reason alone. Indeed, if the maxims were +to be adopted in accordance with those ends (which are all selfish), +we could not properly speak of the notion of duty at all. Hence in +ethics the notion of duty must lead to ends, and must on moral +principles give the foundation of maxims with respect to the ends +which we ought to propose to ourselves. + +Setting aside the question what sort of end that is which is in +itself a duty, and how such an end is possible, it is here only +necessary to show that a duty of this kind is called a duty of virtue, +and why it is so called. + +To every duty corresponds a right of action (facultas moralis +generatim), but all duties do not imply a corresponding right +(facultas juridica) of another to compel anyone, but only the +duties called legal duties. Similarly to all ethical obligation +corresponds the notion of virtue, but it does not follow that all +ethical duties are duties of virtue. Those, in fact, are not so +which do not concern so much a certain end (matter, object of the +elective will), but merely that which is formal in the moral +determination of the will (e.g., that the dutiful action must also +be done from duty). It is only an end which is also duty that can be +called a duty of virtue. Hence there are several of the latter kind +(and thus there are distinct virtues); on the contrary, there is +only one duty of the former kind, but it is one which is valid for all +actions (only one virtuous disposition). + +The duty of virtue is essentially distinguished from the duty of +justice in this respect; that it is morally possible to be +externally compelled to the latter, whereas the former rests on free +self-constraint only. For finite holy beings (which cannot even be +tempted to the violation of duty) there is no doctrine of virtue, +but only moral philosophy, the latter being an autonomy of practical +reason, whereas the former is also an autocracy of it. That is, it +includes a consciousness- not indeed immediately perceived, but +rightly concluded, from the moral categorical imperative- of the power +to become master of one's inclinations which resist the law; so that +human morality in its highest stage can yet be nothing more than +virtue; even if it were quite pure (perfectly free from the +influence of a spring foreign to duty), a state which is poetically +personified under the name of the wise man (as an ideal to which one +should continually approximate). + +Virtue, however, is not to be defined and esteemed merely as +habit, and (as it is expressed in the prize essay of Cochius) as a +long custom acquired by practice of morally good actions. For, if this +is not an effect of well-resolved and firm principles ever more and +more purified, then, like any other mechanical arrangement brought +about by technical practical reason, it is neither armed for all +circumstances nor adequately secured against the change that may be +wrought by new allurements. + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 25} + + + + REMARK + + + +To virtue = + a is opposed as its logical contradictory +(contradictorie oppositum) the negative lack of virtue (moral +weakness) = 0; but vice = - a is its contrary (contrarie s. realiter +oppositum); and it is not merely a needless question but an +offensive one to ask whether great crimes do not perhaps demand more +strength of mind than great virtues. For by strength of mind we +understand the strength of purpose of a man, as a being endowed with +freedom, and consequently so far as he is master of himself (in his +senses) and therefore in a healthy condition of mind. But great crimes +are paroxysms, the very sight of which makes the man of healthy mind +shudder. The question would therefore be something like this: +whether a man in a fit of madness can have more physical strength than +if he is in his senses; and we may admit this without on that +account ascribing to him more strength of mind, if by mind we +understand the vital principle of man in the free use of his powers. +For since those crimes have their ground merely in the power of the +inclinations that weaken reason, which does not prove strength of +mind, this question would be nearly the same as the question whether a +man in a fit of illness can show more strength than in a healthy +condition; and this may be directly denied, since the want of +health, which consists in the proper balance of all the bodily +forces of the man, is a weakness in the system of these forces, by +which system alone we can estimate absolute health. + + + + + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 30} + +III. Of the Reason for conceiving an End which is also a Duty + + + +An end is an object of the free elective will, the idea of which +determines this will to an action by which the object is produced. +Accordingly every action has its end, and as no one can have an end +without himself making the object of his elective will his end, +hence to have some end of actions is an act of the freedom of the +agent, not an affect of physical nature. Now, since this act which +determines an end is a practical principle which commands not the +means (therefore not conditionally) but the end itself (therefore +unconditionally), hence it is a categorical imperative of pure +practical reason and one, therefore, which combines a concept of +duty with that of an end in general. + +Now there must be such an end and a categorical imperative +corresponding to it. For since there are free actions, there must also +be ends to which as an object those actions are directed. Amongst +these ends there must also be some which are at the same time (that +is, by their very notion) duties. For if there were none such, then +since no actions can be without an end, all ends which practical +reason might have would be valid only as means to other ends, and a +categorical imperative would be impossible; a supposition which +destroys all moral philosophy. + +Here, therefore, we treat not of ends which man actually makes to +himself in accordance with the sensible impulses of his nature, but of +objects of the free elective will under its own laws- objects which he +ought to make his end. We may call the former technical +(subjective), properly pragmatical, including the rules of prudence in +the choice of its ends; but the latter we must call the moral +(objective) doctrine of ends. This distinction is, however, +superfluous here, since moral philosophy already by its very notion is +clearly separated from the doctrine of physical nature (in the present +instance, anthropology). The latter resting on empirical principles, +whereas the moral doctrine of ends which treats of duties rests on +principles given a priori in pure practical reason. + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 35} + + + + + +IV. What are the Ends which are also Duties? + + + +They are: A. OUR OWN PERFECTION, B. HAPPINESS OF OTHERS. + +We cannot invert these and make on one side our own happiness, and +on the other the perfection of others, ends which should be in +themselves duties for the same person. + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 40} + +For one's own happiness is, no doubt, an end that all men have (by +virtue of the impulse of their nature), but this end cannot without +contradiction be regarded as a duty. What a man of himself +inevitably wills does not come under the notion of duty, for this is a +constraint to an end reluctantly adopted. It is, therefore, a +contradiction to say that a man is in duty bound to advance his own +happiness with all his power. + +It is likewise a contradiction to make the perfection of another +my end, and to regard myself as in duty bound to promote it. For it is +just in this that the perfection of another man as a person +consists, namely, that he is able of himself to set before him his own +end according to his own notions of duty; and it is a contradiction to +require (to make it a duty for me) that I should do something which no +other but himself can do. + + + + + +V. Explanation of these two Notions + + + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 45} + + A. OUR OWN PERFECTION + + + +The word perfection is liable to many misconceptions. It is +sometimes understood as a notion belonging to transcendental +philosophy; viz., the notion of the totality of the manifold which +taken together constitutes a thing; sometimes, again, it is understood +as belonging to teleology, so that it signifies the correspondence +of the properties of a thing to an end. Perfection in the former sense +might be called quantitative (material), in the latter qualitative +(formal) perfection. The former can be one only, for the whole of what +belongs to the one thing is one. But of the latter there may be +several in one thing; and it is of the latter property that we here +treat. + +When it is said of the perfection that belongs to man generally +(properly speaking, to humanity), that it is in itself a duty to +make this our end, it must be placed in that which may be the effect +of one's deed, not in that which is merely an endowment for which we +have to thank nature; for otherwise it would not be duty. +Consequently, it can be nothing else than the cultivation of one's +power (or natural capacity) and also of one's will (moral disposition) +to satisfy the requirement of duty in general. The supreme element +in the former (the power) is the understanding, it being the faculty +of concepts, and, therefore, also of those concepts which refer to +duty. First it is his duty to labour to raise himself out of the +rudeness of his nature, out of his animal nature more and more to +humanity, by which alone he is capable of setting before him ends to +supply the defects of his ignorance by instruction, and to correct his +errors; he is not merely counselled to do this by reason as +technically practical, with a view to his purposes of other kinds +(as art), but reason, as morally practical, absolutely commands him to +do it, and makes this end his duty, in order that he may be worthy +of the humanity that dwells in him. Secondly, to carry the cultivation +of his will up to the purest virtuous disposition, that, namely, in +which the law is also the spring of his dutiful actions, and to obey +it from duty, for this is internal morally practical perfection. +This is called the moral sense (as it were a special sense, sensus +moralis), because it is a feeling of the effect which the +legislative will within himself exercises on the faculty of acting +accordingly. This is, indeed, often misused fanatically, as though +(like the genius of Socrates) it preceded reason, or even could +dispense with judgement of reason; but still it is a moral perfection, +making every special end, which is also a duty, one's own end. + + + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 50} + + B. HAPPINESS OF OTHERS + + + +It is inevitable for human nature that man a should wish and seek for +happiness, that is, satisfaction with his condition, with certainty of +the continuance of this satisfaction. But for this very reason it is +not an end that is also a duty. Some writers still make a +distinction between moral and physical happiness (the former +consisting in satisfaction with one's person and moral behaviour, that +is, with what one does; the other in satisfaction with that which +nature confers, consequently with what one enjoys as a foreign +gift). Without at present censuring the misuse of the word (which even +involves a contradiction), it must be observed that the feeling of the +former belongs solely to the preceding head, namely, perfection. For +he who is to feel himself happy in the mere consciousness of his +uprightness already possesses that perfection which in the previous +section was defined as that end which is also duty. + +If happiness, then, is in question, which it is to be my duty to +promote as my end, it must be the happiness of other men whose +(permitted) end I hereby make also mine. It still remains left to +themselves to decide what they shall reckon as belonging to their +happiness; only that it is in my power to decline many things which +they so reckon, but which I do not so regard, supposing that they have +no right to demand it from me as their own. A plausible objection +often advanced against the division of duties above adopted consists +in setting over against that end a supposed obligation to study my own +(physical) happiness, and thus making this, which is my natural and +merely subjective end, my duty (and objective end). This requires to +be cleared up. + +Adversity, pain, and want are great temptations to transgression +of one's duty; accordingly it would seem that strength, health, a +competence, and welfare generally, which are opposed to that +influence, may also be regarded as ends that are also duties; that is, +that it is a duty to promote our own happiness not merely to make that +of others our end. But in that case the end is not happiness but the +morality of the agent; and happiness is only the means of removing the +hindrances to morality; permitted means, since no one has a right to +demand from me the sacrifice of my not immoral ends. It is not +directly a duty to seek a competence for one's self; but indirectly it +may be so; namely, in order to guard against poverty which is a +great temptation to vice. But then it is not my happiness but my +morality, to maintain which in its integrity is at once my end and +my duty. + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 55} + + + + + +VI. Ethics does not supply Laws for Actions (which is done by + + Jurisprudence), but only for the Maxims of Action + + + +The notion of duty stands in immediate relation to a law (even +though I abstract from every end which is the matter of the law); as +is shown by the formal principle of duty in the categorical +imperative: "Act so that the maxims of thy action might become a +universal law." But in ethics this is conceived as the law of thy +own will, not of will in general, which might be that of others; for +in the latter case it would give rise to a judicial duty which does +not belong to the domain of ethics. In ethics, maxims are regarded +as those subjective laws which merely have the specific character of +universal legislation, which is only a negative principle (not to +contradict a law in general). How, then, can there be further a law +for the maxims of actions? + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 60} + +It is the notion of an end which is also a duty, a notion peculiar +to ethics, that alone is the foundation of a law for the maxims of +actions; by making the subjective end (that which every one has) +subordinate to the objective end (that which every one ought to make +his own). The imperative: "Thou shalt make this or that thy end (e. +g., the happiness of others)" applies to the matter of the elective +will (an object). Now since no free action is possible, without the +agent having in view in it some end (as matter of his elective +will), it follows that, if there is an end which is also a duty, the +maxims of actions which are means to ends must contain only the +condition of fitness for a possible universal legislation: on the +other hand, the end which is also a duty can make it a law that we +should have such a maxim, whilst for the maxim itself the +possibility of agreeing with a universal legislation is sufficient. + +For maxims of actions may be arbitrary, and are only limited by +the condition of fitness for a universal legislation, which is the +formal principle of actions. But a law abolishes the arbitrary +character of actions, and is by this distinguished from recommendation +(in which one only desires to know the best means to an end). + + + + + +VII. Ethical Duties are of indeterminate, Juridical Duties of + + strict, Obligation + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 65} + + + +This proposition is a consequence of the foregoing; for if the law +can only command the maxim of the actions, not the actions themselves, +this is a sign that it leaves in the observance of it a latitude +(latitudo) for the elective will; that is, it cannot definitely assign +how and how much we should do by the action towards the end which is +also duty. But by an indeterminate duty is not meant a permission to +make exceptions from the maxim of the actions, but only the permission +to limit one maxim of duty by another (e. g., the general love of +our neighbour by the love of parents); and this in fact enlarges the +field for the practice of virtue. The more indeterminate the duty, and +the more imperfect accordingly the obligation of the man to the +action, and the closer he nevertheless brings this maxim of +obedience thereto (in his own mind) to the strict duty (of justice), +so much the more perfect is his virtuous action. + +Hence it is only imperfect duties that are duties of virtue. The +fulfilment of them is merit (meritum) = + a; but their transgression +is not necessarily demerit (demeritum) = - a, but only moral unworth += o, unless the agent made it a principle not to conform to those +duties. The strength of purpose in the former case is alone properly +called virtue [Tugend] (virtus); the weakness in the latter case is +not vice (vitium), but rather only lack of virtue [Untugend], a want +of moral strength (defectus moralis). (As the word Tugend is derived +from taugen [to be good for something], Untugend by its etymology +signifies good for nothing.) Every action contrary to duty is called +transgression (peccatum). Deliberate transgression which has become +a principle is what properly constitutes what is called vice (vitium). + +Although the conformity of actions to justice (i.e., to be an +upright man) is nothing meritorious, yet the conformity of the maxim +of such actions regarded as duties, that is, reverence for justice +is meritorious. For by this the man makes the right of humanity or +of men his own end, and thereby enlarges his notion of duty beyond +that of indebtedness (officium debiti), since although another man +by virtue of his rights can demand that my actions shall conform to +the law, he cannot demand that the law shall also contain the spring +of these actions. The same thing is true of the general ethical +command, "Act dutifully from a sense of duty." To fix this disposition +firmly in one's mind and to quicken it is, as in the former case, +meritorious, because it goes beyond the law of duty in actions and +makes the law in itself the spring. + +But just for or reason, those duties also must be reckoned as of +indeterminate obligation, in respect of which there exists a +subjective principle which ethically rewards them; or to bring them as +near as possible to the notion of a strict obligation, a principle +of susceptibility of this reward according to the law of virtue; +namely, a moral pleasure which goes beyond mere satisfaction with +oneself (which may be merely negative), and of which it is proudly +said that in this consciousness virtue is its own reward. + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 70} + +When this merit is a merit of the man in respect of other men of +promoting their natural ends, which are recognized as such by all +men (making their happiness his own), we might call it the sweet +merit, the consciousness of which creates a moral enjoyment in which +men are by sympathy inclined to revel; whereas the bitter merit of +promoting the true welfare of other men, even though they should not +recognize it as such (in the case of the unthankful and ungrateful), +has commonly no such reaction, but only produces a satisfaction with +one's self, although in the latter case this would be even greater. + + + + + +VIII. Exposition of the Duties of Virtue as Intermediate Duties + + + +(1) OUR OWN PERFECTION as an end which is also a duty + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 75} + +(a) Physical perfection; that is, cultivation of all our faculties +generally for the promotion of the ends set before us by reason. +That this is a duty, and therefore an end in itself, and that the +effort to effect this even without regard to the advantage that it +secures us, is based, not on a conditional (pragmatic), but an +unconditional (moral) imperative, may be seen from the following +consideration. The power of proposing to ourselves an end is the +characteristic of humanity (as distinguished from the brutes). With +the end of humanity in our own person is therefore combined the +rational will, and consequently the duty of deserving well of humanity +by culture generally, by acquiring or advancing the power to carry out +all sorts of possible ends, so far as this power is to be found in +man; that is, it is a duty to cultivate the crude capacities of our +nature, since it is by that cultivation that the animal is raised to +man, therefore it is a duty in itself. + +This duty, however, is merely ethical, that is, of indeterminate +obligation. No principle of reason prescribes how far one must go in +this effort (in enlarging or correcting his faculty of +understanding, that is, in acquisition of knowledge or technical +capacity); and besides the difference in the circumstances into +which men may come makes the choice of the kind of employment for +which he should cultivate his talent very arbitrary. Here, +therefore, there is no law of reason for actions, but only for the +maxim of actions, viz.: "Cultivate thy faculties of mind and body so +as to be effective for all ends that may come in thy way, uncertain +which of them may become thy own." + +(b) Cultivation of Morality in ourselves. The greatest moral +perfection of man is to do his duty, and that from duty (that the +law be not only the rule but also the spring of his actions). Now at +first sight this seems to be a strict obligation, and as if the +principle of duty commanded not merely the legality of every action, +but also the morality, i.e., the mental disposition, with the +exactness and strictness of a law; but in fact the law commands even +here only the maxim of the action, namely, that we should seek the +ground of obligation, not in the sensible impulses (advantage or +disadvantage), but wholly in the law; so that the action itself is not +commanded. For it is not possible to man to see so far into the +depth of his own heart that he could ever be thoroughly certain of the +purity of his moral purpose and the sincerity of his mind even in +one single action, although he has no doubt about the legality of +it. Nay, often the weakness which deters a man from the risk of a +crime is regarded by him as virtue (which gives the notion of +strength). And how many there are who may have led a long blameless +life, who are only fortunate in having escaped so many temptations. +How much of the element of pure morality in their mental disposition +may have belonged to each deed remains hidden even from themselves. + +Accordingly, this duty to estimate the worth of one's actions not +merely by their legality, but also by their morality (mental +disposition), is only of indeterminate obligation; the law does not +command this internal action in the human mind itself, but only the +maxim of the action, namely, that we should strive with all our +power that for all dutiful actions the thought of duty should be of +itself an adequate spring. + +(2) HAPPINESS OF OTHERS as an end which is also a duty + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 80} + +(a) Physical Welfare. Benevolent wishes may be unlimited, for they +do not imply doing anything. But the case is more difficult with +benevolent action, especially when this is to be done, not from +friendly inclination (love) to others, but from duty, at the expense +of the sacrifice and mortification of many of our appetites. That this +beneficence is a duty results from this: that since our self-love +cannot be separated from the need to be loved by others (to obtain +help from them in case of necessity), we therefore make ourselves an +end for others; and this maxim can never be obligatory except by +having the specific character of a universal law, and consequently +by means of a will that we should also make others our ends. Hence the +happiness of others is an end that is also a duty. + +I am only bound then to sacrifice to others a part of my welfare +without hope of recompense: because it is my duty, and it is +impossible to assign definite limits how far that may go. Much depends +on what would be the true want of each according to his own +feelings, and it must be left to each to determine this for himself. +For that one should sacrifice his own happiness, his true wants, in +order to promote that of others, would be a self-contradictory maxim +if made a universal law. This duty, therefore, is only +indeterminate; it has a certain latitude within which one may do +more or less without our being able to assign its limits definitely. +The law holds only for the maxims, not for definite actions. + +(b) Moral well-being of others (salus moralis) also belongs to +the happiness of others, which it is our duty to promote, but only a +negative duty. The pain that a man feels from remorse of conscience, +although its origin is moral, is yet in its operation physical, like +grief, fear, and every other diseased condition. To take care that +he should not be deservedly smitten by this inward reproach is not +indeed my duty but his business; nevertheless, it is my duty to do +nothing which by the nature of man might seduce him to that for +which his conscience may hereafter torment him, that is, it is my duty +not to give him occasion of stumbling. But there are no definite +limits within which this care for the moral satisfaction of others +must be kept; therefore it involves only an indeterminate obligation. + + + + + +IX. What is a Duty of Virtue? + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 85} + + + +Virtue is the strength of the man's maxim in his obedience to +duty. All strength is known only by the obstacles that it can +overcome; and in the case of virtue the obstacles are the natural +inclinations which may come into conflict with the moral purpose; +and as it is the man who himself puts these obstacles in the way of +his maxims, hence virtue is not merely a self-constraint (for that +might be an effort of one inclination to constrain another), but is +also a constraint according to a principle of inward freedom, and +therefore by the mere idea of duty, according to its formal law. + +All duties involve a notion of necessitation by the law, and ethical +duties involve a necessitation for which only an internal +legislation is possible; juridical duties, on the other hand, one +for which external legislation also is possible. Both, therefore, +include the notion of constraint, either self-constraint or constraint +by others. The moral power of the former is virtue, and the action +springing from such a disposition (from reverence for the law) may +be called a virtuous action (ethical), although the law expresses a +juridical duty. For it is the doctrine of virtue that commands us to +regard the rights of men as holy. + +But it does not follow that everything the doing of which is virtue, +is, properly speaking, a duty of virtue. The former may concern merely +the form of the maxims; the latter applies to the matter of them, +namely, to an end which is also conceived as duty. Now, as the ethical +obligation to ends, of which there may be many, is only indeterminate, +because it contains only a law for the maxim of actions, and the end +is the matter (object) of elective will; hence there are many +duties, differing according to the difference of lawful ends, which +may be called duties of virtue (officia honestatis), just because they +are subject only to free self-constraint, not to the constraint of +other men, and determine the end which is also a duty. + +Virtue, being a coincidence of the rational will, with every duty +firmly settled in the character, is, like everything formal, only +one and the same. But, as regards the end of actions, which is also +duty, that is, as regards the matter which one ought to make an end, +there may be several virtues; and as the obligation to its maxim is +called a duty of virtue, it follows that there are also several duties +of virtue. + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 90} + +The supreme principle of ethics (the doctrine of virtue) is: "Act on +a maxim, the ends of which are such as it might be a universal law for +everyone to have." On this principle a man is an end to himself as +well as others, and it is not enough that he is not permitted to use +either himself or others merely as means (which would imply that be +might be indifferent to them), but it is in itself a duty of every man +to make mankind in general his end. + +The principle of ethics being a categorical imperative does not +admit of proof, but it admits of a justification from principles of +pure practical reason. Whatever in relation to mankind, to oneself, +and others, can be an end, that is an end for pure practical reason: +for this is a faculty of assigning ends in general; and to be +indifferent to them, that is, to take no interest in them, is a +contradiction; since in that case it would not determine the maxims of +actions (which always involve an end), and consequently would cease to +be practical reasons. Pure reason, however, cannot command any ends +a priori, except so far as it declares the same to be also a duty, +which duty is then called a duty of virtue. + + + + + +X. The Supreme Principle of Jurisprudence was Analytical; that of + + Ethics is Synthetical + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 95} + + + +That external constraint, so far as it withstands that which hinders +the external freedom that agrees with general laws (as an obstacle +of the obstacle thereto), can be consistent with ends generally, is +clear on the principle of contradiction, and I need not go beyond +the notion of freedom in order to see it, let the end which each may +be what he will. Accordingly, the supreme principle of jurisprudence +is an analytical principle. On the contrary the principle of ethics +goes beyond the notion of external freedom and, by general laws, +connects further with it an end which it makes a duty. This principle, +therefore, is synthetic. The possibility of it is contained in the +Deduction (Sec. ix.). + +This enlargement of the notion of duty beyond that of external +freedom and of its limitation by the merely formal condition of its +constant harmony; this, I say, in which, instead of constraint from +without, there is set up freedom within, the power of self-constraint, +and that not by the help of other inclinations, but by pure +practical reason (which scorns all such help), consists in this +fact, which raises it above juridical duty; that by it ends are +proposed from which jurisprudence altogether abstracts. In the case of +the moral imperative, and the supposition of freedom which it +necessarily involves, the law, the power (to fulfil it) and the +rational will that determines the maxim, constitute all the elements +that form the notion of juridical duty. But in the imperative, which +commands the duty of virtue, there is added, besides the notion of +self-constraint, that of an end; not one that we have, but that we +ought to have, which, therefore, pure practical reason has in +itself, whose highest, unconditional end (which, however, continues to +be duty) consists in this: that virtue is its own end and, by +deserving well of men, is also its own reward. Herein it shines so +brightly as an ideal to human perceptions, it seems to cast in the +shade even holiness itself, which is never tempted to +transgression. * This, however, is an illusion arising from the fact +that as we have no measure for the degree of strength, except the +greatness of the obstacles which might have been overcome (which in +our case are the inclinations), we are led to mistake the subjective +conditions of estimation of a magnitude for the objective conditions +of the magnitude itself. But when compared with human ends, all of +which have their obstacles to be overcome, it is true that the worth +of virtue itself, which is its own end, far outweighs the worth of all +the utility and all the empirical ends and advantages which it may +have as consequences. + + + +* So that one might vary two well-known lines of Haller thus: + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 100} + + With all his failings, man is still + + Better than angels void of will. + + + +We may, indeed, say that man is obliged to virtue (as a moral +strength). For although the power (facultas) to overcome all +imposing sensible impulses by virtue of his freedom can and must be +presupposed, yet this power regarded as strength (robur) is +something that must be acquired by the moral spring (the idea of the +law) being elevated by contemplation of the dignity of the pure law of +reason in us, and at the same time also by exercise. + + + + + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 105} + +XI. According to the preceding Principles, the Scheme of Duties of + + Virtue may be thus exhibited + + + + The Material Element of the Duty of Virtue + + + + + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 110} + + 1 2 + + Internal Duty of Virtue External Virtue of Duty + + + + My Own End, The End of Others, + + which is also my the promotion of + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 115} + + Duty which is also my + + Duty + + + + (My own (The Happiness + + Perfection) of Others) + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 120} + + + + 3 4 + + The Law which is The End which is + + also Spring also Spring + + + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 125} + + On which the On which the + + Morality Legality + + + + of every free determination of will rests + + + + + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 130} + + The Formal Element of the Duty of Virtue. + + + + + +XII. Preliminary Notions of the Susceptibility of the Mind for + + Notions of Duty generally + + + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 135} + +These are such moral qualities as, when a man does not possess them, +he is not bound to acquire them. They are: the moral feeling, +conscience, love of one's neighbour, and respect for ourselves +(self-esteem). There is no obligation to have these, since they are +subjective conditions of susceptibility for the notion of duty, not +objective conditions of morality. They are all sensitive and +antecedent, but natural capacities of mind (praedispositio) to be +affected by notions of duty; capacities which it cannot be regarded as +a duty to have, but which every man has, and by virtue of which he can +be brought under obligation. The consciousness of them is not of +empirical origin, but can only follow on that of a moral law, as an +effect of the same on the mind. + + + + A. THE MORAL FEELING + + + +This is the susceptibility for pleasure or displeasure, merely +from the consciousness of the agreement or disagreement of our +action with the law of duty. Now, every determination of the +elective will proceeds from the idea of the possible action through +the feeling of pleasure or displeasure in taking an interest in it +or its effect to the deed; and here the sensitive state (the affection +of the internal sense) is either a pathological or a moral feeling. +The former is the feeling that precedes the idea of the law, the +latter that which may follow it. + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 140} + +Now it cannot be a duty to have a moral feeling, or to acquire it; +for all consciousness of obligation supposes this feeling in order +that one may become conscious of the necessitation that lies in the +notion of duty; but every man (as a moral being) has it originally +in himself; the obligation, then, can only extend to the cultivation +of it and the strengthening of it even by admiration of its +inscrutable origin; and this is effected by showing how it is just, by +the mere conception of reason, that it is excited most strongly, in +its own purity and apart from every pathological stimulus; and it is +improper to call this feeling a moral sense; for the word sense +generally means a theoretical power of perception directed to an +object; whereas the moral feeling (like pleasure and displeasure in +general) is something merely subjective, which supplies no +knowledge. No man is wholly destitute of moral feeling, for if he were +totally unsusceptible of this sensation he would be morally dead; and, +to speak in the language of physicians, if the moral vital force could +no longer produce any effect on this feeling, then his humanity +would be dissolved (as it were by chemical laws) into mere animality +and be irrevocably confounded with the mass of other physical +beings. But we have no special sense for (moral) good and evil any +more than for truth, although such expressions are often used; but +we have a susceptibility of the free elective will for being moved +by pure practical reason and its law; and it is this that we call +the moral feeling. + + + + B. OF CONSCIENCE + + + +Similarly, conscience is not a thing to be acquired, and it is not a +duty to acquire it; but every man, as a moral being, has it originally +within him. To be bound to have a conscience would be as much as to +say to be under a duty to recognize duties. For conscience is +practical reason which, in every case of law, holds before a man his +duty for acquittal or condemnation; consequently it does not refer +to an object, but only to the subject (affecting the moral feeling +by its own act); so that it is an inevitable fact, not an obligation +and duty. When, therefore, it is said, "This man has no conscience," +what is meant is that he pays no heed to its dictates. For if he +really had none, he would not take credit to himself for anything done +according to duty, nor reproach himself with violation of duty, and +therefore he would be unable even to conceive the duty of having a +conscience. + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 145} + +I pass by the manifold subdivisions of conscience, and only +observe what follows from what has just been said, namely, that +there is no such thing as an erring conscience. No doubt it is +possible sometimes to err in the objective judgement whether something +is a duty or not; but I cannot err in the subjective whether I have +compared it with my practical (here judicially acting) reason for +the purpose of that judgement: for if I erred I would not have +exercised practical judgement at all, and in that case there is +neither truth nor error. Unconscientiousness is not want of +conscience, but the propensity not to heed its judgement. But when a +man is conscious of having acted according to his conscience, then, as +far as regards guilt or innocence, nothing more can be required of +him, only he is bound to enlighten his understanding as to what is +duty or not; but when it comes or has come to action, then +conscience speaks involuntarily and inevitably. To act conscientiously +can, therefore, not be a duty, since otherwise it would be necessary +to have a second conscience, in order to be conscious of the act of +the first. + +The duty here is only to cultivate our conscience, to quicken +our attention to the voice of the internal judge, and to use all means +to secure obedience to it, and is thus our indirect duty. + + + + C. OF LOVE TO MEN + + + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 150} + +Love is a matter of feeling, not of will or volition, and I cannot +love because I will to do so, still less because I ought (I cannot +be necessitated to love); hence there is no such thing as a duty to +love. Benevolence, however (amor benevolentiae), as a mode of +action, may be subject to a law of duty. Disinterested benevolence +is often called (though very improperly) love; even where the +happiness of the other is not concerned, but the complete and free +surrender of all one's own ends to the ends of another (even a +superhuman) being, love is spoken of as being also our duty. But all +duty is necessitation or constraint, although it may be +self-constraint according to a law. But what is done from constraint +is not done from love. + +It is a duty to do good to other men according to our power, whether +we love them or not, and this duty loses nothing of its weight, +although we must make the sad remark that our species, alas! is not +such as to be found particularly worthy of love when we know it more +closely. Hatred of men, however, is always hateful: even though +without any active hostility it consists only in complete aversion +from mankind (the solitary misanthropy). For benevolence still remains +a duty even towards the manhater, whom one cannot love, but to whom we +can show kindness. + +To hate vice in men is neither duty nor against duty, but a mere +feeling of horror of vice, the will having no influence on the feeling +nor the feeling on the will. Beneficence is a duty. He who often +practises this, and sees his beneficent purpose succeed, comes at last +really to love him whom he has benefited. When, therefore, it is said: +"Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," this does not mean, +"Thou shalt first of all love, and by means of this love (in the +next place) do him good"; but: "Do good to thy neighbour, and this +beneficence will produce in thee the love of men (as a settled habit +of inclination to beneficence)." + +The love of complacency (amor complacentiae,) would therefore +alone be direct. This is a pleasure immediately connected with the +idea of the existence of an object, and to have a duty to this, that +is, to be necessitated to find pleasure in a thing, is a +contradiction. + + + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 155} + + D. OF RESPECT + + + +Respect (reverentia) is likewise something merely subjective; a +feeling of a peculiar kind not a judgement about an object which it +would be a duty to effect or to advance. For if considered as duty +it could only be conceived as such by means of the respect which we +have for it. To have a duty to this, therefore, would be as much as to +say to be bound in duty to have a duty. When, therefore, it is said: +"Man has a duty of self-esteem," this is improperly stated, and we +ought rather to say: "The law within him inevitably forces from him +respect for his own being, and this feeling (which is of a peculiar +kind) is a basis of certain duties, that is, of certain actions +which may be consistent with his duty to himself." But we cannot say +that he has a duty of respect for himself; for he must have respect +for the law within himself, in order to be able to conceive duty at +all. + + + + + +XIII. General Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in the + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 160} + + treatment of Pure Ethics + + + +First. A duty can have only a single ground of obligation; and if +two or more proof of it are adduced, this is a certain mark that +either no valid proof has yet been given, or that there are several +distinct duties which have been regarded as one. + +For all moral proofs, being philosophical, can only be drawn by +means of rational knowledge from concepts, not like mathematics, +through the construction of concepts. The latter science admits a +variety of proofs of one and the same theorem; because in intuition +a priori there may be several properties of an object, all of which +lead back to the very same principle. If, for instance, to prove the +duty of veracity, an argument is drawn first from the harm that a +lie causes to other men; another from the worthlessness of a liar +and the violation of his own self-respect, what is proved in the +former argument is a duty of benevolence, not of veracity, that is +to say, not the duty which required to be proved, but a different one. +Now, if, in giving a variety of proof for one and the same theorem, we +flatter ourselves that the multitude of reasons will compensate the +lack of weight in each taken separately, this is a very +unphilosophical resource, since it betrays trickery and dishonesty; +for several insufficient proofs placed beside one another do not +produce certainty, nor even probability. They should advance as reason +and consequence in a series, up to the sufficient reason, and it is +only in this way that they can have the force of proof. Yet the former +is the usual device of the rhetorician. + +Secondly. The difference between virtue and vice cannot be sought in +the degree in which certain maxims are followed, but only in the +specific quality of the maxims (their relation to the law). In other +words, the vaunted principle of Aristotle, that virtue is the mean +between two vices, is false. * For instance, suppose that good +management is given as the mean between two vices, prodigality and +avarice; then its origin as a virtue can neither be defined as the +gradual diminution of the former vice (by saving), nor as the increase +of the expenses of the miserly. These vices, in fact, cannot be viewed +as if they, proceeding as it were in opposite directions, met together +in good management; but each of them has its own maxim, which +necessarily contradicts that of the other. + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 165} + + + +* The common classical formulae of ethics- medio tutissimus ibis; +omne mimium vertitur in vitium; est modus in rebus, etc., medium +tenuere beati; virtus est medium vitiorum et utrinque reductum- +["You will go most safely in the middle" (Virgil); "Every excess +develops into a vice"; "There is a mean in all things, etc." (Horace); +"Happy they who steadily pursue a middle course"; "Virtue is the +mean between two vices and equally removed from either" (Horace).]- +contain a poor sort of wisdom, which has no definite principles; for +this mean between two extremes, who will assign it for me? Avarice (as +a vice) is not distinguished from frugality (as a virtue) by merely +being the latter pushed too far; but has a quite different principle +(maxim), namely placing the end of economy not in the enjoyment of +one's means, but in the mere possession of them, renouncing enjoyment; +just as the vice of prodigality is not to be sought in the excessive +enjoyment of one's means, but in the bad maxim which makes the use +of them, without regard to their maintenance, the sole end. + + + +For the same reason, no vice can be defined as an excess in the +practice of certain actions beyond what is proper (e.g., +Prodigalitas est excessus in consumendis opibus); or, as a less +exercise of them than is fitting (Avaritia est defectus, etc.). For +since in this way the degree is left quite undefined, and the question +whether conduct accords with duty or not, turns wholly on this, such +an account is of no use as a definition. + +Thirdly. Ethical virtue must not be estimated by the power we +attribute to man of fulfilling the law; but, conversely, the moral +power must be estimated by the law, which commands categorically; not, +therefore, by the empirical knowledge that we have of men as they are, +but by the rational knowledge how, according to the ideas of humanity, +they ought to be. These three maxims of the scientific treatment of +ethics are opposed to the older apophthegms: + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 170} + +1. There is only one virtue and only one vice. + +2. Virtue is the observance of the mean path between two opposite +vices. + +3. Virtue (like prudence) must be learned from experience. + + + + + +XIV. Of Virtue in General + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 175} + + + +Virtue signifies a moral strength of will. But this does not exhaust +the notion; for such strength might also belong to a holy (superhuman) +being, in whom no opposing impulse counteracts the law of his rational +will; who therefore willingly does everything in accordance with the +law. Virtue then is the moral strength of a man's will in his +obedience to duty; and this is a moral necessitation by his own law +giving reason, inasmuch as this constitutes itself a power executing +the law. It is not itself a duty, nor is it a duty to possess it +(otherwise we should be in duty bound to have a duty), but it +commands, and accompanies its command with a moral constraint (one +possible by laws of internal freedom). But since this should be +irresistible, strength is requisite, and the degree of this strength +can be estimated only by the magnitude of the hindrances which man +creates for himself, by his inclinations. Vices, the brood of unlawful +dispositions, are the monsters that he has to combat; wherefore this +moral strength as fortitude (fortitudo moralis) constitutes the +greatest and only true martial glory of man; it is also called the +true wisdom, namely, the practical, because it makes the ultimate +end of the existence of man on earth its own end. Its possession alone +makes man free, healthy, rich, a king, etc., nor either chance or fate +deprive him of this, since he possesses himself, and the virtuous +cannot lose his virtue. + +All the encomiums bestowed on the ideal of humanity in its moral +perfection can lose nothing of their practical reality by the examples +of what men now are, have been, or will probably be hereafter; +anthropology which proceeds from mere empirical knowledge cannot +impair anthroponomy which is erected by the unconditionally +legislating reason; and although virtue may now and then be called +meritorious (in relation to men, not to the law), and be worthy of +reward, yet in itself, as it is its own end, so also it must be +regarded as its own reward. + +Virtue considered in its complete perfection is, therefore, regarded +not as if man possessed virtue, but as if virtue possessed the man, +since in the former case it would appear as though he had still had +the choice (for which he would then require another virtue, in order +to select virtue from all other wares offered to him). To conceive a +plurality of virtues (as we unavoidably must) is nothing else but to +conceive various moral objects to which the (rational) will is led +by the single principle of virtue; and it is the same with the +opposite vices. The expression which personifies both is a contrivance +for affecting the sensibility, pointing, however, to a moral sense. +Hence it follows that an aesthetic of morals is not a part, but a +subjective exposition of the Metaphysic of Morals; in which the +emotions that accompany the force of the moral law make the that force +to be felt; for example: disgust, horror, etc., which gives a sensible +moral aversion in order to gain the precedence from the merely +sensible incitement. + + + + + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 180} + +XV. Of the Principle on which Ethics is separated from + + Jurisprudence + + + +This separation on which the subdivision of moral philosophy in +general rests, is founded on this: that the notion of freedom, which +is common to both, makes it necessary to divide duties into those of +external and those of internal freedom; the latter of which alone +are ethical. Hence this internal freedom which is the condition of all +ethical duty must be discussed as a preliminary (discursus +praeliminaris), just as above the doctrine of conscience was discussed +as the condition of all duty. + + + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 185} + + REMARKS + + + +Of the Doctrine of Virtue on the Principle Of Internal Freedom. + + + +Habit (habitus) is a facility of action and a subjective +perfection of the elective will. But not every such facility is a free +habit (habitus libertatis); for if it is custom (assuetudo), that +is, a uniformity of action which, by frequent repetition, has become a +necessity, then it is not a habit proceeding from freedom, and +therefore not a moral habit. Virtue therefore cannot be defined as a +habit of free law-abiding actions, unless indeed we add "determining +itself in its action by the idea of the law"; and then this habit is +not a property of the elective will, but of the rational will, which +is a faculty that in adopting a rule also declares it to be a +universal law, and it is only such a habit that can be reckoned as +virtue. Two things are required for internal freedom: to be master +of oneself in a given case (animus sui compos) and to have command +over oneself (imperium in semetipsum), that is to subdue his +emotions and to govern his passions. With these conditions, the +character (indoles) is noble (erecta); in the opposite case, it is +ignoble (indoles abjecta serva). + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 190} + + + + + +XVI. Virtue requires, first of all, Command over Oneself + + + +Emotions and passions are essentially distinct; the former belong to +feeling in so far as this coming before reflection makes it more +difficult or even impossible. Hence emotion is called hasty (animus +praeceps). And reason declares through the notion of virtue that a man +should collect himself; but this weakness in the life of one's +understanding, joined with the strength of a mental excitement, is +only a lack of virtue (Untugend), and as it were a weak and childish +thing, which may very well consist with the best will, and has further +this one good thing in it, that this storm soon subsides. A propensity +to emotion (e.g., resentment) is therefore not so closely related to +vice as passion is. Passion, on the other hand, is the sensible +appetite grown into a permanent inclination (e. g., hatred in contrast +to resentment). The calmness with which one indulges it leaves room +for reflection and allows the mind to frame principles thereon for +itself; and thus when the inclination falls upon what contradicts +the law, to brood on it, to allow it to root itself deeply, and +thereby to take up evil (as of set purpose) into one's maxim; and this +is then specifically evil, that is, it is a true vice. + +Virtue, therefore, in so far as it is based on internal freedom, +contains a positive command for man, namely, that he should bring +all his powers and inclinations under his rule (that of reason); and +this is a positive precept of command over himself which is additional +to the prohibition, namely, that he should not allow himself to be +governed by his feelings and inclinations (the duty of apathy); since, +unless reason takes the reins of government into its own hands, the +feelings and inclinations play the master over the man. + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 195} + + + + + +XVII. Virtue necessarily presupposes Apathy (considered as + + Strength) + + + +This word (apathy) has come into bad repute, just as if it meant +want of feeling, and therefore subjective indifference with respect to +the objects of the elective will; it is supposed to be a weakness. +This misconception may be avoided by giving the name moral apathy to +that want of emotion which is to be distinguished from indifference. +In the former, the feelings arising from sensible impressions lose +their influence on the moral feeling only because the respect for +the law is more powerful than all of them together. It is only the +apparent strength of a fever patient that makes even the lively +sympathy with good rise to an emotion, or rather degenerate into it. +Such an emotion is called enthusiasm, and it is with reference to this +that we are to explain the moderation which is usually recommended +in virtuous practices: + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 200} + + + + Insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus uniqui + + Ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam. * + + + +* Horace. ["Let the wise man bear the name of fool, and the just of +unjust, if he pursue virtue herself beyond the proper bounds."] + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 205} + + + +For otherwise it is absurd to imagine that one could be too wise +or too virtuous. The emotion always belongs to the sensibility, no +matter by what sort of object it may be excited. The true strength +of virtue is the mind at rest, with a firm, deliberate resolution to +bring its law into practice. That is the state of health in the +moral life; on the contrary, the emotion, even when it is excited by +the idea of the good, is a momentary glitter which leaves exhaustion +after it. We may apply the term fantastically virtuous to the man +who will admit nothing to be indifferent in respect of morality +(adiaphora), and who strews all his steps with duties, as with +traps, and will not allow it to be indifferent whether a man eats fish +or flesh, drink beer or wine, when both agree with him; a micrology +which, if adopted into the doctrine of virtue, would make its rule a +tyranny. + + + + REMARK + + + + {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 210} + +Virtue is always in progress, and yet always begins from the +beginning. The former follows from the fact that, objectively +considered, it is an ideal and unattainable, and yet it is a duty +constantly to approximate to it. The second is founded subjectively on +the nature of man which is affected by inclinations, under the +influence of which virtue, with its maxims adopted once for all, can +never settle in a position of rest; but, if it is not rising, +inevitably falls; because moral maxims cannot, like technical, be +based on custom (for this belongs to the physical character of the +determination of will); but even if the practice of them become a +custom, the agent would thereby lose the freedom in the choice of +his maxims, which freedom is the character of an action done from +duty. + +ON_CONSCIENCE + + ON CONSCIENCE + + + +The consciousness of an internal tribunal in man (before which +"his thoughts accuse or excuse one another") is CONSCIENCE. + +Every man has a conscience, and finds himself observed by an +inward judge which threatens and keeps him in awe (reverence +combined with fear); and this power which watches over the laws within +him is not something which he himself (arbitrarily) makes, but it is +incorporated in his being. It follows him like his shadow, when he +thinks to escape. He may indeed stupefy himself with pleasures and +distractions, but cannot avoid now and then coming to himself or +awaking, and then he at once perceives its awful voice. In his +utmost depravity, he may, indeed, pay no attention to it, but he +cannot avoid hearing it. + +Now this original intellectual and (as a conception of duty) moral +capacity, called conscience, has this peculiarity in it, that although +its business is a business of man with himself, yet he finds himself +compelled by his reason to transact it as if at the command of another +person. For the transaction here is the conduct of a trial (causa) +before a tribunal. But that he who is accused by his conscience should +be conceived as one and the same person with the judge is an absurd +conception of a judicial court; for then the complainant would +always lose his case. Therefore, in all duties the conscience of the +man must regard another than himself as the judge of his actions, if +it is to avoid self-contradiction. Now this other may be an actual +or a merely ideal person which reason frames to itself. Such an +idealized person (the authorized judge of conscience) must be one +who knows the heart; for the tribunal is set up in the inward part +of man; at the same time he must also be all-obliging, that is, must +be or be conceived as a person in respect of whom all duties are to be +regarded as his commands; since conscience is the inward judge of +all free actions. Now, since such a moral being must at the same +time possess all power (in heaven and earth), since otherwise he could +not give his commands their proper effect (which the office of judge +necessarily requires), and since such a moral being possessing power +over all is called GOD, hence conscience must be conceived as the +subjective principle of a responsibility for one's deeds before God; +nay, this latter concept is contained (though it be only obscurely) in +every moral self-consciousness. + + + THE END + + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, by +Immanuel Kant + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS *** + +***** This file should be named 5684.txt or 5684.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/5/6/8/5684/ + +Produced by Matthew Stapleton. + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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