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diff --git a/5682.txt b/5682.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d40d124 --- /dev/null +++ b/5682.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3437 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals +by Immanuel Kant +(#2 in our series by Immanuel Kant) + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world. Be sure to check the +copyright laws for your country before downloading or redistributing +this or any other Project Gutenberg eBook. + +This header should be the first thing seen when viewing this Project +Gutenberg file. Please do not remove it. Do not change or edit the +header without written permission. + +Please read the "legal small print," and other information about the +eBook and Project Gutenberg at the bottom of this file. Included is +important information about your specific rights and restrictions in +how the file may be used. You can also find out about how to make a +donation to Project Gutenberg, and how to get involved. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**eBooks Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*****These eBooks Were Prepared By Thousands of Volunteers!***** + + +Title: Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals + +Author: Immanuel Kant + +Release Date: May, 2004 [EBook #5682] +This file was first posted on August 7, 2002 +Last Updated: September 30, 2016 + +Edition: 10 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS *** + + + + +This eBook was prepared by Matthew Stapleton. + + + + 1785 + + FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS + + by Immanuel Kant + + translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott + + +PREFACE + + + +Ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three sciences: physics, +ethics, and logic. This division is perfectly suitable to the nature +of the thing; and the only improvement that can be made in it is to +add the principle on which it is based, so that we may both satisfy +ourselves of its completeness, and also be able to determine correctly +the necessary subdivisions. + +All rational knowledge is either material or formal: the former +considers some object, the latter is concerned only with the form of +the understanding and of the reason itself, and with the universal +laws of thought in general without distinction of its objects. +Formal philosophy is called logic. Material philosophy, however, which has +to do with determinate objects and the laws to which they are subject, +is again twofold; for these laws are either laws of nature or of +freedom. The science of the former is physics, that of the latter, +ethics; they are also called natural philosophy and moral philosophy +respectively. + +Logic cannot have any empirical part; that is, a part in which the +universal and necessary laws of thought should rest on grounds taken +from experience; otherwise it would not be logic, i.e., a canon for +the understanding or the reason, valid for all thought, and capable of +demonstration. Natural and moral philosophy, on the contrary, can each +have their empirical part, since the former has to determine the +laws of nature as an object of experience; the latter the laws of +the human will, so far as it is affected by nature: the former, +however, being laws according to which everything does happen; the +latter, laws according to which everything ought to happen. Ethics, +however, must also consider the conditions under which what ought to +happen frequently does not. + +We may call all philosophy empirical, so far as it is based on +grounds of experience: on the other hand, that which delivers its +doctrines from a priori principles alone we may call pure +philosophy. When the latter is merely formal it is logic; if it is +restricted to definite objects of the understanding it is metaphysic. + +In this way there arises the idea of a twofold metaphysic- a +metaphysic of nature and a metaphysic of morals. Physics will thus +have an empirical and also a rational part. It is the same with +Ethics; but here the empirical part might have the special name of +practical anthropology, the name morality being appropriated to the +rational part. + +All trades, arts, and handiworks have gained by division of +labour, namely, when, instead of one man doing everything, each +confines himself to a certain kind of work distinct from others in the +treatment it requires, so as to be able to perform it with greater +facility and in the greatest perfection. Where the different kinds +of work are not distinguished and divided, where everyone is a +jack-of-all-trades, there manufactures remain still in the greatest +barbarism. It might deserve to be considered whether pure philosophy +in all its parts does not require a man specially devoted to it, and +whether it would not be better for the whole business of science if +those who, to please the tastes of the public, are wont to blend the +rational and empirical elements together, mixed in all sorts of +proportions unknown to themselves, and who call themselves independent +thinkers, giving the name of minute philosophers to those who apply +themselves to the rational part only- if these, I say, were warned not +to carry on two employments together which differ widely in the +treatment they demand, for each of which perhaps a special talent is +required, and the combination of which in one person only produces +bunglers. But I only ask here whether the nature of science does not +require that we should always carefully separate the empirical from +the rational part, and prefix to Physics proper (or empirical physics) +a metaphysic of nature, and to practical anthropology a metaphysic +of morals, which must be carefully cleared of everything empirical, so +that we may know how much can be accomplished by pure reason in both +cases, and from what sources it draws this its a priori teaching, +and that whether the latter inquiry is conducted by all moralists +(whose name is legion), or only by some who feel a calling thereto. + +As my concern here is with moral philosophy, I limit the question +suggested to this: Whether it is not of the utmost necessity to +construct a pure thing which is only empirical and which belongs to +anthropology? for that such a philosophy must be possible is evident +from the common idea of duty and of the moral laws. Everyone must +admit that if a law is to have moral force, i.e., to be the basis of +an obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for +example, the precept, "Thou shalt not lie," is not valid for men +alone, as if other rational beings had no need to observe it; and so +with all the other moral laws properly so called; that, therefore, the +basis of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man, or in the +circumstances in the world in which he is placed, but a priori +simply in the conception of pure reason; and although any other +precept which is founded on principles of mere experience may be in +certain respects universal, yet in as far as it rests even in the +least degree on an empirical basis, perhaps only as to a motive, +such a precept, while it may be a practical rule, can never be +called a moral law. + +Thus not only are moral laws with their principles essentially +distinguished from every other kind of practical knowledge in which +there is anything empirical, but all moral philosophy rests wholly +on its pure part. When applied to man, it does not borrow the least +thing from the knowledge of man himself (anthropology), but gives laws +a priori to him as a rational being. No doubt these laws require a +judgement sharpened by experience, in order on the one hand to +distinguish in what cases they are applicable, and on the other to +procure for them access to the will of the man and effectual influence +on conduct; since man is acted on by so many inclinations that, though +capable of the idea of a practical pure reason, he is not so easily +able to make it effective in concreto in his life. + +A metaphysic of morals is therefore indispensably necessary, not +merely for speculative reasons, in order to investigate the sources of +the practical principles which are to be found a priori in our reason, +but also because morals themselves are liable to all sorts of +corruption, as long as we are without that clue and supreme canon by +which to estimate them correctly. For in order that an action should +be morally good, it is not enough that it conform to the moral law, +but it must also be done for the sake of the law, otherwise that +conformity is only very contingent and uncertain; since a principle +which is not moral, although it may now and then produce actions +conformable to the law, will also often produce actions which +contradict it. Now it is only in a pure philosophy that we can look for +the moral law in its purity and genuineness (and, in a practical +matter, this is of the utmost consequence): we must, therefore, +begin with pure philosophy (metaphysic), and without it there cannot +be any moral philosophy at all. That which mingles these pure +principles with the empirical does not deserve the name of +philosophy (for what distinguishes philosophy from common rational +knowledge is that it treats in separate sciences what the latter +only comprehends confusedly); much less does it deserve that of +moral philosophy, since by this confusion it even spoils the purity of +morals themselves, and counteracts its own end. + +Let it not be thought, however, that what is here demanded is +already extant in the propaedeutic prefixed by the celebrated Wolf +to his moral philosophy, namely, his so-called general practical +philosophy, and that, therefore, we have not to strike into an +entirely new field. Just because it was to be a general practical +philosophy, it has not taken into consideration a will of any +particular kind- say one which should be determined solely from a +priori principles without any empirical motives, and which we might +call a pure will, but volition in general, with all the actions and +conditions which belong to it in this general signification. By this +it is distinguished from a metaphysic of morals, just as general +logic, which treats of the acts and canons of thought in general, is +distinguished from transcendental philosophy, which treats of the +particular acts and canons of pure thought, i.e., that whose +cognitions are altogether a priori. For the metaphysic of morals has +to examine the idea and the principles of a possible pure will, and +not the acts and conditions of human volition generally, which for the +most part are drawn from psychology. It is true that moral laws and +duty are spoken of in the general moral philosophy (contrary indeed to +all fitness). But this is no objection, for in this respect also the +authors of that science remain true to their idea of it; they do not +distinguish the motives which are prescribed as such by reason alone +altogether a priori, and which are properly moral, from the +empirical motives which the understanding raises to general +conceptions merely by comparison of experiences; but, without noticing +the difference of their sources, and looking on them all as +homogeneous, they consider only their greater or less amount. It is in +this way they frame their notion of obligation, which, though anything +but moral, is all that can be attained in a philosophy which passes no +judgement at all on the origin of all possible practical concepts, +whether they are a priori, or only a posteriori. + +Intending to publish hereafter a metaphysic of morals, I issue in +the first instance these fundamental principles. Indeed there is +properly no other foundation for it than the critical examination of a +pure practical reason; just as that of metaphysics is the critical +examination of the pure speculative reason, already published. But +in the first place the former is not so absolutely necessary as the +latter, because in moral concerns human reason can easily be brought +to a high degree of correctness and completeness, even in the +commonest understanding, while on the contrary in its theoretic but +pure use it is wholly dialectical; and in the second place if the +critique of a pure practical Reason is to be complete, it must be +possible at the same time to show its identity with the speculative +reason in a common principle, for it can ultimately be only one and +the same reason which has to be distinguished merely in its +application. I could not, however, bring it to such completeness here, +without introducing considerations of a wholly different kind, which +would be perplexing to the reader. On this account I have adopted +the title of Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals +instead of that of a Critical Examination of the pure practical +reason. + +But in the third place, since a metaphysic of morals, in spite of +the discouraging title, is yet capable of being presented in popular +form, and one adapted to the common understanding, I find it useful to +separate from it this preliminary treatise on its fundamental +principles, in order that I may not hereafter have need to introduce +these necessarily subtle discussions into a book of a more simple +character. + +The present treatise is, however, nothing more than the +investigation and establishment of the supreme principle of +morality, and this alone constitutes a study complete in itself and +one which ought to be kept apart from every other moral investigation. +No doubt my conclusions on this weighty question, which has hitherto +been very unsatisfactorily examined, would receive much light from the +application of the same principle to the whole system, and would be +greatly confirmed by the adequacy which it exhibits throughout; but +I must forego this advantage, which indeed would be after all more +gratifying than useful, since the easy applicability of a principle +and its apparent adequacy give no very certain proof of its soundness, +but rather inspire a certain partiality, which prevents us from +examining and estimating it strictly in itself and without regard to +consequences. + +I have adopted in this work the method which I think most +suitable, proceeding analytically from common knowledge to the +determination of its ultimate principle, and again descending +synthetically from the examination of this principle and its sources +to the common knowledge in which we find it employed. The division +will, therefore, be as follows: + + + +1 FIRST SECTION. Transition from the common rational knowledge of +morality to the philosophical. + + + +2 SECOND SECTION. Transition from popular moral philosophy to the +metaphysic of morals. + + + +3 THIRD SECTION. Final step from the metaphysic of morals to the +critique of the pure practical reason. + +SEC_1 + + FIRST SECTION + + + + TRANSITION FROM THE COMMON RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE + + OF MORALITY TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL + + + +Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, +which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will. +Intelligence, wit, judgement, and the other talents of the mind, +however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as +qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many +respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad +and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, +therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good. It is +the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honour, even +health, and the general well-being and contentment with one's +condition which is called happiness, inspire pride, and often +presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the influence of +these on the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle +of acting and adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who is not +adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will, enjoying +unbroken prosperity, can never give pleasure to an impartial +rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the +indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness. + +There are even some qualities which are of service to this good will +itself and may facilitate its action, yet which have no intrinsic +unconditional value, but always presuppose a good will, and this +qualifies the esteem that we justly have for them and does not +permit us to regard them as absolutely good. Moderation in the +affections and passions, self-control, and calm deliberation are not +only good in many respects, but even seem to constitute part of the +intrinsic worth of the person; but they are far from deserving to be +called good without qualification, although they have been so +unconditionally praised by the ancients. For without the principles of +a good will, they may become extremely bad, and the coolness of a +villain not only makes him far more dangerous, but also directly makes +him more abominable in our eyes than he would have been without it. + +A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, +not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply +by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself, and +considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can +be brought about by it in favour of any inclination, nay even of the +sum total of all inclinations. Even if it should happen that, owing to +special disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly provision of a +step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish +its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve +nothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, to be +sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then, +like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing +which has its whole value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitlessness +can neither add nor take away anything from this value. It would be, +as it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it the more +conveniently in common commerce, or to attract to it the attention +of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true +connoisseurs, or to determine its value. + +There is, however, something so strange in this idea of the absolute +value of the mere will, in which no account is taken of its utility, +that notwithstanding the thorough assent of even common reason to +the idea, yet a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be the +product of mere high-flown fancy, and that we may have misunderstood +the purpose of nature in assigning reason as the governor of our will. +Therefore we will examine this idea from this point of view. + +In the physical constitution of an organized being, that is, a being +adapted suitably to the purposes of life, we assume it as a +fundamental principle that no organ for any purpose will be found +but what is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose. Now in +a being which has reason and a will, if the proper object of nature +were its conservation, its welfare, in a word, its happiness, then +nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the +reason of the creature to carry out this purpose. For all the +actions which the creature has to perform with a view to this purpose, +and the whole rule of its conduct, would be far more surely prescribed +to it by instinct, and that end would have been attained thereby +much more certainly than it ever can be by reason. Should reason +have been communicated to this favoured creature over and above, it +must only have served it to contemplate the happy constitution of +its nature, to admire it, to congratulate itself thereon, and to +feel thankful for it to the beneficent cause, but not that it should +subject its desires to that weak and delusive guidance and meddle +bunglingly with the purpose of nature. In a word, nature would have +taken care that reason should not break forth into practical exercise, +nor have the presumption, with its weak insight, to think out for +itself the plan of happiness, and of the means of attaining it. Nature +would not only have taken on herself the choice of the ends, but +also of the means, and with wise foresight would have entrusted both +to instinct. + +And, in fact, we find that the more a cultivated reason applies +itself with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness, +so much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction. And from this +circumstance there arises in many, if they are candid enough to +confess it, a certain degree of misology, that is, hatred of reason, +especially in the case of those who are most experienced in the use of +it, because after calculating all the advantages they derive, I do not +say from the invention of all the arts of common luxury, but even from +the sciences (which seem to them to be after all only a luxury of +the understanding), they find that they have, in fact, only brought +more trouble on their shoulders, rather than gained in happiness; +and they end by envying, rather than despising, the more common +stamp of men who keep closer to the guidance of mere instinct and do +not allow their reason much influence on their conduct. And this we +must admit, that the judgement of those who would very much lower +the lofty eulogies of the advantages which reason gives us in regard +to the happiness and satisfaction of life, or who would even reduce +them below zero, is by no means morose or ungrateful to the goodness +with which the world is governed, but that there lies at the root of +these judgements the idea that our existence has a different and far +nobler end, for which, and not for happiness, reason is properly +intended, and which must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme +condition to which the private ends of man must, for the most part, be +postponed. + +For as reason is not competent to guide the will with certainty in +regard to its objects and the satisfaction of all our wants (which +it to some extent even multiplies), this being an end to which an +implanted instinct would have led with much greater certainty; and +since, nevertheless, reason is imparted to us as a practical +faculty, i.e., as one which is to have influence on the will, +therefore, admitting that nature generally in the distribution of +her capacities has adapted the means to the end, its true +destination must be to produce a will, not merely good as a means to +something else, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely +necessary. This will then, though not indeed the sole and complete +good, must be the supreme good and the condition of every other, +even of the desire of happiness. Under these circumstances, there is +nothing inconsistent with the wisdom of nature in the fact that the +cultivation of the reason, which is requisite for the first and +unconditional purpose, does in many ways interfere, at least in this +life, with the attainment of the second, which is always +conditional, namely, happiness. Nay, it may even reduce it to nothing, +without nature thereby failing of her purpose. For reason recognizes +the establishment of a good will as its highest practical destination, +and in attaining this purpose is capable only of a satisfaction of its +own proper kind, namely that from the attainment of an end, which +end again is determined by reason only, notwithstanding that this +may involve many a disappointment to the ends of inclination. + +We have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be +highly esteemed for itself and is good without a view to anything +further, a notion which exists already in the sound natural +understanding, requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught, +and which in estimating the value of our actions always takes the +first place and constitutes the condition of all the rest. In order to +do this, we will take the notion of duty, which includes that of a +good will, although implying certain subjective restrictions and +hindrances. These, however, far from concealing it, or rendering it +unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine +forth so much the brighter. + +I omit here all actions which are already recognized as inconsistent +with duty, although they may be useful for this or that purpose, for +with these the question whether they are done from duty cannot arise +at all, since they even conflict with it. I also set aside those +actions which really conform to duty, but to which men have no +direct inclination, performing them because they are impelled +thereto by some other inclination. For in this case we can readily +distinguish whether the action which agrees with duty is done from +duty, or from a selfish view. It is much harder to make this +distinction when the action accords with duty and the subject has +besides a direct inclination to it. For example, it is always a matter +of duty that a dealer should not over charge an inexperienced +purchaser; and wherever there is much commerce the prudent tradesman +does not overcharge, but keeps a fixed price for everyone, so that a +child buys of him as well as any other. Men are thus honestly +served; but this is not enough to make us believe that the tradesman +has so acted from duty and from principles of honesty: his own +advantage required it; it is out of the question in this case to +suppose that he might besides have a direct inclination in favour of +the buyers, so that, as it were, from love he should give no advantage +to one over another. Accordingly the action was done neither from duty +nor from direct inclination, but merely with a selfish view. + +On the other hand, it is a duty to maintain one's life; and, in +addition, everyone has also a direct inclination to do so. But on this +account the often anxious care which most men take for it has no +intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no moral import. They preserve +their life as duty requires, no doubt, but not because duty +requires. On the other hand, if adversity and hopeless sorrow have +completely taken away the relish for life; if the unfortunate one, +strong in mind, indignant at his fate rather than desponding or +dejected, wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without +loving it- not from inclination or fear, but from duty- then his maxim +has a moral worth. + +To be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides this, there +are many minds so sympathetically constituted that, without any +other motive of vanity or self-interest, they find a pleasure in +spreading joy around them and can take delight in the satisfaction +of others so far as it is their own work. But I maintain that in +such a case an action of this kind, however proper, however amiable it +may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth, but is on a level with +other inclinations, e.g., the inclination to honour, which, if it is +happily directed to that which is in fact of public utility and +accordant with duty and consequently honourable, deserves praise and +encouragement, but not esteem. For the maxim lacks the moral import, +namely, that such actions be done from duty, not from inclination. Put +the case that the mind of that philanthropist were clouded by sorrow +of his own, extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of others, and +that, while he still has the power to benefit others in distress, he +is not touched by their trouble because he is absorbed with his own; +and now suppose that he tears himself out of this dead +insensibility, and performs the action without any inclination to +it, but simply from duty, then first has his action its genuine +moral worth. Further still; if nature has put little sympathy in the +heart of this or that man; if he, supposed to be an upright man, is by +temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others, +perhaps because in respect of his own he is provided with the +special gift of patience and fortitude and supposes, or even requires, +that others should have the same- and such a man would certainly not +be the meanest product of nature- but if nature had not specially +framed him for a philanthropist, would he not still find in himself +a source from whence to give himself a far higher worth than that of a +good-natured temperament could be? Unquestionably. It is just in +this that the moral worth of the character is brought out which is +incomparably the highest of all, namely, that he is beneficent, not +from inclination, but from duty. + +To secure one's own happiness is a duty, at least indirectly; for +discontent with one's condition, under a pressure of many anxieties +and amidst unsatisfied wants, might easily become a great temptation +to transgression of duty. But here again, without looking to duty, all +men have already the strongest and most intimate inclination to +happiness, because it is just in this idea that all inclinations are +combined in one total. But the precept of happiness is often of such a +sort that it greatly interferes with some inclinations, and yet a +man cannot form any definite and certain conception of the sum of +satisfaction of all of them which is called happiness. It is not +then to be wondered at that a single inclination, definite both as +to what it promises and as to the time within which it can be +gratified, is often able to overcome such a fluctuating idea, and that +a gouty patient, for instance, can choose to enjoy what he likes, +and to suffer what he may, since, according to his calculation, on +this occasion at least, he has not sacrificed the enjoyment of the +present moment to a possibly mistaken expectation of a happiness which +is supposed to be found in health. But even in this case, if the +general desire for happiness did not influence his will, and supposing +that in his particular case health was not a necessary element in this +calculation, there yet remains in this, as in all other cases, this +law, namely, that he should promote his happiness not from inclination +but from duty, and by this would his conduct first acquire true +moral worth. + +It is in this manner, undoubtedly, that we are to understand those +passages of Scripture also in which we are commanded to love our +neighbour, even our enemy. For love, as an affection, cannot be +commanded, but beneficence for duty's sake may; even though we are not +impelled to it by any inclination- nay, are even repelled by a natural +and unconquerable aversion. This is practical love and not +pathological- a love which is seated in the will, and not in the +propensions of sense- in principles of action and not of tender +sympathy; and it is this love alone which can be commanded. + +The second proposition is: That an action done from duty derives its +moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but +from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not +depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on +the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without +regard to any object of desire. It is clear from what precedes that +the purposes which we may have in view in our actions, or their +effects regarded as ends and springs of the will, cannot give to +actions any unconditional or moral worth. In what, then, can their +worth lie, if it is not to consist in the will and in reference to its +expected effect? It cannot lie anywhere but in the principle of the +will without regard to the ends which can be attained by the action. +For the will stands between its a priori principle, which is formal, +and its a posteriori spring, which is material, as between two roads, +and as it must be determined by something, it follows that it must be +determined by the formal principle of volition when an action is done +from duty, in which case every material principle has been withdrawn +from it. + +The third proposition, which is a consequence of the two +preceding, I would express thus: Duty is the necessity of acting from +respect for the law. I may have inclination for an object as the +effect of my proposed action, but I cannot have respect for it, just +for this reason, that it is an effect and not an energy of will. +Similarly I cannot have respect for inclination, whether my own or +another's; I can at most, if my own, approve it; if another's, +sometimes even love it; i.e., look on it as favourable to my own +interest. It is only what is connected with my will as a principle, by +no means as an effect- what does not subserve my inclination, but +overpowers it, or at least in case of choice excludes it from its +calculation- in other words, simply the law of itself, which can be an +object of respect, and hence a command. Now an action done from duty +must wholly exclude the influence of inclination and with it every +object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the +will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for +this practical law, and consequently the maxim * that I should follow +this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations. + + + +* A maxim is the subjective principle of volition. The objective +principle (i.e., that which would also serve subjectively as a +practical principle to all rational beings if reason had full power +over the faculty of desire) is the practical law. + + + +Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect +expected from it, nor in any principle of action which requires to +borrow its motive from this expected effect. For all these effects- +agreeableness of one's condition and even the promotion of the +happiness of others- could have been also brought about by other +causes, so that for this there would have been no need of the will +of a rational being; whereas it is in this alone that the supreme +and unconditional good can be found. The pre-eminent good which we +call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception +of law in itself, which certainly is only possible in a rational +being, in so far as this conception, and not the expected effect, +determines the will. This is a good which is already present in the +person who acts accordingly, and we have not to wait for it to +appear first in the result. * + + + +* It might be here objected to me that I take refuge behind the +word respect in an obscure feeling, instead of giving a distinct +solution of the question by a concept of the reason. But although +respect is a feeling, it is not a feeling received through +influence, but is self-wrought by a rational concept, and, +therefore, is specifically distinct from all feelings of the former +kind, which may be referred either to inclination or fear, What I +recognise immediately as a law for me, I recognise with respect. +This merely signifies the consciousness that my will is subordinate to +a law, without the intervention of other influences on my sense. The +immediate determination of the will by the law, and the +consciousness of this, is called respect, so that this is regarded +as an effect of the law on the subject, and not as the cause of it. +Respect is properly the conception of a worth which thwarts my +self-love. Accordingly it is something which is considered neither +as an object of inclination nor of fear, although it has something +analogous to both. The object of respect is the law only, and that the +law which we impose on ourselves and yet recognise as necessary in +itself. As a law, we are subjected too it without consulting +self-love; as imposed by us on ourselves, it is a result of our +will. In the former aspect it has an analogy to fear, in the latter to +inclination. Respect for a person is properly only respect for the law +(of honesty, etc.) of which he gives us an example. Since we also look +on the improvement of our talents as a duty, we consider that we see +in a person of talents, as it were, the example of a law (viz., to +become like him in this by exercise), and this constitutes our +respect. All so-called moral interest consists simply in respect for +the law. + + + +But what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must +determine the will, even without paying any regard to the effect +expected from it, in order that this will may be called good +absolutely and without qualification? As I have deprived the will of +every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there +remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law +in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.e., I +am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim +should become a universal law. Here, now, it is the simple +conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law +applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle +and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a +chimerical notion. The common reason of men in its practical +judgements perfectly coincides with this and always has in view the +principle here suggested. Let the question be, for example: May I when +in distress make a promise with the intention not to keep it? I +readily distinguish here between the two significations which the +question may have: Whether it is prudent, or whether it is right, to +make a false promise? The former may undoubtedly often be the case. I see +clearly indeed that it is not enough to extricate myself from a +present difficulty by means of this subterfuge, but it must be well +considered whether there may not hereafter spring from this lie much +greater inconvenience than that from which I now free myself, and +as, with all my supposed cunning, the consequences cannot be so easily +foreseen but that credit once lost may be much more injurious to me +than any mischief which I seek to avoid at present, it should be +considered whether it would not be more prudent to act herein +according to a universal maxim and to make it a habit to promise +nothing except with the intention of keeping it. But it is soon +clear to me that such a maxim will still only be based on the fear +of consequences. Now it is a wholly different thing to be truthful +from duty and to be so from apprehension of injurious consequences. In +the first case, the very notion of the action already implies a law +for me; in the second case, I must first look about elsewhere to see +what results may be combined with it which would affect myself. For to +deviate from the principle of duty is beyond all doubt wicked; but +to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often be very +advantageous to me, although to abide by it is certainly safer. The +shortest way, however, and an unerring one, to discover the answer +to this question whether a lying promise is consistent with duty, is +to ask myself, "Should I be content that my maxim (to extricate myself +from difficulty by a false promise) should hold good as a universal +law, for myself as well as for others?" and should I be able to say +to myself, "Every one may make a deceitful promise when he finds +himself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate +himself?" Then I presently become aware that while I can will the lie, +I can by no means will that lying should be a universal law. For +with such a law there would be no promises at all, since it would be +in vain to allege my intention in regard to my future actions to those +who would not believe this allegation, or if they over hastily did +so would pay me back in my own coin. Hence my maxim, as soon as it +should be made a universal law, would necessarily destroy itself. + +I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern +what I have to do in order that my will may be morally good. +Inexperienced in the course of the world, incapable of being +prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself: Canst thou also +will that thy maxim should be a universal law? If not, then it must be +rejected, and that not because of a disadvantage accruing from it to +myself or even to others, but because it cannot enter as a principle +into a possible universal legislation, and reason extorts from me +immediate respect for such legislation. I do not indeed as yet discern +on what this respect is based (this the philosopher may inquire), +but at least I understand this, that it is an estimation of the +worth which far outweighs all worth of what is recommended by +inclination, and that the necessity of acting from pure respect for +the practical law is what constitutes duty, to which every other +motive must give place, because it is the condition of a will being +good in itself, and the worth of such a will is above everything. + +Thus, then, without quitting the moral knowledge of common human +reason, we have arrived at its principle. And although, no doubt, +common men do not conceive it in such an abstract and universal +form, yet they always have it really before their eyes and use it as +the standard of their decision. Here it would be easy to show how, +with this compass in hand, men are well able to distinguish, in +every case that occurs, what is good, what bad, conformably to duty or +inconsistent with it, if, without in the least teaching them +anything new, we only, like Socrates, direct their attention to the +principle they themselves employ; and that, therefore, we do not +need science and philosophy to know what we should do to be honest and +good, yea, even wise and virtuous. Indeed we might well have +conjectured beforehand that the knowledge of what every man is bound +to do, and therefore also to know, would be within the reach of +every man, even the commonest. Here we cannot forbear admiration +when we see how great an advantage the practical judgement has over +the theoretical in the common understanding of men. In the latter, +if common reason ventures to depart from the laws of experience and +from the perceptions of the senses, it falls into mere +inconceivabilities and self-contradictions, at least into a chaos of +uncertainty, obscurity, and instability. But in the practical sphere +it is just when the common understanding excludes all sensible springs +from practical laws that its power of judgement begins to show +itself to advantage. It then becomes even subtle, whether it be that +it chicanes with its own conscience or with other claims respecting +what is to be called right, or whether it desires for its own +instruction to determine honestly the worth of actions; and, in the +latter case, it may even have as good a hope of hitting the mark as +any philosopher whatever can promise himself. Nay, it is almost more +sure of doing so, because the philosopher cannot have any other +principle, while he may easily perplex his judgement by a multitude of +considerations foreign to the matter, and so turn aside from the right +way. Would it not therefore be wiser in moral concerns to acquiesce in +the judgement of common reason, or at most only to call in +philosophy for the purpose of rendering the system of morals more +complete and intelligible, and its rules more convenient for use +(especially for disputation), but not so as to draw off the common +understanding from its happy simplicity, or to bring it by means of +philosophy into a new path of inquiry and instruction? + +Innocence is indeed a glorious thing; only, on the other hand, it is +very sad that it cannot well maintain itself and is easily seduced. On +this account even wisdom- which otherwise consists more in conduct +than in knowledge- yet has need of science, not in order to learn from +it, but to secure for its precepts admission and permanence. Against +all the commands of duty which reason represents to man as so +deserving of respect, he feels in himself a powerful counterpoise in +his wants and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums +up under the name of happiness. Now reason issues its commands +unyieldingly, without promising anything to the inclinations, and, +as it were, with disregard and contempt for these claims, which are so +impetuous, and at the same time so plausible, and which will not allow +themselves to be suppressed by any command. Hence there arises a +natural dialectic, i.e., a disposition, to argue against these +strict laws of duty and to question their validity, or at least +their purity and strictness; and, if possible, to make them more +accordant with our wishes and inclinations, that is to say, to corrupt +them at their very source, and entirely to destroy their worth- a +thing which even common practical reason cannot ultimately call good. + +Thus is the common reason of man compelled to go out of its +sphere, and to take a step into the field of a practical philosophy, +not to satisfy any speculative want (which never occurs to it as +long as it is content to be mere sound reason), but even on +practical grounds, in order to attain in it information and clear +instruction respecting the source of its principle, and the correct +determination of it in opposition to the maxims which are based on +wants and inclinations, so that it may escape from the perplexity of +opposite claims and not run the risk of losing all genuine moral +principles through the equivocation into which it easily falls. +Thus, when practical reason cultivates itself, there insensibly arises +in it a dialetic which forces it to seek aid in philosophy, just as +happens to it in its theoretic use; and in this case, therefore, as +well as in the other, it will find rest nowhere but in a thorough +critical examination of our reason. + +SEC_2 + + SECOND SECTION + + + + TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY + + TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS + + + +If we have hitherto drawn our notion of duty from the common use +of our practical reason, it is by no means to be inferred that we have +treated it as an empirical notion. On the contrary, if we attend to +the experience of men's conduct, we meet frequent and, as we ourselves +allow, just complaints that one cannot find a single certain example +of the disposition to act from pure duty. Although many things are +done in conformity with what duty prescribes, it is nevertheless +always doubtful whether they are done strictly from duty, so as to +have a moral worth. Hence there have at all times been philosophers +who have altogether denied that this disposition actually exists at +all in human actions, and have ascribed everything to a more or less +refined self-love. Not that they have on that account questioned the +soundness of the conception of morality; on the contrary, they spoke +with sincere regret of the frailty and corruption of human nature, +which, though noble enough to take its rule an idea so worthy of +respect, is yet weak to follow it and employs reason which ought to +give it the law only for the purpose of providing for the interest +of the inclinations, whether singly or at the best in the greatest +possible harmony with one another. + +In fact, it is absolutely impossible to make out by experience +with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action, +however right in itself, rested simply on moral grounds and on the +conception of duty. Sometimes it happens that with the sharpest +self-examination we can find nothing beside the moral principle of +duty which could have been powerful enough to move us to this or +that action and to so great a sacrifice; yet we cannot from this infer +with certainty that it was not really some secret impulse of +self-love, under the false appearance of duty, that was the actual +determining cause of the will. We like them to flatter ourselves by +falsely taking credit for a more noble motive; whereas in fact we +can never, even by the strictest examination, get completely behind +the secret springs of action; since, when the question is of moral +worth, it is not with the actions which we see that we are +concerned, but with those inward principles of them which we do not +see. + +Moreover, we cannot better serve the wishes of those who ridicule +all morality as a mere chimera of human imagination over stepping +itself from vanity, than by conceding to them that notions of duty +must be drawn only from experience (as from indolence, people are +ready to think is also the case with all other notions); for or is +to prepare for them a certain triumph. I am willing to admit out of +love of humanity that even most of our actions are correct, but if +we look closer at them we everywhere come upon the dear self which +is always prominent, and it is this they have in view and not the +strict command of duty which would often require self-denial. +Without being an enemy of virtue, a cool observer, one that does not +mistake the wish for good, however lively, for its reality, may +sometimes doubt whether true virtue is actually found anywhere in +the world, and this especially as years increase and the judgement +is partly made wiser by experience and partly, also, more acute in +observation. This being so, nothing can secure us from falling away +altogether from our ideas of duty, or maintain in the soul a +well-grounded respect for its law, but the clear conviction that +although there should never have been actions which really sprang from +such pure sources, yet whether this or that takes place is not at +all the question; but that reason of itself, independent on all +experience, ordains what ought to take place, that accordingly actions +of which perhaps the world has hitherto never given an example, the +feasibility even of which might be very much doubted by one who founds +everything on experience, are nevertheless inflexibly commanded by +reason; that, e.g., even though there might never yet have been a +sincere friend, yet not a whit the less is pure sincerity in +friendship required of every man, because, prior to all experience, +this duty is involved as duty in the idea of a reason determining +the will by a priori principles. + +When we add further that, unless we deny that the notion of morality +has any truth or reference to any possible object, we must admit +that its law must be valid, not merely for men but for all rational +creatures generally, not merely under certain contingent conditions or +with exceptions but with absolute necessity, then it is clear that +no experience could enable us to infer even the possibility of such +apodeictic laws. For with what right could we bring into unbounded +respect as a universal precept for every rational nature that which +perhaps holds only under the contingent conditions of humanity? Or how +could laws of the determination of our will be regarded as laws of the +determination of the will of rational beings generally, and for us +only as such, if they were merely empirical and did not take their +origin wholly a priori from pure but practical reason? + +Nor could anything be more fatal to morality than that we should +wish to derive it from examples. For every example of it that is set +before me must be first itself tested by principles of morality, +whether it is worthy to serve as an original example, i.e., as a +pattern; but by no means can it authoritatively furnish the conception +of morality. Even the Holy One of the Gospels must first be compared +with our ideal of moral perfection before we can recognise Him as +such; and so He says of Himself, "Why call ye Me (whom you see) +good; none is good (the model of good) but God only (whom ye do not +see)?" But whence have we the conception of God as the supreme good? +Simply from the idea of moral perfection, which reason frames a priori +and connects inseparably with the notion of a free will. Imitation +finds no place at all in morality, and examples serve only for +encouragement, i.e., they put beyond doubt the feasibility of what the +law commands, they make visible that which the practical rule +expresses more generally, but they can never authorize us to set aside +the true original which lies in reason and to guide ourselves by +examples. + +If then there is no genuine supreme principle of morality but what +must rest simply on pure reason, independent of all experience, I +think it is not necessary even to put the question whether it is +good to exhibit these concepts in their generality (in abstracto) as +they are established a priori along with the principles belonging to +them, if our knowledge is to be distinguished from the vulgar and to +be called philosophical. + +In our times indeed this might perhaps be necessary; for if we +collected votes whether pure rational knowledge separated from +everything empirical, that is to say, metaphysic of morals, or whether +popular practical philosophy is to be preferred, it is easy to guess +which side would preponderate. + +This descending to popular notions is certainly very commendable, if +the ascent to the principles of pure reason has first taken place +and been satisfactorily accomplished. This implies that we first found +ethics on metaphysics, and then, when it is firmly established, +procure a hearing for it by giving it a popular character. But it is +quite absurd to try to be popular in the first inquiry, on which the +soundness of the principles depends. It is not only that this +proceeding can never lay claim to the very rare merit of a true +philosophical popularity, since there is no art in being +intelligible if one renounces all thoroughness of insight; but also it +produces a disgusting medley of compiled observations and +half-reasoned principles. Shallow pates enjoy this because it can be +used for every-day chat, but the sagacious find in it only +confusion, and being unsatisfied and unable to help themselves, they +turn away their eyes, while philosophers, who see quite well through +this delusion, are little listened to when they call men off for a +time from this pretended popularity, in order that they might be +rightfully popular after they have attained a definite insight. + +We need only look at the attempts of moralists in that favourite +fashion, and we shall find at one time the special constitution of +human nature (including, however, the idea of a rational nature +generally), at one time perfection, at another happiness, here moral +sense, there fear of God. a little of this, and a little of that, in +marvellous mixture, without its occurring to them to ask whether the +principles of morality are to be sought in the knowledge of human +nature at all (which we can have only from experience); or, if this is +not so, if these principles are to be found altogether a priori, +free from everything empirical, in pure rational concepts only and +nowhere else, not even in the smallest degree; then rather to adopt +the method of making this a separate inquiry, as pure practical +philosophy, or (if one may use a name so decried) as metaphysic of +morals, * to bring it by itself to completeness, and to require the +public, which wishes for popular treatment, to await the issue of this +undertaking. + + + +* Just as pure mathematics are distinguished from applied, pure +logic from applied, so if we choose we may also distinguish pure +philosophy of morals (metaphysic) from applied (viz., applied to human +nature). By this designation we are also at once reminded that moral +principles are not based on properties of human nature, but must +subsist a priori of themselves, while from such principles practical +rules must be capable of being deduced for every rational nature, +and accordingly for that of man. + + + +Such a metaphysic of morals, completely isolated, not mixed with any +anthropology, theology, physics, or hyperphysics, and still less +with occult qualities (which we might call hypophysical), is not +only an indispensable substratum of all sound theoretical knowledge of +duties, but is at the same time a desideratum of the highest +importance to the actual fulfilment of their precepts. For the pure +conception of duty, unmixed with any foreign addition of empirical +attractions, and, in a word, the conception of the moral law, +exercises on the human heart, by way of reason alone (which first +becomes aware with this that it can of itself be practical), an +influence so much more powerful than all other springs * which may be +derived from the field of experience, that, in the consciousness of +its worth, it despises the latter, and can by degrees become their +master; whereas a mixed ethics, compounded partly of motives drawn +from feelings and inclinations, and partly also of conceptions of +reason, must make the mind waver between motives which cannot be +brought under any principle, which lead to good only by mere +accident and very often also to evil. + + + +* I have a letter from the late excellent Sulzer, in which he asks +me what can be the reason that moral instruction, although containing +much that is convincing for the reason, yet accomplishes so little? My +answer was postponed in order that I might make it complete. But it is +simply this: that the teachers themselves have not got their own +notions clear, and when they endeavour to make up for this by raking +up motives of moral goodness from every quarter, trying to make +their physic right strong, they spoil it. For the commonest +understanding shows that if we imagine, on the one hand, an act of +honesty done with steadfast mind, apart from every view to advantage +of any kind in this world or another, and even under the greatest +temptations of necessity or allurement, and, on the other hand, a +similar act which was affected, in however low a degree, by a +foreign motive, the former leaves far behind and eclipses the +second; it elevates the soul and inspires the wish to be able to act +in like manner oneself. Even moderately young children feel this +impression, ana one should never represent duties to them in any other +light. + + + +From what has been said, it is clear that all moral conceptions have +their seat and origin completely a priori in the reason, and that, +moreover, in the commonest reason just as truly as in that which is in +the highest degree speculative; that they cannot be obtained by +abstraction from any empirical, and therefore merely contingent, +knowledge; that it is just this purity of their origin that makes them +worthy to serve as our supreme practical principle, and that just in +proportion as we add anything empirical, we detract from their genuine +influence and from the absolute value of actions; that it is not +only of the greatest necessity, in a purely speculative point of view, +but is also of the greatest practical importance, to derive these +notions and laws from pure reason, to present them pure and unmixed, +and even to determine the compass of this practical or pure rational +knowledge, i.e., to determine the whole faculty of pure practical +reason; and, in doing so, we must not make its principles dependent on +the particular nature of human reason, though in speculative +philosophy this may be permitted, or may even at times be necessary; +but since moral laws ought to hold good for every rational creature, +we must derive them from the general concept of a rational being. In +this way, although for its application to man morality has need of +anthropology, yet, in the first instance, we must treat it +independently as pure philosophy, i.e., as metaphysic, complete in +itself (a thing which in such distinct branches of science is easily +done); knowing well that unless we are in possession of this, it would +not only be vain to determine the moral element of duty in right +actions for purposes of speculative criticism, but it would be +impossible to base morals on their genuine principles, even for common +practical purposes, especially of moral instruction, so as to +produce pure moral dispositions, and to engraft them on men's minds to +the promotion of the greatest possible good in the world. + +But in order that in this study we may not merely advance by the +natural steps from the common moral judgement (in this case very +worthy of respect) to the philosophical, as has been already done, but +also from a popular philosophy, which goes no further than it can +reach by groping with the help of examples, to metaphysic (which +does allow itself to be checked by anything empirical and, as it +must measure the whole extent of this kind of rational knowledge, goes +as far as ideal conceptions, where even examples fail us), we must +follow and clearly describe the practical faculty of reason, from +the general rules of its determination to the point where the notion +of duty springs from it. + +Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings +alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of +laws, that is according to principles, i.e., have a will. Since the +deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is +nothing but practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the +will, then the actions of such a being which are recognised as +objectively necessary are subjectively necessary also, i.e., the +will is a faculty to choose that only which reason independent of +inclination recognises as practically necessary, i.e., as good. But if +reason of itself does not sufficiently determine the will, if the +latter is subject also to subjective conditions (particular +impulses) which do not always coincide with the objective +conditions; in a word, if the will does not in itself completely +accord with reason (which is actually the case with men), then the +actions which objectively are recognised as necessary are subjectively +contingent, and the determination of such a will according to +objective laws is obligation, that is to say, the relation of the +objective laws to a will that is not thoroughly good is conceived as +the determination of the will of a rational being by principles of +reason, but which the will from its nature does not of necessity +follow. + +The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is +obligatory for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the +formula of the command is called an imperative. + +All imperatives are expressed by the word ought [or shall], and +thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will, +which from its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined +by it (an obligation). They say that something would be good to do +or to forbear, but they say it to a will which does not always do a +thing because it is conceived to be good to do it. That is practically +good, however, which determines the will by means of the conceptions +of reason, and consequently not from subjective causes, but +objectively, that is on principles which are valid for every +rational being as such. It is distinguished from the pleasant, as that +which influences the will only by means of sensation from merely +subjective causes, valid only for the sense of this or that one, and +not as a principle of reason, which holds for every one. * + + + +* The dependence of the desires on sensations is called +inclination, and this accordingly always indicates a want. The +dependence of a contingently determinable will on principles of reason +is called an interest. This therefore, is found only in the case of +a dependent will which does not always of itself conform to reason; in +the Divine will we cannot conceive any interest. But the human will +can also take an interest in a thing without therefore acting from +interest. The former signifies the practical interest in the action, +the latter the pathological in the object of the action. The former +indicates only dependence of the will on principles of reason in +themselves; the second, dependence on principles of reason for the +sake of inclination, reason supplying only the practical rules how the +requirement of the inclination may be satisfied. In the first case the +action interests me; in the second the object of the action (because +it is pleasant to me). We have seen in the first section that in an +action done from duty we must look not to the interest in the +object, but only to that in the action itself, and in its rational +principle (viz., the law). + + + +A perfectly good will would therefore be equally subject to +objective laws (viz., laws of good), but could not be conceived as +obliged thereby to act lawfully, because of itself from its subjective +constitution it can only be determined by the conception of good. +Therefore no imperatives hold for the Divine will, or in general for a +holy will; ought is here out of place, because the volition is already +of itself necessarily in unison with the law. Therefore imperatives +are only formulae to express the relation of objective laws of all +volition to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that +rational being, e.g., the human will. + +Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or +categorically. The former represent the practical necessity of a +possible action as means to something else that is willed (or at least +which one might possibly will). The categorical imperative would be +that which represented an action as necessary of itself without +reference to another end, i.e., as objectively necessary. + +Since every practical law represents a possible action as good +and, on this account, for a subject who is practically determinable by +reason, necessary, all imperatives are formulae determining an +action which is necessary according to the principle of a will good in +some respects. If now the action is good only as a means to +something else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is +conceived as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily +the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is +categorical. + +Thus the imperative declares what action possible by me would be +good and presents the practical rule in relation to a will which +does not forthwith perform an action simply because it is good, +whether because the subject does not always know that it is good, or +because, even if it know this, yet its maxims might be opposed to +the objective principles of practical reason. + +Accordingly the hypothetical imperative only says that the action is +good for some purpose, possible or actual. In the first case it is a +problematical, in the second an assertorial practical principle. The +categorical imperative which declares an action to be objectively +necessary in itself without reference to any purpose, i.e., without +any other end, is valid as an apodeictic (practical) principle. + +Whatever is possible only by the power of some rational being may +also be conceived as a possible purpose of some will; and therefore +the principles of action as regards the means necessary to attain some +possible purpose are in fact infinitely numerous. All sciences have +a practical part, consisting of problems expressing that some end is +possible for us and of imperatives directing how it may be attained. +These may, therefore, be called in general imperatives of skill. +Here there is no question whether the end is rational and good, but +only what one must do in order to attain it. The precepts for the +physician to make his patient thoroughly healthy, and for a poisoner +to ensure certain death, are of equal value in this respect, that each +serves to effect its purpose perfectly. Since in early youth it cannot +be known what ends are likely to occur to us in the course of life, +parents seek to have their children taught a great many things, and +provide for their skill in the use of means for all sorts of arbitrary +ends, of none of which can they determine whether it may not perhaps +hereafter be an object to their pupil, but which it is at all events +possible that he might aim at; and this anxiety is so great that +they commonly neglect to form and correct their judgement on the value +of the things which may be chosen as ends. + +There is one end, however, which may be assumed to be actually +such to all rational beings (so far as imperatives apply to them, +viz., as dependent beings), and, therefore, one purpose which they not +merely may have, but which we may with certainty assume that they +all actually have by a natural necessity, and this is happiness. The +hypothetical imperative which expresses the practical necessity of +an action as means to the advancement of happiness is assertorial. +We are not to present it as necessary for an uncertain and merely +possible purpose, but for a purpose which we may presuppose with +certainty and a priori in every man, because it belongs to his +being. Now skill in the choice of means to his own greatest well-being +may be called prudence, * in the narrowest sense. And thus the +imperative which refers to the choice of means to one's own happiness, +i.e., the precept of prudence, is still always hypothetical; the +action is not commanded absolutely, but only as means to another +purpose. + + + +* The word prudence is taken in two senses: in the one it may bear +the name of knowledge of the world, in the other that of private +prudence. The former is a man's ability to influence others so as to +use them for his own purposes. The latter is the sagacity to combine +all these purposes for his own lasting benefit. This latter is +properly that to which the value even of the former is reduced, and +when a man is prudent in the former sense, but not in the latter, we +might better say of him that he is clever and cunning, but, on the +whole, imprudent. + + + +Finally, there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct +immediately, without having as its condition any other purpose to be +attained by it. This imperative is categorical. It concerns not the +matter of the action, or its intended result, but its form and the +principle of which it is itself a result; and what is essentially good +in it consists in the mental disposition, let the consequence be +what it may. This imperative may be called that of morality. + +There is a marked distinction also between the volitions on these +three sorts of principles in the dissimilarity of the obligation of +the will. In order to mark this difference more clearly, I think +they would be most suitably named in their order if we said they are +either rules of skill, or counsels of prudence, or commands (laws) +of morality. For it is law only that involves the conception of an +unconditional and objective necessity, which is consequently +universally valid; and commands are laws which must be obeyed, that +is, must be followed, even in opposition to inclination. Counsels, +indeed, involve necessity, but one which can only hold under a +contingent subjective condition, viz., they depend on whether this +or that man reckons this or that as part of his happiness; the +categorical imperative, on the contrary, is not limited by any +condition, and as being absolutely, although practically, necessary, +may be quite properly called a command. We might also call the first +kind of imperatives technical (belonging to art), the second +pragmatic * (to welfare), the third moral (belonging to free conduct +generally, that is, to morals). + + + +* It seems to me that the proper signification of the word +pragmatic may be most accurately defined in this way. For sanctions +are called pragmatic which flow properly not from the law of the +states as necessary enactments, but from precaution for the general +welfare. A history is composed pragmatically when it teaches prudence, +i.e., instructs the world how it can provide for its interests better, +or at least as well as, the men of former time. + + + +Now arises the question, how are all these imperatives possible? +This question does not seek to know how we can conceive the +accomplishment of the action which the imperative ordains, but +merely how we can conceive the obligation of the will which the +imperative expresses. No special explanation is needed to show how +an imperative of skill is possible. Whoever wills the end, wills +also (so far as reason decides his conduct) the means in his power +which are indispensably necessary thereto. This proposition is, as +regards the volition, analytical; for, in willing an object as my +effect, there is already thought the causality of myself as an +acting cause, that is to say, the use of the means; and the imperative +educes from the conception of volition of an end the conception of +actions necessary to this end. Synthetical propositions must no +doubt be employed in defining the means to a proposed end; but they do +not concern the principle, the act of the will, but the object and its +realization. E.g., that in order to bisect a line on an unerring +principle I must draw from its extremities two intersecting arcs; this +no doubt is taught by mathematics only in synthetical propositions; +but if I know that it is only by this process that the intended +operation can be performed, then to say that, if I fully will the +operation, I also will the action required for it, is an analytical +proposition; for it is one and the same thing to conceive something as +an effect which I can produce in a certain way, and to conceive myself +as acting in this way. + +If it were only equally easy to give a definite conception of +happiness, the imperatives of prudence would correspond exactly with +those of skill, and would likewise be analytical. For in this case +as in that, it could be said: "Whoever wills the end, wills also +(according to the dictate of reason necessarily) the indispensable +means thereto which are in his power." But, unfortunately, the +notion of happiness is so indefinite that although every man wishes to +attain it, yet he never can say definitely and consistently what it is +that he really wishes and wills. The reason of this is that all the +elements which belong to the notion of happiness are altogether +empirical, i.e., they must be borrowed from experience, and +nevertheless the idea of happiness requires an absolute whole, a +maximum of welfare in my present and all future circumstances. Now +it is impossible that the most clear-sighted and at the same time most +powerful being (supposed finite) should frame to himself a definite +conception of what he really wills in this. Does he will riches, how +much anxiety, envy, and snares might he not thereby draw upon his +shoulders? Does he will knowledge and discernment, perhaps it might +prove to be only an eye so much the sharper to show him so much the +more fearfully the evils that are now concealed from him, and that +cannot be avoided, or to impose more wants on his desires, which +already give him concern enough. Would he have long life? who +guarantees to him that it would not be a long misery? would he at +least have health? how often has uneasiness of the body restrained +from excesses into which perfect health would have allowed one to +fall? and so on. In short, he is unable, on any principle, to +determine with certainty what would make him truly happy; because to +do so he would need to be omniscient. We cannot therefore act on any +definite principles to secure happiness, but only on empirical +counsels, e.g. of regimen, frugality, courtesy, reserve, etc., which +experience teaches do, on the average, most promote well-being. +Hence it follows that the imperatives of prudence do not, strictly +speaking, command at all, that is, they cannot present actions +objectively as practically necessary; that they are rather to be +regarded as counsels (consilia) than precepts precepts of reason, that +the problem to determine certainly and universally what action would +promote the happiness of a rational being is completely insoluble, and +consequently no imperative respecting it is possible which should, +in the strict sense, command to do what makes happy; because happiness +is not an ideal of reason but of imagination, resting solely on +empirical grounds, and it is vain to expect that these should define +an action by which one could attain the totality of a series of +consequences which is really endless. This imperative of prudence +would however be an analytical proposition if we assume that the means +to happiness could be certainly assigned; for it is distinguished from +the imperative of skill only by this, that in the latter the end is +merely possible, in the former it is given; as however both only +ordain the means to that which we suppose to be willed as an end, it +follows that the imperative which ordains the willing of the means +to him who wills the end is in both cases analytical. Thus there is no +difficulty in regard to the possibility of an imperative of this +kind either. + +On the other hand, the question how the imperative of morality is +possible, is undoubtedly one, the only one, demanding a solution, as +this is not at all hypothetical, and the objective necessity which +it presents cannot rest on any hypothesis, as is the case with the +hypothetical imperatives. Only here we must never leave out of +consideration that we cannot make out by any example, in other words +empirically, whether there is such an imperative at all, but it is +rather to be feared that all those which seem to be categorical may +yet be at bottom hypothetical. For instance, when the precept is: +"Thou shalt not promise deceitfully"; and it is assumed that the +necessity of this is not a mere counsel to avoid some other evil, so +that it should mean: "Thou shalt not make a lying promise, lest if +it become known thou shouldst destroy thy credit," but that an +action of this kind must be regarded as evil in itself, so that the +imperative of the prohibition is categorical; then we cannot show with +certainty in any example that the will was determined merely by the +law, without any other spring of action, although it may appear to +be so. For it is always possible that fear of disgrace, perhaps also +obscure dread of other dangers, may have a secret influence on the +will. Who can prove by experience the non-existence of a cause when +all that experience tells us is that we do not perceive it? But in +such a case the so-called moral imperative, which as such appears to +be categorical and unconditional, would in reality be only a pragmatic +precept, drawing our attention to our own interests and merely +teaching us to take these into consideration. + +We shall therefore have to investigate a priori the possibility of a +categorical imperative, as we have not in this case the advantage of +its reality being given in experience, so that [the elucidation of] +its possibility should be requisite only for its explanation, not +for its establishment. In the meantime it may be discerned +beforehand that the categorical imperative alone has the purport of +a practical law; all the rest may indeed be called principles of the +will but not laws, since whatever is only necessary for the attainment +of some arbitrary purpose may be considered as in itself contingent, +and we can at any time be free from the precept if we give up the +purpose; on the contrary, the unconditional command leaves the will no +liberty to choose the opposite; consequently it alone carries with +it that necessity which we require in a law. + +Secondly, in the case of this categorical imperative or law of +morality, the difficulty (of discerning its possibility) is a very +profound one. It is an a priori synthetical practical proposition; * +and as there is so much difficulty in discerning the possibility of +speculative propositions of this kind, it may readily be supposed that +the difficulty will be no less with the practical. + + + +* I connect the act with the will without presupposing any +condition resulting from any inclination, but a priori, and +therefore necessarily (though only objectively, i.e., assuming the +idea of a reason possessing full power over all subjective motives). +This is accordingly a practical proposition which does not deduce +the willing of an action by mere analysis from another already +presupposed (for we have not such a perfect will), but connects it +immediately with the conception of the will of a rational being, as +something not contained in it. + + + +In this problem we will first inquire whether the mere conception of +a categorical imperative may not perhaps supply us also with the +formula of it, containing the proposition which alone can be a +categorical imperative; for even if we know the tenor of such an +absolute command, yet how it is possible will require further +special and laborious study, which we postpone to the last section. + +When I conceive a hypothetical imperative, in general I do not +know beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition. +But when I conceive a categorical imperative, I know at once what it +contains. For as the imperative contains besides the law only the +necessity that the maxims * shall conform to this law, while the law +contains no conditions restricting it, there remains nothing but the +general statement that the maxim of the action should conform to a +universal law, and it is this conformity alone that the imperative +properly represents as necessary. + + + +* A maxim is a subjective principle of action, and must be +distinguished from the objective principle, namely, practical law. The +former contains the practical rule set by reason according to the +conditions of the subject (often its ignorance or its inclinations), +so that it is the principle on which the subject acts; but the law +is the objective principle valid for every rational being, and is +the principle on which it ought to act that is an imperative. + + + +There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act +only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it +should become a universal law. + +Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one +imperative as from their principle, then, although it should remain +undecided what is called duty is not merely a vain notion, yet at +least we shall be able to show what we understand by it and what +this notion means. + +Since the universality of the law according to which effects are +produced constitutes what is properly called nature in the most +general sense (as to form), that is the existence of things so far +as it is determined by general laws, the imperative of duty may be +expressed thus: Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by +thy will a universal law of nature. + +We will now enumerate a few duties, adopting the usual division of +them into duties to ourselves and ourselves and to others, and into +perfect and imperfect duties. * + + + +* It must be noted here that I reserve the division of duties for a +future metaphysic of morals; so that I give it here only as an +arbitrary one (in order to arrange my examples). For the rest, I +understand by a perfect duty one that admits no exception in favour of +inclination and then I have not merely external but also internal +perfect duties. This is contrary to the use of the word adopted in the +schools; but I do not intend to justify there, as it is all one for my +purpose whether it is admitted or not. + + + +1. A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied +of life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can +ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to +take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action +could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: "From +self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer +duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction." It is +asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can +become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system +of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of +the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the +improvement of life would contradict itself and, therefore, could +not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly +exist as a universal law of nature and, consequently, would be +wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty. + +2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He +knows that he will not be able to repay it, but sees also that nothing +will be lent to him unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a +definite time. He desires to make this promise, but he has still so +much conscience as to ask himself: "Is it not unlawful and +inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way?" +Suppose however that he resolves to do so: then the maxim of his +action would be expressed thus: "When I think myself in want of money, +I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that I +never can do so." Now this principle of self-love or of one's own +advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfare; +but the question now is, "Is it right?" I change then the suggestion +of self-love into a universal law, and state the question thus: "How +would it be if my maxim were a universal law?" Then I see at once that +it could never hold as a universal law of nature, but would +necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a universal +law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be +able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping +his promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as well as +the end that one might have in view in it, since no one would consider +that anything was promised to him, but would ridicule all such +statements as vain pretences. + +3. A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some +culture might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds +himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in +pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his +happy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of +neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination to +indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then that +a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law +although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents +rest and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, +amusement, and propagation of their species- in a word, to +enjoyment; but he cannot possibly will that this should be a universal +law of nature, or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct. +For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be +developed, since they serve him and have been given him, for all sorts +of possible purposes. + +4. A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to +contend with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: +"What concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven +pleases, or as he can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor +even envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his +welfare or to his assistance in distress!" Now no doubt if such a mode +of thinking were a universal law, the human race might very well +subsist and doubtless even better than in a state in which everyone +talks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes care occasionally to +put it into practice, but, on the other side, also cheats when he can, +betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But although it +is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance +with that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle should +have the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which +resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might +occur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others, +and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he +would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires. + +These are a few of the many actual duties, or at least what we +regard as such, which obviously fall into two classes on the one +principle that we have laid down. We must be able to will that a maxim +of our action should be a universal law. This is the canon of the +moral appreciation of the action generally. Some actions are of such a +character that their maxim cannot without contradiction be even +conceived as a universal law of nature, far from it being possible +that we should will that it should be so. In others this intrinsic +impossibility is not found, but still it is impossible to will that +their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of nature, +since such a will would contradict itself It is easily seen that the +former violate strict or rigorous (inflexible) duty; the latter only +laxer (meritorious) duty. Thus it has been completely shown how all +duties depend as regards the nature of the obligation (not the +object of the action) on the same principle. + +If now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any transgression of +duty, we shall find that we in fact do not will that our maxim +should be a universal law, for that is impossible for us; on the +contrary, we will that the opposite should remain a universal law, +only we assume the liberty of making an exception in our own favour or +(just for this time only) in favour of our inclination. Consequently +if we considered all cases from one and the same point of view, +namely, that of reason, we should find a contradiction in our own +will, namely, that a certain principle should be objectively necessary +as a universal law, and yet subjectively should not be universal, +but admit of exceptions. As however we at one moment regard our action +from the point of view of a will wholly conformed to reason, and +then again look at the same action from the point of view of a will +affected by inclination, there is not really any contradiction, but an +antagonism of inclination to the precept of reason, whereby the +universality of the principle is changed into a mere generality, so +that the practical principle of reason shall meet the maxim half +way. Now, although this cannot be justified in our own impartial +judgement, yet it proves that we do really recognise the validity of +the categorical imperative and (with all respect for it) only allow +ourselves a few exceptions, which we think unimportant and forced from +us. + +We have thus established at least this much, that if duty is a +conception which is to have any import and real legislative +authority for our actions, it can only be expressed in categorical and +not at all in hypothetical imperatives. We have also, which is of +great importance, exhibited clearly and definitely for every practical +application the content of the categorical imperative, which must +contain the principle of all duty if there is such a thing at all. +We have not yet, however, advanced so far as to prove a priori that +there actually is such an imperative, that there is a practical law +which commands absolutely of itself and without any other impulse, and +that the following of this law is duty. + +With the view of attaining to this, it is of extreme importance to +remember that we must not allow ourselves to think of deducing the +reality of this principle from the particular attributes of human +nature. For duty is to be a practical, unconditional necessity of +action; it must therefore hold for all rational beings (to whom an +imperative can apply at all), and for this reason only be also a law +for all human wills. On the contrary, whatever is deduced from the +particular natural characteristics of humanity, from certain +feelings and propensions, nay, even, if possible, from any +particular tendency proper to human reason, and which need not +necessarily hold for the will of every rational being; this may indeed +supply us with a maxim, but not with a law; with a subjective +principle on which we may have a propension and inclination to act, +but not with an objective principle on which we should be enjoined +to act, even though all our propensions, inclinations, and natural +dispositions were opposed to it. In fact, the sublimity and +intrinsic dignity of the command in duty are so much the more evident, +the less the subjective impulses favour it and the more they oppose +it, without being able in the slightest degree to weaken the +obligation of the law or to diminish its validity. + +Here then we see philosophy brought to a critical position, since it +has to be firmly fixed, notwithstanding that it has nothing to support +it in heaven or earth. Here it must show its purity as absolute +director of its own laws, not the herald of those which are +whispered to it by an implanted sense or who knows what tutelary +nature. Although these may be better than nothing, yet they can +never afford principles dictated by reason, which must have their +source wholly a priori and thence their commanding authority, +expecting everything from the supremacy of the law and the due respect +for it, nothing from inclination, or else condemning the man to +self-contempt and inward abhorrence. + +Thus every empirical element is not only quite incapable of being an +aid to the principle of morality, but is even highly prejudicial to +the purity of morals, for the proper and inestimable worth of an +absolutely good will consists just in this, that the principle of +action is free from all influence of contingent grounds, which alone +experience can furnish. We cannot too much or too often repeat our +warning against this lax and even mean habit of thought which seeks +for its principle amongst empirical motives and laws; for human reason +in its weariness is glad to rest on this pillow, and in a dream of +sweet illusions (in which, instead of Juno, it embraces a cloud) it +substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs of various +derivation, which looks like anything one chooses to see in it, only +not like virtue to one who has once beheld her in her true form. * + + + +* To behold virtue in her proper form is nothing else but to +contemplate morality stripped of all admixture of sensible things +and of every spurious ornament of reward or self-love. How much she +then eclipses everything else that appears charming to the affections, +every one may readily perceive with the least exertion of his +reason, if it be not wholly spoiled for abstraction. + + + +The question then is this: "Is it a necessary law for all rational +beings that they should always judge of their actions by maxims of +which they can themselves will that they should serve as universal +laws?" If it is so, then it must be connected (altogether a priori) +with the very conception of the will of a rational being generally. +But in order to discover this connexion we must, however +reluctantly, take a step into metaphysic, although into a domain of it +which is distinct from speculative philosophy, namely, the +metaphysic of morals. In a practical philosophy, where it is not the +reasons of what happens that we have to ascertain, but the laws of +what ought to happen, even although it never does, i.e., objective +practical laws, there it is not necessary to inquire into the +reasons why anything pleases or displeases, how the pleasure of mere +sensation differs from taste, and whether the latter is distinct +from a general satisfaction of reason; on what the feeling of pleasure +or pain rests, and how from it desires and inclinations arise, and +from these again maxims by the co-operation of reason: for all this +belongs to an empirical psychology, which would constitute the +second part of physics, if we regard physics as the philosophy of +nature, so far as it is based on empirical laws. But here we are +concerned with objective practical laws and, consequently, with the +relation of the will to itself so far as it is determined by reason +alone, in which case whatever has reference to anything empirical is +necessarily excluded; since if reason of itself alone determines the +conduct (and it is the possibility of this that we are now +investigating), it must necessarily do so a priori. + +The will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to +action in accordance with the conception of certain laws. And such a +faculty can be found only in rational beings. Now that which serves +the will as the objective ground of its self-determination is the end, +and, if this is assigned by reason alone, it must hold for all +rational beings. On the other hand, that which merely contains the +ground of possibility of the action of which the effect is the end, +this is called the means. The subjective ground of the desire is the +spring, the objective ground of the volition is the motive; hence +the distinction between subjective ends which rest on springs, and +objective ends which depend on motives valid for every rational being. +Practical principles are formal when they abstract from all subjective +ends; they are material when they assume these, and therefore +particular springs of action. The ends which a rational being proposes +to himself at pleasure as effects of his actions (material ends) are +all only relative, for it is only their relation to the particular +desires of the subject that gives them their worth, which therefore +cannot furnish principles universal and necessary for all rational +beings and for every volition, that is to say practical laws. Hence +all these relative ends can give rise only to hypothetical +imperatives. + +Supposing, however, that there were something whose existence has in +itself an absolute worth, something which, being an end in itself, +could be a source of definite laws; then in this and this alone +would lie the source of a possible categorical imperative, i.e., a +practical law. + +Now I say: man and generally any rational being exists as an end +in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or +that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or +other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as +an end. All objects of the inclinations have only a conditional worth, +for if the inclinations and the wants founded on them did not exist, +then their object would be without value. But the inclinations, +themselves being sources of want, are so far from having an absolute +worth for which they should be desired that on the contrary it must be +the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from +them. Thus the worth of any object which is to be acquired by our +action is always conditional. Beings whose existence depends not on +our will but on nature's, have nevertheless, if they are irrational +beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore called +things; rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons, +because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves, +that is as something which must not be used merely as means, and so +far therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of +respect). These, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose +existence has a worth for us as an effect of our action, but objective +ends, that is, things whose existence is an end in itself; an end +moreover for which no other can be substituted, which they should +subserve merely as means, for otherwise nothing whatever would possess +absolute worth; but if all worth were conditioned and therefore +contingent, then there would be no supreme practical principle of +reason whatever. + +If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of the +human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which, being +drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for +everyone because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective +principle of will, and can therefore serve as a universal practical +law. The foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as an +end in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being +so; so far then this is a subjective principle of human actions. But +every other rational being regards its existence similarly, just on +the same rational principle that holds for me: * so that it is at the +same time an objective principle, from which as a supreme practical +law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced. Accordingly +the practical imperative will be as follows: So act as to treat +humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in +every case as an end withal, never as means only. We will now +inquire whether this can be practically carried out. + + + +* This proposition is here stated as a postulate. The ground of it +will be found in the concluding section. + + + +To abide by the previous examples: + +Firstly, under the head of necessary duty to oneself: He who +contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his action can be +consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he +destroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he +uses a person merely as a mean to maintain a tolerable condition up to +the end of life. But a man is not a thing, that is to say, something +which can be used merely as means, but must in all his actions be +always considered as an end in himself. I cannot, therefore, dispose +in any way of a man in my own person so as to mutilate him, to +damage or kill him. (It belongs to ethics proper to define this +principle more precisely, so as to avoid all misunderstanding, e. +g., as to the amputation of the limbs in order to preserve myself, +as to exposing my life to danger with a view to preserve it, etc. This +question is therefore omitted here.) + +Secondly, as regards necessary duties, or those of strict +obligation, towards others: He who is thinking of making a lying +promise to others will see at once that he would be using another +man merely as a mean, without the latter containing at the same time +the end in himself. For he whom I propose by such a promise to use for +my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting towards +him and, therefore, cannot himself contain the end of this action. +This violation of the principle of humanity in other men is more +obvious if we take in examples of attacks on the freedom and +property of others. For then it is clear that he who transgresses +the rights of men intends to use the person of others merely as a +means, without considering that as rational beings they ought always +to be esteemed also as ends, that is, as beings who must be capable of +containing in themselves the end of the very same action. * + + + +* Let it not be thought that the common "quod tibi non vis fieri, +etc." could serve here as the rule or principle. For it is only a +deduction from the former, though with several limitations; it +cannot be a universal law, for it does not contain the principle of +duties to oneself, nor of the duties of benevolence to others (for +many a one would gladly consent that others should not benefit him, +provided only that he might be excused from showing benevolence to +them), nor finally that of duties of strict obligation to one another, +for on this principle the criminal might argue against the judge who +punishes him, and so on. + + + +Thirdly, as regards contingent (meritorious) duties to oneself: It +is not enough that the action does not violate humanity in our own +person as an end in itself, it must also harmonize with it. Now +there are in humanity capacities of greater perfection, which belong +to the end that nature has in view in regard to humanity in +ourselves as the subject: to neglect these might perhaps be consistent +with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but not with the +advancement of this end. + +Fourthly, as regards meritorious duties towards others: The +natural end which all men have is their own happiness. Now humanity +might indeed subsist, although no one should contribute anything to +the happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally withdraw +anything from it; but after all this would only harmonize negatively +not positively with humanity as an end in itself, if every one does +not also endeavour, as far as in him lies, to forward the ends of +others. For the ends of any subject which is an end in himself ought +as far as possible to be my ends also, if that conception is to have +its full effect with me. + +This principle, that humanity and generally every rational nature is +an end in itself (which is the supreme limiting condition of every +man's freedom of action), is not borrowed from experience, firstly, +because it is universal, applying as it does to all rational beings +whatever, and experience is not capable of determining anything +about them; secondly, because it does not present humanity as an end +to men (subjectively), that is as an object which men do of themselves +actually adopt as an end; but as an objective end, which must as a law +constitute the supreme limiting condition of all our subjective +ends, let them be what we will; it must therefore spring from pure +reason. In fact the objective principle of all practical legislation +lies (according to the first principle) in the rule and its form of +universality which makes it capable of being a law (say, e. g., a +law of nature); but the subjective principle is in the end; now by the +second principle the subject of all ends is each rational being, +inasmuch as it is an end in itself. Hence follows the third +practical principle of the will, which is the ultimate condition of +its harmony with universal practical reason, viz.: the idea of the +will of every rational being as a universally legislative will. + +On this principle all maxims are rejected which are inconsistent +with the will being itself universal legislator. Thus the will is +not subject simply to the law, but so subject that it must be regarded +as itself giving the law and, on this ground only, subject to the +law (of which it can regard itself as the author). + +In the previous imperatives, namely, that based on the conception of +the conformity of actions to general laws, as in a physical system +of nature, and that based on the universal prerogative of rational +beings as ends in themselves- these imperatives, just because they +were conceived as categorical, excluded from any share in their +authority all admixture of any interest as a spring of action; they +were, however, only assumed to be categorical, because such an +assumption was necessary to explain the conception of duty. But we +could not prove independently that there are practical propositions +which command categorically, nor can it be proved in this section; one +thing, however, could be done, namely, to indicate in the imperative +itself, by some determinate expression, that in the case of volition +from duty all interest is renounced, which is the specific criterion +of categorical as distinguished from hypothetical imperatives. This is +done in the present (third) formula of the principle, namely, in the +idea of the will of every rational being as a universally +legislating will. + +For although a will which is subject to laws may be attached to this +law by means of an interest, yet a will which is itself a supreme +lawgiver so far as it is such cannot possibly depend on any +interest, since a will so dependent would itself still need another +law restricting the interest of its self-love by the condition that it +should be valid as universal law. + +Thus the principle that every human will is a will which in all +its maxims gives universal laws, * provided it be otherwise +justified, would be very well adapted to be the categorical +imperative, in this respect, namely, that just because of the idea +of universal legislation it is not based on interest, and therefore it +alone among all possible imperatives can be unconditional. Or still +better, converting the proposition, if there is a categorical +imperative (i.e., a law for the will of every rational being), it +can only command that everything be done from maxims of one's will +regarded as a will which could at the same time will that it should +itself give universal laws, for in that case only the practical +principle and the imperative which it obeys are unconditional, since +they cannot be based on any interest. + + + +* I may be excused from adducing examples to elucidate this +principle, as those which have already been used to elucidate the +categorical imperative and its formula would all serve for the like +purpose here. + + + +Looking back now on all previous attempts to discover the +principle of morality, we need not wonder why they all failed. It +was seen that man was bound to laws by duty, but it was not observed +that the laws to which he is subject are only those of his own giving, +though at the same time they are universal, and that he is only +bound to act in conformity with his own will; a will, however, which +is designed by nature to give universal laws. For when one has +conceived man only as subject to a law (no matter what), then this law +required some interest, either by way of attraction or constraint, +since it did not originate as a law from his own will, but this will +was according to a law obliged by something else to act in a certain +manner. Now by this necessary consequence all the labour spent in +finding a supreme principle of duty was irrevocably lost. For men +never elicited duty, but only a necessity of acting from a certain +interest. Whether this interest was private or otherwise, in any +case the imperative must be conditional and could not by any means +be capable of being a moral command. I will therefore call this the +principle of autonomy of the will, in contrast with every other +which I accordingly reckon as heteronomy. + +The conception of the will of every rational being as one which must +consider itself as giving in all the maxims of its will universal +laws, so as to judge itself and its actions from this point of view- +this conception leads to another which depends on it and is very +fruitful, namely that of a kingdom of ends. + +By a kingdom I understand the union of different rational beings +in a system by common laws. Now since it is by laws that ends are +determined as regards their universal validity, hence, if we +abstract from the personal differences of rational beings and likewise +from all the content of their private ends, we shall be able to +conceive all ends combined in a systematic whole (including both +rational beings as ends in themselves, and also the special ends which +each may propose to himself), that is to say, we can conceive a +kingdom of ends, which on the preceding principles is possible. + +For all rational beings come under the law that each of them must +treat itself and all others never merely as means, but in every case +at the same time as ends in themselves. Hence results a systematic +union of rational being by common objective laws, i.e., a kingdom +which may be called a kingdom of ends, since what these laws have in +view is just the relation of these beings to one another as ends and +means. It is certainly only an ideal. + +A rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when, +although giving universal laws in it, he is also himself subject to +these laws. He belongs to it as sovereign when, while giving laws, +he is not subject to the will of any other. + +A rational being must always regard himself as giving laws either as +member or as sovereign in a kingdom of ends which is rendered possible +by the freedom of will. He cannot, however, maintain the latter +position merely by the maxims of his will, but only in case he is a +completely independent being without wants and with unrestricted power +adequate to his will. + +Morality consists then in the reference of all action to the +legislation which alone can render a kingdom of ends possible. This +legislation must be capable of existing in every rational being and of +emanating from his will, so that the principle of this will is never +to act on any maxim which could not without contradiction be also a +universal law and, accordingly, always so to act that the will could +at the same time regard itself as giving in its maxims universal laws. +If now the maxims of rational beings are not by their own nature +coincident with this objective principle, then the necessity of acting +on it is called practical necessitation, i.e., duty. Duty does not +apply to the sovereign in the kingdom of ends, but it does to every +member of it and to all in the same degree. + +The practical necessity of acting on this principle, i.e., duty, +does not rest at all on feelings, impulses, or inclinations, but +solely on the relation of rational beings to one another, a relation +in which the will of a rational being must always be regarded as +legislative, since otherwise it could not be conceived as an end in +itself. Reason then refers every maxim of the will, regarding it as +legislating universally, to every other will and also to every +action towards oneself; and this not on account of any other practical +motive or any future advantage, but from the idea of the dignity of +a rational being, obeying no law but that which he himself also gives. + +In the kingdom of ends everything has either value or dignity. +Whatever has a value can be replaced by something else which is +equivalent; whatever, on the other hand, is above all value, and +therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity. + +Whatever has reference to the general inclinations and wants of +mankind has a market value; whatever, without presupposing a want, +corresponds to a certain taste, that is to a satisfaction in the +mere purposeless play of our faculties, has a fancy value; but that +which constitutes the condition under which alone anything can be an +end in itself, this has not merely a relative worth, i.e., value, +but an intrinsic worth, that is, dignity. + +Now morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can +be an end in himself, since by this alone is it possible that he +should be a legislating member in the kingdom of ends. Thus +morality, and humanity as capable of it, is that which alone has +dignity. Skill and diligence in labour have a market value; wit, +lively imagination, and humour, have fancy value; on the other hand, +fidelity to promises, benevolence from principle (not from +instinct), have an intrinsic worth. Neither nature nor art contains +anything which in default of these it could put in their place, for +their worth consists not in the effects which spring from them, not in +the use and advantage which they secure, but in the disposition of +mind, that is, the maxims of the will which are ready to manifest +themselves in such actions, even though they should not have the +desired effect. These actions also need no recommendation from any +subjective taste or sentiment, that they may be looked on with +immediate favour and satisfaction: they need no immediate propension +or feeling for them; they exhibit the will that performs them as an +object of an immediate respect, and nothing but reason is required +to impose them on the will; not to flatter it into them, which, in the +case of duties, would be a contradiction. This estimation therefore +shows that the worth of such a disposition is dignity, and places it +infinitely above all value, with which it cannot for a moment be +brought into comparison or competition without as it were violating +its sanctity. + +What then is it which justifies virtue or the morally good +disposition, in making such lofty claims? It is nothing less than +the privilege it secures to the rational being of participating in the +giving of universal laws, by which it qualifies him to be a member +of a possible kingdom of ends, a privilege to which he was already +destined by his own nature as being an end in himself and, on that +account, legislating in the kingdom of ends; free as regards all +laws of physical nature, and obeying those only which he himself +gives, and by which his maxims can belong to a system of universal +law, to which at the same time he submits himself. For nothing has any +worth except what the law assigns it. Now the legislation itself which +assigns the worth of everything must for that very reason possess +dignity, that is an unconditional incomparable worth; and the word +respect alone supplies a becoming expression for the esteem which a +rational being must have for it. Autonomy then is the basis of the +dignity of human and of every rational nature. + +The three modes of presenting the principle of morality that have +been adduced are at bottom only so many formulae of the very same law, +and each of itself involves the other two. There is, however, a +difference in them, but it is rather subjectively than objectively +practical, intended namely to bring an idea of the reason nearer to +intuition (by means of a certain analogy) and thereby nearer to +feeling. All maxims, in fact, have: + +1. A form, consisting in universality; and in this view the +formula of the moral imperative is expressed thus, that the maxims +must be so chosen as if they were to serve as universal laws of +nature. + +2. A matter, namely, an end, and here the formula says that the +rational being, as it is an end by its own nature and therefore an end +in itself, must in every maxim serve as the condition limiting all +merely relative and arbitrary ends. + +3. A complete characterization of all maxims by means of that +formula, namely, that all maxims ought by their own legislation to +harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of +nature. * There is a progress here in the order of the categories of +unity of the form of the will (its universality), plurality of the +matter (the objects, i.e., the ends), and totality of the system of +these. In forming our moral judgement of actions, it is better to +proceed always on the strict method and start from the general formula +of the categorical imperative: Act according to a maxim which can at +the same time make itself a universal law. If, however, we wish to +gain an entrance for the moral law, it is very useful to bring one and +the same action under the three specified conceptions, and thereby +as far as possible to bring it nearer to intuition. + + + +* Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends; ethics regards a +possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom nature. In the first case, the +kingdom of ends is a theoretical idea, adopted to explain what +actually is. In the latter it is a practical idea, adopted to bring +about that which is not yet, but which can be realized by our conduct, +namely, if it conforms to this idea. + + + +We can now end where we started at the beginning, namely, with the +conception of a will unconditionally good. That will is absolutely +good which cannot be evil- in other words, whose maxim, if made a +universal law, could never contradict itself. This principle, then, is +its supreme law: "Act always on such a maxim as thou canst at the same +time will to be a universal law"; this is the sole condition under +which a will can never contradict itself; and such an imperative is +categorical. Since the validity of the will as a universal law for +possible actions is analogous to the universal connexion of the +existence of things by general laws, which is the formal notion of +nature in general, the categorical imperative can also be expressed +thus: Act on maxims which can at the same time have for their object +themselves as universal laws of nature. Such then is the formula of an +absolutely good will. + +Rational nature is distinguished from the rest of nature by this, +that it sets before itself an end. This end would be the matter of +every good will. But since in the idea of a will that is absolutely +good without being limited by any condition (of attaining this or that +end) we must abstract wholly from every end to be effected (since this +would make every will only relatively good), it follows that in this +case the end must be conceived, not as an end to be effected, but as +an independently existing end. Consequently it is conceived only +negatively, i.e., as that which we must never act against and which, +therefore, must never be regarded merely as means, but must in every +volition be esteemed as an end likewise. Now this end can be nothing +but the subject of all possible ends, since this is also the subject +of a possible absolutely good will; for such a will cannot without +contradiction be postponed to any other object. The principle: "So act +in regard to every rational being (thyself and others), that he may +always have place in thy maxim as an end in himself," is accordingly +essentially identical with this other: "Act upon a maxim which, at the +same time, involves its own universal validity for every rational +being." For that in using means for every end I should limit my +maxim by the condition of its holding good as a law for every subject, +this comes to the same thing as that the fundamental principle of +all maxims of action must be that the subject of all ends, i.e., the +rational being himself, be never employed merely as means, but as +the supreme condition restricting the use of all means, that is in +every case as an end likewise. + +It follows incontestably that, to whatever laws any rational being +may be subject, he being an end in himself must be able to regard +himself as also legislating universally in respect of these same laws, +since it is just this fitness of his maxims for universal +legislation that distinguishes him as an end in himself; also it +follows that this implies his dignity (prerogative) above all mere +physical beings, that he must always take his maxims from the point of +view which regards himself and, likewise, every other rational being +as law-giving beings (on which account they are called persons). In +this way a world of rational beings (mundus intelligibilis) is +possible as a kingdom of ends, and this by virtue of the legislation +proper to all persons as members. Therefore every rational being +must so act as if he were by his maxims in every case a legislating +member in the universal kingdom of ends. The formal principle of these +maxims is: "So act as if thy maxim were to serve likewise as the +universal law (of all rational beings)." A kingdom of ends is thus +only possible on the analogy of a kingdom of nature, the former +however only by maxims, that is self-imposed rules, the latter only by +the laws of efficient causes acting under necessitation from +without. Nevertheless, although the system of nature is looked upon as +a machine, yet so far as it has reference to rational beings as its +ends, it is given on this account the name of a kingdom of nature. Now +such a kingdom of ends would be actually realized by means of maxims +conforming to the canon which the categorical imperative prescribes to +all rational beings, if they were universally followed. But although a +rational being, even if he punctually follows this maxim himself, +cannot reckon upon all others being therefore true to the same, nor +expect that the kingdom of nature and its orderly arrangements shall +be in harmony with him as a fitting member, so as to form a kingdom of +ends to which he himself contributes, that is to say, that it shall +favour his expectation of happiness, still that law: "Act according to +the maxims of a member of a merely possible kingdom of ends +legislating in it universally," remains in its full force, inasmuch as +it commands categorically. And it is just in this that the paradox +lies; that the mere dignity of man as a rational creature, without any +other end or advantage to be attained thereby, in other words, respect +for a mere idea, should yet serve as an inflexible precept of the +will, and that it is precisely in this independence of the maxim on +all such springs of action that its sublimity consists; and it is this +that makes every rational subject worthy to be a legislative member in +the kingdom of ends: for otherwise he would have to be conceived +only as subject to the physical law of his wants. And although we +should suppose the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of ends to be +united under one sovereign, so that the latter kingdom thereby +ceased to be a mere idea and acquired true reality, then it would no +doubt gain the accession of a strong spring, but by no means any +increase of its intrinsic worth. For this sole absolute lawgiver must, +notwithstanding this, be always conceived as estimating the worth of +rational beings only by their disinterested behaviour, as prescribed +to themselves from that idea [the dignity of man] alone. The essence +of things is not altered by their external relations, and that +which, abstracting from these, alone constitutes the absolute worth of +man, is also that by which he must be judged, whoever the judge may +be, and even by the Supreme Being. Morality, then, is the relation +of actions to the relation of actions will, that is, to the autonomy +of potential universal legislation by its maxims. An action that is +consistent with the autonomy of the will is permitted; one that does +not agree therewith is forbidden. A will whose maxims necessarily +coincide with the laws of autonomy is a holy will, good absolutely. +The dependence of a will not absolutely good on the principle of +autonomy (moral necessitation) is obligation. This, then, cannot be +applied to a holy being. The objective necessity of actions from +obligation is called duty. + +From what has just been said, it is easy to see how it happens that, +although the conception of duty implies subjection to the law, we +yet ascribe a certain dignity and sublimity to the person who +fulfils all his duties. There is not, indeed, any sublimity in him, so +far as he is subject to the moral law; but inasmuch as in regard to +that very law he is likewise a legislator, and on that account alone +subject to it, he has sublimity. We have also shown above that neither +fear nor inclination, but simply respect for the law, is the spring +which can give actions a moral worth. Our own will, so far as we +suppose it to act only under the condition that its maxims are +potentially universal laws, this ideal will which is possible to us is +the proper object of respect; and the dignity of humanity consists +just in this capacity of being universally legislative, though with +the condition that it is itself subject to this same legislation. + + + +The Autonomy of the Will as the Supreme Principle of Morality + + + +Autonomy of the will is that property of it by which it is a law +to itself (independently of any property of the objects of +volition). The principle of autonomy then is: "Always so to choose +that the same volition shall comprehend the maxims of our choice as +a universal law." We cannot prove that this practical rule is an +imperative, i.e., that the will of every rational being is necessarily +bound to it as a condition, by a mere analysis of the conceptions +which occur in it, since it is a synthetical proposition; we must +advance beyond the cognition of the objects to a critical +examination of the subject, that is, of the pure practical reason, for +this synthetic proposition which commands apodeictically must be +capable of being cognized wholly a priori. This matter, however, +does not belong to the present section. But that the principle of +autonomy in question is the sole principle of morals can be readily +shown by mere analysis of the conceptions of morality. For by this +analysis we find that its principle must be a categorical imperative +and that what this commands is neither more nor less than this very +autonomy. + + + +Heteronomy of the Will as the Source of all spurious Principles + + of Morality + + + +If the will seeks the law which is to determine it anywhere else +than in the fitness of its maxims to be universal laws of its own +dictation, consequently if it goes out of itself and seeks this law in +the character of any of its objects, there always results +heteronomy. The will in that case does not give itself the law, but it +is given by the object through its relation to the will. This +relation, whether it rests on inclination or on conceptions of reason, +only admits of hypothetical imperatives: "I ought to do something +because I wish for something else." On the contrary, the moral, and +therefore categorical, imperative says: "I ought to do so and so, even +though I should not wish for anything else." E.g., the former says: "I +ought not to lie, if I would retain my reputation"; the latter says: +"I ought not to lie, although it should not bring me the least +discredit." The latter therefore must so far abstract from all objects +that they shall have no influence on the will, in order that practical +reason (will) may not be restricted to administering an interest not +belonging to it, but may simply show its own commanding authority as +the supreme legislation. Thus, e.g., I ought to endeavour to promote +the happiness of others, not as if its realization involved any +concern of mine (whether by immediate inclination or by any +satisfaction indirectly gained through reason), but simply because a +maxim which excludes it cannot be comprehended as a universal law in +one and the same volition. + + + + Classification of all Principles of Morality which can be + + founded on the Conception of Heteronomy + + + +Here as elsewhere human reason in its pure use, so long as it was +not critically examined, has first tried all possible wrong ways +before it succeeded in finding the one true way. + +All principles which can be taken from this point of view are either +empirical or rational. The former, drawn from the principle of +happiness, are built on physical or moral feelings; the latter, +drawn from the principle of perfection, are built either on the +rational conception of perfection as a possible effect, or on that +of an independent perfection (the will of God) as the determining +cause of our will. + +Empirical principles are wholly incapable of serving as a foundation +for moral laws. For the universality with which these should hold +for all rational beings without distinction, the unconditional +practical necessity which is thereby imposed on them, is lost when +their foundation is taken from the particular constitution of human +nature, or the accidental circumstances in which it is placed. The +principle of private happiness, however, is the most objectionable, +not merely because it is false, and experience contradicts the +supposition that prosperity is always proportioned to good conduct, +nor yet merely because it contributes nothing to the establishment +of morality- since it is quite a different thing to make a +prosperous man and a good man, or to make one prudent and +sharp-sighted for his own interests and to make him virtuous- but +because the springs it provides for morality are such as rather +undermine it and destroy its sublimity, since they put the motives +to virtue and to vice in the same class and only teach us to make a +better calculation, the specific difference between virtue and vice +being entirely extinguished. On the other hand, as to moral feeling, +this supposed special sense, * the appeal to it is indeed superficial +when those who cannot think believe that feeling will help them out, +even in what concerns general laws: and besides, feelings, which +naturally differ infinitely in degree, cannot furnish a uniform +standard of good and evil, nor has anyone a right to form judgements +for others by his own feelings: nevertheless this moral feeling is +nearer to morality and its dignity in this respect, that it pays +virtue the honour of ascribing to her immediately the satisfaction and +esteem we have for her and does not, as it were, tell her to her +face that we are not attached to her by her beauty but by profit. + + + +* I class the principle of moral feeling under that of happiness, +because every empirical interest promises to contribute to our +well-being by the agreeableness that a thing affords, whether it be +immediately and without a view to profit, or whether profit be +regarded. We must likewise, with Hutcheson, class the principle of +sympathy with the happiness of others under his assumed moral sense. + + + +Amongst the rational principles of morality, the ontological +conception of perfection, notwithstanding its defects, is better +than the theological conception which derives morality from a Divine +absolutely perfect will. The former is, no doubt, empty and indefinite +and consequently useless for finding in the boundless field of +possible reality the greatest amount suitable for us; moreover, in +attempting to distinguish specifically the reality of which we are now +speaking from every other, it inevitably tends to turn in a circle and +cannot avoid tacitly presupposing the morality which it is to explain; +it is nevertheless preferable to the theological view, first, +because we have no intuition of the divine perfection and can only +deduce it from our own conceptions, the most important of which is +that of morality, and our explanation would thus be involved in a +gross circle; and, in the next place, if we avoid this, the only +notion of the Divine will remaining to us is a conception made up of +the attributes of desire of glory and dominion, combined with the +awful conceptions of might and vengeance, and any system of morals +erected on this foundation would be directly opposed to morality. + +However, if I had to choose between the notion of the moral sense +and that of perfection in general (two systems which at least do not +weaken morality, although they are totally incapable of serving as its +foundation), then I should decide for the latter, because it at +least withdraws the decision of the question from the sensibility +and brings it to the court of pure reason; and although even here it +decides nothing, it at all events preserves the indefinite idea (of +a will good in itself free from corruption, until it shall be more +precisely defined. + +For the rest I think I may be excused here from a detailed +refutation of all these doctrines; that would only be superfluous +labour, since it is so easy, and is probably so well seen even by +those whose office requires them to decide for one of these theories +(because their hearers would not tolerate suspension of judgement). +But what interests us more here is to know that the prime foundation +of morality laid down by all these principles is nothing but +heteronomy of the will, and for this reason they must necessarily miss +their aim. + +In every case where an object of the will has to be supposed, in +order that the rule may be prescribed which is to determine the +will, there the rule is simply heteronomy; the imperative is +conditional, namely, if or because one wishes for this object, one +should act so and so: hence it can never command morally, that is, +categorically. Whether the object determines the will by means of +inclination, as in the principle of private happiness, or by means +of reason directed to objects of our possible volition generally, as +in the principle of perfection, in either case the will never +determines itself immediately by the conception of the action, but +only by the influence which the foreseen effect of the action has on +the will; I ought to do something, on this account, because I wish for +something else; and here there must be yet another law assumed in me +as its subject, by which I necessarily will this other thing, and this +law again requires an imperative to restrict this maxim. For the +influence which the conception of an object within the reach of our +faculties can exercise on the will of the subject, in consequence of +its natural properties, depends on the nature of the subject, either +the sensibility (inclination and taste), or the understanding and +reason, the employment of which is by the peculiar constitution of +their nature attended with satisfaction. It follows that the law would +be, properly speaking, given by nature, and, as such, it must be known +and proved by experience and would consequently be contingent and +therefore incapable of being an apodeictic practical rule, such as the +moral rule must be. Not only so, but it is inevitably only heteronomy; +the will does not give itself the law, but is given by a foreign +impulse by means of a particular natural constitution of the subject +adapted to receive it. An absolutely good will, then, the principle of +which must be a categorical imperative, will be indeterminate as +regards all objects and will contain merely the form of volition +generally, and that as autonomy, that is to say, the capability of the +maxims of every good will to make themselves a universal law, is +itself the only law which the will of every rational being imposes +on itself, without needing to assume any spring or interest as a +foundation. + +How such a synthetical practical a priori proposition is possible, +and why it is necessary, is a problem whose solution does not lie +within the bounds of the metaphysic of morals; and we have not here +affirmed its truth, much less professed to have a proof of it in our +power. We simply showed by the development of the universally received +notion of morality that an autonomy of the will is inevitably +connected with it, or rather is its foundation. Whoever then holds +morality to be anything real, and not a chimerical idea without any +truth, must likewise admit the principle of it that is here +assigned. This section then, like the first, was merely analytical. +Now to prove that morality is no creation of the brain, which it +cannot be if the categorical imperative and with it the autonomy of +the will is true, and as an a priori principle absolutely necessary, +this supposes the possibility of a synthetic use of pure practical +reason, which however we cannot venture on without first giving a +critical examination of this faculty of reason. In the concluding +section we shall give the principal outlines of this critical +examination as far as is sufficient for our purpose. + +SEC_3 + + THIRD SECTION + + + + TRANSITION FROM THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS TO THE + + CRITIQUE OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON + + + +The Concept of Freedom is the Key that explains the Autonomy of +the Will + + + +The will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far +as they are rational, and freedom would be this property of such +causality that it can be efficient, independently of foreign causes +determining it; just as physical necessity is the property that the +causality of all irrational beings has of being determined to activity +by the influence of foreign causes. + +The preceding definition of freedom is negative and therefore +unfruitful for the discovery of its essence, but it leads to a +positive conception which is so much the more full and fruitful. + +Since the conception of causality involves that of laws, according +to which, by something that we call cause, something else, namely +the effect, must be produced; hence, although freedom is not a +property of the will depending on physical laws, yet it is not for +that reason lawless; on the contrary it must be a causality acting +according to immutable laws, but of a peculiar kind; otherwise a +free will would be an absurdity. Physical necessity is a heteronomy of +the efficient causes, for every effect is possible only according to +this law, that something else determines the efficient cause to +exert its causality. What else then can freedom of the will be but +autonomy, that is, the property of the will to be a law to itself? But +the proposition: "The will is in every action a law to itself," only +expresses the principle: "To act on no other maxim than that which can +also have as an object itself as a universal law." Now this is +precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the +principle of morality, so that a free will and a will subject to moral +laws are one and the same. + +On the hypothesis, then, of freedom of the will, morality together +with its principle follows from it by mere analysis of the conception. +However, the latter is a synthetic proposition; viz., an absolutely +good will is that whose maxim can always include itself regarded as +a universal law; for this property of its maxim can never be +discovered by analysing the conception of an absolutely good will. Now +such synthetic propositions are only possible in this way: that the +two cognitions are connected together by their union with a third in +which they are both to be found. The positive concept of freedom +furnishes this third cognition, which cannot, as with physical causes, +be the nature of the sensible world (in the concept of which we find +conjoined the concept of something in relation as cause to something +else as effect). We cannot now at once show what this third is to +which freedom points us and of which we have an idea a priori, nor can +we make intelligible how the concept of freedom is shown to be +legitimate from principles of pure practical reason and with it the +possibility of a categorical imperative; but some further +preparation is required. + + + + Freedom must be presupposed as a Property of the Will + + of all Rational Beings + + + +It is not enough to predicate freedom of our own will, from Whatever +reason, if we have not sufficient grounds for predicating the same +of all rational beings. For as morality serves as a law for us only +because we are rational beings, it must also hold for all rational +beings; and as it must be deduced simply from the property of freedom, +it must be shown that freedom also is a property of all rational +beings. It is not enough, then, to prove it from certain supposed +experiences of human nature (which indeed is quite impossible, and +it can only be shown a priori), but we must show that it belongs to +the activity of all rational beings endowed with a will. Now I say +every being that cannot act except under the idea of freedom is just +for that reason in a practical point of view really free, that is to +say, all laws which are inseparably connected with freedom have the +same force for him as if his will had been shown to be free in +itself by a proof theoretically conclusive. * Now I affirm that we +must attribute to every rational being which has a will that it has +also the idea of freedom and acts entirely under this idea. For in +such a being we conceive a reason that is practical, that is, has +causality in reference to its objects. Now we cannot possibly conceive +a reason consciously receiving a bias from any other quarter with +respect to its judgements, for then the subject would ascribe the +determination of its judgement not to its own reason, but to an +impulse. It must regard itself as the author of its principles +independent of foreign influences. Consequently as practical reason or +as the will of a rational being it must regard itself as free, that is +to say, the will of such a being cannot be a will of its own except +under the idea of freedom. This idea must therefore in a practical +point of view be ascribed to every rational being. + + + +* I adopt this method of assuming freedom merely as an idea which +rational beings suppose in their actions, in order to avoid the +necessity of proving it in its theoretical aspect also. The former +is sufficient for my purpose; for even though the speculative proof +should not be made out, yet a being that cannot act except with the +idea of freedom is bound by the same laws that would oblige a being +who was actually free. Thus we can escape here from the onus which +presses on the theory. + + + + Of the Interest attaching to the Ideas of Morality + + + +We have finally reduced the definite conception of morality to the +idea of freedom. This latter, however, we could not prove to be +actually a property of ourselves or of human nature; only we saw +that it must be presupposed if we would conceive a being as rational +and conscious of its causality in respect of its actions, i.e., as +endowed with a will; and so we find that on just the same grounds we +must ascribe to every being endowed with reason and will this +attribute of determining itself to action under the idea of its +freedom. + +Now it resulted also from the presupposition of these ideas that +we became aware of a law that the subjective principles of action, +i.e., maxims, must always be so assumed that they can also hold as +objective, that is, universal principles, and so serve as universal +laws of our own dictation. But why then should I subject myself to +this principle and that simply as a rational being, thus also +subjecting to it all other being endowed with reason? I will allow +that no interest urges me to this, for that would not give a +categorical imperative, but I must take an interest in it and +discern how this comes to pass; for this properly an "I ought" is +properly an "I would," valid for every rational being, provided only +that reason determined his actions without any hindrance. But for +beings that are in addition affected as we are by springs of a +different kind, namely, sensibility, and in whose case that is not +always done which reason alone would do, for these that necessity is +expressed only as an "ought," and the subjective necessity is +different from the objective. + +It seems then as if the moral law, that is, the principle of +autonomy of the will, were properly speaking only presupposed in the +idea of freedom, and as if we could not prove its reality and +objective necessity independently. In that case we should still have +gained something considerable by at least determining the true +principle more exactly than had previously been done; but as regards +its validity and the practical necessity of subjecting oneself to +it, we should not have advanced a step. For if we were asked why the +universal validity of our maxim as a law must be the condition +restricting our actions, and on what we ground the worth which we +assign to this manner of acting- a worth so great that there cannot be +any higher interest; and if we were asked further how it happens +that it is by this alone a man believes he feels his own personal +worth, in comparison with which that of an agreeable or disagreeable +condition is to be regarded as nothing, to these questions we could +give no satisfactory answer. + +We find indeed sometimes that we can take an interest in a +personal quality which does not involve any interest of external +condition, provided this quality makes us capable of participating +in the condition in case reason were to effect the allotment; that +is to say, the mere being worthy of happiness can interest of itself +even without the motive of participating in this happiness. This +judgement, however, is in fact only the effect of the importance of +the moral law which we before presupposed (when by the idea of freedom +we detach ourselves from every empirical interest); but that we +ought to detach ourselves from these interests, i.e., to consider +ourselves as free in action and yet as subject to certain laws, so +as to find a worth simply in our own person which can compensate us +for the loss of everything that gives worth to our condition; this +we are not yet able to discern in this way, nor do we see how it is +possible so to act- in other words, whence the moral law derives its +obligation. + +It must be freely admitted that there is a sort of circle here +from which it seems impossible to escape. In the order of efficient +causes we assume ourselves free, in order that in the order of ends we +may conceive ourselves as subject to moral laws: and we afterwards +conceive ourselves as subject to these laws, because we have +attributed to ourselves freedom of will: for freedom and +self-legislation of will are both autonomy and, therefore, are +reciprocal conceptions, and for this very reason one must not be +used to explain the other or give the reason of it, but at most only +logical purposes to reduce apparently different notions of the same +object to one single concept (as we reduce different fractions of +the same value to the lowest terms). + +One resource remains to us, namely, to inquire whether we do not +occupy different points of view when by means of freedom we think +ourselves as causes efficient a priori, and when we form our +conception of ourselves from our actions as effects which we see +before our eyes. + +It is a remark which needs no subtle reflection to make, but which +we may assume that even the commonest understanding can make, although +it be after its fashion by an obscure discernment of judgement which +it calls feeling, that all the "ideas" that come to us involuntarily +(as those of the senses) do not enable us to know objects otherwise +than as they affect us; so that what they may be in themselves remains +unknown to us, and consequently that as regards "ideas" of this kind +even with the closest attention and clearness that the understanding +can apply to them, we can by them only attain to the knowledge of +appearances, never to that of things in themselves. As soon as this +distinction has once been made (perhaps merely in consequence of the +difference observed between the ideas given us from without, and in +which we are passive, and those that we produce simply from ourselves, +and in which we show our own activity), then it follows of itself that +we must admit and assume behind the appearance something else that +is not an appearance, namely, the things in themselves; although we +must admit that as they can never be known to us except as they affect +us, we can come no nearer to them, nor can we ever know what they +are in themselves. This must furnish a distinction, however crude, +between a world of sense and the world of understanding, of which +the former may be different according to the difference of the +sensuous impressions in various observers, while the second which is +its basis always remains the same, Even as to himself, a man cannot +pretend to know what he is in himself from the knowledge he has by +internal sensation. For as he does not as it were create himself, +and does not come by the conception of himself a priori but +empirically, it naturally follows that he can obtain his knowledge +even of himself only by the inner sense and, consequently, only +through the appearances of his nature and the way in which his +consciousness is affected. At the same time beyond these +characteristics of his own subject, made up of mere appearances, he +must necessarily suppose something else as their basis, namely, his +ego, whatever its characteristics in itself may be. Thus in respect to +mere perception and receptivity of sensations he must reckon himself +as belonging to the world of sense; but in respect of whatever there +may be of pure activity in him (that which reaches consciousness +immediately and not through affecting the senses), he must reckon +himself as belonging to the intellectual world, of which, however, +he has no further knowledge. To such a conclusion the reflecting man +must come with respect to all the things which can be presented to +him: it is probably to be met with even in persons of the commonest +understanding, who, as is well known, are very much inclined to +suppose behind the objects of the senses something else invisible +and acting of itself. They spoil it, however, by presently +sensualizing this invisible again; that is to say, wanting to make +it an object of intuition, so that they do not become a whit the +wiser. + +Now man really finds in himself a faculty by which he +distinguishes himself from everything else, even from himself as +affected by objects, and that is reason. This being pure spontaneity +is even elevated above the understanding. For although the latter is a +spontaneity and does not, like sense, merely contain intuitions that +arise when we are affected by things (and are therefore passive), +yet it cannot produce from its activity any other conceptions than +those which merely serve to bring the intuitions of sense under +rules and, thereby, to unite them in one consciousness, and without +this use of the sensibility it could not think at all; whereas, on the +contrary, reason shows so pure a spontaneity in the case of what I +call ideas [ideal conceptions] that it thereby far transcends +everything that the sensibility can give it, and exhibits its most +important function in distinguishing the world of sense from that of +understanding, and thereby prescribing the limits of the understanding +itself. + +For this reason a rational being must regard himself qua +intelligence (not from the side of his lower faculties) as belonging +not to the world of sense, but to that of understanding; hence he +has two points of view from which he can regard himself, and recognise +laws of the exercise of his faculties, and consequently of all his +actions: first, so far as he belongs to the world of sense, he finds +himself subject to laws of nature (heteronomy); secondly, as belonging +to the intelligible world, under laws which being independent of +nature have their foundation not in experience but in reason alone. + +As a rational being, and consequently belonging to the +intelligible world, man can never conceive the causality of his own +will otherwise than on condition of the idea of freedom, for +independence of the determinate causes of the sensible world (an +independence which reason must always ascribe to itself) is freedom. +Now the idea of freedom is inseparably connected with the conception +of autonomy, and this again with the universal principle of morality +which is ideally the foundation of all actions of rational beings, +just as the law of nature is of all phenomena. + +Now the suspicion is removed which we raised above, that there was a +latent circle involved in our reasoning from freedom to autonomy, +and from this to the moral law, viz.: that we laid down the idea of +freedom because of the moral law only that we might afterwards in turn +infer the latter from freedom, and that consequently we could assign +no reason at all for this law, but could only [present] it as a +petitio principii which well disposed minds would gladly concede to +us, but which we could never put forward as a provable proposition. +For now we see that, when we conceive ourselves as free, we transfer +ourselves into the world of understanding as members of it and +recognise the autonomy of the will with its consequence, morality; +whereas, if we conceive ourselves as under obligation, we consider +ourselves as belonging to the world of sense and at the same time to +the world of understanding. + + + + How is a Categorical Imperative Possible? + + + +Every rational being reckons himself qua intelligence as belonging +to the world of understanding, and it is simply as an efficient +cause belonging to that world that he calls his causality a will. On +the other side he is also conscious of himself as a part of the +world of sense in which his actions, which are mere appearances +[phenomena] of that causality, are displayed; we cannot, however, +discern how they are possible from this causality which we do not +know; but instead of that, these actions as belonging to the +sensible world must be viewed as determined by other phenomena, +namely, desires and inclinations. If therefore I were only a member of +the world of understanding, then all my actions would perfectly +conform to the principle of autonomy of the pure will; if I were +only a part of the world of sense, they would necessarily be assumed +to conform wholly to the natural law of desires and inclinations, in +other words, to the heteronomy of nature. (The former would rest on +morality as the supreme principle, the latter on happiness.) Since, +however, the world of understanding contains the foundation of the +world of sense, and consequently of its laws also, and accordingly +gives the law to my will (which belongs wholly to the world of +understanding) directly, and must be conceived as doing so, it follows +that, although on the one side I must regard myself as a being +belonging to the world of sense, yet on the other side I must +recognize myself as subject as an intelligence to the law of the world +of understanding, i.e., to reason, which contains this law in the idea +of freedom, and therefore as subject to the autonomy of the will: +consequently I must regard the laws of the world of understanding as +imperatives for me and the actions which conform to them as duties. + +And thus what makes categorical imperatives possible is this, that +the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world, in +consequence of which, if I were nothing else, all my actions would +always conform to the autonomy of the will; but as I at the same +time intuite myself as a member of the world of sense, they ought so +to conform, and this categorical "ought" implies a synthetic a +priori proposition, inasmuch as besides my will as affected by +sensible desires there is added further the idea of the same will +but as belonging to the world of the understanding, pure and practical +of itself, which contains the supreme condition according to reason of +the former will; precisely as to the intuitions of sense there are +added concepts of the understanding which of themselves signify +nothing but regular form in general and in this way synthetic a priori +propositions become possible, on which all knowledge of physical +nature rests. + +The practical use of common human reason confirms this reasoning. +There is no one, not even the most consummate villain, provided only +that he is otherwise accustomed to the use of reason, who, when we set +before him examples of honesty of purpose, of steadfastness in +following good maxims, of sympathy and general benevolence (even +combined with great sacrifices of advantages and comfort), does not +wish that he might also possess these qualities. Only on account of +his inclinations and impulses he cannot attain this in himself, but at +the same time he wishes to be free from such inclinations which are +burdensome to himself. He proves by this that he transfers himself +in thought with a will free from the impulses of the sensibility +into an order of things wholly different from that of his desires in +the field of the sensibility; since he cannot expect to obtain by that +wish any gratification of his desires, nor any position which would +satisfy any of his actual or supposable inclinations (for this would +destroy the pre-eminence of the very idea which wrests that wish +from him): he can only expect a greater intrinsic worth of his own +person. This better person, however, he imagines himself to be when be +transfers himself to the point of view of a member of the world of the +understanding, to which he is involuntarily forced by the idea of +freedom, i.e., of independence on determining causes of the world of +sense; and from this point of view he is conscious of a good will, +which by his own confession constitutes the law for the bad will +that he possesses as a member of the world of sense- a law whose +authority he recognizes while transgressing it. What he morally +"ought" is then what he necessarily "would," as a member of the +world of the understanding, and is conceived by him as an "ought" only +inasmuch as he likewise considers himself as a member of the world +of sense. + + + + Of the Extreme Limits of all Practical Philosophy. + + + +All men attribute to themselves freedom of will. Hence come all +judgements upon actions as being such as ought to have been done, +although they have not been done. However, this freedom is not a +conception of experience, nor can it be so, since it still remains, +even though experience shows the contrary of what on supposition of +freedom are conceived as its necessary consequences. On the other side +it is equally necessary that everything that takes place should be +fixedly determined according to laws of nature. This necessity of +nature is likewise not an empirical conception, just for this +reason, that it involves the motion of necessity and consequently of a +priori cognition. But this conception of a system of nature is +confirmed by experience; and it must even be inevitably presupposed if +experience itself is to be possible, that is, a connected knowledge of +the objects of sense resting on general laws. Therefore freedom is +only an idea of reason, and its objective reality in itself is +doubtful; while nature is a concept of the understanding which proves, +and must necessarily prove, its reality in examples of experience. + +There arises from this a dialectic of reason, since the freedom +attributed to the will appears to contradict the necessity of +nature, and placed between these two ways reason for speculative +purposes finds the road of physical necessity much more beaten and +more appropriate than that of freedom; yet for practical purposes +the narrow footpath of freedom is the only one on which it is possible +to make use of reason in our conduct; hence it is just as impossible +for the subtlest philosophy as for the commonest reason of men to +argue away freedom. Philosophy must then assume that no real +contradiction will be found between freedom and physical necessity +of the same human actions, for it cannot give up the conception of +nature any more than that of freedom. + +Nevertheless, even though we should never be able to comprehend +how freedom is possible, we must at least remove this apparent +contradiction in a convincing manner. For if the thought of freedom +contradicts either itself or nature, which is equally necessary, it +must in competition with physical necessity be entirely given up. + +It would, however, be impossible to escape this contradiction if the +thinking subject, which seems to itself free, conceived itself in +the same sense or in the very same relation when it calls itself +free as when in respect of the same action it assumes itself to be +subject to the law of nature. Hence it is an indispensable problem +of speculative philosophy to show that its illusion respecting the +contradiction rests on this, that we think of man in a different sense +and relation when we call him free and when we regard him as subject +to the laws of nature as being part and parcel of nature. It must +therefore show that not only can both these very well co-exist, but +that both must be thought as necessarily united in the same subject, +since otherwise no reason could be given why we should burden reason +with an idea which, though it may possibly without contradiction be +reconciled with another that is sufficiently established, yet +entangles us in a perplexity which sorely embarrasses reason in its +theoretic employment. This duty, however, belongs only to +speculative philosophy. The philosopher then has no option whether +he will remove the apparent contradiction or leave it untouched; for +in the latter case the theory respecting this would be bonum vacans, +into the possession of which the fatalist would have a right to +enter and chase all morality out of its supposed domain as occupying +it without title. + +We cannot however as yet say that we are touching the bounds of +practical philosophy. For the settlement of that controversy does +not belong to it; it only demands from speculative reason that it +should put an end to the discord in which it entangles itself in +theoretical questions, so that practical reason may have rest and +security from external attacks which might make the ground debatable +on which it desires to build. + +The claims to freedom of will made even by common reason are founded +on the consciousness and the admitted supposition that reason is +independent of merely subjectively determined causes which together +constitute what belongs to sensation only and which consequently +come under the general designation of sensibility. Man considering +himself in this way as an intelligence places himself thereby in a +different order of things and in a relation to determining grounds +of a wholly different kind when on the one hand he thinks of himself +as an intelligence endowed with a will, and consequently with +causality, and when on the other he perceives himself as a +phenomenon in the world of sense (as he really is also), and affirms +that his causality is subject to external determination according to +laws of nature. Now he soon becomes aware that both can hold good, +nay, must hold good at the same time. For there is not the smallest +contradiction in saying that a thing in appearance (belonging to the +world of sense) is subject to certain laws, of which the very same +as a thing or being in itself is independent, and that he must +conceive and think of himself in this twofold way, rests as to the +first on the consciousness of himself as an object affected through +the senses, and as to the second on the consciousness of himself as an +intelligence, i.e., as independent on sensible impressions in the +employment of his reason (in other words as belonging to the world +of understanding). + +Hence it comes to pass that man claims the possession of a will +which takes no account of anything that comes under the head of +desires and inclinations and, on the contrary, conceives actions as +possible to him, nay, even as necessary which can only be done by +disregarding all desires and sensible inclinations. The causality of +such actions lies in him as an intelligence and in the laws of effects +and actions [which depend] on the principles of an intelligible world, +of which indeed he knows nothing more than that in it pure reason +alone independent of sensibility gives the law; moreover since it is +only in that world, as an intelligence, that he is his proper self +(being as man only the appearance of himself), those laws apply to him +directly and categorically, so that the incitements of inclinations +and appetites (in other words the whole nature of the world of +sense) cannot impair the laws of his volition as an intelligence. Nay, +he does not even hold himself responsible for the former or ascribe +them to his proper self, i.e., his will: he only ascribes to his +will any indulgence which he might yield them if he allowed them to +influence his maxims to the prejudice of the rational laws of the +will. + +When practical reason thinks itself into a world of understanding, +it does not thereby transcend its own limits, as it would if it +tried to enter it by intuition or sensation. The former is only a +negative thought in respect of the world of sense, which does not give +any laws to reason in determining the will and is positive only in +this single point that this freedom as a negative characteristic is at +the same time conjoined with a (positive) faculty and even with a +causality of reason, which we designate a will, namely a faculty of so +acting that the principle of the actions shall conform to the +essential character of a rational motive, i.e., the condition that the +maxim have universal validity as a law. But were it to borrow an +object of will, that is, a motive, from the world of understanding, +then it would overstep its bounds and pretend to be acquainted with +something of which it knows nothing. The conception of a world of +the understanding is then only a point of view which reason finds +itself compelled to take outside the appearances in order to +conceive itself as practical, which would not be possible if the +influences of the sensibility had a determining power on man, but +which is necessary unless he is to be denied the consciousness of +himself as an intelligence and, consequently, as a rational cause, +energizing by reason, that is, operating freely. This thought +certainly involves the idea of an order and a system of laws different +from that of the mechanism of nature which belongs to the sensible +world; and it makes the conception of an intelligible world +necessary (that is to say, the whole system of rational beings as +things in themselves). But it does not in the least authorize us to +think of it further than as to its formal condition only, that is, the +universality of the maxims of the will as laws, and consequently the +autonomy of the latter, which alone is consistent with its freedom; +whereas, on the contrary, all laws that refer to a definite object +give heteronomy, which only belongs to laws of nature and can only +apply to the sensible world. + +But reason would overstep all its bounds if it undertook to +explain how pure reason can be practical, which would be exactly the +same problem as to explain how freedom is possible. + +For we can explain nothing but that which we can reduce to laws, the +object of which can be given in some possible experience. But +freedom is a mere idea, the objective reality of which can in no +wise be shown according to laws of nature, and consequently not in any +possible experience; and for this reason it can never be +comprehended or understood, because we cannot support it by any sort +of example or analogy. It holds good only as a necessary hypothesis of +reason in a being that believes itself conscious of a will, that is, +of a faculty distinct from mere desire (namely, a faculty of +determining itself to action as an intelligence, in other words, by +laws of reason independently on natural instincts). Now where +determination according to laws of nature ceases, there all +explanation ceases also, and nothing remains but defence, i.e., the +removal of the objections of those who pretend to have seen deeper +into the nature of things, and thereupon boldly declare freedom +impossible. We can only point out to them that the supposed +contradiction that they have discovered in it arises only from this, +that in order to be able to apply the law of nature to human +actions, they must necessarily consider man as an appearance: then +when we demand of them that they should also think of him qua +intelligence as a thing in itself, they still persist in considering +him in this respect also as an appearance. In this view it would no +doubt be a contradiction to suppose the causality of the same +subject (that is, his will) to be withdrawn from all the natural +laws of the sensible world. But this contradiction disappears, if they +would only bethink themselves and admit, as is reasonable, that behind +the appearances there must also lie at their root (although hidden) +the things in themselves, and that we cannot expect the laws of +these to be the same as those that govern their appearances. + +The subjective impossibility of explaining the freedom of the will +is identical with the impossibility of discovering and explaining an +interest * which man can take in the moral law. Nevertheless he does +actually take an interest in it, the basis of which in us we call +the moral feeling, which some have falsely assigned as the standard of +our moral judgement, whereas it must rather be viewed as the +subjective effect that the law exercises on the will, the objective +principle of which is furnished by reason alone. + + + +* Interest is that by which reason becomes practical, i.e., a cause +determining the will. Hence we say of rational beings only that they +take an interest in a thing; irrational beings only feel sensual +appetites. Reason takes a direct interest in action then only when the +universal validity of its maxims is alone sufficient to determine +the will. Such an interest alone is pure. But if it can determine +the will only by means of another object of desire or on the +suggestion of a particular feeling of the subject, then reason takes +only an indirect interest in the action, and, as reason by itself +without experience cannot discover either objects of the will or a +special feeling actuating it, this latter interest would only be +empirical and not a pure rational interest. The logical interest of +reason (namely, to extend its insight) is never direct, but +presupposes purposes for which reason is employed. + + + +In order indeed that a rational being who is also affected through +the senses should will what reason alone directs such beings that they +ought to will, it is no doubt requisite that reason should have a +power to infuse a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction in the +fulfilment of duty, that is to say, that it should have a causality by +which it determines the sensibility according to its own principles. +But it is quite impossible to discern, i.e., to make it intelligible a +priori, how a mere thought, which itself contains nothing sensible, +can itself produce a sensation of pleasure or pain; for this is a +particular kind of causality of which as of every other causality we +can determine nothing whatever a priori; we must only consult +experience about it. But as this cannot supply us with any relation of +cause and effect except between two objects of experience, whereas +in this case, although indeed the effect produced lies within +experience, yet the cause is supposed to be pure reason acting through +mere ideas which offer no object to experience, it follows that for us +men it is quite impossible to explain how and why the universality +of the maxim as a law, that is, morality, interests. This only is +certain, that it is not because it interests us that it has validity +for us (for that would be heteronomy and dependence of practical +reason on sensibility, namely, on a feeling as its principle, in which +case it could never give moral laws), but that it interests us because +it is valid for us as men, inasmuch as it had its source in our will +as intelligences, in other words, in our proper self, and what belongs +to mere appearance is necessarily subordinated by reason to the nature +of the thing in itself. + +The question then, "How a categorical imperative is possible," can +be answered to this extent, that we can assign the only hypothesis +on which it is possible, namely, the idea of freedom; and we can +also discern the necessity of this hypothesis, and this is +sufficient for the practical exercise of reason, that is, for the +conviction of the validity of this imperative, and hence of the +moral law; but how this hypothesis itself is possible can never be +discerned by any human reason. On the hypothesis, however, that the +will of an intelligence is free, its autonomy, as the essential formal +condition of its determination, is a necessary consequence. +Moreover, this freedom of will is not merely quite possible as a +hypothesis (not involving any contradiction to the principle of +physical necessity in the connexion of the phenomena of the sensible +world) as speculative philosophy can show: but further, a rational +being who is conscious of causality through reason, that is to say, of +a will (distinct from desires), must of necessity make it practically, +that is, in idea, the condition of all his voluntary actions. But to +explain how pure reason can be of itself practical without the aid +of any spring of action that could be derived from any other source, +i.e., how the mere principle of the universal validity of all its +maxims as laws (which would certainly be the form of a pure +practical reason) can of itself supply a spring, without any matter +(object) of the will in which one could antecedently take any +interest; and how it can produce an interest which would be called +purely moral; or in other words, how pure reason can be practical- +to explain this is beyond the power of human reason, and all the +labour and pains of seeking an explanation of it are lost. + +It is just the same as if I sought to find out how freedom itself is +possible as the causality of a will. For then I quit the ground of +philosophical explanation, and I have no other to go upon. I might +indeed revel in the world of intelligences which still remains to +me, but although I have an idea of it which is well founded, yet I +have not the least knowledge of it, nor an I ever attain to such +knowledge with all the efforts of my natural faculty of reason. It +signifies only a something that remains over when I have eliminated +everything belonging to the world of sense from the actuating +principles of my will, serving merely to keep in bounds the +principle of motives taken from the field of sensibility; fixing its +limits and showing that it does not contain all in all within +itself, but that there is more beyond it; but this something more I +know no further. Of pure reason which frames this ideal, there remains +after the abstraction of all matter, i.e., knowledge of objects, +nothing but the form, namely, the practical law of the universality of +the maxims, and in conformity with this conception of reason in +reference to a pure world of understanding as a possible efficient +cause, that is a cause determining the will. There must here be a +total absence of springs; unless this idea of an intelligible world is +itself the spring, or that in which reason primarily takes an +interest; but to make this intelligible is precisely the problem +that we cannot solve. + +Here now is the extreme limit of all moral inquiry, and it is of +great importance to determine it even on this account, in order that +reason may not on the one hand, to the prejudice of morals, seek about +in the world of sense for the supreme motive and an interest +comprehensible but empirical; and on the other hand, that it may not +impotently flap its wings without being able to move in the (for it) +empty space of transcendent concepts which we call the intelligible +world, and so lose itself amidst chimeras. For the rest, the idea of a +pure world of understanding as a system of all intelligences, and to +which we ourselves as rational beings belong (although we are likewise +on the other side members of the sensible world), this remains +always a useful and legitimate idea for the purposes of rational +belief, although all knowledge stops at its threshold, useful, namely, +to produce in us a lively interest in the moral law by means of the +noble ideal of a universal kingdom of ends in themselves (rational +beings), to which we can belong as members then only when we carefully +conduct ourselves according to the maxims of freedom as if they were +laws of nature. + + + + Concluding Remark + + + +The speculative employment of reason with respect to nature leads to +the absolute necessity of some supreme cause of the world: the +practical employment of reason with a view to freedom leads also to +absolute necessity, but only of the laws of the actions of a +rational being as such. Now it is an essential principle of reason, +however employed, to push its knowledge to a consciousness of its +necessity (without which it would not be rational knowledge). It is, +however, an equally essential restriction of the same reason that it +can neither discern the necessity of what is or what happens, nor of +what ought to happen, unless a condition is supposed on which it is or +happens or ought to happen. In this way, however, by the constant +inquiry for the condition, the satisfaction of reason is only +further and further postponed. Hence it unceasingly seeks the +unconditionally necessary and finds itself forced to assume it, +although without any means of making it comprehensible to itself, +happy enough if only it can discover a conception which agrees with +this assumption. It is therefore no fault in our deduction of the +supreme principle of morality, but an objection that should be made to +human reason in general, that it cannot enable us to conceive the +absolute necessity of an unconditional practical law (such as the +categorical imperative must be). It cannot be blamed for refusing to +explain this necessity by a condition, that is to say, by means of +some interest assumed as a basis, since the law would then cease to be +a supreme law of reason. And thus while we do not comprehend the +practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, we yet +comprehend its incomprehensibility, and this is all that can be fairly +demanded of a philosophy which strives to carry its principles up to +the very limit of human reason. + + + THE END + + + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS *** + +This file should be named 5682.txt or 5682.zip + +Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the US +unless a copyright notice is included. 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