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diff --git a/old/55022-8.txt b/old/55022-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index e486f36..0000000 --- a/old/55022-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4281 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Brain of an Army, by Spenser Wilkinson - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Brain of an Army - A Popular Account of the German General Staff - -Author: Spenser Wilkinson - -Release Date: July 1, 2017 [EBook #55022] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BRAIN OF AN ARMY *** - - - - -Produced by Al Haines - - - - - - - - - - THE - BRAIN OF AN ARMY - - - A POPULAR ACCOUNT - OF THE - GERMAN GENERAL STAFF - - - BY - SPENSER WILKINSON - - - NEW EDITION - - WITH LETTERS FROM - COUNT MOLTKE AND LORD ROBERTS - - - - WESTMINSTER - ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE - & CO 1895 - - - - - BY THE SAME AUTHOR - - _THE COMMAND OF THE SEA_ - _THE BRAIN OF A NAVY_ - _THE GREAT ALTERNATIVE_ - - _and in conjunction with_ - - SIR CHARLES W. DILKE, BART. - - _IMPERIAL DEFENCE_ - - - - -[Transcriber's note: the errata items below have been applied to this -text.] - -ERRATA. - -page 9, line 6 for _have_ read _has_ - -page 10, line 21, for _occasion_ read _occasions_ - - - - -PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION - -Six years ago a Royal Commission, under the presidency of Lord -Hartington, was known to be inquiring into the administration of the -national defence. There was much talk in the newspapers about the -Prussian staff, and many were the advocates of its imitation in this -country. Very few of those who took part in the discussions seemed to -know what the Prussian staff was, and I thought it might be useful to -the Royal Commission and to the public to have a true account of that -institution, written in plain English, so that any one could understand -it. The essay was published on the 11th of February, 1890, the day on -which the Report of Lord Hartington's Commission was signed. - -The essential feature of the Prussian staff system consists in the -classification of duties out of which it has arisen. Every general in -the field requires a number of assistants, collectively forming his -staff, to relieve him of matters of detail, to act as his confidential -secretaries, and to represent him at places where he cannot be himself. -The duties of command are so multifarious that some consistent -distribution of functions among the officers of a large staff is -indispensable. In Prussia this distribution is based on a thoroughly -rational and practical principle. The general's work is subdivided -into classes, according as it is concerned with administration and -discipline or with the direction of the operations against the enemy. -All that belongs to administration and discipline is put upon one side -of a dividing line, and upon the other side all that directly affects -the preparation for or the management of the fighting--in technical -language, all that falls within the domain of strategy and tactics. -The officers entrusted with the personal assistance of the general in -this latter group of duties are in Prussia called his "general staff." -They are specially trained in the art of conducting operations against -an enemy, that is in the specific function of generalship, which has -thus in the Prussian army received more systematic attention than in -any other. In the British army the assistants of a general are also -grouped into classes for the performance of specific functions in his -relief. But the grouping of duties is accidental, and follows no -principle. It has arisen by chance, and been stereotyped by usage. -The officers of a staff belong to the adjutant-general's branch or to -the quartermaster-general's branch, but no rational criterion exists by -which to discover whether a particular function falls to one branch or -to the other. That this is an evil is evident, because it is manifest -that there can be no scientific training for a group of duties which -have no inherent affinity with one another. The evil has long been -felt, for the attempt has been made to remedy it by amalgamating the -two branches in order to sever them again upon a rational plane of -cleavage. - -But while the essence of the Prussian general staff lies deeply -embedded in the organization of the Prussian army, the interest of the -general public has been attracted by the fact that the great strategist -to whom the victories of 1866 and 1870 are ascribed was not the -commander of the Prussian army, but merely the chief of the general -staff of a royal commander-in-chief. It may well be doubted whether -this feature of the Prussian system is suitable for imitation -elsewhere. The Germans themselves evidently regard it as accidental -rather than essential, for in organizing their navy they have, after -much experiment and deliberation, adopted a different plan. They have -appointed their chosen admiral to be, not chief of the staff to an -Emperor who in war, as he takes the field with the army, cannot -undertake the command of the navy, but to be "the commanding admiral." - -I refrained in the first edition of this essay from drawing from the -German institution which it describes a moral to be applied to the -British army, and was content with a warning against overhasty -imitation. At that time the nature of the relation between Moltke and -the King was still to some extent veiled in official language, and -nothing so far as I am aware had been published which allowed the facts -to rest upon well authenticated, direct evidence as distinguished from -inference. Since then the posthumous publication of Moltke's private -correspondence,[1] and of the first instalment of his military -correspondence,[2] has thrown a flood of light upon the whole subject. -I had the good fortune to be furnished with an earlier clue. As soon -as my essay was ready for the press I ventured to send a proof to Count -Moltke, with a request that he would allow me in a dedication to couple -his name with studies of which his work had been the subject. He was -good enough to reply in a letter of which the following is a -translation:-- - - -BERLIN, January 20, 1890. - -DEAR SIR,-- - -I have read your essay on the German general staff with great interest. - -I am glad that on p. 63 you dispose of the ever-recurring legend -according to which before every important decision a council of war is -assembled. I can assure you that in 1866 and in 1870-71 a council of -war was never called. - -If the commander after consultation with his authorized adviser feels -the need of asking others what he ought to do, the command is in weak -hands. - -If King William I. ever really used the expression attributed to him on -p. 58, he did himself a great injustice. The king judged the -perpetually changing military situation with an uncommonly clear eye. -He was much more than "a great strategist." It was he who took upon -himself an immeasurable responsibility, and for the conduct of an army -character weighs more than knowledge and science. I think your -excellent work would lose nothing if that passage were omitted. - -You touch on p. 112[3] upon the relation between the commander and the -statesman. Neither of the two can set up for himself in advance a goal -to be certainly reached. The plan of campaign modifies itself after -the first great collision with the enemy. Success or failure in a -battle occasions operations originally not intended. On the other hand -the final claims of the statesman will be very different according as -he has to reckon with defeats or with a series of uninterrupted -victories. In the course of the campaign the balance between the -military will and the considerations of diplomacy can be held only by -the supreme authority. - -It has not escaped your penetration that a general staff cannot be -improvised on the outbreak of war, that it must be prepared long -beforehand in peace, and be in practical activity and in close -intercourse with the troops. But even that is not enough. It must -know who is to be its future commander, must be in communication with -him and gain his confidence, without which its position is untenable. - -Great is the advantage if the head of the State is also the leader in -war. He knows his general staff and his troops, and is known by them. -In such armies there are no pronunciamentoes. - -The constitution, however, does not in every country admit of placing -the head of the State at the head of the army. If the Government will -and can select in advance the most qualified general for the post, that -officer must also be given during peace the authority to influence the -troops and their leaders and to create an understanding between himself -and his general staff. This chosen general will seldom be the minister -of war, who during the whole war is indispensable at home, where all -the threads of administration come together. - -You have expressed the kind intention of dedicating your interesting -essay to me, but I suggest that you should consider whether without -such a dedication it would not still better preserve the character of -perfectly independent judgment. - -With best thanks for your kind communication, - I am, dear sir, yours very truly, - COUNT MOLTKE, - Field Marshal. - - -It was hardly possible for Moltke, bound as he was by his own high -position, to have expressed more plainly his opinion of the kind of -reform needed in the British army, nor to have better illustrated than -by that opinion the precise nature of his own work.[4] - -With Moltke's view that the peculiar position which he held was not -necessarily the model best suited for the circumstances of the British -army it is interesting to compare the judgment expressed quite -independently by Lord Roberts, who kindly allows me to publish the -following letter:-- - - -SIMLA, - 11_th September_, 1891. - -DEAR MR. WILKINSON,-- - -I am much obliged to you for so kindly sending me _The Brain of an -Army_ and the other military works which reached me two or three mails -ago. Some of the books I had seen before, and _The Brain of an Army_ I -had often heard of, and meant to study whenever sufficient leisure was -vouchsafed to me, which, alas! is but seldom. I have now read it with -great interest. - -One point that strikes me is the strong inclination evinced at present -to assume that the German system of apportioning the duties of command -and staff is deserving of universal adoption because under exceptional -circumstances, and with quite an exceptional man to act as head of the -Staff, it proved eminently successful in the wars between Prussia and -Austria and Prussia and France. - -The idea of a Chief of the Staff who is to regulate the preparations -for and the operations during a campaign, and who is to possess a -predominant influence in determining the military policy of a nation, -is quite opposed to the views of some of the ablest commanders and -strategists, as summarized at pages 17 and 18 of Home's _Précis of -Modern Tactics_, Edition 1882; and I doubt whether any really competent -general or Commander-in-Chief would contentedly acquiesce in the -dissociation of command and responsibility which the German procedure -necessarily entails. That Von Moltke was the virtual -Commander-in-Chief of the German forces during the wars in question, -and that the nominal commanders had really very little to say to the -movements they were called upon to execute, seems to be clearly proved -by the third volume of the Field Marshal's writings, reviewed in _The -Times_ of the 21st August last. Von Moltke was a soldier of -extraordinary ability, he acted in the Emperor's name, the orders he -initiated were implicitly obeyed, and the military machine worked -smoothly. But had the orders not been uniformly judicious, had a check -or reverse been experienced, and had one or more of the subordinate -commanders possessed greater capacity and resolution than the Chief of -the Staff, the result might have been very different. - -In military nations a Chief of the Staff of the German type may perhaps -be essential, more especially when, as in Germany, the Emperor is the -head of the Army and its titular Commander-in-Chief. The reasons for -this are that, in the first place, he may not possess the qualities -required in a Commander-in-Chief who has to lead the Army in war; and -in the second place, even if he does possess those qualities, there are -so many other matters connected with the civil administration of his -own country, and with its political relations towards other countries, -that the time of a King or Emperor may be too fully occupied to admit -of his devoting that exclusive attention to military matters which is -so necessary in a Commander-in-Chief, if he desires to have an -efficient Army. A Chief of the Staff then becomes essential; he is -indeed the Commander-in-Chief. - -In a small army like ours, however, where the Commander-in-Chief is a -soldier by profession, I am inclined to think that a Chief of the Staff -is not required in the same way as he is in Germany. With us, the man -of the stamp sketched in chapter iv. of _The Brain of an Army_ should -be the head of the Army--the Commander-in-Chief to whom every one in -the Army looks up, and whom every one on service trusts implicitly. -The note at page 12 [61] of your little book expresses my meaning -exactly. Blucher required a Scharnhorst or a Gneisenau "to keep him -straight," but would it not have been better, as suggested in your -note, "to have given Scharnhorst and Gneisenau the actual command"? - -I think, too, that an Emperor or King would be more likely than a man -of inferior social standing to take the advice of a Chief of the Staff. -The former would be so immeasurably above all those about him that he -could afford to listen to advice--as the Emperor of Germany undoubtedly -did to that of Von Moltke on the occasion mentioned in the note at page -14 [64]. But the Commander of about much the same standing socially as -his Chief of the Staff, and possibly not much the latter's senior in -the Army, would be apt to resent what he might consider uncalled-for -interference; and this would be specially the case if he were of a -narrow-minded, obstinate disposition. Indeed, I think that such a -feeling would be almost sure to arise, unless the Commander-in-Chief -were one of those easy-going, soft natures which ought never to be -placed in such a high position. - -My personal experience is, of course, very slight, but I have been a -Commander with a Chief of the Staff, and I have been (in a very small -way) the Chief of the Staff to a Commander, with whom I was sent "to -keep him straight." It was not a pleasant position, and one which I -should not like to fill a second time. In my own Chief of the Staff -(the late Sir Charles Macgregor) I was particularly fortunate; he was -of the greatest possible assistance to me; but without thinking myself -narrow-minded and obstinate, I should have objected if he had acted as -if he were "at the head of the Army." - -I have been referring hitherto more to war than peace, but even in -peace time I doubt if a Chief of the Staff of the German type is -suitable to our organization, and to the comparative smallness of our -army. In war time it might easily lead to disaster. The less capacity -possessed by the nominal Commander-in-Chief the greater might be his -obstinacy, and the more capacity he possessed the more he would resent -anything which might savour of interference. Altogether I think that -the office of Chief of the Staff, as understood in Germany, might -easily be made impossible under the conditions of our service. My -opinion is that the Army Head-Quarters Staff are capable of doing -exactly the same work as the Grand General Staff of the German Army -perform, and that there is no need to upset our present system. We -have only to bring the Intelligence and Mobilization Departments more -closely into communication with, and into subordination to, the -Adjutant-General and Quarter-Master-General, as is now being done in -India with the best results. - -You will understand that the foregoing remarks are based on the -assumption that in the British Service the office of Commander-in-Chief -is held by the soldier who, from his abilities and experience, has -commended himself to the Government as being best qualified to organize -the Army for war, and if requisite to take command in the field. If, -however, for reasons of State it is thought desirable to approximate -our system to the German system in the selection of the head of the -Army, it might become necessary to appoint a Chief of the Staff of the -German type to act as the responsible military adviser of the -Commander-in-Chief and the Cabinet. But in this case the -responsibility of the Officer in question should be fully recognised -and clearly defined. - -Believe me, - Yours very truly, - FRED ROBERTS. - -To SPENSER WILKINSON, Esq. - - -The Report of Lord Hartington's Commission, which appeared in the -spring of 1890, seemed to justify the apprehension which had caused me -to write, for it recommended the creation, under the name of a general -staff, of a department bearing little resemblance to the model which it -professed to copy. The Commission, however, was in a most awkward -dilemma. It was confronted in regard to the command of the army with -two problems, one of which was administrative, the other -constitutional. The public was anxious to have an army efficient for -its purpose of fighting the enemies of Great Britain. The statesmen on -the Commission were intent upon having an army obedient to the -Government. The tradition that the command of the army being a royal -prerogative could be exercised otherwise than through the constituted -advisers of the Crown was not in practice altogether extinct. It can -hardly be doubted that the Commission was right in wishing to establish -the principle that the army is a branch of the public service, -administered and governed under the authority of the Cabinet in -precisely the same way as the post office. No other theory is possible -in the England of our day. But the attempt to make the theory into the -practice touched certain susceptibilities which it was felt ought to be -respected, and the Commission perhaps attached more importance to this -kind of consideration than to the necessity of preparing the war office -for war. - -It was no doubt of the first importance to guard against the recurrence -of a state of things in which all attempts to bring the army into -harmony with the needs of the time and of the nation were frustrated by -an authority not entirely amenable to the control of the Secretary of -State. Not less important, however, was the requirement that any -change by which this result, in itself so desirable, might be attained -should at the same time contribute to the supreme end of readiness for -conflict with any of the Great Powers whose rivalry with Great Britain -has in recent times become so acute. - -In the war of which a part is examined in the following pages a chief -of the staff is seen drafting the orders by which the whole army is -guided. He has no authority; the orders are issued in the name of the -commander,--that is in Prussia, of the king. When, as was the case in -1866 and in 1870-1, the king shows his entire confidence in the chief -of the staff by invariably accepting his drafts, the direction of the -army, the generalship of the campaign, is really the work of the chief -of the staff, though that officer has never had a command, and has been -sheltered throughout under the authority of another. The generalship -or strategy of the campaigns of 1866 and 1870-1 was Moltke's, and -Moltke's alone, and no one has borne more explicit testimony to this -fact than the king. At the same time no one has more emphasized the -other fact, that he was covered by the king's responsibility, than -Moltke himself. - -The work of generalship can rarely be given to any one but the -commander of an army. When the commander owes his position to other -than military considerations, as is the case in Prussia, where the king -is born to be commander-in-chief as he is born to be king, he is wise -to select a good professional general to do the work. But where a -government is free to choose its commander, that officer will wish to -do his own work himself, and will resent the suggestion that an -assistant should prompt and guide him. The Hartington Commission -proposed at the same time to abolish the office of commander-in-chief, -and to create that of a "chief of the staff." This new officer was to -advise the Secretary of State--that is, the Government--upon all the -most important military questions. He was to discuss the strength and -distribution of the army, and the defence of the Empire; to plan the -general arrangements for defence, and to shape the estimates according -to his plan. In a word, he was to perform many of the most important -duties of a commander-in-chief. But he was to be the adviser or -assistant, not of a military commander, but of a civilian -governor-general of the army. - -An army cannot be directed in war nor commanded in peace under the -immediate authority of a civilian. There must be a military commander, -the obedient servant of the Government, supported by the Government in -the exercise of his powers to discipline and direct the army, and -sheltered by the Government against all such criticism as would weaken -his authority or diminish its own responsibility. The scheme -propounded by the Hartington Commission evaded the cardinal question -which has to be settled: that of the military command of the army in -war. War cannot be carried on unless full and undivided authority is -given to the general entrusted by the Government with the conduct of -the military operations. That officer will necessarily be liable to -account to the Government for all that is done, for the design and for -its execution. - -The Report of the Commission made no provision whatever for the command -of the army in war. The proposed "chief of the staff" was to be -entrusted during peace with the duty of the design of operations. Had -the Commission's scheme been adopted, the Government would, upon the -near approach of war, still have had to select its commander. The -selection must fall either upon the "chief of the staff" or upon some -other person. But no general worth his salt will be found to stake his -own reputation and the fate of the nation upon the execution of designs -supplied to him at second-hand. No man with a particle of self-respect -would undertake the defence of his country upon the condition that he -should conduct it upon a plan as to which he had never been consulted, -and which, at the time of his appointment, it was too late to modify. -Accordingly, if the scheme of the Commission had been adopted, it would -have been necessary to entrust the command in war to the officer who -during peace had been chief of the staff. But this officer being in -peace out of all personal relation with the army could not have the -moral authority which is indispensable for its command. The scheme of -the Hartington Commission could therefore not be adopted, except at the -risk of disaster in the event of war. - -While I am revising the proof of this preface come the announcements, -first, that Lord Wolseley is to succeed the Duke of Cambridge, and, -secondly, that though the title of Commander-in-Chief is to be -retained, the duties attaching to the office are to be modified and its -authority diminished. - -The proposed changes in the status of the Commander-in-Chief show that -the present Government is suffering from the pressure of an anxiety -exactly like that which paralysed Lord Hartington's Commission, while -from the speeches in which the new scheme has been explained the idea -of war is altogether absent. The Government contemplates depriving the -Commander-in-Chief of his authority over the Adjutant-General and the -Quartermaster-General, as well as over the heads of some other military -departments. - -The Adjutant-General's department embraces among other matters all that -directly concerns the discipline, training, and education of the army; -while such business as the quartering and movements of troops passes -through the office of the Quartermaster-General. These officers are to -become the direct subordinates of the Secretary of State. In other -words, the staff at the headquarters of the army is to be the staff, -not of the nominal Commander-in-Chief, but of the Secretary of State, -who is thus to be made the real Commander-in-Chief of the army. - -This is evidently a momentous change, not to be lightly or rashly -approved or condemned. The first duty is to discover, if possible, the -motives by which the Government is actuated in proposing it. Mr. -Balfour, speaking in the House of Commons on the 31st of August, -explained the view of the Government. - - -"What," he said, "is the substance and essence of the criticisms passed -by the Harrington Commission upon the War Office system, which has now -been in force in this country for many years? The essence of the -criticisms of the Commissioners was that by having a single -Commander-in-Chief, through whom, and through whom alone, army opinion, -army matters, and army advice would come to the Secretary of State for -War, you were, in the first place, throwing upon the Commander-in-Chief -a burden which no single individual could possibly support; and, -secondly, you were practically destroying the responsibility of the -Secretary of State for War, who nominally is the head of the -department. If you put the Secretary of State for War in direct -communication with the Commander-in-Chief alone, I do not see how the -Secretary of State for War can be anything else than the administrative -puppet of the great soldier who is at the head of the army. He may -come down to the House and express the views of that great officer, but -if he is to take official advice from the Commander-in-Chief alone it -is absolutely impossible that the Secretary of State should be really -responsible, and in this House the Secretary of State will be no more -than the mouthpiece of the Commander-in-Chief." - - -Mr. Balfour's first point is that the burden thrown upon a single -Commander-in-Chief is too great for one man to bear. Marlborough, -Wellington or Napoleon would, perhaps, hardly have accepted this view. -But supposing it were true, the remedy proposed is infinitely worse -than the disease. In 1887 the Royal Commission, over which the late -Sir James Stephen presided, examined with judicial impartiality the -duties of the Secretary of State for War. That Commission in its -report wrote as follows:-- - - -"The first part of the system to be considered is the Secretary of -State. On him we have to observe, _first_, that the scope of his -duties is immense; _secondly_, that he performs them under extreme -disadvantages. He is charged with five separate great functions, any -one of which would be sufficient to occupy the whole time of a man of -first-rate industry, ability, and knowledge. - -"_First_, he is a member of the Cabinet, and a Member of Parliament, in -which capacity he has to give his attention, not only to the matters of -his own department, but to all the leading political questions of the -day. He has to take part in debates on the great topics of discussion, -and on many occasions to speak upon them in his place in Parliament. - -"_Secondly_, he is the head, as has been already observed, of the -political department of the army. He may have to consider, and that at -the shortest notice, the whole conduct of a war; all the important -points connected with an expedition to any part of the globe; political -questions like the abolition of purchase; legislative questions like -the Discipline Act, and many others of the same kind. - -"_Thirdly_, he is the head of the Ordnance Department, which includes -all the questions relating to cannon, small arms, and ammunition, and -all the questions that arise upon the management of four great -factories, and the care of an enormous mass of stores of every -description. - -"_Fourthly_, he has to deal with all the questions connected with -fortifications and the commissariat. - -"_Fifthly_, he is responsible for framing the Military Estimates, which -override all the other departments, and regulate the expenditure of -from £16,000,000 to £18,000,000 of public money. - -"It is morally and physically impossible that any one man should -discharge all these functions in a satisfactory manner. No one man -could possess either the time or the strength or the knowledge which -would be indispensable for that purpose; but even if such a physical -and intellectual prodigy were to be found, he would have to do his duty -under disadvantages which would reduce him practically to impotence." - - -If, then, the Commander-in-Chief is overburdened, it is at least -certain that the right way to relieve him cannot possibly consist in -adding to the functions of the Secretary of State. - -The real point of Mr. Balfour's statement of the case is in what -follows. If you have a single Commander-in-Chief through whom, and -through whom alone, army opinion, army matters, and army advice would -come to the Secretary of State, then, according to Mr. Balfour, you -practically destroy the responsibility of the Secretary of State. - -It is a mark of the hastiness of debate that the word responsibility -has crept in here. No word in the political vocabulary is so -dangerous, because none is so ambiguous. Properly speaking, a person -is said to be responsible when he is liable to be called to account for -his acts, a liability which implies that he is free to act in one way -or another. These two aspects of the term, the liability and the -freedom of choice implied, lead to its use in two opposite senses. -Sometimes responsibility means that a man must answer for what he does, -and sometimes that he may do as he pleases without being controlled by -any one. The word is as often as not a synonym for authority. When -Moltke speaks of the "immeasurable responsibility" of the King of -Prussia, he really means that the King took upon himself as his own -acts decisions of the gravest moment which were prompted by his -advisers, and that by so doing he covered them as against the rest of -the world; he did not mean that the King had to account for his conduct -except to his own conscience and at the bar of history. A Secretary of -State for War, in his relations with the army, wields the whole -authority of the Government. The only thing which he cannot do is to -act in opposition to the wishes of his colleagues, for if he did he -would immediately cease to be Secretary of State. As long as they are -agreed with him he is the master of the army. But his liability to be -called to account is infinitely small. The worst that can happen to -him is that if the party to which he belongs should lose its majority -in the House of Commons the Cabinet of which he is a member may have to -resign. That is an event always possible quite apart from his conduct, -and his actions will as a rule not bring it about unless for other -reasons it is already impending. Whenever, therefore, the phrase "the -responsibility of the Secretary of State" occurs, we ought to -substitute for it the more precise words: "the power of the Cabinet to -decide any matter as it pleases, subject to the chance of its losing -its majority." - -What Mr. Balfour deprecates is a single Commander-in-Chief, and it is -important to grasp the real nature of his objection. If the whole -business of the army be conceived to be a single department of which -the Commander-in-Chief is the head, so that the authority of the -Secretary of State extends to no other matters than those which lie -within the jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief, then undoubtedly the -Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief are each of them in a -false position, for one of them is unnecessary. The Secretary of State -must either simply confirm the Commander-in-Chief's decisions, in which -case his position as superior authority is a mere form, or he must -enter into the reasons for and against and decide afresh, in which case -the Commander-in-Chief becomes superfluous. It is bad organization to -have two men, one over the other, both to do the same business. - -Mr. Balfour's objection to this arrangement is, however, not that it -sins against the principles of good organization, but that it -practically abolishes the Secretary of State. It leaves the decision -of questions which arise within the War Office and the army in the -hands of a person who is outside the Cabinet. In this way it -diminishes the power of the Cabinet, which rests partly upon the -solidarity of that body, and partly upon the practice by which every -branch of Government business is under the control of one or other of -its members. - -Both these objections appear to me to rest upon false premises. I -shall show presently that the duties of the Secretary of State must -necessarily include matters which do not properly come within the scope -of a Commander-in-Chief, and I cannot see how the authority of the -Cabinet to manage the army rationally would be impaired by a War Office -with a military head, the subordinate of the Secretary of State. - -But both objections, supposing them to be valid, would be overcome by -making the Commander-in-Chief Secretary of State--that is, by -abolishing the office of Secretary of State for War, and entrusting his -duties to the Commander-in-Chief as a member of the Cabinet. Why, -then, does not the Government adopt this plan, which at first sight -appears so simple? There is a good reason. The Cabinet is a committee -of peers and members of Parliament selected by the leader of a party -from among his followers. The bond between its members is a party -bond, and their necessary main purpose is to retain their majority in -the House of Commons. A military Commander-in-Chief means an officer -selected as the representative, not of a party, but of a subject. He -is the embodiment of strategical wisdom, and to secure that strategical -knowledge and judgment receive due attention in the councils of -government is the purpose of his official existence. To make him a -member of the Cabinet would be to disturb the harmony of that body by -introducing into it a principle other than that of party allegiance, -and the harmony could not be restored except either by subordinating -strategy to party, which would be a perversion of the -Commander-in-Chief, or by subordinating party to strategy, a sacrifice -which the leaders of a party will not make except under the supreme -pressure of actual or visibly impending war. - -The preliminary decision, then, which may be taken as settled--for the -other party if it had been in power would certainly have come to the -same conclusion--is that no military officer, either within or without -the Cabinet, is to have in his hands the whole management of the army; -the absolute power of the Cabinet must be preserved, and therefore no -military officer is to have more than departmental authority; the -threads are not to be united in any hands other than those of the -Secretary of State. This determination appears to me most unfortunate, -for to my eye the time seems big with great events requiring a British -Government to attach more importance to preparation for conflict than -to the rigorous assertion of Cabinet supremacy. Be that as it may, the -practical question is whether the proposed sub-division of the business -of the War Office into departments is a good or a bad one. I think it -incurably bad, because it follows no principle of classification -inherent in the nature of the work to be done. - -To find the natural and necessary classification of duties in the -management of an army we must look not at the War Office but at war. -Suppose the country to be engaged in a serious war, in which the army, -or a large portion of it is employed against an enemy, who it may be -hoped will not have succeeded in invading this island. In that case we -can distinguish clearly between two functions. There must be an -authority directing against the enemy the troops in the field; a -general with full powers, implicitly obeyed by all the officers and -officials accompanying his army. There must also be an administrative -officer at home, whose function will be to procure and convey to the -army in the field all that it requires--food, ammunition, clothing and -pay, fresh men and fresh horses to replace casualties. This officer at -home cannot be the same person as the general in the field; for the two -duties must be carried on in two different places at the same time. -The two functions, moreover, correspond to two different arts or -branches of the military art. The commander in the field requires to -excel in generalship, or the art of command; the head of the supply -department at home requires to be a skilled military administrator in -the sense not of a wielder of discipline or trainer of troops, but of a -clever buyer, a producer and distributor on a large scale. Neither of -these officers can be identical with the Secretary of State, whose -principal duty in war is to mediate between the political intentions of -the Government and the military action conducted by the commander in -the field. This duty makes him the superior of the commander; while -the officer charged with military supply, though he need not be the -formal subordinate of the commander, must yet conform his efforts to -the needs of the army in the field. - -There are many important matters which cannot be confined either to the -department of command or to that of supply. Under this head fall the -terms of service for soldiers, the conditions of recruiting, the -regulations for the appointment and promotion of officers. These are -properly the subjects of deliberation in which not only military, but -civil opinions and interests must be represented; for their definition -the Secretary of State will do well to refer to a general council of -his assistants, and the ultimate settlement will require the judgment -of the Cabinet, and sometimes also the sanction of Parliament. In time -of war it is generally necessary quickly to levy extra men, and to -drain into the army a large part of the resources of the country. Such -measures must be thought out and arranged in advance during peace, for -the greatest care is required in all decisions which involve the -appropriation by the State of more than the usual share of the -energies, the time and the money of its citizens. Regulations of this -kind can seldom be framed except as the result of the deliberations of -a council of military and civil officers of experience. These, then, -are the rational sub-divisions of army business. There is the -department of command, embracing the discipline and training of the -troops, their organization as combatant bodies, the arrangement of -their movements and distribution in peace and war, and all that belongs -to the functions of generalship. These matters form the proper domain -of a Commander-in-Chief. Side by side with them is the department of -supply, which procures for the commander the materials out of which his -fighting machine is put together and kept in condition. Harmony -between them is secured by the authority of the Government, wielded by -the Secretary of State, who regulates according to the state of the -national policy and of the exchequer the amount to be spent by each -department, and who presides over the great council which lays down the -conditions under which the services of the citizens in money, in -property, or in person are to be claimed by the State for its defence. - -The examination, then, of the conditions of war, and the application, -during peace, of the distribution of duties which war must render -necessary, lead to the true solution of the difficulty raised by Mr. -Balfour. The internal affairs of the army are indeed one department, -but the position of head of that department, while it could properly be -filled by a Commander-in Chief, is not and cannot be identical with -that of the minister who personifies the Cabinet in relation to the -army. The minister ought to be concerned chiefly with the connexion -between the national policy and the military means of giving it effect. -The intention to make the Secretary of State head of the military -department seems to me to prove that the Government really takes no -account of what should be his higher duties. The lack of the -conception of a national policy is thus about to embarrass the military -management of the army. - -It is not my object here to consider in detail how the principles of -organization for war should be applied to the British army. That -subject has been fully treated by Sir Charles Dilke and myself in the -last chapter of our "Imperial Defence," a chapter which has not been -criticised except with approval. But I am concerned to show that the -German practice cannot at any point be quoted in support either of the -recommendations of the Hartington Commission or of the proposals now -announced by the Government, which to any one who regards them from the -point of view of the nation, that is of the defence of the Empire, must -appear to be at once unnecessary, rash and inopportune. - -3, MADEIRA ROAD, - STREATHAM, S.W. - _September_ 3_rd_, 1895. - - - -[1] See in particular the passage in Moltke, _Gesammelte Schriften_, V. -298-9, which I have translated in an essay entitled "The Brain of the -Navy," p. 28. - -[2] It seems incredible that so important and so interesting a work as -Moltke's military correspondence in relation to the Danish war of 1864 -should hitherto have been ignored by English military writers. - -[3] The reference is to a passage in the last chapter of the first -edition, which has been rewritten. - -[4] The passage which Moltke disliked was erased in the first edition, -its place being supplied by words borrowed from his letter. In this -edition it is printed as it was first written, in order to make the -letter intelligible. The last chapter has in this edition been -condensed, and I hope made simpler and clearer. One or two other -slight changes in expression arise from the reconsideration of phrases -which Count Moltke marked in reading the proof. - - - - -PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION - -In May, 1887, a Select Committee was appointed to examine into the Army -and Navy Estimates. On the 8th of July Major-General (now -Lieut-General) Brackenbury, in the course of examination by the -Committee, made a series of comparisons between the English and the -German systems of army management. He referred particularly to the -great general staff of the German army, which he described as "the -keystone of the whole system of German military organization ... the -cause of the great efficiency of the German army ... acting as the -powerful brain of the military body, to the designs of which brain the -whole body is made to work." "I cannot but feel," he said, "that to -the want of any such great central thinking department is due that want -of economy and efficiency which to a certain extent exists in our army." - -If at any time a statesman should be found to undertake the work of an -English Minister of War, his first wish would be to grasp the nature of -this keystone of the German system, to distinguish in it between -essentials and accessories, to perceive which of its peculiarities are -local, temporary, and personal; and what are the unchangeable -principles in virtue of which it has prospered. Equipped with this -knowledge, he would be able to reform without destroying, to rise above -that servile imitation which copies defects as well as excellences, -and, without sacrificing its national features, to infuse into the -English system the merits of the German. - -For such a statesman, and for the public upon whose support he must -depend, this book has been written. It is an endeavour to describe the -German general staff and its relation to the military institutions from -which it is inseparable. - -To illustrate the general staff at work in war, the campaign of 1866, -rather than that of 1870, has been chosen, because it better -exemplifies some of the relations between strategy and policy. - -_December_, 1889. - - - - -TABLE OF CONTENTS - - -PART I - -_THE GENERAL STAFF IN THE MANAGEMENT OF A CAMPAIGN_ - - -CHAPTER I - -THE EVE OF KÖNIGGRÄTZ - -Political and military situation on the 2nd of July--Position of the -Prussian armies---Topography of the district--Supposed position of the -Austrian army, and consequent arrangements for July 3rd--True position -of the Austrian army discovered--Consequent fresh orders for July -3rd--Which result in a decisive victory - - -CHAPTER II - -BEHIND THE SCENES - -The secret of King William's military success--His selection of a -single adviser, and resolute adherence to his proposals--History of the -office of chief of the general staff--Proceedings at Gitschin the night -before the battle - - -CHAPTER III - -FIVE SHORT ORDERS - -Prussian system of division of labour and organization of -responsibility--Simplicity of its working illustrated from the fewness -and brevity of the orders issued - - -CHAPTER IV - -PRELIMINARIES OF A CAMPAIGN - -Nature of the preparations for a -campaign--Mobilization--Concentration--Influence of considerations of -policy--King William in 1866 anxious to avoid war--Problems solved by -the Prussian staff in preparation for the campaign: calculation of the -force required--Its distribution in the theatre of war--Choice of -points of concentration; formation of two armies in 1866 -inevitable--Movement of troops to the points selected; transport by -rail and subsequent marches--Position on June 6th--Opening of campaign -postponed for political reasons--Delay leads to better knowledge of -Austrian movements, and corresponding modification of Prussian -arrangements--King William finally decides for war--Invasion of -Saxony--Position of Prussian armies on June 22nd--Summary - - -CHAPTER V - -THE CRITICS - -Difficulties which beset the judgment of the conduct of a -campaign--Insufficiency of the attainable knowledge of the motives -which guided the commanders--Reserve therefore incumbent on the -military critic--Illustration of hasty judgment--Impartiality consists -only in the attempt to understand - - - -PART II - -_THE GENERAL STAFF AND THE ARMY_ - - -CHAPTER I - -THE SPIRIT OF PRUSSIAN MILITARY INSTITUTIONS - -Spirit of the Prussian officers--The officer the teacher and leader of -his men--System of promotion--Selection for the higher -commands--Superiors responsible for the efficiency of their subordinates - - -CHAPTER II - -THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY - -The army corps and its subdivisions--The company, squadron, and battery -commanders--The superior prescribes the object, and leaves to his -subordinate the choice of means--Graduation of authority and -responsibility--Resulting in freedom of superiors from the burden of -detail - - -CHAPTER III - -THE SYSTEM OF TRAINING - -Peace training determined solely by the requirements of war--It -culminates in the manoeuvres--Which complete the training of the -troops--And develop and test the capacity of the generals - - -CHAPTER IV - -THE ARMY CORPS - -Review of the means adopted to secure its proper handling--Vastness of -the administrative tasks involved in its management--Sketch of a -mobilized Prussian army corps on the march and in quarters--Dual nature -of its commander's anxieties--System devised to relieve -him--Administrative services organized under two or three responsible -heads--Military functions partly those of direction, partly those of -routine--The latter dealt with by the adjutancy - - -CHAPTER V - -THE GENERAL STAFF IN THE ARMY CORPS - -The bureau which assists the general in the military -direction--Enumeration of its functions in war--And in peace--The chief -of the general staff of the army corps--Summary - - -CHAPTER VI - -COMPOSITION OF THE GENERAL STAFF AND ITS DISTRIBUTION THROUGH THE ARMY - -Forms a corps by itself, but not a close corporation--Alternation -between service on the general staff and service with the troops--No -career merely on the staff except for scientific work, involving -abandonment of prospect of command--Numbers and distribution of general -staff--Alternative service on great general staff, and on general staff -of a constituent part of the army--Influence on the work of the -experience thus acquired--Members of the general staff dispersed -throughout the army--The general staff recruited from the pick of the -young combatant officers - - - -PART III - -_THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF_ - - -CHAPTER I - -AN INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT - -Direct preparation for war consists in determining beforehand the -distribution of the forces, their concentration and transport to the -frontier--Information on which these arrangements are based collected -by general staff--Its subdivision for the purpose--Thoroughness of the -work--The _Registrande_--Merely a preliminary groundwork--Explains -Prussian knowledge of enemy's resources in 1866 and 1870--Similar -organization in other armies--Railway arrangements--Production of maps - - -CHAPTER II - -A MILITARY UNIVERSITY - -Regeneration of Prussia assisted by education--War school founded by -Scharnhorst in 1810--Scharnhorst's earlier educational work--History of -the war academy since 1810--The present regulations--The order of -service--Object of the war academy--Constitution and -management--Entrance examination--Practical lessons compulsory--The -order of teaching--Standard by which to judge it---Course of study at -the academy--Method of instruction--Tactics--Military -history--History--Staff duties and tour--Comparison with the university -ideal - - -CHAPTER III - -THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING - -Relation between teaching and research--Exemplified in practice of -general staff--Military history--School of Clausewitz--The critical -method--Historical works of the Prussian general staff--Campaign of -1859--The "applicatory method"--Campaigns of 1866 and of -1870-71--Historical monographs--Connection between military history and -theory--Theory in Prussia the work of individuals--Moltke's paper on -the influence of new firearms upon tactics--His views justified by the -events of 1866--Contributions to military doctrine by individual -members of the Prussian staff--Moral influence of the intellectual lead -taken by the general staff - - -CHAPTER IV - -THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF - -Character needed for a strategist--Relation between a -commander-in-chief and the chief of his staff--Element of permanent -value in the Prussian system--Classification of duties--General summary - - - - -SKETCH MAPS - -I. THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF KÖNIGGRÄTZ - -II. PRUSSIA IN 1866 - -III. THE OPENING MOVEMENTS OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866 - - - - - PART I - - _THE GENERAL STAFF - IN THE - MANAGEMENT OF A CAMPAIGN_ - - - -THE BRAIN OF AN ARMY - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE EVE OF KÖNIGGRÄTZ - -On the afternoon of Monday, the 2nd of July, 1866, King William of -Prussia with his retinue drove into the little town of Gitschin, in the -hilly region of Northern Bohemia, on the southern side of the Giant -Mountains. His upright bearing scarcely showed the burden of his -sixty-nine years, nor did his frank expression reveal the weight of -care that pressed upon him. After months of weary diplomacy, the -political crisis had been brought to a head by a resolution of the Diet -of the Germanic Confederation to the effect that Prussia had violated -"the peace of the Confederation," and that the armies of the -confederated States were to be called out. This resolution, not three -weeks old, meant that Prussia was at war with Saxony, Hanover, Hesse, -Bavaria and Würtemberg, and with the Austrian Empire. Besides this -long array of enemies there were friends of various degrees of good and -ill will to be considered. Russia was a benevolent onlooker; Italy an -active ally, not indeed very formidable in the field, but able to -occupy a portion of the Austrian forces. France was the ambiguous -busybody, waiting to take a side according to the prospect of -advantage, and the French ambassador was on his way to pay his -unwelcome respects to the Prussian king. Even at home there were grave -difficulties. The Prussian Parliament, representing at that time a -liberal electorate, was directly opposed to the whole policy of which -the war was a part. The king had left Berlin to join the army only on -Saturday morning, after a fortnight of constant anxiety over the -complicated operations which had resulted in the capture of the -Hanoverian army and the occupation without fighting of the kingdom of -Saxony. - -The invasion of Bohemia by two separate armies had been ordered on June -22nd. Each of these armies had passed the mountain wall that shelters -Bohemia on the north, and they were now only a day's march apart -quartered in scattered villages a few hours' drive to the east of -Gitschin. The troops were fatigued with a week's hard work. The Crown -Prince coming from Silesia with 115,000 men had with various portions -of his army fought three severe battles and as many serious skirmishes. -His force lay on the left bank of the Elbe around his headquarters at -Königinhof, twenty-one miles due east of Gitschin.[1] Prince Frederick -Charles, the king's nephew, commanded the other army of 140,000 men, -which had met with little serious resistance, though the troops were -tired with the needless marching caused by ill-considered arrangements. -This prince had come to report in person to Gitschin from his -headquarters at Kamenitz, six or seven miles to the east. - -The exact whereabouts of the Austrian army was unknown. It was -supposed to have placed itself in position behind the Elbe, which here -being about the size of the Isis above Oxford, runs from north to south -with a gentle curve to the east. From Königinhof to Königgrätz the -straight line, five-and-twenty miles long, runs due north and south. -If this line be taken as a bowstring, the Elbe corresponds to the bow, -of which the handle is the fortress of Josephstadt. Königgrätz, the -southern point of the bow, is in a straight line twenty-seven miles -from Gitschin, and the high road roughly coincides with this line. On -the Monday afternoon at Gitschin it was believed that the Austrian army -was on the left (eastern) bank of the Elbe, with its flanks covered by -the fortresses of Königgrätz and Josephstadt. This was an awkward -position to attack, and it had been decided to let both Prussian armies -rest next day, while officers should be sent to study the approaches -and make arrangements for a turning manoeuvre. - -Prince Frederick Charles on returning to his headquarters at Kamenitz -learned that the whole supposition was wrong. Some of his officers -reconnoitring towards Königgrätz had found large bodies of Austrian -troops in bivouac on both sides of the high road along the valley of -the Bistritz brook, which runs nearly parallel with the Elbe about -seven miles to the west of that river. A comparison of reports showed -that there must be at least four Austrian army corps behind the -Bistritz, so Frederick Charles, interpreting this as indicating the -intention to attack him next morning, determined to be beforehand with -the enemy and himself to attack at daybreak. At 9 p.m. he issued his -orders for this movement, and at 9.45 sent off to Königinhof a letter -asking the Crown Prince to send one or more corps towards Josephstadt -to occupy the enemy in that quarter. The chief of his staff was sent -to Gitschin to report to the king, and arrived there at 11 p.m. - -"The king[2] at once decided to attack the enemy in front of the Elbe -with all his forces, whether the whole Austrian army or only a large -portion of it should be found there.... Accordingly by his Majesty's -command the following communication to the second army [that of the -Crown Prince] was at once prepared":-- - - -"According to the information received by the first army the enemy in -the strength of about three corps, which, however, may be further -reinforced, has advanced beyond the line formed by the Bistritz at -Sadowa, where an encounter with the first army is to be expected very -early in the morning. - -"According to the orders issued, the first army will stand to-morrow -morning, July 3rd, at 2 a.m., with two divisions at Horsitz with one at -Milowitz, one at Cerekwitz, with two at Pschanek and Briskan, the -cavalry corps at Gutwasser. - -"Your Royal Highness will at once make the arrangements necessary to be -able to move with all your forces in support of the first army against -the right flank of the enemy's expected advance, and to come into -action as soon as possible. The orders sent from here this afternoon -under other conditions are no longer valid. - -"V. MOLTKE." - - -[Illustration: Sketch Map 1--THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF KÖNIGGRÄTZ.] - -This note, with a shorter note to the commander of one of the corps -lying between Gitschin and Königinhof (the only part of the second army -at this time west of the Elbe), telling him to be ready for the Crown -Prince's orders, was despatched at midnight. - -The whole Austro-Saxon army (eight corps) was in fact concentrated -between the Elbe and the Bistritz, not indeed for attack but for the -defence of a strong position on the left bank of the brook, facing -westwards. Had the arrangements of Prince Frederick Charles not been -supplemented, the 3rd of July might have been an unfortunate day for -Prussia. The first army would have been engaged against an enemy -strongly posted and counting nearly double its numbers. The detachment -by the second army of one corps towards Josephstadt could hardly have -produced a decisive effect, and the rest of the second army would have -been too far away to co-operate in time. But the order sent from -Gitschin entirely met the situation. Without interfering with Prince -Frederick Charles's attack it brought the entire second army to his -help in the direction where its action would produce the greatest -effect--on the enemy's flank. - -When the morning came, the attack of the first army as it developed, -disclosed the great strength of the Austrian position and the numbers -by which it was defended. Prince Frederick Charles was unable to do -much more than keep the Austrians engaged until the second army came -up. The attack of the Crown Prince's leading divisions decided the -day. With their capture and maintenance of Chlum, the key of the -position, the situation of the Austrian army became critical, and the -issue not only of the fight but of the whole campaign was practically -settled. The resolution formed between eleven and twelve at night on -July 2nd, in the Lion Inn at Gitschin, had secured the victory of -Königgrätz, perhaps the greatest battle of modern times,[3] and without -exception the most decisive in its results. - - - -[1] See sketch map 1. - -[2] _Der Feldzitg von_ 1866 _in Deutschland_. Redigirt von der -Kriegsgeschichtlichen Abtheilung des groszen Generalstabes, p. 249. - -[3] There is a doubt whether the number of combatants was greater at -Leipsic or at Königgrätz. According to the Belgian Précis -(_Bibliothèque Internationale d'Histoire militaire_) the figures are:-- - - At Leipsic: Allies . . . . . . . . . 300,000 - " French . . . . . . . . . 180,000 - ------- - Total . . . . . . . 480,000 - ======= - - At Königgrätz: Austrians . . . . . . 215,000 - " Prussians . . . . . . 220,000 - ------- - Total . . . . . . . 435,000 - ======= - - According to Rüstow (_Feldhernkunst des 19ten - Jahrhunderts_) the numbers engaged were:-- - - At Leipsic (Oct. 18th): French . . . 130,000 - " " Allies . . . 290,000 - ------- - Total . . . . . . 430,000 - ======= - At Königgrätz, total of both sides 450,000 - ======= - - - - -CHAPTER II - -BEHIND THE SCENES - -The King of Prussia is reputed to have been a modest man and to have -known the limits of his faculties. He was not a great strategist. He -once said to his brother (the father of Prince Frederick Charles), "If -I had not been born a Hohenzollern I should have been a -sergeant-major." How then did he make the swift decision resulting in -a success that would have done credit to the genius of Frederick the -Great or Napoleon? The answer is supplied by the Prussian historian of -the Italian campaign of 1859. "There are generals," says this writer, -"who need no counsel, who deliberate and resolve in their own minds, -those about them having only to carry out their intentions. But such -generals are stars of the first magnitude who scarcely appear once in a -century. In the great majority of cases the leader of an army will not -be willing to dispense with advice. The suggestions made may very well -be the result of the deliberations of a smaller or greater number of -men specially qualified by training and experience to form a correct -judgment. But even among them only one opinion ought to assert itself. -The organization of the military hierarchy should promote subordination -even in thought. This one opinion only should be submitted for the -consideration of the commander-in-chief by the one person to whom this -particular service is assigned. Him let the general choose, not -according to rank or seniority, but in accordance with his own personal -confidence. Though the advice given may not always be unconditionally -the best, yet, if the action taken be consistent and the leading idea -once adopted be steadfastly followed, the affair may always be brought -to a satisfactory issue. The commander-in-chief retains as against his -adviser the infinitely weightier merit of taking upon himself the -responsibility for all that is done. - -"But surround a commander with a number of independent men---the more -numerous, the more distinguished, the abler they are and the worse it -will be--let him hear the advice now of one now of another; let him -carry out up to a certain point a measure judicious in itself, then -adopt a still more judicious but different plan, and then be convinced -by the thoroughly sound objections of a third adviser and the remedial -suggestions of a fourth,--it is a hundred to one that though for each -of his measures excellent reasons can be given, he will lose the -campaign." - -The one authorised adviser here described was by the Prussian system -provided for the king in the person of the chief of the general staff -of the army. This office had risen to importance during the wars of -liberation, though at that epoch the general staff was in the peace -organization a subordinate branch of the Ministry of War. The -Prussians fighting Napoleon, had had no Napoleon to pit against him. -The best they could do was to put Blücher in command with Scharnhorst, -and after Scharnhorst's death with Gneisenau to keep him straight.[1] -In the period that followed the peace of 1815 the position of the -general staff received strict definition. In 1821 Müffling was -appointed its chief, and it was settled that he should not be -subordinate to the Minister of War but directly responsible to the -king. This constitution of the office on a new basis outside of and -independent of the Ministry of War was an advance in the division of -labour implying the want of a fresh organ to perform functions not -before satisfactorily exercised. The business of the Ministry of War -was to raise, maintain and administer the army. The business of the -staff was to direct the army in war, and during peace to make such -special preparations as might be necessary to this end. In order to be -able to devote all its energies to the conduct of armies fighting in -the field, unhampered by the details of daily administration, the -general staff was placed on an independent footing. In 1829 Müffling -was succeeded by Lieut-Gen. von Krauseneck, whose successor (in 1848) -was Lieut-Gen. von Reyher. Reyher died in 1857, when the duties of the -office were intrusted to Major-General von Moltke. - -The division of labour between the royal commander-in-chief and the -chief of the staff may be illustrated by the proceedings of the evening -before the battle of Königgrätz. When General von Voigts-Rhetz (the -chief of Prince Frederick Charles' staff) reached Gitschin and reported -to the king, who was just going to bed, the king sent him to Moltke -saying, "If General Moltke thinks this information involves a fresh -decision he is to come for orders whatever be the time of night." -Voigts-Rhetz went to Moltke's quarters and made his report. Moltke -made up his mind what ought to be done, and then went to the king, whom -he found in bed, and explained his view that whether the whole Austrian -army or only a part of it was at Sadowa the sound course was to move -forward both Prussian armies, so as to take the Austrians in front and -flank. An attack like this from two sides at once must in any case -give the Prussians the best chance of victory they could hope for, and -the result would be the more decisive the larger the portion of the -Austrian army to be engaged. The king at once gave his assent. Moltke -then wrote the two notes, which were sent off immediately. - -It was 11 p.m. when Voigts-Rhetz reached Gitschin. The letters were -despatched at midnight. In that hour fall the reports of Voigts-Rhetz -to the king and to Moltke; Moltke's deliberation and determination; his -visit to the king's quarters and the writing and despatching of the -notes. It appears from these data that there was no discussion, and -that even at this period, the opening of their first great campaign, -the king's confidence in Moltke was as thoroughly established as we -know it to have been four years later.[2] - - - -[1] It might perhaps have been better to have given Scharnhorst and -Gneisenau the actual command. In any case the arrangement adopted in -1813 laid the foundation of the German system of the general staff. - -[2] In the Crown Prince's diary of the Franco-German War we read under -the date January 15th, "Werder asks whether he would not do better now -to abandon Belfort as he thinks he can still defend Alsace? Moltke -read this out and added, with unshakeable icy calmness, 'Your Majesty -will no doubt approve of General Werder being informed in reply that he -has simply to stay where he is and beat the enemy where he finds him.' -Moltke appeared to me admirable beyond all praise. In one second he -had settled the whole affair." _Deutsche Rundschau_, October, 1888, p. -25. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -FIVE SHORT ORDERS - -In one sense there is nothing remarkable in the decision of the 2nd of -July. Given two armies fighting on the same side and within a day's -march of each other, and a hostile army within a day's march of both of -them, it is not difficult to see what the two armies should do. -Nothing is easier than to solve problems of this sort in the study. -Even with the imperfect knowledge of the facts which the Prussians -possessed, the arrangements made at Gitschin were no more than the -suggestions of military common sense. But simple as the situation -seems, nothing is so difficult as to secure such a solution in the -practice of war. It is a common-place in that kind of military -criticism which is wise after the event that Benedek might have avoided -disaster if he had only acted on any reasonable plan and stuck to it. -The merit of the Prussians lay in the system which gave military common -sense its due place in the organization, so as to make sure that it -would be applied when wanted. It was a matter of the judicious -division of labour. - -At the headquarters of an army there are a hundred different anxieties. -In peace there is the recruiting, training, clothing, feeding, and -arming of the troops; the distribution of commands; the maintenance of -discipline. In war most of these matters continue to require -attention; subordinates must be kept to their appointed tasks; above -all the field of politics must be watched from day to day, sometimes -even from hour to hour. The Prussian system gave to the chief of the -general staff the sole duty of attending to the movements of the -armies, and, regarding each new situation as a problem in strategy, of -explaining the solution which presented itself to his trained judgment -as the best. Free from the pressure of other cares and -responsibilities an officer in this position would be more likely to -see clearly and judge coolly than one overloaded with work and -distracted with the thousand worries of command. This is the division -of labour according to kind, which gives each sort of work to a man -specially trained for its performance. It is supplemented by an -organization of responsibility which relieves a man from detail in -proportion to the extent and grasp of his supervision. The army was -broken up into minor armies each with its own commander and his chief -of the staff, so that the chief of the general staff himself had to -consider only the large problems of the campaign, the general nature of -the movements to be effected by the two or three pieces on his board. -The head of each army is told the general intention and the share of -work assigned to his force. He in turn regards his army corps or -divisions[1] as so many units, and besides a statement of the object to -be aimed at gives only such general directions as the corps or division -commanders cannot arrange for themselves. All the detail of the -movements is left in the hands of the corps or division commanders and -their special staffs. - -It is worth while showing by a convincing proof to what simplicity the -system here described reduces the business of supreme command. On June -21 a Prussian _parlementaire_ handed in to the Austrian outposts a -notification of the commencement of hostilities. At that time the -first army was concentrated opposite the Austrian frontier across the -border that separates Saxony from Silesia; the second army was -concentrated near Neisse. From that day until the decisive battle only -five short orders from the king's headquarters are on record:-- - -(1) _June_ 22.--Telegram from Berlin to both armies (at Görlitz and -Neisse): "His Majesty orders both armies to advance into Bohemia and to -seek to unite in the direction of Gitschin." - -A letter of the same date contained a slightly fuller explanation, and -added, to Prince Frederick Charles, that as the second army had the -difficult task of issuing from the mountains the first army must -shorten the crisis by pushing on rapidly. - -(2) _June_ 29.--Telegram from Berlin to Prince Frederick Charles: "His -Majesty expects that the first army by a quickened advance will -disengage the second army which, in spite of a series of victorious -actions, is still for the time being in a difficult situation." - -(A repetition to Prince Frederick Charles, who had been losing time by -his timid and methodical movements, of his original instructions.) - -(3) _June_ 30.--Telegram from Kohlfurt (on the way from Berlin to the -army) to both armies: instructing the second army to maintain itself on -the Elbe and the first army to push forward towards Königgrätz. (A -modification, to suit events, of the plan of No. 1.) - -(4) _July_ 2.--Gitschin. Order arranging for both armies to rest on -July 3, while the country to the front and the Austrian supposed -position should be reconnoitred. Cancelled the same evening by - -(5) Moltke's note (quoted p. 54) to the Crown Prince. - -The brevity and simplicity of these instructions find a counterpart in -the orders issued by the army commanders. Moltke's note sent off from -Gitschin at midnight on Monday was delivered at the Crown Prince's -headquarters at Königinhof at four on Tuesday morning. At five General -von Blumenthal, the chief of the general staff of the second army, sent -out an army order of some twenty lines:-- - -"According to information received here it is expected that the enemy -will to-day attack the first army which is at Horsitz, Milowitz, and -Cerekwitz. The second army will advance to its support as follows:-- - -(l) "The first army corps will march in two columns by Zabres and Gr. -Trotin to Gr. Burglitz." ... - -And so on for the other corps. In this way an army of 115,000 men -(four army corps and a cavalry division) was directed by five sentences -of two lines each. This was sufficient. The details were arranged for -each army corps by the corps commander with the assistance of his staff -officers. - - - -[1] In 1866 the first army was composed of divisions not combined into -army corps. The second army was worked by army corps. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -PRELIMINARIES OF A CAMPAIGN - -The movements of an army during a campaign after the first serious -engagements can rarely, if ever, be settled in detail before the war. -They must needs depend largely on those of the enemy, which cannot be -accurately foreseen. But before war is declared, before the fighting -begins, while the troops are still in their own territory, a -well-conducted government can make its preparations without hindrance. -The army can be placed on a war footing, and assembled at whatever -point or points are judged most advantageous. These preparations in -Prussia fall in different degrees within the domain of the general -staff. - -The changes by which the army is placed on a war footing, known -collectively as mobilization, include the calling out of the reserves -of men and horses; their distribution among the various corps and their -equipment; and the creation and completion of the staffs and of the -different services of supply. All these proceedings in Prussia the -general staff had perfectly arranged and regulated down to the minutest -detail, so that the order needed only to be issued, and the whole -operation would take place as if by clockwork within a given number of -days.[1] The process of mobilization is in essentials the same -whatever be the frontier on which the war is to be fought. It places -the troops ready at their ordinary headquarters, and in Prussia no -regiment leaves its headquarters except in perfect readiness to take -the field. - -On the other hand, the collection of the army on the frontier is the -first stage of the actual operations, resembling the opening of a game -of chess, and it is of the greatest importance that the points selected -should be those best suited for the beginning of the particular -campaign in prospect. - -The placing of an army on a war footing and its transport to a frontier -are political acts of the gravest moment. They are therefore usually -controlled almost as much by political as by military considerations, -and it is impossible rightly to appreciate them without taking into -account the political circumstances by which they are affected. The -influence of politics upon the two processes is however different. In -regard to mobilization, which may be compared to a mechanical process, -the statesman may urge its postponement or its execution by gradual -instalments. In neither case is the essential nature of the operation -changed, though the amount of friction involved may be increased. But -the assembling of an army is the immediate preliminary to attack or -defence, and the statesman's unwillingness to attack may affect the -choice of time and place for the collection of the force available. - -The King of Prussia was sincerely anxious to avoid a war, and until -June 14 was determined not to take the initiative nor to agree to any -measure which might savour of attack. He was with difficulty induced -to consent to the successive stages of preparation. Not until the -beginning of May, when the Austrian mobilization was far advanced and -the transport to the frontiers impending, were the orders for the -Prussian mobilization issued, and that not at once, but piecemeal -between May 3 and May 12. The forces thus called out formed a total of -326,000 combatants, divided into nine army corps,[2] a reserve corps at -Berlin,[3] the corps of occupation in Holstein, and the corps collected -at Wetzlar from the Prussian garrisons withdrawn from fortresses of the -German confederation. The arrangements made for the disposition of -these forces between May 12 and June 22 form the basis of the -subsequent success, and may perhaps best be described in the form of a -series of problems and their solutions. - -1. The first step of preparation for a war is the calculation of the -force required.[4] In the case of our own small wars it is -self-evident that such a calculation is necessary, and the campaign of -1882 in Egypt is an instance in which it was worked out to a nicety. -It might seem equally a matter of course that when two Continental -states go to war each of them will assume from the beginning that its -whole available force will be employed. Yet instances are numerous in -which campaigns have been lost mainly through neglect to work out this -calculation. In 1859 the Austrians undertook with little more than -half their army a war against the combined forces of France and -Sardinia; in 1885 King Milan attacked the Bulgarians without calling -out the whole of the Servian army. In both cases defeat was largely -due to this initial error. - -The basis of the calculation is furnished by an estimate of the force -which will be at the disposal of the enemy. In 1866 the Prussian staff -had to face the preliminary difficulty that it was uncertain even as -late as May 8 which of the German states would be on the Prussian and -which on the Austrian side. The least favourable assumption was made, -and it was estimated that the hostile forces would be in North Germany -36,000, in South Germany 100,000, and in Saxony and Austria 264,000, -making a total of 400,000 men.[5] There could be no doubt that Prussia -must employ the whole of her available forces. - -2. The next question was how to distribute the Prussian forces against -these three sets of enemies. A proportionate division based on the -estimate just given would have resulted in the employment of 215,000 -men against Austria and Saxony, of 30,000 against North Germany, and of -80,000 against South Germany. The staff, however, expected that the -South German forces would not be ready until a late stage of the war, -and might in the first instance be neglected. Hanover and Hesse lying -between the two halves of Prussia and separating Westphalia and Rhenish -Prussia from the main body of the kingdom,[6] were more serious foes. -It would be necessary to strike hard at them, if possible, before their -preparations could be completed. But the fate of Prussia and of -Germany really depended upon the issue of the conflict with Austria. -If she were beaten here, Prussia would in any case be undone; if she -were successful in this struggle, the minor states, even though not -themselves beaten, must needs fall under her sway. It was decided to -employ almost the whole army (eight and a half corps and the reserve -corps, 278,000 men) against Austria and Saxony, and to meet the rest of -the German enemies with a scratch army (48,000) made up of half the -seventh corps and of the troops assembled in Holstein and at Wetzlar. -This force was destined first of all to disarm Hesse and Hanover -(capitulation of Langensalza June 29), and then to attack and defeat -the South German contingents. - -3. The next problem is the choice of the point or points at which the -army is to be assembled for the purpose of beginning the operations. -This is the first act of generalship in the campaign, and a mistake -here is usually the prelude of misfortune. Every general wishes, if -possible, to meet with his whole force the divided forces of the enemy, -and therefore his first thought is to assemble his army at one place, -or at least to collect it so that all its parts may unite for battle. - -[Illustration: Sketch Map 2--PRUSSIA in 1866] - -The Prussian army, if assembled in Upper Silesia, would be at the point -of Prussia nearest to the Austrian capital; if assembled at Görlitz,[7] -it would interpose between Berlin or Breslau and an Austrian army -approaching from Bohemia. These were, therefore, the most favourable -points of assembly, the one for attack and the other for defence. But -the position in Silesia would lose much of its value unless it were -intended, as soon as the army should be ready, to march on Vienna; and -this course in the middle of May was, to the king's mind, inadmissible. -There was, however, a second quite unanswerable argument against -assembling the whole army at either place. The movement could not be -carried out in a reasonable time. To march to either district from the -distant provinces would have been an affair of many weeks, and the -concentration would run the risk of being too late. The difficulty -could not be overcome by the use of the railways. To move a whole army -corps by a single railway required, according to the nature of the -line, irrespective of the distance, from nine to twelve days. But for -the transport to Upper Silesia only one, and for that to Görlitz only -two, through railways were available, so that a very long time would be -required to move the whole army by rail to either point. Moreover, -neither of the districts in question is so fertile as to be able to -feed a large army for more than a few days. As the king was determined -not to fight, if fighting could be avoided, it might become necessary -to keep the army waiting for some weeks after its concentration. This -would be to starve it before a shot had been fired. Thus it was -impracticable in the political circumstances to collect all the nine -corps into one army, either for offence or defence. Separate armies -had to be formed, and considerations of defence to prevail. The -principal centres of concentration were fixed in the neighbourhood of -Görlitz and of Schweidnitz, points on the lines of an Austrian advance -towards Berlin and Breslau respectively from Northern Bohemia, where at -this time (the middle of May) the Austrian army was believed to be -assembling. - -4. Upon the basis of this decision the movement of the troops to the -frontier was arranged. The railway system, as has been seen, did not -admit of moving the corps directly and speedily to Görlitz and -Schweidnitz. Five railways in all were available, leading to points on -the Prussian frontier facing the kingdom of Saxony and the Austrian -Empire. They ended at Zeitz, Halle, Hertzberg, Görlitz, and -Schweidnitz (or Neisse), places scattered along a curve some 250 miles -long. The quickest practicable way of assembling the army was to use -all these railways at once, and when the troops had thus been deposited -on the frontier to continue the concentration by marches. The shortest -lines of march to assemble the whole army would be the radii leading to -the centre of the curve; but this was in the enemy's territory, so that -these lines, if they had been for other reasons desirable, could not be -adopted before war had been declared. The alternative was to -concentrate by marches along the circumference, and this was the plan -adopted. Each corps, as soon as its debarkation from the train was -complete, was marched along the arc towards the point of concentration -selected for it. - -The corps from Posen and Silesia, collected at Schweidnitz and Neisse -(grouped together as the second army under the Crown Prince), were -moved to their right to Landshut and Waldenburg.[8] Those of -Westphalia (half a corps) and Rhenish Prussia were detrained at Zeitz -and Halle, and marched round the frontier of Saxony to the point where -the Elbe emerges from that kingdom. These troops, with the reserve -corps from Berlin, formed the Elbe army, destined to continue its -eastward movement by the invasion of Saxony. The corps from Pomerania, -Brandenburg, and Prussian Saxony, were combined into the first army, -under Prince Frederick Charles. They were first assembled between -Torgau and Cottbus, and then marched along the frontier towards -Görlitz, reaching the western corner of Silesia (neighbourhood of -Hoyerswerda) about the end of the first week in June, when the other -movements described were also completed. - -5. The staff was now anxious to begin the campaign. The three armies -could not be united on Prussian soil without leaving some important -district unprotected, nor await where they were the Austrian attack -without the risk that one of them in isolation might be exposed to the -blows of a superior force. This same risk only would be incurred in -the attempt to meet by a concentric advance towards some point of -Austrian territory; it would increase with every additional day allowed -for the Austrian preparations. But the king still thought a settlement -possible, and would not permit hostilities to commence. - -6. On June 11, the Prussian staff learned that of seven Austrian army -corps destined to operate against Prussia six were in Moravia, not in -Bohemia, as had been supposed. The inference was, that the Austrians -contemplated advancing upon Breslau by way of Neisse, for which -movement the data obtained showed that they would be able to cross the -Silesian border with five or six army corps by about June 19. To meet -this invasion, if it should take place, the second army was moved to -the river Neisse, facing south, and was reinforced by the guard corps -from Berlin, and by the first corps, moved originally from East Prussia -by rail to Görlitz, and now by marching transferred from the first army -to the second. At the same time the first army continued its eastward -march as far as Görlitz, where it would be near enough to reach Breslau -as soon as the Austrians, if they should really invade Silesia, or, if -not required in that direction, could be moved readily into either -Saxony or Bohemia. These movements were effected by June 19. - -The Elbe army was also to be moved to the east, to join the first army, -but its most convenient route from Torgau to Görlitz lay through -Dresden. While the changes just described were in the course of -execution, the political situation also had changed. The hostile -resolution of the diet on June 14 enabled the king to make up his mind. -On June 15 war was declared against Saxony. On the 16th the Elbe army -crossed the border; on the 18th occupied Dresden; and on the 19th, -connection having been established with the first army, now about -Görlitz, was placed under the command of Prince Frederick Charles. -This prince concentrated the first army to the south of Görlitz, on the -confines of Saxony and Silesia, close to the Bohemian border, while the -Elbe army from Dresden rapidly closed up to his right flank. The -intention was that both should advance as one army into Bohemia, and -move, with the left wing skirting the foot of the Giant Mountains, to -meet the second army. There had been no sign of an Austrian attack on -Silesia, so the Crown Prince was ordered to prepare for a march -westward into Bohemia to meet his cousin. On the 19th he was to send -one corps in advance to Landshut, still keeping the rest of his force -on the Neisse ready to face either south or west. A day or two later -two more of his corps were withdrawn to the mountains, a single corps -only remaining on the Neisse, and much trouble being taken to deceive -the Austrians into the belief that the whole army was still there and -was about to march towards Moravia. This was the position of both -Prussian armies on June 22, when the telegram already quoted ordered -them to cross the Bohemian frontier and to try to effect their union -about Gitschin. - -[Illustration: Sketch map 3--THE OPENING MOVEMENTS OF THE CAMPAIGN OF -1866.] - -It will be observed that from the first stage of the preparations one -object, the concentration of as large a force as possible for the -purpose of defeating the Austro-Saxon forces, had been followed by the -chief of the staff. His arrangements were at first controlled by -political considerations, the effect of which in the circumstances was -to render impracticable the formation at the outset of a single army. -Afterwards, before war had been finally decided upon, the armies were -moved to meet the changed situation created by the Austrian -arrangements at length known. The invasion of Saxony was a further -stage in the general concentration. By June 22 it had become clear -that the Austrians were not invading Silesia. The question was, -whether to continue through Prussian territory the march of the first -army towards the second--a safe course now that the Austrian position -was known--or to take for both the shortest line of meeting, that into -Bohemia, with the attendant risk to the second army. The bolder course -was adopted, and was abundantly justified by success. - - - -[1] The details of the operation of mobilization are kept secret, but -the elementary principles have everywhere been copied from the Prussian -system and may be explained in an imaginary example. Suppose a company -to have a peace strength of 120 men and to pass each year forty men -into the reserve, receiving instead the same number of recruits, the -war strength being 240. The public announcement of the decree for -mobilization makes it the duty of each of the 120 reservists to proceed -directly to the headquarters of the company, where they will arrive, -according to the distance from their homes, say on the first, second, -or third day of mobilization. The captain has a nominal list of the -whole company, and keeps in store under his own responsibility the -complete new war kit for each of the 240 men. As they arrive the men -pass the doctor, receive their kits, and are told off to their posts in -the completed company. According to the care with which the rules have -been framed (this is the staff's principal share in the work) so as to -divide the labour, occupying every man from the general to the bugler -and giving to each that work which he can best do, and to none more -than he can do in the time allowed, will be the rapidity, ease, and -certainty with which the whole mobilization will be effected. - -[2] The guard with its peace quarters at Berlin, and corps I. to VIII. -quartered in peace in districts corresponding in the main to the eight -provinces: Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, Prussian Saxony, Posen, -Silesia, Westphalia, Rhenish Prussia. See sketch map 2. - -[3] Called out on May 19th. - -[4] "What king, going to make war against another king, sitteth not -down first, and consulteth whether he be able with ten thousand to meet -him that cometh against him with twenty thousand? Or else, while the -other is yet a great way off, he sendeth an ambassage and desireth -conditions of peace." - -[5] The numbers actually called out against Prussia proved to be:-- - - North Germans . . . . . . 25,000 - South Germans . . . . . . 94,000 - Austrians and Saxons . . 271,000 - ------- - Total . . . . . . . . 390,000 - -[6] See sketch map 2. - -[7] See sketch map 3. - -[8] See sketch map 3. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -THE CRITICS - -Except the conduct of military operations there is nothing so difficult -as to appreciate them truly. A multitude of considerations affect the -leading of armies and many of them evade the research of the historian. -The critic therefore can rarely be sure that he has placed himself in -the exact position of the general whose acts he is studying. If, for -example, he supposes a commander to have been without information which -in fact he possessed, his judgment may be founded upon a picture -completely distorted. Such mistakes are made even by the most careful -historians. The Prussian staff history of the campaign of 1866 alleges -that the Austrian commanders were unaware of the Crown Prince's march -westwards from the Neisse. The Austrian staff history shows that very -good information on the subject had reached the Austrian headquarters -as early as June 25, before any of the Crown Prince's corps had crossed -the border. Where it is so difficult to avoid error it is rash to be -dogmatic. But it may be permissible to raise a doubt as to the value -of some of the judgments that seem to have become traditional -concerning this campaign. Mr. O'Connor Morris, for example, in the -_Academy_ of March 23, 1889, wrote:--"The strategy of Moltke is not -perfection, as worshippers of success have boasted, but he never -attempted, in his invasion of France, to unite widely divided armies, -within striking distance of a concentrated foe, as he did at Gitschin, -under the very beard of Benedek."[1] A similar criticism, without the -sneer, may be found in the Belgian _Précis_. But neither writer has -explained where the mistake lay. Even the Austrian historian declares -that, given the Prussian positions on the Neisse and in Lusatia, the -only sound course was the advance to meet at Gitschin. Was the error -in the original dispersion of the forces along the frontier? If so, -the critics should explain what alternative was practicable in view of -the political conditions and of the geography of the theatre of war. -Would it not be safer to say that the preparations for the campaign of -1866 show the influence upon strategy of a very complicated political -situation? The opening of the campaign of 1870 presented in comparison -a simple problem. There was a single enemy to be faced; and there was -no motive for hesitation or delay. Moreover, the German staff could -count upon beginning the campaign on the least favourable hypothesis -with 330,000 men against 250,000.[2] Possibly in 1866 the strategists' -task would have been easier, and posterity would have thought no worse -of Prussian policy if the king had realized early in May that -mobilization meant war, and had given Moltke from that time a free -hand. But this again is a criticism easy to make twenty years after -the event. The conflict was between Germans, and the general opinion -at the time condemned the Prussian policy. Moreover, Prussia had then -no important success on record since the decisive stroke at Waterloo. -In these conditions the king's hesitation was natural enough, and even -the anxiety to cover every part of Prussian territory is quite -intelligible. Much must needs remain obscure, for it may be years -before the personal history of the principal actors at this period is -given to the world. Meanwhile, the function of criticism is to seek -first of all to understand the events with which it deals. - -It is of little purpose to read a summary of the movements of the -troops during a campaign, and to be given a list of the mistakes made -by the generals on each side. Such a system leads the reader to -suppose that generals as a rule have been remarkably careless, weak, -and ignorant, and entirely conceals from him the difficulties which -always beset the conduct of operations. But where a measure adopted in -the field is shown by the result to have been attended with risks or -followed by disaster, the attempt to ascertain why it was employed -invariably throws light upon the nature of war; and this method of -study, though it offers little satisfaction to the vanity that likes to -take a side and to distribute praise or blame, rewards, by quickening -the insight and forming the judgment, the labour which it requires. - - - -[1] If Mr. O'Connor Morris will mark on a map the positions of the -Austrian and Prussian armies on June 22nd, the date of the order "to -unite widely divided armies," etc., he will discover that the Austrian -forces were distributed over an area not less extended than that which -included both Prussian armies. - -[2] _German Staff History_, 1870-71, vol. i. p. 74. - - - - - PART II - - _THE GENERAL STAFF AND THE ARMY_ - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE SPIRIT OF PRUSSIAN MILITARY INSTITUTIONS - -The general staff has been described as the "brain of an army." The -metaphor is peculiarly apt, for the staff, like the human brain, is not -independent but a part of an organic whole. It can perform its -functions only in connection with a body adapted to its control, and -united with it by the ramifications of a nervous system. How then is -the Prussian army adapted to receive the impulses conveyed from its -intellectual centre? - -An army is what its officers make it, and in the Prussian army the -officers take their profession seriously. It may be doubted whether -there is in the world any body of men so entirely single-minded in -their devotion to duty. Most of them are, according to English -notions, ridiculously poor. Their pay is small, and they have never -made the acquaintance of luxury. - -In 1874 the emperor in an official address to the army wrote, "The more -general the spread of luxury and comfort, the more solemnly is the -officer confronted by the duty never to forget that his honourable -position in the state and in society has not been gained and cannot be -maintained by material wealth. Not only does an enervating mode of -life damage the combatant qualities of an officer, but the pursuit of -gain and comfort would dangerously undermine the very ground upon which -the officer's position is built up."[1] These words fairly express the -spirit of those to whom they were addressed, and many an officer takes -a pride in his poverty, and starves with cheerfulness and even with -merriment. Some of the superior officers have set the example by -abandoning the dearly-loved cigar, and a Prussian officer's mess has -decidedly no attractions for the gourmet. - -"Teacher and leader in every department is the officer. This implies -that he is superior to his men in knowledge, experience, and strength -of character. Without fearing responsibility, every officer in all -circumstances however extraordinary is to stake his whole personality -for the fulfilment of his mission, even without waiting for orders."[2] -This is the foundation stone of Prussian discipline, the secret by -which is secured "the legitimate ascendency of the officers, the -justified confidence of the soldiers, the daily interchange of mutual -devotion, the conviction that each one is useful to all and that the -chiefs are the most useful of all."[3] The attainment of the ideal -thus officially set up is facilitated by the system of promotion. The -principle of seniority, without which no public service can be a -profession or offer a career, is allowed its legitimate place, being -modified only by the retirement of the incapable, and by special -selection for the general staff. "It is necessary that the higher -commands should be attained only by such officers as unite -distinguished abilities and military education with corresponding -qualities of character and with bodily activity."[4] Moreover, "it is -the special duty of the general commanding to see that all the -commandants of fortresses, all the commanders of divisions, brigades, -regiments, and battalions, and all the field-officers in the district -of his army-corps, retain their posts only so long as they have the -bodily activity necessary for service in the field, and the knowledge -and capacity needed for their several particular callings. The moment -he notices in this respect the slightest change to the detriment of my -service, it is his duty, for which he will be held responsible, to -inform me. He must also send me the names of all officers who -distinguish themselves or are fit for a higher post."[5] - -The first feature, then, of the Prussian system is the method by which -it is attempted, with considerable success, always to put the right man -in the right place, and having done so, to see that he keeps up to the -mark. - - - -[1] _Verordnung über die Ehrengerichte der Offiziere im Preussischen -Heere_, May 2nd, 1874. - -[2] _Felddienstordnung_, 1887, § 6. - -[3] Taine, _L'Ancien Régime_, p. 108. - -[4] Cabinet order of May 8th, 1849. - -[5] Cabinet order, _i.e._ King's order in Cabinet of March 13th, 1816. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY - -Organization implies that every man's work is defined; that he knows -exactly what he must answer for, and that his authority is co-extensive -with his responsibility. - -A modern army fights by army corps, and by army corps the Prussian army -is managed, in peace as well as in war. Each province is an army corps -district.[1] All the troops in it belong to the corps[2] and are under -the command of the general, who has in military matters absolute -authority, being independent of the Ministry of War and responsible -directly to the king and to no one else. Every question that comes up -in the corps can be finally settled by its commanding general, except a -very few matters which require the king's assent, or an arrangement -with the Ministry of War. But comparatively few questions of detail -come as high as the commanding general. - -His corps is at all times organized very much as it would be in war. -In the infantry four companies make a battalion, three battalions a -regiment, two regiments a brigade, two infantry brigades with their due -proportion of cavalry and artillery form an infantry division. In the -cavalry four or five squadrons form the regiment, two or three -regiments the brigade, and two or three brigades the division. In the -artillery two or three batteries form a group (_Abtheilung_, now -officially translated brigade division), two or three groups a -regiment, and two regiments a brigade. The corps is made up of -infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade or division,[3] and an artillery -brigade. - -Responsibility and authority begin with the smallest units, the -company, squadron, or battery. The captain, the commander of such a -unit, is the lowest officer who has the power of punishment. In his -hands lies in peace the training, and in war the leading of the -company, squadron, or battery. The lieutenants and in a lower sphere -the noncommissioned officers are his assistants acting under his -responsibility. In the company, to take the infantry as the type, the -captain is supreme. The methods of instruction, the distribution of -time, and the order to be followed in the process are matters which he -settles according to his own judgment. His superiors abstain from any -interference. They are concerned only with the result, of which they -satisfy themselves by inspection at the end of the period assigned to -company training. If any of the soldiers have not been properly -instructed, or if the company is not fit to take its place in the -battalion, that is the captain's fault, and he is likely to lose his -chance of promotion. - -The battalion commander receives his trained companies and practises -them in battalion manoeuvres. His business is with the battalion as a -body composed of four units, not with the internal affairs of the -companies. In battle as on the parade ground this rule is observed. -For example: "If a battalion receives the order to attack a farm its -commander must assign to the several companies the part which each is -to play, must prescribe the points of attack, and at least in general -terms the directions of their advance. He must also arrange the time -of their coming into action so that they may co-operate. But how each -company is to accomplish the task assigned to it, in what formation it -is to fight--these and similar details he will do well, if he knows -that his captains have the necessary insight, to leave to them."[4] - -In this way authority and responsibility are graduated throughout the -army corps. Every commander above the rank of captain deals with a -body composed of units with the interior affairs of none of which he -meddles, except in the case of failure on the part of the officer -directly responsible. The higher the commander and the greater his -authority, the more general becomes the supervision and the less the -burden of detail. The superior prescribes the object to be attained. -The subordinate is left free to choose the means, and is interfered -with only in exceptional circumstances. Thus every officer in his own -sphere is accustomed to the exercise of authority and to the free -application of his own judgment. - -By this system the labour and responsibility of commanding an army -corps are reduced to practicable dimensions. Regimental affairs are -settled by the colonels; brigade affairs by the major-generals. The -divisions commanded by lieutenant-generals are completely organized -bodies capable, in case of need, of independent action and requiring -little supervision from the corps commander. The general commanding -the army corps has to deal directly with only a few subordinates, the -commanders of his infantry divisions, of his cavalry brigade or -division, and of his artillery brigade, and with the heads of the corps -organizations for such purposes as supply and medical service. He -inspects and tests the condition of all the various units, but he does -not attempt to do the work of his subordinates. He is thus at liberty -to keep his mind concentrated upon those essential matters which -properly require his decision, for example, in war, whether he will -advance or retire, whether he will move to the right or to the left, -whether to fight or to postpone an engagement; how to distribute his -force;--what portion he will at once engage and where he will place his -reserve. When he receives an order from the army headquarters he is -able to deliberate upon the best way of realizing the intention -conveyed, for he is as far as possible unhampered by the worry of -detail. He can make up his mind coolly, a very necessary process, -seeing that he will stake life and reputation to carry out what he has -once decided. - - - -[1] The civil and military boundaries are not quite identical. - -[2] The garrisons of fortresses are exceptions. - -[3] In recent years the cavalry division has been made independent of -the army corps. - -[4] Blume, _Strategic_, p. 136. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -THE SYSTEM OF TRAINING - -"The demands which war makes upon the troops must determine their -training in peace.... The tasks of the soldier in war are simple. He -must always be able to march and to use his weapon. He can do both -only so far as his moral and intellectual qualities suffice and his -bodily and military training has been effective. Moreover, his -performance will be fully useful only when it is guided by the will of -the leader and regulated by discipline."[1] - -The ideal here formulated is realized by devoting much time and -attention to training and teaching each individual recruit. Next comes -the exercise of the company, also as thorough as possible. These two -stages of schooling occupy the greater part of the military year. Then -when the companies are perfect they take their places in the battalion, -and the battalions in due time in the regiment and in the brigade. The -crown of the whole training is formed by the manoeuvres, in which -divisions and occasionally army corps are assembled for practice, -resembling as nearly as may be the operations of actual war. - -Several objects are served by these manoeuvres. In the first place, -the separate exercise of brigades preceding the manoeuvres proper -completes the formal training of the troops, and gives practice in the -evolutions of large homogeneous masses of each of the three arms. The -manoeuvres of divisions and army corps serve to accustom the three arms -to act in concert, and to overcome the great friction which at first -always impedes the movements of such large composite bodies. All the -various manoeuvres, moreover, give the superior officers the -opportunity of inspecting the work of their inferiors, that is, of -ascertaining how far the training of the troops has been thorough, and -with what degree of skill they are handled. - -Not the least important purpose of the manoeuvres is the training of -commanders. The troops are divided into two parties supposed to be -enemies at some stage of an imaginary war. The commander of each side -learns from the umpire the nature of the supposed operations which have -brought his forces into their actual situation, together with such -information concerning the enemy as in real war he might be presumed to -have obtained. He has then to act according to his own judgment. In -this way the generals are practised and tested in the power of rapidly -and surely grasping situations such as occur in war and of acting upon -the insight thus gained. The arrangements are so made as to afford -practice like this to as many officers as possible of all ranks, though -it is chiefly the generals, the commanders of brigades, divisions, and -army corps who profit by them. - -Thus the Prussian system of training produces as the net result on the -one hand an army corps as an instrument pliable to its commander's -touch, so that it can be surely and easily handled in any situation, -and on the other hand a general skilled in the manipulation of this -powerful and complicated instrument. - - - -[1] _Felddienstordnung_, §§ 1, 2. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -THE ARMY CORPS - -The Prussian army in 1866 consisted of nine army corps. The German -army to-day has twenty, and in case of war the number would be -increased. Large forces like these are rendered manageable by grouping -them into armies of four or five corps, and dealing with the armies as -units. It is evident that the working of the armies and therefore of -the whole depends upon the ease and certainty with which the several -corps are directed. Some of the means taken to secure this end have -been already touched upon. In the first place each of the component -parts of the corps must be perfectly trained and disciplined. -Secondly, the corps must have had so much practice in working together -as a whole that it has none of the weaknesses of a "scratch team." -Thirdly, the general must be a real commander, able to read a -battle-field, to judge a situation coolly, and to decide promptly. -These qualities are secured partly by the selection[1] exercised in the -appointment of generals, partly by the frequent opportunities for -practice and testing afforded by the manoeuvres. - -But it is not enough to secure a general of tactical and strategical -ability and experience. He must be protected against the danger of -being absorbed by the worries of administration. - -Before a body of 30,000 men can be assembled on the ground selected for -manoeuvres or on the field of battle, a vast amount of business must be -transacted, requiring for its performance abilities of quite another -sort than those needed to handle and lead the troops in action. The -men must all be clothed and equipped. They must be properly and -regularly fed. The task of supplying an army corps with provisions is -like that of feeding a small town which, instead of remaining in its -place, moves every day to a new site ten or fifteen miles distant from -the old one. Among 30,000 men there will always be a number of sick -who require attention. If the corps should meet the enemy there may be -thousands of wounded to be tended, removed, protected, and fed. Order -must be maintained, so that a special set of functionaries is needed to -apply and enforce the laws by which the army is regulated. The numbers -of the corps can be maintained only by a constant stream of fresh men, -trained soldiers not before employed in the war, arriving from its -peace quarters. - -Every one of these matters needs constant attention, or the whole -machine would get out of gear and cease to work. - -The friction that inevitably arises from these complicated necessities -is diminished and to some extent overcome by the organization of -responsibility among the several bodies composing the army corps. But -the anxieties of the commanding general can never be removed. In order -to realize the magnitude and variety of his cares, the attempt may be -made to draw a rough picture of the army corps at work during a -campaign. - -The corps is moving westward along one of the great Continental -high-roads. A vast forest spreading on each side for many miles -confines the troops to the actual roadway. - -The cavalry division is looking out for the enemy in the open country -twenty miles in advance to the west of the forest. Parties of hussars -in every road, lane, and bypath are watching the country as they move -on across a front of eight or nine miles, followed two or three miles -behind on the main road by the rest of the division, a column two miles -long of dragoons, uhlans, and horse artillery. At the head of this -column is the lieutenant-general commanding the cavalry division, with -his staff. It is ten o'clock in the morning, and under the hot July -sun a cloud of dust envelops all but the leading squadron as horse and -guns move on at a steady trot. Now and then a fitful breeze carries -the dust towards the south and reveals for a moment the long cavalcade. - -The pace has just slackened to a walk as two horsemen gallop towards -the road from the north-west. They are a young officer of hussars and -a private whose bandaged arm shows that he has been wounded. Both are -covered with dust, and their horses show signs of extreme fatigue. As -they approach the road the general and his suite move on to a pasture -field to the right to meet them, the column continuing along the road. -The lieutenant respectfully salutes and tells his story briefly. A few -questions are asked and answered. The column is halted, and during the -short rest which ensues the general dictates a note which is written by -one of his officers. The note is handed to an uhlan, who gallops off -at once along the road towards the rear. A few minutes later the -signal to mount is given, and the whole mass of horsemen and guns in a -succession of parallel columns leaves the road and trots over the -fields to the north-west, soon disappearing in a fold of the ground. - -The uhlan sent back with the letter approaches after a five-mile gallop -a group of comrades lying by the roadside, with their horses tethered -near in the grass. One of the horses is saddled and bridled, and as -the messenger comes up its rider springs into the saddle. A few -sentences are exchanged as the new-comer, dismounting, hands the note -to the fresh rider, who in turn gallops off along the road towards the -rear. Three times the note thus changes hands. The fourth rider, -whose station was five miles from the western edge of the forest -region, is continually meeting troops on the march. He passes first a -few squadrons of cuirassiers, then a mile or two further infantry, -guns, more infantry, and then a string of waggons a mile long, laden -with cartridges, shell, bridging material, and appliances for the -comfort of wounded men. All this is merely the advanced guard of the -army corps. - -As the rider draws nearer to the wood he finds a mile of clear road, -and then meets the general commanding the corps to whom his note is -addressed. - -The hussar lieutenant had started before dawn, and after riding many -miles to the front, evading the enemy's scouting parties, had watched a -hostile cavalry division break up from its bivouac. He had been able -to identify the division and to ascertain that it was unusually strong -both in cavalry and horse artillery. On his return he had been seen by -an enemy's patrol, and had escaped capture only by running the gauntlet. - -The information thus obtained is of great importance, not only to the -cavalry division, whose commander has promptly acted upon it, but to -the army corps and to the army of which it is a part. The general -commanding the army corps therefore sends an officer with the report -and a further note from himself to the army headquarters in rear, on -the east of the forest. This officer having to follow the high-road, -meets and rides past the main body of the army corps on the march. - -The leading brigade of infantry, with a number of guns and ammunition -waggons, covers the road for a mile and three-quarters; then for -another mile and a half is the corps' artillery, then the whole second -division of infantry (with its cavalry regiment and its artillery) -trailing its length for four and a half miles. Then after having the -road to himself for a quarter of an hour, as he emerges from the forest -on its eastern side, the rider passes the heavy baggage, a line of -military carts and waggons conveying those requisites which the troops -need every night for comfort, and which cannot be carried in the -knapsacks. These waggons stretch for a mile and a half along the road. -Soon after passing them the rider takes a cross-road leading to the -north, just as he is meeting the foremost portion of the army corps -trains, which in their turn would cover the road for eleven or twelve -miles with their long succession of vehicles: ammunition waggons for -guns and small arms; provision stores for four days for 30,000 men; hay -and oats for the horses of cavalry, artillery, and waggons; the corps -pontoon train; the hospital carts, and a multitude of country carts -pressed into the service to enable extra stores of provisions to be -taken on, and to relieve the military waggons. - -Thus from the general to the rear of the baggage proper would be nearly -twelve miles, from the rear of the baggage to the rear of the trains, -if all were on the march at the same time, another twelve miles, while -the general himself was found nearly five miles behind the front of the -advanced guard of the corps. - -When the officer, late in the afternoon, rides back from the army -headquarters with a letter for the corps commander, he finds a -different scene. At a village in the middle of the forest the leading -waggons of the train are beginning to form up north and south of the -road. There is here an extensive open space, which before night will -be packed with waggons. Farther on the road is clear. The heavy -baggage has dispersed among the cross-roads, each set of waggons -seeking the quarters of its regiment. At the western edge of the -forest the troops of the army corps have taken possession of all the -villages on the road and in the neighbourhood, so that within a radius -of six miles from where the road enters the open country every farm or -cluster of buildings is tenanted by its company or battery. The -villages farthest to the west contain the advanced guard, and beyond -them still the outposts have placed picquets and sentries in all the -roads and lanes leading to the west. - -The general's quarters are in a straggling village on the main road, at -the White Cross Inn. In front of the house an officer is explaining to -an old farmer that the provisions produced by the villagers are -satisfactory, that no further requisition will be made, but that for a -further supply of oats, cheese, and bacon, if delivered next morning, -payment will be made in cash. In a small parlour of the inn two -officers are busy examining the contents of half a dozen mail bags -collected from post-offices in the district. - -Upstairs the general, who has just come in from the outposts, is -hearing reports. The corps intendant proposes to form a temporary -depot at the village where the trains are parked, and to send back the -requisitioned carts next morning to the railway terminus assigned to -the corps. Another officer announces that the telegraph from army -headquarters will by evening be opened as far as the same village, a -third that 150 horses are unserviceable, and that it will be two days -before fresh horses from home will reach the depot. A fourth brings a -list of the number of men who are disabled by sore feet, diarrhoea, and -sunstroke. At this moment comes the letter from army headquarters, -which instructs the general to be ready at short notice to march his -whole corps towards the north, along the front of the forest. This -involves the movement of the trains along a cross-road through the -forest, and arrangements must be made to ensure this road, which is a -bad one, being cleared of hindrances and made fit to bear the heavy -traffic. - -The examination of the mail bags has yielded fresh information about -the enemy. All the officers but one are dismissed, and the general, -with his confidential secretary, is proceeding to study the new -situation thus revealed when a fresh messenger gallops up to the house -with a note to the effect that the advanced guard of the neighbouring -corps ten miles to the south is attacked by a superior force of the -enemy, and that its commander begs the general to move his corps to its -assistance, so as to be able to join in the action before noon next day. - -This picture is a mere shadow of the reality.[2] It may help however -to illustrate the dual nature of the cares by which a general is -distracted. He has at the same time to perform the military functions -of command and to superintend the business of management. His duty as -a commander involves continuous attention to the enemy's movements and -to the instructions of his own chief. He must study the intentions of -the army commander to whom he is subordinate and conform to them in his -own movements against the enemy. But the mere management of his corps -requires an effort which tends to absorb his energies and make him -forget both his commander and the enemy. - -A good system must as far as possible relieve the general from these -cares of management, so that he can keep his mind free to study his -instructions and watch his foe. Accordingly side by side with that -distribution of authority among the combatant units which facilitates -the exercise of the general command is an organization upon similar -principles of the administrative services. The supervision of each -branch is in the hands of an executive officer in the _entourage_ of -the general. - -The corps intendant is responsible for the supplies of provisions, -stores, and money, and for their transport. The hospitals and -ambulance work are controlled by the surgeon-general. The legal -business is conducted and prepared for the general's decision by an -officer called the corps auditeur. - -The strictly military functions of command fall naturally into two -classes, according as they are concerned with the direction of the -troops as pieces in the game played against the enemy, or with their -internal management. The everyday life of a soldier is to a great -extent a matter of routine. In every regiment there are at all times -guards and sentries and an officer of the day; there are patrols and -fatigue parties. These duties are undertaken by all in turn, and they -therefore need to be equitably distributed from day to day. A roll of -the regiment is therefore made every day accounting for all the -officers and men. The working of all this internal mechanism is in -every regiment arranged by the adjutant, under the authority and -supervision of the commanding officer. The brigade, the division, and -the army corps are each of them in like manner provided with an -adjutancy, which in the case of an army corps is formed by a bureau of -four officers. - - - -[1] The thoroughness of this selection has increased in recent years, -inasmuch as most of the generals appointed have enjoyed the special -training of the staff. An incapable, of any rank is ruthlessly retired. - -[2] The details of organization on which it is based are those of the -German army in the period between 1875 and 1885. The materials for a -similar account of the Prussian army corps of 1866 are not accessible. -The reader may imagine the confusion which would follow a battle, -especially a defeat which might compel the corps to retreat as best it -could through the forest, with its trains perhaps entangled in the -cross-road leading north. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -THE GENERAL STAFF IN THE ARMY CORPS - -There remain as the general's special province the communication with -the army headquarters and the direction of the troops as fighting -bodies; the regulation of marches, halts, and combats; the -reconnaissance of the country with a view to these operations; the -collection and sifting of news about the enemy; and the compilation of -reports for the information of the higher commanders and for the -records of the army corps. - -The bureau or department which assists the general in these matters is -the general staff of the army corps. It consists of a colonel or -lieutenant-colonel as chief, one field officer, and two captains.[1] -The functions of the general staff of a division or army corps during -war may be summarised under the following heads:[2]-- - -(1) Elaboration in accordance with the situation from time to time of -all arrangements concerning the fighting, marching, repose, and safety -of the troops. - -(2) Communication of these arrangements in the form of orders. - -(3) Collection, sifting, and appreciation of all information about the -enemy. - -(4) Maintenance of the efficiency of the division or army corps and of -an uninterrupted knowledge of its condition in every respect. - -(5) Keeping record of all operations. - -(6) Reconnaissances. - - -The peace duties of the bureau are a preparation for those of war. -They embrace the elaboration of the arrangements for mobilization, -which require periodical, almost continuous revision, all arrangements -for marching and quarterings, the selection of a site and all other -preparations for the autumn manoeuvres, and the superintendence of the -railway and telegraph service of the army corps. - -The chief of the general staff of the army corps is authorized to -represent the general in his absence and to issue in his name such -orders as will admit of no delay. Accordingly he has a general -supervision over the whole staff and may control not merely his direct -subordinates, but the adjutants, the intendant, and the auditeur. - -It is one of the duties of the general staff to attend to the material -well-being of the troops, so as to secure their being at all times in -condition to march or to fight. The heads of the several departments -specially concerned with this care can work efficiently only in so far -as they are kept in touch of the military situation. They must know, -for example, when an advance or retreat is contemplated, or a battle is -in prospect, so as to make their arrangements accordingly. For this -purpose the chief of the general staff of the army corps is the organ -of communication between them and the commanding general. All the -orders for the movement of the troops and for their distribution in -quarters pass through his hands, and he is also responsible for the -collecting and sifting of information concerning the enemy. His three -assistants relieve him from too much absorption in mechanical detail. -He is thus a sort of confidential secretary to the general, preparing -for him all important correspondence and serving as an _alter ego_. He -knows the general's views and intentions and can therefore see with the -general's eyes. He is familiar with the methods and ideas of the army -headquarters, for he has been trained in the great general staff at -Berlin under the personal influence of its chief. He is familiar with -the working of the army corps, for he has held his post during years of -peace before the war, and has been responsible for the arrangement of -the corps manoeuvres. Thus his training and experience peculiarly -qualify him to be the general's right-hand man, to translate the -general's wishes into detailed orders, and to submit for his approval -at any time such suggestions as will meet the situation. - -The system here described provides as effectively as may be for the -judicious employment of the army corps. Each branch of administration -is so organized as to centre in a competent special manager whose -decisions, though they must be submitted to the general, will seldom -require to be revised or reversed. The general, while in this way in -touch with all that is done in and for his corps, can give his main -attention to the military operations. These also are prepared for him -and the details elaborated by a group of officers specially trained and -practised in this particular branch: the art of command. - - - -[1] In peace there is usually only one captain. The lieutenant-general -commanding a division has the assistance of a single officer of the -general staff, usually a captain or a major. In the smaller units, -comprising only a single arm, the general staff is not represented. - -[2] Bronsart von Schellendorf, _Der Dienst des Generalstabes_, vol. i., -p. 4. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -COMPOSITION OF THE GENERAL STAFF AND ITS DISTRIBUTION THROUGH THE ARMY - -The Prussian general staff forms a corps by itself. The officers -belonging to it wear a special uniform, and their names do not appear -in any regimental lists. The proposals for their promotion are made by -the chief of the staff of the army,[1] and advancement in its ranks is -quicker than in the army generally. - -The corps thus constituted is, however, not a close corporation. By -the rule that regimental service must alternate with employment on the -general staff, the connection between the army and the staff is -maintained, and the practical competence of the staff officers is -secured. The first appointment to the staff and the subsequent return -to it are alike dependent upon selection, or, in other words, upon -special merit. - -A captain on the staff after four or five years' work is transferred to -a regiment. A year or two later he may be again selected for the staff -as major. After a further term he will receive the command of a -battalion, then return to work on the staff, and afterwards be promoted -to the command of a regiment. From this post he may again be chosen to -the staff, returning eventually as a major-general to the command of a -brigade. - -Those officers who are selected for the purely scientific work of the -general staff, such, for instance, as the geographical and -topographical surveys, are considered to have embraced a special career -and to have given up the prospect of command in the field. They are -placed on an auxiliary establishment or side list of the general staff. -As a rule they are students rather than fighting men, or officers of -distinguished scientific attainments who have not the bodily activity -required for service in the field. They remain on the auxiliary -establishment, and do not revert to the wider field of active service -among the combatants. - -The Prussian general staff numbers altogether about 200 officers, 90 of -whom are distributed among the divisions and army corps,[2] whilst -about 100, half of whom belong to the auxiliary establishment, form the -great general staff at Berlin. Service in the staff office of a -division or army corps alternates with employment on the great general -staff, so that the officer whose diligence and ability have opened for -him the staff career, and whose performance secures his periodical -return to it, passes through the various stages of regimental service, -of service on the general staff of the great constituent units of the -army, and of employment in the great central agency of direction. - -Thus the general staff is not merely the intellectual spring which -gives the impulse to the whole army, but it forms also a medium of -circulation by which all the parts are kept in uninterrupted -communication with the centre. At the great general staff the art of -command is studied with special reference to the employment of the -German army as a weapon against France, Russia, or any other probable -adversary, and in conjunction with the Austrian, Italian, or any other -allied army. The wide views thus acquired are applied to the handling -of the several units of which the army is composed, while the central -office in all its general studies has the benefit of the practical -experience obtained in the management of the company, the squadron, and -the battery, as well as of every unit up to the division and the army -corps. - -The influence of the general staff is not limited to the work of the -200 officers who comprise it at any given time. Many of the commanders -of regiments and battalions have been members of the general staff, and -are taking their turn of practice with the troops. Nearly all the -higher commanders have passed through the various stages of duty in the -general staff. The great general staff is perpetually training fresh -generations. Some sixty junior officers are temporarily attached to it -without being incorporated, that is, without ceasing to belong to their -regiments. They are the pick of the 100 lieutenants who every year -leave the Kriegsakademie, or Staff College, at Berlin. They work for a -year at the central general staff office, under the personal -supervision of the chief of the general staff of the army, who thus -acquires an intimate knowledge of their ability and character. At the -end of their year they rejoin their regiments. After a term of -regimental work the best of them will be chosen as captains to the -general staff to fill up vacancies caused by promotions. In this way -the general staff keeps up its numbers by the continual selection of -the fittest. - - - -[1] In the case of regimental officers these proposals are made by the -commander of the regiment; cf. Cabinet order of March 22, 1864. - -[2] Four of the German army corps--those of Saxony, Würtemberg, and -Bavaria (two corps)--do not belong to the Prussian army. - - - - - PART III - - _THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF_ - - - -CHAPTER I - -AN INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT - -The chief of the general staff of the army, assisted by the great -general staff, which is his special organ, and which has its permanent -abode in Berlin, is occupied during peace with preparations for the -conduct of the army in war. The work undertaken with this object -divides itself naturally into three branches, according as it consists -in actual arrangements for particular wars regarded as probable, in the -training of officers to the art of command, or in the scientific study -of war as a means of forming and exercising the faculty of generalship. - -The direct preparation for probable wars consists in arranging, in -anticipation of each of the various possible complications, the most -suitable distribution of the forces available, their concentration on -the frontier, and their transport from the peace quarters to the -districts selected for this purpose.[1] These matters require for -their decision a thorough knowledge of the countries forming the -theatre of war and of the armies of all the probable combatants. - -The great general staff in time of peace is constantly engaged in the -collection and digestion of such information. For this purpose it is -organized into three divisions,[2] to each of which a portion of Europe -is assigned. The first division deals with Sweden, Norway, Russia, -Turkey, and Austria; the second with Germany, Denmark, Italy, and -Switzerland; the third with the western states of Europe and with -America. Of the thoroughness with which the work is done some idea may -be formed by an examination of the reference index,[3] which was for -many years (1869-1883) annually printed and published. The reader who -opens one of these volumes at the chapter headed "British Empire" will -find there a mass of ordered information such as is hardly anywhere -else accessible. It begins with a detailed account of the progress of -the Ordnance survey during the year, dealing separately with England, -Scotland, and Ireland, and with the Admiralty surveys. Then under the -heading land and people, comes a list of new statistical publications, -an abstract of the census and of the Registrar-General's reports, and a -note of any works that illustrate the subjects. Succeeding headings, -worked out with great minuteness, are: constitution, administration, -and finance, intellectual culture, emigration, mining, agriculture, -forestry, and marine economy, industry and trade. Communications are -subdivided into railways, post, telegraphs, and inland navigation. -Several pages are devoted to an exhaustive catalogue of every -publication issued during the year, English or foreign, bearing upon -the British army, including official publications, controversial -pamphlets, and magazine and newspaper articles. The navy is treated in -a similar manner, though less space is devoted to it; and lastly, there -is a review of all new guide-books, books of travel, and maps relating -to Great Britain, especially of county guides, histories, maps and -plans. The progress of the British colonies is followed in the same -fashion. - -The minute systematic study which is thus devoted to the resources of -every European country gives a basis for judging of its fighting power -far more certain than the collection of mere military statistics. For -the reference index is only a groundwork upon which the military study -of the countries can be founded. It is not the product of the three -divisions, but of the geographical and statistical section, which -belongs to the auxiliary establishment, and in this way it prepares the -materials upon which the three divisions are to work. - -The index is no longer given to the world; but the volumes already -published are a monument of systematic research, and reveal the depth -and breadth of the foundation upon which the great general staff -builds, in other words, the accuracy and fulness of the knowledge at -the disposal of its chief when he frames a plan of operations. It is -therefore not a matter of surprise that in 1866 the chief of the -Prussian general staff was well informed concerning the position and -condition of every part of the Austrian army up to the time when the -special preparations for the war began; was able to gauge very fairly -the time that would be required for its mobilization and transport, and -knew perhaps as well as any one in Austria the difficulties in which -that empire would be placed by an effort to continue the struggle. A -still more complete knowledge of the adversary's military and other -resources was revealed by the German general staff at the opening of -the campaign of 1870. - -The German staff has now no longer a monopoly of these studies, as may -be seen by a glance at the _Revue Militaire de l'Étranger_, published -fortnightly (since 1872) by the second bureau of the French general -staff. The intelligence division[4] of our own War Office performs -somewhat similar duties of geographical and statistical research. - -The transport of the portions of the army from their peace quarters to -the places of assembly selected for the commencement of operations has -been referred to in the account of the campaign of 1866. It was then -effected partly by marching, partly by railway. Immediately after that -campaign the veteran critic Jomini, in an essay upon its lessons, urged -the importance of "the serious study of the modifications which -railways will cause from this time onwards in the general direction of -the operations of war, _i.e._ in strategy," and spoke of the want of -this study as "the gap at present existing in the theory of the art of -war."[5] The gap, one would think, had been pretty well filled up -already by a staff which in twenty-one days had moved 197,000 men, -55,000 horses, and 5,300 military vehicles over distances varying from -120 to 360 miles without a single accident, and without any serious -departure from the pre-arranged time-tables. - -The great general staff has a special division devoted to the -manipulation of railways in war, and the attempt is made to give every -officer of the general staff the benefit of a period of service in this -particular branch. - -The production of maps for the army is so closely connected with the -study of the various probable theatres of war that the two duties -cannot safely be entrusted to different institutions. In Germany the -principal government geographical establishment is a branch of the -great general staff, the officers employed in it being on the auxiliary -list. This service is arranged in three departments, the -trigonometric, the topographic, and the cartographic, all of which are -under the supervision of the chief of the National Survey, who is -himself a subordinate of the chief of the general staff of the army. - - - -[1] See Part I. Chap. IV. - -[2] The details of this organization have been modified in recent years. - -[3] _Registrande der Geographisch-Statistischen Abtheilung des Grossen -Generalstabes_. Berlin, 1869-83. - -[4] See a lecture delivered at the Royal United Service Institution in -1875 by the late Major-General, then Major C. B. Brackenbury, R.A., -entitled "The Intelligence Duties of the Staff at Home and Abroad," in -reading which, however, the date of its production should be remembered. - -[5] Jomini, _Troisième Appendice au Précis de l'Art de la Guerre_. -Paris, 1866. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -A MILITARY UNIVERSITY - -The distinctive feature of the regeneration by which modern Prussia was -raised up, after the Prussia of Frederick the Great had been shattered -in the first conflict with Napoleon, was the effort to lay a solid -foundation in healthy institutions and especially in a sound education. -The work which was done for Prussian institutions by Stein and for -liberal education by Humboldt, was done for the army by Scharnhorst, to -whom military education was the corner-stone of army reform. The -University of Berlin began its work on October 15th, 1810, and on the -same day[1] was opened the War School for officers, the great military -high school of Germany, now known as the War Academy. It was the -creation of Scharnhorst, whose greatness is nowhere more conspicuous -than in his educational work. - -As early as 1792, before he had ever seen a battle, he had published a -_Soldier's Pocket-book_, in which the principles and details of field -service were explained and illustrated by examples from then recent -wars. The experiences of his first campaigns in 1793 and 1794 led him -during his last years in the Hanoverian service to draw up a series of -memoirs in which military education occupies a prominent place, and -when in 1801 he joined the Prussian service, one of his first -appointments was that of lecturer to the classes of young officers -which had been instituted by Frederick the Great and still continued to -be held. Scharnhorst rearranged and extended the courses of -instruction, and himself as "Director of the Academy" taught to the -higher class the important subjects of tactics and strategy. The -lectures which he gave between 1801 and 1805 have been preserved in a -fragmentary state, and show that he was the first to concentrate the -attention of his pupils on the conduct of the operations of war, -instead of merely busying them with the details of the several -technical arts and sciences which subserve that end. The regulations -for the Academy which he drafted in 1805 contain the outlines of the -system which in a more developed form is still characteristic of the -highest Prussian military education. Scharnhorst's best pupil at this -time was Carl von Clausewitz, who in after years attributed to these -early lessons the intellectual impulse which produced his masterly -essays, and the historical method in which all his theory has its -roots. Lectures and classes were abruptly ended by the mobilization of -1805, which was followed in 1806 by the great catastrophe. - -The War School of 1810 aimed at the higher training of selected -officers whose ability gave promise of a career in the superior ranks. -It was distinct from the lower schools intended to give a professional -training to young men preparing to become officers, and was closely -connected with the general staff, in which Scharnhorst, at this time -its chief, paid great attention to the instruction of the younger -members. One of the first professors appointed was Clausewitz. - -The wars of liberation practically dissolved the War School, which, -however, after the peace of 1815 was re-established without substantial -modification, though it was placed in the department, not of the chief -of the staff, but of the inspector-general of military education. -During the subsequent long period of peace, the Academy had the -services of many distinguished men. From 1818 to 1830 Clausewitz was -its director. The great geographer Karl Ritter was from 1820 to 1859 -one of its professors. In 1859 the title of War Academy was definitely -adopted, and in 1872 the institution was again placed under the -superintendence of the chief of the general staff. - -The regulations at present in force, though of recent date, are little -more than a codification of the system which has been gradually -developed on the foundations laid by Scharnhorst, and their value and -the authority which attaches to them are in great measure due to the -long and unbroken tradition which they represent. - -They are embodied in two short codes entitled respectively "Order of -Service," and "Order of Teaching of the War Academy." A concise -account of these documents will best explain the workings of this -institution. - -The Order of Service is one of the few results of the brief reign of -the lamented Emperor Frederick, whose signature it bears. It begins in -true German fashion with a definition: "The object of the War Academy -is to initiate into the higher branches of the military sciences a -number of officers of the necessary capacity belonging to the various -arms, and thus to enlarge and extend their military knowledge and to -clear and quicken their military judgment. - -"Side by side with this direct training for their profession, they are -to endeavour, in proportion to the requirements of the army, to -penetrate deeper into certain departments of formal science, and to -acquire mastery in speaking and writing one or two modern foreign -languages." - -The Academy in its scientific working--as an institution for teaching -and study--is under the chief of the general staff of the army, who is -responsible for the appointment of the teachers, for the selection of -officers as students ("the call to the Academy"), for their dismissal -in case of need, and for the permission to attend a particular course -occasionally granted to officers not "called." For the discipline and -management of the Academy, the director, a general, is responsible. He -is assisted by one or two deputies and by a Board of Studies, over -whose nomination the chief of the staff has a controlling influence. -The duties of the board are to approve of the programmes of the several -professors' courses, and to conduct the examinations at the beginning -and at the end of the course. The complete course lasts three years, -with a long vacation of three months each summer. The appointment or -"call" of students is in each case only for a year, its renewal -depending upon diligence and good conduct. Any officer of five years' -service not yet within four years from his turn of promotion to captain -may apply for admission to the Academy, which is regulated by -examination. - -"The object of the entrance examination is to ascertain whether the -candidate possesses the degree of general education and the knowledge -requisite for a profitable attendance at the lectures of the Academy. -The examination is also to determine whether the candidates have the -power of judgment, without which there could be no hope of their -further progress." The questions set are to be such as cannot be -answered merely from knowledge stored up in the memory, and should test -the capacity for clear, collected, and consistent expression. The -military subjects required are tactics, formal and applied, the nature -and construction of firearms, fortification and surveying. The general -subjects are history, geography, mathematics, and French. The paper in -applied tactics must be as simple as possible. It must consist of a -problem for solution, so as to oblige the candidate to make a decision -and give his reasons for it. Each candidate must send in an essay -written at home on one of a list of subjects announced some months -beforehand. This is particularly intended to test his power of -judgment and the degree of general education he has attained. It may -be either in German or French. "Of those officers whose work is judged -the best (by the Board of Studies) the director may submit to the chief -of the general staff of the army, with a view to their being called to -the Academy, the names of any number not exceeding a hundred. The -chief of the staff communicates his decisions to the generals -commanding army corps, who inform the officers concerned." - -The _Order of Service_ lays down that in the instruction given at the -Academy certain practical applications shall never be omitted:-- - -"As a continuous commentary on the lectures, the students, under the -guidance of their professors, are to visit the military workshops, -technical institutions, and exercising grounds at Berlin and Spandau, -and the fortifications of Spandau. They are to attend the exercises of -the railway regiment, and make journeys of instruction on the military -railway. - -"The lessons in tactics, fortification, and transport are to be -supplemented by practical exercises. Moreover, during a portion of the -holidays after the first and the second year, each officer is attached -for instruction to a regiment of one of the two arms to which he does -not properly belong. Lastly, the third year's course is always to -conclude with a three weeks' tour, for practical instruction in staff -duties." - -The _Order of Service_ concerns itself no further with the scope and -method of teaching, but decrees that these shall be determined by the -order of teaching to be issued by the chief of the general staff of the -army. - -The _Order of Teaching_ of the War Academy at present in force was -issued by Count Moltke at the close of his career at the head of the -Prussian staff.[2] Its value can be made clear only by a reproduction -of its principal clauses. But a true judgment of an educational -institution must be based upon the existence of a standard of -comparison, an ideal which may be readily accepted as the measure of -perfection. Such a normal type may be sought in the best University -training of the present day, of which the spirit may perhaps be -expressed in a few sentences. - -A system of instruction, intended not for children but for men, which -is not an attempt to make good the defects of early education, but -addresses itself to minds already trained and disciplined, cannot be -regulated mechanically. In all intelligent education the order of -teaching is at once natural and rational. The subjects group -themselves by their relation to the end in view, and the necessity of -each new advance is evident to the student as soon as he is prepared -for it. Such a course of study has a unity, and a completeness, which -is of great significance in view of the formation of a type of -character. The highest education, however, has features peculiarly its -own. It is founded in the conception of science, not as a department -of knowledge, but as "the proper method of knowing and apprehending the -facts in any department whatever."[3] From this idea of method flow -practical consequences. The student, as soon as maturity is -approached, abandons the general realm of knowledge, and concentrates -himself upon a single province,[4] in which, however, he becomes not -merely a follower, but an independent worker, seeing and judging for -himself and co-operating with his teacher in advancing the bounds of -knowledge. Above all, "it is not the substance of what is -communicated, but the act of communication between the older and the -younger mind, which is the important matter."[5] - -From this educational standpoint, Count Moltke's _Order of Teaching_ -deserves a close examination. Its opening paragraphs must be given in -full:-- - - -"THE COURSE OF STUDY. - -"In accordance with the objects for which the Military Academy is -instituted, its course of study must aim at a thorough professional -education; it must not lose itself in the wide field of general -scientific studies. - -"A sound formal education is the indispensable pre-requisite of a -thorough military professional education. The deepening of the formal -training, of the general intelligence and judgment, must therefore -never be lost sight of during, and side by side with, the professional -studies. Accordingly the course will be based upon the knowledge -gained in the cadet corps, the military schools, the school for -artillery and engineers, and, as regards general knowledge, in the -gymnasia. But a simple repetition of things already known, by way of -refreshing the memory, cannot be sufficient. As the whole course aims -at a higher culture, it must proceed independently, entirely free from -the constraint of a school. - -"The practical abilities of the officers, acquired during five years' -service, offer in many respects a foundation upon which the teachers -can build. - - -"METHOD OF INSTRUCTION. - -"The instruction at the Military Academy begins with the elements of -the various subjects, the object being, in the first instance, to -strengthen and enlarge the grasp of what has already been learned. It -proceeds, as the subjects develop, to more difficult matters, aiming, -as its ultimate goal, at the thorough preparation of the officer for -the modern requirements of war. The instruction in the formal sciences -must for this purpose proceed in a different manner from that adopted -in the military subjects. The scientific teaching may take the form of -lectures, which appeal merely to the comprehension and the memory of -the hearer, while in the military subjects, everything depends upon the -pupil learning to apply and to make the most of the knowledge which he -acquires. It is, moreover, essential to bring about an active process -of mental give and take between teacher and pupils, so as to stimulate -the pupils to become fellow-workers. The awakening effects of -co-operation like this will never be seen where the one only expounds, -and the other only listens. But it will naturally be produced by the -combination of clear exposition, with practice in the application to -specific concrete cases of the knowledge gained. (The so-called -'applicatory method' of teaching. Cp. p. 187, note.) - -"Accordingly, in the purely military subjects the lectures are, as far -as possible, to be interspersed with practical examples, in which the -details are explained upon the map. Moreover, in this department, -there will be opportunities of encouraging the pupils from time to time -to deliver original addresses, the preparation of which should lead to -the formation of independent opinions. The subjects of these addresses -are to be military, and never merely scientific. - -"If the teacher succeeds by the force of his word and his person in -developing the mental powers of his pupils so that they eagerly look -forward to the next year's course and are thoroughly roused to work for -themselves, he has accomplished his task. For the Academy is not to -give fragments of disconnected knowledge; in its course of teaching the -necessity of every new subject must rest upon truths which the pupils -have already perceived and made their own." - -The general framework being thus erected, the _Order of Teaching_ -proceeds to review the several subjects[6] taught in the Academy, -indicating in each case the reason why the particular subject is to be -taken up, and the manner in which it is to be treated. - -The following paragraphs, which deal with the four principal subjects -of instruction, give a sufficient insight into the system:-- - - -"TACTICS. - -"The object of the tactical instruction, to which, above all, -pre-eminent importance must be attached, is (1) to give the officers a -thorough knowledge of the tactical regulations in force in our army and -those of our great neighbours, and (2) by teaching and by setting -problems to make them familiar with the endless diversity of the -conditions of modern battle. - -"The first year's course comprises (_a_) the outlines of the historical -growth of our army organization and of our tactical forms; (_b_) our -drill-books, order of field service and musketry instruction, so far as -they are important for the use of the troops in the field; (_c_) -thorough explanation of the forms of battle of the great European -armies of to-day. - -"Hand in hand with this formal instruction, the German regulations -dealing with march, combat, and rest must be illustrated by problems -involving a small detachment of all arms. In these problems the -principal stress is to be laid on the co-operation and mutual support -of the various arms. - -"In the second and third years' course only applied tactics will be -taught. During the second year the duties of the infantry and cavalry -division, with special regard to the issue of orders and the conduct of -battle, must be thoroughly studied. The third year's course embraces -the functions of an army corps acting as a portion of an army. - -"The teacher must throughout endeavour to make his instruction -suggestive by examples and by exercises on the map and in the open air. -In this he will be successful in proportion as he makes use of the -experiences of modern and of recent wars. - - -"MILITARY HISTORY. - -"The lectures upon military history offer the most effective means of -teaching war during peace, and of awakening a genuine interest in the -study of important campaigns. These lectures should bring into relief -the unchangeable fundamental conditions of good generalship in their -relation to changeable tactical forms, and should place in a true light -the influence of eminent characters upon the course of events and the -weight of moral forces in contrast to that of mere material instruments. - -"These lectures must not degenerate into a mere succession of -unconnected descriptions of military occurrences. They must regard -events in their causal connections, must concern themselves with the -leadership, and must at the same time bring out the ideas of war -peculiar to each age. They will acquire a high value if the teacher -succeeds in bringing into exercise the judgment of his pupils. - -"This judgment, however, must never degenerate into mere negative -criticism, but must clothe itself in the form of distinct suggestions -as to what ought to have been done and decided. - -"The lectures in the first year's course will treat of one or more of -the campaigns of Frederick the Great; in the second year's course, -campaigns of the Revolution or of Napoleon I.; and in the third year's -course, campaigns of the period since Napoleon, especially those of the -time of the Emperor William I. - - -"HISTORY. - -"A thorough historical knowledge is a necessary part of general -scientific education, and is also of manifold value in the professional -life of an officer. Accordingly, the lectures which are to lay the -foundations for it are continued throughout the three years' course. -Their object is to show consecutively the general development of the -human race in the successive stages of religious conceptions, of -political and social forms, and in the results of science, art, and -philosophy. All these phases of human progress are to be illustrated -in the history of representative nations and individuals. Growing -forms are to be explained in connection with previous conditions, and -finally the exposition must reach the present time, the ground upon -which the officer's work is founded, and of which therefore he must -understand the gradual historical growth. - - -"GENERAL STAFF DUTIES AND PRACTICE TOUR. - -"This course is to deal with the functions of the general staff, and -with the service of the general staff officer in peace and war. It -includes, in any order preferred by the teacher-- - -"The historical development of our general staff. - -"The corresponding arrangements of the other Great Powers. - -"The subdivision of our army as based upon the Imperial Constitution, -the military laws, and the conventions.[7] - -"The office work of the general staff officer in its general outlines; -the preparations for the manoeuvres and for mobilization; the various -constituent parts of the mobile army. - -"Railways and transport. - -"The duties of the general staff officer in the field, especially his -position and functions in relation to the general command. - -"The principles of the supply of armies in peace and war, the resources -and means available for the purpose, and the methods employed. - -"The war strength and composition of the armies of our great neighbours. - -"The practice tour[8] with which the course terminates offers the -opportunity of testing the capacity, knowledge, and endurance of each -officer--of finding what he can do. Upon the basis of simple general -and special ideas, usually framed by the teacher who conducts the -exercise, the decisions of the general commanding and the general staff -officer's share in the measures adopted will be illustrated. For this -purpose it will be useful to form two sides, neither of which should, -as a rule, exceed the strength of an imaginary infantry division on a -war footing. The exercise should be so arranged as to occasion in turn -practice in formal work such as may promote facility in the issue of -orders and a knowledge of the arrangements of our army, discussions -upon the spot of tactical situations, analyses of the effects upon the -troops of dispositions given, and lastly, comprehensive examinations of -the situation presented by the campaign or battle. Each officer who -joins the tour should have the opportunity of grappling with as many as -possible of these various kinds of difficulties." - -The advocates of original research as the true instrument of higher -education may not at first sight recognise their ideal in Moltke's -_Order of Teaching_. They may smile at an academy where natural -science and history are taught in lectures appealing only to the -intelligence and the memory. But the school at Berlin has a practical -aim. It is a school of war, and in all that relates to war the German -staff officer learns to apply that science which consists in the true -method of apprehending. Moreover, the _Order of Teaching_, like all -other German military regulations, does not fully reveal the -thoroughness of the work executed in obedience to its precepts. In -military history, for instance, it lays down that the third year's -course is to deal with "campaigns of the time of William I." This -phrase would be met by very superficial work. The letter would be -fulfilled by a perusal of a _précis_ of the campaigns of 1866 or of -1870. A study of one of these campaigns in the official history might -seem completely to fulfil the requirements. But in practice the -students at the Academy work out the selected campaign on a still wider -basis. In the probationary year which follows the Academy course they -are allowed access to the materials from which the staff histories were -written, and are expected to form their own judgment on the campaign -from the study of the original documents themselves. This is the very -ideal of the ideal professor of history. - -There is no doubt another point of view from which the War Academy may -be differently judged. A University, strictly speaking, is a school of -free thought, and should give to those who have lived its life and -breathed its spirit a view of the world, of nature and of humanity, of -which the characteristic is freedom, spontaneity, independence. The -man who in this sense has had a liberal education may be reactionary or -progressive in his sympathies, may be democratic or authoritative in -his leanings, but in any case if the University has done its work he -will choose his own way. He will take his bearings for himself, and -his thought will be conditioned by no ordinances and limited by no -authority. At this intellectual freedom the War Academy does not aim. -Its business is not with the progress of humanity, but with the -training of good servants for the King of Prussia. Whether this -immediate object is a means to the higher end is a question for the -historian in some future century. - - - -[1] Schwartz, _Leben des Generals Carl von Clausewitz_, etc., vol. i. -p. 151. - -[2] It is dated August 12th, 1888; Count Moltke's resignation as chief -of the general staff of the army is dated in the _Gazette_, August -10th, 1888. - -[3] Mark Pattison's _Suggestions on Academical Organisation, with -Especial Reference to Oxford_, p. 307. - -[4] Cp. Pattison's _Suggestions_, p. 262. - -[5] Cp. Paulson's _Suggestions_, p. 165. - -[6] List of the subjects taught in the Academy, with number of hours -per week in each year's course devoted to each:-- - - 1st 2nd 3rd - MILITARY SUBJECTS. year's year's year's - course. course. course. - - Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 2 - Military history . . . . . . . . 3 4 4 - Early history of armies . . . . . 1 -- -- - Construction and nature of weapons 3 -- -- - Fortification . . . . . . . . . . 3 -- -- - Means of communication . . . . . -- 2 -- - Military surveying . . . . . . . -- 2 -- - Military law . . . . . . . . . . -- 1 -- - Military hygiene . . . . . . . . -- 1 -- - Military geography . . . . . . . -- 2 -- - Duties of the general staff . . . -- -- 4 - Siege warfare . . . . . . . . . . -- -- 3 - - NON-MILITARY SUBJECTS. - - History . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 3 - General geography . . . . . . . . 2 -- -- - Administration and law, including - international law . . . . . . . -- -- 2 - Mathematics (Mathematical ) 4 3 2 - Physical Geography (sciences as ) 2 -- -- - Physics . . . . . (alternatives ) -- 3 -- - Geodesy . . . . . (for language.) -- -- 3 - Chemistry . . . . ( ) -- -- 2 - French . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6 6 - or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Russian . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6 6 - -Every candidate for admission to the Academy is required to say whether -he proposes to take up the subjects grouped as mathematical sciences, -or a language, and if a language whether French or Russian. - -[7] The conventions are the agreements with Prussia by which the armies -of Saxony, Bavaria, and Würtemberg are regulated. - -[8] The practice tour (_Uebungsreise_) is a sham fight, or rather a -sham campaign, carried out in the district chosen for the purpose by -officers without men. The troops are imaginary, but the officers -taking part in the exercise are assigned to the several posts of -command, and upon the basis of the imaginary situation, communicated by -the umpire, work out all the necessary orders and dispositions. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING - -The condition of success in the higher education is that the teacher -should be himself a student. He should have in his subject that vital -interest which comes of the endeavour to extend his mastery and to -widen in his own particular branch the existing bounds of knowledge and -achievement. The true teacher does not study his subject in order to -be able to teach, but teaches because he is possessed by his subject. -The benefits of teaching in the higher stages are therefore never -one-sided. The pupil returns in a different form the help which he -receives. For while the elucidation of principles acquires a peculiar -freshness and force in the hands of an active pioneer of knowledge, the -necessities of exposition compel the investigator to keep his -researches in contact with the system or body of doctrine which he -expounds. This fundamental relation between teaching and research is -realized in the connection between the War Academy and the great -general staff. - -It has already been shown how the great general staff is the organ by -which during peace its chief collects and sifts the information upon -which he bases his plan for the opening of a campaign, and how, when -the operations have begun, the general staff, through its several -ramifications, keeps him supplied with the data concerning his own army -and that of the enemy which he requires from time to time in order to -shape his further decisions. - -All this is but preliminary or preparatory work. The decisive act is -that by which the chief of the staff, from the information he has thus -acquired, constructs a problem and designs its solution--puts to -himself the question, What is now to be done? and answers it. Thus in -the last analysis the soul of the organism resides in the chief of the -staff, and is manifested in the exercise of his peculiar faculties. It -therefore becomes necessary to investigate the nature and origin of the -qualities in virtue of which he is fitted for his post. - -The _Order of Teaching_ of the War Academy explains the method by -which, in an elementary stage, the intellectual faculties requisite for -command are developed and trained. The mental outfit of the ideal -general is there analyzed into its constituent parts, which are -classified according to their importance. The highest place is -assigned to military history as "the most effective means of teaching -war during peace."[1] Accordingly the study of military history, to -which so large a space is assigned in the course of the War Academy, is -pursued on a higher plane by the great general staff, which has a -special department for its cultivation. In this historical work, and -in the method on which it is conducted, lies the secret of Prussian -generalship. - -The leading ideas of the school must be sought in the writings of -Clausewitz,[2] the great exponent of the lessons learned in Prussia -from the wars against Napoleon. Clausewitz distinguishes the mere -narration of events, which gives at most the superficial relations of -cause and effect, from their critical examination. In the critical -method applied to military history he defines[3] three stages or -operations. There is first the historical process proper, which has -for its object the ascertainment of the facts so far as this is -possible with the existing materials. Upon the basis thus furnished -the military student will proceed to seek to understand the events in -their relations as cause and effect, and then when their real -historical connection[4] has thus been determined will undertake to -form a judgment as to the fitness of the means employed for the ends -which it was sought to attain. - -It is in this last process that the educational value of military -history is to be sought. The Prussian School aims not only at -developing the power of comprehension, but also at forming the -character.[5] Accordingly it requires that the student should not -merely make himself acquainted with the facts of a campaign, and with -the general bearings of theory upon its events. He is expected in -every case to form a definite conclusion as to what ought to have been -done. He must clearly make up his mind what course he would himself -have adopted in the circumstances which confronted the general whose -operations he is studying. - -The influence of the ideas of Clausewitz upon the historical studies of -the general staff is clearly marked. In 1862 was published "The -Italian Campaign of the year 1859, compiled by the Historical -Department of the General Staff of the Royal Prussian Army." It is an -open secret that this work was written by Moltke himself; and therefore -it is worth noting that the preface describes the object of the book -almost in the words of Clausewitz: "to ascertain as accurately as -possible the nature of the events in Northern Italy during those few -eventful weeks, to deduce them from their causes--in short, to exercise -that objective criticism without which the facts themselves do not -afford effective instruction for our own benefit." The history of the -Italian campaign is a model of this positive criticism. At, every -stage the writer places himself in turn in the position of the -commander of each side, and sketches clearly and concisely the measures -which at that moment would, in his opinion, have been the most -appropriate. This is undoubtedly the true method of teaching the -general's art, and the best exercise in peace that can be devised for -those who have acquired its mastery. - -In 1867 appeared "The Campaign of 1866 in Germany, compiled by the -Department for Military History of the Great General Staff." This work -is described in its preface as "drawn from the official reports of the -Prussian troops, and intended in the first instance for their use. The -description," the writer goes on to say, "is one-sided, because -hitherto our late antagonists have not made disclosures such as would -suffice to explain the motives of their action." A similar -qualification may be applied to the account of the Franco-German war -published by the great general staff. But both works supply, within -the limits laid down by their authors, precisely the kind of history -which is of the greatest value to the military student. The utmost -pains have been taken to secure a true statement of facts, and a clear -exposition of the guiding motives on the Prussian or German side. -Accordingly these works, and the account published more recently of the -campaign of 1864 in Denmark, form rich storehouses of material for that -"objective criticism" in the exercise of which lies the principal means -of maturing the military judgment. - -The great general staff began in 1883 to publish a series of historical -monographs, of which the object is, in the case of subjects chosen from -recent campaigns, "to throw light upon important questions relating to -the art of command, in particular the mode of employing, and the -performance possible to, the several arms; the service of security; -minor warfare; fortification; the composition and preservation of -armies." Those of the essays which take their subjects from earlier -campaigns are intended "to enrich our insight into the nature of war, -and to make possible a profounder and more correct judgment of events, -and of the persons concerned in them." - -The _Order of Teaching_ of the War Academy describes the purpose of all -these studies in military history. They are to lead to a knowledge of -"the unchanging conditions upon which good generalship depends, in -their connection with changing tactical forms." Before there can be -good practice there must be a true theory, and a true theory can be -acquired only from historical study pursued according to a sound -method. Moreover, the theory can never have an independent existence; -it must always derive its sustenance from fresh contact with the -historical reality of which it is the abstract. It is like the giant -Antasus, whose strength fails whenever he is lifted up from the touch -of his mother Earth. On the other hand, historical study which did not -yield a theory would be barren and useless. - -This connection between history and theory finds expression in the -tradition of the Prussian service. The general staff has been no less -active in the production of theoretical works than in that of -historical studies. But in the department of theory each work is -published on the responsibility of its author. There is no official -theory;[6] only the theories of individual officers. A short account -of the principal works which in this way emanated from the general -staff during the reign of King William I. will show that the accepted -body of military doctrine is almost entirely due to this one source. - -In 1865 appeared as a supplement to a military newspaper an anonymous -memorandum of eight pages, headed "Remarks on the Influence of the -Improved Firearms upon Battle." This short essay, of which the -authorship was afterwards acknowledged by Moltke, gave a searching -analysis, based upon exact historical data, of the modifications in the -handling of troops on the battlefield to be looked for from the -adoption of rifled cannon and breechloading rifles. The writer drew -with a master's hand in a few strokes the characteristics of the -physiology and psychology of the modern battlefield, as results of the -new arms. The rifled gun can change its target without changing its -position. Its long range and its accuracy, where the distance is known -and the target visible, must prevent the enemy from employing large -columns within a mile. The breech-loading rifle requires soldiers -carefully taught to shoot. But sharpshooting must be the exception. -Decisive results on a large scale must be sought by reserving the fire -for those short ranges at which errors in estimating the distance are -immaterial. A strict control of the fire by the officers must prevent -the waste of ammunition. The formation for firing will be the line two -deep; that for manoeuvring in the range of the enemy's rifled guns will -be a line of small columns, which can rapidly deploy, are easily -handled, and admit of the full use of the ground for protection and -concealment when in motion. The new firearms produce their full effect -only on open ground. Accordingly the defender will seek positions such -as are formed by a gentle slope of the ground offering a free and -extensive field of fire. The attacker will seek for his advance the -protection afforded by broken ground or by woods and villages. Though -in the abstract the new weapons are favourable to the defence, so that -a general on the defensive will try to force the enemy to attack him in -a good position, the breechloading rifle, if it can be brought within -effective range of the defender, will quickly bring about a decision. -The defenders will not be able to sustain the hail of bullets, and if -they attempt to charge with the bayonet will be effectually stopped by -the rapid fire of the needle-gun.[7] - -The views here expressed were put into practice, and proved to be -sound, on the battlefields of 1866. The battle of Nachod, in which the -Crown Prince's left column, emerging from the mountains, defeated the -Austrian corps which tried to prevent its debouching, illustrated the -leading ideas of Moltke's essay. The position was on the crest of a -long slope, up which the Austrians attacked. The Prussian troops were -handled in small columns, which deployed to resist by steady and rapid -fire at short ranges the advance of the Austrian masses. After the -war, a younger officer of the general staff, Major, afterwards -Lieutenant-General Kühne, published a critical history of these early -battles of the Crown Prince; and it is worth noting that he found the -chief cause of success on the actual battlefields to have lain in the -thoroughness with which the men had been taught to handle the -needle-gun, and in the judgment with which the officers applied the -small column for manoeuvre and the deployed formations for firing. At -Königgrätz itself was illustrated the view that the attack would find -its advantage in broken or covered ground, for the decisive blow was -prepared essentially by Fransecky's hard fighting in the wood of -Maslowed. - -After the war of 1870, the Prussian staff was for many years engaged -upon its history, which was not complete until 1881. During this -period the main business of military criticism was the sifting of that -war, with a view to the improvement of theory, in other words to the -better management of future wars. It has always been thought -remarkable that this criticism should have been undertaken by the -Germans themselves. The bulk of this work also was done by the general -staff, in the shape of unofficial publications by members of that body. -Between 1870 and 1875 appeared the studies of Verdy du Vernois in _The -Art of Command_, works which have exercised the profoundest influence -on the military literature of our time, and which recall the efforts of -Scharnhorst to teach, not a series of disconnected sciences, but a -doctrine of the conduct of war.[8] Verdy's studies were based on his -work in the historical department of the staff, where he was engaged on -the records of both the great campaigns. In 1882 appeared the essay on -_Strategy_ of Blume, who had prepared for it by a strategical history, -published in 1872, of the campaign of 1870 from the battle of Sedan -onwards. In 1883 was published the brilliant popular work of Von der -Goltz, _The Nation in Arms_, also the outcome of extensive historical -studies.[9] All these writers were members of the Prussian general -staff. - -The tactical discussions which immediately followed the war were -conducted in the main by writers whose experience had been gained, not -on the staff, but in the actual command of fighting units. -Boguslawski, Laymann, Tellenbach, and May had been company leaders on -the French or Bohemian battlefields. But even here the influence of -the staff was considerable. Bronsart von Schellendorf, who wrote the -reply to May's _Tactical Retrospect_, Von Scherff, whose essays on -formal tactics were very widely read at the time of their publication -(1873), and Meckel, whose treatise on tactics in 1881 condensed into a -systematic shape the substantial results of the ten years' controversy, -were all officers of the general staff. Thus it is hardly too much to -say that for more than twenty years the Prussian general staff has done -a great part of the military thinking of Europe. - -The school through which a Prussian officer must pass before he can -become a general has now been described, at least in its most striking -features. After five years' service as a lieutenant he has mastered -the elementary duties, and assimilated the spirit of his class, with -its ideals of work and intelligent but absolute obedience. In three -years at the War Academy he has learned the nature of war, and acquired -an insight into the conduct of the armies. At the same time he has -been taught to deal in a practical way with practical questions, never -allowing himself to shrink from the effort of forming a decision. He -has now arrived at full maturity in frame, intelligence, and character, -and spends the more active years of manhood in the higher studies of -the great general staff, the executive and practical activities of -command, and the comprehensive and instructive functions of the general -staff of the division or the army corps. During these years and in all -these varied occupations his energies are put forth to their full -extent, for advancement can only be secured by valuable work in each -successive sphere. By the time he attains to general rank he has -acquired a vast and varied experience; a practised eye, whose rapid and -penetrating glance on the march and in the field seems to the layman -almost miraculous; and a sureness and swiftness of judgment which -decides without fail in an instant nine-tenths of the questions which -arise in the exercise of command. - -It is not contended that the system here described is perfect. Every -system has its failures, and there is no possibility of entirely -excluding the influences of favour or prejudice. But it may be -asserted with confidence that the high average of practical ability -secured in the superior officers of the Prussian army is due in the -main to the practice of selection, the careful inspection by the -superiors, at every stage, and to the mature wisdom by which the higher -education of the general staff is directed. The intellectual -advancement of the officers of every army is confronted by a peculiar -difficulty. The foundations of all military institutions are authority -and obedience--principles which appear to be directly opposed to the -free movement of intelligence. Every army is constantly in danger of -decay from mental stagnation. Free criticism is liable to undermine -discipline, and the habit of unconditional obedience too often destroys -the independence of judgment without which moral and intellectual -progress is impossible. The Prussian general staff has escaped from -this dilemma by itself taking the lead in scientific progress, and -organizing itself, in regard to all that concerns the business of -national defence, as an institution for the advancement of learning. - - - -[1] Cf. Colonel Maurice in the _Encyclopedia Britannica_ article "War," -p. 345: "There does not exist, and never has existed ... an 'art of -war' which was something other than the methodic study of military -history." - -[2] It is interesting to note that Moltke was a pupil at the War -Academy from 1823 to 1826, while Clausewitz was its director. The -director, however, is not a teacher, and Clausewitz did not publish any -of his principal works during his lifetime, so that the evidence does -not prove a personal influence of Clausewitz upon Moltke. - -[3] See Vom Kriege, _Hinterlassenes Werk des Generals Carl von -Clausewitz_, Zweites Buch, Fünftes Capitel. - -[4] Clausewitz is fully aware of the difficulty with which this -critical study has to contend, that the real causes, the motives which -led to the adoption of a particular measure, are in many cases unknown. - -[5] It may be interesting to compare with what follows Foster's _Essay -on Decision of Character_, Letter VI., in which the value of a -"conclusive manner of thinking" is discussed. - -[6] The drill-books and regulations for field service embody an -official theory, and it is, of course, indispensable that they should. -But these books are not prepared under the responsibility of the -general staff. The usual practice is to appoint a committee composed -of a number of combatant officers of all ranks,--a general commanding -an army corps, commanders of divisions, brigades, regiments, and -battalions. They will, as a rule, have had the general staff training, -but it is as experienced commanders that their judgment is asked. They -prepare a draft code of regulations, which is first issued -experimentally, and only adopted after full criticism and revision. - -[7] The précis given in the text needs only the alteration of two words -to bring it perfectly up to date. For "a mile" substitute "two miles," -and for a "line two deep" substitute "line in single rank"="line of -skirmishers." For a recent and interesting but heterodox discussion of -tactical questions the reader may be referred to _Ein -Sommernachtstraum_ (_Midsummer Night's Dream_), which is by a -well-known officer, long a member of the general staff. - -[8] Verdy's practice is to use the history of a campaign real or -imaginary as a series of problems set to the student. This is called -in Germany "the applicatory method," and its introduction is ascribed -to General von Peucker, who was Director of Military Education in -Prussia from 1854 to 1872. - -[9] Von der Goltz's papers on Rossbach and Jena appeared in 1882. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF - -In the best work the man is more than the school. An ordinary man -gives out no more than has been put into him. All his performances can -be explained by his antecedents. But the best workers contribute from -themselves an element which no analysis can adequately explain. A -Newton or a Columbus, a Stanley or a Whitworth, has some unseen spring -of force and insight. - -A man of this stamp is required at the head of an army, and above all -at the head of the organization entrusted with the design of operations. - -The eve of a war is always accompanied by a great outburst of feeling, -which in ninety-nine men out of a hundred manifests itself as an -excitement, a disturbance, interfering with the action of the judgment -and distorting the view of persons and events. But this is the very -time when the weightiest decisions must be taken. The provisional plan -of concentration, the result of careful preparation in quieter times, -has to be reconsidered in relation to the circumstances of the moment, -and definitely settled and adopted. The judgment of the strategist -must therefore be perfectly clear, uninfluenced by the emotions which -he shares with the rest of his countrymen. - -When the concentration has been ordered, and while the armies are in -movement, come the first collisions, following one another in quick -succession. Every day brings its surprises, even to the best informed -and best prepared headquarters. The strategist's equilibrium must be -disturbed as little by unexpected events as by the throbs of national -emotion. He must prepare the way for a decisive battle. No one knows -better than he the terrible nature of the sacrifices which it will -involve, and the stakes which are risked upon its issue. The lives of -thousands will be lost; many thousands will be wounded; a mistake, -miscalculation, or mishap may lead to defeat, with far-reaching, -perhaps disastrous, consequences to his country. But under the weight -of this vast responsibility the strategist's judgment must work -smoothly and easily, like the compass in a storm, with no derangement -of its delicate equipoise. - -The man whose insight remains clear, whose judgment retains its even -balance, when the greater part of mankind are stunned with the awe of -great events, who remains true to himself while others are carried away -by what seems an irresistible current, is not cast in the common mould. -Ordinary men shrink into insignificance beside him. He is separated -from the average officer by a gulf which no system of training can -bridge. The inner calm which neither great occurrences, nor danger, -nor responsibility can disturb cannot be imparted, and no method can be -prescribed for its acquisition. - -The natural place for a leader of men is in the supreme command. Where -a general of this type is at the head of an army he will himself -superintend the work of strategical preparation such as is carried on -in the office of the great general staff at Berlin. His chief of the -staff will be a confidential assistant, whose main function will be to -lighten for him the burden of detail, and the two men will stand to one -another in the same relation as that which subsists between the general -commanding an army corps and the chief of the general staff of the -corps. - -In Prussia the king is the head of the army, and there are good reasons -why he should take the field in person--reasons which have not been -weakened by his becoming also German Emperor. A king who keeps in his -own hands the general direction of the Government cannot very well work -out for himself the problems involved in the strategical preparation of -a campaign. His chief of the staff becomes his strategical adviser, -alike during peace and war, and occupies a position of far greater -importance than the assistant to a professional commander-in-chief. -King William I., in the two great wars in which he took the field, -reposed entire confidence in his chosen chief of the staff; and to the -fine character which could do this without loss of dignity, as well as -to the genius of Moltke, must be attributed the success with which in -these wars the armies were directed. Moltke always attributed to the -king the responsibility for the strategical decisions, and that quite -correctly; but the king equally correctly regarded Moltke as their -source, and attributed the success of the army to Moltke's "conduct of -the operations."[1] The victories of Prussia in 1866, and of Germany -under Prussian guidance in 1870, were due to the perfect understanding -between the king and Moltke, a relation equally creditable to them -both. It must not be forgotten, moreover, that the king exercised the -supreme political as well as the supreme military authority, and that -in the political department, too, he had in Bismarck a trusted adviser, -the counterpart of Moltke. Thus was secured the harmony between the -political and the military direction which is essential to great -success in war. From the exceptional characters of the king, of -Bismarck, and of Moltke, and from the equally exceptional relation -between them, it would be rash to deduce a system, which in any case -could be applicable only to the case of a king wielding the entire -executive power. - -The relation between the Commander-in-Chief and his chief of the staff -must thus be regarded as a personal one, which will vary in its nature -according to the characters and gifts of the two men. If the commander -has in himself the necessary intellectual power, the chief of the staff -should be of subordinate mould; if the commander requires help in the -conception of the operations, his assistant must be able to supply the -initiative required. It is evident that the case in which the -subordinate is the source of inspiration implies on the part of the -commander a magnanimity far from common, and that, therefore, this -arrangement must be considered to be rather the exception than the rule. - -The element of permanent value in the Prussian system is the -classification of duties according to which it regulates the division -of labour. The whole authority of the Government is concentrated in -the person of the king who is the head of the army. The king does -nothing himself; every part of the work is done for him. The whole of -the business of the army is divided up into compartments, so as to -leave nothing over, and at the head of each compartment is an officer, -who within it exercises the king's authority. The king's supervision -does not appear to consist in his doing over again the work of these -officers. They submit to him any important new decisions which they -propose, for they are responsible to him. But in case the king is -unable to agree with the course proposed, there is reason to believe -that the officer who suggests it retires, his place being filled by a -successor who shares the king's view. In this way the authority of the -king is maintained without impairing the initiative of his chosen and -authorized assistants. - -The actual command of the troops is in the hands of the generals -commanding army corps and of the governors of fortresses; they account -directly to the king, and all their subordinates to or through them. -The general concerns of the army pass through one of three departments. -Personal matters, such as the appointment and promotion of officers, -retirements, rewards, and decorations go to the king's military -cabinet, which has its own chief. Administrative affairs, that is -questions of organization, equipment, armament, and fortification, -belong to the ministry of war. The third department, that of the -general staff, is principally occupied with the strategical and -tactical rather than with the administrative direction of the army. -These various departments communicate directly with one another, a -process which is facilitated by regulations leaving no doubt which of -them upon any given point has the power to decide. - -It thus appears that the institution of a general staff as one of the -organs of the management of an army is based upon a true analysis -applying equally to all civilized armies, and to all ordered warfare. - -Military success requires primarily the intelligent direction against -the enemy of the forces employed. The general staff originated as the -auxiliary instrument of this direction, and as such is found, at least -in a rudimentary form, in every army. In Prussia alone its full -importance was understood, and it received an organization peculiarly -suited to its purpose. The distinction was steadily kept in view -between the all-important conduct of the operations against an enemy -and the subordinate though necessary business of administration.[2] -Every function directly bearing upon the conception or design of the -action of the army or of its principal parts against the enemy was -assigned to the general staff, which thus became an enlargement of the -commander's mind, serving to facilitate his performance of his most -characteristic and most difficult duty. To the command thus -strengthened the army was rendered pliable partly by means of a -suitable subdivision into permanent autonomous bodies, and partly -through the organization of the administrative side by side with the -military services. - -The army corps--managing its own internal affairs--having its -adjutancy, its auditoriat, and its intendancy to supply its needs with -the assistance of and in connection with the ministry of war--is a body -easily amenable to the strategical direction proceeding from a general -centre. Thus the growth of the organ of strategical direction was -necessarily accompanied by a corresponding development of other -military institutions by which the perfect adaptability of the organism -to the directing agency was attained and preserved. - -The importance of the office of chief of the general staff of the army -led to its being filled by selection. The confidence reposed in a -chosen chief implied that he should be unhampered in the means of -fulfilling his duties. He was therefore entrusted with the selection, -and eventually with the training, of the officers for his own -department. - -The design of military operation involves the most complete knowledge -of the military sciences, and the most perfect mastery of the military -art. Accordingly the great general staff has become a school of -generalship, from which have emanated a series of masterpieces of -military history and historical criticism, while its individual members -have produced valuable works dealing with the various branches of the -theory of the art of war. - -The attachment of the War Academy to the general staff for which it is -the training school is the means of raising to the highest level the -standard of military education. - -The common devotion of the general staff in all its branches to that -portion of military activity which makes the most exacting demands upon -the intellectual faculties as well as upon the will, finds its -expression in the unity of the general staff through all the branches -of the army. A consequence of the selection by which the corps is -composed, and of the requirement of practical familiarity with the -duties of leadership and with the life and spirit of the troops, is the -constant passage of officers to and fro between regimental and general -staff service, and their alternate employment in the various branches -of the general staff itself. - -The general staff, in short, is the brain, and something more than the -brain, of the army. - -"Its chief and his 200 officers prepare beforehand for all probable -campaigns; they follow the progress of the armies of their neighbours -at the same time that they study the several theatres of war; they work -out together the methods of war; they familiarize themselves with the -machinery of the army, bringing their influence to bear upon all -questions of organization and training; they form an organism whose -arteries spread all through the army, gathering practical experience -and carrying wherever they go the same continuous stream of principles -and of doctrines."[3] - - - -[1] See the king's letters to Moltke of Oct. 28, 1870: "Ihrer ... -weisen Führung der Operationen," and of March 22, 1871: "Die -unübertreffliche Leitung der Kriegsoperationen." Moltke, _Gesammelte -Schriften_, i., 268, 9. - -[2] The function of the military administrator is to transform into -military force so much of the resources of the State as the Government -thinks proper. The process is continuous, and goes on during war as -well as during peace. In Prussia it is conducted by the ministry of -war, the channel or instrument by which the resources of the country -are rendered available for employment against the enemy. Cp. p. 61. - -[3] _Revue militaire de l'Étranger_, vol. xxxii. p. 261. - - - -THE END. - - - -Butler & Tanner, The Selwood Printing Works, Frome, and London. - - - - * * * * * - - - - -THE GREAT ALTERNATIVE: - -A PLEA FOR A NATIONAL POLICY. - -BY - -SPENSER WILKINSON. - -_Small Demy 8vo, 7s. 6d._ - -CONTENTS. - -INTRODUCTION:--I. NATIONAL PARALYSIS. II. THE REMEDY. - - I. THE EASTERN QUESTION. - II. THE UNION OF GERMANY. - III. THE PARTITION OF TURKEY AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. - IV. THE USE OF ARMIES. - V. THE SECRET OF THE SEA. - VI. EGYPT. - VII. A WARNING FROM GERMANY. - VIII. THE EXPANSION OF FRANCE. - IX. INDIA. - X. THE CHEAT ALTERNATIVE. - XI. THE REVIVAL OF DUTY. - - -SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO. - - - * * * * * - - -THE COMMAND OF THE SEA. - -BY SPENSER WILKINSON. - -_Second Edition. Crown 8vo, Coloured Wrapper, 1s._ - -CONTENTS. - - SEA POWER AND LAND POWER. - NATIONAL POLICY. - THE MEDITERRANEAN. - DEFENCE BY A NAVY. - THE SECRET OF SUCCESS. - READINESS IN THE RIGHT PLACE. - THE ACTUAL SITUATION. - A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL. - -"What is Unionism to an Empire shaken, or Home Rule to four -impoverished nations, or an eight hours' day to working classes thrown -out of employment, or Socialism to a people fighting for its life? ... -There are still some thousands of Englishmen to whom the security of -the Empire is dearer than the most highly advertised party nostrums." - - -A. CONSTABLE & CO., WESTMINSTER. - - - * * * * * - - -PUBLICATIONS OF THE - -MANCHESTER TACTICAL SOCIETY. - -TO BE OBTAINED FROM - -EDWARD STANFORD, 26 and 27, COCKSPUR STREET, LONDON, S.W.; AND - -J. E. CORNISH, 16, ST. ANN'S SQUARE, MANCHESTER. - - -THE ORDER OF FIELD SERVICE OF THE GERMAN ARMY. Authorized translation -by MAJOR J. M. GAWNE, and SPENSER WILKINSON, 1893. Price, 3s. 6d. - -APPENDIX TO THE ORDER OF FIELD SERVICE OF THE GERMAN ARMY. Translated -for the Intelligence Division, War Office, by SPENSER WILKINSON, 1895. -Price, 6d. - -SUGGESTIONS FOR A NEW FIELD EXERCISE FOR THE VOLUNTEER INFANTRY, By -SPENSER WILKINSON, Captain 20th L.R.V. Price, 6d. - -ENGLISH DRILL. An Historical Sketch, by J. L. ASPLAND, Lieut.-Colonel -20th L.R.V. Price, 6d. - -ESSAYS ON THE WAR GAME. By SPENSER WILKINSON, Captain 20th L.R.V. Out -of Print. - -EXERCISES IN STRATEGY AND TACTICS, Translated from the German by -SPENSER WILKINSON, Captain 20th L.R.V. Price, 2s. 6d. - -WAR GAME MAPS. By HENRY T. CROOK, C.E., Captain 1st Lancashire -Engineer Volunteers. Price, 6d. - -FIELD ARTILLERY FOR HOME SERVICE. By R. K. BIRLEY, Major and Hon. -Lieut. Colonel the Manchester Artillery. Price, 6d. - -THE CONDUCT OF INFANTRY FIRE ACCORDING TO THE FRENCH REGULATIONS of -1888. Translated, with an introduction, by A. P. LEDWARD, late Captain -20th L.R.V. Price, 6d. - -MAP MANOEUVRES: An Elementary Account of the War Game. By A. G. -HAYWOOD, Captain 6th V.B. Lancashire Division R.A. Price, 6d. - -EXERCISES IN STRATEGY AND TACTICS. Second Series. By H. VON GIZYCKI, -Col.-Commandant 18th Field Artillery Regiment. Translated from the -German by HENRY L. ROCCA, Lieut.-Col. Commandant and Hon. Colonel 5th -(Ardwick) Volunteer Battalion, the Manchester Regiment. Price, 1s. - -THE COMMAND OF ARTILLERY IN THE ARMY CORPS AND THE INFANTRY DIVISION. -By MAJOR-GENERAL HOFFBAUER. Translated from the German by SPENSER -WILKINSON. Price, 2s. 6d. - -A SYSTEM OF INSTRUCTION FOR SMALL PATROLS. Translated from the French -by J. FORMBY, Major 3rd Vol. Batt. The King's Liverpool Regiment. -Price, 6d. - - - * * * * * - - - IMPERIAL DEFENCE. - - The RIGHT HON. SIR CHARLES W. DILKE, BART., - - Author of "Greater Britain" and "Problems - of Greater Britain," - - AND - - SPENSER WILKINSON, Author of "Citizen - Soldiers" and "The Brain of an Army." - - _Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d._ - - - MACMILLAN & CO., LONDON. - - - - - - - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's The Brain of an Army, by Spenser Wilkinson - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BRAIN OF AN ARMY *** - -***** This file should be named 55022-8.txt or 55022-8.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/5/0/2/55022/ - -Produced by Al Haines -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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