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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..493108b --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #53346 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/53346) diff --git a/old/53346-0.txt b/old/53346-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 5f0b83c..0000000 --- a/old/53346-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,17525 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution -and Course of Nature, by Joseph Butler - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - -Title: The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature - To which are added two brief dissertations: I. On personal - identity. II. On the nature of virtue. - -Author: Joseph Butler - -Commentator: Howard Malcom - -Release Date: October 22, 2016 [EBook #53346] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION TO THE CONSTITUTION *** - - - - -Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -book was produced from scanned images of public domain -material from the Google Books project.) - - - - - - - - - - - THE - ANALOGY OF RELIGION, - TO THE - Constitution and Course of Nature. - - TO WHICH ARE ADDED - TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS: - I. ON PERSONAL IDENTITY.--II. ON THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. - - BY - JOSEPH BUTLER, D.C.L. - - Ejus [Analogiæ] hæc vis est, ut id quod dubium est ad - aliquid simile, de quo non quæritur referat ut incerta - certis probet.--QUINTIL. l. i. c. 6. - - WITH - AN INTRODUCTION, NOTES, CONSPECTUS, AND AMPLE INDEX, - BY - HOWARD MALCOM, D.D. - PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY, LEWISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA. - - SEVENTEENTH EDITION. - PHILADELPHIA: - J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO. - 1873. - - Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1857, by - J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO. - in the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the United - States in and for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. - - - - -CONTENTS. - - - PAGE - - EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION 5 - - ” PREFACE 19 - - ” CONSPECTUS 21 - - AUTHOR’S ADVERTISEMENT 66 - - ” INTRODUCTION 67 - - PART I. - - OF NATURAL RELIGION. - - CHAP. I.--A Future Life 77 - - CHAP. II.--The Government of God by Rewards and Punishments 95 - - CHAP. III.--The Moral Government of God 105 - - CHAP. IV.--Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties, and - Danger 128 - - CHAP. V.--Probation, as intended for Moral Discipline and - Improvement 136 - - CHAP. VI.--The Opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing - Practice 157 - - CHAP. VII.--The Government of God, considered as a Scheme or - Constitution, imperfectly comprehended 171 - - CONCLUSION 180 - - PART II. - - OF REVEALED RELIGION. - - CHAP. I.--The Importance of Christianity 186 - - CHAP. II.--The supposed Presumption against a Revelation, - considered as miraculous 202 - - CHAP. III.--Our Incapacity of judging, what were to be expected - in a Revelation; and the Credibility, from Analogy, - that it must contain things appearing liable to - Objections 209 - - CHAP. IV.--Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution, - imperfectly comprehended 223 - - CHAP. V.--The Particular System of Christianity; the - Appointment of a Mediator, and the Redemption of - the World by him 230 - - CHAP. VI.--Want of Universality in Revelation; and of the - supposed Deficiency in the Proof of it 247 - - CHAP. VII.--The Particular Evidence for Christianity 263 - - CHAP. VIII.--Objections against arguing from the Analogy of - Nature to Religion 296 - - CONCLUSION 306 - - DISSERTATIONS. - - DISSERTATION I.--Personal Identity 317 - - DISSERTATION II.--The Nature of Virtue 324 - - INDEX TO PART I 333 - - INDEX TO PART II 343 - - - - -Editor’s Introduction - - -JOSEPH BUTLER was born at Wantage, England, May 18th, 1692, the -youngest of eight children. The biographies of that day were few -and meagre; and in few cases is this so much to be regretted as in -Butler’s. It would have been both interesting and profitable to trace -the development and occupations of one of the mightiest of human minds. -But no cotemporary gathered up the incidents of his life, and now all -efforts to elicit them have been without success. - -His father was a prosperous dry-goods merchant, who, at the time of his -son’s birth, had retired from business with a competency, and resided -in a suburban mansion called “The Priory,” still in existence. - -Being a non-conformist, he educated Joseph at a “dissenting” academy -at Gloucester, under SAMUEL JONES, a gentleman of great ability, and -a skilful instructor, who raised up some of the greatest men of their -day.[1] - -It was while a member of this academy, and about the age of twenty-one, -that Butler disclosed to the world his wonderful power of abstract -reasoning, in his famous correspondence with Samuel Clarke, in relation -to that eminent author’s “_Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of -God_.” This correspondence is now generally inserted at the end of that -work. - -Mr. Butler having deliberately adopted Episcopal views, and resolved -to unite himself with the Established Church, his father, with -praiseworthy liberality, sent him to Oxford, where he entered Oriel -College, March, 1714. Of his college life there is no account; nor of -the time and place of his ordination. He removed to London in 1718, -on receiving the appointment of “Preacher at the Rolls.” His famous -Fifteen Sermons were preached in that chapel, and published before -resigning the place, with a dedication to Sir Joseph Jekyl, “as a -parting mark of gratitude for the favors received during his connection -with that learned society.” - -One of Butler’s warmest college friends was Edward Talbot second son -of a clergyman who afterwards became Bishop of Durham. This admirable -young man died of smallpox; in his last hours recommending Butler to -his father’s patronage; and scarcely had that gentleman attained the -see of Durham, before he gave Mr. B. the living of Haughton, from -whence he transferred him, in 1725, to the richer benefice of Stanhope. - -On receiving this honorable and lucrative appointment, he resigned -the Lectureship at the Rolls, and in the autumn of 1726 retired to -his beautiful residence at Stanhope. Here, without a family to occupy -his time, he devoted himself to his great work, the Analogy: using -horseback exercise, seeing little company, living abstemiously and -caring for his flock. - -Seven years thus rolled away; when to draw him from what seemed to his -friends too great retirement and application, Lord-Chancellor Talbot -made him his chaplain, and afterwards, in 1736, gave him a prebend’s -stall in Rochester. In 1736, Butler being now forty-four, Caroline, -consort of George II., appointed him “Clerk of the Closet,” an office -which merely required his attendance at the Queen’s apartments every -evening, from seven to nine. - -Being now in London, convenient to the press, and enjoying both leisure -and competency, he published his immortal ANALOGY--the cherished work -of his life. The Queen was delighted with the book, and made herself -master of its glorious array of reasoning. But she died the same year, -and he lost not only a patroness, but a friend. He returned to his -benefice at Stanhope, the income of which had been held during his -residence in London. - -On her death-bed, the Queen had urged her husband to promote her -honored chaplain to a bishopric; and next year, the see of Norwich -becoming vacant, the Bishop of Bristol was translated to it, and the -see of Bristol given to Butler. Bristol was the poorest bishopric -in England, its emoluments being but $2,000 per annum; less than -those of the rectorship of Stanhope. Butler distinctly disclosed his -disappointment in his letter to the minister Walpole, accepting the -position; and declared that he did not think it “very suitable to the -condition of his fortune, nor answerable to the recommendation with -which he was honored.” The king was not displeased at this candor, -and in 1740 improved his income by giving him, in addition to his -bishopric, the profitable and influential office of Dean of St. -Paul’s. Butler, who had retained the living of Stanhope along with -his bishopric, now resigned that rectorship. “The rich revenues,” says -Professor Fitzgerald, “of the Deanery of St. Paul, enabled him to -gratify his taste at Bristol.” He expended about $25,000 in improving -and beautifying the episcopal residence and gardens. He fostered useful -charities, and employed his wealth for others rather than for himself. - -In 1750, upon the death of Dr. Edward Chandler, Bishop of Durham, -Butler was promoted to that see, the most honorable and lucrative -in England. He had before been offered the Primacy, on the death of -Archbishop Potter, but declined it, with the remark that “it was too -late for him to try to support a falling church.” On assuming his -diocese at Durham, Butler delivered and published his famous Charge -to the Clergy, upon “The Use and Importance of External Religion.” -He was at once assailed vigorously, in pamphlets and papers, by -Archdeacon Blackburn, the Rev. T. Lindsay, and others, on the charge -of Popery; an imputation which is still sometimes cast upon him, and -which finds some slender support in his setting up a marble cross over -the communion-table at Bristol. That he never was a Papist, is now so -evident, that we can account for the imputation only by the strong -jealousy of the Romish Church then prevalent. - -Butler now became still more munificent. His private charities were -exceedingly generous, and his public ones seemed sometimes to border on -extravagance. He gave $2,000 a year to the county hospital, and often -gave away thousands of dollars at a time. But though quite lavish in -buildings and ornaments, as well as in benevolence, he was remarkably -frugal in his personal expenses. It is said of him, by Rev. John -Newton, that on one occasion, when a distinguished visitor dined with -him by appointment, the provision consisted of a single joint of meat, -and a pudding. The bishop remarked to his guest on that occasion, that -he “had long been disgusted with the fashionable expense of time and -money in entertainments, and was determined that it should receive no -countenance from his example.” - -Of his amusements we know little except that he took much horseback -exercise, and often employed his secretary, Mr. Emms, to play for him -on the organ. - -Butler held the see of Durham less than two years. Symptoms of general -physical decay betrayed themselves about the time of his promotion, and -in spite of all that skill and affection could prompt, he sunk to rest -June 16th, 1752, aged sixty. He was never married. - -A considerable number of his sermons and charges have been printed, -but are too philosophical to be generally read. His great work is the -Analogy, published in 1736, and from that day read and admired by every -highly-cultivated mind. He was induced to write by a state of things -very remarkable in the history of religion. Debauchery and infidelity -were almost universal, not in any one class of society but in all. -England had reached the culminating point of irreligion, and the firm -re-establishment of Episcopacy had as yet done nothing to mend the -nation’s morals. Piety was deemed a mark of ignorance and vulgarity, -and multitudes of those who professed it were persecuted to dungeons -and death. - -Infidel writers, warmed into life by court corruption, became more -numerous and audacious than ever before. Their methods of attacking -Christianity were various; but the most successful then, as always, was -to impugn certain doctrines and declarations of the Sacred Scriptures, -as irrational, and hence reject the whole. They generally admitted the -Being and perfection of God, and extolled the sufficiency of natural -religion; but denied any revelation, or any necessity for one. The -verdict of the world was that the Bible is not authentic, that man is -not accountable, nor even probably immortal, that God neither rewards -nor punishes, and that present indulgence, as far as our nature admits, -is both wise and safe. - -Bishop Downam,[2] one of the most learned of the clergy, in the early -part of the seventeenth century writes thus: “In these times, if a -man do but labor to keep a good conscience, though he meddle not with -matters of state, if he make conscience of swearing, sanctify the -Sabbath, frequent sermons, or abstain from the common corruptions of -the times, he shall straightway be condemned for a puritan, and be less -favored than either a carnal gospeller, or a close Papist.” - -It was considered settled, especially in polite circles, that -Christianity, after so long a prevalence, had been found out to be an -imposture. The clergy, as a body, did nothing to dispel this moral -gloom, but rather increased it by their violent and scandalous conduct. -In the sad language of Bishop Warburton, “Religion had lost its hold on -the minds of the people.” He adds with great point, “Though a _rule of -right_ may direct the philosopher to a principle of action; and the -_point of honor_ may keep up the thing called manners, among gentlemen: -yet nothing but _religion_ can ever fix a sober standard of behavior -among the common people.” Even the universities were on the side of -irreligion; for professorships, as well as pulpits, were given to men, -not for positive worth and fitness, but for possessing qualities then -most in vogue with those who held the appointing power. Such were the -trying times which had driven our pilgrim fathers to seek a home amid -the wilds of an unexplored continent, and to face the dangers of sea -and savage. - -It must ever be regarded as among the highest instances of God’s -bringing good out of evil, that this outrageous rampancy of infidelity -brought out a host of champions for the truth of His word; who boldly -met the odium of discipleship, and waged battle in such style that the -Deistical controversy was settled forever. Never was a dispute more -determined on both sides, and never was victory more complete. Literary -infidelity not only recoiled, but was routed; and can never again -prevail. Henceforth, no _scholar_ will ever treat the evidences of -Christianity as a subject of ridicule or contempt. - -When we contrast the stupendous learning, and powerful logic, of the -Christian writers of that century, with the superficial and almost -contemptible productions of the writers against whom they contended, we -are tempted to wonder why such power should be requisite to overthrow -such weakness. But we must remember, that frail logic and shallow -considerations, will persuade men to indulge their vices; while -the soundest reasonings and the most impressive inducements, with -difficulty lead them to self-restraint and true holiness. - -The infidel writers of that day have sunk into such oblivion that -their works are now seldom found but in great libraries; and even -well-educated persons scarcely know more of them than their names. Yet -so perfectly did their principles accord with the temper of the times -and the universal depravity of the carnal heart, that they enjoyed the -highest popularity with all classes. Forever honored be the names of -that noble band, who, in face of such odds, established the authority -of the Bible, and left the advocates of atheism and immorality without -a lurking-place.[3] In this noble cohort Butler stands conspicuous: -and to him, I think, more than to all the others, is to be attributed -the sudden and total overthrow of infidelity, when it was in its glory. - -As a metaphysician, few have equalled him. What he added to the -science, has ever since remained a part of it, which can be said -of scarcely another. He advanced more that was new, fortified old -positions more ably, and applied speculation to religion more usefully -than any before him. Our language furnishes no profounder thinking. -Merely to understand him is an honorable distinction, and requires no -small previous training of the power of attention. As a polemic, he is -keen, sagacious, candid, patient, persevering, calm, inventive, and -profound: every page indicates that repose of mind, which belongs only -to true greatness, combined with a full knowledge of the subject. So -far as I am able to judge, he never presses a consideration beyond its -just limits, and seldom introduces an illustration which has not the -force of an argument. Fallacies he seems to abolish at a touch. - -The Analogy employed much of his life. It was begun in his twentieth -year, but was not published till he was forty-five. Such a mode of -writing never makes large books, for the matter, constantly revised, -becomes constantly condensed. The Analogy is so condensed, as that to -make a satisfactory synopsis is scarcely practicable. Hence, though my -Conspectus and notes have aided my pupils to understand and remember -the argument, they do not in any measure obviate the necessity of -studying the book itself. If they do not increase the number of those -who shall studiously peruse the book itself, my aim and expectations -will be disappointed. - -To this work no reply has ever been attempted! Extensive as is its -diffusion, and great as is its acknowledged influence, infidelity -has had the highest inducements to attempt to set it aside. Written -for a present purpose, and most signally accomplishing it, it is yet -so written as to endure, in full value, through all coming time. -It is undoubtedly “the most original and the most profound work -extant, in any language, on the philosophy of religion,”[4] “the most -argumentative and philosophical defence of Christianity ever submitted -to the world.”[5] - -Writers in defence of Christianity had, before Butler, amply discussed -the several departments of evidences; but still there remained -objections. The structure of the globe, the course of nature, the -organization of animals, &c. were affirmed to contradict revelation. -Its doctrines and duties, moreover, were pronounced inconsistent -with sound reason. Butler repeats none of the old arguments, but -confines himself to the showing that the declarations of revelation -are in perfect harmony with facts seen daily in the world, and which -all admit. That the world might not have been ordered and governed -otherwise, he does not choose to dispute. Taking things as they are, -and closely studying the connection between one thing and another, -we ought to inquire what course of action on our part, will conform -to the needs of such a nature and such circumstances. Our bodies are -constructed of parts, all adapted to each other, and also to one -general end. So too, our souls. And the two together have relations -and adaptations, which may, to some extent at least, indicate what is -designed to be the _general_ end of our existence. If Christianity -befits these several parts of our mixed nature and their obvious uses, -then there is nothing incongruous between the two; and no objections -against Christianity can be drawn from the course of nature. On the -contrary, all seems to be governed as the gospel declares it is, and -shows that the Author of man and the Author of the Bible is the same. -This is still more impressive when we consider that we have a _moral -faculty_; for it is the very object and business of this faculty to -deal with right and wrong, good and evil; the facts and magnitudes of -which are obvious in the course of nature. If Christianity does, in an -especial manner, _befit_ this faculty, if it is adapted to promote our -general rectitude and happiness, and if it contains no principle which -is not discernible in the government of the visible world, then there -is no discrepancy between Christianity and Providence. - -This is Butler’s position. He confines himself to proving such -an analogy between revelation and the daily course of things, as -that nothing known in the universe can be offered in disproof of -Christianity. The mode of warfare was new. Without professing to prove -Christianity to be true, he demonstrates that it cannot be proved to be -false; and that if it be even probable, the rejection of it is a gross -folly and a tremendous hazard. Every objection against it he proves to -be equally forcible against facts which constantly occur, and which all -admit, though none profess to understand. Thus leaving the ramparts of -the church to be guarded by the mighty men who had valiantly maintained -its defence, he quietly walked out into the camp of the enemy, and -spiked every gun! - -It has been said that the whole argument of the “Analogy” seems to be -built on Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24: “All things are double, one against -the other, and God hath made nothing imperfect.” If it be so, it -involves no disparagement to have received thus the seminal idea of -this immortal work. Who else has so gloriously discerned and expanded -the profound philosophy of the son of Sirac? Others have uttered -sentiments which seem to involve the whole exposition of Butler. Origen -affirms that “he who believes the Scripture to have proceeded from Him -who is the Author of nature, may well expect to find the same sort of -difficulties in it, as are found in nature.” Shall we assign to Origen -the whole credit of the “Analogy”? As well might we bestow all our -admiration for the delightful papers of Addison, in the Spectator, to -the classical authors from whom he selected appropriate mottoes! By -such a rule, the entire merit of this most Christian work of Butler -should be attributed to the pagan Quintilian, from whom he derives the -motto which so appropriately graces his title-page. - -A rapid sketch of the outline of the argument will aid the student -at his outset. He begins by taking for granted the existence of an -intelligent Author and Governor of the universe. Then, from the -conditions and changes observed in the visible world, he argues the -folly of objecting to revelation on account of doctrines which do but -declare the same general laws and the same principles of government. -That there is this harmony, he proves; and hence the probability that -the same sort of government will prevail hereafter, which prevails now. -He demonstrates that man is under exactly such a probation in this -world, and as to this world, as revelation affirms him to be under, -as to the next; and that embarrassments produced by the doctrine of -necessity, involve nature no less than religion. He then evinces the -need that man should be placed in a state of training and trial, if he -is ever to be qualified for better conditions; and that this world, -as now governed, is exactly adapted to give that training, and to -produce such a character as will insure happiness under any possible -contingencies. This is the argument of Part I. - -Proceeding to examine Christianity, he discusses its importance, its -proofs, the unavoidableness of its containing strange things, the -absurdity of expecting fully to comprehend its statements, and the -abundance of its evidence for candid minds, though they are not, and -ought not to be, irresistible. He answers not only the objections to -Christianity, but the objections against its proofs; which he shows -are very different things. Though he keeps rigidly to the refutation -of objections, and nowhere meddles with the direct evidence of -Christianity, yet, by removing every objection, he does in fact confirm -its claims. This clearing away of objections, _after_ the usual proofs -are presented, crowns and completes the evidence. Thus the ultimate -result of a study of his book is not only negative but positive; and -such has been its effect on every candid and competent student. - -We should remember that we have no right to require the removal of -objections, and that therefore the whole of Butler’s work is in fact -supererogatory; a concession and kindness to such as have doubts, -either honest or captious. Our only rightful demand of Christianity is -for _credentials_. It presents these in its nature, its miracles, its -prophecies, its propagation, its influence, and its success. If these -are competent, we should bow to its teachings. To suppose that we are -capable of judging of the _propriety_ of all God’s law, or even to -understand his reasons for it, if they were disclosed, is absurd. - -It is true we naturally presume that a revelation in words, and a -revelation by natural objects and the visible order of things, would -coincide; but to find out the fact or the extent of such coincidence, -is not our first business. We are to weigh the _testimony_ in favor of -religion, embrace it, if sufficient, and attribute the obscurity of any -part, to our present want of capacity. The solution of difficulties -serves to _confirm_ our faith in Christianity, but has no place in our -_ground of reception_: and we have no right to wait for such solution, -however painful and embarrassing may be the difficulties. - -Another, and perhaps even more important, use of the “Analogy,” is to -dissipate the prejudices and objections to Christianity which prevent -a candid study of its evidences. These prepossess and poison the mind, -and obstruct or abate the force of the best arguments. Few, if any, -after a careful examination of the positive evidences of Christianity, -conclude them to be inadequate. But many are they, who having heard -objections which their scanty learning does not enable them to answer, -and their no less scanty interest in the subject does not induce them -to examine, or which their inclinations lead them to cherish, cast -it all aside. In this way they relieve themselves from the labor of -investigation, as well as their compunctions of conscience; while they -indulge both their love of sin and pride of singularity. - -An instance of the use of this book to such a mind, we have in the -case of Chalmers. He had read, when a young man, several infidel -productions. Their semblance of logic and learning, and supercilious -confidence of style, disposed him to regard all religion as mere -superstition. His mind was poisoned. Accustomed as he had been to -the positive and precise reasonings of mathematics, he could not -find similar proofs for Christianity. But he was induced, by some -friends, to study Butler’s Analogy. This, as he expresses it, took -Christianity “out of the class of unlikelihoods.” It brought him to -the investigation, as if the evidence was neither plus nor minus. He -examined the evidences as he would have done a declaration that Cicero -weighed just one hundred and fifty pounds; open to the smallest proof -or presumption on the positive side of the question. Delivered from -prejudice, not only against Christianity but against its proofs, he -soon saw the madness of deism, and immovably accepted the word of God, -though he did not, at that time, feel its transforming power on his own -heart. Long afterwards he writes, “I cannot render sufficient homage to -the argument, which first, addressing itself to the _subject-matter_ of -Christianity, relieves it of all disproof, and pronounces it worthy of -a trial; and then, addressing itself to the evidence of Christianity, -relieves it of all objections, and makes good, to that evidence, all -the entireness and efficiency which natively belong to it.” Years -afterwards he said, “Butler made me a Christian.” That it did far more -for him than to effect his change of sentiment, that it continued to -be a light in his firmament, is touchingly told in the Preface of his -Bridgewater Treatise, where he says, “I have derived greater aid from -the views and reasonings of Butler, than I have been able to find, -besides, in the whole range of our extant authorship.” - -To the sincere believer in the word of God the study of Butler is of -great use. Doubts are among Satan’s tried weapons, and often haunt -the holiest, especially if of a contemplative turn. They see goodness -oppressed, and vice rampant; the world ruled by wicked men, and -truth making its way with difficulty. Their hearts are traitorous, -their surroundings full of temptation, and the direct evidence of -Christianity they may never have studied. To such the analogical -argument comes with full power, meets a candid examination, and -prevails. - -To no Christian is this book so useful as the minister. He is -constantly confronted by the difficulties which Butler so triumphantly -handles. Here he is furnished, not only with a shield to protect his -own mind from subtle darts, but a sword to demolish the cavil, and -defend the system of which he is a public teacher. - -To _all_ persons this book is of great value. We arrive at certainty -in but few of our decisions, and are often obliged, even in matters of -great moment, to act on probability. Thus we employ precautions when -an evil is not certain to occur. If the evil would be very serious, -we adopt the precaution, when there is but little probability, or -perhaps a bare possibility, of its occurrence. Now, Butler has shown -that if the proofs of revelation were weak, nay, if it had absolutely -no proof, nay further, if on fair examination there appeared not even -a probability of its truth, still there would remain a _possibility_, -and this alone, considering the tremendous issues at stake, should make -every man a Christian. This argument cannot be applied to Mahometanism -or any other religion, because against those much may be advanced as -_disproof_. Our author, having shown the utter absence of disproof, -shuts us up to the reception of Christianity, were its truth barely -possible. - -There have not been wanting persons to disparage the “Analogy,” because -it affords, as they say, no _direct_ proof of revelation. As well might -we demand a discussion of chemistry in a work on astronomy. Scores of -writers _prove_ Christianity, and here we have one to relieve us from -the difficulties which beset it, and objections which still remain. -There is an aspect in which the Analogy may be said to contribute -the best of proof. What can go further towards establishing a point, -than to demonstrate that there is no proof of the contrary? What can -show the fallacy of a set of objections, more than to prove that -they might be urged with no less force against the obvious course of -nature? This use of analogy is conformable to the severest logic, and -though offering no pretence of positive argument, goes far towards -establishing full conviction. “The probabilities,” says STEWART, -“resulting from a concurrence of different analogies, may rise so high -as to produce an effect on the belief scarcely distinguishable from -moral certainty.” - -When it is considered that Butler’s argument is wholly in addition -to the cumulative mass of direct and almost irresistible evidence, -and removes even the objections which attend the subject, we see the -rejection of Christianity to be inexpressibly rash and absurd. We see -the skeptic condemned at his own bar, for acting in the most momentous -of all possible concerns, in a manner the very opposite of that which -he calls sensible and prudent in his ordinary affairs. The “Analogy” -establishes, beyond cavil, strong _presumptions_ that Christianity is -true, aside from all inspection of its proofs. The man, therefore, who -really understands this book, and refuses to be a Christian, is led by -his lusts and not his reason. - -Some admirers of this book have lamented as a defect, its want of -evangelical tincture, and its exclusive reference to natural things. To -me, this is a prime recommendation. Were it otherwise, the reasoning -would be in a circle. The very structure of the argument demands that -it should avoid quotations from the Bible. - -It must be admitted, however, that some expressions, taken just as they -stand, without qualification by the current of the argument, tend to -lead astray. For instance, “There is nothing in the human mind contrary -to virtue.” “Men’s happiness and virtue are left to themselves.” -“Religion requires nothing which we are not well able to perform.” “Our -repentance is accepted, to eternal life.” “Our relations to God are -made known by reason.” Such expressions are not to be taken alone, but -as explained by the general drift of sentiment and doctrine. No one can -be familiar with his works, without finding the fullest evidence that -Christianity was to Butler infinitely more than a creed or a ritual. -Nor should we forget that such expressions are not to be interpreted by -the tenor of the “Analogy” only, but by that of his whole ‘Works.’ - -Even if it be judged that he everywhere fails to express himself in -such phrase as we usually call evangelical, it should be remembered -that he was a Church-of-England man, at a time when there was a -powerful reaction against the evangelism of the Puritans, and when a -real lack of emotional piety was general in his church. - -That he did not enjoy in his last illness, which extended over a long -period, that sustaining sense of the love of Christ which hearty -Christians generally feel, is certain. A friend, trying to relieve -his depression, reminded him of his excellent life, and especially -his wide liberalities. He immediately replied, “l am but a steward! -All is His, intrusted to me, to promote his glory and the good of -mankind; how can I know that I have not abused the trust? I reflect on -all these things, and they fill my soul with terror by the feeling of -responsibility they awaken.” - -On another occasion, his chaplain sought to soothe his troubled spirit -by referring to the extensive influence of his _Analogy_ in reclaiming -skeptics. His reply was, “I _began_ the Analogy with a view to the -glory of God; but as I proceeded, visions of the fame it might bring -me mingled themselves with my motives, and all was polluted and made -sinful! The book may be a blessing to others, but it weighs like lead -on my soul.” “Admit all this,” tenderly replied the chaplain; “yet has -not Jesus said, ‘Whosoever cometh unto me shall in no wise be cast -out’?” Instantly the Bishop raised himself in the bed, exclaiming, -“How wonderful that the force of this passage never struck me before! -‘Whosoever,’--_all_, ALL! ‘In no wise,’--no amount of sin can prevent -acceptance! Christ’s righteousness will hide the iniquities of _all_ -who accept his offer of mercy!” - -From that time, for weeks, Butler spoke to all who approached him, of -a _full_ and _free_ salvation. He died triumphantly repeating this -passage. - -If all that is said of the lack of evangelical sentiment in Butler or -his book be conceded, it certainly cannot impair either the value of -the analogical argument, or the force of our author’s use of it. - -Various circumstances conspire to make the study of “The Analogy” -difficult. The nature of the reasoning--the conciseness, and often -obscurity of the style--the dislocation of parts by frequent -digressions--the arrest of a close course of reasoning to answer -objections--and the abstruseness of the subject itself--combine to -make the full comprehension of its import difficult. Mackintosh says, -“No thinker so great, was ever so bad a writer.” But this, like some -other objections of Sir James, is stated too strongly. The language is -good, sinewy Saxon, and will endure when much that is now called fine -writing, will seem grotesque. Still it is possible to write philosophy -in better phrase, as has been shown by at least two great men, Berkeley -and Stewart. Had Butler but possessed the glowing style of Berkeley, -or the smooth, graceful, and transparent diction of Dugald Stewart, -his work, instead of serving only for close thinkers, or a college -text-book, would have been read by all classes, and banished that -vulgar infidelity which flippant writers still disseminate. That it is -thus restricted in its influence is a misfortune to the world. But he -wrote for a class, and did his work completely. Literary infidelity was -conquered. Vulgar, ignorant, licentious infidelity, will always exist, -and is even now deplorably prevalent. Both Europe and America contain -conceited and malignant ignoramuses, who by their sneers, their cavils, -and their audacity, make havoc of souls. Of these, Tom Paine is a type, -whose book, the contempt of cultivated minds, continues to be sold and -read. For this class of persons, “Baxter’s Call,” or “Alleine’s Alarm,” -are far more suitable than treatises on the evidences of Christianity, -or even Butler’s Analogy. - - - - -Editor’s Preface. - - -The text is the result of a careful collation of the various principal -editions. Occasionally solecisms are corrected, and a word transposed -or put in italics, when a sentence could thus be made perspicuous. The -author had a fashion of beginning a large proportion of his sentences -with “and,” “but,” “now,” “indeed,” “however,” &c., which often served -to perplex, and in such cases they have been omitted. Long paragraphs, -comprehending different topics, have been so divided as to correspond -with the true analysis; which will greatly assist the student in -detecting the successive stages of the argument. Special pains has been -taken to correct and improve the punctuation. Hundreds of sentences -have thus been rendered more perspicuous, and many which were obscure, -have been made lucid. In no respect was Butler’s style, as printed, so -defective. - -The Conspectus is made much ampler than any other, for this reason: -that students are apt to content themselves with such help instead of -mastering the full discussion by the author. In the present case they -cannot so do, for such is the fulness of the Conspectus, that if they -master this, they have mastered the subject itself in full. - -Notes by the present editor are distinguished from those of the author -by being enclosed in brackets. They are designed to open out further -views, to elucidate the text, to facilitate extended researches, and to -suggest topics for conversation in the class-room. - -The Index has cost far more labor than would be supposed, and may not -be of much benefit to the undergraduate. Its advantages will not be -small to him in after life when he desires to recur to particular -topics. The general scholar will find it enables him to make use of the -book for occasional reference. Without it the work is not complete for -the class-room, still less for the library. - -That students of the Analogy need help, is confessed; and all attempts -to furnish it have been kindly received. As is remarked by Bishop -Wilson, “His argument, clear and convincing as it is to a prepared -mind, is not obvious to the young reader, whose experience of life -being small, and his habits of reflection feeble, has not the furniture -necessary for comprehending, at first, the thoughts and conclusions of -such a mind. The style is too close, too negligent, too obscure, to be -suitable for the young.” - -If it be asked why, with several existing helps to the study of the -Analogy, I offer another, I frankly reply, because I have found none of -them satisfactory, either to the public or to myself. - - * * * * * - -Some teachers prefer their text-books to be accompanied by a set of -questions. Such will find in this edition all they desire. They have -only to enunciate each sentence of the Conspectus in the interrogative -form, and they will have every possible question prepared to their -hand. - - - - -Conspectus of the Author’s Introduction. - - -I. _What is probable evidence?_ - - =1.= It differs from demonstration in that it admits of degrees; of - _all_ degrees. - - 1.) One probability does not beget assurance. - - 2.) But the slightest presumption makes a probability. - - 3.) The repetition of it may make certainty. - - =2.= What constitutes probability is _likeness_; in regard to the - event itself, or its kind of evidences, or its circumstances. - - 1.) This daily affords presumptions, evidence, or conviction: - according as it is occasional, common, or constant. - - 2.) Measures our hopes and fears. - - 3.) Regulates our expectations as to men’s conduct. - - 4.) Enables us to judge of character from conduct. - - =3.= It is an imperfect mode of judging, and adapted to beings of - limited capacities. - - =4.= Where better evidence cannot be had, it constitutes moral - obligation, even though great doubts remain. - - 1.) We are as much bound to do what, on the whole, _appears_ to - be best, as if we _knew_ it to be so. - - 2.) In questions of great moment, it is reasonable to act when - the favorable chances are no greater than the unfavorable. - - 3.) There are numberless cases in which a man would be thought - distracted if he did not act, and that earnestly, where the - chances of success were _greatly against_ him. - - -II. _The use and application of probabilities_. - -Shall not go further into the _nature_ of probable evidence, nor -inquire _why_ likeness begets presumption and conviction; nor how far -analogical reasoning can be reduced to a _system_; but shall only show -how just and conclusive this mode of reasoning is. - - =1.= In determining our judgments and practice. - - 1.) There may be cases in which its value is doubtful. - - 2.) There may be seeming analogies, which are not really such. - - 3.) But as a mode of argument, it is perfectly just and - conclusive. - - =2.= In noting correspondencies between the different parts of God’s - government. - - 1.) We may expect to find the same sort of difficulties in the - Bible, as we do in Nature. - - 2.) To deny the Bible to be of God, because of these - difficulties, requires us to deny that the world was made by - him. - - 3.) If there be a likeness between revelation and the system of - nature, it affords a presumption that both have the same author. - - 4.) To reason on the construction and government of the world, - without settling foundation-principles, is mere hypothesis. - - 5.) To apply principles which are certain, to cases which are - not applicable, is no better. - - 6.) But to join abstract reasonings to the observation of - facts, and argue, from known present things, to what is likely - or credible, must be right. - - 7.) We cannot avoid acting thus, if we act at all. - - =3.= In its application to religion, revealed, as well as natural. - This is the use which will be made of analogy in the following - work. In so using it, - - 1.) It will be taken for proved that there is an intelligent - Creator and Ruler. - - --There are no presumptions _against_ this, prior to proof. - - --There are proofs:--from analogy, reason, tradition, &c. - - --The fact is not denied by the generality of skeptics. - - 2.) No regard will be paid to those who idly speculate as to how - the world _might_ have been made and governed. - - --Such prating would amount to this: - - · All creatures should have been made at first as happy as - they could be. - - · Nothing of hazard should be put upon them. - - · Should have been _secured_ in their happiness. - - · All punishments avoided. - - --It is a sufficient reply to such talk that mankind have not - faculties for such speculations. - - 3.) We are, to some extent, judges as to _ends_; and may - conclude that Nature and Providence are designed to produce - virtue and happiness; but of the _means_ of producing these in - the highest degree, we are not competent judges. - - --We know not the extent of the universe; - - --Nor even how one person can best be brought to perfection. - - --We are not often competent to judge of the conduct of each - other. - - --As to God, we may presume that order will prevail in his - universe; but are no judges of his modes for accomplishing - this end. - - 4.) Instead of vainly, and perhaps sinfully, imagining schemes - for God’s conduct, we must _study what is_. - - --Discovering general laws. - - --Comparing the known course of things with what revelation - teaches us to expect. - - -III. _The force of this use of Analogy._ - - =1.= Sometimes is practically equivalent to proof. - - =2.= Confirms what is otherwise proved. - - =3.= Shows that the system of revelation is no more open to - ridicule, than the system of nature. - - =4.= Answers almost all objections against religion. - - =5.= To a great extent answers objections against the _proofs_ of - religion. - - -IV. _General scope of the book._ - - =1.= The divine government is considered, as containing in it, - - Chap. 1. Man’s future existence. - - ” 2. In a state of reward or punishment. - - ” 3. This according to our behavior. - - ” 4. Our present life probationary. - - ” 5. And also disciplinary. - - ” 6. Notwithstanding the doctrine of necessity. - - ” 7. Or any apparent want of wisdom or goodness. - - =2.= Revealed religion is considered, - - Chap. 1. As important. - - ” 2. As proved by miracles. - - ” 3. As containing strange things. - - ” 4. As a scheme imperfectly comprehended. - - ” 5. As carried on by a mediator. - - ” 6. As having such an amount of evidence as God saw fit to give. - - ” 7. As having sufficient and full evidence. - - -Conspectus of the Analogy. - - -PART I. - - -CHAPTER I. - -A FUTURE LIFE. - -Will not discuss the subject of identity; but will consider what -analogy suggests from changes which do not destroy; and thus see -whether it is not _probable_ that we shall live hereafter. - - -I. _The probabilities that we shall survive death._ - - =1.= It is a law of nature that creatures should exist in different - stages, and in various degrees of perfection. - - --Worms turn into flies. - - --Eggs are hatched into birds. - - --Our own present state is as different from our state in the - womb, as two states of the same being can be. - - --That we shall hereafter exist in a state as different from - the present as the present is from our state in the womb, is - according to analogy. - - =2.= We now have capacities for happiness, action, misery, &c., and - there is always a probability that things will continue as they - are, except when experience gives us reason to think they will be - altered. This is a general law; and is our _only_ natural reason - for expecting the continuance of any thing. - - =3.= There is no reason to apprehend that death will destroy us. - If there was, it would arise from the nature of death; or from the - analogy of nature. - - 1.) Not from the nature of death. - - --We know not what death is. - - --But only _some_ of its _effects_. - - --These effects do not imply the destruction of the living - agent. - - --We know little of what the _exercise_ of our powers depends - upon; and nothing of what _the powers_ themselves depend on. - - --We may be unable to _exercise_ our powers, and yet not lose - them--_e.g._ sleep, swoon. - - 2.) Not from analogy. - - --Reason shows no connection between death and our - destruction. - - --We have no faculties by which to trace any being beyond it. - - --The possession of living powers, up to the very moment - when our faculties cease to be able to trace them, is a - probability of their continuing. - - --We have already survived wonderful changes. - - --To live after death is analogous to the course of nature. - - -II. _Presumptions against a future life._ - - =1.= That death _destroys_ us. - - _Ans._ 1. This is an assumption that we are compound and - material beings, and hence discerptible; which is not true. - - 1.) Consciousness is a single, indivisible power, and of - course the subject of it must be. - - 2.) The material body is not ourself. - - 3.) We can easily conceive of our having more limbs, or of - a different kind, or of having more or fewer senses, or of - having no bodies at all, or of hereafter animating these same - bodies, remodelled. - - 4.) The dissolution of a succession of new and strange - bodies, would have no tendency to destroy _us_. - - _Ans._ 2. Though the absolute simplicity of the living being - cannot be proved by _experiment_, yet facts lead us so to - conclude. We lose limbs, &c. Our bodies were once _very_ small, - but we might, then, have lost part of them. There is a constant - destruction and renewal going on. - - 1.) Thus we see that no certain _bulk_ is necessary to our - existence, and unless it were proved that there is, and that - it is larger than an indissoluble atom, there is no reason to - presume that death destroys us, even if we are discerptible. - - 2.) The living agent is not an _internal material organism_, - which dies with the body. Because - - --Our only ground for this presumption is our relation to - other systems of matter. But we see these are not necessary - to us. - - --It will not do to say that lost portions of the body were - not _essential_--who is to determine? - - --The relation between the living agent, and the most - essential parts of the body, is only one by which they - mutually affect each other. - - 3.) If we regard our body as made up of organs of sense, we - come to the same result. - - --We see with the eyes, just as we do with glasses. The eye - is not a _recipient_, any more than a telescope. - - --It is not pretended that vision, hearing, &c. can be - traced clear up to the percipient; but so far as we can - trace perceptions, the _organ_ does not perceive. - - --In dreams we perceive without organs. - - --When we lose a limb we do not lose the _directing power_; - we could move a new one, if it could be made, or a wooden - one. But the limb cut off has no power of moving. - - --Thus, our loss of the _organs_ of perception and motion, - not being the destruction of the power, there is no - ground to think that the destruction of other organs or - instruments would destroy _us_. - - _Objection._ These observations apply equally to brutes. - - _Ans._ 1. Be it so. Perhaps they are immortal:--may hereafter - improve: we know not what latent powers they may have. - - 1.) The human being at one period looks as little likely to - make great intellectual attainments; for a long time he has - capacities for virtue and religion, but cannot use them. - - 2.) Many persons go out of the world who never became able - to exercise these capacities; _e.g._ infants. - - _Ans._ 2. If brutes were immortal, it does not prove them to - be _moral agents_. - - 1.) It may be necessary, for aught we know, that there - should be living creatures not moral agents, nor rational. - - 2.) All difficulties as to what would become of them, are - founded in our ignorance. - - =2.= That our souls, though not material, so depend upon the - bodily structure, that we cannot survive its destruction. - - _Ans._ 1. Reason, memory, &c. _do not_ depend on the body, - as perceptions by the senses do. Death may destroy those - _instruments_, and yet not destroy the _powers_ of reflection. - - _Ans._ 2. Human beings exist, here, in two very different - states, each having its own laws: sensation and reflection. By - the first we feel; by the second we reason and will. - - 1.) Nothing which we know to be destroyed at death, is - necessary to reflecting on ideas formerly received. - - 2.) Though the senses act like scaffolds, or levers, to - _bring in_ ideas, yet when once in, we can reflect, &c. - without their aid. - - _Ans._ 3. There are diseases which prove fatal, &c., yet do - not, in any part of their course, _impair_ the intellect; and - this indicates that they do not _destroy_ it. - - 1.) In the diseases alluded to, persons have their reflective - power, in full, the very moment before death. - - 2.) Now, why should a disease, at a certain degree, utterly - destroy powers which were not even affected by it, up to that - point? - - =3.= That death at least _suspends_ our reflective powers, - or interrupts our continuing to exist in the like state of - reflection which we do now. - - _Ans._ There appears so little connection between our powers of - sensation and our powers of reflection that we cannot presume - that what might _destroy the former_, could even _suspend the - latter_. - - 1.) We daily see reason, memory, &c. exercised without any - assistance, that we know of, from our bodies. - - 2.) Seeing them in lively exercise to the last, we must infer - that death is not a discontinuance of their exercise, nor of - the enjoyments and sufferings of such exercise. - - 3.) Our posthumous life may be but a going on, with - additions. Like the change at our birth--which produced not - a suspension of the faculties we had before, nor a _total_ - change in our state of life; but a continuance of both, with - great alterations. - - 4.) Death may but at once put us into a _higher_ state of - life, as our birth did; our relation to bodily organs may be - the only hinderance to our entering a higher condition of the - reflective powers. - - 5.) Were we even sure that death would suspend our - intellectual powers, it would not furnish even the lowest - probability that it would destroy them. - - _Objec._ From the analogy of plants. - - _Ans._ This furnishes poets with apt illustrations of our - frailty, but affords no proper analogy. Plants are destitute - of perception and action, and this is the very matter in - question. - - -REMARKS. - - =1.= It has been shown, that confining ourselves to what we - know, we see no probability of ever ceasing to be:--it cannot be - concluded from the reason of the thing:--nor from the analogy of - nature. - - =2.= We are therefore to go upon the belief of a future existence. - - =3.= Our going into _new scenes_ and conditions, is just as - natural as our coming into the world. - - =4.= Our condition may naturally be a social one. - - =5.= The advantages of it may naturally be bestowed, according to - some fixed law, in proportion to one’s degrees in virtue. - - 1.) Perhaps not so much as now _by society_; but by God’s more - immediate action. - - 2.) Yet this will be no less _natural_, _i.e._ stated, fixed, - or settled. - - 3.) Our notions of what is natural, are enlarged by greater - knowledge of God and his works. - - 4.) There may be some beings in the world, to whom the whole - of Christianity is as natural as the visible course of nature - seems to us. - - =6.= These probabilities of a future life, though they do not - satisfy curiosity, answer all the purposes of religion, as well - as demonstration. - - 1.) Even a demonstration of a future state, would not - demonstrate religion, but would be reconcilable with atheism. - - 2.) But as religion implies a future state, any presumption - against such a state, would be a presumption against religion. - - 3.) The foregoing observations remove all presumptions of that - sort, and prove to a great probability, a fundamental doctrine - of religion. - - -CHAPTER II. - -THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. - -The question of a future life is rendered momentous by our capacity for -happiness and misery. - -Especially if that happiness or misery depends on our present conduct. - -We should feel the deepest solicitude on this subject. - -And that if there were no proof of a future life and interest, other -than the probabilities just discussed. - - -I. _In the present world our pleasures and pains are, to a great -extent, in our own power._ - - =1.= We see them to be consequences of our actions. - - =2.= And we can _foresee_ these consequences. - - =3.= Our desires are not gratified, without the right kind of - exertion. - - =4.= By prudence we may enjoy life; rashness, or even neglect may - make us miserable. - - =5.= Why this is so is another matter. - - 1.) It may be impossible to be otherwise. - - 2.) Or it may be best on the whole. - - 3.) Or God’s plan may be to make only the good happy. - - 4.) Or the whole plan may be incomprehensible to us. - - _Objec._ It may be said “this is only the course of nature.” - - _Ans._ It is granted: but - - 1. The course of nature is but the will of God. We admit - that God is the natural governor of the world: and must not - turn round and deny it because his government is _uniform_. - - 2. Our natural foresight of the consequences of actions, is - his appointment. - - 3. The consequences themselves, are his appointment. - - 4. Our ability to foresee these consequences, is God’s - _instruction_ how we are to act. - - _Objec._ By this reasoning we are instructed to gratify our - appetites, and such gratification is our reward for so doing. - - _Ans._ Certainly not. Foreseen pleasures and pains are proper - motives to action _in general_; but we may, in particular - cases, damage ourselves by indulgence. Our eyes are made to - see with, but not to look at every thing:--for instance the - sun. - -It follows, from what has been said, that - - -II. _We are, now, actually under God’s government, in the strictest -sense._ - - =1.= Admitting that there is a God, it is not so much a matter of - speculation, as of experience, that he governs us. - - =2.= The annexing of pleasures and pains to certain actions, and - giving notice them, is the very essence of government. - - =3.= Whether by direct acts upon us, or by contriving a general - plan, does not affect the argument. - - 1.) If magistrates could make laws which should _execute - themselves_, their government would be far more perfect than it - is. - - 2.) God’s making fire burn us, is as much an instance of - government, as if he _directly inflicted_ the burn, whenever we - touched fire. - - =4.= Hence the analogy of nature shows nothing to render - incredible the Bible doctrine of God’s rewarding or punishing - according to our actions. - - -_Additional remarks on Punishment._ - -As men object chiefly to future punishment, it is proper to show -further that the course of administration, as to _present_ punishment, -is analogous to what religion teaches as to _the future_. - -Indeed they add credibility to it. - -And ought to raise the most serious apprehension. - - -I. _Circumstances to be observed touching present punishments._ - - =1.= They often follow acts which produce present pleasure or - advantage. - - =2.= The sufferings often far exceed the pleasure or advantage. - - =3.= They often follow remotely. - - =4.= After long delay they often come suddenly. - - =5.= As those remote effects are not certainly foreseen, they - may not be thought of at the time; or if so, there is a hope of - escaping. - - =6.= There are opportunities of advantage, which if neglected do - not recur. - - =7.= Though, in some cases, men who have sinned up to a certain - point, may retrieve their affairs, yet in many cases, reformation - is of no avail. - - =8.= Inconsiderateness is often as disastrous as wilful - wrong-doing. - - =9.= As some punishments by civil government, are capital, so are - some natural punishments. - - 1.) Seem intended to remove the offender out of the way. - - 2.) Or as an example to others. - - -II. _These things are not accidental, but proceed from fixed laws._ - - =1.= They are matters of daily experience. - - =2.= Proceed from the general laws, by which the world is - governed. - - -III. _They so closely resemble what religion teaches, as to future -punishment, that both might be expressed in the same words._ - -_e.g._ Proverbs, ch. i. - - The analogy sufficiently answers all objections against the - Scripture doctrine of future punishment, such as - - 1.) That our frailty or temptations annihilate the guilt of - vice. - - 2.) Or the objection from necessity. - - 3.) Or that the Almighty cannot be contradicted. - - 4.) Or that he cannot be offended. - - -REMARKS. - - =1.= Such reflections are terrific, but ought to be stated and - considered. - - =2.= Disregard of a hereafter cannot be justified by any thing - short of a _demonstration_ of atheism. Even skeptical doctrines - afford no justification. - - =3.= There is no pretence of reason for presuming that the - licentious will not find it better for them that they had never - been born. - - -CHAPTER III. - -MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. - -As the structure of the world shows _intelligence_, so the mode of -distributing pleasure and pain, shows government. That is, God’s -_natural_ government, such as a king exercises over his subjects. - -But this does not, at first sight, determine what is the _moral -character_ of such government. - - -I. _What is a moral or righteous government?_ - - =1.= Not mere rewarding and punishing. - - =2.= But doing this according to character. - - =3.= The perfection of moral government is doing this _exactly_. - - _Objec._ God is simply and absolutely benevolent. - - _Ans._ Benevolence, infinite in degree, would dispose him - to produce the greatest possible happiness, regardless of - behaviour. This would rob God of other attributes; and should - not be asserted unless it can be proved. And whether it can - be proved is not the point now in hand. - - The question is not whether there may not be, in the - universe, beings to whom he manifests absolute benevolence, - which might not be incompatible with justice; but whether he - treats _us_ so. - - =4.= It must be owned to be vastly difficult, in such a - disordered world, to estimate with exactness the overplus of - happiness on the side of virtue: and there may be exceptions to - the rule. But it is far from being doubtful that _on the whole_, - virtue is happier than vice, in this world. - - -II. _The beginnings of a righteous administration, are seen in nature._ - - =1.= It has been proved (ch. ii.) that God _governs_: and it is - reasonable to suppose that he would govern _righteously_. - - 1.) Any other rule of government would be harder to account for. - - 2.) The Bible doctrine that hereafter the good shall be happy, - and the wicked miserable, is no more than an expectation that a - method of government, now begun, shall be carried on. - - =2.= The opposite consequences of prudence and rashness, show - a right constitution of nature; and our ability to foresee and - control these consequences, shows that we are under moral law. - - =3.= God has so constructed society that vice, to a great degree, - is actually punished by it. - - 1.) Without this, society could not exist. - - 2.) This is God’s government, through society; and is as - _natural_, as society. - - 3.) Since the course of things is God’s appointment, men are - unavoidably accountable for their behaviour. - - _Objec._ Society often punishes good actions, and rewards - wickedness. - - _Ans._ 1. This is not _necessary_, and consequently not - natural. - - 2. Good actions are never punished by society as _good_, but - because considered bad. - - =4.= By the course of nature, virtue is rewarded, and vice - punished, _as such_, which proves a moral government; as will - be seen if we rightly distinguish between actions and their - qualities. - - 1.) An action may produce present gratification though it be - wrong: in which case the gratification is in the act, not the - morality of it: in other cases the enjoyment consists wholly in - the quality of virtuousness. - - 2.) Vice is naturally attended with uneasiness, apprehension, - vexation, remorse, &c. - - --This is a very different feeling from that produced by mere - misfortune. - - --Men comfort themselves under misfortune, that it was not - their own fault. - - 3.) Honest and good men are befriended _as such_. - - 4.) Injuries are resented as implying fault; and good offices - are regarded with gratitude on account of the _intention_, even - when they fail to benefit us. - - --This is seen in family government, where children are - punished for falsehood, fretfulness, &c., though no one is - hurt. - - --And also in civil government, where the absence or presence - of ill intention goes far in determining the penalty of - wrong-doing. - - 5.) The whole course of the world, in all ages and relations, - turns much upon approbation and disapprobation. - - 6.) The very fact of our having a moral nature, is a proof of - our being under God’s moral government. - - --We are placed in a condition which unavoidably operates on - our moral nature. - - --Hence it arises that reward to virtue and reprobation of - vice, as such, is a _rule_, never inverted. If it be thought - that there are instances to the contrary, (which is not so,) - they are evidently monstrous. - - --The _degree_ in which virtue and vice receive proper - returns, is not the question now, but only the thing itself, - in some degree. - - 7.) It is admitted that virtue sometimes suffers, and vice - prospers; but this is _disorder_, and not the order of nature. - - 8.) It follows, that we have in the government of the world, - a declaration from God, for virtue and against vice. So far - as a man is true to virtue, is he on the side of the divine - administration. Such a man must have a _sense of security_, and - a hope of _something better_. - - =5.= This hope is confirmed by observing that virtue has - necessary tendencies beyond their present effects. - - 1.) These are very obvious with regard to individuals. - - 2.) Are as real, though not so patent, in regard to society. - - --The power of a society under the direction of virtue, tends - to prevail over power not so directed, just as power under - direction of reason, tends to prevail over brute force. - - --As this may not be conceded, we will notice how the case - stands, as to reason: - - · Length of time, and proper opportunity, are necessary for - reason to triumph over brutes. - - · Rational beings, disunited, envious, unjust, and - treacherous, may be overcome by brutes, uniting themselves - by instinct: but this would be an inverted order of things. - - --A like tendency has virtue to produce superiority. - - · By making the good of society, the object of every member - of it. - - · By making every one industrious in his own sphere. - - · By uniting all in one bond of veracity and justice. - - 3.) If the part of God’s government which we see, and the part - we do not see, make up one scheme, then we see a _tendency_ in - virtue to superiority. - - 4.) But to _produce_ that superiority there must be - - --A force proportioned to the obstacles. - - --Sufficient lapse of time. - - --A fair field of trial; such as extent of time, adequate - occasions, and opportunities for the virtuous to unite. - - 5.) These things are denied to virtue in this life, so that its - tendencies, though real, are _hindered_. - - 6.) But it may have all requisite advantages hereafter. - - --Eternity will be lasting enough. - - --Good men will unite; as they cannot do now, scattered over - the earth, and ignorant of one another. - - --Other orders of virtuous beings will join; for the very - nature of virtue is a bond of union. - - 7.) The tendency of such an order of things, so far as seen by - vicious beings in any part of the universe, would be to the - amendment of all who were capable of it, and their recovery to - virtue. - - 8.) All this goes to show that the hinderances to virtue are - contingent, and that its beneficial tendencies are God’s - declarations in its favor. - - 9.) If the preceding considerations are thought to be too - speculative, we may easily come to the same result by - reflecting on the supremacy which any earthly nation would - attain, by entire virtue for many ages. - - -REMARKS. - -Consider now the general system of religion. The government of -the world is one; it is moral; virtue shall in the end prevail -over wickedness; and to see the importance and fitness of such an -arrangement we have only to consider what would be the state of things, -if vice had these advantages, or virtue the contrary. - - _Objec._ Why may not things be now going on in other worlds, and - continue always to go on in this world, in the same mixed and - disordered state as at present? - - _Ans._ We are not proving that God’s moral government is - _perfect_, or the truth of religion, but only seeing what - there is in the course of nature, to confirm it, supposing it - to be known. Were there nothing to judge by, but the present - distribution of pleasure and pain, we should have no ground - to conclude that hereafter we should be rewarded or punished - exactly according to our deserts. But even then there would - be no indication that vice is better than virtue. Still the - preceding observations _confirm_ the doctrine of future - retribution; for, - - 1.) They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent to - virtue and vice. - - 2.) That future distributive justice would differ not in - _kind_, but in degree only, from God’s present government. It - would be the _effect_, towards which we see the _tendency_. - - 3.) That higher rewards and punishments _may be_ hereafter. - - 4.) That we should _expect_ it to be so; because the - tendencies of vice and virtue are immutable, while the - hinderances are only artificial. - - -SUMMARY. - -[This enumerates the steps of the argument, in the foregoing chapter, -in as condensed a form as possible.] - - -CHAPTER IV. - -OF A STATE OF PROBATION. - -The doctrine of probation comprehends several particulars. But the -most common notion is that our future interests are _depending_; and -depending on _ourselves_. And that we have _opportunities_ for both -good and bad conduct, and _temptations_ to each. - -This is not exactly the same as our being under moral government; for -it implies allurement to evil, and difficulties in being good. - -Hence needs to be considered by itself. - - -_Doctrine._ THE NATURAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD, IN THIS WORLD, PUTS US ON -TRIAL AS TO THE THINGS OF THIS WORLD; AND SO IMPLIES, WHAT RELIGION -TEACHES, THAT HIS MORAL GOVERNMENT PUTS US ON TRIAL AS TO A FUTURE -WORLD. - - -I. _So far as we are tempted to do what will damage our future temporal -interests, so far we are under probation as to those interests._ - - =1.= The annexing of pleasures and pains to actions, as good or - bad, and enabling us to foresee their effect, implies that our - interests, in part at least, depend on ourselves. - - =2.= We often _blame_ ourselves and others for evils, as - resulting from misconduct. - - =3.= It is very certain that we often miss possible good, and - incur evils, not for want of knowing better, but through our - _fault_. - - =4.= Every one speaks of the hazards of young persons, from other - causes than ignorance. - - -II. _These natural or temporal trials are analogous to our moral and -religious trial._ - - =1.= In both cases, what constitutes the trial, is either in our - circumstances or in our nature. - - 1.) Some would do right but for violent or extraordinary - temptations. - - 2.) Others will _seek_ evil, and go out of their way after - wicked indulgence, when there are no external temptations. - - 3.) But even those who err through temptation, must have that - within which makes them _susceptible_ of temptation. - - 4.) So that we are in a like state of probation with respect to - both present and future interests. - - =2.= If we proceed to observe how mankind behave in both - capacities, we see the same analogy. - - 1.) Some scarcely look beyond the present gratification. - - 2.) Some are driven by their passions against their better - judgment and feeble resolutions. - - 3.) Some shamelessly go on in open vice. - - 4.) Some persist in wrong-doing, even under strong - apprehensions of future misery. - - =3.= The analogy is no less plain in regard to the influence of - others upon us. - - 1.) Bad example. - - 2.) Wrong education. - - 3.) Corruptions of religion. - - 4.) General prevalence of mistakes as to true happiness. - - =4.= In both cases negligence and folly bring difficulty as well - as vice. - - -III. _The disadvantages we labor under from our fallen and disordered -state, are the same, in relation to both earthly and future interests._ - -This disadvantage affords no ground of complaint; for, - - =1.= We _may_ manage to pass our days in comfort and peace. - - =2.= And so may we obtain the security and comfort of religion. - - =3.= We might as well complain that we are not a higher order of - beings. - - -REMARKS. - - =1.= It is thus proved that the state of trial, which religion - says we are in, is credible; for it exactly corresponds to what - we see. - - 1.) If from birth till death we were in a constant security - of enjoyment, without care or correctness, it would be a - presumption against religion. - - 2.) It might, if we had no experience, be urged that an - infinitely good Being would not expose us to the hazard of - misery. This is indeed a difficulty, and must remain so; but - still the course of nature is as it is. - - 3.) The miseries which we bring on ourselves are no more - unavoidable than our deportment. - - =2.= It has been proved that we are in danger of miscarrying as - to our interests, both present and future. - - =3.= The sum of the whole is, that as we do not have present - enjoyments and honors forced upon us, in spite of misconduct, so - this _may_ be the case, as to that chief and final good which - religion proposes. - - -CHAPTER V. - -PROBATION INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. - -Why we should be placed in the condition spoken of in the last chapter, -is a question which cannot be answered. It may be that we could not -understand, if told. And if we could, it might injure us to know, just -now. It certainly is consistent with God’s righteous government. - -Religion tells us that we are so placed in order to become qualified -for a better state. - -This, though a very partial answer to the inquiry _why_ we are so -placed, answers an infinitely more important question,--viz.: _What is -our business here?_ - - -I. _We are placed in this state of trial, for our improvement in -virtue, as the requisite qualification for future security and -happiness._ - - =1.= Every creature is designed for a particular way of life. - - 1.) Happiness depends on the congruity between a creature’s - nature and its circumstances. - - 2.) Man’s character might be so changed as to make him - _incapable_ of happiness on earth. - - 3.) Or he might be placed, without changing his nature, in a - world where he must be wretched, for want of the proper objects - to answer to his desires. - - 4.) So that without determining what is the future condition of - good men, we know there must be necessary _qualifications_ to - make us capable of enjoying it. - - =2.= Human beings are so constituted as to become fit for new and - different conditions. - - 1.) We not only acquire ideas, but store them up. - - 2.) We can become more expert in any kind of action. - - 3.) And can make settled alterations in our tempers. - - 4.) We can form _habits_--both bodily and mental. - - As these operate in producing radical changes in human - character, we will look for a moment at the process. - - --Neither perceptions, nor knowledge, are habits; though - necessary to _forming_ them. - - --There are habits of perception, however, and habits of - action: the former are passive, the latter active. - - --Habits of body are produced by external acts, and habits of - mind by the exertion of principles; _i.e._ carrying them out. - - --Resolutions to do well are acts, and may _help_ towards - forming good habits. But _mere_ theorizing, and forming - pictures in the mind, not only do not help, but may harden - the mind to a contrary course. - - --Passive impressions, by repetition grow weaker. Thus - familiarity with danger lessens fear. - - --Hence active habits may be formed and strengthened, by - acting according to certain motives or excitements, which - grow less sensibly felt and less and less felt, as the habit - strengthens. - - · Thus the sight of distress excites the passive emotion - of pity, and the active principle of benevolence. But - inquiring out cases of distress in order to relieve them, - causes diminished sensitiveness at the sight of misery, and - stronger benevolence and aptitude in relieving it. - - · So admonition, experience, and example, if acted upon, - produce good; if not, harden. - - 5.) The formation of a habit may be imperceptible and even - inexplicable, but the thing itself is matter of certain - experience. - - 6.) A habit once formed, the action becomes easy and often - pleasurable: opposite inclinations grow weaker: difficulties - less: and occasions more frequent. - - 7.) Thus, a new character, in several respects, is formed. - - =3.= We should not have these capacities for improvement and for - the reconstruction of character, if it were not necessary. - - 1.) They are necessary, even as to this life. - - --We are not qualified, at first, for mature life: - understanding and strength come gradually. - - --If we had them in full, at birth, we should at first be - distracted and bewildered, and our faculties would be of no - use previous to experience. Ignorant of any employment, we - could not provide for ourselves. - - --So that man is an unformed, unfinished creature, even as - to this world, till he _acquire_ knowledge, experience, and - habits. - - 2.) Provision is made for our acquiring, in youth, the - requisite qualities for manhood. - - --Children _learn_, from their very birth, - - · The nature and use of objects. - - · The subordinations of domestic life. - - · The rules of life. - - --Some of this learning is acquired so insensibly, as to seem - like instinct, but some requires great care and labor, and - the doing of things we are averse to. - - --According as we act during this formative period, is our - character formed; and our capacity for various stations in - society determined. - - --Early opportunities lost, cannot be recovered. - - 3.) Our state of discipline throughout this life, for another, - is exactly of the same kind: and comprehended under one general - law. - - --If we could not see how the present discipline fitted us - for a higher life, it would be no objection. - - · We do not know how food, sleep, &c. enlarges the - child’s body; nor would we expect such a result, prior to - experience. - - · Nor do children understand the need of exercise, - temperance, restraint, &c. - - --We thus see a general analogy of Providence indicating that - the present life is preparatory. - - =4.= If virtue is a necessary qualification for future happiness, - then we see our need of the moral culture of our present state. - - 1.) Analogy indicates that our future state will be social. - - --Nature furnishes no shadow of unreasonableness in the - Scripture doctrine that this future community will be under - the more immediate government of God. - - --Nor the least proof that its members will not require the - exercise of veracity, justice, &c. towards each other; and - that character which _results_ from the practice of such - virtues. - - --Certainly the universe is under moral government; and a - virtuous character must, in some way, be a condition of - happiness in that state. - - 2.) We are deficient, and in danger of deviating from what is - right. - - --We have desires for outward objects. - - --The times, degrees, &c. of gratifying these desires, are, - of right, subject to the control of the moral principle. - - --But that principle neither excites them, nor prevents their - being excited. - - --They may exist, when they cannot be lawfully gratified, or - gratified at all. - - --When the desire exists, and the gratification is unlawful, - we are tempted. - - 3.) The only security is the principle within. - - --The strengthening of this lessens the danger. - - --It may be strengthened, by discipline and exercise. - - · Noting examples. - - · Attending to the right, and not to preference. - - · Considering our true interests. - - --When improved, it becomes, in proportion to its strength, - our security from the dangers of natural propensions. - - --Virtue, become habitual by discipline, is improved virtue; - and improved virtue must produce increased happiness, if the - government of the world is moral. - - 4.) Even creatures made upright may fall. - - --The fall of an upright being, is not accounted for by the - nature of liberty; for that would only be saying that an - event happened because it might happen. - - --But from the very nature of propensions. - - --A finitely perfect being would have propensions - corresponding to its surroundings; its understanding; and its - moral sense; and all these in due proportions. - - --Such a being would have propensions, though the object - might not be present, or the indulgence might be contrary to - its moral sense; and this would have some tendency, however - small, to induce gratification. - - --The tendency would be increased by the frequency of - occasions; and yet more by the least indulgence, even in - thought; till, under peculiar conjunctures, it would become - effect. - - --The first transgression might so utterly disorder the - constitution, and change the proportions of forces, as to - lead to a repetition of irregularities; and hence to the - construction of bad habits, and a depraved character. - - 5.) On the contrary, a finitely perfect being may attain higher - virtue, and more security, by obeying the moral principle. - - --For the danger would lessen, by the increased - submissiveness of propensions. - - --The moral principle would gain force by exercise. - - 6.) Thus vice is not only criminal, but degrading; and virtue - is not only right, but improving. - - --The degree of improvement may be such that the danger of - sinning may be almost infinitely lessened. - - --Yet the security may always be the habits formed in a - state of discipline; making such a state altogether fit and - necessary. - - 7.) This course of reasoning is vastly stronger when applied to - fallen and corrupt creatures. - - --The upright need improvement; the fallen must be renewed. - - --Discipline is expedient for the one; necessary for the - other; and of a severer sort. - - -II. _The present world is peculiarly fit for such discipline as we -need._ - - =1.= Surrounding evils tend to produce moderation, practical - knowledge, &c. very different from a mere speculative knowledge - of our liability to vice and misery. - - =2.= Our experience in this world, with right views and practice, - may leave eternal impressions for good. - - =3.= Every act of self-government in the exercise of virtue, - must, from the very make of our nature, form habits of virtue, - and a more intense virtuous principle. - - =4.= Resolute and persevering resistance to particular and - violent temptations, is a _continued_ act of virtue, and that in - a _higher degree_ than if the seduction were transient and weak. - - =5.= Self-denial is not essential to virtue, but is almost - essential to discipline and improvement. - - 1.) Because actions materially virtuous, which have no - difficulty, but agree with our inclinations, may be done merely - from inclination, and so not be _really_ virtuous. - - 2.) But when they are done in face of danger and difficulty, - virtuousness is increased, and confirmed into a habit. - - _Objec._ 1. As our intellectual or physical powers may be - overtasked, so may our moral. - - _Ans._ This may be so in exceptional cases, but it does not - confute the argument. In general, it holds good. All that is - intended to be proved is, that this world is _intended_ to be a - state of improvement, and is _fitted_ for it. - - 1.) Some sciences which of themselves are highly improving, - require a trying measure of attention, which some will not - submit to. - - 2.) It is admitted that this world disciplines many to vice: - but this viciousness of many is the very thing which makes - the world a virtuous discipline to good men. The _whole end_ - in placing mankind as they are we know not; but these things - are evident--the virtues of some are exercised:--and so - exercised as to be improved: and improved beyond what they - would be in a perfectly virtuous community. - - 3.) That all, or even the generality, do not improve, is no - proof that their improvement was not _intended_. Of seeds and - animals not one in a million comes to perfection; yet such - as do, evidently answer an end for which they were designed. - The _appearance of waste_ in regard to seeds, &c. is just as - unaccountable, as the ruin of moral agents. - - _Objec._ 2. Rectitude arising from hope and fear, is only the - discipline of self-love. - - _Ans._ Obedience _is_ obedience, though prompted by hope or - fear: and a _course_ of such obedience, forms a habit of - it: and distinct habits of various virtues, by repressing - inclination whenever justice, veracity, &c. require. - - Beside, veracity, justice, regard to God’s authority, and - self-interest, are coincident; and each, separately, a just - principle. To begin a good life from either of them, and - persist, produces that very character which corresponds to our - relations to God, and secures happiness. - - _Objec._ 3. The virtues requisite for a state of afflictions, - and produced by it, are not wanted to qualify us for a state of - happiness. - - _Ans._ Such is not the verdict of experience. Passive - submission is essential to right character. Prosperity itself - begets extravagant desires; and imagination may produce as much - discontent as actual condition. Hence, though we may not need - _patience_ in heaven, we shall need that _temper_ which is - formed by patience. - - Self-love would always coincide with God’s commands, when - our interest was rightly understood; but it is liable to - error. Therefore, HABITS of resignation are necessary, for - _all_ creatures; and the proper discipline for resignation is - affliction. - - _Objec._ 4. The trouble and danger of such discipline, might have - been avoided by making us at once, what we are intended to become. - - _Ans._ What we are to be, is the effect of what we are to - do. God’s natural government is arranged not to save us from - trouble or danger, but to enable and incline us to go through - them. It is as natural for us to seek means to obtain things, - as it is to seek the things; and in worldly things we are left - to our choice, whether to improve our powers and so better our - condition, or to neglect improvement and so go without the - advantage. - - Analogy, therefore, makes the same arrangement credible, as to - a future state. - - -III. _This state of discipline may be necessary for the display of -character._ - - =1.= Not to the all-knowing Being, but to his creation, or part - of it, and in many ways which we know not. - - =2.= It may be a _means_ in disposing of men according to - character. - - =3.= And of showing creation that they are so disposed of. - - =4.= Such display of character certainly contributes, largely, to - the general course of things considered in this chapter. - - -CHAPTER VI. - -OF NECESSITY AS INFLUENCING CONDUCT. - -Fatalists have no right to object to Christianity, for they of course -hold the doctrine to be compatible with what they see in nature. - -The question is, whether it be not equally compatible with what -Christianity teaches. - -To argue on the supposition of so great an absurdity as necessity, is -puzzling; and the obscurity and puzzle of the argument must therefore -be excused. - - -I. _Necessity does not destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and -Governor of the world._ - - =1.= It does not exclude design and deliberation. - - 1.) This is matter of actual experience and consciousness. - - --Necessity does not account for the _existence_ of any - thing, but is only a _circumstance_ relating to its origin. - Instance the case of a house: the fatalist admits that it had - a builder, and the only question would be, was he obliged to - build it as he did? - - 2.) It is the same as to the construction of the world. To say - it exists by necessity must mean it had a maker, who _acted_ by - necessity: for necessity is only an abstract notion, and can - _do_ nothing. - - 3.) We say God exists by necessity, because we intuitively - discern that there must be an infinite Being, prior to all - causes; but we cannot say that _every thing_ so exists. - The fact that many changes in nature are produced by man’s - contrivance is a proof of this. - - 4.) Thus though the fatalist does not choose to mean by - necessity _an agent acting necessarily_, he is obliged to mean - this. - - 5.) And it also follows that a thing’s being done by necessity - does not exclude _design_. - - =2.= It does not exclude a belief that we are in a state of - religion. - - 1.) Suppose a fatalist to educate a child on his own - principles,--viz.: that he cannot do otherwise than he does; - and is not subject to praise or blame. - - (It might be asked, _would_ he, if possessed of common sense, - so educate his child?) - - --The child would be delighted with his freedom; but would - soon prove a pest, and go to destruction. - - --He would meet with checks and rebuffs, which would teach - him that he _was_ accountable. - - --He would, in the end, be convinced either that his doctrine - was wrong, or that he had reasoned inconclusively upon it, - and misapplied it. - - 2.) To apply fatalism to practice, in any other way, would be - found equally fallacious: _e.g._ that he need not take care of - his life. - - 3.) No such absurdity follows the doctrine of freedom. - - --Reasoning on this ground is justified by all experience. - - --The constitution of things is _as if_ we were free. - - 4.) If the doctrine of necessity be true, and yet, when we - _apply it_ to life, always misleads us; how, then, can we be - sure it would not mislead us with respect to future interests? - - 5.) It follows that if there are proofs of religion on the - supposition of freedom, they are just as conclusive on the - supposition of necessity. - - =3.= It does not refute the notion that God has a will and a - character. - - 1.) It does not hinder _us_ from having a will and a character; - from being cruel, or benevolent, or just, &c. - - 2.) If necessity be plead as the excuse for crime, it equally - excuses the _punishment_ of crime; for if it destroys the sin - of the one, it destroys the sin of the other. - - 3.) The very assumption of injustice in punishing crime, shows - that we cannot rid ourselves of the notion of justice and - injustice. - - _Objec._ If necessity be _reconcilable_ with the character of - God, as portrayed in Christianity, does it not destroy _the - proof_ that he has that character; and so destroy the proofs of - religion? - - _Ans._ No. Happiness and misery are not our fate, but the - results of our conduct. God’s government is that of a father - and a magistrate; and his natural rule of government must be - veracity and justice. We shall proceed to show that, - - -II. _Necessity does not destroy the proofs of religion._ - - =1.= It is a plain fact that God rewards and punishes. - - 1.) He has given us a moral faculty, by which we discern - between actions, and approve or disapprove, &c. - - 2.) This implies a _rule_, a peculiar _kind_ of rule; _i.e._ - one from which we cannot depart without being self-condemned. - - 3.) The dictates of our moral faculty are God’s laws, with - sanctions. It not only raises a sense of _duty_, but a sense of - _security_ in obeying, and danger in disobeying; and this is an - explicit sanction. - - 4.) God’s government must conform to the nature he has given - us; and we must infer that in the upshot happiness will follow - virtue, and misery vice. - - 5.) Hence religious worship is a duty, if only as a means of - keeping up the sense of this government. - - 6.) No objection from necessity can lie against this course of - proof. - - --The conclusion is wholly and directly from facts; not - from what might appear to us to be _fit_, but from what his - actions tell us _he wills_. - - =2.= Natural religion has external evidence which necessity, if - true, does not affect. - - 1.) Suppose a person convinced of the truths of natural - religion, but ignorant of history, and of the present state of - mankind, he would inquire: - - --How this religion came? - - --How far the belief of it extended? - - --If he found that some one had totally propounded it, as a - deduction of reason, then, though its evidences from reason - would not be impaired, its history would furnish no further - proof. - - 2.) But such an one would find, on the contrary, - - --That essentially it had been professed in all countries. - - --And can be traced up through all ages. - - --And was not _reasoned out_, but revealed. - - 3.) These things are of great weight. - - --Showing natural religion to be conformed to the common - sense of mankind. - - --And either that it was revealed, or forces itself upon the - mind. - - --The rude state of the early ages leads to the belief of its - being revealed, and such is the opinion of the learned. - - =3.= Early pretences to revelation indicate some original real - one from which they were copied. - - --The history of revelation is as old as history itself. - - --Such a fact is a proof of religion, against which there is - no presumption. - - --And indicates a revelation prior to the examination - of the book said to contain it; and independent of all - considerations of its being corrupted, or darkened by fables. - - =4.= It is thus apparent that the _external_ evidence of religion - is considerable; and is not affected by the doctrine of necessity. - - -REMARKS. - - 1. The danger of taking custom, &c. for our moral rule. - - 1.) We are all liable to prejudice. - - 2.) Reason may be impaired, perverted, or disregarded. - - 3.) The matter in hand is of infinite moment. - - 2. The foregoing observations amount to practical proof. - - _Objec._ Probabilities which cannot be confuted, may - be overbalanced by greater probabilities: much more by - demonstration. Now, as the doctrine of necessity must be true, - it cannot be that God governs us as if we were free when he - knows we are not. - - _Ans._ This brings the matter to a point, and the answer is - not to be evaded,--viz.: that the whole constitution and - course of things shows this reasoning to be false, be the - fallacy where it may. - - The doctrine of freedom shows where,--viz.: in supposing - ourselves necessary agents when in fact we are free. - - Admitting the doctrine of necessity, the fallacy evidently - lies in denying that necessary agents are accountable; for - that they _are_ rewarded and punished is undeniable. - -CONCLUSION.--It follows that necessity, if true, neither proves that -God will not make his creatures happy or miserable according to -their conduct, nor destroys the proofs that he will do so. That is, -necessity, practically, is false. - - -CHAPTER VII. - -DIVINE GOVERNMENT A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. - -Moral government, _as a fact_, has now been considered; it remains for -us to remove objections against its _wisdom and goodness_. A thing -being true does not prove it to be good. - -In arguing as to its truth, analogy could only show it to be credible. -But, if a moral government be admitted as a fact, analogy makes it -credible that it is a scheme or system, and that man’s comprehension -of it is necessarily so limited, as to be inadequate to determine its -injustice. - -This we shall find to be the case. - - -_Doctrine._ ON THE SUPPOSITION THAT GOD EXERCISES MORAL GOVERNMENT, -THE ANALOGY OF NATURE TEACHES THAT IT MUST BE A SCHEME, AND ONE QUITE -BEYOND OUR COMPREHENSION. - - -I. _The ordering of nature is a scheme; and makes it credible by -analogy, that moral government is a scheme._ - - =1.= The parts curiously correspond to each other; individuals to - individuals, species to species, events to events; and all these - both immediate and remote. - - =2.= This correspondence embraces all the past, and all the - future; including all creatures, actions, and events. - - 1.) There is no event, which does not depend for its occurrence - on some further thing, unknown to us; we cannot give the whole - account of any one thing. - - 2.) Things apparently the most insignificant, seem to be - necessary to others, of the greatest importance. - - =3.= If such is God’s natural government, it is credible that - such is his moral government. - - 1.) In fact they are so blended as to make one scheme. - - --One is subservient to the other, just as the vegetable - kingdom subserves the animal, and our animal organization - subserves our mental. - - --Every act of God seems to look beyond the occasion, and to - have reference to a general plan. - - --There is evidently a previous adjustment. - - · The periods, &c. for trying men. - - · The instruments of justice. - - · The kinds of retribution. - - 2.) The whole comprises a system, a very small part of which is - known to us: therefore no objections against any part can be - insisted on. - - 3.) This ignorance is universally acknowledged, except in - arguing against religion. That it ought to be a valid answer to - objections against religion, we proceed to show. - - --Suppose it to be asserted that all evils might have been - prevented by repeated interpositions; or that more good might - have been so produced; which would be the utmost that could - be said: still, - - --Our ignorance would vindicate religion from any objections - arising from apparent disorders in the world. - - --The government of the world might be _good_, even on those - suppositions; for at most they could but suggest that it - might be _better_. - - --At any rate, they are mere assertions. - - --Instances may be alleged, in things much less out of reach, - of suppositions palpably impossible, which _all_ do not see - to be so: nor _any, at first sight_. - - 4.) It follows that our ignorance is a satisfactory answer to - all objections against the divine government. - - --An objection against an act of Providence, no way connected - with any other thing, as being unjust, could not be answered - by our ignorance. - - --But when the objection is made against an act related to - other and unknown acts, then our ignorance is a full answer. - - --Some unknown relation, or unknown impossibility, may render - the act not only good, but good in the highest degree. - - -II. _Consider some particular things, in the natural government of God, -the like of which we may infer, by analogy, to be contained in his -moral government._ - - =1.= No ends are accomplished without means. - - 1.) Often, means very disagreeable bring the most desirable - results. - - 2.) How means produce ends, is not learned by reason, but - experience. - - 3.) In many cases, before experience, we should have expected - contrary results. - - 4.) Hence we may infer that those things which are objected - against God’s moral government, produce good. - - 5.) It is evident that our not seeing _how_ the means work - good, or their seeming to have an opposite effect, offers no - presumption against their fitness to work good. - - 6.) They may not only be fit, but the _only_ means of ultimate - good. - - _Objec._ Though our capacity of vice and misery may promote - virtue, and _our_ suffering for sin be better than if we were - restrained by force, yet it would have been better if evil had - not entered the world. - - _Ans._ It is granted that though sinful acts may produce - benefits, to refrain from them would produce more. We have - curative pains, yet pain is not better than health. - - =2.= Natural government is carried on by general laws. - - 1.) Nature shows that this is best: all the good we enjoy is - because there are general laws. They enable us to _forecast_ - for the procurement of good. - - 2.) It may not be possible, by general laws, to prevent all - irregularities, or remedy them. - - 3.) Direct interpositions might perhaps remedy many disorders - arising under them, but this would have bad effects. - - --Encouraging improvidence. - - --Leaving us no rule of life. - - --Every interposition would have _distant_ effects: so that - we could not guess what would be the _whole_ result. - - · If it be replied that those distant effects might also be - corrected by direct interpositions--this is only talking at - random. - - _Objec._ If we are so ignorant as this whole argument supposes, - we are too ignorant to understand the proofs of religion. - - _Ans._ 1. Total ignorance of a subject precludes argument, but - partial ignorance does not. We may, in various degrees, know a - man’s character, and the way he is _likely_ to pursue certain - ends; and yet not know how he _ought_ to act to gain those - ends. In this case objections to his mode of pursuing ends may - be answered by our ignorance, though that he _does_ act in a - certain manner is capable of proof. So we may have evidence - of God’s character and aims, and yet not be competent judges - as to his measures. Our ignorance is a good answer to the - difficulties of religion, but no objection to religion itself. - - _Ans._ 2. If our ignorance did invalidate the proofs of - religion, as well as the objections, yet is it undeniable that - moral obligations remain unaffected by our ignorance of the - consequences of obedience or violation. The consequences of - vice and virtue may not be fully known, yet it is credible that - they may be such as religion declares: and this credibility is - an obligation, in point of prudence, to abstain from sin. - - _Ans._ 3. Our answers to the objections against religion, are - _not_ equally valid against the proofs of it. - - [Answers rehearsed.] - - _Ans._ 4. Our answers, though they may be said to be based - on our ignorance, are really not so, but on what analogy - teaches _concerning_ our ignorance,--viz.: that it renders - us incompetent judges. They are based on experience, and - what we _do know_; so that to credit religion is to trust to - experience, and to disregard it is the contrary. - - -CONCLUSION. - - =1.= The reasoning of the last chapter leads us to regard this - life as part of a larger plan of things. - - 1.) Whether we are connected with the distant _parts_ of the - universe, is uncertain; but it is very clear we are connected, - more or less, with present, past, and future. - - 2.) We are evidently in the midst of a scheme, not fixed but - progressive; and one equally incomprehensible, whether we - regard the present, past, or future. - - =2.= This scheme contains as much that is wonderful as religion - does: for it certainly would be as wonderful that all nature - came into existence without a Creator, as that there should be a - Creator: and as wonderful that the Creator should act without any - rule or scheme, as that he should act with one; or that he should - act by a bad rule, rather than a righteous one. - - =3.= Our very nature compels us to believe that the will and - character of the Author of nature, is just and good. - - =4.= Whatever be his character, he formed the world as it is, and - controls it as he does, and has assigned us our part and lot. - - =5.= Irrational creatures act their part, and receive their lot, - without reflection, but creatures endued with reason, can hardly - avoid reflecting whither we go, and what is the scheme, in the - midst of which we find ourselves. - -[Here follows a recapitulation of the book.] - - -PART II. - - -CHAPTER I. - -IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. - -Every one must admit that we _need_ a revelation. Few, if any, could -reason out a system, even of natural religion. If they could, there is -no probability that they would. Such as might, would still feel the -want of revelation. To say that Christianity is superfluous, is as wild -as to say all are happy. - -No exactness in attending to natural religion can make Christianity of -small importance. - -If Christianity be from God, we must obey, unless we know all his -reasons for giving it: and also that those reasons no longer exist; at -least in our case. This we cannot know. - -The importance of Christianity appears if we regard it - - -I. _As a republication of natural religion._ - - =1.= It gives the moral system of the universe. - - 1.) Free from corruptions; teaching that - - --Jehovah created all things. - - -- ” governs all things. - - --Virtue is his law. - - --Mankind will be judged according to character. - - 2.) It publishes its facts authoritatively. - - 3.) With vastly more clearness; e.g. the doctrines of a future - state: danger of sin: efficacy of repentance. - - 4.) With the advantage of a visible church, distinguished from - the world by peculiar institutions. - - _Objec._ The perversions of Christianity, and the little good - it has done. - - _Ans._ 1. Natural religion is no less perverted, and has - done less good. - - 2. The benefits of Christianity are _not_ small. - - 3. The evils ascribed to it, are not _its_ effects. Things - are to be judged by their genuine tendencies. - - 4. The light of reason, no more than revelation forces - acquiescence. - - 5.) With the additional advantage that every Christian, is - bound to instruct and persuade others. - - -II. _As containing truths not discoverable by natural reason._ - - =1.= A mode of salvation for the ruined. - - =2.= Duties unknown before. - - =3.= Our relations to the Son and Holy Ghost. - - 1.) Hence the form of baptism. - - 2.) Pious regards to Christ, and the Holy Ghost, based on our - relations to them. - - =4.= The manner of external worship. - - -III. _The fearful hazard of neglecting Christianity._ - - =1.= Those who think natural religion _sufficient_, must admit - that Christianity is highly _important_. - - =2.= Our relations to Christ being made known, our religious - regard to him is an evident obligation. - - =3.= These relations being real, there is no reason to think that - our neglect of behaving suitably to them, will not be attended - with the same kind of consequences as follow the neglect of - duties made known by reason. - - =4.= If we are corrupt and depraved, and so unfit for heaven, and - if we need God’s Holy Spirit to renew our nature, how can it be a - slight thing whether we make use of the means for obtaining such - assistance? - - =5.= Thus, if Christianity be either true, or merely credible, it - is most rash and presumptuous to treat it lightly. - - -REMARKS. - - =1.= The distinction between positive and moral obligations. - - 1.) For moral precepts we can see _the reason_: for positive we - cannot. - - 2.) Moral duties are such _prior_ to command; positive duties - are such _because_ commanded. - - 3.) The manner in which a duty is made known, does not make it - moral or positive. - - =2.= The ground of regarding moral duties as superior to positive. - - 1.) Both have the nature of moral commands. - - 2.) If the two conflict, we must obey the moral. - - --Positive institutions are _means_ to moral ends. - - --Ends are more excellent than means. - - --Obedience to positive institutions, has no value but as - proceeding from moral principle. - - 3.) Both moral and positive duties are _revealed_, and so are - on a level; but the moral law is _also_ interwoven with our - very nature, and so its precepts must prevail when the two - interfere. - - =3.= There is less necessity for determining their relative - authority, than some suppose. - - 1.) Though man is disposed to outward and ritual religion, - nothing can give us acceptance with God, without moral virtue. - - 2.) Scripture always lays stress on moral duties. - - 3.) It is a great weakness, though very common, to make light - of positive institutions, because less important than moral. - - --We are bound to obey _all_ God’s commands. - - --A precept, merely positive, admitted to be from God, - creates moral obligation, in the strictest sense. - - -CONCLUSION. - -This account of Christianity shows our great obligation to study the -Scriptures. - - -CHAPTER II. - -PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST A REVELATION, CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. - -Having shown the need of revelation, we now examine the presumptions -against it. - -The analogy of nature is generally supposed to afford presumptions -against miracles. - -They are deemed to require stronger evidence than other events. - - -I. _Analogy furnishes no presumptions against the general scheme of -Christianity._ - - =1.= It is no presumption against Christianity, that it is not - the discovery of reason, or of experience. - - =2.= Nor is it a presumption against Christianity, that it - contains things _unlike_ the apparent course of nature. - - 1.) We cannot suppose every thing, in the vast universe, to be - just like what is the course of nature in this little world. - - 2.) Even within the present compass of our knowledge, we see - many things greatly unlike. - - =3.= If we choose to call what is unlike our known course of - things, _miraculous_, still that does not make it _improbable_. - - -II. _There is no presumption against such a revelation, as we should -now call miraculous, being made, at the beginning of the world._ - - =1.= There was then _no_ course of nature, as to this world. - - =2.= Whether man _then_ received a revelation involves a question - not of miracles, but of _fact_. - - =3.= Creation was a very different exertion of power from that - which _rules_ the world, now it _is_ made. - - =4.= Whether the power of forming _stopped_ when man was made; or - went on, and formed a religion for him, is merely a question as - to the _degree_ or _extent_, to which a power was exerted. - - =5.= There is then no presumption from analogy against supposing - man had a revelation when created. - - =6.= All tradition and history teaches that he had, which amounts - to a real and material proof. - - -III. _There is no presumption against miracles, or a miraculous -revelation, after the course of nature was settled._ - - =1.= Such a presumption, requires the adduction of some - _parallel_ case. - - =2.= This would require us to know the history of some other - world. - - =3.= Even then, if drawn from only one other world, the - presumption would be very precarious. - - _To be more particular_, - - =1.= There is a strong presumption against any truth till it is - proved--which yet is overcome by almost any proof. - - --Hence the question of a presumption against miracles, - involves only the _degree_ of presumption, (not whether the - presumption is _peculiar_ to miracles,) and whether that - degree is such as to render them incredible. - - =2.= If we _leave out religion_, we are in total darkness as - to the cause or circumstances on which the course of nature - depends. - - --Five or six thousand years may have given occasion and - reasons for miraculous interpositions of Providence. - - =3.= _Taking in religion_, there are distinct reasons for - miracles; to afford additional instruction; to attest the truth - of instruction. - - =4.= Miracles must not be compared with common events, but with - uncommon; earthquakes, pestilence, &c. - - -CONCLUSION. - - 1. There are no analogies to render miracles incredible. - - 2. On the contrary, we see good reasons for them. - - 3. There are no presumptions against them, _peculiar_ to them, - as distinguished from other unusual phenomena. - - -CHAPTER III. - -OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT SHOULD BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION FROM -GOD. - -Beside the objectors to the _evidences_ of Christianity, there are many -who object to its _nature_. They say it is not full enough: has in it -foolish things: gives rise to superstition: subserves tyranny: is not -universally known: not well arranged: figurative language, &c. - -It is granted that if it contained _immoralities_ or _contradictions_ -they would show it to be false. But other objections against religion, -aside from objections against its evidences, are frivolous: as will now -be shown. - -Let the student look to the _force_ of the proofs, rather than any -_consequences_ which may be drawn from them. - - -I. _The Scripture informs us of a scheme of government, in addition to -the material laws of the world._ - - =1.= If both these schemes, the physical and the moral, coincide - and form one whole, then our inability to criticise the system of - nature, renders it credible that we are incompetent to criticise - the system of grace. - - =2.= Nature shows many things we should not have expected, prior - to experience. - - =3.= Hence it is altogether likely it would be so in religion. - - =4.= If a citizen is incompetent to judge of the propriety of - the _general_ laws of his government, he is equally incompetent - to judge when and how far those laws should be suspended, or - deviated from. - - -II. _We are no better judges of how revelation should be imparted._ - -Whether to every man, or to some for others; or what mode or degree -of proof should be given; or whether the knowledge should be given -gradually or suddenly. - - =1.= We are not able to judge how much new knowledge ought to be - given by revelation. - - =2.= Nor how far, nor in what way, God should qualify men to - transmit any revelation he might make. - - =3.= Nor whether the evidence should be certain, probable, or - doubtful. - - =4.= Nor whether all should have the same benefit from it. - - =5.= Nor whether it should be in writing, or verbal. If it be - said that if not in writing it would not have answered its - purpose: I ask, what purpose? Who knows what purposes would best - suit God’s _general_ government? - - =6.= All which shows it to be absurd to object to particular - things in revelation as unsuitable. - - -III. _Hence the only question, concerning the truth of revelation is, -whether it is a revelation._ - - =1.= No obscurities, &c. could overthrow the authority of a - revelation. - - =2.= It can only be overthrown by nullifying the proofs. - - =3.= Though the proofs could be shown to be less strong than is - affirmed, it still should control our conduct. - - -IV. _Modes of arguing, which are perfectly just, in relation to other -books, are not so as to the Bible._ - - =1.= We are competent judges of common books, but not of - Scripture. - - =2.= Our only inquiry should be to find out the sense. - - =3.= In other books, internal improbabilities weaken external - proof; but in regard to revelation, we scarcely know what are - improbabilities. - - 1.) Those who judge the Scripture by preconceived expectations, - will imagine they find improbabilities. - - 2.) And so they would by thus judging in natural things. - - --It would seem very improbable, prior to experience, that - man should be better able to determine the magnitudes and - motions of heavenly bodies, than he is to determine the - causes and cures of disease, which much more nearly concerns - him. - - --Or that we should sometimes hit upon a thing in an instant, - even when thinking of something else, which we had been - vainly trying to discover for years. - - --Or that language should be so liable to abuse, that every - man may be a deceiver. - - --Or that brute instinct should ever be superior to reason. - - -V. _Such observations apply to almost all objections to Christianity, -as distinguished from objections against its evidence._ - -For instance, the disorderly manner in which some, in the apostolic age -used their miraculous gifts. - - =1.= This does not prove the acts _not_ miraculous. - - =2.= The person having any such gift, would have the same power - over it which he would have over any other ability, and might - pervert it. - - =3.= To say why was he not also endued with prudence, to restrain - its use, is but saying why did not God give a _higher degree_ of - miraculous endowment? As to which we are not competent judges. - - =4.= God does not confer his _natural_ gifts, (memory, eloquence, - knowledge, &c.) only on those who are prudent and make the best - use of them. - - =5.= Nor is worldly instruction, by educators, commonly given in - the happiest manner. - - -VI. _There is a resemblance between religion and nature in several -other respects._ - - =1.= In both, common and necessary things, are plain; but to “go - on to perfection” in either, requires exact and laborious study. - - =2.= The hinderances to both religious and physical knowledge, - are the same in kind. A more perfect knowledge may be brought - about, - - 1.) By the progress of learning and liberty. - - 2.) By students attending to intimations overlooked by the - generality. - - =3.= It is not wonderful that our knowledge of Bible truth should - be small; for the natural world has laid open to inspection, for - thousands of years, and yet only lately are any great discoveries - made. - - =4.= Perhaps these scientific discoveries, are to be the means of - opening and ascertaining Bible truth. - - _Objec._ The cases are not parallel; for natural knowledge is - of no consequence, compared to spiritual. - - _Ans._ 1. The cases _are_ parallel; for natural knowledge - is as important to our natural well-being, as spiritual - knowledge is to our spiritual well-being. - - _Ans._ 2. If the cases were not parallel, there are plenty of - other analogies, which show that God does not dispense his - gifts according to _our_ notions of their value. - - _Objec._ 2. If Christianity be intended for the recovery of - men, why not sooner introduced, and more widely diffused? - - _Ans._ The objection is just as strong against the natural - sciences. Nay, if the light of nature and of revelation are - both from the same source, we might _expect_ that revelation - would have been introduced and diffused just as it is. - - 1.) Remedies for disease are known but to a few, or not - known at all, nor to any without care and study. - - 2.) When proposed by discoverers, they have been treated - with derision, and the use rejected by thousands whom they - might have cured. - - 3.) The best remedies have been used unskilfully, and so - made to produce more disease. - - 4.) Their benefit may come very slowly. - - 5.) In some cases they may be wholly ineffectual. - - 6.) They maybe so disagreeable that many will not submit to - use them, even with the prospect of a cure. - - 7.) Sometimes the remedy may be entirely out of reach if we - were ready to take it. - -All this reasoning may be applied to Christianity. - - -VII. _Having obviated all objections to Christianity, from its -containing things we should not have expected, we will now consider the -objections against its morality._ - - =1.= Reason may judge, as to whether revelation contains things - contrary to justice, and wisdom, &c. as those attributes are - taught by natural religion. But no such objections are advanced, - except such as would equally condemn the constitution of nature. - - =2.= There are indeed particular precepts, to particular persons, - which _would_ be immoral, but for the precept. The precept - changes the nature of the action. - - =3.= None are contrary to immutable morality. We are never - commanded to cultivate the principles of ingratitude, treachery, - &c. - - =4.= God may command the taking of life or property because these - are _his_. - - =5.= The only real difficulty is, that such commands are liable - to be perverted by the wicked to their own horrid purposes; and - to mislead the weak. But such objections do not lie against - revelation, as such, but against the very notion of _religion as - a trial_. - - =6.= The sum of the whole is, objections against the _scheme_ - of Christianity do not affect its truth; since there are no - objections against its morality. Hence objections against it, - aside from its evidences, are frivolous. Objections against the - _evidence_, will be considered in a subsequent chapter, [_i.e._ - ch. vii.] - - -CHAPTER IV. - -CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY UNDERSTOOD. - -In the last chapter it was shown that we might expect, beforehand, that -a revelation would contain strange things, and things liable to great -objections. - -This abates the force of such objections, or rather precludes them. - -But it may be said this does not show such objectionable things to be -good, or credible. - -It was a sufficient answer [ch. vii. part i.] to objections against the -course of nature, that it was a _scheme_, imperfectly comprehended. - -If Christianity be a scheme, the like objections admit of a like answer. - -[In studying this chapter, let chap. vii. part i. be kept in view.] - - -I. _Christianity is a scheme, beyond our comprehension._ - - =1.= God’s _general_ plan is to conduct things _gradually_, so - that, finally, every one shall receive what he deserves. - - =2.= Christianity is a _particular_ arrangement, under this - general plan: is a part of it, and conduces to its completion. - - =3.= It is itself a complicated and mysterious economy. - - 1.) Its arrangements began from the fall of man. - - 2.) Various dispensations, patriarchal, prophetic, &c. were - preparatory to it. - - 3.) At a certain juncture in the condition of the world Jesus - Christ came. - - 4.) The mission of the Holy Ghost was part of this economy. - - 5.) Christ now presides over it, and will establish the church, - judge the world, give up the kingdom, &c. &c. - - =4.= Of course, we can comprehend but little of such a scheme. - - =5.= We plainly see, from what is revealed, that there is very - much unrevealed. - - =6.= Thus it is evident that we are as little capable of judging - as to the whole system of religion, as we are as to the whole - system of nature. - - -II. _In both material and spiritual things, means are used to -accomplish ends._ - - =1.= Hence a thing may seem foolish to us, because we do not know - its object and end. - - =2.= Its seeming foolish to us, is no proof that it is so. - - -III. _Christianity is carried on by general laws, no less than nature._ - - =1.= Why do we say there are _laws of nature_? - - 1.) We indeed know some such. But nothing of the laws of many - things, _e.g._ - - · Pestilence. - · Storms. - · Earthquakes. - · Diversities of human powers. - · Association of ideas. - - 2.) Hence we call many things _accidental_, which we know are - not matters of chance, but are subject to general laws. - - 3.) It is a very little way that we can trace things to their - general laws. - - 4.) We attribute many things to such laws, only by analogy. - - =2.= Just for the same reasons, we say that miracles comport with - God’s _general laws of wisdom_. These laws may be unknown to us; - but no more so than those by which some die as soon as born, or - live to old age, or have superior understandings, &c. - - =3.= We see no more reason to regard the frame and course of - nature as a scheme, than we have to regard Christianity as such. - - 1.) If the first is a scheme, then Christianity, if true, would - be _likely_ to be a scheme. - - 2.) As Christianity is revealed but in part, and is an - arrangement to accomplish ends, there would of course seem to - us, in it, irregularities; just as we see in nature. - - 3.) Therefore objections against the one, are answered in the - same manner as objections against the other. - - * * * * * - -Having, in a previous chapter, [ch. iii.,] answered objections to -Christianity _as a matter of fact_, and in this, as a general question -of _wisdom and goodness_, the next thing is to discuss _objections in -particular_. - -As one of these is directed against _the scheme_, as just now -described, it will be considered here. - - _Objec._ Christianity is a roundabout, and perplexed contrivance; - just such as men, for want of understanding or power, are obliged - to adopt, in their designs. - - _Ans._ 1.) God uses just such complex arrangements in the - natural world. The mystery is quite as great in nature as in - grace. - - 2.) We do not know what are means, and what are ends. - - 3.) The natural world, and its government, are not fixed, but - progressive. - - 4.) Great length of time is required in some changes; _e.g._ - animals, vegetables, geological periods, &c. - - 5.) One state of life is a preparation and means for attaining - another. - - 6.) Man is impatient, but Jehovah deliberate. - - -CHAPTER V. - -OF A MEDIATOR, AND REDEMPTION BY HIM. - -Nothing in Christianity is so much objected to as the position assigned -to Christ; yet nothing is more unjust. The whole world exhibits -mediation. - - -I. _Our existence, and all its satisfactions, are by the medium of -others._ - - =1.= If so in the natural world, why not in the spiritual? - - =2.= The objection therefore is not only against _Christ’s_ - mediation, but _all_ mediation. - - -II. _We cannot know all the ends for which God punishes, nor by whom he -should punish._ - - =1.= Future punishment may be as natural a sequence of sin, as a - broken limb is of falling from a precipice. - - =2.= This is not taking punishment out of the hands of God, and - giving it to nature; it is only distinguishing ordinary events - from miraculous. - - -III. _In natural providence, God has made provision that the bad -consequences of actions do not always follow._ - - =1.= We may say God could have prevented all evil. But we see he - permits it, and has provided relief, and even sometimes perfect - remedies for it. - - 1.) Thus the bad consequences of trifling on a precipice may be - prevented by a friend, if we do not reject his assistance. - - 2.) We may ourselves do much towards preventing the bad - consequences of our misdeeds. - - 3.) Still more if assisted. - - =2.= It might have been perfectly just if it were not so; but - that it is so, shows compassion, as distinguished from goodness. - - =3.= The course of nature affords many instances of such - compassion. - - =4.= Thus analogy sanctions an arrangement, by which the ruinous - consequences of vice or folly may be averted, at least in some - cases. - - =5.= If the consequences of rash and inconsiderate acts, which - we scarcely call vicious, are often so serious, we may apprehend - that the bad consequences will be greater, in proportion as the - irregularity is greater. - - =6.= A dissolute disregard to all religion, if there be a - religion, is incomparably more reprehensible than the mere - neglects, imprudencies, &c. of this life. - - =7.= As the effects of worldly imprudence and vice are often - misery, ruin, and even death, no one can say what may be - the consequences of blasphemy, contempt of God, and final - impenitence. - - =8.= Nor can any one tell, how far the consequences of such great - wickedness can possibly be prevented, consistently with the - eternal rule of right. - - =9.= Still there would, from analogy, be some hope of room for - pardon. - - -IV. _There is no probability that any thing we could do alone, would -entirely prevent the effects of our irregularities._ - - =1.= We do not know all the reasons for punishment, nor why it - should be fit to remit punishment. - - =2.= Nor do we know all the consequences of vice, and so should - not know how to prevent them. - - =3.= Vice impairs men’s abilities for helping themselves. - - =4.= Misconduct makes assistance necessary, which otherwise would - not have been. Why should not the same things be so, as to our - future interests? - - =5.= In temporal things, behaving well in time to come, does not - repair old errors, why should it as to future things? - - =6.= Were it so in _all cases_ it would be contrary to all our - notions of government. - - =7.= It could not be determined in what degree, or in what cases, - it would be so, even if we knew it might in _some_ cases. - - =8.= The efficacy of repentance, as urged in opposition to - atonement, is contrary to the general sense of mankind; as shown - by the prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices. - - -V. _In this state of apprehension, awakened by the light of nature, -revelation comes in, and teaches positively, the possibility of pardon -and safety._ - - =1.= Confirms our fears as to the unprevented consequences of sin. - - =2.= Declares the world to be in a state of ruin. - - =3.= That repentance alone will not secure pardon. - - =4.= That there is a mode of pardon, by interposition. - - =5.= That God’s moral government is compassionate, as well as his - natural government. - - =6.= That he has provided, by the interposition of a mediator, to - save men. - - =7.= All this seems to put man in a strange state of helpless - degradation. But it is not Christianity which puts him so. All - philosophy and history show man to be degraded and corrupt. - - -VI. _Scripture, in addition to confirming the dim testimony of the -light of nature, reveals a Christ, as mediator and propitiatory -sacrifice._ - - =1.= He is “_that prophet_.” - - 1.) Declared the will of God. - - 2.) Published anew the law of nature. - - 3.) Taught with authority. - - 4.) Revealed the right manner of worship. - - 5.) Revealed the exact use of repentance. - - 6.) Revealed future rewards and punishments. - - 7.) Set us a perfect example. - - =2.= He has a _kingdom_ which is not of this world. - - 1.) Founded a church. - - 2.) Governs it. - - 3.) Of it, all who obey him are members. - - 4.) Each of these shall live and reign with him forever. - - =3.= He is a propitiatory _sacrifice_. - - 1.) How his sacrifice becomes efficacious, we are not exactly - told. - - 2.) Conjectures may be absurd; at least cannot be certain. - - 3.) If any complain for want of further instruction, let him - produce his claim to it. - - 4.) Some, because they cannot explain, leave it out of their - creed; and regard Christ only as a teacher. - - 5.) We had better accept the benefit, without disputing about - how it was procured. - - -VII. _We are not judges, antecedent to revelation, whether a mediator -was necessary, nor what should be the whole nature of his office._ - - =1.= We know not how future punishment would have been inflicted. - - =2.= Nor all the reasons why it would be necessary. - - =3.= The satisfaction by Christ, does not represent God as - indifferent whether he punishes the innocent or guilty. - - 1.) We see, in this world, the innocent _forced_ to suffer for - the faults of the guilty. - - 2.) But Christ suffered _voluntarily_. - - =4.= Though, finally, every one shall receive according to - his own deserts; yet, during the progress of God’s scheme, - _vicarious_ sufferings may be necessary. - - 1.) God commands us to assist others, though in many cases it - costs us suffering and toil. - - 2.) One person’s sufferings often tend to relieve another. - - =5.= Vicarious atonement for sinners, serves to vindicate the - authority of God’s laws, and to deter men from sin. - - =6.= Objections to vicarious suffering are obviously not - objections to Christianity, but to the whole course of nature. - - =7.= The objection, therefore, amounts to nothing more than - saying that a divine arrangement is not necessary, or fit, - because the objector does not see it to be so; though he must - own he is no judge, and _could_ not understand why it should be - necessary, if it were so! - - -VIII. _We have no reason to expect the same information touching God’s -conduct, as we have in relation to our own duty._ - - =1.= God instructs us by experience. - - =2.= This experience, though sufficient for our purposes, is an - infinitely small part of his providence. - - =3.= The things not understood involve God’s appointment, and - Christ’s execution; but what _is required of us_, we are clearly - informed. - - =4.= Even the reasons for Christian precepts are made obvious. - - -CHAPTER VI. - -SUPPOSED LACK OF PROOF OF REVELATION, AND ITS WANT OF UNIVERSALITY. - -It has been thought to be a positive argument against revelation, that -its evidences are not adequate, and that it is not universally known -and believed. - -But the argument amounts to just this, that God would not bestow on us -any favor, except in such a mode and degree as we thought best, and did -exactly the same for everybody else. - -Such a notion, all analogy contradicts. - - -I. _Men act in their most important concerns on doubtful evidence._ - - =1.= It is often absolutely _impossible_ to say which of two - modes of acting will give most pleasure or profit. - - =2.= If it were possible, we cannot know what changes temper, - satiety, ill health, &c. might produce, so as to destroy our - pleasure. - - =3.= We cannot foresee what accidents may cut it all off. - - =4.= Strong objections and difficulties may attach to the course - of action we adopt, which yet all would admit ought not to deter - us. - - =5.= We may, after all, be deceived by appearances, or by our - passions, &c. - - =6.= Men think it reasonable to engage in pursuit of advantage, - even when the probabilities of success are against them. - - -II. _As to the light of Christianity not being universal._ - - =1.= Temporal good is enjoyed in very different degrees even - among creatures of the same species. - - =2.= Yet it is certain that God governs. - - =3.= We may prudently or imprudently use our good things. - - =4.= The Jewish religion was not universal. - - =5.= If it be _intended_ that Christianity should be a small - light, shining in a great and wide-spread darkness, it would be - perfectly uniform with other parts of God’s providence. - - =6.= If some have Christianity so corrupted, and interpolated, as - to cause thoughtful persons to doubt it, as is the case in some - countries; and if, where it is the purest, some learn much less - from it than they might, there are manifest parallels in God’s - natural dispensations. - - =7.= No more is expected of any one, than is equitable under his - circumstances. - - =8.= Every one is bound to get rid of his ignorance, as far as he - can, and to instruct his neighbor. - - =9.= If revelation _were_ universal, in extent and degree, - different understandings, educations, tempers, length of lives, - and outward advantages, would soon make the knowledge of it as - different as it is at present. - - -III. _Practical reflections._ - - _First._ That the evidence of religion is not such as unavoidably - to convince all, may be part of our probation. - - =1.= It gives scope for a wise or vicious use of our - understanding. Just as is the case in common affairs. - - =2.= Intellectual inattention to so serious a matter, is as - immoral, as disobedience after conviction of the truth. - - _Secondly._ If the evidence is really doubtful, it puts us on - probation. - - =1.= If a man were in doubt whether a certain person had done - him the greatest favor, or whether his whole temporal interest - depended on him, he ought not to regard that person as he would - if there were _no_ reason to think so. - - =2.= So if there is only reason to apprehend that Christianity - _may_ be true, we are as much bound to _examine_, &c. as we - would be bound to _obey_, if we _knew_ it was true. - - =3.= Considering the infinite importance of religion, there is - not much difference as to what ought to be the mode of life of - those who are convinced and those who doubt its truth. Their - hopes and fears are the same in kind, though not in degree; and - so their obligations are much the same. - - =4.= Doubts presuppose _some_ evidence, belief _more_, and - certainty _more still_. Each state should influence our - conduct, and does so, in common things. - - =5.= It shows a mental defect not to see evidence unless it is - glaring; and a corrupt heart not to be influenced by it unless - overpowering. - - _Thirdly._ Difficulties as to believing religion, are no more a - ground of complaint, than difficulties in practising it. - - =1.= They constitute a wholesome discipline. - - 1.) In allowing an unfair mind to deceive itself. - - 2.) In requiring belief and the practice of virtue under some - uncertainties. - - =2.= In the case of some minds, speculative difficulties as - to the evidence of religion is the _principal_ trial. A full - conviction of its truth would _constrain_ some to obedience. - - _Fourthly._ The difficulties may be _in the objector_ rather than - in the religion. - - =1.= Not sufficiently in earnest to be informed. - - =2.= Secretly _wishes_ religion not to be true. - - =3.= Looks at objections rather than replies. - - =4.= Treats the subject ludicrously. - - _Fifthly._ The proof of Christianity is level to common men. - - =1.= They are capable of being convinced of the existence of - God, and of their moral accountability. - - =2.= And they can understand the evidence of miracles, and the - fulfilment of prophecy. - - =3.= If they are capable of seeing the difficulty, they are - capable of understanding the proof. - - =4.= If they pick up objections from hearsay, and will not or - cannot examine them thoroughly, they must remain ignorant, just - as they do as to the sciences. - - _Objec._ Our directions should be too plain to _admit_ of - doubt; like those of an earthly master. - - _Ans._ The earthly master only wants his work done, and is - careless as to the state of the heart; but as the whole of - morality consists in the state of the heart, the cases are - not parallel. - - _Finally._ The credibility of our being in a state of probation - is just as great as the credibility of there being any religion. - Our probation may be whether we choose to inform ourselves as to - our duty, and then whether we choose to do it. - - Such is exactly the case as to temporal matters. To discern what - is best often requires difficult consideration, and yet leaves - doubts: and not reflecting carefully, or not acting even when - there may be doubt, is often fatal. - - -CHAPTER VII. - -POSITIVE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY. - -Having considered the objections both to the general scheme of -Christianity, and to particular doctrines in it, it only remains to -consider the positive evidence of its truth; _i.e._ what analogy -teaches with regard to that evidence. - -There are many evidences of Christianity, beside those from miracles or -prophecy, which are the principal; embracing a great variety of proofs, -direct and collateral, and reaching through all past time. We shall now -consider the proofs from MIRACLES and PROPHECY. - - -I. _Miracles._ - - =1.= Bible history gives the same evidence for the miracles - described, as for common events. - - 1.) The miracles are evidently not put in for ornament, as - speeches are by historians and poets put into the mouths of - heroes. - - 2.) The accounts of them have been quoted as genuine, by - various writers, from that day to this. - - 3.) These accounts are confirmed by subsequent events; and the - miracles alone, can account for those events. - - 4.) The only fair way of accounting for these statements, - and their reception in the world, is that the things really - happened. - - 5.) The statements should be admitted till disproved, even if - doubtful. - - =2.= Paul’s Epistles have evidences of genuineness, beyond what - can attach to mere history. - - 1.) _Additional._ His evidence is quite detached. He received - the gospel not in common with the other apostles, but - separately, and direct from Christ, _after_ his ascension. - - 2.) _Peculiar._ He speaks of Christ’s miracles and those of - others _incidentally_, as familiar facts, fully believed by - those to whom he wrote. - - =3.= Christianity demands credence on the ground of its miracles, - and was so received by great numbers, at the time and on the - spot; which is the case with no other religion. - - 1.) Its first converts embraced it on this ground. - - 2.) It is not conceivable that they would have done so, at such - fearful sacrifice, unless fully satisfied of the truth of these - miracles. - - 3.) Such a profession and sacrifices furnish the same kind of - evidence as if they had testified to the truth of the miracles - in writing. - - 4.) It is real evidence, for they had full opportunity to - inform themselves. - - 5.) It is a sort of evidence _distinct_ from direct history, - though of the same nature. - - 6.) Men are suspicious as well as credulous, and slow to - believe _against their interests_, as these did. - - =4.= It lies upon unbelievers to show why all this array of proof - is to be rejected; but in such an important concern we shall - proceed to notice some possible objections. - - _Objec._ 1. Enthusiasts make similar sacrifices for idle - follies. - - _Ans._ 1. This objection ignores the distinction between - opinions and facts. Suffering for an opinion is no proof of - its truth; but in attestation of observed facts, it is proof. - - 2. Enthusiasm _weakens_ testimony, it is true, even as to - facts; and so does disease, _in particular instances_. But - when great numbers, not weak, nor negligent, affirm that - _they_ saw and heard certain things, it is the fullest - evidence. - - 3. To reject testimony on the ground of enthusiasm, requires - that the things testified be _incredible_; which has not been - shown, as to religion, but the contrary. - - 4. Religion is not the only thing in regard to which - witnesses are liable to enthusiasm. In common matters, we - _get at the truth_ through witnesses, though influenced by - party spirit, custom, humor, romance, &c. &c. - - _Objec._ 2. Enthusiasm and knavery may have been combined in the - apostles and first Christians. - - _Ans._ Such a mixture is often seen, and is often reproved in - Scripture; but not more in religious than in common affairs. - Men in all matters deceive themselves and others, in every - degree, yet human testimony is good ground of belief. - - _Objec._ 3. Men have been deluded by false miracles. - - _Ans._ Not oftener than by other pretences. - - _Objec._ 4. Fabulous miracles have historical evidence. - - _Ans._ 1. If this were equal to that for Scripture miracles, - the evidence for the latter would not be _impaired_. The - objection really amounts to this, that evidence proved not to - be good, destroys evidence which is good and unconfuted! Or - to this, that if two men, of equal reputation, testify, in - _cases not related_ to each other, and one is proved false, - the other must not be believed! - - 2. Nothing can rebut testimony, but proof that the witness is - incompetent, or misled. - - 3. Against all such objections must be set the fact that - Christianity was too serious a matter to allow the first - converts to be careless as to its evidence; and also that - their religion forbid them to deceive others. - - -II. _As to the evidence from prophecy._ - - =1.= Obscurity as to _part_ of a prophecy does not invalidate it, - but is, as to us, as if that part were not written, or were lost. - We may not see the whole prophecy fulfilled, and yet see enough - fulfilled to perceive in it more than human foresight. - - =2.= A _long series_ of prophecies, all applicable to certain - events, is proof that such events were intended. This answers the - objection that _particular_ prophecies were not intended to be - applied as Christians apply them. - - Mythological and satirical writings greatly resemble prophecy. - Now we apply a parable, or fable, or satire, merely from seeing - it _capable_ of such application. - - So if a long series of prophecies be _applicable_ to the present - state of the world, or to the coming of Christ, it is proof that - they were so _intended_. - - Besides, the ancient Jews, _before_ Christ, applied the - prophecies to him, just as Christians do now. - - =3.= If it could be shown that the prophets did not understand - their own predictions, or that their prophecies are capable of - being applied to other events than those to which Christians - apply them, it would not abate the force of the argument from - prophecy, even with regard to those instances. For, - - 1.) To know the whole meaning of an author we must know the - whole meaning of his book, but knowing the meaning of a book is - not knowing the whole mind of the author. - - 2.) If the book is a _compilation_, the authors may have - meanings deeper than the compiler saw. If the prophets spoke - by inspiration, they are not the authors, but the writers of - prophecy, and may not have known all that the Divine Spirit - intended. But the fulfilment of the prophecy shows a foresight - more than human. - - -REMARK. - -This whole argument is just and real; but it is not expected that those -will be satisfied who will not submit to the perplexity and labor -of understanding it; or who have not modesty and fairness enough to -allow an argument its due weight; or who wilfully discard the whole -investigation. - - -THE GENERAL ARGUMENT - -We _now_ proceed to THE GENERAL ARGUMENT embracing both direct and -circumstantial evidence. A full discussion would require a volume, and -cannot be expected here; but _something_ should be said, especially -as most questions of difficulty, in practical affairs, are settled by -evidence arising from circumstances which confirm each other. - -The thing asserted is that God has given us a revelation declaring -himself to be a moral governor; stating his system of government; and -disclosing a plan for the recovery of mankind out of sin, and raising -them to perfect and final happiness. - - -I. _Consider this revelation as a history._ - - =1.= It furnishes an account of the world, as God’s world. - - 1.) God’s providence, commands, promises, and threatenings. - - 2.) Distinguishes God from idols. - - 3.) Describes the condition of religion and of its professors, - in a world considered as apostate and wicked. - - 4.) Political events are related as affecting religion, and not - for their importance as mere political events. - - 5.) The history is continued by prophecy, to the end of the - world. - - =2.= It embraces a vast variety of other topics; natural and - moral. - - 1.) Thus furnishing the largest scope for criticism. - - 2.) So that _doubts_ of its truth confirm that truth, for in - this enlightened age the claims of a book of such a nature - could be easily and finally shown to be false, if they were so. - - 3.) None who believe in natural religion, hold that - Christianity has been thus confuted. - - =3.= It contains a minute account of God’s selecting one nation - for his peculiar people, and of his dealings with them. - - 1.) Interpositions in their behalf. - - 2.) Threats of dispersion, &c. if they rebelled. - - 3.) Promises of a Messiah as their prince; so clearly as to - raise a general expectation, &c. - - 4.) Foretelling his rejection by them, and that he should be - the Savior of the Gentiles. - - =4.= Describes minutely the arrival of the Messiah, and his - life and labors; and the result, in the establishment of a new - religion. - - -II. _As to the authenticity of this history._ - -Suppose a person ignorant of all history but the Bible, and not -knowing even that to be true, were to inquire into its evidence of -authenticity, he would find, - - =1.= That natural religion owes its establishment to _the - truths_ contained in this book. This no more _disproves_ natural - religion, than our learning a proposition from Euclid, shows that - the proposition was not true before Euclid. - - =2.= The great antiquity of revelation. - - =3.= That its chronology is not contradicted but confirmed by - known facts. - - =4.= That there is nothing in the history itself to awaken - suspicion of its fidelity. - - 1.) Every thing said to be done in any age or country, is - conformable to the manners of that age and country. - - 2.) The characters are all perfectly natural. - - 3.) All the domestic and political incidents are credible. Some - of these, taken alone, seem strange to _some_, in _this_ day; - but not more so than things now occurring. - - 4.) Transcribers may have made errors, but these are not more - numerous than in other ancient books; and none of them impair - the narrative. - - =5.= That profane authors confirm Scripture accounts. - - =6.= That the credibility of the _general_ history, confirms the - accounts of the miracles, for they are all interwoven, and make - but one statement. - - =7.= That there certainly was and is such a people as the Jews; - whose form of government was founded on these very books of - Moses; and whose acknowledgment of the God of the Bible, kept - them a distinct race. - - =8.= That one Jesus, of Jewish extraction, arose at the time - when the Jews expected a Messiah, was rejected by them, as was - prophesied, and was received by the Gentiles, as was prophesied. - - =9.= That the religion of this Jesus spread till it became the - religion of the world, notwithstanding every sort of resistance; - and has continued till now. - - =10.= That the Jewish government was destroyed, and the people - dispersed into all lands; and still for many centuries, continue - to be a distinct race, professing the law of Moses. If this - separateness be _accounted for_, in any way, it does not destroy - the fact that it was _predicted_. - - -CONCLUSION. - - =1.= Recapitulation of the preceding ten observations. - - =2.= Add the fact that there are obvious appearances in the - world, aside from the Jews, which correspond to prophetic history. - - =3.= These appearances, compared with Bible history, and with - each other, in _a joint view_, will appear to be of great weight, - and would impress one who regarded them for the first time, more - than they do us who have been familiar with them. - - =4.= The preceding discussion, though not thorough, amounts to - proof of something more than human in this matter. - - 1.) The sufficiency of these proofs may be denied, but the - _existence_ of them cannot be. - - 2.) The conformity of prophecies to events may be said to be - accidental, but the _conformity itself_ cannot be denied. - - 3.) These collateral proofs may be pronounced fanciful, but it - cannot be said they are _nothing_. Probabilities may not amount - to demonstration, but they remain probabilities. - - =5.= Those who will set down all seeming completions of prophecy, - and judge of them by the common rules of evidence, will find that - _together_ they amount to strong proof. Because probable proofs, - added together, not only increase evidence, but multiply it. - - =6.= It is very well to observe objections; but it should be - remembered that a mistake on one side is far more dangerous than - a mistake on the other; and the safest conclusion is the best. - - =7.= Religion, like other things, is to be judged by all the - evidence taken together. Unless _all_ its proofs be overthrown, - it remains proved. If no proof singly were sufficient, the whole - taken together might be. - - =8.= It is much easier to start an objection, than to comprehend - the united force of a whole argument. - - =9.= Thus it appears that the positive evidence of revelation - cannot be destroyed, though it should be lessened. - - -CHAPTER VIII. - -OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT. - -If all made up their minds with proper care and candor, there would be -no need of this chapter. But some do not try to understand what they -condemn; and our mode of argument is open to objections, especially in -the minds of those who judge without thinking. The chief objections -will therefore be considered. They are these:--it does not solve -difficulties in revelation to say that there are as great in natural -religion:--it will not make men religious to show them that it is -_as_ important as worldly prudence, for showing that, does not make -them prudent:--the justice of God in the system of religion, is not -proved by showing it is as apparent as in his natural providence:--no -reasoning from analogy can carry full conviction:--mankind will not -renounce present pleasures, for a religion which is not free from -doubt. To each of which a reply will now be given. - - -I. _As to requiring a solution of all difficulties._ - - =1.= This is but resolving to comprehend the nature of God, and - the whole plan of his government throughout eternity. - - =2.= It is always right to argue from what is known, to what is - disputed. We are constantly so doing. The most eminent physician - does not understand all diseases, yet we do not despise what he - does know. - - =3.= It is very important to find that objections against - revelation are just as strong, not only against natural religion, - but against the course of nature. - - -II. _As to men’s having as little reason for worldly pursuits, as they -have for being religious._ - - =1.= If men can be convinced that they have as much reason to be - religious as they have to practise worldly prudence, then _there - is_ a reason for being religious. - - =2.= If religion proposes greater than worldly interests, and has - the same reasons for belief, then it has proportionally a greater - claim. - - =3.= If religion being left doubtful, proves it to be false, then - doubts as to the success of any worldly pursuit show it to be - wrong. Yet we constantly act, even in the most important affairs, - without _certainty_ of being right. - - -III. _As to the justice and goodness of God in religion._ - - =1.= Our business is not to vindicate God, but to learn our duty, - governed as we are; which is a very different thing. It has been - shown that if we knew all things, present, past, and future, and - the relations of each thing to all other things, we might see to - be just and good what now do not seem so: and it is probable we - should. - - =2.= We do not say that objections against God’s justice and - goodness are removed by showing the like objections against - natural providence, but that they are not _conclusive_, because - they apply equally to what we know to be facts. - - =3.= The existence of objections does not destroy the evidence - of facts. The fact for instance that God rewards and punishes, - though men may think it unjust. Even necessity, plead for human - acts, does no more to abolish justice than it does injustice. - - =4.= Though the reasonableness of Christianity cannot be shown - from analogy, the truth of it may. The truth of a fact may be - proved without regard to its quality. The reasonableness of - obeying Christianity is proved, if we barely prove Christianity - itself to be possible. - - =5.= Though analogy may not show Christian precepts to be good, - it proves them to be credible. - - -IV. _The analogical argument does not remove doubt._ - - =1.= What opinion does any man hold, about which there can be no - doubt? Even the best way of preserving and enjoying this life, - is not agreed upon. Whether our measures will accomplish our - objects, is always uncertain; and still more whether the objects, - if accomplished, will give us happiness. Yet men do not on this - account refuse to make exertion. - - =2.= This objection overlooks the very nature of religion. - The embracing of it presupposes a certain degree of candor - and integrity, to try which, and exercise, and improve it, is - its intention. Just as warning a man of danger, presupposes a - disposition to avoid danger. - - =3.= Religion is a probation, and has evidence enough as such; - and would not be such, if it compelled assent. - - =4.= We never mean by sufficient evidence, such an amount as - necessarily determines a man to act, but only such as will show - an action to be prudent. - - -V. _As to the small influence of the analogical argument._ - - =1.= As just observed, religion is a _test_, and an _exercise_, - of character; and that some reject it is nothing to our purpose. - We are inquiring not what sort of creature man is, but what he - should be. This is each man’s own concern. - - =2.= Religion, as a probation, accomplishes its end, whether - individuals believe or not. - - =3.= Even this objection admits that religion has some weight, - and of course it should have some influence; and if so, there is - the same reason, though not so strong, for publishing it, that - there would be, if it were likely to have greater influence. - -FURTHER. It must be considered that the reasoning in this treatise is -on the principles of other men, and arguments of the utmost importance -are omitted, because not universally admitted. Thus as to Fatalism, and -the abstract fitness or unfitness of actions. The general argument is -just a question of fact, and is here so treated. Abstract truths are -usually advanced as proof; but in this work, only _facts_ are adduced. -That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, is -an abstract truth: but that they so appear to us, is only a matter of -fact. That there is such a thing as abstract right and wrong, which -determines the will of God in rewarding and punishing, is an assertion -of an abstract truth, as well as a fact. Suppose God in this world -rewarded and punished every man exactly as he obeyed or disobeyed his -conscience, this would not be an abstract truth, but a fact. And if -all acknowledged this as a fact, all would not see it to be right. If, -instead of his doing it now, we say he will do it hereafter, this too -is not an abstract truth, but a question of fact. This fact could be -fully proved on the abstract principles of moral fitness; but without -them, there has now been given a _conclusive practical proof_; which -though it may be cavilled at, and shown not to amount to demonstration, -cannot be answered. - -Hence it may be said as to the force of this treatise, - - =1.= To such as are convinced of the truth of revelation, as - proved on the principles of liberty and moral fitness, it will - furnish a full confirmation. To such as do not admit those - principles it is an original proof. - - =2.= Those who believe will find objections removed, and - those who disbelieve will find they have no grounds for their - scepticism; and a good deal beside. - - =3.= Thus though some may think _too much_ is here made of - analogy, yet there can be no denying that the argument is _real_. - It confirms _all facts_ to which it can be applied; and of - many is the only proof. It is strong on the side of religion, - and ought to be regarded by such as prefer facts to abstract - reasonings. - - -CONCLUSION. - -Recapitulates the general structure and design of the argument, the -classes of persons for whose benefit it is particularly adopted, and -declares those who reject Christianity to be wholly without excuse. - - - - -Advertisement prefixed to the First Edition. - - -If the reader should here meet with any thing which he had not before -attended to, it will not be in the observations upon the constitution -and course of nature, these being all obvious, but in the application -of them; in which, though there is nothing but what appears to me -of some real weight, and therefore of great importance, yet he will -observe several things, which will appear to him of very little, if -he can think things to be of little importance, which are of any real -weight at all, upon such a subject of religion. However, the proper -force of the following treatise lies in the whole general analogy -considered together. - -It is come, I know not how to be taken for granted, by many persons, -that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry; but that -it is, now at length, discovered to be fictitious. Accordingly they -treat it, as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among -all people of discernment; and nothing remained, but to set it up -as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of -reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the -world. On the contrary, thus much at least, will be here found, not -taken for granted but proved, that any reasonable man, who will -thoroughly consider the matter, may be as much assured, as he is of his -own being, that it is not so clear a case, that there is nothing in -it. There is, I think, strong evidence of its truth; but it is certain -no one can, upon principles of reason, be satisfied of the contrary. -The practical consequence to be drawn from this, is not attended to by -every one who is concerned in it. - -_May, 1736._ - - - - -INTRODUCTION. - - -Probable evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by -this, that it admits of degrees; and of all variety of them, from the -highest moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption. We cannot -indeed say a thing is probably true upon one very slight presumption -for it; because, as there may be probabilities on both sides of a -question, there may be some against it; and though there be not, yet -a slight presumption does not beget that degree of conviction, which -is implied in saying a thing is probably true. But that the slightest -possible presumption is of the nature of a probability, appears from -hence; that such low presumption, often repeated, will amount even -to moral certainty. Thus a man’s having observed the ebb and flow of -the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though the lowest -imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow: but the observation of -this event for so many days, and months, and ages together, as it has -been observed by mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will. - -That which chiefly constitutes _probability_ is expressed in the word -_likely_, _i.e._ like some truth,[6] or true event; like it, in itself, -in its evidence, in some (more or fewer) of its circumstances.[7] For -when we determine a thing to be probably true, suppose that an event -has or will come to pass, it is from the mind’s remarking in it a -likeness to some other event, which we have observed has come to pass. -This observation forms, in numberless daily instances, a presumption, -opinion, or full conviction, that such event has or will come to pass; -according as the observation is, that the like event has sometimes, -most commonly, or always, so far as our observation reaches, come to -pass at like distances of time, or place, or upon like occasions. Hence -arises the belief, that a child, if it lives twenty years, will grow -up to the stature and strength of a man; that food will contribute to -the preservation of its life, and the want of it for such a number of -days, be its certain destruction. So likewise the rule and measure -of our hopes and fears concerning the success of our pursuits; our -expectations that others will act so and so in such circumstances; and -our judgment that such actions proceed from such principles; all these -rely upon our having observed the like to what we hope, fear, expect, -judge; I say, upon our having observed the like, either with respect to -others or ourselves. Thus, the prince[8] who had always lived in a warm -climate, naturally concluded in the way of analogy, that there was no -such thing as water’s becoming hard, because he had always observed it -to be fluid and yielding. We, on the contrary, from analogy conclude, -that there is no presumption at all against this: that it is supposable -there may be frost in England any given day in January next; probable -that there will on some day of the month; and that there is a moral -certainty, _i.e._ ground for an expectation without any doubt of it, in -some part or other of the winter. - -Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect kind -of information; and is to be considered as relative only to beings -of limited capacities. For nothing which is the possible object of -knowledge, whether past, present, or future, can be probable to an -infinite intelligence; since it cannot but be discerned absolutely -as it is in itself, certainly true, or certainly false. But to us, -probability is the very guide of life. - -From these things it follows, that in questions of difficulty, or such -as are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence cannot be had, or -is not seen; if the result of examination be, that there appears upon -the whole, any even the lowest presumption on one side, and none on -the other, or a greater presumption on one side, though in the lowest -degree greater; this determines the question, even in matters of -speculation. In matters of practice, it will lay us under an absolute -and formal obligation, in point of prudence and of interest, to act -upon that presumption or low probability, though it be so low as to -leave the mind in very great doubt which is the truth. For surely a -man is as really bound in prudence to do what upon the whole, according -to the best of his judgment, appears to be for his happiness,[9] as -what he certainly knows to be so. - -Further, in questions of great consequence, a reasonable man will think -it concerns him to remark lower probabilities and presumptions than -these; such as amount to no more than showing one side of a question -to be as supposable and credible as the other: nay, such even as but -amount to much less than this. For numberless instances might be -mentioned respecting the common pursuits of life, where a man would -be thought, in a literal sense, distracted, who would not act, and -with great application too, not only upon an even chance, but upon -much less, and where the probability or chance was greatly against his -succeeding.[10] - -It is not my design to inquire further into the nature, the foundation, -and measure of probability; or whence it proceeds that _likeness_ -should beget that presumption, opinion, and full conviction, which -the human mind is formed to receive from it, and which it does -necessarily produce in every one; or to guard against the errors, to -which reasoning from analogy is liable. This belongs to the subject of -Logic; and is a part of that subject which has not yet been thoroughly -considered. Indeed I shall not take upon me to say, how far the extent, -compass, and force, of analogical reasoning, can be reduced to general -heads and rules; and the whole be formed into a system. But though so -little in this way has been attempted by those who have treated of our -intellectual powers, and the exercise of them; this does not hinder but -that we may be, as we unquestionably are, assured, that analogy is of -weight, in various degrees, towards determining our judgment and our -practice. Nor does it in any wise cease to be of weight in those cases, -because persons, either given to dispute, or who require things to be -stated with greater exactness than our faculties appear to admit of -in practical matters, may find other cases in which it is not easy to -say, whether it be, or be not, of any weight; or instances of seeming -analogies, which are really of none. It is enough to the present -purpose to observe, that this general way of arguing is evidently -natural, just, and conclusive. For there is no man can make a question -but that the sun will rise to-morrow, and be seen, where it is seen at -all, in the figure of a circle, and not in that of a square. - -Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen[11] has with singular -sagacity observed, that “_he who believes the Scripture to have -proceeded from him who is the Author of nature, may well expect -to find the same sort of difficulties in it, as are found in the -constitution of nature_.” And in a like way of reflection it may be -added, that he who denies the Scripture to have been from God upon -account of these difficulties, may, for the very same reason, deny -the world to have been formed by him. On the other hand, if there be -an analogy or likeness between that system of things and dispensation -of Providence, which _revelation_ informs us of, and that system of -things and dispensation of Providence, which _experience_ together with -reason informs us of, _i.e._ the known course of nature; this is a -presumption, that they have both the same author and cause; at least so -far as to answer objections against the former’s being from God, drawn -from any thing which is analogical or similar to what is in the latter, -which is acknowledged to be from him; for an Author of nature is here -supposed. - -Forming our notions of the constitution and government of the world -upon reasoning, without foundation for the principles which we assume, -whether from the attributes of God, or any thing else, is building -a world upon hypothesis, like Des Cartes. Forming our notions upon -reasoning from principles which are certain, but applied to cases to -which we have no ground to apply them, (like those who explain the -structure of the human body, and the nature of diseases and medicines, -from mere mathematics,) is an error much akin to the former: since what -is assumed in order to make the reasoning applicable, is Hypothesis. -But it must be allowed just, to join abstract reasonings with the -observation of facts, and argue from such facts as are known, to -others that are like them; from that part of the divine government over -intelligent creatures which comes under our view, to that larger and -more general government over them which is beyond it; and from what is -present, to collect what is likely, credible, or not incredible, will -be hereafter. - -This method then of concluding and determining being practical, and -what, if we will act at all, we cannot but act upon in the common -pursuits of life; being evidently conclusive, in various degrees, -proportionable to the degree and exactness of the whole analogy or -likeness; and having so great authority for its introduction into the -subject of religion, even revealed religion; my design is to apply -it to that subject in general, both natural and revealed: taking for -proved, that there is an intelligent Author of nature, and natural -Governor of the world. For as there is no presumption against this -prior to the proof of it: so it has been often proved with accumulated -evidence; from this argument of analogy and final causes; from abstract -reasonings; from the most ancient tradition and testimony; and from -the general consent of mankind. Nor does it appear, so far as I can -find, to be denied by the generality of those who profess themselves -dissatisfied with the evidence of religion. - -As there are some, who, instead of thus attending to what is in fact -the constitution of nature, form their notions of God’s government -upon hypothesis: so there are others, who indulge themselves in vain -and idle speculations, how the world might possibly have been framed -otherwise than it is; and upon supposition that things might, in -imagining that they should, have been disposed and carried on after a -better model, than what appears in the present disposition and conduct -of them.[12] Suppose now a person of such a turn of mind, to go on with -his reveries, till he had at length fixed upon some particular plan -of nature, as appearing to him the best.--One shall scarce be thought -guilty of detraction against human understanding, if one should say, -even beforehand, that the plan which this speculative person would fix -upon, though he were the wisest of the sons of men, probably would not -be the very best, even according to his own notions of _best_; whether -he thought that to be so, which afforded occasions and motives for -the exercise of the greatest virtue, or which was productive of the -greatest happiness, or that these two were necessarily connected, and -run up into one and the same plan. - -It may not be amiss, once for all, to see what would be the amount -of these emendations and imaginary improvements upon the system of -nature, or how far they would mislead us. It seems there could be no -stopping, till we came to some such conclusions as these: that all -creatures should at first be made as perfect and as happy as they -were capable of ever being: that nothing, surely, of hazard or danger -should be put upon them to do; some indolent persons would perhaps -think nothing at all: or certainly, that effectual care should be -taken, that they should, whether necessarily or not, yet eventually -and in fact, always do what was right and most conducive to happiness; -which would be thought easy for infinite power to effect, either by -not giving them any principles which would endanger their going wrong, -or by laying the right motive of action in every instance before their -minds in so strong a manner, as would never fail of inducing them to -act conformably to it: and that the whole method of government by -punishments should be rejected as absurd; as an awkward roundabout -method of carrying things on; nay, as contrary to a principal purpose, -for which it would be supposed creatures were made, namely, happiness. - -Now, without considering what is to be said in particular to the -several parts of this train of folly and extravagance, what has been -above intimated, is a full direct general answer to it; namely, that -we may see beforehand that we have not faculties for this kind of -speculation. For though it be admitted that, from the first principles -of our nature, we unavoidably judge or determine some ends to be -absolutely in themselves preferable to others, and that the ends now -mentioned, or if they run up into one, that this one is absolutely -the best; and consequently that we must conclude the ultimate end -designed, in the constitution of nature and conduct of Providence, is -the most virtue and happiness possible; yet we are far from being able -to judge what particular disposition of things would be most friendly -and assistant to virtue; or what means might be absolutely necessary -to produce the most happiness in a system of such extent as our own -world may be, taking in all that is past and to come, though we should -suppose it detached from the whole things. Indeed we are so far from -being able to judge of this, that we are not judges what may be the -necessary means of raising and conducting one person to the highest -perfection and happiness of his nature. Nay, even in the little affairs -of the present life, we find men of different educations and ranks are -not competent judges of the conduct of each other. Our whole nature -leads us to ascribe all moral perfection to God, and to deny all -imperfection of him. And this will forever be a practical proof of his -moral character, to such as will consider what a practical proof is; -because it is the voice of God speaking in us. Hence we conclude, that -virtue must be the happiness, and vice the misery, of every creature; -and that regularity and order and right cannot but prevail finally in a -universe under his government. But we are in no sort judges, what are -the necessary means of accomplishing this end. - -Let us then, instead of that idle and not very innocent employment of -forming imaginary models of a world, and schemes of governing it, turn -our thoughts to what we experience to be the conduct of nature with -respect to intelligent creatures; which may be resolved into general -laws or rules of administration, in the same way as many of the laws of -nature respecting inanimate matter may be collected from experiments. -Let us compare the known constitution and course of things with what is -said to be the moral system of nature; the acknowledged dispensations -of Providence, or that government which we find ourselves under, with -what religion teaches us to believe and expect; and see whether they -are not analogous and of a piece. Upon such a comparison it will, I -think, be found that they are very much so: that both may be traced -up to the same general laws, and resolved into the same principles of -divine conduct. - -The analogy here proposed to be considered is of pretty large extent, -and consists of several parts; in some more, in others less exact. -In some few instances perhaps, it may amount to a real practical -proof; in others not so. Yet in these it is a confirmation of what is -proved otherwise. It will undeniably show, what too many need to have -shown them, that the system of religion, both natural and revealed, -considered only as a system, and prior to the proof of it, is not -a subject of ridicule, unless that of nature be so too. And it will -afford an answer to almost all objections against the system both of -natural and revealed religion; though not perhaps an answer in so great -a degree, yet in a very considerable degree an answer to the objections -against the evidence of it: for objections against a proof, and -objections against what is said to be proved, the reader will observe -are different things. - -The divine government of the world, implied in the notion of religion -in general and of Christianity, contains in it: that mankind is -appointed to live in a future state;[13] that there every one shall be -rewarded or punished;[14] rewarded or punished respectively for all -that behaviour here, which we comprehend under the words, virtuous -or vicious, morally good or evil:[15] that our present life is a -probation, a state of trial,[16] and of discipline,[17] for that future -one; notwithstanding the objections, which men may fancy they have, -from notions of necessity, against there being any such moral plan as -this at all;[18] and whatever objections may appear to lie against -the wisdom and goodness of it, as it stands so imperfectly made known -to us at present:[19] that this world being in a state of apostasy -and wickedness, and consequently of ruin, and the sense both of their -condition and duty being greatly corrupted amongst men, this gave -occasion for an additional dispensation of Providence; of the utmost -importance;[20] proved by miracles;[21] but containing in it many -things appearing to us strange, and not to have been expected;[22] a -dispensation of Providence, which is a scheme or system of things;[23] -carried on by the mediation of a divine person, the Messiah, in order -to the recovery of the world;[24] yet not revealed to all men, nor -proved with the strongest possible evidence to all those to whom it is -revealed; but only to such a part of mankind, and with such particular -evidence, as the wisdom of God thought fit.[25] - -The design then of the following treatise will be to show, that -the several parts principally objected against in this moral and -Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its publication, and the -proof which God has afforded us of its truth; that the particular -parts principally objected against in this whole dispensation, are -analogous to what is experienced in the constitution and course of -nature or Providence; that the chief objections themselves which are -alleged against the former, are no other than what may be alleged -with like justness against the latter, where they are found in fact -to be inconclusive; and that this argument from analogy is in general -unanswerable, and undoubtedly of weight on the side of religion,[26] -notwithstanding the objections which may seem to lie against it, and -the real ground which there may be for difference of opinion, as to -the particular degree of weight which is to be laid upon it. This is a -general account of what may be looked for in the following treatise. -I shall begin it with that which is the foundation of all our hopes -and of all our fears; all our hopes and fears, which are of any -consideration; I mean a future life. - - - - -THE - -ANALOGY OF RELIGION. - - - - -PART I. - -Natural Religion. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -A FUTURE LIFE.[27] - - -Strange difficulties have been raised by some concerning personal -identity, or the sameness of living agents, implied in the notion of -our existing now and hereafter, or in any two successive moments; -which, whoever thinks it worth while, may see considered in the first -dissertation at the end of this treatise. But without regard to any of -them here, let us consider what the analogy of nature, and the several -changes which we have undergone, and those which we know we may undergo -without being destroyed, suggest, as to the effect which death may, or -may not, have upon us; and whether it be not from thence probable, that -we may survive this change, and exist in a future state of life and -perception. - -I. From our being born into the present world in the helpless imperfect -state of infancy, and having arrived from thence to mature age, we find -it to be a general law of nature in our own species, that the same -creatures, the _same individuals_, should exist in degrees of life and -perception, with capacities of action, of enjoyment and suffering, in -one period of their being, greatly different from those appointed them -in another period of it. In other creatures the same law holds. For -the difference of their capacities and states of life at their birth -(to go no higher) and in maturity; the change of worms into flies, and -the vast enlargement of their locomotive powers by such change: and -birds and insects bursting the shell of their habitation, and by this -means entering into a new world, furnished with new accommodations -for them, and finding a new sphere of action assigned them; these are -instances of this general law of nature. Thus all the various and -wonderful transformations of animals are to be taken into consideration -here. The states of life in which we ourselves existed formerly, in -the womb and in our infancy, are almost as different from our present -in mature age, as it is possible to conceive any two states or degrees -of life can be. Therefore that we are to exist hereafter, in a state -as different (suppose) from our present, as this is from our former, -is but according to the analogy of nature; according to a natural -order or appointment of the very same kind, with what we have already -experienced. - -II. We know we are endued with capacities of action, of happiness -and misery: for we are conscious of acting, of enjoying pleasure and -suffering pain. Now that we have these powers and capacities before -death, is a presumption that we shall retain them through and after -death; indeed a probability of it abundantly sufficient to act upon, -unless there be some positive reason to think that death is the -destruction of those living powers; because there is in every case -a probability, that all things will continue as we experience they -are, in all respects, except those in which we have some reason to -think they will be altered. This is that _kind_[28] of presumption or -probability from analogy, expressed in the very word _continuance_, -which seems our only natural reason for believing the course of the -world will continue to-morrow, as it has done so far as our experience -or knowledge of history can carry us back. Nay, it seems our only -reason for believing, that any one substance now existing will continue -to exist a moment longer; the self-existent substance only excepted. -Thus if men were assured that the unknown event, death, was not the -destruction of our faculties of perception and of action, there would -be no apprehension that any other power or event, unconnected with this -of death, would destroy these faculties just at the instant of each -creature’s death; and therefore no doubt but that they would remain -after it; which shows the high probability that our living powers will -continue after death, unless there be some ground to think that death -is their destruction.[29] For, if it would be in a manner certain that -we should survive death,[30] provided it were certain that death would -not be our destruction, it must be highly probable we shall survive -it, if there be no ground to think death will be our destruction. - -Though I think it must be acknowledged, that prior to the natural and -moral proofs of a future life commonly insisted upon, there would arise -a general confused suspicion, that in the great shock and alteration -which we shall undergo by death, we, _i.e._ our living powers, might be -wholly destroyed; yet even prior to those proofs, there is really no -particular distinct ground or reason for this apprehension at all, so -far as I can find. If there be, it must arise either from _the reason -of the thing_, or from _the analogy of nature_. - -But we cannot argue from _the reason of the thing_, that death is the -destruction of living agents, because we know not at all what death is -in itself; but only some of its effects, such as the dissolution of -flesh, skin, and bones. These effects do in no wise appear to imply the -destruction of a living agent. Besides, as we are greatly in the dark, -upon what the exercise of our living powers depends, so we are wholly -ignorant what the powers themselves depend upon; the powers themselves -as distinguished, not only from their actual exercise, but also from -the present capacity of exercising them; and as opposed to their -destruction: for sleep, or certainly a swoon, shows us, not only that -these powers exist when they are not exercised, as the passive power of -motion does in inanimate matter; but shows also that they exist, when -there is no present capacity of exercising them: or that the capacities -of exercising them for the present, as well as the actual exercise -of them, may be suspended, and yet the powers themselves remain -undestroyed. Since then we know not at all upon what the existence of -our living powers depends, this shows further, there can no probability -be collected from the reason of the thing, that death will be their -destruction: because their existence may depend upon somewhat in no -degree affected by death; upon somewhat quite out of the reach of this -king of terrors. So that there is nothing more certain, than that _the -reason of the thing_ shows us no connection between death and the -destruction of living agents. - -Nor can we find any thing throughout the whole _analogy of nature_ to -afford us even the slightest presumption, that animals ever lose their -living powers; much less if it were possible, that they lose them -by death: for we have no faculties wherewith to trace any beyond or -through it, so as to see what becomes of them. This event removes them -from our view. It destroys the _sensible_ proof, which we had before -their death, of their being possessed of living powers, but does not -appear to afford the least reason to believe that they are, then, or by -that event, deprived of them. - -Our knowing that they were possessed of these powers, up to the very -period to which we have faculties capable of tracing them, is itself -a probability of their retaining them beyond it. This is confirmed, -and a sensible credibility is given to it, by observing the very great -and astonishing changes which we have experienced; so great, that our -existence in another state of life, of perception and of action, will -be but according to a method of providential conduct, the like to which -has been already exercised even with regard to ourselves; according to -a course of nature, the like to which we have already gone through. - -However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible, how difficult it is to -silence imagination enough to make the voice of reason even distinctly -heard in this case; as we are accustomed, from our youth up, to indulge -that forward, delusive faculty, ever obtruding beyond its sphere; -(of some assistance indeed to apprehension, but the author of all -error,) as we plainly lose ourselves in gross and crude conceptions -of things, taking for granted that we are acquainted with what indeed -we are wholly ignorant of: it may be proper to consider the imaginary -presumptions, that death will be our destruction, arising from these -kinds of early and lasting prejudices; and to show how little they -really amount to, even though we cannot wholly divest ourselves of -them. And, - -I. All presumption of death’s being the destruction of living beings, -must go upon supposition that they are compounded;[31] and so, -discerptible. But since consciousness is a single and indivisible -power, it should seem that the subject in which it resides must be so -too. For were the motion of any particle of matter absolutely one and -indivisible, so as that it should imply a contradiction to suppose -part of this motion to exist, and part not to exist, _i.e._ part of -this matter to move, and part to be at rest, then its power of motion -would be indivisible; and so also would the subject in which the power -inheres, namely, the particle of matter: for if this could be divided -into two, one part might be moved and the other at rest, which is -contrary to the supposition. - -In like manner it has been argued,[32] and, for any thing appearing -to the contrary, justly, that since the perception or consciousness, -which we have of our own existence, is indivisible, so as that it -is a contradiction to suppose one part of it should be here and the -other there; the perceptive power, or the power of consciousness, is -indivisible too: and consequently the subject in which it resides, -_i.e._ the conscious being. Now, upon supposition that the living -agent each man calls himself, is thus a single being, which there is -at least no more difficulty in conceiving than in conceiving it to be -a compound, and of which there is the proof now mentioned; it follows, -that our organized bodies are no more ourselves or part of ourselves, -than any other matter around us. And it is as easy to conceive, how -matter, which is no part of ourselves, may be appropriated to us in the -manner which our present bodies are; as how we can receive impressions -from, and have power over, any matter. It is as easy to conceive, that -we may exist out of bodies, as in them; and that we might have animated -bodies of any other organs and senses wholly different from these now -given us; and that we may hereafter animate these same or new bodies, -variously modified and organized; as to conceive how we can animate -such bodies as our present. And lastly, the dissolution of all these -several organized bodies, supposing ourselves to have successively -animated them, would have no more conceivable tendency to destroy -the living beings ourselves, or deprive us of living faculties, the -faculties of perception and of action, than the dissolution of any -foreign matter, which we are capable of receiving impressions from, and -making use of, for the common occasions of life. - -II. The simplicity and absolute oneness of a living agent cannot, -from the nature of the thing, be properly proved by experimental -observations. But as these _fall in_ with the supposition of its -unity, so they plainly lead us to _conclude_ certainly, that our gross -organized bodies, with which we perceive objects of sense, and with -which we act, are no part of ourselves; and therefore show us, that we -have no reason to believe their destruction to be ours: even without -determining whether our living substance be material or immaterial. For -we see by experience, that men may lose their limbs, their organs of -sense, and even the greatest part of these bodies, and yet remain the -same living agents. Persons can trace up the existence of themselves -to a time, when the bulk of their bodies was extremely small, in -comparison of what it is in mature age: and we cannot but think, that -they might _then_ have lost a considerable part of that small body, -and yet have remained the same living agents; as they may now lose -great part of their present body, and remain so. And it is certain, -that the bodies of all animals are in a constant flux;[33] from that -never-ceasing attrition, which there is in every part of them. Now, -things of this kind unavoidably teach us to distinguish, between these -living agents ourselves, and large quantities of matter, in which we -are very nearly interested; since these may be alienated, and actually -are in a daily course of succession, and changing their owners; whilst -we are assured, that each living agent remains one and the same -permanent being.[34] And this general observation leads us on to the -following ones. - -_First_, That we have no way of determining by experience, what is the -certain bulk of the living being each man calls himself: and yet, till -it be determined that it is larger in bulk than the solid elementary -particles of matter, which there is no ground to think any natural -power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason to think death to be the -dissolution of it, of the living being, even though it should not be -absolutely indiscerptible. - -_Secondly_, From our being so nearly related to and interested -in certain systems of matter, (suppose our flesh and bones,) and -afterwards ceasing to be at all related to them, the living agents, -ourselves, remaining all this while undestroyed notwithstanding -such alienation; and consequently these systems of matter not being -ourselves, it follows further that we have no ground to conclude any -other (suppose _internal_) _systems_ of matter, to be the living agents -ourselves; because we can have no ground to conclude this, but from -our relation to and interest in such other systems of matter: and -therefore we can have no reason to conclude what befalls those systems -of matter at death, to be the destruction of the living agents. We have -already several times over, lost a great part or perhaps the whole of -our body, according to certain common established laws of nature, yet -we remain the same living agents. When we shall lose as great a part, -or the whole, by another common established law of nature, death, why -may we not also remain the same? That the alienation has been gradual -in one case, and in the other will be more at once, does not prove -any thing to the contrary. We have passed undestroyed through those -many and great revolutions of matter, so peculiarly appropriated to us -ourselves; why should we imagine death will be so fatal to us? Nor can -it be objected, that what is thus alienated or lost, is no part of our -original solid body, but only adventitious matter. Because we may lose -entire limbs, which must have contained many solid parts and vessels of -the original body; or if this be not admitted, we have no proof, that -any of these solid parts are dissolved or alienated by death. Though -we are very nearly related to that extraneous or adventitious matter, -whilst it continues united to and distending the several parts of our -solid body, yet after all, the relation a person bears to those parts -of his body, to which he is most nearly related, amounts but to this, -that the living agent, and those parts of the body, mutually affect -each other.[35] The same thing, the same thing in kind though not in -degree, may be said of _all foreign_ matter, which gives us ideas, and -over which we have any power. From these observations the whole ground -of the imagination is removed, that the dissolution of any matter, is -the destruction of a living agent, from the interest he once had in -such matter. - -_Thirdly_, If we consider our body somewhat more distinctly, as made -up of organs and instruments of perception and of motion, it will -bring us to the same conclusion. Thus the common optical experiments -show, and even the observation how sight is assisted by glasses -shows, that we see with our eyes in the same sense as we see with -glasses. Nor is there any reason to believe, that we see with them in -any other sense; any other, I mean, which would lead us to think the -eye itself a percipient. The like is to be said of hearing; and our -feeling distant solid matter by means of something in our hand, seems -an instance of the like kind, as to the subject we are considering. -All these are instances of foreign matter, or such as is no part of -our body, being instrumental in preparing objects for, and conveying -them to, the perceiving power, in a manner similar to the manner in -which our organs of sense prepare and convey them. Both are in a like -way instruments of our receiving such ideas from external objects, -as the Author of nature appointed those external objects to be the -occasions of exciting in us. Glasses are evident instances of this; -namely of matter which is no part of our body, preparing objects for -and conveying them towards the perceiving power, in like manner as our -bodily organs do. And if we see with our eyes only in the same manner -as we do with glasses, the like may justly be concluded, from analogy, -of all our other senses. It is not intended, by any thing here said, -to affirm, that the whole apparatus of vision, or of perception by -any other sense, can be traced through all its steps, quite up to the -_living power_ of seeing, or perceiving: but that so far as it can be -traced by experimental observations, so far it appears, that our organs -of sense prepare and convey objects, in order to their being perceived, -in like manner as foreign matter does, without affording any shadow of -appearance, that they themselves perceive. And that we have no reason -to think our organs of sense percipients, is confirmed by instances of -persons losing some of them, the living beings themselves, their former -occupiers, remaining unimpaired. It is confirmed also by the experience -of dreams; by which we find we are at present possessed of a latent, -and what would be otherwise an unimagined unknown power of perceiving -sensible objects, in as strong and lively a manner without our external -organs of sense, as with them. - -So also with regard to our power of moving, or directing motion by will -and choice; upon the destruction of a limb, this active power evidently -remains, unlessened; so that the living being, who has suffered this -loss, would be capable of moving as before, if it had another limb to -move with. It can walk by the help of an artificial leg. It can make -use of a pole or a lever, to reach towards itself and to move things, -beyond the length and the power of its arm; and this it does in the -same manner as it reaches and moves, with its natural arm, things -nearer and of less weight. Nor is there so much as any appearance of -our limbs being endued with a power of moving or directing themselves; -though they are adapted, like the several parts of a machine, to be the -instruments of motion to each other; and some parts of the same limb, -to be instruments of motion to the other parts. - -Thus a man determines that he will look at an object through a -microscope; or being lame, that he will walk to such a place with a -staff, a week hence. His eyes and his feet no more determine in these -cases, than the microscope and the staff. Nor is there any ground to -think they any more put the determination in practice; or that his -eyes are the seers, or his feet the movers, in any other sense than -as the microscope and the staff are. Upon the whole, then, our organs -of sense, and our limbs, are certainly _instruments_,[36] which the -living persons ourselves make use of to perceive and move with: there -is not any probability, that they are any more; nor consequently, -that we have any other kind of relation to them, than what we have to -any other foreign matter formed into instruments of perception and -motion, suppose into a microscope or a staff; (I say any other kind of -relation, for I am not speaking of the degree of it) nor consequently -is there any probability, that the alienation or dissolution of these -instruments, is the destruction of the perceiving and moving agent. - -And thus our finding that the dissolution of matter, in which living -beings were most nearly interested, is not their dissolution; and -that the destruction of several of the organs and instruments of -perception and of motion belonging to them, is not their destruction; -shows demonstratively, that there is no ground to think that the -dissolution of any other matter, or destruction of any other organs and -instruments, will be the dissolution or destruction of living agents, -from the like kind of relation. And we have no reason to think we stand -in any other kind of relation to any thing which we find dissolved by -death. - -But it is said, these observations are equally applicable to -brutes:[37] and it is thought an insuperable difficulty, that they -should be immortal, and by consequence capable of everlasting -happiness. Now this manner of expression is both invidious and weak: -but the thing intended by it, is really no difficulty at all, either in -the way of natural or moral consideration. For 1, Suppose the invidious -thing, designed in such a manner of expression, were really implied, as -it is not in the least, in the natural immortality of brutes, namely, -that they must arrive at great attainments, and become rational and -moral agents; even this would be no difficulty, since we know not what -latent powers and capacities they may be endued with. There was once, -prior to experience, as great presumption against human creatures, -as there is against the brute creatures, arriving at that degree of -understanding, which we have in mature age. For we can trace up our own -existence to the same original with theirs. We find it to be a general -law of nature, that creatures endued with _capacities_ of virtue and -religion should be placed in a condition of being, in which they are -altogether without _the use_ of them, for a considerable length of -their duration; as in infancy and childhood. And great part of the -human species, go out of the present world, before they come to the -exercise of these capacities in _any_ degree. - -2. The natural immortality of brutes does not in the least imply, that -they are endued with any latent capacities of a rational or _moral_ -nature. The economy of the universe might require, that there should -be living creatures without any capacities of this kind. And all -difficulties as to the manner how they are to be disposed of, are so -apparently and wholly founded in our ignorance, that it is wonderful -they should be insisted upon by any, but such as are weak enough to -think they are acquainted with the whole system of things. There -is then absolutely nothing at all in this objection, which is so -rhetorically urged, against the greatest part of the natural proofs -or presumptions of the immortality of human minds; I say the greatest -part, for it is less applicable to the following observation, which is -more peculiar to mankind. - -III. As it is evident our _present_ powers and capacities of reason, -memory, and affection, do not depend upon our gross body in the manner -in which perception by our organs of sense does; so they do not appear -to depend upon it at all, in any such manner as to give ground to -think, that the dissolution of this body will be the destruction of -these our present powers of reflection, as it will of our powers of -sensation; or to give ground to conclude, even that it will be so much -as a suspension of the former. - -Human creatures exist at present in two states of life and perception, -greatly different from each other; each of which has its own peculiar -laws, and its own peculiar enjoyments and sufferings. When any of -our senses are affected, or appetites gratified with the objects of -them, we may be said to exist or live in a state of sensation. When -none of our senses are affected or appetites gratified, and yet we -perceive, and reason, and act, we may be said to exist or live in a -state of reflection. Now it is by no means certain, that any thing -which is dissolved by death, is in any way necessary to the living -being, in this its state of reflection, _after_ ideas are gained. -For, though, from our present constitution and condition of being, -our external organs of sense are necessary for conveying in ideas to -our reflecting powers, as carriages, and levers, and scaffolds are in -architecture:[38] yet when these ideas are brought in, we are capable -of reflecting in the most intense degree, and of enjoying the greatest -pleasure, and feeling the greatest pain, by means of that reflection, -without any assistance from our senses; and without any at all, which -we know of, from that body which will be dissolved by death. It does -not appear then, that the relation of this gross body to the reflecting -being is, in any degree, necessary to thinking; to intellectual -enjoyments or sufferings: nor, consequently, that the dissolution or -alienation of the former by death, will be the destruction of those -present powers, which render us capable of this state of reflection. - -Further, there are instances of mortal diseases, which do not at all -affect our present intellectual powers; and this affords a presumption, -that those diseases will not destroy these present powers. Indeed, -from the observations made above,[39] it appears, that there is no -presumption, from their mutually affecting each other, that the -dissolution of the body is the destruction of the living agent. By -the same reasoning, it must appear too, that there is no presumption, -from their mutually affecting each other, that the dissolution of -the body is the destruction of our present reflecting powers: indeed -instances of their not affecting each other, afford a presumption of -the contrary. Instances of mortal diseases not impairing our present -reflecting powers, evidently turn our thoughts even from imagining such -diseases to be the destruction of them. Several things indeed greatly -affect all our living powers, and at length suspend the exercise of -them; as for instance drowsiness, increasing till it ends in sound -sleep: and hence we might have imagined it would destroy them, till -we found by experience the weakness of this way of judging. But in -the diseases now mentioned, there is not so much as this shadow of -probability, to lead us to any such conclusion, as to the reflecting -powers which we have at present. For in those diseases, persons the -moment before death appear to be in the highest vigor of life. They -discover apprehension, memory, reason, all entire; the utmost force of -affection; a sense of character, of shame and honor; and the highest -mental enjoyments and sufferings, even to the last gasp. These surely -prove even greater vigor of life than bodily strength does. Now what -pretence is there for thinking, that a progressive disease when arrived -to such a degree, I mean that degree which is mortal, will destroy -those powers, which were not impaired, which were not affected by it, -during its whole progress quite up to that degree? And if death by -diseases of this kind, is not the destruction of our present reflecting -powers, it will scarce be thought that death by any other means is. - -It is obvious that this general observation may be carried further. -There appears to be so little connection between our bodily powers -of sensation, and our present powers of reflection, that there is -no reason to conclude, that death, which destroys the former, does -so much as _suspend the exercise_ of the latter, or interrupt our -_continuing_ to exist in the like state of reflection which we do -now.[40] For suspension of reason, memory, and the affections which -they excite, is no part of the idea of death, nor implied in our notion -of it. Our daily experiencing these powers to be exercised, without -any assistance, that we know of, from those bodies which will be -dissolved by death; and our finding often, that the exercise of them -is so lively to the last; afford a sensible apprehension, that death -may not perhaps be so much as a discontinuance of the exercise of these -powers, nor of the enjoyments and sufferings which it implies.[41] So -that our posthumous life, whatever there may be in it additional to our -present, may yet not be beginning entirely anew; but going on. Death -may, in some sort and in some respects, answer to our birth; which is -not a suspension of the faculties which we had before it, or a _total_ -change of the state of life in which we existed when in the womb; but a -continuation of both, with such and such great alterations. - -Nay, for aught we know of ourselves, of our present life and of death, -death may immediately, in the natural course of things, put us into a -higher and more enlarged state of life, as our birth does;[42] a state -in which our capacities; and sphere of perception and of action, may -be much greater than at present. For as our relation to our external -organs of sense, renders us capable of existing in our present state of -sensation; so it may be the only natural hinderance to our existing, -immediately, and of course; in a _higher_ state of reflection. The -truth is, reason does not at all show us, in what state death naturally -leaves us. But were we sure, that it would suspend all our perceptive -and active powers; yet the suspension of a power and the destruction -of it, are effects so totally different in kind, as we experience from -sleep and a swoon, that we cannot in any wise argue from one to the -other; or conclude even to the lowest degree of probability, that the -same kind of force which is sufficient to suspend our faculties, though -it be increased ever so much, will be sufficient to destroy them.[43] - -These observations together may be sufficient to show, how little -presumption there is, that death is the destruction of human creatures. -However, there is the shadow of an analogy, which may lead us to -imagine it,--viz.: the supposed likeness which is observed between the -decay of vegetables, and of living creatures. This likeness is indeed -sufficient to afford the poets very apt allusions to the flowers of -the field, in their pictures of the frailty of our present life. But -in reason, the analogy is so far from holding, that there appears no -ground for the comparison, as to the present question; because one -of the two subjects compared is wholly void of that, which is the -principal and chief thing in the other; the power of perception and of -action; which is the only thing we are inquiring about the continuance -of. So that the destruction of a vegetable, is an event not similar or -analogous to the destruction of a living agent. - -If, as was above intimated, leaving off the delusive custom of -substituting imagination in the room of experience, we would confine -ourselves to what we do know and understand; if we would argue only -from that, and from that form our expectations, it would appear at -first sight, that as no probability of living beings ever ceasing to -be so, can be concluded from the reason of the thing, so none can be -collected from the analogy of nature; because we cannot trace any -living beings beyond death. But as we are conscious that we are endued -with capacities of perception and of action, and are living persons; -what we are to go upon is, that we shall continue so, till we foresee -some accident or event, which will endanger those capacities, or be -likely to destroy us: which death does in no wise appear to be. - -Thus, when we go out of this world, we may pass into new scenes, and -a new state of life and action, just as naturally as we came into the -present. And this new state may naturally be a social one.[44] And the -advantages of it, advantages, of every kind, may naturally be bestowed, -according to some fixed general laws of wisdom, upon every one in -proportion to the degrees of his virtue. And though the advantages -of that future natural state should not be bestowed, as these of the -present in some measure are, by the will of the society; but entirely -by his more immediate action, upon whom the whole frame of nature -depends: yet this distribution may be just as natural, as their being -distributed here by the instrumentality of men. Indeed, though one -should allow any confused undetermined sense, which people please to -put upon the word _natural_, it would be a shortness of thought scarce -credible, to imagine, that no system or course of things can be so, but -only what we see at present:[45] especially whilst the probability -of a future life, or the natural immortality of the soul, is admitted -upon the evidence of reason; because this is really both admitting -and denying at once, a state of being different from the present to -be natural. But the only distinct meaning of that word is, _stated_, -_fixed_, or _settled_; since what is natural as much requires and -presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, _i.e._ to effect it -continually, or at stated times, as what is supernatural or miraculous -does to effect it for once. - -Hence it must follow, that persons’ notion of what is natural, will be -enlarged in proportion to their greater knowledge of the works of God, -and the dispensations of his providence. Nor is there any absurdity in -supposing, that there may be beings in the universe, whose capacities, -and knowledge, and views, may be so extensive, as that the whole -Christian dispensation may to them appear natural, _i.e._ analogous -or conformable to God’s dealings with other parts of his creation; as -natural as the visible known course of things appears to us. For there -seems scarce any other possible sense to be put upon the word, but that -only in which it is here used; similar, stated, or uniform. - -This credibility of a future life, which has been here insisted upon, -how little soever it may satisfy our curiosity, seems to answer all the -purposes of religion, in like manner as a demonstrative proof would. -Indeed a proof, even a demonstrative one, of a future life, would not -be a proof of religion. For, that we are to live hereafter, is just as -reconcilable with the scheme of atheism, and as well to be accounted -for by it, as that we are now alive is: and therefore nothing can -be more absurd than to argue from that scheme, that there can be no -future state. But as religion implies a future state, any presumption -against such a state, is a presumption against religion. The foregoing -observations remove all presumptions of that sort, and prove, to a -very considerable degree of probability, one fundamental doctrine of -religion; which, if believed, would greatly open and dispose the mind -seriously to attend to the general evidence! of the whole. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. - - -That which makes the question concerning a future life to be of so -great importance to us, is our capacity of happiness and misery. And -that which makes the consideration of it to be of so great importance -to us, is the supposition of our happiness and misery hereafter -depending upon our actions here. Indeed, without this, curiosity -could not but sometimes bring a subject, in which we may be so highly -interested, to our thoughts; especially upon the mortality of others, -or the near prospect of our own. But reasonable men would not take -any further thought about hereafter, than what should happen thus -occasionally to rise in their minds, if it were certain that our future -interest no way depended upon our present behavior; whereas, on the -contrary, if there be ground, either from analogy or any thing else, to -think it does, then there is reason also for the most active thought -and solicitude, to secure that interest; to behave so as that we may -escape that misery, and obtain that happiness, in another life, which -we not only suppose ourselves capable of, but which we apprehend also -is put in our own power. And whether there be ground for this last -apprehension, certainly would deserve to be most seriously considered, -were there no other proof of a future life and interest, than that -presumptive one, which the foregoing observations amount to. - -In the present state, all which we enjoy, and a great part of what -we suffer, _is put in our own power_. Pleasure and pain are the -consequences of our actions; and we are endued by the Author of our -nature with capacities of foreseeing these consequences. We find by -experience that he does not so much as preserve our lives, exclusive -of our own care and attention, to provide ourselves with, and to make -use of, that sustenance, by which he has appointed our lives shall -be preserved; and without which, he has appointed, they shall not be -preserved. In general we foresee, that the external things, which -are the objects of our various passions, can neither be obtained nor -enjoyed, without exerting ourselves in such and such manners: but by -thus exerting ourselves, we obtain and enjoy these objects, in which -our natural good consists; or by this means God gives us the possession -and enjoyment of them. I know not, that we have any one kind or degree -of enjoyment, but by the means of our own actions. By prudence and -care, we may, for the most part, pass our days in tolerable ease and -quiet: on the contrary, we may, by rashness, ungoverned passion, -wilfulness, or even by negligence, make ourselves as miserable as ever -we please. And many do please to make themselves extremely miserable, -_i.e._ to do what they know beforehand will render them so. They follow -those ways, the fruit of which they know, by instruction, example, and -experience, will be disgrace, and poverty, and sickness, and untimely -death. This every one observes to be the general course of things; -though it is to be allowed, we cannot find by experience, that _all_ -our sufferings are owing to our own follies. - -Why the Author of nature does not give his creatures promiscuously such -and such perceptions, without regard to their behavior; why he does -not make them happy without the instrumentality of their own actions, -and prevent their bringing any sufferings upon themselves, is another -matter.[46] Perhaps there may be some impossibilities in the nature -of things, which we are unacquainted with.[47] Or less happiness, it -may be, would upon the whole be produced by such a method of conduct, -than is by the present. Or perhaps divine goodness, with which, if I -mistake not, we make very free in our speculations, may not be a bare -single disposition to produce happiness; but a disposition to make the -good, the faithful, the honest, happy. Perhaps an infinitely perfect -mind may be pleased with seeing his creatures behave suitably to the -nature which he has given them; to the relations which he has placed -them in to each other; and to that which they stand in to himself: -that relation to himself, which, during their existence, is even -necessary,[48] and which is the most important one of all: perhaps, -I say, an infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with this moral -piety of moral agents, in and for itself; as well as upon account of -its being essentially conducive to the happiness of his creation. Or -the whole end, for which God made, and thus governs the world, may -be utterly beyond the reach of our faculties: there may be somewhat -in it as impossible for us to have any conception of, as for a blind -man to have a conception of colors. However this be, it is certain -matter of universal experience, that the general method of divine -administration is, forewarning us, or giving us capacities to foresee, -with more or less clearness, that if we act so and so, we shall have -such enjoyments, if so and so, such sufferings; and giving us those -enjoyments, and making us feel those sufferings, in consequence of our -actions. - -“But all this is to be ascribed to the general course of nature,” True. -This is the very thing which I am observing. It is to be ascribed to -the general course of nature: _i.e._ not surely to the words or ideas, -_course of nature_; but to Him who appointed it, and put things into -it; or to a course of operation, from its uniformity or constancy, -called natural;[49] and which necessarily implies an operating agent. -For when men find themselves necessitated to confess an Author of -nature, or that God is the natural governor of the world, they must -not deny this again, because his government is uniform. They must not -deny that he does things at all, because he does them constantly,[50] -because the effects of his acting are permanent, whether his acting -be so or not; though there is no reason to think it is not. In short, -every man, in every thing he does, naturally acts upon the forethought -and apprehension of avoiding evil or obtaining good: and if the natural -course of things be the appointment of God, and our natural faculties -of knowledge and experience are given us by him, then the good and bad -consequences which follow our actions, are his appointment, and our -foresight of those consequences, is a warning given us by him, how we -are to act. - -“Is the pleasure then, naturally accompanying every particular -gratification of passion, intended to put us upon gratifying ourselves -in every such particular instance, and as a reward to us for so doing?” -No, certainly. Nor is it to be said, that our eyes were naturally -intended to give us the sight of each particular object, to which they -do or can extend; objects which are destructive of them, or which, for -any other reason, it may become us to turn our eyes from. Yet there is -no doubt, but that our eyes were intended for us to see with.[51] So -neither is there any doubt, but that the foreseen pleasures and pains -belonging to the passions, were intended, in general, to induce mankind -to act in such and such manners. - -From this general observation, obvious to every one, (that God has -given us to understand, he has appointed satisfaction and delight to be -the consequence of our acting in one manner, and pain and uneasiness of -our acting in another, and of our not acting at all; and that we find -these consequences, which we were beforehand informed of, uniformly -to follow;) we may learn, that we are at present actually under his -government in the strictest and most proper sense; in such a sense, as -that he rewards and punishes us for our actions. - -An Author of nature being supposed, it is not so much a deduction -of reason, as a matter of experience, that we are thus under his -government; under his government, in the same sense, as we are under -the government of civil magistrates. Because the annexing of pleasure -to some actions, and pain to others, in our power to do or forbear, -and giving notice of this appointment beforehand to those whom it -concerns, is the proper formal notion of government. - -Whether the pleasure or pain which thus follows upon our behavior, be -owing to the Author of nature’s acting upon us every moment which we -feel it; or to his having at once contrived and executed his own part -in the plan of the world; makes no alteration as to the matter before -us. For if civil magistrates could make the sanctions of their laws -take place, without interposing at all, after they had passed them; -without a trial, and the formalities of an execution: if they were able -to make their laws _execute themselves_, or every offender to execute -them upon himself; we should be just in the same sense under their -government then, as we are now; but in a much higher degree, and more -perfect manner. - -Vain is the ridicule, with which one foresees some persons will divert -themselves, upon finding lesser pains considered as instances of divine -punishment. There is no possibility of answering or evading the general -thing here intended, without denying all final causes. For final causes -being admitted, the pleasures and pains now mentioned must be admitted -too as instances of them. And if they are; if God annexes delight to -some actions, and uneasiness to others, with an apparent design to -induce us to act so and so; then he not only dispenses happiness and -misery, but also rewards and punishes actions. If, for example, the -pain which we feel, upon doing what tends to the destruction of our -bodies, suppose upon too near approaches to fire, or upon wounding -ourselves, be appointed by the Author of nature to prevent our doing -what thus tends to our destruction; this is altogether as much an -instance of his punishing our actions, and consequently of our being -under his government,[52] as declaring by a voice from heaven, that if -we acted so, he would inflict such pain upon us; and inflicting it, -whether it be greater or less. - -Thus we find, that the true notion or conception of the Author of -nature, is that of a master or governor, prior to the consideration -of his moral attributes. The fact of our case, which we find by -experience, is, that he actually exercises dominion or government over -us at present, by rewarding and punishing us for our actions, in as -strict and proper a sense of these words, and even in the same sense, -as children, servants, subjects, are rewarded and punished by those who -govern them. - -Thus the whole analogy of nature, the whole present course of things, -most fully shows, that there is nothing incredible in the general -doctrine of religion, that God will reward and punish men for their -actions hereafter: nothing incredible, I mean, arising out of the -notion of rewarding and punishing. For the whole course of nature is -a present instance of his exercising that government over us, which -implies in it rewarding and punishing. - - * * * * * - -As divine _punishment_ is what men chiefly object against, and are most -unwilling to allow; it may be proper to mention some circumstances -in the natural course of punishments at present, which are analogous -to what religion teaches us concerning a future state of punishment; -indeed so analogous, that as they add a further credibility to it, so -they cannot but raise a most serious apprehension of it in those who -will attend to them. - -It has been now observed, that such and such miseries naturally follow -such and such actions of imprudence and wilfulness, as well as actions -more commonly and more distinctly considered as vicious; and that -these consequences, when they may be foreseen, are properly natural -punishments annexed to such actions. The general thing here insisted -upon, is, not that we see a great deal of misery in the world, but a -great deal which men bring upon themselves by their own behavior, which -they might have foreseen and avoided. Now the circumstances of these -natural punishments, particularly deserving our attention, are such -as these. Oftentimes they follow, or are inflicted in consequence of, -actions which procure many present advantages, and are accompanied with -much present pleasure; for instance, sickness and untimely death are -the consequence of intemperance, though accompanied with the highest -mirth, and jollity. These punishments are often much greater, than -the advantages or pleasures obtained by the actions, of which they are -the punishments or consequences. Though we may imagine a constitution -of nature, in which these natural punishments, which are in fact to -follow, would follow, immediately upon such actions being done, or -very soon after; we find on the contrary in our world, that they are -often delayed a great while, sometimes even till long after the actions -occasioning them are forgot; so that the constitution of nature is -such, that delay of punishment is no sort nor degree of presumption of -final impunity. After such delay, these natural punishments or miseries -often come, not by degrees, but suddenly, with violence, and at once; -however, the chief misery often does. As certainty of such distant -misery following such actions, is never afforded persons, so perhaps -during the actions, they have seldom a distinct, full expectation of -its following:[53] and many times the case is only thus, that they see -in general, or may see, the credibility, that intemperance, suppose, -will bring after it diseases; civil crimes, civil punishments; when -yet the real probability often is, that they shall escape; but things -notwithstanding take their destined course, and the misery inevitably -follows at its appointed time, in very many of these cases. Thus also -though youth may be alleged as an excuse for rashness and folly, -as being naturally thoughtless, and not clearly foreseeing all the -consequences of being untractable and profligate, this does not hinder, -but that these consequences follow; and are grievously felt, throughout -the whole course of mature life. Habits contracted even in that age, -are often utter ruin: and men’s success in the world, not only in the -common sense of worldly success, but their real happiness and misery, -depends, in a great degree, and in various ways, upon the manner in -which they pass their youth; which consequences they for the most -part neglect to consider, and perhaps seldom can properly be said to -believe, beforehand. In numberless cases, the natural course of things -affords us opportunities for procuring advantages to ourselves at -certain times, which we cannot procure when we will; nor ever recall -the opportunities, if we have neglected them. Indeed the general course -of nature is an example of this. If, during the opportunity of youth, -persons are indocile and self-willed, they inevitably suffer in their -future life, for want of those acquirements, which they neglected the -natural season of attaining. If the husbandman lets seedtime pass -without sowing, the whole year is lost to him beyond recovery. Though -after men have been guilty of folly and extravagance _up to a certain -degree_, it is often in their power, to retrieve their affairs, to -recover their health and character, at least in good measure; yet real -reformation is in many cases, of no avail at all towards preventing -the miseries, poverty, sickness, infamy, naturally annexed to folly -and extravagance _exceeding that degree_. There is a certain bound to -imprudence and misbehavior, which being transgressed, there remains no -place for repentance in the natural course of things. It is further -very much to be remarked, that neglects from inconsiderateness, want -of attention,[54] not looking about us to see what we have to do, are -often attended with consequences altogether as dreadful, as any active -misbehavior, from the most extravagant passion. And lastly, civil -government being natural, the punishments of it are so too: and some -of these punishments are capital; as the effects of a dissolute course -of pleasure are often mortal. So that many natural punishments are -final[55] to him who incurs them, if considered only in his temporal -capacity; and seem inflicted by natural appointment, either to remove -the offender out of the way of being further mischievous, or as an -example, though frequently a disregarded one, to those who are left -behind. - -These things are not what we call accidental, or to be met with only -now and then; but they are things of every day’s experience. They -proceed from general laws, very general ones, by which God governs the -world in the natural course of his providence.[56] - -And they are so analogous, to what religion teaches us concerning the -future punishment of the wicked, so much of a piece with it, that -both would naturally be expressed in the very same words, and manner -of description. In the book of _Proverbs_,[57] for instance, wisdom -is introduced, as frequenting the most public places of resort, and -as rejected when she offers herself as the natural appointed guide -of human life. _How long_, speaking to those who are passing through -it, _how long, ye simple ones, will ye love folly, and the scorners -delight in their scorning, and fools hate knowledge? Turn ye at my -reproof. Behold, I will pour out my spirit upon you, I will make known -my words unto you._ But upon being neglected, _Because I have called, -and ye refused, I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded; but -ye have set at nought all my counsel, and would none of my reproof: I -also will laugh at your calamity, I will mock when your fear cometh; -when your fear cometh as desolation, and your destruction cometh as a -whirlwind; when distress and anguish come upon you. Then shall they -call upon me, but I will not answer; they shall seek me early, but they -shall not find me._ This passage, every one sees, is poetical, and -some parts of it are highly figurative; but the meaning is obvious. -And the thing intended is expressed more literally in the following -words; _For that they hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear of -the Lord----therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way, -and be filled with their own devices. For the security of the simple -shall slay them, and the prosperity of fools shall destroy them._ The -whole passage is so equally applicable to what we experience in the -present world, concerning the consequences of men’s actions, and to -what religion teaches us is to be expected in another, that it may be -questioned which of the two was principally intended. - -Indeed when one has been recollecting the proper proofs of a future -state of rewards and punishments, nothing methinks can give one so -sensible an apprehension of the latter, or representation of it to -the mind, as observing, that after the many disregarded checks, -admonitions, and warnings, which people meet with in the ways of vice -and folly and extravagance, warnings from their very nature, from the -examples of others, from the lesser inconveniences which they bring -upon themselves, from the instructions of wise and virtuous men: -after these have been long despised, scorned, ridiculed: after the -chief bad consequences, temporal consequences, of their follies, have -been delayed for a great while, at length they break in irresistibly, -like an armed force: repentance is too late to relieve, and can serve -only to aggravate their distress, the case is become desperate: and -poverty and sickness, remorse and anguish, infamy and death, the -effects of their own doings, overwhelm them beyond possibility of -remedy or escape. This is an account of what is; in fact, the general -constitution of nature. - -It is not in any sort meant, that, according to what appears at present -of the natural course of things, men are always uniformly punished -in proportion to their misbehavior. But that there are very many -instances of misbehavior punished in the several ways now mentioned, -and very dreadful instances too; sufficient to show what the laws of -the universe may admit, and, if thoroughly considered, sufficient fully -to answer all objections against the credibility of a future state of -punishments, from any imaginations, that the frailty of our nature and -external temptations, almost annihilate the guilt of human vices: as -well as objections of another sort; from necessity, from suppositions, -that the will of an infinite Being cannot be contradicted, or that he -must be incapable of offence and provocation.[58] - -Reflections of this kind are not without their terrors to serious -persons, even the most free from enthusiasm, and of the greatest -strength of mind; but it is fit that things be stated and considered as -they really are. There is, in the present age, a certain fearlessness -with regard to what may be hereafter under the government of God, which -nothing but a universally acknowledged demonstration on the side of -atheism can justify; and which makes it quite necessary, that men be -reminded, and if possible made to feel, that there is no sort of ground -for being thus presumptuous, even upon the most sceptical principles. -For, may it not be said of any person upon his being born into the -world, he may behave so as to be of no service to it, but by being -made an example of the woeful effects of vice and folly? That he may, -as any one may, if he will, incur an infamous execution from the hands -of civil justice, or in some other course of extravagance shorten his -days; or bring upon himself infamy and diseases worse than death? So -that it had been better for him, even with regard to the present world, -that he had never been born. And is there any pretence of reason for -people to think themselves secure, and talk as if they had certain -proof, that, let them act as licentiously as they will, there can be -nothing analogous to this, with regard to a future and more general -interest, under the providence and government of the same God? - - - - -CHAPTER III.[59] - -THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. - - -As the manifold appearances of design, and of final causes, in the -constitution of the world, prove it to be the work of an intelligent -mind, so the particular final causes of pleasure and pain distributed -amongst his creatures, prove that they are under his government; what -may be called his natural government of creatures endued with sense -and reason. This implies somewhat more than seems usually attended to, -when we speak of God’s natural government of the world. It implies -government of the very same kind with that which a master exercises -over his servants, or a civil magistrate over his subjects. These -latter instances of final causes, as really prove an intelligent -_Governor_ of the world, in the sense now mentioned, and before[60] -distinctly treated of; as any other instances of final causes prove an -intelligent _Maker_ of it. - -But this alone does not appear at first sight to determine any thing -certainly, concerning the moral character of the Author of nature, -considered in this relation of governor; does not ascertain his -government to be moral, or prove that he is the righteous Judge of -the world. Moral government consists, not in barely rewarding and -punishing men for their actions, which the most tyrannical may do, but -in rewarding the righteous, and punishing the wicked: in rendering to -men according to their actions, considered as good or evil. And the -_perfection_ of moral government consists in doing this, with regard -to all intelligent creatures, in an exact proportion to their personal -merits or demerits. - -Some men seem to think the only character of the Author of nature to be -that of simple absolute benevolence. This, considered as a principle of -action and infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest -possible happiness, without regard to persons’ behavior, otherwise than -as such regard would produce higher degrees of it. And supposing this -to be the only character of God, veracity and justice in him would be -nothing but benevolence conducted by wisdom. Surely this ought not to -be asserted, unless it can be proved; for we should speak with cautious -reverence upon such a subject. Whether it can be proved or no, is not -the thing here to be inquired into; but whether in the constitution and -conduct of the world, a righteous government be not discernibly planned -out: which necessarily implies a righteous governor. There may possibly -be in the creation beings, to whom the Author of nature manifests -himself under this most amiable of all characters, this of infinite -absolute benevolence; for it is the most amiable, supposing it not, as -perhaps it is not, incompatible with justice; but he manifests himself -to us under the character of a righteous governor. He may, consistently -with this, be simply and absolutely benevolent, in the sense now -explained: but he is (for he has given us a proof in the constitution -and conduct of the world that he is) a governor over servants, as he -rewards and punishes us for our actions. And in the constitution and -conduct of it, he may also have given, besides the reason of the thing, -and the natural presages of conscience, clear and distinct intimations, -that his government is righteous or moral: clear to such as think the -nature of it deserving their attention, and yet not to every careless -person, who casts a transient reflection upon the subject.[61] - -It is particularly to be observed, that the divine government, which -we experience ourselves under in the present state, taken alone, is -allowed not to be the perfection of moral government. Yet this by no -means hinders, but that there may be _somewhat_, be it more or less, -truly moral in it. A righteous government may plainly appear to be -carried on to some degree, enough to give us the apprehension that it -shall be completed, or carried on to that degree of perfection which -religion teaches us it shall; but which cannot appear, till much more -of the divine administration be seen, than can be seen in the present -life. The design of this chapter is to inquire how far this is the -case: how far, over and above the moral nature[62] which God has given -us, and our natural notion of him as righteous governor of those his -creatures, to whom he has given this nature;[63] I say how far besides -this, the principles and beginnings of a moral government over the -world may be discerned, notwithstanding and amidst all the confusion -and disorder of it. - -One might mention here, what has been often urged with great force, -that, in general, less uneasiness and more satisfaction, are the -natural consequences[64] of a virtuous than of a vicious course of -life, in the present state, as an instance of a moral government -established in nature; an instance of it collected from experience and -present matter of fact.[65] But it must be owned a thing of difficulty -to weigh and balance pleasures and uneasinesses, each amongst -themselves, and also against each other, so as to make an estimate with -any exactness, of the overplus of happiness on the side of virtue. -And it is not impossible, that, amidst the infinite disorders of the -world, there may be exceptions to the happiness of virtue; even with -regard to persons, whose course of life from their youth up has been -blameless: and more with regard to those who have gone on for some -time in the ways of vice, and have afterwards reformed. For suppose an -instance of the latter case; a person with his passions inflamed, his -natural faculty of self-government impaired by habits of indulgence, -and with all his vices about him, like so many harpies, craving their -accustomed gratification; who can say how long it might be, before -such a person would find more satisfaction in the reasonableness and -present good consequences of virtue, than difficulties and self-denial -in the restraints of it? Experience also shows, that men can to a -great degree, get over their sense of shame, so as that by professing -themselves to be without principle, and avowing even direct villany, -they can support themselves against the infamy of it. But as the ill -actions of any one will probably be more talked of, and oftener thrown -in his way, upon his reformation; so the infamy of them will be much -more felt, after the natural sense of virtue and of honor is recovered. -Uneasiness of this kind ought indeed to be put to the account of -former vices: yet it will be said they are in part the consequences -of reformation. Still I am far from allowing it doubtful, whether -virtue, upon the whole, be happier than vice in the present world. If -it were, yet the beginnings of a righteous administration may, beyond -all question, be found in nature, if we will attentively inquire after -them.[66] - -I. In whatever manner the notion of God’s moral government over the -world might be treated, if it did not appear, whether he were in a -proper sense our governor at all; yet when it is certain matter of -experience, that he does manifest himself to us under the character -of a governor in the sense explained,[67] it must deserve to be -considered, whether there be not reason to apprehend, that he may be -a righteous or moral governor. Since it appears to be fact, that God -does govern mankind by the method of rewards and punishments, according -to some settled rules of distribution; it is surely a question to be -asked, what presumption is there against his _finally_ rewarding and -punishing them according to this particular rule, namely, as they act -reasonably, or unreasonably, virtuously or viciously? Rendering men -happy or miserable by this rule, certainly falls in, much more falls -in, with our natural apprehensions and sense of things, than doing -so by any other rule whatever; since rewarding and punishing actions -by any other rule, would appear much harder to be accounted for, by -minds formed as he has formed ours. Be the evidence of religion then -more or less clear, the expectation which it raises in us, that the -righteous shall, upon the whole, be happy, and the wicked miserable, -cannot possibly be considered as absurd or chimerical; because it is -no more than an expectation, that a method of government already begun, -shall be carried on, the method of rewarding and punishing actions; and -shall be carried on by a particular rule, which unavoidably appears to -us at first sight more natural than any other, the rule which we call -distributive justice. Nor, - -II. Ought it to be entirely passed over, that tranquillity, -satisfaction, and external advantages, being the natural consequences -of prudent management of ourselves, and our affairs; and rashness, -profligate negligence, and wilful folly, bringing after them many -inconveniences and sufferings; these afford instances of a right -constitution of nature, as the correction of children, for their -own sakes, and by way of example, when they run into danger or hurt -themselves, is a part of right education.[68] Thus, that God governs -the world by general fixed laws, that he has endued us with capacities -of reflecting upon this constitution of things, and foreseeing the good -and bad consequences of behavior, plainly implies _some sort_ of moral -government; since from such a constitution of things it cannot but -follow, that prudence and imprudence, which are of the nature of virtue -and vice,[69] must be, as they are, respectively rewarded and punished. - -III. From the natural course of things, vicious actions are, to a -great degree, actually punished as mischievous to society; and besides -punishment actually inflicted upon this account, there is also the -fear and apprehension of it in those persons, whose crimes have -rendered them obnoxious to it, in case of a discovery; this state of -fear being often itself a very considerable punishment. The natural -fear and apprehension of it too, which restrains from such crimes, -is a declaration of nature against them. It is necessary to the very -being of society, that vices, destructive of it, should be punished -_as being so_; the vices of falsehood, injustice, cruelty: which -punishment therefore is as natural as society, and so is an instance -of a kind of moral government, naturally established, and actually -taking place. And, since the certain natural course of things is the -conduct of providence or the government of God, though carried on by -the instrumentality of men, the observation here made amounts to this, -that mankind find themselves placed by him in such circumstances, as -that they are unavoidably accountable for their behavior; and are often -punished, and sometimes rewarded, under his government, in the view of -their being mischievous, or eminently beneficial to society. - -If it be objected that good actions and such as are beneficial to -society, are often punished, as in the case of persecution and in other -cases; and that ill and mischievous actions are often rewarded:[70] it -may be answered distinctly, first, that this is in no sort necessary, -and consequently not natural in the sense in which it is necessary, and -therefore natural, that ill or mischievous actions should be punished: -and in the next place, that good actions are never punished, considered -as beneficial to society, nor ill actions rewarded, under the view of -their being hurtful to it. So that it stands good, without any thing on -the side of vice to be set over against it, that the Author of nature -has as truly directed, that vicious actions, considered as mischievous -to society, should be punished, and put mankind under a _necessity_ of -thus punishing them, as he has directed and necessitated us to preserve -our lives by food. - -IV. In the natural course of things, virtue _as such_ is actually -rewarded, and vice _as such_ punished: which seems to afford an -instance or example, not only of government, but of moral government, -begun and established; moral in the strictest sense, though not in -that perfection of degree, which religion teaches us to expect. -In order to see this more clearly, we must distinguish between -_actions_ themselves, and that _quality_ ascribed to them, which we -call virtuous or vicious.[71] The gratification itself of every -natural passion, must be attended with delight; and acquisitions of -fortune, however made, are acquisitions of the means or materials of -enjoyment. An action then, by which any natural passion is gratified, -or fortune acquired, procures delight or advantage; abstracted from -all consideration of the morality of such action. Consequently, the -pleasure or advantage in this case, is gained by the action itself, not -by the morality, the virtuousness or viciousness of it; though it be -perhaps virtuous or vicious. - -To say that such an action or course of behavior, procured such -pleasure or advantage, or brought on such inconvenience and pain, is -quite a different thing from saying, that such good or bad effect -was owing to the virtue or vice of such action or behavior. In one -case, an action abstracted from all moral consideration, produced its -effect: in the other case, for it will appear that there are such -cases, the morality of the action under a moral consideration, _i.e._ -the virtuousness or viciousness of it, produced the effect. Now I say -virtue as such, naturally procures considerable advantages to the -virtuous, and vice as such, naturally occasions great inconvenience -and even misery to the vicious, in very many instances. The immediate -effects of virtue and vice upon the mind and temper, are to be -mentioned as instances of it. Vice as such is naturally attended with -some sort of uneasiness, and not uncommonly, with great disturbance and -apprehension. That inward feeling, which, respecting lesser matters and -in familiar speech we call being vexed with oneself, and in matters -of importance and in more serious language, remorse; is an uneasiness -naturally arising from an action of a man’s own, reflected upon by -himself as wrong, unreasonable, faulty, _i.e._ vicious in greater or -less degrees: and this manifestly is a different feeling from that -uneasiness, which arises from a sense of mere loss or harm. What is -more common, than to hear a man lamenting an accident or event, and -adding--but however he has the satisfaction that he cannot blame -himself for it; or on the contrary, that he has the uneasiness of -being sensible it was his own doing? Thus also the disturbance and -fear, which often follow upon a man’s having done an injury, arise -from a sense of his being blameworthy; otherwise there would, in many -cases, be no ground of disturbance, nor any reason to fear resentment -or shame. On the other hand, inward security and peace, and a mind -open to the several gratifications of life, are the natural attendants -of innocence and virtue. To which must be added the complacency, -satisfaction, and even joy of heart, which accompany the exercise, the -real exercise of gratitude, friendship, benevolence. - -And here, I think, ought to be mentioned the fears of future -punishment, and peaceful hopes of a better life, in those who fully -believe, or have any serious apprehension of religion: because these -hopes and fears are present uneasiness and satisfaction to the mind, -and cannot be got rid of by great part of the world, even by men who -have thought most thoroughly upon the subject of religion. And no one -can say, how considerable this uneasiness or satisfaction may be, or -what upon the whole it may amount to.[72] - -In the next place comes in the consideration, that all honest and -good men are disposed to befriend honest good men as such, and to -discountenance the vicious as such, and do so in some degree; indeed -in a considerable degree: from which favor and discouragement cannot -but arise considerable advantage and inconvenience. Though the -generality of the world have little regard to the morality of their -own actions, and may be supposed to have less to that of others, when -they themselves are not concerned; yet let any one be known to be a -man of virtue, somehow or other he will be favored and good offices -will be done him, from regard to his character, without remote views, -occasionally, and in some low degree, I think, by the generality of -the world, as it happens to come in their way. Public honors too -and advantages are the natural consequences, and sometimes at least, -the consequences in fact, of virtuous actions; of eminent justice, -fidelity, charity, love to our country, considered in the view of -being virtuous. And sometimes even death itself, often infamy and -external inconveniences, are the public consequences of vice as vice. -For instance, the sense which mankind have of tyranny, injustice, -oppression, additional to the mere feeling or fear of misery, has -doubtless been instrumental in bringing about revolutions, which make -a figure even in the history of the world. For it is plain, that men -resent injuries as implying faultiness, and retaliate, not merely -under the notion of having received harm, but of having received -wrong; and they have this resentment in behalf of others, as well as -of themselves. So likewise even the generality are, in some degree, -grateful and disposed to return good offices, not merely because such -a one has been the occasion of good to them, but under the view, that -such good offices implied kind intention and good desert in the doer. - -To all this may be added two or three particular things, which many -persons will think frivolous; but to me nothing appears so, which at -all comes in towards determining a question of such importance, as, -whether there be or be not, a moral institution of government, in the -strictest sense moral, _visibly_ established and begun in nature. The -particular things are these: That in domestic government, which is -doubtless natural, children and others also are very generally punished -for falsehood, injustice, and ill-behavior, as such, and rewarded for -the contrary: which are instances of veracity and justice and right -behavior, as such, naturally enforced by rewards and punishments, more -or less considerable. That, though civil government be supposed to take -cognizance of actions in no other view than as prejudicial to society, -without respect to the immorality of them, yet as such actions are -immoral, so the sense which men have of the immorality of them, very -greatly contributes, in different ways, to bring offenders to justice. -And that entire absence of all crime and guilt in the moral sense, when -plainly appearing, will almost of course procure, and circumstances of -aggravated guilt prevent, a remission of the penalties annexed to civil -crimes, in many cases, though by no means in all. - -Upon the whole then, besides the good and bad effects of virtue and -vice upon men’s own minds, the course of the world does, in some -measure, turn upon the approbation and disapprobation of them as such, -in others. The sense of well and ill doing, the presages of conscience, -the love of good characters and dislike of bad ones, honor, shame, -resentment, gratitude, all these, considered in themselves, and in -their effects, do afford manifest real instances, of virtue as such -naturally favored, and of vice as such discountenanced, more or less, -in the daily course of human life; in every age, in every relation, -in every general circumstance of it. That God has given us a moral -nature,[73] may most justly be urged as a proof of our being under his -moral government: but that he has placed us in a condition, which gives -this nature, as one may speak, scope to operate, and in which it does -unavoidably operate; _i.e._ influence mankind to act, so as thus to -favor and reward virtue, and discountenance and punish vice, this is -not the same, but a further additional proof of his moral government; -for it is an instance of it. The first is a proof, that he will finally -favor and support virtue effectually: the second is an example of his -favoring and supporting it at present, in some degree. - -If a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it arises, that virtue as -such is often rewarded, and vice as such is punished, and this rule -never inverted, it will be found to proceed, in part, immediately from -the moral nature itself, which God has given us;[74] and also in part, -from his having given us, together with this nature, so great a power -over each other’s happiness and misery. For, _first_, it is certain, -that peace and delight, in some degree and upon some occasions, is -the necessary and present effect of virtuous practice; an effect -arising immediately from that constitution of our nature. We are _so -made_, that well-doing as such, gives us satisfaction, at least in -some instances; ill-doing as such, in none. And, _secondly_, from our -moral nature, joined with God’s having put our happiness and misery -in many respects in each other’s power, it cannot but be, that vice -as such, some kinds and instances of it at least, will be infamous, -and men will be disposed to punish it as in itself detestable; and the -villain will by no means be able always to avoid feeling that infamy, -any more than he will be able to escape this further punishment, which -mankind will be disposed to inflict upon him, under the notion of his -deserving it. But there can be nothing on the side of vice, to answer -this; because there is nothing in the human mind contradictory, as -the logicians speak, to virtue. For virtue consists in a regard to -what is right and reasonable, as being so; in a regard to veracity, -justice, charity, in themselves: and there is surely no such thing, -as a like natural regard to falsehood, injustice, cruelty. If it be -thought, that there are instances of an approbation of vice, as such, -in itself, and for its own sake, (though it does not appear to me, that -there is any such thing at all;) it is evidently monstrous: as much -so, as the most acknowledged perversion of any passion whatever. Such -instances of perversion then being left out, as merely imaginary, or -at least unnatural; it must follow, from the frame of our nature, and -from our condition, in the respects now described, that vice cannot -at all be, and virtue cannot but be, favored as such by others, upon -some occasions, and happy in itself, in some degree. For what is here -insisted upon, is not the _degree_ in which virtue and vice are thus -distinguished, but only the thing itself, that they are so in some -degree; though the whole good and bad effect of virtue and vice as -such, is not inconsiderable in degree. But that they must be thus -distinguished in some degree, is in a manner necessary: it is matter -of fact of daily experience, even in the greatest confusion of human -affairs. - -It is not pretended but that, in the natural course of things, -happiness and misery appear to be distributed by other rules, than -only the personal merit and demerit of characters. They may sometimes -be distributed by way of mere discipline. There may be the wisest and -best reasons, why the world should be governed by general laws, from -whence such promiscuous distribution perhaps must follow; and also -why our happiness and misery should be put in each other’s power, in -the degree which they are. And these things, as, in general, they -contribute to the rewarding virtue and punishing vice, as such, so -they often contribute also, not to the inversion of this, which is -impossible, but to the rendering persons prosperous, though wicked; -afflicted, though righteous; and, which is worse, to the _rewarding -some actions_, though vicious, and _punishing other actions_, though -virtuous.[75] But all this cannot drown the voice of nature in the -conduct of Providence, plainly declaring itself for virtue, by way -of distinction from vice, and preference to it. For our being so -constituted as that virtue and vice are thus naturally favored and -discountenanced, rewarded and punished, respectively as such, is -an intuitive proof of the intent of nature, that it should be so; -otherwise the constitution of our mind, from which it thus immediately -and directly proceeds, would be absurd. But it cannot be said, because -virtuous actions are sometimes punished, and vicious actions rewarded, -that nature intended it. For, though this great disorder is brought -about, as all actions are, by means of some natural passion; yet _this -may be_, as it undoubtedly is, brought about by the perversion of such -passion, implanted in us for other, and those very good purposes. And -indeed these other and good purposes, even of every passion, may be -clearly seen. - -We have then a declaration, in some degree of present effect, from Him -who is supreme in nature, which side he is of, or what part he takes; -a declaration for virtue, and against vice. So far therefore as a man -is true to virtue, to veracity and justice, to equity and charity, and -the right of the case, in whatever he is concerned; so far he is on the -side of the divine administration, and co-operates with it: and from -hence, to such a man, arises naturally a secret satisfaction and sense -of security, and implicit hope of somewhat further. - -V. This hope is confirmed by the necessary tendencies of virtue, -which, though not of present effect, yet are at present discernible in -nature; and so afford an instance of somewhat moral in the essential -constitution of it. There is, in the nature of things, a tendency in -virtue and vice to produce the good and bad effects now mentioned, in -a greater degree than they do in fact produce them. For instance; good -and bad men would be much more rewarded and punished as such, were it -not, that justice is often artificially eluded,[76] that characters are -not known, and many, who would thus favor virtue and discourage vice, -are hindered from doing so, by accidental causes. These tendencies of -virtue and vice are obvious with regard to _individuals_. But it may -require more particularly to be considered, that power in a _society_, -by being under the direction of virtue, naturally increases, and has -a necessary tendency to prevail over opposite power, not under the -direction of it; in like manner, as power, by being under the direction -of reason, increases, and has a tendency to prevail over brute force. -There are several brute creatures of equal, and several of superior -strength, to that of men; and possibly the sum of the whole strength -of brutes may be greater than that of mankind; but reason gives us the -advantage and superiority over them; and thus man is the acknowledged -governing animal upon the earth. Nor is this superiority considered by -any as accidental; but as what reason has a tendency, in the nature of -the thing, to obtain. And yet perhaps difficulties may be raised about -the meaning, as well as the truth, of the assertion, that virtue has -the like tendency. - -To obviate these difficulties, let us see more distinctly, how the case -stands with regard to reason; which is so readily acknowledged to have -this advantageous tendency. Suppose then two or three men, of the best -and most improved understanding, in a desolate open plain, attacked -by ten times the number of beasts of prey: would their reason secure -them the victory in this unequal combat? Power then, though joined -with reason, and under its direction, cannot be expected to prevail -over opposite power, though merely brutal, unless the one bears some -proportion to the other. Again: put the imaginary case, that rational -and irrational creatures were of like external shape and manner: it is -certain, before there were opportunities for the first to distinguish -each other, to separate from their adversaries, and to form a union -among themselves, they might be upon a level, or in several respects -upon great disadvantage; though united they might be vastly superior: -since union is of such efficacy, that ten men united, might be able -to accomplish, what ten thousand of the same natural strength and -understanding wholly ununited, could not. In this case, brute force -might more than maintain its ground against reason, for want of union -among the rational creatures. Or suppose a number of men to land upon -an island inhabited only by wild beasts; men who, by the regulations -of civil government, the inventions of art, and the experience of some -years, could they be preserved so long, would be really sufficient to -subdue the wild beasts, and to preserve themselves in security from -them: yet a conjuncture of accidents might give such advantage to the -irrational animals as they might at once overpower, and even extirpate, -the rational ones. Length of time then, proper scope, and opportunities -for reason to exert itself, may be absolutely necessary to its -prevailing over brute force. - -Further: there are many instances of brutes succeeding in attempts, -which they could not have undertaken, had not their irrational nature -rendered them incapable of foreseeing the danger of such attempt, or -the fury of passion hindered their attending to it: and there are -instances of reason and real prudence preventing men’s undertaking -what, it has appeared afterwards, they might have succeeded in by a -lucky rashness. In certain conjunctures, ignorance and folly, weakness -and discord, may have their advantages. So that rational animals -have not _necessarily_ the superiority over irrational ones; but, -how improbable soever it may be, it is evidently possible, that in -some globes the latter may be superior. And were the former wholly at -variance and disunited, by false self-interest and envy, by treachery -and injustice, and consequent rage and malice against each other, -whilst the latter were firmly united among themselves by instinct, this -might greatly contribute to the introducing such an inverted order -of things. For every one would consider it as inverted: since reason -has, in the nature of it, a tendency to prevail over brute force; -notwithstanding the possibility it may not prevail, and the necessity, -which there is, of many concurring circumstances to render it prevalent. - -Now I say, virtue in a society has a like tendency to procure -superiority and additional power: whether this power be considered -as the means of security from opposite power, or of obtaining other -advantages. It has this tendency, by rendering public good, an object -and end, to every member of the society; by putting every one upon -consideration and diligence, recollection and self-government, both in -order to see what is the most effectual method, and also in order to -perform their proper part, for obtaining and preserving it; by uniting -a society within itself, and so increasing its strength; and, which -is particularly to be mentioned, uniting it by means of veracity and -justice. For as these last are principal bonds of union, so benevolence -or public spirit, undirected, unrestrained by them, is, nobody knows -what. - -And suppose the invisible world, and the invisible dispensations of -Providence, to be, in any sort, analogous to what appears: or that both -together make up one uniform scheme, the two parts of which, the part -which we see, and that which is beyond our observation, are analogous -to each other: then, there must be a like natural tendency in the -derived power, throughout the universe, under the direction of virtue, -to prevail in general over that which is not under its direction; as -there is in reason, derived reason in the universe, to prevail over -brute force. - -But then, in order to the prevalence of virtue, or that it may actually -produce, what it has a tendency to produce; the _like concurrences -are necessary_, as are, to the prevalence of reason. There must be -some proportion, between the natural power or force which is, and that -which is not, under the direction of virtue: there must be sufficient -length of time; for the complete success of virtue, as of reason, -cannot, from the nature of the thing, be otherwise than gradual: there -must be, as one may speak, a fair field of trial, a stage large and -extensive enough, proper occasions and opportunities, for the virtuous -to join together, to exert themselves against lawless force, and to -reap the fruit of their united labors. Now indeed it is to be hoped, -that the disproportion between the good and bad, even here on earth, -is not so great, but that the former have natural power sufficient -to their prevailing to a considerable degree, if circumstances would -permit this power to be united. For, much less, very much less, power -under the direction of virtue, would prevail over much greater not -under the direction of it.[77] However, good men over the face of -the earth cannot unite; because, (among other reasons,) they cannot -be sufficiently ascertained of each other’s characters. And the -known course of human things, the scene we are now passing through, -particularly the shortness of life, denies to virtue its full scope in -several other respects. - -The natural tendency which we have been considering, though real, is -_hindered_ from being carried into effect in the present state: but -these hinderances may be removed in a future one. Virtue, to borrow the -Christian allusion, is militant here; and various untoward accidents -contribute to its being often overborne: but it may combat with -greater advantage hereafter, and prevail completely, and enjoy its -consequent rewards, in some future states. Neglected as it is, perhaps -unknown, perhaps despised and oppressed here; there maybe scenes in -eternity, lasting enough, and in every other way adapted, to afford -it a sufficient sphere of action; and a sufficient sphere for the -natural consequences of it to follow in fact. If the soul be naturally -immortal, and this state be a progress towards a future one, as -childhood is towards mature age, good men may naturally unite, not only -among themselves, but also with other orders of virtuous creatures, -in that future state. For virtue, from the very nature of it, is a -principle and bond of union, in some degree, among all who are endued -with it, and known to each other; so as that by it, a good man cannot -but recommend himself to the favor and protection of all virtuous -beings, throughout the whole universe, who can be acquainted with his -character, and can any way interpose in his behalf in any part of his -duration. - -One might add, that suppose all this advantageous tendency of virtue -to become effect, among one or more orders of creatures, in any -distant scenes and periods, and to be seen by any orders of vicious -creatures, throughout the universal kingdom of God; this happy effect -of virtue would have a tendency, by way of example, and possibly in -other ways, to amend those of them who are capable of amendment, and of -being recovered to a just sense of virtue. If our notions of the plan -of Providence were enlarged in any sort proportionable to what late -discoveries have enlarged our views with respect to the material world, -representations of this kind would not appear absurd or extravagant. -They are not to be taken as intended for a literal delineation of -what is in fact the particular scheme of the universe, which cannot -be known without revelation: for suppositions are not to be looked -on as true, because not incredible: but they are mentioned to show, -that our finding virtue to be hindered from procuring to itself such -superiority and advantages, is no objection against its having, in the -essential nature of the thing, a tendency to procure them. And the -suppositions now mentioned do plainly show this: for they show, that -these hinderances are so far from being necessary, that we ourselves -can easily conceive, how they may be removed in future states, and full -scope be granted to virtue. And all these advantageous tendencies -of it are to be considered as declarations of God in its favor. This -however is taking a pretty large compass: though it is certain, that, -as the material world appears to be, in a manner, boundless and -immense, there must be _some_ scheme of Providence vast in proportion -to it. - -But let us return to the earth our habitation; and we shall see this -happy tendency of virtue, by imagining an instance not so vast and -remote: by supposing a kingdom or society of men upon it, perfectly -virtuous, for a succession of many ages; to which, if you please, may -be given a situation advantageous for universal monarchy. In such -a state, there would be no such thing as faction: but men of the -greatest capacity would of course, all along, have the chief direction -of affairs willingly yielded to them; and they would share it among -themselves without envy. Each of these would have the part assigned -him, to which his genius was peculiarly adapted; and others, who had -not any distinguished genius, would be safe, and think themselves very -happy, by being under the protection and guidance of those who had. -Public determinations would really be the result of the united wisdom -of the community: and they would faithfully be executed, by the united -strength of it. Some would contribute in a higher way, but all in some -way, to the public prosperity: and in it, each would enjoy the fruits -of his own virtue. And as injustice, whether by fraud or force, would -be unknown among themselves, so they would be sufficiently secured -from it in their neighbors. For cunning and false self-interest, -confederacies in injustice, ever slight, and accompanied with faction -and intestine treachery; these on one hand would be found mere childish -folly and weakness, when set in opposition against wisdom, public -spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity on the other: allowing both -a sufficient length of years to try their force. Add the general -influence, which such a kingdom would have over the face of the earth, -by way of example particularly, and the reverence which would be paid -it. It would plainly be superior to all others, and the world must -gradually come under its empire; not by means of lawless violence; -but partly by what must be allowed to be just conquest; and partly by -other kingdoms submitting themselves voluntarily to it, throughout a -course of ages, and claiming its protection, one after another, in -successive exigencies. The head of it would be a universal monarch, -in another sense than any mortal has yet been; and the Eastern style -would be literally applicable to him, _that all people, nations, and -languages should serve him_. And though indeed our knowledge of human -nature, and the whole history of mankind, show the impossibility, -without some miraculous interposition, that a number of men, here on -earth, should unite in one society or government, in the fear of God -and universal practice of virtue; and that such a government should -continue so united for a succession of ages: yet admitting or supposing -this, the effect would be as now drawn out. Thus for instance, the -wonderful power and prosperity promised to the Jewish nation in the -Scripture, would be, in a great measure, the consequence of what is -predicted of them; that the _people should be all righteous, and -inherit the land forever_;[78] were we to understand the latter phrase -of a long continuance only, sufficient to give things time to work. The -predictions of this kind, for there are many of them, cannot come to -pass, in the present known course of nature; but suppose them come to -pass, and then, the dominion and preëminence promised must naturally -follow, to a very considerable degree. - -Consider now the general system of religion; that the government of -the world is uniform, and one, and moral; that virtue and right shall -finally have the advantage, and prevail over fraud and lawless force, -over the deceits as well as the violence of wickedness, under the -conduct of one supreme governor: and from the observations above made, -it will appear that God has, by our reason, given us to see a peculiar -connection in the several parts of this scheme, and a tendency towards -the completion of it, arising out of the very nature of virtue: which -tendency is to be considered as something moral in the essential -constitution of things. If any one should think all this to be of -little importance, I desire him to consider, what he would think, if -vice had, essentially and in its nature, these advantageous tendencies; -or if virtue had essentially the contrary ones. - -It may be objected, that notwithstanding all these natural effects and -natural tendencies of virtue, yet things may be now going on throughout -the universe, and may go on hereafter, in the same mixed way as here at -present upon earth: virtue sometimes prosperous, sometimes depressed; -vice sometimes punished, sometimes successful. - -The answer to which is, that it is not the purpose of this chapter, -nor of this treatise, properly to prove God’s perfect moral government -over the world, or the truth of religion; but to observe what there -is in the constitution and course of nature, to confirm the proper -proof of it, supposed to be known: and that the weight of the -foregoing observations to this purpose may be thus distinctly proved. -Pleasure and pain are, to a certain degree, say to a very high degree, -distributed among us without any apparent regard to the merit or -demerit of characters. And were there nothing else concerning this -matter discernible in the constitution and course of nature, there -would be no ground from the constitution and course of nature, to hope -or to fear that men would be rewarded or punished hereafter according -to their deserts: which, however, it is to be remarked, implies, that -even then there would be no ground from appearances to think, that vice -upon the whole would have the advantage, rather than that virtue would. -Thus the proof of a future state of retribution would rest upon the -usual known arguments for it; which are I think plainly unanswerable; -and would be so, though there were no additional confirmation of them -from the things above insisted on. But these things are a very strong -confirmation of them. For, - -_First_, They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent to -virtue and vice. They amount to a declaration, from him, determinate -and not to be evaded, in favor of one, and against the other; such a -declaration, as there is nothing to be set over against or answer, on -the part of vice. So that were a man, laying aside the proper proof -of religion, to determine from the course of nature only, whether it -were most probable, that the righteous or the wicked would have the -advantage in a future life; there can be no doubt, but that he would -determine the probability to be, that the former would. The course of -nature then, in the view of it now given, furnishes us with a real -practical proof of the obligations of religion. - -_Secondly_, When, conformably to what religion teaches us, God shall -reward and punish virtue and vice as such, so as that every one shall, -upon the whole, have his deserts; this distributive justice will not -be a thing different in _kind_, but only in _degree_, from what we -experience in his present government. It will be that in _effect_, -towards which we now see a _tendency_. It will be no more than the -_completion_ of that moral government, the _principles and beginning_ -of which have been shown, beyond all dispute, discernible in the -present constitution and course of nature. - -_Thirdly_, As under the _natural_ government of God, our experience of -those kinds and degrees of happiness and misery, which we do experience -at present, gives just ground to hope for, and to fear, higher degrees -and other kinds of both in a future state, supposing a future state -admitted: so under his _moral_ government our experience, that virtue -and vice are, in the manners above mentioned, actually rewarded and -punished at present, in a certain degree, gives just ground to hope and -to fear, that they _may be_ rewarded and punished in a higher degree -hereafter. It is acknowledged indeed that this alone is not sufficient -ground to think, that they _actually will be_ rewarded and punished in -a higher degree, rather than in a lower: but then, - -_Lastly_, There is sufficient ground to think so, from the good and -bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For these tendencies are essential, -and founded in the nature of things: whereas the hinderances to -their becoming effect are, in numberless cases, not necessary, but -artificial only. Now it may be much more strongly argued, that these -tendencies, as well as the actual rewards and punishments, of virtue -and vice, which arise directly out of the nature of things, will -remain hereafter, than that the accidental hinderances of them will. -And if these hinderances do not remain; those rewards and punishments -cannot but be carried on much farther towards the perfection of moral -government: _i.e._ the tendencies of virtue and vice will become -effect; but when, or where, or in what particular way, cannot be known -at all, but by revelation. - -Upon the whole: there is a kind of moral government implied in God’s -natural government:[79] virtue and vice are naturally rewarded and -punished as beneficial and mischievous to society;[80] and rewarded -and punished directly as virtue and vice.[81] The notion of a moral -scheme of government is not fictitious, but natural; for it is -suggested to our thoughts by the constitution and course of nature: -and the execution of this scheme is actually begun, in the instances -here mentioned. And these things are to be considered as a declaration -of the Author of nature, for virtue, and against vice: they give a -credibility to the supposition of their being rewarded and punished -hereafter; and also ground to hope and to fear, that they may be -rewarded and punished in higher degrees than they are here. All this -is confirmed, and the argument for religion, from the constitution -and course of nature, is carried on farther, by observing, that there -are natural tendencies, and, in innumerable cases, only artificial -hinderances, to this moral scheme’s being carried on much farther -towards perfection, than it is at present.[82] - -The notion then of a moral scheme of government, much more perfect -than what is seen, is not a fictitious, but a natural notion; for it -is suggested to our thoughts, by the essential tendencies of virtue -and vice. These tendencies are to be considered as intimations, as -implicit promises and threatenings, from the Author of nature, of much -greater rewards and punishments to follow virtue and vice, than do at -present. Indeed, every _natural_ tendency, which is to continue, but -which is hindered from becoming effect by only _accidental_ causes, -affords a presumption, that such tendency will, some time or other, -become effect: a presumption proportionable in degree to the length of -the duration, through which such tendency will continue. From these -things together, arises a real presumption, that the moral scheme of -government established in nature, shall be carried on much farther -towards perfection hereafter; and, I think, a presumption that it will -be absolutely completed. From these things, joined with the moral -nature which God has given us, considered as given us by him, arises a -practical proof[83] that it _will_ be completed: a proof from fact; and -therefore a distinct one from that which is deduced from the eternal -and unalterable relations, the fitness and unfitness of actions. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER.[84] - - -The general doctrine of religion, that our present life is a state of -probation for a future one, comprehends under it several particular -things, distinct from each other. The first and most common meaning -of it seems to be, that our future interest is now depending, and -depending upon ourselves; that we have scope and opportunities here, -for that good and bad behavior, which God will reward and punish -hereafter; together with temptations to one, as well as inducements -of reason to the other. And this, in a great measure, is the same as -saying, that we are under the moral government of God, and to give -an account of our actions to him. For the notion of a future account -and general righteous judgment, implies some sort of temptations -to what is wrong: otherwise there would be no moral possibility of -doing wrong, nor ground for judgment, or discrimination. But there -is this difference, that the word _probation_ is more distinctly and -particularly expressive of allurements to wrong, or difficulties in -adhering uniformly to what is right, and of the danger of miscarrying -by such temptations, than the words _moral government_. A state -of probation then, as thus particularly implying in it trial, -difficulties, and danger, may require to be considered distinctly by -itself.[85] - -As the moral government of God, which religion teaches us, implies -that we are in a state of trial with regard to a future world, so -also his natural government over us implies that we are in a state of -trial, in the like sense, with regard to the present world. Natural -government by rewards and punishments, as much implies natural trial, -as moral government does moral trial. The natural government of God -here meant,[86] consists in his annexing pleasure to some actions, -and pain to others, which are in our power to do or forbear, and -giving us notice of such appointment, beforehand. This necessarily -implies, that he has made our happiness and misery, or our interest, to -depend in part upon ourselves. So far as men have temptations to any -course of action, which will probably occasion them greater temporal -inconvenience and uneasiness, than satisfaction, so far their temporal -interest is in danger from themselves; or they are in a state of trial -with respect to it. Now people often blame others, and even themselves, -for their misconduct in their temporal concerns. And we find many are -greatly wanting to themselves, and miss that natural happiness, which -they might have obtained in the present life: perhaps every one does -in some degree. But many run themselves into great inconvenience, and -into extreme distress and misery, not through incapacity of knowing -better, and doing better, for themselves, which would be nothing -to the present purpose, but through their own fault. These things -necessarily imply temptation, and danger of miscarrying, in a greater -or less degree, with respect to our worldly interest or happiness. -Every one too, without having religion in his thoughts, speaks of the -hazards which young people run, upon their setting out in the world: -hazards from other causes, than merely their ignorance, and unavoidable -accidents. And some courses of vice, at least, being contrary to men’s -worldly interest or good; temptations to these must at the same time be -temptations to forego our present and our future interest. - -Thus in our natural or temporal capacity, we are in a state of trial, -_i.e._ of difficulty and danger, analogous, or like to our moral and -religious trial. This will more distinctly appear to any one, who -thinks it worth while, more distinctly, to consider, what it is which -constitutes our trial in both capacities, and to observe, how mankind -behave under it. - -That which constitutes this trial, in both these capacities, must be -something either in our external circumstances, or in our nature. For, -on the one hand, persons may be betrayed into wrong behavior upon -surprise, or overcome upon any other very singular and extraordinary -external occasions, who would, otherwise, have preserved their -character of prudence and of virtue: in which cases, every one, in -speaking of the wrong behavior of these persons, would impute it to -such particular external circumstances. On the other hand, men who -have contracted habits of vice and folly of any kind, or have some -particular passions in excess, will seek opportunities, and, as it -were, go out of their way, to gratify themselves in these respects, -at the expense of their wisdom and their virtue; led to it, as every -one would say, not by external temptations, but by such habits and -passions. And the account of this last case is, that particular -passions are no more coincident with prudence, or that reasonable -self-love, the end of which is our worldly interest, than they are -with the principle of virtue and religion; but often draw contrary -ways to one, as well as to the other: and so such particular passions -are as much temptations, to act imprudently with regard to our worldly -interest, as to act viciously.[87] When we say, men are misled by -external circumstances of temptation; it cannot but be understood, that -there is somewhat within themselves, to render those circumstances -temptations, or to render them susceptible of impressions from them. -So when we say, they are misled by passions; it is always supposed, -that there are occasions, circumstances, and objects, exciting -these passions, and affording means for gratifying them. Therefore, -temptations from within, and from without, coincide, and mutually imply -each other. The several external objects of the appetites, passions, -and affections, being present to the senses, or offering themselves to -the mind, and so exciting emotions suitable to their nature; not only -in cases where they can be gratified consistently with innocence and -prudence, but also in cases where they cannot, and yet can be gratified -imprudently and viciously: this as really puts them in danger of -voluntarily foregoing their present interest or good, as their future; -and as really renders self-denial necessary to secure one, as the -other: _i.e._ we are in a like state of trial with respect to both, by -the very same passions, excited by the very same means. - -Thus mankind having a temporal interest depending upon themselves, and -a prudent course of behavior being necessary to secure it, passions -inordinately excited, whether by means of example, or by any other -external circumstance, towards such objects, at such times, or in -such degrees, as that they cannot be gratified consistently with -worldly prudence, are temptations; dangerous, and too often successful -temptations, to forego a greater temporal good for a less; _i.e._ to -forego what is, upon the whole, our temporal interest, for the sake -of a present gratification. This is a description of our state of -trial in our temporal capacity. Substitute now the word _future_ for -_temporal_, and _virtue_ for _prudence_; and it will be just as proper -a description of our state of trial in our religious capacity; so -analogous are they to each other.[88] - -If, from consideration of this our like state of trial in both -capacities, we go on to observe farther, how mankind behave under -it; we shall find there are some, who have so little sense of it, -that they scarce look beyond the passing day: they are so taken up -with present gratifications, as to have, in a manner, no feeling of -consequences, no regard to their future ease or fortune in this life: -any more than to their happiness in another. Some appear to be blinded -and deceived by inordinate passion, in their worldly concerns, as -much as in religion. Others are not deceived, but as it were forcibly -carried away by the like passions, against their better judgment, and -feeble resolutions too of acting better.[89] And there are men, and -truly not a few, who shamelessly avow, not their interest, but their -mere will and pleasure, to be their law of life: and who, in open -defiance of every thing reasonable, will go on in a course of vicious -extravagance, foreseeing, with no remorse and little fear, that it will -be their temporal ruin; and some of them, under the apprehension of -the consequences of wickedness in another state. To speak in the most -moderate way, human creatures are not only continually liable to go -wrong voluntarily, but we see likewise that they often actually do so, -with respect to their temporal interests, as well as with respect to -religion. - -Thus our difficulties and dangers, or our trials in our temporal and -our religious capacity, as they proceed from the same causes, and have -the same effect upon men’s behavior, are evidently analogous, and of -the same kind. - -It may be added, that the difficulties and dangers of miscarrying in -our religious state of trial, are greatly increased, and one is ready -to think, are in a manner wholly _made_, by the ill behavior of others; -by a wrong education, wrong in a moral sense, sometimes positively -vicious; by general bad example; by the dishonest artifices which are -got into business of all kinds; and, in very many parts of the world, -by religion’s being corrupted into superstitions, which indulge men in -their vices. In like manner, the difficulties of conducting ourselves -prudently in respect to our present interest, and our danger of being -led aside from pursuing it, are greatly increased, by a foolish -education; and, after we come to mature age, by the extravagance and -carelessness of others, with whom we have intercourse: and by mistaken -notions, very generally prevalent, and taken up from common opinion, -concerning temporal happiness, and wherein it consists. - -Persons, by their own _negligence_ and _folly_ in temporal affairs, no -less than by a course of vice, bring themselves into new difficulties, -and, by habits of indulgence, become less qualified to go through -them: and one irregularity after another, embarrasses things to such -a degree, that they know not whereabout they are; and often makes -the path of conduct so intricate and perplexed, that it is difficult -to trace it out; difficult even to determine what is the prudent or -the moral part. Thus, for instance, wrong behavior in one stage of -life, youth; wrong, I mean considering ourselves only in our temporal -capacity, without taking in religion; this, in several ways, increases -the difficulties of right behavior in mature age; _i.e._ puts us into -a more disadvantageous state of trial in our temporal capacity. - -We are an inferior part of the creation of God. There are natural -appearances of our being in a state of degradation.[90] We certainly -are in a condition, which _does not seem_, by any means, the most -advantageous we could imagine or desire, either in our natural or moral -capacity, for securing either our present or future interest. However, -this condition, low, and careful, and uncertain as it is, does not -afford any just ground of complaint. For, as men _may_ manage their -temporal affairs with prudence, and so pass their days here on earth -in tolerable ease and satisfaction, by a moderate degree of care: so -likewise with regard to religion, there is no more required than what -they are well able to do,[91] and what they must be greatly wanting -to themselves, if they neglect. And for persons to have that put upon -them, which they are well able to go through, and no more, we naturally -consider as an equitable thing; supposing it done by proper authority. -Nor have we any more reason to complain of it, with regard to the -Author of nature, than of his not having given us advantages belonging -to other orders of creatures. - -[REMARKS.] The thing here insisted upon is, that the state of trial, -which religion teaches us we are in, is rendered credible, by its -being throughout uniform and of a piece with the general conduct of -Providence towards us, in all other respects within the compass of our -knowledge. Indeed if mankind, considered in their natural capacity, as -inhabitants of this world only, found themselves, from their birth to -their death, in a settled state of security and happiness, without -any solicitude or thought of their own: or if they were in no danger -of being brought into inconveniences and distress, by carelessness, or -the folly of passion, through bad example, the treachery of others, or -the deceitful appearances of things: were this our natural condition, -then it might seem strange, and be some presumption against the truth -of religion, that it represents our future and more general interest, -as not secure _of course_, but as depending upon our behavior, and -requiring recollection and self-government to obtain it. It _then_ -might be alleged, “What you say is our condition, in one respect, is -not in any wise of a sort with what we find, by experience, is our -condition in another. Our whole present interest is secured to our -hands, without any solicitude of ours; and why should not our future -interest, if we have any such, be so too?” But since, on the contrary, -thought and consideration, the voluntary denying ourselves many things -which we desire, and a course of behavior, far from being always -agreeable to us, are absolutely necessary to our acting even a common -decent, and common prudent part, so as to pass with any satisfaction -through the _present_ world, and be received upon any tolerable -good terms in it: since this is the case, all presumption against -self-denial and attention being necessary to secure our _higher_ -interest,[92] is removed. - -Had we not experience, it might, perhaps speciously, be urged, that it -is improbable any thing of hazard and danger should be put upon us by -an infinite being; when every thing which has hazard and danger in our -manner of conception, and will end in error, confusion, and misery, -is already certain in his foreknowledge. Indeed, why any thing of -hazard and danger should be put upon such frail creatures as we are, -may well be thought a difficulty in speculation; and cannot but be so, -till we know the whole, or at least much more of the case. But still -the constitution of nature is as it is. Our happiness and misery are -trusted to our conduct, and made to depend upon it. Somewhat, and, in -many circumstances, a great deal too, is put upon us, either to do, -or to suffer, as we choose. All the various miseries of life, which -people bring upon themselves by negligence and folly, and might have -avoided by proper care, are instances of this: which miseries are, -beforehand, just as contingent and undetermined as conduct, and left to -be determined by it. - -These observations are an answer[93] to the objections against the -credibility of a state of trial, as implying temptations, and real -danger of miscarrying with regard to our general interest, under the -moral government of God. And they show, that, if we are at all to be -considered in such a capacity, and as having such an interest, the -general analogy of Providence must lead us to apprehend ourselves in -danger of miscarrying, in different degrees, as to this interest, by -our neglecting to act the proper part belonging to us in that capacity. -For we have a present interest under the government of God, which we -experience here upon earth. This interest, as it is not forced upon us, -so neither is it offered to our acceptance, but to our acquisition; and -in such manner, as that we are in danger of missing it, by means of -temptations to neglect, or act contrary to it; and without attention -and self-denial, we must and do miss it. It is then perfectly credible, -that this may be our case, with respect to that chief and final good, -which religion proposes to us. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. - - -From the consideration of our being in a probation-state, of so -much difficulty and hazard, naturally arises the question, how we -came to be placed in it? But such a general inquiry as this would -be found involved in insuperable difficulties. For, though some -of these difficulties would be lessened, by observing that all -wickedness is voluntary, as is implied in its very notion; and that -many of the miseries of life have apparent good effects: yet, when -we consider other circumstances belonging to both, and what must be -the consequence of the former in a life to come, it cannot but be -acknowledged plain folly and presumption, to pretend to give an account -of the _whole reasons_ of this matter; the whole reasons of our being -allotted a condition, out of which so much wickedness and misery, -so circumstanced, would in fact arise. Whether it be not beyond our -faculties, not only to find out, but even to understand; or, though we -should be supposed capable of understanding it, yet, whether it would -be of service or prejudice to us to be informed of it, is impossible -to say. But as our present condition can in no wise be shown to be -inconsistent with the perfect moral government of God: so religion -teaches us we were placed in it, that we might qualify ourselves, by -the practice of virtue, for another state which is to follow it. This, -though but a partial answer, a very partial one indeed, to the inquiry -now mentioned; is yet a more satisfactory answer to another, which is -of real, and of the utmost importance to us to have answered,--viz.: -What is our business here? The known end then, why we are placed -in a state of so much affliction, hazard, and difficulty, is, our -improvement in virtue and piety, as the requisite qualification for a -future state of security and happiness. - -The beginning of life, considered as an education for mature age in the -present world, appears plainly, at first sight, analogous to this our -trial for a future one: the former being in our temporal capacity, what -the latter is in our religious capacity. Some observations common to -both, and a more distinct consideration of each, will more distinctly -show the extent and force of the analogy between them; and the -credibility, which arises from hence, as well as from the nature of the -thing, that the present life was intended to be a state of discipline -for a future one. - -I. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed for a particular -way of life; to which, the nature, the capacities, temper, and -qualifications, of each species, are as necessary as their external -circumstances. Both come into the notion of such state, or particular -way of life, and are constituent parts of it. Change a man’s capacities -or character, to the degree in which it is conceivable they may be -changed, and he would be altogether incapable of a human course of -life, and human happiness; as incapable, as if, his nature continuing -unchanged, he were placed in a world, where he had no sphere of action, -nor any objects to answer his appetites, passions, and affections of -any sort. One thing is set over against another, as an ancient writer -expresses it.[94] Our nature corresponds to our external condition. -Without this correspondence, there would be no possibility of any -such thing as human life and happiness: which life and happiness are, -therefore, a _result_ from our nature and condition jointly: meaning -by human life, not living in the literal sense, but the whole complex -notion commonly understood by those words. So that without determining -what will be the employment and happiness, the particular life, of -good men hereafter; there must be some determinate capacities, some -necessary character and qualifications, without which persons cannot -but be utterly incapable of it: in like manner, as there must be some, -without which men would be incapable of their present state of life. - -II. The constitution of human creatures, and indeed of all creatures -which come under our notice, is such, as that they are capable -of naturally becoming qualified for states of life, for which -they were once wholly unqualified. In imagination we may indeed -conceive of creatures, incapable of having any of their faculties -naturally enlarged, or as being unable naturally to acquire any new -qualifications. But the faculties of every species known to us, are -made for enlargement; for acquirements of experience and habits. We -find ourselves, in particular, endued with capacities, not only of -perceiving ideas, and of knowledge or perceiving truth, but also of -storing up ideas and knowledge by memory. We are capable, not only of -acting, and of having different momentary impressions made upon us; -but of getting a new facility in any kind of action, and of settled -alterations in our temper or character. The power of the two last is -the power of habits. But neither the perception of ideas, nor knowledge -of any sort, are habits; though absolutely necessary to the forming of -them. However, apprehension, reason, memory, which are the capacities -of acquiring knowledge, are greatly improved by exercise. Whether the -word habit is applicable to all these improvements, and in particular -how far the powers of memory and of habits may be powers of the same -nature, I shall not inquire. But that perceptions come into our minds -readily and of course, by means of their having been there before, -seems a thing of the same sort, as readiness in any particular kind of -action, proceeding from being accustomed to it. Aptness to recollect -practical observations, of service in our conduct, is plainly habit in -many cases. There are habits of perception, and habits of action. An -instance of the former, is our constant and even involuntary readiness, -in correcting the impressions of our sight concerning magnitudes and -distances, so as to substitute judgment in the room of sensation, -imperceptibly to ourselves. It seems as if all other associations of -ideas not naturally connected, might be called passive habits; as -properly as our readiness in understanding languages upon sight, or -hearing of words. Our readiness in speaking and writing them, are -instances of active habits. - -For distinctness, we may consider habits, as belonging to the body, -or to the mind: and the latter will be explained by the former. -Under the former are comprehended all bodily activities or motions, -whether graceful or unbecoming, which are owing to use: under the -latter, general habits of life and conduct; such as those of obedience -and submission to authority, or to any particular person; those -of veracity, justice, and charity; those of attention, industry, -self-government, envy, revenge. Habits of this latter kind seem -produced by repeated acts, as well as the former. And as habits -belonging to the body are produced by external _acts_, so habits of the -mind are produced by the _exertion_ of inward practical principles; -_i.e._ by carrying them into act, or acting upon them; the principles -of obedience, of veracity, justice, and charity. Nor can those -habits be formed by any external course of action, otherwise than as -it proceeds from these principles: because it is only these inward -principles exerted, which are strictly acts of obedience, of veracity, -of justice, and of charity. - -So likewise habits of attention, industry, self-government, are in -the same manner acquired by exercise; and habits of envy and revenge -by indulgence, whether in outward act, or in thought and intention; -_i.e._ inward act: for such intention is an act. Resolutions to do -well, are also properly acts. And endeavoring to enforce upon our own -minds a practical sense of virtue, or to beget in others that practical -sense of it, which a man really has himself, is a virtuous act. All -these, therefore, may and will contribute towards forming good habits. -But going over the theory of virtue in one’s thoughts, talking well, -and drawing fine pictures, of it; this is so far from necessarily or -certainly conducing to form a habit of it, in him who thus employs -himself, that it may harden the mind in a contrary course, and render -it gradually more insensible; _i.e._ form a habit of insensibility -to all moral considerations. For, from our very faculty of habits, -passive impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker. Thoughts, by often -passing through the mind, are felt less sensibly: being accustomed to -danger, begets intrepidity, _i.e._ lessens fear; to distress, lessens -the passion of pity; to instances of others’ mortality, lessens the -sensible apprehension of our own. - -From these two observations together, that practical habits are formed -and strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive impressions grow -weaker by being repeated upon us, it must follow, that active habits -may be gradually forming and strengthening, by a course of acting -upon such and such motives and excitements, while these motives and -excitements themselves are, by proportionable degrees, growing less -sensible; _i.e._ are continually less and less sensibly felt, even as -the active habits strengthen. And experience confirms this: for active -principles, at the very time that they are less lively in perception -than they were, are found to be, somehow, wrought more thoroughly into -the temper and character, and become more effectual in influencing -our practice. The three things just mentioned may afford instances of -it. Perception of danger is a natural excitement of passive fear, and -active caution: and by being inured to danger, habits of the latter are -gradually wrought, at the same time that the former gradually lessens. -Perception of distress in others is a natural excitement, passively -to pity, and actively to relieve it: but let a man set himself to -attend to, inquire out, and relieve distressed persons, and he cannot -but grow less and less sensibly affected with the various miseries of -life, with which he must become acquainted; when yet, at the same time, -benevolence, considered not as a passion, but as a practical principle -of action, will strengthen: and while he passively compassionates the -distressed less, he will acquire a greater aptitude actively to assist -and befriend them. So also at the same time that the daily instances of -men’s dying around us give us daily a less sensible passive feeling or -apprehension of our own mortality, such instances greatly contribute to -the strengthening a practical regard to it in serious men; _i.e._ to -forming a habit of acting with a constant view to it. - -This seems further to show, that passive impressions made upon our -minds by admonition, experience, or example, though they may have a -remote efficacy, and a very great one, towards forming active habits, -yet can have this efficacy no otherwise than by inducing us to such a -course of action: and that it is not being _affected_ so and so, but -acting, which forms those habits: only it must be always remembered, -that real endeavors to enforce good impressions upon ourselves are a -species of virtuous action. Nor do we know how far it is possible, in -the nature of things, that effects should be wrought in us at once, -equivalent to habits; _i.e._ what is wrought by use and exercise. The -thing insisted on is, not what may be possible, but what is in fact the -appointment of nature: which is, that active habits are to be formed -by exercise. Their progress may be so gradual, as to be imperceptible -in its steps: it may be hard to explain the faculty, by which we are -capable of habits, throughout its several parts; and to trace it up -to its original, so as to distinguish it from all others in our mind: -and it seems as if contrary effects were to be ascribed to it. But -the thing in general, that our nature is formed to yield to use and -exercise, in some such manner as this, is matter of certain experience. - -Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of action, we get an -aptness to go on, a facility, readiness, and often pleasure, in it. -The inclinations which rendered us averse to it, grow weaker; the -difficulties in it, not only the imaginary but the real ones, lessen; -the reasons for it offer themselves of course to our thoughts upon all -occasions; and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to make us go -on, in a course of action, to which we have been accustomed. Practical -principles appear to grow stronger, absolutely in themselves, by -exercise; as well as relatively, with regard to contrary principles; -which, by being accustomed to submit, do so habitually, and of course. -Thus a new character, in several respects, may be formed; and many -habitudes of life, not given by nature, but which nature directs us to -acquire. - -III. Indeed we may be assured, that we should never have had these -capacities of improving by experience, acquired knowledge, and habits, -had they not been necessary, and intended to be made use of. And -accordingly we find them so necessary, and so much intended, that -without them we should be utterly incapable of that which was the end -for which we were made, considered in our temporal capacity only: the -employments and satisfactions of our mature state of life. - -Nature does in no wise qualify us wholly, much less at once, for this -mature state of life. Even maturity of understanding, and bodily -strength, not only are arrived at gradually, but are also very much -owing to the continued exercise of our powers of body and mind from -infancy. If we suppose a person brought into the world with both these -in maturity, as far as this is conceivable, he would plainly at first -be as unqualified for the human life of mature age, as an idiot. He -would be in a manner distracted, with astonishment, and apprehension, -and curiosity, and suspense: nor can one guess, how long it would be, -before he would be familiarized to himself and the objects about him, -enough even to set himself to any thing. It may be questioned too, -whether the natural information of his sight and hearing would be of -any manner of use to him in acting, before experience. And it seems, -that men would be strangely headstrong and self-willed, and disposed -to exert themselves with an impetuosity, which would render society -insupportable, and the living in it impracticable, were it not for some -acquired moderation and self-government, some aptitude and readiness -in restraining themselves, and concealing their sense of things. Want -of every thing of this kind which is learnt would render a man as -incapable of society, as want of language would; or as his natural -ignorance of any of the particular employments of life would render -him incapable of providing himself with the common conveniences, or -supplying the necessary wants of it. In these respects, and probably -in many more of which we have no particular notion, mankind is left -by nature, an unformed, unfinished creature; utterly deficient and -unqualified, before the acquirement of knowledge, experience, and -habits, for that mature state of life, which was the end of his -creation, considering him as related only to this world. - -But, as nature has endued us with a power of supplying those -deficiencies, by acquired knowledge, experience, and habits; so -likewise we are placed in a condition, in infancy, childhood, and -youth, fitted for it; fitted for our acquiring those qualifications of -all sorts, which we stand in need of in mature age. Hence children, -from their very birth, are daily growing acquainted with the objects -about them, with the scene in which they are placed, and to have -a future part; and learning something or other, necessary to the -performance of it. The subordinations, to which they are accustomed in -domestic life, teach them self-government in common behavior abroad, -and prepare them for subjection and obedience to civil authority.[95] -What passes before their eyes, and daily happens to them, gives them -experience, caution against treachery and deceit, together with -numberless little rules of action and conduct, which we could not -live without; and which are learnt so insensibly and so perfectly, as -to be mistaken perhaps for instinct, though they are the effect of -long experience and exercise; as much so as language, or knowledge in -particular business, or the qualifications and behavior belonging to -the several ranks and professions. Thus the beginning of our days is -adapted to be, and is, a state of education in the theory and practice -of mature life. We are much assisted in it by example, instruction, -and the care of others; but a great deal is left to ourselves to do. -And of this, as part is done easily and of course; so part requires -diligence and care, the voluntary foregoing many things which we -desire, and setting ourselves to what we should have no inclination to, -but for the necessity or expedience of it. For that labor and industry, -which the station of so many absolutely requires, they would be greatly -unqualified for, in maturity, as those in other stations would be for -any other sorts of application; if both were not accustomed to them -in their youth. And, according as persons behave themselves, in the -general education which all go through, and in the particular ones -adapted to particular employments, their character is formed,[96] and -made to appear; they recommend themselves more or less; and are capable -of, and placed in, different stations in society. - -The former part of life, then, is to be considered as an important -opportunity, which nature puts into our hands; and which, when lost -is not to be recovered. And our being placed in a state of discipline -throughout this life, for another world, is a providential disposition -of things, exactly of the same kind, as our being placed in a state -of discipline during childhood, for mature age. Our condition in both -respects is uniform and of a piece, and comprehended under one and the -same general law of nature. - -If we were not able at all to discern, how or in what way the present -life could be our preparation for another; this would be no objection -against the credibility of its being so. We do not discern, how food -and sleep contribute to the growth of the body; nor could have any -thought that they would, before we had experience. Nor do children at -all think, on the one hand, that the sports and exercises, to which -they are so much addicted, contribute to their health and growth; -nor, on the other, of the necessity which there is for their being -restrained in them. Nor are they capable of understanding the use of -many parts of discipline, which nevertheless they must be made to go -through, in order to qualify them for the business of mature age. Were -we not able then to discover, in what respects the present life could -form us for a future one; yet nothing would be more supposable than -that it might, in some respects or other, from the general analogy -of Providence. And this, for aught I see, might reasonably be said, -even though we should not take in the consideration of God’s moral -government over the world. But, - -IV. Take in this consideration, and consequently, that the character -of virtue and piety is a necessary qualification for the future state, -and then we may distinctly see, how, and in what respects, the present -life may be a preparation for it; since we _want, and are capable of, -improvement in that character, by moral and religious habits_; and _the -present life is fit to be a state of discipline for such improvement_: -in like manner as we have already observed, how, and in what respects, -infancy, childhood, and youth, are a necessary preparation, and a -natural state of discipline, for mature age. - -Nothing which we at present see, would lead us to the thought of a -solitary inactive state hereafter. If we judge at all from the analogy -of nature, we must suppose, according to the Scripture account of -it, that it will be a community. And there is no shadow of any thing -unreasonable in conceiving, though there be no analogy for it, that -this community will be, as the Scripture represents it, under the more -immediate, or, if such an expression may be used, the more sensible -government of God. Nor is our ignorance, what will be the employments -of this happy community, nor our consequent ignorance, what particular -scope or occasion there will be for the exercise of veracity, justice, -and charity, among the members of it with regard to each other, any -proof, that there will be no sphere of exercise for those virtues. -Much less, if that were possible, is our ignorance any proof, that -there will be no occasion for that frame of mind, or character, which -is formed by the daily practice of those particular virtues here, -and which is a result from it.[97] This at least must be owned in -general, that, as the government established in the universe is moral, -the character of virtue and piety must, in some way or other, be the -_condition_ of our happiness or the qualification for it. - -From what is above observed, concerning our natural power of habits, -it is easy to see, that we are _capable_ of moral improvement by -discipline. And how greatly we _want_ it, need not be proved to any -one who is acquainted with the great wickedness of mankind; or even -with those imperfections, which the best are conscious of. But it is -not perhaps distinctly attended to by every one, that the occasion -which human creatures have for discipline, to improve in them this -character of virtue and piety, is to be traced up higher than to excess -in the passions, by indulgence and habits of vice. Mankind, and perhaps -all finite creatures, from the very constitution of their nature, -before habits of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of deviating -from what is right; and therefore stand in need of virtuous habits, -for a security against this danger. For, together with the general -principle of moral understanding, we have in our inward frame various -affections towards particular external objects. These affections -are naturally, and of right, subject to the government of the moral -principle, as to the occasions upon which they may be gratified; as -to the times, degrees, and manner, in which the objects of them may -be pursued. But the principle of virtue can neither excite them, nor -prevent their being excited. On the contrary, they are naturally felt, -when the objects of them are present to the mind, not only before all -consideration whether they can be obtained by lawful means, but after -it is found they cannot. The natural objects of affection continue so; -the necessaries, conveniences, and pleasures of life, remain naturally -desirable, though they cannot be obtained innocently: nay, though -they cannot possibly be obtained at all. And when the objects of any -affection whatever cannot be obtained without unlawful means; but may -be obtained by them: such affection, though its being excited, and its -continuing some time in the mind, be as innocent as it is natural and -necessary, yet cannot but be conceived to have a _tendency_ to incline -persons to venture upon such unlawful means: and therefore must be -conceived as putting them in some danger of it. Now what is the general -security against this danger, against their actually deviating from -right? As the danger is, so also must the security be, from within: -from the practical principle of virtue.[98] The strengthening or -improving this principle, considered as practical, or as a principle -of action, will lessen the danger, or increase the security against -it. And this moral principle is capable of improvement, by proper -discipline and exercise: by recollecting the practical impressions -which example and experience have made upon us: and, instead of -following humor and mere inclination, by continually attending to the -equity and right of the case, in whatever we are engaged, be it in -greater or less matters; and accustoming ourselves always to act upon -it, as being itself the just and natural motive of action; and as this -moral course of behavior must necessarily, under the divine government, -be our final interest. _Thus the principle of virtue, improved into -a habit, of which improvement we are thus capable, will plainly be, -in proportion to the strength of it, a security against the danger -which finite creatures are in, from the very nature of propension, -or particular affections._ This way of putting the matter, supposes -particular affections to remain in a future state; which it is scarce -possible to avoid supposing. And if they do; we clearly see, that -acquired habits of virtue and self-government may be necessary for the -regulation of them. However, though we were not distinctly to take in -this supposition, but to speak only in general; the thing really comes -to the same. For habits of virtue, thus acquired by discipline, are -improvement in virtue: and improvement in virtue must be advancement in -happiness, if the government of the universe be moral. - -From these things we may observe, (and it will further show this -our natural and original need of being improved by discipline,) how -it comes to pass, that creatures made upright, fall; and how those -who preserve their uprightness, raise themselves by so doing, to a -more secure state of virtue. To say that the former is accounted for -by the nature of liberty, is to say no more, than that an event’s -actually happening is accounted for by a mere possibility of its -happening. But it seems distinctly conceivable from the very nature of -particular affections or propensions. For, suppose creatures intended -for such a particular state of life, for which such propensions were -necessary: suppose them endued with such propensions, together with -moral understanding, as well including a practical sense of virtue as -a speculative perception of it; and that all these several principles, -both natural and moral, forming an inward constitution of mind, were -in the most exact proportion possible; _i.e._ in a proportion the most -exactly adapted to their intended state of life; such creatures would -be made upright, or finitely perfect. Now particular propensions, from -their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being present; -though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the allowance of -the moral principle. If they can be gratified without its allowance, -or by contradicting it, then they must be conceived to have some -tendency, in how low a degree soever, yet some tendency, to induce -persons to such forbidden gratification. This tendency, in some one -particular propension, may be increased, by the greater frequency of -occasions naturally exciting it, than of occasions exciting others. -The least voluntary indulgence in forbidden circumstances,[99] though -but in thought, will increase this wrong tendency; and may increase -it further, till, peculiar conjunctures perhaps conspiring, it -becomes effect; and danger of deviating from right, ends in actual -deviation from it; a danger necessarily arising from the very nature of -propension, and which therefore could not have been prevented, though -it might have been escaped, or got innocently through. The case would -be, as if we were to suppose a straight path marked out for a person, -in which a certain degree of attention would keep him steady: but if -he would not attend, in this degree, any one of a thousand objects, -catching his eye, might lead him out of it. - -Now it is impossible to say, how much even the first full overt act -of irregularity might disorder the inward constitution; unsettle the -adjustments, and alter the proportions, which formed it, and in which -the uprightness of its make consisted: but repetition of irregularities -would produce habits. Thus the constitution would be spoiled; -and creatures made upright, become corrupt and depraved in their -settled character, proportionably to their repeated irregularities -in occasional acts,[100] On the contrary, these creatures might -have improved and raised themselves, to a higher and more secure -state of virtue, by the contrary behavior: by steadily following the -moral principle, supposed to be one part of their nature: and thus -_withstanding_ that unavoidable danger of defection, which necessarily -arose from propension, the other part of it. For, by thus preserving -their integrity for some time, their danger would lessen; since -propensions, by being inured to submit, would do it more easily and -of course: and their security against this lessening danger would -increase; since the moral principle would gain additional strength -by exercise: both which things are implied in the notion of virtuous -habits. - -Thus vicious indulgence is not only criminal in itself, but also -depraves the inward constitution and character. And virtuous -self-government is not only right in itself, but also improves the -inward constitution or character: and may improve it to such a degree, -that though we should suppose it impossible for particular affections -to be absolutely coincident with the moral principle; and consequently -should allow, that such creatures as have been above supposed, would -forever remain defectible, yet their danger of actually deviating from -right may be almost infinitely lessened, and they fully fortified -against what remains of it; if that may be called danger, against which -there is an adequate, effectual security. Still, this their higher -perfection may continue to consist in habits of virtue formed in a -state of discipline, and this their more complete security remain to -proceed from them. - -Thus it is plainly conceivable, that creatures without blemish, as they -came out of the hands of God, may be in danger of going wrong; and so -may stand in need of the security of virtuous habits, additional to the -moral principle wrought into their natures by him. That which is the -ground of their danger, or their want of security, maybe considered as -a deficiency in themselves, to which virtuous habits are the natural -supply. And as they are naturally capable of being raised and improved -by discipline, it may be a thing fit and requisite, that they should be -placed in circumstances with an eye to it: in circumstances peculiarly -fitted to be to them a state of discipline for their improvement in -virtue. - -But how much more strongly must this hold with respect to those who -have corrupted their natures, are fallen from their original rectitude, -and whose passions are become excessive by repeated violations of -their inward constitution! Upright creatures may want to be improved: -depraved creatures want to be renewed. Education and discipline, which -may be in all degrees and sorts of gentleness and of severity, are -expedient for those: but must be absolutely necessary for these. For -these, discipline of the severer sort too, and in the higher degrees -of it, must be necessary, in order to wear out vicious habits; to -recover their primitive strength of self-government, which indulgence -must have weakened; to repair, as well as raise into a habit, the moral -principle, in order to their arriving at a secure state of virtuous -happiness. - -Whoever will consider the thing, may clearly see that the present world -is _peculiarly fit_ to be a state of discipline for this purpose, to -such as will set themselves to mend and improve. For, the various -temptations with which we are surrounded; our experience of the deceits -of wickedness; having been in many instances led wrong ourselves; the -great viciousness of the world; the infinite disorders consequent upon -it; our being made acquainted with pain and sorrow, either from our own -feeling of it, or from the sight of it in others; these things, though -some of them may indeed produce wrong effects upon our minds, yet when -duly reflected upon, have, all of them, a direct tendency to bring us -to a settled moderation and reasonableness of temper: the contrary both -to thoughtless levity, and also to that unrestrained self-will, and -violent bent to follow present inclination, which may be observed in -undisciplined minds. - -Such experience, as the present state affords, of the frailty of our -nature; of the boundless extravagance of ungoverned passion; of the -power which an infinite being has over us, by the various capacities -of misery which he has given us; in short, that kind and degree of -experience, which the present state affords us, that the constitution -of nature is such as to admit the possibility, the danger, and the -actual event, or creatures losing their innocence and happiness, and -becoming vicious and wretched; has a tendency to give us a practical -sense of things very different from a mere speculative knowledge, that -we are liable to vice, and capable of misery. And who knows, whether -the security of creatures in the highest and most settled state of -perfection, may not in part arise, from their having had such a sense -of things as this, formed, and habitually fixed within them, in some -state of probation. And passing through the present world with that -moral attention, which is necessary to the acting a right part in it, -may leave everlasting impressions of this sort upon our minds. - -To be a little more distinct: allurements to what is wrong, -difficulties in the discharge of our duty, our not being able to act a -uniform right part without some thought and care, and the opportunities -which we have, or imagine we have, of avoiding what we dislike or -obtaining what we desire, by unlawful means, when we either cannot do -it at all, or at least not so easily, by lawful ones, these things, -_i.e._ the snares and temptations of vice, are what render the present -world peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline, to those who will -preserve their integrity: because they render being upon our guard, -resolution, and the denial of our passions, necessary in order to that -end. The exercise of such particular recollection, intention of mind, -and self-government, in the practice of virtue, has, from the make of -our nature, a peculiar tendency to form habits of virtue; as implying, -not only a real, but also a more continued, and a more intense exercise -of the virtuous principle, or a more constant and a stronger effort of -virtue exerted into act. Thus suppose a person to know himself to be -in particular danger, for some time, of doing any thing wrong, which -yet he fully resolves not to do; continued recollection and keeping -upon his guard, in order to make good his resolution, is a _continued_ -exerting of that act of virtue in a _high degree_, which need have -been, and perhaps would have been, only _instantaneous_ and _weak_, had -the temptation been so. - -It is indeed ridiculous to assert, that self-denial is essential to -virtue and piety:[101] but it would have been nearer the truth, though -not strictly the truth itself, to have said, that it is essential to -discipline and improvement. For though actions materially virtuous, -which have no sort of difficulty, but are perfectly agreeable to -our particular inclinations, may possibly be done only from these -particular inclinations, and so may not be any exercise of the -principle of virtue, _i.e._ not be virtuous actions at all; yet, on -the contrary, they _may_ be an exercise of that principle: and when -they are, they have a tendency to form and fix the habit of virtue. -But when the exercise of the virtuous principle is more continued, -oftener repeated, and more intense; as it must be in circumstances of -danger, temptation, and difficulty, of any kind and in any degree; this -tendency is increased proportionably, and a more confirmed habit is the -consequence. - -This undoubtedly holds to a certain length: but how far it may hold, -I know not. Neither our intellectual powers, nor our bodily strength -can be improved beyond a certain degree: and both may be overwrought. -Possibly there may be something analogous to this, with respect to the -moral character; which is scarce worth considering. I mention it only, -lest it should come into some persons’ thoughts, not as an exception to -the foregoing observations, which perhaps it is; but as a confutation -of them, which it is not. And there may be several other exceptions. -Observations of this kind cannot be supposed to hold minutely, and in -every case. It is enough that they hold in general. And these plainly -hold so far, as that from them may be seen distinctly, (which is all -that is intended by them,) that _the present world is peculiarly fit -to be a state of discipline, for our improvement in virtue and piety_: -in the same sense as some sciences, by requiring and engaging the -attention, not to be sure of such persons as will not, but of such as -will, set themselves to them, are fit to form the mind to habits of -attention. - -Indeed the present state is so far from proving, in event, a discipline -of virtue to the generality of men, that on the contrary they seem to -make it a discipline of vice. And the viciousness of the world is, -in different ways, the great temptation which renders it a state of -virtuous discipline, in the degree it is, to good men. The whole end, -and the whole occasion, of mankind’s being placed in such a state as -the present, is not pretended to be accounted for. That which appears -amidst the general corruption, is, that there are some persons, who, -having within them the principle of amendment and recovery, attend to -and follow the notices of virtue and religion, be they more clear or -more obscure, which are afforded them; and that the present world is -not only an exercise of virtue in these persons, but an exercise of -it in ways and degrees, peculiarly apt to improve it: apt to improve -it, in some respects, even beyond what would be, by the exercise of -it, required in a perfectly virtuous society, or in a society of -equally imperfect virtue with themselves. But that the present world -does not actually become a state of moral discipline to many, even -to the generality, _i.e._ that they do not improve or grow better in -it, cannot be urged as a proof, that it was not intended for moral -discipline, by any who at all observe the analogy of nature. For, of -the numerous seeds of vegetables and bodies of animals, which are -adapted and put in the way to improve to such a point or state of -natural maturity and perfection, we do not see perhaps that one in -a million actually does. Far the greatest part of them decay before -they are improved to it; and appear to be absolutely destroyed. Yet no -one, who does not deny all final causes, will deny, that those seeds -and bodies, which do attain to that point of maturity and perfection, -answer the end for which they were really designed by nature; and -therefore that nature designed them for such perfection. I cannot -forbear adding, though it is not to the present purpose, that the -_appearance_ of such an amazing _waste_ in nature, with respect to -these seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is to us as unaccountable, -as, what is much more terrible, the present and future ruin of so many -moral agents by themselves, _i.e._ by vice. - -Against this whole notion of moral discipline, it may be objected, in -another way; that so far as a course of behavior, materially virtuous, -proceeds from hope and fear, so far it is only a discipline and -strengthening of self-love. But doing what God commands, because he -commands it, is obedience, though it proceeds from hope or fear. A -course of such obedience will form habits of it. And a constant regard -to veracity, justice, and charity, may form distinct habits of these -particular virtues; and will certainly form habits of self-government, -and of denying our inclinations, whenever veracity, justice, or charity -requires it. Nor is there any foundation for this great nicety, with -which some affect to distinguish in this case, in order to depreciate -all religion proceeding from hope or fear. For, veracity, justice, and -charity, regard to God’s authority, and to our own chief interest, are -not only all three coincident; but each of them is, in itself, a just -and natural motive or principle of action. He who begins a good life -from any one of them, and perseveres in it, as he is already in some -degree, so he cannot fail of becoming more and more, of that character -which is correspondent to the constitution of nature as moral; and -to the relation which God stands in to us as moral governor of it: -nor consequently can he fail of obtaining that happiness, which this -constitution and relation necessarily suppose connected with that -character. - -These several observations, concerning the active principle of virtue -and obedience to God’s commands, are applicable to passive submission -or resignation to his will: which is another essential part of a right -character, connected with the former, and very much in our power to -form ourselves to. It may be imagined, that nothing but afflictions -can give occasion for or require this virtue; that it can have no -respect to, nor be any way necessary to qualify for, a state of perfect -happiness: but it is not experience which can make us think thus. -Prosperity itself, while any thing supposed desirable is not ours, -begets extravagant and unbounded thoughts. Imagination is altogether as -much a source of discontent, as any thing in our external condition. It -is indeed true, that there can be no scope for _patience_, when sorrow -shall be no more; but there may be need of a temper of mind, which -shall have been formed by patience. For, though self-love, considered -merely as an active principle leading us to pursue our chief interest, -cannot but be uniformly coincident with the principle of obedience to -God’s commands, our interest being rightly understood; because this -obedience, and the pursuit of our own chief interest, must be in every -ease one and the thing: yet it may be questioned, whether self-love, -considered merely as the desire of our own interest or happiness, can, -from its nature, be thus absolutely and uniformly coincident with the -will of God; any more than particular affections can:[102] coincident -in such sort, as not to be liable to be excited upon occasions and in -degrees, impossible to be gratified consistently with the constitution -of things, or the divine appointments. So that _habits_ of resignation -may, upon this account, be requisite for all creatures: habits, I -say; which signify what is formed by use. However, in general it is -obvious that both self-love and particular affection in human creatures -considered only as passive feelings, distort and rend the mind; and -therefore stand in need of discipline. Now denial of those particular -affections, in a course of active virtue and obedience to God’s will, -has a tendency to moderate them; and seems also to have a tendency -to habituate the mind, to be easy and satisfied with that degree of -happiness which is allotted us, _i.e._ to moderate self-love. But the -proper discipline for resignation is affliction. A right behavior -under that trial; recollecting ourselves so as to consider it in the -view, in which religion teaches us to consider it, as from the hand of -God, receiving it as what he appoints, or thinks proper to permit, in -his world and under his government; this will habituate the mind to a -dutiful submission. Such submission, together with the active principle -of obedience, make up the temper and character in us, which answers to -his sovereignty; and which absolutely belongs to the condition of our -being, as dependent creatures. Nor can it be said, that this is only -breaking the mind to a submission to mere power; for mere power may -be accidental, and precarious, and usurped: but it is forming within -ourselves the temper of resignation to His rightful authority, who is, -by nature, supreme over all. - -Upon the whole: such a character, and such qualifications, are -necessary for a mature state of life in the present world, as nature -alone does in no wise bestow; but has put it upon us, in great part, -to acquire, in our progress from one stage of life to another, from -childhood to mature age; put it upon us to acquire them, by giving -us capacities of doing it, and by placing us, in the beginning of -life, in a condition fit for it. And this is a general analogy to our -condition in the present world, as in a state of moral discipline for -another. - -It is in vain to object against the credibility of the present life’s -being intended for this purpose, that all the trouble and the danger -unavoidably accompanying such discipline, might have been saved us, by -our being made at once the creatures and the characters, _which we were -to be_. For we experience, that _what we were to be_, was to be the -effect of _what we would do_: and that the general conduct of nature -is, not to save us trouble or danger, but to make us capable of going -through them, and to put it upon us to do so. Acquirements of our own, -experience and habits, are the _natural_ supply to our deficiencies, -and security against our dangers: since it is as plainly natural to -set ourselves to acquire the qualifications, as the external things, -which we stand in need of. In particular, it is as plainly a general -law of nature, that we should with regard to our temporal interest, -form and cultivate practical principles within us, by attention, use, -and discipline, as any thing whatever is a natural law; chiefly in the -beginning of life, but also throughout the whole course of it. The -alternative is left to our choice: either to improve ourselves, and -better our condition; or, in default of such improvement, to remain -deficient and wretched. It is therefore perfectly credible, from the -analogy of nature, that the same may be our case, with respect to the -happiness of a future state, and the qualifications necessary for it. - -There is a third thing, which may seem implied in the present world’s -being a state of probation; that it is a _theatre of action_, for the -manifestation of persons’ characters, with respect to a future one: -not, to be sure, to an all-knowing Being, but to his creation or part -of it. This may, perhaps, be only a consequence of our being in a -state of probation in the other senses. However, it is not impossible, -that men’s showing and making manifest, what is in their heart, -what their real character is, may have respect to a future life, in -ways and manners with which we are not acquainted: particularly it -may be a means, (for the Author of nature does not appear to do any -thing without means,) of their being disposed of suitably to their -characters; and of its being known to the creation, by way of example, -that they are thus disposed of. But not to enter upon any conjectural -account of this; one may just mention, that the manifestation of -persons’ characters contributes very much, in various ways, to the -carrying on a great part of that general course of nature, respecting -mankind, which comes under our observation at present. I shall only -add, that probation, in both these senses, as well as in that treated -of in the foregoing chapter, is implied in moral government; since by -persons’ behavior under it, their characters cannot but be manifested, -and if they behave well, improved. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, CONSIDERED AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. - - -Throughout the foregoing treatise it appears, that the condition of -mankind, considered as inhabitants of this world only, and under the -government of God which we experience, is greatly analogous to our -condition, as designed for another world, or as under that farther -government, which religion teaches us. If therefore any assert, as a -fatalist must, that the opinion of universal necessity is reconcilable -with the former; there immediately arises a question in the way of -analogy, whether he must not also own it to be reconcilable with the -latter, _i.e._ with the system of religion itself, and the proof of -it. The reader then will observe, that the question now before us is -not absolute, _i.e._ whether the opinion of fate be reconcilable with -religion; but hypothetical, whether, upon supposition of its being -reconcilable with the constitution of nature, it be not reconcilable -with religion also. Or, what pretence a fatalist, not other persons, -but a fatalist, has to conclude from his opinion, that there can be no -such thing as religion. And as the puzzle and obscurity, which must -unavoidably arise from arguing upon so absurd a supposition as that of -universal necessity, will, I fear, easily be seen; it will, I hope, as -easily be excused.[103] - -Since it has been all along taken for granted, as a thing proved, that -there is an intelligent Author of nature, or natural Governor of the -world; and since an objection may be made against the proof of this, -from the opinion of universal necessity, as it may be supposed, that -such necessity will itself account for the origin and preservation -of all things; it is requisite, that this objection be distinctly -answered; or that it be shown, that a fatality supposed consistent -with what we certainly experience, does not destroy the proof of -an intelligent Author and Governor of nature; before we proceed to -consider, whether it destroys the proof of a moral Governor of it, or -of our being in a state of religion. - -When it is said by a fatalist, that the whole constitution of nature, -the actions of men, every thing, and every mode and circumstance -of every thing, is necessary, and could not possibly have been -otherwise; it is to be observed, that this necessity does not exclude -deliberation, choice, preference, and acting from certain principles, -and to certain ends: because all this is matter of undoubted -experience, acknowledged by all, and what every man may, every moment, -be conscious of. Hence it follows, that necessity, alone and of itself, -is in no sort an account of the constitution of nature, and how things -came _to be_ and _to continue_ as they are; but only an account of -this _circumstance_ relating to their origin and continuance, that -they could not have been otherwise, than they are and have been. The -assertion, that every thing is by necessity of nature, is not an -answer to the question; Whether the world came into being as it is, -by an intelligent Agent forming it thus, or not: but to quite another -question; Whether it came into being as it is, in that way and manner -which we call _necessarily_, or in that way and manner which we call -_freely_? For suppose farther, that one who was a fatalist, and one who -kept to his natural sense of things, and believed himself a free agent, -were disputing together, and vindicating their respective opinions; -and they should happen to instance a house; they would agree that it -was built by an architect. Their difference concerning necessity and -freedom would occasion no difference of judgment concerning this; -but only concerning another matter; whether the architect built it -necessarily or freely. - -Suppose they should proceed to inquire concerning the constitution -of nature. In a lax way of speaking, one of them might say, it was -by necessity; and the other, by freedom: but if they had any meaning -to their words, as the latter must mean a free agent, so the former -must at length be reduced to mean an agent, whether he would say one -or more, acting by necessity: for abstract notions can do nothing. We -indeed ascribe to God a necessary existence, uncaused by any agent. -For we find within ourselves the idea of infinity, _i.e._ immensity -and eternity, impossible, even in imagination, to be removed out of -being. We seem to discern intuitively, that there must, and cannot -but be, something, external to ourselves, answering this idea, or the -archetype of it. Hence, (for _this abstract_, as much as any other, -implies a _concrete_) we conclude, that there is, and cannot but be, -an infinite and immense eternal being, existing prior to all design -contributing to his existence, and exclusive of it. From the scantiness -of language, a manner of speaking has been introduced; that necessity -is the foundation, the reason, the account of the existence of God. But -it is not alleged, nor can it be at all intended, that _every thing_ -exists as it does, by this kind of necessity: a necessity antecedent in -nature to design: it cannot, I say, be meant that every thing exists -as it does, by this kind of necessity, upon several accounts; and -particularly because it is admitted, that design, in the actions of -men, contributes to many alterations in nature. If any deny this, I -shall not pretend to reason with them. - -From these things it follows; _First_, That when a fatalist asserts, -that every thing is _by necessity_, he must mean, _by an agent acting -necessarily_; he _must_, I say, mean this, for I am very sensible he -would not choose to mean it. _Secondly_, That the necessity, by which -such an agent is supposed to act, does not exclude intelligence and -design. So that, were the system of fatality admitted, it would just as -much account for the formation of the world, as for the structure of a -house, and no more. Necessity as much requires and supposes a necessary -agent, as freedom requires and supposes a free agent, to be the former -of the world. And the appearances of _design_ and of _final causes_ -in the constitution of nature as really prove this acting agent to be -an _intelligent designer_, or to act from choice; upon the scheme of -necessity, supposed possible, as upon that of freedom. - -It appearing thus, that the notion of necessity does not destroy -the proof that there is an intelligent Author of nature and natural -Governor of the world; the present question, which the analogy before -mentioned suggests,[104] and which, I think, it will answer, is this: -Whether the opinion of necessity, supposed consistent with possibility, -with the constitution of the world, and the natural government which -we experience exercised over it, destroys all reasonable ground of -belief, that we are in a state of religion: or whether that opinion be -reconcilable with religion; with the system, and the proof of it. - -Suppose then a fatalist to educate any one, from his youth up, in his -own principles; that the child should reason upon them, and conclude, -that since he cannot possibly behave otherwise than he does, he is not -a subject of blame or commendation, nor can deserve to be rewarded -or punished. Imagine him to eradicate the very perceptions of blame -and commendation out of his mind, by means of this system; to form -his temper, and character, and behavior to it; and from it to judge -of the treatment he was to expect, say, from reasonable men, upon his -coming abroad into the world: as the fatalist judges from this system, -what he is to expect from the Author of nature, and with regard to -a future state. I cannot forbear stopping here to ask, whether any -one of common sense would think fit, that a child should be put upon -these speculations, and be left to apply them to practice. And a -man has little pretence to reason, who is not sensible, that we are -all children in speculations of this kind. However, the child would -doubtless be highly delighted to find himself freed from the restraints -of fear and shame, with which his play-fellows were fettered and -embarrassed; and highly conceited in his superior knowledge, so far -beyond his years. But conceit and vanity would be the least bad part -of the influence, which these principles must have, when thus reasoned -and acted upon, during the course of his education. He must either be -allowed to go on and be the plague of all about him, and himself too, -even to his own destruction, or else correction must be continually -made use of, to supply the want of those natural perceptions of blame -and commendation, which we have supposed to be removed; and to give -him a practical impression, of what he had reasoned himself out of the -belief of, that he was in fact an accountable child, and to be punished -for doing what he was forbid. It is therefore in reality impossible, -but that the correction which he must meet with, in the course of his -education, must convince him, that if the scheme he was instructed -in were not false, yet that he reasoned inconclusively upon it, and -somehow or other misapplied it to practice and common life; as what the -fatalist experiences of the conduct of Providence at present, ought -in all reason to convince him, that this scheme is misapplied, when -applied to the subject of religion.[105] But supposing the child’s -temper could remain still formed to the system, and his expectation of -the treatment he was to have in the world, be regulated by it; so as -to expect that no reasonable man would blame or punish him, for any -thing which he should do, because he could not help doing it: upon this -supposition it is manifest he would, upon his coming abroad into the -world, be insupportable to society, and the treatment which he would -receive from it would render it so to him; and he could not fail of -doing something very soon, for which he would be delivered over into -the hands of civil justice. And thus, in the end, he would be convinced -of the obligations he was under to his wise instructor. - -Suppose this scheme of fatality, in any other way, applied to practice, -such practical application of it will be found equally absurd; equally -fallacious in a practical sense. For instance, that if a man be -destined to live such a time, he shall live to it, though he take no -care of his own preservation; or if he be destined to die before that -time, no care can prevent it, therefore all care about preserving one’s -life is to be neglected: which is the fallacy instanced in by the -ancients. On the contrary, none of these practical absurdities can be -drawn from reasoning, upon the supposition that we are free; but all -such reasoning with regard to the common affairs of life is justified -by experience. Therefore, though it were admitted that this opinion of -necessity were _speculatively_ true; yet, with regard to practice, it -is as if it were false, so far as our experience reaches: that is, to -the whole of our present life. For, the constitution of the present -world, and the condition in which we are actually placed, is, as if we -were free. And it may perhaps justly be concluded, that since the whole -process of action, through every step of it, suspense, deliberation, -inclining one way, determining, and at last doing as we determine, is -as if we were free, therefore we are so.[106] - -The thing here insisted upon is, that under the present natural -government of the world, we find we are treated and dealt with, as if -we were free, prior to all consideration whether we are so or not. -Were this opinion therefore of necessity admitted to be ever so true; -yet such is in fact our condition and the natural course of things, -that whenever we apply it to life and practice, this application of -it always misleads us, and cannot but mislead us, in a most dreadful -manner, with regard to our present interest. How then can people think -themselves so very secure, that the same application of the same -opinion may not mislead them also, in some analogous manner, with -respect to a future, a more general, and more important interest? For, -religion being a practical subject; and the analogy of nature showing -us, that we have not faculties to apply this opinion, were it a true -one, to practical subjects; whenever we do apply it to the subject of -religion, and thence conclude, that we are free from its obligations, -it is plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon. There will still -remain just reason to think, whatever appearances are, that we deceive -ourselves; in somewhat of a like manner, as when people fancy they can -draw contradictory conclusions from the idea of infinity. - -From these things together, the attentive reader will see it follows, -that if upon supposition of freedom the evidence of religion be -conclusive, it remains so, upon supposition of necessity, because the -notion of necessity is not applicable to practical subjects: _i.e._ -with respect to them, is as if it were not true. Nor does this contain -any reflection upon reason, but only upon what is unreasonable. For -to pretend to act upon reason, in opposition to practical principles, -which the Author of our nature gave us to act upon; and to pretend -to apply our reason to subjects, with regard to which, our own short -views, and even our experience, will show us, it cannot be depended -upon; and such, at best, the subject of necessity must be; this is -vanity, conceit, and unreasonableness. - -But this is not all. We find within ourselves a will, and are conscious -of a character. Now if this, in us, be reconcilable with fate, it -is reconcilable with it in the Author of nature. Besides, natural -government and final causes imply a character and a will in the -Governor and Designer;[107] a will concerning the creatures whom he -governs. The Author of nature then being certainly of some character or -other, notwithstanding necessity; it is evident this necessity is as -reconcilable with the particular character of benevolence, veracity, -and justice, in him, which attributes are the foundation of religion, -as with any other character: since we find this necessity no more -hinders _men_ from being benevolent, than cruel; true, than faithless; -just, than unjust; or, if the fatalist pleases, what we call unjust. It -is said indeed, that what, upon supposition of freedom, would be just -punishment, upon supposition of necessity, becomes manifestly unjust: -because it is punishment inflicted for doing that which persons could -not avoid doing. As if the necessity, which is supposed to destroy the -injustice of murder, for instance, would not also destroy the injustice -of punishing it! However, as little to the purpose as this objection -is in itself, it is very much to the purpose to observe from it, how -the notions of justice and injustice remain, even while we endeavor to -suppose them removed; how they force themselves upon the mind, even -while we are making suppositions destructive of them: for there is not, -perhaps, a man in the world, but would be ready to make this objection -at first thought. - -But though it is most evident, that universal necessity, if it be -reconcilable with any thing, is reconcilable with that character in -the Author of nature, which is the foundation of religion; “Yet, does -it not plainly destroy the _proof_ that he is of that character, and -consequently the proof of religion?” By no means. For we find, that -happiness and misery are not our _fate_, in any such sense as not to be -the consequences of our behavior; but that they are the consequences -of it.[108] We find God exercises the same kind of government over us, -which a father exercises over his children, and a civil magistrate over -his subjects. Now, whatever becomes of abstract questions concerning -liberty and necessity, it evidently appears to us, that veracity -and justice must be the natural rule and measure of exercising this -authority or government, to a Being who can have no competitions, or -interfering of interests, with his creatures and his subjects. - -But as the doctrine of liberty, though we experience its truth, may be -perplexed with difficulties, which run up into the most abstruse of -all speculations; and as the opinion of necessity seems to be the very -basis upon which infidelity grounds itself; it may be of some use to -offer a more particular proof of the obligations of religion, which may -distinctly be shown not to be destroyed by this opinion. - -The proof from final causes of an intelligent Author of nature is -not affected by the opinion of necessity; supposing necessity a -thing possible in itself, and reconcilable with the constitution of -things.[109] It is a matter of fact, independent on this or any other -speculation, that he governs the world by the method of rewards and -punishments:[110] and also that he hath given us a moral faculty, by -which we distinguish between actions, and approve some as virtuous -and of good desert, and disapprove others as vicious and of ill -desert.[111] This moral discernment implies, in the notion of it, a -rule of action, and a rule of a very peculiar kind: for it carries -in it authority and a right of direction; authority in such a sense, -as that we cannot depart from it without being self-condemned.[112] -And that the dictates of this moral faculty, which are by nature a -rule to us, are moreover the laws of God, laws in a sense including -sanctions; may be thus proved. Consciousness of a rule or guide of -action, in creatures who are capable of considering it as given them -by their Maker, not only raises immediately a sense of duty, but also -a sense of security in following it, and of danger in deviating from -it. A direction of the Author of nature, given to creatures capable of -looking upon it as such, is plainly a command from him: and a command -from him necessarily includes in it, at least, an implicit promise in -case of obedience, or threatening in case of disobedience. But then the -sense or perception of good and ill desert,[113] which is contained -in the moral discernment, renders the sanction explicit, and makes it -appear, as one may say, expressed. For since his method of government -is to reward and punish actions, his having annexed to some actions an -inseparable sense of good desert, and to others of ill, this surely -amounts to declaring, upon whom his punishments shall be inflicted, and -his rewards be bestowed. He must have given us this discernment and -sense of things, as a presentiment of what is to be hereafter: that is, -by way of information beforehand, what we are finally to expect in this -world. There is then most evident ground to think, that the government -of God, upon the whole, will be found to correspond to the nature which -he has given us: and that, in the upshot and issue of things, happiness -and misery shall, in fact and event, be made to follow virtue and vice -respectively; as he has already, in so peculiar a manner, associated -the ideas of them in our minds. And hence might easily be deduced the -obligations of religious worship, were it only to be considered as a -means of preserving upon our minds a sense of this moral government -of God, and securing our obedience to it: which yet is an extremely -imperfect view of that most important duty. - -No objection from necessity can lie against this general proof of -religion. None against the proposition reasoned upon, that we have -such a moral faculty and discernment; because this is a mere matter of -fact, a thing of experience, that human kind is thus constituted: none -against the conclusion; because it is immediate and wholly from this -fact. For the conclusion, that God will finally reward the righteous -and punish the wicked, is not here drawn, from its appearing to us -fit[114] that _he should_; but from its appearing, that he has told -us, _he will_. And this he hath certainly told us, in the promise -and threatening, which it hath been observed the notion of a command -implies, and the sense of good and ill desert which he has given us, -more distinctly expresses. This reasoning from fact is confirmed, and -in some degree even verified, by other facts; by the natural tendencies -of virtue and of vice;[115] and by this, that God, in the natural -course of his providence, punishes vicious actions as mischievous to -society; and also vicious actions as such in the strictest sense.[116] -So that the general proof of religion is unanswerably real, even upon -the wild supposition which we are arguing upon. - -It must be observed further, that natural religion has, besides this, -an external evidence; which the doctrine of necessity, if it could be -true, would not affect. For suppose a person, by the observations and -reasoning above, or by any other, convinced of the truth of religion; -that there is a God, who made the world, who is the moral governor -and judge of mankind, and will upon the whole deal with every one -according to his works: I say, suppose a person convinced of this by -reason, but to know nothing at all of antiquity, or the present state -of mankind: it would be natural for such a one to be inquisitive, what -was the history of this system of doctrine; at what time, and in what -manner, it came first into the world; and whether it were believed -by any considerable part of it. Were he upon inquiry to find, that -a particular person, in a late age, first of all proposed it, as a -deduction of reason, and that mankind were before wholly ignorant of -it; then, though its evidence from reason would remain, there would -be no additional probability of its truth, from the account of its -discovery. - -But instead of this being the fact, he would find, on the contrary, -what could not but afford him a very strong confirmation of its truth: -_First_, That somewhat of this system, with more or fewer additions and -alterations, hath been professed in all ages and countries, of which -we have any certain information relating to this matter. _Secondly_, -That it is certain historical fact, so far as we can trace things up, -that this whole system of belief, that there is one God, the creator -and moral governor of the world, and that mankind is in a state of -religion, was received in the first ages. And _Thirdly_, That as -there is no hint or intimation in history, that this system was first -reasoned out; so there is express historical or traditional evidence, -as ancient as history, that it was taught first by revelation. - -Now these things must be allowed to be of great weight. The first of -them, general consent, shows this system to be conformable to the -common sense of mankind. The second, namely, that religion was believed -in the first ages of the world, especially as it does not appear that -there were then any superstitious or false additions to it, cannot -but be a further confirmation of its truth. For it is a proof of -this alternative: either that it came into the world by revelation; -or that it is natural, obvious, and forces itself upon the mind. The -former of these is the conclusion of learned men. And whoever will -consider, how unapt for speculation rude and uncultivated minds are, -will, perhaps from hence alone, be strongly inclined to believe it the -truth. And as it is shown in the second part[117] of this treatise, -that there is nothing of such peculiar presumption against a revelation -in the beginning of the world, as there is supposed to be against -subsequent ones; a sceptic could not, I think, give any account, which -would appear more probable even to himself, of the early pretences to -revelation; than by supposing some real original one, from whence they -were copied. - -And the third thing above mentioned, that there is express historical -or traditional evidence, as ancient as history, of the system of -religion being taught mankind by revelation, this must be admitted as -some degree of real proof, that it was so taught. For why should not -the most ancient tradition be admitted as some additional proof of a -fact, against which there is no presumption? This proof is mentioned -here, because it has its weight to show, that religion came into -the world by revelation, prior to all consideration of the proper -authority of any book supposed to contain it; and even prior to all -consideration, whether the revelation itself be uncorruptly handed -down, or mixed and darkened with fables. Thus the historical account, -which we have of the origin of religion, taking in all circumstances, -is a real confirmation of its truth, no way affected by the opinion of -necessity. And the _external_ evidence, even of natural religion, is by -no means inconsiderable. - -It is carefully to be observed, and ought to be recollected after -all proofs of virtue and religion, which are only general, that as -speculative reason may be neglected, prejudiced, and deceived, so also -may our moral understanding be impaired and perverted, and the dictates -of it not impartially attended to. This indeed proves nothing against -the reality of our speculative or practical faculties of perception? -against their being intended by nature, to inform us in the theory -of things, and instruct us how we are to behave, and what we are to -expect in consequence of our behavior. Yet our liableness, in the -degree we are liable, to prejudice and perversion, is a most serious -admonition to us to be upon our guard, with respect to what is of such -consequence, as our determinations concerning virtue and religion; -and particularly not to take custom, and fashion, and slight notions -of honor, or imaginations of present ease, use, and convenience to -mankind, for the only moral rule.[118] - -The foregoing observations, drawn from the nature of the thing, and -the history of religion, amount, _when taken together_, to a real -practical proof of it, not to be confuted: such a proof as, considering -the infinite importance of the thing, I apprehend, would be admitted -fully sufficient, in reason, to influence the actions of men, who act -upon thought and reflection, if it were admitted that there is no proof -of the contrary. But it may be said; “There are many probabilities, -which cannot indeed be confuted; _i.e._ shown to be no probabilities, -and yet may be overbalanced by greater probabilities, on the other -side; much more by demonstration. And there is no occasion to object -against particular arguments alleged for an opinion, when the opinion -itself may be clearly shown to be false, without meddling with such -arguments at all, but leaving them just as they are.[119] Now the -method of government by rewards and punishments, and especially -rewarding and punishing good and ill desert as such respectively, must -go upon supposition, that we are free and not necessary agents. And -it is incredible, that the Author of nature should govern us upon a -supposition as true, which he knows to be false; and therefore absurd -to think, he will reward or punish us for our actions hereafter; -especially that he will do it under the notion, that they are of good -or ill desert.” - -Here then the matter is brought to a point. And the answer is full, -and not to be evaded,--viz.: that the whole constitution and course -of things, the whole analogy of Providence, shows beyond possibility -of doubt, that the conclusion from this reasoning is false; wherever -the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom indeed clearly shows where: -in supposing ourselves necessary, when in truth we are free agents. -But, upon the supposition of necessity, the fallacy lies in taking for -granted, that it is incredible necessary agents should be rewarded -and punished. That, somehow or other, the conclusion now mentioned -is false, is most certain. For it is fact, that God does govern even -brute creatures by the method of rewards and punishments, in the -natural course of things. Men are rewarded and punished for their -actions, punished for actions mischievous to society as being so, -punished for vicious actions as such; by the natural instrumentality -of each other, under the present conduct of Providence. Nay, even -the affection of gratitude, and the passion of resentment, and the -rewards and punishments following from them, which in general are to be -considered as natural, _i.e._ from the Author of nature; these rewards -and punishments, being _naturally_[120] annexed to actions considered -as implying good intention and good desert, ill intention and ill -desert; these natural rewards and punishments, I say, are as much a -contradiction to the conclusion above, and show its falsehood, as a -more exact and complete rewarding and punishing of good and ill desert -as such. So that if it be incredible, that necessary agents should be -thus rewarded and punished; then, men are not necessary but free; since -it is matter of fact, that they are thus rewarded and punished. If, -on the contrary, which is the supposition we have been arguing upon, -it be insisted that men are necessary agents; then, there is nothing -incredible in the further supposition of necessary agents being thus -rewarded and punished: since we ourselves are thus dealt with. - -From the whole therefore it must follow, that a necessity supposed -possible, and reconcilable with the constitution of things, does in no -sort prove that the Author of Nature will not, nor destroy the proof -that he will, finally and upon the whole, in his eternal government, -render his creatures happy or miserable, by some means or other, as -they behave well or ill. Or, to express this conclusion in words -conformable to the title of the chapter, the analogy of nature shows -us, that the opinion of necessity, considered as practical, is false. -And if necessity, upon the supposition above mentioned, doth not -destroy the proof of natural religion, it evidently makes no alteration -in the proof of revealed. - -From these things likewise we may learn, in what sense to understand -that general assertion, that the opinion of necessity is essentially -destructive of all religion. First, in a practical sense; that by this -notion, atheistical men pretend to satisfy and encourage themselves -in vice, and justify to others their disregard to all religion. And -secondly, in the strictest sense; that it is a contradiction to -the whole constitution of nature, and to what we may every moment -experience in ourselves, and so overturns every thing. But by no means -is this assertion to be understood, as if necessity, supposing it could -possibly be reconciled with the constitution of things, and with what -we experience, were not also reconcilable with religion: for upon this -supposition, it demonstrably is so.[121] - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - -THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CONSTITUTION, -IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. - - -Though it be acknowledged, as it cannot but be, that the analogy of -nature gives a strong credibility to the general doctrine of religion, -and to the several particular things contained in it, considered as so -many matters of fact; and likewise that it shows this credibility not -to be destroyed by any notions of necessity: still, objections may be -insisted upon, against the wisdom, equity, and goodness of the divine -government implied in the notion of religion, and against the method -by which this government is conducted; to which objections analogy -can be no direct answer. For the credibility, or the certain truth, -of a matter of fact, does not immediately prove any thing concerning -the wisdom or goodness of it; and analogy can do no more, immediately -or directly, than show such and such things to be true or credible, -considered only as matters of fact. But if, upon supposition of a -moral constitution of nature and a moral government over it, analogy -suggests and makes it credible, that this government must be a scheme, -system, or constitution of government, as distinguished from a number -of single unconnected acts of distributive justice and goodness; and -likewise, that it must be a scheme, so imperfectly comprehended, and -of such a sort in other respects, as to afford a direct general answer -to all objections against the justice and goodness of it: then analogy -is, remotely, of great service in answering those objections; both by -suggesting the answer, and showing it to be a credible one. - -Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the case. For, _First_, -Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government over the -world, the analogy of his natural government suggests and makes it -credible, that his moral government _must_ be a scheme, quite beyond -our comprehension: and this affords a general answer to all objections -against the justice and goodness of it. _Secondly_, A more distinct -observation of some particular things contained in God’s scheme of -natural government, the like things being supposed, by analogy, to be -contained in his moral government, will further show, how little weight -is to be laid upon these objections. - -I. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government over the -world, the analogy of his natural government suggests and makes -it credible, that his moral government must be a scheme, quite -beyond our comprehension; and this affords a general answer to -all objections against the justice and goodness of it. It is most -obvious, analogy renders it highly credible, that, upon supposition -of a moral government, it must be a scheme. For the world, and the -whole natural government of it, appears to be so: to be a scheme, -system, or constitution, whose parts correspond to each other, and -to a whole, as really as any work of art, or as any particular model -of a civil constitution and government. In this great scheme of the -natural world, individuals have various peculiar relations to other -individuals of their own species. Whole species are, we find, variously -related to other species, upon this earth. Nor do we know, how much -further these kinds of relations may extend. And, as there is not any -action or natural event, which we are acquainted with, so single and -unconnected, as not to have a respect to some other actions and events; -so possibly each of them, when it has not an immediate, may yet have -a remote, natural relation to other actions and events, much beyond -the compass of this present world. There seems indeed nothing, from -whence we can so much as make a conjecture, whether all creatures, -actions, and events, throughout the whole of nature, have relations to -each other But, as it is obvious, that all events have future unknown -consequences; so if we trace any event, as far as we can, into what is -connected with it, we shall find, that if it were not connected with -something further in nature, unknown to us, something both past and -present, such event could not possibly have been at all. Nor can we -give the whole account of any one thing whatever; of all its causes, -ends, and necessary adjuncts; those adjuncts, I mean, without which -it could not have been. By this most astonishing connection, these -reciprocal correspondences and mutual relations, every thing which we -see in the course of nature is actually brought about. Things seemingly -the most insignificant imaginable, are perpetually observed to be -necessary conditions to other things of the greatest importance; so -that any one thing whatever, may for aught we know to the contrary, be -a necessary condition to any other. - -The natural world then, and natural government of it, being such an -incomprehensible scheme; so incomprehensible, that a man must, really -in the literal sense, know nothing at all, who is not sensible of -his ignorance in it; this immediately suggests, and strongly shows -the credibility, that the moral world and government of it may be so -too.[122] Indeed the natural and moral constitution and government of -the world are so connected, as to make up together but one scheme: -and it is highly probable, that the first is formed and carried on -merely in subserviency to the latter; as the vegetable world is for the -animal, and organized bodies for minds. But the thing intended here is, -without inquiring how far the administration of the natural world is -subordinate to that of the moral, only to observe the credibility, that -one should be analogous or similar to the other: that therefore every -act of divine justice and goodness may be supposed to look much beyond -itself, and its immediate object; may have some reference to other -parts of God’s moral administration, and to a general moral plan; and -that every circumstance of this his moral government may be adjusted -beforehand with a view to the whole of it. For example: the determined -length of time, and the degrees and ways, in which virtue is to remain -in a state of warfare and discipline, and in which wickedness is -permitted to have its progress; the times appointed for the execution -of justice; the appointed instruments of it; the kinds of rewards and -punishments, and the manners of their distribution; all particular -instances of divine justice and goodness, and every circumstance of -them, may have such respects to each other, as to make up altogether -a whole, connected and related in all its parts; a scheme or system, -which is as properly such, as the natural world is, and of the like -kind. Supposing this to be the case, it is most evident, that we are -not competent judges of this scheme, from the small parts of it which -come within our view in the present life: therefore no objections -against any of these parts can be insisted upon by reasonable men.[123] - -This our ignorance, and the consequence here drawn from it, are -universally acknowledged upon _other_ occasions; and though scarce -denied, yet are universally forgot, when persons come to argue against -religion. And it is not perhaps easy, even for the most reasonable -men, always to bear in mind the degree of our ignorance, and make due -allowances for it. Upon these accounts, it may not be useless to go a -little further, in order to show more distinctly, how just an answer -our ignorance is, to objections against the scheme of Providence. -Suppose then a person boldly to assert,[124] that the things complained -of, the origin and continuance of evil, might easily have been -prevented by repeated interpositions;[125] interpositions so guarded -and circumstanced, as would preclude all mischief arising from them. -Or, if this were impracticable, that a _scheme_ of government is itself -an imperfection, since more good might have been produced, without any -scheme, system, or constitution at all, by continued single unrelated -acts of distributive justice and goodness; because these would have -occasioned no irregularities. Farther than this, it is presumed, the -objections will not be carried. Yet the answer is obvious: that were -these assertions true, still the observations above, concerning our -ignorance in the scheme of divine government and the consequence drawn -from it, would hold, in great measure; enough to vindicate religion, -against all objections from the disorders of the present state. Were -these assertions true, yet the government of the world might be just -and good notwithstanding; for, at the most, they would infer nothing -more than that it might have been better. But they are mere arbitrary -assertions; no man being sufficiently acquainted with the possibilities -of things, to bring any proof of them to the lowest degree of -probability. For however possible what is asserted may seem, yet many -instances may be alleged, in things much less out of our reach, of -suppositions absolutely impossible, and reducible to the most palpable -self contradictions, which, not every one would perceive to be such; -nor perhaps any one, at first sight suspect. - -From these things, it is easy to see distinctly, how our ignorance, -as it is the common, so it is really a satisfactory answer, to all -objections against the justice and goodness of Providence. If a man, -contemplating any one providential dispensation, which had no relation -to any others, should object, that he discerned in it a disregard to -justice, or a deficiency of goodness; nothing would be less an answer -to such objection, than our ignorance in other parts of providence, -or in the possibilities of things, no way related to what he was -contemplating. But when we know not but the part objected against may -be relative to other parts unknown to us; and when we are unacquainted -with what is, in the nature of the thing, practicable in the case -before us; then our ignorance is a satisfactory answer; because, some -unknown relation, or some unknown impossibility, may render what is -objected against, just and good; nay good in the highest practicable -degree. - -II. How little weight is to be laid upon such objections, will further -appear, by a more distinct observation of some particular things -contained in the natural government of God, the like to which may be -supposed, from analogy, to be contained in his moral government. - -_First_, As in the scheme of the natural world, no ends appear to be -accomplished without means: so we find that means very undesirable, -often conduce to bring about ends in such a measure desirable, as -greatly to overbalance the disagreeableness of the means. And in cases -where such means are conducive to such ends, it is not reason, but -_experience_, which shows us, that they are thus conducive. Experience -also shows many means to be conducive and necessary to accomplish ends, -which means, before experience, we should have thought, would have -had even a contrary tendency. From these observations relating to the -natural scheme of the world, the moral being supposed analogous to -it, arises a great credibility, that the putting our misery in each -other’s power to the degree it is, and making men liable to vice to the -degree we are; and in general, that those things which are objected -against the moral scheme of Providence, may be, upon the whole, -friendly and assistant to virtue, and productive of an overbalance of -happiness: _i.e._ the things objected against may be means, by which -an overbalance of good, will in the end, be found produced. And from -the same observations, it appears to be no presumption against this, -that we do not, if indeed we do not, see those means to have any -such tendency, or that they seem to us to have a contrary one. Thus -those things, which we call irregularities, may not be so at all; -because they may be means of accomplishing wise and good ends more -considerable. It may be added, as above, that they may also be the -only means, by which these wise and good ends are capable of being -accomplished. - -It may be proper to add, in order to obviate an absurd and wicked -conclusion from any of these observations, that though the constitution -of our nature, from whence we are capable of vice and misery, may, as -it undoubtedly does, contribute to the perfection and happiness of -the world; and though the actual permission of evil may be beneficial -to it: (_i.e._ it would have been more mischievous, not that a wicked -person had himself abstained from his own wickedness, but that any -one had forcibly prevented it, than that it was permitted:) yet -notwithstanding, it might have been much better for the world, if this -very evil had never been done. Nay it is most clearly conceivable, that -the very commission of wickedness may be beneficial to the world, and -yet, that it would be infinitely more beneficial for men to refrain -from it. For thus, in the wise and good constitution of the natural -world, there are disorders which bring their own cures; diseases, which -are themselves remedies. Many a man would have died, had it not been -for the gout or a fever; yet it would be thought madness to assert, -that sickness is a better or more perfect state than health; though the -like, with regard to the moral world, has been asserted. - -_Secondly_, The natural government of the world is carried on by -general laws. For this there may be wise and good reasons: the wisest -and best, for aught we know to the contrary. And that there are such -reasons, is suggested to our thoughts by the analogy of nature; by our -being made to experience good ends to be accomplished, as indeed all -the good which we enjoy is accomplished, by this means,--viz.: that the -laws, by which the world is governed, are general. We have scarce any -kind of enjoyments, but what we are, in some way or other, instrumental -in procuring ourselves, by acting in a manner which we _foresee_ likely -to procure them: now this foresight could not be at all, were not the -government of the world carried on by general laws. And though, for -aught we know to the contrary, every single case may be, at length, -found to have been provided for even by these: yet to prevent all -irregularities, or remedy them as they arise, by the wisest and best -general laws, may be impossible in the nature of things; as we see it -is absolutely impossible in civil government. - -But then we are ready to think, that, the constitution of nature -remaining as it is, and the course of things being permitted to go -on, in other respects, as it does, there might be interpositions to -prevent irregularities; though they could not have been prevented, or -remedied by any general laws. There would indeed be reason to wish, -which, by-the-way, is very different from a right to claim, that all -irregularities were prevented or remedied by present interpositions, -if these interpositions would have no other effect than this. But it -is plain they would have some visible and immediate _bad_ effects: -for instance, they would encourage idleness and negligence; and they -would render doubtful the natural rule of life, which is ascertained by -this very thing, that the course of the world is carried on by general -laws. And further, it is certain they would have _distant_ effects, -and very great ones too; by means of the wonderful connections before -mentioned.[126] So that we cannot so much as guess, what would be the -whole result of the interpositions desired. It may be said, any bad -result might be prevented by further interpositions, whenever there was -occasion for them: but this again is talking quite at random, and in -the dark.[127] - -Upon the whole then, we see wise reasons, why the course of the world -should be carried on by general laws, and good ends accomplished by -this means: and for aught we know, there may be the wisest reasons -for it, and the best ends accomplished by it. We have no ground to -believe, that all irregularities could be remedied as they arise, or -could have been precluded, by general laws. We find that interpositions -would produce evil, and prevent good: and, for aught we know, they -would produce greater evil than they would prevent; and prevent greater -good than they would produce. And if this be the case, then the not -interposing is so far from being a ground of complaint, that it is an -instance of goodness. This is intelligible and sufficient: and going -further, seems beyond the utmost reach of our faculties. - -It may be said, that “after all, these supposed impossibilities and -relations are what we are unacquainted with; and we must judge of -religion, as of other things, by what we do know, and look upon the -rest as nothing: or however, that the answers here given to what is -objected against religion, may equally be made use of to invalidate the -proof of it; since their stress lies so very much upon our ignorance.” -But, - -_First_, Though total ignorance in any matter does indeed equally -destroy, or rather preclude, all proof concerning it, and objections -against it; yet partial ignorance does not. For we may in any degree be -convinced, that a person is of such a character, and consequently will -pursue such ends; though we are greatly ignorant, what is the proper -way of acting, in order the most effectually to obtain those ends: and -in this case, objections against his manner of acting, as seemingly -not conducive to obtain them, might be answered by our ignorance; -though the proof that such ends were intended, might not at all be -invalidated by it. Thus, the proof of religion is a proof of the moral -character of God, and consequently that his government is moral, and -that every one upon the whole shall receive according to his deserts; a -proof that this is the designed end of his government. But we are not -competent judges, what is the proper way of acting, in order the most -effectually to accomplish this end.[128] Therefore our ignorance is an -answer to objections against the conduct of Providence, in permitting -irregularities, as seeming contradictory to this end. Now, since it -is so obvious, that our ignorance may be a satisfactory answer to -objections against a thing, and yet not affect the proof of it; till it -can be shown, it is frivolous to assert, that our ignorance invalidates -the proof of religion, as it does the objections against it. - -_Secondly_, Suppose unknown impossibilities, and unknown relations, -might justly be urged to invalidate the proof of religion, as well as -to answer objections against it; and that, in consequence of this, -the proof of it were doubtful. Still, let the assertion be despised, -or let it be ridiculed, it is undeniably true, that moral obligations -would remain certain, though it were not certain what would, upon the -whole, be the consequences of observing or violating them. For, these -obligations arise, immediately and necessarily, from the judgment of -our own mind, unless perverted, which we cannot violate without being -self-condemned. And they would be certain too, from considerations -of interest. For though it were doubtful, what will be the future -consequences of virtue and vice; yet it is, however, credible, that -they may have those consequences, which religion teaches us they will: -and this credibility is a certain[129] obligation in point of prudence, -to abstain from all wickedness, and to live in the conscientious -practice of all that is good. - -_Thirdly_, The answers above given to the objections against religion -cannot be made use of to invalidate the proof of it. For, upon -suspicion that God exercises a moral government over the world, analogy -does most strongly lead us to conclude, that this moral government must -be a scheme, or constitution, beyond our comprehension. A thousand -particular analogies show us, that parts of such a scheme, from their -relation to other parts, may conduce to accomplish ends, which we -should have thought they had no tendency to accomplish: nay ends, which -before experience, we should have thought such parts were contradictory -to, and had a tendency to prevent. Therefore all these analogies show, -that the way of arguing made use of in objecting against religion is -delusive: because they show it is not at all incredible, that, could we -comprehend the whole, we should find the permission of the disorders -objected against to be consistent with justice and goodness; and even -to be instances of them. Now this is not applicable to the proof of -religion, as it is to the objections against it;[130] and therefore -cannot invalidate that proof, as it does these objections. - -_Lastly_, From the observation now made, it is easy to see, that the -answers above given to the objections against Providence, though, -in a general way of speaking, they may be said to be taken from our -ignorance; yet are by no means taken merely from that, but from -something which analogy shows us concerning it. For analogy shows us -positively, that our ignorance in the possibilities of things, and the -various relations in nature, renders us incompetent judges, and leads -us to false conclusions, in cases similar to this, in which we pretend -to judge and to object. So that the things above insisted upon are not -mere suppositions of unknown impossibilities and relations: but they -are suggested to our thoughts, and even forced upon the observation -of serious men, and rendered credible too, by the analogy of nature. -Therefore to take these things into the account, is to judge by -experience and what we do know: and it is not judging so, to take no -notice of them. - - -CONCLUSION. - -The observations of the last chapter lead us to consider this little -scene of human life, in which we are so busily engaged, as having a -reference, of some sort or other, to a much larger plan of things. -Whether we are, any way, related to the more distant parts of the -boundless universe, into which we are brought, is altogether uncertain. -But it is evident, that the course of things, which comes within -our view, is connected with some things, past, present, and future, -beyond it.[131] So that we are placed, as one may speak, in the middle -of a scheme, not fixed but progressive, every way incomprehensible: -incomprehensible, in a manner equally, with respect to what has -been, what now is, and what shall be. This scheme cannot but contain -in it some things as wonderful, and as much beyond our thought and -conception,[132] as any thing in that of religion. For, will any man in -his senses say, that it is less difficult to conceive, how the world -came to be and to continue as it is, without, than with, an intelligent -Author and Governor of it? Or, admitting an intelligent Governor of -it, that there is some other rule of government more natural, and of -easier conception, than that which we call moral? Indeed, without an -intelligent Author and Governor of nature, no account at all can be -given, how this universe, or the part of it particularly in which we -are concerned, came to be, and the course of it to be carried on, as it -is: nor any, of its general end and design, without a moral governor of -it. That there is an intelligent Author of nature, and natural Governor -of the world, is a principle gone upon in the foregoing treatise; as -proved, and generally known, and confessed to be proved. And the very -notion of an intelligent Author of nature, proved by particular final -causes, implies a will and a character.[133] - -Now, as our whole nature, the nature which he has given us, leads us to -conclude his will and character to be moral, just, and good: so we can -scarce in imagination conceive, what it can be otherwise. However, in -consequence of this his will and character, whatever it be, he formed -the universe as it is, and carries on the course of it as he does, -rather than in any other manner; and has assigned to us, and to all -living creatures, a part and a lot in it. Irrational creatures act this -their part, and enjoy and undergo the pleasures and the pains allotted -them, without any reflection. But one would think it impossible, that -creatures endued with reason could avoid reflecting sometimes upon all -this; reflecting, if not from whence we came, yet, at least, whither -we are going; and what the mysterious scheme, in the midst of which -we find ourselves, will, at length, come out and produce: a scheme in -which it is certain we are highly interested, and in which we may be -interested even beyond conception.[134] - -For many things prove it palpably absurd to conclude, that we shall -cease to be, at death. Particular analogies do most sensibly show us, -that there is nothing to be thought strange, in our being to exist in -another state of life. And that we are now living beings, affords a -strong probability that we shall _continue_ so; unless there be some -positive ground, and there is none from reason or analogy, to think -death will destroy us. Were a persuasion of this kind ever so well -grounded, there would, surely, be little reason to take pleasure in it. -Indeed it can have no other ground, than some such imagination, as that -of our gross bodies being ourselves; which is contrary to experience. -Experience too most clearly shows us the folly of concluding, from -the body and the living agent affecting each other mutually, that the -dissolution of the former is the destruction of the latter. And there -are remarkable instances of their _not_ affecting each other, which -lead us to a contrary conclusion. The supposition, then, which in all -reason we are to go upon, is, that our living nature will _continue_ -after death. And it is infinitely unreasonable to form an institution -of life, or to act, upon any other supposition. - -All expectation of immortality, whether more or less certain, opens -an unbounded prospect to our hopes and our fears: since we see the -constitution of nature is such, as to admit of misery, as well as to be -productive of happiness, and experience ourselves to partake of both -in some degree; and since we cannot but know, what higher degrees of -both we are capable of. And there is no presumption against believing -further, that our future interest depends upon our present behavior: -for we see our present interest doth; and that the happiness and -misery, which are naturally annexed to our actions, very frequently do -not follow, till long after the actions are done, to which they are -respectively annexed. So that were speculation to leave us uncertain, -whether it were likely, that the Author of nature, in giving happiness -and misery to his creatures, hath regard to their actions or not, yet, -since we find by experience that he hath such regard, the whole sense -of things which he has given us, plainly leads us, at once and without -any elaborate inquiries, to think that it may, indeed must, be to good -actions chiefly that he hath annexed happiness, and to bad actions -misery; or that he will, upon the whole, reward those who do well, and -punish those who do evil. - -To confirm this from the constitution of the world, it has been -observed, that some sort of moral government is necessarily implied -in that natural government of God, which we experience ourselves -under; that good and bad actions, at present, are naturally rewarded -and punished, not only as beneficial and mischievous to society, but -also as virtuous and vicious: and that there is, in the very nature -of the thing, a tendency to their being rewarded and punished in a -much higher degree than they are at present. And though this higher -degree of distributive justice, which nature thus points out and leads -towards, is prevented for a time from taking place; it is by obstacles, -which the state of this world unhappily throws in its way, and which -therefore are in their nature temporary. Now, as these things in the -natural conduct of Providence are observable on the side of virtue; -so there is nothing to be set against them on the side of vice. A -moral scheme of government then is visibly established, and, in some -degree, carried into execution: and this, together with the essential -tendencies of virtue and vice duly considered, naturally raise in us an -apprehension, that it will be carried on further towards perfection in -a future state, and that every one shall there receive according to his -deserts. - -And if this be so, then our future and general interest, under the -moral government of God, is appointed to depend upon our behavior; -notwithstanding the difficulty, which this may occasion, of securing -it, and the danger of losing it: just in the same manner as our -temporal interest, under his natural government, is appointed to depend -upon our behavior; notwithstanding the like difficulty and danger. -For, from our original constitution, and that of the world which we -inhabit, we are naturally trusted with ourselves; with our own conduct -and our own interest. And from the same constitution of nature, -especially joined with that course of things which is owing to men, -we have temptations to be unfaithful in this trust; to forfeit this -interest, to neglect it, and run ourselves into misery and ruin. From -these temptations arise the difficulties of behaving so as to secure -our temporal interest, and the hazard of behaving so as to miscarry in -it. There is therefore nothing incredible in supposing there may be the -like difficulty and hazard with regard to that chief and final good, -which religion lays before us. - -The whole account, how it came to pass that we were placed in such a -condition as this, must indeed be beyond our comprehension. But it is -in part accounted for by what religion teaches us, that the character -of virtue and piety must be a necessary qualification for a future -state of security and happiness, under the moral government of God; in -like manner, as some certain qualifications or other are necessary for -every particular condition of life, under his natural government: and -that the present state was intended to be a school of discipline, for -improving in ourselves that character. Now this intention of nature -is rendered highly credible by observing; that we are plainly made -for improvement of all kinds; that it is a general appointment of -Providence, that we cultivate practical principles, and form within -ourselves habits of action, in order to become fit for what we were -wholly unfit for before; that in particular, childhood and youth is -naturally appointed to be a state of discipline for mature age; and -that the present world is peculiarly fitted for a state of moral -discipline. And, whereas objections are urged against the whole notion -of moral government and a probationary state, from the opinion of -necessity; it has been shown, that God has given us the evidence, as -it were, of experience, that all objections against religion, on this -head, are vain and delusive. He has also, in his natural government, -suggested an answer to all our short-sighted objections, against the -equity and goodness of his moral government; and in general he has -exemplified to us the latter by the former. - -These things, which it is to be remembered, are matters of fact, ought, -in all common sense, to awaken mankind; to induce them to consider -in earnest their condition, and what they have to do. It is absurd, -absurd to the degree of being ridiculous, if the subject were not of so -serious a kind, for men to think themselves secure in a vicious life; -or even in that immoral thoughtlessness, into which far the greatest -part of them are fallen. The credibility of religion, arising from -experience and facts here considered, is fully sufficient, in reason, -to engage them to live in the general practice of all virtue and piety; -under the serious apprehension, though it should be mixed with some -doubt,[135] of a righteous administration established in nature, and -a future judgment in consequence of it: especially when we consider, -how very questionable it is, whether any thing at all can be gained -by vice,[136] how unquestionably little as well as precarious, the -pleasures and profits of it are at the best, and how soon they must -be parted with at the longest. For, in the deliberations of reason, -concerning what we are to pursue and what to avoid, as temptations -to any thing from mere passion are supposed out of the case, so -inducements to vice, from cool expectations of pleasure and interest so -small and uncertain and short, are really so insignificant, as, in the -view of reason to be almost nothing in _themselves_; and in comparison -with the importance of religion they quite disappear and are lost. - -Mere passion may indeed be alleged, though not as a reason, yet as -an excuse, for a vicious course of life. And how sorry an excuse it -is, will be manifest by observing, that we are placed in a condition -in which we are unavoidably inured to govern our passions, by being -necessitated to govern them: and to lay ourselves under the same kind -of restraints, and as great ones too, from temporal regards, as virtue -and piety, in the ordinary course of things, require. The plea of -ungovernable passion then, on the side of vice, is the poorest of all -things; for it is no reason, and a poor excuse. The proper _motives_ to -religion are the proper _proofs_ of it, from our moral nature, from the -presages of conscience, and our natural apprehension of God under the -character of a righteous Governor and Judge: a nature, and conscience, -and apprehension, given us by him; and from the confirmation of the -dictates of reason, by _life and immortality brought to light by -the Gospel; and the wrath of God revealed from heaven against all -ungodliness and unrighteousness of men_. - - -END OF THE FIRST PART. - - - - -PART II. - -Revealed Religion. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.[137] - - -Some persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency of the light of nature, -avowedly reject all revelation, as in its very notion incredible, -and what must be fictitious. And indeed it is certain, no revelation -would have been given, had the light of nature been sufficient in -such a sense, as to render one not wanted and useless. But no man, -in seriousness and simplicity of mind, can possibly think it so, who -considers the state of religion in the heathen world before revelation, -and its present state in those places which have borrowed no light -from it: particularly the doubtfulness of some of the greatest men, -concerning things of the utmost importance, as well as the natural -inattention and ignorance of mankind in general. It is impossible to -say, who would have been able to have reasoned out that whole system, -which we call Natural Religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear of -superstition: but there is certainly no ground to affirm that the -generality could. If they could, there is no sort of probability that -they would. Admitting there were, they would highly want a standing -admonition to remind them of it, and inculcate it upon them. - -And further, were they as much disposed to attend to religion, as the -better sort of men are; yet even upon this supposition, there would -be various occasions for supernatural instruction and assistance, and -the greatest advantages might be afforded by them.[138] So that to say -revelation is a thing superfluous, what there was no need of, and what -can be of no service, is, I think, to talk quite wildly and at random. -Nor would it be more extravagant to affirm, that mankind is so entirely -at ease in the present state, and life so completely happy, that it -is a contradiction to suppose our condition capable of being, in any -respect, better. - -There are other persons, not to be ranked with these, who seem to -be getting into a way of neglecting, and as it were, overlooking -revelation, as of small importance provided natural religion be kept -to. With little regard either to the evidence of the former, or to -the objections against it, and even upon supposition of its truth; -“the only design of it,” say they, “must be, to establish a belief of -the moral system of nature, and to enforce the practice of natural -piety and virtue. The belief and practice of these were, perhaps, much -promoted by the first publication of Christianity: but whether they -are believed and practised, upon the evidence and motives of nature -or of revelation, is no great matter,”[139] This way of considering -revelation, though it is not the same with the former, yet borders -nearly upon it, and very much, at length runs up into it: and requires -to be particularly considered, with regard to the persons who seem -to be getting into this way. The consideration of it will likewise -further show the extravagance of the former opinion, and the truth of -the observations in answer to it, just mentioned. And an inquiry into -the importance of Christianity, cannot be an improper introduction to a -treatise concerning the credibility of it. - -Now, if God has given a revelation to mankind, and commanded those -things which are commanded in Christianity; it is evident, at first -sight, that it cannot in any wise be an indifferent matter, whether -we obey or disobey those commands: unless we are certainly assured, -that we know all the reasons for them, and that all those reasons are -now ceased, with regard to mankind in general, or to ourselves in -particular. It is absolutely impossible we can be assured of this.[140] -For our ignorance of these reasons proves nothing in the case: since -the whole analogy of nature shows, what is indeed in itself evident, -that there may be infinite reasons for things, with which we are not -acquainted. - -But the importance of Christianity will more distinctly appear, by -considering it more distinctly: _First_, as a republication, and -external institution, of natural or essential religion, adapted to the -present circumstances of mankind, and intended to promote natural piety -and virtue: _Secondly_, as containing an account of a dispensation of -things, not discoverable by reason, in consequence of which several -distinct precepts are enjoined us. For though natural religion is the -foundation and principal part of Christianity, it is not in any sense -the whole of it. - -I. Christianity is a republication of Natural religion. It instructs -mankind in the moral system of the world: that it is the work of an -infinitely perfect Being, and under his government, that virtue is -his law, and that he will finally judge mankind in righteousness, -and render to all according to their works, in a future state. And, -which is very material, it teaches natural religion in its genuine -simplicity; free from those superstitions, with which it was totally -corrupted, and under which it was in a manner lost. - -Revelation is, further, an _authoritative_ publication of natural -religion, and so affords the evidence of testimony for the truth of -it. Indeed the miracles and prophecies recorded in Scripture, were -intended to prove a particular dispensation of Providence, _i.e._ the -redemption of the world by the Messiah: but this does not hinder, but -that they may also prove God’s general providence over the world, as -our moral governor and judge. And they evidently do prove it; because -this character of the Author of nature, is necessarily connected with -and implied in that particular revealed dispensation of things: it is -likewise continually taught expressly, and insisted upon, by those -persons who wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies. So -that indeed natural religion seems as much proved by the Scripture -revelation, as it would have been, had the design of revelation been -nothing else than to prove it. - -But it may possibly be disputed, how far miracles can prove natural -religion; and notable objections may be urged against this proof of it, -considered as a matter of speculation: but considered as a practical -thing, there can be none. For suppose a person to teach natural -religion to a nation, who bid lived in total ignorance or forgetfulness -of it; and to declare that he was commissioned by God so to do; suppose -him, in proof of his commission, to foretell things future, which no -human foresight could have guessed at; to divide the sea with a word; -feed great multitudes with bread from heaven; cure all manner of -diseases; and raise the dead, even himself, to life; would not this -give additional credibility to his teaching, a credibility beyond what -that of a common man would have; and be an authoritative publication of -the law of nature, _i.e._ a new proof of it? It would be a practical -one, of the strongest kind, perhaps, which human creatures are capable -of having given them. The Law of Moses then, and the Gospel of Christ, -are authoritative publications of the religion of nature; they afford -a proof of God’s general providence, as moral Governor of the world, -as well as of his particular dispensations of providence towards sinful -creatures, revealed in the Law and the Gospel. As they are the only -evidence of the latter, so they are an additional evidence of the -former. - -To show this further, let us suppose a man of the greatest and most -improved capacity, who had never heard of revelation, convinced upon -the whole, notwithstanding the disorders of the world, that it was -under the direction and moral government of an infinitely perfect -Being; but ready to question, whether he were not got beyond the reach -of his faculties: suppose him brought, by this suspicion, into great -danger of being carried away by the universal bad example of almost -every one around him, who appeared to have no sense, no practical -sense at least, of these things: and this, perhaps, would be as -advantageous a situation with regard to religion, as nature alone -ever placed any man in. What a confirmation now must it be to such a -person, all at once, to find, that this moral system of things was -revealed to mankind, in the name of that infinite Being, whom he had -from principles of reason believed in: and that the publishers of the -revelation proved their commission from him, by making it appear, that -he had intrusted them with a power of suspending and changing the -general laws of nature. - -Nor must it by any means be omitted, for it is a thing of the utmost -importance, that life and immortality are eminently brought to light -by the Gospel. The great doctrines of a future state, the danger of a -course of wickedness[141] and the efficacy of repentance, are not only -confirmed in the Gospel, but are taught, especially the last is, with a -degree of light, to which that of nature is but darkness. - -Further. As Christianity served these ends and purposes, when it was -first published, by the miraculous publication itself, so it was -intended to serve the same purposes in future ages, by means of the -settlement of a visible church:[142] of a society, distinguished from -common ones, and from the rest of the world, by peculiar religious -institutions; by an instituted method of instruction, and an instituted -form of external religion. Miraculous powers were given to the first -preachers of Christianity, in order to their introducing it into the -world: a visible church was established, in order to continue it, and -carry it on successively throughout all ages. Had only Moses and the -prophets, Christ and his apostles, taught, and by miracles proved, -religion to their contemporaries; the benefits of their instructions -would have reached but a small part of mankind. Christianity must -have been, in a great degree, sunk and forgot in a very few ages. To -prevent this, appears to have been one reason why a visible church was -instituted; to be like a city upon a hill, a standing memorial to the -world of the duty which we owe our Maker: to call men continually, -both by example and instruction, to attend to it, and, by the form -of religion, ever before their eyes, remind them of the reality; to -be the repository of the oracles of God; to hold up the light of -revelation in aid to that of nature, and to propagate it, throughout -all generations, to the end of the world--the light of revelation, -considered here in no other view, than as designed to enforce natural -religion. And in proportion as Christianity is professed and taught in -the world, religion, natural or essential religion, is thus distinctly -and advantageously laid before mankind, and brought again and again to -their thoughts, as a matter of infinite importance. - -A visible church has also a further tendency to promote natural -religion, as being an instituted method of education, originally -intended to be of peculiar advantage to those who conform to it. For -one end of the institution was, that, by admonition and reproof, as -well as instruction, by a general regular discipline, and public -exercises of religion, _the body of Christ_, as the Scripture speaks, -should be _edified_; _i.e._ trained up in piety and virtue for a higher -and better state. This settlement, then, appearing thus beneficial, -tending in the nature of the thing to answer, and, in some degree, -actually answering, those ends, it is to be remembered, that the very -notion of it implies positive institutions; for the visibility of the -church consists in them. Take away every thing of this kind, and you -lose the very notion itself. So that if the things now mentioned are -advantages, the reason and importance of positive institutions in -general is most obvious; since without them these advantages could not -be secured to the world. And it is mere idle wantonness, to insist upon -knowing the reasons, _why_ such particular ones were fixed upon rather -than others. - -The benefit arising from this supernatural assistance, which -Christianity affords to natural religion, is what some persons are very -slow in apprehending. And yet it is a thing distinct in itself, and a -very plain obvious one. For will any in good earnest really say, that -the bulk of mankind in the heathen world were in as advantageous a -situation, with regard to natural religion, as they are now among us: -that it was laid before them, and enforced upon them, in a manner as -distinct, and as much tending to influence their practice? - -The objections against all this, from the perversion of Christianity, -and from the supposition of its having had but little good influence, -however innocently they may be proposed, cannot be insisted upon as -conclusive, upon any principles, but such as lead to downright Atheism; -because the manifestation of the law of nature by reason, which, upon -all principles of Theism, must have been from God, has been perverted -and rendered ineffectual in the same manner. It may indeed, I think, -truly be said, that the good effects of Christianity have not been -small; nor its supposed ill effects, any effects at all of it, properly -speaking. Perhaps, too, the things done have been aggravated; and if -not, Christianity hath been often only a pretence, and the same evils -in the main would have been done upon some other pretence. However, -great and shocking as the corruptions and abuses of it have really -been, they cannot be insisted upon as arguments against it, upon -principles of Theism. For one cannot proceed one step in reasoning upon -natural religion, any more than upon Christianity, without laying it -down as a first principle, that the dispensations of Providence are not -to be judged of by their perversions, but by their genuine tendencies: -not by what they do actually seem to effect, but by what they would -effect if mankind did their part; that part which is justly put and -left upon them. It is altogether as much the language of one as of the -other: _He that is unjust, let him be unjust still: and he that is -holy, let him be holy still._[143] The light of reason does not, any -more than that of revelation, force men to submit to its authority; -both admonish them of what they ought to do and avoid, together with -the consequences of each; and after this, leave them at full liberty -to act just as they please, till the appointed time of judgment. -Every moment’s experience shows, that this is God’s general rule of -government.[144] - -To return then: Christianity being a promulgation of the law of nature; -being moreover an authoritative promulgation of it; with new light, -and other circumstances of peculiar advantage, adapted to the wants of -mankind; these things fully show its importance. - -It is to be observed further, that as the nature of the case requires, -so all Christians are commanded to contribute, by their profession -of Christianity, to preserve it in the world, and render it such -a promulgation and enforcement of religion. For it is the very -scheme of the Gospel, that each Christian should, in his degree, -contribute towards continuing and carrying it on: all by uniting in -the public profession and external practice of Christianity; some by -instructing, by having the oversight and taking care of this religious -community, the church of God. Now this further shows the importance of -Christianity; and, which is what I chiefly intend, its importance in a -practical sense: or the high obligations we are under, to take it into -our most serious consideration; and the danger there must necessarily -be, not only in treating it despitefully, which I am not now speaking -of, but in disregarding and neglecting it. For this is neglecting to -do what is expressly enjoined us, for continuing those benefits to the -world, and transmitting them down to future times. And all this holds, -even though the only thing to be considered in Christianity were its -subserviency to natural religion. - -II. Christianity is to be considered in a further view; as containing -an account of a dispensation of things, not at all discoverable by -reason, in consequence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined -us. Christianity is not only an external institution of natural -religion, and a new promulgation of God’s general providence, as -righteous governor and judge of the world; but it contains also a -revelation of a particular dispensation of Providence, carrying on by -his Son and Spirit, for the recovery and salvation of mankind, who are -represented in Scripture to be in a state of ruin. And in consequence -of this revelation being made, we are commanded _to be baptized_, not -only _in the name of the Father_, but also, _of the Son_, _and of the -Holy Ghost_: and other obligations of duty, unknown before, to the Son -and the Holy Ghost, are revealed. Now the importance of these duties -may be judged of, by observing that they arise, not from positive -command merely, but also from the offices which appear, from Scripture, -to belong to those divine persons in the Gospel dispensation; or from -the relations, which we are there informed, they stand in to us. By -_reason_ is revealed the relation, which God the Father stands in to -us. Hence arises the obligation of duty which we are under to him. In -_Scripture_ are revealed the relations, which the Son and Holy Spirit -stand in to us. Hence arise the obligations of duty;[145] which we are -under to them. The truth of the case, as one may speak, in each of -these three respects being admitted: that God is the governor of the -world, upon the evidence of reason; that Christ is the mediator between -God and man, and the Holy Ghost our guide and sanctifier, upon the -evidence of revelation: the truth of the case, I say, in each of these -respects being admitted, it is no more a question, why it should be -commanded, that we be baptized in the name of the Son and of the Holy -Ghost, than that we be baptized in the name of the Father. This matter -seems to require to be more fully stated.[146] - -Let it be remembered then, that religion comes under the twofold -consideration of internal and external: for the latter is as real a -part of religion, of true religion, as the former. Now, when religion -is considered under the first notion, as an inward principle, to be -exerted in such and such inward acts of the mind and heart, the essence -of natural religion may be said to consist in religious regards to -_God the Father Almighty_: and the essence of revealed religion, as -distinguished from natural, to consist in religious regards to _the -Son_, and to _the Holy Ghost_. The obligation we are under, of paying -these religious regards to each of these divine persons respectively, -arises from the respective relations which they each stand in to us. -How these relations are made known, whether by reason or revelation, -makes no alteration in the case: because the duties arise out of the -relations themselves, not out of the manner in which we are informed -of them. The Son and Spirit have each his proper office in that great -dispensation of Providence, the redemption of the world; the one our -Mediator, the other our Sanctifier. Does not then the duty of religious -regards to both these divine persons, as immediately arise to the view -of reason, out of the very nature of these offices and relations; as -the good-will and kind intention, which we owe to our fellow-creatures, -arise out of the common relations between us and them? But it will be -asked, “What are the inward religious regards, appearing thus obviously -due to the Son and Holy Spirit; as arising, not merely from command in -Scripture, but from the very nature of the revealed relations, which -they stand in to us?” I answer, the religious regards of reverence, -honor, love, trust, gratitude, fear, hope. - -In what external manner this inward worship is to be expressed, is a -matter of pure revealed command, as perhaps the external manner, in -which God the Father is to be worshipped, may be more so than we are -ready to think. But the worship, the internal worship itself, to the -Son and Holy Ghost, is no further matter of pure revealed command, than -as the relations they stand in to us are matter of pure revelation: for -the relations being known, the obligations to such internal worship -are obligations of reason, arising out of those relations themselves. -In short, the history of the gospel as immediately shows us the reason -of these obligations, as it shows us the meaning of the words, Son and -Holy Ghost. - -If this account of the Christian religion be just, those persons who -can speak lightly of it, as of little consequence, provided natural -religion be kept to, plainly forget, that Christianity, even what is -peculiarly so called, as distinguished from natural religion, has yet -somewhat very important, even of a moral nature. For the office of -our Lord being made known, and the relation he stands in to us, the -obligation of religious regards to him is plainly moral, as much as -charity to mankind is; since this obligation arises, before external -command, immediately out of that his office and relation itself. Those -persons appear to forget, that revelation is to be considered, as -informing us of somewhat new, in the state of mankind,[147] and in -the government of the world: as acquainting us with some relations we -stand in, which could not otherwise have been known. These relations -being real (though before revelation we could be under no obligations -from them, yet upon their being revealed), there is no reason to think, -but that neglect of behaving suitably to them will be attended with -the same kind of consequences under God’s government, as neglecting to -behave suitably to any other relations, made known to us by reason. -Ignorance, whether unavoidable or voluntary, so far as we can possibly -see, will just as much, and just as little, excuse in one case as in -the other: the ignorance being supposed equally unavoidable, or equally -voluntary, in both cases. - -If therefore Christ be indeed the mediator between God and man, _i.e._ -if Christianity be true; if he be indeed our Lord, our Savior, and our -God, no one can say, what may follow, not only the obstinate, but -the careless disregard to him, in those high relations. Nay, no one -can say, what may follow such disregard, even in the way of natural -consequence.[148] For, as the natural consequences of vice in this -life are doubtless to be considered as judicial punishments inflicted -by God, so for aught we know, the judicial punishments of the future -life may be, in a like way or a like sense, the natural consequence of -vice:[149] of men’s violating or disregarding the relations which God -has placed them in here, and made known to them. - -If mankind are corrupted and depraved in their moral character, and -so are unfit for that state, which Christ is gone to prepare for his -disciples; and if the assistance of God’s Spirit be necessary to renew -their nature, in the degree requisite to their being qualified for -that state; (all which is implied in the express, though figurative -declaration, _Except a man be born of the Spirit, he cannot enter -into the kingdom of God_:[150]) supposing this, is it possible any -serious person can think it a slight matter, whether or no he makes -use of the means, expressly commanded by God, for obtaining this -divine assistance? Especially since the whole analogy of nature shows, -that we are not to expect any benefits, without making use of the -appointed means for obtaining or enjoying them. Now reason shows us -nothing, of the particular immediate means of obtaining either temporal -or spiritual benefits. This therefore we must learn, either from -experience or revelation. And experience, the present case does not -admit of. - -The conclusion from all this evidently is, that Christianity being -supposed either true or credible, it is unspeakable irreverence, and -really the most presumptuous rashness, to treat it as a light matter. -It can never justly be esteemed of little consequence, till it be -positively supposed false. Nor do I know a higher and more important -obligation which we are under, than that of examining most seriously -into its evidence, supposing its credibility; and of embracing it, upon -supposition of its truth. - -The two following deductions may be proper to be added, in order to -illustrate the foregoing observations, and to prevent their being -mistaken. - -_First_, Hence we may clearly see, where lies the distinction between -what is positive and what is moral in religion. Moral _precepts_, are -precepts the reasons of which we see: positive _precepts_, are precepts -the reasons of which we do not see.[151] Moral _duties_ arise out of -the nature of the case itself, prior to external command. Positive -_duties_ do not arise out of the nature of the case, but from external -command; nor would they be duties at all, were it not for such command, -received from Him whose creatures and subjects we are. But the manner -in which the nature of the case or the fact of the relation, is made -known, this doth not denominate any duty either positive or moral. That -we be baptized in the name of the Father is as much a positive duty, as -that we be baptized in the name of the Son, because both arise equally -from revealed command: though the relation which we stand in to God -the Father is made known to us by reason, and the relation we stand -in to Christ, by revelation only. On the other hand, the dispensation -of the Gospel being admitted, gratitude as immediately becomes due to -Christ, from his being the voluntary minister of this dispensation, -as it is due to God the Father, from his being the fountain of all -good; though the first is made known to us by revelation only, the -second by reason. Hence also we may see, and, for distinctness’ sake, -it may be worth mentioning, that positive institutions come under a -twofold consideration. They are either institutions founded on natural -religion, as baptism in the name of the Father; (though this has also a -particular reference to the gospel dispensation, for it is in the name -of God, as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ:) or they are external -institutions founded on revealed religion; as baptism in the name of -the Son; and of the Holy Ghost. - -_Secondly_, From the distinction between what is moral and what is -positive in religion, appears the ground of that peculiar preference, -which the Scripture teaches us to be due to the former. - -The reason of positive institutions in general, is very obvious; -though we should not see the reason, why particular ones are pitched -upon rather than others. Whoever, therefore, instead of cavilling at -words, will attend to the thing itself, may clearly see, that positive -institutions in general, as distinguished from this or that particular -one, have the nature of moral commands; since the reasons of them -appear. Thus, for instance, the _external_ worship of God is a moral -duty, though no particular mode of it be so. Care then is to be taken, -when a comparison is made between positive and moral duties, that they -be compared no further than as they are different; no further than as -the former are positive, or arise out of mere external command, the -reasons of which we are not acquainted with; and as the latter are -moral, or arise out of the apparent reason of the case, without such -external command. Unless this caution be observed, we shall run into -endless confusion. - -Now this being premised, suppose two standing precepts enjoined by the -same authority; that, in certain conjunctures, it is impossible to -obey both; that the former is moral, _i.e._ a precept of which we see -the reasons, and that they hold in the particular case before us; but -that the latter is positive, _i.e._ a precept of which we do not see -the reasons: it is indisputable that our obligations are to obey the -former; because there is an apparent reason for this preference, and -none against it. Further, positive institutions, all those I suppose -which Christianity enjoins, are means to a moral end: and the end must -be acknowledged more excellent than the means.[152] Nor is observance -of these institutions any religious obedience at all, or of any value, -otherwise than as it proceeds from a moral principle. This seems to -be the strict logical way of stating and determining this matter; -but will, perhaps, be found less applicable to practice, than may be -thought at first sight. - -Therefore, in a more practical, though more lax way of consideration, -and taking the words, _moral law_ and _positive institutions_, in -the popular sense, I add, that the whole moral law is as much matter -of revealed command, as positive institutions are: for the Scripture -enjoins every moral virtue. In this respect then they are both upon -a level. But the moral law is, moreover, written upon our hearts; -interwoven into our very nature. And this is a plain intimation of the -Author of it, which is to be preferred, when they interfere. - -But there is not altogether so much necessity for the determination of -this question, as some persons seem to think. Nor are we left to reason -alone to determine it. For, _First_, Though mankind have, in all ages, -been greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar positive rites, -by way of equivalent for obedience to moral precepts; yet, without -making any comparison at all between them, and consequently without -determining which is to have the preference, the nature of the thing -abundantly shows all notions of that kind to be utterly subversive of -true religion, as they are, moreover, contrary to the whole general -tenor of Scripture; and likewise to the most express particular -declarations of it, that nothing can render us accepted of God, without -moral virtue. - -_Secondly_, Upon the occasion of mentioning together positive and moral -duties, the Scripture always puts the stress of religion upon the -latter, and never upon the former. This, though no sort of allowance -to neglect the former, when they do not interfere with the latter, -is yet a plain intimation, that when they do, the latter are to be -preferred. And as mankind are for placing the stress of their religion -anywhere, rather than upon virtue; lest both the reason of the thing, -and the general spirit of Christianity, appearing in the intimation -now mentioned, should be ineffectual against this prevalent folly, -our Lord himself, from whose command alone the obligation of positive -institutions arises, has taken occasion to make the comparison between -them and moral precepts; when the Pharisees censured him, for _eating -with publicans and sinners_; and also when they censured his disciples, -for _plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath day_. Upon this -comparison, he has determined expressly, and in form, which shall have -the preference when they interfere. And by delivering his authoritative -determination in a proverbial manner of expression, he has made it -general: _I will have mercy, and not sacrifice_.[153] The propriety of -the word _proverbial_, is not the thing insisted upon: though I think -the manner of speaking is to be called so. But that the manner of -speaking very remarkably renders the determination general, is surely -indisputable. For, had it been said only, that God preferred mercy to -the rigid observance of the Sabbath, even then, by parity of reason, -most justly might we have argued, that he preferred mercy likewise, -to the observance of other ritual institutions; and in general, moral -duties, to positive ones. And thus the determination would have been -general; though its being so were inferred and not expressed. But as -the passage really stands in the Gospel, it is much stronger. For -the sense and the very literal words of our Lord’s answer, are as -applicable to any other instance of a comparison, between positive and -moral duties, as to that upon which they were spoken. And if, in case -of competition, mercy is to be preferred to positive institutions, -it will scarce be thought, that justice is to give place to them. It -is remarkable too, that, as the words are a quotation from the Old -Testament, they are introduced, on both the forementioned occasions, -with a declaration, that the Pharisees did not understand the meaning -of them. This, I say, is very remarkable. For, since it is scarce -possible, for the most ignorant person, not to understand the literal -sense of the passage in the prophet;[154] and since understanding -the literal sense would not have prevented their _condemning the -guiltless_,[155] it can hardly be doubted, that the thing which our -Lord really intended in that declaration was, that the Pharisees had -not learned from it, as they might, wherein the _general_ spirit of -religion consists: that it consists in moral piety and virtue, as -distinguished from ritual observances. However, it is certain we may -learn this from his divine application of the passage, in the Gospel. - -But, as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human nature, when, -upon a comparison of two things, one is found to be of greater -importance than the other, to consider this other as of scarce any -importance at all: it is highly necessary that we remind ourselves, how -great presumption it is, to make light of any institutions of divine -appointment; that our obligations to obey all God’s commands whatever -are absolute and indispensable; and that commands merely positive, -admitted to be from him, lay us under a moral obligation to obey them: -an obligation moral in the strictest and most proper sense. - -To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the account now given of -Christianity most strongly shows and enforces upon us the obligation -of searching the Scriptures, in order to see, what the scheme of -revelation really is; instead of determining beforehand, from reason, -what the scheme of it must be.[156] Indeed if in revelation there be -found any passages, the seeming meaning of which is contrary to natural -religion; we may most certainly conclude, such seeming meaning not to -be the real one.[157] But it is not any degree of a presumption against -an interpretation of Scripture, that such interpretation contains a -doctrine, which the light of nature cannot discover;[158] or a precept, -which the law of nature does not oblige to. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. - - -Having shown the importance of the Christian revelation, and the -obligations which we are under seriously to attend to it, upon -supposition of its truth, or its credibility, the next thing in -order, is to consider the supposed presumptions against revelation in -general; which shall be the subject of this chapter: and the objections -against the Christian in particular, which shall be the subject of -some following ones.[159] For it seems the most natural method, to -remove the prejudices against Christianity, before we proceed to the -consideration of the positive evidence for it, and the objections -against that evidence.[160] - -It is, I think, commonly supposed, that there is some peculiar -presumption, from the analogy of nature, against the Christian scheme -of things, at least against miracles; so as that stronger evidence -is necessary to prove the truth and reality of them, than would be -sufficient to convince us of other events, or matters of fact. Indeed -the consideration of this supposed presumption cannot but be thought -very insignificant, by many persons. Yet, as it belongs to the subject -of this treatise; so it may tend to open the mind, and remove some -prejudices, however needless the consideration of it be, upon its own -account. - -I. I find no appearance of a presumption, from the analogy of nature, -against the _general scheme_ of Christianity, that God created -and invisibly governs the world by Jesus Christ; and by him also -will hereafter judge it in righteousness, _i.e._ render to every -one according to his works; and that good men are under the secret -influence of his Spirit. Whether these things are, or are not, to -be called miraculous, is perhaps only a question about words; or -however, is of no moment in the case. If the analogy of nature raises -any presumption against this general scheme of Christianity, it must -be, either because it is not discoverable by reason or experience; or -else, because it is unlike that course of nature, which is. But analogy -raises no presumption against the truth of this scheme, upon either of -these accounts. - -_First_, There is no presumption, from analogy, against the truth -of it, upon account of its not being discoverable by reason or -experience. Suppose one who never heard of revelation, of the most -improved understanding, and acquainted with our whole system of natural -philosophy and natural religion; such a one could not but be sensible, -that it was but a very small part of the natural and moral system -of the universe, which he was acquainted with. He could not but be -sensible, that there must be innumerable things, in the dispensations -of Providence past, in the invisible government over the world at -present carrying on, and in what is to come; of which he was wholly -ignorant,[161] and which could not be discovered without revelation. -Whether the scheme of nature be, in the strictest sense, infinite or -not; it is evidently vast, even beyond all possible imagination. And -doubtless that part of it, which is open to our view, is but as a point -in comparison of the whole plan of Providence, reaching throughout -eternity past and future; in comparison of what is even now going on, -in the remote parts of the boundless universe, nay, in comparison of -the whole scheme of this world. And therefore, that things lie beyond -the natural reach of our faculties, is no sort of presumption against -the truth and reality of them; because it is certain, there are -innumerable things, in the constitution and government of the universe, -which are thus beyond the natural reach of our faculties. - -_Secondly_, Analogy raises no presumption against any of the things -contained in this general doctrine of Scripture now mentioned, upon -account of their being unlike the known course of nature. For there is -no presumption at all from analogy, that the _whole_ course of things, -or divine government naturally unknown to us, and _every thing_ in it, -is like to any thing in that which is known; and therefore no peculiar -presumption against any thing in the former, upon account of its being -unlike to any thing in the latter. And in the constitution and natural -government of the world, as well as in the moral government of it, we -see things, in a great degree, unlike one another: and therefore ought -not to wonder at such unlikeness between things visible and invisible. -However, the scheme of Christianity is by no means entirely unlike the -scheme of nature; as will appear in the following part of this treatise. - -The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of a divine mission, -has been stated with great exactness by divines; and is, I think, -sufficiently understood by every one. There are also invisible -miracles,[162] the Incarnation of Christ, for instance, which, being -secret, cannot be alleged as a proof of such a mission; but require -themselves to be proved by visible miracles. Revelation itself too -is miraculous; and miracles are the proof of it; and the supposed -presumption against these shall presently be considered. All which I -have been observing here is, that, whether we choose to call every -thing in the dispensations of Providence, not discoverable without -revelation, nor like the known course of things, miraculous; and -whether the general Christian dispensation now mentioned is to be -called so, or not; the foregoing observations seem certainly to show, -that there is no presumption against it from the analogy of nature. - -II. There is no presumption, from analogy, against some operations, -which we should now call miraculous; particularly none against a -revelation at the beginning of the world: nothing of such presumption -against it, as is supposed to be implied or expressed in the word, -_miraculous_.[163] A miracle, in its very notion, is relative to a -course of nature; and implies something different from it, considered -as being so. Now, either there was no course of nature at the time -which we are speaking of; or if there were, we are not acquainted what -the course of nature is, upon the first peopling of worlds. Therefore -the question, whether mankind had a revelation made to them at _that_ -time, is to be considered, not as a question concerning a miracle, but -as a common question of fact. And we have the like reason, be it more -or less, to admit the report of tradition, concerning this question, -and concerning common matters of fact of the same antiquity; for -instance, what part of the earth was first peopled. - -Or thus: When mankind was first placed in this state, there was a power -exerted, totally different from the present course of nature. Now, -whether this power, thus wholly different from the present course of -nature, (for we cannot properly apply to it the word _miraculous_;) -whether this power _stopped_ immediately after it had made man, or -went on, and exerted itself further in giving him a revelation, is a -question of the same kind, as whether an ordinary power exerted itself -in such a particular _degree_ and manner, or not. - -Or suppose the power exerted in the formation of the world be -considered as miraculous, or rather, be called by that name; the -case will not be different: since it must be acknowledged, that such -a power was exerted. For supposing it acknowledged, that our Savior -spent some years in a course of working miracles:[164] there is no -more presumption, worth mentioning, against his having exerted this -miraculous power, in a certain degree greater, than in a certain degree -less; in one or two more instances, than in one or two fewer; in this, -than in another manner. - -It is evident then, that there can be no peculiar presumption, from the -analogy of nature, against supposing a revelation, when man was first -placed upon earth.[165] - -Add, that there does not appear the least intimation in history or -tradition, that religion was first reasoned out: but the whole of -history and tradition makes for the other side, that it came into the -world by revelation. Indeed the state of religion, in the first ages of -which we have any account, seems to suppose and imply, that this was -the original of it among mankind.[166] And these reflections together, -without taking in the peculiar authority of Scripture, amount to real -and a very material degree of evidence, that there was a revelation -at the beginning of the world. Now this, as it is a confirmation of -natural religion, and therefore mentioned in the former part of this -treatise;[167] so likewise it has a tendency to remove any prejudices -against a subsequent revelation. - -III. But still it may be objected, that there is some peculiar -presumption, from analogy, against miracles; particularly against -revelation, after the settlement and during the continuance of a course -of nature. - -Now with regard to this supposed presumption, it is to be observed in -general, that before we can have ground for raising what can, with -any propriety, be called an _argument_ from analogy, for or against -revelation considered as something miraculous, we must be acquainted -with a similar or parallel case. But the history of some other world, -seemingly in like circumstances with our own, is no more than a -parallel case: and therefore nothing short of this can be so. Yet, -could we come at a presumptive proof, for or against a revelation, from -being informed, whether such world had one, or not; such a proof, being -drawn from one single instance only, must be infinitely precarious. -More particularly: - -_First_, There is a very strong presumption against common speculative -truths, and against the most ordinary facts, before the proof[168] -of them; which yet is overcome by almost any proof. There is a -presumption of millions to one, against the story of Cæsar, or -of any other man. For suppose a number of common facts so and so -circumstanced, of which we had no kind of proof, should happen to come -into one’s thoughts; every one would, without any possible doubt, -conclude them to be false. And the like may be said of a single -common fact. Hence it appears, that the question of importance, as -to the matter before us, is, concerning the _degree_ of the peculiar -presumption supposed against miracles; not whether there be any -peculiar presumption at all against them. For, if there be the -presumption of millions to one, against the most common facts; what -can a small presumption, additional to this, amount to, though it be -peculiar? It cannot be estimated, and is as nothing. The only material -question is, whether there be any such presumptions against miracles, -as to render them in any sort incredible. - -_Secondly_, If we leave out the consideration of religion, we are -in such total darkness, upon what causes, occasions, reasons, or -circumstances, the present course of nature depends; that there does -not appear any improbability for or against supposing, that five or -six thousand years may have given scope[169] for causes, occasions, -reasons, or circumstances, from whence miraculous interpositions may -have arisen. And from this, joined with the foregoing observation, it -will follow, that there must be a presumption, beyond all comparison -greater, against the _particular_ common facts just now instanced in, -than against miracles _in general_; before any evidence of either. - -_Thirdly_, Take in the consideration of religion, or the moral -system of the world, and then we see distinct particular reasons for -miracles: to afford mankind instruction additional to that of nature, -and to attest the truth of it. This gives a real credibility to the -supposition, that it might be part of the original plan of things, that -there should be miraculous interpositions. - -_Lastly_, Miracles must not be compared to common natural events, or to -events which, though uncommon, are similar to what we daily experience: -but to the extraordinary phenomena of nature. And then the comparison -will be between the presumption against miracles, and the presumption -against such uncommon appearances, suppose, as comets, and against -there being any such powers in nature as magnetism and electricity, -so contrary to the properties of other bodies not endued with these -powers. And before any one can determine, whether there be any peculiar -presumption against miracles, more than against other extraordinary -things; he must consider, what, upon first hearing, would be the -presumption against the last mentioned appearances and powers, to a -person acquainted only with the daily, monthly, and annual course of -nature respecting this earth, and with those common powers of matter -which we every day see. - -Upon all this I conclude; that there certainly is no such presumption -against miracles, as to render them in any wise incredible: that, -on the contrary, our being able to discern reasons for them, gives -a positive credibility to the history of them, in cases where those -reasons hold: and that it is by no means certain, that there is any -_peculiar_ presumption at all, from analogy, even in the lowest degree, -against miracles, as distinguished from other extraordinary phenomena: -though it is not worth while to perplex the reader with inquiries into -the abstract nature of evidence, in order to determine a question, -which, without such inquiries, we see[170] is of no importance. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - -OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING, WHAT WERE TO BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION; -AND THE CREDIBILITY, FROM ANALOGY, THAT IT MUST CONTAIN THINGS LIABLE -TO OBJECTIONS. - - -Besides the objections against the _evidence_ for Christianity, many -are alleged against the _scheme_ of it; against the whole manner -in which it is put and left with the world; as well as against -several particular relations in Scripture: objections drawn from -the deficiencies of revelation: from things in it appearing to men -_foolishness_;[171] from its containing matters of offence, which have -led, and it must have been foreseen would lead, into strange enthusiasm -and superstition, and be made to serve the purposes of tyranny and -wickedness; from its not being universal; and, which is a thing of the -same kind, from its evidence not being so convincing and satisfactory -as it might have been: for this last is sometimes turned into a -positive argument against its truth.[172] - -It would be tedious, indeed impossible, to enumerate the several -particulars comprehended under the objections here referred to; they -being so various, according to the different fancies of men. There -are persons who think it a strong objection against the authority -of Scripture, that it is not composed by rules of art, agreed -upon by critics, for polite and correct writing. And the scorn is -inexpressible, with which some of the prophetic parts of Scripture are -treated: partly through the rashness of interpreters; but very much -also, on account of the hieroglyphical and figurative language, in -which they are left us. - -Some of the principal things of this sort shall be particularly -considered in the following chapters. But my design at present is to -observe in general, with respect to this whole way of arguing, that, -upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly credible beforehand, -that we should be incompetent judges of it to a great degree: and -that it would contain many things appearing to us liable to great -objections; in case we judge of it otherwise, than by the analogy -of nature. Therefore, though objections against the _evidence_ of -Christianity are most seriously to be considered, yet objections -against Christianity itself are, in a great measure, frivolous: almost -all objections against it, excepting those which are alleged against -the particular proofs of its coming from God. I express myself with -caution, lest I should be mistaken to vilify reason; which is indeed -the only faculty we have wherewith to judge concerning any thing, even -revelation itself: or be misunderstood to assert, that a supposed -revelation cannot be proved false, from internal characters. For, it -may contain clear immoralities or contradictions; and either of these -would prove it false. Nor will I take upon me to affirm, that nothing -else can possibly render any supposed revelation incredible. Yet still -the observation above, is, I think, true beyond doubt; that objections -against Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its -evidence, are frivolous. To make out this, is the general design of the -present chapter. - -With regard to the whole of it, I cannot but particularly wish, that -the _proofs_ might be attended to; rather than the assertions cavilled -at, upon account of any unacceptable _consequences_, real or supposed, -which may be drawn from them. For, after all, that which is true, must -be admitted, though it should show us the shortness of our faculties: -and that we are in no wise judges of many things, of which we are apt -to think ourselves very competent ones. Nor will this be any objection -with reasonable men; at least upon second thought it will not be any -objection with such, against the justness of the following observations. - -As God governs the world and instructs his creatures, according to -certain laws or rules, in the known course of nature; known by reason -together with experience: so the Scripture informs us of a scheme of -divine Providence, additional to this. It relates, that God has, by -revelation, instructed men in things concerning his government, which -they could not otherwise have known; and reminded them of things, which -they might otherwise know; and attested the truth of the whole by -miracles. Now if the natural and the revealed dispensation of things -are both from God, if they coincide with each other, and together -make up one scheme of Providence; our being incompetent judges of -one, must render it credible, that we may be incompetent judges also -of the other. Upon experience, the acknowledged constitution and -course of nature is found to be greatly different from what, before -experience, would have been expected; and such as, men fancy, there lie -great objections against. This renders it beforehand highly credible, -that they may find the revealed dispensation likewise, if they judge -of it as they do of the constitution of nature, very different from -expectations formed beforehand; and liable, in appearance, to great -objections: objections against the scheme itself, and against the -degrees and manners of the miraculous interpositions by which it was -attested and carried on. Thus, suppose a prince to govern his dominions -in the wisest manner possible, by common known laws; and that upon -some exigencies he should suspend these laws; and govern, in several -instances, in a different manner. If one of his subjects were not a -competent judge beforehand, by what common rules the government should -or would be carried on; it could not be expected, that the same person -would be a competent judge, in what exigencies, or in what manner, or -to what degree, those laws commonly observed would be suspended or -deviated from. If he were not a judge of the wisdom of the ordinary -administration, there is no reason to think he would be a judge of the -wisdom of the extraordinary. If he thought he had objections against -the former; doubtless, it is highly supposable, he might think also, -that he had objections against the latter. And thus, as we fall into -infinite follies and mistakes, whenever we pretend, otherwise than from -experience and analogy, to judge of the constitution and course of -nature; it is evidently supposable beforehand, that we should fall into -as great, in pretending to judge in like manner concerning revelation. -Nor is there any more ground to expect that this latter should appear -to us clear of objections, than that the former should. - -These observations, relating to the whole of Christianity, are -applicable to inspiration in particular. As we are in no sort judges -beforehand, by what laws or rules, in what degree, or by what means, -it were to have been expected, that God would naturally instruct -us; so upon supposition of his affording us light and instruction -by revelation, additional to what he has afforded us by reason and -experience, we are in no sort judges, by what methods, and in what -proportion, it were to be expected that this supernatural light and -instruction would be afforded us. We know not beforehand, what degree -or kind of natural information it were to be expected God would afford -men, each by his own reason and experience: nor how far he would enable -and effectually dispose them to communicate it, whatever it should -be, to each other; nor whether the evidence of it would be certain, -highly probable, or doubtful; nor whether it would be given with equal -clearness and conviction to all. Nor could we guess, upon any good -ground I mean, whether natural knowledge, or even the faculty itself, -by which we are capable of attaining it, reason, would be given us at -once, or gradually. - -In like manner, we are wholly ignorant, what degree of new knowledge, -it were to be expected, God would give mankind by revelation, upon -supposition of his affording one: or how far, or in what way, he would -interpose miraculously, to qualify them, to whom he should originally -make the revelation, for communicating the knowledge given by it; and -to secure their doing it to the age in which they should live; and to -secure its being transmitted to posterity. We are equally ignorant, -whether the evidence of it would be certain or highly probable, or -doubtful:[173] or whether all who should have any degree of instruction -from it, and any degree of evidence of its truth, would have the -same: or whether the scheme would be revealed at once, or unfolded -gradually.[174] Nay we are not in any sort able to judge, whether -it were to have been expected, that the revelation should have been -committed to writing; or left to be handed down, and consequently -corrupted, by verbal tradition, and at length sunk under it, if mankind -so pleased, and during such time as they are permitted, in the degree -they evidently are, to act as they will. - -But it may be said, “that a revelation in some of the above-mentioned -circumstances, one, for instance, which was not committed to writing, -and thus secured against danger of corruption, would not have answered -its purpose.” I ask, what purpose? It would not have answered all the -purposes, which it has now answered, and in the same degree: but it -would have answered others, or the same in different degrees. And which -of these were the purposes of God, and best fell in with his general -government, we could not at all have determined beforehand. - -Now since we have no principles of reason, upon which to judge -beforehand, how it were to be expected that revelation should have been -left, or what was most suitable to the divine plan of government, in -any of the forementioned respects; it must be quite frivolous to object -afterwards as to any of them, against its being left in one way, rather -than another: for this would be to object against things, upon account -of their being different from expectations, which has been shown to be -without reason. - -Thus we see, that the only question concerning the truth of -Christianity is, whether it be a real revelation; not whether it be -attended with every circumstance which we should have looked for: and -concerning the authority of Scripture, whether it be what it claims to -be; not whether it be a book of such sort, and so promulged, as weak -men are apt to fancy a book containing a divine revelation should be. -Therefore, neither obscurity, nor seeming inaccuracy of style, nor -various readings, nor early disputes about the authors of particular -parts, nor any other things of the like kind, though they had been -much more considerable in degree than they are, could overthrow the -authority of the Scripture: unless the prophets, apostles, or our Lord, -had promised, that the book containing the divine revelation should be -exempt from those things. Nor indeed can any objections overthrow such -a kind of revelation as the Christian claims to be, (since there are -no objections against the morality of it,[175]) but such as can show, -that there is no proof of miracles wrought originally in attestation -of it; no appearance of any thing miraculous in its obtaining in the -world; nor any of prophecy, that is, of events foretold, which human -sagacity could not foresee. If it can be shown, that the proof alleged -for all these is absolutely none at all, then is revelation overturned. -But were it allowed, that the proof of any one or all of them is lower -than is allowed; yet, whilst _any_ proof of them remains, revelation -will stand upon much the same foot it does at present, as to all the -purposes of life and practice, and ought to have the like influence -upon our behavior. - -From the foregoing observations too, it will follow, and those who -will thoroughly examine into revelation will find it worth remarking, -that there are several ways of arguing, which though just with regard -to other writings, are not applicable to Scripture: at least not to -its prophetic parts. We cannot argue, for instance, that such and such -cannot be the sense or intent of a passage of Scripture, for, if it -had, it would have been expressed more plainly, or represented under -a more apt figure or hieroglyphic. Yet we may justly argue thus, with -respect to common books. And the reason of this difference is very -evident. In Scripture we are not competent judges, as we are in common -books, how plainly it were to have been expected, that the sense should -have been expressed, or under how apt an image figured. The only -question is, what appearance there is, that this _is_ the sense; and -scarce at all, how much more determinately or accurately it might have -been expressed or figured.[176] - -“But is it not self-evident, that internal improbabilities of all kinds -weaken external probable proof?” Doubtless. But to what practical -purpose can this be alleged here, when it has been proved before,[177] -that real internal improbabilities, which rise even to moral certainty, -are overcome by the most ordinary testimony; and when it now has been -made to appear, that we scarce know what are improbabilities, as to the -matter we are here considering: as it will further appear from what -follows. - -From the observations made above it is manifest, that we are not in any -sort competent judges, what supernatural instruction were to have been -expected; and it is self-evident, that the objections of an incompetent -judgment must be frivolous. Yet it may be proper to go one step -further, and observe, that if men will be regardless of these things, -and pretend to judge of the Scripture by preconceived expectations; the -analogy of nature shows beforehand, not only that it is highly credible -they may, but also probable that they will, imagine they have strong -objections against it, however really unexceptionable. For so, prior -to experience, they would think they had, against the circumstances, -and degrees, and the whole manner of that instruction, which is -afforded by the ordinary course of nature. Were the instruction which -God affords to brute creatures by instincts and mere propensions, and -to mankind by these together with reason, matter of probable proof, -and not of certain observation: it would be rejected as incredible, -in many instances of it, only upon account of the means by which this -instruction is given, the seeming disproportions, the limitations, -necessary conditions, and circumstances of it. For instance: would it -not have been thought highly improbable, that men should have been so -much more capable of discovering, even to certainty, the general laws -of matter, and the magnitudes, paths, and revolutions, of heavenly -bodies; than the occasions and cures of distempers, and many other -things in which human life seems so much more nearly concerned, than in -astronomy? How capricious and irregular a way of information would it -be said; is that of _invention_, by means of which nature instructs us -in matters of science, and in many things, upon which the affairs of -the world greatly depend: that a man should, by this faculty, be made -acquainted with a thing in an instant, (when perhaps he is thinking of -something else,) which he has in vain been searching after, it may be, -for years. - -So likewise the imperfections attending the only method, by which -nature enables and directs us to communicate our thoughts to each -other, are innumerable. Language is, in its very nature, inadequate, -ambiguous, liable to infinite abuse, even from negligence; and so -liable to it from design, that every man can deceive and betray by -it. And, to mention but one instance more; that brutes, without -reason, should act, in many respects, with a sagacity and foresight -vastly greater than what men have in those respects, would be thought -impossible. Yet it is certain they do act with such superior foresight: -whether it be their own, indeed, is another question. From these -things, it is highly credible beforehand, that upon supposition that -God should afford men some additional instruction by revelation, -it would be with circumstances, in manners, degrees, and respects, -against the credibility of which we should be apt to fancy we had great -objections. Nor are the objections against the Scripture, nor against -Christianity in general, at all more or greater, than the analogy of -nature would beforehand--not perhaps give ground to _expect_; (for the -analogy may not be sufficient, in some cases, to ground an expectation -upon;) but no more nor greater, than analogy would show it, beforehand, -to be supposable and _credible_, that there might seem to lie against -revelation. - -By applying these general observations to a particular objection, it -will be more distinctly seen, how they are applicable to others of the -like kind; and indeed to almost all objections against Christianity, -as distinguished from objections against its evidence. It appears -from Scripture, that, as it was not unusual in the apostolic age, for -persons, upon their conversion to Christianity, to be endued with -miraculous gifts; so, some of those persons exercised these gifts in -a strangely irregular and disorderly manner;[178] and this is made an -objection against their being really miraculous. Now the foregoing -observations quite remove this objection, how considerable soever it -may appear at first sight. For, consider a person endued with any of -these gifts, for instance that of tongues: it is to be supposed, that -he had the same power over this miraculous gift, as he would have had -over it, had it been the effect of habit, of study and use, as it -ordinarily is; or the same power over it, as he had over any other -natural endowment. Consequently, he would use it in the same manner as -he did any other; either regularly, and upon proper occasions only, or -irregularly, and upon improper ones: according to his sense of decency, -and his character of prudence.[179] Where then is the objection? Why, -if this miraculous power was indeed given to the world to propagate -Christianity, and attest the truth of it, we might, it seems, have -expected, that other sort of persons should have been chosen to be -invested with it; or that these should, at the same time, have been -endued with prudence; or that they should have been continually -restrained and directed in the exercise of it: _i.e._ that God should -have miraculously interposed, if at all, in a different manner, or -higher degree. But, from the observations made above, it is undeniably -evident, that we are not judges in what degrees and manners it were to -have been expected he should miraculously interpose; upon supposition -of his doing it in some degree and manner. Nor, in the natural course -of Providence, are superior gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, and -other talents of great influence, conferred only on persons of prudence -and decency, or such as are disposed to make the properest use of -them. Nor is the instruction and admonition naturally afforded us for -the conduct of life, particularly in our education, commonly given in -a manner the most suited to recommend it; but often with circumstances -apt to prejudice us against such instruction. - -One might go on to add, there is a great resemblance between the light -of nature and of revelation, in several other respects. Practical -Christianity, or that faith and behavior which renders a man a -Christian, is a plain and obvious thing: like the common rules of -conduct, with respect to ordinary temporal affairs. The more distinct -and particular knowledge of those things, the study of which the -apostle calls _going on unto perfection_,[180] and of the prophetic -parts of revelation, like many parts of natural and even civil -knowledge, may require very exact thought, and careful consideration. -The hinderances too, of natural, and of supernatural light and -knowledge, have been of the same kind. And as it is owned the whole -scheme of Scripture is not yet understood; so, if it ever comes to be -understood, before the _restitution of all things_,[181] and without -miraculous interpositions, it must be in the same way as natural -knowledge is come at: by the continuance and progress of learning and -of liberty;[182] and by particular persons attending to, comparing, and -pursuing, intimations scattered up and down it, which are overlooked -and disregarded by the generality of the world. For this is the way in -which all improvements are made; by thoughtful men’s tracing on obscure -hints, dropped us by nature as it were, accidentally, or which seem to -come into our minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible, that a book -which has been so long in the possession of mankind, should contain -many truths as yet undiscovered. For, all the same phenomena, and the -same faculties of investigation, from which such great discoveries -in natural knowledge have been made in the present and last age, were -equally in the possession of mankind, several thousand years before. -And possibly it might be intended, that events, as they come to pass, -should open and ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture. - -It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a material respect: -for that natural knowledge is of little or no consequence. But I have -been speaking of the general instruction which nature does or does not -afford us. And besides, some parts of natural knowledge, in the more -common restrained sense of the words, are of the greatest consequence -to the ease and convenience of life. But suppose the analogy did, as it -does not, fail in this respect; yet it might be abundantly supplied, -from the whole constitution and course of nature: which shows, that God -does not dispense his gifts according to _our_ notions of the advantage -and consequence they would be of to us. And this in general, with his -method of dispensing knowledge in particular, would together make out -an analogy full to the point before us. - -But it may be objected still further and more generally; “The Scripture -represents the world as in a state of ruin, and Christianity as an -expedient to recover it, to help in these respects where nature fails: -in particular, to supply the deficiencies of natural light. Is it -credible then, that so many ages should have been let pass, before a -matter of such a sort, of so great and so general importance, was made -known to mankind; and then that it should be made known to so small a -part of them? Is it conceivable, that this supply should be so very -deficient, should have the like obscurity and doubtfulness, be liable -to the like perversions, in short, lie open to all the like objections, -as the light of nature itself?”[183] - -Without determining how far this, in fact, is so, I answer; it is -by no means incredible, that it might be so, if the light of nature -and of revelation be from the same hand. Men are naturally liable to -diseases: for which God, in his good providence, has provided natural -remedies.[184] But remedies existing in nature have been unknown -to mankind for many ages; are known but to few now; probably many -valuable ones are not known yet. Great has been and is the obscurity -and difficulty, in the nature and application of them. Circumstances -_seem_ often to make them very improper, where they are absolutely -necessary. It is after long labor and study, and many unsuccessful -endeavors, that they are brought to be as useful as they are; after -high contempt and absolute rejection of the most useful we have; and -after disputes and doubts, which have seemed to be endless. The best -remedies too, when unskilfully, much more when dishonestly applied, may -produce new diseases; and with the rightest application the success of -them is often doubtful. In many cases they are not effectual: where -they are, it is often very slowly: and the application of them, and the -necessary regimen accompanying it, is not uncommonly so disagreeable, -that some will not submit to them; and satisfy themselves with the -excuse, that if they would, it is not certain whether it would be -successful. And many persons, who labor under diseases, for which there -are known natural remedies, are not so happy as to be always, if ever, -in the way of them. In a word, the remedies which nature has provided -for diseases are neither certain, perfect, nor universal. And indeed -the same principles of arguing, which would lead us to conclude, that -they must be so, would lead us likewise to conclude, that there could -be no occasion for them; _i.e._ that there could be no diseases at all. -And therefore our experience that there are diseases, shows that it is -credible beforehand, upon supposition nature has provided remedies for -them, that these remedies may be, as by experience we find they are, -neither certain, nor perfect, nor universal; because it shows, that the -principles upon which we should expect the contrary are fallacious. - -And now, what is the just consequence from all these things? Not -that reason is no judge of what is offered to us as being of divine -revelation. For this would be to infer that we are unable to judge -of any thing, because we are unable to judge of all things. Reason -can, and it ought to judge, not only of the meaning, but also of the -morality and the evidence of revelation. - -_First_, It is the province of reason to judge of the morality of -the Scripture; _i.e._ not whether it contains things different from -what we should have expected from a wise, just, and good Being; (for -objections from hence have been now obviated:) but whether it contains -things plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness; to what -the light of nature teaches us of God. And I know nothing of this sort -objected against Scripture, excepting such objections as are formed -upon suppositions, which would equally conclude, that the constitution -of nature is contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness; which -most certainly it is not. There are, indeed, some particular precepts -in Scripture, given to particular persons, requiring actions, which -would be immoral and vicious, were it not for such precepts. But it is -easy to see, that all these are of such a kind, as that the precept -changes the whole nature of the case and of the action; and both -constitutes and shows that not to be unjust or immoral, which, prior -to the precept, must have appeared and really been so: which may well -be, since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable morality. -If it were commanded, to cultivate the _principles_, and act from the -spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty; the command would not alter -the nature of the case or of the action, in any of these instances. -But it is quite otherwise in precepts, which require only the doing an -_external action_: for instance, taking away the property, or life of -any. For men have no right, either to life or property, but what arises -solely from the grant of God. When this grant is revoked, they cease -to have any right at all in either: and when this revocation is made -known, as surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust -to deprive them of either. And though a course of external acts, which -without command would be immoral, must make an immoral habit; yet a few -detached commands have no such natural tendency. I thought proper to -say thus much of the few Scripture precepts, which require, not vicious -actions, but actions which would have been vicious, but for such -precepts; because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and great -weight is laid upon objections drawn from them. - -To me there seems no difficulty at all in these precepts, but what -arises from their being offences: _i.e._ from their being liable to be -perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked designing men, to serve the -most horrid purposes; and perhaps to mislead the weak and enthusiastic. -And objections from this head are not objections against revelation; -but against the whole notion of religion, as a trial: and against the -general constitution of nature. - -_Secondly_, Reason is able to judge, and must, of the evidence of -revelation, and of the objections urged against that evidence: which -shall be the subject of a following chapter.[185] - -The consequence of the foregoing observations is, that the question -upon which the truth of Christianity depends, is scarcely at all -what objections there are against its scheme, since there are none -against the morality of it, but _what objections there are against its -evidence_; or, _what proof there remains of it, after due allowances -are made for the objections against that proof_: because it has been -shown, that the _objections against Christianity, as distinguished -from objections against its evidence, are frivolous_. For surely very -little weight, if any at all, is to be laid upon a way of arguing and -objecting, which, when applied to the general constitution of nature, -experience shows not to be conclusive: and such, I think, is the whole -way of objecting treated of throughout this chapter. It is resolvable -into principles, and goes upon suppositions, which mislead us to think, -that the Author of nature would not act, as we experience he does; or -would act, in such and such cases, as we experience he does not in like -cases. But the unreasonableness of this way of objecting will appear -yet more evidently from hence, that the chief things thus objected -against are justified, as shall be further shown,[186] by distinct, -particular, and full analogies, in the constitution and course of -nature. - -It is to be remembered, that, as frivolous as objections of the -foregoing sort against revelation are, yet, when a supposed revelation -is more consistent with itself, and has a more general and uniform -tendency to promote virtue, than, all circumstances considered, could -have been expected from enthusiasm and political views, this is a -presumptive proof of its not proceeding from them, and so of its truth: -because we are competent judges, what might have been expected from -enthusiasm and political views.[187] - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -CHRISTIANITY, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY -COMPREHENDED. - - -As hath been now shown,[188] the analogy of nature renders it highly -credible beforehand, that, supposing a revelation to be made, it must -contain many things very different from what we should have expected, -and such as appear open to great objections: and that this observation, -in good measure, takes off the force of those objections, or rather -precludes them. It may be alleged, that this is a very partial answer -to such objections, or a very unsatisfactory way of obviating them: -because it does not show at all, that the things objected against -can be wise, just, and good; much less, that it is credible they are -so. It will therefore be proper to show this distinctly; by applying -to these objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of -Christianity, the answer above[189] given to the like objections -against the constitution of nature: before we consider the particular -analogies in the latter, to the particular things objected against in -the former. Now that which affords a sufficient answer to objections -against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the constitution of -nature, is its being a constitution, a system, or scheme, imperfectly -comprehended;[190] a scheme in which means are made use of to -accomplish ends; and which is carried on by general laws. For from -these things it has been proved, not only to be possible, but also -to be credible, that those things which are objected against may be -consistent with wisdom, justice, and goodness; nay, may be instances -of them: and even that the constitution and government of nature may -be perfect in the highest possible degree. If Christianity then be -a scheme, and of the like kind; it is evident, the like objections -against it must admit of the like answer. And, - -I. Christianity is a scheme, quite beyond our comprehension. - -The moral government of God is exercised, by gradually conducting -things so in the course of his providence, that every one, at -length and upon the whole, shall receive according to his deserts; -and neither fraud nor violence, but truth and right, shall finally -prevail. Christianity is a particular scheme under this general plan of -Providence, and a part of it, conducive to its completion, with regard -to mankind: consisting itself also of various parts, and a mysterious -economy, which has been carrying on from the time the world came into -its present wretched state, and is still carrying on, for its recovery, -by a divine person, the Messiah; who is to _gather together in one the -children of God, that are scattered abroad_,[191] and establish _an -everlasting kingdom, wherein dwelleth righteousness_.[192] In order to -it; after various manifestations of things, relating to this great and -general scheme of Providence, through a succession of many ages: (For -_the Spirit of Christ which was in the prophets, testified beforehand -his sufferings, and the glory that should follow: unto whom it was -revealed, that not unto themselves, but unto us they did minister the -things which are now reported unto us by them that have preached the -Gospel; which things the angels desire to look into_:[193])--after -various dispensations looking forward and preparatory to, this final -salvation: _in the fulness of time_, when infinite wisdom thought fit; -He, _being in the form of God,--made himself of no reputation, and took -upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men: -and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became -obedient to death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God also hath -highly exalted him, and given him a name, which is above every name: -that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, -and things in the earth, and things under the earth: and that every -tongue should confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God -the Father._[194] Parts likewise of this economy are the miraculous -mission of the Holy Ghost, and his ordinary assistances given to good -men:[195] the invisible government, which Christ at present exercises -over his church: that which he himself refers to in these words: _In -my Father’s house are many mansions--I go to prepare a place for -you_:[196] and his future return to _judge the world in righteousness_, -and completely re-establish the kingdom of God. _For the Father judgeth -no man; but hath committed all judgment unto the Son: that all men -should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father._[197] _All power -is given unto him in heaven and in earth._[198] _And he must reign, -till he hath put all enemies under his feet. Then cometh the end, when -he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when -he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power. And -when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also -himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God -may be all in all._[199] Surely little need be said to show, that this -system, or scheme of things, is but imperfectly comprehended by us. The -Scripture expressly asserts it to be so. And indeed one cannot read a -passage relating to this _great mystery of godliness_,[200] but what -immediately runs up into something which shows us our ignorance in it; -as every thing in nature shows us our ignorance in the constitution -of nature. And whoever will seriously consider that part of the -Christian scheme, which is revealed in Scripture, will find so much -more unrevealed, as will convince him, that, to all the purposes of -judging and objecting, we know as little of it, as of the constitution -of nature. Our ignorance, therefore, is as much an answer to our -objections against the perfection of one, as against the perfection of -the other.[201] - -II. It is obvious too, that in the Christian dispensation, as much as -in the natural scheme of things, means are made use of to accomplish -ends. - -The observation of this furnishes us with the same answer, to -objections against the perfection of Christianity, as to objections -of the like kind, against the constitution of nature. It shows the -credibility, that the things objected against, how _foolish_[202] -soever they appear to men, may be the very best means of accomplishing -the very best ends. And their appearing _foolishness_ is no presumption -against this, in a scheme so greatly beyond our comprehension.[203] - -III. The credibility, that the Christian dispensation may have been, -all along, carried on by general laws,[204] no less than the course of -nature, may require to be more distinctly made out. - -Consider then, upon _what ground_ it is we say, that the whole common -course of nature is carried on according to general fore-ordained laws. -We know indeed several of the general laws of matter; and a great -part of the natural behavior of living agents is reducible to general -laws. But we know in a manner nothing, by what laws, storms, tempests, -earthquakes, famine, pestilence, become the instruments of destruction -to mankind. And the laws by which persons born into the world at such -a time and place are of such capacities, geniuses, tempers; the laws -by which thoughts come into our mind, in a multitude of cases; and by -which innumerable things happen, of the greatest influence upon the -affairs and state of the world. These laws are so wholly unknown to us, -that we call the events which come to pass by them, accidental; though -all reasonable men know certainly, that there cannot, in reality, be -any such thing as chance; and conclude that the things which have this -appearance are the result of general laws, and may be reduced to them. -It is but an exceeding little way, and in but a very few respects, that -we can trace up the natural course of things before us, to general -laws. It is only from analogy, that we conclude the whole of it to be -capable of being reduced to them: only from our seeing that part is so. -It is from our finding, that the course of nature, in some respects and -so far, goes on by general laws, that we conclude this of the rest. - -If that be a just ground for such a conclusion, it is a just ground -also, if not to conclude, yet to apprehend, to render it supposable -and credible, which is sufficient for answering objections, that God’s -miraculous interpositions may have been, all along in like manner, -by _general_ laws of wisdom. Thus, that miraculous powers should be -exerted, at such times, upon such occasions, in such degrees and -manners, and with regard to such persons, rather than others; that -the affairs of the world, being permitted to go on in their natural -course so far, should, just at such a point, have a new direction given -them by miraculous interpositions; that these interpositions should -be exactly in such degrees and respects only; all this may have been -by general laws. These laws are indeed unknown to us: but no more -unknown than the laws from whence it is, that some die as soon as -they are born, and others live to extreme old age; that one man is so -superior to another in understanding; with innumerable more things, -which, as was before observed, we cannot reduce to any laws or rules, -though it is taken for granted, they are as much reducible to general -ones, as gravitation. If the revealed dispensations of Providence, -and miraculous interpositions, be by general laws, as well as God’s -ordinary government in the course of nature, made known by reason and -experience; there is no more reason to expect that every exigence, as -it arises, should be provided for by these general laws or miraculous -interpositions, than that every exigence in nature should be, by the -general laws of nature. Yet there might be wise and good reasons, why -miraculous interpositions should be by general laws; and why these laws -should not be broken in upon, or deviated from, by other miracles. - -Upon the whole then, the appearance of deficiencies and irregularities -in nature is owing to its being a scheme but in part made known, and -of such a certain particular kind in other respects. We see no more -reason why the frame and course of nature should be such a scheme, than -why Christianity should. And that the former is such a scheme, renders -it credible, that the latter, upon supposition of its truth, may be -so too. And as it is manifest, that Christianity is a scheme revealed -but in part, and a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish -ends, like to that of nature: so the credibility, that it may have -been all along carried on by general laws, no less than the course of -nature, has been distinctly proved. From all this it is beforehand -credible that there might, I think probable that there would, be the -like appearance of deficiencies and irregularities in Christianity, -as in nature: _i.e._ that Christianity would be liable to the like -objections, as the frame of nature. And these objections are answered -by these observations concerning Christianity; as the like objections -against the frame of nature are answered by the like observations -concerning the frame of nature. - - * * * * * - -The objections against Christianity, considered as a matter of -fact,[205] having, in general, been obviated in the preceding chapter; -and the same, considered as made against the wisdom and goodness of it, -having been obviated in this: the next thing, according to the method -proposed, is to show, that the principal objections, in particular, -against Christianity, may be answered, by particular and full analogies -in nature. And as one of them is made against the whole scheme of it -together, as just now described, I choose to consider it here, rather -than in a distinct chapter by itself. - -The thing objected against this scheme of the gospel is, “that -it seems to suppose God was reduced to the necessity of a long -series of intricate means, in order to accomplish his ends, the -recovery and salvation of the world: in like sort as men, for want -of understanding or power, not being able to come at their ends -directly, are forced to go roundabout ways, and make use of many -perplexed contrivances to arrive at them,” Now every thing which we -see shows the folly of this, considered as an objection against the -truth of Christianity. For, according to our manner of conception, -God makes use of variety of means, what we often think tedious ones, -in the natural course of providence, for the accomplishment of all -his ends. Indeed it is certain there is somewhat in this matter quite -beyond our comprehension: but the mystery is as great in nature as in -Christianity. We know what we ourselves aim at, as final ends: and -what courses we take, merely as means conducing to those ends. But we -are greatly ignorant how far things are considered by the Author of -nature, under the single notion of means and ends; so as that it may be -said, this is merely an end, and that merely a means, in his regard. -And whether there be not some peculiar absurdity in our very manner of -conception, concerning this matter, something contradictory arising -from our extremely imperfect views of things, it is impossible to say. - -However, this much is manifest, that the whole natural world and -government of it, is a scheme or system; not a fixed, but a progressive -one: a scheme in which the operation of various means takes up a -great length of time, before the ends they tend to can be attained. -The change of seasons, the ripening of fruits, the very history of a -flower, are instances of this: and so is human life. Thus vegetable -bodies, and those of animals, though possibly formed at once, yet -grow up by degrees to a mature state. And thus rational agents, who -animate these latter bodies, are naturally directed to form each his -own manners and character, by the gradual gaining of knowledge and -experience, and by a long course of action. Our existence is not only -successive, as it must be of necessity; but one state of our life and -being is appointed by God, to be a preparation for another; and that -to be the means of attaining to another succeeding one: infancy to -childhood; childhood to youth; youth to mature age. Men are impatient, -and for precipitating things: but the Author of nature appears -deliberate throughout his operations; accomplishing his natural ends by -slow successive steps.[206] And there is a plan of things beforehand -laid out, which, from the nature of it, requires various systems of -means, as well as length of time, in order to the carrying on its -several parts into execution. - -Thus, in the daily course of natural providence, God operates in the -very same manner, as in the dispensation of Christianity; making one -thing subservient to another; this, to something further; and so on, -through a progressive series of means, which extend, both backward and -forward, beyond our utmost view. Of this manner of operation, every -thing we see in the course of nature is as much an instance, as any -part of the Christian dispensation. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -THE PARTICULAR SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY; THE APPOINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR, -AND THE REDEMPTION OF THE WORLD BY HIM. - - -There is not, I think, any thing relating to Christianity, which has -been more objected against, than the mediation of Christ, in some -or other of its parts. Yet upon thorough consideration, there seems -nothing less justly liable to it.[207] For, - -I. The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined presumption against -the general notion of _a Mediator between God and man_.[208] For we -find all living creatures are brought into the world, and their life -in infancy is preserved, by the instrumentality of others: and every -satisfaction of it, some way or other, is bestowed by the like means. -So that the visible government, which God exercises over the world, is -by the instrumentality and mediation of others. How far his invisible -government be or be not so, it is impossible to determine at all by -reason. The supposition, that part of it is so, appears, to say the -least, altogether as credible, as the contrary. There is then no sort -of objection, from the light of nature, against the general notion of a -mediator between God and man, considered as a doctrine of Christianity, -or as an appointment in this dispensation: since we find by experience, -that God does appoint mediators, to be the instruments of good and evil -to us: the instruments of his justice and his mercy. And the objection -here referred to is urged, not against mediation in that high, eminent, -and peculiar sense, in which Christ is our mediator; but absolutely -against the whole notion itself of a mediator at all. - -II. As we must suppose, that the world is under the proper moral -government of God, or in a state of religion, before we can enter into -consideration of the revealed doctrine, concerning the redemption of -it by Christ: so that supposition is here to be distinctly noticed. -Now the divine moral government which religion teaches us, implies -that the consequence of vice shall be misery, in some future state, by -the righteous judgment of God. That such consequent punishment shall -take effect by his appointment, is necessarily implied. But, as it -is not in any sort to be supposed, that we are made acquainted with -all the ends or reasons, for which it is fit that future punishments -should be inflicted, or why God has appointed such and such consequent -misery to follow vice; and as we are altogether in the dark, how or in -what manner it shall follow, by what immediate occasions, or by the -instrumentality of what means; so there is no absurdity in supposing -it may follow in a way analogous to that in which many miseries -follow such and such courses of action at present; poverty, sickness, -infamy, untimely death by diseases, death from the hands of civil -justice. There is no absurdity in supposing future punishment may -follow wickedness _of course_, as we speak, or in the way of natural -consequence from God’s original constitution of the world; from the -nature he has given us, and from the condition in which he places us; -or in a like manner, as a person rashly trifling upon a precipice, -in the way of natural consequence, falls down; in the way of natural -consequence of this, breaks his limbs, and in the way of natural -consequence, without help, perishes. - -Some good men may perhaps be offended with hearing it spoken of as a -supposable thing that future punishments of wickedness may be in the -way of natural consequence: as if this were taking the execution of -justice out of the hands of God, and giving it to nature. But they -should remember, that when things come to pass according to the course -of nature, this does not hinder them from being his doing, who is -the God of nature: and that the Scripture ascribes those punishments -to divine justice, which are known to be natural; and which must be -called so, when distinguished from such as are miraculous. After all, -this supposition, or rather this way of speaking, is here made use -of only by way of illustration of the subject before us. For since it -must be admitted, that the future punishment of wickedness is not a -matter of arbitrary appointment, but of reason, equity, and justice; it -comes for aught I see, to the same thing, whether it is supposed to be -inflicted in a way analogous to that in which the temporal punishments -of vice and folly are inflicted, or in any other way. And though there -were a difference, it is allowable, in the present case, to make this -supposition, plainly not an incredible one, that future punishment may -follow wickedness in the way of natural consequence, or according to -some general laws of government already established in the universe. - -III. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we may observe -somewhat, much to the present purpose, in the constitution of nature or -appointments of Providence: the provision which is made, that all the -bad natural consequences of men’s actions should not always actually -follow; or that such bad consequences, as, according to the settled -course of things, would inevitably have followed if not prevented, -should, in certain degrees, be prevented. We are apt presumptuously to -imagine, that the world might have been so constituted, as that there -would not have been any such thing as misery or evil. On the contrary -we find the Author of nature permits it: but then he has provided -reliefs, and in many cases perfect remedies for it, after some pains -and difficulties; reliefs and remedies even for that evil, which is the -fruit of our own misconduct; and which, in the course of nature, would -have continued, and ended in our destruction, but for such remedies. -And this is an instance both of severity and of indulgence, in the -constitution of nature. Thus all the bad consequences, now mentioned, -of a man’s trifling upon a precipice, might be prevented. And though -all were not, yet some of them might, by proper interposition, if not -rejected:[209] by another’s coming to the rash man’s relief, with his -own laying hold on that relief, in such sort as the case required. -Persons may do a great deal themselves towards preventing the bad -consequences of their follies: and more may be done by themselves, -together with the assistance of others their fellow-creatures; which -assistance nature requires and prompts us to. This is the general -constitution of the world. - -Now suppose it had been so constituted, that after such actions were -done, as were foreseen naturally to draw after them misery to the doer, -it should have been no more in human power to have prevented that -naturally consequent misery, in any instance, than it is in all: no -one can say, whether such a more severe constitution of things might -not yet have been really good. But, on the contrary, provision being -made by nature, that we may and do, to so great degree, prevent the bad -natural effects of our follies; this may be called mercy or compassion -in the original constitution of the world: compassion, as distinguished -from goodness in general. And, the whole known constitution and -course of things affording us instances of such compassion, it would -be according to the analogy of nature, to hope, that however ruinous -the natural consequences of vice might be, from the general laws of -God’s government over the universe; yet provision might be made, -possibly might have been originally made, for preventing those ruinous -consequences from inevitably following: at least from following -universally, and in all cases. - -Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this made a question, or -spoken of as in any degree doubtful. The generality of mankind are so -far from having that awful sense of things, which the present state of -vice and misery and darkness seems to make but reasonable, that they -have scarce any apprehension or thought at all about this matter, any -way: and some serious persons may have spoken unadvisedly concerning -it. But let us observe, what we experience to be, and what, from -the very constitution of nature cannot but be, the consequences of -irregular and disorderly behavior: even of such rashness, wilfulness, -neglects, as we scarce call vicious. Now it is natural to apprehend, -that the bad consequences of irregularity will be greater, in -proportion as the irregularity is so. And there is no comparison -between these irregularities, and the greater instances of vice, or -a dissolute profligate disregard to all religion; if there be any -thing at all in religion. For consider what it is for creatures, moral -agents, presumptuously to introduce that confusion and misery into the -kingdom of God, which mankind have in fact introduced: to blaspheme the -Sovereign Lord of all; to contemn his authority; to be injurious, to -the degree they are, to their fellow-creatures, the creatures of God. -Add that the effects of vice in the present world are often extreme -misery, irretrievable ruin, and even death: and upon putting all this -together, it will appear, that as no one can say, in what degree fatal -the unprevented consequences of vice may be, according to the general -rule of divine government; so it is by no means intuitively certain, -how far these consequences could possibly, in the nature of the thing, -be prevented, consistently with the eternal rule of right, or with what -is, in fact, the moral constitution of nature. However, there would be -large ground to hope, that the universal government was not so severely -strict, but that there was room for pardon, or for having those penal -consequences prevented. Yet, - -IV. There seems no probability, that any thing we could do would -alone and of itself prevent them: prevent their following, or being -inflicted. But one would think at least, it were impossible that -the contrary should be thought certain. For we are not acquainted -with the whole of the case. We are not informed of all the reasons, -which render it fit that future punishments should be inflicted: and -therefore cannot know, whether any thing we could do would make such -an alteration, as to render it fit that they should be remitted. We -do not know what the whole natural or appointed consequences of vice -are; nor in what way they would follow, if not prevented: and therefore -can in no sort say, whether we could do any thing which would be -sufficient to prevent them. Our ignorance being thus manifest, let -us recollect the analogy of nature or Providence. For, though this -may be but a slight ground to raise a positive opinion upon, in this -matter; yet it is sufficient to answer a mere arbitrary assertion, -without any kind of evidence, urged by way of objection against a -doctrine, the proof of which is not reason, but revelation. Consider -then: people ruin their fortunes by extravagance; they bring diseases -upon themselves by excess; they incur the penalties of civil laws; -and surely civil government is natural; will sorrow for these follies -past, and behaving well for the future, alone and of itself prevent -the natural consequences of them? On the contrary, men’s natural -abilities of helping themselves are often impaired; or if not, yet they -are forced to be beholden to the assistance of others, upon several -accounts, and in different ways; assistance which they would have had -no occasion for, had it not been for their misconduct; but which, in -the disadvantageous condition they have reduced themselves to, is -absolutely necessary to their recovery, and retrieving their affairs. -Since this is our case, considering ourselves merely as inhabitants of -this world, and as having a temporal interest here, under the natural -government of God, which however has a great deal moral in it; why is -it not supposable that this may be our case also, in our more important -capacity, as under his perfect moral government, and having a more -general and future interest depending?[210] If we have misbehaved in -this higher capacity, and rendered ourselves obnoxious to the future -punishment, which God has annexed to vice: it is plainly credible, that -behaving well for the time to come may be--not useless, God forbid--but -wholly insufficient, alone and of itself, to prevent that punishment: -or to put us in the condition which we should have been in, had we -preserved our innocence. - -Though we ought to reason with all reverence, whenever we reason -concerning the divine conduct: yet it may be added, that it is clearly -contrary to all our notions of government, as well as to what is, -in fact, the general constitution of nature, to suppose, that doing -well for the future should, in all cases, prevent all the judicial -bad consequences of having done evil, or all the punishment annexed -to disobedience. We have manifestly nothing from whence to determine, -in what degree, and in what cases, reformation would prevent this -punishment, even supposing that it would in some. And though the -efficacy of repentance itself alone, to prevent what mankind had -rendered themselves obnoxious to, and recover what they had forfeited, -is now insisted upon, in opposition to Christianity; yet, by the -general prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world, -this notion of repentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt, -appears to be contrary to the general sense of mankind.[211] - -Upon the whole then; had the laws, the general laws of God’s government -been permitted to operate, without any interposition in our behalf, -the future punishment, for aught we know to the contrary, or have any -reason to think, must inevitably have followed, notwithstanding any -thing we could have done to prevent it. - -V. In this darkness, or this light of nature, call it which you -please, revelation comes in; and confirms every doubting fear, which -could enter into the heart of man, concerning the future unprevented -consequence of wickedness. It supposes the world to be in a state -of ruin (a supposition which seems the very ground of the Christian -dispensation; and which, if not provable by reason, yet is in no -wise contrary to it;) and teaches us too, that the rules of divine -government are such, as not to admit of pardon immediately and -directly upon repentance, or by the sole efficacy of it. But teaches -at the same time, what nature might justly have hoped, that the moral -government of the universe was not so rigid, but that there was room -for an interposition, to avert the fatal consequences of vice; which -therefore, by this means, does admit of pardon. Revelation teaches us, -that the unknown laws of God’s more general government, no less than -the particular laws by which we experience he governs us at present, -are compassionate,[212] as well as good in the more general notion of -goodness: and that he hath mercifully provided, that there should be -an interposition to prevent the destruction of human kind; whatever -that destruction unprevented would have been. _God so loved the world, -that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth_, not, to -be sure, in a speculative, but in a practical sense, _that whosoever -believeth in him, should not perish_:[213] gave his Son in the same -way of goodness to the world, as he affords particular persons the -friendly assistance of their fellow-creatures, when, without it, their -temporal ruin would be the certain consequence of their follies: in the -same way of goodness, I say, though in a transcendent and infinitely -higher degree. And the Son of God _loved us, and gave himself for us_, -with a love, which he himself compares to that of human friendship: -though, in this case, all comparisons must fall infinitely short of -the thing intended to be illustrated by them. He interposed in such -a manner as was necessary and effectual to prevent that execution of -justice upon sinners, which God had appointed should otherwise have -been executed upon them; or in such a manner, as to prevent that -punishment from actually following, which, according to the general -laws of divine government, must have followed the sins of the world, -had it not been for such interposition.[214] - -If any thing here said should appear, upon first thought, inconsistent -with divine goodness; a second, I am persuaded, will entirely remove -that appearance. For were we to suppose the constitution of things to -be such, as that the whole creation must have perished, had it not -been for something, which God had appointed should be, in order to -prevent that ruin: even this supposition would not be inconsistent, in -any degree, with the most absolutely perfect goodness. Still it may -be thought, that this whole manner of treating the subject before us -supposes mankind to be naturally in a very strange state. And truly so -it does. But it is not Christianity which has put us into this state. -Whoever will consider the manifold miseries, and the extreme wickedness -of the world; that the best have great wrongnesses within themselves, -which they complain of, and endeavor to amend; but that the generality -grow more profligate and corrupt with age; that even moralists thought -the present state to be a state of punishment: and, that the earth our -habitation has the appearances of being a ruin: whoever, I say, will -consider all these, and some other obvious things, will think he has -little reason to object against the Scripture account, that mankind is -in a state of degradation; against this being _the fact_: how difficult -soever he may think it to account for, or even to form a distinct -conception of the occasions and circumstances of it. But that the -crime of our first parents was the occasion of our being placed in a -more disadvantageous condition, is a thing throughout and particularly -analogous to what we see in the daily course of natural providence; as -the recovery of the world by the interposition of Christ has been shown -to be so in general. - -VI. The particular manner in which Christ interposed in the redemption -of the world, or his office as _Mediator_, in the largest sense, -_between God and man_, is thus represented to us in the Scripture. -_He is the light of the world_;[215] the revealer of the will of God -in the most eminent sense. He is a propitiatory sacrifice;[216] _the -Lamb of God_:[217] and, as he voluntarily offered himself up, he is -styled our High Priest.[218] And, which seems of peculiar weight, he is -described beforehand in the Old Testament, under the same characters -of a priest, and an expiatory victim.[219] And whereas it is objected, -that all this is merely by way of allusion to the sacrifices of -the Mosaic law, the Apostle on the contrary affirms, that the _law -was a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the -things_:[220] and that _the priests that offer gifts according to the -law--serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things, as Moses was -admonished of God, when he was about to make the tabernacle. For see, -saith he, that thou make all things according to the pattern showed to -thee in the mount_;[221] _i.e._ the Levitical priesthood was a shadow -of the priesthood of Christ; in like manner as the tabernacle made by -Moses was according to that showed him in the mount. The priesthood of -Christ, and the tabernacle in the mount, were the originals; of the -former of which the Levitical priesthood was a type; and of the latter -the tabernacle made by Moses was a copy. The doctrine of this epistle -then plainly is, that the legal sacrifices were allusions to the great -and final atonement to be made by the blood of Christ; and not that -this was an allusion to those. Nor can any thing be more express and -determinate than the following passage. _It is not possible that the -blood of bulls and of goats should take away sin. Wherefore when he -cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice and offering_, _i.e._ of -bulls and of goats, _thou wouldest not, but a body hast thou prepared -me. Lo! I come to do thy will, O God. By which will we are sanctified., -through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all._[222] -And to add one passage more of the like kind: _Christ was once offered -to bear the sins of many: and unto them that look for him shall he -appear the second time, without sin_; _i.e._ without bearing sin, -as he did at his first coming, by being an offering for it; without -having our _iniquities_ again _laid upon him_, without being any more -a sin-offering:--_unto them, that look for him shall he appear the -second time, without sin, unto salvation_.[223] Nor do the inspired -writers at all confine themselves to this manner of speaking concerning -the satisfaction of Christ; but declare an efficacy in what he did and -suffered for us, additional to and beyond mere instruction, example, -and government, in great variety of expression: _That Jesus should -die for that nation_, the Jews: _and not for that nation only, but -that also_, plainly by the efficacy of his death, _he should gather -together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad_:[224] -that _he suffered for sins, the just for the unjust_:[225] that _he -gave his life, himself, a ransom_:[226] that _we are bought, bought -with a price_:[227] that _he redeemed us with his blood: redeemed us -from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us_:[228] that he -is our _advocate_, _intercessor_, and _propitiation_:[229] that _he -was made perfect_, or consummate, _through sufferings; and being_ thus -_made perfect, he became the author of salvation_:[230] that _God was -in Christ reconciling the world to himself; by the death of his Son, by -the cross; not imputing their trespasses unto them_:[231] and lastly, -that _through death he destroyed him that had the power of death_.[232] -Christ having thus _humbled himself, and become obedient to death, even -the death of the cross; God also hath highly exalted him, and given -him a name, which is above every name: hath given all things into his -hands: hath committed all judgment unto him; that all men should honor -the Son, even as they honor the Father_.[233] For, _worthy is the Lamb -that was slain, to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, -and honor, and glory, and blessing. And every creature which is in -heaven, and on the earth, heard I, saying, Blessing, and honor, and -glory, and power, be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto -the Lamb forever and ever._[234] - -These passages of Scripture seem to comprehend and express the chief -parts of Christ’s office, as Mediator between God and man, so far, I -mean, as the nature of this his office is revealed; and it is usually -treated of by divines under three heads. - -_First_, He was, by way of eminence, the Prophet: _that Prophet that -should come into the world_,[235] to declare the divine will. He -published anew the law of nature, which men had corrupted; and the very -knowledge of which, to some degree, was lost among them. He taught -mankind, taught us authoritatively, to _live soberly, righteously, and -godly in this present world_, in expectation of the future judgment -of God. He confirmed the truth of this moral system of nature, and -gave us additional evidence of it; the evidence of testimony.[236] He -distinctly revealed the manner, in which God would be worshipped, the -efficacy of repentance, and the rewards and punishments of a future -life. Thus he was a prophet in a sense in which no other ever was. To -which is to be added, that he set us a perfect _example, that we should -follow his steps_. - -_Secondly_, He has a _kingdom which is not of this world_. He founded -a Church, to be to mankind a standing memorial of religion, and -invitation to it; which he promised to be with always even to the -end. He exercises an invisible government over it, himself, and by -his Spirit: over that part of it which is militant here on earth, a -government of discipline, _for the perfecting of the saints, for the -edifying his body: till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of -the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure -of the stature of the fulness of Christ_.[237] Of this Church, all -persons scattered over the world, who live in obedience to his laws, -are members. For these he is _gone to prepare a place, and will come -again to receive them unto himself, that where he is, there they may be -also; and reign with him forever and ever_:[238] and likewise _to take -vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not his Gospel_.[239] - -Against these parts of Christ’s office I find no objections, but what -are fully obviated in the beginning of this chapter. - -_Lastly_, Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, and made -atonement for the sins of the world; which is mentioned last, in regard -to what is objected against it. Sacrifices of expiation were commanded -the Jews, and obtained among most other nations, from tradition, whose -original probably was revelation. And they were continually repeated, -both occasionally, and at the returns of stated times: and made up -great part of the external religion of mankind. _But now once in the -end of the world Christ appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of -himself._[240] This sacrifice was, in the highest degree and with the -most extensive influence, of that efficacy for obtaining pardon of sin, -which the heathens may be supposed to have thought their sacrifices to -have been, and which the Jewish sacrifices really were in some degree, -and with regard to some persons.[241] - -How and in what particular _way_ it had this efficacy, there are not -wanting persons who have endeavored to explain: but I do not find that -the Scripture has explained it. We seem to be very much in the dark -concerning the manner in which the ancients understood atonement to be -made, _i.e._ pardon to be obtained by sacrifices. And if the Scripture -has, as surely it has, left this matter of the satisfaction of Christ -mysterious, left somewhat in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it -must be, if not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain. Nor has any -one reason to complain for want of further information, unless he can -show his claim to it. - -Some have endeavored to explain the efficacy of what Christ has -done and suffered for us, beyond what the Scripture has authorized: -others, probably because they could not explain it, have been for -taking it away, and confining his office as Redeemer of the world, -to his instruction, example, and government of the church. Whereas -the doctrine of the Gospel appears to be, not only that he taught the -efficacy of repentance, but rendered it of the efficacy of which it -is, by what he did and suffered for us: that he obtained for us the -benefit of having our repentance accepted unto eternal life: not only -that he revealed to sinners, that they were in a capacity of salvation, -and how they might obtain it; but moreover that he put them into this -capacity of salvation, by what he did and suffered for them; put us -into a capacity of escaping future punishment, and obtaining future -happiness. And it is our wisdom thankfully to accept the benefit, by -performing the conditions, upon which it is offered, on our part, -without disputing how it was procured on his. For, - -VII. Since we neither know by what means punishment in a future state -would have followed wickedness in this: nor in what manner it would -have been inflicted, had it not been prevented; nor all the reasons -why its infliction would have been needful, nor the particular nature -of that state of happiness, which Christ is gone to prepare for his -disciples: and since we are ignorant how far any thing which we could -do, would, alone and of itself, have been effectual to prevent that -punishment to which we were obnoxious, and recover that happiness which -we had forfeited; it is most evident we are not judges, antecedently -to revelation, whether a mediator was or was not necessary, to obtain -those ends: to prevent that future punishment, and bring mankind to -the final happiness of their nature. For the very same reasons, upon -supposition of the necessity of a mediator, we are no more judges, -antecedently to revelation, of the whole nature of his office, or -of the several parts of which it consists; or of what was fit and -requisite to be assigned him, in order to accomplish the ends of divine -Providence in the appointment. Hence it follows, that to object against -the expediency or usefulness of particular things, revealed to have -been done or suffered by him, because we do not see how they were -conducive to those ends, is highly absurd. Yet nothing is more common -to be met with, than this absurdity. If it be acknowledged beforehand, -that we are not judges in the case, it is evident that no objection -can, with any shadow of reason, be urged against any particular part of -Christ’s mediatorial office revealed in Scripture, till it can be shown -positively not to be requisite or conducive to the ends proposed to be -accomplished; or that it is in itself unreasonable. - -There is one objection made against the satisfaction of Christ, which -looks to be of this positive kind: that the doctrine of his being -appointed to suffer for the sins of the world, represents God as being -indifferent whether he punished the innocent or the guilty. Now from -the foregoing observations we may see the extreme slightness of all -such objections; and (though it is most certain all who make them _do -not see_ the consequence) that they conclude altogether as much against -God’s whole original constitution of nature, and the whole daily -course of divine Providence in the government of the world, (_i.e._ -against the whole scheme of Theism and the whole notion of religion,) -as against Christianity. For the world is a constitution or system, -whose parts have a mutual reference to each other: and there is a -scheme of things gradually carrying on, called the course of nature, -to the carrying on of which God has appointed us, in various ways, -to contribute. And when, in the daily course of natural providence, -it is appointed that innocent people should suffer for the faults -of the guilty, this is liable to the very same objection, as the -instance we are now considering. The infinitely greater importance of -that appointment of Christianity, which is objected against, does not -hinder but it may be, as it plainly is, an appointment of the very same -_kind_, with what the world affords us daily examples of. Nay, if there -were any force at all in the objection, it would be stronger, in one -respect, against natural providence, than against Christianity: because -under the former we are in many cases commanded, and even necessitated -whether we will or no, to suffer for the faults of others; whereas the -sufferings of Christ were voluntary. - -The world’s being under the righteous government of God does indeed -imply, that finally, and upon the whole, every one shall receive -according to his personal deserts: and the general doctrine of the -whole Scripture is, that this shall be the completion of the divine -government. But during the progress, and, for aught we know, even in -order to the completion of this moral scheme, vicarious punishments may -be fit, and absolutely necessary. Men by their follies run themselves -into extreme distress; into difficulties which would be absolutely -fatal to them, were it not for the interposition and assistance of -others. God commands by the law of nature, that we afford them this -assistance, in many cases where we cannot do it without very great -pains, and labor, and sufferings to ourselves. We see in what variety -of ways one person’s sufferings contribute to the relief of another: -and how, or by what particular means, this comes to pass, or follows, -from the constitution and laws of nature, which came under our notice: -and, being familiarized to it, men are not shocked with it. So that the -reason of their insisting upon objections of the foregoing kind against -the satisfaction of Christ is, either that they do not consider God’s -settled and uniform appointments as his appointments at all; or else -they forget that vicarious punishment is a providential appointment -of every day’s experience. And then, from their being unacquainted -with the more general laws of nature or divine government over the -world, and not seeing how the sufferings of Christ could contribute -to the redemption of it, unless by arbitrary and tyrannical will, -they conclude his sufferings could not contribute to it any other -way. And yet, what has been often alleged in justification of this -doctrine, even from the apparent natural tendency of this method of -our redemption; its tendency to vindicate the authority of God’s laws, -and deter his creatures from sin; this has never yet been answered, -and is I think plainly unanswerable: though I am far from thinking it -an account of the whole of the case. But, without taking this into -consideration, it abundantly appears, from the observations above made, -that this objection is not an objection against Christianity, but -against the whole general constitution of nature. And if it were to be -considered as an objection against Christianity, or considering it as -it is, an objection against the constitution of nature; it amounts to -no more in conclusion than this, that a divine appointment cannot be -necessary or expedient, because the objector does not discern it to be -so: though he must own that the nature of the case is such, as renders -him incapable of judging, whether it be so or not; or of seeing it to -be necessary, though it were so! - -It is indeed a matter of great patience to reasonable men, to find -people arguing in this manner: objecting against the credibility of -such particular things revealed in Scripture, that they do not see -the necessity or expediency of them. For though it is highly right, -and the most pious exercise of our understanding, to inquire with due -reverence into the ends and reasons of God’s dispensations: yet when -those reasons are concealed, to argue from our ignorance, that such -dispensations cannot be from God, is infinitely absurd. The presumption -of this kind of objections seems almost lost in the folly of them. And -the folly of them is yet greater, when they are urged, as usually they -are, against things in Christianity analogous or like to those natural -dispensations of Providence, which are matter of experience. Let reason -be kept to: and if any part of the Scripture account of the redemption -of the world by Christ can be shown to be really contrary to it, let -the Scripture, in the name of God, be given up. But let not such poor -creatures as we are, go on objecting against an infinite scheme, that -we do not see the necessity or usefulness of all its parts, and call -this reasoning; and, which still further heightens the absurdity in the -present case, parts which we are not actively concerned in. For it may -be worth mentioning, - -_Lastly_, That not only the reason of the thing, but the whole -analogy of nature, should teach us, not to expect to have the like -information concerning the divine conduct, as concerning our own duty. -God instructs us by experience, (for it is not reason, but experience -which instructs us,) what good or bad consequences will follow from -our acting in such and such manners: and by this he directs us how we -are to behave ourselves. But, though we are sufficiently instructed -for the common purposes of life: yet it is but an almost infinitely -small part of natural providence, which we are at all let into. -The case is the same with regard to revelation. The doctrine of a -mediator between God and man, against which it is objected, that the -expediency of some things in it is not understood, relates only to -what was done on God’s part in the appointment, and on the Mediator’s -in the execution of it. For what is _required of us_, in consequence -of this gracious dispensation, is another subject, in which none can -complain for want of information. The constitution of the world, and -God’s natural government over it, is all mystery, as much as the -Christian dispensation. Yet under the first he has given men all -things pertaining to life; and under the other all things pertaining -unto godliness. And it may be added, that there is nothing hard to be -accounted for in any of the common precepts of Christianity: though -if there were, surely a divine command is abundantly sufficient to -lay us under the strongest obligations to obedience. But the fact is, -that the reasons of all the Christian precepts are evident. Positive -institutions are manifestly necessary to keep up and propagate religion -among mankind. And our duty to Christ, the internal and external -worship of him; this part of the religion of the Gospel manifestly -arises out of what he has done and suffered, his authority and -dominion, and the relation which he is revealed to stand in to us.[242] - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -THE WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION; AND THE SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN -THE PROOF OF IT. - - -It has been thought by some persons, that if the evidence of revelation -appears doubtful, this itself turns into a positive argument against -it: because it cannot be supposed, that, if it were true, it would -be left to subsist upon doubtful evidence. And the objection against -revelation from its not being universal is often insisted upon as of -great weight. - -The weakness of these opinions may be shown, by observing the -suppositions on which they are founded: which are really such as these; -that it cannot be thought God would have bestowed any favor at all -upon us, unless in the degree which we think he might, and which, we -imagine, would be most to our particular advantage; and also that it -cannot be thought he would bestow a favor upon any, unless he bestowed -the same upon all; suppositions, which we find contradicted, not by -a few instances in God’s natural government of the world, but by the -general analogy of nature together. - -Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as doubtful, and of this -supposed doubtfulness as a positive argument against it, should be -put upon considering, what that evidence is, which they act upon with -regard to their temporal interests. It is not only extremely difficult, -but in many cases absolutely impossible, to balance pleasure and pain, -satisfaction and uneasiness, so as to be able to say on which side -is the overplus. There are the like difficulties and impossibilities -in making the due allowances for a change of temper and taste, for -satiety, disgusts, ill health: any of which render men incapable of -enjoying, after they have obtained what they most eagerly desired. -Numberless too are the accidents, besides that one of untimely death, -which may even probably disappoint the best-concerted schemes: and -strong objections are often seen to lie against them, not to be removed -or answered, but which seem overbalanced by reasons on the other side; -so as that the certain difficulties and dangers of the pursuit are, by -every one; thought justly disregarded, upon account of the appearing -greater advantages in case of success, though there be but little -probability of it. Lastly, every one observes our liableness, if we be -not upon our guard, to be deceived by the falsehood of men, and the -false appearances of things: and this danger must be greatly increased, -if there be a strong bias within, suppose from indulged passion, to -favor the deceit. Hence arises that great uncertainty and doubtfulness -of proof, _wherein_ our temporal interest really consists; what are the -most probable _means_ of attaining it; and whether those means will -eventually be _successful_. And numberless instances there are, in the -daily course of life, in which all men think it reasonable to engage in -pursuits, though the probability is greatly against succeeding; and to -make such provision for themselves, as it is supposable they may have -occasion for, though the plain acknowledged probability is, that they -never shall. - -Those who think the objection against revelation, from its light not -being universal, to be of weight,[243] should observe, that the Author -of nature, in numberless instances, bestows that upon some, which he -does not upon others, who seem equally to stand in need of it. Indeed -he appears to bestow all his gifts with the most promiscuous variety -among creatures of the same species: health and strength, capacities -of prudence and of knowledge, means of improvement, riches, and all -external advantages. As there are not any two men found, of exactly -like shape and features; so it is probable there are not any two, of -an exactly like constitution, temper, and situation, with regard to -the goods and evils of life. Yet, notwithstanding these uncertainties -and varieties, God does exercise a natural government over the world; -and there is such a thing as a prudent and imprudent institution of -life, with regard to our health and our affairs, under that his natural -government. - -As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation have been universal; and -as they have been afforded to a greater or less part of the world, -at different times; so likewise at different times, both revelations -have had different degrees of evidence. The Jews who lived during the -succession of prophets, that is, from Moses till after the Captivity, -had higher evidence of the truth of their religion, than those had, -who lived in the interval between the last-mentioned period, and the -coming of Christ. And the first Christians had higher evidence of the -miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, than what we have now. -They had also a strong presumptive proof of the truth of it, perhaps of -much greater force, in way of argument, than many think, of which we -have very little remaining; I mean the presumptive proof of its truth, -from the influence which it had upon the lives of the generality of its -professors. And we, or future ages, may possibly have a proof of it, -which they could not have, from the conformity between the prophetic -history, and the state of the world[244] and of Christianity. - -And further: if we were to suppose the evidence, which some have of -religion, to amount to little more than seeing that it _may_ be true; -but that they remain in great doubts and uncertainties about both its -evidence and its nature, and great perplexities concerning the rule -of life: others to have a _full conviction_ of the truth of religion, -with a distinct knowledge of their duty; and others severally to have -all the intermediate degrees of religious light and evidence, which -lie between these two--if we put the case, that for the present, it -was intended that revelation should be no more than a small light, -in the midst of a world greatly overspread, notwithstanding it, with -ignorance and darkness: that certain glimmerings of this light should -extend, and be directed, to remote distances, in such a manner as -that those who really partook of it should not discern whence it -originally came: that some in a nearer situation to it should have -its light obscured, and, in different ways and degrees, intercepted: -and that others should be placed within its clearer influence, and -be much more enlivened, cheered, and directed by it; but yet that -even to these it should be no more than a _light shining in a dark -place_: all this would be perfectly uniform, and of a piece with the -conduct of Providence, in the distribution of its other blessings. If -the fact of the case really were, that some have received no light -at all from the Scripture; as many ages and countries in the heathen -world: that others, though they have, by means of it, had essential or -natural religion enforced upon their consciences, yet have never had -the genuine Scripture revelation, with its real evidence, proposed to -their consideration; and the ancient Persians and modern Mahometans -may possibly be instances of people in a situation somewhat like to -this; that others, though they have had the Scripture laid before them -as of divine revelation, yet have had it with the system and evidence -of Christianity so interpolated, the system so corrupted, the evidence -so blended with false miracles, as to leave the mind in the utmost -doubtfulness and uncertainty about the whole; which may be the state -of some thoughtful men, in most of those nations who call themselves -Christian: and lastly, that others have had Christianity offered to -them in its genuine simplicity, and with its proper evidence, as -persons in countries and churches of civil and of Christian liberty; -but that even these persons are left in great ignorance in many -respects, and have by no means light afforded them enough to satisfy -their curiosity, but only to regulate their life, to teach them their -duty, and encourage them in the careful discharge of it. I say, if we -were to suppose this somewhat of a general true account of the degrees -of moral and religious light and evidence, which were intended to be -afforded mankind, and of what has actually been and is their situation, -in their moral and religious capacity; there would be nothing in all -this ignorance, doubtfulness, and uncertainty, in all these varieties, -and supposed disadvantages of some in comparison of others, respecting -religion, but may be paralleled by manifest analogies in the natural -dispensations of Providence at present, considering ourselves merely in -our temporal capacity. - -Nor is there any thing shocking in all this, or which would seem to -bear hard upon the moral administration in nature, if we would really -keep in mind, that every one shall be dealt equitably with: instead of -forgetting this, or explaining it away, after it is acknowledged in -words. All shadow of injustice, and indeed all harsh appearances, in -this various economy of Providence, would be lost, if we would keep -in mind, that every merciful allowance shall be made, and no more be -required of any one, than what might have been equitably expected of -him, from the circumstances in which he was placed; and not what might -have been expected, had he been placed in other circumstances: _i.e._ -in Scripture language, that every man shall be _accepted according to -what he had, not according to what he had not_.[245] This however does -not by any means imply, that all persons’ condition here is equally -advantageous with respect to futurity. And Providence’s designing to -place some in greater darkness with respect to religious knowledge, -is no more a reason why they should not endeavor to get out of that -darkness, and others to bring them out of it, than why ignorant and -slow people in matters of other knowledge should not endeavor to learn, -or should not be instructed. - -It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same wise and good -principle, whatever it was, which disposed the Author of nature to -make different kinds and orders of creatures, disposed him also to -place creatures of like kinds in different situations. And that the -same principle which disposed him to make creatures of different -moral capacities, disposed him also to place creatures of like moral -capacities in different religious situations; and even the same -creatures, in different periods of their being. The account or reason -of this is also most probably the account why the constitution of -things is such, as that creatures of moral natures or capacities, for a -considerable part of that duration in which they are living agents, are -not at all subjects of morality and religion; but grow up to be so, and -grow up to be so more and more, gradually from childhood to mature age. - -What, in particular, is the account or reason of these things, we must -be greatly in the dark, were it only that we know so very little even -of our own case. Our present state may possibly be the consequence -of something past, of which we are wholly ignorant: as it has a -reference to somewhat to come, of which we know scarce any more than -is necessary for practice. A system or constitution, in its notion, -implies variety; and so complicated a one as this world, very great -variety. So that were revelation universal, yet, from men’s different -capacities of understanding, from the different lengths of their lives, -their different educations and other external circumstances, and from -their difference of temper and bodily constitution, their religious -situations would be widely different, and the disadvantage of some in -comparison of others, perhaps, altogether as much as at present. The -true account, whatever it be, why mankind, or such a part of mankind, -are placed in this condition of ignorance, must be supposed also the -true account of our further ignorance, in not knowing the reasons why, -or whence it is, that they are placed in this condition. - -The following practical reflections may deserve the serious -consideration of those persons, who think the circumstances of mankind -or their own, in the forementioned respects, a ground of complaint. - -_First_, The evidence of religion not appearing obvious, may constitute -one particular part of some men’s trial in the religious sense: as -it gives scope, for a virtuous exercise, or vicious neglect of their -understanding, in examining or not examining into that evidence. There -seems no possible reason to be given, why we may not be in a state -of moral probation, with regard to the exercise of our understanding -upon the subject of religion, as we are with regard to our behavior -in common affairs. The former is as much a thing within our power and -choice as the latter. And I suppose it is to be laid down for certain, -that the same character, the same inward principle, which, after a man -is convinced of the truth of religion, renders him obedient to the -precepts of it, would, were he not thus convinced, set him about an -examination of it, upon its system and evidence being offered to his -thoughts: and that in the latter state his examination would be with an -impartiality, seriousness, and solicitude, proportionable to what his -obedience is in the former. And as inattention, negligence, want of all -serious concern, about a matter of such a nature and such importance, -when offered to men’s consideration, is, before a distinct conviction -of its truth, as real depravity and dissoluteness, as neglect of -religious practice after such conviction: so active solicitude about -it, and fair impartial consideration of its evidence before such -conviction, is as really an exercise of a morally right temper; as -is religious practice after. Thus, that religion is not intuitively -true, but a matter of deduction and inference; that a conviction of its -truth is not forced upon every one, but left to be, by some, collected -with heedful attention to premises; this as much constitutes religious -probation, as much affords sphere, scope, opportunity, for right -and wrong behavior, as any thing whatever does. And their manner of -treating this subject, when laid before them, shows what is in their -heart, and is an exertion of it. - -_Secondly_, It appears to be a thing as evident, though it is not so -much attended to, that if, upon consideration of religion, the evidence -of it should seem to any persons doubtful, in the highest supposable -degree; even this doubtful evidence will, however, put them into a -_general state of probation_ in the moral and religious sense. For, -suppose a man to be really in doubt, whether such a person had not done -him the greatest favor; or, whether his whole temporal interest did not -depend upon that person; no one, who had any sense of gratitude and of -prudence, could possibly consider himself in the same situation, with -regard to such person, as if he had no such doubt. In truth, it is -as just to say, that certainty and doubt are the same, as to say the -situations now mentioned would leave a man as entirely at liberty in -point of gratitude or prudence, as he would be, were he certain he had -received no favor from such person; or that he no way depended upon -him. Thus, though the evidence of religion which is afforded to some -men should be little more than they are given to see, the system of -Christianity, or religion in general, to be supposable and credible; -this ought in all reason to beget a serious practical apprehension, -that it _may_ be true. And even this will afford matter of exercise -for religious suspense and deliberation, for moral resolution and -self-government; because the apprehension that religion may be true -does as really lay men under obligations, as a full conviction that -it is true. It gives occasion and motives to consider further the -important subject; to preserve attentively upon their minds a general -implicit sense that they may be under divine moral government, an -awful solicitude about religion, whether natural or revealed. Such -apprehension ought to turn men’s eyes to every degree of new light -which may be had, from whatever side it comes; and induce them to -refrain, in the mean time, from all immoralities, and live in the -conscientious practice of every common virtue. Especially are they -bound to keep at the greatest distance from all dissolute profaneness, -for this the very nature of the case forbids; and to treat with highest -reverence a matter, upon which their own whole interest and being, -and the fate of nature, depend. This behavior, and an active endeavor -to maintain within themselves this temper, is the business, the duty, -and the wisdom of those persons, who complain of the doubtfulness of -religion: is what they are under the most proper obligations to. And -such behavior is an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve in -them, that character, which the practice of all the several duties of -religion, from a full conviction of its truth, is an exertion of, and -has a tendency to improve in others: others, I say, to whom God has -afforded such conviction. Nay, considering the infinite importance -of religion, revealed as well as natural, I think it may be said in -general, that whoever will weigh the matter thoroughly may see, there -is not near so much difference, as is commonly imagined, between what -ought in reason to be the rule of life, to those persons who are -fully convinced of its truth, and to those who have only a serious -doubting apprehension, that it may be true. Their hopes, and fears, and -obligations, will be in various degrees: but, as the subject-matter -of their hopes and fears is the same, so the subject-matter of their -obligations, what they are bound to do and to refrain from, is not so -very unlike. - -It is to be observed further, that, from a character of understanding, -or a situation of influence in the world, some persons have it in their -power to do infinitely more harm or good, by setting an example of -profaneness and avowed disregard to all religion, or, on the contrary, -of a serious, though perhaps doubting, apprehension of its truth, and -of a reverent regard to it under this doubtfulness; than they can do, -by acting well or ill in all the _common intercourses_ among mankind. -Consequently they are most highly accountable for a behavior, which, -they may easily foresee, is of such importance, and in which there -is most plainly a right and a wrong; even admitting the evidence of -religion to be as doubtful as is pretended. - -The ground of these observations, and that which renders them just -and true, is, that doubting necessarily implies _some_ degree of -evidence for that, of which we doubt. For no person would be in doubt -concerning the truth of a number of facts so and so circumstanced, -which should accidentally come into his thoughts, and of which he had -no evidence at all. And though in the case of an even chance, and -where consequently we were in doubt, we should in common language say, -that we had no evidence at all for either side; yet that situation -of things, which renders it an even chance and no more, that such an -event will happen, renders this case equivalent to all others, where -there is such evidence on both sides of a question,[246] as leaves -the mind in doubt concerning the truth. Indeed in all these cases, -there is no more evidence on one side than on the other; but there is -(what is equivalent to) much more for either, than for the truth of a -number of facts, which come into one’s thoughts at random. Thus, in -all these cases, doubt as much presupposes evidence, in lower degrees, -as belief presupposes higher, and certainty higher still. Any one, -who will a little attend to the nature of evidence, will easily carry -this observation on, and see, that between no evidence at all, and -that degree of it which affords ground of doubt, there are as many -intermediate degrees, as there are, between that degree which is the -ground of doubt, and demonstration. And though we have not faculties -to distinguish these degrees of evidence with any sort of exactness; -yet, in proportion as they are discerned, they ought to influence -our practice. It is as real an imperfection in the moral character, -not to be influenced in practice by a lower degree of evidence when -discerned, as it is in the understanding, not to discern it. And as, -in all subjects which men consider, they discern the lower as well -as higher degrees of evidence, proportionably to their capacity of -understanding; so, in practical subjects, they are influenced in -practice, by the lower as well as higher degrees of it, proportionably -to their fairness and honesty. And as, in proportion to defects in the -understanding, men are unapt to see lower degrees of evidence, are in -danger of overlooking evidence when it is not glaring, and are easily -imposed upon in such cases; so, in proportion to the corruption of -the heart, they seem capable of satisfying themselves with having no -regard in practice to evidence acknowledged to be real, if it be not -overbearing. From these things it must follow, that doubting concerning -religion implies such a degree of evidence for it, as, joined with -the consideration of its importance, unquestionably lays men under the -obligations before mentioned, to have a dutiful regard to it in all -their behavior. - -_Thirdly_, The difficulties in which the evidence of religion is -involved, which some complain of, is no more a just ground of -complaint, than the external circumstances of temptation, which others -are placed in; or than difficulties in the practice of it, after a full -conviction of its truth. Temptations render our state a more improving -state of discipline,[247] than it would be otherwise: as they give -occasion for a more attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, which -confirms and strengthens it more, than an easier or less attentive -exercise of it could. Speculative difficulties are, in this respect, of -the very same nature with these external temptations. For the evidence -of religion not appearing obvious, is to some persons a temptation to -reject it, without any consideration at all; and therefore requires -such an attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, seriously to -consider that evidence, as there would be no occasion for, but for such -temptation. And the supposed doubtfulness of its evidence, after it has -been in some sort considered, affords opportunity to an unfair mind -of explaining away, and deceitfully hiding from itself, that evidence -which it might see; and also for men’s encouraging themselves in vice, -from hopes of impunity, though they do clearly see thus much at least, -that these hopes are uncertain. In like manner the common temptation -to many instances of folly, which end in temporal infamy and ruin, -is the ground for hope of not being detected, and of escaping with -impunity; _i.e._ the doubtfulness of the proof beforehand, that such -foolish behavior will thus end in infamy and ruin. On the contrary, -supposed doubtfulness in the evidence of religion calls for a more -careful and attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, in fairly -yielding themselves up to the proper influence of any real evidence, -though doubtful; and in practising conscientiously all virtue, though -under some uncertainty, whether the government in the universe may -not possibly be such, as that vice may escape with impunity. And in -general, temptation, meaning by this word the lesser allurements to -wrong and difficulties in the discharge of our duty, as well as the -greater ones; temptation, I say, as such and of every kind and degree, -as it calls forth some virtuous efforts, additional to what would -otherwise have been wanting, cannot but be an additional discipline -and improvement of virtue, as well as probation of it in the other -senses of that word.[248] So that the very same account is to be given, -why the evidence of religion should be left in such a manner, as to -require, in some, an attentive, solicitous, perhaps painful exercise of -their understanding about it; as why others should be placed in such -circumstances, as that the practice of its common duties, after a full -conviction of the truth of it, should require attention, solicitude, -and pains: or, why appearing doubtfulness should be permitted to -afford matter of temptation to some; as why external difficulties -and allurements should be permitted to afford matter of temptation -to others. The same account also is to be given, why some should be -exercised with temptations of both these kinds; as why others should be -exercised with the latter in such very high degrees, as some have been, -particularly as the primitive Christians were. - -Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing, that the speculative -difficulties, in which the evidence of religion is involved, may make -even the principal part of some persons’ trial. For as the chief -temptations of the generality of the world are the ordinary motives -to injustice, or unrestrained pleasure, or to live in the neglect of -religion, from that frame of mind which renders many persons almost -without feeling as to any thing distant, or which is not the object of -their senses; so there are other persons without this shallowness of -temper, persons of a deeper sense as to what is invisible and future; -who not only see, but have a general practical feeling, that what is to -come will be present, and that things are not less real for their not -being the objects of sense; and who, from their natural constitution of -body and of temper, and from their external condition, may have small -temptations to behave ill, small difficulty in behaving well, in the -common course of life. Now when these latter persons have a distinct -full conviction of me truth of religion, without any possible doubts -or difficulties, the practice of it is to them unavoidable, unless -they do a constant violence to their own minds; and religion is scarce -any more a discipline to them, than it is to creatures in a state -of perfection. Yet these persons may possibly stand in need of moral -discipline and exercise, in a higher degree than they would have by -such an easy practice of religion. Or it may be requisite, for reasons -unknown to us, that they should give some further manifestation[249] -what is their moral character, to the creation of God, than such -a practice of it would be. Thus in the great variety of religious -situations in which men are placed, what constitutes, what chiefly and -peculiarly constitutes, the probation, in all senses, of some persons, -may be the difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved: -and their principal and distinguished trial may be, how they will -behave under and with respect to these difficulties. Circumstances in -men’s situation in their temporal capacity, analogous in good measure -to this respecting religion, are to be observed. We find some persons -are placed in such a situation in the world, as that their chief -difficulty with regard to conduct, is not the doing what is prudent -when it is known; for this, in numberless cases, is as easy as the -contrary: but to some the principal exercise is, recollection and being -upon their guard against deceits, the deceits suppose of those about -them; against false appearances of reason and prudence. To persons in -some situations, the principal exercise with respect to conduct is, -attention in order to inform themselves what is proper, what is really -the reasonable and prudent part to act. - -[_Fourthly._] As I have hitherto gone upon supposition, that men’s -dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion is not owing to their -neglects or prejudices; it must be added, on the other hand, in all -common reason, and as what the truth of the case plainly requires -should be added, that such dissatisfaction possibly may be owing to -those, possibly may be men’s own fault. For, - -If there are any persons, who never set themselves heartily and in -earnest to be informed in religion: if there are any, who secretly -wish it may not prove true; and are less attentive to evidence than to -difficulties, and more to objections than to what is said in answer to -them: these persons will scarce be thought in a likely way of seeing -the evidence of religion, though it were most certainly true, and -capable of being ever so fully proved. If any accustom themselves to -consider this subject in the way of mirth and sport: if they attend -to forms and representations, and inadequate manners of expression, -instead of the real things intended by them: (for signs often can be -no more than inadequately expressive of the things signified:) or if -they substitute human errors in the room of divine truth; why may -not all, or any of these things, hinder some men from seeing that -evidence, which really is seen by others; as a like turn of mind, with -respect to matters of common speculation and practice, does, we find -by experience, hinder them from attaining that knowledge and right -understanding, in matters of common speculation and practice, which -more fair and attentive minds attain to? And the effect will be the -same, whether their neglect of seriously considering the evidence of -religion, and their indirect behavior with regard to it, proceed from -mere carelessness, or from the grosser vices; or whether it be owing -to this, that forms and figurative manners of expression, as well as -errors, administer occasions of ridicule, when the things intended, and -the truth itself, would not. Men may indulge a ludicrous turn so far -as to lose all sense of conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and -even, as it seems, to impair their faculty of reason. And in general, -levity, carelessness, passion, and prejudice _do_ hinder us from being -rightly informed, with respect to common things: and they _may_, in -like manner, and perhaps, in some further providential manner, with -respect to moral and religious subjects: may hinder evidence from being -laid before us, and from being seen when it is. The Scripture[250] -does declare, that every one _shall not understand_. And it makes no -difference, by what providential conduct this comes to pass: whether -the evidence of Christianity was, originally and with design, put and -left so, as that those who are desirous of evading moral obligations -should not see it; and that honest-minded persons should: or, whether -it comes to pass by any other means. - -Further: [_Fifthly._] The general proof of natural religion and of -Christianity does, I think, lie level to common men: even those, the -greatest part of whose time, from childhood to old age, is taken -up with providing for themselves and their families the common -conveniences, perhaps necessaries, of life: those I mean, of this -rank, who ever think at all of asking after proof, or attending to it. -Common men, were they as much in earnest about religion, as about their -temporal affairs, are capable of being convinced upon real evidence, -that there is a God who governs the world: and they feel themselves to -be of a moral nature, and accountable creatures. And as Christianity -entirely falls in with this their natural sense of things, so they are -capable, not only of being persuaded, but of being made to see, that -there is evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, and many -appearing completions of prophecy. - -This proof, though real and conclusive, is liable to objections, -and may be run up into difficulties; which however persons who are -capable not only of talking of, but of really seeing, are capable -also of seeing through: _i.e._ not of clearing up and answering them, -so as to satisfy their curiosity, for of such knowledge we are not -capable with respect to any one thing in nature; but capable of seeing -that the proof is not lost in these difficulties, or destroyed by -these objections. But then a thorough examination into religion with -regard to these objections, which cannot be the business of every -man, is a matter of pretty large compass, and, from the nature of it, -requires some knowledge, as well as time and attention; to see, how -the evidence comes out, upon balancing one thing with another, and -what, upon the whole, is the amount of it. If persons who pick up -these objections from others, and take for granted they are of weight, -upon the word of those from whom they received them, or, by often -retailing of them, come to see or fancy they see them to be of weight; -will not prepare themselves for such an examination, with a competent -degree of knowledge; or will not give that time and attention to the -subject, which, from the nature of it, is necessary for attaining such -information: in this case, they must remain in doubtfulness, ignorance, -or error: in the same way as they must, with regard to common -sciences, and matters of common life, if they neglect the necessary -means of being informed in them. - -Perhaps it will still be objected, that if a prince or common master -were to send directions to a servant, he would take care, that they -should always bear the certain marks, who they came from, and that -their sense should be always plain: so as that there should be no -possible doubt if he could help it, concerning the authority or meaning -of them. The proper answer to all this kind of objections is, that, -wherever the fallacy lies, it is even certain we cannot argue thus with -respect to Him who is the Governor of the world: and that he does not -afford us such information, with respect to our temporal affairs and -interests, experience abundantly shows. - -However, there is a full answer to this objection, from the very nature -of religion. The reason why a prince would give his directions in this -plain manner is, that he absolutely desires an external action done, -without concerning himself with the motive or principle upon which it -is done: _i.e._ he regards only the external event, or the thing’s -being done; and not at all, properly speaking, the doing of it, or the -action. Whereas the whole of morality and religion consisting merely in -action itself, there is no sort of parallel between the cases. But if -the prince be supposed to regard only the action; _i.e._ only to desire -to exercise, or in any sense prove, the understanding or loyalty of a -servant; he would not always give his orders in such a plain manner. -It may be proper to add, that the will of God, respecting morality and -religion, may be considered either as absolute, or as only conditional. -If it be absolute, it can only be thus, that we should act virtuously -in such given circumstances; not that we should be brought to act -so, by this changing of our circumstances. And if God’s will be thus -absolute, then it is in our power, in the highest and strictest sense, -to do or to contradict his will; which is a most weighty consideration. -Or his will may be considered only as conditional, that if we act -so and so, we shall be rewarded: if otherwise, punished: of which -conditional will of the Author of nature, the whole constitution of it -affords most certain instances. - -Upon the whole: that we are in a state of religion necessarily -implies, that we are in a state of probation: and the credibility -of our being at all in such a state being admitted, there seems no -peculiar difficulty in supposing our probation to be, just as it -is, in those respects which are above objected against. There seems -no pretence, from _the reason of the thing_, to say, that the trial -cannot equitably be any thing, but whether persons will act suitably -to certain information, or such as admits no room for doubt; so as -that there can be no danger of miscarriage, but either from their not -attending to what they certainly know, or from overbearing passion -hurrying them on to act contrary to it. For, since ignorance and doubt, -afford scope for probation in all senses, as really as intuitive -conviction or certainty; and since the two former are to be put to -the same account as difficulties in practice; men’s moral probation -may also be, whether they will take due care to inform themselves by -impartial consideration, and afterwards whether they will act as the -case requires, upon the evidence which they have, however doubtful. -And this, we find by _experience_, is frequently our probation,[251] -in our temporal capacity. For, the information which we want with -regard to our worldly interests is by no means always given us of -course, without any care of our own. And we are greatly liable to -self-deceit from inward secret prejudices, and also to the deceits of -others. So that to be able to judge what is the prudent part, often -requires much and difficult consideration. Then after we have judged -the very best we can, the evidence upon which we must act, if we will -live and act at all, is perpetually doubtful to a very high degree. -And the constitution and course of the world in fact is such, as that -want of impartial consideration what we have to do, and venturing -upon extravagant courses because it is doubtful what will be the -consequence, are often naturally, _i.e._ providentially, altogether -as fatal, as misconduct occasioned by heedless inattention to what we -certainly know, or disregarding it from overbearing passion. - -Several of the observations here made may well seem strange, perhaps -unintelligible, to many good men. But if the persons for whose sake -they are made think so, (persons who object as above, and throw off all -regard to religion under pretence of want of evidence;) I desire them -to consider again, whether their thinking so be owing to any thing -unintelligible in these observations, or to their own not having such -a sense of religion and serious solicitude about it, as even their -state of scepticism does in all reason require? It ought to be forced -upon the reflection of these persons, that our nature and condition -necessarily require us, in the daily course of life, to act upon -evidence much lower than what is commonly called probable: to guard, -not only against what we fully believe will, but also against what we -think it supposable may, happen; and to engage in pursuits when the -probability is greatly against success, if it even be credible, that -possibly we may succeed in them. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - -THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY. - - -The presumptions against revelation, and objections against the general -scheme of Christianity, and particular things relating to it, being -removed, there remains to be considered, what positive evidence we -have for the truth of it; chiefly in order to see, what the analogy -of nature suggests with regard to that evidence, and the objections -against it: or to see what is, and is allowed to be, the plain -natural rule of judgment and of action, in our temporal concerns, in -cases where we have the same kind of evidence, and the same kind of -objections against it, that we have in the case before us. - -In the evidence of Christianity there seem to be several things of -great weight, not reducible to the head, either of miracles, or the -completion of prophecy, in the common acceptation of the words. But -these two are its direct and fundamental proofs: and those other -things, however considerable they are, yet ought never to be urged -apart from its direct proofs, but always to be joined with them. Thus -the evidence of Christianity will be a long series of things, reaching, -as it seems, from the beginning of the world to the present time, of -great variety and compass, taking in both the direct and also the -collateral, proofs, and making up, all of them together, one argument. -The conviction arising from this kind of proof may be compared to -what they call _the effect_, in architecture or other works of art; -a result from a great number of things, so and so disposed, and taken -into one view. I shall therefore, _first_, make some observations -relating to miracles, and the appearing completions of prophecy; and -consider what analogy suggests, in answer to the objections brought -against this evidence. And, _secondly_, I shall endeavor to give some -account of the general argument now mentioned, consisting both of the -direct and collateral evidence, considered as making up one argument: -this being the kind of proof, upon which we determine most questions -of difficulty, concerning common facts, alleged to have happened, or -seeming likely to happen; especially questions relating to conduct. - -_First_, I shall make some observations upon the direct proof of -Christianity from miracles and prophecy, and upon the objections -alleged against it.[252] - -I. Now the following observations relating to the _historical evidence -of miracles_ wrought in attestation of Christianity appear to be of -great weight. - -1. The Old Testament affords us the same historical evidence of the -miracles of Moses and of the prophets, as of the common civil history -of Moses and the kings of Israel; or, as of the affairs of the Jewish -nation. And the _Gospels_ and _the Acts_ afford us the same historical -evidence of the miracles of Christ and the apostles, as of the common -matters related in them. This indeed could not have been affirmed by -any reasonable man, if the authors of these books, like many other -historians, had appeared to aim at an entertaining manner of writing, -and hence interspersed miracles in their works, at proper distances -and upon proper occasions. These might have animated a dull relation, -amused the reader, and engaged his attention. And the same account -would naturally have been given of them, as of the speeches and -descriptions given by such authors: the same account, in a manner, as -is to be given, why the poets make use of wonders and prodigies. But -the facts, both miraculous and natural, in Scripture, are related in -plain unadorned narratives, and both of them appear, in all respects, -to stand upon the same foot of historical evidence.[253] - -Further: some parts of Scripture, containing an account of miracles -fully sufficient to prove the truth of Christianity, are quoted as -genuine, from the age in which they are said to be written, down to -the present: and no other parts of them, material in the present -question, are omitted to be quoted in such manner, as to afford any -sort of proof of their not being genuine. And, as common history, when -called in question in any instance, may often be greatly confirmed by -contemporary or subsequent events more known and acknowledged; and as -the common Scripture history, like many others, is thus confirmed; -so likewise is the miraculous history of it, not only in particular -instances, but in general. For, the establishment of the Jewish and -Christian religions, which were events contemporary with the miracles -related to be wrought in attestation of both, or subsequent to them, -these events are just what we should have _expected_, upon supposition -such miracles were really wrought to attest the truth of those -religions. These miracles are a satisfactory account of those events: -of which no other satisfactory account can be given; nor any account at -all, but what is merely imaginary and invented. - -It is to be added, that the most obvious, the most easy and direct -account of this history, how it came to be written, and to be received -in the world as a true history, is that it really is so; nor can -any other account of it be easy and direct. Now, though an account, -not at all obvious, but very far-fetched and indirect, may be and -often is, the true account of a matter, yet it cannot be admitted on -the authority of its being asserted. Mere guess, supposition, and -possibility, when opposed to historical evidence, prove nothing, but -that historical evidence is not demonstrative. - -The just consequence from all this, I think is, that the Scripture -history in general is to be admitted as an authentic genuine history, -till something positive be alleged sufficient to invalidate it. No -man will deny the consequence to be, that it cannot be rejected, or -thrown by as of no authority, till it can be proved to be of none; even -though the evidence now mentioned for its authority were doubtful. This -evidence may be confronted by historical evidence on the other side, -if there be any: or general incredibility in the things related, or -inconsistence in the general turn of the history, would prove it to be -of no authority. But since, upon the face of the matter, upon a first -and general view, the _appearance_ is, that it is an authentic history, -it cannot be determined to be fictitious, without some proof that it is -so. The following observations in support of these, and coincident with -them, will greatly confirm the historical evidence for the truth of -Christianity. - -2. The Epistles of Paul, from the nature of epistolary writing, and -moreover from several of them being written, not to particular persons -but to churches, carry in them evidences of their being genuine, beyond -what can be in a mere historical narrative, left to the world at -large. This evidence,[254] joined with that which they have in common -with the rest of the New Testament, seems not to leave so much as any -particular pretence for denying their genuineness, considered as an -ordinary matter of fact, or of criticism: I say _particular_ pretence, -for _denying_ it; because any single fact, of such a kind and such -antiquity, may have _general doubts_ raised concerning it, from the -very nature of human affairs and human testimony. There is also to be -mentioned a distinct and particular evidence of the genuineness of the -epistle chiefly referred to here, the first to the Corinthians; from -the manner in which it is quoted by Clemens Romanus, in an epistle of -his own to that church.[255] Now these epistles afford a proof of -Christianity, detached from all others, which is, I think, a thing of -weight; and also a proof of a nature and kind peculiar to itself. For, - -In them the author declares, that he received the Gospel in general, -and the institution of the Communion in particular, not from the rest -of the apostles, or jointly together with them, but alone, from Christ -himself; whom he declares likewise, conformably to the history in the -Acts, that he saw after his ascension.[256] So that the testimony of -Paul is to be considered, as detached from that of the rest of the -apostles. - -He declares further, that he was endued with a power of working -miracles, as what was publicly known to those very people, speaks of -frequent and great variety of miraculous gifts as then subsisting in -those very churches, to which he was writing; which he was reproving -for several irregularities, and where he had personal opposers. He -mentions these gifts incidentally, in the most easy manner, and without -effort; by way of reproof to those who had them, for their indecent -use of them; and by way of depreciating them, in comparison of moral -virtues. In short he speaks to these churches, of these miraculous -powers, in the manner any one would speak to another of a thing, which -was as familiar, and as much known in common to them both, as any thing -in the world.[257] And this, as hath been observed by several persons, -is surely a very considerable thing. - -3. It is an acknowledged historical fact, that Christianity offered -itself to the world, and demanded to be received, upon the allegation, -(_i.e._ as unbelievers would speak, upon the pretence,) of miracles, -publicly wrought to attest the truth of it, in such an age; and -that it was actually received by great numbers in that very age, -and upon the professed belief of the reality of these miracles. And -Christianity, including the dispensation of the Old Testament, seems -distinguished by this from all other religions. I mean, that this -does not _appear_ to be the case with regard to any other; for surely -it will not be supposed to lie upon any person, to prove by positive -historical evidence, that it was not. It does in no sort appear that -Mahometanism was first received in the world upon the foot of supposed -miracles,[258] _i.e._ public ones:[259] for, as revelation is itself -miraculous, all pretence to it must necessarily imply some pretence -of miracles. And it is a known fact, that it was immediately, at the -very first, propagated by other means. And as particular institutions, -whether in Paganism or Popery, said to be confirmed by miracles _after_ -those institutions had obtained, are not to the purpose: so, were there -what might be called historical proof, that any of them were introduced -by a supposed divine command, believed to be attested by miracles; -these would not be in any wise parallel. For single things of this sort -are easy to be accounted for, after parties are formed, and have power -in their hands; and the leaders of them are in veneration with the -multitude; and political interests are blended with religious claims, -and religious distinctions. But _before_ any thing of this kind, for a -few persons, and those of the lowest rank, all at once, to bring over -such great numbers to a new religion, and get it to be received upon -the particular evidence of miracles; this is quite another thing. - -I think it will be allowed by any fair adversary, that the fact -now mentioned, taking in all the circumstances, is peculiar to -the Christian religion. However, the fact itself is allowed, that -Christianity obtained, _i.e._ was professed to be received in the -world, upon the belief of miracles, immediately in the age in which -it is said those miracles were wrought: or that this is what its -first converts would have alleged, as the reason for their embracing -it. It is not to be supposed that such numbers of men, in the most -distant parts of the world, should forsake the religion of their -country, in which they had been educated; separate themselves from -their friends, particularly in their festival shows and solemnities, -to which the common people are so greatly addicted, and which were of -a nature to engage them much more, than any thing of that sort among -us: and embrace a religion, which could not but expose them to many -inconveniences, and indeed must have been a giving up the world in a -great degree, even from the very first, and before the empire engaged -in form against them: it cannot be supposed, that such numbers should -make so great, and to say the least, so inconvenient a change in their -whole institution of life, unless they were really convinced of the -truth of those miracles, upon the knowledge or belief of which they -professed to make it. And it will, I suppose, readily be acknowledged, -that the generality of the first converts to Christianity must have -believed them: that as by becoming Christians they declared to the -world, they were satisfied of the truth of those miracles; so this -declaration was to be credited. And this their testimony is the same -kind of evidence for those miracles, as if they had put it in writing, -and these writings had come down to us. And it is real evidence, -because it is of facts, which they had capacity and full opportunity to -inform themselves of. - -It is also distinct from the direct or express historical evidence, -though it is of the same kind: and would be allowed to be distinct in -all cases. For were a fact expressly related by one or more ancient -historians, and disputed in after ages; that this fact is acknowledged -to have been _believed_ by great numbers of the age in which the -historian says it was done, would be allowed an additional proof of -such fact, quite distinct from the express testimony of the historian. -The credulity of mankind is acknowledged: and the suspicions of mankind -ought to be acknowledged too; and their backwardness even to believe, -and greater still to practise, what makes against their interest. And -it must particularly be remembered, that education, and prejudice, and -authority, were against Christianity, in the age I am speaking of. So -that the immediate conversion of such numbers is a real presumption -of somewhat more than human in this matter.[260] I say presumption, -for it is not alleged as a proof alone and by itself. Nor need any one -of the things mentioned in this chapter be considered as a proof by -itself: and yet all of them together may be one of the strongest.[261] - -Upon the whole: as there is large historical evidence, both direct and -circumstantial, of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, -collected by those who have writ upon the subject; it lies upon -unbelievers to show why this evidence is not to be credited. This way -of speaking is, I think, just; and what persons who write in defence -of religion naturally fall into. Yet, in a matter of such unspeakable -importance, the proper question is, not whom it lies upon, according to -the rules of argument, to maintain or confute objections: but whether -there really are any, against this evidence, sufficient, in reason, to -destroy the credit of it. However, unbelievers seem to take upon them -the part of showing that there are. - -They allege, that numberless enthusiastic people, in different ages -and countries, expose themselves to the same difficulties which the -primitive Christians did; and are ready to give up their lives for the -most idle follies imaginable. It is not very clear, to what purpose -this objection is brought. For surely, every one, in every case, must -distinguish between opinions and facts. And though testimony is no -proof of enthusiastic opinions, or of any _opinion_ at all; yet it -is allowed, in all other cases, to be a proof of _facts_. A person’s -laying down his life in attestation of facts or of opinions, is the -strongest proof of his believing them. And if the apostles and their -contemporaries did believe the facts, in attestation of which they -exposed themselves to sufferings and death; this their belief, or -rather knowledge, must be a proof of those facts: for they were such -as came under the observation of their senses. And though it is not of -equal weight, yet it is of weight, that the martyrs of the next age, -notwithstanding they were not eye-witnesses of those facts, as were -the apostles and their contemporaries, had, however, full opportunity -to inform themselves whether they were true or not, and gave equal -proof of their believing them to be true. - -But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evidence of testimony -even for facts, in matters relating to religion: some seem to think it -totally and absolutely destroys the evidence of testimony upon this -subject. The powers of enthusiasm, and of diseases too, which operate -in a like manner, are indeed very wonderful, in particular instances. -But if great numbers of men, not appearing in any peculiar degree weak, -nor under any peculiar suspicion of negligence, affirm that they saw -and heard such things plainly, with their eyes and their ears, and are -admitted to be in earnest; such testimony is evidence of the strongest -kind we can have, for any matter of fact. Possibly it may be overcome, -strong as it is, by incredibility in the things thus attested, or by -contrary testimony. And in an instance where one thought it was so -overcome, it might be just to consider, how far such evidence could be -accounted for by enthusiasm; for it seems as if no other imaginable -account were to be given of it. But till such incredibility be shown, -or contrary testimony produced, it cannot surely be expected, that so -far-fetched, so indirect and wonderful an account of such testimony, as -that of enthusiasm must be; an account so strange, that the generality -of mankind can scarce be made to understand what is meant by it; it -cannot, I say, be expected that such an account will be admitted of -such evidence; when there is this direct, easy, and obvious account of -it, that people really saw and heard a thing not incredible, which they -affirm, sincerely and with full assurance, they did see and hear. - -Granting then that enthusiasm is not (strictly speaking) an absurd, -but a possible account of such testimony, it is manifest, that the -very mention of it goes upon the previous supposition, that the things -so attested are incredible: and therefore need not be considered, -till they are shown to be so. Much less need it be considered, after -the contrary has been proved. And I think it has been proved, to full -satisfaction, that there is no incredibility in a revelation, in -general; or in such a one as the Christian, in particular. However, as -religion is supposed peculiarly liable to enthusiasm, it may just be -observed, that prejudices almost without number, and without name, -such as romance, affection, humor, a desire to engage attention, or -to surprise, party spirit, custom, little competitions, unaccountable -likings and dislikings; these influence men strongly in common matters. -And as these prejudices are often scarce know a or reflected upon -by the persons themselves who are influenced by them, they are to -be considered as influences of a like kind to enthusiasm. Yet human -testimony, in common matters, is naturally and justly believed, -notwithstanding. - -It is intimated further, in a more refined way of observation, that -though it should be proved, that the apostles and first Christians -could not, in some respects, be deceived themselves, and in other -respects, cannot be thought to have intended to impose upon the world, -yet it will not follow that their general testimony is to be believed, -though truly handed down to us: because they might still in part, -_i.e._ in other respects, be deceived themselves, and in part also -designedly impose upon others; which, it is added, is a thing very -credible, from that mixture of real enthusiasm, and real knavery, to be -met with in the same characters.[262] - -I must confess, I think the matter of fact contained in this -observation upon mankind is not to be denied; and that something -very much akin to it is often supposed in Scripture as a very common -case, and most severely reproved. But it were to have been expected, -that persons capable of applying this observation as applied in -the objection, might also frequently have met with the like mixed -character, in instances where religion was quite out of the case. -The thing plainly is, that mankind are naturally endued with reason, -or a capacity of distinguishing between truth and falsehood; and as -naturally they are endued with veracity, or a regard to truth in what -they say: but from many occasions they are liable to be prejudiced and -biassed and deceived themselves, and capable of intending to deceive -others, in every degree: insomuch that, as we are all liable to be -deceived by prejudice, so likewise it seems to be not an uncommon -thing, for persons who, from their regard to truth, would not invent -a lie entirely without any foundation at all, to propagate it with -heightening circumstances, after it is once invented and set a-going. -And others, though they would not _propagate_ a lie, yet, which is a -lower degree of falsehood, will let it pass without contradiction. But -notwithstanding all this, _human testimony_ remains still a natural -ground of assent; and this assent a natural principle of action. - -It is objected further, that however it has happened, the _fact_ -is, that mankind have, in different ages, been strangely deluded -with pretences to miracles and wonders. But it is by no means to be -admitted, that they have been oftener, or are at all more liable to be -deceived by these than by other pretences. - -It is added, that there is a very considerable degree of historical -evidence for miracles, which are, on all hands, acknowledged to be -fabulous. But suppose there were even _the like_ historical evidence -for these, to what there is for those alleged in proof of Christianity, -which yet is in no wise allowed, but suppose this; the consequence -would not be, that the evidence of the latter is not to be admitted. -Nor is there a man in the world, who in common cases, would conclude -thus. For what would such a conclusion really amount to but this, that -evidence, confuted by contrary evidence, or any way overbalanced, -destroys the credibility of other evidence, neither confuted nor -overbalanced? To argue that because there is, if there were, like -evidence from testimony, for miracles acknowledged false, as for those -in attestation of Christianity, therefore the evidence in the latter -case is not to be credited; this is the same as to argue, that if two -men of equally good reputation had given evidence in different cases -no way connected, and one of them had been convicted of perjury, this -confuted the testimony of the other! - -Upon the whole then, the general observation, that human creatures -are so liable to be deceived, from enthusiasm in religion, and -principles equivalent to enthusiasm in common matters, and in both from -negligence; and that they are so capable of dishonestly endeavoring -to deceive others; this does indeed weaken the evidence of testimony -in all cases, but does not destroy it in any. And these things will -appear, to different men, to weaken the evidence of testimony, in -different degrees: in degrees proportionable to the observations they -have made, or the notions they have any way taken up, concerning the -weakness and negligence and dishonesty of mankind; or concerning the -powers of enthusiasm, and prejudices equivalent to it. But it seems -to me, that people do not know what they say, who affirm these things -to destroy the evidence from testimony which we have, of the truth of -Christianity. Nothing can destroy the evidence of testimony in any -case, but a proof or probability, that persons are not competent judges -of the facts to which they give testimony; or that they are actually -under some indirect influence in giving it, in such particular case. -Till this be made out, the _natural_ laws of human actions require, -that testimony be admitted. It can never be sufficient to overthrow -direct historical evidence, indolently to say, that there are so many -principles, from whence men are liable to be deceived themselves, -and disposed to deceive others, especially in matters of religion, -that one knows not what to believe. And it is surprising persons can -help reflecting, that this very manner of speaking supposes they are -not satisfied that there is nothing in the evidence, of which they -speak thus; or that they can avoid observing, if they do make this -reflection, that it is on such a subject, a very material one.[263] - -Over against all these objections is to be set the _importance_ of -Christianity, as what must have engaged the attention of its first -converts, so as to have rendered them less liable to be deceived from -carelessness, than they would in common matters; and likewise the -strong _obligations to veracity_, which their religion laid them under: -so that the first and most obvious presumption is, that they could not -be deceived themselves nor deceive others. And this presumption, in -this degree, is peculiar to the testimony we have been considering. - -In argument, assertions are nothing in themselves, and have an air of -positiveness which sometimes is not very easy: yet they are necessary, -and necessary to be repeated; in order to connect a discourse, and -distinctly to lay before the view of the reader, what is proposed -to be proved, and what is left as proved. Now the conclusion from -the foregoing observations is, I think, beyond all doubt, this: -that unbelievers must be forced to admit the external evidence for -Christianity, _i.e._ the proof of miracles wrought to attest it, to be -of real weight and very considerable; though they cannot allow it to -be sufficient, to convince them of the reality of those miracles. And -as they must, in all reason, admit this; so it seems to me, that upon -consideration they would, in fact, admit it; those of them, I mean, who -know any thing at all of the matter; in like manner as persons, in many -cases, own they see strong evidence from testimony, for the truth of -things, which yet they cannot be convinced are true: cases, suppose, -where there is contrary testimony; or things which they think, whether -with or without reason, to be incredible. But there is no testimony -contrary to that which we have been considering: and it has been fully -proved, that there is no incredibility in Christianity in general, or -in any part of it. - -II. As to the evidence for Christianity from prophecy, I shall only -make some few general observations, which are suggested by the analogy -of nature; _i.e._ by the acknowledged natural rules of judging in -common matters, concerning evidence of a like kind to this from -prophecy. - -1. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a prophecy does -not, in any degree, invalidate the proof of foresight, arising from -the appearing completion of those other parts, which are understood. -For the case is evidently the same, as if those parts which are not -understood were lost, or not written at all, or written in an unknown -tongue. Whether this observation be commonly attended to or not, it is -so evident, that one can scarce bring oneself to set down an instance -in common matters, to exemplify it. However, suppose a writing, partly -in cipher, and partly in plain words at length; and that in the part -one understood, there appeared mention of several known facts; it would -never come into any man’s thoughts to imagine, that if he understood -the whole, perhaps he might find, that those facts were not in reality -known by the writer. Indeed, both in this example and in the thing -intended to be exemplified by it, our not understanding the whole (the -whole, suppose, of a sentence or a paragraph) might sometimes occasion -a doubt, whether one understood the literal meaning of such a part: but -this comes under another consideration. - -For the same reason, though a man should be incapable, for want of -learning, or opportunities of inquiry, or from not having turned -his studies this way, even so much as to judge whether particular -prophecies have been throughout completely fulfilled; yet he may see, -in general, that they have been fulfilled to such a degree, as, upon -very good ground, to be convinced of foresight more than human in such -prophecies, and of such events being intended by them. For the same -reason also, though, by means of the deficiencies in civil history, -and the different accounts of historians, the most learned should not -be able to make out to satisfaction, that such parts of the prophetic -history have been minutely and throughout fulfilled; yet a very strong -_proof of foresight_ may arise, from that general completion of them, -which is made out. As much perhaps, as the giver of prophecy intended -should ever be afforded by such parts of prophecy. - -2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to such and such events, -is itself a proof that it was intended of them: as the rules by which -we naturally judge and determine, in common cases parallel to this, -will show.[264] This observation I make in answer to the common -objection against the application of the prophecies, that, considering -each of them distinctly by itself, it does not at all appear, that they -were intended of those particular events to which they are applied by -Christians; and therefore it is to be supposed, that if they meant any -thing, they were intended of other events unknown to us, and not of -these at all. - -Now there are two kinds of writing, which bear a great resemblance to -prophecy, with respect to the matter before us: the mythological, and -the satirical, where the satire is to a certain degree concealed. And -a man might be assured, that he understood what an author intended by -a fable or parable related without any application or moral, merely -from seeing it to be easily capable of such application, and that such -a moral might naturally be deduced from it. And he might be fully -assured, that such persons and events were intended in a satirical -writing, merely from its being applicable to them. And, agreeable to -the last observation, he might be in a good measure satisfied of it, -though he were not enough informed in affairs, or in the story of such -persons to understand half the satire. For, his satisfaction that -he understood the meaning, the intended meaning, of these writings, -would be greater or less in proportion as he saw the general turn -of them to be capable of such application; and in proportion to the -number of particular things capable of it. And thus, if a long series -of prophecy is applicable to the present state of the church, and to -the political situations of the kingdoms of the world, some thousand -years after these prophecies were delivered; and a long series of -prophecy delivered before the coming of Christ is applicable to him; -these things are in themselves a proof, that the prophetic history was -intended of him, and of those events: in proportion as the general turn -of it is capable of such application, and to the number and variety of -particular prophecies capable of it. And though, in all just way of -consideration, the obvious completion of prophecies is to be allowed to -be thus explanatory of, and to determine, their meaning; yet it is to -be remembered further, that the ancient Jews applied the prophecies to -a Messiah before his coming,[265] in much the same manner as Christians -do now: and that the primitive Christians interpreted the prophecies -respecting the state of the church and of the world in the last ages, -in the sense which the event seems to confirm and verify. From these -things it may be made appear: - -3. That the showing even to a high probability, if that could be, -that the prophets thought of some other events, in such and such -predictions, and not those which Christians allege to be completions -of those predictions; or that such and such prophecies are capable of -being applied to other events than those, to which Christians apply -them--that this would not confute or destroy the force of the argument -from prophecy, even with regard to those very instances. For, observe -how this matter really is. If one knew such a person to be the sole -author of such a book, and was certainly assured, or satisfied to any -degree, that one knew the whole of what he intended in it; one should -be assured or satisfied to such degree, that one knew the whole -meaning of that book: for the meaning of a book is nothing but the -meaning of the author. But if one knew a person to have _compiled_ a -book out of memoirs, which he received from another, of vastly superior -knowledge in the subject of it, especially if it were a book full -of great intricacies and difficulties; it would in no wise follow, -that one knew the whole meaning of the book, from knowing the whole -meaning of the compiler: for the original author of them, might have, -and there would be no presumption, in many cases, against supposing -him to have, some further meaning than the compiler saw. To say then -that the Scriptures, and the things contained in them, can have no -other or further meaning than those persons had, who first recited or -wrote them, is evidently saying, that those persons were the original, -proper, and sole authors of those books, _i.e._ that they are not -inspired: which is absurd, while the authority of these books is under -examination; _i.e._ till you have determined they are of no divine -authority at all. Till this be determined, it must in all reason be -supposed, not indeed that they have, (for this is taking for granted -that they are inspired;) but that they may have, some further meaning -than what the compilers saw or understood. And, upon this supposition, -it is supposable also, that this further meaning may be fulfilled. - -Events corresponding to prophecies, interpreted in a different meaning -from that, in which the prophets are supposed to have understood them; -affords in a manner, the same proof, that this different sense was -originally intended, as it would have afforded, if the prophets had -not understood their predictions in the sense it is supposed they did: -because there is no presumption of _their_ sense of them being the -whole sense of them. And it has been already shown, that the apparent -completions of prophecy must be allowed to be explanatory of its -meaning. So that the question is, whether a series of prophecy has -been fulfilled, in a natural or proper, _i.e._ in any real sense of -the words of it. For such completion is equally a proof of foresight -more than human, whether the prophets are, or are not, supposed to have -understood it in a different sense. I say, supposed: for, though I -think it clear, that the prophets did not understand the full meaning -of their predictions, it is another question, how far they thought they -did; and in what sense they understood them. - -Hence may be seen, to how little purpose those persons busy themselves, -who endeavor to prove, that the prophetic history is applicable to -events of the age in which it was written, or of ages before it. -To have proved this, before there was any appearance of a further -completion of it, might have answered some purpose; for it might have -prevented the expectation of any such further completion. Thus could -Porphyry have shown, that some principal parts of the book of Daniel, -for instance the seventh verse of the seventh chapter, which the -Christians interpreted of the latter ages, was applicable to events, -which happened before or about the age of Antiochus Epiphanes; this -might have prevented them from expecting any further completion of -it. And, unless there was then, as I think there must have been, -external evidence concerning that book, more than is come down to -us; such a discovery might have been a stumbling-block in the way -of Christianity itself: considering the authority which our Savior -has given to the book of Daniel, and how much the general scheme of -Christianity presupposes the truth of it. But even this discovery, -had there been any such,[266] would be of very little weight with -reasonable men now; if this passage, thus applicable to events before -the age of Porphyry, appears to be applicable also to events, which -succeeded the dissolution of the Roman empire. I mention this, not at -all as intending to insinuate, that the division of this empire into -ten parts, for it plainly was divided into about that number, were, -alone and by itself, of any moment in verifying the prophetic history: -but only as an example of the thing I am speaking of. Thus upon the -whole, the matter of inquiry evidently must be, as above put, Whether -the prophecies are applicable to Christ, and to the present state of -the world, and of the church; applicable in such a degree, as to imply -foresight: not whether they are _capable_ of any other application. -Though I know no pretence for saying the general turn of them is -capable of any other. - -These observations are, I think, just, and the evidence referred to -in them real: though there may be people who will not accept of such -imperfect information from Scripture. Some too have not integrity and -regard enough to truth, to attend to evidence, which keeps the mind -in doubt, perhaps perplexity, and which is much of a different sort -from what they expected. It plainly requires a degree of modesty and -fairness, beyond what every one has, for a man to say, not to the world -but to himself, that there is a real appearance of great weight in this -matter, though he is not able thoroughly to satisfy himself about it; -but that it shall have its influence upon him, in proportion to its -apparent reality and weight. It is much more easy, and more falls in -with the negligence, presumption, and wilfulness of the generality, to -determine at once, with a decisive air, There is nothing in it. The -prejudices arising from that absolute contempt and scorn, with which -this evidence is treated in the world, I do not mention. For what can -be said to persons, who are weak enough in their understandings to -think this any presumption against it; or, if they do not, are yet weak -enough in their temper to be influenced by such prejudices, upon such a -subject? - -_Secondly_, I shall endeavor to give some account of the general -argument for the truth of Christianity, consisting both of the direct -and circumstantial evidence considered as making up one argument. To -state and examine this argument fully, would be a work much beyond the -compass of this whole treatise; nor is so much as a proper abridgment -of it to be expected here. Yet the present subject requires to have -some brief account of it given. For it is the kind of evidence, upon -which most questions of difficulty, in common practice, are determined: -evidence arising from various coincidences, which support and confirm -each other, and in this manner prove, with more or less certainty, the -point under consideration. I choose to do it also: First, because it -seems to be of the greatest importance, and not duly attended to by -every one, that the proof of revelation is not some direct and express -things only, but a great variety of circumstantial things also; and -that though each of these direct and circumstantial things is indeed -to be considered separately, yet they are afterwards to be joined -together; for that the proper force of the evidence consists in the -result of those several things, considered in their respects to each -other, and united into one view. In the next place, because it seems -to me, that the matters of fact here set down, which are acknowledged -by unbelievers, must be acknowledged by them also to contain together -a degree of evidence of great weight, if they could be brought to -lay these several things before themselves distinctly, and then with -attention consider them together; instead of that cursory thought of -them, to which we are familiarized. For being familiarized to the -cursory thought of things as really hinders the weight of them from -being seen, as from having its due influence upon practice. - -The thing asserted, and the truth of which is to be inquired into, -is this: That over and above our reason and affections, which God -has given us for the information of our judgment and the conduct -of our lives, he has also, by external revelation, given us an -account of himself and his moral government over the world, implying -a future state of rewards and punishments; _i.e._ hath revealed -the system of natural religion: (for natural religion may be -externally[267] revealed by God, as the ignorant may be taught it by -their fellow-creatures)--that God, I say, has given us the evidence -of revelation, as well as the evidence of reason, to ascertain this -moral system; together with an account of a particular dispensation of -Providence, which reason could no way have discovered, and a particular -institution of religion founded on it, for the recovery of mankind out -of their present wretched condition, and raising them to the perfection -and final happiness of their nature. - -This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be considered as wholly -historical. For prophecy is nothing but the history of events before -they come to pass; doctrines also are matters of fact; and precepts -come under the same notion. The general design of Scripture, which -contains in it this revelation, thus considered as historical, may be -said to be, to give us an account of the world in this one single view, -as God’s world: by which it appears essentially distinguished from all -other books, so far as I have found, except such as are copied from -it. It begins with an account of God’s creation of the world, in order -to ascertain, and distinguish from all others, who is the object of -our worship, by what he has done: in order to ascertain, who he is, -concerning whose providence, commands, promises, and threatenings, -this sacred book, all along, treats; [viz.] the Maker and Proprietor -of the world, he whose creatures we are, the God of nature: in order -likewise to distinguish him from the idols of the nations, which are -either imaginary beings, _i.e._ no beings at all; or else part of that -creation, the historical relation of which is here given. And John, not -improbably with an eye to this Mosaic account of the creation, begins -his Gospel with an account of our Savior’s pre-existence, and that _all -things were made by him; and without him, was not any thing made that -was made_:[268] agreeably to the doctrine of Paul, that _God created -all things by Jesus Christ_.[269] This being premised, the Scripture, -taken together, seems to profess to contain a kind of an abridgment of -the history of the world, in the view just now mentioned: that is, a -general account of the condition of religion and its professors, during -the continuance of that apostasy from God, and state of wickedness, -which it everywhere supposes the world to lie in. And this account -of the state of religion carries with it some brief account of the -political state of things, as religion is affected by it. Revelation -indeed considers the common affairs of this world, and what is going -on in it, as a mere scene of distraction; and cannot be supposed to -concern itself with foretelling at what time Rome, or Babylon, or -Greece, or any particular place, should be the most conspicuous seat -of that tyranny and dissoluteness, which all places equally aspire -to be; cannot, I say, be supposed to give any account of this wild -scene for its own sake. But it seems to contain some very general -account of the chief governments of the world, as the general state of -religion has been, is, or shall be, affected by them, from the first -transgression, and during the whole interval of the world’s continuing -in its present state, to a certain future period, spoken of both in -the Old and New Testament, very distinctly, and in great variety of -expression: _The times of the restitution of all things_:[270] when -_the mystery of God shall be finished, as he hath declared to his -servants the prophets_:[271] when _the God of heaven shall set up a -kingdom, which shall never be destroyed: and the kingdom shall not be -left to other people_,[272] as it is represented to be during this -apostasy, but _judgment shall be given to the saints_,[273] and _they -shall reign_:[274] _and the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of -the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the -saints of the Most High_.[275] - -Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would remark, how great a -length of time the whole relation takes up, near six thousand years -of which are past; and how great a variety of things it treats of; -the natural and moral system or history of the world, including the -time when it was formed, all contained in the very first book, and -evidently written in a rude and unlearned age; and in subsequent -books, the various common and prophetic history, and the particular -dispensation of Christianity. Now all this together gives the largest -scope for criticism; and for the confutation of what is capable of -being confuted, either from reason, or from common history, or from -any inconsistence in its several parts. And it deserves, I think, to -be mentioned, that whereas some imagine the supposed doubtfulness of -the evidence for revelation implies a positive argument that it is not -true; it appears, on the contrary, to imply a positive argument that -it is true. For, could any common relation of such antiquity, extent, -and variety (for in these things the stress of what I am now observing -lies) be proposed to the examination of the world: that it could not, -in an age of knowledge and liberty, be confuted, or shown to have -nothing in it, to the satisfaction of reasonable men; would be thought -a strong presumptive proof of its truth. Indeed it must be a _proof_ -of it, just in proportion to the probability, that if it were false, -it might be shown to be so: which, I think, is scarce pretended to be -shown, but upon principles and in ways of arguing, which have been -clearly obviated.[276] Nor does it at all appear, that any set of men, -who believe natural religion, are of the opinion, that Christianity has -been thus confuted. But to proceed: - -Together with the moral system of the world, the Old Testament contains -a chronological account of the beginning of it, and from thence, an -unbroken genealogy of mankind for many ages before common history -begins; and carried on as much farther as to make up a continued -thread of history, of the length of between three and four thousand -years. It contains an account of God’s making a covenant with a -particular nation, that they should be his people, and he would be -their God, in a peculiar sense; of his often interposing miraculously -in their affairs; giving them the promise, and long after, the -possession, of a particular country; assuring them of the greatest -national prosperity in it, if they would worship him, in opposition -to the idols which the rest of the world worshipped, and obey his -commands; and threatening them with unexampled punishments if they -disobeyed him, and fell into the general idolatry: insomuch that -this one nation should continue to be the observation and the wonder -of all the world. It declares particularly, that _God would scatter -them among all people, from one end of the earth unto the other_; but -that _when they should return unto the Lord their God, he would have -compassion upon them, and gather them from all the nations, whither he -had scattered them_: that _Israel should be saved in the Lord, with an -everlasting salvation; and not be ashamed or confounded world without -end_.[277] And as some of these promises are conditional, others are as -absolute as any thing can be expressed: that the time should come, when -_the people should be all righteous, and inherit the land forever_: -that _though God would make a full end of all nations whither he had -scattered them, yet would he not make a full end of them_: that _he -would bring again the captivity of his people Israel, and plant them -upon their land, and they should be no more pulled up out of their -land_: that _the seed of Israel should not cease from being a nation -forever_.[278] It foretells, that God would raise them up a particular -person, in whom all his promises should finally be fulfilled; the -Messiah, who should be, in a high and eminent sense, their anointed -Prince and Savior. This was foretold in such a manner, as raised a -general expectation of such a person in the nation, as appears from -the New Testament, and is an acknowledged fact; an expectation of his -coming at such a particular time, before any one appeared claiming to -be that person, and when there was no ground for such an expectation, -but from the prophecies: which expectation, therefore, must in all -reason be presumed to be explanatory of those prophecies, if there were -any doubt about their meaning. It seems moreover to foretell, that this -person should be rejected by the nation to whom he had been so long -promised, though he was so much desired by them.[279] And it expressly -foretells, that he should be the Savior of the Gentiles; and that the -completion of the scheme contained in this book, and then begun, and in -its progress, should be something so great, that in comparison with it, -the restoration of the Jews alone would be but of small account. _It is -a light thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes -of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I will also give thee -for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be for salvation unto the -end of the earth._ And, _In the last days, the mountain of the Lord’s -house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall be -exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow into it--for out of -Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. -And he shall judge among the nations--and the Lord alone shall be -exalted in that day, and the idols he shall utterly abolish._[280] - -The Scripture further contains an account, that at the time the Messiah -was expected, a person rose up in this nation, claiming to be that -Messiah, to be the person to whom all the prophecies referred, and in -whom they should center: that he spent some years in a continued course -of miraculous works; and endued his immediate disciples and followers -with a power of doing the same, as a proof of the truth of that -religion, which he commissioned them to publish: that invested with -this authority and power, they made numerous converts in the remotest -countries, and settled and established his religion in the world; to -the end of which the Scripture professes to give a prophetic account of -the state of this religion among mankind.[281] - -Let us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of history, to have all -this related to him out of the Scripture. Or suppose such an one, -having the Scripture put into his hands, to remark these things in -it, not knowing but that the whole, even its civil history, as well -as the other parts of it, might be, from beginning to end, an entire -invention; and to ask, What truth was in it, and whether the revelation -here related was real, or a fiction? And, instead of a direct answer, -suppose him, all at once, to be told the following confessed facts; and -then to unite them into one view. - -Let him first be told, in how great a degree the profession and -establishment of natural religion, the belief that there is one God -to be worshipped, that virtue is his law, and that mankind shall be -rewarded and punished hereafter, as they obey and disobey it here; in -how very great a degree, I say, the profession and establishment of -this moral system in the world is owing to the revelation, whether -real or supposed, contained in this book: the establishment of this -moral system, even in those countries which do not acknowledge the -proper authority of the Scripture.[282] Let him be told also, what -number of nations do acknowledge its proper authority. Let him then -take in the consideration, of what importance religion is to mankind. -And upon these things he might, I think, truly observe, that this -supposed revelation’s obtaining and being received in the world, with -all the circumstances and effects of it, considered together as one -event, is the most conspicuous and important event in the history of -mankind: that a book of this nature, and thus promulged and recommended -to our consideration, demands, as if by a voice from heaven, to have -its claims most seriously examined; and that, before such examination, -to treat it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule, is an offence -against natural piety. It is to be remembered, that how much soever -the establishment of natural religion in the world is owing to the -Scripture revelation, this does not destroy the proof of religion from -reason, any more than the proof of Euclid’s Elements is destroyed, by -a man’s knowing or thinking, that he should never have seen the truth -of the several propositions contained in it, nor had those propositions -come into his thoughts, but for that mathematician. - -Let such a person as we are speaking of be, in the next place, -informed of the acknowledged antiquity of the first parts of this book; -and that its chronology, its account of the time when the earth, and -the several parts of it, were first peopled with human creatures, is -no way contradicted, but is really confirmed, by the natural and civil -history of the world, collected from common historians, from the state -of the earth, and from the late invention of arts and sciences. - -And as the Scripture contains an unbroken thread of common and civil -history, from the creation to the captivity, for between three and -four thousand years; let the person we are speaking of be told, in the -next place, that this general history, as it is not contradicted, but -confirmed by profane history[283] as much as there would be reason -to expect, upon supposition of its truth; so there is nothing in the -whole history _itself_, to give any reasonable ground of suspicion -of its not being, in the general, a faithful and literally true -genealogy of men, and series of things. I speak here only of the common -Scripture history, or of the course of ordinary events related in it, -as distinguished from miracles, and from the prophetic history. In -all the Scripture narrations of this kind, following events arise out -of foregoing ones, as in all other histories. There appears nothing -related as done in any age, not conformable to the manners of that -age: nothing in the account of a succeeding age, which one would say -could not be true, or was improbable, from the account of things in the -preceding one. There is nothing in the characters, which would raise a -thought of their being feigned; but all the internal marks imaginable -of their being real. It is to be added also, that mere genealogies, -bare narratives of the number of years, which persons called by such -and such names lived, do not carry the face of fiction; perhaps do -carry some presumption of veracity: and all unadorned narratives, which -have nothing to surprise, may be thought to carry somewhat of the like -presumption too. And the domestic and the political history is plainly -credible. There may be incidents in Scripture, which, taken alone in -the naked way they are told, may appear strange; especially to persons -of other manners, temper, education: but there are also incidents of -undoubted truth, in many or most persons’ lives, which, in the same -circumstances, would appear to the full as strange.[284] There may be -mistakes of transcribers, there may be other real or seeming mistakes, -not easy to be particularly accounted for: but there are certainly -no more things of this kind in the Scripture, than what were to have -been expected in books of such antiquity; and nothing, in any wise, -sufficient to discredit the general narrative. - -Now, that a history, claiming to commence from the creation, and -extending in one continued series, through so great a length of time, -and variety of events, should have such appearances of reality and -truth in its whole contexture, is surely a very remarkable circumstance -in its favor. And as all this is applicable to the common history -of the New Testament, so there is a further credibility, and a very -high one, given to it by profane authors: many of these writing of -the same times, and confirming the truth of customs and events, which -are incidentally as well as more purposely mentioned in it. And this -credibility of the common Scripture-history, gives some credibility -to its miraculous history: especially as this is interwoven with the -common, so as that they imply each other, and both together make up one -relation. - -Let it then be more particularly observed to this person, that it is an -acknowledged matter of fact, which is indeed implied in the foregoing -observation, that there was such a nation as the Jews, of the greatest -antiquity, whose government and general polity was founded on the law, -here related to be given them by Moses as from heaven: that natural -religion, with rites additional yet no way contrary to it, was their -established religion, which cannot be said of the Gentile world: and -that their very being as a nation, depended upon their acknowledgment -of one God, the God of the universe. For, suppose in their captivity in -Babylon, they had gone over to the religion of their conquerors, there -would have remained no bond of union, to keep them a distinct people. -And while they were under their own kings, in their own country, a -total apostasy from God would have been the dissolution of their whole -government. They in such a sense nationally acknowledged and worshipped -the Maker of heaven and earth, when the rest of the world were sunk in -idolatry, as rendered them, in fact, the peculiar people of God. This -remarkable establishment and preservation of natural religion among -them, seems to add peculiar credibility to the historical evidence for -the miracles of Moses and the prophets. Because these miracles are a -full satisfactory account of this event, which plainly needs to be -accounted for, and cannot be otherwise. - -Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of history, be acquainted -further, that one claiming to be the Messiah, of Jewish extraction, -rose up at the time when this nation, from the prophecies above -mentioned, expected the Messiah: that he was rejected, as it seemed -to have been foretold he should, by the body of the people, under the -direction of their rulers: that in the course of a very few years, he -was believed on and acknowledged as the promised Messiah, by great -numbers among the Gentiles, agreeably to the prophecies of Scripture, -yet not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles,[285] of which -miracles we have also strong historical evidence; (by which I mean here -no more than must be acknowledged by unbelievers; for let pious frauds -and follies be admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say they destroy -our evidence of miracles wrought in proof of Christianity:)[286] that -this religion approving itself to the reason of mankind, and carrying -its own evidence with it, so far as reason is a judge of its system, -and being no way contrary to reason in those parts of it which require -to be believed upon the mere authority of its Author; that this -religion, I say, gradually spread and supported itself for some hundred -years, not only without any assistance from temporal power, but under -constant discouragements, and often the bitterest persecutions from -it; and then became the religion of the world: that in the mean time -the Jewish nation and government were destroyed in a very remarkable -manner, and the people carried away captive and dispersed through the -most distant countries; in which state of dispersion they have remained -fifteen hundred years: and that they remain a numerous people, united -among themselves, and distinguished from the rest of the world, as they -were in the days of Moses, by the profession of his law; and everywhere -looked upon in a manner, which one scarce knows how distinctly to -express, but in the words of the prophetic account of it, given so -many ages before it came to pass: _Thou shalt become an astonishment, -a proverb, and a byword, among all nations whither the Lord shall lead -thee_.[287] - -The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews remaining a distinct -people in their dispersion, and the confirmation which this event -appears to give to the truth of revelation, may be thought to be -answered, by their religion’s forbidding them intermarriages with those -of other nations, and prescribing them many peculiarities in their -food, by which they are debarred from incorporating with the people in -whose countries they live. This is not, I think, a satisfactory account -of that which it pretends to account for. But what does it pretend to -account for? The correspondence between this event and the prophecies; -or the coincidence of both, with a long dispensation of Providence, -of a peculiar nature, towards that people? No. It is only the event -itself, which is offered to be thus accounted for: which single event, -taken alone, abstracted from all such correspondence and coincidence, -perhaps would not have appeared miraculous: but that correspondence -and coincidence may be so, though the event itself be supposed not. -Thus the concurrence of our Saviour’s being born at Bethlehem, with a -long foregoing series of prophecy and other coincidences, is doubtless -miraculous; the series of prophecy, and other coincidences, and the -event, being admitted: though the event itself appears to have been -brought about in a natural way; of which, however, no one can be -certain. - -As several of these events seem, in some degree expressly, to have -verified the prophetic history already, so likewise they may be -considered further, as having a peculiar aspect towards the full -completion of it; as affording some presumption that the whole of it -shall, one time or other, be fulfilled. Thus, that the Jews have been -so wonderfully preserved in their long and wide dispersion; which is -indeed the direct fulfilling of some prophecies, but is now mentioned -only as looking forward to somewhat yet to come: that natural religion -came forth from Judea, and spread, in the degree it has done over -the world, before lost in idolatry; which, together with some other -things, have distinguished that very place, in like manner as the -people of it are distinguished: that this great change of religion over -the earth was brought about under the profession and acknowledgment, -that Jesus was the promised Messiah: things of this kind naturally -turn the thoughts of serious men towards the full completion of the -prophetic history, concerning the final restoration of that people; -concerning the establishment of the everlasting kingdom among them, the -kingdom of the Messiah; and the future state of the world, under this -sacred government. Such circumstances and events, compared with these -prophecies, though no completions of them, yet would not, I think, -be spoken of as nothing in the argument, by a person upon his first -being informed of them. They fall in with the prophetic history of -things still future, give it some additional credibility, and have the -appearance of being somewhat in order to the full completion of it. - -Indeed it requires a good degree of knowledge, and great calmness and -consideration, to be able to judge thoroughly of the evidence for the -truth of Christianity, from that part of the prophetic history which -relates to the situation of the kingdoms of the world, and to the state -of the church, from the establishment of Christianity to the present -time. But it appears from a general view of it, to be very material. -And those persons who have thoroughly examined it, and some of them -were men of the coolest tempers, greatest capacities, and least liable -to imputations of prejudice, insist upon it as determinately conclusive. - -[CONCLUSION.] Suppose now a person quite ignorant of history, first -to recollect the passages above mentioned out of Scripture, without -knowing but that the whole was a late fiction, then to be informed -of the correspondent facts now mentioned, and to unite them all into -one view: that the profession and establishment of natural religion -in the world is greatly owing, in different ways, to this book, and -the supposed revelation which it contains; that it is acknowledged to -be of the earliest antiquity; that its chronology and common history -are entirely credible; that this ancient nation, the Jews, of whom it -chiefly treats, appear to have been, in fact, the people of God, in a -distinguished sense; that, as there was a national expectation among -them, raised from the prophecies, of a Messiah to appear at such a -time, so one at this time appeared claiming to be that Messiah; that -he was rejected by this nation, but received by the Gentiles, not upon -the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles; that the religion he taught -supported itself under the greatest difficulties, gained ground, and -at length became the religion of the world; that in the mean time the -Jewish polity was utterly destroyed, and the nation dispersed over the -face of the earth; that notwithstanding this, they have remained a -distinct numerous people for so many centuries, even to this day; which -not only appears to be the express completion of several prophecies -concerning them, but also renders it, as one may speak, a visible and -easy possibility that the promises made to them as a nation, may yet be -fulfilled. - -To these acknowledged truths, let the person we have been supposing -add, as I think he ought, whether every one will allow it or no, the -obvious appearances which there are, of the state of the world, in -other respects besides what relates to the Jews, and of the Christian -church, having so long answered, and still answering to the prophetic -history. Suppose, I say, these facts set over against the things before -mentioned out of the Scripture, and seriously compared with them; -the joint view of both together must, I think, appear of very great -weight to a considerate reasonable person: of much greater indeed, upon -having them first laid before him, than is easy for us, who are so -familiarized to them, to conceive, without some particular attention -for that purpose. - -All these things, and the several particulars contained under them, -require to be distinctly and most thoroughly examined into; that the -weight of each may be judged of, upon such examination, and such -conclusion drawn, as results from their _united force_. But this has -not been attempted here. I have gone no further than to show, that the -general imperfect view of them now given, the confessed historical -evidence for miracles, and the many obvious appearing completions of -prophecy, together with the collateral things[288] here mentioned, and -there are several others of the like sort; that all this together, -which, being fact, must be acknowledged by unbelievers, amounts to -real evidence of somewhat more than human in this matter: evidence -much more important, than careless men, who have been accustomed -only to transient and partial views of it, can imagine; and indeed -abundantly sufficient to act upon. And these things, I apprehend, must -be acknowledged by unbelievers. For though they may say, that the -historical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, -is not sufficient to convince them, that such miracles were really -wrought: they cannot deny, that there is such historical evidence, -it being a known matter of fact that there is. They may say, the -conformity between the prophecies and events is by accident: but there -are many instances in which such conformity itself cannot be denied. -They may say, with regard to such kind of collateral things as those -above mentioned, that any odd accidental events, without meaning, will -have a meaning found in them by fanciful people: and that such as are -fanciful in any one certain way, will make out a thousand coincidences, -which seem to favor their peculiar follies. Men, I say, may talk -thus: but no one who is serious, can possibly think these things to -be nothing, if he considers the importance of collateral things, and -even of lesser circumstances, in the evidence of probability, as -distinguished in nature, from the evidence of demonstration. In many -cases indeed it seems to require the truest judgment, to determine with -exactness the weight of circumstantial evidence: but it is very often -altogether as convincing, as that which is the most express and direct. - -This general view of the evidence for Christianity, considered as -making one argument, may also serve to recommend to serious persons, -to set down every thing which they think may be of any real weight at -all in proof of it, and particularly the many seeming completions of -prophecy: and they will find, that, judging by the natural rules, by -which we judge of probable evidence in common matters, they amount to -a much higher degree of proof, upon such a _joint review_, than could -be supposed upon considering them separately, at different times; -how strong soever the proof might before appear to them, upon such -separate views of it. For probable proofs, by being added, not only -_increase_ the evidence, but _multiply_ it.[289] Nor should I dissuade -any one from setting down, what he thought made for the contrary -side. But then it is to be remembered, not in order to influence his -judgment, but his practice, that a mistake on one side may be, in its -consequences, much more dangerous, than a mistake on the other. And -what course is most safe, and what most dangerous, will be thought a -very material consideration, when we deliberate, not concerning events, -but concerning conduct in our temporal affairs. To be influenced by -this consideration in our judgment, to believe or disbelieve upon it, -is indeed as much prejudice, as any thing whatever. And, like other -prejudices, it operates contrary ways, in different men; for some are -inclined to believe what they hope, and others what they fear. And -it is manifest unreasonableness to apply to men’s passions in order -to gain their assent. But in deliberations concerning conduct, there -is nothing which reason more requires to be taken into the account, -than the importance of it. For, suppose it doubtful, what would be the -consequence of acting in this, or in the contrary manner: still, that -taking one side could be attended with little or no bad consequence, -and taking the other might be attended with the greatest, must appear, -to unprejudiced reason, of the highest moment towards determining how -we are to act. The truth of our religion, like the truth of common -matters, is to be judged of by all the evidence taken together. -And unless the whole series of things which may be alleged in this -argument, and every particular thing in it, can reasonably be supposed -to have been by accident (for here the stress of the argument for -Christianity lies); then is the truth of it proved: in like manner, as -if in any common case, numerous events acknowledged, were to be alleged -in proof of any other event disputed; the truth of the disputed event -would be proved, not only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of -itself clearly imply it, but, though no one of them singly did so, if -the whole of the acknowledged events taken together could not in reason -be supposed to have happened, unless the disputed one were true. - -It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this evidence gives -to those persons who attack Christianity, especially in conversation. -For it is easy to show, in a short and lively manner, that such and -such things are liable to objection, that this and another thing is of -little weight in itself; but impossible to show, in like manner, the -united force of the whole argument in one view. - -Lastly, as it has been made appear, that there is no presumption -against a revelation as miraculous; that the general scheme of -Christianity, and the principal parts of it, are conformable to the -experienced constitution of things, and the whole perfectly credible: -so the account now given of the positive evidence for it, shows, that -this evidence is such, as, from the nature of it, cannot be destroyed, -though it should be lessened. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - -OBJECTIONS AGAINST ARGUING FROM THE ANALOGY OF NATURE, TO RELIGION. - - -If every one would consider, with such attention as they are bound, -even in point of morality, to consider, what they judge and give -characters of; the occasion of this chapter would be, in some good -measure at least, superseded. But since this is not to be expected; -for some we find do not concern themselves to understand even what -they write against: since this treatise, in common with most others, -lies open to objections, which may appear very material to thoughtful -men at first sight; and, besides that, seems peculiarly liable to the -objections of such as can judge without thinking, and of such as can -censure without judging; it may not be amiss to set down the chief of -these objections which occur to me, and consider them to their hands. -They are such as these: - -“That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation, by -saying, that there are the same in natural religion; when what is -wanting is to clear both of them of these their common, as well as -other their respective, difficulties; that it is a strange way indeed -of convincing men of the obligations of religion, to show them, -that they have as little reason for their worldly pursuits: and a -strange way of vindicating the justice and goodness of the Author of -nature, and of removing the objections against both, to which the -system of religion lies open, to show, that the like objections lie -against natural providence; a way of answering objections against -religion, without so much as pretending to make out, that the -system of it, or the particular things in it objected against, are -reasonable--especially, perhaps some may be inattentive enough to add, -must this be thought strange, when it is confessed that analogy is no -answer to such objections: that when this sort of reasoning is carried -to the utmost length it can be imagined capable of, it will yet leave -the mind in a very unsatisfied state; and that it must be unaccountable -ignorance of mankind, to imagine they will be prevailed with to forego -their present interests and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon -doubtful evidence.” - -Now, as plausible as this way of talking may appear, that appearance -will be found in a great measure owing to half views, which show but -part of an object, yet show that indistinctly, and to undeterminate -language. By these means weak men are often deceived by others, and -ludicrous men, by themselves. And even those, who are serious and -considerate, cannot always readily disentangle, and at once clearly see -through the perplexities, in which subjects themselves are involved; -and which are heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse of words. To -this latter sort of persons, the following reply to each part of this -objection severally, may be of some assistance; as it may also tend a -little to stop and silence others. - -_First_, The thing wanted, _i.e._ what men require, is to have _all_ -difficulties cleared. And this is, or at least for any thing we know -to the contrary, it may be, the same as requiring to comprehend the -divine nature, and the whole plan of Providence from everlasting to -everlasting! But it hath always been allowed to argue from what is -acknowledged, to what is disputed. And it is in no other sense a poor -thing, to argue from natural religion to revealed, in the manner -found fault with, than it is to argue in numberless other ways of -probable deduction and inference, in matters of conduct, which we are -continually reduced to the necessity of doing. Indeed the epithet -_poor_ may be applied, I fear as properly, to great part or the whole -of human life, as it is to the things mentioned in the objection. Is it -not a poor thing, for a physician to have so little knowledge in the -cure of diseases, as even the most eminent have? To act upon conjecture -and guess, where the life of man is concerned? Undoubtedly it is: but -not in comparison of having no skill at all in that useful art, and -being obliged to act wholly in the dark. - -Further: since it is as unreasonable, as it is common, to urge -objections against revelation, which are of equal weight against -natural religion; and those who do this, if they are not confused -themselves, deal unfairly with others, in making it seem that they are -arguing only against revelation, or particular doctrines of it, when -in reality they are arguing against moral providence; it is a thing -of consequence to show, that such objections are as much levelled -against natural religion, as against revealed. Objections, which are -equally applicable to both, are properly speaking answered, by its -being shown that they are so, provided the former be admitted to be -true. And without taking in the consideration how distinctly this is -admitted, it is plainly very material to observe, that as the things -objected against in natural religion are of the same kind with what is -certain matter of experience in the course of providence, and in the -information which God affords us concerning our temporal interest under -his government; so the objections against the system of Christianity, -and the evidence of it, are of the very same kind with those which are -made against the system and evidence of natural religion. However, the -reader upon review may see, that most of the analogies insisted upon, -even in the latter part of this treatise, do not necessarily require to -have more taken for granted than is in the former; [viz.] that there is -an Author of nature, or natural Governor of the world: and Christianity -is vindicated, not from its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly -from its analogy to the experienced constitution of nature. - -_Secondly_, Religion is a practical thing, and consists in such a -determinate course of life, as what, there is reason to think, is -commanded by the Author of nature, and will, upon the whole, be our -happiness under his government. If men can be convinced, that they -have the like reason to believe this, as to believe that taking care -of their temporal affairs will be to their advantage; such conviction -cannot but be an argument to them for the practice of religion. -And if there be really any reason for believing one of these, and -endeavoring to preserve life, and secure ourselves the necessaries -and conveniences of it; then there is reason also for believing the -other, and endeavoring to secure the interest it proposes to us. And -if the interest, which religion proposes to us, be infinitely greater -than our whole temporal interest; then there must be proportionably -greater reason for endeavoring to secure one, than the other; since, by -the supposition, the probability of our securing one is equal to the -probability of our securing the other. This seems plainly unanswerable, -and has a tendency to influence fair minds, who consider what our -condition really is, or upon what evidence we are naturally appointed -to act; and who are disposed to acquiesce in the terms upon which we -live, and attend to and follow that practical instruction, whatever it -be, which is afforded us. - -But the chief and proper force of the argument referred to in the -objection, lies in another place. The proof of religion, it is said, is -involved in such inextricable difficulties, as to render it doubtful; -and that it cannot be supposed that if it were true, it would be left -upon doubtful evidence. Here then, over and above the force of each -particular difficulty or objection, these difficulties and objections -taken together are turned into a positive argument against the truth -of religion; which argument would stand thus. If religion were true, -it would not be left doubtful, and open to objections to the degree -in which it is: therefore that it is thus left, not only renders the -evidence of it weak, and lessens its force, in proportion to the weight -of such objections, but also shows it to be false, or is a general -presumption of its being so. Now the observation, that from the natural -constitution and course of things, we must in our temporal concerns, -almost continually, and even in matters of great consequence, act upon -evidence of a like kind and degree to the evidence of religion, is an -answer to this argument. Because it shows, that it is according to the -conduct and character of the Author of nature to appoint we should act -upon evidence like to that, which this argument presumes he cannot be -supposed to appoint we should act upon: it is an instance, a general -one, made up of numerous particular ones, of somewhat in his dealing -with us, similar to what is said to be incredible. As the force of this -answer lies merely in the parallel, which there is between the evidence -for religion and for our temporal conduct; the answer is equally just -and conclusive, whether the parallel be made out, by showing the -evidence of the former to be higher, or the evidence of the latter to -be lower. - -_Thirdly_, The design of this treatise is not to vindicate the -character of God, but to show the obligations of men: it is not to -justify his providence, but to show what belongs to us to do. These are -two subjects, and ought not to be confounded. Though they may at length -run up into each other, yet observations may immediately tend to make -out the latter, which do not appear, by any immediate connection, to -the purpose of the former; which is less our concern, than many seem to -think. For, first, - -It is not necessary we should justify the dispensations of Providence -against objections, any farther than to show, that the things objected -against may, for aught we know, be consistent with justice and -goodness. Suppose then, that there are things in the system of this -world, and plan of Providence relating to it, which taken alone would -be unjust: yet it has been shown unanswerably, that if we could take -in the reference, which these things may have to other things, present -past and to come; to the whole scheme, which the things objected -against are parts of; these very things might, for aught we know, be -found to be, not only consistent with justice, but instances of it. -Indeed it has been shown, by the analogy of what we see, not only -possible that this may be the case, but credible that it is. And thus -objections, drawn from such things, are answered, and Providence is -vindicated, as far as religion makes its vindication necessary. - -Hence it appears, Secondly, that objections against the Divine justice -and goodness are not endeavored to be _removed_, by showing that the -like objections, allowed to be really conclusive, lie against natural -providence: but those objections being supposed and shown not to be -_conclusive_, the things objected against, considered as matters of -fact, are farther shown to be credible, from their conformity to the -constitution of nature; for instance, that God will reward and punish -men for their actions hereafter, from the observation, that he does -reward and punish them for their actions here. And this, I apprehend, -is of weight. - -Thirdly, it would be of weight, even though those objections were -not answered. For, there being the proof of religion above set down; -and religion implying several facts; for instance again, the fact -last mentioned, that God will reward and punish men for their actions -hereafter; the observation, that his present method of government is by -rewards and punishments, shows that future fact not to be incredible: -whatever objections men may think they have against it, as unjust or -unmerciful, according to their notions of justice and mercy; or as -improbable from their belief of necessity. I say, _as improbable_: for -it is evident no objection against it, _as unjust_, can be urged from -necessity; since this notion as much destroys injustice, as it does -justice. - -Fourthly, Though objections against the reasonableness of the system of -religion cannot indeed be answered without entering into consideration -of its reasonableness; yet objections against the credibility or -truth of it may. Because the system of it is reducible into what is -properly matter of fact: and the truth, the probable truth of facts, -may be shown without consideration of their reasonableness. Nor is it -necessary, though, in some cases and respects, it is highly useful and -proper, yet it is not necessary, to give a proof of the reasonableness -of every precept enjoined us, and of every particular dispensation -of Providence, which comes into the system of religion. Indeed the -more thoroughly a person of a right disposition is convinced of the -perfection of the Divine nature and conduct, the farther he will -advance towards that perfection of religion, which John[290] speaks -of.[291] But the general obligations of religion are fully made out, by -proving the reasonableness of the practice of it. And that the practice -of religion _is_ reasonable, may be shown, though no more could be -proved, than that the system of it _may be_ so, for aught we know to -the contrary: and even without entering into the distinct consideration -of this. - -Fifthly, It is easy to see, that though the analogy of nature is not -an immediate answer to objections against the wisdom, the justice, or -goodness, of any doctrine or precept of religion; yet it may be, as it -is, an immediate and direct answer to what is really intended by such -objections; which is, to show that the things objected against are -incredible. - -_Fourthly_, It is most readily acknowledged, that the foregoing -treatise is by no means satisfactory; very far indeed from it: but so -would any natural institution of life appear, if reduced into a system, -together with its evidence. Leaving religion out of the case, men are -divided in their opinions, whether our pleasures overbalance our pains: -and whether it be, or be not, eligible to live in this world.[292] And -were all such controversies settled, which perhaps, in speculation, -would be found involved in great difficulties; and were it determined -upon the evidence of reason, as nature has determined it to our hands, -that life is to be preserved: still, the rules which God has been -pleased to afford us, for escaping the miseries of it, and obtaining -its satisfactions, the rules, for instance, of preserving health, and -recovering it when lost, are not only fallible and precarious, but -very far from being exact. Nor are we informed by nature, as to future -contingencies and accidents, so as to render it at all certain, what -is the best method of managing our affairs. What will be the success -of our temporal pursuits, in the common sense of the word success, is -highly doubtful. And what will be the success of them in the proper -sense of the word; _i.e._ what happiness or enjoyment we shall obtain -by them, is doubtful in a much higher degree. Indeed the unsatisfactory -nature of the evidence, with which we are obliged to take up, in the -daily course of life, is scarce to be expressed. Yet men do not throw -away life, or disregard the interests of it, upon account of this -doubtfulness. The evidence of religion then being admitted real, those -who object against it, as not satisfactory, _i.e._ as not being what -they wish it, plainly forget the very condition of our being: for -satisfaction, in this sense, does not belong to such a creature as man. - -And, what is more material, they forget also the very nature of -religion. For, religion presupposes, in all those who will embrace it, -a certain degree of integrity and honesty; which it was intended to try -whether men have or not, and to exercise in such as have it, in order -to its improvement. Religion presupposes this as much, and in the same -sense, as speaking to a man presupposes he understands the language in -which you speak; or as warning a man of any danger presupposes that he -hath such a regard to himself, as that he will endeavor to avoid it. -Therefore the question is not at all, Whether the evidence of religion -be satisfactory; but Whether it be, in reason, sufficient to prove and -discipline that virtue, which it presupposes. Now the evidence of it is -fully sufficient for all those purposes of _probation_; how far soever -it is from being satisfactory, as to the purposes of _curiosity_, or -any other: and indeed it answers the purposes of the former in several -respects, which it would not do, if it were as overpowering as is -required. Besides, whether the motives or the evidence for any course -of action be satisfactory, meaning here, by that word, what satisfies -a man that such a course of action will in event be for his good; this -need never be, and I think, strictly speaking, never is, the practical -question in common matters. The practical question in all cases is, -Whether the evidence for a course of action be such as, taking in all -circumstances, makes the faculty within us, which is the guide and -judge of conduct,[293] determine that course of action to be prudent. -Indeed, satisfaction that it will be for our interest or happiness, -abundantly determines an action to be prudent: but evidence almost -infinitely lower than this, determines actions to be so too; even in -the conduct of every day. - -_Fifthly_, As to the objection concerning the influence which this -argument, or any part of it, may, or may not be expected to have upon -men; I observe, as above, that religion being intended for a trial[294] -and exercise of the morality of every person’s character, who is a -subject of it; and there being, as I have shown, such evidence for -it, as is sufficient, in reason, to influence men to embrace it: to -object, that it is not to be imagined mankind will be influenced by -such evidence, is nothing to the purpose of the foregoing treatise. For -the purpose of it is not to inquire, what sort of creatures mankind -are; but what the light and knowledge, which is afforded them, requires -they should be: to show how, in reason, they ought to behave; not how, -in fact, they will behave. This depends upon themselves, and is their -own concern; the personal concern of each man in particular. How little -regard the generality have to it, experience indeed does too fully -show. But religion, considered as a probation, has had its end upon -all persons, to whom it has been proposed with evidence sufficient in -reason to influence their practice: for by this means they have been -put into a state of probation; let them behave as they will in it. -Thus, not only revelation, but reason also, teaches us, that by the -evidence of religion being laid before men, the designs of Providence -are carrying on, not only with regard to those who will be influenced -by it, but likewise with regard to those who will not. Lastly, the -objection here referred to, allows the thing insisted upon in this -treatise to be of _some_ weight; and if so, it may be hoped it will -have some influence. And if there be a probability that it will have -any at all, there is the same reason in kind, though not in degree, -to lay it before men, as there would be, if it were likely to have a -greater influence. - -Further, I desire it may be considered, with respect to the whole of -the foregoing objections, that in this treatise I have argued upon -the principles of others,[295] not my own: and have omitted what I -think true, and of the utmost importance, because by others thought -unintelligible, or not true. Thus I have argued upon the principles of -the fatalists, which I do not believe: and have omitted a thing of the -utmost importance which I do believe,--[viz.] the moral fitness and -unfitness of actions, prior to all will whatever; which as certainly -determine the divine _conduct_, as speculative truth and falsehood -necessarily determine the divine _judgment_. Indeed the principle of -liberty, and that of moral fitness, so force themselves upon the mind, -that moralists, ancient as well as modern, have formed their language -upon it. And probably it may appear in mine, though I have endeavored -to avoid it; and, in order to avoid it, have sometimes been obliged to -express myself in a manner, which will appear strange to such as do not -observe the reason for it. But the general argument here pursued, does -not at all suppose, or proceed upon these principles. - -Now, these two abstract principles of liberty and moral fitness being -omitted, religion can be considered in no other view, than merely as -a question of fact: and in this view it is here considered. It is -obvious, that Christianity, and the proof of it, are both historical. -Even natural religion is, properly, a matter of fact. For, that there -is a righteous Governor of the world, is so: and this proposition -contains the general system of natural religion. But then, several -abstract truths, and in particular those two principles, are usually -taken into consideration in the proof of it: whereas it is here treated -of only as a matter of fact. To explain this; That the three angles of -a triangle are equal to two right ones, is an abstract truth; but that -they appear so to our mind, is only a matter of fact. This last must -have been admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient sceptics, who -would not admit the former: but pretended to doubt, whether there were -any such thing as truth, or whether we could certainly depend upon our -faculties of understanding for the knowledge of it in any case. - -The assertion that there is, in the nature of things, an original -standard of right and wrong in actions, independent upon all will, but -which unalterably determines the will of God, to exercise that moral -government over the world, which religion teaches, (_i.e._ finally -and upon the whole to reward and punish men respectively as they act -right or wrong;) contains an abstract truth, as well as matter of fact. -But suppose that in the present state, every man without exception, -was rewarded and punished, in exact proportion as he followed or -transgressed that sense of right and wrong, which God has implanted -in his nature: this would not be at all an abstract truth, but only a -matter of fact. And though this fact were acknowledged by every one, -yet the same difficulties might be raised as now are, concerning the -abstract questions of liberty and moral fitness. And we should have a -proof, even the certain one of experience, that the government of the -world was perfectly moral, without taking in the consideration of those -questions: and this proof would remain, in what way soever they were -determined. - -Thus, God having given mankind a moral faculty, the object of which -is actions, and which naturally approves some actions as right, and -of good desert, and condemns others as wrong, and of ill desert; that -he will, finally and upon the whole, reward the former and punish the -latter, is not an assertion of an abstract truth, but of what is as -mere a fact, as his doing so at present would be. This future fact I -have not, indeed, proved with the force with which it might be proved, -from the principles of liberty and moral fitness; but without them -have given a really conclusive practical proof of it, which is greatly -strengthened by the general analogy of nature; a proof easily cavilled -at, easily shown not to be demonstrative, (and it is not offered as -such;) but impossible, I think, to be evaded, or answered. Thus the -obligations of religion are made out, exclusive of the questions -concerning liberty and moral fitness; which have been perplexed with -difficulties and abstruse reasonings, as every thing may. - -Hence therefore may be observed distinctly, what is the force of this -treatise. It will be, to such as are convinced of religion upon the -proof arising out of the two last mentioned principles, an _additional_ -proof and confirmation of it: to such as do not admit those principles, -an _original_ proof of it,[296] and a confirmation of that proof. Those -who believe, will here find the scheme of Christianity cleared of -objections, and the evidence of it in a peculiar manner strengthened. -Those who do not believe will at least be shown the absurdity of all -attempts to prove Christianity false, the plain undoubted credibility -of it; and, I hope, a good deal more. - -Thus, though some perhaps may seriously think, that analogy, as here -urged, has too great stress laid upon it; and ridicule, unanswerable -ridicule, may be applied, to show the argument from it in a -disadvantageous light; yet there can be no question, but that it is -a real one. For religion, both natural and revealed, implying in it -numerous facts; analogy, being a _confirmation_ of all facts to which -it can be applied, and the _only proof_ of most, cannot but be admitted -by every one to be a material thing, and truly of weight on the side of -religion, both natural and revealed. And it ought to be particularly -regarded by such as profess to follow nature, and to be less satisfied -with abstract reasonings. - - - - -CONCLUSION. - - -Whatever account may be given of the strange inattention and disregard, -in some ages and countries, to a matter of such importance as religion; -it would, before experience, be incredible, that there should be the -like disregard in those, who have had the moral system of the world -laid before them, as it is by Christianity, and often inculcated upon -them: because this moral system carries in it a good degree of evidence -for its truth, upon its being barely proposed to our thoughts. There -is no need of abstruse reasonings and distinctions, to convince an -unprejudiced understanding, that there is a God who made and governs -the world, and will judge it in righteousness; though they may be -necessary to answer abstruse difficulties, when once such are raised: -when the very meaning of those words, which express most intelligibly -the general doctrine of religion, is pretended to be uncertain; and -the clear truth of the thing itself is obscured by the intricacies of -speculation. To an unprejudiced mind, ten thousand thousand instances -of design cannot but prove a designer. And it is intuitively manifest, -that _creatures_ ought to live under a dutiful sense of their Maker; -and that justice and charity must be his laws, to creatures whom he has -made social, and placed in society. - -The truth of revealed religion, peculiarly so called, is not indeed -self-evident, but requires external proof, in order to its being -received. Yet inattention, among us, to revealed religion, will -be found to imply the same dissolute immoral temper of mind, as -inattention to natural religion: because, when both are laid before -us, in the manner they are in Christian countries of liberty, our -obligations to inquire into both, and to embrace both upon supposition -of their truth, are obligations of the same nature. Revelation claims -to be the voice of God: and our obligation to attend to his voice is -surely moral, in all cases. And as it is insisted, that its evidence -is conclusive, upon thorough consideration of it; so it offers itself -with obvious appearances of having something more than human in it, -and therefore in all reason requires to have its claims most seriously -examined into. - -It is to be added, that though light and knowledge, in what manner -soever afforded, is equally from God; yet a miraculous revelation -has a peculiar tendency, from the first principles of our nature, to -awaken mankind, and inspire them with reverence and awe. And this -is a peculiar obligation, to attend to what claims to be so, with -such appearances of truth. It is therefore most certain, that our -obligations to inquire seriously into the evidence of Christianity, -and, upon supposition of its truth, to embrace it, are of the utmost -importance, and moral in the highest and most proper sense. Let us then -suppose, that the evidence of religion in general, and of Christianity, -has been seriously inquired into, by all reasonable men among us. Yet -we find many professedly to reject both, upon speculative principles of -infidelity. All of them do not content themselves with a bare neglect -of religion, and enjoying their imaginary freedom from its restraints. -Some go much beyond this. They deride God’s moral government over -the world. They renounce his protection, and defy his justice. They -ridicule and vilify Christianity, and blaspheme the author of it; and -take all occasions to manifest scorn and contempt of revelation. This -amounts to an active setting themselves against religion; to what -may be considered as a positive principle of irreligion, which they -cultivate within themselves; and, whether they intend this effect -or not, render habitual, as a good man does the contrary principle. -Others, who are not chargeable with all this profligateness, yet are in -avowed opposition to religion, as if discovered to be groundless. - -Now admitting, which is the supposition we go upon, that these persons -act upon what they think principles of reason, (and otherwise they are -not to be argued with,) it is really inconceivable, that they should -imagine they clearly see the whole evidence of it, considered in -itself, to be nothing at all: nor do they pretend this. They are far -indeed from having a just notion of its evidence: but they would not -say its evidence was nothing, if they thought the system of it, with -all its circumstances, were credible, like other matters of science or -history. Their manner of treating it must proceed, either from such -kind of objections against all religion, as have been answered or -obviated in the former part of this treatise; or else from objections, -and difficulties, supposed more peculiar to Christianity. Thus, they -entertain prejudices against the whole notion of a revelation, and -miraculous interpositions. They find things in Scripture, whether in -incidental passages, or in the general scheme of it, which appear to -them unreasonable. They take for granted, that if Christianity were -true, the light of it must have been more general, and the evidence -of it more satisfactory, or rather overpowering: that it must and -would have been, in some way, otherwise put and left, than it is. Now -this is not imagining they see the evidence itself to be nothing, -or inconsiderable; but quite another thing. It is being fortified -_against_ the evidence, in some degree acknowledged, by thinking they -see the system of Christianity, or something which appears to them -necessarily connected with it, to be incredible or false; fortified -against that evidence, which might otherwise make great impression -upon them. Or, lastly, if any of these persons are, upon the whole, in -doubt concerning the truth of Christianity; their behavior seems owing -to their taking for granted, through strange inattention, that such -doubting is, in a manner, the same thing as being certain against it. - -To these persons, and to this state of opinion concerning religion, -the foregoing treatise is adapted. For, all the general objections -against the moral system of nature having been obviated, it is -shown, that there is not any peculiar presumption at all against -Christianity, considered either as not discoverable by reason, or as -unlike to what is so discovered; nor any, worth mentioning, against -it as miraculous, if any at all; none, certainly, which can render -it in the least incredible. It is shown, that, upon supposition of -a divine revelation, the analogy of nature renders it beforehand -highly credible, I think probable, that many things in it must appear -liable to great objections; and that we must be incompetent judges of -it, to a great degree. This observation is, I think, unquestionably -true, and of the very utmost importance. But it is urged, as I hope -it will be understood, with great caution not to vilify the faculty -of reason, which is _the candle of the Lord within us_;[297] though -it can afford no light, where it does not shine; nor judge, where -it has no principles to judge upon. The objections here spoken of, -being first answered in the view of objections against Christianity -as a matter of fact, are in the next place considered as urged more -immediately against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the Christian -dispensation. And it is fully made out, that they admit of exactly the -like answer, in every respect, to what the like objections against -the constitution of nature admit of: that, as partial views give the -appearance of wrong to things, which, upon further consideration -and knowledge of their relations to other things, are found just -and good; so it is perfectly credible, that the things objected -against the wisdom and goodness of the Christian dispensation, may -be rendered instances of wisdom and goodness, by their reference to -other things beyond our view. Because Christianity is a scheme as much -above our comprehension, as that of nature; and like that, a scheme -in which means are made use of to accomplish ends, and which, as is -most credible, may be carried on by general laws. And it ought to be -attended to, that this is not an answer taken merely or chiefly from -our ignorance: but from something positive, which our observation shows -us. For, to like objections, the like answer is experienced to be just, -in numberless parallel cases. - -The objections against the Christian dispensation, and the method -by which it is carried on, having been thus obviated, in general, -and together; the chief of them are considered distinctly, and the -particular things objected to are shown credible, by their perfect -analogy, each apart, to the constitution of nature. Thus, if man be -fallen from his primitive state, and to be restored, and infinite -wisdom and power engages in accomplishing our recovery: it were to have -been expected, it is said, that this should have been effected at once; -and not by such a long series of means, and such a various economy of -persons and things; one dispensation preparatory to another, this to -a further one, and so on through an indefinite number of ages, before -the end of the scheme proposed can be completely accomplished; a scheme -conducted by infinite wisdom, and executed by almighty power. But now, -on the contrary, our finding that every thing in the constitution and -course of nature is thus carried on, shows such expectations concerning -revelation to be highly unreasonable; and is a satisfactory answer to -them, when urged as objections against the credibility, that the great -scheme of Providence in the redemption of the world may be of this -kind, and to be accomplished in this manner. - -As to the particular method of our redemption, the appointment of a -Mediator between God and man: this has been shown to be most obviously -analogous to the general conduct of nature, _i.e._ the God of nature, -in appointing others to be the instruments of his mercy, as we -experience in the daily course of Providence. The condition of this -world, which the doctrine of our redemption by Christ presupposes, so -much falls in with natural appearances, that heathen moralists inferred -it from those appearances: inferred that human nature was fallen from -its original rectitude, and in consequence of this, degraded from its -primitive happiness. However this opinion came into the world, these -appearances kept up the tradition, and confirmed the belief of it. -And as it was the general opinion under the light of nature, that -repentance and reformation, alone and by itself, was not sufficient to -do away sin, and procure a full remission of the penalties annexed to -it; and as the reason of the thing does not at all lead to any such -conclusion; so every day’s experience shows us, that reformation is -not, in any sort, sufficient to prevent the present disadvantages and -miseries, which, in the natural course of things, God has annexed to -folly and extravagance. - -Yet there may be ground to think, that the punishments, which, by -the general laws of divine government, are annexed to vice, may be -prevented: that provision may have been, even originally, made, that -they should be prevented by some means or other, though they could not -by reformation alone. For we have daily instances of _such mercy_, in -the general conduct of nature: compassion provided for misery,[298] -medicines for diseases, friends against enemies. There is provision -made, in the original constitution of the world, that much of the -natural bad consequences of our follies, which persons themselves -alone cannot prevent, may be prevented by the assistance of others; -assistance which nature enables, and disposes, and appoints them to -afford. By a method of goodness analogous to this, when the world lay -in wickedness, and consequently in ruin, _God so loved the world, that -he gave his only-begotten Son_ to save it: and _he being made perfect -by suffering, became the author of eternal salvation to all them that -obey him_.[299] Indeed neither reason nor analogy would lead us to -think, in particular, that the interposition of Christ, in the manner -in which he did interpose, would be of that efficacy for recovery -of the world, which the Scripture teaches us it was. But neither -would reason nor analogy lead us to think, that other particular -means would be of the efficacy, which experience shows they are, in -numberless instances. Therefore, as the case before us does not admit -of experience; so, that neither reason nor analogy can show how, or -in what particular way, the interposition of Christ, as revealed in -Scripture, is of that efficacy, which it is there represented to be; -this is no kind nor degree of presumption against its being really of -that efficacy. - -Further: the objections against Christianity, from the light of it not -being universal, nor its evidence so strong as might possibly be given, -have been answered by the general analogy of nature. That God has made -such variety of creatures, is indeed an answer to the former: but that -he dispenses his gifts in such variety, both of degrees and kinds, -among creatures of the same species, and even to the same individuals -at different times; is a more obvious and full answer to it. And it is -so far from being the method of Providence in other cases, to afford us -such overbearing evidence, as some require in proof of Christianity; -that on the contrary, the evidence upon which we are naturally -appointed to act in common matters, throughout a very great part of -life, is doubtful in a high degree. And admitting the fact, that God -has afforded to some no more than doubtful evidence of religion; the -same account may be given of it, as of difficulties and temptations -with regard to practice. But as it is not impossible,[300] surely, -that this alleged doubtfulness may be men’s own fault; it deserves -their most serious consideration, whether it be not so. However, it is -certain, that doubting implies a _degree_ of evidence for that of which -we doubt: and that this degree of evidence as really lays us under -obligations as demonstrative evidence. - -The whole of religion then is throughout credible: nor is there, I -think, any thing, relating to the revealed dispensation of things, more -different from the experienced constitution and course of nature, than -some parts of the constitution of nature are from other parts of it. -If so, the only question which remains is, What positive evidence can -be alleged for the truth of Christianity? This too in general has been -considered, and the objections against it estimated. Deduct, therefore, -what is to be deducted from that evidence, upon account of any weight -which may be thought to remain in these objections, after what the -analogy of nature has suggested in answer to them: and then consider, -what are the practical consequences from all this upon the most -sceptical principles one can argue upon (for I am writing to persons -who entertain these principles): and upon such consideration it will be -obvious, that immorality, as little excuse as it admits of in itself, -is greatly aggravated, in persons who have been made acquainted with -Christianity, whether they believe it or not: because the moral system -of nature, or natural religion, which Christianity lays before us, -approves itself, almost intuitively, to a reasonable mind, upon seeing -it proposed. - -In the next place, with regard to Christianity, it will be observed -that there is a middle between a full satisfaction of the truth of it, -and a satisfaction of the contrary. The middle state of mind between -these two consists in a serious apprehension, that it may be true, -joined with doubt whether it is so. And this, upon the best judgment -I am able to make, is as far towards speculative infidelity, as any -sceptic can at all be supposed to go, who has had true Christianity, -with the proper evidences of it, laid before him, and has in any -tolerable measure considered them. For I would not be mistaken to -comprehend all who have ever heard of it; because it seems evident, -that in many countries called Christian, neither Christianity nor -its evidence, is fairly laid before men. And in places where both -are, there appear to be some who have very little attended to either, -and who reject Christianity with a scorn proportionate to their -inattention; and yet are by no means without understanding in other -matters. Now it has been shown, that a serious apprehension that -Christianity may be true, lays persons under the strictest obligations -of a serious regard to it, throughout the whole of their life; a regard -not the same exactly, but in many respects nearly the same with what a -full conviction of its truth would lay them under. - -_Lastly_, it will appear, that blasphemy and profaneness, with -regard to Christianity, are absolutely without excuse. There is no -temptation to it, but from the wantonness of vanity or mirth; and -those, considering the infinite importance of the subject, are no such -temptations as to afford any excuse for it. If this be a just account -of things, and yet men can go on to vilify or disregard Christianity, -which is to talk and act as if they had a demonstration of its -falsehood, there is no reason to think they would alter their behavior -to any purpose, though there were a demonstration of its truth. - - - - -DISSERTATIONS. - -OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. - -OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. - - -Advertisement. - -In the first copy of these papers, I had inserted the two following -dissertations into the chapters, on _a Future Life_, and on the _Moral -Government of God_; with which they are closely connected. But as these -do not directly fall under the _title_ of the foregoing treatise, and -would have kept the subject of it too long out of sight, it seems more -proper to place them by themselves. - - - - -DISSERTATION I. - -Personal Identity. - - -Whether we are to live in a future state, as it is the most important -question which can possibly be asked, so it is the most intelligible -one which can be expressed in language. Yet strange perplexities have -been raised about the meaning of that identity or sameness of person, -which is implied in the notion of our living now and hereafter, or in -any two successive moments. And the solution of these difficulties hath -been stranger than the difficulties themselves. For, personal identity -has been explained so by some, as to render the inquiry concerning a -future life of no consequence at all to us the persons who are making -it. And though few men can be misled by such subtleties; yet it may be -proper to consider them a little. - -When it is asked _wherein_ personal identity consists, the answer -should be the same, as if it were asked wherein consists similitude, -or equality; that all attempts to define would but perplex it. Yet -there is no difficulty at all in ascertaining _the idea_. For as, -upon two triangles being compared or viewed together, there arises to -the mind the idea of similitude; or upon twice two and four, the idea -of equality: so likewise, upon comparing the consciousness of one’s -self, or one’s own existence, in any two moments, there as immediately -arises to the mind the idea of personal identity. And as the two former -comparisons not only give us the ideas of similitude and equality; -but also show us that two triangles are alike, and twice two and four -are equal: so the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of -personal identity, but also shows us the identity of ourselves in those -two moments; the present, suppose, and that immediately past; or the -present, and that a month, a year, or twenty years past. In other -words, by reflecting upon that which is myself now, and that which was -myself twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and the -same self. - -But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our -personal identity to ourselves, yet to say, that it _makes_ personal -identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to say, -that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action, but -what he can remember; indeed none but what he reflects upon. And one -should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal -identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal -identity; any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute -truth, which it presupposes. - -This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from hence; that to be -endued with consciousness is inseparable from the idea of a person, or -intelligent being. For, this might be expressed inaccurately thus, that -consciousness makes personality: and from hence it might be concluded -to make personal identity. But though present consciousness of what we -at present do and feel is necessary to our being the persons we _now -are_; yet present consciousness of past actions or feelings is not -necessary to our being the same persons who performed those actions, or -_once had_ those feelings. - -The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same, in the common acceptation -of the word, does not appear to have any relation to this of personal -identity: because, the word _same_, when applied to them and to a -person, is not only applied to different subjects, but it is also -used in different senses. For when a man swears to the same tree, -as having stood fifty years in the same place, he means only the -same as to all the purposes of property, and uses of common life; -and not that the tree has been all that time the same, in the strict -philosophical sense of the word. For he does not know, whether any one -particle of the present tree be the same with any one particle of the -tree which stood in the same place fifty years ago. And if they have -not one common particle of matter, they cannot be the same tree in -the proper philosophic sense of the word _same_: it being evidently -a contradiction in terms, to say they are, when no part of their -substance, and no one of their properties is the same: no part of their -substance, by the supposition; no one of their properties, because it -is allowed, that the same property cannot be transferred from one -substance to another. Therefore when we say the identity of sameness of -a plant consists in a continuation of the same life, communicated under -the same organization, to a number of particles of matter, whether the -same or not; the word _same_, when applied to life and to organization, -cannot possibly be understood to signify, what it signifies in this -very sentence, when applied to matter. In a loose and popular sense -then, the life and the organization and the plant are justly said to -be the same, notwithstanding the perpetual change of the parts. But in -strict and philosophical language, no man, no being, no mode of being, -no any thing, can be the same with that, with which it has indeed -nothing the same. Now sameness is used in this latter sense, when -applied to persons. The identity of these, therefore, cannot subsist -with diversity of substance. - -The thing here considered, and as I think, demonstratively determined, -is proposed by Mr. Locke in these words, _Whether it_; _i.e._ the same -self or person, _be the same identical substance_? And he has suggested -what is a much better answer to the question, than that which he gives -it in form. For he defines person, _a thinking intelligent being_, -&c., and personal identity, _the sameness of a rational being_.[301] -The question then is, whether the same rational being is the same -substance: which needs no answer, because being and substance, in -this place, stand for the same idea. The ground of the doubt, whether -the same person be the same substance, is said to be this; that the -consciousness of our own existence, in youth and in old age, or in any -two joint successive moments, is not the _same individual action_,[302] -_i.e._ not the same consciousness, but different successive -consciousnesses. Now it is strange that this should have occasioned -such perplexities. For it is surely conceivable, that a person may have -a capacity of knowing some object or other to be the same now, which -it was when he contemplated it formerly: yet in this case, where, by -the supposition, the object is perceived to be the same, the perception -of it in any two moments cannot be one and the same perception. And -thus, though the successive consciousnesses, which we have of our own -existence, are not the same, yet are they consciousnesses of one and -the same thing or object; of the same person, self, or living agent. -The person, of whose existence the consciousness is felt now, and was -felt an hour or a year ago, is discerned to be; not two persons, but -one and the same person; and therefore is one and the same. - -Mr. Locke’s observations upon this subject appear hasty: and he seems -to profess himself dissatisfied with suppositions, which he has made -relating to it.[303] But some of those hasty observations have been -carried to a strange length by others; whose notion, when traced -and examined to the bottom, amounts, I think, to this:[304] “That -personality is not a permanent, but a transient thing: that it lives -and dies, begins and ends continually: that no one can any more remain -one and the same person two moments together, than two successive -moments can be one and the same moment: that our substance is indeed -continually changing; but whether this be so or not, is, it seems, -nothing to the purpose; since it is not substance, but consciousness -alone, which constitutes personality: which consciousness, being -successive, cannot be the same in any two moments, nor consequently -the personality constituted by it.” Hence it must follow, that it is -a fallacy upon ourselves, to charge our present selves with any thing -we did, or to imagine our present selves interested in any thing which -befell us yesterday; or that our present self will be interested in -what will befall us to-morrow: since our present self is not, in -reality, the same with the self of yesterday, but another like self or -person coming in its room, and mistaken for it; to which another self -will succeed to-morrow. This, I say, must follow. For if the self or -person of to-day, and that of to-morrow, are not the same, but only -like persons; the person of to-day is really no more interested in what -will befall the person of to-morrow, than in what will befall any other -person. - -It may be thought, perhaps, that this is not a just representation of -the opinion we are speaking of: because those who maintain it allow, -that a person is the same as far back as his remembrance reaches. -Indeed they use the words, _identity_, and _same person_. Nor will -language permit these words to be laid aside; since if they were, there -must be I know not what ridiculous periphrasis substituted in the -room of them. But they cannot, _consistently with themselves_, mean, -that the person is really the same. For it is self-evident, that the -personality cannot be really the same, if, as they expressly assert, -that in which it consists is not the same. And as, consistently with -themselves, they cannot, so, I think it appears, they do not _mean_, -that the person is _really_ the same, but only that he is so in a -fictitious sense: in such a sense only as they assert, for this they do -assert, that any number of persons whatever may be the same person. The -bare unfolding this notion, and laying it thus naked and open, seems -the best confutation of it. However, since great stress is said to be -put upon it, I add the following things. - -_First_, This notion is absolutely contradictory to that certain -conviction, which necessarily and every moment rises within us, when we -turn our thoughts upon ourselves, when we reflect upon what is past, -and look forward upon what is to come. All imagination of a daily -change of that living agent which each man calls himself, for another, -or of any such change throughout our whole present life, is entirely -borne down by our natural sense of things. Nor is it possible for a -person in his wits to alter his conduct, with regard to his health or -affairs, from a suspicion, that, though he should live to-morrow, he -should not, however, be the same person he is to-day. Yet, if it be -reasonable to act, with respect to a future life, upon the notion that -personality is transient, it is reasonable to act upon it, with respect -to the present. Here then is a notion equally applicable to religion -and to temporal concerns. Every one sees and feels the inexpressible -absurdity of it in the latter case; therefore, if any can take up with -it in the former, this cannot proceed from the reason of the thing, but -must be owing to inward unfairness, and secret corruption of heart. - -_Secondly_, It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or quality, but a -_being_ only, which is capable of life and action, of happiness and -misery. Now all beings confessedly continue the same, during the whole -time of their existence. Consider then a living being now existing, and -which has existed for any time alive. This living being must have done -and suffered and enjoyed, what it has done and suffered and enjoyed -formerly, (this living being, I say, and not another) as really as it -does and suffers and enjoys, what it does and suffers and enjoys this -instant. All these successive actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, are -actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, of the same living being. And they -are so, prior to all consideration of its remembering or forgetting: -since remembering or forgetting can make no alteration in the truth of -past matter of fact. And suppose this being endued with limited powers -of knowledge and memory, there is no more difficulty in conceiving it -to have a power of knowing itself to be the same living being which it -was some time ago, of remembering some of its actions, sufferings, and -enjoyments, and forgetting others, than in conceiving it to know or -remember or forget any thing else. - -_Thirdly_, Every person is _conscious_, that he is now the same person -or self he was as far back as his remembrance reaches: since when any -one reflects upon a past action of his own, he is just as certain -of the person who did that action, namely, himself who now reflects -upon it, as he is certain that the action was done at all. Nay, very -often a person’s assurance of an action having been done, of which he -is absolutely assured, arises wholly from the consciousness that he -himself did it. This he, person, or self, must either be a substance, -or the property of some substance. If he, a person, be a substance; -then consciousness that he is the same person is consciousness that -he is the same substance. If the person, or he, be the property of -a substance, still consciousness that he is the same property is as -certain a proof that his substance remains the same, as consciousness -that he remains the same substance would be; since the same property -cannot be transferred from one substance to another. - -But though we are thus certain, that we are the same agents, living -beings, or substances, now, which we were as far back as our -remembrance reaches; yet it is asked, whether we may not possibly -be deceived in it? And this question may be asked at the end of any -demonstration whatever: because it is a question concerning the truth -of perception by memory. He who can doubt, whether perception by memory -can in this case be depended upon, may doubt also, whether perception -by deduction and reasoning, which also include memory, or indeed -whether intuitive perception can. Here then we can go no further. For -it is ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those perceptions, -whose truth we can no otherwise prove, than by other perceptions of -exactly the same kind with them, and which there is just the same -ground to suspect; or to attempt to prove the truth of our faculties, -which can no otherwise be proved, than by the use or means of those -very suspected faculties themselves.[305] - - - - -DISSERTATION II. - -The Nature of Virtue. - - -That which renders beings capable of moral government, is their having -a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception and of action. -Brute creatures are impressed and actuated by various instincts and -propensions: so also are we. But additional to this, we have a capacity -of reflecting upon actions and characters, and making them an object to -our thought: and on doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve -some actions, under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of -good desert; and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill desert. -That we have this moral approving and disapproving[306] faculty, is -certain from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognising it in -each other. It appears from our exercising it unavoidably, in the -approbation and disapprobation even of feigned characters; from the -words right and wrong, odious and amiable, base and worthy, with many -others of like signification in all languages applied to actions and -characters: from the many written systems of morals which suppose it, -since it cannot be imagined, that all these authors, throughout all -these treatises, had absolutely no meaning at all to their words, or a -meaning merely chimerical: from our natural sense of gratitude, which, -implies a distinction between merely being the instrument of good, and -intending it: from the distinction every one makes between injury and -mere harm, which, Hobbes says, is peculiar to mankind; and between -injury and just punishment, a distinction plainly natural, prior to the -consideration of human laws. - -It is manifest that great part of common language, and of common -behavior over the world, is formed upon supposition of such a moral -faculty; whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or -divine reason; whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding, -or as a perception of the heart; or, which seems the truth, as -including both. Nor is it at all doubtful in the general, what course -of action this faculty, or practical discerning power within us, -approves and what it disapproves. For, as much as it has been disputed -wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt there may be -about particulars; yet, in general, there is in reality a universally -acknowledged standard of it. It is that, which all ages and all -countries have made profession of in public: it is that, which every -man you meet puts on the show of: it is that, which the primary and -fundamental laws of all civil constitutions over the face of the earth -make it their business and endeavor to enforce the practice of upon -mankind: namely, justice, veracity, and regard to common good. It being -manifest then, in general, that we have such a faculty or discernment -as this, it may be of use to remark some things more distinctly -concerning it. - -_First_, It ought to be observed, that the object of this faculty -is actions,[307] comprehending under that name active or practical -principles: those principles from which men would act, if occasions -and circumstances gave them power; and which, when fixed and habitual -in any person, we call his character. It does not appear, that brutes -have the least reflex sense of actions, as distinguished from events: -or that will and design, which constitute the very nature of actions -as such, are at all an object to their perception. But to ours they -are: and they are the object, and the only one, of the approving and -disapproving faculty. Acting, conduct, behavior, abstracted from all -regard to what is in fact and event the consequence of it, is itself -the natural object of the moral discernment; as speculative truth -and falsehood is of speculative reason. Intention of such and such -consequences, is indeed, always included; for it is part of the action -itself: but though the intended good or bad consequences do not follow, -we have exactly the same sense of the _action_, as if they did. In -like manner we think well or ill of characters, abstracted from all -consideration of the good or the evil, which persons of such characters -have it actually in their power to do. We never, in the moral way, -applaud or blame either ourselves or others, for what we enjoy or what -we suffer, or for having impressions made upon us, which we consider -as altogether out of our power: but only for what we do or would have -done, had it been in our power: or for what we leave undone, which we -might have done, or would have left undone, though we could have done. - -_Secondly_, Our sense or discernment of actions as morally good or -evil, implies in it a sense or discernment of them as of good or ill -desert. It may be difficult to explain this perception, so as to -answer all the questions which may be asked concerning it: but every -one speaks of such and such actions as deserving punishment; and it is -not, I suppose, pretended, that they have absolutely no meaning at all -to the expression. Now the meaning plainly is not, that we conceive -it for the good of society, that the doer of such actions should be -made to suffer. For if, unhappily, it were resolved, that a man, who -by some innocent action, was infected with the plague, should be left -to perish, lest, by other people’s coming near him, the infection -should spread; no one would say he _deserved_ this treatment. Innocence -and ill desert are inconsistent ideas. Ill desert always supposes -guilt: and if one be no part of the other, yet they are evidently and -naturally connected in our mind. The sight of a man in misery raises -our compassion towards him; and if this misery be inflicted on him by -another, our indignation against the author of it. But when we are -informed, that the sufferer is a villain, and is punished only for -his treachery or cruelty; our compassion exceedingly lessens, and in -many instances our indignation wholly subsides. Now what produces -this effect is the conception of that in the sufferer, which we call -ill desert. Upon considering then, or viewing together, our notion of -vice and that of misery, there results a third, that of ill desert. -And thus there is in human creatures an association of the two ideas, -natural and moral evil, wickedness and punishment. If this association -were merely artificial or accidental, it were nothing: but being most -unquestionably natural, it greatly concerns us to attend to it, instead -of endeavoring to explain it away. - -It may be observed further, concerning our perception of good and -of ill desert, that the former is very weak with respect to common -instances of virtue. One reason of which may be, that it does not -appear to a spectator, how far such instances of virtue proceed from -a virtuous principle, or in what degree this principle is prevalent: -since a very weak regard to virtue may be sufficient to make men act -well in many common instances. On the other hand, our perception of ill -desert in vicious actions lessens, in proportion to the temptations men -are thought to have had to such vices. For, vice in human creatures -consisting chiefly in the absence or want of the virtuous principle; -though a man be overcome, suppose by tortures, it does not from thence -appear to what degree the virtuous principle was wanting. All that -appears is, that he had it not in such a degree, as to prevail over -the temptation; but possibly he had it in a degree, which would have -rendered him proof against common temptations. - -_Thirdly_, Our perception of vice and ill desert arises from, and is -the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities -of the agent. For the mere neglect of doing what we ought to do, would, -in many cases, be determined by all men to be in the highest degree -vicious. This determination must arise from such comparison, and be the -result of it; because such neglect would not be vicious in creatures -of other natures and capacities, as brutes. It is the same also with -respect to positive vices, or such as consist in doing what we ought -not. For every one has a different sense of harm done by an idiot, -madman, or child, and by one of mature and common understanding; though -the action of both, including the intention, which is part of the -action, be the same: as it may be, since idiots and madmen, as well as -children, are capable not only of doing mischief but also of intending -it. Now this difference must arise from somewhat discerned in the -nature or capacities of one, which renders the action vicious; and the -want of which, in the other, renders the same action innocent or less -vicious: and this plainly supposes a comparison, whether reflected upon -or not, between the action and capacities of the agent, previous to our -determining an action to be vicious. Hence arises a proper application -of the epithets, incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, to -actions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious. - -_Fourthly_, It deserves to be considered, whether men are more at -liberty, in point of morals, to make themselves miserable without -reason, than to make other people so: or dissolutely to neglect their -own greater good, for the sake of a present lesser gratification, than -they are to neglect the good of others, whom nature has committed to -their care. It would seem, that a due concern about our own interest -or happiness, and a reasonable endeavor to secure and promote it, -(which is, I think, very much the meaning of the word prudence, -in our language;) it would seem, that this is virtue, and the -contrary behavior faulty and blamable; since, in the calmest way of -reflection, we approve of the first, and condemn the other conduct, -both in ourselves and others. This approbation and disapprobation -are altogether different from mere desire of our own, or of their -happiness, and from sorrow upon missing it. For the object or occasion -of this last kind of perception is satisfaction or uneasiness: whereas -the object of the first is active behavior. In one case, what our -thoughts fix upon is our condition: in the other, our conduct. - -It is true indeed, that nature has not given us so sensible a -disapprobation of imprudence and folly, either in _ourselves_ or -_others_, as of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty: I suppose, because -that constant habitual sense of private interest and good, which we -always carry about with us, renders such sensible disapprobation less -necessary, less wanting, to keep us from imprudently neglecting our own -happiness, and foolishly injuring ourselves, than it is necessary and -wanting to keep us from injuring others; to whose good we cannot have -so strong and constant a regard: and also because imprudence and folly, -appearing to bring its own punishment more immediately and constantly -than injurious behavior, it less needs the additional punishment, -which would be inflicted upon it by others, had they the same sensible -indignation against it, as against injustice, and fraud, and cruelty. -Besides, unhappiness being in itself the natural object of compassion, -the unhappiness which people bring upon themselves, though it be -wilfully, excites in us some pity for them; and this of course lessens -our displeasure against them. Still it is matter of experience, that we -are formed so as to reflect very severely upon the greater instances of -imprudent neglect and foolish rashness, both in ourselves and others. -In instances of this kind, men often say of themselves with remorse, -and of others with some indignation, that they deserved to suffer such -calamities, because they brought them upon themselves, and would not -take warning. Particularly when persons come to poverty and distress by -a long course of extravagance, and after frequent admonitions, though -without falsehood or injustice; we plainly, do not regard such people -as alike objects of compassion with those, who are brought into the -same condition by unavoidable accidents. From these things it appears, -that prudence is a species of virtue, and folly of vice: meaning by -_folly_, something quite different from mere incapacity; a thoughtless -want of that regard and attention to our own happiness, which we had -capacity for. And this the word properly includes; and, as it seems, in -its usual acceptation: for we scarcely apply it to brute creatures. - -However, if any person be disposed to dispute the matter, I shall very -willingly give him up the words virtue and vice, as not applicable to -prudence and folly: but must insist, that the faculty within us, which -is the judge of actions, approves of prudent actions, and disapproves -imprudent ones: I say prudent and imprudent _actions_ as such, and -considered distinctly from the happiness or misery which they occasion. -And by the way, this observation may help to determine what justness -there is in the objection against religion, that it teaches us to be -interested and selfish. - -_Fifthly_, Without inquiring how far, and in what sense, virtue is -resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the want of it; it may -be proper to observe, that benevolence, and the want of it, singly -considered, are in no sort the _whole_, of virtue and vice. For if -this were the case, in the review of one’s own character, or that of -others, our moral understanding and moral sense would be indifferent -to every thing, but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed, and -the degrees in which it was wanting. That is, we should neither approve -of benevolence to some persons rather than to others, nor disapprove -injustice and falsehood upon any other account, than merely as an -overbalance of happiness was foreseen likely to be produced by the -first, and of misery by the second. On the contrary, suppose two men -competitors for any thing whatever, which would be of equal advantage -to each of them; though nothing indeed would be more impertinent, -than for a stranger to busy himself to get one of them preferred -to the other; yet such endeavor would be virtue, in behalf of a -friend or benefactor, abstracted from all consideration of distant -consequences: as that examples of gratitude, and the cultivation of -friendship, would be of general good to the world. Again, suppose one -man should, by fraud or violence, take from another the fruit of his -labor, with intent to give it to a third, who he thought would have as -much pleasure from it as would balance the pleasure which the first -possessor would have had in the enjoyment, and his vexation in the -loss of it; suppose also that no bad consequences would follow: yet -such an action would surely be vicious. Nay further, were treachery, -violence, and injustice, no otherwise vicious, than as foreseen likely -to produce an overbalance of misery to society; then, if in any case a -man could procure to himself as great advantage by an act of injustice, -as the whole foreseen inconvenience, likely to be brought upon others -by it, would amount to; such a piece of injustice would not be faulty -or vicious at all: because it would be no more than, in any other case, -for a man to prefer his own satisfaction to another’s, in equal degrees. - -The fact, then, appears to be, that we are _constituted_ so as to -condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve -of benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted from all -consideration, which conduct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of -happiness or misery. Therefore, were the Author of nature to propose -nothing to himself as an end but the production of happiness, were -his moral character merely that of benevolence; yet ours is not so. -Upon that supposition indeed, the only reason of his giving us the -above mentioned approbation of benevolence to some persons rather -than others, and disapprobation of falsehood, unprovoked violence, -and injustice, must be, that he foresaw this constitution of our -nature would produce more happiness, than forming us with a temper of -mere general benevolence. But still, since this is our constitution, -falsehood, violence, injustice, must be vice in us; and benevolence to -some, preferably to others, virtue; abstracted from all consideration -of the overbalance of evil or good, which they may appear likely to -produce. - -Now if human creatures are endued with such a moral nature as we have -been explaining, or with a moral faculty, the natural object of which -is actions: moral government must consist in rendering them happy and -unhappy, in rewarding and punishing them, as they follow, neglect, or -depart from, the moral rule of action interwoven in their nature, or -suggested and enforced by this moral faculty;[308] in rewarding and -punishing them upon account of their so doing. - -I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observation, contradicted -what any author designed to assert. But some of great and distinguished -merit, have, I think, expressed themselves in a manner, which may -occasion some danger, to careless readers, of imagining the whole of -virtue to consist in singly aiming, according to the best of their -judgment, at promoting the happiness of mankind in the present state; -and the whole of vice, in doing what they foresee, or might foresee, -is likely to produce an overbalance of unhappiness in it: than which -mistakes, none can be conceived more terrible. For it is certain, that -some of the most shocking instances of injustice, adultery, murder, -perjury, and even of persecution, may, in many supposable cases, not -have the appearance of being likely to produce an overbalance of -misery in the present state; perhaps sometimes may have the contrary -appearance. - -This reflection might easily be carried on, but I forbear. The -happiness of the world is the concern of Him who is the lord and the -proprietor of it: nor do we know what we are about, when we endeavor -to promote the good of mankind in any ways, but those which he has -directed; that is indeed in all ways not contrary to veracity and -justice. I speak thus upon supposition of persons really endeavoring, -in some sort, to do good without regard to these. But the truth seems -to be; that such supposed endeavors proceed, almost always, from -ambition, the spirit of party, or some indirect principle, concealed -perhaps in great measure from persons themselves. And though it is our -business and our duty to endeavor, within the bounds of veracity and -justice, to contribute to the ease, convenience, and even cheerfulness -and diversion of our fellow-creatures: yet, from our short views, it is -greatly uncertain, whether this endeavor will, in particular instances, -produce an overbalance of happiness upon the whole; since so many and -distant things must come into the account. And that which makes it our -duty is, that there is some appearance that it will, and no positive -appearance sufficient to balance this, on the contrary side; and also, -that such benevolent endeavor is a cultivation of that most excellent -of all virtuous principles, the active principle of benevolence. - -However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to be our rule of -life; it must be added, otherwise a snare will be laid in the way of -some plain men, that the use of common forms of speech, generally -understood, cannot be falsehood; and in general, that there can be no -designed falsehood, without designing to deceive. It must likewise be -observed, that in numberless cases, a man may be under the strictest -obligations to what he foresees will deceive, without his intending it. -For it is impossible not to foresee, that the words and actions of men, -in different ranks and employments, and of different educations, will -perpetually be mistaken by each other. And it cannot but be so, while -they will judge with the utmost carelessness, as they daily do, of what -they are not, perhaps, enough informed to be competent judges of, even -though they considered it with great attention. - - - - -FOOTNOTES - - -[1] Among these were _Jones_, author of the admirable Treatise on the -Canon of the New Testament: _Lardner_, _Maddox_, _Chandler_, Archbishop -_Secker_, &c. - -[2] Sermon at Spittle, on Abraham’s trial. - -[3] Among them were CUDWORTH, born 1617; “Intel. Syst. of the -Universe:” BOYLE, 1626; “Things above Reason:” STILLINGFLEET, 1635; -“Letters to a Deist:” Sir I. NEWTON, 1642; “Observations on Prophecy:” -LESLIE, 1650; “Short Method with Deists:” LOWTH, 1661, Vindic. of -the Divine Author of the Bible: KING, 1669; “Origin of Evil:” SAM. -CLARK, 1675; “Evidences of Nat. and Rev. Religion:” WATERLAND, 1683; -“Scripture Vindicated:” LARDNER, 1684; “Credibility of Gospel History:” -LELAND, 1691; “View of Deistical Writers,” and “Advantage and Necessity -of Rev.:” CHANDLER, 1693; “Definition of Christianity,” on “Prophecy,” -&c.: WARBURTON, 1698; “Divine Leg. of Moses;” Bishop NEWTON, 1704; “On -the Prophecies:” WATSON, 1737; “Apology for Christianity,” (against -Gibbon,) and also “Apology for the Bible,” (against Paine.) - -[4] MCINTOSH: “Progress of Ethical Philosophy.” - -[5] BROUGHAM: “Disc. on Nat. Theology.” - -[6] Verisimile. - -[7] [These three ways of being “like,” are very distinct from each -other. The first is equivalent to a logical induction. The second -produces belief, because the same evidence made us believe in a similar -case. The third is just an analogy, in the popular sense of the term.] - -[8] The story is told by Mr. Locke in the Chapter of Probability. - -[9] [This is good common sense, and men always act thus if prudent. -But it is not enough thus to act in the matter of salvation. “He that -_believeth_ not shall be damned:” Mark xvi. 16. “He that _believeth_ -hath everlasting life:” John iii. 36. “With the heart man _believeth_ -unto righteousness:” Rom. x. 10. Belief is part of the sinner’s _duty_ -in submitting himself to God; and not merely a question of prudence.] - -[10] See Part II. chap. vi. - -[11] Philocal. p. 23, Ed. Cant. - -[12] [Some of these speculations, carried to the full measure of -absurdity and impiety, may be found in Bayle’s great “Historical and -Critical Dictionary.” See as instances, the articles ORIGEN, MANICHÆUS, -PAULICIANS.] - -[13] Ch. i. - -[14] Ch. ii. - -[15] Ch. iii. - -[16] Ch. iv. - -[17] Ch. v. - -[18] Ch. vi. - -[19] Ch. vii. - -[20] Part II. Ch. i. - -[21] Ch. ii. - -[22] Ch. iii. - -[23] Ch. iv. - -[24] Ch. v. - -[25] Ch. vi. vii. - -[26] Ch. viii. - -[27] [This chapter Dr. Chalmers regards as the least satisfactory in -the book: not because lacking in just analogies, but because infected -with the obscure metaphysics of that age. His reasoning, however, only -serves to show that B. has perhaps made too much of the argument from -the indivisibility of consciousness; and by no means that he does not -fairly use it. - -We certainly cannot object that the subject of identity is not -made plain. Who has explained identity, or motion, or cohesion, or -crystallization, or any thing? Locke goes squarely at the subject of -personal identity, (see Essay, ch. 27,) but has rendered us small aid. -His definition is, “Existence itself, which determines a being of any -sort, to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of -the same kind.” I had rather define it “the uninterrupted continuance -of being.” What ceases to exist, cannot again exist: for then it would -exist after it had ceased to exist, and would have existed before it -existed. Locke makes _consciousness_ to constitute identity, and argues -that a man and a person are not the same; and that hence if I kill a -man, but was not conscious of what I did, or have utterly forgotten, -I am not the same person. Watts shows up this notion of Locke very -ludicrously. - -Butler, in his “Dissertation,” urges that consciousness _presupposes_ -identity, as knowledge presupposes truth. On Locke’s theory, no person -would have existed any earlier than the period to which his memory -extends. We cannot suppose the soul made up of many consciousnesses, -nor could memory, if material, spread itself over successive years of -life.] - -[28] I say _kind_ of presumption or probability; for I do not mean to -affirm that there is the same _degree_ of conviction, that our living -powers will continue after death, as there is, that our substances will. - -[29] _Destruction of living powers_, is a manner of expression -unavoidably ambiguous; and may signify either _the destruction of a -living being, so as that the same living being shall be incapable of -ever perceiving or acting again at all_; or _the destruction of those -means and instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of -its present state of perception and of action_. It is here used in the -former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithet _present_ is -added. The loss of a man’s eye is a destruction of living powers in the -latter sense. But we have no reason to think the destruction of living -powers, in the former sense, to be possible. We have no more reason to -think a being endued with living powers, ever loses them during its -whole existence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires them. - -[30] [The next paragraph indicates that Butler does not, as Chalmers -thinks, consider this argument as “handing us over to an absolute -demonstration.” It just places all arguments for and against the soul’s -future life, in that balanced condition, which leaves us to learn the -fact from revelation, free from presumptions _against_ its truth. This -view of the case entirely relieves the objection as to the future life -of brutes; and shows how entirely we must rely on revelation, as to the -future, both of man and beast.] - -[31] [Dodwell had published a book, in which he argues that human -souls are not _naturally_ immortal, but become so, by the power of the -Holy Ghost, in regeneration. Dr. Clarke replied. The controversy was -continued by Collins. Dr. C. wrote four tracts on the subject. - -These “presumptions” form the base of materialism, and hence the denial -of a future state. Surely, thoughts and feelings, if material, have -extension. But can any one conceive of love a foot long, or anger -an inch thick? How superior to the gloomy mists of modern infidels -have even pagans been! Cicero makes Cato say, “The soul is a simple, -uncompounded substance, without parts or mixture: it cannot be divided, -and so cannot perish.” And in another place, “I never could believe -that the soul lost its senses by escaping from senseless matter; or -that such a release will not enlarge and improve its powers;” and -again, “I am persuaded that I shall only begin truly to live, when I -cease to live in this world,” Xenophon reports Cyrus as saying, in his -last moments, “O my sons! do not imagine that when death has taken me -from you, I shall cease to exist.”] - -[32] See Dr. Clarke’s Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defences of it. - -[33] [As every particle of our bodies is changed within seven years, -an average life would take us through many such changes. If the mind -changes with the body, it would be unjust for an old man to be made to -suffer for the sins of his youth. To escape this, the materialist is -driven to affirm that _the whole_ is not altered, though every particle -be changed. - -This argument from the constant flux is irresistible. It proves our -identity, and that matter and mind are not the same. Does it not -also destroy all presumption that the Ego cannot exist without this -particular body?] - -[34] See Dissertation I. - -[35] [The mind affects the body, as much as the body does the mind. -Love, anger, &c. quicken the circulation; fear checks it; terror may -stop it altogether. Mania is as often produced by moral, as by physical -causes, and hence of late moral means are resorted to for cure. The -brain of a maniac, seldom shows, on dissection, any derangement. But -this does not prove that there was no _functional_ derangement.] - -[36] [“S. What shall we say, then, of the shoemaker? That he cuts with -his instrument only, or with his hands also? A. With his hands also. -S. Does he use his eyes also, in making shoes? A. Yes. S. But are we -agreed that he who uses, and what he uses, are different? A. Yes. S. -The shoemaker, then, and harper, are different from the hands and eyes -they use? A. It appears so. S. Does a man then _use_ his whole body? A. -Certainly. S. But he who uses, and that which he uses are different. -A. Yes. S. A man then is something different from his own body.” PLAT. -ALCIBI. PRIM. p. 129, D. Stallb. Ed. - -“It may easily be perceived that the _mind_ both sees and hears, and -not those parts which are, so to speak, windows of the mind.” “Neither -are we bodies; nor do I, while speaking this to thee, speak to thy -body.” “Whatever is done by thy mind, is done by thee.” CICERO, Tusc. -Disput. I. 20, 46 and 22, 52. - -“The mind of each man is the man; not that figure which may be pointed -out with the finger.” CIC., de Rep. b. 6, s. 24.] - -[37] [Butler’s argument, if advanced for _proof_ would prove too much, -not only as to brutes but as to man; for it would prove pre-existence. -And this is really the tenet, (_i.e._ transmigration,) of those who -arrive at the doctrine of immortality only by philosophy. Philosophy -cannot establish the doctrine of a future state, nor can it afford any -presumptions _against_ either a future or a pre-existent state. - -Nothing is gained by insisting that reason teaches the true doctrine -of the soul; any more than there would be by insisting that by it -we learned the doctrine of a trinity, or atonement. Philosophy does -teach that He who can _create_, under infinite diversity of forms, can -_sustain_ existence, in any mode he pleases. - -The reader who chooses to look further into the discussion as to -the immortality of brutes, will find it spread out in POLIGNAC’S -Anti-Lucretius, and still more in BAYLE’S Dictionary, under the -articles PEREIRA, and RORARIUS. The topic is also discussed in DES -CARTES on the Passions: BAXTER on The Nature of the Soul: HUME’S -Essays, Essay 9: SEARCH’S Light of Nature: CHEYNE’S Philosophical -Principles: WAGSTAFF on the Immortality of Brutes: EDWARDS’ Critical -and Philosophical Exercitations: WATT’S Essays, Essay 9: COLLIBER’S -Enquiry: LOCKE on the Understanding, b. 2, ch. ix.: DITTON on the -Resurrection: WILLIS De Anima Brutæ.] - -[38] [It is as absurd to suppose that a brain thinks, as that an eye -sees, or a finger feels. The eye no more sees, than the telescope or -spectacles. If the _nerve_ be paralyzed, there is no vision, though -the eye be perfect. A few words spoken or read, may at once deprive of -sight, or knock a person down. - -The mind sometimes survives the body. Swift, utterly helpless from -palsy, retained his faculties. In some, the body survives the mind. -MORGAGNI, HALLER, BONNET, and others, have proved that there is no -part of the brain, not even the pineal gland, which has not been found -destroyed by disease, where there had been no hallucination of mind, -nor any suspicion of such disease, during life.] - -[39] Pp. 84, 85. - -[40] [We are told by sceptics that “mind is the result of a curious and -complicated organization.” A mere jumble of words! But were the mind -material, there is no evidence that death would destroy it: for we do -not see that death has any power over matter. The body remains the very -same as it does in a swoon, till _chemical_ changes begin.] - -[41] There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life, -here considered: Whether death be the destruction of living agents; -if not, Whether it be the destruction of their _present_ powers of -reflection, as it certainly is the destruction of their present -powers of sensation; and if not, Whether it be the suspension, or -discontinuance of the exercise of these present reflecting powers. Now, -if there be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were -possible, less for the next, and less still for the first. - -[42] This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans, -νομίζειν μὲν γὰρ δὴ τὸν μὲν ἐνθάδε βίον, ὡς ἂν ἀκμὴν κυομένων εἶναι· -τὸν δὲ θάνατον, γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον, καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα τοῖς -φιλοσοφήσασι· Lib. xv. p. 1039, Ed. Amst. 1707. [“For they think that -the present life is like that of those who are just ready to be born; -and that death is a birth into the real life, and a happy one to those -who have practised philosophy.”] To which opinion perhaps Antoninus may -allude in these words, ὡς νῦν περιμένεις, πότε ἔμβρυον ἐκ τῆς γαστρὸς -τῆς γυναικός σου ἐξέλθῃ, οὕτως ἐκδέχεσθαι, τὴν ὥραν ὲν ᾗ τὸ ψυχάριόν -σου τοῦ ἐλύτρου τούτου ἐκπεσεῖται. Lib. ix. c. 3. [As this last passage -may, by some, be thought indelicate, it is left untranslated.] - -[43] [The _increase_ of a force in any direction, cannot of itself -_change_ that direction. An arrow shot from a bow, towards an object, -does not aim at some other object, by being shot with more force.] - -[44] [Our nature will _always_ be ours, or we should cease to be -ourselves, and become something else. And this nature is _social_. -Every one feels, at least sometimes, that he is not complete in himself -for the production of happiness; and so looks round for that which -may fit his wants, and supply what he cannot produce from within. -Hence amusements, of a thousand kinds, are resorted to, and still -more, society. Society is a want of the mind; as food is of the body. -Society, such as perfectly suits our real nature, and calls out, in a -right manner, its every attribute, would secure our perfect happiness. -But Such society must include God.] - -[45] See Part II. chap. ii. and Part II. chap. iv. - -[46] [Objections and difficulties belong to all subjects, in _some_ -of their bearings. Ingenious and uncandid men may start others, which -care and candor may remove. It is therefore no proof of weakness in a -doctrine, that it is attacked with objections, both real and merely -plausible. Error has been spread by two opposite means:--a dogmatic -insisting on doubtful points, and an unteachable cavilling at certain -truth.] - -[47] Part I. chap. vii. - -[48] [Our relation to God is “even necessary,” because we are his -creatures: so that the relation must endure so long as we endure. But -our relations to other creatures are contingent, and may be changed or -abrogated.] - -[49] Pp. 93, 94. - -[50] [“The terms nature, and power of nature, and course of nature, -are but empty words, and merely mean that a thing occurs usually or -frequently. The raising of a human body out of the earth we call a -miracle, the generation of one in the ordinary way we call natural, for -no other reason than because one is usual the other unusual. Did men -usually rise out of the earth like corn we should call that natural.” -Dr. CLARKE, Controv. with Leibnitz.] - -[51] [That man consists of parts, is evident; and the use of each part, -and of the whole man, is open to investigation. In examining any part -we learn what it _is_, and what it is _to do_: _e.g._ the eye, the -hand, the heart. So of mental faculties; memory is to preserve ideas, -shame to deter us from things shameful, compassion to induce us to -relieve distress. In observing our whole make, we may see an ultimate -design,--viz.: not particular animal gratifications, but intellectual -and moral improvement, and happiness by that means. If this be our end, -it is our duty. To disregard it, must bring punishment; for shame, -anguish, remorse, are by the laws of mind, the sequences of sin. - -See LAW’S Notes on King’s Origin of Evil.] - -[52] [It is almost amazing that philosophy, because it discovers the -laws of matter, should be placed in antagonism with the Bible which -reveals a superintending Providence. The Bible itself teaches this very -result of philosophy,--viz.: that the world is governed by _general -laws_. See Prov. viii. 29: Job. xxxviii. 12, 24, 31, 33: Ps. cxix. 90, -91: Jer. xxxi. 35, and xxxiii. 25.] - -[53] See Part II. chap. vi. - -[54] Part II. chap. vi. - -[55] The general consideration of a future state of punishment, most -evidently belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if any of -these reflections should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this -doctrine, as taught in Scripture, the reader is desired to observe, -that Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the future -punishment of the wicked, both as to the duration and degree of it, -in a like manner of expression and of description, as the Scripture -does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of mere -revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great -distinction between the righteous and the wicked, shall be made at the -end of this world; that each shall _then_ receive according to his -deserts. Reason did, as it well might, conclude that it should, finally -and upon the whole, be well with the righteous, and ill with the -wicked: but it could not be determined upon any principles of reason, -whether human creatures might not have been appointed to pass through -other states of life and being, before that distributive justice should -finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches us, that the -next state of things after the present is appointed for the execution -of this justice; that it shall be no longer delayed; but _the mystery -of God_, the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to -prevail, _shall then be finished_; and he will _take to him his great -power and will reign_, by rendering to every one according to his works. - -[56] [Our language furnishes no finer specimens of the argument -analogical. Butler here seizes the very points, which are most -plausible and most insisted on, as showing the harshness and -unreasonableness of Christianity; and overthrows them at a stroke by -simply directing attention to the same things, in the universally -observed course of nature.] - -[57] Chap. i. - -[58] See chaps. iv. and vi. - -[59] [This chapter, more than any other, carries the force of -positive argument. If in this world, we have _proofs_ that God is -a moral governor, then in order to evince that we shall be under -moral government _hereafter_, we have only to supply an intermediate -consideration,--viz.: that God, as such, must be unchangeable. The -argument, as just remarked, assumes a substantive form, because -admitted facts, as to this world, exhibiting the very _principles_ on -which God’s government goes at present, compel us not only to _suppose_ -that the principles of God will remain, but to _believe_ so.] - -[60] Chap. ii. - -[61] The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not -being universal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be -urged against natural religion, as well as against revealed. And -therefore the consideration of them belongs to the first part of this -treatise, as well as the second. But as these objections are chiefly -urged against revealed religion, I choose to consider them in the -second part. And the answer to them there, ch. vi., as urged against -Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against -the religion of nature; to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to -that chapter. - -[62] Dissertation II. - -[63] Chap. vi. - -[64] See Lord Shaftesbury’s Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II. - -[65] [At the foundation of moral improvement, lies the conviction -that what is right, is our happiness, no less than our duty. This -again is based upon a conviction that God governs justly; and has all -power over us for good or evil. As creation is full of the evidences -of _design_, so is Providence. And as the human mind shows, in its -structure, the most exquisite marks of design, so the government of -mind shows a final object for all our faculties. Among the attributes -of mind we observe, conspicuous, a disposition to seek ends, lay plans, -and sacrifice present indulgence to future and greater good: and a -facility in learning how to subordinate one thing to another, so as -to secure success in our plans. This, with conscience to approve or -disapprove our modes, constitutes an evident _adaptedness_ to a moral -government on the part of God; and would be worse than superfluous, if -there be no such government. Every rule of action, deduced by reason -from the light of nature, may fairly be regarded as God’s law; and the -inconveniences resulting from wrong actions, are God’s retributions. -These retributions, felt or observed, are divine teachings, saying, -emphatically, if you act thus you shall receive thus. We do actually -so judge, in relation to physics. Every rule of motion, distance, -gravitation, heat, electricity, &c. &c., is received as God’s law; and -we would deem it insane to act in opposition.] - -[66] [Consult CAPP on the Gov. of God: TWISSE Vindiciæ Prov. Dei: -WITTICHII Excre. Theol.: DWIGHT’S Theol.: MARTINIUS de Gubernatione -Mundi: LIEFCHILD on Providence: MORTON on do.: SHERLOCK on do.: -RUTHERFORD on do.: and the Sermons of Thos. Leland, Porteus, Topping, -Hunt, Davies, Horseley, South, Wisheart, Seed, Collings, and Doddridge.] - -[67] Chap. ii. - -[68] [In the structure of man, physical and mental, we find no -contrivances for disease or pain, so that in general those who conform -to the laws of their being, enjoy happiness; and suffering is chiefly -the result of our own conduct. But, as without revelation we could only -learn the evil of vice, by its effects, and would often learn it too -late to retrieve our affairs, or our souls’ peace, God has in mercy -given forth his teachings, by which, _beforehand_, we may know the -effects of actions.] - -[69] See Dissertation II. - -[70] [It was contended by MANDEVILLE in his “_Fable of the Bees_,” -that private vices, as luxury for instance, are often conducive to the -well-being of society. This idea is fully refuted by WARBURTON, Divine -Legation of Moses, b. 1: BERKELEY, Minute Philosopher, Dial. 2: and by -BROWN, Characteristics, Ess. 2.] - -[71] [A strong illustration of this distinction is seen in the -“delivering up” of our Savior to be crucified. As to the mere act of -delivering up, we find it referred, =1.= To God the Father, John iii. -16: Acts ii. 23: Rom. viii. 32. =2.= To Christ himself, Eph. v. 2, and -v. 25, &c. In this last passage it is literally _delivered himself_. -=3.= To the Jewish rulers, Luke xx. 20: Mark xii. 12. =4.= To Pontius -Pilate, Matt. xxvii. 26: Mark xv. 15: John xix. 6. =5.= To Judas, Matt. -xxvi. 15: Zec. xi. 12. - -As to the _mere act_, Judas and Pilate did just what God the Father, -and our Lord Jesus did. But how infinitely unlike the _qualities_ of -the act!] - -[72] [“When one supposes he is about to die, there comes over him a -fear and anxiety about things in regard to which he felt none before. -For the stories which are told about _Hades_, that such, as have -practised wrong, must there suffer punishment, although made light of -for a while, these torment the soul lest they should be true. But he -who is conscious of innocence, has a pleasant and good hope, which will -support old age.” PLATO, Respub. i. s. 5.] - -[73] See Dissertation II. - -[74] [Aside from revelation, our ideas of the divine attributes must -be derived from a knowledge of our own. Among these is our moral -sense, which constrains us to consider right and wrong as an immutable -distinction, and moral worth as our highest excellence. Hence we -ascribe perfect virtue to God. It does not follow from such reasoning, -that we form a Deity after our own conceptions, for it is but the -argument _a fortiori_, “He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He -that teacheth man knowledge, shall he not know?” Ps. xciv. 9. We do not -conceive of a Deity who sees just as we do; but that _he sees_, for he -makes sight. So we infer that he has moral attributes, because we have -them, from him. - -This point is not sufficiently pressed upon infidels. They readily -acknowledge God’s physical attributes, because the argument is -addressed to their _understanding_, but deny his moral ones, because -their _hearts_ are hardened through the deceitfulness of sin.] - -[75] [It is easy to see that the occasional disadvantages of virtue, -are no less conducive to moral excellence, than its being generally -advantageous. In view of its general advantages, we are virtuous with a -proper and commanded view to our instinctive desire for happiness. In -face of its disadvantages, we cultivate virtue for its own sake.] - -[76] [The common remark, “virtue brings its own reward,” is true -only with qualifications. The apostles, as to _this_ life, were the -most miserable of men: (1 Cor. xv. 9.) Virtue does not _always_ -bring earthly rewards. The grand support of the good is drawn from -considerations of that future state which the infidel denies. Observe, -1. We cannot suppose that God would so construct man, as that his -principal comfort and reward for virtue, is a delusion. 2. Very good -persons are often beset with painful doubts and fears, as to their -future safety. Would God allow such doubts, if the expectation of -future happiness were the _only_ reward of virtue? 3. This reward, at -best, is private; but for the encouragement of virtue, it must have -_obvious_ triumphs. - -On the other hand, bad men grow callous to the rebukes of conscience, -so that great sinners suffer less from remorse than small ones, and -what is worse, owe their tranquillity to their guilt. Again, he who -kills a good man, wholly _deprives_ him of his only reward, if this -life alone gives it. And the villain who kills himself, escapes his -only punishment. - -Virtuous persons, in the strong language of ROBERT HALL,[A] would be -“the _only_ persons who are wholly disappointed of their object; the -only persons who (by a fatal and irreparable mistake), expecting an -imaginary happiness in an imaginary world, lose their only opportunity -of enjoying those present pleasures, of which others avail themselves; -dooming themselves to grasp at shadows, while they neglect the -substance, and harassed with a perpetual struggle against their natural -propensities and passions, and all in vain!” - -[A] Sermon on the Vanity of Man.] - -[77] [Because, so soon as any community, or collection of persons, -conclude a man to be wholly vicious in his course, and without any -restraint of conscience, he is at once shorn of his influence, and will -soon be stripped of all power of mischief. On the other hand, we see -the might of virtue unarmed with power, in Luther, in Roger Williams, -in Wm. Penn, and innumerable other instances.] - -[78] Isa. lx. 21. - -[79] P. 109. - -[80] P. 110, &c. - -[81] P. 111, &c. - -[82] P. 118, &c. - -[83] See this proof drawn out briefly, ch. vi. - -[84] [This chapter is one of many attempts to account for the -mixture of suffering and enjoyment in this world; and demands close -examination both of its theory and its arguments. The student may -consult, as he has opportunity, MUSÆI Disput.: HOLTZSFUSII Disp. de -Lapsu Prim. Hominum: SELDEN de Laps. Angelorum: STAPFERI Inst.: WITSII -Econom. Fœd.: BATE’S Harmony of the Divine Attrib.: CALCOTT on the -Fall: SHUCKFORD on the Creation of Man: MANTON’S Sermons: SOUTH’S -do.: TOPLADY’S do.: PEARSON on the Creed: LE CLERC’S Diss.: HENLY’S -Dissert.: KENNICOTT on the Tree of Life: and FABRICIUS de Primo Peccato -Angelorum Lapsorum.] - -[85] [The _evils_ of life, are not to be regarded as entering, -necessarily, into God’s plan of probation; and they are not here so -presented. The Scriptures show that _all_ suffering is either punitive, -or castigatory. Man at first was to be tried by temptations, not by -sufferings.] - -[86] Chap. ii. - -[87] See Sermons preached at the _Rolle_, 1726, 2d ed. p. 205, &c. -Pref. p. 25, &c. Serm. p. 21, &c. - -[88] [“If we persist in our objection, notwithstanding these analogies, -then should we conclude, either that we are under the regimen of an -unrighteous Deity, or that there is no Deity at all.”--Dr. CHALMERS.] - -[89] [Shall _we_ be of such? Shall we forget or disregard the great -fact that when death has transferred us to other conditions, we, our -proper selves, will remain? No longer, indeed, united with flesh and -blood, surrounded with houses, lands, business, or enjoyments, such as -the present, _but still ourselves_. Still with wants to be supplied, -desires to be gratified, and capacities to be employed and developed!] - -[90] Part II. chap. v. - -[91] [This is one of those passages, remarked on in our introduction, -as a statement not properly explained or guarded. We cannot suppose the -author, to have overlooked the great fact of man’s fall and corruption. -That the argument properly considered, stands good, is the verdict of -such a man as CHALMERS. After speaking of human helplessness in matters -of religion, he says, “There is nothing in this [helplessness] to break -the analogies on which to found the negative vindication that forms -the great and undoubted achievement of this volume. The analogy lies -here:--that if a man wills to obtain prosperity in this life, he may, -if observant of the rules which experience and wisdom prescribe, in -general, make it good. And if he wills to attain blessedness in the -next life, he shall, if observant of what religion prescribes, most -certainly make it good; in conformity with the declaration, ‘he that -seeketh findeth.’”] - -[92] [It comes to this:--good things, in this life, are not forced -upon us; for we may refuse them, or turn any of them into evils. Nor -are they offered for our mere acceptance: but only as the _results_ of -self-control and pains-taking. So is it, as to heaven.] - -[93] [They _are_ an answer, but a cavil remains,--viz.: “the difference -between temporal and eternal things, is so vast that the cases are not -analogous.” Fairly considered, the cases are analogous, differing only -in _degree_, and not at all in principle. What would be wrong on a -great scale, is wrong on a small one. - -Perhaps the analogy may be pressed further. As the happiness and life -of some animals, may be sacrificed for the benefit of man, why may -not the happiness and life of some men, be sacrificed for the good of -innumerable beings of a higher order, who witness the affairs of this -earth? It would but be securing “the greatest good of the greatest -number.” No analogies could _teach_ this, for analogies of course teach -nothing. But if the Scriptures contained this doctrine, immensely more -repugnant than that which our author is here defending, would analogy -offer repellant presumptions?] - -[94] [That is, the son of Sirac, who says, “All things are double, -one against another; and He hath made nothing imperfect: one thing -established the good of another:” Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24.] - -[95] [Consult MILLMAN’S Hist. of Christ, vol. i.: PRIESTLEY’S -Institutes of Nat. and Rev. Rel., vol. i. ch. i.: and WHATELY’S Pol. -Econ., sec. 5.] - -[96] [We are too apt to overlook the effect of actions on the actor; -(which is often the chief effect) in improving or impairing his -own powers. A razor used to cut wood or stone, is not only put to -an improper use, but spoiled for the use which is proper. But this -is a faint illustration. The razor may be sharpened again; but how -shall we restore a blunted sensibility, an enfeebled judgment, or a -vitiated appetite? Our wrong-doing inflicts worse results on ourselves -than on our victims; and the evil may spread disaster over our whole -future. Hence the young make a fatal blunder when they suppose that an -occasional indulgence in impropriety may be compatible with general -welfare, and improvement. Instead of balancing the pros and cons of a -particular act, in the scale of utility or pleasure, they should mark -well its effects on themselves. See the description of how an upright -being may fall; in a subsequent part of this chapter.] - -[97] [“It might seem, at first sight, that if our state hereafter -presented no temptations to falsehood, injustice, &c., our habit of -indulging these vices here would be no disqualification for such -a state; and our forming the contrary habits no qualification. -But _habits_ of veracity, justice, &c. are not merely securities -against temptations to the contrary, but needful for conserving the -_principles_ of love of truth, justice, &c. As our happiness depends -upon _the ratio_ between our circumstances and our dispositions, our -happiness, in a state where things are ordered so as to give no scope -for the practice of falsehood, injustice, &c., _must depend on our -having formed a love for their opposites_. Besides, the circumstances -of the future life may be such as only to remove temptations from -characters formed by such moral discipline as we undergo in this life, -and not all things that could be temptations to any one.”--PROF. -FITZGERALD.] - -[98] It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually -restrain creatures from doing wrong. But if by a _sense of interest_ -is meant a speculative conviction or belief, that such and such -indulgence would occasion them greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than -satisfaction; it is contrary to present experience to say, that this -sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from thus indulging -themselves. And if by a _sense of interest_ is meant a practical regard -to what is upon the whole our happiness; this is not only coincident -with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the -idea itself. And it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to -be improved, as really as any principle in our nature. For we daily -see it overmatched, not only by the more boisterous passions, but by -curiosity, shame, love of imitation, by any thing, even indolence: -especially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose, which -is the end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are -profligate men mistaken, when they affirm they are wholly governed -by interestedness and self-love; and so little cause is there for -moralists to disclaim this principle.--See p. 131. - -[99] [Discipline is mainly promoted by a careful regard to acts of -small individual moment. The subjecting of trivial acts to moral -considerations, is the sure, and the only mode of self-culture. -These acts are embryo habits, and we may often see clearly the moral -character of a habit, when the single act seems indifferent. Thus -viewed, the importance of single acts will seldom seem small. A single -cigar, one glass of wine for convivial purposes, one story told with -exaggerations, may change the complexion of our character, and of our -whole destiny! - -It is doing or refusing to do, from a law-abiding regard to -consequences, that constitutes self-discipline. Papists wholly err -in teaching the repression of bodily desires as in itself virtuous. -Indulgence may be either an obstacle or an aid to moral progress, -according to our reason for indulgence. When we can repress an appetite -or passion whenever indulgence would be wrong, its mastery over us is -broken; and when the passions and appetites act rightly, from force -of virtuous habit, without direct volition, discipline is complete. -Ascetic acts are only useful as _means_, and so long as they are -_ascetic_ (askesis) are proofs of imperfect obedience. Discipline is -good only _as_ discipline; and when complete, changes from a struggle -between principle and inclination, to a spontaneous habit, and -permanent mental peace.] - -[100] [Chalmers objects to this hypothetical fall of man, that it wants -harmony with the Scripture account. But I do not see the force of the -objection. Butler _of course_ does not copy the Scripture account, for -he would then depart from the aim and nature of his book. The Bible -says man fell _suddenly_, no less in his state than in his character. -Butler says that we could not reason out _how much_ disorder and -damage would ensue from the first sin: and in saying this, avoids any -incongruity with the Mosaic account, which tells us how much. What B. -says of the formation of habit, by repeated transgressions, certainly -cannot be gainsayed. - -Adam “died,” the very day he ate the forbidden fruit. The sinner -“lives” the very day he believes on the only-begotten Son of God. -Increase of guilt, or growth in grace are predicable in both instances. -In both also there is an instant transition into a new relationship -with God.] - -[101] [A forced or reluctant obedience is wholly incompatible with -earthly happiness; but may, in the highest degree promote our _future_ -happiness. It will not _long_ mar our happiness, even here; because -being based on principle, and established by habit, it will, in process -of time, be superseded by prompt and pleasurable submission. Thus a -person _habitually_ virtuous, is hardly conscious of self-denial; a -fact noticed by Aristotle. “He who abstains from bodily pleasures and -delights, is virtuous in this very abstinence; but he who is troubled -by it is undisciplined.” Ethic. Nic. ii. 3.] - -[102] P. 145. - -[103] [The student should learn to distinguish between the _kinds_ -of necessity. There is--1. “Logical necessity,” which requires the -admission of a consequent to a premise 2. “Moral necessity,” which -requires means in order to ends. “Physical necessity,” which is the -compulsory connection of sequences to antecedents, in the material -world. 4. “Metaphysical necessity,” which belongs to God only, as -existing eternally and immutably. All these exist and operate, and by -them we govern ourselves. - -But there are various other kinds of necessity, erroneous and -pernicious, which may be grouped under two heads:--1. “Atheistic,” -sometimes called the Democritic, which ascribes all things to the -mechanical laws of matter. 2. “Theistic,” which admits the existence of -God, but denies to him moral character, and makes him the arbitrary and -only agent in the universe, and creatures not responsible. See COLLINGS -on Providence, PRICE’S Dissertations, RUTHERFORD on Providence, -CHARNOCK’S Sermons, and WHATELY’S Logic.] - -[104] P. 157. - -[105] P. 158. - -[106] [HUME says, “though man, in truth, is a necessary agent, having -all his actions determined by fixed and immutable laws, yet, this being -concealed from him, he acts with the conviction of being a free agent.” - -Which is the same as to say that God intended to conceal from men an -important fact, involving the whole subject of right and wrong, but Mr. -Hume found him out!] - -[107] By _will_ and _character_ is meant that which, in speaking of -men, we should express, not only by these words, but also by the words -_temper_, _taste_, _dispositions_, _practical principles_: _that whole -frame of mind, from whence we act in one manner rather than another_. - -[108] Chap. ii. - -[109] P. 157, &c. - -[110] Chap. ii. - -[111] Dissert. II. - -[112] Serm. 2, at the _Rolls_. - -[113] Dissert. II. - -[114] However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God -is determined, by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case; -though one chooses to decline matters of such abstract speculation, -and to speak with caution when one does speak of them. But if it be -intelligible to say, that _it is fit and reasonable for every one to -consult his own happiness_, then _fitness of action, or the right and -reason of the case_, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it -seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of action, -or one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from -design implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that -end, to be the ground of the preference; as to suppose him to discern -an abstract proposition to be true, without supposing somewhat prior in -it, to be the ground of the discernment. It doth not therefore appear, -that moral right is any more relative to perception, than abstract -truth is; or that it is any more improper to speak of the fitness and -lightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, than -to speak of abstract truth, as thus founded. - -[115] P. 118. - -[116] P. 110, &c. - -[117] Chap. ii. - -[118] Dissertation II. - -[119] Pp. 68, 71. - -[120] Serm. 8th, at the _Rolls_. - -[121] [Consult, in favor of the doctrine of necessity, atheistical -writers generally; such as Fichte, Hegel, D’Holback, Comte, Crousse, -Martineau, Leroux, and Holyoake--also, BELSHAM’S Essays, COLLINS on -Liberty, CROMBIE on Phil. Necessity, HOBBES’ Liberty and Necessity, and -Leviathan, PRIESTLEY on Liberty, HARTLEY on Man, and EDWARDS on the -Will. - -Against the doctrine, see BEATTIE’S Works, Part 2; Replies to Hobbes -by BRAMHALL and LAWSON; Replies to Priestley by PALMER and BRYANT; -GROVE on Liberty; CLARKE’S Sermons at the Boyle Lectures; GIBB’S -Contemplations; KING’S Origin of Evil; REID on the Mind; WATTS on -Liberty; HARRIS’ Boyle Lectures; JACKSON’S Defence; BUTTERWORTH on -Moral Government.] - -[122] [MAIMONIDES makes use of the following similitude. “Suppose one -of good understanding, whose mother had died soon after he was born to -be brought up on an island, where he saw no human being but his father -nor the female of any beast. This person when grown up inquires how men -are produced. He is told that they are bred in the womb of one of the -same species and that while in the womb we are very small and there -move and are nourished. The young man inquires whether when thus in -the womb we did not eat, and drink, and breathe, as we do now, and is -answered, No. Then he denies it, and offers demonstration that it could -not be so. For says he, if either of us cease to breathe our life is -gone; and how could we have lived close shut up in a womb for months? -So if we cease to eat and drink, we die, and how could the child live -so for months? and thus he satisfies himself that it is _impossible_ -man should come into existence in such a manner.”] - -[123] [Let us imagine a person to be taken to view some great -historical painting, before which hangs a thick curtain. The attendant -raises the curtain a few inches. Can the spectator, from the unmeaning -strip of foreground, derive any conception of the figures yet -concealed? Much less is he able to criticize their proportions, or -beauty, or perspective, or even the design of the artist? The small -fragment of a tree, or flower, or animal, or building, may seem quite -unmeaning and even ugly, though the whole would present beauty, -fitness, or grandeur. Now the portion of God’s dominions within our -survey, is as utterly insignificant, compared to the universe, and its -interminable duration, as, an atom compared to a planet or a man’s age -to eternity. - -The concluding observations of this chapter, abundantly remove every -difficulty as to such ignorance being as valid against the _proofs_ of -religion, as it is against _objections_ to it.] - -[124] [No truly philosophical mind can be arrogant; because the -wider the range of thought, the greater are the discoveries of our -ignorance. The young student may well hesitate to decide points, on -which the profoundest thinkers take opposite sides, and when conscious -of inability intrust himself to the guidance of those whose lives are -best.] - -[125] Pp. 177, 178. - -[126] P. 173, &c. - -[127] P. 175. - -[128] Pp. 72, 73. - -[129] P. 68, and Part II. chap. vi. - -[130] Serm. at the _Rolls_, p. 312, 2d ed. - -[131] P. 172, &c. - -[132] See Part II. ch. ii. - -[133] P. 173. - -[134] [The remainder of this chapter is a recapitulation of the whole -argument from the beginning; and should be carefully conned.] - -[135] Part II. ch. vi. - -[136] P. 108. - -[137] [There is a slight indication in this chapter that Butler falls -into the old plan of settling the necessity of Christianity, before -determining its truth. Paley discards this order of arrangement, -in his very first sentence; and with good reason. The necessity of -revelation is an abstraction; the proofs of it are patent facts. To -hold in abeyance the credentials presented by Christianity, till -we first satisfy ourselves that God could or would make any such -announcements, is unphilosophical and irreverent. This chapter -discusses the _importance_ rather than the necessity of revelation; and -so is a fitting commencement of the discussion. Every truth disclosed -in revelation, over and above the truths which natural religion -furnishes, proves the _necessity_ of revelation, if we would know any -thing of _such_ truths. And it is such truths which constitute the very -peculiarities of revelation, and teach the _way of salvation_, for the -sinful and helpless.] - -[138] [No one can read the writings of the great sages of antiquity -without a full and sad conviction that in relation to the character -of God, the sinfulness of man, the future state, and the rules of -living, those prime points on which we need knowledge, they were -almost profoundly ignorant. See on this point, LELAND’S Adv. and -Necess.: CHALMERS’ Nat. Theol.: MCCOSH’S Div. Gov.: PASCAL’S Thoughts: -WARBURTON’S Div. Legation.] - -[139] Invenis multos----propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi -sufficiunt sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid -mihi præcepturus est Christus? Ut bene vivam? Jam bene vivo. Quid -mihi necessarius est Christus; nullum homicidium, nullum furtum, -nullam rapinam facio, res alienas non concupisco, nullo adulterio -contaminor? Nam inveniatur in vita mea aliquid quod reprehendatur, et -qui reprehenderit faciat Christianum. _Aug. in Psal._ xxxi. [You find -many who refuse to become Christians, because they feel sufficient of -themselves to lead a good life. “We ought to live well.” says one. -“What will Christ teach me? To live well? I do live well, what need -then have I of Christ? I commit no murder, no theft, no robbery. I -covet no man’s goods, and am polluted by no adultery. Let some one -find in me any thing to censure, and he who can do so, may make me a -Christian.”] - -[140] [The true mode of distinguishing a temporary, local, or -individual command from such as are of universal and perpetual -obligation, is well laid down by WAYLAND, _Mor. Sci._ ch. ix. sec. 2.] - -[141] [Natural religion shows us the danger of sin; but not the -infinite danger of eternal retribution, and the hopelessness of -restoration after death. And as to the efficacy of repentance, it -rather opposes that doctrine than teaches it. At least it does not -teach that repentance may be accepted, so as not only to cancel guilt, -but restore to the favor of God.] - -[142] [“Christianity was left with Christians, to be transmitted, in -like manner as the religion of nature had been left, with mankind in -general. There was however this difference that by an institution -of external religion with a standing ministry for instruction and -discipline, it pleased God to unite Christiana into _visible churches_, -and all along to preserve them over a great part of the world, and thus -perpetuate a general publication of the Gospel.” BUTLER’S sermon before -the Soc. for Prop. the Gospel. He goes on to show, in that discourse, -that these churches, however corrupt any may become, are repositories -for the written oracles of God, and so carry the antidote to their -heresies.] - -[143] Rev. xxii. 11. - -[144] [“It is no real objection to this, though it may seem so at first -sight, to say that since Christianity is a _remedial_ system, designed -to obviate those very evils which have been produced by the neglect -and abuse of the light of nature, it ought not to be _liable_ to the -same perversions. Because--1. Christianity is not designed primarily -to remedy the defects of _nature_, but of an unnatural state of ruin -into which men were brought by _the Fall_. And 2. It is remedial of -the defects of nature in a _great degree_, by its giving additional -advantages. 3. It might be impossible that it should be remedial in a -greater degree than it is, without destroying man’s free agency; which -would be to destroy its own end, the practice of virtue.”--FITZGERALD’S -Notes.] - -[145] [CHALMERS (Nat. Theol., b. v. ch. iv.) makes this very plain. -He shows the _ethics_ of natural religion to be one thing and -its _objects_ another. Natural religion discloses no Redeemer or -Sanctifier; but it teaches how we should regard such a person, if -there be one. It teaches love and conformity to such a being by the -_relation_ in which we of course stand to him. How we are to _express_ -that love and obedience it cannot teach.] - -[146] See The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy, of the Christian -Sacraments, &c., [by WATERLAND,] and COLLIBER of Revealed Religion, as -there quoted. - -[147] [If Christianity were but “a republication of natural religion,” -or as Tindall says, “as old as creation,” why do deists oppose it? It -does indeed republish natural religion, but it adds stupendous truths -beside. If it gave us no new light, no new motives, it would be but a -tremendous curse, making us all the more responsible, and none the more -instructed or secure.] - -[148] P. 94. - -[149] Ch. v. - -[150] John iii. 5. - -[151] This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts -considered respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have -somewhat of a moral nature, we may see the reason of them, considered -in this view. Moral and positive precepts are in some respects alike, -in other respects different. So far as they are alike, we discern the -reasons of both; so far as they are different, we discern the reasons -of the former, but not of the latter. See p. 189, &c. - -[152] [Without offering the least objection to what is here said of -the comparative value of moral and positive institutions, it should -not be overlooked that sometimes, obedience to a positive rite is more -indicative of an obedient spirit, than obedience to a moral rule. The -latter is urged by its intrinsic propriety, over and above the command, -and appeals to several of our finer impulses. The former rests singly -on our reverence for the will of God. There are many who would repel a -temptation to steal, or to lie, who yet are insensible to the duty of -baptism or the Lord’s supper.] - -[153] Matt. ix. 13, and xii. 7. - -[154] Hosea vi. 6. - -[155] See Matt. xii. 7. - -[156] See ch. iii. - -[157] [Dr. ANGUS judiciously remarks on this sentence, “This sentiment, -as understood by Butler, is just, but very liable to abuse. Clearly, -the Bible must be so interpreted as to agree with _all_ known truth, -whether of natural religion or natural science. At the same time, to -correct the theology of the Bible by the theology of nature, as finite -and guilty men understand it, may involve the rejection of Bible -theology entirely; and of the very light and teaching it was intended -to supply. The converse of Butler’s statement is equally true, and even -more important. If in natural theology there be found any facts, the -seeming lesson of which is contrary to revealed religion, such seeming -lesson is not the real one.” Practically, it will be found that seeming -meanings of Scripture, really erroneous, are corrected by other parts -of Scripture itself. I understand Butler as only affirming that we -must interpret Scripture according to immutable principles, and _known -truth_. The infidel rejects it for not conforming to his _assumed -hypothesis_.] - -[158] P. 203. - -[159] Chaps. iii., iv., v., vi. - -[160] Chap. vii. - -[161] P. 172. - -[162] [Papists urge that the actual conversion of the bread and wine -in the Eucharist is an invisible miracle. But an invisible miracle is -such because wrought under circumstances which _exclude_ examination: -while transubstantiation _invites_ and _facilitates_ examination. It is -wrought publicly, and constantly, and yet cannot be discovered to be a -miracle. Indeed it supposes the working of a second miracle, to make -the first invisible.] - -[163] [Paley shows conclusively that a denial of miracles leads not -only to a denial of revelation, but a denial of the existence of God, -all of whose extraordinary acts are necessarily miraculous.] - -[164] [WHATELY, in his _Logic_, b. iii., has shown the folly of the -Deistical attempts to explain our Savior’s miracles as mere natural -events. Having labored to show this of some _one_ of the miracles, they -then do so as to _another_, and thence infer that _all_ were accidental -conjunctures of natural circumstances. He says, they might as well -argue “that because it is not improbable one may throw sixes once in a -hundred throws, therefore it is no more improbable that one may throw -sixes a hundred times running.” - -FITZGERALD says, “the improbability of a whole series of strange -natural events, taking place unaccountably, one after another, amounts -to a far greater improbability than is involved in the admission of -miracles.”] - -[165] [That man, at first, must have had supernatural _instructions_, -or in other words some revelations, is shown by Archbishop WHATELY in -his “Origin of Civilization.” Rev. SAMUEL STANHOPE SMITH expresses -his conviction, both from reason and history, that man in his savage -state could not even have preserved life without instruction from his -Creator.] - -[166] [The maintenance by the Jews, of a system of pure Theism, through -so many and so rude ages, without being superior, or even equal to -their neighbors, in science and civilization, can only be accounted for -on the presumption of a revelation.] - -[167] P. 166, &c. - -[168] [MILLS (Logic, chap. 24, § 5,) points out what he deems a mistake -of “some of the writers against Hume on Miracles,” in confounding -the improbability of an event, before its occurrence, with the -improbability afterwards; that is, considering them equal in degree. -He fully proves that the great Laplace fell into this error, and the -student should consult the passage. - -Prof. FITZGERALD holds Butler to have fallen into the mistake adverted -to by Mills; and quotes the latter author in a way which seems to make -him say that such is his opinion also. I do not so understand Mills, -nor do I see that Butler has confounded these meanings; but the very -contrary. He expressly affirms, and most truly, that the strongest -presumption may lie against “the most ordinary facts _before the proof_ -which yet is overcome by almost any proof.” Butler’s position here, may -be thus illustrated. Suppose a hundred numbers to be put in a box, and -it is proposed to draw out the number 42. Now there are 99 chances to 1 -against drawing that, or any other _given_ number. But suppose a child -tells you he put the hundred numbers into a box, and drew out one, and -it proved to be 42; you at once believe, for that was as likely to come -as any other. - -The proof of Christianity from prophecy becomes amazingly strong, thus -viewed. There are many predictions, for instance that Christ should be -born at a certain time, and place, and under certain very particular -circumstances. The probabilities against such a _conjuncture_ of events -are almost infinite; yet they happened exactly as foretold.] - -[169] [For instance, a mass of ice or snow, may imperceptibly -accumulate for an age, and then suddenly fall and overwhelm a village. -Or a planet, or comet, may have been gradually nearing our earth for a -million of years, without producing, _as yet_, any effect on our orbit; -but in process of time, its proximity may work great changes in our -condition.] - -[170] P. 208. - -[171] 1 Cor. i. 28. - -[172] See Chap. vi. - -[173] See Chap. vi. - -[174] [See note, page 218.] - -[175] P. 220. - -[176] [It is not to be understood that Butler would not have the -ordinary rules of interpretation applied to the Holy Scriptures. -Because the interpretation, “if not gathered _out_ of the words, -must be brought _into_ them.” We cannot interpret them as if we knew -beforehand, what the Holy Ghost meant to say; as SPINOZA proposes to -do, in his Philosophia Scripturæ Interpretes. The student will do well -to consult BENSON’S Hulsean Lectures on Scripture Difficulties: KING’S -Morsels of Criticism: STORR, Exertationes Exeget.: MICHAELIS, Introd. -ad. Nov. Test.: and FEATLEY’S Key.] - -[177] Pp. 207, 208. - -[178] [See 1 Cor. xii. 1-10: xiii. 1: and xiv. 1-19.] - -[179] [“The power of healing, or working miracles, is, during the -whole course of its operation, one continued arrest or diversion of -the general laws of matter and motion. It was therefore fit that this -power should be given occasionally. But the _speaking with tongues_, -when once the gift was conferred, became thenceforth a natural -power; just as the free use of members of the body, after being -restored, by miracle, to the exercise of their natural functions. -In healing, the apostles are to be considered as the workers of a -miracle; in speaking strange tongues, as persons on whom a miracle is -performed.”--WARBURTON, Doct. of Grace, b. i. ch. iii.] - -[180] Heb. vi. 1. - -[181] Acts iii. 21. - -[182] [The doctrine of “development” has of late been popular in -some quarters. Butler here shows the only _safe_ notion we may -entertain on that subject. “Exact thought, and careful consideration” -may show us how to confute specious heresies, expound embarrassing -passages, dissipate painful doubts, and remove many prejudices or -misapprehensions. But revelation is complete as it stands. - -We may hope for progress in theology as in other sciences; not in -the development of new facts or faith, as Papists and Socinians -pretend, but in the increase of sound wisdom, aided by a more perfect -interpretation of God’s word.] - -[183] Chap. vi. - -[184] Chap. v. - -[185] Chap. vii. - -[186] Chap. iv. latter part, and v. vi. - -[187] [This pregnant paragraph should receive very full attention. -We know much of men, little of God. What men are likely to do, or -say, in certain circumstances, is often very clear; and generally may -be guessed at. But what God would do or say in new contingencies, -who shall attempt to prescribe or predict? We are poorly qualified -to assert that such and such declarations could not have come from -infinite wisdom; but we are quite competent to affirm that such and -such things could not have come from human contrivance or enthusiasm.] - -[188] In the foregoing chapter. - -[189] Part I, ch. vii., to which this all along refers. - -[190] [“It is the last step of reason to know there is an infinity of -things which surpass it.”--PASCAL. “The wall of adamant which bounds -human inquiry, has scarcely ever been discovered by any adventurer, -till he was aroused by the shock that drove him back.”--Sir JAS. -MACKINTOSH. “Of the dark parts of revelation there are two sorts: -one which may be cleared up by the studious; the other which will -always reside within the shadow of God’s throne where it would be -impiety to intrude.”--WARBURTON. “A Christianity without mystery is as -unphilosophical as it is unscriptural.”--ANGUS.] - -[191] John xi. 52. - -[192] 2 Peter iii. 13. - -[193] 1 Peter i. 11, 12. - -[194] Phil. ii. [6-11.] - -[195] [The influences of the Holy Spirit are not only “given to good -men,” but are sent upon many who live unmindful of eternity, quickening -their consciences, enlightening their understandings and arresting -their passions, and thus it is they are converted unto the truth in -Christ.] - -[196] John xiv. 2. - -[197] John v. 22, 23. - -[198] Matt. xxviii. 18. - -[199] 1 Cor. xv. 28. - -[200] 1 Tim. iii. 16. - -[201] P. 174, &c. - -[202] 1 Cor. i. [18-25.] - -[203] Pp. 178, 179. - -[204] Pp. 180, 181. - -[205] P. 172, &c. - -[206] [“Providence hurries not himself to display to-day the -consequence of the principle he yesterday announced. He will draw it -out in the lapse of ages Even according to our reasoning logic is none -the less sure, because it is slow.”--GUIZOT on Civilization, Lect. I. - -How impressively is this sentiment sustained by modern geology, and -astronomy!] - -[207] [“Philosophers make shameful and dangerous mistakes, when they -judge of the Divine economy. He cannot, they tell us, act thus, -it would be contrary to his wisdom, or his justice, &c. But while -they make these peremptory assertions they show themselves to be -unacquainted with the fundamental rules of their own science, and -with the origin of all late improvements. True philosophy would begin -the other way, with observing the constitution of the world, how God -has made us, and in what circumstances he has placed us, and _then_ -from what he has done, form a sure judgment what he would do. Thus -might they learn ‘the invisible things of God from those which are -clearly seen’ the things which are not accomplished from those which -are.”--POWELL’S _Use and Abuse of Philosophy_.] - -[208] 1 Tim. ii. 5. - -[209] [The interposition of a man of known probity and worth often -saves the thoughtless or the guilty from punishment. Mediation is seen -in a thousand forms in the arrangements of social life; and the common -sense of all mankind approves of it. The release of the offending, by -the intercession of the good, and all the benefits of advice, caution, -example, instruction, persuasion, and authority, are instances of -mediation.] - -[210] [MR. NEWMAN notices a distinction between the facts of -revelation, and its principles; and considers the argument from analogy -more concerned with its principles than with its facts. “The revealed -facts are special and singular, from the nature of the case, but the -revealed principles are common to all the works of God; and if the -Author of nature be the author of grace, it may be expected that the -principles displayed in them will be the same, and form a connecting -link between them. In this identity of _principle_, lies the analogy -of natural and revealed religion, in Butler’s sense of the word. The -Incarnation is a fact, and cannot be paralleled by any thing in nature: -the doctrine of mediation is a principle, and is abundantly exemplified -in nature.”--_Essay on Developments._] - -[211] [The student will find the inadequacy of repentance to cancel -guilt, beautifully exhibited by WAYLAND, Mor. Science: MAGEE, -Atonement: HOWE, Living Temple.] - -[212] P. 232, &c. - -[213] John iii. 16. - -[214] It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory -reader, that it is, in any sort, affirmed or implied in any thing -said in this chapter, that none can have the benefit of the general -redemption, but such as have the advantage of being made acquainted -with it in the present life. But it may be needful to mention, that -several questions, which have been brought into the subject before -us, and determined, are not in the least entered into here, questions -which have been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps with equal -rashness contrary ways. For instance, whether God could have saved -the world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently with -the general laws of his government. And had not Christ come into the -world, what would have been the future condition of the better sort of -men; those just persons over the face of the earth, for whom Manasses -in his prayer[A] asserts, repentance was not appointed. The meaning of -the first of these questions is greatly ambiguous: and neither of them -can properly be answered, without going upon that infinitely absurd -supposition, that we know the whole of the case. And perhaps the very -inquiry, _What would have followed, if God had not done as he has_, may -have in it some very great impropriety: and ought not to be carried -on any further than is necessary to help our partial and inadequate -conceptions of things. - -[A] [The “prayer of Manasses” is one of the apocryphal books of the Old -Testament, which next precedes “Maccabees.”] - -[215] John i., and viii. 12. - -[216] Rom. iii. 25, v. 11: 1 Cor. v. 7: Eph. v. 2: 1 John ii. 2: Matt -xxvi. 28. - -[217] John i. 29, 36, and throughout the book of Revelation. - -[218] Throughout the epistle to the Hebrews. - -[219] Isa. liii.: Dan. ix. 24: Ps. cx. 4. - -[220] Heb. x. 1. - -[221] Heb. viii. 4, 5. - -[222] Heb. x. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10. - -[223] Heb. ix. 28. - -[224] John xi. 51, 52. - -[225] 1 Pet. iii. 18. - -[226] Matt. xx. 28: Mark x. 45: 1 Tim. ii. 6. - -[227] 2 Pet. ii. 1: Rev. xiv. 4: 1 Cor. vi. 20. - -[228] 1 Pet. i. 19: Rev. v. 9: Gal. iii. 13. - -[229] Heb. vii. 25: 1 John ii. 1, 2. - -[230] Heb. ii. 10.: v. 9. - -[231] 2 Cor. v. 19: Rom. v. 10: Eph. ii. 16. - -[232] Heb. ii. 14. See also a remarkable passage in the book of Job, -xxxiii. 24. - -[233] Phil. ii. 8, 9: John iii. 35, and v. 22, 23. - -[234] Rev. v. 12, 13. - -[235] John vi. 14. - -[236] P. 188, &c. - -[237] Eph. iv. 12, 13. - -[238] John xiv. 2, 3: Rev. iii. 21, and xi. 15. - -[239] 2 Thess. i. 8. - -[240] Heb. ix. 26. - -[241] [Consult MAGEE, on Atonement: STAPFERI Institutiones: TURRETIN, -De Satisfactione: CHALMERS, Discourses: OWEN, Satis. of Christ.] - -[242] P. 194, &c. - -[243] [This objection is ably urged by TINDALL. The answer of our -author is complete. We should remember, that twice in the history of -mankind, revelation _has been_ universal. The first pair, and the -occupants of the ark, comprised the whole population. But how soon was -light rejected! Christianity is universal, in nature and intention; is -to become so in fact; and according to a very probable construction of -prophecy, will continue to be universal, for three hundred and sixty -thousand years.] - -[244] [May not this be a principal object of the Apocalypse? As the -book of Daniel furnished a constant and powerful support to the faith -of the Jew, by the constant development of prophecy, so the Apocalypse, -rightly studied must powerfully, and through all time, support the -faith of the Christian by the continual unfolding and verification of -its predictions.] - -[245] 2 Cor. viii. 12. - -[246] Introduction. - -[247] Part I. chap. v. - -[248] Part I. chap. iv. and pp. 156, 157. - -[249] Pp. 156, 157. - -[250] Dan. xii. 10. See also Isa. xxix. 13, 14: Matt. vi. 23, and -xi. 25, and xiii. 11, 12: John iii. 19, and v. 44: 1 Cor. ii. 14, -and 2 Cor. iv. 4: 2 Tim. iii. 13; and that affectionate as well as -authoritative admonition, so very many times inculcated, _He that -hath ears to hear, let him hear_. Grotius saw so strongly the thing -intended in these and other passages of Scripture of the like sense, -as to say, that the proof given us of Christianity was less than it -might have been, for this very purpose: _Ut ita sermo Evangelii tanquam -lapis esset Lydius ad quem ingenia sanabilia explorarentur_. De Ver. -R. C. lib. ii. [So that the Gospel should be a touchstone, to test the -honesty of men’s dispositions.] - -[251] Pp. 100, 257, &c. - -[252] [See WITSII Meletemeta, Diss. IV.: PFAFII Disput.: CAMPBELL on -Miracles: DOUGLASS’ Criterion: FARMER’S Dissertations: PALEY’S Evid.: -TAYLOR’S Apol. of Ben Mordecai: TUCKER’S Light of Nat.: WATSON’S -Tracts, vol. iv.: JORTIN’S Sermons: Bp. FLEETWOOD’S Essays: BOYLE -Lectures: LARDNER’S Credibility.] - -[253] [“The miracles of the Jewish historian, are intimately connected -with all the civil affairs, and make a necessary and inseparable -part. The whole history is founded in them; it consists of little -else; and if it were not a history of them, it would be a history of -nothing.”--BOLINGBROKE, Posthumous Works, vol. iii. p. 279.] - -[254] [An admirable work on this recondite mode of proving the truth -of the New Testament narrative, is PALEY’S Horæ Paulinæ. The same -department of evidence is ably handled by BIRK, in his Horæ Evangelicæ, -and Horæ Apostolicæ: GRAVES on the Pentateuch: and BLUNT in his -“Undesigned Coincidences both of the Old and New Testament.” GROTIUS, -De Veritate, has some excellent passages on the same subject.] - -[255] [Clem. Rom. Ep. 1. c. 47.] CLEMENT, who is here quoted, lived in -the first century, and is mentioned Phil. iv. 3. His epistle to the -Corinthians, written in Greek, contains the passage here referred to, -which may be thus translated: “Take the letter of the blessed Paul -the Apostle. What did he write to you, in the first beginning of the -Gospel? Truly he sent you a divinely inspired letter about himself, and -Cephas, and Apollos.” - -[256] Gal. i.: 1 Cor. xi. 23, &c.: 1 Cor. xv. 8. - -[257] Rom. xv. 19: 1 Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10-28, &c., and xiii. 1, 2, 8, and -the whole 14th chapter: 2 Cor. xii. 12, 13: Gal. iii. 2, 5. - -[258] See the Koran, chap. xiii. and chap. xvii. - -[259] [MAHOMET expressly declares that he worked no _public_ miracles -in confirmation of his mission, “because the former nations have -charged them with imposture.” He claims, however, to have had private -miraculous assurances of his mission, and most preposterous they were. - -WHATELY, in his Christian Evidences, has handled this aspect of -miracles with great ability. See also PALEY’S Evidences, sec. 3: and -GIBBON’S Decline and Fall, chap. 1.] - -[260] [ALEXANDER, in his Evidences, and several other writers have -placed this argument in a very convincing light. ARNOBIUS, one of the -earliest Christian writers, asks, “Shall we say that the men of those -times were inconsiderate, deceitful, stupid, and brutish enough to -feign having seen what they never saw? and that when they might have -lived in peace and comfort, they chose gratuitous hatred and obloquy?” - -The _rejection_ of Christianity by so many in the first age was the -result of the continued action of personal and hereditary prejudice -and depravity, capable of resisting any supposable evidence. The -_reception_ of Christianity by multitudes, under the same evidences, -and to their immediate personal damage, shows strongly that there was -enough evidence to produce those effects. Thus the rejection by some -does not countervail the acceptance by others.] - -[261] P. 294, &c. - -[262] [Compare BUTLER’S Sermons; on Balaam, and on Self-deceit.] - -[263] See the foregoing chapter. - -[264] [“Whenever a general scheme is known to be pursued by a writer, -that scheme becomes the true key in the hands of his reader, for -unlocking the meaning of particular parts, which would otherwise not -be seen clearly to refer to such scheme. The inspired writers had one -common and predominant scheme in view, which was to _bear testimony to -Jesus_. Whatever passages occur in their writings, which bear an apt -and easy resemblance to the history of Jesus, may, or rather must in -all reasonable construction, be applied to him.”--HURD on the Proph., -p. 117.] - -[265] [Consult on this point, GULICK, Theologia Prophetica: VITRINGA, -Observationes: HENGSTENBURG, Christologia: HORSLEY’S Tracts and -Sermons: KING’S Morsels of Criticism: WAUGH’S Dissertations: LYALL’S -Propœdia Prophetica.] - -[266] It appears that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in this -way. For Jerome on the place says: _Duas posteriores bestias--in uno -Macedonum regno ponit_. And as to the ten kings; _Decem reges enumerat, -qui fuerunt sævissimi: ipsosque reges non unius ponit regni, verbi -gratia, Macedoniæ, Syriæ, Asiæ, et Ægypti; sed de diversis regnis unum -efficit regum ordinem_. [“The two latter beasts he places in one of the -Macedonian kingdoms.” “He reckons up ten kings who had been excessively -cruel and these not kings of one country, as Macedonia, for instance, -or Syria, or Asia, or Egypt; but makes up his set of kings out of -different kingdoms.”] In this way of interpretation, any thing may be -made of any thing. - -[267] P. 189, &c. - -[268] John i. 3. - -[269] Eph. iii. 9. - -[270] Acts iii. 21. - -[271] Rev. x. 7. - -[272] Dan. ii. 44. - -[273] Dan. vii. 22. - -[274] Rev. xi. 17, 18; xx. 6. - -[275] Dan. vii. 27. - -[276] Chap. ii. iii. &c. - -[277] Deut. xxviii. 64; xxx. 2, 3: Isa. xlv. 17. - -[278] Isa. lx. 21: Jer. xxx. 11; xlvi. 28: Amos ix. 14, 15: Jer. xxxi. -36. - -[279] Isa. viii. 14, 15; xlix. 5; chap. liii.: Mal. i. 10, 11, and -chap. iii. - -[280] Isa. xlix. 6, chap. ii., chap, xi., chap. lvi. 7: Mal. i. 11. To -which must be added, the other prophecies of the like kind, several in -the New Testament, and very many in the Old; which describe what shall -be the completion of the revealed plan of Providence. - -[281] [See DAVIDSON’S Disc. on Proph.: BLANEY on Daniel’s LXX. Weeks: -HURD’S Introd. to the Study of Proph.: JORTIN’S Ser. at Boyle Lect.: -FULLER’S Gosp. its own Witness, part ii.: WAUGH’S Diss.: APTHORPE’S -Discourses.] - -[282] P. 250. - -[283] [Hundreds of instances might be adduced, in which profane -historians corroborate the statements of the Scriptures. The following -are merely specimens: DIODORUS SICULUS, STRABO, TACITUS, PLINY, and -SOLINUS, speak of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. The lives of -David and Solomon are given in the remains of the PHŒNICIAN ANNALS, -in DAMASCENUS, and EUPOLEMUS. MENANDER describes the carrying away of -the Ten Tribes by Salmanasor. SUETONIUS, TACITUS, PLINY the younger, -and NUMENIUS, speak of Jesus Christ. His miracles are owned by -CELSUS, PORPHYRY, JULIAN, and Jewish writers opposed to Christianity. -SUETONIUS, TACITUS, PLINY, JULIAN, and others describe his being put -to death; and TACITUS says that many were put to death for adhering -to his religion. PHLEGON mentions the miracles of Peter; and Paul is -enumerated among eminent authors, in a fragment of LONGINUS.] - -[284] [This thought is elaborated with skill by WHATELY in his -“_Historic Doubts_.” He takes up all the popular infidel objections -as to the life of Christ, and applies them with undiminished or even -increased force against the evidences that such a man as Buonaparte -ever existed. - -JOHNSON in a lively sally once said--“‘It is easy to be on the negative -side. I deny that Canada is taken. The French are a much more numerous -people than we; and it is not likely they would allow us to take it.’ -‘But the Government have announced the fact.’ ‘Very true. But the -ministry have put us to an enormous expense by the war in America, and -it is their interest to persuade us that we have got something for -our money.’ ‘But the fact is confirmed by thousands who were at the -taking of it.’ ‘Aye, but these men have an interest in deceiving us: -they don’t want you should think the French have beat them. Now suppose -you go over and find it so, that would only satisfy yourself; for -when you come back we will not believe you. We will say you have been -bribed.’”--BOSWELL.] - -[285] P. 267, &c. - -[286] P. 270, &c. - -[287] Deut. xxviii. 37. - -[288] All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not -reducible to the head of certain miracles, or determinate completions -of prophecy. See p. 263. - -[289] [Butler states this argument with more than his usual brevity, -and its force is not seen without reflection. “If contrivance or -accident could have given to Christianity _any_ of its apparent -testimonies, its miracles, its prophecies, its morals, its propagation, -or [the character of] its founder, there could be no room to believe, -or even imagine, that _all_ these appearances of great credibility, -could be _united together_, by any such means. If successful craft -could have contrived its public miracles, or the pretence of them, -it requires another reach of craft, to adopt its prophecies to the -same object. Further, it required not only a different, but a totally -opposite art to conceive and promulgate its admirable morals. Again, -its propagation, in defiance of the powers and terrors of the world, -implied still other qualities of action. Lastly, the model of the life -of its founder, is a work of such originality and wisdom, as could be -the offspring only of consummate powers of invention, or rather never -could have been _devised_, but must have come from real life. The -hypothesis sinks under its incredibility. Each of these suppositions of -contrivance, being arbitrary and unsupported, the climax of them is an -extravagance.”--DAVISON, on Prophecy.] - -[290] 1 John iv. 18.--[“There is no fear in love,” &c.] - -[291] [Obedience from dread, if it continue to be the only motive, -precludes advance toward perfection; for “He that feareth is not -made perfect in love.” But obedience from a discernment of the -reasonableness and beneficence of religion, and of the perfections of -its Author, increases love till it “casteth out fear.”] - -[292] [See a discussion of this subject, in BAYLE’S Historical and -Biographical Dictionary: art. XENOPHANES: notes D, E, F, G.] - -[293] See Dissertation II. - -[294] [It is remarked by DEAN FITZGERALD, that “It is not inconceivable -that the Almighty should apply such a test of men’s candor and -fidelity, as should require them first to act upon a thing as true, -before they were so fully satisfied of its truth as to leave no doubt -remaining. Such a course of action might be the appointed, and for all -we know, the only possible way of overcoming habits of thought and -feeling, repugnant to the belief demanded, so that a fixed religious -faith might be the reward, as it were, of a sincere course of prudent -behavior.”] - -[295] By _arguing upon the principles of others_, the reader will -observe is meant, not proving any thing _from_ those principles, but -_notwithstanding_ them. Thus religion is proved, not _from_ the opinion -of necessity; which is absurd: but, _notwithstanding_ or _even though_ -that opinion were admitted to be true. - -[296] P. 141, &c. - -[297] Prov. xx. 27. - -[298] Serm. at the _Rolls_, p. 106. - -[299] John iii. 16: Heb. v. 9. - -[300] P. 258, &c. - -[301] Locke’s Works, vol. i. p. 146. - -[302] Locke, pp. 146, 147. - -[303] Locke, p. 152. - -[304] See an answer to Dr. Clarke’s Third Defence of his Letter to Mr. -Podwell, 2d edit. p. 44, 56, &c. - -[305] [“One is continually reminded throughout this dissertation, of -what is called _The common-sense school_ of Scotch metaphysicians. Nor -can there be any doubt that REID, in particular, was largely indebted -to Butler, of whose writings he was a diligent student, for forming -that sober and manly character of understanding which is, I think, his -great merit.”--FITZGERALD.] - -[306] This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus,[A] and is made -use of as seeming the most full, and least liable to cavil. And -the moral faculty may be understood to have these two epithets, -δοκιμαστικὴ and ἀποδοκιμαστικὴ [applauding and condemning] upon a -double account; because, upon a survey of actions, whether before or -after they are done, it determines them to be good or evil; and also -because it determines itself to be the guide of action and of life, -in contradistinction from all other faculties, or natural principles -of action; in the very same manner as speculative reason _directly_ -and naturally judges of speculative truth and falsehood: and at the -same time is attended with a consciousness upon _reflection_, that the -natural right to judge of them belongs to it. - -[A] Arr. Epict. lib. i. cap. i. - -[307] Οὐδὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία--ἐν πείσει ἀλλὰ ἐνεργείᾳ, [Virtue and vice -are not in feeling, but in action,] M. Anton, lib. ix. 16. Virtutis -laus omnis in actione consistit. [The whole praise of virtue, depends -on action.] Cic. Off. lib. i. cap. 6. - -[308] P. 145. - - - - -INDEX TO PART I. - -REFERENCES TO THE EDITOR’S NOTES ARE IN BRACKETS. - - - Abstract reasonings may mislead, 162 - fitness of things, _note_ 166 - - Actions - distinguished from their qualities, 111 - manifest character, 156 - rewarded and punished, 98 - this world a theater of, 156 - what sort exercise virtue, 152 - - Active and passive impressions, 140 - - Advantages of virtue, 113 - may never recur, 101 - - Affections, excited by objects, 145 - need control, 166 - part of our constitution, 147 - - Affliction, a discipline, 150 - chiefly of our own making, 100 - - Agent, the living, not compounded, 81 - - Alienation of parts of our body, 84 - - All things made double, 137 - - Allurements, use of, 151 - - Analogy - answers objections as to a present state of trial, 135 - as to modes of existence, 78 - carrying the force of positive argument, [105 - deals only with facts, 171 - indicates future punishment, 101 - may amount to proof, 168 - objections which it cannot answer, 171 - the only proof of some things, 79 - - Antiquity of religion, 167 - - Atheists not argued with, in this treatise, 181 - - - Beginnings of a righteous government seen on earth, 107 - - Bible, teaches the existence of general laws, [99 - - Bodies - not necessary to us, 82 - not ourselves, 83 - only instruments, 85, 86 - their solid elements, 88 - - Bodily and mental habits, 134 - - Brain, does not think, [89 - - Brahminical notion of death, 92 - - Brutes, - are they immortal?, [88 - may have greater strength than man, 119 - under man’s control, 119 - - - Capacities, - state of in infancy, 88 - not destroyed by death, 89 - not dependent on the body, 79 - - Causes and ends incomprehensible, 172 - - Changes compatible with identity, 78, 83 - - Character - manifested by probation, 156 - not given but acquired, 155 - what it means, _note_ 163 - - Conscience, - how it acts, 164 - implies government, 115 - a rule, 164 - authority, 164 - future retribution, 165 - may be impaired, 168 - perverted, 168 - - Consciousness an indiscerptible entity, 82 - presupposes identity, [77 - - Consequences - may sometimes be avoided, 102 - may be foreseen, 98 - show a moral government, 98 - - Course of nature constant, 97 - - Creatures finitely perfect, 147 - may fall, 148 - have each a way of life, 137 - - - Danger of wrong doing, how increased, 132 - - Death - and birth similar, 91 - enlarges our sphere, 92 - has no power over matter, [91 - is not a suspension of our powers, 91 - is not our destruction, 80 - what it is, 80 - - Decay of vegetables, inference from, 92 - - Definitions of identity, 77 - - Delivering up of the Lord Jesus Christ, [111 - - Destruction of seeds, 153 - - Different states of human existence, 89 - - Difficulties belong to all subjects, [96 - exercise the virtuous principle, 152 - - Disadvantages of virtue temporary, 126 - - Discipline, its true nature and use, [148 - - Disease not destructive to the soul, 90 - sometimes remedial, 177 - - Disorder produced by sin, 148 - - Distress excites passive pity and active relief, 140 - - Distributive justice a natural rule, 110 - - Divine government a scheme, CHAP. VII. - - Domestic government, 114 - - Dreams, what they prove, 86 - - - Earthly satisfactions attainable, 183 - - Effects of actions on the actor, [143 - - Ends often produced by unlikely means, 180 - - Enjoyments in our own power to a great degree, 95 - - Error, how spread, [96 - - Evidence of natural religion, 166 - - Evil, may possibly be useful, 177 - its possible origin, 147 - not a necessary part of probation, [128 - - Exceptions to the happiness of virtue, 108 - - Experience indispensable, 141 - - - Faculties, human, not perfect at first, 141 - - Fall of man, 133, [148 - - Fallacy in fatalism, 169 - - Fallen creatures require discipline, 150 - - Fatalism,--see _Necessity_. - - Fear a proper motive to obedience, 154 - - Folly, destructive, as well as crime, 132 - - Formal notion of government, 99 - - Foundation of moral improvement, [108 - - Future advantages, how proportioned, 93 - - Future existence probable, CHAP. I. - of brutes, [79 - - Future interest dependent on conduct, 95 - - Future life, - a solemn subject, 95 - not an inactive condition, 144 - reconcilable with atheism, 94 - this life preparatory to it, CHAP. V. - - Future punishment credible, 103 - - Future retribution, how proved, 125 - - Future state - different from the present, 78 - brings us into new scenes, 93 - may have temptations, [145 - social, 144 - will not require such virtues as does the present life, 154 - - - General laws - govern the world, 177, [99 - produce punishment, 103 - wisdom of them, 178 - - General method of God’s government, 97 - - General system of religion, 124 - - Gradual improvement, a wise arrangement, 141, 142 - - GOD - an intelligent governor, 106 - determined by what is fit, [166 - governs by human instruments, 111 - governs justly, [108 - has a will and a character, 163 - his aims incomprehensible, 97 - his attributes inferred from our own, [115 - his general government, 97 - his government just and good, 176 - his indirect commands, 165 - moral government of, CHAP. III. - natural ” , ” II. - necessarily existent, 159 - not indifferent to human actions, 125 - not simply benevolent, 106 - rewards and punishes, 169 - the only necessary being, 159 - - Good actions, how punished, 111 - - Good habits necessary even to the virtuous, 149 - - Good men befriended as such, 112 - cannot now all unite, 121 - - Good not forced upon us, [134 - - Government, - civil, an ordinance of God, 111 - considered as a scheme, CHAP. VII. - of God, CHAP. II. - not perfected in this world, 107 - the formal notion of it, 98 - the perfection of, 106 - - - Habits, - how formed, &c., 139 - necessary to us hereafter, [145 - of resignation, 155 - often ruinous, 101 - of virtue an improvement in virtue, 147 - passive, 138 - shape the character, 141 - - Happiness - not always the _immediate_ reward of virtue, 108 - not given promiscuously, 138 - requisites for, 137 - the result of virtue, 118 - - Helplessness of man, [138 - - Higher degrees of retribution probable, 127 - - Hinderances to virtue, 121 - - History of religion, 169 - - Honest men befriend the honest, 112 - - Hope and fear appeal to self-love, 153 - are just principles of action, 154 - - Human life preparatory, 144 - - Hume’s wonderful discovery, [162 - - Human powers may be overtasked, 152 - - - Identity - does not depend on the sameness of the body, 83 - of living agents, 77, 78 - not explicable, [77 - - Ignorance - acknowledged on all subjects but religion, 174 - answers objections, 175 - the argument from, 180 - total, destroys proof, 178 - - Illustration of the modification of an action by its intention, [111 - - Imagination a source of discontent, 154 - produces much error, 81 - - Immortality of brutes, 88 - - Improvement - by discipline, 144 - by habit, 147 - of our faculties gradual, 141 - wisdom of this, 142 - - Incomprehensibility of God’s plans, 97 - - Inconsiderateness destructive, 102 - - Inferiority of brute force, 119 - - Infidelity unjustifiable, 105 - - Insignificance of our knowledge, [174 - - Interest coincident with virtue, 154 - not a sufficient restraint, _note_ 146 - - Interpositions to prevent irregularities, 177 - would produce evil, 178 - - Intentional good rewarded, 114 - - Irregularities perhaps unavoidable, 177 - seeming may not be such, 176 - - Inward peace attends virtue, 112 - - - Kingdom, idea of a perfect, 123 - - Knowledge of man insignificant, [174 - - - Liberty does not account for the fall, 147 - implied in our present condition, 162 - - Life a probation, 128 - one part of it preparatory to another, [142 - what is it intended for, 137 - - Living agent not subject to death, 79 - - Living powers, see _Death_. - - Locke on human identity, [77 - - - Maimonides, his similitude, [173 - - Man - an inferior part of creation, 133 - a system of parts, [98 - by nature social, [93 - capable of improvement, 145 - connected with present, past, and future, 181 - dealt with as if free, 162 - has a moral nature, 115 - his fall not accounted for by his free agency, 147 - his helplessness, [138 - knows nothing fully, 173 - may become qualified for new states, 137 - not a competent judge of God’s schemes, 174 - requires moral culture, 145 - - Mania often produced by moral causes, [85 - - Materialism, its philosophical absurdity, [81 - - Matter and mind not the same, [83 - affect each other, 85 - - Means - learned by experience, 176 - man not a competent judge of the fitness of them, 178 - not always agreeable, 176 - - Men often miss possible temporal good, 129 - - Men’s temporal interests greatly depend on themselves, 131 - - Might of unarmed virtue, [121 - - Mind - influenced by the passions, 131 - is the man, [87 - its effects on the body, [85 - may survive the body, [89 - the only real percipient, 85 - uses the body as an instrument, [87 - - Miracles, properly speaking, not unnatural, 94 - - Miseries as contingent as conduct, 135 - generally are avoidable, 100 - - Mixture of suffering and enjoyment in this world, [128 - - Moral and natural government of God similar to each other, 184 - - Moral attributes of God may be inferred from our own, [115 - - Moral discipline, CHAP. V. - - Moral government of God, CHAP. III. - - Moral improvement, basis of, [108 - - Moral world, its apparent irregularities, 176 - - Mystery of God, finished, _note_ 102 - - - Natural, the true meaning of the word, 94 - - Natural government of God, CHAP. II. - - Natural religion, - its evidences not affected by the doctrine of necessity, 166 - proof of, 166 - teaches the doctrine of punishment, 102 - - Necessary agents may be punished, 169 - - Necessary bulk of one’s self, 84 - - Necessary existence of God, 159 - - Necessary tendencies of virtue, 118 - - Negligence and folly disastrous, 132 - - Necessity - consigns us to a fallacy, 169 - contradicts the constitution of nature, 170 - destroys no proof of religion, 170 - different kinds of, [157 - does not exclude design, 160 - doctrine of, CHAP. VI. - not an agent, 159 - not applicable to practice, 163 - not in conflict with religion, 160 - our condition indicates freedom, 162 - reconcilable with religion, 168 - the doctrine absurd, 157 - what it means, 158 - writers for and against, [170 - - New scenes in the next world, 93 - - - Obedience, reluctant, useful, [152 - - Objections, - against a proof and against a thing to be proved, 179 - against the scheme of Providence, 174 - analogy of plants, 92 - Christianity not universal, 169 - course of nature, 97 - destruction of seeds, 153 - difference between temporal and eternal things, [135 - discipline might have been avoided, 156 - God simply benevolent, 106 - good and evil may be mixed in the next world, 124 - gratification of appetites natural and proper, 98 - ignorance, the argument from invalidates the proof of religion, 178 - immortality of brutes, 87 - incredible that necessary agents should be punished, 169 - irregularities of the moral world, 176 - necessity destroys the proof of religion, 165 - our powers may be overtasked, 152 - probabilities may be overbalanced by probabilities, 169 - punishments are only natural events, 99 - rectitude arising from hope and fear, sordid, 153 - rewards and punishments, 95 - sin need not have entered the world, 177 - society punishes good actions, 111 - special interpositions might prevent evil, 177, 178 - to the doctrine of necessity, CHAP. VI. - to the doctrine of future punishments, 100-103 - virtue sometimes punished, 111 - virtues of the present life not wanted hereafter, 154 - world disciplines some to vice, 153 - - Obligation certain, when proofs are not, 179 - - Occasional disadvantages of virtue, 117 - - Occasional indulgences in wrong-doing awfully dangerous, [143 - - One period of life preparatory to another, [142 - - Opportunities once lost irrecoverable, 143 - - Organs of sense mere instruments, 89 - - Our moral nature proves a moral government, 115 - - - Pain, no contrivance for it in man, [110 - - Partial ignorance does not destroy proof, 178 - - Passions - carry away the judgment, 131 - make our condition one of trial, 130 - may account for the fall of man, 147 - may be excited where gratification is impossible or unlawful, 146 - may remain in a future state, 147 - should be subject to the moral principle, 145 - the bare excitement of, not criminal, 145 - but dangerous, 146 - - Passive habits, 138 - - Passive impressions weakened by repetition, 139 - - Passive submission essential, 155 - - Peace of the virtuous, 112 - - Perception, instruments of, 85 - possible without instruments, 86 - - Perfection of moral government, 106, 107 - of an earthly kingdom, 123 - - Persecution unnatural, 111 - - Philosophy never arrogant, [174 - what it cannot teach, [87 - - Pleasure - not a sufficient reason for action, 98 - and pain mostly depend on ourselves, 95 - the distribution indicates moral government, 105 - - Powers - may be improved by exercise, 138 - may be overtasked, 152 - may exist and not be exercised, 80 - no reason for supposing that death will destroy them, 81 - - Practical proof, what, 168 - - Present existence unaccounted for by atheism, 94 - - Presumptions that death will destroy us, 81 - that it will suspend our existence, 91 - - Presumptuousness unjustifiable, 105 - - Private vices not public benefits, [111 - - Probabilities in favor of religion may be overbalanced by - probabilities against it, 169 - - Probation, CHAP. IV. - applies to the present life as well as the future, 130 - does not necessarily imply suffering, [128 - implies allurements, 129 - is more than moral government, 128 - requires severe discipline, 150 - - Proofs of natural religion, 166 - of religion not affected by the doctrine of necessity, 160 - - Propensions necessarily create temptations, 146 - are excited by their appropriate objects, 147 - - Proper gratification of the appetites, 98 - - Prosperity of a virtuous community, 123 - may beget discontent, 154 - - Providence, objections to God’s, 140, 174 - - Public spirit a fruit of virtue, 120 - - Punishment - an alarming subject, 105 - especially considered, 100 - greater hereafter than now, 127 - in a future state credible, 103, 125 - is God’s voice of instruction, [108 - is sometimes capital, 102 - not unjust, 163 - often long delayed, 101 - often overtakes suddenly, 101 - of virtuous actions, 111 - religious and natural similar, 100 - results from folly as well as crime, 132 - the result of general laws, 103 - - - Quotations. - Aristotle, [152 - Chalmers, [131, 138, 148 - Cicero, [82, 86 - Clarke, [97 - Fitzgerald, [145 - Robert Hall, [118 - Hume, [162 - Maimonides, [173 - Mandeville, [111 - Plato, [87, 113 - Son of Sirac, [137 - Strabo, [92 - - - Rashness, consequences of, 96 - - Reason - an incompetent judge of means, 178 - gives power over brute force, 119 - needs experience, 141 - not dependent on bodily powers, 89 - requires a fair opportunity, 119-121 - - Recapitulation of the whole argument, 180 - - Rectitude, is self-interest a proper motive to it?, 153 - - References to other authors. - Bates, [128 - Baxter, [88 - Bayle, [88 - Beattie, [170 - Belsham, [170 - Berkeley, [111 - Bonnett, [89 - Bramhall, [171 - Brown, [111 - Bryant, [171 - Butterworth, [107 - Calcott, [128 - Capp, [109 - Chalmers, [77, 79, 148 - Charnock, [158 - Cheyne, [88 - Clarke, 82, [81, 97, 171 - Colliber, [88 - Collings, [158, 170 - Compte, [170 - Crombie, [170 - Crouse, [170 - Davies, [109 - D’Holbach, [170 - Descartes, [88 - Ditton, [88 - Doddridge, [109 - Dodwell, [81 - Dwight, [109 - Edwards, [88, 170 - Fabricius, [128 - Fichte, [170 - Gibbs, [171 - Grove, [171 - Haller, [89 - Harris, [171 - Hartley, [170 - Hegel, [170 - Henly, [128 - Hobbes, [170 - Holtzfusius, [128 - Holyoake, [170 - Horseley, [109 - Hume, [88 - Hunt, [109 - Jackson, [171 - Konnicott, [128 - King, [98, 171 - Law, [98 - Lawson, [171 - Le Clerc, [128 - Leland, [109 - Leroux, [170 - Liefchild, [109 - Locke, [88 - Manton, [128 - Martineau, [170 - Martinius, [119 - Milman, [142 - Morgagni, [89 - Morton, [109 - Musæus, [128 - Palmer, [171 - Pearson, [128 - Polignac, [88 - Porteus, [109 - Price, [158 - Priestley, [142, 170 - Reid, [170 - Rutherford, [109, 158 - Search, [88 - Seed, [109 - Selden, [128 - Shaftesbury, 108 - Sherlock, [109 - Shuckford, [128 - Son of Sirac, [137 - South, [109, 128 - Stapfer, [128 - Strabo, 92 - Toplady, [128 - Topping, [109 - Twisse, [109 - Wagstaff, [88 - Warburton, [111 - Watts, [77, 88, 171 - Whately, [142, 158 - Willis, [88 - Wisheart, [109 - Witsius, [128 - Wittichius, [109 - - Reflection not dependent on sensation, 91 - - Reformation is attended with discomfort, 108 - may not prevent penalties, 102 - - Relation between us and our bodies, 85 - - Relations of things, limitless, 173 - - Religion - a question of fact, 165 - historical evidence of, 168 - professed in all ages, 167 - its proofs not affected by the doctrine of necessity, 170 - nor by our ignorance, 178 - - Reluctant obedience profitable, [152 - - Remedies often very disagreeable, 176 - - Repentance may be too late, 104 - - Requisites to the superiority of reason, 119 - of virtue, 120, 121 - - Resentment of injuries, 114 - - Resignation - a temper consonant with God’s sovereignty, 155 - essential to virtue, 154 - the fruit of affliction, 155 - the habit necessary hereafter, 155 - - Retributions are divine teachings, [108 - - Revelation, - antiquity of, 167 - not improbable, 167 - not universal, _note_ 107 - - Rewards and punishments, how distributed, 126 - - - Satisfactions of virtue, 108 - - Scheme of God incomprehensible, 172 - - Self-denial, its relations to present happiness, 134 - not essential to piety, 152 - - Self-discipline, what, [148 - - Self-love - a just principle of action, 154 - appealed to, 153 - how moderated and disciplined, 155 - not a sufficient restraint, _note_ 146 - reasonable and safe, 130 - - Sensation not necessary to reflection, 91 - - Senses not percipients, 85 - - Severe discipline necessary, 150 - - Similitude of a historical painting, [174 - - Simplicity of the living agent, 83 - - Sin, why not kept out of the world, 177 - - Skepticism does not justify irreligion, 105 - - Social, our nature essentially such, [93 - - Society - must punish vice, 110 - natural and necessary, [93 - sometimes punishes the good, 111 - - Soul - a simple substance, 82 - not destroyed with the body, 79 - not naturally immortal, [81 - - Souls of brutes, 88 - - Special interpositions of Providence, 177, 178 - - Stages of existence, 78 - - State of probation, CHAP. IV. - - State of discipline and improvement, CHAP. V. - - Submissive temper necessary, 155 - - Subordinations exceedingly beneficial, 142 - - Subserviencies in nature, 173 - - Sufferings may be avoided, 95 - not necessary to the cultivation of virtue, [128 - - - Temporal and religious probation similar, 132 - - Temptations - increased by bad examples, 132 - and by former errors, 132 - intended for our improvement, 136 - involve probation, 129 - may improve or injure us, 153 - security against their evils, 146 - sources of, to upright beings, 147 - the necessary result of propensions, 146 - - Tendencies of virtue, 118 - hindered, 121 - essential, not accidental, 126 - - Terms “nature” and “course of nature”, [97 - - Theorizing no aid to virtue, 139 - - Thoughtlessness often fatal, 101 - - Transmigration of souls, [87 - - Trials - manifest character, 156 - may exist in a future state, 147 - produced by our propensions, 131 - qualify for a better state, 144 - unreasonable ones are not inflicted, 133 - why we are subjected to them, 136 - - - Ultimate design of man, [98 - - Understanding may be perverted, 168 - - Uneasiness produced by former sins, 109 - - Union of good beings, 122 - - Unjustifiableness of religious indifference, 105 - - Upright creatures may fall, 147 - need good habits, 149 - - Universe and its government immense, 123 - - - Vice - actually punished by society 110, 111 - must produce uneasiness, 112 - never rewarded as such, 116 - not only criminal but depraving, 149 - often increased by trials, 153 - punished as such, 114 - - Vicious men lose their influence, [121 - - Virtue - a bond of union, 122 - as such, rewarded on earth, 111 - “brings its own reward”, [118 - has occasional disadvantages, [117 - hinderances accidental, 121 - how and why rewarded, 111 - improved by trials, 151 - its benefits to a community, 123 - natural, not vice, 116 - not always rewarded in this life, 108 - on the whole happier than vice, 113 - secures peace, 112 - tendencies essential, 126 - tends to give power, 118, [121 - - Virtuous beings need virtuous habits, 149 - - Virtuous habits a security, 147 - how formed, 139 - improve virtue, 147 - necessary in a future state, [145 - - Voice of nature is for virtue, 117 - - - Waste of seeds, 153 - - Wickedness may produce some benefits, 177 - voluntary, 136 - - Will and character - of God, how determined, _note_ 166 - what they mean, _note_ 163 - - Wonderful discovery of Hume, [162 - - World - a system of subordinations, 173 - a theater for the manifestation of character, 156 - disciplines some to vice, 153 - fitted for man’s discipline, 150 - governed by fixed laws, 110 - - - Youth - a determining period, 101 - if lost, not to be recovered, 143 - its beneficial subordinations, 142 - - - - -INDEX TO PART II. - -REFERENCES TO THE EDITOR’S NOTES ARE IN BRACKETS - - - A common absurdity, 243 - - Abstract truth distinguished from facts, 305, [186 - - Absurdity of some objections to Christianity, 245 - - Abuse of our natural endowments, 217 - - Accidental, what events are so called, 226 - - Accountability gradually increases, 251 - - Actions, - definition of, in morals, 261 - distinguished from things done, 261 - their bad consequences sometimes escaped, 232 - virtue and vice consist in them, 261 - - Advantage, as proper a consideration in religion as in temporal - affairs, 298 - variously bestowed, 249, 312 - - Analogy - a confirmation of all facts to which it can be applied, 306 - affords no argument against the scheme of Christianity, 203 - nor against miracles, 203 - answers presumptions against miracles, 207 - does not prove the wisdom of God, 301 - does not teach that the _whole_ of God’s government is like that on - earth, 204 - easily cavilled at, but unanswerable, 306 - between natural information and that derived from inspiration, 212 - between the remedies of nature and those of grace, 219 - between the gospel and human discoveries, 219 - between the light of nature and of revelation, 218 - between the use of natural gifts, and miraculous, 217 - between the government of God and that of a human master, 261 - its small influence on men, 303 - how used in this treatise, 306 - may show our duty, but not the design of the requirement, 246 - objections to this mode of arguing, CHAP. VIII. - shows that there may be infinite reasons for things, with which we - are not acquainted, 188 - the only ground for some of our knowledge, 306 - - Antidote to heresies, [191 - - Apocalypse, its principal object, [249 - - Appearances of men and things deceptive, 248 - - Arguments proper as to human writings, are not so as to Scripture, 214 - - Atonement, - how held by the ancients, 241 - makes the innocent suffer for the guilty, 243 - - Author of nature taken for granted, 298 - - Authoritativeness of revelation, 189 - - - Baptism - a test of obedience, [199 - commanded and important, 194 - why the form of words, 194 - - Bible, how to be interpreted, [202, 215 - - Brutes, their great sagacity, 216 - - Boundary of human inquiry, [223 - - - Candor necessary in judging of Christianity, 302 - - Chance, really no such thing, 226 - - Characters drawn in Scripture evidently unfeigned, 287 - - Christ - a mediator, CHAP. V. - a prophet, 240 - a priest and king, 241 - his history, as given in Scripture, 285 - his pre-existence taught, 282 - his satisfaction, 239 - his sufferings voluntary, 243 - manner of his interposition, 238 - not merely a teacher and example, 242 - offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, 241 - - Christianity - a fearful curse, if it give no more light than natural religion, [196 - a question of fact, 301 - a remedial system, [193 - an authoritative republication of the religion of nature, 188, 189 - a particular scheme under a general plan, 194, 224 - a scheme imperfectly comprehended, CHAP. IV. - a scheme revealed but in part, 226 - brings life and immortality to light, 190 - could not possibly be a contrivance, [222, 294 - demands attention, if barely probable, 253 - has evidences besides miracles and prophecy, 263 - in what degree remedial, [193 - is a real revelation, 213 - is conformable to the constitution of things, 295 - its benefits require the use of means, 197 - its establishment and prevalence, the most conspicuous and important - event in history, 286 - its evidences, CHAP. VII. - its good effects not small, 192 - its precepts plain and obvious, 218 - its proof historical, 304 - its proofs liable to objection, 260 - men bound to examine its evidence, 197 - miracles and prophecy its direct and fundamental proofs, 263 - must have mysteries, [223 - no objection to the morality of it, 214, 220, 222 - not merely a republication of natural religion, [196 - not primarily designed to remedy the defects of nature, [193 - not the discovery of reason, 188 - objections to its evidence, 210 - objections to its nature, 210 - offered to some in a corrupt state, 250 - prescribes new duties, 194 - preserves natural religion in the world, 191 - propagated against all obstructions, [294 - rashness of treating it lightly, 194, 196, 197 - requires means to accomplish ends, 225 - reveals a particular dispensation of Providence, 194 - reveals important facts, 196 - some of its dark parts may be cleared up, others cannot, [223 - teaches more than natural religion, 194 - the evils ascribed to it, are not its evils, 192 - the one great question concerning it, 213, 214 - the only religion professedly confirmed by miracles, 268 - to be transmitted by Christians, [190 - universal, in nature and intention, [248 - what alone could disprove it, 295 - why not remedial to a greater degree, 193 - why not sooner promulgated, 219 - - Christians - bound to spread Christianity, 190 - primitive, their testimony, 267 - - Church - men bound to support it, 193 - preserves a knowledge of religion, 191 - visible, its design, 190, 191 - - Circumstantial evidences of Christianity, 263, 281 - often as convincing as direct testimony, 294 - - Clemens Romanus, testimony of, 266 - his letter to the Corinthians, [266 - - Climax of infidel extravagance, [294 - - Coincidence of natural and revealed religion, 211, 218 - - Coincidences of Scripture, 266 - - Comparison, how it may mislead us, 201 - - Compassion distinct from goodness, 233 - visible in the constitution of the world, 233 - - Consequences of infidelity; more dangerous than those of faith, 294 - of sin, often averted, 233 - - Conversational objections to revelation, 295 - - Conversion, how produced, [225 - - Course of nature - different from what we might have supposed, previous to experience, 211 - none at the beginning, 205 - our total darkness as to its causes, 208 - - Creation - Mosaic account of, referred to by John, 282 - a different exertion of power from government, 205 - why Scripture describes it, 281 - - Creatures of like moral qualities placed in different religious - situations, 251 - - Credulity of mankind acknowledged, 269 - - Cumulative proof of Christianity, [207 - - - Daniel - his book had more evidence of authenticity than has come to us, 279 - his predictions a support of Jewish faith, [249 - quoted by Christ, 279 - - Dark parts of revelation, [223 - - Degrees of evidence have degrees of weight, 255 - require nice examination, 258 - - Deistical explanation of Christ’s miracles, [206 - - Deists, why do they oppose Christianity, [196 - - Depravity of man obvious, 238 - doctrine of, [218 - - Desert of good and ill, the notion of, 305 - - Development, of truth, 218 - modern, doctrine of, [218 - - Differences of religious advantages may have like reasons as those for - different temporal advantages, 251 - would remain if revelation were universal, 252 - - Difficulties - absurdity of requiring them to be all removed, 297 - as to the evidence of religion, analogous to those attending the - practice of it, 256 - cannot be solved by analogy, 296 - speculative, may be the chief trials of some, 257 - the discernment which can see them, might suffice to see through - them, 260 - - Direct and circumstantial evidence must be taken together, 280 - - Diseases of body and mind, analogous as to their remedies, 220 - - Disobedience, without possible excuse, 253 - - Dispensations, preparatory one to another, 310 - - Disregard of religion a great profligacy, 233 - - Distinction between moral and positive obligation, 198, [198 - between acts and principles, [235 - between temporary, individual, and universal commands, [188 - - Doubt - affords scope for probation, 262 - exercises our virtuous principles, 256 - implies some evidence, 252, 254, 283 - involves some obligation, 263 - puts us upon probation, 253 - - Doubtful evidence should have _some_ influence, 255 - - Duties arising from revealed relations, 195 - moral and positive, 194 - - - Earth, its appearances confirm Scripture, 238 - - Effect of Adam’s transgression, 238 - of combined probabilities, 294, [294 - - Efficacy of repentance, [190 - not taught by the light of nature, 190 - - End, God’s not known, 246 - - Enthusiasm - is not peculiar to religion, 272 - impairs no testimony for Christianity, 271 - may often weaken testimony, 271 - sometimes mixed with knavery, 272 - the absence of all sign of it in Christianity, a presumptive proof - in its favor, 222 - will not account for the spread of Christianity, 270 - - Enthusiasts make as great sacrifices as Christians, 270 - - Epistles of Paul, proof from, 266 - - Eternal retribution not taught by natural religion, [190 - - Ethics of natural religion distinguished from its objects, [194 - - Events expound Scripture, 219 - - Evidence - of Christianity impregnable, 295 - collateral and direct to be viewed together, 294 - from miracles and prophecy, 267 - imperfect, should yet influence practice in proportion to its - degree, 255 - of circumstances may be most direct, 294 - of religion, open to all, 260 - of religion, the same in kind as that which controls us in - temporal things, 258 - much lower than satisfactory often determines us, 303 - not only increased but multiplied by a combination of - probabilities, 294, [294 - reason the proper judge of, 221 - requires careful sifting, 256 - candor in judging, 302, [303 - safety always in admitting it, 294 - why liable to objection, 257 - - Evil, remedies provided for it, 219, 232 - - Exaggeration practised by many who will not lie, 272 - - External manner of heart worship, 195 - - Experience - affords no presumption against Christianity, 203 - corroborates Christian doctrines, 245 - teaches the effects of actions, 246 - - Extravagance of some objections, 187, 188 - - - Facts - analogy the only proof of some, 306 - distinguished from abstract truths, 305 - of revelation distinguished from its principles, [235 - - Fall of man, assumed as a fact, 236 - confirmed by appearances, 238 - - Falsehood, its degrees and inducements, 272 - - False miracles have deceived many, 273 - have some historic evidence, 273 - - Fatalists, their principles argued upon, 304 - - Fear cast out by love, [301 - - Fitness, moral, 304, 305 - - Flippant objections to Christianity, 295 - - Folly, a real vice, 280 - - Foresight of brutes, 216 - - Future punishments, - all the reasons for them not known, 234 - not arbitrarily appointed, 232 - natural sequences, 231, 232 - rendered credible by temporal punishments, 300 - - - Genealogy of mankind given in Scripture, 283 - - General laws - a wise arrangement, 227 - do not render miracles incredible, 227 - control the Christian dispensation, 226 - few events can be traced up to them, 226 - miracles may be their results, 226, 227 - the ground of believing there are such, 226 - things called accidental governed by them, 226 - - Geology, its impressive lessons, [229 - - GOD - a master giving laws, 261 - all his reasons for giving a command must be certainly known, and - known to have passed away, before we can safely disregard it, 188 - duties towards him as the Father, 194, 195 - governs by mediation, 230 - his government shows compassion, 233 - progressive, 229 - his means and ends we cannot distinguish, 228 - his providence, objections to it idle, 300, 301 - his reasons not assigned, 246 - his will, as absolute or conditional, 261 - how he would act in contingencies, unknown, [222 - how to be worshipped, a pure matter of revelation, 195 - instructs us by experience, 211, 246 - little known, [222 - not indifferent as to who suffer, 243 - reveals our duties, not his plans, 246 - the real author of the prophecies, 276 - - Good and evil unequally distributed, 248 - - Government of God sometimes, apparently, tardy in its results, 224, 225 - - Gradual growth of causes, [208 - - - Happiness not always secured by well-laid schemes, 247 - - Hazard of neglecting Christianity, 262 - - Heathen world, condition of, 186, 250 - - Hieroglyphic and figurative language of Scripture, 210 - - Hinderances to natural and spiritual knowledge similar, 218 - - History - of miracles, 264 - of the Jews confirmed by their condition, 289, 290 - of the origin of religion, 206 - furnishes no parallel to revelation, 207 - prophecy is history anticipated, 281 - Scripture, has not been invalidated, 283 - - Holy Spirit, its operations on the heart, [225 - - Human contrivance unequal to some things, [222 - - Human life, in what sense it may be called poor, 297 - - Human testimony, reliable notwithstanding the prevalence of - falsehood, 273 - - - Identity of principle between natural and revealed religion, [235 - - Ignorance - of heathen writers, [187 - of other worlds, forbids objections to Christianity on the ground - of miracles, 207 - of the laws of miracles, not greater than of natural laws, 256 - of the reason of our present condition, 251 - much of it our own fault, 259 - - Imagination may fancy unreal coincidences, 293 - - Immorality not authorized in Scripture, 221, 222 - - Impassable limit to human knowledge, [223 - - Imperceptible accumulation of forces, [208 - - Imperfect knowledge, better than acting in the dark, 297 - - Imperfection of language, 216 - - Importance of revelation, CHAP. I. - an abstraction, [186 - precludes the idea that the first witnesses were careless, 274 - - Improbability before and after an event, [207 - of the Deistical theory greater than that of miracles, [206 - - Inadequacy of repentance, [236 - - Inattention to religion, real depravity, 252, 307 - prevents convincement, 258 - - Incarnation an invisible miracle, 204 - cannot be paralleled, [235 - - Influence of the Holy Ghost, [225 - of the analogical argument, 303 - - Innocent sometimes suffer for the guilty, 243 - - Inspiration, the proper kind and extent of it not discoverable by - reason, 212 - not to be interpreted like other writings, 212 - - Inspired writers, key to their meaning, [276 - their one great scheme, [276 - show a foresight more than human, 278, 279 - - Instruction from God to savages, [206 - - Intercession by the good for the bad, [232 - - Interest, temporal, not always apparent, 302 - - Interpositions of men for each other, [232 - - Internal improbabilities weaken external proof, 215 - - Interpretation of Scripture, [215 - - Irregularity, really no such thing, 226 - whence the appearance of, 227 - - Irregularities of men, consequences proportioned to magnitude, 233 - - Irreligion an aggravated sin, 233 - especially in persons in high standing, 254 - not justifiable on any pretence, 256, 312 - - Invention an irregular way of information, 216 - - Invisible miracles, [204 - things of God, how learned, [230 - - - Jews - God’s dealing with them, 290 - their continuance, a standing miracle, 290 - their history confirmed by facts, 291 - their system of Theism, [206 - - Jewish miracles, a part of civil history, [265 - - John, his allusion to Christ, in the beginning of his gospel, 282 - his doctrine agrees with that of Paul, 282 - - - Kingdom of Christ on earth, 241 - - Knowledge - profound, not necessary to piety, 218 - scientific and religious, have the same difficulties, 218 - - Knowledge of Scripture, improved in the same way as knowledge of the - sciences, 218 - unequally distributed, 249 - - - Language necessarily ambiguous, 216 - of the prophecies, often figurative, 210 - - Laplace, error of, [207 - - Levity destructive to religious influence, 259 - - Liberty - belief of our, unavoidable, 304 - of the will, not discussed, _note_ 304 - necessary to the progress of knowledge, 218 - the principle so natural that language is formed on it, 304 - - Life - future, brought to light by the gospel, 190 - may be taken away by command, 221 - not thrown away because success is uncertain, 302 - whether desirable or not, 301 - - Light of nature - displayed in the Scriptures, 188 - does not teach our future condition, 190 - favors the doctrine of a Mediator, 230 - has left the greatest heathen in doubt, 186 - - Ludicrous turn, danger of, 259 - - - Mahometanism not received on the footing of miracles, [268 - - Mahometans and ancient Persians, how situated as to revelation, 250 - - Man - accepted according to what he hath, 251 - his circumstances no ground of complaint, 252 - his obligation to study the Scriptures, 202, 262 - must be renewed, 197 - - Manasses, prayer of, [237 - - Manner of worship a matter of pure revelation, 195 - - Martyrs - could not have been impostors, 272 - had full knowledge of facts, 269, 271 - the full force of their testimony, 269 - their obligations to veracity, 274 - were not enthusiasts, 271 - - Means as related to ends, 225 - - Mediation seen everywhere, 230 - exemplified in social life, [232 - - Mediator, - appointment of, CHAP. V. - the notion of, natural, 230 - the Scripture doctrine of, 238-240 - whether one was necessary, 243 - why most objected to, 243 - - Medium between full satisfaction of a truth and full satisfaction to - the contrary, 313 - - Memory, eloquence, &c. imprudently used, 217 - - Men apt to be deluded by pretences, 273 - their conduct may be guessed at, [222 - - Mercy seen in the constitution of the world, 233 - - Messiah came at the expected time, 285 - his mission, 224 - - Minuteness of predictions touching Christ, 207 - - Miracles - admitted evidence for such as are false does not impair the evidence - of Christian, 273 - contrary to the course of nature?, 206 - denying them leads to Atheism, [205 - disorderly use of, 217 - distinct reasons for them, 208 - large historical evidence for their truth, 270 - manner in which related, 264 - no argument of analogy against them, 205-207 - none parallel to those of Scripture, 207 - not mere embellishments, 264 - not to be compared to common events, 209 - nowise incredible, 209 - occasions for them likely to arise in the course of ages, 208 - of the Old Testament, inseparable from history, [265 - operate by general laws, 226 - Pagan and Popish, were wrought _after_ those systems had obtained, 268 - peculiar to the Jewish and Christian religions, 268 - received as genuine from the first, 268, 269 - regulated by general laws, 227 - satisfactorily account for the existence of Christianity, 265 - should be compared to uncommon events, 209 - the credentials of Christianity, 267 - the evidence of their truth at first, 249 - the question of their truth only one of _degree_ in point of - evidence, 208 - the only satisfactory account of some events, 265 - the real nature of presumptions against them, 208 - the term a relative one, 205 - their direct proof of Christianity, 264 - their evidence the same as that for common facts, 264 - their force as proofs, 189 - visible and invisible, 204, [204 - what evidence arises from their having been accepted as true by the - first Christians, 268 - writers upon, [264, 268 - - Miraculous power - creation not properly an act of, 205 - misused by some, 217, 267 - pretences of, have deluded some, 273 - why bestowed, 190 - - Misconduct creates need of assistance, 235 - - Mistake of some of Hume’s opponents, 207 - - Mistakes of philosophers dangerous, [230 - of transcribers, &c., 228 - - Modern geology, lesson from, [229 - - Moral action, the nature of, 261 - an action becomes such by command, [221 - - Moral duties. See _Positive_. - - Moral faculty, its object, 305 - - Moral government. See _Government_. - - Moral precepts. See _Positive_. - - Moral system revealed to mankind, 190 - - Morality of Scripture, reason a judge of, 220 - - Mysteries to be expected in revelation, 223, 224 - as many in nature as in Scripture, 246 - - Mystery of godliness, 225 - - Mythological writings resemble prophecy, 276 - - - Narratives of Scripture unadorned, 228 - - Natural consequences of vice are judicial punishments, 197 - and spiritual things analogous in importance, 219 - endowments often abused, 217 - - Natural light compared to revelation, 218 - - Natural religion - and revealed, coincide, 211 - as much perverted as Christianity, 192 - could not have been reasoned out, 192 - discloses no Redeemer, [194 - its ethics and objects distinguished, [194 - its light wholly insufficient, 187 - might be authenticated by miracles, 190 - moral system of, 187 - taught and confirmed by Christianity, 188, 286, 292 - what it does not teach, [190, 194 - - Nature carried on by uniform laws, 226 - implies the agency of God, 231 - its light insufficient, 186 - - Nature and obligation of sacraments, _note_ 195 - - Necessity of revelation, [186 - - Negligence prevents the recognition of truth, 258 - wholly inexcusable, 197 - - - Obedience from dread, [301 - or disobedience, an important matter, 188 - to a positive rite, especially indicative of piety, 199 - - Objections - to certain precepts of Scripture, as immoral, 221 - to prophecy, from its obscurity, 275 - to revelation, are of equal weight against natural religion, 97 - to the analogical argument, as such, CHAP. VIII. - to the distribution of good and evil, 248-250 - to the doctrine of mediation, CHAP. V. - to the evidence for miracles, CHAP. II. - to the unequal distribution of religious knowledge, 249 - - Objections to Christianity - as a matter of fact, 301 - as a remedial system, [193, 219 - as a roundabout, perplexed contrivance, 228 - as deficient in point of truth, 247 - as a scheme, 209 - as mysterious, [223 - as to its wisdom and goodness, CHAP. IV. - as unimportant, CHAP. I. - atonement makes the innocent suffer for the guilty, 227, 243 - contains things unlike the course of nature, 204 - does not remove difficulties, [223 - has been perverted, 192 - has been productive of evils, 192 - has internal improbabilities, 225-227 - disclosed to the world so recently, 219 - disorderly use of miraculous gifts, 227 - has small influence, 192, 303 - if true would not be left doubtful, 299 - is not satisfactory, 260, 261 - its doctrine of mediation, CHAP. V. - its external proof weakened by internal improbabilities, 215 - its lack of evidence, CHAP. VI. - its late introduction, 219 - may be advanced flippantly, but cannot be so answered, 295 - natural things too unimportant to furnish analogies in its favor, 219 - not just and good, CHAP. IV. - not necessary, 147 - not universal, CHAP. VI., 248 - slowly developed, 219 - some of its precepts immoral, 221 - sufficiency of natural religion, 187 - vicarious sufferings, 245 - - Obligation arises from the bare supposableness of Christianity, 253, 262 - - Obligations to God arising out of relationship, 196 - - Obscurity in part of a prophecy, does not impair the evidence of - foresight, 275 - - Offenders often shielded by friends, [232 - - Offices of Christ as a mediator, 238-240 - - Opinions must be distinguished from facts, 270 - - Ordinary rules of interpretation, [215 - - - Pagan and Popish miracles easily accounted for, 268 - - Parables show what the author intended, 276 - - Partial views give an appearance of wrong, 309 - - Passion hinders correct judgment, 259 - - Paul, his separate testimony, 266 - how he received the gospel, 267 - summary of his testimony, 267 - - Perfection of religion, what? CHAP. VIII. - - Persons for whom this treatise is written, 309 - - Philosophy, its true mode of proceeding, [230 - - Piety superior to ritual observances, 201 - - Pleasures and pains, which overbalance? 301 - - Political events, how mentioned in Scripture, 282 - - Popish doctrine of a miracle at the Eucharist, [204 - - Popular conversational objections, 295 - - Porphyry’s mode of interpretation frivolous, _note_ 279 - objections to the book of Daniel, 279 - - Positive evidence of Christianity, CHAP. VII. - - Positive institutions - belong to the notion of a church, 192 - lay us under the strictest obligation, 202 - means to moral ends, 199 - men disposed to depend on them, 200 - necessary to keep up and propagate religion, 246 - not to be made light of, 201 - not to supersede moral obedience, 200 - the reason of them often obvious, 198 - two modes of viewing them, 198 - - Positive precepts compared with moral, 198, 201 - create moral obligations, 221 - - Power of healing, [217 - - Practice should be influenced by probability, 254 - - Predictions of Christ very numerous and minute, 207, 208 - - Prejudice a hinderance to knowledge, 258 - a mark of weakness, 280 - as hostile to truth as enthusiasm, 272 - operates contrary ways, 294 - - Preservation of the Jews as a distinct race, 291 - - Presumptions - against miracles, 205 - against revelation as miraculous, CHAP. II. - none against the _general scheme_ of Christianity, 203 - none peculiar to miracles, 207 - strong, overcome by weak proof, 207, [207 - - Priesthood of Christ, 238 - Jewish, typical of Christ, 239 - - Principles argued upon in this treatise, 304 - - Progressions in our existence, 229 - - Progress in theology probable, [218 - - Probable proofs, by being added, not only increase evidence, but - multiply it, 294 - - Probability should influence practice, 254 - - Profane history corroborates Scripture statements, 287 - - Proofs of Christianity - a touchstone of honesty, [259 - level to common men, 260 - some important ones omitted in this treatise, and why, 304 - why not more plain, 261 - - Prophecy - a joint review of prophecies furnishes a far stronger proof than - examination in detail, 294 - a series of, being applicable to certain events, is proof that it - was intended of them, 276 - compared to compiled memoirs, 278 - created the expectation of a Messiah, 284 - confirmed by appearances, 292 - evidence from, 275 - expressed in figurative language, 275 - how understood by ancient Jews, 277 - in relation to the Jews, 284 - is history anticipated, 281 - its obscurity, 275 - its proofs amazingly strong, [207 - may not _always_ have been understood by the writer, 278 - proves foresight, 276, 279 - sometimes obscured by interpreters, 210 - summary of, concerning Christ, 284 - use of, to future ages, 249 - writers upon, 277, 285 - - Prophet, Christ a, 240 - - Prophets - not the _authors_ of what they wrote, 278 - their sense of their predictions not necessarily the whole - sense, 278 - whether they had in view the events which Christians consider - fulfilments, 277 - - Proverbial, use of the word, 201 - - Providence, never hasty, [229 - objections to it useless, 300, 301 - the course of, progressive, 229 - - Province of reason, 220 - - Prudence, its best plans often frustrated, 247 - often requires us to act with uncertain prospect of success, 247, 248 - - Punishment - follows wickedness, _of course_, 231 - instances of vicarious, 244 - not always avoided by reformation, 235 - not promiscuously inflicted, 243 - provision made for escaping it, 232, 311 - we cannot of ourselves escape it, 234 - we cannot know why such and such are inflicted, 231 - - - Quotations - Angus, [202, 223 - Augustine, _note_ 187 - Arnobius, [269 - Clemens Romanus, [266 - Davidson, [294 - Fitzgerald, [303 - Grotius, [259 - Guizot, [229 - Hurd, [276 - Dr. Johnson, [288 - Mahomet, [268 - Powell, [230 - Warburton, [217, 223 - Whately, [206 - - - Rashness of interpreters, 210 - of treating religion lightly, 197 - - Reason - could not have invented Christianity, 206 - could not ascertain the power of penitence, 194 - discovers our relation to God the Father, 194 - but not our relation to the Son and Holy Ghost, 194, 196 - its limits very narrow, [223 - its proper province, 220 - must have right principles, 220 - needs the aid of experience in judging of the consequences of - actions, 246 - not sufficient to construct a system of natural religion free - from superstition, 186 - our only faculty for judging even revelation, 210 - requires the importance of a question to be taken into account, 295 - teaches nothing of the certain means of either temporal or spiritual - good, 197 - very incompetent to judge what a revelation ought to be, 210-212 - - Reasoning by analogy to any extent, leaves the mind unsatisfied, 296 - - Redemption - agreeable to our natural notions, 235 - analogous to natural remedies, 232 - conjectures about it must be uncertain, 242 - mode of, not discoverable by reason, 243 - men not competent judges of its plan, 243 - on whom are its benefits, _note_ 237 - Scripture account of, 239, 240 - we should be thankful for it, without disputing how it was - procured, 242 - - References to other authors - Alexander, [269 - Apthorpe, [285 - Bayle, [301 - Benson, [215 - Birk, [266 - Blaney, [285 - Blunt, [266 - Bolingbroke, [265 - Boswell, [288 - Boyle, [264 - Butler, [190, 272 - Campbell, [264 - Celsus, [287 - Chalmers, [187, 194, 242 - Colliber, 195 - Damascenus, [287 - Davidson, [285 - Diodorus Siculus, [287 - Eupolemus, [287 - Featley, [215 - Fitzgerald, [193, 206, 207 - Fleetwood, [264 - Fuller, [285 - Gibbon, [268 - Graves, [266 - Grotius, [266 - Gulick, [277 - Hengstenburg, [277 - Horseley, [277 - Howe, [236 - Hurd, [285 - Jortin, [264, 285 - Julian, [257 - King, [215, 277 - Lardner, [264 - Leland, [187 - Longinus, [287 - Lyall, [277 - McCosh, [187 - Mackintosh, [223 - Magee, [236, 242 - Manasses, [237 - Menander, [287 - Michaelis, [215 - Mills, [207 - Newman, [235 - Numenius, [287 - Owen, [242 - Paley, [205, 266, 268 - Pascal, [187, 223 - Pfaffius, [264 - Phlegon, [287 - Phœnician Annals, [287 - Pliny, [287 - Porphyry, 279, [287 - Samuel Stanhope Smith, [206 - Solinus, [287 - Spinoza, [215 - Stapfer, [242 - Storr, [215 - Strabo, [287 - Suetonius, [287 - Tacitus, [287 - Taylor, [264 - Tindall, [196, 248 - Tucker, [264 - Turretin, [242 - Vitringa, [276 - Warburton, [187 - Waterland, [195 - Watson, [264 - Waugh, [277, 285 - Wayland, [188, 236 - Whately, [206, 268, 288 - Witsius, [264 - - Reformation does not always preclude punishment, 235 - - Regard due to the Son and Holy Spirit, 195 - - Regard to God as Creator, the essence of natural religion, 195 - - Rejection of Christ by many, at first, the argument from it, [269 - foretold, 285 - - Relations, being learned, duties are perceived, 194 - - Relations of man to Deity, 194 - to the Son and Holy Ghost, 195 - - Religion - a practical thing, 298 - a question of fact, 301, 304 - affords particular reasons for miracles, 208 - confirmed by the establishment of a church, 191 - considered as external and internal, 195 - doubt of its evidence does not release from moral obligation, 254 - has its end on all persons to whom proposed, 303, [303 - if true, why susceptible of any possible doubt? 299 - its acceptance safe, 295 - its general spirit intimated, 200, 201 - its great importance, 254 - its introduction into the world, 206 - its reasonableness fully shown, if it can only be proved that it _may_ - be reasonable, 301 - its very nature overlooked by those who insist that it should have - overwhelming evidence, 302 - may be true, though doubtful, 299 - must be judged by its evidences _taken together_, 294 - not a thing reasoned out, 206 - not equally taught to all men, 206 - objections to it removed by analogy, 300 - presupposes candor in those who examine it, 256, 302, [303 - reason may judge of its morality, 220 - reasonable, for aught which can be shown to the contrary, 301 - the perception of, 302 - the view of it taken in this treatise, 299 - the evidence for it may be lessened, but cannot be destroyed, 295 - why its evidences are allowed to admit of doubt, 249, 253, 299 - - Relief for evils provided, 232 - - Remedial nature of Christianity, [193 - - Remedies - provided in nature, 219, 232 - may be unskilfully used, 220 - show the compassion of God, 233 - and also his strictness, 234 - - Repentance - cannot cancel guilt, 236, [236 - general sense of mankind on the subject, 236 - its efficacy not taught by natural religion, [190 - its efficacy taught in the Scriptures, 190 - not sufficient to preclude disaster, 234, 235 - - Revelation - a particular part of a great plan, 224 - accounts for the Theism of the Jews, [206 - at the beginning of the world, would not be miraculous, 205 - cannot be neglected with impunity, 260-262 - considered as miraculous, CHAP. II. - considered historically, 281 - difference between its facts and its principles, [235 - discovers new relations, and so new duties, 194 - distinguished from natural religion, 195 - does not compel assent, 253 - has twice been universal, [248 - how it could be overturned, 214 - its disclosures, of course, could not have been anticipated, 211, 212 - its measure of evidence puts us on probation, 253 - its facts necessarily singular, [235 - no more different from the course of nature than some parts of the - course of nature are different from other parts, 312 - necessary, CHAP. I. - republishes and confirms natural religion, 188, 189 - nothing incredible in it, 271 - teaches that God’s laws are compassionate, 236 - the use of unwritten revelation, 213 - what is to be expected in revelation, 210, 212 - - Reverence for the will of God, [199 - - Ridicule of Scripture - an offence against natural piety, 286 - easier than examination, 259 - the great weakness of being influenced by it, 280 - - Roman Empire mentioned, 279 - - Rules for health very fallible and inexact, 302 - of Biblical interpretation, [215 - - - Sacrifices - commanded, 241 - expiatory, 239 - how the ancients regarded them, 242 - learned by the heathen from tradition, 241 - really efficacious, 242 - the prevalence of, 236 - - Sacrifice of Christ - an objection to it, 243 - _how_ efficacious, not taught, 242 - proper and real, 239-241 - puts us into a capacity for salvation, 242 - voluntary, 244 - - Safety an important consideration in judging, 294 - - Satirical writings, how understood, 276, 277 - - Scheme of nature, vast, 204 - progressive, 229 - - Scheme of providence, if understood, would justify facts which are - objected to, 300 - - Schemes, the best may be disconcerted, 247 - - Science confirms Scripture history, 287 - - Scorn of prophetic diction, 210 - - Scripture - announces a general restoration of things, 282 - antiquity of, 287 - characters evidently not feigned, 287 - confirmed by profane authors, 288 - confirmed by the state of the earth, 287 - considered historically, 281 - contains an abridged history of the world, 282 - exposed to criticism, 283 - expounded by itself, [202 - gives a history of this world as God’s world, 281 - gives an account of civil governments only as they affected - religion, 282 - has internal evidence of truth, 287 - history genuine, 265 - how distinguished from other books, 281-283 - how to be interpreted, [202 - if false could be shown to be so, 283 - includes a history of thousands of years, 283 - includes the chronology of nearly four thousand years, 284 - its authority the great question, not its contents, 214 - its chronicles confirmed by history, 287 - its evidences comprise a series of things of great variety and reaching - to the beginning of time, 263 - its evidences not intended to be overpowering, 253 - its great proofs are miracles and prophecy, 264 - its relation to miracles only to be accounted for on the supposition - of their truth, 265 - its strangeness not surprising, 288 - its style objected to, 210 - its truth must be judged of by the evidence _taken together_, 295 - may contain things not yet discovered, 218 - miracles, their first reception, 265 - naturalness of its statements, 287 - not composed by rules of art, 210 - nothing improbable related in any part, 287 - not to be judged by preconceived expectation, 215 - not to be judged exactly as other books, 214 - ordinary rules of interpretation, [215 - our duty to search it, 202, 262 - precepts, some give offence, 210 - reveals our relation to the Son and Holy Spirit, 194 - the possibility of its truth demands investigation, 258 - truths not discoverable by reason, 203 - variety of topics introduced, 283 - written in a rude age, 283 - why it describes creation, 282 - - Searching the Scriptures a great duty, 202 - - Self-deceit, our liability to it, 262 - - Serious apprehension may comport with doubt, 313 - - Shameful mistakes of philosophers, [230 - - Similarity of objections to religion and nature, 298 - - Sincerity of belief proved by dying for it, 270 - - Skepticism no justification of irreligion, 253 - - Sorrow cannot of itself restore abused benefits, 234 - - Speaking with tongues, [217 - - Speculative difficulties similar to external temptations, 256 - the chief trial of some, 257, 259 - - Spread of Christianity unaccountable if it were an imposture, 290 - - Standing ministry, what for, [191 - - Strangeness of some Scripture events, 288 - - Stupidity of the martyrs, if insincere, [269 - - Subserviences, the world a system of, 229 - - Success, temporal, always uncertain, 302 - - Suffering, ignorance does not prevent it either in temporal or spiritual - things, 196 - - Sufferings of Christ vindicate God’s law, 244 - of the early Christians, 269 - - Sufficiency of light of nature pretended, 186 - - Summary of Jewish history, 284 - of the historical evidence of Scripture, 292 - - Supernatural instructions necessary from the first, [206 - - - Temporal interests not always discerned, 247, 248 - managed by prudent persons on the very principles proposed by religion - as to spiritual interests, 298, 299 - - Temporal interests often decided by considerations which fall short of - demonstration, 299 - - Temporary commands, distinguished from perpetual, [188 - - Temptation - a wholesome discipline, 256 - earthly and spiritual similar, 256 - calls forth virtuous effort, 257 - - Testimony - can be destroyed only by counter-testimony, or by the incompetency of - the witness, 274 - for miracles not mentioned in Scripture, does not impair the testimony - for those there recorded, 273 - of Paul, separate and independent, 266 - of profane authors to the truth of Scripture history, [287 - of the first Christians, 269, 271 - must be judged candidly, [259 - none counter to Christianity, 275 - slight, overcomes strong presumptions, 208 - unconfuted, must be admitted, 273 - value of, lessened by enthusiasm, 271 - - Theism of the Jews accounted for, [206 - - Theology of the Bible, not to be corrected, [202 - - Things which it is unreasonable to dispute, 307 - - Thoughtlessness of men, 233 - - Tradition teaches that there was a revelation at the beginning, 205 - of the fall of man, 311 - - Transubstantiation, [205 - - Trial by speculative difficulties, analogous to other trials, 256 - - True philosophy inductive, [230 - - Truth of Christianity proved, unless the whole of its history and - influence can be accounted for by accident, 295 - - Truth, how developed, [218 - the, of an event may be fully proved, though no _one_ of sundry proofs - may be complete, 295 - whether there is any such thing, denied by skeptics, 305 - - Twofold effect of the analogical argument, 305 - - - Unbelievers, acknowledgment of, 289 - cannot deny a conformity between prophecy and events, 293 - - Understanding, its right use, 245 - - Undesigned coincidences in Bible history, [266 - - Undeterminate language deceives many, 297 - - Unequal distribution of religious knowledge, 249 - - Unfair dealing of objectors, 297 - - Unreasonableness of applying to passion for guidance, 295 - - Unsatisfactory evidence, men often obliged to act upon it, 302 - - - Variety in the distribution of God’s gifts, 249, 312 - - Vastness of the scheme of nature, 204 - - Veracity of the first Christians, 274 - - Vicarious punishments witnessed every day, 244 - deter from sin, 245 - - Vice - appointed to be punished, 231 - blinds men to just evidence, 255 - its effects in the present world, 234 - its natural consequences are God’s judicial inflictions, 197 - its real enormity, 234 - not palliated by any supposed lack of evidence for religion, 255 - - Vindication of religion by analogy impossible, 296 - of the character of God, not attempted in this treatise, 299, 300 - - - Way of salvation for the helpless, [186 - - Will of GOD, as absolute or conditional, 261 - - World, wickedness of, 238 - - Worship, mode of, a matter of pure revelation, 195 - - Writers - on the atonement, [242 - Christian sacraments, [195 - miracles, [264, 268 - necessity of revelation, [187 - prophecy, [277-285 - Scripture difficulties, [215 - undesigned coincidences, [266 - -THE END. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Analogy of Religion to the -Constitution and Course of Nat, by Joseph Butler - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION TO THE CONSTITUTION *** - -***** This file should be named 53346-0.txt or 53346-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/3/3/4/53346/ - -Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -book was produced from scanned images of public domain -material from the Google Books project.) - 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - -Title: The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature - To which are added two brief dissertations: I. On personal - identity. II. On the nature of virtue. - -Author: Joseph Butler - -Commentator: Howard Malcom - -Release Date: October 22, 2016 [EBook #53346] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION TO THE CONSTITUTION *** - - - - -Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -book was produced from scanned images of public domain -material from the Google Books project.) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[1]</a></span></p> - -<p class="center larger"><span class="smaller">THE</span><br /> -ANALOGY OF RELIGION,<br /> -<span class="smaller">TO THE</span><br /> -Constitution and Course of Nature.</p> - -<p class="titlepage">TO WHICH ARE ADDED<br /> -TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS:<br /> -I. ON PERSONAL IDENTITY.—II. ON THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.</p> - -<p class="titlepage">BY<br /> -JOSEPH BUTLER, D.C.L.</p> - -<p class="titlepage">Ejus [Analogiæ] hæc vis est, ut id quod dubium est ad aliquid simile, de quo<br /> -non quæritur referat ut incerta certis probet.—<span class="smcap">Quintil.</span> l. i. c. 6.</p> - -<p class="titlepage">WITH<br /> -AN INTRODUCTION, NOTES, CONSPECTUS, AND AMPLE INDEX,<br /> -BY<br /> -HOWARD MALCOM, D.D.<br /> -PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY, LEWISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA.</p> - -<p class="titlepage">SEVENTEENTH EDITION.<br /> -PHILADELPHIA:<br /> -J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO.<br /> -1873.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[2]</a></span></p> - -<p class="titlepage">Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1857, by<br /> -J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO.<br /> -in the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the United States in and for the<br /> -Eastern District of Pennsylvania.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[3]</a></span></p> - -<h2>CONTENTS.</h2> - -<table summary="Contents"> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="tdr smaller">PAGE</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Editor’s Introduction</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Editors_Introduction">5</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="ditto">”</span> <span class="smcap">Preface</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Editors_Preface">19</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="ditto">”</span> <span class="smcap">Conspectus</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Conspectus">21</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Author’s Advertisement</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Advertisement">66</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="ditto">”</span> <span class="smcap">Introduction</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#INTRODUCTION">67</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="tdc">PART I.<br />OF NATURAL RELIGION.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Chap. I.</span>—A Future Life</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#I_CHAPTER_I">77</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Chap. II.</span>—The Government of God by Rewards and Punishments</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#I_CHAPTER_II">95</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Chap. III.</span>—The Moral Government of God</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#I_CHAPTER_III">105</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Chap. IV.</span>—Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties, and Danger</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#I_CHAPTER_IV">128</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Chap. V.</span>—Probation, as intended for Moral Discipline and Improvement</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#I_CHAPTER_V">136</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Chap. VI.</span>—The Opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing Practice</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#I_CHAPTER_VI">157</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Chap. VII.</span>—The Government of God, considered as a Scheme or - Constitution, imperfectly comprehended</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#I_CHAPTER_VII">171</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[4]</a></span><span class="smcap">Conclusion</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#I_CONCLUSION">180</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="tdc">PART II.<br />OF REVEALED RELIGION.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Chap. I.</span>—The Importance of Christianity</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#II_CHAPTER_I">186</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Chap. II.</span>—The supposed Presumption against a Revelation, - considered as miraculous</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#II_CHAPTER_II">202</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Chap. III.</span>—Our Incapacity of judging, what were to be expected - in a Revelation; and the Credibility, from Analogy, that it must contain things appearing liable - to Objections</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#II_CHAPTER_III">209</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Chap. IV.</span>—Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution, - imperfectly comprehended</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#II_CHAPTER_IV">223</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Chap. V.</span>—The Particular System of Christianity; the Appointment - of a Mediator, and the Redemption of the World by him</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#II_CHAPTER_V">230</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Chap. VI.</span>—Want of Universality in Revelation; and of the - supposed Deficiency in the Proof of it</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#II_CHAPTER_VI">247</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Chap. VII.</span>—The Particular Evidence for Christianity</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#II_CHAPTER_VII">263</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Chap. VIII.</span>—Objections against arguing from - the Analogy of Nature to Religion</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#II_CHAPTER_VIII">296</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Conclusion</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#II_CONCLUSION">306</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="tdc">DISSERTATIONS.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Dissertation I.</span>—Personal Identity</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#DISSERTATION_I">317</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Dissertation II.</span>—The Nature of Virtue</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#DISSERTATION_II">324</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Index to Part I</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#INDEX_TO_PART_I">333</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Index to Part II</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#INDEX_TO_PART_II">343</a></td> - </tr> -</table> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[5]</a></span></p> - -<h2 id="Editors_Introduction">Editor’s Introduction</h2> - -<p><span class="smcap">Joseph Butler</span> was born at Wantage, England, May 18th, 1692, -the youngest of eight children. The biographies of that day were -few and meagre; and in few cases is this so much to be regretted as -in Butler’s. It would have been both interesting and profitable to -trace the development and occupations of one of the mightiest of -human minds. But no cotemporary gathered up the incidents of his -life, and now all efforts to elicit them have been without success.</p> - -<p>His father was a prosperous dry-goods merchant, who, at the time -of his son’s birth, had retired from business with a competency, and -resided in a suburban mansion called “The Priory,” still in existence.</p> - -<p>Being a non-conformist, he educated Joseph at a “dissenting” -academy at Gloucester, under <span class="smcap">Samuel Jones</span>, a gentleman of great -ability, and a skilful instructor, who raised up some of the greatest -men of their day.<a name="FNanchor_1" id="FNanchor_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<p>It was while a member of this academy, and about the age of -twenty-one, that Butler disclosed to the world his wonderful power of -abstract reasoning, in his famous correspondence with Samuel Clarke, -in relation to that eminent author’s “<cite>Demonstration of the Being and -Attributes of God</cite>.” This correspondence is now generally inserted -at the end of that work.</p> - -<p>Mr. Butler having deliberately adopted Episcopal views, and resolved -to unite himself with the Established Church, his father, with -praiseworthy liberality, sent him to Oxford, where he entered Oriel -College, March, 1714. Of his college life there is no account; nor -of the time and place of his ordination. He removed to London -in 1718, on receiving the appointment of “Preacher at the Rolls.” -His famous Fifteen Sermons were preached in that chapel, and -published before resigning the place, with a dedication to Sir Joseph -Jekyl, “as a parting mark of gratitude for the favors received during -his connection with that learned society.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[6]</a></span></p> - -<p>One of Butler’s warmest college friends was Edward Talbot -second son of a clergyman who afterwards became Bishop of Durham. -This admirable young man died of smallpox; in his last hours recommending -Butler to his father’s patronage; and scarcely had that -gentleman attained the see of Durham, before he gave Mr. B. the -living of Haughton, from whence he transferred him, in 1725, to the -richer benefice of Stanhope.</p> - -<p>On receiving this honorable and lucrative appointment, he resigned -the Lectureship at the Rolls, and in the autumn of 1726 retired -to his beautiful residence at Stanhope. Here, without a family to -occupy his time, he devoted himself to his great work, the Analogy: -using horseback exercise, seeing little company, living abstemiously -and caring for his flock.</p> - -<p>Seven years thus rolled away; when to draw him from what seemed -to his friends too great retirement and application, Lord-Chancellor -Talbot made him his chaplain, and afterwards, in 1736, gave him a -prebend’s stall in Rochester. In 1736, Butler being now forty-four, -Caroline, consort of George II., appointed him “Clerk of the Closet,” -an office which merely required his attendance at the Queen’s apartments -every evening, from seven to nine.</p> - -<p>Being now in London, convenient to the press, and enjoying both -leisure and competency, he published his immortal <span class="smcap">Analogy</span>—the -cherished work of his life. The Queen was delighted with the book, -and made herself master of its glorious array of reasoning. But she -died the same year, and he lost not only a patroness, but a friend. -He returned to his benefice at Stanhope, the income of which had -been held during his residence in London.</p> - -<p>On her death-bed, the Queen had urged her husband to promote -her honored chaplain to a bishopric; and next year, the see of -Norwich becoming vacant, the Bishop of Bristol was translated to it, -and the see of Bristol given to Butler. Bristol was the poorest -bishopric in England, its emoluments being but $2,000 per annum; -less than those of the rectorship of Stanhope. Butler distinctly -disclosed his disappointment in his letter to the minister Walpole, -accepting the position; and declared that he did not think it “very -suitable to the condition of his fortune, nor answerable to the recommendation -with which he was honored.” The king was not displeased -at this candor, and in 1740 improved his income by giving -him, in addition to his bishopric, the profitable and influential office -of Dean of St. Paul’s. Butler, who had retained the living of Stanhope<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[7]</a></span> -along with his bishopric, now resigned that rectorship. “The -rich revenues,” says Professor Fitzgerald, “of the Deanery of St. Paul, -enabled him to gratify his taste at Bristol.” He expended about -$25,000 in improving and beautifying the episcopal residence and -gardens. He fostered useful charities, and employed his wealth for -others rather than for himself.</p> - -<p>In 1750, upon the death of Dr. Edward Chandler, Bishop of -Durham, Butler was promoted to that see, the most honorable and -lucrative in England. He had before been offered the Primacy, on -the death of Archbishop Potter, but declined it, with the remark that -“it was too late for him to try to support a falling church.” On -assuming his diocese at Durham, Butler delivered and published his -famous Charge to the Clergy, upon “The Use and Importance of -External Religion.” He was at once assailed vigorously, in pamphlets -and papers, by Archdeacon Blackburn, the Rev. T. Lindsay, and -others, on the charge of Popery; an imputation which is still sometimes -cast upon him, and which finds some slender support in his -setting up a marble cross over the communion-table at Bristol. That -he never was a Papist, is now so evident, that we can account for the -imputation only by the strong jealousy of the Romish Church then -prevalent.</p> - -<p>Butler now became still more munificent. His private charities -were exceedingly generous, and his public ones seemed sometimes to -border on extravagance. He gave $2,000 a year to the county hospital, -and often gave away thousands of dollars at a time. But though -quite lavish in buildings and ornaments, as well as in benevolence, -he was remarkably frugal in his personal expenses. It is said of -him, by Rev. John Newton, that on one occasion, when a distinguished -visitor dined with him by appointment, the provision consisted -of a single joint of meat, and a pudding. The bishop remarked -to his guest on that occasion, that he “had long been disgusted with -the fashionable expense of time and money in entertainments, and -was determined that it should receive no countenance from his -example.”</p> - -<p>Of his amusements we know little except that he took much horseback -exercise, and often employed his secretary, Mr. Emms, to play -for him on the organ.</p> - -<p>Butler held the see of Durham less than two years. Symptoms -of general physical decay betrayed themselves about the time of -his promotion, and in spite of all that skill and affection could<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[8]</a></span> -prompt, he sunk to rest June 16th, 1752, aged sixty. He was never -married.</p> - -<p>A considerable number of his sermons and charges have been -printed, but are too philosophical to be generally read. His great -work is the Analogy, published in 1736, and from that day read and -admired by every highly-cultivated mind. He was induced to write -by a state of things very remarkable in the history of religion. -Debauchery and infidelity were almost universal, not in any one class -of society but in all. England had reached the culminating point -of irreligion, and the firm re-establishment of Episcopacy had as yet -done nothing to mend the nation’s morals. Piety was deemed a mark -of ignorance and vulgarity, and multitudes of those who professed it -were persecuted to dungeons and death.</p> - -<p>Infidel writers, warmed into life by court corruption, became more -numerous and audacious than ever before. Their methods of attacking -Christianity were various; but the most successful then, as -always, was to impugn certain doctrines and declarations of the -Sacred Scriptures, as irrational, and hence reject the whole. They -generally admitted the Being and perfection of God, and extolled the -sufficiency of natural religion; but denied any revelation, or any -necessity for one. The verdict of the world was that the Bible is not -authentic, that man is not accountable, nor even probably immortal, -that God neither rewards nor punishes, and that present indulgence, -as far as our nature admits, is both wise and safe.</p> - -<p>Bishop Downam,<a name="FNanchor_2" id="FNanchor_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> one of the most learned of the clergy, in the -early part of the seventeenth century writes thus: “In these times, -if a man do but labor to keep a good conscience, though he meddle -not with matters of state, if he make conscience of swearing, sanctify -the Sabbath, frequent sermons, or abstain from the common corruptions -of the times, he shall straightway be condemned for a puritan, -and be less favored than either a carnal gospeller, or a close Papist.”</p> - -<p>It was considered settled, especially in polite circles, that Christianity, -after so long a prevalence, had been found out to be an imposture. -The clergy, as a body, did nothing to dispel this moral -gloom, but rather increased it by their violent and scandalous conduct. -In the sad language of Bishop Warburton, “Religion had -lost its hold on the minds of the people.” He adds with great point, -“Though a <em>rule of right</em> may direct the philosopher to a principle of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[9]</a></span> -action; and the <em>point of honor</em> may keep up the thing called manners, -among gentlemen: yet nothing but <em>religion</em> can ever fix a sober -standard of behavior among the common people.” Even the universities -were on the side of irreligion; for professorships, as well as -pulpits, were given to men, not for positive worth and fitness, but for -possessing qualities then most in vogue with those who held the -appointing power. Such were the trying times which had driven our -pilgrim fathers to seek a home amid the wilds of an unexplored continent, -and to face the dangers of sea and savage.</p> - -<p>It must ever be regarded as among the highest instances of God’s -bringing good out of evil, that this outrageous rampancy of infidelity -brought out a host of champions for the truth of His word; who -boldly met the odium of discipleship, and waged battle in such style -that the Deistical controversy was settled forever. Never was a dispute -more determined on both sides, and never was victory more -complete. Literary infidelity not only recoiled, but was routed; and -can never again prevail. Henceforth, no <em>scholar</em> will ever treat the -evidences of Christianity as a subject of ridicule or contempt.</p> - -<p>When we contrast the stupendous learning, and powerful logic, of -the Christian writers of that century, with the superficial and almost -contemptible productions of the writers against whom they contended, -we are tempted to wonder why such power should be requisite to -overthrow such weakness. But we must remember, that frail logic -and shallow considerations, will persuade men to indulge their vices; -while the soundest reasonings and the most impressive inducements, -with difficulty lead them to self-restraint and true holiness.</p> - -<p>The infidel writers of that day have sunk into such oblivion that -their works are now seldom found but in great libraries; and even -well-educated persons scarcely know more of them than their names. -Yet so perfectly did their principles accord with the temper of the -times and the universal depravity of the carnal heart, that they -enjoyed the highest popularity with all classes. Forever honored be -the names of that noble band, who, in face of such odds, established -the authority of the Bible, and left the advocates of atheism and immorality -without a lurking-place.<a name="FNanchor_3" id="FNanchor_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> In this noble cohort Butler<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[10]</a></span> -stands conspicuous: and to him, I think, more than to all the others, -is to be attributed the sudden and total overthrow of infidelity, when -it was in its glory.</p> - -<p>As a metaphysician, few have equalled him. What he added to -the science, has ever since remained a part of it, which can be said -of scarcely another. He advanced more that was new, fortified old -positions more ably, and applied speculation to religion more usefully -than any before him. Our language furnishes no profounder thinking. -Merely to understand him is an honorable distinction, and requires -no small previous training of the power of attention. As a polemic, -he is keen, sagacious, candid, patient, persevering, calm, inventive, -and profound: every page indicates that repose of mind, which belongs -only to true greatness, combined with a full knowledge of the subject. -So far as I am able to judge, he never presses a consideration beyond -its just limits, and seldom introduces an illustration which has not -the force of an argument. Fallacies he seems to abolish at a touch.</p> - -<p>The Analogy employed much of his life. It was begun in his -twentieth year, but was not published till he was forty-five. Such a -mode of writing never makes large books, for the matter, constantly -revised, becomes constantly condensed. The Analogy is so condensed, -as that to make a satisfactory synopsis is scarcely practicable. -Hence, though my Conspectus and notes have aided my pupils to -understand and remember the argument, they do not in any measure -obviate the necessity of studying the book itself. If they do not -increase the number of those who shall studiously peruse the book -itself, my aim and expectations will be disappointed.</p> - -<p>To this work no reply has ever been attempted! Extensive as is -its diffusion, and great as is its acknowledged influence, infidelity has -had the highest inducements to attempt to set it aside. Written for -a present purpose, and most signally accomplishing it, it is yet so -written as to endure, in full value, through all coming time. It is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[11]</a></span> -undoubtedly “the most original and the most profound work extant, -in any language, on the philosophy of religion,”<a name="FNanchor_4" id="FNanchor_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> “the most argumentative -and philosophical defence of Christianity ever submitted -to the world.”<a name="FNanchor_5" id="FNanchor_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> - -<p>Writers in defence of Christianity had, before Butler, amply discussed -the several departments of evidences; but still there remained -objections. The structure of the globe, the course of nature, the -organization of animals, &c. were affirmed to contradict revelation. -Its doctrines and duties, moreover, were pronounced inconsistent with -sound reason. Butler repeats none of the old arguments, but confines -himself to the showing that the declarations of revelation are in perfect -harmony with facts seen daily in the world, and which all admit. -That the world might not have been ordered and governed otherwise, -he does not choose to dispute. Taking things as they are, and closely -studying the connection between one thing and another, we ought to -inquire what course of action on our part, will conform to the needs -of such a nature and such circumstances. Our bodies are constructed -of parts, all adapted to each other, and also to one general end. So -too, our souls. And the two together have relations and adaptations, -which may, to some extent at least, indicate what is designed to be -the <em>general</em> end of our existence. If Christianity befits these several -parts of our mixed nature and their obvious uses, then there is nothing -incongruous between the two; and no objections against Christianity -can be drawn from the course of nature. On the contrary, all -seems to be governed as the gospel declares it is, and shows that the -Author of man and the Author of the Bible is the same. This is still -more impressive when we consider that we have a <em>moral faculty</em>; for -it is the very object and business of this faculty to deal with right -and wrong, good and evil; the facts and magnitudes of which are -obvious in the course of nature. If Christianity does, in an especial -manner, <em>befit</em> this faculty, if it is adapted to promote our general -rectitude and happiness, and if it contains no principle which is not -discernible in the government of the visible world, then there is no -discrepancy between Christianity and Providence.</p> - -<p>This is Butler’s position. He confines himself to proving such an -analogy between revelation and the daily course of things, as that -nothing known in the universe can be offered in disproof of Christianity.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[12]</a></span> -The mode of warfare was new. Without professing to -prove Christianity to be true, he demonstrates that it cannot be -proved to be false; and that if it be even probable, the rejection of it -is a gross folly and a tremendous hazard. Every objection against it -he proves to be equally forcible against facts which constantly occur, -and which all admit, though none profess to understand. Thus leaving -the ramparts of the church to be guarded by the mighty men -who had valiantly maintained its defence, he quietly walked out into -the camp of the enemy, and spiked every gun!</p> - -<p>It has been said that the whole argument of the “Analogy” seems -to be built on Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24: “All things are double, one -against the other, and God hath made nothing imperfect.” If it be -so, it involves no disparagement to have received thus the seminal -idea of this immortal work. Who else has so gloriously discerned -and expanded the profound philosophy of the son of Sirac? Others -have uttered sentiments which seem to involve the whole exposition -of Butler. Origen affirms that “he who believes the Scripture to -have proceeded from Him who is the Author of nature, may well expect -to find the same sort of difficulties in it, as are found in nature.” -Shall we assign to Origen the whole credit of the “Analogy”? As -well might we bestow all our admiration for the delightful papers of -Addison, in the Spectator, to the classical authors from whom he -selected appropriate mottoes! By such a rule, the entire merit of -this most Christian work of Butler should be attributed to the pagan -Quintilian, from whom he derives the motto which so appropriately -graces his title-page.</p> - -<p>A rapid sketch of the outline of the argument will aid the student -at his outset. He begins by taking for granted the existence of an -intelligent Author and Governor of the universe. Then, from the conditions -and changes observed in the visible world, he argues the folly -of objecting to revelation on account of doctrines which do but -declare the same general laws and the same principles of government. -That there is this harmony, he proves; and hence the probability -that the same sort of government will prevail hereafter, which -prevails now. He demonstrates that man is under exactly such a -probation in this world, and as to this world, as revelation affirms -him to be under, as to the next; and that embarrassments produced -by the doctrine of necessity, involve nature no less than religion. He -then evinces the need that man should be placed in a state of training -and trial, if he is ever to be qualified for better conditions; and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[13]</a></span> -that this world, as now governed, is exactly adapted to give that -training, and to produce such a character as will insure happiness -under any possible contingencies. This is the argument of Part I.</p> - -<p>Proceeding to examine Christianity, he discusses its importance, its -proofs, the unavoidableness of its containing strange things, the -absurdity of expecting fully to comprehend its statements, and the -abundance of its evidence for candid minds, though they are not, -and ought not to be, irresistible. He answers not only the objections -to Christianity, but the objections against its proofs; which he shows -are very different things. Though he keeps rigidly to the refutation -of objections, and nowhere meddles with the direct evidence of Christianity, -yet, by removing every objection, he does in fact confirm its -claims. This clearing away of objections, <em>after</em> the usual proofs are -presented, crowns and completes the evidence. Thus the ultimate -result of a study of his book is not only negative but positive; and -such has been its effect on every candid and competent student.</p> - -<p>We should remember that we have no right to require the removal -of objections, and that therefore the whole of Butler’s work is in fact -supererogatory; a concession and kindness to such as have doubts, -either honest or captious. Our only rightful demand of Christianity -is for <em>credentials</em>. It presents these in its nature, its miracles, its -prophecies, its propagation, its influence, and its success. If these -are competent, we should bow to its teachings. To suppose that we -are capable of judging of the <em>propriety</em> of all God’s law, or even to -understand his reasons for it, if they were disclosed, is absurd.</p> - -<p>It is true we naturally presume that a revelation in words, and a -revelation by natural objects and the visible order of things, would -coincide; but to find out the fact or the extent of such coincidence, -is not our first business. We are to weigh the <em>testimony</em> in favor of -religion, embrace it, if sufficient, and attribute the obscurity of any -part, to our present want of capacity. The solution of difficulties -serves to <em>confirm</em> our faith in Christianity, but has no place in our -<em>ground of reception</em>: and we have no right to wait for such solution, -however painful and embarrassing may be the difficulties.</p> - -<p>Another, and perhaps even more important, use of the “Analogy,” -is to dissipate the prejudices and objections to Christianity which -prevent a candid study of its evidences. These prepossess and poison -the mind, and obstruct or abate the force of the best arguments. -Few, if any, after a careful examination of the positive evidences of -Christianity, conclude them to be inadequate. But many are they,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[14]</a></span> -who having heard objections which their scanty learning does not -enable them to answer, and their no less scanty interest in the subject -does not induce them to examine, or which their inclinations lead -them to cherish, cast it all aside. In this way they relieve themselves -from the labor of investigation, as well as their compunctions of -conscience; while they indulge both their love of sin and pride of -singularity.</p> - -<p>An instance of the use of this book to such a mind, we have in the -case of Chalmers. He had read, when a young man, several infidel -productions. Their semblance of logic and learning, and supercilious -confidence of style, disposed him to regard all religion as mere superstition. -His mind was poisoned. Accustomed as he had been to the -positive and precise reasonings of mathematics, he could not find -similar proofs for Christianity. But he was induced, by some friends, -to study Butler’s Analogy. This, as he expresses it, took Christianity -“out of the class of unlikelihoods.” It brought him to the investigation, -as if the evidence was neither plus nor minus. He examined -the evidences as he would have done a declaration that Cicero weighed -just one hundred and fifty pounds; open to the smallest proof or -presumption on the positive side of the question. Delivered from -prejudice, not only against Christianity but against its proofs, he soon -saw the madness of deism, and immovably accepted the word of -God, though he did not, at that time, feel its transforming power -on his own heart. Long afterwards he writes, “I cannot render -sufficient homage to the argument, which first, addressing itself to the -<em>subject-matter</em> of Christianity, relieves it of all disproof, and pronounces -it worthy of a trial; and then, addressing itself to the evidence -of Christianity, relieves it of all objections, and makes good, to -that evidence, all the entireness and efficiency which natively belong -to it.” Years afterwards he said, “Butler made me a Christian.” -That it did far more for him than to effect his change of sentiment, -that it continued to be a light in his firmament, is touchingly told in -the Preface of his Bridgewater Treatise, where he says, “I have -derived greater aid from the views and reasonings of Butler, than I -have been able to find, besides, in the whole range of our extant -authorship.”</p> - -<p>To the sincere believer in the word of God the study of Butler is -of great use. Doubts are among Satan’s tried weapons, and often -haunt the holiest, especially if of a contemplative turn. They see -goodness oppressed, and vice rampant; the world ruled by wicked<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[15]</a></span> -men, and truth making its way with difficulty. Their hearts are -traitorous, their surroundings full of temptation, and the direct evidence -of Christianity they may never have studied. To such the -analogical argument comes with full power, meets a candid examination, -and prevails.</p> - -<p>To no Christian is this book so useful as the minister. He is constantly -confronted by the difficulties which Butler so triumphantly -handles. Here he is furnished, not only with a shield to protect his -own mind from subtle darts, but a sword to demolish the cavil, and -defend the system of which he is a public teacher.</p> - -<p>To <em>all</em> persons this book is of great value. We arrive at certainty -in but few of our decisions, and are often obliged, even in matters of -great moment, to act on probability. Thus we employ precautions -when an evil is not certain to occur. If the evil would be very -serious, we adopt the precaution, when there is but little probability, -or perhaps a bare possibility, of its occurrence. Now, Butler has -shown that if the proofs of revelation were weak, nay, if it had absolutely -no proof, nay further, if on fair examination there appeared -not even a probability of its truth, still there would remain a <em>possibility</em>, -and this alone, considering the tremendous issues at stake, -should make every man a Christian. This argument cannot be -applied to Mahometanism or any other religion, because against those -much may be advanced as <em>disproof</em>. Our author, having shown the -utter absence of disproof, shuts us up to the reception of Christianity, -were its truth barely possible.</p> - -<p>There have not been wanting persons to disparage the “Analogy,” -because it affords, as they say, no <em>direct</em> proof of revelation. As well -might we demand a discussion of chemistry in a work on astronomy. -Scores of writers <em>prove</em> Christianity, and here we have one to relieve -us from the difficulties which beset it, and objections which still -remain. There is an aspect in which the Analogy may be said to -contribute the best of proof. What can go further towards establishing -a point, than to demonstrate that there is no proof of the contrary? -What can show the fallacy of a set of objections, more than -to prove that they might be urged with no less force against the -obvious course of nature? This use of analogy is conformable to the -severest logic, and though offering no pretence of positive argument, -goes far towards establishing full conviction. “The probabilities,” -says <span class="smcap">Stewart</span>, “resulting from a concurrence of different analogies,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[16]</a></span> -may rise so high as to produce an effect on the belief scarcely distinguishable -from moral certainty.”</p> - -<p>When it is considered that Butler’s argument is wholly in addition -to the cumulative mass of direct and almost irresistible evidence, -and removes even the objections which attend the subject, we see the -rejection of Christianity to be inexpressibly rash and absurd. We -see the skeptic condemned at his own bar, for acting in the most -momentous of all possible concerns, in a manner the very opposite of -that which he calls sensible and prudent in his ordinary affairs. The -“Analogy” establishes, beyond cavil, strong <em>presumptions</em> that Christianity -is true, aside from all inspection of its proofs. The man, -therefore, who really understands this book, and refuses to be a -Christian, is led by his lusts and not his reason.</p> - -<p>Some admirers of this book have lamented as a defect, its want of -evangelical tincture, and its exclusive reference to natural things. -To me, this is a prime recommendation. Were it otherwise, the -reasoning would be in a circle. The very structure of the argument -demands that it should avoid quotations from the Bible.</p> - -<p>It must be admitted, however, that some expressions, taken just -as they stand, without qualification by the current of the argument, -tend to lead astray. For instance, “There is nothing in the human -mind contrary to virtue.” “Men’s happiness and virtue are left to -themselves.” “Religion requires nothing which we are not well -able to perform.” “Our repentance is accepted, to eternal life.” -“Our relations to God are made known by reason.” Such expressions -are not to be taken alone, but as explained by the general drift -of sentiment and doctrine. No one can be familiar with his works, -without finding the fullest evidence that Christianity was to Butler -infinitely more than a creed or a ritual. Nor should we forget that -such expressions are not to be interpreted by the tenor of the -“Analogy” only, but by that of his whole ‘Works.’</p> - -<p>Even if it be judged that he everywhere fails to express himself in -such phrase as we usually call evangelical, it should be remembered -that he was a Church-of-England man, at a time when there was a -powerful reaction against the evangelism of the Puritans, and when -a real lack of emotional piety was general in his church.</p> - -<p>That he did not enjoy in his last illness, which extended over a -long period, that sustaining sense of the love of Christ which hearty -Christians generally feel, is certain. A friend, trying to relieve his -depression, reminded him of his excellent life, and especially his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[17]</a></span> -wide liberalities. He immediately replied, “l am but a steward! -All is His, intrusted to me, to promote his glory and the good of -mankind; how can I know that I have not abused the trust? I -reflect on all these things, and they fill my soul with terror by the -feeling of responsibility they awaken.”</p> - -<p>On another occasion, his chaplain sought to soothe his troubled spirit -by referring to the extensive influence of his <cite>Analogy</cite> in reclaiming -skeptics. His reply was, “I <em>began</em> the Analogy with a view to the -glory of God; but as I proceeded, visions of the fame it might bring -me mingled themselves with my motives, and all was polluted and -made sinful! The book may be a blessing to others, but it weighs like -lead on my soul.” “Admit all this,” tenderly replied the chaplain; -“yet has not Jesus said, ‘Whosoever cometh unto me shall in no wise -be cast out’?” Instantly the Bishop raised himself in the bed, exclaiming, -“How wonderful that the force of this passage never struck -me before! ‘Whosoever,’—<em>all</em>, <span class="smcapuc">ALL</span>! ‘In no wise,’—no amount of -sin can prevent acceptance! Christ’s righteousness will hide the -iniquities of <em>all</em> who accept his offer of mercy!”</p> - -<p>From that time, for weeks, Butler spoke to all who approached -him, of a <em>full</em> and <em>free</em> salvation. He died triumphantly repeating -this passage.</p> - -<p>If all that is said of the lack of evangelical sentiment in Butler or -his book be conceded, it certainly cannot impair either the value of -the analogical argument, or the force of our author’s use of it.</p> - -<p>Various circumstances conspire to make the study of “The -Analogy” difficult. The nature of the reasoning—the conciseness, -and often obscurity of the style—the dislocation of parts by frequent -digressions—the arrest of a close course of reasoning to answer -objections—and the abstruseness of the subject itself—combine to -make the full comprehension of its import difficult. Mackintosh says, -“No thinker so great, was ever so bad a writer.” But this, like some -other objections of Sir James, is stated too strongly. The language -is good, sinewy Saxon, and will endure when much that is now -called fine writing, will seem grotesque. Still it is possible to -write philosophy in better phrase, as has been shown by at least -two great men, Berkeley and Stewart. Had Butler but possessed the -glowing style of Berkeley, or the smooth, graceful, and transparent -diction of Dugald Stewart, his work, instead of serving only for close -thinkers, or a college text-book, would have been read by all classes, -and banished that vulgar infidelity which flippant writers still disseminate.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[18]</a></span> -That it is thus restricted in its influence is a misfortune -to the world. But he wrote for a class, and did his work completely. -Literary infidelity was conquered. Vulgar, ignorant, licentious -infidelity, will always exist, and is even now deplorably prevalent. -Both Europe and America contain conceited and malignant ignoramuses, -who by their sneers, their cavils, and their audacity, make -havoc of souls. Of these, Tom Paine is a type, whose book, the -contempt of cultivated minds, continues to be sold and read. For -this class of persons, “Baxter’s Call,” or “Alleine’s Alarm,” are -far more suitable than treatises on the evidences of Christianity, or -even Butler’s Analogy.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[19]</a></span></p> - -<h2 id="Editors_Preface">Editor’s Preface.</h2> - -<p>The text is the result of a careful collation of the various principal -editions. Occasionally solecisms are corrected, and a word transposed -or put in italics, when a sentence could thus be made perspicuous. -The author had a fashion of beginning a large proportion of his sentences -with “and,” “but,” “now,” “indeed,” “however,” &c., which -often served to perplex, and in such cases they have been omitted. -Long paragraphs, comprehending different topics, have been so -divided as to correspond with the true analysis; which will greatly -assist the student in detecting the successive stages of the argument. -Special pains has been taken to correct and improve the punctuation. -Hundreds of sentences have thus been rendered more perspicuous, -and many which were obscure, have been made lucid. In no respect -was Butler’s style, as printed, so defective.</p> - -<p>The Conspectus is made much ampler than any other, for this -reason: that students are apt to content themselves with such help -instead of mastering the full discussion by the author. In the present -case they cannot so do, for such is the fulness of the Conspectus, that -if they master this, they have mastered the subject itself in full.</p> - -<p>Notes by the present editor are distinguished from those of the -author by being enclosed in brackets. They are designed to open out -further views, to elucidate the text, to facilitate extended researches, -and to suggest topics for conversation in the class-room.</p> - -<p>The Index has cost far more labor than would be supposed, and -may not be of much benefit to the undergraduate. Its advantages -will not be small to him in after life when he desires to recur to particular<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[20]</a></span> -topics. The general scholar will find it enables him to make -use of the book for occasional reference. Without it the work is not -complete for the class-room, still less for the library.</p> - -<p>That students of the Analogy need help, is confessed; and all -attempts to furnish it have been kindly received. As is remarked by -Bishop Wilson, “His argument, clear and convincing as it is to a -prepared mind, is not obvious to the young reader, whose experience -of life being small, and his habits of reflection feeble, has not the -furniture necessary for comprehending, at first, the thoughts and -conclusions of such a mind. The style is too close, too negligent, too -obscure, to be suitable for the young.”</p> - -<p>If it be asked why, with several existing helps to the study of the -Analogy, I offer another, I frankly reply, because I have found none -of them satisfactory, either to the public or to myself.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>Some teachers prefer their text-books to be accompanied by a set -of questions. Such will find in this edition all they desire. They -have only to enunciate each sentence of the Conspectus in the -interrogative form, and they will have every possible question -prepared to their hand.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[21]</a></span></p> - -<h2 id="Conspectus">Conspectus of the Author’s Introduction.</h2> - -<h3>I. <i>What is probable evidence?</i></h3> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> It differs from demonstration in that it admits of degrees; of <em>all</em> degrees. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) One probability does not beget assurance.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) But the slightest presumption makes a probability.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) The repetition of it may make certainty.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> What constitutes probability is <em>likeness</em>; in regard to the event itself, or its - kind of evidences, or its circumstances. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) This daily affords presumptions, evidence, or conviction: according as it - is occasional, common, or constant.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Measures our hopes and fears.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) Regulates our expectations as to men’s conduct.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) Enables us to judge of character from conduct.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> It is an imperfect mode of judging, and adapted to beings of limited - capacities.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Where better evidence cannot be had, it constitutes moral obligation, even - though great doubts remain. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) We are as much bound to do what, on the whole, <em>appears</em> to be best, as - if we <em>knew</em> it to be so.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) In questions of great moment, it is reasonable to act when the favorable - chances are no greater than the unfavorable.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) There are numberless cases in which a man would be thought distracted - if he did not act, and that earnestly, where the chances of success were - <em>greatly against</em> him.</li> - </ul> - </li> - -</ul> - -<h3>II. <i>The use and application of probabilities</i>.</h3> - -<p class="hanging">Shall not go further into the <em>nature</em> of probable evidence, nor inquire <em>why</em> -likeness begets presumption and conviction; nor how far analogical -reasoning can be reduced to a <em>system</em>; but shall only show how just and -conclusive this mode of reasoning is.</p> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> In determining our judgments and practice. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) There may be cases in which its value is doubtful.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) There may be seeming analogies, which are not really such.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) But as a mode of argument, it is perfectly just and conclusive.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> In noting correspondencies between the different parts of God’s government.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[22]</a></span> - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) We may expect to find the same sort of difficulties in the Bible, as we do - in Nature.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) To deny the Bible to be of God, because of these difficulties, requires us - to deny that the world was made by him.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) If there be a likeness between revelation and the system of nature, it - affords a presumption that both have the same author.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) To reason on the construction and government of the world, without - settling foundation-principles, is mere hypothesis.</li> - <li class="consp">5.) To apply principles which are certain, to cases which are not applicable, - is no better.</li> - <li class="consp">6.) But to join abstract reasonings to the observation of facts, and argue, - from known present things, to what is likely or credible, must be right.</li> - <li class="consp">7.) We cannot avoid acting thus, if we act at all.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> In its application to religion, revealed, as well as natural. This is the use - which will be made of analogy in the following work. In so using it, - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) It will be taken for proved that there is an intelligent Creator and - Ruler. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—There are no presumptions <em>against</em> this, prior to proof.</li> - <li class="consp">—There are proofs:—from analogy, reason, tradition, &c.</li> - <li class="consp">—The fact is not denied by the generality of skeptics.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">2.) No regard will be paid to those who idly speculate as to how the world - <em>might</em> have been made and governed. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—Such prating would amount to this: - <ul> - <li class="consp">· All creatures should have been made at first as happy as they - could be.</li> - <li class="consp">· Nothing of hazard should be put upon them.</li> - <li class="consp">· Should have been <em>secured</em> in their happiness.</li> - <li class="consp">· All punishments avoided.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">—It is a sufficient reply to such talk that mankind have not faculties - for such speculations.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">3.) We are, to some extent, judges as to <em>ends</em>; and may conclude that Nature - and Providence are designed to produce virtue and happiness; - but of the <em>means</em> of producing these in the highest degree, we are not - competent judges. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—We know not the extent of the universe;</li> - <li class="consp">—Nor even how one person can best be brought to perfection.</li> - <li class="consp">—We are not often competent to judge of the conduct of each other.</li> - <li class="consp">—As to God, we may presume that order will prevail in his universe; - but are no judges of his modes for accomplishing this end.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">4.) Instead of vainly, and perhaps sinfully, imagining schemes for God’s - conduct, we must <em>study what is</em>. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—Discovering general laws.</li> - <li class="consp">—Comparing the known course of things with what revelation teaches - us to expect.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h3>III. <i>The force of this use of Analogy.</i></h3> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Sometimes is practically equivalent to proof.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Confirms what is otherwise proved.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[23]</a></span></li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Shows that the system of revelation is no more open to ridicule, than the - system of nature.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Answers almost all objections against religion.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> To a great extent answers objections against the <em>proofs</em> of religion.</li> -</ul> - -<h3>IV. <i>General scope of the book.</i></h3> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> The divine government is considered, as containing in it, - <ul> - <li class="consp">Chap. 1. Man’s future existence.</li> - <li class="consp"><span class="ditto">”</span> 2. In a state of reward or punishment.</li> - <li class="consp"><span class="ditto">”</span> 3. This according to our behavior.</li> - <li class="consp"><span class="ditto">”</span> 4. Our present life probationary.</li> - <li class="consp"><span class="ditto">”</span> 5. And also disciplinary.</li> - <li class="consp"><span class="ditto">”</span> 6. Notwithstanding the doctrine of necessity.</li> - <li class="consp"><span class="ditto">”</span> 7. Or any apparent want of wisdom or goodness.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Revealed religion is considered, - <ul> - <li class="consp">Chap. 1. As important.</li> - <li class="consp"><span class="ditto">”</span> 2. As proved by miracles.</li> - <li class="consp"><span class="ditto">”</span> 3. As containing strange things.</li> - <li class="consp"><span class="ditto">”</span> 4. As a scheme imperfectly comprehended.</li> - <li class="consp"><span class="ditto">”</span> 5. As carried on by a mediator.</li> - <li class="consp"><span class="ditto">”</span> 6. As having such an amount of evidence as God saw fit to give.</li> - <li class="consp"><span class="ditto">”</span> 7. As having sufficient and full evidence.</li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h2>Conspectus of the Analogy.</h2> - -<h3>PART I.</h3> - -<h4>CHAPTER I.<br /> -<span class="smaller">A FUTURE LIFE.</span></h4> - -<p class="hanging">Will not discuss the subject of identity; but will consider what analogy suggests -from changes which do not destroy; and thus see whether it is not -<em>probable</em> that we shall live hereafter.</p> - -<h5 class="sub">I. <i>The probabilities that we shall survive death.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> It is a law of nature that creatures should exist in different stages, and - in various degrees of perfection. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—Worms turn into flies.</li> - <li class="consp">—Eggs are hatched into birds.</li> - <li class="consp">—Our own present state is as different from our state in the womb, as - two states of the same being can be.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[24]</a></span></li> - <li class="consp">—That we shall hereafter exist in a state as different from the present as - the present is from our state in the womb, is according to analogy.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> We now have capacities for happiness, action, misery, &c., and there is - always a probability that things will continue as they are, except when - experience gives us reason to think they will be altered. This is a general - law; and is our <em>only</em> natural reason for expecting the continuance of - any thing.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> There is no reason to apprehend that death will destroy us.<br /> - <span class="sub-line">If there was, it would arise from the nature of death; or from the analogy - of nature.</span> - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Not from the nature of death. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—We know not what death is.</li> - <li class="consp">—But only <em>some</em> of its <em>effects</em>.</li> - <li class="consp">—These effects do not imply the destruction of the living agent.</li> - <li class="consp">—We know little of what the <em>exercise</em> of our powers depends upon; and - nothing of what <em>the powers</em> themselves depend on.</li> - <li class="consp">—We may be unable to <em>exercise</em> our powers, and yet not lose them—<i>e.g.</i> - sleep, swoon.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">2.) Not from analogy. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—Reason shows no connection between death and our destruction.</li> - <li class="consp">—We have no faculties by which to trace any being beyond it.</li> - <li class="consp">—The possession of living powers, up to the very moment when our - faculties cease to be able to trace them, is a probability of their continuing.</li> - <li class="consp">—We have already survived wonderful changes.</li> - <li class="consp">—To live after death is analogous to the course of nature.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">II. <i>Presumptions against a future life.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> That death <em>destroys</em> us. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> 1. This is an assumption that we are compound and material beings, and - hence discerptible; which is not true. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Consciousness is a single, indivisible power, and of course the subject of - it must be.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) The material body is not ourself.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) We can easily conceive of our having more limbs, or of a different kind, - or of having more or fewer senses, or of having no bodies at all, or of - hereafter animating these same bodies, remodelled.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) The dissolution of a succession of new and strange bodies, would have - no tendency to destroy <em>us</em>.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> 2. Though the absolute simplicity of the living being cannot be proved by - <em>experiment</em>, yet facts lead us so to conclude. We lose limbs, &c. - Our bodies were once <em>very</em> small, but we might, then, have lost part - of them. There is a constant destruction and renewal going on. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Thus we see that no certain <em>bulk</em> is necessary to our existence, and unless - it were proved that there is, and that it is larger than an indissoluble - atom, there is no reason to presume that death destroys us, even if we - are discerptible.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) The living agent is not an <em>internal material organism</em>, which dies with - the body. Because <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[25]</a></span> - <ul> - <li class="consp">—Our only ground for this presumption is our relation to other systems - of matter. But we see these are not necessary to us.</li> - <li class="consp">—It will not do to say that lost portions of the body were not <em>essential</em>—who - is to determine?</li> - <li class="consp">—The relation between the living agent, and the most essential parts of - the body, is only one by which they mutually affect each other.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">3.) If we regard our body as made up of organs of sense, we come to the - same result. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—We see with the eyes, just as we do with glasses. The eye is not a - <em>recipient</em>, any more than a telescope.</li> - <li class="consp">—It is not pretended that vision, hearing, &c. can be traced clear up to - the percipient; but so far as we can trace perceptions, the <em>organ</em> - does not perceive.</li> - <li class="consp">—In dreams we perceive without organs.</li> - <li class="consp">—When we lose a limb we do not lose the <em>directing power</em>; we could - move a new one, if it could be made, or a wooden one. But the - limb cut off has no power of moving.</li> - <li class="consp">—Thus, our loss of the <em>organs</em> of perception and motion, not being the - destruction of the power, there is no ground to think that the destruction - of other organs or instruments would destroy <em>us</em>.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Objection.</i> These observations apply equally to brutes. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> 1. Be it so. Perhaps they are immortal:—may hereafter improve: we - know not what latent powers they may have. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) The human being at one period looks as little likely to make great - intellectual attainments; for a long time he has capacities for virtue - and religion, but cannot use them.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Many persons go out of the world who never became able to exercise - these capacities; <i>e.g.</i> infants.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> 2. If brutes were immortal, it does not prove them to be <em>moral agents</em>. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) It may be necessary, for aught we know, that there should be living - creatures not moral agents, nor rational.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) All difficulties as to what would become of them, are founded in our - ignorance.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> That our souls, though not material, so depend upon the bodily structure, - that we cannot survive its destruction. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> 1. Reason, memory, &c. <em>do not</em> depend on the body, as perceptions by - the senses do. Death may destroy those <em>instruments</em>, and yet not - destroy the <em>powers</em> of reflection.</li> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> 2. Human beings exist, here, in two very different states, each having its - own laws: sensation and reflection. By the first we feel; by the - second we reason and will. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Nothing which we know to be destroyed at death, is necessary to reflecting - on ideas formerly received.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Though the senses act like scaffolds, or levers, to <em>bring in</em> ideas, yet when - once in, we can reflect, &c. without their aid.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> 3. There are diseases which prove fatal, &c., yet do not, in any part of - their course, <em>impair</em> the intellect; and this indicates that they do not - <em>destroy</em> it.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[26]</a></span> - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) In the diseases alluded to, persons have their reflective power, in full, - the very moment before death.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Now, why should a disease, at a certain degree, utterly destroy powers - which were not even affected by it, up to that point?</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> That death at least <em>suspends</em> our reflective powers, or interrupts our continuing - to exist in the like state of reflection which we do now. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> There appears so little connection between our powers of sensation and - our powers of reflection that we cannot presume that what might - <em>destroy the former</em>, could even <em>suspend the latter</em>. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) We daily see reason, memory, &c. exercised without any assistance, that - we know of, from our bodies.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Seeing them in lively exercise to the last, we must infer that death is not - a discontinuance of their exercise, nor of the enjoyments and sufferings - of such exercise.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) Our posthumous life may be but a going on, with additions. Like the - change at our birth—which produced not a suspension of the faculties - we had before, nor a <em>total</em> change in our state of life; but a continuance - of both, with great alterations.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) Death may but at once put us into a <em>higher</em> state of life, as our birth - did; our relation to bodily organs may be the only hinderance to our - entering a higher condition of the reflective powers.</li> - <li class="consp">5.) Were we even sure that death would suspend our intellectual powers, it - would not furnish even the lowest probability that it would destroy - them.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> From the analogy of plants. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> This furnishes poets with apt illustrations of our frailty, but affords no - proper analogy. Plants are destitute of perception and action, and - this is the very matter in question.</li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h5>REMARKS.</h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> It has been shown, that confining ourselves to what we know, we see no - probability of ever ceasing to be:—it cannot be concluded from the reason - of the thing:—nor from the analogy of nature.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> We are therefore to go upon the belief of a future existence.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Our going into <em>new scenes</em> and conditions, is just as natural as our coming - into the world.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Our condition may naturally be a social one.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> The advantages of it may naturally be bestowed, according to some fixed - law, in proportion to one’s degrees in virtue. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Perhaps not so much as now <em>by society</em>; but by God’s more immediate - action.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Yet this will be no less <em>natural</em>, <i>i.e.</i> stated, fixed, or settled.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) Our notions of what is natural, are enlarged by greater knowledge of God - and his works.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) There may be some beings in the world, to whom the whole of Christianity - is as natural as the visible course of nature seems to us.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>6.</b> These probabilities of a future life, though they do not satisfy curiosity, - answer all the purposes of religion, as well as demonstration. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Even a demonstration of a future state, would not demonstrate religion, - but would be reconcilable with atheism.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[27]</a></span></li> - <li class="consp">2.) But as religion implies a future state, any presumption against such a - state, would be a presumption against religion.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) The foregoing observations remove all presumptions of that sort, and - prove to a great probability, a fundamental doctrine of religion.</li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h4>CHAPTER II.<br /> -<span class="smaller">THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.</span></h4> - -<p>The question of a future life is rendered momentous by our capacity for -happiness and misery.</p> - -<p>Especially if that happiness or misery depends on our present conduct.</p> - -<p>We should feel the deepest solicitude on this subject.</p> - -<p>And that if there were no proof of a future life and interest, other than the -probabilities just discussed.</p> - -<h5 class="sub">I. <i>In the present world our pleasures and pains are, to a great extent, -in our own power.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> We see them to be consequences of our actions.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> And we can <em>foresee</em> these consequences.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Our desires are not gratified, without the right kind of exertion.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> By prudence we may enjoy life; rashness, or even neglect may make us - miserable.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> Why this is so is another matter. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) It may be impossible to be otherwise.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Or it may be best on the whole.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) Or God’s plan may be to make only the good happy.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) Or the whole plan may be incomprehensible to us.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> It may be said “this is only the course of nature.” - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> It is granted: but - <ul> - <li class="consp">1. The course of nature is but the will of God. We admit that God is the - natural governor of the world: and must not turn round and deny it - because his government is <em>uniform</em>.</li> - <li class="consp">2. Our natural foresight of the consequences of actions, is his appointment.</li> - <li class="consp">3. The consequences themselves, are his appointment.</li> - <li class="consp">4. Our ability to foresee these consequences, is God’s <em>instruction</em> how we are - to act.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> By this reasoning we are instructed to gratify our appetites, and such - gratification is our reward for so doing. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> Certainly not. Foreseen pleasures and pains are proper motives to action - <em>in general</em>; but we may, in particular cases, damage ourselves by - indulgence. Our eyes are made to see with, but not to look at every - thing:—for instance the sun.</li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>It follows, from what has been said, that</p> - -<h5 class="sub">II. <i>We are, now, actually under God’s government, in the strictest -sense.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Admitting that there is a God, it is not so much a matter of speculation, as - of experience, that he governs us.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[28]</a></span></li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> The annexing of pleasures and pains to certain actions, and giving notice - them, is the very essence of government.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Whether by direct acts upon us, or by contriving a general plan, does not - affect the argument. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) If magistrates could make laws which should <em>execute themselves</em>, their - government would be far more perfect than it is.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) God’s making fire burn us, is as much an instance of government, as if - he <em>directly inflicted</em> the burn, whenever we touched fire.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Hence the analogy of nature shows nothing to render incredible the Bible - doctrine of God’s rewarding or punishing according to our actions.</li> -</ul> - -<h5><i>Additional remarks on Punishment.</i></h5> - -<p>As men object chiefly to future punishment, it is proper to show further that -the course of administration, as to <em>present</em> punishment, is analogous to what -religion teaches as to <em>the future</em>.</p> - -<p>Indeed they add credibility to it.</p> - -<p>And ought to raise the most serious apprehension.</p> - -<h6 class="sub">I. <i>Circumstances to be observed touching present punishments.</i></h6> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> They often follow acts which produce present pleasure or advantage.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> The sufferings often far exceed the pleasure or advantage.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> They often follow remotely.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> After long delay they often come suddenly.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> As those remote effects are not certainly foreseen, they may not be thought - of at the time; or if so, there is a hope of escaping.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>6.</b> There are opportunities of advantage, which if neglected do not recur.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>7.</b> Though, in some cases, men who have sinned up to a certain point, may - retrieve their affairs, yet in many cases, reformation is of no avail.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>8.</b> Inconsiderateness is often as disastrous as wilful wrong-doing.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>9.</b> As some punishments by civil government, are capital, so are some natural - punishments. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Seem intended to remove the offender out of the way.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Or as an example to others.</li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h6 class="sub">II. <i>These things are not accidental, but proceed from fixed laws.</i></h6> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> They are matters of daily experience.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Proceed from the general laws, by which the world is governed.</li> -</ul> - -<h6 class="sub">III. <i>They so closely resemble what religion teaches, as to future punishment, -that both might be expressed in the same words.</i></h6> - -<p><i>e.g.</i> Proverbs, ch. i.</p> - -<p>The analogy sufficiently answers all objections against the Scripture doctrine -of future punishment, such as</p> - -<ul> - <li class="consp">1.) That our frailty or temptations annihilate the guilt of vice.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Or the objection from necessity.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) Or that the Almighty cannot be contradicted.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) Or that he cannot be offended.</li> -</ul> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[29]</a></span></p> - -<h5>REMARKS.</h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Such reflections are terrific, but ought to be stated and considered.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Disregard of a hereafter cannot be justified by any thing short of a - <em>demonstration</em> of atheism. Even skeptical doctrines afford no justification.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> There is no pretence of reason for presuming that the licentious will not - find it better for them that they had never been born.</li> -</ul> - -<h4>CHAPTER III.<br /> -<span class="smaller">MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.</span></h4> - -<p>As the structure of the world shows <em>intelligence</em>, so the mode of distributing -pleasure and pain, shows government. That is, God’s <em>natural</em> government, -such as a king exercises over his subjects.</p> - -<p>But this does not, at first sight, determine what is the <em>moral character</em> of -such government.</p> - -<h5 class="sub">I. <i>What is a moral or righteous government?</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Not mere rewarding and punishing.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> But doing this according to character.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> The perfection of moral government is doing this <em>exactly</em>.</li> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> God is simply and absolutely benevolent. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> Benevolence, infinite in degree, would dispose him to produce the greatest - possible happiness, regardless of behaviour. This would rob God of - other attributes; and should not be asserted unless it can be proved. - And whether it can be proved is not the point now in hand.</li> - <li class="consp">The question is not whether there may not be, in the universe, beings to - whom he manifests absolute benevolence, which might not be incompatible with - justice; but whether he treats <em>us</em> so.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> It must be owned to be vastly difficult, in such a disordered world, to estimate - with exactness the overplus of happiness on the side of virtue: and - there may be exceptions to the rule. But it is far from being doubtful - that <em>on the whole</em>, virtue is happier than vice, in this world.</li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">II. <i>The beginnings of a righteous administration, are seen in nature.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> It has been proved (ch. ii.) that God <em>governs</em>: and it is reasonable to suppose - that he would govern <em>righteously</em>. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Any other rule of government would be harder to account for.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) The Bible doctrine that hereafter the good shall be happy, and the - wicked miserable, is no more than an expectation that a method of - government, now begun, shall be carried on.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> The opposite consequences of prudence and rashness, show a right constitution - of nature; and our ability to foresee and control these consequences, - shows that we are under moral law.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> God has so constructed society that vice, to a great degree, is actually - punished by it.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[30]</a></span> - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Without this, society could not exist.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) This is God’s government, through society; and is as <em>natural</em>, as society.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) Since the course of things is God’s appointment, men are unavoidably - accountable for their behaviour.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> Society often punishes good actions, and rewards wickedness. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> 1. This is not <em>necessary</em>, and consequently not natural.</li> - <li class="consp">2. Good actions are never punished by society as <em>good</em>, but because - considered bad.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> By the course of nature, virtue is rewarded, and vice punished, <em>as such</em>, - which proves a moral government; as will be seen if we rightly distinguish - between actions and their qualities. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) An action may produce present gratification though it be wrong: in - which case the gratification is in the act, not the morality of it: in other - cases the enjoyment consists wholly in the quality of virtuousness.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Vice is naturally attended with uneasiness, apprehension, vexation, - remorse, &c. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—This is a very different feeling from that produced by mere misfortune.</li> - <li class="consp">—Men comfort themselves under misfortune, that it was not their own fault.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">3.) Honest and good men are befriended <em>as such</em>.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) Injuries are resented as implying fault; and good offices are regarded - with gratitude on account of the <em>intention</em>, even when they fail to benefit us. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—This is seen in family government, where children are punished for - falsehood, fretfulness, &c., though no one is hurt.</li> - <li class="consp">—And also in civil government, where the absence or presence of ill - intention goes far in determining the penalty of wrong-doing.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">5.) The whole course of the world, in all ages and relations, turns much upon - approbation and disapprobation.</li> - <li class="consp">6.) The very fact of our having a moral nature, is a proof of our being - under God’s moral government. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—We are placed in a condition which unavoidably operates on our moral - nature.</li> - <li class="consp">—Hence it arises that reward to virtue and reprobation of vice, as such, - is a <em>rule</em>, never inverted. If it be thought that there are instances - to the contrary, (which is not so,) they are evidently monstrous.</li> - <li class="consp">—The <em>degree</em> in which virtue and vice receive proper returns, is not the - question now, but only the thing itself, in some degree.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">7.) It is admitted that virtue sometimes suffers, and vice prospers; but this - is <em>disorder</em>, and not the order of nature.</li> - <li class="consp">8.) It follows, that we have in the government of the world, a declaration - from God, for virtue and against vice. So far as a man is true to virtue, - is he on the side of the divine administration. Such a man must have - a <em>sense of security</em>, and a hope of <em>something better</em>.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> This hope is confirmed by observing that virtue has necessary tendencies - beyond their present effects. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) These are very obvious with regard to individuals.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Are as real, though not so patent, in regard to society. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—The power of a society under the direction of virtue, tends to prevail - over power not so directed, just as power under direction of reason, - tends to prevail over brute force.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[31]</a></span></li> - <li class="consp">—As this may not be conceded, we will notice how the case stands, - as to reason: - <ul> - <li class="consp">· Length of time, and proper opportunity, are necessary for reason - to triumph over brutes.</li> - <li class="consp">· Rational beings, disunited, envious, unjust, and treacherous, may - be overcome by brutes, uniting themselves by instinct: but this - would be an inverted order of things.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">—A like tendency has virtue to produce superiority. - <ul> - <li class="consp">· By making the good of society, the object of every member of it.</li> - <li class="consp">· By making every one industrious in his own sphere.</li> - <li class="consp">· By uniting all in one bond of veracity and justice.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">3.) If the part of God’s government which we see, and the part we do - not see, make up one scheme, then we see a <em>tendency</em> in virtue to - superiority.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) But to <em>produce</em> that superiority there must be - <ul> - <li class="consp">—A force proportioned to the obstacles.</li> - <li class="consp">—Sufficient lapse of time.</li> - <li class="consp">—A fair field of trial; such as extent of time, adequate occasions, and - opportunities for the virtuous to unite.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">5.) These things are denied to virtue in this life, so that its tendencies, - though real, are <em>hindered</em>.</li> - <li class="consp">6.) But it may have all requisite advantages hereafter. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—Eternity will be lasting enough.</li> - <li class="consp">—Good men will unite; as they cannot do now, scattered over the earth, - and ignorant of one another.</li> - <li class="consp">—Other orders of virtuous beings will join; for the very nature of virtue - is a bond of union.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">7.) The tendency of such an order of things, so far as seen by vicious beings - in any part of the universe, would be to the amendment of all who - were capable of it, and their recovery to virtue.</li> - <li class="consp">8.) All this goes to show that the hinderances to virtue are contingent, and - that its beneficial tendencies are God’s declarations in its favor.</li> - <li class="consp">9.) If the preceding considerations are thought to be too speculative, we - may easily come to the same result by reflecting on the supremacy - which any earthly nation would attain, by entire virtue for many ages.</li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h5>REMARKS.</h5> - -<p>Consider now the general system of religion. The government of the world -is one; it is moral; virtue shall in the end prevail over wickedness; and to -see the importance and fitness of such an arrangement we have only to -consider what would be the state of things, if vice had these advantages, or -virtue the contrary.</p> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> Why may not things be now going on in other worlds, and continue - always to go on in this world, in the same mixed and disordered - state as at present? - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> We are not proving that God’s moral government is <em>perfect</em>, or the truth - of religion, but only seeing what there is in the course of nature, to - confirm it, supposing it to be known. Were there nothing to judge by,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[32]</a></span> - but the present distribution of pleasure and pain, we should have no - ground to conclude that hereafter we should be rewarded or punished - exactly according to our deserts. But even then there would be no - indication that vice is better than virtue. Still the preceding observations - <em>confirm</em> the doctrine of future retribution; for, - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent to virtue - and vice.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) That future distributive justice would differ not in <em>kind</em>, but in degree - only, from God’s present government. It would be the <em>effect</em>, towards - which we see the <em>tendency</em>.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) That higher rewards and punishments <em>may be</em> hereafter.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) That we should <em>expect</em> it to be so; because the tendencies of vice and - virtue are immutable, while the hinderances are only artificial.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h5>SUMMARY.</h5> - -<p>[This enumerates the steps of the argument, in the foregoing chapter, in -as condensed a form as possible.]</p> - -<h4>CHAPTER IV.<br /> -<span class="smaller">OF A STATE OF PROBATION.</span></h4> - -<p>The doctrine of probation comprehends several particulars. But the most -common notion is that our future interests are <em>depending</em>; and depending on -<em>ourselves</em>. And that we have <em>opportunities</em> for both good and bad conduct, -and <em>temptations</em> to each.</p> - -<p>This is not exactly the same as our being under moral government; for it -implies allurement to evil, and difficulties in being good.</p> - -<p>Hence needs to be considered by itself.</p> - -<p class="hanging"><i>Doctrine.</i> <span class="smcap">The natural government of God, in this world, puts us on -trial as to the things of this world; and so implies, what -religion teaches, that his moral government puts us on -trial as to a future world.</span></p> - -<h5 class="sub">I. <i>So far as we are tempted to do what will damage our future temporal -interests, so far we are under probation as to those interests.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> The annexing of pleasures and pains to actions, as good or bad, and - enabling us to foresee their effect, implies that our interests, in part at - least, depend on ourselves.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> We often <em>blame</em> ourselves and others for evils, as resulting from misconduct.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> It is very certain that we often miss possible good, and incur evils, not for - want of knowing better, but through our <em>fault</em>.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Every one speaks of the hazards of young persons, from other causes - than ignorance.</li> -</ul> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[33]</a></span></p> - -<h5 class="sub">II. <i>These natural or temporal trials are analogous to our moral -and religious trial.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> In both cases, what constitutes the trial, is either in our circumstances - or in our nature. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Some would do right but for violent or extraordinary temptations.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Others will <em>seek</em> evil, and go out of their way after wicked indulgence, - when there are no external temptations.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) But even those who err through temptation, must have that within which - makes them <em>susceptible</em> of temptation.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) So that we are in a like state of probation with respect to both present - and future interests.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> If we proceed to observe how mankind behave in both capacities, we see - the same analogy. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Some scarcely look beyond the present gratification.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Some are driven by their passions against their better judgment and - feeble resolutions.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) Some shamelessly go on in open vice.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) Some persist in wrong-doing, even under strong apprehensions of future - misery.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> The analogy is no less plain in regard to the influence of others upon us. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Bad example.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Wrong education.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) Corruptions of religion.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) General prevalence of mistakes as to true happiness.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> In both cases negligence and folly bring difficulty as well as vice.</li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">III. <i>The disadvantages we labor under from our fallen and disordered -state, are the same, in relation to both earthly and future interests.</i></h5> - -<p>This disadvantage affords no ground of complaint; for,</p> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> We <em>may</em> manage to pass our days in comfort and peace.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> And so may we obtain the security and comfort of religion.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> We might as well complain that we are not a higher order of beings.</li> -</ul> - -<h5>REMARKS.</h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> It is thus proved that the state of trial, which religion says we are in, is - credible; for it exactly corresponds to what we see. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) If from birth till death we were in a constant security of enjoyment, - without care or correctness, it would be a presumption against religion.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) It might, if we had no experience, be urged that an infinitely good Being - would not expose us to the hazard of misery. This is indeed a difficulty, - and must remain so; but still the course of nature is as it is.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) The miseries which we bring on ourselves are no more unavoidable than - our deportment.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> It has been proved that we are in danger of miscarrying as to our interests, - both present and future.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> The sum of the whole is, that as we do not have present enjoyments and - honors forced upon us, in spite of misconduct, so this <em>may</em> be the case, - as to that chief and final good which religion proposes.</li> -</ul> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[34]</a></span></p> - -<h4>CHAPTER V.<br /> -<span class="smaller">PROBATION INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT.</span></h4> - -<p>Why we should be placed in the condition spoken of in the last chapter, is -a question which cannot be answered. It may be that we could not understand, -if told. And if we could, it might injure us to know, just now. It -certainly is consistent with God’s righteous government.</p> - -<p>Religion tells us that we are so placed in order to become qualified for -a better state.</p> - -<p>This, though a very partial answer to the inquiry <em>why</em> we are so placed, -answers an infinitely more important question,—viz.: <em>What is our business -here?</em></p> - -<h5 class="sub">I. <i>We are placed in this state of trial, for our improvement in -virtue, as the requisite qualification for future security and -happiness.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Every creature is designed for a particular way of life. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Happiness depends on the congruity between a creature’s nature and its - circumstances.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Man’s character might be so changed as to make him <em>incapable</em> of - happiness on earth.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) Or he might be placed, without changing his nature, in a world where he - must be wretched, for want of the proper objects to answer to his - desires.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) So that without determining what is the future condition of good men, - we know there must be necessary <em>qualifications</em> to make us capable of - enjoying it.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Human beings are so constituted as to become fit for new and different - conditions. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) We not only acquire ideas, but store them up.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) We can become more expert in any kind of action.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) And can make settled alterations in our tempers.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) We can form <em>habits</em>—both bodily and mental.</li> - <li class="consp">As these operate in producing radical changes in human character, we will - look for a moment at the process. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—Neither perceptions, nor knowledge, are habits; though necessary to - <em>forming</em> them.</li> - <li class="consp">—There are habits of perception, however, and habits of action: the - former are passive, the latter active.</li> - <li class="consp">—Habits of body are produced by external acts, and habits of mind by - the exertion of principles; <i>i.e.</i> carrying them out.</li> - <li class="consp">—Resolutions to do well are acts, and may <em>help</em> towards forming - good habits. But <em>mere</em> theorizing, and forming pictures in the - mind, not only do not help, but may harden the mind to a - contrary course.</li> - <li class="consp">—Passive impressions, by repetition grow weaker. Thus familiarity with - danger lessens fear.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[35]</a></span></li> - <li class="consp">—Hence active habits may be formed and strengthened, by acting according - to certain motives or excitements, which grow less sensibly felt - and less and less felt, as the habit strengthens. - <ul> - <li class="consp">· Thus the sight of distress excites the passive emotion of pity, - and the active principle of benevolence. But inquiring out - cases of distress in order to relieve them, causes diminished - sensitiveness at the sight of misery, and stronger benevolence - and aptitude in relieving it.</li> - <li class="consp">· So admonition, experience, and example, if acted upon, produce - good; if not, harden.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">5.) The formation of a habit may be imperceptible and even inexplicable, - but the thing itself is matter of certain experience.</li> - <li class="consp">6.) A habit once formed, the action becomes easy and often pleasurable: - opposite inclinations grow weaker: difficulties less: and occasions more - frequent.</li> - <li class="consp">7.) Thus, a new character, in several respects, is formed.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> We should not have these capacities for improvement and for the reconstruction - of character, if it were not necessary. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) They are necessary, even as to this life. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—We are not qualified, at first, for mature life: understanding and - strength come gradually.</li> - <li class="consp">—If we had them in full, at birth, we should at first be distracted - and bewildered, and our faculties would be of no use previous to - experience. Ignorant of any employment, we could not provide - for ourselves.</li> - <li class="consp">—So that man is an unformed, unfinished creature, even as to this world, - till he <em>acquire</em> knowledge, experience, and habits.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">2.) Provision is made for our acquiring, in youth, the requisite qualities for - manhood. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—Children <em>learn</em>, from their very birth, - <ul> - <li class="consp">· The nature and use of objects.</li> - <li class="consp">· The subordinations of domestic life.</li> - <li class="consp">· The rules of life.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">—Some of this learning is acquired so insensibly, as to seem like instinct, - but some requires great care and labor, and the doing of - things we are averse to.</li> - <li class="consp">—According as we act during this formative period, is our character - formed; and our capacity for various stations in society determined.</li> - <li class="consp">—Early opportunities lost, cannot be recovered.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">3.) Our state of discipline throughout this life, for another, is exactly of the - same kind: and comprehended under one general law. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—If we could not see how the present discipline fitted us for a higher - life, it would be no objection. - <ul> - <li class="consp">· We do not know how food, sleep, &c. enlarges the child’s body; - nor would we expect such a result, prior to experience.</li> - <li class="consp">· Nor do children understand the need of exercise, temperance, - restraint, &c.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">—We thus see a general analogy of Providence indicating that the - present life is preparatory.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[36]</a></span></li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> If virtue is a necessary qualification for future happiness, then we see our - need of the moral culture of our present state. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Analogy indicates that our future state will be social. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—Nature furnishes no shadow of unreasonableness in the Scripture - doctrine that this future community will be under the more immediate - government of God.</li> - <li class="consp">—Nor the least proof that its members will not require the exercise of - veracity, justice, &c. towards each other; and that character which - <em>results</em> from the practice of such virtues.</li> - <li class="consp">—Certainly the universe is under moral government; and a virtuous - character must, in some way, be a condition of happiness in that - state.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">2.) We are deficient, and in danger of deviating from what is right. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—We have desires for outward objects.</li> - <li class="consp">—The times, degrees, &c. of gratifying these desires, are, of right, subject - to the control of the moral principle.</li> - <li class="consp">—But that principle neither excites them, nor prevents their being - excited.</li> - <li class="consp">—They may exist, when they cannot be lawfully gratified, or gratified - at all.</li> - <li class="consp">—When the desire exists, and the gratification is unlawful, we are - tempted.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">3.) The only security is the principle within. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—The strengthening of this lessens the danger.</li> - <li class="consp">—It may be strengthened, by discipline and exercise. - <ul> - <li class="consp">· Noting examples.</li> - <li class="consp">· Attending to the right, and not to preference.</li> - <li class="consp">· Considering our true interests.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">—When improved, it becomes, in proportion to its strength, our security - from the dangers of natural propensions.</li> - <li class="consp">—Virtue, become habitual by discipline, is improved virtue; and improved - virtue must produce increased happiness, if the government - of the world is moral.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">4.) Even creatures made upright may fall. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—The fall of an upright being, is not accounted for by the nature of - liberty; for that would only be saying that an event happened - because it might happen.</li> - <li class="consp">—But from the very nature of propensions.</li> - <li class="consp">—A finitely perfect being would have propensions corresponding to its - surroundings; its understanding; and its moral sense; and all these - in due proportions.</li> - <li class="consp">—Such a being would have propensions, though the object might not - be present, or the indulgence might be contrary to its moral sense; - and this would have some tendency, however small, to induce - gratification.</li> - <li class="consp">—The tendency would be increased by the frequency of occasions; and - yet more by the least indulgence, even in thought; till, under peculiar - conjunctures, it would become effect.</li> - <li class="consp">—The first transgression might so utterly disorder the constitution, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[37]</a></span> - change the proportions of forces, as to lead to a repetition of irregularities; - and hence to the construction of bad habits, and a depraved - character.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">5.) On the contrary, a finitely perfect being may attain higher virtue, and - more security, by obeying the moral principle. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—For the danger would lessen, by the increased submissiveness of - propensions.</li> - <li class="consp">—The moral principle would gain force by exercise.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">6.) Thus vice is not only criminal, but degrading; and virtue is not only - right, but improving. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—The degree of improvement may be such that the danger of sinning - may be almost infinitely lessened.</li> - <li class="consp">—Yet the security may always be the habits formed in a state of discipline; - making such a state altogether fit and necessary.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">7.) This course of reasoning is vastly stronger when applied to fallen and - corrupt creatures. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—The upright need improvement; the fallen must be renewed.</li> - <li class="consp">—Discipline is expedient for the one; necessary for the other; and of a - severer sort.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">II. <i>The present world is peculiarly fit for such discipline as we need.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Surrounding evils tend to produce moderation, practical knowledge, &c. - very different from a mere speculative knowledge of our liability to vice - and misery.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Our experience in this world, with right views and practice, may leave - eternal impressions for good.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Every act of self-government in the exercise of virtue, must, from the very - make of our nature, form habits of virtue, and a more intense virtuous - principle.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Resolute and persevering resistance to particular and violent temptations, is - a <em>continued</em> act of virtue, and that in a <em>higher degree</em> than if the seduction - were transient and weak.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> Self-denial is not essential to virtue, but is almost essential to discipline and - improvement. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Because actions materially virtuous, which have no difficulty, but agree - with our inclinations, may be done merely from inclination, and so not - be <em>really</em> virtuous.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) But when they are done in face of danger and difficulty, virtuousness is - increased, and confirmed into a habit.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> 1. As our intellectual or physical powers may be overtasked, so may our moral. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> This may be so in exceptional cases, but it does not confute the argument. - In general, it holds good. All that is intended to be proved is, that this - world is <em>intended</em> to be a state of improvement, and is <em>fitted</em> for it. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Some sciences which of themselves are highly improving, require a - trying measure of attention, which some will not submit to.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) It is admitted that this world disciplines many to vice: but this viciousness - of many is the very thing which makes the world a virtuous - discipline to good men. The <em>whole end</em> in placing mankind as they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[38]</a></span> - are we know not; but these things are evident—the virtues of some - are exercised:—and so exercised as to be improved: and improved - beyond what they would be in a perfectly virtuous community.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) That all, or even the generality, do not improve, is no proof that their - improvement was not <em>intended</em>. Of seeds and animals not one in a - million comes to perfection; yet such as do, evidently answer an end - for which they were designed. The <em>appearance of waste</em> in regard to - seeds, &c. is just as unaccountable, as the ruin of moral agents.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> 2. Rectitude arising from hope and fear, is only the discipline of - self-love. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> Obedience <em>is</em> obedience, though prompted by hope or fear: and a <em>course</em> - of such obedience, forms a habit of it: and distinct habits of various - virtues, by repressing inclination whenever justice, veracity, &c. - require.<br /> - <span class="sub-line">Beside, veracity, justice, regard to God’s authority, and self-interest, are - coincident; and each, separately, a just principle. To begin a good - life from either of them, and persist, produces that very character - which corresponds to our relations to God, and secures happiness.</span> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> 3. The virtues requisite for a state of afflictions, and produced by it, are - not wanted to qualify us for a state of happiness. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> Such is not the verdict of experience. Passive submission is essential to - right character. Prosperity itself begets extravagant desires; and - imagination may produce as much discontent as actual condition. - Hence, though we may not need <em>patience</em> in heaven, we shall need that - <em>temper</em> which is formed by patience.<br /> - <span class="sub-line">Self-love would always coincide with God’s commands, when our interest - was rightly understood; but it is liable to error. Therefore, <span class="smcapuc">HABITS</span> of - resignation are necessary, for <em>all</em> creatures; and the proper discipline - for resignation is affliction.</span> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> 4. The trouble and danger of such discipline, might have been avoided - by making us at once, what we are intended to become. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> What we are to be, is the effect of what we are to do. God’s natural - government is arranged not to save us from trouble or danger, but to - enable and incline us to go through them. It is as natural for us to - seek means to obtain things, as it is to seek the things; and in worldly - things we are left to our choice, whether to improve our powers and so - better our condition, or to neglect improvement and so go without the - advantage.<br /> - <span class="sub-line">Analogy, therefore, makes the same arrangement credible, as to a future - state.</span> - </li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">III. <i>This state of discipline may be necessary for the display of -character.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Not to the all-knowing Being, but to his creation, or part of it, and in many - ways which we know not.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> It may be a <em>means</em> in disposing of men according to character.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> And of showing creation that they are so disposed of.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Such display of character certainly contributes, largely, to the general - course of things considered in this chapter.</li> -</ul> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[39]</a></span></p> - -<h4>CHAPTER VI.<br /> -<span class="smaller">OF NECESSITY AS INFLUENCING CONDUCT.</span></h4> - -<p>Fatalists have no right to object to Christianity, for they of course hold -the doctrine to be compatible with what they see in nature.</p> - -<p>The question is, whether it be not equally compatible with what Christianity -teaches.</p> - -<p>To argue on the supposition of so great an absurdity as necessity, is puzzling; -and the obscurity and puzzle of the argument must therefore be excused.</p> - -<h5 class="sub">I. <i>Necessity does not destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and -Governor of the world.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> It does not exclude design and deliberation. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) This is matter of actual experience and consciousness. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—Necessity does not account for the <em>existence</em> of any thing, but is only a - <em>circumstance</em> relating to its origin. Instance the case of a house: - the fatalist admits that it had a builder, and the only question would - be, was he obliged to build it as he did?</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">2.) It is the same as to the construction of the world. To say it exists by - necessity must mean it had a maker, who <em>acted</em> by necessity: for - necessity is only an abstract notion, and can <em>do</em> nothing.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) We say God exists by necessity, because we intuitively discern that there - must be an infinite Being, prior to all causes; but we cannot say that - <em>every thing</em> so exists. The fact that many changes in nature are produced - by man’s contrivance is a proof of this.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) Thus though the fatalist does not choose to mean by necessity <em>an agent - acting necessarily</em>, he is obliged to mean this.</li> - <li class="consp">5.) And it also follows that a thing’s being done by necessity does not exclude - <em>design</em>.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> It does not exclude a belief that we are in a state of religion. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Suppose a fatalist to educate a child on his own principles,—viz.: that - he cannot do otherwise than he does; and is not subject to praise or - blame. - <span class="sub-line">(It might be asked, <em>would</em> he, if possessed of common sense, so educate - his child?)</span> - <ul> - <li class="consp">—The child would be delighted with his freedom; but would soon prove - a pest, and go to destruction.</li> - <li class="consp">—He would meet with checks and rebuffs, which would teach him that he - <em>was</em> accountable.</li> - <li class="consp">—He would, in the end, be convinced either that his doctrine was wrong, - or that he had reasoned inconclusively upon it, and misapplied it.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">2.) To apply fatalism to practice, in any other way, would be found equally - fallacious: <i>e.g.</i> that he need not take care of his life.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) No such absurdity follows the doctrine of freedom. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—Reasoning on this ground is justified by all experience.</li> - <li class="consp">—The constitution of things is <em>as if</em> we were free.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[40]</a></span></li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">4.) If the doctrine of necessity be true, and yet, when we <em>apply it</em> to life, - always misleads us; how, then, can we be sure it would not mislead us - with respect to future interests?</li> - <li class="consp">5.) It follows that if there are proofs of religion on the supposition of freedom, - they are just as conclusive on the supposition of necessity.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> It does not refute the notion that God has a will and a character. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) It does not hinder <em>us</em> from having a will and a character; from being - cruel, or benevolent, or just, &c.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) If necessity be plead as the excuse for crime, it equally excuses the - <em>punishment</em> of crime; for if it destroys the sin of the one, it destroys - the sin of the other.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) The very assumption of injustice in punishing crime, shows that we cannot - rid ourselves of the notion of justice and injustice.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> If necessity be <em>reconcilable</em> with the character of God, as portrayed in - Christianity, does it not destroy <em>the proof</em> that he has that character; - and so destroy the proofs of religion? - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> No. Happiness and misery are not our fate, but the results of our conduct. - God’s government is that of a father and a magistrate; and his - natural rule of government must be veracity and justice. We shall - proceed to show that,</li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">II. <i>Necessity does not destroy the proofs of religion.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> It is a plain fact that God rewards and punishes. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) He has given us a moral faculty, by which we discern between actions, - and approve or disapprove, &c.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) This implies a <em>rule</em>, a peculiar <em>kind</em> of rule; <i>i.e.</i> one from which we - cannot depart without being self-condemned.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) The dictates of our moral faculty are God’s laws, with sanctions. It not - only raises a sense of <em>duty</em>, but a sense of <em>security</em> in obeying, and - danger in disobeying; and this is an explicit sanction.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) God’s government must conform to the nature he has given us; and we - must infer that in the upshot happiness will follow virtue, and misery - vice.</li> - <li class="consp">5.) Hence religious worship is a duty, if only as a means of keeping up the - sense of this government.</li> - <li class="consp">6.) No objection from necessity can lie against this course of proof. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—The conclusion is wholly and directly from facts; not from what - might appear to us to be <em>fit</em>, but from what his actions tell us <em>he - wills</em>.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Natural religion has external evidence which necessity, if true, does not - affect. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Suppose a person convinced of the truths of natural religion, but - ignorant of history, and of the present state of mankind, he would - inquire: - <ul> - <li class="consp">—How this religion came?</li> - <li class="consp">—How far the belief of it extended?</li> - <li class="consp">—If he found that some one had totally propounded it, as a deduction - of reason, then, though its evidences from reason would not be impaired, - its history would furnish no further proof.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[41]</a></span></li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">2.) But such an one would find, on the contrary, - <ul> - <li class="consp">—That essentially it had been professed in all countries.</li> - <li class="consp">—And can be traced up through all ages.</li> - <li class="consp">—And was not <em>reasoned out</em>, but revealed.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">3.) These things are of great weight. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—Showing natural religion to be conformed to the common sense of - mankind.</li> - <li class="consp">—And either that it was revealed, or forces itself upon the mind.</li> - <li class="consp">—The rude state of the early ages leads to the belief of its being - revealed, and such is the opinion of the learned.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Early pretences to revelation indicate some original real one from which - they were copied. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—The history of revelation is as old as history itself.</li> - <li class="consp">—Such a fact is a proof of religion, against which there is no presumption.</li> - <li class="consp">—And indicates a revelation prior to the examination of the book said - to contain it; and independent of all considerations of its being - corrupted, or darkened by fables.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> It is thus apparent that the <em>external</em> evidence of religion is considerable; - and is not affected by the doctrine of necessity.</li> -</ul> - -<h5>REMARKS.</h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp">1. The danger of taking custom, &c. for our moral rule. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) We are all liable to prejudice.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Reason may be impaired, perverted, or disregarded.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) The matter in hand is of infinite moment.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">2. The foregoing observations amount to practical proof.</li> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> Probabilities which cannot be confuted, may be overbalanced by - greater probabilities: much more by demonstration. Now, as the - doctrine of necessity must be true, it cannot be that God governs us - as if we were free when he knows we are not. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> This brings the matter to a point, and the answer is not to be evaded,—viz.: - that the whole constitution and course of things shows this - reasoning to be false, be the fallacy where it may.<br /> - <span class="sub-line">The doctrine of freedom shows where,—viz.: in supposing ourselves necessary - agents when in fact we are free.</span><br /> - <span class="sub-line">Admitting the doctrine of necessity, the fallacy evidently lies in denying - that necessary agents are accountable; for that they <em>are</em> rewarded and - punished is undeniable.</span> - </li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<p><span class="smcap">Conclusion.</span>—It follows that necessity, if true, neither proves that God will -not make his creatures happy or miserable according to their conduct, nor -destroys the proofs that he will do so. That is, necessity, practically, is -false.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[42]</a></span></p> - -<h4>CHAPTER VII.<br /> -<span class="smaller">DIVINE GOVERNMENT A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.</span></h4> - -<p>Moral government, <em>as a fact</em>, has now been considered; it remains for us -to remove objections against its <em>wisdom and goodness</em>. A thing being true -does not prove it to be good.</p> - -<p>In arguing as to its truth, analogy could only show it to be credible. But, if -a moral government be admitted as a fact, analogy makes it credible that it is -a scheme or system, and that man’s comprehension of it is necessarily so -limited, as to be inadequate to determine its injustice.</p> - -<p>This we shall find to be the case.</p> - -<p class="hanging"><i>Doctrine.</i> <span class="smcap">On the supposition that God exercises moral government, -the analogy of nature teaches that it must be a scheme, -and one quite beyond our comprehension.</span></p> - -<h5 class="sub">I. <i>The ordering of nature is a scheme; and makes it credible by -analogy, that moral government is a scheme.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> The parts curiously correspond to each other; individuals to individuals, - species to species, events to events; and all these both immediate and - remote.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> This correspondence embraces all the past, and all the future; including - all creatures, actions, and events. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) There is no event, which does not depend for its occurrence on some - further thing, unknown to us; we cannot give the whole account of - any one thing.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Things apparently the most insignificant, seem to be necessary to others, - of the greatest importance.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> If such is God’s natural government, it is credible that such is his moral - government. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) In fact they are so blended as to make one scheme. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—One is subservient to the other, just as the vegetable kingdom subserves - the animal, and our animal organization subserves our mental.</li> - <li class="consp">—Every act of God seems to look beyond the occasion, and to have - reference to a general plan.</li> - <li class="consp">—There is evidently a previous adjustment. - <ul> - <li class="consp">· The periods, &c. for trying men.</li> - <li class="consp">· The instruments of justice.</li> - <li class="consp">· The kinds of retribution.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">2.) The whole comprises a system, a very small part of which is known to - us: therefore no objections against any part can be insisted on.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) This ignorance is universally acknowledged, except in arguing against - religion. That it ought to be a valid answer to objections against - religion, we proceed to show. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—Suppose it to be asserted that all evils might have been prevented by - repeated interpositions; or that more good might have been so produced; - which would be the utmost that could be said: still,</li> - <li class="consp">—Our ignorance would vindicate religion from any objections arising - from apparent disorders in the world.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[43]</a></span></li> - <li class="consp">—The government of the world might be <em>good</em>, even on those suppositions; - for at most they could but suggest that it might be <em>better</em>.</li> - <li class="consp">—At any rate, they are mere assertions.</li> - <li class="consp">—Instances may be alleged, in things much less out of reach, of suppositions - palpably impossible, which <em>all</em> do not see to be so: nor <em>any, - at first sight</em>.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">4.) It follows that our ignorance is a satisfactory answer to all objections - against the divine government. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—An objection against an act of Providence, no way connected with - any other thing, as being unjust, could not be answered by our - ignorance.</li> - <li class="consp">—But when the objection is made against an act related to other and - unknown acts, then our ignorance is a full answer.</li> - <li class="consp">—Some unknown relation, or unknown impossibility, may render the act - not only good, but good in the highest degree.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">II. <i>Consider some particular things, in the natural government of -God, the like of which we may infer, by analogy, to be contained -in his moral government.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> No ends are accomplished without means. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Often, means very disagreeable bring the most desirable results.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) How means produce ends, is not learned by reason, but experience.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) In many cases, before experience, we should have expected contrary - results.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) Hence we may infer that those things which are objected against God’s - moral government, produce good.</li> - <li class="consp">5.) It is evident that our not seeing <em>how</em> the means work good, or their - seeming to have an opposite effect, offers no presumption against their - fitness to work good.</li> - <li class="consp">6.) They may not only be fit, but the <em>only</em> means of ultimate good.</li> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> Though our capacity of vice and misery may promote virtue, and <em>our</em> - suffering for sin be better than if we were restrained by force, yet it - would have been better if evil had not entered the world. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> It is granted that though sinful acts may produce benefits, to refrain - from them would produce more. We have curative pains, yet pain is - not better than health.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Natural government is carried on by general laws. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Nature shows that this is best: all the good we enjoy is because there - are general laws. They enable us to <em>forecast</em> for the procurement of good.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) It may not be possible, by general laws, to prevent all irregularities, or - remedy them.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) Direct interpositions might perhaps remedy many disorders arising - under them, but this would have bad effects. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—Encouraging improvidence.</li> - <li class="consp">—Leaving us no rule of life.</li> - <li class="consp">—Every interposition would have <em>distant</em> effects: so that we could not - guess what would be the <em>whole</em> result. - <ul> - <li class="consp">· If it be replied that those distant effects might also be corrected - by direct interpositions—this is only talking at random.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[44]</a></span></li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> If we are so ignorant as this whole argument supposes, we are too - ignorant to understand the proofs of religion. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> 1. Total ignorance of a subject precludes argument, but partial ignorance - does not. We may, in various degrees, know a man’s character, and - the way he is <em>likely</em> to pursue certain ends; and yet not know how he - <em>ought</em> to act to gain those ends. In this case objections to his mode - of pursuing ends may be answered by our ignorance, though that he - <em>does</em> act in a certain manner is capable of proof. So we may have - evidence of God’s character and aims, and yet not be competent judges - as to his measures. Our ignorance is a good answer to the difficulties - of religion, but no objection to religion itself.</li> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> 2. If our ignorance did invalidate the proofs of religion, as well as the - objections, yet is it undeniable that moral obligations remain unaffected - by our ignorance of the consequences of obedience or violation. - The consequences of vice and virtue may not be fully known, - yet it is credible that they may be such as religion declares: and this - credibility is an obligation, in point of prudence, to abstain from sin.</li> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> 3. Our answers to the objections against religion, are <em>not</em> equally valid - against the proofs of it.</li> - <li class="consp">[Answers rehearsed.]</li> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> 4. Our answers, though they may be said to be based on our ignorance, - are really not so, but on what analogy teaches <em>concerning</em> our ignorance,—viz.: - that it renders us incompetent judges. They are based - on experience, and what we <em>do know</em>; so that to credit religion is to - trust to experience, and to disregard it is the contrary.</li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h5>CONCLUSION.</h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> The reasoning of the last chapter leads us to regard this life as part of a - larger plan of things. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Whether we are connected with the distant <em>parts</em> of the universe, is - uncertain; but it is very clear we are connected, more or less, with - present, past, and future.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) We are evidently in the midst of a scheme, not fixed but progressive; - and one equally incomprehensible, whether we regard the present, past, - or future.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> This scheme contains as much that is wonderful as religion does: for - it certainly would be as wonderful that all nature came into existence - without a Creator, as that there should be a Creator: and as wonderful - that the Creator should act without any rule or scheme, as that he should - act with one; or that he should act by a bad rule, rather than a righteous - one.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Our very nature compels us to believe that the will and character of the - Author of nature, is just and good.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Whatever be his character, he formed the world as it is, and controls it as - he does, and has assigned us our part and lot.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> Irrational creatures act their part, and receive their lot, without reflection, - but creatures endued with reason, can hardly avoid reflecting whither we - go, and what is the scheme, in the midst of which we find ourselves.</li> -</ul> - -<p>[Here follows a recapitulation of the book.]</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[45]</a></span></p> - -<h3>PART II.</h3> - -<h4>CHAPTER I.<br /> -<span class="smaller">IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.</span></h4> - -<p>Every one must admit that we <em>need</em> a revelation. Few, if any, could reason -out a system, even of natural religion. If they could, there is no probability -that they would. Such as might, would still feel the want of revelation. To -say that Christianity is superfluous, is as wild as to say all are happy.</p> - -<p>No exactness in attending to natural religion can make Christianity of small -importance.</p> - -<p>If Christianity be from God, we must obey, unless we know all his reasons -for giving it: and also that those reasons no longer exist; at least in our case. -This we cannot know.</p> - -<p>The importance of Christianity appears if we regard it</p> - -<h5 class="sub">I. <i>As a republication of natural religion.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> It gives the moral system of the universe. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Free from corruptions; teaching that - <ul> - <li class="consp">—Jehovah created all things.</li> - <li class="consp">—” governs all things.</li> - <li class="consp">—Virtue is his law.</li> - <li class="consp">—Mankind will be judged according to character.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">2.) It publishes its facts authoritatively.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) With vastly more clearness; e.g. the doctrines of a future state: danger - of sin: efficacy of repentance.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) With the advantage of a visible church, distinguished from the world by - peculiar institutions. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> The perversions of Christianity, and the little good it has done. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> 1. Natural religion is no less perverted, and has done less good.</li> - <li class="consp">2. The benefits of Christianity are <em>not</em> small.</li> - <li class="consp">3. The evils ascribed to it, are not <em>its</em> effects. Things are to be judged - by their genuine tendencies.</li> - <li class="consp">4. The light of reason, no more than revelation forces acquiescence.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">5.) With the additional advantage that every Christian, is bound to instruct - and persuade others.</li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">II. <i>As containing truths not discoverable by natural reason.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> A mode of salvation for the ruined.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Duties unknown before.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Our relations to the Son and Holy Ghost. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Hence the form of baptism.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Pious regards to Christ, and the Holy Ghost, based on our relations to - them.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> The manner of external worship.</li> -</ul> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[46]</a></span></p> - -<h5 class="sub">III. <i>The fearful hazard of neglecting Christianity.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Those who think natural religion <em>sufficient</em>, must admit that Christianity is - highly <em>important</em>.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Our relations to Christ being made known, our religious regard to him is - an evident obligation.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> These relations being real, there is no reason to think that our neglect of - behaving suitably to them, will not be attended with the same kind of - consequences as follow the neglect of duties made known by reason.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> If we are corrupt and depraved, and so unfit for heaven, and if we need - God’s Holy Spirit to renew our nature, how can it be a slight thing - whether we make use of the means for obtaining such assistance?</li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> Thus, if Christianity be either true, or merely credible, it is most rash and - presumptuous to treat it lightly.</li> -</ul> - -<h5>REMARKS.</h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> The distinction between positive and moral obligations. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) For moral precepts we can see <em>the reason</em>: for positive we cannot.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Moral duties are such <em>prior</em> to command; positive duties are such <em>because</em> - commanded.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) The manner in which a duty is made known, does not make it moral or - positive.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> The ground of regarding moral duties as superior to positive. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Both have the nature of moral commands.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) If the two conflict, we must obey the moral. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—Positive institutions are <em>means</em> to moral ends.</li> - <li class="consp">—Ends are more excellent than means.</li> - <li class="consp">—Obedience to positive institutions, has no value but as proceeding from - moral principle.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">3.) Both moral and positive duties are <em>revealed</em>, and so are on a level; but - the moral law is <em>also</em> interwoven with our very nature, and so its - precepts must prevail when the two interfere.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> There is less necessity for determining their relative authority, than some - suppose. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Though man is disposed to outward and ritual religion, nothing can give - us acceptance with God, without moral virtue.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Scripture always lays stress on moral duties.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) It is a great weakness, though very common, to make light of positive - institutions, because less important than moral. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—We are bound to obey <em>all</em> God’s commands.</li> - <li class="consp">—A precept, merely positive, admitted to be from God, creates moral - obligation, in the strictest sense.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h5>CONCLUSION.</h5> - -<p>This account of Christianity shows our great obligation to study the -Scriptures.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[47]</a></span></p> - -<h4>CHAPTER II.<br /> -<span class="smaller">PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST A REVELATION, CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS.</span></h4> - -<p>Having shown the need of revelation, we now examine the presumptions -against it.</p> - -<p>The analogy of nature is generally supposed to afford presumptions against -miracles.</p> - -<p>They are deemed to require stronger evidence than other events.</p> - -<h5 class="sub">I. <i>Analogy furnishes no presumptions against the general scheme of -Christianity.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> It is no presumption against Christianity, that it is not the discovery of - reason, or of experience.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Nor is it a presumption against Christianity, that it contains things <em>unlike</em> - the apparent course of nature. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) We cannot suppose every thing, in the vast universe, to be just like what - is the course of nature in this little world.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Even within the present compass of our knowledge, we see many things - greatly unlike.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> If we choose to call what is unlike our known course of things, <em>miraculous</em>, - still that does not make it <em>improbable</em>.</li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">II. <i>There is no presumption against such a revelation, as we should -now call miraculous, being made, at the beginning of the -world.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> There was then <em>no</em> course of nature, as to this world.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Whether man <em>then</em> received a revelation involves a question not of miracles, - but of <em>fact</em>.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Creation was a very different exertion of power from that which <em>rules</em> the - world, now it <em>is</em> made.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Whether the power of forming <em>stopped</em> when man was made; or went on, - and formed a religion for him, is merely a question as to the <em>degree</em> or - <em>extent</em>, to which a power was exerted.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> There is then no presumption from analogy against supposing man had a - revelation when created.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>6.</b> All tradition and history teaches that he had, which amounts to a real and - material proof.</li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">III. <i>There is no presumption against miracles, or a miraculous revelation, -after the course of nature was settled.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Such a presumption, requires the adduction of some <em>parallel</em> case.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> This would require us to know the history of some other world.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Even then, if drawn from only one other world, the presumption would - be very precarious.</li> - <li class="consp"><em>To be more particular</em>,</li> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> There is a strong presumption against any truth till it is proved—which yet - is overcome by almost any proof.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[48]</a></span> - <ul> - <li class="consp">—Hence the question of a presumption against miracles, involves only - the <em>degree</em> of presumption, (not whether the presumption is <em>peculiar</em> - to miracles,) and whether that degree is such as to render them - incredible.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> If we <em>leave out religion</em>, we are in total darkness as to the cause or circumstances - on which the course of nature depends. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—Five or six thousand years may have given occasion and reasons for - miraculous interpositions of Providence.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> <em>Taking in religion</em>, there are distinct reasons for miracles; to afford - additional instruction; to attest the truth of instruction.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Miracles must not be compared with common events, but with uncommon; - earthquakes, pestilence, &c.</li> -</ul> - -<h5>CONCLUSION.</h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp">1. There are no analogies to render miracles incredible.</li> - <li class="consp">2. On the contrary, we see good reasons for them.</li> - <li class="consp">3. There are no presumptions against them, <em>peculiar</em> to them, as distinguished - from other unusual phenomena.</li> -</ul> - -<h4>CHAPTER III.<br /> -<span class="smaller">OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT SHOULD BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION -FROM GOD.</span></h4> - -<p>Beside the objectors to the <em>evidences</em> of Christianity, there are many who -object to its <em>nature</em>. They say it is not full enough: has in it foolish things: -gives rise to superstition: subserves tyranny: is not universally known: not -well arranged: figurative language, &c.</p> - -<p>It is granted that if it contained <em>immoralities</em> or <em>contradictions</em> they would -show it to be false. But other objections against religion, aside from objections -against its evidences, are frivolous: as will now be shown.</p> - -<p>Let the student look to the <em>force</em> of the proofs, rather than any <em>consequences</em> -which may be drawn from them.</p> - -<h5 class="sub">I. <i>The Scripture informs us of a scheme of government, in addition -to the material laws of the world.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> If both these schemes, the physical and the moral, coincide and form one - whole, then our inability to criticise the system of nature, renders it - credible that we are incompetent to criticise the system of grace.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Nature shows many things we should not have expected, prior to experience.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Hence it is altogether likely it would be so in religion.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> If a citizen is incompetent to judge of the propriety of the <em>general</em> laws of - his government, he is equally incompetent to judge when and how far - those laws should be suspended, or deviated from.</li> -</ul> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[49]</a></span></p> - -<h5 class="sub">II. <i>We are no better judges of how revelation should be imparted.</i></h5> - -<p>Whether to every man, or to some for others; or what mode -or degree of proof should be given; or whether the knowledge -should be given gradually or suddenly.</p> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> We are not able to judge how much new knowledge ought to be given - by revelation.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Nor how far, nor in what way, God should qualify men to transmit any - revelation he might make.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Nor whether the evidence should be certain, probable, or doubtful.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Nor whether all should have the same benefit from it.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> Nor whether it should be in writing, or verbal. If it be said that if not in - writing it would not have answered its purpose: I ask, what purpose? - Who knows what purposes would best suit God’s <em>general</em> government?</li> - <li class="consp"><b>6.</b> All which shows it to be absurd to object to particular things in revelation - as unsuitable.</li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">III. <i>Hence the only question, concerning the truth of revelation is, -whether it is a revelation.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> No obscurities, &c. could overthrow the authority of a revelation.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> It can only be overthrown by nullifying the proofs.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Though the proofs could be shown to be less strong than is affirmed, it still - should control our conduct.</li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">IV. <i>Modes of arguing, which are perfectly just, in relation to other -books, are not so as to the Bible.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> We are competent judges of common books, but not of Scripture.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Our only inquiry should be to find out the sense.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> In other books, internal improbabilities weaken external proof; but in - regard to revelation, we scarcely know what are improbabilities. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Those who judge the Scripture by preconceived expectations, will imagine - they find improbabilities.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) And so they would by thus judging in natural things. - <ul> - <li class="consp">—It would seem very improbable, prior to experience, that man should - be better able to determine the magnitudes and motions of heavenly - bodies, than he is to determine the causes and cures of disease, which - much more nearly concerns him.</li> - <li class="consp">—Or that we should sometimes hit upon a thing in an instant, even when - thinking of something else, which we had been vainly trying to - discover for years.</li> - <li class="consp">—Or that language should be so liable to abuse, that every man may be - a deceiver.</li> - <li class="consp">—Or that brute instinct should ever be superior to reason.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">V. <i>Such observations apply to almost all objections to Christianity, -as distinguished from objections against its evidence.</i></h5> - -<p>For instance, the disorderly manner in which some, in the apostolic age -used their miraculous gifts.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[50]</a></span></p> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> This does not prove the acts <em>not</em> miraculous.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> The person having any such gift, would have the same power over it which - he would have over any other ability, and might pervert it.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> To say why was he not also endued with prudence, to restrain its use, - is but saying why did not God give a <em>higher degree</em> of miraculous - endowment? As to which we are not competent judges.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> God does not confer his <em>natural</em> gifts, (memory, eloquence, knowledge, &c.) - only on those who are prudent and make the best use of them.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> Nor is worldly instruction, by educators, commonly given in the happiest - manner.</li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">VI. <i>There is a resemblance between religion and nature in several -other respects.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> In both, common and necessary things, are plain; but to “go on to perfection” - in either, requires exact and laborious study.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> The hinderances to both religious and physical knowledge, are the same - in kind. A more perfect knowledge may be brought about, - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) By the progress of learning and liberty.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) By students attending to intimations overlooked by the generality.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> It is not wonderful that our knowledge of Bible truth should be small; for - the natural world has laid open to inspection, for thousands of years, and - yet only lately are any great discoveries made.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Perhaps these scientific discoveries, are to be the means of opening and - ascertaining Bible truth.</li> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> The cases are not parallel; for natural knowledge is of no consequence, - compared to spiritual. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> 1. The cases <em>are</em> parallel; for natural knowledge is as important to - our natural well-being, as spiritual knowledge is to our spiritual - well-being.</li> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> 2. If the cases were not parallel, there are plenty of other analogies, - which show that God does not dispense his gifts according to <em>our</em> - notions of their value.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> 2. If Christianity be intended for the recovery of men, why not sooner - introduced, and more widely diffused? - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> The objection is just as strong against the natural sciences. Nay, if the - light of nature and of revelation are both from the same source, we - might <em>expect</em> that revelation would have been introduced and diffused - just as it is. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Remedies for disease are known but to a few, or not known at all, nor to - any without care and study.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) When proposed by discoverers, they have been treated with derision, and - the use rejected by thousands whom they might have cured.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) The best remedies have been used unskilfully, and so made to produce - more disease.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) Their benefit may come very slowly.</li> - <li class="consp">5.) In some cases they may be wholly ineffectual.</li> - <li class="consp">6.) They maybe so disagreeable that many will not submit to use them, even - with the prospect of a cure.</li> - <li class="consp">7.) Sometimes the remedy may be entirely out of reach if we were ready - to take it.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>All this reasoning may be applied to Christianity.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[51]</a></span></p> - -<h5 class="sub">VII. <i>Having obviated all objections to Christianity, from its containing -things we should not have expected, we will now -consider the objections against its morality.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Reason may judge, as to whether revelation contains things contrary to - justice, and wisdom, &c. as those attributes are taught by natural religion. - But no such objections are advanced, except such as would equally - condemn the constitution of nature.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> There are indeed particular precepts, to particular persons, which <em>would</em> be - immoral, but for the precept. The precept changes the nature of the - action.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> None are contrary to immutable morality. We are never commanded to - cultivate the principles of ingratitude, treachery, &c.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> God may command the taking of life or property because these are <em>his</em>.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> The only real difficulty is, that such commands are liable to be perverted by - the wicked to their own horrid purposes; and to mislead the weak. But - such objections do not lie against revelation, as such, but against the very - notion of <em>religion as a trial</em>.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>6.</b> The sum of the whole is, objections against the <em>scheme</em> of Christianity - do not affect its truth; since there are no objections against its morality. - Hence objections against it, aside from its evidences, are frivolous. Objections - against the <em>evidence</em>, will be considered in a subsequent chapter, - [<i>i.e.</i> ch. vii.]</li> -</ul> - -<h4>CHAPTER IV.<br /> -<span class="smaller">CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY UNDERSTOOD.</span></h4> - -<p>In the last chapter it was shown that we might expect, beforehand, that a -revelation would contain strange things, and things liable to great objections.</p> - -<p>This abates the force of such objections, or rather precludes them.</p> - -<p>But it may be said this does not show such objectionable things to be good, -or credible.</p> - -<p>It was a sufficient answer [ch. vii. part i.] to objections against the course -of nature, that it was a <em>scheme</em>, imperfectly comprehended.</p> - -<p>If Christianity be a scheme, the like objections admit of a like answer.</p> - -<p>[In studying this chapter, let <a href="#I_CHAPTER_VII">chap. vii. part i.</a> be kept in view.]</p> - -<h5 class="sub">I. <i>Christianity is a scheme, beyond our comprehension.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> God’s <em>general</em> plan is to conduct things <em>gradually</em>, so that, finally, every one - shall receive what he deserves.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Christianity is a <em>particular</em> arrangement, under this general plan: is a part - of it, and conduces to its completion.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> It is itself a complicated and mysterious economy. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Its arrangements began from the fall of man.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Various dispensations, patriarchal, prophetic, &c. were preparatory to it.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) At a certain juncture in the condition of the world Jesus Christ came.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[52]</a></span></li> - <li class="consp">4.) The mission of the Holy Ghost was part of this economy.</li> - <li class="consp">5.) Christ now presides over it, and will establish the church, judge the - world, give up the kingdom, &c. &c.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Of course, we can comprehend but little of such a scheme.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> We plainly see, from what is revealed, that there is very much unrevealed.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>6.</b> Thus it is evident that we are as little capable of judging as to the whole - system of religion, as we are as to the whole system of nature.</li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">II. <i>In both material and spiritual things, means are used to -accomplish ends.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Hence a thing may seem foolish to us, because we do not know its object - and end.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Its seeming foolish to us, is no proof that it is so.</li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">III. <i>Christianity is carried on by general laws, no less than nature.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Why do we say there are <em>laws of nature</em>? - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) We indeed know some such. But nothing of the laws of many things, <i>e.g.</i> - <ul> - <li class="consp">· Pestilence.</li> - <li class="consp">· Storms.</li> - <li class="consp">· Earthquakes.</li> - <li class="consp">· Diversities of human powers.</li> - <li class="consp">· Association of ideas.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp">2.) Hence we call many things <em>accidental</em>, which we know are not matters - of chance, but are subject to general laws.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) It is a very little way that we can trace things to their general laws.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) We attribute many things to such laws, only by analogy.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Just for the same reasons, we say that miracles comport with God’s <em>general - laws of wisdom</em>. These laws may be unknown to us; but no more so than - those by which some die as soon as born, or live to old age, or have - superior understandings, &c.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> We see no more reason to regard the frame and course of nature as a - scheme, than we have to regard Christianity as such. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) If the first is a scheme, then Christianity, if true, would be <em>likely</em> to be - a scheme.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) As Christianity is revealed but in part, and is an arrangement to - accomplish ends, there would of course seem to us, in it, irregularities; - just as we see in nature.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) Therefore objections against the one, are answered in the same manner - as objections against the other.</li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>Having, in a previous chapter, [<a href="#II_CHAPTER_III">ch. iii.</a>,] answered objections to Christianity -<em>as a matter of fact</em>, and in this, as a general question of <em>wisdom and goodness</em>, -the next thing is to discuss <em>objections in particular</em>.</p> - -<p>As one of these is directed against <em>the scheme</em>, as just now described, it will -be considered here.</p> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> Christianity is a roundabout, and perplexed contrivance; just such as - men, for want of understanding or power, are obliged to adopt, in - their designs. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> 1.) God uses just such complex arrangements in the natural world. The - mystery is quite as great in nature as in grace.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[53]</a></span></li> - <li class="consp">2.) We do not know what are means, and what are ends.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) The natural world, and its government, are not fixed, but progressive.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) Great length of time is required in some changes; <i>e.g.</i> animals, vegetables, - geological periods, &c.</li> - <li class="consp">5.) One state of life is a preparation and means for attaining another.</li> - <li class="consp">6.) Man is impatient, but Jehovah deliberate.</li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h4>CHAPTER V.<br /> -<span class="smaller">OF A MEDIATOR, AND REDEMPTION BY HIM.</span></h4> - -<p>Nothing in Christianity is so much objected to as the position assigned to -Christ; yet nothing is more unjust. The whole world exhibits mediation.</p> - -<h5 class="sub">I. <i>Our existence, and all its satisfactions, are by the medium of others.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> If so in the natural world, why not in the spiritual?</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> The objection therefore is not only against <em>Christ’s</em> mediation, but <em>all</em> - mediation.</li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">II. <i>We cannot know all the ends for which God punishes, nor by -whom he should punish.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Future punishment may be as natural a sequence of sin, as a broken limb - is of falling from a precipice.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> This is not taking punishment out of the hands of God, and giving it to - nature; it is only distinguishing ordinary events from miraculous.</li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">III. <i>In natural providence, God has made provision that the bad -consequences of actions do not always follow.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> We may say God could have prevented all evil. But we see he permits it, - and has provided relief, and even sometimes perfect remedies for it. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Thus the bad consequences of trifling on a precipice may be prevented - by a friend, if we do not reject his assistance.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) We may ourselves do much towards preventing the bad consequences of - our misdeeds.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) Still more if assisted.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> It might have been perfectly just if it were not so; but that it is so, shows - compassion, as distinguished from goodness.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> The course of nature affords many instances of such compassion.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Thus analogy sanctions an arrangement, by which the ruinous consequences - of vice or folly may be averted, at least in some cases.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> If the consequences of rash and inconsiderate acts, which we scarcely call - vicious, are often so serious, we may apprehend that the bad consequences - will be greater, in proportion as the irregularity is greater.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>6.</b> A dissolute disregard to all religion, if there be a religion, is incomparably - more reprehensible than the mere neglects, imprudencies, &c. of this life.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>7.</b> As the effects of worldly imprudence and vice are often misery, ruin, and - even death, no one can say what may be the consequences of blasphemy, - contempt of God, and final impenitence.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[54]</a></span></li> - <li class="consp"><b>8.</b> Nor can any one tell, how far the consequences of such great wickedness - can possibly be prevented, consistently with the eternal rule of right.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>9.</b> Still there would, from analogy, be some hope of room for pardon.</li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">IV. <i>There is no probability that any thing we could do alone, would -entirely prevent the effects of our irregularities.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> We do not know all the reasons for punishment, nor why it should be fit - to remit punishment.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Nor do we know all the consequences of vice, and so should not know how - to prevent them.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Vice impairs men’s abilities for helping themselves.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Misconduct makes assistance necessary, which otherwise would not have - been. Why should not the same things be so, as to our future interests?</li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> In temporal things, behaving well in time to come, does not repair old errors, - why should it as to future things?</li> - <li class="consp"><b>6.</b> Were it so in <em>all cases</em> it would be contrary to all our notions of government.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>7.</b> It could not be determined in what degree, or in what cases, it would be - so, even if we knew it might in <em>some</em> cases.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>8.</b> The efficacy of repentance, as urged in opposition to atonement, is contrary - to the general sense of mankind; as shown by the prevalence of propitiatory - sacrifices.</li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">V. <i>In this state of apprehension, awakened by the light of nature, -revelation comes in, and teaches positively, the possibility of -pardon and safety.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Confirms our fears as to the unprevented consequences of sin.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Declares the world to be in a state of ruin.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> That repentance alone will not secure pardon.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> That there is a mode of pardon, by interposition.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> That God’s moral government is compassionate, as well as his natural - government.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>6.</b> That he has provided, by the interposition of a mediator, to save men.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>7.</b> All this seems to put man in a strange state of helpless degradation. But - it is not Christianity which puts him so. All philosophy and history - show man to be degraded and corrupt.</li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">VI. <i>Scripture, in addition to confirming the dim testimony of the -light of nature, reveals a Christ, as mediator and propitiatory -sacrifice.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> He is “<em>that prophet</em>.” - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Declared the will of God.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Published anew the law of nature.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) Taught with authority.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) Revealed the right manner of worship.</li> - <li class="consp">5.) Revealed the exact use of repentance.</li> - <li class="consp">6.) Revealed future rewards and punishments.</li> - <li class="consp">7.) Set us a perfect example.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[55]</a></span></li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> He has a <em>kingdom</em> which is not of this world. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Founded a church.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Governs it.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) Of it, all who obey him are members.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) Each of these shall live and reign with him forever.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> He is a propitiatory <em>sacrifice</em>. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) How his sacrifice becomes efficacious, we are not exactly told.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Conjectures may be absurd; at least cannot be certain.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) If any complain for want of further instruction, let him produce his - claim to it.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) Some, because they cannot explain, leave it out of their creed; and - regard Christ only as a teacher.</li> - <li class="consp">5.) We had better accept the benefit, without disputing about how it was - procured.</li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">VII. <i>We are not judges, antecedent to revelation, whether a mediator -was necessary, nor what should be the whole nature of his -office.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> We know not how future punishment would have been inflicted.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Nor all the reasons why it would be necessary.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> The satisfaction by Christ, does not represent God as indifferent whether - he punishes the innocent or guilty. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) We see, in this world, the innocent <em>forced</em> to suffer for the faults of - the guilty.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) But Christ suffered <em>voluntarily</em>.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Though, finally, every one shall receive according to his own deserts; - yet, during the progress of God’s scheme, <em>vicarious</em> sufferings may be - necessary. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) God commands us to assist others, though in many cases it costs us - suffering and toil.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) One person’s sufferings often tend to relieve another.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> Vicarious atonement for sinners, serves to vindicate the authority of God’s - laws, and to deter men from sin.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>6.</b> Objections to vicarious suffering are obviously not objections to Christianity, - but to the whole course of nature.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>7.</b> The objection, therefore, amounts to nothing more than saying that a - divine arrangement is not necessary, or fit, because the objector does - not see it to be so; though he must own he is no judge, and <em>could</em> not - understand why it should be necessary, if it were so!</li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">VIII. <i>We have no reason to expect the same information touching -God’s conduct, as we have in relation to our own duty.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> God instructs us by experience.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> This experience, though sufficient for our purposes, is an infinitely small - part of his providence.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> The things not understood involve God’s appointment, and Christ’s execution; - but what <em>is required of us</em>, we are clearly informed.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Even the reasons for Christian precepts are made obvious.</li> -</ul> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[56]</a></span></p> - -<h4>CHAPTER VI.<br /> -<span class="smaller">SUPPOSED LACK OF PROOF OF REVELATION, AND ITS WANT OF UNIVERSALITY.</span></h4> - -<p>It has been thought to be a positive argument against revelation, that its -evidences are not adequate, and that it is not universally known and believed.</p> - -<p>But the argument amounts to just this, that God would not bestow on us any -favor, except in such a mode and degree as we thought best, and did exactly -the same for everybody else.</p> - -<p>Such a notion, all analogy contradicts.</p> - -<h5 class="sub">I. <i>Men act in their most important concerns on doubtful evidence.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> It is often absolutely <em>impossible</em> to say which of two modes of acting will - give most pleasure or profit.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> If it were possible, we cannot know what changes temper, satiety, ill - health, &c. might produce, so as to destroy our pleasure.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> We cannot foresee what accidents may cut it all off.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Strong objections and difficulties may attach to the course of action we - adopt, which yet all would admit ought not to deter us.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> We may, after all, be deceived by appearances, or by our passions, &c.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>6.</b> Men think it reasonable to engage in pursuit of advantage, even when the - probabilities of success are against them.</li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">II. <i>As to the light of Christianity not being universal.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Temporal good is enjoyed in very different degrees even among creatures - of the same species.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Yet it is certain that God governs.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> We may prudently or imprudently use our good things.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> The Jewish religion was not universal.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> If it be <em>intended</em> that Christianity should be a small light, shining in a - great and wide-spread darkness, it would be perfectly uniform with - other parts of God’s providence.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>6.</b> If some have Christianity so corrupted, and interpolated, as to cause - thoughtful persons to doubt it, as is the case in some countries; and if, - where it is the purest, some learn much less from it than they might, there - are manifest parallels in God’s natural dispensations.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>7.</b> No more is expected of any one, than is equitable under his circumstances.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>8.</b> Every one is bound to get rid of his ignorance, as far as he can, and to - instruct his neighbor.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>9.</b> If revelation <em>were</em> universal, in extent and degree, different understandings, - educations, tempers, length of lives, and outward advantages, would soon - make the knowledge of it as different as it is at present.</li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">III. <i>Practical reflections.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><i>First.</i> That the evidence of religion is not such as unavoidably to convince all, - may be part of our probation. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> It gives scope for a wise or vicious use of our understanding. Just as is - the case in common affairs.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[57]</a></span></li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Intellectual inattention to so serious a matter, is as immoral, as disobedience - after conviction of the truth.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Secondly.</i> If the evidence is really doubtful, it puts us on probation. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> If a man were in doubt whether a certain person had done him the greatest - favor, or whether his whole temporal interest depended on him, he ought - not to regard that person as he would if there were <em>no</em> reason to think so.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> So if there is only reason to apprehend that Christianity <em>may</em> be true, we - are as much bound to <em>examine</em>, &c. as we would be bound to <em>obey</em>, if we - <em>knew</em> it was true.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Considering the infinite importance of religion, there is not much difference - as to what ought to be the mode of life of those who are convinced - and those who doubt its truth. Their hopes and fears are the same in - kind, though not in degree; and so their obligations are much the same.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Doubts presuppose <em>some</em> evidence, belief <em>more</em>, and certainty <em>more still</em>. - Each state should influence our conduct, and does so, in common things.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> It shows a mental defect not to see evidence unless it is glaring; and a - corrupt heart not to be influenced by it unless overpowering.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Thirdly.</i> Difficulties as to believing religion, are no more a ground of complaint, - than difficulties in practising it. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> They constitute a wholesome discipline. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) In allowing an unfair mind to deceive itself.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) In requiring belief and the practice of virtue under some uncertainties.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> In the case of some minds, speculative difficulties as to the evidence of - religion is the <em>principal</em> trial. A full conviction of its truth would - <em>constrain</em> some to obedience.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Fourthly.</i> The difficulties may be <em>in the objector</em> rather than in the religion. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Not sufficiently in earnest to be informed.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Secretly <em>wishes</em> religion not to be true.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Looks at objections rather than replies.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Treats the subject ludicrously.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Fifthly.</i> The proof of Christianity is level to common men. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> They are capable of being convinced of the existence of God, and of their - moral accountability.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> And they can understand the evidence of miracles, and the fulfilment of - prophecy.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> If they are capable of seeing the difficulty, they are capable of understanding - the proof.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> If they pick up objections from hearsay, and will not or cannot examine - them thoroughly, they must remain ignorant, just as they do as to the - sciences. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> Our directions should be too plain to <em>admit</em> of doubt; like those of an - earthly master. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> The earthly master only wants his work done, and is careless as to the - state of the heart; but as the whole of morality consists in the state of - the heart, the cases are not parallel.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Finally.</i> The credibility of our being in a state of probation is just as great - as the credibility of there being any religion. Our probation may - be whether we choose to inform ourselves as to our duty, and then - whether we choose to do it.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[58]</a></span><br /> - <span class="sub-line">Such is exactly the case as to temporal matters. To discern what is - best often requires difficult consideration, and yet leaves doubts: - and not reflecting carefully, or not acting even when there may - be doubt, is often fatal.</span> - </li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h4>CHAPTER VII.<br /> -<span class="smaller">POSITIVE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.</span></h4> - -<p>Having considered the objections both to the general scheme of Christianity, -and to particular doctrines in it, it only remains to consider the positive evidence -of its truth; <i>i.e.</i> what analogy teaches with regard to that evidence.</p> - -<p>There are many evidences of Christianity, beside those from miracles or -prophecy, which are the principal; embracing a great variety of proofs, direct -and collateral, and reaching through all past time. We shall now consider -the proofs from <span class="smcapuc">MIRACLES</span> and <span class="smcapuc">PROPHECY</span>.</p> - -<h5 class="sub">I. <i>Miracles.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Bible history gives the same evidence for the miracles described, as for - common events. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) The miracles are evidently not put in for ornament, as speeches are by - historians and poets put into the mouths of heroes.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) The accounts of them have been quoted as genuine, by various writers, - from that day to this.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) These accounts are confirmed by subsequent events; and the miracles - alone, can account for those events.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) The only fair way of accounting for these statements, and their reception - in the world, is that the things really happened.</li> - <li class="consp">5.) The statements should be admitted till disproved, even if doubtful.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Paul’s Epistles have evidences of genuineness, beyond what can attach to - mere history. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) <i>Additional.</i> His evidence is quite detached. He received the gospel not - in common with the other apostles, but separately, and direct from - Christ, <em>after</em> his ascension.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) <i>Peculiar.</i> He speaks of Christ’s miracles and those of others <em>incidentally</em>, - as familiar facts, fully believed by those to whom he wrote.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Christianity demands credence on the ground of its miracles, and was so - received by great numbers, at the time and on the spot; which is the - case with no other religion. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Its first converts embraced it on this ground.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) It is not conceivable that they would have done so, at such fearful - sacrifice, unless fully satisfied of the truth of these miracles.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) Such a profession and sacrifices furnish the same kind of evidence as - if they had testified to the truth of the miracles in writing.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) It is real evidence, for they had full opportunity to inform themselves.</li> - <li class="consp">5.) It is a sort of evidence <em>distinct</em> from direct history, though of the same - nature.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[59]</a></span></li> - <li class="consp">6.) Men are suspicious as well as credulous, and slow to believe <em>against their - interests</em>, as these did.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> It lies upon unbelievers to show why all this array of proof is to be - rejected; but in such an important concern we shall proceed to notice - some possible objections. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> 1. Enthusiasts make similar sacrifices for idle follies. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> 1. This objection ignores the distinction between opinions and facts. - Suffering for an opinion is no proof of its truth; but in attestation - of observed facts, it is proof.</li> - <li class="consp">2. Enthusiasm <em>weakens</em> testimony, it is true, even as to facts; and so does - disease, <em>in particular instances</em>. But when great numbers, not weak, - nor negligent, affirm that <em>they</em> saw and heard certain things, it is the - fullest evidence.</li> - <li class="consp">3. To reject testimony on the ground of enthusiasm, requires that the - things testified be <em>incredible</em>; which has not been shown, as to - religion, but the contrary.</li> - <li class="consp">4. Religion is not the only thing in regard to which witnesses are liable - to enthusiasm. In common matters, we <em>get at the truth</em> through - witnesses, though influenced by party spirit, custom, humor, - romance, &c. &c.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> 2. Enthusiasm and knavery may have been combined in the apostles - and first Christians. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> Such a mixture is often seen, and is often reproved in Scripture; but not - more in religious than in common affairs. Men in all matters deceive - themselves and others, in every degree, yet human testimony is good - ground of belief.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> 3. Men have been deluded by false miracles. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> Not oftener than by other pretences.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><i>Objec.</i> 4. Fabulous miracles have historical evidence. - <ul> - <li class="consp"><i>Ans.</i> 1. If this were equal to that for Scripture miracles, the evidence for the - latter would not be <em>impaired</em>. The objection really amounts to this, - that evidence proved not to be good, destroys evidence which is good - and unconfuted! Or to this, that if two men, of equal reputation, - testify, in <em>cases not related</em> to each other, and one is proved false, the - other must not be believed!</li> - <li class="consp">2. Nothing can rebut testimony, but proof that the witness is incompetent, - or misled.</li> - <li class="consp">3. Against all such objections must be set the fact that Christianity was - too serious a matter to allow the first converts to be careless as to its - evidence; and also that their religion forbid them to deceive others.</li> - </ul> - </li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">II. <i>As to the evidence from prophecy.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Obscurity as to <em>part</em> of a prophecy does not invalidate it, but is, as to us, as - if that part were not written, or were lost. We may not see the whole - prophecy fulfilled, and yet see enough fulfilled to perceive in it more - than human foresight.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> A <em>long series</em> of prophecies, all applicable to certain events, is proof that - such events were intended. This answers the objection that <em>particular</em> - prophecies were not intended to be applied as Christians apply them.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[60]</a></span><br /> - <span class="sub-line">Mythological and satirical writings greatly resemble prophecy. Now we - apply a parable, or fable, or satire, merely from seeing it <em>capable</em> of such - application.</span><br /> - <span class="sub-line">So if a long series of prophecies be <em>applicable</em> to the present state of the - world, or to the coming of Christ, it is proof that they were so <em>intended</em>.</span><br /> - <span class="sub-line">Besides, the ancient Jews, <em>before</em> Christ, applied the prophecies to him, just - as Christians do now.</span> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> If it could be shown that the prophets did not understand their own predictions, - or that their prophecies are capable of being applied to other - events than those to which Christians apply them, it would not abate the - force of the argument from prophecy, even with regard to those instances. - For, - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) To know the whole meaning of an author we must know the whole - meaning of his book, but knowing the meaning of a book is not - knowing the whole mind of the author.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) If the book is a <em>compilation</em>, the authors may have meanings deeper - than the compiler saw. If the prophets spoke by inspiration, they are - not the authors, but the writers of prophecy, and may not have known - all that the Divine Spirit intended. But the fulfilment of the prophecy - shows a foresight more than human.</li> - </ul> - </li> -</ul> - -<h5>REMARK.</h5> - -<p>This whole argument is just and real; but it is not expected that those will -be satisfied who will not submit to the perplexity and labor of understanding -it; or who have not modesty and fairness enough to allow an argument its due -weight; or who wilfully discard the whole investigation.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<h4 class="hidden">THE GENERAL ARGUMENT</h4> - -<p>We <em>now</em> proceed to <span class="smcapuc">THE GENERAL ARGUMENT</span> embracing both direct and circumstantial -evidence. A full discussion would require a volume, and cannot -be expected here; but <em>something</em> should be said, especially as most questions -of difficulty, in practical affairs, are settled by evidence arising from circumstances -which confirm each other.</p> - -<p>The thing asserted is that God has given us a revelation declaring himself -to be a moral governor; stating his system of government; and disclosing a -plan for the recovery of mankind out of sin, and raising them to perfect and -final happiness.</p> - -<h5 class="sub">I. <i>Consider this revelation as a history.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> It furnishes an account of the world, as God’s world. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) God’s providence, commands, promises, and threatenings.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Distinguishes God from idols.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) Describes the condition of religion and of its professors, in a world - considered as apostate and wicked.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) Political events are related as affecting religion, and not for their - importance as mere political events.</li> - <li class="consp">5.) The history is continued by prophecy, to the end of the world.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> It embraces a vast variety of other topics; natural and moral.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[61]</a></span> - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Thus furnishing the largest scope for criticism.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) So that <em>doubts</em> of its truth confirm that truth, for in this enlightened age - the claims of a book of such a nature could be easily and finally shown - to be false, if they were so.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) None who believe in natural religion, hold that Christianity has been - thus confuted.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> It contains a minute account of God’s selecting one nation for his peculiar - people, and of his dealings with them. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Interpositions in their behalf.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) Threats of dispersion, &c. if they rebelled.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) Promises of a Messiah as their prince; so clearly as to raise a general - expectation, &c.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) Foretelling his rejection by them, and that he should be the Savior of - the Gentiles.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Describes minutely the arrival of the Messiah, and his life and labors; and - the result, in the establishment of a new religion.</li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">II. <i>As to the authenticity of this history.</i></h5> - -<p>Suppose a person ignorant of all history but the Bible, and not knowing -even that to be true, were to inquire into its evidence of authenticity, he -would find,</p> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> That natural religion owes its establishment to <em>the truths</em> contained in this - book. This no more <em>disproves</em> natural religion, than our learning a - proposition from Euclid, shows that the proposition was not true before - Euclid.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> The great antiquity of revelation.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> That its chronology is not contradicted but confirmed by known facts.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> That there is nothing in the history itself to awaken suspicion of its - fidelity. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) Every thing said to be done in any age or country, is conformable to the - manners of that age and country.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) The characters are all perfectly natural.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) All the domestic and political incidents are credible. Some of these, - taken alone, seem strange to <em>some</em>, in <em>this</em> day; but not more so than - things now occurring.</li> - <li class="consp">4.) Transcribers may have made errors, but these are not more numerous - than in other ancient books; and none of them impair the narrative.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> That profane authors confirm Scripture accounts.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>6.</b> That the credibility of the <em>general</em> history, confirms the accounts of the - miracles, for they are all interwoven, and make but one statement.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>7.</b> That there certainly was and is such a people as the Jews; whose form of - government was founded on these very books of Moses; and whose - acknowledgment of the God of the Bible, kept them a distinct race.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>8.</b> That one Jesus, of Jewish extraction, arose at the time when the Jews - expected a Messiah, was rejected by them, as was prophesied, and was - received by the Gentiles, as was prophesied.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>9.</b> That the religion of this Jesus spread till it became the religion of the - world, notwithstanding every sort of resistance; and has continued till - now.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[62]</a></span></li> - <li class="consp"><b>10.</b> That the Jewish government was destroyed, and the people dispersed into - all lands; and still for many centuries, continue to be a distinct race, - professing the law of Moses. If this separateness be <em>accounted for</em>, in - any way, it does not destroy the fact that it was <em>predicted</em>.</li> -</ul> - -<h5>CONCLUSION.</h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Recapitulation of the preceding ten observations.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Add the fact that there are obvious appearances in the world, aside from - the Jews, which correspond to prophetic history.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> These appearances, compared with Bible history, and with each other, in - <em>a joint view</em>, will appear to be of great weight, and would impress one - who regarded them for the first time, more than they do us who have - been familiar with them.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> The preceding discussion, though not thorough, amounts to proof of something - more than human in this matter. - <ul> - <li class="consp">1.) The sufficiency of these proofs may be denied, but the <em>existence</em> of them - cannot be.</li> - <li class="consp">2.) The conformity of prophecies to events may be said to be accidental, but - the <em>conformity itself</em> cannot be denied.</li> - <li class="consp">3.) These collateral proofs may be pronounced fanciful, but it cannot be said - they are <em>nothing</em>. Probabilities may not amount to demonstration, but - they remain probabilities.</li> - </ul> - </li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> Those who will set down all seeming completions of prophecy, and judge - of them by the common rules of evidence, will find that <em>together</em> they - amount to strong proof. Because probable proofs, added together, not - only increase evidence, but multiply it.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>6.</b> It is very well to observe objections; but it should be remembered that a - mistake on one side is far more dangerous than a mistake on the other; - and the safest conclusion is the best.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>7.</b> Religion, like other things, is to be judged by all the evidence taken - together. Unless <em>all</em> its proofs be overthrown, it remains proved. If - no proof singly were sufficient, the whole taken together might be.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>8.</b> It is much easier to start an objection, than to comprehend the united force - of a whole argument.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>9.</b> Thus it appears that the positive evidence of revelation cannot be destroyed, - though it should be lessened.</li> -</ul> - -<h4>CHAPTER VIII.<br /> -<span class="smaller">OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT.</span></h4> - -<p>If all made up their minds with proper care and candor, there would be no -need of this chapter. But some do not try to understand what they condemn; -and our mode of argument is open to objections, especially in the minds of -those who judge without thinking. The chief objections will therefore be considered. -They are these:—it does not solve difficulties in revelation to say -that there are as great in natural religion:—it will not make men religious to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[63]</a></span> -show them that it is <em>as</em> important as worldly prudence, for showing that, does -not make them prudent:—the justice of God in the system of religion, is not -proved by showing it is as apparent as in his natural providence:—no reasoning -from analogy can carry full conviction:—mankind will not renounce present -pleasures, for a religion which is not free from doubt. To each of which -a reply will now be given.</p> - -<h5 class="sub">I. <i>As to requiring a solution of all difficulties.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> This is but resolving to comprehend the nature of God, and the whole plan - of his government throughout eternity.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> It is always right to argue from what is known, to what is disputed. We - are constantly so doing. The most eminent physician does not understand - all diseases, yet we do not despise what he does know.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> It is very important to find that objections against revelation are just as - strong, not only against natural religion, but against the course of nature.</li> - -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">II. <i>As to men’s having as little reason for worldly pursuits, as they -have for being religious.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> If men can be convinced that they have as much reason to be religious as - they have to practise worldly prudence, then <em>there is</em> a reason for being - religious.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> If religion proposes greater than worldly interests, and has the same reasons - for belief, then it has proportionally a greater claim.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> If religion being left doubtful, proves it to be false, then doubts as to the - success of any worldly pursuit show it to be wrong. Yet we constantly - act, even in the most important affairs, without <em>certainty</em> of being right.</li> - -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">III. <i>As to the justice and goodness of God in religion.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> Our business is not to vindicate God, but to learn our duty, governed as we - are; which is a very different thing. It has been shown that if we knew - all things, present, past, and future, and the relations of each thing to all - other things, we might see to be just and good what now do not seem so: - and it is probable we should.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> We do not say that objections against God’s justice and goodness are - removed by showing the like objections against natural providence, but - that they are not <em>conclusive</em>, because they apply equally to what we know - to be facts.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> The existence of objections does not destroy the evidence of facts. The - fact for instance that God rewards and punishes, though men may think - it unjust. Even necessity, plead for human acts, does no more to abolish - justice than it does injustice.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> Though the reasonableness of Christianity cannot be shown from analogy, - the truth of it may. The truth of a fact may be proved without regard - to its quality. The reasonableness of obeying Christianity is proved, - if we barely prove Christianity itself to be possible.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>5.</b> Though analogy may not show Christian precepts to be good, it proves - them to be credible.</li> -</ul> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[64]</a></span></p> - -<h5 class="sub">IV. <i>The analogical argument does not remove doubt.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> What opinion does any man hold, about which there can be no doubt? - Even the best way of preserving and enjoying this life, is not agreed - upon. Whether our measures will accomplish our objects, is always - uncertain; and still more whether the objects, if accomplished, will - give us happiness. Yet men do not on this account refuse to make - exertion.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> This objection overlooks the very nature of religion. The embracing of it - presupposes a certain degree of candor and integrity, to try which, and - exercise, and improve it, is its intention. Just as warning a man of - danger, presupposes a disposition to avoid danger.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Religion is a probation, and has evidence enough as such; and would not - be such, if it compelled assent.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>4.</b> We never mean by sufficient evidence, such an amount as necessarily - determines a man to act, but only such as will show an action to be - prudent.</li> -</ul> - -<h5 class="sub">V. <i>As to the small influence of the analogical argument.</i></h5> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> As just observed, religion is a <em>test</em>, and an <em>exercise</em>, of character; and that - some reject it is nothing to our purpose. We are inquiring not what sort - of creature man is, but what he should be. This is each man’s own - concern.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Religion, as a probation, accomplishes its end, whether individuals believe - or not.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Even this objection admits that religion has some weight, and of course - it should have some influence; and if so, there is the same reason, - though not so strong, for publishing it, that there would be, if it were - likely to have greater influence.</li> -</ul> - -<p><span class="smcap">Further.</span> It must be considered that the reasoning in this treatise is on the -principles of other men, and arguments of the utmost importance are omitted, -because not universally admitted. Thus as to Fatalism, and the abstract fitness -or unfitness of actions. The general argument is just a question of fact, and -is here so treated. Abstract truths are usually advanced as proof; but in this -work, only <em>facts</em> are adduced. That the three angles of a triangle are equal to -two right angles, is an abstract truth: but that they so appear to us, is only -a matter of fact. That there is such a thing as abstract right and wrong, which -determines the will of God in rewarding and punishing, is an assertion of an -abstract truth, as well as a fact. Suppose God in this world rewarded and -punished every man exactly as he obeyed or disobeyed his conscience, this -would not be an abstract truth, but a fact. And if all acknowledged this as a -fact, all would not see it to be right. If, instead of his doing it now, we say -he will do it hereafter, this too is not an abstract truth, but a question of fact. -This fact could be fully proved on the abstract principles of moral fitness; but -without them, there has now been given a <em>conclusive practical proof</em>; which -though it may be cavilled at, and shown not to amount to demonstration, cannot -be answered.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[65]</a></span></p> - -<p>Hence it may be said as to the force of this treatise,</p> - -<ul> - <li class="consp"><b>1.</b> To such as are convinced of the truth of revelation, as proved on the - principles of liberty and moral fitness, it will furnish a full confirmation. - To such as do not admit those principles it is an original proof.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>2.</b> Those who believe will find objections removed, and those who disbelieve - will find they have no grounds for their scepticism; and a good deal - beside.</li> - <li class="consp"><b>3.</b> Thus though some may think <em>too much</em> is here made of analogy, yet there - can be no denying that the argument is <em>real</em>. It confirms <em>all facts</em> to - which it can be applied; and of many is the only proof. It is strong - on the side of religion, and ought to be regarded by such as prefer facts - to abstract reasonings.</li> -</ul> - -<h5>CONCLUSION.</h5> - -<p>Recapitulates the general structure and design of the argument, the classes -of persons for whose benefit it is particularly adopted, and declares those who -reject Christianity to be wholly without excuse.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[66]</a></span></p> - -<h2 id="Advertisement">Advertisement prefixed to the First Edition.</h2> - -<p>If the reader should here meet with any thing which he had not -before attended to, it will not be in the observations upon the constitution -and course of nature, these being all obvious, but in the application -of them; in which, though there is nothing but what appears -to me of some real weight, and therefore of great importance, yet he -will observe several things, which will appear to him of very little, -if he can think things to be of little importance, which are of any -real weight at all, upon such a subject of religion. However, the -proper force of the following treatise lies in the whole general analogy -considered together.</p> - -<p>It is come, I know not how to be taken for granted, by many -persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry; -but that it is, now at length, discovered to be fictitious. Accordingly -they treat it, as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point -among all people of discernment; and nothing remained, but to set -it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way -of reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the -world. On the contrary, thus much at least, will be here found, not -taken for granted but proved, that any reasonable man, who will -thoroughly consider the matter, may be as much assured, as he is -of his own being, that it is not so clear a case, that there is nothing -in it. There is, I think, strong evidence of its truth; but it is certain -no one can, upon principles of reason, be satisfied of the contrary. -The practical consequence to be drawn from this, is not attended to -by every one who is concerned in it.</p> - -<p class="smaller"><i>May, 1736.</i></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[67]</a></span></p> - -<h2 id="INTRODUCTION">INTRODUCTION.</h2> - -<p>Probable evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative -by this, that it admits of degrees; and of all variety of -them, from the highest moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption. -We cannot indeed say a thing is probably true upon -one very slight presumption for it; because, as there may be probabilities -on both sides of a question, there may be some against -it; and though there be not, yet a slight presumption does not -beget that degree of conviction, which is implied in saying a -thing is probably true. But that the slightest possible presumption -is of the nature of a probability, appears from hence; that -such low presumption, often repeated, will amount even to moral -certainty. Thus a man’s having observed the ebb and flow of -the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though the -lowest imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow: but the -observation of this event for so many days, and months, and ages -together, as it has been observed by mankind, gives us a full -assurance that it will.</p> - -<p>That which chiefly constitutes <em>probability</em> is expressed in the -word <em>likely</em>, <i>i.e.</i> like some truth,<a name="FNanchor_6" id="FNanchor_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> or true event; like it, in itself, -in its evidence, in some (more or fewer) of its circumstances.<a name="FNanchor_7" id="FNanchor_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> For -when we determine a thing to be probably true, suppose that an -event has or will come to pass, it is from the mind’s remarking -in it a likeness to some other event, which we have observed has -come to pass. This observation forms, in numberless daily instances, -a presumption, opinion, or full conviction, that such -event has or will come to pass; according as the observation is, -that the like event has sometimes, most commonly, or always, so<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[68]</a></span> -far as our observation reaches, come to pass at like distances of -time, or place, or upon like occasions. Hence arises the belief, -that a child, if it lives twenty years, will grow up to the stature -and strength of a man; that food will contribute to the preservation -of its life, and the want of it for such a number of days, be -its certain destruction. So likewise the rule and measure of our -hopes and fears concerning the success of our pursuits; our expectations -that others will act so and so in such circumstances; -and our judgment that such actions proceed from such principles; -all these rely upon our having observed the like to what we hope, -fear, expect, judge; I say, upon our having observed the like, -either with respect to others or ourselves. Thus, the prince<a name="FNanchor_8" id="FNanchor_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> -who had always lived in a warm climate, naturally concluded in -the way of analogy, that there was no such thing as water’s becoming -hard, because he had always observed it to be fluid and -yielding. We, on the contrary, from analogy conclude, that there -is no presumption at all against this: that it is supposable there -may be frost in England any given day in January next; probable -that there will on some day of the month; and that there -is a moral certainty, <i>i.e.</i> ground for an expectation without any -doubt of it, in some part or other of the winter.</p> - -<p>Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect -kind of information; and is to be considered as relative only to -beings of limited capacities. For nothing which is the possible -object of knowledge, whether past, present, or future, can be probable -to an infinite intelligence; since it cannot but be discerned -absolutely as it is in itself, certainly true, or certainly false. But -to us, probability is the very guide of life.</p> - -<p>From these things it follows, that in questions of difficulty, or -such as are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence cannot -be had, or is not seen; if the result of examination be, that there -appears upon the whole, any even the lowest presumption on one -side, and none on the other, or a greater presumption on one side, -though in the lowest degree greater; this determines the question, -even in matters of speculation. In matters of practice, it -will lay us under an absolute and formal obligation, in point of -prudence and of interest, to act upon that presumption or low -probability, though it be so low as to leave the mind in very great<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[69]</a></span> -doubt which is the truth. For surely a man is as really bound -in prudence to do what upon the whole, according to the best of -his judgment, appears to be for his happiness,<a name="FNanchor_9" id="FNanchor_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> as what he certainly -knows to be so.</p> - -<p>Further, in questions of great consequence, a reasonable man -will think it concerns him to remark lower probabilities and presumptions -than these; such as amount to no more than showing -one side of a question to be as supposable and credible as the -other: nay, such even as but amount to much less than this. -For numberless instances might be mentioned respecting the common -pursuits of life, where a man would be thought, in a literal -sense, distracted, who would not act, and with great application -too, not only upon an even chance, but upon much less, and -where the probability or chance was greatly against his succeeding.<a name="FNanchor_10" id="FNanchor_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<p>It is not my design to inquire further into the nature, the -foundation, and measure of probability; or whence it proceeds -that <em>likeness</em> should beget that presumption, opinion, and full -conviction, which the human mind is formed to receive from it, -and which it does necessarily produce in every one; or to guard -against the errors, to which reasoning from analogy is liable. -This belongs to the subject of Logic; and is a part of that subject -which has not yet been thoroughly considered. Indeed I -shall not take upon me to say, how far the extent, compass, and -force, of analogical reasoning, can be reduced to general heads -and rules; and the whole be formed into a system. But though -so little in this way has been attempted by those who have treated -of our intellectual powers, and the exercise of them; this does -not hinder but that we may be, as we unquestionably are, assured, -that analogy is of weight, in various degrees, towards determining -our judgment and our practice. Nor does it in any wise -cease to be of weight in those cases, because persons, either given -to dispute, or who require things to be stated with greater exactness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[70]</a></span> -than our faculties appear to admit of in practical matters, -may find other cases in which it is not easy to say, whether it be, -or be not, of any weight; or instances of seeming analogies, -which are really of none. It is enough to the present purpose to -observe, that this general way of arguing is evidently natural, -just, and conclusive. For there is no man can make a question -but that the sun will rise to-morrow, and be seen, where it is seen -at all, in the figure of a circle, and not in that of a square.</p> - -<p>Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen<a name="FNanchor_11" id="FNanchor_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> has with -singular sagacity observed, that “<cite>he who believes the Scripture -to have proceeded from him who is the Author of nature, may -well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it, as are found -in the constitution of nature</cite>.” And in a like way of reflection -it may be added, that he who denies the Scripture to have been -from God upon account of these difficulties, may, for the very -same reason, deny the world to have been formed by him. On -the other hand, if there be an analogy or likeness between that -system of things and dispensation of Providence, which <em>revelation</em> -informs us of, and that system of things and dispensation of -Providence, which <em>experience</em> together with reason informs us -of, <i>i.e.</i> the known course of nature; this is a presumption, that -they have both the same author and cause; at least so far as to -answer objections against the former’s being from God, drawn -from any thing which is analogical or similar to what is in the -latter, which is acknowledged to be from him; for an Author of -nature is here supposed.</p> - -<p>Forming our notions of the constitution and government of -the world upon reasoning, without foundation for the principles -which we assume, whether from the attributes of God, or any -thing else, is building a world upon hypothesis, like Des Cartes. -Forming our notions upon reasoning from principles which are -certain, but applied to cases to which we have no ground to -apply them, (like those who explain the structure of the human -body, and the nature of diseases and medicines, from mere mathematics,) -is an error much akin to the former: since what is assumed -in order to make the reasoning applicable, is Hypothesis. -But it must be allowed just, to join abstract reasonings with the -observation of facts, and argue from such facts as are known, to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[71]</a></span> -others that are like them; from that part of the divine government -over intelligent creatures which comes under our view, to -that larger and more general government over them which is -beyond it; and from what is present, to collect what is likely, -credible, or not incredible, will be hereafter.</p> - -<p>This method then of concluding and determining being practical, -and what, if we will act at all, we cannot but act upon in the -common pursuits of life; being evidently conclusive, in various -degrees, proportionable to the degree and exactness of the whole -analogy or likeness; and having so great authority for its introduction -into the subject of religion, even revealed religion; my -design is to apply it to that subject in general, both natural and -revealed: taking for proved, that there is an intelligent Author -of nature, and natural Governor of the world. For as there is no -presumption against this prior to the proof of it: so it has been -often proved with accumulated evidence; from this argument of -analogy and final causes; from abstract reasonings; from the -most ancient tradition and testimony; and from the general consent -of mankind. Nor does it appear, so far as I can find, to be -denied by the generality of those who profess themselves dissatisfied -with the evidence of religion.</p> - -<p>As there are some, who, instead of thus attending to what is -in fact the constitution of nature, form their notions of God’s -government upon hypothesis: so there are others, who indulge -themselves in vain and idle speculations, how the world might -possibly have been framed otherwise than it is; and upon supposition -that things might, in imagining that they should, have -been disposed and carried on after a better model, than what appears -in the present disposition and conduct of them.<a name="FNanchor_12" id="FNanchor_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> Suppose -now a person of such a turn of mind, to go on with his reveries, -till he had at length fixed upon some particular plan of nature, -as appearing to him the best.—One shall scarce be thought guilty -of detraction against human understanding, if one should say, -even beforehand, that the plan which this speculative person -would fix upon, though he were the wisest of the sons of men, -probably would not be the very best, even according to his own<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[72]</a></span> -notions of <em>best</em>; whether he thought that to be so, which afforded -occasions and motives for the exercise of the greatest virtue, or -which was productive of the greatest happiness, or that these two -were necessarily connected, and run up into one and the same -plan.</p> - -<p>It may not be amiss, once for all, to see what would be the -amount of these emendations and imaginary improvements upon -the system of nature, or how far they would mislead us. It -seems there could be no stopping, till we came to some such conclusions -as these: that all creatures should at first be made as -perfect and as happy as they were capable of ever being: that -nothing, surely, of hazard or danger should be put upon them to -do; some indolent persons would perhaps think nothing at all: -or certainly, that effectual care should be taken, that they should, -whether necessarily or not, yet eventually and in fact, always do -what was right and most conducive to happiness; which would -be thought easy for infinite power to effect, either by not giving -them any principles which would endanger their going wrong, or -by laying the right motive of action in every instance before their -minds in so strong a manner, as would never fail of inducing -them to act conformably to it: and that the whole method of government -by punishments should be rejected as absurd; as an -awkward roundabout method of carrying things on; nay, as contrary -to a principal purpose, for which it would be supposed -creatures were made, namely, happiness.</p> - -<p>Now, without considering what is to be said in particular to -the several parts of this train of folly and extravagance, what has -been above intimated, is a full direct general answer to it; namely, -that we may see beforehand that we have not faculties for this -kind of speculation. For though it be admitted that, from the -first principles of our nature, we unavoidably judge or determine -some ends to be absolutely in themselves preferable to others, and -that the ends now mentioned, or if they run up into one, that -this one is absolutely the best; and consequently that we must -conclude the ultimate end designed, in the constitution of nature -and conduct of Providence, is the most virtue and happiness possible; -yet we are far from being able to judge what particular -disposition of things would be most friendly and assistant to virtue; -or what means might be absolutely necessary to produce the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[73]</a></span> -most happiness in a system of such extent as our own world may -be, taking in all that is past and to come, though we should suppose -it detached from the whole things. Indeed we are so far -from being able to judge of this, that we are not judges what -may be the necessary means of raising and conducting one person -to the highest perfection and happiness of his nature. Nay, -even in the little affairs of the present life, we find men of different -educations and ranks are not competent judges of the conduct -of each other. Our whole nature leads us to ascribe all -moral perfection to God, and to deny all imperfection of him. -And this will forever be a practical proof of his moral character, -to such as will consider what a practical proof is; because it is -the voice of God speaking in us. Hence we conclude, that virtue -must be the happiness, and vice the misery, of every creature; -and that regularity and order and right cannot but prevail finally -in a universe under his government. But we are in no sort -judges, what are the necessary means of accomplishing this end.</p> - -<p>Let us then, instead of that idle and not very innocent employment -of forming imaginary models of a world, and schemes -of governing it, turn our thoughts to what we experience to be -the conduct of nature with respect to intelligent creatures; which -may be resolved into general laws or rules of administration, in -the same way as many of the laws of nature respecting inanimate -matter may be collected from experiments. Let us compare the -known constitution and course of things with what is said to be -the moral system of nature; the acknowledged dispensations of -Providence, or that government which we find ourselves under, -with what religion teaches us to believe and expect; and see -whether they are not analogous and of a piece. Upon such a -comparison it will, I think, be found that they are very much -so: that both may be traced up to the same general laws, and -resolved into the same principles of divine conduct.</p> - -<p>The analogy here proposed to be considered is of pretty large -extent, and consists of several parts; in some more, in others less -exact. In some few instances perhaps, it may amount to a real -practical proof; in others not so. Yet in these it is a confirmation -of what is proved otherwise. It will undeniably show, what -too many need to have shown them, that the system of religion, -both natural and revealed, considered only as a system, and prior<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[74]</a></span> -to the proof of it, is not a subject of ridicule, unless that of nature -be so too. And it will afford an answer to almost all objections -against the system both of natural and revealed religion; -though not perhaps an answer in so great a degree, yet in a very -considerable degree an answer to the objections against the evidence -of it: for objections against a proof, and objections against -what is said to be proved, the reader will observe are different -things.</p> - -<p>The divine government of the world, implied in the notion of -religion in general and of Christianity, contains in it: that mankind -is appointed to live in a future state;<a name="FNanchor_13" id="FNanchor_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> that there every one -shall be rewarded or punished;<a name="FNanchor_14" id="FNanchor_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> rewarded or punished respectively -for all that behaviour here, which we comprehend under the -words, virtuous or vicious, morally good or evil:<a name="FNanchor_15" id="FNanchor_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> that our present -life is a probation, a state of trial,<a name="FNanchor_16" id="FNanchor_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> and of discipline,<a name="FNanchor_17" id="FNanchor_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> for -that future one; notwithstanding the objections, which men may -fancy they have, from notions of necessity, against there being -any such moral plan as this at all;<a name="FNanchor_18" id="FNanchor_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> and whatever objections may -appear to lie against the wisdom and goodness of it, as it stands so -imperfectly made known to us at present:<a name="FNanchor_19" id="FNanchor_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> that this world being -in a state of apostasy and wickedness, and consequently of ruin, -and the sense both of their condition and duty being greatly corrupted -amongst men, this gave occasion for an additional dispensation -of Providence; of the utmost importance;<a name="FNanchor_20" id="FNanchor_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> proved by miracles;<a name="FNanchor_21" id="FNanchor_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> -but containing in it many things appearing to us strange, -and not to have been expected;<a name="FNanchor_22" id="FNanchor_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> a dispensation of Providence, -which is a scheme or system of things;<a name="FNanchor_23" id="FNanchor_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> carried on by the mediation -of a divine person, the Messiah, in order to the recovery of -the world;<a name="FNanchor_24" id="FNanchor_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> yet not revealed to all men, nor proved with the -strongest possible evidence to all those to whom it is revealed; -but only to such a part of mankind, and with such particular -evidence, as the wisdom of God thought fit.<a name="FNanchor_25" id="FNanchor_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a></p> - -<p>The design then of the following treatise will be to show, that -the several parts principally objected against in this moral and -Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its publication, and -the proof which God has afforded us of its truth; that the particular<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[75]</a></span> -parts principally objected against in this whole dispensation, -are analogous to what is experienced in the constitution and -course of nature or Providence; that the chief objections themselves -which are alleged against the former, are no other than -what may be alleged with like justness against the latter, where -they are found in fact to be inconclusive; and that this argument -from analogy is in general unanswerable, and undoubtedly -of weight on the side of religion,<a name="FNanchor_26" id="FNanchor_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> notwithstanding the objections -which may seem to lie against it, and the real ground which there -may be for difference of opinion, as to the particular degree of -weight which is to be laid upon it. This is a general account of -what may be looked for in the following treatise. I shall begin -it with that which is the foundation of all our hopes and of all -our fears; all our hopes and fears, which are of any consideration; -I mean a future life.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[76]</a></span></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[77]</a></span></p> - -<h1><span class="smaller">THE</span><br /> -ANALOGY OF RELIGION.</h1> - -<h2 id="PART_I">PART I.<br /> -<span class="smaller">Natural Religion.</span></h2> - -<h3 id="I_CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I.<br /> -<span class="smaller">A FUTURE LIFE.<a name="FNanchor_27" id="FNanchor_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a></span></h3> - -<p>Strange difficulties have been raised by some concerning personal -identity, or the sameness of living agents, implied in the -notion of our existing now and hereafter, or in any two successive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[78]</a></span> -moments; which, whoever thinks it worth while, may see -considered in the first dissertation at the end of this treatise. -But without regard to any of them here, let us consider what the -analogy of nature, and the several changes which we have undergone, -and those which we know we may undergo without being -destroyed, suggest, as to the effect which death may, or may not, -have upon us; and whether it be not from thence probable, that -we may survive this change, and exist in a future state of life -and perception.</p> - -<p>I. From our being born into the present world in the helpless -imperfect state of infancy, and having arrived from thence to -mature age, we find it to be a general law of nature in our own -species, that the same creatures, the <em>same individuals</em>, should -exist in degrees of life and perception, with capacities of action, -of enjoyment and suffering, in one period of their being, greatly -different from those appointed them in another period of it. In -other creatures the same law holds. For the difference of their -capacities and states of life at their birth (to go no higher) and -in maturity; the change of worms into flies, and the vast enlargement -of their locomotive powers by such change: and birds and -insects bursting the shell of their habitation, and by this means -entering into a new world, furnished with new accommodations -for them, and finding a new sphere of action assigned them; -these are instances of this general law of nature. Thus all the -various and wonderful transformations of animals are to be taken -into consideration here. The states of life in which we ourselves -existed formerly, in the womb and in our infancy, are almost as -different from our present in mature age, as it is possible to conceive -any two states or degrees of life can be. Therefore that we -are to exist hereafter, in a state as different (suppose) from our -present, as this is from our former, is but according to the analogy -of nature; according to a natural order or appointment of the very -same kind, with what we have already experienced.</p> - -<p>II. We know we are endued with capacities of action, of happiness -and misery: for we are conscious of acting, of enjoying -pleasure and suffering pain. Now that we have these powers and -capacities before death, is a presumption that we shall retain -them through and after death; indeed a probability of it abundantly -sufficient to act upon, unless there be some positive reason<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[79]</a></span> -to think that death is the destruction of those living powers; because -there is in every case a probability, that all things will continue -as we experience they are, in all respects, except those in -which we have some reason to think they will be altered. This -is that <em>kind</em><a name="FNanchor_28" id="FNanchor_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> of presumption or probability from analogy, expressed -in the very word <em>continuance</em>, which seems our only natural -reason for believing the course of the world will continue -to-morrow, as it has done so far as our experience or knowledge -of history can carry us back. Nay, it seems our only reason for -believing, that any one substance now existing will continue to -exist a moment longer; the self-existent substance only excepted. -Thus if men were assured that the unknown event, death, was -not the destruction of our faculties of perception and of action, -there would be no apprehension that any other power or event, -unconnected with this of death, would destroy these faculties just -at the instant of each creature’s death; and therefore no doubt -but that they would remain after it; which shows the high probability -that our living powers will continue after death, unless -there be some ground to think that death is their destruction.<a name="FNanchor_29" id="FNanchor_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> -For, if it would be in a manner certain that we should survive -death,<a name="FNanchor_30" id="FNanchor_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> provided it were certain that death would not be -our destruction, it must be highly probable we shall survive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[80]</a></span> -it, if there be no ground to think death will be our destruction.</p> - -<p>Though I think it must be acknowledged, that prior to the -natural and moral proofs of a future life commonly insisted upon, -there would arise a general confused suspicion, that in the great -shock and alteration which we shall undergo by death, we, <i>i.e.</i> -our living powers, might be wholly destroyed; yet even prior to -those proofs, there is really no particular distinct ground or reason -for this apprehension at all, so far as I can find. If there be, it -must arise either from <em>the reason of the thing</em>, or from <em>the analogy -of nature</em>.</p> - -<p>But we cannot argue from <em>the reason of the thing</em>, that death -is the destruction of living agents, because we know not at all -what death is in itself; but only some of its effects, such as the -dissolution of flesh, skin, and bones. These effects do in no wise -appear to imply the destruction of a living agent. Besides, as -we are greatly in the dark, upon what the exercise of our living -powers depends, so we are wholly ignorant what the powers themselves -depend upon; the powers themselves as distinguished, not -only from their actual exercise, but also from the present capacity -of exercising them; and as opposed to their destruction: for -sleep, or certainly a swoon, shows us, not only that these powers -exist when they are not exercised, as the passive power of motion -does in inanimate matter; but shows also that they exist, when -there is no present capacity of exercising them: or that the capacities -of exercising them for the present, as well as the actual -exercise of them, may be suspended, and yet the powers themselves -remain undestroyed. Since then we know not at all upon -what the existence of our living powers depends, this shows further, -there can no probability be collected from the reason of the -thing, that death will be their destruction: because their existence -may depend upon somewhat in no degree affected by death; -upon somewhat quite out of the reach of this king of terrors. -So that there is nothing more certain, than that <em>the reason of the -thing</em> shows us no connection between death and the destruction -of living agents.</p> - -<p>Nor can we find any thing throughout the whole <em>analogy of -nature</em> to afford us even the slightest presumption, that animals -ever lose their living powers; much less if it were possible, that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[81]</a></span> -they lose them by death: for we have no faculties wherewith to -trace any beyond or through it, so as to see what becomes of -them. This event removes them from our view. It destroys -the <em>sensible</em> proof, which we had before their death, of their being -possessed of living powers, but does not appear to afford the least -reason to believe that they are, then, or by that event, deprived -of them.</p> - -<p>Our knowing that they were possessed of these powers, up to -the very period to which we have faculties capable of tracing -them, is itself a probability of their retaining them beyond it. -This is confirmed, and a sensible credibility is given to it, by observing -the very great and astonishing changes which we have -experienced; so great, that our existence in another state of life, -of perception and of action, will be but according to a method of -providential conduct, the like to which has been already exercised -even with regard to ourselves; according to a course of -nature, the like to which we have already gone through.</p> - -<p>However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible, how difficult -it is to silence imagination enough to make the voice of reason -even distinctly heard in this case; as we are accustomed, from -our youth up, to indulge that forward, delusive faculty, ever obtruding -beyond its sphere; (of some assistance indeed to apprehension, -but the author of all error,) as we plainly lose ourselves -in gross and crude conceptions of things, taking for granted that -we are acquainted with what indeed we are wholly ignorant of: -it may be proper to consider the imaginary presumptions, that -death will be our destruction, arising from these kinds of early -and lasting prejudices; and to show how little they really amount -to, even though we cannot wholly divest ourselves of them. -And,</p> - -<p>I. All presumption of death’s being the destruction of living -beings, must go upon supposition that they are compounded;<a name="FNanchor_31" id="FNanchor_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[82]</a></span> -so, discerptible. But since consciousness is a single and indivisible -power, it should seem that the subject in which it resides -must be so too. For were the motion of any particle of matter -absolutely one and indivisible, so as that it should imply a contradiction -to suppose part of this motion to exist, and part not -to exist, <i>i.e.</i> part of this matter to move, and part to be at rest, -then its power of motion would be indivisible; and so also would -the subject in which the power inheres, namely, the particle of -matter: for if this could be divided into two, one part might -be moved and the other at rest, which is contrary to the supposition.</p> - -<p>In like manner it has been argued,<a name="FNanchor_32" id="FNanchor_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> and, for any thing appearing -to the contrary, justly, that since the perception or consciousness, -which we have of our own existence, is indivisible, so -as that it is a contradiction to suppose one part of it should be -here and the other there; the perceptive power, or the power of -consciousness, is indivisible too: and consequently the subject in -which it resides, <i>i.e.</i> the conscious being. Now, upon supposition -that the living agent each man calls himself, is thus a single -being, which there is at least no more difficulty in conceiving -than in conceiving it to be a compound, and of which there is the -proof now mentioned; it follows, that our organized bodies are no -more ourselves or part of ourselves, than any other matter around -us. And it is as easy to conceive, how matter, which is no part -of ourselves, may be appropriated to us in the manner which our -present bodies are; as how we can receive impressions from, and -have power over, any matter. It is as easy to conceive, that we may -exist out of bodies, as in them; and that we might have animated -bodies of any other organs and senses wholly different from these -now given us; and that we may hereafter animate these same or -new bodies, variously modified and organized; as to conceive how<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[83]</a></span> -we can animate such bodies as our present. And lastly, the dissolution -of all these several organized bodies, supposing ourselves -to have successively animated them, would have no more conceivable -tendency to destroy the living beings ourselves, or deprive -us of living faculties, the faculties of perception and of -action, than the dissolution of any foreign matter, which we are -capable of receiving impressions from, and making use of, for the -common occasions of life.</p> - -<p>II. The simplicity and absolute oneness of a living agent cannot, -from the nature of the thing, be properly proved by experimental -observations. But as these <em>fall in</em> with the supposition -of its unity, so they plainly lead us to <em>conclude</em> certainly, that our -gross organized bodies, with which we perceive objects of sense, -and with which we act, are no part of ourselves; and therefore -show us, that we have no reason to believe their destruction to be -ours: even without determining whether our living substance be -material or immaterial. For we see by experience, that men may -lose their limbs, their organs of sense, and even the greatest part -of these bodies, and yet remain the same living agents. Persons -can trace up the existence of themselves to a time, when the bulk -of their bodies was extremely small, in comparison of what it is -in mature age: and we cannot but think, that they might <em>then</em> -have lost a considerable part of that small body, and yet have remained -the same living agents; as they may now lose great part -of their present body, and remain so. And it is certain, that the -bodies of all animals are in a constant flux;<a name="FNanchor_33" id="FNanchor_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> from that never-ceasing -attrition, which there is in every part of them. Now, -things of this kind unavoidably teach us to distinguish, between -these living agents ourselves, and large quantities of matter, in -which we are very nearly interested; since these may be alienated, -and actually are in a daily course of succession, and changing -their owners; whilst we are assured, that each living agent remains<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[84]</a></span> -one and the same permanent being.<a name="FNanchor_34" id="FNanchor_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> And this general -observation leads us on to the following ones.</p> - -<p><i>First</i>, That we have no way of determining by experience, -what is the certain bulk of the living being each man calls himself: -and yet, till it be determined that it is larger in bulk than -the solid elementary particles of matter, which there is no ground -to think any natural power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason -to think death to be the dissolution of it, of the living being, -even though it should not be absolutely indiscerptible.</p> - -<p><i>Secondly</i>, From our being so nearly related to and interested -in certain systems of matter, (suppose our flesh and bones,) and -afterwards ceasing to be at all related to them, the living agents, -ourselves, remaining all this while undestroyed notwithstanding -such alienation; and consequently these systems of matter not -being ourselves, it follows further that we have no ground to -conclude any other (suppose <em>internal</em>) <em>systems</em> of matter, to be -the living agents ourselves; because we can have no ground to -conclude this, but from our relation to and interest in such other -systems of matter: and therefore we can have no reason to conclude -what befalls those systems of matter at death, to be the -destruction of the living agents. We have already several times -over, lost a great part or perhaps the whole of our body, according -to certain common established laws of nature, yet we remain -the same living agents. When we shall lose as great a part, or the -whole, by another common established law of nature, death, why -may we not also remain the same? That the alienation has been -gradual in one case, and in the other will be more at once, does -not prove any thing to the contrary. We have passed undestroyed -through those many and great revolutions of matter, so peculiarly -appropriated to us ourselves; why should we imagine death will -be so fatal to us? Nor can it be objected, that what is thus -alienated or lost, is no part of our original solid body, but only -adventitious matter. Because we may lose entire limbs, which -must have contained many solid parts and vessels of the original -body; or if this be not admitted, we have no proof, that any of -these solid parts are dissolved or alienated by death. Though we -are very nearly related to that extraneous or adventitious matter, -whilst it continues united to and distending the several parts of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[85]</a></span> -our solid body, yet after all, the relation a person bears to those -parts of his body, to which he is most nearly related, amounts but -to this, that the living agent, and those parts of the body, mutually -affect each other.<a name="FNanchor_35" id="FNanchor_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> The same thing, the same thing in kind -though not in degree, may be said of <em>all foreign</em> matter, which -gives us ideas, and over which we have any power. From these -observations the whole ground of the imagination is removed, -that the dissolution of any matter, is the destruction of a living -agent, from the interest he once had in such matter.</p> - -<p><i>Thirdly</i>, If we consider our body somewhat more distinctly, -as made up of organs and instruments of perception and of motion, -it will bring us to the same conclusion. Thus the common -optical experiments show, and even the observation how sight is -assisted by glasses shows, that we see with our eyes in the same -sense as we see with glasses. Nor is there any reason to believe, -that we see with them in any other sense; any other, I mean, -which would lead us to think the eye itself a percipient. The like -is to be said of hearing; and our feeling distant solid matter by -means of something in our hand, seems an instance of the like -kind, as to the subject we are considering. All these are instances -of foreign matter, or such as is no part of our body, -being instrumental in preparing objects for, and conveying them -to, the perceiving power, in a manner similar to the manner in -which our organs of sense prepare and convey them. Both are -in a like way instruments of our receiving such ideas from external -objects, as the Author of nature appointed those external -objects to be the occasions of exciting in us. Glasses are evident -instances of this; namely of matter which is no part of our -body, preparing objects for and conveying them towards the perceiving -power, in like manner as our bodily organs do. And if -we see with our eyes only in the same manner as we do with -glasses, the like may justly be concluded, from analogy, of all -our other senses. It is not intended, by any thing here said, to -affirm, that the whole apparatus of vision, or of perception by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[86]</a></span> -any other sense, can be traced through all its steps, quite up to -the <em>living power</em> of seeing, or perceiving: but that so far as it -can be traced by experimental observations, so far it appears, that -our organs of sense prepare and convey objects, in order to their -being perceived, in like manner as foreign matter does, without -affording any shadow of appearance, that they themselves perceive. -And that we have no reason to think our organs of sense -percipients, is confirmed by instances of persons losing some of -them, the living beings themselves, their former occupiers, remaining -unimpaired. It is confirmed also by the experience of -dreams; by which we find we are at present possessed of a latent, -and what would be otherwise an unimagined unknown power of -perceiving sensible objects, in as strong and lively a manner without -our external organs of sense, as with them.</p> - -<p>So also with regard to our power of moving, or directing -motion by will and choice; upon the destruction of a limb, this -active power evidently remains, unlessened; so that the living -being, who has suffered this loss, would be capable of moving as -before, if it had another limb to move with. It can walk by the -help of an artificial leg. It can make use of a pole or a lever, -to reach towards itself and to move things, beyond the length -and the power of its arm; and this it does in the same manner -as it reaches and moves, with its natural arm, things nearer and -of less weight. Nor is there so much as any appearance of our -limbs being endued with a power of moving or directing themselves; -though they are adapted, like the several parts of a -machine, to be the instruments of motion to each other; and -some parts of the same limb, to be instruments of motion to the -other parts.</p> - -<p>Thus a man determines that he will look at an object through -a microscope; or being lame, that he will walk to such a -place with a staff, a week hence. His eyes and his feet no -more determine in these cases, than the microscope and the staff. -Nor is there any ground to think they any more put the determination -in practice; or that his eyes are the seers, or his feet the -movers, in any other sense than as the microscope and the staff -are. Upon the whole, then, our organs of sense, and our limbs, -are certainly <em>instruments</em>,<a name="FNanchor_36" id="FNanchor_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> which the living persons ourselves<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[87]</a></span> -make use of to perceive and move with: there is not any probability, -that they are any more; nor consequently, that we have -any other kind of relation to them, than what we have to any -other foreign matter formed into instruments of perception and -motion, suppose into a microscope or a staff; (I say any other kind -of relation, for I am not speaking of the degree of it) nor consequently -is there any probability, that the alienation or dissolution -of these instruments, is the destruction of the perceiving -and moving agent.</p> - -<p>And thus our finding that the dissolution of matter, in which -living beings were most nearly interested, is not their dissolution; -and that the destruction of several of the organs and instruments -of perception and of motion belonging to them, is not their -destruction; shows demonstratively, that there is no ground to -think that the dissolution of any other matter, or destruction of -any other organs and instruments, will be the dissolution or -destruction of living agents, from the like kind of relation. And -we have no reason to think we stand in any other kind of relation -to any thing which we find dissolved by death.</p> - -<p>But it is said, these observations are equally applicable to -brutes:<a name="FNanchor_37" id="FNanchor_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> and it is thought an insuperable difficulty, that they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[88]</a></span> -should be immortal, and by consequence capable of everlasting -happiness. Now this manner of expression is both invidious and -weak: but the thing intended by it, is really no difficulty at all, -either in the way of natural or moral consideration. For 1, Suppose -the invidious thing, designed in such a manner of expression, -were really implied, as it is not in the least, in the natural -immortality of brutes, namely, that they must arrive at great -attainments, and become rational and moral agents; even this -would be no difficulty, since we know not what latent powers and -capacities they may be endued with. There was once, prior to -experience, as great presumption against human creatures, as -there is against the brute creatures, arriving at that degree of -understanding, which we have in mature age. For we can trace -up our own existence to the same original with theirs. We find -it to be a general law of nature, that creatures endued with -<em>capacities</em> of virtue and religion should be placed in a condition -of being, in which they are altogether without <em>the use</em> of them, -for a considerable length of their duration; as in infancy and -childhood. And great part of the human species, go out of the -present world, before they come to the exercise of these capacities -in <em>any</em> degree.</p> - -<p>2. The natural immortality of brutes does not in the least -imply, that they are endued with any latent capacities of a -rational or <em>moral</em> nature. The economy of the universe might require, -that there should be living creatures without any capacities -of this kind. And all difficulties as to the manner how they are -to be disposed of, are so apparently and wholly founded in our -ignorance, that it is wonderful they should be insisted upon by -any, but such as are weak enough to think they are acquainted -with the whole system of things. There is then absolutely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[89]</a></span> -nothing at all in this objection, which is so rhetorically urged, -against the greatest part of the natural proofs or presumptions of -the immortality of human minds; I say the greatest part, for it -is less applicable to the following observation, which is more -peculiar to mankind.</p> - -<p>III. As it is evident our <em>present</em> powers and capacities of -reason, memory, and affection, do not depend upon our gross -body in the manner in which perception by our organs of sense -does; so they do not appear to depend upon it at all, in any such -manner as to give ground to think, that the dissolution of this -body will be the destruction of these our present powers of reflection, -as it will of our powers of sensation; or to give ground -to conclude, even that it will be so much as a suspension of the -former.</p> - -<p>Human creatures exist at present in two states of life and perception, -greatly different from each other; each of which has its -own peculiar laws, and its own peculiar enjoyments and sufferings. -When any of our senses are affected, or appetites gratified -with the objects of them, we may be said to exist or live in a -state of sensation. When none of our senses are affected or -appetites gratified, and yet we perceive, and reason, and act, we -may be said to exist or live in a state of reflection. Now it is -by no means certain, that any thing which is dissolved by death, -is in any way necessary to the living being, in this its state of -reflection, <em>after</em> ideas are gained. For, though, from our present -constitution and condition of being, our external organs of sense -are necessary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers, as -carriages, and levers, and scaffolds are in architecture:<a name="FNanchor_38" id="FNanchor_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> yet when -these ideas are brought in, we are capable of reflecting in the -most intense degree, and of enjoying the greatest pleasure, and -feeling the greatest pain, by means of that reflection, without<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[90]</a></span> -any assistance from our senses; and without any at all, which we -know of, from that body which will be dissolved by death. It -does not appear then, that the relation of this gross body to the -reflecting being is, in any degree, necessary to thinking; to intellectual -enjoyments or sufferings: nor, consequently, that the -dissolution or alienation of the former by death, will be the -destruction of those present powers, which render us capable of -this state of reflection.</p> - -<p>Further, there are instances of mortal diseases, which do not -at all affect our present intellectual powers; and this affords a -presumption, that those diseases will not destroy these present -powers. Indeed, from the observations made above,<a name="FNanchor_39" id="FNanchor_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> it appears, -that there is no presumption, from their mutually affecting each -other, that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of the -living agent. By the same reasoning, it must appear too, that -there is no presumption, from their mutually affecting each other, -that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of our present -reflecting powers: indeed instances of their not affecting each -other, afford a presumption of the contrary. Instances of mortal -diseases not impairing our present reflecting powers, evidently -turn our thoughts even from imagining such diseases to be the -destruction of them. Several things indeed greatly affect all our -living powers, and at length suspend the exercise of them; as -for instance drowsiness, increasing till it ends in sound sleep: -and hence we might have imagined it would destroy them, till -we found by experience the weakness of this way of judging. -But in the diseases now mentioned, there is not so much as this -shadow of probability, to lead us to any such conclusion, as to -the reflecting powers which we have at present. For in those -diseases, persons the moment before death appear to be in the -highest vigor of life. They discover apprehension, memory, -reason, all entire; the utmost force of affection; a sense of character, -of shame and honor; and the highest mental enjoyments -and sufferings, even to the last gasp. These surely prove even -greater vigor of life than bodily strength does. Now what pretence -is there for thinking, that a progressive disease when -arrived to such a degree, I mean that degree which is mortal, -will destroy those powers, which were not impaired, which were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[91]</a></span> -not affected by it, during its whole progress quite up to that -degree? And if death by diseases of this kind, is not the -destruction of our present reflecting powers, it will scarce be -thought that death by any other means is.</p> - -<p>It is obvious that this general observation may be carried -further. There appears to be so little connection between our -bodily powers of sensation, and our present powers of reflection, -that there is no reason to conclude, that death, which destroys -the former, does so much as <em>suspend the exercise</em> of the latter, or -interrupt our <em>continuing</em> to exist in the like state of reflection -which we do now.<a name="FNanchor_40" id="FNanchor_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> For suspension of reason, memory, and the -affections which they excite, is no part of the idea of death, nor -implied in our notion of it. Our daily experiencing these powers -to be exercised, without any assistance, that we know of, from -those bodies which will be dissolved by death; and our finding -often, that the exercise of them is so lively to the last; afford a -sensible apprehension, that death may not perhaps be so much as -a discontinuance of the exercise of these powers, nor of the -enjoyments and sufferings which it implies.<a name="FNanchor_41" id="FNanchor_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> So that our posthumous -life, whatever there may be in it additional to our present, -may yet not be beginning entirely anew; but going on. Death -may, in some sort and in some respects, answer to our birth; -which is not a suspension of the faculties which we had before -it, or a <em>total</em> change of the state of life in which we existed when -in the womb; but a continuation of both, with such and such -great alterations.</p> - -<p>Nay, for aught we know of ourselves, of our present life and -of death, death may immediately, in the natural course of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[92]</a></span> -things, put us into a higher and more enlarged state of life, as -our birth does;<a name="FNanchor_42" id="FNanchor_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> a state in which our capacities; and sphere of -perception and of action, may be much greater than at present. -For as our relation to our external organs of sense, renders us -capable of existing in our present state of sensation; so it may -be the only natural hinderance to our existing, immediately, and -of course; in a <em>higher</em> state of reflection. The truth is, reason -does not at all show us, in what state death naturally leaves us. -But were we sure, that it would suspend all our perceptive and -active powers; yet the suspension of a power and the destruction -of it, are effects so totally different in kind, as we experience -from sleep and a swoon, that we cannot in any wise argue from -one to the other; or conclude even to the lowest degree of probability, -that the same kind of force which is sufficient to suspend -our faculties, though it be increased ever so much, will be -sufficient to destroy them.<a name="FNanchor_43" id="FNanchor_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a></p> - -<p>These observations together may be sufficient to show, how -little presumption there is, that death is the destruction of -human creatures. However, there is the shadow of an analogy, -which may lead us to imagine it,—viz.: the supposed likeness -which is observed between the decay of vegetables, and of living -creatures. This likeness is indeed sufficient to afford the poets -very apt allusions to the flowers of the field, in their pictures of -the frailty of our present life. But in reason, the analogy is so -far from holding, that there appears no ground for the comparison, -as to the present question; because one of the two subjects -compared is wholly void of that, which is the principal and -chief thing in the other; the power of perception and of action; -which is the only thing we are inquiring about the continuance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[93]</a></span> -of. So that the destruction of a vegetable, is an event not -similar or analogous to the destruction of a living agent.</p> - -<p>If, as was above intimated, leaving off the delusive custom of -substituting imagination in the room of experience, we would -confine ourselves to what we do know and understand; if we -would argue only from that, and from that form our expectations, -it would appear at first sight, that as no probability of living -beings ever ceasing to be so, can be concluded from the reason -of the thing, so none can be collected from the analogy of -nature; because we cannot trace any living beings beyond death. -But as we are conscious that we are endued with capacities of -perception and of action, and are living persons; what we are to -go upon is, that we shall continue so, till we foresee some accident -or event, which will endanger those capacities, or be likely -to destroy us: which death does in no wise appear to be.</p> - -<p>Thus, when we go out of this world, we may pass into new -scenes, and a new state of life and action, just as naturally as we -came into the present. And this new state may naturally be a -social one.<a name="FNanchor_44" id="FNanchor_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> And the advantages of it, advantages, of every kind, -may naturally be bestowed, according to some fixed general laws -of wisdom, upon every one in proportion to the degrees of his -virtue. And though the advantages of that future natural state -should not be bestowed, as these of the present in some measure -are, by the will of the society; but entirely by his more immediate -action, upon whom the whole frame of nature depends: yet -this distribution may be just as natural, as their being distributed -here by the instrumentality of men. Indeed, though one should -allow any confused undetermined sense, which people please to -put upon the word <em>natural</em>, it would be a shortness of thought -scarce credible, to imagine, that no system or course of things -can be so, but only what we see at present:<a name="FNanchor_45" id="FNanchor_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> especially whilst the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[94]</a></span> -probability of a future life, or the natural immortality of the -soul, is admitted upon the evidence of reason; because this is -really both admitting and denying at once, a state of being different -from the present to be natural. But the only distinct meaning -of that word is, <em>stated</em>, <em>fixed</em>, or <em>settled</em>; since what is natural -as much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render -it so, <i>i.e.</i> to effect it continually, or at stated times, as what is -supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once.</p> - -<p>Hence it must follow, that persons’ notion of what is natural, -will be enlarged in proportion to their greater knowledge of the -works of God, and the dispensations of his providence. Nor is -there any absurdity in supposing, that there may be beings in the -universe, whose capacities, and knowledge, and views, may be so -extensive, as that the whole Christian dispensation may to them -appear natural, <i>i.e.</i> analogous or conformable to God’s dealings -with other parts of his creation; as natural as the visible known -course of things appears to us. For there seems scarce any other -possible sense to be put upon the word, but that only in which it -is here used; similar, stated, or uniform.</p> - -<p>This credibility of a future life, which has been here insisted -upon, how little soever it may satisfy our curiosity, seems to -answer all the purposes of religion, in like manner as a demonstrative -proof would. Indeed a proof, even a demonstrative one, of -a future life, would not be a proof of religion. For, that we are -to live hereafter, is just as reconcilable with the scheme of -atheism, and as well to be accounted for by it, as that we are -now alive is: and therefore nothing can be more absurd than to -argue from that scheme, that there can be no future state. -But as religion implies a future state, any presumption against -such a state, is a presumption against religion. The foregoing -observations remove all presumptions of that sort, and prove, to -a very considerable degree of probability, one fundamental doctrine -of religion; which, if believed, would greatly open and -dispose the mind seriously to attend to the general evidence! -of the whole.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[95]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h3 id="I_CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II.<br /> -<span class="smaller">THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.</span></h3> - -<p>That which makes the question concerning a future life to be -of so great importance to us, is our capacity of happiness and -misery. And that which makes the consideration of it to be of -so great importance to us, is the supposition of our happiness and -misery hereafter depending upon our actions here. Indeed, -without this, curiosity could not but sometimes bring a subject, -in which we may be so highly interested, to our thoughts; especially -upon the mortality of others, or the near prospect of our -own. But reasonable men would not take any further thought -about hereafter, than what should happen thus occasionally to -rise in their minds, if it were certain that our future interest no -way depended upon our present behavior; whereas, on the contrary, -if there be ground, either from analogy or any thing else, -to think it does, then there is reason also for the most active -thought and solicitude, to secure that interest; to behave so as -that we may escape that misery, and obtain that happiness, in -another life, which we not only suppose ourselves capable of, but -which we apprehend also is put in our own power. And whether -there be ground for this last apprehension, certainly would deserve -to be most seriously considered, were there no other proof of a -future life and interest, than that presumptive one, which the -foregoing observations amount to.</p> - -<p>In the present state, all which we enjoy, and a great part of -what we suffer, <em>is put in our own power</em>. Pleasure and pain are -the consequences of our actions; and we are endued by the -Author of our nature with capacities of foreseeing these consequences. -We find by experience that he does not so much as -preserve our lives, exclusive of our own care and attention, to -provide ourselves with, and to make use of, that sustenance, by -which he has appointed our lives shall be preserved; and without -which, he has appointed, they shall not be preserved. In -general we foresee, that the external things, which are the objects -of our various passions, can neither be obtained nor enjoyed, -without exerting ourselves in such and such manners: but by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[96]</a></span> -thus exerting ourselves, we obtain and enjoy these objects, in -which our natural good consists; or by this means God gives us -the possession and enjoyment of them. I know not, that we have -any one kind or degree of enjoyment, but by the means of our -own actions. By prudence and care, we may, for the most part, -pass our days in tolerable ease and quiet: on the contrary, we -may, by rashness, ungoverned passion, wilfulness, or even by -negligence, make ourselves as miserable as ever we please. And -many do please to make themselves extremely miserable, <i>i.e.</i> to -do what they know beforehand will render them so. They follow -those ways, the fruit of which they know, by instruction, example, -and experience, will be disgrace, and poverty, and sickness, -and untimely death. This every one observes to be the general -course of things; though it is to be allowed, we cannot find by -experience, that <em>all</em> our sufferings are owing to our own follies.</p> - -<p>Why the Author of nature does not give his creatures promiscuously -such and such perceptions, without regard to their -behavior; why he does not make them happy without the instrumentality -of their own actions, and prevent their bringing any -sufferings upon themselves, is another matter.<a name="FNanchor_46" id="FNanchor_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> Perhaps there -may be some impossibilities in the nature of things, which we are -unacquainted with.<a name="FNanchor_47" id="FNanchor_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> Or less happiness, it may be, would upon -the whole be produced by such a method of conduct, than is by -the present. Or perhaps divine goodness, with which, if I mistake -not, we make very free in our speculations, may not be a -bare single disposition to produce happiness; but a disposition to -make the good, the faithful, the honest, happy. Perhaps an -infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with seeing his creatures -behave suitably to the nature which he has given them; to the -relations which he has placed them in to each other; and to that -which they stand in to himself: that relation to himself, which, -during their existence, is even necessary,<a name="FNanchor_48" id="FNanchor_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> and which is the most<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[97]</a></span> -important one of all: perhaps, I say, an infinitely perfect mind -may be pleased with this moral piety of moral agents, in and for -itself; as well as upon account of its being essentially conducive -to the happiness of his creation. Or the whole end, for which -God made, and thus governs the world, may be utterly beyond -the reach of our faculties: there may be somewhat in it as impossible -for us to have any conception of, as for a blind man to -have a conception of colors. However this be, it is certain -matter of universal experience, that the general method of divine -administration is, forewarning us, or giving us capacities to foresee, -with more or less clearness, that if we act so and so, we shall -have such enjoyments, if so and so, such sufferings; and giving -us those enjoyments, and making us feel those sufferings, in -consequence of our actions.</p> - -<p>“But all this is to be ascribed to the general course of nature,” -True. This is the very thing which I am observing. It is to be -ascribed to the general course of nature: <i>i.e.</i> not surely to the -words or ideas, <em>course of nature</em>; but to Him who appointed it, -and put things into it; or to a course of operation, from its -uniformity or constancy, called natural;<a name="FNanchor_49" id="FNanchor_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> and which necessarily -implies an operating agent. For when men find themselves -necessitated to confess an Author of nature, or that God is the -natural governor of the world, they must not deny this again, -because his government is uniform. They must not deny that -he does things at all, because he does them constantly,<a name="FNanchor_50" id="FNanchor_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> because -the effects of his acting are permanent, whether his acting be so -or not; though there is no reason to think it is not. In short, -every man, in every thing he does, naturally acts upon the forethought -and apprehension of avoiding evil or obtaining good: -and if the natural course of things be the appointment of God, -and our natural faculties of knowledge and experience are given<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[98]</a></span> -us by him, then the good and bad consequences which follow our -actions, are his appointment, and our foresight of those consequences, -is a warning given us by him, how we are to act.</p> - -<p>“Is the pleasure then, naturally accompanying every particular -gratification of passion, intended to put us upon gratifying ourselves -in every such particular instance, and as a reward to us for -so doing?” No, certainly. Nor is it to be said, that our eyes -were naturally intended to give us the sight of each particular -object, to which they do or can extend; objects which are destructive -of them, or which, for any other reason, it may become -us to turn our eyes from. Yet there is no doubt, but that our -eyes were intended for us to see with.<a name="FNanchor_51" id="FNanchor_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> So neither is there any -doubt, but that the foreseen pleasures and pains belonging to the -passions, were intended, in general, to induce mankind to act in -such and such manners.</p> - -<p>From this general observation, obvious to every one, (that God -has given us to understand, he has appointed satisfaction and -delight to be the consequence of our acting in one manner, and -pain and uneasiness of our acting in another, and of our not acting -at all; and that we find these consequences, which we were -beforehand informed of, uniformly to follow;) we may learn, that -we are at present actually under his government in the strictest -and most proper sense; in such a sense, as that he rewards and -punishes us for our actions.</p> - -<p>An Author of nature being supposed, it is not so much a -deduction of reason, as a matter of experience, that we are -thus under his government; under his government, in the same -sense, as we are under the government of civil magistrates. -Because the annexing of pleasure to some actions, and pain to -others, in our power to do or forbear, and giving notice of this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[99]</a></span> -appointment beforehand to those whom it concerns, is the proper -formal notion of government.</p> - -<p>Whether the pleasure or pain which thus follows upon our -behavior, be owing to the Author of nature’s acting upon us -every moment which we feel it; or to his having at once contrived -and executed his own part in the plan of the world; -makes no alteration as to the matter before us. For if civil -magistrates could make the sanctions of their laws take place, -without interposing at all, after they had passed them; without -a trial, and the formalities of an execution: if they were -able to make their laws <em>execute themselves</em>, or every offender to -execute them upon himself; we should be just in the same sense -under their government then, as we are now; but in a much -higher degree, and more perfect manner.</p> - -<p>Vain is the ridicule, with which one foresees some persons -will divert themselves, upon finding lesser pains considered as -instances of divine punishment. There is no possibility of -answering or evading the general thing here intended, without -denying all final causes. For final causes being admitted, the -pleasures and pains now mentioned must be admitted too as instances -of them. And if they are; if God annexes delight to -some actions, and uneasiness to others, with an apparent design -to induce us to act so and so; then he not only dispenses happiness -and misery, but also rewards and punishes actions. If, for -example, the pain which we feel, upon doing what tends to the -destruction of our bodies, suppose upon too near approaches to -fire, or upon wounding ourselves, be appointed by the Author of -nature to prevent our doing what thus tends to our destruction; -this is altogether as much an instance of his punishing our -actions, and consequently of our being under his government,<a name="FNanchor_52" id="FNanchor_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> as -declaring by a voice from heaven, that if we acted so, he would -inflict such pain upon us; and inflicting it, whether it be greater -or less.</p> - -<p>Thus we find, that the true notion or conception of the Author<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[100]</a></span> -of nature, is that of a master or governor, prior to the consideration -of his moral attributes. The fact of our case, which we -find by experience, is, that he actually exercises dominion or -government over us at present, by rewarding and punishing us -for our actions, in as strict and proper a sense of these words, -and even in the same sense, as children, servants, subjects, are -rewarded and punished by those who govern them.</p> - -<p>Thus the whole analogy of nature, the whole present course -of things, most fully shows, that there is nothing incredible in -the general doctrine of religion, that God will reward and punish -men for their actions hereafter: nothing incredible, I mean, -arising out of the notion of rewarding and punishing. For the -whole course of nature is a present instance of his exercising that -government over us, which implies in it rewarding and punishing.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>As divine <em>punishment</em> is what men chiefly object against, and -are most unwilling to allow; it may be proper to mention some -circumstances in the natural course of punishments at present, -which are analogous to what religion teaches us concerning a -future state of punishment; indeed so analogous, that as they -add a further credibility to it, so they cannot but raise a most -serious apprehension of it in those who will attend to them.</p> - -<p>It has been now observed, that such and such miseries naturally -follow such and such actions of imprudence and wilfulness, -as well as actions more commonly and more distinctly considered -as vicious; and that these consequences, when they may be foreseen, -are properly natural punishments annexed to such actions. -The general thing here insisted upon, is, not that we see a great -deal of misery in the world, but a great deal which men bring -upon themselves by their own behavior, which they might have -foreseen and avoided. Now the circumstances of these natural -punishments, particularly deserving our attention, are such as -these. Oftentimes they follow, or are inflicted in consequence -of, actions which procure many present advantages, and are accompanied -with much present pleasure; for instance, sickness -and untimely death are the consequence of intemperance, though -accompanied with the highest mirth, and jollity. These punishments<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[101]</a></span> -are often much greater, than the advantages or pleasures -obtained by the actions, of which they are the punishments or -consequences. Though we may imagine a constitution of nature, -in which these natural punishments, which are in fact to follow, -would follow, immediately upon such actions being done, or very -soon after; we find on the contrary in our world, that they are -often delayed a great while, sometimes even till long after the -actions occasioning them are forgot; so that the constitution of -nature is such, that delay of punishment is no sort nor degree -of presumption of final impunity. After such delay, these -natural punishments or miseries often come, not by degrees, but -suddenly, with violence, and at once; however, the chief misery -often does. As certainty of such distant misery following such -actions, is never afforded persons, so perhaps during the actions, -they have seldom a distinct, full expectation of its following:<a name="FNanchor_53" id="FNanchor_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> -and many times the case is only thus, that they see in general, or -may see, the credibility, that intemperance, suppose, will bring -after it diseases; civil crimes, civil punishments; when yet the -real probability often is, that they shall escape; but things notwithstanding -take their destined course, and the misery inevitably -follows at its appointed time, in very many of these cases. -Thus also though youth may be alleged as an excuse for rashness -and folly, as being naturally thoughtless, and not clearly foreseeing -all the consequences of being untractable and profligate, this -does not hinder, but that these consequences follow; and are -grievously felt, throughout the whole course of mature life. -Habits contracted even in that age, are often utter ruin: and -men’s success in the world, not only in the common sense of -worldly success, but their real happiness and misery, depends, in -a great degree, and in various ways, upon the manner in which -they pass their youth; which consequences they for the most -part neglect to consider, and perhaps seldom can properly be said -to believe, beforehand. In numberless cases, the natural course -of things affords us opportunities for procuring advantages to -ourselves at certain times, which we cannot procure when we -will; nor ever recall the opportunities, if we have neglected -them. Indeed the general course of nature is an example of -this. If, during the opportunity of youth, persons are indocile<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[102]</a></span> -and self-willed, they inevitably suffer in their future life, for -want of those acquirements, which they neglected the natural -season of attaining. If the husbandman lets seedtime pass -without sowing, the whole year is lost to him beyond recovery. -Though after men have been guilty of folly and extravagance <em>up -to a certain degree</em>, it is often in their power, to retrieve their -affairs, to recover their health and character, at least in good -measure; yet real reformation is in many cases, of no avail at all -towards preventing the miseries, poverty, sickness, infamy, naturally -annexed to folly and extravagance <em>exceeding that degree</em>. -There is a certain bound to imprudence and misbehavior, which -being transgressed, there remains no place for repentance in the -natural course of things. It is further very much to be remarked, -that neglects from inconsiderateness, want of attention,<a name="FNanchor_54" id="FNanchor_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> -not looking about us to see what we have to do, are often attended -with consequences altogether as dreadful, as any active -misbehavior, from the most extravagant passion. And lastly, -civil government being natural, the punishments of it are so too: -and some of these punishments are capital; as the effects of a -dissolute course of pleasure are often mortal. So that many -natural punishments are final<a name="FNanchor_55" id="FNanchor_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> to him who incurs them, if considered -only in his temporal capacity; and seem inflicted by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[103]</a></span> -natural appointment, either to remove the offender out of the -way of being further mischievous, or as an example, though frequently -a disregarded one, to those who are left behind.</p> - -<p>These things are not what we call accidental, or to be met with -only now and then; but they are things of every day’s experience. -They proceed from general laws, very general ones, by -which God governs the world in the natural course of his -providence.<a name="FNanchor_56" id="FNanchor_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a></p> - -<p>And they are so analogous, to what religion teaches us concerning -the future punishment of the wicked, so much of a piece -with it, that both would naturally be expressed in the very same -words, and manner of description. In the book of <cite>Proverbs</cite>,<a name="FNanchor_57" id="FNanchor_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> for -instance, wisdom is introduced, as frequenting the most public -places of resort, and as rejected when she offers herself as the -natural appointed guide of human life. <em>How long</em>, speaking to -those who are passing through it, <cite>how long, ye simple ones, will -ye love folly, and the scorners delight in their scorning, and fools -hate knowledge? Turn ye at my reproof. Behold, I will pour -out my spirit upon you, I will make known my words unto you.</cite> -But upon being neglected, <cite>Because I have called, and ye refused, -I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded; but ye -have set at nought all my counsel, and would none of my reproof: -I also will laugh at your calamity, I will mock when -your fear cometh; when your fear cometh as desolation, and -your destruction cometh as a whirlwind; when distress and -anguish come upon you. Then shall they call upon me, but I -will not answer; they shall seek me early, but they shall not find -me.</cite> This passage, every one sees, is poetical, and some parts of -it are highly figurative; but the meaning is obvious. And the -thing intended is expressed more literally in the following words; -<em>For that they hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear of -the Lord——therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own -way, and be filled with their own devices. For the security of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[104]</a></span> -the simple shall slay them, and the prosperity of fools shall destroy -them.</em> The whole passage is so equally applicable to what -we experience in the present world, concerning the consequences -of men’s actions, and to what religion teaches us is to be expected -in another, that it may be questioned which of the two was principally -intended.</p> - -<p>Indeed when one has been recollecting the proper proofs of a -future state of rewards and punishments, nothing methinks can -give one so sensible an apprehension of the latter, or representation -of it to the mind, as observing, that after the many disregarded -checks, admonitions, and warnings, which people meet -with in the ways of vice and folly and extravagance, warnings -from their very nature, from the examples of others, from the -lesser inconveniences which they bring upon themselves, from -the instructions of wise and virtuous men: after these have been -long despised, scorned, ridiculed: after the chief bad consequences, -temporal consequences, of their follies, have been delayed -for a great while, at length they break in irresistibly, like -an armed force: repentance is too late to relieve, and can serve -only to aggravate their distress, the case is become desperate: -and poverty and sickness, remorse and anguish, infamy and -death, the effects of their own doings, overwhelm them beyond -possibility of remedy or escape. This is an account of what is; -in fact, the general constitution of nature.</p> - -<p>It is not in any sort meant, that, according to what appears at -present of the natural course of things, men are always uniformly -punished in proportion to their misbehavior. But that there are -very many instances of misbehavior punished in the several ways -now mentioned, and very dreadful instances too; sufficient to -show what the laws of the universe may admit, and, if thoroughly -considered, sufficient fully to answer all objections against the -credibility of a future state of punishments, from any imaginations, -that the frailty of our nature and external temptations, -almost annihilate the guilt of human vices: as well as objections -of another sort; from necessity, from suppositions, that the will -of an infinite Being cannot be contradicted, or that he must be -incapable of offence and provocation.<a name="FNanchor_58" id="FNanchor_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a></p> - -<p>Reflections of this kind are not without their terrors to serious<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[105]</a></span> -persons, even the most free from enthusiasm, and of the greatest -strength of mind; but it is fit that things be stated and considered -as they really are. There is, in the present age, a certain -fearlessness with regard to what may be hereafter under the -government of God, which nothing but a universally acknowledged -demonstration on the side of atheism can justify; and -which makes it quite necessary, that men be reminded, and if -possible made to feel, that there is no sort of ground for being -thus presumptuous, even upon the most sceptical principles. For, -may it not be said of any person upon his being born into the -world, he may behave so as to be of no service to it, but by -being made an example of the woeful effects of vice and folly? -That he may, as any one may, if he will, incur an infamous -execution from the hands of civil justice, or in some other -course of extravagance shorten his days; or bring upon himself -infamy and diseases worse than death? So that it had been -better for him, even with regard to the present world, that he -had never been born. And is there any pretence of reason for -people to think themselves secure, and talk as if they had certain -proof, that, let them act as licentiously as they will, there can be -nothing analogous to this, with regard to a future and more general -interest, under the providence and government of the same -God?</p> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<h3 id="I_CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III.<a name="FNanchor_59" id="FNanchor_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a><br /> -<span class="smaller">THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.</span></h3> - -<p>As the manifold appearances of design, and of final causes, in -the constitution of the world, prove it to be the work of an intelligent -mind, so the particular final causes of pleasure and pain -distributed amongst his creatures, prove that they are under his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[106]</a></span> -government; what may be called his natural government of -creatures endued with sense and reason. This implies somewhat -more than seems usually attended to, when we speak of God’s -natural government of the world. It implies government of -the very same kind with that which a master exercises over -his servants, or a civil magistrate over his subjects. These latter -instances of final causes, as really prove an intelligent <em>Governor</em> -of the world, in the sense now mentioned, and before<a name="FNanchor_60" id="FNanchor_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> distinctly -treated of; as any other instances of final causes prove an intelligent -<em>Maker</em> of it.</p> - -<p>But this alone does not appear at first sight to determine any -thing certainly, concerning the moral character of the Author of -nature, considered in this relation of governor; does not ascertain -his government to be moral, or prove that he is the righteous -Judge of the world. Moral government consists, not in barely -rewarding and punishing men for their actions, which the most -tyrannical may do, but in rewarding the righteous, and punishing -the wicked: in rendering to men according to their actions, -considered as good or evil. And the <em>perfection</em> of moral government -consists in doing this, with regard to all intelligent creatures, -in an exact proportion to their personal merits or demerits.</p> - -<p>Some men seem to think the only character of the Author of -nature to be that of simple absolute benevolence. This, considered -as a principle of action and infinite in degree, is a disposition -to produce the greatest possible happiness, without regard -to persons’ behavior, otherwise than as such regard would produce -higher degrees of it. And supposing this to be the only -character of God, veracity and justice in him would be nothing -but benevolence conducted by wisdom. Surely this ought not to -be asserted, unless it can be proved; for we should speak with -cautious reverence upon such a subject. Whether it can be -proved or no, is not the thing here to be inquired into; but -whether in the constitution and conduct of the world, a righteous -government be not discernibly planned out: which necessarily -implies a righteous governor. There may possibly be in the -creation beings, to whom the Author of nature manifests himself -under this most amiable of all characters, this of infinite absolute -benevolence; for it is the most amiable, supposing it not, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[107]</a></span> -perhaps it is not, incompatible with justice; but he manifests -himself to us under the character of a righteous governor. He -may, consistently with this, be simply and absolutely benevolent, -in the sense now explained: but he is (for he has given us a -proof in the constitution and conduct of the world that he is) a -governor over servants, as he rewards and punishes us for our -actions. And in the constitution and conduct of it, he may also -have given, besides the reason of the thing, and the natural presages -of conscience, clear and distinct intimations, that his government -is righteous or moral: clear to such as think the nature of -it deserving their attention, and yet not to every careless person, -who casts a transient reflection upon the subject.<a name="FNanchor_61" id="FNanchor_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a></p> - -<p>It is particularly to be observed, that the divine government, -which we experience ourselves under in the present state, taken -alone, is allowed not to be the perfection of moral government. -Yet this by no means hinders, but that there may be <em>somewhat</em>, -be it more or less, truly moral in it. A righteous government -may plainly appear to be carried on to some degree, enough to -give us the apprehension that it shall be completed, or carried on -to that degree of perfection which religion teaches us it shall; -but which cannot appear, till much more of the divine administration -be seen, than can be seen in the present life. The design -of this chapter is to inquire how far this is the case: how far, -over and above the moral nature<a name="FNanchor_62" id="FNanchor_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> which God has given us, and -our natural notion of him as righteous governor of those his -creatures, to whom he has given this nature;<a name="FNanchor_63" id="FNanchor_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> I say how far besides -this, the principles and beginnings of a moral government -over the world may be discerned, notwithstanding and amidst all -the confusion and disorder of it.</p> - -<p>One might mention here, what has been often urged with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[108]</a></span> -great force, that, in general, less uneasiness and more satisfaction, -are the natural consequences<a name="FNanchor_64" id="FNanchor_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> of a virtuous than of a vicious -course of life, in the present state, as an instance of a moral -government established in nature; an instance of it collected -from experience and present matter of fact.<a name="FNanchor_65" id="FNanchor_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> But it must be -owned a thing of difficulty to weigh and balance pleasures and uneasinesses, -each amongst themselves, and also against each other, -so as to make an estimate with any exactness, of the overplus of -happiness on the side of virtue. And it is not impossible, that, -amidst the infinite disorders of the world, there may be exceptions -to the happiness of virtue; even with regard to persons, -whose course of life from their youth up has been blameless: and -more with regard to those who have gone on for some time in the -ways of vice, and have afterwards reformed. For suppose an instance -of the latter case; a person with his passions inflamed, -his natural faculty of self-government impaired by habits of indulgence, -and with all his vices about him, like so many harpies, -craving their accustomed gratification; who can say how long it -might be, before such a person would find more satisfaction in -the reasonableness and present good consequences of virtue, than -difficulties and self-denial in the restraints of it? Experience -also shows, that men can to a great degree, get over their sense -of shame, so as that by professing themselves to be without principle,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[109]</a></span> -and avowing even direct villany, they can support themselves -against the infamy of it. But as the ill actions of any -one will probably be more talked of, and oftener thrown in his -way, upon his reformation; so the infamy of them will be much -more felt, after the natural sense of virtue and of honor is recovered. -Uneasiness of this kind ought indeed to be put to the -account of former vices: yet it will be said they are in part the -consequences of reformation. Still I am far from allowing it -doubtful, whether virtue, upon the whole, be happier than vice -in the present world. If it were, yet the beginnings of a -righteous administration may, beyond all question, be found in -nature, if we will attentively inquire after them.<a name="FNanchor_66" id="FNanchor_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a></p> - -<p>I. In whatever manner the notion of God’s moral government -over the world might be treated, if it did not appear, whether he -were in a proper sense our governor at all; yet when it is certain -matter of experience, that he does manifest himself to us under -the character of a governor in the sense explained,<a name="FNanchor_67" id="FNanchor_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a> it must -deserve to be considered, whether there be not reason to apprehend, -that he may be a righteous or moral governor. Since it -appears to be fact, that God does govern mankind by the method -of rewards and punishments, according to some settled rules of -distribution; it is surely a question to be asked, what presumption -is there against his <em>finally</em> rewarding and punishing them -according to this particular rule, namely, as they act reasonably, -or unreasonably, virtuously or viciously? Rendering men happy -or miserable by this rule, certainly falls in, much more falls in, -with our natural apprehensions and sense of things, than doing -so by any other rule whatever; since rewarding and punishing -actions by any other rule, would appear much harder to be accounted -for, by minds formed as he has formed ours. Be the -evidence of religion then more or less clear, the expectation -which it raises in us, that the righteous shall, upon the whole, -be happy, and the wicked miserable, cannot possibly be considered<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[110]</a></span> -as absurd or chimerical; because it is no more than an -expectation, that a method of government already begun, shall -be carried on, the method of rewarding and punishing actions; -and shall be carried on by a particular rule, which unavoidably -appears to us at first sight more natural than any other, the rule -which we call distributive justice. Nor,</p> - -<p>II. Ought it to be entirely passed over, that tranquillity, satisfaction, -and external advantages, being the natural consequences -of prudent management of ourselves, and our affairs; and rashness, -profligate negligence, and wilful folly, bringing after them -many inconveniences and sufferings; these afford instances of a -right constitution of nature, as the correction of children, for -their own sakes, and by way of example, when they run into -danger or hurt themselves, is a part of right education.<a name="FNanchor_68" id="FNanchor_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> Thus, -that God governs the world by general fixed laws, that he has -endued us with capacities of reflecting upon this constitution of -things, and foreseeing the good and bad consequences of behavior, -plainly implies <em>some sort</em> of moral government; since from such -a constitution of things it cannot but follow, that prudence and -imprudence, which are of the nature of virtue and vice,<a name="FNanchor_69" id="FNanchor_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> must -be, as they are, respectively rewarded and punished.</p> - -<p>III. From the natural course of things, vicious actions are, to -a great degree, actually punished as mischievous to society; and -besides punishment actually inflicted upon this account, there is -also the fear and apprehension of it in those persons, whose -crimes have rendered them obnoxious to it, in case of a discovery; -this state of fear being often itself a very considerable punishment. -The natural fear and apprehension of it too, which restrains -from such crimes, is a declaration of nature against them. -It is necessary to the very being of society, that vices, destructive -of it, should be punished <em>as being so</em>; the vices of falsehood, -injustice, cruelty: which punishment therefore is as natural as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[111]</a></span> -society, and so is an instance of a kind of moral government, -naturally established, and actually taking place. And, since the -certain natural course of things is the conduct of providence or -the government of God, though carried on by the instrumentality -of men, the observation here made amounts to this, that mankind -find themselves placed by him in such circumstances, as that they -are unavoidably accountable for their behavior; and are often -punished, and sometimes rewarded, under his government, in -the view of their being mischievous, or eminently beneficial to -society.</p> - -<p>If it be objected that good actions and such as are beneficial -to society, are often punished, as in the case of persecution and -in other cases; and that ill and mischievous actions are often -rewarded:<a name="FNanchor_70" id="FNanchor_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a> it may be answered distinctly, first, that this is in no -sort necessary, and consequently not natural in the sense in -which it is necessary, and therefore natural, that ill or mischievous -actions should be punished: and in the next place, that -good actions are never punished, considered as beneficial to -society, nor ill actions rewarded, under the view of their being -hurtful to it. So that it stands good, without any thing on the -side of vice to be set over against it, that the Author of nature -has as truly directed, that vicious actions, considered as mischievous -to society, should be punished, and put mankind under -a <em>necessity</em> of thus punishing them, as he has directed and necessitated -us to preserve our lives by food.</p> - -<p>IV. In the natural course of things, virtue <em>as such</em> is actually -rewarded, and vice <em>as such</em> punished: which seems to afford an -instance or example, not only of government, but of moral -government, begun and established; moral in the strictest sense, -though not in that perfection of degree, which religion teaches -us to expect. In order to see this more clearly, we must distinguish -between <em>actions</em> themselves, and that <em>quality</em> ascribed to -them, which we call virtuous or vicious.<a name="FNanchor_71" id="FNanchor_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a> The gratification itself<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[112]</a></span> -of every natural passion, must be attended with delight; and -acquisitions of fortune, however made, are acquisitions of the -means or materials of enjoyment. An action then, by which -any natural passion is gratified, or fortune acquired, procures -delight or advantage; abstracted from all consideration of the -morality of such action. Consequently, the pleasure or advantage -in this case, is gained by the action itself, not by the -morality, the virtuousness or viciousness of it; though it be perhaps -virtuous or vicious.</p> - -<p>To say that such an action or course of behavior, procured -such pleasure or advantage, or brought on such inconvenience -and pain, is quite a different thing from saying, that such good -or bad effect was owing to the virtue or vice of such action or -behavior. In one case, an action abstracted from all moral consideration, -produced its effect: in the other case, for it will appear -that there are such cases, the morality of the action under -a moral consideration, <i>i.e.</i> the virtuousness or viciousness of it, -produced the effect. Now I say virtue as such, naturally procures -considerable advantages to the virtuous, and vice as such, -naturally occasions great inconvenience and even misery to the -vicious, in very many instances. The immediate effects of virtue -and vice upon the mind and temper, are to be mentioned as instances -of it. Vice as such is naturally attended with some sort -of uneasiness, and not uncommonly, with great disturbance and -apprehension. That inward feeling, which, respecting lesser -matters and in familiar speech we call being vexed with oneself, -and in matters of importance and in more serious language, remorse; -is an uneasiness naturally arising from an action of a -man’s own, reflected upon by himself as wrong, unreasonable, -faulty, <i>i.e.</i> vicious in greater or less degrees: and this manifestly -is a different feeling from that uneasiness, which arises from a -sense of mere loss or harm. What is more common, than to -hear a man lamenting an accident or event, and adding—but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[113]</a></span> -however he has the satisfaction that he cannot blame himself for -it; or on the contrary, that he has the uneasiness of being sensible -it was his own doing? Thus also the disturbance and fear, -which often follow upon a man’s having done an injury, arise -from a sense of his being blameworthy; otherwise there would, -in many cases, be no ground of disturbance, nor any reason to -fear resentment or shame. On the other hand, inward security -and peace, and a mind open to the several gratifications of life, -are the natural attendants of innocence and virtue. To which -must be added the complacency, satisfaction, and even joy of -heart, which accompany the exercise, the real exercise of gratitude, -friendship, benevolence.</p> - -<p>And here, I think, ought to be mentioned the fears of future -punishment, and peaceful hopes of a better life, in those who -fully believe, or have any serious apprehension of religion: because -these hopes and fears are present uneasiness and satisfaction -to the mind, and cannot be got rid of by great part of the -world, even by men who have thought most thoroughly upon the -subject of religion. And no one can say, how considerable this -uneasiness or satisfaction may be, or what upon the whole it may -amount to.<a name="FNanchor_72" id="FNanchor_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a></p> - -<p>In the next place comes in the consideration, that all honest -and good men are disposed to befriend honest good men as such, -and to discountenance the vicious as such, and do so in some -degree; indeed in a considerable degree: from which favor and -discouragement cannot but arise considerable advantage and inconvenience. -Though the generality of the world have little -regard to the morality of their own actions, and may be supposed -to have less to that of others, when they themselves are not concerned; -yet let any one be known to be a man of virtue, somehow -or other he will be favored and good offices will be done him, -from regard to his character, without remote views, occasionally, -and in some low degree, I think, by the generality of the world,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[114]</a></span> -as it happens to come in their way. Public honors too and advantages -are the natural consequences, and sometimes at least, -the consequences in fact, of virtuous actions; of eminent justice, -fidelity, charity, love to our country, considered in the view of -being virtuous. And sometimes even death itself, often infamy -and external inconveniences, are the public consequences of vice -as vice. For instance, the sense which mankind have of tyranny, -injustice, oppression, additional to the mere feeling or fear of -misery, has doubtless been instrumental in bringing about revolutions, -which make a figure even in the history of the world. -For it is plain, that men resent injuries as implying faultiness, -and retaliate, not merely under the notion of having received -harm, but of having received wrong; and they have this resentment -in behalf of others, as well as of themselves. So likewise -even the generality are, in some degree, grateful and disposed to -return good offices, not merely because such a one has been the -occasion of good to them, but under the view, that such good -offices implied kind intention and good desert in the doer.</p> - -<p>To all this may be added two or three particular things, which -many persons will think frivolous; but to me nothing appears so, -which at all comes in towards determining a question of such importance, -as, whether there be or be not, a moral institution of -government, in the strictest sense moral, <em>visibly</em> established and -begun in nature. The particular things are these: That in -domestic government, which is doubtless natural, children and -others also are very generally punished for falsehood, injustice, -and ill-behavior, as such, and rewarded for the contrary: which -are instances of veracity and justice and right behavior, as such, -naturally enforced by rewards and punishments, more or less considerable. -That, though civil government be supposed to take -cognizance of actions in no other view than as prejudicial to -society, without respect to the immorality of them, yet as such -actions are immoral, so the sense which men have of the immorality -of them, very greatly contributes, in different ways, to -bring offenders to justice. And that entire absence of all crime -and guilt in the moral sense, when plainly appearing, will almost -of course procure, and circumstances of aggravated guilt prevent, -a remission of the penalties annexed to civil crimes, in many -cases, though by no means in all.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[115]</a></span></p> - -<p>Upon the whole then, besides the good and bad effects of -virtue and vice upon men’s own minds, the course of the world -does, in some measure, turn upon the approbation and disapprobation -of them as such, in others. The sense of well and ill -doing, the presages of conscience, the love of good characters -and dislike of bad ones, honor, shame, resentment, gratitude, all -these, considered in themselves, and in their effects, do afford -manifest real instances, of virtue as such naturally favored, and -of vice as such discountenanced, more or less, in the daily course -of human life; in every age, in every relation, in every general -circumstance of it. That God has given us a moral nature,<a name="FNanchor_73" id="FNanchor_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a> may -most justly be urged as a proof of our being under his moral -government: but that he has placed us in a condition, which -gives this nature, as one may speak, scope to operate, and in -which it does unavoidably operate; <i>i.e.</i> influence mankind to act, -so as thus to favor and reward virtue, and discountenance and -punish vice, this is not the same, but a further additional proof -of his moral government; for it is an instance of it. The first -is a proof, that he will finally favor and support virtue effectually: -the second is an example of his favoring and supporting it at -present, in some degree.</p> - -<p>If a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it arises, that -virtue as such is often rewarded, and vice as such is punished, -and this rule never inverted, it will be found to proceed, in part, -immediately from the moral nature itself, which God has given -us;<a name="FNanchor_74" id="FNanchor_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a> and also in part, from his having given us, together with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[116]</a></span> -this nature, so great a power over each other’s happiness and -misery. For, <i>first</i>, it is certain, that peace and delight, in some -degree and upon some occasions, is the necessary and present -effect of virtuous practice; an effect arising immediately from -that constitution of our nature. We are <em>so made</em>, that well-doing -as such, gives us satisfaction, at least in some instances; ill-doing -as such, in none. And, <i>secondly</i>, from our moral nature, joined -with God’s having put our happiness and misery in many respects -in each other’s power, it cannot but be, that vice as such, some -kinds and instances of it at least, will be infamous, and men will -be disposed to punish it as in itself detestable; and the villain -will by no means be able always to avoid feeling that infamy, any -more than he will be able to escape this further punishment, -which mankind will be disposed to inflict upon him, under the -notion of his deserving it. But there can be nothing on the side -of vice, to answer this; because there is nothing in the human -mind contradictory, as the logicians speak, to virtue. For virtue -consists in a regard to what is right and reasonable, as being so; -in a regard to veracity, justice, charity, in themselves: and there -is surely no such thing, as a like natural regard to falsehood, -injustice, cruelty. If it be thought, that there are instances of -an approbation of vice, as such, in itself, and for its own sake, -(though it does not appear to me, that there is any such thing at -all;) it is evidently monstrous: as much so, as the most acknowledged -perversion of any passion whatever. Such instances of -perversion then being left out, as merely imaginary, or at least -unnatural; it must follow, from the frame of our nature, and -from our condition, in the respects now described, that vice cannot -at all be, and virtue cannot but be, favored as such by others, -upon some occasions, and happy in itself, in some degree. For -what is here insisted upon, is not the <em>degree</em> in which virtue and -vice are thus distinguished, but only the thing itself, that they -are so in some degree; though the whole good and bad effect of -virtue and vice as such, is not inconsiderable in degree. But -that they must be thus distinguished in some degree, is in a -manner necessary: it is matter of fact of daily experience, even -in the greatest confusion of human affairs.</p> - -<p>It is not pretended but that, in the natural course of things, -happiness and misery appear to be distributed by other rules,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[117]</a></span> -than only the personal merit and demerit of characters. They -may sometimes be distributed by way of mere discipline. There -may be the wisest and best reasons, why the world should be -governed by general laws, from whence such promiscuous distribution -perhaps must follow; and also why our happiness and -misery should be put in each other’s power, in the degree which -they are. And these things, as, in general, they contribute to -the rewarding virtue and punishing vice, as such, so they often -contribute also, not to the inversion of this, which is impossible, -but to the rendering persons prosperous, though wicked; afflicted, -though righteous; and, which is worse, to the <em>rewarding some -actions</em>, though vicious, and <em>punishing other actions</em>, though -virtuous.<a name="FNanchor_75" id="FNanchor_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> But all this cannot drown the voice of nature in the -conduct of Providence, plainly declaring itself for virtue, by way -of distinction from vice, and preference to it. For our being so -constituted as that virtue and vice are thus naturally favored and -discountenanced, rewarded and punished, respectively as such, is -an intuitive proof of the intent of nature, that it should be so; -otherwise the constitution of our mind, from which it thus immediately -and directly proceeds, would be absurd. But it cannot -be said, because virtuous actions are sometimes punished, and -vicious actions rewarded, that nature intended it. For, though -this great disorder is brought about, as all actions are, by means -of some natural passion; yet <em>this may be</em>, as it undoubtedly is, -brought about by the perversion of such passion, implanted in us -for other, and those very good purposes. And indeed these other -and good purposes, even of every passion, may be clearly seen.</p> - -<p>We have then a declaration, in some degree of present effect, -from Him who is supreme in nature, which side he is of, or -what part he takes; a declaration for virtue, and against vice. -So far therefore as a man is true to virtue, to veracity and justice, -to equity and charity, and the right of the case, in whatever he -is concerned; so far he is on the side of the divine administration, -and co-operates with it: and from hence, to such a man,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[118]</a></span> -arises naturally a secret satisfaction and sense of security, and -implicit hope of somewhat further.</p> - -<p>V. This hope is confirmed by the necessary tendencies of -virtue, which, though not of present effect, yet are at present -discernible in nature; and so afford an instance of somewhat -moral in the essential constitution of it. There is, in the nature -of things, a tendency in virtue and vice to produce the good and -bad effects now mentioned, in a greater degree than they do in -fact produce them. For instance; good and bad men would be -much more rewarded and punished as such, were it not, that -justice is often artificially eluded,<a name="FNanchor_76" id="FNanchor_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a> that characters are not known, -and many, who would thus favor virtue and discourage vice, are -hindered from doing so, by accidental causes. These tendencies -of virtue and vice are obvious with regard to <em>individuals</em>. But -it may require more particularly to be considered, that power in -a <em>society</em>, by being under the direction of virtue, naturally increases, -and has a necessary tendency to prevail over opposite -power, not under the direction of it; in like manner, as power, -by being under the direction of reason, increases, and has a -tendency to prevail over brute force. There are several brute<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[119]</a></span> -creatures of equal, and several of superior strength, to that of -men; and possibly the sum of the whole strength of brutes may -be greater than that of mankind; but reason gives us the advantage -and superiority over them; and thus man is the acknowledged -governing animal upon the earth. Nor is this superiority -considered by any as accidental; but as what reason has a tendency, -in the nature of the thing, to obtain. And yet perhaps -difficulties may be raised about the meaning, as well as the truth, -of the assertion, that virtue has the like tendency.</p> - -<p>To obviate these difficulties, let us see more distinctly, how the -case stands with regard to reason; which is so readily acknowledged -to have this advantageous tendency. Suppose then two or -three men, of the best and most improved understanding, in a desolate -open plain, attacked by ten times the number of beasts of -prey: would their reason secure them the victory in this unequal -combat? Power then, though joined with reason, and under its -direction, cannot be expected to prevail over opposite power, -though merely brutal, unless the one bears some proportion to -the other. Again: put the imaginary case, that rational and -irrational creatures were of like external shape and manner: it -is certain, before there were opportunities for the first to distinguish -each other, to separate from their adversaries, and to form -a union among themselves, they might be upon a level, or in -several respects upon great disadvantage; though united they -might be vastly superior: since union is of such efficacy, that -ten men united, might be able to accomplish, what ten thousand -of the same natural strength and understanding wholly ununited, -could not. In this case, brute force might more than maintain -its ground against reason, for want of union among the rational -creatures. Or suppose a number of men to land upon an island -inhabited only by wild beasts; men who, by the regulations of -civil government, the inventions of art, and the experience of -some years, could they be preserved so long, would be really sufficient -to subdue the wild beasts, and to preserve themselves in -security from them: yet a conjuncture of accidents might give -such advantage to the irrational animals as they might at once -overpower, and even extirpate, the rational ones. Length of -time then, proper scope, and opportunities for reason to exert<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[120]</a></span> -itself, may be absolutely necessary to its prevailing over brute -force.</p> - -<p>Further: there are many instances of brutes succeeding in -attempts, which they could not have undertaken, had not their -irrational nature rendered them incapable of foreseeing the danger -of such attempt, or the fury of passion hindered their attending -to it: and there are instances of reason and real prudence preventing -men’s undertaking what, it has appeared afterwards, -they might have succeeded in by a lucky rashness. In certain -conjunctures, ignorance and folly, weakness and discord, may have -their advantages. So that rational animals have not <em>necessarily</em> -the superiority over irrational ones; but, how improbable soever -it may be, it is evidently possible, that in some globes the latter -may be superior. And were the former wholly at variance and disunited, -by false self-interest and envy, by treachery and injustice, -and consequent rage and malice against each other, whilst the -latter were firmly united among themselves by instinct, this might -greatly contribute to the introducing such an inverted order of -things. For every one would consider it as inverted: since -reason has, in the nature of it, a tendency to prevail over brute -force; notwithstanding the possibility it may not prevail, and the -necessity, which there is, of many concurring circumstances to -render it prevalent.</p> - -<p>Now I say, virtue in a society has a like tendency to procure -superiority and additional power: whether this power be considered -as the means of security from opposite power, or of obtaining -other advantages. It has this tendency, by rendering -public good, an object and end, to every member of the society; -by putting every one upon consideration and diligence, recollection -and self-government, both in order to see what is the most -effectual method, and also in order to perform their proper part, -for obtaining and preserving it; by uniting a society within itself, -and so increasing its strength; and, which is particularly to be -mentioned, uniting it by means of veracity and justice. For as -these last are principal bonds of union, so benevolence or public -spirit, undirected, unrestrained by them, is, nobody knows what.</p> - -<p>And suppose the invisible world, and the invisible dispensations -of Providence, to be, in any sort, analogous to what appears: -or that both together make up one uniform scheme, the two parts<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[121]</a></span> -of which, the part which we see, and that which is beyond our -observation, are analogous to each other: then, there must be a -like natural tendency in the derived power, throughout the universe, -under the direction of virtue, to prevail in general over -that which is not under its direction; as there is in reason, -derived reason in the universe, to prevail over brute force.</p> - -<p>But then, in order to the prevalence of virtue, or that it may -actually produce, what it has a tendency to produce; the <em>like -concurrences are necessary</em>, as are, to the prevalence of reason. -There must be some proportion, between the natural power or -force which is, and that which is not, under the direction of -virtue: there must be sufficient length of time; for the complete -success of virtue, as of reason, cannot, from the nature of the -thing, be otherwise than gradual: there must be, as one may -speak, a fair field of trial, a stage large and extensive enough, -proper occasions and opportunities, for the virtuous to join together, -to exert themselves against lawless force, and to reap the -fruit of their united labors. Now indeed it is to be hoped, that -the disproportion between the good and bad, even here on earth, -is not so great, but that the former have natural power sufficient -to their prevailing to a considerable degree, if circumstances -would permit this power to be united. For, much less, very -much less, power under the direction of virtue, would prevail -over much greater not under the direction of it.<a name="FNanchor_77" id="FNanchor_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a> However, -good men over the face of the earth cannot unite; because, -(among other reasons,) they cannot be sufficiently ascertained of -each other’s characters. And the known course of human things, -the scene we are now passing through, particularly the shortness -of life, denies to virtue its full scope in several other respects.</p> - -<p>The natural tendency which we have been considering, though -real, is <em>hindered</em> from being carried into effect in the present -state: but these hinderances may be removed in a future one. -Virtue, to borrow the Christian allusion, is militant here; and -various untoward accidents contribute to its being often overborne:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[122]</a></span> -but it may combat with greater advantage hereafter, and -prevail completely, and enjoy its consequent rewards, in some -future states. Neglected as it is, perhaps unknown, perhaps -despised and oppressed here; there maybe scenes in eternity, -lasting enough, and in every other way adapted, to afford it a -sufficient sphere of action; and a sufficient sphere for the natural -consequences of it to follow in fact. If the soul be naturally -immortal, and this state be a progress towards a future one, as -childhood is towards mature age, good men may naturally unite, -not only among themselves, but also with other orders of virtuous -creatures, in that future state. For virtue, from the very -nature of it, is a principle and bond of union, in some degree, -among all who are endued with it, and known to each other; so -as that by it, a good man cannot but recommend himself to the -favor and protection of all virtuous beings, throughout the whole -universe, who can be acquainted with his character, and can -any way interpose in his behalf in any part of his duration.</p> - -<p>One might add, that suppose all this advantageous tendency of -virtue to become effect, among one or more orders of creatures, -in any distant scenes and periods, and to be seen by any orders -of vicious creatures, throughout the universal kingdom of God; -this happy effect of virtue would have a tendency, by way of example, -and possibly in other ways, to amend those of them who -are capable of amendment, and of being recovered to a just sense -of virtue. If our notions of the plan of Providence were -enlarged in any sort proportionable to what late discoveries have -enlarged our views with respect to the material world, representations -of this kind would not appear absurd or extravagant. They -are not to be taken as intended for a literal delineation of what -is in fact the particular scheme of the universe, which cannot be -known without revelation: for suppositions are not to be looked -on as true, because not incredible: but they are mentioned to -show, that our finding virtue to be hindered from procuring to -itself such superiority and advantages, is no objection against its -having, in the essential nature of the thing, a tendency to procure -them. And the suppositions now mentioned do plainly show -this: for they show, that these hinderances are so far from being -necessary, that we ourselves can easily conceive, how they may -be removed in future states, and full scope be granted to virtue.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[123]</a></span> -And all these advantageous tendencies of it are to be considered -as declarations of God in its favor. This however is taking a -pretty large compass: though it is certain, that, as the material -world appears to be, in a manner, boundless and immense, there -must be <em>some</em> scheme of Providence vast in proportion to it.</p> - -<p>But let us return to the earth our habitation; and we shall see -this happy tendency of virtue, by imagining an instance not so -vast and remote: by supposing a kingdom or society of men upon -it, perfectly virtuous, for a succession of many ages; to which, -if you please, may be given a situation advantageous for universal -monarchy. In such a state, there would be no such thing as -faction: but men of the greatest capacity would of course, all -along, have the chief direction of affairs willingly yielded to -them; and they would share it among themselves without envy. -Each of these would have the part assigned him, to which his -genius was peculiarly adapted; and others, who had not any distinguished -genius, would be safe, and think themselves very -happy, by being under the protection and guidance of those who -had. Public determinations would really be the result of the -united wisdom of the community: and they would faithfully be -executed, by the united strength of it. Some would contribute -in a higher way, but all in some way, to the public prosperity: -and in it, each would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. And -as injustice, whether by fraud or force, would be unknown among -themselves, so they would be sufficiently secured from it in their -neighbors. For cunning and false self-interest, confederacies in -injustice, ever slight, and accompanied with faction and intestine -treachery; these on one hand would be found mere childish folly -and weakness, when set in opposition against wisdom, public -spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity on the other: allowing both -a sufficient length of years to try their force. Add the general -influence, which such a kingdom would have over the face of the -earth, by way of example particularly, and the reverence which -would be paid it. It would plainly be superior to all others, and -the world must gradually come under its empire; not by means -of lawless violence; but partly by what must be allowed to be just -conquest; and partly by other kingdoms submitting themselves -voluntarily to it, throughout a course of ages, and claiming its -protection, one after another, in successive exigencies. The head<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[124]</a></span> -of it would be a universal monarch, in another sense than any -mortal has yet been; and the Eastern style would be literally -applicable to him, <em>that all people, nations, and languages should -serve him</em>. And though indeed our knowledge of human nature, -and the whole history of mankind, show the impossibility, without -some miraculous interposition, that a number of men, here -on earth, should unite in one society or government, in the fear -of God and universal practice of virtue; and that such a government -should continue so united for a succession of ages: yet admitting -or supposing this, the effect would be as now drawn out. -Thus for instance, the wonderful power and prosperity promised -to the Jewish nation in the Scripture, would be, in a great measure, -the consequence of what is predicted of them; that the -<em>people should be all righteous, and inherit the land forever</em>;<a name="FNanchor_78" id="FNanchor_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a> -were we to understand the latter phrase of a long continuance only, -sufficient to give things time to work. The predictions of this -kind, for there are many of them, cannot come to pass, in the -present known course of nature; but suppose them come to pass, -and then, the dominion and preëminence promised must naturally -follow, to a very considerable degree.</p> - -<p>Consider now the general system of religion; that the government -of the world is uniform, and one, and moral; that virtue -and right shall finally have the advantage, and prevail over fraud -and lawless force, over the deceits as well as the violence of -wickedness, under the conduct of one supreme governor: and -from the observations above made, it will appear that God has, -by our reason, given us to see a peculiar connection in the -several parts of this scheme, and a tendency towards the completion -of it, arising out of the very nature of virtue: which -tendency is to be considered as something moral in the essential -constitution of things. If any one should think all this to be of -little importance, I desire him to consider, what he would think, -if vice had, essentially and in its nature, these advantageous -tendencies; or if virtue had essentially the contrary ones.</p> - -<p>It may be objected, that notwithstanding all these natural -effects and natural tendencies of virtue, yet things may be now -going on throughout the universe, and may go on hereafter, in -the same mixed way as here at present upon earth: virtue sometimes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[125]</a></span> -prosperous, sometimes depressed; vice sometimes punished, -sometimes successful.</p> - -<p>The answer to which is, that it is not the purpose of this -chapter, nor of this treatise, properly to prove God’s perfect -moral government over the world, or the truth of religion; but -to observe what there is in the constitution and course of nature, -to confirm the proper proof of it, supposed to be known: and -that the weight of the foregoing observations to this purpose may -be thus distinctly proved. Pleasure and pain are, to a certain -degree, say to a very high degree, distributed among us without -any apparent regard to the merit or demerit of characters. And -were there nothing else concerning this matter discernible in the -constitution and course of nature, there would be no ground -from the constitution and course of nature, to hope or to fear -that men would be rewarded or punished hereafter according to -their deserts: which, however, it is to be remarked, implies, that -even then there would be no ground from appearances to think, -that vice upon the whole would have the advantage, rather than -that virtue would. Thus the proof of a future state of retribution -would rest upon the usual known arguments for it; which are -I think plainly unanswerable; and would be so, though there -were no additional confirmation of them from the things above -insisted on. But these things are a very strong confirmation -of them. For,</p> - -<p><i>First</i>, They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent -to virtue and vice. They amount to a declaration, from him, -determinate and not to be evaded, in favor of one, and against -the other; such a declaration, as there is nothing to be set over -against or answer, on the part of vice. So that were a man, -laying aside the proper proof of religion, to determine from the -course of nature only, whether it were most probable, that the -righteous or the wicked would have the advantage in a future -life; there can be no doubt, but that he would determine the -probability to be, that the former would. The course of nature -then, in the view of it now given, furnishes us with a real practical -proof of the obligations of religion.</p> - -<p><i>Secondly</i>, When, conformably to what religion teaches us, God -shall reward and punish virtue and vice as such, so as that every -one shall, upon the whole, have his deserts; this distributive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[126]</a></span> -justice will not be a thing different in <em>kind</em>, but only in <em>degree</em>, -from what we experience in his present government. It will be -that in <em>effect</em>, towards which we now see a <em>tendency</em>. It will be -no more than the <em>completion</em> of that moral government, the <em>principles -and beginning</em> of which have been shown, beyond all -dispute, discernible in the present constitution and course of -nature.</p> - -<p><i>Thirdly</i>, As under the <em>natural</em> government of God, our experience -of those kinds and degrees of happiness and misery, which -we do experience at present, gives just ground to hope for, and -to fear, higher degrees and other kinds of both in a future state, -supposing a future state admitted: so under his <em>moral</em> government -our experience, that virtue and vice are, in the manners -above mentioned, actually rewarded and punished at present, in -a certain degree, gives just ground to hope and to fear, that they -<em>may be</em> rewarded and punished in a higher degree hereafter. It -is acknowledged indeed that this alone is not sufficient ground to -think, that they <em>actually will be</em> rewarded and punished in a -higher degree, rather than in a lower: but then,</p> - -<p><i>Lastly</i>, There is sufficient ground to think so, from the good -and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For these tendencies are -essential, and founded in the nature of things: whereas the -hinderances to their becoming effect are, in numberless cases, not -necessary, but artificial only. Now it may be much more strongly -argued, that these tendencies, as well as the actual rewards and -punishments, of virtue and vice, which arise directly out of the -nature of things, will remain hereafter, than that the accidental -hinderances of them will. And if these hinderances do not -remain; those rewards and punishments cannot but be carried -on much farther towards the perfection of moral government: -<i>i.e.</i> the tendencies of virtue and vice will become effect; but -when, or where, or in what particular way, cannot be known at -all, but by revelation.</p> - -<p>Upon the whole: there is a kind of moral government implied -in God’s natural government:<a name="FNanchor_79" id="FNanchor_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> virtue and vice are naturally rewarded -and punished as beneficial and mischievous to society;<a name="FNanchor_80" id="FNanchor_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a> -and rewarded and punished directly as virtue and vice.<a name="FNanchor_81" id="FNanchor_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> The -notion of a moral scheme of government is not fictitious, but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[127]</a></span> -natural; for it is suggested to our thoughts by the constitution -and course of nature: and the execution of this scheme is -actually begun, in the instances here mentioned. And these -things are to be considered as a declaration of the Author of -nature, for virtue, and against vice: they give a credibility to -the supposition of their being rewarded and punished hereafter; -and also ground to hope and to fear, that they may be rewarded -and punished in higher degrees than they are here. All this is -confirmed, and the argument for religion, from the constitution -and course of nature, is carried on farther, by observing, that -there are natural tendencies, and, in innumerable cases, only artificial -hinderances, to this moral scheme’s being carried on much -farther towards perfection, than it is at present.<a name="FNanchor_82" id="FNanchor_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a></p> - -<p>The notion then of a moral scheme of government, much more -perfect than what is seen, is not a fictitious, but a natural notion; -for it is suggested to our thoughts, by the essential tendencies of -virtue and vice. These tendencies are to be considered as intimations, -as implicit promises and threatenings, from the Author -of nature, of much greater rewards and punishments to follow -virtue and vice, than do at present. Indeed, every <em>natural</em> tendency, -which is to continue, but which is hindered from becoming -effect by only <em>accidental</em> causes, affords a presumption, that -such tendency will, some time or other, become effect: a presumption -proportionable in degree to the length of the duration, -through which such tendency will continue. From these things -together, arises a real presumption, that the moral scheme of -government established in nature, shall be carried on much -farther towards perfection hereafter; and, I think, a presumption -that it will be absolutely completed. From these things, joined -with the moral nature which God has given us, considered as -given us by him, arises a practical proof<a name="FNanchor_83" id="FNanchor_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a> that it <em>will</em> be completed: -a proof from fact; and therefore a distinct one from -that which is deduced from the eternal and unalterable relations, -the fitness and unfitness of actions.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[128]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h3 id="I_CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV.<br /> -<span class="smaller">PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, DIFFICULTIES, AND -DANGER.<a name="FNanchor_84" id="FNanchor_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a></span></h3> - -<p>The general doctrine of religion, that our present life is a -state of probation for a future one, comprehends under it several -particular things, distinct from each other. The first and most -common meaning of it seems to be, that our future interest is -now depending, and depending upon ourselves; that we have -scope and opportunities here, for that good and bad behavior, -which God will reward and punish hereafter; together with -temptations to one, as well as inducements of reason to the other. -And this, in a great measure, is the same as saying, that we are -under the moral government of God, and to give an account of -our actions to him. For the notion of a future account and -general righteous judgment, implies some sort of temptations to -what is wrong: otherwise there would be no moral possibility of -doing wrong, nor ground for judgment, or discrimination. But -there is this difference, that the word <em>probation</em> is more distinctly -and particularly expressive of allurements to wrong, or -difficulties in adhering uniformly to what is right, and of the -danger of miscarrying by such temptations, than the words <em>moral -government</em>. A state of probation then, as thus particularly implying -in it trial, difficulties, and danger, may require to be -considered distinctly by itself.<a name="FNanchor_85" id="FNanchor_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a></p> - -<p>As the moral government of God, which religion teaches us,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[129]</a></span> -implies that we are in a state of trial with regard to a future -world, so also his natural government over us implies that we -are in a state of trial, in the like sense, with regard to the present -world. Natural government by rewards and punishments, -as much implies natural trial, as moral government does moral -trial. The natural government of God here meant,<a name="FNanchor_86" id="FNanchor_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> consists in -his annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, which -are in our power to do or forbear, and giving us notice of such -appointment, beforehand. This necessarily implies, that he has -made our happiness and misery, or our interest, to depend in part -upon ourselves. So far as men have temptations to any course of -action, which will probably occasion them greater temporal inconvenience -and uneasiness, than satisfaction, so far their temporal -interest is in danger from themselves; or they are in a state of -trial with respect to it. Now people often blame others, and even -themselves, for their misconduct in their temporal concerns. And -we find many are greatly wanting to themselves, and miss that -natural happiness, which they might have obtained in the present -life: perhaps every one does in some degree. But many run -themselves into great inconvenience, and into extreme distress -and misery, not through incapacity of knowing better, and doing -better, for themselves, which would be nothing to the present -purpose, but through their own fault. These things necessarily -imply temptation, and danger of miscarrying, in a greater or less -degree, with respect to our worldly interest or happiness. Every -one too, without having religion in his thoughts, speaks of the -hazards which young people run, upon their setting out in the -world: hazards from other causes, than merely their ignorance, -and unavoidable accidents. And some courses of vice, at least, -being contrary to men’s worldly interest or good; temptations to -these must at the same time be temptations to forego our present -and our future interest.</p> - -<p>Thus in our natural or temporal capacity, we are in a state of -trial, <i>i.e.</i> of difficulty and danger, analogous, or like to our moral -and religious trial. This will more distinctly appear to any one, -who thinks it worth while, more distinctly, to consider, what it -is which constitutes our trial in both capacities, and to observe, -how mankind behave under it.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[130]</a></span></p> - -<p>That which constitutes this trial, in both these capacities, must -be something either in our external circumstances, or in our -nature. For, on the one hand, persons may be betrayed into -wrong behavior upon surprise, or overcome upon any other very -singular and extraordinary external occasions, who would, otherwise, -have preserved their character of prudence and of virtue: -in which cases, every one, in speaking of the wrong behavior of -these persons, would impute it to such particular external circumstances. -On the other hand, men who have contracted habits of -vice and folly of any kind, or have some particular passions in -excess, will seek opportunities, and, as it were, go out of their -way, to gratify themselves in these respects, at the expense of -their wisdom and their virtue; led to it, as every one would say, -not by external temptations, but by such habits and passions. -And the account of this last case is, that particular passions are -no more coincident with prudence, or that reasonable self-love, -the end of which is our worldly interest, than they are with the -principle of virtue and religion; but often draw contrary ways -to one, as well as to the other: and so such particular passions -are as much temptations, to act imprudently with regard to our -worldly interest, as to act viciously.<a name="FNanchor_87" id="FNanchor_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a> When we say, men are -misled by external circumstances of temptation; it cannot but be -understood, that there is somewhat within themselves, to render -those circumstances temptations, or to render them susceptible of -impressions from them. So when we say, they are misled by -passions; it is always supposed, that there are occasions, circumstances, -and objects, exciting these passions, and affording means -for gratifying them. Therefore, temptations from within, and -from without, coincide, and mutually imply each other. The -several external objects of the appetites, passions, and affections, -being present to the senses, or offering themselves to the mind, -and so exciting emotions suitable to their nature; not only in -cases where they can be gratified consistently with innocence and -prudence, but also in cases where they cannot, and yet can be -gratified imprudently and viciously: this as really puts them in -danger of voluntarily foregoing their present interest or good, as -their future; and as really renders self-denial necessary to secure<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[131]</a></span> -one, as the other: <i>i.e.</i> we are in a like state of trial with respect -to both, by the very same passions, excited by the very same -means.</p> - -<p>Thus mankind having a temporal interest depending upon -themselves, and a prudent course of behavior being necessary to -secure it, passions inordinately excited, whether by means of -example, or by any other external circumstance, towards such -objects, at such times, or in such degrees, as that they cannot be -gratified consistently with worldly prudence, are temptations; -dangerous, and too often successful temptations, to forego a -greater temporal good for a less; <i>i.e.</i> to forego what is, upon the -whole, our temporal interest, for the sake of a present gratification. -This is a description of our state of trial in our temporal -capacity. Substitute now the word <em>future</em> for <em>temporal</em>, and -<em>virtue</em> for <em>prudence</em>; and it will be just as proper a description -of our state of trial in our religious capacity; so analogous are -they to each other.<a name="FNanchor_88" id="FNanchor_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a></p> - -<p>If, from consideration of this our like state of trial in both capacities, -we go on to observe farther, how mankind behave under it; -we shall find there are some, who have so little sense of it, that -they scarce look beyond the passing day: they are so taken up with -present gratifications, as to have, in a manner, no feeling of consequences, -no regard to their future ease or fortune in this life: -any more than to their happiness in another. Some appear to be -blinded and deceived by inordinate passion, in their worldly concerns, -as much as in religion. Others are not deceived, but as it -were forcibly carried away by the like passions, against their -better judgment, and feeble resolutions too of acting better.<a name="FNanchor_89" id="FNanchor_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a> And -there are men, and truly not a few, who shamelessly avow, not -their interest, but their mere will and pleasure, to be their law -of life: and who, in open defiance of every thing reasonable,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[132]</a></span> -will go on in a course of vicious extravagance, foreseeing, with -no remorse and little fear, that it will be their temporal ruin; -and some of them, under the apprehension of the consequences -of wickedness in another state. To speak in the most moderate -way, human creatures are not only continually liable to go wrong -voluntarily, but we see likewise that they often actually do so, -with respect to their temporal interests, as well as with respect -to religion.</p> - -<p>Thus our difficulties and dangers, or our trials in our temporal -and our religious capacity, as they proceed from the same causes, -and have the same effect upon men’s behavior, are evidently analogous, -and of the same kind.</p> - -<p>It may be added, that the difficulties and dangers of miscarrying -in our religious state of trial, are greatly increased, and one -is ready to think, are in a manner wholly <em>made</em>, by the ill -behavior of others; by a wrong education, wrong in a moral -sense, sometimes positively vicious; by general bad example; by -the dishonest artifices which are got into business of all kinds; -and, in very many parts of the world, by religion’s being corrupted -into superstitions, which indulge men in their vices. In -like manner, the difficulties of conducting ourselves prudently -in respect to our present interest, and our danger of being led -aside from pursuing it, are greatly increased, by a foolish education; -and, after we come to mature age, by the extravagance and -carelessness of others, with whom we have intercourse: and by -mistaken notions, very generally prevalent, and taken up from -common opinion, concerning temporal happiness, and wherein it -consists.</p> - -<p>Persons, by their own <em>negligence</em> and <em>folly</em> in temporal affairs, no -less than by a course of vice, bring themselves into new difficulties, -and, by habits of indulgence, become less qualified to go through -them: and one irregularity after another, embarrasses things to -such a degree, that they know not whereabout they are; and -often makes the path of conduct so intricate and perplexed, that -it is difficult to trace it out; difficult even to determine what is -the prudent or the moral part. Thus, for instance, wrong behavior -in one stage of life, youth; wrong, I mean considering -ourselves only in our temporal capacity, without taking in religion; -this, in several ways, increases the difficulties of right<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[133]</a></span> -behavior in mature age; <i>i.e.</i> puts us into a more disadvantageous -state of trial in our temporal capacity.</p> - -<p>We are an inferior part of the creation of God. There are -natural appearances of our being in a state of degradation.<a name="FNanchor_90" id="FNanchor_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> We -certainly are in a condition, which <em>does not seem</em>, by any means, -the most advantageous we could imagine or desire, either in our -natural or moral capacity, for securing either our present or -future interest. However, this condition, low, and careful, and -uncertain as it is, does not afford any just ground of complaint. -For, as men <em>may</em> manage their temporal affairs with prudence, -and so pass their days here on earth in tolerable ease and satisfaction, -by a moderate degree of care: so likewise with regard to -religion, there is no more required than what they are well able -to do,<a name="FNanchor_91" id="FNanchor_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a> and what they must be greatly wanting to themselves, if -they neglect. And for persons to have that put upon them, -which they are well able to go through, and no more, we naturally -consider as an equitable thing; supposing it done by proper -authority. Nor have we any more reason to complain of it, with -regard to the Author of nature, than of his not having given us -advantages belonging to other orders of creatures.</p> - -<p>[<span class="smcap">Remarks.</span>] The thing here insisted upon is, that the state -of trial, which religion teaches us we are in, is rendered credible, -by its being throughout uniform and of a piece with the general -conduct of Providence towards us, in all other respects within -the compass of our knowledge. Indeed if mankind, considered -in their natural capacity, as inhabitants of this world only, found -themselves, from their birth to their death, in a settled state of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[134]</a></span> -security and happiness, without any solicitude or thought of their -own: or if they were in no danger of being brought into inconveniences -and distress, by carelessness, or the folly of passion, -through bad example, the treachery of others, or the deceitful -appearances of things: were this our natural condition, then it -might seem strange, and be some presumption against the truth -of religion, that it represents our future and more general interest, -as not secure <em>of course</em>, but as depending upon our behavior, -and requiring recollection and self-government to obtain it. -It <em>then</em> might be alleged, “What you say is our condition, in one -respect, is not in any wise of a sort with what we find, by experience, -is our condition in another. Our whole present interest -is secured to our hands, without any solicitude of ours; and why -should not our future interest, if we have any such, be so too?” -But since, on the contrary, thought and consideration, the voluntary -denying ourselves many things which we desire, and a course -of behavior, far from being always agreeable to us, are absolutely -necessary to our acting even a common decent, and common -prudent part, so as to pass with any satisfaction through the -<em>present</em> world, and be received upon any tolerable good terms -in it: since this is the case, all presumption against self-denial -and attention being necessary to secure our <em>higher</em> interest,<a name="FNanchor_92" id="FNanchor_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a> is -removed.</p> - -<p>Had we not experience, it might, perhaps speciously, be urged, -that it is improbable any thing of hazard and danger should be -put upon us by an infinite being; when every thing which has -hazard and danger in our manner of conception, and will end in -error, confusion, and misery, is already certain in his foreknowledge. -Indeed, why any thing of hazard and danger should be -put upon such frail creatures as we are, may well be thought a -difficulty in speculation; and cannot but be so, till we know the -whole, or at least much more of the case. But still the constitution -of nature is as it is. Our happiness and misery are trusted -to our conduct, and made to depend upon it. Somewhat, and, -in many circumstances, a great deal too, is put upon us, either to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[135]</a></span> -do, or to suffer, as we choose. All the various miseries of life, -which people bring upon themselves by negligence and folly, -and might have avoided by proper care, are instances of this: -which miseries are, beforehand, just as contingent and undetermined -as conduct, and left to be determined by it.</p> - -<p>These observations are an answer<a name="FNanchor_93" id="FNanchor_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a> to the objections against the -credibility of a state of trial, as implying temptations, and real -danger of miscarrying with regard to our general interest, under -the moral government of God. And they show, that, if we are -at all to be considered in such a capacity, and as having such an -interest, the general analogy of Providence must lead us to apprehend -ourselves in danger of miscarrying, in different degrees, -as to this interest, by our neglecting to act the proper part belonging -to us in that capacity. For we have a present interest -under the government of God, which we experience here upon -earth. This interest, as it is not forced upon us, so neither is it -offered to our acceptance, but to our acquisition; and in such -manner, as that we are in danger of missing it, by means of -temptations to neglect, or act contrary to it; and without attention -and self-denial, we must and do miss it. It is then perfectly -credible, that this may be our case, with respect to that chief and -final good, which religion proposes to us.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[136]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h3 id="I_CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V.<br /> -<span class="smaller">PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE -AND IMPROVEMENT.</span></h3> - -<p>From the consideration of our being in a probation-state, of -so much difficulty and hazard, naturally arises the question, how -we came to be placed in it? But such a general inquiry as this -would be found involved in insuperable difficulties. For, though -some of these difficulties would be lessened, by observing that all -wickedness is voluntary, as is implied in its very notion; and -that many of the miseries of life have apparent good effects: -yet, when we consider other circumstances belonging to both, -and what must be the consequence of the former in a life to -come, it cannot but be acknowledged plain folly and presumption, -to pretend to give an account of the <em>whole reasons</em> of this -matter; the whole reasons of our being allotted a condition, out -of which so much wickedness and misery, so circumstanced, -would in fact arise. Whether it be not beyond our faculties, not -only to find out, but even to understand; or, though we should -be supposed capable of understanding it, yet, whether it would -be of service or prejudice to us to be informed of it, is impossible -to say. But as our present condition can in no wise be -shown to be inconsistent with the perfect moral government of -God: so religion teaches us we were placed in it, that we might -qualify ourselves, by the practice of virtue, for another state -which is to follow it. This, though but a partial answer, a very -partial one indeed, to the inquiry now mentioned; is yet a more -satisfactory answer to another, which is of real, and of the utmost -importance to us to have answered,—viz.: What is our business -here? The known end then, why we are placed in a state of so -much affliction, hazard, and difficulty, is, our improvement in -virtue and piety, as the requisite qualification for a future state -of security and happiness.</p> - -<p>The beginning of life, considered as an education for mature -age in the present world, appears plainly, at first sight, analogous -to this our trial for a future one: the former being in our temporal -capacity, what the latter is in our religious capacity. Some<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[137]</a></span> -observations common to both, and a more distinct consideration -of each, will more distinctly show the extent and force of the -analogy between them; and the credibility, which arises from -hence, as well as from the nature of the thing, that the present -life was intended to be a state of discipline for a future one.</p> - -<p>I. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed for a particular -way of life; to which, the nature, the capacities, temper, -and qualifications, of each species, are as necessary as their external -circumstances. Both come into the notion of such state, -or particular way of life, and are constituent parts of it. Change -a man’s capacities or character, to the degree in which it is conceivable -they may be changed, and he would be altogether incapable -of a human course of life, and human happiness; as -incapable, as if, his nature continuing unchanged, he were placed -in a world, where he had no sphere of action, nor any objects to -answer his appetites, passions, and affections of any sort. One -thing is set over against another, as an ancient writer expresses -it.<a name="FNanchor_94" id="FNanchor_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a> Our nature corresponds to our external condition. Without -this correspondence, there would be no possibility of any such -thing as human life and happiness: which life and happiness are, -therefore, a <em>result</em> from our nature and condition jointly: meaning -by human life, not living in the literal sense, but the whole -complex notion commonly understood by those words. So that -without determining what will be the employment and happiness, -the particular life, of good men hereafter; there must be some -determinate capacities, some necessary character and qualifications, -without which persons cannot but be utterly incapable of -it: in like manner, as there must be some, without which men -would be incapable of their present state of life.</p> - -<p>II. The constitution of human creatures, and indeed of all -creatures which come under our notice, is such, as that they are -capable of naturally becoming qualified for states of life, for -which they were once wholly unqualified. In imagination we -may indeed conceive of creatures, incapable of having any of -their faculties naturally enlarged, or as being unable naturally -to acquire any new qualifications. But the faculties of every<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[138]</a></span> -species known to us, are made for enlargement; for acquirements -of experience and habits. We find ourselves, in particular, endued -with capacities, not only of perceiving ideas, and of knowledge -or perceiving truth, but also of storing up ideas and knowledge -by memory. We are capable, not only of acting, and of -having different momentary impressions made upon us; but of -getting a new facility in any kind of action, and of settled alterations -in our temper or character. The power of the two last is -the power of habits. But neither the perception of ideas, nor -knowledge of any sort, are habits; though absolutely necessary to -the forming of them. However, apprehension, reason, memory, -which are the capacities of acquiring knowledge, are greatly improved -by exercise. Whether the word habit is applicable to all -these improvements, and in particular how far the powers of -memory and of habits may be powers of the same nature, I shall -not inquire. But that perceptions come into our minds readily -and of course, by means of their having been there before, seems -a thing of the same sort, as readiness in any particular kind of -action, proceeding from being accustomed to it. Aptness to recollect -practical observations, of service in our conduct, is plainly -habit in many cases. There are habits of perception, and habits -of action. An instance of the former, is our constant and even -involuntary readiness, in correcting the impressions of our sight -concerning magnitudes and distances, so as to substitute judgment -in the room of sensation, imperceptibly to ourselves. It -seems as if all other associations of ideas not naturally connected, -might be called passive habits; as properly as our readiness in -understanding languages upon sight, or hearing of words. Our -readiness in speaking and writing them, are instances of active -habits.</p> - -<p>For distinctness, we may consider habits, as belonging to the -body, or to the mind: and the latter will be explained by the -former. Under the former are comprehended all bodily activities -or motions, whether graceful or unbecoming, which are owing to -use: under the latter, general habits of life and conduct; such as -those of obedience and submission to authority, or to any particular -person; those of veracity, justice, and charity; those of -attention, industry, self-government, envy, revenge. Habits of -this latter kind seem produced by repeated acts, as well as the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[139]</a></span> -former. And as habits belonging to the body are produced by -external <em>acts</em>, so habits of the mind are produced by the <em>exertion</em> -of inward practical principles; <i>i.e.</i> by carrying them into act, or -acting upon them; the principles of obedience, of veracity, justice, -and charity. Nor can those habits be formed by any external -course of action, otherwise than as it proceeds from these principles: -because it is only these inward principles exerted, which -are strictly acts of obedience, of veracity, of justice, and of -charity.</p> - -<p>So likewise habits of attention, industry, self-government, are -in the same manner acquired by exercise; and habits of envy and -revenge by indulgence, whether in outward act, or in thought -and intention; <i>i.e.</i> inward act: for such intention is an act. -Resolutions to do well, are also properly acts. And endeavoring -to enforce upon our own minds a practical sense of virtue, or to -beget in others that practical sense of it, which a man really has -himself, is a virtuous act. All these, therefore, may and will -contribute towards forming good habits. But going over the -theory of virtue in one’s thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine -pictures, of it; this is so far from necessarily or certainly conducing -to form a habit of it, in him who thus employs himself, that -it may harden the mind in a contrary course, and render it gradually -more insensible; <i>i.e.</i> form a habit of insensibility to all moral -considerations. For, from our very faculty of habits, passive impressions, -by being repeated, grow weaker. Thoughts, by often -passing through the mind, are felt less sensibly: being accustomed -to danger, begets intrepidity, <i>i.e.</i> lessens fear; to distress, -lessens the passion of pity; to instances of others’ mortality, -lessens the sensible apprehension of our own.</p> - -<p>From these two observations together, that practical habits are -formed and strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive impressions -grow weaker by being repeated upon us, it must follow, -that active habits may be gradually forming and strengthening, -by a course of acting upon such and such motives and excitements, -while these motives and excitements themselves are, by -proportionable degrees, growing less sensible; <i>i.e.</i> are continually -less and less sensibly felt, even as the active habits strengthen. -And experience confirms this: for active principles, at the very -time that they are less lively in perception than they were, are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[140]</a></span> -found to be, somehow, wrought more thoroughly into the temper -and character, and become more effectual in influencing our practice. -The three things just mentioned may afford instances of it. -Perception of danger is a natural excitement of passive fear, and -active caution: and by being inured to danger, habits of the latter -are gradually wrought, at the same time that the former gradually -lessens. Perception of distress in others is a natural excitement, -passively to pity, and actively to relieve it: but let a man set -himself to attend to, inquire out, and relieve distressed persons, -and he cannot but grow less and less sensibly affected with the -various miseries of life, with which he must become acquainted; -when yet, at the same time, benevolence, considered not as a -passion, but as a practical principle of action, will strengthen: -and while he passively compassionates the distressed less, he will -acquire a greater aptitude actively to assist and befriend them. -So also at the same time that the daily instances of men’s dying -around us give us daily a less sensible passive feeling or apprehension -of our own mortality, such instances greatly contribute to -the strengthening a practical regard to it in serious men; <i>i.e.</i> to -forming a habit of acting with a constant view to it.</p> - -<p>This seems further to show, that passive impressions made -upon our minds by admonition, experience, or example, though -they may have a remote efficacy, and a very great one, towards -forming active habits, yet can have this efficacy no otherwise -than by inducing us to such a course of action: and that it is not -being <em>affected</em> so and so, but acting, which forms those habits: -only it must be always remembered, that real endeavors to enforce -good impressions upon ourselves are a species of virtuous action. -Nor do we know how far it is possible, in the nature of things, -that effects should be wrought in us at once, equivalent to habits; -<i>i.e.</i> what is wrought by use and exercise. The thing insisted on -is, not what may be possible, but what is in fact the appointment -of nature: which is, that active habits are to be formed by exercise. -Their progress may be so gradual, as to be imperceptible -in its steps: it may be hard to explain the faculty, by which we -are capable of habits, throughout its several parts; and to trace -it up to its original, so as to distinguish it from all others in our -mind: and it seems as if contrary effects were to be ascribed to -it. But the thing in general, that our nature is formed to yield<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[141]</a></span> -to use and exercise, in some such manner as this, is matter of -certain experience.</p> - -<p>Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of action, we get -an aptness to go on, a facility, readiness, and often pleasure, in -it. The inclinations which rendered us averse to it, grow weaker; -the difficulties in it, not only the imaginary but the real ones, -lessen; the reasons for it offer themselves of course to our thoughts -upon all occasions; and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to -make us go on, in a course of action, to which we have been accustomed. -Practical principles appear to grow stronger, absolutely -in themselves, by exercise; as well as relatively, with -regard to contrary principles; which, by being accustomed to -submit, do so habitually, and of course. Thus a new character, -in several respects, may be formed; and many habitudes of life, -not given by nature, but which nature directs us to acquire.</p> - -<p>III. Indeed we may be assured, that we should never have had -these capacities of improving by experience, acquired knowledge, -and habits, had they not been necessary, and intended to be made -use of. And accordingly we find them so necessary, and so much -intended, that without them we should be utterly incapable of -that which was the end for which we were made, considered in -our temporal capacity only: the employments and satisfactions -of our mature state of life.</p> - -<p>Nature does in no wise qualify us wholly, much less at once, for -this mature state of life. Even maturity of understanding, and -bodily strength, not only are arrived at gradually, but are also -very much owing to the continued exercise of our powers of body -and mind from infancy. If we suppose a person brought into -the world with both these in maturity, as far as this is conceivable, -he would plainly at first be as unqualified for the human life of -mature age, as an idiot. He would be in a manner distracted, -with astonishment, and apprehension, and curiosity, and suspense: -nor can one guess, how long it would be, before he would be -familiarized to himself and the objects about him, enough even to -set himself to any thing. It may be questioned too, whether the -natural information of his sight and hearing would be of any -manner of use to him in acting, before experience. And it seems, -that men would be strangely headstrong and self-willed, and disposed -to exert themselves with an impetuosity, which would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[142]</a></span> -render society insupportable, and the living in it impracticable, -were it not for some acquired moderation and self-government, some -aptitude and readiness in restraining themselves, and concealing -their sense of things. Want of every thing of this kind which -is learnt would render a man as incapable of society, as want of -language would; or as his natural ignorance of any of the particular -employments of life would render him incapable of providing -himself with the common conveniences, or supplying the -necessary wants of it. In these respects, and probably in many -more of which we have no particular notion, mankind is left by -nature, an unformed, unfinished creature; utterly deficient and -unqualified, before the acquirement of knowledge, experience, -and habits, for that mature state of life, which was the end of -his creation, considering him as related only to this world.</p> - -<p>But, as nature has endued us with a power of supplying those -deficiencies, by acquired knowledge, experience, and habits; so -likewise we are placed in a condition, in infancy, childhood, and -youth, fitted for it; fitted for our acquiring those qualifications -of all sorts, which we stand in need of in mature age. Hence -children, from their very birth, are daily growing acquainted -with the objects about them, with the scene in which they are -placed, and to have a future part; and learning something or other, -necessary to the performance of it. The subordinations, to which -they are accustomed in domestic life, teach them self-government -in common behavior abroad, and prepare them for subjection and -obedience to civil authority.<a name="FNanchor_95" id="FNanchor_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a> What passes before their eyes, and -daily happens to them, gives them experience, caution against -treachery and deceit, together with numberless little rules of -action and conduct, which we could not live without; and which -are learnt so insensibly and so perfectly, as to be mistaken perhaps -for instinct, though they are the effect of long experience -and exercise; as much so as language, or knowledge in particular -business, or the qualifications and behavior belonging to the -several ranks and professions. Thus the beginning of our days -is adapted to be, and is, a state of education in the theory and -practice of mature life. We are much assisted in it by example, -instruction, and the care of others; but a great deal is left to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[143]</a></span> -ourselves to do. And of this, as part is done easily and of -course; so part requires diligence and care, the voluntary foregoing -many things which we desire, and setting ourselves to what -we should have no inclination to, but for the necessity or expedience -of it. For that labor and industry, which the station of -so many absolutely requires, they would be greatly unqualified -for, in maturity, as those in other stations would be for any other -sorts of application; if both were not accustomed to them in -their youth. And, according as persons behave themselves, in -the general education which all go through, and in the particular -ones adapted to particular employments, their character is -formed,<a name="FNanchor_96" id="FNanchor_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a> and made to appear; they recommend themselves more -or less; and are capable of, and placed in, different stations in -society.</p> - -<p>The former part of life, then, is to be considered as an important -opportunity, which nature puts into our hands; and -which, when lost is not to be recovered. And our being placed -in a state of discipline throughout this life, for another world, is -a providential disposition of things, exactly of the same kind, as -our being placed in a state of discipline during childhood, for -mature age. Our condition in both respects is uniform and of a -piece, and comprehended under one and the same general law -of nature.</p> - -<p>If we were not able at all to discern, how or in what way the -present life could be our preparation for another; this would be -no objection against the credibility of its being so. We do not -discern, how food and sleep contribute to the growth of the -body; nor could have any thought that they would, before we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[144]</a></span> -had experience. Nor do children at all think, on the one hand, -that the sports and exercises, to which they are so much addicted, -contribute to their health and growth; nor, on the other, of the -necessity which there is for their being restrained in them. Nor -are they capable of understanding the use of many parts of discipline, -which nevertheless they must be made to go through, in -order to qualify them for the business of mature age. Were we -not able then to discover, in what respects the present life could -form us for a future one; yet nothing would be more supposable -than that it might, in some respects or other, from the general -analogy of Providence. And this, for aught I see, might reasonably -be said, even though we should not take in the consideration -of God’s moral government over the world. But,</p> - -<p>IV. Take in this consideration, and consequently, that the -character of virtue and piety is a necessary qualification for the -future state, and then we may distinctly see, how, and in what -respects, the present life may be a preparation for it; since we -<em>want, and are capable of, improvement in that character, by -moral and religious habits</em>; and <em>the present life is fit to be a -state of discipline for such improvement</em>: in like manner as we -have already observed, how, and in what respects, infancy, childhood, -and youth, are a necessary preparation, and a natural state -of discipline, for mature age.</p> - -<p>Nothing which we at present see, would lead us to the thought -of a solitary inactive state hereafter. If we judge at all from -the analogy of nature, we must suppose, according to the Scripture -account of it, that it will be a community. And there is no -shadow of any thing unreasonable in conceiving, though there -be no analogy for it, that this community will be, as the Scripture -represents it, under the more immediate, or, if such an expression -may be used, the more sensible government of God. -Nor is our ignorance, what will be the employments of this -happy community, nor our consequent ignorance, what particular -scope or occasion there will be for the exercise of veracity, -justice, and charity, among the members of it with regard to -each other, any proof, that there will be no sphere of exercise -for those virtues. Much less, if that were possible, is our ignorance -any proof, that there will be no occasion for that frame of -mind, or character, which is formed by the daily practice of those<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[145]</a></span> -particular virtues here, and which is a result from it.<a name="FNanchor_97" id="FNanchor_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> This at -least must be owned in general, that, as the government established -in the universe is moral, the character of virtue and -piety must, in some way or other, be the <em>condition</em> of our happiness -or the qualification for it.</p> - -<p>From what is above observed, concerning our natural power of -habits, it is easy to see, that we are <em>capable</em> of moral improvement -by discipline. And how greatly we <em>want</em> it, need not be -proved to any one who is acquainted with the great wickedness -of mankind; or even with those imperfections, which the best -are conscious of. But it is not perhaps distinctly attended to by -every one, that the occasion which human creatures have for discipline, -to improve in them this character of virtue and piety, is -to be traced up higher than to excess in the passions, by indulgence -and habits of vice. Mankind, and perhaps all finite -creatures, from the very constitution of their nature, before -habits of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of deviating from -what is right; and therefore stand in need of virtuous habits, for -a security against this danger. For, together with the general -principle of moral understanding, we have in our inward frame -various affections towards particular external objects. These -affections are naturally, and of right, subject to the government -of the moral principle, as to the occasions upon which they may -be gratified; as to the times, degrees, and manner, in which the -objects of them may be pursued. But the principle of virtue -can neither excite them, nor prevent their being excited. On the -contrary, they are naturally felt, when the objects of them are -present to the mind, not only before all consideration whether<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[146]</a></span> -they can be obtained by lawful means, but after it is found they -cannot. The natural objects of affection continue so; the necessaries, -conveniences, and pleasures of life, remain naturally desirable, -though they cannot be obtained innocently: nay, though -they cannot possibly be obtained at all. And when the objects -of any affection whatever cannot be obtained without unlawful -means; but may be obtained by them: such affection, though its -being excited, and its continuing some time in the mind, be as -innocent as it is natural and necessary, yet cannot but be conceived -to have a <em>tendency</em> to incline persons to venture upon such -unlawful means: and therefore must be conceived as putting -them in some danger of it. Now what is the general security -against this danger, against their actually deviating from right? -As the danger is, so also must the security be, from within: from -the practical principle of virtue.<a name="FNanchor_98" id="FNanchor_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a> The strengthening or improving -this principle, considered as practical, or as a principle of action, -will lessen the danger, or increase the security against it. And -this moral principle is capable of improvement, by proper discipline -and exercise: by recollecting the practical impressions -which example and experience have made upon us: and, instead -of following humor and mere inclination, by continually attending -to the equity and right of the case, in whatever we are engaged, -be it in greater or less matters; and accustoming ourselves always -to act upon it, as being itself the just and natural motive of action; -and as this moral course of behavior must necessarily, under the -divine government, be our final interest. <em>Thus the principle of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[147]</a></span> -virtue, improved into a habit, of which improvement we are thus -capable, will plainly be, in proportion to the strength of it, a -security against the danger which finite creatures are in, from -the very nature of propension, or particular affections.</em> This -way of putting the matter, supposes particular affections to remain -in a future state; which it is scarce possible to avoid supposing. -And if they do; we clearly see, that acquired habits of -virtue and self-government may be necessary for the regulation -of them. However, though we were not distinctly to take in -this supposition, but to speak only in general; the thing really -comes to the same. For habits of virtue, thus acquired by discipline, -are improvement in virtue: and improvement in virtue -must be advancement in happiness, if the government of the -universe be moral.</p> - -<p>From these things we may observe, (and it will further show -this our natural and original need of being improved by discipline,) -how it comes to pass, that creatures made upright, fall; and how -those who preserve their uprightness, raise themselves by so -doing, to a more secure state of virtue. To say that the former -is accounted for by the nature of liberty, is to say no more, than -that an event’s actually happening is accounted for by a mere -possibility of its happening. But it seems distinctly conceivable -from the very nature of particular affections or propensions. For, -suppose creatures intended for such a particular state of life, for -which such propensions were necessary: suppose them endued -with such propensions, together with moral understanding, as -well including a practical sense of virtue as a speculative perception -of it; and that all these several principles, both natural and -moral, forming an inward constitution of mind, were in the most -exact proportion possible; <i>i.e.</i> in a proportion the most exactly -adapted to their intended state of life; such creatures would be -made upright, or finitely perfect. Now particular propensions, -from their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being -present; though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the -allowance of the moral principle. If they can be gratified without -its allowance, or by contradicting it, then they must be conceived -to have some tendency, in how low a degree soever, yet some -tendency, to induce persons to such forbidden gratification. This -tendency, in some one particular propension, may be increased,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[148]</a></span> -by the greater frequency of occasions naturally exciting it, than -of occasions exciting others. The least voluntary indulgence in -forbidden circumstances,<a name="FNanchor_99" id="FNanchor_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a> though but in thought, will increase -this wrong tendency; and may increase it further, till, peculiar -conjunctures perhaps conspiring, it becomes effect; and danger -of deviating from right, ends in actual deviation from it; a danger -necessarily arising from the very nature of propension, and which -therefore could not have been prevented, though it might have -been escaped, or got innocently through. The case would be, as -if we were to suppose a straight path marked out for a person, in -which a certain degree of attention would keep him steady: but -if he would not attend, in this degree, any one of a thousand -objects, catching his eye, might lead him out of it.</p> - -<p>Now it is impossible to say, how much even the first full overt -act of irregularity might disorder the inward constitution; unsettle -the adjustments, and alter the proportions, which formed -it, and in which the uprightness of its make consisted: but repetition -of irregularities would produce habits. Thus the constitution -would be spoiled; and creatures made upright, become -corrupt and depraved in their settled character, proportionably to -their repeated irregularities in occasional acts,<a name="FNanchor_100" id="FNanchor_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a> On the contrary,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[149]</a></span> -these creatures might have improved and raised themselves, to a -higher and more secure state of virtue, by the contrary behavior: -by steadily following the moral principle, supposed to be one part -of their nature: and thus <em>withstanding</em> that unavoidable danger -of defection, which necessarily arose from propension, the other -part of it. For, by thus preserving their integrity for some time, -their danger would lessen; since propensions, by being inured to -submit, would do it more easily and of course: and their security -against this lessening danger would increase; since the moral -principle would gain additional strength by exercise: both which -things are implied in the notion of virtuous habits.</p> - -<p>Thus vicious indulgence is not only criminal in itself, but also -depraves the inward constitution and character. And virtuous -self-government is not only right in itself, but also improves the -inward constitution or character: and may improve it to such a -degree, that though we should suppose it impossible for particular -affections to be absolutely coincident with the moral principle; -and consequently should allow, that such creatures as have been -above supposed, would forever remain defectible, yet their danger -of actually deviating from right may be almost infinitely lessened, -and they fully fortified against what remains of it; if that may -be called danger, against which there is an adequate, effectual -security. Still, this their higher perfection may continue to consist -in habits of virtue formed in a state of discipline, and this -their more complete security remain to proceed from them.</p> - -<p>Thus it is plainly conceivable, that creatures without blemish, -as they came out of the hands of God, may be in danger of going -wrong; and so may stand in need of the security of virtuous -habits, additional to the moral principle wrought into their natures -by him. That which is the ground of their danger, or their -want of security, maybe considered as a deficiency in themselves,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[150]</a></span> -to which virtuous habits are the natural supply. And as they -are naturally capable of being raised and improved by discipline, -it may be a thing fit and requisite, that they should be placed -in circumstances with an eye to it: in circumstances peculiarly -fitted to be to them a state of discipline for their improvement in -virtue.</p> - -<p>But how much more strongly must this hold with respect to -those who have corrupted their natures, are fallen from their -original rectitude, and whose passions are become excessive by -repeated violations of their inward constitution! Upright creatures -may want to be improved: depraved creatures want to be -renewed. Education and discipline, which may be in all degrees -and sorts of gentleness and of severity, are expedient for those: -but must be absolutely necessary for these. For these, discipline -of the severer sort too, and in the higher degrees of it, must be -necessary, in order to wear out vicious habits; to recover their -primitive strength of self-government, which indulgence must -have weakened; to repair, as well as raise into a habit, the moral -principle, in order to their arriving at a secure state of virtuous -happiness.</p> - -<p>Whoever will consider the thing, may clearly see that the -present world is <em>peculiarly fit</em> to be a state of discipline for this -purpose, to such as will set themselves to mend and improve. -For, the various temptations with which we are surrounded; our -experience of the deceits of wickedness; having been in many -instances led wrong ourselves; the great viciousness of the world; -the infinite disorders consequent upon it; our being made acquainted -with pain and sorrow, either from our own feeling of it, -or from the sight of it in others; these things, though some of -them may indeed produce wrong effects upon our minds, yet -when duly reflected upon, have, all of them, a direct tendency -to bring us to a settled moderation and reasonableness of temper: -the contrary both to thoughtless levity, and also to that unrestrained -self-will, and violent bent to follow present inclination, -which may be observed in undisciplined minds.</p> - -<p>Such experience, as the present state affords, of the frailty -of our nature; of the boundless extravagance of ungoverned -passion; of the power which an infinite being has over us, by -the various capacities of misery which he has given us; in short,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[151]</a></span> -that kind and degree of experience, which the present state -affords us, that the constitution of nature is such as to admit -the possibility, the danger, and the actual event, or creatures -losing their innocence and happiness, and becoming vicious and -wretched; has a tendency to give us a practical sense of things -very different from a mere speculative knowledge, that we are -liable to vice, and capable of misery. And who knows, whether -the security of creatures in the highest and most settled state of -perfection, may not in part arise, from their having had such a -sense of things as this, formed, and habitually fixed within them, -in some state of probation. And passing through the present -world with that moral attention, which is necessary to the acting -a right part in it, may leave everlasting impressions of this sort -upon our minds.</p> - -<p>To be a little more distinct: allurements to what is wrong, -difficulties in the discharge of our duty, our not being able to act -a uniform right part without some thought and care, and the -opportunities which we have, or imagine we have, of avoiding -what we dislike or obtaining what we desire, by unlawful means, -when we either cannot do it at all, or at least not so easily, by -lawful ones, these things, <i>i.e.</i> the snares and temptations of vice, -are what render the present world peculiarly fit to be a state of -discipline, to those who will preserve their integrity: because -they render being upon our guard, resolution, and the denial of -our passions, necessary in order to that end. The exercise of -such particular recollection, intention of mind, and self-government, -in the practice of virtue, has, from the make of our nature, -a peculiar tendency to form habits of virtue; as implying, not -only a real, but also a more continued, and a more intense exercise -of the virtuous principle, or a more constant and a stronger -effort of virtue exerted into act. Thus suppose a person to know -himself to be in particular danger, for some time, of doing any -thing wrong, which yet he fully resolves not to do; continued -recollection and keeping upon his guard, in order to make good -his resolution, is a <em>continued</em> exerting of that act of virtue -in a <em>high degree</em>, which need have been, and perhaps would -have been, only <em>instantaneous</em> and <em>weak</em>, had the temptation -been so.</p> - -<p>It is indeed ridiculous to assert, that self-denial is essential to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[152]</a></span> -virtue and piety:<a name="FNanchor_101" id="FNanchor_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> but it would have been nearer the truth, -though not strictly the truth itself, to have said, that it is essential -to discipline and improvement. For though actions materially -virtuous, which have no sort of difficulty, but are perfectly -agreeable to our particular inclinations, may possibly be -done only from these particular inclinations, and so may not be -any exercise of the principle of virtue, <i>i.e.</i> not be virtuous actions -at all; yet, on the contrary, they <em>may</em> be an exercise of that -principle: and when they are, they have a tendency to form and -fix the habit of virtue. But when the exercise of the virtuous -principle is more continued, oftener repeated, and more intense; -as it must be in circumstances of danger, temptation, and difficulty, -of any kind and in any degree; this tendency is increased -proportionably, and a more confirmed habit is the consequence.</p> - -<p>This undoubtedly holds to a certain length: but how far it -may hold, I know not. Neither our intellectual powers, nor our -bodily strength can be improved beyond a certain degree: and -both may be overwrought. Possibly there may be something -analogous to this, with respect to the moral character; which is -scarce worth considering. I mention it only, lest it should come -into some persons’ thoughts, not as an exception to the foregoing -observations, which perhaps it is; but as a confutation of them, -which it is not. And there may be several other exceptions. -Observations of this kind cannot be supposed to hold minutely, -and in every case. It is enough that they hold in general. And -these plainly hold so far, as that from them may be seen distinctly, -(which is all that is intended by them,) that <em>the present -world is peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline, for our improvement -in virtue and piety</em>: in the same sense as some -sciences, by requiring and engaging the attention, not to be sure -of such persons as will not, but of such as will, set themselves -to them, are fit to form the mind to habits of attention.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[153]</a></span></p> - -<p>Indeed the present state is so far from proving, in event, a discipline -of virtue to the generality of men, that on the contrary -they seem to make it a discipline of vice. And the viciousness -of the world is, in different ways, the great temptation which -renders it a state of virtuous discipline, in the degree it is, to -good men. The whole end, and the whole occasion, of mankind’s -being placed in such a state as the present, is not pretended -to be accounted for. That which appears amidst the -general corruption, is, that there are some persons, who, having -within them the principle of amendment and recovery, attend to -and follow the notices of virtue and religion, be they more clear -or more obscure, which are afforded them; and that the present -world is not only an exercise of virtue in these persons, but an -exercise of it in ways and degrees, peculiarly apt to improve it: -apt to improve it, in some respects, even beyond what would be, -by the exercise of it, required in a perfectly virtuous society, or -in a society of equally imperfect virtue with themselves. But -that the present world does not actually become a state of moral -discipline to many, even to the generality, <i>i.e.</i> that they do not -improve or grow better in it, cannot be urged as a proof, that it -was not intended for moral discipline, by any who at all observe -the analogy of nature. For, of the numerous seeds of vegetables -and bodies of animals, which are adapted and put in the way to -improve to such a point or state of natural maturity and perfection, -we do not see perhaps that one in a million actually does. -Far the greatest part of them decay before they are improved to -it; and appear to be absolutely destroyed. Yet no one, who does -not deny all final causes, will deny, that those seeds and bodies, -which do attain to that point of maturity and perfection, answer -the end for which they were really designed by nature; and -therefore that nature designed them for such perfection. I cannot -forbear adding, though it is not to the present purpose, that -the <em>appearance</em> of such an amazing <em>waste</em> in nature, with respect -to these seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is to us as unaccountable, -as, what is much more terrible, the present and future ruin -of so many moral agents by themselves, <i>i.e.</i> by vice.</p> - -<p>Against this whole notion of moral discipline, it may be objected, -in another way; that so far as a course of behavior, -materially virtuous, proceeds from hope and fear, so far it is only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[154]</a></span> -a discipline and strengthening of self-love. But doing what God -commands, because he commands it, is obedience, though it proceeds -from hope or fear. A course of such obedience will form -habits of it. And a constant regard to veracity, justice, and -charity, may form distinct habits of these particular virtues; and -will certainly form habits of self-government, and of denying our -inclinations, whenever veracity, justice, or charity requires it. -Nor is there any foundation for this great nicety, with which -some affect to distinguish in this case, in order to depreciate all -religion proceeding from hope or fear. For, veracity, justice, -and charity, regard to God’s authority, and to our own chief interest, -are not only all three coincident; but each of them is, in -itself, a just and natural motive or principle of action. He who -begins a good life from any one of them, and perseveres in it, as -he is already in some degree, so he cannot fail of becoming more -and more, of that character which is correspondent to the constitution -of nature as moral; and to the relation which God -stands in to us as moral governor of it: nor consequently can he -fail of obtaining that happiness, which this constitution and relation -necessarily suppose connected with that character.</p> - -<p>These several observations, concerning the active principle of -virtue and obedience to God’s commands, are applicable to passive -submission or resignation to his will: which is another essential -part of a right character, connected with the former, and -very much in our power to form ourselves to. It may be imagined, -that nothing but afflictions can give occasion for or require this -virtue; that it can have no respect to, nor be any way necessary -to qualify for, a state of perfect happiness: but it is not experience -which can make us think thus. Prosperity itself, while -any thing supposed desirable is not ours, begets extravagant and -unbounded thoughts. Imagination is altogether as much a source -of discontent, as any thing in our external condition. It is indeed -true, that there can be no scope for <em>patience</em>, when sorrow -shall be no more; but there may be need of a temper of mind, -which shall have been formed by patience. For, though self-love, -considered merely as an active principle leading us to pursue -our chief interest, cannot but be uniformly coincident with -the principle of obedience to God’s commands, our interest being -rightly understood; because this obedience, and the pursuit of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[155]</a></span> -our own chief interest, must be in every ease one and the -thing: yet it may be questioned, whether self-love, considered -merely as the desire of our own interest or happiness, can, from -its nature, be thus absolutely and uniformly coincident with the -will of God; any more than particular affections can:<a name="FNanchor_102" id="FNanchor_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a> coincident -in such sort, as not to be liable to be excited upon occasions and -in degrees, impossible to be gratified consistently with the constitution -of things, or the divine appointments. So that <em>habits</em> of -resignation may, upon this account, be requisite for all creatures: -habits, I say; which signify what is formed by use. However, -in general it is obvious that both self-love and particular affection -in human creatures considered only as passive feelings, distort -and rend the mind; and therefore stand in need of discipline. -Now denial of those particular affections, in a course of active -virtue and obedience to God’s will, has a tendency to moderate -them; and seems also to have a tendency to habituate the mind, -to be easy and satisfied with that degree of happiness which is -allotted us, <i>i.e.</i> to moderate self-love. But the proper discipline -for resignation is affliction. A right behavior under that trial; -recollecting ourselves so as to consider it in the view, in which -religion teaches us to consider it, as from the hand of God, receiving -it as what he appoints, or thinks proper to permit, in his -world and under his government; this will habituate the mind to -a dutiful submission. Such submission, together with the active -principle of obedience, make up the temper and character in us, -which answers to his sovereignty; and which absolutely belongs -to the condition of our being, as dependent creatures. Nor can -it be said, that this is only breaking the mind to a submission to -mere power; for mere power may be accidental, and precarious, -and usurped: but it is forming within ourselves the temper of -resignation to His rightful authority, who is, by nature, supreme -over all.</p> - -<p>Upon the whole: such a character, and such qualifications, are -necessary for a mature state of life in the present world, as nature -alone does in no wise bestow; but has put it upon us, in great -part, to acquire, in our progress from one stage of life to another, -from childhood to mature age; put it upon us to acquire them, -by giving us capacities of doing it, and by placing us, in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[156]</a></span> -beginning of life, in a condition fit for it. And this is a general -analogy to our condition in the present world, as in a state of -moral discipline for another.</p> - -<p>It is in vain to object against the credibility of the present -life’s being intended for this purpose, that all the trouble and the -danger unavoidably accompanying such discipline, might have -been saved us, by our being made at once the creatures and the -characters, <em>which we were to be</em>. For we experience, that <em>what -we were to be</em>, was to be the effect of <em>what we would do</em>: and -that the general conduct of nature is, not to save us trouble or -danger, but to make us capable of going through them, and to -put it upon us to do so. Acquirements of our own, experience -and habits, are the <em>natural</em> supply to our deficiencies, and security -against our dangers: since it is as plainly natural to set ourselves -to acquire the qualifications, as the external things, which -we stand in need of. In particular, it is as plainly a general law -of nature, that we should with regard to our temporal interest, -form and cultivate practical principles within us, by attention, -use, and discipline, as any thing whatever is a natural law; chiefly -in the beginning of life, but also throughout the whole course of -it. The alternative is left to our choice: either to improve ourselves, -and better our condition; or, in default of such improvement, -to remain deficient and wretched. It is therefore perfectly -credible, from the analogy of nature, that the same may be our -case, with respect to the happiness of a future state, and the -qualifications necessary for it.</p> - -<p>There is a third thing, which may seem implied in the present -world’s being a state of probation; that it is a <em>theatre of action</em>, -for the manifestation of persons’ characters, with respect to a -future one: not, to be sure, to an all-knowing Being, but to his -creation or part of it. This may, perhaps, be only a consequence -of our being in a state of probation in the other senses. However, -it is not impossible, that men’s showing and making manifest, -what is in their heart, what their real character is, may have -respect to a future life, in ways and manners with which we are -not acquainted: particularly it may be a means, (for the Author -of nature does not appear to do any thing without means,) of -their being disposed of suitably to their characters; and of its -being known to the creation, by way of example, that they are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[157]</a></span> -thus disposed of. But not to enter upon any conjectural account -of this; one may just mention, that the manifestation of persons’ -characters contributes very much, in various ways, to the carrying -on a great part of that general course of nature, respecting mankind, -which comes under our observation at present. I shall -only add, that probation, in both these senses, as well as in that -treated of in the foregoing chapter, is implied in moral government; -since by persons’ behavior under it, their characters cannot -but be manifested, and if they behave well, improved.</p> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<h3 id="I_CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI.<br /> -<span class="smaller">THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, CONSIDERED AS INFLUENCING -PRACTICE.</span></h3> - -<p>Throughout the foregoing treatise it appears, that the condition -of mankind, considered as inhabitants of this world only, -and under the government of God which we experience, is greatly -analogous to our condition, as designed for another world, or as -under that farther government, which religion teaches us. If -therefore any assert, as a fatalist must, that the opinion of universal -necessity is reconcilable with the former; there immediately -arises a question in the way of analogy, whether he must not also -own it to be reconcilable with the latter, <i>i.e.</i> with the system of -religion itself, and the proof of it. The reader then will observe, -that the question now before us is not absolute, <i>i.e.</i> whether the -opinion of fate be reconcilable with religion; but hypothetical, -whether, upon supposition of its being reconcilable with the constitution -of nature, it be not reconcilable with religion also. Or, -what pretence a fatalist, not other persons, but a fatalist, has to -conclude from his opinion, that there can be no such thing as -religion. And as the puzzle and obscurity, which must unavoidably -arise from arguing upon so absurd a supposition as that of -universal necessity, will, I fear, easily be seen; it will, I hope, as -easily be excused.<a name="FNanchor_103" id="FNanchor_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[158]</a></span></p> - -<p>Since it has been all along taken for granted, as a thing proved, -that there is an intelligent Author of nature, or natural Governor -of the world; and since an objection may be made against the -proof of this, from the opinion of universal necessity, as it may -be supposed, that such necessity will itself account for the origin -and preservation of all things; it is requisite, that this objection -be distinctly answered; or that it be shown, that a fatality supposed -consistent with what we certainly experience, does not -destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and Governor of -nature; before we proceed to consider, whether it destroys the -proof of a moral Governor of it, or of our being in a state of -religion.</p> - -<p>When it is said by a fatalist, that the whole constitution of -nature, the actions of men, every thing, and every mode and -circumstance of every thing, is necessary, and could not possibly -have been otherwise; it is to be observed, that this necessity does -not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, and acting from certain -principles, and to certain ends: because all this is matter of -undoubted experience, acknowledged by all, and what every man -may, every moment, be conscious of. Hence it follows, that -necessity, alone and of itself, is in no sort an account of the constitution -of nature, and how things came <em>to be</em> and <em>to continue</em> as -they are; but only an account of this <em>circumstance</em> relating to -their origin and continuance, that they could not have been otherwise, -than they are and have been. The assertion, that every -thing is by necessity of nature, is not an answer to the question; -Whether the world came into being as it is, by an intelligent -Agent forming it thus, or not: but to quite another question; -Whether it came into being as it is, in that way and manner -which we call <em>necessarily</em>, or in that way and manner which we call<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[159]</a></span> -<em>freely</em>? For suppose farther, that one who was a fatalist, and -one who kept to his natural sense of things, and believed himself -a free agent, were disputing together, and vindicating their -respective opinions; and they should happen to instance a -house; they would agree that it was built by an architect. Their -difference concerning necessity and freedom would occasion no -difference of judgment concerning this; but only concerning another -matter; whether the architect built it necessarily or freely.</p> - -<p>Suppose they should proceed to inquire concerning the constitution -of nature. In a lax way of speaking, one of them might -say, it was by necessity; and the other, by freedom: but if they -had any meaning to their words, as the latter must mean a free -agent, so the former must at length be reduced to mean an agent, -whether he would say one or more, acting by necessity: for abstract -notions can do nothing. We indeed ascribe to God a necessary -existence, uncaused by any agent. For we find within ourselves -the idea of infinity, <i>i.e.</i> immensity and eternity, impossible, -even in imagination, to be removed out of being. We seem to -discern intuitively, that there must, and cannot but be, something, -external to ourselves, answering this idea, or the archetype -of it. Hence, (for <em>this abstract</em>, as much as any other, implies -a <em>concrete</em>) we conclude, that there is, and cannot but be, an infinite -and immense eternal being, existing prior to all design contributing -to his existence, and exclusive of it. From the scantiness -of language, a manner of speaking has been introduced; -that necessity is the foundation, the reason, the account of the -existence of God. But it is not alleged, nor can it be at all -intended, that <em>every thing</em> exists as it does, by this kind of necessity: -a necessity antecedent in nature to design: it cannot, I -say, be meant that every thing exists as it does, by this kind of -necessity, upon several accounts; and particularly because it is -admitted, that design, in the actions of men, contributes to many -alterations in nature. If any deny this, I shall not pretend to -reason with them.</p> - -<p>From these things it follows; <i>First</i>, That when a fatalist -asserts, that every thing is <em>by necessity</em>, he must mean, <em>by an -agent acting necessarily</em>; he <em>must</em>, I say, mean this, for I am -very sensible he would not choose to mean it. <i>Secondly</i>, That -the necessity, by which such an agent is supposed to act, does<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[160]</a></span> -not exclude intelligence and design. So that, were the system -of fatality admitted, it would just as much account for the formation -of the world, as for the structure of a house, and no -more. Necessity as much requires and supposes a necessary -agent, as freedom requires and supposes a free agent, to be the -former of the world. And the appearances of <em>design</em> and of <em>final -causes</em> in the constitution of nature as really prove this acting -agent to be an <em>intelligent designer</em>, or to act from choice; upon -the scheme of necessity, supposed possible, as upon that of -freedom.</p> - -<p>It appearing thus, that the notion of necessity does not destroy -the proof that there is an intelligent Author of nature and -natural Governor of the world; the present question, which the -analogy before mentioned suggests,<a name="FNanchor_104" id="FNanchor_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a> and which, I think, it will -answer, is this: Whether the opinion of necessity, supposed consistent -with possibility, with the constitution of the world, and -the natural government which we experience exercised over it, -destroys all reasonable ground of belief, that we are in a state of -religion: or whether that opinion be reconcilable with religion; -with the system, and the proof of it.</p> - -<p>Suppose then a fatalist to educate any one, from his youth up, -in his own principles; that the child should reason upon them, -and conclude, that since he cannot possibly behave otherwise -than he does, he is not a subject of blame or commendation, nor -can deserve to be rewarded or punished. Imagine him to eradicate -the very perceptions of blame and commendation out of his -mind, by means of this system; to form his temper, and character, -and behavior to it; and from it to judge of the treatment -he was to expect, say, from reasonable men, upon his coming -abroad into the world: as the fatalist judges from this system, -what he is to expect from the Author of nature, and with regard -to a future state. I cannot forbear stopping here to ask, whether -any one of common sense would think fit, that a child should be -put upon these speculations, and be left to apply them to practice. -And a man has little pretence to reason, who is not -sensible, that we are all children in speculations of this kind. -However, the child would doubtless be highly delighted to find -himself freed from the restraints of fear and shame, with which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[161]</a></span> -his play-fellows were fettered and embarrassed; and highly conceited -in his superior knowledge, so far beyond his years. But -conceit and vanity would be the least bad part of the influence, -which these principles must have, when thus reasoned and acted -upon, during the course of his education. He must either be -allowed to go on and be the plague of all about him, and himself -too, even to his own destruction, or else correction must be continually -made use of, to supply the want of those natural perceptions -of blame and commendation, which we have supposed to -be removed; and to give him a practical impression, of what he -had reasoned himself out of the belief of, that he was in fact an -accountable child, and to be punished for doing what he was -forbid. It is therefore in reality impossible, but that the correction -which he must meet with, in the course of his education, -must convince him, that if the scheme he was instructed in were -not false, yet that he reasoned inconclusively upon it, and somehow -or other misapplied it to practice and common life; as what -the fatalist experiences of the conduct of Providence at present, -ought in all reason to convince him, that this scheme is misapplied, -when applied to the subject of religion.<a name="FNanchor_105" id="FNanchor_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a> But supposing -the child’s temper could remain still formed to the system, and -his expectation of the treatment he was to have in the world, be -regulated by it; so as to expect that no reasonable man would -blame or punish him, for any thing which he should do, because -he could not help doing it: upon this supposition it is manifest -he would, upon his coming abroad into the world, be insupportable -to society, and the treatment which he would receive from it -would render it so to him; and he could not fail of doing something -very soon, for which he would be delivered over into the -hands of civil justice. And thus, in the end, he would be convinced -of the obligations he was under to his wise instructor.</p> - -<p>Suppose this scheme of fatality, in any other way, applied to -practice, such practical application of it will be found equally -absurd; equally fallacious in a practical sense. For instance, that -if a man be destined to live such a time, he shall live to it, -though he take no care of his own preservation; or if he be -destined to die before that time, no care can prevent it, therefore -all care about preserving one’s life is to be neglected: which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[162]</a></span> -is the fallacy instanced in by the ancients. On the contrary, -none of these practical absurdities can be drawn from reasoning, -upon the supposition that we are free; but all such reasoning -with regard to the common affairs of life is justified by experience. -Therefore, though it were admitted that this opinion of necessity -were <em>speculatively</em> true; yet, with regard to practice, it is as if it -were false, so far as our experience reaches: that is, to the whole -of our present life. For, the constitution of the present world, -and the condition in which we are actually placed, is, as if we -were free. And it may perhaps justly be concluded, that since -the whole process of action, through every step of it, suspense, -deliberation, inclining one way, determining, and at last doing as -we determine, is as if we were free, therefore we are so.<a name="FNanchor_106" id="FNanchor_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a></p> - -<p>The thing here insisted upon is, that under the present natural -government of the world, we find we are treated and dealt with, -as if we were free, prior to all consideration whether we are so or -not. Were this opinion therefore of necessity admitted to be -ever so true; yet such is in fact our condition and the natural -course of things, that whenever we apply it to life and practice, -this application of it always misleads us, and cannot but mislead -us, in a most dreadful manner, with regard to our present interest. -How then can people think themselves so very secure, that the -same application of the same opinion may not mislead them also, -in some analogous manner, with respect to a future, a more -general, and more important interest? For, religion being a -practical subject; and the analogy of nature showing us, that we -have not faculties to apply this opinion, were it a true one, to -practical subjects; whenever we do apply it to the subject of religion, -and thence conclude, that we are free from its obligations, -it is plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon. There will -still remain just reason to think, whatever appearances are, that -we deceive ourselves; in somewhat of a like manner, as when -people fancy they can draw contradictory conclusions from the -idea of infinity.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[163]</a></span></p> - -<p>From these things together, the attentive reader will see it -follows, that if upon supposition of freedom the evidence of religion -be conclusive, it remains so, upon supposition of necessity, -because the notion of necessity is not applicable to practical subjects: -<i>i.e.</i> with respect to them, is as if it were not true. Nor -does this contain any reflection upon reason, but only upon what -is unreasonable. For to pretend to act upon reason, in opposition -to practical principles, which the Author of our nature gave us to -act upon; and to pretend to apply our reason to subjects, with -regard to which, our own short views, and even our experience, -will show us, it cannot be depended upon; and such, at best, the -subject of necessity must be; this is vanity, conceit, and unreasonableness.</p> - -<p>But this is not all. We find within ourselves a will, and are -conscious of a character. Now if this, in us, be reconcilable with -fate, it is reconcilable with it in the Author of nature. Besides, -natural government and final causes imply a character and a will -in the Governor and Designer;<a name="FNanchor_107" id="FNanchor_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a> a will concerning the creatures -whom he governs. The Author of nature then being certainly -of some character or other, notwithstanding necessity; it is evident -this necessity is as reconcilable with the particular character -of benevolence, veracity, and justice, in him, which attributes -are the foundation of religion, as with any other character: since -we find this necessity no more hinders <em>men</em> from being benevolent, -than cruel; true, than faithless; just, than unjust; or, if -the fatalist pleases, what we call unjust. It is said indeed, that -what, upon supposition of freedom, would be just punishment, -upon supposition of necessity, becomes manifestly unjust: because -it is punishment inflicted for doing that which persons could not -avoid doing. As if the necessity, which is supposed to destroy -the injustice of murder, for instance, would not also destroy the -injustice of punishing it! However, as little to the purpose as -this objection is in itself, it is very much to the purpose to observe -from it, how the notions of justice and injustice remain, -even while we endeavor to suppose them removed; how they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[164]</a></span> -force themselves upon the mind, even while we are making suppositions -destructive of them: for there is not, perhaps, a man in -the world, but would be ready to make this objection at first -thought.</p> - -<p>But though it is most evident, that universal necessity, if it be -reconcilable with any thing, is reconcilable with that character in -the Author of nature, which is the foundation of religion; “Yet, -does it not plainly destroy the <em>proof</em> that he is of that character, -and consequently the proof of religion?” By no means. For -we find, that happiness and misery are not our <em>fate</em>, in any such -sense as not to be the consequences of our behavior; but that -they are the consequences of it.<a name="FNanchor_108" id="FNanchor_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a> We find God exercises the -same kind of government over us, which a father exercises over -his children, and a civil magistrate over his subjects. Now, -whatever becomes of abstract questions concerning liberty and -necessity, it evidently appears to us, that veracity and justice -must be the natural rule and measure of exercising this authority -or government, to a Being who can have no competitions, or interfering -of interests, with his creatures and his subjects.</p> - -<p>But as the doctrine of liberty, though we experience its truth, -may be perplexed with difficulties, which run up into the most -abstruse of all speculations; and as the opinion of necessity seems -to be the very basis upon which infidelity grounds itself; it may -be of some use to offer a more particular proof of the obligations -of religion, which may distinctly be shown not to be destroyed -by this opinion.</p> - -<p>The proof from final causes of an intelligent Author of nature -is not affected by the opinion of necessity; supposing necessity a -thing possible in itself, and reconcilable with the constitution of -things.<a name="FNanchor_109" id="FNanchor_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a> It is a matter of fact, independent on this or any other -speculation, that he governs the world by the method of rewards -and punishments:<a name="FNanchor_110" id="FNanchor_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a> and also that he hath given us a moral faculty, -by which we distinguish between actions, and approve some as -virtuous and of good desert, and disapprove others as vicious and -of ill desert.<a name="FNanchor_111" id="FNanchor_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a> This moral discernment implies, in the notion of -it, a rule of action, and a rule of a very peculiar kind: for it -carries in it authority and a right of direction; authority in such -a sense, as that we cannot depart from it without being<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[165]</a></span> -self-condemned.<a name="FNanchor_112" id="FNanchor_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a> And that the dictates of this moral faculty, which are -by nature a rule to us, are moreover the laws of God, laws in a -sense including sanctions; may be thus proved. Consciousness -of a rule or guide of action, in creatures who are capable of considering -it as given them by their Maker, not only raises immediately -a sense of duty, but also a sense of security in following -it, and of danger in deviating from it. A direction of the Author -of nature, given to creatures capable of looking upon it as such, -is plainly a command from him: and a command from him necessarily -includes in it, at least, an implicit promise in case of obedience, -or threatening in case of disobedience. But then the -sense or perception of good and ill desert,<a name="FNanchor_113" id="FNanchor_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a> which is contained in -the moral discernment, renders the sanction explicit, and makes -it appear, as one may say, expressed. For since his method of -government is to reward and punish actions, his having annexed -to some actions an inseparable sense of good desert, and to others -of ill, this surely amounts to declaring, upon whom his punishments -shall be inflicted, and his rewards be bestowed. He must -have given us this discernment and sense of things, as a presentiment -of what is to be hereafter: that is, by way of information -beforehand, what we are finally to expect in this world. There -is then most evident ground to think, that the government of -God, upon the whole, will be found to correspond to the nature -which he has given us: and that, in the upshot and issue of -things, happiness and misery shall, in fact and event, be made -to follow virtue and vice respectively; as he has already, in so -peculiar a manner, associated the ideas of them in our minds. -And hence might easily be deduced the obligations of religious -worship, were it only to be considered as a means of preserving -upon our minds a sense of this moral government of God, and -securing our obedience to it: which yet is an extremely imperfect -view of that most important duty.</p> - -<p>No objection from necessity can lie against this general proof -of religion. None against the proposition reasoned upon, that -we have such a moral faculty and discernment; because this is a -mere matter of fact, a thing of experience, that human kind is -thus constituted: none against the conclusion; because it is -immediate and wholly from this fact. For the conclusion, that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[166]</a></span> -God will finally reward the righteous and punish the wicked, is -not here drawn, from its appearing to us fit<a name="FNanchor_114" id="FNanchor_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a> that <em>he should</em>; but -from its appearing, that he has told us, <em>he will</em>. And this he -hath certainly told us, in the promise and threatening, which it -hath been observed the notion of a command implies, and the -sense of good and ill desert which he has given us, more distinctly -expresses. This reasoning from fact is confirmed, and in -some degree even verified, by other facts; by the natural tendencies -of virtue and of vice;<a name="FNanchor_115" id="FNanchor_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a> and by this, that God, in the natural -course of his providence, punishes vicious actions as mischievous -to society; and also vicious actions as such in the strictest sense.<a name="FNanchor_116" id="FNanchor_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a> -So that the general proof of religion is unanswerably real, even -upon the wild supposition which we are arguing upon.</p> - -<p>It must be observed further, that natural religion has, besides -this, an external evidence; which the doctrine of necessity, if it -could be true, would not affect. For suppose a person, by the -observations and reasoning above, or by any other, convinced of -the truth of religion; that there is a God, who made the world, -who is the moral governor and judge of mankind, and will upon -the whole deal with every one according to his works: I say, -suppose a person convinced of this by reason, but to know -nothing at all of antiquity, or the present state of mankind: it -would be natural for such a one to be inquisitive, what was the -history of this system of doctrine; at what time, and in what -manner, it came first into the world; and whether it were believed -by any considerable part of it. Were he upon inquiry to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[167]</a></span> -find, that a particular person, in a late age, first of all proposed -it, as a deduction of reason, and that mankind were before -wholly ignorant of it; then, though its evidence from reason -would remain, there would be no additional probability of its -truth, from the account of its discovery.</p> - -<p>But instead of this being the fact, he would find, on the contrary, -what could not but afford him a very strong confirmation -of its truth: <i>First</i>, That somewhat of this system, with more or -fewer additions and alterations, hath been professed in all ages -and countries, of which we have any certain information relating -to this matter. <i>Secondly</i>, That it is certain historical fact, so -far as we can trace things up, that this whole system of belief, -that there is one God, the creator and moral governor of the -world, and that mankind is in a state of religion, was received -in the first ages. And <i>Thirdly</i>, That as there is no hint or intimation -in history, that this system was first reasoned out; so -there is express historical or traditional evidence, as ancient as -history, that it was taught first by revelation.</p> - -<p>Now these things must be allowed to be of great weight. The -first of them, general consent, shows this system to be conformable -to the common sense of mankind. The second, namely, -that religion was believed in the first ages of the world, especially -as it does not appear that there were then any superstitious or -false additions to it, cannot but be a further confirmation of its -truth. For it is a proof of this alternative: either that it came -into the world by revelation; or that it is natural, obvious, and -forces itself upon the mind. The former of these is the conclusion -of learned men. And whoever will consider, how unapt for -speculation rude and uncultivated minds are, will, perhaps from -hence alone, be strongly inclined to believe it the truth. And -as it is shown in the second part<a name="FNanchor_117" id="FNanchor_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a> of this treatise, that there is -nothing of such peculiar presumption against a revelation in the -beginning of the world, as there is supposed to be against subsequent -ones; a sceptic could not, I think, give any account, which -would appear more probable even to himself, of the early pretences -to revelation; than by supposing some real original one, -from whence they were copied.</p> - -<p>And the third thing above mentioned, that there is express<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[168]</a></span> -historical or traditional evidence, as ancient as history, of the -system of religion being taught mankind by revelation, this must -be admitted as some degree of real proof, that it was so taught. -For why should not the most ancient tradition be admitted as -some additional proof of a fact, against which there is no presumption? -This proof is mentioned here, because it has its -weight to show, that religion came into the world by revelation, -prior to all consideration of the proper authority of any book -supposed to contain it; and even prior to all consideration, -whether the revelation itself be uncorruptly handed down, or -mixed and darkened with fables. Thus the historical account, -which we have of the origin of religion, taking in all circumstances, -is a real confirmation of its truth, no way affected by -the opinion of necessity. And the <em>external</em> evidence, even of -natural religion, is by no means inconsiderable.</p> - -<p>It is carefully to be observed, and ought to be recollected after -all proofs of virtue and religion, which are only general, that as -speculative reason may be neglected, prejudiced, and deceived, -so also may our moral understanding be impaired and perverted, -and the dictates of it not impartially attended to. This indeed -proves nothing against the reality of our speculative or practical -faculties of perception? against their being intended by nature, -to inform us in the theory of things, and instruct us how we are -to behave, and what we are to expect in consequence of our -behavior. Yet our liableness, in the degree we are liable, to -prejudice and perversion, is a most serious admonition to us to be -upon our guard, with respect to what is of such consequence, as -our determinations concerning virtue and religion; and particularly -not to take custom, and fashion, and slight notions of -honor, or imaginations of present ease, use, and convenience to -mankind, for the only moral rule.<a name="FNanchor_118" id="FNanchor_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a></p> - -<p>The foregoing observations, drawn from the nature of the -thing, and the history of religion, amount, <em>when taken together</em>, -to a real practical proof of it, not to be confuted: such a proof -as, considering the infinite importance of the thing, I apprehend, -would be admitted fully sufficient, in reason, to influence the -actions of men, who act upon thought and reflection, if it were admitted -that there is no proof of the contrary. But it may be said;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[169]</a></span> -“There are many probabilities, which cannot indeed be confuted; -<i>i.e.</i> shown to be no probabilities, and yet may be overbalanced by -greater probabilities, on the other side; much more by demonstration. -And there is no occasion to object against particular -arguments alleged for an opinion, when the opinion itself may be -clearly shown to be false, without meddling with such arguments -at all, but leaving them just as they are.<a name="FNanchor_119" id="FNanchor_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a> Now the method of -government by rewards and punishments, and especially rewarding -and punishing good and ill desert as such respectively, must -go upon supposition, that we are free and not necessary agents. -And it is incredible, that the Author of nature should govern us -upon a supposition as true, which he knows to be false; and -therefore absurd to think, he will reward or punish us for our -actions hereafter; especially that he will do it under the notion, -that they are of good or ill desert.”</p> - -<p>Here then the matter is brought to a point. And the answer -is full, and not to be evaded,—viz.: that the whole constitution -and course of things, the whole analogy of Providence, shows -beyond possibility of doubt, that the conclusion from this reasoning -is false; wherever the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom -indeed clearly shows where: in supposing ourselves necessary, -when in truth we are free agents. But, upon the supposition of -necessity, the fallacy lies in taking for granted, that it is incredible -necessary agents should be rewarded and punished. -That, somehow or other, the conclusion now mentioned is false, -is most certain. For it is fact, that God does govern even brute -creatures by the method of rewards and punishments, in the -natural course of things. Men are rewarded and punished for -their actions, punished for actions mischievous to society as being -so, punished for vicious actions as such; by the natural instrumentality -of each other, under the present conduct of Providence. -Nay, even the affection of gratitude, and the passion of -resentment, and the rewards and punishments following from -them, which in general are to be considered as natural, <i>i.e.</i> from -the Author of nature; these rewards and punishments, being -<em>naturally</em><a name="FNanchor_120" id="FNanchor_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a> annexed to actions considered as implying good intention -and good desert, ill intention and ill desert; these natural -rewards and punishments, I say, are as much a contradiction to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[170]</a></span> -the conclusion above, and show its falsehood, as a more exact and -complete rewarding and punishing of good and ill desert as such. -So that if it be incredible, that necessary agents should be thus -rewarded and punished; then, men are not necessary but free; -since it is matter of fact, that they are thus rewarded and -punished. If, on the contrary, which is the supposition we have -been arguing upon, it be insisted that men are necessary agents; -then, there is nothing incredible in the further supposition of -necessary agents being thus rewarded and punished: since we -ourselves are thus dealt with.</p> - -<p>From the whole therefore it must follow, that a necessity supposed -possible, and reconcilable with the constitution of things, -does in no sort prove that the Author of Nature will not, nor -destroy the proof that he will, finally and upon the whole, in his -eternal government, render his creatures happy or miserable, by -some means or other, as they behave well or ill. Or, to express -this conclusion in words conformable to the title of the chapter, -the analogy of nature shows us, that the opinion of necessity, considered -as practical, is false. And if necessity, upon the supposition -above mentioned, doth not destroy the proof of natural -religion, it evidently makes no alteration in the proof of revealed.</p> - -<p>From these things likewise we may learn, in what sense to -understand that general assertion, that the opinion of necessity is -essentially destructive of all religion. First, in a practical sense; -that by this notion, atheistical men pretend to satisfy and encourage -themselves in vice, and justify to others their disregard to -all religion. And secondly, in the strictest sense; that it is a -contradiction to the whole constitution of nature, and to what we -may every moment experience in ourselves, and so overturns -every thing. But by no means is this assertion to be understood, -as if necessity, supposing it could possibly be reconciled with the -constitution of things, and with what we experience, were not -also reconcilable with religion: for upon this supposition, it -demonstrably is so.<a name="FNanchor_121" id="FNanchor_121"></a><a href="#Footnote_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[171]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h3 id="I_CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII.<br /> -<span class="smaller">THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR -CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.</span></h3> - -<p>Though it be acknowledged, as it cannot but be, that the analogy -of nature gives a strong credibility to the general doctrine of -religion, and to the several particular things contained in it, considered -as so many matters of fact; and likewise that it shows -this credibility not to be destroyed by any notions of necessity: -still, objections may be insisted upon, against the wisdom, equity, -and goodness of the divine government implied in the notion of -religion, and against the method by which this government is -conducted; to which objections analogy can be no direct answer. -For the credibility, or the certain truth, of a matter of fact, does -not immediately prove any thing concerning the wisdom or goodness -of it; and analogy can do no more, immediately or directly, -than show such and such things to be true or credible, considered -only as matters of fact. But if, upon supposition of a moral constitution -of nature and a moral government over it, analogy suggests -and makes it credible, that this government must be a -scheme, system, or constitution of government, as distinguished -from a number of single unconnected acts of distributive justice -and goodness; and likewise, that it must be a scheme, so imperfectly -comprehended, and of such a sort in other respects, as to -afford a direct general answer to all objections against the justice -and goodness of it: then analogy is, remotely, of great service in -answering those objections; both by suggesting the answer, and -showing it to be a credible one.</p> - -<p>Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the case. For, -<i>First</i>, Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government -over the world, the analogy of his natural government suggests -and makes it credible, that his moral government <em>must</em> be a -scheme, quite beyond our comprehension: and this affords a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[172]</a></span> -general answer to all objections against the justice and goodness -of it. <i>Secondly</i>, A more distinct observation of some particular -things contained in God’s scheme of natural government, the like -things being supposed, by analogy, to be contained in his moral -government, will further show, how little weight is to be laid -upon these objections.</p> - -<p>I. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government -over the world, the analogy of his natural government suggests -and makes it credible, that his moral government must be a -scheme, quite beyond our comprehension; and this affords a -general answer to all objections against the justice and goodness -of it. It is most obvious, analogy renders it highly credible, that, -upon supposition of a moral government, it must be a scheme. -For the world, and the whole natural government of it, appears -to be so: to be a scheme, system, or constitution, whose parts -correspond to each other, and to a whole, as really as any work of -art, or as any particular model of a civil constitution and government. -In this great scheme of the natural world, individuals -have various peculiar relations to other individuals of their own -species. Whole species are, we find, variously related to other -species, upon this earth. Nor do we know, how much further -these kinds of relations may extend. And, as there is not any -action or natural event, which we are acquainted with, so single -and unconnected, as not to have a respect to some other actions -and events; so possibly each of them, when it has not an immediate, -may yet have a remote, natural relation to other actions -and events, much beyond the compass of this present world. -There seems indeed nothing, from whence we can so much as -make a conjecture, whether all creatures, actions, and events, -throughout the whole of nature, have relations to each other -But, as it is obvious, that all events have future unknown consequences; -so if we trace any event, as far as we can, into what is -connected with it, we shall find, that if it were not connected -with something further in nature, unknown to us, something -both past and present, such event could not possibly have been -at all. Nor can we give the whole account of any one thing -whatever; of all its causes, ends, and necessary adjuncts; those -adjuncts, I mean, without which it could not have been. By -this most astonishing connection, these reciprocal correspondences<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[173]</a></span> -and mutual relations, every thing which we see in the course of -nature is actually brought about. Things seemingly the most -insignificant imaginable, are perpetually observed to be necessary -conditions to other things of the greatest importance; so that -any one thing whatever, may for aught we know to the contrary, -be a necessary condition to any other.</p> - -<p>The natural world then, and natural government of it, being -such an incomprehensible scheme; so incomprehensible, that a -man must, really in the literal sense, know nothing at all, who is -not sensible of his ignorance in it; this immediately suggests, -and strongly shows the credibility, that the moral world and -government of it may be so too.<a name="FNanchor_122" id="FNanchor_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a> Indeed the natural and moral -constitution and government of the world are so connected, as to -make up together but one scheme: and it is highly probable, -that the first is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to -the latter; as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized -bodies for minds. But the thing intended here is, without inquiring -how far the administration of the natural world is subordinate -to that of the moral, only to observe the credibility, that -one should be analogous or similar to the other: that therefore -every act of divine justice and goodness may be supposed to look -much beyond itself, and its immediate object; may have some -reference to other parts of God’s moral administration, and to a -general moral plan; and that every circumstance of this his moral -government may be adjusted beforehand with a view to the whole -of it. For example: the determined length of time, and the -degrees and ways, in which virtue is to remain in a state of warfare -and discipline, and in which wickedness is permitted to have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[174]</a></span> -its progress; the times appointed for the execution of justice; -the appointed instruments of it; the kinds of rewards and punishments, -and the manners of their distribution; all particular instances -of divine justice and goodness, and every circumstance of -them, may have such respects to each other, as to make up altogether -a whole, connected and related in all its parts; a scheme -or system, which is as properly such, as the natural world is, and -of the like kind. Supposing this to be the case, it is most evident, -that we are not competent judges of this scheme, from the -small parts of it which come within our view in the present life: -therefore no objections against any of these parts can be insisted -upon by reasonable men.<a name="FNanchor_123" id="FNanchor_123"></a><a href="#Footnote_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a></p> - -<p>This our ignorance, and the consequence here drawn from it, -are universally acknowledged upon <em>other</em> occasions; and though -scarce denied, yet are universally forgot, when persons come to -argue against religion. And it is not perhaps easy, even for the -most reasonable men, always to bear in mind the degree of our -ignorance, and make due allowances for it. Upon these accounts, -it may not be useless to go a little further, in order to show more -distinctly, how just an answer our ignorance is, to objections -against the scheme of Providence. Suppose then a person boldly -to assert,<a name="FNanchor_124" id="FNanchor_124"></a><a href="#Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a> that the things complained of, the origin and continuance -of evil, might easily have been prevented by repeated interpositions;<a name="FNanchor_125" id="FNanchor_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a> -interpositions so guarded and circumstanced, as would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[175]</a></span> -preclude all mischief arising from them. Or, if this were impracticable, -that a <em>scheme</em> of government is itself an imperfection, -since more good might have been produced, without any scheme, -system, or constitution at all, by continued single unrelated acts -of distributive justice and goodness; because these would have -occasioned no irregularities. Farther than this, it is presumed, -the objections will not be carried. Yet the answer is obvious: -that were these assertions true, still the observations above, concerning -our ignorance in the scheme of divine government and -the consequence drawn from it, would hold, in great measure; -enough to vindicate religion, against all objections from the disorders -of the present state. Were these assertions true, yet the -government of the world might be just and good notwithstanding; -for, at the most, they would infer nothing more than that it -might have been better. But they are mere arbitrary assertions; -no man being sufficiently acquainted with the possibilities of -things, to bring any proof of them to the lowest degree of probability. -For however possible what is asserted may seem, yet -many instances may be alleged, in things much less out of our -reach, of suppositions absolutely impossible, and reducible to the -most palpable self contradictions, which, not every one would perceive -to be such; nor perhaps any one, at first sight suspect.</p> - -<p>From these things, it is easy to see distinctly, how our ignorance, -as it is the common, so it is really a satisfactory answer, -to all objections against the justice and goodness of Providence. -If a man, contemplating any one providential dispensation, which -had no relation to any others, should object, that he discerned in -it a disregard to justice, or a deficiency of goodness; nothing -would be less an answer to such objection, than our ignorance in -other parts of providence, or in the possibilities of things, no way -related to what he was contemplating. But when we know not -but the part objected against may be relative to other parts unknown -to us; and when we are unacquainted with what is, in -the nature of the thing, practicable in the case before us; then -our ignorance is a satisfactory answer; because, some unknown -relation, or some unknown impossibility, may render what is -objected against, just and good; nay good in the highest practicable -degree.</p> - -<p>II. How little weight is to be laid upon such objections, will<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[176]</a></span> -further appear, by a more distinct observation of some particular -things contained in the natural government of God, the like to -which may be supposed, from analogy, to be contained in his -moral government.</p> - -<p><i>First</i>, As in the scheme of the natural world, no ends appear -to be accomplished without means: so we find that means very -undesirable, often conduce to bring about ends in such a measure -desirable, as greatly to overbalance the disagreeableness of the -means. And in cases where such means are conducive to such -ends, it is not reason, but <em>experience</em>, which shows us, that they -are thus conducive. Experience also shows many means to be -conducive and necessary to accomplish ends, which means, before -experience, we should have thought, would have had even a contrary -tendency. From these observations relating to the natural -scheme of the world, the moral being supposed analogous to it, -arises a great credibility, that the putting our misery in each -other’s power to the degree it is, and making men liable to vice -to the degree we are; and in general, that those things which -are objected against the moral scheme of Providence, may be, -upon the whole, friendly and assistant to virtue, and productive -of an overbalance of happiness: <i>i.e.</i> the things objected against -may be means, by which an overbalance of good, will in the end, -be found produced. And from the same observations, it appears -to be no presumption against this, that we do not, if indeed we -do not, see those means to have any such tendency, or that they -seem to us to have a contrary one. Thus those things, which we -call irregularities, may not be so at all; because they may be -means of accomplishing wise and good ends more considerable. -It may be added, as above, that they may also be the only means, -by which these wise and good ends are capable of being accomplished.</p> - -<p>It may be proper to add, in order to obviate an absurd and -wicked conclusion from any of these observations, that though -the constitution of our nature, from whence we are capable of -vice and misery, may, as it undoubtedly does, contribute to the -perfection and happiness of the world; and though the actual -permission of evil may be beneficial to it: (<i>i.e.</i> it would have -been more mischievous, not that a wicked person had himself -abstained from his own wickedness, but that any one had forcibly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[177]</a></span> -prevented it, than that it was permitted:) yet notwithstanding, -it might have been much better for the world, if this very evil -had never been done. Nay it is most clearly conceivable, that -the very commission of wickedness may be beneficial to the world, -and yet, that it would be infinitely more beneficial for men to refrain -from it. For thus, in the wise and good constitution of the -natural world, there are disorders which bring their own cures; -diseases, which are themselves remedies. Many a man would -have died, had it not been for the gout or a fever; yet it would -be thought madness to assert, that sickness is a better or more -perfect state than health; though the like, with regard to the -moral world, has been asserted.</p> - -<p><i>Secondly</i>, The natural government of the world is carried on -by general laws. For this there may be wise and good reasons: -the wisest and best, for aught we know to the contrary. And -that there are such reasons, is suggested to our thoughts by the -analogy of nature; by our being made to experience good ends -to be accomplished, as indeed all the good which we enjoy is -accomplished, by this means,—viz.: that the laws, by which the -world is governed, are general. We have scarce any kind of -enjoyments, but what we are, in some way or other, instrumental -in procuring ourselves, by acting in a manner which we <em>foresee</em> -likely to procure them: now this foresight could not be at all, -were not the government of the world carried on by general laws. -And though, for aught we know to the contrary, every single -case may be, at length, found to have been provided for even by -these: yet to prevent all irregularities, or remedy them as they -arise, by the wisest and best general laws, may be impossible in -the nature of things; as we see it is absolutely impossible in civil -government.</p> - -<p>But then we are ready to think, that, the constitution of nature -remaining as it is, and the course of things being permitted to go -on, in other respects, as it does, there might be interpositions to -prevent irregularities; though they could not have been prevented, -or remedied by any general laws. There would indeed -be reason to wish, which, by-the-way, is very different from a -right to claim, that all irregularities were prevented or remedied -by present interpositions, if these interpositions would have no -other effect than this. But it is plain they would have some<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[178]</a></span> -visible and immediate <em>bad</em> effects: for instance, they would -encourage idleness and negligence; and they would render -doubtful the natural rule of life, which is ascertained by this -very thing, that the course of the world is carried on by general -laws. And further, it is certain they would have <em>distant</em> effects, -and very great ones too; by means of the wonderful connections -before mentioned.<a name="FNanchor_126" id="FNanchor_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a> So that we cannot so much as guess, what -would be the whole result of the interpositions desired. It may -be said, any bad result might be prevented by further interpositions, -whenever there was occasion for them: but this again is -talking quite at random, and in the dark.<a name="FNanchor_127" id="FNanchor_127"></a><a href="#Footnote_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a></p> - -<p>Upon the whole then, we see wise reasons, why the course of -the world should be carried on by general laws, and good ends -accomplished by this means: and for aught we know, there -may be the wisest reasons for it, and the best ends accomplished -by it. We have no ground to believe, that all irregularities could -be remedied as they arise, or could have been precluded, by general -laws. We find that interpositions would produce evil, and -prevent good: and, for aught we know, they would produce -greater evil than they would prevent; and prevent greater good -than they would produce. And if this be the case, then the not -interposing is so far from being a ground of complaint, that it is -an instance of goodness. This is intelligible and sufficient: and -going further, seems beyond the utmost reach of our faculties.</p> - -<p>It may be said, that “after all, these supposed impossibilities -and relations are what we are unacquainted with; and we must -judge of religion, as of other things, by what we do know, and -look upon the rest as nothing: or however, that the answers here -given to what is objected against religion, may equally be made -use of to invalidate the proof of it; since their stress lies so -very much upon our ignorance.” But,</p> - -<p><i>First</i>, Though total ignorance in any matter does indeed -equally destroy, or rather preclude, all proof concerning it, and -objections against it; yet partial ignorance does not. For we -may in any degree be convinced, that a person is of such a character, -and consequently will pursue such ends; though we are -greatly ignorant, what is the proper way of acting, in order the -most effectually to obtain those ends: and in this case, objections<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[179]</a></span> -against his manner of acting, as seemingly not conducive to obtain -them, might be answered by our ignorance; though the -proof that such ends were intended, might not at all be invalidated -by it. Thus, the proof of religion is a proof of the moral -character of God, and consequently that his government is moral, -and that every one upon the whole shall receive according to his -deserts; a proof that this is the designed end of his government. -But we are not competent judges, what is the proper way of -acting, in order the most effectually to accomplish this end.<a name="FNanchor_128" id="FNanchor_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a> -Therefore our ignorance is an answer to objections against the -conduct of Providence, in permitting irregularities, as seeming -contradictory to this end. Now, since it is so obvious, that our -ignorance may be a satisfactory answer to objections against a -thing, and yet not affect the proof of it; till it can be shown, it -is frivolous to assert, that our ignorance invalidates the proof of -religion, as it does the objections against it.</p> - -<p><i>Secondly</i>, Suppose unknown impossibilities, and unknown relations, -might justly be urged to invalidate the proof of religion, -as well as to answer objections against it; and that, in consequence -of this, the proof of it were doubtful. Still, let the -assertion be despised, or let it be ridiculed, it is undeniably true, -that moral obligations would remain certain, though it were not -certain what would, upon the whole, be the consequences of -observing or violating them. For, these obligations arise, immediately -and necessarily, from the judgment of our own mind, -unless perverted, which we cannot violate without being self-condemned. -And they would be certain too, from considerations -of interest. For though it were doubtful, what will be the future -consequences of virtue and vice; yet it is, however, credible, -that they may have those consequences, which religion teaches -us they will: and this credibility is a certain<a name="FNanchor_129" id="FNanchor_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a> obligation in point -of prudence, to abstain from all wickedness, and to live in the -conscientious practice of all that is good.</p> - -<p><i>Thirdly</i>, The answers above given to the objections against -religion cannot be made use of to invalidate the proof of it. -For, upon suspicion that God exercises a moral government over -the world, analogy does most strongly lead us to conclude, that -this moral government must be a scheme, or constitution, beyond<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[180]</a></span> -our comprehension. A thousand particular analogies show us, -that parts of such a scheme, from their relation to other parts, -may conduce to accomplish ends, which we should have thought -they had no tendency to accomplish: nay ends, which before experience, -we should have thought such parts were contradictory -to, and had a tendency to prevent. Therefore all these analogies -show, that the way of arguing made use of in objecting against -religion is delusive: because they show it is not at all incredible, -that, could we comprehend the whole, we should find the permission -of the disorders objected against to be consistent with -justice and goodness; and even to be instances of them. Now -this is not applicable to the proof of religion, as it is to the -objections against it;<a name="FNanchor_130" id="FNanchor_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a> and therefore cannot invalidate that proof, -as it does these objections.</p> - -<p><i>Lastly</i>, From the observation now made, it is easy to see, that -the answers above given to the objections against Providence, -though, in a general way of speaking, they may be said to be -taken from our ignorance; yet are by no means taken merely -from that, but from something which analogy shows us concerning -it. For analogy shows us positively, that our ignorance in -the possibilities of things, and the various relations in nature, -renders us incompetent judges, and leads us to false conclusions, -in cases similar to this, in which we pretend to judge and to -object. So that the things above insisted upon are not mere -suppositions of unknown impossibilities and relations: but they -are suggested to our thoughts, and even forced upon the observation -of serious men, and rendered credible too, by the analogy of -nature. Therefore to take these things into the account, is to -judge by experience and what we do know: and it is not judging -so, to take no notice of them.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<h3 id="I_CONCLUSION">CONCLUSION.</h3> - -<p>The observations of the last chapter lead us to consider this -little scene of human life, in which we are so busily engaged, as -having a reference, of some sort or other, to a much larger plan -of things. Whether we are, any way, related to the more distant<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[181]</a></span> -parts of the boundless universe, into which we are brought, -is altogether uncertain. But it is evident, that the course of -things, which comes within our view, is connected with some -things, past, present, and future, beyond it.<a name="FNanchor_131" id="FNanchor_131"></a><a href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a> So that we are -placed, as one may speak, in the middle of a scheme, not fixed -but progressive, every way incomprehensible: incomprehensible, -in a manner equally, with respect to what has been, what now is, -and what shall be. This scheme cannot but contain in it some -things as wonderful, and as much beyond our thought and conception,<a name="FNanchor_132" id="FNanchor_132"></a><a href="#Footnote_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a> -as any thing in that of religion. For, will any man in -his senses say, that it is less difficult to conceive, how the world -came to be and to continue as it is, without, than with, an intelligent -Author and Governor of it? Or, admitting an intelligent -Governor of it, that there is some other rule of government more -natural, and of easier conception, than that which we call moral? -Indeed, without an intelligent Author and Governor of nature, -no account at all can be given, how this universe, or the part of -it particularly in which we are concerned, came to be, and the -course of it to be carried on, as it is: nor any, of its general end -and design, without a moral governor of it. That there is an -intelligent Author of nature, and natural Governor of the world, -is a principle gone upon in the foregoing treatise; as proved, and -generally known, and confessed to be proved. And the very -notion of an intelligent Author of nature, proved by particular -final causes, implies a will and a character.<a name="FNanchor_133" id="FNanchor_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a></p> - -<p>Now, as our whole nature, the nature which he has given us, -leads us to conclude his will and character to be moral, just, and -good: so we can scarce in imagination conceive, what it can be -otherwise. However, in consequence of this his will and character, -whatever it be, he formed the universe as it is, and carries -on the course of it as he does, rather than in any other manner; -and has assigned to us, and to all living creatures, a part and a -lot in it. Irrational creatures act this their part, and enjoy and -undergo the pleasures and the pains allotted them, without any -reflection. But one would think it impossible, that creatures -endued with reason could avoid reflecting sometimes upon all -this; reflecting, if not from whence we came, yet, at least, -whither we are going; and what the mysterious scheme, in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[182]</a></span> -midst of which we find ourselves, will, at length, come out and -produce: a scheme in which it is certain we are highly interested, -and in which we may be interested even beyond conception.<a name="FNanchor_134" id="FNanchor_134"></a><a href="#Footnote_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a></p> - -<p>For many things prove it palpably absurd to conclude, that -we shall cease to be, at death. Particular analogies do most -sensibly show us, that there is nothing to be thought strange, in -our being to exist in another state of life. And that we are now -living beings, affords a strong probability that we shall <em>continue</em> -so; unless there be some positive ground, and there is none from -reason or analogy, to think death will destroy us. Were a persuasion -of this kind ever so well grounded, there would, surely, -be little reason to take pleasure in it. Indeed it can have no -other ground, than some such imagination, as that of our gross -bodies being ourselves; which is contrary to experience. Experience -too most clearly shows us the folly of concluding, from the -body and the living agent affecting each other mutually, that the -dissolution of the former is the destruction of the latter. And -there are remarkable instances of their <em>not</em> affecting each other, -which lead us to a contrary conclusion. The supposition, then, -which in all reason we are to go upon, is, that our living nature -will <em>continue</em> after death. And it is infinitely unreasonable to -form an institution of life, or to act, upon any other supposition.</p> - -<p>All expectation of immortality, whether more or less certain, -opens an unbounded prospect to our hopes and our fears: since -we see the constitution of nature is such, as to admit of misery, -as well as to be productive of happiness, and experience ourselves -to partake of both in some degree; and since we cannot but know, -what higher degrees of both we are capable of. And there is no -presumption against believing further, that our future interest -depends upon our present behavior: for we see our present interest -doth; and that the happiness and misery, which are naturally -annexed to our actions, very frequently do not follow, till -long after the actions are done, to which they are respectively -annexed. So that were speculation to leave us uncertain, whether -it were likely, that the Author of nature, in giving happiness -and misery to his creatures, hath regard to their actions or not, -yet, since we find by experience that he hath such regard, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[183]</a></span> -whole sense of things which he has given us, plainly leads us, at -once and without any elaborate inquiries, to think that it may, -indeed must, be to good actions chiefly that he hath annexed -happiness, and to bad actions misery; or that he will, upon the -whole, reward those who do well, and punish those who do evil.</p> - -<p>To confirm this from the constitution of the world, it has been -observed, that some sort of moral government is necessarily implied -in that natural government of God, which we experience -ourselves under; that good and bad actions, at present, are naturally -rewarded and punished, not only as beneficial and mischievous -to society, but also as virtuous and vicious: and that there is, in -the very nature of the thing, a tendency to their being rewarded -and punished in a much higher degree than they are at present. -And though this higher degree of distributive justice, which -nature thus points out and leads towards, is prevented for a time -from taking place; it is by obstacles, which the state of this world -unhappily throws in its way, and which therefore are in their -nature temporary. Now, as these things in the natural conduct -of Providence are observable on the side of virtue; so there is -nothing to be set against them on the side of vice. A moral -scheme of government then is visibly established, and, in some -degree, carried into execution: and this, together with the essential -tendencies of virtue and vice duly considered, naturally raise -in us an apprehension, that it will be carried on further towards -perfection in a future state, and that every one shall there receive -according to his deserts.</p> - -<p>And if this be so, then our future and general interest, under -the moral government of God, is appointed to depend upon our -behavior; notwithstanding the difficulty, which this may occasion, -of securing it, and the danger of losing it: just in the same manner -as our temporal interest, under his natural government, is -appointed to depend upon our behavior; notwithstanding the -like difficulty and danger. For, from our original constitution, -and that of the world which we inhabit, we are naturally trusted -with ourselves; with our own conduct and our own interest. -And from the same constitution of nature, especially joined with -that course of things which is owing to men, we have temptations -to be unfaithful in this trust; to forfeit this interest, to neglect -it, and run ourselves into misery and ruin. From these temptations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[184]</a></span> -arise the difficulties of behaving so as to secure our temporal -interest, and the hazard of behaving so as to miscarry in it. -There is therefore nothing incredible in supposing there may be -the like difficulty and hazard with regard to that chief and final -good, which religion lays before us.</p> - -<p>The whole account, how it came to pass that we were placed -in such a condition as this, must indeed be beyond our comprehension. -But it is in part accounted for by what religion teaches -us, that the character of virtue and piety must be a necessary -qualification for a future state of security and happiness, under -the moral government of God; in like manner, as some certain -qualifications or other are necessary for every particular condition -of life, under his natural government: and that the present state -was intended to be a school of discipline, for improving in ourselves -that character. Now this intention of nature is rendered -highly credible by observing; that we are plainly made for improvement -of all kinds; that it is a general appointment of Providence, -that we cultivate practical principles, and form within -ourselves habits of action, in order to become fit for what we were -wholly unfit for before; that in particular, childhood and youth -is naturally appointed to be a state of discipline for mature age; -and that the present world is peculiarly fitted for a state of moral -discipline. And, whereas objections are urged against the whole -notion of moral government and a probationary state, from the -opinion of necessity; it has been shown, that God has given us -the evidence, as it were, of experience, that all objections against -religion, on this head, are vain and delusive. He has also, in -his natural government, suggested an answer to all our short-sighted -objections, against the equity and goodness of his moral -government; and in general he has exemplified to us the latter -by the former.</p> - -<p>These things, which it is to be remembered, are matters of -fact, ought, in all common sense, to awaken mankind; to induce -them to consider in earnest their condition, and what they have -to do. It is absurd, absurd to the degree of being ridiculous, if -the subject were not of so serious a kind, for men to think themselves -secure in a vicious life; or even in that immoral thoughtlessness, -into which far the greatest part of them are fallen. The -credibility of religion, arising from experience and facts here considered,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[185]</a></span> -is fully sufficient, in reason, to engage them to live in -the general practice of all virtue and piety; under the serious -apprehension, though it should be mixed with some doubt,<a name="FNanchor_135" id="FNanchor_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a> of a -righteous administration established in nature, and a future judgment -in consequence of it: especially when we consider, how -very questionable it is, whether any thing at all can be gained by -vice,<a name="FNanchor_136" id="FNanchor_136"></a><a href="#Footnote_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a> how unquestionably little as well as precarious, the pleasures -and profits of it are at the best, and how soon they must be parted -with at the longest. For, in the deliberations of reason, concerning -what we are to pursue and what to avoid, as temptations to -any thing from mere passion are supposed out of the case, so inducements -to vice, from cool expectations of pleasure and interest -so small and uncertain and short, are really so insignificant, as, in -the view of reason to be almost nothing in <em>themselves</em>; and in -comparison with the importance of religion they quite disappear -and are lost.</p> - -<p>Mere passion may indeed be alleged, though not as a reason, -yet as an excuse, for a vicious course of life. And how sorry an -excuse it is, will be manifest by observing, that we are placed in -a condition in which we are unavoidably inured to govern our -passions, by being necessitated to govern them: and to lay ourselves -under the same kind of restraints, and as great ones too, -from temporal regards, as virtue and piety, in the ordinary course -of things, require. The plea of ungovernable passion then, on -the side of vice, is the poorest of all things; for it is no reason, -and a poor excuse. The proper <em>motives</em> to religion are the proper -<em>proofs</em> of it, from our moral nature, from the presages of conscience, -and our natural apprehension of God under the character -of a righteous Governor and Judge: a nature, and conscience, -and apprehension, given us by him; and from the confirmation -of the dictates of reason, by <em>life and immortality brought to light -by the Gospel; and the wrath of God revealed from heaven -against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men</em>.</p> - -<p class="titlepage">END OF THE FIRST PART.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[186]</a></span></p> - -<h2 id="PART_II">PART II.<br /> -<span class="smaller">Revealed Religion.</span></h2> - -<h3 id="II_CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I.<br /> -<span class="smaller">THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.<a name="FNanchor_137" id="FNanchor_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_137" class="fnanchor">[137]</a></span></h3> - -<p>Some persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency of the light -of nature, avowedly reject all revelation, as in its very notion incredible, -and what must be fictitious. And indeed it is certain, -no revelation would have been given, had the light of nature -been sufficient in such a sense, as to render one not wanted and -useless. But no man, in seriousness and simplicity of mind, can -possibly think it so, who considers the state of religion in the -heathen world before revelation, and its present state in those -places which have borrowed no light from it: particularly the -doubtfulness of some of the greatest men, concerning things of -the utmost importance, as well as the natural inattention and -ignorance of mankind in general. It is impossible to say, who -would have been able to have reasoned out that whole system, -which we call Natural Religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[187]</a></span> -of superstition: but there is certainly no ground to affirm that -the generality could. If they could, there is no sort of probability -that they would. Admitting there were, they would highly -want a standing admonition to remind them of it, and inculcate -it upon them.</p> - -<p>And further, were they as much disposed to attend to religion, -as the better sort of men are; yet even upon this supposition, -there would be various occasions for supernatural instruction and -assistance, and the greatest advantages might be afforded by -them.<a name="FNanchor_138" id="FNanchor_138"></a><a href="#Footnote_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a> So that to say revelation is a thing superfluous, what -there was no need of, and what can be of no service, is, I think, to -talk quite wildly and at random. Nor would it be more extravagant -to affirm, that mankind is so entirely at ease in the present -state, and life so completely happy, that it is a contradiction to -suppose our condition capable of being, in any respect, better.</p> - -<p>There are other persons, not to be ranked with these, who -seem to be getting into a way of neglecting, and as it were, overlooking -revelation, as of small importance provided natural religion -be kept to. With little regard either to the evidence of -the former, or to the objections against it, and even upon supposition -of its truth; “the only design of it,” say they, “must -be, to establish a belief of the moral system of nature, and to -enforce the practice of natural piety and virtue. The belief and -practice of these were, perhaps, much promoted by the first publication -of Christianity: but whether they are believed and practised, -upon the evidence and motives of nature or of revelation, -is no great matter,”<a name="FNanchor_139" id="FNanchor_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a> This way of considering revelation, though<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[188]</a></span> -it is not the same with the former, yet borders nearly upon it, -and very much, at length runs up into it: and requires to be -particularly considered, with regard to the persons who seem to -be getting into this way. The consideration of it will likewise -further show the extravagance of the former opinion, and the -truth of the observations in answer to it, just mentioned. And -an inquiry into the importance of Christianity, cannot be an -improper introduction to a treatise concerning the credibility -of it.</p> - -<p>Now, if God has given a revelation to mankind, and commanded -those things which are commanded in Christianity; it is -evident, at first sight, that it cannot in any wise be an indifferent -matter, whether we obey or disobey those commands: unless we -are certainly assured, that we know all the reasons for them, and -that all those reasons are now ceased, with regard to mankind in -general, or to ourselves in particular. It is absolutely impossible -we can be assured of this.<a name="FNanchor_140" id="FNanchor_140"></a><a href="#Footnote_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a> For our ignorance of these reasons -proves nothing in the case: since the whole analogy of nature -shows, what is indeed in itself evident, that there may be infinite -reasons for things, with which we are not acquainted.</p> - -<p>But the importance of Christianity will more distinctly appear, -by considering it more distinctly: <i>First</i>, as a republication, and -external institution, of natural or essential religion, adapted to -the present circumstances of mankind, and intended to promote -natural piety and virtue: <i>Secondly</i>, as containing an account of -a dispensation of things, not discoverable by reason, in consequence -of which several distinct precepts are enjoined us. For -though natural religion is the foundation and principal part of -Christianity, it is not in any sense the whole of it.</p> - -<p>I. Christianity is a republication of Natural religion. It instructs -mankind in the moral system of the world: that it is the -work of an infinitely perfect Being, and under his government, -that virtue is his law, and that he will finally judge mankind in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[189]</a></span> -righteousness, and render to all according to their works, in a -future state. And, which is very material, it teaches natural -religion in its genuine simplicity; free from those superstitions, -with which it was totally corrupted, and under which it was in a -manner lost.</p> - -<p>Revelation is, further, an <em>authoritative</em> publication of natural -religion, and so affords the evidence of testimony for the truth -of it. Indeed the miracles and prophecies recorded in Scripture, -were intended to prove a particular dispensation of Providence, -<i>i.e.</i> the redemption of the world by the Messiah: but this does not -hinder, but that they may also prove God’s general providence -over the world, as our moral governor and judge. And they -evidently do prove it; because this character of the Author of -nature, is necessarily connected with and implied in that particular -revealed dispensation of things: it is likewise continually -taught expressly, and insisted upon, by those persons who -wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies. So that -indeed natural religion seems as much proved by the Scripture -revelation, as it would have been, had the design of revelation -been nothing else than to prove it.</p> - -<p>But it may possibly be disputed, how far miracles can prove -natural religion; and notable objections may be urged against -this proof of it, considered as a matter of speculation: but -considered as a practical thing, there can be none. For -suppose a person to teach natural religion to a nation, who -bid lived in total ignorance or forgetfulness of it; and to -declare that he was commissioned by God so to do; suppose him, -in proof of his commission, to foretell things future, which no -human foresight could have guessed at; to divide the sea with a -word; feed great multitudes with bread from heaven; cure all -manner of diseases; and raise the dead, even himself, to life; -would not this give additional credibility to his teaching, a credibility -beyond what that of a common man would have; and be -an authoritative publication of the law of nature, <i>i.e.</i> a new -proof of it? It would be a practical one, of the strongest kind, -perhaps, which human creatures are capable of having given -them. The Law of Moses then, and the Gospel of Christ, are -authoritative publications of the religion of nature; they afford -a proof of God’s general providence, as moral Governor of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[190]</a></span> -world, as well as of his particular dispensations of providence -towards sinful creatures, revealed in the Law and the Gospel. -As they are the only evidence of the latter, so they are an additional -evidence of the former.</p> - -<p>To show this further, let us suppose a man of the greatest and -most improved capacity, who had never heard of revelation, convinced -upon the whole, notwithstanding the disorders of the -world, that it was under the direction and moral government of -an infinitely perfect Being; but ready to question, whether he -were not got beyond the reach of his faculties: suppose him -brought, by this suspicion, into great danger of being carried -away by the universal bad example of almost every one around -him, who appeared to have no sense, no practical sense at least, -of these things: and this, perhaps, would be as advantageous a -situation with regard to religion, as nature alone ever placed any -man in. What a confirmation now must it be to such a person, -all at once, to find, that this moral system of things was revealed -to mankind, in the name of that infinite Being, whom he had -from principles of reason believed in: and that the publishers of -the revelation proved their commission from him, by making it -appear, that he had intrusted them with a power of suspending -and changing the general laws of nature.</p> - -<p>Nor must it by any means be omitted, for it is a thing of the -utmost importance, that life and immortality are eminently -brought to light by the Gospel. The great doctrines of a future -state, the danger of a course of wickedness<a name="FNanchor_141" id="FNanchor_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a> and the efficacy of -repentance, are not only confirmed in the Gospel, but are taught, -especially the last is, with a degree of light, to which that of -nature is but darkness.</p> - -<p>Further. As Christianity served these ends and purposes, -when it was first published, by the miraculous publication itself, -so it was intended to serve the same purposes in future ages, by -means of the settlement of a visible church:<a name="FNanchor_142" id="FNanchor_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_142" class="fnanchor">[142]</a> of a society, distinguished<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[191]</a></span> -from common ones, and from the rest of the world, by -peculiar religious institutions; by an instituted method of instruction, -and an instituted form of external religion. Miraculous -powers were given to the first preachers of Christianity, in order -to their introducing it into the world: a visible church was established, -in order to continue it, and carry it on successively -throughout all ages. Had only Moses and the prophets, Christ -and his apostles, taught, and by miracles proved, religion to their -contemporaries; the benefits of their instructions would have -reached but a small part of mankind. Christianity must have -been, in a great degree, sunk and forgot in a very few ages. To -prevent this, appears to have been one reason why a visible -church was instituted; to be like a city upon a hill, a standing -memorial to the world of the duty which we owe our Maker: to -call men continually, both by example and instruction, to attend -to it, and, by the form of religion, ever before their eyes, remind -them of the reality; to be the repository of the oracles of God; -to hold up the light of revelation in aid to that of nature, and to -propagate it, throughout all generations, to the end of the world—the -light of revelation, considered here in no other view, than as -designed to enforce natural religion. And in proportion as -Christianity is professed and taught in the world, religion, natural -or essential religion, is thus distinctly and advantageously laid -before mankind, and brought again and again to their thoughts, -as a matter of infinite importance.</p> - -<p>A visible church has also a further tendency to promote natural -religion, as being an instituted method of education, originally -intended to be of peculiar advantage to those who conform to it. -For one end of the institution was, that, by admonition and reproof, -as well as instruction, by a general regular discipline, and -public exercises of religion, <em>the body of Christ</em>, as the Scripture -speaks, should be <em>edified</em>; <i>i.e.</i> trained up in piety and virtue for -a higher and better state. This settlement, then, appearing thus<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[192]</a></span> -beneficial, tending in the nature of the thing to answer, and, in -some degree, actually answering, those ends, it is to be remembered, -that the very notion of it implies positive institutions; for -the visibility of the church consists in them. Take away every -thing of this kind, and you lose the very notion itself. So that -if the things now mentioned are advantages, the reason and importance -of positive institutions in general is most obvious; since -without them these advantages could not be secured to the world. -And it is mere idle wantonness, to insist upon knowing the -reasons, <em>why</em> such particular ones were fixed upon rather than -others.</p> - -<p>The benefit arising from this supernatural assistance, which -Christianity affords to natural religion, is what some persons are -very slow in apprehending. And yet it is a thing distinct in -itself, and a very plain obvious one. For will any in good earnest -really say, that the bulk of mankind in the heathen world were -in as advantageous a situation, with regard to natural religion, as -they are now among us: that it was laid before them, and enforced -upon them, in a manner as distinct, and as much tending -to influence their practice?</p> - -<p>The objections against all this, from the perversion of Christianity, -and from the supposition of its having had but little good -influence, however innocently they may be proposed, cannot be -insisted upon as conclusive, upon any principles, but such as lead -to downright Atheism; because the manifestation of the law of -nature by reason, which, upon all principles of Theism, must -have been from God, has been perverted and rendered ineffectual -in the same manner. It may indeed, I think, truly be said, that -the good effects of Christianity have not been small; nor its supposed -ill effects, any effects at all of it, properly speaking. Perhaps, -too, the things done have been aggravated; and if not, -Christianity hath been often only a pretence, and the same evils -in the main would have been done upon some other pretence. -However, great and shocking as the corruptions and abuses of it -have really been, they cannot be insisted upon as arguments -against it, upon principles of Theism. For one cannot proceed -one step in reasoning upon natural religion, any more than upon -Christianity, without laying it down as a first principle, that the -dispensations of Providence are not to be judged of by their perversions,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[193]</a></span> -but by their genuine tendencies: not by what they do -actually seem to effect, but by what they would effect if mankind -did their part; that part which is justly put and left upon them. -It is altogether as much the language of one as of the other: <cite>He -that is unjust, let him be unjust still: and he that is holy, let him -be holy still.</cite><a name="FNanchor_143" id="FNanchor_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a> The light of reason does not, any more than that -of revelation, force men to submit to its authority; both admonish -them of what they ought to do and avoid, together with the consequences -of each; and after this, leave them at full liberty to -act just as they please, till the appointed time of judgment. -Every moment’s experience shows, that this is God’s general rule -of government.<a name="FNanchor_144" id="FNanchor_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_144" class="fnanchor">[144]</a></p> - -<p>To return then: Christianity being a promulgation of the law -of nature; being moreover an authoritative promulgation of it; -with new light, and other circumstances of peculiar advantage, -adapted to the wants of mankind; these things fully show its -importance.</p> - -<p>It is to be observed further, that as the nature of the case requires, -so all Christians are commanded to contribute, by their -profession of Christianity, to preserve it in the world, and render -it such a promulgation and enforcement of religion. For it is -the very scheme of the Gospel, that each Christian should, in his -degree, contribute towards continuing and carrying it on: all by -uniting in the public profession and external practice of Christianity; -some by instructing, by having the oversight and taking -care of this religious community, the church of God. Now this -further shows the importance of Christianity; and, which is what -I chiefly intend, its importance in a practical sense: or the high -obligations we are under, to take it into our most serious consideration; -and the danger there must necessarily be, not only in treating<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[194]</a></span> -it despitefully, which I am not now speaking of, but in disregarding -and neglecting it. For this is neglecting to do what -is expressly enjoined us, for continuing those benefits to the -world, and transmitting them down to future times. And all -this holds, even though the only thing to be considered in Christianity -were its subserviency to natural religion.</p> - -<p>II. Christianity is to be considered in a further view; as containing -an account of a dispensation of things, not at all discoverable -by reason, in consequence of which several distinct -precepts are enjoined us. Christianity is not only an external -institution of natural religion, and a new promulgation of God’s -general providence, as righteous governor and judge of the world; -but it contains also a revelation of a particular dispensation of -Providence, carrying on by his Son and Spirit, for the recovery -and salvation of mankind, who are represented in Scripture to -be in a state of ruin. And in consequence of this revelation -being made, we are commanded <em>to be baptized</em>, not only <em>in the -name of the Father</em>, but also, <em>of the Son</em>, <em>and of the Holy -Ghost</em>: and other obligations of duty, unknown before, to the -Son and the Holy Ghost, are revealed. Now the importance of -these duties may be judged of, by observing that they arise, not -from positive command merely, but also from the offices which -appear, from Scripture, to belong to those divine persons in the -Gospel dispensation; or from the relations, which we are there -informed, they stand in to us. By <em>reason</em> is revealed the relation, -which God the Father stands in to us. Hence arises the -obligation of duty which we are under to him. In <em>Scripture</em> are -revealed the relations, which the Son and Holy Spirit stand in -to us. Hence arise the obligations of duty;<a name="FNanchor_145" id="FNanchor_145"></a><a href="#Footnote_145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a> which we are under -to them. The truth of the case, as one may speak, in each of -these three respects being admitted: that God is the governor -of the world, upon the evidence of reason; that Christ is the -mediator between God and man, and the Holy Ghost our guide -and sanctifier, upon the evidence of revelation: the truth of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[195]</a></span> -case, I say, in each of these respects being admitted, it is no -more a question, why it should be commanded, that we be baptized -in the name of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, than that -we be baptized in the name of the Father. This matter seems -to require to be more fully stated.<a name="FNanchor_146" id="FNanchor_146"></a><a href="#Footnote_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a></p> - -<p>Let it be remembered then, that religion comes under the -twofold consideration of internal and external: for the latter is -as real a part of religion, of true religion, as the former. Now, -when religion is considered under the first notion, as an inward -principle, to be exerted in such and such inward acts of the mind -and heart, the essence of natural religion may be said to consist -in religious regards to <em>God the Father Almighty</em>: and the essence -of revealed religion, as distinguished from natural, to consist in -religious regards to <em>the Son</em>, and to <em>the Holy Ghost</em>. The obligation -we are under, of paying these religious regards to each of -these divine persons respectively, arises from the respective relations -which they each stand in to us. How these relations are -made known, whether by reason or revelation, makes no alteration -in the case: because the duties arise out of the relations themselves, -not out of the manner in which we are informed of them. -The Son and Spirit have each his proper office in that great dispensation -of Providence, the redemption of the world; the one -our Mediator, the other our Sanctifier. Does not then the duty -of religious regards to both these divine persons, as immediately -arise to the view of reason, out of the very nature of these offices -and relations; as the good-will and kind intention, which we owe -to our fellow-creatures, arise out of the common relations between -us and them? But it will be asked, “What are the inward -religious regards, appearing thus obviously due to the Son -and Holy Spirit; as arising, not merely from command in Scripture, -but from the very nature of the revealed relations, which -they stand in to us?” I answer, the religious regards of reverence, -honor, love, trust, gratitude, fear, hope.</p> - -<p>In what external manner this inward worship is to be expressed, -is a matter of pure revealed command, as perhaps the -external manner, in which God the Father is to be worshipped, -may be more so than we are ready to think. But the worship,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[196]</a></span> -the internal worship itself, to the Son and Holy Ghost, is no -further matter of pure revealed command, than as the relations -they stand in to us are matter of pure revelation: for the relations -being known, the obligations to such internal worship are -obligations of reason, arising out of those relations themselves. -In short, the history of the gospel as immediately shows us the -reason of these obligations, as it shows us the meaning of the -words, Son and Holy Ghost.</p> - -<p>If this account of the Christian religion be just, those persons -who can speak lightly of it, as of little consequence, provided -natural religion be kept to, plainly forget, that Christianity, even -what is peculiarly so called, as distinguished from natural religion, -has yet somewhat very important, even of a moral nature. -For the office of our Lord being made known, and the relation -he stands in to us, the obligation of religious regards to him is -plainly moral, as much as charity to mankind is; since this obligation -arises, before external command, immediately out of that -his office and relation itself. Those persons appear to forget, -that revelation is to be considered, as informing us of somewhat -new, in the state of mankind,<a name="FNanchor_147" id="FNanchor_147"></a><a href="#Footnote_147" class="fnanchor">[147]</a> and in the government of the -world: as acquainting us with some relations we stand in, which -could not otherwise have been known. These relations being real -(though before revelation we could be under no obligations from -them, yet upon their being revealed), there is no reason to think, -but that neglect of behaving suitably to them will be attended -with the same kind of consequences under God’s government, as -neglecting to behave suitably to any other relations, made known -to us by reason. Ignorance, whether unavoidable or voluntary, -so far as we can possibly see, will just as much, and just as little, -excuse in one case as in the other: the ignorance being supposed -equally unavoidable, or equally voluntary, in both cases.</p> - -<p>If therefore Christ be indeed the mediator between God and -man, <i>i.e.</i> if Christianity be true; if he be indeed our Lord, our -Savior, and our God, no one can say, what may follow, not only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[197]</a></span> -the obstinate, but the careless disregard to him, in those high -relations. Nay, no one can say, what may follow such disregard, -even in the way of natural consequence.<a name="FNanchor_148" id="FNanchor_148"></a><a href="#Footnote_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a> For, as the natural -consequences of vice in this life are doubtless to be considered as -judicial punishments inflicted by God, so for aught we know, the -judicial punishments of the future life may be, in a like way or -a like sense, the natural consequence of vice:<a name="FNanchor_149" id="FNanchor_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_149" class="fnanchor">[149]</a> of men’s violating -or disregarding the relations which God has placed them in here, -and made known to them.</p> - -<p>If mankind are corrupted and depraved in their moral character, -and so are unfit for that state, which Christ is gone to -prepare for his disciples; and if the assistance of God’s Spirit -be necessary to renew their nature, in the degree requisite to -their being qualified for that state; (all which is implied in the -express, though figurative declaration, <cite>Except a man be born of -the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God</cite>:<a name="FNanchor_150" id="FNanchor_150"></a><a href="#Footnote_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a>) supposing -this, is it possible any serious person can think it a slight matter, -whether or no he makes use of the means, expressly commanded -by God, for obtaining this divine assistance? Especially since -the whole analogy of nature shows, that we are not to expect -any benefits, without making use of the appointed means for -obtaining or enjoying them. Now reason shows us nothing, of -the particular immediate means of obtaining either temporal or -spiritual benefits. This therefore we must learn, either from -experience or revelation. And experience, the present case does -not admit of.</p> - -<p>The conclusion from all this evidently is, that Christianity -being supposed either true or credible, it is unspeakable irreverence, -and really the most presumptuous rashness, to treat it as a -light matter. It can never justly be esteemed of little consequence, -till it be positively supposed false. Nor do I know a -higher and more important obligation which we are under, than -that of examining most seriously into its evidence, supposing -its credibility; and of embracing it, upon supposition of its -truth.</p> - -<p>The two following deductions may be proper to be added, in -order to illustrate the foregoing observations, and to prevent their -being mistaken.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[198]</a></span></p> - -<p><i>First</i>, Hence we may clearly see, where lies the distinction -between what is positive and what is moral in religion. Moral -<em>precepts</em>, are precepts the reasons of which we see: positive <em>precepts</em>, -are precepts the reasons of which we do not see.<a name="FNanchor_151" id="FNanchor_151"></a><a href="#Footnote_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a> Moral -<em>duties</em> arise out of the nature of the case itself, prior to external -command. Positive <em>duties</em> do not arise out of the nature of the -case, but from external command; nor would they be duties at -all, were it not for such command, received from Him whose -creatures and subjects we are. But the manner in which the -nature of the case or the fact of the relation, is made known, this -doth not denominate any duty either positive or moral. That we -be baptized in the name of the Father is as much a positive duty, -as that we be baptized in the name of the Son, because both arise -equally from revealed command: though the relation which we -stand in to God the Father is made known to us by reason, and -the relation we stand in to Christ, by revelation only. On the -other hand, the dispensation of the Gospel being admitted, gratitude -as immediately becomes due to Christ, from his being the -voluntary minister of this dispensation, as it is due to God the -Father, from his being the fountain of all good; though the first -is made known to us by revelation only, the second by reason. -Hence also we may see, and, for distinctness’ sake, it may be -worth mentioning, that positive institutions come under a twofold -consideration. They are either institutions founded on natural -religion, as baptism in the name of the Father; (though this has -also a particular reference to the gospel dispensation, for it is in -the name of God, as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ:) or -they are external institutions founded on revealed religion; as -baptism in the name of the Son; and of the Holy Ghost.</p> - -<p><i>Secondly</i>, From the distinction between what is moral and -what is positive in religion, appears the ground of that peculiar -preference, which the Scripture teaches us to be due to the -former.</p> - -<p>The reason of positive institutions in general, is very obvious;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[199]</a></span> -though we should not see the reason, why particular ones are -pitched upon rather than others. Whoever, therefore, instead -of cavilling at words, will attend to the thing itself, may clearly -see, that positive institutions in general, as distinguished from -this or that particular one, have the nature of moral commands; -since the reasons of them appear. Thus, for instance, the <em>external</em> -worship of God is a moral duty, though no particular mode of it -be so. Care then is to be taken, when a comparison is made between -positive and moral duties, that they be compared no further -than as they are different; no further than as the former are -positive, or arise out of mere external command, the reasons of -which we are not acquainted with; and as the latter are moral, -or arise out of the apparent reason of the case, without such external -command. Unless this caution be observed, we shall run -into endless confusion.</p> - -<p>Now this being premised, suppose two standing precepts enjoined -by the same authority; that, in certain conjunctures, it is -impossible to obey both; that the former is moral, <i>i.e.</i> a precept -of which we see the reasons, and that they hold in the particular -case before us; but that the latter is positive, <i>i.e.</i> a precept of -which we do not see the reasons: it is indisputable that our obligations -are to obey the former; because there is an apparent -reason for this preference, and none against it. Further, positive -institutions, all those I suppose which Christianity enjoins, are -means to a moral end: and the end must be acknowledged more -excellent than the means.<a name="FNanchor_152" id="FNanchor_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a> Nor is observance of these institutions -any religious obedience at all, or of any value, otherwise than as -it proceeds from a moral principle. This seems to be the strict -logical way of stating and determining this matter; but will, perhaps, -be found less applicable to practice, than may be thought -at first sight.</p> - -<p>Therefore, in a more practical, though more lax way of consideration,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[200]</a></span> -and taking the words, <em>moral law</em> and <em>positive institutions</em>, -in the popular sense, I add, that the whole moral law is as -much matter of revealed command, as positive institutions are: -for the Scripture enjoins every moral virtue. In this respect -then they are both upon a level. But the moral law is, moreover, -written upon our hearts; interwoven into our very nature. And -this is a plain intimation of the Author of it, which is to be -preferred, when they interfere.</p> - -<p>But there is not altogether so much necessity for the determination -of this question, as some persons seem to think. Nor are -we left to reason alone to determine it. For, <i>First</i>, Though -mankind have, in all ages, been greatly prone to place their religion -in peculiar positive rites, by way of equivalent for obedience -to moral precepts; yet, without making any comparison at all -between them, and consequently without determining which is to -have the preference, the nature of the thing abundantly shows all -notions of that kind to be utterly subversive of true religion, as -they are, moreover, contrary to the whole general tenor of Scripture; -and likewise to the most express particular declarations of -it, that nothing can render us accepted of God, without moral -virtue.</p> - -<p><i>Secondly</i>, Upon the occasion of mentioning together positive -and moral duties, the Scripture always puts the stress of religion -upon the latter, and never upon the former. This, though no -sort of allowance to neglect the former, when they do not interfere -with the latter, is yet a plain intimation, that when they do, the -latter are to be preferred. And as mankind are for placing the -stress of their religion anywhere, rather than upon virtue; lest -both the reason of the thing, and the general spirit of Christianity, -appearing in the intimation now mentioned, should be ineffectual -against this prevalent folly, our Lord himself, from -whose command alone the obligation of positive institutions arises, -has taken occasion to make the comparison between them and -moral precepts; when the Pharisees censured him, for <em>eating -with publicans and sinners</em>; and also when they censured his -disciples, for <em>plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath day</em>. -Upon this comparison, he has determined expressly, and in form, -which shall have the preference when they interfere. And by -delivering his authoritative determination in a proverbial manner<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[201]</a></span> -of expression, he has made it general: <cite>I will have mercy, and -not sacrifice</cite>.<a name="FNanchor_153" id="FNanchor_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a> The propriety of the word <em>proverbial</em>, is not the -thing insisted upon: though I think the manner of speaking is -to be called so. But that the manner of speaking very remarkably -renders the determination general, is surely indisputable. -For, had it been said only, that God preferred mercy to the rigid -observance of the Sabbath, even then, by parity of reason, most -justly might we have argued, that he preferred mercy likewise, -to the observance of other ritual institutions; and in general, -moral duties, to positive ones. And thus the determination -would have been general; though its being so were inferred and -not expressed. But as the passage really stands in the Gospel, -it is much stronger. For the sense and the very literal words of -our Lord’s answer, are as applicable to any other instance of a -comparison, between positive and moral duties, as to that upon -which they were spoken. And if, in case of competition, mercy -is to be preferred to positive institutions, it will scarce be thought, -that justice is to give place to them. It is remarkable too, that, -as the words are a quotation from the Old Testament, they are -introduced, on both the forementioned occasions, with a declaration, -that the Pharisees did not understand the meaning of them. -This, I say, is very remarkable. For, since it is scarce possible, -for the most ignorant person, not to understand the literal sense -of the passage in the prophet;<a name="FNanchor_154" id="FNanchor_154"></a><a href="#Footnote_154" class="fnanchor">[154]</a> and since understanding the -literal sense would not have prevented their <em>condemning the guiltless</em>,<a name="FNanchor_155" id="FNanchor_155"></a><a href="#Footnote_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a> -it can hardly be doubted, that the thing which our Lord -really intended in that declaration was, that the Pharisees had -not learned from it, as they might, wherein the <em>general</em> spirit of -religion consists: that it consists in moral piety and virtue, as -distinguished from ritual observances. However, it is certain we -may learn this from his divine application of the passage, in the -Gospel.</p> - -<p>But, as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human nature, -when, upon a comparison of two things, one is found to be of -greater importance than the other, to consider this other as of -scarce any importance at all: it is highly necessary that we remind -ourselves, how great presumption it is, to make light of any -institutions of divine appointment; that our obligations to obey<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[202]</a></span> -all God’s commands whatever are absolute and indispensable; -and that commands merely positive, admitted to be from him, -lay us under a moral obligation to obey them: an obligation -moral in the strictest and most proper sense.</p> - -<p>To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the account now -given of Christianity most strongly shows and enforces upon us -the obligation of searching the Scriptures, in order to see, what -the scheme of revelation really is; instead of determining beforehand, -from reason, what the scheme of it must be.<a name="FNanchor_156" id="FNanchor_156"></a><a href="#Footnote_156" class="fnanchor">[156]</a> Indeed if -in revelation there be found any passages, the seeming meaning -of which is contrary to natural religion; we may most certainly -conclude, such seeming meaning not to be the real one.<a name="FNanchor_157" id="FNanchor_157"></a><a href="#Footnote_157" class="fnanchor">[157]</a> But it -is not any degree of a presumption against an interpretation of -Scripture, that such interpretation contains a doctrine, which the -light of nature cannot discover;<a name="FNanchor_158" id="FNanchor_158"></a><a href="#Footnote_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a> or a precept, which the law -of nature does not oblige to.</p> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<h3 id="II_CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II.<br /> -<span class="smaller">SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION CONSIDERED -AS MIRACULOUS.</span></h3> - -<p>Having shown the importance of the Christian revelation, -and the obligations which we are under seriously to attend to it, -upon supposition of its truth, or its credibility, the next thing in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[203]</a></span> -order, is to consider the supposed presumptions against revelation -in general; which shall be the subject of this chapter: and the -objections against the Christian in particular, which shall be the -subject of some following ones.<a name="FNanchor_159" id="FNanchor_159"></a><a href="#Footnote_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a> For it seems the most natural -method, to remove the prejudices against Christianity, before we -proceed to the consideration of the positive evidence for it, and -the objections against that evidence.<a name="FNanchor_160" id="FNanchor_160"></a><a href="#Footnote_160" class="fnanchor">[160]</a></p> - -<p>It is, I think, commonly supposed, that there is some peculiar -presumption, from the analogy of nature, against the Christian -scheme of things, at least against miracles; so as that stronger -evidence is necessary to prove the truth and reality of them, than -would be sufficient to convince us of other events, or matters of -fact. Indeed the consideration of this supposed presumption -cannot but be thought very insignificant, by many persons. Yet, -as it belongs to the subject of this treatise; so it may tend to -open the mind, and remove some prejudices, however needless -the consideration of it be, upon its own account.</p> - -<p>I. I find no appearance of a presumption, from the analogy of -nature, against the <em>general scheme</em> of Christianity, that God -created and invisibly governs the world by Jesus Christ; and by -him also will hereafter judge it in righteousness, <i>i.e.</i> render to -every one according to his works; and that good men are under -the secret influence of his Spirit. Whether these things are, or -are not, to be called miraculous, is perhaps only a question about -words; or however, is of no moment in the case. If the analogy -of nature raises any presumption against this general scheme of -Christianity, it must be, either because it is not discoverable by -reason or experience; or else, because it is unlike that course of -nature, which is. But analogy raises no presumption against the -truth of this scheme, upon either of these accounts.</p> - -<p><i>First</i>, There is no presumption, from analogy, against the truth -of it, upon account of its not being discoverable by reason or experience. -Suppose one who never heard of revelation, of the most -improved understanding, and acquainted with our whole system of -natural philosophy and natural religion; such a one could not but -be sensible, that it was but a very small part of the natural and -moral system of the universe, which he was acquainted with. -He could not but be sensible, that there must be innumerable<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[204]</a></span> -things, in the dispensations of Providence past, in the invisible -government over the world at present carrying on, and in what -is to come; of which he was wholly ignorant,<a name="FNanchor_161" id="FNanchor_161"></a><a href="#Footnote_161" class="fnanchor">[161]</a> and which could -not be discovered without revelation. Whether the scheme of -nature be, in the strictest sense, infinite or not; it is evidently -vast, even beyond all possible imagination. And doubtless that -part of it, which is open to our view, is but as a point in comparison -of the whole plan of Providence, reaching throughout -eternity past and future; in comparison of what is even now -going on, in the remote parts of the boundless universe, nay, in -comparison of the whole scheme of this world. And therefore, -that things lie beyond the natural reach of our faculties, is no -sort of presumption against the truth and reality of them; because -it is certain, there are innumerable things, in the constitution -and government of the universe, which are thus beyond the -natural reach of our faculties.</p> - -<p><i>Secondly</i>, Analogy raises no presumption against any of the -things contained in this general doctrine of Scripture now mentioned, -upon account of their being unlike the known course of -nature. For there is no presumption at all from analogy, that -the <em>whole</em> course of things, or divine government naturally unknown -to us, and <em>every thing</em> in it, is like to any thing in that -which is known; and therefore no peculiar presumption against -any thing in the former, upon account of its being unlike to any -thing in the latter. And in the constitution and natural government -of the world, as well as in the moral government of it, we -see things, in a great degree, unlike one another: and therefore -ought not to wonder at such unlikeness between things visible -and invisible. However, the scheme of Christianity is by no -means entirely unlike the scheme of nature; as will appear in -the following part of this treatise.</p> - -<p>The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of a divine -mission, has been stated with great exactness by divines; and is, -I think, sufficiently understood by every one. There are also -invisible miracles,<a name="FNanchor_162" id="FNanchor_162"></a><a href="#Footnote_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a> the Incarnation of Christ, for instance, which,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[205]</a></span> -being secret, cannot be alleged as a proof of such a mission; but -require themselves to be proved by visible miracles. Revelation -itself too is miraculous; and miracles are the proof of it; and -the supposed presumption against these shall presently be considered. -All which I have been observing here is, that, whether -we choose to call every thing in the dispensations of Providence, -not discoverable without revelation, nor like the known course of -things, miraculous; and whether the general Christian dispensation -now mentioned is to be called so, or not; the foregoing -observations seem certainly to show, that there is no presumption -against it from the analogy of nature.</p> - -<p>II. There is no presumption, from analogy, against some operations, -which we should now call miraculous; particularly none -against a revelation at the beginning of the world: nothing of -such presumption against it, as is supposed to be implied or expressed -in the word, <em>miraculous</em>.<a name="FNanchor_163" id="FNanchor_163"></a><a href="#Footnote_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a> A miracle, in its very notion, -is relative to a course of nature; and implies something different -from it, considered as being so. Now, either there was no -course of nature at the time which we are speaking of; or if -there were, we are not acquainted what the course of nature is, -upon the first peopling of worlds. Therefore the question, -whether mankind had a revelation made to them at <em>that</em> time, is -to be considered, not as a question concerning a miracle, but as a -common question of fact. And we have the like reason, be it -more or less, to admit the report of tradition, concerning this -question, and concerning common matters of fact of the same -antiquity; for instance, what part of the earth was first peopled.</p> - -<p>Or thus: When mankind was first placed in this state, there -was a power exerted, totally different from the present course of -nature. Now, whether this power, thus wholly different from the -present course of nature, (for we cannot properly apply to it the -word <em>miraculous</em>;) whether this power <em>stopped</em> immediately after -it had made man, or went on, and exerted itself further in giving -him a revelation, is a question of the same kind, as whether an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[206]</a></span> -ordinary power exerted itself in such a particular <em>degree</em> and -manner, or not.</p> - -<p>Or suppose the power exerted in the formation of the world be -considered as miraculous, or rather, be called by that name; the -case will not be different: since it must be acknowledged, that -such a power was exerted. For supposing it acknowledged, that -our Savior spent some years in a course of working miracles:<a name="FNanchor_164" id="FNanchor_164"></a><a href="#Footnote_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a> -there is no more presumption, worth mentioning, against his -having exerted this miraculous power, in a certain degree greater, -than in a certain degree less; in one or two more instances, than -in one or two fewer; in this, than in another manner.</p> - -<p>It is evident then, that there can be no peculiar presumption, -from the analogy of nature, against supposing a revelation, when -man was first placed upon earth.<a name="FNanchor_165" id="FNanchor_165"></a><a href="#Footnote_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a></p> - -<p>Add, that there does not appear the least intimation in history -or tradition, that religion was first reasoned out: but the whole -of history and tradition makes for the other side, that it came -into the world by revelation. Indeed the state of religion, in the -first ages of which we have any account, seems to suppose and -imply, that this was the original of it among mankind.<a name="FNanchor_166" id="FNanchor_166"></a><a href="#Footnote_166" class="fnanchor">[166]</a> And -these reflections together, without taking in the peculiar authority -of Scripture, amount to real and a very material degree of evidence, -that there was a revelation at the beginning of the world.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[207]</a></span> -Now this, as it is a confirmation of natural religion, and therefore -mentioned in the former part of this treatise;<a name="FNanchor_167" id="FNanchor_167"></a><a href="#Footnote_167" class="fnanchor">[167]</a> so likewise it -has a tendency to remove any prejudices against a subsequent -revelation.</p> - -<p>III. But still it may be objected, that there is some peculiar -presumption, from analogy, against miracles; particularly against -revelation, after the settlement and during the continuance of a -course of nature.</p> - -<p>Now with regard to this supposed presumption, it is to be observed -in general, that before we can have ground for raising -what can, with any propriety, be called an <em>argument</em> from analogy, -for or against revelation considered as something miraculous, we -must be acquainted with a similar or parallel case. But the history -of some other world, seemingly in like circumstances with -our own, is no more than a parallel case: and therefore nothing -short of this can be so. Yet, could we come at a presumptive -proof, for or against a revelation, from being informed, whether -such world had one, or not; such a proof, being drawn from -one single instance only, must be infinitely precarious. More -particularly:</p> - -<p><i>First</i>, There is a very strong presumption against common -speculative truths, and against the most ordinary facts, before the -proof<a name="FNanchor_168" id="FNanchor_168"></a><a href="#Footnote_168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a> of them; which yet is overcome by almost any proof.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[208]</a></span> -There is a presumption of millions to one, against the story of -Cæsar, or of any other man. For suppose a number of common -facts so and so circumstanced, of which we had no kind of proof, -should happen to come into one’s thoughts; every one would, -without any possible doubt, conclude them to be false. And the -like may be said of a single common fact. Hence it appears, -that the question of importance, as to the matter before us, is, -concerning the <em>degree</em> of the peculiar presumption supposed -against miracles; not whether there be any peculiar presumption -at all against them. For, if there be the presumption of millions -to one, against the most common facts; what can a small presumption, -additional to this, amount to, though it be peculiar? -It cannot be estimated, and is as nothing. The only material -question is, whether there be any such presumptions against -miracles, as to render them in any sort incredible.</p> - -<p><i>Secondly</i>, If we leave out the consideration of religion, we are -in such total darkness, upon what causes, occasions, reasons, or -circumstances, the present course of nature depends; that there -does not appear any improbability for or against supposing, that -five or six thousand years may have given scope<a name="FNanchor_169" id="FNanchor_169"></a><a href="#Footnote_169" class="fnanchor">[169]</a> for causes, -occasions, reasons, or circumstances, from whence miraculous -interpositions may have arisen. And from this, joined with the -foregoing observation, it will follow, that there must be a presumption, -beyond all comparison greater, against the <em>particular</em> -common facts just now instanced in, than against miracles <em>in -general</em>; before any evidence of either.</p> - -<p><i>Thirdly</i>, Take in the consideration of religion, or the moral -system of the world, and then we see distinct particular reasons -for miracles: to afford mankind instruction additional to that of -nature, and to attest the truth of it. This gives a real credibility -to the supposition, that it might be part of the original plan of -things, that there should be miraculous interpositions.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[209]</a></span></p> - -<p><i>Lastly</i>, Miracles must not be compared to common natural -events, or to events which, though uncommon, are similar to -what we daily experience: but to the extraordinary phenomena -of nature. And then the comparison will be between the presumption -against miracles, and the presumption against such -uncommon appearances, suppose, as comets, and against there -being any such powers in nature as magnetism and electricity, so -contrary to the properties of other bodies not endued with these -powers. And before any one can determine, whether there be -any peculiar presumption against miracles, more than against -other extraordinary things; he must consider, what, upon first -hearing, would be the presumption against the last mentioned -appearances and powers, to a person acquainted only with the -daily, monthly, and annual course of nature respecting this earth, -and with those common powers of matter which we every day see.</p> - -<p>Upon all this I conclude; that there certainly is no such presumption -against miracles, as to render them in any wise incredible: -that, on the contrary, our being able to discern reasons -for them, gives a positive credibility to the history of them, in -cases where those reasons hold: and that it is by no means certain, -that there is any <em>peculiar</em> presumption at all, from analogy, -even in the lowest degree, against miracles, as distinguished from -other extraordinary phenomena: though it is not worth while to -perplex the reader with inquiries into the abstract nature of evidence, -in order to determine a question, which, without such inquiries, -we see<a name="FNanchor_170" id="FNanchor_170"></a><a href="#Footnote_170" class="fnanchor">[170]</a> is of no importance.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<h3 id="II_CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III.<br /> -<span class="smaller">OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING, WHAT WERE TO BE EXPECTED -IN A REVELATION; AND THE CREDIBILITY, FROM ANALOGY, -THAT IT MUST CONTAIN THINGS LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.</span></h3> - -<p>Besides the objections against the <em>evidence</em> for Christianity, -many are alleged against the <em>scheme</em> of it; against the whole -manner in which it is put and left with the world; as well as -against several particular relations in Scripture: objections drawn<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[210]</a></span> -from the deficiencies of revelation: from things in it appearing -to men <em>foolishness</em>;<a name="FNanchor_171" id="FNanchor_171"></a><a href="#Footnote_171" class="fnanchor">[171]</a> from its containing matters of offence, -which have led, and it must have been foreseen would lead, into -strange enthusiasm and superstition, and be made to serve the -purposes of tyranny and wickedness; from its not being universal; -and, which is a thing of the same kind, from its evidence not -being so convincing and satisfactory as it might have been: for -this last is sometimes turned into a positive argument against its -truth.<a name="FNanchor_172" id="FNanchor_172"></a><a href="#Footnote_172" class="fnanchor">[172]</a></p> - -<p>It would be tedious, indeed impossible, to enumerate the -several particulars comprehended under the objections here referred -to; they being so various, according to the different -fancies of men. There are persons who think it a strong objection -against the authority of Scripture, that it is not composed by -rules of art, agreed upon by critics, for polite and correct writing. -And the scorn is inexpressible, with which some of the prophetic -parts of Scripture are treated: partly through the rashness of -interpreters; but very much also, on account of the hieroglyphical -and figurative language, in which they are left us.</p> - -<p>Some of the principal things of this sort shall be particularly -considered in the following chapters. But my design at present -is to observe in general, with respect to this whole way of arguing, -that, upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly credible beforehand, -that we should be incompetent judges of it to a great degree: -and that it would contain many things appearing to us -liable to great objections; in case we judge of it otherwise, than -by the analogy of nature. Therefore, though objections against -the <em>evidence</em> of Christianity are most seriously to be considered, -yet objections against Christianity itself are, in a great measure, -frivolous: almost all objections against it, excepting those which -are alleged against the particular proofs of its coming from God. -I express myself with caution, lest I should be mistaken to vilify -reason; which is indeed the only faculty we have wherewith to -judge concerning any thing, even revelation itself: or be misunderstood -to assert, that a supposed revelation cannot be proved -false, from internal characters. For, it may contain clear immoralities -or contradictions; and either of these would prove it false. -Nor will I take upon me to affirm, that nothing else can possibly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[211]</a></span> -render any supposed revelation incredible. Yet still the observation -above, is, I think, true beyond doubt; that objections against -Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence, -are frivolous. To make out this, is the general design of the -present chapter.</p> - -<p>With regard to the whole of it, I cannot but particularly wish, -that the <em>proofs</em> might be attended to; rather than the assertions -cavilled at, upon account of any unacceptable <em>consequences</em>, real -or supposed, which may be drawn from them. For, after all, -that which is true, must be admitted, though it should show us -the shortness of our faculties: and that we are in no wise judges -of many things, of which we are apt to think ourselves very -competent ones. Nor will this be any objection with reasonable -men; at least upon second thought it will not be any objection -with such, against the justness of the following observations.</p> - -<p>As God governs the world and instructs his creatures, according -to certain laws or rules, in the known course of nature; -known by reason together with experience: so the Scripture -informs us of a scheme of divine Providence, additional to this. -It relates, that God has, by revelation, instructed men in things -concerning his government, which they could not otherwise have -known; and reminded them of things, which they might otherwise -know; and attested the truth of the whole by miracles. -Now if the natural and the revealed dispensation of things are -both from God, if they coincide with each other, and together -make up one scheme of Providence; our being incompetent -judges of one, must render it credible, that we may be incompetent -judges also of the other. Upon experience, the acknowledged -constitution and course of nature is found to be greatly -different from what, before experience, would have been expected; -and such as, men fancy, there lie great objections -against. This renders it beforehand highly credible, that they -may find the revealed dispensation likewise, if they judge of it as -they do of the constitution of nature, very different from expectations -formed beforehand; and liable, in appearance, to great -objections: objections against the scheme itself, and against the -degrees and manners of the miraculous interpositions by which -it was attested and carried on. Thus, suppose a prince to govern -his dominions in the wisest manner possible, by common known<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[212]</a></span> -laws; and that upon some exigencies he should suspend these -laws; and govern, in several instances, in a different manner. -If one of his subjects were not a competent judge beforehand, by -what common rules the government should or would be carried -on; it could not be expected, that the same person would be a -competent judge, in what exigencies, or in what manner, or to -what degree, those laws commonly observed would be suspended -or deviated from. If he were not a judge of the wisdom of the -ordinary administration, there is no reason to think he would be -a judge of the wisdom of the extraordinary. If he thought he -had objections against the former; doubtless, it is highly supposable, -he might think also, that he had objections against the -latter. And thus, as we fall into infinite follies and mistakes, -whenever we pretend, otherwise than from experience and analogy, -to judge of the constitution and course of nature; it is evidently -supposable beforehand, that we should fall into as great, -in pretending to judge in like manner concerning revelation. -Nor is there any more ground to expect that this latter should -appear to us clear of objections, than that the former should.</p> - -<p>These observations, relating to the whole of Christianity, are -applicable to inspiration in particular. As we are in no sort -judges beforehand, by what laws or rules, in what degree, or by -what means, it were to have been expected, that God would naturally -instruct us; so upon supposition of his affording us light and -instruction by revelation, additional to what he has afforded us -by reason and experience, we are in no sort judges, by what -methods, and in what proportion, it were to be expected that this -supernatural light and instruction would be afforded us. We -know not beforehand, what degree or kind of natural information -it were to be expected God would afford men, each by his own -reason and experience: nor how far he would enable and effectually -dispose them to communicate it, whatever it should be, to -each other; nor whether the evidence of it would be certain, -highly probable, or doubtful; nor whether it would be given with -equal clearness and conviction to all. Nor could we guess, upon -any good ground I mean, whether natural knowledge, or even the -faculty itself, by which we are capable of attaining it, reason, -would be given us at once, or gradually.</p> - -<p>In like manner, we are wholly ignorant, what degree of new<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[213]</a></span> -knowledge, it were to be expected, God would give mankind by -revelation, upon supposition of his affording one: or how far, or -in what way, he would interpose miraculously, to qualify them, to -whom he should originally make the revelation, for communicating -the knowledge given by it; and to secure their doing it to -the age in which they should live; and to secure its being transmitted -to posterity. We are equally ignorant, whether the evidence -of it would be certain or highly probable, or doubtful:<a name="FNanchor_173" id="FNanchor_173"></a><a href="#Footnote_173" class="fnanchor">[173]</a> or -whether all who should have any degree of instruction from it, -and any degree of evidence of its truth, would have the same: -or whether the scheme would be revealed at once, or unfolded -gradually.<a name="FNanchor_174" id="FNanchor_174"></a><a href="#Footnote_174" class="fnanchor">[174]</a> Nay we are not in any sort able to judge, whether -it were to have been expected, that the revelation should have -been committed to writing; or left to be handed down, and -consequently corrupted, by verbal tradition, and at length sunk -under it, if mankind so pleased, and during such time as -they are permitted, in the degree they evidently are, to act as -they will.</p> - -<p>But it may be said, “that a revelation in some of the above-mentioned -circumstances, one, for instance, which was not committed -to writing, and thus secured against danger of corruption, -would not have answered its purpose.” I ask, what purpose? It -would not have answered all the purposes, which it has now -answered, and in the same degree: but it would have answered -others, or the same in different degrees. And which of these -were the purposes of God, and best fell in with his general -government, we could not at all have determined beforehand.</p> - -<p>Now since we have no principles of reason, upon which to judge -beforehand, how it were to be expected that revelation should -have been left, or what was most suitable to the divine plan of -government, in any of the forementioned respects; it must be -quite frivolous to object afterwards as to any of them, against its -being left in one way, rather than another: for this would be to -object against things, upon account of their being different from -expectations, which has been shown to be without reason.</p> - -<p>Thus we see, that the only question concerning the truth of -Christianity is, whether it be a real revelation; not whether it -be attended with every circumstance which we should have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[214]</a></span> -looked for: and concerning the authority of Scripture, whether -it be what it claims to be; not whether it be a book of such sort, -and so promulged, as weak men are apt to fancy a book containing -a divine revelation should be. Therefore, neither obscurity, -nor seeming inaccuracy of style, nor various readings, nor early -disputes about the authors of particular parts, nor any other -things of the like kind, though they had been much more considerable -in degree than they are, could overthrow the authority -of the Scripture: unless the prophets, apostles, or our Lord, -had promised, that the book containing the divine revelation -should be exempt from those things. Nor indeed can any objections -overthrow such a kind of revelation as the Christian claims -to be, (since there are no objections against the morality of it,<a name="FNanchor_175" id="FNanchor_175"></a><a href="#Footnote_175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a>) -but such as can show, that there is no proof of miracles wrought -originally in attestation of it; no appearance of any thing miraculous -in its obtaining in the world; nor any of prophecy, that -is, of events foretold, which human sagacity could not foresee. -If it can be shown, that the proof alleged for all these is absolutely -none at all, then is revelation overturned. But were it -allowed, that the proof of any one or all of them is lower than -is allowed; yet, whilst <em>any</em> proof of them remains, revelation -will stand upon much the same foot it does at present, as to all the -purposes of life and practice, and ought to have the like influence -upon our behavior.</p> - -<p>From the foregoing observations too, it will follow, and those -who will thoroughly examine into revelation will find it worth -remarking, that there are several ways of arguing, which though -just with regard to other writings, are not applicable to Scripture: -at least not to its prophetic parts. We cannot argue, for instance, -that such and such cannot be the sense or intent of a passage -of Scripture, for, if it had, it would have been expressed more -plainly, or represented under a more apt figure or hieroglyphic. -Yet we may justly argue thus, with respect to common books. -And the reason of this difference is very evident. In Scripture -we are not competent judges, as we are in common books, how -plainly it were to have been expected, that the sense should -have been expressed, or under how apt an image figured. The -only question is, what appearance there is, that this <em>is</em> the sense;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[215]</a></span> -and scarce at all, how much more determinately or accurately it -might have been expressed or figured.<a name="FNanchor_176" id="FNanchor_176"></a><a href="#Footnote_176" class="fnanchor">[176]</a></p> - -<p>“But is it not self-evident, that internal improbabilities of all -kinds weaken external probable proof?” Doubtless. But to -what practical purpose can this be alleged here, when it has been -proved before,<a name="FNanchor_177" id="FNanchor_177"></a><a href="#Footnote_177" class="fnanchor">[177]</a> that real internal improbabilities, which rise even -to moral certainty, are overcome by the most ordinary testimony; -and when it now has been made to appear, that we scarce know -what are improbabilities, as to the matter we are here considering: -as it will further appear from what follows.</p> - -<p>From the observations made above it is manifest, that we are -not in any sort competent judges, what supernatural instruction -were to have been expected; and it is self-evident, that the -objections of an incompetent judgment must be frivolous. Yet -it may be proper to go one step further, and observe, that if men -will be regardless of these things, and pretend to judge of the -Scripture by preconceived expectations; the analogy of nature -shows beforehand, not only that it is highly credible they may, -but also probable that they will, imagine they have strong objections -against it, however really unexceptionable. For so, prior to -experience, they would think they had, against the circumstances, -and degrees, and the whole manner of that instruction, which is -afforded by the ordinary course of nature. Were the instruction -which God affords to brute creatures by instincts and mere propensions, -and to mankind by these together with reason, matter -of probable proof, and not of certain observation: it would be -rejected as incredible, in many instances of it, only upon account -of the means by which this instruction is given, the seeming disproportions, -the limitations, necessary conditions, and circumstances -of it. For instance: would it not have been thought -highly improbable, that men should have been so much more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[216]</a></span> -capable of discovering, even to certainty, the general laws of -matter, and the magnitudes, paths, and revolutions, of heavenly -bodies; than the occasions and cures of distempers, and many -other things in which human life seems so much more nearly concerned, -than in astronomy? How capricious and irregular a way -of information would it be said; is that of <em>invention</em>, by means -of which nature instructs us in matters of science, and in many -things, upon which the affairs of the world greatly depend: that -a man should, by this faculty, be made acquainted with a thing -in an instant, (when perhaps he is thinking of something else,) -which he has in vain been searching after, it may be, for years.</p> - -<p>So likewise the imperfections attending the only method, by -which nature enables and directs us to communicate our thoughts -to each other, are innumerable. Language is, in its very nature, -inadequate, ambiguous, liable to infinite abuse, even from negligence; -and so liable to it from design, that every man can deceive -and betray by it. And, to mention but one instance more; that -brutes, without reason, should act, in many respects, with a -sagacity and foresight vastly greater than what men have in those -respects, would be thought impossible. Yet it is certain they do -act with such superior foresight: whether it be their own, indeed, -is another question. From these things, it is highly credible -beforehand, that upon supposition that God should afford men -some additional instruction by revelation, it would be with circumstances, -in manners, degrees, and respects, against the credibility -of which we should be apt to fancy we had great objections. -Nor are the objections against the Scripture, nor against Christianity -in general, at all more or greater, than the analogy of -nature would beforehand—not perhaps give ground to <em>expect</em>; -(for the analogy may not be sufficient, in some cases, to ground -an expectation upon;) but no more nor greater, than analogy -would show it, beforehand, to be supposable and <em>credible</em>, that -there might seem to lie against revelation.</p> - -<p>By applying these general observations to a particular objection, -it will be more distinctly seen, how they are applicable to -others of the like kind; and indeed to almost all objections -against Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its -evidence. It appears from Scripture, that, as it was not unusual -in the apostolic age, for persons, upon their conversion to Christianity,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[217]</a></span> -to be endued with miraculous gifts; so, some of those -persons exercised these gifts in a strangely irregular and disorderly -manner;<a name="FNanchor_178" id="FNanchor_178"></a><a href="#Footnote_178" class="fnanchor">[178]</a> and this is made an objection against their -being really miraculous. Now the foregoing observations quite -remove this objection, how considerable soever it may appear at -first sight. For, consider a person endued with any of these -gifts, for instance that of tongues: it is to be supposed, that he -had the same power over this miraculous gift, as he would have -had over it, had it been the effect of habit, of study and use, as it -ordinarily is; or the same power over it, as he had over any other -natural endowment. Consequently, he would use it in the same -manner as he did any other; either regularly, and upon proper -occasions only, or irregularly, and upon improper ones: according -to his sense of decency, and his character of prudence.<a name="FNanchor_179" id="FNanchor_179"></a><a href="#Footnote_179" class="fnanchor">[179]</a> -Where then is the objection? Why, if this miraculous power -was indeed given to the world to propagate Christianity, and -attest the truth of it, we might, it seems, have expected, that -other sort of persons should have been chosen to be invested -with it; or that these should, at the same time, have been -endued with prudence; or that they should have been continually -restrained and directed in the exercise of it: <i>i.e.</i> that -God should have miraculously interposed, if at all, in a different -manner, or higher degree. But, from the observations made -above, it is undeniably evident, that we are not judges in what -degrees and manners it were to have been expected he should -miraculously interpose; upon supposition of his doing it in some -degree and manner. Nor, in the natural course of Providence, -are superior gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, and other -talents of great influence, conferred only on persons of prudence -and decency, or such as are disposed to make the properest use<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[218]</a></span> -of them. Nor is the instruction and admonition naturally -afforded us for the conduct of life, particularly in our education, -commonly given in a manner the most suited to recommend it; -but often with circumstances apt to prejudice us against such -instruction.</p> - -<p>One might go on to add, there is a great resemblance between -the light of nature and of revelation, in several other respects. -Practical Christianity, or that faith and behavior which renders -a man a Christian, is a plain and obvious thing: like the common -rules of conduct, with respect to ordinary temporal affairs. The -more distinct and particular knowledge of those things, the study -of which the apostle calls <em>going on unto perfection</em>,<a name="FNanchor_180" id="FNanchor_180"></a><a href="#Footnote_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a> and of the -prophetic parts of revelation, like many parts of natural and even -civil knowledge, may require very exact thought, and careful -consideration. The hinderances too, of natural, and of supernatural -light and knowledge, have been of the same kind. And -as it is owned the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet understood; -so, if it ever comes to be understood, before the <em>restitution -of all things</em>,<a name="FNanchor_181" id="FNanchor_181"></a><a href="#Footnote_181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a> and without miraculous interpositions, it must be -in the same way as natural knowledge is come at: by the continuance -and progress of learning and of liberty;<a name="FNanchor_182" id="FNanchor_182"></a><a href="#Footnote_182" class="fnanchor">[182]</a> and by particular -persons attending to, comparing, and pursuing, intimations -scattered up and down it, which are overlooked and disregarded -by the generality of the world. For this is the way in which all -improvements are made; by thoughtful men’s tracing on obscure -hints, dropped us by nature as it were, accidentally, or which -seem to come into our minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible, -that a book which has been so long in the possession of mankind, -should contain many truths as yet undiscovered. For, all -the same phenomena, and the same faculties of investigation,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[219]</a></span> -from which such great discoveries in natural knowledge have -been made in the present and last age, were equally in the possession -of mankind, several thousand years before. And possibly -it might be intended, that events, as they come to pass, should -open and ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture.</p> - -<p>It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a material respect: -for that natural knowledge is of little or no consequence. -But I have been speaking of the general instruction which nature -does or does not afford us. And besides, some parts of natural -knowledge, in the more common restrained sense of the words, -are of the greatest consequence to the ease and convenience of -life. But suppose the analogy did, as it does not, fail in this -respect; yet it might be abundantly supplied, from the whole -constitution and course of nature: which shows, that God does -not dispense his gifts according to <em>our</em> notions of the advantage -and consequence they would be of to us. And this in general, -with his method of dispensing knowledge in particular, would -together make out an analogy full to the point before us.</p> - -<p>But it may be objected still further and more generally; “The -Scripture represents the world as in a state of ruin, and Christianity -as an expedient to recover it, to help in these respects -where nature fails: in particular, to supply the deficiencies of -natural light. Is it credible then, that so many ages should have -been let pass, before a matter of such a sort, of so great and so -general importance, was made known to mankind; and then that -it should be made known to so small a part of them? Is it conceivable, -that this supply should be so very deficient, should have -the like obscurity and doubtfulness, be liable to the like perversions, -in short, lie open to all the like objections, as the light of -nature itself?”<a name="FNanchor_183" id="FNanchor_183"></a><a href="#Footnote_183" class="fnanchor">[183]</a></p> - -<p>Without determining how far this, in fact, is so, I answer; it -is by no means incredible, that it might be so, if the light of -nature and of revelation be from the same hand. Men are -naturally liable to diseases: for which God, in his good providence, -has provided natural remedies.<a name="FNanchor_184" id="FNanchor_184"></a><a href="#Footnote_184" class="fnanchor">[184]</a> But remedies existing -in nature have been unknown to mankind for many ages; are -known but to few now; probably many valuable ones are not -known yet. Great has been and is the obscurity and difficulty,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[220]</a></span> -in the nature and application of them. Circumstances <em>seem</em> -often to make them very improper, where they are absolutely -necessary. It is after long labor and study, and many unsuccessful -endeavors, that they are brought to be as useful as they are; -after high contempt and absolute rejection of the most useful we -have; and after disputes and doubts, which have seemed to be -endless. The best remedies too, when unskilfully, much more -when dishonestly applied, may produce new diseases; and with -the rightest application the success of them is often doubtful. -In many cases they are not effectual: where they are, it is often -very slowly: and the application of them, and the necessary -regimen accompanying it, is not uncommonly so disagreeable, -that some will not submit to them; and satisfy themselves with -the excuse, that if they would, it is not certain whether it would -be successful. And many persons, who labor under diseases, for -which there are known natural remedies, are not so happy as to -be always, if ever, in the way of them. In a word, the remedies -which nature has provided for diseases are neither certain, perfect, -nor universal. And indeed the same principles of arguing, -which would lead us to conclude, that they must be so, would -lead us likewise to conclude, that there could be no occasion for -them; <i>i.e.</i> that there could be no diseases at all. And therefore -our experience that there are diseases, shows that it is credible -beforehand, upon supposition nature has provided remedies for -them, that these remedies may be, as by experience we find they -are, neither certain, nor perfect, nor universal; because it shows, -that the principles upon which we should expect the contrary are -fallacious.</p> - -<p>And now, what is the just consequence from all these things? -Not that reason is no judge of what is offered to us as being of -divine revelation. For this would be to infer that we are unable -to judge of any thing, because we are unable to judge of all -things. Reason can, and it ought to judge, not only of the -meaning, but also of the morality and the evidence of revelation.</p> - -<p><i>First</i>, It is the province of reason to judge of the morality of -the Scripture; <i>i.e.</i> not whether it contains things different from -what we should have expected from a wise, just, and good Being; -(for objections from hence have been now obviated:) but whether -it contains things plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice, or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[221]</a></span> -goodness; to what the light of nature teaches us of God. And -I know nothing of this sort objected against Scripture, excepting -such objections as are formed upon suppositions, which would -equally conclude, that the constitution of nature is contradictory -to wisdom, justice, or goodness; which most certainly it is not. -There are, indeed, some particular precepts in Scripture, given -to particular persons, requiring actions, which would be immoral -and vicious, were it not for such precepts. But it is easy to see, -that all these are of such a kind, as that the precept changes the -whole nature of the case and of the action; and both constitutes -and shows that not to be unjust or immoral, which, prior to the -precept, must have appeared and really been so: which may well -be, since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable -morality. If it were commanded, to cultivate the <em>principles</em>, -and act from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty; the -command would not alter the nature of the case or of the action, -in any of these instances. But it is quite otherwise in precepts, -which require only the doing an <em>external action</em>: for instance, -taking away the property, or life of any. For men have no -right, either to life or property, but what arises solely from the -grant of God. When this grant is revoked, they cease to have -any right at all in either: and when this revocation is made -known, as surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust -to deprive them of either. And though a course of external -acts, which without command would be immoral, must -make an immoral habit; yet a few detached commands have no -such natural tendency. I thought proper to say thus much of -the few Scripture precepts, which require, not vicious actions, -but actions which would have been vicious, but for such precepts; -because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and -great weight is laid upon objections drawn from them.</p> - -<p>To me there seems no difficulty at all in these precepts, but -what arises from their being offences: <i>i.e.</i> from their being liable -to be perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked designing men, -to serve the most horrid purposes; and perhaps to mislead the -weak and enthusiastic. And objections from this head are not -objections against revelation; but against the whole notion of religion, -as a trial: and against the general constitution of nature.</p> - -<p><i>Secondly</i>, Reason is able to judge, and must, of the evidence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[222]</a></span> -of revelation, and of the objections urged against that evidence: -which shall be the subject of a following chapter.<a name="FNanchor_185" id="FNanchor_185"></a><a href="#Footnote_185" class="fnanchor">[185]</a></p> - -<p>The consequence of the foregoing observations is, that the -question upon which the truth of Christianity depends, is scarcely -at all what objections there are against its scheme, since there -are none against the morality of it, but <em>what objections there are -against its evidence</em>; or, <em>what proof there remains of it, after -due allowances are made for the objections against that proof</em>: -because it has been shown, that the <em>objections against Christianity, -as distinguished from objections against its evidence, are -frivolous</em>. For surely very little weight, if any at all, is to be -laid upon a way of arguing and objecting, which, when applied -to the general constitution of nature, experience shows not to be -conclusive: and such, I think, is the whole way of objecting -treated of throughout this chapter. It is resolvable into principles, -and goes upon suppositions, which mislead us to think, that -the Author of nature would not act, as we experience he does; -or would act, in such and such cases, as we experience he does -not in like cases. But the unreasonableness of this way of objecting -will appear yet more evidently from hence, that the chief -things thus objected against are justified, as shall be further -shown,<a name="FNanchor_186" id="FNanchor_186"></a><a href="#Footnote_186" class="fnanchor">[186]</a> by distinct, particular, and full analogies, in the constitution -and course of nature.</p> - -<p>It is to be remembered, that, as frivolous as objections of the -foregoing sort against revelation are, yet, when a supposed revelation -is more consistent with itself, and has a more general and -uniform tendency to promote virtue, than, all circumstances considered, -could have been expected from enthusiasm and political -views, this is a presumptive proof of its not proceeding from -them, and so of its truth: because we are competent judges, what -might have been expected from enthusiasm and political views.<a name="FNanchor_187" id="FNanchor_187"></a><a href="#Footnote_187" class="fnanchor">[187]</a></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[223]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h3 id="II_CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV.<br /> -<span class="smaller">CHRISTIANITY, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CONSTITUTION, -IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.</span></h3> - -<p>As hath been now shown,<a name="FNanchor_188" id="FNanchor_188"></a><a href="#Footnote_188" class="fnanchor">[188]</a> the analogy of nature renders it -highly credible beforehand, that, supposing a revelation to be -made, it must contain many things very different from what we -should have expected, and such as appear open to great objections: -and that this observation, in good measure, takes off the force of -those objections, or rather precludes them. It may be alleged, -that this is a very partial answer to such objections, or a very -unsatisfactory way of obviating them: because it does not show -at all, that the things objected against can be wise, just, and -good; much less, that it is credible they are so. It will therefore -be proper to show this distinctly; by applying to these -objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of Christianity, -the answer above<a name="FNanchor_189" id="FNanchor_189"></a><a href="#Footnote_189" class="fnanchor">[189]</a> given to the like objections against -the constitution of nature: before we consider the particular -analogies in the latter, to the particular things objected against -in the former. Now that which affords a sufficient answer to -objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the constitution -of nature, is its being a constitution, a system, or -scheme, imperfectly comprehended;<a name="FNanchor_190" id="FNanchor_190"></a><a href="#Footnote_190" class="fnanchor">[190]</a> a scheme in which means -are made use of to accomplish ends; and which is carried on by -general laws. For from these things it has been proved, not -only to be possible, but also to be credible, that those things -which are objected against may be consistent with wisdom, -justice, and goodness; nay, may be instances of them: and even<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[224]</a></span> -that the constitution and government of nature may be perfect -in the highest possible degree. If Christianity then be a scheme, -and of the like kind; it is evident, the like objections against it -must admit of the like answer. And,</p> - -<p>I. Christianity is a scheme, quite beyond our comprehension.</p> - -<p>The moral government of God is exercised, by gradually conducting -things so in the course of his providence, that every one, -at length and upon the whole, shall receive according to his -deserts; and neither fraud nor violence, but truth and right, -shall finally prevail. Christianity is a particular scheme under -this general plan of Providence, and a part of it, conducive to -its completion, with regard to mankind: consisting itself also of -various parts, and a mysterious economy, which has been carrying -on from the time the world came into its present wretched -state, and is still carrying on, for its recovery, by a divine person, -the Messiah; who is to <cite>gather together in one the children -of God, that are scattered abroad</cite>,<a name="FNanchor_191" id="FNanchor_191"></a><a href="#Footnote_191" class="fnanchor">[191]</a> and establish <cite>an everlasting -kingdom, wherein dwelleth righteousness</cite>.<a name="FNanchor_192" id="FNanchor_192"></a><a href="#Footnote_192" class="fnanchor">[192]</a> In order to it; after -various manifestations of things, relating to this great and general -scheme of Providence, through a succession of many ages: -(For <cite>the Spirit of Christ which was in the prophets, testified beforehand -his sufferings, and the glory that should follow: unto -whom it was revealed, that not unto themselves, but unto us they -did minister the things which are now reported unto us by them -that have preached the Gospel; which things the angels desire to -look into</cite>:<a name="FNanchor_193" id="FNanchor_193"></a><a href="#Footnote_193" class="fnanchor">[193]</a>)—after various dispensations looking forward and preparatory -to, this final salvation: <cite>in the fulness of time</cite>, when infinite -wisdom thought fit; He, <cite>being in the form of God,—made -himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a -servant, and was made in the likeness of men: and being found -in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient -to death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God also hath -highly exalted him, and given him a name, which is above every -name: that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of -things in heaven, and things in the earth, and things under the -earth: and that every tongue should confess, that Jesus Christ is -Lord, to the glory of God the Father.</cite><a name="FNanchor_194" id="FNanchor_194"></a><a href="#Footnote_194" class="fnanchor">[194]</a> Parts likewise of this -economy are the miraculous mission of the Holy Ghost, and his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[225]</a></span> -ordinary assistances given to good men:<a name="FNanchor_195" id="FNanchor_195"></a><a href="#Footnote_195" class="fnanchor">[195]</a> the invisible government, -which Christ at present exercises over his church: that -which he himself refers to in these words: <cite>In my Father’s house -are many mansions—I go to prepare a place for you</cite>:<a name="FNanchor_196" id="FNanchor_196"></a><a href="#Footnote_196" class="fnanchor">[196]</a> and his -future return to <cite>judge the world in righteousness</cite>, and completely -re-establish the kingdom of God. <cite>For the Father judgeth no -man; but hath committed all judgment unto the Son: that all -men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father.</cite><a name="FNanchor_197" id="FNanchor_197"></a><a href="#Footnote_197" class="fnanchor">[197]</a> <cite>All -power is given unto him in heaven and in earth.</cite><a name="FNanchor_198" id="FNanchor_198"></a><a href="#Footnote_198" class="fnanchor">[198]</a> <cite>And he must -reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. Then cometh -the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, -even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule, and all -authority and power. And when all things shall be subdued -unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that -put all things under him, that God may be all in all.</cite><a name="FNanchor_199" id="FNanchor_199"></a><a href="#Footnote_199" class="fnanchor">[199]</a> Surely -little need be said to show, that this system, or scheme of things, -is but imperfectly comprehended by us. The Scripture expressly -asserts it to be so. And indeed one cannot read a passage relating -to this <em>great mystery of godliness</em>,<a name="FNanchor_200" id="FNanchor_200"></a><a href="#Footnote_200" class="fnanchor">[200]</a> but what immediately -runs up into something which shows us our ignorance in it; as -every thing in nature shows us our ignorance in the constitution -of nature. And whoever will seriously consider that part -of the Christian scheme, which is revealed in Scripture, will find -so much more unrevealed, as will convince him, that, to all the -purposes of judging and objecting, we know as little of it, as of -the constitution of nature. Our ignorance, therefore, is as much -an answer to our objections against the perfection of one, as -against the perfection of the other.<a name="FNanchor_201" id="FNanchor_201"></a><a href="#Footnote_201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a></p> - -<p>II. It is obvious too, that in the Christian dispensation, as -much as in the natural scheme of things, means are made use of -to accomplish ends.</p> - -<p>The observation of this furnishes us with the same answer, to -objections against the perfection of Christianity, as to objections -of the like kind, against the constitution of nature. It shows<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[226]</a></span> -the credibility, that the things objected against, how <em>foolish</em><a name="FNanchor_202" id="FNanchor_202"></a><a href="#Footnote_202" class="fnanchor">[202]</a> -soever they appear to men, may be the very best means of accomplishing -the very best ends. And their appearing <em>foolishness</em> -is no presumption against this, in a scheme so greatly beyond -our comprehension.<a name="FNanchor_203" id="FNanchor_203"></a><a href="#Footnote_203" class="fnanchor">[203]</a></p> - -<p>III. The credibility, that the Christian dispensation may have -been, all along, carried on by general laws,<a name="FNanchor_204" id="FNanchor_204"></a><a href="#Footnote_204" class="fnanchor">[204]</a> no less than the -course of nature, may require to be more distinctly made out.</p> - -<p>Consider then, upon <em>what ground</em> it is we say, that the whole -common course of nature is carried on according to general fore-ordained -laws. We know indeed several of the general laws of -matter; and a great part of the natural behavior of living agents -is reducible to general laws. But we know in a manner nothing, -by what laws, storms, tempests, earthquakes, famine, pestilence, -become the instruments of destruction to mankind. And the -laws by which persons born into the world at such a time and -place are of such capacities, geniuses, tempers; the laws by -which thoughts come into our mind, in a multitude of cases; -and by which innumerable things happen, of the greatest influence -upon the affairs and state of the world. These laws are so -wholly unknown to us, that we call the events which come to -pass by them, accidental; though all reasonable men know certainly, -that there cannot, in reality, be any such thing as chance; -and conclude that the things which have this appearance are the -result of general laws, and may be reduced to them. It is but -an exceeding little way, and in but a very few respects, that we -can trace up the natural course of things before us, to general -laws. It is only from analogy, that we conclude the whole of it -to be capable of being reduced to them: only from our seeing -that part is so. It is from our finding, that the course of nature, -in some respects and so far, goes on by general laws, that we conclude -this of the rest.</p> - -<p>If that be a just ground for such a conclusion, it is a just -ground also, if not to conclude, yet to apprehend, to render it -supposable and credible, which is sufficient for answering objections, -that God’s miraculous interpositions may have been, all -along in like manner, by <em>general</em> laws of wisdom. Thus, that -miraculous powers should be exerted, at such times, upon such<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[227]</a></span> -occasions, in such degrees and manners, and with regard to such -persons, rather than others; that the affairs of the world, being -permitted to go on in their natural course so far, should, just at -such a point, have a new direction given them by miraculous interpositions; -that these interpositions should be exactly in such -degrees and respects only; all this may have been by general -laws. These laws are indeed unknown to us: but no more unknown -than the laws from whence it is, that some die as soon as -they are born, and others live to extreme old age; that one man -is so superior to another in understanding; with innumerable -more things, which, as was before observed, we cannot reduce to -any laws or rules, though it is taken for granted, they are as -much reducible to general ones, as gravitation. If the revealed -dispensations of Providence, and miraculous interpositions, be -by general laws, as well as God’s ordinary government in the -course of nature, made known by reason and experience; there -is no more reason to expect that every exigence, as it arises, -should be provided for by these general laws or miraculous interpositions, -than that every exigence in nature should be, by the -general laws of nature. Yet there might be wise and good -reasons, why miraculous interpositions should be by general laws; -and why these laws should not be broken in upon, or deviated -from, by other miracles.</p> - -<p>Upon the whole then, the appearance of deficiencies and irregularities -in nature is owing to its being a scheme but in part -made known, and of such a certain particular kind in other respects. -We see no more reason why the frame and course of -nature should be such a scheme, than why Christianity should. -And that the former is such a scheme, renders it credible, that -the latter, upon supposition of its truth, may be so too. And as -it is manifest, that Christianity is a scheme revealed but in part, -and a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish -ends, like to that of nature: so the credibility, that it may have -been all along carried on by general laws, no less than the course -of nature, has been distinctly proved. From all this it is beforehand -credible that there might, I think probable that there -would, be the like appearance of deficiencies and irregularities -in Christianity, as in nature: <i>i.e.</i> that Christianity would be -liable to the like objections, as the frame of nature. And these<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[228]</a></span> -objections are answered by these observations concerning Christianity; -as the like objections against the frame of nature are -answered by the like observations concerning the frame of -nature.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The objections against Christianity, considered as a matter of -fact,<a name="FNanchor_205" id="FNanchor_205"></a><a href="#Footnote_205" class="fnanchor">[205]</a> having, in general, been obviated in the preceding chapter; -and the same, considered as made against the wisdom and goodness -of it, having been obviated in this: the next thing, according -to the method proposed, is to show, that the principal objections, -in particular, against Christianity, may be answered, by -particular and full analogies in nature. And as one of them is -made against the whole scheme of it together, as just now described, -I choose to consider it here, rather than in a distinct -chapter by itself.</p> - -<p>The thing objected against this scheme of the gospel is, “that -it seems to suppose God was reduced to the necessity of a long -series of intricate means, in order to accomplish his ends, the -recovery and salvation of the world: in like sort as men, for -want of understanding or power, not being able to come at their -ends directly, are forced to go roundabout ways, and make use -of many perplexed contrivances to arrive at them,” Now every -thing which we see shows the folly of this, considered as an objection -against the truth of Christianity. For, according to our -manner of conception, God makes use of variety of means, what -we often think tedious ones, in the natural course of providence, -for the accomplishment of all his ends. Indeed it is certain -there is somewhat in this matter quite beyond our comprehension: -but the mystery is as great in nature as in Christianity. -We know what we ourselves aim at, as final ends: and what -courses we take, merely as means conducing to those ends. But -we are greatly ignorant how far things are considered by the -Author of nature, under the single notion of means and ends; -so as that it may be said, this is merely an end, and that merely -a means, in his regard. And whether there be not some peculiar -absurdity in our very manner of conception, concerning this -matter, something contradictory arising from our extremely imperfect -views of things, it is impossible to say.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[229]</a></span></p> - -<p>However, this much is manifest, that the whole natural world -and government of it, is a scheme or system; not a fixed, but a -progressive one: a scheme in which the operation of various -means takes up a great length of time, before the ends they tend -to can be attained. The change of seasons, the ripening of -fruits, the very history of a flower, are instances of this: and so -is human life. Thus vegetable bodies, and those of animals, -though possibly formed at once, yet grow up by degrees to a -mature state. And thus rational agents, who animate these -latter bodies, are naturally directed to form each his own manners -and character, by the gradual gaining of knowledge and experience, -and by a long course of action. Our existence is not only -successive, as it must be of necessity; but one state of our life -and being is appointed by God, to be a preparation for another; -and that to be the means of attaining to another succeeding one: -infancy to childhood; childhood to youth; youth to mature age. -Men are impatient, and for precipitating things: but the Author -of nature appears deliberate throughout his operations; accomplishing -his natural ends by slow successive steps.<a name="FNanchor_206" id="FNanchor_206"></a><a href="#Footnote_206" class="fnanchor">[206]</a> And there -is a plan of things beforehand laid out, which, from the nature -of it, requires various systems of means, as well as length of -time, in order to the carrying on its several parts into execution.</p> - -<p>Thus, in the daily course of natural providence, God operates -in the very same manner, as in the dispensation of Christianity; -making one thing subservient to another; this, to something -further; and so on, through a progressive series of means, which -extend, both backward and forward, beyond our utmost view. -Of this manner of operation, every thing we see in the course -of nature is as much an instance, as any part of the Christian -dispensation.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[230]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h3 id="II_CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V.<br /> -<span class="smaller">THE PARTICULAR SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY; THE APPOINTMENT -OF A MEDIATOR, AND THE REDEMPTION OF THE -WORLD BY HIM.</span></h3> - -<p>There is not, I think, any thing relating to Christianity, which -has been more objected against, than the mediation of Christ, in -some or other of its parts. Yet upon thorough consideration, -there seems nothing less justly liable to it.<a name="FNanchor_207" id="FNanchor_207"></a><a href="#Footnote_207" class="fnanchor">[207]</a> For,</p> - -<p>I. The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined presumption -against the general notion of <em>a Mediator between God and -man</em>.<a name="FNanchor_208" id="FNanchor_208"></a><a href="#Footnote_208" class="fnanchor">[208]</a> For we find all living creatures are brought into the -world, and their life in infancy is preserved, by the instrumentality -of others: and every satisfaction of it, some way or other, is -bestowed by the like means. So that the visible government, -which God exercises over the world, is by the instrumentality -and mediation of others. How far his invisible government be -or be not so, it is impossible to determine at all by reason. The -supposition, that part of it is so, appears, to say the least, altogether -as credible, as the contrary. There is then no sort of objection, -from the light of nature, against the general notion of a -mediator between God and man, considered as a doctrine of Christianity, -or as an appointment in this dispensation: since we find -by experience, that God does appoint mediators, to be the instruments -of good and evil to us: the instruments of his justice and -his mercy. And the objection here referred to is urged, not -against mediation in that high, eminent, and peculiar sense, in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[231]</a></span> -which Christ is our mediator; but absolutely against the whole -notion itself of a mediator at all.</p> - -<p>II. As we must suppose, that the world is under the proper -moral government of God, or in a state of religion, before we can -enter into consideration of the revealed doctrine, concerning the -redemption of it by Christ: so that supposition is here to be distinctly -noticed. Now the divine moral government which religion -teaches us, implies that the consequence of vice shall be -misery, in some future state, by the righteous judgment of God. -That such consequent punishment shall take effect by his appointment, -is necessarily implied. But, as it is not in any sort to be -supposed, that we are made acquainted with all the ends or -reasons, for which it is fit that future punishments should be inflicted, -or why God has appointed such and such consequent -misery to follow vice; and as we are altogether in the dark, how -or in what manner it shall follow, by what immediate occasions, -or by the instrumentality of what means; so there is no absurdity -in supposing it may follow in a way analogous to that in which -many miseries follow such and such courses of action at present; -poverty, sickness, infamy, untimely death by diseases, death from -the hands of civil justice. There is no absurdity in supposing -future punishment may follow wickedness <em>of course</em>, as we speak, -or in the way of natural consequence from God’s original constitution -of the world; from the nature he has given us, and from -the condition in which he places us; or in a like manner, as a -person rashly trifling upon a precipice, in the way of natural consequence, -falls down; in the way of natural consequence of this, -breaks his limbs, and in the way of natural consequence, without -help, perishes.</p> - -<p>Some good men may perhaps be offended with hearing it spoken -of as a supposable thing that future punishments of wickedness -may be in the way of natural consequence: as if this were taking -the execution of justice out of the hands of God, and giving it to -nature. But they should remember, that when things come to -pass according to the course of nature, this does not hinder them -from being his doing, who is the God of nature: and that the -Scripture ascribes those punishments to divine justice, which are -known to be natural; and which must be called so, when distinguished -from such as are miraculous. After all, this supposition,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[232]</a></span> -or rather this way of speaking, is here made use of only -by way of illustration of the subject before us. For since it must -be admitted, that the future punishment of wickedness is not a -matter of arbitrary appointment, but of reason, equity, and justice; -it comes for aught I see, to the same thing, whether it is supposed -to be inflicted in a way analogous to that in which the -temporal punishments of vice and folly are inflicted, or in any -other way. And though there were a difference, it is allowable, -in the present case, to make this supposition, plainly not an incredible -one, that future punishment may follow wickedness in -the way of natural consequence, or according to some general -laws of government already established in the universe.</p> - -<p>III. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we may observe -somewhat, much to the present purpose, in the constitution of -nature or appointments of Providence: the provision which is -made, that all the bad natural consequences of men’s actions -should not always actually follow; or that such bad consequences, -as, according to the settled course of things, would inevitably -have followed if not prevented, should, in certain degrees, be prevented. -We are apt presumptuously to imagine, that the world -might have been so constituted, as that there would not have -been any such thing as misery or evil. On the contrary we find -the Author of nature permits it: but then he has provided reliefs, -and in many cases perfect remedies for it, after some pains and -difficulties; reliefs and remedies even for that evil, which is the -fruit of our own misconduct; and which, in the course of nature, -would have continued, and ended in our destruction, but for such -remedies. And this is an instance both of severity and of indulgence, -in the constitution of nature. Thus all the bad consequences, -now mentioned, of a man’s trifling upon a precipice, -might be prevented. And though all were not, yet some of them -might, by proper interposition, if not rejected:<a name="FNanchor_209" id="FNanchor_209"></a><a href="#Footnote_209" class="fnanchor">[209]</a> by another’s -coming to the rash man’s relief, with his own laying hold on that -relief, in such sort as the case required. Persons may do a great<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[233]</a></span> -deal themselves towards preventing the bad consequences of their -follies: and more may be done by themselves, together with the -assistance of others their fellow-creatures; which assistance nature -requires and prompts us to. This is the general constitution of -the world.</p> - -<p>Now suppose it had been so constituted, that after such actions -were done, as were foreseen naturally to draw after them misery -to the doer, it should have been no more in human power to have -prevented that naturally consequent misery, in any instance, than -it is in all: no one can say, whether such a more severe constitution -of things might not yet have been really good. But, on the -contrary, provision being made by nature, that we may and do, -to so great degree, prevent the bad natural effects of our follies; -this may be called mercy or compassion in the original constitution -of the world: compassion, as distinguished from goodness in -general. And, the whole known constitution and course of things -affording us instances of such compassion, it would be according -to the analogy of nature, to hope, that however ruinous the -natural consequences of vice might be, from the general laws of -God’s government over the universe; yet provision might be -made, possibly might have been originally made, for preventing -those ruinous consequences from inevitably following: at least -from following universally, and in all cases.</p> - -<p>Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this made a question, -or spoken of as in any degree doubtful. The generality of mankind -are so far from having that awful sense of things, which the -present state of vice and misery and darkness seems to make but -reasonable, that they have scarce any apprehension or thought at -all about this matter, any way: and some serious persons may -have spoken unadvisedly concerning it. But let us observe, -what we experience to be, and what, from the very constitution -of nature cannot but be, the consequences of irregular and disorderly -behavior: even of such rashness, wilfulness, neglects, as -we scarce call vicious. Now it is natural to apprehend, that the -bad consequences of irregularity will be greater, in proportion as -the irregularity is so. And there is no comparison between these -irregularities, and the greater instances of vice, or a dissolute -profligate disregard to all religion; if there be any thing at all in -religion. For consider what it is for creatures, moral agents,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[234]</a></span> -presumptuously to introduce that confusion and misery into the -kingdom of God, which mankind have in fact introduced: to -blaspheme the Sovereign Lord of all; to contemn his authority; -to be injurious, to the degree they are, to their fellow-creatures, -the creatures of God. Add that the effects of vice in the present -world are often extreme misery, irretrievable ruin, and even -death: and upon putting all this together, it will appear, that as -no one can say, in what degree fatal the unprevented consequences -of vice may be, according to the general rule of divine government; -so it is by no means intuitively certain, how far these -consequences could possibly, in the nature of the thing, be prevented, -consistently with the eternal rule of right, or with what -is, in fact, the moral constitution of nature. However, there -would be large ground to hope, that the universal government -was not so severely strict, but that there was room for pardon, or -for having those penal consequences prevented. Yet,</p> - -<p>IV. There seems no probability, that any thing we could do -would alone and of itself prevent them: prevent their following, -or being inflicted. But one would think at least, it were impossible -that the contrary should be thought certain. For we are -not acquainted with the whole of the case. We are not informed -of all the reasons, which render it fit that future punishments -should be inflicted: and therefore cannot know, whether any -thing we could do would make such an alteration, as to render it -fit that they should be remitted. We do not know what the -whole natural or appointed consequences of vice are; nor in what -way they would follow, if not prevented: and therefore can in no -sort say, whether we could do any thing which would be sufficient -to prevent them. Our ignorance being thus manifest, let us -recollect the analogy of nature or Providence. For, though this -may be but a slight ground to raise a positive opinion upon, in -this matter; yet it is sufficient to answer a mere arbitrary assertion, -without any kind of evidence, urged by way of objection -against a doctrine, the proof of which is not reason, but revelation. -Consider then: people ruin their fortunes by extravagance; -they bring diseases upon themselves by excess; they incur the -penalties of civil laws; and surely civil government is natural; -will sorrow for these follies past, and behaving well for the future, -alone and of itself prevent the natural consequences of them?<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[235]</a></span> -On the contrary, men’s natural abilities of helping themselves -are often impaired; or if not, yet they are forced to be beholden -to the assistance of others, upon several accounts, and in different -ways; assistance which they would have had no occasion for, -had it not been for their misconduct; but which, in the disadvantageous -condition they have reduced themselves to, is absolutely -necessary to their recovery, and retrieving their affairs. -Since this is our case, considering ourselves merely as inhabitants -of this world, and as having a temporal interest here, under the -natural government of God, which however has a great deal -moral in it; why is it not supposable that this may be our case -also, in our more important capacity, as under his perfect moral -government, and having a more general and future interest -depending?<a name="FNanchor_210" id="FNanchor_210"></a><a href="#Footnote_210" class="fnanchor">[210]</a> If we have misbehaved in this higher capacity, -and rendered ourselves obnoxious to the future punishment, -which God has annexed to vice: it is plainly credible, that -behaving well for the time to come may be—not useless, God -forbid—but wholly insufficient, alone and of itself, to prevent -that punishment: or to put us in the condition which we should -have been in, had we preserved our innocence.</p> - -<p>Though we ought to reason with all reverence, whenever we -reason concerning the divine conduct: yet it may be added, that -it is clearly contrary to all our notions of government, as well as -to what is, in fact, the general constitution of nature, to suppose, -that doing well for the future should, in all cases, prevent all the -judicial bad consequences of having done evil, or all the punishment -annexed to disobedience. We have manifestly nothing -from whence to determine, in what degree, and in what cases, -reformation would prevent this punishment, even supposing that -it would in some. And though the efficacy of repentance itself<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[236]</a></span> -alone, to prevent what mankind had rendered themselves obnoxious -to, and recover what they had forfeited, is now insisted -upon, in opposition to Christianity; yet, by the general prevalence -of propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world, this notion -of repentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt, appears to -be contrary to the general sense of mankind.<a name="FNanchor_211" id="FNanchor_211"></a><a href="#Footnote_211" class="fnanchor">[211]</a></p> - -<p>Upon the whole then; had the laws, the general laws of God’s -government been permitted to operate, without any interposition -in our behalf, the future punishment, for aught we know to -the contrary, or have any reason to think, must inevitably have -followed, notwithstanding any thing we could have done to prevent -it.</p> - -<p>V. In this darkness, or this light of nature, call it which you -please, revelation comes in; and confirms every doubting fear, -which could enter into the heart of man, concerning the future -unprevented consequence of wickedness. It supposes the world -to be in a state of ruin (a supposition which seems the very -ground of the Christian dispensation; and which, if not provable -by reason, yet is in no wise contrary to it;) and teaches us too, -that the rules of divine government are such, as not to admit of -pardon immediately and directly upon repentance, or by the sole -efficacy of it. But teaches at the same time, what nature might -justly have hoped, that the moral government of the universe -was not so rigid, but that there was room for an interposition, to -avert the fatal consequences of vice; which therefore, by this -means, does admit of pardon. Revelation teaches us, that the -unknown laws of God’s more general government, no less than -the particular laws by which we experience he governs us at -present, are compassionate,<a name="FNanchor_212" id="FNanchor_212"></a><a href="#Footnote_212" class="fnanchor">[212]</a> as well as good in the more general -notion of goodness: and that he hath mercifully provided, that -there should be an interposition to prevent the destruction of -human kind; whatever that destruction unprevented would have -been. <cite>God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten -Son, that whosoever believeth</cite>, not, to be sure, in a speculative, -but in a practical sense, <em>that whosoever believeth in him, should<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[237]</a></span> -not perish</em>:<a name="FNanchor_213" id="FNanchor_213"></a><a href="#Footnote_213" class="fnanchor">[213]</a> gave his Son in the same way of goodness to the -world, as he affords particular persons the friendly assistance of -their fellow-creatures, when, without it, their temporal ruin would -be the certain consequence of their follies: in the same way of -goodness, I say, though in a transcendent and infinitely higher -degree. And the Son of God <cite>loved us, and gave himself for us</cite>, -with a love, which he himself compares to that of human friendship: -though, in this case, all comparisons must fall infinitely -short of the thing intended to be illustrated by them. He interposed -in such a manner as was necessary and effectual to prevent -that execution of justice upon sinners, which God had appointed -should otherwise have been executed upon them; or in such a -manner, as to prevent that punishment from actually following, -which, according to the general laws of divine government, must -have followed the sins of the world, had it not been for such -interposition.<a name="FNanchor_214" id="FNanchor_214"></a><a href="#Footnote_214" class="fnanchor">[214]</a></p> - -<p>If any thing here said should appear, upon first thought, inconsistent -with divine goodness; a second, I am persuaded, will -entirely remove that appearance. For were we to suppose the -constitution of things to be such, as that the whole creation must<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[238]</a></span> -have perished, had it not been for something, which God had -appointed should be, in order to prevent that ruin: even this -supposition would not be inconsistent, in any degree, with the -most absolutely perfect goodness. Still it may be thought, that -this whole manner of treating the subject before us supposes -mankind to be naturally in a very strange state. And truly so -it does. But it is not Christianity which has put us into this -state. Whoever will consider the manifold miseries, and the -extreme wickedness of the world; that the best have great -wrongnesses within themselves, which they complain of, and -endeavor to amend; but that the generality grow more profligate -and corrupt with age; that even moralists thought the present -state to be a state of punishment: and, that the earth our habitation -has the appearances of being a ruin: whoever, I say, will -consider all these, and some other obvious things, will think he -has little reason to object against the Scripture account, that -mankind is in a state of degradation; against this being <em>the -fact</em>: how difficult soever he may think it to account for, or even -to form a distinct conception of the occasions and circumstances -of it. But that the crime of our first parents was the occasion -of our being placed in a more disadvantageous condition, is a -thing throughout and particularly analogous to what we see in -the daily course of natural providence; as the recovery of the -world by the interposition of Christ has been shown to be so in -general.</p> - -<p>VI. The particular manner in which Christ interposed in the -redemption of the world, or his office as <em>Mediator</em>, in the largest -sense, <em>between God and man</em>, is thus represented to us in the -Scripture. <cite>He is the light of the world</cite>;<a name="FNanchor_215" id="FNanchor_215"></a><a href="#Footnote_215" class="fnanchor">[215]</a> the revealer of the -will of God in the most eminent sense. He is a propitiatory -sacrifice;<a name="FNanchor_216" id="FNanchor_216"></a><a href="#Footnote_216" class="fnanchor">[216]</a> <cite>the Lamb of God</cite>:<a name="FNanchor_217" id="FNanchor_217"></a><a href="#Footnote_217" class="fnanchor">[217]</a> and, as he voluntarily offered -himself up, he is styled our High Priest.<a name="FNanchor_218" id="FNanchor_218"></a><a href="#Footnote_218" class="fnanchor">[218]</a> And, which seems -of peculiar weight, he is described beforehand in the Old Testament, -under the same characters of a priest, and an expiatory -victim.<a name="FNanchor_219" id="FNanchor_219"></a><a href="#Footnote_219" class="fnanchor">[219]</a> And whereas it is objected, that all this is merely by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[239]</a></span> -way of allusion to the sacrifices of the Mosaic law, the Apostle -on the contrary affirms, that the <cite>law was a shadow of good things -to come, and not the very image of the things</cite>:<a name="FNanchor_220" id="FNanchor_220"></a><a href="#Footnote_220" class="fnanchor">[220]</a> and that <cite>the -priests that offer gifts according to the law—serve unto the example -and shadow of heavenly things, as Moses was admonished -of God, when he was about to make the tabernacle. For see, -saith he, that thou make all things according to the pattern -showed to thee in the mount</cite>;<a name="FNanchor_221" id="FNanchor_221"></a><a href="#Footnote_221" class="fnanchor">[221]</a> <i>i.e.</i> the Levitical priesthood was a -shadow of the priesthood of Christ; in like manner as the tabernacle -made by Moses was according to that showed him in the -mount. The priesthood of Christ, and the tabernacle in the -mount, were the originals; of the former of which the Levitical -priesthood was a type; and of the latter the tabernacle made by -Moses was a copy. The doctrine of this epistle then plainly is, -that the legal sacrifices were allusions to the great and final -atonement to be made by the blood of Christ; and not that this -was an allusion to those. Nor can any thing be more express -and determinate than the following passage. <cite>It is not possible -that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sin. -Wherefore when he cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice -and offering</cite>, <i>i.e.</i> of bulls and of goats, <cite>thou wouldest not, but a -body hast thou prepared me. Lo! I come to do thy will, O God. -By which will we are sanctified., through the offering of the body -of Jesus Christ once for all.</cite><a name="FNanchor_222" id="FNanchor_222"></a><a href="#Footnote_222" class="fnanchor">[222]</a> And to add one passage more of -the like kind: <cite>Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many: -and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time, -without sin</cite>; <i>i.e.</i> without bearing sin, as he did at his first -coming, by being an offering for it; without having our <cite>iniquities</cite> -again <cite>laid upon him</cite>, without being any more a sin-offering:—<cite>unto -them, that look for him shall he appear the second time, -without sin, unto salvation</cite>.<a name="FNanchor_223" id="FNanchor_223"></a><a href="#Footnote_223" class="fnanchor">[223]</a> Nor do the inspired writers at all -confine themselves to this manner of speaking concerning the -satisfaction of Christ; but declare an efficacy in what he did and -suffered for us, additional to and beyond mere instruction, example, -and government, in great variety of expression: <cite>That -Jesus should die for that nation</cite>, the Jews: <cite>and not for that -nation only, but that also</cite>, plainly by the efficacy of his death,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[240]</a></span> -<cite>he should gather together in one the children of God that were -scattered abroad</cite>:<a name="FNanchor_224" id="FNanchor_224"></a><a href="#Footnote_224" class="fnanchor">[224]</a> that <cite>he suffered for sins, the just for the unjust</cite>:<a name="FNanchor_225" id="FNanchor_225"></a><a href="#Footnote_225" class="fnanchor">[225]</a> -that <cite>he gave his life, himself, a ransom</cite>:<a name="FNanchor_226" id="FNanchor_226"></a><a href="#Footnote_226" class="fnanchor">[226]</a> that <cite>we are -bought, bought with a price</cite>:<a name="FNanchor_227" id="FNanchor_227"></a><a href="#Footnote_227" class="fnanchor">[227]</a> that <cite>he redeemed us with his -blood: redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a -curse for us</cite>:<a name="FNanchor_228" id="FNanchor_228"></a><a href="#Footnote_228" class="fnanchor">[228]</a> that he is our <cite>advocate</cite>, <cite>intercessor</cite>, and <cite>propitiation</cite>:<a name="FNanchor_229" id="FNanchor_229"></a><a href="#Footnote_229" class="fnanchor">[229]</a> -that <cite>he was made perfect</cite>, or consummate, <cite>through sufferings; -and being</cite> thus <cite>made perfect, he became the author of salvation</cite>:<a name="FNanchor_230" id="FNanchor_230"></a><a href="#Footnote_230" class="fnanchor">[230]</a> -that <cite>God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself; -by the death of his Son, by the cross; not imputing their -trespasses unto them</cite>:<a name="FNanchor_231" id="FNanchor_231"></a><a href="#Footnote_231" class="fnanchor">[231]</a> and lastly, that <cite>through death he destroyed -him that had the power of death</cite>.<a name="FNanchor_232" id="FNanchor_232"></a><a href="#Footnote_232" class="fnanchor">[232]</a> Christ having thus <cite>humbled -himself, and become obedient to death, even the death of the cross; -God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name, which -is above every name: hath given all things into his hands: hath -committed all judgment unto him; that all men should honor the -Son, even as they honor the Father</cite>.<a name="FNanchor_233" id="FNanchor_233"></a><a href="#Footnote_233" class="fnanchor">[233]</a> For, <cite>worthy is the Lamb -that was slain, to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and -strength, and honor, and glory, and blessing. And every creature -which is in heaven, and on the earth, heard I, saying, Blessing, -and honor, and glory, and power, be unto him that sitteth -upon the throne, and unto the Lamb forever and ever.</cite><a name="FNanchor_234" id="FNanchor_234"></a><a href="#Footnote_234" class="fnanchor">[234]</a></p> - -<p>These passages of Scripture seem to comprehend and express -the chief parts of Christ’s office, as Mediator between God and -man, so far, I mean, as the nature of this his office is revealed; -and it is usually treated of by divines under three heads.</p> - -<p><i>First</i>, He was, by way of eminence, the Prophet: <cite>that Prophet -that should come into the world</cite>,<a name="FNanchor_235" id="FNanchor_235"></a><a href="#Footnote_235" class="fnanchor">[235]</a> to declare the divine -will. He published anew the law of nature, which men had -corrupted; and the very knowledge of which, to some degree, -was lost among them. He taught mankind, taught us authoritatively, -to <cite>live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world</cite>, -in expectation of the future judgment of God. He confirmed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[241]</a></span> -the truth of this moral system of nature, and gave us additional -evidence of it; the evidence of testimony.<a name="FNanchor_236" id="FNanchor_236"></a><a href="#Footnote_236" class="fnanchor">[236]</a> He distinctly -revealed the manner, in which God would be worshipped, the -efficacy of repentance, and the rewards and punishments of a -future life. Thus he was a prophet in a sense in which no other -ever was. To which is to be added, that he set us a perfect <cite>example, -that we should follow his steps</cite>.</p> - -<p><i>Secondly</i>, He has a <cite>kingdom which is not of this world</cite>. He -founded a Church, to be to mankind a standing memorial of -religion, and invitation to it; which he promised to be with -always even to the end. He exercises an invisible government -over it, himself, and by his Spirit: over that part of it which is -militant here on earth, a government of discipline, <cite>for the perfecting -of the saints, for the edifying his body: till we all come -in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of -God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the -fulness of Christ</cite>.<a name="FNanchor_237" id="FNanchor_237"></a><a href="#Footnote_237" class="fnanchor">[237]</a> Of this Church, all persons scattered over -the world, who live in obedience to his laws, are members. For -these he is <cite>gone to prepare a place, and will come again to receive -them unto himself, that where he is, there they may be also; -and reign with him forever and ever</cite>:<a name="FNanchor_238" id="FNanchor_238"></a><a href="#Footnote_238" class="fnanchor">[238]</a> and likewise <cite>to take -vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not his -Gospel</cite>.<a name="FNanchor_239" id="FNanchor_239"></a><a href="#Footnote_239" class="fnanchor">[239]</a></p> - -<p>Against these parts of Christ’s office I find no objections, but -what are fully obviated in the beginning of this chapter.</p> - -<p><i>Lastly</i>, Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, and -made atonement for the sins of the world; which is mentioned -last, in regard to what is objected against it. Sacrifices of expiation -were commanded the Jews, and obtained among most other -nations, from tradition, whose original probably was revelation. -And they were continually repeated, both occasionally, and at the -returns of stated times: and made up great part of the external -religion of mankind. <cite>But now once in the end of the world -Christ appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself.</cite><a name="FNanchor_240" id="FNanchor_240"></a><a href="#Footnote_240" class="fnanchor">[240]</a> -This sacrifice was, in the highest degree and with the most extensive -influence, of that efficacy for obtaining pardon of sin, -which the heathens may be supposed to have thought their sacrifices<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[242]</a></span> -to have been, and which the Jewish sacrifices really were -in some degree, and with regard to some persons.<a name="FNanchor_241" id="FNanchor_241"></a><a href="#Footnote_241" class="fnanchor">[241]</a></p> - -<p>How and in what particular <em>way</em> it had this efficacy, there are -not wanting persons who have endeavored to explain: but I do -not find that the Scripture has explained it. We seem to be -very much in the dark concerning the manner in which the -ancients understood atonement to be made, <i>i.e.</i> pardon to be -obtained by sacrifices. And if the Scripture has, as surely it -has, left this matter of the satisfaction of Christ mysterious, left -somewhat in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it must be, if -not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain. Nor has any one -reason to complain for want of further information, unless he can -show his claim to it.</p> - -<p>Some have endeavored to explain the efficacy of what Christ -has done and suffered for us, beyond what the Scripture has -authorized: others, probably because they could not explain it, -have been for taking it away, and confining his office as Redeemer -of the world, to his instruction, example, and government -of the church. Whereas the doctrine of the Gospel appears to -be, not only that he taught the efficacy of repentance, but rendered -it of the efficacy of which it is, by what he did and -suffered for us: that he obtained for us the benefit of having our -repentance accepted unto eternal life: not only that he revealed -to sinners, that they were in a capacity of salvation, and how -they might obtain it; but moreover that he put them into this -capacity of salvation, by what he did and suffered for them; put -us into a capacity of escaping future punishment, and obtaining -future happiness. And it is our wisdom thankfully to accept -the benefit, by performing the conditions, upon which it is -offered, on our part, without disputing how it was procured on -his. For,</p> - -<p>VII. Since we neither know by what means punishment in a -future state would have followed wickedness in this: nor in what -manner it would have been inflicted, had it not been prevented; -nor all the reasons why its infliction would have been needful, -nor the particular nature of that state of happiness, which Christ -is gone to prepare for his disciples: and since we are ignorant<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[243]</a></span> -how far any thing which we could do, would, alone and of itself, -have been effectual to prevent that punishment to which we were -obnoxious, and recover that happiness which we had forfeited; -it is most evident we are not judges, antecedently to revelation, -whether a mediator was or was not necessary, to obtain those -ends: to prevent that future punishment, and bring mankind to -the final happiness of their nature. For the very same reasons, -upon supposition of the necessity of a mediator, we are no more -judges, antecedently to revelation, of the whole nature of his -office, or of the several parts of which it consists; or of what was -fit and requisite to be assigned him, in order to accomplish the -ends of divine Providence in the appointment. Hence it follows, -that to object against the expediency or usefulness of particular -things, revealed to have been done or suffered by him, because -we do not see how they were conducive to those ends, is highly -absurd. Yet nothing is more common to be met with, than this -absurdity. If it be acknowledged beforehand, that we are not -judges in the case, it is evident that no objection can, with any -shadow of reason, be urged against any particular part of Christ’s -mediatorial office revealed in Scripture, till it can be shown positively -not to be requisite or conducive to the ends proposed to be -accomplished; or that it is in itself unreasonable.</p> - -<p>There is one objection made against the satisfaction of Christ, -which looks to be of this positive kind: that the doctrine of his -being appointed to suffer for the sins of the world, represents -God as being indifferent whether he punished the innocent or -the guilty. Now from the foregoing observations we may see -the extreme slightness of all such objections; and (though it is -most certain all who make them <em>do not see</em> the consequence) that -they conclude altogether as much against God’s whole original -constitution of nature, and the whole daily course of divine Providence -in the government of the world, (<i>i.e.</i> against the whole -scheme of Theism and the whole notion of religion,) as against -Christianity. For the world is a constitution or system, whose -parts have a mutual reference to each other: and there is a -scheme of things gradually carrying on, called the course of nature, -to the carrying on of which God has appointed us, in various -ways, to contribute. And when, in the daily course of natural -providence, it is appointed that innocent people should suffer for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[244]</a></span> -the faults of the guilty, this is liable to the very same objection, -as the instance we are now considering. The infinitely greater -importance of that appointment of Christianity, which is objected -against, does not hinder but it may be, as it plainly is, an appointment -of the very same <em>kind</em>, with what the world affords us -daily examples of. Nay, if there were any force at all in the objection, -it would be stronger, in one respect, against natural -providence, than against Christianity: because under the former -we are in many cases commanded, and even necessitated whether -we will or no, to suffer for the faults of others; whereas the sufferings -of Christ were voluntary.</p> - -<p>The world’s being under the righteous government of God -does indeed imply, that finally, and upon the whole, every one -shall receive according to his personal deserts: and the general -doctrine of the whole Scripture is, that this shall be the completion -of the divine government. But during the progress, and, -for aught we know, even in order to the completion of this moral -scheme, vicarious punishments may be fit, and absolutely necessary. -Men by their follies run themselves into extreme distress; -into difficulties which would be absolutely fatal to them, were it -not for the interposition and assistance of others. God commands -by the law of nature, that we afford them this assistance, in many -cases where we cannot do it without very great pains, and labor, -and sufferings to ourselves. We see in what variety of ways one -person’s sufferings contribute to the relief of another: and how, -or by what particular means, this comes to pass, or follows, from -the constitution and laws of nature, which came under our notice: -and, being familiarized to it, men are not shocked with it. So -that the reason of their insisting upon objections of the foregoing -kind against the satisfaction of Christ is, either that they do not -consider God’s settled and uniform appointments as his appointments -at all; or else they forget that vicarious punishment is a -providential appointment of every day’s experience. And then, -from their being unacquainted with the more general laws of -nature or divine government over the world, and not seeing how -the sufferings of Christ could contribute to the redemption of it, -unless by arbitrary and tyrannical will, they conclude his sufferings -could not contribute to it any other way. And yet, what -has been often alleged in justification of this doctrine, even from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[245]</a></span> -the apparent natural tendency of this method of our redemption; -its tendency to vindicate the authority of God’s laws, and deter -his creatures from sin; this has never yet been answered, and is -I think plainly unanswerable: though I am far from thinking it -an account of the whole of the case. But, without taking this -into consideration, it abundantly appears, from the observations -above made, that this objection is not an objection against Christianity, -but against the whole general constitution of nature. -And if it were to be considered as an objection against Christianity, -or considering it as it is, an objection against the constitution -of nature; it amounts to no more in conclusion than this, -that a divine appointment cannot be necessary or expedient, because -the objector does not discern it to be so: though he must -own that the nature of the case is such, as renders him incapable -of judging, whether it be so or not; or of seeing it to be necessary, -though it were so!</p> - -<p>It is indeed a matter of great patience to reasonable men, to -find people arguing in this manner: objecting against the credibility -of such particular things revealed in Scripture, that they -do not see the necessity or expediency of them. For though it -is highly right, and the most pious exercise of our understanding, -to inquire with due reverence into the ends and reasons of God’s -dispensations: yet when those reasons are concealed, to argue from -our ignorance, that such dispensations cannot be from God, is infinitely -absurd. The presumption of this kind of objections -seems almost lost in the folly of them. And the folly of them -is yet greater, when they are urged, as usually they are, against -things in Christianity analogous or like to those natural dispensations -of Providence, which are matter of experience. Let reason -be kept to: and if any part of the Scripture account of the redemption -of the world by Christ can be shown to be really contrary -to it, let the Scripture, in the name of God, be given up. -But let not such poor creatures as we are, go on objecting against -an infinite scheme, that we do not see the necessity or usefulness -of all its parts, and call this reasoning; and, which still further -heightens the absurdity in the present case, parts which we are -not actively concerned in. For it may be worth mentioning,</p> - -<p><i>Lastly</i>, That not only the reason of the thing, but the whole -analogy of nature, should teach us, not to expect to have the like<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[246]</a></span> -information concerning the divine conduct, as concerning our -own duty. God instructs us by experience, (for it is not reason, -but experience which instructs us,) what good or bad consequences -will follow from our acting in such and such manners: -and by this he directs us how we are to behave ourselves. But, -though we are sufficiently instructed for the common purposes of -life: yet it is but an almost infinitely small part of natural providence, -which we are at all let into. The case is the same with -regard to revelation. The doctrine of a mediator between God -and man, against which it is objected, that the expediency of -some things in it is not understood, relates only to what was done -on God’s part in the appointment, and on the Mediator’s in the -execution of it. For what is <em>required of us</em>, in consequence of -this gracious dispensation, is another subject, in which none can -complain for want of information. The constitution of the world, -and God’s natural government over it, is all mystery, as much as -the Christian dispensation. Yet under the first he has given -men all things pertaining to life; and under the other all things -pertaining unto godliness. And it may be added, that there is -nothing hard to be accounted for in any of the common precepts -of Christianity: though if there were, surely a divine command -is abundantly sufficient to lay us under the strongest obligations -to obedience. But the fact is, that the reasons of all the Christian -precepts are evident. Positive institutions are manifestly -necessary to keep up and propagate religion among mankind. -And our duty to Christ, the internal and external worship of -him; this part of the religion of the Gospel manifestly arises -out of what he has done and suffered, his authority and -dominion, and the relation which he is revealed to stand in -to us.<a name="FNanchor_242" id="FNanchor_242"></a><a href="#Footnote_242" class="fnanchor">[242]</a></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[247]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h3 id="II_CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI.<br /> -<span class="smaller">THE WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION; AND THE -SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN THE PROOF OF IT.</span></h3> - -<p>It has been thought by some persons, that if the evidence of -revelation appears doubtful, this itself turns into a positive argument -against it: because it cannot be supposed, that, if it were -true, it would be left to subsist upon doubtful evidence. And -the objection against revelation from its not being universal is -often insisted upon as of great weight.</p> - -<p>The weakness of these opinions may be shown, by observing -the suppositions on which they are founded: which are really -such as these; that it cannot be thought God would have bestowed -any favor at all upon us, unless in the degree which we -think he might, and which, we imagine, would be most to our -particular advantage; and also that it cannot be thought he -would bestow a favor upon any, unless he bestowed the same -upon all; suppositions, which we find contradicted, not by a few -instances in God’s natural government of the world, but by the -general analogy of nature together.</p> - -<p>Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as doubtful, -and of this supposed doubtfulness as a positive argument against -it, should be put upon considering, what that evidence is, which -they act upon with regard to their temporal interests. It is not -only extremely difficult, but in many cases absolutely impossible, -to balance pleasure and pain, satisfaction and uneasiness, so as to -be able to say on which side is the overplus. There are the like -difficulties and impossibilities in making the due allowances for a -change of temper and taste, for satiety, disgusts, ill health: any -of which render men incapable of enjoying, after they have obtained -what they most eagerly desired. Numberless too are the -accidents, besides that one of untimely death, which may even -probably disappoint the best-concerted schemes: and strong -objections are often seen to lie against them, not to be removed -or answered, but which seem overbalanced by reasons on the -other side; so as that the certain difficulties and dangers of the -pursuit are, by every one; thought justly disregarded, upon<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[248]</a></span> -account of the appearing greater advantages in case of success, -though there be but little probability of it. Lastly, every one -observes our liableness, if we be not upon our guard, to be -deceived by the falsehood of men, and the false appearances of -things: and this danger must be greatly increased, if there be a -strong bias within, suppose from indulged passion, to favor the -deceit. Hence arises that great uncertainty and doubtfulness of -proof, <em>wherein</em> our temporal interest really consists; what are the -most probable <em>means</em> of attaining it; and whether those means -will eventually be <em>successful</em>. And numberless instances there -are, in the daily course of life, in which all men think it reasonable -to engage in pursuits, though the probability is greatly -against succeeding; and to make such provision for themselves, -as it is supposable they may have occasion for, though the plain -acknowledged probability is, that they never shall.</p> - -<p>Those who think the objection against revelation, from its light -not being universal, to be of weight,<a name="FNanchor_243" id="FNanchor_243"></a><a href="#Footnote_243" class="fnanchor">[243]</a> should observe, that the -Author of nature, in numberless instances, bestows that upon -some, which he does not upon others, who seem equally to stand -in need of it. Indeed he appears to bestow all his gifts with the -most promiscuous variety among creatures of the same species: -health and strength, capacities of prudence and of knowledge, -means of improvement, riches, and all external advantages. As -there are not any two men found, of exactly like shape and -features; so it is probable there are not any two, of an exactly -like constitution, temper, and situation, with regard to the goods -and evils of life. Yet, notwithstanding these uncertainties and -varieties, God does exercise a natural government over the world; -and there is such a thing as a prudent and imprudent institution -of life, with regard to our health and our affairs, under that his -natural government.</p> - -<p>As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation have been universal; -and as they have been afforded to a greater or less part<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[249]</a></span> -of the world, at different times; so likewise at different times, -both revelations have had different degrees of evidence. The -Jews who lived during the succession of prophets, that is, from -Moses till after the Captivity, had higher evidence of the truth -of their religion, than those had, who lived in the interval between -the last-mentioned period, and the coming of Christ. And -the first Christians had higher evidence of the miracles wrought -in attestation of Christianity, than what we have now. They -had also a strong presumptive proof of the truth of it, perhaps -of much greater force, in way of argument, than many think, of -which we have very little remaining; I mean the presumptive -proof of its truth, from the influence which it had upon the lives -of the generality of its professors. And we, or future ages, may -possibly have a proof of it, which they could not have, from the -conformity between the prophetic history, and the state of the -world<a name="FNanchor_244" id="FNanchor_244"></a><a href="#Footnote_244" class="fnanchor">[244]</a> and of Christianity.</p> - -<p>And further: if we were to suppose the evidence, which some -have of religion, to amount to little more than seeing that it <em>may</em> -be true; but that they remain in great doubts and uncertainties -about both its evidence and its nature, and great perplexities concerning -the rule of life: others to have a <em>full conviction</em> of the -truth of religion, with a distinct knowledge of their duty; and -others severally to have all the intermediate degrees of religious -light and evidence, which lie between these two—if we put the -case, that for the present, it was intended that revelation should be -no more than a small light, in the midst of a world greatly overspread, -notwithstanding it, with ignorance and darkness: that -certain glimmerings of this light should extend, and be directed, -to remote distances, in such a manner as that those who really -partook of it should not discern whence it originally came: that -some in a nearer situation to it should have its light obscured, -and, in different ways and degrees, intercepted: and that others -should be placed within its clearer influence, and be much more -enlivened, cheered, and directed by it; but yet that even to these<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[250]</a></span> -it should be no more than a <em>light shining in a dark place</em>: all -this would be perfectly uniform, and of a piece with the conduct -of Providence, in the distribution of its other blessings. If the -fact of the case really were, that some have received no light at -all from the Scripture; as many ages and countries in the heathen -world: that others, though they have, by means of it, had essential -or natural religion enforced upon their consciences, yet have -never had the genuine Scripture revelation, with its real evidence, -proposed to their consideration; and the ancient Persians and -modern Mahometans may possibly be instances of people in a -situation somewhat like to this; that others, though they have -had the Scripture laid before them as of divine revelation, yet -have had it with the system and evidence of Christianity so interpolated, -the system so corrupted, the evidence so blended with -false miracles, as to leave the mind in the utmost doubtfulness -and uncertainty about the whole; which may be the state of -some thoughtful men, in most of those nations who call themselves -Christian: and lastly, that others have had Christianity -offered to them in its genuine simplicity, and with its proper -evidence, as persons in countries and churches of civil and of -Christian liberty; but that even these persons are left in great -ignorance in many respects, and have by no means light afforded -them enough to satisfy their curiosity, but only to regulate their -life, to teach them their duty, and encourage them in the careful -discharge of it. I say, if we were to suppose this somewhat of -a general true account of the degrees of moral and religious light -and evidence, which were intended to be afforded mankind, and -of what has actually been and is their situation, in their moral -and religious capacity; there would be nothing in all this ignorance, -doubtfulness, and uncertainty, in all these varieties, and -supposed disadvantages of some in comparison of others, respecting -religion, but may be paralleled by manifest analogies in the -natural dispensations of Providence at present, considering ourselves -merely in our temporal capacity.</p> - -<p>Nor is there any thing shocking in all this, or which would -seem to bear hard upon the moral administration in nature, if we -would really keep in mind, that every one shall be dealt equitably -with: instead of forgetting this, or explaining it away, after it is -acknowledged in words. All shadow of injustice, and indeed all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[251]</a></span> -harsh appearances, in this various economy of Providence, would -be lost, if we would keep in mind, that every merciful allowance -shall be made, and no more be required of any one, than what -might have been equitably expected of him, from the circumstances -in which he was placed; and not what might have been -expected, had he been placed in other circumstances: <i>i.e.</i> in -Scripture language, that every man shall be <em>accepted according -to what he had, not according to what he had not</em>.<a name="FNanchor_245" id="FNanchor_245"></a><a href="#Footnote_245" class="fnanchor">[245]</a> This however -does not by any means imply, that all persons’ condition -here is equally advantageous with respect to futurity. And -Providence’s designing to place some in greater darkness with -respect to religious knowledge, is no more a reason why they -should not endeavor to get out of that darkness, and others to -bring them out of it, than why ignorant and slow people in -matters of other knowledge should not endeavor to learn, or -should not be instructed.</p> - -<p>It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same wise and good -principle, whatever it was, which disposed the Author of nature -to make different kinds and orders of creatures, disposed him also -to place creatures of like kinds in different situations. And that -the same principle which disposed him to make creatures of -different moral capacities, disposed him also to place creatures of -like moral capacities in different religious situations; and even -the same creatures, in different periods of their being. The account -or reason of this is also most probably the account why the -constitution of things is such, as that creatures of moral natures -or capacities, for a considerable part of that duration in which -they are living agents, are not at all subjects of morality and religion; -but grow up to be so, and grow up to be so more and more, -gradually from childhood to mature age.</p> - -<p>What, in particular, is the account or reason of these things, -we must be greatly in the dark, were it only that we know so -very little even of our own case. Our present state may possibly -be the consequence of something past, of which we are wholly -ignorant: as it has a reference to somewhat to come, of which -we know scarce any more than is necessary for practice. A -system or constitution, in its notion, implies variety; and so -complicated a one as this world, very great variety. So that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[252]</a></span> -were revelation universal, yet, from men’s different capacities of -understanding, from the different lengths of their lives, their -different educations and other external circumstances, and from -their difference of temper and bodily constitution, their religious -situations would be widely different, and the disadvantage of some -in comparison of others, perhaps, altogether as much as at present. -The true account, whatever it be, why mankind, or such a part -of mankind, are placed in this condition of ignorance, must be -supposed also the true account of our further ignorance, in not -knowing the reasons why, or whence it is, that they are placed -in this condition.</p> - -<p>The following practical reflections may deserve the serious consideration -of those persons, who think the circumstances of mankind -or their own, in the forementioned respects, a ground of -complaint.</p> - -<p><i>First</i>, The evidence of religion not appearing obvious, may -constitute one particular part of some men’s trial in the religious -sense: as it gives scope, for a virtuous exercise, or vicious neglect -of their understanding, in examining or not examining into that -evidence. There seems no possible reason to be given, why we -may not be in a state of moral probation, with regard to the exercise -of our understanding upon the subject of religion, as we are -with regard to our behavior in common affairs. The former is as -much a thing within our power and choice as the latter. And I -suppose it is to be laid down for certain, that the same character, -the same inward principle, which, after a man is convinced of -the truth of religion, renders him obedient to the precepts of it, -would, were he not thus convinced, set him about an examination -of it, upon its system and evidence being offered to his thoughts: -and that in the latter state his examination would be with an -impartiality, seriousness, and solicitude, proportionable to what -his obedience is in the former. And as inattention, negligence, -want of all serious concern, about a matter of such a nature and -such importance, when offered to men’s consideration, is, before -a distinct conviction of its truth, as real depravity and dissoluteness, -as neglect of religious practice after such conviction: so -active solicitude about it, and fair impartial consideration of its -evidence before such conviction, is as really an exercise of a -morally right temper; as is religious practice after. Thus, that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[253]</a></span> -religion is not intuitively true, but a matter of deduction and -inference; that a conviction of its truth is not forced upon every -one, but left to be, by some, collected with heedful attention to -premises; this as much constitutes religious probation, as much -affords sphere, scope, opportunity, for right and wrong behavior, -as any thing whatever does. And their manner of treating this -subject, when laid before them, shows what is in their heart, and -is an exertion of it.</p> - -<p><i>Secondly</i>, It appears to be a thing as evident, though it is not -so much attended to, that if, upon consideration of religion, the -evidence of it should seem to any persons doubtful, in the highest -supposable degree; even this doubtful evidence will, however, -put them into a <em>general state of probation</em> in the moral and religious -sense. For, suppose a man to be really in doubt, whether -such a person had not done him the greatest favor; or, whether -his whole temporal interest did not depend upon that person; no -one, who had any sense of gratitude and of prudence, could -possibly consider himself in the same situation, with regard to -such person, as if he had no such doubt. In truth, it is as just -to say, that certainty and doubt are the same, as to say the situations -now mentioned would leave a man as entirely at liberty in -point of gratitude or prudence, as he would be, were he certain -he had received no favor from such person; or that he no way -depended upon him. Thus, though the evidence of religion -which is afforded to some men should be little more than they -are given to see, the system of Christianity, or religion in general, -to be supposable and credible; this ought in all reason to beget a -serious practical apprehension, that it <em>may</em> be true. And even -this will afford matter of exercise for religious suspense and deliberation, -for moral resolution and self-government; because the -apprehension that religion may be true does as really lay men -under obligations, as a full conviction that it is true. It gives -occasion and motives to consider further the important subject; -to preserve attentively upon their minds a general implicit sense -that they may be under divine moral government, an awful solicitude -about religion, whether natural or revealed. Such apprehension -ought to turn men’s eyes to every degree of new light -which may be had, from whatever side it comes; and induce -them to refrain, in the mean time, from all immoralities, and live<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[254]</a></span> -in the conscientious practice of every common virtue. Especially -are they bound to keep at the greatest distance from all dissolute -profaneness, for this the very nature of the case forbids; and to -treat with highest reverence a matter, upon which their own -whole interest and being, and the fate of nature, depend. This -behavior, and an active endeavor to maintain within themselves -this temper, is the business, the duty, and the wisdom of those -persons, who complain of the doubtfulness of religion: is what -they are under the most proper obligations to. And such behavior -is an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve in them, -that character, which the practice of all the several duties of religion, -from a full conviction of its truth, is an exertion of, and -has a tendency to improve in others: others, I say, to whom God -has afforded such conviction. Nay, considering the infinite importance -of religion, revealed as well as natural, I think it may -be said in general, that whoever will weigh the matter thoroughly -may see, there is not near so much difference, as is commonly -imagined, between what ought in reason to be the rule of life, to -those persons who are fully convinced of its truth, and to those -who have only a serious doubting apprehension, that it may be -true. Their hopes, and fears, and obligations, will be in various -degrees: but, as the subject-matter of their hopes and fears is -the same, so the subject-matter of their obligations, what they -are bound to do and to refrain from, is not so very unlike.</p> - -<p>It is to be observed further, that, from a character of understanding, -or a situation of influence in the world, some persons -have it in their power to do infinitely more harm or good, by -setting an example of profaneness and avowed disregard to all -religion, or, on the contrary, of a serious, though perhaps doubting, -apprehension of its truth, and of a reverent regard to it -under this doubtfulness; than they can do, by acting well or ill -in all the <em>common intercourses</em> among mankind. Consequently -they are most highly accountable for a behavior, which, they may -easily foresee, is of such importance, and in which there is most -plainly a right and a wrong; even admitting the evidence of religion -to be as doubtful as is pretended.</p> - -<p>The ground of these observations, and that which renders them -just and true, is, that doubting necessarily implies <em>some</em> degree -of evidence for that, of which we doubt. For no person would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[255]</a></span> -be in doubt concerning the truth of a number of facts so and so -circumstanced, which should accidentally come into his thoughts, -and of which he had no evidence at all. And though in the -case of an even chance, and where consequently we were in -doubt, we should in common language say, that we had no evidence -at all for either side; yet that situation of things, which -renders it an even chance and no more, that such an event will -happen, renders this case equivalent to all others, where there is -such evidence on both sides of a question,<a name="FNanchor_246" id="FNanchor_246"></a><a href="#Footnote_246" class="fnanchor">[246]</a> as leaves the mind in -doubt concerning the truth. Indeed in all these cases, there is -no more evidence on one side than on the other; but there is -(what is equivalent to) much more for either, than for the truth -of a number of facts, which come into one’s thoughts at random. -Thus, in all these cases, doubt as much presupposes evidence, in -lower degrees, as belief presupposes higher, and certainty higher -still. Any one, who will a little attend to the nature of evidence, -will easily carry this observation on, and see, that between no -evidence at all, and that degree of it which affords ground of -doubt, there are as many intermediate degrees, as there are, between -that degree which is the ground of doubt, and demonstration. -And though we have not faculties to distinguish these -degrees of evidence with any sort of exactness; yet, in proportion -as they are discerned, they ought to influence our practice. It -is as real an imperfection in the moral character, not to be influenced -in practice by a lower degree of evidence when discerned, -as it is in the understanding, not to discern it. And as, in all -subjects which men consider, they discern the lower as well as -higher degrees of evidence, proportionably to their capacity of -understanding; so, in practical subjects, they are influenced in -practice, by the lower as well as higher degrees of it, proportionably -to their fairness and honesty. And as, in proportion to defects -in the understanding, men are unapt to see lower degrees -of evidence, are in danger of overlooking evidence when it is not -glaring, and are easily imposed upon in such cases; so, in proportion -to the corruption of the heart, they seem capable of satisfying -themselves with having no regard in practice to evidence -acknowledged to be real, if it be not overbearing. From these -things it must follow, that doubting concerning religion implies<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[256]</a></span> -such a degree of evidence for it, as, joined with the consideration -of its importance, unquestionably lays men under the obligations -before mentioned, to have a dutiful regard to it in all their -behavior.</p> - -<p><i>Thirdly</i>, The difficulties in which the evidence of religion is -involved, which some complain of, is no more a just ground of -complaint, than the external circumstances of temptation, which -others are placed in; or than difficulties in the practice of it, -after a full conviction of its truth. Temptations render our state -a more improving state of discipline,<a name="FNanchor_247" id="FNanchor_247"></a><a href="#Footnote_247" class="fnanchor">[247]</a> than it would be otherwise: -as they give occasion for a more attentive exercise of the -virtuous principle, which confirms and strengthens it more, than -an easier or less attentive exercise of it could. Speculative difficulties -are, in this respect, of the very same nature with these -external temptations. For the evidence of religion not appearing -obvious, is to some persons a temptation to reject it, without any -consideration at all; and therefore requires such an attentive -exercise of the virtuous principle, seriously to consider that evidence, -as there would be no occasion for, but for such temptation. -And the supposed doubtfulness of its evidence, after it has been -in some sort considered, affords opportunity to an unfair mind of -explaining away, and deceitfully hiding from itself, that evidence -which it might see; and also for men’s encouraging themselves -in vice, from hopes of impunity, though they do clearly see thus -much at least, that these hopes are uncertain. In like manner -the common temptation to many instances of folly, which end in -temporal infamy and ruin, is the ground for hope of not being -detected, and of escaping with impunity; <i>i.e.</i> the doubtfulness -of the proof beforehand, that such foolish behavior will thus end -in infamy and ruin. On the contrary, supposed doubtfulness in -the evidence of religion calls for a more careful and attentive -exercise of the virtuous principle, in fairly yielding themselves -up to the proper influence of any real evidence, though doubtful; -and in practising conscientiously all virtue, though under some -uncertainty, whether the government in the universe may not -possibly be such, as that vice may escape with impunity. And -in general, temptation, meaning by this word the lesser allurements -to wrong and difficulties in the discharge of our duty, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[257]</a></span> -well as the greater ones; temptation, I say, as such and of every -kind and degree, as it calls forth some virtuous efforts, additional -to what would otherwise have been wanting, cannot but be an -additional discipline and improvement of virtue, as well as probation -of it in the other senses of that word.<a name="FNanchor_248" id="FNanchor_248"></a><a href="#Footnote_248" class="fnanchor">[248]</a> So that the very -same account is to be given, why the evidence of religion should -be left in such a manner, as to require, in some, an attentive, -solicitous, perhaps painful exercise of their understanding about -it; as why others should be placed in such circumstances, as that -the practice of its common duties, after a full conviction of the -truth of it, should require attention, solicitude, and pains: or, -why appearing doubtfulness should be permitted to afford matter -of temptation to some; as why external difficulties and allurements -should be permitted to afford matter of temptation to others. -The same account also is to be given, why some should be exercised -with temptations of both these kinds; as why others should -be exercised with the latter in such very high degrees, as some -have been, particularly as the primitive Christians were.</p> - -<p>Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing, that the -speculative difficulties, in which the evidence of religion is involved, -may make even the principal part of some persons’ trial. -For as the chief temptations of the generality of the world are -the ordinary motives to injustice, or unrestrained pleasure, or to -live in the neglect of religion, from that frame of mind which -renders many persons almost without feeling as to any thing distant, -or which is not the object of their senses; so there are -other persons without this shallowness of temper, persons of a -deeper sense as to what is invisible and future; who not only see, -but have a general practical feeling, that what is to come will be -present, and that things are not less real for their not being the -objects of sense; and who, from their natural constitution of -body and of temper, and from their external condition, may have -small temptations to behave ill, small difficulty in behaving well, -in the common course of life. Now when these latter persons -have a distinct full conviction of me truth of religion, without -any possible doubts or difficulties, the practice of it is to them -unavoidable, unless they do a constant violence to their own -minds; and religion is scarce any more a discipline to them, than<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[258]</a></span> -it is to creatures in a state of perfection. Yet these persons may -possibly stand in need of moral discipline and exercise, in a higher -degree than they would have by such an easy practice of religion. -Or it may be requisite, for reasons unknown to us, that they -should give some further manifestation<a name="FNanchor_249" id="FNanchor_249"></a><a href="#Footnote_249" class="fnanchor">[249]</a> what is their moral character, -to the creation of God, than such a practice of it would -be. Thus in the great variety of religious situations in which -men are placed, what constitutes, what chiefly and peculiarly -constitutes, the probation, in all senses, of some persons, may be -the difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved: and -their principal and distinguished trial may be, how they will -behave under and with respect to these difficulties. Circumstances -in men’s situation in their temporal capacity, analogous -in good measure to this respecting religion, are to be observed. -We find some persons are placed in such a situation in the world, -as that their chief difficulty with regard to conduct, is not the -doing what is prudent when it is known; for this, in numberless -cases, is as easy as the contrary: but to some the principal exercise -is, recollection and being upon their guard against deceits, -the deceits suppose of those about them; against false appearances -of reason and prudence. To persons in some situations, -the principal exercise with respect to conduct is, attention in -order to inform themselves what is proper, what is really the -reasonable and prudent part to act.</p> - -<p>[<i>Fourthly.</i>] As I have hitherto gone upon supposition, that -men’s dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion is not owing -to their neglects or prejudices; it must be added, on the other -hand, in all common reason, and as what the truth of the case -plainly requires should be added, that such dissatisfaction possibly -may be owing to those, possibly may be men’s own fault. -For,</p> - -<p>If there are any persons, who never set themselves heartily -and in earnest to be informed in religion: if there are any, who -secretly wish it may not prove true; and are less attentive to -evidence than to difficulties, and more to objections than to what -is said in answer to them: these persons will scarce be thought -in a likely way of seeing the evidence of religion, though it were -most certainly true, and capable of being ever so fully proved.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[259]</a></span> -If any accustom themselves to consider this subject in the -way of mirth and sport: if they attend to forms and representations, -and inadequate manners of expression, instead of the -real things intended by them: (for signs often can be no more -than inadequately expressive of the things signified:) or if they -substitute human errors in the room of divine truth; why may -not all, or any of these things, hinder some men from seeing that -evidence, which really is seen by others; as a like turn of mind, -with respect to matters of common speculation and practice, does, -we find by experience, hinder them from attaining that knowledge -and right understanding, in matters of common speculation and -practice, which more fair and attentive minds attain to? And -the effect will be the same, whether their neglect of seriously -considering the evidence of religion, and their indirect behavior -with regard to it, proceed from mere carelessness, or from the -grosser vices; or whether it be owing to this, that forms and -figurative manners of expression, as well as errors, administer -occasions of ridicule, when the things intended, and the truth -itself, would not. Men may indulge a ludicrous turn so far as to -lose all sense of conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and even, -as it seems, to impair their faculty of reason. And in general, -levity, carelessness, passion, and prejudice <em>do</em> hinder us from -being rightly informed, with respect to common things: and they -<em>may</em>, in like manner, and perhaps, in some further providential -manner, with respect to moral and religious subjects: may hinder -evidence from being laid before us, and from being seen when it -is. The Scripture<a name="FNanchor_250" id="FNanchor_250"></a><a href="#Footnote_250" class="fnanchor">[250]</a> does declare, that every one <em>shall not understand</em>. -And it makes no difference, by what providential conduct -this comes to pass: whether the evidence of Christianity -was, originally and with design, put and left so, as that those who -are desirous of evading moral obligations should not see it; and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[260]</a></span> -that honest-minded persons should: or, whether it comes to pass -by any other means.</p> - -<p>Further: [<i>Fifthly.</i>] The general proof of natural religion and -of Christianity does, I think, lie level to common men: even -those, the greatest part of whose time, from childhood to old age, -is taken up with providing for themselves and their families the -common conveniences, perhaps necessaries, of life: those I mean, -of this rank, who ever think at all of asking after proof, or -attending to it. Common men, were they as much in earnest -about religion, as about their temporal affairs, are capable of -being convinced upon real evidence, that there is a God who -governs the world: and they feel themselves to be of a moral -nature, and accountable creatures. And as Christianity entirely -falls in with this their natural sense of things, so they are capable, -not only of being persuaded, but of being made to see, that -there is evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, and -many appearing completions of prophecy.</p> - -<p>This proof, though real and conclusive, is liable to objections, -and may be run up into difficulties; which however persons who -are capable not only of talking of, but of really seeing, are capable -also of seeing through: <i>i.e.</i> not of clearing up and answering -them, so as to satisfy their curiosity, for of such knowledge we -are not capable with respect to any one thing in nature; but -capable of seeing that the proof is not lost in these difficulties, -or destroyed by these objections. But then a thorough examination -into religion with regard to these objections, which cannot -be the business of every man, is a matter of pretty large compass, -and, from the nature of it, requires some knowledge, as well as -time and attention; to see, how the evidence comes out, upon -balancing one thing with another, and what, upon the whole, is -the amount of it. If persons who pick up these objections from -others, and take for granted they are of weight, upon the word -of those from whom they received them, or, by often retailing of -them, come to see or fancy they see them to be of weight; will -not prepare themselves for such an examination, with a competent -degree of knowledge; or will not give that time and -attention to the subject, which, from the nature of it, is necessary -for attaining such information: in this case, they must -remain in doubtfulness, ignorance, or error: in the same way as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[261]</a></span> -they must, with regard to common sciences, and matters of common -life, if they neglect the necessary means of being informed -in them.</p> - -<p>Perhaps it will still be objected, that if a prince or common -master were to send directions to a servant, he would take -care, that they should always bear the certain marks, who they -came from, and that their sense should be always plain: so as -that there should be no possible doubt if he could help it, concerning -the authority or meaning of them. The proper answer -to all this kind of objections is, that, wherever the fallacy lies, it -is even certain we cannot argue thus with respect to Him who is -the Governor of the world: and that he does not afford us such -information, with respect to our temporal affairs and interests, -experience abundantly shows.</p> - -<p>However, there is a full answer to this objection, from the very -nature of religion. The reason why a prince would give his -directions in this plain manner is, that he absolutely desires an -external action done, without concerning himself with the motive -or principle upon which it is done: <i>i.e.</i> he regards only the external -event, or the thing’s being done; and not at all, properly -speaking, the doing of it, or the action. Whereas the whole -of morality and religion consisting merely in action itself, there -is no sort of parallel between the cases. But if the prince be -supposed to regard only the action; <i>i.e.</i> only to desire to exercise, -or in any sense prove, the understanding or loyalty of a servant; -he would not always give his orders in such a plain manner. It -may be proper to add, that the will of God, respecting morality -and religion, may be considered either as absolute, or as only conditional. -If it be absolute, it can only be thus, that we should -act virtuously in such given circumstances; not that we should be -brought to act so, by this changing of our circumstances. And if -God’s will be thus absolute, then it is in our power, in the highest -and strictest sense, to do or to contradict his will; which is a -most weighty consideration. Or his will may be considered only -as conditional, that if we act so and so, we shall be rewarded: if -otherwise, punished: of which conditional will of the Author -of nature, the whole constitution of it affords most certain -instances.</p> - -<p>Upon the whole: that we are in a state of religion necessarily<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[262]</a></span> -implies, that we are in a state of probation: and the credibility -of our being at all in such a state being admitted, there seems no -peculiar difficulty in supposing our probation to be, just as it is, -in those respects which are above objected against. There seems -no pretence, from <em>the reason of the thing</em>, to say, that the trial -cannot equitably be any thing, but whether persons will act -suitably to certain information, or such as admits no room for -doubt; so as that there can be no danger of miscarriage, but -either from their not attending to what they certainly know, or -from overbearing passion hurrying them on to act contrary to it. -For, since ignorance and doubt, afford scope for probation in all -senses, as really as intuitive conviction or certainty; and since -the two former are to be put to the same account as difficulties in -practice; men’s moral probation may also be, whether they will -take due care to inform themselves by impartial consideration, -and afterwards whether they will act as the case requires, upon -the evidence which they have, however doubtful. And this, we -find by <em>experience</em>, is frequently our probation,<a name="FNanchor_251" id="FNanchor_251"></a><a href="#Footnote_251" class="fnanchor">[251]</a> in our temporal -capacity. For, the information which we want with regard to -our worldly interests is by no means always given us of course, -without any care of our own. And we are greatly liable to self-deceit -from inward secret prejudices, and also to the deceits of -others. So that to be able to judge what is the prudent part, -often requires much and difficult consideration. Then after we -have judged the very best we can, the evidence upon which we -must act, if we will live and act at all, is perpetually doubtful to -a very high degree. And the constitution and course of the -world in fact is such, as that want of impartial consideration -what we have to do, and venturing upon extravagant courses because -it is doubtful what will be the consequence, are often naturally, -<i>i.e.</i> providentially, altogether as fatal, as misconduct occasioned -by heedless inattention to what we certainly know, or -disregarding it from overbearing passion.</p> - -<p>Several of the observations here made may well seem strange, -perhaps unintelligible, to many good men. But if the persons -for whose sake they are made think so, (persons who object as -above, and throw off all regard to religion under pretence of want -of evidence;) I desire them to consider again, whether their thinking<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[263]</a></span> -so be owing to any thing unintelligible in these observations, -or to their own not having such a sense of religion and serious -solicitude about it, as even their state of scepticism does in all -reason require? It ought to be forced upon the reflection of -these persons, that our nature and condition necessarily require -us, in the daily course of life, to act upon evidence much lower -than what is commonly called probable: to guard, not only against -what we fully believe will, but also against what we think it supposable -may, happen; and to engage in pursuits when the probability -is greatly against success, if it even be credible, that -possibly we may succeed in them.</p> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<h3 id="II_CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII.<br /> -<span class="smaller">THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY.</span></h3> - -<p>The presumptions against revelation, and objections against -the general scheme of Christianity, and particular things relating -to it, being removed, there remains to be considered, what positive -evidence we have for the truth of it; chiefly in order to see, -what the analogy of nature suggests with regard to that evidence, -and the objections against it: or to see what is, and is allowed -to be, the plain natural rule of judgment and of action, in our -temporal concerns, in cases where we have the same kind of -evidence, and the same kind of objections against it, that we -have in the case before us.</p> - -<p>In the evidence of Christianity there seem to be several things -of great weight, not reducible to the head, either of miracles, or -the completion of prophecy, in the common acceptation of the -words. But these two are its direct and fundamental proofs: -and those other things, however considerable they are, yet ought -never to be urged apart from its direct proofs, but always to be -joined with them. Thus the evidence of Christianity will be a -long series of things, reaching, as it seems, from the beginning -of the world to the present time, of great variety and compass, -taking in both the direct and also the collateral, proofs, and -making up, all of them together, one argument. The conviction -arising from this kind of proof may be compared to what they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[264]</a></span> -call <em>the effect</em>, in architecture or other works of art; a result from -a great number of things, so and so disposed, and taken into one -view. I shall therefore, <i>first</i>, make some observations relating -to miracles, and the appearing completions of prophecy; and -consider what analogy suggests, in answer to the objections -brought against this evidence. And, <i>secondly</i>, I shall endeavor -to give some account of the general argument now mentioned, -consisting both of the direct and collateral evidence, considered -as making up one argument: this being the kind of proof, upon -which we determine most questions of difficulty, concerning -common facts, alleged to have happened, or seeming likely to -happen; especially questions relating to conduct.</p> - -<p><i>First</i>, I shall make some observations upon the direct proof of -Christianity from miracles and prophecy, and upon the objections -alleged against it.<a name="FNanchor_252" id="FNanchor_252"></a><a href="#Footnote_252" class="fnanchor">[252]</a></p> - -<p>I. Now the following observations relating to the <em>historical -evidence of miracles</em> wrought in attestation of Christianity appear -to be of great weight.</p> - -<p>1. The Old Testament affords us the same historical evidence -of the miracles of Moses and of the prophets, as of the common -civil history of Moses and the kings of Israel; or, as of the -affairs of the Jewish nation. And the <cite>Gospels</cite> and <cite>the Acts</cite> -afford us the same historical evidence of the miracles of Christ -and the apostles, as of the common matters related in them. -This indeed could not have been affirmed by any reasonable man, -if the authors of these books, like many other historians, had -appeared to aim at an entertaining manner of writing, and hence -interspersed miracles in their works, at proper distances and upon -proper occasions. These might have animated a dull relation, -amused the reader, and engaged his attention. And the same -account would naturally have been given of them, as of the -speeches and descriptions given by such authors: the same account, -in a manner, as is to be given, why the poets make use of -wonders and prodigies. But the facts, both miraculous and -natural, in Scripture, are related in plain unadorned narratives,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[265]</a></span> -and both of them appear, in all respects, to stand upon the same -foot of historical evidence.<a name="FNanchor_253" id="FNanchor_253"></a><a href="#Footnote_253" class="fnanchor">[253]</a></p> - -<p>Further: some parts of Scripture, containing an account of -miracles fully sufficient to prove the truth of Christianity, are -quoted as genuine, from the age in which they are said to be -written, down to the present: and no other parts of them, -material in the present question, are omitted to be quoted in such -manner, as to afford any sort of proof of their not being genuine. -And, as common history, when called in question in any instance, -may often be greatly confirmed by contemporary or subsequent -events more known and acknowledged; and as the common -Scripture history, like many others, is thus confirmed; so likewise -is the miraculous history of it, not only in particular instances, -but in general. For, the establishment of the Jewish -and Christian religions, which were events contemporary with the -miracles related to be wrought in attestation of both, or subsequent -to them, these events are just what we should have <em>expected</em>, -upon supposition such miracles were really wrought to -attest the truth of those religions. These miracles are a satisfactory -account of those events: of which no other satisfactory -account can be given; nor any account at all, but what is merely -imaginary and invented.</p> - -<p>It is to be added, that the most obvious, the most easy and -direct account of this history, how it came to be written, and to -be received in the world as a true history, is that it really is so; -nor can any other account of it be easy and direct. Now, though -an account, not at all obvious, but very far-fetched and indirect, -may be and often is, the true account of a matter, yet it cannot -be admitted on the authority of its being asserted. Mere guess, -supposition, and possibility, when opposed to historical evidence, -prove nothing, but that historical evidence is not demonstrative.</p> - -<p>The just consequence from all this, I think is, that the Scripture -history in general is to be admitted as an authentic genuine -history, till something positive be alleged sufficient to invalidate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[266]</a></span> -it. No man will deny the consequence to be, that it cannot be -rejected, or thrown by as of no authority, till it can be proved to -be of none; even though the evidence now mentioned for its -authority were doubtful. This evidence may be confronted by -historical evidence on the other side, if there be any: or general -incredibility in the things related, or inconsistence in the general -turn of the history, would prove it to be of no authority. But -since, upon the face of the matter, upon a first and general view, -the <em>appearance</em> is, that it is an authentic history, it cannot be -determined to be fictitious, without some proof that it is so. -The following observations in support of these, and coincident -with them, will greatly confirm the historical evidence for the -truth of Christianity.</p> - -<p>2. The Epistles of Paul, from the nature of epistolary writing, -and moreover from several of them being written, not to particular -persons but to churches, carry in them evidences of their -being genuine, beyond what can be in a mere historical narrative, -left to the world at large. This evidence,<a name="FNanchor_254" id="FNanchor_254"></a><a href="#Footnote_254" class="fnanchor">[254]</a> joined with that -which they have in common with the rest of the New Testament, -seems not to leave so much as any particular pretence for denying -their genuineness, considered as an ordinary matter of fact, -or of criticism: I say <em>particular</em> pretence, for <em>denying</em> it; because -any single fact, of such a kind and such antiquity, may -have <em>general doubts</em> raised concerning it, from the very nature of -human affairs and human testimony. There is also to be mentioned -a distinct and particular evidence of the genuineness of -the epistle chiefly referred to here, the first to the Corinthians; -from the manner in which it is quoted by Clemens Romanus, in -an epistle of his own to that church.<a name="FNanchor_255" id="FNanchor_255"></a><a href="#Footnote_255" class="fnanchor">[255]</a> Now these epistles afford<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[267]</a></span> -a proof of Christianity, detached from all others, which is, I -think, a thing of weight; and also a proof of a nature and kind -peculiar to itself. For,</p> - -<p>In them the author declares, that he received the Gospel in -general, and the institution of the Communion in particular, not -from the rest of the apostles, or jointly together with them, but -alone, from Christ himself; whom he declares likewise, conformably -to the history in the Acts, that he saw after his ascension.<a name="FNanchor_256" id="FNanchor_256"></a><a href="#Footnote_256" class="fnanchor">[256]</a> -So that the testimony of Paul is to be considered, as detached -from that of the rest of the apostles.</p> - -<p>He declares further, that he was endued with a power of working -miracles, as what was publicly known to those very people, -speaks of frequent and great variety of miraculous gifts as then -subsisting in those very churches, to which he was writing; -which he was reproving for several irregularities, and where he -had personal opposers. He mentions these gifts incidentally, in -the most easy manner, and without effort; by way of reproof to -those who had them, for their indecent use of them; and by -way of depreciating them, in comparison of moral virtues. In -short he speaks to these churches, of these miraculous powers, -in the manner any one would speak to another of a thing, which -was as familiar, and as much known in common to them both, as -any thing in the world.<a name="FNanchor_257" id="FNanchor_257"></a><a href="#Footnote_257" class="fnanchor">[257]</a> And this, as hath been observed by -several persons, is surely a very considerable thing.</p> - -<p>3. It is an acknowledged historical fact, that Christianity -offered itself to the world, and demanded to be received, upon -the allegation, (<i>i.e.</i> as unbelievers would speak, upon the pretence,) -of miracles, publicly wrought to attest the truth of it, in -such an age; and that it was actually received by great numbers -in that very age, and upon the professed belief of the reality of -these miracles. And Christianity, including the dispensation of -the Old Testament, seems distinguished by this from all other -religions. I mean, that this does not <em>appear</em> to be the case with -regard to any other; for surely it will not be supposed to lie -upon any person, to prove by positive historical evidence, that it -was not. It does in no sort appear that Mahometanism was first<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[268]</a></span> -received in the world upon the foot of supposed miracles,<a name="FNanchor_258" id="FNanchor_258"></a><a href="#Footnote_258" class="fnanchor">[258]</a> <i>i.e.</i> -public ones:<a name="FNanchor_259" id="FNanchor_259"></a><a href="#Footnote_259" class="fnanchor">[259]</a> for, as revelation is itself miraculous, all pretence -to it must necessarily imply some pretence of miracles. And it -is a known fact, that it was immediately, at the very first, propagated -by other means. And as particular institutions, whether -in Paganism or Popery, said to be confirmed by miracles <em>after</em> -those institutions had obtained, are not to the purpose: so, were -there what might be called historical proof, that any of them -were introduced by a supposed divine command, believed to be -attested by miracles; these would not be in any wise parallel. -For single things of this sort are easy to be accounted for, after -parties are formed, and have power in their hands; and the -leaders of them are in veneration with the multitude; and political -interests are blended with religious claims, and religious distinctions. -But <em>before</em> any thing of this kind, for a few persons, -and those of the lowest rank, all at once, to bring over such great -numbers to a new religion, and get it to be received upon the -particular evidence of miracles; this is quite another thing.</p> - -<p>I think it will be allowed by any fair adversary, that the fact -now mentioned, taking in all the circumstances, is peculiar to the -Christian religion. However, the fact itself is allowed, that -Christianity obtained, <i>i.e.</i> was professed to be received in the -world, upon the belief of miracles, immediately in the age in -which it is said those miracles were wrought: or that this is -what its first converts would have alleged, as the reason for -their embracing it. It is not to be supposed that such numbers -of men, in the most distant parts of the world, should forsake the -religion of their country, in which they had been educated; -separate themselves from their friends, particularly in their -festival shows and solemnities, to which the common people are -so greatly addicted, and which were of a nature to engage them -much more, than any thing of that sort among us: and embrace<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[269]</a></span> -a religion, which could not but expose them to many inconveniences, -and indeed must have been a giving up the world in a -great degree, even from the very first, and before the empire engaged -in form against them: it cannot be supposed, that such -numbers should make so great, and to say the least, so inconvenient -a change in their whole institution of life, unless they -were really convinced of the truth of those miracles, upon the -knowledge or belief of which they professed to make it. And -it will, I suppose, readily be acknowledged, that the generality -of the first converts to Christianity must have believed them: -that as by becoming Christians they declared to the world, they -were satisfied of the truth of those miracles; so this declaration -was to be credited. And this their testimony is the same kind -of evidence for those miracles, as if they had put it in writing, -and these writings had come down to us. And it is real evidence, -because it is of facts, which they had capacity and full -opportunity to inform themselves of.</p> - -<p>It is also distinct from the direct or express historical evidence, -though it is of the same kind: and would be allowed to be distinct -in all cases. For were a fact expressly related by one or -more ancient historians, and disputed in after ages; that this -fact is acknowledged to have been <em>believed</em> by great numbers of -the age in which the historian says it was done, would be allowed -an additional proof of such fact, quite distinct from the express -testimony of the historian. The credulity of mankind is acknowledged: -and the suspicions of mankind ought to be acknowledged -too; and their backwardness even to believe, and greater still to -practise, what makes against their interest. And it must particularly -be remembered, that education, and prejudice, and -authority, were against Christianity, in the age I am speaking -of. So that the immediate conversion of such numbers is a real -presumption of somewhat more than human in this matter.<a name="FNanchor_260" id="FNanchor_260"></a><a href="#Footnote_260" class="fnanchor">[260]</a> I<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[270]</a></span> -say presumption, for it is not alleged as a proof alone and by -itself. Nor need any one of the things mentioned in this -chapter be considered as a proof by itself: and yet all of them -together may be one of the strongest.<a name="FNanchor_261" id="FNanchor_261"></a><a href="#Footnote_261" class="fnanchor">[261]</a></p> - -<p>Upon the whole: as there is large historical evidence, both -direct and circumstantial, of miracles wrought in attestation of -Christianity, collected by those who have writ upon the subject; -it lies upon unbelievers to show why this evidence is not to be -credited. This way of speaking is, I think, just; and what persons -who write in defence of religion naturally fall into. Yet, in -a matter of such unspeakable importance, the proper question is, -not whom it lies upon, according to the rules of argument, to -maintain or confute objections: but whether there really are any, -against this evidence, sufficient, in reason, to destroy the credit -of it. However, unbelievers seem to take upon them the part -of showing that there are.</p> - -<p>They allege, that numberless enthusiastic people, in different -ages and countries, expose themselves to the same difficulties -which the primitive Christians did; and are ready to give up -their lives for the most idle follies imaginable. It is not very -clear, to what purpose this objection is brought. For surely, -every one, in every case, must distinguish between opinions and -facts. And though testimony is no proof of enthusiastic opinions, -or of any <em>opinion</em> at all; yet it is allowed, in all other cases, to -be a proof of <em>facts</em>. A person’s laying down his life in attestation -of facts or of opinions, is the strongest proof of his believing -them. And if the apostles and their contemporaries did believe -the facts, in attestation of which they exposed themselves -to sufferings and death; this their belief, or rather knowledge, -must be a proof of those facts: for they were such as came -under the observation of their senses. And though it is not of -equal weight, yet it is of weight, that the martyrs of the next -age, notwithstanding they were not eye-witnesses of those facts,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[271]</a></span> -as were the apostles and their contemporaries, had, however, full -opportunity to inform themselves whether they were true or not, -and gave equal proof of their believing them to be true.</p> - -<p>But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evidence of -testimony even for facts, in matters relating to religion: some -seem to think it totally and absolutely destroys the evidence of -testimony upon this subject. The powers of enthusiasm, and of -diseases too, which operate in a like manner, are indeed very -wonderful, in particular instances. But if great numbers of -men, not appearing in any peculiar degree weak, nor under any -peculiar suspicion of negligence, affirm that they saw and heard -such things plainly, with their eyes and their ears, and are -admitted to be in earnest; such testimony is evidence of the -strongest kind we can have, for any matter of fact. Possibly it -may be overcome, strong as it is, by incredibility in the things -thus attested, or by contrary testimony. And in an instance -where one thought it was so overcome, it might be just to consider, -how far such evidence could be accounted for by enthusiasm; for -it seems as if no other imaginable account were to be given of it. -But till such incredibility be shown, or contrary testimony produced, -it cannot surely be expected, that so far-fetched, so indirect -and wonderful an account of such testimony, as that of -enthusiasm must be; an account so strange, that the generality -of mankind can scarce be made to understand what is meant by -it; it cannot, I say, be expected that such an account will be -admitted of such evidence; when there is this direct, easy, and -obvious account of it, that people really saw and heard a thing -not incredible, which they affirm, sincerely and with full assurance, -they did see and hear.</p> - -<p>Granting then that enthusiasm is not (strictly speaking) an -absurd, but a possible account of such testimony, it is manifest, -that the very mention of it goes upon the previous supposition, -that the things so attested are incredible: and therefore need not -be considered, till they are shown to be so. Much less need it -be considered, after the contrary has been proved. And I think -it has been proved, to full satisfaction, that there is no incredibility -in a revelation, in general; or in such a one as the Christian, -in particular. However, as religion is supposed peculiarly -liable to enthusiasm, it may just be observed, that prejudices<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[272]</a></span> -almost without number, and without name, such as romance, -affection, humor, a desire to engage attention, or to surprise, -party spirit, custom, little competitions, unaccountable likings -and dislikings; these influence men strongly in common matters. -And as these prejudices are often scarce know a or reflected upon -by the persons themselves who are influenced by them, they are -to be considered as influences of a like kind to enthusiasm. Yet -human testimony, in common matters, is naturally and justly -believed, notwithstanding.</p> - -<p>It is intimated further, in a more refined way of observation, -that though it should be proved, that the apostles and first Christians -could not, in some respects, be deceived themselves, and -in other respects, cannot be thought to have intended to impose -upon the world, yet it will not follow that their general testimony -is to be believed, though truly handed down to us: because -they might still in part, <i>i.e.</i> in other respects, be deceived themselves, -and in part also designedly impose upon others; which, -it is added, is a thing very credible, from that mixture of real -enthusiasm, and real knavery, to be met with in the same -characters.<a name="FNanchor_262" id="FNanchor_262"></a><a href="#Footnote_262" class="fnanchor">[262]</a></p> - -<p>I must confess, I think the matter of fact contained in this -observation upon mankind is not to be denied; and that something -very much akin to it is often supposed in Scripture as a -very common case, and most severely reproved. But it were to -have been expected, that persons capable of applying this observation -as applied in the objection, might also frequently have -met with the like mixed character, in instances where religion -was quite out of the case. The thing plainly is, that mankind -are naturally endued with reason, or a capacity of distinguishing -between truth and falsehood; and as naturally they are endued -with veracity, or a regard to truth in what they say: but from -many occasions they are liable to be prejudiced and biassed and -deceived themselves, and capable of intending to deceive others, -in every degree: insomuch that, as we are all liable to be deceived -by prejudice, so likewise it seems to be not an uncommon -thing, for persons who, from their regard to truth, would not -invent a lie entirely without any foundation at all, to propagate -it with heightening circumstances, after it is once invented and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[273]</a></span> -set a-going. And others, though they would not <em>propagate</em> a lie, -yet, which is a lower degree of falsehood, will let it pass without -contradiction. But notwithstanding all this, <em>human testimony</em> -remains still a natural ground of assent; and this assent a -natural principle of action.</p> - -<p>It is objected further, that however it has happened, the <em>fact</em> -is, that mankind have, in different ages, been strangely deluded -with pretences to miracles and wonders. But it is by no means -to be admitted, that they have been oftener, or are at all more -liable to be deceived by these than by other pretences.</p> - -<p>It is added, that there is a very considerable degree of historical -evidence for miracles, which are, on all hands, acknowledged -to be fabulous. But suppose there were even <em>the like</em> -historical evidence for these, to what there is for those alleged in -proof of Christianity, which yet is in no wise allowed, but suppose -this; the consequence would not be, that the evidence of -the latter is not to be admitted. Nor is there a man in the -world, who in common cases, would conclude thus. For what -would such a conclusion really amount to but this, that evidence, -confuted by contrary evidence, or any way overbalanced, destroys -the credibility of other evidence, neither confuted nor overbalanced? -To argue that because there is, if there were, like -evidence from testimony, for miracles acknowledged false, as for -those in attestation of Christianity, therefore the evidence in the -latter case is not to be credited; this is the same as to argue, that -if two men of equally good reputation had given evidence in -different cases no way connected, and one of them had been -convicted of perjury, this confuted the testimony of the other!</p> - -<p>Upon the whole then, the general observation, that human -creatures are so liable to be deceived, from enthusiasm in religion, -and principles equivalent to enthusiasm in common matters, -and in both from negligence; and that they are so capable of -dishonestly endeavoring to deceive others; this does indeed -weaken the evidence of testimony in all cases, but does not -destroy it in any. And these things will appear, to different -men, to weaken the evidence of testimony, in different degrees: -in degrees proportionable to the observations they have made, or -the notions they have any way taken up, concerning the weakness -and negligence and dishonesty of mankind; or concerning<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[274]</a></span> -the powers of enthusiasm, and prejudices equivalent to it. But -it seems to me, that people do not know what they say, who affirm -these things to destroy the evidence from testimony which we -have, of the truth of Christianity. Nothing can destroy the -evidence of testimony in any case, but a proof or probability, -that persons are not competent judges of the facts to which they -give testimony; or that they are actually under some indirect -influence in giving it, in such particular case. Till this be made -out, the <em>natural</em> laws of human actions require, that testimony -be admitted. It can never be sufficient to overthrow direct -historical evidence, indolently to say, that there are so many principles, -from whence men are liable to be deceived themselves, -and disposed to deceive others, especially in matters of religion, -that one knows not what to believe. And it is surprising persons -can help reflecting, that this very manner of speaking supposes -they are not satisfied that there is nothing in the evidence, -of which they speak thus; or that they can avoid observing, if -they do make this reflection, that it is on such a subject, a very -material one.<a name="FNanchor_263" id="FNanchor_263"></a><a href="#Footnote_263" class="fnanchor">[263]</a></p> - -<p>Over against all these objections is to be set the <em>importance</em> of -Christianity, as what must have engaged the attention of its first -converts, so as to have rendered them less liable to be deceived -from carelessness, than they would in common matters; and likewise -the strong <em>obligations to veracity</em>, which their religion laid -them under: so that the first and most obvious presumption is, -that they could not be deceived themselves nor deceive others. -And this presumption, in this degree, is peculiar to the testimony -we have been considering.</p> - -<p>In argument, assertions are nothing in themselves, and have -an air of positiveness which sometimes is not very easy: yet they -are necessary, and necessary to be repeated; in order to connect -a discourse, and distinctly to lay before the view of the reader, -what is proposed to be proved, and what is left as proved. Now -the conclusion from the foregoing observations is, I think, beyond -all doubt, this: that unbelievers must be forced to admit the external -evidence for Christianity, <i>i.e.</i> the proof of miracles wrought -to attest it, to be of real weight and very considerable; though -they cannot allow it to be sufficient, to convince them of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[275]</a></span> -reality of those miracles. And as they must, in all reason, admit -this; so it seems to me, that upon consideration they would, in -fact, admit it; those of them, I mean, who know any thing at -all of the matter; in like manner as persons, in many cases, own -they see strong evidence from testimony, for the truth of things, -which yet they cannot be convinced are true: cases, suppose, -where there is contrary testimony; or things which they think, -whether with or without reason, to be incredible. But there is -no testimony contrary to that which we have been considering: -and it has been fully proved, that there is no incredibility in -Christianity in general, or in any part of it.</p> - -<p>II. As to the evidence for Christianity from prophecy, I shall -only make some few general observations, which are suggested -by the analogy of nature; <i>i.e.</i> by the acknowledged natural rules -of judging in common matters, concerning evidence of a like -kind to this from prophecy.</p> - -<p>1. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a prophecy -does not, in any degree, invalidate the proof of foresight, arising -from the appearing completion of those other parts, which are -understood. For the case is evidently the same, as if those parts -which are not understood were lost, or not written at all, or -written in an unknown tongue. Whether this observation be -commonly attended to or not, it is so evident, that one can scarce -bring oneself to set down an instance in common matters, to -exemplify it. However, suppose a writing, partly in cipher, and -partly in plain words at length; and that in the part one understood, -there appeared mention of several known facts; it would -never come into any man’s thoughts to imagine, that if he understood -the whole, perhaps he might find, that those facts were not -in reality known by the writer. Indeed, both in this example -and in the thing intended to be exemplified by it, our not understanding -the whole (the whole, suppose, of a sentence or a paragraph) -might sometimes occasion a doubt, whether one understood -the literal meaning of such a part: but this comes under another -consideration.</p> - -<p>For the same reason, though a man should be incapable, for -want of learning, or opportunities of inquiry, or from not having -turned his studies this way, even so much as to judge whether -particular prophecies have been throughout completely fulfilled;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[276]</a></span> -yet he may see, in general, that they have been fulfilled to such -a degree, as, upon very good ground, to be convinced of foresight -more than human in such prophecies, and of such events being -intended by them. For the same reason also, though, by means -of the deficiencies in civil history, and the different accounts of -historians, the most learned should not be able to make out to -satisfaction, that such parts of the prophetic history have been -minutely and throughout fulfilled; yet a very strong <em>proof of -foresight</em> may arise, from that general completion of them, which -is made out. As much perhaps, as the giver of prophecy intended -should ever be afforded by such parts of prophecy.</p> - -<p>2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to such and such -events, is itself a proof that it was intended of them: as the rules -by which we naturally judge and determine, in common cases -parallel to this, will show.<a name="FNanchor_264" id="FNanchor_264"></a><a href="#Footnote_264" class="fnanchor">[264]</a> This observation I make in answer -to the common objection against the application of the prophecies, -that, considering each of them distinctly by itself, it does -not at all appear, that they were intended of those particular -events to which they are applied by Christians; and therefore it -is to be supposed, that if they meant any thing, they were intended -of other events unknown to us, and not of these at all.</p> - -<p>Now there are two kinds of writing, which bear a great resemblance -to prophecy, with respect to the matter before us: the -mythological, and the satirical, where the satire is to a certain -degree concealed. And a man might be assured, that he understood -what an author intended by a fable or parable related without -any application or moral, merely from seeing it to be easily -capable of such application, and that such a moral might naturally -be deduced from it. And he might be fully assured, that -such persons and events were intended in a satirical writing, -merely from its being applicable to them. And, agreeable to the -last observation, he might be in a good measure satisfied of it,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[277]</a></span> -though he were not enough informed in affairs, or in the story -of such persons to understand half the satire. For, his satisfaction -that he understood the meaning, the intended meaning, of -these writings, would be greater or less in proportion as he saw -the general turn of them to be capable of such application; and -in proportion to the number of particular things capable of it. -And thus, if a long series of prophecy is applicable to the present -state of the church, and to the political situations of the kingdoms -of the world, some thousand years after these prophecies -were delivered; and a long series of prophecy delivered before -the coming of Christ is applicable to him; these things are in -themselves a proof, that the prophetic history was intended of -him, and of those events: in proportion as the general turn of it -is capable of such application, and to the number and variety of -particular prophecies capable of it. And though, in all just way -of consideration, the obvious completion of prophecies is to be -allowed to be thus explanatory of, and to determine, their meaning; -yet it is to be remembered further, that the ancient Jews -applied the prophecies to a Messiah before his coming,<a name="FNanchor_265" id="FNanchor_265"></a><a href="#Footnote_265" class="fnanchor">[265]</a> in much -the same manner as Christians do now: and that the primitive -Christians interpreted the prophecies respecting the state of the -church and of the world in the last ages, in the sense which the -event seems to confirm and verify. From these things it may be -made appear:</p> - -<p>3. That the showing even to a high probability, if that could -be, that the prophets thought of some other events, in such and -such predictions, and not those which Christians allege to be -completions of those predictions; or that such and such prophecies -are capable of being applied to other events than those, to -which Christians apply them—that this would not confute or -destroy the force of the argument from prophecy, even with regard -to those very instances. For, observe how this matter really -is. If one knew such a person to be the sole author of such a -book, and was certainly assured, or satisfied to any degree, that -one knew the whole of what he intended in it; one should be -assured or satisfied to such degree, that one knew the whole<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[278]</a></span> -meaning of that book: for the meaning of a book is nothing but -the meaning of the author. But if one knew a person to have -<em>compiled</em> a book out of memoirs, which he received from another, -of vastly superior knowledge in the subject of it, especially if it -were a book full of great intricacies and difficulties; it would in -no wise follow, that one knew the whole meaning of the book, -from knowing the whole meaning of the compiler: for the original -author of them, might have, and there would be no presumption, -in many cases, against supposing him to have, some further -meaning than the compiler saw. To say then that the Scriptures, -and the things contained in them, can have no other or -further meaning than those persons had, who first recited or -wrote them, is evidently saying, that those persons were the -original, proper, and sole authors of those books, <i>i.e.</i> that they -are not inspired: which is absurd, while the authority of these -books is under examination; <i>i.e.</i> till you have determined they -are of no divine authority at all. Till this be determined, it -must in all reason be supposed, not indeed that they have, (for -this is taking for granted that they are inspired;) but that they -may have, some further meaning than what the compilers saw or -understood. And, upon this supposition, it is supposable also, -that this further meaning may be fulfilled.</p> - -<p>Events corresponding to prophecies, interpreted in a different -meaning from that, in which the prophets are supposed to have -understood them; affords in a manner, the same proof, that this -different sense was originally intended, as it would have afforded, -if the prophets had not understood their predictions in the sense -it is supposed they did: because there is no presumption of <em>their</em> -sense of them being the whole sense of them. And it has been -already shown, that the apparent completions of prophecy must -be allowed to be explanatory of its meaning. So that the question -is, whether a series of prophecy has been fulfilled, in a -natural or proper, <i>i.e.</i> in any real sense of the words of it. For -such completion is equally a proof of foresight more than human, -whether the prophets are, or are not, supposed to have understood -it in a different sense. I say, supposed: for, though I -think it clear, that the prophets did not understand the full -meaning of their predictions, it is another question, how far they -thought they did; and in what sense they understood them.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[279]</a></span></p> - -<p>Hence may be seen, to how little purpose those persons busy -themselves, who endeavor to prove, that the prophetic history is -applicable to events of the age in which it was written, or of ages -before it. To have proved this, before there was any appearance -of a further completion of it, might have answered some purpose; -for it might have prevented the expectation of any such further -completion. Thus could Porphyry have shown, that some principal -parts of the book of Daniel, for instance the seventh verse -of the seventh chapter, which the Christians interpreted of the -latter ages, was applicable to events, which happened before or -about the age of Antiochus Epiphanes; this might have prevented -them from expecting any further completion of it. And, unless -there was then, as I think there must have been, external evidence -concerning that book, more than is come down to us; such -a discovery might have been a stumbling-block in the way of -Christianity itself: considering the authority which our Savior -has given to the book of Daniel, and how much the general -scheme of Christianity presupposes the truth of it. But even -this discovery, had there been any such,<a name="FNanchor_266" id="FNanchor_266"></a><a href="#Footnote_266" class="fnanchor">[266]</a> would be of very little -weight with reasonable men now; if this passage, thus applicable -to events before the age of Porphyry, appears to be applicable -also to events, which succeeded the dissolution of the Roman -empire. I mention this, not at all as intending to insinuate, that -the division of this empire into ten parts, for it plainly was -divided into about that number, were, alone and by itself, of any -moment in verifying the prophetic history: but only as an example -of the thing I am speaking of. Thus upon the whole, the -matter of inquiry evidently must be, as above put, Whether the -prophecies are applicable to Christ, and to the present state of -the world, and of the church; applicable in such a degree, as to -imply foresight: not whether they are <em>capable</em> of any other application.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[280]</a></span> -Though I know no pretence for saying the general turn -of them is capable of any other.</p> - -<p>These observations are, I think, just, and the evidence referred -to in them real: though there may be people who will not accept -of such imperfect information from Scripture. Some too have -not integrity and regard enough to truth, to attend to evidence, -which keeps the mind in doubt, perhaps perplexity, and which -is much of a different sort from what they expected. It plainly -requires a degree of modesty and fairness, beyond what every -one has, for a man to say, not to the world but to himself, that -there is a real appearance of great weight in this matter, though -he is not able thoroughly to satisfy himself about it; but that it -shall have its influence upon him, in proportion to its apparent -reality and weight. It is much more easy, and more falls in with -the negligence, presumption, and wilfulness of the generality, to -determine at once, with a decisive air, There is nothing in it. -The prejudices arising from that absolute contempt and scorn, -with which this evidence is treated in the world, I do not mention. -For what can be said to persons, who are weak enough in -their understandings to think this any presumption against it; -or, if they do not, are yet weak enough in their temper to be influenced -by such prejudices, upon such a subject?</p> - -<p><i>Secondly</i>, I shall endeavor to give some account of the general -argument for the truth of Christianity, consisting both of the -direct and circumstantial evidence considered as making up one -argument. To state and examine this argument fully, would be -a work much beyond the compass of this whole treatise; nor is so -much as a proper abridgment of it to be expected here. Yet the -present subject requires to have some brief account of it given. -For it is the kind of evidence, upon which most questions of difficulty, -in common practice, are determined: evidence arising from -various coincidences, which support and confirm each other, and -in this manner prove, with more or less certainty, the point under -consideration. I choose to do it also: First, because it seems to -be of the greatest importance, and not duly attended to by every -one, that the proof of revelation is not some direct and express -things only, but a great variety of circumstantial things also; -and that though each of these direct and circumstantial things is -indeed to be considered separately, yet they are afterwards to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[281]</a></span> -joined together; for that the proper force of the evidence consists -in the result of those several things, considered in their -respects to each other, and united into one view. In the next -place, because it seems to me, that the matters of fact here set -down, which are acknowledged by unbelievers, must be acknowledged -by them also to contain together a degree of evidence of -great weight, if they could be brought to lay these several things -before themselves distinctly, and then with attention consider -them together; instead of that cursory thought of them, to which -we are familiarized. For being familiarized to the cursory thought -of things as really hinders the weight of them from being seen, -as from having its due influence upon practice.</p> - -<p>The thing asserted, and the truth of which is to be inquired -into, is this: That over and above our reason and affections, -which God has given us for the information of our judgment and -the conduct of our lives, he has also, by external revelation, given -us an account of himself and his moral government over the world, -implying a future state of rewards and punishments; <i>i.e.</i> hath -revealed the system of natural religion: (for natural religion may -be externally<a name="FNanchor_267" id="FNanchor_267"></a><a href="#Footnote_267" class="fnanchor">[267]</a> revealed by God, as the ignorant may be taught it -by their fellow-creatures)—that God, I say, has given us the evidence -of revelation, as well as the evidence of reason, to ascertain -this moral system; together with an account of a particular dispensation -of Providence, which reason could no way have discovered, -and a particular institution of religion founded on it, for -the recovery of mankind out of their present wretched condition, -and raising them to the perfection and final happiness of their -nature.</p> - -<p>This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be considered -as wholly historical. For prophecy is nothing but the history of -events before they come to pass; doctrines also are matters of -fact; and precepts come under the same notion. The general -design of Scripture, which contains in it this revelation, thus -considered as historical, may be said to be, to give us an account -of the world in this one single view, as God’s world: by which -it appears essentially distinguished from all other books, so far as -I have found, except such as are copied from it. It begins with -an account of God’s creation of the world, in order to ascertain,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[282]</a></span> -and distinguish from all others, who is the object of our worship, -by what he has done: in order to ascertain, who he is, concerning -whose providence, commands, promises, and threatenings, this -sacred book, all along, treats; [viz.] the Maker and Proprietor -of the world, he whose creatures we are, the God of nature: in -order likewise to distinguish him from the idols of the nations, -which are either imaginary beings, <i>i.e.</i> no beings at all; or else -part of that creation, the historical relation of which is here given. -And John, not improbably with an eye to this Mosaic account -of the creation, begins his Gospel with an account of our Savior’s -pre-existence, and that <cite>all things were made by him; and without -him, was not any thing made that was made</cite>:<a name="FNanchor_268" id="FNanchor_268"></a><a href="#Footnote_268" class="fnanchor">[268]</a> agreeably to -the doctrine of Paul, that <cite>God created all things by Jesus Christ</cite>.<a name="FNanchor_269" id="FNanchor_269"></a><a href="#Footnote_269" class="fnanchor">[269]</a> -This being premised, the Scripture, taken together, seems to profess -to contain a kind of an abridgment of the history of the -world, in the view just now mentioned: that is, a general account -of the condition of religion and its professors, during the continuance -of that apostasy from God, and state of wickedness, which -it everywhere supposes the world to lie in. And this account -of the state of religion carries with it some brief account of the -political state of things, as religion is affected by it. Revelation -indeed considers the common affairs of this world, and what is -going on in it, as a mere scene of distraction; and cannot be supposed -to concern itself with foretelling at what time Rome, or -Babylon, or Greece, or any particular place, should be the most -conspicuous seat of that tyranny and dissoluteness, which all -places equally aspire to be; cannot, I say, be supposed to give -any account of this wild scene for its own sake. But it seems to -contain some very general account of the chief governments of -the world, as the general state of religion has been, is, or shall -be, affected by them, from the first transgression, and during the -whole interval of the world’s continuing in its present state, to a -certain future period, spoken of both in the Old and New Testament, -very distinctly, and in great variety of expression: <cite>The -times of the restitution of all things</cite>:<a name="FNanchor_270" id="FNanchor_270"></a><a href="#Footnote_270" class="fnanchor">[270]</a> when <cite>the mystery of God -shall be finished, as he hath declared to his servants the prophets</cite>:<a name="FNanchor_271" id="FNanchor_271"></a><a href="#Footnote_271" class="fnanchor">[271]</a> -when <cite>the God of heaven shall set up a kingdom, which shall -never be destroyed: and the kingdom shall not be left to other<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[283]</a></span> -people</cite>,<a name="FNanchor_272" id="FNanchor_272"></a><a href="#Footnote_272" class="fnanchor">[272]</a> as it is represented to be during this apostasy, but <cite>judgment -shall be given to the saints</cite>,<a name="FNanchor_273" id="FNanchor_273"></a><a href="#Footnote_273" class="fnanchor">[273]</a> and <cite>they shall reign</cite>:<a name="FNanchor_274" id="FNanchor_274"></a><a href="#Footnote_274" class="fnanchor">[274]</a> <cite>and the -kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under -the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints of the -Most High</cite>.<a name="FNanchor_275" id="FNanchor_275"></a><a href="#Footnote_275" class="fnanchor">[275]</a></p> - -<p>Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would remark, how -great a length of time the whole relation takes up, near six thousand -years of which are past; and how great a variety of things -it treats of; the natural and moral system or history of the world, -including the time when it was formed, all contained in the very -first book, and evidently written in a rude and unlearned age; -and in subsequent books, the various common and prophetic history, -and the particular dispensation of Christianity. Now all -this together gives the largest scope for criticism; and for the -confutation of what is capable of being confuted, either from -reason, or from common history, or from any inconsistence in its -several parts. And it deserves, I think, to be mentioned, that -whereas some imagine the supposed doubtfulness of the evidence -for revelation implies a positive argument that it is not true; it -appears, on the contrary, to imply a positive argument that it is -true. For, could any common relation of such antiquity, extent, -and variety (for in these things the stress of what I am now observing -lies) be proposed to the examination of the world: that -it could not, in an age of knowledge and liberty, be confuted, or -shown to have nothing in it, to the satisfaction of reasonable -men; would be thought a strong presumptive proof of its truth. -Indeed it must be a <em>proof</em> of it, just in proportion to the probability, -that if it were false, it might be shown to be so: which, I -think, is scarce pretended to be shown, but upon principles and -in ways of arguing, which have been clearly obviated.<a name="FNanchor_276" id="FNanchor_276"></a><a href="#Footnote_276" class="fnanchor">[276]</a> Nor -does it at all appear, that any set of men, who believe natural -religion, are of the opinion, that Christianity has been thus -confuted. But to proceed:</p> - -<p>Together with the moral system of the world, the Old Testament -contains a chronological account of the beginning of it, -and from thence, an unbroken genealogy of mankind for many -ages before common history begins; and carried on as much<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[284]</a></span> -farther as to make up a continued thread of history, of the -length of between three and four thousand years. It contains -an account of God’s making a covenant with a particular nation, -that they should be his people, and he would be their God, in a -peculiar sense; of his often interposing miraculously in their -affairs; giving them the promise, and long after, the possession, -of a particular country; assuring them of the greatest national -prosperity in it, if they would worship him, in opposition to the -idols which the rest of the world worshipped, and obey his commands; -and threatening them with unexampled punishments if -they disobeyed him, and fell into the general idolatry: insomuch -that this one nation should continue to be the observation and -the wonder of all the world. It declares particularly, that <cite>God -would scatter them among all people, from one end of the earth -unto the other</cite>; but that <cite>when they should return unto the Lord -their God, he would have compassion upon them, and gather -them from all the nations, whither he had scattered them</cite>: that -<cite>Israel should be saved in the Lord, with an everlasting salvation; -and not be ashamed or confounded world without end</cite>.<a name="FNanchor_277" id="FNanchor_277"></a><a href="#Footnote_277" class="fnanchor">[277]</a> And as -some of these promises are conditional, others are as absolute as -any thing can be expressed: that the time should come, when -<cite>the people should be all righteous, and inherit the land forever</cite>: -that <cite>though God would make a full end of all nations whither -he had scattered them, yet would he not make a full end of -them</cite>: that <cite>he would bring again the captivity of his people -Israel, and plant them upon their land, and they should be no -more pulled up out of their land</cite>: that <cite>the seed of Israel should -not cease from being a nation forever</cite>.<a name="FNanchor_278" id="FNanchor_278"></a><a href="#Footnote_278" class="fnanchor">[278]</a> It foretells, that God -would raise them up a particular person, in whom all his promises -should finally be fulfilled; the Messiah, who should be, in a high -and eminent sense, their anointed Prince and Savior. This was -foretold in such a manner, as raised a general expectation of such -a person in the nation, as appears from the New Testament, and -is an acknowledged fact; an expectation of his coming at such a -particular time, before any one appeared claiming to be that person, -and when there was no ground for such an expectation, but -from the prophecies: which expectation, therefore, must in all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[285]</a></span> -reason be presumed to be explanatory of those prophecies, if -there were any doubt about their meaning. It seems moreover -to foretell, that this person should be rejected by the nation to -whom he had been so long promised, though he was so much -desired by them.<a name="FNanchor_279" id="FNanchor_279"></a><a href="#Footnote_279" class="fnanchor">[279]</a> And it expressly foretells, that he should be -the Savior of the Gentiles; and that the completion of the -scheme contained in this book, and then begun, and in its progress, -should be something so great, that in comparison with it, -the restoration of the Jews alone would be but of small account. -<cite>It is a light thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up -the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I will -also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be for -salvation unto the end of the earth.</cite> And, <cite>In the last days, the -mountain of the Lord’s house shall be established in the top of -the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills; and all nations -shall flow into it—for out of Zion shall go forth the law, -and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. And he shall judge -among the nations—and the Lord alone shall be exalted in that -day, and the idols he shall utterly abolish.</cite><a name="FNanchor_280" id="FNanchor_280"></a><a href="#Footnote_280" class="fnanchor">[280]</a></p> - -<p>The Scripture further contains an account, that at the time -the Messiah was expected, a person rose up in this nation, claiming -to be that Messiah, to be the person to whom all the prophecies -referred, and in whom they should center: that he spent -some years in a continued course of miraculous works; and -endued his immediate disciples and followers with a power of -doing the same, as a proof of the truth of that religion, which -he commissioned them to publish: that invested with this authority -and power, they made numerous converts in the remotest -countries, and settled and established his religion in the world; -to the end of which the Scripture professes to give a prophetic -account of the state of this religion among mankind.<a name="FNanchor_281" id="FNanchor_281"></a><a href="#Footnote_281" class="fnanchor">[281]</a></p> - -<p>Let us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of history, to have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[286]</a></span> -all this related to him out of the Scripture. Or suppose such -an one, having the Scripture put into his hands, to remark these -things in it, not knowing but that the whole, even its civil history, -as well as the other parts of it, might be, from beginning -to end, an entire invention; and to ask, What truth was in it, -and whether the revelation here related was real, or a fiction? -And, instead of a direct answer, suppose him, all at once, to be -told the following confessed facts; and then to unite them into -one view.</p> - -<p>Let him first be told, in how great a degree the profession and -establishment of natural religion, the belief that there is one -God to be worshipped, that virtue is his law, and that mankind -shall be rewarded and punished hereafter, as they obey and disobey -it here; in how very great a degree, I say, the profession -and establishment of this moral system in the world is owing to -the revelation, whether real or supposed, contained in this book: -the establishment of this moral system, even in those countries -which do not acknowledge the proper authority of the Scripture.<a name="FNanchor_282" id="FNanchor_282"></a><a href="#Footnote_282" class="fnanchor">[282]</a> -Let him be told also, what number of nations do acknowledge its -proper authority. Let him then take in the consideration, of -what importance religion is to mankind. And upon these things -he might, I think, truly observe, that this supposed revelation’s -obtaining and being received in the world, with all the circumstances -and effects of it, considered together as one event, is the -most conspicuous and important event in the history of mankind: -that a book of this nature, and thus promulged and recommended -to our consideration, demands, as if by a voice from heaven, to -have its claims most seriously examined; and that, before such -examination, to treat it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule, is -an offence against natural piety. It is to be remembered, that -how much soever the establishment of natural religion in the -world is owing to the Scripture revelation, this does not destroy -the proof of religion from reason, any more than the proof of -Euclid’s Elements is destroyed, by a man’s knowing or thinking, -that he should never have seen the truth of the several propositions -contained in it, nor had those propositions come into his -thoughts, but for that mathematician.</p> - -<p>Let such a person as we are speaking of be, in the next place,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[287]</a></span> -informed of the acknowledged antiquity of the first parts of this -book; and that its chronology, its account of the time when the -earth, and the several parts of it, were first peopled with human -creatures, is no way contradicted, but is really confirmed, by the -natural and civil history of the world, collected from common -historians, from the state of the earth, and from the late invention -of arts and sciences.</p> - -<p>And as the Scripture contains an unbroken thread of common -and civil history, from the creation to the captivity, for between -three and four thousand years; let the person we are speaking -of be told, in the next place, that this general history, as it is -not contradicted, but confirmed by profane history<a name="FNanchor_283" id="FNanchor_283"></a><a href="#Footnote_283" class="fnanchor">[283]</a> as much as -there would be reason to expect, upon supposition of its truth; so -there is nothing in the whole history <em>itself</em>, to give any reasonable -ground of suspicion of its not being, in the general, a faithful -and literally true genealogy of men, and series of things. I -speak here only of the common Scripture history, or of the -course of ordinary events related in it, as distinguished from -miracles, and from the prophetic history. In all the Scripture -narrations of this kind, following events arise out of foregoing -ones, as in all other histories. There appears nothing related as -done in any age, not conformable to the manners of that age: -nothing in the account of a succeeding age, which one would -say could not be true, or was improbable, from the account of -things in the preceding one. There is nothing in the characters, -which would raise a thought of their being feigned; but all the -internal marks imaginable of their being real. It is to be added -also, that mere genealogies, bare narratives of the number of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[288]</a></span> -years, which persons called by such and such names lived, do not -carry the face of fiction; perhaps do carry some presumption of -veracity: and all unadorned narratives, which have nothing to -surprise, may be thought to carry somewhat of the like presumption -too. And the domestic and the political history is plainly -credible. There may be incidents in Scripture, which, taken -alone in the naked way they are told, may appear strange; especially -to persons of other manners, temper, education: but there -are also incidents of undoubted truth, in many or most persons’ -lives, which, in the same circumstances, would appear to the full -as strange.<a name="FNanchor_284" id="FNanchor_284"></a><a href="#Footnote_284" class="fnanchor">[284]</a> There may be mistakes of transcribers, there may -be other real or seeming mistakes, not easy to be particularly accounted -for: but there are certainly no more things of this kind -in the Scripture, than what were to have been expected in books -of such antiquity; and nothing, in any wise, sufficient to discredit -the general narrative.</p> - -<p>Now, that a history, claiming to commence from the creation, -and extending in one continued series, through so great a length -of time, and variety of events, should have such appearances of -reality and truth in its whole contexture, is surely a very remarkable -circumstance in its favor. And as all this is applicable to -the common history of the New Testament, so there is a further -credibility, and a very high one, given to it by profane authors: -many of these writing of the same times, and confirming the truth -of customs and events, which are incidentally as well as more -purposely mentioned in it. And this credibility of the common -Scripture-history, gives some credibility to its miraculous history:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[289]</a></span> -especially as this is interwoven with the common, so as that they -imply each other, and both together make up one relation.</p> - -<p>Let it then be more particularly observed to this person, that -it is an acknowledged matter of fact, which is indeed implied in -the foregoing observation, that there was such a nation as the -Jews, of the greatest antiquity, whose government and general -polity was founded on the law, here related to be given them by -Moses as from heaven: that natural religion, with rites additional -yet no way contrary to it, was their established religion, which -cannot be said of the Gentile world: and that their very being -as a nation, depended upon their acknowledgment of one God, -the God of the universe. For, suppose in their captivity in -Babylon, they had gone over to the religion of their conquerors, -there would have remained no bond of union, to keep them a -distinct people. And while they were under their own kings, in -their own country, a total apostasy from God would have been -the dissolution of their whole government. They in such a sense -nationally acknowledged and worshipped the Maker of heaven -and earth, when the rest of the world were sunk in idolatry, as -rendered them, in fact, the peculiar people of God. This remarkable -establishment and preservation of natural religion -among them, seems to add peculiar credibility to the historical -evidence for the miracles of Moses and the prophets. Because -these miracles are a full satisfactory account of this event, which -plainly needs to be accounted for, and cannot be otherwise.</p> - -<p>Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of history, be acquainted -further, that one claiming to be the Messiah, of Jewish -extraction, rose up at the time when this nation, from the prophecies -above mentioned, expected the Messiah: that he was -rejected, as it seemed to have been foretold he should, by the -body of the people, under the direction of their rulers: that in -the course of a very few years, he was believed on and acknowledged -as the promised Messiah, by great numbers among the -Gentiles, agreeably to the prophecies of Scripture, yet not upon -the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles,<a name="FNanchor_285" id="FNanchor_285"></a><a href="#Footnote_285" class="fnanchor">[285]</a> of which miracles we -have also strong historical evidence; (by which I mean here no -more than must be acknowledged by unbelievers; for let pious -frauds and follies be admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[290]</a></span> -destroy our evidence of miracles wrought in proof of Christianity:)<a name="FNanchor_286" id="FNanchor_286"></a><a href="#Footnote_286" class="fnanchor">[286]</a> -that this religion approving itself to the reason of mankind, and -carrying its own evidence with it, so far as reason is a judge of -its system, and being no way contrary to reason in those parts of -it which require to be believed upon the mere authority of its -Author; that this religion, I say, gradually spread and supported -itself for some hundred years, not only without any assistance -from temporal power, but under constant discouragements, and -often the bitterest persecutions from it; and then became the -religion of the world: that in the mean time the Jewish nation -and government were destroyed in a very remarkable manner, -and the people carried away captive and dispersed through the -most distant countries; in which state of dispersion they have -remained fifteen hundred years: and that they remain a numerous -people, united among themselves, and distinguished from the rest -of the world, as they were in the days of Moses, by the profession -of his law; and everywhere looked upon in a manner, which -one scarce knows how distinctly to express, but in the words -of the prophetic account of it, given so many ages before it -came to pass: <cite>Thou shalt become an astonishment, a proverb, -and a byword, among all nations whither the Lord shall lead -thee</cite>.<a name="FNanchor_287" id="FNanchor_287"></a><a href="#Footnote_287" class="fnanchor">[287]</a></p> - -<p>The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews remaining -a distinct people in their dispersion, and the confirmation which -this event appears to give to the truth of revelation, may be -thought to be answered, by their religion’s forbidding them intermarriages -with those of other nations, and prescribing them many -peculiarities in their food, by which they are debarred from incorporating -with the people in whose countries they live. This -is not, I think, a satisfactory account of that which it pretends to -account for. But what does it pretend to account for? The -correspondence between this event and the prophecies; or the -coincidence of both, with a long dispensation of Providence, of a -peculiar nature, towards that people? No. It is only the event -itself, which is offered to be thus accounted for: which single -event, taken alone, abstracted from all such correspondence and -coincidence, perhaps would not have appeared miraculous: but -that correspondence and coincidence may be so, though the event<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[291]</a></span> -itself be supposed not. Thus the concurrence of our Saviour’s -being born at Bethlehem, with a long foregoing series of prophecy -and other coincidences, is doubtless miraculous; the series of -prophecy, and other coincidences, and the event, being admitted: -though the event itself appears to have been brought about in a -natural way; of which, however, no one can be certain.</p> - -<p>As several of these events seem, in some degree expressly, to -have verified the prophetic history already, so likewise they may -be considered further, as having a peculiar aspect towards the -full completion of it; as affording some presumption that the -whole of it shall, one time or other, be fulfilled. Thus, that the -Jews have been so wonderfully preserved in their long and wide -dispersion; which is indeed the direct fulfilling of some prophecies, -but is now mentioned only as looking forward to somewhat -yet to come: that natural religion came forth from Judea, and -spread, in the degree it has done over the world, before lost in -idolatry; which, together with some other things, have distinguished -that very place, in like manner as the people of it are -distinguished: that this great change of religion over the earth -was brought about under the profession and acknowledgment, -that Jesus was the promised Messiah: things of this kind naturally -turn the thoughts of serious men towards the full completion -of the prophetic history, concerning the final restoration of that -people; concerning the establishment of the everlasting kingdom -among them, the kingdom of the Messiah; and the future state -of the world, under this sacred government. Such circumstances -and events, compared with these prophecies, though no completions -of them, yet would not, I think, be spoken of as nothing in -the argument, by a person upon his first being informed of them. -They fall in with the prophetic history of things still future, give -it some additional credibility, and have the appearance of being -somewhat in order to the full completion of it.</p> - -<p>Indeed it requires a good degree of knowledge, and great -calmness and consideration, to be able to judge thoroughly of -the evidence for the truth of Christianity, from that part of the -prophetic history which relates to the situation of the kingdoms -of the world, and to the state of the church, from the establishment -of Christianity to the present time. But it appears from a -general view of it, to be very material. And those persons who<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[292]</a></span> -have thoroughly examined it, and some of them were men of the -coolest tempers, greatest capacities, and least liable to imputations -of prejudice, insist upon it as determinately conclusive.</p> - -<p>[<span class="smcap">Conclusion.</span>] Suppose now a person quite ignorant of history, -first to recollect the passages above mentioned out of Scripture, -without knowing but that the whole was a late fiction, then -to be informed of the correspondent facts now mentioned, and to -unite them all into one view: that the profession and establishment -of natural religion in the world is greatly owing, in different -ways, to this book, and the supposed revelation which it -contains; that it is acknowledged to be of the earliest antiquity; -that its chronology and common history are entirely credible; -that this ancient nation, the Jews, of whom it chiefly treats, -appear to have been, in fact, the people of God, in a distinguished -sense; that, as there was a national expectation among -them, raised from the prophecies, of a Messiah to appear at such -a time, so one at this time appeared claiming to be that Messiah; -that he was rejected by this nation, but received by the Gentiles, -not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles; that the -religion he taught supported itself under the greatest difficulties, -gained ground, and at length became the religion of the world; -that in the mean time the Jewish polity was utterly destroyed, -and the nation dispersed over the face of the earth; that notwithstanding -this, they have remained a distinct numerous people -for so many centuries, even to this day; which not only appears -to be the express completion of several prophecies concerning -them, but also renders it, as one may speak, a visible and easy -possibility that the promises made to them as a nation, may yet -be fulfilled.</p> - -<p>To these acknowledged truths, let the person we have been -supposing add, as I think he ought, whether every one will allow -it or no, the obvious appearances which there are, of the state -of the world, in other respects besides what relates to the Jews, -and of the Christian church, having so long answered, and still -answering to the prophetic history. Suppose, I say, these facts -set over against the things before mentioned out of the Scripture, -and seriously compared with them; the joint view of both -together must, I think, appear of very great weight to a considerate -reasonable person: of much greater indeed, upon having<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[293]</a></span> -them first laid before him, than is easy for us, who are so familiarized -to them, to conceive, without some particular attention for -that purpose.</p> - -<p>All these things, and the several particulars contained under -them, require to be distinctly and most thoroughly examined -into; that the weight of each may be judged of, upon such examination, -and such conclusion drawn, as results from their <em>united -force</em>. But this has not been attempted here. I have gone no -further than to show, that the general imperfect view of them -now given, the confessed historical evidence for miracles, and the -many obvious appearing completions of prophecy, together with -the collateral things<a name="FNanchor_288" id="FNanchor_288"></a><a href="#Footnote_288" class="fnanchor">[288]</a> here mentioned, and there are several -others of the like sort; that all this together, which, being fact, -must be acknowledged by unbelievers, amounts to real evidence of -somewhat more than human in this matter: evidence much more -important, than careless men, who have been accustomed only to -transient and partial views of it, can imagine; and indeed abundantly -sufficient to act upon. And these things, I apprehend, -must be acknowledged by unbelievers. For though they may -say, that the historical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation -of Christianity, is not sufficient to convince them, that such -miracles were really wrought: they cannot deny, that there is -such historical evidence, it being a known matter of fact that -there is. They may say, the conformity between the prophecies -and events is by accident: but there are many instances in which -such conformity itself cannot be denied. They may say, with -regard to such kind of collateral things as those above mentioned, -that any odd accidental events, without meaning, will have a -meaning found in them by fanciful people: and that such as are -fanciful in any one certain way, will make out a thousand coincidences, -which seem to favor their peculiar follies. Men, I say, -may talk thus: but no one who is serious, can possibly think -these things to be nothing, if he considers the importance of -collateral things, and even of lesser circumstances, in the evidence -of probability, as distinguished in nature, from the evidence -of demonstration. In many cases indeed it seems to require the -truest judgment, to determine with exactness the weight of circumstantial<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[294]</a></span> -evidence: but it is very often altogether as convincing, -as that which is the most express and direct.</p> - -<p>This general view of the evidence for Christianity, considered -as making one argument, may also serve to recommend to serious -persons, to set down every thing which they think may be of -any real weight at all in proof of it, and particularly the many -seeming completions of prophecy: and they will find, that, -judging by the natural rules, by which we judge of probable -evidence in common matters, they amount to a much higher -degree of proof, upon such a <em>joint review</em>, than could be supposed -upon considering them separately, at different times; how -strong soever the proof might before appear to them, upon such -separate views of it. For probable proofs, by being added, not -only <em>increase</em> the evidence, but <em>multiply</em> it.<a name="FNanchor_289" id="FNanchor_289"></a><a href="#Footnote_289" class="fnanchor">[289]</a> Nor should I dissuade -any one from setting down, what he thought made for the -contrary side. But then it is to be remembered, not in order to -influence his judgment, but his practice, that a mistake on one -side may be, in its consequences, much more dangerous, than a -mistake on the other. And what course is most safe, and what -most dangerous, will be thought a very material consideration, -when we deliberate, not concerning events, but concerning conduct -in our temporal affairs. To be influenced by this consideration -in our judgment, to believe or disbelieve upon it, is indeed -as much prejudice, as any thing whatever. And, like other prejudices, -it operates contrary ways, in different men; for some are -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[295]</a></span>inclined to believe what they hope, and others what they fear. -And it is manifest unreasonableness to apply to men’s passions -in order to gain their assent. But in deliberations concerning -conduct, there is nothing which reason more requires to be taken -into the account, than the importance of it. For, suppose it -doubtful, what would be the consequence of acting in this, or in -the contrary manner: still, that taking one side could be attended -with little or no bad consequence, and taking the other might be -attended with the greatest, must appear, to unprejudiced reason, -of the highest moment towards determining how we are to act. -The truth of our religion, like the truth of common matters, is -to be judged of by all the evidence taken together. And unless -the whole series of things which may be alleged in this argument, -and every particular thing in it, can reasonably be supposed -to have been by accident (for here the stress of the -argument for Christianity lies); then is the truth of it proved: -in like manner, as if in any common case, numerous events -acknowledged, were to be alleged in proof of any other event -disputed; the truth of the disputed event would be proved, not -only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of itself clearly -imply it, but, though no one of them singly did so, if the whole -of the acknowledged events taken together could not in reason -be supposed to have happened, unless the disputed one were -true.</p> - -<p>It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this evidence -gives to those persons who attack Christianity, especially in conversation. -For it is easy to show, in a short and lively manner, -that such and such things are liable to objection, that this and -another thing is of little weight in itself; but impossible to -show, in like manner, the united force of the whole argument -in one view.</p> - -<p>Lastly, as it has been made appear, that there is no presumption -against a revelation as miraculous; that the general scheme -of Christianity, and the principal parts of it, are conformable to -the experienced constitution of things, and the whole perfectly -credible: so the account now given of the positive evidence for -it, shows, that this evidence is such, as, from the nature of it, -cannot be destroyed, though it should be lessened.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[296]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h3 id="II_CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII.<br /> -<span class="smaller">OBJECTIONS AGAINST ARGUING FROM THE ANALOGY OF -NATURE, TO RELIGION.</span></h3> - -<p>If every one would consider, with such attention as they are -bound, even in point of morality, to consider, what they judge -and give characters of; the occasion of this chapter would be, in -some good measure at least, superseded. But since this is not to -be expected; for some we find do not concern themselves to -understand even what they write against: since this treatise, in -common with most others, lies open to objections, which may -appear very material to thoughtful men at first sight; and, besides -that, seems peculiarly liable to the objections of such as can -judge without thinking, and of such as can censure without -judging; it may not be amiss to set down the chief of these -objections which occur to me, and consider them to their hands. -They are such as these:</p> - -<p>“That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation, by -saying, that there are the same in natural religion; when what -is wanting is to clear both of them of these their common, as -well as other their respective, difficulties; that it is a strange -way indeed of convincing men of the obligations of religion, to -show them, that they have as little reason for their worldly pursuits: -and a strange way of vindicating the justice and goodness -of the Author of nature, and of removing the objections against -both, to which the system of religion lies open, to show, that the -like objections lie against natural providence; a way of answering -objections against religion, without so much as pretending to -make out, that the system of it, or the particular things in it -objected against, are reasonable—especially, perhaps some may -be inattentive enough to add, must this be thought strange, when -it is confessed that analogy is no answer to such objections: that -when this sort of reasoning is carried to the utmost length it can -be imagined capable of, it will yet leave the mind in a very unsatisfied -state; and that it must be unaccountable ignorance of -mankind, to imagine they will be prevailed with to forego their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[297]</a></span> -present interests and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon -doubtful evidence.”</p> - -<p>Now, as plausible as this way of talking may appear, that appearance -will be found in a great measure owing to half views, -which show but part of an object, yet show that indistinctly, and -to undeterminate language. By these means weak men are often -deceived by others, and ludicrous men, by themselves. And even -those, who are serious and considerate, cannot always readily disentangle, -and at once clearly see through the perplexities, in -which subjects themselves are involved; and which are heightened -by the deficiencies and the abuse of words. To this latter -sort of persons, the following reply to each part of this objection -severally, may be of some assistance; as it may also tend a little -to stop and silence others.</p> - -<p><i>First</i>, The thing wanted, <i>i.e.</i> what men require, is to have <em>all</em> -difficulties cleared. And this is, or at least for any thing we -know to the contrary, it may be, the same as requiring to comprehend -the divine nature, and the whole plan of Providence -from everlasting to everlasting! But it hath always been allowed -to argue from what is acknowledged, to what is disputed. And -it is in no other sense a poor thing, to argue from natural religion -to revealed, in the manner found fault with, than it is to -argue in numberless other ways of probable deduction and inference, -in matters of conduct, which we are continually reduced to -the necessity of doing. Indeed the epithet <em>poor</em> may be applied, -I fear as properly, to great part or the whole of human life, as it -is to the things mentioned in the objection. Is it not a poor -thing, for a physician to have so little knowledge in the cure of -diseases, as even the most eminent have? To act upon conjecture -and guess, where the life of man is concerned? Undoubtedly -it is: but not in comparison of having no skill at all -in that useful art, and being obliged to act wholly in the dark.</p> - -<p>Further: since it is as unreasonable, as it is common, to urge -objections against revelation, which are of equal weight against -natural religion; and those who do this, if they are not confused -themselves, deal unfairly with others, in making it seem that -they are arguing only against revelation, or particular doctrines -of it, when in reality they are arguing against moral providence; -it is a thing of consequence to show, that such objections are as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[298]</a></span> -much levelled against natural religion, as against revealed. Objections, -which are equally applicable to both, are properly speaking -answered, by its being shown that they are so, provided the -former be admitted to be true. And without taking in the consideration -how distinctly this is admitted, it is plainly very material -to observe, that as the things objected against in natural -religion are of the same kind with what is certain matter of experience -in the course of providence, and in the information which -God affords us concerning our temporal interest under his government; -so the objections against the system of Christianity, and -the evidence of it, are of the very same kind with those which -are made against the system and evidence of natural religion. -However, the reader upon review may see, that most of the -analogies insisted upon, even in the latter part of this treatise, do -not necessarily require to have more taken for granted than is in -the former; [viz.] that there is an Author of nature, or natural -Governor of the world: and Christianity is vindicated, not from -its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly from its analogy to the -experienced constitution of nature.</p> - -<p><i>Secondly</i>, Religion is a practical thing, and consists in such a -determinate course of life, as what, there is reason to think, is -commanded by the Author of nature, and will, upon the whole, -be our happiness under his government. If men can be convinced, -that they have the like reason to believe this, as to believe -that taking care of their temporal affairs will be to their -advantage; such conviction cannot but be an argument to them -for the practice of religion. And if there be really any reason -for believing one of these, and endeavoring to preserve life, and -secure ourselves the necessaries and conveniences of it; then -there is reason also for believing the other, and endeavoring to -secure the interest it proposes to us. And if the interest, which -religion proposes to us, be infinitely greater than our whole temporal -interest; then there must be proportionably greater reason -for endeavoring to secure one, than the other; since, by the supposition, -the probability of our securing one is equal to the probability -of our securing the other. This seems plainly unanswerable, -and has a tendency to influence fair minds, who consider what -our condition really is, or upon what evidence we are naturally -appointed to act; and who are disposed to acquiesce in the terms<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[299]</a></span> -upon which we live, and attend to and follow that practical instruction, -whatever it be, which is afforded us.</p> - -<p>But the chief and proper force of the argument referred to in -the objection, lies in another place. The proof of religion, it is -said, is involved in such inextricable difficulties, as to render it -doubtful; and that it cannot be supposed that if it were true, it -would be left upon doubtful evidence. Here then, over and -above the force of each particular difficulty or objection, these -difficulties and objections taken together are turned into a positive -argument against the truth of religion; which argument -would stand thus. If religion were true, it would not be left -doubtful, and open to objections to the degree in which it is: -therefore that it is thus left, not only renders the evidence of it -weak, and lessens its force, in proportion to the weight of such -objections, but also shows it to be false, or is a general presumption -of its being so. Now the observation, that from the natural -constitution and course of things, we must in our temporal concerns, -almost continually, and even in matters of great consequence, -act upon evidence of a like kind and degree to the evidence -of religion, is an answer to this argument. Because it shows, -that it is according to the conduct and character of the Author -of nature to appoint we should act upon evidence like to that, -which this argument presumes he cannot be supposed to appoint -we should act upon: it is an instance, a general one, made up of -numerous particular ones, of somewhat in his dealing with us, -similar to what is said to be incredible. As the force of this -answer lies merely in the parallel, which there is between the -evidence for religion and for our temporal conduct; the answer -is equally just and conclusive, whether the parallel be made out, -by showing the evidence of the former to be higher, or the evidence -of the latter to be lower.</p> - -<p><i>Thirdly</i>, The design of this treatise is not to vindicate the -character of God, but to show the obligations of men: it is not to -justify his providence, but to show what belongs to us to do. -These are two subjects, and ought not to be confounded. Though -they may at length run up into each other, yet observations may -immediately tend to make out the latter, which do not appear, by -any immediate connection, to the purpose of the former; which -is less our concern, than many seem to think. For, first,</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[300]</a></span></p> - -<p>It is not necessary we should justify the dispensations of Providence -against objections, any farther than to show, that the things -objected against may, for aught we know, be consistent with justice -and goodness. Suppose then, that there are things in the -system of this world, and plan of Providence relating to it, which -taken alone would be unjust: yet it has been shown unanswerably, -that if we could take in the reference, which these things -may have to other things, present past and to come; to the -whole scheme, which the things objected against are parts of; -these very things might, for aught we know, be found to be, not -only consistent with justice, but instances of it. Indeed it has -been shown, by the analogy of what we see, not only possible that -this may be the case, but credible that it is. And thus objections, -drawn from such things, are answered, and Providence is -vindicated, as far as religion makes its vindication necessary.</p> - -<p>Hence it appears, Secondly, that objections against the Divine -justice and goodness are not endeavored to be <em>removed</em>, by showing -that the like objections, allowed to be really conclusive, lie -against natural providence: but those objections being supposed -and shown not to be <em>conclusive</em>, the things objected against, considered -as matters of fact, are farther shown to be credible, from -their conformity to the constitution of nature; for instance, that -God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter, from -the observation, that he does reward and punish them for their -actions here. And this, I apprehend, is of weight.</p> - -<p>Thirdly, it would be of weight, even though those objections -were not answered. For, there being the proof of religion above -set down; and religion implying several facts; for instance again, -the fact last mentioned, that God will reward and punish men for -their actions hereafter; the observation, that his present method -of government is by rewards and punishments, shows that future -fact not to be incredible: whatever objections men may think -they have against it, as unjust or unmerciful, according to their -notions of justice and mercy; or as improbable from their belief -of necessity. I say, <em>as improbable</em>: for it is evident no objection -against it, <em>as unjust</em>, can be urged from necessity; since this -notion as much destroys injustice, as it does justice.</p> - -<p>Fourthly, Though objections against the reasonableness of the -system of religion cannot indeed be answered without entering<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[301]</a></span> -into consideration of its reasonableness; yet objections against -the credibility or truth of it may. Because the system of it is -reducible into what is properly matter of fact: and the truth, the -probable truth of facts, may be shown without consideration of -their reasonableness. Nor is it necessary, though, in some cases -and respects, it is highly useful and proper, yet it is not necessary, -to give a proof of the reasonableness of every precept enjoined -us, and of every particular dispensation of Providence, -which comes into the system of religion. Indeed the more -thoroughly a person of a right disposition is convinced of the -perfection of the Divine nature and conduct, the farther he -will advance towards that perfection of religion, which John<a name="FNanchor_290" id="FNanchor_290"></a><a href="#Footnote_290" class="fnanchor">[290]</a> -speaks of.<a name="FNanchor_291" id="FNanchor_291"></a><a href="#Footnote_291" class="fnanchor">[291]</a> But the general obligations of religion are fully -made out, by proving the reasonableness of the practice of it. -And that the practice of religion <em>is</em> reasonable, may be shown, -though no more could be proved, than that the system of it <em>may -be</em> so, for aught we know to the contrary: and even without -entering into the distinct consideration of this.</p> - -<p>Fifthly, It is easy to see, that though the analogy of nature is -not an immediate answer to objections against the wisdom, the -justice, or goodness, of any doctrine or precept of religion; yet -it may be, as it is, an immediate and direct answer to what is -really intended by such objections; which is, to show that the -things objected against are incredible.</p> - -<p><i>Fourthly</i>, It is most readily acknowledged, that the foregoing -treatise is by no means satisfactory; very far indeed from it: but -so would any natural institution of life appear, if reduced into a -system, together with its evidence. Leaving religion out of the -case, men are divided in their opinions, whether our pleasures -overbalance our pains: and whether it be, or be not, eligible to -live in this world.<a name="FNanchor_292" id="FNanchor_292"></a><a href="#Footnote_292" class="fnanchor">[292]</a> And were all such controversies settled, -which perhaps, in speculation, would be found involved in great<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[302]</a></span> -difficulties; and were it determined upon the evidence of reason, -as nature has determined it to our hands, that life is to be preserved: -still, the rules which God has been pleased to afford us, -for escaping the miseries of it, and obtaining its satisfactions, the -rules, for instance, of preserving health, and recovering it when -lost, are not only fallible and precarious, but very far from being -exact. Nor are we informed by nature, as to future contingencies -and accidents, so as to render it at all certain, what is the -best method of managing our affairs. What will be the success -of our temporal pursuits, in the common sense of the word success, -is highly doubtful. And what will be the success of them -in the proper sense of the word; <i>i.e.</i> what happiness or enjoyment -we shall obtain by them, is doubtful in a much higher -degree. Indeed the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence, with -which we are obliged to take up, in the daily course of life, is -scarce to be expressed. Yet men do not throw away life, or disregard -the interests of it, upon account of this doubtfulness. -The evidence of religion then being admitted real, those who -object against it, as not satisfactory, <i>i.e.</i> as not being what they -wish it, plainly forget the very condition of our being: for -satisfaction, in this sense, does not belong to such a creature -as man.</p> - -<p>And, what is more material, they forget also the very nature -of religion. For, religion presupposes, in all those who will -embrace it, a certain degree of integrity and honesty; which it -was intended to try whether men have or not, and to exercise in -such as have it, in order to its improvement. Religion presupposes -this as much, and in the same sense, as speaking to a man -presupposes he understands the language in which you speak; or -as warning a man of any danger presupposes that he hath such -a regard to himself, as that he will endeavor to avoid it. Therefore -the question is not at all, Whether the evidence of religion -be satisfactory; but Whether it be, in reason, sufficient to prove -and discipline that virtue, which it presupposes. Now the evidence -of it is fully sufficient for all those purposes of <em>probation</em>; -how far soever it is from being satisfactory, as to the purposes of -<em>curiosity</em>, or any other: and indeed it answers the purposes of -the former in several respects, which it would not do, if it were -as overpowering as is required. Besides, whether the motives or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[303]</a></span> -the evidence for any course of action be satisfactory, meaning -here, by that word, what satisfies a man that such a course of -action will in event be for his good; this need never be, and I -think, strictly speaking, never is, the practical question in common -matters. The practical question in all cases is, Whether -the evidence for a course of action be such as, taking in all circumstances, -makes the faculty within us, which is the guide and -judge of conduct,<a name="FNanchor_293" id="FNanchor_293"></a><a href="#Footnote_293" class="fnanchor">[293]</a> determine that course of action to be prudent. -Indeed, satisfaction that it will be for our interest or -happiness, abundantly determines an action to be prudent: but -evidence almost infinitely lower than this, determines actions to -be so too; even in the conduct of every day.</p> - -<p><i>Fifthly</i>, As to the objection concerning the influence which -this argument, or any part of it, may, or may not be expected to -have upon men; I observe, as above, that religion being intended -for a trial<a name="FNanchor_294" id="FNanchor_294"></a><a href="#Footnote_294" class="fnanchor">[294]</a> and exercise of the morality of every person’s character, -who is a subject of it; and there being, as I have shown, -such evidence for it, as is sufficient, in reason, to influence men -to embrace it: to object, that it is not to be imagined mankind -will be influenced by such evidence, is nothing to the purpose of -the foregoing treatise. For the purpose of it is not to inquire, -what sort of creatures mankind are; but what the light and -knowledge, which is afforded them, requires they should be: to -show how, in reason, they ought to behave; not how, in fact, -they will behave. This depends upon themselves, and is their -own concern; the personal concern of each man in particular. -How little regard the generality have to it, experience indeed -does too fully show. But religion, considered as a probation, -has had its end upon all persons, to whom it has been proposed -with evidence sufficient in reason to influence their practice: for -by this means they have been put into a state of probation; let<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[304]</a></span> -them behave as they will in it. Thus, not only revelation, but -reason also, teaches us, that by the evidence of religion being -laid before men, the designs of Providence are carrying on, not -only with regard to those who will be influenced by it, but likewise -with regard to those who will not. Lastly, the objection here -referred to, allows the thing insisted upon in this treatise to be -of <em>some</em> weight; and if so, it may be hoped it will have some -influence. And if there be a probability that it will have any at -all, there is the same reason in kind, though not in degree, to lay -it before men, as there would be, if it were likely to have a greater -influence.</p> - -<p>Further, I desire it may be considered, with respect to the -whole of the foregoing objections, that in this treatise I have -argued upon the principles of others,<a name="FNanchor_295" id="FNanchor_295"></a><a href="#Footnote_295" class="fnanchor">[295]</a> not my own: and have -omitted what I think true, and of the utmost importance, because -by others thought unintelligible, or not true. Thus I have argued -upon the principles of the fatalists, which I do not believe: and -have omitted a thing of the utmost importance which I do believe,—[viz.] -the moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior -to all will whatever; which as certainly determine the divine -<em>conduct</em>, as speculative truth and falsehood necessarily determine -the divine <em>judgment</em>. Indeed the principle of liberty, and that -of moral fitness, so force themselves upon the mind, that moralists, -ancient as well as modern, have formed their language upon -it. And probably it may appear in mine, though I have endeavored -to avoid it; and, in order to avoid it, have sometimes been -obliged to express myself in a manner, which will appear strange -to such as do not observe the reason for it. But the general -argument here pursued, does not at all suppose, or proceed upon -these principles.</p> - -<p>Now, these two abstract principles of liberty and moral fitness -being omitted, religion can be considered in no other view, than -merely as a question of fact: and in this view it is here considered. -It is obvious, that Christianity, and the proof of it, -are both historical. Even natural religion is, properly, a matter<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[305]</a></span> -of fact. For, that there is a righteous Governor of the world, is -so: and this proposition contains the general system of natural -religion. But then, several abstract truths, and in particular -those two principles, are usually taken into consideration in the -proof of it: whereas it is here treated of only as a matter of -fact. To explain this; That the three angles of a triangle are -equal to two right ones, is an abstract truth; but that they appear -so to our mind, is only a matter of fact. This last must -have been admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient sceptics, -who would not admit the former: but pretended to doubt, -whether there were any such thing as truth, or whether we -could certainly depend upon our faculties of understanding for -the knowledge of it in any case.</p> - -<p>The assertion that there is, in the nature of things, an original -standard of right and wrong in actions, independent upon all -will, but which unalterably determines the will of God, to exercise -that moral government over the world, which religion teaches, -(<i>i.e.</i> finally and upon the whole to reward and punish men respectively -as they act right or wrong;) contains an abstract truth, -as well as matter of fact. But suppose that in the present state, -every man without exception, was rewarded and punished, in -exact proportion as he followed or transgressed that sense of -right and wrong, which God has implanted in his nature: this -would not be at all an abstract truth, but only a matter of fact. -And though this fact were acknowledged by every one, yet the -same difficulties might be raised as now are, concerning the abstract -questions of liberty and moral fitness. And we should -have a proof, even the certain one of experience, that the government -of the world was perfectly moral, without taking in the consideration -of those questions: and this proof would remain, in -what way soever they were determined.</p> - -<p>Thus, God having given mankind a moral faculty, the object -of which is actions, and which naturally approves some actions -as right, and of good desert, and condemns others as wrong, and -of ill desert; that he will, finally and upon the whole, reward the -former and punish the latter, is not an assertion of an abstract -truth, but of what is as mere a fact, as his doing so at present -would be. This future fact I have not, indeed, proved with the -force with which it might be proved, from the principles of liberty<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[306]</a></span> -and moral fitness; but without them have given a really conclusive -practical proof of it, which is greatly strengthened by the -general analogy of nature; a proof easily cavilled at, easily shown -not to be demonstrative, (and it is not offered as such;) but impossible, -I think, to be evaded, or answered. Thus the obligations -of religion are made out, exclusive of the questions concerning -liberty and moral fitness; which have been perplexed -with difficulties and abstruse reasonings, as every thing may.</p> - -<p>Hence therefore may be observed distinctly, what is the force -of this treatise. It will be, to such as are convinced of religion -upon the proof arising out of the two last mentioned principles, -an <em>additional</em> proof and confirmation of it: to such as do not -admit those principles, an <em>original</em> proof of it,<a name="FNanchor_296" id="FNanchor_296"></a><a href="#Footnote_296" class="fnanchor">[296]</a> and a confirmation -of that proof. Those who believe, will here find the scheme -of Christianity cleared of objections, and the evidence of it in a -peculiar manner strengthened. Those who do not believe will at -least be shown the absurdity of all attempts to prove Christianity -false, the plain undoubted credibility of it; and, I hope, a good -deal more.</p> - -<p>Thus, though some perhaps may seriously think, that analogy, -as here urged, has too great stress laid upon it; and ridicule, unanswerable -ridicule, may be applied, to show the argument from -it in a disadvantageous light; yet there can be no question, but -that it is a real one. For religion, both natural and revealed, -implying in it numerous facts; analogy, being a <em>confirmation</em> of -all facts to which it can be applied, and the <em>only proof</em> of most, -cannot but be admitted by every one to be a material thing, and -truly of weight on the side of religion, both natural and revealed. -And it ought to be particularly regarded by such as profess to -follow nature, and to be less satisfied with abstract reasonings.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<h3 id="II_CONCLUSION">CONCLUSION.</h3> - -<p>Whatever account may be given of the strange inattention -and disregard, in some ages and countries, to a matter of such -importance as religion; it would, before experience, be incredible, -that there should be the like disregard in those, who have had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[307]</a></span> -the moral system of the world laid before them, as it is by Christianity, -and often inculcated upon them: because this moral -system carries in it a good degree of evidence for its truth, upon -its being barely proposed to our thoughts. There is no need of -abstruse reasonings and distinctions, to convince an unprejudiced -understanding, that there is a God who made and governs the -world, and will judge it in righteousness; though they may be -necessary to answer abstruse difficulties, when once such are -raised: when the very meaning of those words, which express -most intelligibly the general doctrine of religion, is pretended to -be uncertain; and the clear truth of the thing itself is obscured -by the intricacies of speculation. To an unprejudiced mind, ten -thousand thousand instances of design cannot but prove a designer. -And it is intuitively manifest, that <em>creatures</em> ought to -live under a dutiful sense of their Maker; and that justice and -charity must be his laws, to creatures whom he has made social, -and placed in society.</p> - -<p>The truth of revealed religion, peculiarly so called, is not indeed -self-evident, but requires external proof, in order to its -being received. Yet inattention, among us, to revealed religion, -will be found to imply the same dissolute immoral temper of -mind, as inattention to natural religion: because, when both are -laid before us, in the manner they are in Christian countries of -liberty, our obligations to inquire into both, and to embrace both -upon supposition of their truth, are obligations of the same nature. -Revelation claims to be the voice of God: and our obligation to -attend to his voice is surely moral, in all cases. And as it is insisted, -that its evidence is conclusive, upon thorough consideration -of it; so it offers itself with obvious appearances of having -something more than human in it, and therefore in all reason -requires to have its claims most seriously examined into.</p> - -<p>It is to be added, that though light and knowledge, in what -manner soever afforded, is equally from God; yet a miraculous -revelation has a peculiar tendency, from the first principles of -our nature, to awaken mankind, and inspire them with reverence -and awe. And this is a peculiar obligation, to attend to what -claims to be so, with such appearances of truth. It is therefore -most certain, that our obligations to inquire seriously into the -evidence of Christianity, and, upon supposition of its truth, to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[308]</a></span> -embrace it, are of the utmost importance, and moral in the highest -and most proper sense. Let us then suppose, that the evidence -of religion in general, and of Christianity, has been seriously inquired -into, by all reasonable men among us. Yet we find many -professedly to reject both, upon speculative principles of infidelity. -All of them do not content themselves with a bare neglect -of religion, and enjoying their imaginary freedom from its -restraints. Some go much beyond this. They deride God’s -moral government over the world. They renounce his protection, -and defy his justice. They ridicule and vilify Christianity, and -blaspheme the author of it; and take all occasions to manifest -scorn and contempt of revelation. This amounts to an active -setting themselves against religion; to what may be considered -as a positive principle of irreligion, which they cultivate within -themselves; and, whether they intend this effect or not, render -habitual, as a good man does the contrary principle. Others, -who are not chargeable with all this profligateness, yet are in -avowed opposition to religion, as if discovered to be groundless.</p> - -<p>Now admitting, which is the supposition we go upon, that -these persons act upon what they think principles of reason, (and -otherwise they are not to be argued with,) it is really inconceivable, -that they should imagine they clearly see the whole evidence -of it, considered in itself, to be nothing at all: nor do they pretend -this. They are far indeed from having a just notion of its -evidence: but they would not say its evidence was nothing, if -they thought the system of it, with all its circumstances, were -credible, like other matters of science or history. Their manner -of treating it must proceed, either from such kind of objections -against all religion, as have been answered or obviated in the -former part of this treatise; or else from objections, and difficulties, -supposed more peculiar to Christianity. Thus, they -entertain prejudices against the whole notion of a revelation, and -miraculous interpositions. They find things in Scripture, whether -in incidental passages, or in the general scheme of it, which -appear to them unreasonable. They take for granted, that if -Christianity were true, the light of it must have been more -general, and the evidence of it more satisfactory, or rather overpowering: -that it must and would have been, in some way, otherwise -put and left, than it is. Now this is not imagining they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[309]</a></span> -see the evidence itself to be nothing, or inconsiderable; but quite -another thing. It is being fortified <em>against</em> the evidence, in -some degree acknowledged, by thinking they see the system of -Christianity, or something which appears to them necessarily connected -with it, to be incredible or false; fortified against that -evidence, which might otherwise make great impression upon -them. Or, lastly, if any of these persons are, upon the whole, in -doubt concerning the truth of Christianity; their behavior seems -owing to their taking for granted, through strange inattention, -that such doubting is, in a manner, the same thing as being -certain against it.</p> - -<p>To these persons, and to this state of opinion concerning religion, -the foregoing treatise is adapted. For, all the general -objections against the moral system of nature having been obviated, -it is shown, that there is not any peculiar presumption at -all against Christianity, considered either as not discoverable by -reason, or as unlike to what is so discovered; nor any, worth -mentioning, against it as miraculous, if any at all; none, certainly, -which can render it in the least incredible. It is shown, -that, upon supposition of a divine revelation, the analogy of -nature renders it beforehand highly credible, I think probable, -that many things in it must appear liable to great objections; -and that we must be incompetent judges of it, to a great degree. -This observation is, I think, unquestionably true, and of the very -utmost importance. But it is urged, as I hope it will be understood, -with great caution not to vilify the faculty of reason, -which is <cite>the candle of the Lord within us</cite>;<a name="FNanchor_297" id="FNanchor_297"></a><a href="#Footnote_297" class="fnanchor">[297]</a> though it can afford -no light, where it does not shine; nor judge, where it has no -principles to judge upon. The objections here spoken of, being -first answered in the view of objections against Christianity as a -matter of fact, are in the next place considered as urged more -immediately against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the -Christian dispensation. And it is fully made out, that they -admit of exactly the like answer, in every respect, to what the -like objections against the constitution of nature admit of: that, -as partial views give the appearance of wrong to things, which, -upon further consideration and knowledge of their relations to -other things, are found just and good; so it is perfectly credible,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[310]</a></span> -that the things objected against the wisdom and goodness of the -Christian dispensation, may be rendered instances of wisdom -and goodness, by their reference to other things beyond our -view. Because Christianity is a scheme as much above our -comprehension, as that of nature; and like that, a scheme in -which means are made use of to accomplish ends, and which, -as is most credible, may be carried on by general laws. And -it ought to be attended to, that this is not an answer taken -merely or chiefly from our ignorance: but from something positive, -which our observation shows us. For, to like objections, -the like answer is experienced to be just, in numberless parallel -cases.</p> - -<p>The objections against the Christian dispensation, and the -method by which it is carried on, having been thus obviated, in -general, and together; the chief of them are considered distinctly, -and the particular things objected to are shown credible, -by their perfect analogy, each apart, to the constitution of nature. -Thus, if man be fallen from his primitive state, and to be restored, -and infinite wisdom and power engages in accomplishing -our recovery: it were to have been expected, it is said, that this -should have been effected at once; and not by such a long series -of means, and such a various economy of persons and things; -one dispensation preparatory to another, this to a further one, -and so on through an indefinite number of ages, before the end -of the scheme proposed can be completely accomplished; a -scheme conducted by infinite wisdom, and executed by almighty -power. But now, on the contrary, our finding that every thing -in the constitution and course of nature is thus carried on, shows -such expectations concerning revelation to be highly unreasonable; -and is a satisfactory answer to them, when urged as objections -against the credibility, that the great scheme of Providence -in the redemption of the world may be of this kind, and to be -accomplished in this manner.</p> - -<p>As to the particular method of our redemption, the appointment -of a Mediator between God and man: this has been shown -to be most obviously analogous to the general conduct of nature, -<i>i.e.</i> the God of nature, in appointing others to be the instruments -of his mercy, as we experience in the daily course of Providence. -The condition of this world, which the doctrine of our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[311]</a></span> -redemption by Christ presupposes, so much falls in with natural -appearances, that heathen moralists inferred it from those appearances: -inferred that human nature was fallen from its original -rectitude, and in consequence of this, degraded from its primitive -happiness. However this opinion came into the world, these -appearances kept up the tradition, and confirmed the belief of it. -And as it was the general opinion under the light of nature, that -repentance and reformation, alone and by itself, was not sufficient -to do away sin, and procure a full remission of the penalties annexed -to it; and as the reason of the thing does not at all lead -to any such conclusion; so every day’s experience shows us, that -reformation is not, in any sort, sufficient to prevent the present disadvantages -and miseries, which, in the natural course of things, -God has annexed to folly and extravagance.</p> - -<p>Yet there may be ground to think, that the punishments, -which, by the general laws of divine government, are annexed -to vice, may be prevented: that provision may have been, even -originally, made, that they should be prevented by some means -or other, though they could not by reformation alone. For we -have daily instances of <em>such mercy</em>, in the general conduct of -nature: compassion provided for misery,<a name="FNanchor_298" id="FNanchor_298"></a><a href="#Footnote_298" class="fnanchor">[298]</a> medicines for diseases, -friends against enemies. There is provision made, in the original -constitution of the world, that much of the natural bad consequences -of our follies, which persons themselves alone cannot -prevent, may be prevented by the assistance of others; assistance -which nature enables, and disposes, and appoints them to afford. -By a method of goodness analogous to this, when the world lay -in wickedness, and consequently in ruin, <cite>God so loved the world, -that he gave his only-begotten Son</cite> to save it: and <cite>he being made -perfect by suffering, became the author of eternal salvation to all -them that obey him</cite>.<a name="FNanchor_299" id="FNanchor_299"></a><a href="#Footnote_299" class="fnanchor">[299]</a> Indeed neither reason nor analogy would -lead us to think, in particular, that the interposition of Christ, in -the manner in which he did interpose, would be of that efficacy -for recovery of the world, which the Scripture teaches us it was. -But neither would reason nor analogy lead us to think, that other -particular means would be of the efficacy, which experience shows -they are, in numberless instances. Therefore, as the case before -us does not admit of experience; so, that neither reason nor<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[312]</a></span> -analogy can show how, or in what particular way, the interposition -of Christ, as revealed in Scripture, is of that efficacy, which -it is there represented to be; this is no kind nor degree of presumption -against its being really of that efficacy.</p> - -<p>Further: the objections against Christianity, from the light of -it not being universal, nor its evidence so strong as might possibly -be given, have been answered by the general analogy of -nature. That God has made such variety of creatures, is indeed -an answer to the former: but that he dispenses his gifts in such -variety, both of degrees and kinds, among creatures of the same -species, and even to the same individuals at different times; is a -more obvious and full answer to it. And it is so far from being -the method of Providence in other cases, to afford us such overbearing -evidence, as some require in proof of Christianity; that -on the contrary, the evidence upon which we are naturally appointed -to act in common matters, throughout a very great part -of life, is doubtful in a high degree. And admitting the fact, -that God has afforded to some no more than doubtful evidence of -religion; the same account may be given of it, as of difficulties -and temptations with regard to practice. But as it is not impossible,<a name="FNanchor_300" id="FNanchor_300"></a><a href="#Footnote_300" class="fnanchor">[300]</a> -surely, that this alleged doubtfulness may be men’s -own fault; it deserves their most serious consideration, whether -it be not so. However, it is certain, that doubting implies a -<em>degree</em> of evidence for that of which we doubt: and that this -degree of evidence as really lays us under obligations as demonstrative -evidence.</p> - -<p>The whole of religion then is throughout credible: nor is -there, I think, any thing, relating to the revealed dispensation -of things, more different from the experienced constitution and -course of nature, than some parts of the constitution of nature -are from other parts of it. If so, the only question which remains -is, What positive evidence can be alleged for the truth of -Christianity? This too in general has been considered, and the -objections against it estimated. Deduct, therefore, what is to -be deducted from that evidence, upon account of any weight -which may be thought to remain in these objections, after what -the analogy of nature has suggested in answer to them: and -then consider, what are the practical consequences from all this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[313]</a></span> -upon the most sceptical principles one can argue upon (for I am -writing to persons who entertain these principles): and upon -such consideration it will be obvious, that immorality, as little -excuse as it admits of in itself, is greatly aggravated, in persons -who have been made acquainted with Christianity, whether they -believe it or not: because the moral system of nature, or natural -religion, which Christianity lays before us, approves itself, almost -intuitively, to a reasonable mind, upon seeing it proposed.</p> - -<p>In the next place, with regard to Christianity, it will be observed -that there is a middle between a full satisfaction of the -truth of it, and a satisfaction of the contrary. The middle state -of mind between these two consists in a serious apprehension, -that it may be true, joined with doubt whether it is so. And this, -upon the best judgment I am able to make, is as far towards -speculative infidelity, as any sceptic can at all be supposed to go, -who has had true Christianity, with the proper evidences of it, -laid before him, and has in any tolerable measure considered them. -For I would not be mistaken to comprehend all who have ever -heard of it; because it seems evident, that in many countries -called Christian, neither Christianity nor its evidence, is fairly -laid before men. And in places where both are, there appear -to be some who have very little attended to either, and who reject -Christianity with a scorn proportionate to their inattention; and -yet are by no means without understanding in other matters. -Now it has been shown, that a serious apprehension that Christianity -may be true, lays persons under the strictest obligations -of a serious regard to it, throughout the whole of their life; a -regard not the same exactly, but in many respects nearly the same -with what a full conviction of its truth would lay them under.</p> - -<p><i>Lastly</i>, it will appear, that blasphemy and profaneness, with -regard to Christianity, are absolutely without excuse. There is -no temptation to it, but from the wantonness of vanity or mirth; -and those, considering the infinite importance of the subject, are -no such temptations as to afford any excuse for it. If this be a -just account of things, and yet men can go on to vilify or disregard -Christianity, which is to talk and act as if they had a -demonstration of its falsehood, there is no reason to think they -would alter their behavior to any purpose, though there were a -demonstration of its truth.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[314]</a><br /><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[315]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h2 id="DISSERTATIONS">DISSERTATIONS.</h2> - -<p class="center larger">OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.</p> - -<p class="center larger">OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[316]</a></span></p> - -<h3>Advertisement.</h3> - -<p>In the first copy of these papers, I had inserted the -two following dissertations into the chapters, on <cite>a Future -Life</cite>, and on the <cite>Moral Government of God</cite>; with which -they are closely connected. But as these do not directly -fall under the <em>title</em> of the foregoing treatise, and would -have kept the subject of it too long out of sight, it seems -more proper to place them by themselves.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[317]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h3 id="DISSERTATION_I">DISSERTATION I.<br /> -<span class="smaller">Personal Identity.</span></h3> - -<p>Whether we are to live in a future state, as it is the most -important question which can possibly be asked, so it is the most -intelligible one which can be expressed in language. Yet strange -perplexities have been raised about the meaning of that identity -or sameness of person, which is implied in the notion of our -living now and hereafter, or in any two successive moments. -And the solution of these difficulties hath been stranger than the -difficulties themselves. For, personal identity has been explained -so by some, as to render the inquiry concerning a future life of no -consequence at all to us the persons who are making it. And -though few men can be misled by such subtleties; yet it may be -proper to consider them a little.</p> - -<p>When it is asked <em>wherein</em> personal identity consists, the answer -should be the same, as if it were asked wherein consists similitude, -or equality; that all attempts to define would but perplex -it. Yet there is no difficulty at all in ascertaining <em>the idea</em>. For -as, upon two triangles being compared or viewed together, there -arises to the mind the idea of similitude; or upon twice two and -four, the idea of equality: so likewise, upon comparing the -consciousness of one’s self, or one’s own existence, in any two -moments, there as immediately arises to the mind the idea of -personal identity. And as the two former comparisons not only -give us the ideas of similitude and equality; but also show us -that two triangles are alike, and twice two and four are equal: so -the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of personal -identity, but also shows us the identity of ourselves in those two -moments; the present, suppose, and that immediately past; or -the present, and that a month, a year, or twenty years past. In<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[318]</a></span> -other words, by reflecting upon that which is myself now, and -that which was myself twenty years ago, I discern they are not -two, but one and the same self.</p> - -<p>But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain -our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say, that it <em>makes</em> personal -identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to -say, that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one -action, but what he can remember; indeed none but what he -reflects upon. And one should really think it self-evident, that -consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore -cannot constitute, personal identity; any more than knowledge, -in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes.</p> - -<p>This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from hence; -that to be endued with consciousness is inseparable from the idea -of a person, or intelligent being. For, this might be expressed -inaccurately thus, that consciousness makes personality: and -from hence it might be concluded to make personal identity. -But though present consciousness of what we at present do and -feel is necessary to our being the persons we <em>now are</em>; yet present -consciousness of past actions or feelings is not necessary to -our being the same persons who performed those actions, or <em>once -had</em> those feelings.</p> - -<p>The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same, in the common -acceptation of the word, does not appear to have any relation to -this of personal identity: because, the word <em>same</em>, when applied -to them and to a person, is not only applied to different subjects, -but it is also used in different senses. For when a man swears -to the same tree, as having stood fifty years in the same place, he -means only the same as to all the purposes of property, and uses -of common life; and not that the tree has been all that time the -same, in the strict philosophical sense of the word. For he does -not know, whether any one particle of the present tree be the -same with any one particle of the tree which stood in the same -place fifty years ago. And if they have not one common particle -of matter, they cannot be the same tree in the proper philosophic -sense of the word <em>same</em>: it being evidently a contradiction in -terms, to say they are, when no part of their substance, and no -one of their properties is the same: no part of their substance, -by the supposition; no one of their properties, because it is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[319]</a></span> -allowed, that the same property cannot be transferred from one -substance to another. Therefore when we say the identity of -sameness of a plant consists in a continuation of the same life, -communicated under the same organization, to a number of particles -of matter, whether the same or not; the word <em>same</em>, when -applied to life and to organization, cannot possibly be understood -to signify, what it signifies in this very sentence, when applied to -matter. In a loose and popular sense then, the life and the organization -and the plant are justly said to be the same, notwithstanding -the perpetual change of the parts. But in strict and -philosophical language, no man, no being, no mode of being, no -any thing, can be the same with that, with which it has indeed -nothing the same. Now sameness is used in this latter sense, -when applied to persons. The identity of these, therefore, cannot -subsist with diversity of substance.</p> - -<p>The thing here considered, and as I think, demonstratively -determined, is proposed by Mr. Locke in these words, <i>Whether -it</i>; <i>i.e.</i> the same self or person, <i>be the same identical substance</i>? -And he has suggested what is a much better answer to the question, -than that which he gives it in form. For he defines person, -<em>a thinking intelligent being</em>, &c., and personal identity, <em>the sameness -of a rational being</em>.<a name="FNanchor_301" id="FNanchor_301"></a><a href="#Footnote_301" class="fnanchor">[301]</a> The question then is, whether the -same rational being is the same substance: which needs no answer, -because being and substance, in this place, stand for the -same idea. The ground of the doubt, whether the same person -be the same substance, is said to be this; that the consciousness -of our own existence, in youth and in old age, or in any two -joint successive moments, is not the <em>same individual action</em>,<a name="FNanchor_302" id="FNanchor_302"></a><a href="#Footnote_302" class="fnanchor">[302]</a> -<i>i.e.</i> not the same consciousness, but different successive consciousnesses. -Now it is strange that this should have occasioned such -perplexities. For it is surely conceivable, that a person may -have a capacity of knowing some object or other to be the same -now, which it was when he contemplated it formerly: yet in this -case, where, by the supposition, the object is perceived to be the -same, the perception of it in any two moments cannot be one and -the same perception. And thus, though the successive consciousnesses, -which we have of our own existence, are not the same, -yet are they consciousnesses of one and the same thing or object;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[320]</a></span> -of the same person, self, or living agent. The person, of whose -existence the consciousness is felt now, and was felt an hour or a -year ago, is discerned to be; not two persons, but one and the -same person; and therefore is one and the same.</p> - -<p>Mr. Locke’s observations upon this subject appear hasty: and -he seems to profess himself dissatisfied with suppositions, which -he has made relating to it.<a name="FNanchor_303" id="FNanchor_303"></a><a href="#Footnote_303" class="fnanchor">[303]</a> But some of those hasty observations -have been carried to a strange length by others; whose -notion, when traced and examined to the bottom, amounts, I -think, to this:<a name="FNanchor_304" id="FNanchor_304"></a><a href="#Footnote_304" class="fnanchor">[304]</a> “That personality is not a permanent, but a transient -thing: that it lives and dies, begins and ends continually: -that no one can any more remain one and the same person two -moments together, than two successive moments can be one and -the same moment: that our substance is indeed continually -changing; but whether this be so or not, is, it seems, nothing to -the purpose; since it is not substance, but consciousness alone, -which constitutes personality: which consciousness, being successive, -cannot be the same in any two moments, nor consequently -the personality constituted by it.” Hence it must follow, that it -is a fallacy upon ourselves, to charge our present selves with any -thing we did, or to imagine our present selves interested in any -thing which befell us yesterday; or that our present self will be -interested in what will befall us to-morrow: since our present -self is not, in reality, the same with the self of yesterday, but -another like self or person coming in its room, and mistaken for -it; to which another self will succeed to-morrow. This, I say, -must follow. For if the self or person of to-day, and that of to-morrow, -are not the same, but only like persons; the person of -to-day is really no more interested in what will befall the person -of to-morrow, than in what will befall any other person.</p> - -<p>It may be thought, perhaps, that this is not a just representation -of the opinion we are speaking of: because those who maintain -it allow, that a person is the same as far back as his remembrance -reaches. Indeed they use the words, <em>identity</em>, and <em>same -person</em>. Nor will language permit these words to be laid aside; -since if they were, there must be I know not what ridiculous<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[321]</a></span> -periphrasis substituted in the room of them. But they cannot, -<em>consistently with themselves</em>, mean, that the person is really the -same. For it is self-evident, that the personality cannot be really -the same, if, as they expressly assert, that in which it consists is -not the same. And as, consistently with themselves, they cannot, -so, I think it appears, they do not <em>mean</em>, that the person is -<em>really</em> the same, but only that he is so in a fictitious sense: in -such a sense only as they assert, for this they do assert, that any -number of persons whatever may be the same person. The bare -unfolding this notion, and laying it thus naked and open, seems -the best confutation of it. However, since great stress is said to -be put upon it, I add the following things.</p> - -<p><i>First</i>, This notion is absolutely contradictory to that certain -conviction, which necessarily and every moment rises within us, -when we turn our thoughts upon ourselves, when we reflect upon -what is past, and look forward upon what is to come. All imagination -of a daily change of that living agent which each man -calls himself, for another, or of any such change throughout our -whole present life, is entirely borne down by our natural sense -of things. Nor is it possible for a person in his wits to alter his -conduct, with regard to his health or affairs, from a suspicion, -that, though he should live to-morrow, he should not, however, -be the same person he is to-day. Yet, if it be reasonable to act, -with respect to a future life, upon the notion that personality is -transient, it is reasonable to act upon it, with respect to the present. -Here then is a notion equally applicable to religion and to -temporal concerns. Every one sees and feels the inexpressible -absurdity of it in the latter case; therefore, if any can take up -with it in the former, this cannot proceed from the reason of the -thing, but must be owing to inward unfairness, and secret corruption -of heart.</p> - -<p><i>Secondly</i>, It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or quality, but -a <em>being</em> only, which is capable of life and action, of happiness and -misery. Now all beings confessedly continue the same, during -the whole time of their existence. Consider then a living being -now existing, and which has existed for any time alive. This -living being must have done and suffered and enjoyed, what it -has done and suffered and enjoyed formerly, (this living being, I -say, and not another) as really as it does and suffers and enjoys,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[322]</a></span> -what it does and suffers and enjoys this instant. All these successive -actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, are actions, enjoyments, -and sufferings, of the same living being. And they are -so, prior to all consideration of its remembering or forgetting: -since remembering or forgetting can make no alteration in the -truth of past matter of fact. And suppose this being endued -with limited powers of knowledge and memory, there is no -more difficulty in conceiving it to have a power of knowing -itself to be the same living being which it was some time ago, -of remembering some of its actions, sufferings, and enjoyments, -and forgetting others, than in conceiving it to know or remember -or forget any thing else.</p> - -<p><i>Thirdly</i>, Every person is <em>conscious</em>, that he is now the same -person or self he was as far back as his remembrance reaches: -since when any one reflects upon a past action of his own, he -is just as certain of the person who did that action, namely, -himself who now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the -action was done at all. Nay, very often a person’s assurance -of an action having been done, of which he is absolutely assured, -arises wholly from the consciousness that he himself did it. -This he, person, or self, must either be a substance, or the -property of some substance. If he, a person, be a substance; -then consciousness that he is the same person is consciousness -that he is the same substance. If the person, or he, be the -property of a substance, still consciousness that he is the same -property is as certain a proof that his substance remains the -same, as consciousness that he remains the same substance would -be; since the same property cannot be transferred from one -substance to another.</p> - -<p>But though we are thus certain, that we are the same agents, -living beings, or substances, now, which we were as far back as -our remembrance reaches; yet it is asked, whether we may not -possibly be deceived in it? And this question may be asked at -the end of any demonstration whatever: because it is a question -concerning the truth of perception by memory. He who can -doubt, whether perception by memory can in this case be depended -upon, may doubt also, whether perception by deduction -and reasoning, which also include memory, or indeed whether -intuitive perception can. Here then we can go no further. For<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[323]</a></span> -it is ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those perceptions, -whose truth we can no otherwise prove, than by other perceptions -of exactly the same kind with them, and which there is just the -same ground to suspect; or to attempt to prove the truth of our -faculties, which can no otherwise be proved, than by the use or -means of those very suspected faculties themselves.<a name="FNanchor_305" id="FNanchor_305"></a><a href="#Footnote_305" class="fnanchor">[305]</a></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[324]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h3 id="DISSERTATION_II">DISSERTATION II.<br /> -<span class="smaller">The Nature of Virtue.</span></h3> - -<p>That which renders beings capable of moral government, is -their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception -and of action. Brute creatures are impressed and actuated by -various instincts and propensions: so also are we. But additional -to this, we have a capacity of reflecting upon actions and -characters, and making them an object to our thought: and on -doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions, -under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of good -desert; and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill desert. That -we have this moral approving and disapproving<a name="FNanchor_306" id="FNanchor_306"></a><a href="#Footnote_306" class="fnanchor">[306]</a> faculty, is certain -from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognising it in -each other. It appears from our exercising it unavoidably, in the -approbation and disapprobation even of feigned characters; from -the words right and wrong, odious and amiable, base and worthy, -with many others of like signification in all languages applied to -actions and characters: from the many written systems of morals -which suppose it, since it cannot be imagined, that all these -authors, throughout all these treatises, had absolutely no meaning -at all to their words, or a meaning merely chimerical: from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[325]</a></span> -our natural sense of gratitude, which, implies a distinction between -merely being the instrument of good, and intending it: -from the distinction every one makes between injury and mere -harm, which, Hobbes says, is peculiar to mankind; and between -injury and just punishment, a distinction plainly natural, prior -to the consideration of human laws.</p> - -<p>It is manifest that great part of common language, and of -common behavior over the world, is formed upon supposition of -such a moral faculty; whether called conscience, moral reason, -moral sense, or divine reason; whether considered as a sentiment -of the understanding, or as a perception of the heart; or, which -seems the truth, as including both. Nor is it at all doubtful in -the general, what course of action this faculty, or practical discerning -power within us, approves and what it disapproves. For, -as much as it has been disputed wherein virtue consists, or whatever -ground for doubt there may be about particulars; yet, in -general, there is in reality a universally acknowledged standard -of it. It is that, which all ages and all countries have made -profession of in public: it is that, which every man you meet -puts on the show of: it is that, which the primary and fundamental -laws of all civil constitutions over the face of the earth -make it their business and endeavor to enforce the practice of -upon mankind: namely, justice, veracity, and regard to common -good. It being manifest then, in general, that we have such a -faculty or discernment as this, it may be of use to remark some -things more distinctly concerning it.</p> - -<p><i>First</i>, It ought to be observed, that the object of this faculty -is actions,<a name="FNanchor_307" id="FNanchor_307"></a><a href="#Footnote_307" class="fnanchor">[307]</a> comprehending under that name active or practical -principles: those principles from which men would act, if occasions -and circumstances gave them power; and which, when -fixed and habitual in any person, we call his character. It does -not appear, that brutes have the least reflex sense of actions, as -distinguished from events: or that will and design, which constitute -the very nature of actions as such, are at all an object to -their perception. But to ours they are: and they are the object, -and the only one, of the approving and disapproving faculty.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[326]</a></span> -Acting, conduct, behavior, abstracted from all regard to what is -in fact and event the consequence of it, is itself the natural object -of the moral discernment; as speculative truth and falsehood -is of speculative reason. Intention of such and such -consequences, is indeed, always included; for it is part of the -action itself: but though the intended good or bad consequences -do not follow, we have exactly the same sense of the <em>action</em>, as -if they did. In like manner we think well or ill of characters, -abstracted from all consideration of the good or the evil, which -persons of such characters have it actually in their power to do. -We never, in the moral way, applaud or blame either ourselves -or others, for what we enjoy or what we suffer, or for having impressions -made upon us, which we consider as altogether out of -our power: but only for what we do or would have done, had it -been in our power: or for what we leave undone, which we might -have done, or would have left undone, though we could have -done.</p> - -<p><i>Secondly</i>, Our sense or discernment of actions as morally good -or evil, implies in it a sense or discernment of them as of good -or ill desert. It may be difficult to explain this perception, -so as to answer all the questions which may be asked concerning -it: but every one speaks of such and such actions as -deserving punishment; and it is not, I suppose, pretended, that -they have absolutely no meaning at all to the expression. Now -the meaning plainly is not, that we conceive it for the good of -society, that the doer of such actions should be made to suffer. -For if, unhappily, it were resolved, that a man, who by some -innocent action, was infected with the plague, should be left to -perish, lest, by other people’s coming near him, the infection -should spread; no one would say he <em>deserved</em> this treatment. -Innocence and ill desert are inconsistent ideas. Ill desert always -supposes guilt: and if one be no part of the other, yet they are -evidently and naturally connected in our mind. The sight of a -man in misery raises our compassion towards him; and if this -misery be inflicted on him by another, our indignation against -the author of it. But when we are informed, that the sufferer -is a villain, and is punished only for his treachery or cruelty; -our compassion exceedingly lessens, and in many instances our -indignation wholly subsides. Now what produces this effect is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[327]</a></span> -the conception of that in the sufferer, which we call ill desert. -Upon considering then, or viewing together, our notion of vice -and that of misery, there results a third, that of ill desert. And -thus there is in human creatures an association of the two ideas, -natural and moral evil, wickedness and punishment. If this -association were merely artificial or accidental, it were nothing: -but being most unquestionably natural, it greatly concerns us to -attend to it, instead of endeavoring to explain it away.</p> - -<p>It may be observed further, concerning our perception of good -and of ill desert, that the former is very weak with respect to -common instances of virtue. One reason of which may be, that -it does not appear to a spectator, how far such instances of virtue -proceed from a virtuous principle, or in what degree this principle -is prevalent: since a very weak regard to virtue may be sufficient -to make men act well in many common instances. On the other -hand, our perception of ill desert in vicious actions lessens, in -proportion to the temptations men are thought to have had to -such vices. For, vice in human creatures consisting chiefly in -the absence or want of the virtuous principle; though a man be -overcome, suppose by tortures, it does not from thence appear to -what degree the virtuous principle was wanting. All that appears -is, that he had it not in such a degree, as to prevail over -the temptation; but possibly he had it in a degree, which would -have rendered him proof against common temptations.</p> - -<p><i>Thirdly</i>, Our perception of vice and ill desert arises from, and -is the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities -of the agent. For the mere neglect of doing what we -ought to do, would, in many cases, be determined by all men to -be in the highest degree vicious. This determination must arise -from such comparison, and be the result of it; because such -neglect would not be vicious in creatures of other natures and -capacities, as brutes. It is the same also with respect to positive -vices, or such as consist in doing what we ought not. For -every one has a different sense of harm done by an idiot, madman, -or child, and by one of mature and common understanding; -though the action of both, including the intention, which is part -of the action, be the same: as it may be, since idiots and madmen, -as well as children, are capable not only of doing mischief -but also of intending it. Now this difference must arise from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[328]</a></span> -somewhat discerned in the nature or capacities of one, which -renders the action vicious; and the want of which, in the other, -renders the same action innocent or less vicious: and this plainly -supposes a comparison, whether reflected upon or not, between -the action and capacities of the agent, previous to our determining -an action to be vicious. Hence arises a proper application of the -epithets, incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, to actions -which our moral faculty determines to be vicious.</p> - -<p><i>Fourthly</i>, It deserves to be considered, whether men are more -at liberty, in point of morals, to make themselves miserable without -reason, than to make other people so: or dissolutely to -neglect their own greater good, for the sake of a present lesser -gratification, than they are to neglect the good of others, whom -nature has committed to their care. It would seem, that a due -concern about our own interest or happiness, and a reasonable -endeavor to secure and promote it, (which is, I think, very much -the meaning of the word prudence, in our language;) it would -seem, that this is virtue, and the contrary behavior faulty and -blamable; since, in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of -the first, and condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves and -others. This approbation and disapprobation are altogether -different from mere desire of our own, or of their happiness, and -from sorrow upon missing it. For the object or occasion of this -last kind of perception is satisfaction or uneasiness: whereas the -object of the first is active behavior. In one case, what our -thoughts fix upon is our condition: in the other, our conduct.</p> - -<p>It is true indeed, that nature has not given us so sensible a -disapprobation of imprudence and folly, either in <em>ourselves</em> or -<em>others</em>, as of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty: I suppose, because -that constant habitual sense of private interest and good, which -we always carry about with us, renders such sensible disapprobation -less necessary, less wanting, to keep us from imprudently -neglecting our own happiness, and foolishly injuring ourselves, -than it is necessary and wanting to keep us from injuring others; -to whose good we cannot have so strong and constant a regard: -and also because imprudence and folly, appearing to bring its -own punishment more immediately and constantly than injurious -behavior, it less needs the additional punishment, which would -be inflicted upon it by others, had they the same sensible indignation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[329]</a></span> -against it, as against injustice, and fraud, and cruelty. Besides, -unhappiness being in itself the natural object of compassion, -the unhappiness which people bring upon themselves, though it -be wilfully, excites in us some pity for them; and this of course -lessens our displeasure against them. Still it is matter of experience, -that we are formed so as to reflect very severely upon the -greater instances of imprudent neglect and foolish rashness, both -in ourselves and others. In instances of this kind, men often -say of themselves with remorse, and of others with some indignation, -that they deserved to suffer such calamities, because they -brought them upon themselves, and would not take warning. -Particularly when persons come to poverty and distress by a long -course of extravagance, and after frequent admonitions, though -without falsehood or injustice; we plainly, do not regard such -people as alike objects of compassion with those, who are brought -into the same condition by unavoidable accidents. From these -things it appears, that prudence is a species of virtue, and folly -of vice: meaning by <em>folly</em>, something quite different from mere -incapacity; a thoughtless want of that regard and attention to -our own happiness, which we had capacity for. And this the -word properly includes; and, as it seems, in its usual acceptation: -for we scarcely apply it to brute creatures.</p> - -<p>However, if any person be disposed to dispute the matter, I -shall very willingly give him up the words virtue and vice, as -not applicable to prudence and folly: but must insist, that the -faculty within us, which is the judge of actions, approves of prudent -actions, and disapproves imprudent ones: I say prudent and -imprudent <em>actions</em> as such, and considered distinctly from the -happiness or misery which they occasion. And by the way, this -observation may help to determine what justness there is in the -objection against religion, that it teaches us to be interested and -selfish.</p> - -<p><i>Fifthly</i>, Without inquiring how far, and in what sense, virtue -is resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the want of it; it -may be proper to observe, that benevolence, and the want of it, -singly considered, are in no sort the <em>whole</em>, of virtue and vice. -For if this were the case, in the review of one’s own character, or -that of others, our moral understanding and moral sense would -be indifferent to every thing, but the degrees in which benevolence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[330]</a></span> -prevailed, and the degrees in which it was wanting. That -is, we should neither approve of benevolence to some persons -rather than to others, nor disapprove injustice and falsehood upon -any other account, than merely as an overbalance of happiness -was foreseen likely to be produced by the first, and of misery by -the second. On the contrary, suppose two men competitors for -any thing whatever, which would be of equal advantage to each -of them; though nothing indeed would be more impertinent, -than for a stranger to busy himself to get one of them preferred -to the other; yet such endeavor would be virtue, in behalf of a -friend or benefactor, abstracted from all consideration of distant -consequences: as that examples of gratitude, and the cultivation -of friendship, would be of general good to the world. Again, -suppose one man should, by fraud or violence, take from another -the fruit of his labor, with intent to give it to a third, who he -thought would have as much pleasure from it as would balance -the pleasure which the first possessor would have had in the -enjoyment, and his vexation in the loss of it; suppose also that -no bad consequences would follow: yet such an action would -surely be vicious. Nay further, were treachery, violence, and -injustice, no otherwise vicious, than as foreseen likely to produce -an overbalance of misery to society; then, if in any case a man -could procure to himself as great advantage by an act of injustice, -as the whole foreseen inconvenience, likely to be brought upon -others by it, would amount to; such a piece of injustice would -not be faulty or vicious at all: because it would be no more than, -in any other case, for a man to prefer his own satisfaction to -another’s, in equal degrees.</p> - -<p>The fact, then, appears to be, that we are <em>constituted</em> so as to -condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve -of benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted -from all consideration, which conduct is likeliest to produce an -overbalance of happiness or misery. Therefore, were the Author -of nature to propose nothing to himself as an end but the production -of happiness, were his moral character merely that of -benevolence; yet ours is not so. Upon that supposition indeed, -the only reason of his giving us the above mentioned approbation -of benevolence to some persons rather than others, and disapprobation -of falsehood, unprovoked violence, and injustice, must be,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[331]</a></span> -that he foresaw this constitution of our nature would produce -more happiness, than forming us with a temper of mere general -benevolence. But still, since this is our constitution, falsehood, -violence, injustice, must be vice in us; and benevolence to some, -preferably to others, virtue; abstracted from all consideration of -the overbalance of evil or good, which they may appear likely to -produce.</p> - -<p>Now if human creatures are endued with such a moral nature -as we have been explaining, or with a moral faculty, the natural -object of which is actions: moral government must consist in -rendering them happy and unhappy, in rewarding and punishing -them, as they follow, neglect, or depart from, the moral rule of -action interwoven in their nature, or suggested and enforced by -this moral faculty;<a name="FNanchor_308" id="FNanchor_308"></a><a href="#Footnote_308" class="fnanchor">[308]</a> in rewarding and punishing them upon account -of their so doing.</p> - -<p>I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observation, contradicted -what any author designed to assert. But some of great -and distinguished merit, have, I think, expressed themselves in -a manner, which may occasion some danger, to careless readers, -of imagining the whole of virtue to consist in singly aiming, according -to the best of their judgment, at promoting the happiness -of mankind in the present state; and the whole of vice, in doing -what they foresee, or might foresee, is likely to produce an overbalance -of unhappiness in it: than which mistakes, none can be -conceived more terrible. For it is certain, that some of the most -shocking instances of injustice, adultery, murder, perjury, and -even of persecution, may, in many supposable cases, not have the -appearance of being likely to produce an overbalance of misery -in the present state; perhaps sometimes may have the contrary -appearance.</p> - -<p>This reflection might easily be carried on, but I forbear. The -happiness of the world is the concern of Him who is the lord and -the proprietor of it: nor do we know what we are about, when -we endeavor to promote the good of mankind in any ways, but -those which he has directed; that is indeed in all ways not contrary -to veracity and justice. I speak thus upon supposition of -persons really endeavoring, in some sort, to do good without -regard to these. But the truth seems to be; that such supposed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[332]</a></span> -endeavors proceed, almost always, from ambition, the spirit of -party, or some indirect principle, concealed perhaps in great -measure from persons themselves. And though it is our business -and our duty to endeavor, within the bounds of veracity and -justice, to contribute to the ease, convenience, and even cheerfulness -and diversion of our fellow-creatures: yet, from our short -views, it is greatly uncertain, whether this endeavor will, in particular -instances, produce an overbalance of happiness upon the -whole; since so many and distant things must come into the account. -And that which makes it our duty is, that there is some -appearance that it will, and no positive appearance sufficient to -balance this, on the contrary side; and also, that such benevolent -endeavor is a cultivation of that most excellent of all virtuous -principles, the active principle of benevolence.</p> - -<p>However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to be our rule -of life; it must be added, otherwise a snare will be laid in the -way of some plain men, that the use of common forms of speech, -generally understood, cannot be falsehood; and in general, that -there can be no designed falsehood, without designing to deceive. -It must likewise be observed, that in numberless cases, a man -may be under the strictest obligations to what he foresees will -deceive, without his intending it. For it is impossible not to -foresee, that the words and actions of men, in different ranks and -employments, and of different educations, will perpetually be -mistaken by each other. And it cannot but be so, while they -will judge with the utmost carelessness, as they daily do, of what -they are not, perhaps, enough informed to be competent judges -of, even though they considered it with great attention.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<div class="footnotes"> - -<h2>FOOTNOTES</h2> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1" id="Footnote_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Among these were <i>Jones</i>, author of the admirable Treatise on the Canon -of the New Testament: <i>Lardner</i>, <i>Maddox</i>, <i>Chandler</i>, Archbishop <i>Secker</i>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2" id="Footnote_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Sermon at Spittle, on Abraham’s trial.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3" id="Footnote_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Among them were <span class="smcap">Cudworth</span>, born 1617; “Intel. Syst. of the Universe:” -<span class="smcap">Boyle</span>, 1626; “Things above Reason:” <span class="smcap">Stillingfleet</span>, 1635; “Letters to a -Deist:” Sir <span class="smcap">I. Newton</span>, 1642; “Observations on Prophecy:” <span class="smcap">Leslie</span>, 1650; -“Short Method with Deists:” <span class="smcap">Lowth</span>, 1661, Vindic. of the Divine Author -of the Bible: <span class="smcap">King</span>, 1669; “Origin of Evil:” <span class="smcap">Sam. Clark</span>, 1675; “Evidences -of Nat. and Rev. Religion:” <span class="smcap">Waterland</span>, 1683; “Scripture Vindicated:” -<span class="smcap">Lardner</span>, 1684; “Credibility of Gospel History:” <span class="smcap">Leland</span>, 1691; “View of -Deistical Writers,” and “Advantage and Necessity of Rev.:” <span class="smcap">Chandler</span>, 1693; -“Definition of Christianity,” on “Prophecy,” &c.: <span class="smcap">Warburton</span>, 1698; “Divine -Leg. of Moses;” Bishop <span class="smcap">Newton</span>, 1704; “On the Prophecies:” <span class="smcap">Watson</span>, -1737; “Apology for Christianity,” (against Gibbon,) and also “Apology for the -Bible,” (against Paine.)</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4" id="Footnote_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <span class="smcap">McIntosh</span>: “Progress of Ethical Philosophy.”</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5" id="Footnote_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <span class="smcap">Brougham</span>: “Disc. on Nat. Theology.”</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6" id="Footnote_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Verisimile.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7" id="Footnote_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> [These three ways of being “like,” are very distinct from each other. The -first is equivalent to a logical induction. The second produces belief, because -the same evidence made us believe in a similar case. The third is just an -analogy, in the popular sense of the term.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8" id="Footnote_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> The story is told by Mr. Locke in the Chapter of Probability.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9" id="Footnote_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> [This is good common sense, and men always act thus if prudent. But it -is not enough thus to act in the matter of salvation. “He that <em>believeth</em> not -shall be damned:” Mark xvi. 16. “He that <em>believeth</em> hath everlasting life:” -John iii. 36. “With the heart man <em>believeth</em> unto righteousness:” Rom. x. 10. -Belief is part of the sinner’s <em>duty</em> in submitting himself to God; and not merely -a question of prudence.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10" id="Footnote_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> See <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VI">Part II. chap. vi.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11" id="Footnote_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Philocal. p. 23, Ed. Cant.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12" id="Footnote_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> [Some of these speculations, carried to the full measure of absurdity and -impiety, may be found in Bayle’s great “Historical and Critical Dictionary.” -See as instances, the articles <span class="smcap">Origen</span>, <span class="smcap">Manichæus</span>, <span class="smcap">Paulicians</span>.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13" id="Footnote_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_I">Ch. i.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14" id="Footnote_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_II">Ch. ii.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15" id="Footnote_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_III">Ch. iii.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16" id="Footnote_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_IV">Ch. iv.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17" id="Footnote_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_V">Ch. v.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18" id="Footnote_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_VI">Ch. vi.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19" id="Footnote_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_VII">Ch. vii.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20" id="Footnote_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <a href="#II_CHAPTER_I">Part II. Ch. i.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21" id="Footnote_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <a href="#II_CHAPTER_II">Ch. ii.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22" id="Footnote_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <a href="#II_CHAPTER_III">Ch. iii.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23" id="Footnote_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> <a href="#II_CHAPTER_IV">Ch. iv.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24" id="Footnote_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <a href="#II_CHAPTER_V">Ch. v.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25" id="Footnote_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VI">Ch. vi.</a> <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VII">vii.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26" id="Footnote_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VIII">Ch. viii.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27" id="Footnote_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> [This chapter Dr. Chalmers regards as the least satisfactory in the book: -not because lacking in just analogies, but because infected with the obscure -metaphysics of that age. His reasoning, however, only serves to show that B. -has perhaps made too much of the argument from the indivisibility of consciousness; -and by no means that he does not fairly use it.</p> - -<p>We certainly cannot object that the subject of identity is not made plain. -Who has explained identity, or motion, or cohesion, or crystallization, or any -thing? Locke goes squarely at the subject of personal identity, (see Essay, -ch. 27,) but has rendered us small aid. His definition is, “Existence itself, -which determines a being of any sort, to a particular time and place, incommunicable -to two beings of the same kind.” I had rather define it “the uninterrupted -continuance of being.” What ceases to exist, cannot again exist: -for then it would exist after it had ceased to exist, and would have existed before -it existed. Locke makes <em>consciousness</em> to constitute identity, and argues -that a man and a person are not the same; and that hence if I kill a man, but -was not conscious of what I did, or have utterly forgotten, I am not the same -person. Watts shows up this notion of Locke very ludicrously.Butler, in his “Dissertation,” urges that consciousness <em>presupposes</em> identity, -as knowledge presupposes truth. On Locke’s theory, no person would have -existed any earlier than the period to which his memory extends. We cannot -suppose the soul made up of many consciousnesses, nor could memory, if material, -spread itself over successive years of life.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28" id="Footnote_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> I say <em>kind</em> of presumption or probability; for I do not mean to affirm that -there is the same <em>degree</em> of conviction, that our living powers will continue after -death, as there is, that our substances will.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29" id="Footnote_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <em>Destruction of living powers</em>, is a manner of expression unavoidably ambiguous; -and may signify either <em>the destruction of a living being, so as that the same -living being shall be incapable of ever perceiving or acting again at all</em>; or <em>the -destruction of those means and instruments by which it is capable of its present -life, of its present state of perception and of action</em>. It is here used in the -former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithet <em>present</em> is added. The -loss of a man’s eye is a destruction of living powers in the latter sense. But -we have no reason to think the destruction of living powers, in the former -sense, to be possible. We have no more reason to think a being endued with -living powers, ever loses them during its whole existence, than to believe that -a stone ever acquires them.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30" id="Footnote_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> [The next paragraph indicates that Butler does not, as Chalmers thinks, -consider this argument as “handing us over to an absolute demonstration.” It -just places all arguments for and against the soul’s future life, in that balanced -condition, which leaves us to learn the fact from revelation, free from presumptions -<em>against</em> its truth. This view of the case entirely relieves the objection as -to the future life of brutes; and shows how entirely we must rely on revelation, -as to the future, both of man and beast.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31" id="Footnote_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> [Dodwell had published a book, in which he argues that human souls are -not <em>naturally</em> immortal, but become so, by the power of the Holy Ghost, in regeneration. -Dr. Clarke replied. The controversy was continued by Collins. -Dr. C. wrote four tracts on the subject.These “presumptions” form the base of materialism, and hence the denial -of a future state. Surely, thoughts and feelings, if material, have extension. -But can any one conceive of love a foot long, or anger an inch thick? How -superior to the gloomy mists of modern infidels have even pagans been! Cicero -makes Cato say, “The soul is a simple, uncompounded substance, without parts -or mixture: it cannot be divided, and so cannot perish.” And in another place, -“I never could believe that the soul lost its senses by escaping from senseless -matter; or that such a release will not enlarge and improve its powers;” and -again, “I am persuaded that I shall only begin truly to live, when I cease to -live in this world,” Xenophon reports Cyrus as saying, in his last moments, -“O my sons! do not imagine that when death has taken me from you, I shall -cease to exist.”]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32" id="Footnote_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> See Dr. Clarke’s Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defences of it.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33" id="Footnote_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> [As every particle of our bodies is changed within seven years, an average -life would take us through many such changes. If the mind changes -with the body, it would be unjust for an old man to be made to suffer for the -sins of his youth. To escape this, the materialist is driven to affirm that <em>the -whole</em> is not altered, though every particle be changed.This argument from the constant flux is irresistible. It proves our identity, -and that matter and mind are not the same. Does it not also destroy all presumption -that the Ego cannot exist without this particular body?]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34" id="Footnote_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> See <a href="#DISSERTATION_I">Dissertation I</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35" id="Footnote_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> [The mind affects the body, as much as the body does the mind. Love, -anger, &c. quicken the circulation; fear checks it; terror may stop it altogether. -Mania is as often produced by moral, as by physical causes, and -hence of late moral means are resorted to for cure. The brain of a maniac, -seldom shows, on dissection, any derangement. But this does not prove that -there was no <em>functional</em> derangement.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36" id="Footnote_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> [“S. What shall we say, then, of the shoemaker? That he cuts with his -instrument only, or with his hands also? A. With his hands also. S. Does -he use his eyes also, in making shoes? A. Yes. S. But are we agreed that he -who uses, and what he uses, are different? A. Yes. S. The shoemaker, then, -and harper, are different from the hands and eyes they use? A. It appears so. -S. Does a man then <em>use</em> his whole body? A. Certainly. S. But he who uses, -and that which he uses are different. A. Yes. S. A man then is something -different from his own body.” <span class="smcap">Plat. Alcibi. Prim.</span> p. 129, D. Stallb. Ed.“It may easily be perceived that the <em>mind</em> both sees and hears, and not those -parts which are, so to speak, windows of the mind.” “Neither are we bodies; -nor do I, while speaking this to thee, speak to thy body.” “Whatever is done -by thy mind, is done by thee.” <span class="smcap">Cicero</span>, Tusc. Disput. I. 20, 46 and 22, 52.“The mind of each man is the man; not that figure which may be pointed -out with the finger.” <span class="smcap">Cic.</span>, de Rep. b. 6, s. 24.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37" id="Footnote_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> [Butler’s argument, if advanced for <em>proof</em> would prove too much, not only -as to brutes but as to man; for it would prove pre-existence. And this is really -the tenet, (<i>i.e.</i> transmigration,) of those who arrive at the doctrine of immortality -only by philosophy. Philosophy cannot establish the doctrine of a -future state, nor can it afford any presumptions <em>against</em> either a future or a -pre-existent state.Nothing is gained by insisting that reason teaches the true doctrine of the -soul; any more than there would be by insisting that by it we learned the -doctrine of a trinity, or atonement. Philosophy does teach that He who can -<em>create</em>, under infinite diversity of forms, can <em>sustain</em> existence, in any mode he -pleases.The reader who chooses to look further into the discussion as to the immortality -of brutes, will find it spread out in <span class="smcap">Polignac’s</span> Anti-Lucretius, and still -more in <span class="smcap">Bayle’s</span> Dictionary, under the articles <span class="smcap">Pereira</span>, and <span class="smcap">Rorarius</span>. -The topic is also discussed in <span class="smcap">Des Cartes</span> on the Passions: <span class="smcap">Baxter</span> on The -Nature of the Soul: <span class="smcap">Hume’s</span> Essays, Essay 9: <span class="smcap">Search’s</span> Light of Nature: -<span class="smcap">Cheyne’s</span> Philosophical Principles: <span class="smcap">Wagstaff</span> on the Immortality of Brutes: -<span class="smcap">Edwards’</span> Critical and Philosophical Exercitations: <span class="smcap">Watt’s</span> Essays, Essay 9: -<span class="smcap">Colliber’s</span> Enquiry: <span class="smcap">Locke</span> on the Understanding, b. 2, ch. ix.: <span class="smcap">Ditton</span> on -the Resurrection: <span class="smcap">Willis</span> De Anima Brutæ.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38" id="Footnote_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> [It is as absurd to suppose that a brain thinks, as that an eye sees, or a finger -feels. The eye no more sees, than the telescope or spectacles. If the <em>nerve</em> be -paralyzed, there is no vision, though the eye be perfect. A few words spoken -or read, may at once deprive of sight, or knock a person down.The mind sometimes survives the body. Swift, utterly helpless from palsy, -retained his faculties. In some, the body survives the mind. <span class="smcap">Morgagni</span>, -<span class="smcap">Haller</span>, <span class="smcap">Bonnet</span>, and others, have proved that there is no part of the brain, -not even the pineal gland, which has not been found destroyed by disease, -where there had been no hallucination of mind, nor any suspicion of such -disease, during life.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39" id="Footnote_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> Pp. <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40" id="Footnote_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> [We are told by sceptics that “mind is the result of a curious and complicated -organization.” A mere jumble of words! But were the mind material, -there is no evidence that death would destroy it: for we do not see that death -has any power over matter. The body remains the very same as it does in a -swoon, till <em>chemical</em> changes begin.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41" id="Footnote_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life, here considered: -Whether death be the destruction of living agents; if not, Whether it be the -destruction of their <em>present</em> powers of reflection, as it certainly is the destruction -of their present powers of sensation; and if not, Whether it be the suspension, -or discontinuance of the exercise of these present reflecting powers. -Now, if there be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were -possible, less for the next, and less still for the first.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42" id="Footnote_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans, νομίζειν μὲν -γὰρ δὴ τὸν μὲν ἐνθάδε βίον, ὡς ἂν ἀκμὴν κυομένων εἶναι· τὸν δὲ θάνατον, γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως -βίον, καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα τοῖς φιλοσοφήσασι· Lib. xv. p. 1039, Ed. Amst. 1707. [“For -they think that the present life is like that of those who are just ready to be -born; and that death is a birth into the real life, and a happy one to those -who have practised philosophy.”] To which opinion perhaps Antoninus may -allude in these words, ὡς νῦν περιμένεις, πότε ἔμβρυον ἐκ τῆς γαστρὸς τῆς γυναικός σου -ἐξέλθῃ, οὕτως ἐκδέχεσθαι, τὴν ὥραν ὲν ᾗ τὸ ψυχάριόν σου τοῦ ἐλύτρου τούτου ἐκπεσεῖται. Lib. -ix. c. 3. [As this last passage may, by some, be thought indelicate, it is left -untranslated.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43" id="Footnote_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> [The <em>increase</em> of a force in any direction, cannot of itself <em>change</em> that direction. -An arrow shot from a bow, towards an object, does not aim at some -other object, by being shot with more force.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44" id="Footnote_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> [Our nature will <em>always</em> be ours, or we should cease to be ourselves, and -become something else. And this nature is <em>social</em>. Every one feels, at least -sometimes, that he is not complete in himself for the production of happiness; -and so looks round for that which may fit his wants, and supply what he cannot -produce from within. Hence amusements, of a thousand kinds, are resorted -to, and still more, society. Society is a want of the mind; as food is -of the body. Society, such as perfectly suits our real nature, and calls out, in -a right manner, its every attribute, would secure our perfect happiness. But -Such society must include God.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45" id="Footnote_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> See <a href="#II_CHAPTER_II">Part II. chap. ii.</a> and <a href="#II_CHAPTER_IV">Part II. chap. iv.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_46" id="Footnote_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> [Objections and difficulties belong to all subjects, in <em>some</em> of their bearings. -Ingenious and uncandid men may start others, which care and candor may -remove. It is therefore no proof of weakness in a doctrine, that it is attacked -with objections, both real and merely plausible. Error has been spread by two -opposite means:—a dogmatic insisting on doubtful points, and an unteachable -cavilling at certain truth.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_47" id="Footnote_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_VII">Part I. chap. vii.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_48" id="Footnote_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> [Our relation to God is “even necessary,” because we are his creatures: so -that the relation must endure so long as we endure. But our relations to other -creatures are contingent, and may be changed or abrogated.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_49" id="Footnote_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> Pp. <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_50" id="Footnote_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> [“The terms nature, and power of nature, and course of nature, are but -empty words, and merely mean that a thing occurs usually or frequently. The -raising of a human body out of the earth we call a miracle, the generation of -one in the ordinary way we call natural, for no other reason than because one -is usual the other unusual. Did men usually rise out of the earth like corn we -should call that natural.” Dr. <span class="smcap">Clarke</span>, Controv. with Leibnitz.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_51" id="Footnote_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> [That man consists of parts, is evident; and the use of each part, and of -the whole man, is open to investigation. In examining any part we learn what -it <em>is</em>, and what it is <em>to do</em>: <i>e.g.</i> the eye, the hand, the heart. So of mental -faculties; memory is to preserve ideas, shame to deter us from things shameful, -compassion to induce us to relieve distress. In observing our whole make, we -may see an ultimate design,—viz.: not particular animal gratifications, but intellectual -and moral improvement, and happiness by that means. If this be -our end, it is our duty. To disregard it, must bring punishment; for shame, -anguish, remorse, are by the laws of mind, the sequences of sin.See <span class="smcap">Law’s</span> Notes on King’s Origin of Evil.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_52" id="Footnote_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> [It is almost amazing that philosophy, because it discovers the laws of -matter, should be placed in antagonism with the Bible which reveals a superintending -Providence. The Bible itself teaches this very result of philosophy,—viz.: -that the world is governed by <em>general laws</em>. See Prov. viii. 29: Job. -xxxviii. 12, 24, 31, 33: Ps. cxix. 90, 91: Jer. xxxi. 35, and xxxiii. 25.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_53" id="Footnote_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> See <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VI">Part II. chap. vi.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_54" id="Footnote_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VI">Part II. chap. vi.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_55" id="Footnote_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> The general consideration of a future state of punishment, most evidently -belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if any of these reflections -should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this doctrine, as taught in Scripture, -the reader is desired to observe, that Gentile writers, both moralists and -poets, speak of the future punishment of the wicked, both as to the duration -and degree of it, in a like manner of expression and of description, as the -Scripture does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of -mere revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great distinction -between the righteous and the wicked, shall be made at the end of this -world; that each shall <em>then</em> receive according to his deserts. Reason did, as it -well might, conclude that it should, finally and upon the whole, be well with -the righteous, and ill with the wicked: but it could not be determined upon -any principles of reason, whether human creatures might not have been appointed -to pass through other states of life and being, before that distributive -justice should finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches us, that -the next state of things after the present is appointed for the execution of this -justice; that it shall be no longer delayed; but <em>the mystery of God</em>, the great -mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to prevail, <em>shall then be finished</em>; -and he will <em>take to him his great power and will reign</em>, by rendering to every -one according to his works.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_56" id="Footnote_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> [Our language furnishes no finer specimens of the argument analogical. -Butler here seizes the very points, which are most plausible and most insisted -on, as showing the harshness and unreasonableness of Christianity; and overthrows -them at a stroke by simply directing attention to the same things, in the -universally observed course of nature.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_57" id="Footnote_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_I">Chap. i.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_58" id="Footnote_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> See chaps. <a href="#I_CHAPTER_IV">iv.</a> and <a href="#I_CHAPTER_VI">vi.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_59" id="Footnote_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> [This chapter, more than any other, carries the force of positive argument. -If in this world, we have <em>proofs</em> that God is a moral governor, then in order to -evince that we shall be under moral government <em>hereafter</em>, we have only to -supply an intermediate consideration,—viz.: that God, as such, must be unchangeable. -The argument, as just remarked, assumes a substantive form, -because admitted facts, as to this world, exhibiting the very <em>principles</em> on which -God’s government goes at present, compel us not only to <em>suppose</em> that the principles -of God will remain, but to <em>believe</em> so.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_60" id="Footnote_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_II">Chap. ii.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_61" id="Footnote_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not being universal, -nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be urged against natural religion, -as well as against revealed. And therefore the consideration of them -belongs to the first part of this treatise, as well as the second. But as these -objections are chiefly urged against revealed religion, I choose to consider -them in the second part. And the answer to them there, ch. vi., as urged -against Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against -the religion of nature; to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to that -chapter.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_62" id="Footnote_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> Dissertation II.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_63" id="Footnote_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_VI">Chap. vi.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_64" id="Footnote_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> See Lord Shaftesbury’s Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_65" id="Footnote_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> [At the foundation of moral improvement, lies the conviction that what is -right, is our happiness, no less than our duty. This again is based upon a conviction -that God governs justly; and has all power over us for good or evil. -As creation is full of the evidences of <em>design</em>, so is Providence. And as the -human mind shows, in its structure, the most exquisite marks of design, so the -government of mind shows a final object for all our faculties. Among the -attributes of mind we observe, conspicuous, a disposition to seek ends, lay -plans, and sacrifice present indulgence to future and greater good: and a -facility in learning how to subordinate one thing to another, so as to secure -success in our plans. This, with conscience to approve or disapprove our -modes, constitutes an evident <em>adaptedness</em> to a moral government on the part -of God; and would be worse than superfluous, if there be no such government. -Every rule of action, deduced by reason from the light of nature, may fairly be -regarded as God’s law; and the inconveniences resulting from wrong actions, -are God’s retributions. These retributions, felt or observed, are divine teachings, -saying, emphatically, if you act thus you shall receive thus. We do -actually so judge, in relation to physics. Every rule of motion, distance, -gravitation, heat, electricity, &c. &c., is received as God’s law; and we would -deem it insane to act in opposition.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_66" id="Footnote_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> [Consult <span class="smcap">Capp</span> on the Gov. of God: <span class="smcap">Twisse</span> Vindiciæ Prov. Dei: <span class="smcap">Wittichii</span> -Excre. Theol.: <span class="smcap">Dwight’s</span> Theol.: <span class="smcap">Martinius</span> de Gubernatione Mundi: <span class="smcap">Liefchild</span> -on Providence: <span class="smcap">Morton</span> on do.: <span class="smcap">Sherlock</span> on do.: <span class="smcap">Rutherford</span> on -do.: and the Sermons of Thos. Leland, Porteus, Topping, Hunt, Davies, -Horseley, South, Wisheart, Seed, Collings, and Doddridge.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_67" id="Footnote_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_II">Chap. ii.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_68" id="Footnote_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> [In the structure of man, physical and mental, we find no contrivances for -disease or pain, so that in general those who conform to the laws of their being, -enjoy happiness; and suffering is chiefly the result of our own conduct. But, -as without revelation we could only learn the evil of vice, by its effects, and -would often learn it too late to retrieve our affairs, or our souls’ peace, God has -in mercy given forth his teachings, by which, <em>beforehand</em>, we may know the -effects of actions.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_69" id="Footnote_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> See <a href="#DISSERTATION_II">Dissertation II</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_70" id="Footnote_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> [It was contended by <span class="smcap">Mandeville</span> in his “<cite>Fable of the Bees</cite>,” that private -vices, as luxury for instance, are often conducive to the well-being of society. -This idea is fully refuted by <span class="smcap">Warburton</span>, Divine Legation of Moses, b. 1: -<span class="smcap">Berkeley</span>, Minute Philosopher, Dial. 2: and by <span class="smcap">Brown</span>, Characteristics, -Ess. 2.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_71" id="Footnote_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> [A strong illustration of this distinction is seen in the “delivering up” of -our Savior to be crucified. As to the mere act of delivering up, we find it -referred, <b>1.</b> To God the Father, John iii. 16: Acts ii. 23: Rom. viii. 32. <b>2.</b> To -Christ himself, Eph. v. 2, and v. 25, &c. In this last passage it is literally -<em>delivered himself</em>. <b>3.</b> To the Jewish rulers, Luke xx. 20: Mark xii. 12. <b>4.</b> To -Pontius Pilate, Matt. xxvii. 26: Mark xv. 15: John xix. 6. <b>5.</b> To Judas, Matt. -xxvi. 15: Zec. xi. 12.As to the <em>mere act</em>, Judas and Pilate did just what God the Father, and our -Lord Jesus did. But how infinitely unlike the <em>qualities</em> of the act!]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_72" id="Footnote_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> [“When one supposes he is about to die, there comes over him a fear and -anxiety about things in regard to which he felt none before. For the stories -which are told about <em>Hades</em>, that such, as have practised wrong, must there -suffer punishment, although made light of for a while, these torment the soul -lest they should be true. But he who is conscious of innocence, has a pleasant -and good hope, which will support old age.” <span class="smcap">Plato</span>, Respub. i. s. 5.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_73" id="Footnote_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> See <a href="#DISSERTATION_II">Dissertation II</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_74" id="Footnote_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> [Aside from revelation, our ideas of the divine attributes must be derived -from a knowledge of our own. Among these is our moral sense, which constrains -us to consider right and wrong as an immutable distinction, and moral -worth as our highest excellence. Hence we ascribe perfect virtue to God. It -does not follow from such reasoning, that we form a Deity after our own conceptions, -for it is but the argument <i lang="la">a fortiori</i>, “He that formed the eye, shall -he not see? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall he not know?” Ps. xciv. -9. We do not conceive of a Deity who sees just as we do; but that <em>he sees</em>, for -he makes sight. So we infer that he has moral attributes, because we have -them, from him.This point is not sufficiently pressed upon infidels. They readily acknowledge -God’s physical attributes, because the argument is addressed to their -<em>understanding</em>, but deny his moral ones, because their <em>hearts</em> are hardened -through the deceitfulness of sin.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_75" id="Footnote_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75"><span class="label">[75]</span></a> [It is easy to see that the occasional disadvantages of virtue, are no less -conducive to moral excellence, than its being generally advantageous. In view -of its general advantages, we are virtuous with a proper and commanded view -to our instinctive desire for happiness. In face of its disadvantages, we cultivate -virtue for its own sake.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_76" id="Footnote_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76"><span class="label">[76]</span></a> [The common remark, “virtue brings its own reward,” is true only with -qualifications. The apostles, as to <em>this</em> life, were the most miserable of men: -(1 Cor. xv. 9.) Virtue does not <em>always</em> bring earthly rewards. The grand -support of the good is drawn from considerations of that future state which -the infidel denies. Observe, 1. We cannot suppose that God would so construct -man, as that his principal comfort and reward for virtue, is a delusion. 2. Very -good persons are often beset with painful doubts and fears, as to their future -safety. Would God allow such doubts, if the expectation of future happiness -were the <em>only</em> reward of virtue? 3. This reward, at best, is private; but for -the encouragement of virtue, it must have <em>obvious</em> triumphs.On the other hand, bad men grow callous to the rebukes of conscience, so -that great sinners suffer less from remorse than small ones, and what is worse, -owe their tranquillity to their guilt. Again, he who kills a good man, wholly -<em>deprives</em> him of his only reward, if this life alone gives it. And the villain -who kills himself, escapes his only punishment.Virtuous persons, in the strong language of <span class="smcap">Robert Hall</span>,<a name="FNanchor_A1" id="FNanchor_A1"></a><a href="#Footnote_A1" class="fnanchor">[A]</a> would be “the -<em>only</em> persons who are wholly disappointed of their object; the only persons -who (by a fatal and irreparable mistake), expecting an imaginary happiness -in an imaginary world, lose their only opportunity of enjoying those present -pleasures, of which others avail themselves; dooming themselves to grasp at -shadows, while they neglect the substance, and harassed with a perpetual -struggle against their natural propensities and passions, and all in vain!”</p> - -<div class="subfootnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_A1" id="Footnote_A1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_A1"><span class="label">[A]</span></a> Sermon on the Vanity of Man.]</p> - -</div> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_77" id="Footnote_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77"><span class="label">[77]</span></a> [Because, so soon as any community, or collection of persons, conclude a man -to be wholly vicious in his course, and without any restraint of conscience, he -is at once shorn of his influence, and will soon be stripped of all power of mischief. -On the other hand, we see the might of virtue unarmed with power, in -Luther, in Roger Williams, in Wm. Penn, and innumerable other instances.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_78" id="Footnote_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78"><span class="label">[78]</span></a> Isa. lx. 21.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_79" id="Footnote_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79"><span class="label">[79]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_109">109</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_80" id="Footnote_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80"><span class="label">[80]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_81" id="Footnote_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81"><span class="label">[81]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_82" id="Footnote_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82"><span class="label">[82]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_83" id="Footnote_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83"><span class="label">[83]</span></a> See this proof drawn out briefly, <a href="#I_CHAPTER_VI">ch. vi.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_84" id="Footnote_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_84"><span class="label">[84]</span></a> [This chapter is one of many attempts to account for the mixture of suffering -and enjoyment in this world; and demands close examination both of its -theory and its arguments. The student may consult, as he has opportunity, -<span class="smcap">Musæi</span> Disput.: <span class="smcap">Holtzsfusii</span> Disp. de Lapsu Prim. Hominum: <span class="smcap">Selden</span> de Laps. -Angelorum: <span class="smcap">Stapferi</span> Inst.: <span class="smcap">Witsii</span> Econom. Fœd.: <span class="smcap">Bate’s</span> Harmony of the -Divine Attrib.: <span class="smcap">Calcott</span> on the Fall: <span class="smcap">Shuckford</span> on the Creation of Man: -<span class="smcap">Manton’s</span> Sermons: <span class="smcap">South’s</span> do.: <span class="smcap">Toplady’s</span> do.: <span class="smcap">Pearson</span> on the Creed: -<span class="smcap">Le Clerc’s</span> Diss.: <span class="smcap">Henly’s</span> Dissert.: <span class="smcap">Kennicott</span> on the Tree of Life: and -<span class="smcap">Fabricius</span> de Primo Peccato Angelorum Lapsorum.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_85" id="Footnote_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_85"><span class="label">[85]</span></a> [The <em>evils</em> of life, are not to be regarded as entering, necessarily, into -God’s plan of probation; and they are not here so presented. The Scriptures -show that <em>all</em> suffering is either punitive, or castigatory. Man at first was to -be tried by temptations, not by sufferings.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_86" id="Footnote_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_86"><span class="label">[86]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_II">Chap. ii.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_87" id="Footnote_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_87"><span class="label">[87]</span></a> See Sermons preached at the <i>Rolle</i>, 1726, 2d ed. p. 205, &c. Pref. p. 25, &c. -Serm. p. 21, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_88" id="Footnote_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88"><span class="label">[88]</span></a> [“If we persist in our objection, notwithstanding these analogies, then -should we conclude, either that we are under the regimen of an unrighteous -Deity, or that there is no Deity at all.”—Dr. <span class="smcap">Chalmers</span>.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_89" id="Footnote_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_89"><span class="label">[89]</span></a> [Shall <em>we</em> be of such? Shall we forget or disregard the great fact that -when death has transferred us to other conditions, we, our proper selves, will -remain? No longer, indeed, united with flesh and blood, surrounded with -houses, lands, business, or enjoyments, such as the present, <em>but still ourselves</em>. -Still with wants to be supplied, desires to be gratified, and capacities to be -employed and developed!]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_90" id="Footnote_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90"><span class="label">[90]</span></a> <a href="#II_CHAPTER_V">Part II. chap. v.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_91" id="Footnote_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91"><span class="label">[91]</span></a> [This is one of those passages, remarked on in our introduction, as a statement -not properly explained or guarded. We cannot suppose the author, to -have overlooked the great fact of man’s fall and corruption. That the argument -properly considered, stands good, is the verdict of such a man as <span class="smcap">Chalmers</span>. -After speaking of human helplessness in matters of religion, he says, -“There is nothing in this [helplessness] to break the analogies on which to -found the negative vindication that forms the great and undoubted achievement -of this volume. The analogy lies here:—that if a man wills to obtain -prosperity in this life, he may, if observant of the rules which experience and -wisdom prescribe, in general, make it good. And if he wills to attain blessedness -in the next life, he shall, if observant of what religion prescribes, most -certainly make it good; in conformity with the declaration, ‘he that seeketh -findeth.’”]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_92" id="Footnote_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92"><span class="label">[92]</span></a> [It comes to this:—good things, in this life, are not forced upon us; for we -may refuse them, or turn any of them into evils. Nor are they offered for our -mere acceptance: but only as the <em>results</em> of self-control and pains-taking. So -is it, as to heaven.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_93" id="Footnote_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93"><span class="label">[93]</span></a> [They <em>are</em> an answer, but a cavil remains,—viz.: “the difference between -temporal and eternal things, is so vast that the cases are not analogous.” -Fairly considered, the cases are analogous, differing only in <em>degree</em>, and not at -all in principle. What would be wrong on a great scale, is wrong on a small -one.Perhaps the analogy may be pressed further. As the happiness and life of -some animals, may be sacrificed for the benefit of man, why may not the happiness -and life of some men, be sacrificed for the good of innumerable beings -of a higher order, who witness the affairs of this earth? It would but be -securing “the greatest good of the greatest number.” No analogies could -<em>teach</em> this, for analogies of course teach nothing. But if the Scriptures contained -this doctrine, immensely more repugnant than that which our author is -here defending, would analogy offer repellant presumptions?]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_94" id="Footnote_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94"><span class="label">[94]</span></a> [That is, the son of Sirac, who says, “All things are double, one against -another; and He hath made nothing imperfect: one thing established the -good of another:” Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_95" id="Footnote_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_95"><span class="label">[95]</span></a> [Consult <span class="smcap">Millman’s</span> Hist. of Christ, vol. i.: <span class="smcap">Priestley’s</span> Institutes of Nat. -and Rev. Rel., vol. i. ch. i.: and <span class="smcap">Whately’s</span> Pol. Econ., sec. 5.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_96" id="Footnote_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_96"><span class="label">[96]</span></a> [We are too apt to overlook the effect of actions on the actor; (which is -often the chief effect) in improving or impairing his own powers. A razor -used to cut wood or stone, is not only put to an improper use, but spoiled for -the use which is proper. But this is a faint illustration. The razor may be -sharpened again; but how shall we restore a blunted sensibility, an enfeebled -judgment, or a vitiated appetite? Our wrong-doing inflicts worse results on -ourselves than on our victims; and the evil may spread disaster over our whole -future. Hence the young make a fatal blunder when they suppose that an -occasional indulgence in impropriety may be compatible with general welfare, -and improvement. Instead of balancing the pros and cons of a particular -act, in the scale of utility or pleasure, they should mark well its effects on -themselves. See the description of how an upright being may fall; in a -subsequent part of this chapter.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_97" id="Footnote_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_97"><span class="label">[97]</span></a> [“It might seem, at first sight, that if our state hereafter presented no -temptations to falsehood, injustice, &c., our habit of indulging these vices here -would be no disqualification for such a state; and our forming the contrary -habits no qualification. But <em>habits</em> of veracity, justice, &c. are not merely -securities against temptations to the contrary, but needful for conserving the -<em>principles</em> of love of truth, justice, &c. As our happiness depends upon <em>the -ratio</em> between our circumstances and our dispositions, our happiness, in a state -where things are ordered so as to give no scope for the practice of falsehood, -injustice, &c., <em>must depend on our having formed a love for their opposites</em>. -Besides, the circumstances of the future life may be such as only to remove -temptations from characters formed by such moral discipline as we undergo -in this life, and not all things that could be temptations to any one.”—<span class="smcap">Prof. -Fitzgerald.</span>]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_98" id="Footnote_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_98"><span class="label">[98]</span></a> It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually restrain -creatures from doing wrong. But if by a <em>sense of interest</em> is meant a speculative -conviction or belief, that such and such indulgence would occasion them -greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than satisfaction; it is contrary to present -experience to say, that this sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from -thus indulging themselves. And if by a <em>sense of interest</em> is meant a practical -regard to what is upon the whole our happiness; this is not only coincident -with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. -And it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to be improved, as really as -any principle in our nature. For we daily see it overmatched, not only by the -more boisterous passions, but by curiosity, shame, love of imitation, by any -thing, even indolence: especially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose, -which is the end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are profligate -men mistaken, when they affirm they are wholly governed by interestedness -and self-love; and so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim this principle.—See -p. <a href="#Page_131">131</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_99" id="Footnote_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_99"><span class="label">[99]</span></a> [Discipline is mainly promoted by a careful regard to acts of small individual -moment. The subjecting of trivial acts to moral considerations, is the -sure, and the only mode of self-culture. These acts are embryo habits, and we -may often see clearly the moral character of a habit, when the single act seems -indifferent. Thus viewed, the importance of single acts will seldom seem small. -A single cigar, one glass of wine for convivial purposes, one story told with -exaggerations, may change the complexion of our character, and of our whole -destiny!It is doing or refusing to do, from a law-abiding regard to consequences, -that constitutes self-discipline. Papists wholly err in teaching the repression -of bodily desires as in itself virtuous. Indulgence may be either an obstacle or -an aid to moral progress, according to our reason for indulgence. When we -can repress an appetite or passion whenever indulgence would be wrong, its -mastery over us is broken; and when the passions and appetites act rightly, -from force of virtuous habit, without direct volition, discipline is complete. -Ascetic acts are only useful as <em>means</em>, and so long as they are <em>ascetic</em> (askesis) -are proofs of imperfect obedience. Discipline is good only <em>as</em> discipline; and -when complete, changes from a struggle between principle and inclination, to -a spontaneous habit, and permanent mental peace.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_100" id="Footnote_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_100"><span class="label">[100]</span></a> [Chalmers objects to this hypothetical fall of man, that it wants harmony -with the Scripture account. But I do not see the force of the objection. Butler -<em>of course</em> does not copy the Scripture account, for he would then depart from the -aim and nature of his book. The Bible says man fell <em>suddenly</em>, no less in his -state than in his character. Butler says that we could not reason out <em>how much</em> -disorder and damage would ensue from the first sin: and in saying this, avoids -any incongruity with the Mosaic account, which tells us how much. What B. -says of the formation of habit, by repeated transgressions, certainly cannot be -gainsayed.Adam “died,” the very day he ate the forbidden fruit. The sinner “lives” -the very day he believes on the only-begotten Son of God. Increase of guilt, -or growth in grace are predicable in both instances. In both also there is an -instant transition into a new relationship with God.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_101" id="Footnote_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_101"><span class="label">[101]</span></a> [A forced or reluctant obedience is wholly incompatible with earthly happiness; -but may, in the highest degree promote our <em>future</em> happiness. It will -not <em>long</em> mar our happiness, even here; because being based on principle, and -established by habit, it will, in process of time, be superseded by prompt and -pleasurable submission. Thus a person <em>habitually</em> virtuous, is hardly conscious -of self-denial; a fact noticed by Aristotle. “He who abstains from bodily -pleasures and delights, is virtuous in this very abstinence; but he who is -troubled by it is undisciplined.” Ethic. Nic. ii. 3.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_102" id="Footnote_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_102"><span class="label">[102]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_103" id="Footnote_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_103"><span class="label">[103]</span></a> [The student should learn to distinguish between the <em>kinds</em> of necessity. -There is—1. “Logical necessity,” which requires the admission of a consequent -to a premise 2. “Moral necessity,” which requires means in order to ends. -“Physical necessity,” which is the compulsory connection of sequences to -antecedents, in the material world. 4. “Metaphysical necessity,” which belongs -to God only, as existing eternally and immutably. All these exist and -operate, and by them we govern ourselves.But there are various other kinds of necessity, erroneous and pernicious, -which may be grouped under two heads:—1. “Atheistic,” sometimes called -the Democritic, which ascribes all things to the mechanical laws of matter. -2. “Theistic,” which admits the existence of God, but denies to him moral -character, and makes him the arbitrary and only agent in the universe, and -creatures not responsible. See <span class="smcap">Collings</span> on Providence, <span class="smcap">Price’s</span> Dissertations, -<span class="smcap">Rutherford</span> on Providence, <span class="smcap">Charnock’s</span> Sermons, and <span class="smcap">Whately’s</span> Logic.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_104" id="Footnote_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_104"><span class="label">[104]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_157">157</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_105" id="Footnote_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_105"><span class="label">[105]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_158">158</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_106" id="Footnote_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_106"><span class="label">[106]</span></a> [<span class="smcap">Hume</span> says, “though man, in truth, is a necessary agent, having all his -actions determined by fixed and immutable laws, yet, this being concealed from -him, he acts with the conviction of being a free agent.”Which is the same as to say that God intended to conceal from men an -important fact, involving the whole subject of right and wrong, but Mr. Hume -found him out!]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_107" id="Footnote_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_107"><span class="label">[107]</span></a> By <em>will</em> and <em>character</em> is meant that which, in speaking of men, we should -express, not only by these words, but also by the words <em>temper</em>, <em>taste</em>, <em>dispositions</em>, -<em>practical principles</em>: <em>that whole frame of mind, from whence we act in -one manner rather than another</em>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_108" id="Footnote_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_108"><span class="label">[108]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_II">Chap. ii.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_109" id="Footnote_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_109"><span class="label">[109]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_110" id="Footnote_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_110"><span class="label">[110]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_II">Chap. ii.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_111" id="Footnote_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_111"><span class="label">[111]</span></a> <a href="#DISSERTATION_II">Dissert. II.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_112" id="Footnote_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_112"><span class="label">[112]</span></a> Serm. 2, at the <i>Rolls</i>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_113" id="Footnote_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_113"><span class="label">[113]</span></a> <a href="#DISSERTATION_II">Dissert. II.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_114" id="Footnote_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_114"><span class="label">[114]</span></a> However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God is determined, -by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case; though one chooses -to decline matters of such abstract speculation, and to speak with caution when -one does speak of them. But if it be intelligible to say, that <em>it is fit and -reasonable for every one to consult his own happiness</em>, then <em>fitness of action, or -the right and reason of the case</em>, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And -it seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of action, or -one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from design implies -that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that end, to be the ground -of the preference; as to suppose him to discern an abstract proposition to be -true, without supposing somewhat prior in it, to be the ground of the discernment. -It doth not therefore appear, that moral right is any more relative to -perception, than abstract truth is; or that it is any more improper to speak of -the fitness and lightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, -than to speak of abstract truth, as thus founded.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_115" id="Footnote_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_115"><span class="label">[115]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_118">118</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_116" id="Footnote_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_116"><span class="label">[116]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_117" id="Footnote_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_117"><span class="label">[117]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_II">Chap. ii.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_118" id="Footnote_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_118"><span class="label">[118]</span></a> <a href="#DISSERTATION_II">Dissertation II.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_119" id="Footnote_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_119"><span class="label">[119]</span></a> Pp. <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_120" id="Footnote_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_120"><span class="label">[120]</span></a> Serm. 8th, at the <i>Rolls</i>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_121" id="Footnote_121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_121"><span class="label">[121]</span></a> [Consult, in favor of the doctrine of necessity, atheistical writers generally; -such as Fichte, Hegel, D’Holback, Comte, Crousse, Martineau, Leroux, -and Holyoake—also, <span class="smcap">Belsham’s</span> Essays, <span class="smcap">Collins</span> on Liberty, <span class="smcap">Crombie</span> on -Phil. Necessity, <span class="smcap">Hobbes’</span> Liberty and Necessity, and Leviathan, <span class="smcap">Priestley</span> on -Liberty, <span class="smcap">Hartley</span> on Man, and <span class="smcap">Edwards</span> on the Will.Against the doctrine, see <span class="smcap">Beattie’s</span> Works, Part 2; Replies to Hobbes by -<span class="smcap">Bramhall</span> and <span class="smcap">Lawson</span>; Replies to Priestley by <span class="smcap">Palmer</span> and <span class="smcap">Bryant</span>; <span class="smcap">Grove</span> -on Liberty; <span class="smcap">Clarke’s</span> Sermons at the Boyle Lectures; <span class="smcap">Gibb’s</span> Contemplations; -<span class="smcap">King’s</span> Origin of Evil; <span class="smcap">Reid</span> on the Mind; <span class="smcap">Watts</span> on Liberty; <span class="smcap">Harris’</span> Boyle -Lectures; <span class="smcap">Jackson’s</span> Defence; <span class="smcap">Butterworth</span> on Moral Government.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_122" id="Footnote_122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_122"><span class="label">[122]</span></a> [<span class="smcap">Maimonides</span> makes use of the following similitude. “Suppose one of good -understanding, whose mother had died soon after he was born to be brought -up on an island, where he saw no human being but his father nor the female -of any beast. This person when grown up inquires how men are produced. -He is told that they are bred in the womb of one of the same species and that -while in the womb we are very small and there move and are nourished. The -young man inquires whether when thus in the womb we did not eat, and drink, -and breathe, as we do now, and is answered, No. Then he denies it, and offers -demonstration that it could not be so. For says he, if either of us cease to -breathe our life is gone; and how could we have lived close shut up in a womb -for months? So if we cease to eat and drink, we die, and how could the child -live so for months? and thus he satisfies himself that it is <em>impossible</em> man -should come into existence in such a manner.”]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_123" id="Footnote_123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_123"><span class="label">[123]</span></a> [Let us imagine a person to be taken to view some great historical painting, -before which hangs a thick curtain. The attendant raises the curtain a few -inches. Can the spectator, from the unmeaning strip of foreground, derive -any conception of the figures yet concealed? Much less is he able to criticize -their proportions, or beauty, or perspective, or even the design of the artist? -The small fragment of a tree, or flower, or animal, or building, may seem quite -unmeaning and even ugly, though the whole would present beauty, fitness, or -grandeur. Now the portion of God’s dominions within our survey, is as utterly -insignificant, compared to the universe, and its interminable duration, as, an -atom compared to a planet or a man’s age to eternity.The concluding observations of this chapter, abundantly remove every difficulty -as to such ignorance being as valid against the <em>proofs</em> of religion, as it is -against <em>objections</em> to it.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_124" id="Footnote_124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_124"><span class="label">[124]</span></a> [No truly philosophical mind can be arrogant; because the wider the range -of thought, the greater are the discoveries of our ignorance. The young student -may well hesitate to decide points, on which the profoundest thinkers -take opposite sides, and when conscious of inability intrust himself to the -guidance of those whose lives are best.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_125" id="Footnote_125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_125"><span class="label">[125]</span></a> Pp. <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_126" id="Footnote_126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_126"><span class="label">[126]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_127" id="Footnote_127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_127"><span class="label">[127]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_175">175</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_128" id="Footnote_128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_128"><span class="label">[128]</span></a> Pp. <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_129" id="Footnote_129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_129"><span class="label">[129]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, and <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VI">Part II. chap. vi.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_130" id="Footnote_130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_130"><span class="label">[130]</span></a> Serm. at the <i>Rolls</i>, p. 312, 2d ed.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_131" id="Footnote_131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_131"><span class="label">[131]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_132" id="Footnote_132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_132"><span class="label">[132]</span></a> See <a href="#II_CHAPTER_II">Part II. ch. ii.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_133" id="Footnote_133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_133"><span class="label">[133]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_173">173</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_134" id="Footnote_134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_134"><span class="label">[134]</span></a> [The remainder of this chapter is a recapitulation of the whole argument -from the beginning; and should be carefully conned.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_135" id="Footnote_135"></a><a href="#FNanchor_135"><span class="label">[135]</span></a> <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VI">Part II. ch. vi.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_136" id="Footnote_136"></a><a href="#FNanchor_136"><span class="label">[136]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_108">108</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_137" id="Footnote_137"></a><a href="#FNanchor_137"><span class="label">[137]</span></a> [There is a slight indication in this chapter that Butler falls into the old -plan of settling the necessity of Christianity, before determining its truth. -Paley discards this order of arrangement, in his very first sentence; and with -good reason. The necessity of revelation is an abstraction; the proofs of it -are patent facts. To hold in abeyance the credentials presented by Christianity, -till we first satisfy ourselves that God could or would make any such -announcements, is unphilosophical and irreverent. This chapter discusses the -<em>importance</em> rather than the necessity of revelation; and so is a fitting commencement -of the discussion. Every truth disclosed in revelation, over and -above the truths which natural religion furnishes, proves the <em>necessity</em> of -revelation, if we would know any thing of <em>such</em> truths. And it is such truths -which constitute the very peculiarities of revelation, and teach the <em>way of -salvation</em>, for the sinful and helpless.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_138" id="Footnote_138"></a><a href="#FNanchor_138"><span class="label">[138]</span></a> [No one can read the writings of the great sages of antiquity without a -full and sad conviction that in relation to the character of God, the sinfulness -of man, the future state, and the rules of living, those prime points on -which we need knowledge, they were almost profoundly ignorant. See on this -point, <span class="smcap">Leland’s</span> Adv. and Necess.: <span class="smcap">Chalmers’</span> Nat. Theol.: <span class="smcap">McCosh’s</span> Div. -Gov.: <span class="smcap">Pascal’s</span> Thoughts: <span class="smcap">Warburton’s</span> Div. Legation.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_139" id="Footnote_139"></a><a href="#FNanchor_139"><span class="label">[139]</span></a> Invenis multos——propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi sufficiunt -sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid mihi præcepturus est -Christus? Ut bene vivam? Jam bene vivo. Quid mihi necessarius est -Christus; nullum homicidium, nullum furtum, nullam rapinam facio, res -alienas non concupisco, nullo adulterio contaminor? Nam inveniatur in vita -mea aliquid quod reprehendatur, et qui reprehenderit faciat Christianum. <cite>Aug. -in Psal.</cite> xxxi. [You find many who refuse to become Christians, because -they feel sufficient of themselves to lead a good life. “We ought to live well.” -says one. “What will Christ teach me? To live well? I do live well, what -need then have I of Christ? I commit no murder, no theft, no robbery. I -covet no man’s goods, and am polluted by no adultery. Let some one find in -me any thing to censure, and he who can do so, may make me a Christian.”]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_140" id="Footnote_140"></a><a href="#FNanchor_140"><span class="label">[140]</span></a> [The true mode of distinguishing a temporary, local, or individual command -from such as are of universal and perpetual obligation, is well laid down -by <span class="smcap">Wayland</span>, <cite>Mor. Sci.</cite> ch. ix. sec. 2.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_141" id="Footnote_141"></a><a href="#FNanchor_141"><span class="label">[141]</span></a> [Natural religion shows us the danger of sin; but not the infinite danger -of eternal retribution, and the hopelessness of restoration after death. And as -to the efficacy of repentance, it rather opposes that doctrine than teaches it. -At least it does not teach that repentance may be accepted, so as not only to -cancel guilt, but restore to the favor of God.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_142" id="Footnote_142"></a><a href="#FNanchor_142"><span class="label">[142]</span></a> [“Christianity was left with Christians, to be transmitted, in like manner -as the religion of nature had been left, with mankind in general. There was -however this difference that by an institution of external religion with a standing -ministry for instruction and discipline, it pleased God to unite Christiana -into <em>visible churches</em>, and all along to preserve them over a great part of the -world, and thus perpetuate a general publication of the Gospel.” <span class="smcap">Butler’s</span> -sermon before the Soc. for Prop. the Gospel. He goes on to show, in that discourse, -that these churches, however corrupt any may become, are repositories -for the written oracles of God, and so carry the antidote to their heresies.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_143" id="Footnote_143"></a><a href="#FNanchor_143"><span class="label">[143]</span></a> Rev. xxii. 11.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_144" id="Footnote_144"></a><a href="#FNanchor_144"><span class="label">[144]</span></a> [“It is no real objection to this, though it may seem so at first sight, to say -that since Christianity is a <em>remedial</em> system, designed to obviate those very -evils which have been produced by the neglect and abuse of the light of nature, -it ought not to be <em>liable</em> to the same perversions. Because—1. Christianity is -not designed primarily to remedy the defects of <em>nature</em>, but of an unnatural -state of ruin into which men were brought by <em>the Fall</em>. And 2. It is remedial -of the defects of nature in a <em>great degree</em>, by its giving additional advantages. -3. It might be impossible that it should be remedial in a greater degree than -it is, without destroying man’s free agency; which would be to destroy its own -end, the practice of virtue.”—<span class="smcap">Fitzgerald’s</span> Notes.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_145" id="Footnote_145"></a><a href="#FNanchor_145"><span class="label">[145]</span></a> [<span class="smcap">Chalmers</span> (Nat. Theol., b. v. ch. iv.) makes this very plain. He shows -the <em>ethics</em> of natural religion to be one thing and its <em>objects</em> another. Natural -religion discloses no Redeemer or Sanctifier; but it teaches how we should -regard such a person, if there be one. It teaches love and conformity to such -a being by the <em>relation</em> in which we of course stand to him. How we are to -<em>express</em> that love and obedience it cannot teach.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_146" id="Footnote_146"></a><a href="#FNanchor_146"><span class="label">[146]</span></a> See The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy, of the Christian Sacraments, -&c., [by <span class="smcap">Waterland</span>,] and <span class="smcap">Colliber</span> of Revealed Religion, as there quoted.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_147" id="Footnote_147"></a><a href="#FNanchor_147"><span class="label">[147]</span></a> [If Christianity were but “a republication of natural religion,” or as -Tindall says, “as old as creation,” why do deists oppose it? It does indeed -republish natural religion, but it adds stupendous truths beside. If it gave us -no new light, no new motives, it would be but a tremendous curse, making us -all the more responsible, and none the more instructed or secure.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_148" id="Footnote_148"></a><a href="#FNanchor_148"><span class="label">[148]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_94">94</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_149" id="Footnote_149"></a><a href="#FNanchor_149"><span class="label">[149]</span></a> <a href="#II_CHAPTER_V">Ch. v.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_150" id="Footnote_150"></a><a href="#FNanchor_150"><span class="label">[150]</span></a> John iii. 5.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_151" id="Footnote_151"></a><a href="#FNanchor_151"><span class="label">[151]</span></a> This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts considered respectively -as such. But yet, since the latter have somewhat of a moral nature, -we may see the reason of them, considered in this view. Moral and positive -precepts are in some respects alike, in other respects different. So far as they -are alike, we discern the reasons of both; so far as they are different, we discern -the reasons of the former, but not of the latter. See p. <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_152" id="Footnote_152"></a><a href="#FNanchor_152"><span class="label">[152]</span></a> [Without offering the least objection to what is here said of the comparative -value of moral and positive institutions, it should not be overlooked that sometimes, -obedience to a positive rite is more indicative of an obedient spirit, than -obedience to a moral rule. The latter is urged by its intrinsic propriety, over -and above the command, and appeals to several of our finer impulses. The -former rests singly on our reverence for the will of God. There are many who -would repel a temptation to steal, or to lie, who yet are insensible to the duty -of baptism or the Lord’s supper.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_153" id="Footnote_153"></a><a href="#FNanchor_153"><span class="label">[153]</span></a> Matt. ix. 13, and xii. 7.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_154" id="Footnote_154"></a><a href="#FNanchor_154"><span class="label">[154]</span></a> Hosea vi. 6.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_155" id="Footnote_155"></a><a href="#FNanchor_155"><span class="label">[155]</span></a> See Matt. xii. 7.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_156" id="Footnote_156"></a><a href="#FNanchor_156"><span class="label">[156]</span></a> See <a href="#II_CHAPTER_III">ch. iii.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_157" id="Footnote_157"></a><a href="#FNanchor_157"><span class="label">[157]</span></a> [Dr. <span class="smcap">Angus</span> judiciously remarks on this sentence, “This sentiment, as understood -by Butler, is just, but very liable to abuse. Clearly, the Bible must be -so interpreted as to agree with <em>all</em> known truth, whether of natural religion or -natural science. At the same time, to correct the theology of the Bible by the -theology of nature, as finite and guilty men understand it, may involve the -rejection of Bible theology entirely; and of the very light and teaching it was -intended to supply. The converse of Butler’s statement is equally true, and -even more important. If in natural theology there be found any facts, the -seeming lesson of which is contrary to revealed religion, such seeming lesson -is not the real one.” Practically, it will be found that seeming meanings of -Scripture, really erroneous, are corrected by other parts of Scripture itself. I -understand Butler as only affirming that we must interpret Scripture according -to immutable principles, and <em>known truth</em>. The infidel rejects it for not conforming -to his <em>assumed hypothesis</em>.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_158" id="Footnote_158"></a><a href="#FNanchor_158"><span class="label">[158]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_203">203</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_159" id="Footnote_159"></a><a href="#FNanchor_159"><span class="label">[159]</span></a> Chaps. <a href="#I_CHAPTER_III">iii.</a>, <a href="#I_CHAPTER_IV">iv.</a>, <a href="#I_CHAPTER_V">v.</a>, <a href="#I_CHAPTER_VI">vi.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_160" id="Footnote_160"></a><a href="#FNanchor_160"><span class="label">[160]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_VII">Chap. vii.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_161" id="Footnote_161"></a><a href="#FNanchor_161"><span class="label">[161]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_172">172</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_162" id="Footnote_162"></a><a href="#FNanchor_162"><span class="label">[162]</span></a> [Papists urge that the actual conversion of the bread and wine in the -Eucharist is an invisible miracle. But an invisible miracle is such because -wrought under circumstances which <em>exclude</em> examination: while transubstantiation -<em>invites</em> and <em>facilitates</em> examination. It is wrought publicly, and constantly, -and yet cannot be discovered to be a miracle. Indeed it supposes the -working of a second miracle, to make the first invisible.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_163" id="Footnote_163"></a><a href="#FNanchor_163"><span class="label">[163]</span></a> [Paley shows conclusively that a denial of miracles leads not only to -a denial of revelation, but a denial of the existence of God, all of whose -extraordinary acts are necessarily miraculous.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_164" id="Footnote_164"></a><a href="#FNanchor_164"><span class="label">[164]</span></a> [<span class="smcap">Whately</span>, in his <cite>Logic</cite>, b. iii., has shown the folly of the Deistical attempts -to explain our Savior’s miracles as mere natural events. Having -labored to show this of some <em>one</em> of the miracles, they then do so as to <em>another</em>, -and thence infer that <em>all</em> were accidental conjunctures of natural circumstances. -He says, they might as well argue “that because it is not improbable one may -throw sixes once in a hundred throws, therefore it is no more improbable that -one may throw sixes a hundred times running.”<span class="smcap">Fitzgerald</span> says, “the improbability of a whole series of strange natural -events, taking place unaccountably, one after another, amounts to a far greater -improbability than is involved in the admission of miracles.”]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_165" id="Footnote_165"></a><a href="#FNanchor_165"><span class="label">[165]</span></a> [That man, at first, must have had supernatural <em>instructions</em>, or in other -words some revelations, is shown by Archbishop <span class="smcap">Whately</span> in his “Origin of -Civilization.” Rev. <span class="smcap">Samuel Stanhope Smith</span> expresses his conviction, both -from reason and history, that man in his savage state could not even have preserved -life without instruction from his Creator.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_166" id="Footnote_166"></a><a href="#FNanchor_166"><span class="label">[166]</span></a> [The maintenance by the Jews, of a system of pure Theism, through so -many and so rude ages, without being superior, or even equal to their neighbors, -in science and civilization, can only be accounted for on the presumption of a -revelation.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_167" id="Footnote_167"></a><a href="#FNanchor_167"><span class="label">[167]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_168" id="Footnote_168"></a><a href="#FNanchor_168"><span class="label">[168]</span></a> [<span class="smcap">Mills</span> (Logic, chap. 24, § 5,) points out what he deems a mistake of “some -of the writers against Hume on Miracles,” in confounding the improbability of -an event, before its occurrence, with the improbability afterwards; that is, considering -them equal in degree. He fully proves that the great Laplace fell -into this error, and the student should consult the passage.Prof. <span class="smcap">Fitzgerald</span> holds Butler to have fallen into the mistake adverted to -by Mills; and quotes the latter author in a way which seems to make him say -that such is his opinion also. I do not so understand Mills, nor do I see that -Butler has confounded these meanings; but the very contrary. He expressly -affirms, and most truly, that the strongest presumption may lie against “the -most ordinary facts <em>before the proof</em> which yet is overcome by almost any -proof.” Butler’s position here, may be thus illustrated. Suppose a hundred -numbers to be put in a box, and it is proposed to draw out the number 42. -Now there are 99 chances to 1 against drawing that, or any other <em>given</em> number. -But suppose a child tells you he put the hundred numbers into a box, and drew -out one, and it proved to be 42; you at once believe, for that was as likely to -come as any other.The proof of Christianity from prophecy becomes amazingly strong, thus -viewed. There are many predictions, for instance that Christ should be born -at a certain time, and place, and under certain very particular circumstances. -The probabilities against such a <em>conjuncture</em> of events are almost infinite; yet -they happened exactly as foretold.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_169" id="Footnote_169"></a><a href="#FNanchor_169"><span class="label">[169]</span></a> [For instance, a mass of ice or snow, may imperceptibly accumulate for an -age, and then suddenly fall and overwhelm a village. Or a planet, or comet, -may have been gradually nearing our earth for a million of years, without producing, -<em>as yet</em>, any effect on our orbit; but in process of time, its proximity -may work great changes in our condition.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_170" id="Footnote_170"></a><a href="#FNanchor_170"><span class="label">[170]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_208">208</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_171" id="Footnote_171"></a><a href="#FNanchor_171"><span class="label">[171]</span></a> 1 Cor. i. 28.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_172" id="Footnote_172"></a><a href="#FNanchor_172"><span class="label">[172]</span></a> See <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VI">Chap. vi.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_173" id="Footnote_173"></a><a href="#FNanchor_173"><span class="label">[173]</span></a> See <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VI">Chap. vi.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_174" id="Footnote_174"></a><a href="#FNanchor_174"><span class="label">[174]</span></a> [See note, <a href="#Page_218">page 218</a>.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_175" id="Footnote_175"></a><a href="#FNanchor_175"><span class="label">[175]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_220">220</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_176" id="Footnote_176"></a><a href="#FNanchor_176"><span class="label">[176]</span></a> [It is not to be understood that Butler would not have the ordinary rules -of interpretation applied to the Holy Scriptures. Because the interpretation, -“if not gathered <em>out</em> of the words, must be brought <em>into</em> them.” We cannot -interpret them as if we knew beforehand, what the Holy Ghost meant to say; -as <span class="smcap">Spinoza</span> proposes to do, in his Philosophia Scripturæ Interpretes. The -student will do well to consult <span class="smcap">Benson’s</span> Hulsean Lectures on Scripture Difficulties: -<span class="smcap">King’s</span> Morsels of Criticism: <span class="smcap">Storr</span>, Exertationes Exeget.: <span class="smcap">Michaelis</span>, -Introd. ad. Nov. Test.: and <span class="smcap">Featley’s</span> Key.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_177" id="Footnote_177"></a><a href="#FNanchor_177"><span class="label">[177]</span></a> Pp. <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_178" id="Footnote_178"></a><a href="#FNanchor_178"><span class="label">[178]</span></a> [See 1 Cor. xii. 1-10: xiii. 1: and xiv. 1-19.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_179" id="Footnote_179"></a><a href="#FNanchor_179"><span class="label">[179]</span></a> [“The power of healing, or working miracles, is, during the whole course -of its operation, one continued arrest or diversion of the general laws of matter -and motion. It was therefore fit that this power should be given occasionally. -But the <em>speaking with tongues</em>, when once the gift was conferred, became thenceforth -a natural power; just as the free use of members of the body, after being -restored, by miracle, to the exercise of their natural functions. In healing, the -apostles are to be considered as the workers of a miracle; in speaking strange -tongues, as persons on whom a miracle is performed.”—<span class="smcap">Warburton</span>, Doct. of -Grace, b. i. ch. iii.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_180" id="Footnote_180"></a><a href="#FNanchor_180"><span class="label">[180]</span></a> Heb. vi. 1.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_181" id="Footnote_181"></a><a href="#FNanchor_181"><span class="label">[181]</span></a> Acts iii. 21.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_182" id="Footnote_182"></a><a href="#FNanchor_182"><span class="label">[182]</span></a> [The doctrine of “development” has of late been popular in some quarters. -Butler here shows the only <em>safe</em> notion we may entertain on that subject. -“Exact thought, and careful consideration” may show us how to confute -specious heresies, expound embarrassing passages, dissipate painful doubts, -and remove many prejudices or misapprehensions. But revelation is complete -as it stands.We may hope for progress in theology as in other sciences; not in the -development of new facts or faith, as Papists and Socinians pretend, but in -the increase of sound wisdom, aided by a more perfect interpretation of God’s -word.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_183" id="Footnote_183"></a><a href="#FNanchor_183"><span class="label">[183]</span></a> <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VI">Chap. vi.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_184" id="Footnote_184"></a><a href="#FNanchor_184"><span class="label">[184]</span></a> <a href="#II_CHAPTER_V">Chap. v.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_185" id="Footnote_185"></a><a href="#FNanchor_185"><span class="label">[185]</span></a> <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VII">Chap. vii.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_186" id="Footnote_186"></a><a href="#FNanchor_186"><span class="label">[186]</span></a> <a href="#II_CHAPTER_IV">Chap. iv.</a> latter part, and <a href="#II_CHAPTER_V">v.</a> <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VI">vi.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_187" id="Footnote_187"></a><a href="#FNanchor_187"><span class="label">[187]</span></a> [This pregnant paragraph should receive very full attention. We know -much of men, little of God. What men are likely to do, or say, in certain -circumstances, is often very clear; and generally may be guessed at. But -what God would do or say in new contingencies, who shall attempt to prescribe -or predict? We are poorly qualified to assert that such and such declarations -could not have come from infinite wisdom; but we are quite competent to affirm -that such and such things could not have come from human contrivance -or enthusiasm.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_188" id="Footnote_188"></a><a href="#FNanchor_188"><span class="label">[188]</span></a> In the <a href="#II_CHAPTER_III">foregoing chapter</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_189" id="Footnote_189"></a><a href="#FNanchor_189"><span class="label">[189]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_VII">Part I, ch. vii.</a>, to which this all along refers.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_190" id="Footnote_190"></a><a href="#FNanchor_190"><span class="label">[190]</span></a> [“It is the last step of reason to know there is an infinity of things -which surpass it.”—<span class="smcap">Pascal.</span> “The wall of adamant which bounds human -inquiry, has scarcely ever been discovered by any adventurer, till he was -aroused by the shock that drove him back.”—Sir <span class="smcap">Jas. Mackintosh</span>. “Of the -dark parts of revelation there are two sorts: one which may be cleared up by -the studious; the other which will always reside within the shadow of God’s -throne where it would be impiety to intrude.”—<span class="smcap">Warburton.</span> “A Christianity -without mystery is as unphilosophical as it is unscriptural.”—<span class="smcap">Angus.</span>]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_191" id="Footnote_191"></a><a href="#FNanchor_191"><span class="label">[191]</span></a> John xi. 52.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_192" id="Footnote_192"></a><a href="#FNanchor_192"><span class="label">[192]</span></a> 2 Peter iii. 13.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_193" id="Footnote_193"></a><a href="#FNanchor_193"><span class="label">[193]</span></a> 1 Peter i. 11, 12.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_194" id="Footnote_194"></a><a href="#FNanchor_194"><span class="label">[194]</span></a> Phil. ii. [6-11.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_195" id="Footnote_195"></a><a href="#FNanchor_195"><span class="label">[195]</span></a> [The influences of the Holy Spirit are not only “given to good men,” but -are sent upon many who live unmindful of eternity, quickening their consciences, -enlightening their understandings and arresting their passions, and -thus it is they are converted unto the truth in Christ.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_196" id="Footnote_196"></a><a href="#FNanchor_196"><span class="label">[196]</span></a> John xiv. 2.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_197" id="Footnote_197"></a><a href="#FNanchor_197"><span class="label">[197]</span></a> John v. 22, 23.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_198" id="Footnote_198"></a><a href="#FNanchor_198"><span class="label">[198]</span></a> Matt. xxviii. 18.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_199" id="Footnote_199"></a><a href="#FNanchor_199"><span class="label">[199]</span></a> 1 Cor. xv. 28.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_200" id="Footnote_200"></a><a href="#FNanchor_200"><span class="label">[200]</span></a> 1 Tim. iii. 16.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_201" id="Footnote_201"></a><a href="#FNanchor_201"><span class="label">[201]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_202" id="Footnote_202"></a><a href="#FNanchor_202"><span class="label">[202]</span></a> 1 Cor. i. [18-25.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_203" id="Footnote_203"></a><a href="#FNanchor_203"><span class="label">[203]</span></a> Pp. <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_204" id="Footnote_204"></a><a href="#FNanchor_204"><span class="label">[204]</span></a> Pp. <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_205" id="Footnote_205"></a><a href="#FNanchor_205"><span class="label">[205]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_206" id="Footnote_206"></a><a href="#FNanchor_206"><span class="label">[206]</span></a> [“Providence hurries not himself to display to-day the consequence of the -principle he yesterday announced. He will draw it out in the lapse of ages -Even according to our reasoning logic is none the less sure, because it is slow.”—<span class="smcap">Guizot</span> -on Civilization, Lect. I.How impressively is this sentiment sustained by modern geology, and astronomy!]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_207" id="Footnote_207"></a><a href="#FNanchor_207"><span class="label">[207]</span></a> [“Philosophers make shameful and dangerous mistakes, when they judge -of the Divine economy. He cannot, they tell us, act thus, it would be contrary -to his wisdom, or his justice, &c. But while they make these peremptory assertions -they show themselves to be unacquainted with the fundamental rules -of their own science, and with the origin of all late improvements. True -philosophy would begin the other way, with observing the constitution of the -world, how God has made us, and in what circumstances he has placed us, and -<em>then</em> from what he has done, form a sure judgment what he would do. Thus -might they learn ‘the invisible things of God from those which are clearly -seen’ the things which are not accomplished from those which are.”—<span class="smcap">Powell’s</span> -<cite>Use and Abuse of Philosophy</cite>.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_208" id="Footnote_208"></a><a href="#FNanchor_208"><span class="label">[208]</span></a> 1 Tim. ii. 5.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_209" id="Footnote_209"></a><a href="#FNanchor_209"><span class="label">[209]</span></a> [The interposition of a man of known probity and worth often saves the -thoughtless or the guilty from punishment. Mediation is seen in a thousand -forms in the arrangements of social life; and the common sense of all mankind -approves of it. The release of the offending, by the intercession of the good, -and all the benefits of advice, caution, example, instruction, persuasion, and -authority, are instances of mediation.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_210" id="Footnote_210"></a><a href="#FNanchor_210"><span class="label">[210]</span></a> [<span class="smcap">Mr. Newman</span> notices a distinction between the facts of revelation, and its -principles; and considers the argument from analogy more concerned with its -principles than with its facts. “The revealed facts are special and singular, -from the nature of the case, but the revealed principles are common to all the -works of God; and if the Author of nature be the author of grace, it may be -expected that the principles displayed in them will be the same, and form a -connecting link between them. In this identity of <em>principle</em>, lies the analogy -of natural and revealed religion, in Butler’s sense of the word. The Incarnation -is a fact, and cannot be paralleled by any thing in nature: the doctrine -of mediation is a principle, and is abundantly exemplified in nature.”—<cite>Essay -on Developments.</cite>]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_211" id="Footnote_211"></a><a href="#FNanchor_211"><span class="label">[211]</span></a> [The student will find the inadequacy of repentance to cancel guilt, beautifully -exhibited by <span class="smcap">Wayland</span>, Mor. Science: <span class="smcap">Magee</span>, Atonement: <span class="smcap">Howe</span>, -Living Temple.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_212" id="Footnote_212"></a><a href="#FNanchor_212"><span class="label">[212]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_213" id="Footnote_213"></a><a href="#FNanchor_213"><span class="label">[213]</span></a> John iii. 16.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_214" id="Footnote_214"></a><a href="#FNanchor_214"><span class="label">[214]</span></a> It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory reader, that -it is, in any sort, affirmed or implied in any thing said in this chapter, that -none can have the benefit of the general redemption, but such as have the -advantage of being made acquainted with it in the present life. But it may -be needful to mention, that several questions, which have been brought into -the subject before us, and determined, are not in the least entered into here, -questions which have been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps with equal -rashness contrary ways. For instance, whether God could have saved the -world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently with the general -laws of his government. And had not Christ come into the world, what -would have been the future condition of the better sort of men; those just persons -over the face of the earth, for whom Manasses in his prayer<a name="FNanchor_A2" id="FNanchor_A2"></a><a href="#Footnote_A2" class="fnanchor">[A]</a> asserts, repentance -was not appointed. The meaning of the first of these questions is -greatly ambiguous: and neither of them can properly be answered, without -going upon that infinitely absurd supposition, that we know the whole of the -case. And perhaps the very inquiry, <em>What would have followed, if God had -not done as he has</em>, may have in it some very great impropriety: and ought -not to be carried on any further than is necessary to help our partial and -inadequate conceptions of things.</p> - -<div class="subfootnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_A2" id="Footnote_A2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_A2"><span class="label">[A]</span></a> [The “prayer of Manasses” is one of the apocryphal books of the Old Testament, which -next precedes “Maccabees.”]</p> - -</div> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_215" id="Footnote_215"></a><a href="#FNanchor_215"><span class="label">[215]</span></a> John i., and viii. 12.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_216" id="Footnote_216"></a><a href="#FNanchor_216"><span class="label">[216]</span></a> Rom. iii. 25, v. 11: 1 Cor. v. 7: Eph. v. 2: 1 John ii. 2: Matt xxvi. 28.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_217" id="Footnote_217"></a><a href="#FNanchor_217"><span class="label">[217]</span></a> John i. 29, 36, and throughout the book of Revelation.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_218" id="Footnote_218"></a><a href="#FNanchor_218"><span class="label">[218]</span></a> Throughout the epistle to the Hebrews.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_219" id="Footnote_219"></a><a href="#FNanchor_219"><span class="label">[219]</span></a> Isa. liii.: Dan. ix. 24: Ps. cx. 4.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_220" id="Footnote_220"></a><a href="#FNanchor_220"><span class="label">[220]</span></a> Heb. x. 1.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_221" id="Footnote_221"></a><a href="#FNanchor_221"><span class="label">[221]</span></a> Heb. viii. 4, 5.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_222" id="Footnote_222"></a><a href="#FNanchor_222"><span class="label">[222]</span></a> Heb. x. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_223" id="Footnote_223"></a><a href="#FNanchor_223"><span class="label">[223]</span></a> Heb. ix. 28.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_224" id="Footnote_224"></a><a href="#FNanchor_224"><span class="label">[224]</span></a> John xi. 51, 52.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_225" id="Footnote_225"></a><a href="#FNanchor_225"><span class="label">[225]</span></a> 1 Pet. iii. 18.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_226" id="Footnote_226"></a><a href="#FNanchor_226"><span class="label">[226]</span></a> Matt. xx. 28: Mark x. 45: 1 Tim. ii. 6.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_227" id="Footnote_227"></a><a href="#FNanchor_227"><span class="label">[227]</span></a> 2 Pet. ii. 1: Rev. xiv. 4: 1 Cor. vi. 20.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_228" id="Footnote_228"></a><a href="#FNanchor_228"><span class="label">[228]</span></a> 1 Pet. i. 19: Rev. v. 9: Gal. iii. 13.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_229" id="Footnote_229"></a><a href="#FNanchor_229"><span class="label">[229]</span></a> Heb. vii. 25: 1 John ii. 1, 2.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_230" id="Footnote_230"></a><a href="#FNanchor_230"><span class="label">[230]</span></a> Heb. ii. 10.: v. 9.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_231" id="Footnote_231"></a><a href="#FNanchor_231"><span class="label">[231]</span></a> 2 Cor. v. 19: Rom. v. 10: Eph. ii. 16.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_232" id="Footnote_232"></a><a href="#FNanchor_232"><span class="label">[232]</span></a> Heb. ii. 14. See also a remarkable passage in the book of Job, xxxiii. 24.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_233" id="Footnote_233"></a><a href="#FNanchor_233"><span class="label">[233]</span></a> Phil. ii. 8, 9: John iii. 35, and v. 22, 23.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_234" id="Footnote_234"></a><a href="#FNanchor_234"><span class="label">[234]</span></a> Rev. v. 12, 13.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_235" id="Footnote_235"></a><a href="#FNanchor_235"><span class="label">[235]</span></a> John vi. 14.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_236" id="Footnote_236"></a><a href="#FNanchor_236"><span class="label">[236]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_237" id="Footnote_237"></a><a href="#FNanchor_237"><span class="label">[237]</span></a> Eph. iv. 12, 13.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_238" id="Footnote_238"></a><a href="#FNanchor_238"><span class="label">[238]</span></a> John xiv. 2, 3: Rev. iii. 21, and xi. 15.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_239" id="Footnote_239"></a><a href="#FNanchor_239"><span class="label">[239]</span></a> 2 Thess. i. 8.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_240" id="Footnote_240"></a><a href="#FNanchor_240"><span class="label">[240]</span></a> Heb. ix. 26.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_241" id="Footnote_241"></a><a href="#FNanchor_241"><span class="label">[241]</span></a> [Consult <span class="smcap">Magee</span>, on Atonement: <span class="smcap">Stapferi</span> Institutiones: <span class="smcap">Turretin</span>, De -Satisfactione: <span class="smcap">Chalmers</span>, Discourses: <span class="smcap">Owen</span>, Satis. of Christ.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_242" id="Footnote_242"></a><a href="#FNanchor_242"><span class="label">[242]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_243" id="Footnote_243"></a><a href="#FNanchor_243"><span class="label">[243]</span></a> [This objection is ably urged by <span class="smcap">Tindall</span>. The answer of our author is -complete. We should remember, that twice in the history of mankind, revelation -<em>has been</em> universal. The first pair, and the occupants of the ark, comprised -the whole population. But how soon was light rejected! Christianity -is universal, in nature and intention; is to become so in fact; and according -to a very probable construction of prophecy, will continue to be universal, for -three hundred and sixty thousand years.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_244" id="Footnote_244"></a><a href="#FNanchor_244"><span class="label">[244]</span></a> [May not this be a principal object of the Apocalypse? As the book of -Daniel furnished a constant and powerful support to the faith of the Jew, by -the constant development of prophecy, so the Apocalypse, rightly studied must -powerfully, and through all time, support the faith of the Christian by the -continual unfolding and verification of its predictions.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_245" id="Footnote_245"></a><a href="#FNanchor_245"><span class="label">[245]</span></a> 2 Cor. viii. 12.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_246" id="Footnote_246"></a><a href="#FNanchor_246"><span class="label">[246]</span></a> <a href="#INTRODUCTION">Introduction.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_247" id="Footnote_247"></a><a href="#FNanchor_247"><span class="label">[247]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_V">Part I. chap. v.</a></p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_248" id="Footnote_248"></a><a href="#FNanchor_248"><span class="label">[248]</span></a> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_IV">Part I. chap. iv.</a> and pp. <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_249" id="Footnote_249"></a><a href="#FNanchor_249"><span class="label">[249]</span></a> Pp. <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_250" id="Footnote_250"></a><a href="#FNanchor_250"><span class="label">[250]</span></a> Dan. xii. 10. See also Isa. xxix. 13, 14: Matt. vi. 23, and xi. 25, and xiii. -11, 12: John iii. 19, and v. 44: 1 Cor. ii. 14, and 2 Cor. iv. 4: 2 Tim. iii. 13; -and that affectionate as well as authoritative admonition, so very many times -inculcated, <cite>He that hath ears to hear, let him hear</cite>. Grotius saw so strongly the -thing intended in these and other passages of Scripture of the like sense, as -to say, that the proof given us of Christianity was less than it might have been, -for this very purpose: <cite>Ut ita sermo Evangelii tanquam lapis esset Lydius ad -quem ingenia sanabilia explorarentur</cite>. De Ver. R. C. lib. ii. [So that the -Gospel should be a touchstone, to test the honesty of men’s dispositions.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_251" id="Footnote_251"></a><a href="#FNanchor_251"><span class="label">[251]</span></a> Pp. <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_252" id="Footnote_252"></a><a href="#FNanchor_252"><span class="label">[252]</span></a> [See <span class="smcap">Witsii</span> Meletemeta, Diss. IV.: <span class="smcap">Pfafii</span> Disput.: <span class="smcap">Campbell</span> on Miracles: -<span class="smcap">Douglass’</span> Criterion: <span class="smcap">Farmer’s</span> Dissertations: <span class="smcap">Paley’s</span> Evid.: <span class="smcap">Taylor’s</span> Apol. -of Ben Mordecai: <span class="smcap">Tucker’s</span> Light of Nat.: <span class="smcap">Watson’s</span> Tracts, vol. iv.: <span class="smcap">Jortin’s</span> -Sermons: Bp. <span class="smcap">Fleetwood’s</span> Essays: <span class="smcap">Boyle</span> Lectures: <span class="smcap">Lardner’s</span> Credibility.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_253" id="Footnote_253"></a><a href="#FNanchor_253"><span class="label">[253]</span></a> [“The miracles of the Jewish historian, are intimately connected with all -the civil affairs, and make a necessary and inseparable part. The whole -history is founded in them; it consists of little else; and if it were not a -history of them, it would be a history of nothing.”—<span class="smcap">Bolingbroke</span>, Posthumous -Works, vol. iii. p. 279.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_254" id="Footnote_254"></a><a href="#FNanchor_254"><span class="label">[254]</span></a> [An admirable work on this recondite mode of proving the truth of the New -Testament narrative, is <span class="smcap">Paley’s</span> Horæ Paulinæ. The same department of evidence -is ably handled by <span class="smcap">Birk</span>, in his Horæ Evangelicæ, and Horæ Apostolicæ: -<span class="smcap">Graves</span> on the Pentateuch: and <span class="smcap">Blunt</span> in his “Undesigned Coincidences both -of the Old and New Testament.” <span class="smcap">Grotius</span>, De Veritate, has some excellent -passages on the same subject.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_255" id="Footnote_255"></a><a href="#FNanchor_255"><span class="label">[255]</span></a> [Clem. Rom. Ep. 1. c. 47.] <span class="smcap">Clement</span>, who is here quoted, lived in the first -century, and is mentioned Phil. iv. 3. His epistle to the Corinthians, written -in Greek, contains the passage here referred to, which may be thus translated: -“Take the letter of the blessed Paul the Apostle. What did he write to you, -in the first beginning of the Gospel? Truly he sent you a divinely inspired -letter about himself, and Cephas, and Apollos.”</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_256" id="Footnote_256"></a><a href="#FNanchor_256"><span class="label">[256]</span></a> Gal. i.: 1 Cor. xi. 23, &c.: 1 Cor. xv. 8.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_257" id="Footnote_257"></a><a href="#FNanchor_257"><span class="label">[257]</span></a> Rom. xv. 19: 1 Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10-28, &c., and xiii. 1, 2, 8, and the whole -14th chapter: 2 Cor. xii. 12, 13: Gal. iii. 2, 5.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_258" id="Footnote_258"></a><a href="#FNanchor_258"><span class="label">[258]</span></a> See the Koran, chap. xiii. and chap. xvii.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_259" id="Footnote_259"></a><a href="#FNanchor_259"><span class="label">[259]</span></a> [<span class="smcap">Mahomet</span> expressly declares that he worked no <em>public</em> miracles in confirmation -of his mission, “because the former nations have charged them with -imposture.” He claims, however, to have had private miraculous assurances -of his mission, and most preposterous they were.<span class="smcap">Whately</span>, in his Christian Evidences, has handled this aspect of miracles -with great ability. See also <span class="smcap">Paley’s</span> Evidences, sec. 3: and <span class="smcap">Gibbon’s</span> Decline -and Fall, chap. 1.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_260" id="Footnote_260"></a><a href="#FNanchor_260"><span class="label">[260]</span></a> [<span class="smcap">Alexander</span>, in his Evidences, and several other writers have placed this -argument in a very convincing light. <span class="smcap">Arnobius</span>, one of the earliest Christian -writers, asks, “Shall we say that the men of those times were inconsiderate, -deceitful, stupid, and brutish enough to feign having seen what they never -saw? and that when they might have lived in peace and comfort, they chose -gratuitous hatred and obloquy?”The <em>rejection</em> of Christianity by so many in the first age was the result of -the continued action of personal and hereditary prejudice and depravity, -capable of resisting any supposable evidence. The <em>reception</em> of Christianity -by multitudes, under the same evidences, and to their immediate personal -damage, shows strongly that there was enough evidence to produce those -effects. Thus the rejection by some does not countervail the acceptance by -others.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_261" id="Footnote_261"></a><a href="#FNanchor_261"><span class="label">[261]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_262" id="Footnote_262"></a><a href="#FNanchor_262"><span class="label">[262]</span></a> [Compare <span class="smcap">Butler’s</span> Sermons; on Balaam, and on Self-deceit.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_263" id="Footnote_263"></a><a href="#FNanchor_263"><span class="label">[263]</span></a> See the foregoing chapter.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_264" id="Footnote_264"></a><a href="#FNanchor_264"><span class="label">[264]</span></a> [“Whenever a general scheme is known to be pursued by a writer, that -scheme becomes the true key in the hands of his reader, for unlocking the -meaning of particular parts, which would otherwise not be seen clearly to refer -to such scheme. The inspired writers had one common and predominant -scheme in view, which was to <em>bear testimony to Jesus</em>. Whatever passages -occur in their writings, which bear an apt and easy resemblance to the history -of Jesus, may, or rather must in all reasonable construction, be applied to -him.”—<span class="smcap">Hurd</span> on the Proph., p. 117.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_265" id="Footnote_265"></a><a href="#FNanchor_265"><span class="label">[265]</span></a> [Consult on this point, <span class="smcap">Gulick</span>, Theologia Prophetica: <span class="smcap">Vitringa</span>, Observationes: -<span class="smcap">Hengstenburg</span>, Christologia: <span class="smcap">Horsley’s</span> Tracts and Sermons: <span class="smcap">King’s</span> -Morsels of Criticism: <span class="smcap">Waugh’s</span> Dissertations: <span class="smcap">Lyall’s</span> Propœdia Prophetica.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_266" id="Footnote_266"></a><a href="#FNanchor_266"><span class="label">[266]</span></a> It appears that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in this way. For -Jerome on the place says: <cite>Duas posteriores bestias—in uno Macedonum regno -ponit</cite>. And as to the ten kings; <cite>Decem reges enumerat, qui fuerunt sævissimi: -ipsosque reges non unius ponit regni, verbi gratia, Macedoniæ, Syriæ, Asiæ, et -Ægypti; sed de diversis regnis unum efficit regum ordinem</cite>. [“The two latter -beasts he places in one of the Macedonian kingdoms.” “He reckons up ten kings -who had been excessively cruel and these not kings of one country, as Macedonia, -for instance, or Syria, or Asia, or Egypt; but makes up his set of kings -out of different kingdoms.”] In this way of interpretation, any thing may be -made of any thing.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_267" id="Footnote_267"></a><a href="#FNanchor_267"><span class="label">[267]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_268" id="Footnote_268"></a><a href="#FNanchor_268"><span class="label">[268]</span></a> John i. 3.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_269" id="Footnote_269"></a><a href="#FNanchor_269"><span class="label">[269]</span></a> Eph. iii. 9.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_270" id="Footnote_270"></a><a href="#FNanchor_270"><span class="label">[270]</span></a> Acts iii. 21.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_271" id="Footnote_271"></a><a href="#FNanchor_271"><span class="label">[271]</span></a> Rev. x. 7.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_272" id="Footnote_272"></a><a href="#FNanchor_272"><span class="label">[272]</span></a> Dan. ii. 44.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_273" id="Footnote_273"></a><a href="#FNanchor_273"><span class="label">[273]</span></a> Dan. vii. 22.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_274" id="Footnote_274"></a><a href="#FNanchor_274"><span class="label">[274]</span></a> Rev. xi. 17, 18; xx. 6.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_275" id="Footnote_275"></a><a href="#FNanchor_275"><span class="label">[275]</span></a> Dan. vii. 27.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_276" id="Footnote_276"></a><a href="#FNanchor_276"><span class="label">[276]</span></a> <a href="#II_CHAPTER_II">Chap. ii.</a> <a href="#II_CHAPTER_III">iii.</a> &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_277" id="Footnote_277"></a><a href="#FNanchor_277"><span class="label">[277]</span></a> Deut. xxviii. 64; xxx. 2, 3: Isa. xlv. 17.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_278" id="Footnote_278"></a><a href="#FNanchor_278"><span class="label">[278]</span></a> Isa. lx. 21: Jer. xxx. 11; xlvi. 28: Amos ix. 14, 15: Jer. xxxi. 36.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_279" id="Footnote_279"></a><a href="#FNanchor_279"><span class="label">[279]</span></a> Isa. viii. 14, 15; xlix. 5; chap. liii.: Mal. i. 10, 11, and chap. iii.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_280" id="Footnote_280"></a><a href="#FNanchor_280"><span class="label">[280]</span></a> Isa. xlix. 6, chap. ii., chap, xi., chap. lvi. 7: Mal. i. 11. To which must -be added, the other prophecies of the like kind, several in the New Testament, -and very many in the Old; which describe what shall be the completion of the -revealed plan of Providence.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_281" id="Footnote_281"></a><a href="#FNanchor_281"><span class="label">[281]</span></a> [See <span class="smcap">Davidson’s</span> Disc. on Proph.: <span class="smcap">Blaney</span> on Daniel’s LXX. Weeks: -<span class="smcap">Hurd’s</span> Introd. to the Study of Proph.: <span class="smcap">Jortin’s</span> Ser. at Boyle Lect.: <span class="smcap">Fuller’s</span> -Gosp. its own Witness, part ii.: <span class="smcap">Waugh’s</span> Diss.: <span class="smcap">Apthorpe’s</span> Discourses.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_282" id="Footnote_282"></a><a href="#FNanchor_282"><span class="label">[282]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_250">250</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_283" id="Footnote_283"></a><a href="#FNanchor_283"><span class="label">[283]</span></a> [Hundreds of instances might be adduced, in which profane historians -corroborate the statements of the Scriptures. The following are merely specimens: -<span class="smcap">Diodorus Siculus</span>, <span class="smcap">Strabo</span>, <span class="smcap">Tacitus</span>, <span class="smcap">Pliny</span>, and <span class="smcap">Solinus</span>, speak of -the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. The lives of David and Solomon are -given in the remains of the <span class="smcap">Phœnician Annals</span>, in <span class="smcap">Damascenus</span>, and <span class="smcap">Eupolemus</span>. -<span class="smcap">Menander</span> describes the carrying away of the Ten Tribes by Salmanasor. -<span class="smcap">Suetonius</span>, <span class="smcap">Tacitus</span>, <span class="smcap">Pliny</span> the younger, and <span class="smcap">Numenius</span>, speak of -Jesus Christ. His miracles are owned by <span class="smcap">Celsus</span>, <span class="smcap">Porphyry</span>, <span class="smcap">Julian</span>, and -Jewish writers opposed to Christianity. <span class="smcap">Suetonius</span>, <span class="smcap">Tacitus</span>, <span class="smcap">Pliny</span>, <span class="smcap">Julian</span>, -and others describe his being put to death; and <span class="smcap">Tacitus</span> says that many were -put to death for adhering to his religion. <span class="smcap">Phlegon</span> mentions the miracles of -Peter; and Paul is enumerated among eminent authors, in a fragment of -<span class="smcap">Longinus</span>.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_284" id="Footnote_284"></a><a href="#FNanchor_284"><span class="label">[284]</span></a> [This thought is elaborated with skill by <span class="smcap">Whately</span> in his “<cite>Historic Doubts</cite>.” -He takes up all the popular infidel objections as to the life of Christ, and applies -them with undiminished or even increased force against the evidences that such -a man as Buonaparte ever existed.<span class="smcap">Johnson</span> in a lively sally once said—“‘It is easy to be on the negative side. -I deny that Canada is taken. The French are a much more numerous people -than we; and it is not likely they would allow us to take it.’ ‘But the Government -have announced the fact.’ ‘Very true. But the ministry have put us to -an enormous expense by the war in America, and it is their interest to persuade -us that we have got something for our money.’ ‘But the fact is confirmed by -thousands who were at the taking of it.’ ‘Aye, but these men have an interest -in deceiving us: they don’t want you should think the French have beat them. -Now suppose you go over and find it so, that would only satisfy yourself; for -when you come back we will not believe you. We will say you have been -bribed.’”—<span class="smcap">Boswell.</span>]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_285" id="Footnote_285"></a><a href="#FNanchor_285"><span class="label">[285]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_286" id="Footnote_286"></a><a href="#FNanchor_286"><span class="label">[286]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_287" id="Footnote_287"></a><a href="#FNanchor_287"><span class="label">[287]</span></a> Deut. xxviii. 37.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_288" id="Footnote_288"></a><a href="#FNanchor_288"><span class="label">[288]</span></a> All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not reducible to the -head of certain miracles, or determinate completions of prophecy. See p. <a href="#Page_263">263</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_289" id="Footnote_289"></a><a href="#FNanchor_289"><span class="label">[289]</span></a> [Butler states this argument with more than his usual brevity, and its -force is not seen without reflection. “If contrivance or accident could have -given to Christianity <em>any</em> of its apparent testimonies, its miracles, its prophecies, -its morals, its propagation, or [the character of] its founder, there could -be no room to believe, or even imagine, that <em>all</em> these appearances of great -credibility, could be <em>united together</em>, by any such means. If successful craft -could have contrived its public miracles, or the pretence of them, it requires -another reach of craft, to adopt its prophecies to the same object. Further, it -required not only a different, but a totally opposite art to conceive and promulgate -its admirable morals. Again, its propagation, in defiance of the -powers and terrors of the world, implied still other qualities of action. Lastly, -the model of the life of its founder, is a work of such originality and wisdom, -as could be the offspring only of consummate powers of invention, or rather -never could have been <em>devised</em>, but must have come from real life. The hypothesis -sinks under its incredibility. Each of these suppositions of contrivance, -being arbitrary and unsupported, the climax of them is an extravagance.”—<span class="smcap">Davison</span>, -on Prophecy.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_290" id="Footnote_290"></a><a href="#FNanchor_290"><span class="label">[290]</span></a> 1 John iv. 18.—[“There is no fear in love,” &c.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_291" id="Footnote_291"></a><a href="#FNanchor_291"><span class="label">[291]</span></a> [Obedience from dread, if it continue to be the only motive, precludes advance -toward perfection; for “He that feareth is not made perfect in love.” -But obedience from a discernment of the reasonableness and beneficence of -religion, and of the perfections of its Author, increases love till it “casteth out -fear.”]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_292" id="Footnote_292"></a><a href="#FNanchor_292"><span class="label">[292]</span></a> [See a discussion of this subject, in <span class="smcap">Bayle’s</span> Historical and Biographical -Dictionary: art. <span class="smcap">Xenophanes</span>: notes D, E, F, G.]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_293" id="Footnote_293"></a><a href="#FNanchor_293"><span class="label">[293]</span></a> See <a href="#DISSERTATION_II">Dissertation II</a>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_294" id="Footnote_294"></a><a href="#FNanchor_294"><span class="label">[294]</span></a> [It is remarked by <span class="smcap">Dean Fitzgerald</span>, that “It is not inconceivable that -the Almighty should apply such a test of men’s candor and fidelity, as should -require them first to act upon a thing as true, before they were so fully satisfied -of its truth as to leave no doubt remaining. Such a course of action -might be the appointed, and for all we know, the only possible way of overcoming -habits of thought and feeling, repugnant to the belief demanded, so -that a fixed religious faith might be the reward, as it were, of a sincere course -of prudent behavior.”]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_295" id="Footnote_295"></a><a href="#FNanchor_295"><span class="label">[295]</span></a> By <em>arguing upon the principles of others</em>, the reader will observe is meant, -not proving any thing <em>from</em> those principles, but <em>notwithstanding</em> them. Thus -religion is proved, not <em>from</em> the opinion of necessity; which is absurd: but, -<em>notwithstanding</em> or <em>even though</em> that opinion were admitted to be true.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_296" id="Footnote_296"></a><a href="#FNanchor_296"><span class="label">[296]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_297" id="Footnote_297"></a><a href="#FNanchor_297"><span class="label">[297]</span></a> Prov. xx. 27.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_298" id="Footnote_298"></a><a href="#FNanchor_298"><span class="label">[298]</span></a> Serm. at the <i>Rolls</i>, p. 106.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_299" id="Footnote_299"></a><a href="#FNanchor_299"><span class="label">[299]</span></a> John iii. 16: Heb. v. 9.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_300" id="Footnote_300"></a><a href="#FNanchor_300"><span class="label">[300]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_301" id="Footnote_301"></a><a href="#FNanchor_301"><span class="label">[301]</span></a> Locke’s Works, vol. i. p. 146.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_302" id="Footnote_302"></a><a href="#FNanchor_302"><span class="label">[302]</span></a> Locke, pp. 146, 147.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_303" id="Footnote_303"></a><a href="#FNanchor_303"><span class="label">[303]</span></a> Locke, p. 152.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_304" id="Footnote_304"></a><a href="#FNanchor_304"><span class="label">[304]</span></a> See an answer to Dr. Clarke’s Third Defence of his Letter to Mr. Podwell, -2d edit. p. 44, 56, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_305" id="Footnote_305"></a><a href="#FNanchor_305"><span class="label">[305]</span></a> [“One is continually reminded throughout this dissertation, of what is -called <em>The common-sense school</em> of Scotch metaphysicians. Nor can there be -any doubt that <span class="smcap">Reid</span>, in particular, was largely indebted to Butler, of whose -writings he was a diligent student, for forming that sober and manly character -of understanding which is, I think, his great merit.”—<span class="smcap">Fitzgerald.</span>]</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_306" id="Footnote_306"></a><a href="#FNanchor_306"><span class="label">[306]</span></a> This way of speaking is taken from -Epictetus,<a name="FNanchor_A3" id="FNanchor_A3"></a><a href="#Footnote_A3" class="fnanchor">[A]</a> and is made use of as -seeming the most full, and least liable to cavil. And the moral faculty may be -understood to have these two epithets, δοκιμαστικὴ and ἀποδοκιμαστικὴ [applauding -and condemning] upon a double account; because, upon a survey of actions, -whether before or after they are done, it determines them to be good or evil; -and also because it determines itself to be the guide of action and of life, in -contradistinction from all other faculties, or natural principles of action; in -the very same manner as speculative reason <em>directly</em> and naturally judges of -speculative truth and falsehood: and at the same time is attended with a consciousness -upon <em>reflection</em>, that the natural right to judge of them belongs to it.</p> - -<div class="subfootnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_A3" id="Footnote_A3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_A3"><span class="label">[A]</span></a> Arr. Epict. lib. i. cap. i.</p> - -</div> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_307" id="Footnote_307"></a><a href="#FNanchor_307"><span class="label">[307]</span></a> Οὐδὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία—ἐν πείσει ἀλλὰ ἐνεργείᾳ, [Virtue and vice are not in feeling, -but in action,] M. Anton, lib. ix. 16. Virtutis laus omnis in actione consistit. -[The whole praise of virtue, depends on action.] Cic. Off. lib. i. cap. 6.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_308" id="Footnote_308"></a><a href="#FNanchor_308"><span class="label">[308]</span></a> P. <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.</p> - -</div> - -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[333]</a></span></p> - -<h2 id="INDEX_TO_PART_I">INDEX TO PART I.</h2> - -<p class="center">REFERENCES TO THE EDITOR’S NOTES ARE IN BRACKETS.</p> - -<ul> - -<li class="ifrst">Abstract reasonings may mislead, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> -<li class="isub1">fitness of things, <i>note</i> <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Actions</li> -<li class="isub1">distinguished from their qualities, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> -<li class="isub1">manifest character, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> -<li class="isub1">rewarded and punished, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> -<li class="isub1">this world a theater of, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> -<li class="isub1">what sort exercise virtue, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Active and passive impressions, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Advantages of virtue, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may never recur, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Affections, excited by objects, <a href="#Page_145">145</a></li> -<li class="isub1">need control, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> -<li class="isub1">part of our constitution, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Affliction, a discipline, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> -<li class="isub1">chiefly of our own making, <a href="#Page_100">100</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Agent, the living, not compounded, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Alienation of parts of our body, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li> - -<li class="indx">All things made double, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Allurements, use of, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Analogy</li> -<li class="isub1">answers objections as to a present state of trial, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></li> -<li class="isub1">as to modes of existence, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> -<li class="isub1">carrying the force of positive argument, <a href="#Page_105">[105</a></li> -<li class="isub1">deals only with facts, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> -<li class="isub1">indicates future punishment, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may amount to proof, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> -<li class="isub1">objections which it cannot answer, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the only proof of some things, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Antiquity of religion, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Atheists not argued with, in this treatise, <a href="#Page_181">181</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Beginnings of a righteous government seen on earth, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bible, teaches the existence of general laws, <a href="#Page_99">[99</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bodies</li> -<li class="isub1">not necessary to us, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not ourselves, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> -<li class="isub1">only instruments, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li> -<li class="isub1">their solid elements, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bodily and mental habits, <a href="#Page_134">134</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Brain, does not think, <a href="#Page_89">[89</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Brahminical notion of death, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Brutes,</li> -<li class="isub1">are they immortal?, <a href="#Page_88">[88</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may have greater strength than man, <a href="#Page_119">119</a></li> -<li class="isub1">under man’s control, <a href="#Page_119">119</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Capacities,</li> -<li class="isub1">state of in infancy, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not destroyed by death, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not dependent on the body, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Causes and ends incomprehensible, <a href="#Page_172">172</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Changes compatible with identity, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Character</li> -<li class="isub1">manifested by probation, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not given but acquired, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> -<li class="isub1">what it means, <i>note</i> <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Conscience,</li> -<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[334]</a></span>how it acts, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> -<li class="isub1">implies government, <a href="#Page_115">115</a></li> -<li class="isub2">a rule, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> -<li class="isub2">authority, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> -<li class="isub2">future retribution, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may be impaired, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> -<li class="isub1">perverted, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Consciousness an indiscerptible entity, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li> -<li class="isub1">presupposes identity, <a href="#Page_77">[77</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Consequences</li> -<li class="isub1">may sometimes be avoided, <a href="#Page_102">102</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may be foreseen, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> -<li class="isub1">show a moral government, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Course of nature constant, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Creatures finitely perfect, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may fall, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li> -<li class="isub1">have each a way of life, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Danger of wrong doing, how increased, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> - -<li class="indx" id="death">Death</li> -<li class="isub1">and birth similar, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li> -<li class="isub1">enlarges our sphere, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> -<li class="isub1">has no power over matter, <a href="#Page_91">[91</a></li> -<li class="isub1">is not a suspension of our powers, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li> -<li class="isub1">is not our destruction, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li> -<li class="isub1">what it is, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Decay of vegetables, inference from, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Definitions of identity, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Delivering up of the Lord Jesus Christ, <a href="#Page_111">[111</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Destruction of seeds, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Different states of human existence, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Difficulties belong to all subjects, <a href="#Page_96">[96</a></li> -<li class="isub1">exercise the virtuous principle, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Disadvantages of virtue temporary, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Discipline, its true nature and use, <a href="#Page_148">[148</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Disease not destructive to the soul, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> -<li class="isub1">sometimes remedial, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Disorder produced by sin, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Distress excites passive pity and active relief, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Distributive justice a natural rule, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Divine government a scheme, <a href="#I_CHAPTER_VII"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. VII.</span></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Domestic government, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Dreams, what they prove, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Earthly satisfactions attainable, <a href="#Page_183">183</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Effects of actions on the actor, <a href="#Page_143">[143</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ends often produced by unlikely means, <a href="#Page_180">180</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Enjoyments in our own power to a great degree, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Error, how spread, <a href="#Page_96">[96</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Evidence of natural religion, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Evil, may possibly be useful, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its possible origin, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not a necessary part of probation, <a href="#Page_128">[128</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Exceptions to the happiness of virtue, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Experience indispensable, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Faculties, human, not perfect at first, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fall of man, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_148">[148</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fallacy in fatalism, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fallen creatures require discipline, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fatalism,—see <a href="#necessity"><i>Necessity</i></a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Fear a proper motive to obedience, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Folly, destructive, as well as crime, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Formal notion of government, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Foundation of moral improvement, <a href="#Page_108">[108</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Future advantages, how proportioned, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Future existence probable, <a href="#I_CHAPTER_I"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. I.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">of brutes, <a href="#Page_79">[79</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Future interest dependent on conduct, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Future life,</li> -<li class="isub1">a solemn subject, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not an inactive condition, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li> -<li class="isub1">reconcilable with atheism, <a href="#Page_94">94</a></li> -<li class="isub1">this life preparatory to it, <a href="#I_CHAPTER_V"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. V.</span></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Future punishment credible, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[335]</a></span>Future retribution, how proved, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Future state</li> -<li class="isub1">different from the present, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> -<li class="isub1">brings us into new scenes, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may have temptations, <a href="#Page_145">[145</a></li> -<li class="isub1">social, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li> -<li class="isub1">will not require such virtues as does the present life, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">General laws</li> -<li class="isub1">govern the world, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_99">[99</a></li> -<li class="isub1">produce punishment, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li> -<li class="isub1">wisdom of them, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> - -<li class="indx">General method of God’s government, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> - -<li class="indx">General system of religion, <a href="#Page_124">124</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Gradual improvement, a wise arrangement, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> - -<li class="indx">GOD</li> -<li class="isub1">an intelligent governor, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> -<li class="isub1">determined by what is fit, <a href="#Page_166">[166</a></li> -<li class="isub1">governs by human instruments, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> -<li class="isub1">governs justly, <a href="#Page_108">[108</a></li> -<li class="isub1">has a will and a character, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his aims incomprehensible, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his attributes inferred from our own, <a href="#Page_115">[115</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his general government, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his government just and good, <a href="#Page_176">176</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his indirect commands, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> -<li class="isub1">moral government of, <a href="#I_CHAPTER_III"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. III.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">natural <span class="ditto-wide">”</span> , <span class="ditto">”</span> <a href="#I_CHAPTER_II"><span class="smcapuc">II.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">necessarily existent, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not indifferent to human actions, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not simply benevolent, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> -<li class="isub1">rewards and punishes, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the only necessary being, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Good actions, how punished, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Good habits necessary even to the virtuous, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Good men befriended as such, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> -<li class="isub1">cannot now all unite, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Good not forced upon us, <a href="#Page_134">[134</a></li> - -<li class="indx" id="government">Government,</li> -<li class="isub1">civil, an ordinance of God, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> -<li class="isub1">considered as a scheme, <a href="#I_CHAPTER_VII"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. VII.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">of God, <a href="#I_CHAPTER_II"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. II.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">not perfected in this world, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the formal notion of it, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the perfection of, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Habits,</li> -<li class="isub1">how formed, &c., <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> -<li class="isub1">necessary to us hereafter, <a href="#Page_145">[145</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of resignation, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> -<li class="isub1">often ruinous, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of virtue an improvement in virtue, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -<li class="isub1">passive, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li> -<li class="isub1">shape the character, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Happiness</li> -<li class="isub1">not always the <em>immediate</em> reward of virtue, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not given promiscuously, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li> -<li class="isub1">requisites for, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the result of virtue, <a href="#Page_118">118</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Helplessness of man, <a href="#Page_138">[138</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Higher degrees of retribution probable, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hinderances to virtue, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li> - -<li class="indx">History of religion, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Honest men befriend the honest, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hope and fear appeal to self-love, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> -<li class="isub1">are just principles of action, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Human life preparatory, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hume’s wonderful discovery, <a href="#Page_162">[162</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Human powers may be overtasked, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Identity</li> -<li class="isub1">does not depend on the sameness of the body, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of living agents, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not explicable, <a href="#Page_77">[77</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ignorance</li> -<li class="isub1">acknowledged on all subjects but religion, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> -<li class="isub1">answers objections, <a href="#Page_175">175</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the argument from, <a href="#Page_180">180</a></li> -<li class="isub1">total, destroys proof, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[336]</a></span>Illustration of the modification of an action by its intention, <a href="#Page_111">[111</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Imagination a source of discontent, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li> -<li class="isub1">produces much error, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Immortality of brutes, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Improvement</li> -<li class="isub1">by discipline, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li> -<li class="isub1">by habit, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of our faculties gradual, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> -<li class="isub1">wisdom of this, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Incomprehensibility of God’s plans, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Inconsiderateness destructive, <a href="#Page_102">102</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Inferiority of brute force, <a href="#Page_119">119</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Infidelity unjustifiable, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Insignificance of our knowledge, <a href="#Page_174">[174</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Interest coincident with virtue, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not a sufficient restraint, <i>note</i> <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Interpositions to prevent irregularities, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></li> -<li class="isub1">would produce evil, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Intentional good rewarded, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Irregularities perhaps unavoidable, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></li> -<li class="isub1">seeming may not be such, <a href="#Page_176">176</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Inward peace attends virtue, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Kingdom, idea of a perfect, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Knowledge of man insignificant, <a href="#Page_174">[174</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Liberty does not account for the fall, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -<li class="isub1">implied in our present condition, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Life a probation, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> -<li class="isub1">one part of it preparatory to another, <a href="#Page_142">[142</a></li> -<li class="isub1">what is it intended for, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Living agent not subject to death, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Living powers, see <a href="#death"><i>Death</i></a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Locke on human identity, <a href="#Page_77">[77</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Maimonides, his similitude, <a href="#Page_173">[173</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Man</li> -<li class="isub1">an inferior part of creation, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></li> -<li class="isub1">a system of parts, <a href="#Page_98">[98</a></li> -<li class="isub1">by nature social, <a href="#Page_93">[93</a></li> -<li class="isub1">capable of improvement, <a href="#Page_145">145</a></li> -<li class="isub1">connected with present, past, and future, <a href="#Page_181">181</a></li> -<li class="isub1">dealt with as if free, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> -<li class="isub1">has a moral nature, <a href="#Page_115">115</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his fall not accounted for by his free agency, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his helplessness, <a href="#Page_138">[138</a></li> -<li class="isub1">knows nothing fully, <a href="#Page_173">173</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may become qualified for new states, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not a competent judge of God’s schemes, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> -<li class="isub1">requires moral culture, <a href="#Page_145">145</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mania often produced by moral causes, <a href="#Page_85">[85</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Materialism, its philosophical absurdity, <a href="#Page_81">[81</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Matter and mind not the same, <a href="#Page_83">[83</a></li> -<li class="isub1">affect each other, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Means</li> -<li class="isub1">learned by experience, <a href="#Page_176">176</a></li> -<li class="isub1">man not a competent judge of the fitness of them, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not always agreeable, <a href="#Page_176">176</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Men often miss possible temporal good, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Men’s temporal interests greatly depend on themselves, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Might of unarmed virtue, <a href="#Page_121">[121</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mind</li> -<li class="isub1">influenced by the passions, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> -<li class="isub1">is the man, <a href="#Page_87">[87</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its effects on the body, <a href="#Page_85">[85</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may survive the body, <a href="#Page_89">[89</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the only real percipient, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li> -<li class="isub1">uses the body as an instrument, <a href="#Page_87">[87</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Miracles, properly speaking, not unnatural, <a href="#Page_94">94</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Miseries as contingent as conduct, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></li> -<li class="isub1">generally are avoidable, <a href="#Page_100">100</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mixture of suffering and enjoyment in this world, <a href="#Page_128">[128</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Moral and natural government of God similar to each other, <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Moral attributes of God may be inferred from our own, <a href="#Page_115">[115</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[337]</a></span>Moral discipline, <a href="#I_CHAPTER_V"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. V.</span></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Moral government of God, <a href="#I_CHAPTER_III"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. III.</span></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Moral improvement, basis of, <a href="#Page_108">[108</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Moral world, its apparent irregularities, <a href="#Page_176">176</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mystery of God, finished, <i>note</i> <a href="#Page_102">102</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Natural, the true meaning of the word, <a href="#Page_94">94</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Natural government of God, <a href="#I_CHAPTER_II"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. II.</span></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Natural religion,</li> -<li class="isub1">its evidences not affected by the doctrine of necessity, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> -<li class="isub1">proof of, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> -<li class="isub1">teaches the doctrine of punishment, <a href="#Page_102">102</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Necessary agents may be punished, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Necessary bulk of one’s self, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Necessary existence of God, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Necessary tendencies of virtue, <a href="#Page_118">118</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Negligence and folly disastrous, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> - -<li class="indx" id="necessity">Necessity</li> -<li class="isub1">consigns us to a fallacy, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li> -<li class="isub1">contradicts the constitution of nature, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">destroys no proof of religion, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">different kinds of, <a href="#Page_157">[157</a></li> -<li class="isub1">does not exclude design, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li> -<li class="isub1">doctrine of, <a href="#I_CHAPTER_VI"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. VI.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">not an agent, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not applicable to practice, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not in conflict with religion, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li> -<li class="isub1">our condition indicates freedom, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> -<li class="isub1">reconcilable with religion, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the doctrine absurd, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li> -<li class="isub1">what it means, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> -<li class="isub1">writers for and against, <a href="#Page_170">[170</a></li> - -<li class="indx">New scenes in the next world, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Obedience, reluctant, useful, <a href="#Page_152">[152</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Objections,</li> -<li class="isub1">against a proof and against a thing to be proved, <a href="#Page_179">179</a></li> -<li class="isub1">against the scheme of Providence, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> -<li class="isub1">analogy of plants, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Christianity not universal, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li> -<li class="isub1">course of nature, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> -<li class="isub1">destruction of seeds, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> -<li class="isub1">difference between temporal and eternal things, <a href="#Page_135">[135</a></li> -<li class="isub1">discipline might have been avoided, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> -<li class="isub1">God simply benevolent, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> -<li class="isub1">good and evil may be mixed in the next world, <a href="#Page_124">124</a></li> -<li class="isub1">gratification of appetites natural and proper, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> -<li class="isub1">ignorance, the argument from invalidates the proof of religion, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> -<li class="isub1">immortality of brutes, <a href="#Page_87">87</a></li> -<li class="isub1">incredible that necessary agents should be punished, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li> -<li class="isub1">irregularities of the moral world, <a href="#Page_176">176</a></li> -<li class="isub1">necessity destroys the proof of religion, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> -<li class="isub1">our powers may be overtasked, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li> -<li class="isub1">probabilities may be overbalanced by probabilities, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li> -<li class="isub1">punishments are only natural events, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li> -<li class="isub1">rectitude arising from hope and fear, sordid, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> -<li class="isub1">rewards and punishments, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> -<li class="isub1">sin need not have entered the world, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></li> -<li class="isub1">society punishes good actions, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> -<li class="isub1">special interpositions might prevent evil, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> -<li class="isub1">to the doctrine of necessity, <a href="#I_CHAPTER_VI"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. VI.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">to the doctrine of future punishments, <a href="#Page_100">100-103</a></li> -<li class="isub1">virtue sometimes punished, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> -<li class="isub1">virtues of the present life not wanted hereafter, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li> -<li class="isub1">world disciplines some to vice, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Obligation certain, when proofs are not, <a href="#Page_179">179</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Occasional disadvantages of virtue, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[338]</a></span>Occasional indulgences in wrong-doing awfully dangerous, <a href="#Page_143">[143</a></li> - -<li class="indx">One period of life preparatory to another, <a href="#Page_142">[142</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Opportunities once lost irrecoverable, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Organs of sense mere instruments, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Our moral nature proves a moral government, <a href="#Page_115">115</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Pain, no contrivance for it in man, <a href="#Page_110">[110</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Partial ignorance does not destroy proof, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Passions</li> -<li class="isub1">carry away the judgment, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> -<li class="isub1">make our condition one of trial, <a href="#Page_130">130</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may account for the fall of man, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may be excited where gratification is impossible or unlawful, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may remain in a future state, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -<li class="isub1">should be subject to the moral principle, <a href="#Page_145">145</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the bare excitement of, not criminal, <a href="#Page_145">145</a></li> -<li class="isub2">but dangerous, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Passive habits, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Passive impressions weakened by repetition, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Passive submission essential, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Peace of the virtuous, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Perception, instruments of, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li> -<li class="isub1">possible without instruments, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Perfection of moral government, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of an earthly kingdom, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Persecution unnatural, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Philosophy never arrogant, <a href="#Page_174">[174</a></li> -<li class="isub1">what it cannot teach, <a href="#Page_87">[87</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Pleasure</li> -<li class="isub1">not a sufficient reason for action, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> -<li class="isub1">and pain mostly depend on ourselves, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the distribution indicates moral government, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Powers</li> -<li class="isub1">may be improved by exercise, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may be overtasked, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may exist and not be exercised, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li> -<li class="isub1">no reason for supposing that death will destroy them, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Practical proof, what, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Present existence unaccounted for by atheism, <a href="#Page_94">94</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Presumptions that death will destroy us, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> -<li class="isub1">that it will suspend our existence, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Presumptuousness unjustifiable, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Private vices not public benefits, <a href="#Page_111">[111</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Probabilities in favor of religion may be overbalanced by probabilities against it, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Probation, <a href="#I_CHAPTER_IV"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. IV.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">applies to the present life as well as the future, <a href="#Page_130">130</a></li> -<li class="isub1">does not necessarily imply suffering, <a href="#Page_128">[128</a></li> -<li class="isub1">implies allurements, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> -<li class="isub1">is more than moral government, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> -<li class="isub1">requires severe discipline, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Proofs of natural religion, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of religion not affected by the doctrine of necessity, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Propensions necessarily create temptations, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> -<li class="isub1">are excited by their appropriate objects, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Proper gratification of the appetites, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Prosperity of a virtuous community, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may beget discontent, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Providence, objections to God’s, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Public spirit a fruit of virtue, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Punishment</li> -<li class="isub1">an alarming subject, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> -<li class="isub1">especially considered, <a href="#Page_100">100</a></li> -<li class="isub1">greater hereafter than now, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li> -<li class="isub1">in a future state credible, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></li> -<li class="isub1">is God’s voice of instruction, <a href="#Page_108">[108</a></li> -<li class="isub1">is sometimes capital, <a href="#Page_102">102</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not unjust, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[339]</a></span>often long delayed, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> -<li class="isub1">often overtakes suddenly, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of virtuous actions, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> -<li class="isub1">religious and natural similar, <a href="#Page_100">100</a></li> -<li class="isub1">results from folly as well as crime, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the result of general laws, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Quotations.</li> -<li class="isub1">Aristotle, <a href="#Page_152">[152</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Chalmers, <a href="#Page_131">[131</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Cicero, <a href="#Page_82">[82</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Clarke, <a href="#Page_97">[97</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Fitzgerald, <a href="#Page_145">[145</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Robert Hall, <a href="#Page_118">[118</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hume, <a href="#Page_162">[162</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Maimonides, <a href="#Page_173">[173</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Mandeville, <a href="#Page_111">[111</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Plato, <a href="#Page_87">[87</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Son of Sirac, <a href="#Page_137">[137</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Strabo, <a href="#Page_92">[92</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Rashness, consequences of, <a href="#Page_96">96</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Reason</li> -<li class="isub1">an incompetent judge of means, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> -<li class="isub1">gives power over brute force, <a href="#Page_119">119</a></li> -<li class="isub1">needs experience, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not dependent on bodily powers, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li> -<li class="isub1">requires a fair opportunity, <a href="#Page_119">119-121</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Recapitulation of the whole argument, <a href="#Page_180">180</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Rectitude, is self-interest a proper motive to it?, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> - -<li class="indx">References to other authors.</li> -<li class="isub1">Bates, <a href="#Page_128">[128</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Baxter, <a href="#Page_88">[88</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Bayle, <a href="#Page_88">[88</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Beattie, <a href="#Page_170">[170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Belsham, <a href="#Page_170">[170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Berkeley, <a href="#Page_111">[111</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Bonnett, <a href="#Page_89">[89</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Bramhall, <a href="#Page_171">[171</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Brown, <a href="#Page_111">[111</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Bryant, <a href="#Page_171">[171</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Butterworth, <a href="#Page_107">[107</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Calcott, <a href="#Page_128">[128</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Capp, <a href="#Page_109">[109</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Chalmers, <a href="#Page_77">[77</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Charnock, <a href="#Page_158">[158</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Cheyne, <a href="#Page_88">[88</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Clarke, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_81">[81</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Colliber, <a href="#Page_88">[88</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Collings, <a href="#Page_158">[158</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Compte, <a href="#Page_170">[170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Crombie, <a href="#Page_170">[170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Crouse, <a href="#Page_170">[170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Davies, <a href="#Page_109">[109</a></li> -<li class="isub1">D’Holbach, <a href="#Page_170">[170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Descartes, <a href="#Page_88">[88</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Ditton, <a href="#Page_88">[88</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Doddridge, <a href="#Page_109">[109</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Dodwell, <a href="#Page_81">[81</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Dwight, <a href="#Page_109">[109</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Edwards, <a href="#Page_88">[88</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Fabricius, <a href="#Page_128">[128</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Fichte, <a href="#Page_170">[170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Gibbs, <a href="#Page_171">[171</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Grove, <a href="#Page_171">[171</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Haller, <a href="#Page_89">[89</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Harris, <a href="#Page_171">[171</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hartley, <a href="#Page_170">[170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hegel, <a href="#Page_170">[170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Henly, <a href="#Page_128">[128</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hobbes, <a href="#Page_170">[170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Holtzfusius, <a href="#Page_128">[128</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Holyoake, <a href="#Page_170">[170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Horseley, <a href="#Page_109">[109</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hume, <a href="#Page_88">[88</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hunt, <a href="#Page_109">[109</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Jackson, <a href="#Page_171">[171</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Konnicott, <a href="#Page_128">[128</a></li> -<li class="isub1">King, <a href="#Page_98">[98</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Law, <a href="#Page_98">[98</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Lawson, <a href="#Page_171">[171</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Le Clerc, <a href="#Page_128">[128</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Leland, <a href="#Page_109">[109</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Leroux, <a href="#Page_170">[170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Liefchild, <a href="#Page_109">[109</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Locke, <a href="#Page_88">[88</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Manton, <a href="#Page_128">[128</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Martineau, <a href="#Page_170">[170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Martinius, <a href="#Page_119">[119</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[340]</a></span>Milman, <a href="#Page_142">[142</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Morgagni, <a href="#Page_89">[89</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Morton, <a href="#Page_109">[109</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Musæus, <a href="#Page_128">[128</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Palmer, <a href="#Page_171">[171</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Pearson, <a href="#Page_128">[128</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Polignac, <a href="#Page_88">[88</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Porteus, <a href="#Page_109">[109</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Price, <a href="#Page_158">[158</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Priestley, <a href="#Page_142">[142</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Reid, <a href="#Page_170">[170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Rutherford, <a href="#Page_109">[109</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Search, <a href="#Page_88">[88</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Seed, <a href="#Page_109">[109</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Selden, <a href="#Page_128">[128</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Shaftesbury, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Sherlock, <a href="#Page_109">[109</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Shuckford, <a href="#Page_128">[128</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Son of Sirac, <a href="#Page_137">[137</a></li> -<li class="isub1">South, <a href="#Page_109">[109</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Stapfer, <a href="#Page_128">[128</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Strabo, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Toplady, <a href="#Page_128">[128</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Topping, <a href="#Page_109">[109</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Twisse, <a href="#Page_109">[109</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Wagstaff, <a href="#Page_88">[88</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Warburton, <a href="#Page_111">[111</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Watts, <a href="#Page_77">[77</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Whately, <a href="#Page_142">[142</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Willis, <a href="#Page_88">[88</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Wisheart, <a href="#Page_109">[109</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Witsius, <a href="#Page_128">[128</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Wittichius, <a href="#Page_109">[109</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Reflection not dependent on sensation, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Reformation is attended with discomfort, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may not prevent penalties, <a href="#Page_102">102</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Relation between us and our bodies, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Relations of things, limitless, <a href="#Page_173">173</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Religion</li> -<li class="isub1">a question of fact, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> -<li class="isub1">historical evidence of, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> -<li class="isub1">professed in all ages, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its proofs not affected by the doctrine of necessity, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li> -<li class="isub1">nor by our ignorance, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Reluctant obedience profitable, <a href="#Page_152">[152</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Remedies often very disagreeable, <a href="#Page_176">176</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Repentance may be too late, <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Requisites to the superiority of reason, <a href="#Page_119">119</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of virtue, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Resentment of injuries, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Resignation</li> -<li class="isub1">a temper consonant with God’s sovereignty, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> -<li class="isub1">essential to virtue, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the fruit of affliction, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the habit necessary hereafter, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Retributions are divine teachings, <a href="#Page_108">[108</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Revelation,</li> -<li class="isub1">antiquity of, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not improbable, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not universal, <i>note</i> <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Rewards and punishments, how distributed, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Satisfactions of virtue, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Scheme of God incomprehensible, <a href="#Page_172">172</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Self-denial, its relations to present happiness, <a href="#Page_134">134</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not essential to piety, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Self-discipline, what, <a href="#Page_148">[148</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Self-love</li> -<li class="isub1">a just principle of action, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li> -<li class="isub1">appealed to, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> -<li class="isub1">how moderated and disciplined, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not a sufficient restraint, <i>note</i> <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> -<li class="isub1">reasonable and safe, <a href="#Page_130">130</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sensation not necessary to reflection, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Senses not percipients, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Severe discipline necessary, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Similitude of a historical painting, <a href="#Page_174">[174</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Simplicity of the living agent, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sin, why not kept out of the world, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Skepticism does not justify irreligion, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Social, our nature essentially such, <a href="#Page_93">[93</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Society</li> -<li class="isub1">must punish vice, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> -<li class="isub1">natural and necessary, <a href="#Page_93">[93</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[341]</a></span>sometimes punishes the good, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Soul</li> -<li class="isub1">a simple substance, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not destroyed with the body, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not naturally immortal, <a href="#Page_81">[81</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Souls of brutes, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Special interpositions of Providence, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Stages of existence, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> - -<li class="indx">State of probation, <a href="#I_CHAPTER_IV"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. IV.</span></a></li> - -<li class="indx">State of discipline and improvement, <a href="#I_CHAPTER_V"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. V.</span></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Submissive temper necessary, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Subordinations exceedingly beneficial, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Subserviencies in nature, <a href="#Page_173">173</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sufferings may be avoided, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not necessary to the cultivation of virtue, <a href="#Page_128">[128</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Temporal and religious probation similar, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Temptations</li> -<li class="isub1">increased by bad examples, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> -<li class="isub1">and by former errors, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> -<li class="isub1">intended for our improvement, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> -<li class="isub1">involve probation, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may improve or injure us, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> -<li class="isub1">security against their evils, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> -<li class="isub1">sources of, to upright beings, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the necessary result of propensions, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tendencies of virtue, <a href="#Page_118">118</a></li> -<li class="isub1">hindered, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li> -<li class="isub1">essential, not accidental, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Terms “nature” and “course of nature”, <a href="#Page_97">[97</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Theorizing no aid to virtue, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Thoughtlessness often fatal, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Transmigration of souls, <a href="#Page_87">[87</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Trials</li> -<li class="isub1">manifest character, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may exist in a future state, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -<li class="isub1">produced by our propensions, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> -<li class="isub1">qualify for a better state, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li> -<li class="isub1">unreasonable ones are not inflicted, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></li> -<li class="isub1">why we are subjected to them, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Ultimate design of man, <a href="#Page_98">[98</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Understanding may be perverted, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Uneasiness produced by former sins, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Union of good beings, <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Unjustifiableness of religious indifference, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Upright creatures may fall, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -<li class="isub1">need good habits, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Universe and its government immense, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Vice</li> -<li class="isub1">actually punished by society <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> -<li class="isub1">must produce uneasiness, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> -<li class="isub1">never rewarded as such, <a href="#Page_116">116</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not only criminal but depraving, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> -<li class="isub1">often increased by trials, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> -<li class="isub1">punished as such, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Vicious men lose their influence, <a href="#Page_121">[121</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Virtue</li> -<li class="isub1">a bond of union, <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li> -<li class="isub1">as such, rewarded on earth, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> -<li class="isub1">“brings its own reward”, <a href="#Page_118">[118</a></li> -<li class="isub1">has occasional disadvantages, <a href="#Page_117">[117</a></li> -<li class="isub1">hinderances accidental, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li> -<li class="isub1">how and why rewarded, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> -<li class="isub1">improved by trials, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its benefits to a community, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> -<li class="isub1">natural, not vice, <a href="#Page_116">116</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not always rewarded in this life, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> -<li class="isub1">on the whole happier than vice, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -<li class="isub1">secures peace, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> -<li class="isub1">tendencies essential, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> -<li class="isub1">tends to give power, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_121">[121</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Virtuous beings need virtuous habits, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Virtuous habits a security, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -<li class="isub1">how formed, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> -<li class="isub1">improve virtue, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -<li class="isub1">necessary in a future state, <a href="#Page_145">[145</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Voice of nature is for virtue, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Waste of seeds, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Wickedness may produce some benefits, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[342]</a></span>voluntary, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Will and character</li> -<li class="isub1">of God, how determined, <i>note</i> <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> -<li class="isub1">what they mean, <i>note</i> <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Wonderful discovery of Hume, <a href="#Page_162">[162</a></li> - -<li class="indx">World</li> -<li class="isub1">a system of subordinations, <a href="#Page_173">173</a></li> -<li class="isub1">a theater for the manifestation of character, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> -<li class="isub1">disciplines some to vice, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> -<li class="isub1">fitted for man’s discipline, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> -<li class="isub1">governed by fixed laws, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Youth</li> -<li class="isub1">a determining period, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> -<li class="isub1">if lost, not to be recovered, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its beneficial subordinations, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> - -</ul> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[343]</a></span></p> - -<h2 id="INDEX_TO_PART_II">INDEX TO PART II.</h2> - -<p class="center">REFERENCES TO THE EDITOR’S NOTES ARE IN BRACKETS</p> - -<ul> - -<li class="ifrst">A common absurdity, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Abstract truth distinguished from facts, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_186">[186</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Absurdity of some objections to Christianity, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Abuse of our natural endowments, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Accidental, what events are so called, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Accountability gradually increases, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Actions,</li> -<li class="isub1">definition of, in morals, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></li> -<li class="isub1">distinguished from things done, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></li> -<li class="isub1">their bad consequences sometimes escaped, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> -<li class="isub1">virtue and vice consist in them, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Advantage, as proper a consideration in religion as in temporal affairs, <a href="#Page_298">298</a></li> -<li class="isub1">variously bestowed, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Analogy</li> -<li class="isub1">a confirmation of all facts to which it can be applied, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li> -<li class="isub1">affords no argument against the scheme of Christianity, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li> -<li class="isub1">nor against miracles, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li> -<li class="isub1">answers presumptions against miracles, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> -<li class="isub1">does not prove the wisdom of God, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> -<li class="isub1">does not teach that the <em>whole</em> of God’s government is like that on earth, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li> -<li class="isub1">easily cavilled at, but unanswerable, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li> -<li class="isub1">between natural information and that derived from inspiration, <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li> -<li class="isub1">between the remedies of nature and those of grace, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> -<li class="isub1">between the gospel and human discoveries, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> -<li class="isub1">between the light of nature and of revelation, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></li> -<li class="isub1">between the use of natural gifts, and miraculous, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li> -<li class="isub1">between the government of God and that of a human master, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its small influence on men, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> -<li class="isub1">how used in this treatise, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may show our duty, but not the design of the requirement, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li> -<li class="isub1">objections to this mode of arguing, <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VIII"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. VIII.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">shows that there may be infinite reasons for things, with which we are not acquainted, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the only ground for some of our knowledge, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Antidote to heresies, <a href="#Page_191">[191</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Apocalypse, its principal object, <a href="#Page_249">[249</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Appearances of men and things deceptive, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[344]</a></span>Arguments proper as to human writings, are not so as to Scripture, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Atonement,</li> -<li class="isub1">how held by the ancients, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> -<li class="isub1">makes the innocent suffer for the guilty, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Author of nature taken for granted, <a href="#Page_298">298</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Authoritativeness of revelation, <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Baptism</li> -<li class="isub1">a test of obedience, <a href="#Page_199">[199</a></li> -<li class="isub1">commanded and important, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> -<li class="isub1">why the form of words, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bible, how to be interpreted, <a href="#Page_202">[202</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Brutes, their great sagacity, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Boundary of human inquiry, <a href="#Page_223">[223</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Candor necessary in judging of Christianity, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chance, really no such thing, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Characters drawn in Scripture evidently unfeigned, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Christ</li> -<li class="isub1">a mediator, <a href="#II_CHAPTER_V"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. V.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">a prophet, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li> -<li class="isub1">a priest and king, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his history, as given in Scripture, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his pre-existence taught, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his satisfaction, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his sufferings voluntary, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> -<li class="isub1">manner of his interposition, <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not merely a teacher and example, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li> -<li class="isub1">offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Christianity</li> -<li class="isub1">a fearful curse, if it give no more light than natural religion, <a href="#Page_196">[196</a></li> -<li class="isub1">a question of fact, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> -<li class="isub1">a remedial system, <a href="#Page_193">[193</a></li> -<li class="isub1">an authoritative republication of the religion of nature, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li> -<li class="isub1">a particular scheme under a general plan, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li> -<li class="isub1">a scheme imperfectly comprehended, <a href="#II_CHAPTER_IV"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. IV.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">a scheme revealed but in part, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li> -<li class="isub1">brings life and immortality to light, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li> -<li class="isub1">could not possibly be a contrivance, <a href="#Page_222">[222</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li> -<li class="isub1">demands attention, if barely probable, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> -<li class="isub1">has evidences besides miracles and prophecy, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li> -<li class="isub1">in what degree remedial, <a href="#Page_193">[193</a></li> -<li class="isub1">is a real revelation, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></li> -<li class="isub1">is conformable to the constitution of things, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its benefits require the use of means, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its establishment and prevalence, the most conspicuous and important event in history, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its evidences, <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VII"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. VII.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">its good effects not small, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its precepts plain and obvious, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its proof historical, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its proofs liable to objection, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></li> -<li class="isub1">men bound to examine its evidence, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li> -<li class="isub1">miracles and prophecy its direct and fundamental proofs, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li> -<li class="isub1">must have mysteries, <a href="#Page_223">[223</a></li> -<li class="isub1">no objection to the morality of it, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not merely a republication of natural religion, <a href="#Page_196">[196</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not primarily designed to remedy the defects of nature, <a href="#Page_193">[193</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not the discovery of reason, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li> -<li class="isub1">objections to its evidence, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> -<li class="isub1">objections to its nature, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> -<li class="isub1">offered to some in a corrupt state, <a href="#Page_250">250</a></li> -<li class="isub1">prescribes new duties, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> -<li class="isub1">preserves natural religion in the world, <a href="#Page_191">191</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[345]</a></span>propagated against all obstructions, <a href="#Page_294">[294</a></li> -<li class="isub1">rashness of treating it lightly, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li> -<li class="isub1">requires means to accomplish ends, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> -<li class="isub1">reveals a particular dispensation of Providence, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> -<li class="isub1">reveals important facts, <a href="#Page_196">196</a></li> -<li class="isub1">some of its dark parts may be cleared up, others cannot, <a href="#Page_223">[223</a></li> -<li class="isub1">teaches more than natural religion, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the evils ascribed to it, are not its evils, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the one great question concerning it, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the only religion professedly confirmed by miracles, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></li> -<li class="isub1">to be transmitted by Christians, <a href="#Page_190">[190</a></li> -<li class="isub1">universal, in nature and intention, <a href="#Page_248">[248</a></li> -<li class="isub1">what alone could disprove it, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> -<li class="isub1">why not remedial to a greater degree, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> -<li class="isub1">why not sooner promulgated, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Christians</li> -<li class="isub1">bound to spread Christianity, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li> -<li class="isub1">primitive, their testimony, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Church</li> -<li class="isub1">men bound to support it, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> -<li class="isub1">preserves a knowledge of religion, <a href="#Page_191">191</a></li> -<li class="isub1">visible, its design, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Circumstantial evidences of Christianity, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></li> -<li class="isub1">often as convincing as direct testimony, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Clemens Romanus, testimony of, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his letter to the Corinthians, <a href="#Page_266">[266</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Climax of infidel extravagance, <a href="#Page_294">[294</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Coincidence of natural and revealed religion, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Coincidences of Scripture, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Comparison, how it may mislead us, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Compassion distinct from goodness, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> -<li class="isub1">visible in the constitution of the world, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Consequences of infidelity; more dangerous than those of faith, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of sin, often averted, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Conversational objections to revelation, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Conversion, how produced, <a href="#Page_225">[225</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Course of nature</li> -<li class="isub1">different from what we might have supposed, previous to experience, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></li> -<li class="isub1">none at the beginning, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li> -<li class="isub1">our total darkness as to its causes, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Creation</li> -<li class="isub1">Mosaic account of, referred to by John, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> -<li class="isub1">a different exertion of power from government, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li> -<li class="isub1">why Scripture describes it, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Creatures of like moral qualities placed in different religious situations, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Credulity of mankind acknowledged, <a href="#Page_269">269</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Cumulative proof of Christianity, <a href="#Page_207">[207</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Daniel</li> -<li class="isub1">his book had more evidence of authenticity than has come to us, <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his predictions a support of Jewish faith, <a href="#Page_249">[249</a></li> -<li class="isub1">quoted by Christ, <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Dark parts of revelation, <a href="#Page_223">[223</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Degrees of evidence have degrees of weight, <a href="#Page_255">255</a></li> -<li class="isub1">require nice examination, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Deistical explanation of Christ’s miracles, <a href="#Page_206">[206</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Deists, why do they oppose Christianity, <a href="#Page_196">[196</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Depravity of man obvious, <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[346]</a></span>doctrine of, <a href="#Page_218">[218</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Desert of good and ill, the notion of, <a href="#Page_305">305</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Development, of truth, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></li> -<li class="isub1">modern, doctrine of, <a href="#Page_218">[218</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Differences of religious advantages may have like reasons as those for different temporal advantages, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> -<li class="isub1">would remain if revelation were universal, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Difficulties</li> -<li class="isub1">absurdity of requiring them to be all removed, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li> -<li class="isub1">as to the evidence of religion, analogous to those attending the practice of it, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li> -<li class="isub1">cannot be solved by analogy, <a href="#Page_296">296</a></li> -<li class="isub1">speculative, may be the chief trials of some, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the discernment which can see them, might suffice to see through them, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Direct and circumstantial evidence must be taken together, <a href="#Page_280">280</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Diseases of body and mind, analogous as to their remedies, <a href="#Page_220">220</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Disobedience, without possible excuse, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Dispensations, preparatory one to another, <a href="#Page_310">310</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Disregard of religion a great profligacy, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Distinction between moral and positive obligation, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_198">[198</a></li> -<li class="isub1">between acts and principles, <a href="#Page_235">[235</a></li> -<li class="isub1">between temporary, individual, and universal commands, <a href="#Page_188">[188</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Doubt</li> -<li class="isub1">affords scope for probation, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li> -<li class="isub1">exercises our virtuous principles, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li> -<li class="isub1">implies some evidence, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> -<li class="isub1">involves some obligation, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li> -<li class="isub1">puts us upon probation, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Doubtful evidence should have <em>some</em> influence, <a href="#Page_255">255</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Duties arising from revealed relations, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li> -<li class="isub1">moral and positive, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Earth, its appearances confirm Scripture, <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Effect of Adam’s transgression, <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of combined probabilities, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_294">[294</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Efficacy of repentance, <a href="#Page_190">[190</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not taught by the light of nature, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li> - -<li class="indx">End, God’s not known, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Enthusiasm</li> -<li class="isub1">is not peculiar to religion, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> -<li class="isub1">impairs no testimony for Christianity, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may often weaken testimony, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></li> -<li class="isub1">sometimes mixed with knavery, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the absence of all sign of it in Christianity, a presumptive proof in its favor, <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> -<li class="isub1">will not account for the spread of Christianity, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Enthusiasts make as great sacrifices as Christians, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Epistles of Paul, proof from, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Eternal retribution not taught by natural religion, <a href="#Page_190">[190</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ethics of natural religion distinguished from its objects, <a href="#Page_194">[194</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Events expound Scripture, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Evidence</li> -<li class="isub1">of Christianity impregnable, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> -<li class="isub1">collateral and direct to be viewed together, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li> -<li class="isub1">from miracles and prophecy, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li> -<li class="isub1">imperfect, should yet influence practice in proportion to its degree, <a href="#Page_255">255</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of circumstances may be most direct, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of religion, open to all, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of religion, the same in kind as that which controls us in temporal things, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[347]</a></span>much lower than satisfactory often determines us, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not only increased but multiplied by a combination of probabilities, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_294">[294</a></li> -<li class="isub1">reason the proper judge of, <a href="#Page_221">221</a></li> -<li class="isub1">requires careful sifting, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li> -<li class="isub1">candor in judging, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_303">[303</a></li> -<li class="isub1">safety always in admitting it, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li> -<li class="isub1">why liable to objection, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Evil, remedies provided for it, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Exaggeration practised by many who will not lie, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> - -<li class="indx">External manner of heart worship, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Experience</li> -<li class="isub1">affords no presumption against Christianity, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li> -<li class="isub1">corroborates Christian doctrines, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li> -<li class="isub1">teaches the effects of actions, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Extravagance of some objections, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Facts</li> -<li class="isub1">analogy the only proof of some, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li> -<li class="isub1">distinguished from abstract truths, <a href="#Page_305">305</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of revelation distinguished from its principles, <a href="#Page_235">[235</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fall of man, assumed as a fact, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> -<li class="isub1">confirmed by appearances, <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Falsehood, its degrees and inducements, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> - -<li class="indx">False miracles have deceived many, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></li> -<li class="isub1">have some historic evidence, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fatalists, their principles argued upon, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fear cast out by love, <a href="#Page_301">[301</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fitness, moral, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Flippant objections to Christianity, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Folly, a real vice, <a href="#Page_280">280</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Foresight of brutes, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Future punishments,</li> -<li class="isub1">all the reasons for them not known, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not arbitrarily appointed, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> -<li class="isub1">natural sequences, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> -<li class="isub1">rendered credible by temporal punishments, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Genealogy of mankind given in Scripture, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> - -<li class="indx">General laws</li> -<li class="isub1">a wise arrangement, <a href="#Page_227">227</a></li> -<li class="isub1">do not render miracles incredible, <a href="#Page_227">227</a></li> -<li class="isub1">control the Christian dispensation, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li> -<li class="isub1">few events can be traced up to them, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li> -<li class="isub1">miracles may be their results, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the ground of believing there are such, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li> -<li class="isub1">things called accidental governed by them, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Geology, its impressive lessons, <a href="#Page_229">[229</a></li> - -<li class="indx">GOD</li> -<li class="isub1">a master giving laws, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></li> -<li class="isub1">all his reasons for giving a command must be certainly known, and known to have passed away, before we can safely disregard it, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li> -<li class="isub1">duties towards him as the Father, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li> -<li class="isub1">governs by mediation, <a href="#Page_230">230</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his government shows compassion, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> -<li class="isub2">progressive, <a href="#Page_229">229</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his means and ends we cannot distinguish, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his providence, objections to it idle, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his reasons not assigned, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his will, as absolute or conditional, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></li> -<li class="isub1">how he would act in contingencies, unknown, <a href="#Page_222">[222</a></li> -<li class="isub1">how to be worshipped, a pure matter of revelation, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[348]</a></span>instructs us by experience, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li> -<li class="isub1">little known, <a href="#Page_222">[222</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not indifferent as to who suffer, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> -<li class="isub1">reveals our duties, not his plans, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the real author of the prophecies, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Good and evil unequally distributed, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Government of God sometimes, apparently, tardy in its results, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Gradual growth of causes, <a href="#Page_208">[208</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Happiness not always secured by well-laid schemes, <a href="#Page_247">247</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hazard of neglecting Christianity, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Heathen world, condition of, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hieroglyphic and figurative language of Scripture, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hinderances to natural and spiritual knowledge similar, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></li> - -<li class="indx">History</li> -<li class="isub1">of miracles, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of the Jews confirmed by their condition, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of the origin of religion, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> -<li class="isub1">furnishes no parallel to revelation, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> -<li class="isub1">prophecy is history anticipated, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Scripture, has not been invalidated, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Holy Spirit, its operations on the heart, <a href="#Page_225">[225</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Human contrivance unequal to some things, <a href="#Page_222">[222</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Human life, in what sense it may be called poor, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Human testimony, reliable notwithstanding the prevalence of falsehood, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Identity of principle between natural and revealed religion, <a href="#Page_235">[235</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ignorance</li> -<li class="isub1">of heathen writers, <a href="#Page_187">[187</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of other worlds, forbids objections to Christianity on the ground of miracles, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of the laws of miracles, not greater than of natural laws, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of the reason of our present condition, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> -<li class="isub1">much of it our own fault, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Imagination may fancy unreal coincidences, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Immorality not authorized in Scripture, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Impassable limit to human knowledge, <a href="#Page_223">[223</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Imperceptible accumulation of forces, <a href="#Page_208">[208</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Imperfect knowledge, better than acting in the dark, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Imperfection of language, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Importance of revelation, <a href="#II_CHAPTER_I"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. I.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">an abstraction, <a href="#Page_186">[186</a></li> -<li class="isub1">precludes the idea that the first witnesses were careless, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Improbability before and after an event, <a href="#Page_207">[207</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of the Deistical theory greater than that of miracles, <a href="#Page_206">[206</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Inadequacy of repentance, <a href="#Page_236">[236</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Inattention to religion, real depravity, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li> -<li class="isub1">prevents convincement, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Incarnation an invisible miracle, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li> -<li class="isub1">cannot be paralleled, <a href="#Page_235">[235</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Influence of the Holy Ghost, <a href="#Page_225">[225</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of the analogical argument, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Innocent sometimes suffer for the guilty, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Inspiration, the proper kind and extent of it not discoverable by reason, <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not to be interpreted like other writings, <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Inspired writers, key to their meaning, <a href="#Page_276">[276</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[349]</a></span>their one great scheme, <a href="#Page_276">[276</a></li> -<li class="isub1">show a foresight more than human, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Instruction from God to savages, <a href="#Page_206">[206</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Intercession by the good for the bad, <a href="#Page_232">[232</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Interest, temporal, not always apparent, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Interpositions of men for each other, <a href="#Page_232">[232</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Internal improbabilities weaken external proof, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Interpretation of Scripture, <a href="#Page_215">[215</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Irregularity, really no such thing, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li> -<li class="isub1">whence the appearance of, <a href="#Page_227">227</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Irregularities of men, consequences proportioned to magnitude, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Irreligion an aggravated sin, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> -<li class="isub1">especially in persons in high standing, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not justifiable on any pretence, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Invention an irregular way of information, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Invisible miracles, <a href="#Page_204">[204</a></li> -<li class="isub1">things of God, how learned, <a href="#Page_230">[230</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Jews</li> -<li class="isub1">God’s dealing with them, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> -<li class="isub1">their continuance, a standing miracle, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> -<li class="isub1">their history confirmed by facts, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li> -<li class="isub1">their system of Theism, <a href="#Page_206">[206</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Jewish miracles, a part of civil history, <a href="#Page_265">[265</a></li> - -<li class="indx">John, his allusion to Christ, in the beginning of his gospel, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his doctrine agrees with that of Paul, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Kingdom of Christ on earth, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Knowledge</li> -<li class="isub1">profound, not necessary to piety, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></li> -<li class="isub1">scientific and religious, have the same difficulties, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Knowledge of Scripture, improved in the same way as knowledge of the sciences, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></li> -<li class="isub1">unequally distributed, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Language necessarily ambiguous, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of the prophecies, often figurative, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Laplace, error of, <a href="#Page_207">[207</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Levity destructive to religious influence, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Liberty</li> -<li class="isub1">belief of our, unavoidable, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of the will, not discussed, <i>note</i> <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> -<li class="isub1">necessary to the progress of knowledge, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the principle so natural that language is formed on it, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Life</li> -<li class="isub1">future, brought to light by the gospel, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may be taken away by command, <a href="#Page_221">221</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not thrown away because success is uncertain, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> -<li class="isub1">whether desirable or not, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Light of nature</li> -<li class="isub1">displayed in the Scriptures, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li> -<li class="isub1">does not teach our future condition, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li> -<li class="isub1">favors the doctrine of a Mediator, <a href="#Page_230">230</a></li> -<li class="isub1">has left the greatest heathen in doubt, <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ludicrous turn, danger of, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Mahometanism not received on the footing of miracles, <a href="#Page_268">[268</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mahometans and ancient Persians, how situated as to revelation, <a href="#Page_250">250</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Man</li> -<li class="isub1">accepted according to what he hath, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[350]</a></span>his circumstances no ground of complaint, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his obligation to study the Scriptures, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li> -<li class="isub1">must be renewed, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Manasses, prayer of, <a href="#Page_237">[237</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Manner of worship a matter of pure revelation, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Martyrs</li> -<li class="isub1">could not have been impostors, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> -<li class="isub1">had full knowledge of facts, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the full force of their testimony, <a href="#Page_269">269</a></li> -<li class="isub1">their obligations to veracity, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li> -<li class="isub1">were not enthusiasts, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Means as related to ends, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mediation seen everywhere, <a href="#Page_230">230</a></li> -<li class="isub1">exemplified in social life, <a href="#Page_232">[232</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mediator,</li> -<li class="isub1">appointment of, <a href="#II_CHAPTER_V"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. V.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">the notion of, natural, <a href="#Page_230">230</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the Scripture doctrine of, <a href="#Page_238">238-240</a></li> -<li class="isub1">whether one was necessary, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> -<li class="isub1">why most objected to, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Medium between full satisfaction of a truth and full satisfaction to the contrary, <a href="#Page_313">313</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Memory, eloquence, &c. imprudently used, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Men apt to be deluded by pretences, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></li> -<li class="isub1">their conduct may be guessed at, <a href="#Page_222">[222</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mercy seen in the constitution of the world, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Messiah came at the expected time, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> -<li class="isub1">his mission, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Minuteness of predictions touching Christ, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Miracles</li> -<li class="isub1">admitted evidence for such as are false does not impair the evidence of Christian, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></li> -<li class="isub1">contrary to the course of nature?, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> -<li class="isub1">denying them leads to Atheism, <a href="#Page_205">[205</a></li> -<li class="isub1">disorderly use of, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li> -<li class="isub1">distinct reasons for them, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></li> -<li class="isub1">large historical evidence for their truth, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li> -<li class="isub1">manner in which related, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> -<li class="isub1">no argument of analogy against them, <a href="#Page_205">205-207</a></li> -<li class="isub1">none parallel to those of Scripture, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not mere embellishments, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not to be compared to common events, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li> -<li class="isub1">nowise incredible, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li> -<li class="isub1">occasions for them likely to arise in the course of ages, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of the Old Testament, inseparable from history, <a href="#Page_265">[265</a></li> -<li class="isub1">operate by general laws, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Pagan and Popish, were wrought <em>after</em> those systems had obtained, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></li> -<li class="isub1">peculiar to the Jewish and Christian religions, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></li> -<li class="isub1">received as genuine from the first, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a></li> -<li class="isub1">regulated by general laws, <a href="#Page_227">227</a></li> -<li class="isub1">satisfactorily account for the existence of Christianity, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></li> -<li class="isub1">should be compared to uncommon events, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the credentials of Christianity, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the evidence of their truth at first, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the question of their truth only one of <em>degree</em> in point of evidence, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the only satisfactory account of some events, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the real nature of presumptions against them, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the term a relative one, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li> -<li class="isub1">their direct proof of Christianity, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> -<li class="isub1">their evidence the same as that for common facts, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[351]</a></span>their force as proofs, <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li> -<li class="isub1">visible and invisible, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_204">[204</a></li> -<li class="isub1">what evidence arises from their having been accepted as true by the first Christians, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></li> -<li class="isub1">writers upon, <a href="#Page_264">[264</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Miraculous power</li> -<li class="isub1">creation not properly an act of, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li> -<li class="isub1">misused by some, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li> -<li class="isub1">pretences of, have deluded some, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></li> -<li class="isub1">why bestowed, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Misconduct creates need of assistance, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mistake of some of Hume’s opponents, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mistakes of philosophers dangerous, <a href="#Page_230">[230</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of transcribers, &c., <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Modern geology, lesson from, <a href="#Page_229">[229</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Moral action, the nature of, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></li> -<li class="isub1">an action becomes such by command, <a href="#Page_221">[221</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Moral duties. See <a href="#positive"><i>Positive</i></a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Moral faculty, its object, <a href="#Page_305">305</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Moral government. See <a href="#government"><i>Government</i></a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Moral precepts. See <a href="#positive"><i>Positive</i></a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Moral system revealed to mankind, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Morality of Scripture, reason a judge of, <a href="#Page_220">220</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mysteries to be expected in revelation, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li> -<li class="isub1">as many in nature as in Scripture, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mystery of godliness, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mythological writings resemble prophecy, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Narratives of Scripture unadorned, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Natural consequences of vice are judicial punishments, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li> -<li class="isub1">and spiritual things analogous in importance, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> -<li class="isub1">endowments often abused, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Natural light compared to revelation, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Natural religion</li> -<li class="isub1">and revealed, coincide, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></li> -<li class="isub1">as much perverted as Christianity, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li> -<li class="isub1">could not have been reasoned out, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li> -<li class="isub1">discloses no Redeemer, <a href="#Page_194">[194</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its ethics and objects distinguished, <a href="#Page_194">[194</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its light wholly insufficient, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li> -<li class="isub1">might be authenticated by miracles, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li> -<li class="isub1">moral system of, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li> -<li class="isub1">taught and confirmed by Christianity, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></li> -<li class="isub1">what it does not teach, <a href="#Page_190">[190</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Nature carried on by uniform laws, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li> -<li class="isub1">implies the agency of God, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its light insufficient, <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Nature and obligation of sacraments, <i>note</i> <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Necessity of revelation, <a href="#Page_186">[186</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Negligence prevents the recognition of truth, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> -<li class="isub1">wholly inexcusable, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Obedience from dread, <a href="#Page_301">[301</a></li> -<li class="isub1">or disobedience, an important matter, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li> -<li class="isub1">to a positive rite, especially indicative of piety, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Objections</li> -<li class="isub1">to certain precepts of Scripture, as immoral, <a href="#Page_221">221</a></li> -<li class="isub1">to prophecy, from its obscurity, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> -<li class="isub1">to revelation, are of equal weight against natural religion, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> -<li class="isub1">to the analogical argument, as such, <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VIII"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. VIII.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">to the distribution of good and evil, <a href="#Page_248">248-250</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[352]</a></span>to the doctrine of mediation, <a href="#II_CHAPTER_V"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. V.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">to the evidence for miracles, <a href="#II_CHAPTER_II"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. II.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">to the unequal distribution of religious knowledge, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Objections to Christianity</li> -<li class="isub1">as a matter of fact, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> -<li class="isub1">as a remedial system, <a href="#Page_193">[193</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> -<li class="isub1">as a roundabout, perplexed contrivance, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> -<li class="isub1">as deficient in point of truth, <a href="#Page_247">247</a></li> -<li class="isub1">as a scheme, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li> -<li class="isub1">as mysterious, <a href="#Page_223">[223</a></li> -<li class="isub1">as to its wisdom and goodness, <a href="#II_CHAPTER_IV"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. IV.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">as unimportant, <a href="#II_CHAPTER_I"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. I.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">atonement makes the innocent suffer for the guilty, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> -<li class="isub1">contains things unlike the course of nature, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li> -<li class="isub1">does not remove difficulties, <a href="#Page_223">[223</a></li> -<li class="isub1">has been perverted, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li> -<li class="isub1">has been productive of evils, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li> -<li class="isub1">has internal improbabilities, <a href="#Page_225">225-227</a></li> -<li class="isub1">disclosed to the world so recently, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> -<li class="isub1">disorderly use of miraculous gifts, <a href="#Page_227">227</a></li> -<li class="isub1">has small influence, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> -<li class="isub1">if true would not be left doubtful, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li> -<li class="isub1">is not satisfactory, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its doctrine of mediation, <a href="#II_CHAPTER_V"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. V.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">its external proof weakened by internal improbabilities, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its lack of evidence, <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VI"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. VI.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">its late introduction, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may be advanced flippantly, but cannot be so answered, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> -<li class="isub1">natural things too unimportant to furnish analogies in its favor, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not just and good, <a href="#II_CHAPTER_IV"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. IV.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">not necessary, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not universal, <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VI"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. VI.</span></a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> -<li class="isub1">slowly developed, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> -<li class="isub1">some of its precepts immoral, <a href="#Page_221">221</a></li> -<li class="isub1">sufficiency of natural religion, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li> -<li class="isub1">vicarious sufferings, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Obligation arises from the bare supposableness of Christianity, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Obligations to God arising out of relationship, <a href="#Page_196">196</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Obscurity in part of a prophecy, does not impair the evidence of foresight, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Offenders often shielded by friends, <a href="#Page_232">[232</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Offices of Christ as a mediator, <a href="#Page_238">238-240</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Opinions must be distinguished from facts, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ordinary rules of interpretation, <a href="#Page_215">[215</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Pagan and Popish miracles easily accounted for, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Parables show what the author intended, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Partial views give an appearance of wrong, <a href="#Page_309">309</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Passion hinders correct judgment, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Paul, his separate testimony, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li> -<li class="isub1">how he received the gospel, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li> -<li class="isub1">summary of his testimony, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Perfection of religion, what? <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VIII"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. VIII.</span></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Persons for whom this treatise is written, <a href="#Page_309">309</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Philosophy, its true mode of proceeding, <a href="#Page_230">[230</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Piety superior to ritual observances, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Pleasures and pains, which overbalance? <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Political events, how mentioned in Scripture, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Popish doctrine of a miracle at the Eucharist, <a href="#Page_204">[204</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Popular conversational objections, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Porphyry’s mode of interpretation frivolous, <i>note</i> <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[353]</a></span>objections to the book of Daniel, <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li> - -<li class="indx" id="positive">Positive evidence of Christianity, <a href="#II_CHAPTER_VII"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. VII.</span></a></li> - -<li class="indx">Positive institutions</li> -<li class="isub1">belong to the notion of a church, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li> -<li class="isub1">lay us under the strictest obligation, <a href="#Page_202">202</a></li> -<li class="isub1">means to moral ends, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> -<li class="isub1">men disposed to depend on them, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> -<li class="isub1">necessary to keep up and propagate religion, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not to be made light of, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not to supersede moral obedience, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the reason of them often obvious, <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li> -<li class="isub1">two modes of viewing them, <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Positive precepts compared with moral, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li> -<li class="isub1">create moral obligations, <a href="#Page_221">221</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Power of healing, <a href="#Page_217">[217</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Practice should be influenced by probability, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Predictions of Christ very numerous and minute, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Prejudice a hinderance to knowledge, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> -<li class="isub1">a mark of weakness, <a href="#Page_280">280</a></li> -<li class="isub1">as hostile to truth as enthusiasm, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> -<li class="isub1">operates contrary ways, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Preservation of the Jews as a distinct race, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Presumptions</li> -<li class="isub1">against miracles, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li> -<li class="isub1">against revelation as miraculous, <a href="#II_CHAPTER_II"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. II.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">none against the <em>general scheme</em> of Christianity, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li> -<li class="isub1">none peculiar to miracles, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> -<li class="isub1">strong, overcome by weak proof, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_207">[207</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Priesthood of Christ, <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Jewish, typical of Christ, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Principles argued upon in this treatise, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Progressions in our existence, <a href="#Page_229">229</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Progress in theology probable, <a href="#Page_218">[218</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Probable proofs, by being added, not only increase evidence, but multiply it, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Probability should influence practice, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Profane history corroborates Scripture statements, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Proofs of Christianity</li> -<li class="isub1">a touchstone of honesty, <a href="#Page_259">[259</a></li> -<li class="isub1">level to common men, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></li> -<li class="isub1">some important ones omitted in this treatise, and why, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> -<li class="isub1">why not more plain, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Prophecy</li> -<li class="isub1">a joint review of prophecies furnishes a far stronger proof than examination in detail, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li> -<li class="isub1">a series of, being applicable to certain events, is proof that it was intended of them, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li> -<li class="isub1">compared to compiled memoirs, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> -<li class="isub1">created the expectation of a Messiah, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li> -<li class="isub1">confirmed by appearances, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></li> -<li class="isub1">evidence from, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> -<li class="isub1">expressed in figurative language, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> -<li class="isub1">how understood by ancient Jews, <a href="#Page_277">277</a></li> -<li class="isub1">in relation to the Jews, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li> -<li class="isub1">is history anticipated, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its obscurity, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its proofs amazingly strong, <a href="#Page_207">[207</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may not <em>always</em> have been understood by the writer, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> -<li class="isub1">proves foresight, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li> -<li class="isub1">sometimes obscured by interpreters, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> -<li class="isub1">summary of, concerning Christ, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li> -<li class="isub1">use of, to future ages, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> -<li class="isub1">writers upon, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[354]</a></span>Prophet, Christ a, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Prophets</li> -<li class="isub1">not the <em>authors</em> of what they wrote, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> -<li class="isub1">their sense of their predictions not necessarily the whole sense, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> -<li class="isub1">whether they had in view the events which Christians consider fulfilments, <a href="#Page_277">277</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Proverbial, use of the word, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Providence, never hasty, <a href="#Page_229">[229</a></li> -<li class="isub1">objections to it useless, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the course of, progressive, <a href="#Page_229">229</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Province of reason, <a href="#Page_220">220</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Prudence, its best plans often frustrated, <a href="#Page_247">247</a></li> -<li class="isub1">often requires us to act with uncertain prospect of success, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Punishment</li> -<li class="isub1">follows wickedness, <em>of course</em>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></li> -<li class="isub1">instances of vicarious, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not always avoided by reformation, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not promiscuously inflicted, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> -<li class="isub1">provision made for escaping it, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li> -<li class="isub1">we cannot of ourselves escape it, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li> -<li class="isub1">we cannot know why such and such are inflicted, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Quotations</li> -<li class="isub1">Angus, <a href="#Page_202">[202</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Augustine, <i>note</i> <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Arnobius, <a href="#Page_269">[269</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Clemens Romanus, <a href="#Page_266">[266</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Davidson, <a href="#Page_294">[294</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Fitzgerald, <a href="#Page_303">[303</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Grotius, <a href="#Page_259">[259</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Guizot, <a href="#Page_229">[229</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hurd, <a href="#Page_276">[276</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Dr. Johnson, <a href="#Page_288">[288</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Mahomet, <a href="#Page_268">[268</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Powell, <a href="#Page_230">[230</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Warburton, <a href="#Page_217">[217</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Whately, <a href="#Page_206">[206</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Rashness of interpreters, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of treating religion lightly, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Reason</li> -<li class="isub1">could not have invented Christianity, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> -<li class="isub1">could not ascertain the power of penitence, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> -<li class="isub1">discovers our relation to God the Father, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> -<li class="isub1">but not our relation to the Son and Holy Ghost, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its limits very narrow, <a href="#Page_223">[223</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its proper province, <a href="#Page_220">220</a></li> -<li class="isub1">must have right principles, <a href="#Page_220">220</a></li> -<li class="isub1">needs the aid of experience in judging of the consequences of actions, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not sufficient to construct a system of natural religion free from superstition, <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li> -<li class="isub1">our only faculty for judging even revelation, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> -<li class="isub1">requires the importance of a question to be taken into account, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> -<li class="isub1">teaches nothing of the certain means of either temporal or spiritual good, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li> -<li class="isub1">very incompetent to judge what a revelation ought to be, <a href="#Page_210">210-212</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Reasoning by analogy to any extent, leaves the mind unsatisfied, <a href="#Page_296">296</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Redemption</li> -<li class="isub1">agreeable to our natural notions, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li> -<li class="isub1">analogous to natural remedies, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> -<li class="isub1">conjectures about it must be uncertain, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li> -<li class="isub1">mode of, not discoverable by reason, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> -<li class="isub1">men not competent judges of its plan, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> -<li class="isub1">on whom are its benefits, <i>note</i> <a href="#Page_237">237</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[355]</a></span>Scripture account of, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li> -<li class="isub1">we should be thankful for it, without disputing how it was procured, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li> - -<li class="indx">References to other authors</li> -<li class="isub1">Alexander, <a href="#Page_269">[269</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Apthorpe, <a href="#Page_285">[285</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Bayle, <a href="#Page_301">[301</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Benson, <a href="#Page_215">[215</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Birk, <a href="#Page_266">[266</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Blaney, <a href="#Page_285">[285</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Blunt, <a href="#Page_266">[266</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Bolingbroke, <a href="#Page_265">[265</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Boswell, <a href="#Page_288">[288</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Boyle, <a href="#Page_264">[264</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Butler, <a href="#Page_190">[190</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Campbell, <a href="#Page_264">[264</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Celsus, <a href="#Page_287">[287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Chalmers, <a href="#Page_187">[187</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Colliber, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Damascenus, <a href="#Page_287">[287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Davidson, <a href="#Page_285">[285</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Diodorus Siculus, <a href="#Page_287">[287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Eupolemus, <a href="#Page_287">[287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Featley, <a href="#Page_215">[215</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Fitzgerald, <a href="#Page_193">[193</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Fleetwood, <a href="#Page_264">[264</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Fuller, <a href="#Page_285">[285</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Gibbon, <a href="#Page_268">[268</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Graves, <a href="#Page_266">[266</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Grotius, <a href="#Page_266">[266</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Gulick, <a href="#Page_277">[277</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hengstenburg, <a href="#Page_277">[277</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Horseley, <a href="#Page_277">[277</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Howe, <a href="#Page_236">[236</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Hurd, <a href="#Page_285">[285</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Jortin, <a href="#Page_264">[264</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Julian, <a href="#Page_257">[257</a></li> -<li class="isub1">King, <a href="#Page_215">[215</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Lardner, <a href="#Page_264">[264</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Leland, <a href="#Page_187">[187</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Longinus, <a href="#Page_287">[287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Lyall, <a href="#Page_277">[277</a></li> -<li class="isub1">McCosh, <a href="#Page_187">[187</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Mackintosh, <a href="#Page_223">[223</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Magee, <a href="#Page_236">[236</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Manasses, <a href="#Page_237">[237</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Menander, <a href="#Page_287">[287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Michaelis, <a href="#Page_215">[215</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Mills, <a href="#Page_207">[207</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Newman, <a href="#Page_235">[235</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Numenius, <a href="#Page_287">[287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Owen, <a href="#Page_242">[242</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Paley, <a href="#Page_205">[205</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Pascal, <a href="#Page_187">[187</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Pfaffius, <a href="#Page_264">[264</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Phlegon, <a href="#Page_287">[287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Phœnician Annals, <a href="#Page_287">[287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Pliny, <a href="#Page_287">[287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Porphyry, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_287">[287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Samuel Stanhope Smith, <a href="#Page_206">[206</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Solinus, <a href="#Page_287">[287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Spinoza, <a href="#Page_215">[215</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Stapfer, <a href="#Page_242">[242</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Storr, <a href="#Page_215">[215</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Strabo, <a href="#Page_287">[287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Suetonius, <a href="#Page_287">[287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Tacitus, <a href="#Page_287">[287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Taylor, <a href="#Page_264">[264</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Tindall, <a href="#Page_196">[196</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Tucker, <a href="#Page_264">[264</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Turretin, <a href="#Page_242">[242</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Vitringa, <a href="#Page_276">[276</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Warburton, <a href="#Page_187">[187</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Waterland, <a href="#Page_195">[195</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Watson, <a href="#Page_264">[264</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Waugh, <a href="#Page_277">[277</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Wayland, <a href="#Page_188">[188</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Whately, <a href="#Page_206">[206</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Witsius, <a href="#Page_264">[264</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Reformation does not always preclude punishment, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Regard due to the Son and Holy Spirit, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Regard to God as Creator, the essence of natural religion, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Rejection of Christ by many, at first, the argument from it, <a href="#Page_269">[269</a></li> -<li class="isub1">foretold, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[356]</a></span>Relations, being learned, duties are perceived, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Relations of man to Deity, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> -<li class="isub1">to the Son and Holy Ghost, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Religion</li> -<li class="isub1">a practical thing, <a href="#Page_298">298</a></li> -<li class="isub1">a question of fact, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> -<li class="isub1">affords particular reasons for miracles, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></li> -<li class="isub1">confirmed by the establishment of a church, <a href="#Page_191">191</a></li> -<li class="isub1">considered as external and internal, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li> -<li class="isub1">doubt of its evidence does not release from moral obligation, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li> -<li class="isub1">has its end on all persons to whom proposed, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_303">[303</a></li> -<li class="isub1">if true, why susceptible of any possible doubt? <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its acceptance safe, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its general spirit intimated, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its great importance, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its introduction into the world, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its reasonableness fully shown, if it can only be proved that it <em>may</em> be reasonable, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its very nature overlooked by those who insist that it should have overwhelming evidence, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may be true, though doubtful, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li> -<li class="isub1">must be judged by its evidences <em>taken together</em>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not a thing reasoned out, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not equally taught to all men, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> -<li class="isub1">objections to it removed by analogy, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li> -<li class="isub1">presupposes candor in those who examine it, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_303">[303</a></li> -<li class="isub1">reason may judge of its morality, <a href="#Page_220">220</a></li> -<li class="isub1">reasonable, for aught which can be shown to the contrary, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the perception of, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the view of it taken in this treatise, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the evidence for it may be lessened, but cannot be destroyed, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> -<li class="isub1">why its evidences are allowed to admit of doubt, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Relief for evils provided, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Remedial nature of Christianity, <a href="#Page_193">[193</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Remedies</li> -<li class="isub1">provided in nature, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may be unskilfully used, <a href="#Page_220">220</a></li> -<li class="isub1">show the compassion of God, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> -<li class="isub2">and also his strictness, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Repentance</li> -<li class="isub1">cannot cancel guilt, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_236">[236</a></li> -<li class="isub1">general sense of mankind on the subject, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its efficacy not taught by natural religion, <a href="#Page_190">[190</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its efficacy taught in the Scriptures, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not sufficient to preclude disaster, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Revelation</li> -<li class="isub1">a particular part of a great plan, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li> -<li class="isub1">accounts for the Theism of the Jews, <a href="#Page_206">[206</a></li> -<li class="isub1">at the beginning of the world, would not be miraculous, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li> -<li class="isub1">cannot be neglected with impunity, <a href="#Page_260">260-262</a></li> -<li class="isub1">considered as miraculous, <a href="#II_CHAPTER_II"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. II.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">considered historically, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></li> -<li class="isub1">difference between its facts and its principles, <a href="#Page_235">[235</a></li> -<li class="isub1">discovers new relations, and so new duties, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> -<li class="isub1">distinguished from natural religion, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li> -<li class="isub1">does not compel assent, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> -<li class="isub1">has twice been universal, <a href="#Page_248">[248</a></li> -<li class="isub1">how it could be overturned, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[357]</a></span>its disclosures, of course, could not have been anticipated, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its measure of evidence puts us on probation, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its facts necessarily singular, <a href="#Page_235">[235</a></li> -<li class="isub1">no more different from the course of nature than some parts of the course of nature are different from other parts, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> -<li class="isub1">necessary, <a href="#II_CHAPTER_I"><span class="smcapuc">CHAP. I.</span></a></li> -<li class="isub1">republishes and confirms natural religion, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li> -<li class="isub1">nothing incredible in it, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></li> -<li class="isub1">teaches that God’s laws are compassionate, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the use of unwritten revelation, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></li> -<li class="isub1">what is to be expected in revelation, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Reverence for the will of God, <a href="#Page_199">[199</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ridicule of Scripture</li> -<li class="isub1">an offence against natural piety, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li> -<li class="isub1">easier than examination, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the great weakness of being influenced by it, <a href="#Page_280">280</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Roman Empire mentioned, <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Rules for health very fallible and inexact, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of Biblical interpretation, <a href="#Page_215">[215</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Sacrifices</li> -<li class="isub1">commanded, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> -<li class="isub1">expiatory, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> -<li class="isub1">how the ancients regarded them, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li> -<li class="isub1">learned by the heathen from tradition, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> -<li class="isub1">really efficacious, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the prevalence of, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sacrifice of Christ</li> -<li class="isub1">an objection to it, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><em>how</em> efficacious, not taught, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li> -<li class="isub1">proper and real, <a href="#Page_239">239-241</a></li> -<li class="isub1">puts us into a capacity for salvation, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li> -<li class="isub1">voluntary, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Safety an important consideration in judging, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Satirical writings, how understood, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Scheme of nature, vast, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li> -<li class="isub1">progressive, <a href="#Page_229">229</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Scheme of providence, if understood, would justify facts which are objected to, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Schemes, the best may be disconcerted, <a href="#Page_247">247</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Science confirms Scripture history, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Scorn of prophetic diction, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Scripture</li> -<li class="isub1">announces a general restoration of things, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> -<li class="isub1">antiquity of, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">characters evidently not feigned, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">confirmed by profane authors, <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li> -<li class="isub1">confirmed by the state of the earth, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">considered historically, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></li> -<li class="isub1">contains an abridged history of the world, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> -<li class="isub1">exposed to criticism, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> -<li class="isub1">expounded by itself, <a href="#Page_202">[202</a></li> -<li class="isub1">gives a history of this world as God’s world, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></li> -<li class="isub1">gives an account of civil governments only as they affected religion, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> -<li class="isub1">has internal evidence of truth, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">history genuine, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></li> -<li class="isub1">how distinguished from other books, <a href="#Page_281">281-283</a></li> -<li class="isub1">how to be interpreted, <a href="#Page_202">[202</a></li> -<li class="isub1">if false could be shown to be so, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> -<li class="isub1">includes a history of thousands of years, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> -<li class="isub1">includes the chronology of nearly four thousand years, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its authority the great question, not its contents, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[358]</a></span>its chronicles confirmed by history, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its evidences comprise a series of things of great variety and reaching to the beginning of time, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its evidences not intended to be overpowering, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its great proofs are miracles and prophecy, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its relation to miracles only to be accounted for on the supposition of their truth, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its strangeness not surprising, <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its style objected to, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its truth must be judged of by the evidence <em>taken together</em>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> -<li class="isub1">may contain things not yet discovered, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></li> -<li class="isub1">miracles, their first reception, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></li> -<li class="isub1">naturalness of its statements, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not composed by rules of art, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> -<li class="isub1">nothing improbable related in any part, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not to be judged by preconceived expectation, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> -<li class="isub1">not to be judged exactly as other books, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> -<li class="isub1">ordinary rules of interpretation, <a href="#Page_215">[215</a></li> -<li class="isub1">our duty to search it, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li> -<li class="isub1">precepts, some give offence, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> -<li class="isub1">reveals our relation to the Son and Holy Spirit, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the possibility of its truth demands investigation, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> -<li class="isub1">truths not discoverable by reason, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li> -<li class="isub1">variety of topics introduced, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> -<li class="isub1">written in a rude age, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> -<li class="isub1">why it describes creation, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Searching the Scriptures a great duty, <a href="#Page_202">202</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Self-deceit, our liability to it, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Serious apprehension may comport with doubt, <a href="#Page_313">313</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Shameful mistakes of philosophers, <a href="#Page_230">[230</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Similarity of objections to religion and nature, <a href="#Page_298">298</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sincerity of belief proved by dying for it, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Skepticism no justification of irreligion, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sorrow cannot of itself restore abused benefits, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Speaking with tongues, <a href="#Page_217">[217</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Speculative difficulties similar to external temptations, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the chief trial of some, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Spread of Christianity unaccountable if it were an imposture, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Standing ministry, what for, <a href="#Page_191">[191</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Strangeness of some Scripture events, <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Stupidity of the martyrs, if insincere, <a href="#Page_269">[269</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Subserviences, the world a system of, <a href="#Page_229">229</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Success, temporal, always uncertain, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Suffering, ignorance does not prevent it either in temporal or spiritual things, <a href="#Page_196">196</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sufferings of Christ vindicate God’s law, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of the early Christians, <a href="#Page_269">269</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sufficiency of light of nature pretended, <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Summary of Jewish history, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of the historical evidence of Scripture, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Supernatural instructions necessary from the first, <a href="#Page_206">[206</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Temporal interests not always discerned, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> -<li class="isub1">managed by prudent persons on the very principles proposed by religion as to spiritual interests, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[359]</a></span>Temporal interests often decided by considerations which fall short of demonstration, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Temporary commands, distinguished from perpetual, <a href="#Page_188">[188</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Temptation</li> -<li class="isub1">a wholesome discipline, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li> -<li class="isub1">earthly and spiritual similar, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li> -<li class="isub1">calls forth virtuous effort, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Testimony</li> -<li class="isub1">can be destroyed only by counter-testimony, or by the incompetency of the witness, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li> -<li class="isub1">for miracles not mentioned in Scripture, does not impair the testimony for those there recorded, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of Paul, separate and independent, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of profane authors to the truth of Scripture history, <a href="#Page_287">[287</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of the first Christians, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></li> -<li class="isub1">must be judged candidly, <a href="#Page_259">[259</a></li> -<li class="isub1">none counter to Christianity, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> -<li class="isub1">slight, overcomes strong presumptions, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></li> -<li class="isub1">unconfuted, must be admitted, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></li> -<li class="isub1">value of, lessened by enthusiasm, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Theism of the Jews accounted for, <a href="#Page_206">[206</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Theology of the Bible, not to be corrected, <a href="#Page_202">[202</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Things which it is unreasonable to dispute, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Thoughtlessness of men, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tradition teaches that there was a revelation at the beginning, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of the fall of man, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Transubstantiation, <a href="#Page_205">[205</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Trial by speculative difficulties, analogous to other trials, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li> - -<li class="indx">True philosophy inductive, <a href="#Page_230">[230</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Truth of Christianity proved, unless the whole of its history and influence can be accounted for by accident, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Truth, how developed, <a href="#Page_218">[218</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the, of an event may be fully proved, though no <em>one</em> of sundry proofs may be complete, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> -<li class="isub1">whether there is any such thing, denied by skeptics, <a href="#Page_305">305</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Twofold effect of the analogical argument, <a href="#Page_305">305</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Unbelievers, acknowledgment of, <a href="#Page_289">289</a></li> -<li class="isub1">cannot deny a conformity between prophecy and events, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Understanding, its right use, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Undesigned coincidences in Bible history, <a href="#Page_266">[266</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Undeterminate language deceives many, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Unequal distribution of religious knowledge, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Unfair dealing of objectors, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Unreasonableness of applying to passion for guidance, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Unsatisfactory evidence, men often obliged to act upon it, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Variety in the distribution of God’s gifts, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Vastness of the scheme of nature, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Veracity of the first Christians, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Vicarious punishments witnessed every day, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li> -<li class="isub1">deter from sin, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Vice</li> -<li class="isub1">appointed to be punished, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></li> -<li class="isub1">blinds men to just evidence, <a href="#Page_255">255</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its effects in the present world, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its natural consequences are God’s judicial inflictions, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li> -<li class="isub1">its real enormity, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[360]</a></span>not palliated by any supposed lack of evidence for religion, <a href="#Page_255">255</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Vindication of religion by analogy impossible, <a href="#Page_296">296</a></li> -<li class="isub1">of the character of God, not attempted in this treatise, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Way of salvation for the helpless, <a href="#Page_186">[186</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Will of <span class="smcap">God</span>, as absolute or conditional, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></li> - -<li class="indx">World, wickedness of, <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Worship, mode of, a matter of pure revelation, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Writers</li> -<li class="isub1">on the atonement, <a href="#Page_242">[242</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Christian sacraments, <a href="#Page_195">[195</a></li> -<li class="isub1">miracles, <a href="#Page_264">[264</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></li> -<li class="isub1">necessity of revelation, <a href="#Page_187">[187</a></li> -<li class="isub1">prophecy, <a href="#Page_277">[277-285</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Scripture difficulties, [<a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> -<li class="isub1">undesigned coincidences, [<a href="#Page_266">266</a></li> - -</ul> - -<p class="titlepage">THE END.</p> - 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